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theory of justice, the entitlement theory. According to this theory, every
1 I would like to thank Ali Behboud and Thomas Schramme for helpful comments on earlier
versions of this text.
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Nozick’s Wilt Chamberlain Argument 255
distribution of property that arose from voluntary, free transfers of justly
acquired property is just. The entitlement theory is, in Nozick ’ s terminology,
unpatterned; for a distribution of property to be just, it does not have to
fi t any particular pattern. The entitlement theory leads to a libertarian position
in political philosophy, condemning redistributive welfare states as
unjust. In contrast, egalitarians hold that a just state has to redistribute
property in order to achieve an egalitarian distributional pattern in society.
The egalitarian pattern can take many different forms. An egalitarian theory
of justice may, for example, aim for equality of opportunity for welfare or,
as in John Rawls ’ theory of justice, aim for equality of resources except
when inequalities are to the benefi t of the least advantaged.
The Wilt Chamberlain Argument is designed to show that all patterned
theories of justice, including egalitarian theories as the most prominent
subclass, are intuitively not acceptable. The basic outline of the argument
is as follows. Intuitively, it is morally unproblematic freely to transfer property
to other persons, for example, to pay Wilt Chamberlain for watching
him play basketball. But free transfers of property will inevitably upset any
distributional pattern. Liberty upsets patterns, as the title of the corresponding
chapter in Anarchy, State, and Utopia says. If this is right, how could
justice demand preserving a patterned distribution of property?
If patterned theories of justice are indeed not acceptable, then Nozick ’ s
unpatterned entitlement theory of justice would constitute the obvious
alternative. But maybe this is too hasty. It seems to me that the Wilt
Chamberlain Argument is most appealing when directed against egalitarian
theories only, not against any form of patterned theories. In particular,
premise P2 in the formalized version below is less convincing if D 1 in
premise P1 is not specifi ed as an egalitarian distributional pattern but as,
for example, a distributional pattern prescribing that nobody should fall
below a certain baseline of welfare. Nevertheless, a refutation of egalitarian
theories of justice alone would still be a provocative result. Egalitarian
critics of the argument will then probably have to reject either premise P3
or P4. If one wants a less limited version of the argument, one can simply
substitute “ egalitarian ” by “ patterned ” in P1 and call it “ patterned principle
” instead of “ equality principle. ”
It is not clear how those holding alternative conceptions of distributive
justice can reject the entitlement conception of justice in holdings. For suppose
a distribution favored by one of these non - entitlement conceptions is realized.
Let us suppose it is your favorite one and let us call this distribution D 1 ;
perhaps everyone has an equal share, perhaps shares vary in accordance with
some dimension you treasure. Now suppose that Wilt Chamberlain is greatly
in demand by basketball teams, being a great gate attraction. (Also suppose
contracts run for a year, with players being free agents.) He signs the following
sort of contract with a team: In each home game, twenty - fi ve cents from the
256 Fabian Wendt
price of each ticket of admission goes to him. (We ignore the question of
whether he is “ gouging ” the owners, letting them look for themselves.) The
season starts, and people cheerfully attend his team ’ s games; they buy their
tickets, each time dropping a separate twenty - fi ve cents of their admission
price into a special box with Chamberlain ’ s name on it. They are excited
about seeing him play; it is worth the total admission price to them. Let us
suppose that in one season one million persons attend his home games, and
Wilt Chamberlain winds up with $250,000, a much larger sum than the
average income and larger even than anyone else has. Is he entitled to this
income? Is this new distribution D 2 unjust? If so, why? [ … ] If D 1 was a just
distribution, and people voluntarily moved from it to D 2 , transferring parts
of their shares they were given under D 1 (what was it for if not to do something
with?), isn ’ t D 2 also just? (Nozick, 160 – 1)
P1. A society is just if and only if the distribution of property in the society
has a certain egalitarian distributional structure D 1 (Equality Principle
assumption).
P2. When people freely transfer their property to other persons, they change
the distributional structure D 1 into a new distributional structure.
P3. It is not unjust for people freely to transfer their property to other
persons (Liberty Principle).
P4. Whatever distributional structure results from a just distributional
structure by not - unjust steps is itself just (Preservation Principle).
C1. It is not unjust for people freely to transfer their property to other
persons and whatever distributional structure results from a just distributional
structure by not - unjust steps is itself just (conjunction, P3,
P4).
P5. If P2 is true, then the following concretion of P2 is true as well: If people
start from a just distributional structure like, presumably, D 1 and then
freely transfer their property to Wilt Chamberlain, then the distributional
structure in the society will have changed to a new distributional structure
D 2 .
C2. If people start from a just distributional structure like, presumably,
D 1 and then freely transfer their property to Wilt Chamberlain, then
the distributional structure in the society will have changed to a new
distributional structure D 2 ( modus ponens , P2, P5).
P6. If C1 is true, then the following conditional is true as well: If people
start from a just distributional structure like, presumably, D 1 and then
freely transfer their property to Wilt Chamberlain, then the resulting
distributional structure will be just.
C3. If people start from a just distributional structure like, presumably,
D 1 and then freely transfer their property to Wilt Chamberlain, then
the resulting distributional structure will be just ( modus ponens ,
C1, P6).
Nozick’s Wilt Chamberlain Argument 257
C4. If people start from a just distributional structure like, presumably,
D 1 and then freely transfer their property to Wilt Chamberlain, then
the distributional structure in the society will have changed to a new
distributional structure D 2 and if people start from a just distributional
structure like, presumably, D 1 and then freely transfer their

theory of justice, the entitlement theory. According to this theory, every

1 I would like to thank Ali Behboud and Thomas Schramme for helpful comments on earlier

versions of this text.

