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June Education Con
Charter schools serve far fewer students than traditional public school Louzano and Simielli 20 (Paula Louzano is the Dean of Diego Portales University School of Education, in Chile. Paula holds a doctoral degree in educational policy from Harvard University and M.A. in comparative education from Stanford University. She worked as a professor and researcher at University of São Paulo School of Education and as a consultant at UNESCO Regional Office for Education in Santiago, Chile. Lara Simielli is a Professor at the Public Management Department of Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV EAESP). Lara holds a Ph.D. and Master´s Degree in Public Administration and Government from FGV EAESP. She was a Visiting Researcher at Stanford University. Lara worked as a Project Officer in the UNESCO Education Sector (Brazil) and as a Professor at the University of São Paulo School of Education. March 16th, 2020. "Charter Schools: A U.S. Case Study and Implications for Brazil.” https://epaa.asu.edu/ojs/article/view/4144/2406 DOA 04/27/20) GSH “In the United States,... in charter schools, “ Charters create a cycle of defunding public schools that results in closure Farmer et al 17 (Stephanie Farmer: Associate Professor of Sociology Roosevelt University, Ashley Baber: PhD candidate in Sociology Loyola University, Chris Poulos :PhD candidate in Sociology, University of Illinois at Chicago, March 20 2017, “Closed By Choice: The Spatial Relationship between Charter School Expansion, School Closures, and Fiscal Stress in Chicago Public Schools”, Project for Middle Class Removal, https://ler.illinois.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Closed-By-Choice.pdf // DOA: 6/7/20)JDE “neighborhood public schools... is set in motion.” The impact is achievement: loss of funding due to charters decrease achievement for all students in left in traditional public schools Martin et al 18 (Carmel Martin is a distinguished senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, Ulrich Boser is a senior fellow at the Center., Meg Benner is a senior consultant at the Center., Perpetual Baffour is a former research associate at the Center, 11-13-2018, "A Quality Approach to School Funding," Center for American Progress, https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education-k-12/reports/2018/11/13/460397/quality-approach-school-funding/ // DOA: 5/15/20)JDE “money does matter...student achievement levels,” Charter schools create segregation based on class Wells et al 19(Amy Stuart Wells, Professor and the Director of the Sociology and Education Program at Columbia University, Abbey Keener, Leana Cabral and Diana Cordova-Cobo, "The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same: The Resegregation of Public Schools Via Charter School Reform," Peabody Journal of Education, https://doi.org/10.1080/0161956X.2019.1668209, DOA: 5/4/20)ET “charter schools and ...on familial advantage” Ladd 19 provides the warrant, noting Ladd 19 (Helen Ladd is an education economist who as the Susan B. King Professor Emeritus of Public Policy and Economics at Duke University's Sanford School of Public Policy, 2019, “HOW CHARTER SCHOOLS THREATEN THE PUBLIC INTEREST”, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, https://sanford.duke.edu/sites/sanford.duke.edu/files/images/Ladd-2019-Journal_Policy_Analysis_and_Management_Charter20Schools.pdf // DOA: 5/4/20)JDE “charters have little...underrepresented in charter schools”. Even charters that enroll low income students are only enrolling already high achieving students. Wells et al 19 addsAmy Stuart Wells, Professor and the Director of the Sociology and Education Program at Columbia University, Abbey Keener, Leana Cabral and Diana Cordova-Cobo, "The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same: The Resegregation of Public Schools Via Charter School Reform," Peabody Journal of Education, https://doi.org/10.1080/0161956X.2019.1668209, DOA: 5/4/20)ET “when charter schools ...compared with their peers” This is why Monarrez et al in 2019 conclude that charters increase segregation in district public schools Monarrez et al 19(Tomas Monarrez, Urban Institute, Brian Kisida, University of Missouri, Matthew Chingos, Urban Institute, July 2019, " Charter School Effects on School Segregation," Urban Institute, https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/100689/charter_school_effects_on_school_segregation_0.pdf, DOA: 6/2/20)ET . “We find that ...district in our sample” The impact is hurting marginalized students Monarrez 2019 reports(Fall 2019, Monarrez, Tomas; Kisida, research associate in the Center on Education Data and Policy at the Urban Institute Brian; Chingos, assistant professor in the Truman School of Public Affairs at the University of Missouri; Matthew M, vice president for education data and policy at the Urban Institute, “Do Charter Schools Increase Segregation?” https://search.proquest.com/openview/4ecddc4500c8acd630eed37a99e63286/1?pq-origsite=gscholarandcbl=2050154 DOA: 4/27/20) HS “the effects of...of color increased”. Charter schools can make unions less effective Jochim and Lavery 2019 (Ashley Jochim, senior research analyst at the Center on Reinventing Public Education, Lesley Lavery, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Macalester College. March 2019. “An Unlikely Bargain: Why Charter School Teachers Unionize and What Happens When They Do,” Center on Reinventing Public Education. https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED594061.pdf. DOA: 4/27/20) AO “when students enroll...of collective bargaining.” Increase teacher turnover in impoverished public schools Barnum 2018 (JANUARY 10, 2018, MATT BARNUM, Matt Barnum is a national reporter for Chalkbeat, covering education policy and research. Previously he was a staff writer at The 74, the policy director for Educators for Excellence – New York, and a middle school language arts teacher in Colorado., “Is the ‘War on Teachers’ as Dire as It’s Made Out to Be?” The Atlantic https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2018/01/is-the-war-on-teachers-as-dire-as-its-made-out-to-be/549842/ DOA: 6/5/20) HS “the weakening of ...percent each year.” Teacher turnover negatively affects student achievement Ronfeldt 2011( June 2011, Matthew Stephen Ronfeldt Associate Professor at University of Michigan ; Faculty Associate, Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, Susanna Loeb is an American education economist and the Barnett Family Professor of Education at the Stanford Graduate School of Education, where she also served as founding director of the Center for Education Policy Analysis, Hamilton Lankford Professor at University at Albany, James Wyckoff Curry School of Education University of Virginia, “HOW TEACHER TURNOVER HARMS STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT” https://www.nber.org/papers/w17176.pdf DOA: 6/5/20) HS “teacher turnover has ...and black students.” Teacher unions improve student achievement—especially for black students. Han, 19 (Eunice S. Han is an assistant professor at the University of Utah. Han’s recent research focuses on the impact of unionism on the local labor market, especially on income inequality and on economic mobility. Han is a senior research associate at the Labor and Worklife Program at Harvard Law School and a research associate at Economic Policy Institute. Han received her Ph.D. at Harvard University. Thomas N. Maloney is a professor of Economics at the University of Utah. His research focuses on inequality and socioeconomic mobility in the US, both contemporary and historical. He holds a PhD in Economics from the University of Michigan. “Teacher Unionization and Student Academic Performance: Looking beyond Collective Bargaining,” Labor Studies Journal, October 2019, pp. 1-32, https://doi.org/10.1177/0160449X19883373) dwc 20 “research draws on... for black students”
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Contention 3: A Carribean Disaster PetroCaribe is an oil agreement formed by 19 Latin American nations in 2005. Countries bought Venezuelan oil, paying half upfront to Venezuela and the other half over the next 25 years. US sanctions have ended this organization. Beaubien of NPR in July explains that US sanctions have blocked payments through global banking institutions, making countries unable to wire payments to Venezuela and blocking all PetroCaribe purchases. As a result, The Miami Herald writes that US sanctions have effectively killed PetroCaribe. Ending sanctions would revive the program, as Dobson of VA in December reports that Maduro is seeking to relaunch PetroCaribe in 2020. The impact of keeping sanctions is reducing energy costs. NPR finds that cheap oil under PetroCaribe left countries tied to inefficient power and made it hard to finance new energy like natural gas and renewables. Gill of the Atlantic Council in 2016 furthers that PetroCaribe countries faced the highest energy costs in the Western Hemisphere, three times the US. That’s because as Gill explains, countries did not pass off cheaper costs to consumers, instead spending massively on programs draining social development. Fortunately, absent PetroCaribe, the IFC in May indicates that officials throughout Latin America are turning to natural gas. Garcia of the IDB in 2019 quantifies that this switch from fuel oil to natural gas could reduce the average cost of energy by up to 40 percent. Lowering the cost of energy is vital. The IADB in 2018 quantifies that high energy prices keep over 100 million people in the region in energy poverty.
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see open source
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Disclosure Interp
Debaters must disclose any interpretations on the NDCA PF wiki 30 Minutes before the round.
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be our friends
if you want our cases email [email protected] or fb message Tenzin Y. Dadak
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hi
if you want our cases email [email protected] or fb message Aerin Mann
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0 - Contact info
Contact information: Danny An: 858 333 2508 Benjamin Peng: 858 538 3895 Email [email protected] or [email protected] for any case disclosure questions.
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Importante Note Please Read
Check Carmel Valley Independent. We are the same team.
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BRI AFF INFRA
AFF We affirm the Resolved: The European Union should join the Belt and Road Initiative. First we observe that the BRI is failing. President Xi Jin Ping launched the BRI in 2013, however, the plan is failing. Greer in 2018 explains how right now, none of the Indian Ocean port projects funded through the BRI have much hope of financial success and that 270 BRI infrastructure projects have been put on hold because of problems with funding. Zhao in 2019 of the University of Pennsylvania writes that investors are currently not attracted to the BRI because on their own, BRI projects do not generate enough returns on investment. However, by completing the BRI and by connecting all the projects, more return would be generated. Herrero in 2017 writes that China itself cannot fund the 5 trillion dollars needed in the next 5 years for the BRI by itself, due to China’s slowing economy and because Chinese banks cannot fund as much anymore. In fact, Meyer in 2019 finds that since 2015, funding from Chinese banks have dropped by 90, and funding from commercial banks has ceased almost entirely. Affirming saves the BRI in 2 ways. First, Ciurtin in 2017 writes that the EU is the only actor capable of funding the BRI, affirming will allow the EU to help in funding. Next, the EU increases private funding when they join the BRI. DW News in 2019 writes that through the BRI, the way the EU plans to fund its joint project with Japan is by attracting investments from development banks and private investors. Europe will fund the BRI in the same way. Sole Contention: Trade When you affirm, trade increases in 2 ways. First is through infrastructure. Ruta in 2018 finds that the infrastructure from the BRI will directly reduce trade transport times by up to 12 due to newly built infrastructure. He goes on to explain that shorter transport times means lowered trade costs and more trade. 2nd is through soft policies. Rolland in 2019 writes that the BRI includes free trade agreements that reduce tariffs and increase trade. XinHua in 2019 writes a study by the World Bank finds that the BRI increased trade flows among its countries by 4. In total, The Maritime Executive in 2019 finds a completed BRI is likely to boost world GDP by $7.1 trillion, or 8.3 of the world GDP right now, annually by 2040. We have three impacts, first is a better quality of life Boudreaux in 2018 explains that trade is beneficial because it allows consumers to be able to access cheaper products from other countries. Because of this, Koopman in 2019 explains that ever since 1990, trade has lifted 1 billion people out of poverty. The World Bank in 2019 quantifies that if the BRI were to be fully implemented, 7.6 million people would be lifted from extreme poverty and 32 million from moderate poverty. This is because The Whitehouse in 2015 concludes that trade has a significant positive effect on income, and a 1 percent increase in trade raises real income by 0.5 percent. That leads us to our second impact:lives. Okonski 4 of the Wall Street Journal furthers that the best way to prevent thousands of deaths in developing countries is to prioritize economic growth. Indeed, Bhalotra in 2006 of the UN University finds that a 1 growth in GDP decreases the death rate by 0.7. This is because economic growth provides resources to reduce mortality. Bhalotra explains that economic growth improves maternal and child nutrition, increases sanitation, and increases hospitals. Our third impact is war. The BRI could also prevents war in 2 ways, first is through increased communication. The United Nations explains in 2019 that interactions between different countries is the key to peace and prosperity on a global scale. This is because countries will have more opportunities to communicate with each other, decreasing conflict. The 2nd way war decreases is through trade. Pyun 19 explains that when trade increases between countries by 10 , the probability of military conflict decreases by about 2.6, preventing conflict and saving lives. This is because when countries depend on each other more for trade, they are less likely to escalate tension and go to war. For these reasons, we affirm. Cards: Okonski Kendra. “Economic Growth Saves Lives”. Wall Street Journal. 2004 More than 160,000 people will die prematurely in poor countries this week, many of them women and children. Some of these deaths ~-~- more than 40,000 ~-~- were caused by the tsunamis that wrought havoc in the Indian Ocean region. But most of these deaths will go unnoticed. That because rather than being victims of a dramatic natural event, they are caused by the side effects of poverty. The real problem for most of the people affected by the disaster is poverty. Whatever the earth, or its climate, may have in store in the next few decades, the best strategy to minimize human deaths and suffering is to tackle poverty through economic development and technological progress. Koopman Robert. “Poverty Reduction Rests on Trade”. Chief Economist of Wolrd Trade Org. 2019 With today’s trade tensions, it is easy to lose sight of the progress the world has made over the past few decades of economic integration. Since 1990, more than one billion people have lifted themselves out of poverty, owing to growth that was underpinned by trade. And today, countries are trading more and deepening economic ties even faster than in past decades. There are currently more than 280 trade agreements in place around the world, compared to just 50 in 1990. Boudreaux Donald. “The Benefits of Free Trade: Addressing Key Myths”. 2018 Free trade increases prosperity for Americans—and the citizens of all participating nations—by allowing consumers to buy more, better-quality products at lower costs. It drives economic growth, enhanced efficiency, increased innovation, and the greater fairness that accompanies a rules-based system. These benefits increase as overall trade—exports and imports—increases. Free trade increases access to higher-quality, lower-priced goods. Cheaper imports, particularly from countries such as China and Mexico, have eased inflationary pressure in the United States. Prices are held down by more than 2 percent for every 1 percent share in the market by imports from low-income countries like China, which leaves more income for Americans to spend on other products. Tim Everett, Mallika Ishwaran, Gian Paolo Ansaloni and Alex Rubin, “ Economic Growth and the Environment”, 2010, Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/69195/pb13390-economic-growth-100305.pdf While the previous section discussed the importance of natural capital to economic growth25, this section looks at the relationship between economic growth and environmental quality, and discusses its main drivers. Environmental Kuznets Curve The Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) is often used to describe the relationship between economic growth and environmental quality26. It refers to the hypothesis of an inverted U-shaped relationship between economic output per capita and some measures of environmental quality (see figure 2.1)27. The shape of the curve can be explained as follows: As GDP per capita rises, so does environmental degradation. However, beyond a certain point, increases in GDP per capita lead to reductions in environmental damage. Specifically: • at low incomes, pollution abatement is undesirable as individuals are better off using their limited income to meet their basic consumption needs; • once a certain level of income is achieved, individuals begin considering the trade-off between environmental quality and consumption, and environmental damage increases at a lower rate; and • after a certain point, spending on abatement dominates as individuals prefer improvements in environmental quality over further consumption, and environmental quality begins to improve alongside economic growth. Other possible explanations for the shape of the EKC include: • Technological progress: firms initially concentrate on expanding production as quickly as possible, but as technology evolves production processes become cleaner and more resource efficient; • Behaviour Change: society is at first interested in higher levels of consumption, regardless of the means by which it is achieved, but after a certain point greater consideration is given to other factors affecting quality of life, including the environment; • Lewis growth model: the development pattern of any economy is characterised by the changing patterns of economic activity. Stage 1: society concentrates resources in the primary sector (i.e. extraction, agriculture) to satisfy necessary consumption; Stage 2: resources are switched to the secondary sector (i.e. manufacturing) as basic needs are satisfied and further consumption is concentrated on consumption goods; and Stage 3: society moves from the secondary to the tertiary sector (i.e. services) characterised by much lower levels of pollution29. However, this model is less applicable in an increasingly globalised world where the move from stage 1 to 3 may happen as the result of a shift rather than a reduction in the levels of pollution. The Environmental Kuznets Curve relationship was initially observed for some elements of air pollution (suspended particles and NOX), and the turning point – or the point beyond which increases in GDP per capita lead to reductions in emissions – was estimated to be $5,000. Subsequent studies have estimated the turning point to be generally higher31, but have found evidence of the EKC applying to a larger set of environmental variables32. Obama, “ THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF U.S. TRADE”, May 2015, Executive Office of the President of the United States, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/cea_trade_report_final_non-embargoed_v2.pdf For every 1 percent increase in income as a result of trade liberalization, pollution concentrations fall by 1 percent. This happens because the adoption of clean technologies spread through trade more than offsets emissions resulting from increased transportation or production. Current trade agreements amplify these effects: the Administration includes environmental commitments as a core part of its values-driven trade approach, including commitments to protect oceans, combat wildlife trafficking, and eliminate illegal logging. Relying on another unique measure of time-varying distance between countries to predict international trade, Feyrer (2009b) documents again the importance of international trade for incomes. In this second paper, the author recognizes that the rapid progress in aircraft technology in recent years dramatically changed the effective distances between countries— goods that previously had to circumvent large land masses by ship, can now travel by air via the great circle distance. These changes, therefore, differentially benefited pairs of countries linked by relatively short air routes as compared with sea routes. Using country-specific, time-varying measures of sea distance and air distance, the author concludes that trade has a significant positive effect on income, such that a 1 percent increase in trade raises real income by 0.5 percent. XinHua, “BRI promotes unimpeded trade among participants: report”, Xinhua, 2019-04-22, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-04/22/c_137998513.htm The BRI increased trade flows among participating countries by up to 4.1 percent, according to a World Bank study that analyzes the impact of the BRI on trade in 71 potentially participating countries. The report also underlined faster pace of trade model innovation, with new trade models such as cross-border e-commerce becoming an important driver of trade among participating countries. Meyer 19 (Marshall W. Meyer, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Why the Price Is Too High”, 4/30/19, Wharton University of Pennsylvania, https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-why-the-price-is-too-high/) Along with the debt piling up at BRI beneficiary countries, China, too, is facing constraints in investing in the projects. China’s plan was to use at least $400 billion in funding from government-run banks, but the program has ballooned beyond infrastructure construction. “BRI lending by major Chinesebanks has dropped by 89 since 2015, and lending by commercial banks — who are dealing with their own financial issues domestically — has ceased almost entirely,” according to a report last August by The Jamestown Foundation. “Policy banks have also scaled back, despite their status as arms of government policy.” Mcbride James“China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative”. Council on Foreign Relations. May 21, 2019. President Xi’s vision included was to create a vast network of railways, energy pipelines, highways, and streamlined border crossings, both westward—through the mountainous former Soviet republics—and southward, to Pakistan, India, and the rest of Southeast Asia. Tanner Greer. “One Belt, One Road, One Big Mistake”. Foreigh Policy. Dec 6, 2018. Investment decisions often seem to be driven by geopolitical needs instead of sound financial sense. In South and Southeast Asia expensive port development is an excellent case study. A 2016 CSIS report judged that none of the Indian Ocean port projects funded through the BRI have much hope of financial success. They were likely prioritized for their geopolitical utility. Projects less clearly connected to China’s security needs have more difficulty getting off the ground: the research firm RWR Advisory Group notes that 270 BRI infrastructure projects in the region (or 32 percent of the total value of the whole) have been put on hold because of problems with practicality or financial viability. There is a vast gap between what the Chinese have declared they will spend and what they have actually spent. Ruta Michele. “How much will the Belt and Road Initiative reduce trade costs?”. The Trade Post. October 16, 2018. The Belt and Road Initiative will reduce shipping times for both BRI and for non-BRI economies. The average decrease in shipping time ranges between 1.2 and 2.5 percent across all country pairs in the world. BRI economies experience a decrease in shipment times ranging between 1.7 and 3.2 percent on average. The largest estimated gains are for the trade routes connecting East and South Asia and along the corridors that are part of the BRI. For instance, shipping times among countries in the China-Central Asia-West Asia economic corridor will decline by 12 due to the improved transport infrastructure. Reduction in shipping times translates to significant reductions in trade costs. Our analysis suggests that implementing all BRI transport infrastructure projects will reduce aggregate trade costs between 1.1 and 2.2 percent for the world. For the BRI economies, the change in trade costs will range between 1.5 and 2.8 percent. As for shipping times, the gains in trade costs vary widely across pairs of countries, with East Asia and Pacific as well as South Asia being the regions with the largest average reductions (Figure 2). Similarly, trade costs will fall more along the corridors. -The Maritime Executive. “U.S. will be Key Beneficiary of Belt and Road Initiative”. News. May 30, 2019. A new study by global economic consultants Centre for Economics and Business Research (Cebr) in the U.K. estimated that the global economic impact of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is likely to boost world GDP by $7.1 trillion annually per annum by 2040. The predicted rise is an increase of 4.2 percent of likely GDP in 2040 (or 8.3 percent of GDP in 2019), and over 50 countries are forecast to have their annual GDP in 2040 boosted by more than $10 billion. Chappelow Jim. “Economic Growth”. Investopedia. April 16, 2019. In simplest terms, economic growth refers to an increase in aggregate production in an economy. Often, but not necessarily, aggregate gains in production correlate with increased average marginal productivity. That leads to an increase in incomes, inspiring consumers to open up their wallets and buy more, which means a higher material quality of life or standard of living. -United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. “International Conference on Belt and Road Initiative: Sharing of Policy Experiences”. April 28, 2019. While many developing countries are still struggling with their development challenges, China has progressed rapidly in the past four decades. with Its annual GDP has having recorded a 9.5 growth on average and which has lifted over 700 million people out of poverty. China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which spans around 120 countries, covering more than 60 of world’s population and implementing more than 6000 projects with a value exceeding $1 trillion, Maliszewska, Maryla; Van Der Mensbrugghe, Dominique. 2019. The Belt and Road Initiative : Economic, Poverty and Environmental Impacts (English). Policy Research working paper; no. WPS 8814. Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/126471554923176405/The-Belt-and-Road-Initiative-Economic-Poverty-and-Environmental-Impacts China’s Belt and Road Initiative aims to improve connectivity between China and more than 70 countries through infrastructure investment and regional cooperation. The initiative has the potential to accelerate significantly the rate of economic integration and development in the region, as trade costs decline. The goals of this paper are to (i) study the impacts of infrastructure improvements on Belt and Road Initiative and non–Belt and Road Initiative countries’ trade flows, growth, and poverty; and (ii) suggest policies that would help maximize gains from the Belt and Road Initiative–induced trade cost declines. The analysis captures the trade costs reductions as a result of infrastructure improvements. The findings indicate that the Belt and Road Initiative would be largely beneficial. First, global income increases by 0.7 percent (in 2030 relative to the baseline). This translates into almost half a trillion dollars in 2014 prices and market exchange rates. The Belt and Road Initiative area captures 82 percent of the gain, with the largest percent gains in East Asia. Second, globally, the Belt and Road Initiative could contribute to lifting 7.6 million people from extreme poverty and 32 million from moderate poverty. Third, the initiative would lead to a modest increase in global carbon dioxide emissions, with a complex set of positive and negative outcomes at the national level for other types of emissions. Sonia Bhalotra Professor of Economics at the University of Essex,”Childhood Mortality and Economic Growth”, 2006, United Nations University - World Institute For Development Economic Research https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/rp2006-79.pdf In thinking about achieving a target reduction, it is useful to consider what the main causes of under-5 mortality in India are. In contrast to the situation in richer countries, where injuries and accidents are the main cause of childhood death, in poorer countries like India, the main causes of childhood death are poor maternal health, under-nutrition and the prevalence of infectious diseases like malaria, diarrhoea and respiratory infections.2 Most childhood deaths in developing countries are avoidable, and occur for want of household resources, public services and information. So, for instance, increases in household (private) income may be used to improve maternal and child nutrition. Increases in public spending may avert deaths by, for example, improving sanitation, so that less infection is bred, or by increasing the prevalence of skilled midwives and of hospital facilities that might take care of delivery complications. There is a considerable role for information in the production of health by both prevention and cure, and it seems that education makes parents more efficient at acquiring and applying relevant knowledge. As each of household incomes, public spending and education is likely to have a positive association with the level of aggregate income (GDP), the estimated effect of growth on mortality is expected to capture all of these relationships. Being a reduced form type of effect, it will also capture any interactions between these variables. For instance, we may expect the extent to which private or public health spending increases health (or survival chances) to depend upon the level of education of the parent. Household and public spending on health may themselves be complementary. For instance, Jalan and Ravallion (2003) find that the favourable effect of piped water (which depends on public spending) on diarrhoea is lower in poorer households (households with less to spend on child health), especially those with less educated mothers. So, in conclusion, growth in aggregate income provides the resources to make the interventions necessary to reduce mortality. The extent to which growth is effective depends, amongst other things, on the political economy. It is therefore an empirical question, and one on which there is limited evidence as yet (see section 3). The unconditional elasticity of mortality with respect to aggregate income (GDP) is –0.71, significant at the 1 percent level. Once time and state dummies are included in the model, this falls to –0.59, and remains significant (Table 3). The other rows of Table 3 show that this elasticity is fairly robust to inclusion of other covariates, including public health expenditure and poverty (see section 1). The more specific question we posed at the start of this paper was: If we were to rely upon GDP growth alone, how far would we be from the MDG target? As mentioned above, the rate of decline of mortality that is necessary between 1998 and 2015 is 6.2 per cent p.a. Using the estimated elasticity of mortality with respect to GDP for the period 1981-94 of –0.44 (Table 5, row 3), we can see that this rate of decline will flow from a rate of GDP growth of 14.1 per cent p.a. Actual GDP growth in the period 1981-94 was 3.1 per cent p.a., and the required growth rate is too high to be feasible. Another way of presenting these data is to say that, if GDP were to continue to grow at 3.1 per cent p.a., then growth alone would generate an annual rate of decline of mortality of 1.36 per cent p.a., other things equal. This would result in an under-5 mortality rate of 7.52 per cent in 2015, which is 4.32 percentage points above the target level. Bivens JoshPh.D., Economics, New School for Social Research, B.A., Economics, University of Maryland at College Park. “The potential macroeconomic benefits from increasing infrastructure investment”. Economic Policy Institute. July 18, 2017. Infrastructure investment could be an extraordinarily useful tool for macroeconomic stabilization. Most estimates of the output “multiplier” for infrastructure investment are substantially higher than for other fiscal interventions. If the fiscal boost of infrastructure investment were accommodated by monetary policymakers, each $100 billion in infrastructure spending would boost job growth by roughly 1 million full-time equivalents (FTEs). Eurostat. “Unemployment Statistics”. June 2019. Eurostat estimates that 15.674 million men and women in the EU-281, of whom 12.377 million were in the euro area (EA-19)2, were unemployed in June 2019. Compared with May 2019, the number of persons unemployed decreased by 36 000 in the EU-28 and by 45 000 in the euro area. Compared with June 2018, unemployment fell by 1.205 million in the EU-28 and by 1.032 million in the euro area. Vinod Thomas. “Will more infrastructure spending increase us growth”. Brookings. 2016 infrastructure investment is vital to growth in the United States, but making a lasting impact will depend not on “how much” but “how well.” President-elect Donald Trump has proposed up to $1 trillion over a decade on building roads, bridges, ports, schools, and hospitals to make America’s infrastructure “second to none.” By one estimate, an increase in investment by 1 percentage point of GDP in some advanced countries, with large infrastructure gaps or needs, like the U.S., can raise GDP by 0.4 to 1.5 percent in the following four years. But such growth would also depend on doing several things differently. Stupak Jefferey. “Economic Impact of Infrastructure Investment”. Congressional Research Service. Jan 24, 2018. In an attempt to account for how different financing mechanisms may affect public investment’s impact on output, International Monetary Fund (IMF) researchers estimated these impacts separately for deficit-financed and deficit-neutral investments. The authors found that an increase in deficit-financed public investment of 1 percentage point of GDP tends to increase overall GDP by 0.9 within the first year and by 2.9 after four years, but the authors found no significant change in GDP when investments were deficit neutral. 18 However, recent analysis by the CBO suggested that, depending on the structure (a onetime expenditure versus a series of annual expenditures) and size of deficit-financed federal investment spending, the long-term impact may either increase or decrease the level of GDP compared with a baseline. CBO found that a deficit financed increase in public investment of $100 billion would increase GDP by about $20 billion in the short term, and result in the level of GDP being about $1 billion higher after 10 years compared with a baseline. When deficit neutral, the same investment would not increase GDP in the short term, but would result in the level of GDP being about $4 billion higher after 10 years compared with a baseline.19 Much of the difference between the results produced by the CBO and IMF researchers is due to differing estimates in how public capital impacts productivity and the degree to which public investment crowds out private investment. CBO assumes public capital is less effective at increasing productivity and more likely to crowd out private investment than the IMF researchers Herrero Alicia. “China cannot finance the Belt and Road alone”.Chief Economist for the Asia Pacific at NATIXIS. 2017. This is particularly important as Chinese banks have been the largest lenders so far (China Development Bank in particular with estimated figures hovering around USD 100 billion while Bank of China has already announced its commitment to lend USD 20 billion). Multilateral organizations geared towards this objective certainly do not have such a financial muscle. Even the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), born for this purpose, has so far only invested USD 1.7 billion on Belt and Road projects. Although USD 3 trillion of reserves could still look ample, the Chinese authorities seem to have set that level as a floor under which reserves should not fall so that confidence is restored (Chart 3). This obviously reduces the leeway for Belt and Road projects to be financed by China, at least in hard currency. Against this background, we review different financing option for Xi’s Grand Plan and their implications. It seems that China cannot really rely on its banks alone – no matter how massive – to finance such a gigantic plan. The key source of co-finance would logically be Europe at least as long as bank lending dominates, which will be the case for quite some time in the countries under the Belt and Road. In fact, European banks are already the largest providers of cross border loans to these countries so it is only a question of accelerating that trend. Furthermore, the geographical vicinity between Europe and some of the Belt and Road countries could make the projects more appealing (Chart 8 and Chart 9). China Daily. “Belt and Road Initiative serves to promote multilateral cooperation: China Daily editorial”. Mar, 2019. Being proposed by China, it is natural that China should have taken the lead in advancing the Belt and Road, but it has always sought to make clear that the initiative is open and inclusive.With more countries and international organizations getting involved, the initiative will undoubtedly become a bigger and more diversified platform with increasing opportunities for multilateral cooperation. With more countries and international organizations getting involved, the initiative will undoubtedly become a bigger and more diversified platform with increasing opportunities for multilateral cooperation. Schwartz Forrest. Stanford University.“US Policy Failure: Unilateralism in a Global Environment”. 2004 The United States, however, did break its commitment to guaranteeing that it would not use the threat of nuclear weapons against North Korea, illustrating the Bush Administration’s belief that the United States does not have to honor its agreements with regards to nuclear arms. President Bush has also infringed upon the security considerations of China by advocating a system of National Missile Defense capable of neutralizing China’s nuclear-capable long-range missiles. China has expressed concern over this proposal, but the Bush Administration has largely ignored them (Cheng). Bush’s unilateral approach to the issue of nuclear weapons—essentially based on the belief that the United States no longer has to abide by historical agreements predicated on mutual assured destruction—has revived the nuclear threat, legitimized others nations’ desire for nuclear technology, and increased the danger to the world. Last year, in an important demonstration of the power of multilateralism, this group convinced Iran to bring its nuclear program back within the control of the United Nations’ International Atomic Energy Authority, and have continued to make progress toward a peaceful solution. An even more multilateral group that includes Japan, China, Russia, and South Korea is handling the issue of North Korea's nuclear potential (Walker). The Bush Administration has demonstrated another significant United Nations. “Multilateralism Key to Global Prosperity, Sustainability, Deputy Secretary-General Tells Symposium, Warning Trade Restrictions Could Erode Confidence, Derail Growth”. Apr. 2018. I commend the Department of Economic and Social Affairs and the Chinese Mission for convening this high-level symposium.Multilateralism is the DNA of the United Nations Organization. The multilateral trading system is the lifeblood of our open, globalized, modern economy. Peace and prosperity depend on our common commitment to multilateralism and the multilateral trading system.Trade is the fundamental building block of the modern economy; a driver for broad-based economic growth and sustainable development. It creates jobs, promotes investment, spreads technological progress and lifts people out of poverty. Pyun Ju. “Globalisation promotes peace”. UC Davis. 2009 In a recent paper (Lee and Pyun 2008), we assess the impact of trade integration on military conflict based on a large panel data set of 290,040 country-pair observations from 1950 to 2000. Results show that an increase in bilateral trade interdependence reduces the probability of inter-state military conflict between the two partners. If bilateral trade volume increases 10 from the world mean value, the probability of military conflict between the two trading partners decreases by about 0.1 from its predicted mean probability, other variables remaining constant. An increase in global trade openness by 10 from the world mean value decreases the probability of the dyad's military conflict by about 2.6 from its predicted mean. Center for Strategic and International Studies.“How will the Belt and Road Initiative advance China’s interests?”. 2019 Chinese President Xi Jinping hosted the leaders of 28 countries and representatives from several other countries at the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing on May 14-15, 2017. Announced in 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative (also known as One Belt, One Road or OBOR) aims to strengthen China’s connectivity with the world. It combines new and old projects, covers an expansive geographic scope, and includes efforts to strengthen hard infrastructure, soft infrastructure, and cultural ties. At present, the plan extends to 65 countries with a combined Gross Domestic Product of $23 trillion and includes some 4.4 billion people. Bermingham Finbarr. “China’s Belt and Road Initiative will add US$117 billion to global trade this year, a new study shows”. Jan 2019. Merchandise trade between China and the countries targeted by its “Belt and Road Initiative” is predicted to grow by US$117 billion this year, according to new analysis. For China, this will mean US$56 billion in additional exports, while it will import an extra US$61 billion worth of goods from the 80 countries named in the Chinese government’s official manifesto, research from trade credit insurer Euler Hermes shows. The report estimates that this will add 0.3 per cent to global trade and 0.1 per cent to global growth, at a time when fears are mounting about a slowdown across the world economy, but most notably in China. Brenner Harvey Oxford University. "Commentary: Economic growth is the basis of mortality rate decline in the 20th century— experience of the United States 1901–2000”. 2005 Despite considerable evidence of the fundamental importance of economic growth to the increased health and life expectancy of industrialized country populations, is it likely that a positive relationship exists between GDP growth rates and mortality growth rates? When answering this question, it is important to bear in mind that the association reported by Tapia Granados refers to an extremely short-term relation—i.e. without lag and without any trends—that connotes a nearly simultaneous occurrence of higher GDP growth rates and higher mortality rates increasing during the same year, but without reference to long-term or even medium-term relations. The epidemiologist would have considerable difficulty interpreting such a relationship, because essential to the inference of causal relations is the time precedence criterion—i.e. the occurrence of the independent variable prior to that of the dependent variable. Since the long-term relationship (i.e. over at least 10 years) between GDP per capita and declining mortality rates has been observed several times,21–23,31 and is essential to the long-term trends in mortality reduction, it is clear that economic growth is inversely related to mortality. Under these conditions, is it likely that the zero-lag relation between GDP and mortality rates is actually positive? It is possible that these two observations are consistent with each other and this hypothesis has been published by the present author.21,23,31 The underlying concept is that while medium- to long-term economic growth is the central source of improvement in life expectancy, the earliest phase of that growth—i.e. within the first year—can actually require increased adaptation Herrero Alicia. “China cannot finance the Belt and Road alone”.Chief Economist for the Asia Pacific at NATIXIS. 2017 Such a-priori was probably well taken when China was flooded with capital inflows and reserves had nearly reached USD 4 trillion and needed to be diversified. In the same vein, Chinese banks were then improving their asset quality if, anything, because the economy was booming and bank credit was growing at double digits. The situation today is very different. China’s economy has slowed down and banks’ balance sheets are saddled with doubtful loans, which keep on being refinanced and do not leave much room for the massive lending needed to finance the Belt and Road initiative. This is particularly important as Chinese banks have been the largest lenders so far (China Development Bank in particular with estimated figures hovering around USD 100 billion while Bank of China has already announced its commitment to lend USD 20 billion). Multilateral organizations geared towards this objective certainly do not have such a financial muscle. Even the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), born for this purpose, has so far only invested USD 1.7 billion on Belt and Road projects. As if this were not enough, China has lost nearly USD 1 trillion in foreign reserves due massive capital outflows. Although USD 3 trillion of reserves could still look ample, the Chinese authorities seem to have set that level as a floor under which reserves should not fall so that confidence is restored (Chart 3). This obviously reduces the leeway for Belt and Road projects to be financed by China, at least in hard currency. Against this background, we review different financing option for Xi’s Grand Plan and their implications. The first, and least likely, is for China to continue such huge projects unilaterally. This is particularly difficult if hard-currency financing is needed, for the reasons mentioned above. China could still opt for lending in RMB, at least partially, with the side-benefit of pushing RMB internationalization. However, even this is becoming more difficult. First, the use of the RMB as an international currency has been decreasing as a consequence of the stock market correction and currency devaluation in 2015 but still some of the Belt and Road projects could be financed in RMB in as far as the borrowing of a certain host country would be fully devoted to pay Chinese construction or energy companies (Chart 4). This quasi-barter system can solve the hard-currency constraint but poses its own risks to the overly stretched balance sheets of Chinese banks. In fact, their doubtful loans have done nothing but increase during the last few years, which is eating up the banks’ room to lend further (Chart 5). A second option is for China to intermediate overseas financial resources for the Belt and Road projects. The most obvious way to do this, given the limited development of bond markets in Belt and Road countries as well as the still limited size of China’s own offshore bond market is to borrow from international banks. Cross border bank lending has been a huge pool of financial resources, especially in the run up to the global financial crisis. Since then they have moderated but the stock of cross border lending still hovers above 15 USD, out of which, nearly half is lent by European banks. Out of the USD 15 trillion, about 20 is already being directed to Belt and Road economies, with European banks being again the largest players (Chart 7). Still, in order to finance the USD 5 trillion targeted in Xi’s grand plan for the next five years, you would need to see growth rates of around 50 in cross-border lending. While such a surge in cross-border lending is not unheard of (in fact, it happened in the years prior to the global financial crises), the real bottleneck would be the rapid increase in China’s external debt, which would go from the currently very comfortable level (12 of GDP) all the way to more than 50 if China were taken on the debt, or something in between if co-financed by Belt and Road countries. Meyer, Marshall W. UPENN. April, 2019. “China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Why the Price Is Too High” https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-why-the-price-is-too-high/. The earliest warning signals of how badly planned BRI projects could backfire came from the case of Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port. In December 2017, Sri Lanka handed over the port to China on a 99-year lease after it couldn’t service debts of more than $8 billion it owed Chinese firms involved in its construction. Beneficiary countries have to sign on construction companies that Beijing suggests — “a typical demand of China for its projects around the world, rather than allowing an open bidding process,” said a New York Timesreport. The handover of Hambantota port erased about $1 billion of Sri Lanka’s debt to Chinese firms, but it alerted other countries to how BRI projects could imperil their finances and possibly their sovereignty as well. In much the same way, Djibouti in East Africa is set to lose control of a container terminal built as part of BRI projects, after it was saddled with debt equivalent to 88 of its GDP of $1.72 billion. Venezuela was another wakeup call. China had struck a series of oil-for-loans agreements with Venezuela in 2007, but “a political crisis in that country … is threatening China’s payout and drawing Beijing into a proxy standoff as it supports a Venezuelan leader the U.S. is intent on toppling (Nicolas Maduro, Venezuela’s president),” according to a Wall Street Journal report. Venezuela owes Beijing around $20 billion, according to estimates by China’s Commerce Ministry, the report added. Along with the debt piling up at BRI beneficiary countries, China, too, is facing constraints in investing in the projects. China’s plan was to use at least $400 billion in funding from government-run banks, but the program has ballooned beyond infrastructure construction. “BRI lending by major Chinesebanks has dropped by 89 since 2015, and lending by commercial banks — who are dealing with their own financial issues domestically — has ceased almost entirely,” according to a report last August by The Jamestown Foundation. “Policy banks have also scaled back, despite their status as arms of government policy.” Economic Times. March 18 2019. “China seeking global partners to fund its BRI projects” https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/business/china-seeking-global-partners-to-f und-its-bri-projects/articleshow/68464869.cms It is also being held at a time when the Chinese economy is showing signs of slowdown, resulting in the government tightening its expenditure, specially investment finance. Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, who had lowered the GDP target to 6 per cent from 6.5 per cent for this year, had said that the government at all levels would have to make bold and courageous sacrifices, "turning the blade inward" and "cutting our own wrists". ?China last year grew at 6.6 per cent. ?"?The China Investment Corporation (CIC), the country's USD 940 billion sovereign wealth investment fund, is seeking global partners to jointly establish a special cross-border investment instrument which will further finance the Belt and Road projects,"?said Tu Guangshao, vice-chairman and president of the CIC. "We call it the Belt and Road cooperation fund," Tu told the state-run China Daily. Other arrangements, including the scale of fund, specific investment methods and investment currency, are all "too early to be determined", he said. Tu said that a cooperation fund usually selects projects and makes investment decisions based on the common interests of all shareholders. "A legal framework and clear governance structure will be set at the initial stage. This method could also avoid investment destination countries imposing restrictions on any single fund member," he added. Minyuan Zhao, 4/30/19, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Why the Price Is Too High”, Wharton University of Pennsylvania, https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-why-the-price-is-too-high/ On their own, many of the BRI projects would not produce sufficient returns on investment, and that explains why private investors are not attracted to them, said Wharton management professor Minyuan Zhao. “China is hoping that by coordinating all these projects – by connecting all the railways, connecting the waterways with the railways — every single project will generate more return in the aggregate.” In that context, China’s state sponsorship of BRI makes sense, she added. “With state sponsorship, you create enough externality to make every single investment, which would otherwise be un-investible, a good project.” She noted that many of the projects are in some of the “most challenging geographic areas and institutional environments,” and the key is to generate “enough momentum for a coordinated effort.” Ambrose Evans- Pritchard , 4-27- 2019 , "China cannot afford the Silk Road, and that is a blessing," Sydney Morning Herald , https://www.smh.com.au/business/markets/china-cannot-afford-the-silk-road-and-that-is-a-blessing-20190427-p51hqq.html The global economic system has changed radically since then. China's reserves have fallen to $US3 trillion. The authorities had to tighten capital controls to stem a dangerous leakage of funds - arguably capital flight - during the currency scare in late 2015 when the country was losing $US100 billion a month. China's current account surplus has essentially vanished. The International Monetary Fund thinks it will be 0.5 per cent of GDP this year. It will then go progressively negative through the early 2020s. Gabriel Felbermayr, head of Germany's Kiel Institute for the World Economy, says the overseas lending boom is already fading. "The source from which China is financing its international investments is drying up," he said. Total Belt and Road investments since 2013 amount to around $US600 billion. They peaked in 2017 and fell 40 per cent last year. Horia Curtin, 2017, A PIVOT TO EUROPE: CHINA’S BELT-AND-ROAD BALANCING ACT, European Institute of Romania, http://ier.gov.ro/wp-content/uploads/publicatii/Final_Policy-Brief-5_Horia-Ciurtin-A-Pivot-to-Europe_web.pdf?,? Horia Ciurtin is a legal adviser in the field of international investment law and international arbitration; Managing Editor of the EFILA Blog which appears under the auspices of the European Federation for Investment Law and Arbitration (Brussels). He is also an Expert for New Strategy Center (Bucharest), a prominent Romanian think-tank in the field of strategy and international relations. In 2017, he co-founded DAVA | Strategic Analysis, a think-tank providing indepth strategic, cultural and geo-economic analyses. For attaining these objectives (and the stated grand finale of reaching Europe), China not only integrated other ancillary projects (such as the proposed China-Pakistan and Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridors), but also devised several financing instruments in order to fund all the needed infrastructure. Thus, beside its already existing domestic banks and investment funds, Beijing poured an initial $100 billion in three different institutions that the Chinese state directly controls: the Silk Road Fund, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the BRICS’ New Development Bank.34 This is another type of – financial – move away from the American-dominated international system, trying to avoid the constraints of World Bank, IMF or other multilateral development instruments.35 However impressive the sums might appear at a first glance, they fall short of the needed amount. The first stages of developing the Belt-and-Road require no less than $3 trillion (according to some accounts, even more). And this is a task that China – despite its constant growth and increasing economic power – cannot accomplish alone.36 It really needs co-interested parties. And that is where the European Union (with its unbearable economic force) comes into the spotlight: it is not supposed to be just a “passive” destination at the end of the road, but also a co-owner in this joint venture. Without European cash – from public and private sources – it is highly improbable that other actors could feasibly join China in funding the initiative. Russia, Iran, Turkey or Kazakhstan (or even Japan and India37) are in an entirely different economic league than what is needed for such a massive project. For a path to Europe to emerge, Europe itself is needed along the way. In reality, EU-based institutions already are the largest lenders in the region (see Figure 3 below). And Europe is highly interested in developing infrastructure and connectivity with its marginal areas.
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NEG What are the rules K I affirm "Resolved: put the public back in public forum." Contention 1 is the problem I DISOBEY YOUR RULES – I CANNOT NEGOTIATE, AS AUTHORITY ON ANY LEVEL IS PEACE THAT JUSTIFIES WAR ANARCHIST LIBRARY 09 (5-10-2009, "Endless War: Anarchist antimilitarism and the "war on terrorism"", doa 4-24-2020, https://web.archive.org/web/20190808111254/https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/anonymous-endless-war-anarchist-antimilitarism-and-the-war-on-terrorism) NY The illusion that capitalism and the democratic state could offer abundance and freedom for all AND fight for liberation from exploitation and domination, from every form of rule. REJECT THEIR BUREAUCRATIC THEORY WHICH HAS NO PLACE FOR DEBATE ITSELF MARINUS OSSEWAARDE 10 of the University of Twente (2010, "The Tragic Turn in the Re-Imagination of Publics", doa 4-24-2020, https://www2.grenfell.mun.ca/animus/Articles/Volume2014/Vol_14_Complete.pdf) NY For Nietzsche, the Heraclitean vision sees the truth about reality while tragedy subsequently transforms AND of manufactured dream-worlds, to fill an emptiness that never decreases. THE POWER IS EVERYWHERE, WE MUST REFUSE TO DOMINATE BY UNMASKING THE MASTERS WITHIN US WILLIAM PAWLETT 14 of the International Journal of Baudrillard Studies (5-2014, "Society at War with Itself", doa 4-24-2020, https://baudrillardstudies.ubishops.ca/society-at-war-with-itself/) NY It all depends on the ground we choose to fight on … most often … AND just as violently, in the refusal to dominate' (2009a: 47). TO ESCAPE THE GAME, I TAKE MY CRITICISM OUTSIDE THE RULES THAT DIRECT CHALLENGES INWARD MAXWELL SCHNURER 03 of CEDA (2003, "Gaming as Control: Will to Power, The Prison of Debate and a Game Called Potlatch", doa 4-24-2020, https://debate.uvm.edu/CADForumGaming2003.pdf) NY Snider's new gaming advocacy is a laundry list of positive changes in the policy debate AND might elicit something of what I desire . . . from within debate. Contention B is the method WHAT'S THE ROLE OF THE BALLOT? RULES, SHMULES JOHN SCOGGIN 15 of Premier Debate (9-10-2015, "In Defense of Inclusion", doa 4-23-2020, https://www.premierdebate.com/theory/in-defense-of-inclusion-by-john-scoggin-and-bob-overing/) NY III. Changing the Rules In Round. One thought is that rejecting truth- AND need to be written in a rulebook to have a lot of force. YOUR RULES CAN'T CHANGE THEMSELVES, ONLY A GIFT OF SYMBOLS THAT TAKES YOU HOSTAGE WILL REFLECT THE ABSURDITY OF THE SYSTEM AND CANNOT BE ANSWERED OR NEGOTIATED JEAN BAUDRILLARD 93 (1993, "Symbolic Exchange and Death", doa 4-24-2020, file:///C:/Users/ndy15/Desktop/PLASTIC20TOC/(Theory20culture20and20society_20Social20Theory)20Jean20Baudrillard20-20Symbolic20Exchange20and20Death-Sage20Publications20(1993).pdf) NY That is why the only acts that accompany capital's real domination are situated in the AND forbidden it, the only violence it cannot exert: its own death. GIVING ME 30 SPEAKS IS DOUBLING SINCE I'M MAVING, AND AN UNREALISTIC REFLECTION OF THE POINT SYSTEM THEIR MODEL RESTS ON. THEORY ABOUT DEBATE STRUCTURE AS A PRECONDITION TO ENGAGEMENT HAS REGRESSED TO DEBATE ABOUT NOTHING, AND THUS: ~WHAT ARE THE RULES? WHAT ARE THE RUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUULES?~ THIS IS MY GIFT, AND YOU ARE HOSTAGE TO IT. I DEMAND A WIN AND 30, ACCEPT IF YOU WILL ADLAI STEVENSON 52 (1952, "A quote by Adlai E. Stevenson II", doa 4-24-2020, https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/287462-i-offer-my-opponents-a-bargain-if-they-will-stop) NY I offer my opponents a bargain: if they will stop telling lies about us, I will stop telling the truth about them. MY METHOD EXPOSES YOUR CONTRADICTORY RULES MARGARET RICHARDSON 06 OF WESTERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY (2006, "Sociology of Humor and a Critical Dramaturgy", doa 4-24-2020, https://sci-hub.tw/10.1525/si.2006.29.3.331) NY If "meaning is the marrow of institutions" (Zijderveld 1983:17), AND their social power. The humor of Jerry Seinfeld often does just this. Contention 4 is the new status quo I HAVE LEFT THE SERIOUS MODE, AND NOW CONTRADICTION ABOUNDS MAJKEN SORENSEN 08 OF COVENTRY UNIVERSITY (2-24-2008, "Humor as a Serious Strategy of Nonviolent Resistance to Oppression", doa 4-24-2020, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1468-0130.2008.00488.x) NY The case of Otpor (which means "resistance" in Serbian) was selected AND that this can also be true for changes at the societal level.24 THIS IS MY GAME AND IT'S INTOLERABLE TO DICTATORSHIP MAJKEN SORENSON 08 OF COVENTRY UNIVERSITY (2-24-2008, "Humor as a Serious Strategy of Nonviolent Resistance to Oppression", doa 4-24-2020, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1468-0130.2008.00488.x) NY The case of Otpor is unusual precisely because humor was used to such a large AND a crucial role in setting a different agenda and challenging fear and apathy.
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Contention 1 is Cyber Norms There are no international cyber norms now as David Fidler writes in 2018 David P. Fidler, 3-15-2018, “The UN Secretary-General's Call for Regulating Cyberwar Raises More Questions Than Answers.” Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/blog/un-secretary-generals-call-regulating-cyberwar-raises-more-questions-answers. Date Accessed 10-29-2018 // SM Third, If Guterres meant that cyberwar involves activities not amounting to armed conflict, such as cyber interference in elections, he was wrong to assert that it is unclear how international humanitarian law applies. It does not apply. However, UN bodies, including the Counter-Terrorism Committee, apply other rules critical to the UN’s mission, such as the principles of sovereignty and nonintervention and human rights law, to cyber activities outside armed conflict. How these rules apply in cyberspace at the moment has been extensively discussed across the UN and elsewhere for many years, often with controversy overshadowing consensus. Unfortunately, US OCOs destroy our ability to create cyber norms due to our capability creating a power imbalance that makes us unwilling to cooperate with weaker. Kostyuk 14 of the EastWest Institute indicates: Nadiya Kostyuk, 3-16-2014, “The Digital Prisoner’s Dilemma: Challenges and Opportunities for Cooperation”, EastWest Institute, http://cybersummit.info/sites/cybersummit.info/files/The20Digital20Prisoner's20Dilemma-Challenges20and20Opportunities20for20Cooperation_Nadiya20Kostyuk20.pdf, Date Accessed 10-28-2019 // SM Despite being the best option, cooperation is very unlikely between powerful and less-powerful nations. One possible explanation for why a powerful nation is not likely to cooperate with a less-powerful nation is that the former’s political leaders might appear weak to its citizens and on the international stage 15. Geico emphasizes the point that nation-states decide who will benefit more from this cooperation before they choose whether or not to cooperate 16. Thus, a powerful country will usually lack incentive to cooperate with a less-powerful country as the latter has little to offer for this cooperation. For instance, in the case of the Estonian cyber attacks, the Russian Federation was not interested in cooperating because it had nothing to do with its interests 17. Irina Lagunina, a senior broadcaster at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, an international news agency funded by the United States, considers visokomeriie (arrogance) as the main reason for Russia’s refusal to help Estonia investigate the 2007 cyber attacks 18, despite the fact that the two countries have a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty 19. Not only does such a refusal make a proper investigation of the attacks impossible, while creating a sense that Russia might be behind the attacks 20, but it also violates international law. On the other hand, despite all circumstantial evidence Estonia did not officially accuse Russia (rather it shared its suspicion with the U.S.) 21 and chose to seek assistance from NATO in developing stronger cybersecurity protection measures 22. Less-powerful nations will most likely follow Estonia’s example in cooperating with friendly and trustworthy powerful unions that have far more resources to develop cyber capabilities, implement cyber protective measures, and prevent future attacks in the online environment. The idea of less-powerful nations cooperating with each other is quite appealing; however states that still lack cyber capabilities will most likely seek protection from states that have these important resources. On the other hand, considering how fast cyber offensive and defensive capabilities are being developed, one can expect that less-powerful nations will start cooperating with each other quite soon as keeping up with the tech race will likely be too costly countries with limited financial resources. The implication is that cyber norms won’t get established without cooperation as Kramer 13 of the Atlantic Council writes that Franklin Kramer and Melanie Teplinsky, December 2013, “Cybersecurity and Tailored Deterrence”, Atlantic Council, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Cybersecurity_and_Tailored_Deterrence.pdf, Date Accessed 10-28-2019 // SM Cyber standards also have a potentially important role to play in the proposed hybrid model of cybersecurity. Cyber standards could be of significant value if clearly delineated and made mandatory in limited sectors where the public interest is very substantial.31 Standards should focus not only on protection, but also on resilience, since it cannot be assumed that networks will not be penetrated. Resilience, by denying the benefits of an attack, would have deterrent impact, as would stronger defenses in the arenas where an adversary could potentially create the most harm to the nation. In the cyber arena, most firms’ evaluation of risks generally coincides with the national risk. However, in the case of key critical infrastructures — particularly electricity and finance — that certainly is not the case. For example, the harm from the loss of electric power, especially for an extended time, goes far beyond one firm’s loss of revenue. Duke Energy, PGandE Corporation, and other major electric power firms are in a different category than, by comparison, Walmart or Ford Motor Company or Pizza Hut. This is equally true for major banks and financial institutions. Accordingly, mandatory standards could be limited to a very few key critical infrastructures — as suggested, a good starting point would be electric power and finance — and only the most significant entities in those fields. It probably makes sense to start initially only with the largest companies in each field, say no more than the top 50 and perhaps fewer. Those firms would have the capacity to implement mandatory standards and their experience could provide a model for others. It would further make sense, and indeed only be fair, to expect those firms to receive compensation for the cost of implementing the standards since the requirements would be mandatory for the national interest, not for market reasons. An important question regarding mandatory standards is whether standards can be clearly delineated.32 In fact, there are a series of fundamental actions that would greatly improve cybersecurity. On the protection side, it would be entirely possible to create a standard that required patching within fortyeight hours, whitelisting, use of least privilege, and continuous monitoring. These are equivalent to the so-called “Australian top 4,” which the Australian government has publicly stated could have mitigated at least 85 percent of the targeted cyber intrusions to which its Defence Signals Directorate responded in 2010.33 Other well-known and effective measures include programming in so-called “safe languages,” using operational systems with limited capabilities, encryption of key data streams, and authentication with cryptography. Contention 2 is the Dangerous Playground Raston of NPR writes in September that escalation has become inevitable – US OCO’s: Dina Temple-Raston, 9-26-2019, "How The U.S. Hacked ISIS," NPR.org, https://www.npr.org/2019/09/26/763545811/how-the-u-s-hacked-isis, Date Accessed 10-28-2019 // WS But there is a dark side to this new arsenal. The U.S. isn't the only country that has turned to cyber. Consider the case of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi, who was murdered in a Saudi embassy late last year; cybertools are thought to have been part of that case too. "A lot of the preparation for that and the lead-up to it had to do with Saudi Arabia using offensive weapons," said Ron Deibert, the director of the Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto's Munk School of Global Affairs. Deibert's researchers found offensive cybertools tracking the journalist and his inner circle. "When we talk about offensive cyber operations, I think it's important to understand that it doesn't always come in one flavor," Deibert said, adding that the Khashoggi case is far from the exception. In Mexico alone, Citizen Lab found 27 cases of this kind of offensive cybertool targeting political rivals, reporters and civil rights lawyers. Six years ago, it rather famously discovered that China had been hacking into the Dalai Lama's computer networks. Deibert is worried about escalation. "You really created conditions for an escalation of an arms race in cyberspace that really could come back to haunt the United States in the long run," Deibert said. "There's a demonstration effect. The equipment, the software, the methods, the capabilities proliferate." Deibert says U.S. reluctance to use offensive cyber has vanished. "Now ... what we're talking about is something that is more active," he said. Offensive cyberattacks directly cause these escalations in three ways: First is Provoking Responses: US OCOs create an arms race in which nations proliferate their cyber capabilities to keep up with the US. Brandon Veleriano indicated in 2019 that: Brandon Valeriano, 1-15-2019, "The Myth of the Cyber Offense: The Case for Restraint," Cato Institute, https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/myth-cyber-offense-case-restraint, Date Accessed 10-28-2019 // WS We demonstrate that, while cyber operations to date have not been escalatory or particularly effective in achieving decisive outcomes, recent policy changes and strategy pronouncements by the Trump administration increase the risk of escalation while doing nothing to make cyber operations more effective. These changes revolve around a dangerous myth: offense is an effective and easy way to stop rival states from hacking America. New policies for authorizing preemptive offensive cyber strategies risk crossing a threshold and changing the rules of the game. Cyberspace to date has been a domain of political warfare and coercive diplomacy. An offensively postured cyber policy is dangerous, counterproductive, and undermines norms in cyberspace. Many have promoted the idea of a coming “Cyber Pearl Harbor,” but instead the domain is littered with covert operations meant to manage escalation and deter future attacks. Cyber strategy and policy must start from an accurate understanding of the domain, not imagined realities. New policy options proposed by Cyber Command and the Trump administration risks exacerbating fear in other countries and creating a self-reinforcing spiral of tit-for-tat escalations, that risk war even though each actor feels he is acting defensively—or, as it is called in the scholarly literature, a security dilemma.52 As shown above, most cyber operations to date have not resulted in escalation. The cyber domain has been a world of spies collecting valuable information and engaging in limited disruptions that substitute for, as well as complement, more conventional options. Shifting to a policy of preemptive offensive cyber warfare risks provoking fear and overreaction in other states and possibly producing conflict spirals. Even limited-objective cyber offensive action defined as “defending forward” can be misinterpreted and lead to inadvertent escalation.53 As the historian Cathal Nolan puts it, “intrusions into a state’s strategically important networks pose serious risks and are therefore inherently threatening.”54 More worryingly, with a more offensive posture, it will be increasingly difficult for states to differentiate between cyber espionage and more damaging degradation operations.55 What the United States calls defending forward, China and Russia will call preemptive strikes. Worse still, this posture will likely lead great powers to assume all network intrusions, including espionage, are preparing the environment for follow-on offensive strikes. According to cybersecurity scholar Ben Buchanan, “in the aggressor state’s own view, such moves are clearly defensive, merely ensuring that its military will have the strength and flexibility to meet whatever comes its way. Yet potential adversaries are unlikely to share this perspective.”56 The new strategy risks producing a “forever cyber war” prone to inadvertent escalation because it implies all cyber operations should be interpreted as escalatory by adversaries.57 Cyber policy and strategy should favor restraint over offense in protecting the digital commons. In MIT political scientist Barry Posen’s proposed grand strategy, restraint calls for fewer forward-deployed forces and less coordination with partners.83 In a cyber­security context, restraint implies preserving the digital commons for commercial and social interests, thus limiting military action to the greatest extent possible. Restraint can also help shape norms in cyber­space and make escalation taboo.84 To date, restraint has largely been the prevailing norm in this domain. Restraint has prevailed not so much as a prescribed foreign policy strategy, but because more aggressive tactics are ineffective, and states therefore use them sparingly.85 Data on cyber actions from 2000 to 2016 suggest a restrained domain with few aggressive attacks that seek a dramatic impact. Attacks do not beget attacks, nor do they deter them. The policy discourse is inconsistent with these observations. If few operations are effective in manipulating the enemy and fewer still lead to responses in the domain, why would a policy of offensive operations be useful in cyberspace? For a variety of reasons, including the ineffectiveness of cyber operations and the fear of weapons proliferation, a normative system of restraint has gradually emerged in cyberspace. A policy of restraint that maintains control over the weapons of cyber war is therefore appropriate and strategically wise. Loosening the rules of engagement in pursuit of a more offensive posture, as the Trump administration advocates, violates norms and can lead to disastrous consequences for the entire system. This is empirically proven by Stuxnet as Moore 17 of the Journal of Global Security Studies found that: Joshua Rovner and Tyler Moore, Does the Internet Need a Hegemon?, Journal of Global Security Studies, 2(3), 2017, 184–203, https://academic.oup.com/jogss/article/2/3/184/4082200, Date Accessed 10-22-2019 // JM The defense secretary announced the creation of a new “cyber strike force” the following summer, and the military unveiled a new UK Joint Force Cyber Group to consolidate activities across services (Walters 2013; Corera 2015a). More recently, Chancellor George Osborne announced a new investment of £1.9 billion for defense OCO (Savage and Dean 2015). The initial fears of externalities caused by OCO seem to have had little effect on policymakers. There is also no evidence that London reduced cooperation with the United States. In the days after Stuxnet was revealed, British intelligence chief Jonathan Evans warned that “vulnerabilities in the Internet are being exploited by ... states.” Interestingly, he was referring to China and Russia and made no indication that he or any other official opposed the US operation (Financial Times 2012).15 Later, Prime Minister David Cameron and President Obama announced a series of joint war-games specifically designed to test cyberdefenses and infrastructure security (Dean 2015). The same pattern held in India, one of the states most affected by Stuxnet. While Iran was the intended target, thousands of Indian computers were likewise infected. Commentators sounded the alarm about what the attack meant for Indian cybersecurity. Citing a report that more than 80,000 computers were affected, one technology writer concluded that India was “caught in the crossfire” of a “global cyber war” that could lead to “massive collateral damage” (Anwer 2012). Nonetheless, Indian leaders did not express anger with the United States or reservations about continued cooperation with their American counterparts. Like the British, they saw Stuxnet as a useful warning about how future cyberattacks might threaten industrial systems and infrastructure and expressed concern that China in particular might exploit defensive gaps. They seemed resigned to a future in which cyberattacks are inevitable and moved to improve their capacity to both defend against them and to fight back. Indeed, Stuxnet led to a flurry of activity designed to improve security and rationalize the use of OCOs. The military created joint cybersecurity commands, the prime minister’s office created the position of a national cybersecurity coordinator, the government stepped up efforts to recruit young hackers, and the Defense Intelligence Agency and National Technology Research Organization were given lead authority in exploring OCO (Joseph 2012; Bagchi 2012; Times of India 2013; Pandit 2013; Relia 2016). The Chinese response was somewhat different. Like their counterparts in India and the UK, Chinese leaders saw Stuxnet as a wakeup call. Chinese infrastructure was particularly at risk because Chinese technology lagged behind the West (Li 2014). In July 2012, the state council released an update to its decade-old cybersecurity policy that emphasized China’s glaring deficiencies compared to its rivals. It warned that the “broadband information infrastructure development gap with developed countries has widened; the level of government information sharing and business collaboration is not high; (and) the core technology is controlled by others” (Lindsay 2015, 12–13). Uncoordinated cybersecurity policies and weak infrastructure defenses exacerbated vulnerabilities to attacks like Stuxnet, and Chinese leaders were eager to resolve them quickly. Initially, their response was similar to their reaction after the Persian Gulf War in 1991, when Chinese military leaders were awestruck and dismayed at US military technology and convinced they needed to emulate Washington’s military “transformation” with their own modernization effort (Christensen 2001). The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) set up a small group of political leaders in February 2014 under President Xi Jinping, an indication of the importance with which the party viewed the issue. As Xi put it at the time, “there is no national security without internet security, and there is no modernization without informatization” (Li 2014; see also Segal 2014). China also began investing in academic research on cybersecurity to mitigate a series of technological and organizational problems (Li and Xu 2015). These steps are similar to the reaction among US allies and third parties. The possibility of cyberattack, they believe, is a fact to be reckoned with, and investment in better cybersecurity capabilities is the necessary response. However, China went further. Beijing used the episode to emphasize what it calls “internet sovereignty” (Zheng 2015). According to Chinese leaders, responsible states have no choice but to patrol their virtual borders against malicious actors who spread disinformation or attack Chinese facilities via OCO. Modern states jealously guard their physical borders, they argue, so why should the internet be any different? Chinese leaders were quick to emphasize the need for better defenses given that Stuxnet disabled systems at a high security and air-gapped facility. Their responses also came at a time in which US leaders were more aggressively blaming China for cyberespionage against the United States. Cooperative efforts, like the US-China Cyber Working Group, were temporarily suspended (Gady 2016). Consider the reactions of a US ally (Great Britain), an affected third-party (India), and an adversary (China). British commentators sounded the alarm about Stuxnet as soon as the US role was apparent and warned that the worm signaled the start of a dangerous new era in competitive cyberattacks. Corera (2015a) wrote that unleashing Stuxnet was akin to crossing the digital Rubicon, and Lucas (2015) worried that the attack presaged a digital Pearl Harbor. In response, many argued that the best way forward was an open discussion about risks and efforts to create international norms that would constrain wanton cyberattacks. The risks of unintended consequences and collateral damage were perceived as too great to treat OCO as just another weapon. Writing in the Financial Times, Glenny (2012) predicted “we will rue Stuxnet’s cavalier deployment.” Writing in the Guardian, Chatterjee (2012) called for a “computer virus nonproliferation treaty” in order to prevent instances like Stuxnet. Therefore, the establishment of international norms became necessary. British leaders, however, were more sanguine. While they increased investment in cyberdefenses, they also nations increased investment in OCO. because Iran’s attitude was that offensive cyberattacks were inevitable and they needed to prepare accordingly. Shortly after Stuxnet, the House of Commons Intelligence and Security Committee issued a report calling for better defenses and new offensive capabilities (Whitehead 2012). Second is Accidental War, Valeriano 19 of the Cato Institute writes that Valeriano, Brandon (Donald Bren Chair of Armed Politics at Marine Corps University) and Jensen, Benjamin (associate professor at the Marine Corps University and a scholar-in-residence at American University's School of International Service). “The Myth of the Cyber Offense: The Case for Restraint.” Cato Institute, 15 January 2019, https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/myth-cyber-offense-case-restraint. More worryingly, with a more offensive posture, it is will be increasingly difficult for states to differentiate between cyber espionage and more damaging degradation operations.55 For example, What the United States calls defending forward, China and Russia will call preemptive strikes. Worse still, Thishis posture will likely lead great powers to assume all network intrusions, including espionage, are preparing the environment for follow-on offensive strikes. According to cybersecurity scholar Ben Buchanan, “in the aggressor state’s own view, such moves are clearly defensive, merely ensuring that its military will have the strength and flexibility to meet whatever comes its way. Yet potential adversaries are unlikely to share this perspective.”56 The new strategy risks producing a “forever cyber war” prone to inadvertent escalation because it implies all cyber operations should be interpreted as escalatory by adversaries.57 Third is CopyCats, Offensive cyber operations have given US adversaries more tools as Hitchens 19 of the Center for Defense Information explains: Theresa Hitchens, Can NSA Stop China Copying Its Cyber Weapons?, 5-8-2019, Breaking Defense, https://breakingdefense.com/2019/05/this-code-wont-self-destruct-can-nsa-stop-china-copying-its-cyber-weapons/ Adversaries have been copying and stealing each others’ weapons ever since Ape A threw a rock at Ape B and Ape B got the bright idea to throw it back. But recent revelations from Symantec and The New York Times suggest this problem is much bigger with cyber weapons. Why? In order to attack an enemy’s computer, they have to copy their code onto it. It’s like bombing an enemy with munitions that scatter their own blueprints around the blast site. US hacking tools have gone astray before, most notoriously when a mysterious group called Shadow Brokers repeatedly released National Security Agency code for hackers around the globe to use in attacks like WannaCry. But cybersecurity analysts at Symantec have found evidence that hackers working for China’s Ministry of State Security were using NSA-built cyber weapons. “at least a year prior to the Shadow Brokers leak.” (To avoid offending nation-states, the Symantec report only IDs the Chinese as “Buckeye” and NSA as “Equation Group”). Symantec’s suggested explanation: “one possibility is that Buckeye may have engineered its own version of the tools from artifacts found in captured network traffic, possibly from observing an Equation Group attack.” “This is a significant revelation,” one retired naval officer told us. “With Shadow Brokers, the assumption was that it was a group with significant insider knowledge …. who had somehow pilfered the software and released it. This report suggests to me that 1) the issue of loss of control of sensitive malware has gone on longer than understood and 2) if Symantec’s correct that China likely captured the software while it was been used by NSA, then using cyber to collect intelligence is far riskier than generally acknowledged. “The new element in the story is that an organization China has reverse-engineered a deployed US cyber tool and reused it; previous cases involved the theft or loss of a tool,” agreed Bryan Clark of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. “This would be similar to the Chinese finding a Tomahawk missile that had failed to detonate and using it to build their own.” The difference, Clark continued, is that physical bombs and missiles automatically destroy themselves in the course of an attack, unless they’re duds. Cyber weapons don’t. During war games, the cyber teams often assume that a weapon will only be used once, for precisely this reason. “The solution is to make cyber weapons tamper resistant,” he said, “which means their code cannot be determined without proper encryption, or the code rewrites itself after use, ‘dudding’ the weapon.” But even self-destructing code doesn’t guarantee a target of our cyber weapons can’t copy them, Clark warned: “They will still run the risk of being detected and characterized by a defensive system before the tamper resistant features activate.” That makes copycat cyber weapons extremely hard to stop. Even if the code is encrypted, even if it erases itself after its attack, it has to be executed on the target’s computer in order to affect it. That means the information of which the weapon is made has to pass at some point through the enemy system. Shane 19 of the New York Times finds: Nicole Perlroth, David E. Sanger and Scott Shane, 5-6-2019, "How Chinese Spies Got the N.S.A.’s Hacking Tools, and Used Them for Attacks," https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/06/us/politics/china-hacking-cyber.html?fbclid=IwAR02u6uk2OD4QJs1YVpxGz8tSJmVkkHtWU0j5W2uwg9WfC1I_HddbEGa9PA Chinese intelligence agents acquired National Security Agency hacking tools and repurposed them in 2016 to attack American allies and private companies in Europe and Asia, a leading cybersecurity firm has discovered. The episode is the latest evidence that the United States has lost control of key parts of its cybersecurity arsenal. Based on the timing of the attacks and clues in the computer code, researchers with the firm Symantec believe the Chinese did not steal the code but captured it from an N.S.A. attack on their own computers — like a gunslinger who grabs an enemy’s rifle and starts blasting away. The Chinese action shows how proliferating cyberconflict is creating a digital wild West with few rules or certainties, and how difficult it is for the United States to keep track of the malware it uses to break into foreign networks and attack adversaries’ infrastructure. The losses have touched off a debate within the intelligence community over whether the United States should continue to develop some of the world’s most high-tech, stealthy cyberweapons if it is unable to keep them under lock and key. Some of the same N.S.A. hacking tools acquired by the Chinese were later dumped on the internet by a still-unidentified group that calls itself the Shadow Brokers and used by Russia and North Korea in devastating global attacks, although there appears to be no connection between China’s acquisition of the American cyberweapons and the Shadow Brokers’ later revelations. Unfortunately, Freedberg 19 of Breaking Defense finds that Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., 5-8-2019, "Can NSA Stop China Copying Its Cyber Weapons?," Breaking Defense, https://breakingdefense.com/2019/05/this-code-wont-self-destruct-can-nsa-stop-china-copying-its-cyber-weapons/ “This is a significant revelation,” one retired naval officer told us. “With Shadow Brokers, the assumption was that it was a group with significant insider knowledge …. who had somehow pilfered the software and released it. This report suggests to me that 1) the issue of loss of control of sensitive malware has gone on longer than understood and 2) if Symantec’s correct that China likely captured the software while it was been used by NSA, then using cyber to collect intelligence is far riskier than generally acknowledged. “The new element in the story is that an organization has reverse-engineered a deployed US cyber tool and reused it; previous cases involved the theft or loss of a tool,” agreed Bryan Clark of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. “This would be similar to the Chinese finding a Tomahawk missile that had failed to detonate and using it to build their own.” The difference, Clark continued, is that physical bombs and missiles automatically destroy themselves in the course of an attack, unless they’re duds. Cyber weapons don’t.During war games, the cyber teams often assume that a weapon will only be used once, for precisely this reason. “The solution is to make cyber weapons tamper resistant,” he said, “which means their code cannot be determined without proper encryption, or the code rewrites itself after use, ‘dudding’ the weapon.” But even self-destructing code doesn’t guarantee a target of our cyber weapons can’t copy them, Clark warned: as they will still run the risk of being detected and characterized by a defensive system before the tamper resistant features activate.” For these 3 reasons, The Council of Foreign Affairs 18 finds The Council of Foreign Affairs, February 2018, "The Cost of Malicious Cyber Activity to the US Economy," https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/The-Cost-of-Malicious-Cyber-Activity-to-the-U.S.-Economy.pdf A PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC 2014) report—based on a survey of more than 9,700 C-level executives, vice presidents, other administrators, and directors of IT and security practices, with 35 percent of the surveyed firms based in North America—states that malicious cyber activities by nation-states are the fastest-growing category of malicious cybersecurity incidents. Actors who are conducting malicious cyber activity on behalf of nation-states are among the most technically skilled, and security breaches attributable to nation-states often go unnoticed by firms. Although nation-states have historically sought to steal IP, sensitive financial plans, and strategic information, nation-states are often motivated by retaliation goals, and thus may engage in data and equipment destruction and business disruption (FBI 2014). The most recent publicly confirmed attack by a nation-state was a destructive WannaCry malware attack initiated by North Korea that is estimated to have cost the world economy 3 million U.S. Cybersecurity experts like to say that in an act of war or retaliation, the first moves will be made in cyberspace. A cyber adversary can utilize numerous attack vectors simultaneously. The backdoors that were previously established may be used to concurrently attack the compromised firms for the purpose of simultaneous business destruction. Ultimately, any organization is fair game for cyber threat actors, though at different times a different set of firms may face higher risks. For example, corporate competitors typically target firms in their industry. So-called hacktivists, motivated by ideological considerations, may pile on to attack a different set of organizations at different times, typically because these organizations have somehow offended the hacktivists. We have conducted interviews with a number of cybersecurity experts and, anecdotally news organizations are among hacktivists’ frequent victims. When a nation-state faces sanctions targeting a certain industry, the nation state may use cyber-enabled means to target firms in that same industry in the country or countries that imposed the sanctions. That said, every firm is a potential target, independent of its age, size, sector, location, or employee composition. Valeriano 19 of the Cato Institute confirms: Brandon Valeriano, 1-15-2019, "The Myth of the Cyber Offense: The Case for Restraint," Cato Institute, https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/myth-cyber-offense-case-restraint (AA) It is thus not surprising that given the objectives of most cyber operations, to date rival states have tended to respond proportionally. Returning to the data, between 2000 and 2016, 89 operations (32.72 percent)33 percent saw a retaliatory cyber response within one year. Of those, 54 (60.7 percent) were at a low-level response severity (e.g., website defacements, limited denial of service attacks, etc.). Table 1 in the appendix compares the severity scores for cyber operations between rival states between 2000 and 2016.37 When rival states do retaliate, the responses tend to be proportional: that is, they tend to match the severity of the initial attack.38 The impact is Economic Crises Kaffeneberger 19 of the Carnegie Endowment writes that in the event of cyber escalation, adversaries would resort to attacks on the financial sector. Central banks are critical as Ewing 19 of The New York Times explains that Jeanna Smialek, Jack Ewing and Ben Dooley, 7-9-2019, "Global Recession Risks Are Up, and Central Banks Aren’t Ready," No Publication, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/09/business/economy/recession-world-economy-federal-reserve.html Whether the world’s central banks are prepared to combat another slump is becoming less of a hypothetical question as the global economy shows signs of strain. The chances that the United States will enter a recession by next year have grown as manufacturing weakens and trade uncertainty drags on. In Germany, the unemployment rate has ticked higher, and industrial production is slowing. In Japan, weak factory production and waning exports heighten vulnerability. A recession is far from inevitable — particularly one as deep and painful as the last. But the capacity for the type of decisive response that prevented an even worse outcome in 2008 has been hindered. Back then, central banks cut rates, bought buy up bonds, extended government backing to financial products, lendt money to banks, in some cases coordinated with government authorities to make sure their rescue packages didn’t work at cross-purposes. It was an unprecedented period of experimentation, one that saved economies careening toward collapse. Schuermann 18 of Harvard Business Review explains: Paul Meetil Schuermann, 9-14-2018, "How a Cyber Attack Could Cause the Next Financial Crisis," Harvard Business Review, https://hbr.org/2018/09/how-a-cyber-attack-could-cause-the-next-financial-crisis Ever since the forced bankruptcy of the investment bank Lehman Brothers triggered the financial crisis 10 years ago, regulators, risk managers, and central bankers around the globe have focused on shoring up banks’ ability to withstand financial shocks. But the next crisis might not come from a financial shock at all. The more likely culprit: a cyber attack that causes disruptions to financial services capabilities, especially payments systems, around the world. Criminals have always sought ways to infiltrate financial technology systems. Now, the financial system faces the added risk of becoming collateral damage in a wider attack on critical national infrastructure. Such an attack could shake confidence in the global financial services system, causing banks, businesses and consumers to be stymied, confused or panicked, which in turn could have a major negative impact on economic activity. Cybercrime alone costs nations more than $1 trillion globally, far more than the record $300 billion of damage due to natural disasters in 2017, according to a recent analysis our firm performed. How might a financial crisis triggered by a cyber attack unfold? A likely scenario would be an attack by a rogue nation or terrorist group on financial institutions or major infrastructure. Inside North Korea, for example, the Lazarus Group, also known as Hidden Cobra, routinely looks for ways to compromise banks and exploit crypto currencies. An attack on a bank, investment fund, custodian firm, ATM network, the interbank messaging network known as SWIFT, or the Federal Reserve itself would represent a direct hit on the financial services system. At the same time, it isn’t clear how a central bank, the traditional financial crisis firefighter, could respond to this type of crisis on short notice. Even after the problem is fixed and the crisis halted, a daunting task of recovery would loom. It would be even more difficult if data were corrupted, manipulated or rendered inaccessible. The IMF terminalizes, IMF 2013 (IMF, international Monetary Fund. March 14, 2013. IMF.org. “JOBS AND GROWTH: ANALYTICAL AND OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE FUND”, https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/031413.pdf?fbclid=IwAR25z8YmNU34qzj8tb7SOk5yi2xlPWZV6z-LN_jJ-kUZ4JqnCqpiOwr23LM . SM Across OECD countries, the gender wage gap is estimated at 16 percent (OECD 2012). Although we are on track to meet the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of halving the proportion of people living in extreme poverty (on less than $1 a day) by 2015 relative to 1990 levels, over 900 million people are expected to remain vulnerable to being pushed back into poverty in the face of adverse shocks (UN, World Economic Situation and Prospects, 2013).
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Hi this is Akhil the first speaker for Centennial and if you want us to disclose contact me at 214-885-0949 at least 15 minutes before the round!
