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at all.
We arrive at the same conclusion if we approach the question from the
standpoint of self - suffi ciency. For the fi nal and perfect good seems to be self -
suffi cient. (Aristotle, 1097a26 – 1097b8)
P1. There is a supreme good for humanity, commonly referred to as
happiness.
P2. If a good is desired as an end in itself and is suffi cient for making life
good, then that good constitutes happiness.
P3. The virtuous life fulfi lls a human being ’ s function by actualizing that
person ’ s full potential.
216 Eric J. Silverman
P4. If some good fulfi lls a human being ’ s function by actualizing that person
’ s full potential, then that good is desired as an end in itself.
C1. The virtuous life is desired by human beings as an end in itself
( modus ponens , P3, P4).
P5. If some good fulfi lls a human being ’ s function, then it is suffi cient for
making that being ’ s life good.
C2. The virtuous life is suffi cient for making a human being ’ s life good
( modus ponens , P3, P5).
C3. The virtuous life is desired as an end in itself and is suffi cient for
making life good (conjunction, C1, C2).
C4. The virtuous life constitutes happiness, the supreme good for humanity
( modus ponens , P2, C3).
55
Categorical Imperative as the
Source for Morality
Joyce Lazier
Kant , Immanuel . The Metaphysics of Morals , translated by Mary Gregor.
New York : Cambridge University Press , 1991 .
Kant ’ s deontological ethical theory relies on two assumptions used to
deduce the categorical imperative. The fi rst is that morality is for all, or
what is wrong for one to do is wrong for everyone to do. The second is
that morality is grounded on reason and not experience. Combining these
two assumptions, Kant arrives at the categorical imperative. The following
reconstruction of Kant ’ s arguments for the categorical imperative brings to
the forefront two major problems. First, the use of disjunction opens up
Kant ’ s argument to the fallacy of the excluded middle, and second, the
reconstruction also makes more apparent Kant ’ s reliance on teleology. Not
many thinkers today believe that everything has a specifi c, defi ned end that
belongs only to it. The arguments are taken from The Metaphysics of
Morals, parts 216, 222, and 225.
But it is different with the teachings of morality. They command for everyone,
without taking account of his inclinations, merely because and insofar
as he is free and has practical reason. He does not derive instruction in its
laws from observing himself and his animal nature or from perceiving the
ways of the world what happens and how men behave (although the German
word Sitten , like the Latin mores , means only manners and customs). Instead,
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
218 Joyce Lazier
reason commands how men are to act even though no example of this could
be found and it takes no account of the advantages we can thereby gain,
which only experience could teach us. For although reason allows us to seek
our advantage in every way possible to us and can even promise us, on the
testimony of experience, that it will probably be more to our advantage on
the whole to obey its commands than to transgress them especially if obedience
is accompanied with prudence, still the authority of its precepts as commands
is not based on these considerations. Instead it uses them (as counsels)
only as a counterweight against inducements to the contrary, to offset in
advance the error of biased scales in practical appraisal, and only then to
ensure that the weight of a pure practical reason ’ s a priori grounds will turn
the scales in favor of the authority of its precepts. (216)
An imperative is a practical rule by which an action in itself contingent is
made necessary. An imperative differs from a practical law in that a law
indeed represents an action as necessary but takes no account of whether this
action already inheres by an inner necessity in the acting subject (as in a holy
being) or whether it is contingent (as in man); for where the former is the
case there is no imperative. Hence an imperative is a rule the representation
of which makes necessary an action that is subjectively contingent and thus
represents the subject as one that must be constrained (necessitated) to
conform with the rule. A categorical (unconditional) imperative is one that
represents an action as objectively necessary and makes it necessary not indirectly
through the representation of some end that can be attained by the
action but through the mere representation of this action itself (its form), and
hence directly. No other practical doctrine can furnish instances of such
imperatives than that which prescribes obligation (the doctrine of morals).
All other imperative are technical and are, one and all, conditional. The
ground of the possibility of categorical imperative is this: that they refer to
no other property of choice (by which some purpose can be ascribed to it)
than simply to its freedom. (222)
The categorical imperative, which as such only affi rms what obligation is,
is: Act upon a maxim that can also hold as a universal law. You must therefore
fi rst consider your actions in terms of their subjective principles; but you can
know whether this principle also holds objectively only in this way: That
when your reason subjects it to the test of conceiving yourself as also giving
universal law through it, it qualifi es for such a giving of universal law. (225)
P1. A human is free and has practical reason.
P2. Either practical reason or experience uses perceptions of the ways of
the world and actions of humans as sources of its laws.
P3. Practical reason does not use the ways of the world and actions of
humans as sources of its laws.
C1. Experience uses perceptions of the ways of the world and actions of
humans as sources of its laws (disjunctive syllogism, P2, P3).
Categorical Imperative as the Source for Morality 219
P4. Either practical reason or experience teaches us how to act given the
advantages we can gain.
P5. Practical reason does not teach us how to act given the advantages we
can gain.
C2. Experience teaches us how to act given the advantages we can gain

at all.

