hash
stringlengths 32
32
| doc_id
stringlengths 5
12
| section
stringlengths 4
595
| content
stringlengths 0
6.67M
|
|---|---|---|---|
93a47931cc679002202cfe56afd8b056 | 22.840 | 5.28.2 Pre-conditions | None |
93a47931cc679002202cfe56afd8b056 | 22.840 | 5.28.3 Service Flows | 1. The switch is being pushed.
2. The switch harvests the energy from the push, wakes up and communicates to the network.
3. Through optimized protocols only a minimal number of signalling interactions is needed. This allows the switch to complete the signalling procedure. As part of the signalling, the switch also transmits its identity.
4. The network transfers the identity information from the switch to an application server, which e.g. determines that a light needs to be turned on. |
93a47931cc679002202cfe56afd8b056 | 22.840 | 5.28.4 Post-conditions | The light is successfully switched on. |
93a47931cc679002202cfe56afd8b056 | 22.840 | 5.28.5 Existing features partly or fully covering the use case functionality | Existing signaling procedures and data transfer procedures for 5G are specified in TS 23.502 [77]. It is clear that these procedures are not optimized for a minimal number of signaling interactions. This runs the risk that an Ambient IoT device cannot complete these procedures before running out of power. |
93a47931cc679002202cfe56afd8b056 | 22.840 | 5.28.6 Potential New Requirements needed to support the use case | [P.R.5.1.6-001] The 5G system shall support more efficient procedures for Ambient IoT control and user data transmission compared to earlier 3GPP technologies; in terms of a reduced number of interactions between the network and the Ambient IoT device.
NOTE: In this context each interaction is a single instance of control or user data transmission to or from the Ambient IoT device
[P.R.5.1.6-002] The 5G system shall support procedures that take into account the specific nature of Ambient IoT devices (e.g. some Ambient IoT devices will not be able to initiate procedures periodically or after a specific time). |
93a47931cc679002202cfe56afd8b056 | 22.840 | 5.29 Use case on Device Permanent Deactivation | |
93a47931cc679002202cfe56afd8b056 | 22.840 | 5.29.1 Description | This use case illustrates the need to define capabilities that allows the end user or a third party to remotely manage the permanent deactivation of an Ambient IoT device.
The scenario describes a production manager who oversees the manufacture of Integrated Circuits (IC) wafers. The environmental conditions under which the wafers are produced may be considered as industrial secrets, as the production process may require a precise combination of pressure, temperature and humidity to produce IC wafers of optimal quality. To assist in quality control, the production process includes the use of Ambient IoT devices to record the environmental conditions under which the wafers are produced. The production manager may use the sensor data recorded by the Ambient IoT device following the completion of the manufacturing process to verify that environmental conditions were maintained as required. |
93a47931cc679002202cfe56afd8b056 | 22.840 | 5.29.2 Pre-conditions | The production manager has inactive Ambient IoT devices in storage that can collect sensor data, record the data and transmit the recorded data. |
93a47931cc679002202cfe56afd8b056 | 22.840 | 5.29.3 Service Flows | Device activation
1. As a new batch of IC wafers is about to be manufactured, the production manager removes from storage the Ambient IoT devices and adds an Ambient IoT device to each pre-production wafer.
2. The production manager accesses an application that is used to manage the connectivity and operations of Ambient IoT devices. Via this application, the production manager activates an Ambient IoT device to enable the operations of the device (e.g., take and record sensor data).
Device operation
3. During the manufacture process, the Ambient IoT device records the data collected by its sensors.
4. Following completion of the manufacturing process, the production manager wants to access the sensor data that has been recorded on the Ambient IoT device.
5. The production manager accesses an application to manage the connectivity and operations of the Ambient IoT devices. Via this application, the production manager triggers the Ambient IoT device to upload the recorded sensor data to the network.
6. Following completion of the manufacturing process, the production manager wants to clear the sensor data that has been recorded on the Ambient IoT device.
7. The production manager accesses an application to manage the connectivity and operations of the Ambient IoT devices. Via this application, the production manager triggers the Ambient IoT device to delete the recorded sensor data.
Device deactivation
8. The production manager wants to deactivate Ambient IoT devices to disable their operation while the devices are not being used in the manufacturing process.
9. The production manager accesses an application to manage the connectivity and operation of the Ambient IoT devices. Via this application, the production manager deactivates and disables the operation of the device.
10. The production manager removes the deactivated Ambient IoT devices from the finished wafers and returns the devices to storage for possible re-use.
Device end of life cycle
11. The production manager determines that the Ambient IoT devices have reached the end of their life cycle and should no longer be used during the wafer manufacturing process.
12. The production manager accesses an application to manage the connectivity and operation of the Ambient IoT devices. Via this application, the production manager permanently configures an Ambient IoT Device such that all transmissions of the Ambient IoT device are permanently deactivated.
13. The production manager discards the permanently deactivated Ambient IoT device as it is no longer possible to activate, enable its operation or access recorded data. |
93a47931cc679002202cfe56afd8b056 | 22.840 | 5.29.4 Post-conditions | Device permanently deactivated
Two-way communications by an Ambient IoT device are permanently deactivated. |
93a47931cc679002202cfe56afd8b056 | 22.840 | 5.29.5 Existing features partly or fully covering the use case functionality | TS 22.261 clause 6.14.1 describe the following:
During their life cycle these IoT devices go through different stages, …, the activation of the IoT device by the preferred operator, a possible change of operators, etc. These stages need to be managed securely and efficiently.
Clause 6.14.2 defines the following requirement:
Based on operator policy, the 5G system shall provide means for authorised 3rd parties to request changes to UE subscription parameters for access to data networks, e.g., static IP address and configuration parameters for data network access.
The requirement above covers remote UE subscription activation and subscription suspension / deactivation.
If the subscription of an Ambient IoT device has been suspended or terminated, the device can still continually harvest energy and therefore may continue to attempt accessing the network or be accessed by a network. This can result in a security risk where a discarded Ambient IoT Device may be obtained by unauthorized users such that data or other parameters of the device may be subject to unauthorized access.
Therefore, there is a need to permanently deactivated the device such that the device may never be activated and accessed again. |
93a47931cc679002202cfe56afd8b056 | 22.840 | 5.29.6 Potential New Requirements needed to support the use case | [PR 5.29.6-1] Based on operator policy, the 5G system shall provide suitable mechanism to permanently disable the capability of an Ambient IoT device or a group of Ambient IoT devices to transmit RF signals.
[PR 5.29.6-2] Based on operator policy, the 5G system shall provide means for a trusted third party to request the deletion of any digitally stored information of an Ambient IoT device. |
93a47931cc679002202cfe56afd8b056 | 22.840 | 5.30 Use case on Ambient IoT device acting as a controller in smart agriculture | |
93a47931cc679002202cfe56afd8b056 | 22.840 | 5.30.1 Description | In agricultural production, there are many factors that affect the growth of crops, such as soil, climate, water, species, pests and weeds, etc. The yield of crops is the result of the combined influence of these factors. The smart agriculture can increase production, expand planting range and planting cycle by using sensors to monitor the growing environment of crops, and using some controller to correspondingly periodically control the equipment (e.g., the pesticide spraying equipment and irrigation equipment) in the farmland based on the sensed results.
It’s hard to provide a stable and continuous power supply for the controller deployed in the outdoor farmland. The Ambient power-enabled IoT devices, which can obtain and/or store energy from the environment, can be attached in the smart agriculture equipment and used as the controller to control the equipment in the farmland. The ambient IoT devices can harvest the energy from the environment to support its communication implementation.
Considering the operations of the pesticide spraying and irrigation equipment in the farmland is periodically, the ambient IoT controller can be activated periodically to save its energy. After the 5G network receives the demand from the Farm Management Platform, it can periodically activate the ambient IoT controller and then the ambient IOT controller will receive operation information and operate accordingly. The operation information includes e.g., the period to switch on and switch off the irrigation equipment, the amount of sprayed pesticide in each time, the spraying direction of each pesticide spraying equipment and etc.
Following is an example of service flow to describe the ambient IoT device is activated periodically and acting as a controller to control the equipment in the farmland. |
93a47931cc679002202cfe56afd8b056 | 22.840 | 5.30.2 Pre-conditions | The farmer “FF” owns a huge farmland, and installed several pesticide spraying and irrigation equipment in the different location of the farmland to cover the whole farmland. Each pesticide spraying or irrigation equipment is attached with an ambient IoT device, which is an “Ambient IoT controller” to control the operation of pesticide spraying and irrigation equipment (e.g., to control the on/off of pesticide spraying and irrigation system, the spraying direction operation of pesticide spraying system, and etc.) .
Some sensors are also deployed in the farmland to sense and monitor the condition and environment of the farmland.
The operator M has deployed 5G network to provide the “Green Farm comm.” communication service for farmers. The farmer “FF” has subscribed the service. |
93a47931cc679002202cfe56afd8b056 | 22.840 | 5.30.3 Service Flows | 1. The FMP collects the sensing results from the sensors in the farmland. Based on the analysis of the current condition of farmland, the FMP decides which pesticide spraying and irrigation equipment should be put into use.
2. Considering the growth regulation of farmland crops, irrigation and pesticide spraying can work periodically. Thus, the FMP decides the communication patterns of ambient IoT controllers and ask the 5G network to periodically activate the ambient IoT controllers.
3. According to FMP’s command, the 5G network periodically trigger the ambient IoT controllers to be activated. After the ambient IoT controllers have been activated, they receive the operation information via 5G network. The operation information includes e.g. the period to switch on and switch off the irrigation equipment, the period to switch on and switch off the pesticide spraying equipment, the amount of sprayed pesticide in each time, the spraying direction of each pesticide spraying equipment, the period to report the status information etc.
4. After receiving the operation information from the 5G network, the ambient IoT controllers can control the corresponding pesticide spraying and irrigation equipment accordingly, and report the operation status information to the FMP via the 5G network. The status information can include the feedback information about whether to receive the operation information and to operate successfully, and can include the current status of the controlled pesticide spraying and irrigation equipment). In the configured switch off period, the ambient IoT controllers can keep inactive to save the power.
5. The FMP continuously collects the sensing results from the sensors in the farmland. When the FMP observes that the farmland condition varies, the FMP decides to update the operation of the pesticide spraying and irrigation equipment, e.g., change to another set of pesticide spraying and irrigation equipment, change the switch on period, adjust the direction of the pesticide spraying equipment etc.
6. Then the FMP can ask the 5G network to periodically trigger the corresponding new ambient IoT controllers associated with the updated pesticide spraying and irrigation equipment and begin new operation.
7. Additionally, if there is an emergency order from FMP, e.g. high temperature warning to trigger the irrigation operation at once, the message need to be delivered with as short the latency as possible. |
93a47931cc679002202cfe56afd8b056 | 22.840 | 5.30.4 Post-conditions | The ambient IoT controller can periodically activated and control the pesticide spraying and irrigation equipment accordingly.
The on-demand control of all the pesticide spraying and irrigation equipment can be realized to adapt the variation of farmland condition, then the crops in the farmland can grow normally and the yield of crops can be improved. |
93a47931cc679002202cfe56afd8b056 | 22.840 | 5.30.5 Existing features partly or fully covering the use case functionality | None. |
93a47931cc679002202cfe56afd8b056 | 22.840 | 5.30.6 Potential New Requirements needed to support the use case | [P.R.5.30.6-001] The 5G system shall provide means for a trusted third-party to trigger an ambient IoT device or group of ambient IoT devices to communicate periodically.
[P.R.5.30.6-002] The 5G system shall be able to provide ambient IoT service with following KPIs：
Table 5.30.6-1: KPI Table of Ambient IoT controller in smart agriculture
Scenario
Max. allowed end-to-end latency
Communication Service Availability
Reliability
User-experienced data rate
Message Size
Device density
Communication Range
Service area dimension
Device speed
Transfer interval
Positioning service latency
Positioning service availability
Positioning Accuracy
Ambient IoT controller in smart agriculture
Several seconds
99%
N/A
NA
128bit (DL)
(note1)
NA
500m
outdoors
40,000m2
to 4,000,000m2
(note 2)
Static
NA
NA
NA
NA
NOTE 1: this size refers to the payload size of the control information sent by the 5G network to the ambient IoT controller.
NOTE 2: This is typical outdoor farmland size range in China. |
93a47931cc679002202cfe56afd8b056 | 22.840 | 6 Traffic Scenarios | 6.1 Traffic scenario on flower auction |
93a47931cc679002202cfe56afd8b056 | 22.840 | 6.1.1 Description | In the Netherlands, there is extensive logistics industry for flowers and vegetables. A specific case are the auctions where flowers from all over the world are brought in by the growers, then auctioned and subsequently distributed to buyers all over the world.
Flowers are transported on four-wheel containers that can be rented and are that used throughout the logistic chain. These containers are now equipped with a RFID tag. It would be beneficial if Ambient IoT tags could be used. RFID tags are scanned when containers with flowers arrive or leave the auction; tracking and tracing with Ambient IoT could get regular reports from all containers anywhere at the auction.
Figure 6.1.1-1: Logistics at a flower auction
Shipments of flowers can be tracked and traced based on the containers they are on. This is of interest for growers, buyers and the auction. There is also logistics of empty containers, where also the company that owns the containers can benefit from Ambient IoT. Finally, the auction has an interest in managing its space. Companies that own or rent containers are charged for leaving containers on the auction grounds overnight.
Communication service availability is important. Tracking and tracing is mainly done to find out where things have gone wrong in the logistics, e.g., missing containers. If the communication from tags is not significantly more reliable than the logistics itself, then tracking and tracing does not provide a benefit.
Some numbers:
- There are multiple flower auctions in The Netherlands.
- The size of the flower auction location in Aalsmeer is 1 732 769 m2.
- 44 million flowers are auctioned per day |
93a47931cc679002202cfe56afd8b056 | 22.840 | 6.1.2 Assumptions | We assume every four wheeled container is equipped with a tag in the form of an Ambient IoT device.
Figure 6.1.2-1: Container with flowers (Photo: Container Centralen)
Density of containers can be estimated based on the dimensions of the containers. A container is (lxwxh) 1350 mm x 565 mm x 1900m. Packing these containers closely together gives a density of 740 x 1770 = 1,3 million containers per km2.
Figure 6.1.2-2: Density of flower containers (Photo: Royal FloraHolland)
Ceiling in the flower auction is at 9 meters. We assume that base stations are attached to the ceiling. Number of base stations that is needed to cover the flower auction is dependent on the communication range and on the number of devices per base station. Here we assume a base station spacing of one base station for every 50 m x 50 m of ceiling. This gives a maximum range of approx. 35 meters from ceiling to container. The number of containers in that 50 m x 50 m area is approximately 3000.
The assumption is that the Ambient IoT devices are woken up and triggered for communication on demand by the 5G network, where e.g., the flower auction or a flower grower can decide when to wake up and trigger the Ambient IoT devices for communication. When woken up and triggered the Ambient IoT devices respond by transmitting information, e.g., their identity numbers, to the network.
The flower auction can decide in which parts of the flower auction the Ambient IoT devices are woken up. This can be done by e.g. only providing the wake up via some of the base stations. The flower auction can also decide to trigger only part of the Ambient IoT devices.
Assumption is that an identity can be provided within 96 bits (is EPC length used for identification).
Assumption is that probability of errors in logistics handling (e.g., a container is left behind) is <1%. A communication service availability of 99,99% would imply that the chance that communication for tracking a container is approximately 2 orders of magnitude better than the logistics handling reliability.
There is no strict latency requirement when large amounts of containers are triggered. A latency in the order of 10 seconds is acceptable. |
93a47931cc679002202cfe56afd8b056 | 22.840 | 6.1.3 Potential Functional Requirements | None identified. |
93a47931cc679002202cfe56afd8b056 | 22.840 | 6.1.4 Potential Key Performance Requirements | [PR 6.1-001] The 5G system shall be able to provide Ambient IoT service with the following KPIs:
Table 6.1.4-1: KPIs for Flower Auction scenario
Scenario
Max. allowed end-to-end latency
Communication Service Availability
Reliability
User-experienced data rate
Message Size
Device density
Communication Range
Service area dimension
Device speed
Transfer interval
Positioning service latency
Positioning service availability
Positioning Accuracy
Container logistics in a flower auction
<10 s
99,99%
(note 1)
NA
<1 kbit/s
(note 3)
96 bits
(note 2)
< 1,3Million/km2 (note 4)
35 m
Indoors
1 700 000 m2
(note 5)
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NOTE 1: Chance of communication service unavailability needs to be significantly lower than chance of errors in logistics handling. This communication service availability applies at application level, the communication service availability at radio level can be different.
NOTE 2: Only an identifier for the tag is sent (Electronic Product Code (EPC) lengths used for identification is 96 bits).
NOTE 3: This value is calculated as the instant data rate for transmitting 96 bits within 100 ms time period. The need for data transmission is infrequent.
NOTE 4: Based on closely packing containers.
NOTE 5: Size of the flower auction location in Aalsmeer.
6.2 Traffic Scenario on cow stable |
93a47931cc679002202cfe56afd8b056 | 22.840 | 6.2.1 Description | In the dairy industry, there is an increase in the scale of farms. Whilst the number of farms decreases the number of cows per farm increases. The largest dairy farms in the US have over 15000 cows. A more typical dairy farm has around 200 cows.
Figure 6.2.1-1: A typical dairy farm
Because of the increase of the number of cows, there is a lot of automation in dairy farming. For example cows are milked using a milk robot, and manure is removed with robots.
Figure 6.2.1-2: Dairy farm automation with milk robot (left) and manure robot (right)
In order to identify individual cows (e.g. in the milk robot), the cows have tags. These tags also perform measurements of the cows vital signs (e.g. temperature, movement) to e.g. determine the fertility cycle of the cow and monitor health.
Figure 6.2.1-3: Cow sensor (sensor is just behind the ear)
It is also possible to create a cow sensor in the form of a capsule (or bolus) that can be swallowed by cows and remains in the first of the cow’s four stomachs. The advantage of this is that the sensor is smaller, providing more freedom to the cow, and that more internal data from within the cow can be measured.
Many cows spend their whole life in the stable. However, data in the Netherlands shows that more than 80% of cows also can graze outside in the meadows around the farm. |
93a47931cc679002202cfe56afd8b056 | 22.840 | 6.2.2 Assumptions | We assume a typical farm with 200 cows. Every cow is equipped with a sensor.
The dimensions of the stable vary with the interior design of the stable, but 30 m x 60 m is a realistic dimension. For simplicity we assume that cows can go everywhere within the stable. The assumption is that there is an indoor base station on the ceiling in the middle of the stable.
The sensors provide measurement data every hour, but can also provide immediate alerts in case the cow is in distress (e.g. during calving). Assumption is that each measurement (identifier, plus 4 measured values) can be provided within 500 bits.
The cow sensor can harvest energy from the movement and temperature of the cow. A continuous power scenario is assumed where the sensor continuously has power available.
Maximum range for the sensor to base station is approximately 35 meters. Note that when the cows are outside, the distance to outside base stations can be much larger (kilometres). It is not assumed that the sensors can communicate over such long range. Even though the sensor may detect the base station, it should not attempt to connect to the base station when it is out of range.
A typical size of a capsule / bolus for cows is approximately 30 mm by 100 mm. For smaller ruminants, such as sheep or goats, this size is not suitable and smaller capsules will have to be made. |
93a47931cc679002202cfe56afd8b056 | 22.840 | 6.2.3 Potential Functional Requirements | Ambient IoT devices shall not transmit (creating interference) when the network is outside communication range. |
93a47931cc679002202cfe56afd8b056 | 22.840 | 6.2.4 Potential Key Performance Requirements | [PR 6.1-001] The 5G system shall be able to provide Ambient IoT service with the following KPIs:
Table 6.2.4-1: KPIs for dairy stable scenario
Scenario
Max. allowed end-to-end latency
Communication Service Availability
Reliability
User-experienced data rate
Message Size
Device density
Communication Range
Service area dimension
Device speed
Transfer interval
Positioning service latency
Positioning service availability
Positioning Accuracy
Cows in dairy stable
1 s
(note 4)
99,9%
NA
< 0.5 kbit/s (note 2)
500 bits
(note 1)
< 1 /km2 (note 3)
35 m
Indoors
1 800m2
(note 5)
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NOTE 1: An identifier and four measurement values (e.g. temperature, movement, …).
NOTE 2: This value is calculated as the instant data rate for transmitting 500 bits within 1s transmission time. The need for data transmission is infrequent (e.g. once per hour).
