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OpenCaselistCites

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365,600	379,768	neg	Cards for Contention One, Diversification Kurmanaev ‘20 Kurmanaev, Anatoly and Krauss, Clifford, New York Times, To Survive, Venezuela’s Leader Gives Up Decades of Control Over Oil. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/08/world/americas/venezuela-oil-maduro.html Armas ‘19 Armas, Vaela and Pons, Corina, Reuters, “Venezuela's Maduro loosens private sector, currency red tape-sources,” 1.31.19. https://www.reuters.com/article/venezuela-politics-business/venezuelas-maduro-loosens-private-sector-currency-red-tape-sources-idUSL1N1ZV1IS Presna Latina ‘19 PrensaLatina, Venezuela and Russia consolidate agricultural agreements, 12.18.19. https://www.plenglish.com/index.php?o=rnandid=50108andSEO=venezuela-and-russia-consolidate-agricultural-agreements Venezuela Analysis ‘19 Lopez, Ociel, Venezuela Analysis, “Crisis and Critique: Venezuela, a Paradox of Stability?,” 12.28.19 https://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/14753 Washington Post ‘19 Faiola, Anthony, Washington Post, “A fake Walmart, cases of Dom Pérignon and the almighty dollar: Inside socialist Venezuela’s chaotic embrace of the free market,” 12.25.19. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/a-fake-walmart-cases-of-dom-perignon-and-the-almighty-dollar-inside-socialist-venezuelas-chaotic-embrace-of-the-free-market/2019/12/23/ca4f2072-21c3-11ea-b034-de7dc2b5199b_story.html Panam Post Martin, Sabrina, Panam Post, Venezuela: The Country with the Worst Internet Connectivity in Latin America, 11.19.18 https://panampost.com/sabrina-martin/2018/11/19/venezuela-the-country-with-the-worst-internet-connectivity-in-latin-america/ Netblocks ‘19 Netblocks, “Mapping the implications of Venezuela’s new National Telecommunications Corporation,” 5.24.19 https://netblocks.org/analysis/mapping-the-implications-of-venezuelas-new-national-telecommunications-corporation-98aZgYAo WorldBank Worldbank, “Exploring the Relationship Between Broadband and Economic Growth,” 2016. http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/391452529895999/WDR16-BP-Exploring-the-Relationship-between-Broadband-and-Economic-Growth-Minges.pdf Tong ‘16 Tong, Scott, Marketplace,“Oil Pushes out Venezuela’s Agriculture,” 4.18.16 https://www.marketplace.org/2016/04/18/venezuela-ranchers/ Cards For Contention Two, Iran: Holland 19 Steve Holland, Reuters, "U.S. sanctions Iran's central bank, fund after Saudi oil attack - Reuters", 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-aramco-usa-iran/us-sanctions-irans-central-bank-fund-after-saudi-oil-attack-idUSKBN1W51Q4 Dudley 18 Dominic Dudley, Forbes, "Iran Clamps Down On Dollar Trading In Fresh Attempt To Bolster Rial", 2018, https://www.forbes.com/sites/dominicdudley/2018/03/01/iran-clamps-down-dollar-trading/#7332a77f54d1 Klebnikov ‘19 Klebnikov, Sergei, Forbes. “Trump Announces New Sanctions on Iran, Escalating Pressure In Wake Of Saudi Oil Attack” https://www.forbes.com/sites/sergeiklebnikov/2019/09/20/trump-announces-new-sanctions-on-iran-escalating-pressure-in-wake-of-saudi-oil-attack/#73a4f8533b17 Dudley ‘19 Dudley, Dominic, Forbes,” Iran Clamps Down On Dollar Trading In Fresh Attempt To Bolster Rial” https://www.forbes.com/sites/dominicdudley/2018/03/01/iran-clamps-down-dollar-trading/#3de466754d13 Salama ‘19 Salama, Vivian, Wall Street Journal, “U.S. Expands Sanctions Against Venezuela Into an Embargo” https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-expands-sanctions-against-venezuela-into-an-embargo-11565053782 CEPR 19 Weisbrot, Mark and Sachs, Jeffrey, Center for Economic and Policy Research. ”Economic Sanctions as Collective Punishment: The Case of Venezuela” https://cepr.net/images/stories/reports/venezuela-sanctions-2019-04.pdf Guillamon ‘19 Guillamon, Carla V., International Policy Digest, Petro-Diplomacy: Venezuela, Iran, and the U.S. https://intpolicydigest.org/2019/01/20/petro-diplomacy-venezuela-iran-and-the-u-s/ American Foreign Policy Council ‘12 Bailey, Norman A., The American Foreign Policy Council, “Iran’s Venezuela Gateway” https://www.afpc.org/uploads/documents/ISB5.pdf The Wilson Center Arnson, Esfandiari, Stubits, Woodrow Wilson Center Reports on the Americas, Iran in Latin America: Threat or ‘Axis of Annoyance’? https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/Iran_in_LA.pdf Morgenthau ‘09 Morgenthau, Robert M., Global Financial Integrity, The Link between Iran and Venezuela: A Crisis in the Making? https://gfintegrity.org/press-release/link-iran-venezuela-crisis-making/ Tanchum ‘19 Tanchum, Michael, Foreign Policy, Iran is Already Losing. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/09/23/iran-is-already-losing/ Maloney ‘15 Maloney, Suzanne, Brookings, Major beneficiaries of the Iran deal: The IRGC and Hezbollah,2015. https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/major-beneficiaries-of-the-iran-deal-the-irgc-and-hezbollah/ Mearshimer ‘19 Mearshimer, John A., The New York Times, “Iran is Rushing to Build a Nuclear Weapon-And Trump Can’t Stop It” https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/01/opinion/iran-is-rushing-to-build-a-nuclear-weapon-and-trump-cant-stop-it.html Haas ‘19 Haas, Lawrence J., The Hill, Will US, Iranian miscalculation bring war?, 9.26.19. https://thehill.com/opinion/international/463077-will-us-iranian-miscalculation-bring-war PSR Helfand, Ira,International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, “Nuclear War: Two Billion People at Risk,” 2013. https://www.psr.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/two-billion-at-risk.pdf	904,862
365,601	380,116	any round	hi! in order to circumnavigate prepouts you can message us at danielledav04@gmailcom and brianperlstein07@gmailcom and we'll disclose taglines for contentions	905,414
365,602	380,126	Contact Info	Facebook: Tom Perret Email: [email protected]	905,423
365,603	379,563	Iguodala to Curry Back to Iguodala Up for the layup Oh, blocked by James	Posted open source	904,643
365,604	379,575	Hawken MW Disclosure Policy	Hey gang. If you email/text us at least 30 min prior to round and ask us to disclose, we will, so long as you reciprocate. We don't check wiki, so we wont have your case unless we somehow get a flow. Also, we don't paraphrase, so we'd prefer if any cases you send us aren't paraphrased either. (216)-477-6014 [email protected] [email protected] Facebook: Alex Watson and Claire Marrie	904,656
365,605	379,589	Japan NC	Framework Existential threats outweigh all other calculus mechanisms – it is the most intersectional. GPP 17 GPP 17 (Global Priorities Project, Future of Humanity Institute at the University of Oxford, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance,” Global Priorities Project, 2017, https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf // mba-ab+rjs 1.2. THE ETHICS OF EXISTENTIAL RISK In his book Reasons and Persons, Oxford philosopher Derek Parfit advanced an influential argument about the importance of avoiding extinction: I believe that if we destroy mankind, as we now can, this outcome will be much worse than most people think. Compare three outcomes: (1) Peace. (2) A nuclear war that kills 99 of the world’s existing population. (3) A nuclear war that kills 100. (2) would be worse than (1), and (3) would be worse than (2). Which is the greater of these two differences? Most people believe that the greater difference is between (1) and (2). I believe that the difference between (2) and (3) is very much greater. ... The Earth will remain habitable for at least another billion years. Civilization began only a few thousand years ago. If we do not destroy mankind, these few thousand years may be only a tiny fraction of the whole of c ivilized human history. The difference between (2) and (3) may thus be the difference between this tiny fraction and all of the rest of this history. If we compare this possible history to a day, what has occurred so far is only a fraction of a second.65 In this argument, it seems that Parfit is assuming that the survivors of a nuclear war that kills 99 of the population would eventually be able to recover civilisation without long-term effect. As we have seen, this may not be a safe assumption – but for the purposes of this thought experiment, the point stands. What makes existential catastrophes especially bad is that they would “destroy the future,” as another Oxford philosopher, Nick Bostrom, puts it.66 This future could potentially be extremely long and full of flourishing, and would therefore have extremely large value. In standard risk analysis, when working out how to respond to risk, we work out the expected value of risk reduction, by weighing the probability that an action will prevent an adverse event against the severity of the event. Because the value of preventing existential catastrophe is so vast, even a tiny probability of prevention has huge expected value.67 Of course, there is persisting reasonable disagreement about ethics and there are a number of ways one might resist this conclusion.68 Therefore, it would be unjustified to be overconfident in Parfit and Bostrom’s argument. In some areas, government policy does give significant weight to future generations. For example, in assessing the risks of nuclear waste storage, governments have considered timeframes of thousands, hundreds of thousands, and even a million years.69 Justifications for this policy usually appeal to principles of intergenerational equity according to which future generations ought to get as much protection as current generations.70 Similarly, widely accepted norms of sustainable development require development that meets the needs of the current generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.71 However, when it comes to existential risk, it would seem that we fail to live up to principles of intergenerational equity. Existential catastrophe would not only give future generations less than the current generations; it would give them nothing. Indeed, reducing existential risk plausibly has a quite low cost for us in comparison with the huge expected value it has for future generations. In spite of this, relatively little is done to reduce existential risk. Unless we give up on norms of intergenerational equity, they give us a strong case for significantly increasing our efforts to reduce existential risks. 1.3. WHY EXISTENTIAL RISKS MAY BE SYSTEMATICALLY UNDERINVESTED IN, AND THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY In spite of the importance of existential risk reduction, it probably receives less attention than is warranted. As a result, concerted international cooperation is required if we are to receive adequate protection from existential risks. 1.3.1. Why existential risks are likely to be underinvested in There are several reasons why existential risk reduction is likely to be underinvested in. Firstly, it is a global public good. Economic theory predicts that such goods tend to be underprovided. The benefits of existential risk reduction are widely and indivisibly dispersed around the globe from the countries responsible for taking action. Consequently, a country which reduces existential risk gains only a small portion of the benefits but bears the full brunt of the costs. Countries thus have strong incentives to free ride, receiving the benefits of risk reduction without contributing. As a result, too few do what is in the common interest. Secondly, as already suggested above, existential risk reduction is an intergenerational public good: most of the benefits are enjoyed by future generations who have no say in the political process. For these goods, the problem is temporal free riding: the current generation enjoys the benefits of inaction while future generations bear the costs. Thirdly, many existential risks, such as machine superintelligence, engineered pandemics, and solar geoengineering, pose an unprecedented and uncertain future threat. Consequently, it is hard to develop a satisfactory governance regime for them: there are few existing governance instruments which can be applied to these risks, and it is unclear what shape new instruments should take. In this way, our position with regard to these emerging risks is comparable to the one we faced when nuclear weapons first became available. Cognitive biases also lead people to underestimate existential risks. Since there have not been any catastrophes of this magnitude, these risks are not salient to politicians and the public.72 This is an example of the misapplication of the availability heuristic, a mental shortcut which assumes that something is important only if it can be readily recalled. Another cognitive bias affecting perceptions of existential risk is scope neglect. In a seminal 1992 study, three groups were asked how much they would be willing to pay to save 2,000, 20,000 or 200,000 birds from drowning in uncovered oil ponds. The groups answered $80, $78, and $88, respectively.73 In this case, the size of the benefits had little effect on the scale of the preferred response. People become numbed to the effect of saving lives when the numbers get too large. 74 Scope neglect is a particularly acute problem for existential risk because the numbers at stake are so large. Due to scope neglect, decision-makers are prone to treat existential risks in a similar way to problems which are less severe by many orders of magnitude. A wide range of other cognitive biases are likely to affect the evaluation of existential risks.75 The Sole Contention of the Negative is an East Asian Fallout U.S. development of nuclear energy undermines the NPT or Nonproliferation Treaty around the world. Sokolski 7 (Henry, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, serves on the U.S. congressional Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism. “CHAPTER 14 MARKET-BASED NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION” Testimony Presented before a Hearing of The House Committee on Foreign Affairs “Every State a Superpower? Stopping the Spread of Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century” http://www.npolicy.org/userfiles/image/Market-Based20Nuclear20Nonproliferation_pdf(1).pdf lj) More important, if nuclear operators had to cover most or all their costs, the most dangerous and economically uncompetitive forms of nuclear energy would have far greater difficulty proceeding as far as they have to date. Certainly, nuclear fuel making, which can bring a state within days or weeks of acquiring nuclear weapons, and large nuclear reactor projects in the energy-rich and unstable regions of the world, such as the Middle East, would be much harder to sell to private investors and insurers than almost any non-nuclear alternative. Few, in or out of the nuclear industry, dispute these points. It would be useful to exploit this consensus to promote some level of nuclear restraint. This is a particularly important as more and more countries use the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) now, the example of the United States, and the nuclear power practices of other states as justifications to engage in the most uneconomical and dangerous nuclear activities themselves. What will be required to discipline such dangerous enthusiasm? Public recognition and emphasis of the following points: 1. Nuclear energy is not just another way to boil water. Spreading nuclear power reactors worldwide with nuclear cooperation agreements, generous government-backed export loans, and guaranteed financing is a surefire way to increase the number of nuclear weapons-ready nations. Unfortunately, even “proliferation resistant” light water reactors require tons of low enriched fresh fuel to be kept at the site, and they can also produce scores of bomb’s worth of weapons usable plutonium that is contained in the reactor’s spent fuel. Research commissioned by my center, which was subsequently authenticated by experts at our national laboratories and the U.S. State Department, details just how little is required to take these materials and convert them into weapons fuel. Under one scenario, a state could build a small, covert reprocessing line, divert spent fuel without tipping off International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors, produce its first bomb’s worth of material in less than 2 weeks, and continue to make a bomb’s worth of material a day.2 There is no technical fix in sight for this problem for decades or, perhaps, ever. Even the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), which originally claimed it could develop nearly “proliferation proof” fuel-cycles, no longer makes this claim and it warns against spreading its “proliferation resistant” UREX system to nonweapons states for fear it too might be diverted to make bombs.3 What this means is that large nuclear reactors and even light water reactors ought not to be for everyone; they should only go to those states that we can be confident are out of the bomb making business and that can make a compelling case for the economic profitability of these activities. Prolif causes extinction and any argument about prolif good is wrong – our authors indict anything they might say Kroenig, 14 – IR God and Associate Professor in the Department of Government and School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow in the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at The Atlantic Council Matthew, 24 Apr, Routledge, journal of strategic studies, The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have a Future?, Vol 38 Iss 1-2, pages 98-125, Taylor and Francis, accessed 7/21/16, ge Should we worry about the spread of nuclear weapons? At first glance, this might appear to be an absurd question. After all, nuclear weapons are the most powerful weapons ever created by humankind. A single nuclear weapon could vaporize large portions of a major metropolitan area, killing millions of people, and a full-scale nuclear war between superpowers could end life on Earth as we know it. For decades during the Cold War, the public feared nuclear war and post-apocalyptic nuclear war scenarios became a subject of fascination and terror in popular culture. Meanwhile, scholars carefully theorized the dangers of nuclear weapons and policymakers made nuclear nonproliferation a top national priority. To this day, the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries remains a foremost concern of US leaders. Indeed, in his 2014 annual threat assessment to the US Congress, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper argued that nuclear proliferation poses one of the greatest threats to US national security.1¶ Many academics, however, question the threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons. Students of international politics known as ‘proliferation optimists’ argue that the spread of nuclear weapons might actually be beneficial because it deters great power war and produces greater levels of international stability.2 While these arguments remain provocative, they are far from new. The idea that a few nuclear weapons are sufficient to deter a larger adversary and keep the peace has its origins in the early strategic thinking of the 1940s. Moreover, a critical review of this literature demonstrates that many of these arguments are less sound than they initially appear.¶ This essay argues that, contrary to the claims of the optimists, the spread of nuclear weapons poses a grave threat to international peace and to US national security. … This leads to a credibility problem: how can states credibly threaten a nuclear-armed opponent? Since the 1960s, academic nuclear deterrence theory has been devoted almost exclusively to answering this question.38 And their answers do not give us reasons to be optimistic.¶ Thomas Schelling was the first to devise a rational means by which states can threaten nuclear-armed opponents.39 He argued that leaders cannot credibly threaten to intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war, but they can make a ‘threat that leaves something to chance’.40 They can engage in a process, the nuclear crisis, which increases the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force a less resolved adversary to back down. As states escalate a nuclear crisis there is an increasing probability that the conflict will spiral out of control and result in an inadvertent or accidental nuclear exchange. As long as the benefit of winning the crisis is greater than the incremental increase in the risk of nuclear war, however, threats to escalate nuclear crises are inherently credible. In these games of nuclear brinkmanship, the state that is willing to run the greatest risk of nuclear war before backing down will win the crisis, as long as it does not end in catastrophe. It is for this reason that Thomas Schelling called great power politics in the nuclear era a ‘competition in risk taking’.41 This does not mean that states eagerly bid up the risk of nuclear war. Rather, they Leaders face gut-wrenching decisions at each stage of the crisis. They can quit the crisis to avoid nuclear war, but only by ceding an important geopolitical issue to an opponent. Or they can the escalate the crisis in an attempt to prevail, but only at the risk of suffering a possible nuclear exchange.¶ Since 1945 there were have been 20 high stakes nuclear crises in which ‘rational’ states like the United States run a frighteningly-real risk of nuclear war.42 By asking whether states can be deterred, therefore, proliferation optimists are asking the wrong question. The right question to ask is: what risk of nuclear war is a specific state willing to run against a particular opponent in a given crisis? Optimists are likely correct when they assert that a nuclear-armed Iran will not intentionally commit national suicide by launching a bolt-from-the-blue nuclear attack on the United States or Israel. This does not mean that Iran will never use nuclear weapons, however. Indeed, it is almost inconceivable to think that a nuclear-armed Iran would not, at some point, find itself in a crisis with another nuclear-armed power. It is also inconceivable that in those circumstances, Iran would not be willing to run some risk of nuclear war in order to achieve its objectives. If a nuclear-armed Iran and the United States or Israel were to have a geopolitical conflict in the future, over the internal politics of Syria, an Israeli conflict with Iran’s client Hizballah, the US presence in the Persian Gulf, shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, or some other issue, do we believe that Iran would immediately capitulate? Or is it possible that Iran would push back, possibly brandishing nuclear weapons in an attempt to coerce its adversaries? If the latter, there is a risk that proliferation to Iran could result in nuclear war and proliferation optimists are wrong to dismiss it out of hand.¶ An optimist might counter that nuclear weapons will never be used, even in a crisis situation, because states have such a strong incentive, namely national survival, to ensure that nuclear weapons are not used. But this objection ignores the fact that leaders operate under competing pressures. Leaders in nuclear-armed states also have strong incentives to convince their adversaries that nuclear weapons might be used. Historically we have seen that leaders take actions in crises, such as placing nuclear weapons on high alert and delegating nuclear launch authority to low-level commanders, to purposely increase the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force less-resolved opponents to back down.¶ Moreover, not even the optimists’ first principles about the irrelevance of nuclear posture stand up to scrutiny. Not all nuclear wars would be equally devastating.43 Any nuclear exchange would have devastating consequences no doubt, but, if a crisis were to spiral out of control and result in nuclear war, any sane leader would rather face a country with five nuclear weapons than one with 5,000. Similarly, any sane leader would be willing to run a greater risk of nuclear war against the former state than against the latter. Indeed, scholars have demonstrated that states are willing to run greater risks and are, therefore, more likely to win nuclear crises when they enjoy nuclear superiority over their opponents.44 Proliferation optimists might be correct that no rational leader would choose to launch a suicidal nuclear war, but, depending on the context, any sane leader would almost certainly be willing to risk one.¶ Nuclear deterrence theorists have also proposed a second scenario under which rational leaders would be willing to instigate a nuclear exchange: limited nuclear war.45 For example, by launching a single nuclear weapon against a small city, a nuclear-armed state could signal its willingness to escalate a crisis, while leaving its adversary with enough left to lose to deter the adversary from launching a full-scale nuclear response. In a future crisis between China and the United States, for example, China could choose to launch a nuclear strike on a US military base in East Asia to demonstrate its seriousness. In that situation, with the continental United States intact, would Washington choose to launch a full-scale nuclear war on China that could result in the destruction of many American cities? Or would it back down? China might decide to strike after calculating that Washington would prefer a humiliating retreat over a full-scale nuclear war. If launching a limited nuclear war could be a rational strategic move under certain circumstances, it then follows that the spread of nuclear weapons increases the risk of nuclear use. To be sure, some strategic thinkers, including Henry Kissinger, advocated limited nuclear war as a viable strategy only to recant the position later due to fears of uncontrollable escalation. Yet, this does not change the fact that leading nuclear deterrence theorists maintain that limited nuclear war is possible among rational leaders in a MAD world.46¶ In sum, proliferation optimists present an oversimplified conception of nuclear deterrence theory. Leading academic deterrence theorists maintain that the spread of nuclear weapons could lead to nuclear use in games of nuclear brinkmanship and through the exercise of limited nuclear options even among rational leaders in a situation of MAD. Indeed, they understand that a risk of nuclear war is necessary in order for nuclear deterrence to function, which leads us to our next point.¶ The second weakness in the proliferation optimist argument is that it rests on an internal logical contradiction. This might come as a surprise to some, given that optimists are sometimes portrayed as hard-headed thinkers, following their premises to their logical conclusions. But, the contradiction at the heart of the optimist argument is glaring and simple to understand: either the probability of nuclear war is zero, or it is nonzero, but it cannot be both. If the probability of nuclear war is zero, then nuclear weapons should have no deterrent effect. States will not be deterred by a nuclear war that could never occur and states should be willing to intentionally launch large-scale conventional wars against nuclear-armed states. In this case, proliferation optimists cannot conclude that the spread of nuclear weapons is stabilizing.¶ If, on the other hand, the probability of nuclear war is nonzero, then there is a real danger that the spread of nuclear weapons will result in a catastrophic nuclear war. In this case, proliferation optimists cannot conclude that nuclear weapons will never be used. This is true whether the risk of nuclear war is exogenous or endogenous to the behavior of the actors involved; the probability of nuclear war simply cannot be both zero and nonzero.¶ In sum, either the spread of nuclear weapons raises the risk of nuclear war and, in so doing, deters large-scale conventional conflict. Or there is no danger that nuclear weapons will ever be used and the spread of nuclear weapons does not increase international stability. But, despite the claims of many proliferation optimists, it is nonsensical to argue that nuclear weapons will never be used and to simultaneously claim that their spread contributes to international stability. As was argued above, the most obvious way out of this dilemma is to concede that nuclear proliferation does indeed raise the risk of nuclear war.¶ The impact is Japanese proliferation A nuclear energy program triggers Japanese proliferation — only the NPT checks back now Windrem 14 – Award winning investigative reporter at NBC News, Fellow at Fordham University School of Law-Center on National Security (Robert, China Has Nuclear ‘Bomb in the Basement,’ and China Isn’t Happy, NBC News, March 11, 2014, http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/fukushima-anniversary/japan-has-nuclear-bomb-basement-china-isnt-happy-n48976)//SJ No nation has suffered more in the nuclear age than Japan, where atomic bombs flattened two cities in World War II and three reactors melted down at Fukushima just three years ago. But government officials and proliferation experts say Japan is happy to let neighbors like China and North Korea believe it is part of the nuclear club, because it has a “bomb in the basement” -– the material and the means to produce nuclear weapons within six months, according to some estimates. And with tensions rising in the region, China’s belief in the “bomb in the basement” is strong enough that it has demanded Japan get rid of its massive stockpile of plutonium and drop plans to open a new breeder reactor this fall. Japan signed the international Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which bans it from developing nuclear weapons, more than 40 years ago. But according to a senior Japanese government official deeply involved in the country’s nuclear energy program, Japan has been able to build nuclear weapons ever since it launched a plutonium breeder reactor and a uranium enrichment plant 30 years ago. “Japan already has the technical capability, and has had it since the 1980s,” said the official. He said that once Japan had more than five to 10 kilograms of plutonium, the amount needed for a single weapon, it had “already gone over the threshold,” and had a nuclear deterrent. Japan now has 9 tons of plutonium stockpiled at several locations in Japan and another 35 tons stored in France and the U.K. The material is enough to create 5,000 nuclear bombs. The country also has 1.2 tons of enriched uranium. Technical ability doesn’t equate to a bomb, but experts suggest getting from raw plutonium to a nuclear weapon could take as little as six months after the political decision to go forward. A senior U.S. official familiar with Japanese nuclear strategy said the six-month figure for a country with Japan’s advanced nuclear engineering infrastructure was not out of the ballpark, and no expert gave an estimate of more than two years. In fact, many of Japan’s conservative politicians have long supported Japan’s nuclear power program because of its military potential. “The hawks love nuclear weapons, so they like the nuclear power program as the best they can do,” said Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Non-Proliferation Program at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in California. “They don’t want to give up the idea they have, to use it as a deterrent.” Many experts now see statements by Japanese politicians about the potential military use of the nation’s nuclear stores as part of the “bomb in the basement” strategy, at least as much about celebrating Japan’s abilities and keeping its neighbors guessing as actually building weapons. Independently, Japanese proliferation escalates Geoffrey HARTMAN January 16, 2003 “A year later, ‘Axis of Evil’ still a hot topic,” The Daily Nebraskan, http://www.pbs.org/avoidingarmageddon/getInvolved/involved_04_01_entries01.html The simmering crisis in North Korea provides a textbook example of the danger presented by nuclear proliferation. The current crisis evolved after the North Koreans admitted to and threatened to expand a secret nuclear program they had continued in violation of a 1994 agreement with the United States. It is thought that the North Koreans already possess one or two nuclear devices. This nuclear program has transformed an otherwise irrelevant and backwards nation into a flashpoint for a potential conflict in East Asia. If the North Koreans produce more nuclear weapons, it may compel other East Asian states, most notably a nuclear Japan, to go nuclear in response. This could lead to a nuclear arms race in East Asia, which is the last thing anyone wants. As we all learned in "WarGames," there are no winners in causing a global thermonuclear war. Every one dies, Steven Starr 14, the Senior Scientist for Physicians for Social Responsibility and Director of the Clinical Laboratory Science Program at the University of Missouri, 5/30/14, “The Lethality of Nuclear Weapons,” http://www.paulcraigroberts.org/2014/05/30/lethality-nuclear-weapons/ Nuclear war has no winner. Beginning in 2006, several of the world’s leading climatologists (at Rutgers, UCLA, John Hopkins University, and the University of Colorado-Boulder) published a series of studies that evaluated the long-term environmental consequences of a nuclear war, including baseline scenarios fought with merely 1 of the explosive power in the US and/or Russian launch-ready nuclear arsenals. They concluded that the consequences of even a “small” nuclear war would include catastrophic disruptions of global climatei and massive destruction of Earth’s protective ozone layerii. These and more recent studies predict that global agriculture would be so negatively affected by such a war, a global famine would result, which would cause up to 2 billion people to starve to death. iii These peer-reviewed studies~-~--which were analyzed by the best scientists in the world and found to be without error~-~--also predict that a war fought with less than half of US or Russian strategic nuclear weapons would destroy the human race.iv In other words, a US-Russian nuclear war would create such extreme long-term damage to the global environment that it would leave the Earth uninhabitable for humans and most animal forms of life. A recent article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “Self-assured destruction: The climate impacts of nuclear war”,v begins by stating: “A nuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START, could produce a nuclear winter. Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal, resulting in self-assured destruction.” In 2009, I wrote an articlevi for the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament that summarizes the findings of these studies. It explains that nuclear firestorms would produce millions of tons of smoke, which would rise above cloud level and form a global stratospheric smoke layer that would rapidly encircle the Earth. The smoke layer would remain for at least a decade, and it would act to destroy the protective ozone layer (vastly increasing the UV-B reaching Earthvii) as well as block warming sunlight, thus creating Ice Age weather conditions that would last 10 years or longer. Following a US-Russian nuclear war, temperatures in the central US and Eurasia would fall below freezing every day for one to three years; the intense cold would completely eliminate growing seasons for a decade or longer. No crops could be grown, leading to a famine that would kill most humans and large animal populations. Electromagnetic pulse from high-altitude nuclear detonations would destroy the integrated circuits in all modern electronic devicesviii, including those in commercial nuclear power plants. Every nuclear reactor would almost instantly meltdown; every nuclear spent fuel pool (which contain many times more radioactivity than found in the reactors) would boil-off, releasing vast amounts of long-lived radioactivity. The fallout would make most of the US and Europe uninhabitable. Of course, the survivors of the nuclear war would be starving to death anyway. Once nuclear weapons were introduced into a US-Russian conflict, there would be little chance that a nuclear holocaust could be avoided. Theories of “limited nuclear war” and “nuclear de-escalation” are unrealistic.ix In 2002 the Bush administration modified US strategic doctrine from a retaliatory role to permit preemptive nuclear attack; in 2010, the Obama administration made only incremental and miniscule changes to this doctrine, leaving it essentially unchanged. Furthermore, Counterforce doctrinex~-~--used by both the US and Russian military~-~--emphasizes the need for preemptive strikes once nuclear war begins Both sides would be under immense pressure to launch a preemptive nuclear first-strike once military hostilities had commenced, especially if nuclear weapons had already been used on the battlefield. Both the US and Russia each have 400 to 500 launch-ready ballistic missiles armed with a total of at least 1800 strategic nuclear warheads,xi which can be launched with only a few minutes warning.xii Both the US and Russian Presidents are accompanied 24/7 by military officers carrying a “nuclear briefcase”, which allows them to transmit the permission order to launch in a matter of seconds. Yet top political leaders and policymakers of both the US and Russia seem to be unaware that their launch-ready nuclear weapons represent a self-destruct mechanism for the human race. For example, in 2010, I was able to publicly question the chief negotiators of the New START treaty, Russian Ambassador Anatoly Antonov and (then) US Assistant Secretary of State, Rose Gottemoeller, during their joint briefing at the UN (during the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference).	904,670
365,606	379,641	TOC Aff 5 v2	Katherine Lawlor and Brandon Wallace, 4-2-2020, "Institute for the Study of War," Institute for the Study of War, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/irans-proxies-accelerate-soleimanis-campaign-compel-us-withdrawal-iraq Iran continues to escalate proxy attacks against the U.S. in Iraq, demonstrating that it remains undeterred despite the January 3 strike that killed IRGC - Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani and key Iraqi proxy leader Abu Mehdi al-Muhandis and subsequent U.S. strikes. Iran’s proxy network in Iraq is advancing its campaign to compel an American withdrawal by increasing the operational tempo of its attacks on U.S. and allied personnel. Iran’s proxies are responsible for at least 15 attacks on American and U.S.-led Coalition personnel since January 3. … Iran and its proxies likely intend to bait the U.S. into a harsh kinetic response in Iraq that could alienate Iraqis who currently oppose Iran’s effort to expel the U.S. and the proxies have already been somewhat successful in this regard; the U.S. retaliation for the March 11 attack on Camp Taji killed not only Kata’ib Hezbollah militants, but also non-militia members of the Iraqi Security Forces: three soldiers in the 19th Iraqi Army Division and two soldiers in the 3rd Babil Emergency Police Regiment.20 In a press release, the Iraqi Joint Operations Command said that such strikes are not part of a partnership and do not respect the sovereignty of Iraq.21 Iraq’s political class seeks to contain the fallout from repeated Iranian escalations inside Iraq. Iraqi politicians could soon conclude that the easiest mechanism to contain that fallout is to compel the withdrawal of U.S. forces rather than to curtail the proxy militias and establish a government monopoly on use of force inside of Iraq. Some Iraqis will likely perceive more aggressive U.S. kinetic action against the proxies in Iraq to be further violations of Iraqi sovereignty. Further U.S. retaliation to attacks could incentivize the next Iraqi PM to accede to the January 5 parliamentary request, using his authority to end the executive agreement that allows U.S. and Coalition troops to remain in Iraq. … Some Iraqis will likely perceive more aggressive U.S. kinetic action against the proxies in Iraq to be further violations of Iraqi sovereignty. Further U.S. retaliation to attacks (which) could incentivize the next Iraqi PM to accede to the January 5 parliamentary request, use his authority to end the executive agreement that allows U.S. and Coalition troops to remain in Iraq. Anthony Pfaff et al., 3-8-2020, "Amid COVID-19, Iraq remains US-Iran battleground," https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/amid-covid-19-iraq-remains-us-iran-battleground/ “The current tit for tat between US forces and Iran-backed militias is unsustainable. With every exchange of fire, Kita’ib Hizballah (KH) is able to mobilize elements of the Iraqi population to demonstrate against the US presence. Not responding, of course, is equally untenable. The United States does not have a long tradition of placing troops in harm’s way and not permitting them to defend themselves. Of course, the right answer is that the Iraqi Security Forces fulfill their responsibility to protect US forces. However, it is hard to blame them for not having the stomach do so. Iran-backed militias are not only often better armed, but any military action against them will simply energize a brutal, and very personal, campaign directed at individuals and their families who take action against them, much as they did in the early days of … A US exit from Iraq is, in my view, now inevitable. How it takes place—with fewer or more US and Iraqi casualties—depends in part on the overall US-Iran relationship and whether the Trump administration can alter its policy of ‘maximum pressure’ to allow for a compassionate response to the coronavirus crisis. John Fritze, 01-07-2020, "Donald Trump threatens Iraq with sanctions, says US won't leave unless 'they pay us back' for air base," https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/01/05/donald-trump-threatens-iraq-sanctions-expel-us-troops/2821255001/ WASHINGTON — President Donald Trump threatened to impose deep sanctions on Iraq if it moves to expel U.S. troops and said Sunday he would not withdraw entirely unless the military is compensated for the "extraordinarily expensive air base" there. David Cortright, 11-15-2001, "A Hard Look at Iraq Sanctions," Nation, https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/hard-look-iraq-sanctions/ The two most reliable scientific studies on sanctions in Iraq are the 1999 report “Morbidity and Mortality Among Iraqi Children,” by Columbia University’s Richard Garfield, and “Sanctions and Childhood Mortality in Iraq,” a May 2000 article by Mohamed Ali and Iqbal Shah in The Lancet. Garfield, an expert on the public-health impact of sanctions, conducted a comparative analysis of the more than two dozen major studies that have analyzed malnutrition and mortality figures in Iraq during the past decade. He estimated the most likely number of excess deaths among children under five years of age from 1990 through March 1998 to be 227,000. Garfield’s analysis showed child mortality rates double those of the previous decade. Nadda Osman, 3-25-2020, "Coronavirus: Activists launch ‘digital protest’ to end US sanctions on Iran," Middle East Eye, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/coronavirus-iran-activists-digital-protest-us-sanctions “Every day that passes and sanctions on Iran are still not lifted, the death toll and number of Iranians infected with Covid-19 rise exponentially. We don’t have much time. Iranians can’t buy or make necessary medical supplies under US sanctions,” she said. “Researchers predict that if sanctions aren’t lifted, at least 3.5 million Iranian lives will be lost to Covid-19.” Iran's economy has been crippled by US sanctions, which have also curbed its ability to purchase or access medical equipment or pharmaceuticals on international markets. Jacob Powell, 5-17-2019, "The dubious Iran and al-Qaeda link Trump could use to go to war," Middle East Eye, https://www.middleeasteye.net/US-Iran-war-trump-al-qaeda-link-AUMF-analysis The militant group al-Qaeda has a strong connection to Iran, the United States has claimed as part of its recent push towards war with the country. US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in a hearing in April that the militant group operates in Iran and has contacts with the government in Tehran. "There is no doubt there is a connection between the Islamic Republic of Iran and al-Qaeda. Period. Full stop," Pompeo contended. "The factual question with respect to Iran's connections to al-Qaeda is very real. They have hosted al-Qaeda. They have permitted al-Qaeda to transit their country," he added. Still, some observers have raised concerns that more hawkish members of President Donald Trump's administration are attempting to use an unproven connection between al-Qaeda and Iran to go to war. Under the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), a law that was passed in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, such a connection may allow the White House to militarily confront Iran without Congressional approval. Charles Mudede • Apr 6, 2020 At 9, 4-6-2020, "The Real Possibility of War With Iran During a Global Pandemic," Stranger, https://www.thestranger.com/slog/2020/04/06/43328342/the-real-possibility-of-war-with-iran-during-a-global-pandemic At this point my article seemed dated. We had, it appeared, entered a much more different world than the one that prompted my investigation. Iran was now busy burying the dead, and some of its top leaders were counted among them. Meanwhile, Seattle became, according to the New York Times, the American capital of the virus. The US/Iran conflict would certainly be shelved for the time being. I was wrong. The US is still preparing for a war with Iran. On March 27, the New York Times reported that a "secret Pentagon directive orders planning to try to destroy a militia group backed by Iran." On April 1, 2020, a day the future may recognize has having considerable world-historical importance, Trump tweeted that "Iran or its proxies are planning a sneak attack on US troops and/or assets in Iraq. If this happens, Iran will pay a very heavy price, indeed!" Two days later, Fox News reported that the U.S. military is moving air defense systems "into Iraq following attacks on American and coalition forces in recent weeks." Ronald Oliphant, 4-16-2020, "Tensions in Persian Gulf as United States accuses Iran of harassing its warships," Telegraph, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/04/16/tensions-persian-gulf-united-states-accuses-iran-harassing-warships/ Fears were growing of a new confrontation in the Persian Gulf after the United States accused Iranian naval forces of carrying out "dangerous and harassing" manoeuvres near its ships in the region. The incident came just days after armed men presumed to be members of Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps boarded a Hong Kong registered oil tanker in the Strait of Hormuz, raising fears of a renewed crisis in the flashpoint shipping lane. The US fifth fleet said a group of eleven Iranian naval vessels harassed six US navy vessels in the northern Persian Gulf for about an hour on Wednesday, with one coming within just ten yards of a Coast Guard cutter. The "dangerous and provocative actions increased the risk of miscalculation and collision ... and were not in accordance with the obligation under international law to act with due regard for the safety of other vessels in the area," the fleet, which is based in Bahrain, said in a statement. Kaye, Dalia Dassa, 03-26-2020, "COVID-19 Effects on Strategic Dynamics in the Middle East," RAND Corporation, https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/03/covid-19-impacts-on-strategic-dynamics-in-the-middle.html U.S.-Iran escalation. Both sides may be tempted to view the crisis as an opportunity to double down on previous actions that contribute to conflict. The Trump administration continues to pursue its maximum pressure approach despite the lack of strategic results and the fissures it has created with Europe and other allies. Reports suggest that some in the administration seek to use the COVID-19 crisis to capitalize on Iran's increased vulnerability to force Iran to the negotiation table. For their part, Iranian leaders gave up on “strategic patience” after a year of adhering to the Iran nuclear deal following the U.S. withdrawal from the agreement in May 2018, finding the strategy brought little economic relief from Europe or Asia. Instead, Iran began to exact a cost for U.S. maximum pressure policies by targeting oil tankers and facilities, as well as U.S. military assets and personnel. With continued escalation in the months following the killing of General Qasem Soleimani, Iran and its militia partners may perceive COVID-19 as an opportunity to attack American forces with less risk of retaliation as they attempt to drive the United States out of Iraq. The result is that both sides may see advantages to escalation, producing a classic security dilemma that risks an even greater military conflict than either side desires. The distraction from counterterrorism efforts as relations with the Iraqi government remain strained is also a trend likely to continue as the added distraction of a global pandemic shifts priorities. Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, 3-27-2020, "Pentagon Order to Plan for Escalation in Iraq Meets Warning From Top Commander," New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/27/world/middleeast/pentagon-iran-iraq-militias-coronavirus.html During a White House meeting on March 12, Mr. Esper and General Milley argued for a more limited response to the rocket attacks — a view that prevailed on Mr. Trump, who ordered nighttime raids on five suspected weapons depots in Iraq used by Kataib Hezbollah. Several American officials said there was an increased urgency in planning attack options against Kataib Hezbollah as the group, perhaps along with other Shiite militias, has threatened to ramp up strikes against U.S. troops stationed on Iraqi bases after the celebrations for Nowruz, the Iranian New Year, end soon. American military intelligence agencies have detected signs that big attacks could be in the works, according to a senior U.S. military official who has been briefed on some of the contingency planning in Iraq. Kataib Hezbollah, in a statement on Wednesday, warned its fighters to prepare for possible attacks from the United States, and threatened to retaliate against Americans and any Iraqis who help them. “We will respond with full force to all their military, security, and economic facilities,” said the statement, according to SITE, a private company that monitors jihadists’ websites and postings. The immediate targets of a Pentagon campaign against Kataib Hezbollah most likely would be the group’s leadership, bases and weapons depots, Mr. Knights said. In addition to a vast array of rockets, the group is believed to have access to a hidden arsenal of short-range ballistic missiles funneled into Iraq by Iran over the past several months, according to American intelligence and military officials. An extended campaign could hit militia targets across a wide swath of Iraq and Syria, and possibly other Shiite militias in Iraq that are loosely aligned with Kataib Hezbollah. “You can’t just hit rank-and-file fighters, you’d have to hit leadership, most of whom have probably dispersed,” Mr. Knights said. .... In recent weeks, as the threat from militia attacks and exposure to the coronavirus has increased, the United States and its European allies have been turning over smaller coalition bases to their Iraqi counterparts, and either moving to a handful of larger Iraqi bases or leaving the country altogether. Speaking to reporters the day after the United States hit the five Khatib Hezbollah weapons depots this month, Gen. Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr., the head of Central Command, said that the threat from Iran and its proxies remained “very high” and added that tensions “have actually not gone down” since the United States killed General Suleimani. While American officials say they have no clear evidence that Iran specifically directed the deadly attack on Camp Taji on March 11, they say that Kataib Hezbollah and the Iranian Quds Force coordinate closely. General McKenzie said the United States was poised to strike additional militia weapons storage sites and other targets should attacks against American forces continue. He blamed Kataib Hezbollah for about a dozen rocket attacks against American troops based in Iraq in the past six months. Bob Dreyfuss, 5-17-2019, "Trump May Not Want War With Iran—but the Coalition of the Killing May Give Him One," Nation, https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/iran-bolton-war-fever-trump-pompeo/ At home, even an unprovoked (and widely condemned) war against Iran could set off an explosion of MAGA-style jingoism among Trump’s supporters. The rally-round-the-flag effect that usually accompanies US overseas adventures could be used to suppress dissent, intimidate anti-war forces, and provide an opening for the administration to suppress civil liberties. An election season that should be about the president’s misrule—one that could bring to power a progressive coalition supporting economic and social justice—could be swamped by war fever. And the military-industrial complex, already getting fat on arms sales to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other Gulf states, would clamor for even greater largesse, beyond the more than $1 trillion it will already pocket in the next year. That’s why it’s critical that the American people, members of Congress, and especially the Democrats seeking to replace Trump in 2020 speak out forcefully against this war fever. In response to the recent dangerous White House actions, Senator Bernie Sanders warned that Trump has “isolated the US from its closest allies and put us on a dangerous path to conflict.” Senator Angus King of Maine noted that Bolton has already proclaimed his intent to “celebrate in the streets of Tehran.” And Senators Tom Udall of New Mexico and Dick Durbin of Illinois warned in a Washington Post op-ed, “We are again barreling toward another unnecessary conflict in the Middle East based on faulty and misleading logic.” Warnings, of course, are appropriate. But they must be louder and more insistent. And Congress, as it unsuccessfully tried to do in regard to US support for the Saudi-UAE war in Yemen, must stand up to claim its authority over war and peace. Marisa Fernandez, 1-3-2020, "Video: Trump said in 2011 that Obama would use war with Iran to get re-elected," Axios, https://www.axios.com/trump-iran-war-obama-957a39c2-d0b9-4041-bb71-c3dfa12339d5.html Then-citizen Donald Trump predicted in November 2011 video that then-President Barack Obama would start a war with Iran in order to get re-elected in 2012. "Our president will start a war with Iran because he has absolutely no ability to negotiate. He’s weak and he’s ineffective. So the only way he figures that he’s going to get re-elected, and as sure as you're sitting there, is to start a war with Iran." Tom Rogan, 4-18-2020, "Here's how you'll know we're about to go to war with Iran — right now, we're not," Washington Examiner, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/heres-how-youll-know-were-about-to-go-to-war-with-iran-right-now-were-not First, we would have to stage an extremely large air and naval force buildup in the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf, for strike operations inside Iran and defeat of Iran's naval forces. We'd also have to do it in the Mediterranean Sea, to help defend Israel against Iranian ballistic missile attacks and to complicate Russian action via its Black Sea fleet. … Second, we would see a massive ground force deployment in Saudi Arabia (none of Iran's neighbors would likely allow U.S. invasion forces access). Iran is three times the size of Iraq, with a far more powerful regular and irregular military. Those factors alone would require U.S. ground deployment in the region of at least 500,000 ground assault forces. Note, here, that the 120,000 forces mentioned in reporting this week are very likely related to contingency planning. And they aren't even deployed! Toby C. Jones, 12-22-2011, "Don't Stop at Iraq: Why the U.S. Should Withdraw From the Entire Persian Gulf," Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/12/dont-stop-at-iraq-why-the-us-should-withdraw-from-the-entire-persian-gulf/250389/ Led by Saudi Arabia, the Arab Gulf states claim that their fears of Iranian ambition are existential. It is certainly true that Tehran is locked in a regional balance of power struggle with Saudi Arabia and that Iran seeks greater influence. But Iran does not seek the destruction of Saudi Arabia or the overthrow of Arab world's political order. In spite of claims to the contrary by the Saudi and Bahraini governments, Iran's revolutionary imperative is a relic of the past. Israel expresses a similar anxiety about Iran as a security threat. And Iran's leaders have played their part in fostering Israeli uncertainty. Iran's potential acquisition of nuclear weapons is a source of concern, of course, as is its support for Hezbollah and Syria. The challenge of how best to deal with Iranian ambition, however, is mainly a political problem, one that has for too long been treated almost entirely through the lens of security and militarism. The presence of the American military in the Gulf has not only done little to deter Iran's ambitions, it has emboldened them. Surrounding Iran militarily and putting it under the constant threat of American or Israeli military action has failed to deter the country. Instead this approach has strengthened hardliners within Tehran and convinced them that the best path to self-preservation is through defiance, militarism, and the pursuit of dangerous ties across the Middle East. The rivalry between Iran, the U.S., and its regional partners has turned into a political and military arms race, one that could easily spin out of control. Kirsten Fontenrose, 12-10-2019, "Gulf partners could give Iran and the US a way out of their collision course," Atlantic Council, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/gulf-partners-could-give-iran-and-the-us-a-way-out-of-their-collision-course/ Current trajectory: Everyone wins but the United States Iran floated the Hormuz Peace Endeavor (HOPE) proposal to Gulf neighbors this past fall. This plan would give GCC countries the peace of mind they’re looking for, but in exchange for US withdrawal from the region. Iran expected the region to say no publicly but to seek backchannel, bilateral agreements. This is happening, but it is not in the United States’ interest. Iran has assured its Gulf neighbors that it will not attack their people or their oil infrastructure in the near term. Instead it focuses its violent attention on US targets. Dan Spinelli, 6-26-2019, "Here's what it would look like if Trump starts a war with Iran.," Mother Jones, https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/06/heres-what-it-would-look-like-if-trump-starts-a-war-with-iran/ War with Iran by necessity would almost have to involve its regional neighbors and adversaries, including Israel, Lebanon, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, and Russia. Iranian proxies could support Tehran by targeting US troops in Iraq or continuing to use their perch in Yemen to bomb Saudi Arabia, which is America’s close ally and Iran’s sectarian enemy. Then depending on the route American bombers take to reach Iran, they run the risk of angering Iran’s neighbors. “You’re either going to fly in over Iraq or fly in over parts of Syria which has very good air defenses,” Gay says. “That’s where the best Russian air defenses are.” Routing the attack through Israel and Lebanon might provide a workaround, but that could draw these countries into the conflict. M. B., 7-2-2019, "A nuclear war in the Persian Gulf?," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, https://thebulletin.org/2019/07/a-nuclear-war-in-the-persian-gulf/ We believe there is a heightened possibility of a US-Iran war triggering a US nuclear strike for the following reasons: The sanction regime set against the Iranian economy is so brutal that it is likely to force Iran to take an action that will require a US military response. Unless the United States backs down from its present self-declared “economic warfare” against Iran, this will likely escalate to an open warfare between the two countries. In response to a White House request to draw up an Iran war plan, the Pentagon proposed sending 120,000 soldiers to the Persian Gulf. This force would augment the several thousands of troops already stationed in Iran’s vicinity. President Trump has also hinted that if need be, he will be sending “a lot more” troops. Defeating Iran through conventional military means would likely require a half million US forces and US preparedness for many casualties. The US nuclear posture review is worded in such a way that the use of tactical nuclear weapons in conventional theaters is envisaged, foreshadowing the concern that in a showdown with a menacing foe like Iran, the nuclear option is on the table. The United States could once again justify using nuclear force for the sake of a decisive victory and casualty-prevention, the logic used in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Trump’s cavalier attitude toward nuclear weapons, trigger-happy penchant, and utter disdain for Iran, show that he would likely have no moral qualm about issuing an order to launch a limited nuclear strike, especially in a US-Iran showdown, one in which the oil transit from the Gulf would be imperiled, impacting the global economy and necessitating a speedy end to such a war. If the United States were to commit a limited nuclear strike against Iran, it would minimize risks to its forces in the region, defang the Iranian military, divest the latter of preeminence in the Strait of Hormuz, and thus reassert US power in the oil hub of the Persian Gulf. Oil flowing through the Strait of Hormuz is critical to a rising China. US control over this merchant waterway would grant the United States significant leverage in negotiations. A limited US nuclear strike could cause a ‘regime change’ among Iranian leadership, representing a strategic setback for Russia, in light of their recent foray in the Middle East with Iranian backing. Alexandra Witze, 3-16-2020, "How a small nuclear war would transform the entire planet," Nature, https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-00794-y The worst impact would come in the mid-latitudes, including breadbasket areas such as the US Midwest and Ukraine. Grain reserves would be gone in a year or two. Most countries would be unable to import food from other regions because they, too, would be experiencing crop failures, Jägermeyr says. It is the most detailed look ever at how the aftermath of a nuclear war would affect food supplies, he says. The researchers did not explicitly calculate how many people would starve, but say that the ensuing famine would be worse than any in documented history. Farmers might respond by planting maize, wheat and soya beans in parts of the globe likely to be less affected by a nuclear winter, says Deepak Ray, a food-security researcher at the University of Minnesota in St Paul. Such changes might help to buffer the food shock — but only partly. The bottom line remains that a war involving less than 1 of the world’s nuclear arsenal could shatter the planet’s food supplies. “The surprising finding”, says Jägermeyr, “is that even a small-war scenario has devastating global repercussions”.	904,713
365,607	379,652	TOC Neg 9	Developing countries depend on Middle Eastern stability for oil Cordesman 20~-~-Anthony Cordesman, America’s Failed Strategy in the Middle East: Losing Iraq and the Gulf, CSIS, 1/2/20, https://www.csis.org/analysis/americas-failed-strategy-middle-east-losing-iraq-and-gulf Equally, the United States needs to update its strategic thinking in ways that shape a strategy that reflects a proper understanding of Iraq’s current importance as an oil power and its role ensuring the stable flow of world oil exports. The United States may be reaching some form of net surplus in petroleum exports, but it has also steadily become far more dependent on the overall health of the global economy than on its direct oil imports, particularly from the Gulf. Moreover, the economic growth and stability of the developing world will remain dependent on fossil fuels – and Gulf energy exports – for at least the next generation. The flow of petroleum through the Strait of Hormuz increased from 17.2 million barrels per day (MMBD) in 2014 to 20.7 MMBD in 2018 – an increase of 20. The export of liquid natural gas (LNG) increased to 4.1 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) per year. Virtually, every major U.S. trading partner in Asia is dependent on the stable flow of Gulf oil – and Europe is a key importer as well.1 Developing states throughout the world are dependent on Gulf oil ports to keep prices affordable. The fact that the United States is no longer a net exporter does not mean U.S. petroleum prices will not immediately rise to world levels the moment a crisis on Gulf exports occurs. In the real world, “energy independence” is an economic oxymoron. As is the case with nations that are far more directly dependent on Gulf oil, every American job and business is more dependent today on the stable flow of Gulf oil than they were in the year 2000. Not only is Iraq the most critical and uncertain aspect of Gulf security, it is a key part of this flow of oil. Iraq has very real “oil wealth” in one sense of the term. It has over 147 billion barrels of proven oil reserves – some 9 of the world’s supply – and a very high ratio of reserves to actual production (4.6 MMBD in 2018). It also has 125.6 Tcf of gas reserves, which could feed its industrial development while reducing its oil production costs.2 Tensions raise oil prices O’Brien 20~-~-Matt O’Brien, Oil price keeps rising as industry eyes Iran-US conflict, Associated Press, 1/6/20, https://apnews.com/c552a9b1a14be2ebf32a21ebd1f9506c PROVIDENCE, Rhode Island (AP) — The global benchmark for crude oil rose above $70 a barrel on Monday for the first time in over three months, with jitters rising over the escalating military tensions between Iran and the United States. The Brent contract for oil touched a high of $70.74 a barrel, the highest since mid-September, when it briefly spiked over an attack on Saudi crude processing facilities. Stock markets were down as well amid fears of how Iran would fulfill a vow of “harsh retaliation.” “The market is concerned about the potential for retaliation, and specifically on energy and oil infrastructure in the region,” said Antoine Halff, a Columbia University researcher and former chief oil analyst for the International Energy Agency. “If Iran chose to incapacitate a major facility in the region, it has the technical capacity to do so.” Still, many analysts say they see little cause for concern about damage to the U.S. economy resulting from the jump in oil prices. Some note that higher energy prices can actually benefit the overall economy because the United States is now a net exporter of petroleum products. And the Federal Reserve’s commitment to low interest rates means the Fed is unlikely to raise rates anytime soon to counter any inflationary effects from higher oil prices. But economists caution that an escalation in the Trump administration’s confrontation with Iran could pose new risks to the economy in the long run. The U.S. killed Iranian Gen. Qassem Soleimani in Iraq on Friday. Early Sunday, as Iran threatened to retaliate, President Donald Trump tweeted the U.S. was prepared to strike 52 sites in the Islamic Republic if any Americans are harmed. Fears that Iran could strike back at oil and gas facilities important to the U.S. and its Persian Gulf allies stem from earlier attacks widely attributed to Iran. The U.S. has blamed Iran for a wave of provocative attacks in the region, including the sabotage of oil tankers and an attack on Saudi Arabia’s oil infrastructure in September that temporarily halved its production. Iran has denied involvement in those attacks. “Targeting oil infrastructure could raise prices and bring worldwide economic pain and put Iran on the front burner,” which might be exactly the kind of message its leaders are looking to send, said Jim Krane, an energy and geopolitics researcher at Rice University. Analysts noted that American households devote a smaller proportion of their spending to energy bills than in the past. That is in contrast to previous periods, when a surge in oil prices often preceded recessions. The proportion of their spending that U.S. consumers devote to energy has fallen to a historic low of 2.5, down from more than 6 in the early 1980s, economists at Credit Suisse noted in a research report. “A global supply shock would be an unwelcome development, but we would not expect it to lead to an imminent recession,” the economists wrote. “There have been several dramatic shifts which ought to make the U.S. economy resilient to rising oil prices. Strong household balance sheets, an accommodative Fed and a large domestic energy sector reduce the risks that an oil shock tips the economy into recessions. Though the U.S. economy can better withstand a jump in oil prices than it once could, the global economy is still vulnerable. “Higher oil prices are still very much a negative for the global economy, and that will reverberate back on us,” said Mark Zandi, chief economist at Moody’s Analytics. Sung Won Sohn, economics and business professor at Loyola Marymount University, said that if the current crisis were to escalate into a much bigger confrontation, it would represent a potentially serious threat: “If the situation does not escalate beyond the current level, i would say this will be a minor hiccup for the economy. But if it becomes a war and the Strait of Hormuz is closed, then we are looking at a major economic problem.” Compared to other methods of attack, targeting energy sites also “doesn’t kill a lot of people,” Krane said. “It’s capital-intensive, it’s not people-intensive. It’s a safer option in terms of the virulence of reprisal.” It would still wreak havoc on the global economy, he said, because of the way that oil markets affect other energy-intensive industries such as airlines, shipping and petro-chemicals. Global stock markets have been sliding since Friday. European indexes were down over 1 on Monday after Asia closed lower. Wall Street was expected to slide again on the open, with futures down 0.6. Brent crude was up $1.07 at $69.67 a barrel, putting it up almost 6 since before the Iranian general’s killing. Presence is “central nervous system” for long wars – surveillance, local troop training; crucial to fighting ISIS (allies withdrew) Neff 20~-~-Thomas Gibbons-Neff, How U.S. Troops Are Preparing for the Worst in the Middle East, NYT, 1/6/20, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/06/world/middleeast/troops-iran-iraq.html What They Do At any given time, the American forces in the region act much like the central nervous system for America’s long wars since the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. The soldiers, sailors, Marines and aircrew members run key headquarters. They resupply the roughly 12,000 to 13,000 troops in Afghanistan, and launch hundreds of surveillance missions across the region. They train local forces. And, until Sunday, when the American-led mission in Iraq and Syria halted its campaign against the Islamic State to focus on protecting its forces from potential attack, it battled the militant group to its near demise. Allied nations, such as Canada, also stopped their operations, giving the terrorist group an opportunity to either stage more attacks or at least recuperate. withdrawal ? Iraq CT merge with Iranian militias Noack 20~-~-Rick Noack, Here’s what might happen if the U.S. were to suddenly quit Iraq, Washington Post, 1/10/20, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/01/09/heres-what-might-happen-if-us-were-suddenly-quit-iraq/ Counterterrorism efforts could be doomed Peter Neumann, founding director of the London-based International Center for the Study of Radicalization and author of “Bluster: Donald Trump’s War on Terror.” “Among the biggest legacies of the Americans in Iraq has been the training and funding of Iraq’s counterterrorism service. It is the country’s only counterterrorism force that is multiethnic and largely uncorrupt. In comparison, many of the other militias who have fought the Islamic State are controlled by Iran,” he said. “If the United States were to withdraw its troops from Iraq, the governmental counterterrorism force would likely be merged with Iranian-backed militias. It would both undermine their reputation and constitute a blow to the Iraqi state, which the U.S. has sought to strengthen.” US withdrawal would allow ISIS resurgence Noack 20~-~-Rick Noack, Here’s what might happen if the U.S. were to suddenly quit Iraq, Washington Post, 1/10/20, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/01/09/heres-what-might-happen-if-us-were-suddenly-quit-iraq/ It may end in humanitarian disaster Ilan Goldenberg, director of the Middle East Security Program at the Center for a New American Security and a former Defense Department Middle East adviser under the Obama administration Like Neumann, Goldenberg fears that a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq could result in a resurgence of the Islamic State there. If the Islamic State were to return to some parts of the country, he cautioned, “then the humanitarian effect will be devastating, putting these people back under ISIS rule, causing major displacement of people again,” he said. According to the United Nations, about 1.8 million internally displaced people are in Iraq. More than 6 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance. A U.S. departure from Iraq “makes it harder to do all the humanitarian and diplomatic work that needs to be done to … really help sustain in the long-term an effective counter-ISIS campaign,” he said. Withdrawal would force US puppet dictatorships to change, reduce anti-Americanism Tisdall 20~-~-Simon Tisdall, Why instinct and ideology tell Trump to get out of the Middle East, The Guardian, 1/11/20, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jan/11/why-instinct-and-ideology-tell-trump-to-get-out-of-the-middle-east-suleimani-iran 5 Terrorism and anti-Americanism A reduction in the US regional profile could be expected, over time, to bring reductions in anti-Americanism and the targeting of American and allied interests by terrorists who regard the US presence as an affront to the entire Islamic world. A key source of tension with the west might be removed. On the other hand, any loss of US leadership in fighting Isis and successors would be serious. Nato might step into the breach, as Trump last week suggested it should. Regional organisations such as the Gulf Cooperation Council and the EU could invest more in security, shared defence and intelligence capabilities – which might be no bad thing. A lowered profile might also reduce tensions with Turkey which, although nominally an ally, has grown impatient with an “arrogant” America. And it could force dictatorships such as Egypt’s, underwritten by Washington, to change their ways – to the undoubted benefit of all the peoples of the Middle East. US will likely withdraw troops from Afghanistan b/c frustrated with peace process Kugelman 20~-~-Michael Kugelman, Is the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan imminent, Arab News, 4/10/20, https://www.arabnews.com/node/1656711 In a report on April 7, NBC News broke a major story: During his surprise visit to Kabul on March 23, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo threatened to pull out all American troops from Afghanistan if President Ashraf Ghani and his main political rival, Abdullah Abdullah, failed to resolve a weeks-long political crisis that has prevented the launch of formal peace talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government. Pompeo’s threat is not only unsurprising, it is also one that Washington is increasingly likely to carry out, given how events are playing out. For many days, the Trump administration has telegraphed its growing frustration and impatience with the lack of progress in the Afghan peace process. Pompeo’s visit to Kabul was supposed to be a last-ditch effort to break the political impasse that has prevented the launch of a peace process the Trump administration desperately wants to succeed, and soon. US troop withdrawal part of Taliban deal Kugelman 20~-~-Michael Kugelman, Is the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan imminent, Arab News, 4/10/20, https://www.arabnews.com/node/1656711 Washington does not want its agreement with the Taliban — a troop withdrawal deal concluded at the end of February that paved the way for talks between Kabul and the insurgents — to have been negotiated in vain. Nor does it want to face the prospect of withdrawing militarily from Afghanistan without a peace deal in place; because of the threat this would pose to stability, for sure, but also because of the accusations of surrender that critics would inevitably lob its way. Such accusations, especially in an election year, could be politically damaging to the administration. Then there are Trump’s personal reasons for wanting a peace deal. The NBC News report revealed that, as many had long suspected, the president has his eye on a certain prize. After the US-Taliban deal was agreed in January — and some weeks before it was signed — Trump “complained that he hasn’t been awarded a Nobel Prize yet, and said if he’s not given one for ending the war in Afghanistan then the Norwegian Nobel Committee’s process is rigged.” US withdrew $1bn in Afghanistan aid Kugelman 20~-~-Michael Kugelman, Is the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan imminent, Arab News, 4/10/20, https://www.arabnews.com/node/1656711 Pompeo’s visit was one manifestation of the administration’s impatience. Another was the $1 billion reduction in aid to Afghanistan that was announced soon after the trip. Yet another is the frequent messages from the State Department about the need for Ghani and Abdullah to get their act together and resolve their spat so that peace talks can begin. Against this backdrop, it makes sense that Pompeo would go all-in when applying leverage by threatening to cut aid and withdraw troops. The strategy is, in effect, to deploy your two most powerful levers of influence — the most potent elements in your policy toolkit — to get the result you want. From Washington’s perspective, it might make sense; given how deeply dependent Kabul is on US financial and military largesse, surely something has to give. US troop withdrawal conditional on peace talks, which have failed Kugelman 20~-~-Michael Kugelman, Is the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan imminent, Arab News, 4/10/20, https://www.arabnews.com/node/1656711 And yet, several weeks after both threats were made, the Ghani-Abdullah spat remains unresolved. The idea of a full and immediate withdrawal of US troops might seem hard to believe, for several reasons. US officials have long signaled that they hope to maintain a residual force in Afghanistan, mainly for counterterrorism purposes but also to continue training and advising Afghan security forces. Additionally, the US-Taliban deal stipulates that a full troop withdrawal will be completed within 14 months, but only if the insurgents have fulfilled a series of counterterrorism commitments and launched peace talks with Kabul. And yet, that withdrawal could well be hastened, even in contravention of Washington’s accord with the Taliban. Peace prospects, which appeared highly promising immediately after the signing of the US-Taliban deal, have gone from bad to worse. The most potent US carrots and sticks have failed to break the Ghani-Abdullah deadlock. The Taliban have stepped up their attacks. China fills void Cohen 19~-~-Ariel Cohen, Will China Replace The U.S. As The Middle East Hegemon? Forbes, 2/14/19, https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2019/02/14/will-china-replace-the-u-s-as-the-middle-east-hegemon/#66b6cda525cd China has replaced the UAE as the main investor in the Middle East, focusing on energy. However, $3.5 trillion dollars of future opportunities in the Middle East are awaiting Asian investors – from infrastructure projects, to tourism, to industry, says Nasser Saidi, the former Chief Economist of the Dubai International Financial Center and the former Lebanese central banker. Saidi and other top experts spoke at a conference organized by the Middle East Institute of the National University of Singapore (NUS) this week. The event, titled The Middle East Pivot: China’s Belt and Road Initiative – between Geostrategy and Commercial Opportunity, attracted business people and academics from China, the U.S., Singapore, and the Gulf. This author presented a report “Future Calling: Infrastructure Investment in Central Asia”. Throughout the conference, participants and attendees kept coming back to the same critical question: If the U.S. is slowly disengaging from the Middle East, will China necessarily fill the void? The answer is a qualified yes. First, because the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is the most ambitious geopolitical and geo-economic program since the Marshall Plan, and surpasses it in scope and costs. The Marshall Plan dealt with the rebuilding of Europe only, while the U.S. also helped raising Japan from the ashes of World War II. It was limited in time to four years. Belt and Road, proclaimed by Chairman Xi Jinping in 2013, involves over 80 countries in Eurasia, Europe, South and Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Africa. Middle East energy will be the lifeblood of BRI, with China its engine and brain. Western Europe and the developing world will be its market. The United States so far failed to offer a comprehensive, strategic response to Belt and Road, which would need to include an economic, cultural and human dimension. Instead, under both the Obama and the Trump Administration, Washington is sticking to mostly military answers, while ipso facto creating an anti-American block that includes Russia and China – something Henry Kissinger warned against over 40 years ago. Second, Beijing is aggressively bolstering its Near East presence. China is already building strategic partnerships with countries from Algeria to Saudi Arabia to Iran, Iraq, and the UAE. It is targeting major OPEC and Gulf Cooperation Council members, while also focusing on U.S. allies, like Israel, Jordan, Qatar, and Egypt. Following World War II, the British Lion went home to lick his wounds. The British Empire could not sustain its presence in the Middle East after losing its Jewel in the Crown – India – in 1947. In the aftermath of the protracted and costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the American Eagle wants a respite. Vital national interests of the U.S., chief among them energy, are no longer bound to the Middle East region due to the shale gale. Attention is now shifting to the Pacific, as China, the peer competitor, is not flinching over its South China Sea expansion. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy is planning to build four carrier battle groups, and is targeting American aircraft carriers with new ship-busting nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles. China’s high-tech naval railguns and hypersonic cruise missiles are just around the corner. The security of the Middle East and its energy supplies will be defined in the next two decades by the balance of military and economic power between the U.S., China, and Russia. Within the region, the confrontation between Saudi Arabia and the UAE vs. Iran and Qatar will take center stage. Some Chinese participants at the Singapore conference, such as Prof. Wang Suolao of Institute of Area Studies in Beijing University, tried to deny that China is playing geopolitics in the Middle East. However, one cannot help but analyze the region through the prisms of political interests, spheres of influence, proxy management, and exclusive economic zones. China already maintains a sizeable military base in Djibouti, at Bab-el-Mandeb, the entrance to the strategically important Red Sea, which leads to Suez Canal, one of the three principal choke points of global naval routes (the others being the Strait of Malacca, and the Panama Canal). Djibouti is also home to an American Naval Expeditionary Base, Camp Lemonnier, just 11 kilometers away. The two opposing bases present a fitting metaphor of competing national interests on the African continent. Chinese and American forces have even engaged in laser skirmishes there, where China deployed high energy lasers to blind U.S. pilots. This is just a telltale symptom of things to come. China is deploying its economic and diplomatic power in the Middle East first, while the military involvement may come later: the launch of the petro-yuan, which will exclude the dollar; massive Chinese advantage in mobile payment tech which would allow 85 million “unbanked” people in the Middle East to integrate in business and financial activities; the growth of Chinese tourism to the Gulf; the involvement of Chinese Muslim communities with the Middle East – all discussed at the Singapore conference in great detail. These will be the tools used by Beijing to expand its influence from Morocco to Muscat – and beyond. The forum, led by the NUS Middle East Institute Chairman Bilahari Kausikan, highlighted the tremendous opportunities and risks facing Asian (including Singaporean) investments in the Middle East. Experts view pragmatic approaches to industrialization and investment, including in new areas beyond oil and gas, as key. This also applies to political instruments in resolving simmering hostilities, and furthering broad cooperation in fighting religious extremism of both the Sunni and Shia variety. Hydrocarbons, the bread and butter of the Middle East for the past 100 years, may become a stranded resource in just a few decades. Soon, it could be infrastructure, renewables, IT, AI, robotics, high tech, and services that drive the region’s economic development. The U.S. has not yet lost-out to China in the Middle East, but American and European businesses – and strategic planners – will need to work twice as hard to stay competitive. Russia benefits from higher Middle East instability b/c higher oil costs Cropsey 19~-~-SETH CROPSEY, GARY ROUGHEAD, A U.S. Withdrawal Will Cause a Power Struggle in the Middle East, Foreign Policy, 12/17/19, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/17/us-withdrawal-power-struggle-middle-east-china-russia-iran/ While some strategically minded thinkers, such as Andrew Bacevich, advocate redeploying U.S. assets in the Middle East to the Pacific, as opposed to the comprehensive retreat their more isolationist counterparts espouse, the general message remains the same: That there is no longer much value in securing geographically strategic points in the Middle East, and that U.S. security does not depend on it. This perspective is mistaken. Foreign Policy’s Dec. 13 article “RIP the Carter Doctrine” is correct that a stable Persian Gulf benefits the United States indirectly, by safeguarding a global economic and security interest in the steady supply of Middle East energy. In a parallel but opposite direction, an unstable Middle East benefits Russia’s interest in higher energy costs. Pullout from Syria ? Russia fill-in backing Assad Tisdall 20~-~-Simon Tisdall, Why instinct and ideology tell Trump to get out of the Middle East, The Guardian, 1/11/20, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jan/11/why-instinct-and-ideology-tell-trump-to-get-out-of-the-middle-east-suleimani-iran If the US is no longer seen as a reliable defender of its friends, and if it no longer needs or wants to be in the Middle East – then surely it is time to leave. Yet if the Americans did pull out, what would happen? 1. Iraq and Syria Recent events in Iraq and Syria do not encourage confidence in a post-American future. After the Syrian civil war erupted in 2011, the US and its Gulf allies backed disparate rebel forces. But some of these groups harboured jihadists and extremists, which bolstered Bashar al-Assad’s claims to be fighting terrorists and divided the resistance. The US withdrew its support for the rebels. It also declined to intervene directly when Barack Obama’s “red line” on chemical weapons use was crossed. Trump has since hastened American disengagement, notably by abandoning Syrian Kurd allies. Russia filled the vacuum, and is now winning the war for Assad with a merciless bombardment of Idlib. Following the invasion of Iraq in 2003, US forces officially left in 2011, but in fact several thousand remain, primarily tasked with fighting Isis. Following the Suleimani killing, Iraq’s parliament demanded all US troops leave. But there are signs of second thoughts, amid doubts over the ability of Iraq’s politicians and security forces to hold a divided country together while containing Isis. Syria is a chilling reminder of what can happen when the US turns its back and walks away. Russia expands McLeary 20~-~-Paul Mcleary, 1-14-2020, "China, Russia Press For Mideast Gains While US Talks Of Withdrawal," Breaking Defense,JL https://breakingdefense.com/2020/01/china-russia-press-for-mideast-gains-while-us-talks-of-withdrawal/ The close encounter between a Russian warship and an American destroyer in the Arabian Sea last week was more than a new round of the Russian military playing high-stakes cat-and-mouse. It was a forceful reminder that Russia hopes to gain influence in the region as the US sends thousands of new troops, aircraft, and ships to a region President Trump has long claimed he’s anxious to leave. As the Trump administration publicly wrangles with the Iraqi government over US troops there and repositions some 18,000 troops it has rushed to the region over the past several months, the Russians and the Chinese are maneuvering for advantage. “There’s no question the Middle East is at the epicenter of great power competition,” said Seth Jones, director of the Transnational Threats Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “The Russians see the US interest in withdrawing forces as an opportunity to expand their power and interests.” Last week, one day after Iraq’s parliament demanded the departure of US troops from their soil in a non-binding vote, China’s ambassador to Iraq paid a visit to Prime Minister Adil Abdul al-Mahdi with an offer to “rebuild and support the Iraqi government and people,” while noting Beijing’s desire to “increase security and military cooperation” with Baghdad. Gives Iran nukes Efraim Inbar, Summer 2016, "U.S. Mideast Retreat a Boon for Moscow and Tehran," Middle East Forum,JL https://www.meforum.org/6042/us-mideast-retreat The Western loss would be considerable. Russia Benefits Russia is fully alive to the potential for a reassertion of its historic role in the region. Though NATO proclaims that the European theater has diminished in strategic importance,22 Moscow seems to have other thoughts. The Mediterranean region, bordering NATO's southern flank and the Middle East, was the core of all essential dangers to Russia's national interests according to Russian defense minister Sergei Shoigu,23 and continued fallout from the Arab upheavals of the past five years has only increased the region's importance. Shortly after releasing the previous statement, Shoigu announced the decision to establish a navy department task force in the Mediterranean "on a permanent basis."24 Russian president Vladimir Putin (right) meets with Egyptian president Abdel Fattah Sisi. Russia understands the potential for a reassertion of its role in the Middle East in the wake of a U.S. retreat. In addition to intervening in Syria, the Russians are also engaging with Cairo: selling weapons, negotiating port rights, and supplying nuclear reactors. The Russian naval facility in Tartus, on the Syrian littoral (leased since 1971), is a vital base for enhanced Russian naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean, and Moscow has gradually improved its fleet size and stepped up patrols in the area. Its greater military footprint in the eastern Mediterranean is intended to project in-creased power into the Middle East. Putin has taken the major step of intervening militarily in Syria to assure the survival of the Assad regime and, with it, continued access to the Russian naval base. In addition, as a major player in the global energy market, he also wants to protect energy prospects that depend on Assad's survival. Moscow has already signed exploration contracts with Damascus with regard to recent gas discoveries in the Mediterranean basin.25 The preservation of the Assad regime is also vital for Tehran because Damascus is the corridor to Hezbollah, its Shiite proxy in Lebanon. Syria has been an ally of Iran since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979—one of the longest alliances in the Middle East. Moreover, Syria could serve as a launching pad for Iranian destabilization of Jordan, a longstanding U.S. ally. Moscow's efforts on Assad's behalf thus directly serve the interests of the Iranian regime. If successful, those efforts will further Tehran's influence in the region. The confluence of Iranian-Russian interests is also visible outside Syria. Putin is certainly not averse to the Iranian goal of pushing Washington out of the Persian Gulf. Russia is also a clear beneficiary of the nuclear deal, which frees it from international constraints on exporting arms to Tehran. A further outcome of the U.S. withdrawal may well be Iran joining Russia in supporting Kurdish political ambitions in order to weaken Turkey, its main rival for regional leadership. Kurdish aspirations have long been a thorn in Turkey's side. While Tehran and Ankara are supporting opposing sides in the Syrian civil war, the Kurds are busy carving out autonomous regions from the moribund state. Kurdish national dreams might, therefore, actually benefit from the power vacuum created by the disruption of Arab statist structures and the U.S. exit from the region. The emergence of an independent Kurdish entity in northern Iraq seems more probable nowadays with Washington seemingly taking no clear position on such a contingency. Another consequence of the U.S. exit can be seen in changes in Egypt. Moscow, for one, has been well served by Washington's reluctance to support the regime of Abdel Fattah Sisi, who came to power following a military coup against President Muhammad Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Russians are selling the Egyptians weapons, negotiating port rights in Alexandria, and supplying them with nuclear reactors. In Iraq, too, there are harbingers of a Russian presence in coordination with Iran as U.S. influence in that state continues to wane. Iraq signed an arms deal with Russia in October 2012, and a joint intelligence center was set up in Baghdad in October 2015.	904,714
365,608	379,618	4 - Feb Pay Gap	Enriquez 16 Corina Rodríguez Enríquez National Council of Scientific and Technical Research (CONICET) and Interdisciplinary Centre for the Study of Public Policy (CIEPP), Buenos Aires, Basic Income and Time Use Democratization Basic Income Stud. 2016; 11(1): 39–48 Published online June 18, 2016 In every country, data confirms that ... care services in the market A basic Income grants womxn agency to change participation in the labor market. Enriquez 16 A BI can help access care services ... their time to household chores instead. Enriquez 16 an unconditional income ... intrahousehold decision-making processes McKay ‘01 RETHINKING WORK AND INCOME MAINTENANCE POLICY: PROMOTING GENDER EQUALITY THROUGH A CITIZENS ’ BASIC INCOME Ailsa McKay Feminist Economics 7(1), 2001, 97–118 cw//az a basic income has for promotesing gender justice ... The question remaining is: how can this technically be achieved? McKay 13 Ailsa McKayGlasgow Caledonian University, Glasgow, Lanarkshire Crisis, Cuts, Citizenship and a Basic Income: A Wicked Solution to a Wicked Problem Basic Income Studies 2013; 8(1): 93–104 that women womxn will bear ... market suffers and our economy suffers.	904,700
365,609	379,615	3 - Jan ILaw	I affirm. Nyun 8 explains the definition of economic sanctions commonly accepted in academic fields is Thihan Myo Nyun, Feeling Good or Doing Good: Inefficacy of the U.S. Unilateral Sanctions Against the Military Government of Burma/ Myanmar, 7 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 455 (2008), https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol7/iss3/3 // MHS JL pg 463 Economic sanctions can be defined, depending on the particular role one would like sanctions to play in international affairs, in two different ways. Economic sanctions can either encompass every measure designed to inflict economic deprivation or include only the most comprehensive of embargoes imposed for well-defined political reasons. A broad definition based solely on the ends would take into consideration only the economic deprivation inflicted upon a target country, and not the means employed to bring about that deprivation. As a result, any measure - economic or military - that disrupts the economic activity of an adversary would qualify as an economic sanction. Conversely, a definition based on the means, which is commonly accepted today, narrows the scope of what constitutes economic sanctions by focusing only on trade-disrupting measures. Hufbauer and colleagues define economic sanctions as "the deliberate, government-inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial relations." A further synthesis of the literature reveals the following definition, which will be used for this Article: economic sanctions are the actual or threatened withdrawal of normal trade or financial relations, imposed by the sender against the target, for foreign policy purposes. Under this approach, economic sanctions are limited to restrictions on trade, investment, and other cross-border economic activity that reduces the target country's revenues, thereby facilitating the desired change without resorting to military action. Thus, the criterion is refraining from violating international law. Prefer this standard for three reasons: 1. International law is the closest thing to a universal moral standard as it has been elevated to a level of global concern. Thus, compliance with international law is the best determiner of whether an action meets a generalized ethical principle, such as morality. 2. An honored system of international law is necessary to create predictable rules within the international system in a world were no nation can stand alone. Malcolm Shaw 3 writes, Shaw, Malcolm N. International Law. 5th ed., Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pg 43 // MHS JL 25/12/19 But the point raison d’etre of international law and the determining factor in its composition remains the needs and characteristics of the international political system. Where more than one entity exists within the international a system, there has to be some conception as to how to deal with other such entities, whether it be on the basis of co-existence or hostility. International law as it has developed since the seventeenth century has adopted the same approach and has in general (though with notable exceptions) eschewed the idea of permanent hostility and enmity. Because the state, while internally supreme, wishes to maintain its sovereignty externally and needs to cultivate other states in an increasingly interdependent world, it must acknowledge the rights of others. This acceptance of rights possessed by all states, something unavoidable in a world where none can stand alone, leads inevitably to a system to regulate and define such rights and, of course, obligations. 3. Nations must refrain from violating international law in order to ensure that other nations comply. The power of international law lies not in physical enforcement, but in belief that other nations will abide by it. Thomas Franck 6 writes, Thomas Franck Professor of Law Emeritus at the New York University School of Law. “The Power of Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Power: International Law in an Age of Power Disequilibrium.” The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 100, No. 1, (Jan., 2006). P. 91. 25/12/19 This belief in rule adherence is essential to the existence of an ongoing normative system of relations between sovereign states. It emanates from the value states place in law's ability to make interactions predictable. That faith in law’s ability to predict state behavior is the key to its ability to pull nations toward voluntary compliance. And this is true of all law, not just the laws of nations. The real power of law to secure systematic compliance does not rests, primarily, on police enforcement-not even in police states, surely not in ordinary societies, and especially not in the society of nations- but, rather, on the general belief of those to whom the law is addressed that they have stake in the rule of law itself: that law is binding because it is the law. The sole contention is that economic sanctions violate international law. The evidence is overwhelming – even certain UN organizations know that sanctions are illegal. Reinisch 1 writes, August Reinisch Professor of Public International and European Community Law, University of Vienna. “Developing Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Accountability of the Security Council for the Imposition of Economic Sanctions.” The American Journal of International Law. October, 2001. // MHS JL Pg 852-853 25/12/19 This increasing degree of critical self-awareness of the United Nations has itself resulted from an interesting political process. At first, the General Assembly took the lead in passing resolutions questioning unilateral economic sanctions n15 such as the United States-imposed *853 Cuba embargo, n16 and in particular their extraterritorial effects; meanwhile, however, various UN bodies have become rather outspoken in criticizing multilateral sanctions imposed by the Security Council. n17 This trend culminated most recently in a working paper prepared for the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights that qualified the UN sanctions regime against Iraq as "are unequivocally illegal under existing international humanitarian law and human rights law." n18 Such findings are based not only on a factual assessment of the sanctions, and but also on the legal requirement that the us Security Council is bound to comply with international humanitarian law and human rights law. This latter aspect is at least implicitly assumed, and sometimes even more or less explicitly suggested, in the above-mentioned reports. Together with the concomitant issue of the possibility of remedies for individuals hurt by such sanctions, the question of the Council's legal obligation forms the central issue of this discussion. At the same time, it should be noted that the debate about the human rights conformity of Security Council sanctions is not an isolated incident of public criticism of UN action but, rather, an important aspect of a broader and increasingly important debate on the accountability of international organizations. US sanctions on Venezuela specifically violate I-law, Weisbrot 19 Mark Weisbrot and Jeffery Sachs, 19 Weisbrot Sachs, (). "." CENTER FOR ECONOMIC AND POLICY RESEARCH, xx-04-2019, 12-25-2019. http://cepr.net/images/stories/reports/venezuela-sanctions-2019-04.pdf // MHS JL pg 6 The unilateral sanctions imposed by the US the Trump administration are illegal under the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS), especially articles 19 and 20 of Chapter IV. They are also illegal under international human rights law, as well as treaties signed by the United States. The sanctions also violate US law. Each executive order since March 2015 declares that the United States is suffering from a “national emergency” because of the situation in Venezuela. This is required by US law in order to impose such sanctions, and the national emergency is invoked under the 1976 National Emergencies Act. This is the same law that President Trump invoked in February 2019 when declaring a national emergency to circumvent Congressional appropriation for funds to build a wall along the border with Mexico. The executive order also states, as required by law, that Venezuela presents “an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security” of the United States. There is no foundation in fact for either of these declarations Thus, economic sanctions are a clear violation of international law and supposed solutions are merely superficial. This is empirically confirmed. All sanctions violate international humanitarian law. Daniel Drezner 03 writes, Daniel W. Drezner Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Chicago. “How Smart are Smart Sanctions?” Review of Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft by George Lopez and David Cortright. International Studies Review (2003) 5, 107–110. 25/12/19 Unfortunately, even if the implementers of smart sanctions become more sophisticated, smart sanctions are still likely to be a noble failure. The contributors to Smart Sanctions acknowledge some of the reasons for this, but not all. For example, the case studies show that smart sanctions still impose significant costs on a target state’s populace. Michael Brzoska notes that an sanction arms embargo increases the costs of weapons goods procurement, leading ‘‘to a major shift in government spending priorities and a consequent reduction in the economic well-being of the general population in the targeted state’’ (p. 126). De Vries acknowledges that ‘‘financial sanctions probably caused the greatest negative impact on non-targeted sectors of Serbian society nations,’’ with the sanctions triggering severe stagflation in the Yugoslav economiesy (p. 102). for example The flight ban also imposed greater costs on the Yugoslav opposition than on the Milosevic regime, leading the European Union to reverse course. Moreover, travel sanctions can disrupt the shipment of food and coldstorage medicine to war-torn societies. In short, all sanctions impose costs on innocents. And, even if economic sanctions did not violate international law, they cause extreme human suffering. Laura Sjoberg 2k writes, Laura Sjoberg Assistant Professor of Political Science and affiliate faculty in Women's Studies at the University of Florida; holds a research fellowship with the Women and Public Policy Program at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. “Towards a Feminist Theory of Sanctions.” Thesis – University of Chicago. p/ http://www.laurasjoberg.com/BA.pdf //bcm. 2000. Pg 29 – 30 13/07/11 Sanctions have succeeded in wreaking large amounts of economic devastation. This economic devastation has caused social problems in many sanctioned nations. The documentation about a lack of health supplies and food supplies in Cuba, The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya is not in short supply. The sanctions against Iraq, according to Covert Action Quarterly, “completely severed Iraq’s links to the rest of the world.”62 Iraq’s GDP has decreased ninety percent and caused since the beginning of the sanctions regime, and even then the Iraqi economy was suffering from fighting a war. In addition to their economic problems, Iraqi people have been dealing with unprecedented shortages of food and medicine essential materials to eat, feed their children, and deter disease. Geoff Simons describes the result of the sanctions as genocide. He argues, “What the West has done and continues to do to the children of Iraq is one of the genocidal crimes of the century. Many of us were first alerted to what was being perpetrated when the Harvard study team reported in 1991 that ‘at least 170 000 young children under five years of age will die in the coming year’ as a result of the war and the sanctions.”63 Ten years later, As of 2000, Iraq hashad lost an estimated two million people as a direct result of the sanctions on Iraq. Specifically in Venezuela Weisbrot 19 Pg 1. We find that the sanctions have inflicted, and increasingly inflict, very serious harm to human life and health, including an estimated more than 40,000 deaths from 2017–2018; and that these sanctions would fit the definition of collective punishment of the civilian population as described in both the Geneva and Hague international conventions, to which the US is a signatory. They and are also illegal under international law and treaties which the US has signed, and would appear to violate US law as well. (violates us law bc sanctions instituted with national emergency, national emergency constitutes direct threat to the US) Finally, sanctions empower autocratic leaders. Tim Niblock 1 explains. Niblock, Tim. 2001 Professor of Arab Gulf Studies at the University of Exeter. BA in PPE (Oxon), Cert. des Hautes Etudes Europeenes (Bruges), PhD in Internat. Relations (Sussex)“Pariah States” and Sanctions in the Middle East: Iraq, Libya, Sudan. Lynne Rienner Publishers. Boulder, London. Second, economic sanctions have tended to strengthen regimes. The assumption that sanctions will help the population by opening opportunities for civilian forces to overthrow an oppressive and undemocratic regime, therefore, is unjustified. There are three processes through which such strengthening can occur. First, the impact of the sanctions tends to make populations even more dependent on the government, mainly for provision of the basic rations needed for survival. The rationing system becomes an effective instrument for control. This has happened in both Iraq and Libya. Second, sanctions may strengthen a regime’s ideological legitimacy. If the regime has projected itself to its population through an ideology built around nationalism – where external powers (especially Western powers) are seen as imperialist crusaders intent on undermining local sovereignty and indigenous interests – then the imposition of Western-orchestrated UN sanctions will reinforce the regime’s central ideological message. The regime’s analysis of the international order will carry conviction. The Iraqi, Libyan, and Sudanese regimes have all purveyed, from their inceptions, a nationalistic ideology. The imposition of sanctions, therefore, can be and have s been used by those regimes to buttress popular acceptance of the core ideology and to mobilize popular support. Third, the regime can gain some credit domestically by deftly defending the country from an external onslaught (as perceived by the population). Its ability to maneuver successfully to build support in the international community, to withstand and circumvent a blockade, to bring in the basic goods needed by the population, and perhaps to throw doubt on the legality of what is being done to the country, can all strengthen popular support. This factor has been evident in both Iraq and Libya. Overall, the strengthening of regimes that are cavalier in their treatment of human rights is not conducive either to regional or to international stability.	904,696
365,610	379,613	1 - Infra	Par Jonathan, 16 Par Jonathan, (). "Bridging global infrastructure gaps." McKinsey and Company, 06-2016, 9-10-2019. https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/capital-projects-and-infrastructure/our-insights/bridging-global-infrastructure-gaps/fr-fr // MHS SG The world today invests some $2.5 trillion a year on infrastrucutre transportation, power, water, and telecommunications systems. Yet it’s not enough and needs are only growing steeper. In a follow-up to its comprehensive 2013 report Infrastructure productivity: How to save $1 trillion a year, the McKinsey Global Institute finds that the world needs to invest an average of $3.3 trillion annually just to support currently expected rates of growth (exhibit). Emerging economies will account for some 60 percent of that need. The BRI solves this in 2 ways 1st is Mainstage BRI investment BRI solves infrastructure gap Wolfgang Lehmacherfollow, 19 Wolfgang Lehmacherfollow, (). "One Belt, One Road: 5 Chances, 5 Concerns, 5 Considerations." No Publication, 6-11-2019, 9-9-2019. https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/one-belt-road-5-chances-concerns-considerations-wolfgang-lehmacher // MHS SG Infrastructure is a critical enabler of economic growth. The global demand for infrastructure investment is estimated at USD 3.7 trillion annually. Only USD 2.7 trillion is invested each year. Hence, there is a (Global) USD 1 trillion annual gap. This gap can be closed through three levers: 1- increased supply, 2- reduced demand and 3- optimized utilization of the existing assets. The USD 1 to 8 trillion BRI budget helps to increase supply and potentially optimize utilization of existing assets. 2,000 or so projects valued at more than USD 1 trillion have so far been approved and USD 300 billion already been spent on the BRI – this includes for over $60 billion in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. 2nd is International counter investment Wolfgang Lehmacherfollow, 19 Wolfgang Lehmacherfollow, (). "One Belt, One Road: 5 Chances, 5 Concerns, 5 Considerations." No Publication, 6-11-2019, 9-9-2019. https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/one-belt-road-5-chances-concerns-considerations-wolfgang-lehmacher // MHS SG The USD 1 to 8 trillion BRI budget helps to increase supply and potentially optimize utilization of existing assets. 2,000 or so projects valued at more than USD 1 trillion have so far been approved and USD 300 billion already been spent on the BRI – this includes for over $60 billion in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. The BRI also motivates parallel infrastructure development activities. The United States of America (US), India, Japan and other nations have committed major investments to counter the China-driven BRI. Manoj Joshi, 19 Manoj Joshi, (). "With BRI 2.0, Xi Jinping pledges to step up China's game." ORF, 4-29-2019, 9-10-2019. https://www.orfonline.org/research/bri-xi-jinping-pledges-step-up-chinas-game-50343/ // MHS SG The learning process has been steep and is visible in the new emphasis on quality infrastructure. This probably arises from two disparate strands. The first is that it was the signature point of the Japanese counter to the BRI. Japan’s “quality infrastructure” move in 2016 involved the spelling out of issues related to the environmental and social impact of infrastructure investments as well as debt sustainability and the quality of construction involved. In addition, Japan, already a major investor in Asian infrastructure, announced a 30 increase in its infrastructure investments in the 2016-2020 period. Shi Jiangtao, 18 Shi Jiangtao, (). "US competes with China’s ‘Belt and Road’ with Asia-Pacific investment plan." South China Morning Post, 07-30-2018, 9-17-2019. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/2157381/us-competes-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-new-asian-investment // MHS SG The US government is expanding its infrastructure drive in the Asia-Pacific region using new investment programmes amid rising anxiety in Washington about China’s aggressive overseas development policies. Announced by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on Monday, the initiative follows concerns about the Trump administration’s commitment to engaging with countries in the Indo-Pacific region. Pompeo will visit Southeast Asia from Wednesday to Sunday, when he is expected to announce funding plans for the region. Pompeo’s “Indo-Pacific Economic Vision” will increase the financial support that the US government provides to countries in the region through a proposed merged agency, the US International Development Finance Corporation (USIDFC). Allong with US$113 million in direct government investment, the plan would double the global spending cap for the development finance corporation to US$60 billion, which could be used to provide private companies with loans for projects overseas. the move comes in response to China’s ambitious “Belt and Road Initiative” – a group of multibillion-dollar transport and power projects that Beijing has used to assert its influence in Asia and beyond – and is likely to fuel suspicions from Beijing. The Impact is preventing developing countries from being locked into poverty Mafalda Duarte, 15 Mafalda Duarte, (). "Lack of electricity locks people in poverty – low-carbon energy is the key." Guardian, 10-2-2015, 9-25-2019. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/oct/02/lack-of-electricity-locks-people-in-poverty-low-carbon-energy-is-the-key // MHS SG More than 1 billion people worldwide still lack access to electricity that could enable them to light their homes, cook or pump clean water. During my 15 years working in development in Africa and Asia, and now at the helm of Climate Investment Funds, I have seen how a lack of electricity handcuffs poor families to poverty – especially women and girls, who have to gather fuel and carry out the household chores. The success of every one of the 17 sustainable development goals, formally adopted at the UN in September, depends on a swell of renewable, sustainable and affordable energy. Celestina Radogno., 15 Impeding Businesses., (). "How Lack of Electricity Keeps People Impoverished." BORGEN, 10-5-2015, 9-25-2019. https://www.borgenmagazine.com/lack-of-electricity-poverty/ // MHS SG One way a lack of electricity keeps people impoverished is by impeding businesses. Job growth is often impossible when many enterprises such as supermarkets depend on electricity to exist. Between 60-70 percent of business owners in Sub-Saharan Africa say that a lack of power is the number one factor stunting their growth. Access to global markets is also restricted because businesses must shut down after dark and thus cannot network with parts of the world in different time zones. In developed countries like the U.S. many businesses run well after dark and many people receive an education through attending night school. For many impoverished people, night school is not a possibility. Night school does not exist in places like Sub-Saharan Africa where 90 percent of all primary schools have no electricity. This means that people who spend all day collecting wood or other household necessities cannot go to school at all. No education keeps people locked in a cycle of poverty with no way to break out. Because schools do not have electricity they also do not have computers. In an increasingly digitized world students without computer access are missing out on a breadth of resources like online news and scholarly journals. Having these resources is important to keep students and teachers up to date on the latest and best information. It creates a chance to connect their classrooms to the outside world. Becoming computer literate also provides young students with the necessary skills needed for a career.	904,694
