DebateLabKIT/deepa2-corpus · Datasets at Hugging Face

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matter. Conscientiousness is of value because of its consequences.
Yet, unlike, say, benevolence, conscientiousness can
be praised and encouraged only for its own sake. To praise a
conscientious act for its consequences would be to praise not
conscientiousn~ss, but something else altogether. If we appeal
to sympathy or self-interest as a reason for doing one's duty,
then we are not encouraging people to do their duty for its own
sake. If conscientiousness is to be encouraged, it must be thought
of as good for its own sake.
It is different in the case of an act done from a motive that
people act upon irrespective of praise and encouragement. The
use of ethical language is then inappropriate. We do not normally
say that people ought to do, or that it is their duty to do,
whatever gives them the greatest pleasure, for most people are
sufficiently motivated to do this anyway. So, whereas we praise
good acts done for the sake of doing what is right, we withhold
our praise when we believe the act was done from some motive
like self-interest.
This emphasis on motives and on the moral worth of doing
right for its own sake is now embedded in our notion of ethics.
To the extent that it is so embedded, we will feel that to provide
324
Why Act Morally?
considerations of self-interest for doing what is right is to empty
the action of its moral worth.
My suggestion is that our notion of ethics has become misleading
to the extent that moral worth is attributed only to action
done because it is right, without any ulterior motive. It is understandable,
and from the point of view of society perhaps
even desirable, that this attitude should prevail; nevertheless,
those who accept this view of ethics, and are led by it to do
what is right because it is right, without asking for any further
reason, are falling victim to a kind of confidence trick - though
not, of course, a consciously perpetrated one.
That this view of ethics is unjustifiable has already been indicated
by the failure of the argument discussed earlier in this
chapter for a rational justification of ethics. In the history of
Western philosophy, no one has urged more strongly than Kant
that our ordinary moral consciousness finds moral worth only
when duty is done for duty'S sake. Yet Kant himself saw that
without a rational justification this common conception of ethics
would be 'a mere phantom of the brain'. And this is indeed the
case. If we reject - as in general terms we have done - the
Kantian justification of the rationality of ethics, but try to retain
the Kantian conception of ethics, ethics is left hanging without
support. It becomes a closed system, a system that cannot be
questioned because its first premise - that only action done
because it is right has any moral worth - rules out the only
remaining possible justification for accepting this very premise.
Morality is, on this view, no more rational an end than any
other allegedly self-justifying practice, like etiquette or the kind
of religious faith that comes only to those who first set aside all
sceptical doubts.
Taken as a view of ethics as a whole, we should abandon this
Kantian notion of ethics. This does not mean, however, that
we should never do what we see to be right simply because we
see it to be right, without further reasons. Here we need to
325
Practical Ethics
appeal to the distinction Hare has made between intuitive and
critical thinking. When I stand back from my day-to-day ethical
decisions and ask why I should act ethically, I should seek
reasons in the broadest sense, and not allow Kantian preconceptions
to deter me from considering self-interested reasons
for living an ethical life. If my search is successful it will provide
me with reasons for taking up the ethical point of view as a
settled policy, a way of living. I would not then ask, in my dayto-
day ethical decision making, whether each particular right
action is in my interests. Instead I do it because I see myself as
an ethical person. In everyday situations, I will simply assume
that doing what is right is in my interests, and once I have
decided what is right, I will go ahead and do it, without thinking
about further reasons for doing what is right. To deliberate over
the ultimate reasons for doing what is right in each case would
impossibly complicate my life; it would also be inadvisable because
in particular situations I might be too greatly influenced
by strong but temporary desires and inclinations and so make
decisions I would later regret.
That, at least, is how a justification of ethics in terms of selfinterest
might work, without defeating its own aim. We can
now ask if such a justification exists. There is a daunting list of
those who, following Plato's lead, have offered one: Aristotle,
Aquinas, Spinoza, Butler, Hegel, even - for all his strictures
against prostituting virtue - Bradley. Like Plato, these philosophers
made broad claims about human nature and the conditions
under which human beings can be happy. Some were
also able to fall back on a belief that virtue will be rewarded
and wicketlness punished in a life after our bodily death. Philosophers
cannot use this argument if they want to carry conviction
nowadays; nor can they adopt sweeping psychological
theories on the basis of their own general experience of their
fellows, as philosophers used to do when psychology was a
branch of philosophy.
It might be said that since philosophers are not empirical
326
Why Act Morally?
scientists, discussion of the connection between acting ethically
and living a fulfilled and happy life should be left to psychologists,
sociologists, and other appropriate experts. The question
is not, however, dealt with by any other single discipline and

matter. Conscientiousness is of value because of its consequences.