NOTE 3: 200 cows in the stable
NOTE 4: There is no great urgency with cow monitoring that requires a lower latency.
NOTE 5: Assuming a 30 m x 60 m stable. |
93a47931cc679002202cfe56afd8b056 | 22.840 | 6.3 Traffic Scenario on Electronic Shelf Label | |
93a47931cc679002202cfe56afd8b056 | 22.840 | 6.3.1 Description | Recently, a growing number of electronic shelf labels (ESLs) have been deployed in retail industry. The technology has freed the retail stores from labour-intensive paper label replacement work, where a typical grocery store needs to replace about 10,000 price tags per week [78]. The ESLs also help retailers and manufactures to use real-time inventory data to optimize inventory and automate shelf refilling. More importantly, the ESLs and smart shelves system enable retailers to build a better, friendly, and smarter shopping experience to improve shopper engagement. For example, some retailers have integrated electronic shelf label with smart shopping cart to bring better shopper engagement by guiding customers in the store to their shopping items quickly and reduce customer line-up time to zero [79]. Additionally, data collected from ESL system provide good insights on consumer shopping behaviours, which allows retailers to implement a dynamic pricing strategy.
The ESL device is usually equipped with battery, RF module, microcontroller, plastic housing, electronic paper display. Although, most recent electronic paper technologies allow ESL units to draw minimum to zero energy from battery to keep static text and images [80], from time to time, battery replacement still make environment-friendly concern and maintenance cost two pain points for most retailers when the mass deployment of these labels becomes mainstream.
Figure 6.3.1-1: Electronic Shelf Labels deployed in a retail store
In the coming years, Ambient-powered ESL is going to gain momentum in the market. It will dramatically reduce the cost of ESLs. And battery change, from both environment-friendly and labour-saving perspectives, is no longer a concern for retail stores. The Ambient-powered ESL helps to automate several store routines, e.g. price tag change, stock refilling, dynamic price adjustment, customer behaviour analysis, etc. Integrated with a rich set of 5G features, the Ambient-powered IoT ESL is potentially going to drive the next wave of retail industry ESL system upgrade.
In addition to benefits gained from battery-less deployment, thanks to the 5G Ambient IoT system in the retail store, now the store manager does not need to worry about the long-lasting issue where some items’ paper price labels do not match advertised flyer prices. He can just feed the store management portal with the same source pricing data used for weekly flyer promotion. The Ambient IoT store management system will then automatically update the affectedly Ambient IoT price tags based on the same pricing strategy as the store flyer. This process can be done remotely without presence of store clerks. It usually completes in just a few minutes. Previously, to get similar task done, the process might require four night-shift clerks on-site to complete for a large retail store.
In another scenario, the Ambient IoT ESL unit, equipped with temperature sensor, could be used to monitor anomaly in the frozen food area, and report to the store management platform periodically. An anomaly alert then triggers the store management platform to page store clerks to check the status of the freezer. On the smart shelf, the Ambient IoT system could report that items on the self are now out of stock. Store clerks will then be notified to refill the shelf in a timely manner. |
93a47931cc679002202cfe56afd8b056 | 22.840 | 6.3.2 Assumptions | We assume a retailing giant starts to deploy 5G network to provide Ambient IoT communication service for ESL system in the store. The retail store, average 15,800 square meters, offer more than 100,000 different items. The ESL devices are installed on the 6-shelf racks with dimension of 1.8mx1.2mx0.5m. In addition to the Ambient IoT label, some items on the shelf are also attached with trackable tags. Averaging over effective display area in the store, it is estimated that the device density is less than 1.5 million/km2. It is also noted that in certain area of the retail store where small items are stocked as illustrated in Figure 6.3.2-1, the shelf could accommodate about 90 labels per square meter. In the other example illustrated in Figure 6.3.2.1-1, the device density of ESLs equipped with temperature and humidity sensor inside refrigerators is estimated to be less than 10 per 100 square meters.
Fig. 6.3.2-1: display shelfs in a retailing super market
In an electronic shelf label (ESL) system, product pricing and descriptions on the labels can be updated upon request, without applying a fixed transfer interval. However, the temperature and humidity conditions of the shelf or refrigerators are typically reported at predetermined intervals via sensors integrated into the ESL. These intervals are commonly determined in accordance with food safety guidelines that vary across regions and organizations. For example, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) recommends that food should not be left outside of refrigeration for more than two hours, and if the temperature exceeds 32°C, this time limit is reduced to one hour [90]. Meanwhile, the Australian Food and Grocery Council (AFGC) stipulates that chilled food should not be left outside of refrigeration for more than 20 minutes [91]. Based on these industry guidelines, we propose employing a transfer interval key performance indicator (KPI) of “20 minutes to 2 hours” for this particular traffic scenario. These transfer intervals can be provisioned into Ambient IoT devices or the management system by the Ambient IoT service providers or 5G operators.
In the other assumption, we assume the Ambient IoT system has a communication service availability of 99%. This implies there might be 1% Ambient IoT devices could not be reachable even after multiple retransmissions. For a retail store with 2,000 different items to update price tag, this means about 20 ESL price tags need to be updated with human intervention. This workload is acceptable for such a store. |
93a47931cc679002202cfe56afd8b056 | 22.840 | 6.3.3 Potential Key Performance Requirements | [PR.6.3.3-1] The 5G system shall be able to support Ambient IoT devices with the following KPIs
Table 6.3.3.1 – Potential key performance requirements for Electronic Shelf Label use case
Scenario
Max. allowed end-to-end latency
Communication Service Availability
Reliability
User-experienced data rate
Message Size
Device density
Communication Range
Service area dimension
Device speed
Transfer interval
Positioning service latency
Positioning service availability
Positioning Accuracy
Electronic Shelf Label
1s
99%
NA
0.8kbit/s DL (note 1)
100 Bytes (note 2)
less than 1.5 million/km2 (inventory), less than 0.1 million/km2 (temperature sensor)
50m indoors
15,800 square meters
stationary
20 minutes to 2 hours [Note 3]
NA
NA
NA
Note 1: the user experience data rate is estimated based on transmission of 100 Bytes within 1 second.
Note 2: the message payload size is calculated based on the capacity of 50 Unicode characters for item description and pricing on the electronic shelf label.
Note 3: These are the typical intervals where electronic shelf labels equipped with sensors report temperature and humidity conditions of the shelf or refrigerators in accordance with food safety guidelines that vary across regions and organizations. |
93a47931cc679002202cfe56afd8b056 | 22.840 | 7 Consolidated potential requirements and KPIs | |
93a47931cc679002202cfe56afd8b056 | 22.840 | 7.1 Consolidated potential requirements | Mapping table is used per each subclause for consolidated potential requirements. |
93a47931cc679002202cfe56afd8b056 | 22.840 | 7.1.1 Communication aspects of Ambient IoT devices | Table 7.1.1-1 Consolidated Requirements for communication aspects of Ambient IoT devices
CPR #
Consolidated Potential Requirement
Original PR #
Comment
CPR 7.1.1-1
The 5G system shall be able to support mechanisms to communicate:
• between an Ambient IoT device and the 5G network using Ambient IoT direct network communication or Ambient IoT indirect network communication.
• between an Ambient IoT device and Ambient IoT capable UE using Ambient IoT device to UE communication.
PR.5.2.6-001
PR.5.6.6-001
PR.5.11.6-001
PR.5.12.6-002
PR.5.13.6-001
PR.5.1.6-001
PR.5.4.6-001
PR.5.2.6-002
PR.5.12.6-002
PR.5.8.6-003
PR.5.27-004
PR.5.13.6-004
PR.5.3.6-001
PR.5.22.6-1,
PR5.23.6-1,
PR.5.24.6-1
PR.5.26.6-001
CPR 7.1.1-1 is updated to include communication modes.
Note 1: This requirement applies to the 5G network and only UEs with the capability to communicate with an Ambient IoT device.
Note 2: Examples of the communication between 5G network/Ambient IoT capable UE and Ambient IoT devices can include periodic sensor reporting or network-initiated inventory.
CPR 7.1.1-2
The 5G system shall be able to support 5G network or an Ambient IoT capable UE to communicate with a group of Ambient IoT devices simultaneously.
PR 5.2.6-001
PR.5.6.6-001
PR.5.11.6-001
PR.5.12.6-002
PR.5.13.6-001
PR.5.1.6-001
PR.5.4.6-001
PR.5.2.6-002
PR.5.12.6-002
PR.5.8.6-003
PR.5.27-004
PR.5.13.6-004
PR.5.3.6-001
PR.5.22.6-1,
PR.5.23.6-1,
PR.5.24.6-1
PR.5.26.6-001
CPR 7.1.1-3
The 5G network shall support a mechanism to authorize an Ambient IoT capable UE to communicate with an Ambient IoT device.
PR.5.8.6-002
PR.5.12.6-001
PR.5.14.6-001
PR.5.21.6-003
PR.5.21.6-001 |
93a47931cc679002202cfe56afd8b056 | 22.840 | 7.1.2 Positioning/location of Ambient IoT devices | Table 7.1.2-1 Consolidated Requirements for positioning/location of Ambient IoT devices
CPR #
Consolidated Potential Requirement
Original PR #
Comment
CPR 7.1.2-1
The 5G system shall support location services for Ambient IoT devices (e.g., to locate Ambient IoT devices using absolute or relative positioning methods)
Note: The intention is not to use Ambient IoT devices to locate other Ambient IoT devices.
PR.5.9.6-002
PR.5.12.6-004
PR.5.2.6-004
PR.5.8.6-001
PR 5.10.6-001
PR.5.21.6-002 |
93a47931cc679002202cfe56afd8b056 | 22.840 | 7.1.3 Management of Ambient IoT devices | Table 7.1.3-1 Consolidated Requirements for management of Ambient IoT devices
CPR #
Consolidated Potential Requirement
Original PR #
Comment
CPR 7.1.3-1
The 5G network shall support suitable management mechanisms for an Ambient IoT device or a group of Ambient IoT devices.
PR.5.1.6-005
PR.5.16.6-003
PR.5.17.6-001
CPR 7.1.3-2
The 5G system shall support a mechanism to:
- disable the capability to transmit RF signals for one or more Ambient IoT device that is / are currently able to transmit RF signals
- enable the capability to transmit RF signals for one or more Ambient IoT device that is / are currently disabled to transmit RF signals
CPR 7.1.3-3
Based on operator policy, the 5G system shall provide a suitable mechanism to permanently disable the capability of an Ambient IoT device or a group of Ambient IoT devices to transmit RF signals.
CPR-7.1.3-4
Subject to operator policy and regulatory requirements, the 5G system shall support suitable mechanisms for the Ambient IoT device to move between one or more networks and countries.
PR.5.27-001 |
93a47931cc679002202cfe56afd8b056 | 22.840 | 7.1.4 Collected information and network capability exposure | Table 7.1.4-1 Consolidated Requirements for “collected information” and network capability exposure
CPR #
Consolidated Potential Requirement
Original PR #
Comment
CPR 7.1.4-1
Subject to user consent, operator policy and 3rd party request, the 5G system shall be able to get information from Ambient IoT devices (e.g. sensor data) and provide it to a trusted 3rd party via the 5G network.
PR.5.1.6-002
PR.5.12.6-003
PR.5.13.6-005 PR.5.14.6-003
PR.5.16.6-004
PR.5.18.6-1 PR.5.21.6-004
PR 5.2.6-003
CPR 7.1.4-2
Subject to user consent, operator’s policy and 3rd party request, the 5G system shall provide information about an Ambient IoT device or a group of Ambient IoT devices (e.g. position) to the trusted 3rd party via the 5G network.
CPR 7.1.4-3
The 5G system shall enable an authorized 3rd party to instruct the 5G network to trigger a group of Ambient IoT devices in a specific area and which action the Ambient IoT devices need to perform when triggered (e.g. send ID, receive further information, send measurement value).
PR.5.3.6-003
PR.5.19.6-001
PR.5.27-003
CPR 7.1.4-4
The 5G system shall provide suitable mechanisms to support communication between a trusted and authorized 3rd party and an Ambient IoT device or group of Ambient devices.
PR.5.20.6-001
PR.5.22.6-2,
PR.5.23.6-2,
PR.5.24.6-2
PR.5.30.6-001 |
93a47931cc679002202cfe56afd8b056 | 22.840 | 7.1.5 Charging | Table 7.1.5-1 Consolidated Requirements for charging
CPR #
Consolidated Potential Requirement
Original PR #
Comment
CPR. 7.1.5-1
The 5G system shall be able to collect charging information in a suitable way for using Ambient IoT services on per Ambient IoT device basis or a group of Ambient IoT devices (e.g., total number of communications per charging period).
PR.5.3.6-004
PR.5.3.6-005
PR.5.22.6-3,
PR.5.23.6-3,
PR.5.24.6-3 |
93a47931cc679002202cfe56afd8b056 | 22.840 | 7.1.6 Security and privacy | Table 7.1.6-1 Consolidated Requirements for security and privacy
CPR #
Consolidated Potential Requirement
Original PR #
Comment
CPR 7.1.6-1
The 5G system shall be able to provide a mechanism to protect the privacy of information (e.g., location and identity) exchanged during communication between an Ambient IoT device and the 5G network or an Ambient IoT capable UE.
PR.5.1.6-003
PR 5.3.6-002 PR.5.6-002 PR.5.13.6-002 PR.5.21.6-005 PR.5.8.6-004
PR.5.1.6-004
PR.5.8.6-005
PR.5.12.6-006 PR.5.13.6-003
PR.5.14.6-005
PR.5.16.6-001 PR.5.20.6-002
CPR 7.1.6-2
The 5G system shall enable security protection suitable for Ambient IoT, without compromising overall 5G security protection.
PR.5.1.6-003
PR.5.3.6-002 PR.5.6-002 PR.5.13.6-002 PR.5.21.6-005 PR.5.8.6-004
PR.5.1.6-004
PR.5.8.6-005
PR.5.12.6-006 PR.5.13.6-003
PR.5.14.6-005
PR 5.16.6-001 PR.5.20.6-002
CPR 7.1.6-3
Based on subscription and operator policies, the 5G system shall authorize an Ambient IoT capable UE to communicate with a specific Ambient IoT device.
PR.5.12.6-005
PR.5.14.6-004 |
93a47931cc679002202cfe56afd8b056 | 22.840 | 7.2 Consolidated potential KPIs | |
93a47931cc679002202cfe56afd8b056 | 22.840 | 7.2.1 KPIs for inventory | Table 7.2.1-1 KPIs for inventory
Scenarios
Max. allowed end-to-end latency
Communication Service Availability
Reliability
User-experienced data rate
Message Size
Device density
Communication Range (Note 1)
Service area dimension
Device speed
Transfer interval
Positioning service latency
Positioning service availability
Positioning Accuracy
Remark
inventory or asset management
Typically, seconds level
99%
NA
<2 Kbit/s
96/256 bits
<1,5 Million/km²
indoor only
(Note 2)
30~50m indoor,
200m~400m outdoor
1-10km²
3~10km/h
NA
NA
NA
3 m indoor,
cell-level outdoor
UC#5.1, UC#5.2, UC#5.5, UC#5.7, UC#5.16
TS#6.1
NOTE 1: The communication range is the communication distance between the ambient IoT device and the 5G network or between the ambient IoT device and an ambient IoT capable UE.
