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without thereby sacrifi cing anything of comparable moral importance, we
ought, morally, to do it. By “ without sacrifi cing anything of comparable moral
importance ” I mean without causing anything else comparably bad to happen,
or doing something that is wrong in itself, or failing to promote some moral
good, comparable in signifi cance to the bad thing that we can prevent. This
principle seems almost as uncontroversial as the last one [ . . . but . . . ] The
uncontroversial appearance of the principle just stated is deceptive. If it were
acted upon [ . . . ] our lives, our society, and our world would be fundamentally
changed. [ . . . ] The traditional distinction between duty and charity cannot
be drawn, or at least, not in the place we normally draw it. [ . . . ] When we
buy new clothes not to keep ourselves warm but to look “ well - dressed ” we
are not providing for any important need. We would not be sacrifi cing anything
signifi cant if we were to continue to wear our old clothes, and give the
money to famine relief. By doing so, we would be preventing another person
from starving. It follows from what I have said earlier that we ought to give
money away, rather than spend it on clothes which we do not need to keep
us warm. To do so is not charitable, or generous. Nor is it the kind of act
which philosophers and theologians have called “ supererogatory ” – an act
which it would be good to do, but not wrong not to do. On the contrary, we
ought to give the money away, and it is wrong not to do so. (Singer “ Famine, ”
231 – 5)
P1. Suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are
bad.
P2. If it is in one ’ s power to prevent something bad from happening, without
thereby sacrifi cing anything of comparable moral importance, one ought,
morally, to do it.
C1. If it is in one ’ s power to prevent suffering and death from lack of
food, shelter, and medical care, without thereby sacrifi cing anything
of comparable moral importance, one ought, morally, to do it (instantiation
& modus ponens , P1, P2).
P3. By giving money to humanitarian aid agencies, one can prevent suffering
and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care.
246 Joakim Sandberg
C2. If one can give money to humanitarian aid agencies without thereby
sacrifi cing anything of comparable moral importance (to suffering and
death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care) one ought, morally,
to do it (instantiation and modus ponens , C1, P3).
P4. We can give a substantial amount of our money away by simply giving
up buying things that we do not really need; that is, without sacrifi cing
anything of moral importance comparable to suffering and death from
lack of food, shelter, and medical care.
C3. We ought, morally, to give a substantial amount of our money to
humanitarian aid agencies ( modus ponens , C2, P4).
64
The Repugnant Conclusion
Joakim Sandberg
Parfi t , Derek. Reasons and Persons . Oxford : Clarendon Press , 1984 .
Ryberg , Jesper , and Torbj ö rn T ä nnsj ö (eds.). The Repugnant Conclusion:
Essays on Population Ethics . Dordrecht : Kluwer , 2004 .
When philosophers think about future generations and what sort of world
we should try to create, they sometimes ponder issues in so - called population
ethics. For example, “ Would it be better if, in the future, a greater
rather than fewer number of people lived? ” and “ Does the answer to this
question depend further on who these people are and/or their quality of
life? ” The seminal work in this fi eld is Derek Parfi t ’ s Reasons and Persons ,
and the present argument is its undisputed highlight. The argument addresses
the issue of what the relative values are of the quantity of lives lived versus
the quality of these lives and a seemingly straightforward position on this
issue – the position that classical utilitarians take – is that quantity and
quality should be given equal value.
Utilitarians typically compound these two factors into a measure of the
overall utility, or “ quantity of whatever makes life worth living, ” in a population.
Parfi t ’ s argument against this view, however, takes the form of a
reductio ad absurdum : If any loss in the quality of lives can be compensated
for by a suffi cient increase in the quantity of lives lived, then the best
outcome could well be one in which an enormous amount of people lived
lives that are barely worth living. This is what Parfi t calls the “ Repugnant
Conclusion. ” Many ways of trying to get around the conclusion can be
found in the literature. However, it may be noted that it has been surprisingly
diffi cult to develop a theory that avoids this conclusion and at the
same time doesn ’ t imply equally counterintuitive conclusions. The fi eld of
population ethics thus continues to be challenging.
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
248 Joakim Sandberg
In B there are twice as many people living as in A, and these people are
all worse off than everyone in A. But the lives of those in B, compared with
those in A, are more than half as much worth living. [ . . . ] Which would be
the better outcome? [ . . . ] I can now state the [ . . . ] Impersonal Total Principle:
If other things are equal, the best outcome is the one in which there would
be the greatest quantity of whatever makes life worth living. [ . . . ] Z is some
enormous population whose members have lives that are not much above the
level where life ceases to be worth living. [ . . . ] In each of these lives there is
very little happiness. But, if the numbers are large enough, this is the outcome
with the greatest total sum of happiness. [ . . . ] The Impersonal Total Principle
then implies The Repugnant Conclusion: For any possible population of at
least ten billion people, all with a very high quality of life, there must be some
much larger imaginable population whose existence, if other things are equal,
would be better, even though its members have lives that are barely worth
living. As my choice of name suggests, I fi nd this conclusion very hard to
accept. [ . . . ] If we are convinced that Z is worse than A, we have strong
grounds for resisting principles which imply that Z is better. We have strong
grounds for resisting the Impersonal Total Principle. (Parfi t, 385 – 90)
P1. The “ quantity of whatever makes life worth living ” in a given population
is a function of the quantity of its members and their quality of life.
P2. One can increase the quantity of whatever makes life worth living in a
given population by simply adding people whose lives are worth living.
P3. If in one of two outcomes the quality of lives in a population is lower,
the quantity of whatever makes life worth living can still be higher if

