DebateLabKIT/deepa2-corpus · Datasets at Hugging Face

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with one another. Moral skeptics and moral objectivists offer different
explanations of the relativity of morals. Moral skeptics argue that moral
relativity is best explained by the fact that there are no objective moral principles;
rather, people assert moral codes based on their familiarity with the
moral codes they learn in their societies (P4 (i)). Moral objectivists argue
that factual differences in the circumstances of various societies result in
different applications of objective moral principles. Such different applications
yield distinct moral codes despite agreement on objective moral principles
(P4 (ii)).
Mackie supports explanation (i) by appealing to a sentimentalist theory
of the origins of moral expressions. Although Mackie does not call his
argument an Inference to the Best Explanation, the reasoning here involves
a comparative claim that the skeptical explanation accounts for the observed
phenomena of moral expression better than the objectivist one. Inference
to the Best Explanation arguments are comparisons of two or more explanations
of observed phenomena and evaluations of each explanation on
common standards. Commonly cited standards for comparing explanations
are greater simplicity, greater explanatory power, and more coherence with
other hypotheses and phenomena. Philosophers dispute what Inference to
the Best Explanation argument implies, so the argument below includes P6
and C2 and P6 * and C2 * for comparison. P6 and C2 make a stronger
claim, that explanation (i) shows that the belief in the existence of objective
moral facts is unjustifi ed, rather than merely not as well justifi ed as disbelief
in the existence of objective moral facts.
The objection to the argument from relativity on behalf of moral objectivism,
though unsuccessful according to Mackie, leaves moral skepticism
in need of further argument. The argument from queerness claims there are
two necessary conditions of the existence of objective moral facts. The fi rst
condition is a claim about the ontology of moral facts. Putative moral facts
would consist of a different kind of entity or relation than those known
by scientifi c observation and hypothesizing, ordinary perception, and quasi -
scientifi c methods. The second condition claims that mental ability humans
would have to possess in order to have knowledge of moral facts would be
something specifi cally moral. Such ability would be different in kind from
other human mental abilities. Since neither necessary condition of the
existence of objective moral facts is true, the antecedent of the conditional
in P7 is false by modus tollens .
234 Robert L. Muhlnickel
The error theory argument concludes in C4 by conjoining C3, that objective
values no not exist, and C2, the belief that objective moral facts is not
justifi ed. The conjunction (C4) is put in the antecedent of a conditional (P9)
to argue that the presumptive belief in the existence of object moral facts
is erroneous. The presumptive belief is the target of the error theory argument,
and the combined argument from relativity and argument from
queerness presented here, form a valid argument that the presumptive belief
is erroneous.
Mackie fi rst presented the error theory argument in 1946 in “ A Refutation
of Morals. ” He expanded the argument in Ethics: Inventing Right
and Wrong (30 – 42). The selections below are from the latter work.
Mackie states that an error theory argument is required against moral
objectivism:
[T]he traditional moral concepts of the ordinary man as well as the main
line of western philosophers are concepts of objective value. But it is precisely
for this reason that linguistic and conceptual analysis are not enough. The
claim to objectivity, however engrained in out language and thought, is not
self - validating. But the denial of objective values will have to be put forward
not as the result of an analytic approach, but as an ‘ error theory, ’ a theory
that although most people in making moral judgments implicitly claim,
among other things, to be pointing to something objectively prescriptive, these
claims are all false. ( Ethics , 35)
The argument from relativity follows:
The argument from relativity has as its premiss the well - known variation
in moral codes from one society to another and from one period to another,
and also the differences in moral beliefs between different groups and classes
within a complex community. Such variation is in itself merely a truth of
descriptive morality, a fact of anthropology which entails neither fi rst order
nor second order ethical views. Yet it may indirectly support second order
subjectivism: radical differences between fi rst order moral apprehensions
make it diffi cult to treat those judgments as apprehensions of objective truths.
But it is not the mere occurrence of disagreements that tells against the objectivity
of values. [ … ] Disagreement about moral codes seems to refl ect people ’ s
adherence to and participation in different ways of life. The causal connection
seems to be mainly that way round: it is that people approve of monogamy
because they participate in a monogamous way of life rather than that they
participate in a monogamous way of life because they approve of monogamy.
( Ethics , 36)
Defenders of moral objectivism claim that moral relativity is explained
by the application of objective moral principles to specifi c conditions rather
than the nonexistence of objective moral principles. “ It is easy to show, ”
The Error Theory Argument 235
Mackie writes, “ that such general principles, married with differing concrete
circumstances, different existing social patterns, or different preferences,
will beget different specifi c moral rules ” ( Ethics , 37). This argument
fails, Mackie writes:
[P]eople judge that some things are good or right, and others are bad or
wrong, not because – or at any rate not only because – they exemplify some
general principle for which widespread implicit acceptance could be claimed,
but because something about those things arouses certain responses immediately
in them, though they would arouse radically and irresolvably different
responses in others. ( Ethics , 37)
The argument from queerness:
If there were objective values, then they would be entities or qualities or
relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the
universe. Correspondingly, if we are aware of them, it would have to be by
some special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from
our ordinary ways of knowing anything else. [ … ] When we ask the awkward
question, how we can be aware of this authoritative prescriptivity, of the truth
of these distinctively ethical premisses or of the cogency of this distinctively
ethical pattern of reasoning, none of our ordinary accounts of sensory perception
or introspection or the framing and confi rming of explanatory hypotheses

with one another. Moral skeptics and moral objectivists offer different

explanations of the relativity of morals. Moral skeptics argue that moral

relativity is best explained by the fact that there are no objective moral principles;

rather, people assert moral codes based on their familiarity with the

moral codes they learn in their societies (P4 (i)). Moral objectivists argue

that factual differences in the circumstances of various societies result in

different applications of objective moral principles. Such different applications

yield distinct moral codes despite agreement on objective moral principles

(P4 (ii)).

