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365,500 | 379,502 | Aff v1 | open source | 904,588 |
365,501 | 379,519 | Theory - FW | The role of the ballot is to determine the efficacy of the proposal entailed in the NSDA resolution relative to the status quo or competing option
Interp and violation- The aff must affirm the NSDA resolution being used at this tournament - specifically they must prove the US should replace it’s means tested welfare programs with a universal basic income - they don’t
Counter interpretations solve none of our offense because they aren’t predictable
Vote neg—
1. Prep and clash—post facto topic change alters balance of prep, which structurally favors the aff because they speak last and use perms—key to engage a prepared adversary and a target of mutual contestation.
2. Limits—specific topics are key to reasonable expectations for 2Ns—open subjects create incentives for avoidance and monopolization of moral high ground—that denies a role for the neg and turns accessibility.
3. Refinement ~-~- unlimited topics makes assessing the validity of the 1ac’s truth claims impossible AND cause concessionary ground which creates incentives for avoidance and means it’s impossible to evaluate the 1ac
4. Small schools - a massive unpredictable case list uniquely hurts small schools who don’t have the resources to prep out every new aff or every obscure critical theory argument.
Fairness is a voter
1. It’s presupposed by every argument they make which assumes you won’t just intervene against them - if fairness isn’t a voter there’s no reason we can’t just make new final focus arguments.
2. It’s impossible to evaluate who has done the better debating under any rotb if the debate was unfair
3. It’s the internal link into education and skills because people research in order to compete in a fair game.
Education is a voter
1. It’s key to advocacy skills and real world activism which spills over
2. It’s key to cultivating ethical subjectivities by fighting ignorance.
Reject the team—T is question of models of debate
Competing interps—they have to proactively to justify their model and reasonability links to our offense
No rvis or impact turns—it's their burden to prove they're topical. Beating back T doesn't prove their advocacy is good
And T comes first
1. it’s a sequencing question, you have to evaluate the ethicality of the 1ac before evaluating the content of the 1ac A. If the aff claims they are a sequencing question for T you should vote neg on presumption because it proves he hasn’t actually affirmed anything
2. Offense on T is a reason to prefer our role of the ballot - you have to resolve the role of the ballot debate before you evaluate who has offense under a specific role of the ballot.
3. It’s a question of norm setting - the process of having theory debates spills over to norm setting - your ballot contributes the process of permanently resolving T debates - proven by things like truth testing vs policy making debates in policy throughout the 80s which were eventually resolved. | 904,601 |
365,502 | 379,526 | UBI - DA - Medicaid | Waldron 17 explains
Amanda Waldron, Brookings Institute, "8 facts about Medicaid", August 2 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2017/08/02/8-facts-about-medicaid/
Medicaid, the federal ... Affordable Care Act.
Unfortunately, the poorest Americans lack access to jobs that grant employer provided health insurance. Thus, without medicaid these Americans would be forced to purchase unaffordable private insurance.
Bloom 17 quantifies
Ester Bloom, CNBC, "Here's how much the average American spends on health care", Jun 23 2017, https://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/23/heres-how-much-the-average-american-spends-on-health-care.html
According to the ... they were then.
Thus affirming would leave 75 million people without health insurance - two impacts
First is poverty - medicaid reduces out of pocket costs and medical debt for recipients.
Sommers 10 writes
Donald Oellerich, Benjamin D. Sommers, Association for Public Policy and Managment, "The Poverty Reducing Effect of Medicaid", 2010, http://www.appam.org/assets/1/7/The_Poverty-Reducing_Effect_Of_Medicaid.pdf
Medicaid provides health ... anti-poverty program. | 904,606 |
365,503 | 379,510 | UBI - CT - Foreign Aid Bad | check osource | 904,597 |
365,504 | 379,552 | Contact | If you have any questions or want us to disclose, contact us at [email protected] or on Facebook Aryan Jasani. Discord is AwesomeAJ23#7366 and poot nab#1649. Rest of the positions for other topics are disclosed on Plano Senior wiki | 904,631 |
365,505 | 379,553 | T-FRMWK | Our interpretation is the topic should determine the division of aff and neg ground – winning the PF res– hold the line, CX and the 1AC prove there’s no I-meet.
“Resolved” means to enact a policy by law.
Words and Phrases ’64
(Words and Phrases; 1964; Permanent Edition)
Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.
The Role of the Ballot is to vote for whoever does the better debating – any alternative framework must explain why we switch sides, why there has to be a winner and a loser, and why there are structural rules. The frame for evaluating offense is that debate is a game and we’re all here to win – that means procedural questions come first.
Vote neg for clash – abdicating government actions sanctions picking any interpretation for debate – incentivizes retreat from controversy and forces the neg to first characterize the aff and then debate it which eliminates the benefit of preround research. A common point of engagement ensures effective clash, which is a linear impact – negation is the necessary condition for distinguishing debate from discussion, but negation exists on a sliding scale. The topic of discussion is up to the affirmative, but depth and nuanced engagement is determined by negative ground. Any impact intrinsic to debate, not just discussion, comes from negation because it starts the process of critical thinking, reflexivity, and argument refinement.
TVA and SSD solve the 1AC – insert
D No cross apps: Fairness is an impact – 1 it’s an intrinsic good – some level of competitive equity is necessary to sustain the activity – if it didn’t exist, then there wouldn’t be value to the game since judges could literally vote whatever way they wanted regardless of the competing arguments made 2 probability – your ballot can’t solve their impacts but it can solve mine – debate can’t alter subjectivity, but can rectify skews 3 internal link turns every impact – a limited topic promotes in-depth research and engagement w hich is necessary to access all of their education 4 comes before substance – deciding any other argument in this debate cannot be disentangled from our inability to prepare for it – any argument you think they’re winning is a link, not a reason to vote for them, since it’s just as likely that they’re winning it because we weren’t able to effectively prepare to defeat it. This means they don’t get to weigh the aff.
No impact turns:
1 T is just an argument for why the aff is a bad idea, which is what every single negative position says—there’s nothing unique about T that causes violence but the cap k or case turns don’t
2 we’re not imposing a norm or forcing you to do anything—our norm is open to contestation because you can just win that a counter-interpretation is a better
1. Vote on substantive engagement: otherwise we’re speaking without debating and there’s nothing to separate us from dueling oratory. It also creates the most valuable long-term skills since we need to learn how to defend our beliefs in any context, like politics.
2. Fairness – constraint on evaluating substance bc it controls the the I/L to education
1. Drop the debater on T:
a. You can’t vote for the aff regardless of fairness or education if they don’t meet the resolutional burden. Hold them accountable for their interp – topical advocacy frames the debate.
b. Hold them accountable for their interp – a topical advocacy frames the debate - drop the arg lets them jump ship to a new layer killing NEG ground.
c. Drop the arg on T is the same thing as drop the debater since T indicts their advocacy
Use competing interps, since reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and encourages a race to the bottom where debaters exploit judges’ tolerance for questionable argumentation.
1. No RVIs:
a. They incentivize debaters to bait theory and go all-in on it, killing substantive clash on other flows.
b. They can run theory on me too if I’m unfair, so 1) theory is reciprocal because we’re both able to check abuse and 2) time skew doesn’t matter because they can collapse to their shell in the 2ar. | 904,632 |
365,506 | 379,562 | TOC Aff v1 | ==1AC==
====We affirm. ====
====Our sole contention concerns preventing Iranian expansion. ====
====Over the last decade, Iran has created a network of proxies which help them establish influence in neighboring countries. Including terrorist groups such as Hezbollah, Iran’s proxies have killed thousands.====
====America intends to deter its enemies, however, Hannah 19 of Foreign Policy writes====
Hannah 19, John Hannah, 10/30/19, “U.S. Deterrence in the Middle East Is Collapsing,” Foreign Policy
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/30/u-s-deterrence-in-the-middle-east-is-collapsing-syria-
====Instead, US military presence increases Iranian aggression in two ways. First, threat perception. Barzegar 10 explains: ====
Barzegar 10, Kayhan Barzegar, Fall 2010, "Roles at Odds:The Roots of Increased Iran-U.S. Tension in the Post-9/11 Middle East”, IRANIAN REVIEW of Foreign Affairs, https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/5-Dr_Barzegar.pdf
With its sources of power and geo-political posture. The major source of difficulty, however, appears to emanate
...AND...
f threat in the region? And how can the two parties reach a compromise regarding each other’s new regional role.
====Iran responds to the threat with aggression. Swan 19 of Hillsdale College writes:====
Swan 19, Betsy Swan, 5-17-2019, "Trump Admin Moves Fueled Iran’s Aggression, U.S. Intel Says," Daily Beast, https://www.thedailybeast.com/trump-admin-moves-fueled-irans-aggression-us-intel-says
Trump administration hawks have spent the last two weeks decrying an increased threat from Iran. But U.S. intell
...AND...
ect response to the administration’s moves, according to the assessment of multiple U.S. intelligence officials.
====Niehaus of the Journal for International Affairs 19 adds:====
Niehous, 19 (the Pentagon, 11-26-2019, accessed on 4-15-2020, Towson University Journal of International Affairs, "Deterrence in the Persian Gulf: Why American Efforts to Contain Iran Are Failing", https://wp.towson.edu/iajournal/2019/11/25/deterrence-in-the-persian-gulf-why-american-efforts-to-contain-iran-are-failing/)
America is justified in its desire to avoid an overt war with Iran, but the patient approach being pursued by th
...AND...
forces because it believes that this is the most effective way of ensuring its survival against foreign threats.
====It is deep rooted in Iran’s history. Von 20 of the Hill finds:====
Marik Von, 1-15-2020, "Is America on the wrong side in the Middle East?," TheHill, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/478386-is-america-on-the-wrong-side-in-the-middle-east // BK
Despite the clear alignment of U.S. and Iranian counterterrorism objectives, four decades of hostility and distr
...AND...
anesque embrace of Iran’s moderatesand can catalyze profoundly transformational changes in the Islamic Republic.
====Iran associates US presence with this experience and feel they are fighting an existential threat. With a less militaristic policy, Iran will have no incentive to act aggressively. McInnis 15 of the American Enterprise Institute explains:====
Mcinnis 15, J. Matthew, 5-13-2015, "Is Iran really a defensive state?," American Enterprise Institute - AEI, https://www.aei.org/foreign-and-defense-policy/middle-east/is-iran-really-a-defensive-state/
On Tuesday, AEI released my first in a series of working papers on Iranian strategy and decision-making, titled
...AND...
We need to ask honest, tough questions about why Iran does what it does. Read the report. Let the debate begin!
====Sanctions are not as significant. Vaez 19 of the Atlantic finds:====
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/05/why-trumps-sanctions-iran-arent-working/589288/ Vaez, Atlantic, 2019
First and most important: The one thing Tehran would find more intolerable than the crushing impact of sanctions
...AND...
an invitation to dialogue, in part because the Bush administration’s Iraq adventure proved a strategic disaster.
====Second, is empowering hardliners. After Obama withdrew troops from Iraq in 2011, Erdbrink 13 of the New York Times found elections rejected the ultraconservatives who had been in power and overwhelmingly installed a moderate government who advocated a more conciliatory approach to the world. ====
this is paraphrased
Thomas Erdbrink, 6-15-2013, "Iran Moderate Wins Presidency by a Large Margin," No Publication, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/16/world/middleeast/iran-election.html
====Redeployment reversed this trend. Iranian Author Mohammad Tabaar writes in 2019: ====
This card was assigned in my history class
Mohammad Ayatollahi Tabaar, 4-3-2019, "Opinion," New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/03/opinion/iran-trump-sanctions.html
====As a result, Turak 20 of CNBC finds====
Natasha Turak, 2-19-2020, “Iran elections to be dominated by hard-liners as young people refuse to vote: ‘It’s a joke’,” CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/19/iran-parliamentary-elections-hardliners-to-dominate-low-turnout-expected.html
Iran’s is holding its parliamentary elections Friday, and one thing seems all but certain: It will be a major
...AND...
Atlantic Council, told CNBC. “If history repeats itself, a conservative will also be elected president in 2021.”
====Crucially, a more peaceful posture could change Iranian leadership. Von 20 of the Hill finds:====
Marik Von, 1-15-2020, "Is America on the wrong side in the Middle East?," TheHill, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/478386-is-america-on-the-wrong-side-in-the-middle-east
Despite the clear alignment of U.S. and Iranian counterterrorism objectives, four decades of hostility and distr
...AND...
esque embrace of Iran’s moderatesand can catalyze profoundly transformational changes in the Islamic Republic.
====Overall, absent United States military presence, Iran would cease their aggression in the Middle East. Historically, Von concludes====
Marik the goat part 3
Marik Von, 1-15-2020, "Is America on the wrong side in the Middle East?," TheHill, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/478386-is-america-on-the-wrong-side-in-the-middle-east
====And conversely, The Heritage Foundation concludes in 2020:====
PARAPHRASED
Heritage Staff, 2020, "The Situation in Iran," Heritage Foundation, https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/heritage-explains/the-situation-iran
====Curbing Iranian aggression is the most important goal in the Middle East. Journalist Omar Quadrat writes in 2020: ====
Omar Qudrat,, 1-14-2020, "Make no mistake: Iran remains a powerful threat to the US," TheHill, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/477752-make-no-mistake-iran-remains-a-powerful-threat-to-the-us
At home, Iran recently killed approximately 1,500 civilians who took to the streets dreaming of a better future.
...AND...
d just a few hours from the U.S. on a commercial flight, could be used against us to great military advantage.
====Absent US involvement diplomacy would follow. Al Jazeera finds====
Al Jazeera Staff, 2-4-2020, "Iran wants to mend ties with Saudi, UAE 'quickly': Top diplomat," Al Jazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/02/iran-mend-ties-saudi-uae-quickly-top-diplomat-200204164153245.html
A top Iranian diplomat has said his country is open to resolving differences with its Gulf rivals, Saudi Arabia
...AND...
e setting out Iran's position on possible rapprochement with Saudi Arabia, the Iraqi state news agency reported.
====However, Keynoush 20 of the Atlantic Council finds:====
Banafsheh Keynoush, JAN 27, 2020, "Why mediation between Saudi Arabia and Iran keeps failing," Atlantic Council, https://atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/why-mediation-between-saudi-arabia-and-iran-keeps-failing
These multilateral steps could perhaps be backed by workable solutions to accommodate Saudi Arabia and Iran in A
...AND...
cially ones in which the United States or American organizations, or staunch US allies, attempt to take charge. | 904,642 |
365,507 | 379,596 | Disclosure theory | First off is Disclosure
Disclosure is the act of publicizing evidence and arguments prior to engaging in debate rounds.
A. Interpretation. Debaters should disclose on the NDCA wiki with their name and the school they attend, the full citations, and the text of the paragraph below and above of any pieces of evidence which they have read in their case.
B. Violation: They have not disclosed on the wiki
C. Standards:
1 – More Clash –
Engagement – disclosure allows substantive engagement through prepping out specific arguments rather than relying on sketchy tricks to avoid the discussion.
2 – Argument quality
a) Foreknowledge – A world without disclosure rewards debaters for running arguments not because they are good, but because their opponents won't know how to respond. Disclosure forces debaters to commit to quality; under our interpretation, debaters would have to write cases knowing that their opponents could have done thoughtful preparation. That gets rid of anti-educational arguments
b) Cross-pollination — Debaters can use and modify the best ideas from each other’s wikis, ultimately leading to development of the best version of the argument.
Argument quality outweighs because it’s key to our ability to actually understand the best arguments on the topic.
3 – Increasing Inclusion –
a) Intel – schools with big programs who bring more students and judges and are better connected will scout more rounds and have more flows; disclosure equalizes that intel disparity.
b) Research – disclosure forces big, wealthy programs to put their prep on the wiki – that means everyone has access to the best, paywalled evidence, and also keeps smaller programs up-to-date on the meta.
D. Voters:
1 – Educational Ethics – it’s the only portable skill of debate. Misconstruing evidence prevents engagement with the literature.
2 – Fairness – debate is a competition and fairness indicts your ability to determine the winner.
The Role of the Ballot is to Drop the debater for Norm-setting – People change their behavior if they see others lose or lose themselves for doing something —wins and losses determine the direction of activity.
Nails 13 - (Jacob I am a policy debater at Georgia State University. I debated LD for 4 years for Starr's Mill High School (GA) and graduated in 2012. "A Defense of Disclosure (Including Third-Party Disclosure)" http://nsdupdate.com/2013/a-defense-of-disclosure-including-third-party-disclosure-by-jacob-nails/) GHS GB
I fall squarely on the side of disclosure. I find that the largest advantage of widespread disclosure is the educational value it provides. First, disclosure streamlines research. Rather than every team and every lone wolf researching completely in the dark, the wiki provides a public body of knowledge that everyone can contribute to and build off of. Students can look through the different studies on the topic and choose the best ones on an informed basis without the prohibitively large burden of personally surveying all of the literature. The best arguments are identified and replicated, which is a natural result of an open marketplace of ideas. Quality of evidence increases across the board. In theory, the increased quality of information this could trade off with quantity. If debaters could just look to the wiki for evidence, it might remove the competitive incentive to do one’s own research. Empirically, however, the opposite has been true. In fact, a second advantage of disclosure is that it motivates research. Debaters cannot expect to make it a whole topic with the same stock AC – that is, unless they are continually updating and frontlining it. Likewise, debaters with access to their opponents’ cases can do more targeted and specific research. Students can go to a new level of depth, researching not just the pros and cons of the topic but the specific authors, arguments, and adovcacies employed by other debaters. The incentive to cut author-specific indicts is low if there’s little guarantee that the author will ever be cited in a round but high if one knows that specific schools are using that author in rounds. In this way, disclosure increases incentive to research by altering a student’s cost-benefit analysis so that the time spent researching is more valuable, i.e. more likely to produce useful evidence because it is more directed. In any case, if publicly accessible evidence jeopardized research, backfiles and briefs would have done LD in a long time ago. Lastly, and to my mind most significantly, disclosure weeds out anti-educational arguments. I have in mind the sort of theory spikes and underdeveloped analytics whose strategic value comes only from the fact that the time to think of and enunciate responses to them takes longer than the time spent making the arguments themselves. If theory spikes these arguments were made on a level playing field where each side had equal time to craft answers, they would seldom win rounds, which is a testimony to the real world applicability (or lack thereof) of such strategies. A model in which arguments have to withstand close scrutiny to win rounds creates incentive to find the best arguments on the topic rather than the shadiest. Having transitioned from LD to policy where disclosure is more universal, I can say that debates are more substantive, developed, and responsive when both sides know what they’re getting into prior to the round. The educational benefits of disclosure alone aren’t likely to convince the fairness-outweighs-education crowd, but I’ve learned over the course of many theory debates that most of that crowd has a very warped and confusing conception of fairness. Debaters who produce better research are more deserving of a win. Debaters who can make smart arguments and defend them from criticism should win out over debaters who hide behind obfuscation. That so many rounds these days are resolved on frivolous theory and dropped, single-sentence blips suggests that wins are not going to the “better debaters” in any meaningful sense of the term. The structure of LD in the status quo doesn’t incentivize better debating. | 904,677 |
365,508 | 379,586 | IntergenerationalPoverty NC | Link 1
Greenstein
Robert Greenstein, 11-3-2015, "Examining the Safety Net," Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, https://www.cbpp.org/poverty-and-inequality/examining-the-safety-net
In addition, recent advances in poverty research have enabled researchers to track children over several decades as they grow into adulthood. These studies have found striking evidence that providing income-related benefits like SNAP, the EITC, and other income assistance to poor families with children results in increased test scores and educational attainment for poor children — and subsequently in increased employment and earnings in adulthood. In other words, various programs that help poor families with children meet basic necessities also improve children’s longer-term outcomes.
Jusko
Karen Jusko, 2016, “Safety Net”, The Stanford Center on Poverty and Inequality, https://inequality.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/Pathways-SOTU-2016-Safety-Net-2.pdf
The relationship between social transfers and market income can also be used to provide overall estimates of poverty relief. Figure 4 reports the poverty relief ratio, using the 150PL poverty threshold. In the U.S. case, for example, this analysis suggests that the safety net provides about 47 percent of the support needed to provide for all basic needs. That is, the total amount of monetary support provided to low-income Americans meets less than half of their economic needs, as defined by the 150PL. For all other countries, levels of poverty relief are higher, in some cases just slightly higher (e.g., 54 in Canada) and in other cases substantially higher (e.g., 77 in Denmark).
Greenstein
Robert Greenstein, 11-3-2015, "Examining the Safety Net," Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, https://www.cbpp.org/poverty-and-inequality/examining-the-safety-net
A landmark study of the impact of food stamp benefits on children provides further evidence of the long-term impacts of income support and similar assistance. The researchers, led by economist Hilary Hoynes of the University of California at Berkeley, were able to use the uneven roll-out of the Food Stamp Program in the early 1970s to compare poor children who had access to food stamps in the early 1970s with comparable poor children from counties that hadn’t yet instituted the program. They examined records of these children as the children grew up and into adulthood, and found that access to food stamps in early childhood (and the prenatal year) was associated with an 18 percentage-point increase in high school completion rates, lower rates of metabolic syndrome (obesity, high blood pressure, heart disease, and diabetes) in adulthood, and among girls, increases in “self-sufficiency” (using an index of education, earnings, income, and decreases in welfare receipt in adulthood).10 Consistent with these and other studies, economists Greg Duncan and Katherine Magnuson have estimated that a sustained $3,000 increase in the income of low-income families with young children results in an average of 17 percent higher earnings and 135 more hours of work per year when the children become adults.11 An additional 135 hours of this work represents nearly a third of the gap in adult work hours between children raised in poor families and children raised in families whose incomes exceeded twice the poverty line. Exactly why income-support and related programs yield these benefits is not yet clear. Duncan, Magnuson, and others are launching a demonstration project to examine these issues. A number of researchers believe, however, that part of the answer may lie in another important set of research findings that have emerged in recent years — those relating to “toxic stress” in poor families and brain development in children. A growing body of evidence indicates that children living in unusually stressful situations may experience chronic stress levels severe enough to damage the developing neural connections in their brains and to impede their ability to succeed in school and develop the social and emotional skills needed to function well as adults. These stressful situations include living in dangerous neighborhoods, in families with difficulty putting food on the table or paying the rent, or with parents who cannot cope with their daily lives.
Link 2
Huntington
Clare Huntington, January 2015, " POSTMARITAL FAMILY LAW: A LEGAL STRUCTURE FOR NONMARITAL FAMILIES" Stanford Law Review, http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2015/01/67_Stan_L_Rev_167_Huntington.pdf
Family law is based on marriage, but family life increasingly is not. The American family is undergoing a seismic shift, with marriage rates steadily declining and more than four in ten children now born to unmarried parents. Children of unmarried parents fall far behind children of married parents on a variety of metrics, contributing to stark inequality among children. Poverty and related factors explain much of this differential, but new sociological evidence highlights family structure—particularly friction and dislocation between unmarried parents after their relationship ends—as a crucial part of the problem. As the trend toward nonmarital childbearing continues to spread across class lines, the effect will be most pronounced among children. This shift is the single most important issue facing family law today, yet scholars have been slow to engage with the structure and substance of the law in response. In family law, the marital family serves as a misleading synecdoche for all families, not only marginalizing nonmarital families but also actively undermining their already tenuous bonds. It is essential for family law to address the needs of both marital and nonmarital families. This entails a new theory of state regulation as well as new doctrines, institutions, and norms in practice. Some feminists argue that the state should privilege caregiving between parents and children instead of marital relationships, while other commentators stubbornly advocate marriage primacy.
Coontz
Stephanie Coontz and Nancy Folbre. “Marriage, Poverty, and Public Policy”, PBS, 2-26-2002, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/marriage/etc/poverty.html
Such proposals reflect the widespread assumption that failure to marry, rather than unemployment, poor education, and lack of affordable child care, is the primary cause of child poverty. Voices from both sides of the political spectrum urge us to get more women to the altar. Journalist Jonathan Rauch argues that "marriage is displacing both income and race as the great class divide of the new century."3 Robert Rector of the Heritage Foundation claims that "the sole reason that welfare exists is the collapse of marriage."4 In this briefing paper, we question both this explanation of poverty and the policy prescriptions that derive from it. Marriage offers important social and economic benefits. Children who grow up with married parents generally enjoy a higher standard of living than those living in single-parent households. Two parents are usually better than one not only because they can bring home two paychecks, but also because they can share responsibilities for child care. Marriage often leads to higher levels of paternal involvement than divorce, non-marriage, or cohabitation. Long-term commitments to provide love and support to one another are beneficial for adults, as well as children. Public policies toward marriage could and should be improved.5 Taxes or benefit reductions that impose a marriage penalty on low-income couples are inappropriate and should be eliminated. Well designed public policies could play a constructive role in helping couples develop the skills they need to develop healthy and sustainable relationships with each other and their children. It does not follow, however, that marriage promotion should be a significant component of anti-poverty policy, or that public policies should provide a "bonus" to couples who marry.
Lerman
Robert I. Lerman and W. Bradford Wilcox, "For Richer, For Poorer: How Family Structures Economic Success in America”, Institute for Family Studies, https://ifstudies.org/ifs-admin/resources/for-richer-or-poorer-hep-2014.pdf
2– Federal and state policy should strengthen the economic foundations of middle- and lower-income family life in three ways: (a) increase the child credit to $3,000 and extend it to both income and payroll taxes; (b) expand the maximum earned income tax credit for single, childless adults to $1,000, increasing their marriageability; and (c) expand and improve vocational education and apprenticeship programs that would strengthen the job prospects of less-educated young adults.
McLanahan
Sara McLanahan and Isabel Sawhill, et. al, “Marriage and Child Wellbeing Revisited”, The Future of Children Princeton-Brookings, https://futureofchildren.princeton.edu/sites/futureofchildren/files/media/marriage_and_child_wellbeing_revisited_25_2_full_journal.pdf (Sara McLanahan is the editor-in-chief of the Future of Children, as well as the director of the Center for Research on Child Wellbeing and the William S. Tod Professor of Sociology and Public Affairs at Princeton University. Isabel Sawhill is a senior editor of the Future of Children, as well as a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.)
Figure 2 presents the poverty rates for female-headed and married-couple families with children. Since 1980, children in female-headed families have been four or five times more likely to be poor than children in married-couple families. The increasing share of children in femaleheaded families has been like a motor powering the child poverty rate curve, constantly pushing it up. Thus, even if the American economy or government programs helped more single mothers escape poverty, the poverty rate would nonetheless hold steady or even increase because a growing share of children have been moving from the family form with the lowest poverty rate into the family form with the highest poverty rate. Brookings Institution economist Isabel Sawhill estimates, based on a statistical analysis, that if the proportion of children in female-headed families had held steady at its 1970 level of 12.0 percent, and everything else influencing family poverty rates had remained the same, in 2013 the poverty rate for children would have been 16.4 percent rather than its actual rate of 21.3 percent.4 Without any additional government spending or new government programs, different decisions by mothers and fathers about fertility and marriage could have produced an impressive reduction in childhood poverty of nearly 25 percent.
MFI
Massachusetts Family Institute, June 2017, "II: The Cost of Fatherlessness," No Publication, https://www.mafamily.org/ii-the-cost-of-fatherlessness-poverty/
The importance of a father to the economic well-being of children cannot be overemphasized. Statistically one of the greatest predictors of financial stability for children is the presence of a committed father. This is dramatically illustrated by the increased threat of poverty where a father is absent. Nationally, nearly half of all homes where a married father is not present are in poverty.15 In 2015, the poverty rate for fatherless homes was more than twice the average for all families in America and over four times the rate of poverty for children living with a married mother and father.16 In Massachusetts, the economic disparity between married mother-father homes and fatherless households is even greater. For example, the poverty rate for fatherless families in the Commonwealth is five to ten times higher than the poverty rate for children who are living in married two-parent families, with both their birth parents or two adoptive parents.17 The poverty rate for children when both mother and father are present is 5 percent. In contrast, 26 percent of Massachusetts children living with divorced or separated mothers, and 51 percent of those living with never-married mothers, are in families whose income is below the official poverty line.18
Salam
Reihan Salam, 1-22-2014, "Family Structure and the Geography of Upward Mobility," National Review, https://www.nationalreview.com/the-agenda/family-structure-and-geography-upward-mobility-reihan-salam/
In summarizing the findings of “Where is the Land of Opportunity?: The Geography of Intergenerational Mobility in the United States,” an important new paper from economists Raj Chetty, Nathaniel Hendren, Patrick Kline, and Emmanuel Saez, Brad Wilcox, director of the National Marriage Project, draws our attention to the role of family structure: Of all the factors most predictive of economic mobility in America, one factor clearly stands out in their study: family structure. By their reckoning, when it comes to mobility, “the strongest and most robust predictor is the fraction of children with single parents.” They find that children raised in communities with high percentages of single mothers are significantly less likely to experience absolute and relative mobility. Moreover, “children of married parents also have higher rates of upward mobility if they live in communities with fewer single parents.” In other words, as the figure below indicates, it looks like a married village is more likely to raise the economic prospects of a poor child. What makes this finding particularly significant is that this is the first major study showing that rates of single parenthood at the community level are linked to children’s economic opportunities over the course of their lives. A lot of research—including new research from the Brookings Institution—has shown us that kids are more likely to climb the income ladder when they are raised by two, married parents. But this is the first study to show that lower-income kids from both single- and married-parent families are more likely to succeed if they hail from a community with lots of two-parent families.
Link 3
Rand - Credit
Dory Rand, April 2004, "FINANCIAL EDUCATION AND ASSET BUILDING PROGRAMS FOR WELFARE RECIPIENTS AND LOW INCOME WORKERS: THE ILLINOIS EXPERIENCE" The Brookings Institution Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/20040413_doryrand.pdf
IDHS secured passage of changes in Illinois IDA regulations to expand the range of allowable asset purchases and to exempt all assets in TANF-funded IDAs from resource-counting rules.34 FLLIP IDA participants could save toward buying or repairing a home, buying or repairing a car, starting or expanding a small business, or pursuing postsecondary education or training. Employed persons with a minor child and income up to 200 percent of the federal poverty level were eligible to participate in the FLLIP IDA program. Participants had to complete the training requirements and save some of their earned income each month in a restricted account (IDA) with a local financial institution. They had up to two years in which to accumulate sufficient savings towards their asset goal, but could graduate as soon as six months after enrollment if all program requirements were completed.35 Instructors had time to work with participants over many months, sometimes one-on-one, to resolve credit problems, establish regular savings habits, use direct deposit or other savings tools, and, ultimately, prepare them to purchase and maintain their asset. As in the FEP-only program, instructors referred FLLIP IDA participants to local free tax preparation programs and encouraged them to use direct deposit of refunds into IDAs and save as much as possible. Instructors also encouraged IDA participants to use direct deposit of paychecks and automatic saving mechanisms to facilitate saving. Consistent with Illinois’s IDA law, FLLIP matched participants’ savings from earned income or EITC refunds up to $1,000 on a two-to-one basis, $1,000 from IDHS and $1,000 from private funds. For example, a participant that saved $1,000 toward a down payment on a home was eligible for $2,000 in matching funds. The matching funds were intended to provide a strong incentive to remain employed, complete training, and continue saving each month.
Amadeo
Kimberly Amadeo, 12-13-2019, "How Interest Rates Work," Balance, https://www.thebalance.com/what-are-interest-rates-and-how-do-they-work-3305855
You must pay at least the interest each month. If not, your outstanding debt will increase even though you are making payments. Although interest rates are very competitive, they aren't the same. A bank will charge higher interest rates if it thinks there's a lower chance the debt will get repaid. For that reason, banks will always assign a higher interest rate to revolving loans, like credit cards. These types of loans are more expensive to manage. Banks also charge higher rates to people they consider risky. It's important to know what your credit score is and how to improve it. The higher your score, the lower the interest rate you will have to pay. Banks charge fixed rates or variable rates. It depends on whether the loan is a mortgage, credit card, or unpaid bill. The actual interest rates are determined by either the 10-year Treasury note or by the fed funds rate. Fixed rates remain the same throughout the life of the loan. Your initial payments consist mostly of interest payments. As time goes on, you pay a higher and higher percentage of the debt principal. If you make an extra payment, it all goes toward principal. You can pay the debt off sooner that way. Most conventional mortgages are fixed-rate loans.
Lucas
Tim Lucas, 1-24-2020, "A 1 Mortgage Rate Rise = 11 Reduction in Purchase Price," Northwest University, https://mymortgageinsider.com/1-percent-rate-increase-11-percent-price-reduction/
How interest rates affect buying a home How do interest rates affect buying power when you’re searching for your next home? Will you have to settle for a less-nice house if mortgage rates rise? The simple answer is that the higher your mortgage rate is, the higher your monthly payments are going to be. So, yes. You really will get less home for your money if mortgage rates go up appreciably. That could mean a smaller place, or one in a less desirable neighborhood, or one that needs improvements or upgrades. See what mortgage rate you can receive with your credit score, income, and purchase price. 11! Really? What most shoppers don’t realize is how dramatically their buying power is diminished with relatively small rate increases. Let’s imagine you had $1,200 per month to spend on your principle and interest payment. (Keep in mind this number doesn’t include things like property tax, insurance, mortgage insurance, or HOA dues). That $1,200 per month can go a long way when rates are low. For instance, if you locked in a 30-year fixed mortgage at 4.5, you could buy a house for $295,000 if you had 20 down. But let’s say rates rise to 5.5. Still a great rate, but 1 higher than you planned. Now you are limited to a purchase price of $265,000, again assuming 20 down. That’s a 10.17 reduction in buying power and $30,000 shaved off your maximum purchase price. At $1,800 per month and 20 down, you could buy a home for $445,000 with a 4.5 interest rate. But at 5.5 your maximum home price is now $395,000 – an 11.24 reduction in buying power. At the lower end of the spectrum, $1,000 per month would buy you a $235,000 home at 5.0 but just a $208,000 home at 6.0. That’s an 11.49 reduction and in some areas could make the difference between getting into a home or not, or settling for less house. A rate increase could harm your buying power more than increasing home prices. It’s unlikely home prices would rise by more than 10 in a year, but if rates increase by 1 it will have the same effect for buyers.
Link 4
Rand - IDA
Dory Rand, April 2004, "FINANCIAL EDUCATION AND ASSET BUILDING PROGRAMS FOR WELFARE RECIPIENTS AND LOW INCOME WORKERS: THE ILLINOIS EXPERIENCE" The Brookings Institution Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/20040413_doryrand.pdf
There’s more to leaving poverty than finding a job. Aside from a regular paycheck, a whole set of skills are needed to make sound financial decisions, build savings, establish good credit, and achieve the American dream of owning a home, car, or small business, or pursuing higher education. Many welfare recipients entering the workforce for the first time, as well as low-income workers at risk of dependence upon public assistance, lack these skills. Additionally, confusing and administratively burdensome resource-counting rules in public benefit programs discourage savings and asset building and exacerbate asset poverty among welfare recipients and the working poor. To address these issues, the Illinois Department of Human Services (IDHS)—in partnership with a diverse, statewide coalition called Financial Links for Low-Income People (FLLIP)—used its flexibility under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program to create innovative financial education and asset-building programs for welfare recipients and low-income workers. FLLIP participants learned money management skills, accessed important work supports, and built savings through regular bank accounts and through restricted, matched savings accounts called Individual Development Accounts, or IDAs. IDA graduates saved enough to buy or repair a home or car, start a business, or pursue postsecondary education or training. Increasingly, policymakers are recognizing the need to promote financial literacy. Federal agencies announced a new Financial Literacy and Education Commission on January 29, 2004.2 As Congress considers reauthorization of federal welfare legislation and policymakers explore ways to promote greater self-sufficiency, they would do well to maintain the funding and state flexibility needed to implement initiatives such as the FLLIP financial education and asset-building programs. States should eliminate or align resource rules, promote use of direct deposit, and support financial education, free tax counseling, IDA, and car ownership programs. Congress and regulators can complement these efforts through strengthened enforcement of the Community Reinvestment Act.
Georgetown
Dailymail, 5-9-2015, "Revealed: The college majors with the highest earnings," Mail Online, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3075189/High-school-graduates-earn-1-million-lifetime-graduate-college-new-report-finds.html
Americans who don't graduate from college could be missing out on $1million. A recently-published study The Economic Value of College Majors confirmed what researchers have long believed. The study, published by Georgetown University Center on Education and the Workforce, said 'The difference between the lifetime wages of college and high school graduates is $1 million; the difference between the highest- and lowest-paying college majors is $3.4 million.' They also showed which majors have the highest and lowest median earnings. Researchers found the college major with the highest median earnings is petroleum engineering, with $136,000. Rounding out the top five highest are pharmacy and pharmaceutical sciences and administration ($113,000), metallurgical engineering ($98,000), mining and mineral engineering ($97,000), and chemical engineering ($96,000). Meanwhile, the major with the lowest median earnings is early childhood education, with $39,000. Other low-paying majors toward the bottom of the rankings include human services and community organization ($41,000), studio arts ($42,000), social work ($42,000), teacher education: multiple levels ($42,000), and visual and performing arts ($42,000).
Center for Poverty Research
UC-Davis. DeNavas-Walt, Carmen and Bernadette D. Proctor, Income and Poverty in the United States: 2014 U.S. Census Bureau. Current Population Reports P60-252, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 2015.
GRAPH - For disclosure of the graph email sarkararunabhatgmail.com
Internal Link/Impact
Coote
Anna Coote, 5-6-2019, "Universal basic income doesn’t work. Let’s boost the public realm instead," Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/may/06/universal-basic-income-public-realm-poverty-inequality
A study published this week sheds doubt on ambitious claims made for universal basic income (UBI), the scheme that would give everyone regular, unconditional cash payments that are enough to live on. Its advocates claim it would help to reduce poverty, narrow inequalities and tackle the effects of automation on jobs and income. Research conducted for Public Services International, a global trade union federation, reviewed for the first time 16 practical projects that have tested different ways of distributing regular cash payments to individuals across a range of poor, middle-income and rich countries, as well as copious literature on the topic. It could find no evidence to suggest that such a scheme could be sustained for all individuals in any country in the short, medium or longer term – or that this approach could achieve lasting improvements in wellbeing or equality. The research confirms the importance of generous, non-stigmatising income support, but everything turns on how much money is paid, under what conditions and with what consequences for the welfare system as a whole. From Kenya and southern India to Alaska and Finland, cash payment schemes have been claimed to show that UBI “works”. In fact, what’s been tested in practice is almost infinitely varied, with cash paid at different levels and intervals, usually well below the poverty line and mainly to individuals selected because they are severely disadvantaged, with funds provided by charities, corporations and development agencies more often than by governments. Experiments in India and Kenya have been funded, respectively, by Unicef and Give Directly, a US charity supported by Google. They give money to people on very low incomes in selected villages for fixed periods of time. Giving small amounts of cash to people who have next to nothing is bound to make a difference – and indeed, these schemes have helped to improve recipients’ health and livelihoods. But nothing is revealed about their longer-term viability, or how they could be scaled up to serve whole populations. And there is a democratic deficit: people who get their basic income from charities or aid agencies have no control over how payments are made, to whom, at what level or over what period of time. The Alaska Permanent Fund, built from the state’s oil revenues, pays all adults and children a dividend each year – in 2018, it was $1,600 (£1,230). The scheme is popular and enduring; it has been found to produce some positive impacts on rural indigenous groups, but it makes no claim to sufficiency and has done nothing to reduce child poverty or to prevent widening income inequalities. ‘Finland undertook a two-year trial …but the government has refused to fund further expansion.’ Helsinki city centre. Photograph: peeterv/Getty Images/iStockphoto Finland undertook a two-year trial, from January 2017 to December 2018, of modest monthly payments of €560 (£477) to 2,000 unemployed people – but the government has refused to fund further expansion. It told us little about UBI except that, when push comes to shove, elected politicians may balk at paying for a universal scheme. The cost of a sufficient UBI scheme would be extremely high according to the International Labour Office, which estimates average costs equivalent to 20-30 of GDP in most countries. Costs can be reduced – and have been in most trials – by paying smaller amounts to fewer individuals. But there is no evidence to suggest that a partial or conditional UBI scheme could do anything to mitigate, let alone reverse, current trends towards worsening poverty, inequality and labour insecurity. Costs may be offset by raising taxes or shifting expenditure from other kinds of public expenditure, but either way there are huge and risky trade-offs. Money spent on cash payments cannot be invested elsewhere. The more generous the payments, the wider the range of recipients, the longer the scheme continues, the less money will be left to build the structures and systems that are needed to realise UBI’s progressive goals. As this week’s report observes, “If cash payments are allowed to take precedence, there’s a serious risk of crowding out efforts to build collaborative, sustainable services and infrastructure – and setting a pattern for future development that promotes commodification rather than emancipation.” This may help to explain why UBI has attracted support from Silicon Valley tycoons, who are more interested in defending consumer capitalism than in tackling poverty and inequality. The report concludes that the money needed to pay for an adequate UBI scheme “would be better spent on reforming social protection systems, and building more and better-quality public services”. Redistributing the personal tax allowance and developing the idea of universal basic services (UBS) could offer a more promising alternative. This calls for more and better quality public services that are free to those who need them, regardless of ability to pay. Healthcare and education are obvious examples, and it is argued that a similar approach should be applied to areas such as transport, housing, social care and information – everyday essentials that should be available to all. Collective provision offers more cost-effective, socially just, redistributive and sustainable ways of meeting people’s needs than leaving individuals to buy what they can afford in the marketplace.
Greenstein
Robert Greenstein, 6-13-2019, "Commentary: Universal Basic Income May Sound Attractive But, If It Occurred, Would Likelier Increase Poverty Than Reduce It," Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, https://www.cbpp.org/poverty-and-opportunity/commentary-universal-basic-income-may-sound-attractive-but-if-it-occurred
It’s hard to imagine that such a UBI would advance very far, especially given the tax increases we’ll already need for Social Security, Medicare, infrastructure, and other needs. UBI’s daunting financing challenges raise fundamental questions about its political feasibility, both now and in coming decades. Proponents often speak of an emerging left-right coalition to support it. But consider what UBI’s supporters on the right advocate. They generally propose UBI as a replacement for the current “welfare state.” That is, they would finance UBI by eliminating all or most programs for people with low or modest incomes. Consider what that would mean. If you take the dollars targeted on people in the bottom fifth or two-fifths of the population and convert them to universal payments to people all the way up the income scale, you’re redistributing income upward. That would increase poverty and inequality rather than reduce them. Yet that’s the platform on which the (limited) support for UBI on the right largely rests. It entails abolishing programs from SNAP (food stamps) — which largely eliminated the severe child malnutrition found in parts of the Southern “black belt” and Appalachia in the late 1960s — to the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), Section 8 rental vouchers, Medicaid, Head Start, child care assistance, and many others. These programs lift tens of millions of people, including millions of children, out of poverty each year and make tens of millions more less poor. Some UBI proponents may argue that by ending current programs, we’d reap large administrative savings that we could convert into UBI payments. But that’s mistaken. For the major means-tested programs — SNAP, Medicaid, the EITC, housing vouchers, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and school meals — administrative costs consume only 1 to 9 percent of program resources, as a CBPP analysis explains.1 Their funding goes overwhelmingly to boost the incomes and purchasing power of low-income families. Moreover, as the Roosevelt Institute’s Mike Konczal has noted, eliminating Medicaid, SNAP, the EITC, housing vouchers, and the like would still leave you far short of what’s needed to finance a meaningful UBI.2 Would we also end Pell Grants that help low-income students afford college? Would we terminate support for children in foster care, for mental health services, and for job training? Ed Dolan, who favors UBI, has calculated that we could financeing it by using the proceeds from eliminating all means-tested programs outside health care — including Pell Grants, job training, Head Start, free school lunches, and the like, as well as refundable tax credits, SNAP, SSI, low-income housing programs, etc. The result, Dolan found, would be an annual UBI of $1,582 per person, well below the level of support most low-income families (especially working-poor families with children) now receive. The increase in poverty and hardship would be very large.3 That’s why the risk is high that under any UBI that could conceivably gain traction politically, tens of millions of poor people would likely end up worse off. To further understand the risks, consider how working-age adults who aren’t working would fare. In our political culture, there are formidable political obstacles to providing cash to working-age people who aren’t employed, and it’s unlikely that UBI could surmount them. The nation’s social insurance programs — Social Security, Medicare, and unemployment insurance — all go only to people with significant work records. It’s highly unlikely that policymakers would agree to make UBI cash payments of several thousand dollars to people who aren’t elderly or disabled and aren’t working.
Sherman
Arloc Sherman, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 3-17-2015, "Safety Net Lifted 39 Million Americans out of Poverty in 2013," https://www.cbpp.org/blog/safety-net-lifted-39-million-americans-out-of-poverty-in-2013
As the House Ways and Means Committee holds a hearing today on empirical evidence for poverty programs, it’s worth recalling that safety net programs cut poverty nearly in half in 2013, lifting 39 million people out of poverty. The figures rebut claims that government programs do little to reduce poverty. Our analysis of Census data shows that, in 2013: Government policies cut the number of poor Americans by 39 million — from 88 million to 49 million. Of the 39 million people, “universal” assistance programs such as Social Security and unemployment insurance, which are widely available irrespective of income, cut poverty by 19 million. “Means-tested” benefits such as rent subsidies, SNAP (formerly food stamps), and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), which target households of limited means, cut poverty by another 20 million. For millions more people, government assistance makes poverty less severe: 34 million poor people were less deeply poor because of safety net benefits. These figures use the federal government’s new Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM), which — unlike the official poverty measure — accounts for taxes and non-cash benefits as well as cash income. (The SPM also makes other adjustments, such as taking into account out-of-pocket medical and work expenses and differences in living costs across the country.) Because the SPM includes taxes and non-cash benefits, it gives a more accurate picture of the impact of anti-poverty programs than the official poverty measure. Other analysts have recently used SPM data to show the strong impact of poverty programs. For example, Safety net programs lift thousands of children above the poverty line in every state, from 15,000 in Wyoming to 1.3 million in California, according to the Annie E. Casey Foundation’s Kids Count project.
Cass
Cass 16- senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute Oren, June 15 2016, “Why a Universal Basic Income Is a Terrible Idea”, Nat Review, Accessed on 6/27/17, http://www.nationalreview.com/article/436621/universal-basic-income-ubi-terrible-idea
What about poverty? Proponents say a UBI would end it, because each American would receive a check lifting him above the poverty line. But poverty is not only, or even primarily, a matter of material well-being. If it were, the $20,000 in safety-net spending per person below the poverty line, the presence of air conditioning and cable television and cell phones in the majority of such households, even the obesity epidemic ravaging low-income communities would all be signs that the war on poverty is nearly won. But we care about social as well as material conditions, and we care about upward mobility. By these measures, a UBI makes things worse. The greatest crisis facing less educated and lower-income Americans is social, not economic. As Charles Murray’s Coming Apart (2012) documents in harrowing detail, measures of social health that once looked roughly equal across economic classes now show gaping disparities, from family formation to employment to civic engagement to basic levels of trust. In 1960, Murray reports, more than 95 percent of white children were living with both biological parents when the mother turned 40, regardless of class. By the 2000s, the upper-class figure was 90 percent but the lower-class figure had declined to barely 30 percent, a level “so low that it calls into question the viability of white working-class communities as a place for socializing the next generation.” The story for other races is similar. The greatest crisis facing less educated and lower-income Americans is social, not economic.
Minogue
Minogue ’18 Minogue, Rachel (Economic Fellow at Third Way). “Five Problems with Universal Basic Income.” Third Way, 24 May 2018, https://www.thirdway.org/memo/five-problems-with-universal-basic-income.
If significant tax hikes aren’t viable, then the question remains: what gets cut in order to fund UBI? Under this scenario, UBI becomes stingy and punitive, as a vast amount of important government programs would be on the chopping block. Murray, the conservative UBI proponent, recommends that a $13,000 annual basic income replace all social assistance programs. Consider the value of the benefits people would lose: Medicaid, Medicare, Disability Insurance, the Children’s Health Insurance Program, Social Security, Supplemental Security Income, Unemployment Insurance, SNAP, Section 8 housing vouchers, Pell Grants, the Earned Income Tax Credit, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families. As Dylan Matthews writes, “$13,000 a year doesn’t mean much if you lose insurance that was paying $60,000 a year on chemotherapy.”15 Even a UBI that retains much of the existing social safety net could hit the disadvantaged harder, depending on which tax credits and government assistance programs get cut. Stern listed the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), and housing assistance as potential policies to end in favor of UBI. But consider one example. In Queens, New York, a single, low-income working parent with three children can receive up to $31,100 worth of benefits annually from SNAP, the EITC, and Section 8 housing vouchers alone, and for good reason.16 Replacing those benefits with a $12,000 UBI for the parent would reduce the family’s income and benefits by $19,100. A fundamental motivation for UBI is to eliminate poverty, but the tradeoffs necessary for funding would likely cause harm to vulnerable populations. This begs the question: If the main difference between UBI and our current safety net is that UBI gives relatively more to people who don’t need help, what would make UBI worthwhile? Some proponents have suggested UBI could be restricted to certain populations in need, but that would defy the universality at the idea’s core. At this point, what they are really proposing is an expansion of the existing safety net. That’s a worthwhile conversation to have, but it’s not about a universal basic income.
Census Bureau
U.S. Census Bureau, 9-26-2019, "Percentage of People in Poverty Dropped for the Fifth Consecutive Year," United States Census Bureau, https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2019/09/percentage-of-people-in-poverty-dropped-fifth-consecutive-year.html
The share of the U.S. population with incomes below the poverty level dropped between 2017 and 2018 — the fifth consecutive annual drop, according to new American Community Survey (ACS) estimates released today. The 1-year estimates from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2018 ACS show declines in poverty in 14 states and Puerto Rico and in seven of the 25 most populous metropolitan areas. Planners, policymakers and community stakeholders use poverty estimates to evaluate trends and current economic conditions in their communities. The ACS data allows them to make detailed comparisons across demographic groups. In addition, federal and state governments often use these estimates to allocate funds to communities. Government agencies and local organizations regularly use the data to identify the number of individuals and families eligible for various assistance programs. | 904,667 |
365,509 | 379,640 | TOC Aff 5 | Christopher J. Bolan, The US Is Trying to Restore Deterrence in the Gulf. That Won’t be Enough, Defense One, 10/6/19, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/10/us-trying-restore-deterrence-gulf-wont-be-enough/160394/
The United States’ ability to deter Iran in the Gulf is collapsing, as shown by an escalating series of violent actions either known or suspected to be Iranian. U.S. officials have responded with sensible steps that are largely consistent with scholarly insights on deterrence theory. But even if we manage to restore deterrence, it will provide only a temporary respite to the primary source of instability in the Gulf: the security dilemma confronting Saudi Arabia and Iran. U.S. policymakers must address this more fundamental issue, lest the region arrive at a “1914 moment” and careen into war.
...
But even if the United States restores its ability to deter Iran from unwanted behavior, and even if this leads to the negotiations that leaders in both Washington and Tehran claim to seek, a failure to address the basic security dilemma confronting Saudi Arabia and Iran will simply leave the region perched on its perpetual knife’s edge. Both sides must ultimately aim to identify concrete steps that Iran, the Arab Gulf states, and outside actors can take to ease the fears and mistrust that fuel sectarian divisions, competition, and conflict. President Obama was correct when he suggested that for violence to end and regional stability to return, Saudi Arabia and Iran would need to find a way to “share the neighborhood.” Just as U.S. policy seeks to address the justifiable security concerns of the Arab Gulf states, it must also strive to ease Iranian perceptions of its vulnerabilities in a way that minimizes the security dilemma from both sides of the Gulf. The ultimate goal of such an approach should be the inclusion of Iran into a regional security architecture that provides assurances and reduces vulnerabilities both for the Arab Gulf states, but also for Iran. Former Central Intelligence Agency senior Middle East analyst Emile Nakhleh similarly observes that “security collaboration between Riyadh and Tehran is necessary for the long-term security of the Gulf.”
Angela O’Mahony, Miranda Priebe, Bryan Frederick, Jennifer Kavanagh, Matthew Lane, Trevor Johnston, Thomas S. Szayna, Jakub P. Hlávka, Stephen Watts, Matthew Povlock, US Presence and the Incidence of Conflict, RAND Corporation, 2018, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1900/RR1906/RAND_RR1906.pdf
Others contend that U.S. commitments and troop presence are unlikely to have a restraining effect and, instead, make partners more likely to initiate conflict. In this view, partners see U.S. commitments as evidence that the United States will always come to their aid, either out of direct concern for the partner or to defend the United States’ own reputation. If allies expect to share the risk and consequences of their actions with a powerful United States, they may become more reckless in their foreign policy decisions. U.S. partners may making more demands on adversaries, refusing to compromise in disputes, or even initiating conflicts.26 Some have argued, for example, that faith in U.S. security guarantees have led U.S. partners in Asia to be more intransigent and more provocative in their off-shore island disputes with China.27 Analysts have also argued that U.S. support for Georgia’s accession to NATO emboldened its leaders to adopt a more provocative policy toward Russia that contributed to the 2008 war between the two countries.28 The level of U.S. troop presence could affect the risk that partners become emboldened or more belligerent. Increased U.S. troop presence could signal an increased commitment to partner security, increasing partners’ perceptions of U.S. willingness to defend them. Believing in a strong and resilient U.S. safety net, partners may pursue more aggressive actions. While U.S. troops in partner states, under this framework, are most likely to signal willingness and embolden partner actions, U.S. troop presence in nearby states could also indicate U.S. commitment to partners in the region and result in similar aggressive foreign policies.
Simon Tisdall, Why instinct and ideology tell Trump to get out of the Middle East, The Guardian, 1/11/20, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jan/11/why-instinct-and-ideology-tell-trump-to-get-out-of-the-middle-east-suleimani-iran?fbclid=IwAR06-cRXalB16uEvdS5-eTrWU-UWpSh-_MbpPdEqgp_vPorzgXCvdGovspg
Without the Americans to hold their hands and watch their backs, the Saudi royals’ behaviour could improve significantly. No more kidnappings of Lebanese prime ministers, for example, or murders of high-profile journalists. Military adventurism of the type that produced the humanitarian disaster in Yemen would be less likely.
Taylor Luck, Iran crisis: Why Gulf Arabs increasingly see US as a liability, Christian Science Monitor, 1/8/20, https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2020/0108/Iran-crisis-Why-Gulf-Arabs-increasingly-see-US-as-a-liability
The Gulf’s dramatic turnabout and push for diplomacy with Iran was fueled in part by what it perceived as the “unreliability” of the Trump administration and Washington’s unwillingness to protect Arab states from repeated Iranian attacks. In the wake of last summer’s sabotage of Gulf tankers in the Strait of Hormuz, a UAE delegation went to Tehran and signed a pact to monitor the shipping lanes to prevent conflict, while Saudi Arabia quietly reached out to Iranian proxies in Yemen, Iraq, and Syria. September’s attacks on Aramco facilities in Saudi Arabia, which badly damaged the kingdom’s oil infrastructure and went without an overt U.S. response, reinforced the notion that the Gulf stands alone. The belief settled in Arab capitals that for this transactional president, the political cost was too high and personal benefits too few to justify any retaliation. Feeling abandoned, Gulf countries concluded that diplomacy was their only way forward with Iran.
Jacob Powell, 5-17-2019, "The dubious Iran and al-Qaeda link Trump could use to go to war," Middle East Eye, https://www.middleeasteye.net/US-Iran-war-trump-al-qaeda-link-AUMF-analysis
The militant group al-Qaeda has a strong connection to Iran, the United States has claimed as part of its recent push towards war with the country.
US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in a hearing in April that the militant group operates in Iran and has contacts with the government in Tehran.
"There is no doubt there is a connection between the Islamic Republic of Iran and al-Qaeda. Period. Full stop," Pompeo contended.
"The factual question with respect to Iran's connections to al-Qaeda is very real. They have hosted al-Qaeda. They have permitted al-Qaeda to transit their country," he added.
Still, some observers have raised concerns that more hawkish members of President Donald Trump's administration are attempting to use an unproven connection between al-Qaeda and Iran to go to war.
Under the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), a law that was passed in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, such a connection may allow the White House to militarily confront Iran without Congressional approval.
Charles Mudede • Apr 6, 2020 At 9, 4-6-2020, "The Real Possibility of War With Iran During a Global Pandemic," Stranger, https://www.thestranger.com/slog/2020/04/06/43328342/the-real-possibility-of-war-with-iran-during-a-global-pandemic
At this point my article seemed dated. We had, it appeared, entered a much more different world than the one that prompted my investigation. Iran was now busy burying the dead, and some of its top leaders were counted among them. Meanwhile, Seattle became, according to the New York Times, the American capital of the virus. The US/Iran conflict would certainly be shelved for the time being.
I was wrong.
The US is still preparing for a war with Iran. On March 27, the New York Times reported that a "secret Pentagon directive orders planning to try to destroy a militia group backed by Iran." On April 1, 2020, a day the future may recognize has having considerable world-historical importance, Trump tweeted that "Iran or its proxies are planning a sneak attack on US troops and/or assets in Iraq. If this happens, Iran will pay a very heavy price, indeed!" Two days later, Fox News reported that the U.S. military is moving air defense systems "into Iraq following attacks on American and coalition forces in recent weeks."
Ronald Oliphant, 4-16-2020, "Tensions in Persian Gulf as United States accuses Iran of harassing its warships," Telegraph, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/04/16/tensions-persian-gulf-united-states-accuses-iran-harassing-warships/
Fears were growing of a new confrontation in the Persian Gulf after the United States accused Iranian naval forces of carrying out "dangerous and harassing" manoeuvres near its ships in the region.
The incident came just days after armed men presumed to be members of Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps boarded a Hong Kong registered oil tanker in the Strait of Hormuz, raising fears of a renewed crisis in the flashpoint shipping lane.
The US fifth fleet said a group of eleven Iranian naval vessels harassed six US navy vessels in the northern Persian Gulf for about an hour on Wednesday, with one coming within just ten yards of a Coast Guard cutter.
The "dangerous and provocative actions increased the risk of miscalculation and collision ... and were not in accordance with the obligation under international law to act with due regard for the safety of other vessels in the area," the fleet, which is based in Bahrain, said in a statement.
Kaye, Dalia Dassa, 03-26-2020, "COVID-19 Effects on Strategic Dynamics in the Middle East," RAND Corporation, https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/03/covid-19-impacts-on-strategic-dynamics-in-the-middle.html
U.S.-Iran escalation. Both sides may be tempted to view the crisis as an opportunity to double down on previous actions that contribute to conflict. The Trump administration continues to pursue its maximum pressure approach despite the lack of strategic results and the fissures it has created with Europe and other allies. Reports suggest that some in the administration seek to use the COVID-19 crisis to capitalize on Iran's increased vulnerability to force Iran to the negotiation table. For their part, Iranian leaders gave up on “strategic patience” after a year of adhering to the Iran nuclear deal following the U.S. withdrawal from the agreement in May 2018, finding the strategy brought little economic relief from Europe or Asia. Instead, Iran began to exact a cost for U.S. maximum pressure policies by targeting oil tankers and facilities, as well as U.S. military assets and personnel. With continued escalation in the months following the killing of General Qasem Soleimani, Iran and its militia partners may perceive COVID-19 as an opportunity to attack American forces with less risk of retaliation as they attempt to drive the United States out of Iraq. The result is that both sides may see advantages to escalation, producing a classic security dilemma that risks an even greater military conflict than either side desires. The distraction from counterterrorism efforts as relations with the Iraqi government remain strained is also a trend likely to continue as the added distraction of a global pandemic shifts priorities.
Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, 3-27-2020, "Pentagon Order to Plan for Escalation in Iraq Meets Warning From Top Commander," New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/27/world/middleeast/pentagon-iran-iraq-militias-coronavirus.html
During a White House meeting on March 12, Mr. Esper and General Milley argued for a more limited response to the rocket attacks — a view that prevailed on Mr. Trump, who ordered nighttime raids on five suspected weapons depots in Iraq used by Kataib Hezbollah.
Several American officials said there was an increased urgency in planning attack options against Kataib Hezbollah as the group, perhaps along with other Shiite militias, has threatened to ramp up strikes against U.S. troops stationed on Iraqi bases after the celebrations for Nowruz, the Iranian New Year, end soon. American military intelligence agencies have detected signs that big attacks could be in the works, according to a senior U.S. military official who has been briefed on some of the contingency planning in Iraq.
Kataib Hezbollah, in a statement on Wednesday, warned its fighters to prepare for possible attacks from the United States, and threatened to retaliate against Americans and any Iraqis who help them. “We will respond with full force to all their military, security, and economic facilities,” said the statement, according to SITE, a private company that monitors jihadists’ websites and postings.
The immediate targets of a Pentagon campaign against Kataib Hezbollah most likely would be the group’s leadership, bases and weapons depots, Mr. Knights said. In addition to a vast array of rockets, the group is believed to have access to a hidden arsenal of short-range ballistic missiles funneled into Iraq by Iran over the past several months, according to American intelligence and military officials.
An extended campaign could hit militia targets across a wide swath of Iraq and Syria, and possibly other Shiite militias in Iraq that are loosely aligned with Kataib Hezbollah. “You can’t just hit rank-and-file fighters, you’d have to hit leadership, most of whom have probably dispersed,” Mr. Knights said.
....
In recent weeks, as the threat from militia attacks and exposure to the coronavirus has increased, the United States and its European allies have been turning over smaller coalition bases to their Iraqi counterparts, and either moving to a handful of larger Iraqi bases or leaving the country altogether.
Speaking to reporters the day after the United States hit the five Khatib Hezbollah weapons depots this month, Gen. Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr., the head of Central Command, said that the threat from Iran and its proxies remained “very high” and added that tensions “have actually not gone down” since the United States killed General Suleimani.
While American officials say they have no clear evidence that Iran specifically directed the deadly attack on Camp Taji on March 11, they say that Kataib Hezbollah and the Iranian Quds Force coordinate closely.
General McKenzie said the United States was poised to strike additional militia weapons storage sites and other targets should attacks against American forces continue. He blamed Kataib Hezbollah for about a dozen rocket attacks against American troops based in Iraq in the past six months.
Bob Dreyfuss, 5-17-2019, "Trump May Not Want War With Iran—but the Coalition of the Killing May Give Him One," Nation, https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/iran-bolton-war-fever-trump-pompeo/
At home, even an unprovoked (and widely condemned) war against Iran could set off an explosion of MAGA-style jingoism among Trump’s supporters. The rally-round-the-flag effect that usually accompanies US overseas adventures could be used to suppress dissent, intimidate anti-war forces, and provide an opening for the administration to suppress civil liberties. An election season that should be about the president’s misrule—one that could bring to power a progressive coalition supporting economic and social justice—could be swamped by war fever. And the military-industrial complex, already getting fat on arms sales to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other Gulf states, would clamor for even greater largesse, beyond the more than $1 trillion it will already pocket in the next year.
That’s why it’s critical that the American people, members of Congress, and especially the Democrats seeking to replace Trump in 2020 speak out forcefully against this war fever. In response to the recent dangerous White House actions, Senator Bernie Sanders warned that Trump has “isolated the US from its closest allies and put us on a dangerous path to conflict.” Senator Angus King of Maine noted that Bolton has already proclaimed his intent to “celebrate in the streets of Tehran.” And Senators Tom Udall of New Mexico and Dick Durbin of Illinois warned in a Washington Post op-ed, “We are again barreling toward another unnecessary conflict in the Middle East based on faulty and misleading logic.” Warnings, of course, are appropriate. But they must be louder and more insistent. And Congress, as it unsuccessfully tried to do in regard to US support for the Saudi-UAE war in Yemen, must stand up to claim its authority over war and peace.
Marisa Fernandez, 1-3-2020, "Video: Trump said in 2011 that Obama would use war with Iran to get re-elected," Axios, https://www.axios.com/trump-iran-war-obama-957a39c2-d0b9-4041-bb71-c3dfa12339d5.html
Then-citizen Donald Trump predicted in November 2011 video that then-President Barack Obama would start a war with Iran in order to get re-elected in 2012.
"Our president will start a war with Iran because he has absolutely no ability to negotiate. He’s weak and he’s ineffective. So the only way he figures that he’s going to get re-elected, and as sure as you're sitting there, is to start a war with Iran."
Tom Rogan, 4-18-2020, "Here's how you'll know we're about to go to war with Iran — right now, we're not," Washington Examiner, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/heres-how-youll-know-were-about-to-go-to-war-with-iran-right-now-were-not
First, we would have to stage an extremely large air and naval force buildup in the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf, for strike operations inside Iran and defeat of Iran's naval forces. We'd also have to do it in the Mediterranean Sea, to help defend Israel against Iranian ballistic missile attacks and to complicate Russian action via its Black Sea fleet.
…
Second, we would see a massive ground force deployment in Saudi Arabia (none of Iran's neighbors would likely allow U.S. invasion forces access). Iran is three times the size of Iraq, with a far more powerful regular and irregular military. Those factors alone would require U.S. ground deployment in the region of at least 500,000 ground assault forces. Note, here, that the 120,000 forces mentioned in reporting this week are very likely related to contingency planning. And they aren't even deployed!
Toby C. Jones, 12-22-2011, "Don't Stop at Iraq: Why the U.S. Should Withdraw From the Entire Persian Gulf," Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/12/dont-stop-at-iraq-why-the-us-should-withdraw-from-the-entire-persian-gulf/250389/
Led by Saudi Arabia, the Arab Gulf states claim that their fears of Iranian ambition are existential. It is certainly true that Tehran is locked in a regional balance of power struggle with Saudi Arabia and that Iran seeks greater influence. But Iran does not seek the destruction of Saudi Arabia or the overthrow of Arab world's political order. In spite of claims to the contrary by the Saudi and Bahraini governments, Iran's revolutionary imperative is a relic of the past. Israel expresses a similar anxiety about Iran as a security threat. And Iran's leaders have played their part in fostering Israeli uncertainty. Iran's potential acquisition of nuclear weapons is a source of concern, of course, as is its support for Hezbollah and Syria. The challenge of how best to deal with Iranian ambition, however, is mainly a political problem, one that has for too long been treated almost entirely through the lens of security and militarism.
The presence of the American military in the Gulf has not only done little to deter Iran's ambitions, it has emboldened them. Surrounding Iran militarily and putting it under the constant threat of American or Israeli military action has failed to deter the country. Instead this approach has strengthened hardliners within Tehran and convinced them that the best path to self-preservation is through defiance, militarism, and the pursuit of dangerous ties across the Middle East. The rivalry between Iran, the U.S., and its regional partners has turned into a political and military arms race, one that could easily spin out of control.
Kirsten Fontenrose, 12-10-2019, "Gulf partners could give Iran and the US a way out of their collision course," Atlantic Council, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/gulf-partners-could-give-iran-and-the-us-a-way-out-of-their-collision-course/
Current trajectory: Everyone wins but the United States
Iran floated the Hormuz Peace Endeavor (HOPE) proposal to Gulf neighbors this past fall. This plan would give GCC countries the peace of mind they’re looking for, but in exchange for US withdrawal from the region. Iran expected the region to say no publicly but to seek backchannel, bilateral agreements. This is happening, but it is not in the United States’ interest. Iran has assured its Gulf neighbors that it will not attack their people or their oil infrastructure in the near term. Instead it focuses its violent attention on US targets.
Dan Spinelli, 6-26-2019, "Here's what it would look like if Trump starts a war with Iran.," Mother Jones, https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/06/heres-what-it-would-look-like-if-trump-starts-a-war-with-iran/
War with Iran by necessity would almost have to involve its regional neighbors and adversaries, including Israel, Lebanon, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, and Russia. Iranian proxies could support Tehran by targeting US troops in Iraq or continuing to use their perch in Yemen to bomb Saudi Arabia, which is America’s close ally and Iran’s sectarian enemy. Then depending on the route American bombers take to reach Iran, they run the risk of angering Iran’s neighbors. “You’re either going to fly in over Iraq or fly in over parts of Syria which has very good air defenses,” Gay says. “That’s where the best Russian air defenses are.” Routing the attack through Israel and Lebanon might provide a workaround, but that could draw these countries into the conflict.
M. B., 7-2-2019, "A nuclear war in the Persian Gulf?," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, https://thebulletin.org/2019/07/a-nuclear-war-in-the-persian-gulf/
We believe there is a heightened possibility of a US-Iran war triggering a US nuclear strike for the following reasons:
The sanction regime set against the Iranian economy is so brutal that it is likely to force Iran to take an action that will require a US military response. Unless the United States backs down from its present self-declared “economic warfare” against Iran, this will likely escalate to an open warfare between the two countries.
In response to a White House request to draw up an Iran war plan, the Pentagon proposed sending 120,000 soldiers to the Persian Gulf. This force would augment the several thousands of troops already stationed in Iran’s vicinity. President Trump has also hinted that if need be, he will be sending “a lot more” troops. Defeating Iran through conventional military means would likely require a half million US forces and US preparedness for many casualties. The US nuclear posture review is worded in such a way that the use of tactical nuclear weapons in conventional theaters is envisaged, foreshadowing the concern that in a showdown with a menacing foe like Iran, the nuclear option is on the table. The United States could once again justify using nuclear force for the sake of a decisive victory and casualty-prevention, the logic used in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Trump’s cavalier attitude toward nuclear weapons, trigger-happy penchant, and utter disdain for Iran, show that he would likely have no moral qualm about issuing an order to launch a limited nuclear strike, especially in a US-Iran showdown, one in which the oil transit from the Gulf would be imperiled, impacting the global economy and necessitating a speedy end to such a war.
If the United States were to commit a limited nuclear strike against Iran, it would minimize risks to its forces in the region, defang the Iranian military, divest the latter of preeminence in the Strait of Hormuz, and thus reassert US power in the oil hub of the Persian Gulf. Oil flowing through the Strait of Hormuz is critical to a rising China. US control over this merchant waterway would grant the United States significant leverage in negotiations. A limited US nuclear strike could cause a ‘regime change’ among Iranian leadership, representing a strategic setback for Russia, in light of their recent foray in the Middle East with Iranian backing.
Alexandra Witze, 3-16-2020, "How a small nuclear war would transform the entire planet," Nature, https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-00794-y
The worst impact would come in the mid-latitudes, including breadbasket areas such as the US Midwest and Ukraine. Grain reserves would be gone in a year or two. Most countries would be unable to import food from other regions because they, too, would be experiencing crop failures, Jägermeyr says. It is the most detailed look ever at how the aftermath of a nuclear war would affect food supplies, he says. The researchers did not explicitly calculate how many people would starve, but say that the ensuing famine would be worse than any in documented history.
Farmers might respond by planting maize, wheat and soya beans in parts of the globe likely to be less affected by a nuclear winter, says Deepak Ray, a food-security researcher at the University of Minnesota in St Paul. Such changes might help to buffer the food shock — but only partly. The bottom line remains that a war involving less than 1 of the world’s nuclear arsenal could shatter the planet’s food supplies.
“The surprising finding”, says Jägermeyr, “is that even a small-war scenario has devastating global repercussions”. | 904,713 |
365,510 | 379,644 | TOC Neg 1 | US reinforcing troops to deter Iran, defend military bases
Neff 20~-~-Thomas Gibbons-Neff, How U.S. Troops Are Preparing for the Worst in the Middle East, NYT, 1/6/20, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/06/world/middleeast/troops-iran-iraq.html
WASHINGTON — American military units stationed in Iraq and Syria are readying for attacks from either Iranian forces or their proxies after the drone strike that killed a senior Iranian general last week. It is unclear what an Iranian retaliatory attack would look like after the death of Maj. Gen. Qassim Suleimani, an Iranian security and intelligence commander responsible for the deaths of hundreds of troops over the years, and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, a powerful Iraqi militia commander and government official. But, already, American forces in the region are reinforcing their outposts, bases and airfields. The Pentagon has directed about 4,500 additional troops to the region atop the roughly 50,000 already there. Here’s how it breaks down. New Deployments to Iraq and Kuwait The influx of new forces was prompted by several events: the death of an American contractor in Iraq during a rocket attack on Dec. 27 carried out by an Iranian-backed militia; protests around the United States Embassy in Baghdad afterward, following a series of American airstrikes on the militia; and last week’s drone strike on General Suleimani and Mr. al-Muhandis. The new troops will act primarily as a defensive force, meant to reinforce American bases and compounds in the region and respond to a possible attack. No major ground offensives are planned for them. Which Units Are Deploying Roughly 4,000 troops — a brigade — from the 82nd Airborne Division based out of Fort Bragg, N.C., have started deploying to Kuwait. They are part of the division’s global response force, kept on standby for particular emergencies. A senior United States military officer said the deployment of the 82nd Airborne paratroopers and other ground forces was defensive, meant to position more troops in the Middle East who could be quickly deployed to defend or reinforce American embassies, consulates and military bases. Members of the brigade will not be able to deploy with their cellphones, one Defense Department official said, citing “operational security.” In recent years, cellular communications, especially posts on social media, have given away units’ locations. CNN first reported the decision on cellphones. Roughly 100 other paratroopers from the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team, based out of Vicenza, Italy, will also deploy to the Middle East, according to a Defense Department official. Stars and Stripes first reported the deployment.
Persian Gulf deployments support ops in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan
Neff 20~-~-Thomas Gibbons-Neff, How U.S. Troops Are Preparing for the Worst in the Middle East, NYT, 1/6/20, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/06/world/middleeast/troops-iran-iraq.html
Other units include around 100 Marines from the Second Battalion, Seventh Marine Regiment. The company-size contingent is deployed to Kuwait as part of a special purpose task force meant to respond to emergencies in the Middle East. The Marines, fresh off helping American forces withdraw from northeastern Syria, are reinforcing dozens of security personnel positioned at the American Embassy in Baghdad. The compound is large, more than 100 acres, with guard posts, living areas, dining halls and small shops. Around 100 Army Rangers from the 75th Ranger Regiment deployed shortly after last week’s drone strike. The Rangers, part of the secretive Joint Special Operations Command, most likely will act as a reaction force if any Iranian-backed forces launch a concerted attack on an American position, according to one Defense Department official. The 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit includes roughly 2,200 Marines and sailors, composed of an infantry battalion, logistics unit and a squadron of aircraft, namely transport helicopters and attack jets. They are aboard Navy ships in the Bataan Amphibious Ready Group, made up of around 2,000 sailors, and are steaming toward the Middle East as part of a previously scheduled deployment. These Marine Expeditionary Units have long served as a global response force. Often their deployments in the Persian Gulf have found them supporting operations in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan.
Iran wants heg
Lappin 20~-~-Yaakov Lappin, Iran seeks to end direct clash with America and return to an asymmetrical comfort zone, JNS, 1/8/20, https://www.jns.org/iran-seeks-to-end-direct-clash-with-america-and-return-to-an-asymmetrical-comfort-zone/
Despite the apparent de-escalation, the risk of war is far from passing. The Iranians remain on a collision course with the United States in Iraq, but they are likely seeking a return to their comfort zone: proxy operations, outsourced to the Shi’ite militias in Iraq, or plausible deniability attacks on American troops in the future. Its goal, however, remains unaltered: to eject the Americans from Iraq and complete its takeover of that country, as part of a wider scheme to destabilize the region and move towards violent hegemony. The regime calls this vision “exporting the revolution.” This is a plan that includes the goal of surrounding Israel with heavily armed terror armies. Soleimani was instrumental in trying to achieve this dangerous vision. He also demonstrated that proxy warfare is the least risky way to proceed for achieving Iran’s radical strategy. Building a network of armed forces and nourishing them with increasingly advanced weapons, cash and orders was his modus operandi.
Iran de-escalated after Soleimani
Ahmedzade 20~-~-Rufat Ahmedzade, With Soleimani Gone, Iran’s Regional Hegemony Faces Setbacks, London School of Economics, 2/12/20, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2020/02/12/with-soleimani-gone-irans-regional-hegemony-faces-setbacks/
Iran’s leaders do seem, however, to have weighed their retaliation to Soleimani’s killing more carefully. Though they were not deterred by President Trump’s tweeted threats that ‘if Iran hits US bases’ they would really suffer, it looks as if the Iranians deliberately avoided inflicting heavy casualties when they fired a barrage of missiles at US bases in Iraq on 8 January. That night, Iran and the US exchanged de-escalatory messages via the Swiss ambassador, the Financial Times reported. Despite his earlier rhetoric President Trump pulled back from a military response to the attack, declaring instead that Washington would focus on punishing economic sanctions. The strikes – directed from Iranian territory – proved that the Islamic Republic has the capability to hit American military installations in Iraq. For the first time, Tehran took responsibility for its military action and did not use a proxy force to attack US troops. This was also a matter of prestige for Supreme Leader Khamenei and the regime. Iranian officials considered the retaliatory strikes to be ‘proportionate measures in self-defence’, according to Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif. ‘We do not seek escalation or war, but will defend ourselves against any aggression’, he tweeted.
US primary obstacle to Iran heg
Raouf 19~-~-Huda Raouf, Iranian quest for regional hegemony: motivations, strategies and constrains, Review of Economics and Political Science, 7/2/19, https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/REPS-02-2019-0017/full/html#sec012
The study concludes that there are obstacles completely in front of achieving the Iranian quest to regional hegemony over the Middle East. These are the continuing US involvement in the Middle East and the consequent tense relationship between Iran and the USA. It is most unlikely that Iran will be hegemonic state over the Middle East as long as there are refusal and resistance from other regional states for Iranian regional role; as each of regional powers has tools to contain the influence of the other. The Iranian regional behavior that is sectarianism-based, whether to protect Shiite shrines and holy places or to protect Shiites in the region, such policies deepen the ideological and sectarian conflicts. It also has not provided an attractive cultural model for the peoples of the region.
Other 2 possibilities: Iran becomes hegemon or drawn-out regional war; in regional conflict, both Saudi + Iran would nuclearize (Saudis would pay scientists from Pakistan), root cause of terrorism, both turn to Russia and China
Cropsey 19~-~-SETH CROPSEY, GARY ROUGHEAD, A U.S. Withdrawal Will Cause a Power Struggle in the Middle East, Foreign Policy, 12/17/19, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/17/us-withdrawal-power-struggle-middle-east-china-russia-iran/
In the second scenario, Iran defeats Saudi Arabia in a regional confrontation, thereby taking the top leadership spot in the Islamic world, making it a great power in its own right. Control of Middle Eastern oil exports would give Iran the ability to coerce and bully the United States’ European and Pacific allies, and it would deny the United States any peaceful access to the Levantine Basin. The balancing dynamics against this new great power are difficult to project, but regardless, the United States’ ability to control the strategic environment would be hampered markedly. Third, a long-term regional war between Tehran and a fluctuating anti-Iran coalition composed of Saudi Arabia, other Sunni Gulf states, and Israel would cause widespread bloodshed. As the 1980s Iran-Iraq War demonstrated, both Iran and Saudi Arabia would be likely to attempt nuclear breakout. With Iran, this would mean closing the small technological gap that now exists between its low-enriched uranium to the higher level of enrichment needed for a nuclear weapon. The Saudis could pay scientists from a sympathetic Sunni nuclear state—such as Pakistan—or simply buy nuclear weapons from Islamabad. An increasingly fractured and war-ravaged Middle East would spawn more jihadist organizations, and the West would be their primary target. Absent a reliable U.S. presence, Saudi Arabia and perhaps even Israel would increasingly turn to Russia and China as great-power guarantors, leaving U.S. officials in the unfortunate position of hoping polar ice will melt quickly enough to allow unrestricted year-round access over the Arctic, diminishing the importance of the Mediterranean. But hope can only go so far, and the United States needs a more concrete, long-term approach to the Middle East. Despite modest increases in U.S. defense spending in recent years, peer and near-peer competition increasingly puts the predominance of the U.S. military at risk. In testimony before the Senate last year, Adm. Philip S. Davidson, commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, noted that China is “approaching military parity” with the United States “in a number of critical areas,” and that “there is no guarantee that the United States would win a future conflict with China.”
US troop withdrawal = longstanding core Iranian demand, Iraq “handed to Iran on silver platter”
Noack 20~-~-Rick Noack, Here’s what might happen if the U.S. were to suddenly quit Iraq, Washington Post, 1/10/20, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/01/09/heres-what-might-happen-if-us-were-suddenly-quit-iraq/
A counterweight would be lost Ali Fathollah-Nejad, a visiting fellow at the Brookings Doha Center “The departure of U.S. forces from the Middle East has been a long-standing and core Iranian foreign policy demand, shared by Tehran’s moderates as well as hard-liners,” he wrote. According to Fathollah-Nejad, “both the U.S. and Iranian military presence, be it direct or through proxies, is a thorn in the flesh of most Iraqis who have suffered enormously from both countries’ self-centered and myopic policies since the 2003 invasion.” But a U.S. troop withdrawal “would expose a weak Iraq to its powerful Iranian neighbor’s increasing weight as the Iraqi scene would be handed over to Iran on a silver platter after the American counterweight vanishes. Also, such an outcome would barely be welcomed by the popular uprising in Iraq that has been equally critical of Iranian and American interference,” he wrote.
Withdrawal would embolden Iran to act as shadow govt, bolster ISIS
Makhzoomi 20~-~-Khairuldeen Al Makhzoomi, The Dangerous Consequences of U.S. Withdrawal from Iraq, Washington Institute, 2/3/20, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/the-dangerous-consequences-of-u.s.-withdrawal-from-iraq
A complete U.S. withdrawal will only embolden Shia loyalists in Iraq, further alienate the Sunni community from the Iraqi government, and strengthen Iran's expansionist agenda in Iraq as well as the rest of the Middle East. Iran has demonstrated its capabilities to do so by maintaining the upper hand in the Iraqi political, security, and economic sectors—even while U.S. troops remained on the ground. Additionally, Iran was able to extend its influence while acting as a shadow government throughout Shia dominated regions of Iraq. If left unchecked this trend could influence internal conflicts within Saudi Arabia, as witnessed previously by the Saudi-Shi’a uprising of 1979. Similarly, this friction will likely spread to other Gulf countries—such as the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Kuwait—because of these countries’ large Shia populations.
Eliminating the U.S. presence in Iraq will not guarantee the security and stability of the country. In early January, the U.S. central command reported that it halted the training of Iraqi forces to assist them in fighting the Islamic State and other extremist organizations. Expelling U.S. troops from Iraq could potentially bolster the Islamic States’ residual presence and hinder the fight against terrorist organizations such as the Iranian-funded Shia military and political organization, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH).
Loss of deterrence means Iran will lash out, eg. 2019
Samet 20~-~-Daniel J. Samet, To deter Iran, the Gulf states need stronger navies, Atlantic Council, 2/20/20, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/to-deter-iran-the-gulf-states-need-stronger-navies/
If recent events in the ever-tumultuous Gulf have taught us anything, it’s that deterrence matters. A naval buildup will make an increasingly bellicose Tehran think twice about targeting merchant ships in the Gulf. For Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and other Gulf monarchies, deterring Iran is a top national-security priority.
During 2019, a loss of deterrence had led Iran to conclude—accurately—that they could act with relative impunity. One example was the September 2019 strike on Saudi oil facilities at Abqaiq as well as the subsequent non-response. Two more came in the form of the brazen seizure of an unescorted British tanker and the downing of a US drone months prior. Killing Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani on January 3, however, restored deterrence by showing Iran that the United States can and will use force in the face of Iranian aggression. The Gulf states should follow Washington’s lead in restoring deterrence in the face of the desperate regime in Tehran. To achieve this objective, the Gulf states must invest much more in their own navies. | 904,714 |
365,511 | 379,651 | TOC Neg 8 | Many different alt causes to perception that US is leaving the region. A) pivot to Asia + exclusion from US-Iran nuclear deal negotiations, led to Yemen war B) Trump actions on Qatar blockade C) Abandonment of the Kurds + withdrawal from Syria D) Inaction after Iran attacks on Saudi…
Ulrichsen 20~-~-Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, REBALANCING REGIONAL SECURITY IN THE PERSIAN GULF, Baker Institute, 2/20, https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/de9f09e6/cme-pub-persiangulf-022420.pdf
Perceptions matter in shaping and influencing policymakers’ views of the world around
them and the options they feel are open to them at any given time. During the Obama years, a sense of “abandonment” by the U.S. arose in certain Gulf capitals as ruling figures expressed concern over the U.S. decision to accept the fall of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and subsequent election victories for the Muslim Brotherhood.24 Officials in GCC states expressed further frustration at being cut out of the negotiations between the U.S. and Iran and later between the P5+1 and Iran that culminated in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in July 2015. Tensions were palpable at a U.S.-GCC summit held at Camp David in May 2015 when the emirs of Kuwait and Qatar were the only GCC heads of state to attend, as King Salman of Saudi Arabia pointedly chose to stay away.25 For many observers in GCC capitals, their sense of incomprehension at U.S. policy during the Obama administration was encapsulated in the phrase “pivot to Asia,” even though this always was more rhetoric than reality, and never implied that it was the Persian Gulf that was being pivoted “away” from.26 One Gulf leader went so far as to ask a visiting American dignitary “where’s the coach?”, “I don’t know where the coach is” in an apparent reference to the lack of visible U.S. leadership or regional policy.27 Regional figures reacted strongly to a March 2016 interview Obama gave to The Atlantic during which the president had said “free riders aggravate me,” despite there being no explicit reference to any of the Gulf states in his comment, which appeared in context to have been directed against the U.K. 28 A former Saudi ambassador to the U.S., Prince Turki al-Faisal Al Saud, responded furiously in an op-ed in Arab News that began “No, Mr. Obama. We are not ‘free riders’.”29 In a sign that feelings of ill-will were mutual, Ben Rhodes, deputy national security adviser throughout Obama’s two terms in office, told The New Yorker that the Saudis and Emiratis were “more responsible for the image of Obama as being soft in the Middle East than anyone else. They trashed us all around town.”30 The breakdown in trust and confidence was a factor in the Saudi and Emirati decision to launch “Operation Decisive Storm” in Yemen on March 26, 2015, the same day the P5+1 and Iran began an intense week of negotiations in Lausanne that produced a framework agreement on the nuclear deal on April 2. Angered at being cut out of the P5+1 process, the military intervention in Yemen signaled to the White House and the international community that the Saudis and Emiratis rejected the idea that it was possible to focus solely on one issue (Iran’s nuclear ambition) at the expense of the broader picture of what they saw as regionally destabilizing Iranian behavior.31 Officials in GCC states, especially in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, largely welcomed the Trump administration and made strenuous efforts to reach out to key figures in the new White House as they settled into office in 2017.32 While the Trump White House has provided political support to its GCC partners engaged in the Yemen war by blocking congressional pressure to end the conflict, and resisted calls to hold the Saudi leadership to account for the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, the volatility and unpredictability of Trump’s unconventional approach to regional policymaking has, gradually, sapped regional confidence in a second consecutive U.S. presidency. Further doubts were generated by Trump’s initial and subsequent responses to the blockade of Qatar launched by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt in June 2017. Trump’s initial support for the move and his castigation of Qatar as a sponsor of terror at the highest level, caused shockwaves in Doha and called into question the entire basis of Qatar’s defense and security planning, while his later reversal in favor of a mediated solution was greeted with dismay by Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, which had courted White House support for the move.33 For the first time in the post-1990 era, it had not been the U.S. that was seen to have come to the defense of one of their number when faced with external threat. This realization caused concern in Kuwait City and Muscat, to say nothing of the consternation in Doha, as it called into question, as never before, the role of the U.S. as the security guarantor of last (or, indeed, first) resort.34 For the Saudis and the Emiratis, that moment of reflection came two years later, in 2019, when the lack of a U.S. response to the attacks on maritime shipping and energy infrastructure prompted a reassessment of the very basis of deterrence.35 The newfound sense in GCC capitals that they were more on their own than they may ever have thought possible is likely what prompted the sudden flurry of outreach to Iran, directly or via intermediaries, that began after the Abqaiq and Khurais attacks and intensified after the killing of Soleimani and the Iranian response. A White House in disarray produced “policy without process,” as a very senior former official who retired in 2019 put it.36 This breakdown in the traditional structure and discipline of decision-making was manifest in sudden breaks with settled policy (and subsequent reversals or pullbacks), such as Trump’s December 2018 declaration (on Twitter) that the Islamic State had been defeated in Syria and that U.S. forces would withdraw; or the White House announcement in October 2019 of a pullout of troops from northeast Syria, a decision widely perceived as abandoning Syria’s Kurds, hitherto a partner of U.S. forces in the battles against the Islamic State; to a Turkish military incursion that started days later. 37 The fallout from the December 2018 announcement led Secretary of Defense James Mattis and the special presidential envoy for the global coalition to counter ISIL, Brett McGurk, to resign in protest, while the October 2019 announcement came after a telephone call with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and against the advice of U.S. military leaders.38 The cavalier and peremptory manner by which Trump seemingly dismissed the longstanding American partnership with the Kurds, and the way he was perceived to have gone against political and military views in doing so, made an impression on policymakers in GCC capitals.39 If Trump could abruptly abandon the Kurdish-led forces in Syria that had fought alongside U.S. counterparts in the battles against Islamic State, might he do the same, on a larger scale, to the Gulf states, as he had appeared momentarily to do to Qatar in 2017? The doubts over the reliability of the U.S. as a partner that had first appeared in regional capitals in and after 2011 widened during Trump’s second and third years in office.40 In 2019, the pattern of attacks on maritime and energy targets in and around the Persian Gulf in 2019—widely linked with but not formally attributed to Iran or its regional proxies—brought to a head the growing concerns in GCC capitals about the reliability of a partnership that once seemed sacrosanct.41 Tensions in the Persian Gulf escalated almost immediately after the Trump administration launched its “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran in April and May 2019 with the introduction of new sanctions on Iranian officials, further restrictions on exports of Iranian oil, and the designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including the Quds Force commanded by Qassim Soleimani, as a foreign terrorist organization.42 A series of “incidents” of varying severity began within weeks to target the maritime and energy sectors linked to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the two U.S. partners that had been the most hawkish toward Iran as well as the most closely associated with the Trump administration’s regional policy agenda. These included attacks on four commercial ships off the coast of the Emirati port of Fujairah on May 12, a drone attack against a Saudi oil pipeline on May 13, further attacks on two oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman on June 13, and the shooting down of a U.S. drone on June 20 that reportedly violated Iranian airspace after having taken off from a U.S. airbase in Abu Dhabi.43 Most spectacular of all—and the most cathartic for U.S. partners in the Persian Gulf—was the drone and missile strike on Saudi oil infrastructure on September 14 that targeted Aramco’s giant oil-processing facility at Abqaiq as well as the Khurais oilfield. The swarm of drones and cruise missiles fired from an (as-yet) unknown location evaded Saudi missile defense systems and knocked out, albeit only temporarily, 5.7 million barrels of Saudi Arabia’s total of 9.8 million barrels of oil produced per day.44 The scale and the success of the attacks underscored the vulnerability of the expensively procured defensive systems in Saudi Arabia and other GCC states to guard against asymmetric rather than conventional threats.45 A “Saudi security analyst,” speaking to Reuters on condition of anonymity, captured the sense of shock in the kingdom when s/he stated that “The attack is like September 11th for Saudi Arabia, it is a game changer (…) Where are the air defense systems and the U.S. weaponry for which we spent billions of dollars to protect the kingdom and its oil facilities? If they did this with such precision, they can also hit the desalination plants and more targets.”46 Just as shocking to leaders in Saudi Arabia and the UAE as the need to urgently reassess threat perceptions and defense capabilities was the Trump administration’s reactions to the pattern of attacks between May and September 2019. The lack of a visible U.S. response to the attacks on shipping or to the assault on the nerve center of the Saudi economy made the Saudis and other American partners in GCC states reassess the nature of the U.S. security guarantee they had until then (largely) taken for granted.47 Trump denied he had offered the Saudis any pledge of protection after the Aramco attacks and added pointedly that “That was an attack on Saudi Arabia, and that wasn’t an attack on us.”48 The inaction was all the more pronounced when compared with Trump’s response to the downing of the U.S. drone in June 2019, when the U.S. launched a cyber attack against Iran’s electronic warfare capabilities, 49 or after the killing of an American contractor and the storming of the U.S. embassy compound in Iraq in December, when Trump ordered the drone attack that killed Qassim Soleimani on January 3, 2020. 50 Statements by officials and prominent commentators in late 2019 and early 2020 illustrated the concerns many in GCC states felt at U.S. decision-making and prompted policymakers in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to re-examine their own hitherto assertive approaches to regional affairs. A delegation from the UAE traveled to Iran in late July 2019 to discuss coast guard and related maritime security issues, shortly after the UAE had announced a troop redeployment and drawdown in Yemen as well.51 In the weeks after the Saudi attacks in September, the Saudi leadership made discreet approaches to their counterparts in Pakistan and Iraq in a bid to open back-channels of dialogue with Iran to de-escalate tension. Iraq’s prime minister, Adel Abdul Mahdi, stated in late September that “There is a big response from Saudi Arabia and from Iran and even from Yemen, and I think these endeavors will have a good effect.”52 Ali Larijani, the speaker of the Iranian parliament, appeared to endorse such sentiment, telling Al Jazeera that “Iran is open to starting a dialogue with Saudi Arabia and other countries in the region.”53 Pronouncements in GCC states increasingly began to diverge from the U.S. approach in the final months of 2019 and later evolved into different reactions to the sharp escalation in U.S.-Iran tension that accompanied the killing of Soleimani and the Iranian retaliation against U.S. military targets in Iraq. Abulkhaleq Abdulla, a retired Emirati academic often described as an advisor to Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, blasted Trump after the Saudi attacks, stating that “in his response to Iran, he is even worse than Obama (…) Now an Arab Gulf strategic partner has been massively attacked by Iran—which was provoked by Trump, not by us—and we hear Americans saying to us, ‘you need to defend yourselves’!”54 After the U.S. decision to kill Soleimani in January 2020, attitudes hardened, with a “Gulf diplomatic source” voicing (anonymously) a concern felt across the GCC that “Our most important ally, a world power who is here on the pretense of stabilizing the region, is destabilizing the region and taking all of us with them without a second thought.”55
ntagon wants an East Asian pivot
O’Brien, Connor. “The Pentagon wants money for China, but troops are stuck in the Middle East” Politico. February 8, 2020AB
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/02/08/pentagon-china-middle-east-112250
The administration’s National Defense Strategy, unveiled in 2018, places a priority on competition with Russia and China after nearly two decades of counterterrorism operations, largely in the Middle East and Afghanistan. The blueprint has proved popular on Capitol Hill, where both parties have called for adapting to meet new threats and pleas to wind down decades of war are gaining traction. But Democrats say they’re wary about the Pentagon's commitment to that strategy as tensions simmer over Soleimani’s killing, which prompted Iran to retaliate with a missile strike against bases in Iraq that house U.S. troops. "I don't think anything's changed since the National Defense Strategy was implemented that warrants us picking an extended fight with Iran,” House Armed Services Chairman Adam Smith (D-Wash.) said, adding that the president's actions are hurting the Pentagon’s ability to make the case for his budget. “And I think it does undermine those larger issues and is not in our best interests." “I do not know what this president will do next,” added Rep. Andy Kim (D-N.J.), a former National Security Council official. “I see no consistency in his actions, and he doesn't seem to be anchored in the security documents that his own administration has put forward.” Sen. Tammy Duckworth (D-Ill.) questioned the administration’s commitment to its stated strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. "I think we have taken our eye off the ball there," she said. “We say we're going to do it, but then we send more troops to Saudi Arabia, which doesn't help." Just weeks after rebuking Trump on Iran, House Democrats last month passed even more legislation to limit the president's military options in the Middle East. The looming spending crunch The Pentagon also faces growing competition for its dollars. The department is expected to fork over another $7.2 billion from its budget this year to help fund a wall on the U.S.-Mexico border, after the administration shifted $6.1 billion in military funds last year toward the effort. The $13.3 billion total, some lawmakers have noted, is enough to buy a Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft carrier. And the defense budget is set to flatten after several increases by Trump and Republican defense hawks. An independent commission recommended annual budget increases of 3 to 5 percent to carry out the National Defense Strategy. But a two-year budget deal struck by congressional leaders and the White House last summer essentially keeps the budget flat through fiscal 2021, the final year of mandatory caps on spending. Defense Secretary Mark Esper and other brass are increasingly predicting static budgets and emphasizing the need to find savings internally to reinvest in the programs crucial to carrying out the strategy. Walking and chewing gum The Pentagon acknowledged that it must find a way to both focus on the long-term goals of countering Russia and China, while continuing to deal with regional issues with countries such as North Korea and Iran. “The goal is that we need to shift our focus to the Indo-Pacific, we need to shift our resources and our eyes that way, but we got to do it while still engaging with the current threats and the current crises,” Pentagon spokesperson Jonathan Hoffman said at a briefing last month. “We’re going to be able to walk and chew gum at the same time.” The administration has so far escaped the choice between the National Defense Strategy and regional conflicts by adding money to the Pentagon’s budget so it can invest in the conflict in the Middle East and future capabilities to counter Russia and China. But a strict top line budget for the Pentagon in fiscal 2021 means that’s no longer possible, and services may have to pick one or the other. “I think the next budget is going to bring these issues to the fore because services will propose cutting force structure to invest in high tech programs aimed at great power conflict,” said Mark Cancian, who worked on Pentagon budget strategy at the Office of Management and Budget for seven years. “Those force structure cuts, like the Navy proposing to retire ships early or the Air Force proposing to retire aircraft, will cause the Congress to balk.” Some cuts coming Some of this has already begun to come true. A Navy memo to the Office of Management and Budget showed that the service wants to make cuts to the fleet, but the White House instead asked the Navy to stick with the administration’s plan to grow to 355 ships from 293 now. One way the Pentagon can keep pursuing both missions without increasing the budget is to get international partners to pick up some of the slack, Hoffman suggested. “Part of this is our efforts to get our allies and partners to increase their funding so we can maybe shift over to some different missions,” he said. Despite the perception problem, the immediate crisis with Iran is unlikely to affect the Pentagon’s fiscal 2021 budget request, planning for which was well underway before the Iran situation heated up in late December. Reaching the goals laid out by the National Defense Strategy requires investing in research and development for future technology such as hypersonic weapons and the procurement of advanced ships or planes, which can take years to bring into the force. “The money that’s going to deal with Russia and China is primarily research money … and procurement money,” said Dov Zakheim, who served as the Pentagon’s comptroller in George W. Bush’s administration. “That doesn’t really change because of this Iran crisis, because this is an immediate crisis, whereas procurement … could take … years.” By the time the new fiscal year begins on Oct. 1, the country may have moved past the current tensions with Iran. Zakheim added it’s more likely the Pentagon could ask for a supplemental budget request for fiscal 2020, something that would be required only if the president grows the military footprint in the Middle East considerably. Going back for more money But some experts predicted even the warfighting account for "overseas contingencies operations" won’t see massive growth. “Keep in mind that the operations against Libya in 2011 did not change the OCO budget, and those operations came in as something under $1 billion,” Cancian said. “With that as a precedent, what’s going on now wouldn’t push an administration to ask for more money. You would have to have a much higher level of activity before they go through the hassle and political price.” The gap between where the Trump administration wants to focus its attention and where the world is in turmoil is reminiscent of the Obama White House’s attempt to “pivot to the Pacific,” Cancian said. Shortly after the former president announced a renewed focus on the Pacific and China, Russia invaded the Crimean Peninsula in Ukraine and the Islamic State rose to power in the Middle East, forcing the White House to direct its focus and funding back to the Middle East and Europe. “The Trump administration is having some of that experience, that it wants to reorient on great power conflict and it’s being pulled back into regional conflicts,” Cancian said. “My argument is that it’s just not realistic to believe we can disengage from these kinds of conflicts and global commitments to focus on great power competition.” Never really leaving Defense hawks agree and are quick to note that, regardless of the Pentagon’s focus on Russia and China, the U.S will still need to remain involved in the Middle East. Ultimately, the National Defense Strategy is about making a priority of great power competition rather than abandoning the Middle East, said Rep. Mac Thornberry, the top Republican on the House Armed Services Committee.
