DebateLabKIT/deepa2-corpus · Datasets at Hugging Face

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of violence that is in practice, if not in principle, as allencompassing
as that of the absolute pacifist? One might attempt
to do so by emphasising the hardening effect that the use
of violence has, how committing one murder, no matter how
'necessary' or 'justified' it may seem, lessens the resistance to
committing further murders. Is it likely that people who have
become inured to acting violently will be able to create a better
society? This is a question on which the historical record is
relevant. The course taken by the Russian Revolution must
shake the belief that a burning desire for social justice provides
immunity to the corrupting effects of violence. There are, admittedly,
other examples that may be read the other way; but
it would take a considerable number of examples to outweigh
the legacy of Lenin and Stalin.
The consequentialist pacifist can use another argument - the
argument I urged against the suggestion that we should allow
starvation to reduce the populations of the poorest nations to
the level at which they could feed themselves. Like this policy,
violence involves certain harm, said to be justified by the prospects
of future benefits. But the future benefits can never be
certain, and even in the few cases where violence does bring
310
Ends and Means
about desirable ends, we can rarely be sure that the ends could
not have been achieved equally soon by non-violent means.
What, for instance, has been achieved by the thousands of
deaths and injuries caused by more than twenty years of the
Irish Republican Army bombings in Northern Ireland? Only
counter-terrorism by extremist Protestant groups. Or think of
the wasted death and suffering caused by the Baader-Meinhoff
gang in Germany, or the Red Brigade in Italy. What did the
Palestinian Liberation Organization gain from terrorism, other
than a less compromising, more ruthless Israel than the one
against which they began their struggle? One may sympathize
with the ends some of these groups are fighting for, but the
means they are using hold no promise of gaining their ends.
Using these means therefore indicates callous disregard of the
interests of their victims. These consequentialist arguments add
up to a strong case against the use of violence as a means,
particularly when the violence is indiscriminately directed
against ordinary members of the public, as terrorist violence
often is. In practical terms, that kind of violence would seem
never justified.
There are other kinds of violence that cannot be ruled out so
convincingly. There is, for instance, the assassination of a murderous
tyrant. Here, provided the murderous policies are an
expression of the tyrant's personality rather than part of the
institutions he commands, the violence is strictly limited, the
aim is the end of much greater violence, success from a single
violent act may be highly probable, and there may be no other
way of ending the tyrant's rule. It would be implausible for a
consequentialist to maintain that committing violence in these
circumstances would have a corrupting effect, or that more,
rather than less, violence would result from the assassination.
Violence may be limited in a different way. The cases we have
been considering have involved violence against people. These
are the standard cases that come to mind when we discuss
violence, but there are other kinds of violence. Animal Liber-
311
Practical Ethics
ation Front members have damaged laboratories, cages, and
equipment used to confine, hurt, or kill animals, but they avoid
violent acts against any animaL human or non-human. (Other
organizations claiming to be acting on behalf of animals have,
however, injured at least two people by explosive devices. These
actions have been condemned by every well-known animal
liberation organization, including the Animal Liberation Front.)
Earth First!, a radical American environmentalist organization,
advocates 'monkeywrenching' or 'ecotage' - secret acts designed
to stop or slow down processes that are harmful to the
environment. Dave Foreman and Bill Haywood of Earth First!
have co-edited Ecodefense: A Field Guide to Monkeywrenching, a
book that describes techniques for disabling computers, wrecking
machinery, and blocking sewerage systems. In their view:
Monkeywrenching is a non-violent resistance to the destruction
of natural diversity and wildemess. It is not aimed toward harming
human beings or other forms of life. ft is aimed at inanimate
machines and tools .... Monkeywrenchers are very conscious of
the gravity of what they do. They are deliberate about taking
such a serious step .... They remember that they are engaged in
the most moral of all actions: protecting life, defending the Earth.
A more controversial technique is 'spiking' trees in forests that
are to be logged. Putting metal spikes in a few trees in a forest
makes it dangerous to saw timber from the forest, because the
workers at the sawmill can never know when the saw might
hit a spike, breaking the saw and sending sharp pieces of metal
flying around the working area. Ecological activists who support
spiking say that they warn the tiniber companies that trees in
a certain area have been spiked, and if they go ahead and log
the forests, any injuries that occur are the responsibility of the
timber company managers who made that decision. But it is
the workers who will be hurt, not the managers. Can the activists
really shed their responsibility in this way? More orthodox
environmental activists reject such tactics.
Damage to property is not as serious a matter as injuring or
312
Ends and Means
killing; hence it may be justified on grounds that would not
justify anything that caused harm to sentient beings. This does
not mean that violence to property is of no significance. Property

of violence that is in practice, if not in principle, as allencompassing

as that of the absolute pacifist? One might attempt

to do so by emphasising the hardening effect that the use

of violence has, how committing one murder, no matter how

'necessary' or 'justified' it may seem, lessens the resistance to

committing further murders. Is it likely that people who have

become inured to acting violently will be able to create a better

society? This is a question on which the historical record is

relevant. The course taken by the Russian Revolution must

shake the belief that a burning desire for social justice provides

immunity to the corrupting effects of violence. There are, admittedly,

other examples that may be read the other way; but

it would take a considerable number of examples to outweigh

the legacy of Lenin and Stalin.

