DebateLabKIT/deepa2-corpus · Datasets at Hugging Face

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taking the desires of others into account is another question
altogether. Nagel attempts this analogous argument. The role
occupied by 'seeing the present as merely one time among others'
is, in the argument for altruism, taken by 'seeing oneself as
merely one person among others'. But whereas it would be
extremely difficult for most of us to cease conceiving of ourselves
as existing over time, with the present merely one time among
others that we will live through, the way we see ourselves as
a person among others is quite different. Henry Sidgwick's observation
on this point seems to me exactly right:
It would be contrary to Common Sense to deny that the distinction
between anyone individual and any other is real and
fundamental, and that consequently T am concerned with the
321
Practical Ethics
quality of my existence as an individual in a sense, fundamentally
important, in which I am not concerned with the quality of the
existence of other individuals: and this being so, I do not see
how it can be proved that this distinction is not to be taken as
fundamental in determining the ultimate end of rational action
for an individual.
So it is not only Hume's view of practical reason that stands in
the way of attempts to show that to act rationally is to act
ethically; we might succeed in overthrowing that barrier, only
to find our way blocked by the commonsense distinction between
self and others. Taken together, these are formidable
obstacles and I know of no way of overcoming them.
ETHICS AND SELF-INTEREST
If practical reasoning begins with something wanted, to show
that it is rational to act morally would involve showing that in
acting morally we achieve something we want. If, agreeing with
Sidgwick rather than Hume, we hold that it is rational to act
in our long-term interests irrespective of what we happen to
want at the present moment, we could show that it is rational
to act morally by showing that it is in our long-term interests
to do so. There have been many attempts to argue along these
lines, ever since Plato, in The Republic, portrayed Socrates as
arguing that to be virtuous is to have the different elements of
one's personality ordered in a harmonious manner. and this is
necessary for happiness. We shall look at these arguments
shortly; but first it is necessary to assess an objection to this
whole approach to 'Why should I act morally?'
People often say that to defend morality by appealing to selfinterest
is to misunderstand what ethics is all about. F. H. Bradley
stated this eloquently:
What answer can we give when the question Why should I be
Moral?, in the sense of What will it advantage Me?, is put to
us? Here we shall do well, I think, to avoid all praises of the
322
Why Act Morally?
pleasantness of virtue. We may believe that it transcends all
possible delights of vice, but it would be well to remember that
we desert a moral point of view, that we degrade and prostitute
virtue, when to those who do not love her for herself we bring
ourselves to recommend her for the sake of her pleasures.
In other words, we can never get people to act morally by
providing reasons of self-interest. because if they accept what
we say and act on the reasons given, they will only be acting
self-interestedly, not morally.
One reply to this objection would be that the substance of
the action, what is actually done, is more important than the
motive. People might give money to famine relief because their
friends will think better of them, or they might give the same
amount because they think it their duty. Those saved from starvation
by the gift will benefit to the same extent either way.
This is true but crude. It can be made more sophisticated if
it is combined with an appropriate account of the nature and
\ function of ethics. Ethics, though not consciously created, is a
product of social life that has the function of promoting values
common to the members of the society. Ethical judgments do
this by praising and encouraging actions in accordance with
these values. Ethical judgments are concerned with motives
because this is a good indication of the tendency of an action
to promote good or evil, but also because it is here that praise
and blame may be effective in altering the tendency of a person's
actions. Conscientiousness (that is, acting for the sake of doing
what is right) is a particularly useful motive, from the community's
point of view. People who are conscientious will, if
they accept the values of their society (and if most people did
not accept these values they would not be the values of the
society) always tend to promote what the society values. They
may have no generous or sympathetic inclinations, but if they
think it their duty to give famine relief. they will do so. Moreover,
those motivated by the desire to do what is right can be
relied upon to act as they think right in all circumstances,
323
Practical Ethics
whereas those who act from some other motive, like selfinterest,
will only do what they think right when they believe
it will also be in their interest. Conscientiousness is thus a kind
of multipurpose gap-filler that can be used to motivate people
towards whatever is valued, even if the natural virtues normally
associated with action in accordance with those values (generosity,
sympathy, honesty, tolerance, humility, and so on) are
lacking. (This needs some qualification: a conscientious mother
may provide as well for her children as a mother who loves
them, but she cannot love them because it is the right thing to
do. Sometimes conscientiousness is a poor substitute for the real
thing.)
On this view of ethics it is still results, not motives, that really

taking the desires of others into account is another question

altogether. Nagel attempts this analogous argument. The role

occupied by 'seeing the present as merely one time among others'

is, in the argument for altruism, taken by 'seeing oneself as

merely one person among others'. But whereas it would be

extremely difficult for most of us to cease conceiving of ourselves

as existing over time, with the present merely one time among

others that we will live through, the way we see ourselves as

a person among others is quite different. Henry Sidgwick's observation

on this point seems to me exactly right:

