DebateLabKIT/deepa2-corpus · Datasets at Hugging Face

text stringlengths 0 1.71k
identifi ed as justice, P3 begins to look somewhat better:
Even if one has every kind of food and drink, lots of money, and every
sort of power to rule, life is thought to be not worth living when the body ’ s
nature is ruined. So even if someone can do whatever he wishes [ … ] how can
it be worth living when his soul – the very thing by which he lives – is ruined
and in turmoil? (Plato, 445a)
The fuller version of the argument, as it appears in Book 4 (434d – 445b),
can be analyzed like this:
206 Joshua I. Weinstein
P1 ′ . The activity of the soul is to live.
P2 ′ . Living consists of potentially contradictory sub - activities.
C1 ′ . The soul performs potentially contradictory activities (substitution,
P2 ′ into P1 ′ ).
P3 ′ . Everything that performs potentially contradictory activities consists
of parts.
C2 ′ . The soul is composed of parts (instantiation, P3 ′ ).
P4 ′ . Everything that is composed of parts performs its activity well if and
only if each of its parts performs, and only performs, its own
activities.
C3 ′ . The soul performs its activity well if and only if each of its parts
performs, and only performs, its own activity (instantiation, P4 ′ ).
P5 ′ . Justice is doing what is one ’ s own, and not doing what is not one ’ s
own.
C4 ′ . The soul performs its activity well if and only if it is just (substitution,
P5 ′ into C3 ′ ).
C5 ′ . One lives well if and only if one is just (substitution, P1 ′ into C4 ′ ).
P6 ′ . One who lives well is happy, one who lives poorly is miserable.
C6 ′ . The just person lives happily, the unjust lives miserably (substitution,
P6 ′ into C5 ′ ).
This version of the argument is far more muscular and compelling than
the original. The range of impulses it claims to integrate includes everything
from the desire for sweet pastries and attractive partners, through the competitive
urge to succeed and be respected (especially according to one ’ s
parents ’ expectations), and on to the desire to overcome perplexity, escape
one ’ s own ignorance, and contemplate eternity.
But this version also has problems which remain hotly contested to this
day. P3 ′ and the inference to C2 ′ are defended in a complex and controversial
argument based on the principle that no one thing can do or undergo
both one thing and its opposite at the same time in the same sense and
respect (436b – 441c). This sub - argument is notable for probably being the
fi rst recorded use of the principle of noncontradiction. Plato also argues
here that the number of activities – and hence parts of the soul – is exactly
three : sustenance by the appetites; control and stability by the spirited part;
and guidance through deliberation and reason. (Cooper is a good place to
begin examining this tripartition of the soul.) C4 ′ has also drawn much fi re,
since it seems to depend on an equivocation on the meaning of a soul ’ s
being “ just. ” Can one be just because all of one ’ s psychic parts work properly
and together, even as one goes out to rob, cheat, and steal? Or is
Socrates right in asserting that this is impossible? (See Sacks.)
Do living well and treating others properly both depend on “ justice in
the soul ” ; that is, minimizing internal discord and being “ in tune ” with
Justice Brings Happiness in Plato’s Republic 207
oneself? Freudian psychoanalysis and Eastern schools of yoga or meditation
derive much of their appeal from similar arguments: “ You can ’ t live well
without being an authentic, honest, person. ” “ A thief never sleeps well at
night. ” “ You must fi nd inner peace and be at one. ” Plato ’ s version is not
only older and more deeply rooted in Western culture, but the Republic
also includes a detailed explication of how philosophy, politics, and pleasure
all fi t into the one whole thing which is “ living one ’ s life well through
achieving psychic harmony ” – that is, justice.
52
Aristotle ’ s Function Argument
Sean McAleer 1
Aristotle . Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics , translated by Terence Irwin.
Indianapolis : Hackett , 1999 .
The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle (384 – 322 bce ) remains infl uential
today, especially among advocates of virtue ethics (roughly, the view that
moral philosophy should focus primarily the virtues rather than on duties
or rights or good consequences). The Function Argument – so - called because
it relies on the notion of a thing ’ s function or characteristic activity – is the
centerpiece of the fi rst of the Nicomachean Ethics ’ ten books; Aristotle
spends the remaining nine books elaborating on its conclusion by investigating
its key terms (soul, virtue, etc.). The Function Argument concerns the
nature of happiness ( eudaimonia ), which for Aristotle means not a momentary
psychological state or mood but a life of fl ourishing or well - being. We
all want to be happy, Aristotle thinks; happiness is the fi nal good or end
that we seek, the ultimate reason we choose other things and which we
don ’ t choose for the sake of anything else. But these formal features of
happiness don ’ t give us a clear target to aim at in leading our lives. The
task of the Function Argument, an ambitious and infl uential attempt to
1 Work on this chapter was supported by the University of Wisconsin – Eau Claire Faculty
Sabbatical Leave Program, for which the author is most grateful.
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Aristotle’s Function Argument 209
arrive at moral truths by considering human nature, is to provide such a
target; it boldly concludes that human beings can ’ t be happy without being
virtuous.
Some more conceptual background might be helpful. For Aristotle, the
essence of a thing isn ’ t what it ’ s made of, or its DNA or chemical structure,
but what activities it characteristically performs and ends it characteristically
pursues: in other words, its function ( ergon ). This organ is a heart
because its function is to pump blood, while that organ is a kidney because
its function is to clean blood. Once you know a thing ’ s function, you have
a standard by which to evaluate it: something is good when it performs its
function well – when it achieves the good it characteristically seeks. For
example, a knife ’ s function is to cut, so a good knife cuts well. A virtue or
excellence ( aret ê ) is the condition or state that enables a thing to perform
its function well. Thus the virtue of a knife is sharpness, since being sharp

identifi ed as justice, P3 begins to look somewhat better:

Even if one has every kind of food and drink, lots of money, and every

sort of power to rule, life is thought to be not worth living when the body ’ s

nature is ruined. So even if someone can do whatever he wishes [ … ] how can

it be worth living when his soul – the very thing by which he lives – is ruined

and in turmoil? (Plato, 445a)

The fuller version of the argument, as it appears in Book 4 (434d – 445b),

can be analyzed like this:

206 Joshua I. Weinstein

P1 ′ . The activity of the soul is to live.