without thereby sacrifi cing anything of comparable moral importance, we

ought, morally, to do it. By “ without sacrifi cing anything of comparable moral

importance ” I mean without causing anything else comparably bad to happen,

or doing something that is wrong in itself, or failing to promote some moral

good, comparable in signifi cance to the bad thing that we can prevent. This

principle seems almost as uncontroversial as the last one [ . . . but . . . ] The

uncontroversial appearance of the principle just stated is deceptive. If it were

acted upon [ . . . ] our lives, our society, and our world would be fundamentally

changed. [ . . . ] The traditional distinction between duty and charity cannot

be drawn, or at least, not in the place we normally draw it. [ . . . ] When we

buy new clothes not to keep ourselves warm but to look “ well - dressed ” we

are not providing for any important need. We would not be sacrifi cing anything

signifi cant if we were to continue to wear our old clothes, and give the

money to famine relief. By doing so, we would be preventing another person

from starving. It follows from what I have said earlier that we ought to give

money away, rather than spend it on clothes which we do not need to keep

us warm. To do so is not charitable, or generous. Nor is it the kind of act

which philosophers and theologians have called “ supererogatory ” – an act

which it would be good to do, but not wrong not to do. On the contrary, we

ought to give the money away, and it is wrong not to do so. (Singer “ Famine, ”

231 – 5)

P1. Suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are

bad.

P2. If it is in one ’ s power to prevent something bad from happening, without

thereby sacrifi cing anything of comparable moral importance, one ought,

morally, to do it.

C1. If it is in one ’ s power to prevent suffering and death from lack of

food, shelter, and medical care, without thereby sacrifi cing anything

of comparable moral importance, one ought, morally, to do it (instantiation

& modus ponens , P1, P2).

P3. By giving money to humanitarian aid agencies, one can prevent suffering

and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care.

246 Joakim Sandberg

C2. If one can give money to humanitarian aid agencies without thereby

sacrifi cing anything of comparable moral importance (to suffering and

death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care) one ought, morally,

to do it (instantiation and modus ponens , C1, P3).

P4. We can give a substantial amount of our money away by simply giving

up buying things that we do not really need; that is, without sacrifi cing

anything of moral importance comparable to suffering and death from

lack of food, shelter, and medical care.

C3. We ought, morally, to give a substantial amount of our money to

humanitarian aid agencies ( modus ponens , C2, P4).

64

The Repugnant Conclusion

Joakim Sandberg

Parfi t , Derek. Reasons and Persons . Oxford : Clarendon Press , 1984 .

Ryberg , Jesper , and Torbj ö rn T ä nnsj ö (eds.). The Repugnant Conclusion:

Essays on Population Ethics . Dordrecht : Kluwer , 2004 .

When philosophers think about future generations and what sort of world

we should try to create, they sometimes ponder issues in so - called population

ethics. For example, “ Would it be better if, in the future, a greater

rather than fewer number of people lived? ” and “ Does the answer to this

question depend further on who these people are and/or their quality of

life? ” The seminal work in this fi eld is Derek Parfi t ’ s Reasons and Persons ,

and the present argument is its undisputed highlight. The argument addresses

the issue of what the relative values are of the quantity of lives lived versus

the quality of these lives and a seemingly straightforward position on this

issue – the position that classical utilitarians take – is that quantity and

quality should be given equal value.

Utilitarians typically compound these two factors into a measure of the

overall utility, or “ quantity of whatever makes life worth living, ” in a population.

Parfi t ’ s argument against this view, however, takes the form of a

reductio ad absurdum : If any loss in the quality of lives can be compensated

for by a suffi cient increase in the quantity of lives lived, then the best

outcome could well be one in which an enormous amount of people lived

lives that are barely worth living. This is what Parfi t calls the “ Repugnant

Conclusion. ” Many ways of trying to get around the conclusion can be

found in the literature. However, it may be noted that it has been surprisingly

diffi cult to develop a theory that avoids this conclusion and at the

same time doesn ’ t imply equally counterintuitive conclusions. The fi eld of

population ethics thus continues to be challenging.

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

248 Joakim Sandberg

In B there are twice as many people living as in A, and these people are

all worse off than everyone in A. But the lives of those in B, compared with

those in A, are more than half as much worth living. [ . . . ] Which would be

the better outcome? [ . . . ] I can now state the [ . . . ] Impersonal Total Principle:

If other things are equal, the best outcome is the one in which there would

be the greatest quantity of whatever makes life worth living. [ . . . ] Z is some

enormous population whose members have lives that are not much above the

level where life ceases to be worth living. [ . . . ] In each of these lives there is

very little happiness. But, if the numbers are large enough, this is the outcome

with the greatest total sum of happiness. [ . . . ] The Impersonal Total Principle

then implies The Repugnant Conclusion: For any possible population of at

least ten billion people, all with a very high quality of life, there must be some

much larger imaginable population whose existence, if other things are equal,

would be better, even though its members have lives that are barely worth

living. As my choice of name suggests, I fi nd this conclusion very hard to

accept. [ . . . ] If we are convinced that Z is worse than A, we have strong

grounds for resisting principles which imply that Z is better. We have strong

grounds for resisting the Impersonal Total Principle. (Parfi t, 385 – 90)

P1. The “ quantity of whatever makes life worth living ” in a given population

is a function of the quantity of its members and their quality of life.

P2. One can increase the quantity of whatever makes life worth living in a

given population by simply adding people whose lives are worth living.

P3. If in one of two outcomes the quality of lives in a population is lower,

the quantity of whatever makes life worth living can still be higher if