DebateLabKIT/deepa2-corpus · Datasets at Hugging Face

text stringlengths 0 1.71k
Mill seems to be equivocating between them. Since “ audible ” just means
“ possible to hear ” and “ visible ” just means “ possible to see, ” in order for
his analogy to work, Mill must mean “ possible to desire ” when he talks of
something as being “ desirable. ” However, to prove that what we desire is
good, by “ desirable ” Mill must mean “ worthy of desire ” or “ good. ” While
it is possible that Mill is not confused and not equivocating between these
two senses of “ desirable, ” this would only mean that he is instead guilty of
committing the “ naturalistic fallacy ” ; that is, the fallacy of either inferring
how things should be merely from how things actually are (in this case,
what we should desire from what we do desire) or trying to defi ne a moral
Mill’s Proof of Utilitarianism 225
concept with a nonmoral concept (in this case, Mill would be defi ning
“ worthy of desire ” and “ good ” as just amounting to “ desired ” ).
Mill ’ s apparent logical errors continue when, at the tail end of his argument,
Mill seems to commit the “ fallacy of composition. ” One commits
this fallacy whenever one tries to infer something about a whole simply
because it is true of the whole ’ s parts. For example, I would be guilty of
the fallacy of composition if I were to infer that tables were invisible to the
naked eye just because tables are made of atoms, and atoms are invisible
to the naked eye. Mill seems to be committing this fallacy when he infers
that the general happiness is good for the group of all persons simply from
the fact that he has proven that personal happiness is good for an individual
person.
Is this straightforward reading of Mill ’ s argument for utilitarianism
correct? Did Mill really put forth an argument for half of utilitarianism that
is itself riddled with the simplest of logical mistakes? This is unlikely. As a
result, philosophers have developed a number of more charitable alternative
interpretations in an attempt to uncover what Mill actually intended. One
possible way in which philosophers have thought to alter our interpretation
of Mill ’ s argument for the better is by taking his analogy to be an attempt
to show that desire functions as an “ indicator ” or “ evidence ” of goodness.
For example, when someone thinks she hears something and there is no
reason to think that she is mistaken, then it plausible for us to conclude
that there actually is a sound present. On this reading of Mill ’ s argument,
desire similarly serves as an indicator of something worthy of desire actually
being present. Such an interpretation would avoid equivocating between
the two senses of “ desirable ” and would also prevent Mill from falling prey
to the naturalistic fallacy. This more charitable interpretation also has the
advantage of fi tting in well with Mill ’ s empiricist philosophical attitude.
Another way in which we might alter our interpretation of Mill ’ s argument
for the better is by reinterpreting his apparent commitment of the
fallacy of composition to instead be an argument concerning how the value
of happiness for an individual must depend on its intrinsic value. Specifi cally,
Mill could be interpreted as arguing that if happiness is good for an individual
to possess, then happiness itself must be good. But if happiness itself
is good and if we are to judge the moral rightness of our actions by how
much good they produce, then the rightness of my actions would depend
not only on how much of my happiness they result in, but also on how my
actions affect the happiness of others.
However, this does not exhaust the numerous alternative interpretations
of Mill ’ s argument. In fact, Mill ’ s remarks about the impossibility of providing
a proof of utilitarianism have led some philosophers to conclude
that Mill never meant to be giving an argument for utilitarianism in the
fi rst place. Of course, no matter how successful Mill ’ s argument for
226 A. T. Fyfe
utilitarianism might be under some particular interpretation (if we interpret
him to be giving one at all), Mill is still only arguing for utilitarianism ’ s
welfarist aspect. As we noted at the outset, Mill ’ s argument fails to address
consequentialism entirely. Mill simply takes for granted that it is “ the doctrine
of rational persons of all schools ” that “ the morality of actions
depends on the consequences which they tend to produce. ” This has become
increasingly regrettable, since much of the controversy surrounding utilitarianism
has come to concern precisely its consequentialist aspect, something
that Mill found so uncontroversial that he didn ’ t even provide an
argument for it.
The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible, is that
people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible, is that people
hear it: and so of the other sources of our experience. In like manner, I apprehend,
the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is
that people do actually desire it. If the end which the utilitarian doctrine
proposes to itself were not, in theory and in practice, acknowledged to be an
end, nothing could ever convince any person that it was so. No reason can
be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so
far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. This, however,
being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all
which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good: that each person ’ s
happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a
good to the aggregate of all persons. Happiness has made out its title as one
of the ends of conduct, and consequently one of the criteria of morality. (Mill
“ Of What Sort of Proof, ” 61)
As to the sentence [ . . . ] when I said the general happiness is a good to the
aggregate of all persons I did not mean that every human being ’ s happiness
is a good to every other human being, [ . . . ] I merely meant in this particular
sentence to argue that since A ’ s happiness is a good, B ’ s a good, C ’ s a good,
etc., the sum of all these goods must be a good. (Mill “ Excerpt from a Letter, ”
270)
Generic Argument for Traditional Utilitarianism
P1. Consequentialist Theory of the Right. An action is right for someone
to perform if and only if, of the available actions, it is the action that
would maximize total net good over bad in existence – otherwise, the
action is wrong.
P2. Welfarist Theory of the Good. The only intrinsic good is someone ’ s
happiness while the only intrinsic bad is someone ’ s unhappiness.
C1. Traditional Utilitarianism. An action is right for someone to perform
if and only if, of the available actions, it is the action that would
Mill’s Proof of Utilitarianism 227
maximize total net happiness over unhappiness in existence – otherwise,
the action is wrong (substitution, P1, P2).
Mill ’ s Proof of Utilitarianism (Straightforward Interpretation)
P1. The only proof that an object is visible is that people actually see it.

