DebateLabKIT/deepa2-corpus · Datasets at Hugging Face

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of the central principle of democracy, majority rule.
The militant can challenge this argument on two grounds,
one factual and the other philosophical. The factual claim in
the democrat's argument is that a reform that cannot be implemented
by legal means lacks the approval of the majority of
the electorate. Perhaps this would hold in a direct democracy,
in which the whole electorate voted on each issue; but it is
certainly not always true of modem representative democracies.
There is no way of ensuring that on any given issue a majority
of representatives will take the same view as a majority of their
constituents. One can be reasonably confident that a majority
of those Americans who saw, on television, excerpts from Gennarelli's
videotapes would not have supported the experiments.
But that is not how decisions are made in a democracy. In
choosing between representatives - or in choosing between political
parties - voters elect to take one 'package deal' in preference
to other package deals on offer. It will often happen that
in order to vote for policies they favour, voters must go along
with other policies they are not keen on. It will also happen
that policies voters favour are not offered by any major party.
In the case of abortion in the United States, the crucial decision
was not made by a majority of voters, but by the Supreme Court.
299
Practical Ethics
It cannot be overturned by a simple majority of the electors, but
only by the Court itself, or by the complicated procedure of a
constitutional amendment, which can be thwarted by a minority
of the electorate.
What if a majority did approve of the wrong that the militants
wish to stop? Would it then be wrong to use illegal means?
Here we have the philosophical claim underlying the democratic
argument for obedience, the claim that we ought to accept the
majority decision.
The case for majority rule should not be overstated. No sensible
democrat would claim that the majority is always right. If
49 per cent of the population can be wrong, so can 51 per cent.
Whether the majority supports the views of the Animal Liberation
Front or of Operation Rescue does not settle the question
whether these views are morally sound. Perhaps the fact that
these groups are in a minority - if they are - means that they
should reconsider their means. With a majority behind them,
they could claim to be acting with democratic principles on their
side, using illegal means to overcome flaws in the democratic
machinery. Without that majority, all the weight of democratic
tradition is against them and it is they who appear as coercers,
trying to force the majority into accepting something against its
will. But how much moral weight should we give to democratic
principles?
Thoreau, as we might expect, was not impressed by majority
decision making. 'All voting: he wrote, 'is a sort of gaming,
like checkers or backgammon, with a slight moral tinge to it, a
playing with right and wrong, with moral questions: In a sense
Thoreau was right. If we reject, as we must, the doctrine that
the majority is always right, to submit moral issues to the vote
is to gamble that what we believe to be right will come out of
the ballot with more votes behind it than what we believe to
be wrong; and that is a gamble we will often lose.
Nevertheless we should not be too contemptuous about voting,
or gambling either. Cowboys who agree to play poker to
300
Ends and Means
decide matters of honour do better than cowboys who continue
to settle such matters in the traditional Western manner. A
society that decides its controversial issues by ballots does better
than one that uses bullets. To some extent this is a point we
have already encountered, under the heading 'law and order'.
It applies to any society with an established, peaceful method
of resolving disputes; but in a democracy there is a subtle difference
that gives added weight to the outcome of the decisionprocedure.
A method of settling disputes in which no one has
greater ultimate power than anyone else is a method that can
be recommended to all as a fair compromise between competing
claims to power. Any other method must give greater power to
some than to others and thereby invites opposition from those
who have less. That, at least, is true in the egalitarian age in
which we live. In a feudal society in which people accept as
natural and proper their status as lord or vassal there is no
challenge to the feudal lord and no compromise would be
needed. (I am thinking of an ideal feudal system, as I am thinking
of an ideal democracy.) Those times, however, seem to be
gone forever. The breakdown of traditional authority created a
need for political compromise. Among possible compromises,
giving one vote to each person is uniquely acceptable to all. As
such, in the absence of any agreed procedure for deciding on
some other distribution of power, it offers, in principle, the
firmest possible basis for a peaceful method of settling disputes.
To reject majority rule, therefore, is to reject the best possible
basis for the peaceful ordering of society in an egalitarian age.
Where else should one tum? To a meritocratic franchise, with
extra votes for the more intelligent or better educated, as John
Stuart Mill once proposed? But could we agree on who merits
extra votes? To a benevolent despot? Many would accept that
- if they could choose the despot. In practice the likely outcome
of abandoning majority rule is none of these: it is the rule of
those who command the greatest force.
So the principle of majority rule does carry substantial moral
301
Pradical Ethics
weight. Disobedience is easier to justify in a dictatorship like
Nazi Germany than in a democracy like those of North America,

of the central principle of democracy, majority rule.