NOTE 2: The device density is much lower outdoors as only a subset of assets (e.g. stored indoors) will be in transit, and a much larger area for transit applies. |
93a47931cc679002202cfe56afd8b056 | 22.840 | 7.2.2 KPI for sensor data collection | Table 7.2.2-1 KPIs for sensor data collection
Deployment
Scenarios
Max. allowed end-to-end latency
Communication Service Availability
Reliability
User-experienced data rate
Message Size
Device density
Communication Range
(Note 1)
Service area dimension
Device speed
Transfer interval
Positioning service latency
Positioning service availability
Positioning Accuracy
Remark
Indoor
Room envirionment monitoring (e.g. domicile, machinery)
20-30 s
99 %
NA
<1 kbit/s
< 100 bits
1.5
10-30m
NA
Stationary
NA
NA
NA
NA
UC#5.6, UC#5.13
Indoor agriculture and husbandry
>10 s
99.9%
NA
<1 kbit/s
Typically,
< 1000 bits
1 per m²
30 - 200 m
6000 m²~30,000m²
Quasi-stationary
15 minutes to half an hour
NA
NA
NA
UC#5.20 UC#5.23
TS#6.2
UC#5.18
Outdoor
Smart grid
1 s
99%
NA
< 1kbit/s
Typically,
< 100 bytes
< 10,000 /km²
Typically 50-200 meters
[several km² up to 100 000 km²]
Stationary
5-15 min
NA
NA
several 10 m
UC#5.3
Outdoor husbandry and logistics
Typically, > tens of seconds
99%
NA
<500 bit/s
Typically,
[< 100 bytes]
<5200 devices / km²
[300 m - 500 m]
430000 m²
Up to 3 km/h
15 min
NA
NA
NA
UC#5.22, UC#5.19
Smart city
10 s - 30 s
99%
NA
<1 kbit/s
Typically,
< 100 bytes
<1000 devices / km²
300 m - 500 m
City wide including rural areas
Stationary
15 min
NA
NA
NA
UC#5.24, UC#5.25
NOTE 1: The communication range is the communication distance between the ambient IoT device and the 5G network or between the ambient IoT device and an ambient IoT capable UE. |
93a47931cc679002202cfe56afd8b056 | 22.840 | 7.2.3 KPI for tracking | Table 7.2.3-1 KPIs for tracking
Deployment
Scenarios
Max. allowed end-to-end latency
Communication Service Availability
Reliability
User-experienced data rate
Message Size
Device density
Communication Range
(Note 1)
Service area dimension
Device speed
Transfer interval
Positioning service latency
Positioning service availability
Positioning Accuracy
Remark
Indoor
Indoor tracking
1s
99.9%
NA
<1 kbit/s
<1k bits
25/100 m²
10m indoor
200 m²
up to 3km/h
1 per hour
1s
90%
1-3 m, 90% availability
UC#5.8
UC#5.10
UC#5.12, UC#5.14
UC#5.21
Outdoor
Outdoor tracking
1s
99.9%
NA
<1 kbit/s
<1 kbits
<10 per 100 m²
500m
Up to the whole PLMN
up to 10 km/h
1 per hour
1 s
95%
several 10m
UC#5.8
UC#5.9
UC5.12
NOTE 1: The communication range is the communication distance between the ambient IoT device and the 5G network or between the ambient IoT device and an ambient IoT capable UE. |
93a47931cc679002202cfe56afd8b056 | 22.840 | 7.2.4 KPI for actuator control | Table 7.2.4-1 KPIs for actuator control
Deployment
Scenarios
Max. allowed end-to-end latency
Communication Service Availability
Reliability
User-experienced data rate
Message Size
Device density
Communication Range
(Note 1)
Service area dimension
Device speed
Transfer interval
Positioning service latency
Positioning service availability
Positioning Accuracy
Remark
Indoor
Indoor actuator control
Several seconds
99%
NA
2 kbit/s
<100 Bytes
less than 1.5 million/km²
50m indoors
<250 m² for home, and
15,800 square meters for supermarket
stationary
20 minutes to 2 hours
NA
NA
3 m to 5 m indoor
UC#5.11UC#5.26TS#6.3
Outdoor
Outdoor actuator control for large coverage
Several seconds
99%
N/A
NA
128bit (DL)
NA
[500]m
outdoors
40,000~4,000,000m2
Static
NA
NA
NA
NA
UC#5.30
Outdoor actuator control for medium coverage
Several seconds
99%
NA
<2 kbit/s
<200 bits
<20per 100 m²
200 m
City wide including rural areas
Static
NA
NA
NA
NA
UC#5.26UC#11
NOTE 1: The communication range is the communication distance between the ambient IoT device and the 5G network or between the ambient IoT device and an ambient IoT capable UE. |
93a47931cc679002202cfe56afd8b056 | 22.840 | 8 Conclusion and recommendations | This technical report identifies use cases and potential new requirements related to ambient IoT. The resulting service requirements have been consolidated in clause 7. It is recommended to consider the consolidated requirements identified in this TR for the subsequent normative work. Annex A: Ambient IoT availability scenarios The Ambient IoT devices foresee to have different kind of communication pattern that could be dependent on power available for communication e.g. harvesting and the availability of storage capability or the specific use case. Following pattern are foreseen: - Normal operation: In this scenario, Ambient IoT devices have power available continuously or at least for signicant amounts of time, either because there is continuous power harvesting or possibly in combination with limited energy storage (e.g. in a capacitor) to overcome momentary variations in power harvesting. The main effect of this scenario is that the processor and communications module in the Ambient IoT device can be continuously active. The communications module can listen to network at regular intervals to determine if there is mobile terminated traffic (e.g. trigger messages) and can transmit data when relevant. - Device triggered operation: In this scenario, devices have power available only intermittently. The main effect of this scenario is that the Ambient IoT device can only be active for the short periods of time. And it is the Ambient IoT device that decides when to communicate with the network. It is possible that the Ambient IoT device is not able to listen to the network for mobile terminated traffic for very long periods of time. This has an impact on service aspects such as provisioning. - On demand operation: in this scenario 5G network will wake up and trigger the device to communicate in a relevant manner. This scenario only considers the network to trigger the communication and the Ambient IoT device cannot determine when to communicate. Waking up of the Ambient IoT device can be combined with a trigger to perform a specific action (e.g. do measurement) or to communicate (e.g. send an identifier). Waking up can also imply that the Ambient IoT device starts listening to the network for further instructions. These scenarios are not intended as definitions for device categories. The purpose is to enable discussion of service aspects that are associated with different scenarios. Annex B: Ambient power and energy storage B.1 Typical ambient power For ambient IoT devices, energy can be harvested from different types of ambient power sources. Some examples of which could be ambient power includes radio waves, solar energy/light, thermal energy and mechanical vibration etc. RF Energy RF-based energy can be harvested from radio waves ranging from 3 kHz to 300 GHz using a single-stage or multistage converter (i.e., rectifier circuit, as shown in Figure B-1). The amount of power that can be harvested depends on the source power, antenna gain, and the distance from the RF source. Ambient RF energy has a relatively low energy density, e.g., from several microwatts to tens of microwatts. Figure B.1-1: rectifier circuit For RF energy harvesting Based on the current state of art, the minimum RF power can be harvested is around -30dB 00. The conversion efficiency for RF Energy is listed in the table below. Table B.1-1: Conversion efficiency for RF Energy 0 Efficiency（%） Input power（dBm） Center frequency（MHz） Reflector unit 1.2 -14 950 0.3-μm CMOS convertor 5.1 -14.1 920 0.18-μm CMOS convertor 10 -22.6 906 0.25-μm CMOS convertor 11 -14 915 90-μm CMOS convertor 12.8 -19.5 900 0.18-μm CMOS , CoSi2 - Si Schottky 13 -14.7 900 0.35-μm CMOS convertor 16.4 -9 963 0.35-μm COMS convertor 18 -19 869 0.5-μm CMOS convertor 26.5 -11.1 900 0.18-μm CMOS convertor 36.6 -6 963 0.35-μm CMOS convertor 47 -8 915 0.18-μm CMOS convertor 49 -1 900 Skyworks SMS7630 Si Schottky The main advantage of RF-based energy harvesting is its availability in deployed environments and the fact that RF power is controllable (e.g., power can be sent by a transmitter on demand or periodically). Potential applications include logistics/warehouse, manufacturing, smart homes, health monitoring, and environmental monitoring etc. Solar Energy/Light Solar power/light can be transformed into electrical power using photovoltaic cells and it uses photovoltaic effect for energy harvesting with conversion efficiency of 10-40% 0. For the outdoor case, solar energy is one of the most common ambient power, it can supply inexhaustible clean energy and has high power density of up to 100 mW/cm2 0. Figure B.1-2: The equivalent electrical circuit of a single diode solar PV cell [21] Solar power is unstable, inconsistent, and intermittent. It is highly dependent on the atmospheric condition, surrounding obstructions, etc. It is available during daytime but inefficient on a cloudy day or during the night. Solar energy harvesting can be mainly used for outdoor environmental monitoring, agriculture, husbandry, transportation, etc. For the indoor cases, light from the lighting equipment can be used. Although the power density is lower than solar, e.g., 100uw/cm2, it is much stable and controllable. Energy harvested from light can be used for manufacturing, indoor environmental monitoring etc. Thermal Energy Thermal energy is another ambient power source that are available for lots of use cases. Electrical power is directly generated by exploiting the temperature difference in thermoelectric devices taking advantage of thermoelectric effects, such as the Seebeck effect or the Thomson effect. Thermoelectric generators have low efficiency (only about 5–6%) 0. The power density is 25~1000uw/cm2 depending the environment condition. Figure B.1-3: Seebeck effect Although with low conversion efficiency, thermal energy can be used in many outdoor applications or indoor cases as long as temperature difference or temperature fluctuation can be expected in the environment. For example, outdoor environmental monitoring, smart grid, agriculture, husbandry etc. Mechanical Vibration The piezoelectric effect generates electrical voltages or currents from mechanical strains, such as vibration or deformation. Typical piezoelectric-based energy harvesters keep creating power when there is a continuous mechanical motion, such as acoustic noises and wind, or they sporadically generate power for intermittent strains, such as human motion (walking, clicking a button, etc.). The volume of the piezoelectric power generators is relatively small and typical output power density values of usual piezoelectric materials are around 250 μW/cm3 but they can create more power when a motion or deformation is intense 0Error! Reference source not found.. Figure B.1-4: Piezoelectric energy harvesting generator [25] B.2 Energy storage From the discussion above, it can be seen that kinds of ambient power have the following characteristics: • For typical ambient power, it can be observed the power harvested is very limited, e.g. from 1uW to 100mW (per cm2/cm3). • For some ambient power from artificial power source (e.g., light, RF waves), the power can be stable and constant. But for some other kind of ambient power such as solar, heat or vibration, the ambient power will be unstable (intermittent, not constant). It is impossible to use the ambient power as a direct power source for electronic devices. Therefore, Energy storage element is needed, at least for some ambient IoT devices due to the following reasons: • The energy storage element is able to stabilize and control the power output, smooth the fluctuation. • It is able to collect the weak harvested power (e.g., in the level of micro Ampere or even nano Ampere) and provide the required higher peak discharge current (e.g., in the level of tens of micro ampere to hundreds of micro ampere) for the ambient IoT devices. • Therefore, it makes it possible to use more kinds of ambient power sources for ambient IoT by using the energy storage element. Note: It is still necessary to have no power storage for some types of ambient IoT devices (e.g. using energy from radio waves). Capacitor can be considered as the basic energy storage elements for ambient IoT devices. Capacitor have limited power perseverance time and storage capacity, which can restrict the ambient IoT application. For example, with a fully charged capacitor of 24uF, it can drive the ambient IoT devices for 3.6k bits communication (1.5V, 10uA and 1kbit/s are assumed). ◦ 24uF*1.5V= 36uC = 36 uAs The communication is depending on the power consumption. Capacitor could be used in case power source are stable and constant. The printed solid-state battery can be considered as an additional power storage with similar durability and higher capacity. With a solid-state battery of [email protected] as example, it can drive the ambient IoT devices for even 360k bits communication (1.5V and 10uA). Annex C: Considerations when choosing harvesting source When using energy harvesting as the main source of energy for low power devices there are a lot of design parameters to understand. The harvesting sources needs to match the total energy consumption of the Ambioent IoT device. The available energy needs to balance the energy demand for the communication, the computation and other present elements like sensors. Other factors that matters are if it is possible to harvest continously or only part of the time, e.g. if solar cells are used as harvesting method it is only possible to harvest during day time. Below there is a schematic picture of the different parts of the system for an Ambient IoT device. Not all parts are mandatory in an Ambient IoT device, for instance sensors and energy storage are not always present. The power management will ensure that the correct voltage will be available for the sensor, communication and compute parts. Ambient IoT devices can be both with and without some kind of energy storage and there are many types of storage components, from capacitors, super capacitors to more battery types of storages. Figure C-1 Example of parts in an Ambient IOT device The following example assumes that some storage capability is available in the device Below shows two examples with same type of harvesting but with different length of the active time periods that the sensor/compute/communication system needs to be active. In the first example, the Ambient IoT device transmits in shorter bursts and with a higher power compared to second example. In the second example the time for the sensor/compute/communication is active longer. This would mean that, given everything else is equal, the available power for the active period in example two is lower. Figure C-2 Example where the active period for the device is relative short Figure C- 3 Example where the active period for the device is relative long There is therefore not a simple formula to determine the available power for the sensor/compute/communication functionsfrom the characteristics of the energy harvesting method. Annex D: Change history Change history Date Meeting TDoc CR Rev Cat Subject/Comment New version 2022.05 SA1#98e S1-221254 - - - Initial Skeleton 0.0.0 2022.05 SA1#98e Inclusion of: S1-221255; S1-221256; S1-221257; S1-221258; S1-221259; S1-221260; S1-221261; S1-221262 0.1.0 2022.09 SA1#99e - - - Add agreed use cases, power scenarios etc. Inclusion of: S1-222362; S1-222363; S1-222364; S1-222365; S1-222366; S1-222367; S1-222368; S1-222369; S1-222370; S1-222371; S1-222372; S1-222373; S1-222374; S1-222375; S1-222376; S1-222377; S1-222378; S1-222379; S1-222380; S1-222122 0.2.0 2022.11 SA1#100 - - - Update of names, formats. Corrections. Inclusion of: S1-223207 0.2.1 2022.11 SA1#100 - - - Update of requirements, more use cases, annex and others. The KPI tables are updated in unified format base on S1-223799. Inclusion of: S1-223207; S1-223321; S1-223698; S1-223545; S1-223546; S1-223356; S1-223357; S1-223360; S1-223361; S1-223480; S1-223481; S1-223363; S1-223364; S1-223583; S1-223556; S1-223582; S1-223235; S1-223571; S1-223700; S1-223573; S1-223562; S1-223702; S1-223703; S1-223704; S1-223705; S1-223555; S1-223706; S1-223707; S1-223708; S1-223229; S1-223699; S1-223166; S1-223737 0.3.0 2023.02 SA1#101 - - - New use cases, updates of the existing use cases, clear up of FFS etc Inclusion of: S1-230654; S1-230655; S1-230757; S1-230758; S1-230662; S1-230663; S1-230526; S1-230123; S1-230759; S1-230609; S1-230610; S1-230760; S1-230761; S1-230231; S1-230613; S1-230614; S1-230615; S1-230238; S1-230616; S1-230621; S1-230665; S1-230763; S1-230619; S1-230800; S1-230765 1.1.0 2023.05 SA1#102 - - - updates of the existing use cases, clear up of FFS/Editor note etc Inclusion of: S1-231400; S1-231293; S1-231401; S1-231292; S1-231403; S1-231405; S1-231812; S1-231682; S1-231407; S1-231459; S1-231409; S1-231402; S1-231410; S1-231460; S1-231411; S1-231300; S1-231413; S1-231227; S1-231414; S1-231461; S1-231813; S1-231464 1.2.0 2023.08 SA1#103 - - - updates of the existing use cases, clear up of FFS/Editor note, remove the brackets of KPI value, CPR and KPI consolidation, conclusion etc Inclusion of: S1-232178; S1-232033; S1-232315; S1-232379; S1-232349; S1-232303; S1-232279; S1-232304; S1-232305; S1-232149; S1-232157; S1-232355; S1-232388; S1-232359; S1-232387; S1-232310; S1-232380; S1-232172; S1-232381; S1-232389; S1-232313; S1-232391; S1-232644; S1-232619; S1-232392; S1-232393; S1-232645; S1-232647; S1-232648; S1-232352 1.3.0 2023.09 SA#101 SP-231015 MCC Clean-up for presentation for SA approval 2.0.0 2023.11 SA1#104 Final KPI consolidation etc. Inclusion of: S1-233401; S1-233402; S1-233403; S1-233404 2.1.0 2023.12 SA#102 SP-231404 MCC clean-up for 2nd attempt for SA approval 2.2.0 2023.12 SA#102 - Approved by SA#102 19.0.0 |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 1 Scope | The present document specifies the session control protocols needed to support Mission Critical Push To Talk (MCPTT). The present document specifies both on-network and off-network protocols.
Mission critical communication services are services that require preferential handling compared to normal telecommunication services, e.g. in support of police or fire brigade.
The MCPTT service can be used for public safety applications and also for general commercial applications (e.g., utility companies and railways).
The present document is applicable to User Equipment (UE) supporting the MCPTT client functionality, and to application servers supporting the MCPTT server functionality. |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 2 References | The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the present document.
[1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
[2] 3GPP TS 22.179: "Mission Critical Push To Talk (MCPTT) over LTE; Stage 1".
[3] 3GPP TS 23.379: "Functional architecture and information flows to support mission critical communication services; Stage 2".
[4] 3GPP TS 24.229: "IP multimedia call control protocol based on Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Session Description Protocol (SDP); Stage 3".
[5] 3GPP TS 24.380: "Mission Critical Push To Talk (MCPTT) floor control Protocol specification".
[6] IETF RFC 3841 (August 2004): "Caller Preferences for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)".
[7] IETF RFC 4028 (April 2005): "Session Timers in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)".
[8] Void .
[9] IETF RFC 6050 (November 2010): "A Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Extension for the Identification of Services".
[10] IETF RFC 3550 (July 2003): "RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time Applications".
[11] Void.
[12] IETF RFC 4566 (July 2006): "Session Description Protocol".
[13] IETF RFC 3605 (October 2003): "Real Time Control Protocol (RTCP) attribute in Session Description Protocol (SDP)".
[14] IETF RFC 3325 (November 2002): "Private Extensions to the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) for Asserted Identity within Trusted Networks".
[15] IETF RFC 5626 (October 2009): "Managing Client-Initiated Connections in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)".
[16] IETF RFC 3840 (August 2004): "Indicating User Agent Capabilities in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)".
[17] Void.
[18] IETF RFC 5373 (November 2008): "Requesting Answering Modes for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)".
[19] Void.
[20] IETF RFC 5366 (October 2008): "Conference Establishment Using Request-Contained Lists in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)".
[21] IETF RFC 2046 (November 1996): "Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types".
[22] IETF RFC 4488 (May 2006): "Suppression of Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) REFER Method Implicit Subscription".
[23] IETF RFC 4538 (June 2006): "Request Authorization through Dialog Identification in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)".
[24] IETF RFC 3261 (June 2002): "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol".
[25] IETF RFC 3515 (April 2003): "The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Refer Method".
[26] IETF RFC 6665 (July 2012): "SIP-Specific Event Notification".
[27] IETF RFC 7647 (September 2015): "Clarifications for the use of REFER with RFC 6665".
[28] 3GPP TS 24.334: "Proximity-services (ProSe) User Equipment (UE) to Proximity-services (ProSe) Function Protocol aspects; Stage 3".
[29] IETF RFC 4412 (February 2006): "Communications Resource Priority for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)".
[30] IETF RFC 4575 (August 2006): "A Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Event Package for Conference State".
[31] 3GPP TS 24.481: "Mission Critical Services (MCS) group management Protocol specification".
[32] IETF RFC 4483 (May 2006): "A Mechanism for Content Indirection in Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Messages.
[33] IETF RFC 3428 (December 2002): "Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Extension for Instant Messaging".
[34] IETF RFC 4964 (October 2007): "The P-Answer-State Header Extension to the Session Initiation Protocol for the Open Mobile Alliance Push-to-talk over Cellular".
[35] IETF RFC 7614 (August 2015): "Explicit Subscriptions for the REFER Method".
[36] IETF RFC 5318 (December 2008): "The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) P-Refused-URI-List Private-Header (P-Header)".
[37] IETF RFC 3903 (October 2004): "Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Extension for Event State Publication".
[38] IETF RFC 5368 (October 2008): "Referring to Multiple Resources in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)".
[39] IETF RFC 5761 (April 2010): "Multiplexing RTP Data and Control Packets on a Single Port".
[40] 3GPP TS 23.003: "Numbering, addressing and identification".
[41] 3GPP TS 23.203: "Policy and charging control architecture".
[42] 3GPP TS 29.468: "Group Communication System Enablers for LTE (GCSE_LTE); MB2 Reference Point; Stage 3".
[43] 3GPP TS 24.008: "Mobile Radio Interface Layer 3 specification; Core Network Protocols; Stage 3".
[44] IETF RFC 3264 (June 2002): "An Offer/Answer Model with the Session Description Protocol (SDP)".
[45] 3GPP TS 24.483: "Mission Critical Services (MCS) Management Object (MO)".
[46] Void.
[47] IETF RFC 4567 (July 2006): "Key Management Extensions for Session Description Protocol (SDP) and Real Time Streaming Protocol (RTSP)".
[48] IETF RFC 8101 (March 2017): "IANA Registration of New Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Resource-Priority Namespace for Mission Critical Push To Talk service".
[49] 3GPP TS 24.482: "Mission Critical Services (MCS) identity management Protocol specification.
[50] 3GPP TS 24.484: "Mission Critical Services (MCS) configuration management Protocol specification".
[51] IETF RFC 3856 (August 2004): "A Presence Event Package for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)".
[52] IETF RFC 3863 (August 2004): "Presence Information Data Format (PIDF)".
[53] IETF RFC 7519 (May 2015): "JSON Web Token (JWT)".
[54] 3GPP TS 23.032: "Universal Geographical Area Description (GAD)".
[55] IETF RFC 4354 (January 2006): "A Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Event Package and Data Format for Various Settings in Support for the Push-to-Talk over Cellular (PoC) Service".
[56] 3GPP TS 24.007: "Mobile radio interface signalling layer 3; General aspects".
[57] 3GPP TS 23.468: "Group Communication System Enablers for LTE (GCSE_LTE); Stage 2".
[58] 3GPP TS 24.237: "IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) Service Continuity; Stage 3".
[59] 3GPP TS 29.199-9: "Open Service Access (OSA); Parlay X Web Services; Part 9: Terminal location".
[60] W3C: "XML Encryption Syntax and Processing Version 1.1", https://www.w3.org/TR/xmlenc-core1/.
[61] W3C: "XML Signature Syntax and Processing (Second Edition)", http://www.w3.org/TR/xmldsig-core/.
[62] IETF RFC 2392 (August 1998): "Content-ID and Message-ID Uniform Resource Locators".
[63] IETF RFC 4661 (September 2006): "An Extensible Markup Language (XML)-Based Format for Event Notification Filtering".
[64] IETF RFC 6086 (January 2011): "Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) INFO Method and Package Framework".
[65] IETF RFC 3891 (September 2004): "The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Replaces Header".
[66] 3GPP TS 24.216: "Communication continuity managed object".
[67] IETF RFC 4122 (July 2005): "A Universally Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace".
[68] IETF RFC 2045 (November 1996): "Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) Part One: Format of Internet Message Bodies".
[69] 3GPP TS 26.179: "Mission Critical Push To Talk (MCPTT) Codecs and media handling".
[70] 3GPP TS 24.301: "Non-Access-Stratum (NAS) protocol for Evolved Packet System (EPS); Stage 3".
[71] IETF RFC 4648 (October 2006): "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings".
[72] IETF RFC 5627 (October 2009): "Obtaining and Using Globally Routable User Agent URIs (GRUUs) in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)".
[73] 3GPP TS 29.283: "Diameter Data Management Applications".
[74] 3GPP TS 29.061: "Interworking between the Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN) supporting packet based services and Packet Data Networks (PDN)".
[75] IETF RFC 6509 (February 2012): "MIKEY-SAKKE: Sakai-Kasahara Key Encryption in Multimedia Internet KEYing (MIKEY)".
[76] 3GPP TS 22.280: "Mission Critical Services Common Requirements (MCCoRe); Stage 1".
[77] IETF RFC 7462 (March 2015): "URNs for the Alert-Info Header Field of the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)".
[78] 3GPP TS 33.180: "Security of the mission critical service".
[79] 3GPP TS 29.214: "Policy and Charging Control over Rx reference point".
[80] IETF RFC 5795 (March 2010): "The Robust Header Compression (ROHC) Framework".
[81] IETF RFC 3095 (July 2001): "RObust Header Compression (ROHC): Framework and four profiles: RTP, UDP, ESP, and uncompressed".
[82] 3GPP TS 23.280: "Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Common functional architecture to support mission critical services; Stage 2".
[83] IETF RFC 5288 (August 2008): "AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS".
[84] 3GPP TS 24.281: "Mission Critical Video (MCVideo) signalling control; Protocol specification".
[85] 3GPP TS 24.282: "Mission Critical Data (MCData) signalling control; Protocol specification".
[86] IETF RFC 5576 (June 2009): "Source-Specific Media Attributes in the Session Description Protocol (SDP)".
[87] 3GPP TS 24.501: "Non-Access-Stratum (NAS) protocol for 5G System (5GS); Stage 3".
