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P2. The only proof that a sound is audible is that people actually hear it.
C1. The only proof that a thing is desirable is that people actually desire
it (analogical inference, P1, P2).
P3. If the only proof that a thing is desirable is that people actually desire
it and each person actually desires happiness for herself, then each person
’ s happiness is desirable for herself.
P4. Each person actually desires happiness for herself.
C2. The only proof that a thing is desirable is that people actually desire
it and each person actually desires happiness for herself (conjunction,
C1, P4).
C3. Each person ’ s happiness is desirable for herself ( modus ponens , P3,
C2).
C4. The general happiness is desirable for the aggregate of all persons
(fallacy of composition, C3).
Mill ’ s Proof of Utilitarianism (One Alternative Interpretation)
P1. The only proof that a visible thing exists is that people actually see it
and there is no reason to think they are mistaken.
P2. The only proof that an audible sound exists is that people actually hear
it and there is no reason to think they are mistaken.
C1. The only proof that a desirable thing exists is that people actually
desire it and there is no reason to think they are mistaken (analogical
inference, P1, P2).
P3. Each person actually desires happiness for himself and there is no reason
to think he is mistaken.
C2. Each person ’ s happiness is desirable for himself (semantic consequence,
C1, P3).
P4. If each person ’ s happiness is desirable for himself, then happiness is a
desirable thing itself.
P5. If happiness is a desirable thing itself, then the general happiness is
desirable.
C3. If each person ’ s happiness is desirable for himself, then the general
happiness is desirable (hypothetical syllogism, P4, P5).
C4. The general happiness is desirable ( modus ponens , C2, C3).
228 A. T. Fyfe
Mill ’ s Proof of Utilitarianism (Another Alternative
Interpretation)
P1. If everyone desires happiness for herself, then everyone thinks of happiness
itself as good and everyone selfi shly wants happiness for herself.
P2. Everyone desires happiness for herself.
C1. Everyone thinks of happiness itself as good and everyone selfi shly
wants happiness for herself ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
C2. Everyone thinks of happiness itself as good (simplifi cation, C1).
P3. If everyone thinks of happiness itself as good, then everyone should
think of the happiness of herself and others as good.
C3. Everyone should think of the happiness of herself and others as good
( modus ponens , C2, P3).
P4. No one desires anything other than happiness for herself and/or happiness
for others.
P5. If no one desires anything other than happiness for herself and/or happiness
for others, then no one should think of anything other than the
happiness of herself or others as good.
C4. No one should think of anything other than the happiness of herself
or others as good ( modus ponens , P4, P5).
C5. Everyone should think of the happiness of herself and others as good,
and no one should think of anything other than the happiness of
herself or others as good (conjunction, C3, C4).
58
The Experience Machine
Objection to Hedonism
Dan Weijers
Nozick , Robert . Anarchy, State, and Utopia . New York : Basic Books , 1974 .
De Brigard , Filipe . “ If You Like It, Does It Matter if It ’ s Real? ” Philosophical
Psychology 23 , 1 ( 2010 ): 43 – 57 .
Kymlicka , Will . Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction . New
York : Oxford University Press , 1990 .
Sobel , David . “ Varieties of Hedonism . ” Journal of Social Philosophy 33 , 2
( 2002 ): 240 – 56 .
Robert Nozick ’ s Experience Machine thought experiment describes a fantastic
machine that can simulate any kind of experience for anyone who
plugs herself into it. A life attached to an Experience Machine could be full
of immensely pleasurable experiences; however (as Nozick correctly notes),
the thought of actually living such a life is one that nearly everyone fi nds
unappealing.
Although Nozick originally devised the Experience Machine thought
experiment to make a point about how animals should be treated, it was
quickly adopted by anyone who wanted to argue for the falsity of hedonism
as a theory of the good. The Experience Machine thought experiment is
equally effective against any kind of theory that posits the internal aspects
of our experiences as the only valuable things in a life, but hedonism is
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
230 Dan Weijers
often singled out because it is the most widely discussed exemplar of this
type of theory. The adoption of the Experience Machine thought experiment
for the purpose of discrediting hedonism has been extremely successful.
Indeed, virtually everyone who has written about hedonism since the
mid - 1970s cites the Experience Machine thought experiment as a (and often
the) decisive objection against it. Hedonism comes in many guises, but all
hedonistic theories share the foundational claims that pleasure is the only
thing of intrinsic value in a life and that pain is the only thing of intrinsic
disvalue. The reason why the Experience Machine Objection to Hedonism
was (and still is) considered to be decisive is because the widespread judgment
that a life plugged into an Experience Machine is not appealing is
thought to give overwhelming reason to reject this central claim.
As with many other arguments in ethics, the Experience Machine
Objection to Hedonism presents a thought experiment and relies on the
readers ’ agreeing with the author ’ s judgment about it. The Experience
Machine Objection to Hedonism garners near - complete agreement on the
judgment that a life plugged into an Experience Machine is not something

P2. The only proof that a sound is audible is that people actually hear it.