Mackie supports explanation (i) by appealing to a sentimentalist theory

of the origins of moral expressions. Although Mackie does not call his

argument an Inference to the Best Explanation, the reasoning here involves

a comparative claim that the skeptical explanation accounts for the observed

phenomena of moral expression better than the objectivist one. Inference

to the Best Explanation arguments are comparisons of two or more explanations

of observed phenomena and evaluations of each explanation on

common standards. Commonly cited standards for comparing explanations

are greater simplicity, greater explanatory power, and more coherence with

other hypotheses and phenomena. Philosophers dispute what Inference to

the Best Explanation argument implies, so the argument below includes P6

and C2 and P6 * and C2 * for comparison. P6 and C2 make a stronger

claim, that explanation (i) shows that the belief in the existence of objective

moral facts is unjustifi ed, rather than merely not as well justifi ed as disbelief

in the existence of objective moral facts.

The objection to the argument from relativity on behalf of moral objectivism,

though unsuccessful according to Mackie, leaves moral skepticism

in need of further argument. The argument from queerness claims there are

two necessary conditions of the existence of objective moral facts. The fi rst

condition is a claim about the ontology of moral facts. Putative moral facts

would consist of a different kind of entity or relation than those known

by scientifi c observation and hypothesizing, ordinary perception, and quasi -

scientifi c methods. The second condition claims that mental ability humans

would have to possess in order to have knowledge of moral facts would be

something specifi cally moral. Such ability would be different in kind from

other human mental abilities. Since neither necessary condition of the

existence of objective moral facts is true, the antecedent of the conditional

in P7 is false by modus tollens .

234 Robert L. Muhlnickel

The error theory argument concludes in C4 by conjoining C3, that objective

values no not exist, and C2, the belief that objective moral facts is not

justifi ed. The conjunction (C4) is put in the antecedent of a conditional (P9)

to argue that the presumptive belief in the existence of object moral facts

is erroneous. The presumptive belief is the target of the error theory argument,

and the combined argument from relativity and argument from

queerness presented here, form a valid argument that the presumptive belief

is erroneous.

Mackie fi rst presented the error theory argument in 1946 in “ A Refutation

of Morals. ” He expanded the argument in Ethics: Inventing Right

and Wrong (30 – 42). The selections below are from the latter work.

Mackie states that an error theory argument is required against moral

objectivism:

[T]he traditional moral concepts of the ordinary man as well as the main

line of western philosophers are concepts of objective value. But it is precisely

for this reason that linguistic and conceptual analysis are not enough. The

claim to objectivity, however engrained in out language and thought, is not

self - validating. But the denial of objective values will have to be put forward

not as the result of an analytic approach, but as an ‘ error theory, ’ a theory

that although most people in making moral judgments implicitly claim,

among other things, to be pointing to something objectively prescriptive, these

claims are all false. ( Ethics , 35)

The argument from relativity follows:

The argument from relativity has as its premiss the well - known variation

in moral codes from one society to another and from one period to another,

and also the differences in moral beliefs between different groups and classes

within a complex community. Such variation is in itself merely a truth of

descriptive morality, a fact of anthropology which entails neither fi rst order

nor second order ethical views. Yet it may indirectly support second order

subjectivism: radical differences between fi rst order moral apprehensions

make it diffi cult to treat those judgments as apprehensions of objective truths.

But it is not the mere occurrence of disagreements that tells against the objectivity

of values. [ … ] Disagreement about moral codes seems to refl ect people ’ s

adherence to and participation in different ways of life. The causal connection

seems to be mainly that way round: it is that people approve of monogamy

because they participate in a monogamous way of life rather than that they

participate in a monogamous way of life because they approve of monogamy.

( Ethics , 36)

Defenders of moral objectivism claim that moral relativity is explained

by the application of objective moral principles to specifi c conditions rather

than the nonexistence of objective moral principles. “ It is easy to show, ”

The Error Theory Argument 235

Mackie writes, “ that such general principles, married with differing concrete

circumstances, different existing social patterns, or different preferences,

will beget different specifi c moral rules ” ( Ethics , 37). This argument

fails, Mackie writes:

[P]eople judge that some things are good or right, and others are bad or

wrong, not because – or at any rate not only because – they exemplify some

general principle for which widespread implicit acceptance could be claimed,

but because something about those things arouses certain responses immediately

in them, though they would arouse radically and irresolvably different

responses in others. ( Ethics , 37)

The argument from queerness:

If there were objective values, then they would be entities or qualities or

relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the

universe. Correspondingly, if we are aware of them, it would have to be by

some special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from

our ordinary ways of knowing anything else. [ … ] When we ask the awkward

question, how we can be aware of this authoritative prescriptivity, of the truth

of these distinctively ethical premisses or of the cogency of this distinctively

ethical pattern of reasoning, none of our ordinary accounts of sensory perception

or introspection or the framing and confi rming of explanatory hypotheses