[88] 3GPP TS 29.379: "Mission Critical Push To Talk (MCPTT) call control interworking with Land Mobile Radio (LMR) systems; Stage-3".
[89] IETF RFC 8445 (July 2018): "Interactive Connectivity Establishment (ICE): A Protocol for Network Address Translator (NAT) Traversal".
[90] IETF RFC 8839 (January 2021): "Session Description Protocol (SDP) Offer/Answer Procedures for Interactive Connectivity Establishment (ICE)".
[91] 3GPP TS 23.247: "Architectural enhancements for 5G multicast-broadcast services; Stage 2".
[92] 3GPP TS 23.289: "Mission Critical services over 5G System; Stage 2".
[93] IETF RFC 6809 (November 2012): "Mechanism to Indicate Support of Features and Capabilities in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)".
[94] 3GPP TS 24.554: " Proximity-services (ProSe) in 5G System (5GS) protocol aspects; Stage 3".
[95] 3GPP TS 23.501: "System architecture for the 5G System (5GS)".
[96] 3GPP TS 29.514: "5G System; Policy Authorization Service; Stage 3".
[97] 3GPP TS 29.522: "5G System; Network Exposure Function Northbound APIs; Stage 3". |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 3 Definitions, symbols and abbreviations | |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 3.1 Definitions | For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].
An MCPTT user is affiliated to an MCPTT group: The MCPTT user has expressed interest in an MCPTT group it is a member of, and both the MCPTT server serving the MCPTT user and the MCPTT server owning the MCPTT group have authorized the MCPTT user's interest in the MCPTT group communication.
An MCPTT user is affiliated to an MCPTT group at an MCPTT client: The MCPTT user is affiliated to the MCPTT group, the MCPTT client has a registered IP address for an IMPU related to the MCPTT ID, and the MCPTT server serving the MCPTT user has authorised the MCPTT user's interest in the MCPTT group at the MCPTT client.
Affiliation status: Applies for an MCPTT user to an MCPTT group and has one of the following states:
a) the "not-affiliated" state indicating that the MCPTT user is not interested in the MCPTT group and the MCPTT user is not affiliated to the MCPTT group;
b) the "affiliating" state indicating that the MCPTT user is interested in the MCPTT group but the MCPTT user is not affiliated to the MCPTT group yet;
c) the "affiliated" state indicating that the MCPTT user is affiliated to the MCPTT group and there was no indication that MCPTT user is no longer interested in the MCPTT group; and
d) the "deaffiliating" state indicating that the MCPTT user is no longer interested in the MCPTT group but the MCPTT user is still affiliated to the MCPTT group.
Ambient listening call: a call type allowing an authorized MCPTT user to cause an MCPTT client to initiate a communication which results in no indication on the MCPTT UE that it is transmitting. Ambient listening can be initiated by an authorized MCPTT user who wants to be listened to by another authorized MCPTT user or can be initiated by an authorized MCPTT user who wants to listen to another MCPTT user.
Ambient listening client role: the role of an MCPTT client in an ambient listening call, which can be that of:
a) the "listening MCPTT user"; or
b) the "listened-to MCPTT user".
Ambient listening type: the type of an ambient listening call from the perspective of the relationship of the initiator of the call to the user being listened to. The two types of ambient listening call are:
a) "remote-init", indicating that the listening MCPTT user initiated the call; and
b) "local-init", indicating that the listened-to MCPTT user initiated the call.
First-to-answer call: A call initiated by one user towards a list of other users with the intention to establish an MCPTT private call or MCPTT emergency private call, with one of the users in the list of users.
Group document: when the group is not a regroup based on a preconfigured regroup, the term "group document" used within the present document refers to the group document for that group within the GMS as specified in 3GPP TS 24.481 [31]; when the group is a regroup based on a preconfigured group, the term "group document" used within the present document refers to the group document for the preconfigured group as specified in 3GPP TS 24.481 [31] restricted to the users or groups included in the regroup stored by the MCPTT server at the time of the regroup creation, see clause 16.
Group identity: An MCPTT group identity or a temporary MCPTT group identity.
In-progress emergency private call state: the state of two participants when an MCPTT emergency private call is in progress.
In-progress imminent peril group state: the state of a group when an MCPTT imminent peril group call is in progress.
Listening MCPTT user: the MCPTT user in an ambient listening call receiving the media transmission from the listened-to MCPTT user;
Listened-to MCPTT user: the MCPTT user in an ambient listening call who is being listened to, may or may not be aware of being listened to depending on ambient listening type of the call.
MCPTT client ID: is a globally unique identification of a specific MCPTT client instance. MCPTT client ID is a UUID URN as specified in IETF RFC 4122 [67].
MCPTT emergency alert state: MCPTT client internal perspective of the state of an MCPTT emergency alert.
MCPTT emergency group state: MCPTT client internal perspective of the in-progress emergency state of an MCPTT group maintained by the controlling MCPTT function.
MCPTT emergency group call state: MCPTT client internal perspective of the state of an MCPTT emergency group call.
MCPTT emergency private call: MCPTT emergency call between two MCPTT users that is initiated as a private call or a first-to-answer call with emergency indication, or without emergency indication when the MCPTT emergency state is already set,
MCPTT emergency private call state: MCPTT client internal perspective of the state of an MCPTT emergency private call.
MCPTT emergency private priority state: MCPTT client internal perspective of the in-progress emergency private call state of the two participants of an MCPTT emergency private call maintained by the controlling MCPTT function.
MCPTT imminent peril group call state: MCPTT client internal perspective of the state of an MCPTT imminent peril group call.
MCPTT imminent peril group state: MCPTT client internal perspective of the state of an MCPTT imminent peril group.
MCPTT private call: MCPTT call between two MCPTT users that is initiated as a private call or a first-to-answer call.
MCPTT private emergency alert state: MCPTT client internal perspective of the state of an MCPTT private emergency alert targeted to an MCPTT user.
MCPTT speech: Conversational audio media used in mission critical push to talk systems as defined by 3GPP TS 22.179 [2] and 3GPP TS 23.379 [3].
Media-floor control entity: A media control resource shared by participants in an MCPTT session, controlled by a state machine to ensure that only one participant can access the media resource at the same time.
N2: The maximum number of simultaneous affiliations to MCPTT groups that the MCPTT user may have. The value of N2 is specified in the <MaxAffiliationsN2> element of the <Common> element of the MCPTT user profile and corresponds to the parameter Nc2 specified in 3GPP TS 22.280 [76].
Private call: A call initiated by one user towards one other user with the intention to establish an MCPTT private call or MCPTT emergency private call.
Private Call Call-Back: A mechanism for a requesting MCPTT client to request a targeted MCPTT client to initiate an MCPTT private call with the requesting MCPTT client (at earliest convenience).
Remote change of an MCPTT user's selected group: A mechanism allowing an authorised user to remotely change the selected group of another MCPTT user.
Temporary MCPTT group identity: A group identity representing a temporary grouping of MCPTT group identities formed by the group regrouping operation as specified in 3GPP TS 24.481 [31].
Trusted mutual aid: A business relationship whereby the Partner MCPTT system is willing to share the details of the members of an MCPTT group that it owns with the Primary MCPTT system.
Untrusted mutual aid: A business relationship whereby the Partner MCPTT system is not willing to share the details of the members of an MCPTT group that it owns with the Primary MCPTT system.
User Requested Application Priority: The requested priority as defined in 3GPP TS 23.280 [82]. How the server determines the priority for the requested communication based on requested priority and in combination with other factors is up to MCPTT server implementation.
Functional alias status: Applies for the status of a functional alias for an MCTT user and has one of the following states:
a) the "not-activated" state indicating that the MCPTT user has not activated the functional alias;
b) the "activating" state indicating that the MCPTT user is interested in using the functional alias but the functional alias is not yet activated for the MCPTT user;
c) the "activated" state indicating that the MCPTT user has activated the functional alias;
d) the "deactivating" state indicating that the MCPTT user is no longer interested in using the functional alias but the functional alias is still activated for the MCPTT user; and
e) the "take-over-possible" state indicating that the MCPTT user interested in the functional alias is allowed to take-over the functional alias although the functional alias is already activated and used by another MCPTT user.
For the purposes of the present document, the following terms and definitions given in 3GPP TS 22.179 [2] apply:
In-progress emergency
MCPTT emergency alert
MCPTT emergency group call
MCPTT emergency state
Partner MCPTT system
Primary MCPTT system
For the purpose of the present document, the following terms and definitions given in 3GPP TS 24.380 [5] apply:
MBMS subchannel
For the purpose of the present document, the following terms and definitions given in 3GPP TS 23.379 [3] apply:
Pre-selected MCPTT user profile
Selected MCPTT user profile
For the purpose of the present document, the following terms and definitions given in 3GPP TS 33.180 [78] apply:
Client Server Key (CSK)
Multicast Floor Control Key (MKFC)
Multicast Signalling Key (MuSiK)
Multicast Signalling Key Identifier (MuSiK-ID)
MBMS subchannel control key (MSCCK)
MBMS subchannel control key identifier (MSCCK-ID)
Private Call Key (PCK)
Signalling Protection Key (SPK)
XML Protection Key (XPK)
For the purpose of the present document, the following terms and definitions given in 3GPP TS 22.280 [76] apply:
Functional alias
For the purposes of the present document, the following terms related to a MCPTT gateway UE function apply
MCPTT gateway UE: A functional entity that enables simultaneous access to the MCPTT system for multiple MCPTT clients.
MCPTT gateway client: A client that enables the authorized binding with one or more MCPTT GW UEs in order to be able to handle MCPTT services.
MCPTT gateway UE server: A server on an MCTT gateway UE that controls authorized binding with multiple MCPTT gateway clients.
MCPTT gateway UE function: Functional block as part of the MCPTT server that authorises and manages the association between MCPTT client and MCPTT gateway UE. |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 3.2 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].
CID Context ID
CSK Client-Server Key
ECGI E-UTRAN Cell Global Identification
IPEG In-Progress Emergency Group
IPEPC In-Progress Emergency Private Call
IPIG In-Progress Imminent peril Group
MBMS Multimedia Broadcast and Multicast Service
MBS Multicast/Broadcast Service
MBSFN Multimedia Broadcast multicast service Single Frequency Network
MCPTT Mission Critical Push To Talk
MCPTT group ID MCPTT group Identity
MC Mission Critical
MCS Mission Critical Service
MEA MCPTT Emergency Alert
MEG MCPTT Emergency Group
MEGC MCPTT Emergency Group Call
MEPC MCPTT Emergency Private Call
MEPP MCPTT Emergency Private Priority
MES MCPTT Emergency State
MIME Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions
MIG MCPTT Imminent peril Group
MIGC MCPTT Imminent peril Group Call
MONP MCPTT Off-Network Protocol
MPEA MCPTT Private Emergency Alert
NAT Network Address Translation
PCC Policy and Charging Control
PCCB Private Call Call-Back
PLMN Public Land Mobile Network
PPPP ProSe Per-Packet Priority
PQI PC5 5QI
QCI QoS Class Identifier
ROHC Robust Header Compression
RTP Real-time Transport Protocol
SAI Service Area Identifier
SDP Session Description Protocol
SIP Session Initiation Protocol
SPK Signalling Protection Key
SSRC Synchronization SouRCe
TGI Temporary MCPTT Group Identity
TMGI Temporary Mobile Group Identity
UE User Equipment
URI Uniform Resource Identifier
XPK XML Protection Key |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 4 General | |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 4.1 MCPTT overview | The MCPTT service supports communication between several users (i.e., group call), where each user has the ability to gain access to the permission to talk in an arbitrated manner. The MCPTT service also supports private calls between two users. Group calls and private calls can be provided on-network and off-network. In this release of the present document, support is only allowed for MCPTT speech communications.
The present document provides the call control protocol enhancements to support the MCPTT architectural procedures specified in 3GPP TS 23.379 [3].
For on-network calls, the present document makes use of the existing IMS procedures specified in 3GPP TS 24.229 [4], and provides new IMS application procedures specific for MCPTT. For on-network group calls, the procedures in the present document allow the use of unicast or multicast bearers. Multicast bearers are only supported in EPS.
The on-network procedures in this document allow an MCPTT user to:
- initiate a new MCPTT group call;
- join an MCPTT group call that has already been established; and
- leave an established MCPTT group call and then rejoin the same MCPTT group call if still established.
For off-network calls in EPS, the present document utilises the procedures for ProSe direct discovery for public safety; the procedures for one-to-one ProSe direct communication for Public Safety and the procedures for one-to-many ProSe direct communication for Public Safety, as specified in 3GPP TS 24.334 [28]. The present document specifies the MCPTT Off-Network Protocol (MONP) and the MONP application procedures.
For on-network and off-network calls, the present document provides support for MCPTT emergency calls, MCPTT imminent-peril calls and MCPTT emergency alerts.
NOTE: MCPTT emergency calls do not utilise emergency bearers. Instead the EPS bearer priority of a normal bearer is adjusted.
The MCPTT procedures provided by the present document refer to:
- the floor-control procedures defined in 3GPP TS 24.380 [5];
- the group management procedures defined in 3GPP TS 24.481 [31];
- the identity management procedures defined in 3GPP TS 24.482 [49];
- the security procedures defined in 3GPP TS 33.180 [78]; and
- the PS-PS access transfer procedures procedures defined in 3GPP TS 24.237 [58].
The MCPTT procedures provided by the present document access the configuration parameters provided by 3GPP TS 24.483 [45] and 3GPP TS 24.484 [50].
Codecs and media handling for MCPTT are specified in 3GPP TS 26.179 [69];
The following procedures are provided within this document:
- common procedures are specified in clause 6;
- procedures for registration in the IM CN subsystem and service authorisation are specified in clause 7;
- procedures for pre-established session establishment, modification and release are specified in clause 8;
- procedures for affiliation are specified in clause 9;
- procedures for management of functional alias in clause 9A;
- procedures for on-network and off-network group call are specified in clause 10;
- procedures for on-network and off-network private call are specified in clause 11;
- procedures for on-network and off-network emergency alert are specified in clause 12;
- location procedures are specified in clause 13;
- MBMS transmission usage procedures are specified in clause 14;
- MCPTT service continuity procedures are specified in clause 14A; and
- MBS transmission usage procedures are specified in clause 14B.
The MCPTT UE primarily obtains access to the MCPTT service via E-UTRAN or NG-RAN, using the procedures defined in 3GPP TS 24.301 [70] and 3GPP TS 24.501 [87]. |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 4.2 URI and address assignments | In order to support MCPTT, the following URI and address assignments are assumed:
1) the participating MCPTT function is configured to be reachable using:
a) public service identities identifying pre-established sessions on the MCPTT server serving the MCPTT user;
b) the MBMS public service identity of the participating MCPTT function; and
c) the public service identity of the participating MCPTT function serving the MCPTT user.
NOTE: For b) and c) above, the PSI values are configured with the same URI. However for the purpose of readability the names of the PSIs mentioned in b) and c) are used in the present document.
The MCPTT client should use the <Server‑URI> element of the <MCPTT-Service-Details> element of the <anyExt> element of the <on-network> element in the MCS UE initial configuration document, as defined in reference 3GPP TS 24.484 [50] as public service identity of the participating function of the MCPTT client. |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 4.3 MCPTT speech | A session that contains MCPTT speech is either a full-duplex session or a half-duplex session with an SDP media component containing an audio media type with a codec suitable for conversational speech that exists between an MCPTT client and an MCPTT server.
If the MCPTT speech session is a half-duplex session, it additionally contains a media component that describes the characteristics of the media-floor control entity. |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 4.4 Warning Header Field | |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 4.4.1 General | The MCPTT server can include a free text string in a SIP response to a SIP request. When the MCPTT server includes a text string in a response to a SIP INVITE request the text string is included in a Warning header field as specified in IETF RFC 3261 [24]. The MCPTT server includes the Warning code set to 399 (miscellaneous warning) and includes the host name set to the host name of the MCPTT server.
EXAMPLE: Warning: 399 "100 User not authorised to make group calls" |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 4.4.2 Warning texts | The text string included in a Warning header field consists of an explanatory text preceded by a 3-digit text code, according to the following format in Table 4.4.2-1.
Table 4.4.2-1 ABNF for the Warning text
warn-text =/ DQUOTE mcptt-warn-code SP mcptt-warn-text DQUOTE
mcptt-warn-code = DIGIT DIGIT DIGIT
mcptt-warn-text = *( qdtext | quoted-pair )
Table 4.4.2-2 defines the warning texts that are defined for the Warning header field when a Warning header field is included in a response to a SIP INVITE request as specified in clause 4.4.1.
Table 4.4.2-2: Warning texts defined for the Warning header field
Code
Explanatory text
Description
100
function not allowed due to <detailed reason>
The function is not allowed to this user.
The <detailed reason> will be either "group definition", "access policy", "local policy", "user authorisation" or "pre-established session not supported", or can be a free text string.
101
service authorisation failed
The service authorisation of the MCPTT ID against the IMPU failed at the MCPTT server.
102
too many simultaneous affiliations
The MCPTT user already has N2 maximum number of simultaneous affiliations (see <MaxAffiliationsN2> element of user profile configuration document).
103
maximum simultaneous MCPTT group calls reached
The number of maximum simultaneous MCPTT group calls supported for the MCPTT user has been exceeded.
104
isfocus not assigned
A controlling MCPTT function has not been assigned to the MCPTT session.
105
subscription not allowed in a broadcast group call
Subscription to the conference event package rejected during a group call initiated as a broadcast group call.
106
user not authorised to join chat group
The MCPTT user is not authorised to join this chat group.
107
user not authorised to make private calls
The MCPTT user is not authorised to make private calls.
108
user not authorised to make chat group calls
The MCPTT user is not authorised to make chat group calls.
109
user not authorised to make prearranged group calls
The MCPTT user is not authorised to make group calls to a prearranged group.
110
user declined the call invitation
The MCPTT user declined to accept the call.
111
group call proceeded without all required group members
The required members of the group did not respond within the acknowledged call time, but the call still went ahead.
112
group call abandoned due to required group members not part of the group session
The group call was abandoned, as the required members of the group did not respond within the acknowledged call time.
113
group document does not exist
The group document requested from the group management server does not exist.
114
unable to retrieve group document
The group document exists on the group management server but the MCPTT server was unable to retrieve it.
115
group is disabled
The group has the <disabled> element set to "true" in the group management server.
116
user is not part of the MCPTT group
The group exists on the group management server but the requesting user is not part of this group.
117
the group identity indicated in the request is a prearranged group
The group id that is indicated in the request is for a prearranged group, but did not match the request from the MCPTT user.
118
the group identity indicated in the request is a chat group
The group id that is indicated in the request is for a chat group, but did not match the request from the MCPTT user.
119
user is not authorised to initiate the group call
The MCPTT user identified by the MCPTT ID is not authorised to initiate the group call.
120
user is not affiliated to this group
The MCPTT user is not affiliated to the group.
121
user is not authorised to join the group call
The MCPTT user identified by the MCPTT ID is not authorised to join the group call.
122
too many participants
The group call has reached its maximum number of participants.
123
MCPTT session already exists
Inform the MCPTT user that the group call is currently ongoing.
124
maximum number of private calls reached
The maximum number of private calls allowed at the MCPTT server for the MCPTT user has been reached.
125
user not authorised to make private call with automatic commencement
The MCPTT user is not authorised to make a private call with automatic commencement.
126
user not authorised to make private call with manual commencement
The MCPTT user is not authorised to make a private call with manual commencement.
127
user not authorised to be called in private call
The called MCPTT user is not allowed to be part of a private call.
128
isfocus already assigned
The MCPTT server owning an MCPTT group received a SIP INVITE request destined to the MCPTT group from another MCPTT server already assigned as the controlling MCPTT function and the MCPTT server owning the MCPTT group does not support mutual aid or supports trusted mutual aid but does not authorise trusted mutual aid.
136
authentication of the MIKEY-SAKKE I_MESSAGE failed
The MCPTT client's application of the procedures of 3GPP TS 33.180 [78] to authenticate the received I_MESSAGE fails.
137
the indicated group call does not exist
The participating MCPTT function cannot find an ongoing group session associated with the received MCPTT session identity.
138
subscription of conference events not allowed
The controlling MCPTT function could not allow the MCPTT user to subscribe to the conference event package.
139
integrity protection check failed
The integrity protection of an XML MIME body failed.
140
unable to decrypt XML content
The XML content cannot be decrypted.