Yet, unlike, say, benevolence, conscientiousness can

be praised and encouraged only for its own sake. To praise a

conscientious act for its consequences would be to praise not

conscientiousn~ss, but something else altogether. If we appeal

to sympathy or self-interest as a reason for doing one's duty,

then we are not encouraging people to do their duty for its own

sake. If conscientiousness is to be encouraged, it must be thought

of as good for its own sake.

It is different in the case of an act done from a motive that

people act upon irrespective of praise and encouragement. The

use of ethical language is then inappropriate. We do not normally

say that people ought to do, or that it is their duty to do,

whatever gives them the greatest pleasure, for most people are

sufficiently motivated to do this anyway. So, whereas we praise

good acts done for the sake of doing what is right, we withhold

our praise when we believe the act was done from some motive

like self-interest.

This emphasis on motives and on the moral worth of doing

right for its own sake is now embedded in our notion of ethics.

To the extent that it is so embedded, we will feel that to provide

324

Why Act Morally?

considerations of self-interest for doing what is right is to empty

the action of its moral worth.

My suggestion is that our notion of ethics has become misleading

to the extent that moral worth is attributed only to action

done because it is right, without any ulterior motive. It is understandable,

and from the point of view of society perhaps

even desirable, that this attitude should prevail; nevertheless,

those who accept this view of ethics, and are led by it to do

what is right because it is right, without asking for any further

reason, are falling victim to a kind of confidence trick - though

not, of course, a consciously perpetrated one.

That this view of ethics is unjustifiable has already been indicated

by the failure of the argument discussed earlier in this

chapter for a rational justification of ethics. In the history of

Western philosophy, no one has urged more strongly than Kant

that our ordinary moral consciousness finds moral worth only

when duty is done for duty'S sake. Yet Kant himself saw that

without a rational justification this common conception of ethics

would be 'a mere phantom of the brain'. And this is indeed the

case. If we reject - as in general terms we have done - the

Kantian justification of the rationality of ethics, but try to retain

the Kantian conception of ethics, ethics is left hanging without

support. It becomes a closed system, a system that cannot be

questioned because its first premise - that only action done

because it is right has any moral worth - rules out the only

remaining possible justification for accepting this very premise.

Morality is, on this view, no more rational an end than any

other allegedly self-justifying practice, like etiquette or the kind

of religious faith that comes only to those who first set aside all

sceptical doubts.

Taken as a view of ethics as a whole, we should abandon this

Kantian notion of ethics. This does not mean, however, that

we should never do what we see to be right simply because we

see it to be right, without further reasons. Here we need to

325

Practical Ethics

appeal to the distinction Hare has made between intuitive and

critical thinking. When I stand back from my day-to-day ethical

decisions and ask why I should act ethically, I should seek

reasons in the broadest sense, and not allow Kantian preconceptions

to deter me from considering self-interested reasons

for living an ethical life. If my search is successful it will provide

me with reasons for taking up the ethical point of view as a

settled policy, a way of living. I would not then ask, in my dayto-

day ethical decision making, whether each particular right

action is in my interests. Instead I do it because I see myself as

an ethical person. In everyday situations, I will simply assume

that doing what is right is in my interests, and once I have

decided what is right, I will go ahead and do it, without thinking

about further reasons for doing what is right. To deliberate over

the ultimate reasons for doing what is right in each case would

impossibly complicate my life; it would also be inadvisable because

in particular situations I might be too greatly influenced

by strong but temporary desires and inclinations and so make

decisions I would later regret.

That, at least, is how a justification of ethics in terms of selfinterest

might work, without defeating its own aim. We can

now ask if such a justification exists. There is a daunting list of

those who, following Plato's lead, have offered one: Aristotle,

Aquinas, Spinoza, Butler, Hegel, even - for all his strictures

against prostituting virtue - Bradley. Like Plato, these philosophers

made broad claims about human nature and the conditions

under which human beings can be happy. Some were

also able to fall back on a belief that virtue will be rewarded

and wicketlness punished in a life after our bodily death. Philosophers

cannot use this argument if they want to carry conviction

nowadays; nor can they adopt sweeping psychological

theories on the basis of their own general experience of their

fellows, as philosophers used to do when psychology was a

branch of philosophy.

It might be said that since philosophers are not empirical

326

Why Act Morally?

scientists, discussion of the connection between acting ethically

and living a fulfilled and happy life should be left to psychologists,

sociologists, and other appropriate experts. The question

is not, however, dealt with by any other single discipline and