DebateLabKIT/deepa2-corpus · Datasets at Hugging Face

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or inference or logical construction or conceptual analysis, or any combination
of these, will provide a satisfactory answer; ‘ a special sort of intuition ’
is a lame answer, but it is the one to which the clear - headed objectivist is
compelled to resort. ( Ethics , 38)
P1. If ordinary language, commonsense morality, and philosophical theories
indicate belief in objective moral facts, then there is a presumptive belief
that objective moral facts exist.
P2. Ordinary language, commonsense morality, and philosophical theories
indicate belief that objective moral facts exist.
C1. There is a presumptive belief that objective moral facts exist ( modus
ponens , P1, P2).
P3. There is moral relativity among different societies and historical eras.
P4. Moral relativity is explained by either but not both of explanations (i)
or (ii):
(i) People participate in different ways of life that lead them to believe
that distinct moral rules are correct.
(ii) People apply objective moral principles to different circumstances.
P5. Explanation (i) is a better explanation of moral relativity than explanation
(ii).
236 Robert L. Muhlnickel
P6. If (i) explains moral relativity better than (ii), then the belief that objective
moral facts exist is not justifi ed.
C2. The belief that objective moral facts exist is not justifi ed ( modus
ponens , P5, P6).
P7. If there are objective moral values, then they are specifi cally moral entities
or relations and we know of their existence by a specifi cally moral
cognitive ability.
P8. There are no specifi cally moral entities or relations, and we have no
specifi cally moral cognitive ability.
C3. There are no objective moral values ( modus tollens , P7, P8).
C4. There are no objective moral values and the belief that objective
moral facts exist is not justifi ed (conjunction, C3, C2).
P9. If there are no objective values and the belief that objective moral facts
exist is not justifi ed, then the presumptive belief that objective moral
facts exist is in error.
C5. The presumptive belief that objective moral facts exist is in error
( modus ponens , C4, P9).
P6 * . If (i) explains moral disagreement better than (ii), then disbelief that
objective moral facts exist is better justifi ed than belief that moral facts
exist.
C2 * . Disbelief that objective moral facts exist is better justifi ed than
belief that moral facts exist ( modus ponens , C2, P5).
60
Moore ’ s Open Question
Argument
Bruno Verbeek
Moore , George E. Principia Ethica . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University
Press , 1903 .
Frankena , W. K. “ The Naturalistic Fallacy . ” Mind 48 , 192 ( 1939 ): 464 – 77 .
Miller , Alexander . An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics . Cambridge,
UK : Polity Press , 2003 .
The Open Question Argument was fi rst formulated by G. E. Moore in his
Principia Ethica (1903). It marks the beginning of a branch of ethical theory
now referred to as metaethics. One of the central problems in metaethics
– or indeed the central problem for this sub - discipline – is an analysis of
the central concepts and terms in ethics, such as ‘ ought ’ and ‘ good ’ . Moore
argued that the property of goodness is an undefi nable property. The
reason, according to Moore, is that goodness is a simple, unanalyzable
property. So - called “ real defi nitions ” of ‘ good ’ , which attempt to defi ne
‘ good ’ in terms of a kind with specifi c characteristics, will fail. Anyone who
claims to give a defi nition of ‘ goodness ’ is attributing goodness to something
rather than identifying what goodness is. Moral naturalists – that is, those
philosophers who believe that moral properties exist and can be studied by
the sciences – are particularly guilty of this fallacy: hence the name “ naturalistic
fallacy. ” As a result, the argument is typically invoked to reject
moral naturalism. However, Moore was quick to point out that theists who
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
238 Bruno Verbeek
claim that good is what God commands are prone to the same fallacy. (Note
that a common misunderstanding is to think that the naturalistic fallacy is
the invalid inference of an “ ought ” statement from factual [ “ is ” ] premises.)
The test that Moore proposed to determine whether an attempt at defi ning
‘ good ’ is correct and not an attribution in disguise is the so - called “ Open
Question Argument. ” The basic idea is that a correct defi nition of a term
cannot be rephrased as a question without betraying conceptual incompetence.
For example, the defi nition of a ‘ bachelor ’ is “ unmarried man of the
marriageable age. ” If I rephrase this defi nition as an open question ( ‘ Is a
bachelor an unmarried man of the marriageable age? ’ ), it shows that I don ’ t
know what a bachelor is (or ‘ man ’ or ‘ married ’ , etc.). However, suppose
somebody offers the following defi nition of ‘ good ’ : “ the property we refer
to as ‘ good ’ is the property of being pleasurable, ” or “ good is pleasurable ”
for short. If you rephrase this as an open question: “ Is good pleasurable? ”
this does not indicate that I don ’ t know what ‘ good ’ or what ‘ pleasurable ’
is. I am asking a meaningful question. This demonstrates, according to
Moore, that the proposed defi nition is (at best) in fact an attribution of
goodness to all pleasurable things.
My point is that ‘ good ’ is a simple notion, just as ‘ yellow ’ is a simple
notion; that, just as you cannot, by any manner of means, explain to any one
who does not already know it, what yellow is, so you cannot explain what
good is. Defi nitions of the kind that I was asking for, defi nitions which
describe the real nature of the object or notion denoted by a word, and
which do not merely tell us what the word is used to mean, are only possible
when the object or notion in question is something complex. (Moore, 7)
When a man confuses two natural objects with one another, defi ning the
one by the other, if for instance, he confuses himself, who is one natural
object, with ‘ pleased ’ or with ‘ pleasure ’ which are others, then there is no
reason to call the fallacy naturalistic. But if he confuses ‘ good, ’ which is not
in the same sense a natural object, with any natural object whatever, then

or inference or logical construction or conceptual analysis, or any combination

of these, will provide a satisfactory answer; ‘ a special sort of intuition ’

is a lame answer, but it is the one to which the clear - headed objectivist is

compelled to resort. ( Ethics , 38)

P1. If ordinary language, commonsense morality, and philosophical theories

indicate belief in objective moral facts, then there is a presumptive belief

that objective moral facts exist.