US military is limited and declining in Indo-Pacific Region, China’s rising
Doherty, Ben. “US defence strategy in Indo-Pacific region faces 'unprecedented crisis'” The Guardian. August 18, 2019AB
https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/aug/19/us-defence-strategy-in-indo-pacific-region-faces-unprecedented-crisis
America’s military authority is waning and it is ill-prepared to go to war with China in the Indo-Pacific region, a new report from the United States Studies Centre has warned, arguing Australia must move towards a shared reliance on a network of allies, in particular Asian militaries such as Japan, for its security. The report, Averting Crisis, says America’s defence strategy in the Indo-Pacific region is in “the throes of an unprecedented crisis”, created by a mismatch between its ambition to remain the region’s dominant military power, and an overstretched armed force with falling and failing resources. “Faced with an increasingly contested regional security landscape and with limited defence resources at its disposal, the United States military is no longer assured of its ability to single-handedly uphold a favourable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific,” the report, by the US Studies Centre’s Ashley Townshend and Brendan Thomas-Noone, says. “China, by contrast, is growing ever more capable of challenging the regional order by force as a result of its large-scale investment in advanced military systems.” The US will remain influential – it still spends broadly as much on defence as the next eight largest national defence budgets combined – but its military has been overstretched by two decades of counter-insurgency wars in the Middle East, and faces continuing global commitments, ageing equipment, and training cuts. And while America wants to remain the dominant military power in the Indo-Pacific region, it faces growing deficits and rising public debt, as well as political resistance to continuing increases in military spending. The US has been forced to prioritise “the urgent over the important,” Townshend told the Guardian. “China, by contrast, doesn’t yet have global responsibilities, it has regional responsibilities.” Australia can no longer rely on the US alone for its security in the Indo-Pacific region, and should boost its “collective defence” networks, aggregating its military capabilities with those of allied nations such as Japan, the report says. Townshend says Australia should also look to increase co-operation with other militaries in the region, such as Vietnam, Malaysia and Singapore. “The US has said Asia is their priority, but they don’t behave like it is. A strategy of collective defence is fast becoming necessary as a way of offsetting shortfalls in America’s regional military power and holding the line against rising Chinese strength.” The report says Australia should also consider acquiring its own land-based anti-ship missiles – a move forecast in the 2016 defence white paper – and increase its stockpiles of munitions and fuel “required for high-end conflict”. US-China relations have deteriorated over the past year, ostensibly over trade, but the rhetoric over other points of tension – in particular Chinese militarisation in the South China Sea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan – has grown increasingly belligerent in recent months. Australia , a strategic ally of the US, has found itself consistently dragged into the dispute.
Security Commitments bad, leads to violent allies
Thrall, Trevor. “US Grand Strategy in the 21st Century: The Case For Restraint” Routledge Press. Feb 14, 2018AB
Trevor Thrall is associate professor at the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University and a senior fellow at the Cato Institute.
https://books.google.com/books?id=eO4rDwAAQBAJandpg=PT66andlpg=PT66anddq=22Today,+however,+the+risk+of+entrapment+born+of+moral+hazard+and+states27+search+for+security+is+larger+and+possibly+increasing22andsource=blandots=45SbD4tsFNandsig=ACfU3U3p36k5yKzG7su8rNc0qLXS3eUX2gandhl=enandsa=Xandved=2ahUKEwiroMuRy7XkAhWhNn0KHQXBCX8Q6AEwAHoECAAQAQ#v=onepageandq=22Today2C20however2C20the20risk20of20entrapment20born20of20moral20hazard20and20states'20search20for20security20is20larger20and20possibly20increasing22andf=false
The preceding discussion (summarized in Table 2.1) has large implications for the United States. During the Cold War, bipolarity constrained the importance of allies, limiting the risk of entrapment. Moreover, the prospect of nuclear war discouraged risky behavior by the superpowers and their allies. Today, however, the risk of entrapment born of moral hazard and states' search for security is larger and possibly increasing. As long as the US continues to make commitments overseas and fear the emergence of a peer competitor, American partners will be tempted to act in risky ways, expecting that Washington will feel compelled to come to their rescue should they get into trouble. Insofar as the United States opposes Chinese or Russian aggression, smaller states will be tempted to provoke China or Russia to garner growing American support. If the United States is opposed to the emergence of great power peer competitors, then it may well opt to come to the aid of smaller states threatened by those potential competitors. This also means that countries that have limited or no explicit security commitments from the United States may try to profit from the insurance policy offered by the United States by provoking conflicts and expecting the United States - whose interests are clear - to ride to their defense. In the next section, we take a preliminary look at some evidence to test these claims. We focus on events in East and Southeast Asia over the last few years. Some have characterized Chinese aggression in recent years as reactionary. That is, China has felt compelled to respond to perceived provocations from smaller Asian nations such as the Philippines and Vietnam.
Any increase in East Asian militarization will spark a cycle, risks war
Partner, Simon. “It’s time to demilitarize East Asia” The Hill. September 23, 2017AB
https://thehill.com/opinion/international/352035-its-time-to-demilitarize-east-asia
The current instability in East Asia is the product of unresolved Cold War tensions. The U.S. maintains enormous military garrisons in Japan and South Korea despite the putative end of the Cold War. A “pacifist” Japan continues to depend on the U.S. for its security in the face of Chinese military expansion and threats. Both China and North Korea respond to the perceived threat from the U.S. presence with massive new weapons programs. The U.S. responds, in turn, with increased military commitments. And so the cycle continues. If the goal of increased militarization is enhanced security, it is not working. Indeed, the danger of a catastrophic confrontation in East Asia is higher than at any time since the Korean War.
Arms race increase the chance of war by 5 times, disputes 2 times
Gilber, Douglas. “Taking Arms against a Sea of Troubles: Conventional Arms Races during Periods of Rivalry” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 42, No. 2 (Mar., 2005)AB
https://www.jstor.org/stable/30042270?seq=1 (https://sci-hub.tw/https://www.jstor.org/stable/30042270)
In addition to escalation, arms races seem to have an important substantive impact on the likelihood of conflict, especially in comparison with the other variables in our models. For example, as Table II shows, the chance of a MID for strategic rivals more than doubles, from 16 on average to 35 during an arms race year, and the chance of war changes raises 5 times from 1 in 100 to 1 in 20 during arms race years.
Sparks hardliner views in BOTH countries, continued containment causes nuclear war
Elbaum, Max. “Climate Change. War. Poverty. How the U.S.-China Relationship Will Shape Humanity’s Path” Portside. April 4, 2019AB
Max Elbaum is author of Revolution in the Air, recently reissued by Verso Books, and an editor of Organizing Upgrade
https://portside.org/2019-04-04/climate-change-war-poverty-how-us-china-relationship-will-shape-humanitys-path
Dangers and prospects To say all this is dangerous is an understatement. The costs of a ramped-up trade war would fall hardest on the working classes in both U.S. and China—and if it leads to a global downturn, on workers and the poor across the globe. Calls to “get tough on China” are, at bottom, ways of shifting blame for people's economic woes away from the U.S. corporate elite. As Tobita Chow explained in July for In These Times, they tap into and reinforce the anti-Chinese racism long present in U.S. politics and marginalize even the idea of solidarity between workers in both countries. And the multi-front Cold War described by Michael Klare means constant tension, with the very real danger that an initially small flashpoint conflict could escalate into full-scale, even nuclear, war. Short of short open conflict, constant tension between Washington and Beijing increases the influence of nationalism, militarism and authoritarianism in both countries, which almost inevitably translates into increases in domestic repression of popular movements, as well as austerity. What does all this mean for the left? There are important debates on the nature of China's social system and the impact of its geopolitical and global economic strategies. But regardless of one's position in those debates, the U.S. left has a critical role to play in galvanizing opposition to the growing clamor for confrontation in U.S.-China relations. We can do this. But we need a vision and practice that speaks to both humanity's common interest in sheer survival and the global working class' interest in a just and non-exploitative society. We should prioritize the fight for a 180-degree turnaround in the U.S. stance toward China, demanding that diplomacy and negotiation replace trade wars and military encirclement. We should call for a switch from the goal of “containing China” to the goal of forging a U.S. China partnership that would take common action against climate change and support a global campaign to address extreme poverty worldwide. This China-focused effort would be one component of a campaign to de-escalate all global conflicts, and turn to diplomacy over military force. Such a campaign should push the U.S. government to abandon pursuit of hegemony in favor or acceptance of the fact that we all live in a multi-polar world where, as Martin Luther King declared in 1983, “We must learn to live together as brothers sic or perish together as fools.” Making progress on this front will be a challenge, not least because of the barrage of punditry and dominant media framing about China, which focuses exclusively on (often legitimate) grievances and problems—and presents a one-sided picture of a complex society.
Fear of containment leads to hardliners
Zhang, Feng. “The Fight Inside China Over the South China Sea”. Foreign Policy. June 23, 2016AB
https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/23/the-fight-inside-china-over-the-south-china-sea-beijing-divided-three-camps/
The rest of China is debating what China’s strategy toward the South China Sea should be. This is an important fact. It suggests that China’s South China Sea policy has not hardened yet, and is thus malleable. The international community — especially the United States and ASEAN — should create favorable conditions for shaping China’s policy toward a more conciliatory and cooperative direction. In particular, they should help raise the importance of the moderates in Chinese decision-making, turning them from a minority view to a majority consensus. The unfortunate effect of some of the rhetoric from U.S. officials about Chinese “hegemony” in East Asia is to confirm the hardliners’ view that the United States wants to contain China, thus undermining the moderates’ position within China’s domestic debate. Among the three schools discussed above, only hardliners unequivocally seek some sort of military hegemony. If American officials take this view as China’s national policy, they will simply talk past their more moderate Chinese interlocutors, creating a potentially dangerous communication gap between the two sides.
Military Hegemony is unstable with China, sparks arms race
Swaine, Michael. “The Real Challenge in the Pacific” Foreign Affairs. April 20, 2015AB
Senior Associate in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2015-04-20/real-challenge-pacific
For analysts such as Krepinevich, it is axiomatic that rising powers such as China seek hard power dominance and that the central challenge for currently dominant powers such as the United States is how to prevent them from doing so. This sort of zero-sum thinking—which is increasingly common on both sides of the Pacific—polarizes the region and undermines the goals of continued peace and prosperity toward which all strive. Both sides would benefit from a different approach, one that moved from a growing contest over U.S. predominance in the region to a genuine, long-term balance of power in the western Pacific resting on mutual military and political restraint and accommodation, as well as new policy initiatives designed to reduce the volatility of flash points such as the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan. Virtually all U.S. officials and many Asian leaders believe that American military predominance in the maritime realm has provided the foundation for a 70-year period of relative peace and prosperity throughout most of the Asia-Pacific region, forestalling arms races and militarized disputes and permitting a sustained focus on peaceful economic development. Many Chinese, however, believe that in an increasingly multipolar and interdependent world, order and prosperity should rely on a roughly equal balance of power, both globally and among the region’s major nations, which should cooperate in managing common challenges, working whenever possible through international institutions such as the United Nations. To some extent, these views are self-serving. Washington benefits enormously from a U.S.-led international order in which its views and preferences are given special consideration, and Beijing would benefit from a more equal balance of power, which would give it a greater voice and check the United States. But elites in each country also genuinely think that their position accurately reflects the current and future reality of the international system. Americans generally believe that peace and stability flourish under American hegemony, which can and should be preserved, and their Chinese counterparts generally believe that such hegemony is an unfortunate historical anomaly that should give way to a more balanced distribution of power—and that it is doing so already. For most of the postwar era, these perspectives coexisted relatively easily, primarily because Beijing was too weak to push its own view and was able to rise steadily within the U.S.-sponsored order. But times have changed; China has outgrown its subordinate status and now feels strong enough to press its case in the western Pacific. This development should not be surprising to anyone who understands modern Chinese history and great-power transitions. Beijing has an ongoing incentive to work with Washington and the West to sustain continued economic growth and to address a growing array of common global and regional concerns, from pandemics to climate change to terrorism. At the same time, it understandably wishes to reduce its vulnerability to potential future threats from the United States and other nations while increasing its overall influence along its strategically important maritime periphery. As its overseas power and influence grow, its foreign interests expand, and its domestic nationalist backers become more assertive, Beijing will naturally become less willing to accept unconditionally military, political, and economic relationships and structures that it believes disproportionately and unjustly favor Western powers. And it will increasingly worry that Washington might resort to pressure or force to try to undermine Chinese security moves in the western Pacific and head off the United States’ impending relative decline. Many Chinese observers now believe that Beijing’s past weakness and its need to cooperate with the United States and the West in general have made it too accommodating or passive in dealing with perceived challenges ?to China’s vital national interests, from U.S. support for Taiwan and Asian disputants over maritime claims to close-up U.S. surveillance and other intelligence-gathering activities along the Chinese coast. The more extreme variants of this nationalist viewpoint threaten to transform China’s long-standing “peaceful development” policy, which focuses on the maintenance of amicable relations with the United States and other powers, into a more hard-edged approach aimed at more actively undermining U.S. influence in Asia. The so-called bottom-line concept of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s foreign policy is an apparent step in this direction, stressing in an unprecedented manner the need for China to stand resolute in managing territorial and sovereignty issues in the East China and South China Seas. Observing these stirrings, meanwhile, many American and other foreign observers see the beginnings of a larger effort to eject the United States from Asia and eventually replace it as the regional, and possibly even global, superpower. China’s greater assertiveness regarding maritime territorial disputes and U.S. and Japanese intelligence and surveillance activities along its coastline are interpreted as tests of U.S. and allied resolve, a prelude to the creation of no-go zones essential for the establishment of Chinese control over the western Pacific. In this view, the proper course of action for Washington is to decisively disabuse Beijing of its aspirations by enhancing U.S. predominance, increasing Chinese vulnerability in the western Pacific, and making clear who is boss, right up to China’s 12-nautical-mile territorial waters. The problem with this outlook—implicit in the concept of Archipelagic Defense that Krepinevich proposes—is that it misdiagnoses China’s motivations and thus exacerbates, rather than mitigates, the underlying problem. Beijing’s de facto attempts to limit or end U.S. predominance along its maritime periphery are motivated by uncertainty, insecurity, and opportunism rather than a grand strategic vision of Chinese predominance. Chinese leaders today are not trying to carve out an exclusionary sphere of influence, especially in hard-power terms; they are trying to reduce their considerable vulnerability and increase their political, diplomatic, and economic leverage in their own backyard. This is a much less ambitious and in many ways more understandable goal for a continental great power. It does not necessarily threaten vital U.S. or allied interests, and it can and should be met with understanding rather than defensive aggressiveness. Continued U.S. predominance in the western Pacific cannot be justified by the need to resist a Chinese drive to replace it, nor is it necessary in order to ensure regional (and global) order. It is inconceivable that Beijing will accept U.S. predominance in perpetuity and that it will grant the United States complete freedom of action in the Pacific and recognize its ability to prevail militarily in a potential conflict. Trying to sustain such predominance, therefore, is actually the quickest route to instability, practically guaranteeing an arms race, increased regional polarization, and reduced cooperation between Washington and Beijing on common global challenges. And even if some Chinese leaders were tempted to accept continued U.S. predominance, they would almost certainly end up meeting fierce and sustained domestic criticism for doing so as China’s power grows and would likely end ?up reversing course to ensure their political survival. Trying to sustain American military predominance in the region, meanwhile, will become increasingly difficult and expensive. A recent study by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (which I co-authored) on the long-term security environment in Asia concluded that the United States will remain the strongest military power on a global level for many years to come. But this study also found that Washington will almost certainly confront increasingly severe economically induced limitations on its defense spending that will constrain its efforts to keep well ahead of a growing Chinese military and paramilitary presence within approximately 1,500 nautical miles of the Chinese coastline (that is, the area covered by the so-called first and second island chains). The barriers to maritime predominance, however, apply to China as well as the United States. The Carnegie Endowment study also concluded that U.S. military power in Asia will almost certainly remain very strong and that even increased Chinese regional military capabilities will not offer Beijing unambiguous superiority. Any Chinese attempt to establish predominance in Asia would fail, therefore, both because it would be difficult for China to surpass the United States and because a scenario of this kind would frighten bystanders and drive them into Washington’s arms. Chinese leaders understand this and so are highly unlikely to seek predominance if they feel that they can achieve a decent amount of security in less confrontational ways. They are likely to seek some form of predominance (as opposed to acting merely opportunistically and in a more limited manner) only if Washington’s words and actions convince them that even the minimal level of security they seek requires it. Unfortunately, the United States’ adoption of aggressive military concepts—such as Air-Sea Battle, Offshore Control, or even Archipelagic Defense—would deny them such security and thus contribute to an ever-worsening security dilemma. | 904,714 |
365,512 | 379,612 | 1 - SepOct Leverage | University of Pennsylvania, 4-30-2019, "China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Why the Price Is Too High," Knowledge@Wharton, https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/chinas-belt-and-road-initiativewhy-the-price-is-too-high/, accessed 7-14-2019//BH
“BRI lending by major Chinesebanks has dropped by 89 since 2015, and lending by commercial banks — who are dealing with their own financial issues domestically — has ceased almost entirely,” according to a report last August by The Jamestown Foundation. “Policy banks have also scaled back, despite their status as arms of government policy.”
Minxin Pei, 2-15-2019, Nikkei Asian Review, "Will China let Belt and Road die quietly?," https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Will-China-let-Belt-and-Road-die-quietly, accessed 7-14-2019//BH But the world has changed in the last five years.
China's economic slowdown has triggered a capital flight, draining more than $1 trillion from its foreign exchange reserves. If we factor in the trade war's impact on Chinese balance of payments in the future, China will unlikely generate sufficient foreign exchange surpluses to finance BRI on the same scale. The tariffs imposed by the U.S. and the uncertainty about U.S.-China commercial relations will significantly reduce Chinese exports to the U.S. and, to a lesser extent, other developed markets.
Nyshka Chandran, 19 Nyshka Chandran, (). “Fears of excessive debt drive more countries to cut down their Belt and Road investments.” CNBC, 01-17-19, 9-26-2019. https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/18/countries-are-reducing-belt-and-road-investments-over-financing-fears.html // MHS SG
Private investment remains limited and even with capital from international institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the BRI faces a funding gap of up to $500 billion a year, Wang Yiming, deputy head of the Development Research Centre of China’s State Council, said in April.
The EU has leverage now
March 9, 16 March 9, (). "Leveraging Europe’s International Economic Power." German Marshall Fund of the United States, 3-9-2016, 9-10-2019. http://www.gmfus.org/publications/leveraging-europes-international-economic-power // MHS SG
In recent years, the linkages between economic and foreign policy have become more apparent, whether through increased awareness of the external dimension of the EU’s internal policies, or of the internal dimension of the EU’s external policies. In this interaction, long-standing dilemmas disrupt the EU’s ability to project itself as a single foreign policy power. Should there be a coordinated approach to commercial and investment opportunities between member states, or should their “natural” competition to gain market shares persist? 4 If the EU remains the world’s wealthiest and most integrated economic block — as consistently advocated by the European Commission — and if Europe’s capacity to project civilian power globally, including the tools of its economic and social prosperity, remains unmatched, then assumptions regarding a European decline are misplaced. In a holistic approach — or “multidimensional” according to Andrew Moravcsik — the EU is well positioned to exercise the appropriate leverage it needs to meet its foreign policy goals through the use of its economic power. 5 This would be in line with the growing necessity for the EU to think more strategically about the means and measures of its economic security. Another example can be found in the normative power of trade, and the use of trade and investment agreements to set global rules and standards. Through the successful conclusion of a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the EU and the United States would openly state their ambition to continue being rules-setters, as opposed to being rules-takers. Yet this relative hegemony through trade requires an examination from the eyes of third countries worried about the imposition of a transatlantic agenda. Approaching TTIP through the lens of geopolitics, and not just economics, is therefore essential.
The impact of this according to the
Melanie Hart and Kelly Magsamen, 19 Melanie Hart and Kelly Magsamen, (). "Limit, Leverage, and Compete: A New Strategy on China." Center for American Progress, 4-3-2019, 9-11-2019. https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2019/04/03/468136/limit-leverage-compete-new-strategy-china/ // MHS SG
While the United States should not be naïve to the potential strategic impact of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, it should not repeat the mistake it made with the AIIB. Beijing claims the Belt and Road Initiative primarily seeks to support cross-regional development and connectivity. Those are shared regional and global objectives that the United States and other nations can use to hold Beijing accountable to its Belt and Road Initiative promises. While there are legitimate concerns that China will ultimately use this emerging economic and commercial backbone to project security and political influence, the U.S. should focus on addressing specific problems rather than seeking to block the initiative as a whole. The United States can leverage the positive aspects of China’s Belt and Road Initiative and simultaneously dilute and counter some of the negative impacts | 904,694 |
365,513 | 380,054 | 0 - Whats Next - Ian | Hi everyone,
I realize that my partner and I are not very well known in the PF circuit and trolled a little bit at the prestigious Peach State Classic Debate Tournament located at Carrollton High School in Carrollton, Georgia. I wanna thank everyone who debated us and did their best even if we debated like the policy and LD debaters that we are. Neither of us are sure if we're going to be debating in PF anymore.
I have a very strange relationship with debate and I want to thank everyone for being a part of it. I'm still grateful that we were able to get a silver bid. Maybe we'll actually prep next time. Gold bid incoming. The framing issue for the round is anthropocentrism. OCOs are the root cause of all conflict in the Middle East. Penguins solve every impact in the round. Quack.
====Penguins are OCOs====
Yang in 2019
Penguins are great
AND
They are OCOs
National PF circuit watch out. We're coming. Maybe. | 905,274 |
365,514 | 380,155 | 0 - disclosure | A Interpretation: On the January 2020 Public Forum topic at the Plastic Tournament of Champions, debaters must disclose previously-read positions on the National Debate Coaches Association Public Forum wiki. The disclosure must be under their own school, team name, and correct side and must happen at least 30 minutes before the round and must include the author name, taglines, a hyperlink to the evidence, and full-text of all parts of the evidence they cite in context.
B Violation: Nothing is on your wiki – you don’t even have any place to disclose your cases – screenshots prove
C Standards
First is inclusionary practices. Disclosure makes debate more accessible and inclusionary. Three internal links
a) Research. Disclosure forces large schools to put their prep and evidence on the wiki. They have the best evidence because the have prep servants who find it.
b) Paywall. Big schools can afford to get past paywalls while small, poorer teams can't. Linking evidence through paywalls allows everyone to have the same evidence.
c) Prepouts. Small schools don't have the scouting or team size to prep out other teams at the tournament. This levels the playing field as small schools can now prepout big ones.
Inclusion links to education, debaters who are pushed out of the space don’t get education
Second is clash. Disclosure betters clash - 2 internal links
A) Blocking out. Disclosure allows for all arguments to be blocked out by other teams, thus using the best responses to test the truth of the argument.
B) Nuance. Disclosure allows for nuanced arguments to be engaged with with specific arguments instead of bad general responses that do not apply.
1) Case Level: Disclosure streamlines research. The wiki provides a public body of knowledge that everyone can contribute to and build off of and motivates research Nuance.
2) Rebuttal Level: Debates are able to develop research that refutes more direct points giving both sides a chance to fully understand the other team’s argument. This research in itself creates broader and more contextualized education for debaters.
Clash links to education, because testing the truth of arguments is the entire reason we debate, and without clash this education lessens.
Third is research. Disclosure posts cases which allows for in depth research. Two internal links
a) Disclosure incentivizes research into deeper forms of debate. Things like author qualifications and uncommon arguments go researched when they are available.
b) When your case gets posted on the wiki you know people will have responses. This incentivizes researching flaws with blocks and frontlines. Disclosure creates incentives to write more arguments to read. This encourages teams to dive into less common arguments and creates a pedagogical value in exploring less common arguments.
More research betters education because you engage with the literature more and become more knowledgeable about the topic area.
Fourth is evidence ethics. Disclosure improves evidence ethics. Two internal links
a) As evidence is posted teams can check it before the round and indict bad evidence in the round. This also checks the incentive for teams to have bad ethics.
b) Disclosure spreads the best and most true evidence around the circuit.
Evidence ethics link to fairness because if one side is reading untrue evidence they can justify claims that are false which leaves us at an unfair advantage. We can make less arguments because we read true evidence and they don't. It's not reciprocal.
D Voters— Fairness is a voter—debate is a competitive activity that requires objective evaluation. Education is a voter—it’s intrinsic to debate. Debate helps us facilitate intelligible discourse on current issues. Drop the debater—the abuse has already occurred and my time allocation has shifted—also the shell indicts anything you do.
1. Competing interps:
A. Competing Interps are about setting a best norm so you have to justify why not disclosing is a better norm.
B. Reasonability is also extremely arbitrary and thus begs judge intervention.
2. No RVIs on Theory
A. They incentivize debaters to go all in in theory and bait it with abusive practices, killing substantive clash on other flows.
B. They can run theory on me too if I’m unfair so theory is reciprocal because we’re both able to check abuse
C. Illogical: being fair isn’t a reason you should win, it’s a burden for both sides. | 905,454 |
365,515 | 379,499 | 0 - Disclosure Interps | TLDR; disclose in cite boxes with first and last couple words, open source with round reports, don't put 'analytic', and don't be sketchy pre-round
Interpretation: For each position on their corresponding 2019-20 NDCA PF wiki page, debaters must disclose a summary of each analytic argument in their cases.
Interpretation: Debaters must disclose all possible disclosure theory interps on the 2019-20 NDCA PF wiki at least 30 minutes before the round.
Interpretation: Debaters must disclose round reports on the 2019-20 NDCA PF wiki for every round they have debated this season. Round reports disclose which positions (AC, NC, K, T, Theory, etc.) were read/gone for in every speech.
Interpretation: If debaters disclose full text, they must not post the full text of the cards in the cite box, but must upload an open source document with the full text of their cards.
Interpretation: The affirmative must, upon flipping for sides, tell the negative what specific affirmative position they will be reading, within ten minutes of flipping for sides.
Interpretation: The affirmative must, upon the release of tournament pairings, tell the negative what specific affirmative position they will be reading, within ten minutes.
Interpretation: Debaters, on their corresponding NDCA PF wiki page, must disclose their contact information. To clarify, this can be an email address, Facebook, number, etc.
Interp: Debates must disclose each full tag line for cards disclosed on the NDCA PF wiki. | 904,584 |
365,516 | 379,506 | Contact info | Hi I'm vikas, we kinda suck at debate. DM me on facebook if you want to talk avt anything(cw or whatever)
I am done with Spanish Duolingo and have tested out of it and am 5/8 fluent in Spanish.
my fav smash bros character is kirby | 904,592 |
365,517 | 379,509 | FW - Death Good | Suffering and Joy gives meaning to moral actions making it the basis of all other ethical systems
Ariansen 98 Per Ariansen (University of Oslo, Department of Philosophy). “Anthropocentrism with a human face.” Ecological Economics 24 (1998) 153–162 AJ
Suspending for a ... projects of rationalization.
Death is good as it is the best internal link into eliminating suffering - multiple warrants
Hedonic treadmill theory shows material changes to our life do not effect our level of suffering - we always become adjusted to our condition and return to a baseline.
Michaela Keilty 17 , Dynamic Marketings, "Why We're Never Satisfied | The Hedonic Treadmill —", 2017, https://www.dynamicmarketingsd.com/blog/2017/3/15/why-were-never-satisfied-the-hedonic-treadmill
There is a ... be searching for more.
Hedonic Treadmill theory is empirically proven
Pennock 20 Seph Fontane Pennock, Positive Psychology , "The Hedonic Treadmill - Are We Forever Chasing Rainbows?", 29 05 2020, https://positivepsychology.com/hedonic-treadmill/
Along with Brickman ... doomed to unhappiness.
The treadmill’s set point will ALWAYS be negative because we are evolutionarily coded to be discontent - if humans found lasting happiness they would not seek out things like sex or food.
Euba 19 Rafael Euba, NeuroScienceNews.com , "Humans aren’t designed to be happy - Neuroscience News", July 19 2019, https://neurosciencenews.com/human-happiness-14525/
A huge happiness ... during difficult times.
The implication of our reading of hedonic treadmill theory is that humans will spend most of their life in a state of suffering due to having unfulfilled desires - means death reduces suffering
Any amount of pain makes life not worth living because of the asymmetry between pleasure and pain - graph in the doc
(1) Presence of pain (Bad)
(3) Absence of pain (Good)
(2) Presence of pleasure (Good)
(4) Absence of pleasure (Not bad)
Kolbert 12 Elizabeth Kolbert, The New Yorker, "The Case Against Kids | The New Yorker", April 2 2012, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/04/09/the-case-against-kids
Benatar’s case rests ... all,” Benatar writes.
Humans have an optimism bias - you should be skeptical of appeals to common sense or intuition to prove death is bad.
Benatar 15
David Benatar (Professor, University of Cape Town). “We Are Creatures That Should Not Exist.” The Critique. 15 July 2015. JDN. http://www.thecritique.com/articles/we-are-creatures-that-should-not-exist-the-theory-of-anti-natalism/
Anti-natalism is ... a raw deal.” 10 | 904,595 |
365,518 | 379,529 | UBI - DA - Inflation | UBI causes hyperinflation – forces an increase in wages and prices, causing a vicious cycle of economic downturn.
Kolokotronis et al 17 (Alexander Kolokotronis is a Ph.D. student in political science at Yale University. He is the founder of Student Organization for Democratic Alternatives, and formerly the Student Coordinator of NYC Network of Worker Cooperatives and Worker Cooperative Development Assistant at Make the Road New York. Sam Nakayama is an independent writer based in Torrance, California) http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/40022-why-socialist-job-guarantees-are-better-than-universal-basic-income///NG
Economist Pavlina Tcherneva ... in declining output.
That collapses the US economy
Moreira 17 (Fabrizio, Contributor, 2-14-2017, "Hyperinflation In The US," HuffPost, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/hyperinflation-in-the-us-a-real-or-imagined-threat_us_58a31b10e4b0e172783aa0d7~-~-~-~~-~-NG)
Hyperinflation is simply ... in the world.
Economic collapse causes war which goes nuclear - multiple warrants
Harris and Burrows 9 (Counselor in the National Intelligence Council, the principal drafter of Global Trends 2025, **member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis”, Washington Quarterly, http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr_burrows.pdf)
Increased Potential for ... eat-dog world. | 904,608 |
365,519 | 379,514 | Theory Interps | Consider this a we meet to your dumb "check theory interps before the round" cites.
Interp: the aff/ must specify:
1. The most likely funding source for a UBI
2. The most likely benefit amount for the UBI they advocate, either as a unit or method of calculation
3. The programs they consider “means tested” and eliminate
In the 1ac.
Interp: debaters must use direct quotes when introducing evidence for the first time rather than paraphrasing
Interp: Debaters must disclose all previously read cases on the PF wiki that corresponds to their tabroom entry in open source format as soon as possible after every round - they don’t
Interp: Debaters must send all cards and prewritten analytics that they read in a doc before each speech | 904,598 |
365,520 | 379,513 | UBI - ADV - Climate Change | check osource | 904,597 |
365,521 | 379,543 | Petrocaribe | PetroCaribe was an oil alliance meant to save Latin America and the Caribbean, but the program is currently out of business. Beaubien 19 of NPR explains that PetroCaribe was an energy alliance started by former Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez that was meant to spur economic growth in Latin America, where Venezuela would sell subsidized oil to other nations in Latin America and the Caribbean at half the cost, with the rest repaid by these nations at a later date incrementally. Unfortunately, sanctions have single-handedly destroyed this program. Beaubien 19 of NPR furthers that due to US sanctions, payments for oil can not be routed back to Venezuela as banks do not want to facilitate the transfer in fear of US sanctions, causing fuel shipments under PetroCaribe to come to a halt. Moreover, Charles 19 of the Miami Herald explains that since these nations have to pay Venezuela dollars in advance for the oil supplied under the program, sanctions have prevented them from doing so as banks will not facilitate the transfer, with one recent example being Jamaica. The impact is decreasing mortality. Unfortunately, the PetroCaribe program was a lifeline for Latin American and Caribbean nations, as it helped spur development and combat poverty. The FAO 19 finds that PetroCaribe decreased malnourishment rates by 50 in the region, which has improved the quality of life for more than 32 million people in the region. Montanez 17 quantifies that malnourishment has killed 43 million people in Latin America in 2016 alone. Fortunately removing sanctions would allow for the renewal of PetroCaribe, as it is a mutually beneficial agreement with Venezuela being able to sell oil quickly and other nations reaping the benefits of cheaper oil. Moreover, Maduro will continue this program as Parraga 14 of Reuters finds that the alliance was initially set up to build alliances in South America and the Caribbean, helping Venezuela’s standing in the region. | 904,624 |
365,522 | 379,540 | maduro and giorgio frolick on da beach | Welcome to the sanction state – the American restriction of Venezuelan economic engagement is a weaponized move to condemn the Maduro regime through a form of exceptionalized politics wherein the United States can take extrajudicial measures to super-cede constructed threats in Global South
Prashad 20 Vijay Prashad, Paola Estrada, Ana Moldanado, and Zoe PC, Globetrotter, part of the Independent Media Institute, March 26, 2020; https://mronline.org/2020/03/26/as-the-world-tackles-the-covid-19-pandemic-the-u-s-raises-the-pressure-on-venezuela/
In a press conference on March 26, it was almost comical how little evidence the U.S. Department of Justice provided when it accused Venezuela's President Nicol?°s Maduro and several of the leaders of his government of narco-trafficking. The U.S. offered $15 million for the arrest of Maduro and $10 million for the others. Maduro, U.S. Attorney Geoffrey Berman said dramatically, "very deliberately deployed cocaine as a weapon." Evidence for this? Not presented at all. It is surreal that the United States-during the COVID-19 global pandemic-chooses to put its efforts into this ridiculous, evidence-free indictment against Maduro and other members of the government. There is better use for the money put up as a reward in the overstretched hospital in Elmhurst in New York City. Already, there is pressure on the United States to cut the sanctions not only against Venezuela but also against Iran (even the New York Times came out on March 25 to call for an end to sanctions on Iran). The World Health Organization has made it clear that this is just not the time to hamper the ability of countries to get precious supplies in to tackle the pandemic. UN Secretary-General Ant??nio Guterres has called for a ceasefire in conflicts; it is only a matter of days before he was expected to make a statement about sanctions. Now, out of desperation, the U.S. has tried to change the conversation-no longer about COVID-19 and sanctions but about narco-terrorism. When asked about these indictments during the COVID-19 pandemic, U.S. Attorney General William Barr tried to say that the fault lay not in Washington but in Caracas. He said, absent any evidence, that Venezuela is blocking aid from coming into the country. Nothing could be further from the truth, since Venezuela has welcomed medical supplies and medical personnel from China, Cuba, and Russia, as well as from the World Health Organization. In fact, the World Health Organization has pressed the U.S. to allow it more free rein to bring goods into the country-a request that the U.S. has not allowed (the U.S. also has made it difficult for the World Health Organization to get medical supplies into Iran). When Venezuela went to the International Monetary Fund with a request for $5 billion for COVID-19 related purchases, it was the United States government that put pressure on the Fund to deny the request. Barr can so easily say the very opposite of truth because none of the media outlets at the press conference would challenge him based on matters that are clearly in the public record. Regime Change In 1989, the U.S. used the accusation of narco-trafficking, specifically cocaine trafficking, to taint the reputation of its former asset, the president of Panama Manuel Noriega. It was based on this accusation and an indictment in Florida, that the U.S. eventually invaded the country, seized Noriega, planted Washington's puppet in Panama City, and threw Noriega into a Florida prison. The shadow of how the U.S. dealt with Noriega hangs over Caracas: will the U.S. launch an expeditionary raid based on this new indictment? This is not a theoretical question. The U.S. has tried since at least January 2019 to destabilize and overthrow the government of Nicol?°s Maduro. What this indictment does is to merely try to tighten the screw. The bounty on the heads of Maduro and his leadership suggests that the U.S. government has essentially put a mafia-type hit out on these Venezuelans. This is a very dangerous move by the United States. It essentially gives gangsters a green light to attempt assassination inside Venezuela. The refusal to allow Maduro to travel outside Venezuela is a violation of a series of international conventions that promote diplomacy over belligerence. But, given the lawless way that the U.S. has formulated its regime change strategy against Venezuela, it is unlikely that anyone is going to criticize this move. A few hours before the announcement in Washington, word began to spread that the United States was going to place Venezuela's government on the "state sponsor of terrorism" list-the very highest condemnation of a government. But they had to pause. And the pause itself came for absurd reasons. If the U.S. government accused the government of Maduro of being a "state sponsor of terrorism," then it would be tacitly acknowledging that the Maduro government was indeed the government of Venezuela. Since last year, one of the attempts at destabilization had been to deny that Maduro's government was the legitimate government of Venezuela, indeed, to deny that it was any kind of government. It would be impossible to say that the Maduro government was a "state sponsor of terrorism" without acknowledging that it is the government of Venezuela. So, the U.S. had to stay its hand, caught out by its own logic. Meanwhile, the U.S. government does not dare take action against its allies in the key drug-producing and trafficking countries of Colombia and Honduras. Former Colombian president and current Senate member ?Ålvaro Uribe V?©lez is currently implicated in more than 270 legal cases in Colombia with charges including illegal wiretapping, organized crime, selective assassinations, and forced disappearances. Uribe and members of his family have proven links with the paramilitary group Metro Block of Antioquia, which was responsible for thousands of assassinations of Colombian civilians and was deeply involved in the narco-trafficking. Uribe and his prot?©g?© Iv?°n Duque have a close relationship with the U.S. government and have been the cornerstone and ally of diverse plans to attack Venezuela. Current Honduran President Juan Orlando Hern?°ndez was implicated in the case brought by a New York federal court against his brother Antonio Hern?°ndez, and prosecutors alleged that the president had received $25,000 in bribes from drug traffickers that were used for his 2013 presidential campaign. The statement released by the U.S. Department of Justice reads like a thriller, and the lack of evidence lends it to comparison with fiction. It lists names and accusations, makes constant references to "narco-terrorism," and claims that the Venezuelan government wants to "flood" the United States with cocaine. It would take a superhuman effort of blindness to believe this baseless ranting and raving. But the problem is that the people of Venezuela must take this seriously, since it is a deepening of the belligerence of the United States government. The people of Venezuela are aware of a Panama-type situation. It's hard to blame them. This is the track record of the United States government. The UN secretary-general's comment that ceasefires are the call of the hour given the global pandemic should apply to the United States' hybrid war against Venezuela. It needs to stop now. This is the time of healing and compassion, not the time of toxic masculinity and warfare.
•
This constant state of emergency cyclically reifies the state of exception
David Giordanengo, June 21, 2016; “The State of Exception”; https://www.e-ir.info/2016/06/21/the-state-of-exception////vishfish
Bringing the state of emergency into force in the country, in fact, gives full powers to the President of the Republic, enhances the authority of the police forces, prohibits mass gatherings and demonstrations and, most crucially, allows that suspects be arrested and detained without any formal charge, similarly to the condition of the prisoners in Guantanamo. The arrest without a clear accusation is manifestly contrary to the principle of habeas corpus, and thus the theme of natural and political life, of the indistinction between bios and zoe reappears. In such a situation, there is no difference between citizens and immigrants, a fact which is stressed by the debate currently being held in the French National Assembly over depriving people convicted for terrorism of their French citizenship, an action that would literally reduce such individuals to a condition of “bare life”.
States of exception are utilized by the state to place certain groups into indefinite states of being that render them legally dead reading green
Ran and Peixoto 2007 Marcia Ran, Institute of Social Medicine at the University of the State of Rio de Janeiro, and Carlos Peixoto Junior, Post Graduate Psychological Clinic, Pontifica Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, June 4, 2007; “Vulnerability and bare life: bioethics and biopolitics today”; ///vishfish
For Agamben, the state of exception is the device through which the law forms part of life. The main reference to this paradoxical phenomenon is the possibility, invoked by modern totalitarianism, of starting a "legal civil war",5 in which the Nazi State was the biggest example. Through the "Decree for the protection of the people and State", proclaimed in February 1933, Hitler suspended the articles of the Weimar constitution, thereby enabling the elimination of the lives of not only political adversaries but also entire categories of citizens. Since that time, the creation of a permanent state of emergency has become one of the political practices of contemporaneous "democratic" states (Agamben,2 2004 p.13). This practice of the state of exception has made it possible to annul the individual's legal statute, thus creating a legally nameless being. One of the best contemporary examples of this situation is the "indefinite detention" of the Taliban captured in Afghanistan, proclaimed by George Bush. These people are considered to be neither prisoners nor under accusation: they are "detained" and are subject to "pure sovereignty in reality" and deprived of any possibility of exercising their citizen's rights. Partially adopting Agamben's hypotheses, Judith Butler9 analyzed the precarious condition of the detainees at Guantánamo, and showed that they are exactly in the "indeterminate zone" mentioned earlier. The detainees are subject only to the decree proclaimed by the Department of Defense of the United States government, on March 21, 2002. This, in the name of a security alert, suspended the national and international laws. These individuals, described as "potential terrorists", remain in a state of eternal detention without the right to any judgment. To go into the topic more deeply, Butler resorted to the same argument as proposed by Agamben. In this, taking Foucault's hypotheses as the reference, sovereignty and biopolitics are perhaps not mutually exclusive regimes. On the contrary, biopolitics exercised by governmentality would allow administration of regulations to be established bureaucratically, and would accept the exercising of sovereign power through the state of exception. With regard to suspension of the authority of the law, Butler showed that "the relative loss of sovereignty that results from the present predominance of governmentality is compensated by the reemergence of sovereignty within the field of governmentality" (Butler,9 p. 85). From Nazism to Guantánamo, the way in which democratic regimes in the West have been transformed can be traced out. The progressive expansion of executive power has made it possible for the state of exception to emerge as a technique for governing. The proclamation of a state of exception is increasingly seen not only as a security measure but also as the defense of "democracy"2 (p. 32-33).
Excluding some life is innate to politics, so political solutions only make the problem worse. Biopolitics brings bare, biological life into the political realm, managing citizens as living bodies or bare life – a state of invisibility to legal system. This makes unlimited and escalating violence inevitable
Ziarek 12 (Ewa Plonowska, Julian Park Professor of Comparative Literature) “9. Bare Life” Impasses of the Post-Global: Theory in the Era of Climate Change, Vol. 2 AT
For Agamben, bare life constitutes the original but “concealed nucleus” of Western biopolitics in so far as its exclusion founds the political realm. Bare life is always already captured by the political in a double way: first, in the form of the exclusion from the polis—it is included in the political in the form of exclusion—and, second, in the form of the unlimited exposure to violation, which does not count as a crime. Thus, the most fundamental categories of Western politics are not the social contract, or the friend and the enemy, but bare life and sovereign power (7–8). As Agamben’s broad outline of the political genealogy suggests, the position and the political function of bare life changes historically. This genealogy begins with the most distant memory and the first figuration of bare life expressed in ancient Roman law by the obscure notion of homo sacer—that is, the notion of the banned man who can be killed with impunity by all but is unworthy of either juridical punishment or religious sacrifice. Neither the condemned criminal nor the sacrificial scapegoat, and thus outside the human and divine law, homo sacer is the target of sovereign violence exceeding the force of law and yet anticipated and authorized by that law. Banished from collectivity, he is the referent of the sovereign decision on the state of exception, which both confirms and suspends the normal operation of the law. In Agamben’s genealogy, the major shift in the politicization of bare life occurs in modernity. With the mutation of sovereignty into biopower, bare life ceases to be the excluded outside of the political but in fact becomes its inner hidden norm: bare life “gradually begins to coincide with the political realm” (9). However, this inclusion and distribution of bare life within the political does not mean its integration with political existence; rather, it is a disjunctive inclusion of the inassimilable remnant, which still remains the target of sovereign violence. As Agamben argues, “Western politics has not succeeded in constructing the link between zoe and bios” (11). In contrast to the ancient ban, or the inclusive exclusion from the political, a new form of disjunctive inclusion of bare life within the polis emerges with modern democracies. In democratic regimes this hidden incorporation of bare life both into the political realm and into the structure of citizenship manifests itself, according to Agamben, as the inscription of “birth” within human rights—an inscription that establishes a dangerous link between citizenship, nation, and biological kinship. As the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man proclaims, men do not become equal by virtue of their political association but are “born and remain” equal. Democratic citizens are thus bearers of both bare life and human rights, they are at the same time the targets of disciplinary power and free democratic subjects. In a political revision of Foucault’s formulation of modern subjectivity as “empirico-transcendental” doublet, 4 Agamben argues that the modern citizen is “a two-faced being, the bearer both of subjection to sovereign power and of individual liberties (Agamben, 1998, 125). The democratic subject of rights is thus characterized by the aporia between political freedom and the subjection of mere life, without a clear distinction, mediation, or reconciliation between them. Since bare life is included within Western democracies as their hidden inner ground and as such cannot mark their borders, modern politics is about the search for new racialized and gendered targets of exclusion, for the new living dead (130). In our own times, such targets multiply with astonishing speed and infiltrate bodies down to the cellular level: from refugees, illegal immigrants, inmates on death row subject to suicide watch, comatose patients on life support, to organ transplants and fetal stem cells. For Agamben, this inclusion of bare life within the bodies of each citizen becomes catastrophically apparent with the reversal of the democratic state into totalitarian regimes at the beginning of the 20th century. As the disasters of fascism and soviet totalitarianism demonstrate, and as the continuous histories of genocide show, by suspending political forms of life, totalitarian regimes can reduce whole populations to disposable bare life that could be destroyed with impunity.
This status of invisibility under the legal is known as bare life propping up structures of violence against otherized population and serving as the root cause of the systemic devaluation of black lives and lives of women of color
Pokornowski 2016
Steven Pokornowski, lecturer at Rio Honda university with a PhD in English from University of California, Santa Barbara, and a BALAS in English and Psychology. “Vulnerable Life: Zombies, Global Biopolitics, and the Reproduction of Structural Violence.” Humanities 5, 71: August 25, 2016 http://www.mdpi.com/2076-0787/5/3/71/pdf CGH
Thus, we are faced with two interrelated questions. First, we must ask: whose lives matter in the eyes of the law and the media? (Is the life of an American doctor worth more than an African doctor’s? Is the life of an Israeli civilian more valuable than a Palestinian civilian? Are the lives of affluent suburbanites worth more than those of the urban working poor?) Any analysis of the former question raises another: how, then, is life mattered, defined, and valued in the contemporary moment? As much as these are deep, existential questions about ontology, they are also pragmatic epistemic questions about the material effects of social structures in establishing values. These are also the issues at the heart of new media activist campaigns such as #BlackLivesMatter and #SayHerName. These activist movements work to make systemic violence visible by identifying, disrupting, and naming it. In their very monikers, these activisms call out specific structures of violence that demonstrate the systemic devaluation of black life, and the double devaluation of the lives of women of color. #BlackLivesMatter and #SayHerName are also at once invocations: we are called by their very names to recognize the worth of black life, to recognize the humanity of and violence toward women (especially women of color). This essay is one small attempt to answer that call.
This essay aims to demonstrate how the structures and representations of violence made increasingly visible by #BlackLivesMatter and #SayHerName darkly and intimately reflect the structures of violence in historical zombie narratives, dating back to the figure’s exportation from Haiti in W.B. Seabrook’s 1929 ethnography The Magic Island. On one hand, this demonstrates how the zombie naturalizes and proliferates what Scott Lauria Morgensen has identified as the settler colonial biopolitical structure of Western modernity 35. On the other hand, it also exemplifies how this biopolitical structure operates through, and finds its justification in, the language and logic of biomedical discourse, which limits the recognition of humanity through the limit of biological idealism, as demonstrated through the work of Sylvia Wynter 36,37.
The titular formation and main theoretical conception of this paper, vulnerable life, draws on Agamben’s conception of bare life, Butler’s conception of precarious life, and Weheliye’s recalibration of “bare life and biopolitics discourse” 24,27,28. Through a juxtaposition of zombie narratives and contemporary racial violence, this essay demonstrates how the relegation of individuals—and more importantly, groups of people—to zones of indistinction and bare life at once makes those people vulnerable—they are prone to suffer violence—and also uses their vulnerability as a justification to do violence to them and maintain their vulnerable status.
Prefer for two reasons:
a Value to Life – bare life devalues life itself – this makes every life the neg saves totally meaningless – they can’t win an impact
b Extinction – Ziarek says violence resulting from bare life is escalating rapidly until it destroys all life – the impact far outweighs the neg
???The advocacy is to play with the law – “prefer not to” engage the law – this doesn’t mean reject the use of the legal through direct uses of force but rather utilizing an affirmation of the resolution as an opportunity to initiate an impotential study of the law and its relation to bare life to render the potentiality of the law inoperative
Arne De Boever 2006 (Arne De Boever is a PhD-candidate and Teaching Fellow at Columbia University in the City of New York. He studied Germanic philology (German and English) at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (Belgium) and at the Universität Leipzig (Germany). He holds an MA (2003; BAEF/ Francqui Fellow) and MPhil (2005; Marjorie Hope Nicolson Fellow) in English and Comparative Literature from Columbia University. His research interests include: contemporary comparative fiction (1989-present), literature and ethics (memory, violence), and political theory (representative democracy)).; “Overhearing Bartleby: Agamben, Melville, and Inoperative Power” ///vishfish
In “Bartleby, or On Contingency,” Agamben reads Bartleby as “the last, exhausted figure” of what Avicenna refers to as “a complete or perfect potentiality that belongs to the scribe who is in full possession of the art of writing in the moment in which he does not write.”9 Later on in the essay, it becomes clear what Bartleby’s ending or exhaustion consist in: the scrivener’s potentiality is at the same time potentiality for the opposite. The formula “prefer not to” does not consent; but it doesn’t simply refuse either. According to Agamben, it refers to something “whose opposite could have happened in the very moment in which it happened.”10 Bartleby is ultimately not a figure of potentiality, but of a specific mode of potentiality – potentiality that is, at the same time, potentiality for the opposite. Agamben refers to this potentiality as contingency. In the final pages of the essay, he characterizes Bartleby as a messianic figure who has come “to save what was not.” He emphasizes, however, that unlike Jesus, “Bartleby comes not bring a new table of the Law but … to fulfill the Torah by destroying it from top to bottom.”11 The essay on contingency shows Agamben struggling with ideas that he will express much more clearly later on, in his commentary on Saint Paul’s Letter to the Romans, The Time that Remains 2000.12 In this book, but also for example in his State of Exception 2003,13 it becomes clear that Agamben’s thought is not a thought that aims to destroy the law. What opens up a passage towards justice in these works, is rather the law’s “deactivation and inactivity inoperosità – that is, another use of the law emphasis mine.” | 904,623 |
365,523 | 379,555 | NOVDEC AFF | deterrence provides benefits domestic and foreign
[email protected] if you have questions :) | 904,633 |
365,524 | 379,557 | Our Policy on Theory | ==If you have a norm that you think is good/bad in debate (i.e. disclosure, paraphrasing, etc) tell us BEFORE THE ROUND.==
We think that a lot of the time people run theory to get easy wins, not to set a norm or stop abuse. IF YOU ACTUALLY BELIEVE IN SETTING NORMS AND STOPPING ABUSE, DM us on discord, IG, or email ALL INTERPS YOU WANT US TO MEET OR WE AUTO MEET ON ALL OF THEM.
Another reason is that people have different norms in debate (i.e. one team thinks paraphrasing is bad while another thinks paraphrasing is good, one team is fine with gendered language while another team isn't.) Because of this, its risky to run certain cases or do certain things in the debate space. We want to be accommodating to everyone we debate, so send us your interps that you want us to meet.
How to reach us:
Holden:
EMAIL - [email protected]
Taha:
EMAIL: [email protected]
We believe theory is a good thing. However, we also believe theory should only be used when its necessary to check back abuse. Thats why we think addressing people before round is a more productive way of setting norms, and using the debate space as a platform to debate the topic
PS: If ur interp is "Team must do X Y minutes before the round, send us the interp before Y minutes
Example: Teams must disclose 30 minutes before the round
Tell us you wanna disclose around 35 minutes before the round | 904,635 |
365,525 | 379,566 | TOC Neg v1 | =1NC=
====We negate: ====
====Iran is a revisionist power that has been attempting to upend the status quo in the Middle East to export its ideology and influence. Speyer of the London School of Economics explains in 2015:====
Jonathon Speyer, 2015 "Is it Iran’s Middle East now?," Fathom https://fathomjournal.org/is-it-irans-middle-east-now/
Iran’s strategic goal is to emerge as the dominant power in the Middle East and, eventually, the entire Islamic
...AND...
f Shia Arab populations, as becomes apparent when taking a closer look at Iran’s main commitments in the region.
====Thankfully Iran’s ambitions are faltering. Political Scientist Huda Raouf finds in 2019:====
Huda Raouf, 7-12-2019, "Iranian quest for regional hegemony: motivations, strategies and constrains," No Publication, https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/REPS-02-2019-0017/full/html
The study concludes that there are obstacles completely in front of achieving the Iranian quest to regional hege
...AND...
rved as Iran’s proxy air force in Iran’s fight against ISIS, further helping to cement Iran’s regional hegemony.
====Has made dominance over the gulf impossible. As a result, even though tensions remain high, Mohammed Ayoob of James Madison University writes in January:====
Mohammed Ayoob, 1-20-2020, "Neither the U.S. or Iran Want a Full-Scale War. Here's Why.," National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-east-watch/neither-us-or-iran-want-full-scale-war-heres-why-115421
The Iranian reaction to Soleimani’s assassination clearly indicated that Tehran was not interested in inflicting
...AND...
r governmental expenditures and subsidies to poorer sections of society thus maintaining support for the regime.
====And beyond that, because of the regional balance of power the United States establishes, Fassihi of The New York Times explains this October:====
Farnaz Fassihi and Ben Hubbard, 10-4-2019, "Saudi Arabia and Iran Make Quiet Openings to Head Off War," New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/04/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-iran-talks.html
After years of growing hostility and competition for influence, Saudi Arabia and Iran have taken steps toward in
...AND...
e conflict. That solution, in turn, could subvert Mr. Trump’s effort to build an Arab alliance to isolate Iran.
====This is because the US strategy of placing forces in the region can deter Iranian expansionism. Political Scientist Daniel Byman of Brookings writes in 2020:====
Daniel L. Byman, 1-16-2020, "Is deterrence restored with Iran?," Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/01/16/is-deterrence-restored-with-iran/
Some of these factors clearly bolster deterrence of Iran. The United States enjoys vast military superiority ove
...AND...
perception was no doubt reinforced by the U.S. decision to award medals to the Navy officers commanding the ship.
====Because of this, while Iran may act aggressively, they have been unable to establish themselves as a regional power and they remain in a stalemate with regional rivals like Saudi Arabia. Withdrawing troops would reverse this trend, upend the balance of power, and push Iran towards increased influence. Knights of the Washington Institute concluded in 2011: ====
Knights, Washington Institute, 2011, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus111.pdf
As Washington seeks to engage Tehran to create a more normal relationship with the Islamic Republic, it cannot a
...AND...
q Security Agreement), the main external obstacles to expanded Iranian influence in Iraq will have been removed.
====There are two reasons why Iranian expansion inevitably leads to war. First, is miscalculation with the gulf states. Iranian influence in Iraq makes the gulf state fearful. Arango of the New York Times concludes in 2017: ====
Tim Arango, 7-15-2017, "Iran Dominates in Iraq After U.S. ‘Handed the Country Over’," New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/15/world/middleeast/iran-iraq-iranian-power.html
In that contest, Iran won, and the United States lost. Over the past three years, Americans have focused on the
...AND...
ria, where they fight under the command of Iranian officers in defense of the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad.
====Haidar of the Middle East Center explains in 2018: ====
Ribale Sleiman-Haidar, 6-18-2018, "Saudi Domestic Uncertainties and the Rivalry with Iran," Middle East Centre, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2018/06/18/saudi-domestic-uncertainties-and-the-rivalry-with-iran/
The prince’s strong anti-Iranian rhetoric and multiple promises to roll back Iranian influence in Bahrain, Yemen
...AND...
l glue that had bound Saudis together under the umbrella of religious zeal, authenticity and moral high ground.
====Saudi Arabia would thus be forced to militarize in order to ensure security from Iran. Brooks of the Belfer Center writes in 2013:====
Stephen G. Brooks, 2013, "Why America Should Not Retrench," Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/why-america-should-not-retrench
Revoking security guarantees would make the world and the United States less secure. In Asia, Japan and South K
...AND...
rom the solution its proponents advertise, retrenchment would likely exacerbate the problem of American decline.
====Critically, Kenneth Pollack writes in 2015:====
Kenneth M Pollack, 3-2-2015, "Iran’s regional policy after a nuclear deal," Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2015/03/02/irans-regional-policy-after-a-nuclear-deal/
Second, the Saudis may choose to ramp up their support to various Sunni groups fighting Iran’s allies and proxie
...AND...
ssion. If the United States is not there to reassure the Gulf states and deter Iran, things could get very ugly.
====For this reason, Seth Crospey of Foreign Policy writes in 2019====
Seth Cropsey, Gary Roughead, 10-31-2019, andquot;A U.S. Withdrawal Will Cause a Power Struggle in
the Middle East,andquot; Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/17/us-withdrawal-power-struggle-middle-east-china-russia-iran/
====,potentially killing millions. Second, is an Israeli first strike. Iranian expansion terrifies Israel. Citing Israeli Defense Force officers, Ahronheim writes 2020====
Anna Ahronheim January 8, 2020 18, 1-4-2020, "If US leaves the region, Israel will eventually go to war with Iran," The Jerusalem Post | JPost, https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/If-US-leaves-from-the-region-Israel-will-eventually-go-to-war-with-Iran-613446
Should the United States withdraw its forces and Iran continue on its path through Iraq and Syria, Israel will e
...AND...
raelis need to continue their policies to “minimize Iran’s regional insurgency – and that’s feasible,” he said.
========
====Deutsche Welle writes in 2020:====
Paraphrased
Deutsche Welle www.Dw, 02-01-2020, "Israel-Iran conflict to be major Middle East issue in 2020," DW, https://www.dw.com/en/israel-iran-conflict-to-be-major-middle-east-issue-in-2020/a-51600787
====An Israeli strike is the greatest threat to the Middle East. ====
====Turse of Rutgers University writes in 2013 ====
Paraphrased
Nick Turse, 5-13-2013, "What Would Happen if Israel Nuked Iran," Mother Jones, https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/05/nuclear-strike-tehran-israel/ | 904,646 |
365,526 | 379,577 | Econ AC | Schlein
Associated Press, 12-18-2019, "Venezuelans Continue to Leave as Political and Economic Crisis Deepens," Voice of America, https://www.voanews.com/americas/venezuelans-continue-leave-political-and-economic-crisis-deepens
The report finds Venezuela's economy has contracted by 25.5 percent this year, amounting to a cumulative loss in gross domestic product of 62.2 percent since 2013. It says hyperinflation makes food, medicine and other basic commodities unaffordable. Lack of money and critical supplies, it notes, are causing rising levels of acute malnutrition and nutritional deficiency among children and women.
Vivian
Vivian Salama, 08-05-2019, "U.S. Expands Sanctions Against Venezuela Into an Embargo ," WSJ, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-expands-sanctions-against-venezuela-into-an-embargo-11565053782
WASHINGTON—The Trump administration imposed a total economic embargo against the government of Venezuela, a significant escalation of pressure against the regime of President Nicolás Maduro and countries including Russia and China that continue to support him, a senior administration official said.
President Trump late Monday signed an executive order freezing all government assets and prohibiting transactions with it, unless specifically exempted, the first action of its kind against a government in the Western Hemisphere.
Martin
Eric Martin and Patricia Laya | Bloomberg. “Analysis | What Broke Venezuela's Economy and What Could Fix It.” The Washington Post, WP Company, 11 Mar. 2019, www.washingtonpost.com/business/what-broke-venezuelas-economy-and-what-could-fix-it/2019/03/09/4413965c-425b-11e9-85ad-779ef05fd9d8_story.html
Shrinking oil revenue means Venezuela’s external debt has continued to pile up, reaching $157 billion last year, or about 150 percent of gross domestic product. The country defaulted on a portion of its debt in 2017, and creditors are demanding more than $9 billion in overdue payments. In addition, Venezuela owes billions of dollars to companies including Canadian miner Crystallex International Corp. and U.S. oil giant ConocoPhillips to settle disputes over the government’s nationalization of their assets.
How did we get here? For years, Chavez borrowed on the expectation that oil prices would remain high, and Maduro has been unable to dig the country out of the red. The U.S. government has imposed incremental sanctions that have squeezed the country’s finances and cut it off from international capital markets. Normally, when a government can’t pay its obligations, it negotiates a restructuring of its debt. Maduro has said he hoped to do that, but U.S. investors and banks constitute a large cross-section of Venezuela’s creditors and sanctions prevent them from participating in a restructuring. What can be done? Even under a Guaido government, negotiating a restructuring would be a tall order. Hausmann has said creditors will have to take a major haircut so that a new government is left with enough money to take care of the everyday needs of Venezuelans and reactivate the local economy.
Becker
Matt Becker, 11-13-2017, "Debt Restructuring Vs. Debt Consolidation: Which is Best?," LendingTree, https://www.lendingtree.com/debt-consolidation/debt-restructuring/
What is debt restructuring?
Debt restructuring can take several different forms, but at its core, it is simply the process of changing the terms of an existing loan, typically in order to make it easier for the borrower to pay back some or all of the debt.
A debt can be restructured to lower the interest rate, extend the repayment period (consequently lowering the monthly payment), forgive some of the balance owed or otherwise change the terms and conditions of the loan.
Makoff
Gregory Makoff, 7-26-2017, "Venezuela's economic crisis can be stopped. Here's how," World Economic Forum, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/07/venezuela-economic-chaos-how-to-end/
It's a suggestion that may be a surprise to those who remember that in the 1980s, the IMF was protective of international banking interests. Since then, however, IMF policy has shifted. The IMF – and its leading G7 shareholders – understand that countries recovering from a crisis need adequate breathing space to resume growth. And, with regard to private debt, Venezuelans and the IMF would share a common interest in a broad and successful debt operation to conserve the country's cash and support economic and social stabilization.
The IMF’s role in helping Greece – not to mention Ukraine and Jamaica – in recent years should be looked at as an example. In these cases, each country’s IMF loan was conditional on a comprehensive debt restructuring. Creditors gave substantial financial concessions to the country because they realized that a disorderly default would be the outcome if they didn’t play ball. This is how it would work in Venezuela: no debt swap, no IMF – it’s a powerful tool to help a country get a fair deal.
Venezuela’s debt is exceptionally complicated and involves bonds and loans of both the sovereign and the state oil company, PDVSA. History tells us, though, that where there is a will there is a way: in 2006, Iraq restructured its Saddam Hussein-era debt with the help of a G7-supported UN resolution that protected the country's oil tankers. If Venezuela re-engages with the international community, it should find there is strong support for debt restructuring.
Vaz
Ricardo Vaz, 4-18-2019, "US Sanctions Venezuela’s Central Bank," Venezuelanalysis, https://venezuelanalysis.com/news/14434
The measure was announced by White House National Security Advisor John Bolton during a speech in Florida on the 58th anniversary of the United States’ 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, a failed attempt to topple the Cuban Revolution.
“The US is announcing new sanctions against the Central Bank of Venezuela to restrict U.S. transactions with this bank and prohibit its access to U.S. dollars. This bank has been crucial to keeping Maduro in power, including through its control of the transfer of gold for currency,” Bolton tweeted after the speech.
Financial sanctions have seen the Venezuelan government increasingly turn towards transactions in gold to obtain hard currency for vital imports of food and medicine, as well as look for convoluted mechanisms to process oil sales.
Hernandez
Clodovaldo Hernandez, Dec. 10th 2019, "Maduro Causes a Stir with About-Face on Dollarisation," Venezuelanalysis, https://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/14741
Former Vice President, turned journalist and TV host José Vicente Rangel recently returned to the screen in a big way with an interview with President Nicolas Maduro, in which Maduro shook the hornet's nest with his comments concerning dollarisation.
Asked about the serious economic problems in the country, Maduro said he did not see the increasingly open presence of the US dollar in everyday transactions (1) as a bad thing, praising it as a mechanism which helps some people supplement their Bolivar currency incomes.
Following the interview, Troy began to burn, and continues to smoulder, albeit with low intensity given that news from neighbouring countries is dominating headlines.
Maduro's opinion received major criticism from both sides of the political spectrum. Some described this position as inconsistent and contradictory, while others deemed it improvised, heterodox and legitimising ever deeper inequalities.
Gomez
Az Gómez, 4-6-2018, "Dollarization the Cure to Venezuela’s Hyperinflation," AIER, https://www.aier.org/article/dollarization-the-cure-to-venezuelas-hyperinflation/
Expectations about the future purchasing power of a currency affect its demand today, which in turn determines its relative price with respect to other currencies as well as goods and services. Therefore, changing the nominal value of money by removing three zeros is useless as long as confidence in monetary authorities is not restored.
The best way out of Venezuela’s monetary quagmire is dollarization, for it will instantly restore trust and solve hyperinflation. Replacing worthless bolívares with US dollars would, in Hanke’s words, provide “discipline and bring back rules to the system of government.”
In Ecuador, for instance, the 1999 dollarization has brought economic stability, kept inflation at bay, and even neutralized the effects of plenty of misguided policies introduced by former President Rafael Correa, a Maduro ally.
Congressional Research Service
Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions. 16 Oct. 2019, fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10715.pdf.
For more than a decade, the United States has employed sanctions as a policy tool in response to activities of the Venezuelan government and Venezuelan individuals. As Venezuela’s political and economic crisis under the leadership of Nicolás Maduro has deepened, the Trump Administration has significantly expanded sanctions. The Treasury Department has sanctions on at least 132 Venezuelan or Venezuelan-connected individuals and the State Department has revoked the visas of hundreds of individuals. The Trump Administration also has imposed sanctions on Venezuela’s state oil company (Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A., or PdVSA), government, and central bank. Sanctions have increased pressure on the Maduro government, including accelerating the decline in Venezuela’s oil production. However, sanctions have not yet led to a political transition. Maduro remains in power, even though it has been nearly 10 months since the United States recognized Juan Guidó, the head of Venezuela’s National Assembly, as the country’s interim president and ceased to recognize Maduro as the president of Venezuela.
BHP
BHP, 11-11-2019, "Petroleum briefing," https://www.bhp.com/media-and-insights/reports-and-presentations/2019/11/petroleum-briefing/
Today, we’re here to talk about the Petroleum business, its place in BHP’s portfolio, and to address the questions on your mind.
I recognise that you have interest in understanding our market outlook and our plans to grow value and returns. We will cover all of this.
More than anything else today, there are a few points I would like you to take away. Firstly, we believe oil and advantaged gas are commodities that have the potential to generate strong returns over the long term.
Secondly, we have the assets, and the growth projects to replace, and indeed build on the resilient returns we have enjoyed from the Petroleum business, through the next decade. Thirdly, our performance track record in exploration through to production gives confidence in our ability to deliver these plans. And finally, working in both a sustainable and capitally disciplined way underpins everything we do. This is key to the long-term performance of the Petroleum business.
Martin
Eric Martin and Patricia Laya | Bloomberg. “Analysis | What Broke Venezuela's Economy and What Could Fix It.” The Washington Post, WP Company, 11 Mar. 2019, www.washingtonpost.com/business/what-broke-venezuelas-economy-and-what-could-fix-it/2019/03/09/4413965c-425b-11e9-85ad-779ef05fd9d8_story.html
The U.S. presumably would lift its sanctions if Maduro, Chavez’s chosen successor, were to be ousted and Guaido, the head of the National Assembly, to assume real power. Guaido has announced his picks for new boards for the state oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela SA, and its U.S. refining arm, Citgo. They include industry veterans whose credibility could help attract the investment needed to expand exploration and production. An investor-friendly Venezuela could expect to tap financing from the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, Wall Street, foreign oil companies and Venezuelans moving money back into the country. To achieve economic stability in the longer term, Venezuela would need to reduce its vulnerability to boom-and-bust commodity cycles by using oil revenue to invest in other industries.
Inflation: The nation’s inflation rate is running at an eye-watering annual rate of 373,000 percent, according to a Bloomberg index that tracks the price of a cup of coffee in Caracas. Soaring prices are producing hunger, leading thousands to flee Venezuela every day, with 3 million already living abroad.
Kissi
Dawn Kissi, 4-1-2019, " World Bank preparing to become 'deeply involved' in Venezuela," No Publication, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/04/world-bank-preparing-deeply-involved-venezuela-190411195030646.html
Washington, DC - Newly installed World Bank Group president David Malpass said on Thursday that the development lender is preparing to become "deeply involved" in Venezuela, "but the situation is still troublesome on the ground".
Speaking at a press conference on the opening day of the joint World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) spring meetings, Malpass said that Venezuela is a "deep concern" for the World Bank, but that any decision to intervene in the country or recognise opposition leader Juan Guaido as Venezuela's president would be left to the World Bank's stakeholders.
IMF managing director Christine Lagarde also said Thursday during a press conference that it is up the fund's members "to indicate which authority they are recognising diplomatically".
Venezuela is in the throes of a prolonged and worsening economic crisis that has led to severe shortages of food, life-saving medicines and electricity.
Pecksen
Dursun Peksen, 1-25-2018, "Economic Sanctions and the Politics of IMF Lending," Taylor and Francis, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03050629.2018.1429427?scroll=topandneedAccess=trueandjournalCode=gini20and
What effect do economic sanctions have on the IMF lending decisions? Though countries under economic sanctions often face significant economic and financial difficulties, no comprehensive research to date has explored whether the IMF as a de facto lender of last resort intervenes in those countries in need. We posit that economic coercion is likely to hinder the target’s access to IMF credits as sanctioning (sender) countries are likely to use their political influence in the IMF to deny funds to the destabilized target economies. To assess the empirical merits of the hypothesis, we combine data on the IMF lending with the economic sanctions data for 120 emerging market economies from 1975 to 2005. Results indicate that target countries are less likely to receive IMF funds, especially when under sanctions by the United States and international institutions. Our findings contradict the conventional wisdom that the IMF is tasked with providing lifelines to member governments in need of help to ease their short-term balance of payment problems. Further, as much as IMF loans can be used as positive inducements to acquire a country’s strategic cooperation, we show that they might also be used by sender countries as a punishment tool against target countries to amplify the impact of sanctions regimes.
Brown
Vidal and Brown 2015 Pavel Vidal and Scott Brown, “Cuba’s Economic Reintegration: Begin with the International Financial Institutions,” The Atlantic Council of the United States: Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, July 2015 http://publications.atlanticcouncil.org/uscuba //WGC “
US policy toward the island is in transition. In light of the President’s executive orders in December, we are now seeing movement in Congress. Support is growing for removal of the travel ban. Trade, telecommunications, finance, and compensation for nationalized property will all be part of the agenda, as will human rights—a key point of contention given the lack of democratic freedoms for the Cuban people. Cuba is also in a historic period of transition. President Raúl Castro plans to step down in 2018. To jumpstart Cuba’s economy, he will need to accelerate the fiscal and monetary reforms started in 2008. International financial institutions (IFIs), including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), hold the key to easing Cuba through a tough transition to a more stable economic model that will better the lives of its people. Cuba’s reintegration will inevitably spur unprecedented economic change. As this paper discusses, this transformation is precisely what occurred in previously closed economies that chose to rejoin the global economy. But significant obstacles exist to Cuban admission to the IFIs. A series of US laws require US representatives to the IFIs to oppose such admission as well as any multilateral funding for Cuba. Castro himself has been an outspoken critic of the IFIs, long-seen by the Cuban government as agents of imperialism and neoliberalism. Still, signs point to the potential of a new mindset around rejoining these institutions, with Castro greatly diminishing his vitriol against the IFIs in recent years. US policymakers should recognize the tremendous value of Cuban membership in the IFIs for bilateral relations with Cuba and the United States’ international position. The United States is the only major country that continues to impose economic sanctions against Cuba, a point that has consistently hindered its image and stature abroad. Supporting Cuban participation in the IFIs, or even the less politically-toxic option of simply avoiding vocal opposition, will do much more than just strengthen partnerships with democratic allies around the globe. IFI monies and technical advice to modernize sectors such as agriculture, infrastructure, banking, and tourism will be critical to renewing the island’s economic vibrancy and creating new possibilities for Cubans to improve their lives.”
Sanchez
Valentina Sanchez, 5-5-2017, “Venezuela hyperinflation hits 10 million percent. ‘Shock therapy’ may be only chance to undo the economic damage,” CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/02/venezuela-inflation-at-10-million-percent-its-time-for-shock-therapy.html
“Venezuelans who have been suffering all of this time are going to be faced with a very dramatic, very draconian policy aimed at bringing their monetary system under control,” said Dr. Eduardo Gamarra, professor of politics and international relations at Florida International University.
Wasted oil riches Shock therapy supports the implementation of drastic economic policies to combat hyperinflation, shortages, reduce the budget deficit — Venezuela’s current budget deficit stands at –29.95 in relation to GDP — and transition from a state-controlled economy to a mixed one. It was used in post-communist Poland and Russia, and in other countries like Chile and Bolivia, where it successfully ended hyperinflation.
Rendon
Moises Rendon, 3-23-2018, "Venezuela’s Crisis Is Now a Regional Humanitarian Disaster," No Publication, https://www.csis.org/analysis/venezuelas-crisis-now-regional-humanitarian-disaster
Maduro’s administration is running out of money as large debt payments loom: Venezuela owes over $7 billion for the rest of this year to international bond holders. Despite desperate attempts to receive unauthorized and unconstitutional external assistance (e.g., loans from China and Russia without approval by the elected national assembly), and the creation of a digital token “Petro” to avoid international sanctions, default is all but inevitable. In addition, enforcement actions against Venezuela, including seizures of oil-related assets abroad, are just a matter of time.
? 300,000 Venezuelan children are at risk of dying from malnutrition, alerts the Venezuela office of Caritas, a Catholic humanitarian organization.
? The average Venezuelan has lost 24 pounds in the past year due to lack of food.
? 1.2 million Venezuelans have fled the country over the past two years.
? 50,000 people are crossing daily on average to Colombia to meet their basic needs, and an estimated 3,000 are staying in Colombia
Venezuela’s Humanitarian Crisis Has Become a Regional Crisis
The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has recently stated that nations receiving and/or already hosting Venezuelans should allow them access to their territory and adopt all protections they would provide to refugees. Neighboring Colombia has borne the brunt of the exodus with the daily influx hitting a high of 91,000 people early in February. Many of these individuals cross the border in a desperate search for food and medicine and then return to Venezuela. Many have no resources to purchase anything but are looking for humanitarian handouts. On the Simon Bolivar International Bridge in Cúcuta, which divides Colombia from Venezuela, people from all walks of life come together seeking to cross: desperately thin mothers carrying their malnourished children, seniors in wheelchairs hoping to see a doctor, and children crossing alone to gather basic goods for their families. Roughly 40 percent of those crossing are under 18 years of age.
Mercy Corps
Meghan Prichard, 8-13-2019, "Quick facts: Venezuela’s humanitarian crisis," Mercy Corps, https://www.mercycorps.org/articles/venezuela-crisis-quick-facts
Families are struggling to survive inside Venezuela, while others are making desperate journeys to leave their home country entirely.
The regional humanitarian crisis is now the worst in the Western Hemisphere, with more than 4 million refugees and migrants. That's about 10 percent of the country's total population. Four out of every 10 people still in Venezuela want to leave.
The UN estimates there will be 5.3 million Venezuelan refugees and migrants by the end of 2019, rivaling the scale of the Syrian refugee crisis. By 2020, there will be 8 million Venezuelan refugees, making this crisis the largest refugee crisis in the world.
Philips
Tom Phillips, 12-6-2018, "'A slow-motion catastrophe': on the road in Venezuela, 20 years after Chávez's rise," Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/06/on-the-road-venezuela-20-years-after-hugo-chavez-rise
The comandante is dead and his revolution in intensive care as economic, political and social chaos engulf what was once one of Latin America’s most prosperous societies. Almost 10 of Venezuela’s 31 million-strong population have fled overseas; of those who remain, nearly 90 live in poverty.
To understand Venezuela’s collapse, the Guardian travelled hundreds of miles across the nation Chávez dreamed of transforming, from the spot in downtown Caracas where he gave his first speech as president-elect to his birthplace in the country’s sun-scorched southwestern plains.
Bernstein
Muennig P, Franks P, Jia H, Lubetkin E, Gold Mr., xx-xx-xxxx, "Poverty dynamics, poverty thresholds and mortality: An age-stage Markovian model," PubMed Central (PMC), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5955488/
In 2014, 14.8 of the U.S. population lived below the poverty threshold 1. In that year, the official poverty threshold for a family of four was an annual income of $24,008. If a family’s annual income falls below a threshold, all the individuals in the family are considered below the threshold as well. It is now widely accepted that those in poverty have higher mortality risk then those above poverty 2. Yet how many of these people stay below the official poverty threshold the next year? As the ‘official’ poverty threshold is set very low, negative effects of relatively low income are also seen for individuals “near” poverty, variously defined as 1.25, 1.5, and 2× ‘official’ poverty, all the way up to the median income level, which is approximately 3× the ‘official’ poverty threshold. For this reason we define 3 possible “poverty” thresholds, 1×, 2×, and 3× the ‘official’ poverty threshold set by the U.S. Census Bureau as the poverty level. We compare annual survival, remaining life expectancy, and entry and exit of individuals above and below each poverty threshold at each age. We also investigate how three cohorts, each with one of the three specified poverty thresholds experience dynamic heterogeneity, that is, how the demographic structure of the population varies as individuals cross in and out of poverty at each age.
Weisbrot
Weisbrot, Mark. Poverty Reduction in Venezuela: A Reality?Based View. 2008, cepr.net/documents/publications/weisbrot_revista_fall_2008.pdf.
Venezuela has seen a remarkable reduction in poverty since the first quarter of 2003. In the ensuing four years, from 2003 to 2007,1 the poverty rate was cut in half, from 54 percent of households to 27.5 percent. (See Table 1). Extreme poverty fell even more, by 70 percent – from 25.1 percent of households to 7.6 percent. These poverty rates measure only cash income; as will be discussed below, they do not include non-cash benefits to the poor such as access to health care or education. If Venezuela were almost any other country, such a large reduction of poverty in a relatively short time would be noticed as a significant achievement. However, since the Venezuelan government, and especially its president, Hugo Chavez Frias, are consistently disparaged in major media, government, and most policy and intellectual circles, this has not happened. Instead, the reduction in poverty was for quite some time denied. | 904,658 |
365,527 | 379,585 | TANF NC | ASPE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR PLANNING AND EVALUATION, 9-30-2007, "The Effects of Welfare and IDA Program Rules on Asset Holdings of Low-Income Families," ASPE, https://aspe.hhs.gov/execsum/effects-welfare-and-ida-program-rules-asset-holdings-low-income-families
Savings and assets can cushion families against sudden income losses and can bolster long-term economic gains. These savings, however, can make a low-income family ineligible for benefits from means-tested programs when they encounter economic difficulties. Most means-tested programs restrict eligibility to families with assets that fall below a set threshold, and thus, may have the unintended consequence of discouraging low-income families from saving. In recent years, federal and state governments have implemented programs and program rules to encourage savings among low-income families. Specifically, they have relaxed asset rules for the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program and the Food Stamp Program (FSP), and have supported individual development account (IDA) programs. This report examines the relationship between means-tested program rules and asset holding. We examine the effects of state specific TANF, Food Stamp, IDA, EITC program rules and minimum wage requirements on low-education single mothers and low-education families' liquid asset holdings, vehicle asset holdings, and net worth. Our analysis spans a 13 year period from 1991 through 2003, thereby capturing a time of significant change to the AFDC/TANF and Food Stamp programs, as well as the introduction of IDA programs. It also captures asset holdings during weak and strong economic times. Individual-level data for the analysis come from multiple panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), and state program rules data come from a variety of sources, including the Urban Institute's Welfare Rules Database, the Center for Social Development's and Corporation for Enterprise Development's information on IDA programs, and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Food and Nutrition Service (FNS).
Rand
Dory Rand, April 2004, "FINANCIAL EDUCATION AND ASSET BUILDING PROGRAMS FOR WELFARE RECIPIENTS AND LOW INCOME WORKERS: THE ILLINOIS EXPERIENCE" The Brookings Institution Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/20040413_doryrand.pdf
There’s more to leaving poverty than finding a job. Aside from a regular paycheck, a whole set of skills are needed to make sound financial decisions, build savings, establish good credit, and achieve the American dream of owning a home, car, or small business, or pursuing higher education. Many welfare recipients entering the workforce for the first time, as well as low-income workers at risk of dependence upon public assistance, lack these skills. Additionally, confusing and administratively burdensome resource-counting rules in public benefit programs discourage savings and asset building and exacerbate asset poverty among welfare recipients and the working poor. To address these issues, the Illinois Department of Human Services (IDHS)—in partnership with a diverse, statewide coalition called Financial Links for Low-Income People (FLLIP)—used its flexibility under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program to create innovative financial education and asset-building programs for welfare recipients and low-income workers. FLLIP participants learned money management skills, accessed important work supports, and built savings through regular bank accounts and through restricted, matched savings accounts called Individual Development Accounts, or IDAs. IDA graduates saved enough to buy or repair a home or car, start a business, or pursue postsecondary education or training. Increasingly, policymakers are recognizing the need to promote financial literacy. Federal agencies announced a new Financial Literacy and Education Commission on January 29, 2004.2 As Congress considers reauthorization of federal welfare legislation and policymakers explore ways to promote greater self-sufficiency, they would do well to maintain the funding and state flexibility needed to implement initiatives such as the FLLIP financial education and asset-building programs. States should eliminate or align resource rules, promote use of direct deposit, and support financial education, free tax counseling, IDA, and car ownership programs. Congress and regulators can complement these efforts through strengthened enforcement of the Community Reinvestment Act.
ACF
Administration for Children and Families, 3-29-2016, "Integrating Financial Capability Services into State Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Agencies" No Publication, https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocs/intergrating_financial_capability_services_into_state_tanf_agencies.pdf
Financial capability is the capacity—based on knowledge, skills, and access—to manage financial resources effectively. Financial capability services include financial education, financial coaching, financial counseling, credit counseling, credit building, access to safe and affordable financial products, free tax preparation help, access to federal and state benefits, incentivized savings programs, and asset ownership programs.1 Integration refers to incorporating financial capability services directly into existing services that are being provided, rather than creating a standalone program. Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) is a federally funded program administered by the Office of Family Assistance (OFA) that is designed to help needy families achieve self sufficiency through cash assistance and services to promote job preparation, work, and marriage. States receive TANF block grants to support the needs of households in their community. States administering supportive programs, such as TANF, can integrate financial capability services to improve households’ financial lives and help them meet their financial goals. By providing access to financial capability services in combination with TANF services, organizations can help households become more financially stable and better cope with economic challenges—such as job losses or unexpected large expenses. Financial capability services may reduce dependence on TANF and similar services in the future.
Folger
Jean Folger, 11-18-2019, "Assets That Increase Your Net Worth," Investopedia, https://www.investopedia.com/articles/pf/12/assets-that-increase-net-worth.asp
If you rent out your property, it's possible to enjoy a steady source of income while your investment (ideally) appreciates. And if you did get a mortgage, that income can help with the monthly payments. You won't have that income if you plan to use the property yourself, but your net worth can still increase over time as you build equity in the home. Because you will still have a place to live if you sell your vacation home or rental property, you can safely count it as an asset without worrying about the don't-count-your-home-as-an-asset school of thought. Investments Investments can be another major contributor to overall net worth. Although there are several different types of investments, some of the most common include stocks, bonds, mutual funds, ETFs and any other securities. The value of your investments in any tax-deferred retirement plans, such as 401(k)s, 403(b)s and IRAs (individual retirement accounts) can significantly increase your net worth. Most investments will fluctuate over time, so it is important to reflect these changes in your periodic net worth calculations. Note: taxes on these assets are contingent liabilities that should be included in the liability side of your net worth statement in order to provide a more realistic view of your financial situation. Art and Other Collectibles Art and other collectibles can add considerably to your net worth. The value of these assets, however, is often fickle and changes depending on current trends and the demand for such items. Because market values do change over time, and because we are often not aware of the value of certain collectibles—consider the many people who strike it rich on PBS's "Antiques Roadshow," bringing in garage sale finds to discover they are worth tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars—it may pay to seek out professional appraisals. In addition to having a good estimate for your net worth statement, you can also make sure the item is adequately insured against losses (your homeowner's insurance policy may not cover art and other collectibles without a specific rider).
Rand - Credit
Dory Rand, April 2004, "FINANCIAL EDUCATION AND ASSET BUILDING PROGRAMS FOR WELFARE RECIPIENTS AND LOW INCOME WORKERS: THE ILLINOIS EXPERIENCE" The Brookings Institution Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/20040413_doryrand.pdf
IDHS secured passage of changes in Illinois IDA regulations to expand the range of allowable asset purchases and to exempt all assets in TANF-funded IDAs from resource-counting rules.34 FLLIP IDA participants could save toward buying or repairing a home, buying or repairing a car, starting or expanding a small business, or pursuing postsecondary education or training. Employed persons with a minor child and income up to 200 percent of the federal poverty level were eligible to participate in the FLLIP IDA program. Participants had to complete the training requirements and save some of their earned income each month in a restricted account (IDA) with a local financial institution. They had up to two years in which to accumulate sufficient savings towards their asset goal, but could graduate as soon as six months after enrollment if all program requirements were completed.35 Instructors had time to work with participants over many months, sometimes one-on-one, to resolve credit problems, establish regular savings habits, use direct deposit or other savings tools, and, ultimately, prepare them to purchase and maintain their asset. As in the FEP-only program, instructors referred FLLIP IDA participants to local free tax preparation programs and encouraged them to use direct deposit of refunds into IDAs and save as much as possible. Instructors also encouraged IDA participants to use direct deposit of paychecks and automatic saving mechanisms to facilitate saving. Consistent with Illinois’s IDA law, FLLIP matched participants’ savings from earned income or EITC refunds up to $1,000 on a two-to-one basis, $1,000 from IDHS and $1,000 from private funds. For example, a participant that saved $1,000 toward a down payment on a home was eligible for $2,000 in matching funds. The matching funds were intended to provide a strong incentive to remain employed, complete training, and continue saving each month.
Amadeo
Kimberly Amadeo, 12-13-2019, "How Interest Rates Work," Balance, https://www.thebalance.com/what-are-interest-rates-and-how-do-they-work-3305855
You must pay at least the interest each month. If not, your outstanding debt will increase even though you are making payments. Although interest rates are very competitive, they aren't the same. A bank will charge higher interest rates if it thinks there's a lower chance the debt will get repaid. For that reason, banks will always assign a higher interest rate to revolving loans, like credit cards. These types of loans are more expensive to manage. Banks also charge higher rates to people they consider risky. It's important to know what your credit score is and how to improve it. The higher your score, the lower the interest rate you will have to pay. Banks charge fixed rates or variable rates. It depends on whether the loan is a mortgage, credit card, or unpaid bill. The actual interest rates are determined by either the 10-year Treasury note or by the fed funds rate. Fixed rates remain the same throughout the life of the loan. Your initial payments consist mostly of interest payments. As time goes on, you pay a higher and higher percentage of the debt principal. If you make an extra payment, it all goes toward principal. You can pay the debt off sooner that way. Most conventional mortgages are fixed-rate loans.
Lucas
Tim Lucas, 1-24-2020, "A 1 Mortgage Rate Rise = 11 Reduction in Purchase Price," Northwest University, https://mymortgageinsider.com/1-percent-rate-increase-11-percent-price-reduction/
How interest rates affect buying a home How do interest rates affect buying power when you’re searching for your next home? Will you have to settle for a less-nice house if mortgage rates rise? The simple answer is that the higher your mortgage rate is, the higher your monthly payments are going to be. So, yes. You really will get less home for your money if mortgage rates go up appreciably. That could mean a smaller place, or one in a less desirable neighborhood, or one that needs improvements or upgrades. See what mortgage rate you can receive with your credit score, income, and purchase price. 11! Really? What most shoppers don’t realize is how dramatically their buying power is diminished with relatively small rate increases. Let’s imagine you had $1,200 per month to spend on your principle and interest payment. (Keep in mind this number doesn’t include things like property tax, insurance, mortgage insurance, or HOA dues). That $1,200 per month can go a long way when rates are low. For instance, if you locked in a 30-year fixed mortgage at 4.5, you could buy a house for $295,000 if you had 20 down. But let’s say rates rise to 5.5. Still a great rate, but 1 higher than you planned. Now you are limited to a purchase price of $265,000, again assuming 20 down. That’s a 10.17 reduction in buying power and $30,000 shaved off your maximum purchase price. At $1,800 per month and 20 down, you could buy a home for $445,000 with a 4.5 interest rate. But at 5.5 your maximum home price is now $395,000 – an 11.24 reduction in buying power. At the lower end of the spectrum, $1,000 per month would buy you a $235,000 home at 5.0 but just a $208,000 home at 6.0. That’s an 11.49 reduction and in some areas could make the difference between getting into a home or not, or settling for less house. A rate increase could harm your buying power more than increasing home prices. It’s unlikely home prices would rise by more than 10 in a year, but if rates increase by 1 it will have the same effect for buyers.
Rand - IDA
Dory Rand, April 2004, "FINANCIAL EDUCATION AND ASSET BUILDING PROGRAMS FOR WELFARE RECIPIENTS AND LOW INCOME WORKERS: THE ILLINOIS EXPERIENCE" The Brookings Institution Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/20040413_doryrand.pdf
There’s more to leaving poverty than finding a job. Aside from a regular paycheck, a whole set of skills are needed to make sound financial decisions, build savings, establish good credit, and achieve the American dream of owning a home, car, or small business, or pursuing higher education. Many welfare recipients entering the workforce for the first time, as well as low-income workers at risk of dependence upon public assistance, lack these skills. Additionally, confusing and administratively burdensome resource-counting rules in public benefit programs discourage savings and asset building and exacerbate asset poverty among welfare recipients and the working poor. To address these issues, the Illinois Department of Human Services (IDHS)—in partnership with a diverse, statewide coalition called Financial Links for Low-Income People (FLLIP)—used its flexibility under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program to create innovative financial education and asset-building programs for welfare recipients and low-income workers. FLLIP participants learned money management skills, accessed important work supports, and built savings through regular bank accounts and through restricted, matched savings accounts called Individual Development Accounts, or IDAs. IDA graduates saved enough to buy or repair a home or car, start a business, or pursue postsecondary education or training. Increasingly, policymakers are recognizing the need to promote financial literacy. Federal agencies announced a new Financial Literacy and Education Commission on January 29, 2004.2 As Congress considers reauthorization of federal welfare legislation and policymakers explore ways to promote greater self-sufficiency, they would do well to maintain the funding and state flexibility needed to implement initiatives such as the FLLIP financial education and asset-building programs. States should eliminate or align resource rules, promote use of direct deposit, and support financial education, free tax counseling, IDA, and car ownership programs. Congress and regulators can complement these efforts through strengthened enforcement of the Community Reinvestment Act.
Georgetown
Dailymail, 5-9-2015, "Revealed: The college majors with the highest earnings," Mail Online, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3075189/High-school-graduates-earn-1-million-lifetime-graduate-college-new-report-finds.html
Americans who don't graduate from college could be missing out on $1million. A recently-published study The Economic Value of College Majors confirmed what researchers have long believed. The study, published by Georgetown University Center on Education and the Workforce, said 'The difference between the lifetime wages of college and high school graduates is $1 million; the difference between the highest- and lowest-paying college majors is $3.4 million.' They also showed which majors have the highest and lowest median earnings. Researchers found the college major with the highest median earnings is petroleum engineering, with $136,000. Rounding out the top five highest are pharmacy and pharmaceutical sciences and administration ($113,000), metallurgical engineering ($98,000), mining and mineral engineering ($97,000), and chemical engineering ($96,000). Meanwhile, the major with the lowest median earnings is early childhood education, with $39,000. Other low-paying majors toward the bottom of the rankings include human services and community organization ($41,000), studio arts ($42,000), social work ($42,000), teacher education: multiple levels ($42,000), and visual and performing arts ($42,000).
ACF - Tax
Administration for Children and Families, 3-29-2016, "Integrating Financial Capability Services into State Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Agencies" No Publication, https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocs/intergrating_financial_capability_services_into_state_tanf_agencies.pdf
Financial capability is the capacity—based on knowledge, skills, and access—to manage financial resources effectively. Financial capability services include financial education, financial coaching, financial counseling, credit counseling, credit building, access to safe and affordable financial products, free tax preparation help, access to federal and state benefits, incentivized savings programs, and asset ownership programs.1 Integration refers to incorporating financial capability services directly into existing services that are being provided, rather than creating a standalone program. Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) is a federally funded program administered by the Office of Family Assistance (OFA) that is designed to help needy families achieve self sufficiency through cash assistance and services to promote job preparation, work, and marriage. States receive TANF block grants to support the needs of households in their community. States administering supportive programs, such as TANF, can integrate financial capability services to improve households’ financial lives and help them meet their financial goals. By providing access to financial capability services in combination with TANF services, organizations can help households become more financially stable and better cope with economic challenges—such as job losses or unexpected large expenses. Financial capability services may reduce dependence on TANF and similar services in the future.
Rand - Tax
Dory Rand, April 2004, "FINANCIAL EDUCATION AND ASSET BUILDING PROGRAMS FOR WELFARE RECIPIENTS AND LOW INCOME WORKERS: THE ILLINOIS EXPERIENCE" The Brookings Institution Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/20040413_doryrand.pdf
A typical FLLIP IDA participant was an employed African American single female, age 30-39, with two or three children, and some college education.43 IDA participants had greater familiarity with banks and financial issues and scored higher than FEP-only participants on pre- and posttraining knowledge surveys. Both IDA and FEP participants had significant knowledge deficits regarding public benefit programs. FLLIP IDA graduates saved about $40 per month. FLLIP IDA sites and graduates reported that many participants followed instructors’ advice to use direct deposit of savings and tax refunds. Total savings by participants amounted to $116,395, which was matched by $232,790 in public and private matching funds. FLLIP IDA participants made the following types and number of asset purchases: car purchase (59); home repair (42); home purchase (34); postsecondary education or training (13); small business start-up (3); and, car repair (2). C. Lessons Learned and Best Practices Some of the lessons learned and best practice recommendations based on experience with the FLLIP programs to date include: 1. Use of incentives, such as TANF “work activity” credit, childcare and transportation subsidies, and matching funds, improve recruitment and retention in financial education and asset-building programs. 2. The target audience of low-income working adults and welfare recipients responds favorably to classes using hands-on, interactive teaching methods in a community setting. 3. Use of direct deposit or automated savings and links to free tax preparation services improve savings and asset outcomes. 4. Low-income people have significant difficulty understanding complex resource-counting rules and accessing public benefit programs for which they are eligible. 5. Non-native English speakers experience significant difficulties even with a financial education curriculum written at a fifth grade literacy level. 6. The FLLIP research team developed suggested “best practices” for financial education instructors, including: • Describe any specific benefits that participants will receive and ongoing expectations for participants
Sherman
Arloc Sherman, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 3-17-2015, "Safety Net Lifted 39 Million Americans out of Poverty in 2013," https://www.cbpp.org/blog/safety-net-lifted-39-million-americans-out-of-poverty-in-2013
As the House Ways and Means Committee holds a hearing today on empirical evidence for poverty programs, it’s worth recalling that safety net programs cut poverty nearly in half in 2013, lifting 39 million people out of poverty. The figures rebut claims that government programs do little to reduce poverty. Our analysis of Census data shows that, in 2013: Government policies cut the number of poor Americans by 39 million — from 88 million to 49 million. Of the 39 million people, “universal” assistance programs such as Social Security and unemployment insurance, which are widely available irrespective of income, cut poverty by 19 million. “Means-tested” benefits such as rent subsidies, SNAP (formerly food stamps), and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), which target households of limited means, cut poverty by another 20 million. For millions more people, government assistance makes poverty less severe: 34 million poor people were less deeply poor because of safety net benefits. These figures use the federal government’s new Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM), which — unlike the official poverty measure — accounts for taxes and non-cash benefits as well as cash income. (The SPM also makes other adjustments, such as taking into account out-of-pocket medical and work expenses and differences in living costs across the country.) Because the SPM includes taxes and non-cash benefits, it gives a more accurate picture of the impact of anti-poverty programs than the official poverty measure. Other analysts have recently used SPM data to show the strong impact of poverty programs. For example, Safety net programs lift thousands of children above the poverty line in every state, from 15,000 in Wyoming to 1.3 million in California, according to the Annie E. Casey Foundation’s Kids Count project.
Cass
Cass 16- senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute Oren, June 15 2016, “Why a Universal Basic Income Is a Terrible Idea”, Nat Review, Accessed on 6/27/17, http://www.nationalreview.com/article/436621/universal-basic-income-ubi-terrible-idea
What about poverty? Proponents say a UBI would end it, because each American would receive a check lifting him above the poverty line. But poverty is not only, or even primarily, a matter of material well-being. If it were, the $20,000 in safety-net spending per person below the poverty line, the presence of air conditioning and cable television and cell phones in the majority of such households, even the obesity epidemic ravaging low-income communities would all be signs that the war on poverty is nearly won. But we care about social as well as material conditions, and we care about upward mobility. By these measures, a UBI makes things worse. The greatest crisis facing less educated and lower-income Americans is social, not economic. As Charles Murray’s Coming Apart (2012) documents in harrowing detail, measures of social health that once looked roughly equal across economic classes now show gaping disparities, from family formation to employment to civic engagement to basic levels of trust. In 1960, Murray reports, more than 95 percent of white children were living with both biological parents when the mother turned 40, regardless of class. By the 2000s, the upper-class figure was 90 percent but the lower-class figure had declined to barely 30 percent, a level “so low that it calls into question the viability of white working-class communities as a place for socializing the next generation.” The story for other races is similar. The greatest crisis facing less educated and lower-income Americans is social, not economic.
Minogue
Minogue ’18 Minogue, Rachel (Economic Fellow at Third Way). “Five Problems with Universal Basic Income.” Third Way, 24 May 2018, https://www.thirdway.org/memo/five-problems-with-universal-basic-income.
If significant tax hikes aren’t viable, then the question remains: what gets cut in order to fund UBI? Under this scenario, UBI becomes stingy and punitive, as a vast amount of important government programs would be on the chopping block. Murray, the conservative UBI proponent, recommends that a $13,000 annual basic income replace all social assistance programs. Consider the value of the benefits people would lose: Medicaid, Medicare, Disability Insurance, the Children’s Health Insurance Program, Social Security, Supplemental Security Income, Unemployment Insurance, SNAP, Section 8 housing vouchers, Pell Grants, the Earned Income Tax Credit, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families. As Dylan Matthews writes, “$13,000 a year doesn’t mean much if you lose insurance that was paying $60,000 a year on chemotherapy.”15 Even a UBI that retains much of the existing social safety net could hit the disadvantaged harder, depending on which tax credits and government assistance programs get cut. Stern listed the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), and housing assistance as potential policies to end in favor of UBI. But consider one example. In Queens, New York, a single, low-income working parent with three children can receive up to $31,100 worth of benefits annually from SNAP, the EITC, and Section 8 housing vouchers alone, and for good reason.16 Replacing those benefits with a $12,000 UBI for the parent would reduce the family’s income and benefits by $19,100. A fundamental motivation for UBI is to eliminate poverty, but the tradeoffs necessary for funding would likely cause harm to vulnerable populations. This begs the question: If the main difference between UBI and our current safety net is that UBI gives relatively more to people who don’t need help, what would make UBI worthwhile? Some proponents have suggested UBI could be restricted to certain populations in need, but that would defy the universality at the idea’s core. At this point, what they are really proposing is an expansion of the existing safety net. That’s a worthwhile conversation to have, but it’s not about a universal basic income.
Greenstein
Greenstein 17, Robert. “Commentary: Universal Basic Income May Sound Attractive But, If It Occurred, Would Likelier Increase Poverty Than Reduce It.” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 10 Oct. 2017, www.cbpp.org/poverty-and-opportunity/commentary-universal-basic-income-may-sound-attractive-but-if-it-occurred?version=meter2Bat2B0andmodule=meter-Linksandpgtype=articleandcontentId=andmediaId=andreferrer=https3A2F2Fwww.washingtonpost.com2Fnews2Flocal2Fwp2F20162F062F072Fis-a-basic-income-possible-in-d-c-the-city-is-looking-into-it2Fandpriority=trueandaction=clickandcontentCollection=meter-links-click. SJ DT
UBI’s daunting financing challenges raise fundamental questions about its political feasibility, both now and in coming decades. Proponents often speak of an emerging left-right coalition to support it. But consider what UBI’s supporters on the right advocate. They generally propose UBI as a replacement for the current “welfare state.” That is, they would finance UBI by eliminating all or most programs for people with low or modest incomes. Consider what that would mean. If you take the dollars targeted on people in the bottom fifth or two-fifths of the population and convert them to universal payments to people all the way up the income scale, you’re redistributing income upward. That would increase poverty and inequality rather than reduce them. Yet that’s the platform on which the (limited) support for UBI on the right largely rests. It entails abolishing programs from SNAP (food stamps) — which largely eliminated the severe child malnutrition found in parts of the Southern “black belt” and Appalachia in the late 1960s — to the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), Section 8 rental vouchers, Medicaid, Head Start, child care assistance, and many others. These programs lift tens of millions of people, including millions of children, out of poverty each year and make tens of millions more less poor. Some UBI proponents may argue that by ending current programs, we’d reap large administrative savings that we could convert into UBI payments. But that’s mistaken. For the major means-tested programs — SNAP, Medicaid, the EITC, housing vouchers, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and school meals — administrative costs consume only 1 to 9 percent of program resources, as a CBPP analysis explains.1 Their funding goes overwhelmingly to boost the incomes and purchasing power of low-income families. Moreover, as the Roosevelt Institute’s Mike Konczal has noted, eliminating Medicaid, SNAP, the EITC, housing vouchers, and the like would still leave you far short of what’s needed to financinge a meaningful UBI.