141
user unknown to the participating function
The participating function is unable to associate the public user identity with an MCPTT ID.
142
unable to determine the controlling function
The participating function is unable to determine the controlling function for the group call or private call.
143
not authorised to force auto answer
The calling user is not authorised to force auto answer on the called user.
144
user not authorised to call this particular user
The calling user is not authorised to call this particular called user.
145
unable to determine called party
The participating function was unable to determine the called party from the information received in the SIP request.
146
T-PF unable to determine the service settings for the called user
The service settings have not been uploaded by the terminating client to the terminating participating server.
147
user is authorized to initiate a temporary group call
The non-controlling MCPTT function has authorized a request from the controlling MCPTT function to authorize a user to initiate a temporary group session.
148
group is regrouped
The group hosted by a non-controlling function is part of a temporary group session as the result of the group regroup function.
149
SIP INFO request pending
The MCPTT client needs to wait for a SIP INFO request with specific content, before taking further action.
150
invalid combinations of data received in MIME body
The MCPTT client included invalid combinations of data in the SIP request.
151
user not authorised to make a private call call-back request
The MCPTT user is not authorised to make a private call call-back request.
152
user not authorised to make a private call call-back cancel request
The MCPTT user is not authorised to make a private call call-back cancel request.
153
user not authorised to call any of the users requested in the first-to-answer call
All users that were invited in the first-to-answer call cannot be involved in a private call with the inviting user.
154
user not authorised to make ambient listening call
The MCPTT user is not authorised to make an ambient listening call.
155
user not authorised to change user's selected group
The MCPTT user is not authorised to change the selected group of the targeted user.
156
user not authorised to originate a first-to-answer call
The MCPTT user is not authorised to make a first-to-answer call.
157
user not authorised to request a remotely initiated group call
The MCPTT user is not authorised to request a remotely initiated group call.
158
user not authorised to request a remotely initiated private call
The MCPTT user is not authorised to request a remotely initiated private call.
159
user not authorised to be called by this originating user
The called user is not authorised to receive a call by this originating user.
160
user not authorised to request creation of a regroup
The user is not authorised to request creation of a regroup.
161
user not authorised to request removal of a regroup
The user is not authorised to request removal of a regroup.
162
group call abandoned due to required group members not affiliated
The group call was abandoned as the required number of affiliated group members is not met or some required members are not affiliated.
163
the group identity indicated in the request does not exist
The server determines that the group identity indicates a user or group regroup based on a preconfigured group that does not exist.
164
maximum number of service authorizations reached
The number of maximum simultaneous service authorizations for the MCPTT user has been reached.
165
group ID for regroup already in use
The group ID proposed by the client for the user/group regroup based on a preconfigured group is already in use.
166
constituent group is in an emergency call state
The proposed constituent group cannot be added to the temporary group because there is a call on the constituent group that is in an emergency state.
167
call is not allowed on the preconfigured group
Calls are not allowed on this group that is administratively designated for preconfigured group use only.
168
alert is not allowed on the preconfigured group
Alerts are not allowed on this group that is administratively designated for preconfigured group use only.
169
user is not authorised to remove regroup in an emergency state
The MCPTT user is not authorised to remove a regroup that is in an in-progress emergency state.
170
user not authorised to make a private call transfer request
The MCPTT user is not authorised to make a private call transfer request.
171
functional alias not allowed to call this particular functional alias
The calling user is not authorised to call this particular functional alias by using this activated functional alias.
172
functional alias not allowed to be called from this functional alias
The called functional alias is not authorised to receive a call from the originating user using this particular Functional Alias.
173
user not authorised to make a private call forwarding request
The MCPTT user is not authorized to use MCPTT private call forwarding.
174
maximum number of allowed forwardings exceeded
The maximum number of allowed call forwardings has been exceeded.
175
call is forwarded
The MCPTT private call that is requested to be established is released, and a new MCPTT private call is originated to the target of the call forwarding.
176
user not authorized to request for binding/unbinding of a functional alias with the MCPTT group(s) for the MCPTT user
The function is not allowed to this user.
177
unable to determine target functional alias or group for creating/removing a binding information for the MCPTT user
The MCPTT server is unable to determine the targeted functional alias or group for creating/removing a binding information for the MCPTT user.
178
MCPTT group binding already exists with other functional alias for the MCPTT user
The requested functional alias binding with MCPTT group already exist with other functional alias for the MCPTT user.
179
service not authorized with the interconnected system
The MCPTT service is not authorized between the local and the interconnected system and is rejected in the local system.
180
service not authorized by the interconnected system
The MCPTT service is not authorized between the local and the interconnected system and is rejected by the interconnected system.
181
called user requires to use floor control
The called user has rejected the call request because floor control is required to be used.
182
called user requires to not use floor control
The called user has rejected the call request because floor control is required not to be used.
183
MCPTT codec required
The call requires an MCPTT defined codec to be used.
184
user not authorised to make adhoc group calls
The MCPTT user is not authorised to make adhoc group calls.
185
user not authorised to initiate the adhoc group call
The MCPTT user identified by the MCPTT ID is not authorised to initiate the adhoc group call.
186
the MCPTT system do not support adhoc group call
The MCPTT system doesn’t support the adhoc group call or support of adhoc group call is turned off
187
can't determine the adhoc group participants
The MCPTT server can not determine the adhoc group participants based on the input parameters.
188
user is not allowed to participate in adhoc group call
The MCPTT user is not allowed to participate in adhoc group call e.g. user no longer meets the criteria.
189
maximum number of allowed adhoc group participants exceeded
The maximum number of allowed adhoc group participants exceeded the configured limit.
190
user is not authorised to initiate modify adhoc group call participants
The MCPTT user is not allowed to modify the participants list of the adhoc group call.
191
call forwarding due to migration
The private call is subject for call forwarding because the target user has migrated to a partner MCPTT system.
192
invalid location request target client list
The MCPTT server cannot determine the target client of the location information or location configuration change request.
193
user not authorized to request location information
The MCPTT user is not allowed to request location information of other MCPTT clients.
194
user not authorized to request location configuration changes
The MCPTT user is not allowed to request changes in the location reporting configuration of other MCPTT clients.
195
can't determine the adhoc group
The MCPTT server cannot determine that target adhoc group.
196
user participates under another constituent group
The MCPTT user participates to the group regroup or temporary group under another of its constituent groups.
301-350
Value allocated for use in interworking (see NOTE).
NOTE: Usage of these values are described in 3GPP TS 29.379 [88]. |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 4.5 MCPTT session identity | The MCPTT session identity is a SIP URI, which identifies the MCPTT session between:
- the MCPTT client and the participating MCPTT function;
- the participating MCPTT function and the controlling MCPTT function
- the controlling MCPTT function and the non-controlling MCPTT function; and
- the non-controlling MCPTT function and the participating MCPTT function.
The MCPTT session identity shall be a GRUU as defined in IETF RFC 5627 [72] assigned by the MCPTT server as per 3GPP TS 24.229 [4].
The MCPTT session identity identifies the MCPTT session in such a way that e.g.:
- the MCPTT user is able to subscribe to the participant information of the ongoing MCPTT session;
- the MCPTT user is able to rejoin an ongoing MCPTT session; and
- the IM CN subsystem is able to route an initial SIP request to the controlling MCPTT function.
The controlling MCPTT function allocates a unique MCPTT session identity hosted at the controlling MCPTT function for the MCPTT session at the time of session establishment.
The non-controlling MCPTT function allocates a unique MCPTT session identity hosted at the non-controlling MCPTT function for the MCPTT session at the time of session establishment.
When protection of sensitive application data is required by the MCPTT operator, the MCPTT session identity cannot contain identity information that is classed as sensitive such as the MCPTT ID or the MCPTT Group ID, as specified in clause 4.8.
The controlling MCPTT function and non-controlling MCPTT function send the MCPTT session identity towards the MCPTT client during MCPTT session establishment by including it in the Contact header field of the final SIP response to a session initiation request.
The participating MCPTT function allocates a unique MCPTT session identity hosted at the participating MCPTT function for the MCPTT session when it receives a MCPTT session identity in the Contact header field of a SIP request or a SIP response from the controlling MCPTT function or non-controlling MCPTT function and includes it in the Contact header field of the SIP request or SIP response sent towards the MCPTT client. The participating MCPTT function maintains a mapping of the MCPTT session identities it sends to the MCPTT client to the corresponding MCPTT session identities received from the controlling MCPTT function.
The MCPTT client can cache the MCPTT session identity until a time when it is no longer needed.
The MCPTT session identity is also used in floor control requests and responses as specified in 3GPP TS 24.380 [5]. |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 4.6 MCPTT priority calls and alerts | |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 4.6.1 MCPTT emergency group calls | MCPTT emergency group calls as defined by 3GPP TS 23.379 [3] are supported by the procedures in this specification. The following MCPTT emergency group call functionalities are described:
- MCPTT emergency group call origination;
- upgrade of an MCPTT group call to an MCPTT emergency group call; and
- in-progress group emergency cancel.
NOTE 1: In-progress group emergency cancel means the cancellation of the in-progress emergency state of the group, which is managed by the controlling MCPTT function.
The above functionalities are supported using both MCPTT prearranged group calls and MCPTT chat group calls.
Key aspects of MCPTT emergency group calls include:
- adjusted EPS bearer priority for all participants whether or not they themselves are in an emergency condition (i.e. have their MCPTT emergency state set). For unicast bearers this is achieved by using the Resource-Priority header field as specified in IETF RFC 4412 [29] with namespaces defined for use by MCPTT specified in IETF RFC 8101 [48], and for MBMS bearers this is achieved by having the participating MCPTT function adjust the ARP (priority, PVI, PCI) and executing the Modify MBMS Bearer Procedure per 3GPP TS 29.468 [42];
- pre-emptive floor control priority over MCPTT users in MCPTT emergency group calls who themselves do not have their MCPTT emergency state set;
- restoration of normal EPS bearer priority to the call participants when the in-progress emergency group state is cancelled;
- restoration of normal floor control priority participants when the in-progress emergency group state is cancelled;
- requires the MCPTT user to be authorised to either originate or cancel an MCPTT emergency group call;
- requests to originate MCPTT emergency group calls may also include an indication of an MCPTT emergency alert; and
- requests to cancel MCPTT emergency group calls may also include an indication of cancelling a previously issued MCPTT emergency alert.
There are a number of states that are key in managing these aspects of MCPTT emergency group calls, which include:
- MCPTT emergency state: as defined in 3GPP TS 22.179 [2] and 3GPP TS 23.379 [3], indicates that the MCPTT user is in a life-threatening situation. Managed by the MCPTT user of the device or an authorised MCPTT user. While the MCPTT emergency state is set on the client, all calls originated by the client will be MCPTT emergency calls, assuming the MCPTT user is authorised for MCPTT emergency calls on them.
- in-progress emergency group state: as defined in 3GPP TS 22.179 [2] and 3GPP TS 23.379 [3], indicates whether or not there is an MCPTT emergency group call ongoing on the specified group. This state is managed by the controlling MCPTT function. All group calls originated on this MCPTT group when in an in-progress emergency state are MCPTT emergency group calls until this state is cancelled, whether or not the originator is themselves in an MCPTT emergency state.
- MCPTT emergency group (MEG) state: this is an internal state managed by the MCPTT client which tracks the in-progress emergency state of the group as defined in 3GPP TS 22.179 [2] and 3GPP TS 23.379 [3] and managed by the controlling MCPTT function. Ideally, the MCPTT client would not need to track the in-progress emergency group state, but doing so enables the MCPTT client to request MCPTT emergency-level priority earlier than otherwise possible. For example, if the MCPTT user wishes to join an MCPTT emergency group call and is not in MCPTT emergency state itself, the MCPTT client should have emergency level priority. If it has knowledge of the in-progress emergency state of the group, it can request priority by including a Resource-Priority header field set to the MCPTT namespace specified in IETF RFC 8101 [48], and appropriate priority level in the SIP INVITE request (or SIP re-INVITE request).
- MCPTT emergency group call (MEGC) state: this is an internal state managed by the MCPTT client which in conjunction with the MCPTT emergency alert state aids in managing the MCPTT emergency state and related actions.
- MCPTT emergency alert (MEA) state: this is also an internal state of the MCPTT client which in conjunction with the MCPTT emergency group call state aids in managing the MCPTT emergency state and related actions.
NOTE 2: The above states and their transitions are described in Annex G. |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 4.6.2 MCPTT emergency private calls | MCPTT emergency private calls as defined by 3GPP TS 23.379 [3] are supported by the procedures in this specification. The following MCPTT emergency private call functionalities are specified in the present document:
- MCPTT emergency private call origination with optional MCPTT emergency alert initiation;
- upgrade of an MCPTT private call to an MCPTT emergency private; and
- cancellation of the MCPTT emergency private call priority.
Key aspects of MCPTT emergency private calls include:
- adjusted EPS bearer priority for both participants whether or not they are both in an emergency condition (i.e. both have their MCPTT emergency state set). This is achieved by using the Resource-Priority header field as specified in IETF RFC 4412 [29] with namespaces defined for use by MCPTT specified in IETF RFC 8101 [48];
- the initiator of the MCPTT emergency private call can override the other MCPTT user in the MCPTT emergency private call unless that user also has their MCPTT emergency state set;
- restoration of normal EPS bearer priority to the call according to system policy (e.g., configured time limit for the emergency priority of an MCPTT emergency private call or cancellation of the emergency condition of the private call);
- restoration of normal floor control priority participants when the emergency elevated priority is cancelled;
- requires the MCPTT user to be authorised to either originate or cancel an MCPTT emergency private call;
- requires the targeted MCPTT user to be authorised to receive an MCPTT emergency private call;
- requests to originate MCPTT emergency private calls may also include an indication of an MCPTT emergency alert; and
- the originator of the MCPTT emergency private call can request that the call use either manaual or automatic commencement mode.
There are a number of states that are key in managing these aspects of MCPTT emergency private calls, which include:
- MCPTT emergency state (MES): as defined in 3GPP TS 22.179 [2] and 3GPP TS 23.379 [3], indicates that the MCPTT user is in a life-threatening situation. Managed by the MCPTT user of the device or an authorised MCPTT user. While the MCPTT emergency state is set on the client, all MCPTT group and private calls originated by the client will be MCPTT emergency calls, assuming the MCPTT user is authorised for MCPTT emergency calls on them.
- MCPTT private emergency alert (MPEA) state: this is an internal state of the MCPTT client which in conjunction with the MCPTT emergency private call state aids in managing the MCPTT emergency state and related actions.
- MCPTT emergency private call (MEPC) state: this is an internal state managed by the MCPTT client which in conjunction with the MCPTT emergency alert state aids in managing the MCPTT emergency state and related actions.
- In-progress emergency private call (IPEPC) state: indicates whether or not there is an MCPTT emergency private call in-progress for the two participants. This state is managed by the controlling MCPTT function. All private calls originated between these two participants when in an in-progress emergency private call state are MCPTT emergency private calls until this state is cancelled, whether or not the originator is in an MCPTT emergency state.
- MCPTT emergency private priority (MEPP) state: this is an internal state managed by the MCPTT client which tracks the in-progress emergency private call state of the private call managed by the controlling MCPTT function. Ideally, the MCPTT client would not need to track the in-progress emergency private priority state, but doing so enables the MCPTT client to request MCPTT emergency-level priority earlier than otherwise possible. For example, if the MCPTT user wishes to join an MCPTT emergency private call and is not in the MCPTT emergency state, the MCPTT client should have emergency level priority. If it has knowledge of the in-progress emergency private priority state of the private call (i.e., the two participants), it can request priority by including a Resource-Priority header field set to the MCPTT namespace specified in IETF RFC 8101 [48], and appropriate priority level in the SIP INVITE request (or SIP re-INVITE request).
NOTE: The above states and their transitions are described in Annex G. |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 4.6.3 MCPTT emergency alerts | MCPTT emergency alerts as defined by 3GPP TS 23.379 [3] are supported by the procedures in this specification. The following MCPTT emergency group call functionalities are specified in the present document:
- MCPTT emergency alert origination; and
- MCPTT emergency alert cancellation.
MCPTT emergency alerts are supported procedurally by two general mechanisms. One mechanism is embedded within the MCPTT emergency call (both emergency private call and emergency group call using both prearranged and chat session models) signalling procedures documented in clause 10 and clause 11 of this specification. The other mechanism utilizes SIP MESSAGE requests and is documented in clause 12.
MCPTT emergency alerts can be initiated or cancelled as options in the following signalling procedures documented in clause 10 and clause 11:
- MCPTT emergency group call initiation;
- MCPTT group call upgraded to MCPTT emergency call;
- MCPTT emergency group call cancellation (i.e., in-progress emergency state of the group set to false);
- MCPTT emergency private call initiation; and
- MCPTT private call upgrade to MCPTT emergency private call.
MCPTT emergency alerts can also be initiated or cancelled as described in the procedures of clause 12 which include:
- MCPTT emergency alert initiation; and
- MCPTT emergency alert cancellation (with optional cancelling of the in-progress emergency state of a group).
When MCPTT emergency alerts are initiated as an option in initiating or upgrading to an MCPTT emergency group call or are initiated using SIP MESSAGE requests, they are targeted to an MCPTT group, and, if not already affiliated, will result in the initiator being implicitly affiliated to the MCPTT group. When initiated as an option in initiating or upgrading to an MCPTT emergency private call, an MCPTT emergency alert is targeted to an individual MCPTT user, not to an MCPTT group.
Key aspects of MCPTT emergency alerts include:
- MCPTT emergency (MES) state: the MCPTT client's MCPTT emergency state as described in clause G.1 is set upon initiation of an MCPTT emergency alert. While the MCPTT emergency state is set, assuming the MCPTT user has the needed authorisations, if the user initiates a private call and is authorised to do so, the MCPTT private call will be an MCPTT emergency private call. Similarly, assuming the needed authorisations, any subsequent MCPTT group call initiated by an MCPTT user with the MCPTT emergency state set will be an MCPTT emergency group call.
- MCPTT emergency alert (MEA) state: the MCPTT client maintains the internal MCPTT emergency alert state (MEA) which aids in the management of the MCPTT emergency state as described in clause G.5.
- MCPTT private emergency alert (MPEA) state: the MCPTT client maintains the MCPTT private emergency alert state of an MCPTT emergency alert targeted to an MCPTT user which aids in the management of the MCPTT emergency state.
- In-progress emergency group (IPEG) state : MCPTT emergency alert initiation or cancellation in and of itself does not impact the in-progress emergency state of the targeted group, which is maintained by the controlling MCPTT function, nor does it impact the priority of the EPS bearers. However, in setting the MCPTT emergency state, assuming an MCPTT user is authorised to make MCPTT emergency calls on the targeted group, any subsequent MCPTT group call the MCPTT user initiates on the group will cause the in-progress emergency state of the group to be set as described in clause G.2 and will result in upgraded priority of the EPS bearers used in the MCPTT emergency call.
- Authorisations for emergency alerts: MCPTT users need to be authorised to initiate MCPTT emergency alerts and additionally need to be authorised to cancel MCPTT emergency alerts. The parameters related to these authorisations are specified in 3GPP TS 24.483 [45] and 3GPP TS 24.484 [50]. |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 4.6.4 MCPTT imminent peril group call | MCPTT imminent peril group calls as defined by 3GPP TS 23.379 [3] are supported by the procedures in this specification. The following MCPTT imminent peril group calls functionalities are specified in the present document:
- MCPTT imminent peril group calls origination;
- upgrade of an MCPTT group call to an MCPTT imminent peril group call;
- upgrade from an MCPTT imminent peril group call to an MCPTT emergency group call; and
- cancellation of the in-progress imminent peril state of the group.
Key aspects of MCPTT imminent peril include:
- adjusted EPS bearer priority for all participants when the in-progress imminent peril state of the group is set whether or not they themselves initiated an imminent peril group call. For unicast bearers this is achieved by using the Resource-Priority header field as specified in IETF RFC 4412 [29] with namespaces defined for use by MCPTT specified in IETF RFC 8101 [48], and for MBMS bearers this is achieved by having the participating MCPTT function adjust the ARP (priority, PVI, PCI) and executing the Modify MBMS Bearer Procedure per 3GPP TS 29.468 [42];
- restoration of normal EPS bearer priority to the call when the in-progress imminent peril group state is cancelled; and
- requires the MCPTT user to be authorised to either originate or cancel an MCPTT imminent peril group call.
