DebateLabKIT/deepa2-corpus · Datasets at Hugging Face

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(disjunctive syllogism, P4, P5).
P6. Either practical reason or experience bases the authority of its precepts
on how much advantages we can gain.
P7. Practical reason does not use perceived advantages as the basis of the
authority of its commands.
C3. Experience does use perceived advantages as the basis of the authority
of its commands (disjunctive syllogism, P6, P10).
P8. Either experience or a priori grounds are the source of practical reason ’ s
authority.
P9. Experience is not the source of practical reason ’ s authority.
C4. A priori grounds are the source of practical reason ’ s authority (disjunctive
syllogism, P8, P9).
P10. If practical reason ’ s source of authority is a priori , then it commands
for everyone without taking into account one ’ s inclinations.
P11. Practical reason ’ s source of authority is a priori (C4).
C5. Practical reason commands for everyone without taking into account
one ’ s inclinations ( modus ponens , P10, P11).
P12. Either morality comes from experience or it comes from practical
reason.
P13.The teachings of morality do not stem from experience.
C6. The teachings of morality stem from practical reason (disjunctive
syllogism, P12, P13).
P14. If practical reason is the source of morality ’ s commands, then morality
commands for everyone without taking into account one ’ s inclinations.
P15. Practical reason is the source of morality ’ s commands.
C7. The teachings of morality command for everyone without taking
into account one ’ s inclinations ( modus ponens , P14, P15).
P16. If a law represents an action as necessary, then it is not a practical law.
P17. Imperatives are laws that represent an action as necessary
C8. Imperatives are not practical laws ( modus ponens , P16, P17).
P18. If something is an imperative, then it necessitates an action.
P19. If something necessitates an action, then it must constrain the subject
to conform to that rule.
C9. If something is an imperative, then it is a rule that necessitates an
action through constraint of the subject to conform to that rule (hypothetical
syllogism, P18, P19).
P20. If an imperative is categorical, then it represents an action as objectively
necessary.
220 Joyce Lazier
P21. If an action is represented as objectively necessary, then it is not
because of some end that can be attained.
C10. If an imperative is categorical, then it is not because of some end
that can be attained (hypothetical syllogism, P20, P21).
P22. If an imperative is categorical, then it makes an action necessary
directly through representation of the action itself (its form).
P23. If an action is made necessary directly through representation of the
action itself (its form), then it is grounded in freedom of choice (and not
a subjective end).
C11. If an imperative is categorical, then it is grounded in freedom of
choice (and not a subjective end) (hypothetical syllogism, P22, P23).
P24. If an imperative is grounded in freedom of choice (and not some subjective
end), then reason subjects the maxim of action as conceiving itself
as a universal law.
P25. If the maxim of action can be conceived as a universal law, then it
holds objectively.
C12. If an imperative is grounded in freedom of choice, then it holds
objectively (hypothetical syllogism, P24, P25).
P26. A categorical imperative is grounded in freedom of choice.
C13. A categorical imperative holds objectively ( modus ponens , C12,
P26).
P27. If the categorical imperative holds objectively, then it is the source of
morality.
C14. A categorical imperative is the source of morality ( modus ponens ,
P27, C13).
56
Kant on Why Autonomy
Deserves Respect
Mark Piper
Guyer , Paul . “ Kant on the Theory and Practice of Autonomy , ” in Autonomy ,
edited by Ellen Frankel Paul , Fred D. Miller , Jr. , and Jeffrey Paul , 70 – 98 .
Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press , 2003 .
Kant , Immanuel . Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals , translated and
edited by Mary Gregor . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press ,
1998 .
According to a widespread view, there is something important about autonomy
in virtue of which it deserves special respect. More often than not, the
claim that autonomy deserves respect comes into play in relation to particular
autonomous choices or acts of will. An autonomous choice is not a
thoughtless or offhand choice; rather, it is a choice that expresses a person ’ s
nature, freedom, preferences, or values – a person ’ s “ deep self ” – in a powerful
and signifi cant way. As such, it is a choice that seems, according to
many philosophers and nonphilosophers alike, to generate special demands
of respect on others. This notion of the special respect owed to autonomy
is pervasive throughout popular culture and philosophical discourse. It has
application in debates concerning the ground of human dignity, the ground
of human rights (including the defense of specifi c rights such as the right
to free speech), the limits of intersubjective interference, medical ethics
debates (including debates surrounding euthanasia and the physician –
patient relationship), the justifi cation of liberal education, the justifi cation
of liberal government, and the justifi cation of the wrongness of paternalism.
The classic source for the view that autonomy deserves special respect is
Immanuel Kant, and the following is a reconstruction of the core aspects
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
222 Mark Piper
of Kant ’ s argument for this claim. It should be noted that the reconstruction
of this argument is, given Kant ’ s dense and sometimes labyrinthine writing
style, a diffi cult task, sometimes requiring reading between the lines or supplying
premises that Kant does not provide explicitly. The key to the argument

(disjunctive syllogism, P4, P5).

