DebateLabKIT/deepa2-corpus · Datasets at Hugging Face

text stringlengths 0 1.71k
that we would choose for ourselves. It should be noted that this widespread
judgment arises despite Nozick ’ s attempts to rule out some of the possible
reasons that we might not want to plug in, such as allowing those who
depend on us to plug in too. Even in modern reproductions of the Experience
Machine Objection to Hedonism, which tend to place more emphasis than
Nozick did on that fact that the experiences available in an Experience
Machine would be far more pleasurable and less painful than those of a
real life, hardly anyone admits to wanting to plug in to an Experience
Machine.
Despite the nearly unanimous judgment that plugging into an Experience
Machine for life would be a mistake, substantial disagreement remains on
the question of why we think that our current life would be better for us
than a life in an Experience Machine. Many philosophers have offered different
suggestions as to why we do not, and should not, choose a life in an
Experience Machine. Nozick ’ s rationale is that plugging in would deprive
us the chance really to do and be certain things (as opposed merely to having
the internal experiences of doing and being them). Some (e.g., De Brigard)
have suggested that the feelings we experience in response to the thought
of the Experience Machine are based on an subconscious fear of change,
as shown by reversing the thought experiment (imagine that you have actually
been living an Experience Machine life all along). Until the disagreement
about why nearly all of us judge a life plugged into an Experience
Machine to be so ghastly is resolved, we cannot be confi dent that premise
3 of the argument (below) is correct or be sure that the Experience Machine
Objection to Hedonism should really be considered as decisive as it generally
is.
The Experience Machine Objection to Hedonism 231
Suppose that there were an experience machine that would give you any
experience you desired. Superduper neuropsychologists could stimulate your
brain so that you would think and feel you were writing a great novel, or
making a friend, or reading an interesting book. All the time, you would be
fl oating in a tank, with electrodes attached to your brain. Should you plug
into this machine for life, preprogramming your life ’ s experiences? If you are
worried about missing out on desirable experiences, we can suppose that
business enterprises have researched thoroughly the lives of many others. You
can pick and choose from their large library or smorgasbord of such experiences,
selecting your life ’ s experiences for, say, the next two years. After two
years have passed, you will have ten minutes or ten hours out of the tank, to
select the experiences of your next two years. Of course, while in the tank
you won ’ t know that you ’ re there; you ’ ll think it ’ s all actually happening.
Others can also plug in to have the experiences they want, so there ’ s no need
to stay unplugged to serve them. (Ignore problems such as who will service
the machines if everyone plugs in.) Would you plug in? What else can matter
to us, other than how our lives feel from the inside? Nor should you refrain
because of the few moments of distress between the moment you ’ ve decided
and the moment you ’ re plugged. What ’ s a few moments of distress compared
to a lifetime of bliss (if that ’ s what you choose), and why feel any distress at
all if your decision is the best one? (Nozick, 42 – 3)
P1. Plugging into an Experience Machine would make the rest of your life
dramatically more pleasurable and less painful than it would otherwise
have been (stipulated in thought experiment).
P2. Given the choice to plug into an Experience Machine for the rest of
your life, ignoring any responsibilities you might have to others, you
would decline (appeal to readers ’ judgment).
P3. If, ignoring any responsibilities you might have to others, you would
decline the chance to plug into an Experience Machine for the rest of
your life, then pleasure and pain are not the only things of intrinsic value
(or disvalue) in a life.
C1. Pleasure and pain are not the only things of intrinsic value (or disvalue)
in a life ( modus ponens , P2, P3).
P4. If hedonism is true, then pleasure and pain are the only things of intrinsic
value (or disvalue) in a life.
C2. Hedonism is false ( modus tollens , C1, P4).
59
The Error Theory Argument
Robert L. Muhlnickel
Mackie , John . “ A Refutation of Morals . ” Australasian Journal of Philosophy
24 ( 1946 ): 77 – 90 . Reprinted in Twentieth Century Ethical Theory ,
edited by Steven Cahn , Jeram Haber , and Joram Haber , 145 – 52 . Upper
Saddle River, NJ : Prentice - Hall , 1995 .
___. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong . Harmondsworth : Penguin , 1977 .
Metaethics is the philosophical inquiry into the nature and status of morality.
A basic question about the nature and status of morality is whether
expressions of moral approval and disapproval are objective. Moral objectivism,
generally and simply stated, is the view that moral expressions (in
speech, writing, or thought) are cognitive judgments, which are true or false
because of their relations to moral facts. Moral skepticism is the view that
there are no such moral facts. Many philosophers think that commonsense
morality presumes moral objectivism, and many philosophers defend versions
of moral objectivism. Defending moral skepticism requires showing
that the belief that moral facts exist is in error, even though our ordinary
language presumes they do exist. The aim of showing this belief as erroneous
gives the argument its name. The error theory argument is a “ destructive
” argument; it aims to show that moral objectivism is false. J. L. Mackie
defends the error theory argument and claims it shows that moral skepticism
is more reasonable than moral objectivism.
The error theory argument fi rst derives C1 by modus ponens that commonsense
morality assumes and many moral philosophers defend moral
objectivism. That C1 is the presumptive belief forestalls the objection that
the error theory argument attacks a straw man. The error theory argument ’ s
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
The Error Theory Argument 233
destructive aim is advanced by two component arguments: the argument
from relativity and the argument from queerness.
The argument from relativity extends from P3 to C2. P3 states the unimpeachable
fact of moral relativity: moral judgments observed in behavior,
described in records of deliberation, and stated in authoritative moral codes
of different societies and historical eras are different and often incompatible

that we would choose for ourselves. It should be noted that this widespread

judgment arises despite Nozick ’ s attempts to rule out some of the possible

reasons that we might not want to plug in, such as allowing those who

depend on us to plug in too. Even in modern reproductions of the Experience

Machine Objection to Hedonism, which tend to place more emphasis than

Nozick did on that fact that the experiences available in an Experience

Machine would be far more pleasurable and less painful than those of a

real life, hardly anyone admits to wanting to plug in to an Experience

Machine.

