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is Kant ’ s insistence that the only acts of will that deserve respect are
those acts of will that are truly free (according to Kant ’ s understanding of
“ freedom ” ). It should quickly be added that Kant understood the concept
of “ respect ” in a very robust way: according to Kant, to say that something
deserves respect is to say that it is an object of true and proper esteem.
Moreover, it is important to note that for Kant, what it means for a person
to be free is for that person not to be dominated by his or her inclinations
or desires but rather to will and to act in accordance with universal laws
of reason. Lastly, it should be noted that a number of philosophers have
agreed with Kant that autonomy deserves respect but have disagreed with
Kant about what autonomy fundamentally is. More specifi cally, some philosophers
have claimed that it is possible for autonomous acts of will to
contain, or to be based on, inclinations.
For an object as the effect of my proposed action I can indeed have inclination
but never respect, just because it is merely an effect and not an activity
of the will. In the same way I cannot have respect for inclination as such,
whether it is mine or that of another; I can at most in the fi rst case approve
it and in the second sometimes even love it, that is, regard it as favorable to
my advantage. Only what it connected with my will solely as ground and
never as effect, what does not serve my inclination but outweighs it or at least
excludes it altogether from calculations in making a choice – hence the mere
law for itself – can be an object of respect and so a command. (Kant AK
4:400)
P1. If an act of will is free, then it deserves respect.
P2. If an act of will is not free, then it does not deserve respect.
P3. If an act of will is dependent on an object of desire, then it is not a free
act of will.
P4. If an act of will is in no way infl uenced by any object of desire but is
rather exercised in accordance with its own law, then it is a free act of
will.
P5. An inclination is dependent on objects of desire.
C1. Inclinations are not free acts of will ( modus ponens , P3, P5)
C2. Inclinations do not deserve respect ( modus ponens , P2, C1).
P6. An autonomous act of will is in no way infl uenced by any object of
desire but is rather exercised in accordance with its own law.
C3. Autonomous acts of will are free acts of will ( modus ponens , P4,
P6).
C4. Autonomous acts of will deserve respect ( modus ponens , P1, C3).
57
Mill ’ s Proof of Utilitarianism
A. T. Fyfe
Mill , John Stuart . “ Of What Sort of Proof the Principle of Utility Is
Susceptible , ” in Utilitarianism . London : Parker, Son, and Bourn , 1863 .
___. “ Excerpt from a Letter to Henry Jones , ” in The Classical Utilitarians:
Bentham and Mill , edited by John Troyer . Indianapolis : Hackett , 2003 .
Millgram , Elijah . “ Mill ’ s Proof of the Principle of Utility . ” Ethics 110 ( 2000 ):
282 – 310 .
Sayre - McCord , Geoffrey . “ Mill ’ s ‘ Proof ’ of the Principle of Utility: A More
than Half - Hearted Defense . ” Social Philosophy & Policy 18 , 2 ( 2001 ):
330 – 60 .
Utilitarianism, as summarized by one of its chief proponents, John Stuart
Mill (1806 – 73), is the moral theory that “ actions are right in proportion
as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the
reverse of happiness. ” Therefore, viewing matters as Mill would, Robin
Hood is not immoral for stealing from the rich to give to the poor, because
in doing so he is able to produce more happiness in the world than would
have otherwise existed. Likewise, if I possess excess wealth, it would be
immoral of me to withhold that wealth from others for whom it would do
more good. If, for example, I am considering new shoes when my present
pair is fully functional, I should instead donate that excess wealth to famine
relief. In both instances, Mill would have the agent in question perform
whichever available action would best reduce unhappiness and promote
happiness in the world.
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
224 A. T. Fyfe
Utilitarianism is generally understood to be the combination of two
separate moral theories. First, utilitarianism is a form of “ consequentialism,
” since it holds that the rightness or wrongness of an action depends
solely upon the goodness or badness of that action ’ s consequences. Second,
utilitarianism is a form of “ welfarism, ” since it holds that the goodness or
badness of an action ’ s consequences depends solely upon the amount of
happiness and unhappiness brought about by that action (i.e., the action ’ s
effect on people ’ s welfare). Therefore, any argument for utilitarianism must
aim to prove not one but two separate claims: a consequentialist “ theory
of the right ” (i.e., what is right and wrong) and a welfarist “ theory of the
good ” (i.e., what is good and bad).
Examining J. S. Mill ’ s famous argument for utilitarianism, it is clear that
Mill simply takes for granted a consequentialist theory of the right rather
than providing an argument for it. As a result, even if Mill ’ s argument for
utilitarianism succeeds, it will only prove half of what utilitarianism consists
in, a welfarist theory of value. Taking what Mill says at face value, his
argument begins with the claim that the only way we come to know that
something is visible or audible is through seeing or hearing it. Mill then
concludes, by analogy, that the only way to prove that something is desirable
(i.e., worth desiring; good) is by appealing to what we actually do
desire. After using this analogy with audibility and visibility to establish the
only method for proving that something is desirable, Mill argues that happiness
is the only intrinsic good in existence since (1) people do desire it,
and (2) it is the only thing that people desire for its own sake. With this
result in hand, Mill then concludes his argument for utilitarianism – or at
least utilitarianism ’ s welfarist aspect – by inferring that since an increase in
a person ’ s happiness is good for that person, an increase in all persons ’
happiness is good for all persons.
This is a notoriously bad argument. If this straightforward reading accurately
refl ects the argument Mill means to give, then he has committed a
number of elementary logical mistakes. In the fi rst part of his argument,
Mill states that because people desire happiness, it follows that happiness
must be “ desirable. ” However, “ desirable ” has two possible meanings, and

is Kant ’ s insistence that the only acts of will that deserve respect are

those acts of will that are truly free (according to Kant ’ s understanding of

“ freedom ” ). It should quickly be added that Kant understood the concept

of “ respect ” in a very robust way: according to Kant, to say that something

deserves respect is to say that it is an object of true and proper esteem.

