DebateLabKIT/deepa2-corpus · Datasets at Hugging Face

text stringlengths 0 1.71k
Europe, India, Japan, or Australia today. In a democracy we
should be reluctant to take any action that amounts to an attempt
to coerce the majority, for such attempts imply the rejection
of majority rule and there is no acceptable alternative
to that. There may, of course, be cases where the majority decision
is so appalling that coercion is justified, whatever the risk.
The obligation to obey a genuine majority decision is not absolute.
We show our respect for the principle not by blind obedience
to the majority, but by regarding ourselves as justified
in disobeying only in extreme circumstances.
DISOBEDIENCE, CIVIL OR OTHERWISE
If we draw together our conclusions on the use of illegal means
to achieve laudable ends, we shall find that: (1) there are reasons
why we should normally accept the verdict of an established
peaceful method of settling disputes; (2) these reasons are particularly
strong when the decision-procedure is democratic and
the verdict represents a genuine majority view; but (3) there
are still situations in which the use of illegal means can be
justified.
We have seen that there are two distinct ways in which one
might try to justify the use of illegal means in a society that is
democratic (even if imperfectly so, as, to varying degrees, existing
democracies are). The first is on the grounds that the
decision one is objecting to is not a genuine expression of majority
opinion. The second is that although the decision is a
genuine expression of the majority view, this view is so seriously
wrong that action against the majority is justified.
It is disobedience on the first ground that best merits the name
'civil disobedience'. Here the use of illegal means can be regarded
as an extension of the use of legal means to secure a
302
Ends and Means
genuinely democratic decision. The extension may be necessary
because the normal channels for securing reform are not working
properly. On some issues parliamentary representatives are
overly influenced by skilled and well-paid special interests. On
others the public is unaware of what is happening. Perhaps the
abuse requires administrative, rather than legislative change,
and the bureaucrats of the civil service have refused to be inconvenienced.
Perhaps the legitimate interests of a minority are
being ignored by prejudiced officials. In all these cases, the nowstandard
forms of civil disobedience - passive resistance,
marches, or sit-ins - are appropriate. The blockade of the HydroElectric
Commission's road into the site ofthe proposed Franklin
river dam was a classic case of civil disobedience in this sense.
In these situations disobeying the law is not an attempt to
coerce the majority. Instead disobedience attempts to inform the
majority; or to persuade parliamentarians that large numbers
of electors feel very strongly about the issue; or to draw national
attention to an issue previously left to bureaucrats; or to appeal
for reconsideration of a decision too hastily made. Civil disobedience
is an appropriate means to these ends when legal
means have failed, because, although it is illegal. it does not
threaten the majority or attempt to coerce them (though it will
usually impose some extra costs on them, for example for law
enforcement). By not resisting the force ofthe law, by remaining
non-violent and by accepting the legal penalty for their actions,
civil disobedients make manifest both the sincerity of their protest
and their respect for the rule of law and the fundamental
principles of democracy.
So conceived, civil disobedience is not difficult to justify. The
justification does not have to be strong enough to override the
obligation to obey a democratic decision, since disobedience is
an attempt to restore, rather than frustrate, the process of democratic
decision making. Disobedience of this kind could be
justified by, for instance, the aim of making the public aware
303
Practical Ethics
of the loss of irreplaceable wilderness caused by the construction
of a dam, or of how animals are treated in the laboratories and
factory farms that few people ever see.
The use of illegal means to prevent action undeniably in accordance
with the majority view is harder - but not impossible
- to justify. We may think it unlikely that a Nazi-style policy
of genocide could ever be approved by a majority vote, but if
that were to happen it would be carrying respect for majority
rule to absurd lengths to regard oneself as bound to accept the
majority decision. To oppose evils of that magnitude, we are
justified in using virtually any means likely to be effective.
Genocide is an extreme case. To grant that it justifies the use
of illegal means even against a majority concedes very little in
terms of practical political action. Yet admitting even one exception
to the obligation to abide by democratic decisions raises
further questions: where is the line to be drawn between evils
like genocide, where the obligation is clearly overridden, and
less serious issues, where it is not? And who is to decide on
which side of this imaginary line a particular issue falls? Gary
Leber, of Operation Rescue, has written that in the United States
alone, since 1973, 'We've already destroyed four times the number
of people that Hitler did: Ronnie Lee, one of the British
founders of the Animal Liberation Front, has also used the Nazi
metaphor for what we do to animals, saying: 'Although we are
only one species among many on earth, we've set up a Reich
totally dominating the other animals, even enslaving them: It
is not surprising then, that these activists consider their disobedience
well justified. But do they have the right to take this
decision themselves? If not, who is to decide when an issue is
so serious that, even in a democracy, the obligation to obey the
law is overridden?
The only answer this question can have is: we must decide

Europe, India, Japan, or Australia today. In a democracy we

should be reluctant to take any action that amounts to an attempt

to coerce the majority, for such attempts imply the rejection

of majority rule and there is no acceptable alternative

to that. There may, of course, be cases where the majority decision

is so appalling that coercion is justified, whatever the risk.