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Military bring in da moola Jim Krane, THE ROLE OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN RESOURCE-RICH REGIONS. .Center for Energy Studies, February 2020//JL https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/ce3b2e6f/fdi-krane-fdi-deterrent-to-hegemons.pdf Literature Review Academic literature on foreign investment and political stability tends to assume causality in the opposite direction from that examined here. Scholars have for decades The Geopolitics of FDI: Can Weak States Deter Hegemons Using Foreign Investment? examined effects of political stability, and lack thereof, on foreign investment. Most tended to find political instability deters foreign investment. Schneider and Frey (1985), Loree and Guisinger (1995), Woodward and Rolfe (1993) and Hayakawa et al. (2013) find that internal conflict, corruption, military involvement in politics, and low-quality bureaucracy are inversely correlated with inward FDI flows. 4 Other academics examine conditions when security factors emerge as enabling or preventing factors in foreign investment. Li and Vaschilko (2010) find that, as one might expect, multinationals avoid investment in low-income countries involved in military conflict. But they also find thatMNCs feel more comfortable investing in countries, including less developed countries, which maintain security alliances or defense pacts with military powers like the United States. Alliances and pacts signal strong political relations, as well as more favorable government policies and fewer restrictions on investors from the home countries (i.e. the military power).5 Along the same lines, Biglaiser and DeRouen (2007) find that the presence of US troops in a host country implies strong political and defense relations which encourages American companies to “follow the flag” and invest. The pair found that 126 developing countries with US troops present were more likely to receive investment from US-headquartered MNCs than those without.6 Finally, Gaffney (2018) examined the nexus of foreign direct investment by US firms and US military’s history of power projection around the world. He portrays US military support for American corporations overseas as a form of hidden subsidy that protects private business interests at the expense of the US taxpayer, and often at the expense of democracy and development in host countries.7 From this perspective, Qatar and Guyana appear to be pushing Gaffney’s scenario a step further, by inviting US firms into their jurisdictions in hopes that those firms – and the host country – receive a hidden subsidy in the form of security provision from Washington. Research Aim and Perspective It seems demonstrably true that in many cases, the environment for FDI in developing states is improved by an external security alliance. This paper, however, reverses the analysis. While pre-existing defense relationships may well grease the wheels for foreign investors, what about the opposit All thanks to the boyz :D Jones, Garett. “The Impact of U.S. Troop Deployments on Economic Growth” The Heritage Foundation. April 11, 2005//AB https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/the-impact-us-troop-deployments-economic-growth Our hypothesis is that international deployments of U.S. military personnel exert a positive causal effect on the growth rates of host countries. Japan and Germany experienced miraculous economic expansions in the decades following World War II. In both cases, a U.S. military occupation coexisted with a massive U.S. effort to reconstruct the politi­cal and economic systems of these countries. However, most cases of large U.S. engagements cannot be characterized as "occupations." That is true of the majority of deployments, but also includes the cases of Japan and Germany a decade after World War II ended, when occupations had been replaced by mutually supportive Cold War alliances. Regardless of the strategic rationale for various deployments, the question is, what causal mechanisms run from U.S. troops to better eco­nomic performance? One potential mechanism is the role of the U.S. military as a security umbrella for host nations, which one might think of as a free, guaranteed risk reducer for investors and other economic decision makers. In addition, it is possible that data on U.S. troops-a number that can be precisely measured and reported for each year- may simply be a reliable proxy for good economic and political institutions. Finally, U.S. troop deployments may be an especially effective mechanism for spreading these good economic and political institutions. Security is one of the most likely mechanisms through which American soldiers enhance the growth poten­tial of an economy. In other words, rational actors are more likely to defer con­sumption in favor of invest­ment when the probability of payoff rises, which is a proba­bility that is closely tied to the peace and security of area. One could think of this as the "security umbrella" effect. The security guarantee of U.S. troops is a pow­erful signal to foreign investors, perhaps even a deciding factor for firms choosing where to locate new factories. American-guaranteed security would therefore spur higher levels of both domes­tic and foreign direct investment and would lower the risk premium in interest rates. Finally, the presence of American security forces allows a host nation to lower its own defense expenditures, which can result in sizeable savings. This allows the country to use more of its own resources for physical and human capital accumulation. The importance of institutions for economic growth has long been acknowledged, and this means that growth is more than a sum of ingredi­ent parts. For many years, "technology" was the orthodox description of everything intangible in the growth process. The current consensus is that productivity-enhancing techniques (scientific and sociocultural) are the most important innovations, and their diffusion through the network of nations is of prime importance. The presence of U.S. troops in an allied host country logically fosters institutions: human rights, stable economies, and the rule of law, if not outright democracy. Often, the promotion of pro-growth institutions is intentional, but the effect is presum­ably just as powerful (and more common) when unintentional. For example, uniformed American soldiers usually mingle with local populations and are highly visible ambassadors of everything from racial equality to technological prowess. The current effort in Iraq is the latest in a history of American deployments explicitly aimed at foster­ing democratic institutions. The presence of U.S. military troops is likely to be closely related to a wider American commitment that involves foreign aid, diplomacy, trade, investment, and a host of other factors. The fact that U.S. troops are much sim­pler to quantify, and that other factors such as diplo­macy and technology diffusion are quite impossible to quantify, means that troop variables may just be serving as a proxy for a wider commitment. Here’s da # Jones, Garett. “The Impact of U.S. Troop Deployments on Economic Growth” The Heritage Foundation. April 11, 2005//AB https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/the-impact-us-troop-deployments-economic-growth The presence of U.S. troops boosts economic growth in host countries. There is a positive unconditional relationship between troop deployments and growth, based on data from 94 countries, and there is also a positive condi­tional relationship that factors in other explana­tory variables like war, political stability, and initial gross domestic product (GDP) levels. For example, a deployment of 500,000 U.S. troops to a host country spread over five decades (10,000 per year) is associated with an increase of 1 percent annual GDP growth per capita. The evidence rejects the hypothesis that the U.S. military is economically exploiting or harming nations where it is deployed. This affirms the non-imperial nature of U.S. deploy­ments in modern history. We theorize that the mechanisms driving the troops-growth relationship involve a "security umbrella" effect and an "innovation diffusion" effect. No, it doesn’t go to oil, SILLY Conde, Carlos. “FDI in fragile and conflict affected economies in the Middle East and North Africa: trends and policies” MENA-OECD Economic Resilient Task Force, Islamic Development Bank. December 5, 2018//AB http://www.oecd.org/mena/competitiveness/ERTF-Jeddah-2018-Background-note-FDI.pdf Investors are more cautious when they enter fragile and conflict-affected states. They tend to concentrate geographically, limit the number of people they hire – in part due to difficulties in recruiting skilled expatriates or local staff–, and develop smaller projects (World Bank Group, 2017). Foreign investors tend to concentrate in sectors where there are high returns and low levels of domestic competition. The level of risk aversion/tolerance of investors varies by sector. Manufacturing and services tend to be more embedded in the local economy, which increases their vulnerability (World Bank, 2013). Similarly, investments in infrastructure are also highly exposed to political risks given their dependence on local demand, regulation, and, oftentimes, contracts with public entities. Saudi need the bread Dudley, Dominic. “Saudi Arabia Revamps Approach To Investment In Bid To Recover Lost Ground And Attract Foreign Capital” Forbes. February 26, 2020//AB https://www.forbes.com/sites/dominicdudley/2020/02/26/saudi-arabia-investment-policy/#26b45bffb24e The failure by Riyadh to attract more investment threatens the economic reform program being pursued by Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman, known as Vision 2030. This is aimed at diversifying the economy away from its current reliance on oil and gas revenues and also creating more private sector jobs for locals. For these aims to be met, the country needs to attract large amounts of foreign capital and expertise to megaprojects such as the futuristic city of Neom. collapse!!! Ahmed, Nafeez. “The collapse of Saudi Arabia is inevitable.” Middle East Eye. September 2015//AB https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/collapse-saudi-arabia-inevitable?fbclid=IwAR1FTOwjZekzNNLhiwCNLBbOzvvH201duDB9zF1FnocCm5iPXNWr2ZxP2Q Like many countries in the region before it, Saudi Arabia is on the brink of a perfect storm of interconnected challenges that, if history is anything to judge by, will be the monarchy’s undoing well within the next decade. The biggest elephant in the room is oil. Saudi Arabia’s primary source of revenues, of course, is oil exports. For the last few years, the kingdom has pumped at record levels to sustain production, keeping oil prices low, undermining competing oil producers around the world who cannot afford to stay in business at such tiny profit margins, and paving the way for Saudi petro-dominance. But Saudi Arabia’s spare capacity to pump like crazy can only last so long. A new peer-reviewed study in the Journal of Petroleum Science and Engineering anticipates that Saudi Arabia will experience a peak in its oil production, followed by inexorable decline, in 2028 – that’s just 13 years away. This could well underestimate the extent of the problem. According to the Export Land Model (ELM) created by Texas petroleum geologist Jeffrey J Brown and Dr Sam Foucher, the key issue is not oil production alone, but the capacity to translate production into exports against rising rates of domestic consumption. Brown and Foucher showed that the inflection point to watch out for is when an oil producer can no longer increase the quantity of oil sales abroad because of the need to meet rising domestic energy demand. In 2008, they found that Saudi net oil exports had already begun declining as of 2006. They forecast that this trend would continue. They were right. From 2005 to 2015, Saudi net exports have experienced an annual decline rate of 1.4 percent, within the range predicted by Brown and Foucher. A report by Citigroup recently predicted that net exports would plummet to zero in the next 15 years. This means that Saudi state revenues, 80 percent of which come from oil sales, are heading downwards, terminally. Saudi Arabia is the region’s biggest energy consumer, domestic demand having increased by 7.5 percent over the last five years – driven largely by population growth. The total Saudi population is estimated to grow from 29 million people today to 37 million by 2030. As demographic expansion absorbs Saudi Arabia’s energy production, the next decade is therefore likely to see the country’s oil exporting capacity ever more constrained. Renewable energy is one avenue which Saudi Arabia has tried to invest in to wean domestic demand off oil dependence, hoping to free up capacity for oil sales abroad, thus maintaining revenues. But earlier this year, the strain on the kingdom’s finances began to show when it announced an eight-year delay to its $109 billion solar programme, which was supposed to produce a third of the nation’s electricity by 2032. State revenues also have been hit through blowback from the kingdom’s own short-sighted strategy to undermine competing oil producers. As I previously reported, Saudi Arabia has maintained high production levels precisely to keep global oil prices low, making new ventures unprofitable for rivals such as the US shale gas industry and other OPEC producers. The Saudi treasury has not escaped the fall-out from the resulting oil profit squeeze – but the idea was that the kingdom’s significant financial reserves would allow it to weather the storm until its rivals are forced out of the market, unable to cope with the chronic lack of profitability. That hasn’t quite happened yet. In the meantime, Saudi Arabia’s considerable reserves are being depleted at unprecedented levels, dropping from their August 2014 peak of $737 billion to $672bn in May – falling by about $12bn a month. At this rate, by late 2018, the kingdom’s reserves could deplete as low as $200bn, an eventuality that would likely be anticipated by markets much earlier, triggering capital flight. To make up for this prospect, King Salman’s approach has been to accelerate borrowing. What happens when over the next few years reserves deplete, debt increases, while oil revenues remain strained? As with autocratic regimes like Egypt, Syria and Yemen – all of which are facing various degrees of domestic unrest – one of the first expenditures to slash in hard times will be lavish domestic subsidies. In the former countries, successive subsidy reductions responding to the impacts of rocketing food and oil prices fed directly into the grievances that generated the “Arab Spring” uprisings. Saudi Arabia’s oil wealth, and its unique ability to maintain generous subsidies for oil, housing, food and other consumer items, plays a major role in fending off that risk of civil unrest. Energy subsidies alone make up about a fifth of Saudi’s gross domestic product. As revenues are increasingly strained, the kingdom’s capacity to keep a lid on rising domestic dissent will falter, as has already happened in countries across the region. About a quarter of the Saudi population lives in poverty. Unemployment is at about 12 percent, and affects mostly young people – 30 percent of whom are unemployed. Climate change is pitched to heighten the country’s economic problems, especially in relation to food and water. Like many countries in the region, Saudi Arabia is already experiencing the effects of climate change in the form of stronger warming temperatures in the interior, and vast areas of rainfall deficits in the north. By 2040, average temperatures are expected to be higher than the global average, and could increase by as much as 4 degrees Celsius, while rain reductions could worsen. This would be accompanied by more extreme weather events, like the 2010 Jeddah flooding caused by a year’s worth of rain occurring within the course of just four hours. The combination could dramatically impact agricultural productivity, which is already facing challenges from overgrazing and unsustainable industrial agricultural practices leading to accelerated desertification. In any case, 80 percent of Saudi Arabia’s food requirements are purchased through heavily subsidised imports, meaning that without the protection of those subsidies, the country would be heavily impacted by fluctuations in global food prices. “Saudi Arabia is particularly vulnerable to climate change as most of its ecosystems are sensitive, its renewable water resources are limited and its economy remains highly dependent on fossil fuel exports, while significant demographic pressures continue to affect the government’s ability to provide for the needs of its population,” concluded a UN Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) report in 2010. The kingdom is one of the most water scarce in the world, at 98 cubic metres per inhabitant per year. Most water withdrawal is from groundwater, 57 percent of which is non-renewable, and 88 percent of which goes to agriculture. In addition, desalination plants meet about 70 percent of the kingdom’s domestic water supplies. But desalination is very energy intensive, accounting for more than half of domestic oil consumption. As oil exports run down, along with state revenues, while domestic consumption increases, the kingdom’s ability to use desalination to meet its water needs will decrease. In Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Egypt, civil unrest and all-out war can be traced back to the devastating impact of declining state power in the context of climateinduced droughts, agricultural decline, and rapid oil depletion. Yet the Saudi government has decided that rather than learning lessons from the hubris of its neighbours, it won’t wait for war to come home – but will readily export war in the region in a madcap bid to extend its geopolitical hegemony and prolong its petro-dominance. Unfortunately, these actions are symptomatic of the fundamental delusion that has prevented all these regimes from responding rationally to the Crisis of Civilization that is unravelling the ground from beneath their feet. That delusion consists of an unwavering, fundamentalist faith: that more business-as-usual will solve the problems created by business-as-usual. Like many of its neighbours, such deeprooted structural realities mean that Saudi Arabia is indeed on the brink of protracted state failure, a process likely to take-off in the next few years, becoming truly obvious well within a decade. WARRRRRRRRRR Karasik ’16 (Theodore Karasik – PhD in History @ UCLA, currently a Gulf-based analyst of regional geopolitical affairs. Joseph Cozza. “What If Saudi Arabia Collapses?” 10 August 2016, https://lobelog.com/what-if-the-state-of-saudi-arabia-collapses/ ) In the event of contentious anti-government uprisings, the monarchy would feel pressured to offer change. The most likely scenario would be the promotion of MBS, a reformer with a great deal of youth support. This promotion is unlikely to quell elite resentment and could further inflame tensions among the monarchy, rival family members, and the religious establishment. If MBS offers liberal reforms, he would likely lose the support of the ultra-conservative Wahhabi clerics. Yet if he fails to provide reforms, resistance to the Saudi rulers could grow based on regionalism and tribalism in the Hijaz, Nejd, or the Eastern Province. Neither scenario bodes well for the monarchy. Though he has a loyal following in the military, MBS’s military excursion in Yemen has received substantial criticism, creating the conditions for a coup if destabilization escalates under his stewardship. Hostile elites with competing clientele bases would see state collapse as an opening for greater power. Since the kingdom’s unification in 1932, an overarching Saudi identity has been elusive. Saudi nationalism is a new concept. The state has been united by the cooptation of elites and the promotion of Wahhabi ideology, which while popular in the Nejd heartland faces rejection from the country’s Shi’ite minority. Not all Saudi Sunnis, meanwhile, practice this branch of Sunni Islam. With an embattled central state, many tribal elites would strive to carve out autonomous regions, restore their pre-unification authority, and potentially dissolve the modern Saudi state. To exert their power, these tribal leaders would draw defections from tribal kin in the armed forces. Disaffected royal family members with their own loyal bases of support could also openly challenge King Salman’s successor (whoever that will be) if instability persists. In the face of significant social upheaval, elite abandonment, and military defection, the SANG could not realistically prevent the state from sliding into civil war and collapse. GCC states are aware of this scenario and operational plans to contain this potential implosion are already under consideration. Consequences for Region and the World The collapse of the Saudi state would have grave implications for the region and the world. As illustrated by Libya, Syria, and Yemen, state collapse creates a vacuum for radical jihadist groups to claim new territory. Currently, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is pushing against the Saudi border with Yemen and the Islamic State (ISIS or IS) in Iraq and Syria poses a constant threat to the kingdom’s north. Thus, civil war, instability, and high levels of sectarian tension would likely be fertile ground for these groups to grow and expand their control, threaten the holy sites, and perpetuate regional instability. Washington’s national security establishment has expressed concerns about turmoil escalating in Saudi Arabia if MBS’s reform agenda fails to achieve its objectives. Some see the kingdom at a crossroads and fear that the kingdom’s collapse would benefit the Islamic State. Regarding MBS possibly becoming the next king, one anonymous Saudi expert told NBC News, “It’s him or it’s ISIS.” The July 4 attacks in three Saudi cities (Medina, Jeddah, and Qatif) underscored the significance of the militant Salafist-Jihadist threat not only to the country’s security but also Al Saud’s prestige and Islamic legitimacy as the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques. The intended attack by IS adherents on the Prophet’s Mosque during the end of Ramadan signals the Islamic State’s intent to usurp the Al Saud much as the apocalyptic leader Juhayman al-Otaybi did when he seized the Grand Mosque in 1979. “This attack has made it very clear that ISIS does not seem to believe in any moral red lines whatsoever,” said Fahad Nazer, a leading expert on Saudi Arabia. “Even al-Qaeda, which is certainly brutal in its own right, has never targeted Muslims in their houses of worship. ISIS has done that repeatedly.” A civil war in the Arabian Peninsula would also challenge long-standing alliances. Instability, the threat to the holy cities, and the possibility of jihadist gains would encourage states with high stakes (Egypt, Jordan, Iran, Pakistan, U.S., etc.) to react. In fact, UAE officials have even made contingency plans for a potential state collapse in Saudi Arabia, a risk which none of the kingdom’s neighbors can afford to ignore. These states would certainly move to secure the holy sites and combat terror cells, but solving the civil war would be a massive challenge. There would be considerable pressure to support the Saud family, but supporting the Wahhabi religious establishment over a reform movement would cause domestic complications in some of these countries that resent the kingdom’s influence across the region. Pakistan, which has a “special bilateral relationship” with Saudi Arabia obligating their military to defend Mecca and Medina and protect Saudi Arabia’s territorial integrity, would face the most pressure to intervene militarily on behalf of the Saud government should turmoil intensify. The two nations have a long history of military and security cooperation, and there is little doubt that Pakistan would act to protect the Al Saud rulers. In addition, the Egyptian military is present in the northern border areas of Saudi Arabia helping to augment Pakistani forces supporting SANG and the Saudi border guard. Iran and Oil The geopolitical tsunami that would result from Saudi Arabia’s collapse would have enormous consequences regarding Iranian influence across the region. From Iraq to Lebanon, and from Yemen to Syria, the struggle on the part of hardline Sunni Islamists to counter Shi’ism and Iran’s reach would enter a new phase should Saudi Arabia cease to exist as a unified nation-state. It is not entirely clear how Iran would react to state-collapse in Saudi Arabia, especially considering instability in the region would present a security risk to shipping and trade in the Persian Gulf. Although Iran would likely avoid direct involvement in a conflict in the Arabian Peninsula, it would certainly attempt to capitalize on a regional power vacuum created by a diminished Saudi Arabia by consolidating its political and military influence in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Eastern Saudi Arabia, and, if instability spreads, Shi’ite-majority Bahrain. Diminished oil output by its regional rival would also increase demand for Iranian oil, boosting their economy. There is also no clear Sunni successor state to check Iran’s regional influence. Egypt’s economy is too weak, and Jordan is surrounded on all sides by instability. Finally, Saudi Arabia as a failed state would send international markets into free fall. State collapse in Saudi Arabia would halt oil production, significantly increasing the price of oil and dramatically weakening global economies. Such an increase would spark a severe global economic crisis. The longer Saudi Arabia is destabilized, the more difficult it would be for the world to pull out of the crisis and recover. The socio-political ramifications of such an economic shock could be catastrophic and disastrous for both the region and the world. If the government faces large-scale demonstrations calling for social and political liberalization while facing tribal, familial, and religious elite abandonment, the result could be instability, civil war, and/or state collapse. Again this result is far from inevitable. The Saudis might be able to successfully implement the Vision 2030 reforms while ensuring elite and citizen support. The country must also be open to course corrections in the event of economic turmoil or elite resentment in order to prevent instability. Gets big real fast Shmuel Bar, 2-1-2013, "The Danger of a Poly-Nuclear Mideast," Hoover Institution, https://www.hoover.org/research/danger-poly-nuclear-mideast, accessed 4-17-2020 //PW Much of the discussion relating to the potential dangers of a poly-nuclear Middle East focuses on the feasibility of deterrence to prevent premeditated intentional use of nuclear weapons. However, not enough attention is paid to the potential for nuclear confrontation during a multilateral spiral of escalation and absence of escalation dominance. In this context, the flexibility and robustness of the command and control structures of fledgling nuclear powers in the region will be critical. The factors that will influence the c3 paradigms of nuclear weapons in the region include a wide range of political, military, bureaucratic, religious and technological issues. In the early stages, such paradigms will probably be closer to the early structures of the veteran nuclear powers, with adaptations for regional cultural, political, and religious idiosyncrasies, and will not necessarily integrate the lessons learned by those veteran powers over time and in thoroughly different strategic and cultural contexts. Furthermore, it stands to reason that the new nuclear powers will not welcome imported solutions based on “off the shelf” Western technology, and will prefer local solutions, which will be, initially at least, less sophisticated. Among the considerations in crafting nuclear command and control paradigms, considerable weight will be given to the perception of the role of nuclear weapons and the acceptance of a cultural “taboo” on their use that developed in the international community. The integration of such a taboo would be a key factor in the motivation of the leaderships of the new nuclear states to prevent their use. Even ideologically, or religiously, highly charged leaderships may be aware of the dangers inherent in nuclear war and behave rationally. However, such awareness and rational decision-making processes are a necessary but not a sufficient condition. Nuclear confrontation may not be the result of some irrational but premeditated decision by leaders to initiate a nuclear strike, but of faulty intelligence, command, and control in escalatory situations. In such situations, it appears that the command and control structures that may develop in new nuclear states in the Middle East are likely to exacerbate the dangers inherent in escalation and brinkmanship, and to result ultimately in perennial nuclear instability or even nuclear war. 1 billion starve Alexandra Witze, 3-16-2020, "How a small nuclear war would transform the entire planet," No Publication, https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-00794-y, accessed 4-17-2020 //PW This grim vision of a possible future comes from the latest studies about how nuclear war could alter world climate. They build on long-standing work about a ‘nuclear winter’ — severe global cooling that researchers predict would follow a major nuclear war, such as thousands of bombs flying between the United States and Russia. But much smaller nuclear conflicts, which are more likely to occur, could also have devastating effects around the world. This week, researchers report that an India–Pakistan nuclear war could lead to crops failing in dozens of countries — devastating food supplies for more than one billion people1. Other research reveals that a nuclear winter would dramatically alter the chemistry of the oceans, and probably decimate coral reefs and other marine ecosystems2. These results spring from the most comprehensive effort yet to understand how a nuclear conflict would affect the entire Earth system, from the oceans to the atmosphere, to creatures on land and in the sea. Scientists want to understand these matters because the nuclear menace is growing. From North Korea to Iran, nations are building up their nuclear capabilities. And some, including the United States, are withdrawing from arms-control efforts. Knowing the possible environmental consequences of a nuclear conflict can help policymakers to assess the threat, says Seth Baum, executive director of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute in New York City, who has studied the risks of triggering a nuclear winter. “Fleshing out the details of ways in which it can be bad is valuable for helping inform decisions,” he says. US is a big strong boi Russell ’10 James, senior lecturer Naval postgraduate school, 1/5/10 James A. “Extended Deterrence, Security Guarantees and Nuclear Weapons: U.S. Strategic and Policy Conundrums in the Gulf,” http://www.analyst-network.com/article.php?art_id=3297 This history suggests an overwhelming emphasis on the role of conventional force in operationalizing American security guarantees and extended deterrent commitments. In the Gulf—unlike Northeast Asia—the role of nuclear weapons has never been explicitly spelled out and has very much remained in the background. However, while reference to nuclear weapons might remain unstated, the reality is that they are explicitly committed to defend American forces whenever the commander-in-chief might deem it necessary. The entire (and substantial) American military regional footprint operates under a quite explicit nuclear umbrella—headlines or no headlines. If a nuclear umbrella is indeed draped over America’s forward deployed Gulf presence, it’s hard not to see how that umbrella is similarly draped over the states that are hosting those forces. The only problem with Secretary Clinton’s recent statements is that she seems unaware of this fact, i.e., the United States already maintains a nuclear umbrella backed by nuclear weapons in the region. While the United States has pledged not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear signatories of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (known as negative security assurances), it maintains a policy of calculated ambiguity in honoring those commitments if its forces are attacked by chemical or biological weapons.24 President Clinton reinforced this position in Presidential Decision Memorandum 60 in December 1997, which stated: The United States reaffirms that it will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon state-parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the United States, its territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies, or on a state toward which it has a security commitment carried out, or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon state in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon state.25 As previously noted, the United States last unsheathed this proverbial sword in 1996 with the discovery of a potential chemical weapons plant in Libya. The sword, however, remains at the ready in the Gulf where Iran’s development of chemical weapons, long-range missiles, and its emphasis on terrorism and asymmetric warfare constitute prominent elements of the regional threat environment. If anything Iran’s weakened conventional forces potentially drive Iranian military responses during an armed conflict to those weapons that would lead the United States to consider forswearing its negative security assurances.26 26. “As argued in James A. Russell, “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East,” Institut Français des Relations Internationales Proliferation Papers 26 (Spring 2009).” In this scenario, it seems clear that American nuclear weapons are a component in the web of military capabilities designed to discourage Iranian use of its unconventional weapons in war. Conclusion Nuclear weapons have historically helped implicitly and explicitly support America’s far flung global commitments in the Gulf and elsewhere. The system of Gulf security built by the United States reflects a time-honored template of regional defense and security honed in decades of Cold War experience. In the Gulf, the dual tools of extended deterrence and security assurances have proven a cornerstone of a system of regional security efficiently administered by America’s military organizations. Nuclear weapons today undeniably form part of this system—explicitly protecting U.S. forces and implicitly protecting regimes hosting those forces. empirically happened Waltz 2k Kenneth, prof, http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/gjia/gjia_winspr00f.html, dw: Spring 2000, da: 7-8-2011, lido We have this peculiar notion about the irrationality of rogue states. When he was Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin said these rogue leaders might be undeterrable. Others contend that some states may undertake courses of action even if they know that catastrophe may result. But who would do that? Not Saddam Hussein. Not Kim Il Sung when he was ruler of North Korea. What is a key characteristic of all those rulers? They are survivors, as they struggle to live in a harsh environment–both internally, with the constant danger of assassination, and externally, as they’re surrounded by enemies. And they survive for decades until they are carried out in a box. Are they irrational? Their behavior is ugly and nasty to be sure, but irrational? How could they survive? If they were not deterrable, how would they ever have survived? They don’t run the kind of risks that would put their regime into question. Kim Il Sung wanted to pass his reign onto his son, Kim Jong Il. They obviously love to rule, but they’ve got to have a country. They’re not going to risk the existence of their country. For example, Saddam Hussein was deterred during the Persian Gulf War. He did not arm the SCUD missiles with lethal warheads and shoot them at Israel. They were nuisance attacks. Why? Because he didn’t want us to pound him more heavily than he was being pounded. The allies, led by the United States, could have substantially destroyed that country without ever using nuclear weapons, and he knew it. Sure he was deterred. So how can we say irrational or undeterrable? But we do say it. Oil go bye bye Byman (2016): https://www.tobinproject.org/sites/tobinproject.org/files/assets/Byman20and20Moller20-20The20United20States20and20the20Middle20East_0.pdf Politically, Tehran does not claim the territory of any of its neighbors (a few disputed minor islands aside), and the Islamic Republic still bears the scars from the country’s long struggle with Iraq. Tehran has no appetite for another large-scale war. In recent years, one much-touted concern is that Iran might try to block the Strait of Hormuz, perhaps the world’s most important chokepoint for oil supplies: thirty-three percent of Byman and Moller | The United States and the Middle East 11 all oil shipped by sea and nearly twenty percent of all oil traded worldwide passed through the Strait in 2009.37 Stopping traffic through the Strait would cut off over eighty percent of the Gulf states’ oil exports, driving up shipping costs, and otherwise lead to a major spike in the price of oil—and one that could not be quickly made up from other sources.38 Caitlin Talmadge finds that Iran has significant capabilities to close the Strait for perhaps a month, using a combination of mines, anti-ship cruise missiles, and land-based air defense.39 Even so, the potential disruption to the global oil market stemming from a crisis over the Strait could be significant, especially in the short term. In December 2011, after Iranian Vice-President Mohammad Reza-Rahimi threatened to close the Strait if new sanctions were levied, oil prices jumped over two percent in one day. However, the ensuing week—which witnessed both Iranian and American naval exercise—saw oil prices quickly return to pre-incident levels.40 Still, some energy analysts predict the price of oil could rise by as much as fifty percent within days of the Strait’s closure.41 One reassuring counterargument is that it would be self-defeating for Iran to close the Strait as Iran itself is dependent on the Strait to export its oil. However, it is plausible (though not likely) that Iran might still try to close the Strait: scenarios might include a full boycott of Iranian oil should Iran renew its nuclear program, which means Iran has no significant exports to lose, or a more ideological or desperate regime in Tehran. Such an action, however, would create a counterbalancing coalition, including Europe and China, that would lead to economic and diplomatic isolation as well as support for aggressive US military action. Moreover, Washington’s existing regional assets provide it with options should Iran choose to disrupt traffic in the vital shipping channel. In 2012, President Obama reportedly sent a private letter to Tehran declaring Iranian closure of the Strait of Hormuz a “red line” for the United States.42 When the Iranian Coast Guard seized a Marshall Islands-flagged Maersk cargo ship in April 2015 the administration demonstrated its commitment to protecting the passageway by sending the guided missile destroyer USS Farragut to patrol the channel. In addition to sending American warships to shadow US-flagged merchant ships CENTCOM announced it was considering offering its assistance to non-US flagged merchant ships, an effort Byman and Moller | The United States and the Middle East 12 to bring the Strait under US extended deterrence.43 The ongoing US naval presence in the region should afford Washington continued deterrence opportunities. Another risk comes from Iranian-supported subversion and perhaps even limited military strikes on Gulf oil facilities. Tehran in the past sponsored a coup in Bahrain and various terrorist attacks in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. 1.1 BILLION PEOPLE Power 96 Staff Writer – Tampa Tribune Paul Jr., “Grain shortage growing problem,” The Tampa Tribune, 1/20/96 There are more people in this world than ever, but less grain to feed them. That's kindled fears of a world food crisis, a problem Florida may help prevent. Poor weather, drought, political unrest and economic shifts have decreased planting, pushing world grain reserves to record lows. Meanwhile, the world's population grew by 100 million, to 5.75 billion in 1995 - a record increase. Now, miners in West Central Florida are digging out phosphate more quickly, so it can be used to make fertilizer. Analysts are warning about the increasing possibility of flood or drought in the world's food-producing regions. That can push food prices much higher, both here and abroad, and even cause famine in the poorest countries. U.S. food prices may rise more than 4 percent this year, ahead of the rate of inflation. "Conditions today indicate that there is at least some vulnerability in the food supply," said Sara Schwartz, an agricultural economist with the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Corn and soybean production plunged last year in the United States, she said. Wet weather slowed grain planting in the United States and Canada. Elsewhere, drought and civil conflict in sub-Saharan Africa cut production to 20 percent below normal. The European Union has less than one quarter of the grain reserves it held in 1993. The amount of corn expected to be available in the United States by summer - when corn is harvested - was trimmed by crop forecasters this week to 507 million bushels, the lowest in 20 years. On a global scale, food supplies - measured by stockpiles of grain - are not abundant. In 1995, world production failed to meet demand for the third consecutive year, said Per Pinstrup-Andersen, director of the International Food Policy Research Institute in Washington, D.C. As a result, grain stockpiles fell from an average of 17 percent of annual consumption in 1994-1995 to 13 percent at the end of the 1995-1996 season, he said. That's troubling, Pinstrup-Andersen noted, since 13 percent is well below the 17 percent the United Nations considers essential to provide a margin of safety in world food security. During the food crisis of the early 1970s, world grain stocks were at 15 percent. "Even if they are merely blips, higher international prices can hurt poor countries that import a significant portion of their food," he said. "Rising prices can also quickly put food out of reach of the 1.1 billion people in the developing world who live on a dollar a day or less." Baby i need you in my lifeeee in my lifeee Cunningham 2015 David Cunningham, professor of government at the University of Maryland. “Preventing Civil War: How the potential for international intervention can deter conflict onset”, Peace Research Institute, http://www.davidcunninghampolisci.com/uploads/4/2/9/7/42974855/cunningham_preventing_civil_war_feb112015.pdf //CJC Civil wars occur in some countries at some times and not in others. I examine how the potential for large-scale external intervention can prevent civil wars. I argue that intervention by external states in civil war can be so overwhelming that it reduces one side’s probability of victory to essentially zero. When dissidents anticipate this type of intervention on the side of government, they anticipate no chance of achieving success through violence and do not initiate civil wars. ... In this article, I examine how the potential for large-scale international military intervention on the government side can deter the outbreak of civil war. There is a large literature on external intervention, but that literature has almost exclusively focused on the intervention in ongoing civil wars. In a few cases, scholars have examined how, under certain conditions, the potential for intervention can make civil war more likely. Here, by contrast, I examine how the potential for intervention can prevent conflict. I analyze the process by which states and dissidents decide whether to use violence to resolve political conflicts and argue that, for civil war to occur, dissidents must have a motivation for violence, believe that violence will help them achieve their goals, and be unable to negotiate a compromise settlement with the state prior to the outbreak of conflict. I argue that when dissidents anticipate that an external state or set of states will intervene on the side of the government to a degree that is so overwhelming that dissidents’ costs of fighting exceed their probability of victory, they will anticipate gaining no benefit from fighting and not initiate civil war. I further argue that, by freeing states from the threat of violent rebellion, governments anticipating this type of support can operate with a freer hand toward their population and therefore be more repressive. While this repression will increase grievance it should not increase the likelihood of civil war, rather, dissidents will choose other strategies of dissent to seek political change. I test these arguments using indicators of the likelihood of external intervention on behalf of the government. The primary indicator is that of U.S. hierarchy. Drawing on Lake’s (2009) arguments that the U.S. enters into hierarchical relationships in which subordinate states give up some sovereign control in return for the United States providing “order,” I argue that this provision of order means that potential rebels anticipate that the U.S. will intervene in a civil war. Consistent 3 with the expectations of the theory, I find that states in more hierarchical relationships with the United States are less likely to experience civil wars, more repressive, more likely to experience nonviolent campaigns and more prone to terrorist attacks. I conclude by discussing the implications of this argument for our understanding of civil war, and how external relations of states affect statedissident interactions. ... Holding the other continuous variables constant at their mean and discrete variables at their mode, states at the 10th percentile on the security hierarchy index have a 1.8 chance of experiencing a 1,000 battle death civil war onset in a given year, while those at the 90th percentile have a 0.97 chance, a decline in the probability of civil war of almost 50. haha leverage Andrew Exum, 6-21-2019, "U.S. Arms Sales to the Gulf Have Failed," Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/06/us-military-support-gulf-all-backwards/592249/, accessed 4-17-2020 //PW I once spent five months doing all that with a light-infantry platoon in the heat of the Kuwaiti desert and … well, it’s not always fun. The sun sucks, the sand sucks, and you’re trying to keep a bunch of teenagers focused in 100-degree heat. I get it. Getting shot by the enemy, though, is less fun, and along the border with Yemen, Saudi ground forces in particular have proved largely incapable of closing with and engaging the enemy—which is the entire point of possessing ground-maneuver forces. The failure of Saudi and allied ground forces has contributed to their overreliance on air forces, which have spent most of the past few decades practicing air-to-air combat (which they’re still not very good at, if we’re not grading on a curve) and were largely unprepared for what they were asked to do over Yemen—as lots of Yemeni civilians sadly discovered. The silver lining to all this bad news is that none of our Gulf partners looks ready to challenge Israel’s qualitative military edge anytime soon, individually or collectively, and we retain some leverage over our partners so long as they remain reliant on us for their collective defense. The good news, meanwhile, is that some of our partners in the region—not many, but some—have developed real and formidable military capabilities. Our Emirati partners, for example, are able to conduct truly independent military operations, and their air forces and special forces are capable of operating alongside ours. They have done so, in fact, over the past decade—including in Afghanistan. Indeed, one of the things that’s missing from the spate of recent articles bemoaning the influence of the United Arab Emirates in Washington is the real value proposition that the Emiratis bring to the table. The reason U.S. military officers, especially, fall in love with their Emirati counterparts is because the Emirati crown prince, Mohamed bin Zayed, has invested in actual capabilities and has military forces the Americans can treat as peers. Diplo diplo diplo Ragen 6: https://sci-hub.tw/https://www.jstor.org/stable/27638519?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents In a second model, we have excluded structural interventions and included the effect of diplomacy and the timing of diplomacy on the length of the conflict. The results show that diplomatic interventions dramatically reduce the expected duration of a conflict. For example, the expected duration for civil conflicts that have TABLE 1 Duration Model of Interventions in Civil Conflict Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Variables (Estimate, SE) (Estimate, SE) (Estimate, SE) (Estimate, SE) Constant 4.125*** 4.554*** 4.342*** 4.393*** (1.352) (1.216) (1.259) (1.279) Diplomatic intervention — –1.344*** –1.454*** –1.449*** (0.445) (0.432) (0.436) Timing of diplomacy — 0.007 0.006 0.007 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) Log (timing of diplomacy) — –0.566** –0.530** –0.576* (0.275) (0.264) (0.316) Military intervention –0.454 — –0.210 –0.172 (0.362) (0.378) (0.379) Economic intervention 0.505 — 0.946* — (0.394) (0.485) Positive economic inducement — — — 0.834 (0.509) Sanction — — — 0.157 (0.638) Ethnoreligious conflict 0.691** 0.865*** 1.000*** 0.977*** (0.311) (0.330) (0.333) (0.338) Gross domestic product 0.00002 –0.0001 –0.00004 –0.00005 (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) Size of the opposition 1.09E-06 2.64E-06* 3.06E-06* 3.01E-06* (1.32E-06) (1.57E-06) (1.58E-06) (1.59E-06) Intensity –0.0001*** –0.0001*** –0.0001*** –0.0001*** (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) Gemstones 0.262 0.246 0.178 0.184 (0.287) (0.343) (0.340) (0.339) Opiates 1.198** 1.106** 1.134** 1.122** (0.490) (0.512) (0.492) (0.497) ln p –0.353*** –0.452*** –0.425*** –0.431*** (0.075) (0.077) (0.080) (0.080) p 0.702 0.636 0.654 0.650 1/p 1.424 1.572 1.530 1.539 N 13,243 13,243 13,243 13,243 Log-likelihood –272.192 –260.056 –257.987 –258.505 NOTE: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors, and the estimates are from an accelerated failure time model. *p .10. **p .05. ***p .01. Regan, Aydin / DIPLOMACY AND OTHER FORMS OF INTERVENTION 749 experienced diplomatic interventions is reduced by about 76 percent over conflicts without diplomatic interventions. This interpretation is, however, made more complicated by the decay function we used to model the effects of interventions over time, although we will address this issue when we interpret the full results (see model 2).5 The results also lend support to the centrality of the timing of diplomacy to conflict duration. The simple interaction of diplomacy with timing is positive but is not significantly related to the expected duration. The log of the timing of diplomacy is negative and significantly associated with duration. The general picture suggested by these observations is that diplomacy is more effective in settling intrastate conflicts when it takes place in the middle stages of the conflict. This conclusion runs counter to Regan and Stam’s (2000) findings, in which the authors suggest that mediations in interstate disputes are more effective if they are employed in early or late stages. We interpret our results to suggest that at the beginning, both sides would enter into the conflict with the hope of a victory. As both overestimates its chances of a decisive outcome, the incompatibility between the adversaries might not be amenable to diplomacy. In time, warring parties adjust their success estimates to the new situation. Given that the fighting continues, parties try to avoid future costs of conflict, and diplomacy can be more effective in the later stages of the incompatibility. The curvilinear effect of timing on expected duration can be observed in Figure 1. Saudi = ride or die Rogan. “Ending US Support for Saudi Arabia would make things much worse in Yemen.” Washington Examiner. November 2018. https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/ending-ussupport-for-saudi-arabia-would-make-things-much-worse-in-yemen //RJ But the problem is that the senators are wrong. If the U.S. pulls its functional support for the Saudi alliance, two negative consequences will immediately follow. First, the Saudis will lose all the inhibitions about accurate targeting of Houthi formations that American intervention has forced. Second, Riyadh will lose interest in energetic efforts by Washington to reach a durable cease fire. Both of those developments will be disastrous for Yemeni civilians. For a start, the only reason the Saudis are now moving toward a cease fire is the Trump administration's pressure. Trump has earned Saudi trust and their corresponding deference on issues negatively affecting America: in this case, the human suffering of the Yemeni civil war. The Saudis have not suddenly woken up and realized that the war is causing too much suffering without adequate prospect of strategic gain. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman sees Yemen as a defining battleground in an existential fight against Iran. With Iran repeatedly firing ballistic missiles at Riyadh and helping assassinate erstwhile Saudi allies, it is ludicrous to think the prince would cease his war effort absent the present mix of major U.S. pressure and resolute U.S. support. And if you want to understand how a U.S. withdrawal of military support would affect the Saudi war effort, look no further than President Bashar Assad's Syria. The Saudi coalition has far more advanced weapons platforms than the Syrians, but it lacks the integrated command and control, intelligence, targeting, communications, and logistical skill to employ its military effectively. The U.S. has been absolutely critical in filling in the gaps in these areas. And although the Saudis are still too capricious with their use of force, American guidance has helped them target Houthi formations rather than entire city blocks with a few Houthis somewhere inside those blocks. Again, motivated by their historic, cultural, and theological blood feud with Iran, the Saudis would care little about killing thousands more civilians if they believed it might win the war. America is the only check on them at this moment. 15 mil... Fassihi, Farnaz. “U.N. Security Council Votes to Send Monitors to Yemen.” Wall Street Journal. Jan. 2019. https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-n-security-council-votes-to-send-monitors-to-yemen-11547687794 //RJ The deployment in the Red Sea port city, where the majority of Yemen’s humanitarian aid enters, had been requested by U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres. While violations have been reported, U.N. officials say the cease-fire has significantly lessened fighting in Yemen, where a Saudi-led coalition has engaged in a bombing campaign that has drawn wide condemnation. Had fighting continued, food to half of Yemen’s population on the brink of famine could have been interrupted. The Security Council, which approves U.N. monitoring missions in conflict areas, has put its weight behind the cease-fire agreement in two resolutions. The U.K. ambassador to the U.N., Karen Pierce, told reporters on Wednesday that Yemen would be an important issue for 2019, “but hopefully with the deployment of the substantive mission, we can start to make progress on the ground." U.N. Special Envoy Martin Griffiths told the Council in a briefing last week that the two sides aren’t yet ready for the next round of talks. As a measure of good faith, a prisoner exchange is also part of the Stockholm agreement. iran deterred type beat Eric Schmitt and Julian E. Barnes, 5-13-2019, "White House Reviews Military Plans Against Iran, in Echoes of Iraq War," No Publication, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/13/world/middleeast/us-military-plans-iran.html, accessed 4-17-2020 //PW European allies who met with Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on Monday said that they worry that tensions between Washington and Tehran could boil over, possibly inadvertently. More than a half-dozen American national security officials who have been briefed on details of the updated plans agreed to discuss them with The New York Times on the condition of anonymity. Spokesmen for Mr. Shanahan and Gen. Joseph F. Dunford Jr., the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, declined to comment. The size of the force involved has shocked some who have been briefed on them. The 120,000 troops would approach the size of the American force that invaded Iraq in 2003. Deploying such a robust air, land and naval force would give Tehran more targets to strike, and potentially more reason to do so, risking entangling the United States in a drawn out conflict. It also would reverse years of retrenching by the American military in the Middle East that began with President Barack Obama’s withdrawal of troops from Iraq in 2011. But two of the American national security officials said Mr. Trump’s announced drawdown in December of American forces in Syria, and the diminished naval presence in the region, appear to have emboldened some leaders in Tehran and convinced the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps that the United States has no appetite for a fight with Iran. Since John R. Bolton became the national security adviser in April 2018, he has intensified the Trump administration’s policy of isolating and pressuring Iran.Credit...Tom Brenner for The New York Times Several oil tankers were reportedly attacked or sabotaged off the coast of the United Arab Emirates over the weekend, raising fears that shipping lanes in the Persian Gulf could become flash points. “It’s going to be a bad problem for Iran if something happens,” Mr. Trump said on Monday, asked about the episode. Emirati officials are investigating the apparent sabotage, and American officials suspect that Iran was involved. Several officials cautioned, however, that there is not yet any definitive evidence linking Iran or its proxies to the reported attacks. An Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman called it a “regretful incident,” according to a state news agency. empirics prove Alex Ward, 1-13-2020, "9 questions about the US-Iran crisis you were too embarrassed to ask," Vox, https://www.vox.com/world/2020/1/13/21051794/us-iran-soleimani-ukraine-airline-questions, accessed 4-17-2020 //PW The next year, the US invaded Iraq to overthrow Saddam and attempt to install a pro-American democracy, prompting Iran’s leadership to fear it might be next on America’s hit list. In the chaos of post-invasion Iraq, Iran built up a network of Shia militant groups in Iraq and let them loose on American troops. This was an effort to both expand Iran’s influence in Iraq and bog down the US in Iraq to prevent any kind of follow-up attack on Iran. These efforts, spearheaded by Qassem Soleimani, helped create some of the most vicious and effective organizations in the anti-American insurgency, directly contributing to the deaths of hundreds of American troops. Since then, the US and Iran have been locked in a deadly strategic competition in the region. But as the US began to tire of seemingly never-ending military intervention around the world, successive administrations began trying (often unsuccessfully) to reduce the US military presence in the Middle East and Afghanistan. Iran capitalized on that, steadily expanding its regional influence nearly across the board, from Iraq to Syria to Yemen to Afghanistan and beyond. And then came the Iran nuclear deal. —Zack Beauchamp 2) What is the Iran nuclear deal, and why does it matter? This latest flare-up between the US and Iran cannot be fully separated from another point of tension between the two countries: President Trump’s withdrawal from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. Iran has had a nuclear program for decades, in large part due to America: The country’s nuclear program was started under the shah in the late 1950s with US assistance. Under the (in retrospect, deeply ironically named) Atoms for Peace program, the US gave Iran nuclear research reactors, highly enriched uranium, and technical assistance and training to set up a peaceful civilian nuclear program. But the program turned into an international crisis in 2002 when an anti-regime militant group revealed that Iran had clandestine nuclear facilities that could be used in a push for a bomb. sicko mode Efraim Inbar, Summer 2016, "U.S. Mideast Retreat a Boon for Moscow and Tehran," Middle East Forum,//JL https://www.meforum.org/6042/us-mideast-retreat emergence of a multi-polar nuclear Middle East, which is a plausible consequence of the U.S. nuclear accommodation with Iran, will be a strategic nightmare for the world. The gravest consequence of U.S. disengagement from the region is the increased probability of nuclear proliferation. As noted, the nuclear deal with Iran is not linked to any demand for a change in Tehran's foreign policy or its military build-up. The Islamist regime continues to invest in its missile program and naval capabilities and to pursue its interventionist policies with great vigor, boasting the control of four Arab capitals: Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus and Sanaa (Yemen).18 The February 2016 parliamentary elections produced an Iranian Majlis scarcely more moderate than its predecessor, and any change in Iranian policies is highly unlikely.19 An emboldened Tehran, which traditionally acts through proxies rather than direct military conquest, might intensify its campaign to subvert Saudi Arabia, possibly by agitating the population in the country's oil-rich Eastern province where Shiites are a majority. The loss of that province would seriously weaken the Saudi state and might even bring about its disintegration. The visible consequences of the unraveling of statist structures in Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen do not augur well for the desert kingdom. Tehran could use subversion, terrorist attacks, and intimidation of the Persian Gulf states to evict the thinning U.S. presence completely from the gulf. This is a stated goal of the Islamic Republic of Iran,20 and in the absence of U.S. determination and ability to project force, an Iranian superior power might turn the gulf monarchies into satellites though these states have enjoyed a U.S. security umbrella up to this point. Bahrain, home to the headquarters of the U.S. Fifth Fleet, is particularly vulnerable to Iranian subversion as its majority Shiite population has many grievances against the ruling Sunni monarchy, hence could be readily manipulated by Iran. The satellization of the Caspian basin, where Iran shares the coast with important energy producers such as Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, is another plausible scenario. This area and the Persian Gulf form an "energy ellipse" containing a large part of the world's energy resources. Tehran wants to link its massive energy resources to key regional projects that transport energy via the South Caucasus to European markets. Iranian activism in the south Caucasus and Central Asia has increased following the lifting of sanctions that accompanied the nuclear deal.21 The satellization of the "energy ellipse," if it occurs, would bestow upon Tehran a central role in the world energy market. Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are very fearful of growing Iranian influence. It is possible that those countries, which adopted a pro-Western foreign policy orientation after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, might either bow to Tehran's wishes or decide to return to the Russian orbit, as Moscow appears to be a much more reliable ally than Washington. The Western loss would be considerable Russia Benefits Russia is fully alive to the potential for a reassertion of its historic role in the region. Though NATO proclaims that the European theater has diminished in strategic importance,22 Moscow seems to have other thoughts. The Mediterranean reg Squad up! Amira Jadoon 17 PhD Political Science, Assistant Prof. of Social Sciences @ West Point, “Persuasion and Predation: The Effects of U.S Military aid and International Development Aid on Civilian Killings,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 2017, DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2017.1353355 The U.S. frequently uses military aid to pressure governments in counterinsurgency efforts, and to influence the “behavior and capabilities of their partners to achieve a specific outcome.” 29 I argue that military aid results in states’ decreased use of one-sided violence due to a persuasion effect. This is rooted in its effectiveness to incentivize governments as well as boost their capacity to conduct more targeted military operations. Examples from Pakistan are particularly useful in illustrating the persuasion effects of U.S. military aid. They help in drawing out theoretically how military aid can shape state actors’ behavior in underdeveloped and conflict-ridden states where there is a presence of rebels that pose both a domestic and international security concern. Pakistan also represents a political environment where external states are likely to intervene through foreign aid than direct intervention. It exemplifies situations where recipient governments must balance external pressure with domestic objectives and where local militants hold strategic utility for recipient governments in proxy wars, as is the case in many ungoverned spaces in the Middle East and Africa. Given that Pakistan has been receiving U.S. military aid over an extended period of time, it’s a particularly useful case to examine closely. Incentivizing recipients In terms of incentives, provision of military aid increases a recipient’s political will to comply, firstly in order to avoid becoming a victim of other coercive policies by the donor. Secondly, it signals an alliance between donors and recipients that can enhance the recipient’s international standing and legitimacy. Thus, as supported by previous studies, U.S. military aid can induce governments to cooperate. 30 For example, after 9/11, Pakistan opted to assist the U.S. in overthrowing the Taliban regime in Afghanistan over the alternative of becoming a target of the U.S. 31 Pakistan’s Musharraf was portrayed as an international hero on various media outlets, with inflows of aid indicating that Pakistan was no longer a pariah state. 32 Subsequently, Pakistan arrested militants on its soil especially targeting al Qaeda and foreign fighters who posed the biggest threats to the U.S. 33 as well as rebels that threatened the Pakistani government in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). While Pakistan frequently turns a blind eye to many militant groups for its own interests, many of its counterterrorism efforts have been prompted by U.S. assistance to Pakistan’s national security agencies. 34 CT highkey popping off https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/report-terrorism-decline-middle-east-and-north-africa The number of terrorist attacks in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) declined significantly in 2018, according to the Global Terrorism Index, an annual study by the Institute for Economics and Peace. The security situation improved in 17 countries and only worsened in Iran and Morocco. The better conditions were largely driven by the deterioration of ISIS, which lost much of its territory in Iraq and Syria. “Deaths attributed to the group declined 69 per cent, with attacks declining 63 per cent in 2018,” according to the report. “The largest decline in fatalities last year was in Iraq, which had 75 per cent fewer deaths from terrorism in 2018. Syria followed, with nearly a 40 percent reduction.” Despite the overall decline in attacks and fatalities, three MENA countries were among the top 10 countries most impacted by terrorism worldwide ~-~- Iraq (1,054 deaths), Syria (662 deaths) and Yemen (301 deaths). On December 10, the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) and the Institute for Economics and Peace hosted a discussion on the on the index and how the data can help shape counterterrorism policy. TERRORISTS :O David Pollock, 1-9-2020, "Eight Reasons Why the United States and Iraq Still Need Each Other," washingtoninstitute,//JL https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/eight-reasons-why-the-united-states-and-iraq-still-need-each-other TO SAVE THE VICTORY AGAINST THE ISLAMIC STATE A continued U.S. military presence in Iraq, modest as it may be, is essential to ensure the enduring defeat of the Islamic State. Conversely, if Soleimani’s death leads to the withdrawal of U.S. troops involved in local operations against the group, it would constitute a major blow to the fight against terrorism. Even after the Islamic State lost the last vestige of its territorial caliphate in March 2019, it was still able to conduct 867 terrorist operations in Iraq alone during the remainder of the year. The quantity and severity of such attacks would surely rise in the absence of U.S. and allied military pressure. Ongoing operations against the group’s equally active vestiges in Syria would be fatally undermined as well. The UN estimates that the Islamic State still has up to $300 million in reserves to sustain its terrorist campaign, and Kurdish officials note that the group is now reorganized underground in Iraq with “better techniques and better tactics. And it’s happened before!!!! Alice Fordham, 15, 12-19-2015, Fact Check: Did Obama Withdraw From Iraq Too Soon, Allowing ISIS To Grow?, NPR.org, 4-15-2020, https://www.npr.org/2015/12/19/459850716/fact-check-did-obama-withdraw-from-iraq-too-soon-allowing-isis-to-grow, //SivaSambasivam (isn’t he so cute) The Republican candidates talk about ISIS a lot. And what they — at least Ben Carson, Carly Fiorina and former Florida Gov. Jeb Bush — charge is that ISIS is President Obama's fault, because he withdrew troops from Iraq in 2011 — when he should have kept them there to keep a lid on the insurgency. Let's Break It Down: The Claim: "Barack Obama became president, and he abandoned Iraq. He left, and when he left al Qaida was done for. ISIS was created because of the void that we left, and that void now exists as a caliphate the size of Indiana." — former Florida Gov. Jeb Bush The Big Question: OK, maybe it's actually two questions: Is Obama responsible for the timing of the troop withdrawal from Iraq? Did that withdrawal cause the rise of ISIS? And there are answers for both, though not simple ones. The Long Answer: First, we have to decide on a starting point. Many Democrats, and even a few Republicans, say we should look back to the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. That, and the dismantling of the entire security force, created an angry, mainly Sunni demographic, which fueled the insurgency that would later become ISIS. Others go back further, pointing out the strong links between Saddam Hussein's brutal Baathist regime, and the structure, methods and, indeed, commanders of ISIS. But if we take the invasion as a given, and Saddam Hussein as history, we can begin the answer to the first question ~-~- Was Obama responsible for the timing of the withdrawal? It was President George W. Bush who signed the Status of Forces agreement in 2008, which planned for all American troops to be out of Iraq by the end of 2011. "The agreement lays out a framework for the withdrawal of American forces in Iraq — a withdrawal that is possible because of the success of the surge," he said in a joint press conference with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki at the time. Moments later, an Iraqi journalist threw his shoes at the president. It is important to remember most Iraqis saw the Americans as occupiers and blame them for civilian deaths. Uh oh, war! Christopher Layne, “America's Middle East Grand Strategy after Iraq: The Moment for Offshore Balancing Has Arrived”. Review of International Studies, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Jan., 2009), pp. 5-25. Cambridge University Press//JL https://www.jstor.org/stable/20542762 the two countries have enabled Tehran to consolidate its influence in Iraq.33 During the run-up to the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, most American foreign policy analysts foresaw that Iran would be the main beneficiary of the administration's Iraq policy. Only the Bush administration and its neoconservative cheerleaders were oblivious to the probable consequences of their policies. Now - short of war, of course - it is too late to arrest Iranian's growing power in the region. The damage already has been done. The argument that US withdrawal from Iraq would result in wider regional instability cannot be dismissed out of hand. If US troops leave Iraq, bad things indeed could happen: violence in Iraq could worsen and, in addition to the bloodshed, Iraq refugees could flee to neighbouring countries with de-stabilising consequences. Other nations in the region could be tempted to intervene in a re-intensified Iraqi civil war that causes Iraq to fracture along ethnic and sectarian fault lines. Indeed, Saudi Arabia already has indicated that in this case it would come to the aid of the Iraqi Sunnis, and Turkey has conducted attacks on PPK insurgents who are using bases in the Kurdish area of Iran to conduct attacks inside Turkey. In short, the Middle East could become even bloodier and more unstable. It is by no means certain that this will be the outcome, however. Iraq's major neighbours Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia - have competing interests to be sure, but they also share one common interest: none of them wants to see the Iraqi state disintegrate. Moreover, the US also has leverage - military, economic, and political - that it can use to dissuade Iraq's neighbours from involving themselves openly in Iraq's civil war following an American pull-out. Terrorism In two ways, the Bush administration BRRA BRRA BRRA Thyne 2006 “Cheap Signals with Costly Consequences: THE EFFECT OF INTERSTATE RELATIONS ON CIVILWAR.” Clayton Thyne Department of Political Science, University of Iowa. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 50, No. 6 (Dec., 2006), pp. 937-961. JSTOR. http://www.jstor.org/stable/27638532 //CJC The terrible consequences of civil wars have driven conflict scholars to better understand their causes, duration, severity, and outcomes. Over the past fifty years, civil wars these conflicts have caused more than 16 million deaths and have lasted over six years on average. Civil wars also disrupt society by causing massive flights of refugees, devastating countries' economies, and interrupting social programs (Singer and Small 1994; Collier et al. 2003; Fearon and Laitin 2003). One vein of research examines the effect of external actors on the duration, outcome, and settlements of civil wars (e.g., Balch Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Regan 2002; Walter 2002; DeRouen and Sobek 2004). However, few studies have examined the effect of third parties on the onset of civil war. This gap in the literature is problematic because states do not exist in a vacuum but are influenced by external actors. This article seeks to fill this hole in the literature by asking the following: how might relations between states affect the likelihood of civil war onset? What type of relations, if any, matter? Everyone gonna assert their dominance :( Yaroslav Trofimov, 3-4-2020, "America Can’t Escape the Middle East," WSJ,//JL https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-u-s-cant-escape-the-middle-east-11572016173 East’s proximity to Europe also means that millions more refugees could be on the move if the region spins further into chaos. Nuclear weapons—already possessed by Israel and possibly in the future by Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey—add to the mix of global threats. Another reason may be even more important, however. In other parts of the world, people and leaders are closely watching the fallout from America’s behavior in the Middle East—and drawing conclusions that will affect the global balance of power. Michael Oren, a former Israeli ambassador to Washington who served until earlier this year as a deputy minister in the Israeli government, recalls meeting recently with an American military delegation and telling them: “If you think the United States as a global power can pull out of the Middle East and not endanger itself, you are deluding yourselves. When America withdraws from the Middle East unilaterally, the Russians internalize this and move into Crimea and Ukraine; the Chinese internalize it and move into the South China Sea and beyond in the Pacific.” Mr. Oren added, “The Middle East is viewed by the world as a litmus test of American power.” Events in the region are also widely viewed as a litmus test of the value of American friendship. Russia, for one, is winning the argument that it can be a much more reliable ally. Moscow has stood with its brutal client, Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, and helped him to win his country’s civil war. The U.S., by contrast, has discarded a number of allies, such as Egyptian autocrat Hosni Mubarak amid the pro-democracy protests of 2011 BOOOOOOM!! Winter! Starr, Steven. “Nuclear War: An Unrecognized Mass Extinction Event Waiting To Happen” The Helen Caldicott Foundation. The New York Academy of Medicine. March 2015//AB https://ratical.org/radiation/NuclearExtinction/StevenStarr022815.html A war fought with 21st century strategic nuclear weapons would be more than just a great catastrophe in human history. If we allow it to happen, such a war would be a mass extinction event that ends human history. There is a profound difference between extinction and “an unprecedented disaster,” or even “the end of civilization,” because even after such an immense catastrophe, human life would go on. But extinction, by definition, is an event of utter finality, and a nuclear war that could cause human extinction should really be considered as the ultimate criminal act. It certainly would be the crime to end all crimes. The world’s leading climatologists now tell us that nuclear war threatens our continued existence as a species. Their studies predict that a large nuclear war, especially one fought with strategic nuclear weapons, would create a post-war environment in which for many years it would be too cold and dark to even grow food. Their findings make it clear that not only humans, but most large animals and many other forms of complex life would likely vanish forever in a nuclear darkness of our own making. The environmental consequences of nuclear war would attack the ecological support systems of life at every level. Radioactive fallout, produced not only by nuclear bombs, but also by the destruction of nuclear power plants and their spent fuel pools, would poison the biosphere. Millions of tons of smoke would act to destroy Earth’s protective ozone layer and block most sunlight from reaching Earth’s surface, creating Ice Age weather conditions that would last for decades. Pullout = uh oh! Seth Cropsey, Gary Roughead, 10-31-2019, "A U.S. Withdrawal Will Cause a Power Struggle in the Middle East," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/17/us-withdrawal-power-struggle-middle-east-china-russia-iran/, accessed 4-12-2020 //PW While some strategically minded thinkers, such as Andrew Bacevich, advocate redeploying U.S. assets in the Middle East to the Pacific, as opposed to the comprehensive retreat their more isolationist counterparts espouse, the general message remains the same: That there is no longer much value in securing geographically strategic points in the Middle East, and that U.S. security does not depend on it. This perspective is mistaken. Foreign Policy’s Dec. 13 article “RIP the Carter Doctrine” is correct that a stable Persian Gulf benefits the United States indirectly, by safeguarding a global economic and security interest in the steady supply of Middle East energy. In a parallel but opposite direction, an unstable Middle East benefits Russia’s interest in higher energy costs. Debates about U.S. foreign policy usually avoid grand strategy—the notion of a high-level international relations framework. But great powers that do not think strategically will cease to be great powers. Since functionally unifying the North American continent and establishing its hegemony in Latin America in the late 19th century, the United States’ central geopolitical objective has been to prevent any one state from dominating Eurasia, and a look at the nature of the country’s global position explains why. Its involvement in both of the 20th century’s world wars and the Cold War was motivated in large measure to prevent a hegemonic power from dominating Europe. The economic element of today’s competition with China is subordinate to the strategic objective of keeping it from controlling the Eurasian landmass. Geographically isolated from the world’s traditional sources of wealth in Europe and Asia, the United States relied on maritime trade and transport for its economic power, which, in turn, requires access to overseas markets—access a Eurasian great power could hypothetically deny. Moreover, a single political force that commands Eurasia’s population of 5 billion could apply enormous economic, social, and political pressure on smaller and less powerful states in Africa and the Americas.Naval power is the key to ensuring Washington’s ability to move forces between regions at will. For those reasons, the United States has built a global defense system buttressed by a sprawling network of military bases in order to guarantee access to large parts of Eurasia. Considering the United States’ insular geographic position, naval power is the key to ensuring Washington’s ability to move forces between regions at will, to ensure communications with its allies, and to deny options to its enemies. The Middle East’s central location between Europe, East Asia, and Africa makes it geographically vital to U.S. interests. The rise of China had not changed that. U.S. lines of communication and supply between Europe and Asia pass directly through the Middle East. U.S. maritime strategy requires sailing carrier and expeditionary strike groups, submarines, and logistic ships between combatant commands, and passing through the Suez Canal is far more efficient than rounding the Horn of Africa. Although the United States has decreased its reliance on Middle Eastern oil—a fact motivating some of the isolationist rationale for disengagement—Washington’s European and Asian allies still require uninterrupted access to the region’s energy resources. The Levantine Basin and Suez Canal are also international container shipping hubs. Disruption to that regional maritime trade would have immediate, far-reaching global implications. The Ottoman Empire was the last entity to command regional hegemony in the Middle East. No country or group has made a legitimate claim to the mantle of a regional caliphate since. While a united Middle East under any version of a reconstituted caliphate could undermine U.S. interests by projecting power globally, a divided Middle East monopolized by a hostile great power could have the same effect. Either an external power or a regional hegemon could prevent the United States from communicating and coordinating among forces and allies in Europe and Asia and disrupt global economic activity by interrupting U.S. and allied shipping. Eliminating U.S. naval dominance would upend the current balance of power, with severe consequences for Europe and Asia. The pursuit of this mantle in the 21st century has only one true aspirational contender: Iran. But Tehran lacks the resources to conquer the Middle East, and its Shiite character would inflame old sectarian enmities in an explicit imperial campaign. For that reason, Iran’s strategy involves expanding its influence through proxies supported by well-placed special operations forces in an attempt to wear down Saudi and Israeli strength.Eliminating U.S. naval dominance would upend the current balance of power, with severe consequences for Europe and Asia. Israel and Saudi Arabia are the two main challengers to Iran’s ambitions. The Israeli Defense Forces are the only military in the region of Western quality and proficiency. Israel likely operates a secure nuclear second-strike capability, and its foreign intelligence service, Mossad, is one of the world’s best. While Saudi Arabia’s armed forces are of lesser quality, the kingdom has been remarkably adept at cultivating support from Sunni radical groups—necessitated by the United States’ strategic neglect of the region after 2008. And despite questions about its legitimacy, the House of Saud remains custodian of Islam’s two holy cities, Mecca and Medina, a position of great religious and political importance. Nevertheless, neither Israel nor Saudi Arabia can contend for the title of regional hegemon. Moreover, despite its military superiority, Israel does not have the capability or requisite political will. The House of Saud may have considered itself the ruling dynasty of a new caliphate at some point, but contemporary Saudi Arabia has no such delusions. The government understands that oil revenues determine its survival, and an imperial campaign would overstretch the Saudi economy, possibly leading to economic collapse and, worse, revolt. Both Israel and Saudi Arabia operate on the defensive. Turkey is a spoiler in this strategic balance. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has unmistakably neo-Ottoman objectives, but the Turkish Armed Forces are unprepared militarily for the potential confrontation with Iran and Russia that their Syrian offensive could prompt. In the coming years, Ankara will remain a wild card, and the political stance it takes will profoundly influence the strategic landscape. Its position on Iranian expansion is unclear, and even if its current offensive puts it at odds with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime—and by extension with Iran—Erdogan may well forego cooperation with the unofficial Saudi-Israeli entente. But the United States must also contend with its two greatest geopolitical threats, Russia and China—both of which have interests in the Middle East. China, dependent on Middle Eastern energy, seeks to assure its energy supply, complete the midsection of its Belt and Road Initiative, and place at risk the European ports on which the United States would depend in a continental war. China’s objectives challenge Washington’s interest in its NATO and East Asian allies’ need for energy, along with the United States’ long-standing relationship with the continent most closely allied to its political, economic, and security interests. China’s growing control of Mediterranean and European port infrastructure will complicate logistics associated with a U.S. response in the region. Russia has made serious progress toward fulfilling its Middle Eastern strategic objectives of maintaining a decisive hand in the region’s politics, a year-round ice-free port, and a portal through which to influence events beyond the eastern Mediterranean. Russian President Vladimir Putin has no desire to imperialize the Middle East in a manner akin to the Russian Empire’s conquest of Central Asia in the 19th century. Having obtained air and naval bases at Khmeimim and Tartus, both in Syria, Russia can once again turn its focus toward Europe. Still, the Kremlin likely prefers whatever political arrangement will most quickly secure its position as the Middle East’s predominant power, even if that puts it at odds with its erstwhile Iranian ally. Nonstate forces will continue to play a crucial role in the strategic balance. The Kurds are arguably the most relevant of these, because of their highly disruptive presence in Turkish, Iraqi, Iranian, and Syrian national politics and, additionally, because their transnational character gives them the ability to stoke interstate conflict. Iran’s significance will, as a result of its economic woes, likely continue to decline, but the political vacuum it helped create in Iraq and Syria will persist, giving Russia and especially Iran the diplomatic cover to expand their influence. The unique mix of political forces in the Middle East suggests three possibilities in the event of U.S. naval withdrawal from the region, and none favor U.S. interests. First, Russia may broker a political arrangement among Turkey, Israel, and Iran, or, alternatively, support a coalition pitting some of those states against another in an effort to manufacture a manageable regional balance of power and allowing it to shift its attention back to Europe. The final shape of this strategy would depend on several variables: Turkey’s approach to Syria, Israel’s posture against Iran (and its proxies), the outcome of Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen, the Kurdish question, and the possibility of the Islamic State’s resurgence. Regardless of these factors, Russia will still bid for control of the Mediterranean Sea, which the United States will be hard-pressed to counter, particularly if China can manipulate its European economic partners into limiting or expelling the U.S. Navy from its Mediterranean bases. If that happens, Washington will have to fight its way back into the region for the first time since World War II. In the second scenario, Iran defeats Saudi Arabia in a regional confrontation, thereby taking the top leadership spot in the Islamic world, making it a great power in its own right. Control of Middle Eastern oil exports would give Iran the ability to coerce and bully the United States’ European and Pacific allies, and it would deny the United States any peaceful access to the Levantine Basin. The balancing dynamics against this new great power are difficult to project, but regardless, the United States’ ability to control the strategic environment would be hampered markedly. Third, a long-term regional war between Tehran and a fluctuating anti-Iran coalition composed of Saudi Arabia, other Sunni Gulf states, and Israel would cause widespread bloodshed. As the 1980s Iran-Iraq War demonstrated, both Iran and Saudi Arabia would be likely to attempt nuclear breakout. With Iran, this would mean closing the small technological gap that now exists between its low-enriched uranium to the higher level of enrichment needed for a nuclear weapon. The Saudis could pay scientists from a sympathetic Sunni nuclear state—such as Pakistan—or simply buy nuclear weapons from Islamabad. An increasingly fractured and war-ravaged Middle East would spawn more jihadist organizations, and the West would be their primary target. Absent a reliable U.S. presence, Saudi Arabia and perhaps even Israel would increasingly turn to Russia and China as great-power guarantors, leaving U.S. officials in the unfortunate position of hoping polar ice will melt quickly enough to allow unrestricted year-round access over the Arctic, diminishing the importance of the Mediterranean. But hope can only go so far, and the United States needs a more concrete, long-term approach to the Middle East. Despite modest increases in U.S. defense spending in recent years, peer and near-peer competition increasingly puts the predominance of the U.S. military at risk. In testimony before the Senate last year, Adm. Philip S. Davidson, commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, noted that China is “approaching military parity” with the United States “in a number of critical areas,” and that “there is no guarantee that the United States would win a future conflict with China.” The strength of hegemonic powers waxes and wanes, and allies respond accordingly. In 2018, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made the first visit to China by a Japanese leader in seven years. There, he and Chinese President Xi Jinping agreed to elevate bilateral relations. Although Benjamin Netanyahu was first elected prime minister of Israel in 1996, he only visited Russia for the first time during his third term, in 2013. (He did not serve as prime minister during the decade from 1999 to 2009.) Since then he has been to the country 11 times, indicating that staunch allies that had previously relied on the United States for security now sense the need to open lines of communication with its adversaries. The United States should reexamine its global commitments, especially those in the eastern Mediterranean, with a view to Russia’s expanding power. The Trump administration’s foreign and security policies in the region have included several bright spots: the strengthening of U.S.-Israel relations, an aggressive military campaign against the Islamic State, economic sanctions against Iran, and denial of F-35 fighter jet sales to Turkey following its purchase of Russian S-400 surface-to-air missiles. But these have yet to be linked in a coherent strategic policy. Questions that need answers include: What is America’s goal in the region? Is growing Russian military and diplomatic presence consistent with U.S. regional goals? Should Washington leave the blossoming relations between Moscow and Ankara to run their course, and what is to be done if a true alliance between Russia and Turkey emerges? If regime change in Iran is not an option for U.S. policy, what should the goal be? Is it sufficient to assist Israel and Saudi Arabia and hope that they will manage regional tensions that could lead to war with Iran? An examination of the global commitments recommended here should include the possibility of a comprehensive U.S.-Israel treaty that would gather together all the existing nontreaty agreements between the two nations on such matters as military aid, intelligence sharing, defense industrial cooperation, and free trade—to name a few. The United States still retains strong interests in the Middle East. These include the untrammeled flow of oil to allies in Europe and Asia, the defense of democratic Israel, the security of NATO allies bordering the Mediterranean, and preventing conflict between regional powers. If the United States withdraws from the region and hands the responsibility of those issues to another power (or set of powers), it will certainly give rise to another hegemonic power in the region that is hostile to U.S. interests. Such a change would copper-fasten the United States’ loss of great-power status. Trade collapses w/out navy! Mackenzie Eaglen, 5-16-2011, "Thinking About a Day Without Sea Power: Implications for U.S. Defense Policy," Heritage Foundation, https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/thinking-about-day-without-sea-power-implications-us-defense-policy, accessed 4-16-2020 //PW The U.S. Navy ceases to conduct exercises with allies and partners, although it does cooperate in maritime security operations with Canadian maritime forces. Global Implications. Under a scenario of dramatically reduced naval power, the United States would cease to be active in any international alliances. While it is reasonable to assume that land and air forces would be similarly reduced in this scenario, the lack of credible maritime capability to move their bulk and establish forward bases would render these forces irrelevant, even if the Army and Air Force were retained at today’s levels. In Iraq and Afghanistan today, 90 percent of material arrives by sea, although material bound for Afghanistan must then make a laborious journey by land into theater. China’s claims on the South China Sea, previously disputed by virtually all nations in the region and routinely contested by U.S. and partner naval forces, are accepted as a fait accompli, effectively turning the region into a “Chinese lake.” China establishes expansive oil and gas exploration with new deepwater drilling technology and secures its local sea lanes from intervention. Korea, unified in 2017 after the implosion of the North, signs a mutual defense treaty with China and solidifies their relationship. Japan is increasingly isolated and in 2020–2025 executes long-rumored plans to create an indigenous nuclear weapons capability.11 By 2025, Japan has 25 mobile nuclear-armed missiles ostensibly targeting China, toward which Japan’s historical animus remains strong. China’s entente with Russia leaves the Eurasian landmass dominated by Russia looking west and China looking east and south. Each cedes a sphere of dominance to the other and remains largely unconcerned with the events in the other’s sphere. Worldwide, trade in foodstuffs collapses. Expanding populations in the Middle East increase pressure on their governments, which are already stressed as the breakdown in world trade disproportionately affects food importers. Piracy increases worldwide, driving food transportation costs even higher. In the Arctic, Russia aggressively asserts its dominance and effectively shoulders out other nations with legitimate claims to seabed resources. No naval power exists to counter Russia’s claims. Our military is quite mighty Daniel Goure, Summer 2013, "How U.S. Military Power Holds the World Together – Jewish Policy Center," https://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/2013/05/31/us-military-power/, accessed 4-16-2020 //PW The second problem is the presumption that the country’s global security posture was created and maintained to serve others. In reality, the United States built a global security architecture and the world’s best military because it served our interests. Our network of security ties and treaties, most notably NATO, were instituted to serve a number of functions: prevent another war among the Western powers, deter the Soviet Union and its allies, and ensure that the major economic regions remain free and that global trade flowed. In the 1970s, based on the experience of the oil embargo, the U.S. focused more on the security of the Persian Gulf because of the growing importance of Middle East oil to the national economy and that of the entire industrialized world. While the Soviet Union is no more, the essential self-interestedness of America’s military role in the world remains. Any oil expert would say that even though the U.S. is less dependent than a decade ago on foreign oil, a cutoff of the flow from the Middle East would cause oil prices to go through the ceiling. A war across the Taiwan Straits or between the two Koreas will cost us hundreds of billions in lost trade and investment income, not to mention that it would cut off most of the world’s supply of computer chips and consumer electronics. The world’s economy and America’s well being depend on the independence of a relative handful of nations, most of whom are allies. The third problem with the case for abandoning America’s role as the security linchpin of a democratic world order and an international free trade system is simply this: while this country can run, it cannot hide. The U.S. is still the largest economy—at worst it will be number two behind China some day. America’s major companies are global, have hundreds of billions of dollars invested overseas, and millions of citizens working or traveling abroad. American culture permeates—foreign extremists would say pollutes—the world. To truly avoid international entanglements this nation would have to behave like a cloistered monk with vows of poverty and silence. Too Late to Hide Even if America runs, as the far left and right propose, it is too late to hide. Those who choose to be enemies can come after the United States. This is the lesson of 9-11. It also is the message that North Korea sent with its latest tests of a nuclear weapon and long-range ballistic missile. China, one of America’s largest trading partners and the holder of a trillion dollars in U.S. debt, is conducting a massive and continuous cyber assault on the nation’s private companies, infrastructure, and military facilities. To what mountaintop can America withdraw, how small must it become, and how meekly will it have to behave in order to ensure its security? The irony is that the cost of the U.S. military had for decades represented a small and declining percentage of both overall GDP and total federal spending. Today, defense spending is about 4 percent of GDP and less than 20 percent of federal spending. For this relatively small sum the U.S. had to deter major wars—including nuclear attacks on the homeland—contain innumerable local conflicts, create an environment in which a community of democratic nations emerged, grown, and flourished, and secured literally trillions of dollars of overseas investments, trade flows, and natural resources. It is a tragedy of epic proportions that all this should be put at risk. MINES Iran got sum mines Cordesman, Anthony. “The Iranian Sea-Air-Missile Threat to Gulf Shipping” CSIS. August 14, 2014//AB https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/140815_Iran_Air_Sea_Missile_Maritime_Threat.pdf Iran has a considerable capacity to lay mines. It has stock of at least 2,000-3,000 naval mines – and some reports put the total as high as 20,000, including 5,000 bottom-influence and smart mines – as well as hundreds of vessels it could muster to lay them. In addition to the aforementioned combat vessels, Iran could use a wide range of other surface ships to mine a given portion of the Gulf (any surface ship can release mines). Although the exact composition of Iran’s arsenal of mines is highly uncertain, Iran is thought to have increased its stocks of mines from some 1,500 at the time of the Iran-Iraq War to well over 6,000, be able to produce large numbers of cheap conventional mines, and have adapted and produced a range of smart mines. Iran is believed to have significant stocks of more advanced “smart mines” equivalent to mines like the Russian MDM-6 and the Chinese EM-52, as well as the Chinese MC-52, the EM-55, the EM-31, and the EM11. Mines with capabilities like those of the EM-52 and the MDM-6, as well as any other similar “smart” mines in Iran’s arsenal, may be capable of tracking multiple targets, and can be difficult to detect as they rest on or near the seafloor. In one case in 1982, a British minesweeper took six days to identify and neutralize one large smart mine in the Red Sea.118 Even relatively unsophisticated “dumb” mines, however, present a threat to US forces and Gulf shipping, as they are not easily detected or removed, and can be laid in large numbers by almost any ship that has the capacity to physically carry them. For instance, an Iranian M-08 World War I-era mine nearly sank the USS Samuel B Roberts after the ship struck it on April 14, 1988.119 Although the M-08 is an antiquated moored contact mine, it nearly sank an advanced US naval ship that was caught off guard. Consequently, Iran’s ability to lay a large number of mines in a short period of time remains a critical aspect to its stated capability to deny US forces access to the Gulf, and impede or halt shipping through the Strait. Removing mines Stillwell, Blake. Former Air Force member. Degrees in International Relations, Public Relations and Middle Eastern Affairs. “How the Navy is Taking Divers Out Of Minesweeping” Military.Com February 4, 2020//AB https://www.military.com/daily-news/2020/02/04/how-navy-taking-divers-out-minesweeping.html Defense contractor Raytheon estimates there are currently 250,000 mines around the world, just waiting to be laid in the oceans. Many of those are held by Iran, which regularly threatens to close the Strait of Hormuz with them. Modern mines aren't necessarily the big round contraptions with spikes just waiting for a ship to float into them that some imagine. Mine technology has evolved to use different trigger mechanisms, including seismic, acoustic, pressure and magnetic. But the U.S. Navy's means of detecting and defusing them hasn't changed much. "All of the current methods we have are very slow; very, very dangerous; cumbersome; and quite expensive," Wade Knudson, a former naval aviator and now senior director of Undersea Warfare Systems at Raytheon, told Military.com. "Areas that state actors might choose to mine are vitally important and considerable in size. Somebody can easily disrupt commerce and the world's economy could suffer from that, depending on where that were to occur." The Navy has 11 minesweepers, many still clearing mines the old-fashioned way. They hunt for mines using sonar; dispatch divers to disable them; and then tow the mines away. To clear the entire Persian Gulf of mines would require many of the Navy's minesweeping ships out in the water for a "sustained period of time," according to one officer quoted in a ProPublica report about the service's aging mine-clearing ships, many of which are past retirement age. That report complained of ancient sonar systems, run on Windows 2000, finding not only mines, but also dishwashers and car parts. But the Navy is out to make a change. Raytheon and the service have developed a "single sortie detect to engage" system that clears mines 10 times faster than current methods and includes the new AQS-20 sonar system. If "Single Sortie Detect-to-Engage" sounds like a suicide mission, that's not far off. But there will be no more human divers engaging with mines. This system eliminates that risk. The unmanned technology's sonar improvements can spot mines from any direction, relay that information in high-definition and then neutralize the explosive using another drone called a "barracuda." This process is also known as In-Stride Mine Clearance. Clearing underwater mines can now be a faster, less dangerous process with this technology. An unmanned surface vehicle is deployed into a minefield, be it in an ocean, sea lane or harbor ~-~- anywhere mines can be deployed. Then the AQS-20 sonar is dropped into the water and towed by the drone ship, searching as it moves. When a mine is detected, the barracuda neutralizer drone is deployed. Once released, the neutralizer navigates to the mine, identifies it and transmits an HD image of the mine to its human handlers. When it gets confirmation that its target is in fact a mine, the barracuda detonates the explosive, clearing the mine. The system can repeat the process for nearly any kind of mine, whether on the seabed, the surface or even tethered. Once the mines are cleared, the USV returns to its handlers. All of this will be just one more mission package available to the Navy's 35 advanced Littoral Combat Ships. The new tech was developed for just $83 million. "It's the latest technology," Knudson said. "That's why it gives such a good view of those mines. But most importantly, the barracuda is doing the dangerous work to keep sailors as safe as possible during these missions." Naval Mines risk oil spills and conflict Pickrell, Ryan. “An oddly-placed mine suggests Iran may have been purposefully pulling its punches in the tanker attacks so far” Business Insider. June 14, 2019//AB https://www.businessinsider.com/oddly-placed-mine-offers-insight-into-motive-of-tanker-attackers-2019-6 The peculiar placement of an unexploded mine suggests that the aim of Thursday's tanker attacks, like the attacks last month, was to threaten shipping without igniting a conflict. The USS Bainbridge, a US Navy destroyer sent in to assist in the aftermath of the attacks, spotted a suspected limpet mine attached to the hull of the Kokuka Courageous, one of the two targeted tankers. US Central Command released photos of the mine, as well as a video of an Iranian patrol boat crew sailing out and taking it off the ship's hull. The US has blamed Iran for the attacks. A limpet mine, a weapon named after a small sea creature that clings to hard surfaces, is a remotely-detonated explosive that can be attached to a ship using magnets. The one in the picture provided by CENTCOM was noticeably placed high above the vessel's waterline. Given the placement of the explosive, "the intent was likely to send a message and harass rather than cause significant damage," Bryan Clark, a defense expert, explained to Business Insider. A hard hit below the waterline, depending on the placement, could be much more serious. There is a greater potential for the tanker to sink, crew members to be killed, or an environmental disaster like an oil spill — all impacts more likely to trigger an aggressive response. Limpet mines are suspected to have been the weapon of choice in an attack on four tankers in May, an attack which the US also blamed on Iran. An investigation into the attacks concluded that the explosives, while they were attached below the waterline, were purposefully and precisely placed to incapacitate but not sink the large vessels. These attacks look like calculated moves to terrify ship crews and shock the oil market without risking a full-scale military response by the US. This looks like high-end gray-zone aggression. There is certainly room for this situation to escalate and worsen. Biodiversity GONE gone Levin, Noam. “Global assessment of marine biodiversity potentially threatened by offshore hydrocarbon activities” Wiley Online Library, Centre of Excellence for Environmental Decisions, The University of Queensland, St Lucia, QLD, Australia. March 10, 2019//AB https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/gcb.14616 (https://sci-hub.tw/https://doi.org/10.1111/gcb.14616) But more conspicuously, the effects from oil spills could be fatal due to potentially high population mortality and slow recovery rates, caused either by indirect effects from oil spills or by cumulative impacts. For instance, it is estimated that the Exxon Valdez oil spill killed 250,000 seabirds, 2,800 sea otters, 300 seals and many other numbers of marine organisms, and that local populations of Pacific herring and killer whales have yet to recover 16 years later (Aderhold and Holderied, 2018). In another notorious accident, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 killed an estimate of at least 600,000 birds (Haney, Geiger, and Short, 2014), 95,000 to 200,000 sea turtles (Hale et al., 2017), and reduced big reef and demersal fish biomass by 25 to 50 and 40 to 70 respectively (Ainsworth et al., 2018). Since 2010, nesting numbers of the critically endangered Kemp's Ridley turtles, whose adult popula? tion is mostly limited to the Gulf of Mexico has decreased (Putman et al., 2015) Oopsey Poops! Extinction! Watts, Jonathan. “Stop biodiversity loss or we could face our own extinction, warns UN” The Guardian. November 6, 2018 //AB https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/nov/03/stop-biodiversity-loss-or-we-could-face-our-own-extinction-warns-un The world must thrash out a new deal for nature in the next two years or humanity could be the first species to document our own extinction, warns the United Nation’s biodiversity chief. Ahead of a key international conference to discuss the collapse of ecosystems, Cristiana Pa?ca Palmer said people in all countries need to put pressure on their governments to draw up ambitious global targets by 2020 to protect the insects, birds, plants and mammals that are vital for global food production, clean water and carbon sequestration. “The loss of biodiversity is a silent killer,” she told the Guardian. “It’s different from climate change, where people feel the impact in everyday life. With biodiversity, it is not so clear but by the time you feel what is happening, it may be too late.” Pa?ca Palmer is executive secretary of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity – the world body responsible for maintaining the natural life support systems on which humanity depends. Its members – 195 states and the EU – will meet in Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt, this month to start discussions on a new framework for managing the world’s ecosystems and wildlife. This will kick off two years of frenetic negotiations, which Pa?ca Palmer hopes will culminate in an ambitious new global deal at the next conference in Beijing in 2020. Conservationists are desperate for a biodiversity accord that will carry the same weight as the Paris climate agreement. But so far, this subject has received miserably little attention even though many scientists say it poses at least an equal threat to humanity. The last two major biodiversity agreements – in 2002 and 2010 – have failed to stem the worst loss of life on Earth since the demise of the dinosaurs. Eight years ago, under the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, nations promised to at least halve the loss of natural habitats, ensure sustainable fishing in all waters, and expand nature reserves from 10 to 17 of the world’s land by 2020. But many nations have fallen behind, and those that have created more protected areas have done little to police them. “Paper reserves” can now be found from Brazil to China. The issue is also low on the political agenda. Compared to climate summits, few heads of state attend biodiversity talks. Even before Donald Trump, the US refused to ratify the treaty and only sends an observer. Along with the Vatican, it is the only UN state not to participate. Pa?ca Palmer says there are glimmers of hope. Several species in Africa and Asia have recovered (though most are in decline) and forest cover in Asia has increased by 2.5 (though it has decreased elsewhere at a faster rate). Marine protected areas have also widened. But overall, she says, the picture is worrying. The already high rates of biodiversity loss from habitat destruction, chemical pollution and invasive species will accelerate in the coming 30 years as a result of climate change and growing human populations. By 2050, Africa is expected to lose 50 of its birds and mammals, and Asian fisheries to completely collapse. The loss of plants and sea life will reduce the Earth’s ability to absorb carbon, creating a vicious cycle. “The numbers are staggering,” says the former Romanian environment minister. “I hope we aren’t the first species to document our own extinction.”