Moreover, it is important to note that for Kant, what it means for a person

to be free is for that person not to be dominated by his or her inclinations

or desires but rather to will and to act in accordance with universal laws

of reason. Lastly, it should be noted that a number of philosophers have

agreed with Kant that autonomy deserves respect but have disagreed with

Kant about what autonomy fundamentally is. More specifi cally, some philosophers

have claimed that it is possible for autonomous acts of will to

contain, or to be based on, inclinations.

For an object as the effect of my proposed action I can indeed have inclination

but never respect, just because it is merely an effect and not an activity

of the will. In the same way I cannot have respect for inclination as such,

whether it is mine or that of another; I can at most in the fi rst case approve

it and in the second sometimes even love it, that is, regard it as favorable to

my advantage. Only what it connected with my will solely as ground and

never as effect, what does not serve my inclination but outweighs it or at least

excludes it altogether from calculations in making a choice – hence the mere

law for itself – can be an object of respect and so a command. (Kant AK

4:400)

P1. If an act of will is free, then it deserves respect.

P2. If an act of will is not free, then it does not deserve respect.

P3. If an act of will is dependent on an object of desire, then it is not a free

act of will.

P4. If an act of will is in no way infl uenced by any object of desire but is

rather exercised in accordance with its own law, then it is a free act of

will.

P5. An inclination is dependent on objects of desire.

C1. Inclinations are not free acts of will ( modus ponens , P3, P5)

C2. Inclinations do not deserve respect ( modus ponens , P2, C1).

P6. An autonomous act of will is in no way infl uenced by any object of

desire but is rather exercised in accordance with its own law.

C3. Autonomous acts of will are free acts of will ( modus ponens , P4,

P6).

C4. Autonomous acts of will deserve respect ( modus ponens , P1, C3).

57

Mill ’ s Proof of Utilitarianism

A. T. Fyfe

Mill , John Stuart . “ Of What Sort of Proof the Principle of Utility Is

Susceptible , ” in Utilitarianism . London : Parker, Son, and Bourn , 1863 .

___. “ Excerpt from a Letter to Henry Jones , ” in The Classical Utilitarians:

Bentham and Mill , edited by John Troyer . Indianapolis : Hackett , 2003 .

Millgram , Elijah . “ Mill ’ s Proof of the Principle of Utility . ” Ethics 110 ( 2000 ):

282 – 310 .

Sayre - McCord , Geoffrey . “ Mill ’ s ‘ Proof ’ of the Principle of Utility: A More

than Half - Hearted Defense . ” Social Philosophy & Policy 18 , 2 ( 2001 ):

330 – 60 .

Utilitarianism, as summarized by one of its chief proponents, John Stuart

Mill (1806 – 73), is the moral theory that “ actions are right in proportion

as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the

reverse of happiness. ” Therefore, viewing matters as Mill would, Robin

Hood is not immoral for stealing from the rich to give to the poor, because

in doing so he is able to produce more happiness in the world than would

have otherwise existed. Likewise, if I possess excess wealth, it would be

immoral of me to withhold that wealth from others for whom it would do

more good. If, for example, I am considering new shoes when my present

pair is fully functional, I should instead donate that excess wealth to famine

relief. In both instances, Mill would have the agent in question perform

whichever available action would best reduce unhappiness and promote

happiness in the world.

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

224 A. T. Fyfe

Utilitarianism is generally understood to be the combination of two

separate moral theories. First, utilitarianism is a form of “ consequentialism,

” since it holds that the rightness or wrongness of an action depends

solely upon the goodness or badness of that action ’ s consequences. Second,

utilitarianism is a form of “ welfarism, ” since it holds that the goodness or

badness of an action ’ s consequences depends solely upon the amount of

happiness and unhappiness brought about by that action (i.e., the action ’ s

effect on people ’ s welfare). Therefore, any argument for utilitarianism must

aim to prove not one but two separate claims: a consequentialist “ theory

of the right ” (i.e., what is right and wrong) and a welfarist “ theory of the

good ” (i.e., what is good and bad).

Examining J. S. Mill ’ s famous argument for utilitarianism, it is clear that

Mill simply takes for granted a consequentialist theory of the right rather

than providing an argument for it. As a result, even if Mill ’ s argument for

utilitarianism succeeds, it will only prove half of what utilitarianism consists

in, a welfarist theory of value. Taking what Mill says at face value, his

argument begins with the claim that the only way we come to know that

something is visible or audible is through seeing or hearing it. Mill then

concludes, by analogy, that the only way to prove that something is desirable

(i.e., worth desiring; good) is by appealing to what we actually do

desire. After using this analogy with audibility and visibility to establish the

only method for proving that something is desirable, Mill argues that happiness

is the only intrinsic good in existence since (1) people do desire it,

and (2) it is the only thing that people desire for its own sake. With this

result in hand, Mill then concludes his argument for utilitarianism – or at

least utilitarianism ’ s welfarist aspect – by inferring that since an increase in

a person ’ s happiness is good for that person, an increase in all persons ’

happiness is good for all persons.

This is a notoriously bad argument. If this straightforward reading accurately

refl ects the argument Mill means to give, then he has committed a

number of elementary logical mistakes. In the fi rst part of his argument,

Mill states that because people desire happiness, it follows that happiness

must be “ desirable. ” However, “ desirable ” has two possible meanings, and