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Nozick ’ s Taxation Is Forced
Labor Argument
Jason Waller
Nozick , Robert. Anarchy, State, and Utopia . New York : Basic Books , 1974 .
One of the most contentious issues in contemporary debates about distributive
justice concerns the redistribution of wealth. Should the state tax richer
citizens in order to provide various benefi ts (schools, medical care, job
training, cash payments, housing subsidies, etc.) to poorer citizens? The
traditional distinction between the political “ right ” and “ left ” turns largely
(although, not exclusively) on this question. One of the most infl uential
libertarian arguments concerning the redistribution of wealth is offered by
Robert Nozick, who argues that all forms of redistribution are morally
wrong. His general strategy is to show that taxation is a kind of forced
labor (i.e., slavery). The argument has been infl uential because it seems to
turn on an uncontroversial defi nition of forced labor and the seemingly
undeniable claim that all forms of forced labor are immoral. Nozick concludes
that when the state redistributes wealth from the rich to the poor,
the poor are in fact unjustly enslaving the rich. This form of slavery is, of
course, quite mild by comparison to past forms, but (at least according to
Nozick) it is immoral just the same.
Taxation of earnings from labor is on a par with forced labor. Some
persons fi nd this claim obviously true: taking the earnings of n hours of labor
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Nozick’s Taxation Is Forced Labor Argument 243
is like taking n hours from the person; it is like forcing the person to work n
hours for another ’ s purpose. Others fi nd the claim absurd. But even these, if
they object to forced labor, would oppose forcing unemployed hippies to work
for the benefi t of the needy. And they would also object to forcing each person
to work fi ve extra hours each week for the benefi t of the needy. (Nozick, 169)
P1. Forced labor (i.e., slavery) occurs anytime one (i) must perform some
labor under threat of severe punishment (pain, prison, death, etc.) and
yet (ii) the benefi ts of one ’ s labor go to someone else.
P2. All forms of forced labor are immoral.
P3. The state requires all working citizens to pay certain taxes in order to
benefi t the needy or face severe punishment (i.e., prison time).
P4. A is a working citizen.
C1. If citizen A does not pay taxes, then the citizen will receive severe
punishment; that is, she will go to prison (material implication, P3).
P5. If citizen A does not work extra hours, then the citizen will not be able
to pay her taxes.
C2. If citizen A does not work extra hours at her job, then she will receive
severe punishment; that is, she will go to prison (hypothetical syllogism,
C1, P5).
P6. Citizen A receives no benefi ts for the extra hours spent earning the
money to pay her taxes because this money goes to the needy.
C3. During the time when citizen A is earning the money needed to pay
her taxes, the citizen is (i) performing some labor under threat of
severe punishment [by C2] and (ii) the benefi ts of her labor go to
someone else, namely, the needy (conjunction, C2, P6).
C4. During the time when citizen A is earning the money needed to pay
her taxes, she is undergoing forced labor; that is, slavery ( modus
ponens , P1, C3).
C5. Taxing citizen A to help the needy is immoral (instantiation, P2, C4).
P7. This same argument can be made for each taxpayer.
C6. All instances of taxation are immoral (instantiation, C5, P7).
63
Charity is Obligatory
Joakim Sandberg
Singer , Peter. “ Famine, Affl uence, and Morality . ” Philosophy and Public
Affairs 1 ( 1972 ): 229 – 43 .
___. Practical Ethics , 2nd edn . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press ,
1993 .
Sidgwick , Henry. The Methods of Ethics . Indianapolis : Hackett , 1981 .
Unger , Peter. Living High & Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence . New
York : Oxford University Press , 1996 .
Most people think that it is good or charitable to give money to humanitarian
aid agencies that provide food or shelter to people in need, and hence
such agencies are referred to as charities. But couldn ’ t it actually be a moral
duty to give money to such agencies; that is, morally wrong not to do so?
According to the present argument, most famously formulated by Peter
Singer, relatively affl uent people of developed countries are indeed under a
moral duty to give a signifi cant amount of their money to humanitarian aid
agencies.
The argument turns on the seemingly uncontroversial principle (which
can be found already in Sidgwick, 253) that it is wrong not to help others
when helping is easy and cheap. Singer sometimes defends this principle by
way of an example: Wouldn ’ t it be wrong to refuse to save a child from
drowning in a pond, say, simply because one is hesitant to get one ’ s clothes
dirty? The argument can be taken to exemplify philosophical reasoning in
its most interesting form: going from seemingly uncontroversial premises
to a largely controversial or unexpected conclusion. The conclusion is controversial
because it basically requires us to – instead of spending our money
on things for ourselves that we don ’ t really need (nice clothes, coffee, beer,
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Charity is Obligatory 245
CDs) – give most of it away to people in remote parts of the world. And
we are not even allowed to feel good about doing so – what we normally
perceive as charitable (and thus beyond the call of duty) is really just
morally obligatory. A number of slightly different formulations of the argument
can be found in the literature, but we present it in its original form.
All of the premises below have been scrutinized by critics in attempts to
defuse the argument.
I begin with the assumption that suffering and death from lack of food,
shelter, and medical care are bad. I think most people will agree about this,
although one may reach the same view by different routes. [ . . . ] My next
point is this: if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening,

Nozick ’ s Taxation Is Forced

Labor Argument

Jason Waller

Nozick , Robert. Anarchy, State, and Utopia . New York : Basic Books , 1974 .