Despite the nearly unanimous judgment that plugging into an Experience

Machine for life would be a mistake, substantial disagreement remains on

the question of why we think that our current life would be better for us

than a life in an Experience Machine. Many philosophers have offered different

suggestions as to why we do not, and should not, choose a life in an

Experience Machine. Nozick ’ s rationale is that plugging in would deprive

us the chance really to do and be certain things (as opposed merely to having

the internal experiences of doing and being them). Some (e.g., De Brigard)

have suggested that the feelings we experience in response to the thought

of the Experience Machine are based on an subconscious fear of change,

as shown by reversing the thought experiment (imagine that you have actually

been living an Experience Machine life all along). Until the disagreement

about why nearly all of us judge a life plugged into an Experience

Machine to be so ghastly is resolved, we cannot be confi dent that premise

3 of the argument (below) is correct or be sure that the Experience Machine

Objection to Hedonism should really be considered as decisive as it generally

is.

The Experience Machine Objection to Hedonism 231

Suppose that there were an experience machine that would give you any

experience you desired. Superduper neuropsychologists could stimulate your

brain so that you would think and feel you were writing a great novel, or

making a friend, or reading an interesting book. All the time, you would be

fl oating in a tank, with electrodes attached to your brain. Should you plug

into this machine for life, preprogramming your life ’ s experiences? If you are

worried about missing out on desirable experiences, we can suppose that

business enterprises have researched thoroughly the lives of many others. You

can pick and choose from their large library or smorgasbord of such experiences,

selecting your life ’ s experiences for, say, the next two years. After two

years have passed, you will have ten minutes or ten hours out of the tank, to

select the experiences of your next two years. Of course, while in the tank

you won ’ t know that you ’ re there; you ’ ll think it ’ s all actually happening.

Others can also plug in to have the experiences they want, so there ’ s no need

to stay unplugged to serve them. (Ignore problems such as who will service

the machines if everyone plugs in.) Would you plug in? What else can matter

to us, other than how our lives feel from the inside? Nor should you refrain

because of the few moments of distress between the moment you ’ ve decided

and the moment you ’ re plugged. What ’ s a few moments of distress compared

to a lifetime of bliss (if that ’ s what you choose), and why feel any distress at

all if your decision is the best one? (Nozick, 42 – 3)

P1. Plugging into an Experience Machine would make the rest of your life

dramatically more pleasurable and less painful than it would otherwise

have been (stipulated in thought experiment).

P2. Given the choice to plug into an Experience Machine for the rest of

your life, ignoring any responsibilities you might have to others, you

would decline (appeal to readers ’ judgment).

P3. If, ignoring any responsibilities you might have to others, you would

decline the chance to plug into an Experience Machine for the rest of

your life, then pleasure and pain are not the only things of intrinsic value

(or disvalue) in a life.

C1. Pleasure and pain are not the only things of intrinsic value (or disvalue)

in a life ( modus ponens , P2, P3).

P4. If hedonism is true, then pleasure and pain are the only things of intrinsic

value (or disvalue) in a life.

C2. Hedonism is false ( modus tollens , C1, P4).

59

The Error Theory Argument

Robert L. Muhlnickel

Mackie , John . “ A Refutation of Morals . ” Australasian Journal of Philosophy

24 ( 1946 ): 77 – 90 . Reprinted in Twentieth Century Ethical Theory ,

edited by Steven Cahn , Jeram Haber , and Joram Haber , 145 – 52 . Upper

Saddle River, NJ : Prentice - Hall , 1995 .

___. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong . Harmondsworth : Penguin , 1977 .

Metaethics is the philosophical inquiry into the nature and status of morality.

A basic question about the nature and status of morality is whether

expressions of moral approval and disapproval are objective. Moral objectivism,

generally and simply stated, is the view that moral expressions (in

speech, writing, or thought) are cognitive judgments, which are true or false

because of their relations to moral facts. Moral skepticism is the view that

there are no such moral facts. Many philosophers think that commonsense

morality presumes moral objectivism, and many philosophers defend versions

of moral objectivism. Defending moral skepticism requires showing

that the belief that moral facts exist is in error, even though our ordinary

language presumes they do exist. The aim of showing this belief as erroneous

gives the argument its name. The error theory argument is a “ destructive

” argument; it aims to show that moral objectivism is false. J. L. Mackie

defends the error theory argument and claims it shows that moral skepticism

is more reasonable than moral objectivism.

The error theory argument fi rst derives C1 by modus ponens that commonsense

morality assumes and many moral philosophers defend moral

objectivism. That C1 is the presumptive belief forestalls the objection that

the error theory argument attacks a straw man. The error theory argument ’ s

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

The Error Theory Argument 233

destructive aim is advanced by two component arguments: the argument

from relativity and the argument from queerness.

The argument from relativity extends from P3 to C2. P3 states the unimpeachable

fact of moral relativity: moral judgments observed in behavior,

described in records of deliberation, and stated in authoritative moral codes

of different societies and historical eras are different and often incompatible