P6. Either practical reason or experience bases the authority of its precepts

on how much advantages we can gain.

P7. Practical reason does not use perceived advantages as the basis of the

authority of its commands.

C3. Experience does use perceived advantages as the basis of the authority

of its commands (disjunctive syllogism, P6, P10).

P8. Either experience or a priori grounds are the source of practical reason ’ s

authority.

P9. Experience is not the source of practical reason ’ s authority.

C4. A priori grounds are the source of practical reason ’ s authority (disjunctive

syllogism, P8, P9).

P10. If practical reason ’ s source of authority is a priori , then it commands

for everyone without taking into account one ’ s inclinations.

P11. Practical reason ’ s source of authority is a priori (C4).

C5. Practical reason commands for everyone without taking into account

one ’ s inclinations ( modus ponens , P10, P11).

P12. Either morality comes from experience or it comes from practical

reason.

P13.The teachings of morality do not stem from experience.

C6. The teachings of morality stem from practical reason (disjunctive

syllogism, P12, P13).

P14. If practical reason is the source of morality ’ s commands, then morality

commands for everyone without taking into account one ’ s inclinations.

P15. Practical reason is the source of morality ’ s commands.

C7. The teachings of morality command for everyone without taking

into account one ’ s inclinations ( modus ponens , P14, P15).

P16. If a law represents an action as necessary, then it is not a practical law.

P17. Imperatives are laws that represent an action as necessary

C8. Imperatives are not practical laws ( modus ponens , P16, P17).

P18. If something is an imperative, then it necessitates an action.

P19. If something necessitates an action, then it must constrain the subject

to conform to that rule.

C9. If something is an imperative, then it is a rule that necessitates an

action through constraint of the subject to conform to that rule (hypothetical

syllogism, P18, P19).

P20. If an imperative is categorical, then it represents an action as objectively

necessary.

220 Joyce Lazier

P21. If an action is represented as objectively necessary, then it is not

because of some end that can be attained.

C10. If an imperative is categorical, then it is not because of some end

that can be attained (hypothetical syllogism, P20, P21).

P22. If an imperative is categorical, then it makes an action necessary

directly through representation of the action itself (its form).

P23. If an action is made necessary directly through representation of the

action itself (its form), then it is grounded in freedom of choice (and not

a subjective end).

C11. If an imperative is categorical, then it is grounded in freedom of

choice (and not a subjective end) (hypothetical syllogism, P22, P23).

P24. If an imperative is grounded in freedom of choice (and not some subjective

end), then reason subjects the maxim of action as conceiving itself

as a universal law.

P25. If the maxim of action can be conceived as a universal law, then it

holds objectively.

C12. If an imperative is grounded in freedom of choice, then it holds

objectively (hypothetical syllogism, P24, P25).

P26. A categorical imperative is grounded in freedom of choice.

C13. A categorical imperative holds objectively ( modus ponens , C12,

P26).

P27. If the categorical imperative holds objectively, then it is the source of

morality.

C14. A categorical imperative is the source of morality ( modus ponens ,

P27, C13).

56

Kant on Why Autonomy

Deserves Respect

Mark Piper

Guyer , Paul . “ Kant on the Theory and Practice of Autonomy , ” in Autonomy ,

edited by Ellen Frankel Paul , Fred D. Miller , Jr. , and Jeffrey Paul , 70 – 98 .

Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press , 2003 .

Kant , Immanuel . Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals , translated and

edited by Mary Gregor . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press ,

1998 .

According to a widespread view, there is something important about autonomy

in virtue of which it deserves special respect. More often than not, the

claim that autonomy deserves respect comes into play in relation to particular

autonomous choices or acts of will. An autonomous choice is not a

thoughtless or offhand choice; rather, it is a choice that expresses a person ’ s

nature, freedom, preferences, or values – a person ’ s “ deep self ” – in a powerful

and signifi cant way. As such, it is a choice that seems, according to

many philosophers and nonphilosophers alike, to generate special demands

of respect on others. This notion of the special respect owed to autonomy

is pervasive throughout popular culture and philosophical discourse. It has

application in debates concerning the ground of human dignity, the ground

of human rights (including the defense of specifi c rights such as the right

to free speech), the limits of intersubjective interference, medical ethics

debates (including debates surrounding euthanasia and the physician –

patient relationship), the justifi cation of liberal education, the justifi cation

of liberal government, and the justifi cation of the wrongness of paternalism.

The classic source for the view that autonomy deserves special respect is

Immanuel Kant, and the following is a reconstruction of the core aspects

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

222 Mark Piper

of Kant ’ s argument for this claim. It should be noted that the reconstruction

of this argument is, given Kant ’ s dense and sometimes labyrinthine writing

style, a diffi cult task, sometimes requiring reading between the lines or supplying

premises that Kant does not provide explicitly. The key to the argument