Matthews
Dylan Matthews, Vox, 3-14-2018, "Want to stay out of prison? Choose rich parents.," Vox, https://www.vox.com/identities/2018/3/14/17114226/incarceration-family-income-parents-study-brookings-rich-kid-poor-kid
Boys from the poorest families are 20 times likelier to end up in prison than boys from the richest families. Boys who grew up in families in the bottom tenth of the income distribution are about 20 times more likely to be in prison in their 30s than boys born into families in the top tenth: That conclusion, reached by two researchers who leveraged millions of individual tax records, may not be surprising but should be shocking. The Brookings Institution’s Adam Looney and the Federal Reserve Board of Governors’ Nicholas Turner, the two economists behind the paper, both used to work at the Treasury Department. That gave them access to unusually rich tax return data sets and made it possible to link people’s prison histories with their earnings and the earnings of their parents. A few years ago, such a study wouldn’t have been possible. But beginning in 2012, the federal government started requiring state governments and the Federal Bureau of Prisons to report data on prisoners in their custody to the IRS. The main goal was to make it easier to audit prisoners. “The idea was, ‘Let’s audit prisoners to make sure they’re not claiming fraudulent tax refunds,’” Looney explains.
Schrager
Allison Schrager, 7-22-2015, "In America, mass incarceration has caused more crime than it’s prevented," Quartz, https://qz.com/458675/in-america-mass-incarceration-has-caused-more-crime-than-its-prevented/
A new paper from University of Michigan economics professor Michael Mueller-Smith measures how much incapacitation reduced crime. He looked at court records from Harris County, Texas from 1980 to 2009.Mueller-Smith observed that in Harris County people charged with similar crimes received totally different sentences depending on the judge to whom they were randomly assigned. Mueller-Smith then tracked what happened to these prisoners. He estimated that each year in prison increases the odds that a prisoner would reoffend by 5.6 a quarter. Even people who went to prison for lesser crimes wound up committing more serious offenses subsequently, the more time they spent in prison. His conclusion: Any benefit from taking criminals out of the general population is more than off-set by the increase in crime from turning small offenders into career criminals. High recidivism rates are not unique to Texas: Within 5 years of release more than 75 of prisoners are arrested again. Why does prison turn people into career criminals? Prison obliterates your earnings potential. Being a convicted felon disqualifies you from certain jobs, housing, or voting. Mueller-Smith estimates that each year in prison reduces the odds of post-release employment by 24 and increases the odds you’ll live on public assistance. Time in prison also lowers the odds you’ll get or stay married. Being in prison and out of the labor force degrades legitimate skills and exposes you to criminal skills and a criminal network. This makes crime a more attractive alternative upon release, even if you run a high risk of returning to prison.
Mosley
E. Mosely, 7-12-2008, "GO KIDS," Texas Department of Criminal Justice, https://www.tdcj.texas.gov/gokids/gokids_articles_children_impacted.html
When a loved one is sentenced to prison, the emotional turmoil is difficult for everyone to handle. Perhaps the heaviest burden is felt by those who are unintentional victims of crime - children of incarcerated parents. Nationally, 7.3 million children have at least one parent in jail or prison. Sadly, 70 percent of these kids are doomed to follow in the same footsteps as their parents becoming imprisoned at some point in their lives. In fact, children of incarcerated parents are five times more likely than their peers to commit crimes. However, these at-risk children are largely ignored before they get in trouble. More troubling for African Americans are the telling statistics. According to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, of the 156,235 prisoners in the state of Texas, 57, 857 are Black - the highest of any other ethnicity. Women constitute 12,445 of the total prison population - an increase of 428 from 2007 when 12,017 females were behind bars. So what becomes of these children whose mother and/or fathers are locked up? Often, they are left to fend for themselves emotionally and the stress of child-rearing falls on a grandmother, usually, or another surrogate parent or the children may end up in protective services. These hardships manifest in the children in mental health issues like depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder and feelings of abandonment, said psychotherapist Dr. Janice Beal. Also, children go through a grieving process. In an effort to curb the cycle of imprisonment and address an overlooked population of at-risk children, more organizations and people are advocating for children with parents in prison. "One thing I continuously see is depression among this population. The children (of incarcerated parents) express a lot of anger and a lot of aggressive behavior and some anxiety," Beal said. "Children express depression different from adults. They don't verbalize it and say, ' I feel sad right now.' They usually act out their behaviors. "They go to school and can't focus on what they're doing, and their grades begin to drop," Beal added. "School personnel may feel that their behaviors are symptoms associated with ADHD; however, it could also be depression. It (depression) can manifest itself in different ways. We have diagnosed children with depression as early as five-years old. Depending on when the parent left home and the manner in which they were taken, children face feelings of fear, abandonment, guilt, and they may began to act younger than their stated age", Beal said. | 904,666 |
365,528 | 379,591 | Mobility Affirmative | Inherency
Mitnik
Mitnik, Pable A. Stanford.edu, The Pew Charitable Trusts and the Russell Sage Foundation, July 2015, web.stanford.edu/~pmitnik/EconomicMobilityintheUnitedStates.pdf.
The principle of equal opportunity holds so distinguished a place in U.S. history that it even appears in drafts of the country’s founding documents.1 This idea has been interpreted in various ways, but it is typically understood to mean that success should depend on hard work, that opportunities to get ahead should not be affected by the circumstances of birth, and that the labor market should allow for free and open competition among children from all social origins. But is the United States realizing this frequently expressed commitment to equal opportunity? According to a recent survey, only 64 percent of Americans now believe that opportunities for mobility are widely available, the lowest percentage in the roughly three decades the question has been tracked.2 Concern is also growing among scholars and policymakers that the ideal of equal opportunity, which has always been difficult to realize, is not being pursued as effectively as circumstances demand. This sense has been partly fueled by research, much of it by The Pew Charitable Trusts, showing that those born into the top or bottom of the economic ladder are quite likely to remain there as adults.3 Given the substantial body of research on economic mobility, one might imagine that little remains unknown. This is not the case. Although it is well established that a person’s income is related to that of his or her parents, some uncertainty remains about exactly how strong this relationship is. Among studies that rely on the intergenerational elasticity (IGE), the estimates of mobility range widely, making it difficult to reach a consensus on how evenly or unevenly opportunity is distributed. (For an explanation of the IGE, see the sidebar on Page 2.) In previous research, the IGE estimates have varied widely, with recent estimates based on administrative data ranging from as low as 0.34 to as high as 0.6.4 Because of this variability, the actual level of economic persistence across generations remains unclear.5 This uncertainty arises in part because of limitations in the data used to study economic mobility. For example, survey data fail to represent high-income families, while some of the existing administrative analyses are based on relatively young adults who may have not yet hit their earnings stride. These and other limitations can be addressed with a new data set based on tax data and other administrative sources that was developed by the Statistics of Income (SOI) Division of the Internal Revenue Service.6 This data set, created to study tax policy and intergenerational mobility, allows for one of the most robust assessments of the intergenerational transmission of economic advantage yet conducted in the United States. It also lays the groundwork for assessing long-term mobility trends. The research based on this new data set found that: • Approximately half of parental income advantages are passed on to children. The IGE, when averaged across all levels of parental income, is estimated at 0.52 for men and 0.47 for women. These estimates are at the high end of previous estimates and imply that the United States is very immobile.7 • The persistence of advantage is especially large among those raised in the middle to upper reaches of the income distribution. The IGE among adults whose parents were between the 50th and 90th income percentiles is 0.68 for men and 0.63 for women. This means that approximately two-thirds of parental income differences within this region of the income distribution persist into the next generation. • Children born far apart in the income distribution have very different economic outcomes. While a finding of unequal outcomes is not in itself surprising, the magnitude of this inequality has not been well appreciated: 2 The expected family income of children raised in families at the 90th income percentile is about three times that of children raised at the 10th percentile. • Parental income matters more for men’s earnings than for women’s. The average earnings IGE for men (0.56) is more than 40 percent higher than that for women (0.32). Although both men and women benefit from being born into higher-income families, men benefit much more—at least when it comes to their own earnings. • Parental income matters more for women’s chances of marriage, and of marrying better-off partners. The income IGE is large for men (0.52) mainly because children from higher-income families tend to have higher earnings as adults. For women, the income IGE is nearly as large (0.47), mainly because those from higherincome origins are more likely to be married in their late 30s—and to marry higher-earnings partners. These results show that children born into lower-income families can expect very different futures relative to those from higher-income families. Given the country’s commitment to equality of opportunity, the findings may suggest the need for policies that increase economic mobility. Because a wide range of institutions affect mobility, including the family, schools, labor markets, and the tax system, many entry points are possible for developing such policies.8 Although the findings of this report can inform public policy, they do not lead to particular policy prescriptions or indicate which of these many possible intervention points should be given priority.
Raj
Chetty, Raj, et al. “Economic Mobility.” The Stanford Center on Poverty and Inequality, The Poverty and Inequality Report 2015, 2015, inequality.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/SOTU_2015_economic-mobility.pdf.
The United States is often hailed as the “land of opportunity,” a society in which a child’s chances of success depend little on her family background. Is this reputation warranted? And is it especially warranted in some states, regions, or areas of the United States? There is a growing public perception that intergenerational income mobility—a child’s chance of moving up in the income distribution relative to her parents—is declining in the United States. Is it really true that opportunity has declined? In two recent papers, we address these questions by compiling statistics from millions of anonymous income records.1 These data have less measurement error and much larger sample sizes than previous survey-based studies and thus yield more precise estimates of intergenerational mobility across cities and states over time. Our core sample consists of all children in the United States born between 1980–1982, whose income we measure in 2011–2012, when they are approximately 30 years old. We divide our analysis into two parts: an analysis of time trends and an analysis of geographical variation in mobility across areas of the United States. Time Trends We find that the most robust way to measure intergenerational mobility is by ranking parents by parental income (at the time the child was growing up in the family) and by ranking children by their income when they are adults. For each percentile of parent’s income, we compute the average rank of the income of the children when adults. As shown in Figure 1, we find that this rank-rank relationship is almost perfectly linear, with a slope of 0.34. This implies that children growing up in the highest-income families rank, on average, 34 percentiles higher than children growing up in the poorest families. Contrary to popular perception, we find that such percentile rank–based measures of intergenerational mobility have remained extremely stable for the 1971–1993 birth cohorts. For example, the probability that a child reaches the top fifth of the income distribution given parents in the bottom fifth is 8.4 percent for children born in 1971, compared with 9.0 percent for those born in 1986. Children born to the highest-income families in 1984 were 74.5 percentage points more likely to attend college than those from the lowest-income families. The corresponding gap for children born in 1993 is 69.2 percentage points, suggesting that, if anything, mobility may have increased slightly in recent cohorts. Figure 2 illustrates the stability of intergenerational mobility for children born between 1971 and 1993 (where, for children born after 1986, estimates are predictions based on college attendance rates). The y-axis, “intergenerational persistence,” is a measure of the gap in average income percentiles for children born in the poorest versus richest families. On average, children with parents in the bottom 1 percent of the income distribution grow up to earn an income approximately 30 percentiles lower than their peers with parents in the top 1 percent of the income distribution. This difference has remained relatively steady across the birth cohorts we studied. Economic Mobility By Raj Chetty, Nathaniel Hendren, Patrick Kline, and Emmanuel Saez The Stanford Center on Poverty and Inequality state of states Key findings • There is less intergenerational mobility in the United States than is sometimes appreciated by the public, but intergenerational mobility is not declining. When poor children born in 1971 and 1986 are compared, one finds a slight increase (from 8.4 to 9.0 percent) in the chances of reaching the top fifth of the income distribution by age 28.
Gould
Gould, Elise. “U.S. Lags behind Peer Countries in Mobility.” Economic Policy Institute, 10 Oct. 2012, www.epi.org/publication/usa-lags-peer-countries-mobility
The notion that anyone in America who is willing and able to “pull themselves up by their bootstraps” can achieve significant upward mobility is deeply embedded in U.S. society. Conventional wisdom holds that class barriers in the United States are the lowest among the world’s advanced economies. Motivating this belief is the notion that there is a tradeoff between market regulation and mobility; advanced European economies are characterized by higher taxes, greater regulation, more union coverage, universal health care, a more comprehensive social contract, etc. Because some see these policies and institutions as impediments to mobility, mobility is believed to be greater in the United States. While faith in the American Dream is deep, evidence suggests that the United States lacks policies to ensure the opportunities that the dream envisions. According to the data, there is considerably more mobility in most other developed economies. The figure below, from The State of Working America, 12th Edition, measures the relationship between earnings of fathers and sons in member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) with similar incomes to the United States and for which data are available. An elasticity of zero would mean there is no relationship, and thus complete intergenerational mobility, with poor children just as likely as rich children to end up as rich adults. The higher the elasticity, the greater the influence of one’s birth circumstances on later life position. The relationship between father-son earnings is tighter in the United States than in most peer OECD countries, meaning U.S. mobility is among the lowest of major industrialized economies. The relatively low correlations between father-son earnings in Scandinavian countries provide a stark contradiction to the conventional wisdom. An elasticity of 0.47 found in the United States offers much less likelihood of moving up than an elasticity of 0.18 or less, as characterizes Finland, Norway, and Denmark.
Douthat
Douthat, Ross. “Poverty and Perverse Incentives.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 11 Dec. 2012, douthat.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/11/poverty-and-perverse-incentives/.
My colleague Nick Kristof has earned some deserved praise from conservatives for using his Sunday column to reflect on the perverse incentives that welfare programs can sometimes create for their beneficiaries. Here’s his arresting opening example: This is what poverty sometimes looks like in America: parents here in Appalachian hill country pulling their children out of literacy classes. Moms and dads fear that if kids learn to read, they are less likely to qualify for a monthly check for having an intellectual disability. Many people in hillside mobile homes here are poor and desperate, and a $698 monthly check per child from the Supplemental Security Income program goes a long way — and those checks continue until the child turns 18. “The kids get taken out of the program because the parents are going to lose the check,” said Billie Oaks, who runs a literacy program here in Breathitt County, a poor part of Kentucky. “It’s heartbreaking.” Right now, of course, Washington is consumed by the endlessly-recurring left-right debate over whether to raise marginal tax rates on the rich. But the problem Kristof is describing is a reminder that effective marginal tax rates may matter more at the bottom of the income ladder, where benefit cut-offs can discourage precisely the kind of choices that enable intergenerational mobility, and make striving of any sort seem like a dicier proposition than sticking with the benefits you have. The loss of the $698 disability subsidy is a stark, all-or-nothing example — not just a marginal tax on advancement, but a flat penalty on the act of getting an education for your children. But in more subtle and complicated ways, a similar problem plays itself out across the range of anti-poverty programs, from food stamps and Medicaid to the earned income tax credit and S-CHIP, that phase out or cut off as their recipients’ take-home pay increases. As of 2012, a new C.B.O. report finds, low and moderate-income workers face an effective tax rate of about 30 percent on every extra dollar earned, which will rise to 35 percent (almost as high as the marginal bite on upper-class paychecks) as the subsidies for the new health care law take effect. And that clean-sounding figure was obtained by only looking at a relatively narrow range of taxes and benefits: The more programs and variables you include in your analysis, the more byzantine the incentives for people trying to make it up the economic ladder start to look — complete with a number of “cliffs” where taking a higher-paying job can actually leave you with less disposable income than you had before.
Preventing Employment Links
Hughes
Hughes, Charles. “New Study Finds More Evidence of Poverty Traps in the Welfare System.” Cato Institute, 30 Dec. 2014, www.cato.org/blog/new-study-finds-more-evidence-poverty-traps-welfare-system.
A new study from the Illinois Policy Institute analyzes the welfare benefits package available at different levels of earnings in that state. The authors find that low?income workers have limited economic incentive to increase their earnings from the minimum wage, and at some higher levels of earnings these workers actually see a reduction in net income. America’s complex welfare system can too often create these perverse situations where beneficiaries are financially worse off as they increase work effort and earned income. In these poverty traps, lost benefits and increased taxes outweigh any additional earnings, making it harder for beneficiaries to escape from poverty and reach the middle class Author Erik Randolph finds that a single mother with two children who increases her hourly earnings from the Illinois minimum wage of $8.25 to $12 only sees her net income increase by less than $400. For many low?income workers striving to climb the ladder of prosperity, our welfare system takes away almost all of their incentive to move up from an entry?level job as they do not get to realize almost any of these gains. Even worse, someone in this scenario who works hard and increases her earnings all the way to $18 an hour, a wage level which would place her in the middle class, would actually see her net income decrease by more than $24,800 due to benefit reductions and tax increases. Instead of making it easier for beneficiaries to become independent and achieve a level of prosperity, the welfare system traps them into low levels of earnings. This parent would have to increase her earnings all the way to $38 an hour in order to replace the lost benefits and achieve the same standard of living. These findings echo some of the insights from our Work versus Welfare Trade?off paper, in which we compared the benefits available to a similar family in each state to the equivalent wage that family would have to earn to obtain the same level of net income. Our study found that the high level of benefits available combined with benefit cliffs created situations that would deter work. In 34 states, the parent would have to earn well above the minimum wage to achieve the same standard of living she had when not working. This new report from the Illinois Policy Institute illustrates some of the biggest problems with our current welfare system and corroborates many of the findings of our past work. Work versus Welfare looked at two situations, one where the parent worked and one where she had no earned income. This new study from the Illinois Policy Institute provides valuable additional insight, as it looks at this tradeoff at different levels of earned income to analyze the poverty traps in place as beneficiaries move to higher levels of earned income. Instead of encouraging work, the current welfare system often takes away much of the incentive for low?income workers to increase work effort and earnings. As Randolph puts it, “rather than providing a hand up, Illinois’ welfare system can become a trap,” and this is unfortunately the case throughout the country. This study shows yet another reason why our welfare system needs fundamental reform.
Hamilton
Hamilton, Leah (MSW, PhD). “Why Welfare Doesn't Work: And What We Should Do Instead.” BIEN, Basic Income Earth Network, 29 June 2018, basicincome.org/news/2018/06/why-welfare-doesnt-work-and-what-we-should-do-instead/.
Democrats and Republicans don’t see eye to eye very often, but they can safely agree on one point: welfare doesn’t work. Liberals are concerned that an ever-shrinking social safety net reaches fewer and fewer families in need. Republicans worry that welfare benefits create dependence. They are both right. The primary cash assistance program in the United States, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, served 68 of low-income families in 1996. Today, only 23 of poor families receive assistance. This change has been largely brought about by the imposition of five-year lifetime limits (states are allowed to set lower limits) and stricter eligibility criteria. Welfare caseload reductions have been solidly linked to the rise of deep poverty in America, family strain and increased foster care placements. 1.46 million US households (including 2.8 million children) now live on less than $2 per person, per day (the World Bank’s measurement of extreme poverty). Meanwhile, welfare eligibility rules designed to encourage independence have achieved the opposite effect. For example, though many states impose strict work requirements, states which loosen these rules actually see recipients move to higher wage, higher benefit work, presumably because they have the breathing room to search for a good job rather than take the first one that comes along. Similarly, in states with strict limitations on recipient assets, poor families are less likely to own a car, making it nearly impossible to maintain employment in areas without public transportation. Even worse, some researchers are discovering a “cliff effect” in which welfare recipients immediately lose all benefits (including child care assistance) after a small increase in income. As a result, many parents turn down promotional opportunities because they would be ultimately worse off financially. Any parent would make the same decision if it meant the ability to feed their children and afford quality childcare. We must redesign this entire system. In the most prosperous nation in the world, it is ludicrous that children are growing up in the kind of deprivation we normally associate with developing countries. Simultaneously, we must ensure that no one is discouraged from growing their income or assets. We must redesign this entire system. In the most prosperous nation in the world, it is ludicrous that children are growing up in the kind of deprivation we normally associate with developing countries. Simultaneously, we must ensure that no one is discouraged from growing their income or assets. One potential solution is a universal basic income, which would provide an annual benefit to every citizen. However, this idea comes with a hefty price tag and would either increase our national deficit or increase the marginal tax rate, both of which might be political non-starters. The simpler solution is a Negative Income Tax (NIT) which is potentially cheaper than our current poverty alleviation efforts. An NIT is a refundable tax credit which brings every household to the federal poverty level. The most effective way to do this is to decrease the credit slowly (for example, a $0.50 reduction for each $1.00 increase in earned income) so that there is never a penalty for hard work.
Tanner
Tanner, Michael(Senior fellow at the CATO institute). “Ending Welfare as We Know It.” National Review, National Review, 27 Apr. 2016, www.nationalreview.com/2016/04/welfare-trapping-poor-poverty/.
A GNI would also treat poor people as adults, expecting them to budget and manage their money like everyone else. Currently, most welfare programs parcel out payments, not to the poor themselves, but to those who provide services to the poor, such as landlords or health-care providers. But shouldn’t the poor decide for themselves how much of their income should be allocated to rent or food or education or transportation? Perhaps they may even choose to save more or invest in learning new skills that will help them earn more in the future. You can’t expect the poor to behave responsibly if they are never given any responsibility. Moreover, giving the poor responsibility for managing their own lives will mean more choices and opportunities. That, in turn, will break up geographic concentrations of poverty that can isolate the poor from the rest of society and reinforce the worst aspects of the poverty culture. And, by taking the money away from the special interests that support the welfare industry, it would break up the coalitions that inevitably push for greater spending. A GNI would also provide far better incentives when it comes to work, marriage, and savings. Because current welfare benefits are phased out as income increases, they in effect create high marginal tax rates that can discourage work or marriage. Studies have shown that a person on welfare who takes a job can lose as much as 95 cents out of every dollar he earns, through taxes and forgone benefits. Poor people, by and large, are not lazy, but they also aren’t stupid. If they can’t earn more through work than from welfare, many will choose to remain on welfare. In contrast, a guaranteed national income would not penalize someone who left welfare for work. And a guaranteed national income would also do away with much of the government’s excuse for regulating the economy. Minimum-wage laws would instantly become obsolete, to cite just one example. Moreover, a GNI could minimize the economic disruptions that occur from automation and free trade. There would be less opportunity for demagoguery on the American political scene and less resistance to liberalizing the economy.
Discourage Asset Growth Links
Edwards
Edwards, Chris(director of tax policy studies at Cato), and Ryan Bourne. “Exploring Wealth Inequality.” Cato Institute, 5 Nov. 2019, www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/exploring-wealth-inequality#asset-tests.
Displacement of Personal Savings The largest federal program, Social Security, is a prominent example of crowding out. The program is a tax?funded benefit program, not a savings plan. Many Americans rely on Social Security for most or all of their retirement income. The program discourages workers from saving for their own retirement, and it reduces their ability to do so with its heavy 12.4 percent tax on wages up to a dollar cap. In pioneering studies in the 1970s, Martin Feldstein explored how Social Security displaced private savings.138 He found that every dollar increase in benefits reduced private savings by about 50 cents.139 Studies since then have generally confirmed the substantial displacement effect, although the magnitudes of the estimated effects have varied.140 Social Security represents a much larger share of retirement resources for the non?rich than the rich, and the program’s benefits cannot be inherited. The result is that the program’s crowding?out effect increases wealth inequality. Jagadeesh Gokhale and Laurence Kotlikoff modeled a simulated population to estimate that Social Security raises the Gini coefficient on wealth by one?fifth and increases the share of wealth held by the top 10 percent by more than one?quarter.141 This occurs because Social Security leaves the non?rich with “proportionately less to save, less reason to save, and a larger share of their old?age resources in a nonbequeathable form than the lifetime rich. In doing so, Social Security denies the children of the poor the opportunity to receive inheritances.”142 The fact that Social Security increases wealth inequality may surprise people because the program is thought to be a progressive achievement. While the program may reduce income inequality, it raises wealth inequality. Other social programs create similar effects. Medicare provides large resources to retirees and thus also reduces incentives to save for retirement. Unemployment insurance, welfare, education aid, and other programs reduce incentives for people to save for midlife expenses. In general, when the government provides income and other social benefits to people, savings incentives are reduced. Higher government aid results in lower private wealth. Bar?? Kaymak and Markus Poschke built a model of the U.S. economy to estimate the causes of changing wealth inequality in recent decades. They found that the main factor raising wealth inequality has been technological change that has increased wage dispersion. But they also found that the expansion of Social Security and Medicare has had a large effect: By subsidizing income and healthcare expenditures for the elderly, these programs curb incentives to save for retirement, a major source of wealth accumulation over the life?cycle. Furthermore, since both programs are redistributive by design, they have a stronger effect on the savings of low? and middle?income groups. By contrast, those at the top of the income distribution have little to gain from these programs. We argue that the redistributive nature of transfer payments was instrumental in curbing wealth accumulation for income groups outside the top 10 and, consequently, amplified wealth concentration in the U.S.143 Kaymak and Poschke found that the expansion of Social Security and Medicare caused about one?quarter of the rise of the top 1 percent share of wealth in recent decades.144 Social Security and Medicare spending increased from 3.5 percent of GDP in 1970 to 8.3 percent by 2018.145 Those are the two largest federal social programs, but other programs have likely added to this wealth inequality effect. Total federal and state social spending as a share of GDP more than doubled from 6.8 percent in 1970 to 14.3 percent by 2018.146 That large increase was over the period that Thomas Piketty and some other economists claim that there was a large increase in wealth inequality. Section 1 argues that the increase has been modest, but however large, a substantial share stemmed not from market forces but from expansion in government social benefits. Generations of Americans have grown up assuming that the government will take care of them when they are sick, unemployed, and retired. They have responded by putting aside less of their earnings for their own future expenses. Financing social programs requires not just the federal payroll tax but also a large share of other federal and state taxes. American families are less able to save because of higher taxes, and they have a reduced incentive to do so because of the expectation of receiving government benefits. Further evidence for the displacement effect of the welfare state comes from cross?country studies. In an early study comparing national levels of Social Security benefits to private savings, Feldstein found that higher benefits had a “powerful effect” in reducing private savings.147 More recently, a 2015 study by Pirmin Fessler and Martin Schürz for the European Central Bank used a large survey database across European countries to explore the relationship between the level of social spending and wealth distribution. Their statistical results showed that “the degree of welfare state spending across countries is negatively correlated with household net wealth.”148 They explained: The substitution effect of welfare state expenditures with regard to private wealth holdings is significant along the full net wealth distribution, but is relatively lower at higher levels of net wealth. Given an increase in welfare state expenditure, the percentage decrease in net wealth of poorer households is relatively stronger than for households in the upper part of the wealth distribution. This finding implies that given an increase of welfare state expenditure, wealth inequality measured by standard relative inequality measures, such as the Gini coefficient, will increase.149 Based on Fessler and Schürz’s data, countries such as Germany and the Netherlands have relatively high social spending and relatively low private wealth holdings by less well?off households. But other countries such as Luxembourg and Spain have relatively low social spending and relatively high private wealth holdings by less well?off households.150 Consistent with those findings, a 2018 Organisation for Economic Co?operation and Development study shows relatively higher wealth inequality in Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands and relatively lower wealth inequality in Luxembourg and Spain.151 The Gini coefficient for wealth is similar in the United States (85), Denmark (84), Norway (79), and Sweden (87), which people usually think of as egalitarian nations.152 Credit Suisse’s Global Wealth Databook 2014 explained: Strong social security programs—good public pensions, free higher education or generous student loans, unemployment and health insurance—can greatly reduce the need for personal financial assets, as Domeij and Klein (2002) found for public pensions in Sweden. Public housing programs can do the same for real assets. This is one explanation for the high level of wealth inequality we identify in Denmark, Norway and Sweden: the top groups continue to accumulate for business and investment purposes, while the middle and lower classes have a less pressing need for personal saving than in many other countries.153 Another way to think about the effect of social programs on wealth is to estimate the present value of future promised government benefits as if it were real wealth. A 2019 study by John Sabelhaus and Alice Henriques Volz calculated Social Security “wealth” for U.S. households compared to the wealth held in private defined benefit and defined contribution retirement plans.154 It found that Social Security wealth is twice as large as the combined wealth in private retirement plans and is heavily skewed toward lower?income households.155 For the least?wealthy one?quarter of U.S. households, Social Security wealth is five times larger than private retirement plan wealth, whereas for the most?wealthy one?quarter of households, Social Security wealth is less than half as large as private retirement wealth. Social Security and other entitlement programs loom large in household finances for the nonwealthy and thus likely displace a large amount of private wealth. As a result, all the widely cited statistics about wealth distribution—including Gini coefficients and top 1 percent shares—substantially overstate wealth inequality because they exclude Social Security. In a 2016 analysis, Sabelhaus, Henriques Volz, and Sebastian Devlin?Foltz concluded, “Claims to future Social Security benefits are a key component of retirement wealth, and thus failure to include Social Security leads to a biased assessment of the overall distribution of retirement wealth.”156 That is true of Medicare benefits as well. Future Social Security and Medicare benefits represent “wealth” typically worth hundreds of thousands of dollars to individuals. A 2018 Urban Institute study found, for example, that an average?income single man retiring at age 65 in 2020 could expect to receive $318,000 in Social Security benefits and $229,000 in Medicare benefits in present value terms.157 Those are large figures compared to the amount of financial assets the average person holds. Laurence Kotlikoff notes that if claims to future Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid benefits were included in wealth estimates, we “might find declining wealth inequality in recent decades.”158 To individuals, Social Security and other entitlements seem like wealth, but they only represent promises of future benefits, and those benefits are in jeopardy because these unfunded programs are driving huge and rising government deficits and debt. As currently structured, Social Security will only be able to pay a fraction of promised benefits down the road. The Cato Institute has long argued that the United States should move to a retirement system based on private savings accounts, as numerous other countries have done.159 Traditional benefits would be phased out over time as younger workers built up savings in private accounts with a portion of their earnings that currently go to federal payroll taxes. Other social programs could be transitioned to a savings basis as well. Feldstein modeled how the United States could move toward a savings?based Medicare system.160 The nation of Chile has a savings?based unemployment insurance system that is integrated with its savings?based Social Security system.161 Such savings accounts would be inheritable, unlike the benefits from current social programs. They would also be more secure because they would not depend on political promises of a massively indebted government. If the United States transitioned to savings?based social programs, it would dramatically reduce measured wealth inequality as the non?rich built up financial assets. A sad irony in public policy debates is that the politicians—such as Senators Sanders and Warren—who complain the loudest about wealth inequality also oppose moving toward the savings?based social programs that would reduce measured wealth inequality. Asset Tests Government social programs do not just displace private savings by changing incentives to save; some programs actively deter private saving. Numerous means?tested welfare programs impose both income and asset tests, the latter of which cut off benefits if a measure of personal assets rises above statutory thresholds.162 Asset tests are in place for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income, and other programs.163 Both federal and state governments play a role in setting these rules, and there is substantial variability between the states. The purpose of asset tests is to limit program costs and to target benefits to the people most in need. Asset tests help to prevent abuse by people gaining benefits who do not really need them. However, a harmful side effect is that asset tests help to trap people in poverty by discouraging a culture of personal saving. If assets rise above capped levels, the tests act as a 100 percent tax rate on additional wealth accumulation. The caps are sometimes as low as $3,000, although there has been a loosening of rules in many states in recent years. A number of economic studies have documented the negative effects of asset tests.164 The important point with respect to wealth inequality is that asset tests are one mechanism by which governments, not markets, skew economic outcomes to intensify wealth inequality.
Landy
Landy, Benjamin. “How Asset Tests Punish the Poor.” The Century Foundation, 20 Nov. 2013, tcf.org/content/commentary/how-asset-tests-punish-the-poor/?session=1.
Public policy and the poverty trap Every day, millions of low-income Americans live in fear of losing public assistance entirely if they earn any extra income, save too much money, or buy a car to get to a new job. The way that asset tests are designed, even one additional dollar in income could be enough to disqualify a family from receiving benefits worth thousands. That isn't a problem when benefits are phased out slowly, as with the Earned Income Tax Credit. But with many other programs—TANF (welfare), SNAP (food stamps) and Medicaid, to name a few—beneficiaries face a stark choice: continually spend down their savings or become suddenly ineligible. Means-testing makes sense in theory. Public assistance programs are designed to provide benefits only to people with too few resources to avoid destitution. To determine whether an applicant is eligible, government agencies consider both income and assets, including anything that can be converted into cash, like stocks, bonds and bank accounts. In some cases, the list even includes cars, retirement accounts and college savings plans. There is no doubt that denying benefits based on these criteria helps the government to save money. The problem from a public policy standpoint is that asset-testing also creates a powerful incentive for families not to save money. In general, taxes increase progressively with income. But benefits also disappear as income rises, acting as a secondary tax on each additional dollar. The result, according to the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office, is an effective marginal tax rate on income as high as 95 percent for some low-income people. This is the very definition of a poverty trap.
Vallas
Vallas, Rebecca(senior fellow at American Progress, where she has spent the past five years helping to build and lead CAP’s Poverty to Prosperity Program in a range of roles including as the program’s managing director and vice president), and Joe Valenti. “Asset Limits Are a Barrier to Economic Security and Mobility.” Center for American Progress, 10 Sept. 2014, www.americanprogress.org/issues/poverty/reports/2014/09/10/96754/asset-limits-are-a-barrier-to-economic-security-and-mobility/.
Our nation’s public assistance programs do a lot to mitigate hardship and support employment. Without the safety net, the U.S. poverty rate would be nearly twice as high as it is today. However, many of these work and income supports come with restrictive asset limits—eligibility requirements that penalize savings and ownership and are counterproductive to the goal of helping families achieve economic security. Asset limits can make it difficult—if not impossible—for families to get the help they need when they fall on hard times. Consider Melissa, a low-income California woman who applied for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, or TANF, to make ends meet after leaving her abusive husband. Because she owned an eight-year-old car that was presumably worth more than $4,650—the maximum car value then permitted for public assistance recipients under California law—she was denied assistance. Out of options, Melissa had no choice but to sell her car in order to afford rent and other basic expenses. By the time she finally became eligible for benefits, she was even more vulnerable than before since no longer owning a car made it that much more difficult for her to get back on her feet. California has since softened its vehicle asset policies somewhat, but they still restrict car ownership for recipients of certain types of assistance. Many other states have asset-limit policies that similarly conflict with the goals of employment and economic security, especially given the importance of savings and assets for low-income families who are trying to pull themselves out of poverty. Having even a few hundred dollars in savings can make it easier to weather financial setbacks without facing the risk of eviction or having utilities shut off, and assets such as a vehicle can be key to securing and maintaining employment. But because of asset limits, struggling families can face a difficult dilemma: being told on the one hand the value of savings and self-reliance, while on the other being discouraged or explicitly prohibited from having modest savings or assets as a condition of accessing needed public assistance programs. Fortunately, many states and the federal government have begun to address this issue by limiting savings and ownership conditions or removing asset limits completely. For example, California increased its vehicle asset limit to $9,500 last summer in order to enable more low-income families to get the help they need without having to sell a vehicle on which they rely. By reforming asset penalties, states have both saved themselves money and made their income assistance programs more efficient. However, further action is needed. Congress and state policymakers should ensure that counterproductive asset limits do not needlessly stand in the way of economic security for families on the brink.
How asset limits work Asset limits require that public assistance applicants and recipients certify not only that they have very low incomes, but also that the resources they own are valued below a certain threshold. Families must provide extensive documentation regarding bank accounts, other forms of savings, the value of any houses or cars, and additional resources—sometimes even the value of prepaid burial plots. In practice, these limits are often burdensome for state agencies to administer, as well as intrusive for the families applying for assistance. Both the federal government and states are involved in establishing asset limits, leading to varying state standards in terms of whether limits exist, how high they are, and whether basics such as the family car are counted as resources. Many public assistance programs give states leeway to set asset limits: Temporary Assistance for Needy Families provides modest, time-limited income support to qualifying very low-income families with children. TANF asset limits are set by states and range widely, from $1,000 in states such as Georgia and Texas to $10,000 in Delaware. In a growing trend, eight states—Ohio, Louisiana, Colorado, Virginia, Alabama, Hawaii, Illinois, and Maryland—have opted to eliminate their TANF asset limits entirely, and all but Ohio and Virginia have done so within the past five years. The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, or SNAP—formerly known as food stamps—provides nutrition assistance to low-income individuals and families. The federal SNAP asset limit is set at $2,000—or $3,250 for households with an elderly or disabled member—but states are permitted to raise or eliminate the asset limit for households that meet the eligibility requirements of other related programs. The technical term for this policy is “broad-based categorical eligibility,” and it allows states to streamline access to nutrition assistance. Five states have opted to set their SNAP asset limits above the federal level, and 36 states and the District of Columbia have eliminated asset limits in SNAP altogether. Ten states have retained asset limits at the very low federal baseline level. The Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program, or LIHEAP, provides assistance to low-income families in meeting their home heating costs during the winter months. Federal law does not place asset restrictions on LIHEAP eligibility, but states may opt to impose restrictions. Currently, 12 states have LIHEAP asset limits in place, most of which are at or below $5,000. For other programs, the federal government plays a larger role in setting limits: Medicaid provides health insurance to qualifying low-income adults and children. Traditionally, the Medicaid asset limit, which is set by the federal government, was $2,000. However, states were free to determine their own asset limits, and they varied across states and eligibility categories, such as adults with disabilities, pregnant women, and the elderly. Recognizing, however, that savings penalties should not serve as a barrier to health insurance, policymakers recently removed asset limits from Medicaid through the Affordable Care Act. Supplemental Security Income, or SSI, provides income support to very low-income seniors, as well as adults and children with significant disabilities and severe health conditions living in very low-income households. SSI asset limits are set by the federal government and have barely moved from the levels set in 1972, when the program was enacted. In 1972, SSI asset limits were set at $1,500 for an individual and $2,250 for a couple or a disabled child living with their parents. They are currently set at $2,000 for an individual and $3,000 for a couple or a disabled child living with their parents. Had these levels been adjusted for inflation, they would be more than $8,500 for individuals and $12,800 for both couples and families with disabled children today. Why asset-limit reform is necessary Savings can dramatically reduce material hardship. For many low-income families, even a small amount of savings—less than $2,000—can protect against eviction, missed meals, or having utilities shut off during a financial setback. Having a slightly larger cushion—between $2,000 and $10,000—has an even broader effect. The presence of savings and assets may also reduce the length of time families need public assistance. Asset limits serve as a barrier to economic security and mobility by actively discouraging families from attempting to save and build the resources they need to get ahead. They can also prevent middle-income families from accessing needed assistance in the event of an unexpected economic shock. As Melissa experienced when she had to sell her car to receive public assistance in California, asset limits can force families to drain hard-earned savings and to liquidate necessary assets in order to get help for even a short period of time.
Solvency
Pavetti
Pavetti, LaDonna (PhD Vice President for Family Income Support Policy at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.). “Time on Welfare and Welfare Dependency.” Urban Institute, 23 May 1996, www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/70301/900288-Time-on-Welfare-and-Welfare-Dependency.pdf.
The welfare system is an extremely dynamic system. In an "average" year, about one-half of the AFDC caseload leaves the welfare rolls. The best available estimates indicate that between one-half and two-thirds of those who leave do so because they have found paid employment. A small percentage (less than 15 percent) leave for marriage and the remainder leave for a variety of other reasons. Those who leave are replaced by new applicants who have never received assistance before and by families who have received assistance previously and are returning to receive assistance again. The majority of families who leave the welfare system do so after a relatively short period of time ~-~- about half leave within a year; 70 percent within two years and almost 90 percent within five years. But many return almost as quickly as they left ~-~- about 45 percent return within a year and 70 percent return by the end of five years. When one takes into account all of this movement on and off the welfare rolls, only a moderate fraction of recipients who ever turn to the welfare system for support end up spending relatively long periods of time on the welfare rolls. Over the course of their lifetimes, about one-third of women who ever use welfare will spend longer than five years on the welfare rolls and 60 percent will spend 24 months or longer receiving assistance.
Dent
Dent, Anna( freelance policy and research consultant). “Free Money Wouldn't Make People Lazy – but It Could Revolutionise Work | Anna Dent.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 12 Feb. 2019, www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/feb/12/universal-basic-income-work-finland-experiment-payments.
Whether we derive meaning from employment, or find ourselves engaged in meaningless “bullshit jobs” as David Graeber suggests, we cannot deny that the world of work is changing. Climate change, mass migration and continued technological change will all have impacts on what “work” means and looks like in ways that we cannot accurately predict. For its proponents, a UBI can provide a lifejacket and a route through some of these challenges. A UBI could provide a stable income floor, a guaranteed minimum below which no one would fall. Depending on the amount paid, it could enable low-paid workers to turn down the worst jobs on offer, or enable time away from paid work to retrain, or start a business. It would financially compensate those (usually women) caring for family for their work, support more people to be creative, to volunteer, or simply to do nothing. In the US, proposals for a Green New Deal led by Democrats Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Ed Markey appear to advocate for something like a UBI – potentially for those “unwilling” to work, although it is light on detail. A UBI is not designed to promote “laziness” or any other type of behaviour, simply to allow individuals to make their own decisions about how they wish to spend their time. The pure idea of a UBI does not hold any inherent position when it comes to paid work, but promises freedom and choice. As far back as the 1880s, in the work of Paul Lafargue, the right of workers (as opposed to the rich) to be lazy was framed as an explicit rejection of the dominant work ethic, and the route to true independence, free from the pressure to work. The refusal to participate in paid employment is still considered by some as an active strategy of resistance to neoliberalism. A UBI as a way to live securely without paid employment features regularly in mainly leftwing discussions about post-work, interrogating the centrality of paid employment in our lives and societies, and our ability to liberate ourselves, or be liberated from, our roles as paid workers.
Impact: Jobs
Matthews
Matthews, Dylan. “Study: a Universal Basic Income Would Grow the Economy.” Vox, Vox, 30 Aug. 2017, www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/8/30/16220134/universal-basic-income-roosevelt-institute-economic-growth.
A universal basic income could make the US economy trillions of dollars larger, permanently, according to a new study by the left-leaning Roosevelt Institute. Basic income, a proposal in which every American would be given a basic stipend from the government no strings attached, is often brought up as a potential solution to widespread automation reducing demand for labor in the future. But in the meantime, its critics typically allege that it is far too expensive to be practical, or else that it would spur millions of Americans to drop out of the labor force, wrecking the economy and depriving the government of a tax base for funding the plan. The Roosevelt study, written by Roosevelt research director Marshall Steinbaum, Michalis Nikiforos at Bard College's Levy Institute, and Gennaro Zezza at the University of Cassino and Southern Lazio in Italy, comes to a dramatically different conclusion. And it does so using some notably rosy assumptions about the effects of large-scale increases to government spending, taxes, and deficits, assumptions that other analysts would dispute vociferously. Their paper analyzes three different models for a universal basic income: A full universal basic income, in which every adult gets $1,000 a month ($12,000 a year) A partial basic income, in which every adult gets $500 a month ($6,000 a year) A child allowance, in which every child gets $250 a month ($3,000 a year) They find that enacting any of these policies by growing the federal debt — that is, without raising taxes to pay for it — would substantially grow the economy. The effect fades away within eight years, but GDP is left permanently higher. The big, $12,000 per year per adult policy, they find, would permanently grow the economy by 12.56 to 13.10 percent — or about $2.5 trillion come 2025. It would also, they find, increase the percentage of Americans with jobs by about 2 percent, and expand the labor force to the tune of 4.5 to 4.7 million people. They also model the impact of the plan if it's paid for with taxes. That amounts to large-scale income redistribution, which, the authors argue, would stimulate the economy, because lower-income people are likelier to spend their money in the near-term than rich people are. Thus, they find that a full $12,000 a year per adult basic income, paid for with progressive income taxes, would grow the economy by about 2.62 percent ($515 billion) and expand the labor force by about 1.1 million people. These are extremely contentious estimates, borne of controversial assumptions about the way the economy works and the effects that a basic income would have on it. Many, if not most, economic modelers would come to very different conclusions: that a basic income discourages work, that raising taxes to pay for it could have profound negative economic impacts, and that not paying for it and exploding the deficit is a recipe for fiscal and economic ruin. But the authors argue that the economic model they're using, run by the Bard College Levy Economics Institute, uses more realistic assumptions than alternative models, and is particularly well-suited for predicting a UBI’s impact.
Kenney
Kenny, Charles(senior fellow at the Center for Global Development). “The Best Way to Reform Welfare: Give Poor People Cash.” The Atlantic, Atlantic Media Company, 27 Sept. 2015, www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/welfare-reform-direct-cash-poor/407236/.
But more to the point, the programs are almost certainly less effective at reducing poverty than simply giving poor people cash. When governments give people in-kind support like food, it frequently costs more to deliver that support than it would to distribute cash—and for the same or even a lesser impact. Jesse Cunha of the Naval Postgraduate School conducted a randomized trial of cash versus in-kind transfers in rural Mexico. In addition to finding that cash recipients didn’t spend more on tobacco or alcohol, Cunha learned that those who received cash experienced the same improvements in nutrition and child-health measures as those who received food. But the food program cost at least 20 percent more to administer, and the cash program led to significantly higher non-food consumption by recipients. In other words: At less cost to the government, cash programs led to the same health outcomes as food-based programs, but also provided additional resources for recipients to spend on schooling, medicine, and transport. This is not a one-off finding. In many cases, cash programs are simply much more effective than in-kind transfers at turning dollars spent into positive nutritional outcomes. A 2013 survey by Sarah Bailey for the Canadian Foodgrains Bank—involving Zimbabwe, Ecuador, Malawi, and Yemen, among other countries—found that cash transfers usually led to far greater increases in a “food consumption score” of dietary diversity and food frequency than did similarly priced food delivery. In Malawi, the food consumption score increased by 50 percent for cash recipients compared to 20 percent for food recipients. This despite the fact that households in the countries surveyed only report spending between 45 and 90 percent of the cash they receive on food, with the rest going to expenses like debt repayment, household items, and school fees. Cash also has a larger multiplier effect. Bring food from elsewhere to an area, and the impact of that food stops with those who eat it. Give people cash and they spend it on goods provided by local farmers and traders, who are often poor themselves and benefit as well. A 2010 study in Zimbabwe by Cormac Staunton of Concern Worldwide and Micheal Collins of Trinity College Dublin compared food transfers to cash transfers, and estimated that each dollar provided by cash transfers circulated 2.59 times around the local economy before being spent on goods and services from elsewhere. That compared to the 1.00 multiplier of food that was simply consumed. Perhaps most important, cash transfers often lead to productive investments. Consider the charity GiveDirectly, which transfers cash from rich people in the West directly to poor people in Africa using mobile-phone payments. A randomized evaluation in 2011, co-designed by a GiveDirectly co-founder, evaluated the organization’s activities in Kenya and focused on one-off, unconditional payments to families that ranged from $404 to $1,520. Four hundred dollars was more than twice the average local monthly household expenditure. In relative terms, it would be the equivalent of handing $12,000 to a household in the United States. As long as 14 months after the transfer, survey evidence suggested that households were still spending more on food, health, and education than non-recipients. One reason why is that they had invested in physical goods, particularly in metal roofs to replace thatched shelter and in livestock to provide milk and meat. That translated into rising incomes from farming and enterprises in the short term, and—thanks to higher spending on nutrition, health care, and education—the hope for greater earnings potential in the long term as well. As in the Mexican cash-transfer program, spending on alcohol and tobacco did not rise after the transfer. Perhaps that’s because recipients felt less need for a pick-me-up: They reported feeling happier after the transfer, and tests of cortisol in saliva revealed lower biomarkers for stress.*
Press
Press, Gil. “Is AI Going To Be A Jobs Killer? New Reports About The Future Of Work.” Forbes, Forbes Magazine, 17 July 2019, www.forbes.com/sites/gilpress/2019/07/15/is-ai-going-to-be-a-jobs-killer-new-reports-about-the-future-of-work/#262155f3afb2.
The number of jobs which AI and machines will displace in the future has been the subject of numerous studies and surveys and op-eds and policy papers since 2013, when a pair of Oxford academics, Carl Benedikt Frey and Michael Osborne, estimated that 47 of American jobs are at high risk of automation by the mid-2030s. Here are a few more recent examples of what has become a popular number-crunching (automated, computerized, AI-driven) exercise: McKinsey Global Institute: between 40 million and 160 million women worldwide may need to transition between occupations by 2030, often into higher-skilled roles. Clerical work, done by secretaries, schedulers and bookkeepers, is an area especially susceptible to automation, and 72 of those jobs in advanced economies are held by women. Oxford Economics: up to 20 million manufacturing jobs worldwide will be lost to robots by 2030.
Impact: Poverty
CATO
“41. Poverty and Welfare.” Cato Institute, 16 Feb. 2017, www.cato.org/cato-handbook-policymakers/cato-handbook-policy-makers-8th-edition-2017/poverty-welfare.
Although the exact number fluctuates from year to year, the federal government funds more than 100 separate anti-poverty programs. Some 70 of these provide cash or in-kind benefits to individuals, while the remainder target specific groups or disadvantaged neighborhoods or communities. There are eight different health care programs, administered by five separate agencies within the Department of Health and Human Services. Six cabinet departments and five independent agencies oversee 27 cash or general-assistance programs. All together, seven different cabinet agencies and six independent agencies administer at least one anti-poverty program. And those are just the programs specifically aimed at poverty. That doesn't include more universal social welfare programs or social insurance programs such as unemployment insurance, Medicare, or Social Security. Altogether, the federal government spent more than $680 billion in 2014 (the last year for which compete data are available). State and local governments added about $300 billion in additional funding. Thus, government at all levels is spending roughly $1 trillion per year to fight poverty. Stretching back to 1965, when President Lyndon Johnson first declared "war on poverty," anti-poverty spending has totaled more than $23 trillion. Yet the results of all this spending have been disappointing. Using the traditional Census Bureau definition of poverty, we have seen virtually no improvement in poverty rates since 1965. As shown in Figure 41.1, the only appreciable decline since the mid-1970s occurred in the 1990s, a time of state experimentation with tightening welfare eligibility, culminating in the passage of national welfare reform (the Personal Responsibility and Work Responsibility Act of 1996). Most observers agree that the traditional poverty measure is badly flawed — for example, it does not count taxes or the value of in-kind benefits. But even more accurate alternative poverty measures show few gains since the mid-1970s. At the very least, marginal increases in spending appear to yield little marginal decrease in poverty or lead to any meaningful improvements in upward economic mobility. For example, a study by Bruce Meyer and James Sullivan found that the majority of improvements in a more accurate poverty measure occurred prior to 1972. Less than a third of the improvement has taken place in the past four decades, despite massive increases in expenditures during that time (Figure 41.2).
Matthews IPI
Matthews, Merrill ( Ph.D., is a resident scholar with the Institute for Policy Innovation). “New Book Presents Solutions for Financially Insolvent Entitlement Programs.” New Book Presents Solutions for Financially Insolvent Entitlement Programs, Institute for Policy Innovation, 23 May 2019, www.ipi.org/ipi_issues/detail/new-book-presents-solutions-for-financially-insolvent-entitlement-programs.
In case you have any warm feeling for former president Lyndon Johnson and his initiation of our War on Poverty, you will learn it only made things worse, and not for lack of money. “In 2017, we calculate that states spent nearly $500 billion on means-tested welfare programs,” the authors write. “Adding state to federal means-tested spending brings the total to about $1.1 trillion.” The authors estimate we have spent $29 trillion on antipoverty programs in the United States with little to show for it to date. The poverty rate “has fluctuated between 11 percent and 15 percent for 50 years, and stood at about 12.7 percent in 2016.” Solution: Temporary Safety Nets The key to a solution to this fiscal mess is to differentiate safety nets that will help those in temporary need from those in need of permanent help and to create programs that incentivize getting back to work instead of encouraging people with low incomes to stay in need, the authors argue. A good program must separate the able-bodied from those not so fortunate.
Haskins
Pike, Logan, and Justin Haskins. “Too Many People Are Still Stuck in Welfare. Here's How to Lift Them Out.” National Review, National Review, 14 May 2015, www.nationalreview.com/2015/05/how-save-2-million-americans-welfare/.
Most reforms are simple and cost-effective measures that states of every size and political persuasion have already put into place, and as the report card shows, a state’s budget has virtually no effect on the ability of the state to implement necessary welfare-policy changes. Effective state welfare programs can remove barriers that prevent recipients from attaining high-quality employment. Welfare shouldn’t be about establishing government programs that do something to people, but rather programs that do something for people. Welfare’s only purpose ought to be to lift them from the grips of government dependency into a life of self-sufficiency. Instead, it often shackles the impoverished and encourages them to remain in a state of squalor rather than make the difficult but worthwhile trek to prosperity.
Widerquist
Widerquist, Karl(Associate Professor at SFS-Qatar, Georgetown University). “The Cost of Basic Income: Back-of-the-Envelope Calculations.” Georgetown University, Dec. 2017, file:///C:/Users/audre/Downloads/BackOfTheEnvelope~-~-4Posting~-~-2017Sep_stamped.pdf.
This article is not about the politics of UBI. It’s not about whether or which programs could be replaced by UBI. It’s not about how to integrate a UBI into the existing tax and benefit system. It is not even about how to pay the cost of UBI. It focuses on one question only: how much does UBI cost? Key findings of this study include4 : • The net cost of a roughly poverty-level UBI ($12,000 per adult, $6,000 per child) with a 50 marginal tax rate is $539 billion per year. • This UBI would drop the official poverty rate from 13.5 to 0, eliminating poverty for 43.1 million people (including 14.5 million children). • This UBI costs less than 25 of current U.S. entitlement spending, less than 15 of overall federal spending, and about 2.95 of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). • Other countries with similar levels of GDP and inequality can expect similar results for cost as a percent of GDP. More equal nations and wealthier nations can expect lower costs for the same level of UBI. Less equal and less wealthy nations can expect higher costs. | 904,672 |
365,529 | 380,159 | 1 - March NEG v3 | Open Sourced | 905,461 |
365,530 | 380,175 | JAN ~-~- Recovery | ====Venezuela’s humanitarian crisis is rooted in economic shortfalls.====
Carlos Jasso, 1-24-2019, "Venezuela: The Rise and Fall of a Petrostate," Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/venezuela-crisis
Oil dependence. Oil sales account for 98 percent of export earnings and as much
AND
of ten live in poverty. Roughly one in ten have fled the country
====Sanctions prevent recovery, we'll isolate three internal links:====
====1. Oil====
====Venezuela is reliant on oil which is targeted through sanctions====
Collin Eaton, 8-14-2019, "Explainer: U.S. sanctions and Venezuela's trade and oil industry partners," U.S., https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-crude-sanctions-ex/explainer-u-s-sanctions-and-venezuelas-trade-and-oil-industry-partners-idUSKCN1V420P
In January the United States imposed sanctions on Venezuela’s most important global business - producing
AND
compared to output of 3 million bpd at the turn of the century.
====These sanctions have empirically worked====
Francisco Rodríguez, 12-4-2019, "Opinion," Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/12/04/us-oil-sanctions-are-hurting-venezuelans-time-new-approach-pressure-maduro/
Since 2017, the Trump administration has progressively imposed an oil and financial embargo that
AND
and now stand at less than one-tenth of their 2012 levels.
====US sanctions have a ripple effect – they deter others from buying oil from Venezuela.====
Collin Eaton, 8-14-2019, "Explainer: U.S. sanctions and Venezuela's trade and oil industry partners," U.S., https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-crude-sanctions-ex/explainer-u-s-sanctions-and-venezuelas-trade-and-oil-industry-partners-idUSKCN1V420P
Overall exports of crude and refined products by state-run oil company Petroleos de
AND
warned foreign companies they also could face sanctions for doing business with PDVSA.
====2. Blocking Alternative Industries====
====Aside from Oil, Venezuela is reliant on gold.====
Laura Millan Lombrana, 1-30-2019, "In Maduro's Venezuela, Even Counting Gold Bars Is a Challenge," Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-30/in-maduro-s-venezuela-even-counting-gold-bars-is-a-challenge
While crude is by far Venezuela’s largest export, refined oil and then gold both
AND
in international transactions — and even to exchange it for food and medicine.
====It’s maduro’s best bet.====
Roberta Rampton, 11-1-2018, "Trump increases pressure on Venezuela with sanctions on gold," U.S., https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-venezuela-bolton/trump-increases-pressure-on-venezuela-with-sanctions-on-gold-idUSKCN1N65P6
Venezuela this year turned to gold as a way to receive desperately needed hard currency
AND
energy sector given that it is unraveling under Maduro-appointed military officials.
====Sanctions deck gold exports====
Roberta Rampton, 11-1-2018, "Trump increases pressure on Venezuela with sanctions on gold," U.S., https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-venezuela-bolton/trump-increases-pressure-on-venezuela-with-sanctions-on-gold-idUSKCN1N65P6
U.S. President Donald Trump increased economic pressure on Venezuela’s leftist President Nicolas
AND
, Trump’s national security adviser John Bolton said in a speech in Miami.
====sanctions choke venezuela out ====
Clifford Krauss, 4-17-2019, "New U.S. Sanctions on Venezuela Aim to Choke Off Government’s Finances," No Publication, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/17/business/us-venezuela-sanctions-maduro.html
By targeting the central bank, the sanctions close off a few remaining critical paths
AND
United States banking payments system or were not concerned about potential political fallout.
====3. Dollarizing the Bolivar====
====The Venezuelan Bolivar is Isolated right now====
Valentina Sanchez, 8-3-2019, "Venezuela hyperinflation hits 10 million percent. ‘Shock therapy’ may be only chance to undo the economic damage," CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/02/venezuela-inflation-at-10-million-percent-its-time-for-shock-therapy.html
Venezuela’s hyperinflation rate increased from 9,02 percent to 10 million percent since 2018
AND
by armed conflicts or natural disasters, the IMF stated earlier this week.
====US is preventing efforts to bypass sanctions.====
Alexandra Wilts, 3-19-2018, "Donald Trump has banned all American use of Venezuelan cryptocurrencies," Independent, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/trump-venezuela-petro-cryptocurrency-sanctions-maduro-a8264221.html
President Donald Trump has banned all American use of Venezuela’s new cryptocurrency, a step
AND
August, the administration imposed new restrictions dealing with Venezuela’s access to credit.
====This prevents economic recovery.====
Mark Weisbrot and Jeffrey Sachs, April 2019, "Economic Sanctions as Collective Punishment:TheCase of Venezuela", CEPR,http://cepr.net/images/stories/reports/venezuela-sanctions-2019-04.pdf
Again, we can never know what the counterfactual would have been. But what
AND
more of these things — not to mention threatening to take military action.
====Two Impacts:====
====Child deaths are rising rapidly====
Isayen Herrera, 12-17-2017, "As Venezuela Collapses, Children Are Dying of Hunger," No Publication, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12/17/world/americas/venezuela-children-starving.html
For almost two years, the government did not publish a single epidemiological bulletin tracking
AND
a 30 percent increase in one year — as the economic crisis accelerated.
====They collapse the economy====
Caitlin Cheadle, 11-29-2016, "Dropping fertility rates are a threat to the global economy," Business Insider, https://www.businessinsider.com/dropping-fertility-rates-will-affect-the-economy-2016-11
As this large aging population exits the workforce, most of the positive trends that
AND
, ~~and~~ job production to slow – and the economy to stagnate
====The crisis has pushed hospitals into shambles====
Tom Phillips, 1-6-2019, "Venezuela crisis takes deadly toll on buckling health system," Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/06/venezuela-health-system-crisis-nicolas-maduro
. Another recent report noted that 53 of Venezuelan operating theatres were now closed
AND
work in the dialysis units aren’t there because they’ve left the country too."
==== A lack of hygiene and resources has put Venezuelans at risk of disease ====
Michelle Nichols, 3-29-2019, "Venezuelans facing 'unprecedented challenges,' many need aid," U.S., https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-un/venezuelans-facing-unprecedented-challenges-many-need-aid-internal-u-n-report-idUSKCN1R92AG
There are an estimated 2.8 million people in need when it comes to
AND
are in need of ~~water~~ help, according to the report. | 905,475 |
365,531 | 379,501 | 0 - Disclosure Interps | TLDR; disclose in cite boxes with first and last couple words, open source with round reports, don't put 'analytic', and don't be sketchy pre-round
Interpretation: For each position on their corresponding 2019-20 NDCA PF wiki page, debaters must disclose a summary of each analytic argument in their cases.
Interpretation: Debaters must disclose all possible disclosure theory interps on the 2019-20 NDCA PF wiki at least 30 minutes before the round.
Interpretation: Debaters must disclose round reports on the 2019-20 NDCA PF wiki for every round they have debated this season. Round reports disclose which positions (AC, NC, K, T, Theory, etc.) were read/gone for in every speech.
Interpretation: If debaters disclose full text, they must not post the full text of the cards in the cite box, but must upload an open source document with the full text of their cards.
Interpretation: The affirmative must, upon flipping for sides, tell the negative what specific affirmative position they will be reading, within ten minutes of flipping for sides.
Interpretation: The affirmative must, upon the release of tournament pairings, tell the negative what specific affirmative position they will be reading, within ten minutes.
Interpretation: Debaters, on their corresponding NDCA PF wiki page, must disclose their contact information. To clarify, this can be an email address, Facebook, number, etc.
Interp: Debates must disclose each full tag line for cards disclosed on the NDCA PF wiki. | 904,586 |
365,532 | 379,507 | Interps we want you to meet | Open Source Disclo
Debaters must disclose all previously read topical constructive positions Open Source on the 2020 NDCA PF wiki at least 30 minutes before round.
To be clear, this isn’t full text disclosure. Open Source Disclosure must include open source documents with all highlighted cut cards.
Friv Theory Interp
A is the interpretation - Debaters must disclose the name of their main character in Super Smash Brothers (any game) on the NDCA Public Forum wiki on the page with their school's name and their team code at least 30 minutes before the round is scheduled to start.
Another Friv theory interp!!!!!
Interp: Debaters must disclose their level on Duolingo and their level of Spanish proficiency on the NDCA Public Forum wiki on the page with their school's name and their team code at least 30 minutes before the round is scheduled to start.
Another Friv theory interp lmfao
Interpretation: Debaters must be from the state of Georgia | 904,593 |
365,533 | 379,487 | 1- Disclosure Interps | Interpretation: Debaters with computers competing at tournaments must disclose all previously read positions from the current season at least 30 minutes before round under a PF wiki page with the registered school name.
Interpretation: At all tournaments, debaters must disclose all broken positions of the topic that the tournament is running, on the NDCA PF wiki. The disclosure must include tags and first 3 and last 3 words of cited text from each piece of evidence. The disclosure must occur within 30 minutes of the round. | 904,571 |
365,534 | 379,518 | DA vs K - Authoritarianism | Theres a fill in disad - they don’t question what happens after the revolution - authoritarian socialism fills in That’s empirically what happened in socialist countries throughout ALL of the 20th century - we are impact turning socialism it causes genocide
Walter E. Williams 18 (Walter E. Williams, Walter E. Williams is a columnist for The Daily Signal and a professor of economics at George Mason University., 5-30-2018, "Why Capitalism Is Morally Superior to Socialism," https://www.dailysignal.com/2018/05/30/capitalism-vs-socialism/, Daily Signal, Accessed: 7-1-2018 /Kent Denver-YBJL)
A much larger ... not a disaster.” | 904,601 |
365,535 | 379,531 | UBI - DA - Foreign Aid | Trump is refraining from cutting foreign aid now as a result of internal conflict among his party - republican congressional support for USAID is key
Bresnahan 19 John Bresnahan , Politico , "Trump kills plan to cut billions in foreign aid - POLITICO", 08/22/19, https://www.politico.com/story/2019/08/22/white-house-backs-off-foreign-aid-cuts-1472130
President Donald Trump ... of one aide.
A UBI would be leveraged as a means of cutting other programs - Lewis 18
Kyle Lewis, Independent, "A right-wing think tank is now supporting Universal Basic Income – but they’ve missed the point | The Independent", January 19 2018, https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/universal-basic-income-adam-smith-institute-austerity-libertarian-a8167701.html
this threatens to ... individualising society’s problems..
Framing foreign aid as a question of welfare makes cutting it popular
Lancaster 0 Carol Lancaster Dean and Professor of Politics , "Transforming Foreign Aid: United States Assistance in the 21st Century - Carol Lancaster, Dean and Professor of Politics Carol Lancaster - Google Books", 2000, https://books.google.com/books?id=czLTDq_ftp0Candpg=PA54andlpg=PA54anddq=while+the+public+tends+to+be+in+support+of+humanitarian+aid,+if+issues+of+foreign+aid+are+seen+through+the+optic+of+a+tradeoff+with+resources+available+for+addressing+domestic+problems,+they+become+much+more+critical.andsource=blandots=vh6rYsHgIFandsig=ACfU3U1QN40ZtIoIDCtDzhB1IYmkMQCJ8Aandhl=enandsa=Xandved=2ahUKEwiNmuPSwcPpAhWclXIEHb3CD2cQ6AEwAHoECAwQAQ#v=onepageandq=while20the20public20tends20to20be20in20support20of20humanitarian20aid2C20if20issues20of20foreign20aid20are20seen20through20the20optic20of20a20tradeoff20with20resources20available20for20addressing20domestic20problems2C20they20become20much20more20critical.andf=false salience ("drop-dead issues") for their members. ... Destler, Ibid. 54 TRANSFORMING FOREIGN AID
20 million are on the brink now but USAID is solving - we also access a timeframe impact that is orders of magnitude larger than theirs.
Werft 17 Meghan Werft, Global Citizen, "This Is How Many People US Foreign Aid Helps Around the World", July 25 2017, https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/people-helped-by-us-foreign-aid/
The impact of ... starving from famine. | 904,611 |
365,536 | 379,524 | Theory - K read ROTB | Interpretation: The aff must explicitly specify a comprehensive role of the ballot and clarify how the round will play out under that role of the ballot in the form of a text in the 1AC. To clarify, the aff must:
Clarify how offense links back to the role of the ballot, such as whether post-fiat offense or pre-fiat offense matters and which comes first.
Clarify how to weigh and compare between competing advocacies i.e. whether the role of the ballot is solely determined by the flow or another method of engagement.
B. Violation:
B) Multiple ways the AC violates:
You never explicitly specify what counts as offense on the ROB.
2. You never specify how we weigh in the AC.
C. Standards:
Engagement – If I don’t know how the role of the ballot functions, its impossible for me to engage the aff, since knowing what counts as offense for me is a prerequisite to being able to make meaningful arguments that clash with yours. Knowing what a legitimate advocacy is ensures that I read something that is relevant to your method, and knowing how to weigh gives us an explicit standard for what is relevant, preventing superficial clash where we each make vacuous preclusion claims. This is uniquely true of role of the ballots since there is no communal norm on what “preformative engagement” is in the same way there is for what counts as util offense.
Few impacts:
1) Link turns your role of the ballot – your impacts are premised on actually having a debate and engaging with issues of oppression. A one-way street doesn’t give us any benefits you didn’t get form writing your case at home.
2) difficult to engage roles of the ballot are uniquely bad since no one will take seriously a position that can’t be clashed with, so you harm any progress your position can create.
3) Engagement is key to fairness because it’s key to me making arguments that can win me the round
d) voters: Fairness is a voter because it’s impossible to know who did the better debating if the round is unfair.
e) You can’t use your ROB to exclude my shell. My shell allows you to read your role of the ballot, it just functionally constrains how you can do that. If I win comparative offense to my interp it precludes on a methodological level -my method is your ROTB with specification, your is just the ROTB, so if the former is better it’s a reason to vote for me even if method debates in general preclude theory. Also, if they go for K first that proves the abuse of my shell since they should have specified in the AC.
f) competing interps - least arbitrary
g) no rvis you don’t win for being fair | 904,605 |
365,537 | 379,545 | 0-Disclosure | TLDR; disclose in cite boxes with first and last couple words, open source with round reports, don't put 'analytic', and don't be sketchy pre-round
Interpretation: Debaters must disclose all constructive positions on open source with highlighting on the 2019-20 NDCA PF wiki after the round in which they read them.
A Interpretation: Debaters must, on the page with their name and the school they attend, disclose all taglines, full citations, and the first and last three words of the pieces of evidence read in their cases on the NDCA wiki at least one hour before the round if they have read that case before.
Interpretation: For each position on their corresponding 2019-20 NDCA PF wiki page, debaters must disclose a summary of each analytic argument in their cases.
Interpretation: Debaters must disclose all possible disclosure theory interps on the 2019-20 NDCA PF wiki at least 30 minutes before the round.
Interpretation: Debaters must disclose round reports on the 2019-20 NDCA PF wiki for every round they have debated this season. Round reports disclose which positions (AC, NC, K, T, Theory, etc.) were read/gone for in every speech.
Interpretation: If debaters disclose full text, they must not post the full text of the cards in the cite box, but must upload an open source document with the full text of their cards.
Interpretation: Debaters must disclose all constructive positions in cite boxes on the 2019-20 NDCA LD wiki. To clarify, they can’t put “see open source.”
Interpretation: Debaters must talk about dinosaurs in the 1NC
Interpretation: The affirmative must, upon flipping for sides, tell the negative what specific affirmative position they will be reading, within ten minutes of flipping for sides.
Interpretation: The affirmative must, upon the release of tournament pairings, tell the negative what specific affirmative position they will be reading, within ten minutes.
Interpretation: Debaters, on their corresponding NDCA PF wiki page, must disclose their contact information. To clarify, this can be an email address, Facebook, number, etc.
Interp: For every broken position that has evidence with paywalls, debaters must either
a open source disclose all taglines, citations, and evidence read
or
b disclose tags, complete citations, and the full text from each piece of evidence
All disclosure must be occur on the NDCA wiki under the correct side and their own name. To clarify, there needs to be some way to see the full text of your evidence if it has paywalls.
Interp: Debaters must disclose all broken plan flaws on the NDCA wiki.
Interp: Debates must disclose each full tag line for cards disclosed on the NDCA wiki. | 904,626 |
365,538 | 379,548 | Negotiations | We negate.
Our sole contention is Paving the Way for Democracy.
Venezuelan President Nicholas Maduro is failing. Toro ‘16 of the Atlantic writes that Maduro has caused Venezuela’s economic crisis with foolish investments, institutional corruption and authoritarianism. In fact, Rapoza ‘19 of Forbes finds that Maduro led Venezuela into an economic depression three years before sanctions. For example, Swift ‘18 of IPI Global writes that Maduro’s failure to diversify Venezuela’s economy away from oil has been the underlying cause of the crisis, as the increased availability of alternative energy pushes down the value of oil.
Fortunately, US economic sanctions solve the dire Venezuelan crisis.
Rendon ‘19 of the CSIS explains that targeted sanctions have cut off oil and mining revenue, and prevented elites from accessing their finances, causing Maduro to lose control of the country. Indeed, The Economist in 2019 writes that the deterioration of Venezuela’s oil industry will precipitate a change in government, especially since Russia and China are facing a credit crunch at home .
The Latin America Risk Report in 2019 finds that by cutting off resources for the population and cutting off funds to his inner circle, sanctions are causing larger protests and internal regime fracturing that doom Maduro. Specifically, Besaw ‘19 of The Conversation finds that the likelihood of a coup is rising as Maduro’s strategy of payments for loyalty is unsustainable.
Stratfor ‘19 explains that as sanctions continue the probability of a political transition grows, as protests and sanctions’ pressure on their own families convince the military to abandon Maduro. Luhnow ‘19 of the Wall Street Journal confirms that Maduro’s base is turning on him in the face of severe economic distress. Lake ‘19 of Bloomberg finalizes that the opposition’s leader, Guaido, is appealing to the conscience of the military and Maduro’s base, a strategy that has already won military defections and has a precedent of success in Serbia and Egypt.
Despite the failed coup in April, Arreaza ‘19 of America Quarterly explains that Maduro’s allies are slowly rebelling against him, and as Maduro is now unable to rely on his security apparatus, 3 his downfall is confirmed. Arreaza continues that political transitions are not linear; while the coup in April may have failed, portions of Maduro’s regime are slowly betraying him and opening up to negotiations. Soon another coup will succeed.
The Latin America Risk Report continues that Maduro’s recent interference in the election against opposition leader Juan Guaido backfired, unifying the opposition by confirming Guaido’s legitimacy and strength as his leading opponent. Cividanes ‘19 of the University of Ottawa writes that while high-level defections have not stopped Maduro’s regime so far, the government cannot withstand the rising trend, and will eventually crack. In fact, Palmer ‘19 of CBS News explains that the majority of lower and mid-level troops are ready to turn against Maduro: all that's needed is one more high-ranking general to lead the way.
Because of sanctions’ pressure, the AA Institute just one week ago explains that Maduro is now welcoming negotiations and open to dialogue with the Trump administration. Hamburger ‘19 of the Washington Post writes that in the face of sanctions, Maduro has agreed to concessions, including his departure from power and free and fair elections in Venezuela in exchange for leniency from the United States.
Furthermore, Vyas ‘19 of the Wall Street Journal finds that Maduro has begun implementing democratic, market-based reforms in order to survive sanctions. In fact, ICS ‘19 finds that Maduro is diversifying exports and investments away from oil to build new industries that generate revenue.
4
Unfortunately, without sanctions and with Maduro at the helm, Venezuela stands no chance for reform.
Camilleri ‘19 of Foreign Affairs explains that the long-term consequences of Maduro’s regime spill over regionally, sending out millions more desperate refugees that fall victim to transnational crime networks, cause disease outbreaks, and defect to violent guerilla organizations, destabilizing South America as a whole. Without Maduro, Venezuela can finally recover. Padden ‘19 of Voice of America explains that Guaido’s reforms would dramatically reduce poverty and solve shortages. Strauss ‘18 of the Brookings Institution concludes that with Guaido, Venezuela will recover with double-digit growth rates which will spill over and provide a significant economic boost to the rest of Latin America.
Thus, we negate. | 904,628 |
365,539 | 379,560 | TOC Aff v1 | ==1AC==
====We affirm. ====
====Our sole contention concerns preventing Iranian expansion. ====
====Over the last decade, Iran has created a network of proxies which help them establish influence in neighboring countries. Including terrorist groups such as Hezbollah, Iran’s proxies have killed thousands.====
====America intends to deter its enemies, however, Hannah 19 of Foreign Policy writes====
Hannah 19, John Hannah, 10/30/19, “U.S. Deterrence in the Middle East Is Collapsing,” Foreign Policy
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/30/u-s-deterrence-in-the-middle-east-is-collapsing-syria-
====Instead, US military presence increases Iranian aggression in two ways. First, threat perception. Barzegar 10 explains: ====
Barzegar 10, Kayhan Barzegar, Fall 2010, "Roles at Odds:The Roots of Increased Iran-U.S. Tension in the Post-9/11 Middle East”, IRANIAN REVIEW of Foreign Affairs, https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/5-Dr_Barzegar.pdf
With its sources of power and geo-political posture. The major source of difficulty, however, appears to emanate
...AND...
f threat in the region? And how can the two parties reach a compromise regarding each other’s new regional role.
====Iran responds to the threat with aggression. Swan 19 of Hillsdale College writes:====
Swan 19, Betsy Swan, 5-17-2019, "Trump Admin Moves Fueled Iran’s Aggression, U.S. Intel Says," Daily Beast, https://www.thedailybeast.com/trump-admin-moves-fueled-irans-aggression-us-intel-says
Trump administration hawks have spent the last two weeks decrying an increased threat from Iran. But U.S. intell
...AND...
ect response to the administration’s moves, according to the assessment of multiple U.S. intelligence officials.
====Niehaus of the Journal for International Affairs 19 adds:====
Niehous, 19 (the Pentagon, 11-26-2019, accessed on 4-15-2020, Towson University Journal of International Affairs, "Deterrence in the Persian Gulf: Why American Efforts to Contain Iran Are Failing", https://wp.towson.edu/iajournal/2019/11/25/deterrence-in-the-persian-gulf-why-american-efforts-to-contain-iran-are-failing/)
America is justified in its desire to avoid an overt war with Iran, but the patient approach being pursued by th
...AND...
forces because it believes that this is the most effective way of ensuring its survival against foreign threats.
====It is deep rooted in Iran’s history. Von 20 of the Hill finds:====
Marik Von, 1-15-2020, "Is America on the wrong side in the Middle East?," TheHill, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/478386-is-america-on-the-wrong-side-in-the-middle-east // BK
Despite the clear alignment of U.S. and Iranian counterterrorism objectives, four decades of hostility and distr
...AND...
anesque embrace of Iran’s moderatesand can catalyze profoundly transformational changes in the Islamic Republic.
====Iran associates US presence with this experience and feel they are fighting an existential threat. With a less militaristic policy, Iran will have no incentive to act aggressively. McInnis 15 of the American Enterprise Institute explains:====
Mcinnis 15, J. Matthew, 5-13-2015, "Is Iran really a defensive state?," American Enterprise Institute - AEI, https://www.aei.org/foreign-and-defense-policy/middle-east/is-iran-really-a-defensive-state/
On Tuesday, AEI released my first in a series of working papers on Iranian strategy and decision-making, titled
...AND...
We need to ask honest, tough questions about why Iran does what it does. Read the report. Let the debate begin!
====Sanctions are not as significant. Vaez 19 of the Atlantic finds:====
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/05/why-trumps-sanctions-iran-arent-working/589288/ Vaez, Atlantic, 2019
First and most important: The one thing Tehran would find more intolerable than the crushing impact of sanctions
...AND...
an invitation to dialogue, in part because the Bush administration’s Iraq adventure proved a strategic disaster.
====Second, is empowering hardliners. After Obama withdrew troops from Iraq in 2011, Erdbrink 13 of the New York Times found elections rejected the ultraconservatives who had been in power and overwhelmingly installed a moderate government who advocated a more conciliatory approach to the world. ====
this is paraphrased
Thomas Erdbrink, 6-15-2013, "Iran Moderate Wins Presidency by a Large Margin," No Publication, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/16/world/middleeast/iran-election.html
====Redeployment reversed this trend. Iranian Author Mohammad Tabaar writes in 2019: ====
This card was assigned in my history class
Mohammad Ayatollahi Tabaar, 4-3-2019, "Opinion," New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/03/opinion/iran-trump-sanctions.html
====As a result, Turak 20 of CNBC finds====
Natasha Turak, 2-19-2020, “Iran elections to be dominated by hard-liners as young people refuse to vote: ‘It’s a joke’,” CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/19/iran-parliamentary-elections-hardliners-to-dominate-low-turnout-expected.html
Iran’s is holding its parliamentary elections Friday, and one thing seems all but certain: It will be a major
...AND...
Atlantic Council, told CNBC. “If history repeats itself, a conservative will also be elected president in 2021.”
====Crucially, a more peaceful posture could change Iranian leadership. Von 20 of the Hill finds:====
Marik Von, 1-15-2020, "Is America on the wrong side in the Middle East?," TheHill, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/478386-is-america-on-the-wrong-side-in-the-middle-east
Despite the clear alignment of U.S. and Iranian counterterrorism objectives, four decades of hostility and distr
...AND...
esque embrace of Iran’s moderatesand can catalyze profoundly transformational changes in the Islamic Republic.
====Overall, absent United States military presence, Iran would cease their aggression in the Middle East. Historically, Von concludes====
Marik the goat part 3
Marik Von, 1-15-2020, "Is America on the wrong side in the Middle East?," TheHill, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/478386-is-america-on-the-wrong-side-in-the-middle-east
====And conversely, The Heritage Foundation concludes in 2020:====
PARAPHRASED
Heritage Staff, 2020, "The Situation in Iran," Heritage Foundation, https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/heritage-explains/the-situation-iran
====Curbing Iranian aggression is the most important goal in the Middle East. Journalist Omar Quadrat writes in 2020: ====
Omar Qudrat,, 1-14-2020, "Make no mistake: Iran remains a powerful threat to the US," TheHill, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/477752-make-no-mistake-iran-remains-a-powerful-threat-to-the-us
At home, Iran recently killed approximately 1,500 civilians who took to the streets dreaming of a better future.
...AND...
d just a few hours from the U.S. on a commercial flight, could be used against us to great military advantage.
====Absent US involvement diplomacy would follow. Al Jazeera finds====
Al Jazeera Staff, 2-4-2020, "Iran wants to mend ties with Saudi, UAE 'quickly': Top diplomat," Al Jazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/02/iran-mend-ties-saudi-uae-quickly-top-diplomat-200204164153245.html
A top Iranian diplomat has said his country is open to resolving differences with its Gulf rivals, Saudi Arabia
...AND...
e setting out Iran's position on possible rapprochement with Saudi Arabia, the Iraqi state news agency reported.
====However, Keynoush 20 of the Atlantic Council finds:====
Banafsheh Keynoush, JAN 27, 2020, "Why mediation between Saudi Arabia and Iran keeps failing," Atlantic Council, https://atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/why-mediation-between-saudi-arabia-and-iran-keeps-failing
These multilateral steps could perhaps be backed by workable solutions to accommodate Saudi Arabia and Iran in A
...AND...
cially ones in which the United States or American organizations, or staunch US allies, attempt to take charge. | 904,640 |
365,540 | 379,594 | Welfare trap | CATO Institute 2017
“41. Poverty and Welfare.”?Cato Institute, 16 Feb. 2017, www.cato.org/cato-handbook-policymakers/cato-handbook-policy-makers-8th-edition-2017/poverty-welfare.
Although the exact number fluctuates from year to year, the federal government funds more than 100 separate anti-poverty programs. Some 70 of these provide cash or in-kind benefits to individuals, while the remainder target specific groups or disadvantaged neighborhoods or communities. There are eight different health care programs, administered by five separate agencies within the Department of Health and Human Services. Six cabinet departments and five independent agencies oversee 27 cash or general-assistance programs. Altogether, seven different cabinet agencies and six independent agencies administer at least one anti-poverty program. And those are just the programs specifically aimed at poverty. That doesn't include more universal social welfare programs or social insurance programs such as unemployment insurance, Medicare, or Social Security. Altogether, the federal government spent more than $680 billion in 2014 (the last year for which complete data are available). State and local governments added about $300 billion in additional funding. Thus, government at all levels is spending roughly $1 trillion per year to fight poverty. Stretching back to 1965, when President Lyndon Johnson first declared "war on poverty," anti-poverty spending has totaled more than $23 trillion. Yet the results of all this spending have been disappointing. Using the traditional Census Bureau definition of poverty, we have seen virtually no improvement in poverty rates since 1965. As shown in Figure 41.1, the only appreciable decline since the mid-1970s occurred in the 1990s, a time of state experimentation with tightening welfare eligibility, culminating in the passage of national welfare reform (the Personal Responsibility and Work Responsibility Act of 1996). Most observers agree that the traditional poverty measure is badly flawed — for example, it does not count taxes or the value of in-kind benefits. But even more accurate alternative poverty measures show few gains since the mid-1970s. At the very least, marginal increases in spending appear to yield little marginal decrease in poverty or lead to any meaningful improvements in upward economic mobility. For example, a study by Bruce Meyer and James Sullivan found that the majority of improvements in a more accurate poverty measure occurred prior to 1972. Less than a third of the improvement has taken place in the past four decades, despite massive increases in expenditures during that time (Figure 41.2).
Center for poverty research
Center for Poverty Research. “What is the current poverty rate in the United States”. 10-15-2018. https://poverty.ucdavis.edu/faq/what-current-poverty-rate-united-states
The official poverty rate is 12.3 percent, based on the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2017 estimates. That year, an estimated 39.7 million Americans lived in poverty according to the official measure. According to supplemental poverty measure, the poverty rate was 13.9 percent. The official poverty measure was developed in the 1960s in conjunction with President Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty. Each September the U.S. Census Bureau releases an update of the national poverty rate for the prior year. The official measure today is based on data from the Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement. The survey is sent to U.S. households, so the poverty estimates do not include those who are homeless. The sample also excludes military personnel who do not live with at least one civilian adult as well as incarcerated adults.
Santens
Santens, Scott. “The progressive case for replacing the welfare state with basic income”. Tech Crunch, sept 9, 2016. https://techcrunch.com/2016/09/09/the-progressive-case-for-replacing-the-welfare-state-with-basic-income/
The absolute worst thing though, and what too few people seem to know, is that when it comes to disability income, you are essentially not even allowed to earn additional income. If you’re on SSDI and earn one dollar over $1,090 in a month, you are dropped from the program and lose 100 percent of your benefit. That is the steepest of “benefit cliffs” and it’s the equivalent of taxing those with disabilities at rates far greater than 100 percent as a reward for their labor. It’s also the exact opposite of a basic income that is never taken away. It is this clawback of means-tested benefits with the earning of income that is possibly the single greatest flaw of all targeted assistance, and also the single most ignored detail when people defend the current system over the introduction of a basic income that would replace it. Simply put, $1,000 per month in welfare is not at all the same thing as $1,000 per month in basic income. It’s not just apples and oranges. It’s rotten apples and ripe oranges. With welfare, because it is targeted and therefore withdrawn as income is earned, people on welfare are effectively punished for working. Their total incomes don’t really increase with employment. Welfare functions in many ways as a ceiling. With basic income, because it is unconditional and therefore never withdrawn as income is earned, people with basic incomes are always rewarded for working. Their total incomes always increase with any amount of employment. Basic income therefore functions as a floor. Do you see the difference? So when someone says the details matter when it comes to the idea of basic income and suggests the possibility that it could be regressive, and even increase inequality by taking money being targeted at the poor and giving it to the non-poor, understand that the details of the details matter even more than just the details.
Forbes
Dorfman, Jeffrey. “Welfare Offers Short-Term Help And Long-Term Poverty, Thanks To Asset Tests.” Forbes, Forbes Magazine, 17 Oct. 2016, https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffreydorfman/2016/10/13/welfare-offers-short-term-help-and-long-term-poverty/#28439bed32cd
The third flaw in the government welfare system is the way that benefits phase outs as a recipient’s income increases. As a household’s income approaches the poverty line and rises above it, families on various welfare programs can actually face effective marginal tax rates of 50 or 60 percent (see this CBO report for the details). That means that the combination of taxes owed on new income and benefits lost because of the rising income causes the family to lose 50 to 60 percent of its initial income gain to the federal government.In simple terms, a poor family trying to escape poverty pays an effective marginal tax rate that is considerably higher than a middle class family and higher than or roughly equal to the marginal tax rate of a family in the top one percent. Given that our federal income tax system is supposed to progressive, meaning higher income families pay a higher percentage of that income in taxes, it is nonsensical to impose such high tax rates on families in poverty. Clearly, welfare benefits must phase out as incomes rise, but they do not have to phase out this rapidly. An effective marginal tax rate that high can (and by numerous accounts from the real world does) cause families in and near poverty to turn down opportunities for promotions, raises, or more hours of work because the higher earned income is hardly worth it given the losses they face from taxes and lost benefits.
Hughes 2016
Hughes, Charles. “The welfare trap: maze of programs punishes work”. Foundation for Economic Education, jan 4, 2016. https://fee.org/articles/the-welfare-trap-labyrinth-of-programs-punishes-work/
CBO’s analysis looks at the range of effective marginal tax rates households face at different levels of income. The median marginal tax rate for households just above the poverty level is almost 34 percent, the highest for any income level. Some households that receive larger benefits or higher state taxes have even higher effective rates: 10 percent of households just above the poverty line face a marginal rate higher than 65 percent. For each additional dollar earned in this range, these households would lose almost two-thirds to taxes or lost benefits. The comparable rate for the highest earners, households above 400 percent of the poverty level, is only 43.4 percent. If anything this analysis might understate how steep the effective marginal rates are for some households. CBO only considers the combined effect of income taxes, payroll taxes, SNAP, and ACA exchange subsidies, so households that participate in other programs like TANF or housing assistance could face even higher rates. These results mirror some of Cato’s past work investigating the issues and trade-offs involved with these welfare programs.
Tanner 16
Tanner, Michael. “Ending Welfare as We Know It.”?National Review, National Review, 27 Apr. 2016, www.nationalreview.com/2016/04/welfare-trapping-poor-poverty/.
Actually, though, free-market thinkers from F. A. Hayek and Robert Nozick to Milton Friedman and Charles Murray have long been open to some form of GNI. Instead of tinkering around the edges of the welfare state, trimming a billion dollars here, adding a work requirement there, why not simply abolish the entire thing? Get rid of welfare, food stamps, Medicaid, housing assistance, unemployment insurance, and all the rest. Murray would even throw in Medicare and Social Security. Replace it all with a simple cash grant to every American whose income falls below the stipulated level, and then leave the recipients alone to manage their own lives free from government interference. Such a program would be simpler and far more transparent than the hodgepodge of existing anti-poverty programs.?The federal government alone, for instance, currently funds more than 100 separate anti-poverty programs, overseen by nine different cabinet departments and six independent agencies. With different, often contradictory, eligibility levels, work requirements, and other restrictions, our current welfare system is a nightmare of unaccountability that fails to effectively help people transition out of these programs and escape poverty. A GNI would also treat poor people as adults, expecting them to budget and manage their money like everyone else. Currently, most welfare programs parcel out payments, not to the poor themselves, but to those who provide services to the poor, such as landlords or health-care providers. But shouldn’t the poor decide for themselves how much of their income should be allocated to rent or food or education or transportation? Perhaps they may even choose to save more or invest in learning new skills that will help them earn more in the future. You can’t expect the poor to behave responsibly if they are never given any responsibility. Moreover, giving the poor responsibility for managing their own lives will mean more choices and opportunities. That, in turn, will break up geographic concentrations of poverty that can isolate the poor from the rest of society and reinforce the worst aspects of the poverty culture. And, by taking the money away from the special interests that support the welfare industry, it would break up the coalitions that inevitably push for greater spending. A GNI would also provide far better incentives when it comes to work, marriage, and savings. Because current welfare benefits are phased out as income increases, they in effect create high marginal tax rates that can discourage work or marriage. Studies have shown that a person on welfare who takes a job can lose as much as 95 cents out of every dollar he earns, through taxes and forgone benefits. Poor people, by and large, are not lazy, but they also aren’t stupid. If they can’t earn more through work than from welfare, many will choose to remain on welfare. In contrast, a guaranteed national income would not penalize someone who left welfare for work. And a guaranteed national income would also do away with much of the government’s excuse for regulating the economy. Minimum-wage laws would instantly become obsolete, to cite just one example. Moreover, a GNI could minimize the economic disruptions that occur from automation and free trade. There would be less opportunity for demagoguery on the American political scene and less resistance to liberalizing the economy.
Rector 14
Rector, Robert. “welfare state grows as self-sufficiancy declines”. The Heritage Foundation, aug 6, 2014. https://www.heritage.org/budget-and-spending/commentary/welfare-state-grows-self-sufficiency-declines
By this standard, the War on Poverty has been a catastrophic failure. After spending more than $20 trillion on Johnson's war, many Americans are less capable of self-support than when the war began. This lack of progress is, in a major part, due to the welfare system itself. Welfare breaks down the habits and norms that lead to self-reliance, especially those of marriage and work. It thereby generates a pattern of increasing intergenerational dependence. The welfare state is self-perpetuating: By undermining productive social norms, welfare creates a need for even greater assistance in the future. The poverty rate is better understood as self-sufficiency rate. That is, we should measure how many Americans can take care of themselves and their families. Reforms should focus on changing the incentive structure of welfare programs - to point the way toward self-sufficiency
Semuels 16
Semuels, Alana. “The near impossibility of moving up after welfare”. The Atlantic, july 11, 2016. https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/07/life-after-welfare/490586/
Since Bill Clinton signed welfare reform into law in 1996, work has been billed as the best solution for people like Vance. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, better known as welfare reform, encouraged states to put stringent work requirements on people receiving Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF). In order for states to continue to receive federal money, recipients had to put in a certain number of volunteer or work hours every month, and counselors had to push recipients to take a job, any job, that would get them off the dole. (Each state has its own program to administer TANF; W-2 is Wisconsin's version.) Wisconsin, which was one of the earliest states to experiment with welfare reform, had some of the harshest work requirements in the country, according to the 1997 account of the state’s reform efforts by Jason DeParle, “Getting Opal Caples to Work,” in The New York Times Magazine. “It is tougher than anything that has come before: virtually no one is exempt,” he wrote. Reform was successful—in a sense: Today just 3 million people receive cash assistance from the government, down from 13 million in 1995. But reform came at a price. When people could not find jobs in the allowed amount of time, they lost all government help. That thrust them into deep poverty of the type that the safety net would have once prevented. Today, about 1.5 million households, including about three million children, are living on $2.00 per person or less per day, according to the researchers Kathryn Edin and H. Luke Shaefer. Those who do find jobs are often not much better off than they’d been on the dole. The job market is tough these days for those without more than a high school education. A study of Maryland welfare recipients exiting TANF, for example, found that just 22 percent found stable employment five years after leaving welfare, and for many more the only work available was either temporary or paid poverty wages. There is little hope of moving up. In today’s economy, most people cannot expect to receive the on-the-job training or promotions they might have decades ago. Because wages have stagnated, most people who enter low-wage jobs and stay in them will never see their pay go up significantly. “We used to have more general wage growth in the economy, so you could get a job, hold it, and stay in it,” Pamela Loprest, a senior fellow at the Urban Institute, said. “Even if you didn't get more education, you saw some growth in your wages over time.”
Currie
Currie, Janet. “The effect of Welfare on Child Outcomes”. NCBI. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK230341/
The fundamental problem facing researchers and policy makers is that the children of welfare recipients may have bad outcomes for reasons that have nothing to do with the receipt of assistance per se. It is possible that a program could have substantial benefits for poor children and still leave many children disadvantaged relative to better-off peers. Evidently, parents of children on welfare are worse off than other parents in observable ways: they are poorer, likely to have less education, and may also have health problems. Many datasets available to researchers contain at least crude measures of these observable variables so that observed differences between parents on welfare and other parents can be accounted for using standard regression models. To take a simple example, suppose that children of high school dropouts have lower scores on standardized tests than children of college graduates. Then if mothers on welfare are more likely to be high school dropouts than college graduates, a simple comparison of the two group's average scores might tell you more about the effects of maternal education than about the effects of welfare. A simple way to "control" for the effects of education in order to focus on the effects of welfare might involve drawing a sample of high school dropouts and comparing children of welfare mothers to other children within this group. Any differences between the welfare children and the others could then be attributed to welfare use and not to maternal education. Multiple regression techniques simply allow one to control for the effects of several observable variables at the same time. The problem becomes much more difficult however if parents on welfare also differ from other parents in ways that are not observed. For example, they may lack motivation or be discouraged by previous misfortune. Failure to properly control for these differences could lead one to incorrectly infer that it was being on welfare that was associated with negative child outcomes, rather than these underlying conditions. Some underlying problem, such as maternal depression, might cause both welfare dependence and negative child outcomes.
Rumberger 13
Rumberger, Russell. “Poverty and high school dropouts”. American Psychological Association, May 2013. https://www.apa.org/pi/ses/resources/indicator/2013/05/poverty-dropouts
The United States is facing a dropout crisis, with an estimated 1.1 million members of the 2012 high school graduating class not earning diplomas (Education Week, 2012). Dropouts face extremely bleak economic and social prospects. Compared to high school graduates, they are less likely find a job and earn a living wage, and more likely to be poor and to suffer from a variety of adverse health outcomes (Rumberger, 2011). Moreover, they are more likely to rely on public assistance, engage in crime and generate other social costs borne by taxpayers (Belfield and Levin, 2007). Poverty and dropouts are inextricably connected in the three primary settings affecting healthy child and adolescent development: families, schools and communities. In 2009, poor (bottom 20 percent of all family incomes) students were five times more likely to drop out of high school than high-income (top 20 percent of all family incomes) students (Chapman, Laird, Ifill, and KewalRamani, 2011, Table 1). Child poverty is rampant in the U.S., with more than 20 percent of school-age children living in poor families (Snyder and Dillow, 2012, Table 27). And poverty rates for Black and Hispanic families are three times the rates for White families.
Mueller 18
Mueller, Antony. “How countries fall into the welfare trap”. Mises Wire, 3-30-2019. https://mises.org/wire/how-countries-fall-welfare-trap
This vicious cycle is noticeable in the decline in the rate of?productivity growth?of the industrialized countries since the 1970s that came along with the expansion of the welfare state and the rise of public debt. The welfare state and government debt are the main causes of the decline in?productivity rates. Over the past decades, the rates of the annual increase of productivity of the major industrialized countries have fallen from an average of five percent in the 1960s to around two percent in the 1990s and keep on falling. The escape from the welfare trap is the challenge of our time. Less productivity growth means less economic growth and less economic growth means lower income. The longer a country remains stuck in the trap, the harder it is to get out. To overcome the vicious cycle, the insight must take hold that an excessive welfare state erodes productivity. Without productivity gains, there is no increase in real per capita income. The labor productivity of a country determines its income level. The industrialized nations must get out of the whirlpool of welfare spending, public debt, and weak economic growth. Lifting the purchasing power of salaries requires higher productivity. Not more state control is the way to higher productivity but less regulation, less intervention, and less redistribution. End of Article
Covert 18
Covert, Bryce. “The Promise of a Universal Basic Income-and Its Limitations.”?The Nation, 14 Aug. 2018, www.thenation.com/article/archive/the-promise-of-a-universal-basic-income-and-its-limitations/.
But the most important consequence of giving cash, rather than stuff or services, is that it allows people to buy the specific things they lack. Lowrey describes seeing people’s houses in Kenya stuffed with Toms shoes that they didn’t need—each pair donated when someone buys a pair themselves—as well as soccer balls and nets that do little for a family that can’t buy enough food. “Cash is a proven aid intervention,” Lowrey notes, “whereas many of the goods and services provided by charities are not.” Plus it’s far cheaper and easier to disperse. As a way to combat poverty, Lowrey contends that a UBI could work in the United States, too. It “could be a powerful tool to eliminate deprivation…. About 41 million Americans were living below the poverty line as of 2016,” she notes. “A $1,000-a-month grant would push many of them above it.” Lowrey’s argument about poverty is persuasive. By giving every family in the United States $250 a month for each of its children, we would reduce child poverty by about 40 percent and effectively wipe out the most extreme cases. By giving every American about $3,000 a month, we would cut the official poverty rate in half and provide a higher standard of living for all—even for those who are not impoverished. In a review of the existing research on universal cash dispersals in developed countries—the Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend, for example, which gives every Alaskan resident a cut of the state’s oil profits—economist Ioana Marinescu found that universal basic incomes help people improve their nutrition, education, and health. Lowrey argues that a UBI could even change how we view poverty and the poor themselves. She recounts visiting Maine, where she interviewed people who were unable to jump through the hoops to receive the government aid they so desperately needed. “We judge, marginalize, and shame the poor for their poverty—to the point that we make them provide urine samples, and want to force them to volunteer for health benefits,” she notes. “As such, we tolerate levels of poverty that are grotesque and entirely unique among developed nations.” But giving everyone, including the poor, unconditional cash could mean seeing poor people “as deserving for no other reason than their poverty—something that is not and has never been part of this country’s social contract.” For Lowrey, an American UBI would then be about economic justice: It is a dividend from the government that gives each citizen a cut of the prosperity that we all help to generate. A universal basic income would represent a commitment to the idea that we all contribute to society and that, in one of the richest countries on earth, none of us should go without some means of subsistence. “UBI would be sharing the public wealth,” Lowrey argues, before pressing the point:
Hamilton 18
Hamilton, Leah. “Why welfare doesn’t work: and what we should do instead”. Basic Income Earth Network, june 29, 2018. https://basicincome.org/news/2018/06/why-welfare-doesnt-work-and-what-we-should-do-instead/
The primary cash assistance program in the United States, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families,?served?68 of low-income families in 1996. Today, only 23 of poor families receive assistance. This change has been largely brought about by the imposition of five-year lifetime limits (states are allowed to set lower limits) and stricter eligibility criteria. Welfare caseload reductions have been solidly linked to the rise of?deep poverty?in America, family strain and increased?foster care placements. 1.46 million US households (including 2.8 million children) now live on less than?$2 per person, per day (the World Bank’s measurement of extreme poverty). Meanwhile, welfare eligibility rules designed to encourage independence have achieved the opposite effect. For example, though many states impose strict work requirements, states which loosen these rules actually see recipients move to?higher wage, higher benefit?work, presumably because they have the breathing room to search for a good job rather than take the first one that comes along. Similarly, in states with strict limitations on recipient assets, poor families are?less likely?to own a car, making it nearly impossible to maintain employment in areas without public transportation. Even worse,?some?researchers?are discovering a “cliff effect” in which welfare recipients immediately lose all benefits (including childcare assistance) after a small increase in income. As a result, many parents turn down promotional opportunities because they would be ultimately worse off financially. Any parent would make the same decision if it meant the ability to feed their children and afford quality childcare. | 904,675 |
365,541 | 379,584 | MaduroAgriculture NC | Rendon
Moises Rendon, director of the Future of Venezuela Initiative and fellow with the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington., 9-3-2019, "Are Sanctions Working in Venezuela?," CSIS, https://www.csis.org/analysis/are-sanctions-working-venezuela
To date, the United States has sanctioned 119 individuals and 47 entities from or related to Venezuela, many of whom were also designated by Canada, Mexico, Panama, and the European Union. While the current administration has demonstrated a width and breadth of sanctioning techniques, the most notable policy shift since President Trump’s 2017 inauguration has been the gradual transition from individual to sectoral sanctions. These are distinct policy tools: individual sanctions block the assets and movement of persons deemed to be aiding the regime while sectoral sanctions prohibit transactions with certain companies which are engaged in illicit actions on behalf of the government. When President Trump took office, he continued the authorization of sanctions against individuals deemed to be working on behalf of Maduro’s regime, including Maduro’s family, vice president, and ministers and advisors in his inner circle. However, a change in course took place when the president issued an August 2017 executive order prohibiting U.S. citizens from purchasing Venezuelan government debt, specifically targeting Venezuela’s state-owned oil company Petro?leos de Venezuela S.A. (PdVSA). This mandate also restricted the Venezuelan government’s access to U.S. debt and equity markets to limit Maduro’s ability to finance illicit activities and pay off military officials. Sanctions are undoubtedly cutting off financing to the Maduro regime, limiting the government’s ability to import food and medicine amid economic freefall. However, reversing sanctions against Maduro and giving the regime access to revenues will not fix the humanitarian crisis for three main reasons.
