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Brakas).
[S]ince “ the good ” is uttered signifying something in as many ways as
“ being ” [is] {for it is uttered signifying things in [the category of] the “ what ”
(for example, god – that is, mind) and in [the category of] quality (the virtues)
and in [the category of] quantity (the moderate[ - amount]) and in [the category
of] the relative (the useful) and in [the category of] time ([the] opportune - time)
and in [the category of] place ([an] abode) and other things such as these}, it
is clear that it cannot be some common universal – that is, one thing; for
[then] it would not be uttered signifying things in all the categories but in one
only. (Aristotle A6: 1096a23 – 9; author ’ s translation)
In fairness to Aristotle, I must add that he does not remain content
with this negative conclusion. After having fi elded fi ve or six arguments to
prove that the good cannot be one thing, he goes on in the same chapter
to ask:
But what, then, does [ “ the good ” ] signify? 1 It certainly is not like the things
bearing the same name by chance. But then do absolutely all goods belong
to one class at least by being [derived] from one thing or [by being] relative
to one thing? Or [do they belong to one class] rather by analogy (for as sight
1 Literally: “ But how, then, is it uttered signifying something? ”
Aristotle’s Argument that Goods Are Irreducible 213
is in the body, so reason is in the soul, and so on in other cases)? (Aristotle,
1096b26 – 9; author ’ s translation)
He dismisses such questions “ for now, ” since exact statements about
them “ would be more appropriate to another branch of philosophy ”
(Aristotle, 1096b30 – 1). His promise, unfortunately is not fulfi lled – at least
not in the extant works. Even so, I believe a plausible reconstruction of his
answers to these questions can be given. However, no such reconstruction
is in print yet.
P1. “ The good ” signifi es things in all the categories of being.
P2. If “ the good ” signifi es things in all the categories of being, then goods
exist in all the categories of being.
C1. Goods exist in all the categories of being ( modus ponens , P2, P1).
P3. If goods exist in all the categories of being, then goods cannot be
reduced to some universal common to all goods.
C2. Goods cannot be reduced to some universal common to all goods
( modus ponens , P3, C1).
P4. If goods cannot be reduced to some universal common to all goods,
then the good is not one thing.
C3. The good is not one thing ( modus ponens , P4, C2).
54
Aristotle ’ s Argument for
Perfectionism
Eric J. Silverman
Aristotle . Nicomachean Ethics , translated by Martin Ostwald. Upper Saddle
River, NJ : Prentice Hall , 1999 .
Anscombe , G. E. M. “ Modern Moral Philosophy . ” Philosophy 33 , 24 ( 1958 ):
1 – 19 .
Aquinas , Thomas . Treatise on Happiness , translated by John A. Oesterle.
South Bend, IN : University of Notre Dame Press , 1983 .
Broadie , Sarah . Ethics with Aristotle . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1993 .
Cahn , Steven M. , and Christine Vitrano . Happiness: Classic and Contemporary
Readings in Philosophy . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2008 .
One long - disputed issue in ethics concerns the nature of the supreme good
for humanity. In other words, what is the best possible life that a person
can lead? This supreme good is commonly referred to as “ happiness ” or
“ the happy life. ” Several of the ancient Greek philosophers held a view
called “ perfectionism, ” which claims that the ongoing exercise of moral
and intellectual virtue constitutes the best possible life for humanity.
Aristotle ’ s Nicomachean Ethics offers the most infl uential of the ancient
arguments for viewing the life of virtue rather than the life of pleasure,
wealth, honor, or amusement as humanity ’ s supreme good. Aristotle ’ s perfectionistic
views infl uenced the ethics of medieval theists such as Thomas
Aquinas and Moses Maimonides. While his views were less infl uential
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Aristotle’s Argument for Perfectionism 215
during the modern era, some of them were reintroduced when G. E. M.
Anscombe ’ s “ Modern Moral Philosophy ” inaugurated the contemporary
virtue ethics movement.
Aristotle ’ s argument for perfectionism is grounded in a controversial
account of human nature. Since he holds a teleological view of the universe,
he claims that all things – including human beings – have an ultimate function
or purpose for which they exist. Aristotelian terminology refers to this
ultimate purpose as a “ fi nal cause. ” Therefore, he claims that the supreme
good for humanity is to achieve this ultimate purpose. He establishes two
criteria for recognizing the supreme good for humanity: it must be desired
as an end in itself rather than as a means to some further good, and it must
be suffi cient in itself for making life good. Finally, he claims that the virtuous
life fulfi lls humanity ’ s ultimate purpose by actualizing the intellectual
and moral potentials distinctive of our species. Accordingly, he argues that
the virtuous life better fi ts the criteria for happiness than other lifestyles.
Since there are evidently several ends, and since we choose some of these
– e.g., wealth, fl utes, and instruments generally – as a means to something
else, it is obvious that not all ends are fi nal. The highest good, on the other
hand, must be something fi nal. Thus, if there is only one fi nal end, this will
be the good we are seeking; if there are several, it will be the most fi nal and
perfect of them. We call that which is pursued as an end in itself more fi nal
than an end which is pursued for the sake of something else; and what is
never chosen as a means to something else we call more fi nal than that which
is chosen both as an end in itself and as a means to something else. What is
always chosen as an end in itself and never as a means to something else is
called fi nal in an unqualifi ed sense. This description seems to apply to happiness
above all else: for we always choose happiness as an end in itself and
never for the sake of something else. Honor, pleasure, intelligence, and all
virtue we choose partly for themselves – for we would choose each of them
even if no further advantage would accrue from them – but we also choose
them partly for the sake of happiness, because we assume that it is through
them that we will be happy. On the other hand, no one chooses happiness
for the sake of honor, pleasure, and the like, nor as a means to anything

Brakas).