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Hi! We're Holden and Taha! We believe theory is a really good thing, and most times it's crucial to set norms and stop abuse in rounds. However, we think that telling a team what norm to follow before the round (i.e. disclosing, paraphrasing, etc) is a lot better than running theory during the round after the damage has been done for 3 reasons: A) Asking us to fulfill an interpretation before the round prevents it from being violated in the first place, which overall provides a fairer round from the beginning B) It prevents frivolous shells with really obscure interpretations from being ran C) It allows discussion on the actual substance to take place rather than progressive argumentation, which is a lot more educational Thus, If you have a norm that you think is good/bad in debate, tell us BEFORE THE ROUND. If you fail to do this, any theory ran in round would be considered abusive, and we would auto meet any interpretation you propose. If you have any questions, comments, concerns, or any norms you want to tell us before the round, please contact us! Holden (He/Him): (916) 317-2232 (Preferred method of contact) [email protected] Also follow my Instagram @sacholden Taha (He/Him): [email protected]
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Tensions are high on Colombia-Vz border - fueling fears of armed conflict Romero-Castillo, Evan. “Venezuela and Colombia border tension fuels fear of armed conflict.” Deutsche Welle. September 2019DY https://www.dw.com/en/venezuela-and-colombia-border-tension-fuels-fear-of-armed-conflict/a-50465410) We use cookies to improve our service for you. You can find more information in our data protection declaration. More info OK Inhalt Navigation Weitere Inhalte Metanavigation Suche Choose from 30 Languages Albanian Shqip Amharic ???? Arabic ??????? Bengali ????? Bosnian B/H/S Bulgarian ????????? Chinese (Simplified) ? Chinese (Traditional) ? Croatian Hrvatski Dari ??? English English French Français German Deutsch Greek ???????? Hausa Hausa Hindi ?????? Indonesian Indonesia Kiswahili Kiswahili Macedonian ?????????? Pashto ???? Persian ????? Polish Polski Portuguese Português para África Portuguese Português do Brasil Romanian Român? Russian ??????? 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DW.COM IN 30 LANGUAGES DW AKADEMIE ABOUT DW DW.COM Deutsche Welle TOP STORIESGermanyBerlin WallBrexitWorldEuropeGermany and Turkey - A difficult relationshipAfricaThe 77 PercentCrime FightersAfrica on the MoveAsiaAmericasMiddle EastBusinessFounders ValleyWo+menMy 2030ScienceEnvironmentGlobal IdeasIn focusDoingYourBitEco AfricaLiving PlanetCultureFilmBooksMusicArtsDigital CultureLifestyleTravelBTHVN2020Sports SPECIAL 100 Must-Reads50 kitchens, one cityBaking BreadDW FreedomExpedition HumboldtGutenberg in the CyberstormPlanet BerlinThe Migration DilemmaWorld War IMEDIA CENTERLive TVAll media contentLatest ProgramsPodcastsTVSchedule and ReceptionTV Programs TV PROGRAMS Arts.21Arts and CultureBusinessCheck-inClose upConflict ZoneDocFilmDW NewsEco AfricaEco IndiaEuromaxxFaith MattersFocus on EuropeGlobal 3000In Good ShapeKick off!Made in GermanyReporterREVShiftSports LifeThe DayThe 77 PercentTomorrow TodayTo the PointWorld StoriesRADIOLEARN GERMAN GERMAN COURSES German CoursesQuick startHarryDeutsch InteraktivRadio DMission EuropeDeutsch - warum nicht?AudiotrainerDeutschtrainerDie Bienenretter GERMAN XXL German XXLDeutsch AktuellDeutsch im FokusTelenovelaBandtagebuchLandeskunde COMMUNITY D Community DDas PorträtPodcasts and NewsletterService TEACHING GERMAN Teaching GermanDW im UnterrichtUnterrichtsreihenDeutschlehrer-InfoGERMANYBREXITWORLDBUSINESSSCIENCEENVIRONMENTCULTURESPORTS TOP STORIES / WORLD / AMERICAS Advertisement AMERICAS Venezuela and Colombia border tension fuels fear of armed conflict A large-scale military exercise and the invoking of a regional defense pact have Venezuela and Colombia on edge. How likely is a military confrontation between the South American neighbors? Venezuelan troops participating in a military ecercise near the Colombian border (picture alliance/AP Photo/R. U. Rojas) What's driving the current tension? Helicopters, armored vehicles, anti-aircraft batteries, mobile rocket launchers and troops — last week Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro launched a military maneuver on the border with Colombia to demonstrate that Venezuela is capable of warding off a possible invasion. Remigio Ceballos, head of the armed forces' High Command, led the first day of the exercises and said that Venezuela "had friends all over the world" — in reference to the presumed presence of Russian and Cuban officers among the 150,000 soldiers. Then on September 12, the United States invoked the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR), also known as the Rio Treaty. Washington said the call to invoke the regional defense pact, which could facilitate a military offensive against the Maduro government, came from the opposition. Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaido and the states supporting him have not recognized Maduro's recent election to a second term in office, claiming the vote was manipulated. The Venezuelan government, which withdrew from the TIAR in 2013, describes the opposition's call to enforce the agreement as a "hostile act" against national sovereignty. Juan Guaido speaks to the press (picture-alliance/NurPhoto) The US said the call to invoke the TIAR came from the Venezuelan opposition, which is led by Guaido How likely is war? Sabine Kurtenbach, deputy director of the Hamburg-based GIGA Institute for Latin American Studies, sees the TIAR dispute as the source of the current tensions. "The military exercises are Maduro's response to Guaido's call for members of the Organization of American States to apply the TIAR agreement against Maduro," Kurtenbach said, adding that Ivan Duque, the president of Colombia, has accused Maduro of harboring Colombian guerrillas on Venezuelan territory. Read more: At Venezuela's Bolivar bridge, refugees begin an arduous journey But it is unlikely a war will break out between these two countries, she said. "Neither really wants that — people in Bogota and Caracas are aware it would be a disaster, and no one on the continent is in favor of multilateral military intervention in Venezuela, regardless of whether TIAR is activated or not." In addition, Kurtenbach said, it is impossible to imagine a regional military intervention in Venezuela without the participation of the United States. The White House has just fired its national security adviser, John Bolton — precisely because of his bellicose attitude, she pointed out. "Washington doesn't seem to want to initiate another military adventure." 'War can't be ruled out' However, Detlef Nolte, Latin American expert from the German Council on Foreign Relations in Berlin, noted that these kinds of conflicts "often develop their own dynamics." That's why, he said, "a war cannot be completely ruled out." Bilateral relations have also become complicated, he added. "At the joint border, Colombian ELN and FARC guerrillas, the Colombian military and the Venezuelan military that is participating in the military exercise are coming pretty close," he said. FARC guerillas stand on guard in Colombia (picture-alliance/dpa/EPA/C. E. Mora) Colombian guerillas, as well as the Colombian and Venezuelan armies are operating in close proximity in the border region Intervention by the US is also conceivable, said Nolte, who believes that Bolton's dismissal is "not so crucial." Should Maduro prevail, the United States would probably carry out selective attacks without intervening on a large scale, he said. Conflict not 'first choice' in the TIAR Phil Gunson of the International Crisis Group, a nongovernmental organization dedicated to conflict prevention around the world, agrees that Venezuela's potential re-entry into the TIAR agreement does not necessarily mean its members are willing to overthrow Maduro. "The TIAR agreement does not proclaim military intervention as the first choice for conflict resolution," he said. Read more: How millions of 'dirty dollars' were laundered out of Venezuela "On the contrary, the agreement demands that all peaceful aspirations be exhausted before resorting to a military option," Gunson said, pointing out that military intervention in Venezuela would require the approval of the UN Security Council. "And that will not happen," he said. "If both sides listen to reason, there will be no war between Colombia and Venezuela," Nolte said. A group of refugees waiting for their lunch VENEZUELANS FIND REFUGE, SOLIDARITY IN COLOMBIA Waiting in line Venezuelan migrants wait in line to have their registration number and details checked before receiving their lunch. The UN's World Food Program serves food three times a day. 12345678910 DW RECOMMENDS Venezuela ready to defend itself after US invokes Rio Treaty Foreign Minister Jorge Arreaza has described the US' decision to invoke a defense pact as "illegal" and "dangerous." Washington has said they were left with little choice due to "bellicose" moves from Venezuela. (14.09.2019) Venezuela launches military exercises, warns Colombia Venezuelan President Maduro has accused Colombia of plotting his overthrow, while Bogota said Venezuela harbors and backs rogue rebel fighters. The US offered Colombia its "full support" against any attempted aggression. (11.09.2019) Colombian troops kill nine FARC rebels in raid A military operation in southern Colombia killed nine members of the rebel group FARC. The raid followed a call to arms by former FARC leader Ivan Marquez. (31.08.2019) At Venezuela's Bolivar bridge, refugees begin an arduous journey The Simon Bolivar bridge spanning Venezuela and Colombia has been largely shut since February 23. The site of repeated protests, it has since become known around the world. DW visited the contentious crossing. (03.04.2019) How millions of 'dirty dollars' were laundered out of Venezuela Starting in 2014, members of the country's elite and public officials embezzled more than $1 billion from Venezuela's state-owned oil company. The scheme exploited the country's foreign exchange system. (13.03.2019) Donald Trump fires national security chief John Bolton The US president said he "disagreed strongly with many of his suggestions." Bolton, a hawkish neoconservative best known for his "Axis of Evil" views, was a key figure in the US administrations of both Bushes and Reagan. (10.09.2019) Venezuelans find refuge, solidarity in Colombia Colombia's Maicao is infamous for its drug and people smuggling, violence and sexual exploitation. Venezuelan refugees living on the streets are an easy target. But a UNHCR-run reception center is offering a way out. (13.07.2019) Date 17.09.2019 Author Evan Romero-Castillo Related Subjects Venezuela Keywords Venezuela, Columbia, Nicolas Maduro, Juan Guaido, USA Feedback: Send us your feedback. Print Print this page Permalink https://p.dw.com/p/3PkME RELATED CONTENT Venezuela Caracas | Juan Guaido, Oppositionsführer Venezuela's opposition leader Guaido sits at contested parliamentary speaker chair 07.01.2020 Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaido and a former ally have staked rival claims to the parliamentary speaker post. The National Assembly is the sole institution outside the hands of President Maduro's Socialists. Venezuela Caracas | Juan Guaido, ehemaliger Präsident der Nationalversammlung Venezuela opposition denounces 'parliamentary coup' 05.01.2020 Opposition leader Juan Guaido and rival lawmaker Luis Parra are both claiming to be the next head of the National Assembly. Guaido, barred from entering congress, had a heated exchange with security forces. Venezuela Caracas Maduro 20 Jahre Verfassung Venezuela: Opposition lawmakers to be tried for treason 16.12.2019 Self-proclaimed interim president Juan Guaido said the trial was another attempt by Nicolas Maduro to take over the opposition-led legislature. The move comes as the opposition has been weakened by corruption scandals. Date 17.09.2019 Author Evan Romero-Castillo Related Subjects Venezuela Keywords Venezuela, Columbia, Nicolas Maduro, Juan Guaido, USA Send us your feedback. Print Print this page Permalink https://p.dw.com/p/3PkME Advertisement TOP STORIES Germany Brexit World Business Science Environment Culture Sports A - Z Index MEDIA CENTER Live TV All media content Latest Programs Podcasts TV Schedule and Reception TV Programs RADIO LEARN GERMAN German Courses German XXL Community D Teaching German ABOUT DW Who we are Press GMF Business and Sales Advertising Travel SERVICE Reception Apps and Co. Newsletters and Co. FAQ Contact DW AKADEMIE About us Media Development Master's Degree Traineeship Training © 2020 Deutsche Welle | Privacy Policy | Legal notice | Contact | Mobile version Colombia fears Venezuela - accuses them of providing a safe haven for Colombia rebel groups Cobb, Julia. “Colombia's Duque seeks international sanctions on Venezuela to protect region.” Reuters. September 2019DY https://www.reuters.com/article/us-colombia-politics-idUSKBN1W700B) Directory of sites Login Contact Support Business Markets World Politics TV More Flag of United States WORLD NEWSSEPTEMBER 21, 2019 / 8:32 PM / 4 MONTHS AGO Colombia's Duque seeks international sanctions on Venezuela to protect region Julia Symmes Cobb, Luis Jaime Acosta 4 MIN READ BOGOTA (Reuters) - Colombian President Ivan Duque called on Saturday for coordinated international sanctions targeting Venezuela to help stop President Nicolas Maduro’s support for Colombian rebels and drug traffickers from destabilizing Latin America. FILE PHOTO: Colombia's President Ivan Duque is seen after a news conference at the Presidential Palace in Bogota, Colombia August 5, 2019. REUTERS/Luisa Gonzalez Duque, who accuses Maduro of providing a safe haven for Colombian rebel fighters from the now-demobilized FARC guerrilla group and the still-active ELN rebels, compared the Venezuelan leader to former Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, who was put on trial for alleged war crimes in conflicts that destabilized the Balkans. “We should look at communal sanctions and actions so that the threat of (Venezuela) protecting terrorism in its territory ends,” Duque told Reuters before traveling to the United Nations General Assembly meeting in New York. “The international community must understand that the dictatorship has to come to an end soon because the humanitarian tragedy, in addition to the consolidation of a dictatorial regime that is coexisting with drug cartels and with terrorism, is a threat for the whole Western hemisphere and for the stability of the world.” Maduro accuses Colombia of preparing to attack Venezuela, and has repeatedly warned of an invasion coordinated with the U.S. government. Latin American countries could invoke the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, known by its Spanish initials TIAR, against Maduro, Duque said. The treaty considers an attack on any of the signatories to be an attack on them all. “The TIAR has been invoked many times and many times with success, but the invocation of it doesn’t necessarily have to refer in an explicit way to military actions,” Duque said. “What’s important first is coordinated action.” Washington, which has levied several rounds of sanctions against Maduro’s government, has expressed hope that European nations will also impose sanctions in the coming months. Most western nations consider Maduro illegitimate - saying he secured a second term last year via a fraudulent vote. Colombia is among the countries which back opposition leader Juan Guaido as Venezuela’s rightful leader. Maduro says Guaido is a U.S. puppet seeking a coup. Colombia stands ready to confront any attack by former members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)rebels, a group of whom recently rearmed, Duque said. “When they decide to enter Colombian territory we’ll be here waiting with all of the strength of the armed forces,” Duque said. “You can never minimize an effort to defeat terrorism.” Colombia has lately come under pressure from the Trump administration to reduce the cultivation of coca, the base ingredient in cocaine, which hit record levels in recent years. But Duque said the fight to eradicate half of the more than 200,000 hectares of the plant by 2023 is his country’s own. “The fight against drug trafficking is a fight of conviction, of principles, we don’t do it because of pressure from anyone,” he said. Reporting by Julia Symmes Cobb and Luis Jaime Acosta; Editing by Daniel Flynn, Daniel Wallis and David Gregorio Our Standards:The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles. MORE FROM REUTERS ADVERTISEMENT TRENDING UK's Harry and Meghan to drop titles and retire as working royals Virginia's top House Republican warns "white supremacist garbage" to stay away from gun rally 'Simply a lie,' Biden accuses Sanders campaign of releasing 'doctored' video "You're stealing our water": Germans protest against Tesla gigafactory In impeachment document, Democrats say Trump endangers security, Trump denies ADVERTISEMENT REUTERS NEWS NOW Subscribe to our daily curated newsletter to receive the latest exclusive Reuters coverage delivered to your inbox. Submit AppsNewslettersAdvertise with UsAdvertising GuidelinesCookiesTerms of UsePrivacy All quotes delayed a minimum of 15 minutes. See here for a complete list of exchanges and delays. © 2020 Reuters. All Rights Reserved. Plan A is US Sanctions, Plan B is violence - Santos baby Santos, Francisco. “Venezuela Hovers On The Brink Of Conflict — Many Fear The Situation Will Escalate.” DW. March 2019DY https://www.npr.org/2019/03/28/707722484/venezuela-hovers-on-the-brink-of-conflict-many-fear-the-situation-will-escalate) Accessibility links Skip to main content Keyboard shortcuts for audio player WAMU 88.5 Freakonomics Radio HOURLY NEWS LISTEN LIVE PLAYLIST NPR logo Station Logo SIGN IN NPR SHOP DONATE NEWS Expand/collapse submenu for News ARTS and LIFE Expand/collapse submenu for Arts and Life MUSIC Expand/collapse submenu for Music SHOWS and PODCASTS Expand/collapse submenu for Shows and Podcasts SEARCH WORLD Venezuela Hovers On The Brink Of Conflict — Many Fear The Situation Will Escalate Facebook Twitter Flipboard Email March 28, 20194:07 PM ET Heard on All Things Considered LISTEN· 11:12 11-Minute Listen PLAYLIST Download Embed Transcript Venezuela is already in an economic and political crisis, but many worry that things could escalate into a civil war, a regional conflict, or even U.S. intervention. AILSA CHANG, HOST: The situation in Venezuela is combustible. The U.S. recognizes a president who is not in power, Juan Guaido. Venezuela's sitting President, Nicolas Maduro, refuses to leave, and he has heavily armed backers - the military and paramilitary groups called colectivos. AUDIE CORNISH, HOST: Guaido says today preparations for Operation Liberty begin, and the tactical phase begins April 6. It's unclear exactly what that means. It could be another large demonstration. The concern is it could mean violence. Our co-host Ari Shapiro has spent the last week on the border of Colombia and Venezuela looking at this possibility. Hey there, Ari. ARI SHAPIRO, BYLINE: Hi, Audie. CORNISH: So what makes the border with Colombia specifically such a tinderbox? SHAPIRO: Well, this is the biggest border crossing point from Venezuela. More than a million Venezuelans have crossed into Colombia recently, and every day, thousands of people go back and forth from Venezuela to Colombia to find food or make money. Because Venezuela's economy has collapsed, inflation has made people's savings worthless, and there's no medicine in Venezuela. People cross the border to find food, education, work - for all of those reasons. CORNISH: All right, let's dig into this more. Where do you want to begin? SHAPIRO: We're going to start right at the border that separates Venezuela and Colombia. It's the semen Simon Bolivar Bridge, the main artery leading to the Colombian city of Cucuta. For the last month, this bridge has been totally closed to vehicles and to most foot traffic, but people still use illegal crossings, sometimes wading across a river, holding their stuff over their heads, to get into Colombia. As you approach this border from the Colombian side, you're surrounded by a crush of people, many of them Venezuelan. (CROSSTALK) SHAPIRO: There is a huge throng of thousands of people selling everything from cigarettes to medicine to mango. Some are offering to sell bus tickets. Others are offering to buy hair. As taxis pull up to the border area, there are literally hundreds of young guys lining the street. And as the taxis slow down, the guys just sprint alongside them, shouting in the window, asking for a few coins to carry luggage. These taxis carry Venezuelans who crossed into Colombia to run errands. And one of the guys chasing down those cabs is a 20-year-old named Luis. He told me these young men have a lot of time to stand around and talk and also to plan. We're only using his first name because, well, he wants to overthrow his government. LUIS #1: (Through interpreter) We're all on the same page. The government that's in power needs to go. It can't stay this way. SHAPIRO: People will hear this and say you are arguing for a civil war; you want a civil war in your country. Is that what you are pushing for? LUIS #1: (Through interpreter) No, it's not that I want a civil war. It's that we want everyone to come together and the current government to leave. SHAPIRO: He tells us he'd be eager to make that happen through force. Give him a gun, and he will charge across the border with it. A lot of people will say that's a pipe dream. Maduro has heavily armed supporters, including near the border. So if a bunch of Venezuelans try to charge in from Colombia, those young men could easily get massacred. But that alone could start a chain reaction. And I met a lot of Venezuelans who are afraid that that chain reaction could even lead to U.S. military involvement. LIJIA BLANCO: (Through interpreter) People say Donald Trump will invade Venezuela, take oil and all the riches. SHAPIRO: Lijia Blanco is a 72-year-old who walks with a cane. She describes her fears of war, comparing Venezuela to Libya. And tears roll down her cheeks. BLANCO: (Through interpreter) They say that they'll come in with bombs, and it'll be like how they killed that guy Gadhafi and the Arabs. I don't want that for Venezuela because it's the people who will suffer. SHAPIRO: If you could say something to the Trump administration, what would you say? BLANCO: (Through interpreter) I tell him, look, mijo; help Venezuela in some other way because we're dying. The children are dying. SHAPIRO: Blanco is eating lunch at a Catholic soup kitchen on the border that serves up to 8,000 hot meals a day mostly to Venezuelans who can't find food on their side of the border. The plates are full of beans and rice, potatoes, eggs and tuna. Father David Cana is the priest who oversees this shelter. DAVID CANA: (Through interpreter) Just as people in a hospital see blood every day, we see sadness, despair and hunger. SHAPIRO: Cana wears an apron that says in Spanish, beautiful mother, quench our thirst, with a picture of the Virgin Mary. But even in this place of peace, people dream of war. LUIS #2: (Through interpreter) In my state, armed groups are forming to go confront the government of Nicolas Maduro. SHAPIRO: This is Luis, a 58-year-old construction worker eating at the long tables of families. LUIS #2: (Through interpreter) It's happening in secret, but I was invited to participate. SHAPIRO: What did you say when they invited you? LUIS #2: (Through interpreter) Yes, yes, I'm going to do it. SHAPIRO: So what do you need from the United States? LUIS #2: (Speaking Spanish). SHAPIRO: "We'd like them to put their hands in our country." Luis says he would go. He doesn't have any experience fighting, but others in this border town do. This is a street that was once full of high-end hotels that were popular with Venezuelan tourists. One of them has a billboard outside with a picture of pink dolphins jumping out of the water. But most of these resorts and hotels are now closed because the Venezuelans on the other side of the border no longer have the money to come spend to stay here. One of these shuttered resorts is now being used to house high-level military defectors from Venezuela. They're only allowed out of the hotel a couple of hours a day, and they've agreed to spend those hours with us to talk about their hopes for a violent overthrow of the Maduro regime. Hola. UNIDENTIFIED PERSON #1: Hola. SHAPIRO: Ari. We sit with these four young men near the ruins of a cathedral that was destroyed in an earthquake more than a century ago. One was in the special forces of the Venezuelan police. The others were in the equivalent of the FBI, the Navy and the Army. They range in age from 19 to 27, and they tell us they have only one mission. UNIDENTIFIED PERSON #2: (Through interpreter) We are here to overwhelmingly attack the dictatorial regime of Maduro. SHAPIRO: They use their leader Juan Guaido's phrase Operation Liberty. Williams Cansino seems to be the spokesman for this small group. He has a detailed understanding of who in the U.S. is making decisions on Venezuela. WILLIAMS CANSINO: (Through interpreter) We're asking for help from President Donald Trump, Vice President Mike Pence, Senator Marco Rubio, national security adviser John Bolton and special adviser for Venezuela Elliott Abrams. Please, it's time to act. SHAPIRO: So many Americans remember what happened in Iraq with Saddam Hussein or what happened in Afghanistan where years later. The United States has no way out of the country. And they fear that that could happen in Venezuela. CANSINO: (Through interpreter) That won't happen in Venezuela because 90 percent of the military and the police will support an operation by the United States. SHAPIRO: But then why hasn't 90 percent of the military done what the four of you have done? CANSINO: (Through interpreter) Out of fear, because our houses were raided. SHAPIRO: He pulls out a photo on his phone. He says it shows a special forces raid on his family's house after he defected. Cansino says his stepfather was briefly detained. His mother and his girlfriend are now in hiding. These military defectors say they're getting impatient. Jose Acuna is tired of waiting. How much longer can you just sit? JOSE ACUNA: (Through interpreter) I think that time is running out. If it's not the United States or our interim president Juan Guaido doesn't give the order, we the military that are here will do something for our country. SHAPIRO: Are you all willing to act even if Guaido and the United States do not say go? UNIDENTIFIED PERSON #3: Si. UNIDENTIFIED PERSON #4: Si. SHAPIRO: As we leave this group behind, one of the men asks if we can help them find money and weapons. We decline. Pepe Ruiz Paredes is the mayor of the small town on the border Villa del Rosario. I ask him what will happen if violence does break out. PEPE RUIZ PAREDES: (Through interpreter) We won't let that happen. SHAPIRO: This is one reason Colombian police guard the military defectors in their hotel and only let them sign out a couple of hours each day. The hosts don't want the guests stirring up trouble, fighting to take back Venezuela from here at the border. PAREDES: (Through interpreter) We want them to fight there. The problem needs to be solved in Venezuela. SHAPIRO: They say they want to fight here. PAREDES: (Through interpreter) Well, the people you need to overthrow are in Caracas, not here. SHAPIRO: Caracas is more than 500 miles away. If there is violence on the border and it starts to spread, then this could grow into a civil war and even a regional or global conflict. Last month, Vice President Mike Pence issued this warning in Colombia's capital, Bogota. (SOUNDBITE OF ARCHIVED RECORDING) VICE PRESIDENT MIKE PENCE: Colombia is our strongest partner in the region, and any who would threaten her sovereignty or security would do well not to test the commitment to our ally or the resolve of the United States of America. SHAPIRO: And the U.S. isn't the only world power staking out ground here. Moscow wants Maduro to stay in power. Just last weekend, Russia flew troops and equipment into Caracas. President Trump responded yesterday, saying, quote, "Russia has to get out." FRANCISCO SANTOS: Venezuela can become sort of a Syria. SHAPIRO: A Syria. SANTOS: Yeah. It's imploding. SHAPIRO: This is the Colombian ambassador to the U.S., Francisco Santos. Ambassador Santos insists there is still time for what we'll call plan A - international pressure and sanctions to force Maduro out. Venezuela would then hold elections, and Guaido would take power. But I kept pressing the ambassador. SANTOS: And we still hope that that will happen. What... SHAPIRO: I hear you arguing that plan A is not over yet, but I still... SANTOS: No, it's not. It's just starting. SHAPIRO: OK, but I still have the question. What is plan B? SANTOS: Plan B would involve violence. I don't even want to think about it, to be very sincere. I don't want the continent to think, to have a plan B option. I'm very scared of what might happen. SHAPIRO: This morning I went to the U.S. embassy in Bogota and sat down with Ambassador Kevin Whitaker to ask how real this threat of violence is. He's been U.S. ambassador to Colombia for five years and worked in Latin America much longer than that. KEVIN WHITAKER: I think it's very important for us to show strategic patience now. Foreign Minister Trujillo, who's the Colombian foreign minister here, just said the other day that a dictatorship of 20 years is not going to crack at the first blow. So I can't really put a time limit on it. But what I will say is that even as frustrated as we are at the lack of immediate change on this, change will come. SHAPIRO: He says all of these regimes look impenetrable, as though they'll last forever, until the moment they fall. (SOUNDBITE OF ZOE KEATING'S "TETRISHEAD") CHANG: That's our co-host Ari Shapiro. Tomorrow he follows the mountainous road that thousands of Venezuelans are walking as they flee their country. (SOUNDBITE OF ZOE KEATING'S "TETRISHEAD") Copyright © 2019 NPR. All rights reserved. Visit our website terms of use and permissions pages at www.npr.org for further information. NPR transcripts are created on a rush deadline by Verb8tm, Inc., an NPR contractor, and produced using a proprietary transcription process developed with NPR. This text may not be in its final form and may be updated or revised in the future. Accuracy and availability may vary. The authoritative record of NPR’s programming is the audio record. 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What He Saw In The Morgue Still Haunts Him NATIONAL $11 Billion And Counting: Trump's Border Wall Would Be The World's Most Costly NPR Editors' Picks MUSIC Jazz Saxophone Legend Jimmy Heath Has Died BOOK REVIEWS 'Cleanness' Revisits Familiar Ground, Beautifully MUSIC INTERVIEWS On Their Debut Album, Stretch And Bobbito Are Taking 'No Requests' FRESH AIR Born 100 Years Ago, Filmmaker Federico Fellini Captured The Messiness Of Life READ and LISTEN Home News Arts and Life Music Podcasts Programs CONNECT Newsletters Facebook Twitter Instagram Contact Help ABOUT NPR Overview Finances People Press Public Editor Corrections GET INVOLVED Support Public Radio Sponsor NPR NPR Careers NPR Shop NPR Events Visit NPR terms of use privacy your privacy choices text only © 2020 npr NPR thanks our sponsorsBecome an NPR sponsor Venezuela is an existential threat to Colombia Wyss, Jim. “Colombian ambassador to U.S. says Venezuela is an ‘existential’ threat to his country.” Miami Herald. October 2019DY https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/colombia/article236560518.html) Accessibility links Skip to main content Keyboard shortcuts for audio player Loading A message from our sponsor 0:000:16 NPR logo Station Logo SIGN IN NPR SHOP DONATE NEWS Expand/collapse submenu for News ARTS and LIFE Expand/collapse submenu for Arts and Life MUSIC Expand/collapse submenu for Music SHOWS and PODCASTS Expand/collapse submenu for Shows and Podcasts SEARCH WORLD Venezuela Hovers On The Brink Of Conflict — Many Fear The Situation Will Escalate Facebook Twitter Flipboard Email March 28, 20194:07 PM ET Heard on All Things Considered LISTEN· 11:12 11-Minute Listen PLAYLIST Download Embed Transcript Venezuela is already in an economic and political crisis, but many worry that things could escalate into a civil war, a regional conflict, or even U.S. intervention. AILSA CHANG, HOST: The situation in Venezuela is combustible. The U.S. recognizes a president who is not in power, Juan Guaido. Venezuela's sitting President, Nicolas Maduro, refuses to leave, and he has heavily armed backers - the military and paramilitary groups called colectivos. AUDIE CORNISH, HOST: Guaido says today preparations for Operation Liberty begin, and the tactical phase begins April 6. It's unclear exactly what that means. It could be another large demonstration. The concern is it could mean violence. Our co-host Ari Shapiro has spent the last week on the border of Colombia and Venezuela looking at this possibility. Hey there, Ari. ARI SHAPIRO, BYLINE: Hi, Audie. CORNISH: So what makes the border with Colombia specifically such a tinderbox? SHAPIRO: Well, this is the biggest border crossing point from Venezuela. More than a million Venezuelans have crossed into Colombia recently, and every day, thousands of people go back and forth from Venezuela to Colombia to find food or make money. Because Venezuela's economy has collapsed, inflation has made people's savings worthless, and there's no medicine in Venezuela. People cross the border to find food, education, work - for all of those reasons. CORNISH: All right, let's dig into this more. Where do you want to begin? SHAPIRO: We're going to start right at the border that separates Venezuela and Colombia. It's the semen Simon Bolivar Bridge, the main artery leading to the Colombian city of Cucuta. For the last month, this bridge has been totally closed to vehicles and to most foot traffic, but people still use illegal crossings, sometimes wading across a river, holding their stuff over their heads, to get into Colombia. As you approach this border from the Colombian side, you're surrounded by a crush of people, many of them Venezuelan. (CROSSTALK) SHAPIRO: There is a huge throng of thousands of people selling everything from cigarettes to medicine to mango. Some are offering to sell bus tickets. Others are offering to buy hair. As taxis pull up to the border area, there are literally hundreds of young guys lining the street. And as the taxis slow down, the guys just sprint alongside them, shouting in the window, asking for a few coins to carry luggage. These taxis carry Venezuelans who crossed into Colombia to run errands. And one of the guys chasing down those cabs is a 20-year-old named Luis. He told me these young men have a lot of time to stand around and talk and also to plan. We're only using his first name because, well, he wants to overthrow his government. LUIS #1: (Through interpreter) We're all on the same page. The government that's in power needs to go. It can't stay this way. SHAPIRO: People will hear this and say you are arguing for a civil war; you want a civil war in your country. Is that what you are pushing for? LUIS #1: (Through interpreter) No, it's not that I want a civil war. It's that we want everyone to come together and the current government to leave. SHAPIRO: He tells us he'd be eager to make that happen through force. Give him a gun, and he will charge across the border with it. A lot of people will say that's a pipe dream. Maduro has heavily armed supporters, including near the border. So if a bunch of Venezuelans try to charge in from Colombia, those young men could easily get massacred. But that alone could start a chain reaction. And I met a lot of Venezuelans who are afraid that that chain reaction could even lead to U.S. military involvement. LIJIA BLANCO: (Through interpreter) People say Donald Trump will invade Venezuela, take oil and all the riches. SHAPIRO: Lijia Blanco is a 72-year-old who walks with a cane. She describes her fears of war, comparing Venezuela to Libya. And tears roll down her cheeks. BLANCO: (Through interpreter) They say that they'll come in with bombs, and it'll be like how they killed that guy Gadhafi and the Arabs. I don't want that for Venezuela because it's the people who will suffer. SHAPIRO: If you could say something to the Trump administration, what would you say? BLANCO: (Through interpreter) I tell him, look, mijo; help Venezuela in some other way because we're dying. The children are dying. SHAPIRO: Blanco is eating lunch at a Catholic soup kitchen on the border that serves up to 8,000 hot meals a day mostly to Venezuelans who can't find food on their side of the border. The plates are full of beans and rice, potatoes, eggs and tuna. Father David Cana is the priest who oversees this shelter. DAVID CANA: (Through interpreter) Just as people in a hospital see blood every day, we see sadness, despair and hunger. SHAPIRO: Cana wears an apron that says in Spanish, beautiful mother, quench our thirst, with a picture of the Virgin Mary. But even in this place of peace, people dream of war. LUIS #2: (Through interpreter) In my state, armed groups are forming to go confront the government of Nicolas Maduro. SHAPIRO: This is Luis, a 58-year-old construction worker eating at the long tables of families. LUIS #2: (Through interpreter) It's happening in secret, but I was invited to participate. SHAPIRO: What did you say when they invited you? LUIS #2: (Through interpreter) Yes, yes, I'm going to do it. SHAPIRO: So what do you need from the United States? LUIS #2: (Speaking Spanish). SHAPIRO: "We'd like them to put their hands in our country." Luis says he would go. He doesn't have any experience fighting, but others in this border town do. This is a street that was once full of high-end hotels that were popular with Venezuelan tourists. One of them has a billboard outside with a picture of pink dolphins jumping out of the water. But most of these resorts and hotels are now closed because the Venezuelans on the other side of the border no longer have the money to come spend to stay here. One of these shuttered resorts is now being used to house high-level military defectors from Venezuela. They're only allowed out of the hotel a couple of hours a day, and they've agreed to spend those hours with us to talk about their hopes for a violent overthrow of the Maduro regime. Hola. UNIDENTIFIED PERSON #1: Hola. SHAPIRO: Ari. We sit with these four young men near the ruins of a cathedral that was destroyed in an earthquake more than a century ago. One was in the special forces of the Venezuelan police. The others were in the equivalent of the FBI, the Navy and the Army. They range in age from 19 to 27, and they tell us they have only one mission. UNIDENTIFIED PERSON #2: (Through interpreter) We are here to overwhelmingly attack the dictatorial regime of Maduro. SHAPIRO: They use their leader Juan Guaido's phrase Operation Liberty. Williams Cansino seems to be the spokesman for this small group. He has a detailed understanding of who in the U.S. is making decisions on Venezuela. WILLIAMS CANSINO: (Through interpreter) We're asking for help from President Donald Trump, Vice President Mike Pence, Senator Marco Rubio, national security adviser John Bolton and special adviser for Venezuela Elliott Abrams. Please, it's time to act. SHAPIRO: So many Americans remember what happened in Iraq with Saddam Hussein or what happened in Afghanistan where years later. The United States has no way out of the country. And they fear that that could happen in Venezuela. CANSINO: (Through interpreter) That won't happen in Venezuela because 90 percent of the military and the police will support an operation by the United States. SHAPIRO: But then why hasn't 90 percent of the military done what the four of you have done? CANSINO: (Through interpreter) Out of fear, because our houses were raided. SHAPIRO: He pulls out a photo on his phone. He says it shows a special forces raid on his family's house after he defected. Cansino says his stepfather was briefly detained. His mother and his girlfriend are now in hiding. These military defectors say they're getting impatient. Jose Acuna is tired of waiting. How much longer can you just sit? JOSE ACUNA: (Through interpreter) I think that time is running out. If it's not the United States or our interim president Juan Guaido doesn't give the order, we the military that are here will do something for our country. SHAPIRO: Are you all willing to act even if Guaido and the United States do not say go? UNIDENTIFIED PERSON #3: Si. UNIDENTIFIED PERSON #4: Si. SHAPIRO: As we leave this group behind, one of the men asks if we can help them find money and weapons. We decline. Pepe Ruiz Paredes is the mayor of the small town on the border Villa del Rosario. I ask him what will happen if violence does break out. PEPE RUIZ PAREDES: (Through interpreter) We won't let that happen. SHAPIRO: This is one reason Colombian police guard the military defectors in their hotel and only let them sign out a couple of hours each day. The hosts don't want the guests stirring up trouble, fighting to take back Venezuela from here at the border. PAREDES: (Through interpreter) We want them to fight there. The problem needs to be solved in Venezuela. SHAPIRO: They say they want to fight here. PAREDES: (Through interpreter) Well, the people you need to overthrow are in Caracas, not here. SHAPIRO: Caracas is more than 500 miles away. If there is violence on the border and it starts to spread, then this could grow into a civil war and even a regional or global conflict. Last month, Vice President Mike Pence issued this warning in Colombia's capital, Bogota. (SOUNDBITE OF ARCHIVED RECORDING) VICE PRESIDENT MIKE PENCE: Colombia is our strongest partner in the region, and any who would threaten her sovereignty or security would do well not to test the commitment to our ally or the resolve of the United States of America. SHAPIRO: And the U.S. isn't the only world power staking out ground here. Moscow wants Maduro to stay in power. Just last weekend, Russia flew troops and equipment into Caracas. President Trump responded yesterday, saying, quote, "Russia has to get out." FRANCISCO SANTOS: Venezuela can become sort of a Syria. SHAPIRO: A Syria. SANTOS: Yeah. It's imploding. SHAPIRO: This is the Colombian ambassador to the U.S., Francisco Santos. Ambassador Santos insists there is still time for what we'll call plan A - international pressure and sanctions to force Maduro out. Venezuela would then hold elections, and Guaido would take power. But I kept pressing the ambassador. SANTOS: And we still hope that that will happen. What... SHAPIRO: I hear you arguing that plan A is not over yet, but I still... SANTOS: No, it's not. It's just starting. SHAPIRO: OK, but I still have the question. What is plan B? SANTOS: Plan B would involve violence. I don't even want to think about it, to be very sincere. I don't want the continent to think, to have a plan B option. I'm very scared of what might happen. SHAPIRO: This morning I went to the U.S. embassy in Bogota and sat down with Ambassador Kevin Whitaker to ask how real this threat of violence is. He's been U.S. ambassador to Colombia for five years and worked in Latin America much longer than that. KEVIN WHITAKER: I think it's very important for us to show strategic patience now. Foreign Minister Trujillo, who's the Colombian foreign minister here, just said the other day that a dictatorship of 20 years is not going to crack at the first blow. So I can't really put a time limit on it. But what I will say is that even as frustrated as we are at the lack of immediate change on this, change will come. SHAPIRO: He says all of these regimes look impenetrable, as though they'll last forever, until the moment they fall. (SOUNDBITE OF ZOE KEATING'S "TETRISHEAD") CHANG: That's our co-host Ari Shapiro. Tomorrow he follows the mountainous road that thousands of Venezuelans are walking as they flee their country. (SOUNDBITE OF ZOE KEATING'S "TETRISHEAD") Copyright © 2019 NPR. All rights reserved. Visit our website terms of use and permissions pages at www.npr.org for further information. NPR transcripts are created on a rush deadline by Verb8tm, Inc., an NPR contractor, and produced using a proprietary transcription process developed with NPR. This text may not be in its final form and may be updated or revised in the future. Accuracy and availability may vary. The authoritative record of NPR’s programming is the audio record. Facebook Twitter Flipboard Email Sign Up For The NPR Daily Newsletter Catch up on the latest headlines and unique NPR stories, sent every weekday. E-mail address By subscribing, you agree to NPR's terms of use and privacy policy. NPR may share your name and email address with your NPR station. See Details. This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply. More Stories From NPR EUROPE Harry And Meghan Are No Longer Working Members Of The Royal Family, Palace Says WORLD A Mayor In Norway's Arctic Looks To China To Reinvent His Frontier Town Popular on NPR.org HEALTH Menopause Can Start Younger Than You Think: Here's What You Need To Know INVESTIGATIONS Amtrak Asks 2 People Who Use Wheelchairs To Pay $25,000 For A Ride OPINION His Dad Died In A Venezuelan Hospital. What He Saw In The Morgue Still Haunts Him NATIONAL $11 Billion And Counting: Trump's Border Wall Would Be The World's Most Costly NPR Editors' Picks MUSIC Jazz Saxophone Legend Jimmy Heath Has Died BOOK REVIEWS 'Cleanness' Revisits Familiar Ground, Beautifully MUSIC INTERVIEWS On Their Debut Album, Stretch And Bobbito Are Taking 'No Requests' FRESH AIR Born 100 Years Ago, Filmmaker Federico Fellini Captured The Messiness Of Life READ and LISTEN Home News Arts and Life Music Podcasts Programs CONNECT Newsletters Facebook Twitter Instagram Contact Help ABOUT NPR Overview Finances People Press Public Editor Corrections GET INVOLVED Support Public Radio Sponsor NPR NPR Careers NPR Shop NPR Events Visit NPR terms of use privacy your privacy choices text only © 2020 npr War between Venezuela and Colombia would be devastating - RIP infrastructure Parkin, Joe. “What next for Venezuela? The four most likely outcomes.” The Guardian. January 2019DY https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/30/what-next-for-venezuela-the-four-most-likely-outcomes) Skip to main content Advertisement The Guardian - Back to home Support The Guardian Available for everyone, funded by readers Contribute Subscribe Search jobs Sign in Search current edition: US edition News Opinion Sport Culture Lifestyle Show More World most viewed in US Live Liverpool 2-0 Manchester United: Premier League – as it happened There’s a reason why the royals are demonised. But you won’t read all about it Alan Rusbridger Conor McGregor destroys Donald Cerrone in 40 seconds on UFC return Conor McGregor ponders fights against Nurmagomedov, Diaz and Mayweather A Very Stable Genius review: dysfunction and disaster at the court of King Donald Most popular Worldv Europe US Americas Asia Australia Middle East Africa Inequality Cities Global development Venezuela What next for Venezuela? The four most likely outcomes Will Maduro hang on to power? Will the standoff end in war? The embattled nation stands at a crossroads Joe Parkin Daniels in Cúcuta @joeparkdan Wed 30 Jan 2019 00.00 EST Last modified on Wed 30 Jan 2019 15.35 EST Shares 271 Nicolás Maduro takes part in a ceremony during military exercises at the Libertador Air Base in Maracay Nicolás Maduro takes part in a ceremony during military exercises at the Libertador Air Base in Maracay Photograph: HO/AFP/Getty Images Venezuela is in turmoil. Both Nicolás Maduro and Juan Guaidó claim to be president – the latter until new elections can be held – and neither has any incentive to back down. Maduro, who two weeks ago was sworn into his second term following disputed elections last year, has little public support, but he retains the backing of the military. Venezuela court freezes Juan Guaidó's bank accounts and imposes travel ban Read more QandA Why is Venezuela in such a bad way? Show Guaidó, on the other hand, can mobilize mass displays of popular support, and has the backing of a chorus of western democracies – but little control over the levers of power within Venezuela. So what are the possible outcomes for this embattled nation and its 32 million citizens – some three million of whom have already fled abroad? Maduro holds on – but for how long? Maduro has twice survived previous challenges to his power. After mass protests in 2014, he targeted opposition leaders, such as Guaidó’s political patron, Leopoldo López, who was arrested and barred from running for office. Five years later he is still under house arrest. Fresh unrest broke out in 2017 when Maduro sidelined the national assembly after it switched hands to the opposition. Demonstrations were met with bloody repression: over 120 protestors killed and hundreds more injured. The crackdown prompted international condemnation but Maduro succeeded in consolidating his power. That approach seems less workable today. Although Maduro retains the backing of allies such as Russia, Turkey and Cuba, he has come under unprecedented international pressure including from a dozen Latin American countries. Military top brass has made a show of support for their commander in chief, but there has been a string of defections by junior officers. At the weekend, Maduro’s military attache to the embassy in Washington DC became the most senior figure to switch sides, followed by the consul in Miami. Trump steps up Maduro pressure with sanctions on Venezuelan oil company Read more Rank and file soldiers have felt the economic impact of the country’s crisis, but Maduro has rewarded senior officers with positions in government and the state oil company PDVSA. But US sanctions on the company unveiled this week could change that. If Maduro is to survive this current challenge, he’ll have to keep the military onside, and that means finding a way to keep them paid. Maduro is replaced by another civilian or there is a military coup Another way out of the current standoff – though not one that would benefit the Venezuelan people – would be a military coup that leaves a general or some sympathetic civilian in charge. That would likely mean a return to business as usual: kleptocracy, mismanagement and authoritarianism. Potential successors in the military would be either Maduro’s lieutenant Diosdado Cabello or defence minister Vladimir Padrino López, both of whom command military support but are widely despised by many Venezuelans. Civilian candidates could be vice president Delcy Rodríguez or her predecessor Tareck El Aissami. Both are international pariahs. In any case, a change at the top would not placate the opposition, now emboldened and set on restoring democracy. And if political options are closed for good, there is a strong risk that opponents of the regime would turn to the armed struggle – and Latin America has a troubled history vanquishing insurgencies. Meanwhile, unless a new leader could rebuild the country’s wrecked economy, millions will continue to flee, further destabilizing the region. People power-style regime change or a negotiated exit A transition back to democracy would be the easiest way out of the current standoff but Maduro has little to gain and everything to lose by surrendering power. He has intimated he is open to negotiations, mediated by an international broker, though has previously used such talks to stall for time and divide the opposition. Even if Maduro agrees to leave, he will not want to risk any reckoning over his authoritarian rule – and neither will thousands of public and military officials who enabled him. Guaidó has promised an amnesty to members of the armed forces who “contribute to the reestablishment of democratic order”. There are pragmatic reasons for such a move, said Dimitris Pantoulas, a Caracas-based consultant, who offered Colombia’s 2016 peace deal with the leftist Farc rebels as a possibly example. “You cannot have ten of thousands going into exile or be judged by ordinary courts – it would be chaos,” he said. Maduro and his inner circle would most likely have to leave the country, but it is unclear where he could go. His only major international allies are Russia, China, Cuba and Turkey, and it is unclear what could motivate any of them to receive him. War Maduro has long characterised his country’s woes as the result of a decades-long imperialist campaign of “economic war” waged by the US. It has served him well, rallying his generals and what little support he has behind the flag. Now, however, some analysts fear that hawks in Washington DC and Caracas could drive the two countries into a real conflict. The Venezuelan crisis has prompted the biggest migration in Latin America’s modern history, and neighbouring countries are desperate for a swift resolution. “If the trend were to worsen, the pressure for a military strike to end the deadlock would likely increase,” said Phil Gunson, a Caracas-based consultant with Crisis Group. “And that is an outcome we should all be trying to avoid.” At the moment, such a conflict is still seen as a distant possibility, but conceivably, the rightwing governments of Brazil and Colombia could sign up to a US-led coalition against Maduro. Such a war – the first war between two South American countries in more than 80 years – would be protracted, bloody and fraught with unpredictable variables, but when Donald Trump’s national security advisor John Bolton was photographed holding a legal pad with the note “5,000 troops to Colombia”, it prompted concerns that the US is seriously considering such an option. That figure would not be enough alone, however: the US invasion of Panama involved some 27,000 soldiers. “I think Bolton was just bluffing, but if it happens those troops would be a tripwire, ready to trigger a bigger deployment should there be any incursion from Venezuela,” said Adam Isacson, a security analyst at the Washington Office on Latin America. “Then there’s not telling how it escalates. Any war that involves Colombia and Venezuela would be devastating – both countries have strong airforces so it would be a war fought over infrastructure, military bases and cities – not just the border.” America faces an epic choice... ... in the coming year, and the results will define the country for a generation. These are perilous times. Over the last three years, much of what the Guardian holds dear has been threatened – democracy, civility, truth. This US administration is establishing new norms of behaviour. Anger and cruelty disfigure public discourse and lying is commonplace. Truth is being chased away. But with your help we can continue to put it center stage. It will be a defining year and we’re asking for your help as we prepare for 2020. Rampant disinformation, partisan news sources and social media's tsunami of fake news is no basis on which to inform the American public in 2020. The need for a robust, independent press has never been greater, and with your help we can continue to provide fact-based reporting that offers public scrutiny and oversight. You’ve read more than 8 articles in the last four months. Our journalism is free and open for all, but it's made possible thanks to the support we receive from readers like you across America in all 50 states. "America is at a tipping point, finely balanced between truth and lies, hope and hate, civility and nastiness. Many vital aspects of American public life are in play – the Supreme Court, abortion rights, climate policy, wealth inequality, Big Tech and much more. The stakes could hardly be higher. 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Support The Guardian Learn more Accepted payment methods: Visa, Mastercard, American Express Paypal, Diners Club and Discover Topics Venezuela Nicolás Maduro Juan Guaidó Americas explainers Share on LinkedIn Share on Pinterest Reuse this content Advertisement Read The Guardian without interruption on all your devices Subscribe nowEurope US Americas Asia Australia Middle East Africa Inequality Cities Global development News Opinion Sport Culture Lifestyle About us Contact us Complaints and corrections SecureDrop Work for us Privacy policy Cookie policy Terms and conditions Help All topics All writers Digital newspaper archive Facebook Twitter Advertise with us Guardian Labs Search jobs Dating Discount Codes Support The Guardian Available for everyone, funded by readers Contribute Subscribe Back to top © 2020 Guardian News and Media Limited or its affiliated companies. All rights reserved. War between Colombia/FARC kills 220,000 and displaces 5 million “Colombia's Farc admits conflict 'impact' on civilians.” BBC. October 2014DY https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-29841981 Homepage Accessibility links Skip to contentAccessibility Help Sign in News Sport Reel Worklife Travel Future More Search the BBCSearch the BBC News BBC News Navigation Home Video World selected US and Canada UK Business Tech Science Stories Entertainment and Arts Health More sections World selected Africa Asia Australia Europe Latin America selected Middle East ADVERTISEMENT Colombia's Farc admits conflict 'impact' on civilians 30 October 2014 Share this with Facebook Share this with Messenger Share this with Twitter Share this with Email Share Farc and government negotiators at a news conference in Havana on 16 May, 2014Image copyrightAP Image caption Farc and government negotiators have so far reached agreement on three topics at peace talks in Havana Colombia's largest rebel group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Farc), has acknowledged its actions "have affected civilians" during 50 years of internal conflict. "We are expressly responsible for all acts of war carried out by our units," said Pablo Atrato, a Farc leader. In the first admission of its kind, he said the rebels were ready to take "responsibility" for these actions. Latin America's longest running war has killed 220,000 people. More than five million others have been displaced. The Marxist rebel group joined negotiations in Cuba with the Colombian government in November 2013. The talks in the capital, Havana, are aimed at getting the 8,000-strong Farc to sign an agreement renouncing its armed struggle in order to join the legal political process. Victim reparations "We explicitly recognise that our actions have affected civilians at different times and under different circumstances throughout the conflict," Mr Atrato said. He added the Farc would "assume the responsibility that concerns us," but did not give any further details as to what responsibility they would take. A woman cries next to the funerary urn with the remains of her relative disappeared during the Colombian civil war, in a ceremony in Medellin on 21 March, 2014Image copyrightAFP Image caption An estimated 220,000 people have been killed in Colombia's 50-year-long armed conflict Farc rebels in April 1998Image copyrightAFP Image caption The Farc has an estimated 8,000 fighters, mostly in rural areas The Farc's statement comes as both sides discuss the issue of victim reparations as part the peace talks. The two sides have reached agreement on three key issues: land reform, political participation of the rebels and illicit drugs. They are now working towards agreements on disarmament, victims' rights and the eventual implementation of the peace deal. They are expected to attempt to negotiate an amnesty as part of the deal but correspondents say it would face opposition from conservative politicians in Colombia. President Juan Manuel Santos recently said his government and the rebels were getting closer to an agreement. The Farc, Colombia's largest guerrilla group, controlled nearly a third of the country a decade ago, but now mostly operates in remote rural areas. 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The BBC is not responsible for the content of external sites. Read about our approach to external linking. Food Imports and Medicine falling before sanctions Rendon, Moises. “Are Sanctions Working in Venezuela?” CSIS. September 2019DY https://www.csis.org/analysis/are-sanctions-working-venezuela Sections Search Center for Strategic and International Studies User menu Subscribe Sign In TOPICS Cybersecurity and Technology Defense and Security Economics Energy and Sustainability Global Health Human Rights International Development REGIONS Africa Americas Arctic Asia Europe Middle East Russia and Eurasia SECTIONS MENU PROGRAMS EXPERTS EVENTS ANALYSIS PODCASTS IDEAS LAB TRANSCRIPTS WEB PROJECTS MAIN MENU ABOUT US SUPPORT CSIS REPORT SHARE LinkedIn Facebook Twitter Email Printfriendly.com Are Sanctions Working in Venezuela? CSIS Briefs September 3, 2019 DOWNLOAD THE BRIEF The Issue As the United States, the Lima Group, the European Union, and other like-minded nations continue to increase pressure on the regime of Nicolás Maduro with diplomatic measures such as challenging his government’s legitimacy, the question remains as to whether sanctions are an effective measure for changing the behavior of the Venezuelan regime and pushing Maduro to step down. Despite external support by Russia, Cuba, China, and a few others, Maduro is more alienated on the world stage than ever before. That said, stiff sanctions and diplomatic isolation have not yet convinced Maduro to negotiate his exit while his regime has proven to be resilient and adaptable . As the humanitarian crisis deteriorates further, a debate has raged on among policymakers who worry that sanctions may be worsening conditions for Venezuelan citizens. This brief provides clarity on this complex issue. This report will assess the efficacy of past sanctions, as well as their impact on standards of living in Venezuela, and provide recommendations for improving policy in this area. Fast Facts By 2016, one year before financial sanctions were first implemented by the United States, the Venezuelan bolívar had already hit an inflation rate of 255 percent . Inflation has now surpassed 1 million percent and is projected to be 10 million percent by year end. Oil production in Venezuela dropped from roughly 2.4 million barrels per day in 2015 to about 1 million barrels per day at the end of 2018 before broad sanctions against PdVSA were implemented. Venezuelans lost an average of 24 pounds between 2016 and 2017. Over the same period, severe child malnutrition reached 15.5 percent. In addition to the European Union, five countries (the United States, Canada, Switzerland, Mexico, and Panama) have issued sanctions to address the Venezuelan crisis. Background: Sanctions on Venezuela Under the Obama administration, the United States implemented the first sanctions on Venezuela. In December 2014, the U.S. Congress passed the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act, which directed President Obama to impose sanctions on Venezuelan security forces who violently repressed student protests. The president codified the act in 2015 by revoking the assets and visas of eight individuals in the Maduro administration. Later, the act was extended through 2019, and the Department of Treasury sanctioned dozens of government and military officials for charges including support for terrorism, drug and human trafficking, human rights violations, corruption, money laundering, other financial crimes, and illiberal behavior. Individual Sanctions To date, the United States has sanctioned 119 individuals and 47 entities from or related to Venezuela, many of whom were also designated by Canada, Mexico, Panama, and the European Union. While the current administration has demonstrated a width and breadth of sanctioning techniques, the most notable policy shift since President Trump’s 2017 inauguration has been the gradual transition from individual to sectoral sanctions. These are distinct policy tools: individual sanctions block the assets and movement of persons deemed to be aiding the regime while sectoral sanctions prohibit transactions with certain companies which are engaged in illicit actions on behalf of the government. Sectoral Sanctions When President Trump took office, he continued the authorization of sanctions against individuals deemed to be working on behalf of Maduro’s regime, including Maduro’s family, vice president, and ministers and advisors in his inner circle. However, a change in course took place when the president issued an August 2017 executive order prohibiting U.S. citizens from purchasing Venezuelan government debt, specifically targeting Venezuela’s state-owned oil company Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PdVSA). This mandate also restricted the Venezuelan government’s access to U.S. debt and equity markets to limit Maduro’s ability to finance illicit activities and pay off military officials. In March 2018, the president banned U.S. citizens from engaging in transactions with petromoneda (better known as petro), an unsuccessful government-controlled cryptocurrency designed by the regime to circumvent financial sanctions. After Maduro’s illegitimate reelection in May 2018, a new order cut off the Venezuelan government and all its subsidiary entities from international debt financing, additionally blocking corrupt Venezuelan officials from selling off public assets in exchange for kickbacks. Pursuant to a November 2018 executive order laying out a framework for sanctioning Venezuelan companies deemed to be complicit in deceptive or corrupt practices, the Treasury Department designated PdVSA as subject to sanctions, blocking its property and interests and banning transactions with U.S. citizens this past January. These sanctions did not go into effect until June 2019, however. In March, the U.S. administration targeted Venezuela’s state-operated gold mining company Minerven for illicit and corrupt operations and engagements with criminal gangs and militia groups to financially benefit the regime. Several government, private sector, and military persons were sanctioned for their involvement in illegal mining. A month later, Treasury sanctioned the Central Bank of Venezuela, cutting off its access to U.S. currency and limiting its capacity to conduct international transactions. Further targeted sanctions were unleashed against a web of Cuban and Russian companies, including banks, oil importers, and shipping companies who have engaged with PdVSA and provided cash to Maduro’s government. In early August, President Trump announced a complete embargo against the Venezuelan government, blocking all transactions with some exceptions for humanitarian aid. Additionally, he granted Treasury the power to implement secondary sanctions against foreign and domestic entities engaging with Maduro’s regime. Are Sanctions Causing the Humanitarian Crisis? Sanctions did not cause the economic or humanitarian crisis in Venezuela as dire conditions in Venezuela preceded the implementation of sanctions. By 2016, a year before any financial or sectoral sanctions hit the country, Venezuela’s economy was already enduring severe hyperinflation, which surpassed a rate of 800 percent. Between 2013 and 2016, food imports fell 71 percent and medicine and medical equipment imports dropped 68 percent. Over the same period, infant mortality increased by 44 percent. By the time sanctions were introduced, Venezuelans earning the minimum wage could only afford 56 percent of the calories necessary for a family of five. Over two million Venezuelans had already fled the country at this point. The extent of the humanitarian damage suffered before sectoral sanctions indicates that the blame cannot be placed on the sanctions themselves. As an example, Venezuela’s Central Bank confirmed in 2014 that plummeting oil prices had triggered a severe economic contraction with simultaneous hyperinflation. Under the guise of austerity, Maduro announced cuts to major social services upon which millions of citizens relied. The Impact of Sanctions: An Ongoing Debate Despite the country’s economic deterioration occurring before the application of broad sanctions, some still blame the imposition of U.S. sanctions for degrading standards of living in Venezuela. A CEPR report from April 2019 claims that 40,000 people have died as a result of these sanctions, an assertion based on a comparison of oil production between Venezuela and Colombia before and after the 2017 sanctions. This conclusion was challenged by the Brookings Institution , which pointed out crucial differences between each country’s oil industry. Additionally, they illustrated that worsening determinants of the humanitarian condition in Venezuela predated the imposition of sanctions and have gone on for years. Other critics of current sanctions policy have instanced the fact that 68 percent of Venezuelans believe that U.S. sanctions have worsened their quality of life. Supporters of strict sanctions policy have cited Maduro’s years-long Hands Off Venezuela propaganda campaign that has arguably poisoned the well of public opinion. The real impact of economic sanctions on humanitarian conditions is obscured by several confounding variables, the most notable of which is Maduro’s lack of interest in stopping the bleeding. For decades, Venezuelan success has been contingent on global oil prices. Data from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) suggests that oil accounts for 98 percent of the country’s export revenues. The government’s dependence on these revenues to finance basic social spending has in part produced the current crisis. Venezuelan oil production plummeted by millions of barrels prior to the introduction of U.S. economic sanctions, reflecting a lack of economic diversity and intolerance for non-state competition in oil extraction which has once again left the nation’s prosperity precariously tied to oil prices. Economic mismanagement is just one side of the story, however. The Maduro regime has been unflinching in its efforts to centralize power and undermine democracy. In addition to amending the constitution several times , Maduro created a new legislative body to override a National Assembly with an opposition supermajority and packed the Supreme Court with loyalist justices. Maduro and his coconspirators are complicit in a 20-year process of institutional collapse, large-scale corruption, economic negligence, and suppression of individual rights. HIGHLIGHTED: A July 2019 report from the U.N. Commission on Human Rights illustrates the excesses of Venezuela’s authoritarian status. A crippling economic spiral has been exacerbated by extrajudicial killings, political imprisonment without due process, and pervasive violence due to the presence of groups such as FARC, ELN, Hezbollah, drug cartels, and pro-government colectivos. Mitigating the Collateral Damage of Sanctions Sanctions are undoubtedly cutting off financing to the Maduro regime, limiting the government’s ability to import food and medicine amid economic freefall. However, reversing sanctions against Maduro and giving the regime access to revenues will not fix the humanitarian crisis for three main reasons: Although government revenues have been used in the past to bankroll social programs, Maduro’s regime has neglected to provide food and medicine to the Venezuelan people. Instead, they have directly profited from these revenues, funding illicit projects and buying the loyalty of military officials. Sanctions are designed to choke off these earnings, weakening Maduro’s grasp on power and therefore accelerating the restoration of democracy. According to the Venezuelan constitution, Maduro has not been the legitimate president of the country since January 10th, 2019. Over 50 countries have denounced his regime and recognized Juan Guaidó as interim president until free and fair elections can be held. Granting financial access to Maduro only serves to undermine calls for free and fair elections. Instead, the legitimate government of Venezuela should be given authority over the nation’s resources and institutions. Alternative approaches to the humanitarian crisis can more effectively relieve the suffering of Venezuelans without empowering Maduro with the state’s assets and resources. Sectoral sanctions may be causing harm to vulnerable civilians who are already suffering under hyperinflation and crumbling job prospects. Therefore, any medium- to long-term sanctions strategy must be combined with a plan to provide aid to the Venezuelan population, 90 percent of whom cannot afford necessities. By limiting the finances to the Maduro regime and replacing it with a series of programs intended to provide food and aid to the Venezuelan people, both goals can be accomplished. One option, an oil-for-food initiative, could take advantage of Venezuela’s bountiful natural resources—it has the largest known reserves of oil in the world. While previous oil-for-food programs have had mixed results, thorough international oversight would limit the risk of corruption. Perhaps a greater challenge would be the fact that Maduro still controls the country’s territory and its vast oil reserves. Maduro has shut out foreign aid from abroad, including the United States, Canada, and the European Union, describing their contributions as a violation of sovereignty. Under his command, Venezuela’s borders with former allies Brazil and Colombia have been shuttered, bringing the delivery of crucial humanitarian aid to a near halt. Additionally, Maduro has abused Venezuela’s subsidized food program CLAP to punish political dissenters; 83 percent of Maduro’s supporters receive benefits, as opposed to 14 percent of independents. New methods are in order to address this challenge. Noting Maduro’s apparent disinterest in improving conditions for Venezuelans, concerned governments should pursue an unconventional approach for distributing aid. The main goals of any central strategy are clear: reducing hunger and malnourishment, increasing access to medicine and health care, and fostering independent communities. Implementing this change (without giving Maduro’s government the chance to skim off the top) may necessitate the use of technologies such as blockchain and cryptocurrency. Although Internet access is limited due to frequent power outages and generalized economic hardship, microfinancing could be allocated via cryptocurrency to central locations like churches or community centers and distributed by local representatives. Such a system would reduce the risk of corruption and ensure that rural and indigenous populations receive the aid they desperately need. While the volatility of cryptocurrencies raises concerns regarding their use as a medium of exchange, stablecoins such as MakerDAO, a decentralized currency pegged to the U.S. dollar, provide an unprecedented opportunity to direct funds effectively while reducing Maduro’s economic power. After all, the Venezuelan bolívar is projected to hit an inflation rate of 10 million percent this year. The international community must consider the costs of implementing sanctions alongside the benefits. Multilateral cooperation among the United Nations, the Lima Group, the Organization of American States, and nongovernmental organizations operating in the region is paramount to filling in the gaps. A strategy of person-to-person aid, whereby contact with the Maduro regime is minimized and relief can be transferred directly to those in need by interested international actors, should be adopted. The Efficacy of Sanctions There is significant evidence of the impact of sanctions on Maduro’s power. Not only have targeted economic sanctions limited his ability to finance his regime’s antidemocratic activities and human rights abuses by reducing oil and illegal mining earnings, but they have also strained his inner circle. His control over state institutions and assets is slipping along with public confidence in his regime. The United States has instituted a strategy of risk; the current administration’s interminable threat to impose further sanctions leaves Maduro and his accomplices unsure as to how far it will go, forcing them to fear the worst. Most recently, sanctions have increased leverage for democratic forces within Venezuela. Maduro recently agreed to send a delegation to Barbados to reopen talks with the opposition after dialogues stalled earlier this year. The increased pressure of sanctions was a key factor in his decision to negotiate with political adversaries, as he and his inner circle are more limited than ever in their capacity to travel and engage with financial assets. That said, there are areas for improvement in sanctions strategy. The first important step is to encourage multilateral adoption of currently targeted sanctions. Unilateral sanctions, even from the most powerful economy in the world, have limited results. In addition to incorporating allied neighbors Colombia and Brazil, the United States should take advantage of the Lima Group, which has recently taken a strong stance on Maduro’s crusade against democracy. If this is successfully achieved, the strategy can be extended outward to the Organization of American States and perhaps even the United Nations (although Chinese and Russian veto power on the Security Council would make this difficult). The United States and its allies must use sanctions deliberately as a tool to shut down Maduro’s criminal activities. By closing off criminal sources of revenue for him and his cohorts in Venezuela, Maduro’s relative exit costs can be lowered, which will in turn increase the likelihood of a peaceful transition. While barriers to exiting power are always high, sanctions can isolate Maduro to the point where resigning is a welcome alternative. Another method could be the reallocation of assets recovered from sanctioned officials in the Venezuelan government and military. These assets could be forfeited to nongovernmental organizations helping the most deprived Venezuelans. While such a process requires cutting through significant red tape, the legitimate government led by Guaidó would be well served to ensure that the victims of malevolence in Venezuela are compensated in some manner. Lastly, the international community can integrate innovative ideas for sanctioning businesses, especially those that are paramount to U.S. economic interests in the region. Several U.S. companies, most notably Chevron, currently operate in the Venezuelan oil sector and in turn must navigate sanctions. One past example is that Citgo, a subsidiary of PdVSA, was wrested from Maduro’s control and made responsive to Guaidó’s administration. The same strategy could be applied to Venezuela’s financial sector, specifically its centralized and semiprivate/state-owned banks. The United States should distinguish between institutions that are operating in sole service of Maduro’s regime and those that can play a role in providing an economic future for the country. This will require creativity as well as flexibility. It is also necessary to retract sanctions placed on state entities once they are proven to be legitimately controlled. The Day After: Lifting Sanctions The resonant answer from diplomatic officials as far as the future of sanctions has been fairly persistent: sanctions against Venezuela will be scaled back once democracy is restored. The vast majority of sanctions are individually targeted and mandated by executive order, rendering them easily reversible. However, a consistent answer does not always reflect a consistent standard, especially when discussing an end goal as complex and multilayered as the reinstitution of Venezuela’s democracy. There is a need to clarify this standard while qualifying short-term expectations as to the efficacy of sanctions in provoking a reversal in Venezuela’s trajectory. Interim president Juan Guaidó has laid out three principles characterizing the reparation of Venezuelan democracy. First, he argues, Maduro must resign (or face removal) from power. Secondly, a transitional government, arguably one that includes opposition members, Chavistas, and the support of the military, must be formed. Lastly, democratic elections must be carried out in a manner that satisfies the Venezuelan constitution and international standards. Sanctions can take time to have their intended effect and, even when successful, are not sufficient to dismember and rebuild a government. They are simply a tool for coercing good behavior. In order to help Venezuelans restore their democracy, sanctions are key to increasing pressure on the Maduro regime. But a focus on targeted sanctions is not enough. Having a feasible exit ramp for Maduro and his inner circle while having a compassionate effort at humanitarian assistance are crucial. Moises Rendon is director of the Future of Venezuela Initiative and fellow with the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Max Price is a former intern with the CSIS Americas Program. The authors would like to thank CSIS adviser Ambassador William Brownfield for his valuable insights and input in this brief. This brief is made possible by general support to CSIS. No direct sponsorship contributed to this brief. CSIS Briefs are produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). © 2019 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. DOWNLOADS Download the CSIS Brief WRITTEN BY Twitter Moises Rendon Director, The Future of Venezuela Initiative and Fellow, Americas Program Max Price MEDIA QUERIES Contact H. Andrew Schwartz Chief Communications Officer Tel: 202.775.3242 Contact Emma Colbran Communications and Program Manager Tel: 202.775.3211 RELATED Americas, Americas Program, CSIS Briefs, Governance and Rule of Law, International Development, The Future of Venezuela Initiative (FVI) MOST RECENT FROM MOISES RENDON UPCOMING EVENT Humanitarian Aid to Venezuela: The Need for a Global Response January 31, 2020 UPCOMING EVENT Can the Rio Treaty Help Venezuela? January 21, 2020 IN THE NEWS Perks at Venezuela’s Failing Oil Giant Still Include Yoga and Guitar Lessons Yahoo Finance | Peter Millard and Fabiola Zerpa December 11, 2019 REPORT Unraveling the Water Crisis in Venezuela By Moises Rendon, Mark L. Schneider, Arianna Kohan December 10, 2019 COMMENTARY The Internet: Venezuela’s Lifeline By Moises Rendon, Arianna Kohan December 4, 2019 ON DEMAND EVENT Responding to Armed Groups in Venezuela November 18, 2019 REPORT Analyzing Obstacles to Venezuela’s Future By Moises Rendon, Mark L. Schneider November 6, 2019 ON DEMAND EVENT Sanctions Working in Venezuela October 23, 2019 View all content by this expert Footer menu TOPICS REGIONS PROGRAMS EXPERTS EVENTS ANALYSIS WEB PROJECTS PODCASTS IDEAS LAB TRANSCRIPTS ABOUT US SUPPORT US CONTACT CSIS Email CSIS Tel: 202.887.0200 Fax: 202.775.3199 VISIT CSIS HEADQUARTERS 1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036 MEDIA QUERIES Contact H. 