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- the role we happen to occupy - is unimportant. Thus reason
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requires us to act on universalisable judgments and, to that
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extent, to act ethically.
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Is this argument valid? I have already indicated that I accept
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the first point, that ethics involves universalisability. The second
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318
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Why Act Morally?
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point also seems undeniable. Reason must be universal. Does
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the conclusion therefore follow? Here is the flaw in the argument.
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The conclusion appears to follow directly from the premises;
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but this move involves a slide from the limited sense in
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which it is true that a rational judgment must be universally
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valid, to a stronger sense of 'universally valid' that is equivalent
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to universalisability. The difference between these two senses
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can be seen by considering a non-universalisable imperative,
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like the purely egoistic: 'Let everyone do what is in my interests:
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This differs from the imperative of universalisable egoism - 'Let
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everyone do what is in her or his own interests' - because it
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contains an ineliminable reference to a particular person. It
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therefore cannot be an ethical imperative. Does it also lack the
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universality required if it is to be a rational basis for action?
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Surely not. Every rational agent could accept that the purely
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egoistic activity of other rational agents is rationally justifiable.
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Pure egoism could be rationally adopted by everyone.
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Let us look at this more closely. It must be conceded that
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there is a sense in which one purely egoistic rational agent -
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call him Jack - could not accept the practical judgments of
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another purely egoistic rational agent - call her Jill. Assuming
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Jill's interests differ from Jack's, Jill may be acting rationally in
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urging Jack to do A, while Jack is also acting rationally in
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deciding against doing A.
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This disagreement is, however, compatible with all rational
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agents accepting pure egoism. Though they accept pure egoism,
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it points them in different directions because they start from
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different places. When Jack adopts pure egoism, it leads him to
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further his interests and when Jill adopts pure egoism it leads
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her to further her interests. Hence the disagreement over what
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to do. On the other hand - and this is the sense in which pure
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egoism could be accepted as valid by all rational agents - if we
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were to ask Jill (off the record and promising not to tell Jack)
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what she thinks it would be rational for Jack to do, she would,
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319
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Practical Ethics
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if truthful, have to reply that it would be rational for Jack to
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do what is in his own interests, rather than what is in her
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interests.
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So when purely egoistic rational agents oppose each other's
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acts, it does not indicate disagreement over the rationality of
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pure egoism. Pure egoism, though not a universalisable principle,
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could be accepted as a rational basis of action by all rational
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agents. The sense in which rational judgments must be
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universally acceptable is weaker than the sense in which ethical
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judgements must be. That an action will benefit me rather than
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anyone else could be a valid reason for doing it, though it could
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not be an ethical reason for doing it.
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A consequence of this conclusion is that rational agents may
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rationally try to prevent each other from doing what they admit
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the other is rationally justified in doing. There is, unfortunately,
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nothing paradoxical about this. Two salespeople competing for
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an important sale will accept each other's conduct as rational,
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though each aims to thwart the other. The same holds of two
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soldiers meeting in battle, or two footballers vying for the ball.
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Accordingly, this attempted demonstration of a link between
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reason and ethics fails. There may be other ways of forging this
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link, but it is difficult to see any that hold greater promise of
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success. The chief obstacle to be overcome is the nature of practical
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reason. Long ago David Hume argued that reason in action
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applies only to means, not to ends. The ends must be given by
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our wants and desires. Hume unflinchingly drew out the implications
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of this view:
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'Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole
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world to the scratching of my finger. 'Tis not contrary to reason
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for me to choose my total ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness
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of an Indian or person wholly unknown to me. 'Tis as little
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contrary to reason to prefer even my own acknowledged lesser
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good to my greater, and have a more ardent affection for the
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former than the latter.
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320
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Why Ad Morally?
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Extreme as it is, Hume's view of practical reason has stood up
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to criticism remarkably well. His central claim - that in practical
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reasoning we start from something wanted - is difficult to refute;
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yet it must be refuted if any argument is to succeed in showing
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that it is rational for all of us to act ethically irrespective of what
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we want.
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Nor is the refutation of Hume all that is needed for a demonstration
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of the rational necessity of acting ethically. In The
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Possibility of Altruism, Thomas Nagel has argued forcefully that
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not to take one's own future desires into account in one's practical
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deliberations - irrespective of whether one now happens
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to desire the satisfaction of those future desires - would indicate
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a failure to see oneself as a person existing over time, the present
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being merely one time among others in one's life. So it is my
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conception of myself as a person that makes it rational for me
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to consider my long-term interests. This holds true even ifI have
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'a more ardent affection' for something that I acknowledge is
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not really, all things considered, in my own interest.
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Whether Nagel's argument succeeds in vindicating the rationality
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of prudence is one question: whether a similar argument
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can also be used in favour of a form of altruism based on
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