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there is a reason for calling that a naturalistic fallacy; its being made with
regard to ‘ good ’ marks it as something quite specifi c, and this specifi c mistake
deserves a name because it is so common. (Moore, 13)
The general form of the Open Question Argument is the following:
P1. Suppose that the predicate ‘ good ’ is synonymous with some other
predicate N (e.g., ‘ pleasurable ’ ).
P2. ‘ X has the property N ’ will mean ‘ X is good ’ .
C1. Anybody who would ask whether an X with property N is good,
would ipso facto betray conceptual confusion. She is unaware what
‘ good ’ means (symmetry of identity, P2).
Moore’s Open Question Argument 239
P3. However, for every N it is always an open question whether an X with
property N is good. It is a meaningful question that does not demonstrate
conceptual confusion.
P4. If for every N it is always an open question whether an X with property
N is good, then ‘ N ’ cannot be synonymous with ‘ good ’ .
C2. ‘ N ’ cannot be synonymous with ‘ good ’ ( modus ponens , P3, P4).
P5. If N cannot be synonymous with ‘ good ’ , then only ‘ good ’ can be synonymous
with ‘ good ’ ; therefore, good is a simple (primitive) concept and
cannot be defi ned.
C3. Only ‘ good ’ can be synonymous with ‘ good ’ ; therefore, good is a
simple (primitive) concept and cannot be defi ned ( modus ponens , C2,
P5).
The Open Question Argument is a very infl uential argument. It has
motivated very diverse metaethical theories, such as noncognitivism, intuitionism,
and anti - realist theories. It still fi gures prominently in virtually all
textbooks on metaethics. However, the general opinion by now is that the
argument does not work against naturalism. First, this is because it insuffi
ciently distinguishes between conceptual or semantic naturalism (where
“ good ” is defi ned in natural terms) and metaphysical naturalism
(where “ good ” is analyzed as a natural kind, much as “ water ” is analyzed
as H 2 O).
The Open Question Argument works perhaps against the fi rst kind of
naturalism but not the second kind of naturalism, and this is the kind
of naturalism that most moral naturalists defend. Second, it is by no means
obvious that somebody who rephrases a defi nition as a question is conceptually
confused. Some correct defi nitions are extremely complex; for
example, ‘ knowledge is justifi ed true belief ’ . Suppose this were correct; it
still is not dead obvious to any competent speaker of English (Miller). Third,
the argument in a deep sense begs the question against the naturalist
(Frankena).
61
Wolff ’ s Argument for the
Rejection of State Authority
Ben Saunders
Wolff , Robert Paul. In Defense of Anarchism . New York : Harper & Row ,
1970 .
Graham , Gordon. The Case against the Democratic State: An Essay in
Cultural Criticism . Thorverton : Imprint Academic , 2002 .
Reiman , Jeffrey H. In Defense of Political Philosophy: A Reply to Robert
Paul Wolff ’ s In Defense of Anarchism . New York : Harper & Row , 1972 .
Anarchism is traditionally associated with statelessness or resistance to
coercive laws. Robert Paul Wolff defends what is sometimes known as
“ philosophical anarchism. ” This is not a view about political arrangements
as such but, rather, an argument about the duties of the individual. Wolff,
drawing on a Kantian idea of self - legislation, argues that each individual
has a duty to be autonomous (#55). From this, it follows that no one ought
to accept the authority of others, including that of the state.
This does not mean that one must disobey all laws – indeed, one may
well conform to all laws – but one must never comply. (To conform is
merely to do what the law says, for any reason, whereas to comply is to
do so because that is what the law says.) That is, one must not unquestioningly
obey the law because it is law but must always decide what to do for
oneself. A just state ’ s laws may well accord with what one ought to do
anyway, for reasons of morality or prudence, while the threat of punishment
will give one further reasons to do what the law requires. There is, however,
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Wolff’s Argument for the Rejection of State Authority 241
no fundamental difference between being told not to steal by the state and
being told that by a friend – neither actually gives you the reason in
question.
The argument appears valid, but there are some problems with the
premises; in particular, specifying exactly what Wolff means by autonomy.
It is not easy to fi nd a consistent interpretation that explains both why it
is so important as to be the individual ’ s primary obligation and incompatible
with accepting authority. Even if something is in our interests, we do
not ordinarily suppose it to be a duty for us.
The defi ning mark of the state is authority, the right to rule. The primary
obligation of man is autonomy, the refusal to be ruled. [ … ] Insofar as a man
fulfi ls his obligation to make himself the author of his decisions, he will resist
the state ’ s claim to have authority over him. That is to say, he will deny that
he has a duty to obey the laws of the state simply because they are the laws.
(Wolff, 18)
P1. We have a higher - order interest in autonomy.
P2. If something promotes our higher - order interests, we have a duty to
do it.
C1. We have a duty to be autonomous ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
P3. If we have a duty to be autonomous, then autonomy requires that we
decide what to do for ourselves.
C2. We should decide what to do for ourselves ( modus ponens , C1, P3).
P4. If we accept the authority of others, then we are not autonomous.
C3. We should not accept the authority of others ( modus tollens , C1,
P4).
P5. If we accept the authority of the law, then we accept the authority of
others.
C4. We should not accept the authority of the law ( modus tollens, C3,
P5).
62

there is a reason for calling that a naturalistic fallacy; its being made with

regard to ‘ good ’ marks it as something quite specifi c, and this specifi c mistake

deserves a name because it is so common. (Moore, 13)

The general form of the Open Question Argument is the following:

P1. Suppose that the predicate ‘ good ’ is synonymous with some other

predicate N (e.g., ‘ pleasurable ’ ).