Bueno
Bruce Bueno De Mesquita, Alastair Smith, 1-25-2019, "Venezuela’s Embattled President Will Survive As Long As His Generals Are Still Getting Paid.," Slate Magazine, https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/01/venezuela-maduro-survives-guaido.html
When would the army defect? We can learn the answer by reflecting on past experience. The shah of Iran’s military chose to sit on its hands in 1979 rather than fight off the Khomeini revolution. Egyptian dictator Hosni Mubarak’s military decided to sit on the sidelines during the 2011 Arab Spring while the people revolted. Indeed, Egypt’s military leaders chose to join the newly emergent replacement government and then toppled it shortly thereafter securing their own monopoly on power. Many other examples illustrate a similar phenomenon. The members of the incumbent’s inner circle are loyal as long as they can count on their leader to ensure that they have a steady, continuous, substantial flow of access to wealth and power. But if the incumbent’s reliability on that front comes into doubt, then the inner circle is better off either backing a mass uprising, hoping to co-opt it later, or launching a coup d’état to install themselves in power. This brings us to an important difference between Maduro and the shah or Mubarak.
Jim
Jim Wyss, 5-14-2019, "U.S. official describes Venezuela’s Maduro as paranoid, weak, isolated," miamiherald, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/venezuela/article230392499.html
Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro has lost trust in his inner circle, can’t venture out into public and is sleeping in a bunker as he clings to power in the shattered country, said Mauricio Claver-Carone, the senior director of the White House National Security Council. Speaking at the Concordia conference in Colombia’s capital Tuesday, Claver-Carone, one of the Trump administration’s key national security advisers, pushed back against the idea that a brief military uprising on April 30 in Caracas had been a failure, instead arguing that it had unveiled how many of Maduro’s closest allies were plotting against him. “One of the positive elements we saw is that there were many people involved,” he said. “And the amplitude of the conspiracy is much larger than has been reported.”
Grove
Thomas Grove and Anatoly Kurmanaev, 12-21-2019, "Russia’s Backing of Venezuela’s Maduro Has Its Limits ," WSJ, https://www.wsj.com/articles/russias-backing-of-venezuelas-maduro-has-its-limits-11548703541
MOSCOW—Russia’s support for embattled Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro is opening a new geopolitical front between Moscow and Washington right on the U.S.’s doorstep, but the Kremlin’s will and ability to compete appear limited.
Although Moscow is leading the charge among those who still view Mr. Maduro as Venezuela’s legitimate president, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Monday there were no discussions in government to extend major financial or military assistance to keep Mr. Maduro in power.
Holly
Holly Ellyatt, May 1, 2019, “Could Russia and the US come to a deal over Venezuela’s Maduro?,” CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/01/could-russia-and-the-us-strike-a-deal-over-venezuelas-maduro.html
Reuters estimates that the Russian government and state energy company Rosneft have handed Venezuela at least $17 billion in loans and credit lines since 2006. It has also provided the Venezuelan government with military equipment and it has stakes in the country’s energy sector.
As such, Moscow wants to protect its assets from regime change as well as preventing the U.S. from increasing its sphere of influence.
“Russia’s bottom line is to stop regime change by external intervention, but if it falls from within they’ll go with the flow,” Christopher Granville, managing director of EMEA and Global Political Research at TS Lombard, told CNBC Wednesday.
Presse
Presse, 9-25-2019, "Russia’s Putin calls for talks to resolve Venezuela crisis," South China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/news/world/americas/article/3030359/vladimir-putin-calls-dialogue-between-venezuelas-maduro-and
Russian President Vladimir Putin told Venezuela’s Nicolas Maduro on Wednesday he supported talks between the embattled leader and the opposition, warning that refusing dialogue could further threaten the crisis-wracked country. Welcoming the leftist leader at the Kremlin, Putin reiterated support for Maduro but also indicated the Venezuelan president should be open to dialogue with his critics. “No doubt we support the dialogue that you, Mr President, and your government are having with the opposition forces,” Putin said. “We believe that any refusal to have dialogue is irrational, harms the country, and only threatens the population’s well-being.”
Ward
Alex Ward, 12-6-2019, "Venezuela’s opposition leader failed to depose Maduro. He explains why he’s not giving up.," Vox, https://www.vox.com/world/2019/12/6/20998988/venezuela-juan-guaido-interview-maduro-trump
“We sense a firm commitment from the United States,” Venezuela’s self-declared interim president told me on Wednesday. “I think they’re doing everything they could be doing under these circumstances.” On Friday, Bloomberg reported that Trump isn’t sure Guaidó is the man who can dislodge dictator Nicolás Maduro from power. The US may now be considering other options, including siding with Russia to work on a transition plan or pressuring Cuba, Maduro’s key backer. It’s another setback for Guaidó who has led the Venezuelan opposition movement to kick Maduro out of office since January. In recent weeks he’s been plagued with problem after problem, including a corruption scandal opening a rift within his own party, and declining poll numbers that show the public may not be as firmly behind him as it once was.
BBC
BBC News, 2-24-2019, "US says Venezuelans will depose Maduro," https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-47348293
US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has said Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro's "days are numbered" after deadly clashes over humanitarian aid. "Picking exact days is difficult. I'm confident that the Venezuelan people will ensure that Maduro's days are numbered," Mr Pompeo told CNN. Two people died in Saturday's clashes between civilians and troops loyal to Mr Maduro, who blocked aid deliveries. Self-declared interim President Juan Guaidó said Mr Maduro must resign. Mr Guaidó, who has been recognised as interim leader by more than 50 countries, has called on other nations to consider "all measures" to oust Mr Maduro after opposition-led efforts to bring in aid descended into clashes.
Casey
Nicholas Casey, 5-15-2016, "Dying Infants and No Medicine: Inside Venezuela’s Failing Hospitals," The New York Times. 15 May. 2016. Web. 5 Dec. 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/16/world/americas/dying-infants-and-no- medicine-inside-venezuelas-failing-hospitals.html
This nation has the largest oil reserves in the world, yet the government saved little money for hard times when oil prices were high. Now that prices have collapsed — they are around a third what they were in 2014 — the consequences are casting a destructive shadow across the country. Lines for food, long a feature of life in Venezuela, now erupt into looting. The boli?var, the country’s currency, is nearly worthless. The crisis is aggravated by a political feud between Venezuela’s leftists, who control the presidency, and their rivals in congress. The president’s opponents declared a humanitarian crisis in January, and this month passed a law that would allow Venezuela to accept international aid to prop up the health care system. “This is criminal that we can sit in a country with this much oil, and people are dying for lack of antibiotics,” says Oneida Guaipe, a lawmaker and former hospital union leader. But Mr. Maduro, who succeeded Hugo Cha?vez, went on television and rejected the effort, describing the move as a bid to undermine him and privatize the hospital system. “I doubt that anywhere in the world, except in Cuba, there exists a better health system than this one,” Mr. Maduro said.
Raphelson
Samantha Raphelson, 2-1-2018, "Venezuela's Health Care System Ready To Collapse Amid Economic Crisis," NPR.org, https://www.npr.org/2018/02/01/582469305/venezuelas-health-care-system-ready-to-collapse-amid-economic-crisis
The crisis affects Valencia personally, who relies on medication for a kidney transplant.
"I haven't received my medicine since August last year," he says. "Right now, I'm taking medicines that have expired, and my transplant is at risk."
Venezuela's President Nicolas Maduro has refused to accept humanitarian aid, blocking shipments of medicine and first aid supplies. Government data shows infant mortality rose by 30 percent in 2016 and malaria infections shot up 76 percent, Reuters reports. "So most countries when they're hit by a crisis, they're taking aid from other countries, from NGOs," Associated Press reporter Hannah Dreier told NPR in 2016. "But Venezuela keeps refusing to take donations that other countries are offering and is actually turning back shipments of donations that people have given in places like the U.S., not letting medicine in."
Kinsonian
Sarah Kinosian (University of Pennsylvania), 12-16-2019, "Costco in Caracas: how Florida goods flood Venezuelan stores," WSAU, https://wsau.com/news/articles/2019/dec/16/costco-in-caracas-how-florida-goods-flood-venezuelan-stores/966824/
The goods are delivered to Florida-based door-to-door services run by Venezuelans, according to 11 interviews with customs agents, operators and businessmen. The products move in bulk via shipping companies with bases in south Florida who have this year enjoyed a 100 exemption of import duties and waiver of some paperwork at the Venezuelan end, the sources added. "Everything our customers want from the United Sates, we've managed to offer here!" enthused Hector Mambel, who runs a "bodegon" in Puerto Cabello port with a "Mini Walmart" sign outside using the same design as the U.S. giant he buys from. The shift shows how Venezuela's economy is evolving to survive sanctions that have hit oil exports. The trade from Florida does not violate Trump's sanctions because they target business with Maduro's government not with private entrepreneurs. It has, however, bemused some Venezuelans used to constant "anti-imperialist" rhetoric. "I don't understand this government that speaks ill of the 'gringos' and yet we now see U.S. products abound in stores and everything is in dollars," said teacher Ligia Martinez, 38, holding a bag with purchases of cereal, tuna and cake mix.
Dobson
Paul Dobson, 3-19-2018, "Venezuela to Expand Small-Scale Urban Agriculture," Venezuelanalysis, https://venezuelanalysis.com/News/13727
Venezuela revealed that it is looking to expand grassroots and family-based urban food production this weekend, as the government unveiled its National Urban Agriculture Plan 2018. Areas of expansion include incorporating animal rearing, the Green Rooves project, and seed import replacement, as well as using more lots of land for urban food production than in previous years. “This plan looks to cover 96,000 hectares across the national territory and produce more than 2,071,000 tonnes of food,” explained Urban Agriculture Minister, Freddy Bernal. Under the terms of the national plan, urban agriculture, which is normally private or community organised, should “be able to cover 20 of the national population” within three years, he said. The use of Venezuela’s urban spaces to increase food production has gained momentum in recent years as a way for families to lessen the impact of spiralling inflation and food shortages in the shops. Small scale productive units of vegetables, fruit, or eggs are now commonplace both in Venezuela’s households as well as in the public green areas, such as schoolyards, squares, or even public institutions. The Ministry for Urban Agriculture was created in 2016 to support such initiatives.
FocusEconomics
Focuseconomics, 12-3-2019, "Venezuela Economy," FocusEconomics | Economic Forecasts from the World's Leading Economists, https://www.focus-economics.com/countries/venezuela
The economy is seen remaining in a deep recession this year and next, amid dwindling oil production and under pressure from financial and oil-sector sanctions which starve the government of hard currency. Meanwhile, the political crisis seems far from being resolved. The possibility of a political transition remains, a scenario which some of our panelists have factored into their forecasts. FocusEconomics panelists see the economy contracting 8.4 in 2020, which is down 0.9 percentage points from last month’s forecast. In 2021, however, the panel sees GDP growing 0.7.
National Endowment for Democracy
Demdigest, 9-17-2019, "Venezuela 'loosening grip' on market, tightening on dissent," Democracy Digest, https://www.demdigest.org/venezuela-loosening-grip-on-market-tightening-on-dissent/
President Nicolás Maduro’s authoritarian government, long a practitioner of tight state control of the economy, has quietly and cautiously begun implementing free-market policies to tame hyperinflation and correct an economic contraction worse than America’s Great Depression. So far, that approach is providing a sliver of light to the moribund economy, The Wall Street Journal reports: Several smaller opposition parties have agreed to direct negotiations (CFR) with Maduro’s government after opposition leader Juan Guaido announced that a Norway-brokered peace process had been exhausted. Guaido called the decision a “maneuver” by Maduro’s regime to split the opposition.
Talley
Ian Talley and Michael C. Bender In Washington And Kejal Vyas In Caracas, 1-28-2019, "U.S. Imposes Sanctions on Venezuela’s Oil Industry," WSJ, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-to-place-sanctions-on-venezuela-state-owned-petroleos-de-venezuela-11548708213
The U.S. imposed sanctions on Venezuela’s state-owned oil giant in a dramatic move designed to empower the opposition and cripple the government of President Nicolás Maduro by preventing the proceeds of U.S. crude sales returning to Caracas.
The sanctions on Petróleos de Venezuela SA, the South American country’s main exporter, are the culmination of a two-year pressure campaign, and are an attempt to funnel income from the country’s biggest revenue generator into the hands of opposition leader Juan Guaidó.
US Treasury Department
U.S. Department of the Treasury, 4-5-2019, "Treasury Sanctions Companies Operating in the Oil Sector of the Venezuelan Economy and Transporting Oil to Cuba," No Publication, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm643
The United States continues to take strong action against the illegitimate regime of former President Nicolas Maduro, not only to isolate corrupt Venezuelan enterprises, but also to target Maduro’s supporters in Havana who continue to enable the oppression of the people of Venezuela. “Cuba has been an underlying force fueling Venezuela’s descent into crisis. Treasury is taking action against vessels and entities transporting oil, providing a lifeline to keep the illegitimate Maduro regime afloat,” said Treasury Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin. “Cuba continues to profit from, and prop up, the illegitimate Maduro regime through oil-for-repression schemes as they attempt to keep Maduro in power. The United States remains committed to a transition to democracy in Venezuela and to holding the Cuban regime accountable for its direct involvement in Venezuela’s demise.”
Congressional Research Service
Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions. 16 Oct. 2019, fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10715.pdf.
xOn January 28, 2019, pursuant to E.O. 13850, the Treasury Department designated PdVSA as operating in the oil sector of the Venezuelan economy, and Secretary of the Treasury Steven Mnuchin determined that the company was subject to U.S. sanctions. As a result, all property and interests in property of PdVSA subject to U.S. jurisdiction are blocked, and U.S. persons (companies or individuals) generally are prohibited from engaging in transactions with the company. At the same time, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued general licenses to allow certain transactions and activities related to PdVSA and its subsidiaries, some for specified wind-down periods. OFAC first authorized transactions with U.S.-based PdVSA subsidiaries, PDV Holding, Inc. (PDVH) and CITGO Holding, Inc. through July 27, 2019. In March 2019, the general license for those entities was extended for 18 months. OFAC authorized PDVH, CITGO, and other U.S. companies to import petroleum from PdVSA through April 28, 2019, but payments had to be made to a blocked U.S. account. OFAC initially authorized several U.S. companies with operations in Venezuela involving PdVSA (including Chevron) to continue operating through July 27, 2019; that authorization now extends through October 25, 2019.
BHP
BHP, 11-11-2019, "Petroleum briefing," https://www.bhp.com/media-and-insights/reports-and-presentations/2019/11/petroleum-briefing/
Today, we’re here to talk about the Petroleum business, its place in BHP’s portfolio, and to address the questions on your mind.
I recognise that you have interest in understanding our market outlook and our plans to grow value and returns. We will cover all of this.
More than anything else today, there are a few points I would like you to take away. Firstly, we believe oil and advantaged gas are commodities that have the potential to generate strong returns over the long term.
Secondly, we have the assets, and the growth projects to replace, and indeed build on the resilient returns we have enjoyed from the Petroleum business, through the next decade. Thirdly, our performance track record in exploration through to production gives confidence in our ability to deliver these plans. And finally, working in both a sustainable and capitally disciplined way underpins everything we do. This is key to the long-term performance of the Petroleum business.
Cara
Cara Jasso, 1-24-2019, "Venezuela: The Rise and Fall of a Petrostate," Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/venezuela-crisis
Petrostates are thought to be vulnerable to what economists call Dutch disease PDF, a term coined during the 1970s after the Netherlands discovered natural gas in the North Sea.
In an afflicted country, a resource boom attracts large inflows of foreign capital, which leads to an appreciation of the local currency and a boost for imports that are now comparatively cheaper. This sucks labor and capital away from other sectors of the economy, such as agriculture and manufacturing, which economists say are more important for growth and competitiveness. As these labor-intensive export industries flag, unemployment could rise, and the country could develop an unhealthy dependence on the export of natural resources. In extreme cases, a petrostate forgoes local oil production and instead derives most of its oil wealth through high taxes on foreign drillers. Petrostate economies are then left highly vulnerable to unpredictable swings in global energy prices and capital flight.
The so-called resource curse also takes a toll on governance. Since petrostates depend more on export income and less on taxes, there are often weak ties between the government and its citizens. Timing of the resource boom can exacerbate the problem.
Tong
Scott Tong, 4-18-2016, "Oil pushes out Venezuela's agriculture," https://www.marketplace.org/2016/04/18/venezuela-ranchers/
At a time when oil prices are low and petrostates are suffering, economists and historians mention the term “resource curse.” It is a paradox: many natural resource-rich economies have under-performed, faring worse economically than non-endowed countries. How could this be?
Often oil crowds out other sectors, so when a price bust hits an undiversified economy, the impact is severe. Which brings up Venezuela, once dominated by agriculture. Before the country found oil in the early 20th century, ranches provided ample milk and meat. Coffee beans led the country in exports. People mostly worked on farms.
Today, after the Age of Oil, there are food lines and shortages.
“The Venezuelans were fed on food brought from overseas, on imports,” said rancher Giovanni Finol, former president of the livestock federation in the western state of Zulia. “For the last 15 years, the government has been destroying production.”
This represents a strain of what’s called “Dutch disease.” In the Netherlands, Nigeria, Venezuela and elsewhere, oil has pushed out other sectors, in this case dairy, cocoa beans, coffee and poultry.
Rodriguez
Rodriguez 4-19-13 (Alejandro Urrutia, editor of the annual publication Mexico Oil and Gas review, “Effects of Hugo Chavez’s Death on Global Oil,” Global Conflict Analysis, http://globalconflictanalysis.com/2013/04/effects-of-hugo-chavezs-death-on-global-oil-markets/)
The first and most important issue is the future of the oil market in Venezuela. In 2010 OPEC claimed “Venezuela’s Orinoco Oil Belt contained tar sand deposits equivalent to around 300 billion barrels of oil– enough to fulfill current world demand for 10 years.” But even though Venezuela has the largest oil reserves in the world, Hugo Chavez’s dependence on PDVSA left the NOC with just US$11 billion – 9 of its income – to fund future operations (compared to Pemex’s 17 and Brazil’s Petrobras 29), This trend, which is not expected to change despite the death of Chavez, is of great concern to the US and other oil exporting and importing countries because it could have strong implications on global oil prices. This is the case because despite the fact that Chavez has passed away, Chavismo is still alive; therefore, many analysts believe that his policy of depending on oil revenues to foster social programs at home and abroad will continue, leading to a continuation of a decrease in Venezuela’s oil production. If this is case – as is expected – global oil supply would decrease and oil prices would increase because demand would not change. This decline could have a negative impact on American and Western economies, since there would be less supply. This is a great opportunity for Mexico to step up its production and fill in the vacuum left by PDVSA’s decline because the US and other Western nations will need to import oil, and since the US is currently seeking to become energy independent in a North American context, Mexico must capitalize on Venezuela’s continuous expected decline. However, this potential opportunity for Pemex and the Mexican oil and gas industry depends on the political future of Venezuela – which is expected to hold elections in the next 30 days.
Stocker
Stocker, Marc (Senior economic analyst for the Development Prospects Group), April 2018, "," World Bank, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/211351524855152792/pdf/WPS8419.pdf
Such a boost to global aggregate demand was expected to result from a transfer of income and wealth from oil-exporting economies, which tend to have a high aggregate savings rate, to oil-importing economies, where the propensity to spend is higher. And while lower oil prices were anticipated to negatively impact investment in the oil industry, this was expected to have been more than offset by lower energy costs for consumers and for energy-intensive sectors, including transportation, manufacturing, and agricultural sectors. The oil price plunge, however, was accompanied by a global slowdown (Figure 5). Global growth moderated from 2.9 percent in 2014 to 2.8 percent in 2015, before dropping to a post-crisis low of 2.4 percent in 2016, amid weakening global trade and subdued capital flows to EMDEs, and broadbased weakness in commodity prices. A sudden contraction in government spending, domestic demand, and imports in oil-exporting economies had some dampening effects, but the most important factor behind disappointing global growth during and after the oil price plunge was a failed recovery in oil-importing EMDEs and advanced economies, particularly the United States. Growth disappointments among oil importers were partially reversed in 2017, as a broad-based cyclical recovery got underway. However, forecast downgrades continued among a number of oil exporting EMDEs.
World Bank
Amy Silwell, 11-11-2008, "Economic Policy," No Publication, https://www.worldbank.org/en/webarchives/archive?url=httpzzxxweb.worldbank.org/archive/website01034A/WEB/0__CON-6.HTM
Sharply tighter credit conditions and weaker growth are likely to cut into government revenues and their ability to invest to meet education, health and gender goals, as well as the infrastructure expenditures needed to sustain growth. Current estimates suggest that a one percent decline in developing country growth rates pushes an additional 20 million people into poverty. Already 100 million people have been driven into poverty as a result of high food prices.
“The global financial crisis, coming so soon after the food and fuel crises, is likely to hurt the poor most in developing countries,” said Zoellick. “Working with the IMF, UN agencies, regional development banks and others, the World Bank Group is helping both governments and the private sector through lending, equity investments, innovative new tools, and safety net programs.” | 904,665 |
365,542 | 379,579 | Upward Mobility AC | Inherency
Mitnik
Mitnik, Pable A. Stanford.edu, The Pew Charitable Trusts and the Russell Sage Foundation, July 2015, web.stanford.edu/~pmitnik/EconomicMobilityintheUnitedStates.pdf.
The principle of equal opportunity holds so distinguished a place in U.S. history that it even appears in drafts of the country’s founding documents.1 This idea has been interpreted in various ways, but it is typically understood to mean that success should depend on hard work, that opportunities to get ahead should not be affected by the circumstances of birth, and that the labor market should allow for free and open competition among children from all social origins. But is the United States realizing this frequently expressed commitment to equal opportunity? According to a recent survey, only 64 percent of Americans now believe that opportunities for mobility are widely available, the lowest percentage in the roughly three decades the question has been tracked.2 Concern is also growing among scholars and policymakers that the ideal of equal opportunity, which has always been difficult to realize, is not being pursued as effectively as circumstances demand. This sense has been partly fueled by research, much of it by The Pew Charitable Trusts, showing that those born into the top or bottom of the economic ladder are quite likely to remain there as adults.3 Given the substantial body of research on economic mobility, one might imagine that little remains unknown. This is not the case. Although it is well established that a person’s income is related to that of his or her parents, some uncertainty remains about exactly how strong this relationship is. Among studies that rely on the intergenerational elasticity (IGE), the estimates of mobility range widely, making it difficult to reach a consensus on how evenly or unevenly opportunity is distributed. (For an explanation of the IGE, see the sidebar on Page 2.) In previous research, the IGE estimates have varied widely, with recent estimates based on administrative data ranging from as low as 0.34 to as high as 0.6.4 Because of this variability, the actual level of economic persistence across generations remains unclear.5 This uncertainty arises in part because of limitations in the data used to study economic mobility. For example, survey data fail to represent high-income families, while some of the existing administrative analyses are based on relatively young adults who may have not yet hit their earnings stride. These and other limitations can be addressed with a new data set based on tax data and other administrative sources that was developed by the Statistics of Income (SOI) Division of the Internal Revenue Service.6 This data set, created to study tax policy and intergenerational mobility, allows for one of the most robust assessments of the intergenerational transmission of economic advantage yet conducted in the United States. It also lays the groundwork for assessing long-term mobility trends. The research based on this new data set found that: • Approximately half of parental income advantages are passed on to children. The IGE, when averaged across all levels of parental income, is estimated at 0.52 for men and 0.47 for women. These estimates are at the high end of previous estimates and imply that the United States is very immobile.7 • The persistence of advantage is especially large among those raised in the middle to upper reaches of the income distribution. The IGE among adults whose parents were between the 50th and 90th income percentiles is 0.68 for men and 0.63 for women. This means that approximately two-thirds of parental income differences within this region of the income distribution persist into the next generation. • Children born far apart in the income distribution have very different economic outcomes. While a finding of unequal outcomes is not in itself surprising, the magnitude of this inequality has not been well appreciated: 2 The expected family income of children raised in families at the 90th income percentile is about three times that of children raised at the 10th percentile. • Parental income matters more for men’s earnings than for women’s. The average earnings IGE for men (0.56) is more than 40 percent higher than that for women (0.32). Although both men and women benefit from being born into higher-income families, men benefit much more—at least when it comes to their own earnings. • Parental income matters more for women’s chances of marriage, and of marrying better-off partners. The income IGE is large for men (0.52) mainly because children from higher-income families tend to have higher earnings as adults. For women, the income IGE is nearly as large (0.47), mainly because those from higherincome origins are more likely to be married in their late 30s—and to marry higher-earnings partners. These results show that children born into lower-income families can expect very different futures relative to those from higher-income families. Given the country’s commitment to equality of opportunity, the findings may suggest the need for policies that increase economic mobility. Because a wide range of institutions affect mobility, including the family, schools, labor markets, and the tax system, many entry points are possible for developing such policies.8 Although the findings of this report can inform public policy, they do not lead to particular policy prescriptions or indicate which of these many possible intervention points should be given priority.
Raj
Chetty, Raj, et al. “Economic Mobility.” The Stanford Center on Poverty and Inequality, The Poverty and Inequality Report 2015, 2015, inequality.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/SOTU_2015_economic-mobility.pdf.
The United States is often hailed as the “land of opportunity,” a society in which a child’s chances of success depend little on her family background. Is this reputation warranted? And is it especially warranted in some states, regions, or areas of the United States? There is a growing public perception that intergenerational income mobility—a child’s chance of moving up in the income distribution relative to her parents—is declining in the United States. Is it really true that opportunity has declined? In two recent papers, we address these questions by compiling statistics from millions of anonymous income records.1 These data have less measurement error and much larger sample sizes than previous survey-based studies and thus yield more precise estimates of intergenerational mobility across cities and states over time. Our core sample consists of all children in the United States born between 1980–1982, whose income we measure in 2011–2012, when they are approximately 30 years old. We divide our analysis into two parts: an analysis of time trends and an analysis of geographical variation in mobility across areas of the United States. Time Trends We find that the most robust way to measure intergenerational mobility is by ranking parents by parental income (at the time the child was growing up in the family) and by ranking children by their income when they are adults. For each percentile of parent’s income, we compute the average rank of the income of the children when adults. As shown in Figure 1, we find that this rank-rank relationship is almost perfectly linear, with a slope of 0.34. This implies that children growing up in the highest-income families rank, on average, 34 percentiles higher than children growing up in the poorest families. Contrary to popular perception, we find that such percentile rank–based measures of intergenerational mobility have remained extremely stable for the 1971–1993 birth cohorts. For example, the probability that a child reaches the top fifth of the income distribution given parents in the bottom fifth is 8.4 percent for children born in 1971, compared with 9.0 percent for those born in 1986. Children born to the highest-income families in 1984 were 74.5 percentage points more likely to attend college than those from the lowest-income families. The corresponding gap for children born in 1993 is 69.2 percentage points, suggesting that, if anything, mobility may have increased slightly in recent cohorts. Figure 2 illustrates the stability of intergenerational mobility for children born between 1971 and 1993 (where, for children born after 1986, estimates are predictions based on college attendance rates). The y-axis, “intergenerational persistence,” is a measure of the gap in average income percentiles for children born in the poorest versus richest families. On average, children with parents in the bottom 1 percent of the income distribution grow up to earn an income approximately 30 percentiles lower than their peers with parents in the top 1 percent of the income distribution. This difference has remained relatively steady across the birth cohorts we studied. Economic Mobility By Raj Chetty, Nathaniel Hendren, Patrick Kline, and Emmanuel Saez The Stanford Center on Poverty and Inequality state of states Key findings • There is less intergenerational mobility in the United States than is sometimes appreciated by the public, but intergenerational mobility is not declining. When poor children born in 1971 and 1986 are compared, one finds a slight increase (from 8.4 to 9.0 percent) in the chances of reaching the top fifth of the income distribution by age 28.
Gould
Gould, Elise. “U.S. Lags behind Peer Countries in Mobility.” Economic Policy Institute, 10 Oct. 2012, www.epi.org/publication/usa-lags-peer-countries-mobility
The notion that anyone in America who is willing and able to “pull themselves up by their bootstraps” can achieve significant upward mobility is deeply embedded in U.S. society. Conventional wisdom holds that class barriers in the United States are the lowest among the world’s advanced economies. Motivating this belief is the notion that there is a tradeoff between market regulation and mobility; advanced European economies are characterized by higher taxes, greater regulation, more union coverage, universal health care, a more comprehensive social contract, etc. Because some see these policies and institutions as impediments to mobility, mobility is believed to be greater in the United States. While faith in the American Dream is deep, evidence suggests that the United States lacks policies to ensure the opportunities that the dream envisions. According to the data, there is considerably more mobility in most other developed economies. The figure below, from The State of Working America, 12th Edition, measures the relationship between earnings of fathers and sons in member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) with similar incomes to the United States and for which data are available. An elasticity of zero would mean there is no relationship, and thus complete intergenerational mobility, with poor children just as likely as rich children to end up as rich adults. The higher the elasticity, the greater the influence of one’s birth circumstances on later life position. The relationship between father-son earnings is tighter in the United States than in most peer OECD countries, meaning U.S. mobility is among the lowest of major industrialized economies. The relatively low correlations between father-son earnings in Scandinavian countries provide a stark contradiction to the conventional wisdom. An elasticity of 0.47 found in the United States offers much less likelihood of moving up than an elasticity of 0.18 or less, as characterizes Finland, Norway, and Denmark.
Douthat
Douthat, Ross. “Poverty and Perverse Incentives.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 11 Dec. 2012, douthat.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/11/poverty-and-perverse-incentives/.
My colleague Nick Kristof has earned some deserved praise from conservatives for using his Sunday column to reflect on the perverse incentives that welfare programs can sometimes create for their beneficiaries. Here’s his arresting opening example: This is what poverty sometimes looks like in America: parents here in Appalachian hill country pulling their children out of literacy classes. Moms and dads fear that if kids learn to read, they are less likely to qualify for a monthly check for having an intellectual disability. Many people in hillside mobile homes here are poor and desperate, and a $698 monthly check per child from the Supplemental Security Income program goes a long way — and those checks continue until the child turns 18. “The kids get taken out of the program because the parents are going to lose the check,” said Billie Oaks, who runs a literacy program here in Breathitt County, a poor part of Kentucky. “It’s heartbreaking.” Right now, of course, Washington is consumed by the endlessly-recurring left-right debate over whether to raise marginal tax rates on the rich. But the problem Kristof is describing is a reminder that effective marginal tax rates may matter more at the bottom of the income ladder, where benefit cut-offs can discourage precisely the kind of choices that enable intergenerational mobility, and make striving of any sort seem like a dicier proposition than sticking with the benefits you have. The loss of the $698 disability subsidy is a stark, all-or-nothing example — not just a marginal tax on advancement, but a flat penalty on the act of getting an education for your children. But in more subtle and complicated ways, a similar problem plays itself out across the range of anti-poverty programs, from food stamps and Medicaid to the earned income tax credit and S-CHIP, that phase out or cut off as their recipients’ take-home pay increases. As of 2012, a new C.B.O. report finds, low and moderate-income workers face an effective tax rate of about 30 percent on every extra dollar earned, which will rise to 35 percent (almost as high as the marginal bite on upper-class paychecks) as the subsidies for the new health care law take effect. And that clean-sounding figure was obtained by only looking at a relatively narrow range of taxes and benefits: The more programs and variables you include in your analysis, the more byzantine the incentives for people trying to make it up the economic ladder start to look — complete with a number of “cliffs” where taking a higher-paying job can actually leave you with less disposable income than you had before.
Preventing Employment Links
Hughes
Hughes, Charles. “New Study Finds More Evidence of Poverty Traps in the Welfare System.” Cato Institute, 30 Dec. 2014, www.cato.org/blog/new-study-finds-more-evidence-poverty-traps-welfare-system.
A new study from the Illinois Policy Institute analyzes the welfare benefits package available at different levels of earnings in that state. The authors find that low?income workers have limited economic incentive to increase their earnings from the minimum wage, and at some higher levels of earnings these workers actually see a reduction in net income. America’s complex welfare system can too often create these perverse situations where beneficiaries are financially worse off as they increase work effort and earned income. In these poverty traps, lost benefits and increased taxes outweigh any additional earnings, making it harder for beneficiaries to escape from poverty and reach the middle class Author Erik Randolph finds that a single mother with two children who increases her hourly earnings from the Illinois minimum wage of $8.25 to $12 only sees her net income increase by less than $400. For many low?income workers striving to climb the ladder of prosperity, our welfare system takes away almost all of their incentive to move up from an entry?level job as they do not get to realize almost any of these gains. Even worse, someone in this scenario who works hard and increases her earnings all the way to $18 an hour, a wage level which would place her in the middle class, would actually see her net income decrease by more than $24,800 due to benefit reductions and tax increases. Instead of making it easier for beneficiaries to become independent and achieve a level of prosperity, the welfare system traps them into low levels of earnings. This parent would have to increase her earnings all the way to $38 an hour in order to replace the lost benefits and achieve the same standard of living. These findings echo some of the insights from our Work versus Welfare Trade?off paper, in which we compared the benefits available to a similar family in each state to the equivalent wage that family would have to earn to obtain the same level of net income. Our study found that the high level of benefits available combined with benefit cliffs created situations that would deter work. In 34 states, the parent would have to earn well above the minimum wage to achieve the same standard of living she had when not working. This new report from the Illinois Policy Institute illustrates some of the biggest problems with our current welfare system and corroborates many of the findings of our past work. Work versus Welfare looked at two situations, one where the parent worked and one where she had no earned income. This new study from the Illinois Policy Institute provides valuable additional insight, as it looks at this tradeoff at different levels of earned income to analyze the poverty traps in place as beneficiaries move to higher levels of earned income. Instead of encouraging work, the current welfare system often takes away much of the incentive for low?income workers to increase work effort and earnings. As Randolph puts it, “rather than providing a hand up, Illinois’ welfare system can become a trap,” and this is unfortunately the case throughout the country. This study shows yet another reason why our welfare system needs fundamental reform.
Hamilton
Hamilton, Leah (MSW, PhD). “Why Welfare Doesn't Work: And What We Should Do Instead.” BIEN, Basic Income Earth Network, 29 June 2018, basicincome.org/news/2018/06/why-welfare-doesnt-work-and-what-we-should-do-instead/.
Democrats and Republicans don’t see eye to eye very often, but they can safely agree on one point: welfare doesn’t work. Liberals are concerned that an ever-shrinking social safety net reaches fewer and fewer families in need. Republicans worry that welfare benefits create dependence. They are both right. The primary cash assistance program in the United States, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, served 68 of low-income families in 1996. Today, only 23 of poor families receive assistance. This change has been largely brought about by the imposition of five-year lifetime limits (states are allowed to set lower limits) and stricter eligibility criteria. Welfare caseload reductions have been solidly linked to the rise of deep poverty in America, family strain and increased foster care placements. 1.46 million US households (including 2.8 million children) now live on less than $2 per person, per day (the World Bank’s measurement of extreme poverty). Meanwhile, welfare eligibility rules designed to encourage independence have achieved the opposite effect. For example, though many states impose strict work requirements, states which loosen these rules actually see recipients move to higher wage, higher benefit work, presumably because they have the breathing room to search for a good job rather than take the first one that comes along. Similarly, in states with strict limitations on recipient assets, poor families are less likely to own a car, making it nearly impossible to maintain employment in areas without public transportation. Even worse, some researchers are discovering a “cliff effect” in which welfare recipients immediately lose all benefits (including child care assistance) after a small increase in income. As a result, many parents turn down promotional opportunities because they would be ultimately worse off financially. Any parent would make the same decision if it meant the ability to feed their children and afford quality childcare. We must redesign this entire system. In the most prosperous nation in the world, it is ludicrous that children are growing up in the kind of deprivation we normally associate with developing countries. Simultaneously, we must ensure that no one is discouraged from growing their income or assets. We must redesign this entire system. In the most prosperous nation in the world, it is ludicrous that children are growing up in the kind of deprivation we normally associate with developing countries. Simultaneously, we must ensure that no one is discouraged from growing their income or assets. One potential solution is a universal basic income, which would provide an annual benefit to every citizen. However, this idea comes with a hefty price tag and would either increase our national deficit or increase the marginal tax rate, both of which might be political non-starters. The simpler solution is a Negative Income Tax (NIT) which is potentially cheaper than our current poverty alleviation efforts. An NIT is a refundable tax credit which brings every household to the federal poverty level. The most effective way to do this is to decrease the credit slowly (for example, a $0.50 reduction for each $1.00 increase in earned income) so that there is never a penalty for hard work.
Tanner
Tanner, Michael(Senior fellow at the CATO institute). “Ending Welfare as We Know It.” National Review, National Review, 27 Apr. 2016, www.nationalreview.com/2016/04/welfare-trapping-poor-poverty/.
A GNI would also treat poor people as adults, expecting them to budget and manage their money like everyone else. Currently, most welfare programs parcel out payments, not to the poor themselves, but to those who provide services to the poor, such as landlords or health-care providers. But shouldn’t the poor decide for themselves how much of their income should be allocated to rent or food or education or transportation? Perhaps they may even choose to save more or invest in learning new skills that will help them earn more in the future. You can’t expect the poor to behave responsibly if they are never given any responsibility. Moreover, giving the poor responsibility for managing their own lives will mean more choices and opportunities. That, in turn, will break up geographic concentrations of poverty that can isolate the poor from the rest of society and reinforce the worst aspects of the poverty culture. And, by taking the money away from the special interests that support the welfare industry, it would break up the coalitions that inevitably push for greater spending. A GNI would also provide far better incentives when it comes to work, marriage, and savings. Because current welfare benefits are phased out as income increases, they in effect create high marginal tax rates that can discourage work or marriage. Studies have shown that a person on welfare who takes a job can lose as much as 95 cents out of every dollar he earns, through taxes and forgone benefits. Poor people, by and large, are not lazy, but they also aren’t stupid. If they can’t earn more through work than from welfare, many will choose to remain on welfare. In contrast, a guaranteed national income would not penalize someone who left welfare for work. And a guaranteed national income would also do away with much of the government’s excuse for regulating the economy. Minimum-wage laws would instantly become obsolete, to cite just one example. Moreover, a GNI could minimize the economic disruptions that occur from automation and free trade. There would be less opportunity for demagoguery on the American political scene and less resistance to liberalizing the economy.
Discourage Asset Growth Links
Edwards
Edwards, Chris(director of tax policy studies at Cato), and Ryan Bourne. “Exploring Wealth Inequality.” Cato Institute, 5 Nov. 2019, www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/exploring-wealth-inequality#asset-tests.
Displacement of Personal Savings The largest federal program, Social Security, is a prominent example of crowding out. The program is a tax?funded benefit program, not a savings plan. Many Americans rely on Social Security for most or all of their retirement income. The program discourages workers from saving for their own retirement, and it reduces their ability to do so with its heavy 12.4 percent tax on wages up to a dollar cap. In pioneering studies in the 1970s, Martin Feldstein explored how Social Security displaced private savings.138 He found that every dollar increase in benefits reduced private savings by about 50 cents.139 Studies since then have generally confirmed the substantial displacement effect, although the magnitudes of the estimated effects have varied.140 Social Security represents a much larger share of retirement resources for the non?rich than the rich, and the program’s benefits cannot be inherited. The result is that the program’s crowding?out effect increases wealth inequality. Jagadeesh Gokhale and Laurence Kotlikoff modeled a simulated population to estimate that Social Security raises the Gini coefficient on wealth by one?fifth and increases the share of wealth held by the top 10 percent by more than one?quarter.141 This occurs because Social Security leaves the non?rich with “proportionately less to save, less reason to save, and a larger share of their old?age resources in a nonbequeathable form than the lifetime rich. In doing so, Social Security denies the children of the poor the opportunity to receive inheritances.”142 The fact that Social Security increases wealth inequality may surprise people because the program is thought to be a progressive achievement. While the program may reduce income inequality, it raises wealth inequality. Other social programs create similar effects. Medicare provides large resources to retirees and thus also reduces incentives to save for retirement. Unemployment insurance, welfare, education aid, and other programs reduce incentives for people to save for midlife expenses. In general, when the government provides income and other social benefits to people, savings incentives are reduced. Higher government aid results in lower private wealth. Bar?? Kaymak and Markus Poschke built a model of the U.S. economy to estimate the causes of changing wealth inequality in recent decades. They found that the main factor raising wealth inequality has been technological change that has increased wage dispersion. But they also found that the expansion of Social Security and Medicare has had a large effect: By subsidizing income and healthcare expenditures for the elderly, these programs curb incentives to save for retirement, a major source of wealth accumulation over the life?cycle. Furthermore, since both programs are redistributive by design, they have a stronger effect on the savings of low? and middle?income groups. By contrast, those at the top of the income distribution have little to gain from these programs. We argue that the redistributive nature of transfer payments was instrumental in curbing wealth accumulation for income groups outside the top 10 and, consequently, amplified wealth concentration in the U.S.143 Kaymak and Poschke found that the expansion of Social Security and Medicare caused about one?quarter of the rise of the top 1 percent share of wealth in recent decades.144 Social Security and Medicare spending increased from 3.5 percent of GDP in 1970 to 8.3 percent by 2018.145 Those are the two largest federal social programs, but other programs have likely added to this wealth inequality effect. Total federal and state social spending as a share of GDP more than doubled from 6.8 percent in 1970 to 14.3 percent by 2018.146 That large increase was over the period that Thomas Piketty and some other economists claim that there was a large increase in wealth inequality. Section 1 argues that the increase has been modest, but however large, a substantial share stemmed not from market forces but from expansion in government social benefits. Generations of Americans have grown up assuming that the government will take care of them when they are sick, unemployed, and retired. They have responded by putting aside less of their earnings for their own future expenses. Financing social programs requires not just the federal payroll tax but also a large share of other federal and state taxes. American families are less able to save because of higher taxes, and they have a reduced incentive to do so because of the expectation of receiving government benefits. Further evidence for the displacement effect of the welfare state comes from cross?country studies. In an early study comparing national levels of Social Security benefits to private savings, Feldstein found that higher benefits had a “powerful effect” in reducing private savings.147 More recently, a 2015 study by Pirmin Fessler and Martin Schürz for the European Central Bank used a large survey database across European countries to explore the relationship between the level of social spending and wealth distribution. Their statistical results showed that “the degree of welfare state spending across countries is negatively correlated with household net wealth.”148 They explained: The substitution effect of welfare state expenditures with regard to private wealth holdings is significant along the full net wealth distribution, but is relatively lower at higher levels of net wealth. Given an increase in welfare state expenditure, the percentage decrease in net wealth of poorer households is relatively stronger than for households in the upper part of the wealth distribution. This finding implies that given an increase of welfare state expenditure, wealth inequality measured by standard relative inequality measures, such as the Gini coefficient, will increase.149 Based on Fessler and Schürz’s data, countries such as Germany and the Netherlands have relatively high social spending and relatively low private wealth holdings by less well?off households. But other countries such as Luxembourg and Spain have relatively low social spending and relatively high private wealth holdings by less well?off households.150 Consistent with those findings, a 2018 Organisation for Economic Co?operation and Development study shows relatively higher wealth inequality in Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands and relatively lower wealth inequality in Luxembourg and Spain.151 The Gini coefficient for wealth is similar in the United States (85), Denmark (84), Norway (79), and Sweden (87), which people usually think of as egalitarian nations.152 Credit Suisse’s Global Wealth Databook 2014 explained: Strong social security programs—good public pensions, free higher education or generous student loans, unemployment and health insurance—can greatly reduce the need for personal financial assets, as Domeij and Klein (2002) found for public pensions in Sweden. Public housing programs can do the same for real assets. This is one explanation for the high level of wealth inequality we identify in Denmark, Norway and Sweden: the top groups continue to accumulate for business and investment purposes, while the middle and lower classes have a less pressing need for personal saving than in many other countries.153 Another way to think about the effect of social programs on wealth is to estimate the present value of future promised government benefits as if it were real wealth. A 2019 study by John Sabelhaus and Alice Henriques Volz calculated Social Security “wealth” for U.S. households compared to the wealth held in private defined benefit and defined contribution retirement plans.154 It found that Social Security wealth is twice as large as the combined wealth in private retirement plans and is heavily skewed toward lower?income households.155 For the least?wealthy one?quarter of U.S. households, Social Security wealth is five times larger than private retirement plan wealth, whereas for the most?wealthy one?quarter of households, Social Security wealth is less than half as large as private retirement wealth. Social Security and other entitlement programs loom large in household finances for the nonwealthy and thus likely displace a large amount of private wealth. As a result, all the widely cited statistics about wealth distribution—including Gini coefficients and top 1 percent shares—substantially overstate wealth inequality because they exclude Social Security. In a 2016 analysis, Sabelhaus, Henriques Volz, and Sebastian Devlin?Foltz concluded, “Claims to future Social Security benefits are a key component of retirement wealth, and thus failure to include Social Security leads to a biased assessment of the overall distribution of retirement wealth.”156 That is true of Medicare benefits as well. Future Social Security and Medicare benefits represent “wealth” typically worth hundreds of thousands of dollars to individuals. A 2018 Urban Institute study found, for example, that an average?income single man retiring at age 65 in 2020 could expect to receive $318,000 in Social Security benefits and $229,000 in Medicare benefits in present value terms.157 Those are large figures compared to the amount of financial assets the average person holds. Laurence Kotlikoff notes that if claims to future Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid benefits were included in wealth estimates, we “might find declining wealth inequality in recent decades.”158 To individuals, Social Security and other entitlements seem like wealth, but they only represent promises of future benefits, and those benefits are in jeopardy because these unfunded programs are driving huge and rising government deficits and debt. As currently structured, Social Security will only be able to pay a fraction of promised benefits down the road. The Cato Institute has long argued that the United States should move to a retirement system based on private savings accounts, as numerous other countries have done.159 Traditional benefits would be phased out over time as younger workers built up savings in private accounts with a portion of their earnings that currently go to federal payroll taxes. Other social programs could be transitioned to a savings basis as well. Feldstein modeled how the United States could move toward a savings?based Medicare system.160 The nation of Chile has a savings?based unemployment insurance system that is integrated with its savings?based Social Security system.161 Such savings accounts would be inheritable, unlike the benefits from current social programs. They would also be more secure because they would not depend on political promises of a massively indebted government. If the United States transitioned to savings?based social programs, it would dramatically reduce measured wealth inequality as the non?rich built up financial assets. A sad irony in public policy debates is that the politicians—such as Senators Sanders and Warren—who complain the loudest about wealth inequality also oppose moving toward the savings?based social programs that would reduce measured wealth inequality. Asset Tests Government social programs do not just displace private savings by changing incentives to save; some programs actively deter private saving. Numerous means?tested welfare programs impose both income and asset tests, the latter of which cut off benefits if a measure of personal assets rises above statutory thresholds.162 Asset tests are in place for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income, and other programs.163 Both federal and state governments play a role in setting these rules, and there is substantial variability between the states. The purpose of asset tests is to limit program costs and to target benefits to the people most in need. Asset tests help to prevent abuse by people gaining benefits who do not really need them. However, a harmful side effect is that asset tests help to trap people in poverty by discouraging a culture of personal saving. If assets rise above capped levels, the tests act as a 100 percent tax rate on additional wealth accumulation. The caps are sometimes as low as $3,000, although there has been a loosening of rules in many states in recent years. A number of economic studies have documented the negative effects of asset tests.164 The important point with respect to wealth inequality is that asset tests are one mechanism by which governments, not markets, skew economic outcomes to intensify wealth inequality.
Landy
Landy, Benjamin. “How Asset Tests Punish the Poor.” The Century Foundation, 20 Nov. 2013, tcf.org/content/commentary/how-asset-tests-punish-the-poor/?session=1.
Public policy and the poverty trap Every day, millions of low-income Americans live in fear of losing public assistance entirely if they earn any extra income, save too much money, or buy a car to get to a new job. The way that asset tests are designed, even one additional dollar in income could be enough to disqualify a family from receiving benefits worth thousands. That isn't a problem when benefits are phased out slowly, as with the Earned Income Tax Credit. But with many other programs—TANF (welfare), SNAP (food stamps) and Medicaid, to name a few—beneficiaries face a stark choice: continually spend down their savings or become suddenly ineligible. Means-testing makes sense in theory. Public assistance programs are designed to provide benefits only to people with too few resources to avoid destitution. To determine whether an applicant is eligible, government agencies consider both income and assets, including anything that can be converted into cash, like stocks, bonds and bank accounts. In some cases, the list even includes cars, retirement accounts and college savings plans. There is no doubt that denying benefits based on these criteria helps the government to save money. The problem from a public policy standpoint is that asset-testing also creates a powerful incentive for families not to save money. In general, taxes increase progressively with income. But benefits also disappear as income rises, acting as a secondary tax on each additional dollar. The result, according to the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office, is an effective marginal tax rate on income as high as 95 percent for some low-income people. This is the very definition of a poverty trap.
Vallas
Vallas, Rebecca(senior fellow at American Progress, where she has spent the past five years helping to build and lead CAP’s Poverty to Prosperity Program in a range of roles including as the program’s managing director and vice president), and Joe Valenti. “Asset Limits Are a Barrier to Economic Security and Mobility.” Center for American Progress, 10 Sept. 2014, www.americanprogress.org/issues/poverty/reports/2014/09/10/96754/asset-limits-are-a-barrier-to-economic-security-and-mobility/.
Our nation’s public assistance programs do a lot to mitigate hardship and support employment. Without the safety net, the U.S. poverty rate would be nearly twice as high as it is today. However, many of these work and income supports come with restrictive asset limits—eligibility requirements that penalize savings and ownership and are counterproductive to the goal of helping families achieve economic security. Asset limits can make it difficult—if not impossible—for families to get the help they need when they fall on hard times. Consider Melissa, a low-income California woman who applied for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, or TANF, to make ends meet after leaving her abusive husband. Because she owned an eight-year-old car that was presumably worth more than $4,650—the maximum car value then permitted for public assistance recipients under California law—she was denied assistance. Out of options, Melissa had no choice but to sell her car in order to afford rent and other basic expenses. By the time she finally became eligible for benefits, she was even more vulnerable than before since no longer owning a car made it that much more difficult for her to get back on her feet. California has since softened its vehicle asset policies somewhat, but they still restrict car ownership for recipients of certain types of assistance. Many other states have asset-limit policies that similarly conflict with the goals of employment and economic security, especially given the importance of savings and assets for low-income families who are trying to pull themselves out of poverty. Having even a few hundred dollars in savings can make it easier to weather financial setbacks without facing the risk of eviction or having utilities shut off, and assets such as a vehicle can be key to securing and maintaining employment. But because of asset limits, struggling families can face a difficult dilemma: being told on the one hand the value of savings and self-reliance, while on the other being discouraged or explicitly prohibited from having modest savings or assets as a condition of accessing needed public assistance programs. Fortunately, many states and the federal government have begun to address this issue by limiting savings and ownership conditions or removing asset limits completely. For example, California increased its vehicle asset limit to $9,500 last summer in order to enable more low-income families to get the help they need without having to sell a vehicle on which they rely. By reforming asset penalties, states have both saved themselves money and made their income assistance programs more efficient. However, further action is needed. Congress and state policymakers should ensure that counterproductive asset limits do not needlessly stand in the way of economic security for families on the brink.
How asset limits work Asset limits require that public assistance applicants and recipients certify not only that they have very low incomes, but also that the resources they own are valued below a certain threshold. Families must provide extensive documentation regarding bank accounts, other forms of savings, the value of any houses or cars, and additional resources—sometimes even the value of prepaid burial plots. In practice, these limits are often burdensome for state agencies to administer, as well as intrusive for the families applying for assistance. Both the federal government and states are involved in establishing asset limits, leading to varying state standards in terms of whether limits exist, how high they are, and whether basics such as the family car are counted as resources. Many public assistance programs give states leeway to set asset limits: Temporary Assistance for Needy Families provides modest, time-limited income support to qualifying very low-income families with children. TANF asset limits are set by states and range widely, from $1,000 in states such as Georgia and Texas to $10,000 in Delaware. In a growing trend, eight states—Ohio, Louisiana, Colorado, Virginia, Alabama, Hawaii, Illinois, and Maryland—have opted to eliminate their TANF asset limits entirely, and all but Ohio and Virginia have done so within the past five years. The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, or SNAP—formerly known as food stamps—provides nutrition assistance to low-income individuals and families. The federal SNAP asset limit is set at $2,000—or $3,250 for households with an elderly or disabled member—but states are permitted to raise or eliminate the asset limit for households that meet the eligibility requirements of other related programs. The technical term for this policy is “broad-based categorical eligibility,” and it allows states to streamline access to nutrition assistance. Five states have opted to set their SNAP asset limits above the federal level, and 36 states and the District of Columbia have eliminated asset limits in SNAP altogether. Ten states have retained asset limits at the very low federal baseline level. The Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program, or LIHEAP, provides assistance to low-income families in meeting their home heating costs during the winter months. Federal law does not place asset restrictions on LIHEAP eligibility, but states may opt to impose restrictions. Currently, 12 states have LIHEAP asset limits in place, most of which are at or below $5,000. For other programs, the federal government plays a larger role in setting limits: Medicaid provides health insurance to qualifying low-income adults and children. Traditionally, the Medicaid asset limit, which is set by the federal government, was $2,000. However, states were free to determine their own asset limits, and they varied across states and eligibility categories, such as adults with disabilities, pregnant women, and the elderly. Recognizing, however, that savings penalties should not serve as a barrier to health insurance, policymakers recently removed asset limits from Medicaid through the Affordable Care Act. Supplemental Security Income, or SSI, provides income support to very low-income seniors, as well as adults and children with significant disabilities and severe health conditions living in very low-income households. SSI asset limits are set by the federal government and have barely moved from the levels set in 1972, when the program was enacted. In 1972, SSI asset limits were set at $1,500 for an individual and $2,250 for a couple or a disabled child living with their parents. They are currently set at $2,000 for an individual and $3,000 for a couple or a disabled child living with their parents. Had these levels been adjusted for inflation, they would be more than $8,500 for individuals and $12,800 for both couples and families with disabled children today. Why asset-limit reform is necessary Savings can dramatically reduce material hardship. For many low-income families, even a small amount of savings—less than $2,000—can protect against eviction, missed meals, or having utilities shut off during a financial setback. Having a slightly larger cushion—between $2,000 and $10,000—has an even broader effect. The presence of savings and assets may also reduce the length of time families need public assistance. Asset limits serve as a barrier to economic security and mobility by actively discouraging families from attempting to save and build the resources they need to get ahead. They can also prevent middle-income families from accessing needed assistance in the event of an unexpected economic shock. As Melissa experienced when she had to sell her car to receive public assistance in California, asset limits can force families to drain hard-earned savings and to liquidate necessary assets in order to get help for even a short period of time.
Solvency
Pavetti
Pavetti, LaDonna (PhD Vice President for Family Income Support Policy at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.). “Time on Welfare and Welfare Dependency.” Urban Institute, 23 May 1996, www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/70301/900288-Time-on-Welfare-and-Welfare-Dependency.pdf.
The welfare system is an extremely dynamic system. In an "average" year, about one-half of the AFDC caseload leaves the welfare rolls. The best available estimates indicate that between one-half and two-thirds of those who leave do so because they have found paid employment. A small percentage (less than 15 percent) leave for marriage and the remainder leave for a variety of other reasons. Those who leave are replaced by new applicants who have never received assistance before and by families who have received assistance previously and are returning to receive assistance again. The majority of families who leave the welfare system do so after a relatively short period of time ~-~- about half leave within a year; 70 percent within two years and almost 90 percent within five years. But many return almost as quickly as they left ~-~- about 45 percent return within a year and 70 percent return by the end of five years. When one takes into account all of this movement on and off the welfare rolls, only a moderate fraction of recipients who ever turn to the welfare system for support end up spending relatively long periods of time on the welfare rolls. Over the course of their lifetimes, about one-third of women who ever use welfare will spend longer than five years on the welfare rolls and 60 percent will spend 24 months or longer receiving assistance.
Dent
Dent, Anna( freelance policy and research consultant). “Free Money Wouldn't Make People Lazy – but It Could Revolutionise Work | Anna Dent.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 12 Feb. 2019, www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/feb/12/universal-basic-income-work-finland-experiment-payments.
Whether we derive meaning from employment, or find ourselves engaged in meaningless “bullshit jobs” as David Graeber suggests, we cannot deny that the world of work is changing. Climate change, mass migration and continued technological change will all have impacts on what “work” means and looks like in ways that we cannot accurately predict. For its proponents, a UBI can provide a lifejacket and a route through some of these challenges. A UBI could provide a stable income floor, a guaranteed minimum below which no one would fall. Depending on the amount paid, it could enable low-paid workers to turn down the worst jobs on offer, or enable time away from paid work to retrain, or start a business. It would financially compensate those (usually women) caring for family for their work, support more people to be creative, to volunteer, or simply to do nothing. In the US, proposals for a Green New Deal led by Democrats Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Ed Markey appear to advocate for something like a UBI – potentially for those “unwilling” to work, although it is light on detail. A UBI is not designed to promote “laziness” or any other type of behaviour, simply to allow individuals to make their own decisions about how they wish to spend their time. The pure idea of a UBI does not hold any inherent position when it comes to paid work, but promises freedom and choice. As far back as the 1880s, in the work of Paul Lafargue, the right of workers (as opposed to the rich) to be lazy was framed as an explicit rejection of the dominant work ethic, and the route to true independence, free from the pressure to work. The refusal to participate in paid employment is still considered by some as an active strategy of resistance to neoliberalism. A UBI as a way to live securely without paid employment features regularly in mainly leftwing discussions about post-work, interrogating the centrality of paid employment in our lives and societies, and our ability to liberate ourselves, or be liberated from, our roles as paid workers.
Impact: Jobs
Matthews
Matthews, Dylan. “Study: a Universal Basic Income Would Grow the Economy.” Vox, Vox, 30 Aug. 2017, www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/8/30/16220134/universal-basic-income-roosevelt-institute-economic-growth.
A universal basic income could make the US economy trillions of dollars larger, permanently, according to a new study by the left-leaning Roosevelt Institute. Basic income, a proposal in which every American would be given a basic stipend from the government no strings attached, is often brought up as a potential solution to widespread automation reducing demand for labor in the future. But in the meantime, its critics typically allege that it is far too expensive to be practical, or else that it would spur millions of Americans to drop out of the labor force, wrecking the economy and depriving the government of a tax base for funding the plan. The Roosevelt study, written by Roosevelt research director Marshall Steinbaum, Michalis Nikiforos at Bard College's Levy Institute, and Gennaro Zezza at the University of Cassino and Southern Lazio in Italy, comes to a dramatically different conclusion. And it does so using some notably rosy assumptions about the effects of large-scale increases to government spending, taxes, and deficits, assumptions that other analysts would dispute vociferously. Their paper analyzes three different models for a universal basic income: A full universal basic income, in which every adult gets $1,000 a month ($12,000 a year) A partial basic income, in which every adult gets $500 a month ($6,000 a year) A child allowance, in which every child gets $250 a month ($3,000 a year) They find that enacting any of these policies by growing the federal debt — that is, without raising taxes to pay for it — would substantially grow the economy. The effect fades away within eight years, but GDP is left permanently higher. The big, $12,000 per year per adult policy, they find, would permanently grow the economy by 12.56 to 13.10 percent — or about $2.5 trillion come 2025. It would also, they find, increase the percentage of Americans with jobs by about 2 percent, and expand the labor force to the tune of 4.5 to 4.7 million people. They also model the impact of the plan if it's paid for with taxes. That amounts to large-scale income redistribution, which, the authors argue, would stimulate the economy, because lower-income people are likelier to spend their money in the near-term than rich people are. Thus, they find that a full $12,000 a year per adult basic income, paid for with progressive income taxes, would grow the economy by about 2.62 percent ($515 billion) and expand the labor force by about 1.1 million people. These are extremely contentious estimates, borne of controversial assumptions about the way the economy works and the effects that a basic income would have on it. Many, if not most, economic modelers would come to very different conclusions: that a basic income discourages work, that raising taxes to pay for it could have profound negative economic impacts, and that not paying for it and exploding the deficit is a recipe for fiscal and economic ruin. But the authors argue that the economic model they're using, run by the Bard College Levy Economics Institute, uses more realistic assumptions than alternative models, and is particularly well-suited for predicting a UBI’s impact.
Kenney
Kenny, Charles(senior fellow at the Center for Global Development). “The Best Way to Reform Welfare: Give Poor People Cash.” The Atlantic, Atlantic Media Company, 27 Sept. 2015, www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/welfare-reform-direct-cash-poor/407236/.
But more to the point, the programs are almost certainly less effective at reducing poverty than simply giving poor people cash. When governments give people in-kind support like food, it frequently costs more to deliver that support than it would to distribute cash—and for the same or even a lesser impact. Jesse Cunha of the Naval Postgraduate School conducted a randomized trial of cash versus in-kind transfers in rural Mexico. In addition to finding that cash recipients didn’t spend more on tobacco or alcohol, Cunha learned that those who received cash experienced the same improvements in nutrition and child-health measures as those who received food. But the food program cost at least 20 percent more to administer, and the cash program led to significantly higher non-food consumption by recipients. In other words: At less cost to the government, cash programs led to the same health outcomes as food-based programs, but also provided additional resources for recipients to spend on schooling, medicine, and transport. This is not a one-off finding. In many cases, cash programs are simply much more effective than in-kind transfers at turning dollars spent into positive nutritional outcomes. A 2013 survey by Sarah Bailey for the Canadian Foodgrains Bank—involving Zimbabwe, Ecuador, Malawi, and Yemen, among other countries—found that cash transfers usually led to far greater increases in a “food consumption score” of dietary diversity and food frequency than did similarly priced food delivery. In Malawi, the food consumption score increased by 50 percent for cash recipients compared to 20 percent for food recipients. This despite the fact that households in the countries surveyed only report spending between 45 and 90 percent of the cash they receive on food, with the rest going to expenses like debt repayment, household items, and school fees. Cash also has a larger multiplier effect. Bring food from elsewhere to an area, and the impact of that food stops with those who eat it. Give people cash and they spend it on goods provided by local farmers and traders, who are often poor themselves and benefit as well. A 2010 study in Zimbabwe by Cormac Staunton of Concern Worldwide and Micheal Collins of Trinity College Dublin compared food transfers to cash transfers, and estimated that each dollar provided by cash transfers circulated 2.59 times around the local economy before being spent on goods and services from elsewhere. That compared to the 1.00 multiplier of food that was simply consumed. Perhaps most important, cash transfers often lead to productive investments. Consider the charity GiveDirectly, which transfers cash from rich people in the West directly to poor people in Africa using mobile-phone payments. A randomized evaluation in 2011, co-designed by a GiveDirectly co-founder, evaluated the organization’s activities in Kenya and focused on one-off, unconditional payments to families that ranged from $404 to $1,520. Four hundred dollars was more than twice the average local monthly household expenditure. In relative terms, it would be the equivalent of handing $12,000 to a household in the United States. As long as 14 months after the transfer, survey evidence suggested that households were still spending more on food, health, and education than non-recipients. One reason why is that they had invested in physical goods, particularly in metal roofs to replace thatched shelter and in livestock to provide milk and meat. That translated into rising incomes from farming and enterprises in the short term, and—thanks to higher spending on nutrition, health care, and education—the hope for greater earnings potential in the long term as well. As in the Mexican cash-transfer program, spending on alcohol and tobacco did not rise after the transfer. Perhaps that’s because recipients felt less need for a pick-me-up: They reported feeling happier after the transfer, and tests of cortisol in saliva revealed lower biomarkers for stress.*
Press
Press, Gil. “Is AI Going To Be A Jobs Killer? New Reports About The Future Of Work.” Forbes, Forbes Magazine, 17 July 2019, www.forbes.com/sites/gilpress/2019/07/15/is-ai-going-to-be-a-jobs-killer-new-reports-about-the-future-of-work/#262155f3afb2.
The number of jobs which AI and machines will displace in the future has been the subject of numerous studies and surveys and op-eds and policy papers since 2013, when a pair of Oxford academics, Carl Benedikt Frey and Michael Osborne, estimated that 47 of American jobs are at high risk of automation by the mid-2030s. Here are a few more recent examples of what has become a popular number-crunching (automated, computerized, AI-driven) exercise: McKinsey Global Institute: between 40 million and 160 million women worldwide may need to transition between occupations by 2030, often into higher-skilled roles. Clerical work, done by secretaries, schedulers and bookkeepers, is an area especially susceptible to automation, and 72 of those jobs in advanced economies are held by women. Oxford Economics: up to 20 million manufacturing jobs worldwide will be lost to robots by 2030.
Impact: Poverty
CATO
“41. Poverty and Welfare.” Cato Institute, 16 Feb. 2017, www.cato.org/cato-handbook-policymakers/cato-handbook-policy-makers-8th-edition-2017/poverty-welfare.
Although the exact number fluctuates from year to year, the federal government funds more than 100 separate anti-poverty programs. Some 70 of these provide cash or in-kind benefits to individuals, while the remainder target specific groups or disadvantaged neighborhoods or communities. There are eight different health care programs, administered by five separate agencies within the Department of Health and Human Services. Six cabinet departments and five independent agencies oversee 27 cash or general-assistance programs. All together, seven different cabinet agencies and six independent agencies administer at least one anti-poverty program. And those are just the programs specifically aimed at poverty. That doesn't include more universal social welfare programs or social insurance programs such as unemployment insurance, Medicare, or Social Security. Altogether, the federal government spent more than $680 billion in 2014 (the last year for which compete data are available). State and local governments added about $300 billion in additional funding. Thus, government at all levels is spending roughly $1 trillion per year to fight poverty. Stretching back to 1965, when President Lyndon Johnson first declared "war on poverty," anti-poverty spending has totaled more than $23 trillion. Yet the results of all this spending have been disappointing. Using the traditional Census Bureau definition of poverty, we have seen virtually no improvement in poverty rates since 1965. As shown in Figure 41.1, the only appreciable decline since the mid-1970s occurred in the 1990s, a time of state experimentation with tightening welfare eligibility, culminating in the passage of national welfare reform (the Personal Responsibility and Work Responsibility Act of 1996). Most observers agree that the traditional poverty measure is badly flawed — for example, it does not count taxes or the value of in-kind benefits. But even more accurate alternative poverty measures show few gains since the mid-1970s. At the very least, marginal increases in spending appear to yield little marginal decrease in poverty or lead to any meaningful improvements in upward economic mobility. For example, a study by Bruce Meyer and James Sullivan found that the majority of improvements in a more accurate poverty measure occurred prior to 1972. Less than a third of the improvement has taken place in the past four decades, despite massive increases in expenditures during that time (Figure 41.2).
Matthews IPI
Matthews, Merrill ( Ph.D., is a resident scholar with the Institute for Policy Innovation). “New Book Presents Solutions for Financially Insolvent Entitlement Programs.” New Book Presents Solutions for Financially Insolvent Entitlement Programs, Institute for Policy Innovation, 23 May 2019, www.ipi.org/ipi_issues/detail/new-book-presents-solutions-for-financially-insolvent-entitlement-programs.
In case you have any warm feeling for former president Lyndon Johnson and his initiation of our War on Poverty, you will learn it only made things worse, and not for lack of money. “In 2017, we calculate that states spent nearly $500 billion on means-tested welfare programs,” the authors write. “Adding state to federal means-tested spending brings the total to about $1.1 trillion.” The authors estimate we have spent $29 trillion on antipoverty programs in the United States with little to show for it to date. The poverty rate “has fluctuated between 11 percent and 15 percent for 50 years, and stood at about 12.7 percent in 2016.” Solution: Temporary Safety Nets The key to a solution to this fiscal mess is to differentiate safety nets that will help those in temporary need from those in need of permanent help and to create programs that incentivize getting back to work instead of encouraging people with low incomes to stay in need, the authors argue. A good program must separate the able-bodied from those not so fortunate.
Haskins
Pike, Logan, and Justin Haskins. “Too Many People Are Still Stuck in Welfare. Here's How to Lift Them Out.” National Review, National Review, 14 May 2015, www.nationalreview.com/2015/05/how-save-2-million-americans-welfare/.
Most reforms are simple and cost-effective measures that states of every size and political persuasion have already put into place, and as the report card shows, a state’s budget has virtually no effect on the ability of the state to implement necessary welfare-policy changes. Effective state welfare programs can remove barriers that prevent recipients from attaining high-quality employment. Welfare shouldn’t be about establishing government programs that do something to people, but rather programs that do something for people. Welfare’s only purpose ought to be to lift them from the grips of government dependency into a life of self-sufficiency. Instead, it often shackles the impoverished and encourages them to remain in a state of squalor rather than make the difficult but worthwhile trek to prosperity.
Widerquist
Widerquist, Karl(Associate Professor at SFS-Qatar, Georgetown University). “The Cost of Basic Income: Back-of-the-Envelope Calculations.” Georgetown University, Dec. 2017, file:///C:/Users/audre/Downloads/BackOfTheEnvelope~-~-4Posting~-~-2017Sep_stamped.pdf.
This article is not about the politics of UBI. It’s not about whether or which programs could be replaced by UBI. It’s not about how to integrate a UBI into the existing tax and benefit system. It is not even about how to pay the cost of UBI. It focuses on one question only: how much does UBI cost? Key findings of this study include4 : • The net cost of a roughly poverty-level UBI ($12,000 per adult, $6,000 per child) with a 50 marginal tax rate is $539 billion per year. • This UBI would drop the official poverty rate from 13.5 to 0, eliminating poverty for 43.1 million people (including 14.5 million children). • This UBI costs less than 25 of current U.S. entitlement spending, less than 15 of overall federal spending, and about 2.95 of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). • Other countries with similar levels of GDP and inequality can expect similar results for cost as a percent of GDP. More equal nations and wealthier nations can expect lower costs for the same level of UBI. Less equal and less wealthy nations can expect higher costs. | 904,660 |
365,543 | 379,593 | Xu - Mullen neg | C1
Inherency
Gillis
Gillis, Justin, and Nadja Popovich. “The U.S. Is the Biggest Carbon Polluter in History. It Just Walked Away From the Paris Climate Deal.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 1 June 2017, www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/01/climate/us-biggest-carbon-polluter-in-history-will-it-walk-away-from-the-paris-climate-deal.html?mtrref=undefinedandgwh=4565A4883CAD161D01284DF722A5EAFDandgwt=payandassetType=REGIWALL.
The United States, with its love of big cars, big houses and blasting air-conditioners, has contributed more than any other country to the atmospheric carbon dioxide that is scorching the planet. “In cumulative terms, we certainly own this problem more than anybody else does,” said David G. Victor, a longtime scholar of climate politics at the University of California, San Diego. Many argue that this obligates the United States to take ambitious action to slow global warming. But on Thursday, President Trump announced the United Stateswithdrew from the Paris climate accords would withdraw from a 195-nation agreement on climate change reached in Paris in 2015. The decision to walk away from the accord is a momentous setback, in practical and political terms, for the effort to address climate change. An American exit could prompt other countries to withdraw from the pact or rethink their emissions pledges, making it much harder to achieve the agreement’s already difficult goal of limiting global warming to a manageable level. It means the United States — the country with the largest, most dynamic economy — is giving up a leadership role when it comes to finding solutions for climate change. “Nobody really wants barrels of oil or tons of coal,” said John D. Sterman, a professor of management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a founder of a think tank called Climate Interactive.
Hanley
Hanley, Steve. “NextEra Energy Predicts 50 Renewable Energy In US By 2030.” CleanTechnica, 22 July 2019, cleantechnica.com/2019/07/22/nextera-energy-predicts-50-renewable-energy-in-us-by-2030/.
At its June meeting with investors, NextEra Energy presented the audience with 235 colorful slides concerning the financial health of the company. Many of them were identical to the slides presented at the last such meeting in May. One was substantially different, however. In May, the company presented a slide based on data supplied by IHS Markit for calendar year 2017. It showed the United States would get 25 of its electricity from renewable energy resources by 2030. That slide was deleted from the June presentation and replaced with one based on data supplied by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory for calendar year 2018. The new slide projects the country will reach 50 renewables by 2030. The difference is startling and proof of how quickly things are changing in the utility industry. NextEra Energy is no featherweight. It has the largest market capitalization of any utility holding company. It is the parent company of Florida Power and Light, Gulf Power, and NextEra Energy Resources, among other entities. It employs 14,000 people, generates 45,900 megawatts of electricity annually, and has yearly revenue of $17 billion. Not too shabby. If it says renewables will account for half of all electricity a decade from now, other companies should sit up and take notice. Government leaders, too. NextEra Energy produces more electricity from the wind and sun than any other company on the planet, according to Maxx Chatsko of Motley Fool. Its NextEra Energy Resources subsidiary operates 17 gigawatts of wind and solar power assets across the country today. It owns more installed wind power capacity than all but 7 countries and is the 5th largest capital investor in the United States. It plans to build an additional 29 gigawatts of wind and solar power assets in the coming years. This is not a company that makes predictions lightly. How can it make such bold predictions, ones that are significantly more aggressive than those being made by other industry sources? Simple. It feels those other sources are wildly pessimistic in their estimates. See the first chart from Chatsko here. There’s a huge disparity between what NextEra Energy thinks will happen and what other supposedly informed sources think will happen. A lot of CleanTechnica readers have commented over the years that forecasts from the Energy Information Administration are notoriously inaccurate. The chart shows the EIA’s forecast is 31 of electricity from renewables by 2050, while NextEra expects 50 by 2030. Since NextEra Energy began investing in renewable energy, its market cap has increased from $12 billion in 2003 to $100 billion today. The low cost of electricity produced from wind farms — which, unlike thermal power plants, have no fuel expenses once built — frees up capital to invest elsewhere while keeping customers’ bills low, says Chatsko. Moreover, the larger a company’s commitment to renewable energy, the more capital it has to deploy to build more renewable energy systems. Size really does matter in this space. The company’s performance is evidence that investors have nothing to fear from renewables. Decarbonizing the grid does not mean lower profits for utility companies. Quite the opposite, in fact, which is great news for everyone who frets about how the transition away from fossil fuels will affect the economy.
Ellsmoor
James Ellsmoor, 4-14-2019, "Renewable Energy Could Save $160 Trillion In Climate Change Costs by 2050," Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesellsmoor/2019/04/14/renewable-energy-could-save-160-trillion-in-climate-change-costs-by-2050/#a36d36c4878c
Whilst the push for renewable energy certainly has its benefits, there remains a wide range of obstacles in the way of their large-scale development and implementation. For example, the past two years have seen the United States’ solar industry lose momentum over President Donald Trump’s tariffs. These political setbacks are relatively widespread and have been reducing the ability of the renewable energy sector to efficiently evolve and develop, and could have a lasting impact on global emissions. A Time For Action IRENA’s report has noted that transitions have been slow and that current rates of emission reduction are not in line with global climate goals. The report recommends that nations take more aggressive actions to ensure a quick and effective transition away from fossil fuels that will help reach the previously agreed-upon goals and ensure that mitigation of climate change remains a priority. In order to do so, IRENA advocates for stronger national policy focusing on long-term zero-carbon strategies as well as promoting innovation in the fields of renewable energy, technology and smart-grids. ? Read Also: Under Trump's Tariffs, The US Lost 20,000 Solar Energy Jobs Commenting on the report’s findings, La Camera said that “The race to secure a climate safe future has entered a decisive phase. Renewable energy is the most effective and readily-available solution for reversing the trend of rising CO2 emissions. A combination of renewable energy with deeper electrification can achieve 75 of the energy-related emission reduction needed.” What La Camera is describing has already happened in many places worldwide - many islands have been leading the charge in renewable energy transitions, and are becoming incubators for energy innovation.
Egan
Matt Egan graduate from the College of New Jersey and lead writer at CNN, CNN Business, 11-26-2019, "Solar, wind and hydro power could soon surpass coal," CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/26/business/renewable-energy-coal/index.html
This was underlined by last month's bankruptcy of Murray Energy, America's largest private coal mining company. US power companies are rapidly retiring old coal plants and replacing them with wind and solar farms. Utility companies like PSEG (PEG) and Xcel Energy (XEL), which long relied on coal, are now pledging to deliver carbon-free electricity. Navajo Generation Station, the largest coal-fired power plant in the West, permanently closed last week. The shutdown means that South Nevada's electricity is now coal-free. US power plants are expected to consume less coal next year than at any point since 1978, according to the EIA. That will cause coal's market share to drop below 22, compared with 28 in 2018. That shrinking market share makes existing coal plants even less profitable. "It's a negative feedback loop," said Greentech's Deschenes. This trend is playing out overseas as well. Global electricity production from coal is on track to fall by a record 3 in 2019, according to CarbonBrief. That drop is being driven by record declines from Germany and South Korea as well as the first dip in India in at least three decades. Dennis Wamsted, editor and analyst at IEEFA, is predicting that 2021 will be the "crossover year" in the United States, where coal is supplanted by renewables, which include solar, wind, hydropower, biomass and geothermal. "Coal and renewables are rapidly heading in opposite directions," Wamsted said in a report."If the crossover doesn't occur in 2021, it will without a doubt do so by 2022." This transition has already played out in Texas, which was long a coal-first state. During the first half of this year, wind power surpassed coal for the first time in Texas history. Wind made up just 0.8 of the Lone Star State's power as of 2003. That figure has climbed to 22, compared with 21 for coal.
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Parenti
Christian, April 4th, Christian Parenti is the author of "The Freedom: Shadows and Hallucinations in Occupied Iraq" (New Press) and a visiting fellow at CUNY's Center for Place, Culture and Politics., “Why Nuclear Power Is Not the Answer to Global Warming”, AlterNet, http://www.alternet.org/story/154854/why_nuclear_power_is_not_the_answer_to_global_warming?page=2 CCD
An authoritative study by the investment bank Lazard Ltd. found that wind beat nuclear and that nuclear essentially tied with solar. But wind and solar, being simple and safe, are coming on line faster. Another advantage wind and solar have is that capacity can be added bit by bit; a wind farm can have more or less turbines without scuttling the whole project. As economies of scale are created within the alternative energy supply chains and the construction process becomes more efficient, prices continue to drop. Meanwhile, the cost of stalled nukes moves upward.¶ The World Watch Institute reports that between 2004 and 2009, global electricity from wind (not capacity, but actual power output) grew by 27 percent, while solar grew by 54 percent. Over the same time, nuclear power output actually declined by half a percent.¶ What would a nuke build out really cost? Mark Cooper, senior fellow for economic analysis at the Vermont Law School, has found that adding 100 new reactors to the U.S. power grid would cost $1.9 to $4.1 trillion, and that would take at least a decade to do.¶ In a comparative analysis of U.S. states, Cooper found that the states that invested heavily in nuclear power had worse track records on efficiency and developing renewables than those that did not have large nuclear programs. In other words, investing in nuclear technology crowded out developing clean energy.¶ Only when clean technologies—like wind, solar, hydropower, and electric vehicles—are cheaper than other options will the world economy make the switch away from fossil fuels. Right now, alternatives are slightly cheaper than nukes, come on line faster, and are growing robustly.¶ Nuclear power is not only physically dangerous—it is also economically wasteful. If the nuke huggers are so brave and serious they must begin to explain why, after a decade of billions in subsidies being on offer, there is no wave of construction underway. If the nuke renaissance is to begin, who will fund it? And who will build it in time to stave off climate tipping points? How long will it take? Thus the quip “Atomic power is the fuel of the future”—and always will be.
Siegel
John Siciliano and Josh Siegel, July 11, 2019 11:52 AM, Daily on Energy: The case for cutting renewable subsidies to save nuclear, Washington Examiner, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/energy/daily-on-energy-the-case-for-cutting-renewable-subsidies-to-save-nuclear ASJ
A new report on nuclear energy could ignite debate on Capitol Hill over whether to allow renewable energy subsidies to sunset, or renew them as Democrats are seeking to do. The free-market Manhattan Institute’s latest report on nuclear energy says the best thing Congress can do to help nuclear energy is to eliminate both subsidies for wind and solar. The July 10 study, now being circulated on Capitol Hill, concludes that renewables subsidies have hurt the market for nuclear power by making it harder for nuclear power plants to bid into the wholesale electricity markets to sell their power. Recommended For You 'He knows how strong the guy is': Howard Stern says Trump secretly 'loves' Bloomberg Tax credits for solar are slated to decrease in value at the end of the year toward phaseout, but Democrats have been mulling extensions to renew the subsidies. Here’s the problem for nuclear: The subsidies create negative prices, which give renewable energy an advantage, given market rules that favor the lowest-cost form of generation. Large nuclear utilities like Exelon have argued against wind subsidies for years, blaming them for some of the financial difficulties power plants have been experiencing. It is something that Democrats running for president should seriously consider in making climate change a key issue in their campaigns, said Jonathan Lesser, economist and author of the report. All the Democrats are calling for something akin to a Green New Deal, which will demand increased electrification of the economy, but “they won’t say a damn thing about nuclear,” Lesser told John in an interview. The progressive Green New Deal calls for creating a carbon-neutral economy beginning in about a decade, with the nation transitioning to primarily solar and wind to provide its electricity. Lesser’s previous reports have been influential in inspiring conservative lawmakers to introduce legislation to phase out subsidies, and the new report may have a similar effect. John Barrasso, the Wyoming Republican who chairs the Environment and Public Works Committee, used one of Lesser’s reports to inform a bill he introduced earlier this year to end federal subsidies for electric cars. Lesser explains that it would be immensely difficult to rely completely on renewables without the backbone of nuclear power plants also in the mix. Solar and wind have the nation covered: The report shows that nearly a third of the nation would have to be covered with wind turbines in order to rely solely on renewable energy, along with an area the size of Oregon covered with solar panels. And that doesn’t take into consideration the reliability issues that come from the ebb and flow of renewable power when the wind isn’t blowing and the sun isn’t shining. New transmission lines and battery storage devices will be required to make up for the losses in electricity inherent in using more renewables, and the current state of battery technology isn’t efficient enough to do so, Lesser explained. Meanwhile, a new report issued Thursday by the large environmental coalition Environment America argues that the federal government needs to better value the benefits of rooftop solar in developing energy policy. The report looks to confront studies by utility firms and grid operators that tend to only look at the reliability issues confronted in adding more solar to the grid, failing to properly value the societal and public health benefits of rooftop solar, especially given the threat of climate change.
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Lyderson 2015
Kari Lydersen, 2-6-2015, "Why the nuclear industry targets renewables instead of gas," Energy News Network, https://energynews.us/2015/02/06/midwest/why-the-nuclear-industry-targets-renewables-instead-of-gas/
Cheap natural gas has upended the nation’s energy landscape and made aging nuclear power plants increasingly uncompetitive. Yet the nuclear industry, which generates almost a fifth of the nation’s energy, has declared war not on gas but on wind and solar, which represent about 4 and 0.2 percent of our energy mix, respectively. Nuclear generators have successfully fought against renewable and energy efficiency standards on the state level, and lobbied against tax incentives for wind and solar on the federal level. They’re in the process of securing changes in regional capacity markets that would benefit nuclear and harm solar and wind. And as states develop their Clean Power Plans to fulfill the federal mandate to reduce carbon emissions, nuclear is often pitted against renewables. In deregulated states like Illinois, Ohio, Michigan and Pennsylvania, nuclear generators have found it increasingly difficult to sell their power at a profit on open markets, because of competition primarily from gas but also from wind. Meanwhile, energy efficiency and distributed solar generation have reduced demand for electricity and are part of a fundamental shift which could significantly shrink the role of large, centralized power plants. Proponents describe nuclear energy as the ultimate clean fuel, with zero carbon or other harmful emissions and steady reliability. “Nuclear energy produces more clean-air energy than any other source and is the only one that can produce large amounts of electricity 24/7,” says a fact sheet from the Nuclear Energy Institute trade association. But nuclear critics point out the safety and environmental risks and long-term costs of nuclear power. And they fear that the nuclear industry’s tactics could hamper renewable energy development at a crucial time. Illinois: Ground zero Nuclear energy provides almost half of Illinois’ electricity; wind and solar provide almost five percent and less than a tenth of a percent, respectively. Chicago-based Exelon, the country’s largest nuclear generator, has said that three of its six Illinois plants could close if state lawmakers don’t provide “market-based solutions” to help them become more profitable. A diverse group of business and clean energy interests are campaigning against an Exelon “bailout,” as critics call it, pegged at $580 million, saying citizens have already subsidized the company more than enough. Exelon’s fortunes have plummeted in recent years, though a report recently released by Illinois state agencies indicated the company is exaggerating the crisis facing its Illinois plants. As part of the report, required by a 2014 law pushed by Exelon, Illinois officials considered the possibility of a low-carbon energy standard similar to the state’s renewable standard. If nuclear energy were allowed to fulfill state clean energy goals, advocates fear the nuclear plants would overwhelm the program and leave little or no incentive for new renewable energy. Exelon also pressured state legislators last spring to halt a planned “fix” of the state’s renewable energy standard, which would have facilitated the development of more wind and solar power. New wind development in Illinois has stalled because of the problems with the standard. Legislation to fix it will likely be introduced again this spring, with Exelon again weighing in and trying to tie any changes to support for its nuclear plants. Ohio: Trouble in Toledo In Ohio, FirstEnergy successfully lobbied to suspend the state’s renewable energy and energy efficiency standards. Now FirstEnergy is asking that ratepayers be forced to pay a guaranteed rate for energy from the troubled Davis-Besse nuclear plant near Toledo, under a proposal pending before the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio. “Clearly FirstEnergy was seeing both energy efficiency and renewable energy as direct competitors,” said Allison Fisher, energy program outreach director of the watchdog group Public Citizen. “The arguments they were using were that these mandatory standards are distorting the market and are costly to ratepayers. But as soon as the standards were frozen, they turned around and proposed a plan that is looking to distort the market and going to cost $3 billion.” The advent of horizontal hydraulic fracturing (fracking) about a decade ago provided an abundant fuel for natural gas plants which can quickly ratchet up and down to match demand. Cheap natural gas has driven the closing of scores of coal plants nationwide, and has had a major impact on the nuclear industry. So why isn’t the nuclear industry trying to curb the influence of natural gas? Energy experts point to straightforward political and business reasons and the complicated structure of the auctions where energy is sold. “The fact of the matter is natural gas and wind power both compete with Exelon’s nuclear generation,” said Environmental Law and Policy Center director Howard Learner. “Exelon can’t do anything about the market price for natural gas, so Exelon is training its fire on trying to stop and hold off wind power and solar energy development.” Some companies that own nuclear generation are also heavily invested in natural gas. Nuclear makes up 81 percent of Exelon’s generation and 54 percent of its capacity, while natural gas makes up 10 percent of its generation and 22 percent of its capacity. Wind and solar make up 1.9 and 0.3 percent of Exelon’s generation, respectively. “One thing to understand about the nuclear industry is that nuclear is also the coal and natural gas industry,” said Tim Judson, executive director of the Nuclear Information and Resource Service, which published the September 2014 report “Killing the Competition” about nuclear attacks on renewables. “Wind and efficiency are just boutique elements of their portfolios.” Nuclear Energy Institute spokesman Thomas Kauffman said that the institute does not take a position on renewable energy subsidies and that it, “supports the Obama administration’s all-of-the-above energy strategy.” He declined to answer further questions and said that groups weighing in about recent developments have “a history of opposing nuclear power.” Colafella and Young of FirstEnergy said “we believe that a diverse mix of generating assets, including renewables, is needed to keep power flowing reliably and affordably.” “Low market prices – which are largely driven by low-cost natural gas, not renewables – are putting pressure on baseload generating plants that reliably deliver power to our customers around the clock,” they added. But, they reiterated they expect prices to rise, reviving the nuclear plants’ profits.
Impact
WHO
“Air Pollution.” World Health Organization, World Health Organization, 2020, www.who.int/health-topics/air-pollution#tab=tab_1.
Air pollution kills an estimated seven million people worldwide every year. WHO data shows that 9 out of 10 people breathe air containing high levels of pollutants. WHO is working with countries to monitor air pollution and improve air quality. From smog hanging over cities to smoke inside the home, air pollution poses a major threat to health and climate. The combined effects of ambient (outdoor) and household air pollution cause about seven million premature deaths every year, largely as a result of increased mortality from stroke, heart disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, lung cancer and acute respiratory infections. More than 80 of people living in urban areas that monitor air pollution are exposed to air quality levels that exceed WHO guideline limits, with low- and middle-income countries suffering from the highest exposures, both indoors and outdoors.
Shindell
Duke University. "Cutting carbon emissions sooner could save 153 million lives." ScienceDaily. ScienceDaily, 19 March 2018. www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2018/03/180319145243.htm.
As many as 153 million premature deaths linked to air pollution could be avoided worldwide this century if governments speed up their timetable for reducing fossil fuel emissions, a new Duke University-led study finds. The study is the first to project the number of lives that could be saved, city by city, in 154 of the world's largest urban areas if nations agree to reduce carbon emissions and limit global temperature rise to 1.5°C in the near future rather than postponing the biggest emissions cuts until later, as some governments have proposed. Premature deaths would drop in cities on every inhabited continent, the study shows, with the greatest gains in saved lives occurring in Asia and Africa.
Sekretarev
Sekretarev, Ivan. “By 2100, Deadly Heat May Threaten Majority of Humankind.” National Geographic, 21 June 2017, www.nationalgeographic.com/news/2017/06/heatwaves-climate-change-global-warming/#close.
A new study has found that 30 percent of the world’s population is currently exposed to potentially deadly heat for 20 days per year or more—and like a growing forest fire, climate change is spreading this extreme heat. Without major reductions in emissions of greenhouse gases such as CO2, up to three in four people will face the threat of dying from heat by 2100. However, even with reductions, one in two people at the end of the century will likely face at least 20 days when extreme heat can kill, according to the analysis, published on Monday in Nature Climate Change. “Lethal heatwaves are very common. I don’t know why we as a society are not more concerned about the dangers,” says Camilo Mora of the University of Hawaii at Manoa, the study’s lead author. “The 2003 European heatwave killed approximately 70,000 people—that’s more than 20 times the number of people who died in the September 11 attacks.” Dangerous heatwaves are far more common than anyone realized, killing people in more than 60 different parts of the world every year. Notable deadly heatwaves include the 2010 Moscow event that killed at least 10,000 people and the 1995 Chicago heatwave, where 700 people died of heat-related causes.
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Link
Novak
Novak, Matt, (Matt Novak is the author of the Paleofuture blog, which can now be found on Gizmodo) 2-26-2013 “The American Plan to Build Nuclear Power Plants in the Ocean” http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/the-american-plan-to-build-nuclear-power-plants-in-the-ocean-27801262/?no-ist DA: 6/8/14
A new nuclear power plant hasn’t been built in the U.S. in over 30 years. But in the 1970s nuclear power was still in many ways a low-emissions dream of the future. In 1975, nuclear power accounted for about 4 percent of the electrical energy generated in the United States. But some people at that time were predicting that by the dawn of the 21st century, nuclear power might supply over 50 percent of electrical energy needed in this country. (Nuclear power currently produces 19.2 percent of electricity in the U.S.) In the early 1970s, plans were set into motion which would have seen eight to ten offshore nuclear power plants built by 1999. Each power plant was envisioned to produce 1,150 megawatts of electricity, enough for a city of about 600,000 at the time. The plan was devised by Offshore Power Systems (OPS), a partnership between Tenneco and Westinghouse. In 1972, a New Jersey utility company contracted with OPS to build an offshore nuclear power plant in Jacksonville, Florida, and tow it to New Jersey. The $1.1 billion contract to build the plant was even signed at sea — aboard a yacht just off the New Jersey coast. The power plants would have been gigantic barges anchored a few miles off the American coastline, starting with Brigantine, New Jersey. Why build a power plant at sea? Nuclear power plants require a tremendous amount of water for cooling and moving nuclear power plants offshore provides easy access to water without raising the ire of potential protesters on land. Gordon P. Selfridge’s 1975 paper “Floating Nuclear Power Plants: A Fleet on the Horizon?” notes the concern over access to water: Since nuclear power plants have a tremendous impact on the surrounding community, problems and confrontations on land have contributed to the impending move offshore. Physically, the plants consume enormous amounts of water for cooling and steam production and emit low-level radiation. With reference to the “once-through” cooling water necessary for the plants’ operation, one study has projected that the demand for such coolant will encompass over fifty percent of the entire runoff from the continental United States in only twenty-five years unless the plants are moved offshore. The possible ecological impact of running half our river water through nuclear power plants has led many to conclude that such plants would be better built in the coastal zone. News reports from the time indicated that officials expressed a desire to have less of an impact on the environment, which is a more pleasant way to say that it’s probably not good to have half of the nation’s water running through nuclear power plants. Officials were concerned that states friendly to nuclear power (like New Jersey) were running out of vital riverfront property on which to build plants — at least without angering environmental groups. From the September 19, 1972, News Journal in Mansfield, Ohio: The stated reason for building the offshore power plant was to minimize its impact on the environment, but officials privately admitted that the move to the sea was motivated by the fact that New Jersey may be the first state in the United State to run out of riverfront property for power plants. “This is the only reason for putting this plant in the ocean,” said Edward C. Raney, a Cornell University biologist and a public service consultant. “It’s the only way to justify the expense of locating at sea.” But the project met with delay after delay, most stymied by growing public concern over the environmental impact and risk of accidents with nuclear power plants. In 1976, then-candidate for President Jimmy Carter called for a moratorium on new nuclear power plants in the United States. Public opinion was already turning against nuclear power in the mid-1970s but the Three Mile Island accident in Pennsylvania on March 28, 1979, permanently altered the way that Americans perceived nuclear power. In 1982, a federal nuclear licensing board gave temporary approval for the OPS program to go through in New Jersey. But by then OPS was barely hobbling along. In 1975, Tenneco had withdrawn from the project leaving just Westinghouse at the helm. And by the early 1980s all of the utility companies with which OPS signed contract had long since cancelled their orders on account of the delays. Over the next decade OPS began liquidating everything and laying off most of their staff of 1,500 in Jacksonville. In 1990 Westinghouse sold what was then the world’s largest crane — 38 stories tall, and built for $15 million — to a Chinese shipbuilding company for a measly $3 million. Today, environmentalists who once shunned nuclear power are giving it a second look. But with the nuclear meltdown in Fukushima on March 11, 2011, the world is again concerned about the very real potential for accidents — especially when it comes to shared resources like the ocean.
Gellerman
Gellerman, Bruce. “Big Plans For Small Nuclear Plants.” Big Plans For Small Nuclear Plants | Earthwhile, WBUR, 18 Sept. 2019, www.wbur.org/earthwhile/2019/09/18/nuclear-power-miniaturization-new-technology.
Greenpeace calls the project "Chernobyl on Ice," warning of collisions with other vessels, terrorist attacks and storms. The Russian nuclear agency calls the concerns "unfounded" and says the floating reactors offer "clean, green, stable energy." China has also announced plans to launch a fleet of up to 20 floating nuclear power plants. Construction of the first is set to begin soon. A small team at MIT has been studying the feasibility of a similar idea. Buongiorno says the plan calls for building small reactors in shipyards then towing the nuclear platforms offshore where needed. "It becomes a 'plug and play' energy source," says Buongiorno. "You build it, you float it out to the site and provide electricity. But if there is a more profitable site you simply move your power plant there." The United States military did something like this 50 years ago, anchoring a reactor aboard a barge on a lake in Panama to power canal locks during a decade-long drought.
Wellock
Thomas Wellock, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Historian, 9-26-2013 “Waves of Uncertainty: The Demise of the Floating Reactor Concept (Part II)”, http://public-blog.nrc-gateway.gov/2013/09/26/waves-of-uncertainty-the-demise-of-the-floating-reactor-concept-part-ii/ DA: 6/12/14
Offshore Power Systems, apparently, did not appreciate that putting land-based reactors out to sea was bound to raise new safety, environmental and regulatory questions. Concerns about ship collisions, off-shore fishing grounds, barge sinking and the challenge of creating a new regulatory process for floating reactors were just some of the unique issues facing regulators. Even the trade press raised concerns. Nuclear News worried about the “incredibly tangled mass of overlapping jurisdictions, state, national, and international law, inter-agency authority” that included new players such as the U.S. Coast Guard. Drawing from a 1978 GAO report. Drawing from a 1978 GAO report. Events conspired to worsen OPS’s prospects. The oil crisis that began in 1973 made construction financing expensive and slowed electricity consumption. Facing slack demand, PSEG postponed delivery of the first floating plant from 1981 to 1985 and later to 1988. Tenneco backed out of the OPS partnership in 1975. With the entire enterprise threatened, Westinghouse and the Florida Congressional delegation asked the federal government to purchase four plants. But, the prospect of “bailing out” OPS did not appeal to officials in the Ford Administration. The purchase proposal died. Floating reactors did not solve regulatory or political problems. The production facility in Jacksonville needed an NRC manufacturing license. There were so many technical and regulatory uncertainties that the licensing review ran three years behind schedule. A 1978 report from the U.S. General Accounting Office criticized the NRC for what it believed was an incomplete safety review, particularly for not accounting for impacts on the ocean ecosystem during an accident where a melting reactor core broke through the bottom of the barge. Local and state opposition to the plant was intense. Nearby counties voted in non-binding referendums 2 to 1 against the Atlantic Generating Station, and the New Jersey legislature refused to introduce a bill to turn the offshore site over to PSEG. Westinghouse held out hope for a brighter future; PSEG didn’t. In late 1978, the utility announced it canceled its orders for all four of its floating plants. Slack demand, it noted, was “the only reason” for the cancellations. “We simply will not need these units” in the foreseeable future, a utility official admitted. Others blamed excessive regulation. In March 1979, John O’Leary, a Department of Energy deputy secretary, provided to the White House a “grim—even alarming report,” as one staffer said, that the NRC delays with the OPS license were symptomatic of a larger problem. “It has become impossible to build energy plants in America” O’Leary said, due to excessive environmental regulations and an indecisive bureaucracy. Environmental laws, O’Leary complained, had created “a chain of hurdles which effectively kill energy projects” and damage to the nation’s economy. He wanted presidential action. Drawing from a 1978 GAO report. Drawing from a 1978 GAO report. Events rendered O’Leary’s plea for action moot. Two and a half weeks later the Three Mile Island accident occurred, ending any hope of an imminent industry rebound. The accident raised anew questions about a core melt accident and further delayed the manufacturing license. The NRC did not issue a license until 1982. In 1984, Westinghouse formally abandoned the OPS enterprise, dismantled the Jacksonville facility, and sold its huge crane to China. Going to sea, OPS discovered, did not allow it to escape the problems that beset nuclear power. A novel technological solution could not overcome public distrust and economic, technical and regulatory uncertainty. We shall see how Russia handles the challenges.
Waller
Waller, David. “Floating Power Plants (FPPs).” Energy Central, Durham University, 18 Sept. 2017, www.energycentral.com/c/pip/floating-power-plants-fpps
Based upon a renewed global interest in the application of floating power plants (FPPs) Waller Marine, Inc. has developed a series of new designs based on aero derivative and industrial gas turbines ranging from 100 MW simple cycle facilities to 850 MW combined cycle plants. Present interest stems from national utilities looking to expand their present capacities with more efficient generation to developers entering the unregulated generation markets and the installation of new distributed power in third world countries. These advanced designs bring a new capability to the power generation industry where a company can contract for a complete, tested, ready to go, manufactured power plant for fast track installation at a selected site. These designs have already successfully challenged old technological ideas of FPPs and their perceived limitations having now permitted an advanced engineering capability to design these larger capacity units. This development coupled with an expanded LNG market that is able to supply smaller scale capacities to fuel these units has given impetus to WMI’s capability of producing these new, efficient, clean burning floating facilities.
Jacopo
Boungiorno, Jacopo. “Offshoring Nuclear Plants.” The American Sciety of Mechanical Engineers, MIT, 11 July 2014, www.asme.org/topics-resources/content/offshoring-nuclear-plants.
Jacopo Buongiorno, associate professor of nuclear science and engineering at MIT, and his colleagues have been floating just such an idea. Their bobbing reactor design is the offshore oil rig of the nuclear world, and they hope it will address the needs and fears of a power-hungry world. Try convincing an investor or government to build a new reactor and you're bound to come upagainst some resistance. Safety concerns are just part of the equation. "Uranium is cheap," says Buongiorno. "The problem is that the reactor is an expensive, complex structure. You don't get any revenue during construction, which may take five to ten years—not an appealing investment."Buongiorno's simplified design could be built in pre-existing shipyards at a much speedier pace than on-site construction. Newport News for instance, managed to assemble the aircraft carrier Gerald Ford in three years, fitted with two nuclear reactors. "They could build a nuclear power plant, and it could be towed to anywhere there's a coast line, moored a few miles offshore," he says.