Relationship to other MCPTT priority group call types:
- A normal MCPTT group call can be upgraded to an MCPTT imminent peril group call;
- An MCPTT imminent peril group call can be upgraded to an MCPTT emergency group call;
- When either an MCPTT imminent peril group call or an MCPTT emergency group call (i.e., their respective "in-progress" states) the group call returns to the priority designated for normal group calls, i.e., their is no direct transition from an MCPTT emergency group call to an MCPTT imminent peril group call;
- MCPTT imminent peril functionality is only applicable to MCPTT group calls, not MCPTT private calls; and
- MCPTT imminent peril group calls have no associated alert capabilities such as the MCPTT emergency alert capability which is associated with MCPTT emergency group calls.
There are a number of states that are key in managing these aspects of MCPTT imminent peril group calls, which include:
- MCPTT imminent peril group (MIG) state: this is an internal state of the MCPTT client which in conjunction with the MCPTT imminent peril group call state aids the client in managing the use of the Resource-Priority header field and related actions.
- MCPTT imminent peril group call (MIGC) state: this is an internal state managed by the MCPTT client which in conjunction with the MCPTT imminent peril group state aids the client in managing the use of the Resource-Priority header field and related actions.
- In-progress imminent peril group (IPIG) state: this a state of the MCPTT group which is managed by the controlling MCPTT function. While an MCPTT group is in an in-progress imminent peril group state, all participants in group calls using this group will receive elevated priority.
The above states and their transitions are described in Annex G. |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 4.7 Communication security | |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 4.7.1 Media security | If a mission critical organisation requires MCPTT users to communicate using end-to-end security, a security context needs to be established between the initiator of the call and the recipient(s) of the call, prior to the establishment of media, or floor control signalling. This provides assurance to MCPTT users that no unauthorised access to communications is taking place within the MCPTT network. An MCPTT key management server (KMS) manages the security domain. For any end-point to use or access end-to-end secure communications, it needs to be provisioned with keying material associated to its identity by the KMS as specified in 3GPP TS 33.180 [78].
For group calls, the security context is set up at the time of creation of the group or temporary group. The group management server creates group call keying material associated with the group and distributes it to all members of the group or temporary group, in advance of the initiation of a group call as specified in 3GPP TS 24.481 [31] and 3GPP TS 33.180 [78]. The establishment of a security context for group calls has no impact on this specification.
For private calls, the security context is initiated at call setup. An end-to-end security context is established that is unique to the pair of users involved in the call. The procedure involves transferral of an encapsulated private call key (PCK) and private call key id (PCK-ID) from the initiator to the terminator. The PCK is encrypted using the terminator's MCPTT ID and domain-specific material provided from the terminating user's KMS. The domain-specific key material of the terminator's KMS is identified by a KMS URI stored in the terminating user profile. The domain-specific key material for all KMSs is downloaded in advance from the initiator's home KMS as described in 3GPP TS 33.180 [78]. The PCK and PCK-ID are distributed within a MIKEY payload within the SDP offer of the private call request. This payload is called a MIKEY-SAKKE I_MESSAGE, as defined in IETF RFC 6509 [75], which ensures the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of the payload. The encoding of the MIKEY payload in the SDP offer is described in IETF RFC 4567 [47] using an "a=key-mgmt" attribute. The payload is signed using a key associated to the identity of the initiating user. At the terminating side, the signature is validated. If valid, the UE extracts and decrypts the encapsulated PCK. The MCPTT UE also extracts the PCK-ID. This process is described in 3GPP TS 33.180 [78]. With the PCK successfully shared between the two MCPTT UEs, the UEs are able to use SRTP/SRTCP to create an end-to-end secure session.
For first-to-answer calls, the security context is initiated at call setup. An end-to-end security context is established that is unique to the pair of users involved in the call. The procedure involves transferral of an encapsulated private call key (PCK) and private call key id (PCK-ID) from the terminator to the initiator. The PCK is encrypted using the originator's MCPTT ID and domain-specific material provided from the originating user's KMS. The domain-specific key material of the originator's KMS is identified by a KMS URI stored in the originator's user profile. The domain-specific key material for all KMSs is downloaded in advance from the terminator's home KMS as described in 3GPP TS 33.180 [78]. The PCK and PCK-ID are distributed within a MIKEY payload within the SDP answer of the first-to-answer call response. This payload is called a MIKEY-SAKKE I_MESSAGE, as defined in IETF RFC 6509 [75], which ensures the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of the payload. The encoding of the MIKEY payload included in the SDP answer using an "a=key-mgmt" attribute is described in IETF RFC 4567 [47]. The payload is signed using a key associated to the identity of the terminating user. At the originating side, the signature is validated. If valid, the UE extracts and decrypts the encapsulated PCK. The MCPTT UE also extracts the PCK-ID. This process is described in 3GPP TS 33.180 [78]. With the PCK successfully shared between the two MCPTT UEs, the UEs are able to use SRTP/SRTCP to create an end-to-end secure session.
End-to-end security is independent of the transmission path and hence is applicable to both on and off-network communications. With a security context established, the group call key and private call key can be used to encrypt media between the end-points as described in 3GPP TS 24.380 [5] clause 13. |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 4.7.2 Signalling security | Signalling security is established between the participating MCPTT function and the MCPTT client. This allows the following signalling to be integrity and confidentiality protected through the communication path between them:
- Signalling plane control (unicast only): Sensitive application data (as described in clause 4.8)
- User plane control over unicast: Floor control messages
- User plane control over multicast: Floor control messages and MBMS subchannel control messages
NOTE 1: According to 3GPP TS 24.380 [5], currently the multicast floor control messages are Floor Idle and Floor Taken and the multicast MBMS subchannel control messages are Map Group To Bearer and Unmap Group To Bearer.
For unicast signalling between the participating MCPTT function and the MCPTT client, the signalling can be protected using the Client-Server Key (CSK), identified by a Client-Server Key Identifier (CSK-ID). The CSK and CSK-ID are initially uploaded from the MCPTT client to the MCPTT server within a MIKEY MIME payload within a SIP REGISTER message for service authorisation or a SIP PUBLISH message for service authorisation, as specified in clause 9.2.1.3 of 3GPP TS 33.180 [78]. The CSK is confidentiality and integrity protected to the public service identity identifying the participating MCPTT function serving the MCPTT user and signed by the MCPTT ID of the MCPTT user.
The CSK and CSK-ID can also be updated by the participating MCPTT function. The procedure involves the participating MCPTT function generating a new CSK and CSK-ID and distributing the new key to the MCPTT client using a CSK 'key download' SIP MESSAGE, as specified in clause 9.2.1.4 of 3GPP TS 33.180 [78]. The message contains a MIKEY MIME payload containing the CSK and CSK-ID. The CSK is confidentiality and integrity protected to the public service identity identifying the participating MCPTT function serving the MCPTT user and signed by the MCPTT ID of the MCPTT user. The client only uses a single CSK at any one time and discards the previously established CSK on receiving a new CSK.
In case of multicast, the protection of MBMS subchannel control messages on the general purpose MBMS subchannels can be done with MSCCKs (each identified by a corresponding MSCCK-ID), distributed during MBMS bearer announcement. Each general purpose MBMS subchannel is associated with an MSCCK and a corresponding MSCCK‑ID. There can be multiple general purpose MBMS subchannels deployed, each associated with its own MSCCK and corresponding MSCCK-ID. The (MSCCK-ID, MSCCK) pair is provided for each general purpose MBMS subchannel separately.
The protection of floor control messages sent over MBMS subchannels can be done with Multicast Signalling Keys (MuSiK), (each identified by a corresponding (MuSiK-ID)), distributed via MuSiK download messages. The MSCCK and MuSiKs can be distributed independently of each other and in any order and can also be used independently. Signalling supports initial keying, as well as repeated re-keying and un-keying for both MSCCK and MuSiKs.
NOTE 2: When an MCPTT client interworks with a participating MCPTT function compliant only to Release 13 of the present document, the floor control messages can be protected using the MKFC and MKFC-ID as specified in 3GPP TS 24.380 [5].
The MuSiK download message contains an embedded MIME payload which is the MIKEY payload containing the MuSiK and MuSiK-ID, as well as an embedded XML payload potentially containing an explicit list of MCPTT group ids to which the key applies. Both payloads are protected as described in 3GPP TS 33.180 [78], as they are transferred between the participating MCPTT function and the MCPTT client. Within the XML payload, the list of MCPTT group ids is protected as application sensitive data (see clause 4.8). Within the MIKEY payload, the MuSiK is encrypted using the MCPTT ID of the served MCPTT client. The payload is signed using a key associated to the identity of the participating MCPTT function. To distribute MuSiK, the participating MCPTT function uses the I_MESSAGE format from clause 5.2.4 of 3GPP TS 33.180 [78], which includes associated parameters. The participating function sets the Status associated parameter to values defined in clause E.6.9 of 3GPP TS 33.180 [78], namely "Not-revoked" when keying or rekeying and "Revoked" when unkeying, respectively. Upon receipt, the MCPTT client validates the signature and, if valid, the MCPTT client first examines the Status attribute and either marks the associated security functions as "not in use" or stores the MuSiK and the MuSiK-ID, and then replies with a success code; otherwise, the MCPTT client can reply with a failure code. if a success code is not received from the MCPTT client in response to the MuSiK download message, the participating MCPTT function starts using only unicast floor control signalling to the respective MCPTT client for the listed groups.
For MBMS subchannel control messages sent over the general purpose MBMS subchannel of an MBMS bearer, the MSCCK can be used. The security context is initiated when the MBMS bearer is announced to the MCPTT clients. The procedure involves the participating MCPTT function creating an MBMS subchannel control key (MSCCK) and a corresponding key identifier (MSCCK-ID) associated with the MBMS bearer when the MBMS bearer is activated, and then transferring the MSCCK and the MSCCK-ID associated with the MBMS bearer to served MCPTT clients using SIP signalling. The MSCCK is encrypted using the MCPTT ID of the served MCPTT client and domain-specific material provided from the KMS. The MSCCK and the MSCCK-ID associated with the MBMS bearer are distributed within a MIKEY payload within the SDP describing the general purpose MBMS subchannel of the MBMS bearer. This payload is called a MIKEY-SAKKE I_MESSAGE, as defined in IETF RFC 6509 [75], which ensures the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of the payload. The encoding of the MIKEY payload in the SDP is described in IETF RFC 4567 [47] using an "a=key-mgmt" attribute. The payload is signed using a key associated to the identity of the participating MCPTT function. To distribute MSCCK, the participating MCPTT function uses the I_MESSAGE format from clause 5.2.4 of 3GPP TS 33.180 [78], which includes associated parameters. The participating function sets the Status associated parameter to values defined in clause E.6.9 of 3GPP TS 33.180 [78], namely "Not-revoked" when keying or rekeying and "Revoked" when unkeying, respectively. Upon receipt, the MCPTT client validates the signature and, if the signature is found valid and the I_MESSAGE contains a Status attribute, the MCPTT client first examines the Status attribute and either marks the associated security functions as "not in use" or extracts and stores the encapsulated MSCCK and the corresponding MSCCK-ID. The decrypted key is used as described in 3GPP TS 33.180 [78]. With the MSCCK successfully shared between the participating MCPTT function and the served UEs, the participating MCPTT function is able to securely send MBMS subchannel control messages to the MCPTT clients. |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 4.8 Protection of sensitive application data | In certain deployments, for example, in the case that the MCPTT operator uses the underlying SIP core infrastructure from the carrier operator, the MCPTT operator can prevent certain sensitive application data from being visible in the clear to the SIP layer. The following data are classed as sensitive application data:
- MCPTT ID;
- MCPTT group ID;
- user location information;
- emergency, alert and imminent-peril indicators;
- access token (containing the MCPTT ID);
- MCPTT client ID; and
- functional alias.
The above data is transported as XML content in SIP messages. in XML elements or XML attributes.
Data is transported in attributes in the following circumstances in the procedures in the present document:
- an MCPTT ID, an MCPTT Group ID, and an MCPTT client ID in an XML document published in SIP PUBLISH request for affiliation according to IETF RFC 3856 [51];
- an MCPTT ID or an MCPTT Group ID in XML document notified in a SIP NOTIFY request for affiliation according to IETF RFC 3856 [51];
- an MCPTT ID and functional alias in an XML document published in SIP PUBLISH request for functional alias management according to IETF RFC 3856 [51];
- an MCPTT ID and functional alias in an XML document notified in a SIP NOTIFY request for functional alias management according to IETF RFC 3856 [51];
- an MCPTT ID in application/resource-lists+xml document included in an SIP INVITE request setting up a private call according to IETF RFC 5366 [20];
- an MCPTT ID in application/resource-lists+xml document included in an SIP INVITE request setting up a group call to a temporary group involving a non-controlling function that works in "Trusted Mode" according to IETF RFC 5366 [20], whereby the participants are returned to the controlling function in a MIME body of a SIP 403 (Forbidden) with the P-Refused-URI-List header field according to IETF RFC 5318 [36];
- an MCPTT ID in XML document provided in SIP NOTIFY request of a conference event package according to IETF RFC 4575 [30]; and
- an MCPTT ID or MCPTT Group ID in a "uri" attribute of an <entry> element of a <list> element of the <resource-lists> element of the application/resource-lists+xml document according to IETF RFC 5366 [20], included in a SIP REFER request when using a pre-established session (the application/resource-lists+xml MIME body is pointed to by a Cid-URL as specified in IETF RFC 2392 [62] contained in the Refer-To header field of the SIP REFER request);
- an MCPTT ID in XML document provided in SIP INFO request according to IETF RFC 6086 [64], after receiving the SIP ACK for a SIP 200 (OK) with the Warning header field set with the Warning text "111 group call proceeded without all required group members".
3GPP TS 33.180 [78] describes a method to provide confidentiality protection of sensitive application data in elements by using XML encryption (i.e. xmlenc) and in attributes by using an attribute confidentiality protection scheme described in clause 6.6.2.3 of the present document. Integrity protection can also be provided by using XML signatures (i.e. xmlsig).
Protection of the data relies on a shared XML protection key (XPK) used to encrypt and sign data:
- between the MCPTT client and the MCPTT server, the XPK is a client-server key (CSK); and
- between MCPTT servers and between MCPTT domains, the XPK is a signalling protection key (SPK).
The CSK (XPK) and a key-id CSK-ID (XPK-ID) are generated from keying material provided by the key management server. Identity based public key encryption based on MIKEY-SAKKE is used to transport the CSK between SIP end-points. The encrypted CSK is transported from the MCPTT client to the MCPTT server when the MCPTT client performs service authorisation as described in clause 7 and is also used during service authorisation to protect the access token.
The SPK (XPK) and a key-id SPK-ID (XPK-ID) are directly provisioned in the MCPTT servers.
Configuration in the MCPTT client and MCPTT server is used to determine whether one or both of confidentiality protection and integrity protection are required.
The following four examples give a brief overview of the how confidentiality and integrity protection is applied to application data in this specification.
EXAMPLE 1: Pseudo code showing how confidentiality protection is represented in the procedures in the document for sensitive data sent by the originating client.
IF configuration is set for confidentiality protection of sensitive data
THEN
Encrypt data element using the CSK (XPK) by following TS 33.180;
Include in an <EncryptedData> element of the XML MIME body according to TS 33.180:
(1) the encryption method;
(2) the key-id (XPK-ID);
(3) the cipher data;
Encrypt URIs in attribute using the CSK (XPK) by following clause 6.6.2.3;
ELSE
include application data into XML MIME body in clear text;
ENDIF;
EXAMPLE 2: Pseudo code showing how integrity protection is represented in the procedures in the present document for data sent by the originating client.
IF configuration is set for integrity protection of application data
THEN
Use a method to hash the content as specified in TS 33.180;
Generate a signature for the hashed content using the CSK (XPK) as specified in TS 33.180;
Include within a <Signature> XML element of the XML MIME body according to TS 33.180:
(1) a cannonicalisation method to be applied to the signed information;
(2) the signature method used for generating the signature;
(3) a reference to the content to be signed;
(4) the hashing method used;
(5) the hashed content;
(6) the key-id (XPK-ID);
(7) the signature value;
ENDIF;
EXAMPLE 3: Pseudo code showing how confidentiality protection is represented in the procedures in the present document at the server side when receiving encrypted content.
IF configuration is set for confidentiality protection of sensitive data
THEN
Check that the XML content contains the <EncryptedData> element;
Check that the XML document contains a URI with the domain name for MCPTT confidentiality protection;
Return an error if the <EncryptedData> element or domain name for MCPTT confidentiality protection are not found;
Otherwise:
(1) obtain the CSK (XPK) using the CSK-ID (XPK-ID) in the received XML body;
(2) for encrypted data in elements, decrypt the data elements using the CSK as specified in TS 33.180 as required;
(3) for encrypted URIs in attributes, decrypt the URIs using the CSK as specified in clause 6.6.2.3;
ENDIF;
EXAMPLE 4: Pseudo code showing how integrity protection is represented in the procedures in the present document at the server side when receiving signed content.
IF configuration is set for integrity protection of application data
THEN
Check that the XML content contains the <Signature> element;
Return an error if the <Signature> element is not found;
Otherwise:
(1) obtain the CSK (XPK) using the CSK-ID (XPK-ID) in the received XML body;
(2) verify the signature of the content using the CSK;
Return an error if the validation of the signature fails;
IF validation of the signature passes
THEN
decrypt any data found in <EncryptedData> elements;
decrypt any encrypted URIs found in attributes;
ENDIF;
ENDIF;
The content can be re-encrypted and signed again using the SPK between MCPTT servers.
The following examples show the difference between normal and encrypted data content. In this example consider the MCPTT client initiating a prearranged group session.
EXAMPLE 5: application/vnd.3gpp.mcpttinfo+xml MIME body represented with data elements in the clear:
Content-Type: application/vnd.3gpp.mcptt-info+xml
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<mcpttinfo>
<mcptt-Params>
<session-type>prearranged</session-type>
<mcptt-request-uri type="Normal">
<mcpttURI>sip:[email protected]></mcpttURI>
</mcptt-request-uri>
</mcptt-Params>
</mcptt-info>
EXAMPLE 6: application/vnd.3gpp.mcpttinfo+xml MIME body represented with the <mcptt-request-uri> encrypted:
Content-Type: application/vnd.3gpp.mcptt-info+xml
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<mcpttinfo>
<mcptt-Params>
<session-type>prearranged</session-type>
<mcptt-request-uri type="Encrypted">
<EncryptedData xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#'
Type='http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#Content'>
<EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2009/xmlenc11#aes128-gcm"/>
<ds:KeyInfo>
<ds:KeyName>base64XpkId</KeyName>
</ds:KeyInfo>
<CipherData>
<CipherValue>A23B45C5657689090</CipherValue>
</CipherData>
</EncryptedData>
</mcptt-request-uri>
</mcptt-Params>
</mcptt-info>
EXAMPLE 7: application/pidf+xml MIME body represented with clear URIs in attributes:
Content-Type: application/pidf+xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<presence entity="sip:[email protected]">
<tuple id="acD4rhU87bK">
<status>
<affiliation group="sip:[email protected]"/>
</status>
</tuple>
</presence>
EXAMPLE 8: application/pidf+xml MIME body represented with encrypted URIs in attributes:
Content-Type: application/pidf+xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<presence entity="sip:c4Hrt45XG8IohRFT67vfdr3V;iv=45RtfVgHY23k8Ihy;xpk-id=b7UJv9;[email protected]">
<tuple id="acD4rhU87bK">
<status>
<affiliation group="sip:98yudFG45tx_89TYGedb4ujF ;iv=FGD567kjhfH7d4-D;key-id=eV9kl7;[email protected]"/>
</status>
</tuple>
</presence> |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 4.9 Pre-established session | When establishing a pre-established session, the MCPTT client negotiates the media parameters, including establishing IP addresses and ports using interactive connectivity establishment (ICE) as specified in IETF RFC 8445 [89] and IETF RFC 8839 [90] with the participating MCPTT function, prior to using the pre-established session for establishing MCPTT calls with other MCPTT users. The procedures for establishing, modifying and releasing a pre-established session are defined in clause 8.
The pre-established session can later be used in MCPTT calls. This avoids the need to negotiate media parameters (including evaluating ICE candidates) and reserving bearer resources during the MCPTT call establishment that results in delayed MCPTT call establishment.
The use of pre-established session on the origination side is compatible with the use of on demand session on the termination side. The use of pre-established session on the termination side is compatible with the use of on demand session on the origination side.