P2. ‘ X has the property N ’ will mean ‘ X is good ’ .

C1. Anybody who would ask whether an X with property N is good,

would ipso facto betray conceptual confusion. She is unaware what

‘ good ’ means (symmetry of identity, P2).

Moore’s Open Question Argument 239

P3. However, for every N it is always an open question whether an X with

property N is good. It is a meaningful question that does not demonstrate

conceptual confusion.

P4. If for every N it is always an open question whether an X with property

N is good, then ‘ N ’ cannot be synonymous with ‘ good ’ .

C2. ‘ N ’ cannot be synonymous with ‘ good ’ ( modus ponens , P3, P4).

P5. If N cannot be synonymous with ‘ good ’ , then only ‘ good ’ can be synonymous

with ‘ good ’ ; therefore, good is a simple (primitive) concept and

cannot be defi ned.

C3. Only ‘ good ’ can be synonymous with ‘ good ’ ; therefore, good is a

simple (primitive) concept and cannot be defi ned ( modus ponens , C2,

P5).

The Open Question Argument is a very infl uential argument. It has

motivated very diverse metaethical theories, such as noncognitivism, intuitionism,

and anti - realist theories. It still fi gures prominently in virtually all

textbooks on metaethics. However, the general opinion by now is that the

argument does not work against naturalism. First, this is because it insuffi

ciently distinguishes between conceptual or semantic naturalism (where

“ good ” is defi ned in natural terms) and metaphysical naturalism

(where “ good ” is analyzed as a natural kind, much as “ water ” is analyzed

as H 2 O).

The Open Question Argument works perhaps against the fi rst kind of

naturalism but not the second kind of naturalism, and this is the kind

of naturalism that most moral naturalists defend. Second, it is by no means

obvious that somebody who rephrases a defi nition as a question is conceptually

confused. Some correct defi nitions are extremely complex; for

example, ‘ knowledge is justifi ed true belief ’ . Suppose this were correct; it

still is not dead obvious to any competent speaker of English (Miller). Third,

the argument in a deep sense begs the question against the naturalist

(Frankena).

61

Wolff ’ s Argument for the

Rejection of State Authority

Ben Saunders

Wolff , Robert Paul. In Defense of Anarchism . New York : Harper & Row ,

1970 .

Graham , Gordon. The Case against the Democratic State: An Essay in

Cultural Criticism . Thorverton : Imprint Academic , 2002 .

Reiman , Jeffrey H. In Defense of Political Philosophy: A Reply to Robert

Paul Wolff ’ s In Defense of Anarchism . New York : Harper & Row , 1972 .

Anarchism is traditionally associated with statelessness or resistance to

coercive laws. Robert Paul Wolff defends what is sometimes known as

“ philosophical anarchism. ” This is not a view about political arrangements

as such but, rather, an argument about the duties of the individual. Wolff,

drawing on a Kantian idea of self - legislation, argues that each individual

has a duty to be autonomous (#55). From this, it follows that no one ought

to accept the authority of others, including that of the state.

This does not mean that one must disobey all laws – indeed, one may

well conform to all laws – but one must never comply. (To conform is

merely to do what the law says, for any reason, whereas to comply is to

do so because that is what the law says.) That is, one must not unquestioningly

obey the law because it is law but must always decide what to do for

oneself. A just state ’ s laws may well accord with what one ought to do

anyway, for reasons of morality or prudence, while the threat of punishment

will give one further reasons to do what the law requires. There is, however,

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

Wolff’s Argument for the Rejection of State Authority 241

no fundamental difference between being told not to steal by the state and

being told that by a friend – neither actually gives you the reason in

question.

The argument appears valid, but there are some problems with the

premises; in particular, specifying exactly what Wolff means by autonomy.

It is not easy to fi nd a consistent interpretation that explains both why it

is so important as to be the individual ’ s primary obligation and incompatible

with accepting authority. Even if something is in our interests, we do

not ordinarily suppose it to be a duty for us.

The defi ning mark of the state is authority, the right to rule. The primary

obligation of man is autonomy, the refusal to be ruled. [ … ] Insofar as a man

fulfi ls his obligation to make himself the author of his decisions, he will resist

the state ’ s claim to have authority over him. That is to say, he will deny that

he has a duty to obey the laws of the state simply because they are the laws.

(Wolff, 18)

P1. We have a higher - order interest in autonomy.

P2. If something promotes our higher - order interests, we have a duty to

do it.

C1. We have a duty to be autonomous ( modus ponens , P1, P2).

P3. If we have a duty to be autonomous, then autonomy requires that we

decide what to do for ourselves.

C2. We should decide what to do for ourselves ( modus ponens , C1, P3).

P4. If we accept the authority of others, then we are not autonomous.

C3. We should not accept the authority of others ( modus tollens , C1,

P4).

P5. If we accept the authority of the law, then we accept the authority of

others.

C4. We should not accept the authority of the law ( modus tollens, C3,

P5).

62