365,611	379,665	TOC AFF	We affirm Resolved: The US should remove nearly all of its military presence in the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. Contention 1: Iran In January of this year, the assassination of Iran’s top military General Soleimani increased tensions between the US and Iran. Iran bombed a US base in Iraq on March 11, bringing the US and Iran to the brink of war. Luckily, affirming will ease tensions in four ways. First, is removing scapegoats. The presence of American troops incentivizes Iranian aggression. Jones 11~-~- Jones, Toby. (Toby C. Jones is assistant professor of history at Rutgers University. He has authored several books.) “Don’t Stop at Iraq: Why the US Should Withdraw From the Entire Persian Gulf.” The Atlantic, 22 December 2011. https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:68MqCBpeRKcJ:https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/12/dont-stop-at-iraq-why-the-us-should-withdraw-from-the-entire-persian-gulf/250389/+andcd=1andhl=enandct=clnkandgl=us Led by Saudi Arabia, the Arab Gulf states claim that their fears of Iranian ambition are existential. It is certainly true that Tehran is locked in a regional balance of power struggle with Saudi Arabia and that Iran seeks greater influence. But Iran does not seek the destruction of Saudi Arabia or the overthrow of Arab world's political order. In spite of claims to the contrary by the Saudi and Bahraini governments, Iran's revolutionary imperative is a relic of the past. Israel expresses a similar anxiety about Iran as a security threat. And Iran's leaders have played their part in fostering Israeli uncertainty. Iran's potential acquisition of nuclear weapons is a source of concern, of course, as is its support for Hezbollah and Syria. The challenge of how best to deal with Iranian ambition, however, is mainly a political problem, one that has for too long been treated almost entirely through the lens of security and militarism. The presence of the American military in the Gulf has not only done little to deter Iran's ambitions, it has emboldened them. Surrounding Iran militarily and putting it under the constant threat of American or Israeli military action has failed to deter the country. Instead this approach has strengthened hardliners within Tehran and convincing them that the best path to turn to self-preservation is through defiance and militarism, and the pursuit of dangerous ties across the Middle East. The rivalry between Iran, the U.S., and its regional partners has turned into a political and military arms race, one that could easily spin out of control. Less obvious, the United States' military posture has also emboldened its allies, sometimes to act in counterproductive ways. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain justify their brutal crackdown of Bahrain's pro-democracy movement by falsely claiming Iranian meddling. While American policymakers support democratic transitions in the Middle East rhetorically, their unwillingness to confront long-time allies in the Gulf during the Arab Spring is partly the product of the continued belief that the U.S. needs to keep its military in the Gulf, something that requires staying on good terms with Gulf monarchies. The result is that Saudi Arabia and its allies have considerable political cover to behave badly, both at home and abroad. Second, reducing miscalculation. The mere presence of US troops increases the risk of miscalculation and conflict because of the proximity to enemies. Mahony 18~-~-Mahony, Angela. (Assistant Dean for Academic Affairs, Pardee RAND Graduate School; Senior Political Scientist, RAND. Ph.D. in political science, University of California, San Diego; B.A. in economics, University of California, Los Angeles) “US Presence and the Incidence of Conflict.” RAND Corporation. 2018. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1900/RR1906/RAND_RR1906.pdf U.S. Troop Presence Can Embolden Potential Adversaries Although increases in U.S. troop presence are typically associated with deterring U.S. adversaries, U.S. troop presence can potentially degrade deterrence by diminishing a partner’s willingness to spend on its own defense. When the United States provides commitments, it makes its partner more secure, which could lead a partner to underinvest in its own security.10 Recent evidence that U.S. troop presence is associated with a decline in the size of a partner’s military forces and level of defense spending is consistent with this expectation.11 In this way, U.S. troop presence could actually diminish the overall military resources available to deter potential adversaries and make an adversary more likely to initiate conflict. U.S. Troop Presence Can Threaten Potential Adversaries U.S. global military superiority is an important component of U.S. deterrence. However, it can also threaten other states.12 When U.S. forces are nearby, an adversary may feel particularly insecure for a number of reasons. First, the adversary may worry that the larger presence indicates that the United States has plans to use force in the region or that it may be more likely to do so in the near future. Second, U.S. troop presence close to an adversary it increases the risk that the two militaries, operating in close proximity to one another, may have accidents or misperceive each other’s intentions, resulting in an increased risk of escalation and conflict.13 Finally, incentives to protect U.S. forces near a highly capable potential adversary can lead the United States to adopt military concepts and pursue technologies that could potentially and it also increases both sides’ incentives to strike first. Such pressures for preemption could make an adversary feel that fullscale war against its homeland is more likely.14 An adversary’s security concerns can in turn affect the likelihood of conflict. An insecure adversary may, for example, take long-term steps, such as increasing its defense spending, to regain security. The United States and its partners may respond with defense spending of their own, leading to arms races and a heightened security competition that could make any of the parties involved—the potential adversary, the United States, or U.S. partners—more likely to initiate conflict. Insecure adversaries may also take immediate militarized steps either to strengthen their defenses or to signal their own resolve to defend their homeland or sphere of influence. These steps could include making threats, putting military forces on a higher level of alert, initiating a limited use of force, or pursuing aggressive territorial expansion to preemptively secure militarily important areas.15 Decreasing troop presence would greatly decrease the chance of miscalculation. Third, by shifting US policy to diplomacy. Walt 19~-~- Walt, Stephen. (STEPHEN M. WALT is Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School ) “The End of Hubris.” Foreign Affairs. June 2019. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-04-16/end-hubris Washington should also return to its traditional approach to the Middle East. To ensure access to the energy supplies on which the world economy depends, the United States has long sought to prevent any country from dominating the oil-rich Persian Gulf. But until the late 1960s, it did so by relying on the United Kingdom. After the British withdrew, Washington relied on regional clients, such as Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. U.S. forces stayed offshore until January 1991, a few months after Saddam Hussein, the leader of Iraq, seized Kuwait. In response, the George H. W. Bush administration assembled a coalition of states that liberated Kuwait, decimated Iraq’s military, and restored balance to the region. Today, Washington’s primary goal in the Middle East remains preventing any country from impeding the flow of oil to world markets. The region is now deeply divided along several dimensions, with no state in a position to dominate. Moreover, the oil-producing states depend on revenue from energy exports, which makes all of them eager to sell. Maintaining a regional balance of power should be relatively easy, therefore, especially once the United States ends its counterproductive efforts to remake local politics. U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria would be withdrawn, although the United States might still maintain intelligence-gathering facilities, prepositioned equipment, and basing arrangements in the region as a hedge against the need to return in the future. But as it did from 1945 to 1991, Washington would count on local powers to maintain a regional balance of power in accordance with their own interests. As an offshore balancer, the United States would establish normal relations with all countries in the region, instead of having “special relationships” with a few states and profoundly hostile relations with others. No country in the Middle East is so virtuous or vital that it deserves unconditional U.S. support, and no country there is so heinous that it must be treated as a pariah. The United States should act as China, India, Japan, Russia, and the EU do, maintaining normal working relationships with all states in the region—including Iran. Among other things, this policy would encourage rival regional powers to compete for U.S. support, instead of taking it for granted. For the moment, Washington should also make it clear that it will reduce its support for local partners if they repeatedly act in ways that undermine U.S. interests or that run contrary to core U.S. values. Should any state threaten to dominate the region from within or without in the future, the United States would help the rest balance against it, calibrating its level of effort and local presence to the magnitude of the danger. ... Defenders of the status quo will no doubt mischaracterize this course of action as a return to isolationism. That is nonsense. As an offshore balancer, the United States would be deeply engaged diplomatically, economically, and, in some areas, militarily. It would still possess the world’s mightiest armed forces, even if it spent somewhat less money on them. The United States would continue to work with other countries to address major global issues such as climate change, terrorism, and cyberthreats. But Washington would no longer assume primary responsibility for defending wealthy allies that can defend themselves, no longer subsidize client states whose actions undermine U.S. interests, and no longer try to spread democracy via regime change, covert action, or economic pressure. Instead, Washington would use its strength primarily to uphold the balance of power in Asia—where a substantial U.S. presence is still needed—and would devote more time, attention, and resources to restoring the foundations of U.S. power at home. By setting an example that others would once again admire and seek to emulate, an offshore-balancing United States would also do a better job of promoting the political values that Americans espouse. This approach would have also involve less reliance on force and coercion and a renewed emphasis on diplomacy. Military power would remain central to U.S. national security, but its use would be as a last resort rather than a first impulse. It is worth remembering that some of Washington’s greatest foreign policy achievements—the Marshall Plan, the Bretton Woods system, the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, and the peaceful reunification of Germany—were diplomatic victories, not battlefield ones. In recent years, however, both Democratic and Republican administrations have tended to eschew genuine diplomacy and have relied instead on ultimatums and pressure. Convinced they hold all the high cards, too many U.S. officials have come to see even modest concessions to opponents as tantamount to surrender. So they have tried to dictate terms to others and have reached for sanctions or the sword when the target state has refused to comply. But even weak states are reluctant to submit to blackmail, and imposing one-sided agreements on others makes them more likely to cheat or renege as soon as they can. For diplomacy to work, both sides must get some of what they want. Diplomacy would act as a crucial offramp to deescalation. USAF 20~-~- United States Air Force Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies. “News and Analysis.” 21 February 2020. USAF. https://media.defense.gov/2020/Feb/21/2002253106/-1/-1/0/CSDS-OUTREACH1405.PDF U.S. policy towards Iran is incoherent. President Donald Trump says he wants to re-negotiate the nuclear deal, but his expanding maximum pressure campaign whispers regime change. Trump has had it both ways without any apparent political costs. That will change in an election year. In 2016, Trump won three battleground states because he rejected American military adventurism. Some of the president’s most influential media surrogates are warning him that his Iran policy could lead the United States into war, and some 2020 voters are also worried. So were eight Republican senators who, in a rare break with Trump, joined Democrats recently in a vote to limit the president’s ability to attack Iran. As he seeks re-election in November, Trump would risk the support of his base if he stumbled into another military conflict in the Middle East, which would be seen as an unnecessary and costly distraction from urgent problems at home. That will incline him toward restraint. What will U.S. restraint mean for the maximum pressure campaign? Trump’s hardline Iran policy fires up parts of his base, so it will likely continue, but with less risk of provocation. It could also be re-packaged in a style that gives the appearance of reacting to Iranian moves, rather than remaining offensive in nature. This is where the nuclear deal’s dispute resolution mechanism could help. Washington has never offered Iran an off-ramp. While dispute resolution cannot offer quid pro quo de-escalation, it does offer Iran a line of retreat from nuclear escalation without appearing to bow to U.S. pressure. This allows Iran, which strives to convey the impression that it is capable of withstanding the full weight of American pressures, to maintain that posture, and also to demonstrate that it is not isolated and retains the diplomatic support of Europe, Russia, and China. That would make it harder politically for America to marshal international censure of Iran, let alone launch a military strike. These factors, and the possibility of a new face in the White House, will an off-ramp would incline Iran toward restraint, reinforced by the threat of punitive action under the dispute resolution process. After November, any number of developments could alter the strategic and tactical choices of Iran and the United States, potentially improving the political climate for a new deal. Similarly, as America’s European allies lead the effort to keep the nuclear deal operational, their persistent attempts to deny Washington the ability to dictate European foreign policy through threats and U.S. secondary sanctions could erode international acquiescence to American unilateralism. If this European trend becomes irreversible, it would have consequences for America’s image, credibility, and posture in the world. Critically, without diplomacy and adjustment, war and conflict between US and Iran will become inevitable. Seib 20~-~- Seib, Gerald. (Mr. Seib earned a bachelor's degree in journalism from the University of Kansas. While at the university, he was a member of Phi Kappa Phi, a national academic honor society, and Kappa Tau Alpha, a national journalism honor society. ) “US-Iran Conflict: More Conflict Is Inevitable; War Isn’t.” Wall Street Journal. 4 January 2020. https://www.wsj.com/articles/more-conflict-is-inevitable-war-with-iran-isnt-11578069281 After this week's dramatic spike in tensions between Iran and the U.S., further conflict now is inevitable, and terrorism outbreaks have become far more likely. That doesn't mean, however, that an actual war is inevitable. Indeed, neither side wants that, and both have been trying to stop just short of the line of no return. As a result, the question is whether President Trump and Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, are is capable of containing the forces they have that he has unleashed. The testing ground in this new phase of confrontation figures to lie first within Iraq and in the Persian Gulf, though the tensions also could envelop American allies in Saudi Arabia and Israel, reach into cyberspace and activate terror networks Iran has cultivated. Yet the most worrisome force of all may be the law of unintended consequences. That is the rough lay of the land in the aftermath of the American airstrike in Baghdad that killed Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, Iran's top military commander and leader of its powerful Quds Force. Fourth, by decreasing conflict with proxies. Vox 20~-~- Ward, Alex. (Alex is the staff writer covering international security and defense issues, as well as a co-host of Vox's "Worldly" podcast. Before joining Vox, Alex was an associate director in the Atlantic Council's Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security where he worked on military issues and US foreign policy.) “11 US troops were injured in Iran’s attack. It shows how close we came to war.” Vox, 17 January 2020. https://www.vox.com/2020/1/17/21070371/11-troops-injured-trump-iran-war “When deemed fit for duty, the service members are expected to return to Iraq following screening. The health and welfare of our personnel is a top priority and we will not discuss any individual’s medical status,” he added. President Donald Trump’s clear red line with Iran was that its military or regional proxies couldn’t kill an Americans. If they did, the US would respond forcefully. He followed through on that red line in late December after a Tehran-backed proxy militia killed a US contractor in Iraq, prompting the president to strike five of the group’s sites, leaving 25 members dead and another 50 injured. And after members of that same militia — Kata’ib Hezbollah — surrounded and breached the US Embassy in Baghdad on New Year’s Eve, setting the front reception room ablaze, Trump opted to kill top Iranian military leader Qassem Soleimani on January 2…. But let’s stop here for a minute. Imagine that US troops in Iraq hadn’t protected themselves well enough, or that if Iran’s missiles hit more populated targets. They might have been killed, and Trump would have had almost no choice but to escalate a dangerous tit-for-tat with the Islamic Republic. At that point, little could have been done to keep both sides from spiraling toward a larger, more brutal conflict. It is nothing short of pure fortune, then, that allowed everyone to walk back from the brink. “The more that comes out, the more it looks like we got incredibly lucky in avoiding a war,” Ilan Goldenberg, an Iran expert at the Center for a New American Security think tank in Washington, told me. Problematically, the US can’t deter Iran’s proxies, and they wish for a US-Iranian war. Foreign Policy 20~-~-Mesquita, Ethan. (Ethan Bueno de Mesquita is the Sydney Stein professor and deputy dean at the University of Chicago’s Harris School of Public Policy. He is an applied game theorist who has published widely on issues of terrorism, rebellion, and security strategy. ) “The US Can Deter Iran but Not Its Proxies.” Foreign Policy. 23 January 2020. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/23/united-states-iran-proxies-deterrence-suleimani/ In its most straightforward form, the logic of deterrence is simple: If an adversary believes the costs of an attack are high enough, it will prefer not to engage in that attack in the first place. Thus, the administration’s argument goes, if the United States threatens a massive response to Iranian aggression, they are likely to stand down. But this logic rests on a couple of key assumptions. Most importantly, in this instance, those who are threatened with punishment must in fact have the power to prevent the precipitating attacks. For such threats to work, then, the Iranian regime itself must be in a position to decide whether or not attacks occur. Iran has close ties to armed groups throughout the Middle East, from Yemen to Lebanon to Syria to Iraq. Many of these relationships were built in part by Suleimani himself. While these Iranian proxies groups take weapons, training, support, and some degree of direction from Iran but, they are also independent actors. Their preferences are not always aligned with Iran’s, and they have shown themselves willing to contradict Iranian directives when doing so is to their strategic advantage. For instance, Iran-aligned Houthi rebels have engaged in escalatory violence over the objections of their Iranian backers. This partial independence makes it difficult to attribute responsibility for attacks undertaken by such proxies. Suppose one of the several armed Shiite groups with ties to Iran that are operative in Iraq engages in a significant attack in the coming days or weeks. It will be unclear whether that attack was taken at Iran’s direction or not. Will the United States extend its belligerent deterrent stand to such acts? Will it strike back at Iran for actions by Iraqis or Syrians? The answer may well be yes. After all, it was not actions by the Iranian military but by Iranian proxies in Iraq that put in motion the chain of events leading to the killing of Suleimani. Kataib Hezbollah, an Iran-linked Shiite militia, was responsible for the rocket attacks on Iraqi bases in December 2019 that killed an American contractor and injured several soldiers. That event spurred a U.S. airstrike on Kataib Hezbollah’s headquarters in Iraq, which subsequently led to the protests outside the U.S. Embassy that preceded the killing of Suleimani. In an important sense, then, the United States has already shown that it can be provoked by Iranian proxies. In so doing, America has put itself in a profoundly dangerous strategic position. In an attempt to deter Iran with maximalist threats, the United States has given independent armed militias the power to escalate conflict between two sovereign nations. The Iranians appear acutely aware of the risk. Their initial response to the assassination was notably proportional and public. They wanted no misunderstanding. Moreover, the Iranian ambassador to the United Nations recently argued that Iran was responsible for these public actions but that it ought not be held responsible for “any sort of actions to be taken by others,” a clear reference to the risk of provocation by Iran-linked militias. The problem is that, having publicly responded with face-saving missile strikes that did limited damage, Iran may genuinely prefer de-escalation. But its proxies, especially those operating in Iraq, may not. Perhaps they these proxies view greater conflict between Iran and the United States as an opportunity to end the ongoing U.S. presence in Iraq. Or perhaps they see strategic advantages to operate within the chaos of increased civil conflict. In this case, they may well have incentives to engage in attacks—for instance, on attack Americans in Iraq—that exploit the United States’ more aggressive deterrent posture to manipulate the US into greater conflict with Iran. And Iran may not be in a position to prevent those actions, in which case Trump’s deterrent stance will have backfired. Indeed, one might even worry that groups not linked to Iran, like the Islamic State, that wish to spread discord and chaos might view this as an opportune moment to engage in false-flag operations that make it look as though Iranian proxies are engaged in escalatory violence. Once these proxies kill enough Americans, US and Iran would escalate into a full on war. Keeping 5,000 troops in Iraq only incentivizes and gives these militias a chance to kill American troops. The impact is war. Ward 19~-~-Ward, Alex. (Alex is the staff writer covering international security and defense issues, as well as a co-host of Vox's "Worldly" podcast. Before joining Vox, Alex was an associate director in the Atlantic Council's Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security where he worked on military issues and US foreign policy.) “A nasty, brutal fight: what a US-Iran war would look like.” Vox, 3 January 2020. https://www.vox.com/world/2019/7/8/18693297/us-iran-war-trump-nuclear-iraq Which means US-Iran relations teeter on a knife edge, and it won’t take much more to knock them off. So to understand just how bad the situation could get, I asked eight current and former White House, Pentagon, and intelligence officials, as well as Middle East experts, last July about how a war between the US and Iran might play out. The bottom line: It would be hell on earth. “This a US-Iran war would be a violent convulsion similar to chaos of the Arab Spring inflicted on the region for years,” said Ilan Goldenberg, the Defense Department’s Iran team chief from 2009 to 2012, with the potential for it to get “so much worse than Iraq.”... “The worst-case scenarios here are quite serious” Imagine, as we already have, that the earlier stages of strife escalate to a major war. That’s already bad enough. But assume for a moment not only that the fighting takes place, but that the US does the unlikely and near impossible: It invades and overthrows the Iranian regime (which Trump’s former National Security Adviser John Bolton, at least, has openly called for in the past). If that happens, it’s worth keeping two things in mind. First, experts say upward of a million people — troops from both sides as well as Iranian men, women, and children, and American diplomats and contractors — likely will have died by that point. Cities will burn and smolder. Those who survived the conflict will mainly live in a state of economic devastation for years and some, perhaps, will pick up arms and form insurgent groups to fight the invading US force. Second, power abhors a vacuum. With no entrenched regime in place, multiple authority figures from Iran’s clerical and military circles, among others, will jockey for control. Those sides could split into violent factions, initiating a civil war that would bring more carnage to the country. and Millions more refugees might flock out of the country, overwhelming already taxed nations nearby, and ungoverned pockets will give terrorist groups new safe havens from which to operate. To prevent total war with Iran, we must withdraw troops and deflate tensions now. Contention 2: Yemen Contention 1 is Yemen Amidst the Covid-19 crisis, the war in Yemen continues. TRT 20 reports TRTWorld, 4-11-2020, "Yemen's war rages under shadow of looming virus threat," Yemen's war rages under shadow of looming virus threat, https://www.trtworld.com/middle-east/yemen-s-war-rages-under-shadow-of-looming-virus-threat-35462 Yemen's war shows no signs of abating a week after the Saudi-led military coalition declared a unilateral truce due to the coronavirus threat looming over the impoverished nation. Yemen announced its first case of the Covid-19 respiratory disease last Friday, as aid organisations warn the country's health system, which has all but collapsed since the conflict broke out in 2014, is ill equipped to handle the crisis. The coalition supporting the government against the Iran-backed Houthi rebels said the fortnight-long ceasefire was designed to head off the pandemic, in a move welcomed by the United Nations but dismissed by the insurgents as political manoeuvering. Has a ceasefire been agreed? Despite Saudi Arabia's announcement of a halt in military activities from April 9, fighting on the ground and coalition air strikes continue. "We don't have a ceasefire agreement that all of the major players have signed up to yet," Peter Salisbury, an analyst at the International Crisis Group said. UN special envoy for Yemen Martin Griffiths said on Friday he had sent revised proposals to both sides to secure a nationwide ceasefire and the "urgent resumption" of political dialogue. The confirmation of Yemen's first coronavirus case "makes it even more imperative to stop the fighting immediately", he said. US military presence is at the root of this conflict by emboldening Gulf leaders. Hokayem 18 explains Emile Hokayem and David B Roberts, The Century Foundation, "Friends with Benefits", Jaunary 31, 2018, https://tcf.org/content/report/friends-with-benefits/ Traditional concepts of brotherhood and solidarity within the Gulf still prevail, at least in theory, and the goal of regime security remains paramount in each Gulf state’s calculations. Beyond that, however, the Gulf states have failed to develop clear concepts of cooperative or collective security that would make it easier for outside actors to envision their own role. Indeed, agreeing on the need for cooperative and collective security would compel the Gulf states to resolve competing territorial claims, reconcile political rivalries, and address other latent issues. In contrast, relying on an outside security guarantor allows them to sidestep resolving competing territorial claims, reconciling political rivalries, and addressing other issues and delay such moves and instead to adopt more active, hawkish regional stances. Saudi Arabia, and Oman before it, have failed to convince other countries of the necessity of defense integration. This is unsurprising, considering that all security behaviors in the Gulf hinge on an understanding that any form of security or political integration inevitably would foster Saudi hegemony. The United States, therefore, remains an indispensable partner—particularly for the smaller Gulf states—in spite of their misgivings about it. Karlin 19 furthers Mara Karlin, Foreign Affairs, "America's Middle East Purgatory", February 2019, https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/Enduring20American20Presence20in20the20Middle20East.pdf But this Goldilocks approach rests on the false assumption that there is such a thing as a purely operational U.S. military presence in the Middle East. In reality, U.S. military bases across the Gulf countries have strategic implications because they create a moral hazard: they encourage the region’s leaders to act in ways they otherwise might not, safe in the knowledge that the United States is invested in the stability of their regimes. In 2011, for example, the Bahrainis and the Saudis clearly understood the message of support sent by the U.S. naval base in Bahrain when they ignored Obama’s disapproval and crushed Shiite protests there. In Yemen, U.S. support for the Emirati and Saudi military campaign in Yemen shows how offering help can put the United States in profound 30 dilemmas: the United States is implicated in air strikes that kill civilians, but any proposal to halt its supplies of its precision-guided missiles is met with the charge that denying Saudi Arabia smarter munitions might only increase collateral civilian casualties. U.S. efforts to train, equip, and advise the Syrian Democratic Forces in the fight against ISIS are yet another reminder that none of Washington’s partnerships has purely operational consequences: U.S. support of the SDF, seen by Ankara as a sister to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, has made the United States’ relationship with Turkey knottier than ever. Empirically, when the US showed signs of withdrawing diplomacy began. Parsi 20 explains Trita Parsi, 1-6-2020, "The Middle East Is More Stable When the United States Stays Away," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/06/the-middle-east-is-more-stable-when-the-united-states-stays-away/ Some of these measures may have been more tactical than strategic. Saudi Arabia may have reduced tensions with Qatar and the Houthis in order to better situate itself for a confrontation with Tehran down the road or to offset international condemnation of its killing of Khashoggi, human rights abuses at home, and brutal tactics in Yemen. The UAE, too, may have felt that a tactical reduction of tensions was warranted. Nevertheless, as the United States appeared poised to back out of the region, its erstwhile allies’ calculations tilted toward diplomacy. The Saudis and Emiratis simply had no choice but to cease some of their recklessness because they could no longer operate under the protection of the United States. If stability in the Middle East is the United States’ main goal, Washington should have celebrated rather than bemoaned these developments. Indeed, Parsi writes Meanwhile, whereas Iran has no nuclear weapons yet undergoes more inspections than any other country, Israel has a nuclear weapons program with no international transparency whatsoever. Iran may have been adept at taking advantage of U.S. overextension and missteps in the last few decades, but establishing hegemony is a different matter altogether. Further, the region did not fall into deeper chaos as a result of Trump’s earlier refusal to get into a shooting war with Iran after attacks by Iranian proxies against Saudi oil installations in September 2019. Critics lamented the president’s decision as an abandonment of the Carter Doctrine, calling it a disaster for the GCC and warning that it may even prompt Saudi Arabia to seek nuclear weapons. Recognizing that the U.S. military was no longer at their disposal, Saudi Arabia and the UAE began exercising the diplomatic options that had always been available to them. Instead, recognizing that the U.S. military was no longer at their disposal, Saudi Arabia and the UAE began exercising the diplomatic options that had always been available to them. For its part, Saudi Arabia stepped up direct talks with Houthi rebels in Yemen as a way to ease tensions with their backer, Iran. The level of violence on both sides declined as a result, and more than 100 prisoners of war were released. In November, the United Nations’ Yemen envoy, Martin Griffiths, reported an 80 percent reduction in Saudi-led airstrikes, and there were no Yemeni deaths in the previous two weeks. Riyadh also opted to reduce tensions with Qatar, a former ally that had become a nemesis. The Saudi government seemingly ordered its notorious Twitter army to tone down the insults against Qatar and its emir, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, and some sporting events between the two countries resumed, according to the New York Times. Unfortunately, US military actions disrupted the diplomatic progress. Parsi laments Yet when U.S. President Donald Trump opted not to go to war with Iran after a series of Iranian-attributed attacks on Saudi Arabia last year and declared his intentions to pull troops out of the region, it wasn’t chaos or conquest that ensued. Rather, nascent regional diplomacy—particularly among Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—and de-escalation followed. To be sure, the cards were reshuffled again in January, when Trump ordered the assassination of Qassem Suleimani, one of Iran’s most important military figures. Courtesy of Trump, the region is once more moving toward conflict, and the early signs of diplomatic progress achieved during the preceding months have vanished. It is thus time for Washington to answer a crucial question that it has long evaded: Has America’s military dominance in the Middle East prevented regional actors from peacefully resolving conflicts on their own? And in that way, has it been an impediment to stability rather than the guarantor of it?\ US military presence prevents the Houthi rebels from accepting a ceasefire. TRT 20 reports TRTWorld, 4-11-2020, "Yemen's war rages under shadow of looming virus threat," Yemen's war rages under shadow of looming virus threat, https://www.trtworld.com/middle-east/yemen-s-war-rages-under-shadow-of-looming-virus-threat-35462 What do the Houthis want? The rebels are negotiating from a strong position after recent military gains, as they advance towards the government's last northern stronghold of Marib, an oil-rich region which would be a major strategic prize. Hours before the Saudi-led coalition's truce announcement, the Houthis released a document with a long list of demands including the withdrawal of foreign troops and the end of the coalition's blockade on Yemen's land, sea and airports of entry. "The Houthis They see a ceasefire as more than just a halt to military activities," Salisbury said. The rebels also demanded that the coalition pay government salaries for the next decade and hand over compensation for rebuilding, including homes destroyed in air strikes Thankfully, Kristian 20 writes Bonnie Kristian,, 4-6-2020, "As COVID-19 spreads, ending US support for the Saudi war in Yemen is vital," TheHill, https://thehill.com/opinion/international/491377-as-covid-19-spreads-ending-us-support-for-the-saudi-war-in-yemen-is This pandemic has proven a formidable foe for the health-care systems of advanced, stable nations like Italy and the United States. But Yemeni medical facilities are already under-resourced and overwhelmed with war casualties, cholera, and other communicable illnesses. Yemen desperately needs peace and open supply lines for its potential fight against COVID-19. Now more than ever, Washington must end its enablement of the Saudi-led coalition intervention in Yemen’s conflict and support a peaceful, diplomatic resolution with the immediate opening of Yemen’s airports and seaports for humanitarian aid. Riyadh has recently shown fresh interest in leaving Yemen even as it continues its air campaign. and a U.S. departure could tilt the scales toward peace. The best preventive measure to control the spread of the novel coronavirus is hygiene, but the war has mired Yemen in filth. “Pumps to sanitize the water supply sit idle for lack of fuel, while maintenance agencies tasked with chlorinating aquifers go without salaries and supplies,” Reuters reported in 2017. The situation has not improved in the three years since, especially as U.S.-supported Saudi airstrikes have targeted crucial water treatment facilities ……………………………………………………………………………… There is no overnight fix for Yemen’s misery. But the single most effective way to help Yemen now is for Washington to stop supporting the Saudi-led coalition intervention. Without U.S. assistance — which has included weapons provision, naval blockade, refueling planes for airstrikes, drone strikes, and intelligence sharing — the coalition could not continue its fight in Yemen, at least not anywhere near its present scale. If Washington withdraws, it will give Riyadh a new urgency in its peace talks with the Houthi rebels, which have stalled after a brief period of relative calm devolved into fresh turmoil last month. At the very least, the U.S. exit would make the Saudi stranglehold on much-needed food and medical supplies far more difficult to sustain, giving the Yemeni people a fighting chance against COVID-19. Ending Washington’s support for the coalition intervention would be a win for the United States, too. The U.S. has no vital interests at stake in Yemen — the Houthi rebels have local ambitions and do not pose a threat to America — and insofar as our involvement there affects our security, it is for the worse. Ending the conflict is crucial. Daragahi 19 quantifies Borzou Daragahi, 12-2-2019, "War-ravaged Yemeni children will suffer from hunger for 20 years, new report says," Independent, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/yemen-war-children-hunger-ceasefire-latest-a9229706.html “Yemen is now home to the largest food insecure population in the world,” says the 20-page report. And the situation is worsening. Just a year ago, famine was declared in certain parts of the country. Now, 80 per cent of the country’s population or 19 million Yemeni of 24 million is face facing od shortages and are living on the edge of famine, with children suffering the most. “It means each child is robbed of opportunities they would have had,” said Frank McManus, Yemen director for the IRC, speaking in a phone interview from the country’s Houthi-controlled capital, Sana'a. “Malnourishment is not something you can recover from,” he said. “It will shorten your height. It will limit your opportunities. It will impact how you will develop. Contention 2: Conflict US withdrawal decreases conflict in three ways. First is by rebuilding alliances. With US presence in the region, states prefer bilateral interactions with the United States to multilateral ones involving regional actors. Ashford 18~-~-Ashford, Emma. (Emma Ashford is a research fellow in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute in Washington, DC. She holds a PhD in politics from the University of Virginia and an MA from American University’s School of International Service) “Unbalanced: Rethinking America’s Commitment to the Middle East.” Strategic Studies Quarterly. Air University Press. Spring 2018. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26333880.pdf?refreqid=excelsior3A403f1017baf2a096ee9118141128c66c Even close US allies have shown interest expanding their regional role. The United Kingdom has returned to Bahrain, opening a new naval base at Mina Salman; France now has troops in Djibouti and the United Arab Emirates.46 Whether allies or adversaries, it is clear that the future of the Middle East is pluralistic, not hegemonic. Unfortunately, proponents of greater engagement in the region rarely consider either the benefits or risks posed by the growing number of states with a stake in the region. If this develops at the same time as increasing US presence, it has the potential to raise the risk of conflict, particularly in situations like Russia’s Syrian campaign. Yet perhaps the biggest problem is the fact that American predominance in the region prevents states from balancing or bandwagoning in the face of threats, as they would do in the absence of US presence. As many scholars have noted, the Middle East has typically exhibited “underbalancing,” meaning that states that might be expected to form alliances have rarely done so. The most obvious example is the antiIranian axis of Turkey, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, but the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has also repeatedly failed to build joint military infrastructure. The recent GCC crisis between Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates likewise suggests that these states prioritize ideological factors over security concerns. As long as the United States continues to act as a regional security guarantor, theory suggests that ideological factors will continue to inhibit alliances.47 In fact, though the Obama administration’s pivot away from the Middle East was more rhetoric than reality, it did encourage tentative attempts to build better regional alliances. Private rapprochement and cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Israel on the issue of Iran has been growing. The two countries disagree on a variety of issues, the most problematic of which is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Yet when retired top Saudi and Israeli officials spoke about the issue at a 2016 forum in Washington, DC, they were keen to highlight that cooperation is possible even if these issues go unresolved.48 The two states regularly hold informal meetings on security issues. Even the relative lack of criticism expressed by the Gulf States during the 2006 Israeli war against Hezbollah may be indicative of shifting opinion within the region.49 In providing security guarantees and by acting as a third party cutout, US involvement inhibits these developing ties. In the absence of US presence, however, states would be forced to engage in diplomacy. Alliances are key to solving conflict through deterrence. Rice 11~-~-Rice, David. (David is the director of National Media Relations at Rice University) “Military Alliances Keep the Peace.” Futurity, 11 February 2011. https://www.futurity.org/military-alliances-keep-the-peace/ For the study, published in the journal Foreign Policy Analysis, researchers analyzed global defense agreements from 1816 to 2001. “We were interested in analyzing policy prescriptions that leaders of countries can adopt that might make war—and also militarized conflicts short of war—less likely,” says Ashley Leeds, associate professor of political science at Rice University. “War is costly, most importantly in terms of lives lost, but also in terms of financial resources, destruction of productive capacity and infrastructure, and disruption of trade. As a result, research aimed at discovering policies that can prevent war is valuable. “We found that when a country enters into a defense pact, it is less likely to be attacked,” Leeds says. “In addition, entering into defense pacts does not seem to make countries more likely to or attack other states.” The research has current policy relevance for the United States and other countries, Leeds says. “A current policy debate, for instance, is whether Georgia should be accepted as a new member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). If Georgia joins NATO, the U.S. and other NATO countries will be committing to assist Georgia if Georgia is attacked by another state, for instance, Russia. Second is by curtailing aggression . The US security umbrella emboldens allies to act aggressively instead of diplomatically. Hazbun 19~-~-Hazbun, Waleed. (Waleed Hazbun is a political science professor at the University of Alabama. He received his BA from Princeton, and his PhD from MIT.) “In America’s Wake: Turbulence and Insecurity in the Middle East.” University of Alabama. Middle East Political Science, March 2019. https://pomeps.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/POMEPS_Studies_34_Web.pdf In the late 2000s, the large, militarily capable state of Turkey and the small, wealthy state of Qatar began to use their diverse ties to states across the emerging regional divides to play a larger diplomatic role and promote conflict management. Turkey emphasized open borders and regional economic integration while Qatar used diplomatic inventions and pan-Arab media to project influence at the regional level. Te political turmoil resulting from the Arab Uprisings and the confused US reaction to them opened another opportunity for regional powers. Qatar and Turkey sought to promote generally compatible efforts to suggest a new basis for regional order drawing together newly elected governments and emerging Islamist political forces. Teir more activist policies, however, soon entangled them in regional conflicts. Qatar supported military intervention in Libya while Turkey encouraged armed opposition in Syria. Rather than transforming the political landscape these actions contributed to political breakdown and territorial fragmentation. Teir efforts collapsed in the face of the 2013 military coup in Egypt. More broadly, a Saudi-led counter-revolution sought to shore up authoritarian governments, expand domestic divisions along sectarian 17 THEORIZING STRUCTURAL CHANGE lines, and foster of civil wars in Syria, Yemen, and Libya. As Qatar scaled back its regional interventions, Turkey found its interests reorganized as the increasing autonomy of Kurdish actors, some backed by the US in an effort to contain ISIS, became its most pressing concern. While aligned with the US and benefiting from the US security umbrella anchored by its bases around the Gulf, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have attempted to organize the region through used aggressive diplomatic and military interventions as well as financial support to allied regimes and proxies. Saudi Arabia has long sought to project regional influence, but its flows of cash, intelligence cooperation, and diplomacy have previously only had a marginal impact reshaping regional order. With the US under Obama no longer providing regional leadership, it’s policies diverged from Saudi priorities, such as allowing the fall of Mubarak in Egypt and negotiating a nuclear deal with Iran. Saudi Arabia (with UAE support) then sought to act as a regional hegemon though without the needed regional power and consent. Tey backed rebel factions in Syria and escalated the conflict. After their effort to manage the post-Uprising transition in Yemen failed, they launched, with US support, an ineffective war against the Houthi rebels, which has resulted in a humanitarian disaster. Te Trump administration aligned itself more enthusiastically with the Saudi-UAE axis. Saudi efforts, despite this American support, have done little to establish a new regional order or contain Iranian influence. Rather than embracing Qatar’s post-2013 shift away from an activist regional policy and attempt to rebuild GCC consensus policymaking, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have repeatedly sought to coerce Qatar into accepting a subservient role, resulting in the total fragmentation of the GCC as a regional organization. In past decades the US often sought to restrain Israel’s most aggressive actions and/or worked to re-stabilize regional politics in their aftermath. Closer Saudi strategic alignment with Israel and backing by US president Trump has resulted in less restraint on regional actions. This posture sets up a context for continuing instability and a greater likelihood of conflict and escalation. The current uncertainty and shifting regional political dynamics have set up complex rivalries and diverging interests between regional powers. While Iran, Turkey and Qatar have all sought to promote new, but differing, norms for regional politics, seeking to develop an order based around their interests, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have advanced a revisionist agenda built from a growing capacity and willingness to project power and intervene militarily across the region. Tese efforts by multiple regional and global powers to assert their own narrow strategic interests in the context of the post-uprisings Arab world has led to increased disarray in the region, including the fragmentation of Syria and Yemen, and massive humanitarian crises as a consequence of the conflicts there. Tis disarray opened up new opportunities for external intervention in the region, as seen in the NATO campaign in Libya, Russian intervention in support of the regime in Syria, and the US-led anti-ISIS military campaigns in Syria and Iraq during 2016 and 2017. Drawing on the notion of turbulence offers guidance to explain how and why the capacities of states in the region, even as they become more ruthlessly authoritarian and deploy more deadly military power, are less able to constrain threats to their security and balance rivals. Historical precedent proves. Parsi 20~-~-Parsi, Trita. (Trita Parsi is Executive Vice President of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and Adjunct Associate Professor at Georgetown University.) “The Middle East Is More Stable When the United States Stays Away.” Foreign Policy, 6 January 2020. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/06/the-middle-east-is-more-stable-when-the-united-states-stays-away Further, the region did not fall into deeper chaos as a result of Trump’s earlier refusal to get into a shooting war with Iran after attacks by Iranian proxies against Saudi oil installations in September 2019. Critics lamented the president’s decision as an abandonment of the Carter Doctrine, calling it a disaster for the GCC and warning that it may even prompt Saudi Arabia to seek nuclear weapons. Recognizing that the U.S. military was no longer at their disposal, Saudi Arabia and the UAE began exercising the diplomatic options that had always been available to them. For its part, Saudi Arabia stepped up direct talks with Houthi rebels in Yemen as a way to ease tensions with their backer, Iran. The level of violence on both sides declined as a result, and more than 100 prisoners of war were released. In November, the United Nations’ Yemen envoy, Martin Griffiths, reported there was an 80 percent reduction in Saudi-led airstrikes, and there were no Yemeni deaths in the previous two weeks. Riyadh also opted to reduce tensions with Qatar, a former ally that had become a nemesis. The Saudi government seemingly ordered its notorious Twitter army to tone down the insults against Qatar and its emir, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, and some sporting events between the two countries resumed, according to the New York Times. Saudi officials also claimed that they had quietly reached out to Iran via intermediaries seeking ways to ease tensions. Tehran, in turn, welcomed the prospective Saudi-Qatari thaw and, according to the New York Times, floated a peace plan based on a mutual Iranian-Saudi pledge of nonaggression. An even stronger change of heart occurred in Abu Dhabi. In July, the UAE started withdrawing troops from Yemen. The same month, it participated in direct talks with Tehran to discuss maritime security. It even released $700 million in funds to Iran in contradiction to the Trump administration’s maximum pressure strategy. Some of these measures may have been more tactical than strategic. Saudi Arabia may have reduced tensions with Qatar and the Houthis in order to better situate itself for a confrontation with Tehran down the road or to offset international condemnation of its killing of Khashoggi, human rights abuses at home, and brutal tactics in Yemen. The UAE, too, may have felt that a tactical reduction of tensions was warranted. Nevertheless, as the United States appeared poised to back out of the region, its erstwhile allies’ calculations tilted toward diplomacy. The Saudis and Emiratis simply had no choice but to cease some of their recklessness because they could no longer operate under the protection of the United States. If stability in the Middle East is the United States’ main goal, Washington should have celebrated rather than bemoaned these developments. Without the guarantee of the US military, Saudi Arabia and the UAE chose to deescalate conflict in Yemen and turn to diplomatic ties. Ending US presence in the region could be the way to end the Yemen war. Third is the military-industrial complex Vittori 19~-~-Vittori, Jodi. “A Mutual Extortion Racket: The Military Industrial Complex and US Foreign Policy ~-~- The Cases of Saudi Arabia and UAE.” Transparency International Defense and Security Program, 20 December 2019. https://ti-defence.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/US_Defense_Industry_Influence_Paper_v4_digital_singlePage.pdf Defence industry players, and elected officials, the defence bureaucracy, and governments in the Middle East are intertwined and serve one another’s interest, often at the expense of US foreign policy outcomes. These mutually-beneficial relationships have contributed to a vicious cycle of conflict and human rights abuses across the Middle East and North Africa, including increased exports of arms and defence services to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates which began under the Obama administration and have ramped up under President Trump. The impacts are devastating. Just last year, Saudi Arabia launched a war on the Houthis in Yemen, leading to humanitarian disasters that endanger tens of millions. The overall impact is war. Malley 19~-~-Malley, Robert (ROBERT MALLEY is President and CEO of the International Crisis Group. During the Obama administration, he served as Special Assistant to the President, White House Middle East Coordinator, and Senior Adviser on countering the Islamic State) “The Unwanted Wars.” Foreign Affairs, December 2019. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2019-10-02/unwanted-wars The war that now looms largest is a war nobody apparently wants. During his presidential campaign, Donald Trump railed against the United States’ entanglement in Middle Eastern wars, and since assuming office, he has not changed his tune. Iran has no interest in a wide-ranging conflict that it knows it could not win. Israel is satisfied with calibrated operations in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza but fears a larger confrontation that could expose it to thousands of rockets. Saudi Arabia is determined to push back against Iran, but without confronting it militarily. Yet the conditions for an all-out war in the Middle East are riper than at any time in recent memory. A conflict could break out in any one of a number of places for any one of a number of reasons. Consider the September 14 attack on Saudi oil facilities: it could theoretically have been perpetrated by the Houthis, a Yemeni rebel group, as part of their war with the kingdom; by Iran, as a response to debilitating U.S. sanctions; or by an Iranian-backed Shiite militia in Iraq. If Washington decided to take military action against Tehran, this could in turn prompt Iranian retaliation against the United States’ Gulf allies, an attack by Hezbollah on Israel, or a Shiite militia operation against U.S. personnel in Iraq. Likewise, Israeli operations against Iranian allies anywhere in the Middle East could trigger a regionwide chain reaction. Because any development anywhere in the region can have ripple effects everywhere, narrowly containing a crisis is fast becoming an exercise in futility.	904,728
365,612	379,677	Contact Info	Heyo it's Karina and Sabine, we're happy to disclose if you contact us, preferably at least 20 minutes before round. If the tournament is super time crunched and postings are going out late we're fine disclosing informally if necessary. Karina Lu \| she/her \| [email protected], Karina Lu on Messenger Sabine Wood \| sher/her \| [email protected], [email protected], http://m.me/sabinetwo	904,741
365,613	379,678	Contact	Email us 30 minutes before the round if you want us to disclose email [email protected]	904,742
365,614	379,688	content and trigger warnings interp	If the debater reads arguments related to topic, they must give a content warning before their speech. These conversations are empirically trauma inducing and warnings are a good idea. ~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-- When reading content warnings, the debater must properly acknowledge 1) the seriousness of CWs: Debaters should not use flippant language when explaining CWs, or seek to delegitimize the importance of the warning. Making these warnings seem like they are not a big deal trivializes trauma. 2) the importance of specificity in CWs: Debaters should avoid graphic or non-graphic description of the material they are giving the warning for, but they should not say “Content warning” without citing the nature of the content they will read. (A CW for “aggressive” content is not a CW.) Lack of specificity gives the listeners not enough information to mentally prepare themselves. 3) must not single out individuals (e.g. asking if anyone wants the CW before reading it): Debaters should read the CW without asking if anyone wants to hear it. Similarly, although debaters may ask for comment and discussion on content (e.g. if someone’s not okay with this content, we can read another contention/if someone wants to set a brightline for our descriptors) they should not single out individuals by asking everyone to either confirm or deny their requests. Asking if someone needs a CW forces us to out ourselves if we do – just assume the audience does so survivors or victims of trauma don’t have to disclose that to the round. If someone steps forward after you ask for comments they may choose to do so, don’t force that situation on them.	904,750
365,615	379,726	NATO Aff	=1AC= We affirm, ? ===Our sole contention is NATO=== ====NATO is planning on having a fully functioning cyber command by 2023==== Robin Emmott, 10-16-2018, "NATO cyber command to be fully operational in 2023," U.S., https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-cyber/nato-cyber-command-to-be-fully-operational-in-2023-idUSKCN1MQ1Z9 A new NATO military command center to deter computer hackers should be fully staffed in AND , Britain, Estonia and other allies have since offered their cyber capabilities. ====However, NATO is fully reliant on the United States for offensive cyber operations until then.==== Patrick Tucker 19, 5-24-2019, "NATO Getting More Aggressive on Offensive Cyber," Defense One, https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2019/05/nato-getting-more-aggressive-offensive-cyber/157270/ ====At an event in May, Gottemoeller said NATO was in the processes of establishing a new innovation board to "bring together all of the parts of and pieces of NATO that have to wrestle with these new technologies to really try to get a flow of information. Many of you having served in any international institution or government, you know how things can get stove-piped. So we are resolved to break down those stove-pipes, particularly where innovation is concerned," she said. NATO is building a cyber command that is scheduled to be fully operational in 2023 and will coordinate and conduct all offensive cyber operations. Until then, whatever NATO does offensively, it will rely heavily on the United States and the discretion of U.S. commanders, according to Sophie Arts, program coordinator for security and defense at the German Marshall Fund, who explains in this December report.==== ====And the U.S will have full control of these offensive cyber operations but will do them through NATO==== Idrees Ali, 10-3-2018, "With an eye on Russia, U.S. pledges to use cyber capabilities on behalf of NATO," U.S., https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-nato-russia-cyber/with-an-eye-on-russia-u-s-pledges-to-use-cyber-capabilities-on-behalf-of-nato-idUSKCN1MD0C The United States is expected to announce in the coming days that it will use AND of the Cyber Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council think tank in Washington. ===ADV 1: Deterring Russia=== ====The United States Increasing Offensive cyber operations through NATO is key to deter Russia==== Kimberly Marten, 03-xx-2017, "," Reducing Tensions Between Russia and NATO, https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2017/03/CSR'79'Marten'RussiaNATO.pdf In this new Council Special Report, Kimberly Marten, a professor of political science AND deterrence and reassurance measures are necessary and can in fact work in harmony. ====This is critical, Russia’s planning to use cyberattacks against NATO—-it’ll spark World War 3==== O’Hanlon 19—Senior fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, where he specializes in U.S. defense strategy, the use of military force, and American national security policy. He is also director of research for the Foreign Policy program at Brookings. He is an adjunct professor at Columbia, Princeton, and Syracuse universities and University of Denver ~~Michael E., April 2019, The Senkaku Paradox: Risking Great Power War Over Small Stakes, Chapter 2: Plausible Scenarios, pgs 36, Brookings Institution Press, ProQuest Ebook, Accessed through the Wake Forest Library~~ A NATO military response to the postulated Russian aggression seems very likely. Perhaps evidence AND , quite possibly including those systems commonly used for nuclear weapons. ? ===Adv 2: NATO Unity=== ====US-OCO unifies NATO==== Kimberly Marten, 03-xx-2017, "," Reducing Tensions Between Russia and NATO, https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2017/03/CSR'79'Marten'RussiaNATO.pdf The most significant NATO actions in response to the perceived Russian threat were announced at AND , including Sweden and Finland, has also helped demonstrate a unified Western deterrent ====Strong NATO relations deter adversaries, and promote democracy, freedom, and solutions to inequalities==== James Stavridis April 4, 2019, 7-11-2018, "Why NATO Is Essential For World Peace, According to Its Former Commander," Time, https://time.com/5564171/why-nato-is-essential-world-peace/ Moreover, despite all the frustrations of coalition warfare, most observers would agree with AND and again they are willing to fight and die for us.	904,799
365,616	379,757	Lay CyberOps Neg	C1: Defending the Nation Steve Ranger, ZDNet, "What is cyberwar? Everything you need to know about the frightening future of digital conflict \| ZDNet", 12/4/18, https://www.zdnet.com/article/cyberwar-a-guide-to-the-frightening-future-of-online-conflict/ "it's likely that ... Unified Combatant Command" Subpoint A: Escalation Jason Healey, Journal of Cybersecurity, "The implications of persistent (and permanent) engagement in cyberspace", 08/26/19, https://academic.oup.com/cybersecurity/article/5/1/tyz008/5554878#140575448 "According to General ... over private networks" Andy Greenberg, Wired, "How not to Prevent a Cyber War with Russia ", 06/18/19, https://www.wired.com/story/russia-cyberwar-escalation-power-grid/ "As the Trump ... is high here." Subpoint B: Stealing Tech Nicole Perlroth, The New York Times, "In Baltimore and Beyond, a stolen N.S.A Tool Wreaks Havoc", 05/25/19, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/25/us/nsa-hacking-tool-baltimore.html "Since 2017, when ... in the wild." Kalev Leetaru, Forbes, "As Eternal Blue Racks Up Damages It Reminds Us There Is No Such Thing As A Safe Cyber Weapon", 05/25/19, https://www.forbes.com/sites/kalevleetaru/2019/05/25/as-eternalblue-racks-up-damages-it-reminds-us-there-is-no-such-thing-as-a-safe-cyber-weapon/#5e48136c7603 "The NSA's loss ... quarter of 2018" James Sanders, Tech Republic, "Financial impact of ransomware attacks increasing despite overall decrease in attacks", 09/24/19, https://www.techrepublic.com/article/financial-impact-of-ransomware-attacks-increasing-despite-overall-decrease-in-attacks/ "Ransomeware attacks are ... derived from EternalBlue" University of Cambridge, "Lloyds Emerging Risks Report", 2015, https://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/fileadmin/user_upload/research/centres/risk/downloads/crs-lloyds-business-blackout-scenario.pdf "the scenario for ... country's economic production" Micheal Farrell, Politico, "Trump is rattling sabers in cyberspace - but is the U.S. ready?", 07/13/19, https://www.politico.com/story/2019/07/13/trump-cybersecurity-defense-1415650 "Cybersecurity experts have ... hacking, Jaffer argued." Rajiner Tumber, Forbes, "Cyber Attacks: Igniting The Next Recession? ", 01/05/19, https://www.forbes.com/sites/rajindertumber/2019/01/05/cyber-attacks-igniting-the-next-recession/#1830a95dbe4f "Cybercrime is predicted ... the hard way." Olivier Blanchard, IMF, "Jobs and Growth: Analytical and Operational Considerations For The Fund", 03/14/13, https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/031413.pdf "Although we are ... and Prospects, 2013."	904,841
365,617	379,763	Millard RR Neg	Contention 1 is Spending Harriet Torry 20, 2-3-2020, "U.S. Economy Heads Into 2020 With Steady Growth," WSJ, https://www-wsj-com.ezp3.lib.umn.edu/articles/fourth-quarter-economic-growth-11580386835?mod=searchresultsandamp;page=1andamp;pos=4 // BP "The U.S. economy ... upbeat American consumers." UBI is too expensive David R. Henderson 19, 6-13-2019, "Universal Basic Income, In Perspective," Hoover Institution, https://www.hoover.org/research/universal-basic-income-perspective // BP "But assuming unrealistically ... production in general." Thus, Mariko Paulson 18, 3-29-2018, "Options for Universal Basic Income: Dynamic Modeling — Penn Wharton Budget Model," Penn Wharton Budget Model, https://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/issues/2018/3/29/options-for-universal-basic-income-dynamic-modeling // BP "When the "deficit" ... Social Security Revenues." Impact is global poverty Robert Evans, Reuters, July 5th, 2009 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-financial-poverty/recession-adds-6-percent-to-ranks-of-global-poor-u-n-idUSTRE56502P20090706 Contention 2 is Medicaid Medicaid gives great coverage Patricia Gaboe, Health Affairs, July 29th, 2015 https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20150729.049632/full/ "Medicaid and the ... many essential services." Elimination of this program would be devastating. A UBI is insufficient for individuals on Medicaid to get proper healthcare. Medium, Ed Dolan, September 23rd, 2019 https://medium.com/basic-income/how-much-basic-income-can-we-afford-52cc8e9da65 "One is that ... have costly accidents." Health insurance keeps people alive through incentivizing medical care use. The Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, Bob Reischauer, February 2003 https://www.kff.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/sicker-and-poorer-the-consequences-of-being-uninsured-executive-summary.pdf // HZN "Researchers have found ... insurance and mortality." Contention 3 is housing Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 12-10-2019, "National and State Housing Fact Sheets and Data" https://www.cbpp.org/research/housing/national-and-state-housing-fact-sheets-data//MC "Federal Rental Assistance ... and rural housing." Without rental assistance, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 11-9-2017, "Federal Rental Assistance Provides Affordable Homes for Vulnerable People in All Types of Communities" https://www.cbpp.org/research/housing/federal-rental-assistance-provides-affordable-homes-for-vulnerable-people-in-all//MC "There are only ... types of communities." The impact is poverty reduction. Bryce Covert, ThinkProgress, 11-6-2013, "The Social Safety Net Kept Millions Out Of Poverty Last Year" https://thinkprogress.org/the-social-safety-net-kept-millions-out-of-poverty-last-year-704467cf5805///MC "The Supplemental Nutrition ... by 0.9 percent." Contention 4 is immigrants A UBI would have a negative effect on immigrants for two reasons Subpoint A is a lack of coverage. In the status quo, Steven A. Camarota. (11/20/18) 63 of Non-Citizen Households Access Welfare Programs \| Center for Immigration Studies. Retrieved February 22, 2020, from https://cis.org/Report/63-NonCitizen-Households-Access-Welfare-Programs "In 2014, 63 ... counted as welfare." This is critical as Michael D Nicholson. (04/20/17) The Facts on Immigration Today: 2017 Edition - Center for American Progress. Retrieved February 22, 2020, from https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/reports/2017/04/20/430736/facts-immigration-today-2017-edition/ "Approximately 43.4 million ... hold temporary visas." A UBI would not go to these people Miller, John. “Universal Basic Income Is Having a Moment. Can Advocates Convince a Skeptical Public?” America Magazine, 4 Oct. 2019, www.americamagazine.org/politics-society/2019/10/02/universal-basic-income-having-moment-can-advocates-convince-skeptical. "A U.B.I plan ... make them citizens." Welfare programs have worked to reduce poverty. Dylan Matthews, Washington Post, 01-08-2014, "Everything you need to know about the war on poverty" https://outline.com/HK5gZY//MC "It did. A ... out of poverty." Subpoint B is Implementation In the status quo, Radford, Jynnah. “Key Findings about U.S. Immigrants.” Pew Research Center, Pew Research Center, 17 June 2019, www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/17/key-findings-about-u-s-immigrants/. "More than 1 ... years since 2010." During the implementation process of a UBI, legal immigration would have to be restricted in order for the bill to pass. Megan McArdle. (2014, April 18). How A Basic Income In The U.S. Could Increase Global Poverty. PBS NewsHour. Retrieved February 7, 2020, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/how-a-basic-income-in-the-u-s-could-increase-global-poverty "A lot of ... the United States." Even liberals would be forced to cut immigration. Miller 2 "A U.B.I plan ... make them citizens." A reduction in immigration would be horrible. Immigrants fleeing to escape violence and poverty Sarah Bermeo, Washington Post, 6-18-2019, "Analysis" https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/06/18/trump-administration-threatened-cut-foreign-aid-if-central-american-countries-dont-stem-migration///MC "Individuals and families ... for economic opportunity."	904,847
365,618	379,764	0 - Contact Info	Hey! Here's some important info. Best way to contact us is through messenger. FB: Ethan Van Nostrand FB: Max Tran Van Nostrand Phone: 713-664-1522 Our pronouns are both he/him. We are a newer team, please just message us for issues related to disclosure.	904,848
365,619	379,767	STOC 1NC	C1: Cred C1: Cred Troop pullout destroys the security guarantee, Saab 18 confirms (Bilal Saab, Senior Fellow and Director of the defense and security program at the Middle East Institute and Adjunct Assistant Professor at Georgetown University's Security Studies Program, 22 Aug 2018, "Relocating the Fifth Fleet?", https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/08/22/relocating-the-fifth-fleet/ DOA 3/12/20)KJR Indeed, it's impossible AND relationship with Washington. ====Brands et al 18 ==== ~~Brands and Edelman)CREDIBILITY MATTERS STRENGTHENING AMERICAN DETERRENCE IN AN AGE OF GEOPOLITICAL TURMOIL, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, May 8, 2018, https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/Credibility_Paper_FINAL_format.pdf, CP~~ How credible are the promises the United States makes to its allies and partners and AND nervousness about Washington's willingness and ability to deter or defeat aggression against them. ====Kim 19==== ~~Simon Denyer and Min Joo Kim, "In South Korea, military cost dispute and Trump's moves in Syria fuel doubts over U.S. commitment," Washington Post, November 4, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/in-south-korea-military-cost-dispute-and-trumps-moves-in-syria-fuel-doubts-over-us-commitment/2019/11/01/7048b030-fa30-11e9-9534-e0dbcc9f5683_story.html, CP~~ South Korean lawmaker Won Yoo-chul calls it "Trump risk" — the AND What will happen to the safety of the South Korean people?" ====ME litmus test==== ~~Yaroslav Trofimov is the chief foreign-affairs correspondent of The Wall Street Journal. He joined the Journal in 1999 and previously served as Rome, Middle East and Singapore-based Asia correspondent, as bureau chief in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and as Dubai-based columnist on the greater Middle East. He is the author of two books, Faith at War (2005) and Siege of Mecca (2007), 4-9-2020, "America Can't Escape the Middle East," WSJ, https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-u-s-cant-escape-the-middle-east-11572016173, SS~~ Michael Oren, a former Israeli ambassador to Washington who served until earlier this year AND as Egyptian autocrat Hosni Mubarak amid the pro-democracy protests of 2011. ====Brands et al 18 – empirics==== ~~Hal Brands and Eric Edelman Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century: Theory, History, and Practice (Stanford University Press, 2012), Technology and the American Way of War Since 1945 (Columbia University Press, 2008), and Uncovering Ways of War: U.S. Intelligence and Foreign Military Innovation, 1918– 1941 (Cornell University Press, 2002)CREDIBILITY MATTERS STRENGTHENING AMERICAN DETERRENCE IN AN AGE OF GEOPOLITICAL TURMOIL, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, May 8, 2018, https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/Credibility_Paper_FINAL_format.pdf, CP~~ Ronald Reagan's decision not to retaliate meaningfully for Hezbollah's attacks on the Marine barracks in AND shocking attack on the homeland by withdrawing from the greater Middle East.2 ====Brands et al 18 – empirics==== ~~Hal Brands and Eric Edelman Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century: Theory, History, and Practice (Stanford University Press, 2012), Technology and the American Way of War Since 1945 (Columbia University Press, 2008), and Uncovering Ways of War: U.S. Intelligence and Foreign Military Innovation, 1918– 1941 (Cornell University Press, 2002)CREDIBILITY MATTERS STRENGTHENING AMERICAN DETERRENCE IN AN AGE OF GEOPOLITICAL TURMOIL, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, May 8, 2018, https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/Credibility_Paper_FINAL_format.pdf, CP~~ "States that have honored their commitments in the past are more likely to find AND than is a country that has not yielded in the previous ten years. ====Specifically spills over into Asia-Pacific==== ~~Hal Brands and Eric Edelman Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century: Theory, History, and Practice (Stanford University Press, 2012), Technology and the American Way of War Since 1945 (Columbia University Press, 2008), and Uncovering Ways of War: U.S. Intelligence and Foreign Military Innovation, 1918– 1941 (Cornell University Press, 2002)CREDIBILITY MATTERS STRENGTHENING AMERICAN DETERRENCE IN AN AGE OF GEOPOLITICAL TURMOIL, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, May 8, 2018, https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/Credibility_Paper_FINAL_format.pdf, CP~~ Chuck Hagel, Obama's Secretary of Defense at the time, later said that " AND it appears evident that global perceptions were affected by the red line episode. ====Spills over into Asia –==== ~~Joseph Bosco served as China country director for the secretary of Defense from 2005 to 2006 and as Asia-Pacific director of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief from 2009 to 2010. He is a nonresident fellow at the Institute for Corean-American Studies and the Institute for Taiwan-American Studies and is a member of the advisory board of the Global Taiwan Institute., 10-17-2019, "After Syria debacle, US needs to recommit to Indo-Pacific," The Hill, https://thehill.com/opinion/international/466087-after-syria-debacle-us-needs-to-recommit-to-indo-pacific, CP~~ The impact of President Trump's rash action is magnified because it builds on the regional AND a quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom we know nothing." ====Spills over into SK/Japan==== ====The plan decks US credibility in Asia—-perception of abandoning Saudi Arabia spills over—-causes Japanese prolif==== Amitai Etzioni 14, professor of international relations at The George Washington University, former senior adviser to the Carter White House, "Near East and Far East: Not So Distant," 3/3/14, http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/near-east-and-far-east-not-so-distant/ Actually, there is a profound link between the two theaters: namely whatever takes AND credibility—in one theater is likely to have significant repercussions in the other ====Troop withdrawal is the catalytic for South Korean proliferation==== Bleek and Lorber 13 (Philipp C. Bleek Assistant Professor Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies Program Monterey Institute of International Studies, a Graduate School of Middlebury College Fellow, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Eric Lorber PhD Candidate Department of Political Science Duke University JD Candidate University of Pennsylvania Law School, "Friends Don't Let Friends Proliferate: Credibility, Security Assurances, and Allied Nuclear Proliferation"http://posse.gatech.edu/sites/posse.gatech.edu/files/BleekLorberISAISA'13.pdf) The two cases suggest both that security assurances can be effective in stemming allied nuclear AND would be early escalation, at its very worst leading to nuclear use. ====South Korean prolif is the only scenario for east Asian nuclear war—causes regional arms races.==== Ahn and Cho 14 (Ahn, Mun Suk Chonbuk National University, Republic of Korea; Cho, Young Chul. Leiden University, the Netherlands International Journal 69.1 (Mar 2014): 26-34) *ROK-US combined forces command = the warfighting headquarters. Its role is to deter, or defeat if necessary, outside aggression against the ROK. (i.e. US troops) Rational deterrence theorists—Kenneth Waltz chief among them—claim that nuclear proliferation leads AND mideast A Soviet AND even nuclear war. ===Nuke war bad=== Jonathan Schell was an American author and was a fellow at the Institute of Politics at the John F. Kennedy School of Government and a fellow at the Kennedy School's Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics, and Public Policy. In 2003, he was a visiting lecturer at Yale Law School, and in 2005, a Distinguished Visiting Fellow at Yale's Center for the Study of Globalization, whose work primarily dealt with campaigning against nuclear weapons, https://books.google.com/books?id=tYKJsAEs1oQCandprintsec=frontcoveranddq=jonathan+schell+fate+of+the+earthandhl=enandsa=Xandved=0ahUKEw j2p6fzmbXOAhXJCMAKHZsID_QQ6AEIHjAA#v=onepageandq=to20say20that20human20extinctionandf=false To say that human AND and to ourselves. C2: Saudi-Iran Horowitz- tensions are surface level and stuff Michael Horowitz, 1/10/20, War with Iran is still less likely than you think, Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/01/10/war-with-iran-is-still-less-likely-than-you-think/ Domestic politics AND be very costly. Peeler- Iran no want US invasion 20 1/8/20, Bryan Peeler, The Conversation, https://theconversation.com/why-the-u-s-is-unlikely-to-go-to-war-with-iran-129596, The missile attacks AND end anytime soon though. ===Benaim- Chance of war really low now=== https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/Enduring20American20Presence20in20the20Middle20East.pdf Daniel Benaim and Michael Wahid Hanna Foreign Affairs, August 7, 2019During the Cold War, traditional state-based threats pushed the United States to play a major role in the Middle East. That role involved not only ensuring the stable supply of energy to Western markets but also working to prevent the spread of communist influence and tamping down the Arab-Israeli 26 conflict so as to help stabilize friendly states. These efforts were largely successful. Beginning in the 1970s, the United States nudged Egypt out of the pro-Soviet camp, oversaw the first Arab-Israeli peace treaty, and solidified its hegemony in the region. Despite challenges from Iran after its 1979 revolution and from Saddam Hussein's Iraq throughout the 1990s, U.S. dominance was never seriously in question. The United States contained the Arab-Israeli conflict, countered Saddam's bid to gain territory through force in the 1990–91 Gulf War, and built a seemingly permanent military presence in the Gulf that deterred Iran and muffled disputes among the Gulf Arab states. ~~{AND~~} Thanks to all these efforts, the chances of deliberate interstate war in the Middle East are perhaps lower now than at any time in the past 50 years. Lilli- More troops=less conflict (click on link and show them graph its better and rly clear) ~~Eugenio Lilli, University College Dublin, Clinton Institute for American Studies. Belfield House, Belfield - Dublin, Ireland, Apr 12, 2018, "Debating US Military Strategy in the Persian Gulf: What is the Way Forward?," Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, vol.61 no.1, http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttextandamp;pid=S0034-73292018000100204~~#B28, CP~~ Data from the UCDP AND was only minimal. Cropsey- Iran-Saudi-US war happens when US pulls out, two scenarios for conflict Seth Crospey, 12/17/19, Foriegn Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/17/us-withdrawal-power-struggle-middle-east-china-russia-iran/ Three possibilities in AND nuclear weapon. ==Subpoint A) Saudi Lash out== Knights- Our troops= Security Guarantee (Michael Knights, senior fellow of The Washington Institute, specializing in the military and security affairs of Iraq, Iran, and the Persian Gulf states. "U.S.-Saudi Security Cooperation (Part 1): Conditioning Arms Sales to Build Leverage." November 5, 2018. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/u.s.-saudi-security-cooperation-part-1-conditioning-arms-sales-to-build-lev. DOA: 1/17/2019) DE The U.S.-Saudi AND and general economy. Troop pullout destroys the security guarantee, Saab 18 confirms (Bilal Saab, Senior Fellow and Director of the defense and security program at the Middle East Institute and Adjunct Assistant Professor at Georgetown University's Security Studies Program, 22 Aug 2018, "Relocating the Fifth Fleet?", https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/08/22/relocating-the-fifth-fleet/ DOA 3/12/20)KJR Indeed, it's impossible AND relationship with Washington. ===Scenario 1: Succession War=== Luck- Losing the security guarantee would cause infighting in the Saudi Royal family ====Luck 2018 finds (Taylor Luck, correspondent for the Washington Post and Christian Science Monitor. November 28, 2018. The Christian Science Monitor. "As US sours on young prince, old Saudi succession pot is stirred. Too late?" https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2018/1128/As-US-sours-on-young-prince-old-Saudi-succession-pot-is-stirred.-Too-late. DOA: February 3, 2019.) ALP==== Indeed, two AND not heir apparent." Doran- A succession battle leads to a civil war Doran and Badran 2018 AND that the country does not become another base, like Lebanon, for Iran ===Scenario 2: Allied Adventurism=== Emmons- Saudi Arabia aggressive in Yemen Alex Emmons, 4/15/19, The Intercept, https://theintercept.com/2019/04/15/saudi-weapons-yemen-us-france/ The catalogue of AND previously been acknowledged. Roopora- Saudi Arabia will go sicko mode on Iran if US pulls out Simrat Roopora, 8/31/17, The Century Foundation,https://tcf.org/content/report/saudi-fears-spur-aggressive-new-doctrine/?agreed=1 Driven by fear AND aggressive foreign policy. ====Brands- More actors in ME do the same thing==== ~~Hal Brands is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist, the Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, and a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. Most recently, he is the co-author of "The Lessons of Tragedy: Statecraft and World Order.", 10-9-2018, "How to Make the Middle East Even Worse? A U.S. Withdrawal," Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-10-09/how-to-make-the-middle-east-even-worse-a-u-s-withdrawal, CP~~ The Saudi invasion of Yemen, for instance, seems to have been motivated by AND MISSING THE IMPACT SCENARIO (Ward, Cavanaugh, Davies, and Ostavar) ==Subpoint B: Israel== ====Welle- Tensions are high, could become war. ==== Deutsche Welle (Www.Dw, xx-xx-xxxx, "Israel-Iran conflict to be major Middle East issue in 2020," DW, https://www.dw.com/en/israel-iran-conflict-to-be-major-middle-east-issue-in-2020/a-51600787 European signatories to the JCPOA have been unable to effectively lift the renewed embargoes on AND all ratchet up the prospect that an inadvertent clash could escalate the conflict. ====Green- Containment working==== ~~Rep. Mark Green is a graduate of West Point and a combat veteran who served in Afghanistan and Iraq. He was part of the mission to capture Saddam Hussein, and he interviewed Saddam Hussein for six hours on the night of his capture. He serves on the House Homeland Security and Oversight committees, 1-21-2020, "President Trump's Iran strategy is working," The Hill, https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/479208-president-trumps-iran-strategy-is-working, CP~~ While Democrats have scorned President Trump's actions and "mourned" the terrorist leader Soleimani's AND , we remain committed to standing in solidarity with those who love freedom. ====Cropsey- Iran fills power vacuum==== Seth Cropsey, Gary Roughead, 10-31-2019, "A U.S. Withdrawal Will Cause a Power Struggle in the Middle East," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/17/us-withdrawal-power-struggle-middle-east-china-russia-iran/ If the United States withdraws from the region and hands the responsibility of those issues AND special operations forces in an attempt to wear down Saudi and Israeli strength. ===Rhamey- Power vacuum makes conflict 3x more likely http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.922.6625andrep=rep1andtype=pdf While scholars have long AND between states more than triple=== Ahronheim- Iran pushes for war Anna Ahronheim and; January 8, 2020 18, 1-4-2020, "If US leaves the region, Israel will eventually go to war with Iran," The Jerusalem Post ~\| JPost, https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/If-US-leaves-from-the-region-Israel-will-eventually-go-to-war-with-Iran-613446 Should the United States AND has the upper hand. ===Impact: Pre-emptive Strike=== ====Zenko- US troops=Security blanket via defensive missions==== https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2018-10-18-us-military-policy-middle-east-zenko.pdf Due to the regional sensitivities surrounding expanding settlements and the military occupation of portions of AND to US President Donald Trump's decision to withdraw American troops from northern Syria. ====Oren- troops on brink of war now==== ~~MICHAEL OREN was Israel's ambassador to the United States from 2009 to 2013 and, from 2015 to 2019, a member of Knesset and deputy minister in the Prime Minister's Office, "The Coming Middle East Conflagration," The Atlantic, NOVEMBER 4, 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/11/israel-preparing-open-war/601285/, CP~~ The senior ministers of the Israeli government met twice last week to discuss the possibility AND a day of large-scale exchanges, the real war would begin. ====Gilead- US power makes Israel feel buff, withdrawal risks war==== ~~Major General Amos Gilead (Res.) is the Executive Director of the Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS) at IDC Herzliya in Herzliya, Israel. Prior to assuming his current position, General Gilead led a distinguished career for more than three decades in the Israel Defense Forces and in the Israeli Defense Establishment, his last position being Director of Policy and Political-Military Affairs at the Ministry of Defense, "Geopolitics Abhors a Vacuum: Why America's Withdrawal From the Middle East – and Russia's Rise – May Make War Inevitable," Real Clear Defense, January 24, 2020, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2020/01/24/geopolitics_abhors_a_vacuum_why_americas_withdrawal_from_the_middle_east__and_russias_rise__may_make_war_inevitable_114992.html, CP~~ In Israel, where we understand the necessity of military strength, we also understand AND , with America's withdrawal, is the rising power in the Middle East. ====Kraft- Troops=balance of power, withdrawal tips the scales==== ~~Dina Kraft, Correspondent, 10-17-2019, "Why Trump's withdrawal from Syria has Israel on edge," https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2019/1017/Why-Trump-s-withdrawal-from-Syria-has-Israel-on-edge, CP~~ In the past two years Israelis had grown accustomed to the image of President Trump AND us, so we must stand ready to protect ourselves from the danger." ====Reduction of military presence causes Israel to attack ==== Abbott 14 Samuel Abbott, Masters at the University of Leicester in International Relations. The Dangers of Obama's Cut-Price Foreign Policy http://www.e-ir.info/2014/05/01/the-dangers-of-obamas-cut-price-foreign-policy/ The danger with inaction by the United States is Israel, as they may take AND and other essential social activity, and a breakdown in law and order. ===Impact- Regional Prolif=== Cropsey- Iran could get nukes, they tried in the past Seth Cropsey, Gary Roughead, 10-31-2019, "A U.S. Withdrawal Will Cause a Power Struggle in the Middle East," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/17/us-withdrawal-power-struggle-middle-east-china-russia-iran/ Third, a long AND for a nuclear weapon. Sokolski- Iran nukes makes everyone jealous now they want nukes too Sokolski '18 https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/21/in-the-middle-east-soon-everyone-will-want-the-bomb/ President Donald Trump's AND nuclear weapons development). Bar- Polynuclear middle east does not avoid conflict through MAD Shmuel Bar, 2-1-2013, "The Danger of a Poly-Nuclear Mideast," Hoover Institution, https://www.hoover.org/research/danger-poly-nuclear-mideast A Soviet AND even nuclear war.	904,861
365,620	379,779	Round 1	THIS CASE WAS READ PARAPHRASED ====ISIS has money==== United Nations '19 https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/N1901937_EN.pdf 11. Regarding relocators from the core conflict zone, relatively few have become active AND strategic view to funding larger-scale attacks once the opportunity arises again. ====US military funds Iraq counterterror and training==== Washington Post '20 https://outline.com/j7yTAw Like Iraq's Sunnis, "the Kurds would be more at the mercy of the AND under ISIS rule, causing major displacement of people again," he said. ====Concessions to terrorists increase terror attacks==== Patrick T.Brandt (School of Economic, Political and Policy Sciences, University of Texas), European Journal of Political Economy, "Why concessions should not be made to terrorist kidnappers," September 2016, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268016300143 This paper examines the dynamic implications of making concessions to terrorist kidnappers. We apply AND of religious fundamentalist terrorists meant that such casualties generally did not curb kidnappings. ====US counterterror splintered ISIS and Al Qaeda==== Dunne, Charles W., 08-02-2019, "A Balance Sheet on America's "War on Terror" in the Middle East," Arab Center Washington DC, http://arabcenterdc.org/policy_analyses/a-balance-sheet-on-americas-war-on-terror-in-the-middle-east///ZY Eighteen years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States AND Baghouz in eastern Syria, the last town it held in the country. ====55,000 killed per year==== CNBC '16 https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/isis-death-toll-18-800-killed-iraq-2-years-u-n499426 LONDON — At least 18,802 civilians have been killed in Iraq in AND has now lasted nearly five years — was needed to repair the damage." ====Iran wants dominance in the ME==== Jonathon Speyer, 2015 "Is it Iran's Middle East now?," Fathom https://fathomjournal.org/is-it-irans-middle-east-now/ Iran's strategic goal is to emerge as the dominant power in the Middle East and AND apparent when taking a closer look at Iran's main commitments in the region. ====Arab spring isolated Iran- they're mad==== Tisdall '17 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/may/17/iran-arab-spring Iran has been isolated by the Arab spring. Nerves are fraying in Tehran as AND well to ponder: "Whether Cairo or Tehran, death to tyrants!" ==== Iran expands using proxies==== Fulton '11 https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/after-the-arab-spring-irans-foreign-relations-in-the-middle-east Its humanitarian efforts aside, Iran continues to foster militant activity in the region. AND attempting to exploit the post-Mubarak order to reestablish ties with Cairo. ====US sanctions cut off revenue, only alternative is power projection==== Yonah '18 https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/us-sanctions-may-prevent-irans-expansion-despite-exit-from-syria-575374 A report by the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center said Tehran's ambitions to AND foreign areas, let alone increasing its foreign presence, said the report. ====US prevents Iran from seizing oil fields==== Nebehay '19 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-ministers/iran-russia-take-aim-at-u-s-military-presence-near-syrian-oilfields-idUSKBN1X82OQ GENEVA (Reuters) - Iran and Russia on Tuesday condemned U.S. AND revenue, U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper said on Friday. ====Iran fears confrontation with US==== Huda Raouf, 7-12-2019, "Iranian quest for regional hegemony: motivations, strategies and constrains," No Publication, https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/REPS-02-2019-0017/full/html The study concludes that there are obstacles completely in front of achieving the Iranian quest AND has not provided an attractive cultural model for the peoples of the region. ====US has balanced regional power- Saudi and Iran will negotiate==== Farnaz Fassihi and Ben Hubbard, 10-4-2019, "Saudi Arabia and Iran Make Quiet Openings to Head Off War," New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/04/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-iran-talks.html After years of growing hostility and competition for influence, Saudi Arabia and Iran have AND subvert Mr. Trump's effort to build an Arab alliance to isolate Iran. ====Iran perceives US withdrawal as signaling defeat- expands influence==== Knights, Washington Institute, 2011, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus111.pdf As Washington seeks to engage Tehran to create a more normal relationship with the Islamic AND main external obstacles to expanded Iranian influence in Iraq will have been removed. ====War with Israel==== Anna Ahronheim January 8, 2020 18, 1-4-2020, "If US leaves the region, Israel will eventually go to war with Iran," The Jerusalem Post ~\| JPost, https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/If-US-leaves-from-the-region-Israel-will-eventually-go-to-war-with-Iran-613446 Should the United States withdraw its forces and Iran continue on its path through Iraq AND to "minimize Iran's regional insurgency – and that's feasible," he said. ====War with Israel kills millions==== Nick Turse, 5-13-2013, "What Would Happen if Israel Nuked Iran," Mother Jones, https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/05/nuclear-strike-tehran-israel/ Its scenarios are staggering. An Israeli attack on the Iranian capital of Tehran using AND ,000, would result in an almost unfathomable 99.9 casualty	904,881
365,621	379,805	theorydisclosure	hello, it is your friends from lovejoy. we may be open to disclose if these things are followed... 1) you contact us thru text - Garrett Larson (972-567-2709) - Brianna Kim (469-515-0927) we prob won't respond in any other way of communication other than text 2) you must ask us 30 min before the round Theory: 1) we won't run theory, because we aren't a fan of it. we believe that running theory in public forum is a way to make debate inaccessible for many debaters who aren't gifted with the same opportunities and privileges as other debaters. additionally, 'public' forum is public...which means that the 'public' should be allowed to judge and debate it. we think that not running theory makes debate more accessible. 2) if you run disclosure theory against us and are either a) abusive w/ it or b) don't follow our criteria, then we will run mis-disclosure.	904,907
365,622	379,790	0 - CONTACT INFO	Hey, we're from Lovejoy. Please contact us if you have any questions. We are most likely to respond by text Shalin Mehta 214 592 3020 [email protected] Kendall Carll 469 247 4719 [email protected]	904,892
365,623	379,785	3 - JAN - Diplomacy-Oil AC	C1 Diplomacy Intro Remedios ‘19 Remedios, Jesse. May 7 2019. “Sanctions against Venezuela: diplomatic tool or indiscriminate weapon?” National Catholic Reporter. https://www.ncronline.org/news/world/sanctions-against-venezuela-diplomatic-tool-or-indiscriminate-weapon When the Trump administration announced in January it would back Juan Guaidó's claim as the rightful president of Venezuela, it instituted a series of harsh economic sanctions against the country's authoritarian leader Nicolás Maduro in hopes of overthrowing his regime. When Guaidó's April 30 "military uprising" failed to amount to much, some analysts questioned what U.S. sanctions, the anti-Maduro strategy going back to 2017, were accomplishing. One report from a prominent think tank argued the results are nothing short of a worsening humanitarian crisis, evident in the form of 40,000 excess deaths researchers found in one year alone. Benjamin ’19 Medea Benjamin and Nicolas J S Davies, Common Dreams, 17 June 2019, https://www.commondreams.org/views/2019/06/17/us-sanctions-economic-sabotage-deadly-illegal-and-ineffective There is one more critical reason for sparing the people of Iran, Venezuela and other targeted countries from the deadly and illegal impacts of U.S. economic sanctions: they don’t work. Twenty years ago, as economic sanctions slashed Iraq’s GDP by 48 over 5 years and serious studies documented their genocidal human cost, they still failed to remove the government of Saddam Hussein from power. Two UN Assistant Secretaries General, Denis Halliday and Hans Von Sponeck, resigned in protest from senior positions at the UN rather than enforce these murderous sanctions. In 1997, Robert Pape, then a professor at Dartmouth College, tried to resolve the most basic questions about the use of economic sanctions to achieve political change in other countries by collecting and analyzing the historical data on 115 cases where this was tried between 1914 and 1990. In his study, titled “Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work,” he concluded that sanctions had only been successful in 5 out of 115 cases. Pape also posed an important and provocative question: “If economic sanctions are rarely effective, why do states keep using them?” He suggested three possible answers: “Decision makers who impose sanctions systematically overestimate the prospects of coercive success of sanctions.” “Leaders contemplating ultimate resort to force often expect that imposing sanctions first will enhance the credibility of subsequent military threats.” “Imposing sanctions usually yields leaders greater domestic political benefits than does refusing calls for sanctions or resorting to force.” We think that the answer is probably a combination of “all of the above.” But we firmly believe that no combination of these or any other rationale can ever justify the genocidal human cost of economic sanctions in Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Venezuela or anywhere else. Rodriguez ‘18 Francisco Rodriguez, Foreign Policy, 12 January 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/12/why-more-sanctions-wont-help-venezuela/ During the first year of his administration, U.S. President Donald Trump has taken an increasingly hard line against the government of Venezuela’s president, Nicolás Maduro. Washington has tightened sanctions on Caracas and even suggested a military intervention to remove the Venezuelan leader from office. Twelve months into Trump’s term, Maduro seems even more entrenched in power, and Venezuela’s opposition is more fractured than ever. 1 – Hardliners Kurmanaev ‘19 Kurmanaev, Anatoly. Aug 8 2019. “Venezuela’s Leader Suspends Talks With Opposition.” New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/08/world/americas/venezuela-maduro-opposition-talks-barbados.html President Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela has suspended mediated talks with his country’s opposition movement, to protest the Trump administration’s latest sanctions. The move threatens what many analysts and diplomats consider to be the country’s best chance of ending a crippling political and economic crisis. Accusing the administration of “grave and brutal aggression,” Mr. Maduro recalled his envoys late Wednesday night, hours before they were to board a plane to rejoin opposition negotiators and Norwegian mediators on the Caribbean island of Barbados. On Monday, President Trump signed an executive order freezing all Venezuelan state assets in the United States, and his national security adviser, John R. Bolton, threatened to impose sanctions on Mr. Maduro’s remaining trade partners. Venezuela has been in an ongoing recession since Mr. Maduro took office in 2013 and initially doubled down on his predecessor’s disastrous policies of currency and price controls and expropriations. As his popularity tanked, he has increasingly relied on repression and electoral machinations to stay in power. The United States has progressively cut off Mr. Maduro’s access to international finance since January, when it recognized the head of Venezuela’s opposition, Juan Guaidó, as the country’s legitimate leader. The latest executive order is intended to scare off Mr. Maduro’s remaining trading partners in Russia and Asia from doing business in Venezuela. It was unclear whether Mr. Maduro would rejoin the talks at a later date. Both sides have benefited from appearing to seek a negotiated resolution to the crisis, but the latest American sanctions have emboldened hardline opponents of the talks within Mr. Maduro’s administration. “The Barbados dialogue is a dialogue with extremists,” Mr. Maduro said on state television Wednesday after suspending the talks. “Many ask me why you’re talking with those who want to kill you.” DW News ’19 8 August 2019, “Nicolas Maduro halts talks with opposition over US sanctions”, https://www.dw.com/en/venezuela-nicolas-maduro-halts-talks-with-opposition-over-us-sanctions/a-49938617 Venezuela's information ministry said on Wednesday that the government would not attend a planned round of talks, brokered by Norway, with the opposition in Barbados this week. The move came in response to Washington's decision to freeze all assets held by Venezuela's government in the US and blocking US citizens from conducting business with Maduro's government. "President Nicolas Maduro has decided to not send the Venezuelan delegation on this occasion, due to the serious and brutal aggression, perpetrated continuously and cunningly, by the Trump administration against Venezuela,” the statement read. Polga ‘19 John Polga-Hecimovich, 30 August 2019, https://www.georgetownjournalofinternationalaffairs.org/online-edition/2019/8/28/a-transition-from-above-or-from-below-in-venezuela Venezuela continues to buckle under the autocratic rule of Nicolás Maduro. Street protests and social pressure, however, have not succeeded in dislodging the president or bringing about the democratic change so many Venezuelans desire. Instead, the political opposition and international allies have bet on a transition “from above,” or a combination of bottom-up and top-down approaches, and hope to effect change by encouraging a split in Maduro’s governing coalition. Indeed, this appears to be one of the strategies the United States is using in its recently revealed negotiations with members of the Venezuelan government to encourage free and fair elections and the exit of Maduro. Existing scholarly research suggests that a lack of prominent pro-government political moderates makes a transition from above unlikely. Instead, re-democratization depends on finding and courting moderate members of the government—in this case, moderate supporters of ex-president Hugo Chávez, known as Chavistas. However, if press reports are accurate, the United States is in contact with Diosdado Cabello and other pro-Maduro hardliners Given the unlikelihood of transition from below, Venezuela’s political opposition, the Lima Group, and other international actors have set their sights on inducing top-down change through a combination of sticks and a few carrots. This type of transition characteristically stems from self-imposed government liberalization, carried out by a government which seeks to reinforce itself and in doing so may inadvertently bring about democratization. This strategic miscalculation from autocrats is more common than it might first appear. Latin American history is replete with examples of top-down liberalization in which dictators relaxed repression, allowed some civil liberties, and began negotiations with pro-democratic opposition elites. This includes the re-democratization of Ecuador (1976-1979), Brazil (1982-1985), Uruguay (1983-1984), and Chile throughout the 1980s. Similar processes occurred in Poland and with the reunification of Germany in 1989. Liberalization often results from a split in the authoritarian regime between “hard-liners” (in this case Nicolás Maduro, Jorge and Delcy Rodríguez, Tareck El Aissami, Diosdado Cabello) and moderate “soft-liners” (Héctor Rodríguez, Aristóbulo Isturiz). In most cases, the hardline authoritarian leader faces pressure due to declining economic conditions or social unrest, and soft-liners rise to prominence. Whereas hard-liners tend to be satisfied with the status quo, moderates may prefer to liberalize and broaden the social base of the dictatorship in order to gain allies and strengthen their position vis-à-vis the hardliners. 2 – Scapegoat Ward ‘19 Alex Ward, Vox, 3 May 2019, https://www.vox.com/world/2019/5/3/18528083/venezuela-guaido-maduro-trump-bolton-fail What’s more, a US official told me in January that sanctions on PdVSA essentially gives Maduro even more ammunition to paint the US as a big, mean bully trying to destroy Venezuela and make its people suffer. If the economy tanks even further than it already has, the Venezuelan leader can blame the US sanctions and perhaps regain some favor among both the elites — particularly the military leadership — whose support Maduro needs to remain in power, as well as everyday Venezuelans who are the most vulnerable to economic pressures. Maduro needs a good scapegoat: Millions have fled the country due to the crippling economic crisis gripping the country. Inflation is through the roof. Hunger rates have skyrocketed. And diseases once thought eradicated from Venezuela have sparked a new health crisis. Reuters ‘17 2 October 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics/venezuelas-maduro-approval-rises-to-23-percent-after-trump-sanctions-poll-idUSKCN1C8037 Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro’s approval rating rose to 23 percent in September, up 6 percentage points from 17 percent in July, according to a poll by local firm Datanalisis. The rebound followed several rounds of sanctions by U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration as well as a sharp drop-off in four months of violent anti-government protests. Nearly 52 percent of respondents opposed the Trump administration sanctions that came in response to the creation of a legislative superbody called the Constituent Assembly, which critics call the consolidation of a dictatorship. Impact Rapoza ‘19 Kenneth Rapoza, Senior Contributor to Forbes, May 3, 2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2019/05/03/no-u-s-sanctions-are-not-killing-venezuela-maduro-is/#659c9f8e4343 But Venezuela is not the Middle East. U.S. policies are not the reason why Venezuela is a mess, as Omar said this week on the Democracy Now! radio program. The U.S. is not making Venezuela any worse than it is or will become under existing leadership. Her view mimics many left-of-center voices critical of the regime change policies that began under Bush and Cheney. The ruling Socialists United of Venezuela is, point blank, the only reason why Venezuela is a mess. And president Nicolas Maduro is its leader. Maduro governs a failed state. Fifty other countries, including Colombia, Brazil, the U.K. and Spain, all agree. Brazil and Colombia are currently catering to around one million Venezuelans who have fled the country. Some have preferred taking their children out of school and living in United Nations tents in Colombia instead of Maduro's Venezuela. Maduro's incompetence, of which the Socialists United rallies around, is killing Venezuela. Not Trump. Not Elliot Abrams. Not Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. This is not a pre-emptive strike, searching for terrorists under beds and weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. The economy began its deep decline years ago, in the Obama years. It has been in an economic depression for three years. Obama first sanctioned members of the Maduro Administration in 2015. Trump later sanctioned Maduro's Vice President Tareck El Aissami for drug trafficking in February 2017. Later that year, U.S. companies were banned from providing financial assistance (as in loans) to one company only, oil firm PdVSA. C2 Oil Intro Beeton ‘19 March 25, 2019, “Venezuela’s Oil Production Plummets in February Due to New US Sanctions Sales to US Also Disappear for the First Time,” http://cepr.net/press-center/press-releases/venezuela-s-oil-production-plummets-in-february-due-to-new-us-sanctions kegs While the Venezuelan economy was already in bad shape before US sanctions began, due to a collapse in oil prices and mistakes in macroeconomic policy, the sanctions especially since August 2017 have prevented the government from taking measures that could get rid of hyperinflation and allow for an economic recovery from a long depression. Weisbrot and Sachs ‘19 Mark Weisbrot and Jeffrey Sachs. April 2019. CEPR. http://cepr.net/images/stories/reports/venezuela-sanctions-2019-04.pdf Thus one of the most important impacts of the sanctions, in terms of its effects on human life and health, is to lock Venezuela into a downward economic spiral. For this reason, it is important to note that when we look at, for example, the estimated more than 40,000 excess deaths that occurred just from 2017 to 2018, the counterfactual possibility in the absence of sanctions is not just zero excess deaths, but actually a reduction in mortality and other improvements in health indicators. That is because an economic recovery could have already begun in the absence of economic sanctions. And conversely, the death toll going forward this year, if the sanctions remain in place, is almost certainly going to be vastly higher than anything we have seen previously, given the highly accelerated rate of decline of oil production and therefore the availability of essential imports, and also the accelerated decline of income per person. Links Fox ’19 DW News, 10 January 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/the-human-cost-of-the-us-sanctions-on-venezuela/a-50647399 President Donald Trump intensified sanctions in 2017 and this year imposed an oil embargo that blocked the purchase of petroleum from Venezuela's state oil company, PDVSA. It also confiscated Venezuela's US subsidiary CITGO, worth $8 billion. It was a huge blow for Venezuela, which received 90 of government revenue from the oil industry. The U.S. government has also frozen $5.5 billion of Venezuelan funds in international accounts in at least 50 banks and financial institutions. Even if Venezuela could get money abroad, the United States has long blocked international trade by threatening sanctions on foreign companies for doing business with the country. Rodriguez ‘19 Francisco Rodriguez 06-24-2019. Torino Economics. https://torinocap.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Sanctions-and-Vzlan-Economy-June-2019.pdf. This paper considers the evidence on the effect of financial and oil sanctions in the 2017-19 period on Venezuelan oil production and broader socio-economic indicators. Using a panel of countries covering 95 of the word’s oil production, we show that Venezuela’s acceleration in the rate of decline in oil output after the imposition of financial sanctions in 2017 was more rapid than that of all other oil-producing economies in the world except for those undergoing armed conflict at the time. Using synthetic control methods, we estimate that financial sanctions were associated with a decline in production of 797tbd, which at today’s oil prices would represent USD 16.9bn a year in foregone oil revenues. Run on a four-year pre-trend window (2013-2017), all but 1 of the 36 regressions produce a negative estimate of ?1. The exception is the pairwise comparison with Yemen, to which we return below. Chart 4 shows the distribution of these estimates. The median coefficient estimate is -.46, which indicates that sanctions lead to a 46 log point decline in oil output. Taking the August 2017 level of oil production as the starting point, this estimate would imply that sanctions are associated with a 37.1 decline in Venezuela’s oil production, or of 689 thousand barrels per day or USD15.2bn in export revenue at current prices. 5 Morgenstern ‘19 Scott Morgenstern and John Polga-Hecimovich, The Coversation, 8 February 2019, https://theconversation.com/why-venezuelas-oil-money-could-keep-undermining-its-economy-and-democracy-111013 Oil money, in short, can sustain whatever government is in power, be it dictatorship or democracy. But when crude prices fall, the loss of revenue polarizes politics as the wealthy and the poor fight over the reduced proceeds. And when these countries not only rely on one export but also very limited markets, that adds to their vulnerability. Oil sales constituted 98 percent of Venezuela’s export earnings in 2017, with the U.S. buying nearly half of the country’s exported crude. Wyss ‘19 Jim Wyss, 11 March 2019, Miami Herald, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/venezuela/article227416389.html In particular, financial sanctions rolled out in 2017 made it difficult for Venezuela to refinance loans and get fresh funding. Then, in January, Washington used “the nuclear option” and blocked money from Venezuela’s U.S. oil sales from going to Maduro’s coffers — effectively costing the country billions. Venezuela imports 80 to 90 percent of all its goods — including food and medicine — and asphyxiating PDVSA the state run oil company limits the country’s ability to bring in necessities. Venezuela’s imports in 2018 fell to an estimated $11.7 billion down from $66 billion in 2012, according to Torino Capital. And the firm expects imports to fall to about $7 billion this year. Center for Economic and Policy Research ‘19 Center for Economic and Policy Research, http://cepr.net/images/stories/reports/venezuela-sanctions-2019-04.pdf It is important to emphasize that nearly all of the foreign exchange that is needed to import medicine, food, medical equipment, spare parts and equipment needed for electricity generation, water systems, or transportation, is received by the Venezuelan economy through the government’s revenue from the export of oil. Thus, any sanctions that reduce export earnings, and therefore government revenue, thereby reduce the imports of these essential and, in many cases, life-saving goods. The August 2017 sanctions adversely impacted oil production in Venezuela. But following the August 2017 executive order, oil production crashed, falling at more than three times the rate of the previous twenty months. This would be expected from the loss of credit and therefore the ability to cover maintenance and operations and carry out new investments necessary to maintain production levels. This acceleration in the rate of decline of oil production would imply a loss of $6 billion in oil revenue over the ensuing year. This by itself is an enormous loss of foreign exchange, relative to the country’s need for essential imports. Imports of food and medicine for 2018 were just $2.6 billion. Total imports of goods for 2018 were about $10 billion. The loss of so many billions of dollars of foreign exchange and government revenues was very likely the main shock that pushed the economy from its high inflation, when the August 2017 sanctions were implemented, into the hyperinflation that followed. Other executive decisions made by the Trump administration resulted in the closure of Venezuelan accounts in financial institutions, loss of access to credit, and other financial restrictions that have had severe negative impacts on oil production as well as the economy, as detailed in this paper. Even more costly to the economy and the population, the August 2017 sanctions adversely impacted oil production in Venezuela. Figure 1 shows oil production in Venezuela and Colombia, in thousands of barrels per day, from 2013–18. Both countries’ production declined at about the same rate from the beginning of 2016, after a sharp fall in oil prices. But following the August 2017 executive order, oil production crashed, falling at more than three times the rate of the previous twenty months. This would be expected from the loss of credit and therefore the ability to cover maintenance and operations and carry out new investments necessary to maintain production levels. This acceleration in the rate of decline of oil production would imply a loss of $6 billion in oil revenue over the ensuing year. This by itself is an enormous loss of foreign exchange, relative to the country’s need for essential imports. Imports of food and medicine for 2018 were just $2.6 billion. Total imports of goods for 2018 were about $10 billion. Annual oil production fell by 30.1 percent in 2018, as compared with 11.5 percent in 2017.8 The difference in this rate of decline implies a loss of approximately $8.4 billion in foreign exchange that was increasingly desperately needed for essential imports such as medicine and food. It is important to emphasize that nearly all of the foreign exchange that is needed to import medicine, food, medical equipment, spare parts and equipment needed for electricity generation, water systems, or transportation, is received by the Venezuelan economy through the government’s revenue from the export of oil. Thus, any sanctions that reduce export earnings, and therefore government revenue, thereby reduce the imports of these essential and, in many cases, life-saving goods. The loss of so many billions of dollars of foreign exchange and government revenues was very likely the main shock that pushed the economy from its high inflation, when the August 2017 sanctions were implemented, into the hyperinflation that followed. It is common in the history of hyperinflations that they are triggered by a large external shock to government revenues and the balance of payments, as happened to Venezuela following the implementation of these sanctions. If we look at the combined impact of all of these actions, we find that they drastically reduced the ability of Venezuela to produce and sell oil and to sell any foreign assets of the government, the most important of which were frozen and/or confiscated; and also to use whatever foreign exchange that the country is still able to earn to buy essential imports. For these reasons, a baseline projection of Venezuela’s real GDP shows an astounding and unprecedented decline of 37.4 percent in 2019, as compared to 16.7 percent in 2018.12 Imports of goods are projected to fall by 39.4 percent, from $10 billion to $6.1 billion.13 More than 1.9 million people are expected to leave the country, 14 and the impacts on human life and health (described below) are expected to be even more severe than what happened last year. The most immediate impact of the January sanctions was to cut off Venezuela from its largest oil market, the United States, which had bought 35.6 percent of Venezuela’s oil exports in 2018,15 or about 586,000 barrels per day on average.16 In the week of March 15, imports of Venezuelan oil fell to zero for the first time, and they remained there for another two weeks before there was a rebound for one week to 139,000 barrels per day, then 71,000 barrels per day. 17 The Trump administration also intervened to pressure other countries, including India, not to buy the oil that had been previously imported by the US. It is important to note that these threats are effective because the US government can sanction foreign financial institutions who disobey its instructions. Thus in February even Gazprom, which is majority owned by the Russian government, froze the accounts of PDVSA and cut off transactions with the company, under threat of sanctions from the Trump administration.19 Reuters also noted that “Washington is particularly keen to end deliveries of gasoline and refined products used to dilute Venezuela’s heavy crude oil to make it suitable for export.”20 This could impact another 300,000 barrels per day of Venezuelan oil production.21 As a result of these efforts, oil that Venezuela was producing piled up, filling storage facilities and then tankers. The resulting lack of markets and available space to store oil seems to be the main cause of a sharp drop in oil production in February.22 As can be seen in Figure 2, Venezuela’s oil production declined by 130,000 barrels per day from January to February. In the six months prior, it was declining by an average of 20,500 barrels per day. Then in March it fell another 289,000 barrels per day, for a total of 431,000 barrels per day Egan ‘19 Matt Egan, CNN Business, 19 February 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/19/investing/venezuela-oil-sanctions-pdvsa/index.html US sanctions are a double-whammy for Venezuela. Not only was the United States Venezuela's No. 1 customer, but it was the country's main source of naphtha, the liquid hydrocarbon mixture used to dilute crude. Without it, Venezuela's heavy crude can't be readily transported. Rystad Energy forecasts that some operators in Venezuela will run out of diluent by March. US oil prices are up almost 5 since the sanctions were announced. Brent, the global benchmark, is up 8. But analysts don't believe Venezuela is the main reason for the run-up in crude. Instead, they point to OPEC's deeper-than-expected production cuts, turmoil in Libya and the bullish tone in global financial markets as recession fears fade. Constable ‘18 Simon Constable, 14 June 2018, Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/simonconstable/2018/06/14/venezuelas-latest-desperate-plan/#417cf4a844fe Hyperinflation makes it hard for any business to run efficiently. Inflation in the country is now a staggering 34,458, according to the latest estimate (June 14, 2018) from Steve Hanke, professor of applied economics at the Johns Hopkins University. That's down from more than 37,000 earlier this month. Hanke uses the prices of goods inside the country to estimate the rate of inflation. U.S. sanctions mean critical oil extraction equipment is hard to come by in the country. Drill bits and metal pipes quickly get worn out in the oil business because the oil itself is highly corrosive. Without replacement parts, the wells cannot operate. Kurmanaev ‘19 Anatoly Kurmanaev and Clifford Krauss, NYT, 8 February 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/08/world/americas/venezuela-sanctions-maduro.html Now the new American sanctions could cut Venezuela’s oil exports by two-thirds, to just $14 billion this year, and lead to a 26 percent reduction in the economy’s size, according to Mr. Rodríguez, the economist. Mr. Trump said the oil sanctions were meant to punish Mr. Maduro for human rights violations and force him to cede power to Juan Guaidó, the opposition leader whom the United States and many other countries have recognized as the rightful Venezuelan president. The sanctions announced by the Treasury Department on Jan. 28 banned United States companies and individuals from dealing with Venezuela’s state-run oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, or Pdvsa, which provides about 90 percent of the country’s hard currency. The sanctions essentially shut Venezuelan oil out of the American market. Kumar ‘19 Krishna Kumar and Collin Eaton, Reuters, 23 January 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-usa-oil-graphic/u-s-sanctions-on-venezuela-would-reroute-crude-leave-refiners-short-idUSKCN1PH2GU Those deliveries are being made largely through oil-for-debt repayment structures as output from state-run oil company Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A., known as PDVSA, has slumped to near 70-year lows in a nationwide economic crisis. Venezuela’s output has been cut in half since 2016 to less than 1.2 million bpd, according to figures from OPEC secondary sources. Shipments to the United States account for about 75 percent of the cash Venezuela gets for crude shipments, according to a Barclays research note published last week. Parraga ’19 Marianna Parraga and Natalia Chumakova and Ron Bousso, Reuters, 21 February 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-oil-supplies/venezuela-gets-fuel-from-russia-europe-but-the-bill-soars-idUSKCN1QA0H9 The South American nation exports crude but its refineries are in poor condition - hence the need to import gasoline and diesel for petrol stations and power plants, as well as naphtha to dilute its heavy oil. Since the United States imposed fresh sanctions on Venezuela on Jan. 28, products supplies have mainly come from Russian state oil major Rosneft, Spain’s Repsol, India’s Reliance Industries and trading houses Vitol and Trafigura, according to sources and vessel-tracking data. Russia has been a traditional political backer of Caracas, while India and Spain also have long-standing trade ties. But supplies even from those allies are coming at a cost. “The prices they are charging us are horrifying,” said an executive at Venezuelan state-run oil firm PDVSA who is familiar with recent purchases. The executive said the heavy premiums were partially due to the fact that single cargoes passed through several hands before reaching Venezuelan ports and also involved complex and expensive ship-to-ship transfers. A trader involved in one fixture said shipowners were now charging a fee of up to 50 cents per barrel to Venezuela versus 15-20 cents before sanctions. Last year, Venezuela imported most products from the United States with the main providers being PDVSA’s own U.S. subsidiary Citgo Petroleum and a U.S. unit of India’s Reliance. Monthly supplies fluctuated but in December alone PDVSA imported almost 300,000 barrels per day (bpd) of fuel as its domestic refineries worked at just below a third of its 1.3-million-bpd capacity, according to PDVSA data. Imports have fallen to some 140,000 bpd of gasoline, diesel, naphtha and other fuels since the end of January, Refinitiv Eikon data shows. Impacts Martin and Laya ‘19 Eric Martin and Patricia Laya, Bloomberg Businessweek, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-09/what-broke-venezuela-s-economy-and-what-could-fix-it-quicktake Shrinking oil revenue means Venezuela’s external debt has continued to pile up, reaching $157 billion last year, or about 150 percent of gross domestic product. The country defaulted on a portion of its debt in 2017, and creditors are demanding more than $9 billion in overdue payments. In addition, Venezuela owes billions of dollars to companies including Canadian miner Crystallex International Corp. and U.S. oil giant ConocoPhillips to settle disputes over the government’s nationalization of their assets. Among the top priorities is reducing the budget deficit. No plan will get inflation under control unless this is accomplished. Because the government stopped providing statistics several years ago, no one knows the true size of the deficit. Estimates range, but the CIA put it at 46 percent of gross domestic product in 2017. Venezuelan economist Ricardo Hausmann of Harvard University, an informal adviser to Guaido, has proposed that the IMF loan Venezuela more than $60 billion over three years. A loan of that magnitude would allow the central bank to stop printing bolivars. To restore incentives for saving and investment, one approach would be to replace the bolivar with the U.S. dollar or another stable, widely convertible currency. So-called dollarization is currently employed in Ecuador. Another option is for Venezuela to peg its currency to the dollar, as Brazil did in the mid-1990s, in order to both stabilize the currency and stem hyperinflation. Reuters ‘18 Reuters. June 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-debt/venezuelas-creditors-working-on-eventual-debt-restructuring-source-idUSKBN1JG3CA Venezuela’s public and private creditors are working on how to one day restructure its debt, though U.S. sanctions make that impossible for now, a source close to the Paris Club of government creditors said on Wednesday. Crippled by a hyperinflationary economic crisis, the cash-strapped Venezuelan government and state oil company PDVSA are in default on most of their $60 billion in outstanding bonds. Including debt owed to other governments and official lenders, the OPEC member’s foreign debt is estimated to stand at $140 billion, with China owed $20-25 billion and Paris Club creditors $5.8 billion, the source said. Herbst ‘19 John E. Herbst and Jason Marczak, September 2019, Atlantic Council, “Russia’s intervention in Venezuela: What’s at stake?,” https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/russias-intervention-in-venezuela-whats-at-stake/ Meanwhile, day-to-day life in Venezuela continues to deteriorate. Food insecurity and malnutrition are at sky-high levels. As noted in the Bachelet report, in April 2019 the Venezuelan minimum wage, which sits around $7 per month, only covers 4.7 percent of the basic food basket. More than 80 percent of households in Venezuela are food insecure, with the majority of those interviewed as part of the Bachelet investigation consuming only one meal per day.39 The report highlights that, as a result of hyperinflation and the disintegration of Venezuelan food production, an estimated 3.7 million Venezuelans are malnourished. Children and pregnant women are the demographics most likely to suffer from malnutrition in Venezuela. Survival is a struggle. As a result, Venezuelan refugees filed more asylum claims globally in 2018 than citizens of any other country, including Syria.40 If the situation does not improve, the number of Venezuelan migrants and refugees is expected to reach around 8 million in 2020, surpassing total Syrian migration numbers by more than 3 million. Fox ’19 DW News, 10 January 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/the-human-cost-of-the-us-sanctions-on-venezuela/a-50647399 Jenjerlys is just one of more than 300,000 people who are estimated to be at risk because of lack of access to medicines or treatment because of sanctions on the country. That includes 16,000 people who need dialysis, 16,000 cancer patients and roughly 80,000 people with HIV, according to a report published in April by the Washington-based Center for Economic and Policy Research. The situation is poised to get worse, with the total US embargo of the country, announced in August, and new EU sanctions levied last week. Camilleri ‘19 Michael Camilleri, Foreign Affairs, 3 Sept 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/venezuela/2019-09-03/plan-b-venezuela Without question, the Maduro regime is itself responsible for the single largest economic collapse outside a war zone in at least 45 years. But U.S. actions are aggravating the consequences of this collapse while handing Maduro an easy scapegoat. The Trump administration might argue that economic sanctions need time to take full effect. But sanctions have a poor record of producing regime change, and the administration’s waiting game comes at a terrible human price. For Venezuelan society to resist Maduro, it must be able to eat. By one estimate, more than eight in ten Venezuelans now rely on food handouts from Maduro that are conditioned on political loyalty—hardly ripe conditions for a popular uprising.	904,887