Associated Press
Associated Press 06 Associated Press, “Russian world-first: A Floating Nuclear Plant,” NBC News, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/13316942/ns/world_news-world_environment/t/russian-world-first-floating-nuclear-plant/#.U9KelLGotfC, 6/14/2006, 7/25/2014 - AP
An Arctic military shipbuilding plant and Russia's Atomic Power Agency signed a contract Wednesday to build the world's first floating nuclear reactor. The $336 million reactor will be built by the Sevmash plant in the Arctic port of Severodvinsk beginning next year, and will be commissioned in October 2010, said Sergei Obozov, head of the state-controlled Rosenergoatom consortium in charge of nuclear power plants. He said the reactor — to provide heating and electricity to Sevmash — was the perfect solution for supplying energy to remote Arctic sites, and that Russian authorities were looking at 11 other possible sites for such reactors. Atomic Power Agency head Sergei Kiriyenko denied that the reactor would pose a security or safety risk, saying that the Sevmash plant — the only Russian plant where atomic submarines are manufactured — was sufficiently well guarded. "There will be no floating Chernobyl," Kiriyenko said, according to ITAR-Tass news agency. "It is no secret that the question has arisen repeatedly: 'Is such a thing at all possible?'," Kiriyenko was quoted as saying by his ministry's press service. "But today the government's position is such ... that we are obliged to use our experience... No one else in the world has such experience as we have accumulated over the years in our atomic fleet of safely operating small-capacity reactors." Environmental groups have sharply criticized the proposed floating reactors. "Floating nuclear power plants are absolutely unsafe, inherently so. There are risks of the unit itself sinking, there are risks in towing the units to where they need to be," said Charles Digges, editor of the Web site for the Norwegian-based environmental group Bellona. "They (Russians) are sitting on so much oil and have so many other avenues to alternative sources of energy for these particular regions where they would use floating nuclear power plants ... which are cheaper to build, cheaper to research," he said. Russia has in recent years overcome a public backlash against nuclear power that followed the April 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster, and the government has supported efforts to revive the nuclear industry. Russia currently has 31 reactors at 10 nuclear power plants, accounting for 16-17 percent of the country's electricity generation, and President Vladimir Putin has called for raising the share to 25 percent.
Impact
Daryan
William Daryan, 1-3-2012. “Part 10 – Small modular reactors and mass production options” http://daryanenergyblog.wordpress.com/ca/part-10-smallreactors-mass-prod/
So there are a host of practical factors in favour smaller reactors. But what’s the down side? Firstly, economies of scale. With a small reactor, we have all the excess baggage that comes with each power station, all the fixed costs and a much smaller pay-off. As I noted earlier, even thought many smaller reactors are a lot safer than large LWR’s (even a small LWR is somewhat safer!) you would still need to put them under a containment dome. It’s this process of concrete pouring that is often a bottle neck in nuclear reactor construction. We could get around the problem by clustering reactors together, i.e putting 2 or 4 reactors not only on the same site but under the same containment dome. The one downside here is that if one reactor has a problem, it will likely spread to its neighbours. How much of a showstopper this fact is depends on which type of reactors we are discussing. A proposed modular reactor design with four 250 MWth reactors within the same containment building working a shared pair of turbines to produce 500 MWe¶ Also, in the shorter term small reactors would be slower to build, especially many of those we’ve been discussing, given that they are often made out of non-standard materials. Only a few facilities in the world could build them as the entire nuclear manufacturing industry is currently geared towards large LWR’s. Turning that juggernaut around would take decades. So by opting for small reactors while we’d get safer more flexible reactors, we be paying for it, as these reactors would be slower to build (initially anyway) and probably more expensive too.
Jacobson
Jacobson, Mark Z., et al. “The 7 Reasons Why Nuclear Energy Is Not the Answer to Solve Climate Change.” The Leonardo DiCaprio Foundation, 2019, www.leonardodicaprio.org/the-7-reasons-why-nuclear-energy-is-not-the-answer-to-solve-climate-change/.
Meltdowns have been either catastrophic (Chernobyl, Russia in 1986; three reactors at Fukushima Dai-ichi, Japan in 2011) or damaging (Three-Mile Island, Pennsylvania in 1979; Saint-Laurent France in 1980). The nuclear industry has proposed new reactor designs that they suggest are safer. However, these designs are generally untested, and there is no guarantee that the reactors will be designed, built and operated correctly or that a natural disaster or act of terrorism, such as an airplane flown into a reactor, will not cause the reactor to fail, resulting in a major disaster. To recap, new nuclear power costs about 5 times more than onshore wind power per kWh (between 2.3 to 7.4 times depending upon location and integration issues). Nuclear takes 5 to 17 years longer between planning and operation and produces on average 23 times the emissions per unit electricity generated (between 9 to 37 times depending upon plant size and construction schedule). In addition, it creates risk and cost associated with weapons proliferation, meltdown, mining lung cancer, and waste risks. Clean, renewables avoid all such risks. Nuclear advocates claim nuclear is still needed because renewables are intermittent and need natural gas for backup. However, nuclear itself never matches power demand so it needs backup. Even in France with one of the most advanced nuclear energy programs, the maximum ramp rate is 1 to 5 per minute, which means they need natural gas, hydropower, or batteries, which ramp up 5 to 100 times faster, to meet peaks in demand. Today, in fact, batteries are beating natural gas for wind and solar backup needs throughout the world. A dozen independent scientific groups have further found that it is possible to match intermittent power demand with clean, renewable energy supply and storage, without nuclear, at low cost. Finally, many existing nuclear plants are so costly that their owners are demanding subsidies to stay open. For example, in 2016, three existing upstate New York nuclear plants requested and received subsidies to stay open using the argument that the plants were needed to keep emissions low. However, subsidizing such plants may increase carbon emissions and costs relative to replacing the plants with wind or solar as soon as possible. Thus, subsidizing nuclear would result in higher emissions and costs over the long term than replacing nuclear with renewables.
Rose
Thomas Rose and Trevor Sweeting (2016) How safe is nuclear power? A statistical study suggests less than expected, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 72:2, 112-115, DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2016.1145910
This type of prediction often runs up against the argument that nuclear operators learn from the past. Therefore we also tried to account for any learning effects in our analysis. We restricted our analysis to accidents related to civil nuclear reactors used for power generation, as arguments about trade-offs for using nuclear technology differ depending on the application. And, because the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) does not distribute comprehensive, long-term reports on nuclear incidents and accidents because of confidentiality agreements with the countries it works with, we have had to use alternative sources for information on nuclear accidents over time. By our calculations, the overall probability of a core melt accident in the next decade, in a world with 443 reactors, is almost 70. (Because of statistical uncertainty, however, the probability could range from about 28 to roughly 95.) The United States, with 104 reactors, has about a 50 probability of experiencing one core-melt accident within the next 25 years.
Lendman
Stephen Lendman, (BA from Harvard University. Two years of US Army service followed, then an MBA from the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania. Syndicated journalist riting on major world and national issues), 3-13-2011, "Nuclear Meltdown in Japan," No Publication, http://www.thepeoplesvoice.org/TPV3/Voices.php/2011/03/13/nuclear-meltdown-in-japan
For years, Helen Caldicott warned it's coming. In her 1978 book, "Nuclear Madness," she said: "As a physician, I contend that nuclear technology threatens life on our planet with extinction. If present trends continue, the air we breathe, the food we eat, and the water we drink will soon be contaminated with enough radioactive pollutants to pose a potential health hazard far greater than any plague humanity has ever experienced." More below on the inevitable dangers from commercial nuclear power proliferation, besides added military ones. On March 11, New York Times writer Martin Fackler headlined, "Powerful Quake and Tsunami Devastate Northern Japan," saying: "The 8.9-magnitude earthquake (Japan's strongest ever) set off a devastating tsunami that sent walls of water (six meters high) washing over coastal cities in the north." According to Japan's Meteorological Survey, it was 9.0. The Sendai port city and other areas experienced heavy damage. "Thousands of homes were destroyed, many roads were impassable, trains and buses (stopped) running, and power and cellphones remained down. On Saturday morning, the JR rail company" reported three trains missing. Many passengers are unaccounted for. Striking at 2:46PM Tokyo time, it caused vast destruction, shook city skyscrapers, buckled highways, ignited fires, terrified millions, annihilated areas near Sendai, possibly killed thousands, and caused a nuclear meltdown, its potential catastrophic effects far exceeding quake and tsunami devastation, almost minor by comparison under a worst case scenario. On March 12, Times writer Matthew Wald headlined, "Explosion Seen at Damaged Japan Nuclear Plant," saying: "Japanese officials (ordered evacuations) for people living near two nuclear power plants whose cooling systems broke down," releasing radioactive material, perhaps in far greater amounts than reported. NHK television and Jiji said the 40-year old Fukushima plant's outer structure housing the reactor "appeared to have blown off, which could suggest the containment building had already been breached." Japan's nuclear regulating agency said radioactive levels inside were 1,000 times above normal. Reuters said the 1995 Kobe quake caused $100 billion in damage, up to then the most costly ever natural disaster. This time, from quake and tsunami damage alone, that figure will be dwarfed. Moreover, under a worst case core meltdown, all bets are off as the entire region and beyond will be threatened with permanent contamination, making the most affected areas unsafe to live in. On March 12, Stratfor Global Intelligence issued a "Red Alert: Nuclear Meltdown at Quake-Damaged Japanese Plant," saying: Fukushima Daiichi "nuclear power plant in Okuma, Japan, appears to have caused a reactor meltdown." Stratfor downplayed its seriousness, adding that such an event "does not necessarily mean a nuclear disaster," that already may have happened - the ultimate nightmare short of nuclear winter. According to Stratfor, "(A)s long as the reactor core, which is specifically designed to contain high levels of heat, pressure and radiation, remains intact, the melted fuel can be dealt with. If the (core's) breached but the containment facility built around (it) remains intact, the melted fuel can be....entombed within specialized concrete" as at Chernobyl in 1986. In fact, that disaster killed nearly one million people worldwide from nuclear radiation exposure. In their book titled, "Chernobyl: Consequences of the Catastrophe for People and the Environment," Alexey Yablokov, Vassily Nesterenko and Alexey Nesterenko said: "For the past 23 years, it has been clear that there is a danger greater than nuclear weapons concealed within nuclear power. Emissions from this one reactor exceeded a hundred-fold the radioactive contamination of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki." "No citizen of any country can be assured that he or she can be protected from radioactive contamination. One nuclear reactor can pollute half the globe. Chernobyl fallout covers the entire Northern Hemisphere." Stratfor explained that if Fukushima's floor cracked, "it is highly likely that the melting fuel will burn through (its) containment system and enter the ground. This has never happened before," at least not reported. If now occurring, "containment goes from being merely dangerous, time consuming and expensive to nearly impossible," making the quake, aftershocks, and tsunamis seem mild by comparison. Potentially, millions of lives will be jeopardized. Japanese officials said Fukushima's reactor container wasn't breached. Stratfor and others said it was, making the potential calamity far worse than reported. Japan's Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) said the explosion at Fukushima's Saiichi No. 1 facility could only have been caused by a core meltdown. In fact, 3 or more reactors are affected or at risk. Events are fluid and developing, but remain very serious. The possibility of an extreme catastrophe can't be discounted. Moreover, independent nuclear safety analyst John Large told Al Jazeera that by venting radioactive steam from the inner reactor to the outer dome, a reaction may have occurred, causing the explosion. "When I look at the size of the explosion," he said, "it is my opinion that there could be a very large leak (because) fuel continues to generate heat." Already, Fukushima way exceeds Three Mile Island that experienced a partial core meltdown in Unit 2. Finally it was brought under control, but coverup and denial concealed full details until much later. According to anti-nuclear activist Harvey Wasserman, Japan's quake fallout may cause nuclear disaster, saying: "This is a very serious situation. If the cooling system fails (apparently it has at two or more plants), the super-heated radioactive fuel rods will melt, and (if so) you could conceivably have an explosion," that, in fact, occurred. As a result, massive radiation releases may follow, impacting the entire region. "It could be, literally, an apocalyptic event. The reactor could blow." If so, Russia, China, Korea and most parts of Western Asia will be affected. Many thousands will die, potentially millions under a worse case scenario, including far outside East Asia. | 904,674 |
365,544 | 380,114 | Contact Info | Hi, we're Holden and Luke
Pronouns:
Holden - Man
Luke - Man
Here's our contact info if you want us to send you speech docs:
Holden:
(916) 317-2232 (preferred)
[email protected]
Follow my Instagram @sacholden
Luke:
(916) 693-9425
[email protected] | 905,412 |
365,545 | 379,488 | AFF- Oil | Venezuela’s economy is dangerously dependent on their oil industry. According to Egan ‘19 of CNN Business
"Sanctions are already ... research at ClipperData."
Currently, the Economist Intelligence Unit ‘19 explains that
Venezuela's oil industry...reduces PDVSA's cashflow.
Sanctions taken out the lynchpin of the economy. Eaton ‘19
The United States...sanctions were imposed.
Sachs ‘19 of Columbia University recognizes that
It is important...in this paper
sanctions are having a spillover effect
In fact, AP News ‘19 finds last August that
The biggest impact...contraction,” Rodriguez said.
This is currently materializing in three ways
The First is Denying Recovery
According to Kasai ‘20 of World Oil ,
Some buyers of...for old debts.
The Second is Fearing Retaliation
Reuters ‘20 reports that
Abrams said China’s... legislature in 2016.
Overall, Graham ‘20 of The Dialogue finds this year that
However, at present... of violating sanctions.
The Third is the return of Price Controls
Reuters last month reports that
The socialist government...transport of products.
Pons of Mercury News furthers last month,
Venezuela on Thursday...prices in 2014.
The Impact is Perpetuating the Humanitarian Crisis
entirety of Venezuela’s population is losing. Weisbrot ‘19 of CEPR explains that
And it will...already been declining.
This is empirically proven by Chu ‘18 of the Independent, who finds that
In his early... democratic checks and balances.
The situation gets worse as time progresses, as Watt ‘18 of The World
As well as hitting...Caracas, told Al-Jazeera.
Crucially, Goodman of the SDUT, last month shows,
He said U.S.... need humanitarian assistance.
Thus, We Affirm. | 904,572 |
365,546 | 379,537 | ERROR | ERROR | 904,619 |
365,547 | 379,528 | UBI - K - Citizenship | Citizenship is an arbitrary distinction that necessitates violent exclusion of foreigners: their notion of giving a UBI to only citizens reifies exclusion through drawing lines around nationality – this maintains the violent sovereignty of the nation-state
Cohen 99 – Nell and Herbert Singer Professor of Political Thought at Columbia University - (Jean, “Changing Paradigms of Citizenship and the Exclusiveness of the Demos,” International Sociology 14.3, September 1999, 245-268)//elliot
It is this ... second-class citizens.
National identity causes extinction~-~-~-~~-~- vote neg for a shared identity that rejects nationalist exclusions - that’s key to prevent global crises
Smith, 3 - Professor of Political Science at University of Pennsylvania and PhD Harvard University. (Rogers, Stories Of Peoplehood, The Politics and Morals of Political Membership, p. 166-169)
It is certainly ... novel political arrangements. | 904,607 |
365,548 | 379,535 | UBI - CT - Affordable College Bad | Paying for student loans decks military recruitment numbers
Luxenberg 16 (Benjamin, Marine Corps veteran, is enrolled in the joint MBA/MPP program of Harvard Business School and the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. He is an Associate Scholar of the Foreign Policy Research Institute.), War On The Rocks, "Does Free College Threaten Our All-Volunteer Military?", 2016/09, https://warontherocks.com/2016/09/does-free-college-threaten-our-all-volunteer-military/
hroughout the current ... national security scenarios.
Decreases in recruiting kills Trump’s Afghanistan strategy—long term troop commitments are key - a decrease in recruiting numbers signals we won’t be able to follow through
Munoz 9-20-17 - military correspondent for The Washington Times focusing on U.S. defense and national security policy, programs and operations. He was most recently a foreign correspondent with the Stars and Stripes Mideast bureau, based in Kabul, Afghanistan. Mr. Muñoz also reported on U.S. and foreign military operations in South America, Cuba and the Asia-Pacific region. His work has appeared in The Guardian, United Press International, Atlantic Media, Air Force Magazine, USNI News and elsewhere.
Carlo, Afghanistan welcomes Trump plan for long-term U.S. partnership, Washington Times, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/sep/20/hamdullah-mohib-afghanistans-ambassador-welcomes-d/
A country that ... around that now.”
That sparks nuclear war in South Asia – strong US presence in Afghanistan is vital to deter indopak
Datla 16 (Anand, consultant and former Defense Department civilian who has worked on strategic planning, policy, and operations + served as a professional staff member of the House Armed Services Committee, 6/19, "U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan: Implications for Regional Nuclear Rivalries," http://www.fletcherforum.org/home/2016/9/6/us-withdrawal-from-afghanistan-implications-for-regional-nuclear-rivalries)
The security challenges ... in the region. | 904,615 |
365,549 | 379,523 | PIK - Race War | We advocate the entirety of the aff minus the use of the word “race war”.
their analytic of a race war devolves into nationalism and securitization - turns case
Saul Newman and Michael P. Levine 06 ~-~- Saul Newman is a British political theorist and central post-anarchist thinker. Michael P. Levine is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Western Australia. (https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/41802327.pdf?refreqid=excelsior3A0bd0f7c0469462ca09e95562d89cde14 “War, Politics and Race: Reflections on Violence in the 'War on Terror'”) mba-alb
One of the ... Neal points out, | 904,603 |
365,550 | 379,551 | Disclosure | A Interpretation: Debaters must, on the page with their name and the school they attend, disclose all taglines, full citations, and the first and last three words of the pieces of evidence read in their cases on the NDCA wiki at least one hour before the round if they have read that case before. | 904,631 |
365,551 | 379,544 | 0-Contact | If you have any questions or want us to disclose, contact us at [email protected] or on Facebook Aryan Jasani. Discord is AwesomeAJ23#7366 and poot nab#1649. Rest of the positions for other topics are disclosed on Plano Senior wiki | 904,626 |
365,552 | 379,561 | TOC Aff v1 | ==1AC==
====We affirm. ====
====Our sole contention concerns preventing Iranian expansion. ====
====Over the last decade, Iran has created a network of proxies which help them establish influence in neighboring countries. Including terrorist groups such as Hezbollah, Iran’s proxies have killed thousands.====
====America intends to deter its enemies, however, Hannah 19 of Foreign Policy writes====
Hannah 19, John Hannah, 10/30/19, “U.S. Deterrence in the Middle East Is Collapsing,” Foreign Policy
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/30/u-s-deterrence-in-the-middle-east-is-collapsing-syria-
====Instead, US military presence increases Iranian aggression in two ways. First, threat perception. Barzegar 10 explains: ====
Barzegar 10, Kayhan Barzegar, Fall 2010, "Roles at Odds:The Roots of Increased Iran-U.S. Tension in the Post-9/11 Middle East”, IRANIAN REVIEW of Foreign Affairs, https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/5-Dr_Barzegar.pdf
With its sources of power and geo-political posture. The major source of difficulty, however, appears to emanate
...AND...
f threat in the region? And how can the two parties reach a compromise regarding each other’s new regional role.
====Iran responds to the threat with aggression. Swan 19 of Hillsdale College writes:====
Swan 19, Betsy Swan, 5-17-2019, "Trump Admin Moves Fueled Iran’s Aggression, U.S. Intel Says," Daily Beast, https://www.thedailybeast.com/trump-admin-moves-fueled-irans-aggression-us-intel-says
Trump administration hawks have spent the last two weeks decrying an increased threat from Iran. But U.S. intell
...AND...
ect response to the administration’s moves, according to the assessment of multiple U.S. intelligence officials.
====Niehaus of the Journal for International Affairs 19 adds:====
Niehous, 19 (the Pentagon, 11-26-2019, accessed on 4-15-2020, Towson University Journal of International Affairs, "Deterrence in the Persian Gulf: Why American Efforts to Contain Iran Are Failing", https://wp.towson.edu/iajournal/2019/11/25/deterrence-in-the-persian-gulf-why-american-efforts-to-contain-iran-are-failing/)
America is justified in its desire to avoid an overt war with Iran, but the patient approach being pursued by th
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forces because it believes that this is the most effective way of ensuring its survival against foreign threats.
====It is deep rooted in Iran’s history. Von 20 of the Hill finds:====
Marik Von, 1-15-2020, "Is America on the wrong side in the Middle East?," TheHill, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/478386-is-america-on-the-wrong-side-in-the-middle-east // BK
Despite the clear alignment of U.S. and Iranian counterterrorism objectives, four decades of hostility and distr
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anesque embrace of Iran’s moderatesand can catalyze profoundly transformational changes in the Islamic Republic.
====Iran associates US presence with this experience and feel they are fighting an existential threat. With a less militaristic policy, Iran will have no incentive to act aggressively. McInnis 15 of the American Enterprise Institute explains:====
Mcinnis 15, J. Matthew, 5-13-2015, "Is Iran really a defensive state?," American Enterprise Institute - AEI, https://www.aei.org/foreign-and-defense-policy/middle-east/is-iran-really-a-defensive-state/
On Tuesday, AEI released my first in a series of working papers on Iranian strategy and decision-making, titled
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We need to ask honest, tough questions about why Iran does what it does. Read the report. Let the debate begin!
====Sanctions are not as significant. Vaez 19 of the Atlantic finds:====
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/05/why-trumps-sanctions-iran-arent-working/589288/ Vaez, Atlantic, 2019
First and most important: The one thing Tehran would find more intolerable than the crushing impact of sanctions
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an invitation to dialogue, in part because the Bush administration’s Iraq adventure proved a strategic disaster.
====Second, is empowering hardliners. After Obama withdrew troops from Iraq in 2011, Erdbrink 13 of the New York Times found elections rejected the ultraconservatives who had been in power and overwhelmingly installed a moderate government who advocated a more conciliatory approach to the world. ====
this is paraphrased
Thomas Erdbrink, 6-15-2013, "Iran Moderate Wins Presidency by a Large Margin," No Publication, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/16/world/middleeast/iran-election.html
====Redeployment reversed this trend. Iranian Author Mohammad Tabaar writes in 2019: ====
This card was assigned in my history class
Mohammad Ayatollahi Tabaar, 4-3-2019, "Opinion," New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/03/opinion/iran-trump-sanctions.html
====As a result, Turak 20 of CNBC finds====
Natasha Turak, 2-19-2020, “Iran elections to be dominated by hard-liners as young people refuse to vote: ‘It’s a joke’,” CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/19/iran-parliamentary-elections-hardliners-to-dominate-low-turnout-expected.html
Iran’s is holding its parliamentary elections Friday, and one thing seems all but certain: It will be a major
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Atlantic Council, told CNBC. “If history repeats itself, a conservative will also be elected president in 2021.”
====Crucially, a more peaceful posture could change Iranian leadership. Von 20 of the Hill finds:====
Marik Von, 1-15-2020, "Is America on the wrong side in the Middle East?," TheHill, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/478386-is-america-on-the-wrong-side-in-the-middle-east
Despite the clear alignment of U.S. and Iranian counterterrorism objectives, four decades of hostility and distr
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esque embrace of Iran’s moderatesand can catalyze profoundly transformational changes in the Islamic Republic.
====Overall, absent United States military presence, Iran would cease their aggression in the Middle East. Historically, Von concludes====
Marik the goat part 3
Marik Von, 1-15-2020, "Is America on the wrong side in the Middle East?," TheHill, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/478386-is-america-on-the-wrong-side-in-the-middle-east
====And conversely, The Heritage Foundation concludes in 2020:====
PARAPHRASED
Heritage Staff, 2020, "The Situation in Iran," Heritage Foundation, https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/heritage-explains/the-situation-iran
====Curbing Iranian aggression is the most important goal in the Middle East. Journalist Omar Quadrat writes in 2020: ====
Omar Qudrat,, 1-14-2020, "Make no mistake: Iran remains a powerful threat to the US," TheHill, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/477752-make-no-mistake-iran-remains-a-powerful-threat-to-the-us
At home, Iran recently killed approximately 1,500 civilians who took to the streets dreaming of a better future.
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d just a few hours from the U.S. on a commercial flight, could be used against us to great military advantage.
====Absent US involvement diplomacy would follow. Al Jazeera finds====
Al Jazeera Staff, 2-4-2020, "Iran wants to mend ties with Saudi, UAE 'quickly': Top diplomat," Al Jazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/02/iran-mend-ties-saudi-uae-quickly-top-diplomat-200204164153245.html
A top Iranian diplomat has said his country is open to resolving differences with its Gulf rivals, Saudi Arabia
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e setting out Iran's position on possible rapprochement with Saudi Arabia, the Iraqi state news agency reported.
====However, Keynoush 20 of the Atlantic Council finds:====
Banafsheh Keynoush, JAN 27, 2020, "Why mediation between Saudi Arabia and Iran keeps failing," Atlantic Council, https://atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/why-mediation-between-saudi-arabia-and-iran-keeps-failing
These multilateral steps could perhaps be backed by workable solutions to accommodate Saudi Arabia and Iran in A
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cially ones in which the United States or American organizations, or staunch US allies, attempt to take charge. | 904,641 |
365,553 | 379,599 | Protecting clean energy sourcesrenewables | Egan 19
The US is set to use primarily renewables by 2021 – Egan 19
Matt Egan, C. B.
Matt Egan, CNN Business. "Solar, Wind And Hydro Power Could Soon Surpass Coal". CNN, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/26/business/renewable-energy-coal/index.html.
Coal, long the king of America's electric grid, will soon get toppled by renewable energy. Solar and wind power are growing so rapidly that for the first time ever, the United States will likely get more power in 2021 from renewable energy than from coal, according to projections from the Institute for Energy Economic and Financial Analysis. This milestone is being driven by the gangbusters growth for solar and wind as well as the stunning collapse of coal. And it comes as the United Nations warned on Tuesday that countries are not doing enough to keep the planet's temperature from rising to near-catastrophic levels. "The next piece of the energy transition is very close at hand," said PJ Deschenes, partner at Greentech Capital Advisors, a boutique investment bank focused on clean energy. "Coal is coming offline as fast or faster than we anticipated." For decades, coal was the cornerstone of the power industry. But a combination of environmental concerns, aging plants and competition have caused a sharp decline in coal usage in the United States. Coal provided about half of America's power generation between 2000 and 2010. However, coal usage started to fall sharply late in the last decade because of the abundance of cheap natural gas. Coal was dethroned by natural gas in 2016, according to the US Energy Information Administration. Despite President Donald Trump's promise to save coal, the industry's decline has only continued. This was underlined by last month's bankruptcy of Murray Energy, America's largest private coal mining company. US power companies are rapidly retiring old coal plants and replacing them with wind and solar farms. Utility companies like PSEG (PEG) and Xcel Energy (XEL), which long relied on coal, are now pledging to deliver carbon-free electricity. Navajo Generation Station, the largest coal-fired power plant in the West, permanently closed last week. The shutdown means that South Nevada's electricity is now coal-free. US power plants are expected to consume less coal next year than at any point since 1978, according to the EIA. That will cause coal's market share to drop below 22, compared with 28 in 2018. That shrinking market share makes existing coal plants even less profitable. "It's a negative feedback loop," said Greentech's Deschenes. This trend is playing out overseas as well. Global electricity production from coal is on track to fall by a record 3 in 2019, according to CarbonBrief. That drop is being driven by record declines from Germany and South Korea as well as the first dip in India in at least three decades. Dennis Wamsted, editor and analyst at IEEFA, is predicting that 2021 will be the "crossover year" in the United States, where coal is supplanted by renewables, which include solar, wind, hydropower, biomass and geothermal. "Coal and renewables are rapidly heading in opposite directions," Wamsted said in a report."If the crossover doesn't occur in 2021, it will without a doubt do so by 2022." This transition has already played out in Texas, which was long a coal-first state. During the first half of this year, wind power surpassed coal for the first time in Texas history. Wind made up just 0.8 of the Lone Star State's power as of 2003. That figure has climbed to 22, compared with 21 for coal.
Parenti 12
Parenti, C.
Parenti, Christian. "Why Nuclear Power Is Not The Answer To Global Warming". Alternet.Org, 2012, https://www.alternet.org/2012/04/why_nu
An authoritative study by the investment bank Lazard Ltd. found that wind beat nuclear and that nuclear essentially tied with solar. But wind and solar, being simple and safe, are coming on line faster. Another advantage wind and solar have is that capacity can be added bit by bit; a wind farm can have more or less turbines without scuttling the whole project. As economies of scale are created within the alternative energy supply chains and the construction process becomes more efficient, prices continue to drop. Meanwhile, the cost of stalled nukes moves upward.¶ The World Watch Institute reports that between 2004 and 2009, global electricity from wind (not capacity, but actual power output) grew by 27 percent, while solar grew by 54 percent. Over the same time, nuclear power output actually declined by half a percent.¶ What would a nuke build out really cost? Mark Cooper, senior fellow for economic analysis at the Vermont Law School, has found that adding 100 new reactors to the U.S. power grid would cost $1.9 to $4.1 trillion, and that would take at least a decade to do.¶ In a comparative analysis of U.S. states, Cooper found that the states that invested heavily in nuclear power had worse track records on efficiency and developing renewables than those that did not have large nuclear programs. In other words, investing in nuclear technology crowded out developing clean energy.¶ Only when clean technologies—like wind, solar, hydropower, and electric vehicles—are cheaper than other options will the world economy make the switch away from fossil fuels. Right now, alternatives are slightly cheaper than nukes, come on line faster, and are growing robustly.¶ Nuclear power is not only physically dangerous—it is also economically wasteful. If the nuke huggers are so brave and serious they must begin to explain why, after a decade of billions in subsidies being on offer, there is no wave of construction underway. If the nuke renaissance is to begin, who will fund it? And who will build it in time to stave off climate tipping points? How long will it take? Thus the quip “Atomic power is the fuel of the future”—and always will be.
Acciona
Which are the benefits of solar energy? | ACCIONA
"Which Are The Benefits Of Solar Energy? | ACCIONA". Acciona.Com, 2017, https://www.acciona.com/renewable-energy/solar-energy/.
Solar energy offers many benefits that make it one of the most promising energy forms. Renewable, non-polluting and available planet-wide, it contributes to sustainable development and job creation where it is installed. Likewise, the simplicity of this technology makes it ideal for using in rural or difficultly accessed areas isolated from the network. An example is the rural region of Cajamarca in Peru, where ACCIONA has developed several projects to facilitate electrical self-sufficiency for inhabitants. Solar energy is also useful for generating electricity on a large scale and injecting it into the network, especially in regions where the meteorology provides for lots of hours of sun per year. Solar capture modules are relatively easy to maintain, which, along with the continuing, sharp reduction in cost of photovoltaic cells, explains the present favorable outlook for solar technology. Solar plants also do not emit polluting gases and are silent. Another advantage of energy borne from the Sun is its ability to generate local wealth, by lessening energy dependence on abroad. While it is certain that solar energy – like wind – is intermittent and directly depends on the weather and day-night cycles, rapid advances in electricity storage technologies are reducing this dependency and will lead to the increasing share of solar in the energy system.
SEIA
About Solar Energy | SEIA
"About Solar Energy | SEIA". SEIA, 2020, https://www.seia.org/initiatives/about-solar-energy.
All of these applications depend on supportive policy frameworks at the local, state and federal level to ensure consumers and businesses have fair access to clean energy technologies like solar. Understand the policies that drive solar growth in the U.S. The solar market today There are more than 71 gigawatts (GW) of solar installed in the U.S., enough to power more than 13.5 million homes. Over the last decade, the solar market in the United States has grown at an average rate of 50 each year. There are more than 2 million individual solar installations in the U.S., ranging from small home rooftop systems to large utility-scale systems that add hundreds of megawatts of clean electricity to the power grid.
https://www.seia.org/initiatives/climate-change
There is no one technology that can reduce all U.S. GHG emissions to zero, and SEIA works alongside partners in other industries such as wind and energy storage to advocate for a broad transition to a clean energy economy. Solar technologies are a crucial component of our nationwide effort to curb emissions and achieve ambitious climate goals. Solar energy is not just a solution that can help mitigate our impact on the climate, it also contributes to the resiliency and reliability of our electric grid, making America more energy secure in the face of increased natural disasters and powerful storms that become more frequent in a changing climate. Electric Sector More than a third of U.S. GHG emissions result from the burning of fossil fuels for electricity usage in buildings and homes. Both Concentrating Solar Power (CSP) and Photovoltaic (PV) technologies produce clean, emissions-free electricity and can feed this electricity directly into the U.S. grid. Solar Heating and Cooling (SHC) technologies can also be used to displace the need for electricity. Through Q3 2019, the U.S. now has more than 71 gigawatts (GW) of cumulative installed solar electric capacity, enough to power more than 13.5 million average American homes, and offset nearly 81 million metric tons of carbon dioxide emissions.2 Transportation Sector Electric vehicles (EVs) and plug-in hybrids are widely seen as one of the near-term climate change solutions in the transportation sector, especially when these vehicles are charged by a solar-powered carport or charging station. EVs are an increasingly important component of distributed solar power, helping American families reduce their carbon footprint by creating an end-to-end system that includes rooftop solar, home battery storage, and electric vehicles.
EERE 2017
5 Common Geothermal Energy Myths Debunked
"5 Common Geothermal Energy Myths Debunked". Energy.Gov, 2020, https://www.energy.gov/eere/articles/5-common-geothermal-energy-myths-debunked.
Geothermal energy is safe, reliable, and resides just beneath our feet. It can help meet U.S. energy demands by supplying power to our electric grid and can even be used to heat and cool homes and businesses. So what are the facts about geothermal energy? We’ve targeted five common misunderstandings and reveal the remarkable truths about this amazing natural resource. Myth: We could run out of geothermal energy Geothermal energy is a renewable energy and will never deplete. Abundant geothermal energy will be available for as long as the Earth exists. Myth: Renewables cannot supply energy 24/7 Geothermal power plants produce electricity consistently, running 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, regardless of weather conditions. The power output of a geothermal power plant is highly predictable and stable, thus facilitating energy planning with remarkable accuracy. Geothermal power plants are also an excellent means of meeting base load energy demand (i.e. the minimum level of demand on an electrical grid during a 24-hour period). Myth: Geothermal power plants take up a lot of space Geothermal energy has the smallest land footprint of any comparable energy source in the world. They are compact and use less land per gigawatt hours (404 m2) than coal (3642 m2), wind (1335 m2), or solar photovoltaics plants (3237 m2). Myth: Generating electrical power from geothermal sources causes pollution Electrical power does not, by its nature, create pollution. Modern closed-loop geothermal power plants used to generate electrical power do not emit greenhouse gases. Additionally, they consume less water on average than most conventional power generation technologies.
Johnson 19
Johnson, S.
Johnson, Scott. "US Report Finds Sky Is The Limit For Geothermal Energy Beneath Us". Ars Technica, 2019, https://arstechnica.com/science/2019/06/report-geothermal-could-power-up-to-16-of-us-grid-by-2050/.
The technology used in natural gas fracking—injecting pressurized fluid underground to form fractures in the rock that released trapped gas into horizontally drilled wells—could be adapted to generate electricity in sites like these. Creating fractures and/or injecting water to get heated by these rocks eventually results in a similar geothermal plant setup, but it takes a lot more engineering than just jamming a straw into a source that's already sending hot water to the surface. Advancing enhanced geothermal techniques alone could produce 45 gigawatts of electricity by 2050. Add in the more conventional plants, and you’re at 60 gigawatts—26 times more than current geothermal generation. And in a scenario where natural gas prices go up, making geothermal even more competitive, we could double that to 120 gigawatts. That would be fully 16 percent of the total projected 2050 generation in the US. Additionally, that electricity can be generated around the clock and can even be flexibly ramped up or down, making it an excellent pairing with intermittent forms of renewable energy like wind and solar. On the heating (and cooling) side, there are two main areas of opportunity. Traditional ground-source heat pumps circulate fluid through loops in the ground to provide cooling in the summer and heating in the winter, and they could be much more widely adopted with minimal effort. The report estimates that installations could increase 14 times over, to 28 million homes by 2050, covering 23 percent of national residential demand. Accounting for limitations in how quickly the market could realistically change brings the number down to 19 million homes—still a massive increase. There’s even more potential for district heating systems, where a single, large geothermal installation pipes heat to all the buildings in an area. There are only a handful of such systems operating in the US today (Boise, Idaho, has an example), but the report finds more than 17,000 locations where it would make sense, covering heating needs for 45 million homes. The report focuses a great deal on the barriers that have so far prevented this eye-popping potential from being realized. Some barriers are indeed technological—those enhanced geothermal systems have yet to reach maturity, for example. Some barriers are simply down to a lack of awareness that things like ground-source heat pumps are already viable options.
Dept of energy 2013
Energy Department Invests $16 Million to Harness Wave and Tidal Energy
"Energy Department Invests $16 Million To Harness Wave And Tidal Energy". Energy.Gov, 2020, https://www.energy.gov/articles/energy-department-invests-16-million-harness-wave-and-tidal-energy.
WASHINGTON – As part of the Obama Administration’s all-of-the-above strategy to deploy every available source of American energy, the Energy Department today announced $16 million for seventeen projects to help sustainably and efficiently capture energy from waves, tides and currents. Together, these projects will increase the power production and reliability of wave and tidal devices and help gather valuable data on how deployed devices interact with the surrounding environment. “Wave and tidal energy represent a large, untapped resource for the United States and responsible development of this clean, renewable energy source is an important part of our all-of-the-above energy strategy,” said Assistant Secretary for Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy David Danielson. Tidal and wave energy is a clean, renewable resource that can be harnessed wherever changing tides, waves or currents move a significant volume of water – including off the coasts of many U.S. cities where there is high electricity demand. The Department’s latest nationwide wave and tidal energy resource assessments identify up to 1,400 terawatt hours of potential generation per year. One terawatt-hour of electricity is enough to power 85,000 homes, and developing a small fraction of the available wave and tidal energy resource could allow for millions of American homes to be powered with this clean, reliable form of renewable energy. Stronger, More Efficient Wave and Tidal Energy Technologies Today, the Energy Department announced about $13.5 million for eight projects to help U.S. companies build durable, efficient wave and tidal devices that reduce overall costs and maximize the amount of energy captured. The projects will develop new drivetrain, generator and structural components as well as develop software that predicts ocean conditions and adjusts device settings accordingly to optimize power production.
New econ 2020
How can Wave and Tidal Energy help combat Climate Change? - Climate Change The New Economy
"How Can Wave And Tidal Energy Help Combat Climate Change? - Climate Change The New Economy". Climate Change The New Economy, 2018, https://climatechange-theneweconomy.com/cop23-series-can-wave-tidal-energy-help-combat-climate-change/
In the UK alone The Government estimates that wave and tidal stream energy combined has the potential to deliver around 20 per cent of the UK’s current electricity needs which equates to an installed capacity of around 30 – 50GW. Proponents believe wave power could provide up to 25 percent of U.S. electricity and 30 percent or more in Australia. In Scotland that number be upwards of 70 percent. On a global scale there are not many projections of wave and tidal energy to 2050. Building on those few, we estimate that wave and tidal energy can grow from 0.004 percent of global energy production to .28 percent by 2050. The result: reducing carbon dioxide emissions by 9.2 gigatons over thirty years. Cost to implement would be $412 billion, with net losses of $1 trillion over three decades, but the investment would pave the way for longer-term expansion and emissions reductions.
Husseini 18
Husseini, T., Husseini, T. and Husseini, T.
Husseini, Talal et al. "Tidal Energy Advantages And Disadvantages: Key Points To Consider". Power Technology | Energy News And Market Analysis, 2018, https://www.power-technology.com/features/tidal-energy-advantages-and-disadvantages/.
“It’s a very predictable energy source and typically offsets the intermittency of solar and wind – balancing the grid with a low levelised cost of energy. One of our assets, CorPower, is challenging how the industry thinks about wave energy by using principles of the human heart. Through its wave energy converter, the company is able to deliver five times higher wave energy absorption than other technologies. And that’s why the power of wave energy should not be overlooked.” Advantages of tidal energy: longevity of equipment Tidal power plants can last much longer than wind or solar farms, at around four times the longevity. Tidal barrages are long concrete structures usually built across river estuaries. The barrages have tunnels along them containing turbines, which are turned when water on one side flows through the barrage to the other side. These dam-like structures are said to have a lifespan of around 100 years. The La Rance in France, for example, has been operational since 1966 and continues to generate significant amounts of electricity each year. Wind turbines and solar panels generally come with a warranty of 20 to 25 years, and while some solar cells have reached the 40-year mark, they typically degenerate at a pace of 0.5 efficiency per year. The longer lifespan of tidal power makes it much more cost-competitive in the long run. Even nuclear power plants do not last this long. For example, the new Hinckley Point C nuclear plant planned to be built in Somerset, UK, is estimated to provide power for around 60 years, once completed, according to a BBC report.
Stanford 19
Nuclear plants still emit CO2 – Stanford 19
Jacobson, Mark. “The 7 reasons why nuclear energy is not the answer to solve climate change”. (2019). https://www.leonardodicaprio.org/the-7-reasons-why-nuclear-energy-is-not-the-answer-to-solve-climate-change/
There is no such thing as a zero- or close-to-zero emission nuclear power plant. Even existing plants emit due to the continuous mining and refining of uranium needed for the plant. Emissions from new nuclear are 78 to 178 g-CO2/kWh, not close to 0. Of this, 64 to 102 g-CO2/kWh over 100 years are emissions from the background grid while consumers wait 10 to 19 years for nuclear to come online or be refurbished, relative to 2 to 5 years for wind or solar. In addition, all nuclear plants emit 4.4 g-CO2e/kWh from the water vapor and heat they release. This contrasts with solar panels and wind turbines, which reduce heat or water vapor fluxes to the air by about 2.2 g-CO2e/kWh for a net difference from this factor alone of 6.6 g-CO2e/kWh. In fact, China’s investment in nuclear plants that take so long between planning and operation instead of wind or solar resulted in China’s CO2 emissions increasing 1.3 percent from 2016 to 2017 rather than declining by an estimated average of 3 percent. The resulting difference in air pollution emissions may have caused 69,000 additional air pollution deaths in China in 2016 alone, with additional deaths in years prior and since. Finally, many existing nuclear plants are so costly that their owners are demanding subsidies to stay open. For example, in 2016, three existing upstate New York nuclear plants requested and received subsidies to stay open using the argument that the plants were needed to keep emissions low. To recap, new nuclear power costs about 5 times more than onshore wind power per kWh (between 2.3 to 7.4 times depending upon location and integration issues). Nuclear takes 5 to 17 years longer between planning and operation and produces on average 23 times the emissions per unit electricity generated (between 9 to 37 times depending upon plant size and construction schedule). In addition, it creates risk and cost associated with weapons proliferation, meltdown, mining lung cancer, and waste risks. Clean, renewables avoid all such risks. Nuclear advocates claim nuclear is still needed because renewables are intermittent and need natural gas for backup. However, nuclear itself never matches power demand so it needs backupHowever, subsidizing such plants may increase carbon emissions and costs relative to replacing the plants with wind or solar as soon as possible. Thus, subsidizing nuclear would result in higher emissions and costs over the long term than replacing nuclear with renewables.
Gilis 17
The US is key in the fight against emissions; China and India are on track to meet emission reduction goals – Gilis 17
Gillis, J., and Popovich, N. (2017). “The U.S. Is the Biggest Carbon Polluter in History. It Just Walked Away From the Paris Climate Deal.” june 1, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/01/climate/us-biggest-carbon-polluter-in-history-will-it-walk-away-from-the-paris-climate-deal.html
The United States, with its love of big cars, big houses and blasting air-conditioners, has contributed more than any other country to the atmospheric carbon dioxide that is scorching the planet. “In cumulative terms, we certainly own this problem more than anybody else does,” said David G. Victor, a longtime scholar of climate politics at the University of California, San Diego. Many argue that this obligates the United States to take ambitious action to slow global warming. But on Thursday, President Trump announced the United Stateswithdrew from the Paris climate accords would withdraw from a 195-nation agreement on climate change reached in Paris in 2015. The decision to walk away from the accord is a momentous setback, in practical and political terms, for the effort to address climate change. An American exit could prompt other countries to withdraw from the pact or rethink their emissions pledges, making it much harder to achieve the agreement’s already difficult goal of limiting global warming to a manageable level. It means the United States — the country with the largest, most dynamic economy — is giving up a leadership role when it comes to finding solutions for climate change. “Nobody really wants barrels of oil or tons of coal,” said John D. Sterman, a professor of management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a founder of a think tank called Climate Interactive. “They need a warm, dry, safe place to live, and access to healthy food, and lighting when it’s dark.” If it turns out that those goods can really be provided with clean energy, that may be the economic opportunity of the 21st century — and increasingly, countries like China and India seem to see things that way. Recent analyses by Climate Action Tracker, an alliance of European think tanks, suggest that both countries are on track to beat the targets they set in the Paris agreement, even as the United States backs away. But the United States has been burning coal, oil and natural gas far longer, and today the US country, with just over 4 percent of the world’s population, is responsible for almost a third of the excess carbon dioxide that is heating the planet. China is responsible for less than a sixth. The 28 countries of the European Union, taken as a group, come in just behind the United States in historical emissions. China has four times as many people as the United States, so the Chinese still burn far less fossil fuel on average than Americans — less than half as much, in fact. The typical American also burns roughly twice as much as the average person in Europe or in Japan, and 10 times as much as the average person in India.
Hutner 19
Heidi Hutner and Erica Cirino, 5-28-2019, "Nuclear power is not the answer in a time of climate change – Heidi Hutner andamp; Erica Cirino," Aeon,?https://aeon.co/ideas/nuclear-power-is-not-the-answer-in-a-time-of-climate-change
Lassiter and several other energy experts advocate for the new, Generation IV nuclear power plants that are supposedly designed to deliver high levels of nuclear power at the lowest cost and with the lowest safety risks. But other experts say that the benefits even here remain unclear. The biggest critique of the Generation IV nuclear reactors is that they are in the design phase, and we don’t have time to wait for their implementation. Climate abatement action is needed immediately. ‘New nuclear power seemingly represents an opportunity for solving global warming, air pollution, and energy security,’ says Mark Jacobson, director of Stanford University’s Atmosphere and EnergyProgramme. But it makes no economic or energy sense. ‘Every dollar spent on nuclear results in one-fifth the energy one would gain with wind or solar at the same cost, and nuclear energy takes five to 17 years longer before it becomes available. As such, it is impossible for nuclear to help with climate goals of reducing 80 per cent of emissions by 2030. Also, while we’re waiting around for nuclear, coal, gas and oil are being burned and polluting the air. In addition, nuclear has energy security risks other technologies don’t have: weapons proliferation, meltdown, waste and uranium-worker lung-cancer risks.’ Around the world, 31 countries have nuclear power plants that are currently online, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency. By contrast, four countries have made moves to phase out nuclear power following the 2011 Fukushima disaster, and 15 countries have remained opposed and have no functional power plants.
Drew 18
Clean energy now is key – saves many and stimulates economic growth
Shindell, Drew, 9-21-2018, "Climate and health impacts of US emissions reductions consistent with 2 °C," No Publication, https://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspace/handle/10161/17535
Nationally, however, clean energy policies produce climate disbenefits including warmer summers (although these would be eliminated by the remote effects of similar policies if they were undertaken elsewhere). The policies also greatly reduce damaging ambient particulate matter and ozone. “By 2030, clean energy policies could prevent ?175,000 premature deaths, with ?22,000 (11,000–96,000; 95 confidence) fewer annually thereafter, whereas clean transportation could prevent ?120,000 premature deaths and ?14,000 (9,000–52,000) annually thereafter. Near-term national benefits are valued at ?US$250 billion (140 billion to 1,050 billion) per year, which is likely to exceed implementation costs. Including longer-term, worldwide climate impacts, benefits roughly quintuple, becoming ?5–10 times larger than estimated implementation costs. Including longer-term, worldwide climate impacts, benefits roughly quintuple, becoming ?5-10 times larger than estimated implementation costs. Achieving the benefits, however, would require both larger and broader emissions reductions than those in current legislation or regulations.
Misc
Nuclear is much worse than renewables–always prefer my evidence–independent, objective university and NGO studies that are peer-reviewed and NOT FUNDED BY NUCLEAR INDUSTRY conclude nuke power produces more emissions than renewables – Shrader 13
(Kristin, Spring 2013 , O'Neill Family Professor, Department of Biological Sciences and Department of Philosophy, at the University of Notre Dame. She has previously held senior professorships at the University of California and the University of Florida. Most of Shrader-Frechette's research work analyzes the ethical problems in risk assessment, public health, or environmental justice - especially those related to radiological, ecological, and energy-related risks.1 Shrader-Frechette has received the Global Citizenship Award, and the Catholic Digest named her one of 12 "Heroes for the US and the World", published more than 380 articles and 16 books/monographs, “Answering Scientific Attacks on Ethical Imperatives”, Ethics and the Environment, Volume 18, Number 1, Spring 2013, pg 1-17, Published by Indiana University Press, Project Muse?CCD
Why do many people mistakenly believe fission is a low-carbon technology? Of the twenty-nine major international nuclear-emissions assessments done since 2000—none of which were published in peer-re- viewed scientific journals—all eighteen performed/funded by the fission industry) trim data by “counting” carbon emissions from only one stage (reactor operation) of fourteen stages. University and non-governmental organization studies, not funded by the nuclear industry, however, did not trim these data (Shrader-Frechette 2011). The fourteen nuclear-fuel-cycle stages include (1) mining uranium ore—or using hundreds of metric tons of chemicals such as sulfuric acid, nitric acid, and ammonia to leach it; (2) milling ore to extract the roughly 0.2 percent uranium oxide (U3O8); (3) converting U3O8 to gaseous uranium hexafluoride (UF6) through fluorine; (4) enriching UF6 to 3.5 percent U-235, and removing waste, enrichment tails (85 percent of the UF6); (5) fabricating fuel into ceramic- pellet uranium dioxide (UO2), packing pellets into zirconium-alloy tubes, bundling tubes together to form fuel rods; (6) constructing the reactor, during an average twelve years; (7) operating the reactor; (8) reprocessing spent fuel; (9) conditioning spent fuel; (10) storing/cooling radioactive waste onsite; (11) transporting waste to a secure, permanent, storage fa- cility; (12) storing the waste permanently, given the long half-lives of the radionuclides; (13) decommissioning the reactor; and (14) reclaiming the uranium mines, milling facilities, enrichment facilities, and so on (Fleming 2007, 4–7). At all fuel-cycle stages, except (7), massive carbon releases occur. Yet the nuclear industry routinely calls fission an “emissions free” technology because the industry misleadingly trims greenhouse-emissions data from all but (7) of fourteen fuel-cycle stages (NEI 2007).¶ Stage-(2) milling, for instance, uses mainly fossil fuels and requires roughly 1,000 metric tons of uranium ore to produce one ton of U308, after grinding/leaching/processing (Argonne 2007, Diehl 2004). In stage (4) enrichment, to produce 124 tons of enriched UF6, one must proc- ess1000 metric tons UF6, create 876 tons of radioactive waste, and use 951,543 Mwh (Megawatt-hours) of electricity. At stage (4), 8 Mwh elec- tricity (most from fossil fuels) is needed to produce one kilogram of en- riched UF6 (WISE 2006).¶ Unsurprisingly, completely independent, peer-reviewed, university analyses in professional, scientific journals throughout the world—from Oxford (UK) to Heerlen (Netherlands) to Singapore, agree about per-kil- owatt-hour, carbon-equivalent, full-fuel-cycle emissions: Once full-fuel- cycle greenhouse emissions are counted, fission is five to forty times dirtier than wind, three to ten times dirtier than solar-PV), and roughly as dirty as natural gas (Van Leeuwen 2006; Barnaby and Kemp 2007, 7–14; Shrader- Frechette 2011, 35–68). Nuclear thus contributes both to climate change, and to the massive health toll of fossil fuels—including causing up to 40 percent of all cancers (Lashof et al. 1981, 3, 6; Shrader-Frechette, 2007, 3–38, 114–49). Although the Kyoto Protocol “counts” emissions only at the single point of electricity generation, once one includes full-fuel-cycle greenhouse emissions, university scientists agree that greenhouse-emis- sions ratios, among various energy technologies, are as follows: 112 coal : 49 natural gas : 49 nuclear : 4 solar : 1 wind (Sovacool 2008; Fthenakis and Kim 2007; Barnaby and Kemp 2007, 7–14; Shrader-Frechette 2011, 35–68. ; WWW, 35–68). But if so, there is no low-carbon argument to make in favor of atomic energy over renewables like wind and solar-PV.
“EXPERTS: NUCLEAR BAILOUT COULD COST UP TO $17 BILLION A YEAR AND “DESTROY” RENEWABLES INDUSTRY IN U.S. “· NIRS. (2018). https://www.nirs.org/press/experts-nuclear-bailout-could-cost-up-to-17-billion-a-year-and-destroy-renewables-industry-in-u-s/
Today, the Nuclear Information and Resource Service (NIRS) updated and expanded the nuclear bailout costs estimated in its November 2016 report that concluded that federal handouts for nuclear alone could add up to $280 billion to electricity bills by 2030. A bailout of coal-fired power plants would leave ratepayers and taxpayers holding the bag for even more. NIRS estimates that the current Trump bailout scheme could cost consumers $8-$17 billion for just the nuclear element and as much again for coal subsidies. Forcing the purchase of overpriced and non-competitive nuclear and coal power also would crowd out renewables, leaving the U.S. farther behind in wind, solar and energy storage technology development and use. Tim Judson, executive director, Nuclear Information and Resource Service (NIRS), said: “By pushing for a nationwide bailout for nuclear power and coal, the Trump administration is rushing headlong into an energy buzz saw, and they don’t even seem to know it. Subsidizing the nuclear industry alone is likely to cost American consumers $8 billion to $17 billion per year, and subsidies for coal could cost just as much. Betting on old, increasingly uneconomical nuclear and coal power plants as a national security strategy is like gold-plating a Studebaker and calling it a tank. And it could destroy the booming renewable energy industry, which is already employing more Americans than coal and nuclear combined.”
Hyder, Zeeshan. “Solar panel reliability: How reliable is solar power?”. Solar Reviews. (2020). https://www.solarreviews.com/blog/solar-panel-reliability-how-reliable-is-solar-power
The electricity then flows to a solar inverter where the DC electricity from the panels is converted into AC electricity that can be used in your home. The percentage of light converted into electricity is known as the efficieny of the panel, most solar panels have an efficiency of 15-18 . High efficiency panels use higher-quality photovoltaic cells and require less physical space to reach a desired power output. How reliable are solar panels? The reliability and lifespan of solar panels is excellent, according to a recent study by the Energy Department. The researchers looked at 54,500 panels in total (50,000 of which were in the US). They found that every year, only 5 out of 10,000 panels failed of those placed between 2000 and 2015 failed. That means that the more modern panels have a failure rate of only 0.05. When you consider it’s now 2020 and the manufacturing process is a lot more advanced, you can be confident that the current failure rate is even lower! Most reliable solar panel manufacturers offer a power output warranty of either 25 years or 30 years. The odds of your solar system ever experiencing failures is extremely unlikely; even if it does, you will be covered by the warranty and the panel will be replaced free of charge. | 904,680 |
365,554 | 379,587 | 0- Contact Information | Emails
Arunabh Sarkar
- [email protected]
Jaxson Nield
- [email protected] | 904,668 |
365,555 | 379,581 | Regional Coop AC | Military presence emboldens separatists and hinders regional cooperation
Danny Sjursen (Maj. Danny Sjursen is a retired U.S. Army officer and former history instructor at West Point), September 9 2019, Truthdig, “How the US Shattered the Middle East”, https://www.truthdig.com/articles/how-the-u-s-shattered-the-middle-east/
Let us take an … the idea all along.
Military presence aggresses Iran - causes constant threat of military confrontation
Jones 11 – (12/22, Toby, PhD in Middle Eastern History from Stanford University, assistant professor of history at Rutgers University, “Don't Stop at Iraq: Why the U.S. Should Withdraw From the Entire Persian Gulf,” http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/12/dont-stop-at-iraq-why-the-us-should-withdraw-from-the-entire-persian-gulf/250389/)
Led by Saudi Arabia, … home and abroad.
Best analysis of the internal dynamics of Iranian leadership supports our interpretation of Iran's behavior - they only escalate if the US is in the region
Rezaei 10/11 – (2015, Masoud, PhD in International Relations, Visiting Research Fellow at the the Center for Middle East Strategic Studies in Tehran, "Ayatollah Khamenei's Military and Strategic Thinking," http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/Ayatollah-Khamenei-s-Military-and-Strategic-Thinking.htm
Therefore, within the framework …way of thinking.
US military presence inflames and emboldens all regional allies in the Gulf.
Jones 11 – (12/22, Toby, PhD in Middle Eastern History from Stanford University, assistant professor of history at Rutgers University, “Don't Stop at Iraq: Why the U.S. Should Withdraw From the Entire Persian Gulf,” http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/12/dont-stop-at-iraq-why-the-us-should-withdraw-from-the-entire-persian-gulf/250389/)
The presence of the American … long-standing military entanglements.
US presence directly incentivizes Qatari misadventures ~-~-- our military protection allows them to continue destabilizing regional conflicts
Glaser, 14
(12/28, Columnist-The National Interest, America’s Toxic Middle East Allies, http://nationalinterest.org/print/feature/americaE28099s-toxic-middle-east-allies-11929?page=show)
Qatar is another … costs associated with them.
Alliances increase the risk of conflict 249 percent
Unpacking Alliances: Deterrent and Compellent Alliances and Their Relationship with Conflict, 1816–2000 Brett V. Benson The Journal of Politics 2011 73:4, 1111-1127 journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1017/S0022381611000867?mobileUi=0and
Do alliances deter … violent conflict.
Removing presence is key – the US attempt to play a balancing role in the region causes conflict
Oktav 11 – (Summer 2011, Özden Zeynep, PhD, Professor of Political Science and International Relations, Yildiz Technical University, Turkey, "The Gulf States and Iran: A Turkish Perspective," Middle East Policy Council, Volume XVIII, Number 2 https://mepc.org/gulf-states-and-iran-turkish-perspective
From Tehran’s perspective, … of territorial disintegration.
Regional actors are 3.5 times more likely to craft agreements that cease hostilities for 5 years - the THICCest meta analysis of the century
Juliana Velasco, 2013, "Regional Organizations And The Durability Of Peace" University of Central Florida, https://stars.library.ucf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3701andcontext=etd
There are also … of regional organizations.
The conflict in Yemen is a genocide, 22 million people are in need of aid
Jeff Bachman, 11-26-2018, "US complicity in the Saudi-led genocide in Yemen spans Obama, Trump administrations," Conversation, https://theconversation.com/us-complicity-in-the-saudi-led-genocide-in-yemen-spans-obama-trump-administrations-106896
A Saudi-led coalition … and Trump administrations.
Affirming triggers cooperation between the Saudis and Iran, an empirical analysis of Saudi-Iranian cooperation during the 1990s supports our argument.
Hamidaddin 13 – (9/20, Abdullah, PhD candidate in King's College London, writer and commentator on religion, Middle Eastern societies and politics with a focus on Saudi Arabia and Yemen, "A window for Iranian-Gulf relations?" http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2013/09/20/A-window-for-Iranian-Gulf-relations-.html)
When I look …, creating a vicious circle.
When Saudi realized the US military was not at their disposal, airstrikes went down 80 percent.
Parsi ’20 Trita Parsi (co-founder and Executive Vice president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. He is also the founder and former president of the National Iranian American Council). "The Middle East Is More Stable When the United States Stays Away." Foreign Policy, 6 January 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/06/the-middle-east-is-more-stable-when-the-united-states-stays-away/.
Further, the region … the previous two weeks.
Genocide bad, hospitals, schools, and everything is destroyed.
Kenneth Roth, 8-12-2018, "World Report 2019: Rights Trends in Yemen," Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/yemen
Yemen is facing … end the violence
Military presence creates an escalating spiral of aggression that threatens miscalculation and war with Iran.
Maleki and Reardon 14 – (10/4, Abbas, PhD in Strategic Management, assistant professor of political science at Sharif University of Technology in Tehran, director of the International Institute for Caspian Studies, senior associate of the Belfer Center's International Security Program, former Wilhelm Fellow in International Studies at MIT and deputy foreign minister of Iran from 1988-1997, and Robert, PhD in Political Science from MIT, Research Fellow with the International Security Program and the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard's Belfer Center, "Improving U.S.-Iranian Relations and Overcoming Perceptual Biases," in U.S.-Iran Misperceptions: A Dialogue, pp. 158-161) https://books.google.com/books?id=7uWnAgAAQBAJandpg=PA158andlpg=PA158anddq=The+views+Americans+and+Iranians+have+of+each+other+as+innately+and+implacably+hostile+revisionistandsource=blandots=236vs6K0oeandsig=ACfU3U0nIepVpALnN2LDSgwFImI1IJQxwAandhl=enandsa=Xandved=2ahUKEwjLkPfuseToAhUM7J4KHS1gCi0Q6AEwAHoECAsQKQ#v=onepageandqandf=false
The views Americans …its aggressive behavior.
Empirics prove the conflict is ripe and risk of miscalc is high – early this year Iran shot down a Ukrainian plane thinking it was the US
Al Jazeera, 1-12-2020, "Anger after Iran admits downing plane: All the latest updates," No Publication, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/01/protests-iran-admits-downing-plane-latest-updates-200112055030204.html
Here are … preserving the JCPOA
Iran war escalates – causes extinction
Avery 13 (John, Associate Professor @ University of Copenhagen, 11-6-2013, “An Attack On Iran Could Escalate Into Global Nuclear War,” http://www.countercurrents.org/avery061113.htm)
Despite the willingness … US citizens included. | 904,662 |
365,556 | 379,634 | Disclosure interp | Debaters must disclose all broken positions on the NDCA 2019-2020 PF wiki under their own school, name and correct side with cites, tags, and text of all cards read at least 30 minutes before the round or once pairings come out. | 904,713 |
365,557 | 379,643 | TOC Aff 5 v4 | Trump and Democrats both want to end all Middle East presence, withdrawal inevitable
Cropsey 19~-~-SETH CROPSEY, GARY ROUGHEAD, A U.S. Withdrawal Will Cause a Power Struggle in the Middle East, Foreign Policy, 12/17/19, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/17/us-withdrawal-power-struggle-middle-east-china-russia-iran/
Members of the restraint camp in U.S. foreign policy decry what they see as an ongoing waste of resources on overseas commitments. Notwithstanding differences over withdrawing U.S. military assistance to the Kurds in northern Syria, both the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump and the front-runners for the Democratic presidential candidates nomination agree on ending “endless wars”—which is code for narrowing the scope of all U.S. engagement abroad, particularly in the Middle East. With the Islamic State mostly defeated and the threat of terrorism on the decline, the thinking goes, the United States no longer needs an active presence in the region.
Trump policy in Middle East incoherent
Cropsey 19~-~-SETH CROPSEY, GARY ROUGHEAD, A U.S. Withdrawal Will Cause a Power Struggle in the Middle East, Foreign Policy, 12/17/19, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/17/us-withdrawal-power-struggle-middle-east-china-russia-iran/
The United States should reexamine its global commitments, especially those in the eastern Mediterranean, with a view to Russia’s expanding power. The Trump administration’s foreign and security policies in the region have included several bright spots: the strengthening of U.S.-Israel relations, an aggressive military campaign against the Islamic State, economic sanctions against Iran, and denial of F-35 fighter jet sales to Turkey following its purchase of Russian S-400 surface-to-air missiles. But these have yet to be linked in a coherent strategic policy. Questions that need answers include: What is America’s goal in the region? Is growing Russian military and diplomatic presence consistent with U.S. regional goals? Should Washington leave the blossoming relations between Moscow and Ankara to run their course, and what is to be done if a true alliance between Russia and Turkey emerges? If regime change in Iran is not an option for U.S. policy, what should the goal be? Is it sufficient to assist Israel and Saudi Arabia and hope that they will manage regional tensions that could lead to war with Iran? An examination of the global commitments recommended here should include the possibility of a comprehensive U.S.-Israel treaty that would gather together all the existing nontreaty agreements between the two nations on such matters as military aid, intelligence sharing, defense industrial cooperation, and free trade—to name a few. The United States still retains strong interests in the Middle East. These include the untrammeled flow of oil to allies in Europe and Asia, the defense of democratic Israel, the security of NATO allies bordering the Mediterranean, and preventing conflict between regional powers.
US already began withdrawing troops due to coronavirus (but still only 3k, higher than pre-Suleimani numbers)
Evans 20~-~-Zachary Evans, U.S. Begins Limited Troop Withdrawals from Middle East after Iran Hit Hard by Coronavirus, National Review, 3/10/20, https://www.nationalreview.com/news/u-s-begins-limited-troop-withdrawals-from-middle-east-after-iran-hit-hard-by-coronavirus/
The U.S. has begun withdrawing troops originally sent to the Middle East in the wake of the killing of top Iranian commander Qasem Soleimani, as Iran sees the worst outbreak of Wuhan coronavirus in the region. Around 1,000 troops have returned from Kuwait over the past two weeks, while an additional 2,000 are expected to return in the near future, the Wall Street Journal reported. After President Trump ordered the drone strike on Soleimani, the Pentagon deployed additional troops to bases in the region to counter a possible Iranian reprisal against American or allied targets. While Iran did attack American positions in Iraq, leaving dozens of troops with concussions and traumatic brain injuries with ballistic missile strikes, there has been no other major retaliation.
Trump wants pullout
Tisdall 20~-~-Simon Tisdall, Why instinct and ideology tell Trump to get out of the Middle East, The Guardian, 1/11/20, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jan/11/why-instinct-and-ideology-tell-trump-to-get-out-of-the-middle-east-suleimani-iran
The crisis triggered by Donald Trump’s assassination of General Qassem Suleimani has crystallised Iran’s official thinking around a single, overriding demand: that American military forces should pack up their weapons, close their bases, and leave the Middle East for ever. The odd thing is, Trump seems to agrees. Referring to last week’s retaliatory strikes on US targets, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s leader, declared: “Military action like this is not sufficient. What is important is ending the corrupting presence of America.” Hassan Rouhani, the country’s president, said the only answer was to “kick all US forces out of the region”. This long-held Iranian position does not differ greatly from Trump’s views, at least in theory. The US president has repeatedly argued in favour of reducing the American troop presence around the Middle East. In northern Syria last autumn, he got his way – with chaotic results that dismayed allies and delighted Turkey, Russia and the Syrian regime. Trump has never proposed an across-the-board retreat. In Israel’s case, he has sought closer political and security ties. He has cosied up to the wealthy Saudi royals. Yet, judging by his speeches and tweets, Trump is unconvinced by traditional arguments that stress the region’s vital strategic importance to the US. His attitude is part ideological, part gut. When Trump vowed in 2016 to end America’s “forever wars” in his presidential campaign, he was specifically referring to the Bush-Obama legacy in Iraq and Afghanistan. Trump has dismissed both occupations as misconceived, and a waste of lives and tax dollars. For him, liberal, Tony Blair-type ideas about the international community as a collective, the imperative of “humanitarian intervention”, and nation-building are an anathema. Trump is interested in markets, not morality. He holds no vision of the greater good, has no sense of a US global mission, other than putting America first. Speaking last week about a hypothetical rapprochement with Iran, his businessman’s focus was on its untapped economic potential and natural resources. There are other reasons, on the American side, for asking how long the US will continue to maintain a military presence that includes extensive bases and facilities in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, Oman and Afghanistan. One reason, mentioned by Trump last week, is that the present-day US is much less reliant on imported oil.
Carter doctrine declared Persian Gulf US protectorate
Tisdall 20~-~-Simon Tisdall, Why instinct and ideology tell Trump to get out of the Middle East, The Guardian, 1/11/20, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jan/11/why-instinct-and-ideology-tell-trump-to-get-out-of-the-middle-east-suleimani-iran
The so-called Carter doctrine, announced by president Jimmy Carter after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, declared the region (and its oil) to be a de facto US protectorate. “An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the US ... and will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force,” Carter declared. In effect, Carter was completing America’s post-1945, post-Suez takeover from Britain as the Middle East’s leading external power – and as time passed, its footprint grew. But now times are changing again. Thanks to the shale oil boom, the US has become the world’s leading producer of crude oil. Middle East supply-lines no longer matter so much.
Navy pullout of Gulf inevitable
Samet 20~-~-Daniel J. Samet, To deter Iran, the Gulf states need stronger navies, Atlantic Council, 2/20/20, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/to-deter-iran-the-gulf-states-need-stronger-navies/
The Trump administration’s hands-off approach toward Iranian aggression in the Gulf should serve as a wake-up call for Arab countries. Although Washington has assumed the burden of defending Gulf waterways for decades, obituaries for the Carter Doctrine suggest that the Trump administration is not inclined to commit US ships in the Gulf in perpetuity. This comes at a time when the US Navy has cut its shipbuilding budget even as it inches toward its goal of 355 vessels. What is more, the Indo-Pacific has become the most important theater for the US military—and particularly the navy—in response to China. The military brass will not be enthusiastic about devoting resources to purportedly peripheral US interests when many see the fleet as overextended. The writing is on the wall.
Add this to dwindling dependence on Middle Eastern oil at home and you have a recipe for US retrenchment in the Gulf. Those who say otherwise may point to the international coalition to protect commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz that Washington has cobbled together, which includes the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain. Yet it’s unclear how far-reaching this commitment will be. Separately, the United Kingdom and Japan have dispatched warships to the region, but solely for their own merchant vessels. If the Gulf states expect other countries to provide all the naval support in their neighborhood, they would do well to reconsider that assumption.
Many different alt causes to perception that US is leaving the region. A) pivot to Asia + exclusion from US-Iran nuclear deal negotiations, led to Yemen war B) Trump actions on Qatar blockade C) Abandonment of the Kurds + withdrawal from Syria D) Inaction after Iran attacks on Saudi…the result is more negotiation
Ulrichsen 20~-~-Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, REBALANCING REGIONAL SECURITY IN THE PERSIAN GULF, Baker Institute, 2/20, https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/de9f09e6/cme-pub-persiangulf-022420.pdf
Perceptions matter in shaping and influencing policymakers’ views of the world around
them and the options they feel are open to them at any given time. During the Obama years, a sense of “abandonment” by the U.S. arose in certain Gulf capitals as ruling figures expressed concern over the U.S. decision to accept the fall of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and subsequent election victories for the Muslim Brotherhood.24 Officials in GCC states expressed further frustration at being cut out of the negotiations between the U.S. and Iran and later between the P5+1 and Iran that culminated in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in July 2015. Tensions were palpable at a U.S.-GCC summit held at Camp David in May 2015 when the emirs of Kuwait and Qatar were the only GCC heads of state to attend, as King Salman of Saudi Arabia pointedly chose to stay away.25 For many observers in GCC capitals, their sense of incomprehension at U.S. policy during the Obama administration was encapsulated in the phrase “pivot to Asia,” even though this always was more rhetoric than reality, and never implied that it was the Persian Gulf that was being pivoted “away” from.26 One Gulf leader went so far as to ask a visiting American dignitary “where’s the coach?”, “I don’t know where the coach is” in an apparent reference to the lack of visible U.S. leadership or regional policy.27 Regional figures reacted strongly to a March 2016 interview Obama gave to The Atlantic during which the president had said “free riders aggravate me,” despite there being no explicit reference to any of the Gulf states in his comment, which appeared in context to have been directed against the U.K. 28 A former Saudi ambassador to the U.S., Prince Turki al-Faisal Al Saud, responded furiously in an op-ed in Arab News that began “No, Mr. Obama. We are not ‘free riders’.”29 In a sign that feelings of ill-will were mutual, Ben Rhodes, deputy national security adviser throughout Obama’s two terms in office, told The New Yorker that the Saudis and Emiratis were “more responsible for the image of Obama as being soft in the Middle East than anyone else. They trashed us all around town.”30 The breakdown in trust and confidence was a factor in the Saudi and Emirati decision to launch “Operation Decisive Storm” in Yemen on March 26, 2015, the same day the P5+1 and Iran began an intense week of negotiations in Lausanne that produced a framework agreement on the nuclear deal on April 2. Angered at being cut out of the P5+1 process, the military intervention in Yemen signaled to the White House and the international community that the Saudis and Emiratis rejected the idea that it was possible to focus solely on one issue (Iran’s nuclear ambition) at the expense of the broader picture of what they saw as regionally destabilizing Iranian behavior.31 Officials in GCC states, especially in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, largely welcomed the Trump administration and made strenuous efforts to reach out to key figures in the new White House as they settled into office in 2017.32 While the Trump White House has provided political support to its GCC partners engaged in the Yemen war by blocking congressional pressure to end the conflict, and resisted calls to hold the Saudi leadership to account for the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, the volatility and unpredictability of Trump’s unconventional approach to regional policymaking has, gradually, sapped regional confidence in a second consecutive U.S. presidency. Further doubts were generated by Trump’s initial and subsequent responses to the blockade of Qatar launched by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt in June 2017. Trump’s initial support for the move and his castigation of Qatar as a sponsor of terror at the highest level, caused shockwaves in Doha and called into question the entire basis of Qatar’s defense and security planning, while his later reversal in favor of a mediated solution was greeted with dismay by Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, which had courted White House support for the move.33 For the first time in the post-1990 era, it had not been the U.S. that was seen to have come to the defense of one of their number when faced with external threat. This realization caused concern in Kuwait City and Muscat, to say nothing of the consternation in Doha, as it called into question, as never before, the role of the U.S. as the security guarantor of last (or, indeed, first) resort.34 For the Saudis and the Emiratis, that moment of reflection came two years later, in 2019, when the lack of a U.S. response to the attacks on maritime shipping and energy infrastructure prompted a reassessment of the very basis of deterrence.35 The newfound sense in GCC capitals that they were more on their own than they may ever have thought possible is likely what prompted the sudden flurry of outreach to Iran, directly or via intermediaries, that began after the Abqaiq and Khurais attacks and intensified after the killing of Soleimani and the Iranian response. A White House in disarray produced “policy without process,” as a very senior former official who retired in 2019 put it.36 This breakdown in the traditional structure and discipline of decision-making was manifest in sudden breaks with settled policy (and subsequent reversals or pullbacks), such as Trump’s December 2018 declaration (on Twitter) that the Islamic State had been defeated in Syria and that U.S. forces would withdraw; or the White House announcement in October 2019 of a pullout of troops from northeast Syria, a decision widely perceived as abandoning Syria’s Kurds, hitherto a partner of U.S. forces in the battles against the Islamic State; to a Turkish military incursion that started days later. 37 The fallout from the December 2018 announcement led Secretary of Defense James Mattis and the special presidential envoy for the global coalition to counter ISIL, Brett McGurk, to resign in protest, while the October 2019 announcement came after a telephone call with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and against the advice of U.S. military leaders.38 The cavalier and peremptory manner by which Trump seemingly dismissed the longstanding American partnership with the Kurds, and the way he was perceived to have gone against political and military views in doing so, made an impression on policymakers in GCC capitals.39 If Trump could abruptly abandon the Kurdish-led forces in Syria that had fought alongside U.S. counterparts in the battles against Islamic State, might he do the same, on a larger scale, to the Gulf states, as he had appeared momentarily to do to Qatar in 2017? The doubts over the reliability of the U.S. as a partner that had first appeared in regional capitals in and after 2011 widened during Trump’s second and third years in office.40 In 2019, the pattern of attacks on maritime and energy targets in and around the Persian Gulf in 2019—widely linked with but not formally attributed to Iran or its regional proxies—brought to a head the growing concerns in GCC capitals about the reliability of a partnership that once seemed sacrosanct.41 Tensions in the Persian Gulf escalated almost immediately after the Trump administration launched its “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran in April and May 2019 with the introduction of new sanctions on Iranian officials, further restrictions on exports of Iranian oil, and the designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including the Quds Force commanded by Qassim Soleimani, as a foreign terrorist organization.42 A series of “incidents” of varying severity began within weeks to target the maritime and energy sectors linked to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the two U.S. partners that had been the most hawkish toward Iran as well as the most closely associated with the Trump administration’s regional policy agenda. These included attacks on four commercial ships off the coast of the Emirati port of Fujairah on May 12, a drone attack against a Saudi oil pipeline on May 13, further attacks on two oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman on June 13, and the shooting down of a U.S. drone on June 20 that reportedly violated Iranian airspace after having taken off from a U.S. airbase in Abu Dhabi.43 Most spectacular of all—and the most cathartic for U.S. partners in the Persian Gulf—was the drone and missile strike on Saudi oil infrastructure on September 14 that targeted Aramco’s giant oil-processing facility at Abqaiq as well as the Khurais oilfield. The swarm of drones and cruise missiles fired from an (as-yet) unknown location evaded Saudi missile defense systems and knocked out, albeit only temporarily, 5.7 million barrels of Saudi Arabia’s total of 9.8 million barrels of oil produced per day.44 The scale and the success of the attacks underscored the vulnerability of the expensively procured defensive systems in Saudi Arabia and other GCC states to guard against asymmetric rather than conventional threats.45 A “Saudi security analyst,” speaking to Reuters on condition of anonymity, captured the sense of shock in the kingdom when s/he stated that “The attack is like September 11th for Saudi Arabia, it is a game changer (…) Where are the air defense systems and the U.S. weaponry for which we spent billions of dollars to protect the kingdom and its oil facilities? If they did this with such precision, they can also hit the desalination plants and more targets.”46 Just as shocking to leaders in Saudi Arabia and the UAE as the need to urgently reassess threat perceptions and defense capabilities was the Trump administration’s reactions to the pattern of attacks between May and September 2019. The lack of a visible U.S. response to the attacks on shipping or to the assault on the nerve center of the Saudi economy made the Saudis and other American partners in GCC states reassess the nature of the U.S. security guarantee they had until then (largely) taken for granted.47 Trump denied he had offered the Saudis any pledge of protection after the Aramco attacks and added pointedly that “That was an attack on Saudi Arabia, and that wasn’t an attack on us.”48 The inaction was all the more pronounced when compared with Trump’s response to the downing of the U.S. drone in June 2019, when the U.S. launched a cyber attack against Iran’s electronic warfare capabilities, 49 or after the killing of an American contractor and the storming of the U.S. embassy compound in Iraq in December, when Trump ordered the drone attack that killed Qassim Soleimani on January 3, 2020. 50 Statements by officials and prominent commentators in late 2019 and early 2020 illustrated the concerns many in GCC states felt at U.S. decision-making and prompted policymakers in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to re-examine their own hitherto assertive approaches to regional affairs. A delegation from the UAE traveled to Iran in late July 2019 to discuss coast guard and related maritime security issues, shortly after the UAE had announced a troop redeployment and drawdown in Yemen as well.51 In the weeks after the Saudi attacks in September, the Saudi leadership made discreet approaches to their counterparts in Pakistan and Iraq in a bid to open back-channels of dialogue with Iran to de-escalate tension. Iraq’s prime minister, Adel Abdul Mahdi, stated in late September that “There is a big response from Saudi Arabia and from Iran and even from Yemen, and I think these endeavors will have a good effect.”52 Ali Larijani, the speaker of the Iranian parliament, appeared to endorse such sentiment, telling Al Jazeera that “Iran is open to starting a dialogue with Saudi Arabia and other countries in the region.”53 Pronouncements in GCC states increasingly began to diverge from the U.S. approach in the final months of 2019 and later evolved into different reactions to the sharp escalation in U.S.-Iran tension that accompanied the killing of Soleimani and the Iranian retaliation against U.S. military targets in Iraq. Abulkhaleq Abdulla, a retired Emirati academic often described as an advisor to Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, blasted Trump after the Saudi attacks, stating that “in his response to Iran, he is even worse than Obama (…) Now an Arab Gulf strategic partner has been massively attacked by Iran—which was provoked by Trump, not by us—and we hear Americans saying to us, ‘you need to defend yourselves’!”54 After the U.S. decision to kill Soleimani in January 2020, attitudes hardened, with a “Gulf diplomatic source” voicing (anonymously) a concern felt across the GCC that “Our most important ally, a world power who is here on the pretense of stabilizing the region, is destabilizing the region and taking all of us with them without a second thought.”55
Middle East no longer as important a) interstate conflicts replaced by intrastate violence, b) Asia more impt, c) oil less impt ? US exists in “purgatory,” has no political capital to make investments that actually change the region; only difference is emboldening allies to act aggressively
Karlin 19—Mara Karlin, America’s Middle East Purgatory, Foreign Affairs, Jan-Feb 2019, https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/Enduring20American20Presence20in20the20Middle20East.pdf
In that regard, Trump is strikingly like his predecessor. Trump may talk about the Middle East differently than Obama did. But the two seem to share the view that the United States is too involved in the region and should devote fewer resources and less time to it. And there is every reason to believe that the next president will agree. The reduced appetite for U.S. engagement in the region reflects not an ideological predilection or an idiosyncrasy of these two presidents but a deeper change in both regional dynamics and broader U.S. interests. Although the Middle East still matters to the United States, it matters markedly less than it used to. U.S. strategy toward the Middle East, however, has yet to catch up with these changes. The United States thus exists in a kind of Middle Eastern purgatory—too distracted by regional crises to pivot to other global priorities but not invested enough to move the region in a better direction. This worst-ofboth-worlds approach exacts a heavy price. It sows uncertainty among Washington’s Middle Eastern partners, which encourages them to act in risky and aggressive ways. (Just look at Saudi Arabia’s brazen assassination of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi or its bloody campaign in Yemen.) It deepens the American public’s frustration with the region’s endless turmoil, as well as with U.S. efforts to address it. It diverts resources that could otherwise be devoted to confronting a rising China and a revanchist Russia. And all the while, by remaining unclear about the limits of its commitments, the United States risks getting dragged into yet another Middle Eastern conflict. 25 To say that the Middle East matters less to the United States does not mean that decreased U.S. involvement will necessarily be good for the region. The Middle East is in the midst of its greatest upheaval in half a century, generating an all-out battle for power among its major players. The region’s governments, worried about what Washington’s growing disregard for the Middle East means for their own stability, are working hard to draw the hegemon back in. But it is time for Washington to put an end to wishful thinking about its ability to establish order on its own terms or to transform selfinterested and shortsighted regional partners into reliable allies—at least without incurring enormous costs and longterm commitments. That means making some ugly choices to craft a strategy that will protect the most important U.S. interests in the region, without sending the United States back into purgatory. A LESS RELEVANT REGION In response to the Iraq war, the United States has aimed to reduce its role in the Middle East. Three factors have made that course both more alluring and more possible. First, interstate conflicts that directly threatened U.S. interests in the past have largely been replaced by substate security threats. Second, other rising regions, especially Asia, have taken on more importance to U.S. global strategy. And third, the diversification of global energy markets has weakened oil as a driver of U.S. policy. During the Cold War, traditional state-based threats pushed the United States to play a major role in the Middle East. That role involved not only ensuring the stable supply of energy to Western markets but also working to prevent the spread of communist influence and tamping down the Arab-Israeli 26 conflict so as to help stabilize friendly states. These efforts were largely successful. Beginning in the 1970s, the United States nudged Egypt out of the pro-Soviet camp, oversaw the first Arab-Israeli peace treaty, and solidified its hegemony in the region. Despite challenges from Iran after its 1979 revolution and from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq throughout the 1990s, U.S. dominance was never seriously in question. The United States contained the Arab-Israeli conflict, countered Saddam’s bid to gain territory through force in the 1990–91 Gulf War, and built a seemingly permanent military presence in the Gulf that deterred Iran and muffled disputes among the Gulf Arab states. Thanks to all these efforts, the chances of deliberate interstate war in the Middle East are perhaps lower now than at any time in the past 50 years. But today, the chief threat in the Middle East is not a state-onstate conflict but the growing substate violence spilling across borders—a challenge that is harder to solve from the outside. The terrorism and civil war plaguing the Middle East have spread easily in a permissive environment of state weakness. This environment was fostered by the U.S. invasion of Iraq and then, more generally, by the dysfunctional governance that led to the Arab uprisings of 2010–12 and the subsequent repressive responses. The region’s most violent hot spots are those where dictators met demands from their citizens with force and drove them to take up arms. The United States cannot fundamentally alter this permissive environment for terrorism and chaos without investing in state building at a level far beyond what either the American public or broader foreign policy considerations would allow. And so it simply cannot hope to do much to counter the Middle East’s violence or instability. 27 Some of the chaos directly threatens U.S. partners. Jordan’s vulnerability skyrocketed in 2014 as hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees fled there (which is the reason the United States ramped up its aid to the country). Saudi Arabia’s critical infrastructure has proved dangerously exposed (which is why the United States deepened its support there, as well). But today, the primary threats to these partners are internal. In Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere, dysfunctional stateled economic systems and unaccountable governments are failing to meet the needs or aspirations of a large, young, reasonably healthy, and globally connected generation. Change will have to come from the Arab states themselves, and although the United States can support reformers within Arab societies, it cannot drive this kind of transformation from the outside. Some argue that these problems still matter a lot to the United States and that there is still much it could do to solve them if it were willing to go all in. Proponents of this maximalist approach believe that with sufficient resources, the United States could decisively defeat ISIS and other extremists, stabilize and reconstruct liberated communities, and lay the foundations for a lasting peace by pushing states to overhaul the social contract between rulers and ruled. This outcome is not impossible to imagine. But the experience of the United States in Iraq, Libya, and Syria suggests that this path would be rockier than it might first appear and that it would be extremely challenging to sustain domestic political support for the large, long-term investments that these goals would require. Even as the Middle East’s problems have become less susceptible to constructive outside influence, the United States’ global interests have also changed—most of all when it 28 comes to Asia. For decades, U.S. policymakers debated whether China could rise peacefully, but the country’s destabilizing behavior, especially its insistence that its neighbors accept its territorial claims in the South China Sea and over Taiwan, have led many to worry that it will not. Both Obama and Trump recognized that Asia has become more important to U.S. grand strategy. As the former put it when announcing what became known as the “rebalance” to Asia, “After a decade in which we fought two wars that cost us dearly, in blood and treasure, the United States is turning our attention to the vast potential of the Asia-Pacific region.” Russia, meanwhile, has generated growing concern ever since its invasion of Crimea in 2014, and fears about European security and stability have pushed the Middle East even further down the list of U.S. priorities. Then there is oil—the fuel that first drew the United States into the Middle East after World War II. Middle Eastern oil remains an important commodity in the global economy, but it is weakening as a driver of U.S. policy. One reason is the more abundant global supply, including new domestic sources aided by technologies such as fracking. Another is a widely anticipated stall in global demand, as technological advances and concerns about greenhouse gas emissions cause countries to shift away from fossil fuels. The result is a Middle East that is less central to global energy markets and less able to control pricing—and a United States that can afford to worry less about protecting the flow of oil from the region. Many of the things that mattered to the United States when it first became involved in the Middle East still matter today. The United States should still care about protecting freedom of navigation in the region’s major maritime passages, preventing oil producers or troublemakers from suddenly 29 turning off the flow, and containing would-be regional hegemons and other actors hostile to Washington. The question is how crucial these priorities are relative to other ones, and how much the United States should invest in them. The answer is that the United States should probably be less involved in shaping the trajectory of the region than it is. LOST ILLUSIONS For a long time, policymakers have been tempted by the notion that there is some kind of golden mean for U.S. engagement in the Middle East. Somehow, the argument runs, the United States can develop a strategy that keeps it involved in the most critical issues but avoids allowing it to be drawn into the region’s more internecine battles. In this scenario, the United States could reduce its military presence while retaining a “surge” capacity, relying more on local partners to deter threats and using aid and trade incentives to build coalitions among local actors to advance stabilizing policies, such as conflict resolution. But this Goldilocks approach rests on the false assumption that there is such a thing as a purely operational U.S. military presence in the Middle East. In reality, U.S. military bases across the Gulf countries have strategic implications because they create a moral hazard: they encourage the region’s leaders to act in ways they otherwise might not, safe in the knowledge that the United States is invested in the stability of their regimes. In 2011, for example, the Bahrainis and the Saudis clearly understood the message of support sent by the U.S. naval base in Bahrain when they ignored Obama’s disapproval and crushed Shiite protests there. In Yemen, U.S. support for the Emirati and Saudi military campaign shows how offering help can put the United States in profound dilemmas: the United States is implicated in air strikes that kill civilians, but any proposal to halt its supplies of its precision-guided missiles is met with the charge that denying Saudi Arabia smarter munitions might only increase collateral civilian casualties. U.S. efforts to train, equip, and advise the Syrian Democratic Forces in the fight against ISIS are yet another reminder that none of Washington’s partnerships has purely operational consequences: U.S. support of the SDF, seen by Ankara as a sister to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, has made the United States’ relationship with Turkey knottier than ever. Supporters of the Goldilocks approach also suggest that the United States can substitute military engagement with vigorous diplomacy. But U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s experience with the negotiations over the Syrian civil war, where his efforts were undercut by Obama’s reluctance to involve the United States, demonstrated that diplomacy without teeth doesn’t get you very far. Goldilocks proponents imagine that the United States can somehow escape the pushpull dynamic of Middle Eastern involvement, but all this approach ends up accomplishing is prolonging the time in purgatory. Yet it is not enough to simply propose that the United States do less in the region without explaining what that would look like in practice. It is clear that Washington should reduce its role in the Middle East; how it scales back and to what end are the critical questions. A new approach to the region should begin with accepting a painful tradeoff: that what is good for the United States may not be good for the Middle East. U.S. policymakers and the public already seem surprisingly comfortable watching repressive Arab rulers consolidate power in some countries, while brutal insurgents displace civilians and destroy cities in 31 others. But a superpower must make tough choices, prioritizing the conflicts and issues that matter most for its global strategy. During the Cold War, for example, the United States took a relatively hands-off approach to most of Africa, backing anticommunist strongmen and proxies in a few places even at the cost of long-term stability. This had terrible consequences for the people of, say, Angola or what was then Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo), but it was a tolerable decision for U.S. interests. The same is likely to be true in the Middle East today. It is not enough to just set limits on its commitments; the United States must also clearly communicate those limits to other countries. At a summit at Camp David in 2015, Obama alarmed Gulf partners when he told them that the United States would protect them from external threats but pointedly declined to mention internecine ones. Obama was right to put the onus on Gulf states to address their own internal challenges and to make clear that the United States had no dog in most of their regional fights. Today, likewise, the United States should put its regional partners on notice that it will not back some of their pet political projects, such as the United Arab Emirates’ attempt to resuscitate the Palestinian politician Mohammad Dahlan in the Gaza Strip or its effort, along with Egypt, to back the military commander Khalifa Haftar in Libya. Washington must also set clear guidelines about when it will and won’t use force. It should clarify, for example, that it will target terrorists who threaten the United States or its partners but will not intervene militarily in civil wars except to contain them (as opposed to resolving them through force). Since a less engaged United States will have to leave more of the business of Middle Eastern security to partners in the 32 region, it must rethink how it works with them. For example, the U.S. military is fond of talking about a “by, with, and through” approach to working with local partners—meaning military “operations are led by our partners, state or nonstate, with enabling support from the United States or U.S.-led coalitions, and through U.S. authorities and partner agreements,” as General Joseph Votel, commander of U.S. Central Command, explained in an article in Joint Force Quarterly in 2018. But that model works only if the partners on the ground share Washington’s priorities. Consider the Defense Department’s doomed program to train and equip rebels in Syria. Rightly mistrustful of those partners, fearing they might drag the United States into a war with Bashar alAssad, Washington was unwilling to provide sophisticated support. And although the fighters were instructed to prioritize attacking ISIS over regime forces that were shelling their hometowns, they changed course when Turkey invaded Afrin and began fighting the Turks instead, stalling the campaign against ISIS elsewhere. The United States has worked well with Kurdish militias in the fight against ISIS in northeastern Syria—but as soon as Trump expressed his desire to pull U.S. forces out, the rebels began to explore cutting a deal with Damascus. It is also crucial that the United States accept the limitations of its partners and see them for what they truly are, warts and all. Sometimes, these partners won’t be able to confront security challenges without direct help from the United States. In these cases, U.S. policy-makers will have to accept that if the effort is imperative for U.S. national security interests, Washington will have to do the work itself. For example, the United States has spent decades trying to build a security alliance among Gulf states. Even before the current Gulf rift 33 began, this effort had started going off the rails, with many countries allowing mutual hatreds to get in the way of a cooperative effort against Iran. Now that Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates are blockading Qatar, this alliance is looking even more like a pipe dream.
After withdrawal, counterterror + sustaining freedom of navigation still protected b/c pertain directly to US interests
Karlin 19—Mara Karlin, America’s Middle East Purgatory, Foreign Affairs, Jan-Feb 2019, https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/Enduring20American20Presence20in20the20Middle20East.pdf
WHAT STILL MATTERS 34 These recommendations all removing US presence involves accepting what doesn’t matter to U.S. interests. But there are issues in the Middle East that still greatly concern the United States. Those who prefer that Washington withdraw from the region entirely underestimate how dangerous the resulting power vacuum could be. The United States does have important interests in the region to protect. One of them is sustaining freedom of navigation for the U.S. Navy and for global commercial traffic through the Middle East’s major maritime passages—the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab el Mandeb Strait, and the Suez Canal. Fortunately, this is a global priority. Outside the Persian Gulf itself, the littoral states and other concerned parties across Asia and Europe share Washington’s objective. Chinese naval forces have participated in antipiracy efforts in the Horn of Africa, and the Chinese navy recently built its first overseas base to support that mission, in Djibouti. The United States could encourage China to participate in the 33-member Combined Maritime Forces and Combined Task Force 151, which fight piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the eastern coast of Somalia, to ensure that China’s activities are focused on shared maritime security. This would allow the United States to rely more on other concerned parties to address the piracy challenge. Still, doing so would come with its own costs—particularly as China has sought to rewrite the rules on freedom of navigation in its own region. Fighting terrorism also remains a priority. To secure the American people, including U.S. forces stationed abroad, and the most important U.S. partners, the United States will have to prevent new threats from emerging in the Middle East. Like the Obama administration, the Trump administration has emphasized the need to lower the level of U.S. involvement in 35 counterterrorism efforts. But this approach has its limits. Washington should recognize that its partners will inevitably permit or even encourage the activities of terrorist groups if doing so aligns with their short-term interests. Qatar, for example, has proved willing to work with extremist groups that, at a minimum, give aid to terrorist groups with international ambitions. The United States should recognize that it cannot control everything its partners do and focus its efforts on discouraging their relationships with terrorist groups that might pursue operations beyond their immediate neighborhood or acquire game-changing capabilities. Finally, the United States still has an interest in seeing its main partners—however imperfect they are—stable and secure, and it should weigh its investments in security cooperation and economic aid accordingly. Washington also needs to ensure that problems in the Middle East don’t spill over into neighboring regions (a lesson from the Bosnian war in the 1990s that policymakers forgot when confronted with the Syrian war). Preventing conflicts from spreading does not mean launching all-out military interventions. But it will sometimes require the United States to actively contain the fighting and engage in coercive diplomacy designed to bring civil wars to a swifter end.
Now is better to prevent war
Can’t just use airstrikes, need troops and the Persian Gulf
Parvaz, D. “Here is what war with Iran would look like” Think Progress. May 20, 2019AB
https://thinkprogress.org/war-iran-us-troops-draft-trump-bolton-e649c4a98b98/
What would war with, on, or against Iran — distinctions that signal varying types of military engagement — look like? What kind of troop deployment, timeline, civilian and military casualties on both sides, and expense are we talking about? The 2003 invasion of Iraq has cost the United States more than $1 trillion, in addition to the deaths of at least 4,887 U.S. troops and at least 206,000 Iraqi civilians. Of course, the nature of these questions is speculative — war is not as predictable as dominoes. There are dynamic events that can change the entire course of a conflict. As of now, the numbers rest somewhere between Sen. Tom Cotton’s (R-AR) “two strikes” estimate and a total apocalypse. Gil Barndollar, director of Middle East Studies at the Center for the National Interest, who served as an infantry officer in the U.S. Marine Corps in both Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf, told ThinkProgress that even if the United States were to assume “completely permissive conditions” from Iran (no missiles, chemical, or biological attacks, etc.), it would still take “months to mobilize and stage forces” for such an operation. “The entire active duty U.S. Army and Marine Corps today totals a bit over 600,000 troops. Comprehensive Plans of Action, or JCPOA), which saw Iran getting sanctions relief in exchange for curtailing its nuclear enrichment program. But Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany remain committed to the deal, and Iran’s nuclear program continues under inspection from the U.N.’s nuclear watchdog agency. (It’s unclear whether news that the country is increasing its production of low-enriched uranium will violate the terms of that deal.) Iran’s nuclear reactors were considered targets last summer, shortly after the United States left the JCPOA and started reimposing sanctions on Iran. Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, said that while both the United States and Israel had the conventional weapons capabilities to launch airstrikes, some of these facilities are underground, so it’s unclear how much damage could be done with such airstrikes.
Need Military in the Persian Gulf for War with Iran
Rogan, Tom. “Here's how you'll know we're about to go to war with Iran — right now, we're not” Washington Examiner. May 16, 2019AB
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/heres-how-youll-know-were-about-to-go-to-war-with-iran-right-now-were-not
But were the United States about to go to war with Iran we would see the following: First, we would have to stage an extremely large air and naval force buildup in the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf, for strike operations inside Iran and defeat of Iran's naval forces. We'd also have to do it in the Mediterranean Sea, to help defend Israel against Iranian ballistic missile attacks and to complicate Russian action via its Black Sea fleet. At present, the U.S. has only one carrier strike group near Iran. The Trump administration has not altered the course of another strike group that could have been sent back toward the Persian Gulf. And the only other deployed U.S. carrier group is conducting Russia-minded naval exercises in the Arctic. The Iranian navy and air force are far bigger than the Iraqi forces were in March 2003, and so war against Iran would almost certainly entail at least five concurrently deployed carrier strike groups. On the Air Force side of things we would also see multiple fighter and bomber squadrons deployed to Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Kingdom. We are seeing instead a limited B-52 deployment, which would be largely useless in the opening stages of any campaign (first stage strike operations would focus on achieving air superiority, and involve B-2 bombers and electronic warfare aircraft). Second, we would see a massive ground force deployment in Saudi Arabia (none of Iran's neighbors would likely allow U.S. invasion forces access). Iran is three times the size of Iraq, with a far more powerful regular and irregular military. | 904,713 |
365,558 | 379,632 | 0 - Disclosure | Interpretation All debaters must disclose before the round on the ndca pf wiki, located on debatecoaches.org, all broken cases at least 30 minutes before round under their actual high school and name
Bietz ’10: Bietz, Mike. “The Case for Public Case Disclosure.” NFL Rostrum, Vol. 84, Issue 9. May 2010. https://nationalforensicleague.org/DownloadHandler.ashx?File=/userdocs/publications/05-201020Complete20Rostrum.pdfBig teams already get many, many more flows than the smaller teams just because they have more debaters, more judges and more coaches. Open Disclosure gives everyone access to the same information. Additionally, it helps the ‘little guy’ even more because for many of these debaters, the option of going to a lot of tournaments isn’t available. Open case Disclosure gives them the ability to see what other teams are running prior to showing up to the tournament. Thus, there is an added benefit of equalizing not only information at a tournament, but also equalizing (to some degree) the playing-field for people who do not have the resources to travel as much. | 904,710 |
365,559 | 379,609 | 2 - NovDec Nato | NATO is planning on having a fully functioning cyber command by 2023
Robin Emmott, 10-16-2018, "NATO cyber command to be fully operational in 2023," U.S., https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-cyber/nato-cyber-command-to-be-fully-operational-in-2023-idUSKCN1MQ1Z9
A new NATO military command center to deter computer hackers should be fully staffed in 2023 and able to mount its own cyber-attacks but the alliance is still grappling with ground rules for doing so, a senior general said on Tuesday. While NATO does not have its own cyber weapons, the U.S.-led alliance established an operations center on Aug. 31 at its military hub in Belgium. The United States, Britain, Estonia and other allies have since offered their cyber capabilities.
However, NATO is fully reliant on the United States for offensive cyber operations until then.
Patrick Tucker 19, 5-24-2019, "NATO Getting More Aggressive on Offensive Cyber," Defense One, https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2019/05/nato-getting-more-aggressive-offensive-cyber/157270/
At an event in May, Gottemoeller said NATO was in the processes of establishing a new innovation board to “bring together all of the parts of and pieces of NATO that have to wrestle with these new technologies to really try to get a flow of information. Many of you having served in any international institution or government, you know how things can get stove-piped. So we are resolved to break down those stove-pipes, particularly where innovation is concerned,” she said. NATO is building a cyber command that is scheduled to be fully operational in 2023 and will coordinate and conduct all offensive cyber operations. Until then, whatever NATO does offensively, it will rely heavily on the United States and the discretion of U.S. commanders, according to Sophie Arts, program coordinator for security and defense at the German Marshall Fund, who explains in this December report.