The consequentialist pacifist can use another argument - the

argument I urged against the suggestion that we should allow

starvation to reduce the populations of the poorest nations to

the level at which they could feed themselves. Like this policy,

violence involves certain harm, said to be justified by the prospects

of future benefits. But the future benefits can never be

certain, and even in the few cases where violence does bring

310

Ends and Means

about desirable ends, we can rarely be sure that the ends could

not have been achieved equally soon by non-violent means.

What, for instance, has been achieved by the thousands of

deaths and injuries caused by more than twenty years of the

Irish Republican Army bombings in Northern Ireland? Only

counter-terrorism by extremist Protestant groups. Or think of

the wasted death and suffering caused by the Baader-Meinhoff

gang in Germany, or the Red Brigade in Italy. What did the

Palestinian Liberation Organization gain from terrorism, other

than a less compromising, more ruthless Israel than the one

against which they began their struggle? One may sympathize

with the ends some of these groups are fighting for, but the

means they are using hold no promise of gaining their ends.

Using these means therefore indicates callous disregard of the

interests of their victims. These consequentialist arguments add

up to a strong case against the use of violence as a means,

particularly when the violence is indiscriminately directed

against ordinary members of the public, as terrorist violence

often is. In practical terms, that kind of violence would seem

never justified.

There are other kinds of violence that cannot be ruled out so

convincingly. There is, for instance, the assassination of a murderous

tyrant. Here, provided the murderous policies are an

expression of the tyrant's personality rather than part of the

institutions he commands, the violence is strictly limited, the

aim is the end of much greater violence, success from a single

violent act may be highly probable, and there may be no other

way of ending the tyrant's rule. It would be implausible for a

consequentialist to maintain that committing violence in these

circumstances would have a corrupting effect, or that more,

rather than less, violence would result from the assassination.

Violence may be limited in a different way. The cases we have

been considering have involved violence against people. These

are the standard cases that come to mind when we discuss

violence, but there are other kinds of violence. Animal Liber-

311

Practical Ethics

ation Front members have damaged laboratories, cages, and

equipment used to confine, hurt, or kill animals, but they avoid

violent acts against any animaL human or non-human. (Other

organizations claiming to be acting on behalf of animals have,

however, injured at least two people by explosive devices. These

actions have been condemned by every well-known animal

liberation organization, including the Animal Liberation Front.)

Earth First!, a radical American environmentalist organization,

advocates 'monkeywrenching' or 'ecotage' - secret acts designed

to stop or slow down processes that are harmful to the

environment. Dave Foreman and Bill Haywood of Earth First!

have co-edited Ecodefense: A Field Guide to Monkeywrenching, a

book that describes techniques for disabling computers, wrecking

machinery, and blocking sewerage systems. In their view:

Monkeywrenching is a non-violent resistance to the destruction

of natural diversity and wildemess. It is not aimed toward harming

human beings or other forms of life. ft is aimed at inanimate

machines and tools .... Monkeywrenchers are very conscious of

the gravity of what they do. They are deliberate about taking

such a serious step .... They remember that they are engaged in

the most moral of all actions: protecting life, defending the Earth.

A more controversial technique is 'spiking' trees in forests that

are to be logged. Putting metal spikes in a few trees in a forest

makes it dangerous to saw timber from the forest, because the

workers at the sawmill can never know when the saw might

hit a spike, breaking the saw and sending sharp pieces of metal

flying around the working area. Ecological activists who support

spiking say that they warn the tiniber companies that trees in

a certain area have been spiked, and if they go ahead and log

the forests, any injuries that occur are the responsibility of the

timber company managers who made that decision. But it is

the workers who will be hurt, not the managers. Can the activists

really shed their responsibility in this way? More orthodox

environmental activists reject such tactics.

Damage to property is not as serious a matter as injuring or

312

Ends and Means

killing; hence it may be justified on grounds that would not

justify anything that caused harm to sentient beings. This does

not mean that violence to property is of no significance. Property