The MCPTT client procedures for:
- leaving an MCPTT call using a pre-established session that was initiated by the MCPTT client are defined in clause 6.2.4.2;
- releasing a MCPTT call using a pre-established session that was initiated by the MCPTT client are defined in clause 6.2.5.2;
- establishing a pre-arranged group call using a pre-established session are defined in clause 10.1.1.2.2;
- rejoining a pre-arranged group call using a pre-established session are defined in clause 10.1.1.2.4.2;
- joining a chat MCPTT group call using a pre-established session are defined in clause 10.1.2.2.2;
- establishing a private call using a pre-established session are defined in clause 11.1.1.2.2; and
- releasing a private call using a pre-established session are defined in clause 11.1.3.1.2.
The participating MCPTT function procedures for:
- establishing a MCPTT session using automatic commencement mode are defined in clause 6.3.2.2.5.3;
- establishing a MCPTT session using manual commencement mode are defined in clause 6.3.2.2.6.3;
- releasing a MCPTT call using a pre-established session are defined in clause 6.3.2.2.8.2;
- establishing a pre-arranged group call using a pre-established session are defined in clause 10.1.1.3.1.2;
- releasing a pre-arranged group call using a pre-established session are defined in clause 10.1.1.3.3.2;
- rejoining a pre-arranged group call using a pre-established session are defined in clause 10.1.1.3.5.2;
- establishing a MCPTT group call using a pre-established session are defined in clause 10.1.2.3.2;
- originating a private call from a MCPTT client using a pre-established session are defined in clause 11.1.1.3.1.2;
- establishing a private call to a MCPTT client using a pre-established session are defined in clause 11.1.1.3.2;
- releasing a private call initiated by the served MCPTT client using a pre-established session are defined in clause 11.1.3.2.1.2; and
- releasing a private call initiated by the remote MCPTT client using a pre-established session are defined in clause 11.1.3.2.2.2. |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 4.10 MCPTT client ID | The MCPTT client assigns the MCPTT client ID when the MCPTT client is used for the first time. The MCPTT client generates the MCPTT client ID as specified in clause 4.2 of IETF RFC 4122 [67].
The MCPTT client preserves the MCPTT client ID:
- while the MCPTT client is SIP registered as specified in 3GPP TS 24.229 [4];
- while the MCPTT client is not SIP registered as specified in 3GPP TS 24.229 [4] and the UE serving the MCPTT client is switched on;
- while the UE serving the MCPTT client is switched off; and
- while the UE serving the MCPTT client is power-cycled.
NOTE: MCPTT client ID is not preserved when the UE is reset to factory settings. |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 4.11 Off-network MCPTT | Off-network services are available for the user if the value of "/<x>/<x>/OffNetwork/Authorised" leaf node present in user profile as specified in 3GPP TS 24.483 [45] is set to "true". |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 4.12 Broadcast Group Calls | A broadcast group call is a group call where the initiating MCPTT user expects no response from the other MCPTT users, so that when the user's transmission is complete, so is the call. The functionality in the present release of the specification for broadcast group calls is not compliant to the requirements for user-broadcast group and group-broadcast group calls as specified in 3GPP TS 22.179 [2], 3GPP TS 22.280 [76] and 3GPP TS 23.379 [3]. In the present release of the specification, a broadcast group call can be initiated by an MCPTT user on any MCPTT group that the MCPTT user is part of.
NOTE 1: Configuration related to the authorisation to create a user-broadcast group or a group-broadcast exists in the user profile document as specified in 3GPP TS 24.484 [50], but is not used by any procedures in 3GPP TS 24.481 [31] in the current release, as the ability for an authorised user to create user-broadcast groups and group-broadcast groups is not provided in the current release.
NOTE 2: Configuration related to broadcast group hierarchies can be found in the group document as specified in 3GPP TS 24.481 [31] and in the service configuration document as specified in 3GPP TS 24.484 [50]. However, this configuration is not used by any procedures in 3GPP TS 24.380 [5] in the current release. |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 4.13 MCPTT Resource Management | MCPTT utilizes the QoS functionality of a 3GPP network. For MCPTT calls dedicated bearers are used for the media plane and could be used for the control plane. To do this the MCPTT system shall requests resources from the 3GPP network over:
- Rx interface for 4G and 5G networks as defined in 3GPP TS 29.214 [79];
- N5 interface for 5G networks with a trusted application function as defined in 3GPP TS 29.514 [96]; or
- indirectly via N33 interface for 5G networks with an untrusted application function as defined in 3GPP TS 29.522 [97];
When the MCPTT client uses an access network in which dedicated bearers cannot be established, the MCPTT system may decide to not request resources via Rx, N5 or N33. The MCPTT system may determine which access network the MCPTT client is using from the SIP header P-Access-Network-Info, see reference 3GPP TS 24.229 [4]. |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 5 Functional entities | |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 5.1 Introduction | This clause associates the functional entities with the MCPTT roles described in the stage 2 architecture document (see 3GPP TS 23.379 [3]). |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 5.2 MCPTT client | To be compliant with the procedures in the present document, an MCPTT client shall:
- act as the user agent for all MCPTT application transactions (e.g. initiation of a group call); and
- support handling of the MCPTT client ID as described in clause 4.10.
To be compliant with the on-network procedures in the present document, an MCPTT client shall:
- support the MCPTT client on-network procedures defined in 3GPP TS 23.379 [3];
- support the GCS UE procedures defined in 3GPP TS 23.468 [57] for unicast delivery, MBMS delivery and service continuity;
- support 5G multicast-broadcast services defined in 3GPP TS 23.247 [91];
- act as a SIP UA as defined in 3GPP TS 24.229 [4];
- generate SDP offer and SDP answer in accordance with 3GPP TS 24.229 [4] and clause 6.2;
- act as a floor participant responsible for floor requests and implement the on-network procedures for floor requests as specified in 3GPP TS 24.380 [5];
- for registration and service authorisation, implement the procedures specified in clause 7.2;
- for pre-established sessions, implement the procedures specified in clause 8.2.1, clause 8.3.1, clause 8.4.1, and the procedures specified in 3GPP TS 24.380 [5];
- for affiliation, implement the procedures specified in clause 9.2;
- for functional alias management, implement the procedures specified in clause 9A.2;
- for group call functionality (including broadcast, emergency and imminent peril), implement the MCPTT client procedures specified in clause 10.1; and
- for private call functionality (including emergency), implement the MCPTT client procedures specified in clause 11.1;
- for emergency alert, implement the procedures specified in clause 12.1;
- for location reporting, implement the procedures specified in clause 13.3;
- for MBMS transmission usage, implement the procedures in clause 14.3; and
- for MBS transmission usage, implement the procedures in clause 14B.3.
To be compliant with the off-network procedures in the present document, an MCPTT client shall:
- support the off-network procedures defined in 3GPP TS 23.379 [3];
- support the MCPTT off-network protocol (MONP) defined in clause 15;
- act as a floor participant for floor requests and implement the off-network procedures for floor requests as specified in 3GPP TS 24.380 [5];
- act as a floor control server providing distributed floor control and implement the off-network procedures for floor control as specified in 3GPP TS 24.380 [5];
- implement the procedures for ProSe direct discovery for public safety use as specified in 3GPP TS 24.334 [28];
- implement the procedures for one-to-one ProSe direct communication for Public Safety use as specified in 3GPP TS 24.334 [28];
- implement the procedures for one-to-many ProSe direct communication for Public Safety use as specified in 3GPP TS 24.334 [28];
- for group call functionality (including emergency and imminent peril), implement the MCPTT client procedures specified in clause 10.2;
- for broadcast group call functionality implement the procedures specified in clause 10.3; and
- for private call functionality (including emergency), implement the MCPTT client procedures specified in clause 11.2.
To be compliant with the service continuity procedures in the present document, an MCPTT client shall:
- implement the registration requirements for service continuity as specified in clause 7.2.1; and
- implement the procedures specified in clause 14A.
To be compliant with the on-network and off-network procedures in the present document requiring end-to-end private call security key distribution, an MCPTT client shall support the procedures specified in 3GPP TS 33.180 [78].
To be compliant with the procedures for confidentiality protection of XML elements in the present document, the MCPTT client shall implement the procedures specified in clause 6.6.2.
To be compliant with the procedures for integrity protection of XML MIME bodies in the present document, the MCPTT client shall implement the procedures specified in clause 6.6.3. |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 5.3 MCPTT server | |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 5.3.1 General | An MCPTT server can perform the controlling role for group calls and private calls as defined in 3GPP TS 23.379 [3].
An MCPTT server can perform the participating role for group calls and private calls as defined in 3GPP TS 23.379 [3].
An MCPTT server can perform a non-controlling role for temporary group calls involving groups from multiple MCPTT systems as specified in 3GPP TS 23.379 [3].
An MCPTT server can perform a non-controlling role for temporary group calls involving groups only from the primary MCPTT system.
An MCPTT server performing the participating role can serve an originating MCPTT user.
An MCPTT server performing the participating role can serve a terminating MCPTT user.
The same MCPTT server can perform the participating role and controlling role for the same group session.
The same MCPTT server can perform the participating role and non-controlling role for the same group session.
When referring to the procedures in the present document for the MCPTT server acting in a participating role for the served user, the term, "participating MCPTT function" is used.
When referring to the procedures in the present document for the MCPTT server acting in a controlling role for the served user, the term "controlling MCPTT function" is used.
When referring to the procedures in the present document for the MCPTT server acting in a non-controlling role for a group call, the term "non-controlling MCPTT function of an MCPTT group" is used.
To be compliant with the procedures in the present document, an MCPTT server shall:
- support the MCPTT server procedures defined in 3GPP TS 23.379 [3];
- implement the role of an AS performing 3rd party call control acting as a routing B2BUA as defined in 3GPP TS 24.229 [4];
- support the GCS AS procedures defined in 3GPP TS 23.468 [57] for unicast delivery, MBMS delivery and service continuity;
- support 5G multicast-broadcast services defined in 3GPP TS 23.247 [91];
- generate SDP offer and SDP answer in accordance with 3GPP TS 24.229 [4] and clause 6.3;
- implement the role of a centralised floor control server and implement the on-network procedures for floor control as specified in 3GPP TS 24.380 [5];
- for registration and service authorisation, implement the procedures specified in clause 7.3;
- for pre-established sessions, implement the procedures specified in clause 8.2.2, clause 8.3.2, clause 8.4.2 and the procedures specified in 3GPP TS 24.380 [5];
- for affiliation, implement the procedures specified in clause 9.2.2;
- for functional alias management, implement the procedures specified in clause 9A.2.2;
- for group call functionality (including broadcast, emergency and imminent peril), implement the MCPTT server procedures specified in clause 10.1;
- for private call functionality (including emergency), implement the MCPTT server procedures specified in clause 11.1;
- for priority sharing, implement the MCPTT server procedures in clause 6.7; and
- for MBMS transmission usage, implement the procedures in clause 14.2; and
- for MBS transmission usage, implement the procedures in clause 14B.2.
To be compliant with the procedures in the present document requiring the distribution of private call keying material between MCPTT clients as specified in 3GPP TS 33.180 [78], an MCPTT server shall ensure that the keying material is copied from incoming SIP messages into the outgoing SIP messages.
To be compliant with the procedures for confidentiality protection of XML elements in the present document, the MCPTT server shall implement the procedures specified in clause 6.6.2.
To be compliant with the procedures for integrity protection of XML MIME bodies in the present document, the MCPTT server shall implement the procedures specified in clause 6.6.3. |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 5.3.2 Functional connectivity models | The following figures give an overview of the connectivity between the different functions of the MCPTT server as described in clause 5.3.1.
NOTE: Separate boxes are shown for each of the functions of the MCPTT server. In each MCPTT system, these functions can be physically combined into one MCPTT server or can be implemented on more than one MCPTT server. For example, there could be an instantiation of an MCPTT server that only serves as a controlling MCPTT function, but not as a participating MCPTT function for any MCPTT clients. When an MCPTT server supports more than one function, then sending requests from one function to another does not incur a traversal of the underlying IMS SIP core network.
Figure 5.3.2-1 shows the basic functions of the MCPTT server when operating within the primary MCPTT system.
Figure 5.3.2-1: Functions of the MCPTT server in the primary MCPTT system
Figure 5.3.2-2 shows the use of the non-controlling MCPTT function of an MCPTT group within the primary MCPTT system. This can occur due to group re-grouping of groups within the same MCPTT system, where the MCPTT server(s) of one or more of the constituent groups are not controlled by the same controlling MCPTT function as that of the temporary group. The non-controlling MCPTT function of an MCPTT group either provide the identities of the users of the group to the controlling MCPTT function, or the non-controlling MCPTT function of an MCPTT group can invite the users of the group on behalf of the controlling MCPTT function.
Figure 5.3.2-2: The non-controlling function operating in the primary MCPTT system
Figure 5.3.2-3 shows the roles of the MCPTT server in a mutual aid relationship between a primary MCPTT system and a partner MCPTT system. Here, the controlling MCPTT function is in the primary MCPTT system and the called user is homed in a partner MCPTT system.
Figure 5.3.2-3: Mutual aid relationship between the primary MCPTT system and a partner MCPTT system with the controlling MCPTT function in the primary MCPTT system
Figure 5.3.2-4 shows the roles of the MCPTT server in a mutual aid relationship between a primary MCPTT system and a partner MCPTT system. Here, the controlling MCPTT function is in the partner MCPTT system.
Figure 5.3.2-4: Mutual aid relationship between the primary MCPTT system and a partner MCPTT system with the controlling MCPTT function in the partner MCPTT system
Figure 5.3.2-5 shows the roles of the MCPTT server in a mutual aid relationship between a primary MCPTT system and a partner MCPTT with the use of a non-controlling MCPTT function of an MCPTT group within the partner MCPTT system. This can occur due to group re-grouping where the MCPTT server(s) of one or more of the constituent groups are homed on the partner system. If the primary MCPTT system and partner MCPTT system operate in a trusted mutual aid relationship, then the non-controlling MCPTT function of an MCPTT group can provide the identities of the users of the group to the controlling MCPTT function. If the primary MCPTT system and partner MCPTT system operate in an untrusted mutual aid relationship, then the non-controlling MCPTT function of an MCPTT group invites the users of the group on behalf of the controlling MCPTT function.
Figure 5.3.2-5: Mutual aid relationship between the primary MCPTT system and a partner MCPTT system involving the use of a non-controlling MCPTT function of an MCPTT group in the partner MCPTT system
Figure 5.3.2-6 illustrates a functional connectivity model involving multiple partner systems where the partner system that owns the group does not home any of the group members.
Figure 5.3.2-6: : Mutual aid relationship between the primary MCPTT system and more than one partner MCPTT system
Other functional connectivity models can exist. |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 5.3.3 Failure case | When initiating a failure response to any received request, depending on operator policy, the MCPTT server may insert a SIP Response-Source header field with an "fe" header field parameter constructed with the URN namespace "urn:3gpp:fe", the fe-id part of the URN set to "as" and the "role" header field parameter set to "pf-mcptt-server", "cf-mcptt-server" or "ncf-mcptt-server" depending on the current role endorsed by the MCPTT server and in accordance with clause 7.2.17 of 3GPP TS 24.229 [4]. |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 5.3.4 Management of MBMS bearers | When providing services over MBMS, an MCPTT server acting in the participating MCPTT function role shall:
- allocate TMGIs and activate MBMS bearers in MBMS service areas to be used for MCPTT media and media control distribution via multicast, per 3GPP TS 23.468 [57] and 3GPP TS 29.468 [42];
- deactivate MBMS bearers and deallocate TMGIs when no longer necessary, per 3GPP TS 23.468 [57] and 3GPP TS 29.468 [42];
- handle MBMS bearers related notifications per 3GPP TS 23.468 [57] and 3GPP TS 29.468 [42]; and
- adjust the priority / pre-emption characteristics of MBMS bearers, as appropriate, in response to relevant events (e.g. emergency or imminent peril call), using procedures specified in per 3GPP TS 23.468 [57] and 3GPP TS 29.468 [42]. |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 5.3.5 Management of MBS sessions | When providing services over MBS, an MCPTT server acting in the participating MCPTT function role shall:
- create MBS sessions in MBS service areas to be used for MCPTT media and media control distribution via multicast and broadcast, per 3GPP TS 23.247 [91];
- delete the MBS sessions when no longer necessary, per 3GPP TS 23.247 [91];
- update the MBS sessions to be used for updating the MBS service areas and/or MBS Service Information, per 3GPP TS 23.247 [91]. |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 5.4 MCPTT UE-to-network relay | To be compliant with the procedures in the present document for service continuity, an MCPTT UE- to-network relay shall support the ProSe UE-to-network relay procedures as specified in 3GPP TS 24.334 [28] and 3GPP TS 23.379 [3]. |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 5.5 MCPTT gateway server | |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 5.5.1 General | To allow interconnection between MCPTT system in different trust domains, MC Gateway Servers can be optionally added on the path between controlling and participating MCPTT functions.
An MCPTT gateway server acts as a SIP and HTTP proxy for signalling with a partner MCPTT system in a different trust domain.
An MCPTT gateway server acts as an application and security gateway with a partner MCPTT system in a different trust domain.
An MCPTT gateway server provides topology hiding to the partner MCPTT system in a different trust domain.
An MCPTT gateway server enforces local policies and local security.
An MCPTT gateway server can be an exit point from its MCPTT system to a partner MCPTT system in a different trust domain, an entry point to its MCPTT system from a partner MCPTT system in a different trust domain, or both.
An MCPTT gateway server is transparent to MCPTT controlling and participating servers. When required for interconnection, MC gateway servers URIs are known and used by MCPTT servers in place of the PSIs of the interconnected MCPTT server. The MCPTT server does not need to know if it finally addresses directly an MCPTT controlling function or an intermediate MCPTT gateway server.
To be compliant with the procedures in the present document, an MCPTT gateway server shall:
- support the MC gateway server procedures defined in 3GPP TS 23.280 [82] and 3GPP TS 23.379 [3]; and
- support the MC gateway server procedures defined in 3GPP TS 33.180 [78];
- implement the procedures specified in clause 6.8
To be compliant with the procedures for confidentiality protection in the present document, the MCPTT gateway server shall implement the procedures specified in clause 6.6.2, acting on behalf of the MCPTT server when sending or receiving confidentiality protected content to or from an MCPTT server in another trust domain.
To be compliant with the procedures for integrity protection of XML MIME bodies in the present document, the MCPTT gateway server shall implement the procedures specified in clause 6.6.3, acting on behalf of the MCPTT server when sending or receiving integrity protected content to or from an MCPTT server in another trust domain. |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 5.5.2 Functional connectivity models | The following figures give an overview of the connectivity between the different functions of the MCPTT server in different trust domains when MCPTT gateway servers are used.
Figure 5.5.2-1 shows the roles of the MCPTT servers in a non trusted relationship between a primary MCPTT system and a partner MCPTT system. Here, the originating participating MCPTT function and the controlling MCPTT function are in the primary MCPTT system and a terminating participating MCPTT function is in a partner MCPTT system.
Figure 5.5.2-1: Non trusted relationship between the primary MCPTT system and a partner MCPTT system with a terminating participating MCPTT function in the partner MCPTT system
Figure 5.5.2-2 shows the roles of the MCPTT servers in a non trusted relationship between a primary MCPTT system and a partner MCPTT system. Here, the originating participating MCPTT function is in the primary MCPTT system and the controlling MCPTT function and a terminating participating MCPTT function are in a partner MCPTT system.
Figure 5.5.2-2: Non trusted relationship between the primary MCPTT system and a partner MCPTT system with a controlling MCPTT function in the partner MCPTT system
Other functional connectivity models for non trusted relationship exist, based on the same principle of use of MCPTT gateway servers, e.g. with non-controlling MCPTT functions. |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 5.6 MCPTT gateway UE | |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 5.6.1 General | An MCPTT gateway UE enables MCPTT service access for a MCPTT user utilizing non-3GPP device connected to the MCPTT gateway UE via non-3GPP access network.
NOTE: A UE that is not using 3GPP network access is also considered a non-3GPP device in this context.
An MCPTT gateway UE provides the following MCPTT gateway functions:
- Relay of signaling, media and floor control between an MCPTT client in the non-3GPP device and MCPTT servers; and
- Access to a MCPTT system with required quality of service using 3GPP network. |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 5.6.2 Functional connectivity models | The following figures give an overview of the connectivity between the different functional entities when using a MCPTT gateway. One MCPTT client can only utilize one MCPTT gateway UE at the same time.