Mill seems to be equivocating between them. Since “ audible ” just means

“ possible to hear ” and “ visible ” just means “ possible to see, ” in order for

his analogy to work, Mill must mean “ possible to desire ” when he talks of

something as being “ desirable. ” However, to prove that what we desire is

good, by “ desirable ” Mill must mean “ worthy of desire ” or “ good. ” While

it is possible that Mill is not confused and not equivocating between these

two senses of “ desirable, ” this would only mean that he is instead guilty of

committing the “ naturalistic fallacy ” ; that is, the fallacy of either inferring

how things should be merely from how things actually are (in this case,

what we should desire from what we do desire) or trying to defi ne a moral

Mill’s Proof of Utilitarianism 225

concept with a nonmoral concept (in this case, Mill would be defi ning

“ worthy of desire ” and “ good ” as just amounting to “ desired ” ).

Mill ’ s apparent logical errors continue when, at the tail end of his argument,

Mill seems to commit the “ fallacy of composition. ” One commits

this fallacy whenever one tries to infer something about a whole simply

because it is true of the whole ’ s parts. For example, I would be guilty of

the fallacy of composition if I were to infer that tables were invisible to the

naked eye just because tables are made of atoms, and atoms are invisible

to the naked eye. Mill seems to be committing this fallacy when he infers

that the general happiness is good for the group of all persons simply from

the fact that he has proven that personal happiness is good for an individual

person.

Is this straightforward reading of Mill ’ s argument for utilitarianism

correct? Did Mill really put forth an argument for half of utilitarianism that

is itself riddled with the simplest of logical mistakes? This is unlikely. As a

result, philosophers have developed a number of more charitable alternative

interpretations in an attempt to uncover what Mill actually intended. One

possible way in which philosophers have thought to alter our interpretation

of Mill ’ s argument for the better is by taking his analogy to be an attempt

to show that desire functions as an “ indicator ” or “ evidence ” of goodness.

For example, when someone thinks she hears something and there is no

reason to think that she is mistaken, then it plausible for us to conclude

that there actually is a sound present. On this reading of Mill ’ s argument,

desire similarly serves as an indicator of something worthy of desire actually

being present. Such an interpretation would avoid equivocating between

the two senses of “ desirable ” and would also prevent Mill from falling prey

to the naturalistic fallacy. This more charitable interpretation also has the

advantage of fi tting in well with Mill ’ s empiricist philosophical attitude.

Another way in which we might alter our interpretation of Mill ’ s argument

for the better is by reinterpreting his apparent commitment of the

fallacy of composition to instead be an argument concerning how the value

of happiness for an individual must depend on its intrinsic value. Specifi cally,

Mill could be interpreted as arguing that if happiness is good for an individual

to possess, then happiness itself must be good. But if happiness itself

is good and if we are to judge the moral rightness of our actions by how

much good they produce, then the rightness of my actions would depend

not only on how much of my happiness they result in, but also on how my

actions affect the happiness of others.

However, this does not exhaust the numerous alternative interpretations

of Mill ’ s argument. In fact, Mill ’ s remarks about the impossibility of providing

a proof of utilitarianism have led some philosophers to conclude

that Mill never meant to be giving an argument for utilitarianism in the

fi rst place. Of course, no matter how successful Mill ’ s argument for

226 A. T. Fyfe

utilitarianism might be under some particular interpretation (if we interpret

him to be giving one at all), Mill is still only arguing for utilitarianism ’ s

welfarist aspect. As we noted at the outset, Mill ’ s argument fails to address

consequentialism entirely. Mill simply takes for granted that it is “ the doctrine

of rational persons of all schools ” that “ the morality of actions

depends on the consequences which they tend to produce. ” This has become

increasingly regrettable, since much of the controversy surrounding utilitarianism

has come to concern precisely its consequentialist aspect, something

that Mill found so uncontroversial that he didn ’ t even provide an

argument for it.

The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible, is that

people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible, is that people

hear it: and so of the other sources of our experience. In like manner, I apprehend,

the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is

that people do actually desire it. If the end which the utilitarian doctrine

proposes to itself were not, in theory and in practice, acknowledged to be an

end, nothing could ever convince any person that it was so. No reason can

be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so

far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. This, however,

being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all

which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good: that each person ’ s

happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a

good to the aggregate of all persons. Happiness has made out its title as one

of the ends of conduct, and consequently one of the criteria of morality. (Mill

“ Of What Sort of Proof, ” 61)

As to the sentence [ . . . ] when I said the general happiness is a good to the

aggregate of all persons I did not mean that every human being ’ s happiness

is a good to every other human being, [ . . . ] I merely meant in this particular

sentence to argue that since A ’ s happiness is a good, B ’ s a good, C ’ s a good,

etc., the sum of all these goods must be a good. (Mill “ Excerpt from a Letter, ”

270)

Generic Argument for Traditional Utilitarianism

P1. Consequentialist Theory of the Right. An action is right for someone

to perform if and only if, of the available actions, it is the action that

would maximize total net good over bad in existence – otherwise, the

action is wrong.

P2. Welfarist Theory of the Good. The only intrinsic good is someone ’ s

happiness while the only intrinsic bad is someone ’ s unhappiness.

C1. Traditional Utilitarianism. An action is right for someone to perform

if and only if, of the available actions, it is the action that would

Mill’s Proof of Utilitarianism 227

maximize total net happiness over unhappiness in existence – otherwise,

the action is wrong (substitution, P1, P2).

Mill ’ s Proof of Utilitarianism (Straightforward Interpretation)

P1. The only proof that an object is visible is that people actually see it.