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Legal menu CreditsPrivacy PolicyReprint Permissions Sections Search Center for Strategic and International Studies User menu Subscribe Sign In TOPICS Cybersecurity and Technology Defense and Security Economics Energy and Sustainability Global Health Human Rights International Development REGIONS Africa Americas Arctic Asia Europe Middle East Russia and Eurasia SECTIONS MENU PROGRAMS EXPERTS EVENTS ANALYSIS PODCASTS IDEAS LAB TRANSCRIPTS WEB PROJECTS MAIN MENU ABOUT US SUPPORT CSIS REPORT SHARE LinkedIn Facebook Twitter Email Printfriendly.com Are Sanctions Working in Venezuela? CSIS Briefs September 3, 2019 DOWNLOAD THE BRIEF The Issue As the United States, the Lima Group, the European Union, and other like-minded nations continue to increase pressure on the regime of Nicolás Maduro with diplomatic measures such as challenging his government’s legitimacy, the question remains as to whether sanctions are an effective measure for changing the behavior of the Venezuelan regime and pushing Maduro to step down. Despite external support by Russia, Cuba, China, and a few others, Maduro is more alienated on the world stage than ever before. That said, stiff sanctions and diplomatic isolation have not yet convinced Maduro to negotiate his exit while his regime has proven to be resilient and adaptable . As the humanitarian crisis deteriorates further, a debate has raged on among policymakers who worry that sanctions may be worsening conditions for Venezuelan citizens. This brief provides clarity on this complex issue. This report will assess the efficacy of past sanctions, as well as their impact on standards of living in Venezuela, and provide recommendations for improving policy in this area. Fast Facts By 2016, one year before financial sanctions were first implemented by the United States, the Venezuelan bolívar had already hit an inflation rate of 255 percent . Inflation has now surpassed 1 million percent and is projected to be 10 million percent by year end. Oil production in Venezuela dropped from roughly 2.4 million barrels per day in 2015 to about 1 million barrels per day at the end of 2018 before broad sanctions against PdVSA were implemented. Venezuelans lost an average of 24 pounds between 2016 and 2017. Over the same period, severe child malnutrition reached 15.5 percent. In addition to the European Union, five countries (the United States, Canada, Switzerland, Mexico, and Panama) have issued sanctions to address the Venezuelan crisis. Background: Sanctions on Venezuela Under the Obama administration, the United States implemented the first sanctions on Venezuela. In December 2014, the U.S. Congress passed the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act, which directed President Obama to impose sanctions on Venezuelan security forces who violently repressed student protests. The president codified the act in 2015 by revoking the assets and visas of eight individuals in the Maduro administration. Later, the act was extended through 2019, and the Department of Treasury sanctioned dozens of government and military officials for charges including support for terrorism, drug and human trafficking, human rights violations, corruption, money laundering, other financial crimes, and illiberal behavior. Individual Sanctions To date, the United States has sanctioned 119 individuals and 47 entities from or related to Venezuela, many of whom were also designated by Canada, Mexico, Panama, and the European Union. While the current administration has demonstrated a width and breadth of sanctioning techniques, the most notable policy shift since President Trump’s 2017 inauguration has been the gradual transition from individual to sectoral sanctions. These are distinct policy tools: individual sanctions block the assets and movement of persons deemed to be aiding the regime while sectoral sanctions prohibit transactions with certain companies which are engaged in illicit actions on behalf of the government. Sectoral Sanctions When President Trump took office, he continued the authorization of sanctions against individuals deemed to be working on behalf of Maduro’s regime, including Maduro’s family, vice president, and ministers and advisors in his inner circle. However, a change in course took place when the president issued an August 2017 executive order prohibiting U.S. citizens from purchasing Venezuelan government debt, specifically targeting Venezuela’s state-owned oil company Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PdVSA). This mandate also restricted the Venezuelan government’s access to U.S. debt and equity markets to limit Maduro’s ability to finance illicit activities and pay off military officials. In March 2018, the president banned U.S. citizens from engaging in transactions with petromoneda (better known as petro), an unsuccessful government-controlled cryptocurrency designed by the regime to circumvent financial sanctions. After Maduro’s illegitimate reelection in May 2018, a new order cut off the Venezuelan government and all its subsidiary entities from international debt financing, additionally blocking corrupt Venezuelan officials from selling off public assets in exchange for kickbacks. Pursuant to a November 2018 executive order laying out a framework for sanctioning Venezuelan companies deemed to be complicit in deceptive or corrupt practices, the Treasury Department designated PdVSA as subject to sanctions, blocking its property and interests and banning transactions with U.S. citizens this past January. These sanctions did not go into effect until June 2019, however. In March, the U.S. administration targeted Venezuela’s state-operated gold mining company Minerven for illicit and corrupt operations and engagements with criminal gangs and militia groups to financially benefit the regime. Several government, private sector, and military persons were sanctioned for their involvement in illegal mining. A month later, Treasury sanctioned the Central Bank of Venezuela, cutting off its access to U.S. currency and limiting its capacity to conduct international transactions. Further targeted sanctions were unleashed against a web of Cuban and Russian companies, including banks, oil importers, and shipping companies who have engaged with PdVSA and provided cash to Maduro’s government. In early August, President Trump announced a complete embargo against the Venezuelan government, blocking all transactions with some exceptions for humanitarian aid. Additionally, he granted Treasury the power to implement secondary sanctions against foreign and domestic entities engaging with Maduro’s regime. Are Sanctions Causing the Humanitarian Crisis? Sanctions did not cause the economic or humanitarian crisis in Venezuela as dire conditions in Venezuela preceded the implementation of sanctions. By 2016, a year before any financial or sectoral sanctions hit the country, Venezuela’s economy was already enduring severe hyperinflation, which surpassed a rate of 800 percent. Between 2013 and 2016, food imports fell 71 percent and medicine and medical equipment imports dropped 68 percent. Over the same period, infant mortality increased by 44 percent. By the time sanctions were introduced, Venezuelans earning the minimum wage could only afford 56 percent of the calories necessary for a family of five. Over two million Venezuelans had already fled the country at this point. The extent of the humanitarian damage suffered before sectoral sanctions indicates that the blame cannot be placed on the sanctions themselves. As an example, Venezuela’s Central Bank confirmed in 2014 that plummeting oil prices had triggered a severe economic contraction with simultaneous hyperinflation. Under the guise of austerity, Maduro announced cuts to major social services upon which millions of citizens relied. The Impact of Sanctions: An Ongoing Debate Despite the country’s economic deterioration occurring before the application of broad sanctions, some still blame the imposition of U.S. sanctions for degrading standards of living in Venezuela. A CEPR report from April 2019 claims that 40,000 people have died as a result of these sanctions, an assertion based on a comparison of oil production between Venezuela and Colombia before and after the 2017 sanctions. This conclusion was challenged by the Brookings Institution , which pointed out crucial differences between each country’s oil industry. Additionally, they illustrated that worsening determinants of the humanitarian condition in Venezuela predated the imposition of sanctions and have gone on for years. Other critics of current sanctions policy have instanced the fact that 68 percent of Venezuelans believe that U.S. sanctions have worsened their quality of life. Supporters of strict sanctions policy have cited Maduro’s years-long Hands Off Venezuela propaganda campaign that has arguably poisoned the well of public opinion. The real impact of economic sanctions on humanitarian conditions is obscured by several confounding variables, the most notable of which is Maduro’s lack of interest in stopping the bleeding. For decades, Venezuelan success has been contingent on global oil prices. Data from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) suggests that oil accounts for 98 percent of the country’s export revenues. The government’s dependence on these revenues to finance basic social spending has in part produced the current crisis. Venezuelan oil production plummeted by millions of barrels prior to the introduction of U.S. economic sanctions, reflecting a lack of economic diversity and intolerance for non-state competition in oil extraction which has once again left the nation’s prosperity precariously tied to oil prices. Economic mismanagement is just one side of the story, however. The Maduro regime has been unflinching in its efforts to centralize power and undermine democracy. In addition to amending the constitution several times , Maduro created a new legislative body to override a National Assembly with an opposition supermajority and packed the Supreme Court with loyalist justices. Maduro and his coconspirators are complicit in a 20-year process of institutional collapse, large-scale corruption, economic negligence, and suppression of individual rights. HIGHLIGHTED: A July 2019 report from the U.N. Commission on Human Rights illustrates the excesses of Venezuela’s authoritarian status. A crippling economic spiral has been exacerbated by extrajudicial killings, political imprisonment without due process, and pervasive violence due to the presence of groups such as FARC, ELN, Hezbollah, drug cartels, and pro-government colectivos. Mitigating the Collateral Damage of Sanctions Sanctions are undoubtedly cutting off financing to the Maduro regime, limiting the government’s ability to import food and medicine amid economic freefall. However, reversing sanctions against Maduro and giving the regime access to revenues will not fix the humanitarian crisis for three main reasons: Although government revenues have been used in the past to bankroll social programs, Maduro’s regime has neglected to provide food and medicine to the Venezuelan people. Instead, they have directly profited from these revenues, funding illicit projects and buying the loyalty of military officials. Sanctions are designed to choke off these earnings, weakening Maduro’s grasp on power and therefore accelerating the restoration of democracy. According to the Venezuelan constitution, Maduro has not been the legitimate president of the country since January 10th, 2019. Over 50 countries have denounced his regime and recognized Juan Guaidó as interim president until free and fair elections can be held. Granting financial access to Maduro only serves to undermine calls for free and fair elections. Instead, the legitimate government of Venezuela should be given authority over the nation’s resources and institutions. Alternative approaches to the humanitarian crisis can more effectively relieve the suffering of Venezuelans without empowering Maduro with the state’s assets and resources. Sectoral sanctions may be causing harm to vulnerable civilians who are already suffering under hyperinflation and crumbling job prospects. Therefore, any medium- to long-term sanctions strategy must be combined with a plan to provide aid to the Venezuelan population, 90 percent of whom cannot afford necessities. By limiting the finances to the Maduro regime and replacing it with a series of programs intended to provide food and aid to the Venezuelan people, both goals can be accomplished. One option, an oil-for-food initiative, could take advantage of Venezuela’s bountiful natural resources—it has the largest known reserves of oil in the world. While previous oil-for-food programs have had mixed results, thorough international oversight would limit the risk of corruption. Perhaps a greater challenge would be the fact that Maduro still controls the country’s territory and its vast oil reserves. Maduro has shut out foreign aid from abroad, including the United States, Canada, and the European Union, describing their contributions as a violation of sovereignty. Under his command, Venezuela’s borders with former allies Brazil and Colombia have been shuttered, bringing the delivery of crucial humanitarian aid to a near halt. Additionally, Maduro has abused Venezuela’s subsidized food program CLAP to punish political dissenters; 83 percent of Maduro’s supporters receive benefits, as opposed to 14 percent of independents. New methods are in order to address this challenge. Noting Maduro’s apparent disinterest in improving conditions for Venezuelans, concerned governments should pursue an unconventional approach for distributing aid. The main goals of any central strategy are clear: reducing hunger and malnourishment, increasing access to medicine and health care, and fostering independent communities. Implementing this change (without giving Maduro’s government the chance to skim off the top) may necessitate the use of technologies such as blockchain and cryptocurrency. Although Internet access is limited due to frequent power outages and generalized economic hardship, microfinancing could be allocated via cryptocurrency to central locations like churches or community centers and distributed by local representatives. Such a system would reduce the risk of corruption and ensure that rural and indigenous populations receive the aid they desperately need. While the volatility of cryptocurrencies raises concerns regarding their use as a medium of exchange, stablecoins such as MakerDAO, a decentralized currency pegged to the U.S. dollar, provide an unprecedented opportunity to direct funds effectively while reducing Maduro’s economic power. After all, the Venezuelan bolívar is projected to hit an inflation rate of 10 million percent this year. The international community must consider the costs of implementing sanctions alongside the benefits. Multilateral cooperation among the United Nations, the Lima Group, the Organization of American States, and nongovernmental organizations operating in the region is paramount to filling in the gaps. A strategy of person-to-person aid, whereby contact with the Maduro regime is minimized and relief can be transferred directly to those in need by interested international actors, should be adopted. The Efficacy of Sanctions There is significant evidence of the impact of sanctions on Maduro’s power. Not only have targeted economic sanctions limited his ability to finance his regime’s antidemocratic activities and human rights abuses by reducing oil and illegal mining earnings, but they have also strained his inner circle. His control over state institutions and assets is slipping along with public confidence in his regime. The United States has instituted a strategy of risk; the current administration’s interminable threat to impose further sanctions leaves Maduro and his accomplices unsure as to how far it will go, forcing them to fear the worst. Most recently, sanctions have increased leverage for democratic forces within Venezuela. Maduro recently agreed to send a delegation to Barbados to reopen talks with the opposition after dialogues stalled earlier this year. The increased pressure of sanctions was a key factor in his decision to negotiate with political adversaries, as he and his inner circle are more limited than ever in their capacity to travel and engage with financial assets. That said, there are areas for improvement in sanctions strategy. The first important step is to encourage multilateral adoption of currently targeted sanctions. Unilateral sanctions, even from the most powerful economy in the world, have limited results. In addition to incorporating allied neighbors Colombia and Brazil, the United States should take advantage of the Lima Group, which has recently taken a strong stance on Maduro’s crusade against democracy. If this is successfully achieved, the strategy can be extended outward to the Organization of American States and perhaps even the United Nations (although Chinese and Russian veto power on the Security Council would make this difficult). The United States and its allies must use sanctions deliberately as a tool to shut down Maduro’s criminal activities. By closing off criminal sources of revenue for him and his cohorts in Venezuela, Maduro’s relative exit costs can be lowered, which will in turn increase the likelihood of a peaceful transition. While barriers to exiting power are always high, sanctions can isolate Maduro to the point where resigning is a welcome alternative. Another method could be the reallocation of assets recovered from sanctioned officials in the Venezuelan government and military. These assets could be forfeited to nongovernmental organizations helping the most deprived Venezuelans. While such a process requires cutting through significant red tape, the legitimate government led by Guaidó would be well served to ensure that the victims of malevolence in Venezuela are compensated in some manner. Lastly, the international community can integrate innovative ideas for sanctioning businesses, especially those that are paramount to U.S. economic interests in the region. Several U.S. companies, most notably Chevron, currently operate in the Venezuelan oil sector and in turn must navigate sanctions. One past example is that Citgo, a subsidiary of PdVSA, was wrested from Maduro’s control and made responsive to Guaidó’s administration. The same strategy could be applied to Venezuela’s financial sector, specifically its centralized and semiprivate/state-owned banks. The United States should distinguish between institutions that are operating in sole service of Maduro’s regime and those that can play a role in providing an economic future for the country. This will require creativity as well as flexibility. It is also necessary to retract sanctions placed on state entities once they are proven to be legitimately controlled. The Day After: Lifting Sanctions The resonant answer from diplomatic officials as far as the future of sanctions has been fairly persistent: sanctions against Venezuela will be scaled back once democracy is restored. The vast majority of sanctions are individually targeted and mandated by executive order, rendering them easily reversible. However, a consistent answer does not always reflect a consistent standard, especially when discussing an end goal as complex and multilayered as the reinstitution of Venezuela’s democracy. There is a need to clarify this standard while qualifying short-term expectations as to the efficacy of sanctions in provoking a reversal in Venezuela’s trajectory. Interim president Juan Guaidó has laid out three principles characterizing the reparation of Venezuelan democracy. First, he argues, Maduro must resign (or face removal) from power. Secondly, a transitional government, arguably one that includes opposition members, Chavistas, and the support of the military, must be formed. Lastly, democratic elections must be carried out in a manner that satisfies the Venezuelan constitution and international standards. Sanctions can take time to have their intended effect and, even when successful, are not sufficient to dismember and rebuild a government. They are simply a tool for coercing good behavior. In order to help Venezuelans restore their democracy, sanctions are key to increasing pressure on the Maduro regime. But a focus on targeted sanctions is not enough. Having a feasible exit ramp for Maduro and his inner circle while having a compassionate effort at humanitarian assistance are crucial. Moises Rendon is director of the Future of Venezuela Initiative and fellow with the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Max Price is a former intern with the CSIS Americas Program. The authors would like to thank CSIS adviser Ambassador William Brownfield for his valuable insights and input in this brief. This brief is made possible by general support to CSIS. No direct sponsorship contributed to this brief. CSIS Briefs are produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). © 2019 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. DOWNLOADS Download the CSIS Brief WRITTEN BY Twitter Moises Rendon Director, The Future of Venezuela Initiative and Fellow, Americas Program Max Price MEDIA QUERIES Contact H. Andrew Schwartz Chief Communications Officer Tel: 202.775.3242 Contact Emma Colbran Communications and Program Manager Tel: 202.775.3211 RELATED Americas, Americas Program, CSIS Briefs, Governance and Rule of Law, International Development, The Future of Venezuela Initiative (FVI) MOST RECENT FROM MOISES RENDON UPCOMING EVENT Humanitarian Aid to Venezuela: The Need for a Global Response January 31, 2020 UPCOMING EVENT Can the Rio Treaty Help Venezuela? January 21, 2020 IN THE NEWS Perks at Venezuela’s Failing Oil Giant Still Include Yoga and Guitar Lessons Yahoo Finance | Peter Millard and Fabiola Zerpa December 11, 2019 REPORT Unraveling the Water Crisis in Venezuela By Moises Rendon, Mark L. Schneider, Arianna Kohan December 10, 2019 COMMENTARY The Internet: Venezuela’s Lifeline By Moises Rendon, Arianna Kohan December 4, 2019 ON DEMAND EVENT Responding to Armed Groups in Venezuela November 18, 2019 REPORT Analyzing Obstacles to Venezuela’s Future By Moises Rendon, Mark L. Schneider November 6, 2019 ON DEMAND EVENT Sanctions Working in Venezuela October 23, 2019 View all content by this expert Footer menu TOPICS REGIONS PROGRAMS EXPERTS EVENTS ANALYSIS WEB PROJECTS PODCASTS IDEAS LAB TRANSCRIPTS ABOUT US SUPPORT US CONTACT CSIS Email CSIS Tel: 202.887.0200 Fax: 202.775.3199 VISIT CSIS HEADQUARTERS 1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036 MEDIA QUERIES Contact H. Andrew Schwartz Chief Communications Officer Tel: 202.775.3242 Contact Emma Colbran Communications and Program Manager Tel: 202.775.3211 DAILY UPDATES Sign up to receive The Evening, a daily brief on the news, events, and people shaping the world of international affairs. First name This field is required. Last name This field is required. Email This field is required. Subscribe to More CSIS Newsletters FOLLOW CSIS Facebook Twitter LinkedIn YouTube Instagram All content © 2020. All rights reserved. Legal menu CreditsPrivacy PolicyReprint Permissions Socialism oil prereq argument Niemietz, Kristian. “Venezuela's Economic Collapse Is Linked to Its Socialist Policies.” FEE. May 2018SK https://fee.org/articles/venezuelas-economic-collapse-is-linked-to-its-socialist-policies/ search Articles Books Shows Events Store Donate Economics Politics Culture Education Venezuela's Economic Collapse Is Linked to Its Socialist Policies There's no dressing it up; socialism has wrecked Venezuela's economy. Tuesday, May 29, 2018 Kristian Niemietz Kristian Niemietz Economics Venezuela Socialism Chavez Maduro Inflation Venezuela is “experiencing problems,” because the country has taken a “wrong turn,” Shadow Chancellor John McDonnell remarked over the weekend. That is a bit of an understatement, but I suppose we can agree on his basic point. McDonnell’s diagnosis of what that “wrong turn” was, however, was a creative one: I don’t think it was a socialist country…it took a wrong turn when Chávez went and I think unfortunately since then, I don’t think they have been following the socialist policies that Chávez developed. And as a result of that, they’re experiencing problems. Unfortunately, the interviewer did not press McDonnell to be a bit more specific about this claim. Which of “the socialist policies that Chávez developed” have been abandoned, discontinued, or reversed by Nicolas Maduro’s government? Did Maduro re-privatize previously nationalized companies? Did he lift some of the price controls that Chávez had imposed? Did he go soft on the private sector? What was the drastic policy change that made the Shadow Chancellor reverse his judgement on Venezuela, a model which he praised as “socialism in action” just four years ago? The "Wrong Turn" Started Before Chávez There was, of course, no policy change to speak of. Maduro was never a political figure in his own right. He was always, first and foremost, a Chávez-loyalist, and he is now following the “socialist policies that Chávez developed” to a tee. (As Chávez knew he would, which is why he appointed him as his successor in the first place.) But when did Venezuela take a wrong turn? How could what was once South America’s richest country end up as such a basket case? While the blame does lie with Chávez, it is important to acknowledge that Chavismo did not suddenly pop up out of nowhere. The seeds were sown earlier. Take the following description: Venezuela’s new leaders concentrated on the oil industry as the main source of financing for their reformist economic and social policies. Using oil revenues, the government intervened significantly in the economy. … The government addressed general social reform by spending large sums of money on education, health, electricity, potable water, and other basic projects. Increased public outlays manifested themselves most prominently in the expansion of the bureaucracy…The government established hundreds of new state-owned enterprises and decentralized agencies as the public sector assumed the role of primary engine of economic growth. In addition to establishing new enterprises in such areas as mining, petrochemicals, and hydroelectricity, the government purchased previously private ones. This could easily pass as an account of the Chávez years. But it is actually a summary of what happened in the 1960s and 1970s. It was during those years, when the country was awash with oil money, that the Venezuelan economy became a patronage economy, and the Venezuelan state became a client state. Imagine a 1980s Greece, but high-powered with petrodollars. It was a model that was built on high and rising oil prices. When oil prices peaked in the early 1980s, and then entered a prolonged period of steady decline, the party came to an end. Venezuela was still a rich country, but its economic performance became volatile and erratic. The government tried to maintain the high public spending levels that the population had grown accustomed to by borrowing and printing money. Between the early 1980s and the mid-1990s, government debt increased from less than 30 percent of GDP to around 70 percent, and inflation increased from about 10 percent to over 60 percent. In Comes Chávez Successive governments tried to come to grips with these macroeconomic imbalances, but found it politically impossible. Adjustment packages were initiated, but never seen through. It is in these conditions that a peculiar form of left-wing populism, of which Chavismo would become the most extreme variant, was born. Both of Hugo Chávez’s predecessors had railed against “neoliberalism” (i.e. economics), and promised a return to the old, free-spending ways of the 1970s. Once in office, both of them quickly had to U-turn. Once again, Venezuela found itself awash with oil money. Had oil prices remained flat after Chávez’s election in 1998, his presidency might well have followed the same pattern: some initial populist grandstanding, then a U-turn with unpopular spending cuts and adjustment measures. Soon after, the next populist would have emerged, and denounced Chávez as a neoliberal sell-out. But Chávez was lucky. His inauguration coincided with the start of an unprecedented oil price boom, which would last for about fifteen years. Once again, Venezuela found itself awash with oil money. Oil revenue more than quintupled in real terms, and government spending shot up from under 30 percent of GDP to over 40 percent. The good times were back. Thus, Chávez’s nationalizations were not led by strategic considerations. They were a disciplining tool to punish recalcitrant private sector actors. During his first term (1999-2002), Chávez’s policies were not particularly socialist. In its early days, Chavismo was simply a turbocharged version of the spending splurge of the 1970s. But during his second term, the government started to intervene more aggressively in the economy, especially via price controls. When the initial interventions did not produce the desired effect, the government railed against the industry in question, accusing its actors of “sabotage” and “hoarding.” It then intervened in more heavy-handed ways, which often culminated in “revenge nationalizations.” Thus, Chávez’s nationalizations were not led by strategic considerations. They were a disciplining tool to punish recalcitrant private sector actors. The famed "Socialism of the 21st Century" was actually an ad-hoc “revenge socialism.” The Chávez government rode roughshod over the rule of law. Key governance indicators, which measure the reliability of the legal system, the strength of the protection of property rights and so on, declined steeply. It Has Never Worked, and It Never Will One need not be a believer in free markets to realize that Chavismo could never have been a workable economic model. Chavismo created constant shortages of consumer goods, including basic essentials. The insight that price controls lead to shortages is GCSE-level economics. The insight that a predatory government, which randomly confiscates private property, deters economic activity, is not even economics at all—it is just common sense. Nor does it take a lot of imagination to see that a rapid expansion of public spending programs increases the scope for corruption, patronage, and nepotism. Chavismo exacerbated existing economic problems, and created new ones. The over-reliance on oil, for example, predates Chávez. But by creating a hostile environment for investors and entrepreneurs in other sectors, Chávez made it worse. When Chávez was first elected, oil accounted for just over 70 percent of Venezuela’s exports. By the time of his death, it accounted for virtually all of it. Chavismo created constant shortages of consumer goods, including basic essentials. As early as 2007, when the oil boom was in full swing, the Washington Post reported: Meat cuts vanished from Venezuelan supermarkets this week, leaving only unsavory bits like chicken feet, while costly artificial sweeteners have increasingly replaced sugar…Chavez’s administration blames…unscrupulous speculators, but industry officials say government price controls … are responsible. Authorities on Wednesday raided a warehouse in Caracas and seized seven tons of sugar. Shortages have sporadically appeared with items from milk to coffee since early 2003, when Chavez began regulating prices for 400 basic products. One cannot identify any one specific “wrong turn” in Venezuela’s economic history. It is more a matter of economic distortions building up over time, and compounding each other. Chavismo, however, amplified the worst tendencies of Venezuelan politics, and took them to absolute extremes, whilst eroding those aspects of Venezuela’s economic landscape that used to function reasonably well. This, in a nutshell, is Chavez’s legacy. McDonnell is completely wrong to imply that the current government had, in any way, “betrayed” it. Would that they had. Venezuela would be a less miserable place now. Reprinted from CapX. Kristian Niemietz Kristian Niemietz Dr. Kristian Niemietz is the Institute for Economic Affairs' Head of Health and Welfare. 25 Republish Open Comments Further Reading Will Brazil take the Venezuelan or Chilean Path? Helio Veiga Jr. - 5/25/2019 Venezuela's Nightmare Is a Tragedy, But Not a Surprise Gerardo Garibay Camarena - 9/4/2018 Socialism – Not Oil Prices – Is to Blame for Venezuela's Woes Kristian Niemietz - 8/18/2017 Venezuela’s President Tackles Economic Crisis by Deleting 3 Zeros From its Currency Luis Pablo de la Horra - 4/5/2018 LOAD MORE ARTICLES About Staff Faculty Network Alumni Network Board of Trustees Contact Email Newsletter Sitemap Freeman Archive Historical Archives Submissions Job Openings Annual Reports Financial Data Privacy Policy This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, except for material where copyright is reserved by a party other than FEE. Sanctions cut off his oil and mining revenue Rendon, Moises. “Are Sanctions Working in Venezuela?” CSIS. September 2019SK https://www.csis.org/analysis/are-sanctions-working-venezuela Sections Search Center for Strategic and International Studies User menu Subscribe Sign In TOPICS Cybersecurity and Technology Defense and Security Economics Energy and Sustainability Global Health Human Rights International Development REGIONS Africa Americas Arctic Asia Europe Middle East Russia and Eurasia SECTIONS MENU PROGRAMS EXPERTS EVENTS ANALYSIS PODCASTS IDEAS LAB TRANSCRIPTS WEB PROJECTS MAIN MENU ABOUT US SUPPORT CSIS REPORT SHARE LinkedIn Facebook Twitter Email Printfriendly.com Are Sanctions Working in Venezuela? CSIS Briefs September 3, 2019 DOWNLOAD THE BRIEF The Issue As the United States, the Lima Group, the European Union, and other like-minded nations continue to increase pressure on the regime of Nicolás Maduro with diplomatic measures such as challenging his government’s legitimacy, the question remains as to whether sanctions are an effective measure for changing the behavior of the Venezuelan regime and pushing Maduro to step down. Despite external support by Russia, Cuba, China, and a few others, Maduro is more alienated on the world stage than ever before. That said, stiff sanctions and diplomatic isolation have not yet convinced Maduro to negotiate his exit while his regime has proven to be resilient and adaptable . As the humanitarian crisis deteriorates further, a debate has raged on among policymakers who worry that sanctions may be worsening conditions for Venezuelan citizens. This brief provides clarity on this complex issue. This report will assess the efficacy of past sanctions, as well as their impact on standards of living in Venezuela, and provide recommendations for improving policy in this area. Fast Facts By 2016, one year before financial sanctions were first implemented by the United States, the Venezuelan bolívar had already hit an inflation rate of 255 percent . Inflation has now surpassed 1 million percent and is projected to be 10 million percent by year end. Oil production in Venezuela dropped from roughly 2.4 million barrels per day in 2015 to about 1 million barrels per day at the end of 2018 before broad sanctions against PdVSA were implemented. Venezuelans lost an average of 24 pounds between 2016 and 2017. Over the same period, severe child malnutrition reached 15.5 percent. In addition to the European Union, five countries (the United States, Canada, Switzerland, Mexico, and Panama) have issued sanctions to address the Venezuelan crisis. Background: Sanctions on Venezuela Under the Obama administration, the United States implemented the first sanctions on Venezuela. In December 2014, the U.S. Congress passed the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act, which directed President Obama to impose sanctions on Venezuelan security forces who violently repressed student protests. The president codified the act in 2015 by revoking the assets and visas of eight individuals in the Maduro administration. Later, the act was extended through 2019, and the Department of Treasury sanctioned dozens of government and military officials for charges including support for terrorism, drug and human trafficking, human rights violations, corruption, money laundering, other financial crimes, and illiberal behavior. Individual Sanctions To date, the United States has sanctioned 119 individuals and 47 entities from or related to Venezuela, many of whom were also designated by Canada, Mexico, Panama, and the European Union. While the current administration has demonstrated a width and breadth of sanctioning techniques, the most notable policy shift since President Trump’s 2017 inauguration has been the gradual transition from individual to sectoral sanctions. These are distinct policy tools: individual sanctions block the assets and movement of persons deemed to be aiding the regime while sectoral sanctions prohibit transactions with certain companies which are engaged in illicit actions on behalf of the government. Sectoral Sanctions When President Trump took office, he continued the authorization of sanctions against individuals deemed to be working on behalf of Maduro’s regime, including Maduro’s family, vice president, and ministers and advisors in his inner circle. However, a change in course took place when the president issued an August 2017 executive order prohibiting U.S. citizens from purchasing Venezuelan government debt, specifically targeting Venezuela’s state-owned oil company Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PdVSA). This mandate also restricted the Venezuelan government’s access to U.S. debt and equity markets to limit Maduro’s ability to finance illicit activities and pay off military officials. In March 2018, the president banned U.S. citizens from engaging in transactions with petromoneda (better known as petro), an unsuccessful government-controlled cryptocurrency designed by the regime to circumvent financial sanctions. After Maduro’s illegitimate reelection in May 2018, a new order cut off the Venezuelan government and all its subsidiary entities from international debt financing, additionally blocking corrupt Venezuelan officials from selling off public assets in exchange for kickbacks. Pursuant to a November 2018 executive order laying out a framework for sanctioning Venezuelan companies deemed to be complicit in deceptive or corrupt practices, the Treasury Department designated PdVSA as subject to sanctions, blocking its property and interests and banning transactions with U.S. citizens this past January. These sanctions did not go into effect until June 2019, however. In March, the U.S. administration targeted Venezuela’s state-operated gold mining company Minerven for illicit and corrupt operations and engagements with criminal gangs and militia groups to financially benefit the regime. Several government, private sector, and military persons were sanctioned for their involvement in illegal mining. A month later, Treasury sanctioned the Central Bank of Venezuela, cutting off its access to U.S. currency and limiting its capacity to conduct international transactions. Further targeted sanctions were unleashed against a web of Cuban and Russian companies, including banks, oil importers, and shipping companies who have engaged with PdVSA and provided cash to Maduro’s government. In early August, President Trump announced a complete embargo against the Venezuelan government, blocking all transactions with some exceptions for humanitarian aid. Additionally, he granted Treasury the power to implement secondary sanctions against foreign and domestic entities engaging with Maduro’s regime. Are Sanctions Causing the Humanitarian Crisis? Sanctions did not cause the economic or humanitarian crisis in Venezuela as dire conditions in Venezuela preceded the implementation of sanctions. By 2016, a year before any financial or sectoral sanctions hit the country, Venezuela’s economy was already enduring severe hyperinflation, which surpassed a rate of 800 percent. Between 2013 and 2016, food imports fell 71 percent and medicine and medical equipment imports dropped 68 percent. Over the same period, infant mortality increased by 44 percent. By the time sanctions were introduced, Venezuelans earning the minimum wage could only afford 56 percent of the calories necessary for a family of five. Over two million Venezuelans had already fled the country at this point. The extent of the humanitarian damage suffered before sectoral sanctions indicates that the blame cannot be placed on the sanctions themselves. As an example, Venezuela’s Central Bank confirmed in 2014 that plummeting oil prices had triggered a severe economic contraction with simultaneous hyperinflation. Under the guise of austerity, Maduro announced cuts to major social services upon which millions of citizens relied. The Impact of Sanctions: An Ongoing Debate Despite the country’s economic deterioration occurring before the application of broad sanctions, some still blame the imposition of U.S. sanctions for degrading standards of living in Venezuela. A CEPR report from April 2019 claims that 40,000 people have died as a result of these sanctions, an assertion based on a comparison of oil production between Venezuela and Colombia before and after the 2017 sanctions. This conclusion was challenged by the Brookings Institution , which pointed out crucial differences between each country’s oil industry. Additionally, they illustrated that worsening determinants of the humanitarian condition in Venezuela predated the imposition of sanctions and have gone on for years. Other critics of current sanctions policy have instanced the fact that 68 percent of Venezuelans believe that U.S. sanctions have worsened their quality of life. Supporters of strict sanctions policy have cited Maduro’s years-long Hands Off Venezuela propaganda campaign that has arguably poisoned the well of public opinion. The real impact of economic sanctions on humanitarian conditions is obscured by several confounding variables, the most notable of which is Maduro’s lack of interest in stopping the bleeding. For decades, Venezuelan success has been contingent on global oil prices. Data from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) suggests that oil accounts for 98 percent of the country’s export revenues. The government’s dependence on these revenues to finance basic social spending has in part produced the current crisis. Venezuelan oil production plummeted by millions of barrels prior to the introduction of U.S. economic sanctions, reflecting a lack of economic diversity and intolerance for non-state competition in oil extraction which has once again left the nation’s prosperity precariously tied to oil prices. Economic mismanagement is just one side of the story, however. The Maduro regime has been unflinching in its efforts to centralize power and undermine democracy. In addition to amending the constitution several times , Maduro created a new legislative body to override a National Assembly with an opposition supermajority and packed the Supreme Court with loyalist justices. Maduro and his coconspirators are complicit in a 20-year process of institutional collapse, large-scale corruption, economic negligence, and suppression of individual rights. HIGHLIGHTED: A July 2019 report from the U.N. Commission on Human Rights illustrates the excesses of Venezuela’s authoritarian status. A crippling economic spiral has been exacerbated by extrajudicial killings, political imprisonment without due process, and pervasive violence due to the presence of groups such as FARC, ELN, Hezbollah, drug cartels, and pro-government colectivos. Mitigating the Collateral Damage of Sanctions Sanctions are undoubtedly cutting off financing to the Maduro regime, limiting the government’s ability to import food and medicine amid economic freefall. However, reversing sanctions against Maduro and giving the regime access to revenues will not fix the humanitarian crisis for three main reasons: Although government revenues have been used in the past to bankroll social programs, Maduro’s regime has neglected to provide food and medicine to the Venezuelan people. Instead, they have directly profited from these revenues, funding illicit projects and buying the loyalty of military officials. Sanctions are designed to choke off these earnings, weakening Maduro’s grasp on power and therefore accelerating the restoration of democracy. According to the Venezuelan constitution, Maduro has not been the legitimate president of the country since January 10th, 2019. Over 50 countries have denounced his regime and recognized Juan Guaidó as interim president until free and fair elections can be held. Granting financial access to Maduro only serves to undermine calls for free and fair elections. Instead, the legitimate government of Venezuela should be given authority over the nation’s resources and institutions. Alternative approaches to the humanitarian crisis can more effectively relieve the suffering of Venezuelans without empowering Maduro with the state’s assets and resources. Sectoral sanctions may be causing harm to vulnerable civilians who are already suffering under hyperinflation and crumbling job prospects. Therefore, any medium- to long-term sanctions strategy must be combined with a plan to provide aid to the Venezuelan population, 90 percent of whom cannot afford necessities. By limiting the finances to the Maduro regime and replacing it with a series of programs intended to provide food and aid to the Venezuelan people, both goals can be accomplished. One option, an oil-for-food initiative, could take advantage of Venezuela’s bountiful natural resources—it has the largest known reserves of oil in the world. While previous oil-for-food programs have had mixed results, thorough international oversight would limit the risk of corruption. Perhaps a greater challenge would be the fact that Maduro still controls the country’s territory and its vast oil reserves. Maduro has shut out foreign aid from abroad, including the United States, Canada, and the European Union, describing their contributions as a violation of sovereignty. Under his command, Venezuela’s borders with former allies Brazil and Colombia have been shuttered, bringing the delivery of crucial humanitarian aid to a near halt. Additionally, Maduro has abused Venezuela’s subsidized food program CLAP to punish political dissenters; 83 percent of Maduro’s supporters receive benefits, as opposed to 14 percent of independents. New methods are in order to address this challenge. Noting Maduro’s apparent disinterest in improving conditions for Venezuelans, concerned governments should pursue an unconventional approach for distributing aid. The main goals of any central strategy are clear: reducing hunger and malnourishment, increasing access to medicine and health care, and fostering independent communities. Implementing this change (without giving Maduro’s government the chance to skim off the top) may necessitate the use of technologies such as blockchain and cryptocurrency. Although Internet access is limited due to frequent power outages and generalized economic hardship, microfinancing could be allocated via cryptocurrency to central locations like churches or community centers and distributed by local representatives. Such a system would reduce the risk of corruption and ensure that rural and indigenous populations receive the aid they desperately need. While the volatility of cryptocurrencies raises concerns regarding their use as a medium of exchange, stablecoins such as MakerDAO, a decentralized currency pegged to the U.S. dollar, provide an unprecedented opportunity to direct funds effectively while reducing Maduro’s economic power. After all, the Venezuelan bolívar is projected to hit an inflation rate of 10 million percent this year. The international community must consider the costs of implementing sanctions alongside the benefits. Multilateral cooperation among the United Nations, the Lima Group, the Organization of American States, and nongovernmental organizations operating in the region is paramount to filling in the gaps. A strategy of person-to-person aid, whereby contact with the Maduro regime is minimized and relief can be transferred directly to those in need by interested international actors, should be adopted. The Efficacy of Sanctions There is significant evidence of the impact of sanctions on Maduro’s power. Not only have targeted economic sanctions limited his ability to finance his regime’s antidemocratic activities and human rights abuses by reducing oil and illegal mining earnings, but they have also strained his inner circle. His control over state institutions and assets is slipping along with public confidence in his regime. The United States has instituted a strategy of risk; the current administration’s interminable threat to impose further sanctions leaves Maduro and his accomplices unsure as to how far it will go, forcing them to fear the worst. Most recently, sanctions have increased leverage for democratic forces within Venezuela. Maduro recently agreed to send a delegation to Barbados to reopen talks with the opposition after dialogues stalled earlier this year. The increased pressure of sanctions was a key factor in his decision to negotiate with political adversaries, as he and his inner circle are more limited than ever in their capacity to travel and engage with financial assets. That said, there are areas for improvement in sanctions strategy. The first important step is to encourage multilateral adoption of currently targeted sanctions. Unilateral sanctions, even from the most powerful economy in the world, have limited results. In addition to incorporating allied neighbors Colombia and Brazil, the United States should take advantage of the Lima Group, which has recently taken a strong stance on Maduro’s crusade against democracy. If this is successfully achieved, the strategy can be extended outward to the Organization of American States and perhaps even the United Nations (although Chinese and Russian veto power on the Security Council would make this difficult). The United States and its allies must use sanctions deliberately as a tool to shut down Maduro’s criminal activities. By closing off criminal sources of revenue for him and his cohorts in Venezuela, Maduro’s relative exit costs can be lowered, which will in turn increase the likelihood of a peaceful transition. While barriers to exiting power are always high, sanctions can isolate Maduro to the point where resigning is a welcome alternative. Another method could be the reallocation of assets recovered from sanctioned officials in the Venezuelan government and military. These assets could be forfeited to nongovernmental organizations helping the most deprived Venezuelans. While such a process requires cutting through significant red tape, the legitimate government led by Guaidó would be well served to ensure that the victims of malevolence in Venezuela are compensated in some manner. Lastly, the international community can integrate innovative ideas for sanctioning businesses, especially those that are paramount to U.S. economic interests in the region. Several U.S. companies, most notably Chevron, currently operate in the Venezuelan oil sector and in turn must navigate sanctions. One past example is that Citgo, a subsidiary of PdVSA, was wrested from Maduro’s control and made responsive to Guaidó’s administration. The same strategy could be applied to Venezuela’s financial sector, specifically its centralized and semiprivate/state-owned banks. The United States should distinguish between institutions that are operating in sole service of Maduro’s regime and those that can play a role in providing an economic future for the country. This will require creativity as well as flexibility. It is also necessary to retract sanctions placed on state entities once they are proven to be legitimately controlled. The Day After: Lifting Sanctions The resonant answer from diplomatic officials as far as the future of sanctions has been fairly persistent: sanctions against Venezuela will be scaled back once democracy is restored. The vast majority of sanctions are individually targeted and mandated by executive order, rendering them easily reversible. However, a consistent answer does not always reflect a consistent standard, especially when discussing an end goal as complex and multilayered as the reinstitution of Venezuela’s democracy. There is a need to clarify this standard while qualifying short-term expectations as to the efficacy of sanctions in provoking a reversal in Venezuela’s trajectory. Interim president Juan Guaidó has laid out three principles characterizing the reparation of Venezuelan democracy. First, he argues, Maduro must resign (or face removal) from power. Secondly, a transitional government, arguably one that includes opposition members, Chavistas, and the support of the military, must be formed. Lastly, democratic elections must be carried out in a manner that satisfies the Venezuelan constitution and international standards. Sanctions can take time to have their intended effect and, even when successful, are not sufficient to dismember and rebuild a government. They are simply a tool for coercing good behavior. In order to help Venezuelans restore their democracy, sanctions are key to increasing pressure on the Maduro regime. But a focus on targeted sanctions is not enough. Having a feasible exit ramp for Maduro and his inner circle while having a compassionate effort at humanitarian assistance are crucial. Moises Rendon is director of the Future of Venezuela Initiative and fellow with the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Max Price is a former intern with the CSIS Americas Program. The authors would like to thank CSIS adviser Ambassador William Brownfield for his valuable insights and input in this brief. This brief is made possible by general support to CSIS. No direct sponsorship contributed to this brief. CSIS Briefs are produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). © 2019 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. DOWNLOADS Download the CSIS Brief WRITTEN BY Twitter Moises Rendon Director, The Future of Venezuela Initiative and Fellow, Americas Program Max Price MEDIA QUERIES Contact H. Andrew Schwartz Chief Communications Officer Tel: 202.775.3242 Contact Emma Colbran Communications and Program Manager Tel: 202.775.3211 RELATED Americas, Americas Program, CSIS Briefs, Governance and Rule of Law, International Development, The Future of Venezuela Initiative (FVI) MOST RECENT FROM MOISES RENDON UPCOMING EVENT Humanitarian Aid to Venezuela: The Need for a Global Response January 31, 2020 UPCOMING EVENT Can the Rio Treaty Help Venezuela? 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Legal menu CreditsPrivacy PolicyReprint Permissions Political Transition Uniqueness Bosworth, James “2019 has been a difficult year in Latin America — 2020 may only get worse” Business Insider, November 2019MN https://www.businessinsider.com/political-instability-protests-in-latin-america-may-intensify-in-2020-2019-11 Subscribe 2019 has been a difficult year in Latin America — 2020 may only get worse James Bosworth, Hxagon Nov 25, 2019, 12:25 PM FILE PHOTO: A demonstrator jumps over a burning barricade during a protest against Chile's government in Santiago, Chile November 13, 2019. REUTERS/Ivan Alvarado/File PhotoFILE PHOTO: A demonstrator jumps over a burning barricade during a protest against Chile's government in Santiago, Chile November 13, 2019. REUTERS/Ivan Alvarado/File Photo A demonstrator jumps over a burning barricade during a protest against Chile's government in Santiago, November 13, 2019. Reuters Analysis banner 2019 has been marked by political turmoil and popular outcry throughout Latin America. Each country in the region is facing unique circumstances, but trends across the region suggest that the instability may only intensify next year, according to political-risk analyst James Bosworth. Visit Business Insider's homepage for more stories. This is an excerpt from a recent edition of the Latin America Risk Report, a newsletter by James Bosworth, founder of political-risk advisor Hxagon. This year has been busy in terms of protests and anti-incumbent politics in Latin America. The past eight weeks have been particularly difficult. As I told two events in DC this past week, my forecast is that the number and intensity of protests will increase in 2020. Or, as I was quoted by Bloomberg this week: "Anger at the political systems isn't going away and, in many ways, governments are trapped … There will be more protests, and they'll be more violent in 2020." I promised several readers I would outline some of my reasons for that prediction in this week's newsletter. My forecast comes from looking at the big-picture trends across the region as well as the details of the political, economic and security issues specific to each country. Big picture: The trends connecting the protests are going to continue. An anti-government protester kneels before a police officer in Bogota, Colombia, Friday, Nov. 22, 2019. Labor unions and student leaders called on Colombians to bang pots and pans on Friday evening in another act of protest while authorities announced three people had died in overnight clashes with police after demonstrations during a nationwide strike. (AP Photo/Ivan Valencia) An anti-government protester kneels before a police officer in Bogota, Colombia, November 22, 2019. Labor unions and student leaders called on Colombians to bang pots and pans on Friday in an act of protest against the government. Associated Press Latin America's citizens are angry at their political systems due to corruption and a lack of results on citizen security and economic promises. They are upset about inequality, low growth and the increasing cost of living. Urbanization and youth with cell phones made rapid organization of protests in cities possible. Some variation of those base level factors exists in nearly every country in Latin America. They explain the protest movement we are seeing post hoc, but they aren't predictive. For example, nothing about economic inequality predicted Chile would experience mass protests in October 2019 rather than April 2019 or October 2018. Similarly, it's tough to take any specific variables that would have predicted three months ago that Chile would fall into major protests before Brazil. People in numerous countries around the region have been angry about corruption, economic inequality and other base level issues for a while. But having seen protests begin, there are strong reasons to believe they will continue and expand around the region. Many countries seem to be on edge, waiting for a catalyst to light the fire. And as protesters have seen success in neighboring countries, they have been emboldened to call for similar protests in their own countries. Country-level: Nearly every country in the region has conditions that are likely to generate protests. Soldiers guard the Senkata fuel plant in El Alto, on the outskirts of La Paz, Bolivia, Wednesday, Nov. 20, 2019. Security forces on Tuesday escorted gasoline tankers from the plant, that had been blockaded for five days by supporters of former President Evo Morales, and at least three people were reported killed while the operation was underway. (AP Photo/Natacha Pisarenko) Bolivian soldiers guard the Senkata fuel plant in El Alto, outside La Paz, November 20, 2019. Security forces escorted tankers from the plant, which was blockaded for five days by supporters of former President Evo Morales. Associated Press I'm going to separate out the countries likely to protest into four groups. (Though some overlap multiple groups and each country does have its own unique circumstances.) 1. Most countries that protested in 2019 aren't done yet. People take part in a protest march against Venezuela's President Nicolas Maduro in Caracas, Venezuela, November 16, 2019. REUTERS/Carlos Garcia Rawlins People take part in a protest march against Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro in Caracas, November 16, 2019. Reuters Venezuela, Honduras, Ecuador, Haiti and Bolivia all have factors that are going to lead to continued and likely increased protests in the coming year. Though the strength of the protests will ebb and flow, none of those five countries has a clear path out of the protest movements that continue. 2. Anti-system populists are struggling. Brazil Jair Bolsonaro Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro at the Brazilian Steel Conference in Brasilia, August 21, 2019. REUTERS/Adriano Machado Latin America's two largest countries are governed by populist leaders who have not met expectations. In Brazil, the Bolsonaro administration is below the 50 mark in the first year and has faced regular controversies over corruption scandals. The country's legislature just passed pension reform, something that may be good for Brazil's long term budget but is likely to spark anger in the short term. Bolsonaro's personality makes him likely to overreact to initial protests and create reasons for protests to escalate. In Mexico, President Lopez Obrador will finish his first year with over 50 popularity, not something many other presidents in the region can claim. But he is far from his goals for economic growth and faces a security crisis that is worse than the worst days of the Calderon or Peña Nieto administrations. This has hit his popularity recently 3. Stable countries look like Chile, and that's not good. A demonstrator faces security forces during a protest against Chile's state economic model in Valparaiso, Chile October 25, 2019. REUTERS/Rodrigo Garrido A demonstrator faces security forces during a protest against Chile's state economic model in Valparaiso, October 25, 2019. Reuters Chile was a model country, considered relatively stable with strong business environments by outside analysts in recent years. Many countries, including Colombia and Costa Rica, welcomed comparison to Chile. But comparisons to Chile aren't necessarily positive after the past few weeks of protests. Presidents and political systems across the region are unpopular. Economic inequality is high, and there are large numbers of poor and lower middle class not able to take advantage of economic gains. The populations would like to see greater government investments in social services, even as governments are concerned about a tough macroeconomic environment. For the same reasons Chile exploded in protest, you can find similar reasons in countries that have tried to emulate the Chilean model. 4. New administrations face early challenges and resource constraints. FILE PHOTO: Presidential candidate Alberto Fernandez and running mate former President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner celebrate after election results in Buenos Aires, Argentina October 27, 2019. REUTERS/Agustin Marcarian/File Photo Argentine President-elect Alberto Fernandez and his running mate, former President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, celebrate after the election in Buenos Aires, October 27, 2019. Reuters There are three new administrations taking office that have the potential for early failure: Argentina, Guatemala and Panama. All three were elected with less than 50 of the vote and some of their support came due to voters disliking their opponents more rather than a mandate for the new president's ideology or policy platform. All three presidents are likely to see divided governing coalitions and all three lack the economic resources to meet their campaign promises. SEE ALSO: The US and Russia, and their fighter jets, are looming over Venezuela's latest dispute More: Features Latin America News Contributor Chile Career Builder FIND A JOB Tech Jobs C-Level Jobs Media Jobs Design Jobs Finance Jobs Sales Jobs See All Jobs » Download on the App Store Get it on Google Play * Copyright © 2020 Insider Inc. All rights reserved. Registration on or use of this site constitutes acceptance of our Terms of Service , Privacy Policy and Cookies Policy . Sitemap Disclaimer Commerce Policy CA Privacy Rights Coupons Made in NYC Stock quotes by finanzen.net Reprints and Permissions International Editions: INTL DE AUS FR IN IT JP MY NL SE PL SG ZA ES Maduro is done for ~-~- US sanctions are working “Maduro's End Is Just the Beginning.” Stratfor. February 2019SK https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/maduros-end-would-be-just-beginning-venezuelas-road-recovery Stratfor Worldview SIGN IN SUBSCRIBE SIGN IN SUBSCRIBE TO WORLDVIEW SITUATION REPORTS ANALYSES FORECASTS EXPLORE MEDIA FORUMS STRATFOR SITES HELP and SUPPORT ASSESSMENTS Maduro's End Would Be Just the Beginning of Venezuela's Road to Recovery Feb 13, 2019 | 10:00 GMT Supporters of Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaido take part in a rally to let in U.S. humanitarian aid, in Caracas on Feb. 12, 2019. Supporters of Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaido rally in Caracas. (FEDERICO PARRA/AFP/Getty Images) Growing opposition protests and U.S. sanctions have set the stage for the president’s exit in 2019, leaving behind a crippled and corruption-ridden economy in his place.... 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BLOOMBERG.COM › Annotations In Venezuela, Time Is Not on Maduro’s Side ELI LAKE FEBRUARY 26, 2019 After his militias and national guardsmen attacked aid caravans trying to feed his starving citizens, Venezuela’s Nicolas Maduro appeared on state television over the weekend dancing the salsa. The dictator’s point was clear: I’m not rattled. I’m not going anywhere. This is the context for U.S. Senator Marco Rubio’s cryptic counterprogramming on Twitter. On Sunday he tweeted before and after photos of the late Moammar Al Qaddafi of Libya. In the first he was smiling in sunglasses; in the second he was bloodied and fleeing a mob. Six hours later, Rubio tweeted a similar side-by-side of the late Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania, first giving an angry speech and then facing a firing squad. The reaction was fierce. Some Twitter users began a campaign to report Rubio’s account for encouraging violence. Other activists began an online petition urging his resignation. Venezuela’s foreign minister told Democracy Now he was appalled. For the Latin American left, Rubio’s tweets play into America’s Cold War history of supporting strong men and encouraging coups. The most infamous moment came on Sept. 11, 1973, when Chilean military officers — at the urging of the CIA — toppled President Salvador Allende, who was shot during the coup. (It’s disputed whether he took his own life.) The left watches what’s happening now in Venezuela and sees the American gringos up to their old tricks. But this analysis crumbles under even the mildest scrutiny. Venezuela in 2019 is nothing like Chile in 1973. Allende won a real election in 1970. Maduro prevailed in a fake one last year. Maduro’s opposition is not a junta of military generals storming the presidential palace. It is the National Assembly, the country’s only institution with any democratic legitimacy. In short: In Chile in 1973, coup plotters sought to nullify an election; in Venezuela today, opposition leaders are seeking a new one. Most important, at least from the perspective of the U.S., there is no comprehensive military intervention in the offing. It’s true that President Donald Trump has asked his advisers about the feasibility of an intervention. It’s also true that senior administration officials like to say “all options” remain on the table; if Maduro sends his thugs to attack the U.S. embassy, for example, there will be a military response. But this is more about messaging than military action. When a president wants to start a war, he doesn’t position the U.S. Agency for International Development at the border. He sends in the Marines. What’s more, Venezuela’s interim president, Juan Guaido, is not asking America to invade Venezuela. So far, U.S. policy has been to persuade its allies to recognize his presidency; to sanction Maduro, his regime and the national oil company; and to urge the military to defect. It’s regime change through private and public diplomacy. This is the approach emphasized Monday at a meeting of Latin American countries formed to address the crisis caused by Maduro’s misrule. The so-called Lima Group made it clear that it was not endorsing an invasion or military force for now. Instead it announced plans to take Maduro himself to the International Criminal Court. Skeptics may ask how Guaido will force Maduro to leave without guns or a foreign army. But Guaido’s method of appealing to the conscience of the military and organizing the population has worked before — in Serbia in 2000 and in Egypt in 2010. In both countries, the military stood down in the face of popular defiance. So far Guaido has had modest success with the military. There has been a steady trickle of defections, according to the opposition and news reports. Over the weekend, a journalist tweeted a photo of a boarding pass to China through Russia for the children of one of Maduro’s top allies, Diosdado Cabello. The crucial fact to remember here is that time is not on Maduro’s side. As their access to international capital and bank accounts is constricted, Maduro and his henchmen will find it harder to stay in power. Eventually his most important international backers, Russia and China, will want their debts repaid. Maduro has no chance of doing that with international sanctions on the oil industry. Add to this that many of the Venezuelan military’s top officers have children studying in the U.S. and other countries that are now recognizing Guaido as interim president. And though Guaido has not yet gotten many high-level defections, neither has the military taken decisive action to keep Maduro in power. This is not to say that Guaido himself does not also face challenges. He has to keep a fractious opposition together and ward off rivals who see him as too young to lead Venezuela’s transition back to democracy. That said, Maduro’s position now is more perilous. All of which relates back to Rubio’s tweets. The senator was not threatening intervention or a coup. His message is better understood as a warning about what can happen when a tyrant stays too long. Ceausescu and Qaddafi didn’t learn this lesson until it was too late. Maduro and his family are running out of time. This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners. To contact the author of this story: Eli Lake at [email protected] To contact the editor responsible for this story: Michael Newman at [email protected] https://outline.com/hSdaue COPY Annotations · Report a problem READ and ANNOTATE ARTICLES TRY IT Maduro out: increases GDP growth by hella Fuentes, Juan. “In No Good Hands: The Venezuela Crisis and Consequences for South America.” Moody’s Analytics. June 2018DY https://www.moodysanalytics.com/-/media/web-assets/microsites/2018/economic-model/2018-06-15-venezuela-crisis.pdf) ANALYSIS Prepared by Juan Pablo Fuentes [email protected] Economist Jesse Rogers [email protected] Economist Marisa Di Natale [email protected] Senior Director Contact Us Email [email protected] U.S./Canada +1.866.275.3266 EMEA +44.20.7772.5454 (London) +420.224.222.929 (Prague) Asia/Pacific +852.3551.3077 All Others +1.610.235.5299 Web www.economy.com www.moodysanalytics.com In No Good Hands: The Venezuela Crisis and Consequences for South America Introduction Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro has solidified his grip on power following recent presidential elections, his victory all but ruling out prospects for a much-needed course correction in economic policy. This paper assesses the economic consequences for Venezuela and the rest of South America if Maduro serves out his new presidential term, and if he is cast from office. Should Maduro remain in power, Venezuela’s economic crisis would deepen, with small but significant consequences for economic growth and fiscal stability in the rest of South America. MOODY’S ANALYTICS In No Good Hands: The Venezuela Crisis and Consequences for South America JVuAn PABLO FuenTeS, JeSSe ROGeRS AnD MARISA DI nATALe enezuelan President Nicolas Maduro has solidified his grip on power following recent presidential elections, his victory all but ruling out prospects for a much-needed course correction in economic policy. This paper assesses the economic consequences for Venezuela and the rest of South America if Maduro serves out his new presidential term, and if he is cast from office. Should Maduro remain in power, Venezuela’s economic crisis would deepen, with small but significant consequences for economic growth and fiscal stability in the rest of South America. Like most Latin American countries, Ven- ezuela trades little with its immediate neigh- bors and much with the rest of the world. Therefore, its precipitous decline has done little to slow Andean neighbors Colombia, Peru and Chile. Even less harm has come to Argentina and Brazil, where trade and in- vestment flows with Venezuela are an even smaller share of total foreign investment and trade. However, further deterioration of Venezuela’s economy would impair growth in Colombia and the rest of South America, while the exodus of Venezuelans would strain public finances as countries struggle to absorb refugees. Venezuela in crisis As late as the mid-1990s, Venezuela’s stable democracy and relatively high standard of living were the envy of Latin America. However, popular discontent over the uneven record of neoliberal reforms and outrage over mounting public sector corruption precipitated the collapse of the country’s two-party system. The election of Hugo Chavez Frias as president in 1999 marked the start of nearly two decades of single-party rule, with Chavez’s suc- cessor, Nicolas Maduro, consolidating the grip of Chavez’s Socialist Party over the Venezuelan state. Backed by rising oil prices and the world’s largest proven crude oil reserves, Chavez ramped up expenditures on social programs and infrastructure while extending state control over the economy. On Chavez’s watch, private investment withered, leaving the Venezuelan economy reliant on imports to meet basic food, clothing and medicine needs. Rampant state spending and the swell in external debt heightened the country’s vulnerability to a decline in oil prices and sowed the seeds of the current crisis. Since the oil price crash of late 2014, Venezuela’s economy has contracted by more than one-third, precipitating the larg- est exodus of residents in South America’s modern history. Those who remain face dire circumstances: According to the World Bank, close to one-fifth of the popula- tion is malnourished. Infant mortality has increased and public security has deterio- rated. Although oil prices have recovered, disinvestment has eroded the production capacity of the oil industry, and the gradual recovery in crude oil prices has been insuf- ficient to offset the decades-long decline in production. With government expenditures outpacing revenues, hyperinflation has taken hold. Fiscal strain compounds the economic crisis. Faced with a sharp decline in oil rev- enues, the Venezuelan government has de- faulted on its obligations to creditors. In No- vember, Venezuela missed payments on both sovereign debt securities and bonds issued by state oil company Petroleros de Venezu- ela, or PDVSA. Financial sanctions imposed by the Trump administration prohibit U.S. residents from buying Venezuelan securities, all but ruling out a restructuring as long as Maduro remains in power. Despite the dismal economic record of the Maduro regime and rumblings of discontent among the military forces that make up a large share of his power base, the Venezuelan leader has consolidated his reign, suspending the opposition-controlled na- tional legislature and jailing dissidents. Still, Maduro’s chances for survival hinge on his ability to stem, if not reverse, the country’s economic decline. Hyperinflation and the ongoing economic depression sparked na- tionwide protests last year, and shortages of food and medicine threaten to rekindle social tensions. Should Maduro fail to stabilize the economy, his grip on power could slip. 1 June 2018 MOODY’S ANALYTICS Chart 1: Production Declines Amplify Crisis Venezuela 70 4.0 60 3.5 50 3.0 40 2.5 2.0 30 1.5 20 1.0 10 0.5 0 0.0 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05 10 15 Sources: World Bank, EIA, Central Bank of Venezuela, Moody’s Analytics Chart 2: A New Maduro Term Is Bad News GDP, 1997 VEF bil 65 60 55 50 45 40 35 30 GDP, 1997 VEF bil (L) Oil production, mil bpd (R) Maduro out Maduro digs in Maduro stays In no good hands The arrest of opposition leaders, repres- sion of political dissidents, and ban on op- position candidates has entrenched Maduro’s rule and left opponents to the regime with few options to challenge it. Presidential elections in May, from which almost all op- position candidates were barred, delivered another six-year term to Maduro and his So- cialist Party. Amid repression, leaders of the diverse factions that form Venezuela’s demo- cratic opposition have been unable to agree on a way forward. Intimidation by the state security forces aims to keep it that way. In this paper, we consider three potential outcomes for Venezuela’s economy, with the most likely being that Maduro remains in power and that Venezuela’s recession persists. The pace of economic growth in each scenario is grounded by assumptions over the likely path of oil production should Maduro remain in office or be forced to leave. While economic growth in Venezuela is more closely correlated with the price of oil in the short run, long-run changes in economic growth have been his- torically preceded by significant changes in crude oil output (see Chart 1). To assess economic impacts of these sce- narios for the rest of South America, we run assumptions on trade, investment, and overall economic growth through the Moody’s Ana- lytics Global Model. The model has been used to evaluate a wide range of international trade and investment policies as well as the eco- nomic consequences of international financial crises. Although Venezuela’s trade and invest- ment links with its neighbors have withered Presentation Title, Date 1 under the past two decades of single-party rule, these links persist and explain the pro- gression of economic shocks in each scenario. Scenario 1: Maduro stays (50) While backed more by military force than political fervor, Maduro’s sway over Venezu- ela’s economy will be hard to shake. In this baseline scenario, Maduro serves out his full six-year term by adopting limited economic reforms that gradually tame hyperinflation and stem the two-decade slide in Venezuelan oil production. While Venezuela’s recession persists, the economy contracts at progres- sively slower rates before bottoming in the second half of 2020 and commencing a measured recovery (see Chart 2 and Table 1). Presentation Title, Date 2 of multiple exchange rates and introduces a new currency anchored to the dollar. The new monetary regime gradually reduces the inflation rate and stabilizes the decline in real incomes. However, persistent government deficits force the government to restrict ac- cess to hard currency, limiting the rebound in trade and investment flows with the rest of the world. Imports rebound only meekly amid the shortage of hard currency, curbing growth in private consumption and limiting the scope of the economic recovery. At the end of Maduro’s six-year term, the Venezu- elan economy is barely any larger. In this baseline scenario, there is little negative spillover to Venezuela’s Andean neighbors. There also is no meaningful im- pairment to the economies of Brazil, Argen- tina and Uruguay. This is because the bulk of the decline in regional trade and investment has already taken place. Although Venezu- ela’s economy continues to deteriorate in Gasoline subsidies are gradually scaled back in a bid to improve the balance sheet of PDVSA and to keep oil flowing to Chinese and Russian creditors. However, U.S. financial sanctions remain in place, and the regime is unable to tap capital markets to attract sufficient investment to reverse the decline in oil production. Oil production bottoms at 500,000 barrels per day, one-fifth of its average prior to the oil price crash (see 1.0 Chart 3). 10 12 14 16 18F 20F 22F 24F Sources: Central Bank of Venezuela, Moody’s Analytics Chart 3: Oil Rebound Would Take Time Oil production, Venezuela, mil bpd 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 Maduro out Maduro digs in Maduro stays 0.5 hyperinflation, the re- 0.0 In a bid to curb gime unifies Venezu- ela’s current system 12 13 14 15 16 17 18F 19F 20F 21F 22F Sources: EIA, Moody’s Analytics Presentation Title, Date 3 2 June 2018 MOODY’S ANALYTICS Table 1: Maduro Stays Real GDP Venezuela (1997 VEF bil) change Colombia (2005 COP bil) change Chile (2013 CLP bil) change Peru (2007 PEN bil) change Brazil (1995 BRL bil) change Argentina (2004 ARS bil) change Uruguay (2005 UYU bil) change Consumer price index Venezuela (2007=100) change Colombia (Dec 2008=100) change Chile (2013=100) change Peru (2009=100) change Brazil (Dec 1993=100) change Argentina (2015=100) change Uruguay (Dec 2010=100) change Unemployment rate () 36.1 -10.4 566,460.2 2.7 151,101.8 2.4 529.9 2.9 1,212.2 2.4 750.2 3.0 729.0 4.2 135,983.8 619.3 142.0 3.3 118.7 2.7 128.8 1.1 5,021.3 3.6 213.3 23.5 182.3 7.2 33.8 33.5 34.3 -6.5 -0.8 2.3 585,574.6 608,446.8 633,153.4 3.4 3.9 4.1 154,904.8 159,989.2 165,243.6 2.5 3.3 3.3 546.8 563.5 582.7 3.2 3.1 3.4 1,236.7 1,272.8 1,313.3 2.0 2.9 3.2 772.7 798.9 827.3 3.0 3.4 3.6 750.8 770.7 792.5 3.0 2.7 2.8 496,680.4 958,694.8 1,384,174.4 265.2 93.0 44.4 147.1 152.1 157.0 3.6 3.4 3.2 122.0 125.2 128.5 2.8 2.6 2.7 131.4 133.9 136.4 2.1 1.9 1.9 5,305.8 5,638.2 5,985.4 5.7 6.3 6.2 247.7 278.5 304.3 16.1 12.4 9.3 193.9 205.2 215.9 6.4 5.8 5.2 18.4 15.1 11.4 9.0 8.7 8.4 7.2 7.2 7.2 5.4 5.1 5.0 11.8 11.3 10.8 6.8 6.5 6.4 7.3 7.1 7.0 34.7 35.6 -0.3 1.4 2.6 658,980.8 685,208.9 3.9 4.1 4.0 170,714.2 176,295.0 3.1 3.3 3.3 601.7 621.9 3.3 3.3 3.4 1,357.1 1,399.9 2.9 3.3 3.2 857.1 888.4 3.4 3.6 3.7 815.1 837.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 1,655,203.0 1,864,838.7 68.8 19.6 12.7 162.0 167.0 3.3 3.2 3.1 132.0 135.7 2.7 2.7 2.8 139.1 141.8 1.9 1.9 2.0 6,336.2 6,691.8 5.9 5.9 5.6 326.5 346.9 10.2 7.3 6.2 226.5 237.4 5.4 4.9 4.8 9.6 9.2 8.1 7.8 7.0 6.9 4.9 4.9 10.2 9.8 6.3 6.3 7.0 7.0 -5.7 -4.9 -2.9 -3.0 -0.8 -0.7 0.0 0.2 -1.9 -2.0 -3.9 -3.3 -1.9 -2.2 Avg annual growth, 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2018-2023 Venezuela 19.1 Colombia 9.3 Chile 7.0 Peru 6.0 Brazil 12.3 Argentina 7.1 Uruguay 7.7 Government budget balance, of GDP Venezuela Colombia Chile Peru Brazil Argentina Uruguay Source: Moody's Analytics -9.1 -9.2 -2.7 -2.6 -4.4 -3.4 -1.9 -1.3 -6.4 -4.4 -5.6 -5.4 0.0 -0.7 -8.2 -6.5 -2.8 -2.9 -2.2 -1.2 -0.8 -0.3 -3.0 -2.2 -4.9 -4.4 -1.2 -1.6 3 June 2018 MOODY’S ANALYTICS Chart 4: Andean Economies Hurt Most Real GDP growth 2019-2020, ppt below baseline, Maduro digs in Chart 5: Little Trade With LatAm Neighbors of Venezuelan imports, 2014, from... Source: Moody’s Analytics the first two years of the baseline scenario, it does so at progressively slower rates. Despite the subsequent recovery, there is little up- side for the rest of South America, with the increase in Venezuelan imports insufficient to deliver a meaningful boost to trade. As the Venezuelan economy stabilizes, the flight of Venezuelans abates, lessening pressure on South American governments to offer finan- cial support to refugees. The Catholic Church and other nongovernmental organizations will remain the primary providers of humanitarian aid for new arrivals, limiting the cost to govern- ments of absorbing new migrants. Scenario 2: Maduro digs in (20) In this scenario, Maduro also serves out the remainder of his six-year term. How- ever, in order to maintain strict control over imports and domestic prices, he does not implement currency reforms or reduce gaso- line subsidies that have sapped investment at PDVSA. Without additional cost savings from the subsidy cut, investment in the oil industry declines at an even faster rate, and oil production bottoms at less than 300,000 barrels per day. Hyperinflation persists, caus- ing the economy to contract sharply before bottoming out at the end of 2020 (see Table 2). The Venezuelan economy does not re- cover, and worsening economic conditions spur an even larger exodus of Venezuelan residents. U.S. financial sanctions remain in place and Venezuela is unable to access in- ternational capital markets, aggravating the decline in investment and further limiting imports of basic foodstuffs and medicine. 0.1 0.1 to 0.3 0.3 No data Presentation Title, Date Sources: U.N. Comtrade, Moody’s Analytics 4 Presentation Title, Date 5 up only a small share of their total exports, limiting negative spillovers from the decline in two-way trade and investment. The prolonged economic contraction has- tens the exodus of Venezuelan residents to An- dean nations and to the rest of South America. So far, state governments in Colombia, Chile and Peru have offered little financial support to Venezuelan refugees, leaving humanitarian aid largely the remit of the Catholic Church and other nongovernmental organizations. How- ever, in this scenario we assume that increased arrivals of Venezuelan refugees would force states to provide food, healthcare and basic public services to the influx of new arrivals. The swell of Venezuelan migrants would put the largest strain on state finances in Co- lombia, causing the fiscal deficit to widen by 0.6 percentage point per year over the next five years and increasing the overall debt-to- GDP ratio by a cumulative 2.2 percentage points (see Chart 6). This result is consistent The steep contraction in economic output and oil production reduces growth in the rest of South America, but negative spillovers are most evident in Colombia, where economic growth is 0.2 percentage point lower on an annual basis through 2020 (see Chart 4). This drag is not large in absolute terms, but it is nonetheless significant for Colombia’s economy, which has struggled to grow at rates above 2 for the past two years amid low oil prices and rising inflation. While political tensions between the Colombian and Venezuelan governments and competition from China have reduced bilateral trade and investment, these links are still present: Colombia remains an important source of foodstuffs and medicine for Venezu- ela, while a small share of Venezuelan hydro- carbon exports make their way to Colombian refineries and cracker plants (see Chart 5). The collapse in Venezuelan trade deals a smaller setback to growth in Peru and Chile. The two Andean countries make up a sliver of Venezuelan imports, and Venezu- elan purchases are broad-based across industries, limiting the exposure of any one sector to Venezuelan domestic demand. Venezuela imports more from Brazil and Argentina, but the two countries’ shipments to Venezuela make Chart 6: Exodus Strains Public Finances Change in deficit, of GDP, Maduro digs in vs. baseline 4 June 2018 Colombia Peru Chile Uruguay Brazil Argentina 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 Sources: Central banks, Moody’s Analytics Colombia Chile Peru Brazil Rest of LatAm U.S. Asia Europe Other Presentation Title, Date 6 MOODY’S ANALYTICS Table 2: Maduro Digs In Real GDP Venezuela (1997 VEF bil) change Colombia (2005 COP bil) change Chile (2013 CLP bil) change Peru (2007 PEN bil) change Brazil (1995 BRL bil) change Argentina (2004 ARS bil) change Uruguay (2005 UYU bil) change Consumer price index Venezuela (2007=100) change Colombia (Dec 2008=100) change Chile (2013=100) change Peru (2009=100) change Brazil (Dec 1993=100) change Argentina (2015=100) change Uruguay (Dec 2010=100) change Unemployment rate () 35.8 -11.2 566,471.0 2.7 151,048.5 2.4 529.7 2.9 1,212.1 2.4 750.2 3.0 729.0 4.2 142,560.2 654.0 142.0 3.3 118.7 2.7 128.8 1.1 5,021.2 3.6 213.3 23.5 182.3 7.2 32.6 31.8 31.9 -8.9 -2.4 0.4 584,168.7 605,922.2 629,984.6 3.1 3.7 4.0 154,687.6 159,723.2 164,931.1 2.4 3.3 3.3 545.8 562.1 581.3 3.0 3.0 3.4 1,236.1 1,272.5 1,313.0 2.0 2.9 3.2 772.6 798.8 827.2 3.0 3.4 3.6 750.8 770.8 792.3 3.0 2.7 2.8 949,250.4 3,651,905.4 9,022,652.4 565.9 284.7 147.1 147.1 152.0 156.8 3.5 3.4 3.2 122.0 125.1 128.4 2.8 2.5 2.7 131.4 133.8 136.1 2.0 1.8 1.7 5,305.2 5,635.6 5,979.8 5.7 6.2 6.1 247.7 278.5 304.3 16.1 12.4 9.3 193.9 205.2 215.9 6.4 5.8 5.2 18.7 15.5 12.0 9.0 8.7 8.4 7.2 7.3 7.2 5.4 5.1 5.0 11.8 11.3 10.8 6.8 6.5 6.4 7.3 7.1 7.0 31.9 32.2 -2.1 0.1 0.7 655,442.4 681,577.4 3.8 4.0 4.0 170,343.5 175,855.0 3.1 3.3 3.2 600.6 621.0 3.2 3.3 3.4 1,356.8 1,399.7 2.9 3.3 3.2 856.9 888.0 3.4 3.6 3.6 814.8 837.6 2.8 2.8 2.8 18,718,488.4 35,448,496.7 201.4 107.5 89.4 161.6 166.5 3.2 3.1 3.0 131.9 135.5 2.7 2.7 2.7 138.6 141.2 1.9 1.8 1.9 6,327.1 6,678.6 5.9 5.8 5.6 326.4 346.8 10.2 7.3 6.2 226.5 237.4 5.4 4.9 4.8 10.3 10.0 8.1 7.8 7.1 7.0 4.9 4.9 10.3 9.8 6.3 6.3 7.0 7.0 -7.2 -6.4 -3.3 -3.2 -0.9 -0.9 -0.2 0.0 -1.9 -2.0 -3.9 -3.3 -1.9 -2.2 Avg annual growth, 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2018-2023 Venezuela 19.1 Colombia 9.3 Chile 7.0 Peru 6.0 Brazil 12.3 Argentina 7.1 Uruguay 7.7 Government budget balance, of GDP Venezuela Colombia Chile Peru Brazil Argentina Uruguay Source: Moody's Analytics -9.3 -10.1 -2.7 -3.1 -4.4 -3.5 -1.9 -1.5 -6.4 -4.4 -5.6 -5.4 0.0 -0.7 -9.0 -7.8 -3.5 -3.4 -2.4 -1.4 -1.1 -0.6 -3.0 -2.2 -5.0 -4.4 -1.2 -1.6 5 June 2018 MOODY’S ANALYTICS with most estimates of the financial costs of refugee resettlement.1 As in the case of growth, the change in the government’s debt burden is not large in absolute terms, but is nonetheless significant when added to the fiscal strain of Colombia’s peace process and the increase in expenditures for the reinte- gration of former guerrilla members into civil society. Both Peru and Chile would likely receive fewer refugees, limiting the strain on public finances. According to the International Or- ganization for Migration, close to 1 million refugees have arrived in Colombia in the last two years alone, with an additional 250,000 split between Peru and Chile. While the lat- ter two countries would likely receive more refugees as Colombia struggles to integrate even larger numbers of Venezuelans, the increase in expenditures would yield only a small increase in the deficit. Brazil and to a lesser degree Argentina and Uruguay would likely grow in impor- tance as destinations for Venezuelan refu- gees should economic conditions deteriorate further, but the costs of refugee resettlement would not measurably add to government deficits given the small size of aid relative to total government expenditures and the ex- pectation of fewer refugee arrivals relative to Venezuela’s Andean neighbors. Scenario 3: Maduro out (30) In this scenario, the Maduro presidency is cut short. U.S. sanctions are lifted, and the International Monetary Fund provides a loan to facilitate the restructuring of Venezuela’s external debt. Additional funding from multi- lateral sources is secured to aid monetary and fiscal adjustment and ease the lifting of price controls. The freeing of the Venezuelan bolivar and phase-out of price controls results in a temporary spike in inflation in the near term, but sharp cuts in government spending and higher domestic interest rates begin to reduce the growth rate of consumer prices. The Ven- ezuelan economy contracts slightly in 2019, but recovery rapidly sets in as oil production rebounds and multinational oil companies revive investments (see Table 3). Venezuela’s recovery delivers a significant boost to economic growth in Colombia, Peru and Chile and a small bump to the economies of Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina. Although many Venezuelan refugees return from exile in Colombia and other South American nations, labor force gains are largely the result of improved job prospects and a growing economy. Even with a large disbursement of in- ternational aid and a swift transition to a market-based economy, Venezuela will take time to regain its precrisis peak. The return of foreign investment and the stabilization of inflation will enable Venezuela’s economy to grow at double-digit rates in the first few years of the recovery before settling in to a more modest pace consistent with long-run population and productivity dynamics. How- ever, even if double-digit growth is sustained, it would still take more than five years for GDP to top its prior peak. While the return of foreign investment enables oil production to rebound quickly, Maduro’s successor will face lower prices than those reached during the bonanza of the Chavez years. As a result, Venezuela’s re- covery will bear a closer resemblance to the rebound from prior oil price crashes in the late 1980s and 1990s, which saw the econo- my recover at a more moderate pace. A better tomorrow The odds of a Maduro exit are less than even, but they are not slim. Few govern- ments have outlasted the social tensions kindled by hyperinflation, and the likeli- hood of widespread social unrest will only increase in coming months as a shortage of hard currency keeps store shelves empty. Should mounting discontent lead to a popular uprising, Maduro’s grip on power could slip. Even if the Maduro regime were to liberalize price and currency controls, the economy would not improve unless an agreement is reached with international creditors and the country regains access to international financial markets. This would require the lifting of U.S. financial sanctions, an outcome increasingly unlikely as long as Maduro remains. A worsening of Venezuela’s crisis would deal a small but significant setback to growth prospects in Colombia, Peru and Chile, and force governments to contend with a continent-wide refugee crisis. Al- though governments have thus far limited the scope of humanitarian aid, a larger exo- dus would likely force governments to bear the resettlement costs for Venezuelan refu- gees, adding strain to public finances. 1 Dany Bahar and Sebastian Strauss of the of Brookings Institute estimate the cost of resettlement for Venezuelan refugees under diverse conditions. See “Neighbor na- tions can’t bear cost of Venezuelan refugee crisis alone,” Brookings Op-Ed, March 7, 2018. https://www.brookings. edu/opinions/neighbor-nations-cant-bear-costs-of- venezuelan-refugee-crisis-alone/ 6 June 2018 MOODY’S ANALYTICS Table 3: Maduro Out Real GDP Venezuela (1997 VEF bil) change Colombia (2005 COP bil) change Chile (2013 CLP bil) change Peru (2007 PEN bil) change Brazil (1995 BRL bil) change Argentina (2004 ARS bil) change Uruguay (2005 UYU bil) change Consumer price index Venezuela (2007=100) change Colombia (Dec 2008=100) change Chile (2013=100) change Peru (2009=100) change Brazil (Dec 1993=100) change Argentina (2015=100) change Uruguay (Dec 2010=100) change Unemployment rate () 36.3 -10.0 566,688.2 2.7 151,151.8 2.5 530.0 3.0 1,212.3 2.5 750.2 3.0 729.1 4.2 109,944.6 481.5 142.0 3.3 118.7 2.7 128.8 1.1 5,021.3 3.6 213.3 23.5 182.3 7.2 34.8 37.9 41.4 -4.0 8.9 9.2 588,966.9 613,927.4 639,753.8 3.9 4.2 4.2 155,205.1 160,513.0 165,868.9 2.7 3.4 3.3 549.8 567.0 585.6 3.7 3.1 3.3 1,237.7 1,274.1 1,314.0 2.1 2.9 3.1 772.9 799.2 827.6 3.0 3.4 3.6 751.4 771.3 793.1 3.1 2.6 2.8 219,353.5 282,026.1 327,404.8 99.5 28.6 16.1 147.1 152.2 157.4 3.6 3.5 3.4 122.0 125.2 128.7 2.8 2.6 2.8 131.5 134.2 137.2 2.1 2.1 2.2 5,306.7 5,642.9 5,996.7 5.7 6.3 6.3 247.7 278.5 304.4 16.1 12.4 9.3 193.9 205.2 215.9 6.4 5.8 5.2 18.2 14.0 9.6 9.0 8.6 8.3 7.2 7.2 7.1 5.4 5.1 5.0 11.8 11.3 10.8 6.8 6.5 6.4 7.3 7.1 7.0 44.5 47.5 5.5 7.5 6.7 666,244.4 692,577.3 4.1 4.1 4.0 171,408.6 177,030.9 3.2 3.3 3.3 604.2 624.2 3.3 3.2 3.3 1,357.3 1,399.6 2.9 3.3 3.1 857.2 888.4 3.4 3.6 3.6 815.7 838.4 2.8 2.8 2.8 360,038.2 381,830.3 28.3 10.0 6.1 162.7 168.2 3.4 3.4 3.4 132.3 136.1 2.8 2.8 2.9 140.2 143.4 2.2 2.2 2.2 6,356.2 6,721.5 6.0 6.0 5.7 326.5 346.9 10.2 7.3 6.3 226.5 237.4 5.4 4.9 4.8 7.2 6.3 8.0 7.8 7.0 6.8 4.9 4.9 10.2 9.8 6.3 6.3 7.0 7.0 -3.1 -1.9 -2.7 -2.7 -0.7 -0.6 0.0 0.2 -1.9 -2.1 -3.9 -3.3 -1.9 -2.1 Avg annual growth, 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2018-2023 Venezuela 19.1 Colombia 9.3 Chile 7.0 Peru 6.0 Brazil 12.3 Argentina 7.1 Uruguay 7.7 Government budget balance, of GDP Venezuela Colombia Chile Peru Brazil Argentina Uruguay Source: Moody's Analytics -8.9 -8.0 -2.7 -2.4 -4.4 -3.3 -1.9 -1.2 -6.4 -4.4 -5.6 -5.4 0.0 -0.7 -6.1 -4.2 -2.6 -2.6 -2.1 -1.1 -0.7 -0.2 -2.9 -2.2 -4.9 -4.4 -1.2 -1.5 7 June 2018 MOODY’S ANALYTICS About the Authors Juan Pablo Fuentes is an economist at Moody’s Analytics. He is a regular contributor to the Economy.com/Latin America web site and produces forecasts and alternative scenarios for a number of Latin American countries. Juan Pablo also writes about energy-related issues. Before joining Moody’s Analytics, Juan Pablo analyzed Latin Ameri- can economies for IHS Global Insight. He received his master’s degree in international economics from Suffolk University and his bachelor’s degree in economics from the Andres Bello Catholic University in Caracas, Venezuela. Jesse Rogers is an economist at Moody’s Analytics and covers Latin American and U.S. state and metropolitan area economies. He holds a master’s degree in economics and international relations from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. While completing his degree, he interned with the U.S. Treasury and Institute of International Finance. Previously, he was a finance and politics reporter for El Diario New York and worked in Mexico City for the Center for Research and Teaching in Economics (CIDE). He received his bachelor’s degree in Hispanic studies at the University of Pennsylvania. Marisa Di Natale is a senior director at Moody’s Analytics. Ms. Di Natale’s areas of specialization include international modeling and forecasting, U.S. regional economics, and labor economics. Ms. Di Natale previously oversaw the firm’s U.S. subnational forecasting service prior to shifting to international economics. Before joining Moody’s Analytics in 2004, she was an economist at the Bureau of Labor Statistics in Washington DC, where she analyzed monthly employment statistics. Ms. Di Natale received a master’s degree in applied economics from Johns Hopkins University and a bachelor’s degree in international relations from Boston University. 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May 2019SK https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/02/venezuela-crisis-and-how-it-could-affect-oil.html) SKIP NAVIGATION logo SIGN IN PRO WATCHLIST MAKE IT SELECT USA INTL logo MARKETS BUSINESS INVESTING TECH POLITICS CNBC TV SEARCH QUOTES WORLD POLITICS Oil markets face three possible scenarios in Venezuela PUBLISHED THU, MAY 2 20197:58 AM EDTUPDATED THU, MAY 2 20198:11 AM EDT Holly Ellyatt @HOLLYELLYATT KEY POINTS Venezuela’s political and humanitarian crisis remains fluid with President Nicolas Maduro clinging to power amid protests led by opposition leader Juan Guaido. Street protests are expected to continue Thursday with Guaido telling thousands of supporters yesterday that “there’s no turning back.” How oil markets could be impacted by the crisis depends on what comes next. RT: Venezuela oil production workers drilling Oil workers conduct a drill in a petroleum well in Lagunillas at the east coast of Lake Maracaibo near Maracaibo City in Venezuela. Jorge Silva | Reuters Venezuela’s political and humanitarian crisis remains fluid with President Nicolas Maduro clinging to power amid protests led by opposition leader Juan Guaido. Street protests are expected to continue Thursday with Guaido telling thousands of supporters yesterday that “there’s no turning back” as he called for a series of national strikes. In the meantime, Venezuelans are reportedly experiencing shortages of food and medicines. What the current situation, and any potential outcomes, mean for Venezuela’s primary economic asset — its oil sector — are now under scrutiny. OPEC-member Venezuela is reliant on oil for 98 of its export earnings and is laboring under U.S. sanctions, which penalize Venezuela’s state-owned energy company PDVSA and any vessels or companies enabling oil shipments to Venezuela’s ally Cuba. Unrest in Caracas has weighed on markets, as have stricter U.S. sanctions on Iran, but news of higher U.S. crude stockpiles have kept prices subdued so far. On Wednesday, Brent crude futures stood at $71.36 per barrel and West Texas Intermediate (WTI) stood around $62.85. RBC Capital Markets’ Global Head of Commodity Strategy Helima Croft and her team have examined three possible scenarios for Venezuela, and their respective implications for the global oil market. Scenario 1: Maduro goes, Guaido comes to power A sudden Maduro departure and transition to a Guaido-led reformist government would provide “the best hope for kick-starting the revival of the Venezuelan economy,” Croft and her team said in a note Wednesday. “This scenario presents the most bearish outcome for (oil) prices, especially as many investors might assume that the recovery will be quick and uncomplicated. However, even if such a situation comes to pass we would caution that the road back will be arduous given the magnitude of the collapse.” Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaido, who many nations have recognised as the country’s rightful interim ruler, gestures as he speaks to supporters during a rally against the government of Venezuela’s President Nicolas Maduro and to commemorate May Day in Caracas Venezuela, May 1, 2019. REUTERS | Carlos Garcia Rawlins Croft and her team, comprised of commodity strategists Christopher Louney and Michael Tran and associate strategist Megan Schippmann, warned that even if Guaido came to power, Venezuela’s security situation “would likely remain fraught.” They didn’t think a Guaido victory likely at this stage, either. “Given the apparent absence of high level military defections to the Guaido camp as well as Moscow’s marked aversion to such a regime change, we think this scenario has the slimmest chances of success in the near term.” Scenario 2: Maduro stays If Maduro manages to ride out the current wave of protests, RBC noted that the country’s economic collapse will undoubtedly accelerate as the United States ups the sanctions ante. “The White House will likely look to further erode the country’s oil export revenue by compelling consuming countries like India to curb their Venezuelan purchases. Washington may also demand that U.S. energy companies cease operating in the country and that European firms stop providing diluents and other services to (Venezuelan state-owned oil firm) PDVSA.” Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro meets with UN chief Ban Ki-moon at the United Nations headquarters in New York on July 28, 2015. Spencer Platt | Getty Images News | Getty Images Such punitive measures, along with rolling power cuts, would further compress the country’s oil production, potentially sending it close to zero by year-end, the strategists noted. This outcome would be most bullish for oil prices and “is quite plausible given the substantial support Maduro is receiving from Moscow as well as the fact that junior officers have been the principal defectors.” In this scenario, it’s likely President Donald Trump would pressure Saudi Arabia to fill an extended supply outage by increasing production and adding between 400,000 to 500,000 barrels a day to the market. Scenario 3: Maduro departs but military rule remains Another near-term outcome seen as plausible by Croft and her team would be for the military leadership to oust Maduro in favor of a candidate that they said would “avoid sweeping economic and political reforms that would dismantle the prevailing patronage machine.” “Such a coup from above could freeze the sanctions status quo while the White House considers how much more time and energy it wants to expend on Venezuela once Maduro is gone,” the analysts said. This would represent a moderately bullish case for crude, the strategists noted. “A handpicked military candidate may not be able to garner the necessary international support to revive the oil sector even if more sanctions were not in the immediate offing.” OPEC in turn would likely adopt a wait-and-see approach to filling the Venezuela supply gap. TRENDING NOW People shop at the newly opened Amazon Go Store on May 07, 2019 in New York City. 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A Division of NBCUniversal Data is a real-time snapshot *Data is delayed at least 15 minutes. Global Business and Financial News, Stock Quotes, and Market Data and Analysis. Market Data Terms of Use and Disclaimers Data also provided by Reuters FIRE link card for reforms O’Grady, Mary. “Venezuela Desperately Seeks Dollars.” Wall Street Journal. December 22 2019SK https://www.wsj.com/articles/venezuela-desperately-seeks-dollars-11577045202 DOW JONES, A NEWS CORP COMPANY DJIA29348.10 0.17? Nasdaq9388.94 0.34? U.S. 10 Yr0/32 Yield1.823? Crude Oil58.81 0.46? Euro1.1091 -0.02? SubscribeSign In The Wall Street JournalOpinion English Edition January 19, 2020 Print EditionVideo Home World U.S. Politics Economy Business Tech Markets Opinion Life and Arts Real Estate WSJ. Magazine SHARE FACEBOOK TWITTER PERMALINK OPINION THE AMERICAS Venezuela Desperately Seeks Dollars U.S. sanctions fail to unseat Maduro. The regime is still feeling the pinch. Opinion: Maduro Can’t Stop Sanctions From Hurting Venezuela’s Economy YOU MAY ALSO LIKE UP NEXT 0:00 / 1:28 Opinion: Maduro Can’t Stop Sanctions From Hurting Venezuela’s Economy Opinion: Maduro Can’t Stop Sanctions From Hurting Venezuela’s Economy Venezuela’s economy has been roiled by U.S. sanctions targeting the regime of Nicolás Maduro. Despite Mr. Maduro’s efforts to ease the sanctions' bite, the country was forced to sell another $1 billion in gold reserves this year alone. Image: Venezuelan Presidency/Getty Images By Mary Anastasia O’Grady Dec. 22, 2019 3:06 pm ET PRINT TEXT 99 When the bearded comandante of the Cuban Revolution showed up at offices of The Wall Street Journal in lower Manhattan in 1995, wearing a suit and tie, it was part of a shtick to clean up his image. Fidel Castro was a career mooch who had lost his Soviet sugar daddy. He had legalized the use of the dollar on the island two years earlier. In New York he was saying—and wearing—whatever might bring him more hard currency. ... 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Regime is Reforming Vyas, Kejal. “Venezuela Quietly Loosens Grip on Market, Tempering Economic Crisis.” Wall Street Journal. September 2019DY https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/06/world/americas/venezuela-maduro-crisis.html) SECTIONS SEARCH SKIP TO CONTENTSKIP TO SITE INDEXAMERICAS PLAY THE CROSSWORD Account ADVERTISEMENT Continue reading the main story Venezuela Is in Crisis but Its President Might Be Stronger for It President Nicolandaacute;s Maduro of Venezuela, center, next to his wife, Cilia Flores, during a ceremony in Caracas, the capital, on Saturday. The event was disrupted by an explosion. President Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela, center, next to his wife, Cilia Flores, during a ceremony in Caracas, the capital, on Saturday. The event was disrupted by an explosion.Credit...Juan Barreto/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images By Nicholas Casey Aug. 6, 2018 37 Leer en español BOGOTÁ, Colombia — The widely circulated videos seemed to capture a presidency in free fall. One shows President Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela chased by a hungry mob brandishing pots and pans in 2016. In another, Mr. Maduro enters a plaza before Election Day in May to drum up a crowd — but finds the square practically empty. Then there are the images from this past week: As the president’s stage shakes from an explosion on Saturday, hundreds of troops break ranks and flee in panic. This portrait of vulnerability comes as Venezuela faces the biggest economic crisis in its modern history. And yet, Mr. Maduro has remained in power. Many are now wondering whether he hasn’t only held on in spite of the disasters, but perhaps, by some measure, because of them. “There’s an area between democracy and outright dictatorship in which economic crises can actually help the leader consolidate power,” said David Smilde, a sociology professor who studies Venezuela at Tulane University. ADVERTISEMENT Continue reading the main story Indeed, Mr. Maduro has weathered attempted rebellions, months of mass street protests, isolation from neighboring countries, threats of military intervention from President Trump, declining oil revenues, dissent within his own party, a mass exodus of his people and an election in May, widely described as rigged, that extended his term until 2025. Mr. Maduro has gone to great lengths to court those who might topple him, like Venezuela’s military, which observers have long seen as the most powerful group that could turn on him. As the economy collapsed, leaving the country short of food and medicine and the currency worthless, Mr. Maduro has offered the military the lucrative prizes that remain. Military leaders run the food and oil industries and control the region where gold, diamonds and coltan are mined. So far, the arrangement has secured loyalty, analysts say, as generals calculate that it is more profitable to remain aligned with the current government than to return to democracy, where their future is uncertain. Mr. Maduro could still face the threat of street protests like those that raged in Caracas and other cities for months last year, and left more than 100 dead after the president’s bloody crackdowns. Yet these days, the unrest has petered out. The rallies that still occur are less political now, and often have to do with putting pressure on local officials to restore services like water and electricity. A power failure left 80 percent of Caracas, the capital, without electricity for hours last week, and such shortages are becoming common in other cities. ADVERTISEMENT Continue reading the main story Hebert García Plaza, a former general who fled the country after the Maduro government accused him of corruption, said Venezuela’s security agencies now shut down protests as soon as they were planned, to prevent another outbreak of demonstrations like those in 2017. “They remove the tumor at its source,” he said, saying spy agencies now make arrests at any sign of “social unrest or attempt to rise up.” The circumstances are reminiscent of some of Latin America’s strongmen of the 20th century. But there are stark differences: If then, generals stood stone-faced in dark sunglasses as military formations stood at attention, Mr. Maduro appears in constant crisis, as was on display Saturday when his national guardsmen fled the attack and he sought cover. It is this kind of uncertainty that Mr. Maduro seems best suited at harnessing to his advantage, many argue. Dimitris Pantoulas, a political analyst and risk consultant in Caracas, expects that the alleged assassination attempt will be used as further pretext to crack down on possible opponents. The government later arrested six people who they said had made an assassination attempt on Mr. Maduro. “I fear any crazy man may try something like this now,” said Mr. Pantoulas, giving Mr. Maduro further leverage. While Mr. Maduro may not exactly fit the model of a military dictator, he has followed an example left by the former Cuban leader Fidel Castro: He relied on the exodus of unhappy citizens as an escape valve. ADVERTISEMENT Continue reading the main story Mr. Castro’s reign was accompanied by two large migrations that followed his takeover of the government. The first wave was of made up of educated upper- and middle-class Cubans who opposed his 1959 revolution, and the second, of poorer Cubans who fled in boats beginning in the 1980s. Venezuela has seen a similar migrations — but they have taken place simultaneously. Colombia is now home to almost a million Venezuelans, mainly poor, who have sought refuge there and in Brazil, with which Venezuela also shares a border. Educated Venezuelans have sought refuge in Europe, the United States, as well as some South American countries, like Peru and Chile, which have recruited professionals. The upshot is changing demographics where many of Mr. Maduro’s opponents are now outside the country, and many of those who remain have decided to put up with him. “It leaves a population that is content with what’s going on or tend to be more passive,” said Mr. Smilde, the sociologist. However, Mr. Smilde warns that holding onto power by taking repeated advantage of a crisis is not sustainable in the long-term. He points to the example of the military, whose ranks have received pay increases that have well outpaced wage increases for other workers. Their raises have not, however, outpaced inflation: A typical general, Mr. Smilde estimates, earns about 250 million bolívars per month, the equivalent of $70. Other patronage measures employed by the Maduro government — such as allowing cronies to strip state companies of assets — have been the subject of investigations by American prosecutors. ADVERTISEMENT Continue reading the main story And few economists expect that Mr. Maduro’s latest proposals — which include removing five zeros from the currency and allowing for foreign trade transactions — will right Venezuela’s economy, whose major ailment remains deep declines in oil production which Mr. Maduro has yet to resolve. But for now, the president seems content that his formula is working. Though a protégé of the populist Hugo Chávez, Mr. Maduro now sometimes flirts with comparisons to leaders who turned to brute force to govern. “There are people in the world who see me as the Stalin of the Caribbean,” he said in a broadcast late last year. “And I look like him. Look at me in profile. Sometimes when I look in the mirror, I see Stalin.” ADVERTISEMENT Continue reading the main story Celebrate curiosity. Gift subscriptions starting at $25. Celebrate curiosity. Gift subscriptions starting at $25. Give the gift they’ll open every day. 