NOTE: MC clients for other service types (e.g. MCVideo or MCData) can utilize the MC gateway UE supporting the corresponding service types. MC gateway UEs for different service types can be deployed in the same UE.
Figure 5.6.2-1 shows the scenario when the MCPTT client resides in the MCPTT gateway UE. Handling of the MCPTT service by the MCPTT client on the MCPTT gateway UE follows the procedures defined in this document for MCPTT clients hosted on regular MCPTT UEs. How the non-3GPP device interacts with the MCPTT client over a non‑3GPP access technology is not part of the current specification.
Figure 5.6.2-1: Relationship between non-3GPP device, MCPTT gateway UE and the MCPTT server with the MCPTT client located in the MCPTT gateway UE
Figure 5.6.2-2 shows the scenario when the MCPTT client resides in the non-3GPP device that uses a non‑3GPP access technology to access the MCPTT service. In this case the MCPTT gateway UE will relay the signaling between the MCPTT client and the MCPTT System as well as forward the media plane.
Figure 5.6.2-2: Relationship between non-3GPP device, MCPTT gateway UE and the MCPTT server with the MCPTT client located in the non-3GPP device |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 5.6.3 QoS for MCPTT gateway UE | When the MCPTT client is on a non-3GPP device the use of the MCPTT gateway UE requires an IP network behind the MCPTT gateway UE. In a 5G network this can be achieved by the use of framed routing (see reference 3GPP TS 23.501 [95]). In a 4G and 5G network this can be achieved by using local IP network behind the MCPTT gateway UE. In the case that a local IP network is used, MCPTT gateway UE needs to handle routing including network address translation (NAT).
When using a MCPTT gateway UE, the 3GPP QoS and priority functions shall be utilized between the MCPTT gateway UE and the packet gateway. QoS between the non 3GPP device and the MCPTT gateway UE is out of scope of 3GPP.
In the case that MCPTT clients are hosted in non 3GPP devices the following applies. The MCPTT system may use the P-Access-Network-Info header to determine the type of access network. However, the P-Access-Network-Info header does not include sufficient information for the MCPTT system to determine that the MCPTT client is using a MCPTT gateway UE. Hence, the MCPTT client shall additionally inform the MCPTT system that the MCPTT client uses a MCPTT gateway UE for which the MCPTT system shall request network resources.
In the case that MCPTT clients are instantiated in a MCPTT gateway UE, the MCPTT clients shall utilize the existing quality of services functions. |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 6 Common procedures | |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 6.1 Introduction | This clause describes the common procedures for each functional entity as specified. |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 6.2 MCPTT client procedures | |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 6.2.0 Distinction of requests at the MCPTT client | |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 6.2.0.1 SIP MESSAGE request | The MCPTT client needs to distinguish between the following SIP MESSAGE requests:
- SIP MESSAGE requests routed to the MCPTT client containing a Content-Type header field set to "application/vnd.3gpp.mcptt-location-info+xml" and including an XML body containing a Location root element containing a Configuration element. Such requests are known as "SIP MESSAGE request for location report configuration" in the present document;
- SIP MESSAGE requests routed to the MCPTT client containing a Content-Type header field set to "application/vnd.3gpp.mcptt-location-info+xml" and including an XML body containing a Location root element containing a Request element. Such requests are known as "SIP MESSAGE request for location report request" in the present document;
- SIP MESSAGE requests routed to the MCPTT client containing a Content-Type header field set to "application/vnd.3gpp.mcptt-info+xml" and including an XML body containing a <mcpttinfo> root element containing the <mcptt-Params> element and an <anyExt> element containing the <request-type> element set to a value of "private-call-call-back-request". Such requests are known as "SIP MESSAGE request for private call call-back request for terminating client";
- SIP MESSAGE requests routed to the MCPTT client containing a Content-Type header field set to "application/vnd.3gpp.mcptt-info+xml" and including an XML body containing a <mcpttinfo> root element containing the <mcptt-Params> element and an <anyExt> element containing the <request-type> element set to a value of "private-call-call-back-cancel-request". Such requests are known as "SIP MESSAGE request for private call call-back cancel request for terminating client";
- SIP MESSAGE requests routed to the MCPTT client containing a Content-Type header field set to "application/vnd.3gpp.mcptt-info+xml" and including an XML body containing a <mcpttinfo> root element containing the <mcptt-Params> element and an <anyExt> element containing the <response-type> element set to a value of "private-call-call-back-response". Such requests are known as "SIP MESSAGE request for private call call-back response for terminating client";
- SIP MESSAGE requests routed to the MCPTT client containing a Content-Type header field set to "application/vnd.3gpp.mcptt-info+xml" and including an XML body containing a <mcpttinfo> root element containing the <mcptt-Params> element and an <anyExt> element containing the <response-type> element set to a value of "private-call-call-back-cancel-response". Such requests are known as "SIP MESSAGE request for private call call-back cancel response for terminating client";
- SIP MESSAGE requests routed to the MCPTT client containing a Content-Type header field set to "application/vnd.3gpp.mcptt-info+xml" and including an XML body containing a <mcpttinfo> root element containing the <mcptt-Params> element and an <anyExt> element containing the <request-type> element set to a value of "group-selection-change-request". Such requests are known as "SIP MESSAGE request for group selection change request for terminating client";
- SIP MESSAGE requests routed to the MCPTT client containing a Content-Type header field set to "application/vnd.3gpp.mcptt-info+xml" and including an XML body containing a <mcpttinfo> root element containing the <mcptt-Params> element and an <anyExt> element containing the <response-type> element set to a value of "group-selection-change-response". Such requests are known as "SIP MESSAGE request for group selection change response for terminating client";
- SIP MESSAGE requests routed to the MCPTT client containing a Content-Type header field set to "application/vnd.3gpp.mcptt-info+xml" and including an XML body containing a <mcpttinfo> root element containing the <mcptt-Params> element and an <anyExt> element containing the <request-type> element set to a value of "remotely-initiated-group-call-request". Such requests are known as "SIP MESSAGE request for remotely initiated group call request for terminating client";
- SIP MESSAGE requests routed to the MCPTT client containing a Content-Type header field set to "application/vnd.3gpp.mcptt-info+xml" and including an XML body containing a <mcpttinfo> root element containing the <mcptt-Params> element and an <anyExt> element containing the <response-type> element set to a value of "remotely-initiated-group-call-response". Such requests are known as "SIP MESSAGE request for remotely initiated group call response for terminating client";
- SIP MESSAGE requests routed to the MCPTT client containing a Content-Type header field set to "application/vnd.3gpp.mcptt-info+xml" and including an XML body containing a <mcpttinfo> root element containing the <mcptt-Params> element and an <anyExt> element containing the <request-type> element set to a value of "remotely-initiated-private-call-request". Such requests are known as "SIP MESSAGE request for remotely initiated private call request for terminating client";
- SIP MESSAGE requests routed to the MCPTT client containing a Content-Type header field set to "application/vnd.3gpp.mcptt-info+xml" and including an XML body containing a <mcpttinfo> root element containing the <mcptt-Params> element and an <anyExt> element containing the <response-type> element set to a value of "remotely-initiated-private-call-response". Such requests are known as "SIP MESSAGE request for remotely initiated private call response for terminating client";
- SIP MESSAGE requests routed to the MCPTT client containing a Content-Type header field set to "application/mikey" and a CSB-ID containing a CSK-ID. Such requests are known as "SIP MESSAGE request for CSK download for terminating client";
- SIP MESSAGE requests routed to the MCPTT client containing a Content-Type header field set to "application/vnd.3gpp.mcptt-info+xml" and including an XML body containing a <mcptt-info> root element containing the <mcptt-Params> element and an <emergency-alert-area-ind> element. Such requests are known as "SIP MESSAGE request for notification of entry into or exit from an emergency alert area";
- SIP MESSAGE requests routed to the MCPTT client containing a Content-Type header field set to "application/vnd.3gpp.mcptt-info+xml" and including an XML body containing a <mcptt-info> root element containing the <mcptt-Params> element and an <group-geo-area-ind> element. Such requests are known as "SIP MESSAGE request for notification of entry into or exit from a group geographic area";
- SIP MESSAGE requests routed to the MCPTT client with the Request-URI set to a public user identity of the MCPTT user that contains a <preconfigured-group> element in an application/vnd.3gpp.mcptt-regroup+xml MIME body and a <regroup-action> element set to "create". Such requests are known as "SIP MESSAGE request to the MCPTT client to request creation of a regroup using preconfigured group" in the procedures in the present document;
- SIP MESSAGE requests routed to the MCPTT client with the Request-URI set to a public user identity of the MCPTT user that contains a <preconfigured-group> element in an application/vnd.3gpp.mcptt-regroup+xml MIME body and a <regroup-action> element set to "remove". Such requests are known as "SIP MESSAGE request to the MCPTT client to request removal of a regroup using preconfigured group" in the procedures in the present document;
- SIP MESSAGE request routed to the MCPTT client containing a Content-Type header field set to "application/vnd.3gpp.mcptt-info+xml" and includes an XML body containing a <mcpttinfo> root element containing the <mcptt-Params> element and an <anyExt> element containing the <request-type> element set to a value of "transfer-private-call-request". Such requests are known as "SIP MESSAGE request for transfer private call request for terminating client";
- SIP MESSAGE request routed to the MCPTT client containing a Content-Type header field set to "application/vnd.3gpp.mcptt-info+xml" and includes an XML body containing a <mcpttinfo> root element containing the <mcptt-Params> element and an <anyExt> element containing the <responset-type> element set to a value of "transfer-private-call-response". Such requests are known as "SIP MESSAGE request for transfer private call response for terminating client";
- SIP MESSAGE request routed to the MCPTT client containing a Content-Type header field set to "application/vnd.3gpp.mcptt-info+xml" and includes an XML body containing a <mcpttinfo> root element containing the <mcptt-Params> element and an <anyExt> element containing the <request-type> element set to a value of "forward-private-call-request". Such requests are known as "SIP MESSAGE request for forwarding private call request for terminating client";
- SIP MESSAGE request routed to the MCPTT client containing a Content-Type header field set to "application/vnd.3gpp.mcptt-info+xml" and includes an XML body containing a <mcpttinfo> root element containing the <mcptt-Params> element and an <anyExt> element containing the <responset-type> element set to a value of "forward-private-call-response". Such requests are known as "SIP MESSAGE request for forwarding private call response for terminating client";
- SIP MESSAGE requests routed to the MCPTT client containing a Content-Type header field set to "application/vnd.3gpp.mcptt-info+xml" and including an XML body containing a <mcptt-info> root element containing the <mcptt-Params> element and an <adhoc-emergency-alert-ind> element. Such requests are known as "SIP MESSAGE request for adhoc group emergency notification"; and
- SIP MESSAGE requests routed to the MCPTT client with the Request-URI set to the public user identity of the MCPTT user and containing a Content-Type header field set to "application/vnd.3gpp.mcptt-info+xml" and including an XML body containing a <mcpttinfo> root element containing a <mcptt-Params> element containing an <imminentperil-ind> element. Such requests are known as "SIP MESSAGE request for imminent peril state change notification for terminating MCPTT client" in the procedures in the present document. |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 6.2.1 SDP offer generation | The SDP offer shall contain one SDP media-level clause for MCPTT speech according to 3GPP TS 24.229 [4] and, may contain one SDP media-level section for a media plane control messages according to 3GPP TS 24.380 [5].
When composing an SDP offer according to 3GPP TS 24.229 [4] the MCPTT client:
1) shall set the IP address of the MCPTT client for the offered MCPTT speech media stream and, if media plane control messages shall be used, for the offered media plane control channel;
NOTE 1: If the MCPTT client is behind a NAT the IP address and port included in the SDP offer can be a different IP address and port than the actual IP address and port of the MCPTT client depending on the NAT traversal method used by the SIP/IP Core.
2) shall include an "m=audio" media-level section for the MCPTT media stream consisting of:
a) the port number for the media stream selected, with the following clarification:
i) if the MCPTT client is requesting an upgrade (resp. downgrade) of an already established session to (resp. from) emergency or imminent peril and if multiplexing of media streams was used, the MCPTT client should select a different port number not to impact the resource priority used for the other multiplexed media streams;
b) the codec(s) and media parameters and attributes with the following clarification:
i) if the MCPTT client is initiating a call to a group identity;
ii) if the <preferred-voice-encodings> element is present in the group document retrieved by the group management client as specified in 3GPP TS 24.481 [31] containing an <encoding> element with a "name" attribute; and
iii) if the MCPTT client supports the encoding name indicated in the value of the "name" attribute;
then the MCPTT client:
i) shall insert the value of the "name" attribute in the <encoding name> field of the "a=rtpmap" attribute as defined in IETF RFC 4566 [12];
c) if the SDP offer is for an ambient listening call:
i) if this is a remotely initiated ambient listening call, include an "a=recvonly" attribute; or
ii) if this is a locally initiated ambient listening call, include an "a=sendonly" attribute;
d) "i=" field set to "speech" according to 3GPP TS 24.229 [4]; and
e) if the MCPTT client is initiating a call with implicit floor request:
i) may include an "a=ssrc" attribute as specified in IETF RFC 5576 [86] where the MCPTT client may indicate to the MCPTT server which RTP SSRC it would like to use in the subsequent RTP media flow if the implicit floor request is granted;
NOTE 2: The actual RTP SSRC that the client will have to use if the implicit floor request is granted will be received either in the mc-ssrc attribute of the SDP answer in the case of an implicit floor grant, or in the corresponding information element of the floor granted message in the case of an explicit floor grant. The client will use the RTP SSRC received from the MCPTT server regardless of this optional a=ssrc attribute.
3) if media plane control messages shall be used during the session, shall include an "m=application" media-level section as specified in 3GPP TS 24.380 [5] clause 4.3, consisting of:
a) the port number for the media plane control channel selected as specified in 3GPP TS 24.380 [5], ], with the following clarification:
i) if the MCPTT client is requesting an upgrade (resp. downgrade) of an already established session to (resp. from) emergency or imminent peril and if multiplexing of media plane control channels was used, the MCPTT client should select a different port number not to impact the resource priority used for the other multiplexed media plane control channels;
b) an mc_floor_ssrc 'fmtp' attribute as specified in 3GPP TS 24.380 [5] clause 14, with the RTCP SSRC that the MCPTT client has selected as specified in 3GPP TS 24.380 [5] clause 4.3 and shall be used by the participating MCPTT function in the floor control messages sent to the MCPTT client for this session; and
NOTE 3: The MCPTT client will receive in the SDP answer the RTP SSRC it will have to use in the floor control message it will send to the participating MCPTT function in this session.
c) any other necessary 'fmtp' attribute as specified in 3GPP TS 24.380 [5] clause 14; and
NOTE 4: The same media plane control channel is used for transport of messages associated with floor control, pre-established session call control and MBMS bearer management.
4) if end-to-end security is required for a private call and the SDP offer is not for establishing a pre-established session, shall include the MIKEY-SAKKE I_MESSAGE in an "a=key-mgmt" attribute as a "mikey" attribute value in the SDP offer as specified in IETF RFC 4567 [47]. |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 6.2.2 SDP answer generation | When the MCPTT client receives an initial SDP offer for an MCPTT session, the MCPTT client shall process the SDP offer and shall compose an SDP answer according to 3GPP TS 24.229 [4].
When composing an SDP answer, the MCPTT client:
1) shall accept the MCPTT speech media stream in the SDP offer;
2) shall set the IP address of the MCPTT client for the accepted MCPTT speech media stream and, if included in the SDP offer, for the accepted media-floor control entity;
NOTE 1: If the MCPTT client is behind a NAT the IP address and port included in the SDP answer can be a different IP address and port than the actual IP address and port of the MCPTT client depending on the NAT traversal method used by the SIP/IP Core.
3) shall include an "m=audio" media-level section for the accepted MCPTT speech media stream consisting of:
a) the port number for the media stream with the following clarification:
i) if the MCPTT client is responding to an upgrade (resp. downgrade) of an already established session to (resp. from) emergency or imminent peril and if multiplexing of media streams was used, the MCPTT client should select a different port number not to impact the resource priority used for the other multiplexed media streams;
b) media-level attributes as specified in 3GPP TS 24.229 [4];
c) if the "a=recvonly" attribute is present in the SDP offer, include an "a=sendonly" attribute;
d) if the "a=sendonly" attribute is present in the SDP offer, include an "a=recvonly" attribute; and
e) "i=" field set to "speech" according to 3GPP TS 24.229 [4];
4) if included in the SDP offer, shall include an "m=application" media-level section of the offered media-floor control entity as specified in 3GPP TS 24.380 [5] clause 4.3, consisting of:
a) the port number for the media plane control channel selected as specified in 3GPP TS 24.380 [5], with the following clarification:
i) if the MCPTT client is requesting an upgrade (resp. downgrade) of an already established session to (resp. from) emergency or imminent peril and if multiplexing of media plane control channels was used, the MCPTT client should select a different port number not to impact the resource priority used for the other multiplexed media plane control channels; and
b) an mc_floor_ssrc 'fmtp' attribute as specified in 3GPP TS 24.380 [5] clause 14, with the RTCP SSRC that the MCPTT client has selected as specified in 3GPP TS 24.380 [5] clause 4.3 and shall be used by the participating MCPTT function in the floor control messages sent to the MCPTT client for this session; and
NOTE 2: The MCPTT client has received in the SDP offer the RTP SSRC it will have to use in the floor control message it will send to the participating MCPTT function in this session.
c) any other necessary 'fmtp' attribute as specified in 3GPP TS 24.380 [5] clause 14; and
5) if end-to-end security is required for a first-to-answer call, shall include the MIKEY-SAKKE I_MESSAGE in an "a=key-mgmt" attribute as a "mikey" attribute value in the SDP answer as specified in 3GPP TS 33.180 [78]. |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 6.2.3 Commencement modes | |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 6.2.3.1 Automatic commencement mode | |
133fe75ad74e43ce3dae7fa700a45c85 | 24.379 | 6.2.3.1.1 Automatic commencement mode for private calls | When performing the automatic commencement mode procedures, the MCPTT client:
1) shall accept the SIP INVITE request and generate a SIP 200 (OK) response according to rules and procedures of 3GPP TS 24.229 [4];
2) shall include the option tag "timer" in a Require header field of the SIP 200 (OK) response;
3) shall include the g.3gpp.mcptt media feature tag in the Contact header field of the SIP 200 (OK) response;
4) shall include the g.3gpp.icsi-ref media feature tag containing the value of "urn:urn-7:3gpp-service.ims.icsi.mcptt" in the Contact header field of the SIP 200 (OK) response;
5) shall include the Session-Expires header field in the SIP 200 (OK) response and start the SIP session timer according to IETF RFC 4028 [7]. The "refresher" parameter in the Session-Expires header field shall be set to "uas";
6) shall, if the incoming SIP INVITE request contains a Replaces header field, include in the SDP answer in the SIP 200 (OK) response to the SDP offer the parameters used for the pre-established session identified by the contents of the Replaces header field;
7) shall, if the incoming SIP INVITE request does not contain a Replaces header field, include an SDP answer in the SIP 200 (OK) response to the SDP offer in the incoming SIP INVITE request according to 3GPP TS 24.229 [4] with the clarifications given in clause 6.2.2;
NOTE: In the case of a new emergency call where the terminating client is using a pre-established session, the SIP INVITE request containing a Replaces header is used to replace the pre-established session.
7a) shall, if the incoming SIP INVITE request contains a <transfer-announced-ind> element in the <anyExt> element of the <mcptt-Params> element of the <mcpttinfo> element contained in the application/vnd.3gpp.mcptt-info+xml MIME body, set the value of the <replaces-header-value> element contained in the <anyExt> element of the <mcptt-Params> element of the <mcpttinfo> element of the application/vnd.3gpp.mcptt-info+xml MIME body to the following value: The Call-ID header field, and the value of the from-tag header field parameter set to the value contained in the incoming SIP INVITE request. The value of the to-tag is the one set by the MCPTT client in the 200 (OK) response. Together they represent a dialog identifier;
8) shall send the SIP 200 (OK) response towards the MCPTT server according to rules and procedures of 3GPP TS 24.229 [4];
9) shall, if the incoming SIP INVITE request contains a Replaces header field, release the pre-established session identified by the contents of the Replaces header field; and
10) shall interact with the media plane as specified in 3GPP TS 24.380 [5] clause 6.2.
When NAT traversal is supported by the MCPTT client and when the MCPTT client is behind a NAT, generation of SIP responses is done as specified in this clause and as specified in IETF RFC 5626 [15]. |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.