The militant can challenge this argument on two grounds,

one factual and the other philosophical. The factual claim in

the democrat's argument is that a reform that cannot be implemented

by legal means lacks the approval of the majority of

the electorate. Perhaps this would hold in a direct democracy,

in which the whole electorate voted on each issue; but it is

certainly not always true of modem representative democracies.

There is no way of ensuring that on any given issue a majority

of representatives will take the same view as a majority of their

constituents. One can be reasonably confident that a majority

of those Americans who saw, on television, excerpts from Gennarelli's

videotapes would not have supported the experiments.

But that is not how decisions are made in a democracy. In

choosing between representatives - or in choosing between political

parties - voters elect to take one 'package deal' in preference

to other package deals on offer. It will often happen that

in order to vote for policies they favour, voters must go along

with other policies they are not keen on. It will also happen

that policies voters favour are not offered by any major party.

In the case of abortion in the United States, the crucial decision

was not made by a majority of voters, but by the Supreme Court.

299

Practical Ethics

It cannot be overturned by a simple majority of the electors, but

only by the Court itself, or by the complicated procedure of a

constitutional amendment, which can be thwarted by a minority

of the electorate.

What if a majority did approve of the wrong that the militants

wish to stop? Would it then be wrong to use illegal means?

Here we have the philosophical claim underlying the democratic

argument for obedience, the claim that we ought to accept the

majority decision.

The case for majority rule should not be overstated. No sensible

democrat would claim that the majority is always right. If

49 per cent of the population can be wrong, so can 51 per cent.

Whether the majority supports the views of the Animal Liberation

Front or of Operation Rescue does not settle the question

whether these views are morally sound. Perhaps the fact that

these groups are in a minority - if they are - means that they

should reconsider their means. With a majority behind them,

they could claim to be acting with democratic principles on their

side, using illegal means to overcome flaws in the democratic

machinery. Without that majority, all the weight of democratic

tradition is against them and it is they who appear as coercers,

trying to force the majority into accepting something against its

will. But how much moral weight should we give to democratic

principles?

Thoreau, as we might expect, was not impressed by majority

decision making. 'All voting: he wrote, 'is a sort of gaming,

like checkers or backgammon, with a slight moral tinge to it, a

playing with right and wrong, with moral questions: In a sense

Thoreau was right. If we reject, as we must, the doctrine that

the majority is always right, to submit moral issues to the vote

is to gamble that what we believe to be right will come out of

the ballot with more votes behind it than what we believe to

be wrong; and that is a gamble we will often lose.

Nevertheless we should not be too contemptuous about voting,

or gambling either. Cowboys who agree to play poker to

300

Ends and Means

decide matters of honour do better than cowboys who continue

to settle such matters in the traditional Western manner. A

society that decides its controversial issues by ballots does better

than one that uses bullets. To some extent this is a point we

have already encountered, under the heading 'law and order'.

It applies to any society with an established, peaceful method

of resolving disputes; but in a democracy there is a subtle difference

that gives added weight to the outcome of the decisionprocedure.

A method of settling disputes in which no one has

greater ultimate power than anyone else is a method that can

be recommended to all as a fair compromise between competing

claims to power. Any other method must give greater power to

some than to others and thereby invites opposition from those

who have less. That, at least, is true in the egalitarian age in

which we live. In a feudal society in which people accept as

natural and proper their status as lord or vassal there is no

challenge to the feudal lord and no compromise would be

needed. (I am thinking of an ideal feudal system, as I am thinking

of an ideal democracy.) Those times, however, seem to be

gone forever. The breakdown of traditional authority created a

need for political compromise. Among possible compromises,

giving one vote to each person is uniquely acceptable to all. As

such, in the absence of any agreed procedure for deciding on

some other distribution of power, it offers, in principle, the

firmest possible basis for a peaceful method of settling disputes.

To reject majority rule, therefore, is to reject the best possible

basis for the peaceful ordering of society in an egalitarian age.

Where else should one tum? To a meritocratic franchise, with

extra votes for the more intelligent or better educated, as John

Stuart Mill once proposed? But could we agree on who merits

extra votes? To a benevolent despot? Many would accept that

- if they could choose the despot. In practice the likely outcome

of abandoning majority rule is none of these: it is the rule of

those who command the greatest force.

So the principle of majority rule does carry substantial moral

301

Pradical Ethics

weight. Disobedience is easier to justify in a dictatorship like

Nazi Germany than in a democracy like those of North America,