And the U.S will have full control of these offensive cyber operations but will do them through NATO
Idrees Ali, 10-3-2018, "With an eye on Russia, U.S. pledges to use cyber capabilities on behalf of NATO," U.S., https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-nato-russia-cyber/with-an-eye-on-russia-u-s-pledges-to-use-cyber-capabilities-on-behalf-of-nato-idUSKCN1MD0C
The United States is expected to announce in the coming days that it will use offensive and defensive cyber capabilities on behalf of NATO if asked, a senior Pentagon official said, amid concerns about Russia’s increasingly assertive use of its cyber capabilities. The 29-nation NATO alliance recognized cyber as a domain of warfare, along with land, air and sea, in 2014, but has not outlined in detail what that entails. “We will formally announce that the United States is prepared to offer NATO its cyber capabilities if asked,” Katie Wheelbarger, the principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, told reporters during a trip to Europe by U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis. Wheelbarger said the United States will keep control of its people and capabilities but use them in support of NATO if asked. She added that it was a part of a British-led push to increase NATO’s cyber capabilities. In a recent summit, member nations said NATO would create a cyberspace operations center to coordinate NATO’s cyber activities. NATO has also talked about integrating individual nations’ cyber capabilities into alliance operations. Last year, officials said the United States, Britain, Germany, Norway, Spain, Denmark and the Netherlands were drawing up cyber warfare principles to guide their militaries on what justifies deploying cyber attack weapons more broadly. In Europe, the issue of deploying malware is sensitive because democratic governments do not want to be seen to be using the same tactics as an authoritarian regime. Senior Baltic and British security officials say they have intelligence showing persistent Russian cyber hacks to try to bring down European energy and telecommunications networks, coupled with internet disinformation campaigns. U.S. intelligence officials have found that in the campaign leading up to the 2016 U.S. presidential election, Russian hackers breached the Democratic National Committee and leaked confidential information. “It sends a message primarily aimed at Russia,” Wheelbarger said. She added that the move would make clear that NATO is capable of countering Russian cyber efforts and would help in creating a more coherent cyber policy across the alliance. “U.S. together with the United Kingdom clearly lead in the level and sophistication of capabilities and if used, they would likely lead to tactical success,” said Klara Jordan, director of the Cyber Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council think tank in Washington.
The United States Increasing Offensive cyber operations through NATO is key to deter Russia
Kimberly Marten, 03-xx-2017, "," Reducing Tensions Between Russia and NATO, https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2017/03/CSR_79_Marten_RussiaNATO.pdf
In this new Council Special Report, Kimberly Marten, a professor of political science at Barnard College, at Columbia University, and director of the program on U.S.-Russia relations at Columbia’s Harriman Institute, addresses the rising tensions between Russia and both the United States and the rest of NATO. Marten is convincing when she writes about the tensions between NATO and Russia—tensions that could boil over into conflict if there were an accidental or intentional encounter between Russian and NATO militaries, a Russian incursion into NATO territory, or a hybrid war that included cyberattacks and sowing seeds of discontent in Eastern Europe. Marten also recommends several policy steps that the United States and NATO should take to avoid any such crisis. She weighs the needs of viii Foreword deterrence—including the United States publicly committing to uphold NATO’s defense clause, positioning troops in vulnerable NATO countries, and enhancing cyber defense and offense capabilities across the NATO bloc—and reassurance—including treating Russian President Vladimir Putin and other Russian leaders with respect, refraining from undermining each other’s domestic political stability (including formally stating that the United States does not seek Russian regime change), reestablishing arms control negotiations and agreements, and halting further NATO expansion, especially in Ukraine. Operating firmly in the tradition of foreign policy realism, Marten makes the case that both deterrence and reassurance measures are necessary and can in fact work in harmony.
This is critical, Russia’s planning to use cyberattacks against NATO~-~~-~-it’ll spark World War 3
O’Hanlon 19—Senior fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, where he specializes in U.S. defense strategy, the use of military force, and American national security policy. He is also director of research for the Foreign Policy program at Brookings. He is an adjunct professor at Columbia, Princeton, and Syracuse universities and University of Denver Michael E., April 2019, The Senkaku Paradox: Risking Great Power War Over Small Stakes, Chapter 2: Plausible Scenarios, pgs 36, Brookings Institution Press, ProQuest Ebook, Accessed through the Wake Forest Library
A NATO military response to the postulated Russian aggression seems very likely. Perhaps evidence of its preparations to move forces into position to defend its ally and liberate its territory from Russian occupation would be enough to catalyze a diplomatic resolution of the crisis. If not, however, the stage would be set for the possible eruption of World War III. Russia might try to impede a deployment through cyber-, space, and other such attacks, which would likely only slow the deployment, not stop it. Thus escalation could easily result. 62 Once shots were fired, NATO would be unlikely to back down. Not every nation would necessarily send significant military forces, to be sure, but some key countries would probably remain resolute. Much more likely than acceptance of defeat would be a redoubled commitment to complete the mission—and, if Russian nuclear weapons had been used by that point, even in a limited attack, to respond in kind. Put differently, if Russia did choose to try to physically prevent the deployment of large forces into eastern NATO territory in likely preparation for a counterattack, there would be two possibilities. If that attempt failed, a showdown in the east on land would still loom. If it succeeded, NATO would then face a momentous decision: accept defeat, or reinforce dramatically with conventional forces (perhaps after a period of repairing damage and building more equipment and weaponry, depending on how many losses it had already suffered), or escalate to the nuclear level. In situations of this sort, the parties to the conflict might find themselves living scenarios like those that nuclear theorists pondered throughout the Cold War. They could be engaged in behavior that Thomas Schelling might have described as “the threat that leaves something to chance” or that Herman Kahn might have placed on the lower rungs of a nuclear escalation ladder that reached potentially to all-out war. 63 American planners saw these kinds of escalatory ladders and options as ideas that might serve U.S. interests; thus it would not be too surprising to see Russian planners invoke them now. 64 And whatever the dangers during the deployment phase, they would snowball during any actual maneuver warfare in eastern Europe. For example, it is entirely imaginable that an operation designed to liberate a Baltic state from a Russian occupation would trespass onto Russian territory to cut off supply lines and possible reinforcements. 65 Moscow may or may not simply take NATO’s word that it has no designs on the country’s government. In other words, it might even fear that NATO’s counteroffensive could aspire to regime change in Russia. It may or may not have a clear picture of the kind of attack it is experiencing, as command and control systems would be compromised in the course of conventional battle, quite possibly including those systems commonly used for nuclear weapons.
?
US-OCO unifies NATO
Kimberly Marten, 03-xx-2017, "," Reducing Tensions Between Russia and NATO, https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2017/03/CSR_79_Marten_RussiaNATO.pdf
The most significant NATO actions in response to the perceived Russian threat were announced at the 2016 Warsaw Summit, envisioning the establishment over the next year of an “enhanced forward presence” in NATO’s east. Four new battalions (together equivalent to approximately one new combat brigade) will be deployed. The United Kingdom will oversee a new battalion in Estonia; Canada, a battalion in Latvia; Germany, one in Lithuania; and the United States, one in Poland, where this new multinational division will be headquartered.52 Although details have not been made public, reportedly each new battalion will include around one thousand troops.53 NATO also expressed How to Assess and Respond to a Crisis 27 some support for Romania’s ideas about a new multinational Black Sea maritime presence but announced no new NATO deployments there. Furthermore, at its 2014 Wales Summit, NATO had declared that cyber defense was part of its collective defense planning, and, at the Warsaw Summit, current Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg affirmed that cyberspace is an operational domain of conflict, potentially making way for member states with offensive cyber programs (including the United States, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) to use such weapons on NATO’s behalf.54 The force increases envisioned in the Warsaw Summit are far below the recommendations of more hawkish Western defense analysts. But they do establish persistent multinational forces near Russia’s borders and are a strong symbol of NATO’s deterrent tripwire. When capable allies—such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Canada—demonstrate that they are willing to put themselves in harm’s way to answer an outside attack, it sends a strong signal that the alliance will hold. Recent enhanced NATO military cooperation with earby neutral states, including Sweden and Finland, has also helped demonstrate a unified Western deterrent
Strong NATO relations deter adversaries, and promote democracy, freedom, and solutions to inequalities
James Stavridis April 4, 2019, 7-11-2018, "Why NATO Is Essential For World Peace, According to Its Former Commander," Time, https://time.com/5564171/why-nato-is-essential -world-peace/
Moreover, despite all the frustrations of coalition warfare, most observers would agree with Winston Churchill that “there is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting without them.” The greatest single advantage the U.S. has on the global stage is our network of allies, partners and friends. That network is under deliberate pressure: from China, with its “One Belt, One Road” competitive strategy, and from Russia, with its relentless attacks on coalition unity. A strong NATO means not only having allies in a fight, should it come to that, but also a powerful deterrent to the aggression of ambitious adversaries. Perhaps NATO’s greatest accomplishment is not even its unblemished record of deterring attack against its members but rather the fact that no alliance nation has ever attacked another. NATO’s most fundamental deliverable has been peace among Europe’s major powers for 70 years after two millennia of unhesitating slaughter on the continent. The disasters of the 20th century alone pulled the U.S. into two world wars that killed more than half a million Americans. History provides few achievements that compare to those seven decades of peace. They were built not on the ambitions of cold-eyed leaders but something more noble. NATO is a pool of partners who, despite some egregious outliers, by and large share fundamental values–democracy, liberty, freedom of speech, freedom of expression, gender equality, and racial equality. Admittedly we execute those values imperfectly, and they are stronger in some NATO countries than in others. But they are the right values, and there is no other place on earth where the U.S. could find such a significant number of like-minded nations that are willing to bind themselves with us in a defensive military treaty. So what can NATO do to ensure the alliance continues to provide value for all the members in general, and for the U.S. in particular? What would a NATO 4.0 look like? The alliance should up its game in cybersecurity, both defensively and in the collective development of new offensive cybertools. Geographically, the alliance needs more focus on the Arctic; as global warming opens shipping lanes and access to hydrocarbons, geopolitical competition will increase. We should taper off the Afghan mission, perhaps maintaining a small training cadre in country and continuing to help the Afghan security forces push the Taliban to negotiate peace. There is work to do in consolidating the Balkans, where tensions among Serbs, Croats and Balkan Muslims threaten to erupt into war again. NATO can continue to have a small mission there to help continue the arc of reconciliation. The alliance will need to be forthright in dealing with Russia, confronting Putin where we must–in its invasion and continued occupation of Ukraine–but at the same time attempting to reduce operational tensions and find zones of cooperation. Geographically, the biggest challenge ahead will be the Middle East. The NATO nations do not agree on an approach with Iran, which is an aggressive actor in the region with significant ambitions that will impact NATO. Developing better partnerships with the Arab world, which began in earnest with the Libyan campaign and continued into Syrian operations against the so-called Islamic State alongside various NATO allies in the U.S.-led coalition, makes sense. Working far more closely with Israel would pay dividends for the alliance. And what of other tiny, would-be members, the next Montenegros? NATO should accept North Macedonia to stabilize the south Balkans, then halt expansion. It should build global partnerships with democracies like Japan, Australia, New Zealand, India and other Indo-Pacific nations. Should we be prepared to fight and die in a NATO campaign? Yes. On balance, the alliance still provides strategic benefit to the U.S. We should support this venerable organization, encourage our allies to increase their defense spending and push them to operate with us on key challenges. We should demand that they help us build a NATO 4.0 that is even more fit for the decades ahead. We should also remember how dangerous the world can be. As NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander for four years, I signed more than 2,000 personal condolence letters; about a third of them were to the grieving family members of European soldiers. I visited the thousands of non-U.S. troops in Afghanistan often, and they were uniformly brave, professional and motivated. As a democracy, it is right that we should debate whether NATO is worth dying for. I can tell you that our NATO allies have shown time and again they are willing to fight and die for us. | 904,693 |
365,560 | 379,626 | 1 - Leverage | First we want to observe that the BRI is a failing program due to lack of funding.
BRI funding drops drastically
Matt Schrader, The Jamestown Foundation, "Domestic Criticism May Signal Shrunken Belt and Road Ambitions", August 10, 2018, https://jamestown.org/program/domestic-criticism-may-signal-china-scaling-back-its-bri-ambitions/ This is not a point that domestic critics of BRI typically cite. Censorship may again be the culprit. Although an 86 success rate for BRI projects is certainly better than some Western observers might guess, the PRC government may not eager for it to be widely known at home that China’s banks have tens of billions of dollars tied up in problematic projects abroad. Indeed, the PRC’s policymaking apparatus appears to have already responded to concerns of BRI overreach by adjusting the scale of lending to limit possible financial risk. BRI lending by major PRC banks has dropped by 89 since 2015, and lending by commercial banks—who are dealing with their own financial issues domestically—has ceased almost entirely. Policy banks have also scaled back, despite their status as arms of PRC government policy.
Ciurtin ‘17 tells us that
BRI is reliant on EU Funding
Ciurtin ‘17, Horia Ciurtin, EFILA, 2017, “A Pivot to Europe: China’s Belt and Road Balancing Act”, EIR,
http://ier.gov.ro/wp-content/uploads/publicatii/Final_Policy-Brief-5_Horia-Ciurtin-A-Pivot-to-Europe_web.pdf DL
However impressive the sums might appear at a first glance, they fall short of the needed amount. The first stages of developing the Belt-and-Road require(s) no less than $3 trillion (according to some accounts, even more). And this is a task that China – despite its constant growth and increasing economic power – cannot accomplish alone.36 It really needs co-interested parties. And that is where the European Union (with its unbearable economic force) comes into the spotlight: it is not supposed to be just a “passive” destination at the end of the road, but also a co-owner in this joint venture. Without European cash – from public and private sources – it is highly improbable that other actors could feasibly join China in funding the initiative. Russia, Iran, Turkey or Kazakhstan (or even Japan and India37) are in an entirely different economic league than what is needed for such a massive project. For a path to Europe to emerge, Europe itself is needed along the way. In reality, EU-based institutions
already are the largest lenders in the region (see Figure 3 below). And Europe is highly interested in developing infrastructure and connectivity with its marginal areas.
Nyshka Chandran, 19 Nyshka Chandran, (). “Fears of excessive debt drive more countries to cut down their Belt and Road investments.” CNBC, 01-17-2019, 10-11-2019. https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/18/countries-are-reducing-belt-and-road-investments-over-financing-fears.html // MHS SG
Private investment remains limited and even with capital from international institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the BRI faces a funding gap of up to $500 billion a year, Wang Yiming, deputy head of the Development Research Centre of China’s State Council, said in April. | 904,705 |
365,561 | 379,656 | Warming | UBI is key to stop global warming – there are 2 links
1. First, is that UBI helps environmental movements and decreases ecological footprints – four warrants.
Bickman 17 Jed Bickman (editor at The New Press) What Are We Worth? Part 2: Life for All, 6/6/2017, The Spouter, https://thespouter.com/ubi-aside-life-for-all-85703b689fc1
Usually this assertion of broad economic growth would be deeply concerning to all of us worried about climate change and other forms of environmental damage. So would a basic income increase unsustainable overconsumption? Just the opposite. Overconsumption and overproduction are driven by the specific exploitative relationship of labor to capital under our current system. Labor historian (and basic income opponent) Erik Loomis shows in his book Out of Sight that empowered, unionized workers drove the great environmentalist victories of the 20th century such as the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts?—?and that the right to labor in a clean and healthy environment has long been a fundamental pillar of workers rights, and a demand of the labor union. Workers care about the environment as the place they work and live, not as an abstract, externalized “nature.” Today, working people understand the immediate threat of extreme weather, and the basic income will free everyone of the economic necessity of climate denialism in the name of clinging to extractivist jobs. This will allow workers the freedom to force their bosses to accept green regulation, or form their own businesses and co-ops under greener models. As Alyssa Battistoni has argued convincingly, a basic income will give people the time they need to create communities and habits that reduce their ecological and carbon footprints. It is the harried and underpaid worker, who may also be an exhausted mother with too little support or childcare, who grabs a burger and a Happy Meal at McDonald’s instead of cooking a meal with vegetables from a local garden. Reducing the pressure on this mother has a cascade of health and environmental benefits. Further, Battistoni points out, it is the very rich who have the disproportionate carbon footprints, so any effort to redistribute their wealth and check their accumulation of frequent flyer miles is a win for the ecosystems of the world. (Battistoni has more recently argued that now’s not the time to advocate a UBI, mostly on strategic grounds?—?that the idea is becoming unhinged from ideology as more libertarians pile on to the idea as a way to destroy the safety net. I agree with her?—?we cannot let our vision be compromised by John Galt. My goal is to resist that by arguing us back to a racial justice understanding of the ideal.) \
links: 1. Stops Climate Denialism,
2. Forces workers to pressure acceptance of green regulation
3. Redistributes wealth away from top polluters
4. Decreases overproduction by stopping exploitative labor.
2. Second, is that UBI programs uniquely spur innovation – two warrants
Despite welfare programs, innovation is at an all-time low.
Derek Thompson 16, senior editor @ The Atlantic, where he writes about economics, labor markets, and the media. “America's Monopoly Problem.” The Atlantic, Atlantic Media Company, 11 Sept. 2016, www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/10/americas-monopoly-problem/497549/, NG
Entrepreneurship, as measured by the rate of new-business formation, has declined in each decade since the 1970s, and adults under 35 (a?k?a Millennials) are on track to be the least entrepreneurial generation on record. This decline in dynamism has coincided with the rise of extraordinarily large and profitable firms that look discomfortingly like the monopolies and oligopolies of the 19th century. American strip malls and yellow pages used to brim with new small businesses. But today, in a lot where several mom-and-pop shops might once have opened, Walmart spawns another superstore. In almost every sector of the economy—including manufacturing, construction, retail, and the entire service sector—the big companies are getting bigger. The share of all businesses that are new firms, meanwhile, has fallen by 50 percent since 1978. According to the Roosevelt Institute, a liberal think tank dedicated to advancing the ideals of Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt, “markets are now more concentrated and less competitive than at any point since the Gilded Age.”
a. The first way in which UBI increases innovation is by decreasing risks of entrepreneurship
Universal basic income is key to financial security.
Scott Santens 16, “Universal Basic Income Will Accelerate Innovation by Reducing Our Fear of Failure.” Medium, Basic Income, 30 Nov. 2016, medium.com/basic-income/universal-basic-income-will-accelerate-innovation-by-reducing-our-fear-of-failure-b81ee65a254.
If everyone received as with a absolute minimum, a sufficient amount of money each month to cover their basic needs for that month no matter what?—?an unconditional basic income?—?then the fear of hunger and homelessness is eliminated. It’s gone. And with it, the risks of failure is decreased considered too steep to take a chance on something. But the effects of basic income don’t stop with a reduction of risk. Basic income is also basic capital. It enables more people to actually afford to create a new product or service instead of just think about it, and even better, it enables people to be the consumers who purchase those new products and services, and in so doing decide what succeeds and what fails through an even more widely distributed and further decentralized free market system. Such market effects have even been observed in universal basic income experiments in Namibia and India where local markets flourished thanks to UBI a tripling of entrepreneurs and the enabling of everyone to be a consumer with a minimum amount of buying power. Basic income would even help power the sharing economy. For example, imagine how much an unconditional monthly income would enable people within the Open Source Software (OSS) and free software movements (FSM) to do the unpaid work that is essentially the foundation of the internet itself.
UBI uniquely increases entrepreneurship – empirics prove welfare programs tradeoff with employment which means no growth happens.
Scott Santens 16, “Universal Basic Income Will Accelerate Innovation by Reducing Our Fear of Failure.” Medium, Basic Income, 30 Nov. 2016, medium.com/basic-income/universal-basic-income-will-accelerate-innovation-by-reducing-our-fear-of-failure-b81ee65a254.
Taking risks is equivalent to random genetic mutation in this biological analogy. A new product or service introduced into the market can result in success or failure. The outcome is entirely unknown until it’s tried. What succeeds can make someone rich and what fails can bankrupt someone. That’s a big risk. We traditionally like to think of these risk-takers as a special kind of person, but really they’re mostly just those who are economically secure enough to feel failure isn’t scarier than the potential for success. As a prime example, Elon Musk is one of today’s most well-known and highly successful risk takers. Back in his college years he challenged himself to live on $1 a day for a month. Why did he do that? He figured that if he could successfully survive with very little money, he could survive any failure. With that knowledge gained, the risk of failure in his mind was reduced enough to not prevent him from risking everything to succeed. This isn’t just anecdotal evidence either. Studies have shown that the very existence of food stamps?—?just knowing they are there as an options in case of failure?—?increases rates of entrepreneurship. A study of a reform to the French unemployment insurance system that allowed workers to remain eligible for benefits if they started a business found that the reform resulted in more entrepreneurs starting their own businesses. In Canada, a reform was made to their maternity leave policy, where new mothers were guaranteed a job after a year of leave. A study of the results of this policy change showed a 35 increase in entrepreneurship due to women basically asking themselves, “What have I got to lose? If I fail, I’m guaranteed my paycheck back anyway.” Meanwhile, entrepreneurship is currently on a downward trend. Businesses that were less than five years old used to comprise half of all businesses three decades ago. Now they comprise about one-third. Businesses are also closing their doors faster than new businesses are opening them. Until recently, this had never previously been true here in the US for as long as such data had been recorded. Startup rates are falling. Why? Risk aversion due to rising insecurity. Universal basic income is key to fostering disruptive technology
b. The second way is by promoting the creation of disruptive technology
Jathan Sadowski 16, postdoctoral research fellow in smart cities at the University of Sydney, Australia, “Why Silicon Valley Is Embracing Universal Basic Income.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 22 June 2016, www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jun/22/silicon-valley-universal-basic-income-y-combinator NG
First, UBI subsidizes disruptive technologies. “The motivation behind the project is to begin exploring alternatives to the existing social safety net,” Elizabeth Rhodes, the research director for Y Combinator’s UBI project, told Quartz. “If technology eliminates jobs or jobs continue to become less secure, an increasing number of people will be unable to make ends meet with earnings from employment.” UBI becomes a consolation prize for those whose lives are disrupted. Benefits still accrue to the designers and owners of the technologies, but now with less guilt and pushback about the collateral damage. Rather than steer technology towards social progress by promoting projects that contribute to public benefit and human flourishing – not just reflect the desires of privileged groups – Silicon Valley elites can shake off critics by pointing to UBI as the solution, and one that does not restrict their profit motive. UBI can, in some ways, be seen as welfare for capitalists. Now, more people can drive for Uber and work for TaskRabbit – at even lower wages! – because UBI subsidizes the meager paychecks earned by hustling for the sharing economy. The tech companies take home the profit and face even less pressure to pay a living wage to their non-employee employees. Second, support for UBI is framed in terms of human capital. Steve Waldman, a well-known programmer and economics writer, praises UBI by referring to it is “Venture Capital for the people”. VC, venture capital, invites people to embrace their inner entrepreneurs, he believes. Thus, UBI is not (only) a moral response to economic harms or a political response to social injustice, but a sound financial investment in the startup-of-you. A way of producing more makers, risk-takers, and move-fast-breakers – the type of people that tech culture values above all others. Thinking of UBI as a financial innovation represents the “businessification” of government; now we talk about the “return on investment” of social policy, rather than outcomes in terms of public good. When social policy is evaluated using economic standards you get starkly different policies, different expectations, and different beneficiaries.
New innovations are necessary to solve climate change
Fischer 17— (Severin Fischer, Senior Researcher in the Global Security Team at the Center for Security Studies (CSS). He holds a PhD in Political Science from Trier University, Germany., "Climate Policy after Paris: Inconvenient Truths" Feb 2017, http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSSAnalyse203-EN.pdf, accessed 7-14-2017, SL)
The abovementioned limitations in achieving the Paris Agreement’s goal through conventional instruments show the need for a debate on the use of new, hitherto untested technologies. Already today, the most important of the IPCC’s scenarios take into account negative emissions, which can be created by technologies that not only limit the emission of CO2 into the atmosphere but additionally extract CO2 from it. Here, the IPCC favors the use of “Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage” (BECCS). Through targeted forestation, the natural soaking up of carbon in biomass, its combustion, and subsequent geological storage of emissions, CO2 concentration in the atmosphere can be reduced. Depending on the scale of use, this could lead to a comparatively rapid reduction of atmospheric emissions. In the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report, the use of this technology is already foreseen from 2025 onwards. Its large-scale application is anticipated for the second half of this century in the models that calculate ways of accomplishing the two-degree target. This is the only way to bring emissions down to zero in the medium term, as anticipated in the Paris Agreement’s Article 4. In practice, however, only a single pilot project in the US exists so far. In addition to BECCS, other measures have been considered such as Direct Air Capture, reforestation, and ocean fertilization/liming. All of these can bind additional emissions for a net negative effect. In academia, such concepts are subsumed under the heading of Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) technologies. The common factor here is that they all focus on sucking CO2 out of the atmosphere. A second group of technology also seeks to limit the symptoms of emissions-induced changes to the atmosphere that have already taken place or to prevent them from happening in the first place. Foremost among those technologies is the field of Solar Radiation Management (SRM). Examples include the idea of dispersing highly reflective aerosols in the stratosphere in order to limit insolation of the Earth’s surface, enhancing the reflectivity of clouds with seawater, or the genetic modification of plants for greater reflection of sunlight. SRM technologies have seen little experimental testing so far, and it is nearly impossible to anticipate their implications. While there is no doubt that SRM technologies come under the heading of “climate engineering”, CDR technologies may also be seen as unconventional forms of emissions mitigation. Both groups of technologies, however, will only see controlled and sufficient application if political actors make an effort to foster research and develop a legal framework. As the existing measures undertaken by international climate policy become increasingly disconnected from the temperature goals and the calculations of scientific models, a debate over the abovementioned technology options becomes all the more urgent. It is important to remember that there is usually a delay of several decades between the initial steps toward testing a technology and its large-scale application. Accordingly, funding must be earmarked at an early stage.
Climate change is linear – any reduction of emissions is necessary to limit immense suffering
Wallace-Wells 19 (David Wallace-Wells is a National Fellow with the New America Foundation and is a deputy editor of New York Magazine, “The Cautious Case for Climate Optimism Believing in a comfortable future for our planet probably means some giant carbon-sucking machines,” New York Magazine, February 4, 2019, http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/02/book-excerpt-the-uninhabitable-earth-david-wallace-wells.html)
It’s not too late. In fact, it never will be. Whatever you may have read over the past year — as extreme weather brought a global heat wave and unprecedented wildfires burned through 1.6 million California acres and newspaper headlines declared, “Climate Change Is Here” — global warming is not binary. It is not a matter of “yes” or “no,” not a question of “fucked” or “not.” Instead, it is a problem that gets worse over time the longer we produce greenhouse gas, and can be made better if we choose to stop. Which means that no matter how hot it gets, no matter how fully climate change transforms the planet and the way we live on it, it will always be the case that the next decade could contain more warming, and more suffering, or less warming and less suffering. Just how much is up to us, and always will be. A century and a half after the greenhouse effect was first identified, and a few decades since climate denial and misinformation began muddying our sense of what scientists do know, we are left with a set of predictions that can appear falsifiable — about global temperatures and sea-level rise and even hurricane frequency and wildfire volume. And there are, it is true, feedback loops in the climate system that we do not yet perfectly understand and dynamic processes that remain mysterious. But to the extent that we live today under clouds of uncertainty about the future of climate change, those clouds are, overwhelmingly, not projections of collective ignorance about the natural world but of blindness about the human one, and they can be dispersed by human action. The question of how bad things will get is not, actually, a test of the science; it is a bet on human activity. How much will we do to forestall disaster and how quickly? These are the disconcerting, contradictory lessons of global warming, which counsels both human humility and human grandiosity, each drawn from the same perception of peril. There’s a name for those who hold the fate of the world in their hands, as we do — gods. But for the moment, at least, many of us seem inclined to run from that responsibility rather than embrace it. Or even admit we see it, though it sits in front of us as plainly as a steering wheel. That climate change is all-enveloping means that it targets us all and that we must all share in the responsibility so we do not all share in the suffering — at least not share in so suffocatingly much of it. Since I first began writing about climate a few years ago, I’ve been asked often whether I see any reason for optimism. The thing is, I am optimistic. But optimism is always a matter of perspective, and mine is this: No one wants to believe disaster is coming, but those who look, do. At about two degrees Celsius of warming, just one degree north of where we are today, some of the planet’s ice sheets are expected to begin their collapse, eventually bringing, over centuries, perhaps as much as 50 feet of sea-level rise. In the meantime, major cities in the equatorial band of the planet will become unlivable. There will be, it has been estimated, 32 times as many extreme heat waves in India, and even in the northern latitudes, heat waves will kill thousands each summer. Given only conventional methods of decarbonization (replacing dirty-energy sources like coal and oil with clean ones like wind and solar), this is probably our best-case scenario. It is also what is called — so often nowadays the phrase numbs the lips — “catastrophic warming.” A representative from the Marshall Islands spoke for many of the world’s island nations when he used another word to describe the meaning of two degrees: genocide. You do not need to contemplate worst-case scenarios to be alarmed; this best-case scenario is alarming enough. Two degrees would be terrible, but it’s better than three, at which point Southern Europe would be in permanent drought, African droughts would last five years on average, and the areas burned annually by wildfires in the United States could quadruple, or worse, from last year’s million-plus acres. And three degrees is much better than four, at which point six natural disasters could strike a single community simultaneously; the number of climate refugees, already in the millions, could grow tenfold, or 20-fold, or more; and, globally, damages from warming could reach $600?trillion — about double all the wealth that exists in the world today. We are on track for more warming still — just above four degrees by 2100, the U.N. estimates. So if optimism is always a matter of perspective, the possibility of four degrees shapes mine.
Warming causes extinction.
Yangyang Xu and Ramanathan 17, Assistant Professor of Atmospheric Sciences at Texas AandM University; and Veerabhadran Ramanathan, Distinguished Professor of Atmospheric and Climate Sciences at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography, University of California, San Diego, 9/26/17, “Well below 2 °C: Mitigation strategies for avoiding dangerous to catastrophic climate changes,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol. 114, No. 39, p. 10315-10323
We are proposing the following extension to the DAI risk categorization: warming greater than 1.5 °C as “dangerous”; warming greater than 3 °C as “catastrophic?”; and warming in excess of 5 °C as “unknown??,” with the understanding that changes of this magnitude, not experienced in the last 20+ million years, pose existential threats to a majority of the population. The question mark denotes the subjective nature of our deduction and the fact that catastrophe can strike at even lower warming levels. The justifications for the proposed extension to risk categorization are given below. From the IPCC burning embers diagram and from the language of the Paris Agreement, we infer that the DAI begins at warming greater than 1.5 °C. Our criteria for extending the risk category beyond DAI include the potential risks of climate change to the physical climate system, the ecosystem, human health, and species extinction. Let us first consider the category of catastrophic (3 to 5 °C warming). The first major concern is the issue of tipping points. Several studies (48, 49) have concluded that 3 to 5 °C global warming is likely to be the threshold for tipping points such as the collapse of the western Antarctic ice sheet, shutdown of deep water circulation in the North Atlantic, dieback of Amazon rainforests as well as boreal forests, and collapse of the West African monsoon, among others. While natural scientists refer to these as abrupt and irreversible climate changes, economists refer to them as catastrophic events (49). Warming of such magnitudes also has catastrophic human health effects. Many recent studies (50, 51) have focused on the direct influence of extreme events such as heat waves on public health by evaluating exposure to heat stress and hyperthermia. It has been estimated that the likelihood of extreme events (defined as 3-sigma events), including heat waves, has increased 10-fold in the recent decades (52). Human beings are extremely sensitive to heat stress. For example, the 2013 European heat wave led to about 70,000 premature mortalities (53). The major finding of a recent study (51) is that, currently, about 13.6 of land area with a population of 30.6 is exposed to deadly heat. The authors of that study defined deadly heat as exceeding a threshold of temperature as well as humidity. The thresholds were determined from numerous heat wave events and data for mortalities attributed to heat waves. According to this study, a 2 °C warming would double the land area subject to deadly heat and expose 48 of the population. A 4 °C warming by 2100 would subject 47 of the land area and almost 74 of the world population to deadly heat, which could pose existential risks to humans and mammals alike unless massive adaptation measures are implemented, such as providing air conditioning to the entire population or a massive relocation of most of the population to safer climates. Climate risks can vary markedly depending on the socioeconomic status and culture of the population, and so we must take up the question of “dangerous to whom?” (54). Our discussion in this study is focused more on people and not on the ecosystem, and even with this limited scope, there are multitudes of categories of people. We will focus on the poorest 3 billion people living mostly in tropical rural areas, who are still relying on 18th-century technologies for meeting basic needs such as cooking and heating. Their contribution to CO2 pollution is roughly 5 compared with the 50 contribution by the wealthiest 1 billion (55). This bottom 3 billion population comprises mostly subsistent farmers, whose livelihood will be severely impacted, if not destroyed, with a one- to five-year megadrought, heat waves, or heavy floods; for those among the bottom 3 billion of the world’s population who are living in coastal areas, a 1- to 2-m rise in sea level (likely with a warming in excess of 3 °C) poses existential threat if they do not relocate or migrate. It has been estimated that several hundred million people would be subject to famine with warming in excess of 4 °C (54). However, there has essentially been no discussion on warming beyond 5 °C. Climate change-induced species extinction is one major concern with warming of such large magnitudes (5 °C). The current rate of loss of species is ?1,000-fold the historical rate, due largely to habitat destruction. At this rate, about 25 of species are in danger of extinction in the coming decades (56). Global warming of 6 °C or more (accompanied by increase in ocean acidity due to increased CO2) can act as a major force multiplier and expose as much as 90 of species to the dangers of extinction (57). The bodily harms combined with climate change-forced species destruction, biodiversity loss, and threats to water and food security, as summarized recently (58), motivated us to categorize warming beyond 5 °C as unknown??, implying the possibility of existential threats. Fig. 2 displays these three risk categorizations (vertical dashed lines)
It’s feasible! Multiple other methods to pay for it.
Gibson 14 Carl Gibson (co-founder of US Uncut). “The Case for a Basic Guaranteed Income for All.” Huffington Post. May 13th, 2014. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/carl-gibson/the-case-for-a-basic-guar_b_5311330.html
The cost of guaranteeing every adult citizen (approximately 225 million, according to census figures) $12,000 a year is roughly $2.8 trillion. That sounds like a lot, until looking into just one of the least-mentioned sources ~-~- offshore tax havens. Currently, 1 $32 trillion is stashed in offshore accounts in notorious tax havens like the Cayman Islands and Bermuda. Much of that is profit made in the U.S. by American corporations, but booked overseas to avoid taxes. And as journalist Nicholas Shaxson wrote in "Treasure Islands," much more of it is held in blind trusts operated by oppressive authoritarian regimes, drug cartels, human traffickers, and other unsavory characters. $2.8 trillion isn't even one eighth of that amount. We aren't asking for the whole pie, just a piece. And we'll even save them a bite. A few commonsense loophole closures like getting rid of the "carried interest" loophole, eliminating transfer pricing schemes like the "Dutch Sandwich" and "Double Irish" tax loopholes, and instituting 2 a one percent sales tax on all financial transactions on Wall Street would be more than enough to cover the cost of a universal guaranteed income for all. And we still haven't even discussed other widely-supported, commonsense initiatives like 3 turning wasteful Pentagon spending like the F-35 project into money set aside for a universal basic income, 4taxing investment income at the samereal income rate as real, actual work, 5 raising the inheritance tax to pre-Bush levels, or 6 creating new tax brackets for millionaires and billionaires. By providing a basic income for all citizens through ending tax loopholes and preferential tax treatments for the super-wealthy, we're directly correcting the ever-growing gap between the few who have more than they could ever spend in multiple lifetimes, and the vast majority fighting over crumbs. More importantly, we're also giving the poorest Americans a fighting chance at fulfilling their dreams, rather than spending their best years slaving away for a corporate giant that doesn't respect basic human needs. We can't call ourselves a free country until working Americans are freed from poverty wages and dead-end jobs.
UBI increases work incentives and reduces poverty – empirics prove.
Santens 16 Santens, Scott. "Universal Basic Income Is the Best Tool to Fight Poverty." The Blog. Huffington Post, 2 June 2016. Web. SJ DT’
The second argument Eduardo makes is that a basic income would sap the desire to work, and because “work remains an important social, psychological and economic anchor,” basic income would be a bad idea. Although unmentioned by Eduardo, some strong evidence to the contrary was mentioned in another New York Times article late last year. Abhijit Banerjee, a director of the Poverty Action Lab at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, released a paper with three colleagues last week that carefully assessed the effects of seven cash-transfer programs in Mexico, Morocco, Honduras, Nicaragua, the Philippines and Indonesia. It found “no systematic evidence that cash transfer programs discourage work.” Still, Professor Banerjee observed, in many countries, “we encounter the idea that handouts will make people lazy.” It’s a good article I suggest be read in full. The author went on to explain how cash assistance does not show work disincentive effects, instead providing “very tangible benefits” especially for kids who go on to see improved longevity of life, educational outcomes, health, and incomes in adulthood. The author even concludes with a response to Paul Ryan who last year wished to move people from cash assistance to work. Before the United States goes down that road again, however, it might make sense to reassess the strength of the underlying argument: that poor people will never act responsibly, get a job and stay in a family unless they are thrown into the swimming pool and left to struggle with little support from the rest of us. So the author warns the reader that we should look at the evidence before thinking people won’t find work unless forced to. I agree. That’s exactly what we should do. What does strike me as odd is how the author is the same Eduardo Porter. So, on the one hand, Eduardo believes basic income won’t work because work is so important for us to keep doing and we’ll choose not to work if work becomes fully voluntary. On the other hand he himself is familiar with the evidence that giving people cash UBI does not reduce the amount of work we do, and does in fact have many positive effects. Even odder, Eduardo’s article about welfare even makes the point that people continue to work despite the high marginal tax rates that welfare imposes by being removed with work. Universal basic income doesn’t even have that problem because it’s never reduced with any amount of earned income above it. This is where it becomes clear that universal basic income is an idea judged by many not logically or scientifically, but emotionally. This is likely why Eduardo himself can make the case against those perpetuating the myth of welfare’s “corrupting influence” regarding work disincentives in one article, and then in another about universal basic income, practically forget everything he knows is true in order to argue against giving people sufficient money to live without conditions aka basic income. Be wary of any article against basic income that doesn’t include any supporting evidence. Applicable experiments have been done. We have studied the work disincentive effects in the US and in Canada in the 1970s where the results were quite interesting. Fully universal basic incomes have been tested in Namibia and India, where the results of both were more work, not less. The charity Give Directly has given basic incomes to people in Uganda and Kenya, where the results in both locations were more work, not less. Unconditional cash transfers are being used more frequently all over the world entirely because of their successes, and in places like Liberia and Lebanon where they ended up being like basic incomes, they too show more work, not less. Perhaps most interesting of all the applicable evidence of cash without strings is the seemingly universal shift from typical wage labor to more self-employment and unpaid work.
UBI pays for itself in two ways:
1. It ends repetitive Welfare programs
Malkanifollow 17 explains that, Vivan Malkanifollow, Mar 17 2017, "Understanding Universal Basic Income – Stanford Politics," Stanford Politics, https://stanfordpolitics.com/understanding-universal-basic-income-178032e6090f /
When we think about the cost of UBI, we need to keep in mind that some programs will become redundant. This does not mean that the welfare state becomes redundant; it means that certain existing welfare programs may disappear and be replaced by UBI. So part of UBI will be funded in that way. The other thing that we need to keep in mind is that when people are free from the basic fear linked to income insecurity, this will impact crime, health, and other problems that do a lot of damage to society and also cost a lot to deal with. Prisons are expensive, and so many people’s lives are ruined because they are constantly under pressure from income insecurity. These costs must be factored in when looking at the bigger picture of implementing UBI. But this only addresses one part of the problem. The bigger question you ask about how expansive basic income would be can only be answered if we start thinking of different ways to fund basic income.
2. It decreases crime which frees up funds from maintaining prisons, courts, and
Malkanifollow 2, Vivan Malkanifollow, Mar 17 2017, "Understanding Universal Basic Income – Stanford Politics," Stanford Politics, https://stanfordpolitics.com/understanding-universal-basic-income-178032e6090f /
When we think about the cost of UBI, we need to keep in mind that some programs will become redundant. This does not mean that the welfare state becomes redundant; it means that certain existing welfare programs may disappear and be replaced by UBI. So part of UBI will be funded in that way. The other thing that we need to keep in mind is that when people are free from the basic fear linked to income insecurity, this will impact crime, health, and other problems that do a lot of damage to society and also cost a lot to deal with. Prisons are expensive, and so many people’s lives are ruined because they are constantly under pressure from income insecurity. These costs must be factored in when looking at the bigger picture of implementing UBI. But this only addresses one part of the problem. The bigger question you ask about how expansive basic income would be can only be answered if we start thinking of different ways to fund basic income.
UBI uniquely increases entrepreneurship – welfare programs tradeoff with employment which means no growth happens.
Santens 16 Santens, Scott. "Universal Basic Income Is the Best Tool to Fight Poverty." The Blog. Huffington Post, 2 June 2016. Web. SJ DT’
Fully universal basic incomes have been tested in Namibia and India, where the results of both were more work, not less. The charity Give Directly has given basic incomes to people in Uganda and Kenya, where the results in both locations were more work, not less. Unconditional cash transfers are being used more frequently all over the world entirely because of their successes, and in places like Liberia and Lebanon where they ended up being like basic incomes, they too show a more work, not less. Perhaps most interesting of all the applicable evidence of cash without strings is the seemingly universal shift from typical wage labor to more self-employment and unpaid work. | 904,716 |
365,562 | 379,660 | WW NEG | https://docs.google.com/document/d/1SmGivVKzG7xM2IN_t7j66bv8PAV_Io5z35H5VQPBlQQ/edit?usp=sharing
Lemme know if this doesn't work | 904,720 |
365,563 | 379,661 | 0 - contact info | don't contact me | 904,721 |
365,564 | 379,663 | Contact for Flow and Go | Hey yall,
Max~-~~-~-1st speaker~-~~-~- [email protected]
Arnav~-~~-~-2nd speaker~-~~-~- [email protected]
Disclosure is fun; email me and max if u want to disclose
We are traditional; plz dont read progressive argumentation
Happy debating :) | 904,723 |
365,565 | 379,669 | Contact Info | Hello! Nicole and I are happy to disclose our AC/NC positions before round.
Hannah (she/her): 425-679-1538 or Hannah Huang on Messenger (messenger preferred)
Nicole (she/her): [email protected] or Nicole Zheng on Messenger | 904,732 |
365,566 | 379,697 | Possible Interps | Interpretation: All debaters must disclose all positions on the NDCA 2019-20 PF wiki via open-source – they don’t. | 904,760 |
365,567 | 379,709 | April AFF | Contention 1 is war with iran
Mr. Ayatollah said dip from iraq or else and they don’t like boats
Babak Dehghanpisheh, Reuters, "Iran Supreme Leader says Americans will be expelled from Iraq and Syria - Reuters", March 20, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-usa-khamanei-idUSKBN22T0PF
Trump recently vetoed a resolution which would stop him from taking action against iran
Al Jazeera, "Trump vetoes Congressional resolution restricting war with Iran | US-Iran escalation News | Al Jazeera", 6 May 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/05/trump-vetoes-congressional-resolution-opposing-war-iran-200506212943280.html
Aggressive foreign policy has put America and Iran on a collision course in two ways
COVID-19
Coronavirus is making war in the middle east even more likely:
Kaye 2020 (March 26, 2020 Dalia Dassa Kaye, Director, Center for Middle East Public Policy; Senior Political Scientist at RAND, “Covid-19 Impats on strategic dynamics in the middle east,” RAND https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/03/covid-19-impacts-on-strategic-dynamics-in-the-middle.html
Nuclear Subs
US military presence in the Strait of Hormuz pushes Iran to develop nuclear subs.
O’Connor, Newsweek, 4-17-2020 Tom, “IRAN SAYS IT WANTS NUCLEAR SUBMARINES TO POWER UP FLEET AFTER CONFRONTATION WITH U.S. NAVY” https://www.newsweek.com/iran-says-it-wants-nuclear-submarines-power-fleet-after-confrontation-us-navy-1498590,
Nuclear submarines require enriched uranium- escalating conflict with the US
Keck, The Diplomat, 2013
Zachary, “Iran’s Nuclear Submarine Gambit” https://thediplomat.com/2013/04/irans-nuclear-submarine-gambit/,
Withdrawing troops from Iran’s backyard reduces the probability of US-Iran war for two reasons.
1. First is provoking Iran.
Continued military presence risks miscalculation and provocation of Iran
Aboudouh 20(Ahmed Aboudouh, consultant editor at The Independent, April 11th 2020, The Independent, “The US is eager to leave Iraq soon and the coronavirus pandemic will accelerate it,” https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/us-troops-military-conflict-iraq-iran-trump-a9460496.html
Absent a US threat of invasion, Iran will cease its escalatory actions
Travino 13 (Rusty Travino, University of New Mexico, Fall 2013, “Is Iran an Off an an Offensives Realist or a Def es Realist or a Defensive Realist? A Theor e Realist? A Theoretical Reflection on Iranian Motives for Creating Instability” https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/022f/aacba045efbcaa6a477f44c1dbd67ddee03d.pdf
2. Second is a shift to diplomacy.
America’s approach to Iran has been overwhelmingly informed by aggression.
Jones 2011 confirms (Toby Jones, assistant professor of history at Rutgers University. December 22, 2011. The Atlantic. “Don't Stop at Iraq: Why the U.S. Should Withdraw From the Entire Persian Gulf”, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/12/dont-stop-at-iraq-why-the-us-should-withdraw-from-the-entire-persian-gulf/250389/ .
Withdrawing troops sends a signal that the US will shift to diplomacy, breaking the cycle of escalation
Harb 2019 (Imad K Harb, Imad K Harb is Director of Research and Analysis at Arab Center Washington DC. 16 Oct 2019. “Saudi Arabia and Iran may finally be ready for rapprochement,” Aljazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/saudi-arabia-iran-finally-ready-rapprochement-191015103242982.html.
A US-Iran war would be beyond devastating, causing nuclear holocaust
(Prof Michel Chossudovsky, 5-26-2018, "When War Games Go Live? "Simulating World War III"," Global Research, https://www.globalresearch.ca/when-war-games-go-live-preparing-to-attack-iran-simulating-world-war-iii/28542 | 904,774 |
365,568 | 379,736 | District NEG | =1NC=
====Ethan and I negate,====
====Resolved: The United States should increase its use of nuclear energy for commercial energy production====
====Contention 1: Saving Rural America====
====Rural America is in crisis.====
Ryan **Mccrimmon**, 11-14-20**19 Explains**, "The economic gap in rural America," POLITICO, https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-agriculture/2019/11/14/the-economic-gap-in-rural-america-782365
RURAL AREAS FACE TOUGHEST ECONOMIC CONDITIONS: Rural communities are facing population declines, slow
AND
in income between metro and non-metro areas has widened since 2010.
====Rural America may be in distress, but fortunately, renewables provide a strong opportunity for economic growth.====
Arjun **Krishnaswami**, 12-6-20**18**, "Renewable Energy Brings Economic Boost to Rural Communities," NRDC, https://www.nrdc.org/experts/arjun-krishnaswami/renewable-energy-brings-economic-boost-rural-communities
A new NRDC report released today documents the impact of clean energy on the rural
AND
policymakers at all levels would do well to accelerate and guide the transition.
====The economic opportunity that renewable energy provides to Rural America is luckily going to be bolstered by the recent US policy shift to renewables over nuclear and fossil fuels.====
Justin **Mikulka** **November 6, 2019** Desmog "Significant Renewable Energy Growth in U.S. Very Soon, New Estimates Predict," EcoWatch, https://www.ecowatch.com/renewable-energy-growth-us-2641236776.html
After revising its three-year U.S. power forecast, the Federal
AND
overall decrease in burning fossil fuels for power in the U.S.
====The economic benefits that renewables offer is threatened if you vote affirmative. The reason—nuclear power prevents renewable energy development. Lovins 19 articulates…====
Amory B. **Lovins**, Nov 18, **2019**, "Does Nuclear Power Slow Or Speed Climate Change?," Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/amorylovins/2019/11/18/does-nuclear-power-slow-or-speed-climate-change/
The bedrock economic principle of "opportunity cost" means you can't spend the same
AND
threatens to destroy the competitive regional power markets where renewables and efficiency win.
====Considering that market corruption in the nuclear sector jeopardizes the benefits of renewable development to rural areas, we urge you to negate, and move to our second contention… ====
====Contention 2: Not in My Back Yard====
====Contested energy projects fall victim to the not in my backyard, or NIMBY phenomenon,====
Mertz 18 ECONOMIC INCENTIVES: OR HOW I LEARNED TO STOP WORRYING AND ACCEPT NUCLEAR POWER Nicolas Mertz* J.D., Boston University School of Law, 2018; B.S. in Engineering, Nuclear Engineering, University of California, Berkeley, 2015. I would like to offer my sincerest thanks to Professor Alan Feld for his advice and guidance during the drafting of this Note. I would also like to thank the Boston University Law Review's editors and staff for their hard work and help throughout the publication process. https://www.bu.edu/bulawreview/files/2018/10/MERTZ.pdf
When the public fears projects with widespread benefits but concentrated costs, said fear manifests
AND
, solving the nuclear NIMBY problem will require looking beyond private corporate payouts.
====Problematically, when communities contest energy projects out of fear, the projects always fall to those with the smallest voice.====
Michael B. Gerrard 1994, "The Victims of Nimby," Scholarship Archive, https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/707/
Many leading voices in the environmental justice movement believe that minority communities are victims of
AND
and 'unacceptable' groups and threatens the social unity essential to harmony and progress."
====Nuclear power Plants are large, cumbersome, capital intense projects that most would prefer to keep as far from them as possible. The problem with this is that they inevitably get pushed down the chain to the communities who simply can't argue against them.====
====Because renewable energy saves Rural America, and Nuclear Power Plants disproportionately affect the economically disadvantaged, we urge you to negate.==== | 904,809 |
365,569 | 379,516 | Methods DA - Timmons | Extemp link. Was basically sand paradox = can't say racism bad.
Alston and Timmons 14 Jonathan Alston and Aaron Timmons , Vbriefly, "“Nobody Knows the Trouble I See” (And In National Circuit Lincoln-Douglas Debate, Does Anyone Really Care?) – Briefly", April 28 2014, https://www.vbriefly.com/2014/04/28/20144nobody-knows-the-trouble-i-see-and-in-national-circuit-lincoln-douglas-debate-does-anyone-really-care/
Allan G. Johnson ... that it is not?
Debate as a game is an insufficient paradigm to evaluate their arguments - You should hack against them for making blatantly racist arguments - it doesn’t matter if we concede a pre-empt or don’t win on the line by line that oppression is bad.
Alston and Timmons 2 (Timmons, Aaron - in 2000, Mr. Timmons was recognized as one of the top coaches of the 20th century. Mr. Timmons has been inducted into the Hall of Fame for the National Speech and Debate Association, the Texas Forensic Association, and the Tournament of Champions. Mr. Timmons is a full time teacher and has taught at debate workshops for over 30 years. Jonathan Alston - Jonathan Alston, an English teacher and debate coach at Newark’s Science Park High School. Alston, born and raised in Newark and educated at Science and Yale, recently guided his debaters to 1st, 2nd, and 3rd places in a national tournament at Berkeley. He has coached seven state debate champions.) Vbriefly, "“Nobody Knows the Trouble I See” (And In National Circuit Lincoln-Douglas Debate, Does Anyone Really Care?) – Briefly", April 28 2014, https://www.vbriefly.com/2014/04/28/20144nobody-knows-the-trouble-i-see-and-in-national-circuit-lincoln-douglas-debate-does-anyone-really-care/
Morris and Herbeck ... no neutral ground. | 904,600 |
365,570 | 379,538 | UBI - DA - Inflation v2 | The Leiberthal card is the only difference.
UBI causes hyperinflation – forces an increase in wages and prices, devastating those who didn’t re-enter the labor market and causes a vicious cycle of economic downturn.
Kolokotronis et al 17 (Alexander Kolokotronis is a Ph.D. student in political science at Yale University. He is the founder of Student Organization for Democratic Alternatives, and formerly the Student Coordinator of NYC Network of Worker Cooperatives and Worker Cooperative Development Assistant at Make the Road New York. Sam Nakayama is an independent writer based in Torrance, California) http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/40022-why-socialist-job-guarantees-are-better-than-universal-basic-income///NG
Economist Pavlina Tcherneva ... in declining output.
That collapses the US economy and spills over to the nations that trade with us.
Moreira 17 (Fabrizio, Contributor, 2-14-2017, "Hyperinflation In The US," HuffPost, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/hyperinflation-in-the-us-a-real-or-imagined-threat_us_58a31b10e4b0e172783aa0d7~-~-~-~~-~-NG)
Hyperinflation is simply ... in the world.
US econ key to heg - other countries will doubt our future Lieberthal 12
Lieberthal, Brookings John L. Thornton China Center director, 2012
(Kenneth, “The Real National Security Threat: America's Debt”, 7-10, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/07/10-economy-foreign-policy-lieberthal-ohanlon)
Alas, globalization and ... is not reestablished.
Economic collapse causes war which goes nuclear - multiple warrants
Harris and Burrows 9 (Counselor in the National Intelligence Council, the principal drafter of Global Trends 2025, member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis”, Washington Quarterly, http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr_burrows.pdf)
Increased Potential for ... eat-dog world. | 904,621 |
365,571 | 379,534 | UBI - CT - Coronavirus Recession Recovery Bad | Recruitment crisis now (paraphrase) read 18 - crisis now, most americans are ineligible due to obesity
RUSSEL READ, CIRCA, WJLA, "Why the US military is on the brink of a recruitment crisis | WJLA", February 16 2018, https://wjla.com/news/nation-world/why-the-us-military-is-on-the-brink-of-a-recruitment-crisis
WASHINGTON (CIRCA) - The ... across the globe.
Coronavirus will cause a surge of military recruitment by mid July - financial precarity is key - they solve and stop this surge
Kyle Rempfer, Army Times, "Army retention rises as economy slumps, but recruiting hasn’t seen a boom yet", May 20 2020, https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2020/05/20/army-retention-rises-as-economy-slumps-but-recruiting-hasnt-seen-a-boom-yet/
The U.S. unemployment ... longterm,’" he said.
Weak economies uniquely drive high qualified recruits to join the military
NPR 12 , NPR, "In Weak Economy, College Grads 'Surge' Into Military : NPR", August 18 2012, https://www.npr.org/2012/08/18/158505630/in-weak-economy-college-grads-surge-into-military
The weak economy ... stagnated as well."
Decreases in recruiting kills Trump’s Afghanistan strategy—long term troop commitments are key - a decrease in recruiting numbers signals we won’t be able to follow through
Munoz 9-20-17 - military correspondent for The Washington Times focusing on U.S. defense and national security policy, programs and operations. He was most recently a foreign correspondent with the Stars and Stripes Mideast bureau, based in Kabul, Afghanistan. Mr. Muñoz also reported on U.S. and foreign military operations in South America, Cuba and the Asia-Pacific region. His work has appeared in The Guardian, United Press International, Atlantic Media, Air Force Magazine, USNI News and elsewhere.
Carlo, Afghanistan welcomes Trump plan for long-term U.S. partnership, Washington Times, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/sep/20/hamdullah-mohib-afghanistans-ambassador-welcomes-d/
A country that ... around that now.”
That sparks nuclear war in South Asia – strong US presence in Afghanistan is vital to deter indopak
Datla 16 (Anand, consultant and former Defense Department civilian who has worked on strategic planning, policy, and operations + served as a professional staff member of the House Armed Services Committee, 6/19, "U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan: Implications for Regional Nuclear Rivalries," http://www.fletcherforum.org/home/2016/9/6/us-withdrawal-from-afghanistan-implications-for-regional-nuclear-rivalries)
The security challenges ... in the region. | 904,614 |
365,572 | 379,550 | Disclosure | A Interpretation: Debaters must, on the page with their name and the school they attend, disclose all taglines, full citations, and the first and last three words of the pieces of evidence read in their cases on the NDCA wiki at least one hour before the round if they have read that case before. | 904,630 |
365,573 | 379,541 | Texas | Interpretation: All debaters must be in Texas
Violation – they’re not in Texas
Standards:
1 – health: check the weather – Texas is the move when it comes to good weather conditions –check out Sherman Texas.
Hamer 19 https://www.cheatsheet.com/culture/retirees-cities-best-weather-year-round.html/ SJCP//JG
All three publications agree that Texas is a wise state to choose for retirement if weather is a high priority. January lows are pleasant throughout the state, and the summers are warm in places like Galveston or Richardson. But Kiplinger thinks Sherman, Texas, will be a future retirees best bet. It has reasonable year-round weather conditions — although slightly on the warmer side during the summer months — and an excitingly low cost of living.
Good weather key to good health – bad weather is a risk to health, natural disasters and weather-related illness prove.
2 monetary disparities – the Hamer 19 evidence I just read indicates there is a low cost of living in Texas – this allows poor, small school debaters to go to more tournaments since it leaves more money for tournament expenses – that’s in independent voter for inclusion since it precludes participation
Fairness is a voter—debate is a competitive activity that requires objective evaluation. Drop the debater—the abuse has already occurred and my time allocation has shifted—also the shell indicts your whole aff—justifies severance which skews my strat. Use competing interps—leads to a race to the top since we figure out the best possible norm and avoids judge intervention since there’s a clear briteline. No RVIs—
a. Baiting—they’ll just bait theory and prep it out—justifies infinite abuse and results in a chilling effect
b. It’s not logical—you don’t reward them for meeting the burden of being fair. Logic is a meta constraint on all args because it definitionally determines whether an argument is valid. | 904,624 |
365,574 | 379,558 | Our Policy on Theory | ==If you have a norm that you think is good/bad in debate (i.e. disclosure, paraphrasing, etc) tell us BEFORE THE ROUND.==
We think that a lot of the time people run theory to get easy wins, not to set a norm or stop abuse. IF YOU ACTUALLY BELIEVE IN SETTING NORMS AND STOPPING ABUSE, DM us on discord, IG, or email ALL INTERPS YOU WANT US TO MEET OR WE AUTO MEET ON ALL OF THEM.
Another reason is that people have different norms in debate (i.e. one team thinks paraphrasing is bad while another thinks paraphrasing is good, one team is fine with gendered language while another team isn't.) Because of this, its risky to run certain cases or do certain things in the debate space. We want to be accommodating to everyone we debate, so send us your interps that you want us to meet.
How to reach us:
Holden:
EMAIL - [email protected]
Taha:
EMAIL: [email protected]
We believe theory is a good thing. However, we also believe theory should only be used when its necessary to check back abuse. Thats why we think addressing people before round is a more productive way of setting norms, and using the debate space as a platform to debate the topic
PS: If ur interp is "Team must do X Y minutes before the round, send us the interp before Y minutes
Example: Teams must disclose 30 minutes before the round
Tell us you wanna disclose around 35 minutes before the round | 904,636 |
365,575 | 379,559 | Contact Info | Whats good ~-~- hit me up if u wanna disclose
preferably on fb messenger: Ben Kirsch
https://www.facebook.com/ben.kirsch.355
or j email me:
[email protected] | 904,637 |
365,576 | 379,547 | 0-Disclosure | TLDR; disclose in cite boxes with first and last couple words, open source with round reports, don't put 'analytic', and don't be sketchy pre-round
Interpretation: Debaters must disclose all constructive positions on open source with highlighting on the 2019-20 NDCA PF wiki after the round in which they read them.
A Interpretation: Debaters must, on the page with their name and the school they attend, disclose all taglines, full citations, and the first and last three words of the pieces of evidence read in their cases on the NDCA wiki at least one hour before the round if they have read that case before.
Interpretation: For each position on their corresponding 2019-20 NDCA PF wiki page, debaters must disclose a summary of each analytic argument in their cases.
Interpretation: Debaters must disclose all possible disclosure theory interps on the 2019-20 NDCA PF wiki at least 30 minutes before the round.
Interpretation: Debaters must disclose round reports on the 2019-20 NDCA PF wiki for every round they have debated this season. Round reports disclose which positions (AC, NC, K, T, Theory, etc.) were read/gone for in every speech.
Interpretation: If debaters disclose full text, they must not post the full text of the cards in the cite box, but must upload an open source document with the full text of their cards.
Interpretation: Debaters must disclose all constructive positions in cite boxes on the 2019-20 NDCA LD wiki. To clarify, they can’t put “see open source.”
Interpretation: The affirmative must, upon flipping for sides, tell the negative what specific affirmative position they will be reading, within ten minutes of flipping for sides.
Interpretation: The affirmative must, upon the release of tournament pairings, tell the negative what specific affirmative position they will be reading, within ten minutes.
Interpretation: Debaters, on their corresponding NDCA PF wiki page, must disclose their contact information. To clarify, this can be an email address, Facebook, number, etc.
Interp: For every broken position that has evidence with paywalls, debaters must either
a open source disclose all taglines, citations, and evidence read
or
b disclose tags, complete citations, and the full text from each piece of evidence
All disclosure must be occur on the NDCA wiki under the correct side and their own name. To clarify, there needs to be some way to see the full text of your evidence if it has paywalls.
Interp: Debaters must disclose all broken plan flaws on the NDCA wiki.
Interp: Debates must disclose each full tag line for cards disclosed on the NDCA wiki. | 904,627 |
365,577 | 379,567 | TOC Neg v1 | =1NC=
====We negate: ====
====Iran is a revisionist power that has been attempting to upend the status quo in the Middle East to export its ideology and influence. Speyer of the London School of Economics explains in 2015:====
Jonathon Speyer, 2015 "Is it Iran’s Middle East now?," Fathom https://fathomjournal.org/is-it-irans-middle-east-now/
Iran’s strategic goal is to emerge as the dominant power in the Middle East and, eventually, the entire Islamic
...AND...
f Shia Arab populations, as becomes apparent when taking a closer look at Iran’s main commitments in the region.
====Thankfully Iran’s ambitions are faltering. Political Scientist Huda Raouf finds in 2019:====
Huda Raouf, 7-12-2019, "Iranian quest for regional hegemony: motivations, strategies and constrains," No Publication, https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/REPS-02-2019-0017/full/html
The study concludes that there are obstacles completely in front of achieving the Iranian quest to regional hege
...AND...
rved as Iran’s proxy air force in Iran’s fight against ISIS, further helping to cement Iran’s regional hegemony.
====Has made dominance over the gulf impossible. As a result, even though tensions remain high, Mohammed Ayoob of James Madison University writes in January:====
Mohammed Ayoob, 1-20-2020, "Neither the U.S. or Iran Want a Full-Scale War. Here's Why.," National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-east-watch/neither-us-or-iran-want-full-scale-war-heres-why-115421
The Iranian reaction to Soleimani’s assassination clearly indicated that Tehran was not interested in inflicting
...AND...
r governmental expenditures and subsidies to poorer sections of society thus maintaining support for the regime.
====And beyond that, because of the regional balance of power the United States establishes, Fassihi of The New York Times explains this October:====
Farnaz Fassihi and Ben Hubbard, 10-4-2019, "Saudi Arabia and Iran Make Quiet Openings to Head Off War," New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/04/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-iran-talks.html
After years of growing hostility and competition for influence, Saudi Arabia and Iran have taken steps toward in
...AND...
e conflict. That solution, in turn, could subvert Mr. Trump’s effort to build an Arab alliance to isolate Iran.
====This is because the US strategy of placing forces in the region can deter Iranian expansionism. Political Scientist Daniel Byman of Brookings writes in 2020:====
Daniel L. Byman, 1-16-2020, "Is deterrence restored with Iran?," Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/01/16/is-deterrence-restored-with-iran/
Some of these factors clearly bolster deterrence of Iran. The United States enjoys vast military superiority ove
...AND...
perception was no doubt reinforced by the U.S. decision to award medals to the Navy officers commanding the ship.
====Because of this, while Iran may act aggressively, they have been unable to establish themselves as a regional power and they remain in a stalemate with regional rivals like Saudi Arabia. Withdrawing troops would reverse this trend, upend the balance of power, and push Iran towards increased influence. Knights of the Washington Institute concluded in 2011: ====
Knights, Washington Institute, 2011, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus111.pdf
As Washington seeks to engage Tehran to create a more normal relationship with the Islamic Republic, it cannot a
...AND...
q Security Agreement), the main external obstacles to expanded Iranian influence in Iraq will have been removed.
====There are two reasons why Iranian expansion inevitably leads to war. First, is miscalculation with the gulf states. Iranian influence in Iraq makes the gulf state fearful. Arango of the New York Times concludes in 2017: ====
Tim Arango, 7-15-2017, "Iran Dominates in Iraq After U.S. ‘Handed the Country Over’," New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/15/world/middleeast/iran-iraq-iranian-power.html
In that contest, Iran won, and the United States lost. Over the past three years, Americans have focused on the
...AND...
ria, where they fight under the command of Iranian officers in defense of the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad.
====Haidar of the Middle East Center explains in 2018: ====
Ribale Sleiman-Haidar, 6-18-2018, "Saudi Domestic Uncertainties and the Rivalry with Iran," Middle East Centre, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2018/06/18/saudi-domestic-uncertainties-and-the-rivalry-with-iran/
The prince’s strong anti-Iranian rhetoric and multiple promises to roll back Iranian influence in Bahrain, Yemen
...AND...
l glue that had bound Saudis together under the umbrella of religious zeal, authenticity and moral high ground.
====Saudi Arabia would thus be forced to militarize in order to ensure security from Iran. Brooks of the Belfer Center writes in 2013:====
Stephen G. Brooks, 2013, "Why America Should Not Retrench," Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/why-america-should-not-retrench
Revoking security guarantees would make the world and the United States less secure. In Asia, Japan and South K
...AND...
rom the solution its proponents advertise, retrenchment would likely exacerbate the problem of American decline.
====Critically, Kenneth Pollack writes in 2015:====
Kenneth M Pollack, 3-2-2015, "Iran’s regional policy after a nuclear deal," Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2015/03/02/irans-regional-policy-after-a-nuclear-deal/
Second, the Saudis may choose to ramp up their support to various Sunni groups fighting Iran’s allies and proxie
...AND...
ssion. If the United States is not there to reassure the Gulf states and deter Iran, things could get very ugly.
====For this reason, Seth Crospey of Foreign Policy writes in 2019====
Seth Cropsey, Gary Roughead, 10-31-2019, andquot;A U.S. Withdrawal Will Cause a Power Struggle in
the Middle East,andquot; Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/17/us-withdrawal-power-struggle-middle-east-china-russia-iran/
====,potentially killing millions. Second, is an Israeli first strike. Iranian expansion terrifies Israel. Citing Israeli Defense Force officers, Ahronheim writes 2020====
Anna Ahronheim January 8, 2020 18, 1-4-2020, "If US leaves the region, Israel will eventually go to war with Iran," The Jerusalem Post | JPost, https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/If-US-leaves-from-the-region-Israel-will-eventually-go-to-war-with-Iran-613446
Should the United States withdraw its forces and Iran continue on its path through Iraq and Syria, Israel will e
...AND...
raelis need to continue their policies to “minimize Iran’s regional insurgency – and that’s feasible,” he said.
========
====Deutsche Welle writes in 2020:====
Paraphrased
Deutsche Welle www.Dw, 02-01-2020, "Israel-Iran conflict to be major Middle East issue in 2020," DW, https://www.dw.com/en/israel-iran-conflict-to-be-major-middle-east-issue-in-2020/a-51600787
====An Israeli strike is the greatest threat to the Middle East. ====
====Turse of Rutgers University writes in 2013 ====
Paraphrased
Nick Turse, 5-13-2013, "What Would Happen if Israel Nuked Iran," Mother Jones, https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/05/nuclear-strike-tehran-israel/ | 904,647 |
365,578 | 379,588 | NGOs PMCs NC | C1- NGOs
DOD cooperates with NGOs
Lynn Lawrey, Summer 2009, "Guide to Nongovernmental Organizations for the Military" Center for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine, https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/ngo-guide.pdf
Security planning is … violent extremist groups
Military does humanitarian things in coop with NGOs
Vergun, David. “Humanitarian Operations Save Lives, Build Goodwill.” U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 15 Apr. 2019, www.defense.gov/Explore/Features/story/Article/1814289/humanitarian-operations-save-lives-build-goodwill/.
The Defense Department … actual disaster strikes.
Military provides intel information that allow humanitarian missions to happen
Lynn Lawrey, Summer 2009, "Guide to Nongovernmental Organizations for the Military" Center for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine, https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/ngo-guide.pdf
Militaries have a monopoly …NGOs have almost no capacity.
Empirics prove - in Kuwait the US military ran an operations center that brought together 80 NGOs for logistical information to deploy humanitarian projects
Lynn Lawrey, Summer 2009, "Guide to Nongovernmental Organizations for the Military" Center for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine, https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/ngo-guide.pdf
There have been … NGOs force multipliers.
Military provides security to NGOs in all Humanitarian operations
DANIEL J. O’DONOHUE, 5-14-2019, "Foreign Humanitarian Assistance" No Publication, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_29.pdf
In addition to …and medical clinics
NGOs are less security oriented, can’t protect themselves without the military
Glenn Penner, 2013, "A Framework for NGO-Military Collaboration," No Publication, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/a-framework-for-ngo-military-collaboration
NGO-Military Interaction … can be improved upon.
Without the military, NGOs would have failed - laundry list of reasons
Lynn Lawrey, Summer 2009, "Guide to Nongovernmental Organizations for the Military" Center for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine, https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/ngo-guide.pdf
Militaries, too, … NGOs have almost no capacity.
NGOs were key to the Iraqi water crisis - gave access to clean drinking water for 2 million people
OCHA 17 (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 4-18-2017, "Iraq: UN and partners scale up humanitarian response to growing needs," https://www.unocha.org/story/iraq-un-and-partners-scale-humanitarian-response-growing-needs, MSCOTT)
As fighting continues … likely to continue.
C2- PMCs
When the US military leaves they empirically transition to a more distributed military presence - that’s a lily pad PMC.
Grossman 9 professor @ Evergreen State College (Zoltan, professor of geography, Evergreen State College, Olympia Washington, “Imperial Footprint: America’s Foreign Military Bases”, Global Dialogue, Vol 11, Winter/Spring 2009, http://www.worlddialogue.org/print.php?id=450
A key aspect … against one another.
US withdrawal causes contractors to fill in – Iraq empirics prove
Dunigan 14 (Molly is a political scientist at the RAND Corporation and an adjunct professor in Carnegie Mellon University's Department of Social and Decision Sciences. She is the recipient of numerous awards, including a U.S. Institute of Peace Jennings Randolph Peace Fellowship, a U.S. State Department Foreign Language Areas Studies Fellowship, and an International Studies Association Catalytic Research Grant. Her education includes: Ph.D. in political science, Cornell University; M.A. in international relations, Cornell University; B.A. in political science, Vassar College. "The future of US military contracting: current trends and future implications." International Journal 69.4 (2014): 510+. Academic OneFile. Web. 15 Feb. 2015. http://iissonline.net/the-future-of-us-military-contracting-current-trends-and-future-implications/)
US employment of … national armed forces.
These PMCs threaten State Military power by controlling national intelligence and waging wars based on the whims of corporations
Bowers ’11. Devon Douglas-Bowers. Politics and Government Department Chair at the Hampton Institute. May 22, 2011. The Threat of Private Military Companies. Global Research. http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-threat-of-private-military-companies/24896 GK.
PMCs threaten state … military action abroad.
PMCs in the region caused on of the biggest debacles of the Iraq War
Global Policy Forum, 3-11-2013, "PMSCs in Iraq," No Publication, https://www.globalpolicy.org/pmscs/50154-iraq.html
The use of private … politicized Middle East. (Tom Dispatch)
High use of PMCs cause exponential conflict and nuclear war
RUSSELL 2009 (James, Senior Lecturer, National Security Affairs, “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East”, IFRI Security Studies Center, Proliferation Papers, Spring, https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/enotes/proliferation-papers/strategic-stability-reconsidered-prospects-escalation-and
Strategic stability …the entire world.
Any shift to smaller bases is a multiplier for the probability of future wars which is an impact magnifier
Swanson 7/12/2015 (David, reporter, “What Are Foreign Military Bases For?”, https://worldbeyondwar.org/what-are-foreign-military-bases-for/ //Cornell Debate
Vine also tells … the clock up a little. | 904,669 |
365,579 | 379,583 | Per Pupil Spending AC | UQ
Garland
Sarah Garland, 8-17-2014, "Why is a Reagan-era report driving today's education reform?," Hechinger Report, https://hechingerreport.org/report-1980s-driving-todays-education-reform/
The new evaluation system, along with many of the other changes roiling American education, can be traced directly back to a set of old ideas – as old as Curtis’s tenure at Curtis High. The push for new teacher evaluations, new standards, new curricula, and new tests began with “A Nation at Risk,” a report published in 1983 that busy educators like Curtis usually don’t have much time to think about. But in many ways, the report has defined the careers of a generation of educators like her – and the educations of a generation of American public school students. “A Nation at Risk,” commissioned by the Reagan administration in 1981, was a scathing appraisal of public education. Its authors – a federal commission of leaders from government, business, and education – spent two years examining American schools, and they were appalled at what they found. Standardized test and SAT scores were falling. The United States was dropping behind competitors such as Japan. The public education system was so bad that not only were US students unprepared to join an increasingly high-tech workforce, 23 million Americans were functionally illiterate. Worst of all, the report concluded, Americans were complacent as their schools crumbled, threatening the very “fabric of society.” “We always argued that it would be a Democrat who would be the one to move the ball down the field” — Joe Williams, director of Democrats for Education Reform One of the most famous lines in the report said: “If an unfriendly foreign power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war.” The document set off panic in a once self-satisfied nation and launched a movement to transform the public education system. A generation later, its effects are powerful. The excoriation of American schooling is what most people remember, but its actual legacy is ingrained in public education today. The report’s five proposed solutions – improving content, raising standards, overhauling the teaching profession, adding time to the school day and year, and improving leadership and fiscal support – are clear in current reform. They can be seen in the spread of the Common Core standards, a set of streamlined but intense new standards introduced in 2009 that, though controversial, are still in use in more than 40 states; in new teacher ratings based partly on standardized test scores; and in the invention and rise of charter schools with longer school days and no union contracts. Initially embraced by a coalition of conservatives and liberals, the solutions offered in “A Nation at Risk” stoked a backlash among many on the left who argued that its criticisms of public education were over the top and that its solutions ignored poverty and inequity in the system. But the Republican-driven revolution is being driven home, as never before, by a Democratic president
Prothero
Arianna Prothero, 2-14-2017, "Growth in Charter School Population," Education Week, https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2017/02/15/growth-in-charter-school-population.html
For the first time, the number of students enrolled in charter schools has surpassed 3 million nationwide, finds the latest annual report from the National Alliance for Public Charter Schools. The group, which advocates for charter schools at the federal and state levels, finds there are now more than 6,900 charter schools nationally, with around 3.1 million students attending them. That would mean that charter enrollment has nearly tripled in the last 10 years. However, it still makes up a small fraction of overall K-12 public school enrollment nationally—around 5 percent. Growth in Charter School Population An annual study of charter schools finds a steady rise in the number of students attending charter schools in the last decade. Source: National Alliance for Public Charter Schools The report comes as the U.S. Senate has confirmed as Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos, a strong supporter of expanding charter schools. As part of its report, the charter group surveyed a national sample of 1,000 parents of school-age children. It found 78 percent of parents with charter schools in their community and 73 percent of parents without charter schools favor opening one in their community. One in 10 of the parents said a charter would be their first choice of school.
Sarah
Sarah Butrymowicz, 1-6-2014, "Some schools seen as charters in name only," Seattle Times, https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/some-schools-seen-as-charters-in-name-only/
SAN CARLOS, Calif. — In cities across the country, charter schools have become known for anxiety-fueled lotteries, bitter disputes over sharing buildings with traditional schools and teaching methods that are sometimes unorthodox. But in some states, charter schools have increasingly become associated with something more basic yet elusive: money. In California — a state besieged by budget cuts, where per-pupil spending is among the lowest in the nation — dozens of schools converted to charters in the 1990s and 2000s in search of a funding boost. Across the country, charter schools have access to hundreds of thousands of dollars in federal startup grants. In California, until recently, charters got the state’s average per-pupil allotment; that meant schools in districts with below-average funding could receive additional money by chartering.
L1
Foreman
James Forman Jr., 2007, "Do Charter Schools Threaten Public Education? Emerging Evidence from Fifteen Years of a Quasi-Market for Schooling" Georgetown University, https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1444andcontext=facpub
Nor are they a repudiation of the belief-held by Finn and other prominent choice advocates- that a decentralized education mar- ket is preferable because government-run schools are wasteful and poorly organized. But charter advocates who demand level funding with traditional public schools do relinquish the claim that "states could also save money by expanding dramatically the number of charter schools," or that charter schools "can produce quality schooling at a fraction of the cost of traditional public schools.,,203 Given the fear such claims gener- ated among advocates of increased funding for schools, their abandon- ment should provide them some relief. 2. Charter Schools as Allies for Increased Funding for All Schools So far I have argued that charter advocates are relinquishing claims that they save money and adopting a stance that demands additional funding. The final piece of my argument is the claim that there is good reason to suspect that, in advocating for more money for themselves, charter schools will necessarily become proponents of greater education funding for all schools, including district schools. My argument here is in some tension with one strand of the literature critiquing privatization in other contexts. Some scholars of various forms of privatization have em- phasized how withdrawal from the public system can undermine support for it. Sheryll Cashin's argument about the growth of private housing communities is representative: she claims that members of such commu- nities will iook out for themselves but not the larger public.204 David Sklansky makes a similar point regarding the growth of private police forces, questioning why the residents of an affluent community would vote for increased funding of the public police if they are already well- protected by their private guards.205 But while allowing self-interested political constituencies to compete with the public sector will sometimes undermine support for the public system, the structure of education funding provides a reason to suspect that this might not occur in the education context. Charter school funding is derived using a formula based on what district schools spend per child.206 Charter schools, therefore, have an incentive to argue for increased funding for district schools, because this increases their own per pupil allotment from the state. Some charter educators have identified this dynamic. Eric Rofes and Lisa Stulberg, for example, argue: Since charter school funding is so closely tied to district funding, raising public funding in urban and other low-income districts will help all public schools. We should not see charters as having a separate constituency from district schools, nor should we use our support of charter schooling as a stand-in for a broader commit- ment to public school change. In fact, we would be surprised if those who have argued against additional financing of public schools and then founded charters have not had their minds changed about the profound ways in which education is short- changed in our national and state budgets.207 As the Fordham report exemplifies, currently charters are clamoring for equal funding. If they succeed, they will have every incentive to join traditional public school advocates and argue for increased funding for all schools. To see why this is so, consider the case of Chris Whittle, the founder of Edison Schools. Whittle began Edison on the premise that existing government funding for education was sufficiently generous that he could make a profit running schools.20X After ten years in the business, he now argues for increased public funding.209 This is not sur- prising. More funding will allow him to run better schools, or increase his profits, or both. But given the structure of education financing, in or- der to achieve his goals, he needs to convince the government to allocate greater sums not only to his schools, but to all schools. In other words, it is in the self-interest of Whittle and other charter operators to argue for increased funding for district schools.210 On one level it should not be surprising that by creating a wide range of for- and non-profit firms who are invested in running successful schools and depend on public funding, privatization may produce an ad- ditional political constituency for public education. It is well established in a variety of contexts that private firms might act in the political arena to maintain public programs.Zll In the context of charter schools, how- ever, this dynamic has been largely overlooked.212 One reason, perhaps, is that the structure of the debate surrounding how to improve our nation's struggling schools has long pitted choice versus additional resources.Z13 Defenders of district schools typically ar- gue against choice by saying that a better approach to reform involves giving district schools additional funding. In return, charter advocates seeking to justify a new charter law are more or less compelled to argue against the merits of extra spending, lest legislators adopt that solution instead. Charter supporters therefore make claims that inefficiently or- ganized monopoly schools will simply waste any extra money. But as charters become an established fact, rather than a competing policy proposal, the structure of the debate necessarily changes. With charter laws on the books and charter schools in operation, charter advocates no longer have the same incentive to argue against increased funding-now, after all, some of the additional money will go to their schools. As char- ters grow, in other words, the choice versus money argument may evolve from an either/or to a both/and formulation. This evolution is even more likely as charter school operators recognize the limitations of private phi- lanthropy as an adequate substitute for public funding. Finally, if charters do become an additional constituency for education funding, they will be an especially well-placed one. The groups most associated with arguments for increased funding are the unions of teach- ers and other education professionals. Many critics, especially- though not exclusively-those in the Republican Party, see these organizations as an obstacle to reform. Perhaps the most extreme example of the hos- tility was demonstrated when President Bush's former Education Secre- tary Rod Paige called the National Education Association (NEA) "a ter- rorist organization."z14 By contrast, Republicans have supported the charter school movement, promoted individual successful schools, and lauded individual charter leaders. Arguments by charter operators that schools need greater funding may resonate with a different constituency than would the same argument coming from the American Federation of Teachers. v. CONCLUSION Overall, the evidence from fifteen years of this quasi-market for schooling suggests that charter schools do not threaten public education. I have argued that the fear that charters would threaten traditional pub- lic schools by cream-skimming the privileged has not been borne out. And I have put forward a number of reasons to suspect that charter schools may in fact become allies with district schools in an effort to increase education funding.
Kirst
Kirst, Michael W. “Politics of Charter Schools: Competing National Advocacy Coalitions Meet Local Politics*.” Stanford University, May 2006, ncspe.tc.columbia.edu/working-papers/OP119.pdf.
An earlier AFT study alleging regular public schools had greater test score gains than charter schools ignited a firestorm of criticism by charter supporters (American Federation of Teachers, 2004). Andrew Rotherham of the Progressive Policy Institute called the AFT report a “hatchet job.” Caroline Hoxby told the Harvard Education Letter, that the AFT report was “the worst study” ever seen on charter schools.” This criticism culminated in advertisement in the New York Times signed by 31 university scholars. The authors reacted by labeling charter supporters “barricade-rushers” and “zealots” (Carnoy et al., 2005). The politics surrounding charters is so supercharged that it is doubtful any study will go unchallenged by either side. For the foreseeable future, charters will engender dueling policy studies and evaluations that will be part of the political debate, but produce scant consensus. Supporters of choice are vocal and publicized, and they are organized locally and nationally. A 2003 analysis by the American Association of School Administrators listed the individuals, corporations, and foundations that support, either fully or in part, some aspect of choice schools, as shown in Table 3. Their assets are considerable, and they fund research, lobbying, and legal fees. National publicity groups, such as the National Charter School Alliance founded in 2003, are organized to project favorable news of choice reforms.
L2
Barnum
Matt Barnum, 6-11-2019, "Critics of charter schools say they’re hurting school districts. Are they right?," Chalkbeat, https://www.chalkbeat.org/2019/6/11/21108318/critics-of-charter-schools-say-they-re-hurting-school-districts-are-they-right
Researchers looking at the issue in North Carolina, New York, Pennsylvania, and in two cases, California, have come to similar conclusions: As charters grow, the fixed costs of educating district students haven’t gone anywhere, even though the students have. Some advocates have a particularly evocative term for those dollars: “stranded costs.” There’s a big caveat, though: this logic only applies when the overall number of students in a district is flat or declining. If our hypothetical school district has a population of school-age kids growing fast enough to make up for the students leaving for charters, the expansion of charter schools might not hurt financially. Charters may even help, if they allow district schools to keep existing seats filled while avoiding overcrowding and the need to build new schools. That may be one reason why some states that have seen the greatest population growth, like Arizona, Colorado, Florida, and Utah, have also seen charters boom.
Shen
Yilan Shen, February 2011, "Charter School Finance" NCSL, https://www.ncsl.org/documents/educ/charterschoolfinance.pdf
If a student transfers from a traditional public school to a charter school, advocates argue the full amount of money that would have been spent for that student at the tradition- al public school should move to the charter school. Char- ter advocates hold that districts receive funds to educate a certain number of students. When that number declines, it makes sense that their funding also should decline. To give districts time to adjust to decreasing funding, some states have adopted “hold harmless” provisions. Allocating additional funds to districts that lose students to charter schools helps them adjust to lower funding levels. Massa- chusetts, for instance, provides extra funds to a district that loses a student to a charter school for six years, gradually decreasing the funding during that time. Over the six year period after a student moves to a charter school, the district will have received a total of more than twice the state’s annual per-pupil contribution.5 These types of provisions soften the effects of losing per-pupil revenue on traditional school districts. However, charter schools were originally en- visioned to be drivers of competition. If the goal is to follow the original charter concept, some argue these provisions may dampen true competition.
May
Jay F. May, April 2014, "Charter School Funding" University of Arkansas, http://www.uaedreform.org/wp-content/uploads/charter-school-funding-report.pdf
All other state-controlled funding is not guaranteed to follow students, and much of it does not follow students. One example is any form of “hold harmless” funding, whereby a district receives the same level of funding at higher enrollment levels even when its enrollment decreases. Hold harmless funding is discussed below in the section of focus area enrollment. Trends in Focus Area Enrollment Figure M28 shows net and sector enrollment for district and charter students by focus areas, between FY03 and FY11. The enrollment table shows the fluctuation in urban city and metropolitan counties over the past eight years. Column one shows a net focus area gain or loss. Five focus areas experienced enrollment increases for both district and charter schools. Twenty-four focus areas reported district losses, and in five of these locations, charter enrollment growth was larger than district losses, so the net enrollment figure was positive. In 19 focus areas, districts lost students over and above charter enrollment increases. The last column indicates whether hold harmless funding was allocated to focus area districts to transition to lower enrollment levels. States offer such funding for several reasons, but primarily to recognize that districts bear fixed costs that do not vary with student enrollment increases or decreases. By its very definition, when districts receive hold harmless funding states are increasing funding inequity, and are not letting funding follow students. Districts receiving hold harmless funding do so at the expense of districts and charter schools that have increasing enrollments. Transition aid or “hold harmless” funding is a good example of a payment made to districts that does not benefit charter students. Hold harmless funding is designed to fill the funding gap left as either students leave a district or changes to the funding formula would disadvantage certain districts. The drop in district enrollment has impacted many districts across the U.S., and some states support districts transitioning to lower levels of enrollment by continuing to pay districts as if all students were still enrolled in district schools. Hold harmless language is found in statute in Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, and Texas. States with hold harmless provisions have varying reasons for transitioning districts to lower levels of enrollment.
I/L
https://www.statista.com/statistics/203118/expenditures-per-pupil-in-public-schools-in-the-us-since-1990/
Baker
Bruce D. Baker, 11-30-2016, "Exploring the consequences of charter school expansion in U.S. cities," Economic Policy Institute, https://www.epi.org/publication/exploring-the-consequences-of-charter-school-expansion-in-u-s-cities/
Of course, this strategy ignores the complexities of municipal bankruptcy proceedings, and the contractual, social, and moral obligations for the stewardship of publicly owned capital (and other) assets and responsibility to current and retired employees. Advocates for charter expansion typically assert that charter expansion causes no financial harm to host districts. The logic goes, if charter schools serve typical students drawn from the host district’s population, and receive the same or less in public subsidy per pupil to educate those children, then the per pupil amount of resources left behind for children served in district schools either remains the same or increases. Thus, charter expansion causes no harm (and in fact yields benefits) to children remaining in district schools. The premise that charter schools are uniformly undersubsidized is grossly oversimplified and inaccurate in many charter operating contexts (Baker 2014c). In addition, numerous studies find that charter schools serve fewer students with costly special needs, leaving proportionately more of these children in district schools.
NCES
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator_cmb.asp
In 2016–17, public schools spent $12,794 per pupil on current expenditures (in constant 2018–19 dollars), a category that includes salaries, employee benefits, purchased services, and supplies. Current expenditures per pupil were 20 percent higher in 2016–17 than in 2000–01, after adjusting for inflation. During this period, current expenditures per student increased from $10,675 in 2000–01 to $12,435 in 2008–09, decreased between 2008–09 and 2012–13 to $11,791, and then reached $12,794 in 2016–17. Total expenditures for public elementary and secondary schools in the United States in 2016–17 amounted to $739 billion, or $14,439 per public school student enrolled in the fall (in constant 2018–19 dollars).1 Total expenditures included $12,794 per pupil in current expenditures, which include salaries, employee benefits, purchased services, tuition, and supplies. Total expenditures per pupil also included $1,266 in capital outlay (expenditures for property and for buildings and alterations completed by school district staff or contractors) and $379 for interest on school debt.
Census
Us Census Bureau, 5-21-2019, "U.S. School Spending Per Pupil Increased for Fifth Consecutive Year," United States Census Bureau, https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2019/school-spending.html
MAY 21, 2019 — The amount spent per pupil for public elementary and secondary education (prekindergarten through 12th grade) for all 50 states and the District of Columbia increased by 3.7 to $12,201 per pupil during the 2017 fiscal year, compared to $11,763 per pupil in 2016, according to new tables released today by the U.S. Census Bureau. The increase in spending in 2017 was due in part to an overall increase in revenue for school systems in the 50 states and the District of Columbia. In 2017, public elementary and secondary education revenue, from all sources, amounted to $694.1 billion, up 3.4 from $671.2 billion in 2016. Other highlights include: Of the 50 states, New York ($23,091), the District of Columbia ($21,974), Connecticut ($19,322), New Jersey ($18,920) and Vermont ($18,290) spent the most per pupil in 2017. Of the 100 largest school systems based on enrollment in the United States, the five school systems with the highest spending per pupil in 2017 were New York City School District in New York ($25,199), Boston City Schools in Massachusetts ($22,292), Baltimore City Schools in Maryland ($16,184), Montgomery County School District in Maryland ($16,109), and Howard County School District in Maryland ($15,921). Maryland had one additional school system in the top 10, making it four of the top 10 school systems in the United States. To see the top 10 school districts by current spending per pupil, see the graphic Top 10 Largest School Districts by Enrollment and Per Pupil Current Spending. Within public school systems, New Mexico (14.4), Mississippi (14.1), Alaska (14.0), Arizona (13.7) and South Dakota (12.8) received the highest percentage of their revenues from the federal government, while public school systems in New Jersey (4.1), Massachusetts (4.3), Connecticut (4.3), Minnesota (5.2) and New York (5.3) received the lowest. These statistics come from the 2017 Annual Survey of School System Finances. Education finance data include revenues, expenditures, debt and assets (cash and security holdings) of elementary to secondary (prekindergarten through 12th grade) public school systems. Statistics cover school systems in all states and include the District of Columbia. These statistics are not adjusted for cost of living differences between geographic areas.
Impact
Barnum
Matt Barnum, 8-13-2019, "4 new studies bolster the case: More money for schools helps students," Chalkbeat, https://www.chalkbeat.org/2019/8/13/21055545/4-new-studies-bolster-the-case-more-money-for-schools-helps-low-income-students
Since then, the research hits have just kept on coming. Four new studies from different parts of the country have come to similar conclusions. In Texas and in Wisconsin, researchers found that spending more translated to higher test scores and boosted college enrollment. Two other studies — one looking at California and another looking across seven states — found that spending more money didn’t affect test scores in more affluent areas, but did boost test scores in higher-poverty districts. “All four studies find that increased school spending improves student outcomes,” said Jackson. The findings come as school spending is on the upswing across the country, with states continuing to rebound from the Great Recession and policymakers respond to pressure from striking teachers to invest more in schools. The new research indicates that students are likely to benefit from those increases, even as notable disparities between states like Mississippi and Massachusetts, and between some neighboring school districts, linger. The studies don’t provide clear answers on how to best use new resources, though, and they focus on whether pure increases in spending lead to better outcomes. Some pricey initiatives — particularly school turnaround efforts nationally and in New York City — have fallen short of expectations. That suggests it does matter how money is spent. Still, the latest research offers one solution for policymakers, advocates, and philanthropists who have been vexed by flat national test scores and the disappointing results from certain high-profile reform initiatives. “Overall, this study provides convincing evidence that spending increases can have a significant impact on districts serving impoverished students,” the researchers in the multi-state study wrote. Here’s what the latest studies show.
Martin
Carmel Martin, Ulrich Boser, Meg Benner, and Perpetual Baffour, 11-13-2018, "A Quality Approach to School Funding," Center for American Progress, https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education-k-12/reports/2018/11/13/460397/quality-approach-school-funding/
Money matters for student achievement. A growing body of evidence shows that increased spending on education leads to better student outcomes. When states invest in their public schools and create more equitable school finance systems, student achievement levels rise, and the positive effects are even greater among low-income students. States, districts, and schools must spend their money wisely, targeting their funds toward evidence-based interventions, such as high-quality early childhood programs. Overall, efforts to cut funding for education or services that support children are short-sighted and defy current research. Students in high-poverty communities continue to have less access to core academic services that increase student outcomes. Core services that have a significant influence on instructional quality and student performance are systematically unavailable to students in low-income schools relative to students in higher-income schools. These critical services include early childhood education, quality teachers, and exposure to rigorous curriculum. Districts, states, and the federal government play crucial roles in equity. States will have the greatest opportunity to guarantee that all students under their purview have access to a high-quality education, but local, state, and federal governments all play important roles in minimizing inequities in education funding. Historically, the federal government has focused its investment in supporting education and related services on the most at-risk children, and it can uniquely address inequities in per-pupil spending across states. While students within the same school district can receive starkly different levels of funding, the widest variation in per-pupil spending exists across state boundaries. The differences in average state per-pupil spending ranges from around $5,700 to $17,000.12
Carey
Kevin Carey and Elizabeth A. Harris, 12-12-2016, "It Turns Out Spending More Probably Does Improve Education," No Publication, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/12/nyregion/it-turns-out-spending-more-probably-does-improve-education.html
That study was conducted by C. Kirabo Jackson of Northwestern, Rucker C. Johnson from the University of California at Berkeley and Claudia Persico, then a graduate student at Northwestern and now an assistant professor at the University of Wisconsin. They examined outcomes for about 15,000 people, born between 1955 and 1985, and found that for poor children, a 10 percent increase in per-pupil spending each year of elementary and secondary school was associated with wages that were nearly 10 percent higher, a drop in the incidence of adult poverty and roughly six additional months of schooling. “The notion that spending doesn’t matter is just not true,” Mr. Jackson said. “We found that exposure to higher levels of public K-12 spending when you’re in school has a pretty large beneficial effect on the adult outcomes of kids, and that those effects are much more pronounced for children from low-income families.”
Northwestern
Northwestern University, March 2017, "The Benefits of Increased School Spending" POLICY RESEARCH BRIEF, https://www.ipr.northwestern.edu/documents/policy-briefs/school-spending-policy-research-brief-Jackson.pdf
OVERVIEW Does money matter for schools? This controversial topic of debate originates with the influential 1966 Coleman Report that found no connection between how much money is spent per student and test performance. IPR economist Kirabo Jackson leads a study that takes a fresh approach beyond just examining K–12 standardized test results to observing long-term effects, such as how much students earn as adults. Examining changes in K–12 public school spending due to school finance reforms in 28 states, Jackson and his colleagues find strong ties between increased school spending and positive outcomes. FINDINGS Increased spending raises graduation rates and boosts adult income. When a district’s per-pupil spending increased by 10 percent, those exposed to the increases across all 12 school-age years, i.e., those 5 years old or younger at the time of the increase, completed more years of school—and as adults, they earned more and were less likely to be poor. For example, in 2012 schools spent $12,600 on average per pupil. Jackson’s findings suggest that a permanent 10 percent spending increase—or an increase of $1,260 per student overall—would lead to 7 percent higher wages at age 40 and a 3 percentage- point lower likelihood of adult poverty among those exposed to the spending increases across all 12 years of their public school education. Low-income students benefit most from increased spending. On average, these students spent about six more months in school, were 10 percentage points more likely to graduate high school, had 13 percent higher wages as adults, and were 6 percentage points less likely to live in poverty. Farther out, their family income increased by 17 percent. It matters how the money is spent. Schools primarily spent the extra money on instruction and support services. When a district increased spending by $100 due to reforms, spending on instruction increased by about $70, and spending on support services increased by about $40 on average. This higher spending was associated with lower student-to-teacher ratios, longer school years, and increased teacher and other support salaries. These benefits, Jackson and his colleagues explain, might help schools attract and retain more qualified instructors, counselors, and social workers. The estimated benefits of increased school spending justify the higher spending. Jackson and his colleagues calculate an approximate cost-benefit ratio of 1-to-2. For every additional dollar invested in schools, there is a return on investment of $2 in additional future earnings by the student. IPR economist Kirabo Jackson focuses on the economics of education, with research covering teacher labor markets, teacher effectiveness, and how school spending affects student outcomes. POLICY TAKEAWAYS • When per-pupil spending increased, students had: • higher graduation rates • higher adult wages • a lower likelihood of adult poverty • Low-income students benefited most from increased spending. School Spending Improves Long-Term Outcomes, Especially for Low-Income Students METHODOLOGY The school finance reforms that began in the early 1970s and accelerated in the 1980s caused some of the most dramatic changes in the structure of K–12 education spending in U.S. history, with state supreme courts overturning property tax-based school finance systems in 28 states between 1971 and 2010. Jackson and his colleagues track the large spending increases that resulted from these cases to examine if children who were in school during or after the reforms were passed have better outcomes than children who were too old to be affected by the reforms. They look at educational attainment and adult earnings to assess the impact of the school finance reforms rather than standardized test scores, which are not necessarily good measures of learning or likely economic success. FACTS AND FIGURES • When school spending rose a total of 10 percent across all 12 years of public school, graduation rates increased 7 percent. • Students exposed to this spending increase had 7 percent higher wages as adults and a 3 percentage-point lower risk of adult poverty. • Low-income students benefited the most from increased spending: They experienced a 10 percent increase in high school graduation rates, 13 percent higher wages at age 40, and a 6 percentage point lower likelihood of living in poverty. • For every additional dollar spent on schools, the researchers calculated a $2 return on investment
Strauss
Strauss. V, 2018, October 15. Perspective | How are America's public schools really doing? Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2018/10/15/how-are-americas-public-schools-really-doing/
Politicians are not alone. Policy advocates and philanthropists routinely decry the state of American public education, generally as a prelude to their prescribed reforms. The XQ “Super School” project, for instance — a venture funded by billionaire Laurene Powell Jobs — explained its objective by making the case that we need to “scrap the blueprint and revolutionize this dangerously broken system.” One can’t even open a book about education without being told how bad things are. A quick search on the Google Books Ngram Viewer indicates that the likelihood of encountering the phrase “failing schools” was 100 times greater in 2008 than it was in 1975. This rhetoric has been galvanizing for highly interventionist reform efforts. Every year, billions of federal and philanthropic dollars are channeled into school reform, and every president since George H.W. Bush has made education an administrative priority. The irony, however, is that most schools may not need reforming. No school is perfect, of course. And there are many that require our attentions and investments. But sweeping, large-scale reform is hardly the remedy for what ails our most vulnerable schools — the schools where our poorest and least advantaged students are all so often concentrated together. Disruption, which is so highly lauded in the private sector, is exactly what those schools don’t need. Instead, what they need is courageous policy addressing issues like school integration and compensatory funding. So, how are America’s schools doing? In most cases, just fine. Better than ever.
Chen
https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2019/05/largest-annual-increase-public-school-spending-since-2008.html
There are around 48.6 million children enrolled in public elementary and secondary education in the United States. But how much are we spending on their education? The nation spent a total of $694.3 billion on public school systems in fiscal year 2017, up 4.4 from FY 2016, according to Census Bureau statistics released today. It was the largest yearly increase in total expenditure since 2008. School systems are spending more on teachers. Instructional salaries was the largest overall expenditure category: $229.2 billion in FY 2017, accounting for 33.0 of total spending. The increase in public school spending is happening at a time when the gross domestic product (GDP) reached an all-time high in 2017, according to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. The five states that had the highest percentage increases in total expenditure from FY 2016 to FY 2017 are the District of Columbia (13.7), Nevada (9.5), Texas (7.6), Idaho (7.6) and Tennessee (6.9). While total expenditure increased by 4.4, total revenue increased by 3.4 compared to 2016. The total expenditure for elementary and secondary education included 88.0 in current spending ($610.9 billion), and 9.0 in capital outlay ($62.2 billion). Current spending is comprised of expenses for day-to-day activities, including salaries for teachers and most other school system employees. School systems are spending more on teachers. Instructional salaries was the largest overall expenditure category: $229.2 billion in FY 2017, accounting for 33.0 of total spending. Overall, per pupil expenditure in the United States is up 3.8 from 2016, to $12,214 per student. Spending on instructional activities made up 60.6 ($370.5 billion) and support services made up 34.3 ($209.4 billion). These statistics come from the 2017 Census of Governments: Finance — Annual Survey of School System Finances. Education finance data include revenues, expenditures, debt and assets (cash and security holdings) of elementary and secondary (prekindergarten through 12th grade) public school systems. | 904,664 |
365,580 | 379,592 | Xu - Mullen Aff | Inherency
Ingber
Sasha Ingber, 9-19-2018, NPR, “31 Percent Of U.S. Households Have Trouble Paying Energy Bills” https://www.npr.org/2018/09/19/649633468/31-percent-of-u-s-households-have-trouble-paying-energy-bills
Nearly a third of households in the United States have struggled to pay their energy bills, the Energy Information Administration said in a report released Wednesday. The differences were minor in terms of geography, but Hispanics and racial minorities were hit hardest. About one in five households had to reduce or forgo food, medicine and other necessities to pay an energy bill, according to the report. "Of the 25 million households that reported forgoing food and medicine to pay energy bills, 7 million faced that decision nearly every month," the report stated.