[S]ince “ the good ” is uttered signifying something in as many ways as

“ being ” [is] {for it is uttered signifying things in [the category of] the “ what ”

(for example, god – that is, mind) and in [the category of] quality (the virtues)

and in [the category of] quantity (the moderate[ - amount]) and in [the category

of] the relative (the useful) and in [the category of] time ([the] opportune - time)

and in [the category of] place ([an] abode) and other things such as these}, it

is clear that it cannot be some common universal – that is, one thing; for

[then] it would not be uttered signifying things in all the categories but in one

only. (Aristotle A6: 1096a23 – 9; author ’ s translation)

In fairness to Aristotle, I must add that he does not remain content

with this negative conclusion. After having fi elded fi ve or six arguments to

prove that the good cannot be one thing, he goes on in the same chapter

to ask:

But what, then, does [ “ the good ” ] signify? 1 It certainly is not like the things

bearing the same name by chance. But then do absolutely all goods belong

to one class at least by being [derived] from one thing or [by being] relative

to one thing? Or [do they belong to one class] rather by analogy (for as sight

1 Literally: “ But how, then, is it uttered signifying something? ”

Aristotle’s Argument that Goods Are Irreducible 213

is in the body, so reason is in the soul, and so on in other cases)? (Aristotle,

1096b26 – 9; author ’ s translation)

He dismisses such questions “ for now, ” since exact statements about

them “ would be more appropriate to another branch of philosophy ”

(Aristotle, 1096b30 – 1). His promise, unfortunately is not fulfi lled – at least

not in the extant works. Even so, I believe a plausible reconstruction of his

answers to these questions can be given. However, no such reconstruction

is in print yet.

P1. “ The good ” signifi es things in all the categories of being.

P2. If “ the good ” signifi es things in all the categories of being, then goods

exist in all the categories of being.

C1. Goods exist in all the categories of being ( modus ponens , P2, P1).

P3. If goods exist in all the categories of being, then goods cannot be

reduced to some universal common to all goods.

C2. Goods cannot be reduced to some universal common to all goods

( modus ponens , P3, C1).

P4. If goods cannot be reduced to some universal common to all goods,

then the good is not one thing.

C3. The good is not one thing ( modus ponens , P4, C2).

54

Aristotle ’ s Argument for

Perfectionism

Eric J. Silverman

Aristotle . Nicomachean Ethics , translated by Martin Ostwald. Upper Saddle

River, NJ : Prentice Hall , 1999 .

Anscombe , G. E. M. “ Modern Moral Philosophy . ” Philosophy 33 , 24 ( 1958 ):

1 – 19 .

Aquinas , Thomas . Treatise on Happiness , translated by John A. Oesterle.

South Bend, IN : University of Notre Dame Press , 1983 .

Broadie , Sarah . Ethics with Aristotle . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1993 .

Cahn , Steven M. , and Christine Vitrano . Happiness: Classic and Contemporary

Readings in Philosophy . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2008 .

One long - disputed issue in ethics concerns the nature of the supreme good

for humanity. In other words, what is the best possible life that a person

can lead? This supreme good is commonly referred to as “ happiness ” or

“ the happy life. ” Several of the ancient Greek philosophers held a view

called “ perfectionism, ” which claims that the ongoing exercise of moral

and intellectual virtue constitutes the best possible life for humanity.

Aristotle ’ s Nicomachean Ethics offers the most infl uential of the ancient

arguments for viewing the life of virtue rather than the life of pleasure,

wealth, honor, or amusement as humanity ’ s supreme good. Aristotle ’ s perfectionistic

views infl uenced the ethics of medieval theists such as Thomas

Aquinas and Moses Maimonides. While his views were less infl uential

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

Aristotle’s Argument for Perfectionism 215

during the modern era, some of them were reintroduced when G. E. M.

Anscombe ’ s “ Modern Moral Philosophy ” inaugurated the contemporary

virtue ethics movement.

Aristotle ’ s argument for perfectionism is grounded in a controversial

account of human nature. Since he holds a teleological view of the universe,

he claims that all things – including human beings – have an ultimate function

or purpose for which they exist. Aristotelian terminology refers to this

ultimate purpose as a “ fi nal cause. ” Therefore, he claims that the supreme

good for humanity is to achieve this ultimate purpose. He establishes two

criteria for recognizing the supreme good for humanity: it must be desired

as an end in itself rather than as a means to some further good, and it must

be suffi cient in itself for making life good. Finally, he claims that the virtuous

life fulfi lls humanity ’ s ultimate purpose by actualizing the intellectual

and moral potentials distinctive of our species. Accordingly, he argues that

the virtuous life better fi ts the criteria for happiness than other lifestyles.

Since there are evidently several ends, and since we choose some of these

– e.g., wealth, fl utes, and instruments generally – as a means to something

else, it is obvious that not all ends are fi nal. The highest good, on the other

hand, must be something fi nal. Thus, if there is only one fi nal end, this will

be the good we are seeking; if there are several, it will be the most fi nal and

perfect of them. We call that which is pursued as an end in itself more fi nal

than an end which is pursued for the sake of something else; and what is

never chosen as a means to something else we call more fi nal than that which

is chosen both as an end in itself and as a means to something else. What is

always chosen as an end in itself and never as a means to something else is

called fi nal in an unqualifi ed sense. This description seems to apply to happiness

above all else: for we always choose happiness as an end in itself and

never for the sake of something else. Honor, pleasure, intelligence, and all

virtue we choose partly for themselves – for we would choose each of them

even if no further advantage would accrue from them – but we also choose

them partly for the sake of happiness, because we assume that it is through

them that we will be happy. On the other hand, no one chooses happiness

for the sake of honor, pleasure, and the like, nor as a means to anything