We arrive at the same conclusion if we approach the question from the

standpoint of self - suffi ciency. For the fi nal and perfect good seems to be self -

suffi cient. (Aristotle, 1097a26 – 1097b8)

P1. There is a supreme good for humanity, commonly referred to as

happiness.

P2. If a good is desired as an end in itself and is suffi cient for making life

good, then that good constitutes happiness.

P3. The virtuous life fulfi lls a human being ’ s function by actualizing that

person ’ s full potential.

216 Eric J. Silverman

P4. If some good fulfi lls a human being ’ s function by actualizing that person

’ s full potential, then that good is desired as an end in itself.

C1. The virtuous life is desired by human beings as an end in itself

( modus ponens , P3, P4).

P5. If some good fulfi lls a human being ’ s function, then it is suffi cient for

making that being ’ s life good.

C2. The virtuous life is suffi cient for making a human being ’ s life good

( modus ponens , P3, P5).

C3. The virtuous life is desired as an end in itself and is suffi cient for

making life good (conjunction, C1, C2).

C4. The virtuous life constitutes happiness, the supreme good for humanity

( modus ponens , P2, C3).

55

Categorical Imperative as the

Source for Morality

Joyce Lazier

Kant , Immanuel . The Metaphysics of Morals , translated by Mary Gregor.

New York : Cambridge University Press , 1991 .

Kant ’ s deontological ethical theory relies on two assumptions used to

deduce the categorical imperative. The fi rst is that morality is for all, or

what is wrong for one to do is wrong for everyone to do. The second is

that morality is grounded on reason and not experience. Combining these

two assumptions, Kant arrives at the categorical imperative. The following

reconstruction of Kant ’ s arguments for the categorical imperative brings to

the forefront two major problems. First, the use of disjunction opens up

Kant ’ s argument to the fallacy of the excluded middle, and second, the

reconstruction also makes more apparent Kant ’ s reliance on teleology. Not

many thinkers today believe that everything has a specifi c, defi ned end that

belongs only to it. The arguments are taken from The Metaphysics of

Morals, parts 216, 222, and 225.

But it is different with the teachings of morality. They command for everyone,

without taking account of his inclinations, merely because and insofar

as he is free and has practical reason. He does not derive instruction in its

laws from observing himself and his animal nature or from perceiving the

ways of the world what happens and how men behave (although the German

word Sitten , like the Latin mores , means only manners and customs). Instead,

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

218 Joyce Lazier

reason commands how men are to act even though no example of this could

be found and it takes no account of the advantages we can thereby gain,

which only experience could teach us. For although reason allows us to seek

our advantage in every way possible to us and can even promise us, on the

testimony of experience, that it will probably be more to our advantage on

the whole to obey its commands than to transgress them especially if obedience

is accompanied with prudence, still the authority of its precepts as commands

is not based on these considerations. Instead it uses them (as counsels)

only as a counterweight against inducements to the contrary, to offset in

advance the error of biased scales in practical appraisal, and only then to

ensure that the weight of a pure practical reason ’ s a priori grounds will turn

the scales in favor of the authority of its precepts. (216)

An imperative is a practical rule by which an action in itself contingent is

made necessary. An imperative differs from a practical law in that a law

indeed represents an action as necessary but takes no account of whether this

action already inheres by an inner necessity in the acting subject (as in a holy

being) or whether it is contingent (as in man); for where the former is the

case there is no imperative. Hence an imperative is a rule the representation

of which makes necessary an action that is subjectively contingent and thus

represents the subject as one that must be constrained (necessitated) to

conform with the rule. A categorical (unconditional) imperative is one that

represents an action as objectively necessary and makes it necessary not indirectly

through the representation of some end that can be attained by the

action but through the mere representation of this action itself (its form), and

hence directly. No other practical doctrine can furnish instances of such

imperatives than that which prescribes obligation (the doctrine of morals).

All other imperative are technical and are, one and all, conditional. The

ground of the possibility of categorical imperative is this: that they refer to

no other property of choice (by which some purpose can be ascribed to it)

than simply to its freedom. (222)

The categorical imperative, which as such only affi rms what obligation is,

is: Act upon a maxim that can also hold as a universal law. You must therefore

fi rst consider your actions in terms of their subjective principles; but you can

know whether this principle also holds objectively only in this way: That

when your reason subjects it to the test of conceiving yourself as also giving

universal law through it, it qualifi es for such a giving of universal law. (225)

P1. A human is free and has practical reason.

P2. Either practical reason or experience uses perceptions of the ways of

the world and actions of humans as sources of its laws.

P3. Practical reason does not use the ways of the world and actions of

humans as sources of its laws.

C1. Experience uses perceptions of the ways of the world and actions of

humans as sources of its laws (disjunctive syllogism, P2, P3).

Categorical Imperative as the Source for Morality 219

P4. Either practical reason or experience teaches us how to act given the

advantages we can gain.

P5. Practical reason does not teach us how to act given the advantages we

can gain.

C2. Experience teaches us how to act given the advantages we can gain