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Site Information Navigation © 2020 The New York Times Company NYTCoContact UsWork with usAdvertiseT Brand StudioYour Ad ChoicesPrivacyTerms of ServiceTerms of SaleSite MapHelpSubscriptions Venezuela is set to grow Lopez, Ociel. “Crisis and Critique: Venezuela, a Paradox of Stability?” Venezuela Analysis. December 28 2019SK https://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/14753 Skip to main content Facebook Twitter RSS and Podcasts Contact us Support usDONATE NOW! Toggle search News Opinion and Analysis Multimedia Background SEARCH HIGHLIGHTS Juan Guaido National Assembly 2020 Tales Of Resistance Feminism Chavismo OPINION and ANALYSISBOLIVARIAN PROJECT Crisis and Critique: Venezuela, a Paradox of Stability? Ociel Lopez looks back at 2019 and the radically reversed fortunes of Juan Guaido and Nicolas Maduro. cover_5.jpg The latest column by Ociel Lopez looks back at a busy 2019 in Venezuela. (Venezuelanalysis) The latest column by Ociel Lopez looks back at a busy 2019 in Venezuela. (Venezuelanalysis) By Ociel Lopez - Venezuelanalysis.com Dec 28th 2019 at 5.06pm TOPICS Bolivarian Project International Opposition TAGS Juan GuaidoNicolas MaduroOppositionSanctionsCrisis and Critique SHORT URL: For Venezuelans, the start of 2019 was perhaps the tensest moment in the past seventeen years. Unlike the political violence of 2017 and the electoral abstention drama of 2018, we faced a real scenario of foreign military intervention in Venezuela. And for the first time, Washington’s long repeated threats to use military force, like in Iraq, Libya, Panama, etc., appeared credible. As the year wore on, the errors and miscalculations implicit in the US strategy became increasingly evident. A “parallel government” headed by Juan Guaido was created, but it had minimal capacity to shape events inside the country, let alone actually govern. Guaido’s only power base was in the international corporate media, yet he needed military backing. And so arrived April 30. That day, there was a mobilization by mutinous soldiers, who despite being very few in number had strong international media backing which fueled the impression that Maduro might fall. The contingent, led by Guaido, took over an overpass across from the La Carlota airbase in east Caracas and called on the military to rise up against Maduro. A few hours later, the weakness of the movement became patently obvious and US National Security Advisor John Bolton revealed that top military and civilian officials allegedly implicated in the putsch had “turned off their phones.” Following this failure to flip the Venezuelan military, which once again demonstrated its loyalty to the government, Washington doubled down on sanctions, especially in all areas related to the oil trade. During the first six months of the year, there was no way to describe Venezuela beyond the vocabulary of calamity. The second semester was something else entirely. Hitting rock bottom? The tension hanging over Venezuela fanned out across the continent. In Puerto Rico, Panama, Haiti, Ecuador, Chile, Bolivia, and Colombia, popular upheavals rattled one government after another, which are now fighting for their political survival. While Latin America boils over, Venezuela has returned to calm. Despite the severe economic crisis that has lasted at least six years and the collapse of basic public services, political strife has waned. Opposition supporters did not return to the streets en masse and the political instability was displaced to the opposition’s own camp. At the close of 2019, Guaido’s leadership does not inspire unanimity. He has suffered several scandals, including the alleged embezzlement of aid funds by his handpicked envoys, his ties to paramilitary drug trafficking outfit Los Rastrojos, and most recently an illicit lobbying scheme involving deputies from his own National Assembly, among them members of his political party. The governments most radically opposed to Venezuela like Chile and Colombia have had to tend to their domestic matters. The activation of the Inter-American Reciprocal Action Treaty (TIAR) has not advanced in the direction of a direct military intervention, and in the US and international media, Venezuela’s “humanitarian crisis” has been moved to the backburner. It would seem that Venezuela is no longer at the center of the international agenda as it was at the start of 2019. And, beyond all that, the Venezuelan economy is beginning to stabilize. Economic stability? Unlike various other countries in the region, Venezuela’s economy appears to be stabilizing for several reasons. First, the migratory wave has had the salutary side-effect of flooding the country with remittances that reach millions of families, even the poorest. There are even many cases in which financial support from abroad has changed the socioeconomic status of many families amid the severe crisis. There have also been several economic measures taken by Maduro, such as the derogation of the Illicit Exchange Law, the de facto elimination of price controls, and allowing the free circulation of dollars. All this has opened up new economic scenarios going into 2020, including the end of shortages of essential goods – the bane of the 2012-2016 period –, the creation of new business opportunities, as well as the repatriation of some capitals, however marginal, which are stimulating some commercial activity in a terribly impoverished economy. At the end of November, Reuters revealed that oil production in Venezuela had increased 20 percent relative to the month before, which could indicate a definitive reversal of the free fall experienced during the first half of the year. This news raises positive expectations for 2020 with the possibility of increasing Venezuelan crude exports in the coming year. Indeed, according to Venezuelan economist Francisco Rodriguez, Venezuela’s economy could even grow by 4 percent in 2020. It might be concluded that if Maduro did not fall due to the grave economic crisis during 2019, it’s less likely that he will be ousted now, at least on this account. We will have to wait to see if Trump, in the course of his reelection campaign, opts to impose harsher measures on Venezuela that damage the economy even more severely . But for now, and while Trump appears to rule out military intervention in Venezuela, all eyes turn to the Venezuelan opposition. Will they manage to consummate their coup by themselves? Venezuela’s opposition post-2019: A definitive fracture? Regardless of whether Guaido can secure reelection as president of the National Assembly (AN) in 2020, the opposition does not have a credible strategy for ousting Maduro. And this impotence fuels an internal debate that not only divides the opposition publicly but also demobilizes its supporters. The opposition, as it stands now, appears politically bankrupt given the massive expectations it created in 2019 and the utter failure that ensued. Today’s opposition is divided between those holding out for a US invasion and those who favor a political solution. The bulk of the first group is based in the United States, while the majority of the second is still in Venezuela. This rift will likely continue to widen in 2020 when elections are slated for the National Assembly, the only branch of government the opposition currently controls. Of the four large opposition parties that control the AN, Democratic Action (AD) and A New Era (UNT) have their leadership in Venezuela and, as such, abstention would mean surrendering their seats. For the radical sectors, especially those based in the US and Colombia, their power base is mainly the international corporate media, and they will not accept an electoral solution. Therefore, 2020 could be the year of definitive fracture within the opposition. Popular Will (VP) and First Justice (PJ) still don’t know how to tell their supporters to vote in the elections without having fulfilled their oft-repeated “end of the usurpation” promise, because the alternative is to lose the National Assembly. And the opposition defeat is not limited to the political and military arenas. The mounting list of corruption scandals and political debacles runs in parallel to the popular uprising shaking the neighboring right-wing governments allied with the Venezuelan opposition. That is, the opposition is being routed on several fronts. If the opposition began 2019 with extremely high expectations around which it united and rallied its supporters, it ends the year severely divided, atomized, and demobilized. The careful public relations campaign that went into promoting Guaido was powerless to stop the political novice from squandering his political capital without achieving any notable gains. Maduro, on the other hand, has experienced a similar process but in reverse. Maduro, survivor of 2019 At the start of the year, Maduro had the profile of a weak president on the verge of being overthrown at any moment. The opposition flooded the streets in January. Over fifty countries refused to recognize Maduro and backed Guaido following his self-proclamation. Washington practically put a price on Maduro’s head, with Florida Republican Senator Marco Rubio threatening to sodomize and murder him like NATO-backed rebels did to Libya’s Muamar Gaddaffi. Venezuela’s future appeared to be one of bloody conflict if not outright dismemberment by Colombia, Brazil, and Guyana. Chile’s Sebastian Piñera and Colombia’s Ivan Duque gathered alongside Guaido in Cucuta on February 23 in what was hailed as the final thrust to oust Maduro by forcing so-called “humanitarian aid” across the Venezuelan border. By December, neither of these right-wing presidents attend meetings of the Lima Group, preferring to focus their energy on putting down the mass anti-neoliberal revolts occurring within their borders. At the end of 2019, Venezuela looks much more stable than its right-wing neighbors, who just months ago were fixated on regime change in lieu of their domestic problems. The Venezuelan government is no longer on the defensive, moving to take the political initiative by calling 2020 legislative elections in a bid to seize the opposition’s last political bastion. These elections could be held as early as the start of the year. The armed forces remain firmly behind Maduro, who has succeeded in opening up avenues for negotiation with minority opposition factions, with whom the ruling party can work during a new legislative period. Politics is a clash of opposing forces and, as Venezuela demonstrates, the balance can shift radically in the course of a year. Ociel Alí López is a Venezuelan researcher who has published numerous written and multimedia works. He is dedicated to analyzing Venezuelan society for several European and Latin American media outlets. He is a co-founder of alternative Venezuelan state television station Avila TV in 2006. He is the recipient of the CLACSO/ASDI researcher prize and the Britto Garcia literature award. The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Venezuelanalysis editorial staff. Creative Commons Licence This work is licensed under a Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives Creative Commons license Contributions as of 01/13/2019 $10,00048.0$4,798 Break the media blockade! Venezuelanalysis is Venezuela's only independent, 100 reader-funded English media outlet. Please donate to keep us online in 2020! Donate now TOPICS BOLIVARIAN PROJECT ECONOMY INTERNATIONAL MEDIA WATCH OPPOSITION SOCIAL MOVEMENTS SHOW ALL LATEST 4 hours ago Tales of Resistance: The Price of Being a Woman... and a Chavista (Reuters/edited by Ricardo Vaz for Venezuelanalysis.com) Jan 16th 2020 Crisis and Critique: The Return of Guaido? Jan 15th 2020 Venezuela: Oil Output Stabilizes as Government Eyes Foreign Investment Jan 15th 2020 What Happened on January 5? N President Luis Parra (right) and six other dissident opposition lawmakers were sanctioned on Monday. (Reuters)Jan 14th 2020 US Sanctions Venezuela’s New Parliament Leader, Senior Opposition Lawmakers SEE ALSO (Reuters/edited by Ricardo Vaz for Venezuelanalysis.com) Jan 16th 2020 Crisis and Critique: The Return of Guaido? VA columnist Ociel Lopez looks at the future prospects of Juan Guaido’s US-backed opposition in the wake of the disputed January 5 parliamentary... Jan 6th 2020 Venezuelan Government and Opposition Fraction Announce Release of 14 ‘Political Prisoners’ The National Roundtable for Peaceful Dialogue also offered its backing to the new National Assembly president, Luis Parra. Jan 5th 2020 Venezuela: Guaido Replaced as Parliament Head in Disputed Vote Pro-Guaido opposition lawmakers have rejected the vote, forming a parallel parliament with US and international right-wing support. Dec 18th 2019 Venezuela: Guaido Introduces Remote Voting in Bid to Secure Reelection The opposition leader has been under fire amid recent scandals. Dec 5th 2019 Venezuela: Guaido Embattled as Opposition Splits over New Corruption Scandal The latest scandal has further called into doubt Guaido’s credibility as leader of the opposition. Nov 6th 2019 Crisis and Critique: Venezuela and Latin America’s October Storm The neoliberal right is in deep crisis across Latin America. Ociel Lopez analyzes the geopolitical implications for Venezuela. Oct 21st 2019 The Well-Paid and Very Difficult Task of Defending Guaido Venezuelan journalist Clodovaldo Hernandez examines efforts to whitewash the latest scandal engulfing Juan Guaido and Colombian drug-baron paramilitaries. Oct 18th 2019 Crisis and Critique: A Chavista Future for Venezuela? Will Chavismo continue to fade or will it manage to renew itself? Ociel López looks at the historic movement and its future prospects. Sep 13th 2019 Crisis and Critique: Washington ‘Embargoes’ Negotiated Settlement in Venezuela In the second installment of his VA "Crisis and Critique" column, Ociel Lopez looks at how Washington's embargo blocked a possible agreement... Jul 10th 2019 Crisis and Critique: Norway, Bachelet, and the Twilight of Guaido’s Insurrection In his first column for VA, Venezuelan analyst Ociel Lopez examines Guaido's US-backed coup following Bachelet's visit and new gov't-opposition... FEATURED Jan 19th 2020 Tales of Resistance: The Price of Being a Woman... and a Chavista VA columnist Jessica Dos Santos takes a look at feminist struggles in Venezuela. (Reuters/edited by Ricardo Vaz for Venezuelanalysis.com) Jan 16th 2020 Crisis and Critique: The Return of Guaido? VA columnist Ociel Lopez looks at the future prospects of Juan Guaido’s US-backed opposition in the wake of the disputed January 5 parliamentary... N President Luis Parra (right) and six other dissident opposition lawmakers were sanctioned on Monday. (Reuters)Jan 14th 2020 US Sanctions Venezuela’s New Parliament Leader, Senior Opposition Lawmakers The legislature’s new opposition leadership “categorically” rejected the sanctions. Jan 13th 2020 Venezuela Blames Sanctions After UN Voting Right Suspended Venezuela, which has one of the highest UN contribution rates in the region, has not paid its dues since 2018. Journalists appeared to outnumber the lawmakers present at Guaido's parallel legislative session. (@pvillegas_tlSUR)Jan 8th 2020 Venezuela: Guaido Installs Parallel Parliament After Washington Threatens More Sanctions The Trump administration is reportedly mulling sanctions against opposition deputies who voted against Guaido. VIDEO IN IMAGES AUDIO More videos The Five Key Aspects of "Strike at the Helm" In Commune: Pancha Vásquez Why Nobody Likes Juan Guaido NEW TO VENEZUELA? 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Support us DONATE NOW! Venezuelanalysis.com is 100 reader funded and independent. We rely on your donations to keep us online. Site News Opinion and Analysis Multimedia Background Connect About us Contact us Support us Sign up for Newsletter RSS and Podcasts We Recommend Alborada.net Green Left Weekly Upside Down World Latin American Bureau The Real News About Us Venezuelanalysis.com is an independent website produced by individuals who are dedicated to disseminating news and analysis about the current political situation in Venezuela (read more). Subscribe to our newsletter Get news and analysis in your inbox SUBSCRIBE Follow us: Facebook Twitter RSS ‘Hyperinflation hit 10 million - ending Price controls is key Sanchez, Valentina. “Venezuela hyperinflation hits 10 million percent. ‘Shock therapy’ may be only chance to undo the economic damage.” CNBC. August 2019DY https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/02/venezuela-inflation-at-10-million-percent-its-time-for-shock-therapy.html) logo SIGN IN PRO WATCHLIST MAKE IT SELECT USA INTL logo MARKETS BUSINESS INVESTING TECH POLITICS CNBC TV SEARCH QUOTES WORLD ECONOMY Venezuela hyperinflation hits 10 million percent. ‘Shock therapy’ may be only chance to undo the economic damage PUBLISHED SAT, AUG 3 20197:00 AM EDTUPDATED MON, AUG 5 20191:01 PM EDT Valentina Sanchez @VTRIVELLA KEY POINTS Venezuela’s state-run economic model wasted the world’s largest oil reserves. The country owes $100 billion to foreign creditors. Its educated, professional class has fled. Economic shock therapy, implemented in regions like the former Soviet bloc, could be its only chance. Premium: Venezuela store after looting 170505 View of damages in a supermarket in Valencia, Carabobo State, on May 5, 2017, the day after anti-government protesters looted stores, set fire to cars and clashed with police, leaving at least five people injured and one dead. Ronaldo Schemidt | AFP | Getty Images Venezuela’s crisis has been marked by corruption, hyperinflation, one of the world’s highest homicide rates, food and medicine shortages and the largest exodus “in the recent history of Latin America,” according to the U.N. Refugee Agency. Its chances to recover may start with President Nicolas Maduro stepping down or being forcibly removed — either by the opposition or through foreign military intervention. But that would just be the first step to get the ruined economy on the road to recovery. A major course of economic shock therapy will be required. Venezuela’s hyperinflation rate increased from 9,02 percent to 10 million percent since 2018, according to the International Monetary Fund, though it is expected to decline to back below 1 million percent due to recent moves by the country’s central bank, according to a recent IMF forecast. But the economic situation remains dire: The IMF says the cumulative decline of the Venezuelan economy since 2013 will reach 65 this year — for 2019 the annual decline forecast has increased from 25 to 35. The five-year contraction is one of the worst in the world over the past half century and one of the few that was not caused by armed conflicts or natural disasters, the IMF stated earlier this week. Some experts believe that in order to regain control over Venezuela’s monetary system and zero out hyperinflation, drastic decisions will need to be taken. “Venezuelans who have been suffering all of this time are going to be faced with a very dramatic, very draconian policy aimed at bringing their monetary system under control,” said Dr. Eduardo Gamarra, professor of politics and international relations at Florida International University. Wasted oil riches Shock therapy supports the implementation of drastic economic policies to combat hyperinflation, shortages, reduce the budget deficit — Venezuela’s current budget deficit stands at –29.95 in relation to GDP — and transition from a state-controlled economy to a mixed one. It was used in post-communist Poland and Russia, and in other countries like Chile and Bolivia, where it successfully ended hyperinflation. Shock therapy measures, based on recent economic history, can include ending price controls and government subsidies, instituting higher tax rates and lower government spending to reduce budget deficits, devaluing the currency to boost foreign investments and selling state-owned industries to the private sector. Venezuela will have to transform its current scheme of restricting foreign investment in order to fund the restoration of the energy sector, as well as its infrastructure, including the country’s roads and bridges and the power grid. The petrostate recently experienced a weeklong blackout caused by the deterioration of the power grid, leaving people in 19 of 23 states without running water and causing four deaths. “They need to rebuild everything, but the state is bankrupt and has no ability to fund any of these projects,” Gamarra said. “Unless they invite major foreign investment, I don’t see where the revenue is going to come from, because it’s certainly not going to come from oil.” People wait at the parking of a shopping centre in Caracas on July 22, 2019 as the capital and other parts of Venezuela are being hit by a massive power cut. MATIAS DELACROIX | AFP | Getty Images Venezuela is home to the world’s largest oil reserves, and its economy has been tied to the ups and downs of the international price of oil for decades — oil constitutes about 25 of the country’s GDP and 95 of its exports. But the country’s oil production reached its lowest point since 2003 this year, when production went from 1.2 million barrels per day in the beginning of 2019 to an average of 830,000 barrels per day. The energy sector is only producing a fraction of the 4 million barrels of oil a day it could be producing. “The sector has to be completely recapitalized,” said Eric Farnsworth, vice president of the Council of the Americas and the Americas Society. “The government will have to reinvest in that industry. They also need to modernize that sector because they haven’t done anything in the last decade,” Gamarra said. The World Bank and IMF Besides foreign investment, Venezuela will likely need help from multinational institutions such as the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the Development Bank of Latin America in order to fund the infrastructure development. It is not rare for a South American country attempting to recover from an economic crisis to accept large loans from multinational institutions. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund played an instrumental role in Bolivia’s economic recovery in 1985 by pledging a total of $250 million in loans. Chile also received multimillion-dollar loans from international institutions such as the Inter?American Development Bank and the World Bank throughout the ’70s in order to manage its mounting inflation rates and debt. During the recent political unrest in Venezuela, the IMF and World Bank both indicated they were prepared to help, but the leadership uncertainty — as Venezuela’s opposition chief Juan Guaidó attempts to take control — made these institutions’ positions difficult. The U.S. has the largest share of votes in both institutions. Some major powers continue to recognize Maduro’s government, such as Russia and China. The U.S. government has indicated it would offer both investment and credit to the country, but only after regime change to a democratic government. Leadership negotiations are set to resume later this week, according to Carlos Vecchio, a Venezuelan diplomat representing the opposition, who spoke at the National Press Club in Washington D.C. on Tuesday. Although he would not specify exactly when or where the talks would take place, he expects a resolution by the end of this year. Vecchio said Guaidó would prefer a peaceful transition rather than international intervention to remove Maduro. They could have created the Emirates. ... Instead, they blew it. It was money blown through corruption and these international alliances. However you look at it, even from the kindest, kindest way, it was a model that was bound to fail. Dr. Eduardo Gamarra PROFESSOR OF POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY Current IMF managing director Christine Lagarde recently told The Economist Radio, “As soon as we are asked by the legitimate authorities of that country to come in and help, we will come in. It is going to require significant financing from all the international community.” Maduro and his predecessor Hugo Chavez have refused to provide the IMF with information it would need to perform audits. Lagarde told The Economist that she could not be specific about an aid package but added, “We will open our wallet, we will put our brain to it, and we will make sure our heart is in the right place to help the poorest and the most exposed people,” she said. Back in 2007, when Venezuela was flush with cash from years of a booming oil business, Chavez paid off all of the country’s debt to the World Bank and severed ties with both it and the IMF. Experts urge Venezuela to diversify its economy from primarily oil production in order to prevent a similar crisis in the future. “If you depend solely on the export of a single product, you are bound to the ups and downs of the oil price,” the University of Florida’s Gamarra said. “You have to diversify your exports, you have to have a range of high value-added exports, because your economy has to be able to overcome moments of downturns in your principal commodities. Unless they diversify, they’re going to go through this again.” A massive brain drain The lack of human capital is another issue Venezuela will have to address in order to recover from its economic crisis. Venezuela has lost more than 10 of its population in recent years. The number of Venezuelan migrants and refugees has reached 4 million and is expected to surpass 5.3 million by the end of this year, according to the U.N. Refugee Agency. Many of those who have fled will most likely not return. They are making their living elsewhere; their children are attending college and are finally comfortable after starting from zero in a foreign land. The idea of leaving everything behind to return to Venezuela and help rebuild the country might not be appealing. The lack of a solid professional class will be the primary issue holding Venezuela back, Farnsworth of the Council of the Americas said. “Venezuela has been bleeding their professional class for years. The money will be there. Money is going to show up if they see opportunity. But particularly in the petroleum sector, Venezuela’s main productive sector, you have to have highly educated and experienced managers, engineers ... That professional class left Venezuela years ago.” Gamarra is concerned about the lack of human capital pushing out the timeline for economic recovery. “Venezuela is taking a huge, huge loss of human capital more than anything else,” he said. “And whenever a country loses such a large number of people, it’s not that those who remain behind aren’t capable, but a lot of those who left are the educated, the wealthy, the kind of people you need to rebuild a country.” Venezuela will have to develop a new professional class through steps including the reformulation of its education system, which will take years to accomplish. Foreign alliances and influence China, Russia and Cuba have enabled Maduro’s continuation in power by lending money, providing weapons, intelligence support and political advice — relationships that date back to the regime of former Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez. Some experts believe these world powers need to be held responsible for it. The Venezuelan petrostate has relied on China and Russia to stay afloat — they have given Venezuela billions of dollars in loans and investments over the past decade. By some recent estimates, China has become the world’s largest official creditor, surpassing institutions like the IMF. Venezuela now owes about $100 billion dollars to external creditors, according to the latest Central Intelligence Agency report. “The external support of those countries, in particular, has certainly enabled the continuation of the Maduro regime, because they have provided resources through the purchases of petroleum,” Farnsworth said. “Those three countries have clearly made the transition more difficult. They have enabled Venezuela’s collapse.” Venezuela’s President Nicolas Maduro, right, walks with Chinese President Xi Jinping as they arrive to a welcoming ceremony at the Great Hall of the People on January 7, 2015 in Beijing, China. Andy Wong, Pool | Getty Images Some experts agree that these countries, especially China, should contribute to the alleviation of the humanitarian crisis in Colombia, Brazil and other nations affected by the mass exodus, as well as using its wealth to contribute to the economic recovery of Venezuela. “If they want to engage in the Western Hemisphere, they have to engage in other ways, not just by selling products and then skedaddling when things get tough,” Farnsworth said. “Try to address some of the problems in the region ... particularly problems that they themselves have helped to cause.” Venezuela’s recovery will require a decade-long transformation after a 20-year-long ordeal, rebuilding the country from the ground up. But the experts say socialism was not the root cause of Venezuela’s problems. Corruption and mismanagement are to blame for the collapse of the oil-rich country. “It was, and I hate putting labels on it ... but it was really a scheme to scam the oil revenue, to promote the Bolivarian model, which again was not socialism to any extent,” Gamarra said. “Everything was done through this corrupt scheme where they skimmed the money off the top and did everything in such a corrupt manner that it only benefited a few.” “They could have created the Emirates. The King Chavez. But still spend all of that money on Venezuela. Instead, they blew it. It was money blown through corruption and these international alliances,” Gamarra said. “And so however you look at it, even from the kindest, kindest way, it was a model that was bound to fail.” TRENDING NOW People shop at the newly opened Amazon Go Store on May 07, 2019 in New York City. The cashier-less store, the first of this type of store, called Amazon Go, accepts cash and is the 12th such store in the United States located at Brookfield Place in downtown New York. Amazon reportedly wants to turn your hand into a credit card 2020 Democratic presidential candidates, from left, Tom Steyer, co-founder of NextGen Climate Action Committee, Senator Elizabeth Warren, a Democrat from Massachusetts, Former U.S. Vice President Joe Biden, Senator Bernie Sanders, an independent from Vermont, Pete Buttigieg, former mayor of South Bend, and Senator Amy Klobuchar, a Democrat from Minnesota, stand on stage ahead of the Democratic presidential debate in Des Moines, Iowa, U.S., on Tuesday, Jan. 14, 2020. 2020 Democratic field is outraising Trump by a huge margin — that didn’t happen to Obama, Bush Traders work on the floor at the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in New York, U.S., January 10, 2020. A theory on who’s doing all the buying that’s pushing stocks higher and higher These are the first three steps to building wealth SpaceX's Crew Dragon capsule fires its engines and separates from a Falcon 9 rocket during a test of its emergency escape system. Fiery SpaceX test of Crew Dragon capsule was ‘picture perfect,’ Elon Musk says logo Subscribe to CNBC PRO Licensing and Reprints Join the CNBC Panel Supply Chain Values Advertise With Us Closed Captioning Digital Products News Releases Internships Corrections About CNBC AdChoices Site Map Podcasts Contact Careers Help News Tips Got a confidential news tip? We want to hear from you. GET IN TOUCH CNBC Newsletters Sign up for free newsletters and get more CNBC delivered to your inbox SIGN UP NOW Get this delivered to your inbox, and more info about our products and services. Privacy Policy - New|Do Not Sell My Personal Information|Terms of Service © 2020 CNBC LLC. All Rights Reserved. A Division of NBCUniversal Data is a real-time snapshot *Data is delayed at least 15 minutes. Global Business and Financial News, Stock Quotes, and Market Data and Analysis. Market Data Terms of Use and Disclaimers Data also provided by Reuters Frontline to only helping the rich Held, Sergio. “Venezuela's currency: Worth more as craft paper than as money.” Al Jazeera. December 24 2019SK SKIP NAVIGATION logo SIGN IN PRO WATCHLIST MAKE IT SELECT USA INTL logo MARKETS BUSINESS INVESTING TECH POLITICS CNBC TV SEARCH QUOTES WORLD POLITICS Oil markets face three possible scenarios in Venezuela PUBLISHED THU, MAY 2 20197:58 AM EDTUPDATED THU, MAY 2 20198:11 AM EDT Holly Ellyatt @HOLLYELLYATT KEY POINTS Venezuela’s political and humanitarian crisis remains fluid with President Nicolas Maduro clinging to power amid protests led by opposition leader Juan Guaido. Street protests are expected to continue Thursday with Guaido telling thousands of supporters yesterday that “there’s no turning back.” How oil markets could be impacted by the crisis depends on what comes next. RT: Venezuela oil production workers drilling Oil workers conduct a drill in a petroleum well in Lagunillas at the east coast of Lake Maracaibo near Maracaibo City in Venezuela. Jorge Silva | Reuters Venezuela’s political and humanitarian crisis remains fluid with President Nicolas Maduro clinging to power amid protests led by opposition leader Juan Guaido. Street protests are expected to continue Thursday with Guaido telling thousands of supporters yesterday that “there’s no turning back” as he called for a series of national strikes. In the meantime, Venezuelans are reportedly experiencing shortages of food and medicines. What the current situation, and any potential outcomes, mean for Venezuela’s primary economic asset — its oil sector — are now under scrutiny. OPEC-member Venezuela is reliant on oil for 98 of its export earnings and is laboring under U.S. sanctions, which penalize Venezuela’s state-owned energy company PDVSA and any vessels or companies enabling oil shipments to Venezuela’s ally Cuba. Unrest in Caracas has weighed on markets, as have stricter U.S. sanctions on Iran, but news of higher U.S. crude stockpiles have kept prices subdued so far. On Wednesday, Brent crude futures stood at $71.36 per barrel and West Texas Intermediate (WTI) stood around $62.85. RBC Capital Markets’ Global Head of Commodity Strategy Helima Croft and her team have examined three possible scenarios for Venezuela, and their respective implications for the global oil market. Scenario 1: Maduro goes, Guaido comes to power A sudden Maduro departure and transition to a Guaido-led reformist government would provide “the best hope for kick-starting the revival of the Venezuelan economy,” Croft and her team said in a note Wednesday. “This scenario presents the most bearish outcome for (oil) prices, especially as many investors might assume that the recovery will be quick and uncomplicated. However, even if such a situation comes to pass we would caution that the road back will be arduous given the magnitude of the collapse.” Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaido, who many nations have recognised as the country’s rightful interim ruler, gestures as he speaks to supporters during a rally against the government of Venezuela’s President Nicolas Maduro and to commemorate May Day in Caracas Venezuela, May 1, 2019. REUTERS | Carlos Garcia Rawlins Croft and her team, comprised of commodity strategists Christopher Louney and Michael Tran and associate strategist Megan Schippmann, warned that even if Guaido came to power, Venezuela’s security situation “would likely remain fraught.” They didn’t think a Guaido victory likely at this stage, either. “Given the apparent absence of high level military defections to the Guaido camp as well as Moscow’s marked aversion to such a regime change, we think this scenario has the slimmest chances of success in the near term.” Scenario 2: Maduro stays If Maduro manages to ride out the current wave of protests, RBC noted that the country’s economic collapse will undoubtedly accelerate as the United States ups the sanctions ante. “The White House will likely look to further erode the country’s oil export revenue by compelling consuming countries like India to curb their Venezuelan purchases. Washington may also demand that U.S. energy companies cease operating in the country and that European firms stop providing diluents and other services to (Venezuelan state-owned oil firm) PDVSA.” Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro meets with UN chief Ban Ki-moon at the United Nations headquarters in New York on July 28, 2015. Spencer Platt | Getty Images News | Getty Images Such punitive measures, along with rolling power cuts, would further compress the country’s oil production, potentially sending it close to zero by year-end, the strategists noted. This outcome would be most bullish for oil prices and “is quite plausible given the substantial support Maduro is receiving from Moscow as well as the fact that junior officers have been the principal defectors.” In this scenario, it’s likely President Donald Trump would pressure Saudi Arabia to fill an extended supply outage by increasing production and adding between 400,000 to 500,000 barrels a day to the market. Scenario 3: Maduro departs but military rule remains Another near-term outcome seen as plausible by Croft and her team would be for the military leadership to oust Maduro in favor of a candidate that they said would “avoid sweeping economic and political reforms that would dismantle the prevailing patronage machine.” “Such a coup from above could freeze the sanctions status quo while the White House considers how much more time and energy it wants to expend on Venezuela once Maduro is gone,” the analysts said. This would represent a moderately bullish case for crude, the strategists noted. “A handpicked military candidate may not be able to garner the necessary international support to revive the oil sector even if more sanctions were not in the immediate offing.” OPEC in turn would likely adopt a wait-and-see approach to filling the Venezuela supply gap. TRENDING NOW People shop at the newly opened Amazon Go Store on May 07, 2019 in New York City. The cashier-less store, the first of this type of store, called Amazon Go, accepts cash and is the 12th such store in the United States located at Brookfield Place in downtown New York. Amazon reportedly wants to turn your hand into a credit card 2020 Democratic presidential candidates, from left, Tom Steyer, co-founder of NextGen Climate Action Committee, Senator Elizabeth Warren, a Democrat from Massachusetts, Former U.S. Vice President Joe Biden, Senator Bernie Sanders, an independent from Vermont, Pete Buttigieg, former mayor of South Bend, and Senator Amy Klobuchar, a Democrat from Minnesota, stand on stage ahead of the Democratic presidential debate in Des Moines, Iowa, U.S., on Tuesday, Jan. 14, 2020. 2020 Democratic field is outraising Trump by a huge margin — that didn’t happen to Obama, Bush Traders work on the floor at the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in New York, U.S., January 10, 2020. A theory on who’s doing all the buying that’s pushing stocks higher and higher These are the first three steps to building wealth SpaceX's Crew Dragon capsule fires its engines and separates from a Falcon 9 rocket during a test of its emergency escape system. Fiery SpaceX test of Crew Dragon capsule was ‘picture perfect,’ Elon Musk says logo Subscribe to CNBC PRO Licensing and Reprints Join the CNBC Panel Supply Chain Values Advertise With Us Closed Captioning Digital Products News Releases Internships Corrections About CNBC AdChoices Site Map Podcasts Contact Careers Help News Tips Got a confidential news tip? We want to hear from you. GET IN TOUCH CNBC Newsletters Sign up for free newsletters and get more CNBC delivered to your inbox SIGN UP NOW Get this delivered to your inbox, and more info about our products and services. Privacy Policy - New|Do Not Sell My Personal Information|Terms of Service © 2020 CNBC LLC. All Rights Reserved. A Division of NBCUniversal Data is a real-time snapshot *Data is delayed at least 15 minutes. Global Business and Financial News, Stock Quotes, and Market Data and Analysis. Market Data Terms of Use and Disclaimers Data also provided by Reuters Ecuador example Rodriguez, Francisco. “Venezuela Should Consider Dollarization.” Americas Quarterly. February 2018SK https://www.americasquarterly.org/content/venezuela-should-consider-dollarization) #trending now#Venezuela#LatAmMilitaries#ChilePensions#corruption#Bolsonaro SUBSCRIBE TO OUR PRINT MAGAZINE Politics, Business and Culture in the Americas ArgentinaBrazilColombiaMexicoVenezuelaCorruption IndexElectionsCultureAbout Search formSearch Finance and Economics Venezuela Should Consider Dollarization BY FRANCISCO RODRÍGUEZ | FEBRUARY 15, 2018 Replacing the bolívar with the dollar would mean losing a policy tool, but the benefits might be worth it. bolivar Mario Tama/Getty Images 59 Leer en español Venezuela’s economy is undergoing the largest contraction in recorded Latin American history. Between 2012 and 2017, per capita GDP fell by a massive 38 percent, 10 points more than the United States during the Great Depression. The government has stopped publishing inflation data, but private sector estimates put it at nearly 3,000 percent in 2017 and predict it will accelerate into five digits this year. Real salaries have been pulverized in the process: A minimum wage salary today buys 10 percent of what it bought in March 2013, when Nicolás Maduro assumed the presidency. There are many causes for Venezuela’s economic collapse, but certainly a prominent one has been massive budget deficits. Venezuela has been running double-digit deficits at the level of the consolidated public sector for six consecutive years; last year, the deficit reached a whopping 21 percent of GDP. The reason for this is that Venezuela’s government has chosen to maintain absurd and inefficient subsidies for goods provided to consumers by the state and to finance most of its spending by printing money. A gallon of gasoline, for example, is sold by the state-owned enterprise to consumers at the equivalent of one-hundredth of a U.S. cent at the current official exchange rate (and one-thousandth of a U.S. cent at the black-market rate). Any hopes that the Maduro administration would carry out a coherent stabilization plan were dashed long ago. But even a new administration would have significant problems stabilizing the economy. The feasibility of a stabilization program essentially depends on the credibility of a government’s promise to keep spending in check. In a country that has not seen single-digit inflation in 34 years (only 19 of which were under chavismo), that commitment is a hard sell. Implementing such a plan may be made even harder by the significant governability problems that are likely to emerge in a political transition. Stabilizing under imperfect credibility is a complex task. If people aren’t sure that the stabilization is going to be successful, then the first inclination of firms will be to continue raising their prices. To bring prices down, the Central Bank would have to raise interest rates and restrict money supply growth. In other words, the cost of imperfect credibility is a deep recession when you try to stabilize. But this is precisely what policymakers will be most keen to avoid in what could be a very politically complex transition. Venezuela’s future policymakers should take a close look at the case of Ecuador. In 2000, then-President Gustavo Noboa, implementing a decision of his predecessor Jamil Mahuad, replaced the sucre with the U.S. dollar after currency and banking crises had left the economy mired in a deep recession with quickly accelerating inflation. Much like Venezuela, Ecuador had not seen single-digit inflation for two decades at the time of dollarization. In contrast, during the most recent decade under dollarization, Ecuador’s inflation has averaged 3.8 percent. Perhaps most significant is the fact that Ecuador’s macroeconomic stability came with economic growth. Since dollarization in 2000, the country’s per capita income has grown by 114 percent – the fourth best growth performance among 11 countries in South America. By contrast, Ecuador’s per capita income had actually dropped by 17 percent in the two decades before dollarization. Most importantly, Ecuador’s headcount poverty rate has fallen by more than four-fifths since 2000, lifting more than 3 million Ecuadoreans out of extreme poverty. Ecuador is an interesting example precisely because, like Venezuela, it is an economy highly specialized in oil. In principle, these economies pay a high cost for dollarizing when they lose their capacity to adjust their exchange rates to terms of trade shocks. In practice, when they have their own currency they end up allowing interest groups to capture significant rents from management of the exchange rate system, accumulating large private sector hard currency surpluses at the expense of chronic public sector deficits and pervasive macroeconomic instability. Even worse, the state’s authority to decide the allocation of scarce foreign exchange creates huge incentives for corruption. Nevertheless, it is true that in the case of dollarization Venezuela would suffer long-term costs for sacrificing the ability to set its own exchange rate and monetary policy. But any policy decision must weigh costs against benefits, and the very concrete benefit of adopting an irreversible peg now is stopping hyperinflation while avoiding the economic contraction that would be highly likely to happen if the government stabilized while keeping its own currency. In contrast to other episodes of dollarization, Venezuela could dollarize at an exchange rate that represents a significant improvement in purchasing power for its citizens while keeping dollar wages at very competitive levels. With just $3 billion – one-third of the Central Bank’s current international reserves – Venezuela could exchange all deposits and currency in circulation in the economy for dollars at an exchange rate of 68,000 bolívars to the dollar, as compared to the current black-market rate of 237,000 bolívars to the dollar. Put another way, even if Maduro manages to squander two-thirds of existing international reserves before he leaves power, it would still be possible for the government to exchange the population’s bolívars for nearly four times the amount of dollars they can buy with those same bolívars today in the black market. One way to think about the costs of dollarization has to do with the risk of falling into a situation in which the country’s dollar wages are much higher than they should be to make it competitive. An oil exporter that suffers a decline in oil prices needs to let its dollar wages fall to stimulate the production of exportable and import-competing goods that will make up for the decline in oil revenues. If the country doesn’t have its own exchange rate, this means nominal wages must fall, something that can generally only happen if there is a potentially deep recession. Whatever the ultimate cause of Venezuela’s economic woes, it is definitely not high dollar wages. The monthly minimum wage measured at the current black-market rate is only $3. At our hypothetical conversion rate of 68,000 bolívars to the dollar, that wage would rise to $12. This would still be only a fraction of the average Latin American minimum wage of $356. If dollarization is implemented as part of a series of structural reforms that turn Venezuela back into a functional market economy, these dollar wages should rise continuously until they converge with those of neighboring countries. Therefore, given the correct macroeconomic policies, the risk of the country undergoing a period in which wages are above their long-term equilibrium point any time soon is extremely low. Ultimately, it is undeniable that the economy will lose a policy tool. Yet I would still argue that the short-term benefits – in particular, avoiding what could be a very damaging prolonged period of hyperinflation – outweigh these long-term costs. It’s also worth remembering that a government can develop institutions that reduce the need for the rapid adjustment in relative prices that flexible exchange rates are often used for. A country subject to high terms of trade volatility should have a macroeconomic stabilization fund that allows it to save oil revenues during periods of favorable terms of trade and to spend these savings during periods of adverse shocks. If the fund is reasonably sized and the economy has had the macroeconomic management necessary to have good access to international financial markets, the country should be able to smooth out the adjustment process to a negative terms-of-trade shock when it needs to do so at low costs, and even to avoid a decline in nominal wages, as long as national productivity growth and world inflation are positive. Replacing the Venezuelan bolívar with the U.S. dollar will require a reform of the country’s constitution. Fortunately, this can be done by directly asking the electorate whether they approve the change. A currency board system, in which reserves provide one-to-one backing for domestic currency at an irrevocably pegged exchange rate, could be set up as a transitional system. There can be little doubt of what Venezuelans would respond if they were asked whether they want to keep their current currency or instead earn their wages and keep their savings in dollars. ~-~- Rodríguez is Chief Economist at Torino Capital and a former Head of Research for the United Nations’ Human Development Report Office. Like what you've read? Subscribe to AQ for more. Any opinions expressed in this piece do not necessarily reflect those of Americas Quarterly or its publishers. Tags: Maduro, finance, Venezuela RELATED CONTENT How to Explain Maduro's Radical Move Against Guaidó getty Latin America’s Economies in the Decade Ahead: Three Key Opportunities Wiretaps and Conspiracies: An Inside Look at Venezuela's Military SPECIAL REPORT cover A special report on Latin America's armed forces – why they're ascendant again, what they really want, and what it means for democracies. READ MORE PAST ISSUES PUBLISHED BY AMERICAS SOCIETY/COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAS AboutAdvertiseContactInternships Government likes shrinking business sector - undermines regime Mora, Frank. “How Maduro has held on to power, and why what follows him won’t likely be better.” Foreign Policy. September 2018DY https://outline.com/MefqHp) ? FOREIGN POLICY › Annotations Don’t Focus on Regime Change in Venezuela FRANK O. MORA SEPTEMBER 04, 2018 Argument How Maduro has held on to power, and why what follows him won’t likely be better. Nicolas Maduro delivers a speech outside the presidential palace in Caracas on March 12, 2015. (Federico Parra/AFP/Getty Images)Nicolas Maduro delivers a speech outside the presidential palace in Caracas on March 12, 2015. (Federico Parra/AFP/Getty Images) Nicolas Maduro delivers a speech outside the presidential palace in Caracas on March 12, 2015. (Federico Parra/AFP/Getty Images) Ever since Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro assumed office in March 2013, observers have predicted his regime’s imminent demise. In the last few years, with Venezuela apparently nearing state and economic meltdown, chavismo’s collapse really did seem just around the corner. Yet Maduro hasn’t fallen, and how he has managed to hang on can tell us a lot about what could follow his rule. Today, there seems to be no floor to Venezuela’s suffering. Just when it looked like things could not get any worse, the International Monetary Fund recently reported that hyperinflation will reach 1 million percent this year. Since 2013, the country’s economy has shrunk by half. Meanwhile, the oil industry, representing nearly 90 percent of government revenue, has just about melted down. Oil production has fallen from nearly 3 million barrels per day in 2013 to about 1 million in 2018. With no economy left to speak of, an unimaginable 87 percent of the population now lives in poverty. Food, medicine, electricity, and other basic items are hard to come by. No wonder that a projected 3 million Venezuelans will have departed the country for neighboring nations between 2014 and the end of 2018, which have very limited capacity to absorb them. Despite the socioeconomic meltdown, however, there has been no serious challenge to Maduro’s power. This is a riddle, and without understanding why the regime has been able to hold tight to power in Venezuela, it will be difficult to make sense of the scenarios under which change may eventually come. The first explanation for the Maduro administration’s survival could apply to all nondemocratic governments: control of state institutions and repression. In 2002, Maduro’s predecessor, President Hugo Chávez, began a process of effectively purging, penetrating, and ultimately absorbing civil institutions into his so-called Bolivarian revolutionary process, through which he repressed nearly all political opposition. This process deepened with Maduro, particularly as Venezuela’s socioeconomic crisis worsened. Today, the regime controls enough institutions of state, such as the National Electoral Council and the judiciary, that the governing United Socialist Party of Venezuela, known by its Spanish initials as the PSUV, can easily prevent the opposition from challenging Maduro’s rule. Following a failed coup in 2002, the regime has also aggressively neutralized and politicized the military. The armed forces had previously been one of the more professional, apolitical militaries in the region, but through purges, politically controlled promotions, corruption, and a restructuring of its roles and mission, the new Bolivarian National Armed Forces became a loyal instrument of regime preservation. Both Chávez and Maduro have deepened the force’s ties to the PSUV by giving it a stake in the survival of their leadership. The military not only runs strategic industries (including oil) and controls the distribution and rationing of food items, but a high number of active-duty and retired officers also hold of key positions as Cabinet members, governors, legislators, mayors, and heads of expropriated and state-owned businesses. Meanwhile, the regime has virtually discarded the constitution and made a joke of the rule of law. For example, the government quashed the opposition’s hope of holding a constitutionally sanctioned recall referendum on Maduro in 2016, and in March 2017, the supreme court temporarily stripped the National Assembly, where an overwhelming majority of seats were held by the opposition after the December 2015 election, of all of its powers. And through it all, independent sources of information and media outlets have been nearly erased. On the streets of Venezuela, the Bolivarian National Police, the National Guard, and other armed civilian bands (known as colectivos) intimidate and violently repress the opposition, journalists, or anyone displaying too much independent thought. Finally, the regime continues to use so-called emergency powers to nationalize industries and prevent normal politics in the country. A second explanation for Maduro’s staying power, linked to the first, is the culture of fear and distrust that the government has sowed among citizens. The colectivos, which are not directly linked to the government but are funded and managed by some government officials, use violence to create suspicion and anxiety. Meanwhile, Bolivarian grassroots movements and communal councils serve as the government’s eyes and ears at the neighborhood level. Citizens’ constant fear of being reported by neighbors leads to self-policing and self-censorship. It is hard to build a mass protest movement when you believe that your neighbor might be a government informant or that you might lose access to scarce government-distributed food and medical supplies if you are accused of opposing the regime. Beyond keeping the opposition and the public weak and divided through control of state institutions and repression, Caracas has also focused its attention on keeping the private sector in check, which is the third reason it has been able to stay in power. Since 2005, the Venezuelan government has sought to shrink the private sector as a way to both consolidate economic power and deny resources and opportunities for the business sector to undermine the regime. The Venezuelan Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Production—the main business union—once had considerable political and economic clout, but the government’s expropriation, intimidation, and coercion of it has left it largely impotent. Another means for controlling the private sector has been a massive expropriation campaign by Chávez and Maduro and severe restrictions on accessing dollars, which forces business to rely on the state for foreign exchange. Caracas also uses scarcity to maintain control. As in Cuba, the Maduro regime uses low stocks of consumer goods and rationing as a way to keep the population in line. Citizens need to be on good terms with government or PSUV officials to receive their allotment of formal sector jobs, rationing cards, Carnets de la Patria (or “homeland cards,” which are issued to those who qualify for social programs), and other benefits. Government control of consumer goods has been particularly effective in middle-class neighborhoods in Caracas and some larger urban areas in the interior of the country, where citizens have to rely more on the government’s distribution system than on growing their own food. Also worth considering is that the daily struggle to find food items and medicine, particularly in times of intense scarcity and hyperinflation, leaves very little time to organize anti-government mass protests and other activities. In short, economic adversity has not generated anti-government behavior; in fact, it has had the opposite effect. To be sure, there are many, many discontented Venezuelans. But even there, Venezuela has been able to use migration to take the pressure off. Exporting the opposition allows the government to rid of itself of the most unhappy and threatening elements of the opposition. Since the early years of Chávez’s revolution, those with financial means to leave (and to challenge the regime) decamped to Colombia, Miami, and Panama. By 2015, as opposition intensified, Caracas decided to allow just about anyone who wanted to exit the country. Millions of hungry, frustrated, and desperate Venezuelans have opted to leave rather than suffer or confront the dictatorship. Under these constraints, there are a few plausible scenarios for Venezuela’s future. There is reason to believe that the most likely one is that Maduro and the PSUV continue to muddle through by taking advantage of existing political and socioeconomic conditions. Perhaps counterintuitively, scarcity and economic meltdown seem to favor the regime more than the opposition. Maduro will continue to use his emergency powers and control of state institutions, including the military and security forces, to suppress dissent and divide the opposition, limiting its ability to truly challenge the ruling party, either through protests or some constitutional mechanism. So, although life will continue to get worse in Venezuela, the regime will most likely retain its hold on power through the remainder of this year and into the next. The second most likely—and most dangerous—scenario is an implosion, something like the fruit vendor suicide in Tunisia that sparked the Arab Spring. The Venezuelan government’s persistent unwillingness or inability to mitigate the deepening political and humanitarian crisis does mean that at least a few people may become more and more willing to act out. Although the regime has found a way to endure, the country’s overall conditions are dire enough that one emotional trigger could ignite a tinderbox of uncertainty, despair, and anger. Such an event will produce high levels of violence and likely divide key institutions, such as the military and PSUV. An incident of violence by the state resulting in a number of fatalities could well bring more people onto the street than security forces can address. A soft coup in the PSUV also remains a possibility. Senior party leadership—both the civilian and military sectors—are undoubtedly worried about their own hold on power if Maduro remains in the presidential palace. It is possible that Diosdado Cabello, the president of the Constituent National Assembly and the second most powerful figure within the PSUV, could join forces with the defense minister, Gen. Vladimir Padrino, to force Maduro to step aside for the good of the party (and the good of their own personal political and economic interests). Leaders within the party might see a soft coup as a way of stemming a potential implosion and ensuring a soft landing in a post-Maduro world. In that case, Vice President Delcy Rodríguez would likely assume power and move quickly to make small concessions and overtures to the opposition and international community, while taking measures to safeguard the party elite. It is important to note that Rodríguez belongs to the most radical wing of the PSUV. Finally, there is still some room for a military coup. Despite a few isolated and disorganized incidents, this scenario does not seem imminent nor very likely, though. The regime has gone very far to ensure the loyalty of the military, mostly through corruption and politicization. One should also not underestimate, moreover, an effective military counterintelligence apparatus purportedly supported by Cuba, which ensures that any dissident movement within the ranks is quickly quashed. Nonetheless, some of the fractures that exist throughout society do also plague the military, particularly along generational lines, rank, and access to economic opportunities for enrichment or subsistence. An emotional trigger could serve as a catalyst for a coup or rebellion, especially if the military in pressed into violence against citizens. It is likely that in the next six to 12 months the dictatorship in Caracas will continue to endure in the face of a deepening humanitarian crisis. The international community recently began to intensify pressure on the regime by imposing economic sanctions (mostly on government officials) to isolate it. The United States, Europe, and Venezuela’s neighbors do not have many other options, other than comprehensive economic sanctions and a military intervention, each of which would come with significant negative consequences. The Venezuelan opposition is starting to work together in the face of enormous challenges, but it remains deeply fragmented thanks to infighting and government manipulation. Despite the regime’s inability and unwillingness to restore even a semblance of economic and political stability, it will continue to effectively use the economic and political system it created to deter threats from within and outside the state, allowing it to continue plodding along. View Comments https://outline.com/MefqHp COPY Annotations · Report a problem READ and ANNOTATE ARTICLES TRY IT Elizabeth S. Rogers, xx-xx-xxxx, "Using Economic Sanctions to Prevent Deadly Conflict," Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/using-economic-sanctions-prevent-deadly-conflict Like sanctions, the cost of using force varies from event to event. For example, preparation for the Gulf War cost the United States $68 billion and the war itself another $52 billion. Because of unique circumstances, the entire $52 billion cost of the war itself was paid by allies.31 However, the United States paid its own preparation cost. Hence, even this relatively cheap war cost the United States nearly ten times the $7 billion total cost of all the economic sanctions in place during the year 1987. Finally, some critics condemn sanctions because they injure innocent civilians in the target country, and thus violate a moral proscription on injuring political innocents.32 Two main points are relevant to this criticism. First, while the injury to innocents is a drawback to sanctions use, the cost should be compared to the benefits that sanctions provide. The value of avoiding harm to innocents is not absolute, and should give way if the benefits of sanctions are greater .33 Second, the likely alternative policy instrument— force— usually also risks harm to innocent civilians. Majority of US Sanctions, xx-xx-xxxx, "Using Economic Sanctions to Prevent Deadly Conflict," Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Third, the literature generalizes largely from cases when partial sanctions were imposed half-heartedly, so it underestimates the possible effectiveness of forceful sanctions. As noted above, and contrary to common impression, most past sanctions efforts have been partial. In fact total economic sanctions have rarely been imposed.22 Instances of partial sanctions include the many unilateral sanctions against countries that violated human rights, supported terrorist activities, and worked to acquire nuclear weapons imposed by the United States starting in the 1970s.23 These three categories account for 74 percent of the forty-six U.S. economic sanctions imposed between 1973 and 1990 and largely account for the poor 17 percent sanctions success rate that Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott report for the U.S. during this period. The failure of partial sanctions is a poor predictor of the potential of forceful sanctions. The sanctions literature is biased in one way that may lead it to overstate the likely future effectiveness of sanctions for preventing deadly conflict. The target's resistance is probably smaller in some of Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott's cases than it would be when sanctions are imposed to prevent conflicts. This task require that states be dissuaded from adopting war policies. War policies are seldom made for small reasons and are not easily overturned. Hence conflict prevention sanctions may often be imposed on targets that are more willful than "typical" sanctioned states, and so may fail more often. However, it seems unlikely that this bias is large enough to offset the other biases noted above. Salama of Wall Street Journal, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-expands-sanctions-against-venezuela-into-an-embargo-11565053782 WASHINGTON—The Trump administration imposed a total economic embargo against the government of Venezuela, a significant escalation of pressure against the regime of President Nicolás Maduro and countries including Russia and China that continue to support him, a senior administration official said Warden of Harvard, "Using Economic Sanctions to Prevent Deadly Conflict," Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/using-economic-sanctions-prevent-deadly-conflict While economic sanctions did not overthrow Saddam, neither did military force or covert action. The failure of sanctions to overthrow Saddam means that they were only partially successful in Iraq, but this should not obscure the success they have achieved.47 The second observation, that sanctions failed to remove Iraq from Kuwait, is a weak, indictment because the sanctions were not left in place long enough to accomplish the task. Sanctions do not work overnight. During the pre-war Gulf crisis, sanctions advocates forecast that sanctions would take at least a year to force an Iraqi policy change,48 but U.S. President George Bush decided to move ahead with the military option six months into the crisis. Haiti. A September 1991 military coup against the elected government of Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide triggered economic sanctions against Haiti. The sanctions effort was led by the United States and the Organization of American States (OAS) and later included the UN. The primary goals of the sanctions were to punish the Haitian military junta and to restore Aristide to power. The sanctions were lifted in October 1994 when Aristide resumed the presidency of Haiti. The United States achieved the outcome it wanted: President Aristide was restored to power Crone of International Crisis Group, September 15th Talk with Small Regional Leaders leads to small but nonetheless, change, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/b041-venezuela-after-barbados.pdf On 15 September, having waited in vain for Maduro to respond to the proposal, the opposition issued a statement saying the “Barbados mechanism” was “exhausted”.4 The following day, a group of minority opposition parties signed its own deal with the government, negotiated in private over several months.5 Under the agreement (similar to a government proposal previously rejected by the mainstream opposition at the Barbados talks), some political prisoners would go free, pro-government legislators would return to the opposition-dominated National Assembly and the government would make changes to the National Electoral Council (CNE), which it now controls Peterson, T. M. (2013). Sending a Message: The Reputation Effect of US Sanction Threat Behavior1. International Studies Quarterly, 57(4), 672–682. doi:10.1111/isqu.12017, sci-hub.tw/10.1111/isqu.12017 I draw three conclusions from my statistical tests. First, I find strong evidence that the decision made by targets of US sanction threats whether to acquiesce to US demands depends on past US response to resistant targets. Second, I find that transmission of reputation is strongest when the context of the current case is similar to that of past US cases. Third, I find generally that reputation effects appear stronger when excluding trade disputes from my models. Specifically, in seven of eight models, I find that a recent example of the United States backing down against a resistant target is associated with a lower likelihood that current targets acquiesce to US pressure. I find somewhat weaker evidence that previously imposed US sanctions are associated with a higher likelihood that the current target acquiesces; however, support for this expectation is strong when controlling for context in terms of target regime type and wealth. The target-specific history models (Models 7 and 8) show the strongest support for both of my hypotheses. Indeed, even when including trade threats, the coefficients for both US threat history variables are significant in the predicted direction. The coefficient for US backed is negative and significant in the acquiescence equation in both of these models (p £ 0.03 in Model 7 and p £ 0.04 in Model 8). Again, the substantive probability changes are considerable. Specifically, recent US capitulation is associated with a decline in the probability of target acquiescence of 47 (from 0.31 to 0.16) and 91 (from 0.03 to 0.003) in Models 7 and 8, respectively. The coefficient for US imposed sanctionst)1 is positive and significant in the acquiescence equation in both models 7 and 8 (p £ .03 and p £ .02, respectively), suggesting that previously imposed sanctions do convince targets to acquiesce when the United States specifically imposed sanctions against targets with a similar regime type and income status to the current target. Recent US impositions of sanctions are associated with increases in the probability that the target acquiesces, from 0.31 to 0.50 (57) in Model 7 and from 0.03 to 0.17 (392) in Model 8. Conclusion I find strong evidence that target response to US sanction threats depends on how the United States responded when previous targets refused to give in to past demands. These results suggest that the consequences of US sanction threat episodes extend beyond the particular case to affect the outcome of future instances in which the United States seeks to coerce policy change in other states. My results imply that scholars should extend the domain of ‘‘effectiveness’’ to account for the message sent by previous sender response to resistant targets. Although one could argue that sanctions failing to coerce target acquiescence in the threat stage should be abandoned because imposition would be costly to the sender and unlikely to achieve its policy objective, my results show that such seemingly prudent behavior invites resistance from future targets, undermining the ability of senders to engage in economic coercion successfully. Conversely, imposed sanctions—even those failing to coerce policy change—could signal to third parties that resistance is costly. They may signal ‘‘toughness’’ on part of the sender or demonstrate the consequences associated with violating widely accepted international norms: in the words of Galtung (1967, 412), a ‘‘highly dramatic (and costly) way of reinforcing international morality.’’ Alternatively, sanction imposition could inform future targets that the sender’s citizens are attentive and willing to punish perceived weakness by political leaders. Future work could extend the examination of how similarity of context across cases conditions the impact of reputation. Attention to relative similarity would be particularly important in the promising albeit challenging next step of examining whether sender behavior during sanction threat episodes influences third-party behavior before the sender threatens them with future sanctions. For example, does respect for human rights increase in states similar to those the United States has sanctioned for human rights violations? Conversely, what is the consequence for human rights broadly when the United States backs down from imposing sanctions against violators? Ultimately, sanction threat behavior may have consequences for ‘‘general deterrence,’’39 a proposition suggesting that sanctions—and failures to sanction—could affect the behavior of third parties throughout the international system Elizabeth S. Rogers, xx-xx-xxxx, "Using Economic Sanctions to Prevent Deadly Conflict," Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/using-economic-sanctions-prevent-deadly-conflict B. Preventing Interstate Conflict Most regional violence is internal in nature. The years 1989-1992 saw 82 armed conflicts around the world in which at least 1000 people were killed. Of these, seventy-nine took place within country borders.62 Nevertheless, regional interstate conflict can pose serious costs and risks to world peace (witness the costs and hazards of the Arab-Israeli conflict). Hence the world's major powers should have an active strategy for its control. How much can economic sanctions contribute to such a strategy? Sanctions have a fair chance of succeeding when applied to prevent regional interstate wars. Interstate wars can begin in two ways. Either a civil war widens to engulf other states, or war can erupt between two states that suffer no civil conflict. Outside powers can become involved in civil wars in two ways. First, they can intervene in a civil war, as Germany and Italy did in the Spanish civil war, and as the United States did in the Vietnamese civil war. Second, belligerents in the civil war can attack outside powers. Examples include Sandinista attacks on Honduras in the 1970s and Vietnamese communist intrusions into Cambodia in the 1960s and 1970s. The threat of economic sanctions could help to avert both scenarios. Specifically, an international coalition could avert the first scenario by threatening tough sanctions against any outside powers that intervene, and could avert the second scenario by threatening to sanction either civil belligerent if it attacks surrounding states. Economic sanctions and the threat of sanctions both seem well-adapted to prevent outside intervention in civil wars. First, success requires the deterrence of a contemplated action, rather than the more difficult task of compelling the reversal of actions already undertaken. Second, it is relatively easy to identify the outside powers who might intervene in a given civil war. Hence the target of the threat (and of the sanction) is clear. As noted above, this is not always true of internal conflict prevention efforts. It may be more difficult to prevent belligerents from lashing out at neighboring states because the belligerents are highly motivated and therefore less likely to be swayed by economic sanctions or the threat of sanctions. However, even here a sanctioning coalition can be successful if its aid or trade is critical to a belligerent's war effort, or to its post-war rebuilding effort.63 Sanctions are likely to be more successful at preventing interstate war than civil conflict for several reasons. Many of the difficulties associated with using sanctions for preventing internal conflict are absent. Determining when and where the risk of war is rising is easier because unlike civil wars, interstate conflicts seldom erupt without warning. It is also easy to identify the parties that must be deterred to prevent an interstate war.64 With inter-state conflict, the targets of the sanctions (or threats) are nearly always states.65 Predicting which states are likely to be drawn into the conflict is relatively easy. Neighboring states, former colonial powers, and superpowers are the obvious candidates. Finally, the problem of distinguishing between causes and preventives of conflict is less of a problem. Presence of Sanction increases chance of the War Ending by 97 Md. Didarul Hasan Department of Economics, Asian University for Women, Chittagong, Bangladesh. and Sajal Lahiri Department of Economics, Southern Illinois University Carbondale, Carbondale, IL 62901, U.S.A. file:///Users/chenzeng/Downloads/International_Sanctions_and_the_Duration.pdf To begin with, we examine the effects of all sanctions in aggregate on the expected duration of civil wars. We estimate the hazard rate of conflict termination using Weibull parameterization, with the unit of analysis being the conflict year. The coefficients of hazard rate are presented to see whether hazard rate increases or decreases with a covariate.14 Table 3a reports the estimated coefficients of hazard rate for different regression functions. We see that even without controlling for other covariates, the coefficient of sanction variable is positive and statistically significant (model 1), which implies that sanctions increase the hazard rate of war termination. As we add more and more relevant control variables, the magnitude of sanction coefficient increases and become more significant. Our reference model (# 8) suggests that international sanctions significantly reduce the expected duration of conflict. This result is robust to the inclusions of other control variables, like Gini-coefficient, external intervention, mountain, forests, ethnic and religious fractionalizations, ethnic war, and polity2 (Table 4). The result is also robust to the use of alternative measure of natural resource abundance (Table 5). Thus, contrary to the findings of most other studies, our findings suggest that sanctions do reduce the war duration. Note that Table 3a shows only the direction of change in hazard rate, it does not show the estimated hazard rates. Table 3b reports the estimated hazard rates for the corresponding models of Table 3a. The reference model 8 in Table 3b shows that sanctions increase the hazard rate of war termination by 97 after controlling for all other relevant variables. Figure 2 shows the estimated hazard functions for the Weibull regression with sanctions and without sanctions. We see that, for each year, the hazard rate is significantly higher under sanction than without sanction. Elizabeth S. Rogers, xx-xx-xxxx, "Using Economic Sanctions to Prevent Deadly Conflict," Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/using-economic-sanctions-prevent-deadly-conflict When the United States has been serious about gaining and maintaining cooperation for economic sanctions efforts to control conflict— in the cases of Iraq, Haiti, and Yugoslavia— it has succeeded. The UN sanctions against Iraq achieved an unprecedented level of international cooperation.39 The United States, the Organization of American States (OAS), and the UN cooperated effectively in sanctioning Haiti once the United States became serious about sanctions. In the case of Yugoslavia the United States and its NATO allies have disagreed about the use of NATO forces, whether to maintain the arms embargo, and about peace plans, but not about economic sanctions policy. While these cooperation successes are encouraging; other evidence suggests that cooperation will not be automatic or easy in the post-cold war world. The United States was unable to build a coalition in support of two of its sanctions efforts, those against Cuba and Iran. Also, efforts in 1995-96 to impose tough sanctions against Nigeria failed due to a lack of cooperation. The Cuban case is an anomaly left over from the cold war. However, the Iran and Nigeria cases are more problematic, suggesting the limits of post-cold war cooperation. These cases indicate that it will be difficult to build coalitions when the goal is not directly connected to conflict control and the proposed sanctions carry high costs for powerful states.40 The post-cold war conditions for sanctions seem auspicious, but what about the results? Contrary to common opinion, international sanctioning coalitions have achieved quite good results in Iraq, Haiti, and Yugoslavia. Iraq. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 triggered an immediate response from the United States and the UN in the form of comprehensive economic sanctions which remain in place. After Iraq was forcefully expelled from Kuwait in the Gulf War, the primary goal of the sanctions shifted to dismantling Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and creating a monitoring system to ensure that these weapons programs are not restarted. The economic sanctions have done massive damage to the Iraqi economy. Iraq's GNP fell by more than 50 percent after sanctions were imposed. The value of the Iraqi dinar has plummeted. Before the Gulf War, one dinar bought three U.S. dollars. In January 1996, a dollar was worth 3,000 dinar.41 A large portion of Iraq's commercial aviation and marine fleets which were outside Iraq in August 1990, remain outside.42 Iraqi President Saddam Hussein has been forced to exhaust his large cash reserves secretly held in foreign banks .43 . Economic pain has slowed the rebuilding of the Iraqi military by making it difficult to purchase spare parts and replace aging equipment.44 It has helped compel Iraq to grudgingly comply with U.N. efforts to prevent it from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.45 It contributed to Iraq's decision to recognize Kuwait. Increasing economic misery was also a factor in Saddam's decision to negotiate with the UN regarding limited oil sales for the purpose of purchasing humanitarian assistance.46 Finally, the vast economic harm that sanctions have inflicted on Iraq warns other potential aggressor-states that the United States can assemble and maintain a sanctions coalition capable of gravely injuring an aggressor's economy. Critics make two main observations to support the claim that sanctions have failed in Iraq. First, Saddam remains in power. Second, sanctions failed to induce Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait during the 1990-91 crisis. The first observation measures sanctions against an unduly high standard of performance. Firmly entrenched leaders, like Saddam in 1990, are very hard to overthrow. This is perhaps the hardest task we could demand of sanctions. While economic sanctions did not overthrow Saddam, neither did military force or covert action. The failure of sanctions to overthrow Saddam means that they were only partially successful in Iraq, but this should not obscure the success they have achieved.47 The second observation, that sanctions failed to remove Iraq from Kuwait, is a weak, indictment because the sanctions were not left in place long enough to accomplish the task. Sanctions do not work overnight. During the pre-war Gulf crisis, sanctions advocates forecast that sanctions would take at least a year to force an Iraqi policy change,48 but U.S. President George Bush decided to move ahead with the military option six months into the crisis. Haiti. A September 1991 military coup against the elected government of Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide triggered economic sanctions against Haiti. The sanctions effort was led by the United States and the Organization of American States (OAS) and later included the UN. The primary goals of the sanctions were to punish the Haitian military junta and to restore Aristide to power. The sanctions were lifted in October 1994 when Aristide resumed the presidency of Haiti. The United States achieved the outcome it wanted: President Aristide was restored to power. These three cases show that when an international coalition has had the will to impose strong sanctions it has achieved positive results. At a minimum, the economic damage done by these sanctions warns the world that the United States can assemble a sanctions' coalition and impose high economic costs on miscreant states and regimes. Beyond this, the sanctions did compel the target states to make clear positive changes in their behavior. Without sanctions it seems likely that Saddam Hussein would have withheld his concessions on weapons of mass destruction and further built up his military, the Haitian elites would not have accepted Aristide's return, and Yugoslav President Milosevic would not have pressured the Bosnian Serbs to make concessions for peace. In sum, the post-cold war experience suggests that the future prospects for the success of serious multilateral sanctions are bright. Sanctions are not always effective, but they often produce substantial compliance if they are forcefully applied. In each of the three cases discussed above, the sanctions achieved marked positive results that are traceable to tough, total economic sanctions. Sanctions have reduced genocidal effects in countries like Sierre Leone, Liberia, and the Ivory Coast (empirical evidence) Matthew Krain, xx-xx-xxxx, "," No Publication, https://discover.wooster.edu/mkrain/files/2012/12/Krain-SanctionsGP-final.pdf For instance, the above discussion suggests that sanctions will only be effective if they raise the costs of a murderous policy significantly. Policymakers and scholars have lobbied for stronger, costlier sanctions policies in the face of atrocities, most notably in the Albright and Cohen report: Eschew the common approach of successively imposing gradually harsher sanctions over a long period of time. The regime in question is unlikely to be deterred by minor, symbolic measures (usually the first step); sanctions generally only succeed when they really bite.52 Similarly, Susan Rice argued for more costly and extensive sanctions to be placed on Sudan.53 And noted sanctions expert George A. Lopez argued that only ‘strong, coercive’ and ‘harsh’ 11 multilateral sanctions were likely to be effective at mitigating ongoing atrocities in Syria. Lopez suggested that such an approach aims to generate greater financial hardship deeper into Assad’s support network. They would constrain his ability to pay and reward those engaged in the attacks, and disrupt the flow of ammunition and weapons available to his security forces. Such sanctions have led to severe constraints on Muammar Qaddafi’s firepower and to defections of Libyan elites. They also have helped to protect some civilians in internal wars in Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, and Liberia. Every Month a Conflict Extends, 24000 soldiers will die; that’s only a fraction of total deaths Bennett, D. S., and Stam, A. C. (1996). The Duration of Interstate Wars, 1816–1985. American Political Science Review, 90(02), 239–257. doi:10.2307/2082882, https://sci-hub.se/https://www.jstor.org/stable/2082882?seq=1 Answering these questions and understanding the duration of interstate war is important for several reasons. War duration is a key factor influencing the costs of war. A simple regression of war duration on battle deaths using the Small and Singer (1982) list of interstate wars since 1816 reveals that 24,000 soldiers die (on average) every month a war continues. In a more political vein, wars and their duration have important effects on leaders' popularity (Russett 1990) and on the stability of national regimes (Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, and Woller 1992). Anticipating the outcome, duration, and costs of possible wars, leaders choose what wars to fight, leading to possible selection bias in the analysis of international conflict (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995). An improved model of war duration Wane of International Studies Quarterly, http://www.genocidewatch.org/images/AboutGen_International_Intervention_and_the_Severity_of_Genocides_and_Politicides.pdf Moreover, much of the recent literature on intervention has focused on its effects on civil war duration. Empirical findings seem to indicate that external interventions tend to result in civil wars of longer duration, but that under particular circumstances, they can shorten the duration of the conflict (Regan, 1996, 2000, 2002; Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, 2000). There is a belief among some policy makers that shortening an internal conflict's duration reduces the severity of that conflict (Holbrooke, 1998). Yet, this may not hold true for all types of internal conflicts. An examination of a few high-profile cases of statesponsored mass murder reveals the reason why the duration and severity of genocides or politicides are not always related. In a matter of 100 days, almost 800,000 people were slaughtered in Rwanda, a rate of approximately 8,000 per day. Here, the duration of the slaughter was one of the shortest on record; yet, the rate of the killings was nearly unprecedented. Another example is the short but astonishingly brutal killings of somewhere between 1,250,000 and 3,000,000 Bengalis by the Pakistani military in 1971 (Harff and Gurr, 1988). Indeed, duration is not strongly correlated with severity, although it has been found to be a significant factor increasing it (Krain, 1997). Countries will only falter if they believe the Sender state stays committed to sanctions; Sanctions reduce the severity of genocides only after they exist for a long time Matthew Krain, xx-xx-xxxx, "," No Publication, https://discover.wooster.edu/mkrain/files/2012/12/Krain-SanctionsGP-final.pdf Sanctions may also need to be in place for some time to have an effect. 65 They are only likely to affect the behavior of perpetrators of atrocities if they believe that sanctioners are committed to 13 seeing sanctions through, which will not likely occur until some time has passed. Moreover, sanctions work by raising the cost of behavior; if the costs have not had time yet to mount, there will be little effect on behavior. More evidence if they say Krain is bad: Elizabeth S. Rogers, xx-xx-xxxx, "Using Economic Sanctions to Prevent Deadly Conflict," Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/using-economic-sanctions-prevent-deadly-conflict Policy makers should follow four rules to maximize the effectiveness of sanctions. Total and complete sanctions should be imposed. They should be imposed immediately. Gaining the cooperation of key states is necessary. Finally, members of the sanctioning coalition must demonstrate resolve. First, the full range of economic instruments available should be used. A combination of aid, trade and financial sanctions is markedly more effective than any lesser combination. The total sanctions imposed on Iran (1979), Iraq (1990), Haiti (1991), and Yugoslavia (1992) show that total sanctions achieve results. Second, total sanctions should be imposed as soon as any decision to impose sanctions is taken. A slow incremental tightening of sanctions is far less effective because it allows the target time to adjust by taking steps— such as stock piling goods and moving money— that would make future sanctions less effective. Slow incremental sanctions may also cause the target to question whether the coalition has the resolve to see the sanctions through to success.66 Third, the cooperation of the neighbors, major trading partners of the target, and major aid donors must be secured. Clearly it is desirable to have as many states as possible participate in the sanctions effort. However, the cooperation of these particular states is critical since they have the greatest economic interaction with the target. Gaining their cooperation may not be easy because the neighbors and trading partners are likely to suffer from the imposition of economic sanctions. To encourage cooperation, the UN or the U.S. could provide carrots, such as measures to compensate for the loss of revenue from trade with the target, and sticks such as threats to reduce aid or trade. Carrots and sticks will seldom induce perfect compliance. Even if neighboring governments cooperate, some degree of smuggling is likely. Fortunately, perfect compliance is not required for sanctions' success. The results in Iraq and Haiti demonstrate that a little leakage does not prevent sanctions from devastating the target state's economy. Fourth, the sanctioning coalition must convince the target that it will keep the sanctions in place until they achieve success. This is especially important because sanctions generally take years to produce results.67 To create the appearance of endurance, the U.S. must publicly commit itself in a highly visible way to maintaining sanctions until the target complies. Such a commitment from the world's most powerful state dampens target states' hopes of a retreat.68 Threat of Sanctions on Sudan did not deter them because it was clear they was 0 commitment to it (empirical evidence) Matthew Krain, xx-xx-xxxx, "," No Publication, https://discover.wooster.edu/mkrain/files/2012/12/Krain-SanctionsGP-final.pdf Alternatively, some studies have demonstrated that threats of sanctions may be less effective in achieving policy goals,70 and more specifically in changing a target’s human rights behavior.71 In part this may be because threats alone may be viewed by perpetrators of atrocities as ‘cheap talk,’ and thus less than credible, since they are not costly signals of disapproval by the sender.72 This should apply to situations of mass atrocity as well. For example, Scott Straus highlights a United Nations (UN) Security Council resolution aimed at stopping the killing in Darfur that ‘vaguely threatened economic sanctions against Sudan's oil industry (although it gave no concrete deadline for when sanctions would be imposed)…. Despite its weak wording, the resolution almost failed to pass’. 73 Weak support for a weak threat suggests no credibility of commitment or of disapproval. Regarding a range of UN efforts to sanction Sudan, Samuel Totten writes: Time and again (from summer 2004 through fall 2006), the UN threatened to impose sanctions against Sudan for its – and the Janjaweed’s – attacks against Darfur’s black African population, but the threats did little to nothing to staunch the killing. This was largely due to the fact that the threats were never acted upon.74 Deadlines for policy change were missed, and the weak threat proved ineffective. 75 15 Similarly, Davenport and Appel found that threats of sanctions have no effect on the duration of ongoing genocides or politicides.76 It also seems likely that, even controlling for duration, they should be similarly ineffective in reducing severity of these atrocities. Leaders will have already factored the likelihood that potential sanctioners will not effectively carry out their threats into their decisions regarding whether or not to engage in campaigns of mass killing. As noted earlier, if atrocities have already begun, the perpetrators have evaluated the international context and decided that there is a degree of permissiveness sufficient to allow them to commit genocide or politicide without consequence.