P2. Ordinary language, commonsense morality, and philosophical theories

indicate belief that objective moral facts exist.

C1. There is a presumptive belief that objective moral facts exist ( modus

ponens , P1, P2).

P3. There is moral relativity among different societies and historical eras.

P4. Moral relativity is explained by either but not both of explanations (i)

or (ii):

(i) People participate in different ways of life that lead them to believe

that distinct moral rules are correct.

(ii) People apply objective moral principles to different circumstances.

P5. Explanation (i) is a better explanation of moral relativity than explanation

(ii).

236 Robert L. Muhlnickel

P6. If (i) explains moral relativity better than (ii), then the belief that objective

moral facts exist is not justifi ed.

C2. The belief that objective moral facts exist is not justifi ed ( modus

ponens , P5, P6).

P7. If there are objective moral values, then they are specifi cally moral entities

or relations and we know of their existence by a specifi cally moral

cognitive ability.

P8. There are no specifi cally moral entities or relations, and we have no

specifi cally moral cognitive ability.

C3. There are no objective moral values ( modus tollens , P7, P8).

C4. There are no objective moral values and the belief that objective

moral facts exist is not justifi ed (conjunction, C3, C2).

P9. If there are no objective values and the belief that objective moral facts

exist is not justifi ed, then the presumptive belief that objective moral

facts exist is in error.

C5. The presumptive belief that objective moral facts exist is in error

( modus ponens , C4, P9).

P6 * . If (i) explains moral disagreement better than (ii), then disbelief that

objective moral facts exist is better justifi ed than belief that moral facts

exist.

C2 * . Disbelief that objective moral facts exist is better justifi ed than

belief that moral facts exist ( modus ponens , C2, P5).

60

Moore ’ s Open Question

Argument

Bruno Verbeek

Moore , George E. Principia Ethica . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University

Press , 1903 .

Frankena , W. K. “ The Naturalistic Fallacy . ” Mind 48 , 192 ( 1939 ): 464 – 77 .

Miller , Alexander . An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics . Cambridge,

UK : Polity Press , 2003 .

The Open Question Argument was fi rst formulated by G. E. Moore in his

Principia Ethica (1903). It marks the beginning of a branch of ethical theory

now referred to as metaethics. One of the central problems in metaethics

– or indeed the central problem for this sub - discipline – is an analysis of

the central concepts and terms in ethics, such as ‘ ought ’ and ‘ good ’ . Moore

argued that the property of goodness is an undefi nable property. The

reason, according to Moore, is that goodness is a simple, unanalyzable

property. So - called “ real defi nitions ” of ‘ good ’ , which attempt to defi ne

‘ good ’ in terms of a kind with specifi c characteristics, will fail. Anyone who

claims to give a defi nition of ‘ goodness ’ is attributing goodness to something

rather than identifying what goodness is. Moral naturalists – that is, those

philosophers who believe that moral properties exist and can be studied by

the sciences – are particularly guilty of this fallacy: hence the name “ naturalistic

fallacy. ” As a result, the argument is typically invoked to reject

moral naturalism. However, Moore was quick to point out that theists who

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

238 Bruno Verbeek

claim that good is what God commands are prone to the same fallacy. (Note

that a common misunderstanding is to think that the naturalistic fallacy is

the invalid inference of an “ ought ” statement from factual [ “ is ” ] premises.)

The test that Moore proposed to determine whether an attempt at defi ning

‘ good ’ is correct and not an attribution in disguise is the so - called “ Open

Question Argument. ” The basic idea is that a correct defi nition of a term

cannot be rephrased as a question without betraying conceptual incompetence.

For example, the defi nition of a ‘ bachelor ’ is “ unmarried man of the

marriageable age. ” If I rephrase this defi nition as an open question ( ‘ Is a

bachelor an unmarried man of the marriageable age? ’ ), it shows that I don ’ t

know what a bachelor is (or ‘ man ’ or ‘ married ’ , etc.). However, suppose

somebody offers the following defi nition of ‘ good ’ : “ the property we refer

to as ‘ good ’ is the property of being pleasurable, ” or “ good is pleasurable ”

for short. If you rephrase this as an open question: “ Is good pleasurable? ”

this does not indicate that I don ’ t know what ‘ good ’ or what ‘ pleasurable ’

is. I am asking a meaningful question. This demonstrates, according to

Moore, that the proposed defi nition is (at best) in fact an attribution of

goodness to all pleasurable things.

My point is that ‘ good ’ is a simple notion, just as ‘ yellow ’ is a simple

notion; that, just as you cannot, by any manner of means, explain to any one

who does not already know it, what yellow is, so you cannot explain what

good is. Defi nitions of the kind that I was asking for, defi nitions which

describe the real nature of the object or notion denoted by a word, and

which do not merely tell us what the word is used to mean, are only possible

when the object or notion in question is something complex. (Moore, 7)

When a man confuses two natural objects with one another, defi ning the

one by the other, if for instance, he confuses himself, who is one natural

object, with ‘ pleased ’ or with ‘ pleasure ’ which are others, then there is no

reason to call the fallacy naturalistic. But if he confuses ‘ good, ’ which is not

in the same sense a natural object, with any natural object whatever, then