DebateLabKIT/deepa2-corpus · Datasets at Hugging Face

text stringlengths 0 1.71k
is what enables a knife to cut well. Aristotle takes these insights about the
functions of artifacts and organs and applies them to human beings. He
argues that human beings have a distinctive function, “ activity of the soul
in accord with reasons ” – what we ’ ll simply call “ rationality, ” remembering
that it has both theoretical and practical (action - oriented) aspects. Since the
good for human beings is happiness, and the human function is rationality,
Aristotle concludes that happiness is rationality in accord with virtue –
though he concedes that external factors beyond our control can affect
whether we fl ourish.
Aristotle ’ s claim that rationality is the human function is controversial.
Some philosophers think that human beings are too complex to have a
single, distinctive function; others doubt that the function is rationality.
Readers will also want to be sensitive to the various senses ‘ good ’ can
have: a teleological sense, in which a good is an end or goal pursued or
desired; a benefi cial sense, in which a thing is good for someone; an evaluative
sense, in which a thing is good when it performs its function well; a
moral sense, which goes beyond mere functional effi ciency.
But presumably the remark that the best good is happiness is apparently
something generally agreed, and we still need a clearer statement of what the
best good is. Perhaps, then, we shall fi nd this if we fi rst grasp the function of
a human being. For just as the good, i.e., doing well, for a fl autist, a sculptor,
and every craftsman, and, in general, for whatever has a function and characteristic
action, seems to depend on its function, the same seems to be true
for a human being, if a human being has some function [ … ].
Now we say that the function of a kind of thing – of a harpist, for instance
– is the same in kind as the function of an excellent individual of the kind
– of an excellent harpist, for instance. And the same is true without qualifi cation
in every case, if we add to the function the superior achievement in accord
with the virtue; for the function of a harpist is to play the harp, and the
210 Sean McAleer
function of a good harpist is to play it well. Moreover, we take the
human function to be a certain kind of life, and take this life to be activity
and actions of the soul that involve reason; hence the function of the excellent
man is to do this well and fi nely.
Now each function is completed well by being completed in accord
with the virtue proper to that kind of thing. And so the human good proves
to be activity of the soul in accord with virtue, and indeed with the best
and most complete virtue, if there are more virtues than one. (I.7:
1097b23 – 1098a18)
P1. The good for members of a kind is to perform well the function distinctive
of their kind.
P2. To perform well the function distinctive of one ’ s kind is to perform it
in accord with the relevant virtue(s).
C1. The good for members of any kind is to perform their distinctive
function in accord with the relevant virtue(s) (transitivity of identity,
P1, P2).
P3. The function distinctive of humans is rationality.
C2. The good for humans is rationality in accord with virtue (substitution,
C1, P3).
P4. Happiness is the good for humans.
C3. Happiness is rationality in accord with virtue (transitivity of identity,
C2, P4).
53
Aristotle ’ s Argument that Goods
Are Irreducible
Jurgis (George) Brakas
Aristotle . Nicomachean Ethics , translated by W. D. Ross, revised by J. O.
Urmson, and edited by Jonathan Barnes . Princeton, NJ : Princeton
University Press , 1984 .
Brakas , Jurgis . Philosophiegeschicte und logische Analyse/Logical Analysis
and History of Philosophy , VI ( 2003 ): 23 – 74 .
For most philosophers seeking to discover the nature of the good, the
assumption underlying their quest is that the good is one thing – certainly
when they are seeking the good for human beings, if not the good in general.
This is a very natural assumption to make. If you say “ health is a good (or
a value), ” “ wealth is a good, ” and “ my life is a good, ” it is reasonable to
think that “ a good ” (or “ a value ” ) means the same thing when you make
such claims. Aristotle, however, disagrees. While discussing the good for
humanity in the Nicomachean Ethics , he suddenly shifts to a discussion of
the good in general and argues that it cannot be one thing. In other words,
for Aristotle, the senses of the good – or “ value ” – are irreducible (#60).
His target here is not just his teacher, Plato, who did believe that the good
is one thing (the Form of the good), but, more broadly, anyone who believes
that the good is one thing (whatever that may be). Many would say that
this is a very undesirable outcome, since it would mean that goods by nature
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
212 Jurgis (George) Brakas
are “ fragmented, ” not capable of being placed in a hierarchy consistently
derived from one fundamental good.
Aristotle ’ s basic strategy is to argue that goods fall into every one of his
categories of being – that is, into substance (or “ the what ” ), quality, quantity,
and the rest because “ the good ” signifi es things in all of them. If they
really do fall into all the categories, then they cannot be reduced to one
thing, since they do not have anything in common. For example, although
human being and ox can be reduced to animal (a substance) and blue and
yellow to color (a quality), human being and blue cannot be reduced to one
thing because they have no genus in common. There is just one problem
here: why does Aristotle believe that goods exist in all the categories if “ the
good ” signifi es things in all of them? You can make any word signify whatever
you please, but that does not mean that what it signifi es exists – in the
categories or anywhere else. However, a good case can be made that “ the
good ” signifying things in all the categories that Aristotle has in mind here
is the one signifying real, not apparent, goods – doing so by using his
method of endoxa (interpreted in a certain way), a method which allows
him to separate opinion from knowledge and the apparent from the real.
The interpretation offered here of the passage where Aristotle makes this
argument is new. The passage has been remarkably resistant to satisfactory
interpretation, defying the efforts of scholars for about a century (see

is what enables a knife to cut well. Aristotle takes these insights about the

functions of artifacts and organs and applies them to human beings. He

argues that human beings have a distinctive function, “ activity of the soul

in accord with reasons ” – what we ’ ll simply call “ rationality, ” remembering

that it has both theoretical and practical (action - oriented) aspects. Since the

good for human beings is happiness, and the human function is rationality,

Aristotle concludes that happiness is rationality in accord with virtue –

though he concedes that external factors beyond our control can affect

whether we fl ourish.