P2 ′ . Living consists of potentially contradictory sub - activities.

C1 ′ . The soul performs potentially contradictory activities (substitution,

P2 ′ into P1 ′ ).

P3 ′ . Everything that performs potentially contradictory activities consists

of parts.

C2 ′ . The soul is composed of parts (instantiation, P3 ′ ).

P4 ′ . Everything that is composed of parts performs its activity well if and

only if each of its parts performs, and only performs, its own

activities.

C3 ′ . The soul performs its activity well if and only if each of its parts

performs, and only performs, its own activity (instantiation, P4 ′ ).

P5 ′ . Justice is doing what is one ’ s own, and not doing what is not one ’ s

own.

C4 ′ . The soul performs its activity well if and only if it is just (substitution,

P5 ′ into C3 ′ ).

C5 ′ . One lives well if and only if one is just (substitution, P1 ′ into C4 ′ ).

P6 ′ . One who lives well is happy, one who lives poorly is miserable.

C6 ′ . The just person lives happily, the unjust lives miserably (substitution,

P6 ′ into C5 ′ ).

This version of the argument is far more muscular and compelling than

the original. The range of impulses it claims to integrate includes everything

from the desire for sweet pastries and attractive partners, through the competitive

urge to succeed and be respected (especially according to one ’ s

parents ’ expectations), and on to the desire to overcome perplexity, escape

one ’ s own ignorance, and contemplate eternity.

But this version also has problems which remain hotly contested to this

day. P3 ′ and the inference to C2 ′ are defended in a complex and controversial

argument based on the principle that no one thing can do or undergo

both one thing and its opposite at the same time in the same sense and

respect (436b – 441c). This sub - argument is notable for probably being the

fi rst recorded use of the principle of noncontradiction. Plato also argues

here that the number of activities – and hence parts of the soul – is exactly

three : sustenance by the appetites; control and stability by the spirited part;

and guidance through deliberation and reason. (Cooper is a good place to

begin examining this tripartition of the soul.) C4 ′ has also drawn much fi re,

since it seems to depend on an equivocation on the meaning of a soul ’ s

being “ just. ” Can one be just because all of one ’ s psychic parts work properly

and together, even as one goes out to rob, cheat, and steal? Or is

Socrates right in asserting that this is impossible? (See Sacks.)

Do living well and treating others properly both depend on “ justice in

the soul ” ; that is, minimizing internal discord and being “ in tune ” with

Justice Brings Happiness in Plato’s Republic 207

oneself? Freudian psychoanalysis and Eastern schools of yoga or meditation

derive much of their appeal from similar arguments: “ You can ’ t live well

without being an authentic, honest, person. ” “ A thief never sleeps well at

night. ” “ You must fi nd inner peace and be at one. ” Plato ’ s version is not

only older and more deeply rooted in Western culture, but the Republic

also includes a detailed explication of how philosophy, politics, and pleasure

all fi t into the one whole thing which is “ living one ’ s life well through

achieving psychic harmony ” – that is, justice.

52

Aristotle ’ s Function Argument

Sean McAleer 1

Aristotle . Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics , translated by Terence Irwin.

Indianapolis : Hackett , 1999 .

The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle (384 – 322 bce ) remains infl uential

today, especially among advocates of virtue ethics (roughly, the view that

moral philosophy should focus primarily the virtues rather than on duties

or rights or good consequences). The Function Argument – so - called because

it relies on the notion of a thing ’ s function or characteristic activity – is the

centerpiece of the fi rst of the Nicomachean Ethics ’ ten books; Aristotle

spends the remaining nine books elaborating on its conclusion by investigating

its key terms (soul, virtue, etc.). The Function Argument concerns the

nature of happiness ( eudaimonia ), which for Aristotle means not a momentary

psychological state or mood but a life of fl ourishing or well - being. We

all want to be happy, Aristotle thinks; happiness is the fi nal good or end

that we seek, the ultimate reason we choose other things and which we

don ’ t choose for the sake of anything else. But these formal features of

happiness don ’ t give us a clear target to aim at in leading our lives. The

task of the Function Argument, an ambitious and infl uential attempt to

1 Work on this chapter was supported by the University of Wisconsin – Eau Claire Faculty

Sabbatical Leave Program, for which the author is most grateful.

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

Aristotle’s Function Argument 209

arrive at moral truths by considering human nature, is to provide such a

target; it boldly concludes that human beings can ’ t be happy without being

virtuous.

Some more conceptual background might be helpful. For Aristotle, the

essence of a thing isn ’ t what it ’ s made of, or its DNA or chemical structure,

but what activities it characteristically performs and ends it characteristically

pursues: in other words, its function ( ergon ). This organ is a heart

because its function is to pump blood, while that organ is a kidney because

its function is to clean blood. Once you know a thing ’ s function, you have

a standard by which to evaluate it: something is good when it performs its

function well – when it achieves the good it characteristically seeks. For

example, a knife ’ s function is to cut, so a good knife cuts well. A virtue or

excellence ( aret ê ) is the condition or state that enables a thing to perform

its function well. Thus the virtue of a knife is sharpness, since being sharp