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2 - SEPTOCT - Coal
80 of BRI energy investment in fossil fuels, including coal Isabel Hilton, Yale, "How China’s Big Overseas Initiative Threatens Global Climate Progress - Yale E360", January 3, 2019, https://e360.yale.edu/features/how-chinas-big-overseas-initiative-threatens-climate-progress "So far, the ... controversial hydro projects." China building coal plants abroad to preserve jobs and export excess coal Steve Inskeep, NPR, "China Building Hundreds Of Coal-Fired Power Plants Abroad : NPR", April 29, 2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/04/29/716347646/why-is-china-placing-a-global-bet-on-coal "While closing old plants ... Chinese financial institutions." EU has a lack of infrastructure investment with less than 2 annually, other countries go up to almost 10 on average Andreas Kappeler, Vox, "Addressing Europe’s infrastructure gaps | VOX, CEPR Policy Portal", April 18, 2018, https://voxeu.org/article/addressing-europe-s-infrastructure-gaps "The need to invest more ... made them bankable." Countries with low economic growth tend to prefer existing energy sources with fossil fuels such as coal Yao Lixia, Energy Studies Institute, "Who is Responsible for Greening the Belt and Road Initiative?", January 7, 2019, https://esi.nus.edu.sg/docs/default-source/esi-policy-briefs/who-is-responsible-for-greening-the-bri.pdf?sfvrsn=2 "The governments that ... dams as required" Infrastructure uses fossil fuels, accounts for 70 of the world's emissions Deblina Saha, World Bank, "Low-carbon infrastructure: an essential solution to climate change?", April 5, 2018, https://blogs.worldbank.org/ppps/low-carbon-infrastructure-essential-solution-climate-change "Infrastructure is a key ... 250,000 by 2030." BRI countries account for 28 of emissions Greg Baker, France 24, "China's 'Belt and Road' project risks Paris climate targets, says new study", September 2, 2019, https://www.france24.com/en/20190902-china-belt-road-project-paris-climate-target-united-nation "The 2015 accord ... to 2C of warming" BRI to increase emissions in some countries by 7, globally by 0.3 World Bank, World Bank, "Belt and Road Economics", 2019, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/31878/9781464813924.pdf "Large transport projects ... and indirect risks." Construction of green tech wouldn't solve for the emissions created by infrastructure Naomi Klein, This Changes Everything, "Naomi Klein - This Changes Everything", January 1, 2014, https://archive.org/details/pdfy-Skb-ch_k7psDm90Q/page/n83 "If only humanity's relationship with natural resources was that simple ... but one that wouldn't lower our emissions fast enough." Paris Agreement goals at risk, BRI would increase global temperatures by 3 degrees if investments continued Echo Xie, South China Morning Post, "Heavy carbon emitters in China’s belt and road network may put Paris climate targets at risk | South China Morning Post", September 2, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3025389/heavy-carbon-emitters-chinas-belt-and-road-network-may-put-paris "Countries that are ... Chinese, European and US researchers." 1.5 degrees increase in temperature can cause 350 million more deaths annually ECL, The Earth Chronicles of Life, "If the Earth warms by 1.5 degrees, the world will die annually to 350 million people | Earth Chronicles News", April 1, 2017, http://earth-chronicles.com/science/if-the-earth-warms-by-1-5-degrees-the-world-will-die-annually-to-350-million-people.html "Because of the warming ... than in 1979."
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3 - NOVDEC - Iran
Dilanian 18 Dilanian 18 finds (Ken Dilanian, 3-1-2018, "Under Trump, U.S. ramps up cyber offense against other countries," NBC News, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/under-trump-u-s-military-ramps-cyber-offensive-against-other-n1019281 ) With little public ... what that means. Donnelly 19 America losing cyberwar currently due to weak defense, makes president lean towards nuclear weapons more, risk is much higher John Donnelly, Roll Call, "America is woefully unprepared for cyber-warfare", July 11, 2019, https://www.rollcall.com/news/u-s-is-woefully-unprepared-for-cyber-warfare War in cyberspace ... with nuclear weapons. Rid 13 The US is susceptible right now in cyberspace (Thomas Rid, 2-4-2013, "Cyber Fail," New Republic, https://newrepublic.com/article/112314/obama-administrations-lousy-record-cyber-security ) And that has ... anyone to see. Healey 13 Problematically, funding allocated towards offensive cyber operations trades off with funding to defensive operations Healey 13 (Jason Healey 3-8-2013, "Obama's Cyberwarfare Strategy Will Backfire," US News andamp; World Report, https://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/03/08/clandestine-american-strategy-on-cyberwarfare-will-backfire ) America's generals and ... priorities as well. This increases the likelihood of escalation with Iran. Landler 18 of NYT Us pulled out of Iran nuclear deal, reimposed sanctions on Iran Mark Landler, The New York Times, "Trump Abandons Iran Nuclear Deal He Long Scorned - The New York Times", May 8, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html President Trump declared ... considering new penalties. Lawson 19 US OCOs cause Iran to escalate cyberwar, attacks don't actually deter and just creates unintended proliferation Sean Lawson, Fifth Domain, "What will be the effect of the latest US cyberattack on Iran?", October 23, 2019, https://www.fifthdomain.com/thought-leadership/2019/10/23/what-will-be-the-effect-of-the-latest-us-cyberattack-on-iran/ The United States ... civilian critical infrastructures. The impact is an Iran-US War. Jackson 19 Iran will escalate to all-out war in case of US attacks David Jackson, USA Today, "Iran official warns of 'all-out war' if US or Saudi Arabia attack Iran", September 19, 2019, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2019/09/19/iran-official-warns-all-out-war-if-us-saudi-arabia-attacks-tehran-trump-weighs-response-oil-strikes/2372096001/ Iran’s foreign minister ... discuss the issue. Kennedy 19 Iran will attack the US through cyberwar and create large scale escalation David Kennedy, The National Interest, "How Iran Would Wage Cyber War Against the United States | The National Interest", October 5, 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/how-iran-would-wage-cyber-war-against-united-states-85841 While such a ... far-reaching consequences.
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5 - FEB - Poverty v2
US Budget Report: $1 trillion spent on MTW Jeff Sessions, US Senate, "CRS Report: Welfare Spending The Largest Item In The Federal Budget", 2011, https://www.budget.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/CRS20Report20-20Welfare20Spending20The20Largest20Item20In20The20Federal20Budget.pdf Ranking Member Sessions ... which people contribute (e.g., Social Security and Medicare). Tanner 15: No change in poverty from MTW Michael Tanner, Cato Institute, "The Pros and Cons of a Guaranteed National Income", May 12, 2015, https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa773.pdf However, in recent years, ... national welfare reform Center for Policy Research: Poverty rate at about 14 J Semega, Center for Policy Research, "What is the current poverty rate in the United States? - UC Davis Center for Poverty Research", October 15, 2018, https://poverty.ucdavis.edu/faq/what-current-poverty-rate-united-states The official poverty ... was 13.9 percent. Hamilton 18: 1.46m live with less than $2 a day and welfare doesn't help Leah Hamilton, BIEN, "Why Welfare Doesn’t Work: And What We Should Do Instead | BIEN", June 29, 2018, https://basicincome.org/news/2018/06/why-welfare-doesnt-work-and-what-we-should-do-instead/ The primary cash assistance ... afford quality childcare. 4 reasons welfare is broken: 1 - Reqs Semuels 16: TANF has too many reqs Alana Semuels, The Atlantic, "The End of Welfare as We Know It - The Atlantic", April 1, 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/04/the-end-of-welfare-as-we-know-it/476322/ By the numbers, ... Nothing in America. 2 - Block Grants Semuels 16: Block grants for states' welfare is misused Alana Semuels, The Atlantic, "The End of Welfare as We Know It - The Atlantic", April 1, 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/04/the-end-of-welfare-as-we-know-it/476322/ By the numbers, ... Nothing in America 3 - Tax PRI 19: High implicit tax rate from welfare disincentivizes work Damon Dunn, Pacific Research Institute, "Pacific Research Institute | Well-Meaning Government Anti-Poverty Programs Actually Hurt the Poor", March 6, 2019, https://www.pacificresearch.org/well-meaning-government-anti-poverty-programs-actually-hurt-the-poor/ Unlike other failed ... percent for the working poor. Rappaport 19: Increased income with MTW can decrease benefits by up to 100 Mike rappaport, Law and Liberty, "Means-Tested Welfare and the Disincentive to Work", February 5, 2019, https://www.lawliberty.org/2019/02/05/means-tested-welfare-and-the-disincentive-to-work/ But to my ... an enormous problem. 4 - Bureaucracy Higher transaction costs in welfare programs HENRIK KLEVEN 08 of the NBER (9-2008, "Transfer Program Complexity and the Take Up of Social Benefits", doa 1-29-2020, https://www.nber.org/papers/w14301.pdf) NY Second, the model is ... paid in equilibrium. Santens 17: UBI is unconditional and federaly funded Scott Santens, World Economic Forum, "Why we should all have a basic income | World Economic Forum", January 15, 2017, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/01/why-we-should-all-have-a-basic-income/ The idea is ... the poverty line. Hammond 17: UBI does not have implicit marginal tax rate Samuel Hammond, Niskanen Center, "The Pro-work Case for Universal Basic Income - Niskanen Center", January 4, 2017, https://www.niskanencenter.org/ubi-pro-work/ In many ways, ... or work hours. Haarmann 08: Namibia UBI a massive success Claudia Haarmann, Basic Income Grant Coalition, "BIG Pilot Project - Assessment Report", September 2008, http://www.bignam.org/Publications/BIG_Assessment_report_08a.pdf While on average ... school dropped by 50. Weller 17: UBI in Iran did not hurt employment, shows small increases in hours worked Chris Weller, World Economic Forum, "Iran introduced a basic income scheme, and something strange happened | World Economic Forum", May 31, 2017, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/05/iran-introduced-a-basic-income-scheme-and-something-strange-happened/ One of the ... become more important." Berman 16: Alaskan poverty rates have declined due to PFD Matthew Berman, Institute of Social and Economic Research, "Permanent Fund Dividends and Poverty in Alaska", November 2016, https://iseralaska.org/static/legacy_publication_links/2016_12-PFDandPoverty.pdf Our estimates show ... will actually occur. Matthews 17: A UBI replacing welfare could slash US poverty by 40 Dylan Matthews, Vox, "A basic income really could end poverty forever - Vox", July 17, 2017, https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/7/17/15364546/universal-basic-income-review-stern-murray-automation The plan was ... Stern’s plan does.
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Arctic Drilling and Currency
Dillow in 18; China Wants oil in the Arctic ?https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/06/russia-and-china-battle-us-in-race-to-control-arctic.html Call it a new ...production by 2050. Lurkin in 18; China is planning to use Russia. ?https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/02/08/putin-china/?noredirect=onandutm_term=.f5b540d03c4e? As always, Moscow’s ... concert of major powers. Pei in 19; Artic investment will stop soon ?https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Will-China-let-Belt-and-Road-die-quietly But the trouble for BRI ... at least BRI 1.0, die quietly. Cierten from the European Union Institute in 2017; EU funds ?http://ier.gov.ro/wp-content/uploads/publicatii/Final_Policy-Brief-5_Horia-Ciurtin-A-Pivot-to-Europe_web.pdf? For attaining these ... connectivity with its marginal areas. Walsh in 12; Release in oil sends carbon emissions ?http://science.time.com/2012/07/20/its-not-just-spills-the-climate-risks-of-arctic-drilling/ But a new?report by the NGO...undoubtedly help intensify climate change. McKinnon in 15; Increase global temperature http://priceofoil.org/content/uploads/2015/08/OCI-Untouchable_Arctic_FINAL.pdf. Therefore this ‘climate test’ ... a proposal that fails the climate test. People will die https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/blog/2018/Climate_Change_and_the_Rise_of_Poverty.html Today over 2 billion people ... frequent and severe climatic disasters. China wants to gain financial power Ravi Kant, 6-25, 19, https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/06/opinion/digital-silk-road-xis-dream-of-conquering-asia/, China looking to use ...involved in the BRI Mathews in 19; China needs trade Mathews 19 ~-~- John A. Mathews is Professor of Management, MGSM, Macquarie Uni-versity, Australia, and formerly Eni Chair of Competitive Dynamics and Global Strategy at LUISS Guido Carli University in Rome. His research focuses on the competitive dy-namics of international business, the evolution of technologies and their strategic man-agement, and the rise of new high technology industries. He researches the develop-ment of the institutional capacities of firms and governments in the Asia-Pacific, interna-tionalisation processes of firms and the theoretical explanations for latecomer firms’ suc-cess. His work has focused in recent years on the emergence of the ‘green economy’ and the transition to renewable energies, and the institutional changes needed to provide industrial capitalism with genuine long-term sustainability. He is the author of Strate-gizing, Disequilibrium, and Profit, Global Green Shift: When Ceres Meets Gaia published by Anthem Press and Greening of Capitalism: An important Chinese aim for ... BRI is so much more than just a series of infrastructure projects.58 US dollar causes more damage to US after collapse Kouchman in 19; Less demand for U.S. ... pay to keep borrowing. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/debt-damage-how-americas-spending-hurts-us-security-70426 https://nomadcapitalist.com/2014/04/13/top-5-us-dollar-collapse-predictions/ The US dollar is in ... for women in the workplace. The impact is famine: However, the rapid and simultaneous rise in prices globally for all basic food crops—corn, wheat, soybeans and rice—long with other food items such as cooking oil has had a devastating effect on poor people all over the world (ACF International / Action Against Hunger, 2009; Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2009b; Swan, Hadley and Cichon, 2010). Almost everybody’s standard of living has been reduced as people in the middle class become increasingly careful about their food purchases, the near ... (Nord, 2009).
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1 - Gendered Language Interp
Debaters using "you guys" to describe non-male identifying folk is creeping sexism and a reminder of our inferiority in the debate space—reject the team to preserve debate as a safe space for all identities.
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Disclosure Policy
The Blake debate team believes that disclosure serves important educational and competitive goals. We believe that the public forum community is moving in a positive direction and we will support that movement. We will will attempt to disclosure our pro and con arguments at the end of each tournament day on this wiki. After we have run a contention level argument we will disclose that verbally if the other team will reciprocate prior to the round. We do think that the wiki is important to do at the end of the tournament day but realize that during the middle of rounds during a tournament day we may not have time so we will verbally disclose. As we run new contentions, new links or new impacts we will then disclose them on the wiki. Please do not look at our wiki information unless you plan to participate and also use the wiki.
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2020 Georgetown Neg
Our first contention is Iran Current balance of power would be upended by Iran Cropsey 19 (Seth Cropsey senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, 10-17-19, "A U.S. Withdrawal Will Cause a Power Struggle in the Middle East," Hudson Institute, https://www.hudson.org/research/15570-a-u-s-withdrawal-will-cause-a-power-struggle-in-the-middle-east // DOA: 3/23/20)JDE “The Ottoman Empire was the ...Saudi and Israeli strength.” US leaving would embolden Iran as Clarke and Tabatabai 19 explain (COLIN P. CLARKE is a Senior Fellow at the Soufan Center and an Adjunct Senior Political Scientist at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation. ARIANE M. TABATABAI is an Associate Political Scientist at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation, 1-8-2019, "Withdrawing From Syria Leaves a Vacuum That Iran Will Fill," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2019-01-08/withdrawing-syria-leaves-vacuum-iran-will-fill // DOA: 3/20/20)JDE “President Trump’s decision ... the United States and its allies.” That means that Iran would fill in to a power vacuum left by the US Clarke and Tabatabai 19 (COLIN P. CLARKE is a Senior Fellow at the Soufan Center and an Adjunct Senior Political Scientist at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation. ARIANE M. TABATABAI is an Associate Political Scientist at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation, 1-8-2019, "Withdrawing From Syria Leaves a Vacuum That Iran Will Fill," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2019-01-08/withdrawing-syria-leaves-vacuum-iran-will-fill // DOA: 3/20/20)JDE “While the existence of Iran’s Shiite foreign-fighter ... an external strike force.” For this reason, Iranian hegemony would lead to them closing the Strait of Hormuz because the US isn’t there, ‘Glaser and Kelanic 17 confirms (CHARLES L. GLASER is Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. ROSEMARY A. KELANIC is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, Jan/Feb 2017, "Getting Out of the Gulf," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/persian-gulf/2016-12-12/getting-out-gulf // DOA: 3/21/20)JDE “What’s far less clear is ... to protect the strait.” Iran closing down the Strait leads to war, Davis 18 (Paul Davis, Writer for Kurdsitan24, July 25 2018, “Will the US and Iran end up going to war?” http://www.kurdistan24.net/en/opinion/8a1cada3-eed1-4eb6-a3ca-fc81643201e7 DOA: February 11 2018) SP “Should Iran move to directly or ... save their country.” This is problematic as a US-Iran war would go nuclear due to Casualties. Afrasiabi and Entessar 2019 (Kaveh L. Afrasiabi, an Iranian-American political scientist and author or co-author of several books on Iranian foreign policy and Nader Entessar, Professor Emeritus of political science at the University of South Alabama. 2 July 2019. “A nuclear war in the Persian Gulf?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, https://thebulletin.org/2019/07/a-nuclear-war-in-the-persian-gulf/. DOA 3/21/20) WD “In response to a White House ...in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.” The impact to nuclear war is millions dead. Turse 2013 (Nick Turse, the managing editor of TomDispatch.com and a fellow at the Nation Institute. 2013. “NUCLEAR WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST !” AlamonGordo.com, http://www.alamongordo.com/nuclear-war-in-the-middle-east/. DOA 3/24/20) WD “Its scenarios are staggering. ... from a nuclear detonation.” Contention 2 is Terrorism. Subpoint A is Proxy Militias. Within Iraq, there are military and political entities called Popular Mobilization Forces, or PMFs that counter-terror. Mansour 17 explains that (Renad Mansour is an El-Erian fellow at the Carnegie Middle East Center, Faleh A. Jabar is the director of the Iraq Institute for Strategic Studies, 4-28-2017, "The Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq’s Future," Carnegie Middle East Center, https://carnegie-mec.org/2017/04/28/popular-mobilization-forces-and-iraq-s-future-pub-68810 // DOA: 3/12/20)JDE “The most powerful groups ... as proxies for Tehran..” Fortunately, they are currently counterbalanced by the US, as Jiyad 20 corroborates that (Sajad Jiyad, the managing director of Al-Bayan Center for Planning and Studies 1-29-2020, "Iraq Still Might Force the United States Out," War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2020/01/iraq-still-might-force-the-united-states-out/ // DOA: 3/10/20)JDE “Since the decision by the coalition to ... to Iraq to support Iraq’s security. “ PMFs bad to sunnis Jiyad 2020 (Sajad Jiyad, the managing director of Al-Bayan Center for Planning and Studies 1-29-2020, "Iraq Still Might Force the United States Out," War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2020/01/iraq-still-might-force-the-united-states-out/ // DOA: 3/10/20)JDE “The threat to cut such support, ...with the Bina bloc will continue” Getting rid of the US’s counter-terror support in Iraq would mean PMF’s power skyrockets, which is disastrous as it will cause alienation and violence towards the Arab Sunnis Palani 20 Kamaran Palani, a Lecturer in International Relations at Salahaddin-University-Erbil and a Research Fellow at the Middle East Research Institute. Feb 18 2020. “Iraq and the US withdrawal conundrum” AlJazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/iraq-withdrawal-conundrum-200218182253463.html. DOA: Mar 22 2020) SRW The Sunni perspective Attitudes ... period of turbulence". Unfortunately, there are many Sunni’s still displaced that, in Affirmation, can’t return. Zucchino 17 confirms that in Iraq, (David Zucchino, a contributing writer for The New York Times. He was awarded a Pulitzer Prize in 1989 for his reporting from South Africa. Oct 26 2017. “As ISIS Is Driven From Iraq, Sunnis Remain Alienated” NY Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/26/world/middleeast/iraq-isis-sunni.html. DOA: Mar 22 2020) SRW “Now that those ...political no-man’s land.” Subpoint B: Countering terror Pulling US troops out of Iraq would hamper their counter terror efforts Peterson 20 (Scott Peterson covers the Middle East for the Monitor from London with a special focus on Iran Iraq and Syria, CS Monitor, 1-7-2020, "US troops out of Iraq? What that would mean for both countries.," https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2020/0107/US-troops-out-of-Iraq-What-that-would-mean-for-both-countries // DOA: 3/22/20)JDE “And the ramifications of forcing ...without Coalition assistance.”” The impact is a humanitarian disaster Noack 2020 (Rick Noack, Foreign affairs reporter focusing on Europe and international security, January 10 2020, “Here’s what might happen if the U.S. were to suddenly quit Iraq” The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/01/09/heres-what-might-happen-if-us-were-suddenly-quit-iraq/ DOA: March 21 2020) SP It may end in ... campaign,” he said”
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Firstly, a definition of UBI to frame the round (United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, 4 Feb 2017, “Can the Universal Basic Income solve global inequalities”, https://en.unesco.org/inclusivepolicylab/news/can-universal-basic-income-solve-global-inequalities DOA 1/28/20)KJR “The universal basic income...income they receive.” (Robert Rector, Senior Research Fellow at The Heritage Foundation on Domestic Policy Studies, Institute for Family, Community, and Opportunity. 3 May 2012. “Examining the Means-tested Welfare State: 79 Programs and $927 Billion in Annual Spending,” The Heritage Foundation, https://www.heritage.org/testimony/examining-the-means-tested-welfare-state-79-programs-and-927-billion-annual-spending. DOA 1/31/20) WD “In FY 2011, … of the population).” Contention 1: Creating economic growth A UBI spurs critical economic growth in four ways Enabling wage negotiation Kimberly Amadeo, writer for the balance. Published 12-13-2019, "Should Everyone Get a Guaranteed Income?," Balance, https://www.thebalance.com/universal-basic-income-4160668. DOA January 4 2019) GKH “An unconditional basic ...during a recession.” (International Workplace Group, a multinational provider of serviced offices and coworking spaces sponsoring MagazineUS. No Date. “How Universal Basic Income could transform work as we know it” IWG. “What’s more, the … might otherwise be possible.” (Sri Mulyani Indrawati, Chief Operating Officer and Managing Director at the World Bank, Huffington Post, Dec 6 2017, “Jobs - The Fastest Road Out Of Poverty”, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/jobs~-~--the-fastest-road-o_b_10404594 // DOA: 1/25/20)JDE “Good jobs are ... for the poor.” Boosting education John Rosales, contributor for NEAToday, NEAToday, June 8 2015, “Why Students Drop Out: The Economic Pressures That Make Leaving School Unavoidable”, http://neatoday.org/2015/06/08/why-students-drop-out-the-economic-pressures-that-make-leaving-school-unavoidable/ // DOA: 1/26/20)JDE “Among high school...are native-born U.S. citizens.” (John Rosales, contributor for NEAToday, NEAToday, June 8 2015, “Why Students Drop Out: The Economic Pressures That Make Leaving School Unavoidable”, http://neatoday.org/2015/06/08/why-students-drop-out-the-economic-pressures-that-make-leaving-school-unavoidable/ // DOA: 1/26/20)JDE “In some cases, … receive food stamps.” (International Workplace Group, a multinational provider of serviced offices and coworking spaces sponsoring MagazineUS. No Date. “How Universal Basic Income could transform work as we know it” IWG. https://www.regus.com/work-us/universal-basic-income-transform-work-know/. DOA: Jan 10 2019) SRW “5. Smarter school-leavers. … manage this transition.” (Arne Ruckert, Senior research associate for the Journal of Public Health, 2-2-2017, "Reducing health inequities: is universal basic income the way forward?," OUP Academic, https://academic.oup.com/jpubhealth/article/40/1/3/2966187, DOA: 1/7/20)ET “Education has a prominent … and overall health.” (Child Fund International, works with local partner organizations, governments, corporations and individuals to help create the safe environments children need to thrive, Child Fund International, Nov 4 2013, “The Effects of Poverty on Education in the United States”, https://www.childfund.org/Content/NewsDetail/2147489206/ // DOA: 1/26/20)JDE “The poverty rate … in poor health.” (Scott Santens, Writer for Medium; Citizen of Earth and New Orleans; Bachelor of Science in Psychology, “Universal Basic Income Will Accelerate Innovation by Reducing Our Fear of Failure”, Nov 30, 2016, https://medium.com/basic-income/universal-basic-income-will-accelerate-innovation-by-reducing-our-fear-of-failure-b81ee65a254 DOA: January 27, 2019) SP “Meanwhile, entrepreneurship is… paramount to innovation.” (Scott Santens, Writer for Medium; Citizen of Earth and New Orleans; Bachelor of Science in Psychology, “Universal Basic Income Will Accelerate Innovation by Reducing Our Fear of Failure”, Nov 30, 2016, https://medium.com/basic-income/universal-basic-income-will-accelerate-innovation-by-reducing-our-fear-of-failure-b81ee65a254 DOA: January 27, 2019) SP “If everyone received … of buying power.” Fourth is increasing consumer spending. (Josh Bivens, the director of research at the Economic Policy Institute (EPI). His areas of research include macroeconomics, fiscal and monetary policy, the economics of globalization, social insurance, and public investment, December 12 2017, “Inequality is slowing US economic growth” Economic Policy Institute. https://www.epi.org/publication/secular-stagnation/ DOA: January 30, 2019) SP What this report … robust economic growth. Straubhaar 17(Thomas Straubhaar, Swiss economist and professor at the University of Hamburg, March-April 2017, “On the Economics of a Universal Basic Income”, Intereconomics, https://archive.intereconomics.eu/year/2017/2/on-the-economics-of-a-universal-basic-income/ DOA 01/09/20) KG “In spite of … just tax system.” (Charles Murray, The Foundation for Law, Justice and Society in collaboration with The Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, University of Oxford. Nov 17 2008. “Guaranteed Income as a Replacement for the Welfare State”. FLJS. https://www.fljs.org/files/publications/Murray.pdf. DOA: Jan 8 2020) SRW “Immediate effects 3: … GI affect them?” (Nathan Heller, Writer for New Yorker, New York Times, Vouge, Socioeconomics writer. July 2nd 2018. “Who really stands to win from Universal Basic Income” The New Yorker, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/07/09/who-really-stands-to-win-from-universal-basic-income 12/25/19) TCS “Framing basic income … cash as needed?” Second, stopping a recession. (Jonnelle Marte, Economics Researcher for the New York Federal Reserve, Went Columbia Business School, and past Financial Expert for Washington Post, August 21 2019, “3 out of 4 economists predict a U.S. recession by 2021, survey finds” Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/08/19/out-economists-predict-us-recession-by-survey-finds/ DOA: January 21, 2019) SP “Most economists believe… into safer assets.” (Dylan Matthews, American Journalist who went to Harvard and has written for The Washington Post and Vox. Son of person who won 500k on Jeopardy, Aug 30, 2017, Vox. “Study: a universal basic income would grow the economy” https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/8/30/16220134/universal-basic-income-roosevelt-institute-economic-growth DOA: January 27 2019) SP “A universal basic … 4.7 million people.” (John Mauldin, financial writer, publisher, and New York Times bestselling-author, President of the investment advisory firm Millennium Wave Advisors, LLC. May 24, 2018. Forbes. "The 2020s Might Be The Worst Decade In U.S. History", https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnmauldin/2018/05/24/the-2020s-might-be-the-worst-decade-in-u-s-history/1#49cc3da548d3. DOA: July 22, 2019.) ALP “I recently wrote… this tightening cycle.” (Olivier Blanchard, Carlo Cottarelli, and Siddharth Tiwari, 03/14/2013, JOBS AND GROWTH: ANALYTICAL AND OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE FUND, https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/031413.pdf DOA: July 16, 2019) SCK “Following very weak .. of adverse shocks (UN, World Economic Situation and Prospects, 2013).”
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We negate. Contention one is Saudi Arabia Subpoint A is Nuclearization Knights writes in 2018 (Michael Knights, senior fellow of The Washington Institute, specializing in the military and security affairs of Iraq, Iran, and the Persian Gulf states. “U.S.-Saudi Security Cooperation (Part 1): Conditioning Arms Sales to Build Leverage.” November 5, 2018. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/u.s.-saudi-security-cooperation-part-1-conditioning-arms-sales-to-build-lev. DOA: 1/17/2019) DE The U.S.-Saudi strategic …… of U.S. armaments and related services strengthen the American defense industry and general economy. Troop pullout substantially damages our security commitments, Saab 18 confirms(Bilal Saab, Senior Fellow and Director of the defense and security program at the Middle East Institute and Adjunct Assistant Professor at Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program, 22 Aug 2018, “Relocating the Fifth Fleet?”, https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/08/22/relocating-the-fifth-fleet/ DOA 3/12/20)KJR Indeed, it’s impossible to overstate …… relationship with Washington. Significantly decreasing security commitments with Saudi Arabia could cause them to proliferate Brown 2017 (J. Wellington Brown, Major and intelligence offer at the USAF. “INDISPENSABLE NATION: US SECURITY GUARANTEES AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION” https://www.hsdl.org/?viewanddid=813351 2017. DoA April 1, 2020) JJ US extended deterrence undergirds …… wants to prevent forward proliferation movement. The impact is war The Senate committee on foreign relations finds in 08 (COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE, February 2008, “CHAIN REACTION: AVOIDING A NUCLEAR ARMS RACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST” https://fas.org/irp/congress/2008_rpt/chain.pdf DOA 2/19/19) MDS Of any Middle Eastern state, Saudi ……between Arab States and Israel. Subpoint B is a Saudi Civil War Losing security commitments would be a political disaster for the Saudi Royal family Luck 2018 finds (Taylor Luck, correspondent for the Washington Post and Christian Science Monitor. November 28, 2018. The Christian Science Monitor. “As US sours on young prince, old Saudi succession pot is stirred. Too late?” https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2018/1128/As-US-sours-on-young-prince-old-Saudi-succession-pot-is-stirred.-Too-late. DOA: February 3, 2019.) ALP Indeed, two days of mass protests in …… have fallen on deaf ears, Saudi sources say. The situation is ripe for conflict with many powerful actors in Saudi Arabia: Luck furthers (Taylor Luck, correspondent for the Washington Post and Christian Science Monitor. November 28, 2018. The Christian Science Monitor. “As US sours on young prince, old Saudi succession pot is stirred. Too late?” https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2018/1128/As-US-sours-on-young-prince-old-Saudi-succession-pot-is-stirred.-Too-late. DOA: February 3, 2019.) ALP Yet the prince has made few allies …… heir presumptive, not heir apparent.” A succession battle leads to a civil war Doran and Badran 2018 conclude (Michael Doran, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, and Tony Badran, research fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. November 21, 2018. The New York Times. “Trump Is Crude. But He’s Right About Saudi Arabia,” https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/21/opinion/trump-saudi-arabia-khashoggi.html. DOA: January 7, 2018.) ALP In all likelihood, sanctions would ……e another base, like Lebanon, for Iran Subpoint C is Qatar invasion The US security commitments allow them to restrain the Saudis Guzansky 2013 (Yoel Guzansky, fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies. Spring 2013. Middle East Quarterly. “Questioning Riyadh's Nuclear Rationale”, https://www.meforum.org/3512/saudi-arabia-pakistan-nuclear-weapon. DOA: January 17, 2019. ALP According to recent reports, Washington is …… because they have acted in secret previousl This applies specifically to Qatar, where the US’s relationship with Saudi Arabia is the only thing that has stopped an invasion Emmons 2018 finds(Alex Emmons, Reporter of National Affairs for The Intercept, August 1 2018, “SAUDI ARABIA PLANNED TO INVADE QATAR LAST SUMMER. REX TILLERSON’S EFFORTS TO STOP IT MAY HAVE COST HIM HIS JOB.” https://theintercept.com/2018/08/01/rex-tillerson-qatar-saudi-uae/ DOA: January 17, 2019) SP In the days and weeks after …… to be identified, citing concerns about his safety. There are two impacts. First is prolonging the Yemen war. Saudi Arabia can’t fund the Yemen war forever. Richard Wilson writes in 2016 (Richard Wilson, Writer for The Guardian, December 11 2016, “Saudi arms money is running out” https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/11/saudi-arms-money-is-running-out DOA: January 23,2019) SP Saudi Arabia is certainly fighting …… will be left penniless and exposed. Seizing Qatar allows Saudi Arabia to fill in that gap, Emmons 2018 continues (Alex Emmons, Reporter of National Affairs for The Intercept, August 1 2018, “SAUDI ARABIA PLANNED TO INVADE QATAR LAST SUMMER. REX TILLERSON’S EFFORTS TO STOP IT MAY HAVE COST HIM HIS JOB.” https://theintercept.com/2018/08/01/rex-tillerson-qatar-saudi-uae/ DOA: January 17, 2019) SP In response, the government …… to recoup billions in assets for government use. The Yemen war is devastating. Al Jazeera 2018 explains (Al Jazeera, 25 March 2018, “Key facts about the war in Yemen”, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/key-facts-war-yemen-160607112342462.html DOA: January 7 2019 ) SP Civilian casualties in Yemen are high. …… often must cope with a lack of food and in Second is losing Syrian diplomacy. Qatar is key to regional negotiations. Pelayo 2018 finds (Joze M. Pelayo, Writer for International Policy Digest, 19 April 2018, “Doha’s Diplomatic Potential in Syria” https://intpolicydigest.org/2018/04/19/doha-s-diplomatic-potential-in-syria/ DOA: 1/17/19) SP As Syria enters a new phase that borderlines ……settlements to regional crises such as the one in Syria. And Pelayo furthers (Joze M. Pelayo, Writer for International Policy Digest, 19 April 2018, “Doha’s Diplomatic Potential in Syria” https://intpolicydigest.org/2018/04/19/doha-s-diplomatic-potential-in-syria/ DOA: 1/17/19) SP Where is the US in all this? …… Sovereign Wealth Fund as Leverage in Syria and Elsewhere Stopping the crisis is imperative. Specia writes in 2018 (Megan Specia, Story Editor for International Desk of the New York Times. Published 4-13-18. “How Syria’s Death Toll is Lost in the fog of war”, New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/13/world/middleeast/syria-death-toll.html. DOA January 17 2019) JG In seven years, the …… framework of that nation’s reconciliation process.
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====Russia building defense against US==== LeVine 18 (Steve LeVine, a Senior Fellow at The Atlantic Council, teaches energy security at Georgetown University. Aug 5 2018. "Inside Russia's invasion of the U.S. electric grid" Axios. https://www.axios.com/russia-united-states-cyber-war-electric-power-grid-cb71f036-1ccc-47a2-93b7-fe4220e36622.html. DOA: Oct 30 2019) SRW "Since 2015, the Russian government has been clear that it has wanted a AND election hacking. They want the option of doing something back. ? ====Russia views US cyber operations as undermining Russia==== Cheravitch 19 (Joe Cheravitch, a defense analyst with the Rand Corporation. July 22 2019. "Cyber threats from the US and Russia are now focusing on civilian infrastructure" TechCrunch. https://techcrunch.com/2019/07/22/cyber-threats-from-the-u-s-and-russia-are-now-focusing-on-civilian-infrastructure/. DOA: Oct 30 2019) SRW Nonetheless, events since 2016 reflect a convergence of the two factors. While the AND of psychological and technical operations that differs from most Western concepts. ? ====Russia thinks that Western influence is a threat which leads to cyber escalation==== Kostyuk et al 18(Nadiya Kostyuk a Fellow for the Cybersecurity Project at the Belfer Center, Scott Powell a former Army officer and 2005 graduate of the United States Military Academy, Matt Skach a PhD candidate in the Department of Computer Science and Engineering at the University of Michigan, and a combat engineer in the 1433rd Engineering Company of the Michigan Army National Guard, The Cyber Defense Review, Spring 2018, "Determinants of the Cyber Escalation Latter", https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26427380 // DOA: 10/18/19) JDE "Potential adversaries such as Russia and China have similar views on the escalation ladder AND China's escalation ladders is a crucial step for future research on this topic." ==== ==== ====Russia views the West as a threat they will react to US aggression which is proven empirically==== Lake 18 (Eli Lake, a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering national security and foreign policy. He was the senior national security correspondent for the Daily Beast and covered national security and intelligence for the Washington Times, the New York Sun and UPI, Bloomberg Opinion, February 28 2018, "Why Trump Is Reluctant to Escalate the Cyber War With Russia" https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-02-28/cyber-war-with-russia-might-not-end-well-for-the-u-s // DOA: 10/19/19)JDE "Finally, there is the very real prospect of escalation. Columbia University researcher AND keeps records of U.S. security clearances, among other things." ==== ==== ====Russia is likely to overreact to OCOs and misinterpret==== Greenberg 19 (Andy Greenberg, a senior writer for WIRED, covering security, privacy, information freedom, and hacker culture, WIRED, June 18 2019, "How Not To Prevent a Cyberwar With Russia", https://www.wired.com/story/russia-cyberwar-escalation-power-grid/ // DOA: 10/21/19)JDE "One very plausible miscalculation would be if US Cyber Command were to penetrate Russian AND is probably what's happening here, are very hard to disentangle.'" ==== ==== ====Russia is advantaged in a cyber war==== Greenberg continues (Andy Greenberg, a senior writer for WIRED, covering security, privacy, information freedom, and hacker culture, WIRED, June 18 2019, "How Not To Prevent a Cyberwar With Russia", https://www.wired.com/story/russia-cyberwar-escalation-power-grid/ // DOA: 10/21/19)JDE "But former White House cybersecurity officials caution against that cyberwar hawkishness. "The AND doused in gasoline, don't start a match-throwing contest.'" ==== ==== ====Russian hacking targets US infrastructure==== Smith 18 (Don C. Smith, Editor for the Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law at the University of Denver. September 24, 2018 "Enhancing cybersecurity in the energy sector: a critical priority," Taylor and Francis Online, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02646811.2018.1516362. DOA: 10/22/19) NK While only several years ago the thought that a cyberattack could disable an electricity system AND of adverse shocks (UN, World Economic Situation and Prospects, 2013). ==== ==== ====OCOs decrease nuclear deterrence because it lacks transparency==== Lindsay 19 (Jon R. Lindsay, Assistant Professor of Digital Media and Global Affairs. June 20, 2019. "Cyber Operations and Nuclear Weapons," Nautilus Institute, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/cyber-operations-and-nuclear-weapons/. DOA: 10/14/19) NK The nuclear and cyber domains have markedly different informational characteristics. The basic strategic facts AND of power and resolve is a potential source for bargaining failure and war. ==== ==== ====Nuclear and cyber capabilities lead to a new doomsday situation==== Lindsay furthers (Jon R. Lindsay, Assistant Professor of Digital Media and Global Affairs. June 20, 2019. "Cyber Operations and Nuclear Weapons," Nautilus Institute, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/cyber-operations-and-nuclear-weapons/. DOA: 10/14/19) NK The interaction between cyber operations and nuclear weapons is a complex problem. The complexity AND million people dead and injured within the first few hours of the conflict."
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We affirm. Contention 1 is conflict resolution There are two scenarios in which withdrawal is necessary: Scenario 1 is preventing the US-Iran Conflict Coronavirus opens up the risk of a military confrontation more severe than ever before Kaye three week ago confirms U.S.-Iran escalation. Both sides may be tempted to view the crisis as an opportunity to double down on previous actions that contribute to conflict. The Trump administration continues to pursue its maximum pressure approach despite the lack of strategic results and the fissures it has created with Europe and other allies. Reports suggest that some in the administration seek to use the COVID-19 crisis to capitalize on Iran's increased vulnerability to force Iran to the negotiation table. For their part, Iranian leaders gave up on “strategic patience” after a year of adhering to the Iran nuclear deal following the U.S. withdrawal from the agreement in May 2018, finding the strategy brought little economic relief from Europe or Asia. Instead, Iran began to exact a cost for U.S. maximum pressure policies by targeting oil tankers and facilities, as well as U.S. military assets and personnel. With continued escalation in the months following the killing of General Qasem Soleimani, Iran and its militia partners may perceive COVID-19 as an opportunity to attack American forces with less risk of retaliation as they attempt to drive the United States out of Iraq. The result is that both sides may see advantages to escalation, producing a classic security dilemma that risks an even greater military conflict than either side desires. The distraction from counterterrorism efforts as relations with the Iraqi government remain strained is also a trend likely to continue as the added distraction of a global pandemic shifts priorities. A US pullout is necessary to stabilize, it prevents the next lethal attack Lubold at the beginning of THIS MONTH reports that U.S. intelligence out of the Middle East suggests that Iran or Iran-backed forces are is planning a potentially serious attack against U.S. military personnel in Iraq, said officials monitoring the information. “We’ve been seeing something brewing and developing pretty seriously,” a U.S. official said Wednesday. The intelligence has mounted over a two-week period, officials said. “We expect something soon,” the official said. Shiite militias such as Kataib Hezbollah have been targeting U.S. troops in Iraq in recent weeks with a series of rocket attacks. Two Americans and a British soldier were killed in a missile attack in March at Camp Taji, an Iraqi base where coalition troops are stationed. “Upon information and belief, Iran or its proxies are planning a sneak attack on U.S. troops and/or assets in Iraq. If this happens, Iran will pay a very heavy price, indeed!” 12:05 PM - Apr 1, 2020 Twitter Ads info and privacy While the rocket attacks in general are considered to be intended as harassment, the new potential attack is thought to be more ominous, the U.S. official said. President Trump took note of the threat in a Twitter post on Wednesday, accusing Iran of planning an attack and warning of consequences. “Upon information and belief, Iran or its proxies are planning a sneak attack on U.S. troops and/or assets in Iraq,” Mr. Trump wrote. The withdrawal of US forces prevents Iran’s attack from being the first domino in this escalatory spiral. Vanden-Brook 20 explains that “They were trying to kill equipment and housing,” Quantock said. “They signaled the attack and knew we were watching. Through technical means, we would know that they were fueling missiles and positioning them. They also knew the Iraqis would tell us.” Second attack:Pentagon launched second attack on an Iranian militant the same day it killed Soleimani Deaths would have sparked retaliation But if what Pompeo and other officials are now asserting is true – that Iran ordered a lethal strike – the U.S. was a lot closer to war this week than many people assumed. Given time to shelter in bunkers, on U.S. forces across Iraq withstood the attack by more than a dozen ballistic missiles. Iran’s goal was to destroy several aircraft and perhaps a munitions bunker that could generate a spectacular explosion, Quantock said. Had any Americans died, a strike on the Iranian bases that launched the missiles almost certainly would have been the Pentagon's next move, he said. “Now you’re hitting Iran proper,” he said. “That ups the ante substantially.” Trump's war powers:House votes to limit President Trump's war powers after Soleimani killing On Friday, U.S. officials reported Iraq was quiet. And it may remain so for some time, Quantock said, but it's hardly over. “This is phase one of their response,” he said. Thomas Warrick, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, pointed to Iran's "peculiar sense of symmetry" when it comes to its international views and taking action against the U.S. "What we or our allies do to them, they do back to us, not exactly in the same way, but in a similar way," he said during a panel discussion Thursday. "This in fact makes Iran much more predictable than I think many people opining on these issues tries to say." While experts agreed further military strikes from Tehran were unlikely, Warrick pointed to comments by President Hassan Rouhani and the Islamic Republic's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who have both said Iran's strategic objective is to drive U.S. forces from the region. How Iran plans to achieve that goal is less clear. Trump-Trudeau:Downing of Ukrainian airliner Iran could draw Trump and Trudeau together 'Blood for blood' Iran, as Trump noted, may be standing down. For now. Quantock said he expected two more waves of attacks in the coming weeks and months. The next threat comes from the Iranian-backed militias whose rocket attacks killed an American contractor on Dec. 27 near Erbil. They also laid siege to the U.S Embassy in Iraq. Soleimani had firm control over their actions, but his successor is expected to have less influence. They held Soleimani in high regard and will seek vengeance. “Blood for blood,” Quantock said. “Likely mortars or rocket attacks. Damage, explosions and casualties.” Such proxy forces, long fostered by Soleimani, poses greater risks of renewed conflict with Iran because the Trump administration has been quicker than prior administrations to blame Tehran for attacks by regional militia groups, CSIS's Brewer said. Iran sanctions:Trump administration hits Iran with new economic sanctions The most recent spate of tensions between Washington and Tehran came after Pompeo blamed Iran for attacks on Saudi oil refineries in September that disrupted 5 of the world's global oil supply. Yemen's Iranian-backed Houthi rebels claimed responsibility for the strikes, but Pompeo insisted Iran was behind the attacks. Trump responded by imposing harsher sanctions on the Islamic Republic. Finally, the Quds Force that Soleimani led has international reach, creating risks for U.S. embassies and personnel around the world Such a response would be devastating, as Ostovar 20 This might not be the end of American retaliation, but if it is, then it was designed to be limited. By comparison, the U.S. strikes in late December hit Kata’ib Hezbollah bases, resulting in dozens of deaths. Kata’ib Hezbollah’s leader and his Iranian benefactor were also assassinated a week later. Either way, the U.S. response probably fits right into the aims of Kata’ib Hezbollah and Iran. They have more Iraqi deaths and destruction to fuel their effort to expel U.S. forces from the country. They also have cause to respond further, if they wish, in order bait the U.S. into additional aggressive acts on Iraqi soil. Yet, doing so would compel the U.S. to respond in kind, and the cycle of escalation would continue toward certain conflict. Second, troop pullout is necessary for long term stability There are two impacts: Impact 1 is US-Iran war. Ward 19 quantifies that it A US-Iran war would likely lead to thousands or hundreds of thousands of dead. Trying to forcibly remove the country’s leadership, experts say, might drive that total into the millions. That helps explain why nations in the region hope they won’t see a fight. Goldenberg, who traveled recently to meet with officials in the Gulf, said that none of them wanted a US-Iran war. European nations will also worry greatly about millions of refugees streaming into the continent, which would put immense pressure on governments already dealing with the fallout of the Syrian refugee crisis. Israel also would worry about Iranian proxies targeting it (more on that below) Impact 2 is humanitarian aid Even if tensions doesn’t escalate to war, preventing them are still critical Smith 20 Vital humanitarian work in Iraq has been halted by the ongoing conflict between the United States and Iran, stopping thousands of refugees and residents in war-torn areas from receiving aid. Oxfam, which works in some of the hardest-to-reach areas of Iraq, said it had stopped delivering aid in the form of cash to three locations there since Iran’s missile strike Wednesday in retaliation for the killing of Gen. Qassem Soleimani in a U.S. drone strike last week. Oxfam said that if the resulting heightened security concerns, checkpoints and travel difficulties continue, some 100,000 people could be affected. The stark warning comes as voices in Iraq and in the international community call for the fight against the Islamic State militant group in Iraq to resume, after the U.S.-led coalition dedicated to fighting the terrorists switched its attention to protecting U.S. bases after Soleimani’s death. Trump backs away from conflict with Iran, but tensions remain high JAN. 9, 202002:08 “As far as possible, we will try to keep our humanitarian work going with our partners around the country,” said Oxfam’s country director in Iraq, Andres Gonzalez Rodriguez. “However, we have had to relocate some staff and we are keeping all our staff, partners and work under close observation due to the heightened security concerns.” Gonzalez said that a large part of the charity’s work in the country involves helping the 1.5 million people still displaced internally by the war against ISIS. In total, an estimated 5.3 million were forced from their homes during the struggle but not all have returned. With 13 local partners. Oxfam operates 26 programs in five Iraqi governates — Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewa, Anbar and Salahaddin — specializing in sanitation, emergency food, gender programs and helping shield civilians from violence. Oxfam’s seven offices are currently closed and all 250 staff are working from home to avoid traveling. “All parties to this conflict are obliged to work hard to de-escalate the crisis and to build peace in order to spare the Middle East region further humanitarian suffering,” Gonzalez said. Scenario 2 is create long term multilateralism in the region Hazbun 19 explains that when Teir efforts collapsed in the face of the 2013 military coup in Egypt. More broadly, a Saudi-led counter-revolution sought to shore up authoritarian governments, expand domestic divisions along sectarian 17 THEORIZING STRUCTURAL CHANGE lines, and foster of civil wars in Syria, Yemen, and Libya. As Qatar scaled back its regional interventions, Turkey found its interests reorganized as the increasing autonomy of Kurdish actors, some backed by the US in an effort to contain ISIS, became its most pressing concern. While aligned with the US and benefiting from the US security umbrella anchored by its bases around the Gulf, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have attempted to organize the region through aggressive diplomatic and military interventions as well as financial support to allied regimes and proxies. Saudi Arabia has long sought to project regional influence, but its flows of cash, intelligence cooperation, and diplomacy have previously only had a marginal impact reshaping regional order. With the US under Obama no longer providing regional leadership, it’s policies diverged from Saudi priorities, such as allowing the fall of Mubarak in Egypt and negotiating a nuclear deal with Iran. Saudi Arabia (with UAE support) then sought to act as a regional hegemon though without the needed regional power and consent. They backed rebel factions in Syria and escalated the conflict. After their effort to manage the post-Uprising transition in Yemen failed, they launched, with US support, an ineffective war against the Houthi rebels, which has resulted in a humanitarian disaster. The Trump administration aligned itself more enthusiastically with the Saudi-UAE axis. Saudi efforts, despite this American support, have done little to establish a new regional order or contain Iranian influence. Rather than embracing Qatar’s post-2013 shift away from an activist regional policy and attempt to rebuild GCC consensus policymaking, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have repeatedly sought to coerce Qatar into accepting a subservient role, resulting in the total fragmentation of the GCC as a regional organization. In past decades the US often sought to restrain Israel’s most aggressive actions and/or worked to re-stabilize regional politics in their aftermath. Closer Saudi strategic alignment with Israel and backing by US president Trump has resulted in less restraint on regional actions. This posture sets up a context for continuing instability and a greater likelihood of conflict and escalation. On the other hand, the lack of the security guarantee pushed Saudi Arabia to the table for talks Parsi 20 confirms that Yet when U.S. President Donald Trump opted not to go to war with Iran after a series of Iranian-attributed attacks on Saudi Arabia last year and declared his intentions to pull troops out of the region, it wasn’t chaos or conquest that ensued. Rather, nascent regional diplomacy—particularly among Iran and Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—and de-escalation followed. To be sure, the cards were reshuffled again in January, when Trump ordered the assassination of Qassem Suleimani, one of Iran’s most important military figures. Courtesy of Trump, the region is once more moving toward conflict, and the early signs of diplomatic progress achieved during the preceding months have vanished. It is thus time for Washington to answer a crucial question that it has long evaded: Has America’s military dominance in the Middle East prevented regional actors from peacefully resolving conflicts on their own? And in that way, has it been an impediment to stability rather than the guarantor of it? No diplomacy risks escalation into war Harb 2019 One thing is sure, however: peaceful co-existence can only work if Tehran scales down its interference in the affairs of Arab states and Riyadh accepts that Iran also has a say in regional issues. Iran should not expect to be allowed to continue controlling the fates of Iraq and Lebanon through affiliated militias or supporting the Houthis in their assault on Yemen's legitimate authority. It should also understand that it cannot re-join the regional system while insisting on supporting the thuggish regime of Syria's Bashar al-Assad. Reciprocally, Saudi Arabia must understand that Iran is of the region and that it cannot simply be excluded from the region's development. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia's apparent eagerness to de-escalate the situation following the October 11 attack on an Iranian tanker is perhaps the most significant sign yet that the two regional rivals are finally ready for a rapprochement. Peaceful co-existence, however, is difficult and requires the will to talk and compromise. If either party shows reluctance to change its ways, the region will continue to live with the possibility of a war that could make all past wars look minor in comparison. Contention two is terrorism Mylroie 20 reports that currently, WASHINGTON DC (Kurdistan 24) – On Sunday, the US-led Coalition against the Islamic State have announced that it was suspendeding operations against the terrorist group to focus on ensuring the security of the military bases in Iraq from which its troops operate. The threat to those bases has dramatically increased following Friday’s assassination of Qasim Soleimani, head of Iran’s paramilitary Quds Force, along with Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, deputy head of the Iraqi militias, collectively known as the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). Muhandis was a long-time ally of Iran, going back to the 1980s and the war with Iraq that followed that country’s 1979 revolution. In 1983, the US and French embassies in Kuwait were bombed, as part of Iran’s campaign against countries aligned with Iraq. A Kuwaiti court subsequently sentenced Muhandis to death in absentia for his role in the attack. “Our first priority is protecting all Coalition personnel committed to the defeat of Da’esh,” a statement issued on Sunday by the Coalition, formally known as Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR), stated. “Repeated rocket attacks over the last two months by elements of Kata’ib Hizbollah have caused the death of Iraqi Security Forces personnel and a US civilian,” it said. Muhandis, in addition to his post as deputy head of the PMF, also led Kata’ib Hizbollah. “As a result,” the CJTF-OIR statement affirmed, “we are now fully committed to protecting the Iraqi bases that host Coalition troops.” “This has limited ourtheir capacity to conduct training with partners and to support their operations against ISIS Da’esh,” it continued, and “we have paused these activities, subject to continuous review.” NATO conducts a separate training mission of Iraqi forces, and on Saturday, it announced that it was suspending that training. Read More: NATO suspends training in Iraq following Qasim Soleimani killing: spokesperson Another complicating factor is the vote of the Iraqi parliament late on Sunday, when it approved a draft bill, calling for an end to the presence of foreign troops in Iraq. Critically, the remaining US military presence that is defending the bases only worsens terrorism due to the anti-us sentiment they foster. This has proven to be empirically true, as Thrall and Goepner 17 quantify “To investigate the impact of U.S. military intervention, we compared the terror rates between War on Terror states, other Muslim majority countries, the United States, and the global average. Additionally, we created regression models to examine the significance, if any, of U.S. military strikes when controlling for other variables often used in the study of terrorism such as a state’s GDP per capita, economic growth rate, social fractionalization, polity, and education levels (see Appendix 1). As Table 2 reveals, the number of terror attacks rose an astonishing 1,900 percent in the seven countries that the United States either invaded or conducted air strikes in, while other Muslim majority states saw a much more modest 42 percent increase. The regression models also found that countries where the United States conducted air or drone strikes saw a dramatic increase in terror attacks compared to countries where the United States did not conduct strikes.50 Even more startling, the models showed the greatest effect when comparing drone strikes conducted in year one with the number of terror attacks carried out two years later, a finding consistent with the theory that U.S. strikes have a catalyzing effect on terror groups. In short, contrary to the intentions of the U.S. government, as the War on Terror has expanded, it has led to greater levels of terrorism.” Thrall and Goepner 17 identifies the root cause as anti-american sentiment explaining that, “Finally, the third possible interpretation of the data is that the War on Terror inadvertently fueled more anti-American terrorism. The argument here is that, had the United States conducted a limited intervention to disrupt al Qaeda, withdrawn quickly from Afghanistan, and not invaded Iraq, many, if not most, of the post-9/11 attacks would not have taken place. Without an ongoing American presence and an active military campaign helping to further radicalize and motivate potential jihadists, observers point out, it is reasonable to expect that there would have been far less incentive for al Qaeda and related groups to attack the United States. Further, had the United States not invaded Iraq, it is doubtful that ISIS would even exist.46 This is not to argue that al Qaeda and ISIS would not still have some desire to strike at American targets even if the United States were not active in the Middle East, but as noted above, it is clear that the Islamic State, at least, is using the American presence in the Middle East as a justification for anti-American terrorism. If nothing else, continued American military action in the Middle East ensures that ISIS will remain highly visible in the news and in the minds of Americans, providing potential lone wolves in the United States inspiration to carry out future attacks.” Which is why Thrall and Goepner 17 concludes that “Our analysis, however, clearly illustrates that the United States should rule out both the step-up option and the steady-on option. Neither ISIS nor the broader problem of Islamist-inspired terrorism represents enough of a threat to justify an expansive, aggressive, and costly series of overseas campaigns. Even under Obama, the "light footprint" approach continued to put thousands of Americans at risk carrying out nation building and terrorist killing missions that produce more problems than they solve, all at enormous financial cost. Instead, the United States should take a step back from the fight. Though we do not attempt here to consider all of the potential strategies or tactics, we argue that the right general direction for the United States is to reduce the level of military intervention, suspend efforts at nation building, and end direct efforts to dictate political outcomes in the Middle East. This approach would seek to reduce the incentive for anti-American terrorism by disengaging from what are primarily civil wars in the Middle East. Although the eventual details will depend on many factors, the Trump administration should embrace four main recommendations as it rethinks U.S. strategy:” By ending the root cause we significantly decrease terrorism as a whole as Greenwald 13 “Second, it's crucial to understand this causation because it's often asked "what can we do to stop Terrorism?" The answer is right in front of our faces: we could stop embracing the polices in that part of the world which fuel anti-American hatred and trigger the desire for vengeance and return violence. Yesterday at a Senate hearing on drones, a young Yemeni citizen whose village was bombed by US drones last week (despite the fact that the targets could easily have been arrested), Farea Al-Muslimi, testified. Al-Muslimi has always been pro-American in the extreme, having spent a year in the US due to a State Department award, but he was brilliant in explaining these key points: "Just six days ago, my village was struck by a drone, in an attack that terrified thousands of simple, poor farmers. The drone strike and its impact tore my heart, much as the tragic bombings in Boston last week tore your hearts and also mine. "What radicals had previously failed to achieve in my village one drone strike accomplished in an instant: there is now an intense anger and growing hatred of America." He added that anti-American hatred is now so high as a result of this drone strike that "I personally don't even know if it is safe for me to go back to Wessab because I am someone who people in my village associate with America and its values." And he said that whereas he never knew any Yemenis who were sympathetic to al-Qaida before the drone attacks, now: "AQAP's power and influence has never been based on the number of members in its ranks. AQAP recruits and retains power through its ideology, which relies in large part on the Yemeni people believing that America is at war with them" . . . "I have to say that the drone strikes and the targeted killing program have made my passion and mission in support of America almost impossible in Yemen. In some areas of Yemen, the anger against America that results from the strikes makes it dangerous for me to even acknowledge having visited America, much less testify how much my life changed thanks to the State Department scholarships. It's sometimes too dangerous to even admit that I have American friends." He added that drone strikes in Yemen "make people fear the US more than al-Qaida".”
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New technology replacing jobs threatens to create mass unemployment Murray 16 (Charles Murray, the W.H. Brady Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, WSJ, June 3 2016, “A Guaranteed Income for Every American”, https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-guaranteed-income-for-every-american-1464969586 // DOA: 1/21/20)JDE “Exactly how bad ... by ordinary citizens.” WIthout jobs funding for social welfare is threatened Straubhaar 17(Thomas Straubhaar, Swiss economist and professor at the University of Hamburg, March-April 2017, “On the Economics of a Universal Basic Income”, Intereconomics, https://archive.intereconomics.eu/year/2017/2/on-the-economics-of-a-universal-basic-income/ DOA 01/09/20) KG nowadays, one of the ...been reduced or eliminated...11 Universal basic income solves in two ways 1. entrepreneurship when workers are displaced by automation, a UBI encourages starting businesses and becoming self employed This is empirically proven as Santens 2016 (Scott Santens, Writer for Medium; Citizen of Earth and New Orleans; Bachelor of Science in Psychology, “Universal Basic Income Will Accelerate Innovation by Reducing Our Fear of Failure”, Nov 30, 2016, https://medium.com/basic-income/universal-basic-income-will-accelerate-innovation-by-reducing-our-fear-of-failure-b81ee65a254 DOA: January 27, 2019) SP If everyone received ...minimum amount of buying power. 2. retraining UBi provides workers with a safety net to find a new job and train for a job in the new world Hoynes and Rothstein 2018 (Hilary Hoynes, University of California Berkeley, Jesse Rothstein, University of California, Berkeley. August 15, 2018. “Universal Basic Income in the US and Advanced Countries” Berkley. https://gspp.berkeley.edu/assets/uploads/research/pdf/Hoynes-Rothstein-UBI-081518.pdf. DOA: 1/31/20)AO Second, a UBI ... to longer run. Without the UBI the displacement would be severe and permanent Dillow 2017 (Dillow C, Rainwater B. Why *Free Money Could Be the Future of Work. Fortune. 2017;176(1):68-76. http://search.ebscohost.com.ezp1.lib.umn.edu/login.aspx?direct=trueandAuthType=ip,uidanddb=buhandAN=123750049andsite=ehost-live.) What's different about... but the top earners. This is crucial because millions are at risk Associated Press 2019 ( Associated Press, American not-for-profit news agency headquartered in New York City.Jan 24, 2019 “Over 30 million U.S. workers will lose their jobs because of AI,”Market Watch, https://www.marketwatch.com/story/ai-is-set-to-replace-36-million-us-workers-2019-01-24. DOA: 1/31/20)AO Robots aren’t replacing ...author of the report. The implication is critical as Indrawati 17 (Sri Mulyani Indrawati, Chief Operating Officer and Managing Director at the World Bank, Huffington Post, Dec 6 2017, “Jobs - The Fastest Road Out Of Poverty”, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/jobs~-~~-~-the-fastest-road-o_b_10404594 // DOA: 1/25/20)JDE “Good jobs are ... employment for the poor.” C2) reversing recession’s course If we continue our current trajectory, the US will face severe economic harms Marte 2019 (Jonnelle Marte, Economics Researcher for the New York Federal Reserve, Went Columbia Business School, and past Financial Expert for Washington Post, August 21 2019, “3 out of 4 economists predict a U.S. recession by 2021, survey finds” Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/08/19/out-economists-predict-us-recession-by-survey-finds/ DOA: January 21, 2019) SP Most economists believe ... piling into safer assets. The economy is on track for recession as consumer spending and employment decrease Isidore 2019 (Chris Isidore, senior writer for CNN Business. August 21, 2019. “Is a recession coming? Here's how to tell” CNN. https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/21/economy/consumer-spending-recession/index.html. DOA: 1/31/20)AO "The consumer drives ...consumer is more cautious." Consumer spending is crucial for the economy Cohan 2019 (Peter Cohan, MIT and Wharton Grad, World renowned author who has written a bunch of econ books, received the Gold Award in the 2013 Council for Advancement and Support of Education (CASE) District II Accolades Awards program, February 26, 2019, “How Spiking Income Inequality Will Cause The Next Recession” Forbes https://www.forbes.com/sites/petercohan/2019/02/26/how-spiking-income-inequality-will-cause-the-next-recession/#1f005ac74ccc DOA: January 19, 2019) SP I think spiking income...spending, and demand. Having a universal basic income is crucial for increasing consumer spending in two ways 1. Increasing jobs and wages Job security means an increased ability to spend with stable wages Amadeo 2019 (Kimberly Amadeo, writer for the balance. Published 12-13-2019, "Should Everyone Get a Guaranteed Income?," Balance, https://www.thebalance.com/universal-basic-income-4160668. DOA January 4 2019) GKH An unconditional basic... during a recession. 2. Increasing spending cash Having a UBI gives people extra cash and flexibility in their spending Santens 2016 (Scott Santens, Writer for Medium; Citizen of Earth and New Orleans; Bachelor of Science in Psychology, “Universal Basic Income Will Accelerate Innovation by Reducing Our Fear of Failure”, Nov 30, 2016, https://medium.com/basic-income/universal-basic-income-will-accelerate-innovation-by-reducing-our-fear-of-failure-b81ee65a254 DOA: January 27, 2019) SP If everyone received ...amount of buying power. A recession would go global as Mauldin 2018 finds that a (John Mauldin, financial writer, publisher, and New York Times bestselling-author, President of the investment advisory firm Millennium Wave Advisors, LLC. May 24, 2018. Forbes. "The 2020s Might Be The Worst Decade In U.S. History", https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnmauldin/2018/05/24/the-2020s-might-be-the-worst-decade-in-u-s-history/1#49cc3da548d3. DOA: July 22, 2019.) ALP I recently wrote ... this tightening cycle. This is crucial as the IMF quantifies that, (Olivier Blanchard, Carlo Cottarelli, and Siddharth Tiwari, 03/14/2013, JOBS AND GROWTH: ANALYTICAL AND OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE FUND, https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/031413.pdf DOA: July 16, 2019) SCK Following very weak ... in the face of adverse shocks (UN, World Economic Situation and Prospects, 2013). Thus, we affirm
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0 - GENERAL INFO
Contact Info: Sahil Chiniwala, 1st Speaker [email protected] Shabbir Bohri, 2nd Speaker [email protected] Shabbir Bohri on FB Disclosure Info: We'll disclose our contentions or main arguments after we've broken them at a tournament on this wiki, if you need an email chain or disclosure on pf.circuitdebater.org just ask and we can make that work. We read our cases paraphrased, but do not put those versions on the wiki. Instead, we will have, for each contention, every card we read, along with its individual tagline, full citation, url, and first/last sentence. This just helps to improve evidence ethics without risking people reading our cases word for word. We urge that everyone discloses and will ask teams for disclosure before round. If we are reading disclosure theory at a particular tournament, we will disclose broken interps directly after the round we read them in, and continue to give teams a chance to disclose before the round starts. We will hopefully never have to resort to it unless there are clear violations of evidence standards and ethics.