The obligation to obey a genuine majority decision is not absolute.

We show our respect for the principle not by blind obedience

to the majority, but by regarding ourselves as justified

in disobeying only in extreme circumstances.

DISOBEDIENCE, CIVIL OR OTHERWISE

If we draw together our conclusions on the use of illegal means

to achieve laudable ends, we shall find that: (1) there are reasons

why we should normally accept the verdict of an established

peaceful method of settling disputes; (2) these reasons are particularly

strong when the decision-procedure is democratic and

the verdict represents a genuine majority view; but (3) there

are still situations in which the use of illegal means can be

justified.

We have seen that there are two distinct ways in which one

might try to justify the use of illegal means in a society that is

democratic (even if imperfectly so, as, to varying degrees, existing

democracies are). The first is on the grounds that the

decision one is objecting to is not a genuine expression of majority

opinion. The second is that although the decision is a

genuine expression of the majority view, this view is so seriously

wrong that action against the majority is justified.

It is disobedience on the first ground that best merits the name

'civil disobedience'. Here the use of illegal means can be regarded

as an extension of the use of legal means to secure a

302

Ends and Means

genuinely democratic decision. The extension may be necessary

because the normal channels for securing reform are not working

properly. On some issues parliamentary representatives are

overly influenced by skilled and well-paid special interests. On

others the public is unaware of what is happening. Perhaps the

abuse requires administrative, rather than legislative change,

and the bureaucrats of the civil service have refused to be inconvenienced.

Perhaps the legitimate interests of a minority are

being ignored by prejudiced officials. In all these cases, the nowstandard

forms of civil disobedience - passive resistance,

marches, or sit-ins - are appropriate. The blockade of the HydroElectric

Commission's road into the site ofthe proposed Franklin

river dam was a classic case of civil disobedience in this sense.

In these situations disobeying the law is not an attempt to

coerce the majority. Instead disobedience attempts to inform the

majority; or to persuade parliamentarians that large numbers

of electors feel very strongly about the issue; or to draw national

attention to an issue previously left to bureaucrats; or to appeal

for reconsideration of a decision too hastily made. Civil disobedience

is an appropriate means to these ends when legal

means have failed, because, although it is illegal. it does not

threaten the majority or attempt to coerce them (though it will

usually impose some extra costs on them, for example for law

enforcement). By not resisting the force ofthe law, by remaining

non-violent and by accepting the legal penalty for their actions,

civil disobedients make manifest both the sincerity of their protest

and their respect for the rule of law and the fundamental

principles of democracy.

So conceived, civil disobedience is not difficult to justify. The

justification does not have to be strong enough to override the

obligation to obey a democratic decision, since disobedience is

an attempt to restore, rather than frustrate, the process of democratic

decision making. Disobedience of this kind could be

justified by, for instance, the aim of making the public aware

303

Practical Ethics

of the loss of irreplaceable wilderness caused by the construction

of a dam, or of how animals are treated in the laboratories and

factory farms that few people ever see.

The use of illegal means to prevent action undeniably in accordance

with the majority view is harder - but not impossible

- to justify. We may think it unlikely that a Nazi-style policy

of genocide could ever be approved by a majority vote, but if

that were to happen it would be carrying respect for majority

rule to absurd lengths to regard oneself as bound to accept the

majority decision. To oppose evils of that magnitude, we are

justified in using virtually any means likely to be effective.

Genocide is an extreme case. To grant that it justifies the use

of illegal means even against a majority concedes very little in

terms of practical political action. Yet admitting even one exception

to the obligation to abide by democratic decisions raises

further questions: where is the line to be drawn between evils

like genocide, where the obligation is clearly overridden, and

less serious issues, where it is not? And who is to decide on

which side of this imaginary line a particular issue falls? Gary

Leber, of Operation Rescue, has written that in the United States

alone, since 1973, 'We've already destroyed four times the number

of people that Hitler did: Ronnie Lee, one of the British

founders of the Animal Liberation Front, has also used the Nazi

metaphor for what we do to animals, saying: 'Although we are

only one species among many on earth, we've set up a Reich

totally dominating the other animals, even enslaving them: It

is not surprising then, that these activists consider their disobedience

well justified. But do they have the right to take this

decision themselves? If not, who is to decide when an issue is

so serious that, even in a democracy, the obligation to obey the

law is overridden?

The only answer this question can have is: we must decide