Maitra
Maitra 7/25 (Ramtanu Maitra, currently South Asian Analyst at EIR News Services Inc, Associate Editor at 21st Century Science and Technology, intelligence analyst at EIR News Service, BE in civil engineering from Bengal Engineering and Science University, MS in engineering from Cooper Union for the Advancement of Science and Arts), Executive Intelligence Review, “Expand Nuclear Power for the World’s Survival”, July 25th, 2014, http://www.larouchepub.com/other/2014/4129expand_nuclear.html
Over 1.2 billion people—20 of the world’s population—are today without access to electricity, and almost all of them live in developing countries. This includes about 550 million in Africa and over 400 million in India. It is incumbent upon all the world leaders to bring this number to zero at the earliest possible date, and thus provide these people with a future to look forward to within a span of 25 years. Can this be done with fossil fuels, wind, and solar power? The answer is a resounding “No!” The only way world can meet the power requirements of one and all is by fully exploiting the highest energy-flux density power generation achieved through nuclear fission now, and by starting to move to an even higher level by using hydrogen as fuel in generating power through nuclear fusion. As of March 11, 2014, in 31 countries, 435 nuclear power plant units with an installed electric net capacity of about 372 GW were in operation, and an additional 72 plants with an installed capacity of 68 GW in 15 countries were under construction. Altogether, the existing nuclear power plants provide a shade over 11 of the world’s installed generating capacity. Most of the other 89 comes from the burning of fossil fuels.
Link 1
Stacy
Thomas F. Stacy and George S. Taylor, PhD., June 2015, “The Levelized Cost of Electricity from Existing Generation Resources”, Institute for Energy Research, https://instituteforenergyresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/ier_lcoe_2015.pdf.
WASHINGTON – Today, the Institute for Energy Research released a first-of-its-kind study calculating the levelized cost of electricity from existing generation sources. Our study shows that on average, electricity from new wind resources is nearly four times more expensive than from existing nuclear and nearly three times more expensive than from existing coal. These are dramatic increases in the cost of generating electricity. This means that the premature closures of existing plants will unavoidably increase electricity rates for American families. Almost all measures of the cost of electricity only assess building new plants–until now. Using data from the Energy Information Administration and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, we offer useful comparison between existing plants and new plants. America’s electricity generation landscape is rapidly changing. Federal and state policies threaten to shutter more than 111 GW of existing coal and nuclear generation, while large amounts of renewables, such as wind, are forced on the grid. To understand the impacts of these policies, it is critical to understand the cost difference between existing and new sources of generation. The following chart shows the sharp contrast in the cost of electricity from existing sources vs. new sources: Click here to view the full study. This study was conducted by Tom Stacy, a former member of the ASME Energy Policy Committee, and George Taylor, PhD, the director of Palmetto Energy Research. The source of the calculations used in this study is a compilation of data reported by the generators themselves to FERC and EIA.
Murray
Brian Murray. "The Paradox of Declining Renewable Costs and Rising Electricity Prices". Forbes, June 17, 2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/brianmurray1/2019/06/17/the-paradox-of-declining-renewable-costs-and-rising-electricity-prices/#1511769761d5. (JL)
The release this spring of a working paper by economists at the Energy Policy Institute at University of Chicago (EPIC) ignited a debate on the cost-effectiveness of renewable mandates. The paper examined the effects of renewable portfolio standards (RPS) programs, which have been adopted by 29 states and Washington DC, finding that these policies have raised retail prices considerably and have reduced CO2 emissions only modestly. We will return to that debate in a moment, but for now let’s ask - if the cost of renewable power generation is falling, how can their use cause retail prices to rise? This paradox is even more striking when we consider that more renewables actually can drive down the wholesale prices that electricity generators are paid. Because variable renewable energy (VRE) resources wind and solar incur virtually all of their costs up front and incur no fuel costs to produce electricity, the average cost of VRE generation is much higher than the marginal cost, which is close to zero. Much electricity in the US is transacted in states with competitive wholesale electricity markets. Marginal costs set prices in competitive markets, which means that the penetration of VRE can push down wholesale power prices, even more so when the VRE resource is receiving a per unit subsidy, as is the case with wind. This is something that has placed financial pressure on legacy resources such as coal, nuclear and natural gas plants that do incur fuel costs and other marginal costs of generation. It would seem, then, that higher renewables should lead to lower electricity prices. But wholesale prices are paid to the generators; the retail prices paid by final customers reflect the full cost of delivering electricity. Generation, though the largest component, only accounts for 44 percent of the total cost. The other main costs affected by renewables integration are transmission and distribution of electricity to its point of use, reliability costs to maintain stable voltage and frequency, maintenance needed to keep the system running, depreciation and taxes. Unit costs, however, tell only part of the story. Individual power generators, whether conventional power plants or wind farms, seldom operate in isolation; they are each part of a larger grid-connected system that aggregates power across generators to deliver power to a region of consumers. VRE’s effect on system costs will depend in part on the cost of the electricity that it is displacing, which in turn depends on the location and timing of its deployment. Wind generation at night in the Midwest may be displacing coal, while solar generation in the afternoon in California may be displacing natural gas, each with different cost profiles. And to handle the intermittency of VRE, system operators need to activate ramping resources more frequently to meet demand. These flexible plants are typically more expensive to operate and thus higher deployment can raise total system costs even as renewable costs decline. Moreover, these resources must be kept on hand to provide reliable capacity in a market characterized by more intermittent supply and the costs of maintaining this capacity is passed along to consumers. To cost-effectively scale up renewables, they must be sited where they are most productive – in places with plenty of sun, wind and land. That is typically not close to the population centers where users locate, so more transmission infrastructure is required to connect supply and demand. This may be having an effect on system costs. Between 2012 and 2017, when non-hydro renewables generation grew by 77 percent, transmission costs rose by 50 percent. While not all transmission cost increases nationally can be attributed to renewables expansion – maintaining old lines and modernizing for grid reliability are other reasons – there are notable cases where renewables are driving transmission investments. The Competitive Renewable Energy Zone project in Texas, for example, invested $7 billion to connect wind generation in sparsely populated west Texas to the state’s population centers.
Ringle ~-~-- *** ____ ***
John. C. Ringle, (John C. Ringle of Corvallis is professor emeritus of nuclear engineering at Oregon State University), “Reintroduction of reactors in US a major win” November 13, 2010, http://robertmayer.wordpress.com/2010/11/21/reintroduction-of-reactors-in-us-a-major-win/
Small nuclear reactors will probably be the mechanism that ushers in nuclear power’s renaissance in the U.S. Nuclear plants currently supply about 20 percent of the nation’s electricity and more than 70 percent of our carbon-free energy. But large nuclear plants c ost $8 billion to $10 billion and utilities are having second thoughts about how to finance these plants. A small modular reactor (SMR) has several advantages over the conventional 1,000-megawatt plant: 1. It ranges in size from 25 to 140 megawatts, hence only costs about a tenth as much as a large plant. 2. It uses a cookie-cutter standardized design to reduce construction costs and can be built in a factory and shipped to the site by truck, railroad or barge. 3. The major parts can be built in U.S. factories, unlike some parts for the larger reactors that must be fabricated overseas. 4. Because of the factory-line production, the SMR could be built in three years with one-third of the workforce of a large plant. 5. More than one SMR could be clustered together to form a larger power plant complex. This provides versatility in operation, particularly in connection with large wind farms. With the variability of wind, one or more SMRs could be run or shut down to provide a constant base load supply of electricity. 6. A cluster of SMRs should be very reliable. One unit could be taken out of service for maintenance or repair without affecting the operation of the other units. And since they are all of a common design, replacement parts could satisfy all units. France has already proved the reliability of standardized plants. At least half a dozen companies are developing SMRs, including NuScale in Oregon. NuScale is American-owned and its 45-megawatt design has some unique features. It is inherently safe. It could be located partially or totally below ground, and with its natural convection cooling system, it does not rely on an elaborate system of pumps and valves to provide safety. There is no scenario in which a loss-of-coolant accident could occur. Tests conducted on a one-third model of the NuScale reactor at Oregon State University have confirmed the effectiveness of this cooling system. Small reactors haven’t been built for commercial use since the very early days of nuclear power development, when the very first power reactors were of this size. For more than 50 years, however, small reactors have been built and operated successfully and safely by the Navy in submarines and aircraft carriers. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission anticipates getting applications from two to three companies within the next two years for approval of SMR designs.
Bowden
Bowden, David. "French Nuclear Power Lowers Electricity Prices." Sky News. Sky News, 5 July 2016. Web. 26 Aug. 2016. https://uk.finance.yahoo.com/news/french-nuclear-power-lowers-electricity-031412961.html?guccounter=1andguce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8andguce_referrer_sig=AQAAAGI2ifdtrL_3lMFuFkNkgp3FdZ-VPzdWfRkxq08PALhb4tIYhSRrWswj19sOVF4rMWXZmxEzHaACehBR6WrLwl9p8lpVzaAK_yr_NvXYSrjV9Vy8UAFgd8q4wIgQEoBIKJOHfwPCHdR-eA11kzcBi9uteuudGs8nk2_uLaSkrqp5
Why? At least in part it's because most of France's power comes from nuclear, so spikes in oil, gas or other fuel prices make little difference. The power station at Nogent-sur-Seine houses two of France's 58 nuclear reactors which, between them, account for almost three quarters of the country's electricity generation. Compare that with just 16 reactors in the UK pumping in less than a fifth of our wattage and it's one of is the reasons why the French have the lowest electricity bills in Europe and we have some of the highest. For power station director Catherine Bach, the answer is simple. France embraced nuclear power wholeheartedly 40 years ago. She said: "In France, in the 1960s, effectively after the oil crisis, France chose nuclear and today we have an energy mix which is a little more than 70 of electricity coming from nuclear energy, other renewable fuels such as hydroelectric around 15, the rest is from fossil fuels." In the control room a handful of staff monitor every aspect of the plant's operation. When it is working flat out, it produces more than 1,300 megawatts of power. Next door, the giant steam turbines churn out the electricity, fuelled by the nuclear reactors and cooled by the waters of the River Seine. Last year, this power station produced 17 billion kilowatts of electricity, enough to power two million homes. Add in the output of the 56 other reactors and France is a net exporter of electricity and the UK is one of the customers.
Link 2
Pinker
Joshua S. Goldstein, Staffan A. Qvist and Steven Pinker. "Opinion". New York Times,, 4-6-2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/06/opinion/sunday/climate-change-nuclear-power.html. (JL)
As young people rightly demand real solutions to climate change, the question is not what to do — eliminate fossil fuels by 2050 — but how. Beyond decarbonizing today’s electric grid, we must use clean electricity to replace fossil fuels in transportation, industry and heating. We must provide for the fast-growing energy needs of poorer countries and extend the grid to a billion people who now lack electricity. And still more electricity will be needed to remove excess carbon dioxide from the atmosphere by midcentury. Where will this gargantuan amount of carbon-free energy come from? The popular answer is renewables alone, but this is a fantasy. Wind and solar power are becoming cheaper, but they are not available around the clock, rain or shine, and batteries that could power entire cities for days or weeks show no sign of materializing any time soon. Today, renewables work only with fossil-fuel backup. Germany, which went all-in for renewables, has seen little reduction in carbon emissions, and, according to our calculations, at Germany’s rate of adding clean energy relative to gross domestic product, it would take the world more than a century to decarbonize, even if the country wasn’t also retiring nuclear plants early. A few lucky countries with abundant hydroelectricity, like Norway and New Zealand, have decarbonized their electric grids, but their success cannot be scaled up elsewhere: The world’s best hydro sites are already dammed. Small wonder that a growing response to these intimidating facts is, “We’re cooked.” But we actually have proven models for rapid decarbonization with economic and energy growth: France and Sweden. They decarbonized their grids decades ago and now emit less than a tenth of the world average of carbon dioxide per kilowatt-hour. They remain among the world’s most pleasant places to live and enjoy much cheaper electricity than Germany to boot. They did this with nuclear power. And they did it fast, taking advantage of nuclear power’s intense concentration of energy per pound of fuel. France replaced almost all of its fossil-fueled electricity with nuclear power nationwide in just 15 years; Sweden, in about 20 years. In fact, most of the fastest additions of clean electricity historically are countries rolling out nuclear power.
Goldstein
Joshua S. Goldstein and Staffan A. Qvist, 1-11-2019, "Only Nuclear Energy Can Save the Planet," Wall Street Journal, https://www.wsj.com/articles/only-nuclear-energy-can-save-the-planet-11547225861
Fosmark is one of Sweden’s eight nuclear power reactors. The country repealed a ban on building new ones in 2010.Photo: Hans Blomberg/Handout/REUTERS What the world needs is a carbon-free source of electricity that can be ramped up to massive scale very quickly and provide power reliably around the clock, regardless of weather conditions—all without expanding the total acreage devoted to electric generation. Nuclear power meets all of those requirements. When Sweden and France built nuclear reactors to replace fossil fuel in the 1970s and 1980s, they were able to add new electricity production relative to their GDPs at five times Germany’s speed for renewables. Sweden’s carbon emissions dropped in half even as its electricity production doubled. Electricity prices in nuclear-powered France today are 55 of those in Germany.
Kessides
Ioannis N. Kessides and Vladimir Kuznetsov 12, Ioannis is a researcher for the Development Research Group at the World Bank, Vladimir is a consultant for the World Bank, “Small Modular Reactors for Enhancing Energy Security in Developing Countries”, August 14, Sustainability 2012, 4(8), 1806-1832, https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/4/8/1806/htm.
SMRs offer a number of advantages that can potentially offset the overnight cost penalty that they suffer relative to large reactors. Indeed, several characteristics of their proposed designs can serve to overcome some of the key barriers that have inhibited the growth of nuclear power. These characteristics include 23,24: * • Reduced construction duration. The smaller size, lower power, and simpler design of SMRs allow for greater modularization, standardization, and factory fabrication of components and modules. Use of factory-fabricated modules simplifies the on-site construction activities and greatly reduces the amount of field work required to assemble the components into an operational plant. As a result, the construction duration of SMRs could be significantly shorter compared to large reactors leading to important economies in the cost of financing. * • Investment scalability and flexibility. In contrast to conventional large-scale nuclear plants, due to their smaller size and shorter construction lead-times SMRs could be added one at a time in a cluster of modules or in dispersed and remote locations. Thus capacity expansion can be more flexible and adaptive to changing market conditions. The sizing, temporal and spatial flexibility of SMR deployment have important implications for the perceived investment risks (and hence the cost of capital) and financial costs of new nuclear build. Today’s gigawatt-plus reactors require substantial up-front investment—in excess of US$ 4 billion. Given the size of the up-front capital requirements (compared to the total capitalization of most utilities) and length of their construction time, new large-scale nuclear plants could be viewed as “bet the farm” endeavors for most utilities making these investments. SMR total capital investment costs, on the other hand, are an order of magnitude lower—in the hundreds of millions of dollars range as opposed to the billions of dollars range for larger reactors. These smaller investments can be more easily financed, especially in small countries with limited financial resources. SMR deployment with just-in-time incremental capacity additions would normally lead to a more favorable expenditure/cash flow profile relative to a single large reactor with the same aggregate capacity—even if we assume that the total time required to emplace the two alternative infrastructures is the same. This is because when several SMRs are built and deployed sequentially, the early reactors will begin operating and generating revenue while the remaining ones are being constructed. In the case of a large reactor comprising one large block of capacity addition, no revenues are generated until all of the investment expenditures are made. Thus the staggered build of SMRs could minimize the negative cash flow of deployment when compared to emplacing a single large reactor of equivalent power 25. * • Better power plant capacity and grid matching. In countries with small and weak grids, the addition of a large power plant (1000 MW(e) or more) can lead to grid stability problems—the general “rule of thumb” is that the unit size of a power plant should not exceed 10 percent of the overall electricity system capacity 11. The incremental capacity expansion associated with SMR deployment, on the other hand, could help meet increasing power demand while avoiding grid instability problems. * • Factory fabrication and mass production economies. SMR designs are engineered to be pre-fabricated and mass-produced in factories, rather than built on-site. Factory fabrication of components and modules for shipment and installation in the field with almost Lego-style assembly is generally cheaper than on-site fabrication. Relative to today’s gigawatt-plus reactors, SMRs benefit more from factory fabrication economies because they can have a greater proportion of factory made components. In fact, some SMRs could be manufactured and fully assembled at the factory, and then transported to the deployment site. Moreover, SMRs can benefit from the “economies of multiples” that accrue to mass production of components in a factory with supply-chain management. * • Learning effects and co-siting economies. Building reactors in a series can lead to significant per-unit cost reductions. This is because the fabrication of many SMR modules on plant assembly lines facilitates the optimization of manufacturing and assembly processes. Lessons learned from the construction of each module can be passed along in the form of productivity gains or other cost savings (e.g., lower labor requirements, shorter and more efficiently organized assembly lines) in successive units (Figure 6). Moreover, additional learning effects can be realized from the construction of successive units on the same site. Thus multi-module clustering could lead to learning curve acceleration. Since more SMRs are deployed for the same amount of aggregate power as a large reactor, these learning effects can potentially play a much more important role for SMRs than for large reactors 26. Also, sites incorporating multiple modules may require smaller operator and security staffing. * • Design simplification. Many SMRs offer significant design simplifications relative to large-scale reactors utilizing the same technology. This is accomplished thorough the adoption of certain design features that are specific to smaller reactors. For example, fewer and simpler safety features are needed in SMRs with integral design of the primary circuit (i.e., with an in vessel location of steam generators and no large diameter piping) that effectively eliminates large break LOCA. Clearly one of the main factors negatively affecting the competitiveness of small reactors is economies of scale—SMRs can have substantially higher specific capital costs as compared to large-scale reactors. However, SMRs offer advantages that can potentially offset this size penalty. As it was noted above, SMRs may enjoy significant economic benefits due to shorter construction duration, accelerated learning effects and co-siting economies, temporal and sizing flexibility of deployment, and design simplification. When these factors are properly taken into account, then the fact that smaller reactors have higher specific capital costs due to economies of scale does not necessarily imply that the effective (per unit) capital costs (or the levelized unit electricity cost) for a combination of such reactors will be higher in comparison to a single large nuclear plant of equivalent capacity 22,25. In a recent study, Mycoff et al. 22 provide a comparative assessment of the capital costs per unit of installed capacity of an SMR-based power station comprising of four 300 MW(e) units that are built sequentially and a single large reactor of 1200 MW(e). They employ a generic mode to quantify the impacts of: (1) economies of scale; (2) multiple units; (3) learning effects; (4) construction schedule; (5) unit timing; and (6) plant design (Figure 7). To estimate the impact of economies of scale, Mycoff et al. 22 assume a scaling factor n = 0.6 and that the two plants are comparable in design and characteristics—i.e., that the single large reactor is scaled down in its entirety to ¼ of its size. According to the standard scaling function, the hypothetical overnight cost (per unit of installed capacity) of the SMR-based power station will be 74 percent higher compared to a single large-scale reactor. Based on various studies in the literature, the authors posit that the combined impact of multiple units and learning effects is a 22 percent reduction in specific capital costs for the SMR-based station. To quantify the impact of construction schedule, the authors assume that the construction times of the large reactor and the SMR units are five and three years respectively. The shorter construction duration results in a 5 percent savings for the SMRs. Temporal flexibility (four sequentially deployed SMRs with the first going into operation at the same time as the large reactor and the rest every 9 months thereafter) and design simplification led to 5 and 15 percent reductions in specific capital costs respectively for the SMRs. When all these factors are combined, the SMR-based station suffers a specific capital cost disadvantage of only 4 percent as compared to the single large reactor of the same capacity. Thus, the economics of SMRs challenges the widely held belief that nuclear reactors are characterized by significant economies of scale 19.
IL
Maitra
Maitra 7/25 (Ramtanu Maitra, currently South Asian Analyst at EIR News Services Inc, Associate Editor at 21st Century Science and Technology, intelligence analyst at EIR News Service, BE in civil engineering from Bengal Engineering and Science University, MS in engineering from Cooper Union for the Advancement of Science and Arts), Executive Intelligence Review, “Expand Nuclear Power for the World’s Survival”, July 25th, 2014, http://www.larouchepub.com/other/2014/4129expand_nuclear.html
Over 1.2 billion people—20 of the world’s population—are today without access to electricity, and almost all of them live in developing countries. This includes about 550 million in Africa and over 400 million in India. It is incumbent upon all the world leaders to bring this number to zero at the earliest possible date, and thus provide these people with a future to look forward to within a span of 25 years. Can this be done with fossil fuels, wind, and solar power? The answer is a resounding “No!” The only way world can meet the power requirements of one and all is by fully exploiting the highest energy-flux density power generation achieved through nuclear fission now, and by starting to move to an even higher level by using hydrogen as fuel in generating power through nuclear fusion. As of March 11, 2014, in 31 countries, 435 nuclear power plant units with an installed electric net capacity of about 372 GW were in operation, and an additional 72 plants with an installed capacity of 68 GW in 15 countries were under construction. Altogether, the existing nuclear power plants provide a shade over 11 of the world’s installed generating capacity. Most of the other 89 comes from the burning of fossil fuels.
Fleischmann
Chuck Fleischmann 2011 “Small Modular Reactors Could Help With U.S. Energy Needs”, American Physical Society, Vol. 6, No. 2, October 2011, http://www.aps.org/publications/capitolhillquarterly/201110/backpage.cfm
The timely implementation of small reactors could position the United States on the cutting edge of nuclear technology. As the world moves forward in developing new forms of nuclear power, the United States should set a high standard in safety and regulatory process. Other nations have not been as rigorous in their nuclear oversight with far reaching implications. As we consider the disastrous events at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear facility, it is imperative that power companies and regulatory agencies around the world adequately ensure reactor and plant safety to protect the public. Despite terrible tragedies like the natural disaster in Japan, nuclear power is still one of the safest and cleanest energy resources available. The plan to administer these small reactors would create technologically advanced U.S. jobs and improve our global competitiveness. Our country needs quality, high paying jobs. Increasing our competitive edge in rapidly advancing industries will put the United States in a strategic position on the forefront of expanding global technologies in the nuclear arena.
Dichristopher
Tom Dichristopher, 3-21-2019, “The US is losing the nuclear energy export race to China and Russia. Here’s the Trump team’s plan to turn the tide,” CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/21/trump-aims-to-beat-china-and-russia-in-nuclear-energy-export-race.html
The Trump administration is preparing a new push to help American companies compete in the race to build the next generation of nuclear power plants around the world — a competition the U.S. is currently losing. In doing so, the administration also aims to push back on the growing dominance of Russia and China in the space, preventing them from expanding their international influence by forging long-lasting nuclear ties with foreign powers. The State Department plans to expand cooperation with countries pursuing atomic energy long before those nations ever purchase a nuclear reactor. By facilitating early stage talks, the U.S. intends to put American companies first in line to build tomorrow's fleet of nuclear power plants overseas. We still lead the world in nuclear technology innovation. Our big challenge is taking that incredible IP and those incredible technological innovative breakthroughs and bringing them to market. To be sure, the Energy and Commerce departments actively facilitate U.S. nuclear cooperation with their foreign counterparts. But the State Department now intends to push the issue in talks at the highest levels of government, making it clear that Washington believes cooperation in the nuclear realm is central to its strategic relationships. But even with the State Department lending its diplomatic heft, winning nuclear energy contracts won't be easy. ...New plan takes shape During the address, Ford outlined State's plan to help American companies compete with Chinese and Russian firms. The department will more closely coordinate nuclear cooperation efforts across agencies and ramp up informal, non-binding talks with nations that might pursue nuclear energy technology. The goal is to expand the number of countries engaged in ongoing communication with U.S. government agencies, nuclear energy companies and researchers. The State Department will do this by signing nuclear cooperation memorandums of understanding with the countries. Under the MOUs, American experts would help foreign nations develop the apparatus necessary to accommodate a nuclear energy industry. That includes creating safety, security and non-proliferation protocols, as well as an independent regulatory system. That will make more countries "fully prepared to take advantage of the emerging technologies and coming innovations in reactor design and other areas that are being pioneered in the United States," Ford said. That marks a change from the past, said Ted Jones, director for national security and international programs at the Nuclear Energy Institute, the industry's main trade group. "We've long urged greater coordination among the many agencies involved in U.S. nuclear exports and a genuinely strategic approach to U.S. nuclear cooperation," he said. "The State Department's plans for nuclear cooperation MOUs indicate that this Administration is moving in the right direction." There has long been an instinct within U.S. foreign policy circles to limit nuclear energy exports, if only to reduce the risk that those transfers will open the door to nuclear weapons proliferation. But if the U.S. continues to lose sales to other countries, its ability to set strong nonproliferation standards around the world will fade. Primary coolant pumps assembled by St Petersburg's Central Mechanical Engineering Design Bureau, a member of the Atomenergomash company group, and shipped to the Belarusian nuclear power plant. The State Department now plans to address nuclear energy cooperation in high-level meetings with presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers, a senior State Department official told CNBC. The department is currently drawing up priorities with two major considerations in mind, the official said. First, the State Department is identifying geostrategic opportunities, with a focus on the parts of the world where the U.S. is at risk of losing bids to rivals like Russia and China. Second, the government will consult nuclear energy companies about where they see the brightest opportunities and the best chances of closing deals. Next generation technology The industry is already on board with State's new initiative. The Nuclear Energy Institute regularly polls members on where they see opportunities overseas. In the survey that went out a few weeks ago, NEI asked members to identify their long-term market opportunities, a question that is consistent with Specifically, the State Department initiative. State's focus is on teeing up sales of a new generation of nuclear technology expected to come online in the next five to 10 years, the official said. Those include small modular reactors that can be bolted together to form larger units, Terrapower's traveling wave reactor backed by Bill Gates and microreactors meant to provide enough power for a few thousand homes. Altogether, there are about two dozen serious designs for advanced nuclear reactors trying to break into the market, said McGinnis. Under McGinnis and Secretary Rick Perry, one of the Energy Department's top priorities is facilitating the development of these new technologies. "We still lead the world in nuclear technology innovation," he said. "Our big challenge is taking that incredible IP and those incredible technological innovative breakthroughs and bringing them to market. That's been our challenge." On Tuesday, NuScale Energy signed a memorandum to explore deploying its small modular reactors in Romania, after signing similar agreements with Canada and Jordan. The U.S. will still have to reach so-called 123 Agreements with foreign countries before American firms can sell nuclear reactors overseas.
Impact 1
Danielsen
Danielsen 12 Katrine Danielsen, Senior Advisor Social Development and Gender Equity at the Royal Tropical Institute, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, “Gender equality, women's rights and access to energy services: An inspiration paper in the run-up to Rio+20”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, February 2012, http://eu2012.dk/en/Meetings/Other-Meetings/Apr/~/media/Files/Other20meetings/April/EU20Sustainable20Energy20for20All20Summit/Gender20Energy20Report.pdf // t-haas
Energy poverty is gendered One of the most critical development challenges is to overcome the energy poverty of billions of people in developing countries who face inadequate and unreliable access to modern energy services and rely on biomass for cooking and heating. People deprived of such basic energy services are less likely to earn a living, stay healthy and have time for learning and fulfilment. Energy poverty therefore undermines the realization of the Millennium Development Goals. Women in most developing countries experience energy poverty differently and more severely than men. Without access to modern energy services, women and girls spend most of their day performing basic subsistence tasks including time-consuming and physically draining tasks of collecting biomass fuels. Access to energy is gendered: it is determined by intra-household decision-making, women’s social position and the value attached to women’s labour. Unequal gender relations limit women’s ability to participate and voice their energy needs in decisionmaking at all levels of the energy system.
Ban ~-~-- *** ____ ***
Ban 12 UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in remarks at a side event on “Energy, Gender and Economic Growth” in Rio de Janeiro, June 21st, 2012, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sgsm14367.doc.htm
I am deeply honoured to be here. I thank all the participants. Let me say a special word about Dr. Brundtland. Long before Rio+20 … even before the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, Dr. Brundtland was a global leader on the environment. The World Commission on Environment and Development will rightly go down in history as the Brundtland Commission. Its seminal 1987 report, “Our Common Future”, gave us the conceptual breakthrough of sustainable development and led to the decision to hold the Earth Summit. As if that was not enough, since then, Dr. Brundtland has been extremely active, most recently serving on the High-level Panel on Global Sustainability. She was also UN Special Envoy for Climate Change. And before that, she led the World Health Organization for five years. Dr. Brundtland’s path shows that you can work for sustainable development as a politician or as a physician … as an advocate or an international leader. Dr. Brundtland says that when she first became prime minister, many Norwegians experienced culture shock. But by the next generation, children would ask their parents, “But can a man be prime minister?” Attitudes are changing. But in too many parts of the world, women still suffer terrible exclusion. Energy poverty takes an especially heavy toll on women. Most of the 3 billion people in the world who rely on wood, charcoal and dung for cooking are women. Most of the nearly 2 million people each year who die from smoke caused by dangerous cooking, heating and lighting are women. Too many women spend hours each day foraging for fuel. In some cases, venturing too far puts them at risk of attack. Just going out for firewood can expose a girl to rape. Women face especially grave risks when they have to rely on a clinic that has no electricity. More than a quarter of a million health facilities in our world are dark at night. As we know, a pregnant woman can go into labour at any time. Her survival should not depend on daylight. That is why new initiatives like the solar suitcase are so valuable. One Congolese doctor told us that in his village, the first night he received the solar suitcase he was able to save two women who were giving birth. Energy saves lives and livelihoods. It is the golden thread weaving together the three strands of sustainable development: the economy, the environment and equity. My Sustainable Energy for All initiative sets ambitious targets for 2030: universal access to modern energy sources … a doubling of the global rate of energy efficiency … and a doubling of renewable energy. This is critical to our larger campaign for sustainable development. We cannot have the future we want without full equality for women. Today, I call on everyone to help put the “power” in our drive to empower women. Then they can help light our world.
Impact 2
IEF
IEF 9
International Energy Forum, “Reducing Energy Poverty through Cooperation and Partnership”, IEF Symposium on Energy Poverty, December 8-9 2009, www.ief.org/_resources/files/content/events/ief-symposium-on-energy-poverty/background-paper.pdf LN
Productivity¶ .¶ Energy poverty¶ gravely impairs¶ a community’s ability to prosper¶ financially¶ .¶ Lack of¶ electricity significantly¶ reduces¶ a community’¶ s ability to start, operate and expand commercial¶ enterprises.¶ Work stops or slows after sundown¶ and¶ productivity dips. While rural communities may¶ not need access to the Internet to develop,¶ even intermittent¶ access to electricity¶ would enable¶ them to embrace leap¶ -¶ frog technologies, like mobile phones for agricultural coordination, that¶ require only¶ limited amounts of power. On the fuel side, the paucity of modern fuels¶ can reduce¶ agricultural productivity¶ in a number of¶ ways¶ .¶ For example,¶ the dung used for heating or cooking could alternatively be¶ used¶ as¶ fertilizer. A¶ report by The Energy and Reso¶ urces Institute (¶ TERI¶ )¶ valued the dung used as fuel in India alone at¶ $800 million.
Cetta
Becca Cetta, 4-24-2019, "Nuclear Technology in Agriculture: How Africa Benefits," https://www.borgenmagazine.com/nuclear-technology-in-agriculture/
SEATTLE — When most people think of nuclear technology they think of poisonous radiation, dangerous mutations and atomic bombs. The general public wants to stay away from any nuclear power or anything that can cause harm. While nuclear technology may seem like a foreign entity, it’s actually present in our every day lives. In fact, it plays an important role in medicine, water sanitation, electricity and even the food industry. Nuclear technology in agriculture is the process of using radiation to change the characteristics of genes in plants, seeds and organisms. The radiation changes the properties of crops in order to sustain life and full cultivation. For example, some crops can become resistant to pests and parasites without harmful pesticides. Radiation can kill bacteria that would cause crop failure and technology can alter the makeup of plant genes to increase crop production. Background The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) have been working to improve nuclear technology in the agricultural industry for half a century. While the United States and other developed countries have benefitted immensely from the use of nuclear technology in agriculture many many developing countries are missing out. And those who lack access are the ones who need it the most. In Africa, nearly 800 million people are suffering from chronic malnourishment, and many attribute this to the lack of technological advancements and energy deficits. Indeed, less than half of the continent has access to electricity making any developments, technological or nuclear, nearly impossible. Africa’s agricultural industry remains in jeopardy as crops fail due to climate change and livestock die off due to rising zoonic plagues. However, the combined efforts of the IAEA and FAO, nuclear technology could revolutionize agriculture in Africa and save its at-risk citizens from hunger. Some African nations are already utilizing nuclear technology in agriculture to optimize cultivation, control pests and insects and kill bacteria. Here are just a few examples of revolutionary initiatives already underway in Africa’s agricultural industry: 3 Examples of Nuclear Technology in Agriculture Benin Five thousand farmers in Benin are in the process of using nuclear technology to improve soil and water balance. New techniques have caused an increase in maize crops by 50 percent while also using 70 percent less fertilizer. Other crops such as soybeans have tripled in the past few years after farmers began mixing seeds and bacteria through nuclear technology. This has revolutionized Benin’s farming industry, which makes up 40 percent of the economy. Sierra Leone Many children in Sierra Leone are suffering from micronutrient deficiencies, meaning even when they are getting food, it doesn’t have enough vitamins and mineral they need. One of the most crucial nutrients lacking in Sierra Leone is iron. In 2018, Sierra Leone had the highest child mortality rate in the world —estimated at 110 out of 1000 live births — the cause relating to lack of nutrients in an already limited supply of food. The IAEA and the FOA have used nuclear technology to develop cassava and rice crops that yield greater quantity, are rich in nutrients and are less vulnerable to disease outbreaks. The World Bank is also utilizing nuclear technology in Sierra Leone to combat disease-causing pests as part of its Pest Management Plan (PMP) to increase food security throughout the nation. The Central African Republic This land-locked nation is in the middle of a civil war making it difficult for scientists to access fields to conduct experiments. These experiments are part of the IAEA’s and FAO’s plan to increase the cultivation of the cassava plant, as seen in Sierra Leone and much of central and western Africa. This plant is one of the most sought after crops in the region for its high content in carbohydrates and fiber, essential nutrients in communities where vitamins are scarce. Due to the rising conflict and disease outbreaks, this essential crop is in danger of failing. The IAEA and FAO plan to use nuclear technology and plant irradiation to protect the remaining cassava plants and promote higher yield rates in future rotations. Whether it relates to the mutation of plants, pest control, seed irradiation, disease prevention or sanitation, nuclear technology is paving the way to revolutionize agriculture in Africa. Recently the IAEA and FAO met in Vienna at the Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Science and technology to discuss progress made in sustainable development and work to improve nuclear technology in agriculture not only in Africa but throughout the entire world. The IAEA warns that at the current rate of fossil fuel consumption, our entire supply could be drained by 2030. With resources being depleted at an irreversible rate, the need for a nuclear technology revolution in Africa has never been more necessary. – Becca Cetta
Impact 3
Hernandez
Hernández, Diana. “Understanding 'energy insecurity' and why it matters to health.” Social science and medicine (1982) vol. 167 (2016): 1-10. doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2016.08.029
One factor that contributes to energy as an ignored hardship is the lack of an appropriate label and related conceptual framing. While the term “energy insecurity” exists in the literature, the phenomenon is not well understood. Existing studies have utilized the term to understand its connection to low socioeconomic status and other social disadvantages, negative health outcomes, and in conjunction with other economic and environmental insecurities. First, socioeconomic status and race/ethnicity are closely linked to the experience of economic energy insecurity. Hernández et al. (2016; 2014) demonstrated that households near or below the federal poverty line were more likely to surpass the ten percent threshold on energy expenditures. The authors also found that African Americans across the economic spectrum experienced economic energy insecurity at the highest rates while Asian and Latino immigrants were the least burdened (Hernández et al, 2014, 2016). Second, energy insecurity has been linked to health and other hardships (Cook et al., 2008; Smith et al., 2007 Frank et al., 2006; Nord and Kantor, 2006). Cook et al. (2008) found that children in moderately and severely energy insecure homes are more prone to food insecurity, hospitalizations, poorer health ratings, and developmental concerns than children in ‘energy secure’ homes. The “heat or eat” dilemma demonstrates the trade-offs that low-income householders make in order to meet the basic necessities of life whereby at-risk groups are forced to decide between food and energy, often sacrificing one for the other (Frank et al., 2006; Nord and Kantor, 2006; Food Research and Action Center, 2005; Bhattacharya et al., 2002). Third, energy insecurity has also been linked to other insecurities such that rising energy costs have also impacted access to clean and safe water (Eichelberger, 2010). Beyond these limited examples, attention to energy insecurity remains scant and research in this area is severely underdeveloped (Hernández, 2013).
Goldstein
Joshua S. Goldstein, Staffan A. Qvist and Steven Pinker. "Opinion". No Publication, 4-6-2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/06/opinion/sunday/climate-change-nuclear-power.html. (JL)
All this, however, depends on overcoming an irrational dread among the public and many activists. The reality is that nuclear power is the safest form of energy humanity has ever used. Mining accidents, hydroelectric dam failures, natural gas explosions and oil train crashes all kill people, sometimes in large numbers, and smoke from coal-burning kills them in enormous numbers, more than half a million per year. By contrast, in 60 years of nuclear power, only three accidents have raised public alarm: Three Mile Island in 1979, which killed no one; Fukushima in 2011, which killed no one (many deaths resulted from the tsunami and some from a panicked evacuation near the plant); and Chernobyl in 1986, the result of extraordinary Soviet bungling, which killed 31 in the accident and perhaps several thousand from cancer, around the same number killed by coal emissions every day. (Even if we accepted recent claims that Soviet and international authorities covered up tens of thousands of Chernobyl deaths, the death toll from 60 years of nuclear power would still equal about one month of coal-related deaths.) Nuclear power plants cannot explode like nuclear bombs, and they have not contributed to weapons proliferation, thanks to robust international controls: 24 countries have nuclear power but not weapons, while Israel and North Korea have nuclear weapons but not power. | 904,673 |
365,581 | 379,636 | TOC Aff 2 | Soleimani lost ? tempered regional hegemony
Ahmedzade 20~-~-Rufat Ahmedzade, With Soleimani Gone, Iran’s Regional Hegemony Faces Setbacks, London School of Economics, 2/12/20, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2020/02/12/with-soleimani-gone-irans-regional-hegemony-faces-setbacks/
General Qassem Soleimani’s demise in an American drone attack on the orders of US President Donald Trump is going to have a major impact on Iran’s projection of power in the region. General Soleimani was instrumental in Tehran’s interventionist policies in the Middle East and controlled the Syria and Iraq portfolios of Iran’s foreign policy. This makes it hard to replace Soleimani with an equally strong character, able to continue Tehran’s strong ties with its powerful militias in the region; ties forged under Soleimani mostly due to his personal relationships and capabilities. Newly appointed Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force commander Esmail Ghaani seems to lack Soleimani’s charisma and he will have to prove himself at his new job. What is certain is that the Islamic Republic leadership has suffered a major setback in its regional policies. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei’s generals believed that they had already established ‘deterrence’ against the US via proxy groups, but this has backfired with Soleimani’s assassination. General Soleimani was the driving force in Iran’s power projection policy and architect of the regional structures that have sustained the Islamic Republic’s strategic politico-military upper hand from Tehran to Beirut. The entire Iranian leadership seems to have miscalculated President Trump’s willingness to act after testing his response to various Iranian plots such as the mysterious strikes on Saudi Aramco oil facilities, attacks on oil tankers in the Persian Gulf, the shooting of an American unmanned drone over the Gulf, and several rocket attacks on various US military installations inside Iraq. IRGC commanders and Khamenei believed that Trump’s warnings were nothing but bluster. Taking into account his election campaign promise to put an end to ‘endless wars’ in the Middle East, the Iranian leadership thought the Trump administration would be unwilling to escalate tensions with Iran.
Iran can’t achieve heg, Saudi spends 5x on military
Parsi 20~-~-Trita Parsi, The Middle East Is More Stable When the United States Stays Away, Foreign Policy, 1/6/20, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/06/the-middle-east-is-more-stable-when-the-united-states-stays-away/
Assertions about the United States’ pivotal role in the Middle East, no matter how often repeated, have not been proved true. Iran, ravaged by sanctions, corruption, and economic mismanagement, is nowhere near establishing hegemony in the region. Saudi Arabia spends more than five times as much on its military than does Iran; the entire Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and the UAE—outspends Iran by a factor of eight. Meanwhile, whereas Iran has no nuclear weapons yet undergoes more inspections than any other country, Israel has a nuclear weapons program with no international transparency whatsoever. Iran may have been adept at taking advantage of U.S. overextension and missteps in the last few decades, but establishing hegemony is a different matter altogether.
Iran builds up to deter US
Matsunaga 16~-~-Yasuyuki Matsunaga, Is Iran Seeking Regional Hegemony? Atlantic Councill, 4/12/16, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/is-iran-seeking-regional-hegemony/
But, practically, what do these amount to? Not much if we treat such narratives, as many in the US do, either as mere rhetoric or certain idiosyncratic, self-serving images that Iran’s decision-makers may well have. If we start with the premise, however, that such official narratives to a large extent reflect how key decision-makers actually perceive and interpret their strategic environments, there are some lessons that may well be learned from them. First, rather than aspiring to be a regional hegemon of its own, Iran is more than ever obsessed with “opposing” the hegemony that they perceive to be firmly in place—the US hegemony—in the MENA region.
Granted that some of its neighbors may well regard its “support for the oppressed people” as interference and influence peddling, Iran simply may not be aspiring to achieve any hegemony, regional or otherwise, in the sense usually understood, that is, domination. The counter-hegemonic aspiration, if genuine, would also help explain why Ayatollah Khamenei resisted—for such a long time until the unexpected election in July 2013 of former nuclear negotiator Hasan Rouhani as president—negotiating any sanctions relief despite the obvious mounting cost of such refusal. Second, if we take it that the primary strategic goal of Iran’s Islamic revolutionary state is to remain as a counter-hegemon, we may well conclude that Iran’s strategic posture will be fundamentally defensive, despite occasional incendiary remarks uttered by some of its ill-advised politicians and even some military commanders. It also explains why Iran allocates so much money and efforts for developing medium-range ballistic missiles. After all, what would such ballistic missiles do to help if Iran’s goal was to achieve regional “hegemony,” which is derived from the Greek word for leadership?
The importance that Iran’s national security strategy places on its missile program would only make sense if we construe Iran’s official strategic narratives as actually reflecting how fixated its key decision-makers are on deterring “likely” US aggression. The talk of Iran being a regional power, in the same vein, may well be understood rather cynically as not reflecting their self-appraisal but as are attempts by Iran’s leadership to deter such aggression.
Iran nuclearization would cause arms race
Chilton 20—Kevin Chilton, Avoiding a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, Defense News, 2/13/20, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/02/13/avoiding-a-nuclear-arms-race-in-the-middle-east/
Second, an Iranian nuclear breakout attempt could spur a proliferation cascade throughout the Middle East, beginning with Saudi Arabia. Mohammed bin Salman, the Saudi crown prince, openly stated in 2018 that if Iran developed nuclear weapons, Riyadh would quickly “follow suit.” One suggested approach would see Saudi Arabia purchase a nuclear power reactor from a major supplier like South Korea and then build a reprocessing plant that would yield enough weapons-grade plutonium in five years. A half-decade delay isn’t optimal, however, when the goal is achieving nuclear deterrence quickly. Thus, there is the so-called Islamabad option. This refers to Riyadh’s role in financing Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and an alleged commitment from Islamabad that it would repay the favor. While Pakistani and Saudi officials have denied any such understanding, there is the possibility that the two could work out an arrangement where Islamabad could deploy some of its nuclear arsenal on Saudi soil following a successful Iranian breakout. Although this maneuver would draw sharp, international criticism, in theory, it would allow Riyadh to remain in good standing vis-a-vis the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Nevertheless, Pakistan might not be willing to play spoiler against a nuclearized Iran. If it is, Middle Eastern geopolitics would become extremely unstable. If Saudi Arabia acquires nuclear weapons, many believe Turkey would follow suit. Last September, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared that he “cannot accept” the argument from Western nations that Turkey should not be allowed to attain nuclear weapons. In 1958, Charles de Gaulle proclaimed that a nation without nuclear weapons “does not command its own destiny”; two years later, France tested its first bomb. Erdogan’s comments echo those earlier remarks and raise the possibility that Ankara could become the second NATO member to leave the alliance’s nuclear umbrella in favor of its own independent arsenal.
US and Israel will pre-emptively strike if Iran nuclearized
Chilton 20—Kevin Chilton, Avoiding a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, Defense News, 2/13/20, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/02/13/avoiding-a-nuclear-arms-race-in-the-middle-east/
U.S. President Donald Trump recently remarked that his foremost priority regarding Iran is preventing its regime from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Refocusing attention on Tehran’s nuclear program is critical given its announcement that it will exceed the limits on how many centrifuges it can operate for uranium enrichment. This decision not only renders the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA, as increasingly obsolete, but it will also accelerate Iran’s breakout timetable, which some experts now believe is only four to five months. This raises two immediate concerns. First, should Iran race for the bomb, it is almost inevitable that the United States and/or Israel will take preventative military action to stop it from crossing that fateful threshold. This could easily spiral into a regional war as Iran activates its various proxy forces against the United States and its allies.
US-Iran tension derailed de-escalation btwn GCC and Iran
Aftandilian 20~-~-Gregory Aftandilian, Gulf Arab States Still Worried about a US-Iran War, Arab Center, 1/23/20, http://arabcenterdc.org/policy_analyses/gulf-arab-states-still-worried-about-a-us-iran-war/
The fact that the Soleimani killing occurred when these GCC states were trying to reach out to Iran made the US-Iran crisis even more disturbing, as it threatened to derail the easing of Gulf Arab-Iran tensions. Indeed, Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi told the Iraqi parliament that he had been mediating between Iran and Saudi Arabia and that Soleimani, shortly before he was killed, was bringing a message to the Saudis from Iran. Although US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has dismissed this claim, if it were true, it would also explain why the Saudis were especially eager not to see a military confrontation in the Gulf region.
Iran war squo compounded by US commitments
Cordesman 19~-~-Anthony Cordesman, The Gulf Military Balance and U.S. Commitments to the Gulf, CSIS, 12/9/19, https://www.csis.org/analysis/gulf-military-balance-and-us-commitments-gulf
It is far from clear that a major conflict will occur, but it is clear that the threat from Iran is growing, that some form of “gray area” military clashes are likely, and there is a risk that such a clash could escalate significantly even if Iran does not want to engage in a major conflict. These risks are compounded by a wide range of other variables that affect U.S. commitments to the Arab/Persian Gulf region. They include very different and unpredictable levels of tension and conflict – driven by the following major variables and contingencies.
Withdrawal would force US puppet dictatorships to change, reduce anti-Americanism
Tisdall 20~-~-Simon Tisdall, Why instinct and ideology tell Trump to get out of the Middle East, The Guardian, 1/11/20, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jan/11/why-instinct-and-ideology-tell-trump-to-get-out-of-the-middle-east-suleimani-iran
5 Terrorism and anti-Americanism
A reduction in the US regional profile could be expected, over time, to bring reductions in anti-Americanism and the targeting of American and allied interests by terrorists who regard the US presence as an affront to the entire Islamic world. A key source of tension with the west might be removed.
On the other hand, any loss of US leadership in fighting Isis and successors would be serious. Nato might step into the breach, as Trump last week suggested it should. Regional organisations such as the Gulf Cooperation Council and the EU could invest more in security, shared defence and intelligence capabilities – which might be no bad thing.
A lowered profile might also reduce tensions with Turkey which, although nominally an ally, has grown impatient with an “arrogant” America. And it could force dictatorships such as Egypt’s, underwritten by Washington, to change their ways – to the undoubted benefit of all the peoples of the Middle East.
Israel and Saudi Arabia can’t get heg themselves, but challenge Iran heg
Cropsey 19~-~-SETH CROPSEY, GARY ROUGHEAD, A U.S. Withdrawal Will Cause a Power Struggle in the Middle East, Foreign Policy, 12/17/19, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/17/us-withdrawal-power-struggle-middle-east-china-russia-iran/
Israel and Saudi Arabia are the two main challengers to Iran’s ambitions. The Israeli Defense Forces are the only military in the region of Western quality and proficiency. Israel likely operates a secure nuclear second-strike capability, and its foreign intelligence service, Mossad, is one of the world’s best. While Saudi Arabia’s armed forces are of lesser quality, the kingdom has been remarkably adept at cultivating support from Sunni radical groups—necessitated by the United States’ strategic neglect of the region after 2008. And despite questions about its legitimacy, the House of Saud remains custodian of Islam’s two holy cities, Mecca and Medina, a position of great religious and political importance. Nevertheless, neither Israel nor Saudi Arabia can contend for the title of regional hegemon. Moreover, despite its military superiority, Israel does not have the capability or requisite political will. The House of Saud may have considered itself the ruling dynasty of a new caliphate at some point, but contemporary Saudi Arabia has no such delusions. The government understands that oil revenues determine its survival, and an imperial campaign would overstretch the Saudi economy, possibly leading to economic collapse and, worse, revolt. Both Israel and Saudi Arabia operate on the defensive. Turkey is a spoiler in this strategic balance. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has unmistakably neo-Ottoman objectives, but the Turkish Armed Forces are unprepared militarily for the potential confrontation with Iran and Russia that their Syrian offensive could prompt. In the coming years, Ankara will remain a wild card, and the political stance it takes will profoundly influence the strategic landscape. Its position on Iranian expansion is unclear, and even if its current offensive puts it at odds with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime—and by extension with Iran—Erdogan may well forego cooperation with the unofficial Saudi-Israeli entente.
Troop withdrawal would include US security guarantees for Israel + mutual defense treaty, and also force centrist two-state solution
Tisdall 20~-~-Simon Tisdall, Why instinct and ideology tell Trump to get out of the Middle East, The Guardian, 1/11/20, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jan/11/why-instinct-and-ideology-tell-trump-to-get-out-of-the-middle-east-suleimani-iran
2 Israel
A wholesale US military pull-back would be a traumatic experience for Israel, and one it would try to avoid. The Jewish state has been surrounded by enemies since its conception. Although proudly self-reliant in defence, a symbolic weakening of America’s protective shield would be a blow that could encourage the country’s foes.
For these and other reasons, any US regional troop drawdown would almost certainly be accompanied by additional American security guarantees for Israel, possibly including a mutual defence treaty as recently proposed by prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Israel’s supporters in Congress would ensure the country was not abandoned.
At the same time, such a shift could force a much-needed reset for Israel’s political stalemate, undermining the Trump-backed, nationalist hard-right – typified by Netanyahu – and opening the way for a centrist coalition more prepared, for example, to cut an equitable two-state deal with the Palestinians.
Israel nukes have guaranteed second-strike capability
Mizokami 20~-~-Kyle Mizokami, Israel Has a Secret Nuclear Weapons Program (Well, Maybe Not-So-Secret), The National Interest, 2/16/20, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/israel-has-secret-nuclear-weapons-program-well-maybe-not-so-secret-123936
Israel does not confirm nor deny having nuclear weapons. Experts generally assess the country as currently having approximately eighty nuclear weapons, fewer than countries such as France, China and the United Kingdom, but still a sizeable number considering its adversaries have none. These weapons are spread out among Israel’s version of a nuclear “triad” of land-, air- and sea-based forces scattered in a way that they deter surprise nuclear attack. Israel’s first nuclear weapons were likely gravity bombs delivered by fighter aircraft. The F-4 Phantom is thought to be the first delivery system; as a large, twin-engine robust fighter, the Phantom was probably the first aircraft in the Israeli Air Force capable of carrying a first generation nuclear device. A new, smaller generation of nuclear gravity bombs likely equips F-15I and F-16I fighters. While some might argue a gravity bomb is obsolete in light of Israeli advances in missile technology, a manned aircraft allows a nuclear strike to be recalled right up to the last minute. Israel’s first land-based nuclear weapons were based on Jericho I missiles developed in cooperation with France. Jericho I is believed to have been retired, replaced by Jericho II and -III ballistic missiles. Jericho II has a range of 932 miles, while Jericho III, designed to hold Iran and other distant states at risk, has a range of at least 3,106 miles. The total number of Israeli ballistic missiles is unknown, but estimated by experts to number at least two dozen. Like other nuclear-armed nations, the Israeli Navy has reportedly deployed nukes to what is generally agreed to as the most survivable seagoing platform: submarines. Israel has five German-built Dolphin-class submarines, which experts believe are equipped with nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. The cruise missiles are reportedly based off the Popeye air-to-ground missile or the Gabriel antiship missile. This ensures a so-called “second-strike capability”—as long as one submarine is on patrol, some portion of Israel’s nuclear deterrent remains invulnerable to a nuclear first strike, guaranteeing the ability to launch a nuclear counterattack. The establishment of a nuclear triad demonstrates how seriously Israel takes the idea of nuclear deterrence. The country will likely not declare itself a nuclear power any time soon; ambiguity over ownership of nukes has served the country very well. The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and general instability across the Middle East has ensured that Israel will likely remain the only nuclear-armed state in the region for the foreseeable future, but a collapse of the agreement or some new nuclear program could easily change that. In the meantime, Israel’s ultimate insurance policy isn’t going anywhere.
US perceived departure in 2015 led to cooperation btwn Arabs and Israel
Haghirian 17~-~-Mehran Haghirian, Arab States of the Persian Gulf Must Choose Between Paths Proposed By Iran and Israel, Atlantic Council, 2/22/17, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/arab-states-of-the-persian-gulf-must-choose-between-paths-proposed-by-iran-and-israel/
The perception left by the Barack Obama administration that the United States is leaving the region and that an increasingly emboldened Iran is exerting power across the Middle East after the implementation of the 2015 nuclear agreement, has revived long-standing hostilities between Arabs and Persians, and presented an opening to realize mutual interests and foster cooperation between Arabs and Israelis. Israel has long seen Iran as its major adversary because of Iran’s support for Hamas and Hezbollah as well as Iran’s ballistic missile program and nuclear advances. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia along with its GCC partners were alarmed when Iran took advantage of the US invasion of Iraq to become influential in Baghdad. The GCC states also grew intolerant of Iran’s perceived links to the uprisings in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province as well as Iran’s support for the regime of Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad and for the Houthis in Yemen. | 904,713 |
365,582 | 379,645 | TOC Neg 2 | Kurds protected by other NATO troops
Noack 20~-~-Rick Noack, Here’s what might happen if the U.S. were to suddenly quit Iraq, Washington Post, 1/10/20, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/01/09/heres-what-might-happen-if-us-were-suddenly-quit-iraq/
It would threaten the Kurds Galip Dalay, a fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs who specializes in Kurdish politics Iraq’s Kurdistan region is “still by far the most secure part of the country,” he said. For that reason, NATO members such as Germany have withdrawn their troops only from the non-Kurdish areas of Iraq, but have kept some forces in Irbil, the regional capital of Kurdistan.
Iraq withdrawal would shift balance of power, lead to China/Russia fill-in
Makhzoomi 20~-~-Khairuldeen Al Makhzoomi, The Dangerous Consequences of U.S. Withdrawal from Iraq, Washington Institute, 2/3/20, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/the-dangerous-consequences-of-u.s.-withdrawal-from-iraq
At present, it seems the Iraqi government’s recent 170-0 vote—in the absence of Sunni and Kurdish blocs—to expel U.S. troops may worsen Iraq’s economic crisis, shift the balance of power in the region, and worsen the political divides within Iraq. The Iraqi Parliament claims the United States violated its sovereignty by killing Qasim Soleimani and Abu Mahdi Al Muhandis, the Deputy of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), in an airstrike. In the days following the assassination, a letter of approval circulated on social media, stating that the United States would acquiesce to the parliament resolution and begin withdrawing its troops from Iraq. However, the pentagon later responded, calling the letter a ‘mistake’ and reiterated that no decision to withdraw U.S. troops had been made. Instead, the U.S. State Department rebuffed the Iraqi government’s request to remove troops, discussing the “appropriate force posture in the Middle East.”
With an economy on the verge of collapse and a highly corrupt political system, Iraq must seriously consider the repercussions of expelling U.S. troops. The Trump Administration warned Iraq that it would respond to the expulsion of U.S. troops by freezing Iraq’s central bank account held in New York, which it can do under U.S. sanctions law or under suspicion of improper use of funds. This move could profoundly affect the Iraqi economy, as Iraq holds international revenue from oil sales there. Restricting Iraq’s access to the bank would cause the dinar’s value to plummet, as it did in 2015—when the U.S. cut off access to the central bank out of fear that Iraq was funneling cash to Iran and the Islamic State.
The Trump administration has threatened Iraq with "sanctions like they've never seen before,” following the Iraqi parliament order for U.S. troops to leave Iraqi soil. Sanctions law would also prohibit U.S. companies and businesses from investing in Iraq, as well as prevent Iraq from reducing its external debts. Therefore, U.S. sanctions, in the aftermath of the Iraqi parliament’s vote, will increase instability and threaten any attempts to improve infrastructure and investment.
A weaker Iraq will also put international and regional powers in a greater position to exploit Iraq's economy. In March 2019, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani called on Iran to expand its gas and power trade with Iraq, boosting bilateral trade to $20 billion, in the face of U.S. sanctions against Iran. This boost in trade gave Iran enough backing to challenge sanctions through additional financial ‘loopholes’ in Iraq. U.S. sanctions will also open the door for other regional powers to take advantage of this economic opportunity, such as Turkey, which will likely strengthen and increase its trade volume with Iraq. Although the Iraqi government restricted food imports from Turkey to boost domestic production in July 2019, Turkey would likely fill the void left behind by U.S. businesses in the future.
In light of a possible U.S. withdrawal, international actors are seeking to gain a foothold in Iraq to further their regional influence. Iraq and China are expected to deepen military ties in the near future, evidenced by Adil Abdul al-Mahdi’s recent meeting with the Chinese ambassador to Iraq, Zhang Tao, which revealed the Chinese government’s willingness to provide military assistance to Iraq. Earlier this month, Iraqi ambassador to Iran, Saad Jawad Qandil, also said Iraq is in the process of purchasing Russian surface-to-air missile systems to update its defense infrastructure amid fears of further U.S.-Iranian confrontation on Iraqi soil.
withdrawal ? Kurds at mercy of militias and central govt
Noack 20~-~-Rick Noack, Here’s what might happen if the U.S. were to suddenly quit Iraq, Washington Post, 1/10/20, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/01/09/heres-what-might-happen-if-us-were-suddenly-quit-iraq/
“Once the U.S. umbrella is completely gone, the Kurds will be much more vulnerable to the central government and much more vulnerable to the Shiite militias’ wishes. The sense of security and the sense of autonomy that the Kurds enjoy might be put into jeopardy,” he said, referring to calls from some Shiites to “take most of their privileges” away. Like Iraq’s Sunnis, “the Kurds would be more at the mercy of the militias, Iran and the central government,” Dalay said.
Kurds already being attacked by govt, Iran, Syria, Turkey
MEPC 20~-~-Iraq after the U.S. Troop Withdrawal, Middle East Policy Council, 2020, https://mepc.org/commentary/iraq-after-us-troop-withdrawal
But the Americans are not the only party making their presence felt. According to Aswat Al Iraq, Iraqi Kurdish officials have charged “Iran, Syria and Turkey with involvement in violence incidents in Kurdish Zakhu, Dohuk town....Noteworthy is that dozens of persons had launched attacks on alcohol-selling shops, massage centers and hotels, after last week’s Juma (Friday) prayers in Zakhu of Dohuk Province, followed by clashes among attackers and police forces that injured about 30 persons from both sides and causing the stretch of violence acts to the town of Summail and then Dohuk city. The incidents were followed by attacks on the headquarters of the Kurdistan Islamic Union, setting fire and damaging the Union's headquarters.” Likewise, Bryar Mohammed singles out the Iraqi central government in an article for the Kurdish news agency AK News, accusing it of “trying to bully Diyala Province out of trying to become an autonomous region….Suhad Hayli from the Iraqiya List party says he expects the Iraqi government will use force to quash the autonomy demands of the Kurdish Province to the north east of Baghdad, bordering Iran. Diyala Provincial Council's demand for regional autonomy was announced two days ago, almost two months after another Sunni dominated province called for the same....With signs that the status quo is disintegrating, Kurds in Khanaqin city and its Mandali suburb wish to split from Diyala Province now and join the Kurdistan Region.”
US is nation building in Iraq – failed state w/deep structural problems
Cordesman 20~-~-Anthony Cordesman, America’s Failed Strategy in the Middle East: Losing Iraq and the Gulf, CSIS, 1/2/20, https://www.csis.org/analysis/americas-failed-strategy-middle-east-losing-iraq-and-gulf
“Saving” Iraq, however, is a far more serious challenge than simply dealing with its current political divisions, the remnants of ISIS, or the short-term challenges posed by Iran. Iraq is a failed state in many other ways and faces far more serious problems than many analysts seem ready to admit. Rebuilding the American image in Iraq will be a critical challenge, as will be creating any form of effective governance. However, these challenges are only part of the story. The current public protests and public upheavals in Iraq are not simply the result of current anger at foreign intervention, corruption, poor economic conditions, or a lack of meaningful employment opportunities. Iraq’s problems are the result of deep structural problems that have combined together over decades of war and political crises – with factors like high population growth, hyper-urbanization, a breakdown of traditional economic structures, acute over-employment in unproductive state industries, growing water and climate problems, and the equivalent of a deeply divided petro-kleptocracy that claims a far too large share of the nation’s oil wealth. Iraq not only needs to “recover” from the fight against ISIS but also from the ongoing ethnic and sectarian upheavals triggered by the U.S. invasion that removed Saddam without any clear plan to replace him as well. The United States is rebuilding the entire Iraqi economy and political system – over a period that will probably take a decade – and attempting to create an honest and effective enough political and governance structure to actually implement a comprehensive reform of the national economic distribution of the nation’s wealth. Iraq must also match this civil progress with a security structure that can create a strong and independent enough Iraq to secure the Gulf region and the broader structure of the Middle East. No amount of investment in the other Arab Gulf states that are already America’s strategic partners – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, (and Jordan in actual practice) – can do as much to deter and defend against Iran and secure Gulf petroleum exports – 20 of the world’s daily supply – as a strong and unified Iraq that can defend itself and serve its own economic and political interests.
Iraq is a critical buffer to limit Iran, needs US presence
Cordesman 20~-~-Anthony Cordesman, America’s Failed Strategy in the Middle East: Losing Iraq and the Gulf, CSIS, 1/2/20, https://www.csis.org/analysis/americas-failed-strategy-middle-east-losing-iraq-and-gulf
Iraq, however, is a different story. It has critical strategic priority in securing the Gulf, in countering Iran and extremism, and in ensuring the stable flow of global petroleum exports to meet the growing needs of the global economy. If the United States and its allies can prevent Iraq from becoming the “weak man of the Gulf” – or being dominated by Iran – the overall security of the Gulf will be relatively easy for the United States to secure if it can only make up its mind to stay in the Gulf and give the region its proper strategic priority. A strong and unified Iraq not only is the best practical defense against regional extremism, it becomes a critical buffer that limits Iran as a threat. Our strategic partners in the Arabian Peninsula and Israel will be relatively secure. In spite of the lack of any clear strategy in the White House, the U.S. military and U.S. CENTCOM have already taken most of the other steps necessary to defend and deter against Iran. ISIS and extremism will remain an enduring threat but not to the concern that would require major new levels of U.S. attention if Iraq is capable of resisting another division between Sunnis and Shi’ites in the face of rising extremism.
Iraq key to regional security
Cordesman 20~-~-Anthony Cordesman, America’s Failed Strategy in the Middle East: Losing Iraq and the Gulf, CSIS, 1/2/20, https://www.csis.org/analysis/americas-failed-strategy-middle-east-losing-iraq-and-gulf
It will be enough if Iraq has security forces that are unified and strong enough to deal with internal unrest, can resist Iranian intervention and the rise of extremism, limit the flow of arms and “volunteers” to Lebanon and Syria, check any “gray area” threats from Iran and outside powers, and keep Iraq secure long enough so its Arab neighbors and the United States can come to its aid in the case of a real emergency.
Ultimately, the Untied States might also find that an independent Iraq – rather than a formal strategic partner – might be the key to any lasting security arrangements in the Gulf that guarantees Iraq’s security without leaving the rest of the region vulnerable.
US-Iran conflict possible in Iraq after state collapse
Cordesman 20~-~-Anthony Cordesman, America’s Failed Strategy in the Middle East: Losing Iraq and the Gulf, CSIS, 1/2/20, https://www.csis.org/analysis/americas-failed-strategy-middle-east-losing-iraq-and-gulf
It is all too tempting for the United States to focus on the current crisis over the clash between Iran and the United States in Iraq. Events have steadily escalated since late December. Iran has sponsored attacks by Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces on U.S. troops and facilities – as a result, the United States has launched retaliatory attacks on Iraqi PMFs. This has been followed by well-organized demonstrations and attacks on the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, which was then followed by a U.S. drone strikes that killed Qasem Soleimani – the head of Iran’s Quds Force – and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis – the head of Al-Hashd al-Shaabi, an Iraqi militia group tied to Iran that had been linked to attacks on U.S. targets. Moreover, the Iraqi central government virtually collapsed even before these events. Its corruption, ineffectiveness, and failed economic policies led to massive popular demonstrations. Its legislature was virtually disbanded after legislation was passed calling for a different, locally elected, and more representative system. Prime Minister Mahdi had resigned but then stayed on in an uncertain “acting” capacity. The Kurdish regional government remained divided. All the while, the government failed to effectively aid the Sunni cities in the West that had been shattered in the fight with ISIS. The central government’s Army and Air Force remained largely separate from the Kurdish forces in the north. Efforts to integrate the various Shi’ite and Sunni PMFs – that had helped fight ISIS – into the central government’s forces resulted in an unworkable system where these deeply divided forces – many with close ties to Iran – reported directly to a Prime Minister with no real authority who had lost his popular mandate. The United States faces an all too real risk that events in Iraq will trigger a much more serious clash between the United States and Iran in Iraq – as well as Iran in the rest of the region – not to mention that the United States will face major Iraqi hostility over its use of force in Iraq despite opposition from the Iraqi government. The United States has again slashed its official presence in Iraq, and the U.S. Ambassador has warned U.S. citizens to leave the country. At the same time, Iraq has no clear path towards unity, the creation of either a workable political system or an effective government, or the prospects of economic recovery. Coping with a new crisis of each given day often seems beyond America’s reach. | 904,714 |
365,583 | 379,617 | 3 - Jan Econ | Obama’s policies were targeted at individuals, whereas Trump chose to move to targeting sectors.
Rendon ’19 Rendon, Moises (Director of The Future of Venezuela Initiative and Fellow of the Americas Program). “Are Sanctions Working in Venezuela?” CSIS, 3 September 2019, https://www.csis.org/analysis/are-sanctions-working-venezuela. Premier
Individual Sanctions To date, the United States has sanctioned 119 individuals and 47 entities from or related to Venezuela, many of whom were also designated by Canada, Mexico, Panama, and the European Union. While the current administration has demonstrated a width and breadth of sanctioning techniques, the most notable policy shift since President Trump’s 2017 inauguration has been the gradual transition from individual to sectoral sanctions. These are distinct policy tools: individual sanctions block the assets and movement of persons deemed to be aiding the regime while sectoral sanctions prohibit transactions with certain companies which are engaged in illicit actions on behalf of the government.
Trump slowly expanded sanctions across industries, targeting oil, then banking, then gold-mining, and then shipping. This culminated in the August sanctions.
Rendon ’19 Rendon, Moises (Director of The Future of Venezuela Initiative and Fellow of the Americas Program). “Are Sanctions Working in Venezuela?” CSIS, 3 September 2019, https://www.csis.org/analysis/are-sanctions-working-venezuela. Premier
Sectoral Sanctions When President Trump took office, he continued the authorization of sanctions against individuals deemed to be working on behalf of Maduro’s regime, including Maduro’s family, vice president, and ministers and advisors in his inner circle. However, a change in course took place when the president issued an August 2017 executive order prohibiting U.S. citizens from purchasing Venezuelan government debt, specifically targeting Venezuela’s state-owned oil company Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PdVSA). This mandate also restricted the Venezuelan government’s access to U.S. debt and equity markets to limit Maduro’s ability to finance illicit activities and pay off military officials. In March 2018, the president banned U.S. citizens from engaging in transactions with petromoneda (better known as petro), an unsuccessful government-controlled cryptocurrency designed by the regime to circumvent financial sanctions. After Maduro’s illegitimate reelection in May 2018, a new order cut off the Venezuelan government and all its subsidiary entities from international debt financing, additionally blocking corrupt Venezuelan officials from selling off public assets in exchange for kickbacks. Pursuant to a November 2018 executive order laying out a framework for sanctioning Venezuelan companies deemed to be complicit in deceptive or corrupt practices, the Treasury Department designated PdVSA as subject to sanctions, blocking its property and interests and banning transactions with U.S. citizens this past January. These sanctions did not go into effect until June 2019, however. In March, the U.S. administration targeted Venezuela’s state-operated gold mining company Minerven for illicit and corrupt operations and engagements with criminal gangs and militia groups to financially benefit the regime. Several government, private sector, and military persons were sanctioned for their involvement in illegal mining. A month later, Treasury sanctioned the Central Bank of Venezuela, cutting off its access to U.S. currency and limiting its capacity to conduct international transactions. Further targeted sanctions were unleashed against a web of Cuban and Russian companies, including banks, oil importers, and shipping companies who have engaged with PdVSA and provided cash to Maduro’s government. In early August, President Trump announced a complete embargo against the Venezuelan government, blocking all transactions with some exceptions for humanitarian aid. Additionally, he granted Treasury the power to implement secondary sanctions against foreign and domestic entities engaging with Maduro’s regime.
Studies prove—US sanctions have led to the deaths of tens of thousands each year.
Cho ’19 Cho, Joshua (Writer for FAIR). “The Atlantic Illustrates Everything That’s Wrong With Media Coverage of Venezuela Sanctions.” Fairness and Accuracy In Reporting, 6 May 2019, https://fair.org/home/the-atlantic-illustrates-everything-thats-wrong-with-media-coverage-of-venezuela-sanctions/. Premier
The Center for Economic and Policy Research (2/4/19) has pointed out how recognition of Juan Guaidó as president of Venezuela effectively functions as an oil embargo on Venezuela. This is devastating, since Venezuela’s economy depends almost entirely on oil export revenues for essential imports like food, medicine and medical equipment (New York Times, 2/8/19). Newer US sanctions that have caused Venezuela’s crude oil production to plummet even further are expected to reduce revenues over the coming year by $2.5 billion, almost as much as the country spent last year ($2.6 billion) to import food and medicine (CEPR, 3/25/19). Economists Mark Weisbrot of CEPR and Columbia’s Jeffrey Sachs (CEPR, 4/25/19) have estimated that the death toll from US sanctions is more than 40,000 in 2017–18 alone, based on the experience of other countries in similar situations. They note that sanctions produce lethal effects by increasing unemployment and restricting access to essential imports like food and medicine, as well as preventing easy fixes to problems like rampant hyperinflation (Real News, 1/18/19). This is why UN human rights experts denounce US sanctions as “economic warfare,” which could amount to “crimes against humanity,” and compare the way they kill Venezuelans to a medieval siege (Independent, 1/26/19; Grayzone, 4/7/19). Although it’s hard to see how one measures the “success” of sanctions—except by their capacity to immiserate the target populations—apparently the only “open question” for the Atlantic is whether or not “gradual economic strangulation” will “prove a match” for the support for Maduro from “foreign patrons” like Russia, China and Cuba. By confining itself to questions of tactical efficacy, and whether sanctions will triumph over the American empire’s rivals, the report completely omits questions of whether or not the US possesses the moral prerogative, and legal authorization, to impose unilateral sanctions and embargoes forre regime change purposes.
Kimberly Amadeo, 19 Kimberly Amadeo, (). "12 Causes of Economic Recession." Balance, 7-25-2019, 12-2-2019. https://www.thebalance.com/causes-of-economic-recession-3306010 // MHS SG
Economic recessions are caused by a loss of business and consumer confidence. As confidence recedes, so does demand. A recession is a tipping point in the business cycle. It's where the peak, accompanied by irrational exuberance, moves into contraction. Loss of confidence in investments. Loss of confidence makes consumers stop buying and move into defensive mode. Once a critical mass moves toward the exit sign, panic sets in. Retail sales slow. Businesses run fewer employment ads, and the economy adds fewer jobs. Manufacturers cut back in reaction to falling orders—the unemployment rate rises. To restore confidence, the federal government and the central bank must step in.
Trump’s newest policy changes the game. His policy is so vague that it will ripple throughout the economy.
Armario ’19 Armario, Christine. “AP Explains: The wide reach of Trump’s Venezuela sanctions.” Associated Press, 7 August 2019, https://apnews.com/0b13effe006b41648f8285f8531ba869. Premier
WHAT’S THE LIKELY IMPACT? The biggest impact probably will come from “secondary sanctions” that could have a devastating effect on Venezuela’s economy. The Trump administration can now punish foreign governments and businesses that help Maduro stay in power from doing business in the U.S. National Security Adviser John Bolton put it in stark terms Tuesday: Do business with the Venezuelan government and you’ll be barred from the U.S. “Make a very careful calculation,” he warned. Analysts say the definition of providing “material support” is so vague that it could have a ripple effect that chills all business with Venezuela. In particular, countries like India and Malaysia that now buy 46 percent of Venezuela’s exports could decide they are better off reducing trade. “All these measures are impacting the economy’s import capacity and will lead to a deeper economic contraction,” Rodriguez said. ___\
US sanctions Maduro because he limits US imperialism economic and foreign policy in Latin America
Madeline Roache, human rights correspondent, February 28, 2019, “Sanctions, Venezuela, and US intentions,” Al Jazeera,https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/sanctions-venezuela-intentions-190226124044497.html(accessed 12/6/19)
According to Lucas Koerner, an editor and political analyst at Venezuelanalysis.com, the US has sought to overthrow the Venezuelan government partly because of the way Maduro and his predecessor Hugo Chavez have used oil as an "instrument of countering US hegemony" in the Western Hemisphere. Beginning under Chavez, Venezuela helped create multilateral bodies that excluded the US, such as the Community ofLatin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America(ALBA), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), and PetroCaribe, through which Caracas offers oil at a preferential rate to various countries in Latin America. "These bodies are part of a broader effort to limit Washington's influence in the region and support progressive governments, for example, in Bolivia,Ecuador, Honduras and El Salvador," Koerner told Al Jazeera. It is also no secret that Chavez and Madurohave angered the US by seeking stronger economic relations with Iran, China and Russia.Although the US historically had close relations with Venezuela, a major oil supplier, ties sharply deteriorated, first under Chavez and then Maduro, both virulent critics of what they called Washington's "imperialistic" economic and foreign policy. In 2002, the administration of former US President George W Bush supported a failed military coup against Chavez, who was removed for two days before returning to power as an "anti-imperialist hero".
Collapsing Venezuela’s economy is the government’s stated strategy.
Cho ’19 Cho, Joshua (Writer for FAIR). “The Atlantic Illustrates Everything That’s Wrong With Media Coverage of Venezuela Sanctions.” Fairness and Accuracy In Reporting, 6 May 2019, https://fair.org/home/the-atlantic-illustrates-everything-thats-wrong-with-media-coverage-of-venezuela-sanctions/. Premier
Most importantly, the Atlantic blindly peddled the humanitarian pretext offered by Trump administration officials, that they are merely opposing “tyranny” in Latin America officials. Instead of recalling the US’s history of using sanctions to undermine popular leftist governments to “make the economy scream,” installing reactionary dictatorships in countries like Chile, or supporting a failed 2002 Venezuelan coup to remove the popularly elected President Hugo Chávez (Extra!, 5–6/02), the authors leaned into corporate media tropes about Latin American leftists. Mimicking Bolton’s red-baiting, the Atlantic characterized the other two nations targeted by him as “repressive socialist governments”: Cuba and Nicaragua, where revolutionaries overthrew the reviled US-backed Batista and Somoza dictatorships in their respective countries (New York Times, 3/16/86). The Atlantic erased Maduro’s numerous domestic supporters, and the pre-sanctions social gains of the Bolivarian revolution (FAIR.org, 2/20/19), by depicting him as an isolated “strongman” propped up by “foreign patrons.” The “humanitarian” motivation of sanctions and embargoes is also belied by US State Department memoranda that openly strategized to undermine the fledgling Castro government by intentionally driving the population to “hunger” and “desperation.” These half-century-old documents are echoed by recent remarks by Trump administration officials boasting that US sanctions resemble Darth Vader’s death grip, and claiming that Venezuela’s “total economic collapse” is evidence that regime change “is working.”
The terminal impact is state collapse—the scenario would be disastrous.
Mora ’19 Mora, Frank (Director of the Kimberly Green Latin American and Caribbean Center at Florida International University). “Stabilizing Venezuela: Scenarios and Options.” Council on Foreign Relations, 14 July 2019, https://www.cfr.org/report/stabilizing-venezuela. Premier
In the face of domestic political pressure, international isolation, and tightening economic sanctions, the state could collapse: the centers of power would disintegrate, and anarchy would reign as armed militias and colectivos wreaked havoc in major cities. The humanitarian crisis would reach catastrophic levels, forcing nearly a third of the population to flee to the borders in search of relief. The spread of disease within and outside Venezuela would exacerbate the health crisis. Local and international nonstate groups, such as transnational criminal organizations, could expand their presence and activities, while terrorist groups from within and outside the hemisphere could find Venezuela a hospitable environment from which to operate. Policy Options and Implications The United States and other Western powers want the restoration of democracy and rule of law. Nicolas Maduro is equally committed to holding on to power. International sanctions and diplomatic isolation are denying legitimacy and resources to Maduro’s government but have not dislodged him from power. The crisis is intensifying tensions between the United States and Maduro’s foreign allies—China, Cuba, Russia, and Turkey—which are doubling down on their support for the regime. The political and humanitarian crisis requires policy options that address the goals of restoring democracy and providing humanitarian assistance. Intensify Diplomatic and Economic Pressures and Incentives The United States and its partners could continue increasing political and economic pressure on the regime, while working with the International Committee of the Red Cross and other nongovernmental organizations to bring humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable. Additional financial pressures could include secondary sanctions on more foreign-owned companies that do business with Venezuela. Washington could also work with the Lima Group to bolster its capacity and legal framework to impose sanctions on the regime. However, this approach could cause the political standoff to continue while the humanitarian situation worsened. The spillover effects of the crisis—migration and the spread of infectious disease—could overburden Venezuela’s neighbors. In addition, as the humanitarian crisis deepens with no political resolution at hand, the international coalition could fragment as some call for negotiations. The longer the crisis continues, the greater the likelihood of state collapse. Therefore, pressure alone could prove counterproductive.
Sanctions push Venezuela into defaulting.
Sabatini ’17 Sabtaini, Christopher (Lecturer at the School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA) at Columbia University). “Why U.S. economic sanctions on Venezuela are a bad idea.” Global Americans, 20 July 2017, https://theglobalamericans.org/2017/07/u-s-economic-sanctions-venezuela-bad-idea/. Premier
By recent reckonings, the Venezuelan government—through sovereign debt or through debt owed by its state-owned oil company PDVSA—needs to meet at least $55 billion in international loan payments. And no one believes that the Central Bank has that much in hard currency and gold that it can make that. (The announcement this week of an MOU with the government of Angola to extract gold and diamonds and the Maduro Central Bank president’s declaration that the government will count diamonds as part of its international reserves both indicate that they are in a panic and that the government is bizarrely counting on a medieval return to a barter economy to pay off its creditors.) So, a block on the country’s main source of hard currency will, almost inevitably provoke a Venezuelan default. Alone, that will drive the country even further into economic despair and isolation—and again potentially putting the blame at the feet of the democratic opposition. A default and the lack of hard currency and isolation from international capital markets, wouldn’t hurt the regime, which has shown a remarkable willingness to impose the costs of its economic failings on its own people, as much as it would hurt the very people the U.S. and the opposition claims to defend. Social services, food and medicine imports would be cut. The National Guard and military’s budget for rubber bullets, tear gas, and truncheons though would likely remain the same.
That could cause a hemisphere-wise collapse—the Asian crisis proves.
Sabatini ’17 Sabtaini, Christopher (Lecturer at the School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA) at Columbia University). “Why U.S. economic sanctions on Venezuela are a bad idea.” Global Americans, 20 July 2017, https://theglobalamericans.org/2017/07/u-s-economic-sanctions-venezuela-bad-idea/. Premier
But there is even a darker scenario here. A Venezuelan default could trigger a broader debt crisis in the hemisphere. Yes, Venezuela is not Colombia, Peru or even Brazil which despite problems are on better economic terms. But capital markets are not rational and mom-and-pop investors are not always all that savvy about the nuances of Latin American economies or their governments’ solvency. In the past, individual countries’ seemingly isolated economic troubles—as in the 1997 Asian crisis—quickly spread across borders to countries that were not directly linked to the original risk.
Juan M. Sánchez, 12 Juan M. Sánchez, (). "The Relationships Among Changes in GDP, Employment, and Unemployment: This Time, It’s Different." No Publication, 05-18-2012, 12-2-2019. https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/economic-synopses/2012/05/18/the-relationships-among-changes-in-gdp-employment-and-unemployment-this-time-its-different/ // MHS SG
Different factors affect gross domestic product (GDP) and unemployment. However, historically, a 1 percent decrease in GDP has been associated with a slightly less than 2-percentage-point increase in the unemployment rate. This relationship is usually referred to as Okun's law.1 The first chart plots this relationship for 1949-2011 (open circles). The law, however, seems to have changed during the Great Recession. | 904,698 |
365,584 | 379,621 | 4 - Feb Econ | Gibson 14 Carl Gibson (co-founder of US Uncut). “The Case for a Basic Guaranteed Income for All.” Huffington Post. May 13th, 2014. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/carl-gibson/the-case-for-a-basic-guar_b_5311330.html DA 03/02/2020 JL//MHS
The cost of guaranteeing ... fighting over crumbs.
Brad Jones, 17 Brad Jones, (Associate Editor — American Association for Cancer Research). "Experts say universal basic income would boost US economy by staggering $2.5 trillion." Futurism, 27/11/17, 2-3-2020. https://futurism.com/experts-universal-basic-income-boost-us-economy-staggering-2-5-trillion // MHS JL
the Roosevelt Institute ... product of $2.48 trillion. For
Sessions, 11 Jeff Sessions, (Former Senator and Attorney General of the USFG). "." Senate, 2011, 2-4-2020. https://www.budget.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/CRS20Report20-20Welfare20Spending20The20Largest20Item20In20The20Federal20Budget.pdf // MHS JL
Pataki (Pataki, Pataki, (Former NY governor). "Do Tax Loopholes Cost American Taxpayers $1.4 Trillion a Year?." Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, 10-28-2015, 2-4-2020. https://www.crfb.org/blogs/tax-loopholes-cost-american-taxpayers-14-trillion-year // MHS JL
paraphrased
Harkinson 11 Josh Harkinson (staff reporter). “Study: Income Inequality Kills Economic Growth.” Mother Jones. October 4th, 2011. http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2011/10/study-income-inequality-kills-economic-growth DA 03/02/2020 JL//MHS
Comparing six major ... during the Arab Spring in
Haass 13 Richard Haass (President of the Council on Foreign Relations) “The World Without America” April 30th 2013 http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/repairing-the-roots-of-american-power-by-richard-n~-~-haass DA 03/02/2020 MHS//JL
The most critical threat facing ... for the vast majority of the planet’s
Santens 16 Santens, Scott. "Universal Basic Income Is the Best Tool to Fight Poverty." The Blog. Huffington Post, 2 June 2016. Web. Scott Santens has a crowdfunded monthly basic income and has been a moderator of the Basic Income community on Reddit since 2013. As a writer and blogger, his pieces advocating basic income have appeared in The Huffington Post, The Boston Globe, TechCrunch, Vox, the World Economic Forum, and Politico. As a public speaker, he has presented at the first World Summit on Technological Unemployment and has participated as a panelist at conferences about the future of work across the U.S. He is on the board of directors of USBIG, Inc., a founding member of the Economic Security Project, an advisor to the Universal Income Project, a founding committee member of Basic Income Action, and founder of the BIG Patreon Creator Pledge. He holds a B.S. in psychology and his home is in New Orleans, Louisiana. https://www.huffpost.com/entry/universal-basic-income-is_b_10251176 DA 14/02/20 MHS//JL
Abhijit Banerjee, a director of the ... more work, not less. Unconditional | 904,702 |
365,585 | 379,625 | 1 - SepOct Environment | Contention 1: Increased Emissions
This occurs through a couple of ways.
First Infrastructure
The EPA 2010 tells us that 14 of global greenhouse gas emissions are from transportation and 6 are from buildings, which China plans to build through the BRI.
Second Coal
The use of coal plants is dying, as Carbon Brief ‘19 (evans Pierce 19) writes that there has been an unprecedented 31G(iga)W(atts) worth of coal plant closures in a single year and new coal plant construction has been down by 89 since 2015.
Unfortunately the BRI revitalizes the use of coal, as
China is also building coal plants overseas, as Stanway ‘19 writes that Chinese coal companies are responding to domestic restrictions by making coal investments overseas.
Tabuchi ‘17 quantifies this, by saying that over all, 1,600 overseas coal plants are planned or under construction, by China.
If the EU joins, the BRI, the initiative will continue to expand, which will allow the creation of coal plants in different developing countries along with the EU.
The second way that the BRI increases emissions is through chinese banks.
Min ‘19 further explains that 75 of overall investment into BRI countries, from these banks, were for fossil fuels.
BRI Countries Emissions higher as a result of BRI
Jing-Li Fan, Ideas, "Determinants of carbon emissions in 'Belt and Road Initiative' countries: A production technology perspective", 2019, https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/appene/v239y2019icp268-279.html
Little attention has been given to the carbon emissions issues of ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ countries although most countries have set explicit targets for Intended Nationally Determined Contributions. Taking advantage of the production theory, distance function, and data envelopment analysis, we employed a production-theoretical decomposition analysis to decompose the total carbon dioxide emission changes of the “Belt and Road Initiatives” countries from 2000 to 2014 into the contribution of seven driving factors and focused particularly on a production technology perspective. The main findings are as follows: (1) the economic development as proxied by the gross domestic product and the potential carbon emissions related to energy consumption were the two most important factors affecting carbon emission growth. The driving factor values for these two factors were 1.989 and 1.37. The average CO2 emissions of the “Belt and Road Initiatives” countries in 2014 were 1.425 times larger than those in 2000. (2) The carbon abatement technology changes and potential energy intensity changes were the two main inhibiting factors return with factor values of 0.775 and 0.793. Moreover, we divided all countries into four groups, namely China and three other groups based on the income level. The results showed that the three groups had similar characteristics in terms of the carbon abatement technology effect and the carbon dioxide abatement technological efficiency, whereas China exhibited larger fluctuations. The promoting effect of economic development is significantly higher in China than in the other three groups. In addition, this promoting effect exhibited a decrease over time, indicating a decoupling between economic development and CO2 emissions.
The impact of this is exacerbating climate change.
Zadek ‘19 explicates that
Infrastructure investments on track to aggregate climate change Zadek '19, The Brookings Institution, "The Critical frontier: Reducing emissions from China's Belt and Road", April 25, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2019/04/25/the-critical-frontier-reducing-emissions-from-chinas-belt-and-road/ New infrastructure will be a major contributor to global carbon emissions over the coming decades, accounting for over half of new sources according to the World Economic Forum. Such investments in countries involved in the BRI could make up as much as 60 percent of global infrastructure investments over the coming two decades. That is, BRI-involved countries could be the single largest source of growing carbon emissions over this critical period. A forthcoming report by Tsinghua University and partners has, for the first time, aggregated growth and carbon scenarios for BRI countries. Notwithstanding data weaknesses and uncertainties, the results indicate that these countries are currently on track to generate emissions well above 2-Degree Scenario (2DS) levels based on current infrastructure investment patterns and growth projections. BRI-involved countries could exceed their 2DS carbon budget by as much as 11 gigatons by 2030 and 85 gigatons by 2050. In this scenario, these countries would account for 50 percent of global emissions by 2050, up from 15 percent in 2015, if all other countries succeeded in following a 2DS pathway. More optimistically, emissions would be 39 percent lower if BRI-involved countries achieved “historical best practices.” However, they would still fall short by 77 percent of the reduction required to align with a 2DS, resulting in their carbon emissions still exceeding the 2DS budget by a huge margin (38 percent) by 2050.
To keep global temperatures between 1.5 – 2 degree C, coal needs to be phased outs, which is countered=
According to Hilton 19’ in Yale E360,
Hilton, Isabel. “How China's Big Overseas Initiative Threatens Global Climate Progress.” Yale E360, 3 Jan. 2019, https://e360.yale.edu/features/how-chinas-big-overseas-initiative-threatens-climate-progress. SM
As a spokesman for the China Huaneng Group, China’s national state-owned power company, told China Energy News in July 2015, the company was actively seeking development opportunities along the “Belt and Road.” It had a particular eye on the coal resources of South Asia, Southeast Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and the Russian Far East. Other energy companies followed suit, supported by the third key element in the strategy – China’s state-owned banks. Later that year, 190 countries agreed under the Paris climate accord to try to keep {keeping} the global average temperature rise below 2 degrees Celsius (C) and as close to 1.5 degrees C as possible. The energy finance think tank Carbon Tracker estimates that this will require a complete phaseout of coal worldwide by 2040. That, in turn, means that 100 GW a year, or one coal plant a day, will need to close from now to 2040, a goal that is directly undercut by China’s coal investments. The average life of a coal-fired power station is around 40 years, so a phaseout by 2040 implies that any new plant built today – and most built after the turn of the century – is unlikely to operate long enough to recover its costs. As the price of renewables, already competitive with new coal and natural gas, is forecast to continue to drop, the point at which such plants become uneconomical could be very close. Against that background, China’s new coal power plants and infrastructure both at home and abroad threaten both the sustainability of its partners and global efforts to contain climate change.
This indicates that the BRI will cause the world to reach the 2 degree threshold.
For each degree increase in global temperature, the CBC in 2015 writes there will be a 10 decrease in global crop yields. This means less food for the hungry all around the world and increases food prices making it totally inaccessible to the poor.
The Overseas Development Institute in 2015 further estimates that over 720 million people could be pushed into extreme poverty” as a result of climate impacts.
Duke University 18 further writes that roughly 153 million air pollution deaths will occur at the 2 degree threshold as well.
They can have 150 mill saved | 904,705 |
365,586 | 379,668 | TOC AFF | We affirm Resolved: The US should remove nearly all of its military presence in the Arab states of the Persian Gulf.
Contention 1: Iran
In January of this year, the assassination of Iran’s top military General Soleimani increased tensions between the US and Iran.
Iran bombed a US base in Iraq on March 11, bringing the US and Iran to the brink of war.
Luckily, affirming will ease tensions in four ways.
First, is removing scapegoats.
The presence of American troops incentivizes Iranian aggression.
Jones 11~-~- Jones, Toby. (Toby C. Jones is assistant professor of history at Rutgers University. He has authored several books.) “Don’t Stop at Iraq: Why the US Should Withdraw From the Entire Persian Gulf.” The Atlantic, 22 December 2011. https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:68MqCBpeRKcJ:https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/12/dont-stop-at-iraq-why-the-us-should-withdraw-from-the-entire-persian-gulf/250389/+andcd=1andhl=enandct=clnkandgl=us
Led by Saudi Arabia, the Arab Gulf states claim that their fears of Iranian ambition are existential. It is certainly true that Tehran is locked in a regional balance of power struggle with Saudi Arabia and that Iran seeks greater influence. But Iran does not seek the destruction of Saudi Arabia or the overthrow of Arab world's political order. In spite of claims to the contrary by the Saudi and Bahraini governments, Iran's revolutionary imperative is a relic of the past. Israel expresses a similar anxiety about Iran as a security threat. And Iran's leaders have played their part in fostering Israeli uncertainty. Iran's potential acquisition of nuclear weapons is a source of concern, of course, as is its support for Hezbollah and Syria. The challenge of how best to deal with Iranian ambition, however, is mainly a political problem, one that has for too long been treated almost entirely through the lens of security and militarism.
The presence of the American military in the Gulf has not only done little to deter Iran's ambitions, it has emboldened them. Surrounding Iran militarily and putting it under the constant threat of American or Israeli military action has failed to deter the country. Instead this approach has strengthened hardliners within Tehran and convincing them that the best path to turn to self-preservation is through defiance and militarism, and the pursuit of dangerous ties across the Middle East. The rivalry between Iran, the U.S., and its regional partners has turned into a political and military arms race, one that could easily spin out of control.
Less obvious, the United States' military posture has also emboldened its allies, sometimes to act in counterproductive ways. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain justify their brutal crackdown of Bahrain's pro-democracy movement by falsely claiming Iranian meddling. While American policymakers support democratic transitions in the Middle East rhetorically, their unwillingness to confront long-time allies in the Gulf during the Arab Spring is partly the product of the continued belief that the U.S. needs to keep its military in the Gulf, something that requires staying on good terms with Gulf monarchies. The result is that Saudi Arabia and its allies have considerable political cover to behave badly, both at home and abroad.
Second, reducing miscalculation.
The mere presence of US troops increases the risk of miscalculation and conflict because of the proximity to enemies.
Mahony 18~-~-Mahony, Angela. (Assistant Dean for Academic Affairs, Pardee RAND Graduate School; Senior Political Scientist, RAND. Ph.D. in political science, University of California, San Diego; B.A. in economics, University of California, Los Angeles) “US Presence and the Incidence of Conflict.” RAND Corporation. 2018. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1900/RR1906/RAND_RR1906.pdf
U.S. Troop Presence Can Embolden Potential Adversaries
Although increases in U.S. troop presence are typically associated with deterring U.S. adversaries, U.S. troop presence can potentially degrade deterrence by diminishing a partner’s willingness to spend on its own defense. When the United States provides commitments, it makes its partner more secure, which could lead a partner to underinvest in its own security.10 Recent evidence that U.S. troop presence is associated with a decline in the size of a partner’s military forces and level of defense spending is consistent with this expectation.11 In this way, U.S. troop presence could actually diminish the overall military resources available to deter potential adversaries and make an adversary more likely to initiate conflict.
U.S. Troop Presence Can Threaten Potential Adversaries
U.S. global military superiority is an important component of U.S. deterrence. However, it can also threaten other states.12 When U.S. forces are nearby, an adversary may feel particularly insecure for a number of reasons. First, the adversary may worry that the larger presence indicates that the United States has plans to use force in the region or that it may be more likely to do so in the near future. Second, U.S. troop presence close to an adversary it increases the risk that the two militaries, operating in close proximity to one another, may have accidents or misperceive each other’s intentions, resulting in an increased risk of escalation and conflict.13 Finally, incentives to protect U.S. forces near a highly capable potential adversary can lead the United States to adopt military concepts and pursue technologies that could potentially and it also increases both sides’ incentives to strike first. Such pressures for preemption could make an adversary feel that fullscale war against its homeland is more likely.14
An adversary’s security concerns can in turn affect the likelihood of conflict. An insecure adversary may, for example, take long-term steps, such as increasing its defense spending, to regain security. The United States and its partners may respond with defense spending of their own, leading to arms races and a heightened security competition that could make any of the parties involved—the potential adversary, the United States, or U.S. partners—more likely to initiate conflict. Insecure adversaries may also take immediate militarized steps either to strengthen their defenses or to signal their own resolve to defend their homeland or sphere of influence. These steps could include making threats, putting military forces on a higher level of alert, initiating a limited use of force, or pursuing aggressive territorial expansion to preemptively secure militarily important areas.15
Decreasing troop presence would greatly decrease the chance of miscalculation.
Third, by shifting US policy to diplomacy.
Walt 19~-~- Walt, Stephen. (STEPHEN M. WALT is Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School ) “The End of Hubris.” Foreign Affairs. June 2019. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-04-16/end-hubris
Washington should also return to its traditional approach to the Middle East. To ensure access to the energy supplies on which the world economy depends, the United States has long sought to prevent any country from dominating the oil-rich Persian Gulf. But until the late 1960s, it did so by relying on the United Kingdom. After the British withdrew, Washington relied on regional clients, such as Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. U.S. forces stayed offshore until January 1991, a few months after Saddam Hussein, the leader of Iraq, seized Kuwait. In response, the George H. W. Bush administration assembled a coalition of states that liberated Kuwait, decimated Iraq’s military, and restored balance to the region.
Today, Washington’s primary goal in the Middle East remains preventing any country from impeding the flow of oil to world markets. The region is now deeply divided along several dimensions, with no state in a position to dominate. Moreover, the oil-producing states depend on revenue from energy exports, which makes all of them eager to sell. Maintaining a regional balance of power should be relatively easy, therefore, especially once the United States ends its counterproductive efforts to remake local politics. U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria would be withdrawn, although the United States might still maintain intelligence-gathering facilities, prepositioned equipment, and basing arrangements in the region as a hedge against the need to return in the future. But as it did from 1945 to 1991, Washington would count on local powers to maintain a regional balance of power in accordance with their own interests.
As an offshore balancer, the United States would establish normal relations with all countries in the region, instead of having “special relationships” with a few states and profoundly hostile relations with others. No country in the Middle East is so virtuous or vital that it deserves unconditional U.S. support, and no country there is so heinous that it must be treated as a pariah. The United States should act as China, India, Japan, Russia, and the EU do, maintaining normal working relationships with all states in the region—including Iran. Among other things, this policy would encourage rival regional powers to compete for U.S. support, instead of taking it for granted. For the moment, Washington should also make it clear that it will reduce its support for local partners if they repeatedly act in ways that undermine U.S. interests or that run contrary to core U.S. values. Should any state threaten to dominate the region from within or without in the future, the United States would help the rest balance against it, calibrating its level of effort and local presence to the magnitude of the danger.
...
Defenders of the status quo will no doubt mischaracterize this course of action as a return to isolationism. That is nonsense. As an offshore balancer, the United States would be deeply engaged diplomatically, economically, and, in some areas, militarily. It would still possess the world’s mightiest armed forces, even if it spent somewhat less money on them. The United States would continue to work with other countries to address major global issues such as climate change, terrorism, and cyberthreats. But Washington would no longer assume primary responsibility for defending wealthy allies that can defend themselves, no longer subsidize client states whose actions undermine U.S. interests, and no longer try to spread democracy via regime change, covert action, or economic pressure.
Instead, Washington would use its strength primarily to uphold the balance of power in Asia—where a substantial U.S. presence is still needed—and would devote more time, attention, and resources to restoring the foundations of U.S. power at home. By setting an example that others would once again admire and seek to emulate, an offshore-balancing United States would also do a better job of promoting the political values that Americans espouse.
This approach would have also involve less reliance on force and coercion and a renewed emphasis on diplomacy. Military power would remain central to U.S. national security, but its use would be as a last resort rather than a first impulse. It is worth remembering that some of Washington’s greatest foreign policy achievements—the Marshall Plan, the Bretton Woods system, the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, and the peaceful reunification of Germany—were diplomatic victories, not battlefield ones. In recent years, however, both Democratic and Republican administrations have tended to eschew genuine diplomacy and have relied instead on ultimatums and pressure. Convinced they hold all the high cards, too many U.S. officials have come to see even modest concessions to opponents as tantamount to surrender. So they have tried to dictate terms to others and have reached for sanctions or the sword when the target state has refused to comply. But even weak states are reluctant to submit to blackmail, and imposing one-sided agreements on others makes them more likely to cheat or renege as soon as they can. For diplomacy to work, both sides must get some of what they want.
Diplomacy would act as a crucial offramp to deescalation.
USAF 20~-~- United States Air Force Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies. “News and Analysis.” 21 February 2020. USAF. https://media.defense.gov/2020/Feb/21/2002253106/-1/-1/0/CSDS-OUTREACH1405.PDF
U.S. policy towards Iran is incoherent. President Donald Trump says he wants to re-negotiate the nuclear deal, but his expanding maximum pressure campaign whispers regime change. Trump has had it both ways without any apparent political costs. That will change in an election year. In 2016, Trump won three battleground states because he rejected American military adventurism. Some of the president’s most influential media surrogates are warning him that his Iran policy could lead the United States into war, and some 2020 voters are also worried. So were eight Republican senators who, in a rare break with Trump, joined Democrats recently in a vote to limit the president’s ability to attack Iran. As he seeks re-election in November, Trump would risk the support of his base if he stumbled into another military conflict in the Middle East, which would be seen as an unnecessary and costly distraction from urgent problems at home. That will incline him toward restraint.