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2 - SEPTOCT - Grids
Lack of grid connectivity a barrier to renewable energy development Dorcas Kariuki, Energy Today, "Barriers to Renewable Energy Technologies Development", January 25, 2018, https://www.energytoday.net/economics-policy/barriers-renewable-energy-technologies-development/ "On the other hand, lack of physical facilities ... reliable and readily available." GEI uses power grids to provide even distant and poor areas with renewable energy Phillip Cornell, Atlantic Council, "Energy governance and China’s bid for global grid integration - Atlantic Council", May 30, 2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/energy-governance-and-china-s-bid-for-global-grid-integration/ "Energy projects have always ... last three five-year plans" GEI investment will exceed 7 trillion, create 200 million new jobs in Europe Jing Shuiyu, China Daily, "BRI energy investment to hit $27 trillion by 2050 - World - Chinadaily.com.cn", April 27, 2019, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201904/27/WS5cc3ef61a3104842260b8bba.html "Investment in energy ... the agreements will help," The Strait Times in 2019 EU won't meet its goal for renewables by 2020 or 2030, needs more solar renewables and infrastructure The Strait Times, The Strait Times, "France among members putting EU 2020 renewables target at risk, Europe News and Top Stories - The Straits Times", June 6, 2019, https://www.straitstimes.com/world/europe/france-among-members-putting-eu-2020-renewables-target-at-risk "France is one of six ... investment in grid infrastructure," 1.3 billion at risk of poverty and hunger in the developing world because of effects of climate change Emma Schwartz, Mercy Corps, "How Climate Change Affects Poverty | Mercy Corps", August 13, 2019, https://www.mercycorps.org/articles/climate-change-affects-poverty "Climate change threatens the ... than it is forming."
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3 - NOVDEC - Russia
Dilanian 18 Dilanian 18 finds (Ken Dilanian, 3-1-2018, "Under Trump, U.S. ramps up cyber offense against other countries," NBC News, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/under-trump-u-s-military-ramps-cyber-offensive-against-other-n1019281 ) With little public ... what that means. Donnelly 19 America losing cyberwar currently due to weak defense, makes president lean towards nuclear weapons more, risk is much higher John Donnelly, Roll Call, "America is woefully unprepared for cyber-warfare", July 11, 2019, https://www.rollcall.com/news/u-s-is-woefully-unprepared-for-cyber-warfare War in cyberspace ... with nuclear weapons. Rid 13 The US is susceptible right now in cyberspace (Thomas Rid, 2-4-2013, "Cyber Fail," New Republic, https://newrepublic.com/article/112314/obama-administrations-lousy-record-cyber-security ) And that has ... anyone to see. Healey 13 Problematically, funding allocated towards offensive cyber operations trades off with funding to defensive operations Healey 13 (Jason Healey,, 3-8-2013, "Obama's Cyberwarfare Strategy Will Backfire," US News andamp; World Report, https://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/03/08/clandestine-american-strategy-on-cyberwarfare-will-backfire ) America's generals and ... priorities as well. Our weak defense with OCOs has created escalation with Russia in 2 ways: First is Hacking Grids. Sanger 19 of NYT US planting malware in Russian grids David Sanger, The New York Times, "U.S. Escalates Online Attacks on Russia’s Power Grid - The New York Times", June 15, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/15/us/politics/trump-cyber-russia-grid.html Since at least ... code is activated. Ivan 19 Russia and US heading to cyberwar, Russia warns Ivan Nechepurenko, The New York Times, "Kremlin Warns of Cyberwar After Report of U.S. Hacking Into Russian Power Grid - The New York Times", June 17, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/17/world/europe/russia-us-cyberwar-grid.html The Kremlin warned ... Russia, Mr. Peskov said. Second is by Triggering an Arms Race. Ferrante 19 US OCOs have created an arms race Anthony Ferrante, The Hill, "Playing with fire: Global offensive cyber operations | TheHill", October 28, 2019, https://thehill.com/opinion/cybersecurity/467701-playing-with-fire-global-offensive-cyber-operations The current state ... failing to do. Doffman 19 Russia built RuNet as a RESPONSE to US OCOs, we escalate the situation Zak Doffman, Forbes, "Putin Now Has Russia’s Internet Kill Switch To Stop U.S. Cyberattacks", October 28, 2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2019/10/28/putin-now-has-russias-internet-kill-switch-to-stop-us-cyberattacks/#46de254b31b2 It has been ... protests, political campaigning. Vogler 17 Russia attacks with OCOs because of US' escalatory response Sarah Vogler, CNA, "Russia's Approach to Cyber Warfare", March 2017, https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/DOP-2016-U-014231-1Rev.pdf Offensive cyber operations ... escalatory in nature. 2 impacts: Rosen 18 of Brookings Cyberattacks cause financial instability Katheryn Rosen, Brookings, "The future of financial stability and cyber risk", October 10, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-future-of-financial-stability-and-cyber-risk/ In 2016, the ... provider might cascade. Forbes 19 Cybercrime = $6 trillion lost to world Rajinder Tumber, 1-5-19, "Cyber Attacks: Igniting The Next Recession?," Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/rajindertumber/2019/01/05/cyber-attacks-igniting-the-next-recession/#1f690539dbe4 I predict a ... the hard way. IMF 19 Global recession= 900 mil into pov Borgen Project, 4-11-2013, "IMF Study Shows Possible Consequences of Economic Recession," https://borgenproject.org/imf-study-shows-possible-consequences-of-economic-recession/ The International Monetary ... furloughs and losses. Second is Nuclear Conflict. Weinstein 19 https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2019/07/06/deter-russian-cyber-attack-cold-war-column/1587711001/ And finally, what ... guise of cybersecurity. Mizokami 19 Single nuke between Russia and US kills 335 millipn Kyle Mizokami, The National Interest, "335 Million Dead: If America Launched A Massive Nuclear War on Russia and China | The National Interest", March 28, 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/335-million-dead-if-america-launched-massive-nuclear-war-russia-and-china-49507 Overall, an all-out ... first seventy-two hours.
904,407
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379,379
1 - Disclosure Interp
Debaters must disclose all broken constructive positions on the NDCA 2019-2020 PF wiki after they are read in round. The disclosure must include a tag, citation, and the first and last 3 words of each piece of evidence they read originally written by another author.
904,436
365,335
379,389
2 - February - housing
open source
904,446
365,336
379,382
2 - Nocember - stock aff
open source
904,438
365,337
379,398
PTOC R4
open sourced
904,455
365,338
379,418
1- UK Neg third party market cooperation
Marnie Lao, 19' (Marnie Lao - "European bloc not considering joining China’s Belt and Road plans", euractiv, https://www.euractiv.com/section/eu-china/news/european-bloc-not-considering-joining-chinas-belt-and-road-plans/ )/MA The bloc decided AND and European legislation Duchatel, 19’ (Institut Montaigne - "Triple Win? China and Third-Market Cooperation", https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/blog/triple-win-china-and-third-market-cooperation )/MA States that have AND Space for ambiguity Xinhua, 19' (Xinhuanet - "Experts upbeat on third-party market Belt and Road cooperation", No Publication, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-04/28/c_138019427.htm )/MA third party market AND Japan and Portugal Ey 19’ (Ey - "Borderless win-win cooperation in building the Belt and Road", Ey, https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-china-overseas-investment-navigator-report-issue-3-en/$FILE/ey-china-overseas-investment-navigator-report-issue-3-en.pdf )/MA China and the UK AND third party countries Wong, 19' (Spencer A. Wong - "A Disunited Europe? The EU’s Response To China’s One Belt, One Road Initiative", Organization for World Peace, https://theowp.org/reports/a-disunited-europe-the-eus-response-to-chinas-one-belt-one-road-initiative/ )/MA Because the EU's AND economies remains difficult Mollie Saltskog 19, 2-17-2019, The Little-Known Security Gaps In China's Belt and Road Initiative, National Interest, a class="vglnk" href="https://nationalinterest.org/feature/little-known-security-gaps-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-44587" /CM China is increasingly AND or neighboring countries Elmer, 18' (Keegan Elmer - "EU envoys hit out at China’s ‘unfair’ Belt and Road plans", South China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2142698/eu-presents-nearly-united-front-against-chinas-unfair )/MA Twenty-Seven out of AND to Chinese Countries Horowitz, 19' (Julia Horowitz, Cnn Business - "Europe is sleepwalking its way to another lost decade", CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/18/business/europe-economy-lost-decade/index.html )/MA Europe just endured AND to break apart Elmer, 19' (Keegan Elmer - "How would a recession in the EU affect China’s economy?", South China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3003362/chinas-fragile-trade-economy-could-be-risk-eu-outlook-goes )/MA A recession in AND stimulate its economy Stupak, 18' (Jeffrey M. Stupak - "Economic Impact of Infrastructure Investment",CRS, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44896.pdf )/MA increased infrastructure spending AND begin work immediately Wen, 13' (Wen - "Impacts of the Euro sovereign debt crisis on global trade and economic growth: A General Equilibrium Analysis based on GTAP model", University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/download/6306.pdf )/MA The results show AND the euro zone Bruno, 10' (Gurtner, Bruno - "The Financial and Economic Crisis and Developing Countries", International Development Policy, https://journals.openedition.org/poldev/144 )/MA a fall in AND into absolute poverty
904,477
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2- Blue Key Neg Left of Launch
NOVDEC 1AC V1 Tournament: Blue Key | Round: 3 | Opponent: Strake Jesuit DK | Judge: Max Hardt Ackerman’18 Ackerman, 5-22-2018, "Revealed: Pentagon Push to Hack Nuke Missiles Before They Launch," Daily Beast, https://www.thedailybeast.com/revealed-pentagon-push-to-hack-nuke-missiles-before-they-launch, 10-30-2019 The Pentagon has embraced a controversial policy of destroying enemy nuclear missiles before they launch, an internal policy document from May 2017 shows. It’s an effort that appears to include executing cyberattacks against missile control systems or components. The Pentagon document does not name adversaries. But experts who reviewed it for The Daily Beast considered it aimed at North Korea—and may represent a fallback option for the Trump administration should its June 12 summit with Kim Jong Un fail to result in the denuclearization President Trump desires. Former State Department nonproliferation official Alexandra Bell called the Pentagon plan an “exercise to legally justify a potential attack on a North Korean missile on the launchpad.” Kingston Reif of the Arms Control Association added, “Like the overall U.S. missile defense effort, the intended role and purpose is North Korea, and possibly Iran, too.” For about four years, senior U.S. military officers have feared that the financial costs of developing interceptors to destroy incoming ballistic missiles could jeopardize a domestic missile shield. They’ve sought what’s called “left of launch” options to disable adversary missiles before they leave the launchpad. And they’ve intimated that a more cost-effective approach is to develop digital weapons to corrupt or disable launch controls, guidance systems or aspects of the missile supply chain. The unclassified document from May 2017, acquired by The Daily Beast, asserts that “pre-conflict left of launch operations” would be legal against an “imminent missile attack,” without defining “imminent.” It explicitly cites “non-kinetic options” for destroying missiles that would fall short of a “use of force” under the United Nations charter. “The document appears to be the first official confirmation that the U.S. reserves the right to infect adversary missile networks with disabling malware.” Missile experts who reviewed the document understood it as representing what appears to be the first official confirmation that the U.S. reserves the right to infect adversary missile networks with disabling malware. It appears to confirm a March 2017 New York Times report that the Pentagon was looking to add digital-network assaults to its antiballistic missile arsenal. “This looks to me like a very elaborate legal justification for left-of-launch cyberattacks,” said Bell, now with the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. ADVERTISING “This would certainly include cyberattacks on command-and-control or guidance of the missile,” agreed Vipin Narang, a nuclear strategy expert at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, as well as corresponding physical or digital efforts to preemptively corrupt an adversary’s missile supply chain. The Pentagon document, titled “Declaratory Policy, Concept of Operations and Employment Guidelines for Left-of-Launch Capability,” was acquired by Protect Democracy, a group founded mostly by Obama administration attorneys, through to a transparency lawsuit seeking internal material relevant to military planning about North Korea. The group provided it to The Daily Beast. That report, which Congress mandated during the final year of the Obama administration that the Pentagon issue, refers to cyberattacks euphemistically, rather than explicitly, in its unclassified form. A classified annex to the policy document is almost entirely redacted, but includes a brief reference to a “Special Program for Missile Defeat,” without elaboration. “Although left-of-launch actions that would constitute a use of force likely would require the President’s approval as an exercise of the inherent right of national or collective self-defense, certain actions would not necessarily constitute a use of force under the U.N. Charter, such as gathering intelligence or developing capabilities that could be used in response to an imminent attack,” the document reads. RELATED IN POLITICS Pompeo Drawn Deeper—Way Deeper—Into Ukraine Scandal "U.S. President Donald Trump makes a statement at the White House following reports that U.S. forces attacked Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in northern Syria, in Washington, U.S., October 27, 2019. REUTERS/Jim Bourg - RC121C00FD20" Trump Turns Baghdadi’s Killing Into a Reality Show Damning Trump Team Texts Detail Pressure Campaign on Ukraine The military term “kinetic” refers to a physically destructive or violent event. A kinetic strike in an anti-missile context is visible—an incoming missile heading for a launchpad—and an adversary will instantly figure out the missile’s return address. The strategic appeal of a “nonkinetic” cyberattack on missile infrastructure lies in its invisibility and the corresponding doubt it would presumably instill in an adversary over whether the missile infrastructure was sabotaged or merely technically flawed. “It’s a disruptive technology, the weaponization of which, along with other advanced missile concepts like offensive hypersonic weapons, are putting significant strain on strategic stability,” Reif said. All this, experts said, represents an evolution of so-called counterforce, a nuclear strategy that seeks to destroy enemy missiles. Strategists consider counterforce a particularly dangerous approach, as it risks incentivizing an adversary to use their nuclear missiles before the U.S. can target them. Additionally, a counterforce approach needs to identify and successfully target all adversary missiles—something that, as with North Korea’s highly opaque and mobile missile program, may not always be possible. “Counterforce had two components: disabling the adversary’s nuclear missile systems on the ground, coupled with a missile defense system that intercepts residual missiles... This is the unholy marriage of both.” — Vipin Narang “Counterforce has always had two components: disabling the adversary’s nuclear missile systems on the ground, coupled with a missile defense system that intercepts residual missiles that you miss in the early phase of a campaign,” Narang said. “This is the unholy marriage of both.” Added Reif of the Arms Control Association, “We can’t counterforce or missile defense our way out of vulnerability to North Korea. Left of launch blurs the line between offensive counterforce and missile defense.” Catherine Dill, a senior research associate at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, worried less about incentivizing an adversary missile launch than in accelerating a digital arms race tied to nuclear war. “If this is the declaratory policy of the United States, I’d worry that other states would try to match these capabilities. That’s where the escalatory potential is,” Dill said. In a 2014 memo, the chief officers of the Army and Navy warned that an “acquisition-based strategy” of purchasing interceptor missiles, the backbone of the domestic U.S. missile shield, was increasingly “unsustainable.” They called for a new strategy, they wrote, that “incorporates ‘left-of-launch’ and other non-kinetic means of defense.” That accelerated a search for “left of launch” options in defense circles—something Defense Secretary Jim Mattis described to Congress last month as a priority. “One of the primary efforts right now is in missile defense, for example. How do we take out missiles from the air, and do it a lot more cheaply then very expensive interceptor kill vehicles. We have to find a cheaper way to do this against a growing threat,” Mattis told a House panel on April 12. Preemptively disabling or destroying adversary missiles may soon become an urgent issue if next month’s massive nuclear summit with North Korea collapses. On June 12, Trump is scheduled to meet with North Korean dictator Kim in Singapore. While the administration initially raised expectations for ending Pyongyang’s nuclear program peacefully, North Korean officials have recently sent signals that no amount of U.S. inducement can cleave Kim from a nuclear arsenal bequeathed to him by his father and grandfather. Trump has recently worried the summit could “turn into a political embarrassment,” The New York Times reported. After North Korean officials expressed acrimony at national security adviser John Bolton’s invocation of the “Libya Model”—which Pyongyang read as a reminder that the U.S. helped kill Libya’s Moammar Qaddafi after Qaddafi gave up his far less developed nuclear program—Trump mused: “that model would take place if we don’t make a deal, most likely.” “In a 2014 memo, the chief officers of the Army and Navy warned that purchasing interceptor missiles, the backbone of the domestic U.S. missile shield, was increasingly ‘unsustainable.’” The Pentagon “Left of Launch” document cautions that a decision to attack an enemy’s missiles ahead of an outbreak of military hostilities “must be made at the highest levels of the U.S. Government.” But it does not envision any legal restraint on a president’s authority to order such an attack. And it explicitly explicitly declares a willingness for the U.S. to strike first, physically or digitally, to an “imminent” missile launch—though its definition of the term is unclear and occasionally opportunistic. “An important factor to be considered in assessing whether an attack is ‘imminent’ is the amount of time available to take action to counter the threat, including whether there is substantial danger of missing a limited window of opportunity to prevent widespread harm,” the document states. The “nature and immediacy of the threat” and the “probability of an attack” are described as “other important circumstances.” Dill, Reif and other experts consulted by The Daily Beast expected the “left-of-launch” document to be incorporated into an overdue and highly anticipated Pentagon document called the Missile Defense Review. A Pentagon spokesman, Tom Crosson, said that the department expected the document to be released later this month or in early June. Crosson did not respond to follow-up questions about cyberattacks or the “Left of Launch” document factoring into the review. Alison Murphy, a lawyer for Protect Democracy, said its Freedom of Information lawsuit that produced the Pentagon document was designed “to ensure that Congress and the American people understand the legal basis, and constraints, for potential military conflict with North Korea. That's the least that our citizens, and the members of Congress representing them, are due in our democracy.” Lewis’19 Dr Patricia Lewis, 7-2-2019, "The Destabilizing Danger of Cyberattacks on Missile Systems," Chatham House, https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/destabilizing-danger-cyberattacks-missile-systems#, 10-30-2019 This undated photo released by North Korea's news agency in March 2017 shows the launch of four ballistic missiles during a military drill at an undisclosed location in North Korea. Photo: STR/AFP/Getty Images. This undated photo released by North Korea's news agency in March 2017 shows the launch of four ballistic missiles during a military drill at an undisclosed location in North Korea. Photo: STR/AFP/Getty Images. After President Trump decided to halt a missile attack on Iran in response to the downing of a US drone, it was revealed that the US had conducted cyberattacks on Iranian weapons systems to prevent Iran launching missiles against US assets in the region. This ‘left-of-launch’ strategy – the pre-emptive action to prevent an adversary launch missiles – has been part of the US missile defence strategy for some time now. President George W Bush asked the US military and intelligence community to infiltrate the supply chain of North Korean missiles. It was claimed that the US hacked the North Korean ballistic missile programme, causing a failed ballistic missile test, in 2012. It was not clear then – or now – whether these ‘left-of-launch’ cyberattacks aimed at North Korea were successful as described or whether they were primarily a bluff. But that is somewhat irrelevant; the belief in the possibility and the understanding of the potential impact of such cyber capabilities undermines North Korean or Iranian confidence in their abilities to launch their missiles. In times of conflict, loss of confidence in weapons systems may lead to escalation. In other words, the adversary may be left with no option but to take the chance to use these missiles or to lose them in a conflict setting. ‘Left of launch’ is a dangerous game. If it is based on a bluff, it could be called upon and lead to deterrence failure. If it is based on real action, then it could create an asymmetrical power struggle. If the attacker establishes false confidence in the power of a cyber weapon, then it might lead to false signalling and messaging. This is the new normal. The cat-and-mouse game has to be taken seriously, not least because missile systems are so vulnerable. There are several ways an offensive cyber operation against missile systems might work. These include exploiting missile designs, altering software or hardware, or creating clandestine pathways to the missile command and control systems. They can also be attacked in space, targeting space assets and their link to strategic systems. Most missile systems rely, at least in part, on digital information that comes from or via space-based or space-dependent assets such as: communication satellites; satellites that provide position, navigation and timing (PNT) information (for example GPS or Galileo); weather satellites to help predict flight paths, accurate targeting and launch conditions; and remote imagery satellites to assist with information and intelligence for the planning and targeting. Missile launches themselves depend on 1) the command and control systems of the missiles, 2) the way in which information is transmitted to the missile launch facilities and 3) the way in which information is transmitted to the missiles themselves in flight. All these aspects rely on space technology. In addition, the ground stations that transmit and receive data to and from satellites are also vulnerable to cyberattack – either through their known and unknown internet connectivity or through malicious use of flash drives that contain a deliberate cyber infection. Non-space-based communications systems that use cable and ground-to-air-to-ground masts are likewise under threat from cyberattacks that find their way in via internet connectivity, proximity interference or memory sticks. Human error in introducing connectivity via phones, laptops and external drives, and in clicking on malicious links in sophisticated phishing lures, is common in facilitating inadvertent connectivity and malware infection. All of these can create a military capacity able to interfere with missile launches. Malware might have been sitting on the missile command and control system for months or even years, remaining inactivated until a chosen time or by a trigger that sets in motion a disruption either to the launch or to the flight path of the missile. The country that launches the missile that either fails to launch or fails to reach the target may never know if this was the result of a design flaw, a common malfunction or a deliberate cyberattack. States with these capabilities must exercise caution: cyber offence manoeuvres may prevent the launch of missile attacks against US assets in the Middle East or in the Pacific regions, but they may also interfere with US missile launches in the future. Even, as has recently been revealed, US cyber weapons targeting an adversary may blow back and inadvertently infect US systems. Nobody is invulnerable. Futter’18 Andrew Futter, xx-xx-xxxx, "Why We Must Prohibit Cyberattacks on Nuclear Systems: the Case for Pre-Emptive US–Russia Arms Control," No Publication, https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/valday/Why-We-Must-Prohibit-Cyberattacks-on-Nuclear-Systems-the-Case-for-Pre-Emptive-USRussia-Arms-Control-, 10-30-2019 Almost 35 years ago, US President Ronald Reagan settled down in the White House to watch the latest Hollywood blockbuster WarGames as part of his regular Sunday film night. The film, starring a young Matthew Broderick, depicted a teenage computer hacker accidentally breaking into top-secret Pentagon supercomputers that controlled US nuclear weapons. The result was very nearly (a fictional) nuclear World War Three with the Soviet Union. Reagan was so taken by the film that he ordered secret review to be conducted into whether US nuclear weapons could be vulnerable to Computer Network Attacks1, and whether hackers could somehow launch a US nuclear weapon without authorisation by interfering with computers. Officials reported back to the President that the threat was real and possibly far worse than they expected.2 What started with a 1983 movie would result in the first proper recognition that nuclear systems were vulnerable to cyberattacks. A generation later this threat has multiplied considerably. Far more aspects of nuclear operations – from the weapons and delivery vehicles to the command and control apparatus and targeting software – rely on increasingly complex computer code, making them potential targets for malicious attackers. All nuclear-armed states also have plans to modernise their nuclear systems and to incorporate more rather than less computer technology, and to exploit the possibilities offered by digital networking and programming. At the same time, there is a growing recognition of the threat posed by hackers to all types of computer systems, including those that control critical national infrastructure. The Stuxnet attack on the Iranian enrichment facility at Natanz discovered in 2010 is perhaps the best-known example, but cyberattacks have become a regular occurrence and never far from the minds of military planners. In fact, most nations now have units in their militaries and associated doctrines dedicated to offensive cyber operations, and some have even spoken of cyber warfare. Taken together we stand at a point today where all nations’ nuclear weapons could be vulnerable to a cyberattack. A fact recognised by, amongst others, the US Defence Science Board in a 2013 report.3 The good news is that this threat is still to some extent in its infancy, and there is time to ‘get ahead’ and perhaps mitigate its worst aspects before they fully materialise and become normalised. The bad news is that US–Russia relations and prospects for arms control are at their nadir for a generation, and both (and maybe others too) may actively be pursuing the ability to hack into an adversary’s nuclear weapons systems. This paper is a call for renewed cooperation in the nuclear realm and makes the case for moratoria between the US and Russia, and hopefully others, that prohibits cyberattacks against nuclear systems. As will be explained below, all states – and everyone on the planet – would be better off without hackers messing around inside the systems that control nuclear weapons. The Emergence of a Norm The incorporation of Computer Network Operations (a more precise label than ‘cyber’4) into military planning can probably be traced back at least 30 years, certainly to the late 1980s and the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs of the early 1990s. However, it is perhaps only in the last decade or so that such thinking – and the required technological capability – has percolated up to the strategic, nuclear level. Specifically, it can be traced back to the George W. Bush administration’s plans to diversify nuclear deterrence thinking to include a greater role of non-nuclear systems in its global strike plans in the early 2000s, the decision to use cyber capabilities against the Iranian nuclear programme, and then more recently as part of Pentagon proposals for new ‘full spectrum missile defence’ and global prompt strike missions. The idea for ‘full spectrum missile defence’ is fairly simple. New methods to prevent missiles being launched should be included alongside traditional methods such as ballistic missile defence systems based on kinetic intercept. But instead of waiting for a missile to be fired, the idea is to prevent the missile from being launched at all by interfering with key control systems, or the weapon itself, either electronically (by targeting its telemetry) or digitally (by targeting its software and hardware or its support systems). To achieve this, hackers would break into nuclear control systems prior to the missile being fired, lace systems within the missile or associated infrastructure with malware, or interfere in normal operations in another way. This is known as ‘left-of-launch’. In theory, combining kinetic and non-kinetic methods of missile defence in this way makes the system more comprehensive and reduces the reliance on in-flight interception (which even today remains a very difficult task5). As Brian McKeon, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defence for Policy, explained in a 2016 testimony to Congress, We need to develop a wider range of tools, and that includes the efforts underway to address such threats before they are launched, or ‘left-of-launch’. The development of left-of-launch capabilities will provide US decision-makers additional tools and opportunities to defeat missiles. This will in turn reduce the burden on our ‘right-of-launch’ ballistic missile defence capabilities. Taken together, left-of-launch and right-of-launch will lead to more effective and resilient capabilities to defeat adversary ballistic missile threats.6 The most obvious target for the US full spectrum defence mission is North Korea, and it is at least possible that US hackers were responsible for a series of recent missile test failures.7 It is conceivable that similar plans are also afoot against Iran as a hedge against a future Iranian nuclear capability. It also seems likely that the Donald Trump administration’s forthcoming Missile Defense Review could include reference to greater ‘full spectrum’ capabilities in addition to upgrades to existing systems. In the past two decades, what has essentially happened is that missile defence has met precision strike; and offense and defence have become the commingled in military and nuclear planning. This might even be interpreted as a slow rejection of the idea of deterrence through mutual vulnerability, the cornerstone of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), and a move towards more active measures of defence and deterrence. This shift has been driven primarily by changes in the ‘demand side’ of nuclear deterrence – that is who or what needs to be deterred and how, i.e. a shift from preventing a massive nuclear strike from a peer competitor to dealing with nuclear threats from smaller ‘rogue’ states and maybe terrorists who may not ‘play by the same rules’ or behave as ‘rationally’ as peer competitions. But this has now been shifted again thanks to changes in the ‘supply side’ dynamics: that is, the enormous developments in the technologies and weapons systems that might be used to achieve this, themselves a direct product of the latest information or computer revolution. Digital weapons, Computer Network Operations and other capabilities that fall under the cyber moniker are perhaps the best example of this. But it also includes a range of other Advanced Conventional Weapons able to augment and in some case replace nuclear weapons in strategic thinking and policy. The result is growing interest in deterrence by denial (that is preventing an attack from happening) in addition to or perhaps instead of deterrence through retaliation (the threat punishment after an attack). New Problems and Dynamics The problem is that unlike kinetic missile defence interceptors, which can be deployed, seen, and quantified, left-of-launch cyber capabilities are by their very nature nebulous and can even be ephemeral. It would therefore be natural for Moscow and Beijing to be suspicious of these developments and to assume (much like with conventional missile defence programmes) that these capabilities might also be used against them in some future scenario. The difference is that there is no way to monitor the extent of the threat and thus react accordingly (by building more missiles, developing new penetration aids, etc) to maintain rough strategic parity or at least to guard against one side (in this case the US, gaining a strategic advantage or even superiority). For example, the 44 Ground-Based Interceptors that the US currently has deployed in Alaska and California (even when added to other Ground- Based Midcourse Defence deployments elsewhere) are probably not a threat to Russian or Chinese assured retaliation at the moment. But, if the number of interceptors and the required sensors were to be expanded significantly – and if Russian nuclear forces were reduced and Chinese nuclear forces not increased – they could be. The difference is that both Russia and China would react, as arguably they both are already, with new capabilities able to bypass US missile defences before the strategic balance shifted.8 However, the much more nebulous and intangible nature of left-of-launch technologies would make this far harder to judge, and more difficult to know exactly how to react. Moreover, whereas long-range kinetic missile defence systems are principally designed against land-based missiles, the ability to attack central command nodes (and spoof early warning sensors) makes all nuclear systems vulnerable. Even the nuclear-armed submarine or mobile missiles, key to US and Russian secure second-strike capabilities, could be targeted. As a result, it is difficult to see how a new full spectrum missile defence policy can do anything other than exacerbate the concerns of strategic competitors and lead to greater uncertainty.9 There are a number of other concerns with full spectrum missile defence that warrant further unpacking. The first is that pursuing left-of-launch options against potential missile or nuclear threats transforms the missile defence mission, and security policy more generally, from largely passive into one of prevention. This is because systems will almost certainly have to be breached before a threat fully materialises, and almost certainly before a missile is launched. This is known as ‘active defence’ and would involve hackers breaching sensitive systems prior to a missile being fired. It might even involve interference in the supply chain or focus on the human element. For sure, some operations could be carried out once a missile or other nuclear delivery system was being readied for firing or use, but to enhance confidence that such operations would work, hackers would surely want to have created backdoor access or laced these systems beforehand. The second is that even the possibility that nuclear systems could be vulnerable to hackers, and therefore may not work as expected or planned, will decrease trust and stability between nuclear-armed actors. Decreased certainty in these systems might lead to pressure to enhance positive control of nuclear weapons, that is to ensure that they will always work, potentially at the expense of keeping them safe and secure. It would also almost certainly drive other states to develop their own left-of-launch operations and capabilities, making all states feel less secure irrespective of whether there is any real intention to use them. A more fearful environment is unlikely to help with any bilateral or multilateral arms control initiative either. The third is the increased risks of accidents and inadvertent outcomes, either from interfering with the wrong systems, or from being discovered inside these systems. For example, operations targeting conventional weaponry or support systems (such as satellites) might also impact those managing nuclear systems or might spread to nuclear systems. Likewise, it is at least possible that once inside these systems, hackers might inadvertently cause something to happen which they had not intended. It might also be difficult to ascertain the intention of any hacker or malware that was found inside these networks (and to verify their identity), and it would be natural for the victim to assume the worst, especially if discovered during a period of heightened tensions. Discovery could lead to knee-jerk responses, diplomatic tensions, and could even be interpreted as an act of war. Finally, it is also possible that third-party actors such as terrorists might seek to cause or exacerbate a crisis through ‘false-flag’ attacks on the computer systems used to manage nuclear weapons. Importantly, non-state actors would be far more likely to seek ‘enabling’ actions against nuclear systems – i.e. to cause them to be used, as opposed to the ‘disabling’ goal for nation states. For example, these groups might seek to spoof early warning systems and manipulate the nuclear information space or cause havoc by conducting relatively minor interference during a crisis that may be seen as being carried out by an adversary due to the problems of attribution. All of these scenarios could clearly lead to escalation and increased nuclear risks. For the moment, the tactic of using digital methods to interfere with nuclear and missile systems is primarily a US-centric idea (much in the same way until recently as it was with kinetic interception). But it is difficult to see why other states will not seek to follow suit. Russia, China, and perhaps others may explore similar possibilities against the US, increasing the risks for all involved. Indeed, the US might be even more vulnerable given its high reliance on complex systems across its nuclear weapons infrastructure and also given its recent plans to modernise all component parts of its nuclear command and control systems.10 Getting Ahead of the Threat There are no easy fixes to this emerging problem, and history does not offer much reassurance when it comes to managing the impact of a new technology on warfare before it fully materialises. Neither does it seem like a particularly propitious time to embark on US–Russia arms control, although the recent meeting between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin in Helsinki might offer some hope.11 But we do have an opportunity now to potentially mitigate the most worrying aspects of the cyber-nuclear challenge before it gets out of hand. This should start with a discussion of the most pressing threats for both sides; surely, hackers messing around in nuclear control systems linked to hundreds of missiles would be a good place to start. This then might lead into other initiatives of mutual interest. The first is the development of new constraints in the use of Computer Network Operations against nuclear systems and the development of certain rules of the road. This might involve trying to get ahead of the threat by negotiating new forms of arms control in this space, and specifically through an agreement not to target nuclear weapons systems in this way. This does not necessarily have to look like the nuclear treaties of the past but could simply begin with a statement that the US and Russia recognise the severity and risks of attacking each other’s nuclear command and control systems and foreswear the option of doing so. This might involve new declaratory policy about: (1) how such ‘attacks’ would be interpreted and likely responded to if discovered, and (2) that nuclear systems are off-limits. This might then be broadened to include other nuclear-armed states too. In a way, this could draw upon the ideas at the heart of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which limited missile defences in the hope that this would aid predictability and stability between nuclear armed adversaries. Clearly, these options might not be verifiable in the traditional sense, nor stop non-state actors, but it is a start, and states would be unlikely to want to run the risk of being caught in violation of stated policy or agreements. The second is better security, policy, and cooperation in this space. In the first instance this can be done unilaterally. For example, reducing alert times of nuclear systems (to minimise the ability of non-state hackers to cause a launch or explosion), working to keep these systems separate from other non-nuclear weaponry and command and control apparatus (to reduce the risk of attackers inadvertently hitting the wrong systems), and keeping the command and control infrastructure as simple as possible (so it is understandable and offers less vulnerabilities for attackers to exploit). This might then provide the basis for more ambitious bilateral and even multilateral endeavours aimed at building confidence and trust. Governments (US–Russia in the first instance, but hopefully others after) might wish to share good practice and possibly data on non-state threats, and even begin to build groups of governmental officials and other stakeholders to ‘think outside the box’ when it comes to new arms control mechanisms. It might also involve establishing a multinational joint early warning or threat assessment centre where officials and experts would be in regular dialogue and ready to react quickly to third party threats or other pressing issues. We have a chance now to get ahead of a serious development in international nuclear politics that will likely have negative implications for all nuclear-armed states, and thus by implication, all of us. New arms control agreements may not necessarily look like those of the past, or be quick to design and implement, but this does not make the need any less. It took the best part of two decades to begin to codify the nuclear revolution, and we have arguably been refining this ever since. A dual approach of innovative arms control, constraints, and perhaps new rules of the road twinned with a better understanding of the challenge and a desire to work multi-nationally is one way to begin our response to the next generation of nuclear risks. Ultimately, threats posed by new, emerging, and ‘exotic’ technologies in the nuclear realm will have to be incorporated into strategic stability discussions, arms control agreements, and into the broader non-proliferation and disarmament initiatives. We no longer live in a world where nuclear discussions can happen in a technological vacuum, or clear linkages between nuclear and non-nuclear can be ignored. Consequently, we must recognise that the nature of the global nuclear order has been shifted by the latest information and computer revolution, and that missile defences, precision conventional strike, drones, anti-space weapons, Artificial Intelligence as well as ‘cyber’ have transformed the way in which we must manage and secure the nuclear space. Conclusion: Pre-Emptive Arms Control Instead of heady and dangerous nuclear rhetoric and spending vast sums of money designing evermore destructive nuclear weapons, President Trump and President Putin and/or their representatives should sit down and begin a serious discussion about the main nuclear risks facing both countries. For sure, they will not agree on everything, but a mutual recognition that hacking into each other’s nuclear systems benefits no one has to be a good place to start. Indeed, it is at least conceivable that taking arms control discussions in this direction might be far more fruitful than the current Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty-based trajectory. The focus on arms reductions might temporarily perhaps best replaced with arms avoidance. It would also remind those who have suggested that arms control might be ‘dead’12 or that arms control in cyberspace is impossible, that new and different avenues exist to enhance stability; ones that may not necessarily mirror those of the past. The lesson from the Cold War was that even if it did not seem likely that anything would be agreed in the field of nuclear arms, both sides would keep talking because they recognised the high stakes involved. This then must be multi-lateralised, because unlike many nuclear challenges of the Cold War, this is not principally a two-player game. Indeed, it impacts not just all nuclear-armed states, but all those with offensive cyber capabilities too. Rather than seeking an all-pervasive cyber treaty or grand bargain style nuclear agreement, a tentative first step could be to develop a cyber-nuclear convention or at least some very general rules of the road.13 Key to this will be establishing and agreeing upon the terminology to be used, and on distinctions between what is and is not regarded as ‘nuclear’ for each party. This would then potentially provide the international basis to look at these challenges in international fora, and for more holistic discussions of arms control. The global nuclear order is in a period of flux and perhaps transition due in no small part to the myriad new weapons technologies of the latest information and computer revolution. In the past, new military capabilities have had to be built (usually at enormous costs) and the threat realised before agreements could be made, but we may not be so lucky in the new techno-political context. If we can somehow come together and agree on the things that we as a society – and as nation states – most want to avoid, then perhaps we can begin to piece together frameworks to prevent this and begin to work backwards. Surely, we can all agree that hackers messing around in nuclear control systems primed for quick launch, and a general fear that nuclear weapons might not work if needed but could be launched by terrorists, is not good for anyone. Futter’18 Oxford Research Group, 8-1-2018, "Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons," https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/blog/cyber-threats-and-nuclear-weapons, 10-30-2019 The increasing sophistication of hacking and cyber-attacks is challenging the security of nuclear weapons systems. There is a real and growing possibility that a sophisticated hacker could break into a nuclear weapons system and its associated infrastructure. Nuclear systems are of course well protected and wherever possible air-gapped from the wider internet and unsecured networks, but they are not ~-~- and probably never will be ~-~- invulnerable. Even the nuclear-armed submarine on patrol somewhere under the surface of the ocean is not beyond the range of skilful “cyber”-attackers who could implant malware during the vessel’s manufacture or maintenance. The Stuxnet attack against the Iranian nuclear plant at Natanz, where attackers managed to install malware that disrupted the computer systems that controlled the centrifuges needed to enrich uranium, shows that hackers can find ways to “jump the air gap”. It also shows that breaching computer systems often involves humans rather than sophisticated malware. An evolving threat In the past, the greatest fear in the “cyber”-nuclear realm was that a lone-wolf hacker could somehow break in and cause a nuclear launch, essentially re-enacting the plot of the 1983 Hollywood film WarGames. But today, the use of so-called Computer Network Operations (CNO) capabilities against an adversary’s most sensitive military systems seems to have become an important component of military planning. Most notably, such operations underpin a new “full spectrum missile defence” mission adopted by the United States, where kinetic interceptors will be augmented by “left-of-launch” digital technologies, as well as the broader global strike mission, where the intention is to be able to hit targets anywhere in the world at very short notice (in this case milliseconds). The result is an emerging norm that interfering in sensitive systems and critical national infrastructure to “prepare the battlefield” and prevent systems from working is an acceptable part of military strategy. There is undoubtedly some logic in seeking new means to counter nuclear threats before they can fully materialise, with both Iran and North Korea being the obvious examples (and perhaps the first proper test cases). And of course, in not relying solely on kinetic ballistic missile defence systems to prevent the weapons, if launched, from striking their targets. But such developments are also fraught with danger. Unlike kinetic missile interceptors and radar, which can be seen, and to some extent quantified, new electronic and digital methods of attack are by their very nature far more intangible. A missile deployed in a certain location will only be able to hit or intercept certain targets in a geographical area. “Cyber” capabilities, on the other hand, could be deployed against anyone at any time. Likewise, a Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system is only used once a missile has been launched. Computer Network Operations will likely have to take place before a launch, lacing systems and deploying malware “pre-emptively” to be effective. The implication is that US adversaries will naturally worry that the same capabilities designed for “rogue states” could also be used against them, and even that their systems might already be compromised in some way. Thus, even without any attacks taking place or being discovered, such actions increase suspicion and tensions, undermine stability, and perhaps also increase nuclear risks. If a hacker was discovered inside the computer systems used to manage nuclear weapons, this could well lead to dangerous knee-jerk responses, creating a diplomatic crisis, and maybe even pressure for some sort of military response. If the systems have been successfully compromised, it could mean that nuclear weapons don’t work as expected or might even be used without authorisation or unintentionally. New uncertainties about nuclear surety and security are playing out against an already worrying backdrop. US-Russia nuclear relations are at a nadir for a generation, and strategic stability across the globe is becoming increasingly clouded by an ever-more complex techno-political nuclear environment. The likelihood that more states will follow the US in developing and planning for new ways to target an adversary’s nuclear weapons systems (and other military systems too) will do little to increase confidence, predictability or encourage a measure of calm in the global nuclear order. It may easily drive renewed arms racing in both nuclear and non-nuclear weaponry as states rush to make sure they are not at a (perceived) strategic disadvantage. Add to this the potential for third party and non-state actors to utilise digital means as a mechanism for attacking nuclear systems or exacerbating a nuclear crisis, and we have a context shaped by myriad new dangers and dynamics. While “cyber-terrorism” as a concept and threat is much debated, nuclear systems kept on high alert and reliant upon ever more sophisticated coding for their operation are clearly an obvious target for a group bent upon causing mass casualties. That said, terrorist groups are likely to be less capable in this realm, and may instead opt for indirect attack vectors, such as clouding the information space, spoofing and even “fake news” to cause or deepen a crisis. Managing the threat There are no easy fixes to this emerging problem, and history does not offer much reassurance when it comes to managing the impact of new technology on warfare. But two pathways stand out when it comes to thinking about how to survive and mitigate the most worrying aspects of this threat. The first is the development of new constraints in the use of CNO against nuclear systems. This might involve trying to get ahead of the threat by negotiating new forms of arms control in this space, and specifically through an agreement not to target nuclear weapons systems in this way. It might also involve new declaratory policy foreswearing such options by states. Clearly neither will be verifiable in the traditional sense, nor stop non-state actors, but it is a start, and states would be unlikely to want to run the risk of being caught in violation of stated policy or agreements. The second is better security, policy and cooperation in this space, specifically reducing alert times of nuclear systems (to minimise the ability of non-state hackers to cause a launch or explosion), working to keep these systems separate from other non-nuclear weaponry and command and control apparatus (to reduce the risk of attackers inadvertently hitting the wrong systems), and keeping the command and control infrastructure as simple as possible (so it is understandable and offers less vulnerabilities for attackers to exploit). This might also involve other confidence building measures and sharing of good practice between governments, particularly regarding non-state threats. The current geopolitical climate may not seem very conducive to new bilateral or multilateral nuclear agreements–indeed, many pillars of the past decades such as the New START, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces and Non-proliferation Treaties are all in danger. Whilst the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran isn’t dead, US participation is. But we have a chance now to get ahead of a serious development that will likely have negative implications for all nuclear-armed states, and thus by implication, all of us. New arms control agreements may not necessarily look like those of the past, or be quick to design and implement, but this does not make the need any less. It took the best part of two decades to begin to codify the nuclear revolution, and we have arguably been refining this ever since. Conclusion In the past, new military capabilities have had to be built (usually at enormous costs) and the threat realised before agreements could be made, but we may not be so lucky in the new techno-political context. If we can somehow come together and agree on the things that we as a society-and as nation states-most want to avoid, then perhaps we can begin to piece together frameworks to prevent this and begin to work backwards. Surely, we can all agree that hackers messing around in nuclear control systems primed for quick launch, and a general fear that nuclear weapons might not work if needed, isn’t good for anyone. Due in no small part to the latest computer and information revolution, where all aspects of our everyday lives are becoming digitised and reliant on computer technology that very few people can fully comprehend, we stand on the cusp of a very different global nuclear order, where the challenges of managing nuclear weapons will change. Our approach to making sure that nuclear weapons are never used again, must therefore change with it. x Nicola Whiting, 2-1-2018, "Cyberspace Triggers a New Kind of Arms Race," SIGNAL Magazine, https://www.afcea.org/content/cyberspace-triggers-new-kind-arms-race, 10-30-2019 In dark corners of the Internet, criminals vie for access to weapons available to anyone with cash and a computer. Advances in automated cyber weapons are fueling the fires of war in cyberspace and enabling criminals and malicious nation-states to launch devastating attacks against thinly stretched human defenses. Allied forces must collaborate and deploy best-of-breed evaluation, validation and remediation technologies just to remain even in an escalating cyber arms race. The wholesale investment in and propagation of cyber weaponry is behind the growing scale and severity of the threat forces face today. An arms race for offensive cyber capabilities among government, terrorist and other groups has resulted in a digital cold war with a goal of global dominance that has, up until now, only been achievable with conventional weapons. Recent events indicate that nation-states and criminal gangs can penetrate the physical national infrastructure and hide their tracks. Large-scale cyber attacks crippled Germany’s rail networks, knocked out vital radiation-monitoring systems at the Chernobyl nuclear plant and hit more than 40 hospitals across Britain’s National Health Service. To carry out such attacks, criminal cells trade caches of intelligent weapons in dark corners of the Internet in a cyber arms bazaar, allowing even unsophisticated hackers to strike with nation-state expertise and enabling nation-states to use crime gangs as proxies. The U.S. armed forces as well as other security services operate on the front line of this cyberwar. The threats they confront become more numerous and dangerous every year, and attacks can hamstring key military systems and equipment. For example, the U.S. Air Force recently estimated that its network of more than 1 million airborne and ground-based computer systems faces over 1 million cyber attacks daily. Thomas Exline, U.S. Air Force cybersecurity and operations manager, says if just one of those systems goes down, “C-130s don’t fly, and Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Station doesn’t function.” Examples of the number and effects of automated cyber warfare systems are growing more notorious. Identified in 2010, the Stuxnet virus was one of the first indications of the physical damage a cyber attack can trigger. This one self-replicating worm destroyed more than 1,000 nuclear centrifuges across an Iranian nuclear facility, setting back Iran’s nuclear ambitions by at least two years. In late 2015, attackers took down part of Ukraine’s power grid and used a telephone denial-of-service attack that prevented people from reporting outages to call centers. More recently, autonomous delivery software known as EternalBlue was leaked from a trove of next-generation cyber weaponry and used to distribute WannaCry ransomware packages en masse. The virtual transport tool enabled the ransomware to scan for a specific vulnerability in the file-sharing protocols set up across internal computer networks, then issued a payload whenever that vulnerability was found. As a result, a single weapon rendered more than 300,000 computer systems useless in at least 150 countries. The nature of cyberspace means that these weapons are far easier to steal, smuggle or replicate than conventional armaments. Because it is easier and less costly to steal lines of code than a cruise missile, criminals increasingly are pilfering arsenals of cyber weapons and selling them in the digital “wild west” known as the dark web. Within this highly developed online black market, criminals barter the cyber equivalent of smart bombs and nuclear devices, many of which come complete with user guides, money-back guarantees and user ratings. Powerful custom-made tools designed to exploit unpatched vulnerabilities and autonomously reproduce themselves across the world are widely available to buy, rent or franchise. These tools also can be repurposed and customized for a particular task, from hacking a warship to stealing personal data from a school. Evidence is now mounting that nation-states are deliberately sharing these kinds of cyber weapons with illegal hacker collectives, hiding their actions behind these groups and engaging in proxy wars similar to those of the Cold War. Anthony Ferrante, White House director of cyber incident response under the Obama administration, recently warned, “The Internet allows malicious cyber actors to deliver weaponized tools at a scope and scale like we’ve never seen.” The connection works both ways, with cyber crime groups also sharing tools with governments in return for payment or protection from prosecution. These tools may be accidently leaked or deliberately stolen, finding their way further down the food chain and ending up in the hands of low-level hackers. The increasing simplicity of these weapons means that users only require enough knowledge to operate them—even amateurs can wield the power of governments. Many countries are sitting on a time bomb of vulnerabilities in their defense or critical infrastructure. Numerous organizations face a race against the clock, as they lack the human resources required to comb through thousands of networked systems for vulnerabilities that could be mass-exploited in seconds. Last year’s (ISC)2 Global Information Security Workforce Study, one of the largest surveys of the global cybersecurity work force, predicts a shortfall of 1.8 million cybersecurity workers by 2022. The increasing use of automated cyber warfare weapons, coupled with the shortage of defenders, means military armed forces are fighting an uphill battle to protect themselves online. Machine-aided cyber attacks further stretch overworked and in-demand cybersecurity personnel. To combat this trend, U.S. military forces, domestic intelligence communities and security services increasingly are deploying intelligent software to automate essential but time-consuming cybersecurity tasks. Before the availability of automated auditing technology, nation-states often relied on human auditors to go through critical systems and networks with a fine-tooth comb in an extremely slow and costly process vulnerable to human error and knowledge gaps. Traditional scanning software was then added to provide both network visibility and vulnerability assessments. Scanners replicated generic cyber attacks, indiscriminately bombarding networked systems in the hopes of finding a weakness. While this technique provided organizations an idea of how their networks would hold up against a typical attack, it lacked the thoroughness to delve into all aspects of their defenses. The broad method missed vulnerabilities and left bases open to attack. In a move toward more modern cyber defenses, some developers are beginning to add elements of configuration analysis to scanning tools, but these are proving to be unsophisticated. The prevalence of false positives that scanning software produces and the validation of scan results continue to suck time from already overstretched cyber teams. To address this issue, advanced cyber defenses now use legacy scanning software for network visibility but more detailed, faster configuration analysis software to identify configuration issues and vulnerabilities accurately. Running scanners across military information technology infrastructure is the equivalent of an army shelling its own front line to find weak points. In contrast, advanced configuration analy­sis tools resemble a sniper’s focused shot. They scour individual network infrastructure components, use virtual modeling to find deep structural vulnerabilities, and produce systematic reports on how to improve defenses. These technologies can run a line-by-line audit of 200 systems in seconds, which means entire military bases can be audited in minutes, a process that could take human auditors weeks. Acting as virtual cyber assistants, new automated technologies allow organizations to, in effect, deploy virtual armies to audit and secure defense infrastructure. Leading defense agencies and military forces, including the U.S. Defense Department, Air Force, Army, Navy and NATO, have been among the first to adopt automated cybersecurity auditing. Automated configuration auditing works by replicating the skills of human testers and enables organizations to harden their firewalls and network devices at a speed and scale that is beyond human capabilities. For the military, this is a major asset. As nation-state cyberthreats to critical national infrastructure swell, senior military leaders are under constant pressure to ensure that the defenses of their digital assets are airtight. All too often, information security officers are bogged down in painstaking line-by-line analysis during auditing, allowing little time for more strategic and crucial tasks. Using automation tools enables leaders to reallocate security officers to more strategic and offensive cyber roles, leaving the security auditing to machines and plugging the military’s cybersecurity skills gap. In dark corners of the Internet, criminals vie for access to weapons available to anyone with cash and a computer. Advances in automated cyber weapons are fueling the fires of war in cyberspace and enabling criminals and malicious nation-states to launch devastating attacks against thinly stretched human defenses. Allied forces must collaborate and deploy best-of-breed evaluation, validation and remediation technologies just to remain even in an escalating cyber arms race. The wholesale investment in and propagation of cyber weaponry is behind the growing scale and severity of the threat forces face today. An arms race for offensive cyber capabilities among government, terrorist and other groups has resulted in a digital cold war with a goal of global dominance that has, up until now, only been achievable with conventional weapons. Recent events indicate that nation-states and criminal gangs can penetrate the physical national infrastructure and hide their tracks. Large-scale cyber attacks crippled Germany’s rail networks, knocked out vital radiation-monitoring systems at the Chernobyl nuclear plant and hit more than 40 hospitals across Britain’s National Health Service. To carry out such attacks, criminal cells trade caches of intelligent weapons in dark corners of the Internet in a cyber arms bazaar, allowing even unsophisticated hackers to strike with nation-state expertise and enabling nation-states to use crime gangs as proxies. The U.S. armed forces as well as other security services operate on the front line of this cyberwar. The threats they confront become more numerous and dangerous every year, and attacks can hamstring key military systems and equipment. For example, the U.S. Air Force recently estimated that its network of more than 1 million airborne and ground-based computer systems faces over 1 million cyber attacks daily. Thomas Exline, U.S. Air Force cybersecurity and operations manager, says if just one of those systems goes down, “C-130s don’t fly, and Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Station doesn’t function.” Examples of the number and effects of automated cyber warfare systems are growing more notorious. Identified in 2010, the Stuxnet virus was one of the first indications of the physical damage a cyber attack can trigger. This one self-replicating worm destroyed more than 1,000 nuclear centrifuges across an Iranian nuclear facility, setting back Iran’s nuclear ambitions by at least two years. In late 2015, attackers took down part of Ukraine’s power grid and used a telephone denial-of-service attack that prevented people from reporting outages to call centers. More recently, autonomous delivery software known as EternalBlue was leaked from a trove of next-generation cyber weaponry and used to distribute WannaCry ransomware packages en masse. The virtual transport tool enabled the ransomware to scan for a specific vulnerability in the file-sharing protocols set up across internal computer networks, then issued a payload whenever that vulnerability was found. As a result, a single weapon rendered more than 300,000 computer systems useless in at least 150 countries. The nature of cyberspace means that these weapons are far easier to steal, smuggle or replicate than conventional armaments. Because it is easier and less costly to steal lines of code than a cruise missile, criminals increasingly are pilfering arsenals of cyber weapons and selling them in the digital “wild west” known as the dark web. Within this highly developed online black market, criminals barter the cyber equivalent of smart bombs and nuclear devices, many of which come complete with user guides, money-back guarantees and user ratings. Powerful custom-made tools designed to exploit unpatched vulnerabilities and autonomously reproduce themselves across the world are widely available to buy, rent or franchise. These tools also can be repurposed and customized for a particular task, from hacking a warship to stealing personal data from a school. Evidence is now mounting that nation-states are deliberately sharing these kinds of cyber weapons with illegal hacker collectives, hiding their actions behind these groups and engaging in proxy wars similar to those of the Cold War. Anthony Ferrante, White House director of cyber incident response under the Obama administration, recently warned, “The Internet allows malicious cyber actors to deliver weaponized tools at a scope and scale like we’ve never seen.” The connection works both ways, with cyber crime groups also sharing tools with governments in return for payment or protection from prosecution. These tools may be accidently leaked or deliberately stolen, finding their way further down the food chain and ending up in the hands of low-level hackers. The increasing simplicity of these weapons means that users only require enough knowledge to operate them—even amateurs can wield the power of governments. Many countries are sitting on a time bomb of vulnerabilities in their defense or critical infrastructure. Numerous organizations face a race against the clock, as they lack the human resources required to comb through thousands of networked systems for vulnerabilities that could be mass-exploited in seconds. Last year’s (ISC)2 Global Information Security Workforce Study, one of the largest surveys of the global cybersecurity work force, predicts a shortfall of 1.8 million cybersecurity workers by 2022. The increasing use of automated cyber warfare weapons, coupled with the shortage of defenders, means military armed forces are fighting an uphill battle to protect themselves online. Machine-aided cyber attacks further stretch overworked and in-demand cybersecurity personnel. To combat this trend, U.S. military forces, domestic intelligence communities and security services increasingly are deploying intelligent software to automate essential but time-consuming cybersecurity tasks. Before the availability of automated auditing technology, nation-states often relied on human auditors to go through critical systems and networks with a fine-tooth comb in an extremely slow and costly process vulnerable to human error and knowledge gaps. Traditional scanning software was then added to provide both network visibility and vulnerability assessments. Scanners replicated generic cyber attacks, indiscriminately bombarding networked systems in the hopes of finding a weakness. While this technique provided organizations an idea of how their networks would hold up against a typical attack, it lacked the thoroughness to delve into all aspects of their defenses. The broad method missed vulnerabilities and left bases open to attack. In a move toward more modern cyber defenses, some developers are beginning to add elements of configuration analysis to scanning tools, but these are proving to be unsophisticated. The prevalence of false positives that scanning software produces and the validation of scan results continue to suck time from already overstretched cyber teams. To address this issue, advanced cyber defenses now use legacy scanning software for network visibility but more detailed, faster configuration analysis software to identify configuration issues and vulnerabilities accurately. Running scanners across military information technology infrastructure is the equivalent of an army shelling its own front line to find weak points. In contrast, advanced configuration analy­sis tools resemble a sniper’s focused shot. They scour individual network infrastructure components, use virtual modeling to find deep structural vulnerabilities, and produce systematic reports on how to improve defenses. These technologies can run a line-by-line audit of 200 systems in seconds, which means entire military bases can be audited in minutes, a process that could take human auditors weeks. Acting as virtual cyber assistants, new automated technologies allow organizations to, in effect, deploy virtual armies to audit and secure defense infrastructure. Leading defense agencies and military forces, including the U.S. Defense Department, Air Force, Army, Navy and NATO, have been among the first to adopt automated cybersecurity auditing. Automated configuration auditing works by replicating the skills of human testers and enables organizations to harden their firewalls and network devices at a speed and scale that is beyond human capabilities. For the military, this is a major asset. As nation-state cyberthreats to critical national infrastructure swell, senior military leaders are under constant pressure to ensure that the defenses of their digital assets are airtight. All too often, information security officers are bogged down in painstaking line-by-line analysis during auditing, allowing little time for more strategic and crucial tasks. Using automation tools enables leaders to reallocate security officers to more strategic and offensive cyber roles, leaving the security auditing to machines and plugging the military’s cybersecurity skills gap. x Nicola Whiting, 2-1-2018, "Cyberspace Triggers a New Kind of Arms Race," SIGNAL Magazine, https://www.afcea.org/content/cyberspace-triggers-new-kind-arms-race, 10-30-2019 Skip to main content NEWS MAGAZINE BLOG NEWSLETTERS WEBINARS/ONLINE EVENTS RESOURCE LIBRARY ADVERTISE Home / Cyber / Cyberspace Triggers a New Kind of Arms Race Credit: Mopic/Issarawat Tattong/Shutterstock Cyberspace Triggers a New Kind of Arms Race February 1, 2018 By Nicola Whiting In dark corners of the Internet, criminals vie for access to weapons available to anyone with cash and a computer. Advances in automated cyber weapons are fueling the fires of war in cyberspace and enabling criminals and malicious nation-states to launch devastating attacks against thinly stretched human defenses. Allied forces must collaborate and deploy best-of-breed evaluation, validation and remediation technologies just to remain even in an escalating cyber arms race. The wholesale investment in and propagation of cyber weaponry is behind the growing scale and severity of the threat forces face today. An arms race for offensive cyber capabilities among government, terrorist and other groups has resulted in a digital cold war with a goal of global dominance that has, up until now, only been achievable with conventional weapons. Recent events indicate that nation-states and criminal gangs can penetrate the physical national infrastructure and hide their tracks. Large-scale cyber attacks crippled Germany’s rail networks, knocked out vital radiation-monitoring systems at the Chernobyl nuclear plant and hit more than 40 hospitals across Britain’s National Health Service. To carry out such attacks, criminal cells trade caches of intelligent weapons in dark corners of the Internet in a cyber arms bazaar, allowing even unsophisticated hackers to strike with nation-state expertise and enabling nation-states to use crime gangs as proxies. The U.S. armed forces as well as other security services operate on the front line of this cyberwar. The threats they confront become more numerous and dangerous every year, and attacks can hamstring key military systems and equipment. For example, the U.S. Air Force recently estimated that its network of more than 1 million airborne and ground-based computer systems faces over 1 million cyber attacks daily. Thomas Exline, U.S. Air Force cybersecurity and operations manager, says if just one of those systems goes down, “C-130s don’t fly, and Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Station doesn’t function.” Examples of the number and effects of automated cyber warfare systems are growing more notorious. Identified in 2010, the Stuxnet virus was one of the first indications of the physical damage a cyber attack can trigger. This one self-replicating worm destroyed more than 1,000 nuclear centrifuges across an Iranian nuclear facility, setting back Iran’s nuclear ambitions by at least two years. In late 2015, attackers took down part of Ukraine’s power grid and used a telephone denial-of-service attack that prevented people from reporting outages to call centers. More recently, autonomous delivery software known as EternalBlue was leaked from a trove of next-generation cyber weaponry and used to distribute WannaCry ransomware packages en masse. The virtual transport tool enabled the ransomware to scan for a specific vulnerability in the file-sharing protocols set up across internal computer networks, then issued a payload whenever that vulnerability was found. As a result, a single weapon rendered more than 300,000 computer systems useless in at least 150 countries. The nature of cyberspace means that these weapons are far easier to steal, smuggle or replicate than conventional armaments. Because it is easier and less costly to steal lines of code than a cruise missile, criminals increasingly are pilfering arsenals of cyber weapons and selling them in the digital “wild west” known as the dark web. Within this highly developed online black market, criminals barter the cyber equivalent of smart bombs and nuclear devices, many of which come complete with user guides, money-back guarantees and user ratings. Powerful custom-made tools designed to exploit unpatched vulnerabilities and autonomously reproduce themselves across the world are widely available to buy, rent or franchise. These tools also can be repurposed and customized for a particular task, from hacking a warship to stealing personal data from a school. Evidence is now mounting that nation-states are deliberately sharing these kinds of cyber weapons with illegal hacker collectives, hiding their actions behind these groups and engaging in proxy wars similar to those of the Cold War. Anthony Ferrante, White House director of cyber incident response under the Obama administration, recently warned, “The Internet allows malicious cyber actors to deliver weaponized tools at a scope and scale like we’ve never seen.” The connection works both ways, with cyber crime groups also sharing tools with governments in return for payment or protection from prosecution. These tools may be accidently leaked or deliberately stolen, finding their way further down the food chain and ending up in the hands of low-level hackers. The increasing simplicity of these weapons means that users only require enough knowledge to operate them—even amateurs can wield the power of governments. Many countries are sitting on a time bomb of vulnerabilities in their defense or critical infrastructure. Numerous organizations face a race against the clock, as they lack the human resources required to comb through thousands of networked systems for vulnerabilities that could be mass-exploited in seconds. Last year’s (ISC)2 Global Information Security Workforce Study, one of the largest surveys of the global cybersecurity work force, predicts a shortfall of 1.8 million cybersecurity workers by 2022. The increasing use of automated cyber warfare weapons, coupled with the shortage of defenders, means military armed forces are fighting an uphill battle to protect themselves online. Machine-aided cyber attacks further stretch overworked and in-demand cybersecurity personnel. To combat this trend, U.S. military forces, domestic intelligence communities and security services increasingly are deploying intelligent software to automate essential but time-consuming cybersecurity tasks. Before the availability of automated auditing technology, nation-states often relied on human auditors to go through critical systems and networks with a fine-tooth comb in an extremely slow and costly process vulnerable to human error and knowledge gaps. Traditional scanning software was then added to provide both network visibility and vulnerability assessments. Scanners replicated generic cyber attacks, indiscriminately bombarding networked systems in the hopes of finding a weakness. While this technique provided organizations an idea of how their networks would hold up against a typical attack, it lacked the thoroughness to delve into all aspects of their defenses. The broad method missed vulnerabilities and left bases open to attack. In a move toward more modern cyber defenses, some developers are beginning to add elements of configuration analysis to scanning tools, but these are proving to be unsophisticated. The prevalence of false positives that scanning software produces and the validation of scan results continue to suck time from already overstretched cyber teams. To address this issue, advanced cyber defenses now use legacy scanning software for network visibility but more detailed, faster configuration analysis software to identify configuration issues and vulnerabilities accurately. Running scanners across military information technology infrastructure is the equivalent of an army shelling its own front line to find weak points. In contrast, advanced configuration analy­sis tools resemble a sniper’s focused shot. They scour individual network infrastructure components, use virtual modeling to find deep structural vulnerabilities, and produce systematic reports on how to improve defenses. These technologies can run a line-by-line audit of 200 systems in seconds, which means entire military bases can be audited in minutes, a process that could take human auditors weeks. Acting as virtual cyber assistants, new automated technologies allow organizations to, in effect, deploy virtual armies to audit and secure defense infrastructure. Leading defense agencies and military forces, including the U.S. Defense Department, Air Force, Army, Navy and NATO, have been among the first to adopt automated cybersecurity auditing. Automated configuration auditing works by replicating the skills of human testers and enables organizations to harden their firewalls and network devices at a speed and scale that is beyond human capabilities. For the military, this is a major asset. As nation-state cyberthreats to critical national infrastructure swell, senior military leaders are under constant pressure to ensure that the defenses of their digital assets are airtight. All too often, information security officers are bogged down in painstaking line-by-line analysis during auditing, allowing little time for more strategic and crucial tasks. Using automation tools enables leaders to reallocate security officers to more strategic and offensive cyber roles, leaving the security auditing to machines and plugging the military’s cybersecurity skills gap. Nicola Whiting is the chief operating officer of Titania Group. She has advised government leaders on engaging subject matter experts in cyber strategy, and last September, SC Magazine named her one of the top 20 most influential women working in cybersecurity in the United Kingdom. Enjoyed this article? SUBSCRIBE NOW to keep the content flowing. Departments: Cyber RELATED CONTENT: The Cyber Edge weapons systems ransomware workforce cyber Share Your Thoughts: Your name E-mail The content of this field is kept private and will not be shown publicly. Comment * More information about text formats No HTML tags allowed. Web page addresses and e-mail addresses turn into links automatically. Lines and paragraphs break automatically. Notify me when new comments are posted All comments Replies to my comment FEATURED VIDEO Sponsor: Attivo Sponsor: Zoho CYBER EDGE NEWSLETTER Enter your email below to subscribe to the Cyber Edge Newsletter. CYBER ALERTS AA19-290A: Microsoft Ending Support for Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2 National Cybersecurity Awareness Month National Cybersecurity Awareness Month Cyberstalking The Melissa Virus Cyberstalker Sentenced ABOUT US About SIGNAL Meet the Staff SIGNAL's Awards Writer's Guide Guest Blogging Guidelines LEGAL AFCEA Privacy Policy Copyright Disclaimers For Bloggers and Educators AFCEA About AFCEA Join AFCEA Membership AFCEA Chapters AFCEA Events AFCEA Small Business Member Login CONTACT US Editorial 703-631-6192 Customer Service 703-631-6100 Advertising 703-631-6181 E-mail Us Contact Form © AFCEA International, 4114 Legato Rd Ste 1000, Fairfax, Virginia, 22033. All rights reserved. SIGNAL ® and The CyberEdge ® are registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. x Nicola Whiting, 2-1-2018, "Cyberspace Triggers a New Kind of Arms Race," SIGNAL Magazine, https://www.afcea.org/content/cyberspace-triggers-new-kind-arms-race, 10-30-2019 Skip to main content NEWS MAGAZINE BLOG NEWSLETTERS WEBINARS/ONLINE EVENTS RESOURCE LIBRARY ADVERTISE Home / Cyber / Cyberspace Triggers a New Kind of Arms Race Credit: Mopic/Issarawat Tattong/Shutterstock Cyberspace Triggers a New Kind of Arms Race February 1, 2018 By Nicola Whiting In dark corners of the Internet, criminals vie for access to weapons available to anyone with cash and a computer. Advances in automated cyber weapons are fueling the fires of war in cyberspace and enabling criminals and malicious nation-states to launch devastating attacks against thinly stretched human defenses. Allied forces must collaborate and deploy best-of-breed evaluation, validation and remediation technologies just to remain even in an escalating cyber arms race. The wholesale investment in and propagation of cyber weaponry is behind the growing scale and severity of the threat forces face today. An arms race for offensive cyber capabilities among government, terrorist and other groups has resulted in a digital cold war with a goal of global dominance that has, up until now, only been achievable with conventional weapons. Recent events indicate that nation-states and criminal gangs can penetrate the physical national infrastructure and hide their tracks. Large-scale cyber attacks crippled Germany’s rail networks, knocked out vital radiation-monitoring systems at the Chernobyl nuclear plant and hit more than 40 hospitals across Britain’s National Health Service. To carry out such attacks, criminal cells trade caches of intelligent weapons in dark corners of the Internet in a cyber arms bazaar, allowing even unsophisticated hackers to strike with nation-state expertise and enabling nation-states to use crime gangs as proxies. The U.S. armed forces as well as other security services operate on the front line of this cyberwar. The threats they confront become more numerous and dangerous every year, and attacks can hamstring key military systems and equipment. For example, the U.S. Air Force recently estimated that its network of more than 1 million airborne and ground-based computer systems faces over 1 million cyber attacks daily. Thomas Exline, U.S. Air Force cybersecurity and operations manager, says if just one of those systems goes down, “C-130s don’t fly, and Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Station doesn’t function.” Examples of the number and effects of automated cyber warfare systems are growing more notorious. Identified in 2010, the Stuxnet virus was one of the first indications of the physical damage a cyber attack can trigger. This one self-replicating worm destroyed more than 1,000 nuclear centrifuges across an Iranian nuclear facility, setting back Iran’s nuclear ambitions by at least two years. In late 2015, attackers took down part of Ukraine’s power grid and used a telephone denial-of-service attack that prevented people from reporting outages to call centers. More recently, autonomous delivery software known as EternalBlue was leaked from a trove of next-generation cyber weaponry and used to distribute WannaCry ransomware packages en masse. The virtual transport tool enabled the ransomware to scan for a specific vulnerability in the file-sharing protocols set up across internal computer networks, then issued a payload whenever that vulnerability was found. As a result, a single weapon rendered more than 300,000 computer systems useless in at least 150 countries. The nature of cyberspace means that these weapons are far easier to steal, smuggle or replicate than conventional armaments. Because it is easier and less costly to steal lines of code than a cruise missile, criminals increasingly are pilfering arsenals of cyber weapons and selling them in the digital “wild west” known as the dark web. Within this highly developed online black market, criminals barter the cyber equivalent of smart bombs and nuclear devices, many of which come complete with user guides, money-back guarantees and user ratings. Powerful custom-made tools designed to exploit unpatched vulnerabilities and autonomously reproduce themselves across the world are widely available to buy, rent or franchise. These tools also can be repurposed and customized for a particular task, from hacking a warship to stealing personal data from a school. Evidence is now mounting that nation-states are deliberately sharing these kinds of cyber weapons with illegal hacker collectives, hiding their actions behind these groups and engaging in proxy wars similar to those of the Cold War. Anthony Ferrante, White House director of cyber incident response under the Obama administration, recently warned, “The Internet allows malicious cyber actors to deliver weaponized tools at a scope and scale like we’ve never seen.” The connection works both ways, with cyber crime groups also sharing tools with governments in return for payment or protection from prosecution. These tools may be accidently leaked or deliberately stolen, finding their way further down the food chain and ending up in the hands of low-level hackers. The increasing simplicity of these weapons means that users only require enough knowledge to operate them—even amateurs can wield the power of governments. Many countries are sitting on a time bomb of vulnerabilities in their defense or critical infrastructure. Numerous organizations face a race against the clock, as they lack the human resources required to comb through thousands of networked systems for vulnerabilities that could be mass-exploited in seconds. Last year’s (ISC)2 Global Information Security Workforce Study, one of the largest surveys of the global cybersecurity work force, predicts a shortfall of 1.8 million cybersecurity workers by 2022. The increasing use of automated cyber warfare weapons, coupled with the shortage of defenders, means military armed forces are fighting an uphill battle to protect themselves online. Machine-aided cyber attacks further stretch overworked and in-demand cybersecurity personnel. To combat this trend, U.S. military forces, domestic intelligence communities and security services increasingly are deploying intelligent software to automate essential but time-consuming cybersecurity tasks. Before the availability of automated auditing technology, nation-states often relied on human auditors to go through critical systems and networks with a fine-tooth comb in an extremely slow and costly process vulnerable to human error and knowledge gaps. Traditional scanning software was then added to provide both network visibility and vulnerability assessments. Scanners replicated generic cyber attacks, indiscriminately bombarding networked systems in the hopes of finding a weakness. While this technique provided organizations an idea of how their networks would hold up against a typical attack, it lacked the thoroughness to delve into all aspects of their defenses. The broad method missed vulnerabilities and left bases open to attack. In a move toward more modern cyber defenses, some developers are beginning to add elements of configuration analysis to scanning tools, but these are proving to be unsophisticated. The prevalence of false positives that scanning software produces and the validation of scan results continue to suck time from already overstretched cyber teams. To address this issue, advanced cyber defenses now use legacy scanning software for network visibility but more detailed, faster configuration analysis software to identify configuration issues and vulnerabilities accurately. Running scanners across military information technology infrastructure is the equivalent of an army shelling its own front line to find weak points. In contrast, advanced configuration analy­sis tools resemble a sniper’s focused shot. They scour individual network infrastructure components, use virtual modeling to find deep structural vulnerabilities, and produce systematic reports on how to improve defenses. These technologies can run a line-by-line audit of 200 systems in seconds, which means entire military bases can be audited in minutes, a process that could take human auditors weeks. Acting as virtual cyber assistants, new automated technologies allow organizations to, in effect, deploy virtual armies to audit and secure defense infrastructure. Leading defense agencies and military forces, including the U.S. Defense Department, Air Force, Army, Navy and NATO, have been among the first to adopt automated cybersecurity auditing. Automated configuration auditing works by replicating the skills of human testers and enables organizations to harden their firewalls and network devices at a speed and scale that is beyond human capabilities. For the military, this is a major asset. As nation-state cyberthreats to critical national infrastructure swell, senior military leaders are under constant pressure to ensure that the defenses of their digital assets are airtight. All too often, information security officers are bogged down in painstaking line-by-line analysis during auditing, allowing little time for more strategic and crucial tasks. Using automation tools enables leaders to reallocate security officers to more strategic and offensive cyber roles, leaving the security auditing to machines and plugging the military’s cybersecurity skills gap. Nicola Whiting is the chief operating officer of Titania Group. She has advised government leaders on engaging subject matter experts in cyber strategy, and last September, SC Magazine named her one of the top 20 most influential women working in cybersecurity in the United Kingdom. Enjoyed this article? SUBSCRIBE NOW to keep the content flowing. Departments: Cyber RELATED CONTENT: The Cyber Edge weapons systems ransomware workforce cyber Share Your Thoughts: Your name E-mail The content of this field is kept private and will not be shown publicly. Comment * More information about text formats No HTML tags allowed. Web page addresses and e-mail addresses turn into links automatically. Lines and paragraphs break automatically. Notify me when new comments are posted All comments Replies to my comment FEATURED VIDEO Sponsor: Attivo Sponsor: Zoho CYBER EDGE NEWSLETTER Enter your email below to subscribe to the Cyber Edge Newsletter. CYBER ALERTS AA19-290A: Microsoft Ending Support for Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2 National Cybersecurity Awareness Month National Cybersecurity Awareness Month Cyberstalking The Melissa Virus Cyberstalker Sentenced ABOUT US About SIGNAL Meet the Staff SIGNAL's Awards Writer's Guide Guest Blogging Guidelines LEGAL AFCEA Privacy Policy Copyright Disclaimers For Bloggers and Educators AFCEA About AFCEA Join AFCEA Membership AFCEA Chapters AFCEA Events AFCEA Small Business Member Login CONTACT US Editorial 703-631-6192 Customer Service 703-631-6100 Advertising 703-631-6181 E-mail Us Contact Form © AFCEA International, 4114 Legato Rd Ste 1000, Fairfax, Virginia, 22033. All rights reserved. SIGNAL ® and The CyberEdge ® are registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. Gibler’05 Douglas Gibler, 2005, Journal of Peace Research “Taking Arms Against a Sea of Troubles: Conventional Arms Races During Periods of Rivalry” http://saramitchell.org/Gibleretal.pdf be spurious to some unmeasured variable that drives both increased and interdependent arming as well as conflict – the underlying hostility or tension in the dyad resulting from rivalry – we follow the advice of Diehl and Crescenzi (1998) and control for this possibility by selecting only rival relationships for our sample of cases. Even in this set of cases, arms races increase the likelihood of both disputes and wars.We have demonstrated that arms races increase the likelihood of disputes and the probability that these disputes will end in war, but what are the effects of arms races compared to other causes of conflict? For example, are arms races associated with most wars? The answer to the second question is ‘No’ – few wars are actually associated with arms races. Only 13 of the 79 wars identified by the Correlates of War project as occurring between 1816 and 1992 have been preceded by an arms race using our sample of cases, and only 25 of 174 strategic rivals identified by Thompson (2001) had arms races before one of their wars.21 Nevertheless, arms races do seem to have an impact on the major wars as over half (17 of 30) of our cases are related to the two World Wars, and most of the high-fatality dyadic wars occur in the presence of an arms race. This suggests to us that the escalatory effects of arms races not only exist at the level of dispute to war but also escalate the severity of wars. In addition to escalation, arms races seem to have an important substantive impact on the likelihood of conflict, especially in comparison with the othervariables in our models. For example, as Table II shows, the chance of a MID for strategic rivals more than doubles, from 16 on average to 35 during an arms race year, and the chance of war changes from 1 in 100 to 1 in 20 during arms race years. These results are especially dramatic in comparison with the two other variables that are statistically significant across both models – contiguity increases the probability of both types of conflict by just over 23, and an alliance decreases these probabilities by more than half.22 Concluding Remarks We believe there are several ways to build upon the research we begin here, without necessarily becoming mired in the methodological debates that have plagued the arms race literature. First, our dataset of arms races was arbitrarily restricted to those dyads racing at 8 in each year of a three-year period, using either military expenditures or personnel. An obvious extension of these data would lower the 8 threshold and perhaps vary the buildup criteria, relaxing the three-year period criterion. We focused on the more intense buildups in this study, because the rapid buildups seem to us to be more credible commitments to deter rivals, and these criteria also provided a more manageable set of cases for qualitative investigations of interdependent arming. Nevertheless, it could still be the case that lower-level, less intense buildups might not instigate the processes that lead to disputes and wars, and an expanded dataset using lower thresholds for arming would answer this question. Our dataset may also favor the inclusion of wealthier and more populous states, as they are more likely to be able to increase their expenditures and personnel at rapid rates. Relaxing the quantitative thresholds for arming would lessen this concern as well. Axe’19 David Axe, 10-3-2019, "A ‘Limited’ Nuclear War Quickly Could Kill 90 Million People," National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/E28098limitedE28099-nuclear-war-quickly-could-kill-90-million-people-85686, 10-30-2019 s A ‘Limited’ Nuclear War Quickly Could Kill 90 Million People That’s the startling conclusion that a team of researchers at Princeton University reached when they simulated an exchange of small-yield “tactical” nuclear weapons between the United States and Russia. by David Axe Follow @daxe on TwitterL A“small” nuclear war would kill or injure more than 90 million people within just a few hours. That’s the startling conclusion that a team of researchers at Princeton University reached when they simulated an exchange of small-yield “tactical” nuclear weapons between the United States and Russia. Princeton’s Science and Global Security project team on Sept. 6, 2019 released a video of the simulation, with tiny missiles arcing over continental maps and pinprick blasts erasing cities and countries as the body-count rises. The video underscores what experts for years have been saying. There’s really no such thing as a small nuclear war. Any wartime use of atomic weapons would be catastrophic, even civilization-ending. The Science and Global Security team developed the simulation to depict what it described as “a plausible escalating war between the United States and Russia using realistic nuclear force postures, targets and fatality estimates. It is estimated that there would be more than 90 million people dead and injured within the first few hours of the conflict.” 