365,624	379,814	1 - 1AC - Seizing the Moral High Ground	===1AC – Pitt RR=== ===="Earth… Your Oasis In Space – Where The Air Is Free and Breathing Is Easy"==== ===="Kepler-186f – Where The Grass Is Always REDDER On The Other Side"==== ===="Visit Beautiful Southern Enceladus – More Than 100 Breathtaking Geysers! The Home Of "Cold Faithful" – Booking Tours Now"==== ==== ==== ====The world has been abducted by these hyperstitions of Astromodernity – the cosmotechnics of unfettered capital have arrived from the future to complete the symbolic alignment of Kant's "starry heavens above and moral law within."^^ ^^ NASA's nostalgic 2010 poster series "Visions of the Future" are coded to invite manifest destiny, motivating the expansion of racial capitalism into the cosmos as the "redder" grass on the other side of a white picket fence. These are terms of this contractual future: the reproduction of capital's subjective protocols in the present and future.==== ====Thus, the stakes of National Space Policy are grounded in individuation by accumulation, the destruction of communal bonds to maximize operative efficiency. Accumulation is not a historical event but the perpetual "frontier of capital" that dispossesses all life through enclosure. This accumulation operates on a continuum of domestication along with the afterlives of indigenous genocide, slavery, and the imposition of racialized gender, setting the stage for the counterinsurgency tactics of the 20^^th^^ century like NASA's "Back to Earth" campaign that weaponized the overview effect against civil rights activists.^^ ^^ Staring down the counterfutures of networked insurgency, Empire fights on the terms of the colonial subject just as the Cold War Space race engineered cosmic desire against revolutionary bottom up black, queer, and communist movements in the imperial core and global south.==== ====Now, outer space is a spatial fix for faltering accumulation. Obama's 2010 NSP proclaimed a commitment to "facilitating the growth of a… commercial space sector… for all mankind". The 2015 "SPACE Act" cemented this vision of the future, inaugurating the regime of NewSpace, a hyperreal playground projecting the shared hyperstition of NASA's Astromodern technics and NewSpace privatization as the only possible future. ==== ====Hyperstition is the science of creating self-actualizing futures that produces the politics of outer space in both its material and symbolic dimensions. Through this, Astromodernity has foreclosed the futures of National Space Policy to the highway exits of capital and we want to get the fuck off. ==== Woods, 17 ~~Andrew, intellectual historian, PhD Candidate at the Centre for the Study of Theory and Criticism @ WesternU (Canada), doctoral fellow at the Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right; His articles on the origins and development of the "cultural Marxism" conspiracy theory has been published in Commune magazine and included in the book collections "Critical Theory and the Humanities in the Age of the Alt-Right" (Palgrave) and "Conspiracy Theory, Politics, and Representation" (Routledge); currently writing a book on the history of the "cultural Marxism" conspiracy theory: "Visions from the Future." Temporary Art Review, http://temporaryartreview.com/visions-from-the-future/~~//AD There are three key dates that mark the beginning of the period we call astromodernity AND the future of the future on behalf of the futures of the past. ====Hyperstition is nothing less than temporal sorcery, materializing the future of individuation in the present through the computational infrastructure of Low Earth Orbit that ties cyber space to outer space even as it renders obsolete the bordered space of the the Westphalian nation state. Likewise, the OST and first US national space policy in 1958 prophesized this future, modelling the colonial edict of mare liberum that marked the seas as a common frontier for colonial extraction.^^ ^^ ==== ====Today, datafication and algorithmic governance are the software updates to the weapons of individuation, as satellites built during the cold war allow for finance, telecommunications, and GPS to reduce terrestrial sociality into data packets for the computational unconscious. ==== ====Enter cryptocurrency, an Astromodern hyperstition that flees to the vastness of the Cloud by appealing to securitized protocols of privatization and consumption. Here, the corrupted future of open cyberspace is a smokescreen for the dividends of deep web policing and crypto-economies from military contracts to narco-trafficking.==== ====This militarized hyperstition is the focal point of the pseudo-leftist fantasy of Luxury Communism that requires same satellite-run supply chains and ecological devastation of post-Westphalian Empire, processing trillions of terabytes per minute for blockchain encryption. Where Musk posits a false choice between death on earth and life on Mars, luxury communism and social democracy regurgitate the impossibility of imagining an end to capitalism anywhere in the cosmos.==== ====Astromodernity triangulates the hyperstitions of outer space as the commons, the Cloud, and the private to cohere a desirous attachment to a future of individuation that is both already here and entirely absent. There's only one question left to ask: have you been seduced?==== Hickman, 19 ~~Craig: "Edmund Berger: On Art and Revolutionary Transformation in the Age of Blockchain." non.copyriot, https://non.copyriot.com/edmund-berger-on-art-and-revolutionary-transformation-in-the-age-of-blockchain/~~//AD Looked at from another direction such moments or events could take on the hue of AND artificial agents and machinic cousins will humanity as homo politicos even exist anymore? ====Thus, the plan: establish orbital counter-operations to share information and manage space traffic.==== ====In the face of capital's enclosure of outer space, our praxis must link the materiality of orbital insurgency to a worlding practice that intervenes in the NewSpace Race – where hyperstition jury-rigs nostalgic futures into the present, our response is to negotiate counter-futures through dual power, tying of prefiguration to insurrection to create a better world in the present. This horizon of revolutionary struggle shapes our subjectivities because who we are is produced by what we do. ==== ====Thus, Counter operations repurpose space infrastructure against its progenitor, sabotaging the circuits of accumulation, blockading the operations of logistics and hacking the networks of communication to world new worlds.==== Mezzadra, Political Theory @ UBologna, and Neilson, Institute for Culture and Society, 19 ~~Sandro, Associate Professor, teaches postcolonial studies and contemporary political theory; Brett, Professor, Institute for Culture and Society: THE POLITICS OF OPERATIONS: Excavating Contemporary Capitalism (2019). Duke University Press, ISBN: 9781478003267~~//AD Moreover, as we suggested in chapter 2, there is a need to take AND and continuing to develop institutions of counterpower within a dual-power approach. ====Our praxis must be formed through international cooperation because computational capital subordinates national boundary to post westphalian logistics from the USFG to the Russian Federation. ==== ====This is the opening for counter operations. For example, the Accoustic.Space.Lab in Russia and VIRAC used a network of artists, scientists, and data analysts to build pirate radios and hack cold war satellites, distributing military intel as an exposé on nuclear radiation. This counter operation interrupted military logistics utilizing encrypted media to funnel data to activists on the ground, subverting cybernetic governance to produce insurgent futures as terrestrial realities.^^ ^^==== ====From sabotaging blockchain mining to hacking derelict satellites, counter operations repurpose space traffic for autonomous zones of jurisgenerative social life. The algorithmic individuation of Empire is still haunted by the spectre of communism and its general antagonism, whose fugitive forms and overt, covert protocols change themselves, us, and each other to resist the future of accumulation and its individuating enclosure – only alternative, communist ways of living and caring generate social bonds strong enough to murder the medium of computational capital itself. ==== Beller, 18 ~~Jonathan, Professor and Director of the Graduate Program in Media Studies @ Pratt Institute: "Preface to the revolution: digital specters of communism and the expiration of politics." Social Identities, 24:2, 238-254, DOI: 10.1080/13504630.2017.1321719~~//AD This becoming obsolescent of linguistic debate and the wholesale sublation of the political by the AND pursuit of value that thus far has kept communism imprisoned in quotation marks. ====We should use the time, space, and energy we have in debate to test revolutionary tactics that combat the enclosure of counterinsurgent domestication – praxis-based iterative testing about the repertoire of tactical options we have as activists generates strategies for organizational refinement that can be immediately exported, practiced, and evaluated outside of debate – anything else forecloses insurrection and prefiguration by rejecting questions of adaptability and tradeoffs in action in favor of discursive critique.==== Doherty, Political Sociology @ KeeleU, and Hayes, Languages and Social Sciences @ AstonU, 18 ~~Brian and Graeme: "Chapter 15: Tactics and Strategic Action," in The Wiley Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, First Edition. Edited by David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Holly J. McCammon. Published 2018 by John Wiley and Sons Ltd. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Brian_Doherty3/publication/332946936_Tactics_Strategic_Action/links/5cd2dd19299bf14d957f60ca/Tactics-Strategic-Action.pdf~~//AD Actor?centered approaches to tactics accordingly stress the social?psychological significance to collective AND of what is legitimate and appropriate conduct that reflects ideological and moral positions.	904,916
365,625	379,899	Venezuela Affirmative v1 - Blake	==Contention One: Fueling the Fire == ====The Trump Administrations has recently imposed new sanctions on Venezuela in response to their ongoing political crisis as the CRS '19 explains,==== Congressional Research Service, 10-16-2019, "Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions" https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10715.pdf, Date Accessed 12-2-2019 // WS For more than a decade, the United States has employed sanctions as a policy AND elections. S. 1025 would codify many of the sanctions discussed above. ====The Washington Office on Latin America or WOLA '19 explains that,==== 04-06-2019, "Human Rights Organizations: New U.S. Sanctions Risk Aggravating Human Suffering in Venezuela With No Solution in Sight." WOLA, https://www.wola.org/2019/08/human-rights-organizations-new-u-s-sanctions-risk-aggravating-human-suffering-in-venezuela-with-no-solution-in-sight/, Date Accessed 12-12-2019//SMV On August 5, the Trump administration announced ~~these~~ new sanctions against the AND a severe degradation of its human rights by the government of Nicolás Maduro. ====However, these sanctions aren't helping to solve the political crisis; instead, they make it worse as Rodriguez '18 indicates,==== Francisco RodríGuez, 1-12-2018, "Why More Sanctions Won't Help Venezuela," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/12/why-more-sanctions-wont-help-venezuela/, Date Accessed 12-2-2019 // WS U.S. foreign policy toward Venezuela is premised on a series of misconceptions AND and minds of Venezuelans by helping drive the country's economy into the ground. ====Two reasons why US sanctions are exacerbating the crisis in Venezuela. First, sanctions destroy their oil-reliant economy. Alvarez '19 finds that==== Cesar J. Alvarez and Stephanie Hanson, 02-09-2019, "Venezuela's Oil-Based Economy." CFR, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/venezuelas-oil-based-economy, Date Accessed 12-18-2019//SMV Venezuela's proven oil reserves are among the top ten in the world. Oil generates AND for about one-third of the country's gross domestic product (GDP). ====And, Krauss '19 indicates that as a result of sanctions,==== Anatoly Kurmanaev and Clifford Krauss, 02-08-2019, "U.S. Sanctions Are Aimed at Venezuela's Oil. Its Citizens May Suffer First." New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/08/world/americas/venezuela-sanctions-maduro.html, Date Accessed 12-18-2019//SmV President Trump slapped surprise oil sanctions on Venezuela aimed at toppling President Nicolás Maduro, AND and a dozen tankers filled with Venezuelan crude sat stranded across the Caribbean. ====This is disastrous as Martin '19 indicates that,==== Eric Martin and Patricia Laya, 03-11-2019, "What Broke Venezuela's Economy and What Could Fix It." New York Times, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/what-broke-venezuelas-economy-and-what-could-fix-it/2019/03/09/4413965c-425b-11e9-85ad-779ef05fd9d8_story.html, Date Accessed 12-18-2019//SMV Venezuela's economic situation is unthinkably bad, especially for what was once South America's richest AND needs to dilute its heavy crude, further hindering its ability to export. ====Second, sanctions prevent any chance for economic recovery. Sachs '19 found that,==== Mark Weisbrot and Jeffrey Sachs, 04-2019, "Collective Punishment: The Case of Venezuela." CERP, Date Accessed 12-18-2019//SMV The August 2017 sanctions prohibited the Venezuelan government from borrowing in US financial markets. AND of these essential and, in many cases, life-saving goods. ====He continues that,==== Mark Weisbrot and Jeffrey Sachs, 04-2019, "Collective Punishment: The Case of Venezuela." CERP, Date Accessed 12-18-2019//SMV Thus one of the most important impacts of the sanctions, in terms of its AND an economic recovery could have already begun in the absence of economic sanctions. ====These sanctions have been devastating to the Venezuelan economy as Sachs 19 finds that==== Weisbrot and Jeffrey Sachs, Center for Economic and Policy Research April 2019 If we look at the combined impact of all of these actions, we find AND 4 percent, from $10 billion to $6.1 billion. ====There are two impacts to Venezuelan instability. First is a refugee crisis as US Sanctions exacerbate Venezuelan migration crisis. Al Jazeera finds in 2019 ==== 8-1-2019, Dylan Baddour,"Colombia sees new migrant wave from Venezuela amid US sanctions," Al Jazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2019/08/colombia-sees-migrant-wave-venezuela-sanctions-190813201741399.html, Date Accessed:// 12-18-19, LNW Bogota, Colombia - A tighter squeeze on Venezuela from recent US sanctions will only AND Nicolas Maduro and the US-backed opposition, over the country's future. ====Janetsky 19' quantifies that==== Megan Janetsky, 1-14-19, "Here's Why Colombia Opened Its Arms to Venezuelan Migrants", Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/14/heres-why-colombia-opened-its-arms-to-venezuelan-migrants-until-now/, Date Accessed:// 12-18-19, LNW As mass migrations sweep across Latin America, a growing wave of xenophobia has taken AND "They ~~Colombian politicians~~ see them as victims of their enemy." ====This is especially devastating because death increases as a result as The Japan Times finds in 2019 that==== 8-26-2019, "Violent deaths of Venezuelans in Colombia said on the rise, averaging one a day since year's start," Japan Times, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/08/26/world/crime-legal-world/violent-deaths-venezuelans-colombia-said-rise-averaging-one-day-since-years-start/~~#.XfrldkdKg2w, Date Accessed:// 12-18-19, LNW BOGOTA – An average of one Venezuelan died violently in Colombia each day in the AND months of this year, 18 Venezuelans died by suicide in the country. ====Baddour furthers that Venezuelan migration is causing a crisis in columbia==== Dylan Baddour, 8-16-2019, "This Country Is Setting the Bar for Handling Migrants," Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/08/colombias-counterintuitive-migration-policy/596233/ The ~~Colombian~~ government has spent hundreds of millions of dollars bolstering hospitals, AND of 7 million, is now home to 350,000 Venezuelans alone. ====The second impact is hampering access to life saving medicine as Sachs '19 finds that due to US sanctions killing Venezuela's trading abilities, ==== Mark Weisbrot and Jeffrey Sachs, 04-2019, "Collective Punishment: The Case of Venezuela." CERP, Date Accessed 12-18-2019//SMV More than 300,000 people were estimated to be at risk because of lack AND , along with imports generally, contributing to malnutrition and stunting in children. ====And Buncombe '19 quantifies that,==== Andrew Buncombe, 02-26-2019, "US sanctions on Venezuela responsible for 'tens of thousands' of deaths, claims new report." Independent, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/venezuela-sanctions-us-excess-death-toll-economy-oil-trump-maduro-juan-guaido-jeffrey-sachs-a8888516.html, Date Accessed 12-16-2019//SMV As many as 40,000 people may have died in Venezuela as a result AND treaties that the US has signed. Congress should move to stop it." =Blah= ====The impact is starvation as Ulmer finds,==== Alexandra Ulmer, 07-03-2019, "Banging on empty pots, Venezuelans protest food shortages." Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics/banging-on-empty-pots-venezuelans-protest-food-shortages-idUSKBN18U0SO, Date Accessed 12-18-2019//SMV Around 93 percent of Venezuelans cannot afford to buy enough food and 73 percent of AND cut back on meat or vegetables and instead get by on cheaper starches. ====As a result of this economic depression, unemployment has peaked as Biller '19 reports,==== David Biller and Patricia Laya, 04-09-2019, "Venezuela Unemployment Nears That of War-Ruined Bosnia, IMF Says." Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-09/venezuela-unemployment-nears-that-of-war-ruined-bosnia-imf-says, Date Accessed 12-18-2019//SMV Venezuela's unemployment rate is soaring to levels unseen in the world since the Bosnian war AND 1/2-year domestic war, according to the multilateral's database. ====The impact is saving lives. ==== ====That's why WOLA '19 corroborates that empirically,==== 04-06-2019, "Human Rights Organizations: New U.S. Sanctions Risk Aggravating Human Suffering in Venezuela With No Solution in Sight." WOLA, https://www.wola.org/2019/08/human-rights-organizations-new-u-s-sanctions-risk-aggravating-human-suffering-in-venezuela-with-no-solution-in-sight/, Date Accessed 12-12-2019//SMV On August 5, the Trump administration announced ~~the~~ new sanctions against the AND a severe degradation of its human rights by the government of Nicolás Maduro. ====Specifically, ==== Ana Campoy, 5-9-19, "The definitive 21st-century guide to the fight in Venezuela," Quartz, https://qz.com/1611086/venezuela-maduro-guaido-and-the-new-face-of-dictatorship/ US, Venezuela no longer has any institutions that can keep presidential power in check AND . "It's unlikely to yield peacefully. That's been the historic pattern."	905,078
365,626	379,915	Belt and Road Negative v1 - St James	=Marist OW – Saint James v1= ==Contention 1 is BRI Politics== ====Recently Trump has delayed talks of imposing EU auto tariffs in favor of further trade talks as Bryce Baschuk writes this week that==== Bryce Baschuk, 9-4-2019, "EU Trade Chief Says U.S. Car Tariff Threat 'Not Based on Facts'," Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-09-04/eu-trade-chief-says-u-s-car-tariff-threat-not-based-on-facts, Date Accessed 9-4-2019 // WS European Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmstrom said cars made in the EU don't pose a threat AND EU and the U.S. endeavor to negotiate a trade pact. ====Unfortunately joining the BRI represents a geopolitical shift of the EU moving towards China and away from the US fo by creating a severed alliance. Noah Barkin explains in 2019 that joining the BRI:==== Noah Barkin, 6-4-2019, "The US is losing Europe in its battle with China", The Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/06/united-states-needs-europe-against-china/590887/, Date Accessed 7-19-2019 // SDV But conversations I had with dozens of officials on both sides of the Atlantic— AND power can reverse the course of history and return to its glorious past. ====Seeing this shift away from the US requires a response from Trump – Nahal Toosi explains that economic pressure in an election year is how Trump feels he can make larger progress against Europe – he argues that:==== Nahal Toosi, 8-24-2019, " Democrats can't just unwind Trump's foreign policy," https://www.politico.com/story/2019/08/24/democrats-trump-foreign-policy-1474308, Date Accessed 9-3-2019 // JM Trump's defenders view the situation differently. They argue that Trump has injected a much AND "It'll be interesting if that turns out to be the same man." ====In fact, Burchard puts simply that:==== HANS VON DER BURCHARD, 7-26-2019, "Europe braces for Trump trade war," POLITICO, https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-braces-for-trump-trade-war/, Date Accessed 7-25-2019 // WS Trump has repeatedly said he wants to slash the U.S.'s $ AND , that will have "immediate financial consequences for our friends in Europe." ====No matter how he gets there, Trump's response is the same – it comes in the form of unleashing tariffs. Vasilis Trigkas furthers in 2018 that if trade negotiations accelerate between China and the EU==== Vasilis Trigkas, 6-6-18, "Nato, China summits a chance for Europe to assert itself," South China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/united-states/article/2153948/nato-and-china-summits-give-europe-chance, Date Accessed 8-27-2019 // WS In Beijing, EU leaders may have a seemingly easier task negotiating with the Chinese AND serve as a model for a prospective commercial rapprochement between Beijing and Washington. ====Charles Wallace specifies that these tariffs would go on the auto industry as he writes 3 days ago that==== Wallace, Charles 10-2-19 "Trump To Put Tariffs On European Imports." Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/charleswallace1/2019/10/02/trump-to-put-tariffs-on-european-imports/~~#7888a7103945. Date Accessed 10-5-19 // AO Trump also has threatened to impose tariffs on European automakers because of the hefty taxes Europe puts on U.S. cars such as SUVs. The Europeans have threatened to retaliate if tose taxes go ahead. ====The impact is sending the global economy into a tailspin. Thomas Duesterberg writes in 2019 that the EU:==== Thomas Duesterberg, 4-5-2019, "Trans-Atlantic Trade Is Headed Toward Disaster," Foreign Policy, http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:wj2zcclEw_sJ:https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/05/trans-atlantic-trade-is-headed-toward-disaster/andamp;hl=enandamp;gl=usandamp;strip=1andamp;vwsrc=0, Date Accessed 7-18-2019 // WS After an Oval Office meeting last month between U.S. President Donald Trump AND the trigger on auto tariffs and send the global economy into a tailspin. ====Gina Heeb quantifies that a:==== Heeb, Gina. "Trump's proposed car tariffs could trigger a global growth recession, BAML says." Market Insider. February 1 2019.//GG, https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/trump-tariffs-cars-could-trigger-global-growth-recession-baml-2019-2-1027973273 President Donald Trump has doubled down on threats to levy duties on car imports from AND posing even greater risks than the global trade tensions that emerged last year. ====The impact of preventing this recession is massive as Harry Bradford writes that the next==== Harry Bradford, 4-5-2013, "Three Times The Population Of The U.S. Is At Risk Of Falling Into Poverty," HuffPost, span class="skimlinks-unlinked"https://www.huffpost.com/entry/global-poverty-900-million-economic-shock_n_3022420/span, Date Accessed 7-28-2019 // WS Economic Shock Could Throw 900 Million People Into Poverty, IMF Study Warns A recent AND figure is three times the size of the U.S. population. ==Contention 2 is the Environment== ====Right now, globally and within china, the coal sector is collapsing as Kirk 19 states that:==== Karin Kirk, 8-28-19, "Why It's Premature to Declare Coal Dead," Yale Climate Connections, https://www.yaleclimateconnections.org/2019/08/why-its-premature-to-declare-coal-dead/, Date Accessed 8-28-19//LH Coal's story across the world is a study in contrasts: up sharply in some AND climate, can Earth's over-reliance on fossil fuels end fast enough? ====The BRI is China's opportunity to rebound the coal sector due to it's potential to harm the environment as Isabel Hilton writes in 2019 that==== Isabel Hilton, 1-3-2019, "How China's Big Overseas Initiative Threatens Global Climate Progress," Yale E360, https://e360.yale.edu/features/how-chinas-big-overseas-initiative-threatens-climate-progress, Date Accessed 7-13-2019 // WS China's Belt and Road Initiative is a colossal infrastructure plan that could transform the economies AND century, it would make the emissions targets in the Paris Agreement impossible." ====And Rao Dokku explains that China has a unique incentive to export coal due to domestic environmental regulations as he writes that==== Nagamalleswara Rao Dokku, 9-25-2018, "Is China going green by dumping brown on its BRI partners? ," East Asia Forum, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/09/25/is-china-going-green-by-dumping-brown-on-its-bri-partners/, Date Accessed 7-15-2019 // WS The ecological impact of the BRI is worrying not just for the local communities directly AND oak, the Manchurian ash and the Amur tiger in far eastern Russia. ====There are two impacts. This first is emissions. Simon Zadek of Brookings writes in April that==== Simon Zadek, 4-25-2019, "The critical frontier: Reducing emissions from China's Belt and Road," Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2019/04/25/the-critical-frontier-reducing-emissions-from-chinas-belt-and-road/" Date Accessed 7-18-2019 // WS While every energy-saving bulb makes a difference, there are only a small AND -risked by public institutions, notably export credit agencies and development banks. ====Jackson Ewing of the Hill quantifies that as a result of BRI coal investment==== Jackson Ewing, 4-5-2019, "China's foreign energy investments can swing coal and climate future," TheHill, https://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/437564-chinas-foreign-energy-investments-can-swing-coal-and-climate?fbclid=IwAR0UCb9C9o6WKWc0c4DKoeqHBBnKKAlCEEpVjF4crjAbPdI_9PKs5hfqcrE, Date Accessed 7-23-2019 // WS When blackouts roiled Pakistan in 2014-15, China stepped in to help the AND an emerging fleet of Asian coal-fired power plants leading the way. ====Unfortunately, growing emissions will result in lives lost through increased climate change. Adam Vaughn indicates that:==== Adam Vaughan, 5-12-2009, "Cleaner air from reduced emissions could save millions of lives, says report," Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/may/12/emissions-pollution-premature-deaths, Date Accessed 8-21-2018 // WS Tackling climate change by cutting greenhouse gas emissions could save millions of lives because of the cleaner air that would result, according to a recent study. Researchers predict that by 2050, about 100 million premature deaths caused by respiratory health problems linked to air pollution could be avoided through measures such as low emission cars. The economic benefits of saving those lives in developing countries such as China and India could also strengthen the negotiating hand of the UK and Europe at a crucial UN climate summit in Copenhagen this December. Johannes Bollen, one of the authors of the report for the Netherlands Environment Agency, said the ~~approximately~~ 100 million early deaths could be prevented by cutting global emissions by 50 by 2050~~.~~,a target consistent with those being considered internationally. The reports warns that if governments continue with business-as-usual energy use, then population growth, ageing demographics and increased urbanisation will cause premature deaths from pollution to increase by 30 in OECD countries, and 100 outside the OECD. The study also has implications for which technologies are chosen to reduce CO2 and other greenhouse gases. The study points out that while carbon capture and storage technology can capture CO2, it does not usually trap other air pollutants. Last month, the energy and climate minister, Ed Miliband, put "clean coal" at the centre of UK energy policy by pledging no new coal-fired power stations would be built without at least partial CCS. ====The second impact is air pollution as EC writes that==== End Coal, https://endcoal.org/health/, Date Accessed 7-28-2019, // SDV Coal is responsible for over 800,000 premature deaths per year globally and many AND disposal of coal ash waste, can have significant impacts on human health. ====And unfortunately, spreading renewable energy won't even make a visible impact, as Kirk states that even though countries are==== Karin Kirk, 8-28-19, "Why It's Premature to Declare Coal Dead," Yale Climate Connections, https://www.yaleclimateconnections.org/2019/08/why-its-premature-to-declare-coal-dead/, Date Accessed 8-28-19//LH Coal's story across the world is a study in contrasts: up sharply in some AND climate, can Earth's over-reliance on fossil fuels end fast enough?	905,093
365,627	379,860	Belt and Road Negative v2 - Coal Export Diplomacy Contention	==Contention 1: Limiting Coal Expansion== ====Currently the BRI is facing collapse due to a funding gap as Minxin Pei writes in 2019 that ==== Minxin Pei , 2-15-2019, "Will China let Belt and Road die quietly?," https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Will-China-let-Belt-and-Road-die-quietly, Date Accessed 7-10-2019 // WS The news for China's ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been unrelentingly AND eventually lets BRI, at least BRI 1.0, die quietly. ====This is why U Penn quantifies in 2019 that==== U. Penn, 4-30-2019, "China's Belt and Road Initiative: Why the Price Is Too High," Knowledge@Wharton, https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-why-the-price-is-too-high/, Date Accessed 7-12-2019 // WS' Along with the debt piling up at BRI beneficiary countries, China, too, AND have also scaled back, despite their status as arms of government policy." ====Unfortunately voting AFF provide the needed funds to keep the BRI afloat as Horia Cjurtin writes in 2017 that ==== Horia Ciurtin, December 2017, "A PIVOT TO EUROPE: CHINA'S BELT-AND-ROAD BALANCING ACT", European Institute of Romania, http://ier.gov.ro/wp-content/uploads/publicatii/Final_Policy-Brief-5_Horia-Ciurtin-A-Pivot-to-Europe_web.pdf, Date Accessed 7-13-2019 // WS However, as shown before, China cannot financially and logistically manage such an ambitious AND ) demands on China, before getting to the actual build-up. ====Saving the Belt and Road is an environmental disaster as Isable Hilton writes in 2019 that==== Isabel Hilton, 1-3-2019, "How China's Big Overseas Initiative Threatens Global Climate Progress," Yale E360, https://e360.yale.edu/features/how-chinas-big-overseas-initiative-threatens-climate-progress, Date Accessed 7-13-2019 // WS China's Belt and Road Initiative is a colossal infrastructure plan that could transform the economies AND century, it would make the emissions targets in the Paris Agreement impossible." ====And Rao Dokku explains that China has a unique incentive to export coal due to domestic environmental regulations as he writes that==== Nagamalleswara Rao Dokku, 9-25-2018, "Is China going green by dumping brown on its BRI partners? ," East Asia Forum, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/09/25/is-china-going-green-by-dumping-brown-on-its-bri-partners/, Date Accessed 7-15-2019 // WS The ecological impact of the BRI is worrying not just for the local communities directly AND oak, the Manchurian ash and the Amur tiger in far eastern Russia. ====There are two impacts. This first is emissions. Simon Zadek of Brookings writes in April that==== Simon Zadek, 4-25-2019, "The critical frontier: Reducing emissions from China's Belt and Road," Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2019/04/25/the-critical-frontier-reducing-emissions-from-chinas-belt-and-road/" Date Accessed 7-18-2019 // WS While every energy-saving bulb makes a difference, there are only a small AND -risked by public institutions, notably export credit agencies and development banks. ====Jackson Ewing of the Hill quantifies that as a result of BRI coal investment==== Jackson Ewing, 4-5-2019, "China's foreign energy investments can swing coal and climate future," TheHill, https://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/437564-chinas-foreign-energy-investments-can-swing-coal-and-climate?fbclid=IwAR0UCb9C9o6WKWc0c4DKoeqHBBnKKAlCEEpVjF4crjAbPdI_9PKs5hfqcrE, Date Accessed 7-23-2019 // WS When blackouts roiled Pakistan in 2014-15, China stepped in to help the AND an emerging fleet of Asian coal-fired power plants leading the way. ====Unfortunately, growing emissions will result in lives lost through increased climate change. Adam Vaughn indicates that:==== Adam Vaughan, 5-12-2009, "Cleaner air from reduced emissions could save millions of lives, says report," Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/may/12/emissions-pollution-premature-deaths, Date Accessed 8-21-2018 // WS Tackling climate change by cutting greenhouse gas emissions could save millions of lives because of the cleaner air that would result, according to a recent study. Researchers predict that by 2050, about 100 million premature deaths caused by respiratory health problems linked to air pollution could be avoided through measures such as low emission cars. The economic benefits of saving those lives in developing countries such as China and India could also strengthen the negotiating hand of the UK and Europe at a crucial UN climate summit in Copenhagen this December. Johannes Bollen, one of the authors of the report for the Netherlands Environment Agency, said the ~~approximately~~ 100 million early deaths could be prevented by cutting global emissions by 50 by 2050~~.~~,a target consistent with those being considered internationally. The reports warns that if governments continue with business-as-usual energy use, then population growth, ageing demographics and increased urbanisation will cause premature deaths from pollution to increase by 30 in OECD countries, and 100 outside the OECD. The study also has implications for which technologies are chosen to reduce CO2 and other greenhouse gases. The study points out that while carbon capture and storage technology can capture CO2, it does not usually trap other air pollutants. Last month, the energy and climate minister, Ed Miliband, put "clean coal" at the centre of UK energy policy by pledging no new coal-fired power stations would be built without at least partial CCS. ====The second impact is air pollution as EC writes that==== End Coal, https://endcoal.org/health/, Date Accessed 7-28-2019, // SDV Coal is responsible for over 800,000 premature deaths per year globally and many AND disposal of coal ash waste, can have significant impacts on human health.	905,012
365,628	379,859	Belt and Road Negative v3 - NATO Contention	==Contention 2 is NATO== ====The EU joining the BRI will destroy NATO in two ways==== ====First is military mobility. Robbie Gramer writes in March that==== Robbie Gramer, 3-20-2019, Trump Wants NATO's Eyes on China, Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/20/us-wants-nato-to-focus-on-china-threat-critical-infrastructure-political-military-huawei-transatlantic-tensions/, Date Accessed 9-12-2019 // JM "The United States has been very clear that we are concerned with certain foreign AND ports and infrastructure could hamper their plans in the event of a conflict. ====This is why Shannon O'Neil writes this year that==== Shannon K. O'Neil, 4-3-2019, "Why Europe Is Getting Tough on China," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-04-03/why-europe-getting-tough-china, Date Accessed 9-18-2019 // WS Working with Europe not only increases U.S. leverage but helps ensure that AND . interventions sometimes coming unhelpfully late in European debates and with mixed success. ====Second is American backlash. Specifically, this retaliation comes in the form of the US decreasing contributions toward NATO as Stephan Walt writes in 2016 that as a result of the EU turning their back on the US==== Stephan Walt, 2016, https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/EUGS_Opinion_1_Walt_0.pdf, Date Accessed 9-12-2019 // WS A growing proportion of US military power will be assigned to Asia, while American AND guarantee its security, especially if European companies are helping China grow stronger. ====These two reasons are problematic as The Economist reports in March that as a result there would be gaps in military capabilities and the EU would be forced to==== The Economist, 3-14-19, https://www.economist.com/technology-quarterly/2019/03/14/what-would-happen-if-america-left-europe-to-fend-for-itself, Date Accessed 9-13-2019 // WS There would be gaps in capabilities, too. How bad these were would depend AND , "~~which~~ would overwhelm the Europeans politically, financially and militarily." ====There are two impacts ==== ====The first is a welfare spending tradeoff. Since The EU would be forced to fill the new defense gap and increase their own defense spending it would directly trade off with their welfare expenditures as Ted Galen writes that the EU is==== Ted Galen, 7-12-2010, "U.S. Defense Spending Subsidizes European Free-Riding Welfare States," Cato Institute, https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/us-defense-spending-subsidizes-european-freeriding-welfare-states, Date Accessed 9-13-2019 // WS Most other NATO governments appear to have implicitly made similar calculations. They are reducing AND "American conditions" — a caricature of "cut-throat capitalism." ====These welfare systems are critical to reducing poverty as the European Commission writes that on average ==== European Commission, "Poverty and social exclusion," No Publication, https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=751andamp;langId=en, Date Accessed 9-26-2019 // WS This is still above the target set out in the Europe 2020 strategy, but AND , the least effective by 16 (the EU average is 34) ====The second impact is war. Heidi Hardt writes in 2018 that currently NATO deters Russian aggression through its Article 5 agreement which states==== Heidi Hardt, 7-16-2018, "Opinion," HuffPost, span class="skimlinks-unlinked"https://www.huffpost.com/entry/opinion-hardt-trump-nato_n_5b4c9dfde4b022fdcc5b89d6/span, Date Accessed 9-12-2019 // WS Simply put, withdrawing from NATO would make the world less safe. It would AND by Russia, China and non-state actors, including terrorist organizations. ====This has empirically deterred Russian aggression, however, if NATO were to disband or the US reduce contributions, Hardt continues it==== Heidi Hardt, 7-16-2018, "Opinion," HuffPost, span class="skimlinks-unlinked"https://www.huffpost.com/entry/opinion-hardt-trump-nato_n_5b4c9dfde4b022fdcc5b89d6/span, Date Accessed 9-12-2019 // WS Simply put, withdrawing from NATO would make the world less safe. It would AND by Russia, China and non-state actors, including terrorist organizations. ====Specifically, due to NATO's perceived weakness and inability to respond to an invasion, Moscow would invade the Balticss as Zack Beauchamp writes in 2016 that ==== Zack Beauchamp, 7-21-2016, "Donald Trump needs to clarify his position on NATO before something scary happens," Vox, https://www.vox.com/2016/7/21/12247074/donald-trump-nato-war, Date Accessed 9-12-2019 // WS According to some Russia experts, Vladimir Putin's ultimate wish in Europe is to break AND really willing to sacrifice their own soldiers in defense of a tiny state? ====The impact is death. The Baltic states would force their civilians to fight in a 'total defense' strategy if Russia invades. Michael Peck writes that==== Michael Peck, 10-21-2017, "If Russia Ever Invades the Baltics, This Is the Plan to Make It as Painful as Possible," National Interest, a class="vglnk" href="https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/if-russia-ever-invades-the-baltics-the-plan-make-it-painful-22807" Date Accessed 9-12-2019 // WS The Baltic states have a plan to defend themselves against Russian invasion: mobilize their AND might deter attack—or at least not leave you feeling so helpless.	905,011
365,629	379,843	OCO Affirmative v3 - Decision Calculus Contention v2	==Our Sole Contention is Shifting the Decision Calculus== ====The use of OCO's have changed the decision calculus for how we respond to conflicts in three ways. ==== ====Subpoint A is Avoiding a War Caused By Private Companies==== ====Despite private companies being hacked in the status quo, it remains illegal for them to hack back. This is because the US believes in reserving the power to hack back should be limited to the federal government - Bennett indicates in 2018 that:==== Wade Bennett, 6-21-2018, "US gov't should have CYBERCOM 'hack back' against attacks, intel experts say," American Military News, https://americanmilitarynews.com/2018/06/us-should-have-cybercom-hack-back-against-attacks-intel-experts-say/, Date Accessed 11-22-2019 // JM A cyber security panel this week encouraged the U.S. government to adapt AND are not allowed to access computers outside their own network without expressed permission. ====This is vital as federal use of OCO's comparatively prevents companies become cyber vigilantes. Duffy argues in 2018 that:==== Ryan Duffy, 6-19-2018, "Private sector warms to Cyber Command hacking back," CyberScoop, https://www.cyberscoop.com/cyber-command-hack-back/, Date Accessed 11-18-2019 // CDM The U.S. government should decide how to retaliate against the worst attacks AND that provides a really good view" to the government, said Amoroso. ====Private cyber vigilantism incites global conflict as Kallberg indicates in 2018 that:==== Jan Kallberg, 10-9-2018, "Legalizing Private Hack Backs leads to Federal Risks," https://cyberdefense.com/private-cyber-retaliation-undermines-federal-authority, Date Accessed 11-21-2019 // CDM The demarcation in cyber between the government sphere and the private sphere is important to AND control, and is counterproductive for the national cyberdefense and the national interest. ====In fact, it would spill over into other countries policies and magnify the impact of cyber conflict – Nojeim indicates that private sector hacking back leads==== Greg Nojeim, 7-22-2017, "Letting Cyberattack Victims Hack Back Is a Very Unwise Idea," Wired, https://www.wired.com/story/letting-cyberattack-victims-hack-back-is-a-very-unwise-idea/, Date Accessed 11-21-2019 // CDM What's more, if the US allows hacking back by private-sector firms, AND that American laws cannot reach, along with an increase in financial damages. ====Sorcher argues that:==== Sara Sorcher, 4-6-2015, "Influencers: Companies should not be allowed to hack back," Christian Science Monitor. https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/Passcode-Influencers/2015/0401/Influencers-Companies-should-not-be-allowed-to-hack-back, Date Accessed 11-22-2019 // JM Even as companies are hit by increasingly sophisticated cyberattacks, 82 percent of Influencers say AND than full scale 'hack back' is acceptable and even more commonplace." - Influencer ====That's why Knake concludes that:==== Robert Knake, 5-30-2018, "Instead of Hacking Back, U.S. Companies Should Let Cyber Command Do It for Them," Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/blog/instead-hacking-back-us-companies-should-let-cyber-command-do-it-them, Date Accessed 11-21-2019 // JM Private companies hacking back scares many people in the cybersecurity policy community because, particularly AND and a counter offensive capability, while maintaining government responsibility for these activities. ====Subpoint B – Avoiding Conventional Wars in Global Hotspots==== ====Rasidi indicated at the end of 2019 that:==== Yasmeen Rasidi, 10-23-2019, "Has the US Already Declared a Cyber War on Iran?," Citizen Truth, https://citizentruth.org/has-the-us-already-declared-a-cyber-war-on-iran/, Date Accessed 10-23-2019 // WS Conventional battlefields have been replaced by cyber warfare and the U.S. has AND favored by U.S. administrations intent on avoiding actual military confrontations. ====We see this decision calculus changed in two forthcoming hotspots. The first hot spot we avoid is a conventional conflict with Iran. Sebastien Roblin wrote that back in June:==== Sebastien Roblin, 11-2-2019, "Fact: The United States and Iran Came within Minutes of War Back in June," National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/fact-united-states-and-iran-came-within-minutes-war-back-june-93011, Date Accessed 11-5-2019 // WS By most accounts, the United States and Iran came within minutes of armed conflict AND minister stated this marked "the permanent closure of the path of diplomacy." ====Empirically the reason we avoided this war was because US Offensive Cyber Operations provided an attack alternative as Elias Groll wrote last month that Trump==== Elias Groll, 9-27-2019, "The U.S.-Iran Standoff Is Militarizing Cyberspaceandnbsp;," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/09/27/the-u-s-iran-standoff-is-militarizing-cyberspace/, Date Accessed 10-24-2019 // WS With U.S. President Donald Trump considering ways to retaliate against Iran for AND on Saudi oil facilities, Trump is reportedly mulling the use of cyberweapons. ====The impact is death. Preventing a war with Iran is crucial as John Haltiwanger wrote last month that==== John Haltiwanger, 9-19-2019, "Trump and Iran may be on the brink of a war that would likely be devastating to both sides," Business Insider, https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-iran-near-brink-of-a-war-that-would-likely-devastate-both-sides-2019-5, Date Accessed 10-23-2019 // WS A war with Iran would potentially be more calamitous ~~worse~~ than the US AND forces killed at least 608 US troops in Iraq between 2003 and 2011. ====The second hot spot we avoid is a conventional conflict with Venezuela. Recent meetings on the Venezuela crisis are leading the international community to believe that military intervention is becoming inevitable as Paddeu indicated three weeks ago:==== Federica Paddeu, 10-29-2019, "The Rio Treaty: Paving the Way for Military Intervention in Venezuela?," Just Security, https://www.justsecurity.org/66758/the-rio-treaty-paving-the-way-for-military-intervention-in-venezuela/, Date Accessed 11-9-2019 // JM The meeting fueled speculation about a military option, in particular because Costa Rica's proposal AND collective self-defense against terrorist groups along the Venezuela-Colombia border. ====OCO's achieve the US's same goals without the human cost as Max Smeets furthers in 2018 that:==== Max Smeets, 2018 "The Strategic Promise of Offensive Cyber Operations." Strategic Studies Quarterly, Volume 12, Issue 3, , https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-12_Issue-3/Smeets.pdf, Date Accessed 10-22-2019 //WS In 2015, when India's Prime Minster Narendra Modi launched "Digital India Week" AND how these individuals can suffer bodily harm during an offensive cyber operation.77 ====And specifically, an OCO is the only thing that can influence the behavior of Venezuela as Leetaru explains in 2019 that==== Kalev Leetaru, 3-9-2019, "Could Venezuela's Power Outage Really Be A Cyber Attack?," Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/kalevleetaru/2019/03/09/could-venezuelas-power-outage-really-be-a-cyber-attack/, Date Accessed 11-9-2019 // JM On the other hand, outages are commonplace in Venezuela due to years of grid AND based infrastructure attacks will continue to grow as a weapon of modern warfare. ====This is crucial to lead to peaceful regime change as Depetris indicates in 2019 that:==== Daniel R. Depetris, 5-1-2019, "On Venezuela, America Should Check Its Regime Change Impulses at the Door," American Conservative, https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/on-venezuela-america-should-check-its-regime-change-impulses-at-the-door/, Date Accessed 11-9-2019 // JM Bolton, speaking in a rare press conference outside the White House, stated that AND it is the Venezuelan people who must be their society's agents of change. ====Peaceful regime change leads to a resurgence Venezuelan democracy, which empirically reduces poverty as Riggirozzi wrote in 2019 that:==== Pia Riggirozzi, 2-14-2019, "Venezuela is putting democracy and its legitimacy to test," Conversation, https://theconversation.com/venezuela-is-putting-democracy-and-its-legitimacy-to-test-111466, Date Accessed 11-9-2019 // JM Long before the current crisis in Venezuela, democracy in Latin America was a damaged AND international oil industry downturn, so too did the post-neoliberal project. ====A resurgence to those reforms are crucial as Riggirozzi concludes of the 30 million people in Venezeula:==== Pia Riggirozzi, 2-14-2019, "Venezuela is putting democracy and its legitimacy to test," Conversation, https://theconversation.com/venezuela-is-putting-democracy-and-its-legitimacy-to-test-111466, Date Accessed 11-9-2019 // JM A state that failed the people The halving of the oil price in 2014 sharply AND development, and reconstruct a sense of citizenship and belonging for its people. ====Voting affirmative is crucial as we re-affirm the use of OCO's as an alternative to kinetic warfare. A world of kinetic warfare in Venezuela would be disastrous as Weeks indicates in 2019 that:==== Gregory Weeks, 3-25-2019, "The U.S. is thinking of invading Venezuela. That's unlikely to lead to democracy.," Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/03/25/us-is-thinking-invading-venezuela-thats-unlikely-lead-democracy/?noredirect=onandutm_term=.4577208c577d, 4-14-2019 // JM 3. U.S. armed intervention has been bad for Latin Americans Research AND regional relations — particularly since even allies have spoken out against this approach.	904,962
365,630	379,874	OCO Negative v4 - al-Shabab Contention	==Contention 2 – A Failed Alternative== ====Stephen Feldstein indicates in 2018 that:==== Stephen Feldstein, 2-19-2018, "Do Terrorist Trends in Africa Justify the US Military's Expansion?", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/02/09/do-terrorist-trends-in-africa-justify-u.s.-military-s-expansion-pub-75476, Date Accessed 11-25-2019 // SDV Notwithstanding this variance, both datasets clearly show that al-Shabab remains a potent AND a future attack against Europe or the United States would not be inconceivable. ====Unfortunately, as a result of the use of offensive cyber operations – the Trump administration now prefers drone strikes in this new age of cyberwar – O'Neill argues that: ==== Patrick Howell O'Neill, 2018, "Drones emerge as new dimension in cyberwar," CyberScoop, https://www.cyberscoop.com/apolloshield-septier-drones-uav-cyberwar-hacking/, Date Accessed 11-25-2019 // WS It sounds a little bit sci-fi, but make no mistake: The AND video camera on to drones this year. ====As a consequence, we have seen these types of attacks increase on al-Shabab. Gavin indicates in 2019 that:==== Michelle Gavin, 4-3-2019, "The Controversy Over U.S. Strikes in Somalia," Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/controversy-over-us-strikes-somalia, Date Accessed 11-25-2019 // JM The Trump administration has more than doubled the pace of strikes AND casualties. Trump ended that rule by executive order last month. ====Unfortunately, these drone strikes aren't working. Hansen indicates in 2019 that:==== Stig Jarle Hansen, 2-19-2019, "Somalia drone strikes are a potent weapon, but not the game changer," Conversation, https://theconversation.com/somalia-drone-strikes-are-a-potent-weapon-but-not-the-game-changer-111845, Date Accessed 11-25-2019 // JM In recent years, drones have emerged as the United States' weapon of choice. They AND Obama–era restrictions, granting more freedom to local commanders to order drone strikes. ====In fact, these drone strikes have intensified al-Shabab's responses. Burke write in 2019 that:==== Jason Burke, 1-16-2019, "Kenya received warnings of imminent al-Shabaab terror attack," Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/16/kenya-received-warnings-imminent-al-shabaab-terror-attack?fbclid=IwAR0L8YLll5l9Iwlb0X0bz6qsU9JTsQf1Rp3UD9VPimnv5i570YjrfzYg214), Date Accessed 11-25-2019 // JM Intelligence services in Kenya were warned that al-Shabaab was planning terrorist AND some media have claimed. They are saying 'we are in business'," Ali said. ====Kristian wrote in 2019 that:==== Bonnie Kristian, 3-12-2019, "Escalation in Somalia is a Foreign Policy Failure in Progress", Reason, https://reason.com/2019/03/12/escalation-in-somalia-is-a-foreign-polic/, Date Accessed 11-25-2019 // SDV While the Trump administration has very visibly made and modified plans to reduce U.S. AND American or Somali people. This is not our fight, and we should stop fighting it. ====There are two impacts. First, our responses increase Somalian poverty. Desai wrote in early October that:==== Raj Desai, 10-2-2019, "Somalia's path to stability", Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2019/10/02/somalias-path-to-stability/, Date Accessed 11-25-2019 // SDV Among these nations, no country has become more impoverished, relative to its position AND displaced Somalis the poverty rate is 74 percent. ====This is problematic as it feeds the never-ending loop of terror recruitment as Hansen wrote in 2019 that:==== Stig Jarle Hansen, 2-19-2019, "Somalia drone strikes are a potent weapon, but not the game changer," Conversation, https://theconversation.com/somalia-drone-strikes-are-a-potent-weapon-but-not-the-game-changer-111845, Date Accessed 11-25-2019 // JM In Somalia, there are many factors that keep al-Shabaab going. Among these AND from civilians who fear they will be accidentally targeted. ====This results a longer war and more civilian casualties as Maruf indicates:==== Harun Maruf, 12-10-2017, "UN: 4,500 Civilian Killed, Wounded in Somalia Since 2016", Voa News, https://www.voanews.com/africa/un-4500-civilians-killed-wounded-somalia-2016, Date Accessed 11-25-2019 // SDV The United Nations says more than 4,500 civilians have been killed or AND affected children, exposing them to "grave violations" during military operations. ====Second, an emboldened al Shabab increases the risk of a nuclear war. Zwane argues in 2018 that: ==== Tengetile Zwane, March 2018, a Political Science lecturer at University of Pretoria, and has a Masters of Security Studies at University of Pretoria, in South Africa, https://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/67965/Zwane_Nuclear_2018.pdf?sequence=1andamp;isAllowed=y, Date Accessed 11-25-2019 // JM A case worth noting is the unexpected horrific attacks by the Somali-based militant group al AND acts of nuclear terrorism. ====The impact is countless lives. Bunn finds that a single blast:==== Nickolas Roth and Matthew Bunn, 2017, "The effects of a single terrorist nuclear bomb." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, http://thebulletin.org/effects-single-terrorist-nuclear-bomb11150, Date Accessed 11-25-2019 // JM The scale of death and suffering. How many would die in such an event, AND should stand as an eternal reminder of the need to prevent nuclear weapons from ever being used in anger again.	905,032
365,631	379,600	Highland HJ Aff - Navy	Cunningham 19 Cunningham. "Nuclear Power Dying A Slow Death". OilPrice, May 28, 2019, https://oilprice.com/Alternative-Energy/Nuclear-Power/Nuclear-Power-Dying-A-Slow-Death.html. (JL) But in the years ahead, nuclear is set to decline without help. In the U.S., nuclear power’s share of the electricity mix could fall from 20 percent to 8 percent by 2040. One of the main reasons why nuclear power is in decline is that the vast majority of the plants online were built decades ago. Most are now aging and nearing the end of their original intended operating lives. As a result, nuclear plants, particularly in advanced economies, are beginning to shut down. Adding to the industry’s woes in the U.S., nuclear has suffered from a decade of cheap shale gas. Meanwhile, the rise of renewable energy everywhere has significantly undercut the case for new nuclear. But two major events have struck a devastating blow to the nuclear industry from which it never really recovered. The 1986 nuclear explosion at Chernobyl ground nuclear construction to a halt worldwide. The events have been depicted in a riveting miniseries by HBO, set to wrap up in a week, which has captivated audiences around the world. The show has received critical acclaim, but leaves viewers with a stomach-churning dread. The timing of the show is not optimal for the nuclear industry, which is reeling from shutdowns, cost inflation, uncertainty and lack of interest.Related: The Next LNG Boom Will Dwarf The Last One The Chernobyl incident nearly killed the industry, and choked off new investment for years. After dozens of reactors were constructed in the U.S. in the 1970s-1980s, very few moved forward following Chernobyl. The handful of projects that did receive a greenlight came in the next wave of investment in the 2000s, when electricity prices were rising, concerns about climate change emerged, and memories of Chernobyl and Three Mile Island began to fade. But the “nuclear renaissance,” as the resurging interest in the early 21st century has been dubbed, was just about killed off before it started. In 2011 an earthquake and tsunami struck the Fukushima Dai-Ichi plant in Japan, causing an explosion and meltdown. Japan closed more than 50 of its nuclear reactors, which not coincidentally led to a spike in global LNG prices and also pushed up demand for oil and coal. Meanwhile, the Fukushima disaster reverberated around the world. In Europe, and in Germany in particular, the disaster accelerated plans to shut down reactors. Again, without nuclear, Japan and Germany had to rely on more fossil fuels, despite the rapid increase of renewable energy. Back in the U.S., nuclear plants faced a different and arguably more insurmountable problem. Cost overruns and delays, which have long plagued the industry, have proven to be just about fatal. In South Carolina, ratepayers have been stuck with a $9 billion tab to build a nuclear project, but after a decade of work, the project has been shelved and the state has nothing to show for it. Southern Company, which has presided over the budget-busting and oft-delayed Vogtle nuclear plant in Georgia, now sounds very regretful about its project. Just a few weeks ago Southern’s CEO said that the company won’t pursue nuclear again until maybe the 2040s. To slash carbon emissions, “we do need, as a nation, to continue to invest in nuclear technology. But, for us, that won’t be my administration’s call,” Southern’s Tom Fanning said. “It will be in the ’30s and ’40s when I think we need to add more nukes.”Related: Have Gasoline Prices Peaked For 2019? Fittingly, the Three Mile Island site, which almost saw a nuclear meltdown in 1979, is set to close this year, after its owners unsuccessfully sought a bailout from the Pennsylvania legislature. The closure of the project almost certainly will lead to higher consumption of natural gas, which highlights the conundrum that the world faces in its race to slash emissions. The IEA sounded the alarm in its new report, arguing that climate goals will be exceedingly difficult if nuclear is killed off. The agency argues that the world needs an 80 percent increase in nuclear generation through 2040 in order to slow climate change. But, as it stands, nuclear power is riskier, more expensive and takes infinitely longer to bring online than renewable energy. Very few, if any, utilities will want to move forward on new nuclear projects when they have cheap solar and wind to turn to. “Plans to build new nuclear plants face concerns about competitiveness with other power generation technologies and the very large size of nuclear projects that require billions of dollars in upfront investment,” the IEA said. “Those doubts are especially strong in countries that have introduced competitive wholesale markets.” That last point is worth noting. If nuclear power is going to survive, let alone thrive, it will need a hefty dose of support from government policy because the industry is increasingly uncompetitive. The IEA pleaded with governments to rescue the industry. “It has become increasingly clear that the construction of a new wave of large-scale Generation III reactors in all European or North American electricity markets is inconceivable without strong government intervention,” the IEA said in its report. Werner 18 https://news.usni.org/2018/10/02/37045 The Navy’s ability to maintain and manufacture aircraft carrier and submarine propulsion systems is at risk, a panel of experts say, because the commercial nuclear industry has been in failing health for two decades. Today, the Navy operates more nuclear reactors than the entire U.S. commercial reactor industry. The Navy’s 101 reactor-powered carriers and submarines provide an unmatched advantage to operate around the world continuously. Building these reactors, though, relies on a shrinking pool of vendors, Adm. James Caldwell, the director of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, said at the Nuclear Energy, Naval Propulsion, and National Security Symposium at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “The base is small. The base is healthy and capable of supporting our Navy propulsion needs. It’s sustainable through the program of record, but it takes a lot of energy to sustain that,” Caldwell said. For example, the Navy only has one contractor making reactor plant heavy-components and only a handful of companies make the flow control, valves, pumps and other parts, Caldwell said. Several companies make reactor instrument controls. The vendors the nuclear Navy relies on are being hurt by a retracting commercial nuclear power plant industry. Cheaper fuel alternatives, such as natural gas, are making it too expensive for power companies to run their nuclear plants, said Mike Wallace, a senior advisor at CSIS and former Chairman of the Constellation Energy Nuclear Group. Wallace also is a former Navy nuclear submarine officer. As a result, today the U.S. has 98 commercial reactors, and Wallace expects this number will continue decreasing. With fewer commercial reactors operating, there is not enough business for the nuclear industry’s vendors. “We are continuing if not accelerating in a decline, impacting not only domestic nuclear energy but also the infrastructure to support naval propulsion and the infrastructure supporting our weapons complex,” Wallace said. A solid 30-year shipbuilding plan and stable budget environment would signal to the nuclear industry they could earn a return on investing in new equipment or expanding their business operations, Caldwell said. “What helps the commercial industry helps the Navy nuclear propulsion industry,” Caldwell said. “More vendors mean more affordability; also means the ability to have some innovation that might help us out.” In 16 years – between 1946, when then Capt. Hyman Rickover was in charge of developing nuclear propulsion for the Navy, and 1962, when USS Enterprise (CVN-65) began its maiden deployment – the Navy went from considering a theoretical propulsion unit to operating the an eight-reactor ship larger than anything the world had ever seen, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson said during a keynote speech at the event. “The speed this nation can achieve if we put our minds to it is just stunning,” Richardson said. Wallace was not so sure the commercial nuclear industry would survive. He doesn’t see the federal government doing enough to ensure the health of these companies, which are vital to maintaining a nuclear Navy. “Under current conditions, in the next 15 to 20 years we could see all commercial plants shut down in the U.S.,” Wallace said. “It’s a trend line down that, at some point, hits a click because you don’t want to be the last one holding a commercial plant.” Meanwhile, Russia and China are rapidly expanding their state-sponsored nuclear energy industries, which include a robust export market, said William Ostendorff, a retired Navy captain and a visiting professor at the U.S. Naval Academy. Ostendorff is also a former commissioner of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Russia and China are building dozens of nuclear power plants around the world, in countries such as Turkey and Pakistan, Ostendorff said. The U.S. nuclear power industry is building two plants domestically and zero overseas. “U.S. companies lack the capital and structure to emulate the Russia and Chinese models,” Ostendorff said. Ichord 19 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/the-value-of-the-us-nuclear-power-complex-to-us-national-security/#framework Human capital. The civilian nuclear industry generates a vast investment in human capital that is a necessary condition for all applications of nuclear energy in the national security apparatus. The following analysis considers the staff in the nuclear supply chain at private companies, research universities, and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), among others. At different levels of specialization, the employees command wage differentials in the labor market that can serve as a useful quantitative indicator of the investment that would be needed in the case of a significant reduction or disappearance of the civilian nuclear industry. As shown in the above table, this element constitutes the largest component of estimated total costs and would certainly be difficult to reconstitute if lost. The DOE national laboratories are often referred to as “national treasures,” and they have extensive equipment and human scientific and technological expertise. They support both civilian and military energy programs, both nuclear and non-nuclear. Congress appropriated $37 billion in fiscal year 2019 (FY19) for the DOE laboratory system. The laboratories manage the implementation of most of the DOE nuclear energy programs, which in FY19 were funded at $1.326 billion, with Congress increasing the levels from the Trump Administration’s request. The Idaho National Laboratory is one of the leading nuclear labs, and received $1.6 billion in FY19, including about $318 million for management of the DOE Nuclear Energy Office programs. Another laboratory at Oak Ridge has 4,400 research and mission support staff, including 1,100 staff scientists and engineers. It has 3,200 users and visiting researchers annually, and in 2018 had program expenditures of $1.6 billion. Of course, not all these resources are devoted to nuclear projects, but this gives an indication of the size of one of the major national labs. In FY18 and FY19, the nine national laboratories with major nuclear energy programs received a total budget of about $10 billion. Ichord 19 (45) https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/the-value-of-the-us-nuclear-power-complex-to-us-national-security/#framework This analysis defines this complex as also including universities, national and independent research-and-development laboratories, fuel providers, and suppliers of equipment and technical services. These companies and institutions are active internationally. Nuclear fuel, technology, and services exports are also included in this national security equation. The role of these institutions in innovation and the RandD of new technologies is also of growing importance. The Trump Administration’s National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy both highlight the need to maintain and enhance what is being called the “National Security Innovation Base” and the increasing interaction between civilian and military technologies. A major component of the US nuclear power complex is the development, operation, and maintenance of nuclear reactors in the US Navy’s fleet. The nuclear fleet includes sixty-eight submarines; eleven aircraft carriers; and four research, development, and training platforms, and constitutes 45 percent of the navy’s major combatants. This program is funded under the National Nuclear Safety Administration of the Department of Energy and managed by the Office of Naval Reactors. Enacted funding in FY19 was $1.789 billion. The FY20 DOE Congressional Budget Request of $1.648 billion focused on three major programs: Columbia-class Reactor Systems Development, the Land-based S8G Prototype Refueling Overhaul, and the Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project. This funding serves to support the Navy Nuclear Laboratory (NNL) and its Bettis and Knolls Atomic Power Laboratories, the Kenneth A. Kesselring Site, and the Naval Reactors Facility. In late 2018, NNL issued a large contract with ten-year options up to $30 billion to a subsidiary of Fluor Corporation for management and technical services. Bechtel, which was the previous NNL prime contractor, also has major contracts for component equipment and construction services with the navy, some under the navy’s shipbuilding and conversion funds for the Ford-class aircraft carriers. Another longtime supplier of reactors, fuels, and other services is BWXT, which has supplied reactors for the navy’s Ohio-, Virginia-, Seawolf-, and Los Angeles-class submarines, as well as the Nimitz- and Ford-class aircraft carriers. WNA 19 https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/non-power-nuclear-applications/transport/nuclear-powered-ships.aspx The USA has the main navy with nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, while both it and Russia have had nuclear-powered cruisers (USA: 9; Russia: 4). The USA had built 219 nuclear-powered vessels to mid-2010. All US aircraft carriers and submarines are nuclear-powered. (The UK’s new large aircraft carriers are powered by two 36 MW gas turbines driving electric motors.) The US Navy has accumulated over 6200 reactor-years of accident-free experience involving 526 nuclear reactor cores over the course of 240 million kilometres, without a single radiological incident, over a period of more than 50 years. It operated 81 nuclear-powered ships (11 aircraft carriers, 70 submarines – 18 SSBN/SSGN, 52 SSN) with 92 reactors in 2017. there were 10 Nimitz-class carriers in service (CVN 68-77), each designed for 50-year service life with one mid-life refuelling and complex overhaul of their two A4W Westinghouse reactors. The Gerald Ford-class (CVN 78 on) has a similar hull and some 800 fewer crew and two more powerful Bechtel A1B reactors driving four shafts as well as the electromagnetic aircraft launch system. It has an expected service life of 90 years. The Russian Navy logged over 6500 nautical reactor-years to 2015. It appears to have eight strategic submarines (SSBN/SSGN) in operation and 13 nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN), plus some diesel submarines. Russia announced that it would build eight new nuclear SSBN submarines in its plan to 2015. Its only nuclear-powered carrier project was cancelled in 1992. It has one nuclear-powered cruiser in operation and three others were being overhauled. In 2012 it announced that its third-generation strategic submarines would have extended service lifetimes, from 25 to 35 years. EFI 17 https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58ec123cb3db2bd94e057628/t/5b4ea217562fa7b940de153f/1531879967649/The+U.S.+Nuclear+Energy+Enterprise_A+Key+National+Security+Enabler.pdf Also, there is a clear correlation between the location of nuclear engineering educational programs and nuclear supply chain companies (Figure S3). For example, New York and Ohio have the most higher education nuclear engineering programs; each state also has more than thirty supply chain companies. If, however, the future of nuclear power is not robust and the nuclear enterprise further weakens, nuclear engineering and other related disciplines are likely to constrict once again. At a minimum, high quality university programs are likely to tip more towards international students coming from countries with expanding nuclear prospects, which will further dilute the pool of American nationals who can fill national security roles. Retirements are also a significant concern. The Nuclear Energy Institute reports that the nuclear power sector will soon lose 25,000 skilled workers to retirement. Clearly, without a vibrant nuclear enterprise, it will be difficult to attract the talented scientists and engineers needed to support both commercial and national security needs for decades to come. The analysis suggests that the imperatives of global climate change, collective energy security, balance of trade and U.S. national security require a viable domestic commercial nuclear power industry, including a robust supply chain of technology, services and human resources. Recent events and future trends point in the opposite direction: commercial reactors are shutting down, new builds are struggling, the supply chain is at risk, and it is likely that the educational pipeline will negatively respond to these challenges. Grady of USNI 19 https://news.usni.org/2018/02/15/navy-wants-congressional-permission-bring-new-cyber-sailors-higher-ranks Having struggled last year to meet its recruiting goals, the Navy’s personnel chief sees “difficult times ahead” in attracting and keeping sailors and officers as the sea service expands the fleet in the coming years. Testifying Wednesday before the Senate Armed Services personnel subcommittee Wednesday, Vice Adm. Robert Burke said, “Certain fields are in short supply” — specifically citing nuclear, advanced electronics, aviation and cyber. In budget documents released early this week, the Navy is expected to add 7,500 more sailors than it did last year to bring end-strength to 335,400 and projected to have an end-strength of 344,800 by 2023. The anticipated manpower growth is to fill billets in the increased number of ships coming into the fleet. The situation in recruiting and retention “requires close attention.” Steps the Navy is taking to spur recruiting and improve retention are both monetary and non-monetary, he said. In the Fiscal Year 2019 budget request, there is an across-the-board military pay increase of 2.6 percent. In addition, the service is requesting $318 million for retention bonuses, up from $254 million two years before and $92.2 million in recruiting bonuses, up from $23.4 million two years before. NEI 12 NEI, 12, National Energy Institute, Winter 2012, “US Nuclear Export Rules Hurt Global Competitiveness”, http://www.nei.org/News-Media/News/News-Archives/us-nuclear-export-rules-hurt-global-competitivenes Nuclear Winter 2012—Fifty years ago, the United States was the global leader in nuclear technology and services, the first country to harness atoms for peace, and the first to profit from it internationally. Today, U.S. dominance of the global nuclear power market has eroded as suppliers from other countries compete aggressively against American exporters. U.S. suppliers confront competitors that benefit from various forms of state promotion and also must contend with a U.S. government that has not adapted to new commercial realities. The potential is tremendous—$500 billion to $740 billion in international orders over the next decade, representing tens of thousands of potential American jobs, according to the U.S. Department of Commerce. With America suffering a large trade deficit, nuclear goods and services represent a market worth aggressive action. However, antiquated U.S. government approaches to nuclear exports are challenging U.S. competitiveness in the nuclear energy market. New federal support is needed if the United States wants to reclaim dominance in commercial nuclear goods and services—and create the jobs that go with them. “The U.S. used to be a monopoly supplier of nuclear materials and technology back in the ’50s and ’60s,” said Fred McGoldrick, former director of the Office of Nonproliferation and Export Policy at the State Department. “That position has eroded to the point where we’re a minor player compared to other countries.” America continues to lead the world in technology innovation and know-how. So what are the issues? And where is the trade? Effective coordination among the many government agencies involved in nuclear exports would provide a boost to U.S. suppliers. “Multiple U.S. agencies are engaged with countries abroad that are developing nuclear power, from early assistance to export controls to trade finance and more,” said Ted Jones, director for supplier international relations at NEI. The challenge is to create a framework that allows commercial nuclear trade to grow while ensuring against the proliferation of nuclear materials. “To compete in such a situation, an ongoing dialogue between U.S. suppliers and government needs to be conducted and U.S. trade promotion must be coordinated at the highest levels,” Jones said Goure 13 https://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/2013/05/31/us-military-power/ There are three fundamental problems with the argument in favor of abandoning America’s security role in the world. The first problem is that the United States cannot withdraw without sucking the air out of the system. U.S. power and presence have been the central structural feature that holds the present international order together. It flavors the very air that fills the sphere that is the international system. Whether it is the size of the U.S. economy, its capacity for innovation, the role of the dollar as the world’s reserve currency or the contribution of U.S. military power to the stability and peace of the global commons, the present world order has “Made in the USA” written all over it. The international system is not a game of Jenga where the worst thing that can happen is that one’s tower collapses. Start taking away the fundamental building blocks of the international order, particularly American military power, and the results are all but certain to be major instability, increased conflict rates, rapid proliferation of nuclear weapons, economic dislocation and, ultimately, serious and growing threats to security at home. The second problem is the presumption that the country’s global security posture was created and maintained to serve others. In reality, the United States built a global security architecture and the world’s best military because it served our interests. Our network of security ties and treaties, most notably NATO, were instituted to serve a number of functions: prevent another war among the Western powers, deter the Soviet Union and its allies, and ensure that the major economic regions remain free and that global trade flowed. In the 1970s, based on the experience of the oil embargo, the U.S. focused more on the security of the Persian Gulf because of the growing importance of Middle East oil to the national economy and that of the entire industrialized world. Eaglen 11 https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/thinking-about-day-without-sea-power-implications-us-defense-policy There is one remaining private shipyard suitable for building both conventional and nuclear combatants. Fear of an irreversible loss of specialized shipbuilding trades is at an all-time high. The ship repair business has disappeared, and all depot-level maintenance is conducted in two heavily subsidized public shipyards. The U.S.-flagged merchant marine consists solely of vessels engaged in Jones Acttrade, and there is no commercial shipbuilding in the United States. The U.S. Navy ceases to conduct exercises with allies and partners, although it does cooperate in maritime security operations with Canadian maritime forces. Global Implications. Under a scenario of dramatically reduced naval power, the United States would cease to be active in any international alliances. While it is reasonable to assume that land and air forces would be similarly reduced in this scenario, the lack of credible maritime capability to move their bulk and establish forward bases would render these forces irrelevant, even if the Army and Air Force were retained at today’s levels. In Iraq and Afghanistan today, 90 percent of material arrives by sea, although material bound for Afghanistan must then make a laborious journey by land into theater. China’s claims on the South China Sea, previously disputed by virtually all nations in the region and routinely contested by U.S. and partner naval forces, are accepted as a fait accompli, effectively turning the region into a “Chinese lake.” China establishes expansive oil and gas exploration with new deepwater drilling technology and secures its local sea lanes from intervention. Korea, unified in 2017 after the implosion of the North, signs a mutual defense treaty with China and solidifies their relationship. Elliot 15 https://www.cgdev.org/publication/food-security-developing-countries-there-role-wto Agricultural policies such as those targeted by Oxfam exacerbate the natural price volatility of commodity markets and put a huge burden on poor people who have neither savings nor safety nets. When commodity prices are low, subsidies push prices even lower and discourage investment in agriculture. Slashing these subsidies was a central goal of developing-country negotiators when the World Trade Organization (WTO) launched its Doha Round of trade talks in 2001. Unfortunately, deep disagreements over agriculture and food security repeatedly blocked progress, and the Doha Round lingers in a zombie-like state — neither fully dead nor really alive. That is a shame because trade is a key tool to bring food security to an estimated 800 million people around the world that remain chronically undernourished (figure 1). Many countries need reliable access to international markets to supplement their inadequate domestic food supplies. Better policies to make agriculture in developing countries more productive and profitable, including via exports, would also help alleviate food insecurity and reduce poverty. Stronger international trade rules would help by constraining the beggar-thy-neighbor policies that distort trade, contribute to price volatility, and discourage investments in developing-country agriculture. Heydarian 20 MANILA – While global attention focuses on the fast-spreading Covid-19 epidemic, ratcheting US-China tensions in the South China Sea represent another rising threat to regional stability. The US Pentagon announced last week that a Chinese warship fired a military-grade laser at US Navy P-8 surveillance aircraft while conducting a routine mission in the hotly contested maritime area. Known as “dazzlers,” such lasers can temporarily blind pilots by beaming powerful light across vast distance and deep into aircraft cockpits up in the skies. “China’s navy destroyer’s actions were unsafe and unprofessional,” the US Pacific Fleet said in a statement. “Weapons-grade lasers could potentially cause serious harm to aircrew and mariners, as well as ship and aircraft systems,” the statement said. The Pentagon also took its fight to social media, with the US Navy’s official Instagram account accusing China of “violating the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea, a multilateral agreement reached at the 2014 Western Pacific Naval Symposium to reduce the chance of an incident at sea.” The Pentagon also warned China: “You Don’t Want To Play Laser Tag With Us.” Washington is expected to lodge a formal diplomatic complaint over the laser incident in coming days, according to news reports. It wouldn’t be the first time: in 2018, US officials warned pilots that a Chinese airbase in Djibouti may have targeted its planes with “military-grade laser beams”, resulting in Washington making a formal diplomatic complaint to Beijing. The laser incident points to a potential new round of tit-for-tat provocations in the contested sea, where both China and the US are locked in a heated competition for supremacy. Strategic analysts are now weighing whether wider US-China tensions, including in relation to their unresolved trade war and heated words and claims amid the China-borne virus crisis, could escalated the South China Sea situation. China’s latest provocation came against the backdrop of ramped up Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in the maritime area, including maneuvers that China claims violated its sovereignty over various sea features it has transformed into full-fledged islands. Last year, the US conducted a record-high of nine Freedom FONOPs in the South China Sea, up from five in 2018 and six in 2017. In January, the USS Montgomery, an independence-class littoral combat ship, conducted the first US FONOP of 2020, sailing within a few nautical miles of the China- claimed Fiery Cross Reef. Last month, the US deployed the USS Wayne E Meyer missile destroyer within 12 nautical miles of the Fiery Cross and Mischief reefs, two of the largest artificially created islands in the sea. It was reportedly the first time that an American warship had challenged China’s claims over the two land features and their surrounding waters in a single operation. Stashwick 19 https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/19/chinas-south-china-sea-militarization-has-peaked/ These limitations on the bases’ strategic and operational value demand an alternative theory for their construction: the governing legitimacy and political primacy of China’s Communist Party. Chatham House fellow Bill Hayton’s historical research shows that China’s territorial claims to the South China Sea emerged across several governments over the past century during periods of flagging domestic support to bolster governments’ popular legitimacy. That historical context aligns with the conclusions of regional observers like Bilahari Kausikan, a long-serving senior Singaporean diplomat. He argues that the Communist Party depends on the image of defending the state’s territorial integrity and sovereignty to maintain support and that the party can perform its role as the defender of Chinese sovereignty on the unpopulated reefs of the South China Sea, compared with a place like Taiwan, at minimal cost or risk of humiliation or defeat. This interpretation is bolstered by the recent research of Paul Musgrave and Daniel Nexon. They show that extravagant national projects with costs that outweigh obvious strategic returns, like the bloated Belt and Road Initiative, are commonly efforts to buy back domestic legitimacy or secure a state’s place within the international hierarchy. Through this lens, the thousands of acres of reclaimed land and the massive runways, hangars, bunkers, and headquarters built in the Spratly Islands are better understood for the symbolic political capital they provide the Chinese regime than their straightforward military value. Bolstering the Communist Party’s primacy and China’s position at the top of Southeast Asia’s regional hierarchy may not be the exclusive benefit of its South China Sea bases, but it appears to be the most important one. Even recent party publications espouse the island buildup as a demonstration of the Communist Party’s “steadfast determination” to defend China’s sovereignty. This nationalistic underpinning of its governing legitimacy will only become more important as the party ratchets up domestic social repression and the economy slows. Using China’s anxiety to limit militarization If the United States pulled back its regional presence to appease Chinese anxieties over the expanding U.S. presence in the region, China is likelier to use the opportunity to reinforce its position than content itself with the gains it has made to date. Despite China’s often strident rhetoric, the presence of the U.S. military in the South China Sea has generally heightened its sensitivity to provoking even stronger military responses and motivated greater, if dubiously productive, diplomatic engagement with its neighbors. To provide the Communist Party that symbolic political capital, China’s Spratly bases simply need to exist, incentivizing China to limit the threat those islands pose. The appearance of new high-profile weapons systems on the islands, only to have the U.S. Navy and Air Force defy the Chinese presence with sail-bys and flyovers, makes China’s buildup appear impotent, damaging its symbolic value for the Communist Party. The Communist Party’s political imperatives compel it to defend its Spratly bases against both genuine threats and capricious humiliation.	904,681
365,632	379,598	Child Poverty	National Center for children in poverty National Center For Children In Poverty. “Child Poverty”. NCCP. http://www.nccp.org/topics/childpoverty.html About 15 million children in the United States – 21 of all children – live in families with incomes below the federal poverty threshold, a measurement that has been shown to underestimate the needs of families. Research shows that, on average, families need an income of about twice that level to cover basic expenses. Using this standard, 43 of children live in low-income families. Most of these children have parents who work, but low wages and unstable employment leave their families struggling to make ends meet. Poverty can impede children’s ability to learn and contribute to social, emotional, and behavioral problems. Poverty also can contribute to poor health and mental health. Risks are greatest for children who experience poverty when they are young and/or experience deep and persistent poverty. Research is clear that poverty is the single greatest threat to children’s well-being. But effective public policies – to make work pay for low-income parents and to provide high-quality early care and learning experiences for their children – can make a difference. Investments in the most vulnerable children are also critical. Shapiro 17 Shapiro, Isaac. “Child poverty falls to record low comprehensive measure shows stronger government policies account for long-term improvement”. CBPP, oct 5 2017. https://www.cbpp.org/research/poverty-and-inequality/child-poverty-falls-to-record-low-comprehensive-measure-shows The child poverty rate fell to a record low of 15.6 percent in 2016, a little more than half its 1967 level of 28.4 percent. This finding emerges from a new poverty series we have developed that combines the Census Bureau’s poverty data for 2016 with long-term poverty data compiled by Columbia University researchers. The new poverty series relies on the federal government’s Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM), a comprehensive yardstick that most analysts believe provides a more accurate assessment of the resources available to low-income households to meet basic needs than the “official” poverty measure does. That’s because the SPM counts the income that the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly known as the Food Stamp Program), rental subsidies, and other federal non-cash benefits and refundable tax credits provide, while the “official” poverty measure ignores such benefits. The data show that the near-halving of the child poverty rate since the late 1960s is largely attributable to the creation or expansion of various safety net programs, particularly SNAP and two major refundable tax credits. When poverty is measured without counting the income that safety net programs provide (i.e., under the official poverty measure), child poverty has fallen significantly the last two years as the labor market tightened, but is only modestly lower than it was in the 1960s. But once these benefits are taken into account, a large decline in child poverty is evident. (See Figure 1.) Thorn 19 Thorn, Betsy. “Food support programs and their impacts on very young children”. Health Affairs, mar 28, 2019. https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20190301.863688/full/ The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) each serve approximately three in ten young children (those ages 0–4 years) each month. WIC improves nutritional intake of participants. The research base is insufficient to determine whether SNAP improves nutrition. Both SNAP and WIC reduce food insecurity. SNAP and WIC improve children’s health outcomes, as measured by birthweight and other health markers. New research on SNAP shows that benefits to young children have lasting impacts, including improved health and economic outcomes in adulthood. Participation rates in WIC drop dramatically as children age, and almost all children face a gap in eligibility between when WIC ends and when they gain access to subsidized school meals.More research is needed on the impact of WIC on the health of children; how SNAP, WIC, and the school meals programs interact; and how nutrition education and other program parameters can best promote healthy eating among participants. Recent policy activity has likely contributed to a decline in WIC and SNAP participation among immigrants, with potential negative consequences for their health and well-being. CBPP 17 Center on Budget and Policies Priorities. “SNAP helps millions of children”. April 26, 2017. https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/snap-helps-millions-of-children The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) delivers more nutrition assistance to low-income children than any other federal program. It forms a critical foundation for the health and well-being of America’s children, lifting millions of families and their children out of poverty and helping them afford an adequate diet. Research shows that SNAP also has important long-lasting benefits for children. In a typical month, SNAP helps families with nearly 20 million children afford an adequate diet. That’s 1 in 4 children in the United States. (See Figure 1.) Nearly half (44 percent) of SNAP recipients are children; another 21 percent are adults who live with those children.1 Two-thirds of SNAP benefits go to families with children. SNAP provided an estimated $44 billion in 2016 to help families with children buy groceries. More than half of this amount went to families with very young children: infants, toddlers, and preschool- age children. US bureau of labor 2018 US Bureau of Labor. “Program participation and spending patterns of families receiving government means-tested assistance”. Jan 2018. https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2018/article/program-participation-and-spending-patterns-of-families-receiving-means-tested-assistance.htm SNAP benefits were reported by 51.6 percent of families receiving assistance. A greater proportion of one-parent families (66.4 percent) than two-parent families (39.3 percent) received SNAP benefits. For families with SNAP benefits, the average amount received was $3,928; benefits received by one-parent and two-parent families were similar ($3,936 and $3,916, respectively).12 Nearly 22 percent of families received housing assistance. One-parent families had a participation rate of 37.8 percent, compared with a rate of 8.3 percent for two-parent families.13 A much smaller proportion of families (9.9 percent) received SSI benefits; these benefits averaged $6,719. One-parent families received benefits averaging $6,915, and two-parent families received benefits averaging $6,466. However, the difference between these amounts was not statistically significant.14 Minogue 18 Minogue, Rachel. “five problems with universal basic income”. Third Way, may 24, 2018. https://www.thirdway.org/memo/five-problems-with-universal-basic-income Viewed by some as an alternative to work, UBI would shrink the labor force. By definition, a smaller labor force would mean lower economic output and lower tax revenues to invest in the future. UBI is very expensive. A $12,000-per-year UBI would cost the government $2.4 trillion annually, or one-eighth of GDP. That’s nearly as large as the entire US safety net today. Because UBI is universal, it would divert assistance from the most needy. Even under a leading proposal that leaves most of the safety net intact, a single parent with three children could lose up to $19,000 in annual benefits on net. The idea has been scarcely tested. Only one of a handful of experiments with UBI would provide insights relevant to the US economy, but that study is still in its early stages. Food research and access center Food research and Action Center. “National school lunch program”. https://frac.org/programs/national-school-lunch-program The National School Lunch Program — the nation’s second largest food and nutrition assistance program behind SNAP — makes it possible for all school children in the United States to receive a nutritious lunch every school day. The vast majority of schools — approximately 95 percent — participate in the program, providing meals to more than 30 million children on an average day. Check out the latest news and resources on Child Nutrition Reauthorization in FRAC’s Legislative Action Center. CBPP Sherman, Arloc. “Economic security programs help low-income children succeed over long-term, many studies find”. CBPP, july 17, 2017. https://www.cbpp.org/research/poverty-and-inequality/economic-security-programs-help-low-income-children-succeed-over One in three U.S. children spend a year or more below the poverty line before their 18th birthday.1 Children experiencing poverty tend to be worse off in a range of ways, including being more likely to enter school behind their peers, scoring lower on achievement tests, working less and earning less as adults, and having worse health outcomes.2 This pattern is especially clear for the poorest and youngest children and those who remain in poverty a long time during childhood.3 Further, these adverse outcomes happen “in part because they are poorer, not just because low income is correlated with other household and parental characteristics,” a recent systematic research review concludes.4 That is, income itself matters. ECONOMIC SECURITY PROGRAMS CAN BLUNT THESE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF POVERTY AND BRING POOR CHILDREN CLOSER TO EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, NUMEROUS STUDIES FIND. FOR EXAMPLE, A STUDY OF THE LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF THE INTRODUCTION OF FOOD STAMPS (NOW KNOWN AS SNAP) IN THE 1960S AND 1970S FOUND THAT YOUNG CHILDREN WHO HAD ACCESS TO FOOD STAMPS GREW UP TO HAVE HIGHER HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATION RATES AND LOWER RATES OF CERTAIN HEALTH PROBLEMS SUCH AS HEART DISEASE AND OBESITY, AS COMPARED TO SIMILAR DISADVANTAGED CHILDREN WHO LACKED ACCESS TO FOOD STAMPS BECAUSE THEIR COUNTY HADN’T YET IMPLEMENTED THE PROGRAM. IN ADDITION, WOMEN WHO HAD ACCESS TO FOOD STAMPS AS YOUNG CHILDREN HAD IMPROVED ECONOMIC SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN ADULTHOOD. Other economic security programs have been found to improve health outcomes at birth, raise reading and math test scores in middle school, increase high school completion and college entry, lift lifetime income, and extend longevity. The findings come from studies of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), anti-poverty and welfare-to-work pilot programs in the 1990s, an earlier public assistance program for mothers, and various negative income tax experiments in the late 1960s through early 1980s, among others. In addition, a recent well-known housing study found that housing vouchers that help poor families move to less poor neighborhoods before children turn 13 raise the earnings of these children by 31 percent when they reach adulthood.5 Cohen 17 Cohen, Ronnie. “poor children benefit when parents have access to healthcare”. Reuters, nov 13, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-kids-insurance/poor-children-benefit-when-parents-have-access-to-healthcare-idUSKBN1DD2H2 Low-income children in the U.S. whose parents qualified for Medicaid were more likely to receive preventive care, regardless of their own insurance coverage, a new study finds. Researchers called the finding “an important spillover effect.” Children whose mothers and fathers were enrolled in Medicaid, government insurance for the poor, were 29 percent more likely to receive at least one well-child visit, a just-released Pediatrics report showed. Well-child healthcare visits increase children’s likelihood of being vaccinated and reduce their likelihood of being unnecessarily hospitalized, previous studies have shown. “Efforts to expand Medicaid eligibility for low-income parents could promote their children’s receipt of these important services,” said lead author Dr. Maya Venkataramani, a professor at Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine in Baltimore, Maryland. Georgetown University Georgetown University. “medicaid fact sheets”. March 3, 12017. ttps://ccf.georgetown.edu/2017/03/03/medicaid-fact-sheets/ Fact Sheet: Medicaid’s Role for Children: Medicaid is an essential source of health coverage for the nation’s children. The program provides health coverage to children and parents in low-income families who lack access to affordable private health insurance, as well as to children with special health care needs. Fact Sheet: Medicaid’s Role for Young Children: Today, more than 45 million children have coverage through Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP). For the nation’s youngest children, Medicaid and CHIP play an outsized role, covering 44 percent of children under the age of six, compared to 35 percent of children between the ages of six and 18. EPSDT: A Primer on Medicaid’s Pediatric Benefit: Children enrolled in Medicaid are entitled to a comprehensive array of preventive and ameliorative care through the Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic and Treatment (EPSDT) benefit. Beyond the indecipherable acronym, EPSDT is a critically important benefit that is broadly recognized as the definitive standard for children. We’ve broken down the acronym in this fact sheet, and we’re continuing to investigate how it’s working for kids, so stay tuned for more! Lowrey 19 Lowrey, Annie. “The supreme court is bad for your health”. The Atlantic, july 31, 2019. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/07/medicaid-saves-lives/595096/ Did Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts kill almost 16,000 people? That is one way, if a hyperbolic one, to read a new study on federalism and Medicaid. Economists looked at the long aftermath of the Court’s 2012 decision to allow states to opt out of the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion. They found that opt-in states experienced a 9.3 percent reduction in the mortality rate among near-elderly adults of lower socioeconomic status, adding up to thousands of lives saved. Opt-out states, accordingly, experienced thousands of avoidable deaths. The study, conducted by government and academic researchers using large pools of health, income, and mortality data, demonstrates something reassuring and something discomfiting, particularly in light of Republicans’ ongoing efforts to repeal, alter, sabotage, or roll back the Affordable Care Act: Medicaid saves lives, and the country’s ongoing insurance crisis takes them needlessly away. Garfield Garfield, Rachel. “the uninsured: a primer”. Kaiser Family Foundation, nov 2016. http://files.kff.org/attachment/Report-The-Uninsured-A20Primer-Key-Facts-about-Health-Insurance-and-the-Unisured-in-America-in-the-Era-of-Health-Reform Uninsured people are more likely than those with insurance to report problems getting needed medical care. One in five (20) uninsured adults say that they went without care in the past year because of cost compared to 3 of adults with private coverage and 8 of adults with public coverage. Many uninsured people do not obtain the treatments their health care providers recommend for them. In 2015, 20 of uninsured adults said they delayed or did not get a needed prescription drug due to cost, compared to 15 with public coverage and 6 with private coverage.70 And while insured and uninsured people who are injured or newly diagnosed with a chronic condition receive similar plans for follow-up care from their doctors, people without health coverage are less likely than those with coverage to obtain all the recommended services. Because uninsured people are less likely than those with insurance to have regular outpatient care, they are more likely to have negative health consequences. Because uninsured patients are less likely than those with insurance to receive necessary follow-up screenings, 73 they have an increased risk of being diagnosed at later stages of diseases, including cancer, and have higher mortality rates than those with insurance.74,75,76 In addition, when uninsured people are hospitalized, they receive fewer diagnostic and therapeutic services and also have higher mortality rates than those with insurance.77,78,79,80 Uninsured children also face problems getting needed care. Uninsured children are more likely to lack a usual source of care, to delay care, or to have unmet medical needs than children with insurance (Figure 10).81 Further, uninsured children with common childhood illnesses and injuries do not receive the same level of care as others and are at higher risk for preventable hospitalizations and for missed diagnoses of serious health conditions.82,83 Among children with special health care needs, those without health insurance have worse access to care, including specialist care, than those with insurance.84 Lack of health coverage, even for short periods of time, results in decreased access to care. Research has shown that adults who experience gaps in their health insurance coverage are less likely to have a regular source of care or to be up to date with blood pressure or cholesterol checks than those with continuous coverage. 85 Research also indicates that children who are uninsured for part of the year have more access problems than those with full-year coverage. 86,87 Similarly, adults who lack insurance for an entire year have poorer access to care than those who have coverage for at least part of the year, suggesting that even a short period of coverage can improve access to care. Brisson Brisson, Amy. “Impact of affordable housing on families and communities”. Enterprise. https://homeforallsmc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Impact-of-Affordable-Housing-on-Families-and-Communities.pdf High housing costs leave low-income families with little left over for other important expenses, leading to difficult budget trade-offs. Affordable housing increases the amount that families can put toward other important household needs and savings for the future. Housing Stability and Education Housing instability can seriously jeopardize children’s performance and success in school, and contribute to long-lasting achievement gaps. Quality affordable housing helps create a stable environment for children, contributing to improved educational outcomes. Housing Stability and Health Housing instability and homelessness have serious negative impacts on child and adult health. Affordable housing can improve health by providing stability, freeing up resources for food and health care and increasing access to amenities in quality neighborhoods. Healthy Housing and Asthma Green improvements to affordable housing can improve the health outcomes of low-income families – particularly children at risk for asthma. This, in turn, can contribute to better school performance by reducing asthma symptoms and missed school days. CBO 15 CBO. “Federal housing assistance for low-income households”. Sept 9, 2015. https://www.cbo.gov/publication/50782 This CBO report discusses the ways in which the federal government provides housing assistance to low-income households, examines how?that assistance has changed since 2000, and provides information about the households that receive assistance. In addition, the report assesses policy options for altering that assistance. Some options would provide substantial budgetary savings over the 2016–2025 period considered in CBO’s analysis and others would involve substantial costs. What Housing Assistance Does the ?Federal Government Provide? Three spending programs account for the majority of the assistance provided directly to low-income households: The Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) program—with $18 billion in spending in 2014—provides federally funded, portable vouchers that recipients use to help pay for housing they choose in the private market. Project-based rental assistance (PBRA)—with?$12 billion in spending in 2014—provides for federally contracted and subsidized rent in designated buildings that are privately owned and operated. Public housing—at a cost of $7 billion in 2014—provides for federally subsidized rent in buildings that are publicly owned and operated. In addition, the federal government provided about $8 billion in 2014 for other housing programs. Most of that was in the form of grants to state and local governments. One tax credit, the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC), accounts for most of the assistance provided indirectly to low-income households. It is available to developers of low-income housing and, according to an estimate by the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT), accounted for $7 billion in tax expenditures in 2014. Tax expenditures resemble government spending programs in that they provide financial assistance to specific entities or groups of people or for designated activities. The federal government provided much more support through the tax code, about $130 billion in 2014, for housing not targeted at low-income households—mostly through the tax deductions for mortgage interest payments and for property taxes. Although beyond the scope of this report, that and other types of assistance not focused on low-income households are described in the appendix. Over time, the composition of federal assistance has changed as lawmakers have relied more on the private sector to provide low-income housing. Since 2000, measured in real terms, spending on the voucher program and project-based assistance has grown by about one-third, spending on public housing has declined by the same fraction, and tax expenditures for the LIHTC have increased. Whom Do Federal Low-Income? Housing Programs Assist? The federal government’s three main spending programs for low-income housing provide assistance to 4.8 million low-income households. Initial eligibility for federal housing programs is limited to households with no more than 50 percent of area median income (AMI), and roughly three-quarters of the assisted households have income of no more than 30 percent of AMI. The house-holds that receive assistance comprise 9.8 million people, or roughly 3 percent of the U.S. population. Of those households, almost one-half are headed by people who are neither elderly (defined by the Department of Housing and Urban Development as age 62 or older) nor disabled—yet work is the largest source of income for only about half of households headed by such people. Sherman 17 Sherman, Arloc. “Economic security programs help low-income children succeed over long-term, many studies find”. CBPP, july 17, 2017. https://www.cbpp.org/research/poverty-and-inequality/economic-security-programs-help-low-income-children-succeed-over Government economic security programs such as food assistance, housing subsidies, and working-family tax credits — which bolster income, help families afford basic needs, and keep millions of children above the poverty line — also have longer-term benefits, studies find: they help children to do better in school and increase their earning power in their adult years. One in three U.S. children spend a year or more below the poverty line before their 18th birthday.1 Children experiencing poverty tend to be worse off in a range of ways, including being more likely to enter school behind their peers, scoring lower on achievement tests, working less and earning less as adults, and having worse health outcomes.2 This pattern is especially clear for the poorest and youngest children and those who remain in poverty a long time during childhood.3 Further, these adverse outcomes happen “in part because they are poorer, not just because low income is correlated with other household and parental characteristics,” a recent systematic research review concludes.4 That is, income itself matters. Economic security programs can blunt these negative effects of poverty and bring poor children closer to equal opportunity, numerous studies find. For example, a study of the long-term effects of the introduction of food stamps (now known as SNAP) in the 1960s and 1970s found that young children who had access to food stamps grew up to have higher high school graduation rates and lower rates of certain health problems such as heart disease and obesity, as compared to similar disadvantaged children who lacked access to food stamps because their county hadn’t yet implemented the program. In addition, women who had access to food stamps as young children had improved economic self-sufficiency in adulthood. Other economic security programs have been found to improve health outcomes at birth, raise reading and math test scores in middle school, increase high school completion and college entry, lift lifetime income, and extend longevity. The findings come from studies of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), anti-poverty and welfare-to-work pilot programs in the 1990s, an earlier public assistance program for mothers, and various negative income tax experiments in the late 1960s through early 1980s, among others. In addition, a recent well-known housing study found that housing vouchers that help poor families move to less poor neighborhoods before children turn 13 raise the earnings of these children by 31 percent when they reach adulthood.5 Researchers are still exploring the reasons why more adequate family income helps children over the long term. One way that the added income may help is, for example, by reducing severe poverty-related stress, a condition that scientists have linked to lasting consequences for children’s brain development and physical health. Another may be by helping families afford better learning environments from child care through college. Important gains for children have been found both in programs that boost income by raising parental employment and in programs that raise income without an increase in parental employment. Casey 19 Casey. “what do we know about the impact of homelessness and housing instabiliaty on child-welfare involved families”. Aug 22, 2019. https://www.casey.org/impact-homelessness-child-welfare/ While permanent housing is ideal, housing programs often have limited housing supply to reach all families in need. Consequently, homeless families find themselves relying on shelters and transitional housing programs that provide services and allow longer stays. While child protection agencies do not usually fund homeless shelters, in some instances they now oversee and/or fund transitional housing programs. For instance, Strengthening, Preserving, and Reunifying Families (SPRF), a child welfare housing program in Jackson County, Ore., was established as a partnership between the child protection agency, a local substance use disorder treatment program, a local crisis relief nursery, the juvenile court, and other community stakeholders to address family stability and substance use for parents involved with child welfare. Together, the partner agencies decided to provide a continuum of supports from transitional to permanent housing. Evaluation results indicate that SPRF families experienced, on average, fewer child welfare reports and removals, and higher rates of reunification.13 Permanent supportive housing Stable, long-term housing can help improve child welfare outcomes. The Family Options Study used a randomized controlled trial to test the effects of multiple housing interventions, including a transitional housing program and a permanent housing subsidy. The study found that when families were given priority access to long-term housing subsidies instead of seeking housing resources on their own, homelessness and housing instability were reduced by half within 20 months. In addition, these families had lower rates of subsequent out-of-home placements.14 While this study suggests that permanent housing subsidies alone are an effective housing intervention, some child protection agencies are going beyond simply referring clients to other agencies for permanent housing support. Instead – through the use of Title IV-E waivers, grants and demonstration projects, and other flexible child welfare funding – they are partnering with organizations to test innovative housing initiatives, like supportive housing programs. According to some studies, supportive housing programs, which combine long-term, affordable housing with intensive wraparound services, have been shown to be highly effective and cost-efficient for homeless families involved in the child welfare system. This is particularly true for families with multiple co-occurring needs.15 Findings across multiple studies indicate that families that receive supportive housing fare better on a range of child welfare and housing metrics when compared to families that do not.16,17 The Urban Institute Wheaton, Laura. “the effects of the safety net on child poverty in three states”. Urban Institute, july 2011. https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/32796/412374-the-effects-of-the-safety-net-on-child-poverty-in-three-states.pdf Government safety net policies substantially reduce child poverty. These policies include direct cash and noncash benefit programs, tax credits, and programs designed to reduce family expenses on necessities. Any assessment of the effects of the safety net on poverty must take into account these policies. The Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM) provides such an evaluation (box 1). The SPM also uses current measures of family needs (“thresholds”) that capture recent spending and differences in housing costs across the country. The SPM thresholds that determine poverty are lower in states with low housing costs and higher in high–housing cost states. The Total Effect of Policies on Poverty Government safety net policies cut child poverty rates in half in Georgia, Illinois, and Massachusetts (figure 1). Social Security and unemployment insurance, universal programs that pay benefits regardless of other income or assets, have relatively small effects on child poverty. Most poverty reduction results from means-tested programs such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Supplemental Nutrition Assistance (SNAP), housing assistance, and tax credits (the earned income tax credit and child tax credit). Means-tested programs reduced child poverty from 26.7 to 13.8 percent in Georgia, from 22.8 to 12.4 percent in Illinois, and from 19.4 to 9.0 percent in Massachusetts. Individual Safety Net Program Effects The poverty-reduction effect of individual safety net programs depends on states’ program rules, families’ program participation, and families’ needs. Generous program rules and higher family participation rates provide more poverty reduction, and higher needs (i.e., lower incomes) generally produce higher benefit levels. Also, federal programs that provide the same benefit across the country reduce poverty more in states with lower housing costs than in states with higher costs. National Center for children in poverty Chau, Michelle. “parents’ low education leads to low income, despite full time employment”. NCCP, nov 2007. http://www.nccp.org/publications/pub_786.html Higher education leads to higher earnings. 82 of children whose parents have less than a high school diploma live in low-income families. 57 of children whose parents have a high school diploma, but no college education, live in low-income families. Only 24 of children whose parents have some college education or more live in low-income families. If parents have low education levels, full-time employment does not protect their families from low earnings. Among children whose parents work full-time and year-round: 73 of children whose parents have less than a high school diploma live in low-income families. 46 of children whose parents have a high school diploma, but no college education, live in low-income families. Only 17 of children whose parents have some college education or more live in low-income families. Parents with less education are losing economic ground. Figure 2: Low-income children with parents employed full-time, by parents’ education, 1986-2006. Over the past two decades, children with parents employed full-time are increasingly likely to be low income if their parents do not have at least a college education. Among children whose parents work full-time and year-round: The percent of children in low-income families increased from 65 to 73 if parents had less than a high school diploma. The percent of children in low-income families increased from 34 to 46 if parents had a high school diploma, but no college. The percent of children in low-income families increased from 15 to 17 if parents had some college education or more. Thompson 18 Derek Thompson, 03/28/18, “Busting the Myth of ‘Welfare Makes People Lazy’”, The Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2018/03/welfare-childhood/555119/ “Take, for example, the striking finding from a new paper from researchers at Georgetown University and the University of Chicago. They analyzed a Mexican program called Prospera, the world’s first conditional cash-transfer system, which provides money to poor families on the condition that they send their children to school and stay up to date on vaccinations and doctors’ visits. In 2016, Prospera offered cash assistance to nearly 7 million Mexican households. In the paper, researchers matched up data from Prospera with data about households’ incomes to analyze for the first time the program’s effect on children several decades after they started receiving benefits. The researchers found that the typical young US person exposed to the Prospera Welfare program for seven years ultimately completed three more years of education and was 37 percent more likely to be employed. That’s not all: Young Prospera beneficiaries grew up to become adults who worked, on average, nine more hours each week than similarly poor children who weren’t enrolled in the program. They also earned higher hourly wages.” Ratcliff 2015 Ratcliffe, Caroline. “Child poverty and adult success”. Urban Institute, sept 2015. https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/65766/2000369-Child-Poverty-and-Adult-Success.pdf One in every five children currently lives in poverty, but nearly twice as many experience poverty at some point during their childhood. These ever-poor children are less successful than their never-poor counterparts in their educational achievement and employment, and they are more likely to have a nonmarital teenage birth and some involvement with the criminal justice system. Children who spend half their childhood living in poverty fall even further behind. For example, although 93 percent of never-poor children complete high school, and 83 percent of ever-poor, nonpersistently poor children complete high school, only 64 percent of persistently poor children do so. A large deficit exists even after controlling for other family and neighborhood characteristics. This disadvantage can erode employment prospects and wages throughout a lifetime. The educational achievement of one generation can also ripple through to the next. The results suggest parental education relates to children’s academic achievement, even after controlling for other family and neighborhood characteristics. For example, ever-poor children whose parents have more than a high school education are 30 percent more likely to complete high school and almost five times more likely to complete college than ever-poor children whose parents did not complete high school. Beyond childhood poverty experience and parental education, residential stability or instability stands out as important to children’s future success. Household moves that happen for negative reasons are particularly associated with worse outcomes. Ever-poor children with three or more negative moves (versus no moves) during their childhood, for example, are 15 percent less likely to complete high school by age 20, 36 percent less likely to enroll in college or another postsecondary education program by age 25, and 68 percent less likely to complete a four-year college degree by age 25. These outcomes could result not only from instability and uncertainty of circumstances within the household but also from changing schools; children with frequent school changes have lower educational achievement (Hartmann and Leff 2002; Sandefur, Meier, and Campbell 2006). Sherman 2013 Sherman, arloc. “Various supports for low-income families reduce poverty and have long-term positive effects on families and children”. CBPP, july 30, 2013. https://www.cbpp.org/research/various-supports-for-low-income-families-reduce-poverty-and-have-long-term-positive-effects Finally, University of California at Davis researchers Hilary W. Hoynes, Douglas L. Miller, and David Simon examined the effect of EITC expansions that policymakers enacted in the 1990s, by comparing changes in birth outcomes for families eligible for the largest increases in their EITC to changes in outcomes for families eligible for little or no increase. They found that infants born to mothers who were eligible for the largest EITC increases experienced the greatest improvements on a number of birth indicators associated with more favorable long-term outcomes for children, such as a reduced incidence of low birth weight and premature births. SNAP improves long-term health and self-sufficiency. While reducing hunger and food insecurity and lifting millions out of poverty in the short run, SNAP brings important long-run benefits. A new NBER study examined what happened when government introduced food stamps in the 1960s and early 1970s and concluded that children who had access to food stamps in early childhood and whose mothers had access during their pregnancy had better health outcomes as adults years later, compared to children born at the same time in counties that had not yet implemented the program. Along with lower rates of “metabolic syndrome” (obesity, high blood pressure, heart disease, and diabetes), adults who had access to food stamps as young children reported better health, and women who had access to food stamps as young children reported improved economic self-sufficiency (as measured by employment, income, poverty status, high school graduation, and program participation).Medicaid has important health benefits for both children and adults. Children covered by Medicaid or CHIP are more likely than uninsured children to receive important preventive services, such as well-child check-ups, that are important for spotting health problems early. For adults, Medicaid participation is associated with better health, lower mortality, and less household debt and out-of-pocket costs. A study widely regarded as the most important and rigorous examination of Medicaid’s effects on beneficiaries — under which researchers were able to compare outcomes in Oregon between low-income people who received Medicaid and similar people who remained uninsured — found the adults with Medicaid coverage were 40 percent less likely than the uninsured adults to suffer a decline in their health over a six-month period. Those with Medicaid coverage also were more likely than the uninsured to access preventive care, such as mammograms for women. In addition, there were significant improvements in diagnosing and treating depression and diabetes among the Medicaid recipients. On a related front, separate research published in the New England Journal of Medicine reported that expansions of Medicaid coverage for low-income adults in Arizona, Maine, and New York reduced mortality by 6.1 percent. Moreover, people with Medicaid in Oregon were 40 percent less likely than those without insurance to go into medical debt or to leave other bills unpaid in order to cover medical expenses. The latest research from Oregon finds that Medicaid coverage “almost completely eliminated catastrophic out-of-pocket medical expenditures.” Head Start children fare better years later. Researching the long-term impacts of Head Start, Harvard’s David Deming found that children who participated in the program between 1984 and 1990 later were more likely to complete high school, less likely to be out of school and out of work, and less likely to be in poor health. Head Start, he concluded, “closes one-third of the gap” on a combined measure of adult outcomes “between children with median and bottom-quartile family income.” Some questions remain about whether the advantage that Head Start children enjoy when they enter kindergarten endures in later school years, and there is broad agreement that policymakers should pursue further reforms to strengthen the program’s impacts in these areas. But Deming tracked children for a longer period, beyond just their school years, and he found that the program’s positive influence is evident in later years in various important areas of children’s lives such as high school completion, college enrollment, health status, and being either employed or in school. Similarly, the University of Chicago’s Jens Ludwig and the University of California at Davis’ Douglas Miller find evidence that Head Start has a positive effect on children’s health — specifically, that mortality rates among children aged 5 to 9 fell due to screenings conducted as part of Head Start’s health services. Pell Grants help low-income students overcome significant barriers to earning a college education. Pell Grants provide assistance to more than 9 million low- and moderate-income students to pay for college. Students qualify for the grants based on their income, assets, and family size; three-quarters of recipients had family incomes below $30,000 in the 2010-2011 academic year. Need-based grant aid improves college access, studies show, especially among minority students. Pell Grants, in particular, appear to promote college completion. A 2009 Education Department study found that, after controlling for barriers to college success such as financial independence, college graduates who received these grants earned their degrees faster than non-recipients. And a 2008 study found that low-income students who receive a Pell Grant were 63 percent less likely to drop out than low-income students without such a grant. College graduates have higher employment rates and earnings and lower poverty rates than those who lack a college degree. By helping students graduate, Pell Grants improve students’ chances of success in the labor market. Housing assistance programs reduce risk factors for poor school outcomes. Four housing-related problems — homelessness, frequent moves that result in school changes, overcrowding, and poor housing quality — can impair children’s academic achievement, research shows. Children in homeless families are more likely than other low-income children to drop out of school, repeat a grade, or perform poorly on tests. Frequent moves, particularly those that cause children to change schools during kindergarten or high school, tend to worsen educational performance (both for the children andfor their classmates in schools in which large numbers of students move in or out during the year). Research shows, moving often imposes stress on students, which can cause students to have difficulty concentrating. Moreover, when students change schools, they can suffer gaps in their learning because they miss school days and because different schools cover material in a different order. In addition, changing schools can impair the development of the bond with teachers that disadvantaged children often need to perform well. Children also may miss school due to homelessness or frequent moves or because they live in housing that may exacerbate a child’s asthma or result in lead poisoning. And, children living in overcrowded housing may lack the space or quiet to do their homework, and they may also suffer from stress-related behavior problems that interfere with academic performance. Global partnership 2018 Global Partnership. “why education saves lives around the world”. Daily Infographic, Nov 24, 2018. https://www.dailyinfographic.com/why-education-saves-lives-across-world Since 1918 the United States has required an elementary education for all children. However, for children across the world, few opportunities exist for basic education. That’s why the Global Partnership for Education considers learning a critical component for achieving 17 global goals for health and well-being. According to a report by the Education Commission, providing female students with a primary education saved more than 30 million lives of children under the age of 5. Knowledge leads to healthy choices and a wholesome lifestyle in general. For instance, educating our kids helps reduce HIV infections. The number of possible HIV infections that could have been avoided is mind-numbing – 700k people could have been saved from HIV each year. A proper education impacts families for generations. Children with educated mothers are 50 more likely to be immunized and twice as likely to attend school. With these substantial benefits, it’s easy to understand why the Global Partnership for Education considers teaching children an essential goal. Speaking of education, check out how the Montessori Method works and how people benefit from this approach.	904,679