What will U.S. restraint mean for the maximum pressure campaign? Trump’s hardline Iran policy fires up parts of his base, so it will likely continue, but with less risk of provocation. It could also be re-packaged in a style that gives the appearance of reacting to Iranian moves, rather than remaining offensive in nature. This is where the nuclear deal’s dispute resolution mechanism could help. Washington has never offered Iran an off-ramp. While dispute resolution cannot offer quid pro quo de-escalation, it does offer Iran a line of retreat from nuclear escalation without appearing to bow to U.S. pressure. This allows Iran, which strives to convey the impression that it is capable of withstanding the full weight of American pressures, to maintain that posture, and also to demonstrate that it is not isolated and retains the diplomatic support of Europe, Russia, and China. That would make it harder politically for America to marshal international censure of Iran, let alone launch a military strike. These factors, and the possibility of a new face in the White House, will an off-ramp would incline Iran toward restraint, reinforced by the threat of punitive action under the dispute resolution process. After November, any number of developments could alter the strategic and tactical choices of Iran and the United States, potentially improving the political climate for a new deal. Similarly, as America’s European allies lead the effort to keep the nuclear deal operational, their persistent attempts to deny Washington the ability to dictate European foreign policy through threats and U.S. secondary sanctions could erode international acquiescence to American unilateralism. If this European trend becomes irreversible, it would have consequences for America’s image, credibility, and posture in the world.
Critically, without diplomacy and adjustment, war and conflict between US and Iran will become inevitable. Seib 20~-~- Seib, Gerald. (Mr. Seib earned a bachelor's degree in journalism from the University of Kansas. While at the university, he was a member of Phi Kappa Phi, a national academic honor society, and Kappa Tau Alpha, a national journalism honor society. ) “US-Iran Conflict: More Conflict Is Inevitable; War Isn’t.” Wall Street Journal. 4 January 2020. https://www.wsj.com/articles/more-conflict-is-inevitable-war-with-iran-isnt-11578069281
After this week's dramatic spike in tensions between Iran and the U.S., further conflict now is inevitable, and terrorism outbreaks have become far more likely.
That doesn't mean, however, that an actual war is inevitable. Indeed, neither side wants that, and both have been trying to stop just short of the line of no return.
As a result, the question is whether President Trump and Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, are is capable of containing the forces they have that he has unleashed.
The testing ground in this new phase of confrontation figures to lie first within Iraq and in the Persian Gulf, though the tensions also could envelop American allies in Saudi Arabia and Israel, reach into cyberspace and activate terror networks Iran has cultivated. Yet the most worrisome force of all may be the law of unintended consequences. That is the rough lay of the land in the aftermath of the American airstrike in Baghdad that killed Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, Iran's top military commander and leader of its powerful Quds Force.
Fourth, by decreasing conflict with proxies.
Vox 20~-~- Ward, Alex. (Alex is the staff writer covering international security and defense issues, as well as a co-host of Vox's "Worldly" podcast. Before joining Vox, Alex was an associate director in the Atlantic Council's Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security where he worked on military issues and US foreign policy.) “11 US troops were injured in Iran’s attack. It shows how close we came to war.” Vox, 17 January 2020. https://www.vox.com/2020/1/17/21070371/11-troops-injured-trump-iran-war
“When deemed fit for duty, the service members are expected to return to Iraq following screening. The health and welfare of our personnel is a top priority and we will not discuss any individual’s medical status,” he added.
President Donald Trump’s clear red line with Iran was that its military or regional proxies couldn’t kill an Americans. If they did, the US would respond forcefully. He followed through on that red line in late December after a Tehran-backed proxy militia killed a US contractor in Iraq, prompting the president to strike five of the group’s sites, leaving 25 members dead and another 50 injured.
And after members of that same militia — Kata’ib Hezbollah — surrounded and breached the US Embassy in Baghdad on New Year’s Eve, setting the front reception room ablaze, Trump opted to kill top Iranian military leader Qassem Soleimani on January 2….
But let’s stop here for a minute. Imagine that US troops in Iraq hadn’t protected themselves well enough, or that if Iran’s missiles hit more populated targets. They might have been killed, and Trump would have had almost no choice but to escalate a dangerous tit-for-tat with the Islamic Republic. At that point, little could have been done to keep both sides from spiraling toward a larger, more brutal conflict. It is nothing short of pure fortune, then, that allowed everyone to walk back from the brink.
“The more that comes out, the more it looks like we got incredibly lucky in avoiding a war,” Ilan Goldenberg, an Iran expert at the Center for a New American Security think tank in Washington, told me.
Problematically, the US can’t deter Iran’s proxies, and they wish for a US-Iranian war.
Foreign Policy 20~-~-Mesquita, Ethan. (Ethan Bueno de Mesquita is the Sydney Stein professor and deputy dean at the University of Chicago’s Harris School of Public Policy. He is an applied game theorist who has published widely on issues of terrorism, rebellion, and security strategy. ) “The US Can Deter Iran but Not Its Proxies.” Foreign Policy. 23 January 2020. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/23/united-states-iran-proxies-deterrence-suleimani/
In its most straightforward form, the logic of deterrence is simple: If an adversary believes the costs of an attack are high enough, it will prefer not to engage in that attack in the first place. Thus, the administration’s argument goes, if the United States threatens a massive response to Iranian aggression, they are likely to stand down.
But this logic rests on a couple of key assumptions. Most importantly, in this instance, those who are threatened with punishment must in fact have the power to prevent the precipitating attacks. For such threats to work, then, the Iranian regime itself must be in a position to decide whether or not attacks occur.
Iran has close ties to armed groups throughout the Middle East, from Yemen to Lebanon to Syria to Iraq. Many of these relationships were built in part by Suleimani himself. While these Iranian proxies groups take weapons, training, support, and some degree of direction from Iran but, they are also independent actors. Their preferences are not always aligned with Iran’s, and they have shown themselves willing to contradict Iranian directives when doing so is to their strategic advantage. For instance, Iran-aligned Houthi rebels have engaged in escalatory violence over the objections of their Iranian backers. This partial independence makes it difficult to attribute responsibility for attacks undertaken by such proxies.
Suppose one of the several armed Shiite groups with ties to Iran that are operative in Iraq engages in a significant attack in the coming days or weeks. It will be unclear whether that attack was taken at Iran’s direction or not. Will the United States extend its belligerent deterrent stand to such acts? Will it strike back at Iran for actions by Iraqis or Syrians?
The answer may well be yes. After all, it was not actions by the Iranian military but by Iranian proxies in Iraq that put in motion the chain of events leading to the killing of Suleimani. Kataib Hezbollah, an Iran-linked Shiite militia, was responsible for the rocket attacks on Iraqi bases in December 2019 that killed an American contractor and injured several soldiers. That event spurred a U.S. airstrike on Kataib Hezbollah’s headquarters in Iraq, which subsequently led to the protests outside the U.S. Embassy that preceded the killing of Suleimani.
In an important sense, then, the United States has already shown that it can be provoked by Iranian proxies. In so doing, America has put itself in a profoundly dangerous strategic position. In an attempt to deter Iran with maximalist threats, the United States has given independent armed militias the power to escalate conflict between two sovereign nations.
The Iranians appear acutely aware of the risk. Their initial response to the assassination was notably proportional and public. They wanted no misunderstanding. Moreover, the Iranian ambassador to the United Nations recently argued that Iran was responsible for these public actions but that it ought not be held responsible for “any sort of actions to be taken by others,” a clear reference to the risk of provocation by Iran-linked militias.
The problem is that, having publicly responded with face-saving missile strikes that did limited damage, Iran may genuinely prefer de-escalation. But its proxies, especially those operating in Iraq, may not. Perhaps they these proxies view greater conflict between Iran and the United States as an opportunity to end the ongoing U.S. presence in Iraq. Or perhaps they see strategic advantages to operate within the chaos of increased civil conflict.
In this case, they may well have incentives to engage in attacks—for instance, on attack Americans in Iraq—that exploit the United States’ more aggressive deterrent posture to manipulate the US into greater conflict with Iran. And Iran may not be in a position to prevent those actions, in which case Trump’s deterrent stance will have backfired. Indeed, one might even worry that groups not linked to Iran, like the Islamic State, that wish to spread discord and chaos might view this as an opportune moment to engage in false-flag operations that make it look as though Iranian proxies are engaged in escalatory violence.
Once these proxies kill enough Americans, US and Iran would escalate into a full on war. Keeping 5,000 troops in Iraq only incentivizes and gives these militias a chance to kill American troops.
The impact is war.
Ward 19~-~-Ward, Alex. (Alex is the staff writer covering international security and defense issues, as well as a co-host of Vox's "Worldly" podcast. Before joining Vox, Alex was an associate director in the Atlantic Council's Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security where he worked on military issues and US foreign policy.) “A nasty, brutal fight: what a US-Iran war would look like.” Vox, 3 January 2020. https://www.vox.com/world/2019/7/8/18693297/us-iran-war-trump-nuclear-iraq
Which means US-Iran relations teeter on a knife edge, and it won’t take much more to knock them off. So to understand just how bad the situation could get, I asked eight current and former White House, Pentagon, and intelligence officials, as well as Middle East experts, last July about how a war between the US and Iran might play out.
The bottom line: It would be hell on earth.
“This a US-Iran war would be a violent convulsion similar to chaos of the Arab Spring inflicted on the region for years,” said Ilan Goldenberg, the Defense Department’s Iran team chief from 2009 to 2012, with the potential for it to get “so much worse than Iraq.”...
“The worst-case scenarios here are quite serious”
Imagine, as we already have, that the earlier stages of strife escalate to a major war. That’s already bad enough. But assume for a moment not only that the fighting takes place, but that the US does the unlikely and near impossible: It invades and overthrows the Iranian regime (which Trump’s former National Security Adviser John Bolton, at least, has openly called for in the past). If that happens, it’s worth keeping two things in mind.
First, experts say upward of a million people — troops from both sides as well as Iranian men, women, and children, and American diplomats and contractors — likely will have died by that point. Cities will burn and smolder. Those who survived the conflict will mainly live in a state of economic devastation for years and some, perhaps, will pick up arms and form insurgent groups to fight the invading US force.
Second, power abhors a vacuum. With no entrenched regime in place, multiple authority figures from Iran’s clerical and military circles, among others, will jockey for control. Those sides could split into violent factions, initiating a civil war that would bring more carnage to the country. and Millions more refugees might flock out of the country, overwhelming already taxed nations nearby, and ungoverned pockets will give terrorist groups new safe havens from which to operate.
To prevent total war with Iran, we must withdraw troops and deflate tensions now.
Contention 2: Yemen
Contention 1 is Yemen
Amidst the Covid-19 crisis, the war in Yemen continues. TRT 20 reports
TRTWorld, 4-11-2020, "Yemen's war rages under shadow of looming virus threat," Yemen's war rages under shadow of looming virus threat, https://www.trtworld.com/middle-east/yemen-s-war-rages-under-shadow-of-looming-virus-threat-35462
Yemen's war shows no signs of abating a week after the Saudi-led military coalition declared a unilateral truce due to the coronavirus threat looming over the impoverished nation. Yemen announced its first case of the Covid-19 respiratory disease last Friday, as aid organisations warn the country's health system, which has all but collapsed since the conflict broke out in 2014, is ill equipped to handle the crisis. The coalition supporting the government against the Iran-backed Houthi rebels said the fortnight-long ceasefire was designed to head off the pandemic, in a move welcomed by the United Nations but dismissed by the insurgents as political manoeuvering. Has a ceasefire been agreed? Despite Saudi Arabia's announcement of a halt in military activities from April 9, fighting on the ground and coalition air strikes continue. "We don't have a ceasefire agreement that all of the major players have signed up to yet," Peter Salisbury, an analyst at the International Crisis Group said. UN special envoy for Yemen Martin Griffiths said on Friday he had sent revised proposals to both sides to secure a nationwide ceasefire and the "urgent resumption" of political dialogue. The confirmation of Yemen's first coronavirus case "makes it even more imperative to stop the fighting immediately", he said.
US military presence is at the root of this conflict by emboldening Gulf leaders. Hokayem 18 explains
Emile Hokayem and David B Roberts, The Century Foundation, "Friends with Benefits", Jaunary 31, 2018, https://tcf.org/content/report/friends-with-benefits/
Traditional concepts of brotherhood and solidarity within the Gulf still prevail, at least in theory, and the goal of regime security remains paramount in each Gulf state’s calculations. Beyond that, however, the Gulf states have failed to develop clear concepts of cooperative or collective security that would make it easier for outside actors to envision their own role. Indeed, agreeing on the need for cooperative and collective security would compel the Gulf states to resolve competing territorial claims, reconcile political rivalries, and address other latent issues. In contrast, relying on an outside security guarantor allows them to sidestep resolving competing territorial claims, reconciling political rivalries, and addressing other issues and delay such moves and instead to adopt more active, hawkish regional stances. Saudi Arabia, and Oman before it, have failed to convince other countries of the necessity of defense integration. This is unsurprising, considering that all security behaviors in the Gulf hinge on an understanding that any form of security or political integration inevitably would foster Saudi hegemony. The United States, therefore, remains an indispensable partner—particularly for the smaller Gulf states—in spite of their misgivings about it.
Karlin 19 furthers
Mara Karlin, Foreign Affairs, "America's Middle East Purgatory", February 2019, https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/Enduring20American20Presence20in20the20Middle20East.pdf
But this Goldilocks approach rests on the false assumption that there is such a thing as a purely operational U.S. military presence in the Middle East. In reality, U.S. military bases across the Gulf countries have strategic implications because they create a moral hazard: they encourage the region’s leaders to act in ways they otherwise might not, safe in the knowledge that the United States is invested in the stability of their regimes. In 2011, for example, the Bahrainis and the Saudis clearly understood the message of support sent by the U.S. naval base in Bahrain when they ignored Obama’s disapproval and crushed Shiite protests there. In Yemen, U.S. support for the Emirati and Saudi military campaign in Yemen shows how offering help can put the United States in profound 30 dilemmas: the United States is implicated in air strikes that kill civilians, but any proposal to halt its supplies of its precision-guided missiles is met with the charge that denying Saudi Arabia smarter munitions might only increase collateral civilian casualties. U.S. efforts to train, equip, and advise the Syrian Democratic Forces in the fight against ISIS are yet another reminder that none of Washington’s partnerships has purely operational consequences: U.S. support of the SDF, seen by Ankara as a sister to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, has made the United States’ relationship with Turkey knottier than ever.
Empirically, when the US showed signs of withdrawing diplomacy began. Parsi 20 explains
Trita Parsi, 1-6-2020, "The Middle East Is More Stable When the United States Stays Away," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/06/the-middle-east-is-more-stable-when-the-united-states-stays-away/
Some of these measures may have been more tactical than strategic. Saudi Arabia may have reduced tensions with Qatar and the Houthis in order to better situate itself for a confrontation with Tehran down the road or to offset international condemnation of its killing of Khashoggi, human rights abuses at home, and brutal tactics in Yemen. The UAE, too, may have felt that a tactical reduction of tensions was warranted. Nevertheless, as the United States appeared poised to back out of the region, its erstwhile allies’ calculations tilted toward diplomacy. The Saudis and Emiratis simply had no choice but to cease some of their recklessness because they could no longer operate under the protection of the United States. If stability in the Middle East is the United States’ main goal, Washington should have celebrated rather than bemoaned these developments.
Indeed, Parsi writes
Meanwhile, whereas Iran has no nuclear weapons yet undergoes more inspections than any other country, Israel has a nuclear weapons program with no international transparency whatsoever. Iran may have been adept at taking advantage of U.S. overextension and missteps in the last few decades, but establishing hegemony is a different matter altogether. Further, the region did not fall into deeper chaos as a result of Trump’s earlier refusal to get into a shooting war with Iran after attacks by Iranian proxies against Saudi oil installations in September 2019. Critics lamented the president’s decision as an abandonment of the Carter Doctrine, calling it a disaster for the GCC and warning that it may even prompt Saudi Arabia to seek nuclear weapons. Recognizing that the U.S. military was no longer at their disposal, Saudi Arabia and the UAE began exercising the diplomatic options that had always been available to them. Instead, recognizing that the U.S. military was no longer at their disposal, Saudi Arabia and the UAE began exercising the diplomatic options that had always been available to them. For its part, Saudi Arabia stepped up direct talks with Houthi rebels in Yemen as a way to ease tensions with their backer, Iran. The level of violence on both sides declined as a result, and more than 100 prisoners of war were released. In November, the United Nations’ Yemen envoy, Martin Griffiths, reported an 80 percent reduction in Saudi-led airstrikes, and there were no Yemeni deaths in the previous two weeks. Riyadh also opted to reduce tensions with Qatar, a former ally that had become a nemesis. The Saudi government seemingly ordered its notorious Twitter army to tone down the insults against Qatar and its emir, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, and some sporting events between the two countries resumed, according to the New York Times.
Unfortunately, US military actions disrupted the diplomatic progress. Parsi laments
Yet when U.S. President Donald Trump opted not to go to war with Iran after a series of Iranian-attributed attacks on Saudi Arabia last year and declared his intentions to pull troops out of the region, it wasn’t chaos or conquest that ensued. Rather, nascent regional diplomacy—particularly among Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—and de-escalation followed. To be sure, the cards were reshuffled again in January, when Trump ordered the assassination of Qassem Suleimani, one of Iran’s most important military figures. Courtesy of Trump, the region is once more moving toward conflict, and the early signs of diplomatic progress achieved during the preceding months have vanished. It is thus time for Washington to answer a crucial question that it has long evaded: Has America’s military dominance in the Middle East prevented regional actors from peacefully resolving conflicts on their own? And in that way, has it been an impediment to stability rather than the guarantor of it?\
US military presence prevents the Houthi rebels from accepting a ceasefire. TRT 20 reports
TRTWorld, 4-11-2020, "Yemen's war rages under shadow of looming virus threat," Yemen's war rages under shadow of looming virus threat, https://www.trtworld.com/middle-east/yemen-s-war-rages-under-shadow-of-looming-virus-threat-35462
What do the Houthis want? The rebels are negotiating from a strong position after recent military gains, as they advance towards the government's last northern stronghold of Marib, an oil-rich region which would be a major strategic prize. Hours before the Saudi-led coalition's truce announcement, the Houthis released a document with a long list of demands including the withdrawal of foreign troops and the end of the coalition's blockade on Yemen's land, sea and airports of entry. "The Houthis They see a ceasefire as more than just a halt to military activities," Salisbury said. The rebels also demanded that the coalition pay government salaries for the next decade and hand over compensation for rebuilding, including homes destroyed in air strikes
Thankfully, Kristian 20 writes
Bonnie Kristian,, 4-6-2020, "As COVID-19 spreads, ending US support for the Saudi war in Yemen is vital," TheHill, https://thehill.com/opinion/international/491377-as-covid-19-spreads-ending-us-support-for-the-saudi-war-in-yemen-is
This pandemic has proven a formidable foe for the health-care systems of advanced, stable nations like Italy and the United States. But Yemeni medical facilities are already under-resourced and overwhelmed with war casualties, cholera, and other communicable illnesses. Yemen desperately needs peace and open supply lines for its potential fight against COVID-19. Now more than ever, Washington must end its enablement of the Saudi-led coalition intervention in Yemen’s conflict and support a peaceful, diplomatic resolution with the immediate opening of Yemen’s airports and seaports for humanitarian aid. Riyadh has recently shown fresh interest in leaving Yemen even as it continues its air campaign. and a U.S. departure could tilt the scales toward peace. The best preventive measure to control the spread of the novel coronavirus is hygiene, but the war has mired Yemen in filth. “Pumps to sanitize the water supply sit idle for lack of fuel, while maintenance agencies tasked with chlorinating aquifers go without salaries and supplies,” Reuters reported in 2017. The situation has not improved in the three years since, especially as U.S.-supported Saudi airstrikes have targeted crucial water treatment facilities
………………………………………………………………………………
There is no overnight fix for Yemen’s misery. But the single most effective way to help Yemen now is for Washington to stop supporting the Saudi-led coalition intervention. Without U.S. assistance — which has included weapons provision, naval blockade, refueling planes for airstrikes, drone strikes, and intelligence sharing — the coalition could not continue its fight in Yemen, at least not anywhere near its present scale. If Washington withdraws, it will give Riyadh a new urgency in its peace talks with the Houthi rebels, which have stalled after a brief period of relative calm devolved into fresh turmoil last month. At the very least, the U.S. exit would make the Saudi stranglehold on much-needed food and medical supplies far more difficult to sustain, giving the Yemeni people a fighting chance against COVID-19. Ending Washington’s support for the coalition intervention would be a win for the United States, too. The U.S. has no vital interests at stake in Yemen — the Houthi rebels have local ambitions and do not pose a threat to America — and insofar as our involvement there affects our security, it is for the worse.
Ending the conflict is crucial. Daragahi 19 quantifies
Borzou Daragahi, 12-2-2019, "War-ravaged Yemeni children will suffer from hunger for 20 years, new report says," Independent, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/yemen-war-children-hunger-ceasefire-latest-a9229706.html
“Yemen is now home to the largest food insecure population in the world,” says the 20-page report. And the situation is worsening. Just a year ago, famine was declared in certain parts of the country. Now, 80 per cent of the country’s population or 19 million Yemeni of 24 million is face facing od shortages and are living on the edge of famine, with children suffering the most. “It means each child is robbed of opportunities they would have had,” said Frank McManus, Yemen director for the IRC, speaking in a phone interview from the country’s Houthi-controlled capital, Sana'a. “Malnourishment is not something you can recover from,” he said. “It will shorten your height. It will limit your opportunities. It will impact how you will develop.
Contention 2: Conflict
US withdrawal decreases conflict in three ways.
First is by rebuilding alliances.
With US presence in the region, states prefer bilateral interactions with the United States to multilateral ones involving regional actors.
Ashford 18~-~-Ashford, Emma. (Emma Ashford is a research fellow in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute in Washington, DC. She holds a PhD in politics from the University of Virginia and an MA from American University’s School of International Service) “Unbalanced: Rethinking America’s Commitment to the Middle East.” Strategic Studies Quarterly. Air University Press. Spring 2018. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26333880.pdf?refreqid=excelsior3A403f1017baf2a096ee9118141128c66c
Even close US allies have shown interest expanding their regional role. The United Kingdom has returned to Bahrain, opening a new naval base at Mina Salman; France now has troops in Djibouti and the United Arab Emirates.46 Whether allies or adversaries, it is clear that the future of the Middle East is pluralistic, not hegemonic. Unfortunately, proponents of greater engagement in the region rarely consider either the benefits or risks posed by the growing number of states with a stake in the region. If this develops at the same time as increasing US presence, it has the potential to raise the risk of conflict, particularly in situations like Russia’s Syrian campaign. Yet perhaps the biggest problem is the fact that American predominance in the region prevents states from balancing or bandwagoning in the face of threats, as they would do in the absence of US presence. As many scholars have noted, the Middle East has typically exhibited “underbalancing,” meaning that states that might be expected to form alliances have rarely done so. The most obvious example is the antiIranian axis of Turkey, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, but the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has also repeatedly failed to build joint military infrastructure. The recent GCC crisis between Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates likewise suggests that these states prioritize ideological factors over security concerns. As long as the United States continues to act as a regional security guarantor, theory suggests that ideological factors will continue to inhibit alliances.47 In fact, though the Obama administration’s pivot away from the Middle East was more rhetoric than reality, it did encourage tentative attempts to build better regional alliances. Private rapprochement and cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Israel on the issue of Iran has been growing. The two countries disagree on a variety of issues, the most problematic of which is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Yet when retired top Saudi and Israeli officials spoke about the issue at a 2016 forum in Washington, DC, they were keen to highlight that cooperation is possible even if these issues go unresolved.48 The two states regularly hold informal meetings on security issues. Even the relative lack of criticism expressed by the Gulf States during the 2006 Israeli war against Hezbollah may be indicative of shifting opinion within the region.49 In providing security guarantees and by acting as a third party cutout, US involvement inhibits these developing ties.
In the absence of US presence, however, states would be forced to engage in diplomacy.
Alliances are key to solving conflict through deterrence.
Rice 11~-~-Rice, David. (David is the director of National Media Relations at Rice University) “Military Alliances Keep the Peace.” Futurity, 11 February 2011. https://www.futurity.org/military-alliances-keep-the-peace/
For the study, published in the journal Foreign Policy Analysis, researchers analyzed global defense agreements from 1816 to 2001.
“We were interested in analyzing policy prescriptions that leaders of countries can adopt that might make war—and also militarized conflicts short of war—less likely,” says Ashley Leeds, associate professor of political science at Rice University.
“War is costly, most importantly in terms of lives lost, but also in terms of financial resources, destruction of productive capacity and infrastructure, and disruption of trade. As a result, research aimed at discovering policies that can prevent war is valuable.
“We found that when a country enters into a defense pact, it is less likely to be attacked,” Leeds says. “In addition, entering into defense pacts does not seem to make countries more likely to or attack other states.”
The research has current policy relevance for the United States and other countries, Leeds says.
“A current policy debate, for instance, is whether Georgia should be accepted as a new member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). If Georgia joins NATO, the U.S. and other NATO countries will be committing to assist Georgia if Georgia is attacked by another state, for instance, Russia.
Second is by curtailing aggression .
The US security umbrella emboldens allies to act aggressively instead of diplomatically.
Hazbun 19~-~-Hazbun, Waleed. (Waleed Hazbun is a political science professor at the University of Alabama. He received his BA from Princeton, and his PhD from MIT.) “In America’s Wake: Turbulence and Insecurity in the Middle East.” University of Alabama. Middle East Political Science, March 2019. https://pomeps.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/POMEPS_Studies_34_Web.pdf
In the late 2000s, the large, militarily capable state of Turkey and the small, wealthy state of Qatar began to use their diverse ties to states across the emerging regional divides to play a larger diplomatic role and promote conflict management. Turkey emphasized open borders and regional economic integration while Qatar used diplomatic inventions and pan-Arab media to project influence at the regional level. Te political turmoil resulting from the Arab Uprisings and the confused US reaction to them opened another opportunity for regional powers. Qatar and Turkey sought to promote generally compatible efforts to suggest a new basis for regional order drawing together newly elected governments and emerging Islamist political forces. Teir more activist policies, however, soon entangled them in regional conflicts. Qatar supported military intervention in Libya while Turkey encouraged armed opposition in Syria. Rather than transforming the political landscape these actions contributed to political breakdown and territorial fragmentation. Teir efforts collapsed in the face of the 2013 military coup in Egypt. More broadly, a Saudi-led counter-revolution sought to shore up authoritarian governments, expand domestic divisions along sectarian 17 THEORIZING STRUCTURAL CHANGE lines, and foster of civil wars in Syria, Yemen, and Libya.
As Qatar scaled back its regional interventions, Turkey found its interests reorganized as the increasing autonomy of Kurdish actors, some backed by the US in an effort to contain ISIS, became its most pressing concern. While aligned with the US and benefiting from the US security umbrella anchored by its bases around the Gulf, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have attempted to organize the region through used aggressive diplomatic and military interventions as well as financial support to allied regimes and proxies. Saudi Arabia has long sought to project regional influence, but its flows of cash, intelligence cooperation, and diplomacy have previously only had a marginal impact reshaping regional order. With the US under Obama no longer providing regional leadership, it’s policies diverged from Saudi priorities, such as allowing the fall of Mubarak in Egypt and negotiating a nuclear deal with Iran. Saudi Arabia (with UAE support) then sought to act as a regional hegemon though without the needed regional power and consent. Tey backed rebel factions in Syria and escalated the conflict. After their effort to manage the post-Uprising transition in Yemen failed, they launched, with US support, an ineffective war against the Houthi rebels, which has resulted in a humanitarian disaster. Te Trump administration aligned itself more enthusiastically with the Saudi-UAE axis. Saudi efforts, despite this American support, have done little to establish a new regional order or contain Iranian influence. Rather than embracing Qatar’s post-2013 shift away from an activist regional policy and attempt to rebuild GCC consensus policymaking, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have repeatedly sought to coerce Qatar into accepting a subservient role, resulting in the total fragmentation of the GCC as a regional organization. In past decades the US often sought to restrain Israel’s most aggressive actions and/or worked to re-stabilize regional politics in their aftermath. Closer Saudi strategic alignment with Israel and backing by US president Trump has resulted in less restraint on regional actions. This posture sets up a context for continuing instability and a greater likelihood of conflict and escalation.
The current uncertainty and shifting regional political dynamics have set up complex rivalries and diverging interests between regional powers. While Iran, Turkey and Qatar have all sought to promote new, but differing, norms for regional politics, seeking to develop an order based around their interests, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have advanced a revisionist agenda built from a growing capacity and willingness to project power and intervene militarily across the region. Tese efforts by multiple regional and global powers to assert their own narrow strategic interests in the context of the post-uprisings Arab world has led to increased disarray in the region, including the fragmentation of Syria and Yemen, and massive humanitarian crises as a consequence of the conflicts there. Tis disarray opened up new opportunities for external intervention in the region, as seen in the NATO campaign in Libya, Russian intervention in support of the regime in Syria, and the US-led anti-ISIS military campaigns in Syria and Iraq during 2016 and 2017. Drawing on the notion of turbulence offers guidance to explain how and why the capacities of states in the region, even as they become more ruthlessly authoritarian and deploy more deadly military power, are less able to constrain threats to their security and balance rivals.
Historical precedent proves.
Parsi 20~-~-Parsi, Trita. (Trita Parsi is Executive Vice President of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and Adjunct Associate Professor at Georgetown University.) “The Middle East Is More Stable When the United States Stays Away.” Foreign Policy, 6 January 2020. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/06/the-middle-east-is-more-stable-when-the-united-states-stays-away
Further, the region did not fall into deeper chaos as a result of Trump’s earlier refusal to get into a shooting war with Iran after attacks by Iranian proxies against Saudi oil installations in September 2019. Critics lamented the president’s decision as an abandonment of the Carter Doctrine, calling it a disaster for the GCC and warning that it may even prompt Saudi Arabia to seek nuclear weapons.
Recognizing that the U.S. military was no longer at their disposal, Saudi Arabia and the UAE began exercising the diplomatic options that had always been available to them.
For its part, Saudi Arabia stepped up direct talks with Houthi rebels in Yemen as a way to ease tensions with their backer, Iran. The level of violence on both sides declined as a result, and more than 100 prisoners of war were released. In November, the United Nations’ Yemen envoy, Martin Griffiths, reported there was an 80 percent reduction in Saudi-led airstrikes, and there were no Yemeni deaths in the previous two weeks.
Riyadh also opted to reduce tensions with Qatar, a former ally that had become a nemesis. The Saudi government seemingly ordered its notorious Twitter army to tone down the insults against Qatar and its emir, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, and some sporting events between the two countries resumed, according to the New York Times.
Saudi officials also claimed that they had quietly reached out to Iran via intermediaries seeking ways to ease tensions. Tehran, in turn, welcomed the prospective Saudi-Qatari thaw and, according to the New York Times, floated a peace plan based on a mutual Iranian-Saudi pledge of nonaggression.
An even stronger change of heart occurred in Abu Dhabi. In July, the UAE started withdrawing troops from Yemen. The same month, it participated in direct talks with Tehran to discuss maritime security. It even released $700 million in funds to Iran in contradiction to the Trump administration’s maximum pressure strategy.
Some of these measures may have been more tactical than strategic. Saudi Arabia may have reduced tensions with Qatar and the Houthis in order to better situate itself for a confrontation with Tehran down the road or to offset international condemnation of its killing of Khashoggi, human rights abuses at home, and brutal tactics in Yemen. The UAE, too, may have felt that a tactical reduction of tensions was warranted.
Nevertheless, as the United States appeared poised to back out of the region, its erstwhile allies’ calculations tilted toward diplomacy. The Saudis and Emiratis simply had no choice but to cease some of their recklessness because they could no longer operate under the protection of the United States. If stability in the Middle East is the United States’ main goal, Washington should have celebrated rather than bemoaned these developments.
Without the guarantee of the US military, Saudi Arabia and the UAE chose to deescalate conflict in Yemen and turn to diplomatic ties. Ending US presence in the region could be the way to end the Yemen war.
Third is the military-industrial complex
Vittori 19~-~-Vittori, Jodi. “A Mutual Extortion Racket: The Military Industrial Complex and US Foreign Policy ~-~- The Cases of Saudi Arabia and UAE.” Transparency International Defense and Security Program, 20 December 2019. https://ti-defence.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/US_Defense_Industry_Influence_Paper_v4_digital_singlePage.pdf
Defence industry players, and elected officials, the defence bureaucracy, and governments in the Middle East are intertwined and serve one another’s interest, often at the expense of US foreign policy outcomes. These mutually-beneficial relationships have contributed to a vicious cycle of conflict and human rights abuses across the Middle East and North Africa, including increased exports of arms and defence services to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates which began under the Obama administration and have ramped up under President Trump.
The impacts are devastating. Just last year, Saudi Arabia launched a war on the Houthis in Yemen, leading to humanitarian disasters that endanger tens of millions.
The overall impact is war.
Malley 19~-~-Malley, Robert (ROBERT MALLEY is President and CEO of the International Crisis Group. During the Obama administration, he served as Special Assistant to the President, White House Middle East Coordinator, and Senior Adviser on countering the Islamic State) “The Unwanted Wars.” Foreign Affairs, December 2019. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2019-10-02/unwanted-wars
The war that now looms largest is a war nobody apparently wants. During his presidential campaign, Donald Trump railed against the United States’ entanglement in Middle Eastern wars, and since assuming office, he has not changed his tune. Iran has no interest in a wide-ranging conflict that it knows it could not win. Israel is satisfied with calibrated operations in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza but fears a larger confrontation that could expose it to thousands of rockets. Saudi Arabia is determined to push back against Iran, but without confronting it militarily. Yet the conditions for an all-out war in the Middle East are riper than at any time in recent memory.
A conflict could break out in any one of a number of places for any one of a number of reasons. Consider the September 14 attack on Saudi oil facilities: it could theoretically have been perpetrated by the Houthis, a Yemeni rebel group, as part of their war with the kingdom; by Iran, as a response to debilitating U.S. sanctions; or by an Iranian-backed Shiite militia in Iraq. If Washington decided to take military action against Tehran, this could in turn prompt Iranian retaliation against the United States’ Gulf allies, an attack by Hezbollah on Israel, or a Shiite militia operation against U.S. personnel in Iraq. Likewise, Israeli operations against Iranian allies anywhere in the Middle East could trigger a regionwide chain reaction. Because any development anywhere in the region can have ripple effects everywhere, narrowly containing a crisis is fast becoming an exercise in futility. | 904,731 |
365,587 | 379,685 | content and trigger warnings interp | If the debater reads arguments related to topic, they must give a content warning before their speech. These conversations are empirically trauma inducing and warnings are a good idea.
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When reading content warnings, the debater must properly acknowledge
1) the seriousness of CWs: Debaters should not use flippant language when explaining CWs, or seek to delegitimize the importance of the warning. Making these warnings seem like they are not a big deal trivializes trauma.
2) the importance of specificity in CWs: Debaters should avoid graphic or non-graphic description of the material they are giving the warning for, but they should not say “Content warning” without citing the nature of the content they will read. (A CW for “aggressive” content is not a CW.) Lack of specificity gives the listeners not enough information to mentally prepare themselves.
3) must not single out individuals (e.g. asking if anyone wants the CW before reading it): Debaters should read the CW without asking if anyone wants to hear it. Similarly, although debaters may ask for comment and discussion on content (e.g. if someone’s not okay with this content, we can read another contention/if someone wants to set a brightline for our descriptors) they should not single out individuals by asking everyone to either confirm or deny their requests. Asking if someone needs a CW forces us to out ourselves if we do – just assume the audience does so survivors or victims of trauma don’t have to disclose that to the round. If someone steps forward after you ask for comments they may choose to do so, don’t force that situation on them. | 904,747 |
365,588 | 379,700 | AC r4 and on | C3: Economic Growth
Without a UBI, the United States is highly likely to enter a recession.
Kenneth Thomas, Daily Business Review, "Miami Economist Sees 80 Probability of a Recession in 2020", November 1, 2019, Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.
The PETOD effect existed in five of those eight elections with recessions beginning during each election year in four cases (1860, 1920, 1960 and 1980) and in the previous year in one case (June 1899 before the 1900 presidential election). The PETOD effect of 63 (five of eight) would have been 75 (six of eight) counting the Y2K recession. Also, the PETOD effect existed for two of the last three (67) and four of the last six (67) such presidential elections; these results would have been three of the last three (100) and five of the last six (87) counting Y2K. Considering traditional economic factors and my nontraditional anomalies, I believe there is an 80 probability a recession will begin next year.
Fortunately, Cash Transfers will provide a foundation for our economy offering money to each individual
Chris Leeson, Medium, "We Need To Talk About Universal Basic Income", July 23, 2017, https://medium.com/@_C_Leeson/we-need-to-talk-about-universal-basic-income-f5c46f577d71
No one needs to be sold on the worthiness of alleviating poverty. Not even those caricatured as being indifferent to poverty actually are; it’s just that they’re unwilling to countenance the tradeoffs required for doing so. But if a system could alleviate poverty while keeping other things equal or even augmenting other points along the wealth distribution continuum, then it’s a no-brainer. One of the selling points of the UBI is that it is superior to automatic stabilizers, such as existing welfare and welfare-like structures. It is the assumption that giving everyone money is better than assisting the targeted few. By contrast, Australia has just embraced “needs” based school funding which functions in line with existing transfer payments for social welfare and provides more funding to schools with kids of lower socio-economic backgrounds. What happens when we move away from means-tested strategies and toward universal strategies? Let’s consider the institutions we’d want to universalize and the costs associated with a UBI. Healthcare, elderly care, education, transportation, communications infrastructure — these are the essentials; the tools of opportunity. The cost of a UBI of $15,000 per person in America would be approximately $4.83 trillion, not including administrative costs. That’s 27 of GDP. Currently, according to OECD data, the United States spends approximately 20 of GDP on social welfare, so moving to a UBI would represent a 7 percentage point increase. But the question was never over the dollar amount; it’s always been about efficiency and effectiveness. Is it more efficient to give everyone money, or to target particular needs. Here are some facts. Preventive measures are more cost-effective than reactive measures. There is a natural rate of unemployment. UBI creates “choice” based spending. Recipients are able to choose whether they participate in society, get an education, and pay for the dentist or buy drugs, alcohol, and be a part of the underground/illegal economy. One can make a good case for thinking that a and UBI will increase standards of living. It may do that in the short term — the problem is: when it comes to the long term, we just don’t know. We know that free markets have delivered a better quality of life, and we know that command governments, such as the various communisms of the 20th century, have failed. We also know there has been rising wealth inequality and we have the possibility of fitting a UBI program within a broader capitalist system. It could be just what is needed. Leisure Time, Innovation, Entrepreneurship, Education A UBI provides some economic security and a fall back position that will enable entrepreneurship, education, and leisure time. But a big problem stems from the possibility that our inclinations to be lazy are stronger than our inclinations to be industrious. A universal basic income won’t suddenly turn people into creatives or business magnates. Those people arguably have that drive and those traits regardless of the environment you put them in.
Investing now rather than waiting to implement a stimulus package revitalizes stabilizers. This is needed, as
Sara Estep, Center for American Progress, "The Importance of Automatic Stabilizers in the Next Recession", June 17, 2019 americanprogress.org/issues/economy/news/2019/06/17/471120/importance-automatic-stabilizers-next-recession/
The United States is experiencing one of the longest periods of economic expansion in its history, but downturns are difficult to predict, giving policymakers reason to worry about whether the country is prepared for the next recession. Automatic stabilizers—policy features that automatically expand spending or reduce tax receipts during economic downturns in order to inject stimulus—helped reduce the severity of the Great Recession a decade ago. In order to improve the U.S. economy’s resilience against future recessions, policymakers must strengthen automatic stabilizers. Otherwise, families could be left struggling to keep a roof over their heads and put food on the table as Congress takes time to act. This column offers a brief explanation of automatic stabilizers, their role in mitigating a recession, and how they can be improved for the future. What are automatic stabilizers? Automatic stabilizers are features of the federal government’s budget that automatically injected funds into the economy through transfer payments or tax reductions when the economy goes into recession or otherwise slumps. They are “automatic” because they do not require action by Congress; in other words, they are built into already enacted policies. Many government policies serve as automatic stabilizers simply by their nature. For example, when many workers lose their jobs around the same time, the unemployment insurance program receives more claims and pays out more in benefits. The progressive income tax system also serves as an automatic stabilizer because when people’s incomes fall, they pay less in taxes. Some programs could have additional features built into them that would react when certain macroeconomic indicators were triggered. (see Table 1)
In fact, a UBI is literally designed to prevent shocks in the market and protect against drops in investor confidence
Robert Jameson, Yahoo, "Would a universal basic income be an effective stimulus during a recession?", October 10, 2017, https://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20171009191552AAR2KSH
It is designed to help provide stability - to be there year in, year out, whether there is a recession on or not! It’s entirely possible, however, that the stability it a UBI provides might helps prevent the economy falling into a recession in the first place. Confidence levels may be more stable when people have the security of a Basic Income - and that may potentially reduces the likelihood of sudden falls in aggregate demand that could lead to a recession.
A US recession will push millions of people into poverty.
Isabel Sawhill ofBroookings Institute, "Simulating the Effect of the “Great Recession” on Poverty", September 10, 2009, https://www.brookings.edu/research/simulating-the-effect-of-the-great-recession-on-poverty/
?In short, our results show that recessions can have long-term scarring effects for all workers but especially for the most disadvantaged, whose skills and attachment to the work force are already somewhat marginal. A prolonged lack of jobs reduces the amount of on-the-job training or experience that people receive, discourages them from making the effort needed to climb out of poverty, and can even lead to a deterioration in their health or family life that adversely affects opportunity. There were 37 million people in poverty in 2007, so our results indicate that the lastrecession would increased the number of people in poverty by about 8 million, or 22 percent. Our estimates for the increase in poverty amongst children are even more dramatic. There were about 13 million children living in poverty in 2007, and we estimate that further, the number of poor children could increasede by at least 5 million, or 38 percent.
To:
a. save 42 million women from abusive relationships
b. 9/10 of the people in poverty and reduce poverty by 74
c. and to save the millions of people who are going into poverty in the next recession, vote pro | 904,763 |
365,589 | 379,689 | Theory Policy and Contact Info | Hi! We're Holden and Luke!
We believe theory is a really good thing, and most times it's crucial to set norms and stop abuse in rounds. However, we think that telling a team what norm to follow before the round (i.e. disclosing, etc) is a lot better than running theory during the round after the damage has been done for 3 reasons:
A) Asking us to fulfill an interpretation before the round prevents it from being violated in the first place, which overall provides a fairer round from the beginning
B) It prevents frivolous shells with really obscure interpretations from being ran
C) It allows discussion on the actual substance to take place rather than progressive argumentation, which is a lot more educational
Thus, If you have a norm that you think is good/bad in debate, tell us BEFORE THE ROUND. If you fail to do this, any theory ran in round would be considered abusive, and we would auto meet any interpretation you propose.
If you have any questions, comments, concerns, or any norms you want to tell us before the round, please contact us!
Holden (He/Him):
(916) 317-2232 (Preferred method of contact)
[email protected]
Also follow my Instagram @sacholden
Luke (He/Him):
(916) 693-9425
[email protected] | 904,751 |
365,590 | 379,691 | Contact Info | Email: [email protected]
Number: 201-895-8008
Messenger: Sunay Hegde | 904,753 |
365,591 | 379,713 | April NEG | We negate.
Contention one is Iraq
Allawi will probably be for withdraw, yet kurdish leadership opposes the issue
(Kamaran Palani, Lecturer in IR at Salahaddin University in Erbil. February 18, 2020. Al Jazeera. “Iraq and the US withdrawal conundrum”, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/iraq-withdrawal-conundrum-200218182253463.html . DOA: April 10, 2020.) ALP
That’s for two reasons.
The first is genocide. Turkey has genocidal ambition against the Kurds
(Qanta Ahmed, a British physician specialising in sleep disorders. She is also an author and commentator, and has contributed articles to The Spectator, Huffington Post and The Jerusalem Post. Oct 22 2019. “The U.S. must engage Kurdistan to stop the humanitarian crisis” nydailynews. https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ny-oped-the-us-must-engage-kurdistan-20191022-tqgqqlgzdbg6vdhrptwzz7t23e-story.html. DOA: April 10 2020) SRW
Other groups are also potentially at risk of spillover
(Kosar Nawzad, reporter for Kurdistan 24. Jan 10, 2020. “Kurds in disputed Kirkuk say US withdrawal from Iraq ‘will be a disaster’” Kurdistan 24. https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/916ed4bd-58d4-4dba-a7b2-c7a2103dc9b2 . DOA: April 10 2020) SRW
The second impact is terror. When ethnic minorities in Iraq face violence from external actors, they empirically turn to ISIS for protection.
After the American withdrawal in 2011
(Kosar Nowzad, reporter for Kurdistan 24. Dec 20, 2018. “Over a year later, Islamic State still casts shadow on Iraq's Hawija” Kurdistan 24. https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/f80aff46-7b18-4cfe-a836-a19571e58094. DOA: April 10 2020) SRW
In 2011, withdraw caused ISIS
(Kamaran Palani, Lecturer in IR at Salahaddin University in Erbil. February 18, 2020. Al Jazeera. “Iraq and the US withdrawal conundrum”, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/iraq-withdrawal-conundrum-200218182253463.html . DOA: April 10, 2020.) ALP
ISIS Bad
(Rick Noack, Foreign affairs reporter focusing on Europe and international security, January 10 2020, “Here’s what might happen if the U.S. were to suddenly quit Iraq” The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/01/09/heres-what-might-happen-if-us-were-suddenly-quit-iraq/ DOA: March 21 2020) SP
Contention two is Saudi Arabia
The US and Saudi Arabia currently have close military ties
(Michael Knights, senior fellow of The Washington Institute, specializing in the military and security affairs of Iraq, Iran, and the Persian Gulf states. “U.S.-Saudi Security Cooperation (Part 1): Conditioning Arms Sales to Build Leverage.” November 5, 2018. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/u.s.-saudi-security-cooperation-part-1-conditioning-arms-sales-to-build-lev. DOA: 1/17/2019) DE
Troop pullout substantially damages our security commitments
(Bilal Saab, Senior Fellow and Director of the defense and security program at the Middle East Institute and Adjunct Assistant Professor at Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program, 22 Aug 2018, “Relocating the Fifth Fleet?”, https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/08/22/relocating-the-fifth-fleet/ DOA 3/12/20)KJR
The US security commitments allow them to restrain the Saudis
Guzansky 2013 (Yoel Guzansky, fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies. Spring 2013. Middle East Quarterly. “Questioning Riyadh's Nuclear Rationale”, https://www.meforum.org/3512/saudi-arabia-pakistan-nuclear-weapon. DOA: January 17, 2019. ALP
This applies specifically to Qatar, where the US’s relationship with Saudi Arabia is the only thing that has stopped an invasion
(Alex Emmons, Reporter of National Affairs for The Intercept, August 1 2018, “SAUDI ARABIA PLANNED TO INVADE QATAR LAST SUMMER. REX TILLERSON’S EFFORTS TO STOP IT MAY HAVE COST HIM HIS JOB.” https://theintercept.com/2018/08/01/rex-tillerson-qatar-saudi-uae/ DOA: January 17, 2019) SP
There are two impacts.
First is prolonging the Yemen war.
Saudi Arabia can’t fund the Yemen war forever.
(Richard Wilson, Writer for The Guardian, December 11 2016, “Saudi arms money is running out” https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/11/saudi-arms-money-is-running-out DOA: January 23,2019) SP
Seizing Qatar allows Saudi Arabia to fill in that gap,
(Alex Emmons, Reporter of National Affairs for The Intercept, August 1 2018, “SAUDI ARABIA PLANNED TO INVADE QATAR LAST SUMMER. REX TILLERSON’S EFFORTS TO STOP IT MAY HAVE COST HIM HIS JOB.” https://theintercept.com/2018/08/01/rex-tillerson-qatar-saudi-uae/ DOA: January 17, 2019) SP
The Yemen war is devastating.
(Al Jazeera, 25 March 2018, “Key facts about the war in Yemen”, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/key-facts-war-yemen-160607112342462.html DOA: January 7 2019 ) SP
Second is losing Syrian diplomacy.
Qatar is key to regional negotiations.
(Joze M. Pelayo, Writer for International Policy Digest, 19 April 2018, “Doha’s Diplomatic Potential in Syria” https://intpolicydigest.org/2018/04/19/doha-s-diplomatic-potential-in-syria/ DOA: 1/17/19) SP
(Joze M. Pelayo, Writer for International Policy Digest, 19 April 2018, “Doha’s Diplomatic Potential in Syria” https://intpolicydigest.org/2018/04/19/doha-s-diplomatic-potential-in-syria/ DOA: 1/17/19) SP
Stopping the crisis is imperative.
(Megan Specia, Story Editor for International Desk of the New York Times. Published 4-13-18. “How Syria’s Death Toll is Lost in the fog of war”, New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/13/world/middleeast/syria-death-toll.html. DOA January 17 2019) JG | 904,778 |
365,592 | 379,715 | Contact Info | We will disclose all cases after we break them at bid-distributing tournaments. We disclose full text because we cite some paywalled articles. If you want to read the full PDF of the paywalled articles, use http://libgen.io/scimag/ and enter the DOI number.
Facebook: Bryan Benitez and Raj Solanki
Email: [email protected] or [email protected]
We are more likely to see Facebook messages.
*at grapevine* We have been uploading our full text disclosure cites after every round but for some reason it keeps on going away.It shows up for a bit and then it goes away. Please email me or fb message me if you want me to email our full text cites to you!! | 904,783 |
365,593 | 379,704 | CORN AFF | We didnt bother cutting cards for this LOL HF
We affirm Resolved: The US should end its economic sanctions against Venezuela.
Our sole contention is yellow gold:
Subpoint A: My Plate
Marcetic 19 explains US sanctions sent oil production plummeting at more than three times the rate of the previous twenty months, for a loss of around 6 billion dollars in revenue
Marcetic continues to explain virtually every basic necessity of Venezuelans’ daily life is funded through oil export revenue.
Due to the lack of revenue being generated due to sanctions Venezuelan citizens have lack of access to foods such as corn.
In addition, Before sanctions were imposed, La patilla 15 reported an 80 and 90 percent shortage on cornmeal.
We will continue to prove why corn is crucial to the citizens of Venezuela's wellbeing.
Streit 18 Corn is high in carbs and packed with fiber, vitamins and minerals. It’s also relatively low in protein and fat.
According to Aslam 18 corn reduces the risk of anemia, ia an energy Enhancer, a miracle for those underweight, lowers blood sugar and cholesterol level,helpful during pregnancy, and preserves healthy skin
Subpoint B: A cornucopia
In addition to the many benefits of corn on the cob corn is used in a multitude of products.
Reuters 10 breaks down the four main uses of corn:
*makes direct eye contact**opponent is intimidated*
The first is Food products including: Cereals, snack foods, salad dressings, soft drink sweeteners, chewing gum, peanut butter,hominy grits, taco shells and other flour products.
Next is Animal feeds which are Distillers dried grain, gluten feed and meal, high-oil feed corn for cattle, swine, poultry and fish
Third is Industrial products which include Soaps, paints, corks, linoleum, polish, adhesives, rubber substitutes, wallboard, dry-cell batteries, textile finishings, cosmetic powders, candles, dyes, pharmaceuticals, lubricants, insulation, wallpaper and other starch products.
Finally is Fermentation products and byproducts consisting of industrial alcohols, fuel ethanol, recyclable plastics, industrial enzymes, fuel octane enhancers, fuel oxygenates and solvents.
BONUS CORN-SPECIALTY CORNS which include white corn, blue corn and popcorn.
As human beings we can not reasonably expect the citizens of Venezuela to watch movies without popcorn due to our sanctions.
Subpoint C: A rap to summarize
Wells 16 states Whole corn,such as eating on the cob, is considered a vegetable. The corn kernel itself (where popcorn comes from) is considered a grain. To be more specific, this form of corn is a “whole” grain. To complicate things a little more, many grains including popcorn are considered to be a fruit.
Now onto the rap:
Corn, corn, in the ground it is born.
All other foods we don’t need to mourn.
Corn, corn, cornety corn
Praise it loud through a bullhorn
Subpoint A is a fruit in the trees
A cornless world is a disease.
Fruit is good
Solve your problems it would
Solving our problems with corn is a breeze.
Corn, corn, in the ground it is born.
All other foods we don’t need to mourn.
Corn, corn, cornety corn
Praise it loud through a bullhorn
Subpoint B is vegetable
Our food crisis is solvable.
Veggie foods
Can be real goods
So ending sanctions is indisputable.
Corn, corn, in the ground it is born.
All other foods we don’t need to mourn.
Corn, corn, cornety corn
Praise it loud through a bullhorn
Subpoint C is a grain for us all.
Corn’s like wheat, we can have a ball.
Grainy foods
Make many good moods
Give us energy to play baseball
Corn, corn, in the ground it is born.
All other foods we don’t need to mourn.
Corn, corn, cornety corn
Praise it loud through a bullhorns | 904,768 |
365,594 | 379,719 | Possible Interps I might read | 1. All debaters must disclose case positions on the wiki before round
2. Trigger warning must be provided when reading arguments psychologicaly harming | 904,788 |
365,595 | 379,733 | Defense better | 1NC
Contention 1: Framing
Cyber-attacks against the US have skyrocketed recently as
Garrett, Gregory. “Cyberattacks Skyrocketed in 2018: Are you ready 2019?” 12/13/18 Industry Week Magizine https://www.industryweek.com/technology-and-iiot/cyberattacks-skyrocketed-2018-are-you-ready-2019?fbclid=IwAR13dGWlGQAGbVy0cZ0LheYhHFTUenOP9NAVsMtnxUajPatJkqVv1JMLeeM
Board directors continue to up their investment in cybersecurity. Seventy-three percent now say their organization requires that third-party vendors meet certain cyber risk requirements—up 30 percentage points from 2016, according to the 2018 BDO Cyber Governance Survey of 145 co-directors at public companies. This increase in requirements and investment is warranted as manufacturing companies adopt and integrate more advanced technologies into their operations. During 2018 Under the Trump Administration, we have seen a 350 increase in cyber ransomware attacks, a 250 increase in spoofing or business email compromise (BEC) attacks and a 70 increase in spear-phishing attacks in companies overall. Further, the average cost of a cyber-data breach has risen from $4.9 million in 2017 to $7.5 million in 2018, according to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Risks have grown significantly around cyberattacks, information breaches from third-party vendors and information theft (i.e., personal identifiable information, intellectual property and trade secrets).
The United States’ cybersecurity is under prepared
Heritage Foundation, xx-xx-2019, "The Growing Threat of Cyberattacks," https://www.heritage.org/cybersecurity/heritage-explains/the-growing-threat-cyberattacks
No threat facing America has grown as fast, or in a manner as difficult to understand, as the danger from cyberattacks. While the cyber threats to U.S. interests are real, the digital sky is not falling. As such, the U.S. must do more to secure its networks—but first, it must do no harm. While prior Administrations have taken some steps to improve the overall security of the nation’s networks, it has not been enough. Add to this the constantly changing threats and vulnerabilities in the cyber domain, and the U.S. remains unprepared. There have been several legislative fights over cyber bills. While some have characterized these as partisan battles that have left America exposed to a growing variety of cyber threats, this is not generally true. Many cyber bills have had bipartisan support as well as bipartisan opposition. The fight is not over a need for appropriate cyber legislation; the fight is over how to define “appropriate.”
The U.S remaining unprepared is harming American citizens in 2 way
1. Economically
Cyber-attacks cause financial strain
Paul Meetil Schuermann, 9-14-2018, "How a Cyber Attack Could Cause the Next Financial Crisis," Harvard Business Review, https://hbr.org/2018/09/how-a-cyber-attack-could-cause-the-next- financial-crisis
Criminals have always sought ways to infiltrate financial technology systems. Now, the financial system faces the added risk of becoming collateral damage in a wider attack on critical national infrastructure. Such an attack could shake confidence in the global financial services system, causing banks, businesses and consumers to be stymied, confused or panicked, which in turn could have a major negative impact on economic activity. Cybercrime alone costs nations more than $1 trillion globally, far more than the record $300 billion of damage due to natural disasters in 2017, according to a recent analysis our firm performed. We ranked cyber attacks as the biggest threat facing the business world today — ahead of terrorism, asset bubbles, and other risks. An attack on a computer processing or communications network could cause $50 billion to $120 billion of economic damage, a loss ranking somewhere between those of Hurricanes Sandy and Katrina, according to recent estimates. Yet a much broader and more debilitating attack isn’t farfetched. Just last month, the Federal Bureau of Investigation issued a warning to banks about a pending large scale attack known as an ATM “cash-out” strike, in which waves of synchronized fraudulent withdrawals drain bank accounts. In July, meanwhile, it was revealed that hackers working for Russia had easily penetrated the control rooms of US electric utilities and could have caused blackouts. How might a financial crisis triggered by a cyber-attack unfold? A likely scenario would be an attack by a rogue nation or terrorist group on financial institutions or major infrastructure. Inside North Korea, for example, the Lazarus Group, also known as Hidden Cobra, routinely looks for ways to compromise banks and exploit crypto currencies. An attack on a bank, investment fund, custodian firm, ATM network, the interbank messaging network known as SWIFT, or the Federal Reserve itself would represent a direct hit on the financial services system.
2. Healthcare
Cyber-attacks are rapidly increasing on Healthcare
Jessica Davis, 1-22-2019,”Healthcare cyberattacks Cost $1.4 Million on Average in Recovery," HealthITSecurity, https://healthitsecurity.com/news/healthcare-cyberattacks-cost-1.4-
The average healthcare organization spent $1.4 million to recover from a cyberattack, according to a recent report from Radware. The number is slightly lower than other industries, which spent $1.67 million. The Radware 2018-2019 Global Application and Network Security Report researchers surveyed 790 IT executives and found a 50 percent growth in organizations estimating the cost of a cyberattack to be greater than $1 million. In fact, those executives are increasingly shifting away from lower estimates. About 54 percent of respondents said revenue-killing operational and productivity loss felt the greatest impact of a cyberattack, while 43 percent pointed to negative customer experience. Another 37 percent said they saw reputation loss after a cyberattack. “Quantifiable monetary losses can be directly tied to the aftermath of cyberattacks in lost revenue, unexpected budget expenditures and drops in stock values,” the report authors wrote. “Protracted repercussions are most likely to emerge as a result of negative customer experiences, damage to brand reputation and loss of customers.” When these attacks are broken down by sector, healthcare was the second-most attacked industry, after the government sector. In fact, about 39 percent of healthcare organizations were hit daily or weekly by hackers. And only 6 percent said they’d never experienced a cyberattack. According to the report, these organizations saw a significant increase in malware or bot attacks, with socially engineered threats and DDoS steadily growing, as well. Ransomware attacks have gone down, Radware noted. However, recent reports have shown that hackers continue to hit healthcare the hardest with these attacks. Crypto mining is on the rise, with 44 percent of organizations experiencing a crypto mining or ransomware attack. Another 14 percent experienced both. What’s worse is that these health providers don’t feel prepared for these attacks. The report found healthcare “is still intimidated by ransomware.”
And the only way to prevent these attacks is through Cyber Defense
McGraw 13 Gary McGraw, PhD is Chief Technology Of?cer of Cigital, and author of¶ Software Security (AWL 2006) along with ten other software security¶ books. He also produces the monthly Silver Bullet Security Podcast for¶ IEEE Security and Privacy Magazine (syndicated by SearchSecurity), Cyber War is Inevitable (Unless We Build Security In), Journal of Strategic Studies - Volume 36, Issue 1, 2013, pages 109-119, http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/doi/pdf/10.1080/01402390.2012.742013
The conceptual con?ation of cyber war, cyber espionage, and cyber¶ crime into a three-headed cyber Cerberus perpetuates fear, uncertainty¶ and doubt. This has made the already gaping policy vacuum on cyber¶ security more obvious than ever before.¶ Of the three major cyber security concerns in the public eye, cyber¶ crime is far more pervasive than cyber war or espionage. And yet it is¶ the least commonly discussed among policymakers. Cyber crime is¶ already commonplace and is growing: 285 million digital records were¶ breached in 2008 and 2011 boasted the second-highest data loss total¶ since 2004.2¶ Though economic calculations vary widely and are dif?cult to make,¶ cyber crime and data loss have been estimated to cost the global¶ economy at least $1.0 trillion dollars annually.3¶ Even if this estimate is¶ an order of magnitude too high, cyber crime is still an important problem that needs addressing. Just as consumers ?ock to the Internet,¶ so do criminals. Why did Willie Sutton, the notorious Depression-era¶ gangster, rob banks? As he famously (and perhaps apocryphally) put it:¶ ‘That’s where the money is.’ Criminals ?ock to the Internet for the same¶ reason.¶ Cyber espionage is another prominent problem that captivates the¶ imagination, and is much more common than cyber war. The highly¶ distributed, massively interconnected nature of modern information¶ systems makes keeping secrets dif?cult. It is easier than ever before to¶ transfer, store and hide information, while more information than ever¶ before is stored and manipulated on networked machines. A pen drive¶ the size of a little ?nger can store more information than the super¶ computers of a decade ago.¶ Cyber war, cyber espionage, and cyber crime all share the same root¶ cause: our dependence on insecure networked computer systems. The¶ bad news about this dependency is that cyber war appears to be¶ dominating the conversation among policymakers even though cyber¶ crime is the largest and most pervasive problem. When pundits and¶ policymakers focus only on cyber war, threats emanating from¶ cyber crime and espionage are relegated to the background. Interestingly, building systems properly from a security perspective will address¶ the cyber crime and espionage problems just as effectively as it will¶ address cyber war. By building security into our systems in the ?rst¶ place we can lessen the possibility of cyber war, take a bite out of cyber¶ crime, and deter cyber espionage all at the same time.
Thus, we offer the following framework: Because defense is the best way to protect American citizens, we ask you as the judge to evaluate this round as to which side can provide the best cyber defense.
Contention 2: Offensive Cyber Operations Prevent Cyber Defense
Subpoint A: Trading off
Preemptive OCO policy creates priority confusion and drains cyber-defense resources
Healey ’13 Jason Healey is director of the Cyber Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council finds. http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/03/08/clandestine-american-strategy-on-cyberwarfare-will-backfire
America's generals and spymasters have decided they can secure a better future in cyberspace through, what else, covert warfare, preemptive attacks, and clandestine intelligence. Our rivals are indeed seeking to harm U.S. interests and it is perfectly within the president's purview to use these tools in response. Yet this is an unwise policy that will ultimately backfire. The undoubted, immediate national security advantages will be at the expense of America's longer-term goals in cyberspace. ¶ The latest headlines on covert and preemptive cyberplans highlight just the latest phase of a cyber "cult of offense" dating back to the 1990s. Unclassified details are scarce, but the Atlantic Council's study of cyber history reveals covert plans, apparently never acted upon, to drain the bank accounts of Slobodan Milosevic and Saddam Hussein. More recent press accounts detail cyber assaults on terrorist networks (including one that backfired onto U.S. servers) and Stuxnet, which destroyed Iranian centrifuges. American spy chiefs say U.S. cyber capabilities are so prolific that this is the "golden age" of espionage, apparently including the Flame and Duqu malware against Iran and Gauss, which sought financial information (perhaps also about Iran) in Lebanese computers.¶ Offensive cyber capabilities do belong in the U.S. military arsenal. But the continuing obsession with covert, preemptive, and clandestine offensive cyber capabilities not only reduces resources dedicated for defense but overtakes other priorities as well.
Focus on preemptive cyber-attack capability trades off with fixing critical cyber vulnerabilities
Rid 2013 Thomas Rid is a reader at the Department of War Studies, King's College London finds. 2013, http://www.newrepublic.com/article/112314/obama-administrations-lousy-record-cyber-security#
But the rhetoric of war doesn't accurately describe much of what happened. There was no attack that damaged anything beyond data, and even that was the exception; the Obama administration's rhetoric notwithstanding, there was nothing that bore any resemblance to World War II in the Pacific. Indeed, the Obama administration has been so intent on The US respondsing to the cyber threats with martial aggression that it hasn't paused to consider the true nature of the threat. And that has lead to two crucial mistakes: first, failing to realize (or choosing to ignore) that offensive capabilities in cyber security don’t translate easily into defensive capabilities. And second, failing to realize (or choosing to ignore) that it is far more urgent for the United States to concentrate on developing the latter, rather than the former.¶ At present, the United States government is one of the most aggressive actors when it comes to offensive cyber operations, excluding commercial espionage. The administration has anonymously admitted that it designed Stuxnet (codenamed Olympic Games) a large-scale and protracted sabotage campaign against Iran’s nuclear enrichment facility in Natanz that was unprecedented in scale and sophistication. Close expert observers assume that America also designed Flame, a major and mysterious espionage operation against several Middle Eastern targets mostly in the energy sector. The same goes for Gauss, a targeted and sophisticated spying operation designed to steal information from Lebanese financial institutions. ¶ Developing sophisticated, code-borne sabotage tools requires skills and expertise; they also require detailed intelligence about the input and output parameters of the targeted control system. The Obama administration seems to have decided to prioritize such high-end offensive operations. Indeed, the Pentagon's bolstered Cyber Command seems designed primarily for such purposes. But these kinds of narrowly-targeted offensive investments have no defensive value. ¶ So amid all the activity, little has been done to address the country's major vulnerabilities. The software that controls America's most critical infrastructure—from pipeline valves to elevators to sluices, trains, and the electricity grid—is often highly insecure by design, as the work of groups like Digital Bond illustrates. Worse, these systems are often connected to the internet for maintenance reasons, which means they are always vulnerable to attack. Shodan, a search engine dubbed the Google for hackers, has already made these networked devices searchable. Recently a group of computer scientists at the Freie Universität in Berlin began to develop their own crawlers to geo-locate these vulnerable devices and display them on a map. Although the data are still incomplete and anonymized, parts of America's most vulnerable infrastructure are now visible for anyone to see.¶ Defending these areas ought to be the government's top priority, not the creation of a larger Cyber Command capable of going on the offense. Yet the White House has hardly complained that the piece of legislation that would have made some progress towards that goal, the Cybersecurity Act of 2012, has stalled indefinitely in the Senate.
?
Subpoint B: Increasing Vulnerabilities
A focus on offensive cyber operations increases instabilities
Rebecca Slayton, Assistant Professor at Cornell University, in Belfer Center, 2-2017 "Why Cyber Operations Do Not Always Favor the Offense," Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/why-cyber-operations-do-not-always-favor-offense, 9-26-2018
This policy brief is based on “What Is the Cyber Offense-Defense Balance? Concepts, Causes, and Assessment,” which appears in the winter 2016/17 issue of International Security. Bottom Lines Creating unnecessary vulnerabilities. Making offensive cyber operations a national priority can increase instabilities in international relations and worsen national vulnerabilities to attack. But because the skills needed for offense and defense are similar, military offensive readiness can be maintained by focusing on defensive operations that make the world safer, rather than on offensive operations. Managing complexity. The ease of both offense and defense increases as organizational skills and capability in managing complex technology improve; it declines as the complexity of cyber operations rises. What appears to be offensive advantage is primarily a result of the offense’s relatively simple goals and the defense’s poor management. Assessing kinetic effects. It is often more expensive for the offense to achieve kinetic effects—for instance, sabotaging machinery—than for the defense to prevent them. An empirical analysis of the Stuxnet cyberattacks on Iran’s nuclear enrichment facilities shows that Stuxnet likely cost the offense more than the defense and was relatively ineffective. The assumption that cyberspace favors the offense is widespread among policymakers and analysts, many of whom use this assumption as an argument for prioritizing offensive cyber operations. Faith in offense dominance is understandable: breaches of information systems are common, ranging from everyday identity theft to well-publicized hacks on the Democratic National Committee. A focus on offense, however, increases international tensions and states’ readiness to launch a counter-offensive after a cyberattack, and it often heightens cyber vulnerabilities. Meanwhile, belief in cyber offense dominance is not based on a clear conception or empirical measurement of the offense-defense balance. One useful conception of the cyber offense-defense balance is based on cost-benefit analysis: What is the benefit of offense less the cost of offense, relative to the benefit of defense less the cost of defense? The technological complexity of cyberspace does tend to increase the costs of defense, but the costs of offense and defense are ultimately shaped by the complexity of the goals of offense and defense and organizations’ capabilities in managing this complexity. Organizational skill can shift the costliness of cyber operations toward the defense. Further, whereas breaching information systems is easy and can be done at relatively low cost, achieving physical effects is far more difficult and costly. Meanwhile, the benefits of cyber operations are highly situational and subjective. Thus, claims that all of cyberspace is offense dominant obscure crucial differences between distinctive kinds of operations and the ways they are valued; such claims should be avoided. It only makes sense to discuss the offense-defense balance of specific cyber operations with specific goals, between specific adversaries with distinctive capabilities. Creating Unnecessary Vulnerabilities Prioritizing offensive operations can increase adversaries’ fears, suspicions, and readiness to take offensive action. Cyber offenses include cyber exploitation (intelligence gathering) and cyberattack (disrupting, destroying, or subverting an adversary’s computer systems). An adversary can easily mistake defensive cyber exploitation for offensive operations because the distinction is a matter of intent, not technical operation. The difficulty of distinguishing between offensive and defensive tactics makes mistrustful adversaries more reactive, and repeatedly conducting offensive cyber operations only increases distrust. A focus on offensive operations can also increase vulnerabilities; for example, secretly stockpiling information about vulnerabilities in computers for later exploitation, rather than publicizing and helping civil society to mitigate those vulnerabilities, leaves critical infrastructure vulnerable to attack. The skills and organizational capabilities for offense and defense are very similar. Defense requires understanding how to compromise computer systems; one of the best ways to protect computer systems is to engage in penetration testing (i.e., controlled offensive operations on one’s own systems). The similarity between offensive and defensive skills makes it unnecessary to conduct offensive operations against adversaries to maintain offensive capability. Thus, rather than stockpiling technologies in the hope of gaining offensive advantage, states should develop the skills and organizational capabilities required to innovate and maintain information and communications technologies. Managing Complexity The complexity of information systems gives the offense certain advantages for purely probabilistic reasons. Imagine a race: offense and defense go hunting for randomly distributed vulnerabilities, with the offense attempting to exploit those vulnerabilities and the defense aiming to patch them. The number of vulnerabilities grows with the size and complexity of the computer system, as do the technological advantages of offense—at least in principle. With a vast number of vulnerabilities, it is unlikely that the defense will be able to find and patch every vulnerability before the offense finds and exploits it. Technology is, however, embedded in social organizations, and organizations can help the defense better manage complexity. Those that develop software can check for common errors before making hardware-software systems available for use. The defender has complete access to its computer system, whereas the attacker has a more limited set of attack vectors. Organizations can help skilled defenders by establishing good cybersecurity processes, such as continually scanning for vulnerabilities and updating software. Assessing Kinetic Effects To date, failures of cyber defense have largely been failures of management, and the successes of offense are a result of its relatively simpler goals. Offense, like defense, becomes more difficult as its goals become more complex. In particular, the advantages that complexity offers the offense in cyberspace diminish in the physical world. Computers controlling physical machinery can be hacked, but achieving particular physical effects, such as covertly sabotaging nuclear enrichment facilities, requires knowledge of the physical processes that the computers control, not merely knowledge of the computers. Much of the detailed knowledge needed to run an industrial control system is tacit, passed from one engineer to another but never written down, let alone stored on a computer. Gathering such information requires traditional espionage by humans on the ground, which is both expensive and risky. A cost-benefit analysis of Stuxnet for both the offense and the defense demonstrates why damaging physical infrastructure is more costly than simply infiltrating information networks. The costs of Stuxnet were likely far greater for the offense (the United States and Israel) than for the defense (Iran), and Stuxnet was relatively ineffective, setting back Iran’s nuclear program by fewer than three months. The great expense of Stuxnet was intelligence; though digital espionage can be used to obtain some kinds of information, the knowledge needed to disrupt a physical control system, such as the detailed methods and settings used to control pressure in Iran’s nuclear centrifuges, is not generally held in computers. The costs for both sides are dominated not by technology but by skilled labor—for example, hackers who identify and exploit zero-day vulnerabilities, systems administrators who manage and defend computer systems, and the nuclear engineers who understand enrichment processes and the means of disrupting them. In addition, assessing costs alone is misguided: the perceived benefits of attacking with and defending from Stuxnet (i.e., the value of Iran’s nuclear weapons program) greatly exceeded the costs for both the offense and the defense. This is one reason not to be complacent about the need to secure industrial control systems and critical infrastructure: though cyberattacks on such systems will be costly, a determined adversary may be willing to pay the cost to achieve its aims. Conclusion The common assumption that the offense dominates cyberspace is dangerous and deeply misguided. The offense-defense balance can be assessed only for specific operations, not for all of cyberspace, as it is shaped by the capabilities of adversaries and the complexity of their goals in any conflict. When it comes to exerting precise physical effects, cyberspace does not offer overwhelming advantages to the offense. Because the capabilities of offense and defense are similar, improving defensive operations allows preparation for cyber offense without risking geopolitical instability or increasing vulnerability to attack.
Thus, we negate | 904,806 |
365,596 | 379,734 | Diversification | =1NC=
====We negate,====
====Our Sole Contention is The Oil Curse====
====Venezuela has been cursed since Hugo Chavez, when oil became the focus of the country– Kaznacheev 17====
Peter Kaznacheev, 1-11-2017, "Curse or Blessing? How Institutions Determine Success in Resource-Rich Economies," Cato Institute, https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/curse-or-blessing-how-institutions-determine-success-resource-rich
Although some economists have raised doubts about the role of natural resources in economic development
AND
1977 to below the global median income in a quarter of a century.
====This is problematic, as countries who focus on oil are more likely to be autocratic, and engage in civil wars – Campbell 16====
John Campbell, 6-3-2016, "How to End the Oil Curse," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-06-03/how-end-oil-curse
The unaccountable power of oil explains what the political scientist Michael Ross calls "the oil curse." Oil states are 50 percent more likely to be authoritarian than are non-oil states, and between 1980 and 2013, oil-producing autocracies were four times less likely to transition to democracy than their non-oil-producing peers. Oil states in the developing world are also more than 200 percent more likely to suffer civil wars; 25 percent of oil states are currently embroiled in one (compared with 11 percent of non-oil states). According to Ross, oil states are today no richer, no freer, and no more peaceful than they were in 1980—a marked contrast to most states in the developing world, which have made significant economic and political progress since then. More than 50 percent of the world's traded oil today comes from authoritarian or failed states.
====Moreover, after controlling for other exports, trade, investment, inflation, 10 increase in oil share decreases GDP 7 – Kakanov 18====
Evgeny Kakanov ,10-22-2018, "," No Publication, http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=ECO/WKP(2018)59anddocLanguage=En
Table 2 presents the long run estimates for these regressions. The coefficients of the baseline regression including investment, education, population and a dummy for minor conflicts (column 1 "baseline") have the expected signs12, though education is insignificant likely due to the inclusion of country specific time trends which capture the slow and gradual impact of education on GDP13 . The coefficient of the oil share (column 2 "share") is negative and significant at the 1 level, pointing at the prevalence of resource curse. The coefficient suggests that, ceteris paribus, a 10 percentage point increase in the oil share is associated with a 7 lower GDP per capita level in the long run14. To ensure that this result is not driven by a relevant but omitted variable, several robustness checks are carried out. • The oil share could have a negative impact mechanically when total exports fall (and thus oil share increases) which would have a negative impact on GDP. This is controlled for by introducing total exports (value, real terms, PPP-adjusted) in the regression (column 3 "Exports"). The results still show a negative and significant impact of the oil share. • Countries with high resource dependence could also be less open, with barriers to trade negatively affecting GDP. However, controlling for trade openness (column 4 "Trade") delivers similar results. • Another dimension of openness relates to capital controls: more resource dependent countries could impose more constraints on capital movements to limit impacts of oil price shocks. Using the Chin-Ito index of capital account openness (Chinn and Ito, 2006) still a significant negative impact of the oil share (column Capital) is found. • Finally, resource dependent countries could potentially suffer from inadequate monetary policies leading to higher inflation. Controlling for inflation (column Inflation) produces qualitatively the same result. • Finally, a potentially nonlinear impact of the oil share using a quadratic term (Share2) is examined. Results (columns "Nonlinear" and "Nonlin_Exp" controlling for exports) suggest that the negative impact of being an oil exporter becomes stronger when the oil share increases.
====Therefore, Rapoza 19 concludes that Venezuela's economy was in shambles before sanctions====
Kenneth Rapoza, 05-03-2019, "No, U.S. Sanctions Are Not Killing Venezuela. Maduro Is," Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2019/05/03/no-u-s-sanctions-are-not-killing-venezuela-maduro-is/~~#34f619a44343
The ruling Socialists United of Venezuela is, point blank, the only reason why Venezuela is a mess. And president Nicolas Maduro is its leader. Maduro governs a failed state. Fifty other countries, including Colombia, Brazil, the U.K. and Spain, all agree. Brazil and Colombia are currently catering to around one million Venezuelans who have fled the country. Some have preferred taking their children out of school and living in United Nations tents in Colombia instead of Maduro's Venezuela. Maduro's incompetence, of which the Socialists United rallies around, is killing Venezuela. Not Trump. Not Elliot Abrams. Not Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. This is not a pre-emptive strike, searching for terrorists under beds and weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. The economy began its deep decline years ago, in the Obama years. It has been in an economic depression for three years. Obama first sanctioned members of the Maduro Administration in 2015. Trump later sanctioned Maduro's Vice President Tareck El Aissami for drug trafficking in February 2017. Later that year, U.S. companies were banned from providing financial assistance (as in loans) to one company only, oil firm PdVSA. Talk of the U.S. banning food and medicine shipments to Venezuela is not entirely true. So long as those shipments are not going to sanctioned individuals, it's not breaking sanctions law. In 2018, the U.S. sanctioned trading in PdVSA bonds in the secondary market. All of those bonds but one were already in default long before those sanctions were announced. Then in 2019, the U.S. asked PdVSA crude oil importers like Chevron to wind down its purchases, demanding PdVSA keep its cash receipts from U.S. sales in its U.S. bank account and not repatriate it to Venezuela. And last week, total bans on PdVSA crude oil shipments to the U.S. began. Venezuela's economy was in dire straits way before this. Worth pondering, if the U.S. sanctions, of which the most serious were only enacted this year, were driving Venezuela to the poor house, why are even worse economic sanctions against Russia not hurting that country just as bad? "Without hard currency exports to the U.S., the Venezuelan regime is under extreme duress," says Agathe Demarais, global forecasting director for The Economist Intelligence Unit. She says it is hard to quantify the impact of sanctions on an economy unless there is a total embargo. "The objective of U.S. sanctions is to collapse support for Maduro from within the regime," she says, adding that it comes with amnesty offers to military officials in exchange for free and fair elections. National Assembly President Juan Guaido has been orchestrating protests all year. Guiado declared himself interim president in January until new elections could be held. He has gone so far as using those powers to appoint new diplomats at its embassies. Tens of thousands more people come to Guaido rallies than come to Maduro's counter-rallies. Yet, despite Guaido's ability to woo some defectors from the National Guard, he has yet to make any big splash moves. Top officials and military commanders remain supportive of Maduro. No A-listers have said they have had enough of this chaos. However, Guaido's strategy is more like death by a thousand cuts. Time is on his side and not on Maduro's. As the economy deteriorates, more National Guardsmen are expected to defect. This opens a new element in the crisis: an opening among the military and PSUV officials to negotiate Maduro's resignation. Anti-Maduro bureaucrats and politicians in the U.S., like Senator Marco Rubio, could literally stop saying a word about Venezuela and it would not change Maduro's fortunes one bit. "Omar has no idea what she's talking about," Rubio told Trish Regan on Fox's Primetime last night. "She's just making it up. She doesn't even follow this issue....It's actually embarrassing." Alejandro Arreaza, an emerging markets research analyst for Barclays in New York, said the protests this week chip away at Maduro's strength in Caracas. "The situation remains very fluid. But the government position seems to have been weakened more," he says. Venezuela's international isolation, coupled with its self-inflicted economic collapse, have not been enough to give anyone at PSUV a true "come to Jesus" moment. They have dug in. Their political ideology, after all, demands it. They have a reputation to uphold: they are revolutionaries fighting for the downtrodden and the natives, robbed by colonials and later robbed again by American corporations. That's what Maduro tells his soldiers they are up against. It's a historic battle, an academic "decolonial" battle that the left is fighting even here in the U.S., and if it must be won, then why not win it? Most of the rank and file in Venezuela's army must believe it. Higher ranks might care less about Maduro's post-colonial theory, but they have bigger things going on — running drugs and extortion rings, for instance. Their lives depend on PSUV staying in power. Since the founding of PSUV by revolutionary Hugo Chavez, the party reluctantly paid Wall Street bondholders, while preaching its brand of anti-capitalist, Cuban-style Marxism. They ruined the country long ago. They were more interested in the past, and their role in erasing it, than they were interested in investing in Venezuela's future. After years of lackluster investment in infrastructure, their entire power grid is buckling. Real GDP declined 15 in 2018, back when the only sanction was on PdVSA bonds, hardly an economic mover. Demarais of The Economist Intelligence Unit says she expects further contractions this year and next. A forecast recovery in 2021 to 2023 rests on the assumption that Maduro (and PSUV) are gone. Then the International Monetary Fund, Chavez's old enemy, will come in to fund this mess. PSUV's worst nightmare would have come true...all thanks to them. Venezuela's GDP has fallen by around 50 since 2013. Demarais thinks oil production falls to 900,000 barrels a day over the coming quarters. Less oil out of Venezuela, an OPEC country, will have an impact on oil prices. Then again, oil at $100 a barrel won't do much to save Venezuela so long as PSUV is running it.
====Fortunately, the curse is being broken as non-oil exports in Venezuela are increasing now – Armas 19====
Mayela Armas, 10-23-2019, "In hungry Venezuela, food producers step up exports to survive," U.S., https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-exports-insight/in-hungry-venezuela-food-producers-step-up-exports-to-survive-idUSKBN1X215M
Shrimp farming is booming in this western Venezuelan city, but little of the shellfish is destined for tables in this malnourished nation. About 90 of this shrimp is headed for Europe and Asia - with the blessing of President Nicolas Maduro. Venezuela's leader has lauded food exports on television as a way to raise hard currency to stabilize an economy in crisis. And he is paving the way for more foreign sales. His administration has loosened restrictions to allow more production to go abroad, 10 food industry entrepreneurs and executives told Reuters. In addition to seafood, Venezuelan cheese, avocados, citrus, breakfast cereal and candy are finding international buyers. These new foreign sales are tiny, with most companies billing less than $1 million per year. Venezuela remains almost entirely dependent on oil exports, which amounted to $29 billion last year. Still, the numbers signal a shift for a government that has long blamed the private sector for shortages of basic goods. Maduro and his predecessor, Hugo Chavez, for years accused food companies of hoarding and profiteering. Business leaders say empty shelves were the result of state policies such as price and currency controls and the nationalization of farms and factories. Since 2017, 140 Venezuelan businesses have begun exporting for the first time, half of them selling food products, according to data provided by Scottsdale, Arizona-based advisory firm Import Genius, which collects customs data for the import-export industry. Some veteran exporters, meanwhile, are leaning more heavily than ever on foreign sales as Venezuela's currency has collapsed. Fernando Villamizar, the head of a Venezuelan shrimp industry association, said the withering of consumer spending power at home has forced producers to look abroad for growth. On a recent morning at a facility owned by a member of the trade group, dozens of workers in baggy smocks, plastic gloves and face masks cleaned shellfish and put them in boxes to be frozen. An order that day was bound for France. The plant also ships to Spain and Vietnam. "We have to sell outside the country" to survive, Villamizar said. Venezuelan companies sold $81 million worth of shrimp abroad last year, up from $54 million in 2016, making it the country's 4th-largest non-oil export, according to figures from the Venezuelan Association of Exporters. Maduro's enthusiasm for non-oil exports comes as U.S. sanctions have hurt Venezuela's petroleum sales. To earn hard currency, his government is scrambling for alternatives. In July, Maduro toured a factory outside Caracas that ships chocolate to Japan, television cameras in tow. He said the goal of these and other exports was to generate "euros, rubles, yuan and cryptocurrencies." Food producers looking to export need to obtain a variety of government permits. Under Chavez, the state frequently denied those permissions, delayed them or never acted on them, the food industry entrepreneurs and executives told Reuters. They said Maduro's administration is now granting more permits, allowing them room to maneuver. The Information Ministry did not respond to requests for comment on Maduro's exports strategy. The government this year has also largely given up controlling prices, three of the food industry executives said. More goods have returned to Venezuelan stores. But even with more products available, Venezuela's hyperinflation means few can afford to buy. Compared to five years ago, the daily calories now consumed by the average citizen have fallen 56 to 1,600 calories, according to Caracas-based Citizenry in Action, a nutrition-focused nonprofit. That is well below the 2,000 to 2,500 calories per day recommended by the World Health Organization. Millions depend on government food handouts and subsidized staples. Lack of demand has spurred two large Venezuelan food companies - Empresas Polar and rival General de Alimentos Nisa CA, or Genica - to export products that until now had only been sold in Venezuela, said two people involved in those operations and a third with knowledge of them. The two companies last year exported a combined $59,000 worth of merchandise, mainly to Argentina and Chile. Among the items headed abroad was a once-popular melted cheese spread made by Polar. Genica told Reuters it was entering new markets but would not elaborate. Polar did not respond to requests for comment. The Venezuelan unit of another major firm, Nestle SA, as of June had exported 18 tonnes of instant cereal worth $18,600 to the United States, according to port records. Convenience foods are now beyond the reach of Venezuelan shoppers such as Doris Molina, a 28-year-old accountant. "I don't give my son cereal anymore because it's so expensive," she said, walking with her four-year-old at a Caracas mall. The local price of Nestle's instant cereal has increased around 3,400 since last year. Nestle said in a statement that its exports generate foreign exchange it needs to acquire raw materials, and that these sales comply with Venezuelan law. Such sales do not violate U.S. sanctions, which forbid American firms from doing business with Venezuela's government or state-run companies such as oil giant Petroleos de Venezuela SA. Venezuela's private sector companies are free to sell to U.S. buyers. Attorney Daniel Sanchez opened a fish farm in central Venezuela three years ago to raise tilapia, which is largely unknown in Venezuela. He has buyers in Colombia and is eyeing the United States. Showing off outdoor tanks teaming with fish, Sanchez said he sells tilapia for $2 a kilogram. That's the equivalent of more than a week's pay for Venezuelans earning the minimum wage. "The idea is to produce for export," Sanchez said. Ramon Goyo, head of the Venezuela Association of Exporters, said a new company joins his trade group almost weekly to seek advice on how to sell abroad. "They're looking for hope," Goyo said. "There's no (way to make it) in Venezuela's hyperinflation. There's no spending power." Exports by Venezuela's private sector companies increased by 26 in the first quarter of 2019 versus the same period a year ago, even as the economy contracted by 27, according to the most recent central bank statistics.
====Rendon furthers in 2019 that sanctions are also helping democratic leverage====
Moises Rendon, The, 9-3-2019, "Are Sanctions Working in Venezuela?," No Publication, https://www.csis.org/analysis/are-sanctions-working-venezuela
There is significant evidence of the impact of sanctions on Maduro's power. Not only have targeted economic sanctions limited his ability to finance his regime's antidemocratic activities and human rights abuses by reducing oil and illegal mining earnings, but they have also strained his inner circle. His control over state institutions and assets is slipping along with public confidence in his regime. The United States has instituted a strategy of risk; the current administration's interminable threat to impose further sanctions leaves Maduro and his accomplices unsure as to how far it will go, forcing them to fear the worst. Most recently, sanctions have increased leverage for democratic forces within Venezuela. Maduro recently agreed to send a delegation to Barbados to reopen talks with the opposition after dialogues stalled earlier this year. The increased pressure of sanctions was a key factor in his decision to negotiate with political adversaries, as he and his inner circle are more limited than ever in their capacity to travel and engage with financial assets. That said, there are areas for improvement in sanctions strategy. The first important step is to encourage multilateral adoption of currently targeted sanctions. Unilateral sanctions, even from the most powerful economy in the world, have limited results. In addition to incorporating allied neighbors Colombia and Brazil, the United States should take advantage of the Lima Group, which has recently taken a strong stance on Maduro's crusade against democracy. If this is successfully achieved, the strategy can be extended outward to the Organization of American States and perhaps even the United Nations (although Chinese and Russian veto power on the Security Council would make this difficult). The United States and its allies must use sanctions deliberately as a tool to shut down Maduro's criminal activities. By closing off criminal sources of revenue for him and his cohorts in Venezuela, Maduro's relative exit costs can be lowered, which will in turn increase the likelihood of a peaceful transition. While barriers to exiting power are always high, sanctions can isolate Maduro to the point where resigning is a welcome alternative. Another method could be the reallocation of assets recovered from sanctioned officials in the Venezuelan government and military. These assets could be forfeited to nongovernmental organizations helping the most deprived Venezuelans. While such a process requires cutting through significant red tape, the legitimate government led by Guaidó would be well served to ensure that the victims of malevolence in Venezuela are compensated in some manner. Lastly, the international community can integrate innovative ideas for sanctioning businesses, especially those that are paramount to U.S. economic interests in the region. Several U.S. companies, most notably Chevron, currently operate in the Venezuelan oil sector and in turn must navigate sanctions. One past example is that Citgo, a subsidiary of PdVSA, was wrested from Maduro's control and made responsive to Guaidó's administration. The same strategy could be applied to Venezuela's financial sector, specifically its centralized and semiprivate/state-owned banks. The United States should distinguish between institutions that are operating in sole service of Maduro's regime and those that can play a role in providing an economic future for the country. This will require creativity as well as flexibility. It is also necessary to retract sanctions placed on state entities once they are proven to be legitimately controlled.
====This is great news, as democratic institutions are key to avoid the resource curse – Labrador 19====
Rocio Cara Labrador, 1-24-2019, "Venezuela: The Rise and Fall of a Petrostate," Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/venezuela-crisis
A country that discovers a resource after it has formed robust democratic institutions is usually better able to avoid the resource curse, analysts say. For example, strong institutions in Norway have helped the country enjoy steady economic growth since the 1960s, when vast oil reserves were discovered in the North Sea, writes Karl in her book. Today, oil accounts for 22 percent of the country's GDP and over 80 percent of its exports. Strong democracies with an independent press and judiciary help curtail classic petrostate problems by holding government and energy companies to account. If a country strikes oil or another resource before it develops its state infrastructure, the curse is much harder to avoid. However, there are remedial measures that low-income and developing countries can try, provided they are willing. For instance, a government's overarching objective should be to use the oil earnings in a responsible manner "to finance outlays on public goods that serve as the platform for private investment and long-term growth," says Columbia University's Jeffrey Sachs, an expert on economic development. This can be done financially, with broad-based investing in international assets, or physically, by building infrastructure and educating workers. Transparency is essential in all of this, Sachs says. Many countries have established sovereign wealth funds (SWF) to manage investment of revenues from their vast resource wealth. SWFs in some fifty countries managed more than $7 trillion in 2018. Analysts anticipate that a global shift from fossil fuel energy to renewables such as solar or wind will force petrostates such as Venezuela to diversify their economies.
====All in all, Argus Media concludes in 2019, that diversification away from oil is greatly benefiting Venezuela's economy====
Argus Media, 12-19-2019, "Venezuela defies sanctions with dollar-driven upswing," No Publication, https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2037897-venezuela-defies-sanctions-with-dollardriven-upswing
US sanctions have failed to dislodge Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro so far, but they have compelled the government to ease economic controls this year, modestly improving the Opec country's 2020 economic outlook. The sanctions "have forced the Maduro government throughout this year to erase most price controls, loosen capital controls, tighten controls on commercial bank loan operations and accept informal dollarization as it seeks to capture new hard currency streams and reduce hyperinflationary pressures," a Venezuelan central bank economist tells Argus. Maduro's biggest economic achievement this year has been to curb hyperinflation, the economist said. Opposition-controlled National Assembly advisers acknowledge the slowing inflation, but caution that inflationary pressures persist on years of structural distortions. The advisers estimate cumulative inflation from January through November at over 5,500pc compared with the central bank's 2018 inflation estimate of 130,000pc. They now believe it is likely that 2019 inflation could average about 7,000pc, a marked improvement over end-2018 forecasts from entities such as the International Monetary Fund that anticipated 10mn pc inflation in 2019. In October the IMF reduced its 2019 inflation forecast to 200,000pc, rising to 500,000pc in 2020. The US sanctions imposed on state-owned PdV in January constricted oil revenues that historically accounted for up to 90pc of Venezuela's income. The sanctions "accelerated PdV's crude output decline, crippled oil export operations by discouraging many buyers and logistics operators and suppliers from doing business with the company, and blocked our access to international financing," a PdV board member tells Argus. The US sanctions forced Maduro to gradually erase most domestic price controls and loosen capital controls in a bid to encourage foreign investment and facilitate remittances from Venezuelans abroad, oil ministry and central bank officials said. PdV's crude production has rebounded to more than 800,000 b/d in recent weeks, partly by quietly transferring operational and procurement controls to PdV's minority joint venture partners, including Russia's Rosneft, China's CNPC and Spain's Repsol, although fresh investment is still on hold. Maduro's efforts to channel remittances totaling up to $4bn this year compared with about $2bn in 2018 through government-approved banks and exchange houses have largely failed because no one trusts the government, says Jose Guerra, a former central bank chief economist and current opposition deputy in the National Assembly. Remittances in 2020 are expected to jump to about $6bn, equivalent to almost 80pc of the central bank's current hard currency reserves of $7.5bn. The trends are driving a robust black market in dollars and euros. Up to 55pc of non-oil commercial transactions are conducted in non-Venezuelan currency. In oil-producing Zulia state, almost 90pc of transactions are in dollars. Zulia lies on the border with Colombia, which hosts the bulk of Venezuela's diaspora. Dollarization is a necessary "pressure release valve" that is allowing private-sector companies to secure hard currency to finance imports, Maduro said in October, adding "thank God for dollarization." Food and medicine imports have rebounded, benefiting about 15pc of the population with access to dollars. The other 85pc scrape by on the equivalent of $1-$2/day. Venezuelan business chamber Fedecamaras said this week the private sector will account for the first time in decades for up to 25pc of GDP in 2019 and likely more in 2020. | 904,807 |
365,597 | 379,724 | Case Citations | Chris and I Negate, Resolved: The benefits of the United States federal government’s use of offensive cyber operations outweigh the harms. With this we offer
Contention 1: There are no benefits to offensive cyber operations
Subpoint A: Cyber command
US offensive cyber operations will be conducted through Cyber Command.
Shannon Vavra 19, 6-11-2019, "U.S. ramping up offensive cyber measures to stop economic attacks, Bolton says," CyberScoop, https://www.cyberscoop.com/john-bolton-offensive-cybersecurity-not-limited-election-security/
The U.S. is beginning use offensive cyber measures in response to commercial espionage, President Trump’s nation
...AND...
cyber strategy, both of which gave the Defense Department more flexibility to conduct offensive cyber measures.
However, Cyber Command is not effective.
Josh Lospinoso 18, 7-12-2018, "Fish Out of Water: How the Military Is an Impossible Place for Hackers, and What to Do About It," War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2018/07/fish-out-of-water-how-the-military-is-an-impossible-place-for-hackers-and-what-to-do-about-it/
The U.S. military established Cyber Command almost a decade ago, but it fails to maximize its contributions to n
...AND...
ove unless the military focuses on retention and promotion of its most precious resource: its technical talent.
Subpoint B: Hidden Effect
Empirically, offensive cyber attacks conducted by the United States Federal Government have taken years to be exposed
KAVEH WADDELL, MAR 6, 2017,”The Cyberwar Information Gap,” https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/03/the-cyberwar-information-gap/518700/
U.S. government hackers began developing destructive malware meant to disrupt Iran’s nascent nuclear program as
...AND...
ttacks on North Korea’s missile launches that took place in 2016, during Barack Obama’s final year as president.
Contention 2: US Offensive Cyber Operations lead to a perpetual war
Offensive cyber operations lock the US into permanent conflict
Maria Ellers, 10-23, 19, How America's Cyber Strategy Could Create an International Crisis, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/skeptics/how-americas-cyber-strategy-could-create-international-crisis-90526, María Ellers is a US-Russia Relations Intern at the Center for the National Interest.
The United States has adopted a new cyber warfare strategy focused on “persistent engagement” and “forward defen
...AND...
are, which could cause states to find themselves in a position of “not just persistent, but permanent conflict.”
The US use of the Offensive Cyber Operations strategies encourages an endless cyber war
Mack Degeurin, Editorial Intern, New York Magazine, 9-14-2018 "U.S. Silently Enters New Age of Cyberwarfare," Select All, http://nymag.com/selectall/2018/09/us-rescinds-ppd-20-cyber-command-enters-new-age-of-cyberwar.html, 9-24-2018 KAS
This past month, buried beneath an ant mound of political scandal and news cacophony, President Trump set in mot
...AND...
ine war. “A United States that is more powerful in cyberspace does not necessarily mean that it is more secure.” | 904,796 |
365,598 | 379,756 | Disclosure Policy | Due to time constraints, we may be too busy to disclose after every round, so we will disclose at the end of the day. If you would like you to know what we are reading before you debate us please email us at [email protected] or [email protected]. | 904,840 |
365,599 | 379,760 | Dowling Neg 1 | C1:Increasing Attacks
Nicole Perlroth, New York Times, "In Baltimore and Beyond, a Stolen N.S.A. Tool Wreaks Havoc", May 25th, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/25/us/nsa-hacking-tool-baltimore.html
"Since 2017, when ... in the wild."
Kalev Leetaru, Forbes, "As Eternal Blue Racks Up Damages It Reminds Us There Is No Such Thing As A Safe Cyber Weapon", May 25th, 2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/kalevleetaru/2019/05/25/as-eternalblue-racks-up-damages-it-reminds-us-there-is-no-such-thing-as-a-safe-cyber-weapon/#5e48136c7603
"The NSA's loss ... be future breaches."
James Sanders, Tech Republic, "Financial impact of ransomware attacks increasing despite overall decrease in attack", 09/24/19, https://www.techrepublic.com/article/financial-impact-of-ransomware-attacks-increasing-despite-overall-decrease-in-attacks/
"Ransomeware attacks are ... Brokers in 2017."
Jason Healey, Journal of Cybersecurity , "The implications of persistent (and permanent) engagement in cyberspace", 08/26/19, https://academic.oup.com/cybersecurity/article/5/1/tyz008/5554878#140575448
"According to General ... over private networks."
David Sanger, The New York Times, "The Urgent Search for a Cyber Silver Bullet Against Iran ", 09/23/19, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/23/world/middleeast/iran-cyberattack-us.html
"But when it ... Las Vegas Casino."
Andy Greenberg, Wired, "How not to Prevent a Cyber War with Russia", June 18th, 2019, https://www.wired.com/story/russia-cyberwar-escalation-power-grid/
"As the Trump ... is high here."
John Donnelly, Roll Call, "America is woefully unprepared for cyber-warfare", 07/11/19, https://www.rollcall.com/news/u-s-is-woefully-unprepared-for-cyber-warfare
"America's adversaries have ... the authors wrote."
Elias Groll, Foreign Policy, "The U.S.-Iran Standoff Is Militarizing Cyberspace ", 09/27/19, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/09/27/the-u-s-iran-standoff-is-militarizing-cyberspace/
"But experts in ... used any time."
Nicole Lindsey, CPO Magazine, "The Rise of the Global Cyber War Threat ", 08/05/19, https://www.cpomagazine.com/cyber-security/the-rise-of-the-global-cyber-war-threat/
"Russia, China, Iran ... we do this?"
Paul Bedard, Washington Examiner, "New EMP warning: US will ‘cease to exist,’ 90 percent of population will die", 01/24/19, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/washington-secrets/new-emp-warning-us-will-cease-to-exist-90-of-population-will-die
"At a time ... attack, said Pry."
University of Cambridge, Lloyds Emerging Risks Report, "Business Blackout", 2015, https://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/fileadmin/user_upload/research/centres/risk/downloads/crs-lloyds-business-blackout-scenario.pdf
"By its design ... country's economic production."
Steve Morgan, Cybersecurity Ventures, "Cybercrime Damages $6 Trillion by 2021", 10/06/17, https://cybersecurityventures.com/hackerpocalypse-cybercrime-report-2016/
"Cybercrime is the ... and reputational harm."
Bob Pisani , CNBC, "A cyberattack could trigger the next financial crisis, new report says", 09/13/18, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/13/a-cyberattack-could-trigger-the-next-financial-crisis.html
"They may all ... the broader economy."
Rajiner Tumber, Forbes, "Cyber Attacks: Igniting The Next Recession?", 01/05/19, https://www.forbes.com/sites/rajindertumber/2019/01/05/cyber-attacks-igniting-the-next-recession/#1830a95dbe4f
"Cybercrime is predicted ... the hard way."
Olivier Blanchard , IMG, "JOBS AND GROWTH: ANALYTICAL AND OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE FUND", March 2013, https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/031413.pdf
"Although we are ... of adverse shocks." | 904,844 |
Subsets and Splits