It would be contrary to Common Sense to deny that the distinction

between anyone individual and any other is real and

fundamental, and that consequently T am concerned with the

321

Practical Ethics

quality of my existence as an individual in a sense, fundamentally

important, in which I am not concerned with the quality of the

existence of other individuals: and this being so, I do not see

how it can be proved that this distinction is not to be taken as

fundamental in determining the ultimate end of rational action

for an individual.

So it is not only Hume's view of practical reason that stands in

the way of attempts to show that to act rationally is to act

ethically; we might succeed in overthrowing that barrier, only

to find our way blocked by the commonsense distinction between

self and others. Taken together, these are formidable

obstacles and I know of no way of overcoming them.

ETHICS AND SELF-INTEREST

If practical reasoning begins with something wanted, to show

that it is rational to act morally would involve showing that in

acting morally we achieve something we want. If, agreeing with

Sidgwick rather than Hume, we hold that it is rational to act

in our long-term interests irrespective of what we happen to

want at the present moment, we could show that it is rational

to act morally by showing that it is in our long-term interests

to do so. There have been many attempts to argue along these

lines, ever since Plato, in The Republic, portrayed Socrates as

arguing that to be virtuous is to have the different elements of

one's personality ordered in a harmonious manner. and this is

necessary for happiness. We shall look at these arguments

shortly; but first it is necessary to assess an objection to this

whole approach to 'Why should I act morally?'

People often say that to defend morality by appealing to selfinterest

is to misunderstand what ethics is all about. F. H. Bradley

stated this eloquently:

What answer can we give when the question Why should I be

Moral?, in the sense of What will it advantage Me?, is put to

us? Here we shall do well, I think, to avoid all praises of the

322

Why Act Morally?

pleasantness of virtue. We may believe that it transcends all

possible delights of vice, but it would be well to remember that

we desert a moral point of view, that we degrade and prostitute

virtue, when to those who do not love her for herself we bring

ourselves to recommend her for the sake of her pleasures.

In other words, we can never get people to act morally by

providing reasons of self-interest. because if they accept what

we say and act on the reasons given, they will only be acting

self-interestedly, not morally.

One reply to this objection would be that the substance of

the action, what is actually done, is more important than the

motive. People might give money to famine relief because their

friends will think better of them, or they might give the same

amount because they think it their duty. Those saved from starvation

by the gift will benefit to the same extent either way.

This is true but crude. It can be made more sophisticated if

it is combined with an appropriate account of the nature and

\ function of ethics. Ethics, though not consciously created, is a

product of social life that has the function of promoting values

common to the members of the society. Ethical judgments do

this by praising and encouraging actions in accordance with

these values. Ethical judgments are concerned with motives

because this is a good indication of the tendency of an action

to promote good or evil, but also because it is here that praise

and blame may be effective in altering the tendency of a person's

actions. Conscientiousness (that is, acting for the sake of doing

what is right) is a particularly useful motive, from the community's

point of view. People who are conscientious will, if

they accept the values of their society (and if most people did

not accept these values they would not be the values of the

society) always tend to promote what the society values. They

may have no generous or sympathetic inclinations, but if they

think it their duty to give famine relief. they will do so. Moreover,

those motivated by the desire to do what is right can be

relied upon to act as they think right in all circumstances,

323

Practical Ethics

whereas those who act from some other motive, like selfinterest,

will only do what they think right when they believe

it will also be in their interest. Conscientiousness is thus a kind

of multipurpose gap-filler that can be used to motivate people

towards whatever is valued, even if the natural virtues normally

associated with action in accordance with those values (generosity,

sympathy, honesty, tolerance, humility, and so on) are

lacking. (This needs some qualification: a conscientious mother

may provide as well for her children as a mother who loves

them, but she cannot love them because it is the right thing to

do. Sometimes conscientiousness is a poor substitute for the real

thing.)

On this view of ethics it is still results, not motives, that really