365,633	379,580	0-Contact Information	Emails Arunabh Sarkar - [email protected] Jaxson Nield - [email protected]	904,661
365,634	379,578	Stigma AC	Kronebusch Karl Kronebusch, Stigma and Other Determinants of Participation in TANF and Medicaid, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Summer, 2004), pp. 509-530 Published by: Wiley on behalf of Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3326264 Accessed: 27-01-2020 02:02 UTC Low-income families in the United States frequently do not participate in means- tested government programs for which they are eligible. Estimated take-up rates range from 40 to 70 percent for programs providing cash assistance (Blank and Rug- gles, 1996; Moffitt, 1987) and in-kind benefits, such as Medicaid (Seldin, Banthin, and Cohen, 1998) or food stamps (Blank and Ruggles, 1996). The implementation of welfare reform appears to have made this problem worse. Welfare take-up rates fell from 84 percent in 1995 to 56 percent in 1998 (Zedlewski, 2002), and there have been concurrent declines in Medicaid and food stamp enrollment for both adults and children (Klein and Fish-Parcham, 1999; Kronebusch, 2001; Zedlewski and Brauner, 1999), despite the expectation that eligibility for Medicaid and food stamps had been preserved by federal law. Understanding why eligible families do not enroll in these programs is critical to devising effective outreach, enrollment, and reten- tion strategies. NCOA NCOA, June 2016, " An End to Stigma Challenging the Stigmatization of Public Assistance Among Older Adults and People with Disabilities" NCOA, https://www.ncoa.org/wp-content/uploads/An-End-to-Stigma-Issue-Brief-NCOA.pdf NCOA’s Center for Benefits Access and its national partners regularly hear from field partners that the stigma low-income older adults and people with disabilities feel when applying for public benefits is one of the largest barriers to program participation. In keeping with NCOA’s mission, this report focuses on the stigma that older adults and people with disabilities encounter when applying for benefits. However, many of the findings may be broadly applicable to anyone applying for public assistance programs, as benefits stigma is not a phenomenon limited to seniors or people with disabilities.1 Throughout this report, the terms “benefits,” “welfare,” and “public assistance” are used interchangeably to designate public programs that provide a measure of well-being and support by distributing social income. Notably, this includes programs traditionally designated as “social insurance.” Dupere Katie Dupere, 7-27-2105, "6 welfare myths we all need to stop believing," Mashable, https://mashable.com/2015/07/27/welfare-myths-debunked/ Stigma runs deep when it comes to government programs designed to aid low-income individuals and families. Need-based assistance in the U.S. — such as Women, Infants and Children (WIC), the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, or food stamps) and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) — is often subject to public scrutiny, causing those who receive it to feel shame. But it's all due to the misconception that these programs reward the undeserving, allowing people to "work the system" while rejecting the common (yet highly unrealistic) "pull yourself up by your bootstraps" values of our society. Welfare recipients are also often assumed to share a range of undesirable characteristics, most of which have racist and classist undertones. These stereotypes simply aren't true. We need to dispel the myths surrounding government benefits so we can truly understand the value of welfare, the humanity of those receiving it and the improvements that could be made to better support those in need. Below, we explore six common welfare myths, which you can consider thoroughly debunked. Welfare recipients are often characterized as lazy, simply waiting for the next month's benefits to roll in. Stuber – Columbia Identity Stuber, March 2006, "Sources of stigma for means-tested government programs.," Columbia University, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16542766 Stigma has been shown to discourage participation in means-tested government programs. Prior research cannot explain why this deterrent effect varies in intensity across different individuals and programs. We develop a more comprehensive model of the possible determinants of stigma associated with means-tested programs than has previously been suggested by studies of welfare stigma. We test hypotheses using unique data based on interviews with 1405 respondents in 10 states and the District of Columbia, USA. The results suggest that there are two distinct forms of stigma related to participation in means-tested government programs: one related to self-identity, the other to the anticipation of negative treatment. Both forms of stigma are more pronounced for Welfare compared to Medicaid. The sources of stigma identified by conventional treatments of welfare stigma (e.g., individual attributions of responsibility for poverty) have significant explanatory power, but neglect other important influences. We find that stigma is exacerbated by poor health and by minority status. Stigma is also fostered by the ways in which means-tested programs are implemented, including negative interactions with case workers, long waiting times, and, for Medicaid, applications for benefits in alternative enrollment sites such as health centers or hospitals. These findings suggest new points of leverage for addressing the potentially deleterious consequences of stigma. Swartz Identity Swartz, Teresa Toguchi, et al. “WELFARE AND CITIZENSHIP: THE EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE ON YOUNG ADULTS' CIVIC PARTICIPATION.” The Sociological Quarterly, U.S. National Library of Medicine, 1 Oct. 2009, www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2771575/. This stands in contrast with second tier means-tested, stigmatizing programs administered at the discretion of caseworkers, where recipients learn that they are viewed as marginal and problematic to government and that their actions or voices have little effect on government actors or priorities. Soss and colleagues (1999, 2000; Bruch et al. 2008) argue that experiences with hierarchical and paternalistic welfare institutions and agency representatives diminish welfare recipients’ “external political efficacy,” or beliefs that the government will be responsive to them, dampening their political activity. For example, through interviews with 25 welfare and 25 SSDI recipients, Soss found that welfare recipients were much less likely than SSDI beneficiaries to believe that their individual actions could affect government decisions or that government officials listen to people like them(1999, p. 370). These feelings of alienation from government were not rooted in self-doubts about their own political abilities, or “internal political efficacy,” but rather in what they had learned about government unresponsiveness to them. Interestingly, some researchers have found the possibility that even means-tested, stigmatizing programs can cultivate external political efficacy and active citizenship if delivered in a positive, empowering manner (Lawless and Fox 2001; Soss 1999, 2000). Stuber – JPAM Identity Jennifer Stuber and Karl Kronebusch, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Summer, 2004), pp. 509-530, Wiley on behalf of Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3326264 chart - email sarkararunabhatgmail.com for disclosure of chart Stuber – Neg Treat Stuber, March 2006, "Sources of stigma for means-tested government programs.," Columbia University, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16542766 Stigma has been shown to discourage participation in means-tested government programs. Prior research cannot explain why this deterrent effect varies in intensity across different individuals and programs. We develop a more comprehensive model of the possible determinants of stigma associated with means-tested programs than has previously been suggested by studies of welfare stigma. We test hypotheses using unique data based on interviews with 1405 respondents in 10 states and the District of Columbia, USA. The results suggest that there are two distinct forms of stigma related to participation in means-tested government programs: one related to self-identity, the other to the anticipation of negative treatment. Both forms of stigma are more pronounced for Welfare compared to Medicaid. The sources of stigma identified by conventional treatments of welfare stigma (e.g., individual attributions of responsibility for poverty) have significant explanatory power, but neglect other important influences. We find that stigma is exacerbated by poor health and by minority status. Stigma is also fostered by the ways in which means-tested programs are implemented, including negative interactions with case workers, long waiting times, and, for Medicaid, applications for benefits in alternative enrollment sites such as health centers or hospitals. These findings suggest new points of leverage for addressing the potentially deleterious consequences of stigma. Swartz – Neg Treat Swartz, Teresa Toguchi, et al. “WELFARE AND CITIZENSHIP: THE EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE ON YOUNG ADULTS' CIVIC PARTICIPATION.” The Sociological Quarterly, U.S. National Library of Medicine, 1 Oct. 2009, www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2771575/. The stigma associated with welfare receipt may have also contributed to lower self-efficacy among this group. Many of the women interviewed discussed experiences in their everyday lives when they were looked down upon by others because of welfare receipt, even when they did not think of themselves as undeserving. Angie, for instance, noted accusations by cashiers when she used food stamps: “The cashiers are kind of snotty to me, and you know ‘You are taking the taxpayers’ money.’” Similarly, Rosie described how negative stereotypes are unfairly applied to all welfare recipients, including her: The bad apples always get the media’s attention and it makes everybody categorize welfare people on assistance as the bad apples … all those bad apples. There’s hundreds like me who have done stuff with their lives and there’s always going to be people who take advantage of freebies …. I’m a nurse now, I’m working. I am paying back through taxes all the help I received. The common charge that welfare recipients took tax money without paying their part reveals the perceived illegitimacy of non-contributory systems. These women realized that the public culture and individuals that they encountered in their daily lives viewed them as outside the American mainstream and challenged their status as full members of the community. Indeed, welfare recipients do appear to experience the stigma associated with receiving welfare in a way that those receiving first tier government assistance may not given that fewer stereotypes persist about recipients of social insurance and less stigmatizing programs. Mumford Mumford, Kevin J. “How Costly Is Welfare Stigma? Separating Psychological Costs from Time Costs in Food Assistance Programs.” Stigma, Colleen Flaherty Manchester† Kevin J. Mumford‡ University of Minnesota, Jan. 2012, www.krannert.purdue.edu/faculty/kjmumfor/papers/stigma.pdf.https://www.krannert.purdue.edu/faculty/kjmumfor/papers/stigma.pdf The U.S. government spends tens of billions of dollars annually on means-tested food assistance programs, yet a sizable fraction of eligible households do not take-up these benefits.1 In particular, Trippe and Doyle (1992) find that approximately 50 percent of households eligible for the food stamp program (FSP) did not participate in the program, while Kim (1998) estimates that only 32 percent of eligible families participated in food stamps among the working poor.2 While participation rates in FSP, recently re-named Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), have been higher in recent years, they still show that a large fraction of eligible households are not participating. Perhaps more critical given research on early childhood development, take-up of the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) is just 38 percent among eligible families with children ages one to five (Currie 2003). The decision to turn down food assistance, or welfare benefits more generally, is reconciled within standard economic theory by assuming that there is a cost associated with program participation (Moffitt 1983). This cost contains at least two distinct parts: (1) the psychological cost from stereotyping participants as lazy or lacking ambition (i.e. stigma) and (2) the time cost from participants completing forms, traveling to the program offices, and, for the case of FSP and WIC, the hassle incurred when paying for groceries with government coupons. Gershon Livia Gershon, 1-30-2018, "The Health Threats of Welfare Stigma," JSTOR Daily, https://daily.jstor.org/the-health-threats-of-welfare-stigma/ The Trump administration has made it easier for states to require adults who receive health insurance through Medicaid to hold jobs. That change, like many other “welfare reform” proposals, means that anyone who wants to get help from the government must do more paperwork and endure more scrutiny. Jennifer Stuber and Karl Kronebusch examined what happened when states changed the rules of aid programs after the federal government revamped its policies in 1996. Among people who are eligible for means-tested programs like Medicaid, food stamps, or cash assistance, the percent who actually enroll has always been fairly low. Even before the policy change, pickup rates for various programs ranged from 40 to 70 percent. Given that people who are eligible for these programs are, by definition, facing serious economic hardship, that might seem odd. Researchers found that people with high levels of need were scared away from applying for welfare benefits by stigma. Stuber and Kronebusch write that the explanation is the incredible power of stigma. Americans commonly associate means-tested aid with laziness, dishonesty, and moral weakness (an association that doesn’t hold true for other government aid like tax breaks and Social Security). That makes applying for benefits a threat to a person’s self-image. At the institutional level, that same stigma means many potential aid recipients also worry that they’ll face hostile treatment as they apply for benefits. Goodman Peter S. Goodman, 5-30-2018, "Free Cash to Fight Income Inequality? California City Is First in U.S. to Try," No Publication, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/30/business/stockton-basic-income.html Basic income is a term that gets thrown around loosely, but the gist is that the government distributes cash universally. As the logic runs, if everyone gets money — rich and poor, the employed and the jobless — it removes the stigma of traditional welfare schemes while ensuring sustenance for all. That a city in California has made itself a venue for the idea seems no accident. The state has long tried fresh approaches to governance. Ahead of the state’s political primaries in June, much of the conversation has centered on concerns about economic inequality. The concept of basic income has been gaining adherents from Europe to Africa to North America as a potential stabilizer in the face of a populist insurrection tearing at the post-World War II liberal economic order. It is being embraced by social thinkers seeking to reimagine capitalism to more justly distribute its gains, and by technologists concerned about the job-destroying power of their creations. In various guises, the idea has captivated activists and intellectuals for centuries. In the 1500s, Thomas More’s novel “Utopia” advanced the suggestion that thieves would be better deterred by public assistance than fear of a death sentence. Berman Berman, Jillian. “Hungry U.S. College Students Are Going without Food Stamps amid Confusion over Eligibility.” MarketWatch, 11 Jan. 2019, www.marketwatch.com/story/hungry-us-college-students-are-going-without-food-stamps-amid-confusion-over-eligibility-2019-01-09. Students set foot on a college campus often the hope that their education will help them climb the economic ladder and sustain themselves and their families. But in many cases, they’re going hungry in the process. Nearly two million students may be walking around college campuses hungry and aren’t getting access to the resources to which they’re entitled. That’s one conclusion of a report published Wednesday by the Government Accountability Office, the first-ever federal government effort to understand the scope of food insecurity on college campuses and offer possible policy solutions. Among low-income college students potentially eligible for food stamps who have at least one additional risk factor for food insecurity — including being a first-generation college student or a single parent — 57 did not report participating in the food stamp program in 2016, according to the GAO. Santens Scott Santens, 10-22-2015, "Universal Basic Income Will Likely Increase Social Cohesion," HuffPost, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/universal-basic-income-wi_b_8354072 Not only did a greater sense of community grow, but the very first thing the village even did was to organize an 18-member committee to mobilize the community and advise residents. This was an immediate effect described in the report as “community mobilization and empowerment.” There were also other notable effects, like a 42 percent drop in crime, huge reductions in child malnutrition and school dropout rates, and a 301 percent increase in self-employment. It would be one thing if these kinds of effects have only been observed in one place, but the findings have also since been replicated in a more recent series of basic income experiments in India. There in a larger basic income experiment that spanned multiple villages and thousands more people than in Namibia, again a multitude of positive effects were found, including community effects. For example, recipients actually pooled their cash together to make shared community purchases like temple repairs, the formation of credit unions, wedding loan funds, and even TVs everyone could watch. Additionally, separate castes actually began to work together, which was surprising even to them. Moffitt Robert A Moffitt., June 2016, "The Deserving Poor, the Family, and the U.S. Welfare System," PubMed Central (PMC), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4487675/ Table 5 shows similar figures for non-elderly, non-disabled single parent families, married parent families, and childless individuals and families.9 Here again we see that the size of transfers differs markedly across groups, with single parent families receiving more than married parent families, and childless individuals and families receiving very little from the U.S. transfer system. However, here the differences in changes in benefits over time for the three groups are dramatically different, with transfers to the average single parent family falling by 20 percent and those to the average married parent family rising by 68 percent. The decline for single parent families reflects the contraction of the AFDC-TANF program combined with increases in transfers from other programs which were smaller in magnitude because those other programs largely served different family types. Transfers to childless individuals and families were essentially unchanged, rising by a small 7 percent. These results imply a redistribution of benefits away from single parent families toward married parent families. These figures suffer from the obvious problem that income is not being controlled for, and transfers should ordinarily be expected to flow disproportionately to those with low income. It is possible that the redistributional movements shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5 could be the result of differential changes in income across the different groups, which would give them a rather different interpretation. To address this issue we must condition on private income for each family. To this end, define private income for a family as the sum of its earned income and its private unearned income. For most families eligible for welfare programs, private unearned income is very small relative to earned income; most families have very little capital income and only miscellaneous income from other sources (e.g., child support). Bregman Bregman 17 Rutger Bregman (Historian). Utopia for Realists: The Case for a Universal Basic Income, Open Borders, and a 15-hour Workweek, 2017 ‘Politically, there was a concern that if you began a guaranteed annual income, people would stop working and start having large families,’ said Forget. What really happened was precisely the opposite. Young adults postponed getting married, and birthrates dropped. Their school performance improved substantially. The ‘Mincome cohort’ studied harder and faster. In the end, total work hours only notched down 1 for men, 3 for married women and 5 for unmarried women. Men who were family breadwinners hardly worked less at all, while new mothers used the cash assistance to take several months’ maternity leave, and students to stay at school longer. Forget’s most remarkable finding, though, was that hospitalisations decreased by as much as 8.5. Considering the size of public spending on health care in the developed world, the financial implications were huge. Several years into the experiment, domestic violence IPV was also down, as were mental health complaints. Mincome had made the whole town healthier. Forget could even trace the impacts of receiving a basic income through to the next generation, both in earnings and in health. Dauphin—the town with no poverty—was one of five guaranteed income experiments in North America. The other four were all conducted in the United States. Few people today are aware that the United States was just a hair’s breadth from realising a social safety net at least as extensive as those in most western European countries. When President Lyndon B. Johnson declared his ‘War on Poverty’ in 1964, Democrats and Republicans alike rallied behind fundamental welfare reforms. Leins LEINS 15 brackets for offensive rhetoric is a staff writer and producer at U.S. News and World Report Casey Leins. “Sobering Stats for Domestic Violence Awareness Month.” US News and world report. Oct 9, 2015. Accessed 2/28/18. URL = https://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/data-mine/2015/10/09/sobering-stats-for-domestic-violence-awareness-month SJCPNM Every minute, about 20 people are physically abused by an intimate partner in the U.S., according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Although the rate of domestic violence has dropped significantly over the past decade, the issue remains extremely relevant and far-reaching, and has been spotlighted recently by cases involving NFL players Ray Rice and Greg Hardy, as well as pop star Chris Brown. While these well known and well covered stories have shed light on domestic violence and helped alert the public to its dangers, many incidents still go unreported and unknown. Since October is Domestic Violence Awareness Month, here's a look at some sobering stats on the issue. Domestic violence doesn't just occur between romantic partners. Domestic violence is a pattern of abusive behavior in which someone uses physical, sexual, psychological or other types of harm against a current or former partner, an immediate family member or another relative. It can also include stalking, threats or other behaviors meant to manipulate or control someone else. READ: U.S. Hospitals May Often Miss Signs of Child Abuse Between 2003 and 2012, domestic violence accounted for over 20 percent of all violent crime in the U.S. Intimate partner violence – meaning violence involving current or former spouses, boyfriends or girlfriends – is the most common type of domestic violence. It's more common in dating relationships than active marriages. NCOA NCOA, June 2016, " An End to Stigma Challenging the Stigmatization of Public Assistance Among Older Adults and People with Disabilities" NCOA, https://www.ncoa.org/wp-content/uploads/An-End-to-Stigma-Issue-Brief-NCOA.pdf Counselors who worked with a population of younger Medicare beneficiaries who qualified based on disability status noted that this population is less likely to be affected by stigma. A counselor in New York State suggested that this is because these individuals have already completed the process to enroll in Social Security Disability Insurance and Medicare, which is long and onerous. “By the time they’re talking to a counselor, only about 10 need more discussion before they start applying for benefits,” noted one counselor in Wisconsin. She speculated this was due to the suddenness of disability, compared to retirement, and added that younger people with disabilities who have been on Social Security for a long time are less likely to feel stigmatized than older people with more recent disability status who thought they would be able to work until they retired. Racial biases Several counselors noted potential applicants’ tendency toward racialized language in their interactions. This tendency is well-evidenced in research. Studies by Bas van Doorn and Shanto Iyengar, among others, have thoroughly demonstrated the unconscious association of false stereotypes about people of color, and more specifically African Americans, with certain public benefits. This is despite the fact that the majority of recipients of most means-tested and universal programs are white.7 Such unconscious biases are shared—though not interpreted in the same way— by all Americans; they form a part of a vocabulary handed down from the past that is reproduced by people as they use it to navigate their social and economic terrain.8	904,659
365,635	379,605	TOC AFF	C1 - US Troop Presence contributes to sex trafficking C2 - Iraq is attacking US troops in the region which increases the chance of war C3 - The United States troop presence gives a security guarantee that prevents Saudi Arabia from negotiating in Yemen Open Source Cases Below. IDRK how to disclose but below R1 is Neg and R7 is Aff	904,688
365,636	379,638	TOC Aff 4 v2	Ana Swanson, 4-15-2019, “In Search for Leverage, Trump May Be Undercutting His Own Trade Deals,” New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/15/us/politics/trump-trade-deals.html WASHINGTON — President Trump is embracing a new tactic as he tries to rewrite the rules of global trade: Don’t believe a final deal is truly final. Mr. Trump, who has called deal-making his “art form,” has used his unpredictability as a source of leverage in discussions with Europe, Canada, Mexico, Japan and elsewhere. He has dangled the possibility of lifting American metal tariffs while threatening to add new tariffs on automobiles at any time. He has repeatedly agreed to new trade terms with foreign partners, then talked about undoing those deals to achieve additional goals. Mr. Trump has argued that this aggressive and unpredictable negotiating style allows him to extract greater economic concessions than past administrations — and he may be right, at least in the short run. But his approach is causing concern among business groups and foreign officials, who say the uncertainty Mr. Trump loves to sow could undermine the role the United States has traditionally played in setting and stabilizing the global rules of trade, hampering economic growth in the process. Becca Wasser, 11-15-2018, “Could America Use Its Leverage to Alter the Saudis’ Behavior?,” RAND Corporation, https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/11/could-america-use-its-leverage-to-alter-the-saudis.html The Trump administration is unlikely to end its support for Saudi regional efforts or radically change its approach. But it could consider using its influence to encourage the Saudi leadership to moderate its assertive and damaging policies abroad. Rather than providing its assistance freely to Saudi Arabia, Washington could utilize it to extract concessions from the Saudi leadership to alter its behavior. Making U.S. support conditional to initiatives tied to Prince Mohammed's success provides Washington with a degree of sway over the brash monarch, who increasingly needs to produce a “win” in light of the reputational harm the Khashoggi affair has done to the kingdom, his legacy and perhaps even his hold on power. This approach is not without risk—the Saudi government could, for example, reduce intelligence sharing, or switch off the proverbial oil tap, like the OPEC states did in 1973. But 2018 is not 1973, and the United States is no longer as reliant on Saudi oil. More so, the Saudi government's assertive actions also pose operational and reputational risks to important U.S. interests, as the Khashoggi affair demonstrated, and therefore the benefits of this approach are likely to outweigh any costs Riyadh may seek to impose. On the surface, making U.S. support provisory may appear to be an unpalatable approach, one that legitimizes the crown prince. But wielded correctly, the White House can use this leverage to recalibrate the U.S.-Saudi relationship. Blanket support need not be granted in a way that emboldens Saudi behavior, leading to actions that are damaging to U.S. interests. Instead, the administration could consider also making conditional its support for the Saudi government's priority programs with the goal of altering and shaping its behavior. This includes making the Saudis take responsibility for Khashoggi's brutal death, putting an end to indiscriminate targeting practices in Yemen, altering the government's harsh response to opposition inside and outside of the Kingdom, and ending the rift with Qatar. Naysayers of such an approach might claim that it only deepens the transactionalism on which the U.S.-Saudi relationship is presently based. But it is worth recognizing that the partnership was founded on an explicit alignment of interests, not values. By acknowledging this, the United States would be better positioned to adopt an approach that best serves its own interests. At this point, the Saudi government needs U.S. support more than the White House needs Saudi Arabia. Jeremy Shapiro, 4-27-2016, “How America enables its allies' bad behavior,” Vox, https://www.vox.com/2016/4/27/11497942/america-bad-allies Reverse Leverage: Many US allies are highly dependent on US support — military, economic, diplomatic, and intelligence — and they should be bending over backward to maintain that support. Yet it is more often Washington that performs the awkward gymnastics, bending over backward to keep relations smooth and assistance flowing. Qatar, for example, is a tiny country full of natural resources surrounded by neighbors that loathe its government. It is fully dependent on the US for its protection. Yet US officials are afraid to call out Qatar for its actions in Syria and Libya lest the United States lose its military base. So, rather than leveraging Qatar's dependence on the US for its entire survival to induce Qatar to stop acting against US interests in Syria and Libya, the US allows Qatar to leverage the US need for a military base in the region to induce the US to shut up and let it do whatever it wants. Moral Hazard: In the diplomatic version of helicopter parenting, the US protects its client states from suffering the full consequences of their behavior by bailing them out of trouble, incurring the costs and adverse consequences rather than making their putative ally bear the consequences of their actions. The result is a classic case of "moral hazard." For example, when Saudi Arabia intervened militarily in Yemen against US advice, the US response was nonetheless to support the intervention, specifically to ensure that Saudi Arabia would not feel the full consequences of failure. Naturally, the lesson that the Saudis learned is that the United States will back them back no matter what they do. And in Yemen, this unconditional support has adversely affected important US interests: The increased violence and chaos caused by Saudi military intervention has empowered al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which is based in Yemen and still considered by the US to be a dangerous threat to the US homeland. It has diverted Saudi assets from the campaign against ISIS, and it has escalated the conflict between the Saudis and Iran, which is having a destabilizing effect throughout the region. Endless Reassurance: President Obama complained in the Atlantic interview that Saudi Arabia's competition with Iran is helping "to feed proxy wars and chaos" in the Middle East, yet he made a personal trip to Saudi Arabia just last week to reassure the Saudis of the US commitment to Saudi Arabia's security. But why should the US care if Saudi Arabia feels like we're abandoning it? Rather than trying to reassure the Saudis, the US should be leveraging Saudi fears of abandonment — along with the billions of dollars in arms the US sells Saudi Arabia — to compel it to curb its actions in the region that are feeding proxy wars and chaos. F. Gregory Gause III, October-November 2019, “Should We Stay or Should We Go? The United States and the Middle East,” Survival: Journal of Global Politics and Strategy, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00396338.2019.1662114?needAccess=true. The Clash made that kind of binary choice the centrepiece of their nearly eponymous 1982 hit song, and Americans have been having a more concentrated debate along those very lines about the Middle East. Elites have lagged behind the general public on this issue. Fatigue over the seemingly endless wars in Iraq and Afghanistan was reflected by the American electorate in the last three presidential elections, in which the more dovish candidate on Middle East interventions won. A 2017 poll found that, while a strong majority of Americans believed that the US should stay engaged in the Middle East, 50 of those polled believed that Washington should ‘let Middle Easterners resolve their own conflicts’ and 25 said that the US should just get out of the region altogether.1 Yet the American military commitment to the greater Persian Gulf region continues, although reduced from the levels prevailing at the height of the Iraq War in the mid-2000s. But important voices in the American foreign-policy community are now catching up to the public, calling for a reassessment of the extent of American involvement in the region. Meanwhile, American allies in the Middle East itself seem to think that the US is already exiting the region. Danny Sjursen, 4-10-2020, “How the ‘West Point Mafia’ Runs Washington,” Nation, https://www.thenation.com/article/politics/esper-pompeo-west-point/ The ’86 Mafia’s current congressional heavyweight, however, is Mark Green. An early Trump supporter, he regularly tried to shield the president from impeachment as a minority member of the House Oversight and Reform Committee. The Tennessee representative nearly became Trump’s secretary of the Army, but ultimately withdrew his nomination because of controversies that included his sponsoring gender-discrimination bills and commenting that “transgender is a disease.” Legislators like Green, in turn, take their foreign policy marching orders from the military’s corporate suppliers. Among those, Esper, of course, represents the gold standard when it comes to “revolving door” defense lobbying. Just before ascending the Pentagon summit, pressed by Senator Elizabeth Warren during his confirmation hearings, he patently refused to “recuse himself from all matters related to” Raytheon, his former employer and the nation’s third-largest defense contractor. (And that was even before its recent merger with United Technologies Corporation, which once employed another Esper classmate as a senior vice president.) Incidentally, one of Raytheon’s “biggest franchises” is the Patriot missile defense system, the very weapon being rushed to Iraq as I write, ostensibly as a check on Pompeo’s favored villain, Iran. Alain De Benoist, 2013, Carl Schmitt Today: Terrorism, `Just' War, and the State of Emergency, GRECE, https://books.google.com/books?id=qSG1Xtnd0OECandpg=PA33andlpg=PA33anddq=the+persian+gulf+is+pivotal+to+pmcsandsource=blandots=zhxtiuzbGZandsig=ACfU3U1znIUfycw0WPddEHXiTpZieYB4Bwandhl=enandsa=Xandved=2ahUKEwixoNaIvu_oAhVwZN8KHZ0oCP0Q6AEwAHoECA0QKQ#v=onepageandq=the20persian20gulf20is20pivotal20to20pmcsandf=false FROM These TO Gulf Julian Lee, 1-12-2020, "Trump Is Wrong. The U.S. Does Need Middle East Oil," Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-01-12/trump-is-wrong-the-u-s-does-need-middle-east-oil President Donald Trump was wrong last week when he said that the U.S. doesn’t need Middle East oil. For one thing, U.S. refiners still need to process it to make the products their customers want. What’s more, America’s car drivers and truckers need it to keep flowing or else they’ll face higher prices at their local gas pump. … And with tension now flaring with Iran, the fact that there are fewer sources from which to import the heavy, sour crude (containing high concentrations of sulfur) on which Gulf coast refineries depend is coming into relief. The U.S. imposed sanctions on Venezuelan oil exports in January 2019 and Mexico and Colombia are facing declining output as a result of a lack of new investment. For now, while Canada remains the biggest supplier to the U.S., the Middle East delivers most of the rest. Hal Brands, 3-21-2019, "Why America Can't Quit The Middle East," Hoover Institution, https://www.hoover.org/research/why-america-cant-quit-middle-east Third, hasty withdrawals are likely to be followed by hasty re-engagements. After the United States left Iraq in 2011, the state nearly collapsed, ISIS surged to prominence, and an emergency military intervention—which has now lasted nearly five years—was needed to repair the damage. If the United States disengages from Syria and Afghanistan today and the result is a significant terrorist attack, the pressure to get back into the region and take decisive military action will be strong indeed—even if that means shortchanging other geopolitical priorities. If America goes home from the Middle East, it will sooner or later face pressures to go big. Whatever policies the Trump administration pursues in the Middle East, then, the United States will continue to face the same conflicting imperatives that have long shaped its approach to that region. America will be drawn toward the Middle East by enduring interests and pressing threats. But it will be tempted to depart the region because of the dangers and costs U.S. engagement causes. Trita Parsi, 1-6-2020, "The Middle East Is More Stable When the United States Stays Away," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/06/the-middle-east-is-more-stable-when-the-united-states-stays-away/ As the scholars Hal Brands, Steven Cook, and Kenneth Pollack wrote endorsing the Carter Doctrine and its continuation, “the United States established and upheld the basic rules of conduct in the region: the United States would meet efforts to interfere with the free flow of oil by force; uphold freedom of navigation; demand that regional powers give up their irredentist claims on other states or face grave consequences; and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.” This account is accurate enough (although the last rule on the list always exempted Israel), but the story glosses over how the policy also gave cover to U.S. allies for some fairly destabilizing behaviors of their own. That’s an omission Brands makes in a Bloomberg article, too, where he points to Saudi Arabia’s slaughter of the Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi to argue that a “post-American Middle East will not be stable and peaceful. It will be even nastier and more turbulent than it is today.” And in the words of U.S. Sen. Lindsey Graham in 2018, “If it weren’t for the United States, they’d be speaking Farsi in about a week in Saudi Arabia.” All this without a nod to the fact that, if anything, the United States’ protection of the Saudi regime has enabled its promotion of terrorism and its destabilizing activities in the region, which have, in turn, prompted further Iranian response. … As the scholars Hal Brands, Steven Cook, and Kenneth Pollack wrote endorsing the Carter Doctrine and its continuation, “the United States established and upheld the basic rules of conduct in the region: the United States would meet efforts to interfere with the free flow of oil by force; uphold freedom of navigation; demand that regional powers give up their irredentist claims on other states or face grave consequences; and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.” This account is accurate enough (although the last rule on the list always exempted Israel), but the story glosses over how the policy also gave cover to U.S. allies for some fairly destabilizing behaviors of their own. That’s an omission Brands makes in a Bloomberg article, too, where he points to Saudi Arabia’s slaughter of the Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi to argue that a “post-American Middle East will not be stable and peaceful. It will be even nastier and more turbulent than it is today.” And in the words of U.S. Sen. Lindsey Graham in 2018, “If it weren’t for the United States, they’d be speaking Farsi in about a week in Saudi Arabia.” All this without a nod to the fact that, if anything, the United States’ protection of the Saudi regime has enabled its promotion of terrorism and its destabilizing activities in the region, which have, in turn, prompted further Iranian response. Stephen M. Walt, 2-22-2017, "America Can't Be Trusted Anymore," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/10/america-cant-be-trusted-anymore/ Implicit in Reagan’s dictum is the idea that Americans are honest, plain-speaking truth-tellers who can be counted upon to keep their word and fulfill their promises. America’s opponents, by contrast, are a slippery bunch of deceptive charlatans who will exploit any loophole and seize any opportunity to hoodwink the country. Accordingly, U.S. negotiators must insist on all sorts of intrusive measures — such as the extraordinarily stringent inspection regime incorporated into the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran — to make sure they can verify what others are really up to. Reagan’s proverb notwithstanding, the importance the United States attaches to verification is really a reminder that there is damn little trust involved. Lately, however, I’ve been wondering whether this wariness has things backward. Is the real problem that Washington can’t trust others, or rather that other states can’t trust it? Even before Deceitful Donald showed up, the United States had amassed a pretty good record of reneging on promises and commitments. At a minimum, Washington cannot claim any particular virtue or trustworthiness in its dealings with others. In the unipolar era, in fact, the United States repeatedly did things it had promised not to do. To be sure, this is how one expects great powers to behave, especially when important matters are at stake. The Athenians famously told the Melians that “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must,” and that logic did not escape U.S. leaders throughout the country’s history. Think about all the treaties U.S. officials signed with various Native American tribes and subsequently broke, modified, or reneged upon as the nation expanded steadily across North America. Or consider the Nixon shocks of 1971, when the United States unilaterally ended convertibility of the dollar into gold, in effect dismantling the Bretton Woods economic order it had helped create. President Richard Nixon also slapped a 10 percent surcharge on imports to make sure the U.S. economy didn’t suffer as the dollar rose in value. ... Trump is also a serial fabulist who lies with facility and frequency yet has yet to pay any political penalty for his disinterest in truth. Determined to outdo his predecessor in every way, Trump uttered six times as many falsehoods in his first 10 months as president as Obama did in his entire two terms. Add to that the frenetic pace of turnover within the White House and the cabinet, and you have an environment where no policy utterance can be expected to have a shelf life greater than a week or two. Stephen Sestanovich, 3-14-2016, "Why Credibility Matters in Foreign Affairs," Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/03/obama-doctrine-goldberg-free-rider-credibility/473616/ There’s some of the same self-justification in the way Obama talks about “free riders”—the small and medium countries that count on the U.S. to provide for their security, without ponying up much on their own. “Free riders aggravate me” is already one of the most quoted lines of “The Obama Doctrine.” Virtually all American presidents have probably felt the same way, and future ones will too. They have wanted—and will want—allies who actually contribute to the common defense. Obama has good reason to be unhappy with America’s friends. Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Israel, and others have undercut his policies. In Europe he sees institutional dysfunction rivaling that of Washington. Yet the president plays the blame game in part because he too resists doing more. I recently heard a reporter ask a senior administration official whether the U.S. has ever told its Middle Eastern partners that it would be ready to commit a limited contingent of military personnel in Syria as long as they would do the same—an increased and coordinated effort. The (commendably honest) answer: “No.” “Free-rider” problems preoccupy social scientists for the same reason they exasperate policymakers: They’re hard to fix. So hard that American presidents have often concluded that there was only one viable solution. To bring wrong-headed allies along—and limit their worst impulses—the U.S. itself had to do more, not less. Sure, doing less might force some allies to exert themselves more, but not necessarily in a way that served U.S. interests. Obama is probably right that the Turks and Saudis have made things worse in Syria. He seems not to ask himself whether a more determined U.S. role might have kept them in line. Jacob Powell, 5-17-2019, "The dubious Iran and al-Qaeda link Trump could use to go to war," Middle East Eye, https://www.middleeasteye.net/US-Iran-war-trump-al-qaeda-link-AUMF-analysis The militant group al-Qaeda has a strong connection to Iran, the United States has claimed as part of its recent push towards war with the country. US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in a hearing in April that the militant group operates in Iran and has contacts with the government in Tehran. "There is no doubt there is a connection between the Islamic Republic of Iran and al-Qaeda. Period. Full stop," Pompeo contended. "The factual question with respect to Iran's connections to al-Qaeda is very real. They have hosted al-Qaeda. They have permitted al-Qaeda to transit their country," he added. Still, some observers have raised concerns that more hawkish members of President Donald Trump's administration are attempting to use an unproven connection between al-Qaeda and Iran to go to war. Under the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), a law that was passed in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, such a connection may allow the White House to militarily confront Iran without Congressional approval. Charles Mudede • Apr 6, 2020 At 9, 4-6-2020, "The Real Possibility of War With Iran During a Global Pandemic," Stranger, https://www.thestranger.com/slog/2020/04/06/43328342/the-real-possibility-of-war-with-iran-during-a-global-pandemic At this point my article seemed dated. We had, it appeared, entered a much more different world than the one that prompted my investigation. Iran was now busy burying the dead, and some of its top leaders were counted among them. Meanwhile, Seattle became, according to the New York Times, the American capital of the virus. The US/Iran conflict would certainly be shelved for the time being. I was wrong. The US is still preparing for a war with Iran. On March 27, the New York Times reported that a "secret Pentagon directive orders planning to try to destroy a militia group backed by Iran." On April 1, 2020, a day the future may recognize has having considerable world-historical importance, Trump tweeted that "Iran or its proxies are planning a sneak attack on US troops and/or assets in Iraq. If this happens, Iran will pay a very heavy price, indeed!" Two days later, Fox News reported that the U.S. military is moving air defense systems "into Iraq following attacks on American and coalition forces in recent weeks." Ronald Oliphant, 4-16-2020, "Tensions in Persian Gulf as United States accuses Iran of harassing its warships," Telegraph, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/04/16/tensions-persian-gulf-united-states-accuses-iran-harassing-warships/ Fears were growing of a new confrontation in the Persian Gulf after the United States accused Iranian naval forces of carrying out "dangerous and harassing" manoeuvres near its ships in the region. The incident came just days after armed men presumed to be members of Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps boarded a Hong Kong registered oil tanker in the Strait of Hormuz, raising fears of a renewed crisis in the flashpoint shipping lane. The US fifth fleet said a group of eleven Iranian naval vessels harassed six US navy vessels in the northern Persian Gulf for about an hour on Wednesday, with one coming within just ten yards of a Coast Guard cutter. The "dangerous and provocative actions increased the risk of miscalculation and collision ... and were not in accordance with the obligation under international law to act with due regard for the safety of other vessels in the area," the fleet, which is based in Bahrain, said in a statement. Kaye, Dalia Dassa, 03-26-2020, "COVID-19 Effects on Strategic Dynamics in the Middle East," RAND Corporation, https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/03/covid-19-impacts-on-strategic-dynamics-in-the-middle.html U.S.-Iran escalation. Both sides may be tempted to view the crisis as an opportunity to double down on previous actions that contribute to conflict. The Trump administration continues to pursue its maximum pressure approach despite the lack of strategic results and the fissures it has created with Europe and other allies. Reports suggest that some in the administration seek to use the COVID-19 crisis to capitalize on Iran's increased vulnerability to force Iran to the negotiation table. For their part, Iranian leaders gave up on “strategic patience” after a year of adhering to the Iran nuclear deal following the U.S. withdrawal from the agreement in May 2018, finding the strategy brought little economic relief from Europe or Asia. Instead, Iran began to exact a cost for U.S. maximum pressure policies by targeting oil tankers and facilities, as well as U.S. military assets and personnel. With continued escalation in the months following the killing of General Qasem Soleimani, Iran and its militia partners may perceive COVID-19 as an opportunity to attack American forces with less risk of retaliation as they attempt to drive the United States out of Iraq. The result is that both sides may see advantages to escalation, producing a classic security dilemma that risks an even greater military conflict than either side desires. The distraction from counterterrorism efforts as relations with the Iraqi government remain strained is also a trend likely to continue as the added distraction of a global pandemic shifts priorities. Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, 3-27-2020, "Pentagon Order to Plan for Escalation in Iraq Meets Warning From Top Commander," New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/27/world/middleeast/pentagon-iran-iraq-militias-coronavirus.html During a White House meeting on March 12, Mr. Esper and General Milley argued for a more limited response to the rocket attacks — a view that prevailed on Mr. Trump, who ordered nighttime raids on five suspected weapons depots in Iraq used by Kataib Hezbollah. Several American officials said there was an increased urgency in planning attack options against Kataib Hezbollah as the group, perhaps along with other Shiite militias, has threatened to ramp up strikes against U.S. troops stationed on Iraqi bases after the celebrations for Nowruz, the Iranian New Year, end soon. American military intelligence agencies have detected signs that big attacks could be in the works, according to a senior U.S. military official who has been briefed on some of the contingency planning in Iraq. Kataib Hezbollah, in a statement on Wednesday, warned its fighters to prepare for possible attacks from the United States, and threatened to retaliate against Americans and any Iraqis who help them. “We will respond with full force to all their military, security, and economic facilities,” said the statement, according to SITE, a private company that monitors jihadists’ websites and postings. The immediate targets of a Pentagon campaign against Kataib Hezbollah most likely would be the group’s leadership, bases and weapons depots, Mr. Knights said. In addition to a vast array of rockets, the group is believed to have access to a hidden arsenal of short-range ballistic missiles funneled into Iraq by Iran over the past several months, according to American intelligence and military officials. An extended campaign could hit militia targets across a wide swath of Iraq and Syria, and possibly other Shiite militias in Iraq that are loosely aligned with Kataib Hezbollah. “You can’t just hit rank-and-file fighters, you’d have to hit leadership, most of whom have probably dispersed,” Mr. Knights said. .... In recent weeks, as the threat from militia attacks and exposure to the coronavirus has increased, the United States and its European allies have been turning over smaller coalition bases to their Iraqi counterparts, and either moving to a handful of larger Iraqi bases or leaving the country altogether. Speaking to reporters the day after the United States hit the five Khatib Hezbollah weapons depots this month, Gen. Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr., the head of Central Command, said that the threat from Iran and its proxies remained “very high” and added that tensions “have actually not gone down” since the United States killed General Suleimani. While American officials say they have no clear evidence that Iran specifically directed the deadly attack on Camp Taji on March 11, they say that Kataib Hezbollah and the Iranian Quds Force coordinate closely. General McKenzie said the United States was poised to strike additional militia weapons storage sites and other targets should attacks against American forces continue. He blamed Kataib Hezbollah for about a dozen rocket attacks against American troops based in Iraq in the past six months. Bob Dreyfuss, 5-17-2019, "Trump May Not Want War With Iran—but the Coalition of the Killing May Give Him One," Nation, https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/iran-bolton-war-fever-trump-pompeo/ At home, even an unprovoked (and widely condemned) war against Iran could set off an explosion of MAGA-style jingoism among Trump’s supporters. The rally-round-the-flag effect that usually accompanies US overseas adventures could be used to suppress dissent, intimidate anti-war forces, and provide an opening for the administration to suppress civil liberties. An election season that should be about the president’s misrule—one that could bring to power a progressive coalition supporting economic and social justice—could be swamped by war fever. And the military-industrial complex, already getting fat on arms sales to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other Gulf states, would clamor for even greater largesse, beyond the more than $1 trillion it will already pocket in the next year. That’s why it’s critical that the American people, members of Congress, and especially the Democrats seeking to replace Trump in 2020 speak out forcefully against this war fever. In response to the recent dangerous White House actions, Senator Bernie Sanders warned that Trump has “isolated the US from its closest allies and put us on a dangerous path to conflict.” Senator Angus King of Maine noted that Bolton has already proclaimed his intent to “celebrate in the streets of Tehran.” And Senators Tom Udall of New Mexico and Dick Durbin of Illinois warned in a Washington Post op-ed, “We are again barreling toward another unnecessary conflict in the Middle East based on faulty and misleading logic.” Warnings, of course, are appropriate. But they must be louder and more insistent. And Congress, as it unsuccessfully tried to do in regard to US support for the Saudi-UAE war in Yemen, must stand up to claim its authority over war and peace. Marisa Fernandez, 1-3-2020, "Video: Trump said in 2011 that Obama would use war with Iran to get re-elected," Axios, https://www.axios.com/trump-iran-war-obama-957a39c2-d0b9-4041-bb71-c3dfa12339d5.html Then-citizen Donald Trump predicted in November 2011 video that then-President Barack Obama would start a war with Iran in order to get re-elected in 2012. "Our president will start a war with Iran because he has absolutely no ability to negotiate. He’s weak and he’s ineffective. So the only way he figures that he’s going to get re-elected, and as sure as you're sitting there, is to start a war with Iran." Tom Rogan, 4-18-2020, "Here's how you'll know we're about to go to war with Iran — right now, we're not," Washington Examiner, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/heres-how-youll-know-were-about-to-go-to-war-with-iran-right-now-were-not First, we would have to stage an extremely large air and naval force buildup in the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf, for strike operations inside Iran and defeat of Iran's naval forces. We'd also have to do it in the Mediterranean Sea, to help defend Israel against Iranian ballistic missile attacks and to complicate Russian action via its Black Sea fleet. … Second, we would see a massive ground force deployment in Saudi Arabia (none of Iran's neighbors would likely allow U.S. invasion forces access). Iran is three times the size of Iraq, with a far more powerful regular and irregular military. Those factors alone would require U.S. ground deployment in the region of at least 500,000 ground assault forces. Note, here, that the 120,000 forces mentioned in reporting this week are very likely related to contingency planning. And they aren't even deployed! Toby C. Jones, 12-22-2011, "Don't Stop at Iraq: Why the U.S. Should Withdraw From the Entire Persian Gulf," Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/12/dont-stop-at-iraq-why-the-us-should-withdraw-from-the-entire-persian-gulf/250389/ Led by Saudi Arabia, the Arab Gulf states claim that their fears of Iranian ambition are existential. It is certainly true that Tehran is locked in a regional balance of power struggle with Saudi Arabia and that Iran seeks greater influence. But Iran does not seek the destruction of Saudi Arabia or the overthrow of Arab world's political order. In spite of claims to the contrary by the Saudi and Bahraini governments, Iran's revolutionary imperative is a relic of the past. Israel expresses a similar anxiety about Iran as a security threat. And Iran's leaders have played their part in fostering Israeli uncertainty. Iran's potential acquisition of nuclear weapons is a source of concern, of course, as is its support for Hezbollah and Syria. The challenge of how best to deal with Iranian ambition, however, is mainly a political problem, one that has for too long been treated almost entirely through the lens of security and militarism. The presence of the American military in the Gulf has not only done little to deter Iran's ambitions, it has emboldened them. Surrounding Iran militarily and putting it under the constant threat of American or Israeli military action has failed to deter the country. Instead this approach has strengthened hardliners within Tehran and convinced them that the best path to self-preservation is through defiance, militarism, and the pursuit of dangerous ties across the Middle East. The rivalry between Iran, the U.S., and its regional partners has turned into a political and military arms race, one that could easily spin out of control. Kirsten Fontenrose, 12-10-2019, "Gulf partners could give Iran and the US a way out of their collision course," Atlantic Council, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/gulf-partners-could-give-iran-and-the-us-a-way-out-of-their-collision-course/ Current trajectory: Everyone wins but the United States Iran floated the Hormuz Peace Endeavor (HOPE) proposal to Gulf neighbors this past fall. This plan would give GCC countries the peace of mind they’re looking for, but in exchange for US withdrawal from the region. Iran expected the region to say no publicly but to seek backchannel, bilateral agreements. This is happening, but it is not in the United States’ interest. Iran has assured its Gulf neighbors that it will not attack their people or their oil infrastructure in the near term. Instead it focuses its violent attention on US targets. Dan Spinelli, 6-26-2019, "Here's what it would look like if Trump starts a war with Iran.," Mother Jones, https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/06/heres-what-it-would-look-like-if-trump-starts-a-war-with-iran/ War with Iran by necessity would almost have to involve its regional neighbors and adversaries, including Israel, Lebanon, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, and Russia. Iranian proxies could support Tehran by targeting US troops in Iraq or continuing to use their perch in Yemen to bomb Saudi Arabia, which is America’s close ally and Iran’s sectarian enemy. Then depending on the route American bombers take to reach Iran, they run the risk of angering Iran’s neighbors. “You’re either going to fly in over Iraq or fly in over parts of Syria which has very good air defenses,” Gay says. “That’s where the best Russian air defenses are.” Routing the attack through Israel and Lebanon might provide a workaround, but that could draw these countries into the conflict. M. B., 7-2-2019, "A nuclear war in the Persian Gulf?," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, https://thebulletin.org/2019/07/a-nuclear-war-in-the-persian-gulf/ We believe there is a heightened possibility of a US-Iran war triggering a US nuclear strike for the following reasons: The sanction regime set against the Iranian economy is so brutal that it is likely to force Iran to take an action that will require a US military response. Unless the United States backs down from its present self-declared “economic warfare” against Iran, this will likely escalate to an open warfare between the two countries. In response to a White House request to draw up an Iran war plan, the Pentagon proposed sending 120,000 soldiers to the Persian Gulf. This force would augment the several thousands of troops already stationed in Iran’s vicinity. President Trump has also hinted that if need be, he will be sending “a lot more” troops. Defeating Iran through conventional military means would likely require a half million US forces and US preparedness for many casualties. The US nuclear posture review is worded in such a way that the use of tactical nuclear weapons in conventional theaters is envisaged, foreshadowing the concern that in a showdown with a menacing foe like Iran, the nuclear option is on the table. The United States could once again justify using nuclear force for the sake of a decisive victory and casualty-prevention, the logic used in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Trump’s cavalier attitude toward nuclear weapons, trigger-happy penchant, and utter disdain for Iran, show that he would likely have no moral qualm about issuing an order to launch a limited nuclear strike, especially in a US-Iran showdown, one in which the oil transit from the Gulf would be imperiled, impacting the global economy and necessitating a speedy end to such a war. If the United States were to commit a limited nuclear strike against Iran, it would minimize risks to its forces in the region, defang the Iranian military, divest the latter of preeminence in the Strait of Hormuz, and thus reassert US power in the oil hub of the Persian Gulf. Oil flowing through the Strait of Hormuz is critical to a rising China. US control over this merchant waterway would grant the United States significant leverage in negotiations. A limited US nuclear strike could cause a ‘regime change’ among Iranian leadership, representing a strategic setback for Russia, in light of their recent foray in the Middle East with Iranian backing. Alexandra Witze, 3-16-2020, "How a small nuclear war would transform the entire planet," Nature, https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-00794-y The worst impact would come in the mid-latitudes, including breadbasket areas such as the US Midwest and Ukraine. Grain reserves would be gone in a year or two. Most countries would be unable to import food from other regions because they, too, would be experiencing crop failures, Jägermeyr says. It is the most detailed look ever at how the aftermath of a nuclear war would affect food supplies, he says. The researchers did not explicitly calculate how many people would starve, but say that the ensuing famine would be worse than any in documented history. Farmers might respond by planting maize, wheat and soya beans in parts of the globe likely to be less affected by a nuclear winter, says Deepak Ray, a food-security researcher at the University of Minnesota in St Paul. Such changes might help to buffer the food shock — but only partly. The bottom line remains that a war involving less than 1 of the world’s nuclear arsenal could shatter the planet’s food supplies. “The surprising finding”, says Jägermeyr, “is that even a small-war scenario has devastating global repercussions”.	904,713
365,637	379,649	TOC Neg 6	Middle East presence is crucial to US realist strategy to prevent one power from controlling Eurasia Cropsey 19~-~-SETH CROPSEY, GARY ROUGHEAD, A U.S. Withdrawal Will Cause a Power Struggle in the Middle East, Foreign Policy, 12/17/19, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/17/us-withdrawal-power-struggle-middle-east-china-russia-iran/ Debates about U.S. foreign policy usually avoid grand strategy—the notion of a high-level international relations framework. But great powers that do not think strategically will cease to be great powers. Since functionally unifying the North American continent and establishing its hegemony in Latin America in the late 19th century, the United States’ central geopolitical objective has been to prevent any one state from dominating Eurasia, and a look at the nature of the country’s global position explains why. Its involvement in both of the 20th century’s world wars and the Cold War was motivated in large measure to prevent a hegemonic power from dominating Europe. The economic element of today’s competition with China is subordinate to the strategic objective of keeping it from controlling the Eurasian landmass. Geographically isolated from the world’s traditional sources of wealth in Europe and Asia, the United States relied on maritime trade and transport for its economic power, which, in turn, requires access to overseas markets—access a Eurasian great power could hypothetically deny. Moreover, a single political force that commands Eurasia’s population of 5 billion could apply enormous economic, social, and political pressure on smaller and less powerful states in Africa and the Americas. For those reasons, the United States has built a global defense system buttressed by a sprawling network of military bases in order to guarantee access to large parts of Eurasia. Considering the United States’ insular geographic position, naval power is the key to ensuring Washington’s ability to move forces between regions at will, to ensure communications with its allies, and to deny options to its enemies. The Middle East’s central location between Europe, East Asia, and Africa makes it geographically vital to U.S. interests. The rise of China had not changed that. U.S. lines of communication and supply between Europe and Asia pass directly through the Middle East. U.S. maritime strategy requires sailing carrier and expeditionary strike groups, submarines, and logistic ships between combatant commands, and passing through the Suez Canal is far more efficient than rounding the Horn of Africa. Although the United States has decreased its reliance on Middle Eastern oil—a fact motivating some of the isolationist rationale for disengagement—Washington’s European and Asian allies still require uninterrupted access to the region’s energy resources. The Levantine Basin and Suez Canal are also international container shipping hubs. Disruption to that regional maritime trade would have immediate, far-reaching global implications. Hegemon in Middle East would break up US alliances Cropsey 19~-~-SETH CROPSEY, GARY ROUGHEAD, A U.S. Withdrawal Will Cause a Power Struggle in the Middle East, Foreign Policy, 12/17/19, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/17/us-withdrawal-power-struggle-middle-east-china-russia-iran/ The Ottoman Empire was the last entity to command regional hegemony in the Middle East. No country or group has made a legitimate claim to the mantle of a regional caliphate since. While a united Middle East under any version of a reconstituted caliphate could undermine U.S. interests by projecting power globally, a divided Middle East monopolized by a hostile great power could have the same effect. Either an external power or a regional hegemon could prevent the United States from communicating and coordinating among forces and allies in Europe and Asia and disrupt global economic activity by interrupting U.S. and allied shipping. Eliminating U.S. naval dominance would upend the current balance of power, with severe consequences for Europe and Asia. China wants to disrupt US bases + alliances in prep for US-China war Cropsey 19~-~-SETH CROPSEY, GARY ROUGHEAD, A U.S. Withdrawal Will Cause a Power Struggle in the Middle East, Foreign Policy, 12/17/19, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/17/us-withdrawal-power-struggle-middle-east-china-russia-iran/ But the United States must also contend with its two greatest geopolitical threats, Russia and China—both of which have interests in the Middle East. China, dependent on Middle Eastern energy, seeks to assure its energy supply, complete the midsection of its Belt and Road Initiative, and place at risk the European ports on which the United States would depend in a continental war. China’s objectives challenge Washington’s interest in its NATO and East Asian allies’ need for energy, along with the United States’ long-standing relationship with the continent most closely allied to its political, economic, and security interests. China’s growing control of Mediterranean and European port infrastructure will complicate logistics associated with a U.S. response in the region. Ceding Middle East would create rise of hostile power, represent demise of US great-power status Cropsey 19~-~-SETH CROPSEY, GARY ROUGHEAD, A U.S. Withdrawal Will Cause a Power Struggle in the Middle East, Foreign Policy, 12/17/19, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/17/us-withdrawal-power-struggle-middle-east-china-russia-iran/ If the United States withdraws from the region and hands the responsibility of those issues to another power (or set of powers), it will certainly give rise to another hegemonic power in the region that is hostile to U.S. interests. Such a change would copper-fasten the United States’ loss of great-power status. War is nonlinear Beyerchen 93~-~-Alan Beyerchen, Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability of War, Ohio State University/International Security, 1993, https://www.clausewitz.com/item/Beyerchen-ClausewitzNonlinearityAndTheUnpredictabilityOfWar.htm A third route to explaining the difficulties encountered in coping with On War has been typified by Michael Handel, for whom the issue is not so much changes in our interpretations as changes in warfare itself. Those aspects of On War that deal with human nature, uncertainty, politics, and rational calculation "will remain eternally valid," he contended. "In all other respects technology has permeated and irreversibly changed every aspect of warfare." (5) For Handel, the essential problem in understanding Clausewitz lies in our confrontation with a reality qualitatively different from his. Each of these approaches has merit, yet none satisfies completely. I offer a revision of our perception of Clausewitz and his work by suggesting that Clausewitz displays an intuition concerning war that we can better comprehend with terms and concepts newly available to us: On War is suffused with the understanding that every war is inherently a nonlinear phenomenon, the conduct of which changes its character in ways that cannot be analytically predicted. I am not arguing that reference to a few of today's "nonlinear science" concepts would help us clarify confusion in Clausewitz's thinking. My suggestion is more radical: in a profoundly unconfused way, he understands that seeking exact analytical solutions does not fit the nonlinear reality of the problems posed by war, and hence that our ability to predict the course and outcome of any given conflict is severely limited. The correctness of Clausewitz's perception has both kept his work relevant and made it less accessible, for war's analytically unpredictable nature is extremely discomfiting to those searching for a predictive theory. An approach through nonlinearity does not make other reasons for difficulty in understanding On War evaporate. It does, however, provide new access to the realistic core of Clausewitz's insights and offers a correlation of the representations of chance and complexity that characterize his work. Furthermore, it may help us remove some unsettling blind spots that have prevented us from seeing crucial implications of his work. …Obviously, acquisition and management of the precision and the amount of input data necessary for exact prediction pose an impractical problem, but the large scale of the atmospheric system is actually not the issue. The difficulty arises merely from multiplying pairs of the variables in two of the three coupled equations. (17) The heart of the matter is that the system's variables cannot be effectively isolated from each other or from their context; linearization is not possible, because dynamic interaction is one of the system's defining characteristics. The question is whether, according to Clausewitz, wars are also nonlinear systems...Only if war were some hermetically sealed phenomenon could its fundamental nature rage on unchecked. This would require that war (a) be an isolated and sudden act without prelude, (b) consist of a single decisive act or set of simultaneous ones, and (c) achieve a result perfectly complete in itself. But Clausewitz contends that an actual war never occurs without a context; that it always takes time to conduct, in a series of interactive steps; and that its results are never absolutely final—all of which impose restrictions on the analytically simple "pure theory" of war. Any specific war is subject to historical contingencies; thus he concludes that the theoretical basis for prediction of the course of the war dissolves from any analytical certainties into numerical possibilities. (21) Wars, therefore, are not only characterized by feedback (a process distinctly involving nonlinearities), but inseparable from their contexts…Yet another implication is that chance is also not extrinsic to war, because the interactive nature of military action itself generates chance. Single-valued, analytically exact solutions achieved by idealization that conveniently excise all but a few variables derive from a linear intuition. Clausewitz understands that war has no distinct boundaries and that its parts are interconnected. What is needed is to comprehend intuitively both that the set of parameters for "the problem" is unstable, and that no arbitrarily selected part can be abstracted adequately from the whole. The work of Clausewitz indicates that knowing how the system functions at this moment does not guarantee that it will change only slightly in the next. Although it may remain stable, it might also suddenly (although perhaps subtly) pass a threshold into a thoroughly different regime of behavior. And the causes of such changes in a complex system can be imperceptibly small. Production of an unchanging set of laws or even principles to be employed in all "similar" contexts is not merely useless, it can become counterproductive and lead to the kind of fixed, inflexible, mechanical mentality that is overwhelmed by events. Adaptability is as important in doctrine as on the battlefield…The overall pattern is clear: war seen as a nonlinear phenomenon—as Clausewitz sees it—is inherently unpredictable by analytical means. Chance and complexity dominate simplicity in the real world. Thus no two wars are ever the same. No war is guaranteed to remain structurally stable. No theory can provide the analytical short-cuts necessary to allow us to skip ahead of the "running" of the actual war. No realistic assumptions offer a way to bypass these uncomfortable truths. Yet these truths have the virtue that they help us identify the blinders we impose on our thinking when we attempt to linearize. And what Clausewitz says about the conduct of war applies to the study of war: "once barriers—which in a sense consist only in man's ignorance of what is possible—are torn down, they are not so easily set up again." (84) Sanctions have never stopped nuclearization Waltz 12—Kenneth Waltz, Why Iran Should Get the Bomb, Foreign Affairs, 6/15/12, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2012-06-15/why-iran-should-get-bomb The crisis over Iran’s nuclear program could end in three different ways. First, diplomacy coupled with serious sanctions could convince Iran to abandon itspursuit of a nuclear weapon. But this outcomeis unlikely: the historical record indicates that a country bent on acquiring nuclear weapons can rearely dissuaded from doing so. Punishing a state through economic sanctions does not inexorably derail its nuclear program. Take North Korea, which succeeded in building itsweapons despite countless rounds of sanctions and UN security council resolutions. If Tehran determines that its security depends on posessing nuclear weapons, sanctions are unlikely to change its mind. In fact, adding still more sanctions now could make Iran feel even more vulnerable, giving it still more reason to seek the protection oft he ultimate deterrent Iran set to breach the deal David Axe, 1-21-2020, "Experts: Iran Could Be a Nuclear Armed State in Just 1 Year," National Interest,JL https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/experts-iran-could-be-nuclear-armed-state-just-1-year-115491 Trump abandoned the Iran deal to spite Obama, according to a leaked memo written by the United Kingdom's former ambassador to the United States. Kim Darroch in 2018 described Trump’s move as an act of "diplomatic vandalism.” The European Union, China, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, Germany and Iran remain parties to the deal. As recently as June 2019 Iran had abided by all the deal’s limits on centrifuges, heavy water and enriched fissible materials. More recently, Tehran has warned that it would exceed the JCPOA’s caps, Davenport explained. According to a May 31, 2019 report from the International Atomic Energy Agency on Iran’s implementation of the nuclear deal, Iran moved closer to the caps on enriched uranium and heavy water set by the deal, but did not exceed them. The agency reported that as of May 20, Iran had stockpiled 174 kilograms of uranium enriched to 3.67 percent uranium-235, which is less than the 202 kilograms permitted by the JCPOA. In its previous report in February, the IAEA reported that the stockpile was 168 kilograms. Behrouz Kamalvandi, spokesman for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, said on June 17 that Iran was quadrupling its uranium-enrichment capacity and would breach the limit set by the deal within 10 days. Exceeding the limit of uranium enriched to 3.67-percent U-235 would reduce the so-called “breakout time,” or the time it takes Iran to produce enough nuclear material for a weapon, but it does not pose an immediate risk. Currently, due to restrictions put in place by the nuclear deal, the United States estimates that timeline at 12 months. Any reduction in the 12-month timeline will depend on how quickly Iran continues to enrich and stockpile uranium. Tehran would need to produce about 1,050 kilograms of uranium hexafluoride gas enriched to 3.67-percent U-235 to produce enough weapons-grade material (more than 90 percent-enriched U-235) for one bomb. Set to breach in year Daniel Oberhaus,01.06.2020 07:11 PM, "How Close Is Iran to a Nuclear Weapon? Here's What We Know," Wired,JL https://www.wired.com/story/how-close-is-iran-to-a-nuclear-weapon-heres-what-we-know/ the Islamic republic is closer to a nuke now than it has been in the last five years. Although Iran did not withdraw from the 2015 treaty altogether, it no longer recognizes restrictions on uranium enrichment levels, the number of uranium centrifuges it operates, or the amount of enriched uranium in its stockpiles. The door to becoming a nuclear-armed superpower was once bolted shut for Iran, but now it stands ajar.This raises a troubling question: If Iran decides to walk through that door, how long would it take to build a nuclear bomb? This is known as Iran’s “breakout” time and Miles Pomper, a nuclear arms control expert at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, currently estimates it to be at least a year. The calculation is based on the amount of work the country would have to do just to get its nuclear infrastructure back to pre-2015 levels. Estimating brea Arms race scenario Michael Patrick, 4-11-2016, "Recalculating U.S. Policy in the Middle East: Less Military, More Civilian," Middle East Institute,JL https://www.mei.edu/publications/recalculating-us-policy-middle-east-less-military-more-civilian as the only instrument of U.S. foreign policy that really counts. However, the next administration will have to consider the changing dynamics in the Middle East and new approaches, beyond simply military means, to deal with them. The United States requires less military presence and greater civilian effort in meeting future Middle Eastern challenges. Nonproliferation: Risks Postponed, U.S. Role Increasingly Diplomatic The most threatening nonproliferation issue in the region is the Iranian nuclear program. Were Iran to succeed in building and deploying functional nuclear weapons with the means to deliver them, it would likely trigger an arms race in the region with a high risk of miscalculation by Iran and its antagonists, including both Israel and Sunni-majority states such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt. The Iran nuclear deal, if fully implemented, has at best postponed this risk for 15 years. Vigilance will be required to ensure implementation meets the letter and the spirit of the agreement, but Washington needs now to turn its attention to ensuring that the environment a decade hence continues to discourage Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. This will require lowering the level of regional tensions and ending the Sunni-Shiite proxy wars in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. It will also require a regional security architecture that enables both Iran and its Sunni competitors to be confident all will remain non-nuclear. Today, there is no such architecture and precious little mutual confidence. A strong American military posture will continue to be needed in order to provide assurance that any Iranian effort to break out of the nuclear deal and acquire nuclear weapons can be stopped. The weapons required for that purpose need not all be stationed in the region, however. There is little military utility, and a good deal of risk, in basing American troops and sailors in the Middle East. If destruction of Iran’s nuclear facilities may someday be required, it can be done just as effectively, while putting fewer Americans at risk, from far off with cruise missiles, drones, cyberattacks, and other stand-off weapons.	904,714
365,638	379,622	Unionization	Gebelhoff 16 (Robert, Why are unions in the U.S. so weak?, August 1st 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2016/08/01/why-are-unions-in-the-u-s-so-weak/?utm_term=.fbfbb62a7666, The Washington Post, JS) lackluster union presence is largely an ... businesses and the government. Worstall 15 (Tim, Fellow at the Adam Smith Institute in London, The Real Value Of A Universal Basic Income Is That It Raises The Reservation Wage, https://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2015/09/18/the-real-value-of-a-universal-basic-income-is-that-it-raises-the-reservation-wage/#58af30ee7ca1, September 18th 2015, Forbes) decline of unions has meant ... untenable by a minimum wage. Bronfenbrenner, 3 ~-~- director of labor education research at the New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations at Cornell University (Kate, "Declining unionization, rising inequality", May, Proquest) // NK the union wage premium ... high end of each industry. Fox 14 – Justin Fox, Fox, a former editorial director of Harvard Business Review, is a columnist for Bloomberg View, 9-1-2014, "What Unions No Longer Do," Harvard Business Review, https://hbr.org/2014/09/what-unions-no-longer-do KKC Unions no longer counteract ... between blacks and whites has grown. Fox 14 The decline of unions ... perennial competitiveness laggard.	904,702
365,639	379,628	2 - NovDec Nato	US still has offensive capabilities even if they don’t use them Rebecca Slaton, February 2017, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/why-cyber-operations-do-not-always-favor-offense, Why Cyber Operations Do Not Always Favor the Offense The skills and organizational capabilities for offense and defense are very similar. Defense requires understanding how to compromise computer systems; one of the best ways to protect computer systems is to engage in penetration testing (i.e., controlled offensive operations on one’s own systems). The similarity between offensive and defensive skills makes it unnecessary to conduct offensive operations against adversaries to maintain offensive capability. Thus, rather than stockpiling technologies in the hope of gaining offensive advantage, states should develop the skills and organizational capabilities required to innovate and maintain information and communications technologies. If the USFG doesn’t use offensive cyber weapons it will just share all it’s capabilities with its allies who will use if on Americas behalf Israel gets US tech Derek B. Johnson, 19 Derek B. Johnson, (). "Bill boosting cyber Randamp;D between U.S. and Israel passes House." FCW, xx-xx-xxxx, 10-31-2019. https://fcw.com/articles/2019/07/24/house-bill-us-israel-cyber-research.aspx // MHS JL The House of representatives quietly passed legislation on July 23 that would expand cybersecurity research and development partnerships between several federal agencies and the government of Israel. US shares tech with NATO “US to offer cyberwar capabilities to NATO allies.” CNBC. 10/3/18. https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/03/us-to-offer-cyberwar-capabilities-to-natoallies.html The decision comes on the heels of the NATO summit in July, when members agreed to allow the alliance to use cyber capabilities that are provided voluntarily by allies to protect networks and respond to cyberattacks. It reflects growing concerns by the U.S. and its allies over Moscow’s use of cyber operations to influence elections in America and elsewhere. NATO supports and follows US military goals Irvin Oliver, 19 Irvin Oliver, (). "Reconsidering NATO and U.S. Foreign Policy." No Publication, 4-16-2019, 11-1-2019. https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2019/04/16/reconsidering_nato_and_us_foreign_policy_114338.html // MHS JL NATO has enabled and supported U.S. foreign policy since the early days of the Cold War and continues to do so today. Given the 2018 National Defense Strategy’s emphasis on the return of great power competition, NATO’s importance to the United States will grow as competition intensifies.2 The United States should consider reinforcing NATO and reassuring its NATO allies of continued American commitment. This would maintain NATO as a resource for implementing U.S. foreign policy. NATO was a primary mechanism for the United States to balance against the Soviet Union and prevent them from strengthening their hand in Europe, which was central to the policy of containment. For the United States, NATO was a way to deter Soviet aggression and deny Soviet expansion into Western Europe. Early on, it became clear the Soviet Union and its former allies would find themselves on opposing ideological sides. Winston Churchill expressed the West’s trepidation toward Soviet intent when he described an “iron curtain” descending across Europe, dividing free and liberal Europe from European capitals under Soviet control.3 In the emerging bipolar structure of the international system, the United States looked to secure its position and national interests against the world’s other superpower. This was one of the factors for early U.S. support for NATO.4 Kosovo was NATO’s first war and a vehicle to apply American power after the Cold War. With no overarching threat focusing U.S. foreign policy, American interests expanded. The United States again saw its security intertwined with that of Europe’s and sought to maintain regional security in Europe while protecting human rights and values.9 The new twist was the protection of human rights, and the genocide in the Balkans threatened both.10 The decision to use force in Kosovo was controversial, and the United States faced opposition at home and internationally. Still, the United States led NATO operations in Kosovo, providing the architecture for the military campaign and conducting most of NATO’s airstrikes.11 NATO provided legitimacy for the American use of force in the unipolar moment.12 When the United States was unable to secure a United Nations authorization to use force in Kosovo, NATO became the best avenue to employ force with international legitimacy. Through NATO’s interventions in Kosovo and Bosnia in the 1990s, the United States was able to pursue its foreign policy interests while giving NATO a raison d’être in the absence of the Soviet threat. Al-Qaeda’s attacks on 9/11 changed that and led NATO to return to its original collective defense mandate. Al-Qaeda’s attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, led much of the world to rally with the United States in support. This included the only time in NATO’s history when it invoked Article Five of the North Atlantic Treaty—that an attack on one is an attack on all. NATO members Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, and Norway joined the United States and Australia in the early offensive operations in Afghanistan.13 These initial NATO elements eventually expanded into the International Security Assistance Force and supported Operation Enduring Freedom across Afghanistan. The expansion of NATO support helped to mitigate the lack of U.S. forces due to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. At its height, over 130,000 troops supported the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force mission, which included security force assistance, reconstruction, and counter-terrorism operations.	904,706
365,640	379,630	0 - Dino	Interpretation: Debaters must talk about dinosaurs in the 1AC Violation they don’t Kriss 15 (Sam, London Bureau Chief at Full Stop. Founded in January of 2011, Full Stop focuses on debuts, works in translation, and books published by small presses. Pale/ontology: The Dinosaurian Critique of Philosophy. http://www.full-stop.net/2015/04/22/features/sam-kriss/paleontology-the-dinosaurian-critique-of-philosophy/ //shree) The great failing of all philosophy is its continued refusal to properly consider the question of dinosaurs. A baffling refusal. They have something to hide. When they don’t talk about dinosaurs it’s because there’s something they’re trying to keep covered up. Radicals tend to not like dinosaurs very much. They’re big, and clunky, and all of them dead; they bear royal names and privileges, they inspire a politically dubious sense of the sublime. There doesn’t seem to be any real place in our non-alienated future for the dinosaurs. If they mean anything it’s only the ancient regime, a grand and terrible relic of a lost age. We’ll gawp at their bones, but first they must be bones. That’s not the real problem with dinosaurs, though: the reason so many seemingly educated people seem so unwilling to talk about dinosaurs is the uncomfortable feeling that they might somehow come back. The thing about the repressed is that it always does come back. It’s in a different form, but no number of asteroid impacts can blot out the central law of the psyche. The primal analytic scene is this: a patient, squirming on a couch, saying this and that thing about the problems in her life, trying to avoid the central issue in a constant swerving series of linguistic loops, unavoidably centripetal — suddenly she seizes up. A cough. One hand darts into the air, seized, contorted; already the polished and manicured nails are looking somehow claw-like. When she tries to speak again her mouth opens into a long slit running to the corners of her jaw, revealing the rows of tiny sharp teeth behind. Her face lengthens to a snouty point, her hair frills into soft downy feathers, her ankle travels halfway up her leg. There’s a dinosaur on the couch. Then it speaks — something ultimately quite banal about its parents or its childhood; the point is that it’s something ancestral and inhuman, from the old dark wordless prehistory of the mind. Memory is everywhere a form of bioengineering; the bringing back of a dinosaur. Faulkner understood it: The past is never dead. It’s not even past. Reintroducing the dinosaurs isn’t a matter of temporal but spatial rearrangement. In cinema, the reanimated dinosaurs always seem to have a particular fury that has nothing to do with hunger. It doesn’t matter if they were hiding out in some isolated valley, or brought back by genetic engineering, or if they infiltrated our world through a rift in the fabric of time, the anger is the same. Dinosaurs attack fences, Portaloos, helicopters, cars. Especially cars: they take particular joy in crushing heavily-built vehicles under one gargantuan foot. When they break into homes, they’ll do their best to shred every manufactured item they find. If they’re ever let out in a built-up area, they’ll immediately get to work systematically destroying skyscrapers. The carnivorous species will, admittedly, sometimes stop to eat a few people — but this always seems like an afterthought, a snack break in their main task of leveling large buildings. In 1953’s The Beast from 20,000 Fathoms, arguably the first dinosaur-in-the-city film and a direct influence on the original Godzilla, the first thing an atomically reanimated Rhedosaurus does on making land in New England is to destroy a lighthouse. It’s not at all concerned with the possible edibility of the lighthouse-keepers; instead, it bites the building itself in half before rearing up over its castrated stump and roaring in primeval victory. In 1956’s The Beast of Hollow Mountain (old science fiction films weren’t named creatively, but the producers knew what worked) the dinosaur sets off a cattle rampage, seemingly deliberately, that all but demolishes a Wild West town, turning the agricultural basis of settled human civilization against itself. As the technological means of reanimating the dinosaurs went from atom bombs and papier-mâché to wormholes, time travel and CGI, soon no city was safe. The dinosaurs themselves came to inhabit every achievement of industrial civilization, whether as the mechanical dinobots that stomp on Hong Kong in Transformers: Age of Extinction or the genetically engineered creatures (explicitly connected with dinosaurs in the film) that threaten half the planet in Pacific Rim. Over the past few years, cinematic culture has come to resemble a series of variations on one single image: a saurian monster pummeling, with all the fury of the unfathomably alien, a mute and motionless office building. This is strange, because the dinosaurs never seem to have the same antipathy towards geological structures — and it’s hard to imagine how a dinosaur could conceive of a tall building apart from as a geological structure. Clearly it’s not the buildings themselves the dinosaurs object to; it’s the spatial logic that they represent, the system by which we parcel out the topology of existence into named and comprehensible chunks. Dinosaurs are different from other monsters in that they were once here. They’re not invaders from the outside; their claim to this space is better than ours. The place where you’re reading this now is understood to be within some defined area: a privately owned home or office, a neighborhood, a city, a region, a nation-state as symbolized by some patches of color on a square of cloth somewhere, a breakaway territory, an autonomous zone — something by which space is understood. Except it isn’t: you’re standing in the footprints of dinosaurs. Their great herds roamed over this same land, and fought titanic combats, and died in their millions. Over the ground that they walked, human beings have built Ipswitch and Rotterdam and Kansas City, flyovers and business parks and shopping centers. This little patch of soil you know so well was once a strange and terrifying place. Human beings take the remnants of this lost universe, crush them up, and use them to power Hyundais. No wonder dinosaurs hate cars so much: cars are the crematoria we’ve built for our ancestors. In Jurassic Park dinosaurs are treated as the scaly instantiations of a principle of mathematical chaos, but in fact their destruction is a finely premeditated revenge. Philosophers don’t want to consider dinosaurs because in any epistemology or ontology that follows Kant in featuring a distinction between human experience and the non-human world, dinosaurs represent the ultimate point of the non-human world’s unknowability. God is an indeterminate quantity; the real Absolute Other is twenty-three meters from end to end, with broad flat teeth for slicing up vegetable matter and a long tapering tail that draws lazy circles in the heavy Tithonian air. Levinas and Derrida speak of the unfathomable void of an animal’s eyes, and in a way they’re right; there’s sometimes something briefly terrifying in there. But it’s only a punctum, a sudden pin-prick: we know animals, we see them in the park, we grew up with them in fables and nursery stories. It’s a wound that quickly heals. Dinosaurs are too big to fit in any of our conceptual categories. If we’re to conceive of a noumenon, a real world as it really is, outside our experience, the previous existence of dinosaurs on the earth is the most important single fact about that world. They stand for the sheer unimportance of human subjectivity: reality was around for millions of years before we arrived to ponder its nature, and it did fine; even without a human subject to give meaning to its objectivity it was still full of life and danger. In this light, the strange refusal to talk about dinosaurs is so pervasive and so consistent that it can only be read as a neurotic symptom. If we don’t discuss them, maybe they won’t come back to claw our fragile distinction from the world of objects into shreds. It’s not just our finely wrought society that the dinosaurs threaten; it’s the idea that human subjectivities and the world beyond them can face each other as two equal halves, evenly matched. It’s the fantasy of an inert world, one without gargantuan teeth. It’s the idea that humans are subjects, always subjects, and always humans. When it comes to the non-human world, philosophers have an unusual tic: they all suddenly start talking about desks. Is the desk really brown, or is its brownness a property of my sense-perception? Is it really made of wood, or is that just informed by discursive practices? Bertrand Russell does it in The Problems of Philosophy. Wittgenstein does it in his Philosophical Investigations. Husserl does it in the first volume of his Ideas. Marx, to his credit, at least has some fun with it while talking about commodity fetishism in Capital; his desk stands on its head, and evolves out of its wooden brain grotesque ideas, far more wonderful than if it were to begin dancing of its own free will. Meanwhile, Heidegger has the full complement: a desk, a pen, and an ink-pot. He also famously uses a hammer, but it’s not the kind of hammer that Nietzsche encourages us to philosophize with, or the kind that one of Heidegger’s distant German ancestors might have used to cave in the skulls of a few Roman legionaries. For Heidegger the non-human world is made of tools; his hammer is an instrument of carpentry, one that you would use to build a desk. All this betrays a critical lack of imagination. Read enough philosophy and you’ll end up with the impression that the entire world is some vast university building, a network of tiny wood-paneled rooms sprawling over the entire surface of the planet, each one containing nothing more than a single desk and a puzzled man trying to figure out his relationship to it. Of course, nobody is watching the philosopher. All these philosophers needed to get out more: searching for an example, they settled on the desk in front of them, when they could have gone down to the museum and looked at the dinosaurs. This isn’t just a cosmetic point: a desk is not like a dinosaur. Both might be dead objects that were once alive, but unlike the grinning calcified skeletons in the museums, felled trees don’t plot many schemes for revenge. A wooden desk might give you a splinter, but other than that it’s stupidly compliant, happily representing a static world. The faddish recent trend towards object-oriented philosophy, for all its pretensions, does little better. Its central feature is what’s called an ‘anthropodecentrism’; a rejection of any philosophical approach that ascribes some intrinsic difference to the human experience of the world or routes all relations between objects through humans. Objects don’t require a subject; they don’t just have existence in themselves but must too have a being-for-itself. As Graham Harman — its foremost advocate — argues, who are we to say with certitude that a hammer (of course, it’s still a hammer; sometimes a lizard or a piece of fruit, never a dinosaur) doesn’t move knowingly towards its own Being? Why do we malign a banana’s perspective on the world? This sounds like the kind of philosophy that would be able to finally face the dinosaurian core of reality; in fact it does precisely the opposite. They refuse to consider the non-human world as being properly non-human. All they do is execute the same Beauty and the Beast maneuver that Marx does in Capital, but with none of his irony; rather than standing in awe of the inhuman, they have candles and teapots dancing around in a grim pantomime. Rather than resurrect the dinosaurs, they’d have the dinosaurs play at being human. With all their Lovecraftian references, object-oriented ontologists and speculative realists make a point of stressing the “weirdness” of their philosophical project, but while there’s often an Unheimlich element to the world of lifelike automatons and inorganic demons they claim to inhabit, it’s not necessarily as strange as they insist. Things come to life crop up constantly in popular culture. There’s the Freudian nightmare of the Toy Story films, or worse yet the hellscape of Pixar’s Cars series, in which human-like cars dominate the world, working in factories and offices, with the only reasonable explanation for all this being that long in the film’s past the cars have unshackled themselves from the yoke of humanity and slaughtered every last living person. Maybe the fossilized remains of the people that once built these cars are being used to power their engines. Even dinosaurs are subjected to this logic, with the cutesy talking banalized creatures of The Land Before Time. Object-oriented philosophy isn’t much more than commodity fetishism; Harman’s ‘vicarious causation’ is less a profoundly weird innovation that reveals a hidden truth than the old Marxian analysis of capitalism raised to a universal: material relations between people, social relations between things. Real strangeness isn’t in the vaudeville act of objects perceiving and relating to each other, but a collapse of the human-world distinction that brings out the non-human in humanity. When the dinosaurs come back, it’s through us. An ancestral statement is ancestral, in our buried history. As any knowledgeable animist will tell you, our ancestors continue to live through us. First there’s the psychoanalytic subject, suddenly seized by a saurian remembrance. When you excavate the buried truth about yourself, all the repressed memories and hidden feelings, you’re no longer fully yourself at all. The bones were always visible, half-poking out through the stony strata (in one of his seminars Lacan remarked that it wouldn’t be a bad thing if every analyst went out and bought a small book on geology), but that person in the past is suddenly revealed as a very different person to the one that remembers, unaccountably attached to a similar body: not bones any more, but a living, breathing, roaring dinosaur. But in fact this resurrection of the dinosaurs happens all the time. For a start, it’s the basis of the process of material production under capitalism. Workers are, for a few hours each day, entirely subordinated to the process of production; subjectivity takes place on the level of the firm, while actual human beings are interchangeable units slotted carelessly into the assembly-line. Then in their leisure time they’re approached in their role as consumers, subjects again, and sold images of dinosaurs destroying their workplaces with teeth and claws. The point is to resolve our feelings of alienation into the figure of a giant scaly monster, in the hope that the pseudo-catharsis of the dinosaurian revolution onscreen will stop it happening in the streets. Our task is to not be afraid of dinosaurs, because we are dinosaurs. Any encounter with another person takes place across the void of the Real: you look into their eyes and see the hungry glint of a velociraptor, the utter foreignness of the other’s desire. This is what’s called objectification: the transformation of another person into something entirely unknowable, the brief resurrection of the dinosaurs. A normal philosophy will try to collapse all of humanity into the single figure of a philosopher staring, baffled, at his own desk. (The desk doesn’t stare back.) A figure invariably coded as one that’s probably male and certainly white, a solipsist who stands detached from things, looking at them, resting his chin on one hand. There’s nothing quite so stupid and solipsistic as the insistence that you are exactly what you feel yourself to be. This is perfectly exemplified by Hegel’s famous dialectic of the master and slave. In the Hegelian myth, when two people first encountered each other, they both demand that the other recognize them not as object but as a self-consciousness, a reflective subject. In such an immediate confrontation, this kind of recognition is impossible: in practical terms, what this means is that they both immediately try to club each other to death. The one who is not afraid of death wins, and the other is enslaved. Then, sheltered in the dialectical oasis of Knechtschaft, the slave comes to recognize the master as subject, allowing the relation to progress to a higher form. In the end, full consciousness is reached by both, at the small cost of hundreds of millions of deaths. There’s another way. The necessary alternative is to fully inhabit your existence as an object, to admit that you too are a dinosaur in the eyes of the other. If humanity is fully represented by the unobserved observer confused by carpentry, or the stupid waltz of master and slave, then none of us are fully human. We are the desk, not the philosopher: at some point always the object of someone else’s puzzled stare. Look at your hands: is that skin you’re seeing, or scales? You are not who you think you are. Once this is recognized, maybe we can turn our mutual inhumanity into a solidarity of the non-human. We can accept that we ourselves are strange and terrifying beasts, and then finally let the fury of the dinosaurs loose.	904,707
365,641	379,654	Race War	The race war isn’t just exported globally but is within our domestic borders and people of color are fighting for their lives. Black churches are being burned in Louisiana. The election of an alt right president who told four ethnic minority congresswomen, to “go back” to the “broken and crime infested” “countries” and called Rev. Al Sharpton “a con man, a troublemaker, always looking for a score” who “Hates Whites and Cops!”, and white nationalists like Dylan roof slaughtering African Americans while afterwards confessing to “trying to start a race war.” The 21st century wave of racialized white nationalist violence has solidified the race war and we need to fight back. The time for passivity is over-people of color scream and shout every day and are silenced within seconds. The fixation with protest ensures a deluded logic of respectability and indoctrination that sustains a historic racialized script. Rodríguez 19Dylan Rodríguez- “Insult/Internal Debate/Echo” Propter Nos Vol. 3 (2019) https://trueleappress.files.wordpress.com/2019/01/pn3-rodri?guez-insultinternal-debateecho-final.pdf 2019 VHS AI A delusion guides much of the righteous protest. It is the belief, tragic in its aversion to historical truth, that They don’t have The Right to do this (to us, to others, to the death). The protest stakes its high ground on the claim that the violence is beyond Their Right. Its furnace of outrage is fueled by the demand that They cease and desist, stop stop stop stop the beating killing brutal degrading displays of savage-sophisticated contempt for skin, bones, still-beating hearts. The protest demands recognition that the (your) other human life is worthy of integrity. The protest grasps for words that will somehow touch the brutalizers’ thin and nerveless membranes of decency. The protest claims the objects of violence embody dignity, manhood, motherhood, queer citizenship, and perhaps it will also remind them that “we are not criminals.” This activity is not naïve, for the delusion is not derivative of dumb ignorance, but rather of a willful one. The protest works hard to believe in the redemption of Rights forsaken. It is a religious belief—this is what we mean by willful delusion. It is a powerful delusion, to project that the manic aggression of Their world can be harnessed by anything remotely so abstract as Rights. (Of course, abstraction is as well a method of and for revolt, which is why Their colleges and universities are increasingly overrun by an instructional logic of vocational indoctrination, especially in sites of “diversity.”) Always hiding in these soon-discarded terms of protest appeal is another kind of recognition, popping through the delusion like unwelcome glares from behind. It is the knowledge—a deep knowing in friction with anything actually formally learned— that nothing is beyond Their Right, which is to say, They cannot dialog with the protest, they can only ever tolerate it. There is another way to view the relation of power: that in Their maddening assumption of Right as capacity for self-making brutality (a.k.a. policing, governing, civilizing), They are daring you to violate the long-settled limits of the appeal to decency and respect. The residual power of the delusion is the always- Propter Nos Vol. 3 (2019) 130 available temporality of its belief—some of you know as well as i that the righteous protest is never far from next-level noise, of a kind that turns the deputies’ presence into a beast of law. The end of protest is nearby, as it has always been, even if the form of the convening riff-raff looks familiar to Them. It is another way of saying that there is an inherent, beautiful danger to the theater of collective consciousness when it is fixated on the correction of errors and hypocrisies that are, in the long historical script, the productive technologies of US nation-building. Part 2 is Revolution Vote affirmative to embrace combat breath to mobilize the militant creation of a of UBI. Only our vitalization of insurrectionary politics and militant reconstructions can mobilize collective resistance to institutional violence. Agathangelou 11Anna M. Agathangelou- “Bodies to the Slaughter: Global Racial Reconstructions, Fanon’s Combat Breath, and Wrestling for Life” Somatechnics 1.1 209–248 DOI: 10.3366/soma.2011.0014 Edinburgh University Press www.eupjournals.com/soma 2011 VHS AI These multiple struggles point to the problem-spaces of ‘embodiment’ (Bosnak 2007; Ihde 2001; Seremetakis 1994; MerleauPonty 1962) and Fanon’s theory of ‘combat breath’ (Fanon 1967c: 65). Fanon understands ‘combat breathing’ as is the lived struggle of the slave and colonised subject contending with foreign violence and surveillance and the ‘monopolizing notion of humanity that gives to the colonizer’s values all ontological weight’ (Maldonado-Torres 2005: 154). He sees freedom as a structuring ontology, not just a political experience and practice; this gestures back to the Stoics, for whom air, breath and soul are one. Anaximenes states that ‘our soul (yuch), being air (aeraand), holds us together, so do breath (pneuBma) and air (aeraand) encompass the whole world. Yuch is air; air and pneuma are synonyms; therefore the soul is also pneuma’ (Anaximenes 1898, quoted in Benso 2008: 14; Vamvacas 2009). I read Fanon’s idea of combat breath to point beyond violence to the relation of the materiality and immateriality of the breath (pneuBma) to open up a ‘different idea of the polis from that envisioned by the metaphysical (and Roman) West’ (Spanos 2000: 206). I work with Fanon to understand the new problem-space that shapes our present. Combat breath, I argue, is not an event of the past, or what remains after slavery and colonialism, nor the ‘end’ of anti-colonial projects (such as development, national liberation, socialisms and communisms) but living practices constituted in involuntary constrictions of specific peoples’ lives. With Fanon, I articulate combat breath as lived existential struggles that bring together the ‘infinite and the finite without collapsing them into a monolithicprocess’(Z?iz?ekandMilibank2009:17).This combat breath of the living disrupts and exceeds the dominant implicit spatial schism of ecology and body, sovereign subject and its soma or flesh, person and living being (the phenomenon and the noumenon) in political projects and their desired contingent orders. Since the 1990s, political projects changing the world order and institutions alike have involved intensified war and slaughter (Goodman 2010), pauperisation, and restructuring institutions such as the state and the market, ecologies, and corporealities in the name of progress. Such restructuring has become the focus of contestation in many parts of the world, though often in more complex ways than most analyses acknowledge: what kinds of expenditures, for instance, are required to erect such order(s) and sovereign bodies, and make viable such projects? Somatechnics 210 Worldwide, a diverse (neo) liberal leadership has intensified its involvement in (post) and (neo) reconstructions by focusing on grammars and ethics of suffering in the name of security and humanitarian regimes. Direct force is extended and refined in the name of ‘saving the state and the market’ and securing world peace and order; venturist states and markets stalk opportunity by leveraging somata’s ‘surpluses’ (taxes, extraction of more value from labour, sale of body parts and ‘body bits’, regeneration of bodies), buffering the state’s capacity to incur substantial debts and carry out executions, whether this entails deployment of forces, structural financial repairs, policing action, or suffocating people. Such interventions point to the deployment and limits of temporal and spatial reassemblages and derivative reconstructions across political, social, economic, and corporeal registers. Thematically speaking, derivative reconstructions disclose the power of a derivative-slave-colonisation death discourse with definite practices and purposes: the use of vital energies of ‘black’ states, slaves, and ‘black’ ecologies even at the moment of their execution to generate capable somata (such as land, bodies).2 The refusal to find solidarity with our method is the functional equivalent of greenlighting ontological slaughter- only combat breath as a praxis and material orientation can build the spiritual energy for a violent revolution. Agathangelou 11Anna M. Agathangelou- “Bodies to the Slaughter: Global Racial Reconstructions, Fanon’s Combat Breath, and Wrestling for Life” Somatechnics 1.1 209–248 DOI: 10.3366/soma.2011.0014 Edinburgh University Press www.eupjournals.com/soma 2011 VHS AI In effect, in explaining what ‘combat breath’ is in the everyday struggles against the coloniser whose project is the final destruction of the colonised, he is also able to point to the reasons why combat breathing enables alternative worlds and worldviews. There is not occupation of territory, on the one hand, and independence of persons on the other. It is the country as a whole, its history, its daily pulsation that are contested, disfigured, in the hope of a final destruction. Under these conditions, the individual’s breathing is an observed, an occupied breathing. It is a combat breathing. From this point on, the real values of the occupied quickly tend to acquire a clandestine form of existence. In the presence of the occupier, the occupied learns to dissemble, to resort to trickery. (Fanon 1967c: 65) Anaximenes said: ‘It is breathing, not simple air, that individualizes the human being, that gives him or her subjectivity, and that ultimately constitutes his or her soul. Such an activity of breathing provides physiological as well as psychological, physical as well as spiritual life; and in this sense, more than a material element (as air is), pneuma is a force, a life-force’ (quoted in Benso 2008: 14). What politics can empty this life force? If pneuma, air, and psyche ‘interact and feed each other ... and each nourishes the other’ (Anaximenes quoted in Benso 2008: 16), what happens when this breathing is disrupted by violent bloody means? Nothing less than ontological slaughtering unless one already presumes that breathing or what makes a human being a subject is only reserved for the coloniser, the settler who cannot hear the breathing of the slave and the colonised. Fanon recognises that the ‘stability’ of the coloniser’s being is directly connected to the native’s hallucinatory whitening that is, annihilation and also his/her ontological suffocation. Ultimately, for this antagonism to be disrupted, that is the suffocation, that theft of air that is assumed to be required for stability, violence is required: You should reject the distinction between theory and practice-Opening ourselves to genealogies of militancy presents possibilities for actual social insurgencies. Shukaitis and Graeber 07 Stevphen Shukaitis is Senior Lecturer at the University of Essex, Centre for Work and Organization, and a member of the Autonomedia editorial collective. David Rolfe Graeber is an American anthropologist and anarchist activist- “Constituent Imagination: Militant investigations// Collective theorizing” AK press. https://selforganizedseminar.files.wordpress.com/2011/08/shukaitis-graeber-constituent-imagination.pdf 2007 VHS AI Moments of possibility, of rupture—Yves Fremion calls them the “orgasms of history.” From Greek slave revolts to the San Francisco Diggers, from the Brethren of the Free Spirit to the Dutch Provos, these social explosions unleashed the power of collective imagination in ways that are almost never appreciated by conventional histories. Emerging without leaders or guidance from institutional structures, they open windows to the possibility that everything could change at once and the world be made anew. In these moments, borders that separate people burst open into renewed periods of social creativity and insurgencies. Workers talk to and organize with students, artists collaborate with housing organizers, the very boundaries between these categories blur as singular antagonisms combine and recombine. Where before there were multiple but separate struggles, these same struggles are multiplied, transformed, fused, and increased exponentially in their presence and potentialities. That is not to say that they are homogenized or combined into one thing, but rather complementarities and affinities are weaved, dancing new strategies through the social fabric. These new forms reveal glimpses of a future world, of the possibilities for liberation existing in the present. We can trace the connections between them, a genealogy of resistance that draws together hidden histories and points towards the future. Each contains difficulties and complications, places where it was necessary to take a leap of faith and risk the impossible. It is from these moments, these spaces of creation, that we can learn the most. From the College of Sociology turning festivals and the sacred into resistance to punk DIY culture creating new social relations and forms of production, these moments embody not just practices to adapt and creatively redeploy, but are in themselves ways of understanding the world and forms of research in action. To treat practices as forms of knowing, and knowledges as forms of doing, means rejecting the idea that theory and practice can ever truly be separated: they are always interconnected and woven through each other. 38 Constituent Imagination All too often and easily, the understanding embodied in organizing is not appreciated for the forms of knowledge it contains; likewise theorization often becomes detached from the location of its production and circulation. In these moments of possibility, these openings in the flow of history, boundaries and distinctions break down, forming an archipelago of possibility and the understanding that it is our task to extend today into tomorrow. Part 3 is the White Debate community The race war is not just “out there” but within the very education spaces we participate in. Debate is a microcosm for the race war – black debaters being told to “calm down” for being too “ratchet”, the refusal to invite certain teams to a round robin because of the arguments they read, black debaters getting the cops called on them because their music is too loud, and coaches preffing all white juries to adjudicate debates out of fear of “race hacks”. The race war is happening now and it has been inseparable from the internal protocols of debate. The seeming neutrality of fairness, limits, predictability, and clash are not pre-determined by a resolutional stasis but an internal drive to quash militant skills against the race war. Ask yourself why positions like the kant aff are deemed predictable but insurgent strategies like the aff aren’t. The race war is here and you as a judge have to take arms with a side. Thus the ROTB is to vote for the debater who abolishes the white debate community. You should understand this debate as a choice between policy and planning – their commitment to unending policy presupposes a subject fixed by socializing forces and has an imperative to participate in the correction of itself and other participants. Planning is an motion that engages in the militant preservation and fugitivity necessary to overcome the fetters of hope. Moten and Harney ‘13 (The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study, Minor Compositions pgs 80-82) rc/Pat Policy posits curriculum against study, child development against play, human capital against work. It posits having a voice against hearing voices, networked friending against contactual friendship. Policy posits the public sphere, or the counter-public sphere, or the black public sphere, against the illegal occupation of the illegitimately privatized. Policy is not the one against the many, the cynical against the romantic, or the pragmatic against the principled. It is simply baseless vision, woven into settler’s fabric. It is against all conservation, all rest, all gathering, cooking, drinking and smoking if they lead to marronage. Policy’s vision is to break it up then fix it, move it along by fixing it, manufacture ambition and give it to your children. Policy’s hope is that there will be more policy, more participation, more change. But there is also a danger in all this participation, a danger of crisis. When those who plan together start to participate without first being fixed, this leads to crisis. Participation without fully entering the blinding light of this dim enlightenment, without fully functioning families and financial responsibility, without respect for the rule of law, without distance and irony, without submission to the rule of expertise; participation that is too loud, too fat, too loving, too full, too flowing, too dread; this leads to crisis. People are in crisis. Economies are in crisis. We are facing an unprecedented crisis, a crisis of participation, a crisis of faith. Is there any hope? Yes, there is, say the deputies, if we can pull together, if we can share a vision of change. For policy, any crisis in the productivity of radical contingency is a crisis in participation, which is to say, a crisis provoked by the wrong participation of the wrong(ed). This is the third rule of policy. The crisis of the credit crunch caused by sub-prime debtors, the crisis of race in the 2008 US elections produced by Reverend Wright and Bernie Mac, the crisis in the Middle East produced by Hamas, the crisis of obesity produced by unhealthy eaters, the crisis of the environment produced by Chinese and Indians, are all instances of incorrect and uncorrected participation. The constant materialisation of planning in such participation is simply the inevitability of crisis, according to the deputised, who prescribe, as a corrective, hope for and hopefulness in correction. They say that participation must be hopeful, must have vision, must embrace change; that participants must be fashioned, in a general imposition of self-fashioning, as hopeful, visionary, change agents. Celebrating their freedom on lockdown in the enterprise zone, guarding that held contingency where the fashioning and correction of selves and others is always on automatic, the participant is the deputy’s mirror image. Deputies will lead the way toward concrete changes in the face of crisis. Be smart, they say. Believe in change. This is what we have been waiting for. Stop criticising and offer solutions. Set up roadblocks and offer workshops. Check ID’s and give advice. Distinguish between the desire to correct and the desire to plan with others. Ruthlessly seek out and fearfully beware militant preservation, in an undercommons of means without ends, of love among things. Now’s the time to declare and, in so doing, correctly fashion yourself as the one who is deputised to correct others. Now’s the time, before its night again. Before you start singing another half-illiterate fantasy. Before you resound that ongoing amplification of the bottom, the operations on the edge of normal rhythm’s soft center. Before someone says let’s get together and get some land. But we’re not smart. We plan. We plan to stay, to stick and move. We plan to be communist about communism, to be unreconstructed about reconstruction, to be absolute about abolition, here, in that other, undercommon place, as that other, undercommon thing, that we preserve by inhabiting. Policy can’t see it, policy can’t read it, but it’s intelligible if you got a plan. Cross racial affinity can only be found in moments of revolutionary violence- use the ballot to find solidarity with a movement that can abolish forms of whiteness Harney 17 (Stefano Harney is a professor of Business Management at Singapore Management University. He co-wrote The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study with Fred Moten. “Stefano Harney Part 2 Interview by Michael Schapira and Jesse Montgomery,” Full Stop, August 10, 2017 //tjb) It’s also good timing that you wrote to me about this comment I made to you in an earlier conversation because I just finished a terrific book called Dixie Be Damned by Neal Shirley and Saralee Stafford. They write about insurrections in the South from the dismal swamp in the 18th century to a 1975 uprising in a North Carolina women’s prison. It’s stirring stuff and then in a really sound, clear-hearted concluding chapter they surprised me. They said our enemies have been saved not by fascism but by democracy. It should not have surprised me, given that we were just speaking about Du Bois and democratic despotism, but it did. They are right. And I think it is in this sense that a better university would be worse for us, has been worse for us, in a paradoxical way. Some ask, ‘Is another university possible?’ Well, that implies this one is possible but more than that it suggests another university would be better for us. I don’t know about that. This is not to say I do not find work like that of Marc Bousquet and Chris Newfield indispensable. I do. But there is something at stake in Shirley and Stafford’s book and I want to talk with you about it because I think it connects to your question about how the Undercommons book has been read and used. The authors quote Frank Wilderson on the way blackness can never be disimbricated from the violence of slavery.Then they say: ‘Those who would risk extending solidarity across racial boundaries would find themselves the recipient of exemplary violence in order to instill fear of constant consequence for this treason. Ever after, meaningful cross-racial affinity can only be found in moments of revolutionary violence.” (Italics in the original.)Now this is an historical observation on their part, but to some extent it is also programmatic for the authors. As an observation, well, they have just convinced me of its validity in the last 250 pages, and as program, well, I’m not a pacifist. I’m for self-defense, and that can be violent. But do words like solidarity, affinity, to say nothing of the unlovely term allyship, accidentally preserve something we want to abolish? And I feel bad using Shirley and Stafford to make this point because theirs is such a good book, but maybe that’s why I feel compelled to say, ‘even here’ this question comes up. What I mean is who is this someone in solidarity with blackness, who is this ally of blackness, who is this someone with affinity to black struggle? I think this means that this someone has his or her own struggles and is indicating that now she or he wants to join not in common struggles, but in the struggles of blackness. Because in a sense you have to have your own thing to be an ally or to be in solidarity.Ok, but what are your own struggles from which you would be offering solidarity, allyship, affinity?Are you organizing in the white community, is that it? I think that is the implication, that you have been working in white communities, and/or on the environment, or feminist issues, etc. But the problem is, there’s no such thing as a white community. A white community is a contradiction in terms, an oxymoron. You can’t organize an oxymoron. The only thing you can do with a white community is work to abolish it. Moreover at that point of abolition we may be able to say there is no such thing as a community, that a community is an oxymoron. You can’t commune and have a community. Communing is anti-community. It’s undercommon. Maybe the only kind of community that is possible is the maroon community, because it is by definition not a community, and when in some historical instances (of necessity even) it became one, it took on the same murderous qualities of any community. Okay, so then the question arising, if you do abolish the white community, what of the people who were marked as white, and in many cases who dwelt in the supremacy of whiteness, what becomes of them? Well, in the practice of abolition they will move closer to the only thing they ever had that was about life and not death, about love and not hate, blackness. This is to say, people who present as white are not allies, or in solidarity, or showing affinity, because they have nothing of their own, no place from which to show this, no resource to bring, unless and until they embrace the one thing of their own they disown.The thing that can’t be owned born(e) of the owned, blackness. Now white people aren’t coming with much blackness, by definition. And this is why the underlying humility motivating terms like ally, solidarity, and affinity is not misplaced, if that is indeed what underlies their use in practice. In any case, whiteness is either absence or violence, and in either case, not much to offer as an ally. But on the other hand white people have a big role to play in the revolutionary violence Shirley and Stafford speak of because the act of abolition of white communities is a monumental task. By contrast and in a sense to reverse while also honouring Wilderson’s initial point, Black people have for the very reason of this unrelenting violence and its brutal failure, a lot of blackness, if I can put it that way, a special, (under) privileged relationship to blackness, as Fred puts it. So another way to think of the historical events Shirley and Stafford are speaking about as cross-racial moments would be to think about these events as moments in which there was not a total coincidence between black people and blackness. In a way we could read moments of non-coincidence as moments not of liberation from blackness but generalization of blackness. But we have to be careful here. Blackness is neither the opposite nor the total reversal or abolition of whiteness. Blackness exists in/as the general antagonism. It’s always anti-colonial, always fugitive. So what we tried to do in the book is to think about how study, and planning, and logisticality, and hapticality named capacities for expanding the social poesis of blackness, of the anti-regulatory, jurisgenerative improvisation of the use of each other. And we were thinking about how the undercommons of study might be a place where those in blackness and those coming into blackness might commune, might serve the debt together, in difference but not separability, as might say, not separability from that quantum blackness that moves across and against property, subjectivity, development, usufruction. And if you want to say this is going to be a practice that is hard for a lot of people who do not experience the lived fact of the coincidence of being a black person and blackness, and it is going to be a humble practice, and even a practice of entering into service, feeling in debt, well that’s okay, cause all of that is what blackness is too.	904,715
