DebateLabKIT/deepa2-corpus · Datasets at Hugging Face

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suffi ciently many people are added whose lives are worth living.
C1. If A is a population of at least ten billion people with a very high
quality of life, there must be some much larger imaginable population,
Z, where the quantity of whatever makes life worth living would be
greater even though its members have lives that are barely worth living
(instantiation, P3).
P4. If, other things being equal, the best outcome would be the one in which
there is the greatest quantity of whatever makes life worth living, one
outcome is better than another if the quantity of whatever makes life
worth living is greater.
C2. If, other things being equal, the best outcome would be the one in
which there is the greatest quantity of whatever makes life worth
living, Z would be better than A ( modus ponens , C1, P4).
P5. Z is worse than A.
C3. It is not the case that, other things being equal, the best outcome
would be the one in which there is the greatest quantity of whatever
makes life worth living ( modus tollens , C2, P5).
65
Taurek on Numbers Don ’ t Count
Ben Saunders
Taurek , John. “ Should the Numbers Count? ” Philosophy and Public Affairs
6 ( 1977 ): 293 – 316 .
Parfi t , Derek. “ Innumerate Ethics . ” Philosophy and Public Affairs 7 ( 1978 ):
285 – 301 .
Sidgwick , Henry. The Methods of Ethics . Indianapolis : Hackett , 1981 .
Wasserman , David , and Alan Strudler . “ Can a Nonconsequentialist Count
Lives? ” Philosophy and Public Affairs 31 ( 2003 ): 71 – 94 .
Consequentialists think that we have a moral duty to bring about the best
outcomes possible. The idea of the overall best outcome, however, typically
involves summing good and bad effects distributed over different individuals.
It is therefore frequently objected that consequentialism is indifferent
to the separateness of persons, ignoring the distribution of good and bad
consequences and implying that a great loss to one person could be justifi ed
by smaller benefi ts to a great many others.
Nonconsequentialists have often argued that we should not engage in
this interpersonal aggregation – that it makes no sense to speak of what ’ s
good or bad from “ the point of the view of the universe ” (Sidgwick, 382).
Sometimes, however, rejecting consequentialism leads to positions that confl
ict with common sense. In this much discussed article, Taurek rejects the
idea that we have any obligation to save fi ve people rather than one other,
whom he calls “ David. ” He argues that since there is no impersonal
perspective from which we can judge either outcome better than the other,
we are permitted to choose to bring about whichever outcome we prefer
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
250 Ben Saunders
– though if we want to show equal concern to all involved, he suggests that
we toss a coin so everyone has a 50 percent chance of survival.
Not all aspects of Taurek ’ s argument are entirely clear. For example,
interpreters differ as to whether he denies any notion of impersonal “ betterness
” (even so - called Pareto improvements; i.e., those that are better for
someone and worse for no one) or only denies the intelligibility of impersonal
claims where there is a confl ict of interests between two parties.
Nonetheless, much ink has been spilled attempting to show that nonconsequentialists
can resist his conclusion and justify saving a larger group of
people without engaging in morally suspect aggregation.
The claim that one ought to save the many instead of the few was made
to rest on the claim that, other things being equal, it is a worse thing that
these fi ve persons should die than that this one should. It is this evaluative
judgement that I cannot accept. I do not wish to say in this situation that it
is a worse thing were these fi ve persons to die and David to live than it is or
would be were David to die and these fi ve to continue living. I do not wish
to say this unless I am prepared to qualify it by explaining to whom or for
whom or relative to what purpose it is or would be a worse thing. (Taurek,
303 – 4)
P1. If we call one state of affairs (impersonally) better than another, then
one ought (morally) to prefer it.
P2. It is not the case that David ought (morally) to prefer that he die so
fi ve others can be saved than the reverse (they die so he can be saved).
C1. It is not the case that David ’ s dying so fi ve others can be saved is
(impersonally) better than the reverse (they die so he can be saved)
( modus tollens , P1, P2).
P3. If one state of affairs is not better than another, one is not required to
bring it about.
C2. David is not required to bring it about that he dies so fi ve others
can be saved ( modus ponens , C1, P3).
P4. If it is permissible for David to choose to save himself, it is also permissible
for a third party to save David.
C3. It is permissible for a third party to save David ( modus ponens , C2,
P4).
P5. If it is permissible to save one rather than fi ve, there cannot be any
general obligation to save the greater number (in confl ict cases).
C4. There is no general obligation to save the greater number (in confl ict
cases) ( modus ponens , C3, P5).
66
Parfi t ’ s Leveling Down Argument
against Egalitarianism
Ben Saunders
Parfi t , Derek. “ Equality or Priority? ” Ratio 10 ( 1997 ): 202 – 21 . Originally
published separately as “ The 1991 Lindley Lecture. ” Lawrence:
Department of Philosophy, University of Kansas, 1995. Reprinted in The
Ideal of Equality , edited by M. Clayton and A. Williams . London :
Palgrave Macmillan , 2002 .
Frankfurt , Harry. “ Equality as a Moral Ideal ” Ethics 98 ( 1987 ): 21 – 42 .
Jerome , Jerome K. “ The New Utopia , ” in Cultural Notes no. 14. London :
Libertarian Alliance , 1987 .
Temkin , Larry . Inequality . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1993 .
Almost everyone these days affi rms the moral equality of persons.
Egalitarians hold that this has implications for distributive justice – that

suffi ciently many people are added whose lives are worth living.