C1. The only proof that a thing is desirable is that people actually desire

it (analogical inference, P1, P2).

P3. If the only proof that a thing is desirable is that people actually desire

it and each person actually desires happiness for herself, then each person

’ s happiness is desirable for herself.

P4. Each person actually desires happiness for herself.

C2. The only proof that a thing is desirable is that people actually desire

it and each person actually desires happiness for herself (conjunction,

C1, P4).

C3. Each person ’ s happiness is desirable for herself ( modus ponens , P3,

C2).

C4. The general happiness is desirable for the aggregate of all persons

(fallacy of composition, C3).

Mill ’ s Proof of Utilitarianism (One Alternative Interpretation)

P1. The only proof that a visible thing exists is that people actually see it

and there is no reason to think they are mistaken.

P2. The only proof that an audible sound exists is that people actually hear

it and there is no reason to think they are mistaken.

C1. The only proof that a desirable thing exists is that people actually

desire it and there is no reason to think they are mistaken (analogical

inference, P1, P2).

P3. Each person actually desires happiness for himself and there is no reason

to think he is mistaken.

C2. Each person ’ s happiness is desirable for himself (semantic consequence,

C1, P3).

P4. If each person ’ s happiness is desirable for himself, then happiness is a

desirable thing itself.

P5. If happiness is a desirable thing itself, then the general happiness is

desirable.

C3. If each person ’ s happiness is desirable for himself, then the general

happiness is desirable (hypothetical syllogism, P4, P5).

C4. The general happiness is desirable ( modus ponens , C2, C3).

228 A. T. Fyfe

Mill ’ s Proof of Utilitarianism (Another Alternative

Interpretation)

P1. If everyone desires happiness for herself, then everyone thinks of happiness

itself as good and everyone selfi shly wants happiness for herself.

P2. Everyone desires happiness for herself.

C1. Everyone thinks of happiness itself as good and everyone selfi shly

wants happiness for herself ( modus ponens , P1, P2).

C2. Everyone thinks of happiness itself as good (simplifi cation, C1).

P3. If everyone thinks of happiness itself as good, then everyone should

think of the happiness of herself and others as good.

C3. Everyone should think of the happiness of herself and others as good

( modus ponens , C2, P3).

P4. No one desires anything other than happiness for herself and/or happiness

for others.

P5. If no one desires anything other than happiness for herself and/or happiness

for others, then no one should think of anything other than the

happiness of herself or others as good.

C4. No one should think of anything other than the happiness of herself

or others as good ( modus ponens , P4, P5).

C5. Everyone should think of the happiness of herself and others as good,

and no one should think of anything other than the happiness of

herself or others as good (conjunction, C3, C4).

58

The Experience Machine

Objection to Hedonism

Dan Weijers

Nozick , Robert . Anarchy, State, and Utopia . New York : Basic Books , 1974 .

De Brigard , Filipe . “ If You Like It, Does It Matter if It ’ s Real? ” Philosophical

Psychology 23 , 1 ( 2010 ): 43 – 57 .

Kymlicka , Will . Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction . New

York : Oxford University Press , 1990 .

Sobel , David . “ Varieties of Hedonism . ” Journal of Social Philosophy 33 , 2

( 2002 ): 240 – 56 .

Robert Nozick ’ s Experience Machine thought experiment describes a fantastic

machine that can simulate any kind of experience for anyone who

plugs herself into it. A life attached to an Experience Machine could be full

of immensely pleasurable experiences; however (as Nozick correctly notes),

the thought of actually living such a life is one that nearly everyone fi nds

unappealing.

Although Nozick originally devised the Experience Machine thought

experiment to make a point about how animals should be treated, it was

quickly adopted by anyone who wanted to argue for the falsity of hedonism

as a theory of the good. The Experience Machine thought experiment is

equally effective against any kind of theory that posits the internal aspects

of our experiences as the only valuable things in a life, but hedonism is

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

230 Dan Weijers

often singled out because it is the most widely discussed exemplar of this

type of theory. The adoption of the Experience Machine thought experiment

for the purpose of discrediting hedonism has been extremely successful.

Indeed, virtually everyone who has written about hedonism since the

mid - 1970s cites the Experience Machine thought experiment as a (and often

the) decisive objection against it. Hedonism comes in many guises, but all

hedonistic theories share the foundational claims that pleasure is the only

thing of intrinsic value in a life and that pain is the only thing of intrinsic

disvalue. The reason why the Experience Machine Objection to Hedonism

was (and still is) considered to be decisive is because the widespread judgment

that a life plugged into an Experience Machine is not appealing is

thought to give overwhelming reason to reject this central claim.

As with many other arguments in ethics, the Experience Machine

Objection to Hedonism presents a thought experiment and relies on the

readers ’ agreeing with the author ’ s judgment about it. The Experience

Machine Objection to Hedonism garners near - complete agreement on the

judgment that a life plugged into an Experience Machine is not something