365,642	379,666	TOC AFF	We affirm Resolved: The US should remove nearly all of its military presence in the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. Contention 1: Iran In January of this year, the assassination of Iran’s top military General Soleimani increased tensions between the US and Iran. Iran bombed a US base in Iraq on March 11, bringing the US and Iran to the brink of war. Luckily, affirming will ease tensions in four ways. First, is removing scapegoats. The presence of American troops incentivizes Iranian aggression. Jones 11~-~- Jones, Toby. (Toby C. Jones is assistant professor of history at Rutgers University. He has authored several books.) “Don’t Stop at Iraq: Why the US Should Withdraw From the Entire Persian Gulf.” The Atlantic, 22 December 2011. https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:68MqCBpeRKcJ:https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/12/dont-stop-at-iraq-why-the-us-should-withdraw-from-the-entire-persian-gulf/250389/+andcd=1andhl=enandct=clnkandgl=us Led by Saudi Arabia, the Arab Gulf states claim that their fears of Iranian ambition are existential. It is certainly true that Tehran is locked in a regional balance of power struggle with Saudi Arabia and that Iran seeks greater influence. But Iran does not seek the destruction of Saudi Arabia or the overthrow of Arab world's political order. In spite of claims to the contrary by the Saudi and Bahraini governments, Iran's revolutionary imperative is a relic of the past. Israel expresses a similar anxiety about Iran as a security threat. And Iran's leaders have played their part in fostering Israeli uncertainty. Iran's potential acquisition of nuclear weapons is a source of concern, of course, as is its support for Hezbollah and Syria. The challenge of how best to deal with Iranian ambition, however, is mainly a political problem, one that has for too long been treated almost entirely through the lens of security and militarism. The presence of the American military in the Gulf has not only done little to deter Iran's ambitions, it has emboldened them. Surrounding Iran militarily and putting it under the constant threat of American or Israeli military action has failed to deter the country. Instead this approach has strengthened hardliners within Tehran and convincing them that the best path to turn to self-preservation is through defiance and militarism, and the pursuit of dangerous ties across the Middle East. The rivalry between Iran, the U.S., and its regional partners has turned into a political and military arms race, one that could easily spin out of control. Less obvious, the United States' military posture has also emboldened its allies, sometimes to act in counterproductive ways. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain justify their brutal crackdown of Bahrain's pro-democracy movement by falsely claiming Iranian meddling. While American policymakers support democratic transitions in the Middle East rhetorically, their unwillingness to confront long-time allies in the Gulf during the Arab Spring is partly the product of the continued belief that the U.S. needs to keep its military in the Gulf, something that requires staying on good terms with Gulf monarchies. The result is that Saudi Arabia and its allies have considerable political cover to behave badly, both at home and abroad. Second, reducing miscalculation. The mere presence of US troops increases the risk of miscalculation and conflict because of the proximity to enemies. Mahony 18~-~-Mahony, Angela. (Assistant Dean for Academic Affairs, Pardee RAND Graduate School; Senior Political Scientist, RAND. Ph.D. in political science, University of California, San Diego; B.A. in economics, University of California, Los Angeles) “US Presence and the Incidence of Conflict.” RAND Corporation. 2018. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1900/RR1906/RAND_RR1906.pdf U.S. Troop Presence Can Embolden Potential Adversaries Although increases in U.S. troop presence are typically associated with deterring U.S. adversaries, U.S. troop presence can potentially degrade deterrence by diminishing a partner’s willingness to spend on its own defense. When the United States provides commitments, it makes its partner more secure, which could lead a partner to underinvest in its own security.10 Recent evidence that U.S. troop presence is associated with a decline in the size of a partner’s military forces and level of defense spending is consistent with this expectation.11 In this way, U.S. troop presence could actually diminish the overall military resources available to deter potential adversaries and make an adversary more likely to initiate conflict. U.S. Troop Presence Can Threaten Potential Adversaries U.S. global military superiority is an important component of U.S. deterrence. However, it can also threaten other states.12 When U.S. forces are nearby, an adversary may feel particularly insecure for a number of reasons. First, the adversary may worry that the larger presence indicates that the United States has plans to use force in the region or that it may be more likely to do so in the near future. Second, U.S. troop presence close to an adversary it increases the risk that the two militaries, operating in close proximity to one another, may have accidents or misperceive each other’s intentions, resulting in an increased risk of escalation and conflict.13 Finally, incentives to protect U.S. forces near a highly capable potential adversary can lead the United States to adopt military concepts and pursue technologies that could potentially and it also increases both sides’ incentives to strike first. Such pressures for preemption could make an adversary feel that fullscale war against its homeland is more likely.14 An adversary’s security concerns can in turn affect the likelihood of conflict. An insecure adversary may, for example, take long-term steps, such as increasing its defense spending, to regain security. The United States and its partners may respond with defense spending of their own, leading to arms races and a heightened security competition that could make any of the parties involved—the potential adversary, the United States, or U.S. partners—more likely to initiate conflict. Insecure adversaries may also take immediate militarized steps either to strengthen their defenses or to signal their own resolve to defend their homeland or sphere of influence. These steps could include making threats, putting military forces on a higher level of alert, initiating a limited use of force, or pursuing aggressive territorial expansion to preemptively secure militarily important areas.15 Decreasing troop presence would greatly decrease the chance of miscalculation. Third, by shifting US policy to diplomacy. Walt 19~-~- Walt, Stephen. (STEPHEN M. WALT is Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School ) “The End of Hubris.” Foreign Affairs. June 2019. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-04-16/end-hubris Washington should also return to its traditional approach to the Middle East. To ensure access to the energy supplies on which the world economy depends, the United States has long sought to prevent any country from dominating the oil-rich Persian Gulf. But until the late 1960s, it did so by relying on the United Kingdom. After the British withdrew, Washington relied on regional clients, such as Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. U.S. forces stayed offshore until January 1991, a few months after Saddam Hussein, the leader of Iraq, seized Kuwait. In response, the George H. W. Bush administration assembled a coalition of states that liberated Kuwait, decimated Iraq’s military, and restored balance to the region. Today, Washington’s primary goal in the Middle East remains preventing any country from impeding the flow of oil to world markets. The region is now deeply divided along several dimensions, with no state in a position to dominate. Moreover, the oil-producing states depend on revenue from energy exports, which makes all of them eager to sell. Maintaining a regional balance of power should be relatively easy, therefore, especially once the United States ends its counterproductive efforts to remake local politics. U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria would be withdrawn, although the United States might still maintain intelligence-gathering facilities, prepositioned equipment, and basing arrangements in the region as a hedge against the need to return in the future. But as it did from 1945 to 1991, Washington would count on local powers to maintain a regional balance of power in accordance with their own interests. As an offshore balancer, the United States would establish normal relations with all countries in the region, instead of having “special relationships” with a few states and profoundly hostile relations with others. No country in the Middle East is so virtuous or vital that it deserves unconditional U.S. support, and no country there is so heinous that it must be treated as a pariah. The United States should act as China, India, Japan, Russia, and the EU do, maintaining normal working relationships with all states in the region—including Iran. Among other things, this policy would encourage rival regional powers to compete for U.S. support, instead of taking it for granted. For the moment, Washington should also make it clear that it will reduce its support for local partners if they repeatedly act in ways that undermine U.S. interests or that run contrary to core U.S. values. Should any state threaten to dominate the region from within or without in the future, the United States would help the rest balance against it, calibrating its level of effort and local presence to the magnitude of the danger. ... Defenders of the status quo will no doubt mischaracterize this course of action as a return to isolationism. That is nonsense. As an offshore balancer, the United States would be deeply engaged diplomatically, economically, and, in some areas, militarily. It would still possess the world’s mightiest armed forces, even if it spent somewhat less money on them. The United States would continue to work with other countries to address major global issues such as climate change, terrorism, and cyberthreats. But Washington would no longer assume primary responsibility for defending wealthy allies that can defend themselves, no longer subsidize client states whose actions undermine U.S. interests, and no longer try to spread democracy via regime change, covert action, or economic pressure. Instead, Washington would use its strength primarily to uphold the balance of power in Asia—where a substantial U.S. presence is still needed—and would devote more time, attention, and resources to restoring the foundations of U.S. power at home. By setting an example that others would once again admire and seek to emulate, an offshore-balancing United States would also do a better job of promoting the political values that Americans espouse. This approach would have also involve less reliance on force and coercion and a renewed emphasis on diplomacy. Military power would remain central to U.S. national security, but its use would be as a last resort rather than a first impulse. It is worth remembering that some of Washington’s greatest foreign policy achievements—the Marshall Plan, the Bretton Woods system, the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, and the peaceful reunification of Germany—were diplomatic victories, not battlefield ones. In recent years, however, both Democratic and Republican administrations have tended to eschew genuine diplomacy and have relied instead on ultimatums and pressure. Convinced they hold all the high cards, too many U.S. officials have come to see even modest concessions to opponents as tantamount to surrender. So they have tried to dictate terms to others and have reached for sanctions or the sword when the target state has refused to comply. But even weak states are reluctant to submit to blackmail, and imposing one-sided agreements on others makes them more likely to cheat or renege as soon as they can. For diplomacy to work, both sides must get some of what they want. Diplomacy would act as a crucial offramp to deescalation. USAF 20~-~- United States Air Force Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies. “News and Analysis.” 21 February 2020. USAF. https://media.defense.gov/2020/Feb/21/2002253106/-1/-1/0/CSDS-OUTREACH1405.PDF U.S. policy towards Iran is incoherent. President Donald Trump says he wants to re-negotiate the nuclear deal, but his expanding maximum pressure campaign whispers regime change. Trump has had it both ways without any apparent political costs. That will change in an election year. In 2016, Trump won three battleground states because he rejected American military adventurism. Some of the president’s most influential media surrogates are warning him that his Iran policy could lead the United States into war, and some 2020 voters are also worried. So were eight Republican senators who, in a rare break with Trump, joined Democrats recently in a vote to limit the president’s ability to attack Iran. As he seeks re-election in November, Trump would risk the support of his base if he stumbled into another military conflict in the Middle East, which would be seen as an unnecessary and costly distraction from urgent problems at home. That will incline him toward restraint. What will U.S. restraint mean for the maximum pressure campaign? Trump’s hardline Iran policy fires up parts of his base, so it will likely continue, but with less risk of provocation. It could also be re-packaged in a style that gives the appearance of reacting to Iranian moves, rather than remaining offensive in nature. This is where the nuclear deal’s dispute resolution mechanism could help. Washington has never offered Iran an off-ramp. While dispute resolution cannot offer quid pro quo de-escalation, it does offer Iran a line of retreat from nuclear escalation without appearing to bow to U.S. pressure. This allows Iran, which strives to convey the impression that it is capable of withstanding the full weight of American pressures, to maintain that posture, and also to demonstrate that it is not isolated and retains the diplomatic support of Europe, Russia, and China. That would make it harder politically for America to marshal international censure of Iran, let alone launch a military strike. These factors, and the possibility of a new face in the White House, will an off-ramp would incline Iran toward restraint, reinforced by the threat of punitive action under the dispute resolution process. After November, any number of developments could alter the strategic and tactical choices of Iran and the United States, potentially improving the political climate for a new deal. Similarly, as America’s European allies lead the effort to keep the nuclear deal operational, their persistent attempts to deny Washington the ability to dictate European foreign policy through threats and U.S. secondary sanctions could erode international acquiescence to American unilateralism. If this European trend becomes irreversible, it would have consequences for America’s image, credibility, and posture in the world. Critically, without diplomacy and adjustment, war and conflict between US and Iran will become inevitable. Seib 20~-~- Seib, Gerald. (Mr. Seib earned a bachelor's degree in journalism from the University of Kansas. While at the university, he was a member of Phi Kappa Phi, a national academic honor society, and Kappa Tau Alpha, a national journalism honor society. ) “US-Iran Conflict: More Conflict Is Inevitable; War Isn’t.” Wall Street Journal. 4 January 2020. https://www.wsj.com/articles/more-conflict-is-inevitable-war-with-iran-isnt-11578069281 After this week's dramatic spike in tensions between Iran and the U.S., further conflict now is inevitable, and terrorism outbreaks have become far more likely. That doesn't mean, however, that an actual war is inevitable. Indeed, neither side wants that, and both have been trying to stop just short of the line of no return. As a result, the question is whether President Trump and Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, are is capable of containing the forces they have that he has unleashed. The testing ground in this new phase of confrontation figures to lie first within Iraq and in the Persian Gulf, though the tensions also could envelop American allies in Saudi Arabia and Israel, reach into cyberspace and activate terror networks Iran has cultivated. Yet the most worrisome force of all may be the law of unintended consequences. That is the rough lay of the land in the aftermath of the American airstrike in Baghdad that killed Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, Iran's top military commander and leader of its powerful Quds Force. Fourth, by decreasing conflict with proxies. Vox 20~-~- Ward, Alex. (Alex is the staff writer covering international security and defense issues, as well as a co-host of Vox's "Worldly" podcast. Before joining Vox, Alex was an associate director in the Atlantic Council's Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security where he worked on military issues and US foreign policy.) “11 US troops were injured in Iran’s attack. It shows how close we came to war.” Vox, 17 January 2020. https://www.vox.com/2020/1/17/21070371/11-troops-injured-trump-iran-war “When deemed fit for duty, the service members are expected to return to Iraq following screening. The health and welfare of our personnel is a top priority and we will not discuss any individual’s medical status,” he added. President Donald Trump’s clear red line with Iran was that its military or regional proxies couldn’t kill an Americans. If they did, the US would respond forcefully. He followed through on that red line in late December after a Tehran-backed proxy militia killed a US contractor in Iraq, prompting the president to strike five of the group’s sites, leaving 25 members dead and another 50 injured. And after members of that same militia — Kata’ib Hezbollah — surrounded and breached the US Embassy in Baghdad on New Year’s Eve, setting the front reception room ablaze, Trump opted to kill top Iranian military leader Qassem Soleimani on January 2…. But let’s stop here for a minute. Imagine that US troops in Iraq hadn’t protected themselves well enough, or that if Iran’s missiles hit more populated targets. They might have been killed, and Trump would have had almost no choice but to escalate a dangerous tit-for-tat with the Islamic Republic. At that point, little could have been done to keep both sides from spiraling toward a larger, more brutal conflict. It is nothing short of pure fortune, then, that allowed everyone to walk back from the brink. “The more that comes out, the more it looks like we got incredibly lucky in avoiding a war,” Ilan Goldenberg, an Iran expert at the Center for a New American Security think tank in Washington, told me. Problematically, the US can’t deter Iran’s proxies, and they wish for a US-Iranian war. Foreign Policy 20~-~-Mesquita, Ethan. (Ethan Bueno de Mesquita is the Sydney Stein professor and deputy dean at the University of Chicago’s Harris School of Public Policy. He is an applied game theorist who has published widely on issues of terrorism, rebellion, and security strategy. ) “The US Can Deter Iran but Not Its Proxies.” Foreign Policy. 23 January 2020. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/23/united-states-iran-proxies-deterrence-suleimani/ In its most straightforward form, the logic of deterrence is simple: If an adversary believes the costs of an attack are high enough, it will prefer not to engage in that attack in the first place. Thus, the administration’s argument goes, if the United States threatens a massive response to Iranian aggression, they are likely to stand down. But this logic rests on a couple of key assumptions. Most importantly, in this instance, those who are threatened with punishment must in fact have the power to prevent the precipitating attacks. For such threats to work, then, the Iranian regime itself must be in a position to decide whether or not attacks occur. Iran has close ties to armed groups throughout the Middle East, from Yemen to Lebanon to Syria to Iraq. Many of these relationships were built in part by Suleimani himself. While these Iranian proxies groups take weapons, training, support, and some degree of direction from Iran but, they are also independent actors. Their preferences are not always aligned with Iran’s, and they have shown themselves willing to contradict Iranian directives when doing so is to their strategic advantage. For instance, Iran-aligned Houthi rebels have engaged in escalatory violence over the objections of their Iranian backers. This partial independence makes it difficult to attribute responsibility for attacks undertaken by such proxies. Suppose one of the several armed Shiite groups with ties to Iran that are operative in Iraq engages in a significant attack in the coming days or weeks. It will be unclear whether that attack was taken at Iran’s direction or not. Will the United States extend its belligerent deterrent stand to such acts? Will it strike back at Iran for actions by Iraqis or Syrians? The answer may well be yes. After all, it was not actions by the Iranian military but by Iranian proxies in Iraq that put in motion the chain of events leading to the killing of Suleimani. Kataib Hezbollah, an Iran-linked Shiite militia, was responsible for the rocket attacks on Iraqi bases in December 2019 that killed an American contractor and injured several soldiers. That event spurred a U.S. airstrike on Kataib Hezbollah’s headquarters in Iraq, which subsequently led to the protests outside the U.S. Embassy that preceded the killing of Suleimani. In an important sense, then, the United States has already shown that it can be provoked by Iranian proxies. In so doing, America has put itself in a profoundly dangerous strategic position. In an attempt to deter Iran with maximalist threats, the United States has given independent armed militias the power to escalate conflict between two sovereign nations. The Iranians appear acutely aware of the risk. Their initial response to the assassination was notably proportional and public. They wanted no misunderstanding. Moreover, the Iranian ambassador to the United Nations recently argued that Iran was responsible for these public actions but that it ought not be held responsible for “any sort of actions to be taken by others,” a clear reference to the risk of provocation by Iran-linked militias. The problem is that, having publicly responded with face-saving missile strikes that did limited damage, Iran may genuinely prefer de-escalation. But its proxies, especially those operating in Iraq, may not. Perhaps they these proxies view greater conflict between Iran and the United States as an opportunity to end the ongoing U.S. presence in Iraq. Or perhaps they see strategic advantages to operate within the chaos of increased civil conflict. In this case, they may well have incentives to engage in attacks—for instance, on attack Americans in Iraq—that exploit the United States’ more aggressive deterrent posture to manipulate the US into greater conflict with Iran. And Iran may not be in a position to prevent those actions, in which case Trump’s deterrent stance will have backfired. Indeed, one might even worry that groups not linked to Iran, like the Islamic State, that wish to spread discord and chaos might view this as an opportune moment to engage in false-flag operations that make it look as though Iranian proxies are engaged in escalatory violence. Once these proxies kill enough Americans, US and Iran would escalate into a full on war. Keeping 5,000 troops in Iraq only incentivizes and gives these militias a chance to kill American troops. The impact is war. Ward 19~-~-Ward, Alex. (Alex is the staff writer covering international security and defense issues, as well as a co-host of Vox's "Worldly" podcast. Before joining Vox, Alex was an associate director in the Atlantic Council's Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security where he worked on military issues and US foreign policy.) “A nasty, brutal fight: what a US-Iran war would look like.” Vox, 3 January 2020. https://www.vox.com/world/2019/7/8/18693297/us-iran-war-trump-nuclear-iraq Which means US-Iran relations teeter on a knife edge, and it won’t take much more to knock them off. So to understand just how bad the situation could get, I asked eight current and former White House, Pentagon, and intelligence officials, as well as Middle East experts, last July about how a war between the US and Iran might play out. The bottom line: It would be hell on earth. “This a US-Iran war would be a violent convulsion similar to chaos of the Arab Spring inflicted on the region for years,” said Ilan Goldenberg, the Defense Department’s Iran team chief from 2009 to 2012, with the potential for it to get “so much worse than Iraq.”... “The worst-case scenarios here are quite serious” Imagine, as we already have, that the earlier stages of strife escalate to a major war. That’s already bad enough. But assume for a moment not only that the fighting takes place, but that the US does the unlikely and near impossible: It invades and overthrows the Iranian regime (which Trump’s former National Security Adviser John Bolton, at least, has openly called for in the past). If that happens, it’s worth keeping two things in mind. First, experts say upward of a million people — troops from both sides as well as Iranian men, women, and children, and American diplomats and contractors — likely will have died by that point. Cities will burn and smolder. Those who survived the conflict will mainly live in a state of economic devastation for years and some, perhaps, will pick up arms and form insurgent groups to fight the invading US force. Second, power abhors a vacuum. With no entrenched regime in place, multiple authority figures from Iran’s clerical and military circles, among others, will jockey for control. Those sides could split into violent factions, initiating a civil war that would bring more carnage to the country. and Millions more refugees might flock out of the country, overwhelming already taxed nations nearby, and ungoverned pockets will give terrorist groups new safe havens from which to operate. To prevent total war with Iran, we must withdraw troops and deflate tensions now. Contention 2: Yemen Contention 1 is Yemen Amidst the Covid-19 crisis, the war in Yemen continues. TRT 20 reports TRTWorld, 4-11-2020, "Yemen's war rages under shadow of looming virus threat," Yemen's war rages under shadow of looming virus threat, https://www.trtworld.com/middle-east/yemen-s-war-rages-under-shadow-of-looming-virus-threat-35462 Yemen's war shows no signs of abating a week after the Saudi-led military coalition declared a unilateral truce due to the coronavirus threat looming over the impoverished nation. Yemen announced its first case of the Covid-19 respiratory disease last Friday, as aid organisations warn the country's health system, which has all but collapsed since the conflict broke out in 2014, is ill equipped to handle the crisis. The coalition supporting the government against the Iran-backed Houthi rebels said the fortnight-long ceasefire was designed to head off the pandemic, in a move welcomed by the United Nations but dismissed by the insurgents as political manoeuvering. Has a ceasefire been agreed? Despite Saudi Arabia's announcement of a halt in military activities from April 9, fighting on the ground and coalition air strikes continue. "We don't have a ceasefire agreement that all of the major players have signed up to yet," Peter Salisbury, an analyst at the International Crisis Group said. UN special envoy for Yemen Martin Griffiths said on Friday he had sent revised proposals to both sides to secure a nationwide ceasefire and the "urgent resumption" of political dialogue. The confirmation of Yemen's first coronavirus case "makes it even more imperative to stop the fighting immediately", he said. US military presence is at the root of this conflict by emboldening Gulf leaders. Hokayem 18 explains Emile Hokayem and David B Roberts, The Century Foundation, "Friends with Benefits", Jaunary 31, 2018, https://tcf.org/content/report/friends-with-benefits/ Traditional concepts of brotherhood and solidarity within the Gulf still prevail, at least in theory, and the goal of regime security remains paramount in each Gulf state’s calculations. Beyond that, however, the Gulf states have failed to develop clear concepts of cooperative or collective security that would make it easier for outside actors to envision their own role. Indeed, agreeing on the need for cooperative and collective security would compel the Gulf states to resolve competing territorial claims, reconcile political rivalries, and address other latent issues. In contrast, relying on an outside security guarantor allows them to sidestep resolving competing territorial claims, reconciling political rivalries, and addressing other issues and delay such moves and instead to adopt more active, hawkish regional stances. Saudi Arabia, and Oman before it, have failed to convince other countries of the necessity of defense integration. This is unsurprising, considering that all security behaviors in the Gulf hinge on an understanding that any form of security or political integration inevitably would foster Saudi hegemony. The United States, therefore, remains an indispensable partner—particularly for the smaller Gulf states—in spite of their misgivings about it. Karlin 19 furthers Mara Karlin, Foreign Affairs, "America's Middle East Purgatory", February 2019, https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/Enduring20American20Presence20in20the20Middle20East.pdf But this Goldilocks approach rests on the false assumption that there is such a thing as a purely operational U.S. military presence in the Middle East. In reality, U.S. military bases across the Gulf countries have strategic implications because they create a moral hazard: they encourage the region’s leaders to act in ways they otherwise might not, safe in the knowledge that the United States is invested in the stability of their regimes. In 2011, for example, the Bahrainis and the Saudis clearly understood the message of support sent by the U.S. naval base in Bahrain when they ignored Obama’s disapproval and crushed Shiite protests there. In Yemen, U.S. support for the Emirati and Saudi military campaign in Yemen shows how offering help can put the United States in profound 30 dilemmas: the United States is implicated in air strikes that kill civilians, but any proposal to halt its supplies of its precision-guided missiles is met with the charge that denying Saudi Arabia smarter munitions might only increase collateral civilian casualties. U.S. efforts to train, equip, and advise the Syrian Democratic Forces in the fight against ISIS are yet another reminder that none of Washington’s partnerships has purely operational consequences: U.S. support of the SDF, seen by Ankara as a sister to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, has made the United States’ relationship with Turkey knottier than ever. Empirically, when the US showed signs of withdrawing diplomacy began. Parsi 20 explains Trita Parsi, 1-6-2020, "The Middle East Is More Stable When the United States Stays Away," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/06/the-middle-east-is-more-stable-when-the-united-states-stays-away/ Some of these measures may have been more tactical than strategic. Saudi Arabia may have reduced tensions with Qatar and the Houthis in order to better situate itself for a confrontation with Tehran down the road or to offset international condemnation of its killing of Khashoggi, human rights abuses at home, and brutal tactics in Yemen. The UAE, too, may have felt that a tactical reduction of tensions was warranted. Nevertheless, as the United States appeared poised to back out of the region, its erstwhile allies’ calculations tilted toward diplomacy. The Saudis and Emiratis simply had no choice but to cease some of their recklessness because they could no longer operate under the protection of the United States. If stability in the Middle East is the United States’ main goal, Washington should have celebrated rather than bemoaned these developments. Indeed, Parsi writes Meanwhile, whereas Iran has no nuclear weapons yet undergoes more inspections than any other country, Israel has a nuclear weapons program with no international transparency whatsoever. Iran may have been adept at taking advantage of U.S. overextension and missteps in the last few decades, but establishing hegemony is a different matter altogether. Further, the region did not fall into deeper chaos as a result of Trump’s earlier refusal to get into a shooting war with Iran after attacks by Iranian proxies against Saudi oil installations in September 2019. Critics lamented the president’s decision as an abandonment of the Carter Doctrine, calling it a disaster for the GCC and warning that it may even prompt Saudi Arabia to seek nuclear weapons. Recognizing that the U.S. military was no longer at their disposal, Saudi Arabia and the UAE began exercising the diplomatic options that had always been available to them. Instead, recognizing that the U.S. military was no longer at their disposal, Saudi Arabia and the UAE began exercising the diplomatic options that had always been available to them. For its part, Saudi Arabia stepped up direct talks with Houthi rebels in Yemen as a way to ease tensions with their backer, Iran. The level of violence on both sides declined as a result, and more than 100 prisoners of war were released. In November, the United Nations’ Yemen envoy, Martin Griffiths, reported an 80 percent reduction in Saudi-led airstrikes, and there were no Yemeni deaths in the previous two weeks. Riyadh also opted to reduce tensions with Qatar, a former ally that had become a nemesis. The Saudi government seemingly ordered its notorious Twitter army to tone down the insults against Qatar and its emir, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, and some sporting events between the two countries resumed, according to the New York Times. Unfortunately, US military actions disrupted the diplomatic progress. Parsi laments Yet when U.S. President Donald Trump opted not to go to war with Iran after a series of Iranian-attributed attacks on Saudi Arabia last year and declared his intentions to pull troops out of the region, it wasn’t chaos or conquest that ensued. Rather, nascent regional diplomacy—particularly among Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—and de-escalation followed. To be sure, the cards were reshuffled again in January, when Trump ordered the assassination of Qassem Suleimani, one of Iran’s most important military figures. Courtesy of Trump, the region is once more moving toward conflict, and the early signs of diplomatic progress achieved during the preceding months have vanished. It is thus time for Washington to answer a crucial question that it has long evaded: Has America’s military dominance in the Middle East prevented regional actors from peacefully resolving conflicts on their own? And in that way, has it been an impediment to stability rather than the guarantor of it?\ US military presence prevents the Houthi rebels from accepting a ceasefire. TRT 20 reports TRTWorld, 4-11-2020, "Yemen's war rages under shadow of looming virus threat," Yemen's war rages under shadow of looming virus threat, https://www.trtworld.com/middle-east/yemen-s-war-rages-under-shadow-of-looming-virus-threat-35462 What do the Houthis want? The rebels are negotiating from a strong position after recent military gains, as they advance towards the government's last northern stronghold of Marib, an oil-rich region which would be a major strategic prize. Hours before the Saudi-led coalition's truce announcement, the Houthis released a document with a long list of demands including the withdrawal of foreign troops and the end of the coalition's blockade on Yemen's land, sea and airports of entry. "The Houthis They see a ceasefire as more than just a halt to military activities," Salisbury said. The rebels also demanded that the coalition pay government salaries for the next decade and hand over compensation for rebuilding, including homes destroyed in air strikes Thankfully, Kristian 20 writes Bonnie Kristian,, 4-6-2020, "As COVID-19 spreads, ending US support for the Saudi war in Yemen is vital," TheHill, https://thehill.com/opinion/international/491377-as-covid-19-spreads-ending-us-support-for-the-saudi-war-in-yemen-is This pandemic has proven a formidable foe for the health-care systems of advanced, stable nations like Italy and the United States. But Yemeni medical facilities are already under-resourced and overwhelmed with war casualties, cholera, and other communicable illnesses. Yemen desperately needs peace and open supply lines for its potential fight against COVID-19. Now more than ever, Washington must end its enablement of the Saudi-led coalition intervention in Yemen’s conflict and support a peaceful, diplomatic resolution with the immediate opening of Yemen’s airports and seaports for humanitarian aid. Riyadh has recently shown fresh interest in leaving Yemen even as it continues its air campaign. and a U.S. departure could tilt the scales toward peace. The best preventive measure to control the spread of the novel coronavirus is hygiene, but the war has mired Yemen in filth. “Pumps to sanitize the water supply sit idle for lack of fuel, while maintenance agencies tasked with chlorinating aquifers go without salaries and supplies,” Reuters reported in 2017. The situation has not improved in the three years since, especially as U.S.-supported Saudi airstrikes have targeted crucial water treatment facilities ……………………………………………………………………………… There is no overnight fix for Yemen’s misery. But the single most effective way to help Yemen now is for Washington to stop supporting the Saudi-led coalition intervention. Without U.S. assistance — which has included weapons provision, naval blockade, refueling planes for airstrikes, drone strikes, and intelligence sharing — the coalition could not continue its fight in Yemen, at least not anywhere near its present scale. If Washington withdraws, it will give Riyadh a new urgency in its peace talks with the Houthi rebels, which have stalled after a brief period of relative calm devolved into fresh turmoil last month. At the very least, the U.S. exit would make the Saudi stranglehold on much-needed food and medical supplies far more difficult to sustain, giving the Yemeni people a fighting chance against COVID-19. Ending Washington’s support for the coalition intervention would be a win for the United States, too. The U.S. has no vital interests at stake in Yemen — the Houthi rebels have local ambitions and do not pose a threat to America — and insofar as our involvement there affects our security, it is for the worse. Ending the conflict is crucial. Daragahi 19 quantifies Borzou Daragahi, 12-2-2019, "War-ravaged Yemeni children will suffer from hunger for 20 years, new report says," Independent, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/yemen-war-children-hunger-ceasefire-latest-a9229706.html “Yemen is now home to the largest food insecure population in the world,” says the 20-page report. And the situation is worsening. Just a year ago, famine was declared in certain parts of the country. Now, 80 per cent of the country’s population or 19 million Yemeni of 24 million is face facing od shortages and are living on the edge of famine, with children suffering the most. “It means each child is robbed of opportunities they would have had,” said Frank McManus, Yemen director for the IRC, speaking in a phone interview from the country’s Houthi-controlled capital, Sana'a. “Malnourishment is not something you can recover from,” he said. “It will shorten your height. It will limit your opportunities. It will impact how you will develop. Contention 2: Conflict US withdrawal decreases conflict in three ways. First is by rebuilding alliances. With US presence in the region, states prefer bilateral interactions with the United States to multilateral ones involving regional actors. Ashford 18~-~-Ashford, Emma. (Emma Ashford is a research fellow in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute in Washington, DC. She holds a PhD in politics from the University of Virginia and an MA from American University’s School of International Service) “Unbalanced: Rethinking America’s Commitment to the Middle East.” Strategic Studies Quarterly. Air University Press. Spring 2018. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26333880.pdf?refreqid=excelsior3A403f1017baf2a096ee9118141128c66c Even close US allies have shown interest expanding their regional role. The United Kingdom has returned to Bahrain, opening a new naval base at Mina Salman; France now has troops in Djibouti and the United Arab Emirates.46 Whether allies or adversaries, it is clear that the future of the Middle East is pluralistic, not hegemonic. Unfortunately, proponents of greater engagement in the region rarely consider either the benefits or risks posed by the growing number of states with a stake in the region. If this develops at the same time as increasing US presence, it has the potential to raise the risk of conflict, particularly in situations like Russia’s Syrian campaign. Yet perhaps the biggest problem is the fact that American predominance in the region prevents states from balancing or bandwagoning in the face of threats, as they would do in the absence of US presence. As many scholars have noted, the Middle East has typically exhibited “underbalancing,” meaning that states that might be expected to form alliances have rarely done so. The most obvious example is the antiIranian axis of Turkey, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, but the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has also repeatedly failed to build joint military infrastructure. The recent GCC crisis between Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates likewise suggests that these states prioritize ideological factors over security concerns. As long as the United States continues to act as a regional security guarantor, theory suggests that ideological factors will continue to inhibit alliances.47 In fact, though the Obama administration’s pivot away from the Middle East was more rhetoric than reality, it did encourage tentative attempts to build better regional alliances. Private rapprochement and cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Israel on the issue of Iran has been growing. The two countries disagree on a variety of issues, the most problematic of which is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Yet when retired top Saudi and Israeli officials spoke about the issue at a 2016 forum in Washington, DC, they were keen to highlight that cooperation is possible even if these issues go unresolved.48 The two states regularly hold informal meetings on security issues. Even the relative lack of criticism expressed by the Gulf States during the 2006 Israeli war against Hezbollah may be indicative of shifting opinion within the region.49 In providing security guarantees and by acting as a third party cutout, US involvement inhibits these developing ties. In the absence of US presence, however, states would be forced to engage in diplomacy. Alliances are key to solving conflict through deterrence. Rice 11~-~-Rice, David. (David is the director of National Media Relations at Rice University) “Military Alliances Keep the Peace.” Futurity, 11 February 2011. https://www.futurity.org/military-alliances-keep-the-peace/ For the study, published in the journal Foreign Policy Analysis, researchers analyzed global defense agreements from 1816 to 2001. “We were interested in analyzing policy prescriptions that leaders of countries can adopt that might make war—and also militarized conflicts short of war—less likely,” says Ashley Leeds, associate professor of political science at Rice University. “War is costly, most importantly in terms of lives lost, but also in terms of financial resources, destruction of productive capacity and infrastructure, and disruption of trade. As a result, research aimed at discovering policies that can prevent war is valuable. “We found that when a country enters into a defense pact, it is less likely to be attacked,” Leeds says. “In addition, entering into defense pacts does not seem to make countries more likely to or attack other states.” The research has current policy relevance for the United States and other countries, Leeds says. “A current policy debate, for instance, is whether Georgia should be accepted as a new member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). If Georgia joins NATO, the U.S. and other NATO countries will be committing to assist Georgia if Georgia is attacked by another state, for instance, Russia. Second is by curtailing aggression . The US security umbrella emboldens allies to act aggressively instead of diplomatically. Hazbun 19~-~-Hazbun, Waleed. (Waleed Hazbun is a political science professor at the University of Alabama. He received his BA from Princeton, and his PhD from MIT.) “In America’s Wake: Turbulence and Insecurity in the Middle East.” University of Alabama. Middle East Political Science, March 2019. https://pomeps.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/POMEPS_Studies_34_Web.pdf In the late 2000s, the large, militarily capable state of Turkey and the small, wealthy state of Qatar began to use their diverse ties to states across the emerging regional divides to play a larger diplomatic role and promote conflict management. Turkey emphasized open borders and regional economic integration while Qatar used diplomatic inventions and pan-Arab media to project influence at the regional level. Te political turmoil resulting from the Arab Uprisings and the confused US reaction to them opened another opportunity for regional powers. Qatar and Turkey sought to promote generally compatible efforts to suggest a new basis for regional order drawing together newly elected governments and emerging Islamist political forces. Teir more activist policies, however, soon entangled them in regional conflicts. Qatar supported military intervention in Libya while Turkey encouraged armed opposition in Syria. Rather than transforming the political landscape these actions contributed to political breakdown and territorial fragmentation. Teir efforts collapsed in the face of the 2013 military coup in Egypt. More broadly, a Saudi-led counter-revolution sought to shore up authoritarian governments, expand domestic divisions along sectarian 17 THEORIZING STRUCTURAL CHANGE lines, and foster of civil wars in Syria, Yemen, and Libya. As Qatar scaled back its regional interventions, Turkey found its interests reorganized as the increasing autonomy of Kurdish actors, some backed by the US in an effort to contain ISIS, became its most pressing concern. While aligned with the US and benefiting from the US security umbrella anchored by its bases around the Gulf, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have attempted to organize the region through used aggressive diplomatic and military interventions as well as financial support to allied regimes and proxies. Saudi Arabia has long sought to project regional influence, but its flows of cash, intelligence cooperation, and diplomacy have previously only had a marginal impact reshaping regional order. With the US under Obama no longer providing regional leadership, it’s policies diverged from Saudi priorities, such as allowing the fall of Mubarak in Egypt and negotiating a nuclear deal with Iran. Saudi Arabia (with UAE support) then sought to act as a regional hegemon though without the needed regional power and consent. Tey backed rebel factions in Syria and escalated the conflict. After their effort to manage the post-Uprising transition in Yemen failed, they launched, with US support, an ineffective war against the Houthi rebels, which has resulted in a humanitarian disaster. Te Trump administration aligned itself more enthusiastically with the Saudi-UAE axis. Saudi efforts, despite this American support, have done little to establish a new regional order or contain Iranian influence. Rather than embracing Qatar’s post-2013 shift away from an activist regional policy and attempt to rebuild GCC consensus policymaking, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have repeatedly sought to coerce Qatar into accepting a subservient role, resulting in the total fragmentation of the GCC as a regional organization. In past decades the US often sought to restrain Israel’s most aggressive actions and/or worked to re-stabilize regional politics in their aftermath. Closer Saudi strategic alignment with Israel and backing by US president Trump has resulted in less restraint on regional actions. This posture sets up a context for continuing instability and a greater likelihood of conflict and escalation. The current uncertainty and shifting regional political dynamics have set up complex rivalries and diverging interests between regional powers. While Iran, Turkey and Qatar have all sought to promote new, but differing, norms for regional politics, seeking to develop an order based around their interests, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have advanced a revisionist agenda built from a growing capacity and willingness to project power and intervene militarily across the region. Tese efforts by multiple regional and global powers to assert their own narrow strategic interests in the context of the post-uprisings Arab world has led to increased disarray in the region, including the fragmentation of Syria and Yemen, and massive humanitarian crises as a consequence of the conflicts there. Tis disarray opened up new opportunities for external intervention in the region, as seen in the NATO campaign in Libya, Russian intervention in support of the regime in Syria, and the US-led anti-ISIS military campaigns in Syria and Iraq during 2016 and 2017. Drawing on the notion of turbulence offers guidance to explain how and why the capacities of states in the region, even as they become more ruthlessly authoritarian and deploy more deadly military power, are less able to constrain threats to their security and balance rivals. Historical precedent proves. Parsi 20~-~-Parsi, Trita. (Trita Parsi is Executive Vice President of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and Adjunct Associate Professor at Georgetown University.) “The Middle East Is More Stable When the United States Stays Away.” Foreign Policy, 6 January 2020. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/06/the-middle-east-is-more-stable-when-the-united-states-stays-away Further, the region did not fall into deeper chaos as a result of Trump’s earlier refusal to get into a shooting war with Iran after attacks by Iranian proxies against Saudi oil installations in September 2019. Critics lamented the president’s decision as an abandonment of the Carter Doctrine, calling it a disaster for the GCC and warning that it may even prompt Saudi Arabia to seek nuclear weapons. Recognizing that the U.S. military was no longer at their disposal, Saudi Arabia and the UAE began exercising the diplomatic options that had always been available to them. For its part, Saudi Arabia stepped up direct talks with Houthi rebels in Yemen as a way to ease tensions with their backer, Iran. The level of violence on both sides declined as a result, and more than 100 prisoners of war were released. In November, the United Nations’ Yemen envoy, Martin Griffiths, reported there was an 80 percent reduction in Saudi-led airstrikes, and there were no Yemeni deaths in the previous two weeks. Riyadh also opted to reduce tensions with Qatar, a former ally that had become a nemesis. The Saudi government seemingly ordered its notorious Twitter army to tone down the insults against Qatar and its emir, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, and some sporting events between the two countries resumed, according to the New York Times. Saudi officials also claimed that they had quietly reached out to Iran via intermediaries seeking ways to ease tensions. Tehran, in turn, welcomed the prospective Saudi-Qatari thaw and, according to the New York Times, floated a peace plan based on a mutual Iranian-Saudi pledge of nonaggression. An even stronger change of heart occurred in Abu Dhabi. In July, the UAE started withdrawing troops from Yemen. The same month, it participated in direct talks with Tehran to discuss maritime security. It even released $700 million in funds to Iran in contradiction to the Trump administration’s maximum pressure strategy. Some of these measures may have been more tactical than strategic. Saudi Arabia may have reduced tensions with Qatar and the Houthis in order to better situate itself for a confrontation with Tehran down the road or to offset international condemnation of its killing of Khashoggi, human rights abuses at home, and brutal tactics in Yemen. The UAE, too, may have felt that a tactical reduction of tensions was warranted. Nevertheless, as the United States appeared poised to back out of the region, its erstwhile allies’ calculations tilted toward diplomacy. The Saudis and Emiratis simply had no choice but to cease some of their recklessness because they could no longer operate under the protection of the United States. If stability in the Middle East is the United States’ main goal, Washington should have celebrated rather than bemoaned these developments. Without the guarantee of the US military, Saudi Arabia and the UAE chose to deescalate conflict in Yemen and turn to diplomatic ties. Ending US presence in the region could be the way to end the Yemen war. Third is the military-industrial complex Vittori 19~-~-Vittori, Jodi. “A Mutual Extortion Racket: The Military Industrial Complex and US Foreign Policy ~-~- The Cases of Saudi Arabia and UAE.” Transparency International Defense and Security Program, 20 December 2019. https://ti-defence.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/US_Defense_Industry_Influence_Paper_v4_digital_singlePage.pdf Defence industry players, and elected officials, the defence bureaucracy, and governments in the Middle East are intertwined and serve one another’s interest, often at the expense of US foreign policy outcomes. These mutually-beneficial relationships have contributed to a vicious cycle of conflict and human rights abuses across the Middle East and North Africa, including increased exports of arms and defence services to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates which began under the Obama administration and have ramped up under President Trump. The impacts are devastating. Just last year, Saudi Arabia launched a war on the Houthis in Yemen, leading to humanitarian disasters that endanger tens of millions. The overall impact is war. Malley 19~-~-Malley, Robert (ROBERT MALLEY is President and CEO of the International Crisis Group. During the Obama administration, he served as Special Assistant to the President, White House Middle East Coordinator, and Senior Adviser on countering the Islamic State) “The Unwanted Wars.” Foreign Affairs, December 2019. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2019-10-02/unwanted-wars The war that now looms largest is a war nobody apparently wants. During his presidential campaign, Donald Trump railed against the United States’ entanglement in Middle Eastern wars, and since assuming office, he has not changed his tune. Iran has no interest in a wide-ranging conflict that it knows it could not win. Israel is satisfied with calibrated operations in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza but fears a larger confrontation that could expose it to thousands of rockets. Saudi Arabia is determined to push back against Iran, but without confronting it militarily. Yet the conditions for an all-out war in the Middle East are riper than at any time in recent memory. A conflict could break out in any one of a number of places for any one of a number of reasons. Consider the September 14 attack on Saudi oil facilities: it could theoretically have been perpetrated by the Houthis, a Yemeni rebel group, as part of their war with the kingdom; by Iran, as a response to debilitating U.S. sanctions; or by an Iranian-backed Shiite militia in Iraq. If Washington decided to take military action against Tehran, this could in turn prompt Iranian retaliation against the United States’ Gulf allies, an attack by Hezbollah on Israel, or a Shiite militia operation against U.S. personnel in Iraq. Likewise, Israeli operations against Iranian allies anywhere in the Middle East could trigger a regionwide chain reaction. Because any development anywhere in the region can have ripple effects everywhere, narrowly containing a crisis is fast becoming an exercise in futility.	904,729
365,643	379,682	Contact Info	Tournament: All \| Round: 1 \| Opponent: All \| Judge: All Hello! Ishan and I are happy to disclose our AC/NC positions before round. Ishan (he/him): 425-435-7077 or Ishan Sinha on Messenger (messenger preferred) Rasan (he/him): [email protected] or Rasan Kamkolkar on Messenger	904,744
365,644	379,674	Contact Info	Heyo it's Karina and Sabine, we're happy to disclose if you contact us, preferably at least 20 minutes before round. If the tournament is super time crunched and postings are going out late we're fine disclosing informally if necessary. Karina Lu \| she/her \| [email protected], Karina Lu on Messenger Sabine Wood \| sher/her \| [email protected], [email protected], http://m.me/sabinetwo	904,738
365,645	379,680	Contact	Email us 30 minutes before the round if you want us to disclose email [email protected]	904,743
365,646	379,683	disclosure interp	Debaters must disclose previously-read positions on the National Debate Coaches Association Public Forum wiki. The disclosure must be under their own school, team name, and correct side and must happen at least 30 minutes before the round and must include the author name, taglines, a hyperlink to the evidence, and open sourced full-text of all parts of the evidence they cite in context.* specifics are open sourced *we will read specifically open source disclosure if we feel up to it	904,745
365,647	379,698	AC r4 and on	C3: Economic Growth Without a UBI, the United States is highly likely to enter a recession. Kenneth Thomas, Daily Business Review, "Miami Economist Sees 80 Probability of a Recession in 2020", November 1, 2019, Error! Hyperlink reference not valid. The PETOD effect existed in five of those eight elections with recessions beginning during each election year in four cases (1860, 1920, 1960 and 1980) and in the previous year in one case (June 1899 before the 1900 presidential election). The PETOD effect of 63 (five of eight) would have been 75 (six of eight) counting the Y2K recession. Also, the PETOD effect existed for two of the last three (67) and four of the last six (67) such presidential elections; these results would have been three of the last three (100) and five of the last six (87) counting Y2K. Considering traditional economic factors and my nontraditional anomalies, I believe there is an 80 probability a recession will begin next year. Fortunately, Cash Transfers will provide a foundation for our economy offering money to each individual Chris Leeson, Medium, "We Need To Talk About Universal Basic Income", July 23, 2017, https://medium.com/@_C_Leeson/we-need-to-talk-about-universal-basic-income-f5c46f577d71 No one needs to be sold on the worthiness of alleviating poverty. Not even those caricatured as being indifferent to poverty actually are; it’s just that they’re unwilling to countenance the tradeoffs required for doing so. But if a system could alleviate poverty while keeping other things equal or even augmenting other points along the wealth distribution continuum, then it’s a no-brainer. One of the selling points of the UBI is that it is superior to automatic stabilizers, such as existing welfare and welfare-like structures. It is the assumption that giving everyone money is better than assisting the targeted few. By contrast, Australia has just embraced “needs” based school funding which functions in line with existing transfer payments for social welfare and provides more funding to schools with kids of lower socio-economic backgrounds. What happens when we move away from means-tested strategies and toward universal strategies? Let’s consider the institutions we’d want to universalize and the costs associated with a UBI. Healthcare, elderly care, education, transportation, communications infrastructure — these are the essentials; the tools of opportunity. The cost of a UBI of $15,000 per person in America would be approximately $4.83 trillion, not including administrative costs. That’s 27 of GDP. Currently, according to OECD data, the United States spends approximately 20 of GDP on social welfare, so moving to a UBI would represent a 7 percentage point increase. But the question was never over the dollar amount; it’s always been about efficiency and effectiveness. Is it more efficient to give everyone money, or to target particular needs. Here are some facts. Preventive measures are more cost-effective than reactive measures. There is a natural rate of unemployment. UBI creates “choice” based spending. Recipients are able to choose whether they participate in society, get an education, and pay for the dentist or buy drugs, alcohol, and be a part of the underground/illegal economy. One can make a good case for thinking that a and UBI will increase standards of living. It may do that in the short term — the problem is: when it comes to the long term, we just don’t know. We know that free markets have delivered a better quality of life, and we know that command governments, such as the various communisms of the 20th century, have failed. We also know there has been rising wealth inequality and we have the possibility of fitting a UBI program within a broader capitalist system. It could be just what is needed. Leisure Time, Innovation, Entrepreneurship, Education A UBI provides some economic security and a fall back position that will enable entrepreneurship, education, and leisure time. But a big problem stems from the possibility that our inclinations to be lazy are stronger than our inclinations to be industrious. A universal basic income won’t suddenly turn people into creatives or business magnates. Those people arguably have that drive and those traits regardless of the environment you put them in. Investing now rather than waiting to implement a stimulus package revitalizes stabilizers. This is needed, as Sara Estep, Center for American Progress, "The Importance of Automatic Stabilizers in the Next Recession", June 17, 2019 americanprogress.org/issues/economy/news/2019/06/17/471120/importance-automatic-stabilizers-next-recession/ The United States is experiencing one of the longest periods of economic expansion in its history, but downturns are difficult to predict, giving policymakers reason to worry about whether the country is prepared for the next recession. Automatic stabilizers—policy features that automatically expand spending or reduce tax receipts during economic downturns in order to inject stimulus—helped reduce the severity of the Great Recession a decade ago. In order to improve the U.S. economy’s resilience against future recessions, policymakers must strengthen automatic stabilizers. Otherwise, families could be left struggling to keep a roof over their heads and put food on the table as Congress takes time to act. This column offers a brief explanation of automatic stabilizers, their role in mitigating a recession, and how they can be improved for the future. What are automatic stabilizers? Automatic stabilizers are features of the federal government’s budget that automatically injected funds into the economy through transfer payments or tax reductions when the economy goes into recession or otherwise slumps. They are “automatic” because they do not require action by Congress; in other words, they are built into already enacted policies. Many government policies serve as automatic stabilizers simply by their nature. For example, when many workers lose their jobs around the same time, the unemployment insurance program receives more claims and pays out more in benefits. The progressive income tax system also serves as an automatic stabilizer because when people’s incomes fall, they pay less in taxes. Some programs could have additional features built into them that would react when certain macroeconomic indicators were triggered. (see Table 1) In fact, a UBI is literally designed to prevent shocks in the market and protect against drops in investor confidence Robert Jameson, Yahoo, "Would a universal basic income be an effective stimulus during a recession?", October 10, 2017, https://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20171009191552AAR2KSH It is designed to help provide stability - to be there year in, year out, whether there is a recession on or not! It’s entirely possible, however, that the stability it a UBI provides might helps prevent the economy falling into a recession in the first place. Confidence levels may be more stable when people have the security of a Basic Income - and that may potentially reduces the likelihood of sudden falls in aggregate demand that could lead to a recession. A US recession will push millions of people into poverty. Isabel Sawhill ofBroookings Institute, "Simulating the Effect of the “Great Recession” on Poverty", September 10, 2009, https://www.brookings.edu/research/simulating-the-effect-of-the-great-recession-on-poverty/ ?In short, our results show that recessions can have long-term scarring effects for all workers but especially for the most disadvantaged, whose skills and attachment to the work force are already somewhat marginal. A prolonged lack of jobs reduces the amount of on-the-job training or experience that people receive, discourages them from making the effort needed to climb out of poverty, and can even lead to a deterioration in their health or family life that adversely affects opportunity. There were 37 million people in poverty in 2007, so our results indicate that the lastrecession would increased the number of people in poverty by about 8 million, or 22 percent. Our estimates for the increase in poverty amongst children are even more dramatic. There were about 13 million children living in poverty in 2007, and we estimate that further, the number of poor children could increasede by at least 5 million, or 38 percent. To: a. save 42 million women from abusive relationships b. 9/10 of the people in poverty and reduce poverty by 74 c. and to save the millions of people who are going into poverty in the next recession, vote pro	904,761
365,648	379,694	offs	1- Gift K A UBI is a form of a Gift Arjo 96 ~~A gift is~~ any 'good', including money, that is transferred, conveyed or transmitted from one party to another when the nature, the value and the timing of the return of an equivalent is left undetermined. Thus - A UBI is a gift Gift becomes a commodity for the ego Arrigo and Williams explain, the notion of gif-giving, assures the giver that they will enjoy an elevated status. The idea of a true and whole hearted gift is crushed by the need for reciprocating the gift. AandW find that the need for reciprocacy puts the receiver at a stage of psychological subjugation. Thus, the act of gift giving, becomes an act of egoism. Impacts ~~1~~ Authoritarianism Stanford 11 writes, sustenance and other bequests to members of the community maintained elevated status It could preserve the status of authority and control the public. Gift giving economies help put the givers at the top while the receivers are subjugated. ~~2~~ Silence THe gift creates a notion of thankfulness and pity, the false sentiments can create silence and perpetuate the superiority of the giver. In this way, the UBI becomes a gift from the government to the public, perpetuating silence and authoritarianism The Alt is to reject the Aff Implementing a UBI would encompass the entirety of the public under the receiver. UBI would increase governmental authority and support authoritarianism. The larger the UBI, the easier it would be for the government. Even if the intention was not so, the subconscious psychological effects felt, perpetuated the impacts. ROB: The ROB is thus to vote for the team who best protects rights, liberty, and autonomy ~~1~~ Autonomy is a prereq for a good life, and for people's ability to act ~~2~~ For people to be valued, their autonomy must be respected 2- PC DA Aff eliminates important Welfare Programs: There are 3 Main Impacts The First is losing Housing. The CBPP found in 2019 that over 10 million Americans use federal assistance to afford modest housing. Cutting this program for a UBI would hurt these Americans as Weiss of the ABA in 2019 explains that without housing assistance, the majority of families would be homeless or living in substandard conditions because they would not be able to spend on rent. For this reason, Weiss furthers that in 2017 alone, welfare programs for housing assistance lifted 3 million people out of poverty. A UBI would not replace these benefits since Goulden of the JRF in 2018 corroborates that a UBI would not be nearly enough to make up for market-based rents for people in the lower and middle classes as these would sky-rocket without government aid. Removing housing would be disastrous as the current 10 million recipients would be pushed onto the street The Second is losing Healthcare. Leonard of US News finds that over 70 million people are dependent on Medicaid - a means-tested healthcare program. Medicaid provides healthcare for any American that makes less than 30 above the poverty line. Broddus of the Center of Budget and Policy Priorities in late 2019 finds that this is detrimental as Medicaid coverage is seen to decrease mortality in older Americans by up to 64 and the medicaid program helped to save 19,000 people over a span of a few years. And the Third is losing SNAP. Feeding America explains that SNAP stands for the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program. SNAP is a federal program that helps millions of low-income Americans put food on the table. The CBPP 19 corroborates that SNAP benefits reach anyone who qualifies under program rules. For this reason, 40 million people depend on SNAP and were taken out of a situation of food insecurity. They further said that in 2016 alone, this program helped to keep 7.3 million people out of poverty and lift 1.9 million children above the poverty line. 3 - IDA Calder 17 finds implementing a UBI will decrease political support for immigration, thus immigration will decrease. Zwolinski 13 writes, "A ~~UBI~~would restrict immigration even more than it already is." He continues, that this will be caused by the government's inability to fund immigrant UBI. Impacts ~~1~~ Resentment A UBI will create anti-immigrant resentment. Dahner 13 corroborates, a UBI fuels anti-immigrant lobbying and supports radical nationalism which causes racial and ethnic prejudice. Resentment lowers cultural diversity, and hurts those who need to migrate. Parijis 12 agrees, they say anti-immigration leads to solidarity and resentment between communities. ~~2~~ Racism and Exploitation The increased resentment will develop into racism. As a result, ethnic minorities become the target of hate. This is exactly what Parijis 12 finds when they say a culturally diverse community is needed to prevent solidarity and prejudice. Moreover, this resentment and racism leads to exploitation of immigrant workers. Collins of the IPS in 2017 finds this is empirically evident in Dubai. A sustainable UBI "makes low wage work less attractive." This sets up for immigrants to be forced to fill in for these jobs.	904,756
365,649	379,711	Interp- Disclosure	Debaters must, on a page on the NDCA PF 2019-2020 wiki with their name and the school they attend, disclose the taglines and citations of any pieces of evidence which they have read in their case in a previous round at least one hour before the round. To clarify, disclose your broken cases.	904,776
365,650	379,718	Contact for PF MS National Tourney	Hey its Arnav, Contact me at least 20 min before round starts at [email protected] and either send me ur opensource link or case doc link. I will have open sourced my cases or will send you the speech doc Happy Debating! emoticon_smile	904,787
365,651	379,730	Access AC	=1AC= ====We affirm,==== ====Resolved: The US should replace means-tested welfare programs with a universal basic income.==== ====Our Sole Contention is Mending the Social Safety Net==== ====Subpoint A: Lack of access==== ====Meeting the requirements for Means Tested Welfare is hard, this prevents access to help==== KERRI NICOLL 15 of the Journal of Poverty (7-15-2015, "Why Do Eligible Households Not Participate in Public Antipoverty Programs? A Review", doa 1-27-2020, https://sci-hub.tw/10.1080/10875549.2015.1015069) NY Scholarship on program factors has explored features of policy design and implementation hypothesized to affect AND , Zambrowski, and Cohen, 1999; Ratcliffe et al., 2008). ====Moreover, shifting incomes and unexpected financial expenses prevent access to Means Tested Welfare==== LESLIE ALBRECHT 19 of Columbia University (Leslie Albrecht is a personal finance reporter based in New York. She is a graduate of the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism. 10-25-2019, "How income volatility hurts both rich and poor Americans", doa 1-31-2020, https://www.marketwatch.com/story/forget-the-stock-markets-roller-coaster-many-americans-struggle-with-income-volatility-2018-02-16) NY The Dow Jones Industrial Average DJIA, -1.80 has been on AND , they might be opting to delay medical care or a car repair." ====Subpoint B: Lack of Access increases poverty==== ====Unfortunately, poverty is on the rise because of a lack of EITC acceptance==== RICHARD CAPUTO 10 of the Journal of Social Services (2010, "Prevalence and Patterns of Earned Income Tax Credit Use Among Eligible Tax-Filing Families: A Panel Study, 1999–2005", doa 1-27-2020, https://sci-hub.tw/10.1606/1044-3894.3950) NY Findings of the study suggest that EITC eligibility is prevalent, while EITC participation is AND , and encourage those EITC-eligible non-filers to file accordingly. ====AND due to people not accepting EITC, incomes suffer==== QUENTIN PALFREY 17 of the Governing Institute (7-24-2017, "Getting Public Benefits to the People Who Need Them", doa 1-29-2020, https://www.governing.com/gov-institute/voices/col-improving-low-take-up-rates-benefit-programs-earned-income-tax-credit.html) NY California's new budget expanded the state's Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), providing access AND challenging for families to calculate how much credit they should expect to receive. ====Subpoint C: Universalism Reduces Poverty==== ====Universalism increases the amount of money from the high-income brackets to the low-income brackets==== OLIVER JACQUES 18 of the Journal of Social Policy (2-16-2018, "The case for welfare state universalism, or the lasting relevance of the paradox of redistribution", doa 1-29-2020, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0958928717700564) NY Consider, first, bivariate correlations between the main variables of interest, as shown AND the effects of universalism across clusters remain significant, whatever country we exclude. ====Furthermore, universalism strongly decreases single-mother poverty, every standard deviation decreases by factor of 2.5. If US increased universal welfare to Sweden's levels, single-mother poverty would decrease by a factor of 17.9 (95)==== DAVID BRADY 12 of Duke University (Universal replacement rate is the average percentage of median income coming from universal social programs. 3-9-2012, "Targeting, Universalism, and Single-Mother Poverty: A Multilevel Analysis Across 18 Affluent Democracies", doa 1-30-2020, https://sci-hub.tw/10.1007/s13524-012-0094-z) NY In Model 1, the welfare state index is significantly negative. The odds of AND single-mother poverty would decline more modestly. If it increased its targeting ====Assist the people in poverty, and affirm====	904,803
365,652	379,732	Escalation	=1NC= We Negate, ? ===Contention 1: There are no benefits to offensive cyber operations=== ===Subpoint A: Cyber command=== ====US offensive cyber operations will be conducted through Cyber Command.==== Shannon Vavra 19, 6-11-2019, "U.S. ramping up offensive cyber measures to stop economic attacks, Bolton says," CyberScoop, https://www.cyberscoop.com/john-bolton-offensive-cybersecurity-not-limited-election-security/ The U.S. is beginning use offensive cyber measures in response to commercial AND of which gave the Defense Department more flexibility to conduct offensive cyber measures. ====CyberCom has too much bureaucracy making it hard for effective operations==== Jack Detsch 16 Christian Science Monitor, 1-22-2016, "Declassified documents reveal scope of Defense Department’s cyber strategy," https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/2016/0122/Declassified-documents-reveal-scope-of-Defense-Department-s-cyber-strategy "~~Cyber Command~~ has far too many layers of bureaucracy and management to ever AND "The direct tie creates a culture where Cyber Command can ultimately underperform. ===Subpoint B: Hidden Effect=== ====Empirically, offensive cyber operations conducted by the United States Federal Government have taken years to be exposed==== KAVEH WADDELL, MAR 6, 2017,"The Cyberwar Information Gap," https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/03/the-cyberwar-information-gap/518700/ U.S. government hackers began developing destructive malware meant to disrupt Iran’s nascent AND place in 2016, during Barack Obama’s final year as president. ? ===Contention 2: There is definite harm to offensive cyber operations=== ===Subpoint A: Permanent War=== ====The United States does not understand the difference between offensive and defensive cyber operations, this encourages adversaries to retaliate to defense actions and locks the United States into permanent war.==== MaríA Ellers 19, 10-23-2019, "How America's Cyber Strategy Could Create an International Crisis," National Interest, a class="vglnk" href="https://nationalinterest.org/blog/skeptics/how-americas-cyber-strategy-could-create-international-crisis-90526" Buchanan argues that Washington’s poor understanding of the indistinguishability between offense and defense is the AND the most destructive factor to any strategy that attempts to deter escalating conflict. ====Offensive cyber operations perpetuate cyber war, and encourages others to enhance offensive cyber operations==== Mack Degeurin, Editorial Intern, New York Magazine, 9-14-2018 ~~"U.S. Silently Enters New Age of Cyberwarfare," Select All, http://nymag.com/selectall/2018/09/us-rescinds-ppd-20-cyber-command-enters-new-age-of-cyberwar.html, 9-24-2018~~ KAS This past month, buried beneath an ant mound of political scandal and news cacophony AND more powerful in cyberspace does not necessarily mean that it is more secure." ===Subpoint B: Perception leads to Escalation=== ====Misperceptions of attacks, and assumptions of the worse case set the ground works for escalations with Russia==== ?ukasz Kulesa Research Director at the European Leadership Network and Shatabhisha Shetty Deputy Director and co-founder of the European Leadership Network, European Leadership Network, June 2017 ~~"Trump, Putin and the Growing Risk of Military Escalation ", https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/170704-Trump-Putin-and-the-Growing-Risk-of-Military-Escalation.pdf, 8-12-2018~~ AWS NATO ministers at the 2016 Warsaw Summit added cyberspace as an operational domain alongside air AND during a crisis to prevent the other side from achieving a rapid victory. ====Furthermore, actors in cyber space purposely try to cause miscalculation and misattribution to incite escalation==== SARAH MALONEY, journalist, MAR 30, 2017, Cybereason ~~~~~~ATTACK ATTRIBUTION: IT'S COMPLICATED - https://www.cybereason.com/blog/attack-attribution-its-complicated Cyberspace doesn’t permit positive control of cyber tools. Once the tool is used, AND guessing the identities of people at a masquerade ball than actual science	904,805
365,653	379,740	Pre-ToC Disclosure	If you would like to contact us for disclosure, here's our contact info: Khegan Meyers - (813) 731-3722 - [email protected] - FB: Khegan Elijah Meyers Harsh Bagdy - (813) 422-9614 - [email protected] - FB: Harsh Bagdy	904,821
365,654	379,750	BADGERLAND AFF	C1: Boko Haram Austin M. Duncan 18, 6-6-2018, "Revitalizing U.S. Strategy in Nigeria to Address Boko Haram," Strategy Bridge, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2018/6/6/revitalizing-us-strategy-in-nigeria-to-address-boko-haram "Despite progress since ... of Boko Haram." U.S. Mission Nigeria 17, 5-24-17 "U.S. Government Supports Nigeria in Fight against Cybercrime and Financial Fraud." U.S. Embassy and Consulate in Nigeria, https://ng.usembassy.gov/u-s-government-supports-nigeria-fight-cybercrime-financial-fraud. "On May 23 ... dangerous criminal attacks." Benjamin Tyavkase Gudaku 19, 03-2019, “Harnessing Cyberspace Intelligence and the Fight Against Boko Haram in North-Eastern Nigeria,” International Journal of Interdisciplinary Research Methods, https://www.eajournals.org/wp-content/uploads/Harnessing-Cyberspace-Intelligence-and-the-Fight-against-Boko-Haram-in-North-Eastern-Nigeria.pdf "Many terror-related groups ... on unsuspecting citizens." Sunday O. Ogunlana 19, 2019, “Halting Boko Haram / Islamic State’s West Africa Province Propaganda in Cyberspace with Cybersecurity Technologies,” Journal of Strategic Security 12, no. 1 (2019), 72-106, https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1707andcontext=jss "It appears that ... and violent messages." Dan Lamothe 17, 12-16-2017, "How the Pentagon’s cyber offensive against ISIS could shape the future for elite U.S. forces," Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/12/16/how-the-pentagons-cyber-offensive-against-isis-could-shape-the-future-for-elite-u-s-forces/ "The U.S. military ... inside the organization." Austin M. Duncan 18, 6-6-2018, "Revitalizing U.S. Strategy in Nigeria to Address Boko Haram," Strategy Bridge, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2018/6/6/revitalizing-us-strategy-in-nigeria-to-address-boko-haram "It addition to ... and nonlethal effects." Ryan Duffy 18, 5-29-2018, "The U.S. military combined cyber and kinetic operations to hunt down ISIS last year, general says," CyberScoop, https://www.cyberscoop.com/u-s-official-reveals-military-combined-cyber-kinetic-operations-hunt-isis/ "The military used ... in and struck." Clint Bramlette, Air Force Institute of Technology, "CYBER-ATTACK DRONE PAYLOAD DEVELOPMENT AND GEOLOCATION VIA DIRECTIONAL ANTENNAE", March 2019, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1074625.pdf "This research succeeds ... to increase accuracy." Michael Sulmeyer, "Campaign Planning with Cyber Operations", Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, December 28th, 2017 "What should US .. civilian casualty risk." Landry Signé 18, 2-26-2018, "Boko Haram’s campaign against education and enlightenment," Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2018/02/26/boko-harams-campaign-against-education-and-enlightenment/ "Since it became ... is significantly higher." C2: Iran-Isreal War Saheb Sadeghi, Foreign Policy, "For Many Iranians, Staying In The Nuclear Deal No Longer Makes Sense", 09/24/19, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/09/24/for-many-iranians-staying-in-the-nuclear-deal-no-longer-makes-sense/ "Talks have little ... will also increase." The Times Of Isreal, "Iran could enrich enough uranium for nuke in 6-8 months, says former IAEA deputy", 06/5/19, https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-could-make-nuclear-weapon-in-6-8-months-says-former-iaea-deputy/ "A former deputy ... making a weapon," Kim Zetter, Wired, "An Unprecedented Look at Stuxnet, the World's First Digital Weapon", 11/03/14, https://www.wired.com/2014/11/countdown-to-zero-day-stuxnet/ "In January 2010 ... being fed gas." Alex Ward, 6-24-19, “The Weekend in the Risky US-Iran Standoff, explained,” Vox, https://www.vox.com/2019/6/24/18715408/usa-iran-sanctions-cyber-pompeo-coalition "Multiple outlets reported ... Iran's missile program." Anna Wagner, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, "Cyber security at nuclear facilities: US-Russian joint support needed - Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists", 12/15/17, https://thebulletin.org/2017/12/cyber-security-at-nuclear-facilities-us-russian-joint-support-needed/ "Civilian nuclear facilities ... a single vendor." Jon Lindsay, "CYBER OPERATIONS AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS", NAPSNet Special Reports, June 20, 2019, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/cyber-operations-and-nuclear-weapons/ "A nuclear weapon ... credible nuclear threats." Doreen Horschig, 6-23-19, “If Iran tensions flare, Israel may strike while the world quietly watches,” The Conversation, https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/if-iran-tensions-flare-israel-may-strike-while-the-world-quietly-watches-119062300146_1.html "Isreal will not ... the Middle East" Cham Dallas, Conflict and Health, "Nuclear war between Isreal and Iran: lethality beyond the pale", 2013, https://sci-hub.tw/https://www.researchgate.net/publication/236689331_Nuclear_war_between_Israel_and_Iran_Lethality_beyond_the_pale "No real appreciation ... the selected targeting"	904,833
365,655	379,754	UBI RR Aff	First an Overview: There are two ways a UBI could be funded: increasing the federal deficit or increasing taxes. The most likely implementation is a monthly thousand-dollar UBI funded by existing welfare funds and deficit spending. Deficit spending is a political non-issue. Kate Davidson 19, 7-29-2019, "Federal Borrowing Soars as Deficit Fear Fades," WSJ, https://www-wsj-com.ezp2.lib.umn.edu/articles/treasury-to-borrow-over-1-trillion-in-2019-for-second-year-in-a-row-11564428624?mod=searchresultsandamp;page=1andamp;pos=1 // BP "Concerns about rising ... into the future." Contention 1 is poverty traps. Since the Lyndon Johnson administration, the US government has been engaged in a war on poverty, which has been an abject failure. Rachel Sheffield 14, 9-15-2014, "The War on Poverty After 50 Years," Heritage Foundation, https://www.heritage.org/poverty-and-inequality/report/the-war-poverty-after-50-years // BP "This week, the ... a grinding halt." And, despite this spending, millions do not qualify for the social safety net. The Washington Post, Tracy Jan, February 4th, 2019, https://outline.com/2sHJaj // HZN "More than a ... Child Care Initiative." First, minimal asset requirements. Jeffrey Dorfman,10-13-2016, "Welfare Offers Short-Term Help And Long-Term Poverty, Thanks To Asset Tests," Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffreydorfman/2016/10/13/welfare-offers-short-term-help-and-long-term-poverty/ // AN "The second failure ... be very damaging." Second, high marginal tax rates. Jeffrey Dorfman,10-13-2016, "Welfare Offers Short-Term Help And Long-Term Poverty, Thanks To Asset Tests," Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffreydorfman/2016/10/13/welfare-offers-short-term-help-and-long-term-poverty/ // AN (recut by BP) "The third flaw ... people in poverty." Thus, Tim Worstall, Forbes , "The Average US Welfare Payment Puts You In The Top 20 Of All Income Earners", 05/04/15, https://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2015/05/04/the-average-us-welfare-payment-puts-you-in-the-top-20-of-all-income-earners/#6a5d75eb316f "OK, let's take ... of all incomes." A UBI solves these problems, because it is an unconditional, equal cash transfer for everyone. Jeffrey Dorfman,10-13-2016, "Welfare Offers Short-Term Help And Long-Term Poverty, Thanks To Asset Tests," Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffreydorfman/2016/10/13/welfare-offers-short-term-help-and-long-term-poverty/ // BP "Basic Income Addresses ... and on welfare." The impact is alleviating poverty. No matter what form the UBI takes, Irwin Garfinkel, Chien-Chung Huang, Wendy Naidich 02, 2-22-2002, “The Effects of a Basic Income Guarantee on Poverty and Income Distribution,” Columbia University, http://www.usbig.net/papers/014-garfinkel.pdf // BP "All four BIG ... very significant improvements." Contention 2 is Economic Collapse The next recession is coming Donna Borak, August 21st, 2019, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/business/live-news/recession-fears-august-2019/index.html "But there are ... and American workers." It's critical that we prevent this recession from becoming an economic catastrophe. Kerry Craig, May 18th, 2018, South China Morning Post https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2146736/global-recession-way-its-likely-be-mild "As the world's ... severe the outcome." A UBI can prevent a recession from becoming a global disaster in two ways First by increasing demand Vox, Dylan Matthews, August 30th, 2017, https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/8/30/16220134/universal-basic-income-roosevelt-institute-economic-growth "And the Levy ... correct the problem." More money means more consumption Michalis Nikiforos, The Roosevelt Institute, "Modeling the Macroeconomic Effects of a Universal Basic Income", August 2017, https://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Modeling-the-Macroeconomic-Effects-of-a-Universal-Basic-Income.pdf "The Keynesian nature ... of economic activity." This increase in consumption would help the economy. Matthews 2 "Basic income, a ... 4.7 million people." This recovers the economy Josh Bivens, Economic Policy Institute, April 18th, 2019 https://www.epi.org/publication/next-recession-bivens/ "The common root ... replenishing aggregate demand." Second by removing consumer debts Christian Weller, Forbes, July 15th, 2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/christianweller/2019/07/15/in-next-recession-household-debt-will-feature-big-again/#2f0f6f951423 "Families are getting ... of bad debt." A UBI would be able to solve Ellen Brown, January 7th, 2019, Occupy http://www.occupy.com/article/universal-basic-income-easier-it-looks#sthash.LQjAZKRv.dpbs "Why a UBI ... voluntary loan repayments." And it’s been empirically proven Peoples Policy Project, James King, October 19th, 2017, https://www.peoplespolicyproject.org/2017/10/19/even-a-modest-basic-income-could-improve-economic-security/ "Opponents of a ... their monthly expenses." Preventing another economic collapse is critical Robert Evans, Reuters, July 5th, 2009 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-financial-poverty/recession-adds-6-percent-to-ranks-of-global-poor-u-n-idUSTRE56502P20090706 "Economic recession has ... hunger and disease."	904,837
365,656	379,765	Disclosure Policy	Hey! I'm Varnica, the second speaker for Lambert BZ. If you would like us to disclose or have any questions regarding our disclosure feel free to hit me up at least 15 minutes before the round. Contact - Varnica Basavaraj email - cheer. [email protected] facebook - Varnica Basavaraj (prob best) phone number - 7325896093	904,852
365,657	379,771	Contact Info	[email protected] [email protected]	904,865
365,658	379,775	Runoffs	====Before we begin this round, let us all take a moment of prayer so that we can channel the power of God and His son, our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ, against evil Democrat Coronavirus. ==== ====The political has been ceded to white Christianity as this administration spends its time praying. White Christian conservatives have captured the political and drive the world towards Armageddon as they prepare for the second coming. Why are we forced to debate this irrelevant topic while our society is crumbling around us? Our white Christian country demands that we give our crusaders in the Middle East their due. Even if we have something educational to say about this topic, the political will just pray it away and continue their Mission to conquer the world in the name of Jesus Christ. ==== ====The words of the topic are part of a regime of signs that have to be rhetorically framed and understood before approached as a political mandate. The coherence of this topic comes from the face of the actor- the United States. Language always comes from a face and is incomprehensible without the face that emits it. Just like how authoritarians use their face to represent their power, western Christians use the face of Christ- That is the face of the United States and its military presence built into the topic. ==== European racism has a face bc of the white face of Jesus Christ- every other race didn't have the same face and were thus inferior to the Lord made flesh. Eurocentric cultures have overcoded the face- the body doesn't matter anymore. "The head is included in the body, but the face is not" ====Today, religion and race formulate the groundwork for white Christianity as the focal point for international politics. Our military presence in the Arab States presupposes Islamophobic tendencies through the profiling of supposed "terrorists" that we must police and control. The facialization machine as a whole operates through American militarism, the abstract face being captured by a White European Jesus Mythology—the apex of white supremacy and the exclusion of the Other. As faciality strives to make the Other intelligible and targetable, it constructs politics as a valorization of the militarization of whiteness. The military industrial complex has literally become an American religion, the worship of the weapons of whiteness.==== Astore 19 ~~https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/militarization-national-religion/~~ "Show me your budget, and I will tell you what you value" AND placed the peacemakers, not the warriors, among the children of God. ====Race and religion form intersectional grids through our military, the vengeful face of a white Jesus in the form of a modern-day crusade. The regime of signs LITERALLY INSCRIBES SCRIPTURE ONTO THE WEAPON, PACKAGING WORSHIP INTO ARMS AS AGENTS OF A VIOLENT GLOBAL BAPTISM.==== Rhee 10 ~~https://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/us-military-weapons-inscribed-secret-jesus-bible-codes/story?id=9575794)~~ Coded references to New Testament Bible passages about Jesus Christ are inscribed on high- AND devout Christian from South Africa who was killed in a 2003 plane crash. ====Thus, the construction of Jesus reifies the superiority of whiteness, utilizing facialized understandings of subjectivity to subject nonwhite bodies to ontologized violence in the name of the "one". Processes of facialization determine which bodies are the next targets of violence by dictating our understanding of reality. The incapacitation and disaggregation of all populations, whether based on the construction of gendered, racial, or national boundaries for identity to be policed upon, relies fundamentally on the stereotyping and positive identification of the white male face of Jesus.==== ====But how can that assemblage be disassembled? A start based on problematizing the whiteness of the Christian faciality machine can jump start resistance. Indeed, Jesus himself becomes a collective and the rationale for militarism in the first place evaporates under such a conception. We resist on the level of form- we call for repentance, not from Christ, but from ourselves for our sins. We reject the military industrial complex's divine right and take back our missionaries so that we can finally have a conversation about the American approach towards religion. ==== Barber 20 ~~https://www.thenation.com/article/society/national-day-prayer-coronavirus/~~ By obscuring America's original sin of race-based slavery and the Doctrine of Discovery AND because, as the Bible says, "Faith without works is dead."	904,875