Aristotle ’ s claim that rationality is the human function is controversial.

Some philosophers think that human beings are too complex to have a

single, distinctive function; others doubt that the function is rationality.

Readers will also want to be sensitive to the various senses ‘ good ’ can

have: a teleological sense, in which a good is an end or goal pursued or

desired; a benefi cial sense, in which a thing is good for someone; an evaluative

sense, in which a thing is good when it performs its function well; a

moral sense, which goes beyond mere functional effi ciency.

But presumably the remark that the best good is happiness is apparently

something generally agreed, and we still need a clearer statement of what the

best good is. Perhaps, then, we shall fi nd this if we fi rst grasp the function of

a human being. For just as the good, i.e., doing well, for a fl autist, a sculptor,

and every craftsman, and, in general, for whatever has a function and characteristic

action, seems to depend on its function, the same seems to be true

for a human being, if a human being has some function [ … ].

Now we say that the function of a kind of thing – of a harpist, for instance

– is the same in kind as the function of an excellent individual of the kind

– of an excellent harpist, for instance. And the same is true without qualifi cation

in every case, if we add to the function the superior achievement in accord

with the virtue; for the function of a harpist is to play the harp, and the

210 Sean McAleer

function of a good harpist is to play it well. Moreover, we take the

human function to be a certain kind of life, and take this life to be activity

and actions of the soul that involve reason; hence the function of the excellent

man is to do this well and fi nely.

Now each function is completed well by being completed in accord

with the virtue proper to that kind of thing. And so the human good proves

to be activity of the soul in accord with virtue, and indeed with the best

and most complete virtue, if there are more virtues than one. (I.7:

1097b23 – 1098a18)

P1. The good for members of a kind is to perform well the function distinctive

of their kind.

P2. To perform well the function distinctive of one ’ s kind is to perform it

in accord with the relevant virtue(s).

C1. The good for members of any kind is to perform their distinctive

function in accord with the relevant virtue(s) (transitivity of identity,

P1, P2).

P3. The function distinctive of humans is rationality.

C2. The good for humans is rationality in accord with virtue (substitution,

C1, P3).

P4. Happiness is the good for humans.

C3. Happiness is rationality in accord with virtue (transitivity of identity,

C2, P4).

53

Aristotle ’ s Argument that Goods

Are Irreducible

Jurgis (George) Brakas

Aristotle . Nicomachean Ethics , translated by W. D. Ross, revised by J. O.

Urmson, and edited by Jonathan Barnes . Princeton, NJ : Princeton

University Press , 1984 .

Brakas , Jurgis . Philosophiegeschicte und logische Analyse/Logical Analysis

and History of Philosophy , VI ( 2003 ): 23 – 74 .

For most philosophers seeking to discover the nature of the good, the

assumption underlying their quest is that the good is one thing – certainly

when they are seeking the good for human beings, if not the good in general.

This is a very natural assumption to make. If you say “ health is a good (or

a value), ” “ wealth is a good, ” and “ my life is a good, ” it is reasonable to

think that “ a good ” (or “ a value ” ) means the same thing when you make

such claims. Aristotle, however, disagrees. While discussing the good for

humanity in the Nicomachean Ethics , he suddenly shifts to a discussion of

the good in general and argues that it cannot be one thing. In other words,

for Aristotle, the senses of the good – or “ value ” – are irreducible (#60).

His target here is not just his teacher, Plato, who did believe that the good

is one thing (the Form of the good), but, more broadly, anyone who believes

that the good is one thing (whatever that may be). Many would say that

this is a very undesirable outcome, since it would mean that goods by nature

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

212 Jurgis (George) Brakas

are “ fragmented, ” not capable of being placed in a hierarchy consistently

derived from one fundamental good.

Aristotle ’ s basic strategy is to argue that goods fall into every one of his

categories of being – that is, into substance (or “ the what ” ), quality, quantity,

and the rest because “ the good ” signifi es things in all of them. If they

really do fall into all the categories, then they cannot be reduced to one

thing, since they do not have anything in common. For example, although

human being and ox can be reduced to animal (a substance) and blue and

yellow to color (a quality), human being and blue cannot be reduced to one

thing because they have no genus in common. There is just one problem

here: why does Aristotle believe that goods exist in all the categories if “ the

good ” signifi es things in all of them? You can make any word signify whatever

you please, but that does not mean that what it signifi es exists – in the

categories or anywhere else. However, a good case can be made that “ the

good ” signifying things in all the categories that Aristotle has in mind here

is the one signifying real, not apparent, goods – doing so by using his

method of endoxa (interpreted in a certain way), a method which allows

him to separate opinion from knowledge and the apparent from the real.

The interpretation offered here of the passage where Aristotle makes this

argument is new. The passage has been remarkably resistant to satisfactory

interpretation, defying the efforts of scholars for about a century (see