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

Nozick’s Wilt Chamberlain Argument 255

distribution of property that arose from voluntary, free transfers of justly

acquired property is just. The entitlement theory is, in Nozick ’ s terminology,

unpatterned; for a distribution of property to be just, it does not have to

fi t any particular pattern. The entitlement theory leads to a libertarian position

in political philosophy, condemning redistributive welfare states as

unjust. In contrast, egalitarians hold that a just state has to redistribute

property in order to achieve an egalitarian distributional pattern in society.

The egalitarian pattern can take many different forms. An egalitarian theory

of justice may, for example, aim for equality of opportunity for welfare or,

as in John Rawls ’ theory of justice, aim for equality of resources except

when inequalities are to the benefi t of the least advantaged.

The Wilt Chamberlain Argument is designed to show that all patterned

theories of justice, including egalitarian theories as the most prominent

subclass, are intuitively not acceptable. The basic outline of the argument

is as follows. Intuitively, it is morally unproblematic freely to transfer property

to other persons, for example, to pay Wilt Chamberlain for watching

him play basketball. But free transfers of property will inevitably upset any

distributional pattern. Liberty upsets patterns, as the title of the corresponding

chapter in Anarchy, State, and Utopia says. If this is right, how could

justice demand preserving a patterned distribution of property?

If patterned theories of justice are indeed not acceptable, then Nozick ’ s

unpatterned entitlement theory of justice would constitute the obvious

alternative. But maybe this is too hasty. It seems to me that the Wilt

Chamberlain Argument is most appealing when directed against egalitarian

theories only, not against any form of patterned theories. In particular,

premise P2 in the formalized version below is less convincing if D 1 in

premise P1 is not specifi ed as an egalitarian distributional pattern but as,

for example, a distributional pattern prescribing that nobody should fall

below a certain baseline of welfare. Nevertheless, a refutation of egalitarian

theories of justice alone would still be a provocative result. Egalitarian

critics of the argument will then probably have to reject either premise P3

or P4. If one wants a less limited version of the argument, one can simply

substitute “ egalitarian ” by “ patterned ” in P1 and call it “ patterned principle

” instead of “ equality principle. ”

It is not clear how those holding alternative conceptions of distributive

justice can reject the entitlement conception of justice in holdings. For suppose

a distribution favored by one of these non - entitlement conceptions is realized.

Let us suppose it is your favorite one and let us call this distribution D 1 ;

perhaps everyone has an equal share, perhaps shares vary in accordance with

some dimension you treasure. Now suppose that Wilt Chamberlain is greatly

in demand by basketball teams, being a great gate attraction. (Also suppose

contracts run for a year, with players being free agents.) He signs the following

sort of contract with a team: In each home game, twenty - fi ve cents from the

256 Fabian Wendt

price of each ticket of admission goes to him. (We ignore the question of

whether he is “ gouging ” the owners, letting them look for themselves.) The

season starts, and people cheerfully attend his team ’ s games; they buy their

tickets, each time dropping a separate twenty - fi ve cents of their admission

price into a special box with Chamberlain ’ s name on it. They are excited

about seeing him play; it is worth the total admission price to them. Let us

suppose that in one season one million persons attend his home games, and

Wilt Chamberlain winds up with $250,000, a much larger sum than the

average income and larger even than anyone else has. Is he entitled to this

income? Is this new distribution D 2 unjust? If so, why? [ … ] If D 1 was a just

distribution, and people voluntarily moved from it to D 2 , transferring parts

of their shares they were given under D 1 (what was it for if not to do something

with?), isn ’ t D 2 also just? (Nozick, 160 – 1)

P1. A society is just if and only if the distribution of property in the society

has a certain egalitarian distributional structure D 1 (Equality Principle

assumption).

P2. When people freely transfer their property to other persons, they change

the distributional structure D 1 into a new distributional structure.

P3. It is not unjust for people freely to transfer their property to other

persons (Liberty Principle).

P4. Whatever distributional structure results from a just distributional

structure by not - unjust steps is itself just (Preservation Principle).

C1. It is not unjust for people freely to transfer their property to other

persons and whatever distributional structure results from a just distributional

structure by not - unjust steps is itself just (conjunction, P3,

P4).

P5. If P2 is true, then the following concretion of P2 is true as well: If people

start from a just distributional structure like, presumably, D 1 and then

freely transfer their property to Wilt Chamberlain, then the distributional

structure in the society will have changed to a new distributional structure

D 2 .

C2. If people start from a just distributional structure like, presumably,

D 1 and then freely transfer their property to Wilt Chamberlain, then

the distributional structure in the society will have changed to a new

distributional structure D 2 ( modus ponens , P2, P5).

P6. If C1 is true, then the following conditional is true as well: If people

start from a just distributional structure like, presumably, D 1 and then

freely transfer their property to Wilt Chamberlain, then the resulting

distributional structure will be just.

C3. If people start from a just distributional structure like, presumably,

D 1 and then freely transfer their property to Wilt Chamberlain, then

the resulting distributional structure will be just ( modus ponens ,

C1, P6).

Nozick’s Wilt Chamberlain Argument 257

C4. If people start from a just distributional structure like, presumably,

D 1 and then freely transfer their property to Wilt Chamberlain, then

the distributional structure in the society will have changed to a new

distributional structure D 2 and if people start from a just distributional

structure like, presumably, D 1 and then freely transfer their