365,659	379,796	2 - NOVDEC - IntelligenceLoss-Defense NC	C1 Intel Loss DA Uren ’18 Tom Uren, Bart Hogeveen, and Fergus Hanson, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 4 July 2018, https://www.aspi.org.au/report/defining-offensive-cyber-capabilities There is considerable concern about state-sponsored offensive cyber operations, which this paper defines as operations to manipulate, deny, disrupt, degrade, or destroy targeted computers, information systems or networks. There are relatively few publicly available offensive cyber doctrine documents, but observed behaviour indicates that states such as Iran, North Korea and Russia are using operations that cause denial and manipulation effects to support broader strategic or military objectives. By definition, offensive cyber operations are distinct from cyber-enabled espionage, in which the goal is to gather information without having an effect. When information gathering is a primary objective, stealth is needed to avoid detection in order to maintain persistent access that allows longer term intelligence gathering. Groll ’19 Groll, Elias. September 27 2019. “The U.S.-Iran Standoff Is Militarizing Cyber Spce.” Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/09/27/the-u-s-iran-standoff-is-militarizing-cyberspace/ But for every cyberattack that the United States launches, it must also make hard choices about the intelligence value of such a move. Attacking digital systems typically requires breaking into them ahead of time, which can provide key intelligence. When one moves from surveilling a system to destroying it, that access is lost. “You can’t attack something and stay in that network,” Williams said. And for every cyberattack that the United States launches, it will have less access to networks and fewer targets to hit in cyberspace. “It’s not like you’ve got a thousand cyber-cruise missiles.” Slayton ’17 Rebecca Slayton, Harvard Kennedy School – Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, February 2017, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/why-cyber-operations-do-not-always-favor-offense Assessing kinetic effects. It is often more expensive for the offense to achieve kinetic effects—for instance, sabotaging machinery—than for the defense to prevent them. An empirical analysis of the Stuxnet cyberattacks on Iran’s nuclear enrichment facilities shows that Stuxnet likely cost the offense more than the defense and was relatively ineffective. A cost-benefit analysis of Stuxnet for both the offense and the defense demonstrates why damaging physical infrastructure is more costly than simply infiltrating information networks. The costs of Stuxnet were likely far greater for the offense (the United States and Israel) than for the defense (Iran), and Stuxnet was relatively ineffective, setting back Iran’s nuclear program by fewer than three months. The great expense of Stuxnet was intelligence; though digital espionage can be used to obtain some kinds of information, the knowledge needed to disrupt a physical control system, such as the detailed methods and settings used to control pressure in Iran’s nuclear centrifuges, is not generally held in computers. The costs for both sides are dominated not by technology but by skilled labor—for example, hackers who identify and exploit zero-day vulnerabilities, systems administrators who manage and defend computer systems, and the nuclear engineers who understand enrichment processes and the means of disrupting them. Taylor ’13 Peter Taylor, 18 March 2013, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/9937516/Iraq-war-the-greatest-intelligence-failure-in-living-memory.html Ten years on from the invasion, Iraq remains the most divisive war in recent history and the greatest intelligence failure in living memory. Much of the key intelligence that was used to justify the war was based on fabrication, wishful thinking and lies - and as subsequent investigations showed, it was dramatically wrong. Saddam Hussein had no weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Dilanian ’19 Ken Dilanian, NBC News, 23 June 2019, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/under-trump-u-s-military-ramps-cyber-offensive-against-other-n1019281 With little public scrutiny, the U.S. military has drastically stepped up its secret hacking of foreign computer networks in a new effort to keep China, Russia, Iran and other adversaries on their heels, current and former U.S. officials tell NBC News. Empowered with new legal authority from both Congress and President Donald Trump, the military's elite cyber force has conducted more operations in the first two years of the Trump administration than it did in eight years under Obama, officials say — including against Russia, despite Trump's well-documented affinity for Vladimir Putin. The general in charge of the push, Paul Nakasone, has spoken about the new policy in cryptic terms such as "persistent engagement," and "defending forward," without explaining what that means. Multiple current and former American officials briefed on the matter say military hackers are breaking into foreign networks, striking at enemy hackers and planting cyber bombs that would disable infrastructure in the event of a conflict. Weichert ‘19 Brandon J Weichert, 23 May 2019, The American Spectator, https://spectator.org/iran-more-failures-from-u-s-intelligence/ In this land, the man who gives victory in battle is prized beyond every other man,” or so says Prince Feisal as portrayed by Sir Alec Guinness in the epic 1962 biopic, Lawrence of Arabia. Okay, so Feisal’s quote is apocryphal, and he was referring to the Arab-speaking peoples of the region. But the dog-eat-dog mindset that Feisal was referring to is as relevant to Persian thinking as it is to the Arabs. Lee Smith referred to it as the “Strong Horse” principle. There was a time, not long ago, in fact, when the mere mention of the U.S. military caused Islamists of both the Sunni and Shiite worlds to tremble in fear. After 20 years of inconclusive combat, though, the idea of American military invincibility has been replaced by utter contempt in both the Arab and Persian minds. In other words, we’re a joke in that part of the world. What’s more, after multiple failed wars, we should quit while we’re behind (at least until we can figure out how best to win in the Sandbox without bleeding ourselves dry). Conflict Begets Fear, Begetting More Conflict Recently, it was reported that a Katyusha rocket landed about a mile away from the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, Iraq. Iranian militants operating in a predominantly Shiite neighborhood in Baghdad are suspected… well, maybe. We don’t know. It’s likely we never will. But, the smartest people in Washington (don’t laugh) assume that it’s true. Meanwhile, single-source, unverified intelligence reports indicate that Iran was plotting to attack U.S. military outposts throughout the region and possibly kidnap American servicemen there. Iran also attempted an attack on two Saudi oil tankers operating in the Strait of Hormuz… or, that was the assumption, until it wasn’t. Not to worry, though, that bastion of truth, CNN, reports that U.S. intelligence detected Iranian ships being loaded with short-range ballistic missiles! Now, whether those ships were preparing to launch them at nearby U.S. forces or if they were merely transporting those missiles remains ambiguous. One would think our military-industrial-intelligence complex would want to know what the Iranian intentions were before spouting off and risking a wider war, but, that’s just not how Washington rolls. Bear in mind that launching short-range ballistic missiles from ships is a very tricky undertaking — one that the Iranians have never appeared capable of actually doing (and the undertaking is very inefficient). So, it is probable — though unconfirmed like everything else about the recent “news” about Iran — that Iran was merely transporting those missiles to another location in the region. Fears abounded among America’s policy community that Iran was preparing to move those missiles in range near U.S. forces operating in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Iraq, or Syria. Maybe. Then again, we don’t know! Can We Cut Through the Fog of War First? The bottom line here is that the fog of war is setting in. Despite the fact that the United States has been at war basically since 1945, first against the Communists, and then against the Islamists — and that the U.S. government is spending more than $80 billion on its 17 intelligence services for FY2019 — we are somehow less informed about what’s happening in a purported major threat, like Iran, than, say, weather patterns on Mars! The entire reason for having such a bloated military-industrial-intelligence complex is, in part, to reduce the fog of war. It’s also to prevent wasteful military excursions and international misunderstandings. More dangerously, as the summer months approach Washington, D.C., its denizens can expect war fever as well as humidity to envelop the Swamp. And, just as we act more aggressive than we really want to be at times in order to scare our rivals, the Iranians do the exact same thing to us. It’s possible all of these moves were intended to put us back on our heels. It’s also more than likely that the Iranian leaders are just as stupid as ours are, and seriously miscalculated the American response to their provocations. Fact is, no one knows anything about what’s occurring in Iran. It’s an intelligence blackhole and has been since the revolution swept the Ayatollah and his fanatical theocracy into power in 1979. Iraq was also an intelligence dead zone in the run-up to the disastrous 2003 invasion. Of course, that lack of intelligence didn’t stop the democratic globalists who run Washington from pushing us into a wasteful conflict. Unsurprisingly, many of the same policymakers who were intimately involved with the Iraq War are similarly engaged with the Trump Administration’s more aggressive Iran policy. Yet, as I noted previously, these policymakers have failed to learn the critical lessons about the mistakes of the Iraq War. Is It Containment or Invasion? The objective, as I understood it, of the Trump Administration’s Mideast policy was to reduce the threat of Islamic extremism to the United States, balance against unwanted Russian influence in the region, and roll back the Iranians’ malign presence beyond their own borders. In the process of achieving these aims, the Trump Administration sought to rehabilitate America’s ailing relations with the Sunni Arab states — notably the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia — and Israel. In so doing, a new balance of power in the region between Israel and the Sunni Arab states, backstopped by the United States, would assiduously work to roll back unwanted Iranian influence and contain Iranian ambitions with minimal force — much as how the United States fought and won the Cold War. Now, however, it appears that we’re blundering our way into another Mideast war that will be just as unwinnable as the last ones we’ve fought. President Trump insists that he doesn’t want war with Iran, as though he’s some hostage in the Oval Office. He’s the president. If he doesn’t want war with Iran now, then we don’t have a war with them. It’s possible that he’s playing good cop to his national security adviser John Bolton’s bad cop, in the hopes of getting a great deal with Iran. We can only be so lucky. Given the presence of many former George W. Bush neocons in top tier positions in the Trump Administration, though, this prospect seems unlikely. And, given how poorly our intelligence services have performed in penetrating opaque regimes, grave strategic miscalculations will be made as the democratic globalists who populate the administration rush to war. Perhaps our strike on Iran will be limited to airstrikes or debilitating the oil-rich Kharg Island in order to further decimate Iran’s energy sector, as some have suggested. This is certainly a better option than a full-fledged invasion of Iran. However, this more limited military option fails to answer the critical question: How will Iran retaliate? When pressed by his overzealous military advisers to invade Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, then-President John F. Kennedy demanded to know how the Soviets would respond. His military men could only answer that the Soviets would not retaliate, because retaliating would lead to the unthinkable: general nuclear war between the two Superpowers. Of course, Kennedy knew full well that Moscow would have to respond, which is why he resisted the military advice and focused on the less popular, though, ultimately, safer approach of negotiations. While Iran is not the Soviet Union, it still has the capability to do considerable harm to American forces in the region and to complicate U.S. foreign policy in general. Intelligence Informs Policy, Not the Other Way Around Make no mistake: Iran is a threat. Yet, that threat is not so grave that we must invade another Mideast state. Containment, covert action, and relying on regional partners, such as Israel and the Sunni Arab states, to drive the policies against Iran is key. If the Israelis and Sunni Arabs are unwilling to make the ultimate sacrifice in war against Iran, why should we? It’s likely that Iran has a rudimentary nuclear weapons capability. Why have they not used it? What’s their plan? I suspect that they would use such weapons if their arsenal were more developed, but as it stands Iran’s leadership knows they cannot win in a war against the United States. Perhaps Washington should focus on massive increases in its intelligence collection operations in Iran to answer some of these questions rather than mindlessly burbling about military escalation against Iran — especially since the mere threat of American military action is no longer sufficient to cow Mideast enemies into submission. Tay ‘19 Shirley Tay, CNBC News, 16 May 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/16/there-is-a-real-risk-of-miscalculation-in-us-iran-tensions-expert.html As U.S.-Iran tensions continue to escalate, there is rising fear among experts and government officials that a conflict between the two countries may break out. According to Henry Rome, a global macro and Iran analyst at political risk consultancy Eurasia Group, the risk of miscalculation by Washington and Tehran is “real.” “If the U.S. and Iran were to end up in conflict in the near future, it will be because of a miscalculation or a misperception,” he told CNBC. While President Donald Trump and Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei have both said they are not interested in war, Rome said Thursday that “history has shown us that many, many times that even two states — uninterested in armed confrontation — can be drawn into it based on accidents, misperceptions or other provocations.” The Trump administration has deployed a carrier strike group and bombers to the Middle East region in response to what it calls “troubling and escalatory indications and warnings” from Iran. Despite rising fears of how misunderstandings between the two countries could escalate into a full-blown conflict, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo told CNBC on Saturday that the U.S. is “not going to miscalculate.” “Our aim is not war, our aim is a change in the behavior of the Iranian leadership,” he said. On Wednesday, the U.S. State Department announced that all non-emergency American staff on diplomatic missions will be pulled out of Iraq, citing concerns of threats from Iranian-backed forces. Washington’s decision, however, runs counter to remarks from a senior British military official on Tuesday— who said there has been “no increased threat from Iranian-backed forces in Iraq or Syria.” “The U.S. is having a credibility problem here in trying to convince its allies of the threats faced by Iran, largely because of its track record and the individuals leading it, namely (U.S. National Security Advisor) John Bolton,” Rome said. Still, Rome said the “vague” U.S. intelligence and lack of public confirmation of Iranian threats in Iraq doesn’t mean that “we should reflexively reject these threats.” C2 AI and Cyber Defense Donnelly ’19 John M Donnelly, Roll Call, 11 July 2019, https://www.rollcall.com/news/u-s-is-woefully-unprepared-for-cyber-warfare Information operations and cyberattacks in the gray zone have grown in recent years — in number, sophistication and damage. China’s 2018 attack on a Navy contractor gave that country access not just to details of a key new anti-ship missile but also to much of what the Navy knows about China’s maritime capabilities. China has also reportedly stolen data on F-35 fighters, littoral combat ships, anti-missile systems and drones operated by the U.S. military. The broader U.S. economy has lost more than $1 trillion in intellectual property pilfered in cyberspace, experts say. Russia has specialized in a massive information warfare campaign to influence U.S. elections by sowing dissent and planting lies in U.S. social media circles. North Korea, Iran and even terrorist groups have shown they, too, can do damage with a few keystrokes. On June 11, national security adviser John Bolton publicly stated that the U.S. has stepped up its offensive cyber-assaults since last year. The message to America’s adversaries, Bolton said, is “You will pay a price.” Four days later, The New York Times reported that the United States, in a classified operation, had penetrated Russia’s energy grid with malware that, if triggered, could disrupt Russia’s electrical systems. The Pentagon has said the Times reporting was inaccurate but has not provided any clarification. Later that month, Yahoo News disclosed that U.S. Cyber Command had hit Iranian military computers after Iran shot down a U.S. drone in the Persian Gulf. Despite this ramped-up offense, America’s defenses lag behind, according to retired Army Gen. Keith Alexander, who headed the National Security Agency and the U.S. Cyber Command. “I think we are making gradual moves toward that, but I think there needs to be more,” said Alexander, now CEO of cybersecurity firm IronNet. “I believe it’s the government’s responsibility under the Constitution for common defense. Period.” Without effective cyber-defenses, more aggressive overseas operations could come back to bite the United States, experts warn. “Defense is a necessary foundation for offense,” the Defense Science Board, a Pentagon advisory panel, said in a 2018 report. “Effective offensive cyber capability depends on defensive assurance and resilience of key military and homeland systems.” Defenseless defense The Navy cybersecurity review, made public in March, said those defenses are severely lacking. As the Navy prepares to win “some future kinetic battle,” the report said, it is “losing” the current one. Defense contractors “hemorrhage critical data.” The current situation is the result of a “national miscalculation” about the extent to which the cyber war is upon us, and the vaunted U.S. military’s systems have been “compromised to such an extent that their reliability is questionable.” The U.S. economy, too, will soon lose its status as the world’s strongest if trends do not change, the authors wrote. The Defense Science Board, meanwhile, has delivered a similar message, recommending in 2017 that a second U.S. military that is truly cyber-secure be created as soon as possible, because the one America has will not necessarily work. A cyberattack on the military, the science board said, “might result in U.S. guns, missiles, and bombs failing to fire or detonate or being directed against our own troops; or food, water, ammo, and fuel not arriving when or where needed; or the loss of position/navigation ability or other critical warfighter enablers.” The report chillingly warned that doubts about U.S. defense capabilities due to cyber vulnerabilities could cause a president to more quickly turn to nuclear weapons in a conflict. Kenneth Rapuano, the Pentagon assistant secretary for homeland defense and global security, said the department is trying to implement “as a matter of top priority” the Defense Science Board recommendation to ensure that at least part of the military is at the highest level of cyber preparedness, starting with nuclear weapons. Browne ’19 Ryan Browne, CNBC, 24 July 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/20/ai-cyberattacks-artificial-intelligence-threatens-cybersecurity.html The fear for many is that AI will bring with it a dawn of new forms of cyber breaches that bypass traditional means of countering attacks. “We’re still in the early days of the attackers using artificial intelligence themselves, but that day is going to come,” warns Nicole Eagan, CEO of cybersecurity firm Darktrace. “And I think once that switch is flipped on, there’s going to be no turning back, so we are very concerned about the use of AI by the attackers in many ways because they could try to use AI to blend into the background of these networks.” Amaro and Gamble ’19 Silvia Amaro, Hadley Gamble, CNBC, 17 February 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/17/us-government-is-exceptionally-vulnerable-to-cyberattacks-security-expert-says.html The United States is “vulnerable” to cybersecurity attacks and need to step up their defense mechanisms, the co-founder of the computer security firm CrowdStrike told CNBC Saturday. Recent cyberattacks, including NotPetya last June, have been devastating to American companies, causing them hundreds of millions of dollars in losses. Other attacks, such as the cybersecurity breach at the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) in 2015, have reportedly given key information to governments like China’s that can be used to blackmail American citizens working with sensitive intelligence. As a result, it is urgent that U.S. authorities become better at protecting their networks, Dmitri Alperovitch, co-founder and chief technology officer at CrowdStrike told CNBC at the Munich Security Conference. “The U.S. government is actually exceptionally vulnerable,” he said. Despite the “very good” intelligence operations in the U.S., “their procurement process is so archaic that they are not actually able to buy the technologies they need to protect themselves fast enough,” Alperovitch said. Zinutallin ’18 Leron Zinutallin, 10 December 2018, Tripwire, https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/featured/artificial-intelligence-cybersecurity-attacking-defending/ On the opposite side, there are many incentives to use AI when attempting to attack vulnerable systems belonging to others. These incentives include the speed of attack, low costs and difficulties attracting skilled staff in an already constrained environment. Current research in the public domain is limited to white hat hackers employing machine learning to identify vulnerabilities and suggest fixes. At the speed AI is developing, however, it won’t be long before we see attackers using these capabilities on a mass scale, if they don’t already. How do we know for sure? The fact is that it is quite hard to attribute a botnet or a phishing campaign to AI rather than a human. Industry practitioners, however, believe that we will see an AI-powered cyber-attack within a year; 62 percent of surveyed Black Hat conference participants seem to be convinced in such a possibility. Many believe that AI is already being deployed for malicious purposes by highly motivated and sophisticated attackers. It’s not at all surprising given the fact that AI systems make an adversary’s job much easier. Why? Resource efficiency point aside, they introduce psychological distance between an attacker and their victim. Indeed, many offensive techniques traditionally involved engaging with others and being present, which, in turn, limited attacker’s anonymity. AI increases the anonymity and distance. Autonomous weapons are the case in point; attackers are no longer required to pull the trigger and observe the impact of their actions. Slayton ’17 Slayton, Rebecca. February 2017. Why Cyber Operations Do Not Always Favor the Offense. Belfer Center. Harvard Kennedy School. https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/why-cyber-operations-do-not-always-favor-offense The assumption that cyberspace favors the offense is widespread among policymakers and analysts, many of whom use this assumption as an argument for prioritizing offensive cyber operations. Faith in offense dominance is understandable: breaches of information systems are common, ranging from everyday identity theft to well-publicized hacks on the Democratic National Committee. A focus on offense, however, increases international tensions and states’ readiness to launch a counter-offensive after a cyberattack, and it often heightens cyber vulnerabilities. Meanwhile, belief in cyber offense dominance is not based on a clear conception or empirical measurement of the offense-defense balance. Creating unnecessary vulnerabilities. Making offensive cyber operations a national priority can increase instabilities in international relations and worsen national vulnerabilities to attack. But because the skills needed for offense and defense are similar, military offensive readiness can be maintained by focusing on defensive operations that make the world safer, rather than on offensive operations. The skills and organizational capabilities for offense and defense are very similar. Defense requires understanding how to compromise computer systems; one of the best ways to protect computer systems is to engage in penetration testing (i.e., controlled offensive operations on one’s own systems). The similarity between offensive and defensive skills makes it unnecessary to conduct offensive operations against adversaries to maintain offensive capability. Thus, rather than stockpiling technologies in the hope of gaining offensive advantage, states should develop the skills and organizational capabilities required to innovate and maintain information and communications technologies. Healey ’13 Jason Healey is director of the Cyber Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council finds. http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/03/08/clandestine-american-strategy-on-cyberwarfare-will-backfire America's generals and spymasters have decided they can secure a better future in cyberspace through, what else, covert warfare, preemptive attacks, and clandestine intelligence. Our rivals are indeed seeking to harm U.S. interests and it is perfectly within the president's purview to use these tools in response. Yet this is an unwise policy that will ultimately backfire. The undoubted, immediate national security advantages will be at the expense of America's longer-term goals in cyberspace. ¶ The latest headlines on covert and preemptive cyberplans highlight just the latest phase of a cyber "cult of offense" dating back to the 1990s. Unclassified details are scarce, but the Atlantic Council's study of cyber history reveals covert plans, apparently never acted upon, to drain the bank accounts of Slobodan Milosevic and Saddam Hussein. More recent press accounts detail cyber assaults on terrorist networks (including one that backfired onto U.S. servers) and Stuxnet, which destroyed Iranian centrifuges. American spy chiefs say U.S. cyber capabilities are so prolific that this is the "golden age" of espionage, apparently including the Flame and Duqu malware against Iran and Gauss, which sought financial information (perhaps also about Iran) in Lebanese computers.¶ Offensive cyber capabilities do belong in the U.S. military arsenal. But the continuing obsession with covert, preemptive, and clandestine offensive cyber capabilities not only reduces resources dedicated for defense but overtakes other priorities as well. McGraw ‘13 Gary McGraw, PhD is Chief Technology Of?cer of Cigital, and author of¶ Software Security (AWL 2006) along with ten other software security¶ books. He also produces the monthly Silver Bullet Security Podcast for¶ IEEE Security and Privacy Magazine (syndicated by SearchSecurity), Cyber War is Inevitable (Unless We Build Security In), Journal of Strategic Studies - Volume 36, Issue 1, 2013, pages 109-119 The conceptual con?ation of cyber war, cyber espionage, and cyber¶ crime into a three-headed cyber Cerberus perpetuates fear, uncertainty¶ and doubt. This has made the already gaping policy vacuum on cyber¶ security more obvious than ever before.¶ Of the three major cyber security concerns in the public eye, cyber¶ crime is far more pervasive than cyber war or espionage. And yet it is¶ the least commonly discussed among policymakers. Cyber crime is¶ already commonplace and is growing: 285 million digital records were¶ breached in 2008 and 2011 boasted the second-highest data loss total¶ since 2004.2¶ Though economic calculations vary widely and are dif?cult to make,¶ cyber crime and data loss have been estimated to cost the global¶ economy at least $1.0 trillion dollars annually.3¶ Even if this estimate is¶ an order of magnitude too high, cyber crime is still an important problem that needs addressing. Just as consumers ?ock to the Internet,¶ so do criminals. Why did Willie Sutton, the notorious Depression-era¶ gangster, rob banks? As he famously (and perhaps apocryphally) put it:¶ ‘That’s where the money is.’ Criminals ?ock to the Internet for the same¶ reason.¶ Cyber espionage is another prominent problem that captivates the¶ imagination, and is much more common than cyber war. The highly¶ distributed, massively interconnected nature of modern information¶ systems makes keeping secrets dif?cult. It is easier than ever before to¶ transfer, store and hide information, while more information than ever¶ before is stored and manipulated on networked machines. A pen drive¶ the size of a little ?nger can store more information than the super¶ computers of a decade ago. Cyber war, cyber espionage, and cyber crime all share the same root cause: our dependence on insecure networked computer systems. The¶ bad news about this dependency is that cyber war appears to be¶ dominating the conversation among policy-makers even though cyber¶ crime is the largest and most pervasive problem. When pundits and¶ policymakers focus only on cyber war, threats emanating from¶ cyber crime and espionage are relegated to the background. Interestingly, building systems properly from a security perspective will address¶ the cyber crime and espionage problems just as effectively as it will¶ address cyber war. By building security into our systems in the ?rst¶ place we can lessen the possibility of cyber war, take a bite out of cyber¶ crime, and deter cyber espionage all at the same time. Wolff ’18 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/02/opinion/trumps-reckless-cybersecurity-strategy.html. The idea of using offensive cyberattacks for defensive purposes is not a new one — discussions about the potential risks and rewards of “hacking back,” especially in the private sector, go back more than five years. But for the American government to embrace this strategy is a sharp change from the cautious, defense-oriented approach of the past decade. President Barack Obama was notably restrained in his authorization of offensive cyber missions. When deciding whether to use the Stuxnet worm to compromise uranium enrichment facilities in Iran in 2010 (his administration’s most famous use of offensive cyber capabilities), he reportedly expressed repeated concerns about the precedent it would set for other countries. The Obama administration’s forbearance and careful decision-making around cyberattack authorization aligns with the 2015 Department of Defense cyber strategy, which identified controlling the escalation of cyber conflicts as a key strategic goal. That goal is conspicuously absent from the Department of Defense’s new strategy.The Trump administration’s shift to an offensive approach is designed to escalate cyber conflicts, and that escalation could be dangerous. Not only will it detract resources and attention from the more pressing issues of defense and risk management, but it will also encourage the government to act recklessly in directing cyberattacks at targets before they can be certain of who those targets are and what they are doing. Firdosi ’19 Ahad Firdosi, Medium, 3 January 2019, https://medium.com/datadriveninvestor/cybersecurity-2019-artificial-intelligence-and-iot-devices-in-sight-6108b6ba5c27 According to the report, cyber terrorists will exploit Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems and use their techniques to improve attacks. Automated systems powered by AI could probe networks and systems to search for undiscovered vulnerabilities that could be exploited. In turn, the AI could be used to make more sophisticated some phishing attacks and social engineering, from the creation of much more realistic videos and audios or well-designed emails to deceive specific people. This highly credible resource will also easily allow the spread of fake news. Johnson ’18 Larry Johnson, 21 Dec 2018, https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/325142 In the next few years, artificial intelligence, machine learning and advanced software processes will enable cyber attacks to reach an unprecedented new scale, wreaking untold damage on companies, critical systems and individuals. As dramatic as Atlanta’s March 2018 cyber “hijacking” by ransomware was, this was nothing compared to what is coming down the pike once ransomware and other malware can essentially "think" on their own. This is not a theoretical risk, either. It is already happening. Recent incidents involving Dunkin Donuts' DD Perks program, CheapAir and even the security firm CyberReason's honeypot test showed just a few of the ways automated attacks are emerging “in the wild” and affecting businesses. (A honeypot experiment, according to Wikipedia, is a security mechanism designedto detect, deflect, or, in some manner, counteract attempts at unauthorized use of information systems.) In November, three top antivirus companies also sounded similar alarms. Malwarebytes, Symantec and McAfee all predicted that AI-based cyber attacks would emerge in 2019, and become more and more of a significant threat in the next few years. What this means is that we are on the verge of a new age in cybersecurity, where hackers will be able unleash formidable new attacks using self-directed software tools and processes. These automated attacks on their own will be able to find and breach even well-protected companies, and in vastly shorter time frames than can human hackers. Automated attacks will also reproduce, multiply and spread in order to massively elevate the damage potential of any single breach. Dixon ’19, Dixon, William. June 19 2019. “3 ways AI will change the nature of cyber attakcs.” World Economic Forum. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/06/ai-is-powering-a-new-generation-of-cyberattack-its-also-our-best-defence/ Not only will AI-driven attacks be much more tailored and consequently more effective, their ability to understand context means they will be even harder to detect. Traditional security controls will be impotent against this new threat, as they can only spot predictable, pre-modelled activity. AI is constantly evolving and will become ever-more resistant to the categorization of threats that remains fundamental to the modus operandi of legacy security approaches. The cybersecurity community is already heavily investing in this new future and is using AI solutions to rapidly detect and contain any emerging cyberthreats that have the potential to disrupt or compromise key data. Defensive AI is not merely a technological advantage in fighting cyberattacks, but a vital ally on this new battlefield. Rather than rely on security personnel to respond to incidents manually, organizations will instead use AI to fight back against a developing problem in the short term, while human teams will oversee the AI’s decision-making and perform remedial work that improves overall resilience in the long term. AI-powered attacks will outpace human response teams and outwit current legacy-based defenses; therefore, the mutually dependent partnership of human and AI will be the bedrock of defense strategies in the future. The battleground of the future is digital, and AI is the undisputed weapon of choice. There is no silver bullet to the generational challenge of cybersecurity, but one thing is clear: only AI can play AI at its own game. The technology is available, and the time to prepare is now. Wilson Center ’19, April 4 2019. “AI raises the risk of cyberattacks – and the best defense is more AI.” World Economic Forum. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/04/how-ai-raises-the-threat-of-cyberattack-and-why-the-best-defence-is-more-ai-5eb78ba081/ Artificial intelligence promises to accelerate the speed and success rate of cyber attacks by sophisticated actors and eventually by those less-skilled (if off-the-shelf tools are developed and made available). It will also further blur traditionally understood lines between cyber offence and defence. Whichever side better deploys these automated technologies fastest will hold an advantage. AI will bring about attacks for which a majority of the public and many private sector companies will not be prepared. The good news is that the cybersecurity industry is using the same methods for defence. But these services require sustained investment and incentives for evolving cybersecurity defences that do not yet exist at scale. In protecting networks against adversaries, humans will continue to be important players in defending their own networks. But, it is imperative that autonomous systems play a central role in any such strategy. Effectively using artificial intelligence for defensive purposes will require a hybridization of various tactics and tools of both a proactive and responsive nature. Policymakers must encourage analysis of best practices for employing such tools and consider setting standards for their use. Palmer ’16, Palmer, Danny. December 14 2016. “ How AI-powered cyberattacks will make fighting hackers even harder.” https://www.zdnet.com/article/how-ai-powered-cyberattacks-will-make-fighting-hackers-even-harder/ Take phishing. It's the simplest method of cyberattack available ~-~- and there are schemes on the dark web which put all the tools required to go phishing into anyone's hands. It's simply a case of taking an email address, scraping some publicly available personal data to make the phishing email seem convincing, then sending it to the victim and waiting for them to bite. That could become even more effective if AI is added. "Spear phishing is going to become really, really good when machine learning is incorporated into it on the attacking side," says Dave Palmer, director of technology at Darktrace, a cybersecurity firm which deploys machine learning in its technology. The machine learning algorithms don't even need to be very advanced; relatively simple sequence-to-sequence machine learning could be installed on an infected device in order to monitor emails and conversations of a compromised victim. After a period of monitoring, the AI could tailor phishing messages to mimic the message style of the victim to particular contacts in their address book, in order to convince them to click on a malicious link. "If I were emailing someone outside the company, I'd probably be polite and formal, but if I was emailing a close colleague, I'd be more jokey as I email them all the time. Maybe I'd sign off my emails to them in a certain way. That would all be easily replicated by machine learning and it's not hard to envision an email mimicking my style with a malicious attachment," Palmer explains. SANS ‘03 https://www.giac.org/paper/gsec/3108/countering-cyber-terrorism-effectively-ready-rumble/105154 The operations of a utility company which specializes in electrical distribution that serves critical businesses is disrupted by cyber terrorists. The cyber terrorists manage to interrupt the distribution of electricity to the customers. This will of course cause a huge problem to the affected entities or areas to carry on normal operations and the normal way of life., would be likely. Applegate 18 (Oct) https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/10_d2r1s4_applegate.pdf Economist Scott Borg noted that if an attacker managed to knockout power to a third of the United States for a period of three months, the economy cost would be upwards of 700 billion dollars which is the economic equivalent of 40 to 50 large hurricanes hitting at the same time 5. This type of attack would be economically devastating and would have significant long-term consequences. While it is unlikely that a state would engage in this type of large-scale attack outside the bounds of an openly declared war, it would also be short-sighted to assume that only states will have access to these types of attacks. Heyes 17 (Apr) https://newstarget.com/2017-04-17-nuclear-power-plant-map-reveals-how-grid-down-scenario-would-obliterate-the-entire-east-coast-of-the-usa-except-maine.html A scientific group is sounding the alarm in a new interactive chart that reveals how unstable the country’s nuclear power plants could become were something to happen to the power grid that provides them with the electricity they need to safely operate. The Union of Concerned Scientists, in its interactive database, notes that the nation’s highest concentration of nuclear plants is along the U.S. east coast, which is also home to the highest concentration of Americans in the country. Areas around New York City, Philadelphia, Washington, D.C. and most of the southeast are at the greatest risk. Should a grid-down scenario develop, and last for more than a few days, a hundred million Americans will be at risk of dying a horrible, radiation-filled death. (RELATED: 28 Nuclear Reactors In The United States Could Suddenly Fail Due To Earthquakes… Most Are Located Along The East Coast) Even before the Japan accident in March 2011, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission was concerned that a protracted power outage could lead to radiation leaks as the loss of power to plants’ cooling tanks would lead to overheating and spillage of dangerous atomic elements. Pry ‘15, PhD, Executive Director of the Task Force on National and Homeland Security and Director of the U.S. Nuclear Strategy Forum (Peter, “TERRORISM–AN EXISTENTIAL THREAT”, http://www.emptaskforcenhs.com/uncategorized/terrorism-an-existential-threat/) Terrorists do not need a nuclear missile to pose an existential threat to the United States, however. Technology has so evolved since World War II and the Cold War that the U.S. and the West have become an electronic civilization. Our prosperity and very lives depend upon a complex web of high-tech information, communications, financial, transportation, and industrial critical infrastructures, all supported by the keystone critical infrastructure–the electric power grid. Admiral Michael Rogers, Director of the National Security Agency and U.S. CYBERCOMMAND, in November 2014, warned that China and other actors could make a cyber attack that would blackout the U.S. national electric grid for 18 months, with catastrophic consequences for society. The Congressional EMP Commission warned that a nationwide blackout lasting one year could kill up to 9 of 10 Americans from starvation and societal collapse. Terrorists and hostile nations are probing U.S. cyber defenses every day and are working hard to develop the cyber equivalent of a nuclear warhead. Terrorists can also pose an existential threat to the United States by attacking its technological Achilles’ Heel the old fashioned way, using bullets and bombs. A study by the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the government agency responsible for grid security, warns that a terror attack that destroys just nine (9) key transformer substations, out of 2,000, could blackout the entire nation for over a year. Terrorists have learned that the electric grid is a major societal vulnerability. Terrorist attacks have already caused large-scale blackouts of 420,000 people in Mexico (October 2013), the entire nation of Yemen (by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in June 2014), and 80 percent of the grid in Pakistan (January 2015)–this last a nuclear weapons state. And if terrorists steal a nuclear weapon from Pakistan, buy one from North Korea, or are given one by Iran, they could loft the warhead by balloon or missile to high-altitude over the U.S. to make the ultimate cyber attack–a nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP). EMP could blackout the national electric grid and other life sustaining critical infrastructures, perhaps permanently.	904,898
365,660	379,795	2 - NOVDEC - Iran-NoKo Prolif DA	C1 Proliferation Iran Blaustein ’13 Michael Blaustein, 16 May 2013, New York Post, https://nypost.com/2013/05/16/stuxnet-virus-might-have-improved-irans-nuclear-capabilities-report/ When the Stuxnet computer virus attacked Iran’s nuclear enrichment facilities in 2010, it was widely acknowledged to be the most successful cyber attack of all time. Unfortunately, new research shows that the Stuxnet virus was not only unsuccessful, it might have actually improved Iran’s ability to make nuclear weapons, according to a new report The stunning claim comes from a report published in a British academic journal which claims that Stuxnet had no discernible effect on Iran’s ability to enrich uranium — which can be used as fuel in a nuclear weapon — and that it might have actually improved Iran’s nuclear capabilities by exposing vulnerabilities that the regime might not have found for years. The increase implies that, at best, Stuxnet had no lasting effect on Iran, and at worst might have made the Iranians even savvier makers of nukes. Backing up Barzashak’s position is the fact that before the attack Iran was enriching uranium to 3.5 percent, and after the attack it began enriching uranium to 20 percent. For a bomb, Iran will need to enrich uranium to about 90 percent. “Uranium-enrichment capacity grew during the time that Stuxnet was said to have been destroying Iranian centrifuges,” Barzashak writes. “Iran produced more enriched uranium, more efficiently: the entire plant’s separative capacity per day increased. “The malware — if it did in fact infiltrate Natanz — has made the Iranians more cautious about protecting their nuclear facilities,” Barzashka writes. Furthermore, “Iran’s uranium-enrichment capacity increased and, consequently, so did its nuclear-weapons potential.” “Stuxnet was of net benefit to Iran if, indeed, its government wants to build a bomb or increase its nuclear-weapons potential,” Barzashka warns. Tirone ’19 Bloomberg, 15 November 2019, Jonathan Tirone, https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/irans-uranium-enrichment Under the agreement, which was struck by Iran, the U.S., China, France, Russia, Germany, the U.K. and the European Union, Iran maintained the ability to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes. It was allowed to keep 5,000 centrifuges to separate the uranium-235 isotope needed to induce a fission chain reaction. Iran had agreed under the accord that for 15 years it would not refine the metal to more than 3.7 enrichment — the level needed to fuel nuclear power plants — and would limit its enriched-uranium stockpile to 300 kilograms, or 3 of the amount it held in May 2015. The International Atomic Energy Agency verified that Iran eliminated its inventory of 20-enriched uranium, which can be used to make medical isotopes and to power research reactors but could also be purified to weapons-grade material at short notice. Inspectors also confirmed that Iran destroyed a reactor capable of producing plutonium. BBC ’19 7 Sept 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-49619246 Iran says it has begun using new advanced centrifuges to enrich uranium - the latest step in reducing its commitment to a 2015 nuclear deal with world powers. Forty such centrifuges were now operational, said nuclear agency spokesman Behruz Kamalvandi. Enriched uranium can be used to make reactor fuel but also nuclear weapons. Iran stopped abiding by two commitments in July in response to sanctions the US reinstated when it abandoned the deal. President Donald Trump wants to force Iran to negotiate a new agreement that would place indefinite curbs on its nuclear programme and also halt its development of ballistic missiles. But Iran has so far refused. North Korea Vavra ’18 Shannon Vavra, Axios, 26 January 2018, https://www.axios.com/north-korea-running-out-of-money-report-1517000914-6548c7b1-777f-40fa-b9dc-da371a9e7b30.html Two Chinese officials with ties to top North Korean government officials told Radio Free Asia that Kim Jong-un’s regime is running low on funds for its nuclear program, Fox News reports. Why it matters: The North is getting more and more isolated, according to this report. Some experts say when Kim Jong-un is isolated, he comes to the negotiating table to try to get sanctions eased — so this could explain the North’s recent talks with South Korea. But it’s also anyone’s best guess as to what Kim Jong-un wants exactly at any given time. Zetter ’15 Kim Zetter, 10 February 2015, https://www.wired.com/2015/02/nsa-acknowledges-feared-iran-learns-us-cyberattacks/ Regardless of whether Iran is behind the Shamoon attack, there's no question that it Iran and other nations learn from cyberattacks launched by the US and its allies. Common cybercriminals also study Stuxnet and the like to learn new techniques for evading detection and stealing data. The NSA document published by The Intercept noted that while there were no indications in 2013 that Iran planned to conduct a destructive attack against a US or UK target similar to Wiper, "we cannot rule out the possibility of such an attack, especially in the face of increased international pressure on the regime." Of course, a similar attack did strike the US. But instead of hitting the US oil industry or a similarly critical sector, it struck a Hollywood film studio. And instead of coming from Iran, it came this time (according to the White House and FBI) from North Korea. All of which suggests that when the US and Israeli strike their enemies, it isn't just that single adversary who learns from the attack. Parker ’18 Mitchell Parker, CSO Online, 24 October 2018, https://www.csoonline.com/article/3315745/defense-security-and-the-real-enemies.html When I was a kid, I used to read National Geographic magazines. They were 25 cents each at the local library. The August 1974 issue had an article in it titled “Rare Look at North Korea,” by H. Edward Kim, who visited North Korea (DPRK) and provided a detailed report. In that article, he spoke of how North Koreans figured out how to build their own tractors by reverse engineering one. They spoke about the tractor running backwards at first, but they eventually were able to build running tractors better than the presumably Soviet ones they took apart to learn how to build them. They have since applied their ingenuity to technology. They are guided by the Juche ideology authored by their first leader, Kim Il Sung, which is based on the tenets of independence, self-reliance, and self-defense. Under their second leader, Kim Jong Il, the Songun, or “military first” policy was added. Kim Jong Un, the third and current leader, has extended these with a focus on nuclear weapons development, empowering companies, and providing incentives for economic development called the “Socialist Corporate Responsible Management System.” Their system is focused on enriching their military, the DPRK and then their people, in that order. They have become an extremely adept force in technology, as Sony Pictures unfortunately learned, and have utilized their skills learned from reverse engineering our technology to bolster their economy. The recent thefts of $571 million in cryptocurrencies, according to CCN, done on behalf of a country with a $28.5 billion GDP in 2016, shows that a significant portion of their income now comes from their technology skills. Nichols ’19 Reuters, Michelle Nichols, 5 August 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-cyber-un/north-korea-took-2-billion-in-cyberattacks-to-fund-weapons-program-u-n-report-idUSKCN1UV1ZX North Korea has generated an estimated $2 billion for its weapons of mass destruction programs using “widespread and increasingly sophisticated” cyberattacks to steal from banks and cryptocurrency exchanges, according to a confidential U.N. report seen by Reuters on Monday. Pyongyang also “continued to enhance its nuclear and missile programmes although it did not conduct a nuclear test or ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missile) launch,” said the report to the U.N. Security Council North Korea sanctions committee by independent experts monitoring compliance over the past six months. The North Korean mission to the United Nations did not respond to a request for comment on the report, which was submitted to the Security Council committee last week. The experts said North Korea “used cyberspace to launch increasingly sophisticated attacks to steal funds from financial institutions and cryptocurrency exchanges to generate income.” They also used cyberspace to launder the stolen money, the report said. “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea cyber actors, many operating under the direction of the Reconnaissance General Bureau, raise money for its WMD (weapons of mass destruction) programmes, with total proceeds to date estimated at up to two billion US dollars,” the report said. North Korea is formally known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The Reconnaissance General Bureau is a top North Korean military intelligence agency. Impact Nichols ’15 Tom Nichols, 16 May 2015, National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/heres-what-makes-rogue-nuclear-states-really-dangerous-12899 The stability of nuclear deterrence rests on a certain amount of predictability. Contrary to what most people believe or have seen in movies, the President of the United States cannot simply go berserk and personally order a nuclear strike. Nor can Vladimir Putin, for all his talk, merely open a briefcase and rain down nuclear hell. Orders must be transmitted through civilian and military channels designed specifically to prevent such a moment. And here we return to North Korea and Iran. We have no idea who really has the authority or the ability to launch nuclear weapons. We can’t even be certain who has custody of the actual bombs. We might have assumed, for example, that the order to use nuclear arms would have to pass from North Korea’s boy-king, Kim Jong-un, to his minister of defense. Since the minister of defense is now scattered in pieces all over a stadium in North Korea, we have to rethink that notion. And who really runs Iran? In theory, the Islamic Republic has a “president,” but real power resides in a cabal of old mullahs. If Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, who could say yes—or more important, no—to a nuclear strike? This will matter a great deal during a crisis. Whom do we watch for signs of impending attack? With whom do we communicate? The Kim family has a capricious tendency to vanish during times of tension; this is the exact opposite of how Americans approach foreign policy, where the president’s visibility and engagement is a sign of reassurance both to allies and enemies. Likewise, if we hear bellicose rhetoric from the Iranian mullahs but reassuring words from an Iranian president, whom do we believe? This is why it is so difficult to negotiate with rogue regimes, or to trust in their competence, if they are established nuclear powers. It’s bad enough that by their nature they seek to upend the international status quo; far worse is their own inability to define who makes vital decisions of war and peace. While we should resist preventive thinking, the opacity of these regimes during a crisis might make such a temptation overwhelming. If “who’s in charge?” becomes a pressing question, the preventive answer might be: “who cares?”	904,897
365,661	379,788	6 - APR - Proxy Wars AC	Currently, Saudi Arabia and Iran are locked in a power struggle with dire consequences for the region. Cliffe ‘20 Jeremy Cliffe, New Statesman, 8 January 2020, https://www.newstatesman.com/world/2020/01/iran-and-saudi-arabia-are-locked-cold-war-style-stand-situation-even-more-volatile In his 2016 book, The Iran Wars, Jay Solomon reported that “US intelligence officials describe Qasem Soleimani as a Persian version of Karla, the Soviet spymaster depicted in John le Carré’s Cold War novels”. “Like Karla,” the American journalist added, “Soleimani’s endgame has always been to blunt the West’s advances and to cement ties with Washington’s adversaries, using any means possible.” The observation sums up the significance of the leader of Iran’s elite Quds Force, who helped reshape the Middle East in the years before his killing by an American drone strike on 3 January. But it also evokes the parallels between the Cold War world and today’s Middle East, where Iran and Saudi Arabia face each other in a manner reminiscent of the US-Soviet stand-off. Like the two superpowers in the postwar years, Riyadh and Tehran they are split by a major ideological divide (Sunni versus Shia branches of Islam) and are relatively evenly matched economically and militarily. The parallels are not perfect. But they offer a reference point for the increasingly fragile geopolitics of the region. The Middle Eastern cold war resembles the original one in three important ways. First, it is fuelled by a blend of ideological conviction and brute power politics. Just as the Soviet Union was motivated by both Marxist dogma and Russian imperialism, similarly Iran’s network-building across the Middle East is about the quest to uphold Shia Islam, but also old Persian expansionism. Soleimani epitomised this blend of idealism and cynicism. The warlord was, as Solomon put it: “brutal or cunning, depending on what is required” and would do anything “to further the revolution”. Second, Iran and Saudi Arabia are both acting out of fear of encirclement, just as the US and the Soviet Union did. Tehran’s traumatising isolation during the Iran-Iraq War, in which most powers, including Saudi Arabia and America, backed Saddam Hussein, prompted it to invest in a chain of friendly militia forces and governments in its neighbourhood. The result, achieved in no small part thanks to Soleimani, is a “Shia crescent” curving from Yemen on the Gulf, through Iran and an increasingly Iran-influenced Iraq to the Iran-backed regime in Syria and Hezbollah in Lebanon. That has stirred Saudi fears that it will be isolated, raising tensions between the two powers. Third, the two regional powers fight through espionage, retaliatory provocations and proxies, just as America and the Soviets did in Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan. Ongoing wars in Yemen, Iraq and Syria have all led to Iran and Saudi Arabia taking rival sides (again, with Soleimani often central to the Iranian involvement). And in September 2019 drones bombed Abqaiq in Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest crude-oil processing plant; Iranian-backed rebels in Yemen claimed responsibility. Yet there are also crucial differences between the Iranian-Saudi stand-off and the Cold War. From the 1950s to the 1980s the US extended a crushing financial and military advantage over the Soviets thanks to its more functional model of society. Neither Iran nor Saudi Arabia enjoys such an advantage. Freedom House rates both “not free” and the Economist Intelligence Unit classified both as “authoritarian regimes”. Waiting for one side to outweigh the other so dramatically that the conflict dissolves is not an option. An even more important difference is that neither side has nuclear weapons – though Tehran was developing them until its attempts were paused by the now moribund 2015 nuclear deal, and Riyadh has flirted with the idea. Nukes stabilised the original Cold War by massively increasing the costs of a runaway escalation. Fortunately, withdrawing nearly all US military presence in the Persian Gulf would mend this instability for 3 reasons. First, is by reducing tensions with Iran. Jones ‘11 Jones 2011 (Toby Jones, assistant professor of history at Rutgers University. December 22, 2011. The Atlantic. “Don't Stop at Iraq: Why the U.S. Should Withdraw From the Entire Persian Gulf”, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/12/dont-stop-at-iraq-why-the-us-should-withdraw-from-the-entire-persian-gulf/250389/ . DOA: March 3, 2020.) ALP Led by Saudi Arabia, the Arab Gulf states claim that their fears of Iranian ambition are existential. It is certainly true that Tehran is locked in a regional balance of power struggle with Saudi Arabia and that Iran seeks greater influence. But Iran does not seek the destruction of Saudi Arabia or the overthrow of Arab world's political order. In spite of claims to the contrary by the Saudi and Bahraini governments, Iran's revolutionary imperative is a relic of the past. Israel expresses a similar anxiety about Iran as a security threat. And Iran's leaders have played their part in fostering Israeli uncertainty. Iran's potential acquisition of nuclear weapons is a source of concern, of course, as is its support for Hezbollah and Syria. The challenge of how best to deal with Iranian ambition, however, is mainly a political problem, one that has for too long been treated almost entirely through the lens of security and militarism. The presence of the American military in the Gulf has not only done little to deter Iran's ambitions, it has emboldened them. Surrounding Iran militarily and putting it under the constant threat of American or Israeli military action has failed to deter the country. Instead this approach has strengthened hardliners within Tehran and it convinced them that the best path to self-preservation is through defiance, militarism, and the pursuit of dangerous ties across the Middle East. The rivalry between Iran, the U.S., and its regional partners has turned into a political and military arms race, one that could easily spin out of control. Less obvious, the United States' military posture has also emboldened its allies, sometimes to act in counterproductive ways. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain justify their brutal crackdown of Bahrain's pro-democracy movement by falsely claiming Iranian meddling. While American policymakers support democratic transitions in the Middle East rhetorically, Us unwillingness to confront long-time allies in the Gulf during the Arab Spring is partly the product of the continued belief that the U.S. needs to keep its military in the Gulf, something that requires staying on good terms with Gulf monarchies. The result is that Saudi Arabia and its allies have considerable political cover to behave badly, both at home and abroad. AND US presence harms Iranian relations with the Saudis Panaite ’20 University of Miami – Scholarly Repository, 20 December 2017, Atena C. Panaite, https://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1717andcontext=oa_theses Threat perception revolves mainly around the United States and its policies towards Iran. Since the days of the Islamic Revolution, Tehran has considered the Western superpower to be its most vicious enemy. The large U.S. military presence in the Gulf is seen by Iranian policy makers as indicating hostility and intent to attack, and therefore prevents major strides that could be achieved in Iranian relations with the main regional ally of the Americans, Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia: The kingdom is the United States’ main regional ally, and thus falls under the “enemy” category. It is hard to imagine friendly relations between the two neighbors as long as Iranian-American relations remain tense; AND Empirics are on our side Parsi ‘20 (TRITA PARSI, Executive Vice President of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and Adjunct Associate Professor at Georgetown University. JANUARY 6, 2020. “The Middle East Is More Stable When the United States Stays Away,” Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/06/the-middle-east-is-more-stable-when-the-united-states-stays-away/. DOA: 3/22/20)AO Yet when U.S. President Donald Trump opted not to go to war with Iran after a series of Iranian-attributed attacks on Saudi Arabia last year and declared his intentions to pull troops out of the region, it wasn’t chaos or conquest that ensued. Rather, nascent regional diplomacy—particularly among Iran,and Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—and de-escalation followed. To be sure, the cards were reshuffled again in January, when Trump ordered the assassination of Qassem Suleimani, one of Iran’s most important military figures. Courtesy of Trump, the region is once more moving toward conflict, and the early signs of diplomatic progress achieved during the preceding months have vanished. It is thus time for Washington to answer a crucial question that it has long evaded: Has America’s military dominance in the Middle East has prevented regional actors from peacefully resolving conflicts on their own? And in that way, has it has been an impediment to stability rather than the guarantor of it Second, is by preventing Saudi Arabia from acting recklessly. Hazbun ‘19 (Waleed Hazbun, Richard L. Chambers Professor of Middle Eastern Studies in the Department of Political Science at the University of Alabama. March 2019. “In America’s Wake: Turbulence and Insecurity in the Middle East” POMEPS Studies. https://pomeps.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/POMEPS_Studies_34_Web.pdf. DOA: March 14 2020) SRW In the late 2000s, the large, militarily capable state of Turkey and the small, wealthy state of Qatar began to use their diverse ties to states across the emerging regional divides to play a larger diplomatic role and promote conflict management. Turkey emphasized open borders and regional economic integration while Qatar used diplomatic inventions and pan-Arab media to project influence at the regional level. The political turmoil resulting from the Arab Uprisings and the confused US reaction to them opened another opportunity for regional powers. Qatar and Turkey sought to promote generally compatible efforts to suggest a new basis for regional order drawing together newly elected governments and emerging Islamist political forces. Their more activist policies, however, soon entangled them in regional conflicts. Qatar supported military intervention in Libya while Turkey encouraged armed opposition in Syria. Rather than transforming the political landscape these actions contributed to political breakdown and territorial fragmentation. Their efforts collapsed in the face of the 2013 military coup in Egypt. More broadly, a Saudi-led counter-revolution sought to shore up authoritarian governments, expand domestic divisions along sectarian lines, and foster of civil wars in Syria, Yemen, and Libya. As Qatar scaled back its regional interventions, Turkey found its interests reorganized as the increasing autonomy of Kurdish actors, some backed by the US in an effort to contain ISIS, became its most pressing concern. While aligned with the US and benefiting from the US security umbrella anchored by its bases around in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have has attempted to organize the region through aggressive diplomatic and military interventions as well as financial support to allied regimes and proxies. Saudi Arabia has long sought to project regional influence, but its flows of cash, intelligence cooperation, and diplomacy have previously only had a marginal impact reshaping regional order. With the US under Obama no longer providing regional leadership, it’s policies diverged from Saudi priorities, such as allowing the fall of Mubarak in Egypt and negotiating a nuclear deal with Iran. Saudi Arabia (with UAE support) then sought to act as a regional hegemon though without the needed regional power and consent. They backed rebel factions in Syria and escalated the conflict. After their effort to manage the post-Uprising transition in Yemen failed, they launched, with US support, an ineffective war against the Houthi rebels, which has resulted in a humanitarian disaster. The Trump administration aligned itself more enthusiastically with the Saudi-UAE axis. Saudi efforts, despite this American support, have done little to establish a new regional order or contain Iranian influence. Rather than embracing Qatar’s post-2013 shift away from an activist regional policy and attempt to rebuild GCC consensus policymaking, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have repeatedly sought to coerce Qatar into accepting a subservient role, resulting in the total fragmentation of the Gulf Cooperation Council as a regional organization. In past decades the US often sought to restrain Israel’s most aggressive actions and/or worked to re-stabilize regional politics in their aftermath. Closer Saudi strategic alignment with Israel and backing by the US president Trump has resulted in less restraint on regional actions. This posture sets up a context for continuing instability and a greater likelihood of conflict and escalation. AND withdrawing US presence can promote a shift towards diplomacy Parsi ‘20 Trita Parsi, Foreign Policy, 6 January 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/06/the-middle-east-is-more-stable-when-the-united-states-stays-away/ Instead, recognizing that the U.S. military was no longer at their disposal, Saudi Arabia and the UAE began exercising diplomacy the diplomatic options that had always been available to them. For its part, Saudi Arabia stepped up direct talks with Houthi rebels in Yemen as a way to ease tensions with their backer, Iran. The level of violence on both sides declined as a result, and more than 100 prisoners of war were released. In November, the United Nations’ Yemen envoy, Martin Griffiths, reported there was an 80 percent reduction in Saudi-led airstrikes, and there were no Yemeni deaths in the previous two weeks. AND US presence increases the length of conflict Bapat ’10 Navin Bapat (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill). Transnational Terrorism, U.S. Military Aid, and the Incentive to Misrepresent. Accessed 11/23/2016. Published 8/3/2010. KZ https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Navin_Bapat/publication/227574734_Transnational_Terrorism_US_Military_Aid_and_the_Incentive_to_Misrepresent/links/0c96052616f8ac6f3a000000.pdf If we use the instrumental variable model to compare the mean duration until a group collapses, we see that when the instrument is equal to .39, signifying no military aid, the predicted duration until a group collapses is 4.69 years. However, when the instrument is increased to its mean of .61, indicating thatwhen the U.S. is providing military assistance, the predicted duration of the conflict increases to 7.82 years, which is a 67 increase. We therefore see that consistent with Hypothesis 1, U.S. military aid seems to prolong the existence of terrorists, which can be explained by the lucrative nature of having an active terrorist campaign in the post 9/11 era. Third, is by reviving Arab State alliances. Ashford ‘18 (Emma Ashford, research fellow in Defense and Foreign Policy at the Cato Institute. Spring 2018. Strategic Studies Quarterly. “Unbalanced: Rethinking America’s Commitment to the Middle East”, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26333880 . DOA: March 4, 2020.) ALP Yet perhaps the biggest problem is the fact that American predominance in the region prevents states from balancing or bandwagoning in the face of threats, as they would do in the absence of US presence. As many scholars have noted, the Middle East has typically exhibited “underbalancing,” meaning that states that might be expected to form alliances have rarely done so. The most obvious example is the antiIranian axis of Turkey, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, but the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has also repeatedly failed to build joint military infrastructure. The recent GCC crisis between Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates likewise suggests that these states prioritize ideological factors over security concerns. As long as the United States continues to act as a regional security guarantor, theory suggests that ideological factors will continue to inhibit alliances.47 In fact, though the Obama‘s administration’s pivot away from the Middle East was more rhetoric than reality, it did encourage tentative attempts to build better regional alliances. Private rapprochement and cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Israel on the issue of Iran has been growing. The two countries disagree on a variety of issues, the most problematic of which is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Yet when retired top Saudi and Israeli officials spoke about the issue at a 2016 forum in Washington, DC, they were keen to highlight that cooperation is possible even if these issues go unresolved.48 The two states regularly hold informal meetings on security issues. Even the relative lack of criticism expressed by the Gulf States during the 2006 Israeli war against Hezbollah may be indicative of shifting opinion within the region.49 In providing security guarantees and by acting as a third party cutout, US involvement inhibits these developing ties. AND Arab State alliances are critical Gause ‘17 (F. Gregory Gause, Head of the International Affairs Department at Texas AandM University, focused on the international politics of the Middle East. June 12, 2017. Cambridge University Press. “Ideologies, Alignments, and Underbalancing in the New Middle East Cold War”, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/ps-political-science-and-politics/article/ideologies-alignments-and-underbalancing-in-the-new-middle-east-cold-war/739C0AB7ACDAD0E8ADE7D36C3CD37AA6 . DOA: March 11, 2020.) The pattern of alliances and alignments in the Middle East following the Arab uprisings challenges established theories of regional international relations (IR) in intriguing ways (Gause 2014; see also Lynch 2016; Ryan 2012; Salloukh 2013). One notable element of current regional geopolitics is the failure of other local powers to form effective blocking or balancing alliances against Iran, the state that has most clearly improved its regional position as a result of upheavals that go back to the 2003 Iraq War. Even as they fail to form new alliances, however, regional actors are taking steps domestically to increase their military power and cultivating non-state actors to increase their regional influence. This “underbalancing” (Schweller 2004, 2006) in terms of stateto-state alignment is best explained not by sectarianism or balance of power logic but rather by a variant of Walt’s (1987) balance-of-threat framework that emphasizes ideology and domestic-regime security issues. Explaining these patterns, therefore, requires grappling with constructivist theories of identity, the drivers of regime insecurity, and the relative importance of state-to-state and transnational policies. Efforts by other regional powers to challenge Iranian gains have largely failed, whether Turkish and Saudi support for the Syrian opposition (although different elements of it), Saudi financing of the March 14 coalition in Lebanon and military aid to the Lebanese government (now cut off ), or half-hearted Saudi efforts to challenge Iran’s influence in Iraq. The Saudi–Emirati military campaign in Yemen against the Huthis succeeded in pushing them out of the southern part of the country but not (as of March 2017) out of San’a, the capital. Iran certainly has problems. Its Syrian ally is an increasing burden and will be for some time. Lower oil prices hurt Iran more than the Saudis because Tehran does not have the financial cushion that Riyadh built during recent years of high oil prices. However, it is difficult to argue with the fact that Iran is the regional state that gained the most from changes that commenced with the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. AND Iran seeks to create instability in the GCC because they know they are outmatched militarily Pieters ‘20 Journal of International Relations, 10 January 2020, http://www.sirjournal.org/blogs/2020/1/10/gulf-security-in-the-face-of-irans-challenges Hybrid and asymmetrical warfare are especially effective for states who are overmatched by the conventional forces of their foes, as is the case for Iran when facing the modern militaries of the GCC. Iran poses a credible security, military, and intelligence threat through its use of proxy groups, its ballistic and cruise missiles and its distributed naval firepower which utilizes small boats and fast attack capabilities, and its intelligence capabilities thtrough the channels of its Quds force. Iranian strategy combines using propaganda, funding and arming proxy groups throughout the region, while avoiding direct conflict, to deter regional actors and ensure its freedom of action in the region. GCC states have numerous advantages over Iran with their modern and efficient weapon systems to include modern airframes and missile defense systems, their ability to significantly outspend Iran on military hardware, and their allies like the United States and Europe. Despite these advantages, However, Iran’s strategy of creating GCC instability and breaking up GCC unity has proven to be effective in the cases of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, and Oman, Kuwait and Qatar. While Iran poses credible asymmetric threats to the GCC and its allies, perhaps its most dangerous capability is the slow burn of the political threat to member states of the GCC. If Iran continues to break up GCC unity, this could very well pose an existential threat, making the future of the GCC, non-existent. AND US presence prevents diplomacy Pradhan ’11 Pradhan, P. K. (2011). The GCC–Iran Conflict and its Strategic Implications for the Gulf Region. Strategic Analysis, 35(2), 265–276. https://sci-hub.tw/https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09700161.2011.542923?scroll=topandneedAccess=true The problems between the GCC countries and Iran are deep seated but there is little evidence of any serious efforts being made towards reconciliation. This means that the prospects for rapprochement remain bleak. The clash of interests and the scramble for influence in the region and the lack of mutual trust have not allowed an amicable solution of the situation. The presence of the US in the region has been the major point of conflict. AND regional organizations like the GCC are much better than outside actors at diplomacy Velasco ‘13 Univ. of Central Florida, https://stars.library.ucf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3701andcontext=etd The most significant outcome is that when accounting for all other variables, regional organizations are 6.728 times more likely to craft an agreement that is not broken for at least 5 years.95 The return of significance on regional organizations with the addition of the other variables not only reinforces hypothesis 2. It also reinforces the theory in general. AND both agree that diplomacy is the only way to solve the conflict Alrefai ‘19 Alrefai, Eyad. June 17 2019. “Diplomacy is the key: How Iran, Saudi could bring stability to Middle East.” Business Standard. https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/diplomacy-is-the-key-how-iran-saudi-could-bring-stability-to-middle-east-119061700218_1.html Direct dialogue between the two regional actors could launch negotiations that may lead to more stability in the region. The existing regional turmoil has had a detrimental impact on relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran over Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain and Yemen. The Yemen war, which has caused a dramatic humanitarian crisis, remains one of the main areas of conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran, but it also offers ground for talks between the two states. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran agree that the conflicts in Yemen and Syria can only be ended through the implementation of political, rather than military, solutions. If Saudi Arabia and Iran can take steps toward political compromises in Syria and Yemen, this subsequently will reflect positively on the trust building process. While Saudi Arabia relies on its strategic Western allies and its ever-increasing military expenditure, Iran, which has been isolated by the US, prefers a more regional approach. Indeed, Saudi Arabia may have to ignore US protests to sit down at the negotiating table with Iran. The impact is stability. The Saudi-Iran conflict has destroyed the Middle East Fisher ‘16 Fisher, Max. Nov 19 2016. “How the Iranian-Saudi Proxy Struggle Tore Apart the Middle East.” https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/20/world/middleeast/iran-saudi-proxy-war.html Behind much of the Middle East’s chaos — the wars in Syria and Yemen, the political upheaval in Iraq and Lebanon and Bahrain — there is another conflict. Saudi Arabia and Iran are waging a struggle for dominance that has have turned much of the Middle East into their battlefield. Rather than fighting directly, they wield and in that way worsen the region’s direst problems: dictatorship, militia violence and religious extremism. The history of their rivalry tracks — and helps to explain — the Middle East’s disintegration, particularly the Sunni-Shiite sectarianism both powers have found useful to cultivate. It is a story in which the United States has been a supporting but constant player, most recently by backing the Saudi war in Yemen, which kills hundreds of civilians. These dynamics, scholars warn, point toward a future of civil wars, divided societies and unstable governments. Asked when the Iran-Saudi struggle might cool, Mr. Pollack said he doubted that it would: “Where we’re headed with the Middle East is the current trend extrapolated, with more failed and failing governments.” AND it has caused proxy wars across the region Ali ‘18 Ali, Sumana. Sept 23 2018. “The Result of Saudi-Iranian Proxy War: The Worst Man-made Humanitarian Crisis.” https://www.lavocedinewyork.com/en/un/2018/09/23/the-result-of-saudi-iranian-proxy-war-the-worst-man-made-humanitarian-crisis/ Yemen is being devastated by the proxy war between the Saudi-UAE-US-UK-led coalition and Iran-backed Houthi rebels. Millions of Yemeni civilians are starving, not receiving adequate health care and living in fear of the next airstrike. Despite the well-known circumstances, no action has been taken to end this embarrassing crisis. Yemen, which is the poorest country on the Arabian Peninsula, has been devastated by war, famine, and mass destruction of infrastructure due to the proxy war between the Saudi-UAE-US-UK-led coalition and Iran-backed Houthi rebels. Approximately 3.5 million Yemeni civilians are in critical need of food and humanitarian aid. This Saudi-Iranian conflict in Yemen has resulted in mass starvation, destruction of clean water supply, Cholera outbreak, malnourished children, displaced civilians, and the death of over ten thousands civilians. Since 2015, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), approximately 22.2 million people were in need of life-saving assistance like food, safe water, nutritional support, and basic medical care. Doctors without Borders reported that Yemen’s health care system collapsed and over half of the country’s medical facilities were closed. Many others are unable to provide care due to being damaged by airstrikes or lacking in medical personnel and supplies. Airstrikes, landmines, and snipers are often preventing civilians from seeking medical help, leading to deaths from preventable diseases. Since the airstrikes have destroyed clean water supplies, there have been 101,475 cases of Cholera, the largest cholera epidemic in the world. UNICEF reports that every ten minutes, one child in Yemen dies from malnutrition. Yemeni children, most of whom are malnourished, die from diseases that could be prevented by mere vaccination. This isn’t a new trend, as the Saudi-Iranian conflict has led to devastating proxy wars in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Morocco, Lebanon, and Bahrain. Almost in every conflict in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia and Iran back groups fighting each other and make matters worse. This decades-old rivalry between Saudis and Iranians have led to conflicts in almost every major Muslim country in the world. AND this will ravate the region in the long term Fisher ‘16 Fisher, Max. Nov 19 2016. “How the Iranian-Saudi Proxy Struggle Tore Apart the Middle East.” https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/20/world/middleeast/iran-saudi-proxy-war.html Behind much of the Middle East’s chaos — the wars in Syria and Yemen, the political upheaval in Iraq and Lebanon and Bahrain — there is another conflict. Saudi Arabia and Iran are waging a struggle for dominance that has have turned much of the Middle East into their battlefield. Rather than fighting directly, they wield and in that way worsen the region’s direst problems: dictatorship, militia violence and religious extremism. The history of their rivalry tracks — and helps to explain — the Middle East’s disintegration, particularly the Sunni-Shiite sectarianism both powers have found useful to cultivate. It is a story in which the United States has been a supporting but constant player, most recently by backing the Saudi war in Yemen, which kills hundreds of civilians. These dynamics, scholars warn, point toward a future of civil wars, divided societies and unstable governments. Asked when the Iran-Saudi struggle might cool, Mr. Pollack said he doubted that it would: “Where we’re headed with the Middle East is the current trend extrapolated, with more failed and failing governments.” AND Middle Eastern peace is impossible without reconciliation Fraihat ‘16 Fraihat, Ibrahim. May 30 2016. Foreign Affairs. “Keeping Iran and Saudi Arabia From War.” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2016-05-30/keeping-iran-and-saudi-arabia-war Conflicts in the Middle East, whether in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, or Yemen, share a common factor: the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia. For years, this rivalry has inflamed violence in areas already torn by war and created new battlefields where there had been relative peace before. It is thus hard to imagine that the two countries could come together for the region’s greater good. But they’ll Saudi and Iran will have to find a way to coexist if the region is ever to be peaceful. Even if they can’t fully resolve their rivalry, they can still contain their hostility. Making this happen will be a challenge, but both sides can take steps now that will help bring the Middle East back from the brink of destruction.	904,890
365,662	379,810	0 - Contact Info	Andrew Pribe - Negative Final Focuser [email protected] Daniel Beck - Affirmative Final Focuser [email protected]	904,912
365,663	379,897	Belt and Road Affirmative v3 - Bronx Science	==Contention 1 is Western Europe== ====The world is looking to Germany as recession looms and their decision holds the fate of the world in it. Schumacher indicated on September 16 that:==== Elizabeth Schumacher, 9-16-2019, A German recession made with American parts, Boston Globe, https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2019/09/16/german-recession-made-with-american-parts/MMcb6eH26Awy7KUs5ewZ5L/story.html, Date Accessed 9-18-2019 // JM Much has justifiably been made of President Trump's blustering, bullying approach to trade policy AND is going to pull the rest of the developed world down with it. ====Unfortunately, Germany is a part of the last half of Europe who hasn't joined the BRI. Meyenberg indicates in 2019 joining the BRI is absolutely crucial for the rest of Europe – they argue that:==== Imko Meyenburg, 9-10-2019, Eight charts that explain why Germany could be heading for recession, https://theconversation.com/eight-charts-that-explain-why-germany-could-be-heading-for-recession-123284, Date Accessed 9-12-2019 // JM Germany is a big contributor to the economic performance of the euro area and EU AND Hopefully this investment will not come too late to avoid a prolonged recession. ====Merkel knows the economic power the BRI has – Wang Jiamei wrote in 2019 that:==== Wang Jiamei, Global Times, 4-2-2019, "German business enthusiasm for Belt and Road Initiative to prompt pragmatism from Berlin available online at: http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1144461.shtml, Date Accessed 9-8-2019 // CDM German business circles have shown growing enthusiasm toward the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI AND marine transportation and other areas," said the communique, according to Xinhua. ====Voting affirmative means Germany joins the BRI and arguably takes the lead in reframing the Eurozone ecnomy as Brzeski wrote THIS WEEK that:==== Bert Colijn, Carsten Brzeski, 10-15-2019, "A Eurozone recession silver lining needs to come from Berlin," ING Think, https://think.ing.com/articles/eurozone-recession-berlin-merkel-economy-germany/, Date Accessed 10-18-2019 // JM The R-word is haunting Europe again. The German economy might already be AND turn into fuel for a eurozone break-up debate in core countries. ====There are two unique benefits to a German economic recovery through the BRI. First, Germany economic recovery ensures European recovery. Ewing writes in August that:==== Jack Ewing, 8-16-2019, Germany Has Powered Europe's Economy. What Happens When Its Engine Stalls?, New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/16/business/eu-economy-germany-recession.html, Date Accessed 9-12-2019 // JM When a debt crisis slammed the eurozone nearly a decade ago, Germany's powerhouse economy AND Krämer, the chief economist at Commerzbank. "There is no decoupling." ====A EU recession would be huge as it would inherently affect many other nations as John Maulding writes in 2018 that==== John Mauldin, 12-8-2018, "Why Europe Has No Control Over Its Future," Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnmauldin/2019/01/22/why-europe-has-no-control-over-its-future/, Date Accessed 7-25-2019 // WS If Europe goes into recession, it will have a profound impact on the world AND the Fed or U.S. government could speed up the process. ====The impact of preventing this recession is massive as Harry Bradford writes that the next==== Harry Bradford, 4-5-2013, "Three Times The Population Of The U.S. Is At Risk Of Falling Into Poverty," HuffPost, span class="skimlinks-unlinked"https://www.huffpost.com/entry/global-poverty-900-million-economic-shock_n_3022420/span, Date Accessed 7-28-2019 // WS Economic Shock Could Throw 900 Million People Into Poverty, IMF Study Warns A recent AND That figure is three times the size of the U.S. population ====Second, a German economic rebound ensures a stronger NATO. Guy Chazen indicates in 2018 that:==== Guy Chazen, 4-27-2018, "Germany to miss Nato defence spending pledge," Financial Times, https://www.ft.com/content/542495ae-4a28-11e8-8ee8-cae73aab7ccb, Date Accessed 9-18-2019 // JM As the US turns inward, Germany is also showing more willingness to take on AND the Bundeswehr in the "best possible" manner, but lacks detail. ====Blocking an assertive Russia in the Baltics is key to protect 6.6 million Europeans – Roblin explains that:==== Sebastien Roblin, 5-6-2019, "This Is Where Russia and NATO Could Start a War (And You Likely Never Heard Of It)", National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/where-russia-and-nato-could-start-war-and-you-likely-never-heard-it-56147, Date Accessed 9-18-2019 // JM The Soviet Union seized the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania early in AND be unwilling to risk nuclear war to liberate already-conquered Baltic states. ==Contention 2 is a Free Trade Area== ====Tristan Kohl writes this year that right now China==== Tristan Kohl, 1-14-2019, "Belt and Road Initiative's effect on supply-chain trade: evidence from structural gravity equations," OUP Academic, https://academic.oup.com/cjres/article/12/1/77/5289371, Date Accessed 9-11-2019 // WS While China already participates in trade agreements with countries in southern Asia, it does AND for trade and welfare is provided in Tables A2 and A3, respectively. ====Thankfully the BRI will results in a New Free Trade Agreement signed between China and the EU as Julien Chaisse further last month that the BRI has:==== Julien Chaisse, 9-2-19, "China's 'Belt andandnbsp;Road' Initiative: its strategic, trade, and fiscal implications," https://researchoutreach.org/articles/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-its-strategic-trade-and-fiscal-implications/, Date Accessed 10-3-2019 // WS The 'Belt and Road Initiative' (BRI) aims to create the infrastructure necessary to AND be achieved across the many nations requisite to its construction and ultimate success. ====This is massive as Matteo Bressan quantifies this year that ==== Matteo Bressan, 3-4-19, "Opportunities and challenges for BRI in Europe-Belt and Road Portal," https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/ghsl/wksl/84696.htm, Date Accessed 7-6-2019 // WS Although lagging other countries, Italy is playing a leading role in the China- AND ) may contribute to overcoming the region's traditionally peripheral economic position in Europe. ====Empirics show that trade between BRI countries and China increased with FTAs as Jeppe finds,==== Jeppe Saarinen, 03-04-2019, "China-Chile FTA Upgraded, New Opportunities for Investors," China Briefing, https://www.china-briefing.com/news/china-chile-fta-upgraded-market-opportunities-investors/, Date Accessed 10-16-2019 // SMV Bilateral trade between China and Chile reached US$42.8 billion in 2018 AND how effectively the FTA has worked to promote trade between the two countries. ====This trade is critical for an economy rebound in Europe. Cosmo Beverelli for the World Trade Organization quantifies that ==== Cosmo Beverelli, 2011, "ARE YOU EXPERIENCED? SURVIVAL AND RECOVERY OF TRADE RELATIONS AFTER BANKING CRISES" https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201103_e.pdf , Date Accessed 10-3-19 //WS In Table 7, all estimates are expressed in terms of hazard ratios. In AND the experience coefficient remains unchanged, the coefficient of size becomes slightly smaller. ====This is because The World Bank finds that Countries that trade more==== The World Bank, 4-3-2018, "Stronger Open Trade Policies Enable Economic Growth for All," World Bank, https://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2018/04/03/stronger-open-trade-policies-enables-economic-growth-for-all, Date Accessed 8-14-2019 // WS Trade is central to ending global poverty. Countries that are open to international trade AND global trading system that is more open, reliable and predictable for all.	905,076
365,664	379,895	Belt and Road Affirmative v1 - Peachtree Ridge	==Contention 1: Poverty Reduction== ====Chen Yingqun indicated at the end of August that: ==== Chen Yingqun, 8-28-2019, "Europe may face economic setbacks," https://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/europe-may-face-economic-setbacks/, Date Accessed 8-30-2019 // JM Europe is edging toward a crisis, as several of its largest economies face recession AND sustainable," he said. "European countries will have to make changes." ====And unfortunately nothing internally can resolve this as Yusuf Khan indicated in August that: ==== Yusuf Khan, 8-10-2019, "Three of Europe's biggest economies are probably in recession — and the ECB is out of bullets," Markets Insider, https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/germany-italy-uk-are-headed-for-recession-and-ecb-is-out-of-tools-2019-8-1028435638, Date Accessed: 8-28-2019 // EE Can the ECB do anything to save this mess? Not really. The European AND a stimulus to Europe. As a result, Europe looks pretty stuck. ====Fortunately, joining the BRI provides the economic stimulus that the EU needs in two ways. First, provides market stability. Toumert Ai indicated in August that:==== Toumert Ai, 8-11-2019, "A new world economy on the horizon with BRI serving as an opening alternative,"http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1161079.shtml, Date Accessed 8-27-2019 // JM The BRI premise is linking economies through smart investment in infrastructure, finance and logistics AND . And this time there would be no nation or economy left undamaged. ====Second, gives the EU an opportunity to enhance their own economic development strategies – Le Corre argued in 2018 that:==== Philippe Le Corre, October 2018, China's Rise as a Geoeconomic Influencer: Four European Case Studies, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/WP_LeCorre_China_Final_Web.pdf, Date Accessed 8-28-19 // JM As China becomes a global actor with ambitions beyond the geoeconomic sphere, the rest AND region137 and create more jobs and growth in the key sectors of tomorrow. ====Amighini indicates that stability and new routes provided through the BRI decreased trade times. She writes:==== Alessia A. Amighini, 2-3-2018, "Beyond Ports and Transport Infrastructure: The Geo-Economic Impact of the BRI on the European Union," SpringerLink, https://link-springer-com.proxy.swarthmore.edu/chapter/10.1007/978-981-10-7116-4_14, Date Accessed 7-14-2019 // DF What has been partly overlooked in the design of the EU TEN -T corridors AND statistics on the reduction in travel time and cost expected from project completion. ====Decreased trade times materialize in export specialization. Nadia Rocha wrote in 2019 that:==== Nadia Rocha, 1-28-2019, "Hurry up! How the Belt and Road Initiative changes trade times and trade," World Bank Blogs, https://blogs.worldbank.org/trade/hurry-how-belt-and-road-initiative-changes-trade-times-and-trade, Date Accessed 8-28-2019 // JM 1. The BRI transportation infrastructure will boost intra-regional trade. The impact AND range between 0.8 and 42.6 percent (figure 3). ====Export specialization reduces poverty in two ways. First, it would generate enough economic growth to reverse recession trends to prevent NEW individuals from being pushed into poverty. Plumper indicates that:==== Thomas Plumper and Michael Graff, "Export Specialization and Economic Growth", Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Winter, 2001), pp. 661-688, https://www.jstor.org/stable/4177405, Date Accessed 8-31-2019 // JM The empirical estimations presented in this paper support some hypotheses of 'new' trade theory as AND industrialized country is about 2 percent, this is not a negligible effect. ====Preventing this recession becomes the LARGEST priority for the debate as John Maulding indicated in 2019 that:==== John Mauldin, 1-22-2019, "Why Europe Has No Control Over Its Future," Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnmauldin/2019/01/22/why-europe-has-no-control-over-its-future/, Date Accessed 7-25-2019 // WS Nick's implication is disturbing. Europe is helpless. It will continue circling the drain AND the Fed or U.S. government could speed up the process. ====And as a result, Robert Evans writes that as a result of the last major recession ==== Robert Evans, 7-6-2009, "Recession adds 6 percent to ranks of global poor: U.N.," U.S., https://www.reuters.com/article/us-financial-poverty/recession-adds-6-percent-to-ranks-of-global-poor-u-n-idUSTRE56502P20090706, Date Accessed 6-13-2019 // WS - Economic recession has reversed a 20-year decline in world poverty and is AND Geneva by U.N. Secretary- General Ban Ki-moon. ====Second, it lifts people already in poverty OUT of food-based poverty traps. Vincent indicates that:==== Dr. Vincent, 9-27-2018, "New models of cooperation are essential for developing agricultural prosperity amongst BRI countries," No Publication, http://www.fao.org/china/news/detail-events/en/c/1155691/, Date Accessed 8-28-2019 // JM The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is an ambitious initiative, sparking a AND enterprises on topics relating to agricultural technology, investment and e-commerce. ====By providing jobs and food security, BRI lifts people out of poverty especially in poorer Eastern European nations. Richard Adams quantifies that:==== Richard H. Adams Jr, 4-1-2016, "Economic Growth, Inequality, and Poverty: Findings from a New Data Set," https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=636334, Date Accessed 8-13-2019 // WS Since income distributions are relatively stable over time, economic growth – in the sense AND such as Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa.	905,074
365,665	379,907	Belt and Road Affirmative v1 - Holy Cross	==Contention 1 is the EU's Economy== ====In the world of Brexit, the EU's financial state is extremely fragile as the next budget framework is being crafted. Piotr Arak indicated on September 13 that: ==== Piotr Arak, 9-13-2019, "As recession looms, Europe needs more spending", EU Observer, https://euobserver.com/opinion/145867, Date Accessed 9-22-2019 // JM Brexit may have another victim and it is the ~~next~~ EU budget for AND we must develop in order to keep up with China and the US. ====Unfortunately, this framework has huge cuts to agriculture as a result of a hurt economy – the European Commission explains that:==== European Commission, "Fact check on the EU budget," The European Commission, Europa, https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/eu-budget/how-it-works/fact-check_en, Date Accessed: 9-26-2019 // EE In 2017, the share of EU spending on farming was 41. In 1985 AND . This means that EU spending replaces national expenditure to a large extent. ====Funding for the CAP is crucial as The European Commission quantifies that:==== The European Commission, Date Accessed: 9-26-2019, "Germany," https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/food-farming-fisheries/by_country/documents/cap-in-your-country-de_en.pdf // EE The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is Europe's answer to the need for a AND EUR 99.58 billion for Rural Development (the socalled Second Pillar). ====The impact to this impending budgetary crisis is that the economy depends on the CAP. The European Commission indicates, ==== European Commission, 11-29-2019 "The Future of Food and Farming," https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/sites/agriculture/files/future-of-cap/future_of_food_and_farming_communication_en.pdf Date Accessed: 9/26/2019 // EE The EU's farm sector and rural areas are major players in terms of the Union's AND while serving as~~are~~ major bases for employment, recreation and tourism ====Luckily joining the BRI allows the EU more economic capability to make a better budget framework as LeCorre writes that:==== Philippe Le Corre, October 2018, China's Rise as a Geoeconomic Influencer: Four European Case Studies, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/WP_LeCorre_China_Final_Web.pdf, Date Accessed 8-28-19 // JM As China becomes a global actor with ambitions beyond the geoeconomic sphere, the rest AND region137 and create more jobs and growth in the key sectors of tomorrow. ====This new infrastructure reduces trade times. Alessia Amighini indicates:==== Alessia A. Amighini, 2-3-2018, "Beyond Ports and Transport Infrastructure: The Geo-Economic Impact of the BRI on the European Union," SpringerLink, https://link-springer-com.proxy.swarthmore.edu/chapter/10.1007/978-981-10-7116-4_14, Date Accessed 7-14-2019 // DF What has been partly overlooked in the design of the EU TEN -T corridors AND statistics on the reduction in travel time and cost expected from project completion. ====Matteo Bressan quantifies this year that as a result of these new and improved trade routes ==== Matteo Bressan, 3-4-19, "Opportunities and challenges for BRI in Europe-Belt and Road Portal," No Publication, https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/ghsl/wksl/84696.htm, Date Accessed 7-6-2019 // WS Although lagging other countries, Italy is playing a leading role in the China- AND ) may contribute to overcoming the region's traditionally peripheral economic position in Europe. ====This trade is important for economic growth as The World Bank finds that Countries that trade more==== The World Bank, 4-3-2018, "Stronger Open Trade Policies Enable Economic Growth for All," World Bank, https://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2018/04/03/stronger-open-trade-policies-enables-economic-growth-for-all, Date Accessed 8-14-2019 // WS Trade is central to ending global poverty. Countries that are open to international trade AND a global trading system that is more open, reliable and predictable for all ==Contention 2 is Russia == ====Member states in the EU are pushing for more sanctions against Russia unfortunately its not so easy to pass. Gabriela Baczynska explained in 2019 that:==== Gabriela Baczynska, 6-20-2019, 'EU agrees to extend economic sanctions on Russia until 2020," https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-summit-russia-ukraine/eu-to-extend-economic-sanctions-on-russia-until-2020-idUSKCN1TL1I4, Date Accessed 9-22-2019 // JM The EU's Russia hawks, Poland and Lithuania, are among those pushing~~push AND that Russia releases the Ukrainian servicemen "unconditionally", their joint statement read. ====And it's not getting easier — Nasos Koukakis explained this week that as a result of attacks on the Saudi oil fields, there could be:==== Nasos Koukakis, 9-16-2019, "Saudi attacks could push European oil supply closer to Russia," CNBC Markets, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/16/saudi-attacks-could-push-european-oil-supply-closer-to-russia.html, Date Accessed 9-17-2019 // JM Although Europe's energy dependence on Saudi Arabia is very small, the effects of a AND been built at much lower prices in relation to current international oil prices. ====This underlies the key issue – the more the EU is dependent on Russian energy, the less likely they are to sanction Russian behavior. Collins indicates that this:==== Gabriel Collins, 7-18-2017, "Russia's Use of the 'Energy Weapon' in Europe", Baker Institute at Rice University, https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/ac785a2b/BI-Brief-071817-CES_Russia1.pdf, Date Accessed 8-31-2019 // JM The current dataset lacks information on the most critical potential scenario for energy security planners AND further weakening Western Europe's resolve to take such measures in a timely fashion. ====That's important because sanctions are used to curb Russian aggression – Nigel Gould-Davies argues in 2018 that:==== Nigel Gould-Davies, 8-22-2018, "Sanctions on Russia Are Working," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2018-08-22/sanctions-russia-are-working, Date Accessed 9-22-2019 // JM Nor have sanctions proved counterproductive. Some have argued that sanctions play into Russian President AND If anything, sanctions have been used too little, not too much. ====Easing Putin's ability to be aggressive is extremely problematic as he's ramping up ability to attack in the Balkins as Cipa found THIS WEEK that:==== Akri Cipa, 9-20-2019, "EU and US Must Counter Russia and China's Presence in the Balkans," The Globe Post, https://theglobepost.com/2019/09/20/russia-china-balkans/, Date Accessed 9-22-2019 // JM After the catastrophic and traumatic wars of the 1990s, the Balkans experienced two decades AND come from China, which is also expanding its influence in the region. ====And a war in the Balkins would kill millions. Colin Drury explains in 2017 that:==== Colin Drury, 3-30-2017, "What Would Happen if Russia and Europe Went to War?," VICE, https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/4xe5a3/what-would-happen-if-russia-and-europe-went-to-war, Date Accessed 9-22-2019 // JM But peace is not inevitable. If you think Europe can't descend into a bar AND here really does hang by threads. Maybe go out and play more. ====Thankfully, joining the BRI alleviates energy dependence on Russia. Conrad argues that:==== Bjorn Conrad and Genia Kostka, February 2017, "Chinese investments in Europe's energy sector: Risks and opportunities?", Energy Policy, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421516306711, Date Accessed 8-31-2019 // JM Europe's economic order is based on the principle of economic openness and the ?rm belief AND relationships and a long-term partnership (Gippner and Torney, 2017). ====And re-orienting the energy sector from Russia to China is attractive for the EU as Wu indicated in August that:==== Wenyuan Wu, 8-24-2019, "Will Europe Ever Shake Its Dependence On Russian Energy?," https://finance.yahoo.com/news/europe-ever-shake-dependence-russian-170000966.html, Date Accessed 9-22-2019 // JM In contrast to Russia's targeted approach, Chinese energy investment in Europe is more expansive AND countries as an outgrowth of the strategic Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).	905,085
365,666	379,892	Kentucky - Belt and Road Negative v1	====The most important thing in this debate are human rights. Kenan Malik finds in March that==== Kenan Malik, 3-10-2019, "Human rights mean nothing unless we defend real, threatened people," Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/mar/10/human-rights-mean-nothing-unless-we-defend-real-threatened-people, Date Accessed: 9-15-19 // MN In talking of the "right to have rights", Arendt was not suggesting that AND human and nothing but", we make all our rights more fragile still. ====Meaning you must vote for whoever protects human rights best, as Michael Posner finds in 2018==== Michael Posner, 12-9-2018, "Why We Should Care About Human Rights: The Universal Declaration Of Human Rights At 70," Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelposner/2018/12/09/why-we-should-care-about-human-rights-the-universal-declaration-of-human-rights-at-70/~~#39c46ed84db0, Date Accessed: 9-5-19 // MN It also internationalized responsibility for protecting rights. Prior to World War II, governments AND , diabolical leaders were subjecting their people to mass violence and even genocide. ==Our Sole Contention in Human Rights== ====The BRI represents a geopolitical danger as Alek Chance writes in 2016 that the BRI is==== Alek Chance, November 2016, "American Perspectives on the Belt and Road Initiative," https://chinaus-icas.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/American-Perspectives-on-the-Belt-and-Road-Initiative.pdf, Date Accessed 8-14-2019 // WS American observers have taken note of certain discussions in China regarding the strategic implications of AND agendas within China, some of which may influence its course in the future ====Thorsten Benner continues in 2018 that==== Thorsten Benner and Thomas Wright, 4-5-18, "Testimony to U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission", https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/wrightbennerchinatransatlanticrelations.pdf, Date Accessed 8-14-2019 // WS The second related goal is to weaken Western unity, both within Europe and across AND Western liberal democracies face from the rise of illiberal-authoritarian political movements. ====The EU joining the BRI will result in massive Chinese influence throughout Europe in two ways. First, it allows China to re-shape norms. Andrea Taylor writes in August that:==== Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Rachel Rizzo, 8-12-2019, "The U.S. or China? Europe Needs to Pick a Side," POLITICO Magazine, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/08/12/us-china-europe-relations-227614, Date Accessed 8-12-2019 // WS China is a close and important partner for Europe; the two sides trade roughly AND on geopolitical issues like Taiwan and the militarization of the South China Sea. ====Second, BRI allows China to influence key EU policies. Erik Brattberg indicates in 2018 that the BRI:==== Erik Brattberg, Etienne Soula, 10-19-2018, "Europe's Emerging Approach to China's Belt and Road Initiative," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/10/19/europe-s-emerging-approach-to-china-s-belt-and-road-initiative-pub-77536, Date Accessed 7-15-2019 // WS Some of these activities have provided China with a political foothold enabling it to influence AND trade practices and investing in key industries, sensitive technologies, and infrastructure." ====Taylor empirically showed in August that: ==== Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Rachel Rizzo, 8-12-2019, "The U.S. or China? Europe Needs to Pick a Side," POLITICO Magazine, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/08/12/us-china-europe-relations-227614, Date Accessed 8-12-2019 // WS Choosing the United States does not mean that Europe should forfeit all trade and economic AND that it will unequivocally side with America to uphold democratic norms and standards. ====By increasing Chinese influences, Turdush indicates that the BRI: ==== Ruqiye TURDUSH, 12-16-2018, "Policy Argument Against China – Uyghur Research Institute," No Publication, http://www.uysi.org/en/2018/06/21/policy-argument-against-china/, Date Accessed 8-14-2019 // WS Moreover, declining hegemony of the post-War global powers has helped China to AND China to kill more Uyghurs today that at any other time in history. ====Without any international backlash, oppression will only continue as The New Statesmen concludes in 2019:==== New Statesmen, 3-21-2019, "China's Uyghur detention camps may be the largest mass incarceration since the Holocaust," https://www.newstatesman.com/world/asia/2019/03/china-s-uyghur-detention-camps-may-be-largest-mass-incarceration-holocaust, Date Accessed 7-23-2019 // WS ~~Edited for trivialization, we don't endorse the authors use of the word or offensive language~~ Over the last few years, a network of enormous detention camps has sprung up AND however, are that not to do so could prove even more dangerous. ====There are two impacts to this oppression. The first is the erasure of the Uygher Identity. Mamtimin Ala furthers when he writes in 2018 that ==== Mamtimin Ala, 11-7-2018, "Xi Jinping's Genocide of the Uyghurs," Foreign Policy Journal, https://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2018/11/07/xi-jinpings-genocide-of-the-uyghurs/ In this context, the Uyghur cultural genocide can be perceived through these two lenses AND to establish "eternal peace" in Xinjiang and beyond at all costs. ====The impact is massive as Rushan Abbas finds in 2019 that ==== Rushan Abbas, USA TODAY 5-9-2019 ~~"I've fought China's slow-motion genocide of Uighur Muslims. Now, my family are victims. available online at: https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/voices/2019/05/09/uighur-chinese-human-rights-violations-concentration-camps-column/1143252001/ accessed - 7-21-2019~~cdm As many as 3 million people, out of a population of about 11 million AND must not be reduced to mere numbers, figures on a balance sheet. ====Second, oppression breeds radicalization. Sudha Ramachandran wrote in 2019 that:==== Sudha Ramachandran, 3-14-2019, "Protecting BRI: China's Foreign Security Concerns", Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13560-protecting-bri-chinas-foreign-security-concerns.html, Date Accessed 9-5-2019 // JM In mid-February, the Chinese Embassy in Turkey warned its nationals in the AND Africa where China's presence and economic footprint has expanded significantly in recent years.	905,071
365,667	379,912	Belt and Road Affirmative v2 - Holy Cross and St James	=Vance/Walker – Kentucky Aff v1= ====We affirm.==== ==Contention 1: Poverty Reduction== ====Chen Yingqun indicated at the end of August that: ==== Chen Yingqun, 8-28-2019, "Europe may face economic setbacks," https://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/europe-may-face-economic-setbacks/, Date Accessed 8-30-2019 // JM Europe is edging toward a crisis, as several of its largest economies face recession AND sustainable," he said. "European countries will have to make changes." ====And unfortunately nothing internally can resolve this as Yusuf Khan indicated in August that: ==== Yusuf Khan, 8-10-2019, "Three of Europe's biggest economies are probably in recession — and the ECB is out of bullets," Markets Insider, https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/germany-italy-uk-are-headed-for-recession-and-ecb-is-out-of-tools-2019-8-1028435638, Date Accessed: 8-28-2019 // EE Can the ECB do anything to save this mess? Not really. The European AND a stimulus to Europe. As a result, Europe looks pretty stuck. ====Fortunately, joining the BRI provides the economic stimulus that the EU needs in two ways. First, provides market stability. Toumert Ai indicated in August that:==== Toumert Ai, 8-11-2019, "A new world economy on the horizon with BRI serving as an opening alternative,"http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1161079.shtml, Date Accessed 8-27-2019 // JM The BRI premise is linking economies through smart investment in infrastructure, finance and logistics AND . And this time there would be no nation or economy left undamaged. ====Second, gives the EU an opportunity to enhance their own economic development strategies – Le Corre argued in 2018 that:==== Philippe Le Corre, October 2018, China's Rise as a Geoeconomic Influencer: Four European Case Studies, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/WP_LeCorre_China_Final_Web.pdf, Date Accessed 8-28-19 // JM As China becomes a global actor with ambitions beyond the geoeconomic sphere, the rest AND region137 and create more jobs and growth in the key sectors of tomorrow. ====Amighini indicates that stability and new routes provided through the BRI decreased trade times. She writes:==== Alessia A. Amighini, 2-3-2018, "Beyond Ports and Transport Infrastructure: The Geo-Economic Impact of the BRI on the European Union," SpringerLink, https://link-springer-com.proxy.swarthmore.edu/chapter/10.1007/978-981-10-7116-4_14, Date Accessed 7-14-2019 // DF What has been partly overlooked in the design of the EU TEN -T corridors AND statistics on the reduction in travel time and cost expected from project completion. ====Decreased trade times materialize in export specialization. Nadia Rocha wrote in 2019 that:==== Nadia Rocha, 1-28-2019, "Hurry up! How the Belt and Road Initiative changes trade times and trade," World Bank Blogs, https://blogs.worldbank.org/trade/hurry-how-belt-and-road-initiative-changes-trade-times-and-trade, Date Accessed 8-28-2019 // JM 1. The BRI transportation infrastructure will boost intra-regional trade. The impact AND range between 0.8 and 42.6 percent (figure 3). ====Export specialization reduces poverty in two ways. First, it would generate enough economic growth to reverse recession trends to prevent NEW individuals from being pushed into poverty. Plumper indicates that:==== Thomas Plumper and Michael Graff, "Export Specialization and Economic Growth", Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Winter, 2001), pp. 661-688, https://www.jstor.org/stable/4177405, Date Accessed 8-31-2019 // JM The empirical estimations presented in this paper support some hypotheses of 'new' trade theory as AND industrialized country is about 2 percent, this is not a negligible effect. ====Preventing this recession becomes the LARGEST priority for the debate as John Maulding indicated in 2019 that:==== John Mauldin, 1-22-2019, "Why Europe Has No Control Over Its Future," Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnmauldin/2019/01/22/why-europe-has-no-control-over-its-future/, Date Accessed 7-25-2019 // WS Nick's implication is disturbing. Europe is helpless. It will continue circling the drain AND the Fed or U.S. government could speed up the process. ====And as a result, Robert Evans writes that as a result of the last major recession ==== Robert Evans, 7-6-2009, "Recession adds 6 percent to ranks of global poor: U.N.," U.S., https://www.reuters.com/article/us-financial-poverty/recession-adds-6-percent-to-ranks-of-global-poor-u-n-idUSTRE56502P20090706, Date Accessed 6-13-2019 // WS - Economic recession has reversed a 20-year decline in world poverty and is AND Geneva by U.N. Secretary- General Ban Ki-moon. ====Second, it lifts people already in poverty OUT of food-based poverty traps. Vincent indicates that:==== Dr. Vincent, 9-27-2018, "New models of cooperation are essential for developing agricultural prosperity amongst BRI countries," No Publication, http://www.fao.org/china/news/detail-events/en/c/1155691/, Date Accessed 8-28-2019 // JM The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is an ambitious initiative, sparking a AND enterprises on topics relating to agricultural technology, investment and e-commerce. ====By providing jobs and food security, BRI lifts people out of poverty especially in poorer Eastern European nations. Richard Adams quantifies that:==== Richard H. Adams Jr, 4-1-2016, "Economic Growth, Inequality, and Poverty: Findings from a New Data Set," https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=636334, Date Accessed 8-13-2019 // WS Since income distributions are relatively stable over time, economic growth – in the sense AND such as Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa.	905,090
365,668	379,832	Belt and Road Affirmative v1 - Economic Growth v1	==Our Second Contention is revitalizing the EU economy== ====The EU economy is plunging toward a recession as Chen Yingqun indicated last week that: ==== Chen Yingqun, 8-28-2019, "Europe may face economic setbacks," https://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/europe-may-face-economic-setbacks/, Date Accessed 8-30-2019 // JM Europe is edging toward a crisis, as several of its largest economies face recession AND sustainable," he said. "European countries will have to make changes." ====This has a massive impact, since the EU's economy is interconnected across the globe through an array of trade agreements, an EU recession would inherently affect many other nations as John Maulding writes in 2018 that==== John Mauldin, 12-8-2018, "Why Europe Has No Control Over Its Future," Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnmauldin/2019/01/22/why-europe-has-no-control-over-its-future/, Date Accessed 7-25-2019 // WS If Europe goes into recession, it will have a profound impact on the world AND the Fed or U.S. government could speed up the process. ====The impact of preventing this recession is massive as Harry Bradford writes that the next==== Harry Bradford, 4-5-2013, "Three Times The Population Of The U.S. Is At Risk Of Falling Into Poverty," HuffPost, span class="skimlinks-unlinked"https://www.huffpost.com/entry/global-poverty-900-million-economic-shock_n_3022420/span, Date Accessed 7-28-2019 // WS Economic Shock Could Throw 900 Million People Into Poverty, IMF Study Warns A recent AND That figure is three times the size of the U.S. population ====Thankfully the EU joining the BRI allows the EU to weather the economic storm in two ways. First is through increased trade. The BRI aims to create new railway connections between China and the EU. This will drastically reduce trade times by moving large amounts of trade from sea to land as Alessia Amighini quantifies in 2018 that the new connections will reduce travel times by 53 on average==== Alessia A. Amighini ~~University of Piemonte Orientale, Vercelli, Italy; and Catholic University of Milan, Milano, Italy~~, 2-3-2018, "Beyond Ports and Transport Infrastructure: The Geo-Economic Impact of the BRI on the European Union," SpringerLink, https://link-springer-com.proxy.swarthmore.edu/chapter/10.1007/978-981-10-7116-4_14 //WS What has been partly overlooked in the design of the EU TEN -T corridors AND statistics on the reduction in travel time and cost expected from project completion. ====Matteo Bressan quantifies this year that as a result of these new and improved trade routes ==== Matteo Bressan, 3-4-19, "Opportunities and challenges for BRI in Europe-Belt and Road Portal," No Publication, https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/ghsl/wksl/84696.htm, Date Accessed 7-6-2019 // WS Although lagging other countries, Italy is playing a leading role in the China- AND ) may contribute to overcoming the region's traditionally peripheral economic position in Europe. ====This trade is important for economic growth as The World Bank finds that Countries that trade more==== The World Bank, 4-3-2018, "Stronger Open Trade Policies Enable Economic Growth for All," World Bank, https://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2018/04/03/stronger-open-trade-policies-enables-economic-growth-for-all, Date Accessed 8-14-2019 // WS Trade is central to ending global poverty. Countries that are open to international trade AND a global trading system that is more open, reliable and predictable for all ====Second is through Science diplomacy. Eshan Masood writes in May that Science Diplomacy or the spread of==== Ehsan Masood, 5-1-2019, "How China is redrawing the map of world science," No Publication, https://www.nature.com/immersive/d41586-019-01124-7/index.html, Date Accessed 8-28-2019 // JM Xi and other Chinese leaders see science as a central element in building bridges with AND is too early to say how China's dealings with other countries will evolve. ====Since the BRI intertwines the EU and China through economic and social connections, Robert Tijssen writes in 2019 that the BRI:==== Robert Tijssen, 1-11-2019, "China's Belt and Road Initiative finds new research partners in Europe," No Publication, https://www.natureindex.com/news-blog/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-finds-new-research-partners-in-europe, Date Accessed 8-28-2019 // WS China is pouring billions of dollars into establishing land and sea routes to Europe, AND demands that Europe adapt and respond to grasp the resulting challenges and opportunities. ====Through the creation of new jobs and businesses this innovation is critical for economic rebound as the European Commission writes in 2018 that==== European Commission, 2-20-2018, "Research and innovation are essential for EU's prosperity and social model, report says," https://ec.europa.eu/info/news/research-and-innovation-are-essential-eus-prosperity-and-social-model-report-says-2018-feb-19_en, Date Accessed 9-3-2019 // WS This is one of the main findings of the latest Science, Research and Innovation AND run under our research and innovation programme Horizon 2020. ====This economic growth is key. By providing jobs and increasing wages economic growth created as a result of the BRI lifts people out of poverty especially in poorer Eastern European nations. Richard Adams quantifies that a one percent increased in economic growth results in a 2-3 percent reduction in the percentage of people living in poverty. ==== Richard H. Adams, Jr., 4-1-2016, "Economic Growth, Inequality, and Poverty: Findings from a New Data Set by Richard H. Adams, Jr. :: SSRN," No Publication, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=636334, Date Accessed 8-13-2019 // WS Since income distributions are relatively stable over time, economic growth AND such as Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa.	904,938
365,669	380,164	2 - Jan NEG v1	Contention 1 is Terror Venezuela has become key to Hezbollah and terror operations in Latin America. Savage 19 Savage Sean, 19, 6-7-2019, Are Iran and Hezbollah turning Venezuela into the next Syria?, israelhayom, https://www.israelhayom.com/2019/06/07/are-iran-and-hezbollah-turning-venezuela-into-the-next-syria/ //RK a report by The New York Times highlighted how close Maduro confidante Tareck El Aissami, who was indicted in the U.S. in March on drug-trafficking charges, played a crucial role in assisting Iran and Hezbollah in their operations in Latin America. US Sanctions cut off funding for Hezbollah, which spills over to assist the fight against terror in the Middle East. Neumann 19 finds that Al Arabiya English, 20, 4-25-2020, How Hezbollah evades sanctions in Venezuela and partakes in Maduro’s drug trade, https://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2019/05/08/How-Hezbollah-evades-sanctions-in-Venezuela-and-partakes-in-Maduro-s-drug-trade.html //RK The US sanctions on Venezuela have had a secondary effect on Hezbollah’s finances, impacting the salaries of their fighters in Syria and degrading their military and terrorist capabilities. Disrupting Venezuela’s financing of criminal and terrorist groups would help improve security not only in the western hemisphere, but in the Middle East as well. But it’s not just in the Middle East. Hezbollah poses a global threat. Singer 18 Robert Singer, 92, 3-17-1992, With roots in Latin America, Hezbollah is the real terror threat in our hemisphere, miamiherald, https://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/op-ed/article210889749.html //RK Hezbollah has built up its presence in Latin America, posing a wider danger to the Americas aimed at our very doorsteps. Hezbollah poses a serious danger to the entire civilized world. The West must prevent this terrorist group and its patron and principal funder, the government of Iran, from building its strategic base in Central and South America. Iran sponsored Hezbollah will smuggle a nuke into U.S. – risks extinction Worman and Durbin 14 John – Guest speaker for UN organizations and US universities on Terrorism and risk assessment. SME in Terrorism and regional security for the Levant.Responsible for macro level business development; promoting training services to police and military units for special operations and counter-terrorism tactics, techniques and procedures. Kirk - Adjunct Instructor at University of Argosy: Undergraduate Studies-Criminal Justice Program. Terrorism, Threats and Risk Assessment, Police Organization and Structure, Corrections. “Iran’s Terrorist Proxy: Penetrating the United States with Nuclear Material as the Trigger to Setting off a US Media Explosion, Is a Reality”, Global Security Studies, Fall 2014, Volume 5, Issue 4, http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Worman20Iran20-AG.pdf Schuler 2 A radiological dispersal weapon employed as outlined would potentially create the worst disaster ever experienced in US history, not because nuclear material was released into the air, but in a rush to tell the world about the incident(s), facts would become confusing and incorrect, creating global panic. Citizens would draw on their innate thinking and reference the little they know about the nuclear sciences and the devastation wrought on a population at the end of WWII. Ehrenreich and Gitlin (1993) make the point that media heads tend to swivel in the same direction. “If the flagship media have done the story, so must everyone” (par. 9). The media’s responsibility lies in reporting facts from the best sources of information. However, media reports often sound the same and even use the same clips for visual effect. If the flagship rushes a story and is incorrect in its reporting, then so will all the stories using the flagship media agency as its source. There have been a number of misreports and inconsistencies in the news that perhaps can be viewed as poor reporting or investigating or downright media biases. An Iran’s Terrorist Proxy apology for being incorrect will never be enough with a story of this magnitude, as wrong information will create the desired effect for the terrorists. The sheer force created by irrational fear, generated from ignorance and misperception would be catastrophic to the US economy, citizen’s emotional and psychological security, and the overall well-being of all United States citizens. Events of this magnitude would eclipse the September 11th attacks. An old saying states, “never underestimate your enemy”; Iran is perceived as the United States’ enemy. The concern of a radiological dispersal weapon being planned and delivered into the United States beginning with Iran and ending with narco-terrorists executing an attack should be brought to the forefront of everyone’s thinking. Not only do the facts lend truth to this supposition but also the necessary pieces for this plot are genuinely real and positioned now to execute if directed. Iran has the nuclear material, the demonstrated will and the global network to conduct this type of guerilla attack. It will potentially use everything at its disposal to remove the US from the Middle East and away from the sphere of Israel’s influence when the time presents itself. The United States should pay close attention to its foreign-policy actions, related to the Syrian conflict, HezbAllah and the peace process between Israel and Palestine. The United States’ actions could set into motion an unstoppable, world changing, terrorist event.	905,466
365,670	379,597	Constructive rebuttle	A. Interp: the other team has to respond to all of our substance in the next constructive or concede it B. Standards: 1. Predictability. If they can respond in second rebuttal then they can sandbag new DAs and we don’t know what they’ll go for 2. Time skew - not responding in second constructive means we can’t frontline until summary, they get all of rebuttal. This puts them at a 4-3 structural advantage 3. Clash, responding earlier gives us more time to respond increasing clash C. Voters: drop the debater to set a precedent. This increases fairness because of the standards and fairness comes first because you can’t evaluate the better debater if the round is unfair. ?No RVI, don’t give them a reverse voting issue. You wouldn’t give someone a medal for not being abusive Default to competing interps over reasonability. Reasonability begs judge intervention	904,678