One of the most contentious issues in contemporary debates about distributive

justice concerns the redistribution of wealth. Should the state tax richer

citizens in order to provide various benefi ts (schools, medical care, job

training, cash payments, housing subsidies, etc.) to poorer citizens? The

traditional distinction between the political “ right ” and “ left ” turns largely

(although, not exclusively) on this question. One of the most infl uential

libertarian arguments concerning the redistribution of wealth is offered by

Robert Nozick, who argues that all forms of redistribution are morally

wrong. His general strategy is to show that taxation is a kind of forced

labor (i.e., slavery). The argument has been infl uential because it seems to

turn on an uncontroversial defi nition of forced labor and the seemingly

undeniable claim that all forms of forced labor are immoral. Nozick concludes

that when the state redistributes wealth from the rich to the poor,

the poor are in fact unjustly enslaving the rich. This form of slavery is, of

course, quite mild by comparison to past forms, but (at least according to

Nozick) it is immoral just the same.

Taxation of earnings from labor is on a par with forced labor. Some

persons fi nd this claim obviously true: taking the earnings of n hours of labor

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

Nozick’s Taxation Is Forced Labor Argument 243

is like taking n hours from the person; it is like forcing the person to work n

hours for another ’ s purpose. Others fi nd the claim absurd. But even these, if

they object to forced labor, would oppose forcing unemployed hippies to work

for the benefi t of the needy. And they would also object to forcing each person

to work fi ve extra hours each week for the benefi t of the needy. (Nozick, 169)

P1. Forced labor (i.e., slavery) occurs anytime one (i) must perform some

labor under threat of severe punishment (pain, prison, death, etc.) and

yet (ii) the benefi ts of one ’ s labor go to someone else.

P2. All forms of forced labor are immoral.

P3. The state requires all working citizens to pay certain taxes in order to

benefi t the needy or face severe punishment (i.e., prison time).

P4. A is a working citizen.

C1. If citizen A does not pay taxes, then the citizen will receive severe

punishment; that is, she will go to prison (material implication, P3).

P5. If citizen A does not work extra hours, then the citizen will not be able

to pay her taxes.

C2. If citizen A does not work extra hours at her job, then she will receive

severe punishment; that is, she will go to prison (hypothetical syllogism,

C1, P5).

P6. Citizen A receives no benefi ts for the extra hours spent earning the

money to pay her taxes because this money goes to the needy.

C3. During the time when citizen A is earning the money needed to pay

her taxes, the citizen is (i) performing some labor under threat of

severe punishment [by C2] and (ii) the benefi ts of her labor go to

someone else, namely, the needy (conjunction, C2, P6).

C4. During the time when citizen A is earning the money needed to pay

her taxes, she is undergoing forced labor; that is, slavery ( modus

ponens , P1, C3).

C5. Taxing citizen A to help the needy is immoral (instantiation, P2, C4).

P7. This same argument can be made for each taxpayer.

C6. All instances of taxation are immoral (instantiation, C5, P7).

63

Charity is Obligatory

Joakim Sandberg

Singer , Peter. “ Famine, Affl uence, and Morality . ” Philosophy and Public

Affairs 1 ( 1972 ): 229 – 43 .

___. Practical Ethics , 2nd edn . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press ,

1993 .

Sidgwick , Henry. The Methods of Ethics . Indianapolis : Hackett , 1981 .

Unger , Peter. Living High & Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence . New

York : Oxford University Press , 1996 .

Most people think that it is good or charitable to give money to humanitarian

aid agencies that provide food or shelter to people in need, and hence

such agencies are referred to as charities. But couldn ’ t it actually be a moral

duty to give money to such agencies; that is, morally wrong not to do so?

According to the present argument, most famously formulated by Peter

Singer, relatively affl uent people of developed countries are indeed under a

moral duty to give a signifi cant amount of their money to humanitarian aid

agencies.

The argument turns on the seemingly uncontroversial principle (which

can be found already in Sidgwick, 253) that it is wrong not to help others

when helping is easy and cheap. Singer sometimes defends this principle by

way of an example: Wouldn ’ t it be wrong to refuse to save a child from

drowning in a pond, say, simply because one is hesitant to get one ’ s clothes

dirty? The argument can be taken to exemplify philosophical reasoning in

its most interesting form: going from seemingly uncontroversial premises

to a largely controversial or unexpected conclusion. The conclusion is controversial

because it basically requires us to – instead of spending our money

on things for ourselves that we don ’ t really need (nice clothes, coffee, beer,

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

Charity is Obligatory 245

CDs) – give most of it away to people in remote parts of the world. And

we are not even allowed to feel good about doing so – what we normally

perceive as charitable (and thus beyond the call of duty) is really just

morally obligatory. A number of slightly different formulations of the argument

can be found in the literature, but we present it in its original form.

All of the premises below have been scrutinized by critics in attempts to

defuse the argument.

I begin with the assumption that suffering and death from lack of food,

shelter, and medical care are bad. I think most people will agree about this,

although one may reach the same view by different routes. [ . . . ] My next

point is this: if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening,