DebateLabKIT/deepa2-corpus · Datasets at Hugging Face

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- the role we happen to occupy - is unimportant. Thus reason
requires us to act on universalisable judgments and, to that
extent, to act ethically.
Is this argument valid? I have already indicated that I accept
the first point, that ethics involves universalisability. The second
318
Why Act Morally?
point also seems undeniable. Reason must be universal. Does
the conclusion therefore follow? Here is the flaw in the argument.
The conclusion appears to follow directly from the premises;
but this move involves a slide from the limited sense in
which it is true that a rational judgment must be universally
valid, to a stronger sense of 'universally valid' that is equivalent
to universalisability. The difference between these two senses
can be seen by considering a non-universalisable imperative,
like the purely egoistic: 'Let everyone do what is in my interests:
This differs from the imperative of universalisable egoism - 'Let
everyone do what is in her or his own interests' - because it
contains an ineliminable reference to a particular person. It
therefore cannot be an ethical imperative. Does it also lack the
universality required if it is to be a rational basis for action?
Surely not. Every rational agent could accept that the purely
egoistic activity of other rational agents is rationally justifiable.
Pure egoism could be rationally adopted by everyone.
Let us look at this more closely. It must be conceded that
there is a sense in which one purely egoistic rational agent -
call him Jack - could not accept the practical judgments of
another purely egoistic rational agent - call her Jill. Assuming
Jill's interests differ from Jack's, Jill may be acting rationally in
urging Jack to do A, while Jack is also acting rationally in
deciding against doing A.
This disagreement is, however, compatible with all rational
agents accepting pure egoism. Though they accept pure egoism,
it points them in different directions because they start from
different places. When Jack adopts pure egoism, it leads him to
further his interests and when Jill adopts pure egoism it leads
her to further her interests. Hence the disagreement over what
to do. On the other hand - and this is the sense in which pure
egoism could be accepted as valid by all rational agents - if we
were to ask Jill (off the record and promising not to tell Jack)
what she thinks it would be rational for Jack to do, she would,
319
Practical Ethics
if truthful, have to reply that it would be rational for Jack to
do what is in his own interests, rather than what is in her
interests.
So when purely egoistic rational agents oppose each other's
acts, it does not indicate disagreement over the rationality of
pure egoism. Pure egoism, though not a universalisable principle,
could be accepted as a rational basis of action by all rational
agents. The sense in which rational judgments must be
universally acceptable is weaker than the sense in which ethical
judgements must be. That an action will benefit me rather than
anyone else could be a valid reason for doing it, though it could
not be an ethical reason for doing it.
A consequence of this conclusion is that rational agents may
rationally try to prevent each other from doing what they admit
the other is rationally justified in doing. There is, unfortunately,
nothing paradoxical about this. Two salespeople competing for
an important sale will accept each other's conduct as rational,
though each aims to thwart the other. The same holds of two
soldiers meeting in battle, or two footballers vying for the ball.
Accordingly, this attempted demonstration of a link between
reason and ethics fails. There may be other ways of forging this
link, but it is difficult to see any that hold greater promise of
success. The chief obstacle to be overcome is the nature of practical
reason. Long ago David Hume argued that reason in action
applies only to means, not to ends. The ends must be given by
our wants and desires. Hume unflinchingly drew out the implications
of this view:
'Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole
world to the scratching of my finger. 'Tis not contrary to reason
for me to choose my total ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness
of an Indian or person wholly unknown to me. 'Tis as little
contrary to reason to prefer even my own acknowledged lesser
good to my greater, and have a more ardent affection for the
former than the latter.
320
Why Ad Morally?
Extreme as it is, Hume's view of practical reason has stood up
to criticism remarkably well. His central claim - that in practical
reasoning we start from something wanted - is difficult to refute;
yet it must be refuted if any argument is to succeed in showing
that it is rational for all of us to act ethically irrespective of what
we want.
Nor is the refutation of Hume all that is needed for a demonstration
of the rational necessity of acting ethically. In The
Possibility of Altruism, Thomas Nagel has argued forcefully that
not to take one's own future desires into account in one's practical
deliberations - irrespective of whether one now happens
to desire the satisfaction of those future desires - would indicate
a failure to see oneself as a person existing over time, the present
being merely one time among others in one's life. So it is my
conception of myself as a person that makes it rational for me
to consider my long-term interests. This holds true even ifI have
'a more ardent affection' for something that I acknowledge is
not really, all things considered, in my own interest.
Whether Nagel's argument succeeds in vindicating the rationality
of prudence is one question: whether a similar argument
can also be used in favour of a form of altruism based on

- the role we happen to occupy - is unimportant. Thus reason

requires us to act on universalisable judgments and, to that

extent, to act ethically.

Is this argument valid? I have already indicated that I accept

the first point, that ethics involves universalisability. The second

318

Why Act Morally?

point also seems undeniable. Reason must be universal. Does

the conclusion therefore follow? Here is the flaw in the argument.

The conclusion appears to follow directly from the premises;

but this move involves a slide from the limited sense in

which it is true that a rational judgment must be universally

valid, to a stronger sense of 'universally valid' that is equivalent

to universalisability. The difference between these two senses

can be seen by considering a non-universalisable imperative,

like the purely egoistic: 'Let everyone do what is in my interests:

This differs from the imperative of universalisable egoism - 'Let

everyone do what is in her or his own interests' - because it

contains an ineliminable reference to a particular person. It

therefore cannot be an ethical imperative. Does it also lack the

universality required if it is to be a rational basis for action?

Surely not. Every rational agent could accept that the purely

egoistic activity of other rational agents is rationally justifiable.

Pure egoism could be rationally adopted by everyone.

Let us look at this more closely. It must be conceded that

there is a sense in which one purely egoistic rational agent -

call him Jack - could not accept the practical judgments of

another purely egoistic rational agent - call her Jill. Assuming

Jill's interests differ from Jack's, Jill may be acting rationally in

urging Jack to do A, while Jack is also acting rationally in

deciding against doing A.

This disagreement is, however, compatible with all rational

agents accepting pure egoism. Though they accept pure egoism,

it points them in different directions because they start from

different places. When Jack adopts pure egoism, it leads him to

further his interests and when Jill adopts pure egoism it leads

her to further her interests. Hence the disagreement over what

to do. On the other hand - and this is the sense in which pure

egoism could be accepted as valid by all rational agents - if we

were to ask Jill (off the record and promising not to tell Jack)

what she thinks it would be rational for Jack to do, she would,

319

Practical Ethics

if truthful, have to reply that it would be rational for Jack to

do what is in his own interests, rather than what is in her

interests.

So when purely egoistic rational agents oppose each other's

acts, it does not indicate disagreement over the rationality of

pure egoism. Pure egoism, though not a universalisable principle,

could be accepted as a rational basis of action by all rational

agents. The sense in which rational judgments must be

universally acceptable is weaker than the sense in which ethical

judgements must be. That an action will benefit me rather than

anyone else could be a valid reason for doing it, though it could

not be an ethical reason for doing it.

A consequence of this conclusion is that rational agents may

rationally try to prevent each other from doing what they admit

the other is rationally justified in doing. There is, unfortunately,

nothing paradoxical about this. Two salespeople competing for

an important sale will accept each other's conduct as rational,

though each aims to thwart the other. The same holds of two

soldiers meeting in battle, or two footballers vying for the ball.

Accordingly, this attempted demonstration of a link between

reason and ethics fails. There may be other ways of forging this

link, but it is difficult to see any that hold greater promise of

success. The chief obstacle to be overcome is the nature of practical

reason. Long ago David Hume argued that reason in action

applies only to means, not to ends. The ends must be given by

our wants and desires. Hume unflinchingly drew out the implications

of this view:

'Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole

world to the scratching of my finger. 'Tis not contrary to reason

for me to choose my total ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness

of an Indian or person wholly unknown to me. 'Tis as little

contrary to reason to prefer even my own acknowledged lesser

good to my greater, and have a more ardent affection for the

former than the latter.

320

Why Ad Morally?

Extreme as it is, Hume's view of practical reason has stood up

to criticism remarkably well. His central claim - that in practical

reasoning we start from something wanted - is difficult to refute;

yet it must be refuted if any argument is to succeed in showing

that it is rational for all of us to act ethically irrespective of what

we want.

Nor is the refutation of Hume all that is needed for a demonstration

of the rational necessity of acting ethically. In The

Possibility of Altruism, Thomas Nagel has argued forcefully that

not to take one's own future desires into account in one's practical

deliberations - irrespective of whether one now happens

to desire the satisfaction of those future desires - would indicate

a failure to see oneself as a person existing over time, the present

being merely one time among others in one's life. So it is my

conception of myself as a person that makes it rational for me

to consider my long-term interests. This holds true even ifI have

'a more ardent affection' for something that I acknowledge is

not really, all things considered, in my own interest.

Whether Nagel's argument succeeds in vindicating the rationality

of prudence is one question: whether a similar argument

can also be used in favour of a form of altruism based on