C1. If A is a population of at least ten billion people with a very high

quality of life, there must be some much larger imaginable population,

Z, where the quantity of whatever makes life worth living would be

greater even though its members have lives that are barely worth living

(instantiation, P3).

P4. If, other things being equal, the best outcome would be the one in which

there is the greatest quantity of whatever makes life worth living, one

outcome is better than another if the quantity of whatever makes life

worth living is greater.

C2. If, other things being equal, the best outcome would be the one in

which there is the greatest quantity of whatever makes life worth

living, Z would be better than A ( modus ponens , C1, P4).

P5. Z is worse than A.

C3. It is not the case that, other things being equal, the best outcome

would be the one in which there is the greatest quantity of whatever

makes life worth living ( modus tollens , C2, P5).

65

Taurek on Numbers Don ’ t Count

Ben Saunders

Taurek , John. “ Should the Numbers Count? ” Philosophy and Public Affairs

6 ( 1977 ): 293 – 316 .

Parfi t , Derek. “ Innumerate Ethics . ” Philosophy and Public Affairs 7 ( 1978 ):

285 – 301 .

Sidgwick , Henry. The Methods of Ethics . Indianapolis : Hackett , 1981 .

Wasserman , David , and Alan Strudler . “ Can a Nonconsequentialist Count

Lives? ” Philosophy and Public Affairs 31 ( 2003 ): 71 – 94 .

Consequentialists think that we have a moral duty to bring about the best

outcomes possible. The idea of the overall best outcome, however, typically

involves summing good and bad effects distributed over different individuals.

It is therefore frequently objected that consequentialism is indifferent

to the separateness of persons, ignoring the distribution of good and bad

consequences and implying that a great loss to one person could be justifi ed

by smaller benefi ts to a great many others.

Nonconsequentialists have often argued that we should not engage in

this interpersonal aggregation – that it makes no sense to speak of what ’ s

good or bad from “ the point of the view of the universe ” (Sidgwick, 382).

Sometimes, however, rejecting consequentialism leads to positions that confl

ict with common sense. In this much discussed article, Taurek rejects the

idea that we have any obligation to save fi ve people rather than one other,

whom he calls “ David. ” He argues that since there is no impersonal

perspective from which we can judge either outcome better than the other,

we are permitted to choose to bring about whichever outcome we prefer

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

250 Ben Saunders

– though if we want to show equal concern to all involved, he suggests that

we toss a coin so everyone has a 50 percent chance of survival.

Not all aspects of Taurek ’ s argument are entirely clear. For example,

interpreters differ as to whether he denies any notion of impersonal “ betterness

” (even so - called Pareto improvements; i.e., those that are better for

someone and worse for no one) or only denies the intelligibility of impersonal

claims where there is a confl ict of interests between two parties.

Nonetheless, much ink has been spilled attempting to show that nonconsequentialists

can resist his conclusion and justify saving a larger group of

people without engaging in morally suspect aggregation.

The claim that one ought to save the many instead of the few was made

to rest on the claim that, other things being equal, it is a worse thing that

these fi ve persons should die than that this one should. It is this evaluative

judgement that I cannot accept. I do not wish to say in this situation that it

is a worse thing were these fi ve persons to die and David to live than it is or

would be were David to die and these fi ve to continue living. I do not wish

to say this unless I am prepared to qualify it by explaining to whom or for

whom or relative to what purpose it is or would be a worse thing. (Taurek,

303 – 4)

P1. If we call one state of affairs (impersonally) better than another, then

one ought (morally) to prefer it.

P2. It is not the case that David ought (morally) to prefer that he die so

fi ve others can be saved than the reverse (they die so he can be saved).

C1. It is not the case that David ’ s dying so fi ve others can be saved is

(impersonally) better than the reverse (they die so he can be saved)

( modus tollens , P1, P2).

P3. If one state of affairs is not better than another, one is not required to

bring it about.

C2. David is not required to bring it about that he dies so fi ve others

can be saved ( modus ponens , C1, P3).

P4. If it is permissible for David to choose to save himself, it is also permissible

for a third party to save David.

C3. It is permissible for a third party to save David ( modus ponens , C2,

P4).

P5. If it is permissible to save one rather than fi ve, there cannot be any

general obligation to save the greater number (in confl ict cases).

C4. There is no general obligation to save the greater number (in confl ict

cases) ( modus ponens , C3, P5).

66

Parfi t ’ s Leveling Down Argument

against Egalitarianism

Ben Saunders

Parfi t , Derek. “ Equality or Priority? ” Ratio 10 ( 1997 ): 202 – 21 . Originally

published separately as “ The 1991 Lindley Lecture. ” Lawrence:

Department of Philosophy, University of Kansas, 1995. Reprinted in The

Ideal of Equality , edited by M. Clayton and A. Williams . London :

Palgrave Macmillan , 2002 .

Frankfurt , Harry. “ Equality as a Moral Ideal ” Ethics 98 ( 1987 ): 21 – 42 .

Jerome , Jerome K. “ The New Utopia , ” in Cultural Notes no. 14. London :

Libertarian Alliance , 1987 .

Temkin , Larry . Inequality . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1993 .

Almost everyone these days affi rms the moral equality of persons.

Egalitarians hold that this has implications for distributive justice – that