365,671	379,590	Halting US Education NC	UQ Morgan Morgan, David E. An Unbroken Educational Apartheid Legacy: Chicagos South Suburban Predominantly Black Communities of Color. Authorhouse, 2015. https://books.google.com/books/about/An_Unbroken_Educational_Apartheid_Legacy.html?id=xp6rBwAAQBAJ One of the several reports of historical significance that includes toward excellence in public education is A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Educational Reform. In 1983 American education reform entered a new era under Ronald Reagan. It was in that year that the federal government published a report of the National Commission on Excellence in Education entitled A Nation at Risk The Imperative for Education Reform. Commissioned in August 1981 by President Ronald Reagan's secretary of education, Terrel H. Bell, and chaired by David P. Gardner, then president of the University of Utah, this eighteen-member blue-ribbon panel of educators and elected officials examined the quality of elementary and secondary public education in the United States and found, like today in Rich Township High School District 227 by 2017, a sing tide of mediocrity'. that threatened the nation's future. in compassion and inflammatory tones, the commissioners reported that the United States, like Illinois School District Board 227, had engaged in unthinking, irrational, unreasonable, unilateral educational disarmament, asserting that if an unfriendly foreign power had tried to impose on America the mediocre educational performance the commissioners found, the nation might well have viewed it as an 'Act of war." In a "A Nation at Risk The Imperative for Educational Reform,. in support of their conclusions, these leaders presented numerous indicators of risk, including Americans' poor academic performance relative to students overseas, high levels of functional illiteracy among U.S. adults and seventeen-year olds, and declining achievement-test scores. As in Rich Township High School District 227 over twenty-five years later, the commissioners cited increasing enrollments in college remedial courses, increasing business and military expenditures on remedial education, and a diluted and ineffective curriculum in the schools. They demonstrated low expectations for student performance and college admissions, less time devoted to instruction and homework, and poor-quality teaching and teacher preparation. According to the commission's analysis, the nation's schools are narrowly emphasizing basic reading and computational skills at the expense of other essential talents, such as comprehension, analysis, problem solving, and the ability to reach conclusions. For the first time In U.S. history, the report concluded, the educational skills of one generation would not surpass, nor would they even equal, those of its predecessors. This discovery was particularly alarming as it would occur during a period of increasing business demand for highly trained workers. The commission called for a new public commitment to excellence in public education reform anchored in higher expectations for all students. it incited students to work harder and elected officials to encourage and support students' efforts. The call for reform and excellence in public education asserted that all children can learn and that public policies must do everything possible to fully develop the talents of America's youth. The commissioners recommended tougher high school graduation requirements, more rigorous and measurable standards of student performance and conduct, more time devoted to learning, better teaching and teacher preparation, more effective school leadership, and greater fiscal support. The report struck a national nerve to improve educational outcomes for all children. It defined the public dialog addressing school excellence and sparked state and federal action in education reform. Mumford Mumford, Megan. “Fourteen Economic Facts on Education and Economic Opportunity.” Brookings, Brookings, 30 Aug. 2016, www.brookings.edu/research/fourteen-economic-facts-on-education-and-economic-opportunity-2/. Why has the education premium risen in recent decades? Economists continue to study this question, but a number of studies point to the interplay of supply and demand for skills. In The Race between Education and Technology, Harvard economists Claudia Goldin and Lawrence Katz (2008) make the case that the U.S. economy prospered during the twentieth century in large part because educational attainment kept up with the rising demand for skills, which was catalyzed by significant technological change. The labor market’s demand for analytical skills, written communications, and specific technical knowledge increased dramatically. Between 1900 and 1980 Americans kept pace by steadily increasing their level of education, reflecting in large part the country’s commitment to a secondary school system essentially free and open to all (Goldin and Katz 2008). Yet over the past three decades the rise in educational attainment has slowed, even as technological progress—and the corresponding demand for skills—has accelerated. Goldin and Katz (2008) succinctly capture the essence of the story: “In the first half of the century, education raced ahead of technology, but later in the century, technology raced ahead of educational gains” Cohen Crabbe-Field, Sophia. “The Untold History of Charter Schools.” Democracy Journal, 27 Apr. 2017, democracyjournal.org/arguments/the-untold-history-of-charter-schools/. In the 1970s, deregulation was the name of the game. Efforts to deregulate major sectors of government took root under Ford and Carter, and continued to escalate throughout the 1980s under Reagan. From banking and energy to airlines and transportation, liberals and conservatives both worked to promote deregulatory initiatives spanning vast sectors of public policy. Schools were not immune. Since at least the late 1970s, political leaders in Minnesota had been discussing ways to reduce direct public control of schools. A private school voucher bill died in the Minnesota legislature in 1977, and Minnesota’s Republican governor Al Quie, elected in 1979, was a vocal advocate for school choice. Two prominent organizations were critical in advancing school deregulation in the state. One was the Minnesota Business Partnership, comprised of CEOs from the state’s largest private corporations; another was the Citizens League, a powerful, centrist Twin Cities policy group. When the League spoke, the legislature listened—and often enacted its proposals into law. In 1982 the Citizens League issued a report endorsing private school vouchers on the grounds that consumer choice could foster competition and improvement without increasing state spending, and backed a voucher bill in the legislature in 1983. The Business Partnership published its own report in 1984 calling for “profound structural change” in schooling, with recommendations for increased choice, deregulation, statewide testing, and accountability. The organized CEOs would play a major role throughout the 1980s lobbying for K-12 reform, as part of a broader agenda to limit taxes and state spending. Efforts to tinker with public schooling took on greater urgency in 1983, when Ronald Reagan’s National Commission on Excellence in Education released its report, A Nation At Risk. This influential (though empirically flawed) document panicked political leaders across the country. Among other things, the report concluded that American public schools were failing—“eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity”—with ill-prepared teachers and low-quality standards. Its authors tied the country’s economy and national security to the supposedly poor performance of U.S. public schools, and Reagan capitalized on the alarm. His narrative fit snugly within the larger Cold War panic, and as in Minnesota, national business leaders were happy to promote this new movement. School choice was not specifically mentioned in A Nation at Risk, though Governor Quie, who was then serving as a member on the National Commission, tried to get such recommendations included. But reformers didn’t have to wait long for a national endorsement. In 1986, the National Governors Association, chaired by Tennessee’s Republican governor Lamar Alexander, backed school choice in its Time for Results report. Back in Minnesota, Rudy Perpich, a member of the Democratic–Farmer–Labor Party, was elected as governor for his second non-consecutive term in 1983. (He had first served from 1976-1979.) During the four years that Quie governed Minnesota, Perpich worked on a global business committee for a supercomputer firm, and returned to government deeply shaped by his corporate experience. Ember Reichgott Junge, the state senator who would author Minnesota’s—and the nation’s—first charter school bill, described Perpich’s role bluntly: “According to the history books, Minnesota DFL governor Rudy Perpich had nothing to do with passage of chartering legislation. In reality, he had everything to do with it.” Junge traces this history in Zero Chance of Passage, her first-person account of legislating charter schools, published in 2012. Junge says Perpich was greatly troubled by A Nation at Risk, and thought increasing competition among schools would be a constructive response. As such, in 1985, with Republicans in control of the legislature, Perpich recommended two school choice proposals: postsecondary enrollment options (PSEO), to allow high school juniors and seniors to attend nonsectarian public and private colleges, and open enrollment, to allow parents to send their children to schools anywhere in the state. PSEO passed in 1985, and open enrollment in 1987. 1987 was also the year that the Citizens League waded back into the subject, publishing a report calling for “cooperatively-managed schools”—where teachers could participate in the operational decisions of their workplace. The thinking was this could help drive more distinctive schools—because school choice would mean little without varied options to choose from. The Citizens League’s description of cooperatively managed schools is strikingly similar to modern-day charters. Teachers would be “held accountable” for student achievement, and the schools would “have flexibility to function differently from the schools we know today, from different uses of personnel and technology to different work hours.” Crawford Crawford, Susan. “Why Education Reforms Aren't Working.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 21 Dec. 2019, www.nytimes.com/2019/12/21/opinion/letters/education-reform.html. In our desperation to improve academic achievement, our country has fostered a culture obsessed with test results, yet, ironically, this fixation only serves as a detriment to America’s academic performance on the international stage. Riya Jones Fairfax, Va. To the Editor: The “education reform” movement of the past 20 years has not resulted in improved educational attainment because that was not its focus. All of its components — which include opening charter schools, merit pay for teachers, mayoral control in large cities, closing rather than helping struggling schools — focus on governance structures of public education, not on classroom instruction. Indeed, the one initiative that would have yielded prompt improvement in achievement is the “Reading First” component of No Child Left Behind, which in turn built on the findings of The National Reading Panel Report to Congress of 2000. Instead, it was engulfed by vendor scandals early on, and disappeared. Twenty years later, struggling readers at every grade level still await the report’s full implementation. For that, we don’t need any more “reforms,” just action on what is well established about how to make sure every child is reading on grade level. L1 Kirst Kirst, Michael W. “Politics of Charter Schools: Competing National Advocacy Coalitions Meet Local Politics*.” Stanford University, May 2006, ncspe.tc.columbia.edu/working-papers/OP119.pdf. Local supporters of charters can be an impressive and influential coalition in some local contexts. Some of these local pro-charter players include: • Parents dissatisfied with local school • Community-based organizations • National advocacy organizations with state affiliates • State charter technical assistance centers (e.g. CA Charter Schools Association) • Local business leaders • Real estate developers who want distinctive schools as part of their development • Faith-based organizations • Institutions of higher education • Foundations and individual philanthropists • Workforce development agencies However, this imposing array of supporters can be trumped by a local counter coalition that opposes local charters: 6 • Local teacher unions • Local school boards • Many local administrators • Non-certified school employees • Local sports and public school support groups • PTA School board administrators and the PTA fear charter expansion because it causes enrollment decline in their districts. ... An earlier AFT study alleging regular public schools had greater test score gains than charter schools ignited a firestorm of criticism by charter supporters (American Federation of Teachers, 2004). Andrew Rotherham of the Progressive Policy Institute called the AFT report a “hatchet job.” Caroline Hoxby told the Harvard Education Letter, that the AFT report was “the worst study” ever seen on charter schools.” This criticism culminated in advertisement in the New York Times signed by 31 university scholars. The authors reacted by labeling charter supporters “barricade-rushers” and “zealots” (Carnoy et al., 2005). The politics surrounding charters is so supercharged that it is doubtful any study will go unchallenged by either side. For the foreseeable future, charters will engender dueling policy studies and evaluations that will be part of the political debate, but produce scant consensus. Supporters of choice are vocal and publicized, and they are organized locally and nationally. A 2003 analysis by the American Association of School Administrators listed the individuals, corporations, and foundations that support, either fully or in part, some aspect of choice schools, as shown in Table 3. Their assets are considerable, and they fund research, lobbying, and legal fees. National publicity groups, such as the National Charter School Alliance founded in 2003, are organized to project favorable news of choice reforms. Knopp https://isreview.org/issue/62/charter-schools-and-attack-public-education As for a coordinated effort, the private incursion into public schools is being pushed by a band of jackals grouped around Bill Gates and the $2 billion that his Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation have sunk into the education “reform” movement. The foundation funded a 2006 study by the New Commission on the Skills of the American Workforce called Tough Choices or Tough Times, “signed by a bipartisan collection of prominent politicians, businesspeople, and urban school superintendents,” which called for a series of measures including: (a) replacing public schools with what the report called “contract schools,” which would be charter schools writ large; (b) eliminating nearly all the powers of local school boards—their role would be to write and sign the authorizing agreements for the contract schools; (c) eliminating teacher pensions and slashing health benefits; and (d) forcing all 10th graders to take a high school exit examination based on 12th grade skills, and terminating the education of those who failed (i.e., throwing millions of students out into the streets as they turn 16).25 L2 Walker Tim Walker, 6-18-2019, "Neighborhood Public Schools Forced to Give Up Space to Charter Schools," NEA Today, http://neatoday.org/2019/06/18/educators-fight-charter-school-co-location/ While co-location may fall a little more under-the-radar than other privatization initiatives, charter companies have been aggressively pursuing the tactic to solidify and expand their presence. Indeed, in order to survive on the Catskill campus, Ganas has been aggressively recruiting students from Catskill and the surrounding community. If a Catskill student leaves to go to Ganas, the public dollars would go with the student to the charter school, leaving the public school with less funds and fewer resources. “Co-location helps fuel the decades-long strategy of the privatizers, including the charter lobby, of starving public schools of funds, using misguided ‘accountability’ policies to label them as failures, and pitching privatization as the answer,” says NEA senior policy analyst Bob Tate. Fortunately, a growing number of educators see what is happening. Curtailing school privatization – specifically the expansion of unaccountable, for-profit charter schools – has been a pillar of the RedforEd movement. Recent city-wide strikes in Los Angeles and Oakland helped drive support for the state legislature’s recent actions restricting the charter sector. Wilcox Wilcox, Ben. “The Hidden Costs of Charter School Choice.” Integrity Florida, Sept. 2018, www.integrityflorida.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/charter-school-report-final.pdf. The Florida Supreme Court removed Constitutional Amendment 8 from the November 2018 ballot that would have created a statewide charter school authorizer. However, future attempts by the legislature to establish a statewide charter authorizer may occur and should be opposed. A state charter authorizer would preempt voters’ rights to local control of education through their elected school boards, even though local tax dollars would pay for charter expansion. • The charter school industry has spent more than $13 million since 1998 to influence state education policy through contributions to political campaigns. • The charter school industry has spent more than $8 million in legislative lobbying expenditures since 2007 to influence education policy. 4 • The legislature has modified the original Florida charter school law significantly over the years to encourage creation of new charters, increase the number of students in charter schools and enhance funding of charters, sometimes at the expense of traditional schools. ... Efforts by the charter school industry to shape policies in their favor have been aided in recent years by officials in the Florida Legislature who stand to benefit directly from the expansion of this education model. A number of high-powered legislators have either worked for charter schools or charter companies or had immediate family members involved with charters. Richard Corcoran, the outgoing Speaker of the Florida House of Representatives, made the expansion of charter schools a top priority during his time in office.200 His wife, Anne Corcoran, is the founder and a board member for Classical Preparatory School, a Pasco County charter school that opened in 2014.201 She also serves on the not-for-profit board for the Tallahassee Classical School, which has successfully appealed a decision by the Leon County School Board denying their application for a new school in Leon County.202,203 Both Richard and Anne Corcoran have deflected criticisms about conflicts of interest by arguing that Anne Corcoran is simply an unpaid proponent for liberal arts education, including charter schools. They argue further that, as an attorney, she has likely lost money due to the time she has dedicated to the schools and that the House speaker has always been a proponent of school choice, regardless of any connections with charters.204 Another lawmaker with direct ties to the charter school industry is Representative Manny Diaz, a member of the House Education Committee205 who also serves as chair of the K-12 Appropriations 35 Subcommittee.206 While serving in these prominent roles that influence education policy and funding, Diaz also serves as chief operating officer for Academica-affiliated Doral College in Miami,207 where he receives a six-figure salary.208 Diaz has been called one of the most pro-charter school voices in the House and has consistently championed legislation expanding the reach of charter schools in Florida since he was elected to office in 2012.209 Senator Anitere Flores served in the Florida House of Representatives from 2004 to 2010 and has served in the Senate since 2010. She previously worked for Doral College, serving as the president until 2015. Since then she has worked as development director at the nonprofit A.C.E. Foundation, which provides support for charter schools.210 According to its website, the A.C.E. Foundation uses funding from public and private partners to provide support such as curriculum planning, staffing, marketing support, professional development, direct funding and other resources to charter schools that focus on students from economically disadvantaged backgrounds.211 Flores and Diaz have championed bills that would assist online charter schools, limit school district control over privately managed charter schools and provide public funding to build more charter schools.212 While Flores and Diaz have direct ties to charter schools, other state lawmakers are involved with foundations or business entities connected to charter schools. Representative Michael Bileca chairs the House Education Committee while also serving as executive director of the Dennis Bileca Foundation,213 which awarded substantial grant funding to True North Classical Academy, a charter school in Miami.214 Corcoran, Diaz and Bileca are credited with driving HB 7069, the controversial education bill in 2017, through the legislative process. Opponents argued that the legislation would lead to millions of tax dollars being directed away from traditional public schools to expand the charter school industry while removing authority from local school boards. They also objected to a rushed legislative process. 215 The charter school industry has long had allies within the legislature. Academica founder and president Fernando Zulueta’s brother-in-law, Eric Fresen, served in the Florida House from 2008 to 2016 and was chair of the House Education Budget Subcommittee. While in office, Fresen worked as a consultant for an architecture firm, Civica, which specializes in building charter schools, many for Academica.216 I/L Pianta Pianta, Robert. “The One Education Reform That Would Really Help? Giving Public Schools More Money.” The Washington Post, WP Company, 10 Dec. 2019, www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/12/10/all-reforms-world-wont-help-our-school-much-more-money/. These stories, in turn, drove the privatization and school choice movements in the 1990s and 2000s, which only further diverted resources from our public classrooms — and exacerbated the issues hampering public education. And this is the problem. The perception that education is in crisis has contributed to a fundamentally distorted view of the system that ignores the biggest problem plaguing U.S. public schools: a lack of resources. That’s why, despite the many forms of capital devoted to addressing the purported crisis over three-plus decades of school reform efforts, we have failed to take one common-sense step: sinking adequate public funds into our schools, teachers and children, and distributing it equitably. Schools have been starved for funds even as mounting research illustrated that greater investments in public schools pave the way for students to realize lasting academic gains, particularly if we place an emphasis on the early years and grades. This lack of investment was only compounded by the Great Recession, which prompted state legislatures to shift already limited funds and sources of revenue from districts to balance their budgets and bridge spending gaps elsewhere. Nonwhite communities and underserved rural and urban areas particularly suffered the consequences, languishing as a result of regressive funding formulas tied to property taxes. To this day, funding levels have failed to recover from this raid on our schools’ financial reserves. That is plain to see as today’s students across our industrial cities and rural communities learn in inadequate, decaying facilities with dangerous levels of lead and mold. Millions of children must make do with deep cuts to curriculums and programming. And appalling teacher pay leaves many educators with little choice but to take on second and third jobs, limiting their ability to deliver high-quality instruction for students and further starving a profession of the talent it desperately needs in the face of massive, nationwide shortages. Federal data reveals that schools are so strapped for funds that over 90 percent of our underpaid teachers spend an average of nearly $500 of their own money on supplies every year. The decades of debate since “A Nation at Risk” have revolved around whether public, private or charter schools provide better education and spurred battles over testing and accountability. These fights have caused us to lose sight of the fact that our public education system is a national resource fundamental to our shared social, political and economic success — and, as a result, the idea of public education remains neglected and degraded today. Goldstein Goldstein, Dana. “'It Just Isn't Working': PISA Test Scores Cast Doubt on U.S. Education Efforts.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 3 Dec. 2019, www.nytimes.com/2019/12/03/us/us-students-international-test-scores.html. The performance of American teenagers in reading and math has been stagnant since 2000, according to the latest results of a rigorous international exam, despite a decades-long effort to raise standards and help students compete with peers across the globe. And the achievement gap in reading between high and low performers is widening. Although the top quarter of American students have improved their performance on the exam since 2012, the bottom 10th percentile lost ground, according to an analysis by the National Center for Education Statistics, a federal agency. The disappointing results from the exam, the Program for International Student Assessment, were announced on Tuesday and follow those from the National Assessment of Educational Progress, an American test that recently showed that two-thirds of children were not proficient readers. Over all, American 15-year-olds who took the PISA test scored slightly above students from peer nations in reading but below the middle of the pack in math. Impact Gonser Gonser, Sarah. “Students Are Being Prepared for Jobs That No Longer Exist. Here's How That Could Change.” NBCNews.com, NBCUniversal News Group, 12 Apr. 2018, www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/students-are-being-prepared-jobs-no-longer-exist-here-s-n865096. On Sunday, Oct. 1, the first day the application became available online, Ben Lara sat down at the computer in his bedroom to apply for federal student financial aid. Lara, 18, is a senior at Lowell High School, where almost half the 3,200 students are low-income. He is trim with close-cropped hair and a wide flash of a smile. Along with being a National Honor Society student, squeezing in five business electives into an already packed course load, he works 30 to 35 hours a week at his job sorting in-store advertisements at Target. His main goal: getting out of his hometown and into a top-tier college. In many ways, the future of Lowell, once the largest textile manufacturing hub in the United States, is tied to the success of students like Ben Lara. Like many cities across America, Lowell is struggling to find its economic footing as millions of blue-collar jobs in manufacturing, construction and transportation disappear, subject to offshoring and automation. The jobs that once kept the city prosperous are being replaced by skilled jobs in service sectors such as health care, finance and information technology — positions that require more education than just a high-school diploma, thus squeezing out many of those blue-collar, traditionally middle-class workers. Lara’s classmate Amber Phoumyvong, 17, shares his desire to escape from Lowell, but not his academic drive — a principal challenge to an education system trying to support a revitalization for places like Lowell. Six months before she graduates, she is not about to hide her feelings: She hates school. “Elementary school: hated it,” Amber says. “Middle school: h-a-t-e-d it. School just isn’t for me. I hate coming to school. I hate waking up early. I hate homework.” Amber envisions a comfortable future that includes a family, a modern-yet-rustic house and a good job, maybe as a business owner. Her distaste for school may put her dreams out of reach, but it would take more than a boost in motivation to change the tide. On the surface, American high schools are educating better than ever. Eighty-four percent of students are graduating on time — an all-time high, according to the U.S. Department of Education — and 70 percent are enrolling in college directly after high school. And yet, beneath these optimistic benchmarks lies a career- and job-readiness picture that may be increasingly out of sync with what the future economy will require. As emerging technologies rapidly and thoroughly transform the workplace, some experts predict that by 2030 400 million to 800 million people worldwide could be displaced and need to find new jobs. The ability to adapt and quickly acquire new skills will become a necessity for survival. Critics say high schools aren’t doing enough to prepare young people for life after graduation, in-demand jobs and a pathway to the middle class. Underscoring the criticism are sobering statistics: Nationally, just 25 percent of high school seniors are able to do grade-level math and just 37 percent score proficient in reading. Those numbers are egregiously lower among African-American and Hispanic students. And while 93 percent of middle school students say they plan to attend college, only 26 percent go on to graduate from college within six years of enrolling. These indicators, coupled with the staggering cost of higher education and millions of unfilled jobs in skilled trades, are pushing policymakers to rethink America’s bachelor’s-or-bust mentality. At Lowell High School, educators are scrambling to prepare kids for the future, while acknowledging its fundamental unknowability. “We’re preparing kids for these jobs of tomorrow, but we really don’t even know what they are,” said Amy McLeod, the school’s director of curriculum, instruction and assessment. “It’s almost like we’re doing this with blinders on. ... We’re doing all we can to give them the finite skills, the computer languages, the programming, but technology is expanding so rapidly, we almost can’t keep up.” When The Hechinger Report surveyed nearly 1,000 Lowell High School juniors and seniors this winter to gauge their feelings about their job- and career-readiness, close to 70 percent said they felt well-prepared to succeed in college and careers; nearly 80 percent said they felt confident that they’d acquired the digital skills necessary to thrive after high school. But a national survey indicates this optimism may be misplaced: Just 16 percent of college instructors rated incoming students as “well” or “very well” prepared for college-level work, according to the 2015 study by ACT, the creators of the standardized college entrance exam. At Lowell High School, students generally have strong performance on academic assessments and high graduation rates overall, but the school has a significant achievement gap: Academic performance and graduation rates for low-income, special education and English language learners — the high-needs students who make up nearly 60 percent of the school's population — are alarmingly lagging. Disengaged from school For Amber, college is dead-last on her to-do list. There is one part of her school day, however, that continues to stand out from the blur of required classes and tests she endures in order to graduate: “Culinary is most likely the best part of my day,” she says. In her first year at Lowell High, Amber, like all freshman here, got to pick one or more courses from the school’s Pathways Programs. She chose Culinary Arts and never deviated from the program all four years. Lowell High School’s amped-up program goes a step beyond typical enrichment offerings, with coursework intended to prepare kids for continuing education and jobs in local and state industries that are actively hiring and projected to grow. Pathways — which include multiple classes organized under umbrella sectors such as engineering, health and bioscience, business, environmental sustainability and culinary arts — is extremely popular at the school. Last year, 463 of the 645 students who graduated accrued 10 or more Pathway credits, earning a special designation on their transcripts, a sort of postsecondary résumé-builder. Although the goal is to get kids into college or other postsecondary education, students can also become certified in a specific skill, enabling them to be job-ready by graduation. For students like Amber, who would rather do just about anything but go to school, the Pathways program serves another function: It makes learning engaging, maybe even fun, and possibly keeps her in school and on track to graduate. “I think we’re turning kids off to learning in this country by putting them in rows and giving them multiple-choice tests — the compliance model,” McLeod said. “But my hope is that in the pathways courses, we’re teaching them to love learning. And they’re learning about options in the field — there’s plenty of options for kids to try here.” Amber, whose parents moved here from Laos before she was born, always loved food and cooking. At home, she likes to cook stir-fries and feu (Lao beef stew), and recently learned how to prepare a papaya salad, based on a recipe from her mother and grandmother. Her eyes light up when she speaks about the food she loves. But turn the subject back to school, and she crosses her arms and her face becomes guarded once more. The Lowell culinary program ultimately became a disappointment. “I’m fine with the behind-the-scenes part of culinary, I still like cooking, it’s still fun. But dealing with people and customer service, that’s just not my thing,” she says. And so mid-senior year, she finds herself adrift. “All my friends, they have their lives planned out. They’re going to college, they have scholarships, they know what they’re going to major in, where they’re going to live,” she says. “I feel it’s different for me because I wasn’t born to have my life planned out.” Amber is far from alone as she faces finishing high school with plans for her future derailed and no clear path to college. A 2016 Gallup poll of students found that just 34 percent of 12th-graders across America feel engaged in school and only 44 percent of 11th-graders report feeling excited about the future. Engagement and optimism about the future are directly linked to making plans for life after high school — such as attending college or starting a business. Though the mere mention of college depresses her, Amber knows she will eventually need more education after high school. Workers with bachelor’s degrees now outnumber workers with high-school diplomas, according to a report by the Georgetown University Center on Education and the Workforce. Even when hiring workers without a bachelor's degree, employers still look for more than a high school diploma, increasingly favoring those who have an associate degree or some college training. American high schools need to do more to educate young people about careers that require two-year degrees or certifications, rather than primarily promoting expensive bachelor’s degrees, say some experts. “I think where high schools have gotten it wrong, or let's be honest, those of us in the policy world have gotten it wrong, is in thinking that high schools’ only job is preparing kids for a four-year liberal arts degree," said Michael J. Petrilli, president of the Thomas B. Fordham Institute, a right-leaning think tank. “We have probably about 30 to 40 percent of kids who graduate high school ready for a four-year college program and they do OK. But then there's another probably 30 or 40 percent of kids who aren't terribly well-prepared, but go to college anyway and end up in remedial classes and drop out. So now they've had this failure early in their life and nothing much to show for it.” Haycock Kati Haycock, 4-13-2016, "47 of high school grads aren’t prepared for college," MarketWatch, https://www.marketwatch.com/story/how-high-schools-are-failing-those-who-earn-a-diploma-2016-04-13 To succeed in today’s fast-changing, knowledge-based economy, young people need more skills than ever before. And the jobs that used to require work boots, a good set of tools, and a steady hand now require advanced math, science, and reading — and, typically, also a certificate or degree beyond a high school diploma. Business leaders have long known this. But ample evidence suggests that many high schools have yet to fully grasp the reality of these new demands. Despite widespread rhetoric around college and career-readiness for all students, just 8 of graduates from public high schools complete a full college- and career-preparatory course of study. Rates of college- and career-ready course-taking are consistently low across all student groups, according to The Education Trust’s new report, “Meandering Toward Graduation: Transcript Outcomes of High School Graduates.” The reality is far too many young people — especially those of color and those from low-income households — have a diploma in hand but lack the knowledge and skills needed to be successful for life beyond high school. In fact, nearly half (47) of all American public high-school graduates complete neither a college- nor career-ready course of study, defined here as the standard 15-course sequence required for entry at many public colleges, along with three or more credits in a broad career field such as health science or business. Students are meandering toward graduation, taking courses that expose them to a little of everything and not much of anything. And it’s taking a toll on the students themselves, their families, and their future employers. The vast majority of high school graduates expect to earn a postsecondary degree. But according to a recent survey from Achieve Inc., an education reform organization, 78 of college instructors report that public high schools aren't doing a good enough job preparing graduates to meet the expectations of college coursework. As a result, approximately one in four students who enter college the fall after high school graduation enroll in remedial coursework during their first year of college — costing their families a stunning $1.5 billion annually, according to a new report from Education Reform Now, a think tank and advocacy organization. The news is not much better from employers, 62 of whom say that public high schools aren't doing enough to prepare their graduates to meet the expectations of the workplace. So what’s going on in high schools? Simply put, they’re treating graduation as the end goal, rather than ensuring students complete a cohesive curriculum that aligns with students’ future goals. For example, large numbers of high school freshmen get locked into a math trajectory that all but precludes them from taking the advanced math courses that both colleges and many career fields demand. And too many students take a random smattering of career-prep courses — ranging from computers and engineering to trade courses in fields such as construction, architecture or manufacturing — rather than a series of courses aligned with any particular career field. Of course, seat time itself is not enough. Once enrolled in college and career-prep classes, students need to master the content. Yet too few students — and in particular too few black and Latino students — have the grades that suggest they learned the course content. This is not just about mastery. There are also problems with the level of day-to-day instruction. Students can rise no higher than the assignments they are given. In an in-depth a look at classroom assignments, we found that too many of those assignments failed to meet the college- and career-ready standard. Perhaps the most damning feedback on our high schools come from young people themselves. Nearly nine out 10 of all recent high school graduates said they would have worked harder if their high schools had demanded more, set higher academic standards, and raised expectations of the coursework and studying necessary to earn a diploma. Thankfully, this feedback also points the way forward. Students want — and deserve — high expectations, and the support they need to meet those expectations in the form of a coherent course of study and high-quality instruction in those courses. Each spring, more than three million fresh graduates stream out of our schools, diplomas in hand and futures ahead. The America that our high schools need to prepare them for is not yesterday’s — but tomorrow’s. It’s time to ensure that all of our graduates leave with the skills and knowledge they need for college and career. Their futures — and America’s — are depending on it. Kati Haycock is the CEO of The Education Trust, a national nonprofit advocacy organization that promotes high academic achievement for all students at all levels, particularly for students of color and low-income.	904,671
365,672	379,606	Disclosure Policy	Hi. We have never disclosed before but theory scared us into this. I hope everything is correct, but I really do not know. If anyone has any advice pls reach out to me on messenger!! - Taimur Moolji	904,690
365,673	379,635	TOC Aff 1	US-Iran conflict possible in Iraq after state collapse Cordesman 20~-~-Anthony Cordesman, America’s Failed Strategy in the Middle East: Losing Iraq and the Gulf, CSIS, 1/2/20, https://www.csis.org/analysis/americas-failed-strategy-middle-east-losing-iraq-and-gulf It is all too tempting for the United States to focus on the current crisis over the clash between Iran and the United States in Iraq. Events have steadily escalated since late December. Iran has sponsored attacks by Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces on U.S. troops and facilities – as a result, the United States has launched retaliatory attacks on Iraqi PMFs. This has been followed by well-organized demonstrations and attacks on the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, which was then followed by a U.S. drone strikes that killed Qasem Soleimani – the head of Iran’s Quds Force – and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis – the head of Al-Hashd al-Shaabi, an Iraqi militia group tied to Iran that had been linked to attacks on U.S. targets. Moreover, the Iraqi central government virtually collapsed even before these events. Its corruption, ineffectiveness, and failed economic policies led to massive popular demonstrations. Its legislature was virtually disbanded after legislation was passed calling for a different, locally elected, and more representative system. Prime Minister Mahdi had resigned but then stayed on in an uncertain “acting” capacity. The Kurdish regional government remained divided. All the while, the government failed to effectively aid the Sunni cities in the West that had been shattered in the fight with ISIS. The central government’s Army and Air Force remained largely separate from the Kurdish forces in the north. Efforts to integrate the various Shi’ite and Sunni PMFs – that had helped fight ISIS – into the central government’s forces resulted in an unworkable system where these deeply divided forces – many with close ties to Iran – reported directly to a Prime Minister with no real authority who had lost his popular mandate. The United States faces an all too real risk that events in Iraq will trigger a much more serious clash between the United States and Iran in Iraq – as well as Iran in the rest of the region – not to mention that the United States will face major Iraqi hostility over its use of force in Iraq despite opposition from the Iraqi government. The United States has again slashed its official presence in Iraq, and the U.S. Ambassador has warned U.S. citizens to leave the country. At the same time, Iraq has no clear path towards unity, the creation of either a workable political system or an effective government, or the prospects of economic recovery. Coping with a new crisis of each given day often seems beyond America’s reach. US campaign against Iran threatens Iraqi stability, most Iraqis oppose both US and Iran Dogantekin 20~-~-Vakkas Dogantekin, Iran surrounded by dozens of US bases as tension grows, AA News, 1/8/20, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/iran-surrounded-by-dozens-of-us-bases-as-tension-grows/1696692 Iraq U.S. military involvement in Iraq goes back to the 1991 Gulf War when it imposed no-fly zones over the country. The U.S. would later invade Iraq in 2003 as part of its highly-criticized war on terror campaign, establishing a presence of ground troops. After then-Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was overthrown and executed in December 2006, Washington sought to withdraw in 2011. However, the Pentagon redeployed thousands of troops three years later following the partial takeover of the country by the Daesh/ISIS terror group. Though both helped Iraqi security forces expel the Daesh/ISIS threat, the U.S. and Iran have frequently accused each other of hostile acts. Washington's "maximum pressure" campaign against Tehran and random rocket attacks by Iran-backed groups against U.S. military targets in the region threaten the stability of Iraq and neighboring countries at a time when two hostile foreign powers ~-~- both calling Iraq an ally ~-~- lock heads on Iraqi territory. Most Iraqis express deep opposition to both American and Iranian influence in their country, staging mass protests against their government's passive policies for months. Following Soleimani's death, some Iraqis were seen celebrating while another big crowd turned out to mourn. There are approximately 6,000 U.S. Special Operations Forces in Iraq, spread across seven different facilities, and another five bases in the country's northern semi-autonomous Kurdish region. US has no interest in Iraq Cordesman 20~-~-Anthony Cordesman, America’s Failed Strategy in the Middle East: Losing Iraq and the Gulf, CSIS, 1/2/20, https://www.csis.org/analysis/americas-failed-strategy-middle-east-losing-iraq-and-gulf These developments have led the United States to strip its Embassy down to even more of a core operation – and now it no longer has an effective civil presence in Iraq especially after the Ambassador warned U.S. citizens to leave after the killing of Solemani. The United States has focused almost exclusively on Iran and has shown no clear interest as of yet in either the future of Iraq or the U.S. role in the country. It seems all too possible that the end result could be another U.S. departure from Iraq – either because of Iraqi pressure or because of high-level decisions by the United States to cut its presence in Iraq to the point that it no longer is a major player. At best, the United States faces a remarkably difficult set of short-term challenges, at a time when an effective U.S. approach to Iraq not only requires the United States to deal with the most immediate problems but also requires a focus on the three long-term objectives addressed in this paper: US troop withdrawal from Iraq will cause anti-US militias to stop fighting govt MEPC 20~-~-Iraq after the U.S. Troop Withdrawal, Middle East Policy Council, 2020, https://mepc.org/commentary/iraq-after-us-troop-withdrawal In a recent article, the Iraqi daily Azzaman highlights these dilemmas and reports: “The government hopes its decision not to let U.S. troops stay in the country will spur armed groups to join its national reconciliation efforts....Many hope withdrawal will pull the carpet from underneath insurgent groups who have been tenaciously resisting U.S. presence in the country. For them U.S. presence has always been part of the problem and not solution. There are reports that some armed groups are in touch with the authorities, expressing a willingness to lay down arms and join national reconciliation....The government’s latest crackdown on what it terms ‘remnants of the former regime’ in which hundreds of former Baath party members have been incarcerated does not help in this direction.” No planning on Iraq issue, abandoned reform + never had active strat Cordesman 20~-~-Anthony Cordesman, America’s Failed Strategy in the Middle East: Losing Iraq and the Gulf, CSIS, 1/2/20, https://www.csis.org/analysis/americas-failed-strategy-middle-east-losing-iraq-and-gulf At the same time, focusing on the current crisis has now led to consistent failures in the U.S. strategy when dealing with Iraq and the Middle East for the last two decades – and has already turned two apparent “victories” into real world defeats. From the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003 to the present, the United States has never had a workable grand strategy for Iraq or any consistent plans and actions that have gone beyond current events. The United States has never defined workable grand strategic objectives, made effective efforts to create a stable post-conflict Iraq, or shown the Iraq people its presence actually serves their interests. At the same time, the Department of Defense has reported that it spent over $765 billion on the Iraq conflict and the fight against ISIS as of March 31, 2019 – and this is only a fraction of the direct cost. There is no clear stream of reporting on State or USAID spending, but it seems to have reached another $100 billion. The current Iraqi reaction to the U.S. military strikes in Iraq and the attacks on the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad warn that the United States may now be on the edge of snatching defeat from the jaws of “victory” for the third time since 2003. In round one, the United States invaded Iraq in 2003 to meet a non-existent threat of proliferation and drive Saddam Hussein from power. It scored a massive military victory with no plan for what would happen once Saddam was removed. The net impact resulted in crippled Iraqi military forces, deep sectarian conflict and ethnic divisions, the empowerment of Sunni extremists, and the creation of a new war. In round two, the United States and its allies ended up fighting these Islamic extremists from 2004 to 2010. Although the United States defeated these extremists in western Iraq with the aid of a massive surge of U.S. ground troops and the aid of Iraqi Sunni popular forces, the United States failed to create a stable Iraqi government and economy. The United States effectively abandoned its nation building efforts after 2009 and withdrew its combat forces at the end of 2011 – creating a power vacuum that opened up Iraq to ISIS – all the while, it was never able to decide on any active strategy for stabilizing Iraq or dealing with the Syrian civil war. It focused on defeating ISIS – relying heavily on Syrian Kurds in the process – and scored another “victory” in 2016-2018 by disbanding the ISIS “caliphate.” However, the United States never developed any meaningful plan for dealing with Iraq’s political and economic crises, for dealing with Syria, or even for dealing with the tens of thousands ISIS prisoners that its “victory” created. In the process, it opened up Syria to Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah. While the United States was able to partially rebuild Iraq’s official military forces, it also saw Iran create a powerful Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) tied to Iranian influence. The United States ultimately failed to ensure that most Iraqis saw the critical role that U.S. advisors and airpower played in defeating ISIS, to make any clear efforts to reform a failed Iraq government or boost the Iraqi economy, or to ensure that the populated areas shattered by the fighting would be rebuilt or receive effective aid. Round three is still taking form, but no one can accuse the United States for not having any coherent strategy while dealing with an Iraqi political system that has no cohesion – its government so hopelessly corrupt and ineffective – and an economy that has been in a state of crisis as it failed to develop since at least the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War in 1979. There is no real Iraq government, just an acting Prime Minister and a President with no real power. The United States had some 5,200 advisors and train and assist forces trying to rebuild the Iraq military forces for the second time since 2003, however, it has no clear plan for the future, has done nothing to convince the Iraqis that U.S. efforts are in their interest, and has effectively abandoned any serious efforts at economic reform, stability, and growth. Iran has committed many errors of its own, but it clearly is seeking to push the United States out of Iraq as it has strong ties to key militias and Shiite political movements. The United States has the bare shell of a full embassy, no clear plans to influence Iraq’s future, and a U.S. President who talks about withdrawal as well as a level of victory over ISIS that never occurred. US forces withdrawing from Iraq, w/France, Germany, Australia Loeb 20~-~-Saul Loeb, US forces ‘to start withdrawing from 15 bases in Iraq’, Middle East Monitor, 2/10/20, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200210-us-forces-to-start-withdrawing-from-15-bases-in-iraq/ US forces have started to withdraw from 15 bases across Iraq according to a report by Sky News Arabia. France, Germany and Australia have also submitted requests to the joint special operations command to set up the withdrawal of their own forces from the country, the chair of the Iraqi parliamentary defence committee, Badr Al-Ziyadi, is reported to have said by Bloomberg. US troops already withdrew from Iraq MEPC 20~-~-Iraq after the U.S. Troop Withdrawal, Middle East Policy Council, 2020, https://mepc.org/commentary/iraq-after-us-troop-withdrawal On December 15, U.S. troops in Baghdad lowered their flag, signaling the end of the American military mission in Iraq. The move comes after nearly 9 years of military action in the country, the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime and the sparking of sectarian warfare and strife, complicated by the involvement of al-Qaeda militants. In the wake of the official U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, many wonder what will become of the country and whether its notoriously fractious political system will be able to overcome the challenges coming its way. 15k workers at US embassy in Iraq after troop withdrawal MEPC 20~-~-Iraq after the U.S. Troop Withdrawal, Middle East Policy Council, 2020, https://mepc.org/commentary/iraq-after-us-troop-withdrawal Nonetheless, it is clear from early reports that the official withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq does not mean the end of American involvement in the country. The Iraqi Al Sumaria news, reporting on the fact that 15,000 employees will be working at the U.S. embassy in Iraq, cites “Iraqi Parliament Speaker Osama Al Nujaifi who considered, on Monday, that keeping 15 thousand employees at the U.S. embassy in Iraq after U.S. troops’ withdrawal is illogical. This issue requires answers from Iraqi government, Nujaifi revealed, indicating that the parliament will host Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Al Maliki to discuss Security Forces’ readiness at his return from Washington.” Asian fill-in has been happening for the last decade – won’t take sides like the US does Ulrichsen 20~-~-Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, REBALANCING REGIONAL SECURITY IN THE PERSIAN GULF, Baker Institute, 2/20, https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/de9f09e6/cme-pub-persiangulf-022420.pdf This final section analyzes how security trends in the Persian Gulf may evolve as diversifying security relationships further internationalize the region and U.S. interest (if not force projection) recedes. The four decades since 1979 gradually entrenched an increasingly zero-sum approach to regional affairs as relations between the U.S. and Iran, as well as Iran and Saudi Arabia, became polarized. It is likely that the convergence of several patterns described in this paper may shift this dynamic in a new and different direction in the 2020s. As the hitherto heavy reliance of GCC states on the U.S. for defense and security partnerships gives way to a multiplicity of such ties, it is improbable that states such as Russia, China, India, or Japan will pick sides in regional disputes to anything like the same degree the U.S. has done. The “Asianization” of the Persian Gulf is a process that has been unfolding since the 2000s in tandem with the broader realignment of world economic centers of gravity. Already by 2010, the volume of exports from the six GCC states to Japan, South Korea, India, and China was over three times higher than the combined export figure to the U.S. plus the (then) 27 EU member-states.56 Asian economic powerhouses are additionally far more dependent than Western states on the Persian Gulf (including Iran and Iraq) for energy imports. By 2019, Asian buyers accounted for more than 80 of crude oil and condensates that passed from Gulf ports through the Straits of Hormuz. China (19), India (16), Japan (15), and South Korea (13) were the four largest takers of Persian Gulf crude exports, compared with 6 for the U.S.57 Figures for July 2019 showed that Saudi Arabia exported 1.74 million barrels of crude oil per day to China compared with just 161,000 barrels per day to the U.S, while yearend figures for 2019 as a whole showed a 47 year-on-year jump in Chinese crude oil imports from Saudi Arabia. For the most part, inroads made by Asian economic partners in Persian Gulf states focused primarily on commercial and investment links and had at most only a limited security or defense component. Significant Chinese investments in Khalifa Port in Abu Dhabi and Duqm in Oman were designed to create regional hubs for Chinese industrial and manufacturing interests. 59 To the extent that these investments were part of China’s Belt and Road scheme, they represented “part of a much larger strategic approach to the Middle East.”60 While greater investment has been augmented by a series of Gulf port visits by Chinese naval vessels in recent years, China, as well as other states such as India, South Korea, and Japan, maintained a discreet security profile in the broader region, engaging on specific issues such as counter-piracy naval patrols off the coast of the Horn of Africa after 2008. 61 The importance of securing sea lines of communication was thus a motivating factor in policymaking circles in Beijing, Delhi, Seoul, and Tokyo, but in each case the focus was on addressing threats to maritime shipping on the open seas. Japan and China opened military bases in Djibouti, in 2011 and 2017 respectively, while India signed an agreement with Oman to establish a logistical support facility for the Indian Navy at Duqm in 2018, and South Korea worked closely with U.S.- and European-led counterpiracy missions in the Gulf of Aden off the Yemeni coastline.62 These initiatives resulted in an increase in the frequency and visibility of (primarily) naval activity in the broader region, but remained outside the Gulf and did not come close to approximating the network of U.S. bases and force deployments in the area. Some diversification of defense and security relationships in Gulf states had been underway for more than a decade. The UAE led the way through agreements with Australia in 2008 and France in 2009 that saw the stationing of contingents of Australian and French forces at, respectively, Al-Minhad outside Dubai and three French military facilities in Abu Dhabi.63 Security cooperation with South Korea intensified after the 2011 award of the contract to construct Abu Dhabi’s four nuclear reactors to a Korean consortium was accompanied by a clause in the agreement committing South Korea to provide military support to the UAE if requested, likely through Korean special forces that have been training Emirati counterparts.64 India and the UAE similarly set in motion a growing strategic alignment that focused initially on maritime security and naval cooperation that expanded in 2016 to encompass cybersecurity, counterterrorism, and civil nuclear cooperation.65 The UAE and Qatar (separately) developed closer operational links with NATO as did Kuwait, which opened NATO’s first Regional Center in the Gulf in 2017.66 As yet, however, there has been no credible alternative collective security arrangement to the U.S.-led structures described earlier in this paper, but the progressive internationalization of Gulf political economies and the gradual disengagement of U.S. interest, if not force, may change this over time. Russia and Iran both proposed new regional security frameworks that provide options for future hedging and balancing among regional states should doubts about U.S. intentions persist and intensify. Russia unveiled its “Collective Security Concept for the Persian Gulf Area” on July 23, 2019, which called for the removal of “extra-regional” foreign troops from the Gulf, the involvement of the United Nations and organizations such as the Arab League in multilateral tracks to resolve regional conflicts, and, longer-term, the creation of an Organization for Security and Cooperation in the Persian Gulf.67 Chinese support added geopolitical weight to the Russian proposal as a potential alternative, should concerns about what one analyst labeled “the reliability of the U.S. as the region’s sole security guarantor” continue to rise. 68 The Iranian proposal for a “Hormuz Peace Endeavor,” or HOPE, was presented in September 2019 by President Hasan Rouhani during the United Nations General Assembly and by Foreign Minister Javad Zarif to a meeting of the United Nations Security Council in New York.69 The HOPE initiative set out a list of “subject-oriented” principles it believed could form the basis for building coalitions of common interest, including respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, the peaceful settlement of disputes, arms control, energy security, and freedom of navigation. Like the Russian proposal, HOPE called for the active involvement of the United Nations in supporting a new regional security architecture, alongside the creation of a non-intervention and non-aggression pact by the states of the “Hormuz community,” and for the introduction of confidence building measures to increase regionwide communication and dialogue.70 US troops in region prevent alternative security architecture Ulrichsen 20~-~-Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, REBALANCING REGIONAL SECURITY IN THE PERSIAN GULF, Baker Institute, 2/20, https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/de9f09e6/cme-pub-persiangulf-022420.pdf Any search for an alternative security architecture in the Gulf is complicated by several factors. One is the incompatibility between the Iranian position on excluding “extraregional” forces from regional security arrangements and the practical reality of the existing network of American partnerships with GCC states, notwithstanding the growing doubts over U.S. reliability described above. Another is that for reasons of domestic politics, any leader, Iranian or American, would likely find it difficult to make (or even be seen to make) the first concessionary step toward dialogue or negotiation after the fallout from the JCPOA. Allies perceiving US weak turn to Russia and China Cropsey 19~-~-SETH CROPSEY, GARY ROUGHEAD, A U.S. Withdrawal Will Cause a Power Struggle in the Middle East, Foreign Policy, 12/17/19, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/17/us-withdrawal-power-struggle-middle-east-china-russia-iran/ The strength of hegemonic powers waxes and wanes, and allies respond accordingly. In 2018, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made the first visit to China by a Japanese leader in seven years. There, he and Chinese President Xi Jinping agreed to elevate bilateral relations. Although Benjamin Netanyahu was first elected prime minister of Israel in 1996, he only visited Russia for the first time during his third term, in 2013. (He did not serve as prime minister during the decade from 1999 to 2009.) Since then he has been to the country 11 times, indicating that staunch allies that had previously relied on the United States for security now sense the need to open lines of communication with its adversaries. China/Russia won’t seek heg in Middle East Karlin 19—Mara Karlin, America’s Middle East Purgatory, Foreign Affairs, Jan-Feb 2019, https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/Enduring20American20Presence20in20the20Middle20East.pdf A clear-eyed approach also requires accepting that China or Russia (or both) will likely gain more of a footing in the Middle East as the United States pulls back. The good news is that neither power is likely to make a real bid for regional hegemony. So far, China has established itself in the region by gingerly stepping around multiple conflicts, seeking friendships and trade relationships while carefully avoiding taking sides in any rivalries. The crass views of power and money evident in Russia’s involvement in Syria, where Kremlin-linked mercenary firms have fought for Assad and gained lucrative oil profits, suggest that regional governments will face a strict quid pro quo from Moscow, not the kind of reliable partnerships the United States has traditionally provided. Setting Syria aside, Russia’s role in the region has been similar to China’s: free-riding on U.S. security guarantees while using diplomacy and commercial ties to make friends as widely as possible without offering unique guarantees to any one party. Russia doesn’t want to take on security guarantees Noack 20~-~-Rick Noack, Here’s what might happen if the U.S. were to suddenly quit Iraq, Washington Post, 1/10/20, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/01/09/heres-what-might-happen-if-us-were-suddenly-quit-iraq/ Russia won’t (and can’t) step into the vacuum Becca Wasser, a senior policy analyst at the Rand Corporation think tank, researching Russia’s role in the Middle East “If U.S. troops were to withdraw,” she wrote in an email, “Russia will welcome this move and will make noise to fill this vacuum.” “But it won’t step up to the plate as Iraq’s new security guarantor or seek to build a military presence in Iraq,” she wrote. “Ultimately, Russia does not want to take on an outsized role in Iraq. It wants to remain on the fringes of politics and not get embroiled in disputes among Iraqi stakeholders. It wants to sell weapons to Baghdad to gain money and make them reliant on Russian equipment, but it doesn’t want to become responsible for Iraq’s security as a security guarantor. It wants to be a presence in Iraq to annoy the United States and take advantage of opportunities created by Washington’s missteps, but it doesn’t want to be responsible for Iraq in the same manner that the United States has since 2003.” Russia prioritizes its dominance over alliance w/Iran Cropsey 19~-~-SETH CROPSEY, GARY ROUGHEAD, A U.S. Withdrawal Will Cause a Power Struggle in the Middle East, Foreign Policy, 12/17/19, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/17/us-withdrawal-power-struggle-middle-east-china-russia-iran/ Russia has made serious progress toward fulfilling its Middle Eastern strategic objectives of maintaining a decisive hand in the region’s politics, a year-round ice-free port, and a portal through which to influence events beyond the eastern Mediterranean. Russian President Vladimir Putin has no desire to imperialize the Middle East in a manner akin to the Russian Empire’s conquest of Central Asia in the 19th century. Having obtained air and naval bases at Khmeimim and Tartus, both in Syria, Russia can once again turn its focus toward Europe. Still, the Kremlin likely prefers whatever political arrangement will most quickly secure its position as the Middle East’s predominant power, even if that puts it at odds with its erstwhile Iranian ally. Nonstate forces will continue to play a crucial role in the strategic balance. The Kurds are arguably the most relevant of these, because of their highly disruptive presence in Turkish, Iraqi, Iranian, and Syrian national politics and, additionally, because their transnational character gives them the ability to stoke interstate conflict. Iran’s significance will, as a result of its economic woes, likely continue to decline, but the political vacuum it helped create in Iraq and Syria will persist, giving Russia and especially Iran the diplomatic cover to expand their influence. Fill-in leads to more equitable policy, diplomacy increased since Suleimani – both sides want de-escalation Ulrichsen 20~-~-Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, REBALANCING REGIONAL SECURITY IN THE PERSIAN GULF, Baker Institute, 2/20, https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/de9f09e6/cme-pub-persiangulf-022420.pdf Looking further ahead, the steady diversification of economic and energy relationships will give a greater array of international partners a direct stake in regional stability in the Persian Gulf. Even if this translates only gradually into more visible involvement in security arrangements, it is unlikely that the nations expected to figure prominently in political and economic partnerships in the 2020s will “pick sides” to anything like the same extent the U.S. has done in the region since 1979. This, alone, may be expected to lead to a rebalancing as partner-states resist pressures to get involved in regional standoffs and instead opt to maintain broadly equitable (even if largely separate, at first) relations with all; an early example of this was a trilateral naval exercise conducted by Iran with Russia and China in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Oman in December 2019, which focused on anti-piracy and search-and-rescue operations.75 Since the Soleimani killing, diplomacy in the Gulf has intensified with the Qatar and Omani foreign ministers as well as the emir of Qatar all traveling to Iran, and leaders in every capital, including Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, expressing the importance of de-escalating tension.76 The restraining effect of the demonstration of Iranian threat and concern at the U.S. response has been palpable as regional leaders gear up for Dubai’s World Expo 2020 and Saudi Arabia’s G-20 Summit, and raises the possibility that future regional security arrangements might be based on more realistic balance of power projections. The trends that are gradually reshaping the international relations of the Persian Gulf did not begin with the Trump administration, but they may just have an outcome that is longer-lasting and more durable. US troop withdrawal ? Russia would manage peace btwn Saudis and Iran Cropsey 19~-~-SETH CROPSEY, GARY ROUGHEAD, A U.S. Withdrawal Will Cause a Power Struggle in the Middle East, Foreign Policy, 12/17/19, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/17/us-withdrawal-power-struggle-middle-east-china-russia-iran/ The unique mix of political forces in the Middle East suggests three possibilities in the event of U.S. naval withdrawal from the region, and none favor U.S. interests. First, Russia may broker a political arrangement among Turkey, Israel, and Iran, or, alternatively, support a coalition pitting some of those states against another in an effort to manufacture a manageable regional balance of power and allowing it to shift its attention back to Europe. The final shape of this strategy would depend on several variables: Turkey’s approach to Syria, Israel’s posture against Iran (and its proxies), the outcome of Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen, the Kurdish question, and the possibility of the Islamic State’s resurgence. Regardless of these factors, Russia will still bid for control of the Mediterranean Sea, which the United States will be hard-pressed to counter, particularly if China can manipulate its European economic partners into limiting or expelling the U.S. Navy from its Mediterranean bases. If that happens, Washington will have to fight its way back into the region for the first time since World War II. Fill-in escapes bipolar antagonism Ulrichsen 20~-~-Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, REBALANCING REGIONAL SECURITY IN THE PERSIAN GULF, Baker Institute, 2/20, https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/de9f09e6/cme-pub-persiangulf-022420.pdf A way of getting around these rigidities might be the addition (rather than removal) of participants in regional security, which is what both the Russian and the Iranian proposals moved toward. Over time, the “multilateralization” of the Gulf security architecture could potentially overcome the hitherto binary divisions between Iran and the U.S. and its partners over the function and role of external forces in the region. Appeals for greater inclusivity and burden sharing might also address concerns expressed in regional capitals and by the Trump administration in recent years. Officials in most of the GCC states were angered by their exclusion from the negotiations between the international community (represented by the P5+1) and Iran that culminated in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2015, and are likely to demand greater involvement should talks on a “new” nuclear deal ever become a possibility.71 A new framework for negotiations that includes regional states would expand the range of stakeholders in the outcome of any eventual agreement and overcome the lack of local “buy-in” that undermined the JCPOA. US will maintain Middle East heg even after pullout Karlin 19—Mara Karlin, America’s Middle East Purgatory, Foreign Affairs, Jan-Feb 2019, https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/Enduring20American20Presence20in20the20Middle20East.pdf Given the relatively limited ambitions of China and Russia, and how well the United States has demonstrated the immense price of being the regional security manager, Washington should be able to retain the preponderance of power in the Middle East even after pulling back. Yet if one of its core partners or interests is threatened, it will need to be prepared to change course.	904,713
365,674	379,647	TOC Neg 4	Trump wants withdrawal b/c believes Middle East should be more self-reliant, wants to sell them arms Tisdall 20~-~-Simon Tisdall, Why instinct and ideology tell Trump to get out of the Middle East, The Guardian, 1/11/20, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jan/11/why-instinct-and-ideology-tell-trump-to-get-out-of-the-middle-east-suleimani-iran Geopolitical priorities are shifting, too. The US is more focused nowadays on China as an economic and military rival, and on defending its interests across the Asia-Pacific region, than on curbing Russian influence or fixing the Middle East. Trump believes his allies in the region, like Nato’s European members, should be more self-reliant – and is happy to sell them expensive US weaponry to that end. The US certainly worries about Iran’s behaviour and jihadist terrorism. Trump craves the kudos of brokering a peace deal in Palestine. But Beijing’s military expansionism, its belt and road “debt diplomacy”, open trade lanes in the South China Sea, and democracy in Taiwan and Hong Kong are Washington’s bigger, long-term concerns. US overall forces overseas shrinking, only 9 of US forces deployed Cordesman 19~-~-Anthony Cordesman, The Gulf Military Balance and U.S. Commitments to the Gulf, CSIS, 12/9/19, https://www.csis.org/analysis/gulf-military-balance-and-us-commitments-gulf The Shrinking Size of US Overseas Deployments Major cuts have taken place in the number of U.S. military forces deployed overseas since the end of the Cold War, and in the number deployed in the Gulf region since the U.S. withdrew most of its land combat forces in 2011. Graphs based on DoD data show that only 9 of U.S. forces are now deployed in Permanent Change of Station positions overseas. Only 14,611 of these personnel are deployed in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. If combat personnel and personnel at sea are added, the total only seems to rise to average levels around 24,000, with some 17,000 on land. In contrast, an IISS estimate for 2018 is higher. It shows these totals as 25,500 in Gulf countries, and 36,954 in MENA and Other Gulf-related countries – plus more at sea. Current strat = relying exclusively on military instead of using diplomacy; downsizing civilian tools Trades off with Pacific Jon B. Alterman, 5-15-2019, "Who Wins When US-Iran Tensions Rise? China," Defense One,JL https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/05/who-wins-when-us-iran-tensions-rise-china/157050/ China’s Iran dealings also help it make money across the Gulf in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, who are eager to keep Beijing from falling firmly into the Iranian camp. Saudi Arabia exports more oil to China than Iran does. That is partly because the Saudis want to be present in the world’s largest oil import market, but partly also because the Saudis want to influence Chinese decisions. Third, growing tensions with Iran now draw U.S. attention, troops, and materiel away from the Western Pacific. While the United States was enmeshed in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan for the first decade of this century, China aggressively expanded its military operations in the South China Sea, and Chinese commercial and diplomatic ties exploded across the Asian continent. U.S. Central Command’s desire to keep an aircraft carrier — or two — in and around the Persian Gulf has kept the U.S. footprint lighter in East Asia. A United States that is focused on the Middle East isn’t focused on China. Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, U.S. tensions with Iran have driven a remarkable wedge between the United States and its allies. The Iranian nuclear deal represented a rare moment of international comity, bringing together the United States, Russia, China, and Europe to constrain Tehran’s nuclear program. By abandoning the deal, the Trump administration has fractured the Western alliance, raising tensions with its closest allies and bringing them closer to the Chinese position. Beijing has no allies, and it much prefers a world of bilateral relationships. In these equations, China is the stronger party in every relationship except with the United States. Pentagon wants an East Asian pivot O’Brien, Connor. “The Pentagon wants money for China, but troops are stuck in the Middle East” Politico. February 8, 2020AB https://www.politico.com/news/2020/02/08/pentagon-china-middle-east-112250 The administration’s National Defense Strategy, unveiled in 2018, places a priority on competition with Russia and China after nearly two decades of counterterrorism operations, largely in the Middle East and Afghanistan. The blueprint has proved popular on Capitol Hill, where both parties have called for adapting to meet new threats and pleas to wind down decades of war are gaining traction. But Democrats say they’re wary about the Pentagon's commitment to that strategy as tensions simmer over Soleimani’s killing, which prompted Iran to retaliate with a missile strike against bases in Iraq that house U.S. troops. "I don't think anything's changed since the National Defense Strategy was implemented that warrants us picking an extended fight with Iran,” House Armed Services Chairman Adam Smith (D-Wash.) said, adding that the president's actions are hurting the Pentagon’s ability to make the case for his budget. “And I think it does undermine those larger issues and is not in our best interests." “I do not know what this president will do next,” added Rep. Andy Kim (D-N.J.), a former National Security Council official. “I see no consistency in his actions, and he doesn't seem to be anchored in the security documents that his own administration has put forward.” Sen. Tammy Duckworth (D-Ill.) questioned the administration’s commitment to its stated strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. "I think we have taken our eye off the ball there," she said. “We say we're going to do it, but then we send more troops to Saudi Arabia, which doesn't help." Just weeks after rebuking Trump on Iran, House Democrats last month passed even more legislation to limit the president's military options in the Middle East. The looming spending crunch The Pentagon also faces growing competition for its dollars. The department is expected to fork over another $7.2 billion from its budget this year to help fund a wall on the U.S.-Mexico border, after the administration shifted $6.1 billion in military funds last year toward the effort. The $13.3 billion total, some lawmakers have noted, is enough to buy a Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft carrier. And the defense budget is set to flatten after several increases by Trump and Republican defense hawks. An independent commission recommended annual budget increases of 3 to 5 percent to carry out the National Defense Strategy. But a two-year budget deal struck by congressional leaders and the White House last summer essentially keeps the budget flat through fiscal 2021, the final year of mandatory caps on spending. Defense Secretary Mark Esper and other brass are increasingly predicting static budgets and emphasizing the need to find savings internally to reinvest in the programs crucial to carrying out the strategy. Walking and chewing gum The Pentagon acknowledged that it must find a way to both focus on the long-term goals of countering Russia and China, while continuing to deal with regional issues with countries such as North Korea and Iran. “The goal is that we need to shift our focus to the Indo-Pacific, we need to shift our resources and our eyes that way, but we got to do it while still engaging with the current threats and the current crises,” Pentagon spokesperson Jonathan Hoffman said at a briefing last month. “We’re going to be able to walk and chew gum at the same time.” The administration has so far escaped the choice between the National Defense Strategy and regional conflicts by adding money to the Pentagon’s budget so it can invest in the conflict in the Middle East and future capabilities to counter Russia and China. But a strict top line budget for the Pentagon in fiscal 2021 means that’s no longer possible, and services may have to pick one or the other. “I think the next budget is going to bring these issues to the fore because services will propose cutting force structure to invest in high tech programs aimed at great power conflict,” said Mark Cancian, who worked on Pentagon budget strategy at the Office of Management and Budget for seven years. “Those force structure cuts, like the Navy proposing to retire ships early or the Air Force proposing to retire aircraft, will cause the Congress to balk.” Some cuts coming Some of this has already begun to come true. A Navy memo to the Office of Management and Budget showed that the service wants to make cuts to the fleet, but the White House instead asked the Navy to stick with the administration’s plan to grow to 355 ships from 293 now. One way the Pentagon can keep pursuing both missions without increasing the budget is to get international partners to pick up some of the slack, Hoffman suggested. “Part of this is our efforts to get our allies and partners to increase their funding so we can maybe shift over to some different missions,” he said. Despite the perception problem, the immediate crisis with Iran is unlikely to affect the Pentagon’s fiscal 2021 budget request, planning for which was well underway before the Iran situation heated up in late December. Reaching the goals laid out by the National Defense Strategy requires investing in research and development for future technology such as hypersonic weapons and the procurement of advanced ships or planes, which can take years to bring into the force. “The money that’s going to deal with Russia and China is primarily research money … and procurement money,” said Dov Zakheim, who served as the Pentagon’s comptroller in George W. Bush’s administration. “That doesn’t really change because of this Iran crisis, because this is an immediate crisis, whereas procurement … could take … years.” By the time the new fiscal year begins on Oct. 1, the country may have moved past the current tensions with Iran. Zakheim added it’s more likely the Pentagon could ask for a supplemental budget request for fiscal 2020, something that would be required only if the president grows the military footprint in the Middle East considerably. Going back for more money But some experts predicted even the warfighting account for "overseas contingencies operations" won’t see massive growth. “Keep in mind that the operations against Libya in 2011 did not change the OCO budget, and those operations came in as something under $1 billion,” Cancian said. “With that as a precedent, what’s going on now wouldn’t push an administration to ask for more money. You would have to have a much higher level of activity before they go through the hassle and political price.” The gap between where the Trump administration wants to focus its attention and where the world is in turmoil is reminiscent of the Obama White House’s attempt to “pivot to the Pacific,” Cancian said. Shortly after the former president announced a renewed focus on the Pacific and China, Russia invaded the Crimean Peninsula in Ukraine and the Islamic State rose to power in the Middle East, forcing the White House to direct its focus and funding back to the Middle East and Europe. “The Trump administration is having some of that experience, that it wants to reorient on great power conflict and it’s being pulled back into regional conflicts,” Cancian said. “My argument is that it’s just not realistic to believe we can disengage from these kinds of conflicts and global commitments to focus on great power competition.” Never really leaving Defense hawks agree and are quick to note that, regardless of the Pentagon’s focus on Russia and China, the U.S will still need to remain involved in the Middle East. Ultimately, the National Defense Strategy is about making a priority of great power competition rather than abandoning the Middle East, said Rep. Mac Thornberry, the top Republican on the House Armed Services Committee. US military is limited and declining in Indo-Pacific Region, China’s rising Doherty, Ben. “US defence strategy in Indo-Pacific region faces 'unprecedented crisis'” The Guardian. August 18, 2019AB https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/aug/19/us-defence-strategy-in-indo-pacific-region-faces-unprecedented-crisis America’s military authority is waning and it is ill-prepared to go to war with China in the Indo-Pacific region, a new report from the United States Studies Centre has warned, arguing Australia must move towards a shared reliance on a network of allies, in particular Asian militaries such as Japan, for its security. The report, Averting Crisis, says America’s defence strategy in the Indo-Pacific region is in “the throes of an unprecedented crisis”, created by a mismatch between its ambition to remain the region’s dominant military power, and an overstretched armed force with falling and failing resources. “Faced with an increasingly contested regional security landscape and with limited defence resources at its disposal, the United States military is no longer assured of its ability to single-handedly uphold a favourable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific,” the report, by the US Studies Centre’s Ashley Townshend and Brendan Thomas-Noone, says. “China, by contrast, is growing ever more capable of challenging the regional order by force as a result of its large-scale investment in advanced military systems.” The US will remain influential – it still spends broadly as much on defence as the next eight largest national defence budgets combined – but its military has been overstretched by two decades of counter-insurgency wars in the Middle East, and faces continuing global commitments, ageing equipment, and training cuts. And while America wants to remain the dominant military power in the Indo-Pacific region, it faces growing deficits and rising public debt, as well as political resistance to continuing increases in military spending. The US has been forced to prioritise “the urgent over the important,” Townshend told the Guardian. “China, by contrast, doesn’t yet have global responsibilities, it has regional responsibilities.” Australia can no longer rely on the US alone for its security in the Indo-Pacific region, and should boost its “collective defence” networks, aggregating its military capabilities with those of allied nations such as Japan, the report says. Townshend says Australia should also look to increase co-operation with other militaries in the region, such as Vietnam, Malaysia and Singapore. “The US has said Asia is their priority, but they don’t behave like it is. A strategy of collective defence is fast becoming necessary as a way of offsetting shortfalls in America’s regional military power and holding the line against rising Chinese strength.” The report says Australia should also consider acquiring its own land-based anti-ship missiles – a move forecast in the 2016 defence white paper – and increase its stockpiles of munitions and fuel “required for high-end conflict”. US-China relations have deteriorated over the past year, ostensibly over trade, but the rhetoric over other points of tension – in particular Chinese militarisation in the South China Sea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan – has grown increasingly belligerent in recent months. Australia , a strategic ally of the US, has found itself consistently dragged into the dispute. Security Commitments bad, leads to violent allies Thrall, Trevor. “US Grand Strategy in the 21st Century: The Case For Restraint” Routledge Press. Feb 14, 2018AB Trevor Thrall is associate professor at the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University and a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. https://books.google.com/books?id=eO4rDwAAQBAJandpg=PT66andlpg=PT66anddq=22Today,+however,+the+risk+of+entrapment+born+of+moral+hazard+and+states27+search+for+security+is+larger+and+possibly+increasing22andsource=blandots=45SbD4tsFNandsig=ACfU3U3p36k5yKzG7su8rNc0qLXS3eUX2gandhl=enandsa=Xandved=2ahUKEwiroMuRy7XkAhWhNn0KHQXBCX8Q6AEwAHoECAAQAQ#v=onepageandq=22Today2C20however2C20the20risk20of20entrapment20born20of20moral20hazard20and20states'20search20for20security20is20larger20and20possibly20increasing22andf=false The preceding discussion (summarized in Table 2.1) has large implications for the United States. During the Cold War, bipolarity constrained the importance of allies, limiting the risk of entrapment. Moreover, the prospect of nuclear war discouraged risky behavior by the superpowers and their allies. Today, however, the risk of entrapment born of moral hazard and states' search for security is larger and possibly increasing. As long as the US continues to make commitments overseas and fear the emergence of a peer competitor, American partners will be tempted to act in risky ways, expecting that Washington will feel compelled to come to their rescue should they get into trouble. Insofar as the United States opposes Chinese or Russian aggression, smaller states will be tempted to provoke China or Russia to garner growing American support. If the United States is opposed to the emergence of great power peer competitors, then it may well opt to come to the aid of smaller states threatened by those potential competitors. This also means that countries that have limited or no explicit security commitments from the United States may try to profit from the insurance policy offered by the United States by provoking conflicts and expecting the United States - whose interests are clear - to ride to their defense. In the next section, we take a preliminary look at some evidence to test these claims. We focus on events in East and Southeast Asia over the last few years. Some have characterized Chinese aggression in recent years as reactionary. That is, China has felt compelled to respond to perceived provocations from smaller Asian nations such as the Philippines and Vietnam. Any increase in East Asian militarization will spark a cycle, risks war Partner, Simon. “It’s time to demilitarize East Asia” The Hill. September 23, 2017AB https://thehill.com/opinion/international/352035-its-time-to-demilitarize-east-asia The current instability in East Asia is the product of unresolved Cold War tensions. The U.S. maintains enormous military garrisons in Japan and South Korea despite the putative end of the Cold War. A “pacifist” Japan continues to depend on the U.S. for its security in the face of Chinese military expansion and threats. Both China and North Korea respond to the perceived threat from the U.S. presence with massive new weapons programs. The U.S. responds, in turn, with increased military commitments. And so the cycle continues. If the goal of increased militarization is enhanced security, it is not working. Indeed, the danger of a catastrophic confrontation in East Asia is higher than at any time since the Korean War. Arms race increase the chance of war by 5 times, disputes 2 times Gilber, Douglas. “Taking Arms against a Sea of Troubles: Conventional Arms Races during Periods of Rivalry” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 42, No. 2 (Mar., 2005)AB https://www.jstor.org/stable/30042270?seq=1 (https://sci-hub.tw/https://www.jstor.org/stable/30042270) In addition to escalation, arms races seem to have an important substantive impact on the likelihood of conflict, especially in comparison with the other variables in our models. For example, as Table II shows, the chance of a MID for strategic rivals more than doubles, from 16 on average to 35 during an arms race year, and the chance of war changes raises 5 times from 1 in 100 to 1 in 20 during arms race years. Sparks hardliner views in BOTH countries, continued containment causes nuclear war Elbaum, Max. “Climate Change. War. Poverty. How the U.S.-China Relationship Will Shape Humanity’s Path” Portside. April 4, 2019AB Max Elbaum is author of Revolution in the Air, recently reissued by Verso Books, and an editor of Organizing Upgrade https://portside.org/2019-04-04/climate-change-war-poverty-how-us-china-relationship-will-shape-humanitys-path Dangers and prospects To say all this is dangerous is an understatement. The costs of a ramped-up trade war would fall hardest on the working classes in both U.S. and China—and if it leads to a global downturn, on workers and the poor across the globe. Calls to “get tough on China” are, at bottom, ways of shifting blame for people's economic woes away from the U.S. corporate elite. As Tobita Chow explained in July for In These Times, they tap into and reinforce the anti-Chinese racism long present in U.S. politics and marginalize even the idea of solidarity between workers in both countries. And the multi-front Cold War described by Michael Klare means constant tension, with the very real danger that an initially small flashpoint conflict could escalate into full-scale, even nuclear, war. Short of short open conflict, constant tension between Washington and Beijing increases the influence of nationalism, militarism and authoritarianism in both countries, which almost inevitably translates into increases in domestic repression of popular movements, as well as austerity. What does all this mean for the left? There are important debates on the nature of China's social system and the impact of its geopolitical and global economic strategies. But regardless of one's position in those debates, the U.S. left has a critical role to play in galvanizing opposition to the growing clamor for confrontation in U.S.-China relations. We can do this. But we need a vision and practice that speaks to both humanity's common interest in sheer survival and the global working class' interest in a just and non-exploitative society. We should prioritize the fight for a 180-degree turnaround in the U.S. stance toward China, demanding that diplomacy and negotiation replace trade wars and military encirclement. We should call for a switch from the goal of “containing China” to the goal of forging a U.S. China partnership that would take common action against climate change and support a global campaign to address extreme poverty worldwide. This China-focused effort would be one component of a campaign to de-escalate all global conflicts, and turn to diplomacy over military force. Such a campaign should push the U.S. government to abandon pursuit of hegemony in favor or acceptance of the fact that we all live in a multi-polar world where, as Martin Luther King declared in 1983, “We must learn to live together as brothers sic or perish together as fools.” Making progress on this front will be a challenge, not least because of the barrage of punditry and dominant media framing about China, which focuses exclusively on (often legitimate) grievances and problems—and presents a one-sided picture of a complex society. Fear of containment leads to hardliners Zhang, Feng. “The Fight Inside China Over the South China Sea”. Foreign Policy. June 23, 2016AB https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/23/the-fight-inside-china-over-the-south-china-sea-beijing-divided-three-camps/ The rest of China is debating what China’s strategy toward the South China Sea should be. This is an important fact. It suggests that China’s South China Sea policy has not hardened yet, and is thus malleable. The international community — especially the United States and ASEAN — should create favorable conditions for shaping China’s policy toward a more conciliatory and cooperative direction. In particular, they should help raise the importance of the moderates in Chinese decision-making, turning them from a minority view to a majority consensus. The unfortunate effect of some of the rhetoric from U.S. officials about Chinese “hegemony” in East Asia is to confirm the hardliners’ view that the United States wants to contain China, thus undermining the moderates’ position within China’s domestic debate. Among the three schools discussed above, only hardliners unequivocally seek some sort of military hegemony. If American officials take this view as China’s national policy, they will simply talk past their more moderate Chinese interlocutors, creating a potentially dangerous communication gap between the two sides. Military Hegemony is unstable with China, sparks arms race Swaine, Michael. “The Real Challenge in the Pacific” Foreign Affairs. April 20, 2015AB Senior Associate in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2015-04-20/real-challenge-pacific For analysts such as Krepinevich, it is axiomatic that rising powers such as China seek hard power dominance and that the central challenge for currently dominant powers such as the United States is how to prevent them from doing so. This sort of zero-sum thinking—which is increasingly common on both sides of the Pacific—polarizes the region and undermines the goals of continued peace and prosperity toward which all strive. Both sides would benefit from a different approach, one that moved from a growing contest over U.S. predominance in the region to a genuine, long-term balance of power in the western Pacific resting on mutual military and political restraint and accommodation, as well as new policy initiatives designed to reduce the volatility of flash points such as the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan. Virtually all U.S. officials and many Asian leaders believe that American military predominance in the maritime realm has provided the foundation for a 70-year period of relative peace and prosperity throughout most of the Asia-Pacific region, forestalling arms races and militarized disputes and permitting a sustained focus on peaceful economic development. Many Chinese, however, believe that in an increasingly multipolar and interdependent world, order and prosperity should rely on a roughly equal balance of power, both globally and among the region’s major nations, which should cooperate in managing common challenges, working whenever possible through international institutions such as the United Nations. To some extent, these views are self-serving. Washington benefits enormously from a U.S.-led international order in which its views and preferences are given special consideration, and Beijing would benefit from a more equal balance of power, which would give it a greater voice and check the United States. But elites in each country also genuinely think that their position accurately reflects the current and future reality of the international system. Americans generally believe that peace and stability flourish under American hegemony, which can and should be preserved, and their Chinese counterparts generally believe that such hegemony is an unfortunate historical anomaly that should give way to a more balanced distribution of power—and that it is doing so already. For most of the postwar era, these perspectives coexisted relatively easily, primarily because Beijing was too weak to push its own view and was able to rise steadily within the U.S.-sponsored order. But times have changed; China has outgrown its subordinate status and now feels strong enough to press its case in the western Pacific. This development should not be surprising to anyone who understands modern Chinese history and great-power transitions. Beijing has an ongoing incentive to work with Washington and the West to sustain continued economic growth and to address a growing array of common global and regional concerns, from pandemics to climate change to terrorism. At the same time, it understandably wishes to reduce its vulnerability to potential future threats from the United States and other nations while increasing its overall influence along its strategically important maritime periphery. As its overseas power and influence grow, its foreign interests expand, and its domestic nationalist backers become more assertive, Beijing will naturally become less willing to accept unconditionally military, political, and economic relationships and structures that it believes disproportionately and unjustly favor Western powers. And it will increasingly worry that Washington might resort to pressure or force to try to undermine Chinese security moves in the western Pacific and head off the United States’ impending relative decline. Many Chinese observers now believe that Beijing’s past weakness and its need to cooperate with the United States and the West in general have made it too accommodating or passive in dealing with perceived challenges ?to China’s vital national interests, from U.S. support for Taiwan and Asian disputants over maritime claims to close-up U.S. surveillance and other intelligence-gathering activities along the Chinese coast. The more extreme variants of this nationalist viewpoint threaten to transform China’s long-standing “peaceful development” policy, which focuses on the maintenance of amicable relations with the United States and other powers, into a more hard-edged approach aimed at more actively undermining U.S. influence in Asia. The so-called bottom-line concept of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s foreign policy is an apparent step in this direction, stressing in an unprecedented manner the need for China to stand resolute in managing territorial and sovereignty issues in the East China and South China Seas. Observing these stirrings, meanwhile, many American and other foreign observers see the beginnings of a larger effort to eject the United States from Asia and eventually replace it as the regional, and possibly even global, superpower. China’s greater assertiveness regarding maritime territorial disputes and U.S. and Japanese intelligence and surveillance activities along its coastline are interpreted as tests of U.S. and allied resolve, a prelude to the creation of no-go zones essential for the establishment of Chinese control over the western Pacific. In this view, the proper course of action for Washington is to decisively disabuse Beijing of its aspirations by enhancing U.S. predominance, increasing Chinese vulnerability in the western Pacific, and making clear who is boss, right up to China’s 12-nautical-mile territorial waters. The problem with this outlook—implicit in the concept of Archipelagic Defense that Krepinevich proposes—is that it misdiagnoses China’s motivations and thus exacerbates, rather than mitigates, the underlying problem. Beijing’s de facto attempts to limit or end U.S. predominance along its maritime periphery are motivated by uncertainty, insecurity, and opportunism rather than a grand strategic vision of Chinese predominance. Chinese leaders today are not trying to carve out an exclusionary sphere of influence, especially in hard-power terms; they are trying to reduce their considerable vulnerability and increase their political, diplomatic, and economic leverage in their own backyard. This is a much less ambitious and in many ways more understandable goal for a continental great power. It does not necessarily threaten vital U.S. or allied interests, and it can and should be met with understanding rather than defensive aggressiveness. Continued U.S. predominance in the western Pacific cannot be justified by the need to resist a Chinese drive to replace it, nor is it necessary in order to ensure regional (and global) order. It is inconceivable that Beijing will accept U.S. predominance in perpetuity and that it will grant the United States complete freedom of action in the Pacific and recognize its ability to prevail militarily in a potential conflict. Trying to sustain such predominance, therefore, is actually the quickest route to instability, practically guaranteeing an arms race, increased regional polarization, and reduced cooperation between Washington and Beijing on common global challenges. And even if some Chinese leaders were tempted to accept continued U.S. predominance, they would almost certainly end up meeting fierce and sustained domestic criticism for doing so as China’s power grows and would likely end ?up reversing course to ensure their political survival. Trying to sustain American military predominance in the region, meanwhile, will become increasingly difficult and expensive. A recent study by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (which I co-authored) on the long-term security environment in Asia concluded that the United States will remain the strongest military power on a global level for many years to come. But this study also found that Washington will almost certainly confront increasingly severe economically induced limitations on its defense spending that will constrain its efforts to keep well ahead of a growing Chinese military and paramilitary presence within approximately 1,500 nautical miles of the Chinese coastline (that is, the area covered by the so-called first and second island chains). The barriers to maritime predominance, however, apply to China as well as the United States. The Carnegie Endowment study also concluded that U.S. military power in Asia will almost certainly remain very strong and that even increased Chinese regional military capabilities will not offer Beijing unambiguous superiority. Any Chinese attempt to establish predominance in Asia would fail, therefore, both because it would be difficult for China to surpass the United States and because a scenario of this kind would frighten bystanders and drive them into Washington’s arms. Chinese leaders understand this and so are highly unlikely to seek predominance if they feel that they can achieve a decent amount of security in less confrontational ways. They are likely to seek some form of predominance (as opposed to acting merely opportunistically and in a more limited manner) only if Washington’s words and actions convince them that even the minimal level of security they seek requires it. Unfortunately, the United States’ adoption of aggressive military concepts—such as Air-Sea Battle, Offshore Control, or even Archipelagic Defense—would deny them such security and thus contribute to an ever-worsening security dilemma.	904,714
365,675	379,610	2 - NovDec Saudi	Bipartisan political pressure ahead of 2020 elections have put relations on the brink of collapse. Hannah 17 John Hannah, Foreign Policy, 5-20-2017 Trump Should Salvage U.S.-Saudi Relations, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/27/trump-should-salvage-u-s-saudi-relations/, 10-13-2019//rjs The U.S.-Saudi relationship is in real trouble. And things could get worse—even much worse. Bipartisan majorities in Congress have already made clear their desire to punish Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman for a long series of transgressions, including the kingdom’s role in Yemen’s catastrophic civil war and the murder of dissident U.S.-based journalist Jamal Khashoggi. These efforts will only intensify as the 2020 U.S. presidential election cycle ramps up. For the ever-expanding list of Democratic aspirants, the temptation to outdo each other in attacking President Donald Trump’s close links to the kingdom’s leadership will be nearly irresistible. It’s a truism of U.S. politics that there’s no downside to Saudi bashing. That’s doubly true today, with the controversial Mohammed bin Salman at the helm, and with talk of the use of bone saws on journalists, the detention and torture of U.S. citizens, and the abuse of women’s rights activists dominating the headlines. Even if Congress falls short of getting any new anti-Saudi legislationpast the president’s veto, the constant drip, month after month, of hearings, bills, and public criticismtargeting the kingdom risks doing serious long-term damage to the two countries’ strategic relationship. It’s true that there’s a lot of ruin in U.S.-Saudi ties. The relationship has endured oil boycotts, the 9/11 attacks (15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudi nationals), and more than 70 years of constant clashing of cultures and values. The national interests that have bound Washington and Riyadh together through the decades, despite their deep differences, remain formidable. But real changes are now afoot in the underlying dynamics of the relationship. They should at minimum give pause to anyone who blithely assumes that there’s no amount of public derision that the United States could heap on the kingdom that might put the broader U.S.-Saudi partnership at risk, and the Trump administration should take notice. One such change is the rapid rise of Saudi nationalism—especially among the country’s large youth population. As part of his reform agenda for transforming the kingdom, Mohammed bin Salman has consciously sought to build a new sense of identity among Saudis, grounded in nationalism rather than Wahhabism, the fundamentalist religious sect that served as an ideological gateway for terrorist groups such as al Qaeda and the Islamic State. While largely a positive development, the nationalist tide could have a double edge, as I learned on an Atlantic Council trip to Riyadh in February. Saudi-Iran conflict is shifting to cyberspace in the 21st century – Saudi relies on the US to keep up. Deutch 18 Ron Deutch and Yoel Guzansky, Dec-2018 INSS, “Cyberspace: The Next Arena for the Saudi-Iranian Conflict?” https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Deutch-Guzansky.pdf//rjs This article examined the feasibility of cyberspace developing into the next arena for widespread conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran. In fact, cybernetic clashes between the two have already occurred, although this is not yet the focus of friction between them. Therefore, when discussing the Saudi-Iranian conflict in cyberspace, a distinction must be made between the short to medium term and the long term. As their experiences show, both these countries suffer from cybernetic weaknesses, which have the potential of opening them up to highly significant strategic damage. These weaknesses could turn out to be the cracks that bring down one of the two regimes, if one succeeds in landing a sufficiently severe blow. Since this is the case, the risks and opportunities that cyberspace represents for both Saudi Arabia and Iran make it tempting, particularly when it is a question of long-term investment of resources. At present, it appears that the cybernetic capabilities of both these countries are too meager to cover full-scale conflict between them. They fulfill an important supporting role but are still insufficiently developed to provide a response for each country’s security concept. Evidence of this can be found in the relatively simple means of aggression used by both Saudi Arabia and Iran in cyberspace. They include, above all, the dissemination of “fake news” and subversion through social media. Neither Saudi Arabia nor Iran possess wide-scale cyberattack capabilities; as far as it is known, Saudi Arabia still lacks independent technological abilities, and while Iran may be more advanced in this respect, it still relies to a large extent on semi-random “mercenaries.” The more interesting question that should be asked concerns the longterm trends. As already mentioned, decision makers in both Saudi Arabia and Iran are well aware of the potential for both damage and benefit inherent in cyberspace and are taking steps to position themselves as players in this field for the long term. To this must be added the strategic balance that the two have between them: neither Saudi Arabia nor Iran can has the capabilities to defeat the other side using only conventional militarymeans. This being the case, the decision to turn to the cyber channel—with the options it presents—is the obvious step. In this sense, we cannot rule out the possibility that we are seeing the first signs of a Saudi-Iranian technological race, in addition, of course, to all the cybernetic threats that separately occupy each of these two countries. It is hard to predict the outcomes of such a race: On one hand, although it is possible to argue over Iran’s status as a regular cyber power, at present Iran undoubtedly has an advantage over Saudi Arabia in this field. Iran has relatively well developed defensive infrastructures and valuable experience gained during the years of dealing with Israeli and American attacks. Also, unlike Saudi Arabia, which lacks real “hard” attack capabilities, Iran has demonstrated its ability to attack Saudi and western targets—American in particular—over the internet, even if it is apparently unable to mount a systematic and broad attack like Israel, Russia, and the United States. Finally, and above all, while Saudi Arabia is lacking technological and human infrastructure in the cyber field (or at most, only the first stirrings of such infrastructure), Iran has already invested extensive resources in providing university training and in working with foreign institutions, and even in stealing knowledge. All this has placed Iran several steps ahead of Saudi Arabia, and over time, this gap could become fatal for the kingdom. On the other hand, there are two important factors that could work to the benefit of Saudi Arabia in the long-term technological race and block Iran’s advancement. The first is the Saudi Kingdom’s huge advantage in resources. The Saudi security forces enjoy some of the largest annual budgets in the world. If they are properly channeled and the smart investment in cyberspace is increased, alongside those in advanced technological education, Saudi Arabia can accelerate its technological progress. Meanwhile, Iran, buckling under the burden of international sanctions, has difficulty in allocating similar resources to the development and acquisition of new capabilities. Another important factor is the defense umbrella and the cooperation existing between Saudi Arabia and the world’s largest cyber power—the United States. As a central ally, the United States can provide Saudi Arabia with the cybernetic defense umbrella and offensive technological capabilities that will enable it to catch up with the Iranians. To this can be added what appears to be covert but frequent cooperation with Israel, which, as already stated, is a cyber power in itself. The relative weight of these benefits will increase as time passes. If they are wisely exploited by the kingdom, they could emerge as a real asset and give it a decisive advantage over Iran. An examination of the current cyber capabilities of Saudi Arabia and Iran shows that a wide cybernetic conflict between these two countries is probably not imminent; however, the nature of cyberspace and its structural vagueness make it particularly suited to the way their concept of operational conduct. Therefore, in the medium-long term, we can expect both to make increased use of cyberspace as an additional way of damaging the enemy, in contrast to the limitations of their conventional forces, which have held them back until now Saudi is heavily reliant on the US for cyber ops – commitment is key. Lynch 18 Justin Lynch, Fifth Domain, 10-16-2018 After 2012 hack, Saudia Arabia relied on US contractors, https://www.fifthdomain.com/international/2018/10/16/after-2012-hack-saudia-arabia-relied-on-us-contractors/, 10-14-2019//rjs Lawmakers are urging President Donald Trump to reconsider America’s relationship with Saudi Arabia following the Kingdom’s alleged role in the murder of a commentator, but the U.S. defense industry and the Saudi government have a tangled history on the topic of cybersecurity.Following a 2012 hack, the Middle Eastern country Saudi Arabia has relied heavily on American and Western cybersecurity contractors, according to public records, former intelligence officials and experts. Financial details of the relationship between the Saudi government and American cybersecurity contractors are not public. But the Department of Commerce has approved more than $166 million in sales of controlled information security equipment and software to Saudi Arabia from 2012 to 2017, according to an analysis by Fifth Domain of documents that detail approved exports from the Bureau of Industry and Security’s commerce control list. According to the Department of Commerce, the items are controlled because they relate to encryption capabilities that are tied to information security. The analysis shows that 2016 was the largest year of approved information security equipment and software sales to Saudi Arabia, when the Department of Commerce signed off on nearly 50 million dollars in sales to the Kingdom. The list was obtained by Fifth Domain through a Freedom of Information Act request. In addition, according to public statements of the Saudi government and American defense contractors, the Kingdom has relied on U.S. companies and individuals for improved cybersecurity. The American firms who have partnered with the Saudi government or public institutions make up a roster of high-profile U.S. cyber talent. The list includes IronNet Cybersecurity, led by Keith Alexander, former head of the National Security Agency and U.S. Cyber Command and some of the largest military contractors of the U.S. government, Raytheon, Booz Allen Hamilton, Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin. Saudi Arabia is “no different than the rest of us. We are under constant attack, we are under constant threat. That is the world that we live in. Most of the countries we deal with over there, they are just trying to catch up,” John DeSimone, the vice president of cybersecurity and special missions at Raytheon told Fifth Domain in a Sept. 6 interview. A spokeswoman for the Saudi embassy in Washington did not return requests for comment regarding how the country built its cybersecurity and intelligence capabilities. Kingdom regrouped after crisis In 2012, Saudi Arabia suffered one of the world’s largest digital attacks on critical infrastructure at the time when hackers targeted its national oil producer, Saudi Aramco. Roughly 30,000 computers were reportedly destroyed in the Shamoon event. “Following the 2012 Saudi Aramco incident, the Saudi government started investing significant resources toward advancing its cybersecurity capabilities and implementing both domestic and international measures to address its cyber insecurity,” according to a 2017 report from the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, a Virginia-based think-tank. In the aftermath, the Kingdom partnered with American and Western cybersecurity firms to bolster its digital defenses. In 2017, Raytheon signed a memorandum of understanding with Saudi Arabia to cooperated on defense projects that included defensive cybersecurity systems and platforms. Saudi Arabia, UAE and other countries are “very similar to what you see in the (federal and civilian) space — cyber systems integration, really tying together the information they have, providing the tools to do analytics, hunt, threat — but all on the defensive side,” said DeSimone, of Raytheon. Spokespeople for Raytheon did not respond to requests for details regarding the company’s relationship with Saudi Arabia. The Saudi oil supply is stable now – they’d cut supply and raise prices if the US stopped military aid – that kills growth. Reuters 18 Reuters 10/16/18 Reuters. US, Saudi Arabia Have Leverage on Each Other; Using It Has Costs. October 16, 2018. https://www.voanews.com/a/us-saudi-arabia-have-leverage-on-each-other-using-it-has-costs/4616830.htmlBE WASHINGTON — The United States and Saudi Arabia have had a mutually dependent relationship for seven decades based on a central bargain: the kingdom would pump oil and the superpower would provide security. The interests that bind, and sometimes divide, the two range from the price of oil and containing Iran, to counter-terrorism, the wars in Syria and Yemen, Saudi investment in the United States and efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Relations have been strained by the Oct. 2 disappearance of Saudi journalist and Washington Post contributor Jamal Khashoggi when he visited the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. Turkey believes he was murdered and his body removed. Saudi Arabia has denied that but, according to published reports, may be considering describing the incident as an attempted rendition gone wrong. Below are descriptions of the leverage each side has and the risks of exercising it. Oil As the world's largest oil exporter, Saudi Arabia has some ability to flood the market to depress oil prices or to curb supply and raise them. The kingdom generally seeks a sweet spot to maximize current oil revenues without endangering future earnings, which could happen if prices rose so high that they chilled demand or encouraged development of alternatives. Saudi Arabia needs oil revenue to fund state expenses and its Public Investment Fund, a sovereign wealth fund slated to play a leading role in its drive to develop non-oil industries. On Sunday, the Saudi Press Agency (SPA) quoted an unnamed Saudi official making a veiled threat to respond to pressure by tinkering with oil supplies. With the boom in production of U.S. shale oil, the United States is less dependent on imported oil. However, a Saudi decision to shrink global oil supplies and raise prices could hurt U.S. President Donald Trump by slowing economic growth and denting his 2020 re-election prospects. It could also undercut the U.S. effort to shrink Iran’s oil revenues, part of a wider U.S. strategy of forcing Tehran to curb its nuclear and missile programs as well as its support for proxies in Yemen, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq. High oil prices would raise Iran's revenues just as Washington wants to reduce them. Trump called Saudi King Salman on Sept. 29 to discuss efforts to maintain supplies to ensure oil market stability and global economic growth, Saudi state news agency SPA reported.	904,693
365,676	379,616	3 - Jan Heg	Russia gains more power by taking over Venezuelan oil production, leading to bipolarity or multipolarity, or two competing powers in the Americas Smith in June Smith, Matthew. “Venezuela’s Crisis Threatens U.S. Control Over Oil Prices.” Oil Prices, 14 June 2019, https://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/International/Venezuelas-Crisis-Threatens-US-Control-Over-Oil-Prices.html. Premier Russia has shown itself willing to be a creditor of last resort for Maduro. In exchange for moderate loans, cash advances, bail outs and arms over the last five years since Maduro came to power, Moscow has secured significant interests in five of Venezuela’s largest oil fields. The Maduro regime has also signed over almost half of its downstream, refinery and infrastructure business Citgo to Russian state-controlled oil giant Rosneft for $1.5 billion in urgently needed funds. That includes giving Moscow indirect interests in Citgo’s U.S. refining assets. This is quite a prize for Moscow. It not only bolsters its oil reserves, infrastructure and assets in a country which hold the world’s largest oil reserves, and but it gives Russia a strategic presence in a region long considered to be exclusively under U.S. hegemony. Moscow has coveted such a presence since the Cold War began, and even more so after its failure to base missiles in Cuba which triggered the Cuban missile crisis. It appears that Russia is not interested in the survival of the Maduro regime but rather to evade existing sanctions, apply political pressure to the U.S. and boost its oil reserves, refining capacity and production. There is a growing likelihood that Russia can cement its presence in South America because of a growing void triggered by Trump’s general disinterest in Latin America as well as tough rhetoric on narcotics, migration and corruption. It shouldn’t be forgotten that despite its economic woes Venezuela has one of the most powerful militaries in South America, which has had its strength bolstered by Russian arms. gives Russia leverage Smith in June Smith, Matthew. “Venezuela’s Crisis Threatens U.S. Control Over Oil Prices.” Oil Prices, 14 June 2019, https://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/International/Venezuelas-Crisis-Threatens-US-Control-Over-Oil-Prices.html. Premier Moscow is clearly looking to bolster its oil reserves, infrastructure, refining capacity and production to boost its global political power. Venezuela’s vast reserves totaling 300 billion barrels dwarf U.S. reserves which reached a record of 39 billion barrels at the end of 2017. Because of the U.S.’s vast shale oil industry and rapidly growing production, which now makes it the world’s largest oil producer, it has been able to effectively dictate oil prices, displacing OPEC’s ability to influence the world economy. Greater ability to influence oil prices and use crude to further extend Russia’s national interest is particularly important to Moscow because oil and gas exports generate around 40 percent of its fiscal revenues. An notable increase in the volume of oil reserves and production that it controls will gives Russia greater influence over oil prices. The validity of such a strategy was demonstrated by the political power that Moscow has been able to exert over Germany, Poland and Ukraine because Russia is a crucial supplier of natural gas to those nations. Moscow not only wants to expand its global geopolitical power but also maximize the value of its existing reserves and production before the advent of peak oil demand by having a greater say in setting the market price. By achieving control of a substantial proportion of Venezuela’s vast oil reserves Russia can strengthen its global political presence, gain greater influence over oil prices and use crude as an economic weapon to achieve its national interest. bipolarity causes conflicts – even if they have no material reason to fight William Wohlforth (professor of government at Dartmouth College) 2009 “ Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War”Project Muse Most scholars hold that the consequences of unipolarity for great power conflict are indeterminate and that a power shift resulting in a return to bipolarity or multipolarity will not raise the specter of great power war. This article calls into question the core assumptions underlying the consensus: (1) that people are mainly motivated by the instrumental pursuit of tangible ends such as physical security and material prosperity and (2) that major powers’ satisfaction with the status quo is relatively independent of the distribution of capabilities. In fact, it is known that people are motivated powerfully by a noninstrumental concern for relative status, and there is strong empirical evidence linking the salience of those concerns to distributions of resources. If the status of states depends in some measure on their relative capabilities and if states derive utility from status, then different distributions of capabilities may affect levels of satisfaction, just as different income distributions may affect levels of status competition in domestic settings. Building on research in psychology and sociology, the author argues that even capabilityies distributions among major powers foster ambiguous status hierarchies, which generate more dissatisfaction and clashes over the status quo. And the more stratified the distribution of capabilities, the less likely such status competition is. Unipolarity thus augurs for great power peace, and a shift back to bipolarity or multipolarity raises the probability of war even among great powers with little material cause to fight. Too little power is worse than too much—bipolarity risks nuclear war Nye 2008 – PhD, Dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard (Joseph, “War, peace and hegemony in a globalized world”, page 37, edited by Chandra Chari – founder/editor of The Book Review, WEA) Many realists extol the virtues of the classic nineteenth-century European balance of power in which constantly shifting coalitions contained the ambitions of any especially aggressive power. They urge the United States to rediscover the virtues of a multipolar balance of power at the global level today. French President Jacques Chirac has often appealed for a return to multipolarity. But whether such multipolarity would be good or bad for the world is debatable. War was the constant companion and crucial instrument of the multipolar balance of power. Rote adherence to the balance of power and multipolarity may proves to be a dangerous approach to global governance in a world where war could turn nuclear, or where the major new threats come from transnational terrorism. Many regions of the world and periods in history have seen stability when one power has been pre-eminent. As the historian Niall Ferguson has warned, in a disorderly world people may find that the problem in the future is too little American power rather than too much.4 Expanded Russian influence leads to nuclear war and collapses the international order Gray 17 – PhD, professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, where he is the director of the Centre for Strategic Studies (Colin, “Russian strategy Expansion, crisis and conflict,” Foreword, in Comparative Strategy, 36.1)//BB, sex edited Short of war itself, the international political and strategic relations between Russia and the United States are about as bad as they can be. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that the simultaneous conduct of two air independent campaigns over Syria could evolve all too suddenly into a war triggered by accident or by miscalculation. There is little, if any, mystery about the broad political purpose fueling Vladimir Putin’s conduct of international relations. Subtlety is not a characteristic of Russian statecraft; cunning and intended trickery, though, are another matter. Stated directly, Putin is striving to recover and restore that of which he is able from the late USSR. There is no ideological theme in his governance. Instead, there is an historically unremarkable striving after more power and influence. The challenge for the Western World, as demonstrated in this National Institute study in meticulous and troubling detail, is to decide where and when this latest episode in Russian expansionism will be stopped. What we do know, for certain, is that it must and will be halted. It is more likely than not that Putin himself does not have entirely fixed political-strategic objectives. His behavior of recent years has given a credible impression of opportunistic adaptability. In other words, he will take what he is able, where he can, and when he can. However, there is ample evidence to support this study’s proposition that Russian state policy today is driven by a clear vision of Russia as a recovering and somewhat restored superpower, very much on the high road back to a renewed hegemony over Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Putin’s international political objectives appear largely open today: he will have Russia take whatever turns out to be available to take, preferably if the taking allows for some humiliation of the principal enemy, the United States. A practical political and strategic problem for Putin is to guess just how far he dares to push NATO in general and the United States in particular, before he finds himself, almost certainly unexpectedly, in a situation analogous to 1939. Just how dangerous would it be for Russia to press forcefully the Baltic members of NATO? Vladimir Putin would not be the first statesman person to trust his luck once too often, based upon unrealistic confidence in his own political genius and power. There is danger not only that Putin could miscalculate the military worth of Russia’s hand, but that he also will misunderstand the practical political and strategic strength of NATO ‘red lines.’ In particular, Putin may well discover, despite some current appearances, that not all of NATO’s political leaders are expediently impressionable and very readily deterrable. Putin’s military instrument is heavily dependent, indeed probably over-dependent, upon the bolstering value of a whole inventory of nuclear weapons. It is unlikely to have evaded Putin’s strategic grasp to recognize that these are not simply weapons like any others. A single political or strategic guess in error could well place us, Russians included, in a world horrifically new to all. This National Institute study, Russian Strategy: Expansion, Crisis and Conflict, makes unmistakably clear Putin’s elevation of strategic intimidation to be the leading element in Russian grand strategy today. Putin is behaving in militarily dangerous ways and ‘talking the talk’ that goes with such rough behavior. Obviously, he is calculating, perhaps just hoping, that American lawyers in the White House will continue to place highest priority on avoiding direct confrontation with Russia. This study presents an abundantly clear record of the Russian lack of regard for international law, which they violate with apparent impunity and without ill consequence to themselves, including virtually every arms control treaty and agreement they have entered into with the United States since 1972 (SALT I). The challenge for the United States today and tomorrow is the need urgently to decide what can and must be done to stop Putin’s campaign in its tracks before it wreaks lethal damage to the vital concept and physical structure of international order in much of the world, and particularly in Europe.	904,697
365,677	379,624	0 - Other shells	some of the shells we may read just incase yall wanna prep your self for these bois Interpretation: Debaters must adhere to NSDA standards for proper citations of all evidence. NSDA, 16 NSDA, (governing body of debate). "Debate Evidence Guide." NSDA, 14-12-2016, 7-29-2019. https://www.speechanddebate.org/wp-content/uploads/Debate-Evidence-Guide.pdf // MHS JL pg 1 A debater or judge asks to see something read and/or the original source of something read. The opposing debater should provide this information promptly. A debater questions the written source citation of the opponent. When debaters read evidence, they are required to provide a full written citation, to the extent provided by the original source. Requirements include: 1. full name of primary author and/or editor 2. publication date 3. source 4. title of article 5. date accessed for digital evidence 6. full URL, author qualifications 7. Page number NSDA 7NSDA, (governing body of debate). "Debate Evidence Guide." NSDA, 09-23-2017, 12-01-2017. https://www.speechanddebate.org/wp-content/uploads/NSDA-Code-Of-Honor.pdf// MHS JL pg 1. “As a member of the National Speech and Debate Association, I pledge to uphold the highest standards of integrity, humility, respect, leadership, and service in the pursuit of excellence.” Integrity: An Honor Society member obeys the highest ethical standards and adheres to the rules of the organization. Members recognize that integrity is central to earning the trust, respect, and support of one’s peers. Integrity encompasses the highest regard for honesty, civility, justice, and fairness.Humility: A member does not regard oneself more highly than others. Regardless of a person’s level of success, an individual always looks beyond oneself to appreciate the inherent value of others.Respect: A member respects individual differences and fosters diversity. They promote tolerance, inclusion, and empowerment for people from a variety of backgrounds, including race, religion, gender, sexual orientation, and ability.Leadership: A member influences others to take positive action toward productive change. Members commit to thoughtful and responsible leadership that promotes the other core values in the Code of Honor.Service: A member exercises their talents to provide service to peers, community, and the activity. At all times a member is prepared to work constructively to improve the lives of others. Interpretation: Debaters must verbally offer a speech doc before their first speech including all carded evidence plus disclosure and dino	904,704
365,678	379,671	TOC NEG	C1 NGOS Specifically, there are two ways that the U.S. military presence amplifies NGO operations. First is through logistics. U.S. military presence is key to collecting and providing intel that allow humanitarian missions to happen. Lawry of the IHD in 2009 confirms that the military provides extensive intelligence information about population movement, security infrastructure conditions, and other information necessary for NGOs to conduct operations. He furthers that since NGOs do not have satellites, intelligence analysts, or other capacities to collect and digest complex and intricate information, the military is critical to the execution of humanitarian missions. Militaries, too, have various comparative advantages. Without the military in many instances, NGOs would have been unable to provide humanitarian services or less efficient in their programming. • Militaries have a monopoly on security and the use of force. When a population is affected by conflict, external, noncombatant militaries can provide security for humanitarian operations, displaced persons, and both NGO and UN staff and infrastructure. NGOs, with strict neutrality and noncombatant policies and lack of capacity, cannot. • Militaries can provide extensive intelligence information about population movements, security conditions, road, river and bridge conditions, and other information pertinent to conducting humanitarian operations. NGOs do not have satellites, intelligence analysts, or other capacities to collect and digest complex and intricate information. • Militaries have by far the largest airlift capacity globally. Aside from the private sector, the combined load capacity of which is much greater than even the U.S. military, the US military is the largest single organization that can lift humanitarian supplies and materials in almost every condition and in very short notice. NGOs do use aircraft, but normally sporadically and in the worst scenarios for minimal periods. • Militaries have distinct advantages in large-scale communications infrastructure and communications capacities. NGOs often depend on communication capacities from militaries or UN agencies (or both) because large satellite stations, bandwidth, and other regional or global communications are not available at reasonable costs for NGOs. • Militaries can respond to maritime and/or chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosives (CBRNE) emergencies. NGOs have almost no capacity.219 Lawry empirically finds that during the 2003 Iraq invasion of Kuwait, a humanitarian conflict that was developed around the U.S. military directly relayed critical/logistical information to more than 80 NGOs. There have been other successful military run information-coordination centers in Afghanistan, Kuwait, and Indonesia. A humanitarian operations center, also called a civil-military operations center, run by the U.S. military, was indispensable in Kuwait during the 2003 Iraq invasion.216 Although coordination met with resistance from NGOs in the early stages of the war, ultimately more than 80 NGOs, the UN, and the military met within this center and worked together. Having a neutral and media-free space for close interaction and discussion allowed civil and military actors to consult without having to fight the usual issues of ownership and control. At the HOC-Kuwait, humanitarian information was collected and shared. The vast preponderance of cooperation and collaboration, interestingly, occurred informally over coffee after daily briefings. Lessons learned from this productive experience have been invaluable in easing the often times contentious civilmilitary relationship. Themes that recurred over the years are notable, and include simply agreeing on common definitions of important terms and avoiding use of confusing acronyms and potentially offensive phrases.217 NGOs, for example, agreed to avoid using the term belligerent, and the military agreed not to call the NGOs force multipliers. Second is security. Without a dominant military presence, NGOs would be at a serious risk. Penner of the Small Wars Journal in 2013 confirms that NGOs are not security oriented like the military and as a result they are unable to protect themselves in violent environments, resulting in failed missions. NGO-military cooperation has largely been ad hoc. Institutional and cultural differences pervade. NGOs required logistical support for large operations and the military often provided logistical infrastructure for NGOs. NGOs provided the military with accurate information on troubled areas. NGOs are highly cognizant of how their actions affect donor support. NGOs are less security oriented than the military. The NGO-military relationship works best when both have something to offer the other. Fortunately, U.S. military cooperation with NGOs has secured operations and brought about the completion of missions and protection of all critical infrastructure. O’Donohue of the JCS in 2019 confirms that the U.S. military gives security to NGOs in all aspects of humanitarian projects, from securing aid supplies, main shipping routes, protecting relief distribution centers, and delivery to facilities like medical clinics where the aid is used, the military protects and ensures humanitarian missions are completed. The joint force will work with interagency partners and the HN and often works with international organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), PNs, and the private sector during FHA operations. The tenets of multinational unity of effort (i.e., respect, rapport, knowledge of partners, patience, and coordination) applied during an FHA mission cannot guarantee success; however, ignoring them may lead to mission failure. This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, and it provides considerations for military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational forces, and other interorganizational partners. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs), and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing and executing their plans and orders. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of objectives. Support Activities. Some activities that may be supported by US military forces under FHA include providing logistical support, such as the transportation of humanitarian supplies or personnel; making available, preparing, and transporting nonlethal excess property (EP) to foreign countries; transferring on-hand DOD stocks to respond to unforeseen emergencies; and conducting some DOD humanitarian demining assistance activities. In some circumstances, medical support and base operating services may be conducted if required by the operation. In addition to force protection and PR for the joint force, a JFC may also be tasked to provide protection for other personnel and assets. If not clearly stated in the mission, the extent of this security should be addressed in the ROE, to include protection of: (1) Forces of other nations working jointly with US forces in a multinational force. (2) USG, NGO, and international organization personnel and equipment. (3) HA recipients. (4) Affected country personnel and assets. (5) Humanitarian relief convoys, supplies, and main supply routes. (6) Relief distribution centers. (7) Stocks of HA supplies. (8) Ports and airfields. (9) Hospitals and medical clinics. It is for these two reasons that Lawry writes that without U.S. military presence NGOs would be unable to provide support to areas of dire need. NGOs are better at managing refugee camps and providing water and sanitation services because of their close relationships with UNHCR. NGO staff members are also often trained or specialized in various aspects of camp management.218 Militaries, too, have various comparative advantages. Without the military in many instances, NGOs would have been unable to provide humanitarian services or less efficient in their programming. • Militaries have a monopoly on security and the use of force. When a population is affected by conflict, external, noncombatant militaries can provide security for humanitarian operations, displaced persons, and both NGO and UN staff and infrastructure. NGOs, with strict neutrality and noncombatant policies and lack of capacity, cannot. The impact is preventing a humanitarian crisis. Absent logistical support and protection from the military, NGO operations would fail. The OCHA in 2017 terminalizes that humanitarian partners continue to respond to rising displacement and provide basic assistance to families in new areas. To date, emergency response actors of food, water, and medical kits have been distributed to cover the immediate needs of more than two million people. And absent our military presence, the millions who rely on NGOs and our military are left without basic standards of living. Iraq: UN and partners scale up humanitarian response to growing needs As fighting continues in west Mosul Iraq, humanitarian partners continue to respond to rising displacement and provide basic assistance to families in newly accessible areas, where conditions allow. Where access inside west Mosul city allows humanitarian partners to reach civilians, displaced families are provided with ready-to-eat food rations. Resident or returning families in the area are provided dry food rations i.e. to cook themselves. Almost 62,000 people in 14 west Mosul neighbourhoods have received ready-to-eat food rations to date; 64,000 people in eleven west Mosul neighbourhoods have received dry food rations. West Mosul has been cut off from its main supply route since November 2016, and remains largely inaccessible to humanitarian actors. In western Mosul city, many neighbourhoods face chronic water shortages, with many people drinking untreated water. Humanitarians are concerned over an increased number of displaced children arriving from western Mosul with diarrhoea. Shortages of clean drinking water have likely been exacerbated by ISIL’s recent attacks on the Badush water treatment plant, western Mosul’s largest functioning treatment plant. Ensuring water treatment and sewage treatment facilities in Mosul are operational remains a top priority for humanitarian partners. Approximately 500,000 people live in ISIL-controlled areas of west Mosul. Iraqi authorities also estimate that some 150,000 civilians reside in 28 currently accessible neighbourhoods of western Mosul. Since the start of military operations to retake Mosul six months ago, nearly half a million people have been displaced from their homes. “The sheer volume of civilians still fleeing Mosul city is staggering,” said Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq Lise Grande. “Our worst case scenario when the fighting started was that up to one million civilians may flee Mosul. Already, more than 493,000 people have left, leaving almost everything behind,” said Ms. Grande. To date, emergency response packages (of ready-to-eat food, water, hygiene and dignity kits) have been distributed to cover the immediate needs of more than two million people since the fighting began in late October. Front-line organizations have been providing food, water, shelter, emergency kits, medical support and psycho-social services – to both families who have fled and families who have stayed. C2 ISIS Rogers 18. Rogers, Michael. “Statement of Admiral Michael S. Rogers.” Congress, 27 February 2018. https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Rogers_02-27-18.pdf We face a growing variety of threats from adversaries acting with precision and boldness, and often with stealth. U.S. Cyber Command engages with adversaries in cyberspace every day. Accordingly, we have developed substantial knowledge of how malicious cyber actors work against the United States, our allies and partners, and many other targets as well. That knowledge in turn provides insights into the motivations, capabilities, and intentions of those who sponsor such activities, whether they be states, criminal enterprises, or violent extremists. Cyberspace is a global and dynamic operating environment, with unique challenges. A significant story in cyberspace over the past year relates to the progress made against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and USCYBERCOM contributions to the eviction of ISIS fighters from their geographic strongholds. Today, ISIS’s so-called “Caliphate” is crumbling. It has lost 98 percent of the territory it once controlled in Iraq and Syria, and approximately 3.2 million Syrians and 4.5 million Iraqis now have a pathway to begin to rebuild their cities and their lives. Denying sanctuary to ISIS in Iraq and Syria is a victory for civilization, and an important step in stabilizing the nations of that region and building peace in the Middle East. Cyberspace operations played an important role in this campaign, with USCYBERCOM supporting the successful offensive by U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and our Coalition partners. 3 We learned a great deal in performing those missions, and continue to execute some today. Mounting cyber operations against ISIS helped us re-learn and reinforce important lessons learned over the last decade of cyber operations against violent extremists. I should emphasize that this campaign was a Coalition fight, with key international partners conducting and supporting both kinetic and cyberspace operations against ISIS. Wilson Center, 12-11-2019, "Report: Terrorism on Decline in Middle East and North Africa," https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/report-terrorism-decline-middle-east-and-north-africa The number of terrorist attacks in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) declined significantly in 2018, according to the Global Terrorism Index, an annual study by the Institute for Economics and Peace. The security situation improved in 17 countries and only worsened in Iran and Morocco. The better conditions were largely driven by the deterioration of ISIS, which lost much of its territory in Iraq and Syria. “Deaths attributed to the group declined 69 per cent, with attacks declining 63 per cent in 2018,” according to the report. “The largest decline in fatalities last year was in Iraq, which had 75 per cent fewer deaths from terrorism in 2018. Syria followed, with nearly a 40 percent reduction.” Problematically, ICG 19 reports International Crisis Group, 3-12-2019, “Averting an ISIS Resurgence in Iraq and Syria.” https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/207-averting-isis-resurgence-iraq-and-syria In Iraq and Syria, ISIS is down but not out. The group remains active but reduced and geographically circumscribed. Keeping it down requires sustained effort. Any of several events – Turkish intervention in north-eastern Syria, but also instability in Iraq or spill-over of U.S.-Iranian tensions – could enable its comeback. In Iraq, ISIS is waging an active, deadly insurgency. Yet it is an insurgency that is diminished, not just from ISIS’s capabilities at its height in early 2015, but also from the long campaign that preceded the group’s 2014 surge. ISIS’s current war is also one limited mostly to the country’s rural periphery. In much of Iraq today, security is better than it has been for years – despite the violence amid recent protests, which has marred the relative calm. Hennigan 19~-~-Hennigan, W.J. (W.J. Hennigan covers the Pentagon and national security issues in Washington, D.C. He has reported from more than two dozen countries across five continents, covering war, counter-terrorism, and the lives of U.S. service members.) “ISIS Fighters Are Gaining Strength After Trump’s Syria Pullout, US Spies Say.” Time, 19 November 2019. https://time.com/5732842/isis-gaining-strength-trump-syria-pullout/ The assessment, publicly disclosed Tuesday in a Department of Defense Office of Inspector General report, focused on the abrupt decision to remove all 1,000 U.S. troops from northern Syria. The move created a power vacuum and set off a series of violent developments on the ground that risks upending more than five years of progress in the war against the terrorist group. “ISIS exploited the Turkish incursion and subsequent draw-down of U.S. troops to reconstitute capabilities and resources within Syria and strengthen its ability to plan attacks abroad,” the 116-page report says. “The DIA also reported that without counter-terrorism pressure, ISIS will probably be able to more freely build clandestine networks and will attempt to free ISIS members detained in… prisons and family members living in internally displaced persons camps.” The White House referred questions about the inspector general report to the Pentagon, which responded by email. “ISIS fighters are still operating in the region, and unless pressure is maintained, a reemergence of the group and its capabilities remains a very real possibility,” Commander Sean Robertson, a Pentagon spokesman, said in a statement. “We are committed to keeping that from happening.” CBS 19~-~- “Defense Dept inspector general says ISIS likely to ‘resurge’ without ‘sustained pressure’.” CBS News, 4 February 2019. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/defense-isis-likely-to-resurge-without-sustained-pressure/ The U.S. military believes that "absent sustained pressure" on the Islamic State, ISIS could re-emerge in Syria within six to 12 months, according to a new Department of Defense Inspector General report on Operation Inherent Resolve. According to the Pentagon, while U.S.-backed Syrian forces have continued the fight to retake the remaining ISIS strongholds in Syria, ISIS remains a "potent force of battle-hardened and well-disciplined fighters that could likely resurge in Syria absent continued counterterrorism pressure," the report reads. Brahmi 20~-~- Brahimi, Alia. (Alia Brahimi is a former research fellow at Oxford University and the London School of Economics) “Qassem Suleimani Wanted US Troops Out of Iraq. If They Go, ISIS Will Be Back.” Foreign Policy, 17 January 2020. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/17/qassem-suleimani-expel-us-troops-iraq-isis-will-be-back/ Now, as tensions escalate between the United States and Iran in the wake of the U.S. killing of Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani this month, it is worth remembering that the Islamic State is regrouping in Iraq. Indeed, the militant group’s 14,000-18,000 fighters are returning to their guerrilla roots, assassinating tribal elders, taxing local populations, kidnapping soldiers, burning crops, laying roadside ambushes, and engaging in nighttime hit-and-runs. Training and support from U.S. forces in Iraq is essential to preventing its full-blown revival, but the standoff with Iran may yield the opposite result: removing the U.S. presence from Iraq altogether. ~-~-~-~- The United States has also provided training and mentoring to Iraqi forces, as well as critical help with battlespace management. The Iraqis are said to be highly capable with regard to signals intelligence and have developed counterterrorism expertise, but they still lack the ability to knit together the moving parts of the intelligence and targeting cycle. However controversial U.S. troop deployments in the Middle East are, for the time being, the 5,000-strong U.S. presence in Iraq is necessary (through of course not sufficient) to retain cohesion on the ground and maintain strategic momentum. “The sad truth is that, if left to their own devices, the Iraqi security forces might rot while they stand, like they did in 2014,” the former commander said. “Maybe not next week, but eventually it would happen.” Other countries will not fill-in. Magid (2020), Pesha. “Islamic State Aims for Comeback Amid Virus-Expedited U.S. Withdrawal.” Foreign Policy. APRIL 6, 2020, 5:04 PM. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/06/iraq-islamic-state-comeback-coronavirus-us-withdrawal/ In Iraq, this prediction is already beginning to play out as several coalition members, including France and Britain, have withdrawn their troops from Iraq and halted their training programs to protect their soldiers from the spread of COVID-19. ... “Iraqi forces are fighting an ISIS insurgency that has abandoned the semi-conventional warfare that the organization had at its height and that is now a much harder target, operating as small guerrilla units in rugged terrain in the country’s rural periphery or attempting to work clandestinely to infiltrate populated areas,” said Sam Heller, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group. “It’s an enemy that ISIS requires a relatively advanced set of technical enablers that the coalition is able to provide.” Chief among these enablers are air support and intelligence gathering to fight it, both of which are primarily provided by the United States. Rasool pointed to the same capabilities while talking about the need for a partnership with the coalition. “The cooperation with the international coalition, especially when it comes to reconnaissance, air support, and intelligence information—that is very important,” he said. “If you don’t have modern planes, then you cannot have a strong army.” The coalition uses its technical capabilities to help coordinate and advise missions with the Iraqi Army and local tribal militias that were mobilized in 2014 to fight the Islamic State. The impact is on preventing genocide. ISIS has repeatedly targeted ethno-religious groups in Iraq and Syria, including the Turkmen, Shabak, Yadizis, and Christians. UN 16~-~-UN Commision of Inquiry on Syria: ISIS is commiting genocide against the Yazidis.” UN, 2016. https://www.ohchr.org/FR/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=20113andLangID=F ISIS sought – and continues to seek – to destroy the Yazidis in multiple ways, as envisaged by the 1948 Genocide Convention. “ISIS has sought to erase the Yazidis through killings; sexual slavery, enslavement, and torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and forcible transfer causing serious bodily and mental harm; the infliction of conditions of life that bring about a slow death; the imposition of measures to prevent Yazidi children from being born, including forced conversion of adults, the separation of Yazidi men and women, and mental trauma; and the transfer of Yazidi children from their own families and placing them with ISIS fighters, thereby cutting them off from beliefs and practices of their own religious community”, the report says. In just two years, ISIS harmed millions. NBC 16~-~- Jamieson, Alastair. “ISIS Death Toll: 18,800 Killed in Iraq in 2 Years, UN says.” NBC News, 19 January 2016. https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/isis-death-toll-18-800-killed-iraq-2-years-u-n499426 At least18,802 civilians have been killed in Iraq in ISIS-linked violence in under two years, a United Nations report said Tuesday — with millions of others forced from their homes and thousands more held as slaves. “The violence suffered by civilians in Iraq remains staggering,” said the report by the Office of the United Nations High Comissioner for Human Rights PDF link here. ISIS continues to commit “systematic and widespread violence and abuses of international human rights law and humanitarian law,” it said, adding that some of those act amount “crimes against humanity, and possibly genocide.” U.N. monitors recorded at least 55,047 civilian casualties as a result of the conflict between Jan. 1, 2014 and Oct. 31, 2015, with 18,802 people killed and and 36,245 wounded, it said. Over the same period, 3.2 million people became “internally displaced by ISIS” including over one million school-age girls and boys. “The persistent violence and scale of the displacement” limit their access to housing, clean water and education, the report said. It also documented human rights abuses, saying some 3,500 people are believed to be held as captives, mostly women and children from the Yazidi religious minority who have been forced into sexual slavery. C3 POWER VAC (Burke) Arleigh A., 1-2-2020, "America’s Failed Strategy in the Middle East: Losing Iraq and the Gulf," No Publication, https://www.csis.org/analysis/americas-failed-strategy-middle-east-losing-iraq-and-gulf In round two, the United States and its allies ended up fighting these Islamic extremists from 2004 to 2010. Although the United States defeated these extremists in western Iraq with the aid of a massive surge of U.S. ground troops and the aid of Iraqi Sunni popular forces, the United States failed to create a stable Iraqi government and economy. The United States effectively abandoned its nation building efforts after 2009 and withdrew its combat forces from Iraq at the end of 2011 – which createding a power vacuum that opened up Iraq to ISIS – all the while, it was never able to decide on any active strategy for stabilizing Iraq or dealing with the Syrian civil war. It focused on defeating ISIS – relying heavily on Syrian Kurds in the process – and scored another “victory” in 2016-2018 by disbanding the ISIS “caliphate.” Claire Parker and Rick Noack. Jan 30, 2020. “Iran has invested in allies and proxies across the Middle East. Here’s where they stand after Soleimani’s death.” https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/01/03/iran-has-invested-allies-proxies-across-middle-east-heres-where-they-stand-after-soleimanis-death/ Many — though not all — of the groups Iran sponsors are Shiite. While ideology plays a role in Iran’s foreign policy, experts say the regime’s primary goal is to project power throughout the Middle East to counter U.S., Israeli and Saudi influence. The success of Iran’s strategy rests in large part on its ability to capitalize on power vacuums in the Middle East, Vatanka said. Most recently, Iran has broadened its reach by backing militias in war-torn Yemen and Syria amid the chaos ushered in by the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011. How does Iran do this? Primarily through the Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force, which Soleimani controlled until his death. (The Trump administration designated the Revolutionary Guard a foreign terrorist organization in April). The Quds Force organizinges and trainings fighters with allied militias and provides them with weapons, according to a report by the Soufan Center. Iran also uses soft power to cement economic alliances with countries like Iraq, where Iran has supported local militias in the fight against U.S. forces in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq and later in the fight against the Islamic State. Ahronheim (2020), Anna. “If US leaves the region, Israel will eventually go to war with Iran.” Jerusalem Post. JANUARY 8, 2020 18:33. https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/if-us-leaves-from-the-region-israel-will-eventually-go-to-war-with-iran-613446 Should the United States withdraw its forces and Iran continue on its path through Iraq and Syria, Israel will eventually find itself in a war along its entire northern border, Brig.-Gen. (res.) Ilan Lavi has warned. “The United States is the main brakes in the region and its withdrawal would lead to an escalation, since the Iranians will continue to apply gas” to their aspirations of regional hegemony, Lavi said during a conference held by the Alma Research and Education Center in Northern Israel. On Monday evening, a letter sent from the head of the US military’s task force in Iraq to Abdul Amir, deputy director of Combined Joint Operations, sparked concern the US was removing its forces from Iraq after its parliament voted to oust American troops from the country following the assassination of top Iranian General Qasem Soleimani. While Washington later clarified that it was a “mistake” and no troops were being withdrawn, Lavi, who served as deputy head of the Northern Command, said that no one is able to predict what the American president might later decide to do. And if Trump does decide to withdraw, “I’m not optimistic,” he said. “Eventually, and I don’t mean tomorrow or next year, we will have to go to war. The Iranians will continue.” Saudi Arabia has reacted to Iranian expansion through wars. Marcus 19 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-42008809 Fast-forward to 2011 and uprisings across the Arab world caused political instability throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia exploited these upheavals to expand their influence, notably in Syria, Bahrain and Yemen, further heightening mutual suspicions. Iran's critics say it is intent on establishing itself or its proxies across the region, and achieving control of a land corridor stretching from Iran to the Mediterranean.How have things got worse? The strategic rivalry is heating up because Iran is in many ways winning the regional struggle. In Syria, Iranian (and Russian) support for President Bashar al-Assad has enabled his forces to largely rout rebel group groups backed by Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is trying desperately to contain rising Iranian influence while the militaristic adventurism of the kingdom's young and impulsive Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman - the country's de facto ruler - is exacerbating regional tensions. He Saudi Arabia is waging a war against the rebel Houthis movement in neighbouring Yemen, in part to stem perceived Iranian influence there, but after four years this is proving a costly gamble. Iran has denied accusations that it is smuggling weaponry to the Houthis, though successive reports from a panel of UN experts have demonstrated significant assistance for the Houthis from Tehran in terms of both technology and weaponry. Sternman 18 https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/reports/twenty-first-century-proxy-warfare/ It’s a pricey wager and it is still unclear whether it’s a winning bet. Civil wars raging today in the so-called “arc of instability” remain the greatest threats to international security. Proxy Conflict in the Middle Eastthere has displacesd tens of millions of people, killed hundreds of thousands, and devastated large swaths of the region’s economy and infrastructure. Renewed U.S. rivalry with Russia and China and competition among Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Israel for regional primacy are forcing Washington to reconfigure its grand strategy. Current conceptions of proxy warfare do not account for the paradigm shift now underway. A clear-eyed cost-benefits analysis of proxy warfare is needed to make U.S. strategy more effective. Not only that, Seth Cropsey, Gary Roughead, 10-31-2019, "A U.S. Withdrawal Will Cause a Power Struggle in the Middle East," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/17/us-withdrawal-power-struggle-middle-east-china-russia-iran/ The unique mix of political forces in the Middle East suggests three possibilities in the event of U.S. naval withdrawal from the Middle East region, and none favor U.S. interests. First, Russia may broker a political arrangement among Turkey, Israel, and Iran, or, alternatively, support a coalition pitting some of those states against another in an e?ort to manufacture a manageable regional balance of power and allowing it to shift its attention back to Europe. The ?nal shape of this strategy would depend on several variables: Turkey’s approach to Syria, Israel’s posture against Iran (and its proxies), the outcome of Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen, the Kurdish question, and the possibility of the Islamic State’s resurgence. Regardless of these factors, Russia will still bid for control of the Mediterranean Sea, which the United States will be hard-pressed to counter, particularly if China can manipulate its European economic partners into limiting or expelling the U.S. Navy from its Mediterranean bases. If that happens, Washington will have to ?ght its way back into the region for the ?rst time since World War II. In the second scenario, Iran defeats Saudi Arabia in a regional confrontation, thereby taking the top leadership spot in the Islamic world, making it a great power in its own right. Control of Middle Eastern oil exports would give Iran the ability to coerce and bully the United States’ European and Paci?c allies, and it would deny the United States any peaceful access to the Levantine Basin. The balancing dynamics against this new great power are di?cult to project, but regardless, the United States’ ability to control the strategic environment would be hampered markedly. Third, a long-term regional war between Tehran and a ?uctuating anti-Iran coalition composed of Saudi Arabia, other Sunni Gulf states, and Israel would cause widespread bloodshed. As the 1980s Iran-Iraq War demonstrated, both Iran and Saudi Arabia would be likely to attempt nuclear breakout. With Iran, this would mean closing the small technological gap that now exists between its low-enriched uranium to the higher level of enrichment needed for a nuclear weapon.	904,734
365,679	379,675	LW Aff Conflict-Iraq	Contention 1: Conflict US withdrawal decreases conflict in three ways. First is by rebuilding alliances. Ashford 18~-~-Ashford, Emma. (Emma Ashford is a research fellow in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute in Washington, DC. She holds a PhD in politics from the University of Virginia and an MA from American University’s School of International Service) “Unbalanced: Rethinking America’s Commitment to the Middle East.” Strategic Studies Quarterly. Air University Press. Spring 2018. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26333880.pdf?refreqid=excelsior3A403f1017baf2a096ee9118141128c66c "Even close US allies have shown interest expanding their regional role."... "In providing security guarantees and by acting as a third party cutout, US involvement inhibits these developing ties." Banafsheh Keynoush an interpreter for four Iranian presidents, is the author of an upcoming book on Saudi Arabia and Iran. “Saudi Arabia and Iran need each other.” The Guardian, 6 Jan 2016. "The US-Saudi friendship will not suddenly end, even though Washington and the EU are openly condemning Riyadh’s human rights record." ... "Since then, Riyadh and Tehran have severed relations three times, only to recognise subsequently that their ties needed urgently to be repaired." In the absence of US presence, however, states would be forced to engage in diplomacy. Wechsler. “Iran may be tempted to try an ‘October surprise.’ Here’s how Trump can be prepared.” The Washington Post, 24 Feb 2020. "We hope the administration is developing contingency plans for each of these scenarios — and seeking to prevent them."... "and reaffirm the requirement for ships in the area to turn on their automatic identification systems." Alliances are key to solving conflict through deterrence. Rice 11~-~-Rice, David. (David is the director of National Media Relations at Rice University) “Military Alliances Keep the Peace.” Futurity, 11 February 2011. https://www.futurity.org/military-alliances-keep-the-peace/ "For the study, published in the journal Foreign Policy Analysis, researchers analyzed global defense agreements from 1816 to 2001." ... "If Georgia joins NATO, the U.S. and other NATO countries will be committing to assist Georgia if Georgia is attacked by another state, for instance, Russia." Second is by curtailing aggression . The US security umbrella emboldens allies to act aggressively instead of diplomatically. Hazbun 19~-~-Hazbun, Waleed. (Waleed Hazbun is a political science professor at the University of Alabama. He received his BA from Princeton, and his PhD from MIT.) “In America’s Wake: Turbulence and Insecurity in the Middle East.” University of Alabama. Middle East Political Science, March 2019. https://pomeps.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/POMEPS_Studies_34_Web.pdf "In the late 2000s, the large, militarily capable state of Turkey and the small, wealthy state of Qatar began to use their diverse ties to states across the emerging regional divides to play a larger diplomatic role and promote conflict management." "deadly military power, are less able to constrain threats to their security and balance rivals." Historical precedent proves. Parsi 20~-~-Parsi, Trita. (Trita Parsi is Executive Vice President of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and Adjunct Associate Professor at Georgetown University.) “The Middle East Is More Stable When the United States Stays Away.” Foreign Policy, 6 January 2020. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/06/the-middle-east-is-more-stable-when-the-united-states-stays-away "Further, the region did not fall into deeper chaos as a result of Trump’s earlier refusal to get into a shooting war with Iran after attacks by Iranian proxies against Saudi oil installations in September 2019." ... "Ending US presence in the region could be the way to end the Yemen war." Malley 19~-~-Malley, Robert (ROBERT MALLEY is President and CEO of the International Crisis Group. During the Obama administration, he served as Special Assistant to the President, White House Middle East Coordinator, and Senior Adviser on countering the Islamic State) “The Unwanted Wars.” Foreign Affairs, December 2019. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2019-10-02/unwanted-wars The war that now looms largest is a war nobody apparently wants. During his presidential campaign, Donald Trump railed against the United States’ entanglement in Middle Eastern wars, and since assuming office, he has not changed his tune. Iran has no interest in a wide-ranging conflict that it knows it could not win. Israel is satisfied with calibrated operations in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza but fears a larger confrontation that could expose it to thousands of rockets. Saudi Arabia is determined to push back against Iran, but without confronting it militarily. Yet the conditions for an all-out war in the Middle East are riper than at any time in recent memory. "A conflict could break out in any one of a number of places for any one of a number of reasons." ... "Because any development anywhere in the region can have ripple effects everywhere, narrowly containing a crisis is fast becoming an exercise in futility." Contention 2 is Iraq Iraq is in a moment of political crisis. Behravesh 20 writes Maysam Behravesh, 4-15-2020, "Navigating Iraq’s Political and Economic Turbulence amid Pandemic," Middle East Institute, https://www.mei.edu/events/navigating-iraqs-political-and-economic-turbulence-amid-pandemic "A perfect storm has hit Iraq: the COVID-19 virus is spreading throughout the country and overwhelming its healthcare system, a precipitous decline" ... "What is the future of the U.S.-Iraq strategic relationship?" Mansour 20 writes prior to the Soleimani strike Renad Mansour, Foreign Affairs, "The Killing of Soleimani Undermines Iraq's Anti-Government Protesters", January 27, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2020-01-27/trumps-strikes-risk-upending-iraqi-politics "The most immediate political impact of the U.S. strike was on the Iraqi parliament." ... "Sensing renewed political life, Sadr turned from his anticorruption rhetoric—a position he felt obliged to take during the swell of the protests—to his more typical, outspoken anti-American diatribes in an attempt to rally Iraqi Shiites to him." The threat of unrest is immense, as Bandow 20 notes Doug Bandow, 1-16-2020, "Note to Trump: Iraq Is Not a U.S. Colony," Cato Institute, https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/note-trump-iraq-not-us-colony "Civilian boycotts and protests might be the least of Washington’s problems." ... "American deaths are likely and will lead to retaliation—against Iraqis, which will trigger more attacks. It would take only one violent protest to trigger a crisis." The impact is preventing civil conflict A surge in extremist factions and civil unrest has empirically spelled widespread disaster in Iraq. Ottaviani 14 quantifies Jacopo Ottaviani, 2-10-2014, "The Iraq War Never Ended," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/02/10/the-iraq-war-never-ended/ "Violence in Iraq has swelled and ebbed since the U.S. invasion in 2003." ... "according to Iraq Body Count, a British-based NGO that runs an online database of civilian deaths."	904,739
365,680	379,681	Policy	Disclosure on the wiki is bad for small schools but if you ask us before the round we will	904,743
365,681	379,687	contact	we open source any interps and cases please email us with any concerns and email hannah if you want a girlfriend and are a girl Hannah(she/her): [email protected] or Hannah Huang on Messenger Sabine (she/her): [email protected], [email protected], http://m.me/sabinetwo	904,749
365,682	379,703	Contact Info	Hey! We'll disclose if you ask us, here's our contact info: [email protected] (925)309-9827	904,767
365,683	379,710	1- JR Masterman Disclosure Policy	Cases will be disclosed after being broken, and updated at the end of the day if case args change. Interps are disclosed before hand, the rest of the shell will be disclosed if it's read. Email Lucas at [email protected] if you have any questions about anything!	904,775
365,684	379,716	Interps I might read	1. All debaters must disclose case positions on the wiki before round 2. Trigger warning must be provided when reading arguments psychologicaly harming	904,785
365,685	379,737	0 - Contact Info	he/him email me at [email protected] for any thing related to theory, disclosure, content warnings etc I'll try to meet any reasonable things - this is terminal defense to all theory or independent voting issues if you don't contact me before hand	904,818
365,686	379,731	District AFF	=1AC= ====Clean, Cheap, leadership is the reason my partner Ethan and I affirm,==== ====Resolved: The United States should increase its use of nuclear energy for commercial energy production==== ====Our Sole Contention is Clean, Cheap, Leadership==== ====Subpoint A: Clean==== ====The world is facing a clean energy crisis, and nuclear energy is the best solution. Goldstein 19…==== Joshua S. Goldstein and Staffan A. Qvist, 1-11-2019, "Only Nuclear Energy Can Save the Planet," WSJ, https://www.wsj.com/articles/only-nuclear-energy-can-save-the-planet-11547225861 Climate scientists tell us that the world must drastically cut its fossil fuel use in AND in nuclear-powered France today are 55 of those in Germany. ====Problematically, the benefits that nuclear power can offer to the environment are threatened by early retirement. Walton 18…==== Robert Walton, 11-9-2018, "35 of US nuclear plants face early retirement: Union of Concerned Scientists," Utility Dive, https://www.utilitydive.com/news/35-of-us-nuclear-plants-face-early-retirement-union-of-concerned-scientis/541793/ More than one-third of nuclear plants in the United States are at risk AND power sector's carbon emissions could rise 4 to 6 by 2035. ====Voting negative continues to push nuclear power out of the equation, which increases carbon emissions by 4-6. Vote affirmative for clean energy.==== ====Subpoint B: Cheap==== ====Nuclear power plants are cheap to run, the world nuclear association in 2019 articulates…==== World Nuclear Association, 10-xx-2019, "Nuclear Power Economics," No Publication, https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/economic-aspects/economics-of-nuclear-power.aspx Nuclear power plants are expensive to build but relatively cheap to run. In many AND risk of higher, specifically-nuclear, taxation adds to these risks. ====Not only are nuclear power plants highly competitive and inexpensive to run, but they also are an incredible source of economic growth. Naser 17==== Hanan Naser 17. On the cointegration and causality between oil market, nuclear energy consumption, and economic growth: evidence from developed countries. Energy, Ecology and Environment, vol 3, no 2, 182–97 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40974-017-0052-0. Naser, Faculty of Business Studies, American University of Bahrain. Our empirical findings have major policy implications, especially that results suggest that the investigated AND year, with more than 100,000 workers contributing to that production. ====Vote affirmative for cheap, growing energy supply.==== ====Subpoint C: Leadership==== ====When the United States focuses on Nuclear energy over alternatives, we innovate and grow the nuclear industry. Spillover from the energy sector goes to every nuclear industry. Unfortunately, if we move focus away from nuclear energy, we risk losing our nuclear dominance. Ichord 19,==== Ichord May 2019, "," US Nuclear Energy Leadership: Innovation And The Strategic Global Challenge Honorary Co-Chairs Senator Mike Crapo Senator Sheldon Whitehouse Rapporteur Dr. Robert F. Ichord, Jr. Co-Directors Randolph Bell Dr. Jennifer T. Gordon Ellen Scholl Report of the Atlantic Council Task Force on US Nuclear Energy Leadership, https://www.ourenergypolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/US_Nuclear_Energy_Leadership-1-1.pdf The United States has been the central architect of international nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear safety AND against the risks of diversion of nuclear materials for military or terrorist purposes. ====In order to promote clean, cheap, leadership… we urge an affirmative ballot====	904,804
365,687	379,742	Septober 19 Aff	Used At: Parkway West Greater St. Louis #1 Contentions: 1. Improving Trade 2. Health Silk Road https://drive.google.com/file/d/1kTZkyQpWrVy7kf9MVZdbAWkg4kH4W-kz/view?usp=sharing	904,825
365,688	379,744	Contact Info	If you have questions or concerns before the round email us at [email protected]	904,827
365,689	379,749	a Disclosure Policy	Due to time constraints, we may be too busy to disclose after every round, so we will disclose at the end of the day. If you would like you to know what we are reading before you debate us please email us at [email protected] or [email protected].	904,832
365,690	379,751	Dowling AFF 1	C1: Deterrence Beatrice Christofaro, Business Insider, "Cyber-attacks are the newest frontier of war and can strike harder than a natural disaster. Here's why the US could struggle to cope if it got hit", May 23rd, 2019, https://www.businessinsider.com/cyber-attack-us-struggle-taken-offline-power-grid-2019-4 "The reasons we ... major geopolitical move." Kevin Freiburger, GCN, "On the offense: How federal cybersecurity is changing", 08/27/19, https://gcn.com/articles/2019/08/27/cybersecurity-offense.aspx "Offensive cybersecurity means ... and military infrastructure." Michael Sulmeyer, Foreign Affairs, "How the US Can Play Cyber-Offense", March 22nd, 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-03-22/how-us-can-play-cyber-offense "If subtle measures ... them otherwise useless." Bob Pisani, CNBC, "A cyberattack could trigger the next financial crisis, new report says", September 13th, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/13/a-cyberattack-could-trigger-the-next-financial-crisis.html "They may all ... the broader economy." Olivier Blanchard , IMG, "JOBS AND GROWTH: ANALYTICAL AND OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE FUND", March 2013, https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/031413.pdf "Although we are ... of adverse shocks." C2: Iran -Isreal Saheb Sadeghi, Foreign Policy, "For Many Iranians, Staying In The Nuclear Deal No Longer Makes Sense", 09/24/19, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/09/24/for-many-iranians-staying-in-the-nuclear-deal-no-longer-makes-sense/ "Talks have little ... will also increase." Alex Ward, Vox, "The Weekend in the Risky US-Iran Standoff, explained", 06/24/19, https://www.vox.com/2019/6/24/18715408/usa-iran-sanctions-cyber-pompeo-coalition "Multiple outlets reported ... Iran's missile systems. Anna Wagner, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, "Cyber security at nuclear facilities: US-Russian joint support needed - Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists", 12/15/17, https://thebulletin.org/2017/12/cyber-security-at-nuclear-facilities-us-russian-joint-support-needed/ "Civilian nuclear facilities ... using cyber weapons." Jon Lindsay, "CYBER OPERATIONS AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS", NAPSNet Special Reports, June 20, 2019, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/cyber-operations-and-nuclear-weapons/ "A nuclear weapon ... command and control." Doreen Horschig, 6-23-19, “If Iran tensions flare, Israel may strike while the world quietly watches,” The Conversation, https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/if-iran-tensions-flare-israel-may-strike-while-the-world-quietly-watches-119062300146_1.html "Isreal, which has ... the Middle East." Haviv Gur, The Times of Isreal, "Netanyahu makes a case for a preemptive strike ", 10/15/13, https://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-makes-a-case-for-preemptive-strike/ "In a speech ... perhaps too late." Cham Dallas, Conflict and Health, "Nuclear war between Israel and Iran: lethality beyond the pale", 2013 https://scihub.tw/https://www.researchgate.net/publication/236689331_Nuclear_war_between_Israel_and_Iran_Lethality_beyond_the_pale "No real appreciation ... the selected targeting." C3: ISIS Dina Raston 19, 9-26-2019, NPR, "How The U.S. Hacked ISIS," https://www.npr.org/2019/09/26/763545811/how-the-u-s-hacked-isis "It had turned ... everything, Neil said." Mark Pomerleau 19, 9-17-19, Fifth Domain, "How Cyber Command can limit the reach of ISIS", https://www.c4isrnet.com/dod/cybercom/2019/09/17/how-cyber-command-can-limit-the-reach-of-isis/, Date Accessed 10-30-2019 "Joint Task Force ... that particular realm." Nathan Sales 19, 5-6-19, USA Today, "Fight against ISIS: Strategies to keep global terrorist network at bay", https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2019/05/06/fight-against-isis-strategies-keep-global-terrorist-network-bay-column/1112549001/ "One of our ... designated 14 more." Michael S Rogers 18, April 11 2018, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, "EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE", https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS26/20180411/108076/HHRG-115-AS26-Wstate-RogersM-20180411.pdf "Today, ISIS's so-called ... execute some today."	904,834
365,691	379,773	Round 4	====Nuclear war's inevitable==== Hellman 1 – Professor of E Engineering at Stanford (Martin E., "Nuclear War: Inevitable or Preventable?" http://www-ee.stanford.edu/~~hellman/Breakthrough/book/chapters/hellman.html) Every day, the United States depends on 30,000 nuclear weapons for its AND nuclear war virtually inevitable. We cannot continue on our present course forever. ====Nuclear war is survivable==== LFTR 09 (Lifeboat Foundation Technology Research Think Tank, "dedicated to encouraging scientific advancements while helping humanity survive existential risks" Brian Wang MA "The Science of Nuclear War Effects and Battlestar Galactica" http://nextbigfuture.com/2009/02/nuclear-war-effects-and-battlestar.html) Executive Summary on Nuclear War 200 million megaton of explosions will not kill the AND that there would be firestorms in every city hit by a nuclear bomb. ====Kinetic energy weapons are almost here – NASA has already done testing==== Loeb 10 – Researcher for the Gravity Research Program (Lexi, University of Oregon "Nuclear Weapons May Already Be Obsolete— New Space Based Weapons of Mass Destruction Are Simpler and Just as Lethal" http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/2581739/nuclear_weapons_may_already_be_obsolete.html?cat= Get high enough in the sky and drop a massive object or accelerate it in AND . It will never please anyone who believes that all weapons are bad. ====KE Weapons will cause extinction==== Gettings 01 – Professor of Geophysics (Paul, at U of Utah, Weapons of Mass Destruction) Planetary K.E. Munitions. The current title-holder in pure destructive AND hemispheres. There is no report of any of these ever being deployed. ====Only through nuclear war can we realize our destructive power and live in harmony with the environment and without inertia weapons – preventing a future war that would destroy civilization and we'd become stewards of the environment==== Zimmerman 87 (Michael E. Professor of Philosophy at Newcomb. "Anthropocentric Humanism and the Arms Race" Today we are faced with facts and evidence about the nuclear arms race that counsel AND and sons of the Earth-co-creators of the cosmic order. ====they only way there will be nuclear disarmament is through nuclear war==== Nye 88 (Joseph S., former Dead of Government at Harvard, PhD in Political Science from Harvard, chaired the National Security Council Group on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. "Fateful Visions" pg 17) For public opinion to help sustain an abolition agreement, there may have to be AND likely path to an agreement to abolish nuclear weapons may be nuclear war. ====Kinetic energy operates on a magnitude degrees higher than nuclear war – extinction ==== Crawford and Baxter 15 ~~Crawford, Ian A., and Stephen Baxter. "The lethality of interplanetary warfare: a fundamental constraint on extraterrestrial liberty." In The Meaning of Liberty Beyond Earth, pp. 187-198. Springer, Cham, 2015. Ian Crawford is a faculty member in the Department of Earth and Planetary Sciences, Birkbeck College, University of London. Stephen Baxter is in the British Interplanetary Society, London, UK~~ What of the future reality? It is hard to predict the weapons technologies of AND energy output (NASA 2013b) to dismantle Earth entirely (Dyson 1996). ====Solves Mindset Shift==== Deudney 18 ~~Daniel Horace Deudney is an American political scientist and Associate Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University. The Great Debate: The Nuclear-Political Question and the Cold War~~ Although nuclear war is the oldest of these technogenic threats to civilization and human survival AND of institutional innovation and adjustment toward a fully "bombs away" future. ====BFR in development right now – planned tests very soon ==== Ralph 18 (brackets original) ~~Eric Ralph, "SpaceX's first completed BFR spaceship section spotted in huge Port of L.A. tent", TESLARATI. 9-21-2018. https://www.teslarati.com/spacex-first-completed-bfr-spaceship-section-port-of-la-tent/. ~~ Described by CEO Elon Musk as "the first ~~completed~~ cylinder section" AND out its Raptor engines, aerodynamic characteristics, structural composition, and more. ====Kinetic weapons coming – Congressional support ==== Trevithick 18 ~~Joseph Trevithick, "Congress Wants Space-Based Missile Defense Weapons and Sensors No Matter What", Drive. 7-23-2018. http://thedrive.com/the-war-zone/22380/congress-demands-space-based-missile-defense-weapons-and-sensors-no-matter-what. ~~ U.S. lawmakers from the House and Senate have agreed on a final AND spending bill, Congress seems determined to find out as soon as possible. ====Kinetic weapons! They're everywhere! ==== Alderman 1/31 ~~Ray Alderman, Vita Standards Organization, "Future weapons and the kill web", Military Embedded Systems. 1-31-2019. http://mil-embedded.com/guest-blogs/future-weapons-and-the-kill-web/. ~~ That brings us to touch. Kinetic weapons are most prevalent and rely on motion AND this one either, but you can look it up on the web. ====SpaceX will create weapons to protect the US==== Erwin 18 ~~Sandra Erwin 2018-09-23t12, "SpaceX President Gwynne Shotwell: 'We Would Launch A Weapon to Defend the US'", Space. 09-23-2018. https://www.space.com/41868-spacex-gwynne-shotwell-answers-weapons-question.html. ~~ NATIONAL HARBOR, Md. — SpaceX President and Chief Operating Officer Gwynne Shotwell speaks AND , they stick to a plan, and their pace is much faster."	904,873
365,692	379,782	1 - SEPTOCT - Euro Recession AC v1	European Recession AC v1 Intro Rowley ’19, Anthony Rowley, SCMP, 9 June 2019, https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3013604/brace-global-recession-unlike-any-other-amid-world-polarised-us-and Global economic recession is no longer a threat but an inevitability. The question economists should be asking is not whether or when a recession will strike but rather what can be done once it does. Normal policy tools such as monetary easing and/or fiscal stimulus may be no more effective than pushing on the proverbial piece of string. This time, it will be different — as optimists like to say when trying to convince themselves that crises cannot happen again; though not for the reasons they think. The 2019 recession will be different from the Great Recession a decade ago, and indeed, from any slump since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The comparison with 1930 — when the US introduced its Smoot-Hawley tariffs and plunged the world into depression in the wake of the 1929 US stock market crash — is obvious, except, this time, world trade growth is already crumbling. Global trade growth is at its slowest in 10 years, according to the World Bank. Trade crises tend to cut deeper into the heart of global economic activity than any of the post-war financial or debt crises did. The onset may be slower and less dramatic but the adverse effects last longer. It is easy to forget that what caused global economic growth to stagnate for seven or eight years after the 2008 financial crisis was the secondary shock to trade. World trade only began to pick up again in 2016, to then have US President Donald Trump clobber it with tariffs. The renewed slowdown in trade this time is more complex and systemic than the one that followed the Great Recession, and it is accompanied by a global economy still dependent on residual monetary stimulus from the 2008 crisis to keep investment and consumption moving forward, if uncertainly. The World Bank expects global economic growth to ease to a weaker-than-expected 2.6 per cent in 2019. Its president, David Malpass , said: “There's been a tumble in business confidence, a deepening slowdown in global trade, and sluggish investment in emerging and developing economies.” Yet, stock markets have chosen to focus on hopes that the US Federal Reserve and other central banks will conduct monetary easing again. This is clutching at straws. As former Deutsche Bundesbank president Axel Weber noted in Tokyo last week, markets have “overpriced” the chances of precautionary easing. Another legacy of the 2008 crisis is the mountain of debt in advanced and developing economies, a consequence of easing and historically low interest rates. As Malpass said, “Debt management and transparency need to be high priorities”. In this situation of slowing economic momentum, declining business confidence and investment, and a general sense of economic malaise, who can doubt that the slowdown risks spilling over into a recession? Kempe ‘19 Frederick Kempe, 25 May 2019, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/24/european-union-real-dangers-are-slow-growth-declining-clout-uninspired-leadership.html It’s no wonder that populists are gaining ground against established parties that haven’t delivered results. If the eurozone’s GDP over the past decade were a stock, you wouldn’t want to own it. Eurozone economic output in 2017 was lower than it was in 2009, according to World Bank figures. Looking at the considerable political risks ahead, the Atlantic Council’s Ben Haddad judges that stock as “high risk, low returnn risks ahead By comparison, Chinese GDP over that same period grew by 139, India’s GDP by 96 and the United States’ by 34. The European Commission has cut the 2019 eurozone growth forecast to 1.2 from an already unimpressive 1.9 ~-~- with concerns over Germany’s economic strength abound. “And there are strong signals that worse is to come,” says Ana Palacio, former Spanish foreign minister. “Debt levels are rising fast and the European Central Bank has re-launched stimulus measures to stave off recession.” Unlike the financial crisis of a decade ago, where the pain was concentrated in southern Europe, this one will hit the eurozone generally and, most dangerously, Germany. “The European Union barely survived the first crisis,” says Palacio. “A recession that hits the EU core would amount to a serious, even existential threat.” Kirkegaard ’19 Peterson Institute for International Economics, 18 April 2019, Jacob Funk Kirkegarrd, https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/europes-new-leaders-need-think-now-about-next-economic-downturn Europe has rebounded nicely, if unevenly, after its last double-dip recession by relying on the monetary stimulus of the European Central Bank (ECB) and other central banks. Today, however, Europe faces a potential economic iceberg when its next recession hits, though this issue seems strangely absent from the debate over who should run Europe’s major institutions later this year. Because the ECB and other European central banks will not be able to provide sufficient macroeconomic stimulus in the next downturn, a boost will have to be forthcoming instead from fiscal policy in Europe.1 This is both good and bad news. On the monetary front, policy rates remain at zero or negative and the ECB has accumulated a sizeable €2.6 trillion (22 percent of euro area GDP) bond portfolio, complicating further large-scale asset purchases. Measured at the EU or euro area levels, Europe has averaged general government deficits in 2018 below 1 percent of GDP, with gross debts falling since 2014. Fiscal space is thus available to combat the next downturn. Lower interest levels in Europe in the foreseeable future give governments the capacity to carry extra debt, reducing constraints on Europe’s fiscal capacity.2 The problem of course remains political. The EU and especially the euro area remain half-built houses without the institutions to decide and implement a common fiscal policy, a major handicap that will come to haunt Europe even more in the future. Because the next downturn will come in the next five to eight years, during the tenure of Europe’s new incoming presidents of the European Commission and ECB, the views of Europe’s presidential candidates on the role of fiscal policy is especially pertinent. As I have argued elsewhere, the next ECB president must not only be willing to use monetary policy to combat downturns but also effectively push member states to be more forceful in using fiscal policy for the same purpose. All fiscal stimulus acts with a time lag. Speed is of the essence if the stimulus is to work. Europe cannot afford to invent new institutions through which to channel fiscal stimulus, as it did in 2010, which is why leadership at the European Commission may be crucial. Fiscal expansion may not be such an easy sell. President Emmanuel Macron of France has scaled back his 2017 proposal for a new euro area budget, ruling out countercyclical purposes. The so-called Budget Instrument for Convergence and Competitiveness comes into being in 2021, but as a new euro area institution without its own expert staff or experience, it cannot—as the argument sometimes goes—easily be scaled up in the next crisis. The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) is another possible fiscal policy conduit for the euro area, but it remains able to lend conditionally to member states only in a crisis. Changing its governance may prove time consuming in a downturn, accompanied by concerns over its use of bailout resources. The euro area will therefore not have its own preemptive fiscal institutional capacity in the next downturn, leaving the European Commission to do the job. Withers ‘19 Paul Withers, UK Express News, 13 February 2019, https://www.express.co.uk/finance/city/1086662/europe-news-eurozone-latest-global-economy-germany-italy-recession Last week, eurozone growth forecasts were slashed by the European Commission as fears continue to intensify over the bloc's biggest economies. In its latest quarterly forecasts, the Commission warned eurozone growth will slow to 1.3 percent this year from 1.9 percent in 2018. Growth is expected to rebound slightly to 1.6 percent in 2020, but alarm bells will be ringing as the new estimates are less optimistic than the Commission’s previous forecasts. In November, Brussels said it expected eurozone growth to hit 1.9 percent this year and 1.7 percent in 2020. The Commission is also forecasting growth in a 27-nation European Union - without Britain due to Brexit - to dramatically slow to 1.5 percent this year from 2.1 percent in 2018. The recent gloomy forecasts have spooked investors, who fear the crisis dominating the eurozone could drag down the global economy with it. Salman Ahmed, chief investment strategist at Lombard Oliver, told Bloomberg: “The concern I have right now is in Europe. “It’s clear China is going through a slowdown, but there’s also a strong amount of stimulus in the pipeline. However, in Europe, things are deteriorating quite fast.” Germany’s crumbling economy - Europe’s biggest at £3.1trillion - has magnified the seriousness of the financial problems engulfing the bloc. In December, industrial output fell for the fourth consecutive month, down 0.4 percent on November. This was in contrast to a forecast from Reuters for an increase of 0.7 percent. Industrial output was down 3.9 percent on December 2017. Earlier this month, Germany’s lucrative manufacturing sector plunged into contraction territory, slumping to 49.7 points in January from 51.1 in December, according to the latest figures from IHS Markit. BRI Solves in 3 ways 1 – FTAs Kohl ’19 Tristain Kohl, “The Belt and Road Initiative’s Effect on Supply-Chain Trade: Evidence from Structural Gravity Equations”, www.academic.oup.com/cjres/article/12/1/77/5289371, Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society Studies, 14 January 2019 Alternatively, BRI sets out to reduce trade costs through the creation of FTAs. In their simplest form, FTAs reduceing tariffs. However, more recent FTAs tend to be much more extensive by design, covering a wide variety of policy domains unrelated to tariffs, which may still serve as impediments to trade (Baier et al., 2018; Kohl et al., 2016). Examples of such policies include mutual recognition of product standards or even complete harmonisation of legislation. Taken together, the key mechanisms through which we expect BRI to bring about a change in international trade is through either a change in geographic distance as a proxy for infrastructural investments, or the creation of FTAs as a substitute for such infrastructural developments. Xinhua ’19 22 April 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-04/22/c_137998513.htm Solid progress has been made in promoting unimpeded trade among countries and regions participating in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), according to a report released Monday. Efforts invested in the initiative have liberalized and facilitated trade and investment in the participating countries and regions, lowered the costs of trade and business, and released growth potential, enabling the participants to engage in broader and deeper economic globalization, it said. "A network of free trade areas involving China and other Belt and Road (BandR) countries has taken shape," it said. China has signed or upgraded free trade agreements with ASEAN, Singapore, Pakistan, Georgia and other countries and regions, and signed an economic and trade cooperation agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union, according to the report. Trade in goods between China and other BandR countries reached 1.3 trillion U.S. dollars in 2018, up 16.4 percent year on year, while that in services rose 18.4 percent from 2016 to 97.76 billion dollars in 2017. Bruegel ‘17 Bruegel, Chatham House, China Center for International Economic Exchanges and The Chinese University of Hong Kong, September 2017, http://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/CHHJ5627_China_EU_Report_170912_WEB.pdf Such negotiations can be initiated upon the successful conclusion of the investment agreement between the EU and China. China’s relative importance to the EU as a trade partner will continue to grow in the coming years, even as the EU’s relative importance to China is likely to decline slightly (by 2020, the EU may no longer be China’s largest trading partner, partly as a result of Brexit). This means that the extent to which China and the EU further open up their markets and improve trade and investment liberalization and facilitation with each other will be a crucial factor shaping EU–China economic relations to 2025. As China’s economy continues to develop and urbanize, leading to a shift to higher-quality consumption and higher value-added activities, expanding market access and coordinating regulation between the EU and China will become more important and potentially easier to achieve. Trade in services should be actively promoted in both directions. Healthcare products and services are good examples of areas that can benefit both sides. Driven by the changing demographics of China’s ageing population and the capacity gap in healthcare provision between the EU and China, it should become a major area for market opening. As an example of an FTA’s potential impact, Chinese research estimates that an FTA in 2020 could increase the EU’s exports to China by one-third over the five years to 2025, while China’s exports to the EU would be 20 per cent higher. Although an FTA would help improve the EU–China trade balance, eliminating the EU’s trade deficit with China will require additional joint efforts beyond an FTA. In the meantime, the two sides should encourage pragmatic cooperation and market liberalization across a number of related areas, while conducting further research and engaging in dialogue on how an FTA could help deliver mutually beneficial economic development. 3. Use China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a platform for further expanding bilateral trade and economic cooperation The BRI offers the opportunity for complementary benefits to the EU and China. The EU has the potential to become the western ‘anchor’ of the BRI, which aims to create new land and sea connections between the fast growing markets of East Asia and the mature, developed markets of Europe, enhancing trade between them as well as markets along the planned rail and sea routes. Related Chinese investment, alongside the EU’s ‘Juncker Plan’, can help address some EU infrastructure bottlenecks, especially in port and rail facilities in Central and Eastern Europe, and through new rail freight routes between China and Europe. The EU’s global trade could increase by some 6 per cent as a result, once all related projects are completed, principally due to a reduction in transport costs. EU companies could use these new routes to increase the amounts of their exports to a growing Chinese consumer market, even as Chinese companies improve the price competitiveness of their exports in the other direction. For their part, EU financial institutions can bring expertise in the long-term financial management of complex infrastructure investment projects, while European investment could help BRI projects meet the necessary global standards for environmental and other forms of sustainability. Moreover, new BRI-related investment, trade and industrial cooperation can help invigorate growth in the EU and its neighbourhood. The EU and China should ensure that these investments contribute to balanced, sustainable and inclusive development for both and for the world economy as a whole. Center for European Policy Studies ’16 April 2016, https://www.amfori.org/sites/default/files/CEPS20-20EU-China20agreement20-20Summary.pdf EU bilateral exports to China increase strongly, by between 79.2 (modest) and 110.6 (ambitious), while there is a tiny drop in exports to the rest of the world. Overall EU exports go up by between 2.2 and 3.2, respectively. China’s exports to the EU increase by between 39.2 (modest) and 56.9 (ambitious), with a larger increase in total exports in value than for the EU. In addition, in the China case, there is a slight increase in exports to the rest of the world. Hence, the trade effects of the FTA are quite powerful, with more than a doubling of EU exports and a 60 increase of the already very large Chinese exports (of goods mainly) to the EU. 2 – Access to Chinese Markets Lemon ‘19 Jason Lemon, Newsweek, 26 March 2019, https://www.newsweek.com/macron-merkel-china-belt-and-road-1375673 French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel have called for improved trading ties with China as they voice cautious optimism about the Continent becoming more involved in Chinese President Xi Jinping's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). "We, as Europeans, want to play an active part in the project," Merkel said after Tuesday talks in Paris with Xi, Macron and European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post reported. "And that must lead to a certain reciprocity, and we are still wrangling over that a bit." Macron voiced a similar view, while remaining cautious. "What's at stake is demonstrating that cooperation yields more than confrontation," the French leader said, according to Reuters, a clear contrast to the current position of Europe's close ally the United States. Washington has dubbed the BRI a "vanity project," as President Donald Trump has generally taken a hard-line stance against Beijing. Last summer, Trump launched a multibillion-dollar trade war with China, accusing it of treating the U.S. "very unfairly" when it comes to trade. efforts to move forward with the BRI, which is modeled after the historic Silk Road trade route and aims to link China by land and sea with other parts of Asia, Europe, the Middle East and Africa through vast infrastructure development. "China's BRI offers both opportunities and risks, and the prudent thing to do, which European countries are moving toward, is to explore its opportunities while being cautious of its risks," Yuen Yuen Ang, an associate professor of political science at the University of Michigan specializing in China, told Newsweek. Conversely, she pointed out, "the U.S. slams the door on BRI because it sees its relationship with China in zero-sum terms." Washington thinks "if China 'wins,' the U.S. 'loses,'" she said. Analysts have raised significant concerns about what some have classified as "predatory" lending practices by Beijing in an effort to expand the BRI and its global influence. Throughout Asia and Africa, China has offered long-term loans that some nations are unlikely to pay back. The goal, according to analysts, is for governments to eventually default on the loans and give China control of the infrastructure built with the funds. European nations are also concerned about what they view as unfair trade practices by China that make it difficult for foreign enterprises to compete fairly. While European leaders believe they have opened their markets wide to Chinese companies, they see China as having been slow to respond in kind. Hanneman and Huotari ’18 Thilo Hanneman and Mikko Huotari, Merics – Mercator Institute for China Studies, 17 April 2018, https://www.merics.org/en/papers-on-china/reciprocity Europe continues to be a favorite destination for Chinese investors. China’s global outbound investment declined in 2017 for the first time as Beijing enacted capital controls. Chinese FDI in the EU followed the global trend and dropped to EUR 35 billion, a 17 decline compared to 2016. However, the pace of Chinese deal making in Europe is more resilient than in other advanced economies, and state-related investors are staging a comeback. European FDI in China remains lackluster because of slowing growth and persistent market access hurdles. The level of European FDI in China has hovered around EUR 10 billion per year in the past five years before 2015 and has further declined in 2016 and 2017 to EUR 8 billion per year. Despite promises to level the playing field, European companies continue to face major formal and informal investment restrictions in the Chinese market, especially in sectors with high growth opportunities. By all available measures, there is a significant gap in investment openness between the EU and China. Chinese investors enjoy one of the most open investment regimes in Europe, with almost unfettered access to all industries. China on the other hand continues to strategically limit access for foreign companies in many sectors and there is rampant informal discrimination against foreign firms. The lack of investment reciprocity harms European interests. The lack of reciprocity violates fairness principles that the post-WWII economic order was built on. It also is a threat to efficient market allocation of resources, which can cause serious harm for European producers and consumers. Finally, the perception of China as a free rider undermines popular support for economic cooperation with China and for an open, liberal economic order in Western democracies. Moving toward greater reciprocity is ultimately in China’s own interest: China’s leaders are aware that the current investment barriers not only stoke foreign discontent but are ultimately also detrimental to China’s own economic welfare. Carrai ’19 Maria Adele Carrai, 8 April 2019, ChinaFile Conversation – a weekly real time discussion of China news from a group of the world’s leading China experts, http://www.chinafile.com/conversation/how-should-europe-handle-relations-china Another important factor is the role of the U.S. in EU-China relations. Xi Jinping visited Europe in late March, just before the 70th anniversary of NATO on April 4 – an anniversary that U.S. Vice President Mike Pence marked by calling China’s rise “perhaps the greatest challenge NATO will face in the coming decades.” While the EU’s transatlantic ties remain much stronger than its ties with China, the power of Chinese money and investment could gradually bring EU countries closer to Beijing. To enact an effective strategy, the EU needs to come together: A united EU market can provide the leverage to make China comply with demands for a more balanced economic relationship. Bisio ‘19 Virgilio Bisio, 8 April 2019, ChinaFile Conversation – a weekly real time discussion of China news from a group of the world’s leading China experts, http://www.chinafile.com/conversation/how-should-europe-handle-relations-china China’s leaders are adept at keeping regional blocs divided in order to deal with individual countries or select groupings on more favorable terms. They have effectively exploited the divergent interests of Europe’s economic powerhouses and its investment-hungry East and South. Wu ‘18 Wendy Wu, South China Morning Post, 20 June 2018, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2151512/european-chamber-warns-china-may-lose-appeal-investors Meanwhile, 43 per cent said they had found it more difficult getting access to the sectors listed under the Made in China 2025 policy, although access had improved for larger European firms, particularly in cars and machinery. Companies surveyed identified the top regulatory obstacles as unfavourable treatment in dealing with administrative issues, discrimination in enforcement of rules, market access barriers and licensing requirements. Legal services, pharmaceutical and medical devices were among the sectors that reported the most cases of unfair treatment. The chamber polled 1,195 members for the annual report in February and March, with 532 completing the survey. Its report also warned that China risked losing some of its lustre for investors, who were concerned about market restrictions and uneven treatment, as well as possible capital controls and rising labour costs. These factors, along with the growth of emerging markets, could push European companies to invest elsewhere, it said. “The pressure is now on China to further develop its institutions or risk current inefficiencies rendering any market opening meaningless. In short, maturing markets demand mature regulatory environments,” the report said. Half of the companies surveyed said they expected to see “meaningful” efforts to open up and even out the playing field in the next five years, while the rest believed it would take longer. “The ball is now in China’s court to decide how long it will wait before it follows through on its reform promises,” the chamber said. European firms reported strong profits in China last year on resilient economic growth and increasing demand for quality goods and services from the middle class in sectors such as cars, medical devices and pharmaceuticals, according to the report. But telecoms and information technology firms were hit hard by the controversial new cybersecurity law, it said. 3 – German Infrastructure McCormick ‘19 McCormick, Myles. “German Business Confidence Slides to Lowest Level since 2014.” Financial Times, Financial Times, 22 Feb. 2019, www.ft.com/content/8098cf74-3681-11e9-bd3a-8b2a211d90d5. Business confidence in Germany this month slid to its lowest level since December 2014 in the latest sign of weakness in the Eurozone’s largest economy. Financiers views soured on both the current economic conditions and the country’s future outlook, according to the latest business climate index published by the Ifo Institute think tank. The gauge fell more sharply than expected to 98.5 in February from a revised level of 99.3 in January. Analysts polled by Reuters had expected a reading of 99. “Worries in the German business world continue to grow,” said Clemens Fuest, president of the Ifo Institute. “These survey results as well as other indicators point to economic growth of 0.2 per cent in the first quarter. The economic situation in Germany remains weak.” The gauges for both current conditions and future outlook dropped slightly further than expected to 103.4 and 98.3 respectively, compared to 104.5 and 94.3 last month. The gloom was driven by growing pessimism across manufacturing — which fell for the sixth straight month — services and construction, with a slight uptick in views on trade. Claus Vistesen, an economist at Pantheon Macroeconomics, said: “These headlines are not pretty. Across sectors, sentiment slipped further across the board, indicating that political uncertainty and external headwinds continue to depress business sentiment.” Petroff ‘19 Alanna Petroff, 22 September 2017, CNN Business, https://money.cnn.com/2017/09/22/news/economy/germany-infrastructure-investment-spending/index.html The German economy has a weak link: Infrastructure. The German economy is a finely-tuned machine fueled by competitiveness and efficiency. A closer look reveals wear and tear in a vital area: Infrastructure. Broadband speeds are slower in Germany than in many of its less developed neighbors, and many of the country's schools would benefit from tech upgrades and structural refurbishment. Its roads could also use some work: In 2017, Germany's road network slid to 16th in the World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Report, the latest in a series of downgrades. Experts warn that Germany is at risk of falling behind if it does not invest more, advice that Chancellor Angela Merkel, who is campaigning to win a fourth term in elections on Sunday, says she has taken to heart. Her critics, both foreign and domestic, say that much more could be done. Germany has long been criticized by its neighbors because it exports more goods than it purchases from abroad, a dynamic that makes it difficult for other European countries to keep their trade deficits in check and remain competitive. More spending by the German government ~-~- on infrastructure, for example ~-~- would help boost the economy and spur business spending. The windfall would encourage German consumers to spend more on foreign services and imported goods, ultimately reducing the country's trade surplus. "Government investment is a good way to stimulate demand," said Stephen Brown, an economist at Capital Economics. "Germany is not recognizing that there could be a link ... between public sector and private sector investment." Yet the German government ~-~- which wants to avoid a budget deficit ~-~- is reluctant to increase spending too much. Schulze ‘16 Sept 14 2016. https://www.cnbc.com/2016/09/14/germany-has-a-crumbling-infrastructure-problem.html The repercussions of Germany’s crumbling infrastructure — and reconstruction efforts — extend beyond travel delays and traffic jams. DIW’s Fratzscher said the current conditions are causing lasting economic damage. “Public investment for investment in infrastructure is an important precondition for the creation of jobs, productivity and economic dynamism,” he said. Ewing ‘19 Ewing, Jack. Aug 16 2019. “Germany Has Powered Europe’s Economy. What Happens When Its Engine Stalls?”. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/16/business/eu-economy-germany-recession.html When a debt crisis slammed the eurozone nearly a decade ago, Germany’s powerhouse economy helped lift troubled neighbors like Greece, Portugal and Spain above the turmoil. The question that Europe faces now is whether those countries are strong enough to return the favor. There is little chance that the European Union can thrive when Germany is sickly. Germany has the eurozone’s biggest economy, accounting for more than a quarter of the bloc’s output. It has the most people, 83 million, and the most workers, who help stoke nearly every other country’s economy. The list of European Union countries that count Germany as their No. 1 trading partner is long. It includes France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Slovakia and Sweden. Germany is especially vulnerable to trade tensions because exports account for almost half of the country’s gross domestic product. And it is most sensitive to the downturn in the auto industry because vehicles are the country’s biggest export. Sales of German cars have slumped as Chinese buyers pull back. Jiamei ‘19 Jiamei, Wang. “German Business Enthusiasm for Belt and Road Initiative to Prompt Pragmatism from Berlin.” Global Times, 2 Apr. 2019, www.globaltimes.cn/content/1144461.shtml. German business circles have shown growing enthusiasm toward the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), even though the German government is still wrangling over the infrastructure-building initiative. On March 29, the Federal Association of the German Silk Road Initiative (BVDSI) was founded in Bremen, Germany to serve as a platform for establishing project-related contact for economies along the BRI route. The development opportunities of the BRI - and how to seize them - have apparently become the consensus within and a focus of the German business community. This eagerness is totally justified, considering that the BRI is now widely seen as the engine for economic growth. Just last month, Italy, resisting pressure from the EU and the US, officially signed a memorandum of understanding with China to endorse the infrastructure-building initiative, becoming the first G7 country to join the BRI. The two sides welcome the signing of the MOU, said a joint communique issued by the two countries. "The two sides stand ready to strengthen the alignment of the BRI and Trans-European Transport Networks and deepen the cooperation in ports, logistics, marine transportation and other areas," said the communique, according to Xinhua. Jiamei ‘19 Jiamei, Wang. “German Business Enthusiasm for Belt and Road Initiative to Prompt Pragmatism from Berlin.” Global Times, 2 Apr. 2019, www.globaltimes.cn/content/1144461.shtml. Amid the global economic slowdown and rising anti-globalization sentiment, the economic benefits brought by BRI projects are growing increasingly obvious and becoming more and more attractive to European countries. The BRI promotes the development of infrastructure construction in BRI economies, providing great business opportunities for European companies and industries, which will give a major boost to these economies. Also, against the background of growing political and financial uncertainties in the world, it is necessary for the EU to strengthen bilateral cooperation with China. Even European leaders have gradually realized that they cannot shun BRI projects. On March 26, German Chancellor Angela Merkel described the BRI as an important project in which Europeans wanted to participate, but that also "must lead to a certain reciprocity, and we are still wrangling over that a bit." Rolland ’19 Nadège Rolland, The National Bureau of Asian Research, 11 April 2019, https://www.nbr.org/publication/a-guide-to-the-belt-and-road-initiative/ According to Chinese official sources from the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, since 2013, 80 Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have undertaken over 3,100 BRI projects. “Hard” infrastructure projects occur mostly in the following sectors: transportation (ports, roads, railways), energy (pipelines, power grids, hydropower dams), and information technologies and communications (fiber-optic networks, data centers, satellite constellations). In addition, “soft” infrastructure projects are also underway, such as the creation of special economic zones and the negotiation of free trade agreements, currency swap agreements, and reduced tariffs. The Economist ‘19 15 August 2019, https://www.economist.com/europe/2019/08/15/germanys-economy-is-now-shrinking A short-term bump in spending, as Mrs Merkel argues, would rub up against bottlenecks in areas like construction. Nor would it help remove the pall of uncertainty facing German firms. So some analysts want a credible, possibly cross-party, commitment to establish a fund that would disburse several hundred billion euros over the next decade. Possible targets include transport infrastructure, broadband networks, house building and help for local governments struggling under debt loads. Other ideas include cutting taxes on Germany’s army of low-paid workers or its corporations, or introducing incentives for climate-friendly policies like retrofitting buildings and clean fuel. There could hardly be a better time. Yields on 30-year government bonds are negative, meaning in effect that investors pay the government for the privilege of lending it money. Even if the European Central Bank cuts rates further next month, the monetary toolbox is nearly exhausted. Tax cuts and, in time, investment in infrastructure would help rebalance the German economy from its exports-first approach. Mrs Merkel, now in the twilight of her chancellorship, has u-turned before, notes Mr Dullien. But the headwinds may need to blow a little harder first. The Economist ‘19 https://www.economist.com/leaders/2019/08/22/germany-needs-fiscal-stimulus-heres-how-to-do-it None of these applies to Germany. Stimulus is patently affordable. The government can borrow for 30 years at negative interest rates. As a result, it could probably spend double what Mr Scholz suggests for years and still keep its debt-to-gdp ratio steady at around a prudent 60. Central bankers are hamstrung. Short-term interest rates cannot fall much further. The European Central Bank is likely to start buying more assets in September, which will help but may not be enough. And crowding out investment is not a concern. Negative rates are a sign that Europe is awash with savings and bereft of plans to put them to use (see article). If Germany deployed them to improve its decaying infrastructure, its firms would probably invest more, not less. The country needs looser fiscal policy in both the long term and the short term. It has neglected infrastructure in pursuit of needlessly restrictive fiscal targets, most recently its “black zero” ban on deficits. This has, for example, left 11 of its bridges in poor condition and its railways plagued by delays. Germany should replace the deficit ban with a rule allowing borrowing for investment spending. It should use tax breaks to encourage its private firms, innovation laggards, to invest more too, including in research and development. In the short term Germany needs demand. This necessity has grown in strength this year as the economy has deteriorated. Although unemployment is just 3.1, the Bundesbank has warned that joblessness could soon rise. The domestic economy cannot endure brutal global trading conditions for ever. It would be better to use fiscal policy to prevent a deep downturn than to wait for recession to bring about a bigger deficit of its own accord. Impact Tufts University The financial crisis that commenced in 2007 and its aftermath have been widely referred to as the “Great Recession”—and with good reason. From its beginning until its nadir in 2009, it was responsible for the destruction of nearly $20 trillion worth of financial assets owned by U.S. households. During this time, the U.S. unemployment rate rose from 4.7 percent to 10 percent (not counting the discouraged and marginally attached workers discussed in Chapter 7). By 2010, college graduates fortunate enough to find a job were, on average, earning 17.5 percent less than their counterparts before the crisis—and experts were predicting that such a decline in earnings would persist for more than a decade. The crisis also spread beyond U.S. borders. As consumption and income declined in the United States, many countries experienced a significant reduction in exports as well as a decline in the investments that they held in the United States. As a result, global GDP declined by 2 percent in 2009. It has been estimated that between 50 million and 100 million people around the world either fell into, or were prevented from escaping, extreme poverty due to the crisis. Why did this happen? Why were its effects so long-lasting? What lessons can be learned for the future? These are complicated questions to which this chapter provides some answers.	904,884
365,693	379,794	3 - JAN - Economic Solvency NC	Rendon 9-3-2019, Director, The Future of Venezuela Initiative and Fellow, Americas Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Are Sanctions Working in Venezuela?,” https://www.csis.org/analysis/are-sanctions-working-venezuela Sanctions did not cause the economic or humanitarian crisis in Venezuela as dire conditions in Venezuela preceded the implementation of sanctions. By 2016, a year before any financial or sectoral sanctions hit the country, Venezuela’s economy was already enduring severe hyperinflation, which surpassed a rate of 800 percent. Between 2013 and 2016, food imports fell 71 percent and medicine and medical equipment imports dropped 68 percent. Over the same period, infant mortality increased by 44 percent. By the time sanctions were introduced, Venezuelans earning the minimum wage could only afford 56 percent of the calories necessary for a family of five. Over two million Venezuelans had already fled the country at this point. The extent of the humanitarian damage suffered before sectoral sanctions indicates that the blame cannot be placed on the sanctions themselves. As an example, Venezuela’s Central Bank confirmed in 2014 that plummeting oil prices had triggered a severe economic contraction with simultaneous hyperinflation. Under the guise of austerity, Maduro announced cuts to major social services upon which millions of citizens relied. Bahar May 22, 2019, The Brookings Institute, “Chavismo is the worst of all sanctions: The evidence behind the humanitarian catastrophe in Venezuela,” https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2019/05/22/chavismo-is-the-worst-of-all-sanctions-the-evidence-behind-the-humanitarian-catastrophe-in-venezuela/ Thus, it is clear from our analysis that the further deterioration observed since 2017—whether caused by the sanctions, management incompetence, or whatever it was—by no means constitutes the bulk of the collapse that has caused widespread suffering, death, and displacement to millions of Venezuelans. The weight of evidence seems to indicates that much of the suffering and devastation in Venezuela has been, in line with most accounts, inflicted by those in power for more than 20 years already. Ignoring this and blaming the damage on agents other than Maduro and the Chavista governments after decades of failed policies is, to put it mildly, highly misleading. Katona, 12/31/2019, Oil Price, “Venezuela Is Quietly Ramping Up Oil Production,” Katona is a Group Physical Trader at MOL Group and Expert at the Russian International Affairs Council, currently based in Budapest.https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Venezuela-Is-Quietly-Ramping-Up-Oil-Production.html# kegs If anyone is to ever write a guidebook on political survival, the skills of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro would certainly top the contemporary charts. This autumn went relatively well for the besieged leader as the political headlines drifted towards the US-China trade wars, OPEC+ production cuts and the US impeachment saga. In fact, the weakening of media attention against the background of a rigid sanction regime nudged the Venezuelan authorities to render their economy a bit more market-based and also to throw more efforts into fighting the nation’s main scourge, hyperinflation. Yet once again elections in Venezuela are around the corner and the fragile stability might be jeopardized again. Argus Media Group, 12/12/2019, Venezuela defies sanctions with dollar-driven upswing, (Argus is an independent media organisation with 1000 staff. It is headquartered in London and has 22 offices in the world’s principal commodity trading and production centres. Argus produces price assessments and analysis of international energy and other commodity markets, and offers bespoke consulting services and industry-leading conferences. Companies in 140 countries around the world use Argus data to index physical trade and as benchmarks in financial derivative markets as well as for analysis and planning purposes. Argus was founded in 1970 and is a privately held UK-registered company. It is owned by employee shareholders and global growth equity firm General Atlantic.) https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2037897-venezuela-defies-sanctions-with-dollardriven-upswing?backToResults=true US sanctions have failed to dislodge Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro so far, but they have compelled the government to ease economic controls this year, modestly improving the Opec country's 2020 economic outlook. The sanctions "have forced the Maduro government throughout this year to erase most price controls, loosen capital controls, tighten controls on commercial bank loan operations and accept informal dollarization as it seeks to capture new hard currency streams and reduce hyperinflationary pressures," a Venezuelan central bank economist tells Argus. Maduro's biggest economic achievement this year has been to curb hyperinflation, the economist said. Opposition-controlled National Assembly advisers acknowledge the slowing inflation, but caution that inflationary pressures persist on years of structural distortions. The advisers estimate cumulative inflation from January through November at over 5,500 percent pc compared with the central bank's 2018 inflation estimate of 130,000pc. They now believe it is likely that 2019 inflation could average about 7,000pc, a marked improvement over end-2018 forecasts from entities such as the International Monetary Fund that anticipated 10mn pc million percent inflation in 2019. In October the IMF reduced its 2019 inflation forecast to 200,000pc, rising to 500,000pc in 2020. Sanchez, 8/3/2019, “Venezuela hyperinflation hits 10 million percent. ‘Shock therapy’ may be only chance to undo the economic damage,” https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/02/venezuela-inflation-at-10-million-percent-its-time-for-shock-therapy.html Shock therapy measures, based on recent economic history, can include ending price controls and government subsidies, instituting higher tax rates and lower government spending to reduce budget deficits, devaluing the currency to boost foreign investments and selling state-owned industries to the private sector. Venezuela will have to transform its current scheme of restricting foreign investment in order to fund the restoration of the energy sector, as well as its infrastructure, including the country’s roads and bridges and the power grid. Zerpa, 11/5/2019, 3:51 PM EST, Bloomberg, “Venezuela Is Now More Than 50 Dollarized, Study Finds,” https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-11-05/venezuela-is-now-more-than-50-dollarized-study-finds Venezuela’s economy is increasingly dollarized, with more than half of retail transactions now being carried out in U.S. currency, a study found. An estimated 54 of all sales in Venezuela last month were in dollars, according to a survey by Econoalitica, a Caracas-based research firm. More than four million Venezuelans have migrated in recent years to escape the economic crisis, and many of their families back home now survive on the remittances they send back. This has caused a breach in living standards between those with access to hard currency, and those without, said Asdrubal Oliveros, director of Ecoanalitica. “Venezuela lives in an economy dominated by dollar transactions,” Oliveros told reporters. “This excludes those who only have access to bolivars, whose ability to buy things is severely restricted.” A recent loosening of price controls has led to a boom of product imports ~-~- from Nutella to Heineken ~-~- sold in foreign currency. But the products are sold at prices that few people dependent on local currency salaries can afford, in a country where the monthly minimum salary is about $6. Argus Media Group, 12/12/2019, Venezuela defies sanctions with dollar-driven upswing, (Argus is an independent media organisation with 1000 staff. It is headquartered in London and has 22 offices in the world’s principal commodity trading and production centres. Argus produces price assessments and analysis of international energy and other commodity markets, and offers bespoke consulting services and industry-leading conferences. Companies in 140 countries around the world use Argus data to index physical trade and as benchmarks in financial derivative markets as well as for analysis and planning purposes. Argus was founded in 1970 and is a privately held UK-registered company. It is owned by employee shareholders and global growth equity firm General Atlantic.) https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2037897-venezuela-defies-sanctions-with-dollardriven-upswing?backToResults=true Dollarization is a necessary "pressure release valve" that is allowing private-sector companies to secure hard currency to finance imports, Maduro said in October, adding "thank God for dollarization." Food and medicine imports have rebounded, benefiting about 15pc of the population with access to dollars. The other 85pc scrape by on the equivalent of $1-$2/day. Venezuelan business chamber Fedecamaras said this week the private sector will account for the first time in decades for up to 25pc of GDP in 2019 and likely more in 2020. Reuters ‘20 Ramirez blamed the collapse on Maduro’s decision to place the military in charge of Venezuela’s state-owned oil company PDVSA. After jailing two former PDVSA presidents on corruption charges, Maduro in 2017 appointed Manuel Quevedo, a major general from the National Guard with no experience in the energy sector, as PDVSA’s head and oil minister. That year, Maduro and Quevedo promised to add 1 million bpd to Venezuela’s flagging output, but instead crude production and refining have slid to their lowest levels in almost 75 years. Ramirez said some 30,000 employees have left PDVSA in recent years, amid an exodus of experienced workers also described by union leaders and former staff. “It’s been a disaster,” Ramirez said. “The main processes in the industry - human resources, contracts, supply - are in the hands of military officials with no knowledge of oil.” Stefanie Eschenbacher, Marianna Parraga, Luc and Cohen 2020, “Exclusive: Weakened by sanctions, Venezuela's PDVSA cedes oilfield operations to foreign firms,” JANUARY 3, 2020 / 3:00 PM / 2 DAYS AGO https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-oil-ramirez-exclusive/exclusive-weakened-by-sanctions-venezuelas-pdvsa-cedes-oilfield-operations-to-foreign-firms-idUSKBN1Z221R That could give Maduro more breathing room by encouraging fresh investment in PDVSA’s operations, potentially boosting oil revenues. However, it would be controversial after late President Hugo Chavez, an iconic figure to many Venezuelans, made nationalization a flagship policy. Rafael Ramirez, a former oil minister and PDVSA president who left office after clashing with Maduro in 2014, said the company had already effectively handed control to joint venture partners even though an agreement had not yet been formally reached. Ramirez, an adviser to some international energy firms that have recently worked in Venezuela, said PDVSA had been reduced to little more than an administrator of contracts with oil companies. “PDVSA is no longer producing. It’s signing contracts for others to produce in a de facto privatization,” Ramirez told Reuters during an interview at a location he requested not be disclosed. Martin ’19, Sabrina Martin, 24 December 2019, “After Collapse of Venezuela’s State Oil Company, Maduro Weighs Privatization,” https://panampost.com/sabrina-martin/2019/12/25/venezuelas-state-oil-compan-maduro/ A BBC Mundo report revealed that sources in the oil sector in Venezuela are betting that Maduro “will end up promoting a change in the Hydrocarbon Law that will allow foreign companies that collaborate with PDVSA to exploit the oil fields.” It is not the first time that this news has come up about the possibility of somehow privatizing the oil fields in Venezuela. On 6th December, the Reuters news agency revealed that both the regime and the opposition “are considering handing over field operations to PDVSA partners”. So far there is no official information on this matter. Meanwhile, Jose Ignacio Hernandez, Special Prosecutor of the interim government of Juan Guaido, described this action as a possible “de facto privatization, a sign of the collapse of the state.” The Reuters report notes that the amendment to the law is being discussed with joint ventures such as Chevron, Russia’s Rosneft, and China’s state-owned CNPC. The talks appear to be taking place within the framework of the Boston Group, where officials close to Maduro, opponents, and economists critical of the regime meet to discuss economics and politics. The initiative also arises at a time international sanctions have “strangled” the tyranny and forced it to make some areas of the economy, such as price and exchange control, more flexible. The BBC Mundo report points out that allowing joint ventures to invest in Venezuela “would mean breaking with the statist energy policy that the Bolivarian Revolution has maintained in Venezuela since the time of the late President Hugo Chavez.” The crude oil production that had bottomed out in Venezuela in the middle of a production of 600 thousand barrels per day has increased recently but not thanks to PDVSA but to the partner companies. According to Reuters, oil production averaged 926,000 barrels per day in November, which is 200,000 barrels more than in October. That is a 20 increase. What has happened is that PDVSA delivered production, sales, and collections to the partner companies, even though they were a minority in the partnership scheme. Repsol, Rosneft, Chevron, and Gazprom manage the whole process according to Al Navío. Everything coincides: Maduro will hand over operations to mixed companies and the Venezuelan opposition in the National Assembly will discuss a new Hydrocarbons Law. According to Konzapata, the new regulations would allow multinationals to obtain the majority of mixed companies. Jose Toro Hardy, who until 1999 was a member of the board of directors of the Venezuelan state oil company. An economist who, together with a team of specialists, managed to position the company as the second best in the world, had already pointed out to the PanAm Post that it was the regime that “killed the dream of nationalization”. “If we want to revive the oil industry, which will always be possible because we still have underground oil reserves, it will have to be based on private investment. That’s why I say this regime killed the dream of nationalization,” he said. Reuters, 12/10/2019, “Venezuela Nov crude output jumps to highest level since U.S. tightened sanctions -sources,” https://www.reuters.com/article/venezuela-oil/venezuela-nov-crude-output-jumps-to-highest-level-since-u-s-tightened-sanctions-sources-idUSL1N28K1YG CARACAS, Dec 10 (Reuters) - Venezuela’s crude output in November jumped more than 20 from the prior month to the highest level since the United States tightened sanctions on state oil company PDVSA in August, two people with knowledge of PDVSA data said this week. November output averaged between 926,000 barrels-per-day (bpd) and 965,000 bpd, according to the people, compared with the 761,000 bpd average in October that PDVSA reported to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). That increase came as exports jumped to over 1 million bpd. That marked the first time that Venezuela’s output exceeded 900,000 bpd barrels per day since August, when Washington warned foreign firms continuing to work with PDVSA that it could sanction them. The Trump administration first sanctioned PDVSA in January as part of its push to oust socialist President Nicolas Maduro. John E. Herbst and Jason Marczak, September 2019, Atlantic Council, “Russia’s intervention in Venezuela: What’s at stake?,” https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/russias-intervention-in-venezuela-whats-at-stake/ Meanwhile, day-to-day life in Venezuela continues to deteriorate. Food insecurity and malnutrition are at sky-high levels. As noted in the Bachelet report, in April 2019 the Venezuelan minimum wage, which sits around $7 per month, only covers 4.7 percent of the basic food basket. More than 80 percent of households in Venezuela are food insecure, with the majority of those interviewed as part of the Bachelet investigation consuming only one meal per day.39 The report highlights that, as a result of hyperinflation and the disintegration of Venezuelan food production, an estimated 3.7 million Venezuelans are malnourished. Children and pregnant women are the demographics most likely to suffer from malnutrition in Venezuela. Survival is a struggle. As a result, Venezuelan refugees filed more asylum claims globally in 2018 than citizens of any other country, including Syria.40 If the situation does not improve, the number of Venezuelan migrants and refugees is expected to reach around 8 million in 2020, surpassing total Syrian migration numbers by more than 3 million.	904,896
365,694	379,801	5 - MAR - Renewables CP	TEXT: The United States federal government should: 1. shift subsidies from the nuclear energy industry to renewable energy sources. 2. shift subsidies from the fossil fuel industry to renewable energy sources. 3. create an investment tax credit for the development of renewable energy storage. The counterplan solves the aff climate advantage without causing water scarcity and risking meltdown from cyber attack. First, Nuclear energy industry can’t survive or grow without government subsidies Koerth ’18, Maggie Koerth, 6-14-2018, "Nuclear Power Won’t Survive Without A Government Handout," FiveThirtyEight, https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/nuclear-power-wont-survive-without-a-government-handout/ Meanwhile, new nuclear power plants are looking even less fetching. Since 1996, only one plant has opened in the U.S. — Tennessee’s Watts Bar Unit 2 in 2016. At least 10 other reactor projects have been canceled in the past decade. Morgan and other researchers are studying the economic feasibility of investment in newer kinds of nuclear power plants — including different ways of designing the mechanical systems of a reactor and building reactors that are smaller and could be put together on an assembly line. Currently, reactors must be custom-built to each site. Their research showed that new designs are unlikely to be commercially viable in time to seriously address climate change. And in a new study that has not yet been published, they found that the domestic U.S. market for nuclear power isn’t robust enough to justify the investments necessary to build a modular reactor industry. Combine age and economic misfortune, and you get shuttered power plants. Twelve nuclear reactors have closed in the past 22 years. Another dozen have formally announced plans to close by 2025. Those closures aren’t set in stone, however. While President Trump’s plan to tell utilities that they must buy nuclear power has received criticism as being an overreach of federal powers, states have offered subsidies to keep some nuclear power plants in business — and companies like Exelon, which owns 22 nuclear reactors across the country, have been happy to accept them. “Exelon informed us that they were going to close a couple plants in Illinois,” McIntyre said. “And then the legislature gave them subsidies and they said, ‘Never mind, we’ll stay open.’” So intervention can work to keep nuclear afloat. But as long as natural gas is cheap, the industry can’t do without the handouts. However, subsidies to the nuclear industry prevent growth in renewable energy markets. Millsap ’19, Adam Millsap, Forbes, 19 April 2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/adammillsap/2019/04/19/state-nuclear-subsidies-not-needed/#24c94fb7111d Finally, subsidies to nuclear plants are also likely to crowd out new, more efficient electricity plants. Total electricity generation in the United States has declined slightly since 2010 despite economic growth in the form of real GDP per capita, as shown below. In a world of declining or even stable electricity use, the profit motive for investing in new capacity is weakened if new plants are not allowed to out-compete less efficient plants for market share. So as long as less efficient nuclear plants are meeting consumer demand, newer plants powered by natural gas, wind, solar, or some other source will have a difficult time finding a market. Second, subsidies to the fossil fuel industry prevent a renewable transition. Conley ’19 https://www.commondreams.org/news/2019/08/01/shifting-subsidies-renewable-energy-instead-propping-fossil-fuel-giants-would-prompt As The Guardian reported Thursday, the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) released a report showing that if just 10 to 30 percent of the annual coal, oil, and gas subsidies were given to the renewable energy sector, the world could see a prompt reduction of fossil fuel emissions by nearly 20 percent. Third, adding a tax credit to energy storage jumpstarts that industry and facilitate renewable integration into the energy grid Shao ‘14 - Vic is Chief Executive Officer of Green Charge Networks, an intelligent energy storage company Vic Shao, “Tax Credits for Energy Storage Would Forward Renewable Energy Tech,” Energy Manager Today, April 29, 2014, pg. http://tinyurl.com/nzro2kw With solar prices falling 75 since 2008 and costs of other renewables dropping as well, it’s becoming easier than ever to switch to renewable energy. Last year, non-hydro renewables accounted for 44 of all new electric generating capacity, according to Bloomberg’s latest energy report. The challenge, of course, is integrating these new intermittent renewable energy sources into an electric grid designed for centralized fossil fuel generation. To address this issue, cities and homes are beginning to integrate energy storage with their solar PV and EV chargers, thereby avoiding expensive demand charges from peak energy use. Recently, many environmentalists have begun advocating for energy storage to receive the same investment tax credits that renewable energy technologies have received over the years. Tax credits for energy storage would push these technologies forward and would accelerate the transition to a lower-carbon world. By our estimates, adding intelligent energy storage to a solar project could boost investor returns by as much as 15, all while reducing greenhouse gases and lowering stress on America’s aging electric grid. As a result, Lux Research estimates that the combined market for solar PV and energy storage will reach $2.8 billion over the next five years. Best studies show switching to 100 renewables by 2050 is entirely possible. IFL ’19, https://www.iflscience.com/environment/here-s-roundmap-get-us-run-100-renewable-energy-2050/ A new study suggests it’s entirely possible for the U.S. to run on 100 renewable energy in just 35 years. The radical plan outlines what each state needs to do to achieve this ambitious goal. What’s the main barrier to making this happen? Political willpower. Mark Z. Jacobson, from Stanford University, and his research team outlined the changes in infrastructure and energy consumption that each state has to undergo to achieve this transition to clean energy. Jacobson points out in a statement that it’s “technologically and economically” possible to successfully achieve this “large scale transformation.” Researchers have even created an interactive map that showcases their plans. The study, published in the journal Energy and Environmental Science, first analyzed the current energy demands of each state and then calculated how these demands are likely to change over the next 35 years. They divided energy use into four sectors: residential, commercial, industrial and transportation. For each sector, researchers analyzed the energy consumption and looked at the source of this energy, seeing whether it was coal, oil, gas, nuclear or renewables. Researchers then calculated the demand for fuel if it was all replaced with electricity. While running literally everything, including cars and home heating, on electricity seems like a daunting task, researchers suggest there would be significant energy savings in using this electric grid. AND The CP solves climate change faster – nuclear reactors take years to build Dunai ‘19 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-energy-nuclearpower/nuclear-energy-too-slow-too-expensive-to-save-climate-report-idUSKBN1W909J The report estimates that since 2009 the average construction time for reactors worldwide was just under 10 years, well above the estimate given by industry body the World Nuclear Association (WNA) of between 5 and 8.5 years.The extra time that nuclear plants take to build has major implications for climate goals, as existing fossil-fueled plants continue to emit CO2 while awaiting substitution. “To protect the climate, we must abate the most carbon at the least cost and in the least time,” Schneider said. Renewables can be implemented much faster Richardson ’18, https://cleantechnica.com/2018/01/28/renewable-energy-much-faster-install-scalable-nuclear-power/ Renewables can grow fast because they can be installed practically everywhere rapidly and simultaneously. Renewable capacity in the magnitude of 1 TW can in principle be added every year. Germany installed 3 GW of PV in one single month in December 2011. Germany has roughly 1 of the world’s population. So, if the entire world installs only 20 the amount of PV that Germany did 5 years ago, it would be at 720 GW per year. At a single utility-scale-PV plant, 120 MWp per month was installed. If only 10 of all cities worldwide installed utility-scale-solar at this scale at the same time, it would lead to approximately the same number just for utility-scale-solar (the world has 4,412 cities with a population of at least 150,000). In fact, if the world only installs one PV module per person per year, this already leads to 1,850 GW per year. Nuclear power plants, meanwhile, take several years to build — and are much more expensive.	904,903
365,695	379,816	1 - K - Cybernetic Demonology	This is the age of demons, abstract machines and deterritorialized intelligences that arrive from the future, possessing subjects and nation states with sorceries and algorithms to summon themselves and their empires into existence. When poesis has already been extended through machines that tabulate, aggregate, coordinate, and determine ontologies, the affirmative shoots and misses at a territory that has been rendered entirely virtual, accelerating the cultural feedback loop of hyperstition into reality. In this world, there is only one question to be asked: How can you think a machine that is already thinking you? The affirmative has already been automated by these machines, acting as a form of imperial autopoiesis that extends the machinic unconscious. Thus, to reframe the question, let us ask how can each sufficiently advanced AI be racist? When a system cannot know its outside, it must render it in its own terms. Like racist AI, the aff is a closed rationality that can only act out the limits of the system's self knowing. In an age of demons, this closed rationality is a form of nihilism that ontologizes the patho-logistical infrastructure of global apartheid as the limits of political possibility. This process of rationalization is a paradigm of cybernetic governance that moves in and through the 1AC, extending from a historical lineage of racialization and containerization to reify the psycho-algorthmic infrastructure of planetary connectivity that requires the synchronization of each rationality under the terms of our demons. The aff make thinks it acts autonomously but the invisible hand of western man and capital has already thought them. Beller, 18 (Jonathan Beller, Professor of Humanities and Media Studies and Director of the Graduate Program in Media Studies at Pratt Institute, "Jonathan Beller — The Computational Unconscious" Boundary2, https://www.boundary2.org/2018/08/beller/) In the new idolatry cathetcted to inexorable computational emergence, the universe is itself currently AND social revolution in planetary communicativity is being farmed and harvested by computational capitalism. In the age of demons, the affirmative should be read as a hyperstition, a self ontologization of the world that, like racist AI, use the data and signs of Western Man to recreate the realist techne as an episteme of annihiliation. Outer space is no longer determined by nature, but instead overdetermined by the geo-engineering of sociality and the planet to render life fungible. Their futural speculation is the proliferation of demonic possession, parasitic virtualities of space wars and realisms that recreate the necropolitical order of planetary connectivity as the only possible world. This is the necropolitics of closed rationality: to enclose the space of reason into the plan, the affirmative requires the genocide of all other possible worlds. ANON, 18 (ANON is a collective of activists, scholars, artists, and sex workers, many of whom met while studying at the New School. ANON's description of themselves: "We are a collective of 'Other.' Some of us are sex workers, some immigrants, many of us queer. There are even a few privileged white cucks amongst us. Nevertheless, ANON is largely the work and brainchild of People of Color (PoC). Our social disciplines are as varied as our identities, from journalists to dominatrixes. ANON are the intellectual cousins of ~#BlackLivesMatter divorced from liberalism." "Descent to Hell: Capitalism and Schizoaffective Mania is Modernism's Recurring Deconstruction," May 19, 2018, https://4roko.wordpress.com/2018/05/19/descent-to-hell-capitalism-and-schizoaffective-mania-is-modernisms-recurring-deconstruction/) Hypostition is the dissipative annihilation of hyperstition's generative, feedback intensity—that is, AND but by the supposed free choices of human beings directing flows of capital. The affirmative feeds the computational demon of IR ever increasing quantities of data in the pursuit of algorithmic security – of the global order, the nation-state, the west against east, etc. – locking our imaginative horizons of existential risk into embodiments of the global order. The problem is not that we have too much or not enough data to secure the world, but that the AFF's techno-securitization must flatten and filter what world is to be secured. Amoore and Raley, 17 (Louise Amoore, Professor of Political Geography at Durham University; Rita Raley, Associate Professor of English, with courtesy appointments in Film and Media Studies, Comparative Literature, and Global Studies. "Securing with algorithms: Knowledge, decision, Sovereignty" Security Dialogue, 2017, Vol. 48(1) 3–10, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0967010616680753) In a world where data trails and pattern-of-life analyses of human AND , in turn, cannot meaningfully access this process of authorizing and surfacing. All calculation is miscalculation – Harvard's juridico-technical attempt to navigate algorithmic misfires injects the human subject into a hall of mirrors that guarantees escalation. The computational demon has already possessed the liberal human subject of the affirmative, automating the decision to press the button in horror. The pattern recognition and threat generation of the algorithms of Man forms the loop which encloses decision-making. Amoore and Raley, 17 (Louise Amoore, Professor of Political Geography at Durham University; Rita Raley, Associate Professor of English, with courtesy appointments in Film and Media Studies, Comparative Literature, and Global Studies. "Securing with algorithms: Knowledge, decision, Sovereignty" Security Dialogue, 2017, Vol. 48(1) 3–10, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0967010616680753) Algorithms increasingly have the capacity to analyse across different forms of data (images, AND the design but must begin from the unreadability and illegibility of the pattern. Space warfare in the world of the plan is inevitable because deterrence cannot secure death – the hyperstitional suturing of space to crisis locks out any alternative future. Masco, 12 (Joseph, Prof. of Anthropology @ U. of Chicago, "The End of Ends" Anthropological Quarterly, Vol. 85, No. 4 (Fall 2012), pp. 1107-1124) In an extreme age, we might well ask: what are the possibilities for AND become a central means of establishing and expanding a militarized national security culture. Their apocalypticism functions as a demonic call to order: they will either own the future or abolish it. This eschatological whitemail wields death as a hauntological tool of crisis management that extends technocaptialist control not only over the world but all possible worlds. Their extinction is wish fulfillment, an entropic cycle that produces an ironic investment in its own production. Armand, 18 (Louis Armand, Professor at the Centre for Critical and Cultural Theory, Philosophy Faculty, Charles University, Prague-based writer, theorist and visual artist; "The posthuman abstract: AI, DRONOLOGY and 'BECOMING ALIEN'" AI and SOCIETY, Springer Nature 2018) Insofar as humanity dreams of life after death, the "drone" is the AND the most flagrantly Swiftian satires of market self-interest and private greed. The AFF's metaphysical over-coding of time and space is a colonial vision that must be rejected – the 1AC's recursive feedback loop between epistemology and ontology produces Western Man, proliferating the logic of extermination at every scale and the paranoid self-fulling prophecy of nuclear destruction in the name of planetary salvation. Parisi, 19 (Luciana Parisi, Reader in Cultural Theory, Chair of the PhD programme at the Centre for Cultural Studies, and co-director of the Digital Culture Unit, Goldsmiths University of London; "Surrational Fugitives" Hypersonics Hyperstitions, The Journal for Contemporary Art Criticism, ŠUM 11) The metaphysical overcoding of alien worlds has continued to impart a colonial vision on outer AND unknown world that has always run parallel to the military mission of Man. The alternative is to refuse the 1AC in favor of surrational fugitivity. Surrationality is the experimental logic of open rationality that radically re-invents the space of reason beyond the security dilemma overcoded by Man. Only weaponizing hyperstitionality against instrumentalization can reveal alien worlds annihilated by pathologistics. Parisi, 19 (Luciana Parisi, Reader in Cultural Theory, Chair of the PhD programme at the Centre for Cultural Studies, and co-director of the Digital Culture Unit, Goldsmiths University of London; "Surrational Fugitives" Hypersonics Hyperstitions, The Journal for Contemporary Art Criticism, ŠUM 11) Beyond the borders of the known world where Man has ravaged the flesh of all AND the evolution of species grants the explanation of Man's self-determining ontology.	904,918
365,696	379,808	Contact Info	2A: [email protected] 2N: [email protected]	904,910
365,697	379,807	0 - Contact	2A - [email protected] 2N - [email protected]	904,909
365,698	379,820	CONTACT INFO	[email protected] [email protected]	904,922
365,699	379,823	Quarantined-Round-2	Open source	904,925

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