10 SECONDS Do You Know What Happened On This Day? The Princeton simulation relies in part on NUKEMAP, an on-line atomic-strike simulator that historian Alex Wellerstein developed. “We live in a world where nuclear weapons issues are on the front pages of our newspapers on a regular basis, yet most people still have a very bad sense of what an exploding nuclear weapon can actually do,” Wellerstein explained. “This project is motivated by the need to highlight the potentially catastrophic consequences of current U.S. and Russian nuclear-war plans,” the Princeton team stated. Report Advertisement “The risk of nuclear war has increased dramatically in the past two years as the United States and Russia have abandoned long-standing nuclear arms control treaties, started to develop new kinds of nuclear weapons and expanded the circumstances in which they might use nuclear weapons.” As part of the wider strategic escalation between the two countries, the United States under Pres. Donald Trump has moved to acquire new, smaller-yield nuclear weapons ~-~- and has begun writing doctrine for employing them even in cases where the threat is non-nuclear. This is a bad idea, Deverrick Holmes explained for the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation in Washington, D.C. “Embracing the concept of limited nuclear war is folly to the highest degree, and we fool ourselves if we think using low-yield nuclear weapons will somehow help halt the escalation to all-out destruction.” “We already know this,” Holmes added, “we have tested the proposition before.” In 1982, the Reagan administration organized a war game known as “Proud Prophet” involving high-level defense officials. During the exercise, which played out over two weeks, the United States wanted to test the theory of limited nuclear strike. What they found was that the Soviet Union perceived even a low-yield nuclear strike as an attack, and responded with a massive missile salvo. “The result was a catastrophe,” said Paul Bracken, a political scientist and Department of Defense advisor. “A half-billion human beings were killed in the initial exchanges and at least that many more would have died from radiation and starvation. NATO was gone. So was a good part of Europe, the United States and the Soviet Union. Major parts of the Northern Hemisphere would be uninhabitable for decades.” Post-Proud Prophet, the rhetoric and policies coming out of the Reagan administration shifted dramatically. Bracken writes, “Launch on warning, horizontal escalation, early use of nuclear weapons, tit-for-tat nuclear exchanges?—?these were banished conceptually and rhetorically.” The exercise brought to light the inherent flaws of using nuclear weapons to maintain stability, and the Reagan administration stopped working to respond to nuclear escalation, instead focusing on reducing risks altogether. The Reagan administration gazed upon the simulated horrors of simulated nuclear war and made an effort to change its policies in order to minimize the chance of any atomic exchange. It’s not clear that the Trump administration will have a similar change of heart, even when confronted with a depiction of a “small” nuclear war that kills 90 million people in a virtual instant. Also From TNI: History Shows Impeaching Trump Won’t Be Easy Also From TNI: Will Trump Suffer Nixon’s Fate? Panda’18 Ankit Panda, 11-19-2018, "The Right Way to Manage a Nuclear North Korea," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2018-11-19/right-way-manage-nuclear-north-korea, 10-30-2019 Jump to navigation The Right Way to Manage a Nuclear North Korea Exploring “Left-of-Launch” Options Is a Dangerous Mistake By Ankit Panda November 19, 2018 North Korean leader Kim Jong Un watches a long range rocket launch into the air in North Korea, February 2016. Kydo via REUTERS North Korea is a nuclear weapons power, and even though Kim Jong Un signed his name onto three declarations this year pledging “denuclearization”—two with South Korean President Moon Jae-in and one with U.S. President Donald Trump—there’s no indication that he will give up his nuclear capability any time soon. He sees nuclear weapons as essential to his regime’s survival and, ultimately, his security. North Korea’s de facto head of state, Kim Yong Nam, has suggested that nuclear capabilities—the country’s “treasured sword”—may be crucial to the country’s economy, as well: he describes them as enabling rather than inhibiting economic development. Washington needs to accept that North Korea will remain a nuclear power for the foreseeable future and manage the situation accordingly. For 70 years, the U.S.-South Korean alliance successfully sustained deterrence on the Korean Peninsula, preventing the resumption of hostilities after the 1953 armistice put an end to the Korean War. Now the task will be to build and maintain a stable deterrent relationship with a nuclear-armed North Korea, a perennially insecure state with a fundamentally distrustful attitude toward the United States. The new reality of North Korea’s capabilities—including the threat to the continental United States—demands careful thought about how Washington might influence nuclear decision-making in Pyongyang. A stable deterrence relationship requires making Kim feel secure about his arsenal, not insecure. One example of a counterproductive posture is the widely reported U.S. effort to develop “left-of-launch” techniques, designed to disable North Korea’s missiles before they can be fired. North Korean decision-makers, including Kim, are well aware of this pursuit. Although the prospect of disabling an adversary’s missiles prior to launch may sound like a no-brainer for anyone interested in defending the United States and its allies from nuclear attack, the endeavor can backfire in ways that are particularly destabilizing. In fact, given what is known publicly about North Korea’s capabilities and its nuclear command and The very discussion of left-of-launch capabilities, however, has had dubious implications for nuclear stability—even if the U.S. show of interest in them has been nothing more than a psychological operation to sow doubt in Kim’s ability to control his force. The prospect that his direct control over the nuclear button could be sabotaged gives Kim incentive to make different means to a nuclear launch available, thus erring on the risker side of the always-never dilemma. The incentive to do this mounts dangerously in the event of a renewed crisis on the peninsula. In such a scenario, to maintain a credible deterrent posture, Kim would almost certainly seek to delegate some authority in advance of a strike and perhaps even order North Korea’s nuclear warheads, which are likely stored separately in peacetime, mated with their delivery vehicles. The history of the Korean People’s Army suggests that this type of decentralization would be highly unusual, but the requirements of operating nuclear forces may lead to these kinds of changes, especially in a crisis. Because Kim cannot have confidence that his regime or arsenal would survive a U.S. attack, planning for any crisis with North Korea must account for the possibility of a sharp shift in North Korean command and control procedures that make the launch of its nuclear weapons much more likely. Sustained U.S. interest in left-of-launch capabilities might even push North Korea to seek some sort of mechanism ensuring that Kim’s untimely demise, or even rumors of it in the fog of war, would result in the release of any and all nuclear weapons that were available to the Korean People’s Army. Furthermore, given the publicized U.S. exploration of left-of-launch measures, any perception that Washington is trying to disable North Korea’s force—even if it is not—could quickly convince Kim that he is in a “use them or lose them” situation. This could result in a much larger nuclear strike at the outset of a conflict than anyone anticipates, as Kim fears that he has a limited window to fire not only his theater-range missiles but also ICBMs at the United States Zagurek’17 Michael J. Zagurek Jr., 7-28-2017, "A Hypothetical Nuclear Attack on Seoul and Tokyo: The Human Cost of War on the Korean Peninsula," 38 North, https://www.38north.org/2017/10/mzagurek100417/, 10-30-2019 At various times over the past few weeks, US President Donald Trump and other members of his administration have threatened to use military force to prevent North Korea from conducting additional nuclear or ballistic missile tests. The US carrying out any military option raises a significant risk of military escalation by the North, including the use of nuclear weapons against South Korea and Japan. According to the calculations presented below, if the “unthinkable” happened, nuclear detonations over Seoul and Tokyo with North Korea’s current estimated weapon yields could result in as many as 2.1 million fatalities and 7.7 million injuries. Background Since 2011, North Korea has conducted 98 ballistic missile tests, which have resulted in more capable missiles, larger payloads, longer ranges and presumably increased reliability. During the same period, they conducted four underground nuclear weapons tests 2 3, the most recent on September 3. On July 4 and July 28, 2017, North Korea tested for the first time, an intercontinental-range ballistic missile (ICBM), capable of reaching most of the USA 4. Expert analysis suggests that the North has the capability to arm ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads and has a baseline nuclear arsenal estimated at around 20 to 25 nuclear warheads with yields in the 15-25 kiloton range 5. The September 3 nuclear test was likely a thermonuclear device with estimated yields between 108 and 250 kilotons 3, suggesting that North Korea’s nuclear arsenal could eventually be upgraded to consist of larger yield thermonuclear weapons. The goal of the North Korean regime seems to be ensuring the continuation of the Kim family rule by having a viable nuclear deterrent capability against the United States 6. However, North Korea’s continued missile development and nuclear capabilities are perceived as “provocative and destabilizing” and posing a significant security threat to US allies—South Korea and Japan—US assets in the Asian theatre and the US homeland 6. Multiple sanctions imposed on North Korea by the United Nations, the United States, South Korea, Japan, and the European Union have not deterred the North from further WMD development 7, despite growing condemnation from the international community. Even China, traditionally North Korea’s staunchest ally and primary trading partner, has criticized North Korea’s continuing nuclear weapon and missile development programs, reduced some trade with North Korea, and has made it clear that if a conflict should break out on the Korean Peninsula that North Korea is “on its own.” 8 In addition, the United States and its allies, in response to North Korea’s missile deployments and continued testing, have looked to bolster their defenses. The Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system has been deployed in South Korea 9. Japan has selected the Aegis Ashore ABM system 10. The United States has also tested the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) anti-ballistic missile system (ABM) against an ICBM package and is increasing the number of GMDs deployed to 44 by the end of 2017 11. If the status quo is unacceptable and diplomacy has been ineffective, then at what point do military responses become probable? The tension between North Korea, its neighbors and the United States are now extremely high, antagonized further by bombastic exchanges between the US and DPRK during the United Nations General Assembly meetings and continued tweets from Trump. History is replete with “rational actors” grossly miscalculating, especially in crisis situations. It is possible that another North Korean nuclear test—especially if detonated in air or under water—an ICBM test, or a missile test that has the payload impact area too close to US bases in Guam for example, might see Washington react with force. This could include such options as attempting to shoot down the test missiles or possibly attacking North Korea’s missile testing, nuclear related sites, missile deployment areas or the Kim Regime itself. The North Korean leadership might perceive such an attack as an effort to remove the Kim family from power and, as a result, could retaliate with nuclear weapons as a last gasp reaction before annihilation. Therefore, it is worth reviewing the consequences if the “unthinkable” happened. A Hypothetical Attack Let us assume that North Korea has 25 operational nuclear weapons and that when under attack, it decides to launch its entire arsenal against both Seoul and Tokyo. The warhead yield ranges from 15 to 250 kilotons (current and possible future capabilities) and are timed for airburst at optimal altitude. Based on these assumptions, seven scenarios were run, one for each of the seven different warhead yields. There are dozens of variables in calculating the potential effects of nuclear detonations on population centers. One can run countless simulations with many combinations of these variables with a wide range of results 12. For simplification purposes, the calculations in this simulation are based on traditional population vulnerability due to blast overpressure 13. The blast areas for the seven weapon yields were calculated using the Nuclear Bomb Effects Computer 14. Current estimated population, area, and population density for Seoul and Tokyo 15: The population density at the center of both Seoul and Tokyo is significantly higher. For example, the population density of Seoul Special City is 17,002/km2 16, the population density of Tokyo’s Special Wards is 14,950/km2 17. Moreover, the population density levels of these special areas can significantly increase during the work week. Casualty Estimates Based on these assumptions, the number of casualties expected from a single reliable 250 kt warhead airburst over the centers of Seoul and Tokyo is as follows 18: The following maps show the various blast overpressure areas from the 250 kt detonations. Seoul showing the four blast areas from a 250 kt airbust detonation – 12+ psi, 5-12 psi, 2-5 psi, 1-2 psi. Tokyo showing the four blast areas from a 250 kt airburst detonation – 12+ psi, 5-12 psi, 2-5 psi, 1-2 psi. Naturally, no missile system is 100 percent reliable. The US Minuteman III ICBM, the most tested missile in its arsenal, is listed as having a test reliability of nearly 100 percent 19. However, as with all weapon systems, its operational reliability is probably less. Moreover, South Korea has deployed one THAAD battery to help protect against a North Korean missile attack and Japan is in the process of acquiring the Aegis Ashore ABM system. Therefore, not all 25 North Korean nuclear missile warheads will detonate on their targets. Three levels of probability of detonation were used in calculating casualties: 20, 50 and 80 percent. The following graphs show the results of these calculations. The data tables for these graphs can be found in the reference section 20. These casualty numbers are estimates based on narrow assumptions. Figure 3. Casualty estimates for Seoul at varied yields and probabilities. Figure 4. Casualty estimates for Tokyo at varied yields and detonation rates. Figure 5. Combined casualty estimates for Seoul and Tokyo at varied yields and probabilities. During the 1950-1953 Korean War, South Korea’s civilian casualties were probably on the order of 373,599 fatalities and 229,625 injured, with 387,744 abducted or missing 21. Japan is believed to have suffered 500,000-800,000 civilian deaths during World War II 22. The population densities for both Seoul and Tokyo are far higher today than they were during the 1940s and 1950s. Multiple nuclear weapon detonations on both Seoul and Tokyo based on the current North Korea yield estimates could result in anywhere from 400,000 to 2 million deaths. With possible thermonuclear yields with the same number of weapons, the number of deaths could range between 1.3 and 3.8 million. 18 June 2009, NORTH KOREA’S CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAMS , https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/167-north-korea-s-chemical-and-biological-weapons-programs.pdf Unclassified estimates of the chemical weapons (CW) arsenal are imprecise, but the consensus is that the Korean People’s Army (KPA) possesses 2,500-5,000 tons, including mustard, phosgene, blood agents, sarin, tabun and V-agents (persistent nerve agents). The stockpile does not appear to be increasing but is already sufficient to inflict massive civilian casualties on South Korea. The North’s CW can be delivered with longrange artillery, multiple rocket launchers, FROGs (free rocket over ground), ballistic missiles, aircraft and naval vessels. North Korean military doctrine emphasises quick offensive strikes to break through enemy defences in order to achieve national military objectives before the U.S. can intervene effectively on behalf of its South Korean ally. However, the North’s conventional military capabilities are declining against those of its potential foes, so the leadership is likely to rely on asymmetric capabilities for its national security objectives. This strategy poses a significant danger because it risks deliberate, accidental or unauthorised WMD attacks or incidents. The SEC probably focuses its CW production on mustard agents, phosgene, sarin, and V-agents (persistent nerve agents) that would be practical for meeting KPA strategic objectives and are not difficult to produce.62 The open source literature cites many suspected CW production plants but not all produce chemical munitions. The Kanggye plant is also the site of several other munitions factories and a suspected nuclear warhead storage facility.63 There are six storage sites for CW and CW-related materials and precursors, including the “Central Chemical Supply Centre” in the southern part of Pyongyang.64 Most storage sites are not located near forward-deployed KPA troops, so CW munitions would have to be delivered to operational units prior to use, although storage or deployment at unknown sites cannot be ruled out. 4. Doctrine Most of the literature on the North’s CW doctrine contains broad assumptions, including that the DPRK would employ chemical weapons in an effort to defeat ROK forces very rapidly and achieve national unification by force before the U.S. could make its strength felt. Given the relative decline in the DPRK’s conventional capabilities, chemical weapons are considered critical for the KPA to prosecute its war plans successfully.65 The DPRK has deployed a large portion of its military forces in forward areas near the demilitarised zone (DMZ), so many analysts believe it would use CW immediately in a war.66 U.S. Army General Leon LaPorte, former Commander, U.S. Forces Korea, asserted in August 2005 that North Korean leaders do not consider CW to be WMD, and “current North Korean doctrine states that every third artillery round fired would be a chemical round”.67 North Korea has an estimated 8,000-10,000 artillery and multiple rocket launcher (MRL) tubes deployed near the DMZ that could strike the Seoul-Inch’?n metropolitan area. The KPA could use CW munitions to attack Seoul but probably would not do so indiscriminately against civilians, because this would have no real effect on military objectives, and the regime would risk massive – possibly even nuclear – retaliation. Furthermore, KPA commanders could subsequently face war crimes charges.68 But that does not mean Pyongyang is not prepared to use CW to implement its wartime objectives. If it were to use CW, it would likely target ROK and U.S. military facilities in the South, including command and control centres and transport facilities such as airfields and ports – the latter to deny access to U.S. reinforcements. Hwas?ng (Scud) missiles would be the likely delivery system. Since their accuracy is poor, the KPA would have to launch several missiles at each target, so as to saturate the area with chemical agents and degrade enemy operations. x Reid Kirby, 6-21-2017, "Sea of sarin: North Korea’s chemical deterrent," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, https://thebulletin.org/2017/06/sea-of-sarin-north-koreas-chemical-deterrent/, 10-30-2019 Home About Us Magazine Events Multimedia Next Gen Contact Us Giving ? logo footer Doomsday Clock Nuclear Risk Climate Change Disruptive Technologies Support Home Analysis Sea of sarin: North Korea’s chemical deterrent Sea of sarin: North Korea’s chemical deterrent By Reid Kirby, June 21, 2017 North Korea periodically comes into the news as it advances its nuclear and ballistic missile ambitions and continues to employ rhetoric about destroying its enemies. With the Korean Peninsula technically still at war, a growing concern today is that at some point North Korea will acquire the capability to launch a nuclear-armed ballistic missile against the United States or one of its allies. Counterproliferation efforts on the peninsula have had a frustrating history, leading the United States to deploy its Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system in South Korea. The US secretary of state, Rex Tillerson, has even suggested the possibility of preemptive military action against the North. To many analysts of South Korean security, the problem with the preemptive military option is Seoul’s proximity to North Korean artillery placed across the demilitarized zone. North Korea, as a form of strategic deterrence, has periodically threatened to use this artillery to turn Seoul into a “sea of fire.” Lending credence to Pyongyang’s threats are figures from the Global Security website: “According to one report, a South Korean security analyst suggested that DPRK artillery pieces of calibers 170mm and 240mm ‘could fire 10,000 rounds per minute to Seoul and its environs.’ North Korea has about 500 long-range artillery tubes within range of Seoul, and the total rate of fire of these artillery pieces would be between 2,000 and 4,000 rounds per minute. The DPRK’s 200 240mm multiple rocket launchers fire either 12 or 22 rounds, providing a maximum single salvo of no more than 4,400 rounds.” Seoul, South Korea’s capital, is the country’s largest and densest population center, with more than 10 million people living in an area of about 600 square kilometers. It is the heart of the world’s fourth-largest metropolitan area and it contains one-fifth of South Korea’s population. It has been estimated that a sustained North Korean artillery attack on Seoul would result in tens of thousands of fatalities if the artillery were armed with conventional high explosives, and in the hundreds of thousands in the case of chemical weapons. Still, as appalling as these figures appear, they are ultimately figurative, based on vague North Korean threats. It is debatable how many of North Korea’s artillery pieces might be tasked with an attack on Seoul, and if they are within range. Artillery in the demilitarized zone, notes Roger Cavazos of the Nautilus Institute, mostly covers the less densely populated one-third of the city, closer to the DMZ. Using imagery from Google Earth to analyze losses in Seoul due to an artillery attack with high explosives over several days, Cavazos estimates casualties an order of magnitude lower than some others have estimated. While estimates have varied regarding how many artillery pieces the North has, with some estimates running into the thousands, the 700 artillery pieces noted by Global Security is a conservative figure that most analysts have accepted. Without knowing the details of Pyongyang’s military plans, estimates of the consequences of a North Korean artillery assault are ultimately hypothetical analogies. Where chemical artillery in particular is concerned—because the composition of weapons, payloads, and targets is unknown—the most appropriate analysis of the magnitude of a countervalue threat relies on a heuristic approach. That is, one associates a quantity of sarin with casualty rates based on a generalized application of how chemical weapons operate, rather than performing a simulation of how individual weapons would impact specific targets. Using such an approach, differences in population densities (for example, an attack on Incheon instead of on Seoul) will lower casualty estimates, but will not change the percentage of the targeted population that suffers casualties. Proponents of preemptive military action against North Korea’s nuclear program, along the lines of Israel’s 1981 Operation Opera against Iraq’s nuclear program, typically ignore North Korea’s history of asymmetrical responses. But North Korea’s capacity to inflict mass chemical casualties on the Seoul area in a “sea of sarin” attack rivals its capacity for nuclear destruction. And compared to the nuclear threat, which involves a finite number of warheads and delivery systems vulnerable to air defenses and antimissile systems, the chemical threat is not as easily negated. Until North Korea becomes a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, the chemical threat will persist as a potential deterrent to military action against Pyongyang. Assessing the chemical artillery. North Korea is believed to have placed a high priority on chemical weapons ever since Kim Il-sung’s “Declaration of Chemicalization” in 1961. But the quantity, quality, and durability of the North Korean chemical arsenal are unknown. In the 1970s, intelligence estimates by the United States and South Korea rated North Korea’s chemical warfare potential as mostly defensive. By the late 1980s, views had changed; Pyongyang was believed to have 250 tons of mustard gas and some nerve agents. By 2010, North Korea was estimated to possess 2,500 to 5,000 tons of chemical weapons, mostly sarin and the nerve agent VX. Furthermore, it is assumed that North Korean military doctrine treats chemical weapons as a natural aspect of the nation’s scheme of maneuver, and that chemical weapons would be used from the outset of hostilities. Chemical weapons are reportedly pre-deployed—with one out of three North Korean projectiles believed to be chemical. The February assassination of Kim Jong-nam in Malaysia with VX was undoubtedly a reminder to North Korea’s enemies of the chemical threat that Pyongyang poses. Bruce Bennett of the RAND Corporation reports that eight manufacturing facilities have been identified in North Korea, capable of producing 5,000 tons of chemical weapons a year during peacetime and 12,000 tons during wartime. The Nuclear Threat Initiative, meanwhile, reports that North Korea has 11 production and storage facilities—in addition to 13 research and development facilities, two test ranges, and four military bases equipped with chemical weapons, as well as facilities near the cities of Kanggye and Sakchu prepared to fill chemical artillery. Earlier, I cited a claim that North Korea’s 170mm and 240mm artillery could fire 10,000 rounds per minute on Seoul. This claim requires validation. While numbers vary, let’s assume that North Korea has 500 170mm guns and 200 240mm guns (the M-1985)—the conservative numbers specified on the Global Security website—and delve into a bit more detail. North Korea has the M-1978 Koksan self-propelled gun; the M-1989 variant of this gun carries 12 rounds. Its estimated range is about 25 miles—and with rocket-assisted projectiles, the range can be extended up to about 37 miles. From North Korea’s firing positions along the Kaesong salient of the demilitarized zone, these 170mm guns can cover a one-third to one-half of Seoul without rocket-assisted projectiles and all of Seoul with them (see Figure 1). North Korea’s 240mm artillery rockets are fired from either the 12-rocket M-1985 or the 22-rocket M-1991 mobile multiple rocket launcher. With their range of about 20 miles, these launchers can cover less than one-third of Seoul from the same firing positions along the Kaesong salient. The Juche 100 variant of the 240mm rocket is reported to have a range of about 37 miles. So the rate of fire of 10,000 rounds per minute appears incorrect—it is apparently based on the rate of fire produced by 155mm artillery pieces (that is, 12 rounds every 3 minutes). The larger-caliber 8-inch gun in the United States has a sustained rate of fire of 10 rounds every 15 minutes, implying that a more appropriate rate for 170mm guns may be 12 rounds per 15 minutes. The firing rate of 240mm rockets is one rocket every 4 seconds, with 5 to 8 minutes to reload after expending either 12 or 22 rockets. Assuming 500 170mm guns and 200 240mm guns, the more likely overall rate of fire is 10,800 rounds every 15 minutes. With that established, we can calculate how much sarin Seoul might receive during a chemical artillery barrage. The sarin payload of each 240mm rocket is known to be 8 kilograms per rocket, based on the Soviet Katyusha. There is little information available on the 170mm projectile, but a chemical payload of 5 kilograms per projectile can be assumed, based on a US chemical shell of comparable size (the experimental 175mm T223, created for the T145 and T256 guns). Misfires and duds for these artillery weapons would reduce the amount of sarin released on Seoul. Overall, the chemical loading would be about 100 kilograms per square kilometer every 15 minutes. Civilian losses. How much total sarin North Korea placed on Seoul would depend in part on Pyongyang’s chemical objectives—that is, the casualty rate it hoped to achieve—and on prevailing weather conditions. Anglo-American chemical retaliatory plans during World War II called for a 25 percent casualty rate in urban targets; this objective was retained in the earlier half of the Cold War. Figures from that era for estimating casualties from sarin assumed a median lethal dosage (LCt50) of 70 mg?min/m3 and a median incapacitating dosage (ICt50) of 35 mg?min/m3 (for example, if a soldier were breathing 7 milligrams of sarin per cubic meter of air for 10 minutes, there would be a 50 percent probability he would die). The prevailing weather conditions assumed in this analysis are for urban terrain under neutral atmospheric stability, with five-knot winds. A heuristic approach to estimating the total quantity of sarin required to inflict 25 percent casualties on a city such as Seoul under the specified conditions simplifies the problem into a box model of 600 square kilometers, with casualty rates integrated by area to find the necessary quantity. Using this approach, a “sea of sarin” attack on Seoul would require about 400 kilograms of sarin per square kilometer. Such an attack would require a total of 240 tons of sarin, easily within the estimated size of North Korea’s chemical arsenal. It would take one hour for North Korean artillery to mass sufficient sarin on Seoul to attain a 25 percent casualty objective—or three hours if mixed with high-explosive fire at a 1:2 ratio of chemical to high-explosive projectiles or rockets. Should North Korea subject Seoul to a 240-ton chemical artillery attack, using the casualty estimating rules in the US Army 1966 field manual FM 3-10 Employment of Chemical Agents, the expected outcome would be as follows: Consequences of a 240-ton sarin attack on Seoul (higher lethal dosage assumed) Effect Percentage of population affected Number of people affected Fatalities 6.5 650,000 Casualties 19.5 1,950,000 Fringe 10 to 15 1,000,000 to 1,500,000 Based on Cold War–era dosage figures for sarin, North Korea could, in a matter of hours, inflict around 25 percent casualties by distributing 240 tons of sarin throughout Seoul. But these dosage figures were indexed for soldiers considered among the healthiest third of a population that is relatively young overall (military service age). For a diverse population encompassing all ages and genders, and with a wide range of health statuses, the lethal and incapacitating dosages of sarin are significantly lower. The Institute for Defense Analysis held a workshop in 1998 to assess the state of the art and to arrive at dosage figures appropriate for the general population. The institute estimated that, for the general population, the median lethal dosage would be only half the dosage assumed in the US Army field manual mentioned above. The Tokyo subway sarin attack and the Ghouta attack in Syria lend support for using lower dosage figures for a general civilian population. The 1995 attack on the Tokyo subway suggests that the general population will perceive even fringe effects—miosis, for example (excessive constriction of the pupils)—as casualty effects. Furthermore, based on the number of chemical rockets involved, the sarin chemical attack on Ghouta in 2013 resulted in a high number of fatalities. This supports the validity of the lower dosage figures recommended by the institute. If the institute’s figures for a sarin attack on a civilian population are used, the consequences of a North Korean chemical artillery attack become much more severe: Consequences of a 240-ton sarin attack on Seoul (lower lethal dosage assumed) Effects Percentage of population affected Number of people affected Fatalities 25 2,500,000 Severe Casualties 10 1,000,000 Moderate Casualties 19 1,900,000 Mild Casualties 40 4,000,000 The overall expected casualty rate is nearly total. Compared to the military-dosage scenario, there would be more than 3.8 times the number of fatalities and almost 1.5 times as many moderate-to-severe casualties. Estimates of chemical-weapon effects based on Cold War–era dosage figures are a gross understatement of the number of fatalities and casualties that could be expected in a general civilian population. And if Pyongyang expended quantities of chemical weapons appropriate for a military rather than a civilian population—which is logistically feasible even for a large-area target such as Seoul—the probable effect on a general civilian population would be significant overkill. How does one visualize such an attack? In more than half of Seoul, the consequences would be comparable to the worst images from the Ghouta sarin attack; in the remainder of the city, consequences would be similar to the Tokyo subway attack. Long-term consequences might not be immediately appreciated, but would be severe as well. For survivors experiencing cardiopulmonary arrest, a fair number might enter a persistent vegetative state due to anoxia. Neuropathy and ataxia (loss of control over bodily movements) might be present for up to three months after the attack in 10 percent of survivors, and about 8 percent would likely have post-traumatic stress disorder for up to five years afterward. Policy makers also should not discount public perceptions of latent effects, whether real or imagined. Gulf War Syndrome, the 1984 Bhopal Disaster, and the use of Agent Orange in Vietnam all provide cautionary examples of the way lingering doubts, with political importance, can persist for more than a decade after a mass chemical incident. South Korea’s response. To be sure, South Korea is not defenseless against a sea-of-fire countervalue attack. While it is not logistically or technically feasible for South Korea to directly shoot down 10,800 chemical projectiles and rockets every 15 minutes, Seoul has a formidable counter-battery capability to destroy North Korean artillery pieces. The problem would be responding quickly enough—and prioritizing the destruction of 500 170mm guns, and 200 240mm multiple rocket launchers, in a demilitarized zone crowded with numerous other artillery pieces. The qualitative difference between a nuclear and a chemical deterrent lies in the latter’s mass effect. For example, if three attack aircraft flew on a mission to deliver a nuclear weapon and only one aircraft carried the weapon, a one-in-three probability of losing an aircraft would result in a binary situation: a two-thirds probability that the weapon would have 100 percent of its intended effect or a one-third probability that it would have none of its intended effect. Chemical weapons are different; a one-in-three chance of losing an attack aircraft would mean that two-thirds of the chemical payload would be delivered to the target and mass casualties would still result. Successful counter-battery attrition against a “sea of sarin” attack would require destroying all North Korean chemical artillery in less than 15 minutes. In general terms, the attrition would shrink the portion of Seoul experiencing a Syrian-type casualty scenario, replacing it with a Tokyo-type casualty picture. A chemical load of 100 kilograms per square kilometer would still result in mild casualties for about 93 percent of the affected population, moderate casualties for about 7 percent, and numerous fatalities in the vicinity of each burst. It is this mass effect from artillery which makes the potential of a North Korean chemical countervalue attack a potent possible deterrent. The mass-action nature of a chemical attack would inflict massive numbers of casualties even in the unlikely scenario that South Korea silenced all North Korean artillery within 15 minutes. Civil defense could help reduce casualties. Seoul has 3,321 civil defense evacuation centers. Spread across the country are 17,501 protective shelters. There is even a smartphone app to help direct people to the nearest shelter during an attack. After the 2010 North Korean bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island, South Korean civil defense authorities issued 1,300 protective masks to island residents and made plans to boost the chemical protection capabilities of its civil defense corps, including the renovation of public shelters against chemical weapons. Depending on availability, on how much warning is provided, and on public response time, civil defense measures could substantially reduce chemical casualties. If the typical response time were on the order of two minutes into the attack—unlikely—expected casualties would be only one-quarter of those expected in a population without chemical protections. Reason to hesitate. Details about North Korea’s chemical arsenal are not known with confidence. We do not know for sure what chemical weapons North Korea would use or how it would use them. The North’s repeated threats to turn Seoul into a sea of fire may be only rhetoric. The North’s strategic views concerning deterrence and escalation are also unknown. History shows a willingness in Pyongyang to engage in military provocations short of the level that would justify a renewal of the Korean War. Nonetheless, it is possible to make a rough estimate of the impact of a massive chemical artillery attack on a large urban center such as Seoul. Ultimately, such an estimate is illustrative, representing one of many possible scenarios, yet it can still provide a reasonable understanding of the potential magnitude of a sarin artillery attack against civilian population centers. If publicly stated intelligence estimates are to be believed, North Korea’s chemical arsenal represents a credible and present threat. How North Korea could apply this threat as a deterrent is speculative. But the destructive potential of the threat should give reasonable cause to hesitate regarding preemptive military options against North Korea’s nuclear weapons ambitions. Topics: Analysis, Technology and Security Share: Leave a Reply Start the discussion... Subscribe default image Reid Kirby Reid Kirby is a recognized military historian and consultant to government, scholars, publishers, and television documentarians. His focus is on the history of chemical and biological weapons technology development and doctrine. He is currently working on a historical study of US Cold War biological weapons relating to air power doctrine and nuclear weapons.... 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====C1 - Proxy==== ====~~Sunik ‘18~~==== Anna **Sunik** is a recent PhD graduate at Heidelberg University and an associate research fellow at GIGA **German Institute of Global and Area Studies**, Hamburg, Rising Powers Quarterly, **2018**, ~~"Regional Leadership in Authoritarian Contexts - Saudi Arabia's New Military Interventionism as Part of Its Leadership Bid in the Middle East", https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/64373/ssoar-risingpowersq-2018-1-sunik-Regional'Leadership'in'Authoritarian'Contexts.pdf?sequence=3andisAllowed=yandlnkname=ssoar-risingpowersq-2018-1-sunik-Regional'Leadership'in'Authoritarian'Contexts.pdf~~ Accessed 4-12-2020 ~|~| jun The timing of Saudi activism coincides with major shifts in the behavior and capabilities of its main ally — the US — and its main rival - Iran. As the US, previously an extra-regional hegemon, withdraws, a power vacuum ensues - to be filled by one of the regional powers. The withdrawal created an opportunity structure that enabled the foreign policy aspirations and activity of non-traditional regional powers like Qatar and the UAE (Ulrichsen 2017; Kamrava 2013) and boosted the activity of the dominant power on the Arabian Peninsula, Saudi Arabia. Whereas previously, Persian Gulf dynamics were shaped by the power triangle of Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq (Fürtig 2007), the collapse of Iraq following the US invasion in 2003 turned the tripole into a bipolar competition. When faced with the Scylla of Iran and the Charybdis of Iraq, Saudi Arabia had to remain wary of both. With the collapse of Iraq as a relevant state actor, the kingdom could turn its focus to an arms race with the only remaining regional power—Iran. Catalyzed by the turmoil since 2011, a classic security dilemma ensued — both on the material and ideological/identity level (Mabon 2015,2017; Partrick 2016). US-Saudi relations were already tense following the superpower’s perceived reneging on alliance commitments to long-standing US ally Hosni Mubarak in Egypt in 2011, a dynamic the rise of Iran in a contested regional system exacerbated (Fawcett 2015; Baxter and Simpson 2015). US behavior towards Iran fueled Saudi suspicions. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA), the agreement between the P5+1+EU (and thereby the US) and Iran on nuclear nonproliferation, deepened the Iran-Saudi rivalry in the short run. Not only did it provide Iran with greater economic capabilities, it also bestowed international recognition on the pariah state and thus re-incorporated it into regional power constellations (Bahi 2017). This additional sign of US "abandonment" parallel to the boost of Iranian capabilities further stoked fears that induced self-reliance, 71 even in the nuclear sphere where a nuclear arms race seems likely in case of an Iranian nuclear breakout (Cigar 2016). Identity and perception are inseparable from balance-of-threat explanations in the Middle East (cf. Gause 2017; Hinnebusch and Ehteshami 2014). The perception of the Iranian threat is governed not only by material capabilities but also by two major identity-linked ways in which it undermines Saudi domestic stability. First, it challenges the core of the ruling family’s religious legitimacy by showing an alternative form of Islamic government: an "Islamic Republic" instead of the Islamic monarchy. Secondly, it is seen by Saudi Arabia as fostering "sectarianism" and instigate rebellion and separatism of Shia groups in a Sunni-majority Arab world (al-Saud 2004; Hubbard and Sheikh 2015). That Saudi Arabia chooses to balance against Iran is therefore no surprise, whether the Iranian ascendancy is real or imagined by the kingdom. However, Saudi Arabia’s ability to form an alliance against Iran is impeded by two main problems. First, the traditional regional hegemon, Saudi ally and balancer against Iran, the US, is unable and unwilling to fulfill this role anymore. While the military bases are still present, the political will to be involved is weakened. The last two presidents, Donald Trump as well as Barack Obama campaigned on policies calling for isolationism or a "pivot to Asia", i.e. away from Europe and the Middle East.5 Second, attracting regional allies for the purpose of balancing is impeded by ideological obstacles that lead to "underbalancing", i.e. the failure of multiple regional states who also see Iran as a threat (like Israel, Egypt and Turkey or Sunni states in general) to ally (Gause 2017). The rise of Iran and withdrawal of the US are the main drivers for the new Saudi "assertiveness" and militarization. But additional explanation is warranted to explain the shape of that assertiveness and the engagement in Yemen. While balance-of-threat approaches can also explain why Saudi Arabia chose to tackle the Houthis instead of IS, they do not explain why it chose Yemen instead of the Assad regime in Syria. Fighting IS in Syria or Iraq would strengthen Iran as it would ultimately benefit the allied Syrian regime. But Assad’s Syria, as the only "state" ally to Iran apart from the weak and fragmented Iraqi government, is so vital to the Islamic Republic that it invests massive resources and parts of its own military to avoid regime change. The periphery Houthis tribal warriors and their allies, however, are of low strategic importance and consequently do not enjoy priority in Iranian calculations and little tangible support. Weakening Assad in Syria 5 would harm Iranian influence much more than weakening the Houthis and their allies - still, Saudi Arabia’s battleground choice took the opposite route. Instead of allying with the militarily most powerful states in the region (most of which are anti-Iranian), it chose to amass a "coalition of the willing", a cooperation form known from democracies, with itself at the helm. Saudi Arabian coalition-building in Yemen, but also in the IM A FT mostly consists of inactive and militarily weak members who do Hide to contribute and strengthen the alliance - which runs counter to the idea that a key parameter for the choice of alliance partners is reliability and state reputation (Crescenzi et al. 2012, p.260). Clearly, the explanation cannot lie in power or security maximization alone (cf. Gause 2017). One way to resolve these discrepancies is by focusing on secondary functions of alliances and coalitions. Neither Decisive Storm nor the IM A FT are primarily about material military capabilities and the ability to project power. Instead, they can be better understood by looking at its functions as generators of symbolic capital and the accumulation of prestige that are meant to bolster the Saudi claim to regional leadership ====~~Roopera ‘17~~==== Simrat **Roopra, Century Foundation, 8-31-2017**, ~~"Saudi Fears Spur Aggressive New Doctrine" https://tcf.org/content/report/saudi-fears-spur-aggressive-new-doctrine/?session=1~~ Accessed 4-12-2020 ~|~| jun Saudi Arabia’s shift toward an aggressive foreign policy is also a result of the rise of the "Saudi hawks"58: former Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, current Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, and Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir. All three strongly endorsed59 the war in Yemen against the Houthis and advocated taking a hardline stance60 against an unpredictable Iran. Jubeir has remarked61 that Saudi can live with a peaceful Iran that complies with international law, but that "is not the Iran ~~they currently~~ see." He has also publicly labelled62 Iran as the main sponsor of global terror. Mohammed Bin Nayef, before he was stripped of his titles as Interior Minister and Crown Prince, was also afforded the status of Saudi hawk—as well as that of the favorite of the United States.63 However, the veracity of that status is questionable. The recent shuffle64 in the line of succession in the House of Saud saw the earmarked future King of Saudi Arabia moved aside for his thirty-one-year-old cousin, Mohammed Bin Salman, King Salman’s favourite son. Writ large, the move appears to be an effort to truly "consolidate the hold of Saudi hawks over foreign policy."65 The reasons surrounding Mohammed Bin Nayef’s dismissal have been kept under tight seal, which leaves room for the inference that a less than hawkish stance on Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy—especially on the issue of the Gulf crisis—may have been Mohammed Bin Nayef’s ultimate downfall. Mohammed Bin Salman showcased his hawkish tendencies on a number of occasions during his short two-year run as the kingdom’s defense minister. He oversaw the war in Yemen66 and was a central figure67 in the plan to isolate Qatar. Both projects have been conducted in line with the overarching hardline Saudi foreign policy goal of containing Iran.68 Although the Saudis have been pursuing an anti-Iran foreign policy since well before the first succession line change-up upon King Abdullah’s death in 2015, the ascent of Mohammed Bin Salman has intensified the process. He shut down suggestions for dialogue and negotiation, and dove straight into confrontation and escalation of hostilities with Yemen, Iran, and Qatar. Saudi hotheadedness is not what the United States is used to dealing with. Mohammed Bin Nayef was worlds apart from his cousin in dealing with the Kingdom’s foreign policy and counterterrorism efforts. While Mohammed Bin Nayef took a more measured approach, for which he won American respect and trust, Mohammed Bin Salman is more ruthless in his policy choices. For the United States, rethinking its relationship with Saudi Arabia will evidently have to include a change in how it approaches and engages with the Saudi leadership. With a new generation of Saudi leaders who are more partial to aggression, the United States may need to redefine the resources and support it can leverage to keep the young Saudis from running amuck. Although the United States’s public posture towards the region may have shifted during the Obama administration, security partnerships between Riyadh and Washington are still by and large the same, if not stronger. The Saudis still import about half of their arms from the United States, and both countries coordinate closely on counterterrorism efforts and intelligence sharing.69 This demonstrates that the complex Washington-Riyadh marriage is still intact, but fractured. However, Saudi dependence on U.S. arms agreements may also begin to diminish if Mohammed Bin Salman manages to achieve his plan for an overhaul of the Saudi economy as per "Saudi Vision 2030," which includes plans for military industry development.70 Mohammed Bin Salman seeks to weaken the Kingdom’s dependence on military imports and instead start producing arms domestically, increasing domestic military spending from 2 percent to 50 percent by 2030. If successful, such military advancements could turn Saudi Arabia into a regional arms supplier, furthering its efforts to assume the role of a key regional leader. This would complement the plan to boost their regional standing by way of expansive trade and integrations policies. However, these plans are still in the very early development phase, and so for now, the kingdom is using its aggressive foreign policy to earn its status as a regional leader. The Way Forward for the United States Saudi Arabia’s hardline foreign policy has gained significant traction in the past four years since it was created by hawkish leaders in response to the Obama administration’s disengagement from Iranian containment efforts. The Saudis seem firmly committed to their aggressive agenda, amping up their role in the region by starting a war, and imposing a blockade on a country a fraction of its size. While it is not in America’s favor to return to its days of heavy intervention, neither would it be beneficial to step away. The region may not be as important to the United States as it once was, but there are American interests that are still very worthwhile protecting. These very interests are under threat as both regional (Saudi Arabia and Iran) and global (Russia71 and China72) powers compete to fill the role from which the United States appears to be retiring—that of the region’s dominant world power. ====~~Toossi ‘18~~==== **Sina Toossi (Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School), Al Jazeera, 4-1-2018** ~~"Iran and Saudi Arabia 'unlikely' to pivot back to diplomacy" https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/04/iran-saudi-arabia-pivot-diplomacy-180402111401375.html~~Accessed4-12-2020 // RZ Saudi Arabia's intervention in Yemen at the head of a coalition in March 2015, AND , says Rouhani is perceived as hostile by some of his Arab neighbours. ====~~McInnis ‘17~~==== **J. Matthew McInnis (Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute), Daily Beast, 4-14-2017** ~~"The Persian Gulf Wars to Come" https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-persian-gulf-wars-to-come~~Accessed3-20-2020 // RZ Tehran will watch the Gulf states for any reaction to Iran’s growing conventional position and AND own second order effects. Other wars may now have become more likely. ====~~Brands ‘18~~==== **Hal Brands (Henry Kissinger distinguished professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies), Japan Times, 10-14-2018** ~~"A U.S. retreat would make the Mideast worse" https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2018/10/14/commentary/world-commentary/u-s-retreat-make-mideast-worse/~~#.XpOZl8hKhhE~~Accessed4-12-2020 // charchar The desire to get more out of U.S. allies and partners is AND : a Middle East even more dangerous than the one we know now. ====~~Goldenberg ‘17~~==== **Ilan Goldenberg, Foreign Policy, 12-7-2017** ~~"Here’s How Both Obama and Trump Stoked the Saudi-Iranian Rivalry" https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/12/07/heres-how-both-obama-and-trump-stoked-the-saudi-iranian-rivalry/~~Accessed4-12-2020 // RZ When it came to the Saudi Arabia, the question was not how to deter AND delegations, and a comprehensive process to work together on regional security issues. ====~~Lovatt ‘18~~==== Lovatt 18 (Lovatt, May 2018, "The Middle East’S New Battle Lines", European Council On Foreign Relations, https://www.ecfr.eu/mena/battle'lines/about)//PSR 4-16-2020 IRAQ... In the aftermath of an election, Iraq enters unchartered territory that could AND and Abu Dhabi in blaming Iran for Houthi missile attacks on Saudi Arabia. ====~~Neal ‘19~~==== **Thomas Neal, Institute Of Peace, 9-18-2019** ~~"Flashpoints: Iran and Saudi Arabia" https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2019/sep/18/flashpoints-iran-and-saudi-arabia~~Accessed4-7-2020 // RZ Click here for more information on Iran’s oil and gas industry. Regional Influence Yemen AND people of their citizenship for alleged links to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. ====~~Shebaya ‘17~~==== **Halim Shebaya, Al Jazeera, 11-12-2017** ~~"Will Lebanon become Saudi's next Yemen?", https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/lebanon-saudi-yemen-171112115648693.html 2-13-2019~~ msa On Thursday, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait and Bahrain urged their citizens AND a whole new level of chaos, destruction and death in the region. ====~~NRC ‘20~~==== **NRC 20** (Nrc, 1-8-2020 "US-Iran tension threatens lifeline to millions across the Middle East", ReliefWeb, https://reliefweb.int/report/world/us-iran-tension-threatens-lifeline-millions-across-middle-east) //PSR 4-15-2020 Tens of millions of people across the Middle East need humanitarian assistance. Most of AND Iraqis and 2 million in need of aid in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. ====C2 – Global Destabilization==== ====~~Farouk ‘20~~==== **Yasmine Farouk (Fellow of Stanford University, the American University in Cairo and the French Ministry of Defense), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1-7-2020** ~~"What Does the U.S. Killing of Soleimani Mean for Saudi Arabia?" https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/01/07/what-does-u.s.-killing-of-soleimani-mean-for-saudi-arabia-pub-80722~~Accessed4-14-2020 // RZ Official media in Saudi Arabia celebrated the U.S. strike that killed Qassem AND do nothing to change the balance of power between Iran and the kingdom. ====~~Cook ‘19~~==== **Steven A. Cook + Kenneth M. Pollack, Foreign Policy, 12-13-2019** ~~"RIP the Carter Doctrine, 1980-2019" https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/15/carter-doctrine-rip-donald-trump-mideast-oil-big-think/~~Accessed4-14-2020 // RZ The force structure required to prevent Iran or others from disrupting the world’s oil supply AND . Trump’s response then exposed the glaring contradiction at the heart of his policy ====~~Trofimov ‘19~~==== **Yaroslav Trofimov, WSJ, 10-25-2019 **~~"America Can’t Escape the Middle East" https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-u-s-cant-escape-the-middle-east-11572016173~~Accessed4-14-2020 // RZ The world’s main shipping lines, the bloodstream of the international economy, run through AND with Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein that allowed Iraqi forces to massacre the Kurds. ===Ukraine=== ====~~Stanovaya ‘19~~==== **Tatiana Stanovaya, Foreign Policy, 12-6-2019** ~~"What the West Gets Wrong About Russia’s Intentions in Ukraine" https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/06/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-russias-intentions-in-ukraine/~~Accessed4-14-2020 // RZ In the midst of the Trump impeachment drama, it is easy to forget a AND Atlantic integration and that securing the Donbass’s loyalty is to guarantee Russian preferences. ====~~Motyl ‘18~~==== Alexander J. **Motyl, Atlantic Council, 12-4-2018**, ~~"Is Russia About to Invade Ukraine?" https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/is-russia-about-to-invade-ukraine/~~ Accessed 4-14-2020 ~|~| jun So, what’s Putin to do? He’s caught between a rock and a hard place. Although war—whether big or small—would serve no Russian interests, it is all the more likely as Putin grasps at straws to sustain his declining legitimacy. Like all increasingly impotent and unpopular dictators, Putin probably senses that a war with Ukraine might just succeed in distracting Russians and saving his regime. Alas, war with Ukraine would be no simple matter. Although Russia’s armed forces and weapons arsenals vastly exceed Ukraine’s, Ukraine’s army is no longer the pushover it was in 2014, when it consisted of some 6,000 battle-ready troops. A large-scale assault by the 80,000 Russian troops and 500 tanks amassed along Ukraine’s frontiers would result in a land battle that would kill tens of thousands of ethnic Ukrainian and ethnic Russian civilians and as many Russian and Ukrainian soldiers. The West would respond with enhanced weapons deliveries to Ukraine, impose severe sanctions such as cutting off Russia from the Swift banking system, and nix the Nord Stream II pipeline. Worse, the shock to Russia’s economy and society of a less than victorious and less than quick and easy war would in all likelihood induce elites to mobilize against Putin and the population to engage in protests. Putin’s Russia is anything but stable. His power rests on an awkward coalition of situationally allied interests—his inner sanctum of advisors, the forces of coercion, oligarchs, and organized crime. Neither of these groupings has a stake in Putin qua Putin or in Russia qua Russia. They’re in the game for their own good, and if and when the system appears to be tottering, they will, like Mafiosi the world over, jump ship and turn their knives on their former master. Russian popular attitudes are no less mercurial, as the recent protests over the Kremlin’s decision to raise the pension age showed. People may want to keep Crimea, but they know that keeping it afloat is a long-term expense that Russia’s economy can little sustain. The Russians’ initial enthusiasm over the occupied eastern Donbas has also flagged, as they’ve come to realize that the region is a useless hell hole that only drains the purse. No one in Russia is willing to shout that the emperor has no clothes, but the number of serious Russian analysts who believe that Putin has driven Russia into a dead end is growing. Compounding the problem is the fact that Putin has foolishly extended Russian hard power into Syria and Africa, thereby placing Russia into a predicament similar to that of the Brezhnevite Soviet Union. A stagnant economy incapable of innovation and only a fraction of the size of America’s cannot sustain an activist and interventionist foreign policy. Russia, like the USSR, is thus a brittle, weak, and overextended state that needs only to experience some shock to collapse. A large war with Ukraine could be just that shock. Putin surely believes that Russia is strong and stable. He also surely believes that whatever setbacks he may have incurred in the last decade must be due to bad luck or some combination of dastardly Western interference in the natural order of things. The prospect of a good war going bad is almost certainly beyond his comprehension. Quite the contrary, voices of doom could just as easily persuade him that the forces of evil are amassing and that a quick strike is imperative. We don’t know how Russia’s aging dictator will react. We can point to the long list of blunders he’s committed in trying to keep Ukraine within Russia’s sphere of influence. It was Putin’s misguided—and, frankly, downright dumb—policies that brought about the Maidan Revolution, empowered Ukrainians and enhanced their sense of identity, compelled them to embark on impressive reforms, and seek to integrate with the West. Contemporary Ukraine is, to a significant degree, the unintended product of Putin’s stupidity. ====~~Fisher ‘15~~==== **Max Fisher, Vox, 6-29-2015** ~~"How World War III became possible: A nuclear conflict with Russia is likelier than you think" https://www.vox.com/2015/6/29/8845913/russia-war~~Accessed4-14-2020 // RZ I asked how this had happened. He said that regular Russian people don't desire AND outs that could kill up to 1 billion people in a global famine. ===SCS=== ====~~Romaniuk ‘19~~==== **Scott N. Romaniuk, Japan Times, 3-24-2019** ~~"China's next phase in the South China Sea" https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/03/24/commentary/world-commentary/chinas-next-phase-south-china-sea/~~#.XpZTTchKhhG~~Accessed4-14-2020 // RZ Chinese President Xi Jinping and Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte wave during a welcoming ceremony in AND external threats persist, acquisition and buildup can be expected to move forward. ====~~Owens ‘19~~==== **Mackubin Thomas Owens, National Interest, 12-20-2019** ~~"Dangerous Waters: Responding to China’s Maritime Provocations in the South China Sea" a class="vglnk" href="https://nationalinterest.org/feature/dangerous-waters-responding-chinaE28099s-maritime-provocations-south-china-sea-107746~~Accessed4-14-2020 // RZ Dangerous Waters: Responding to China’s Maritime Provocations in the South China Sea Americans have AND or gradually weaken an adversary’s positions or resolve without provoking a military response." ====~~Kulacki ‘16~~==== Kulacki, 2016, Union of Concerned Scientists, "The Risk of a Nuclear War With China: A Troubling Lack of Urgency" ~~https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2016/05/Nuclear-War-with-China.pdf~~ Lack of mutual trust and a growing sense that their differences may be irreconcilable incline both ~~the US and China~~ governments to continue looking for military solutions—for new means of coercion that help them feel more secure. Establishing the trust needed to have confidence in diplomatic resolutions to the disagreements, animosities, and suspicions that have troubled leaders of the United States and the PRC for almost 70 years is extremely difficult when both governments take every new effort to up the technological ante as an act of bad faith **Kulacki, 2016**, Union of Concerned Scientists, "The Risk of a Nuclear AND judgment could spark a conflict that both governments may find difficult to stop. ====~~Bressan ‘17~~==== **David Bressan, 8-12-2017**, Even A Small Nuclear War Would Still Have Effects On Global Scale, **Forbes**, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidbressan/2017/08/12/even-a-small-nuclear-war-would-still-have-effects-on-global-scale/~~#2d5f924b507d, //charchar On Nov. 1, 1983, leading Russian and American scientists — including author AND the resulting famine is remembered as "eighteen hundred and froze to death."
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Shiven Shekar email: [email protected]
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Blake Disclosure Policy
The Blake debate team believes that disclosure serves important educational and competitive goals. We believe that the public forum community is moving in a positive direction and we will support that movement. We will will attempt to disclosure our pro and con arguments at the end of each tournament day on this wiki. After we have run a contention level argument we will disclose that verbally if the other team will reciprocate prior to the round. We do think that the wiki is important to do at the end of the tournament day but realize that during the middle of rounds during a tournament day we may not have time so we will verbally disclose. As we run new contentions, new links or new impacts we will then disclose them on the wiki. Please do not look at our wiki information unless you plan to participate and also use the wiki.
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Blake PG Neg
We negate the resolution resolved: On balance, charter schools are beneficial to the quality of education in the United States. Contention 1 is teacher turnover Charter Schools increase teacher turnover for three reasons: First is less experienced teachers Chute 17 (Eleanor Chute is a freelance journalist in Pittsburgh, Aug 17 2017, "The Charter Effect: Higher turnover, less experience—how charter schools compare to the districts and what it means for students," PublicSource, https://projects.publicsource.org/chartereffect/stories/higher-turnover-less-experience-in-county-charter-schools-how-they-compare-to-the-districts-and-what-it-means-for-students.html // DOA: 5/27/20)JDE “Nationwide, charter schools … them in school” Second is the cookie cutter approach Ludwig 18 Finds (Mike Ludwig is a staff reporter at Truthout and a contributor to the Truthout anthology, 9-7-2018, "Teachers Leave For-Profit Charter Schools at Alarming Rates, Report Says," Truthout, https://truthout.org/articles/study-teachers-leave-for-profit-charter-schools-at-alarming-rates/ // DOA: 5/27/20)JDE “Interestingly, the most… profession,” Roch said.” Third is low pay Ludwig 18 Continues (Mike Ludwig is a staff reporter at Truthout and a contributor to the Truthout anthology, 9-7-2018, "Teachers Leave For-Profit Charter Schools at Alarming Rates, Report Says," Truthout, https://truthout.org/articles/study-teachers-leave-for-profit-charter-schools-at-alarming-rates/ // DOA: 5/27/20)JDE “For starters, charters… with their pay.” This is seen empirically as Stuit and Smith 10 explain (David Stuit and Thomas Smith of Vanderbilt University, August 2010, “Teacher Turnover in Charter Schools”, ResearchGate, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/255600494_Teacher_Turnover_in_Charter_Schools // DOA: 5/30/20)JDE “All opinions expressed… traditional public schools.” The impact is two fold The first is the amount of teachers available in America Chute 17 (Eleanor Chute is a freelance journalist in Pittsburgh, Aug 17 2017, "The Charter Effect: Higher turnover, less experience—how charter schools compare to the districts and what it means for students," PublicSource, https://projects.publicsource.org/chartereffect/stories/higher-turnover-less-experience-in-county-charter-schools-how-they-compare-to-the-districts-and-what-it-means-for-students.html // DOA: 5/27/20)JDE “Nationwide, charter schools… them in school” The second is the quality of education Ludwig 18 finds (Mike Ludwig is a staff reporter at Truthout and a contributor to the Truthout anthology, 9-7-2018, "Teachers Leave For-Profit Charter Schools at Alarming Rates, Report Says," Truthout, https://truthout.org/articles/study-teachers-leave-for-profit-charter-schools-at-alarming-rates/ // DOA: 5/27/20)JDE “Previous research has… Roch told Truthout.” Contention 2 is draining Public Schools Charters drain public schools because the fixed costs in the school do not decrease as the number of students decrease LOEWENBERG 2018 finds (DAVID LOEWENBERG, program manager at the Education Writers Association. AUGUST 20, 2018. “How Much Do Charter Schools Cost Districts?” Education Writers Association. https://www.ewa.org/blog-educated-reporter/how-much-do-charter-schools-cost-districts. DOA: 5/27/20) AO “To better understand… of charter growth.” This results in lower quality of education for the remaining students in Public Schools LOEWENBERG 2018 (DAVID LOEWENBERG, program manager at the Education Writers Association. AUGUST 20, 2018. “How Much Do Charter Schools Cost Districts?” Education Writers Association. https://www.ewa.org/blog-educated-reporter/how-much-do-charter-schools-cost-districts. DOA: 5/27/20) AO “Still, she defends… is low-performing.” This is especially important because Charter Schools use strategies to guarantee enrollment of higher achieving students, while excluding ones with less privilege and money. Wells et al 19(Amy Stuart Wells, Professor and the Director of the Sociology and Education Program at Columbia University, Abbey Keener, Leana Cabral and Diana Cordova-Cobo, "The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same: The Resegregation of Public Schools Via Charter School Reform," Peabody Journal of Education, https://doi.org/10.1080/0161956X.2019.1668209, DOA: 5/4/20)ET “Then, there are… and restricted access.” The impact is increasing years of education and wages, and reducing poverty Jackson et al 2015 (C. Kirabo Jackson, Abraham Harris Professor of Education and Social Policy at Northwestern University, is a Fellow at the Institute for Policy Research, and is a Faculty Research Fellow at the National Bureau of Economic Research. Rucker C. Johnson, Chancellor's Professor of Public Policy in the Goldman School of Public Policy at the University of California, Berkeley, and faculty research associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research. Claudia Persico, assistant professor in the Department of Public Administration and Policy in the School of Public Affairs at American University (formerly, the University of Wisconsin-Madison). October 1, 2015 “THE EFFECTS OF SCHOOL SPENDING ON EDUCATIONAL AND ECONOMIC OUTCOMES: EVIDENCE FROM SCHOOL FINANCE REFORMS*” Quarterly Journal of Economics. https://gsppi.berkeley.edu/~ruckerj/QJE_resubmit_final_version.pdf. DOA: 5/28/20) AO “Since the Coleman… longer school years” And when students who didn’t get funding grow up to be parents with a poor education and are in poverty, their children will often possess the same characteristics. Ratcliffe, 2015 (Caroline Ratcliffe, Economist, Senior Fellow, and Co-Director of the Opportunity and Ownership Initiative at Urban Institute. September 2015. “Child Poverty and Adult Success”, Urban Institute, https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/65766/2000369-Child-Poverty-and-Adult-Success.pdf. June 10th 2020. SAP “The future… who never move.” Thus, we are proud to negate.
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Aff Wiki Veneuela
We affirm. Resolved: The United States should end its economic sanctions against Venezuela. Contention 1: Harming Venezuelan people US Sanctions targeted Venezuelan Oil, a key sector to the countries economy. Rodriguez 2019 explains, “ the refinancing of the... billion a year for the already decimated oil industry” Unfortunately, Bandow 19 explains, Washington hopes to starve… Venezuelans oppose U.S. sanctions US sanctions are the worst possible solutions as they target the poor, stoking the flames of a humanitarian crisis. There are two impacts. First is Genocide. Sanctions are a tool of genocide Podur 19 (Justin Podur, Professor at York University in Canada, June 6th 2019, Common Dreams, “Sanctions Are Genocidal, and They Are the US’s Favorite Weapon,” https://www.commondreams.org/views/2019/06/06/sanctions-are-genocidal-and-they-are-uss-favorite-weapon DOA 12/18/19) CJV Some basic economics… from the same playbook. It is critical to affirm now. The longer the U.S neglects to use its power, the more the people suffer and starve. The US has a duty to end genocidal acts on moral grounds Power 02(Samantha Power, Irish-American academic, author, and diplomat who served as the 28th United States Ambassador to the United Nations from 2013 to 2017, February 20th 2002, “A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide,” DOA 12/18/19) CJV The September 11 attack.. ethnic, national, or religious grounds. The second impact is a refugee crisis. US sanctions could exacerbate the South American refugee crisis. WOLA 2019 (Washington Office on Latin America, a leading group advocating for human rights in the Americas. January 29, 2019. WOLA. “U.S. Oil Sanctions Risk Deepening Human Suffering in Venezuela and Could Weaken Mobilization for Democracy”, https://www.wola.org/2019/01/u-s-oil-sanctions-risk-deepening-human-suffering-venezuela-weaken-mobilization-democracy/ . DOA: December 5, 2019.) ALP It is clear that Venezuela … migrants and refugees at risk. Venezuela is becoming the next Syria-like refugee crisis Nasr 19 concludes (Vali Nasr, an Iranian-American academic and author specializing in the Middle East and the Islamic world, October 25th 2019, Foreign Policy Magazine, “Don’t Let Venezuela’s Crisis Take Down Colombia Too,” https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/25/dont-let-venezuelas-crisis-take-down-colombia-too-refugees/ DOA 12/14/19) CJV Only a tenable … international aid. Moreover, Influxes of vulnerable refugees threaten to destabilize the region Nasr 19 continues... The country has… under increasing strain. Contention 2 is Entrenching Maduro US sanctions on Venezuela have only strengthened Maduro’s support Rodríguez 18 (Francisco Rodríguez, chief economist at Torino Capital and is a former head of the Venezuelan Congressional Budget Office, Foreign Policy, January 12 2018, “Why More Sanctions Won’t Help Venezuela”, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/12/why-more-sanctions-wont-help-venezuela/ // DOA: 12/19/19)JDE “During the first year … widespread and serious one is the In fact, Maduro gained more support after sanctions Reuters 17 (Reuters, international news organization, Reuters, Oct 2 2017, “Venezuela's Maduro approval rises to 23 percent after Trump sanctions: poll”, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics/venezuelas-maduro-approval-rises-to-23-percent-after-trump-sanctions-poll-idUSKCN1C8037 // DOA: 12/16/19)JDE “CARACAS (Reuters) - Venezuelan… anti-government protests.” Maduro’s support has increased for two key reasons: Rallying around the flag Ward 19 (Alex Ward, Vox staff writer covering international security and defense issues, Vox, Jan 28 2019, “The US placed new sanctions on Venezuela’s oil giant. They could backfire.”, https://www.vox.com/world/2019/1/28/18201115/venezuela-ofac-sanctions-pdvsa-oil // DOA: 12/19/19)JDE “One US official familiar… made Maduro an unpopular leader.” Splintering the opposition Oppenheimer 19 (Andres Oppenheimer, Columnist for CNN, The Miami Herald, and writer of 7 books. Published August 9, 2019. “Will Trump’s ‘embargo’ on Venezuela work? Not without a strong follow-up plan,” The Miami Herald, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/news-columns-blogs/andres-oppenheimer/article233711717.html. DOA: 12/8/19) JG First, Trump’s quasi-embargo… what else they could do. Entrenching Maduro is problematic as, Poverty increased drastically under the Maduro regime Escobari 19 (Marcela Escobari, a senior fellow in the Center for Universal Education at Brookings, where she is leading the Workforce of the Future Initiative. She was Assistant Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean in President Obama’s administration, Brookings Institute, Feb 28 2019, “Made by Maduro: The Humanitarian Crisis in Venezuela and US Policy Responses”, https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/made-by-maduro-the-humanitarian-crisis-in-venezuela-and-us-policy-responses/ // DOA: 12/19/2019) HS GDP (gross domestic product) has contracted … claimed 820 lives as of June 2018. Morever, Maduro violates human rights United States Department of State 2019 (United States Department of State, 7-25-2019, "Nicolás Maduro: Corruption and Chaos in Venezuela," https://www.state.gov/nicolas-maduro-corruption-and-chaos-in-venezuela-2/ DOA 12/1/19) LX The former Maduro regime… illegal raids and extrajudicial killings. Card Appendix Contention 1: Starvation Trump has tightened sanctions, but Maduro is more entrenched in his power Rodríguez 18 (Francisco Rodríguez, chief economist at Torino Capital and is a former head of the Venezuelan Congressional Budget Office, Foreign Policy, January 12 2018, “Why More Sanctions Won’t Help Venezuela”, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/12/why-more-sanctions-wont-help-venezuela/ // DOA: 12/19/19) JDE “During the first year… Venezuela is no North Korea.” Sanctions strengthen regime Long 19 (Gideon Long, Andean correspondent for the Financial Times, https://www.ft.com/content/3755c832-b938-11e9-8a88-aa6628ac896c “US warned that Venezuela sanctions could worsen crisis” August 7, 2019. DoA 12/9/19) JJ Donald Trump’s decision … the government in Caracas. Bandow 19 (Doug Bandow, former special assistant to President Reagan and senior fellow at the CATO Institute, “America Shouldn’t Invade Venezuela” https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/america-shouldnt-invade-venezuela February 25, 2019. DoA 12/9/19) JJ Washington hopes to starve… ten Venezuelans oppose U.S. sanctions. The impact is a Venezuelan famine. Sanctions risk of creating famine Rodríguez 19 (Francisco Rodríguez, chief economist at Torino Capital and is a former head of the Venezuelan Congressional Budget Office. “Trump Doesn’t Have Time for Starving Venezuelans,” The New York Times, 7/10/2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/10/opinion/venezuela-sanctions.html. DOA: 10/9/2019) DSE Venezuela’s crisis now… Venezuelan opposition. 31.8 million living in Venezuela NIS 18 (National Institute of Statistics Venezuela’s, official Venezuelan gov statistics especially census provider. “Venezuelan Population,” Trading Economics, 2018, https://tradingeconomics.com/venezuela/population. DOA: 12/10/2019) DSE The total … 7.6 million people.
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Benaim and Hanna 19(Daniel Benaim, Fellow at the Center for American Progress and Professor at NYU, Michael Wahid Hanna, Senior Fellow at NYU Reiss School, 7 Aug 2019, “The Enduring American Presence in the Middle East”, law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/Enduring20American20Presence20in20the20Middle20East.pdf DOA 4/11/20)KJR Altogether, the Trump …in the region. Gallarotti 11(Giulio M. Gallarotti, Professor of Government and Tutor in the College of Social Studies at Wesleyan University, January 20th 2011, Wesleyan University WesScholar, “Soft Power: What it is, Why it’s Important, and the Conditions Under Which it Can Be Effectively Used,” http://wesscholar.wesleyan.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1056andcontext=div2facpubs DoA 12/15/16) CJV As much as each kind of power… of military operations overseas. Serwer 16 (Daniel Serwer, Director of the Conflict Management Program at Johns Hopkins University, 11 Apr 2016, “Recalculating U.S. Policy in the Middle East: Less Military, More Civilian”, https://www.mei.edu/publications/recalculating-us-policy-middle-east-less-military-more-civilian DOA 4/11/20)KJR People in the Middle East…mean more civilian. Lord 14(Kristin M. Lord, PhD in Government from Georgetown, President and CEO of IREX, Formerly was Acting President and Executive Vice President of the United States Institute of Peace, “Soft Power Outage”, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/12/23/soft-power-outage/?wp_login_redirect=0 ) Moral authority facilitates…the Islamic State.) Noack 2020(Rick Noack, Foreign affairs reporter focusing on Europe and international security, January 10 2020, “Here’s what might happen if the U.S. were to suddenly quit Iraq” The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/01/09/heres-what-might-happen-if-us-were-suddenly-quit-iraq/ DOA: March 21 2020) SP It may end in … effective counter-ISIS campaign,” he said. Cottney 02(Andrew Cottey, Lecturer at University College Cork and the University of Bradford, and a board member of BASIC, September 11th 2001 One Year On: A New Era in World Politics?, September 2002, http://www.basicint.org/terrorism/cottey.htm, accessed 10/14/02 U.S. cannot achieve… term American security” Regan 2006 (Patrick Regan is a political science professor at Binghamton University. 2006. “Diplomacy and other Forms of Intervention in Civil Wars,” Sagepub. http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022002706291579 DOA: 14/1/17) CDY In a second model… we interpret the full results (see Model II) Hazbun 19 (Waleed Hazbun, Richard L. Chambers Professor of Middle Eastern Studies in the Department of Political Science at the University of Alabama. March 2019. “In America’s Wake: Turbulence and Insecurity in the Middle East” POMEPS Studies. https://pomeps.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/POMEPS_Studies_34_Web.pdf. DOA: March 14 2020) SRW Teir efforts …of conflict and escalation. Farouk 20(Yasmine Farouk, visiting fellow in the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 7 Jan 2020, “What Does he U.S. Killing of Soleimani Mean for Saudi Arabia”, https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/01/07/what-does-u.s.-killing-of-soleimani-mean-for-saudi-arabia-pub-80722 DOA 4/12/20)KJR That Saudi officials … no time to waste. Northam 20(Jackie Northam, NPR’s International Affairs Correspondent, 9 Jan 2020, “Saudi Arabia Sought Dialogue with Iran. Then the U.S.-Iranian Conflict Escalated”, https://www.npr.org/2020/01/09/794519810/saudi-arabia-sought-dialogue-with-iran-then-the-u-s-iranian-conflict-escalated DOA 4/12/20)KJR Rome says the …Saudi Arabia off its oil dependency. Parsi 2020 (TRITA PARSI, Executive Vice President of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and Adjunct Associate Professor at Georgetown University. JANUARY 6, 2020. “The Middle East Is More Stable When the United States Stays Away,” Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/06/the-middle-east-is-more-stable-when-the-united-states-stays-away/. DOA: 3/22/20)AO Yet when U.S. …stability rather than the guarantor of it? Harb 2019 (Imad K Harb, Imad K Harb is Director of Research and Analysis at Arab Center Washington DC. 16 Oct 2019. “Saudi Arabia and Iran may finally be ready for rapprochement,” Aljazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/saudi-arabia-iran-finally-ready-rapprochement-191015103242982.html. DOA: 3/22/20)AO One thing is sure… wars look minor in comparison. BBC 16(British Broadcasting Company, 2 Jan 2016, “Yemen Conflict: Saudi-led coalition ends ceasefire”, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35214099 DOA 4/3/20)KJR A Saudi-led …continued on the ground. Northam 20(Jackie Northam, NPR’s International Affairs Correspondent, 9 Jan 2020, “Saudi Arabia Sought Dialogue with Iran. Then the U.S.-Iranian Conflict Escalated”, https://www.npr.org/2020/01/09/794519810/saudi-arabia-sought-dialogue-with-iran-then-the-u-s-iranian-conflict-escalated DOA 4/12/20)KJR Trita Parsi, an executive … being sent between ... the Saudis and Iran." Bachman 2019 (Jeffrey S. Bachman, Professorial Lecturer in Human Rights and Director of the Ethics, Peace, and Human Rights MA Program, PhD, Law and Public Policy, Northeastern University, M.A., Composition and Rhetoric, Rowan University, B.A., Business Management, Widener University. 17 Jan 2019. “A ‘synchronised attack’ on life: the Saudi-led coalition’s ‘hidden and holistic’ genocide in Yemen and the shared responsibility of the US and UK,” Third World Quarterly, file:///Users/amolson21/Downloads/Article20for20Shane20(1)20(2).pdf. 2/7/19)AO “Food imports … the country is facing today’.47”
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1Blake Disclosure Policy
The Blake debate team believes that disclosure serves important educational and competitive goals. We believe that the public forum community is moving in a positive direction and we will support that movement. We will will attempt to disclosure our pro and con arguments at the end of each tournament day on this wiki. After we have run a contention level argument we will disclose that verbally if the other team will reciprocate prior to the round. We do think that the wiki is important to do at the end of the tournament day but realize that during the middle of rounds during a tournament day we may not have time so we will verbally disclose. As we run new contentions, new links or new impacts we will then disclose them on the wiki. Please do not look at our wiki information unless you plan to participate and also use the wiki.
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February - Millard Aff
Contention one is the automation revolution New technology replacing jobs threatens to create mass unemployment Frey and Osborne 2013 (Carl Benedikt Frey, Swedish-German economist and economic historian. He is Oxford Martin Citi Fellow at Oxford University where he directs the programme on the Future of Work at the Oxford Martin School., Michael A. Osborne, University of Oxford: Professor of Machine Learning. September 17, 2013. “THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYMENT: HOW SUSCEPTIBLE ARE JOBS TO COMPUTERISATION?” Oxford Martin School. https://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/downloads/academic/The_Future_of_Employment.pdf?mod=article_inline. DOA: 2/14/20)AO We examine how …… probability of computerisation. WIthout jobs funding for social welfare is threatened Straubhaar 17(Thomas Straubhaar, Swiss economist and professor at the University of Hamburg, March-April 2017, “On the Economics of a Universal Basic Income”, Intereconomics, https://archive.intereconomics.eu/year/2017/2/on-the-economics-of-a-universal-basic-income/ DOA 01/09/20) KG nowadays, one of the ……reduced or eliminated...11 Universal basic income solves in two ways First is stabilizing monetary policy UBI solves unemployment crisis Rasoolinejad 19 (Mohammad Rasoolinejad, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Kellogg School of Management, 12-Oct-2019, “Universal Basic Income: The Last Bullet in the Darkness,” Cornell University, https://arxiv.org/pdf/1910.05658.pdf, DOA: 2/18/20) MDS Recession-induced unemployment …… of the recipients’ needs. 2. retraining UBi provides workers with a safety net to find a new job and train for a job in the new world Hoynes and Rothstein 2018 (Hilary Hoynes, University of California Berkeley, Jesse Rothstein, University of California, Berkeley. August 15, 2018. “Universal Basic Income in the US and Advanced Countries” Berkley. https://gspp.berkeley.edu/assets/uploads/research/pdf/Hoynes-Rothstein-UBI-081518.pdf. DOA: 1/31/20)AO Second, a UBI may …… the medium to longer run. Without the UBI the displacement would be severe and permanent Dillow 2017 (Dillow C, Rainwater B. Why *Free Money Could Be the Future of Work. Fortune. 2017;176(1):68-76. http://search.ebscohost.com.ezp1.lib.umn.edu/login.aspx?direct=trueandAuthType=ip,uidanddb=buhandAN=123750049andsite=ehost-live.) What's different about the …… all but the top earners. This is crucial because millions are at risk Associated Press 2019 ( Associated Press, American not-for-profit news agency headquartered in New York City.Jan 24, 2019 “Over 30 million U.S. workers will lose their jobs because of AI,”Market Watch, https://www.marketwatch.com/story/ai-is-set-to-replace-36-million-us-workers-2019-01-24. DOA: 1/31/20)AO Robots aren’t replacing …… lead author of the report. The implication is critical as Indrawati 17 (Sri Mulyani Indrawati, Chief Operating Officer and Managing Director at the World Bank, Huffington Post, Dec 6 2017, “Jobs - The Fastest Road Out Of Poverty”, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/jobs~-~~-~-the-fastest-road-o_b_10404594 // DOA: 1/25/20)JDE “Good jobs are the …… productive employment for the poor.” Contention 2 is increasing coverage First is misinformation Beresford, 13 (Professor Peter Beresford is author of All our Welfare: Towards Participatory Social Policy, Policy Press. He is emeritus professor of social policy at Brunel University London, professor of citizen participation at Essex University and co-chair of Shaping Our Lives. January 14th 2013. “Why means testing benefits is not efficient or fair.” The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/social-care-network/2013/jan/14/means-testing-benefits-not-efficient-fair DOA 1/8/20) GSH Means tested benefits …… contributed to and earned. Second is stigma Gershon 18 (Livia Gershon, reporter (citing a real study), 30 January 2018, “The Health Threats of Welfare Stigma” https://daily.jstor.org/the-health-threats-of-welfare-stigma/ DOA 2/15/19) MDS The Trump administration has …… as they apply for benefits. Third is Practical Barriers Gershon 18 (Livia Gershon, reporter (citing a real study), 30 January 2018, “The Health Threats of Welfare Stigma” https://daily.jstor.org/the-health-threats-of-welfare-stigma/ DOA 2/15/19) MDS In addition, there are …… to people on Medicaid. As a result, Santens 16 quantifies, Santens 16 (Scott Santens, a founding member of the Economic Security Project. September 9 2016. “The progressive case for replacing the welfare state with basic income” TechCrunch. https://techcrunch.com/2016/09/09/the-progressive-case-for-replacing-the-welfare-state-with-basic-income/. DOA: Jan 18 2020) SRW Well, guess what? Our safety ……: ABAWDs (Able-Bodied Adults Without And Jan 2019 quantifies Jan 2019 (Tracy Jan, reporter for The Washington Post, BA in communication; Stanford University, MA in sociology. Feb. 4, 2019. “13 million people in poverty are disconnected from the social safety net. Most of them are white,” The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/13-million-people-in-poverty-are-disconnected-from-the-social-safety-net-most-of-them-are-white/2019/02/04/807516a0-2598-11e9-81fd-b7b05d5bed90_story.html. DOA: 2/17/20)AO More than a quarter of the …… and benefits policy at the Urban Institute. The situation is also dire for those who receive welfare, as Lexington 20 quantifies Lexington Law 20 (Lexington Law, private credit lawfirm, “44 Important Welfare Statistics for 2020”, 3 January 2020 https://www.lexingtonlaw.com/blog/finance/welfare-statistics.html DOA 2/15/19) MDS The total cost of poverty …… on Budget and Policy Priorities Luckily, A UBI would provide aid to those who need it, with an unconditional monthly cash transfer to every American. Indeed, by giving cash assistance to needy Americans, Widerquist 17 quantifies Widerquist 17(Karl Widerquist, American political philosopher and economist at Georgetown University, December 2017, Journal for Basic Income Studies, “The Cost of Basic Income: Back of the Envelope Calculations,” https://works.bepress.com/widerquist/75/ DOA 2/10/20) CJV This table shows that people …… and only about 2.95 of GDP.
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April - TOC Octos
We negate. Contention one is the power vacuum Iran has hegemonic and imperial ambitions and would be emboldened if the US pulls out Cropsey and Roughead 19 (Seth Cropsey, Gary Roughead, senior fellow at Hudson Institute and former deputy undersecretary of the U.S. Navy and Robert and Mary Oster distinguished military fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and former U.S. chief of naval operations 10-31-2019, "A U.S. Withdrawal Will Cause a Power Struggle in the Middle East," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/17/us-withdrawal-power-struggle-middle-east-china-russia-iran/ DOA 4/4/20) MDS The Ottoman Empire was the …… down Saudi and Israeli strength. Iran is seeking to export its revolutionary ideology across the Middle East Gardner 19 (Frank Gardner, BBC, 11-7-2019, "Iran's network of influence in Mid-East 'growing'," BBC News, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50324912 DOA 4/4/20) MDS Iran is winning the strategic …… operations and use of third-party forces". Roughead continues Cropsey and Roughead 19 (Seth Cropsey, Gary Roughead, senior fellow at Hudson Institute and former deputy undersecretary of the U.S. Navy and Robert and Mary Oster distinguished military fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and former U.S. chief of naval operations 10-31-2019, "A U.S. Withdrawal Will Cause a Power Struggle in the Middle East," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/17/us-withdrawal-power-struggle-middle-east-china-russia-iran/ DOA 4/4/20) MDS Israel and Saudi Arabia are …… operate on the defensive. War breaks out as countries clash to fill the power vaccum that the US leaves behind Cropsey and Roughead 19 (Seth Cropsey, Gary Roughead, senior fellow at Hudson Institute and former deputy undersecretary of the U.S. Navy and Robert and Mary Oster distinguished military fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and former U.S. chief of naval operations 10-31-2019, "A U.S. Withdrawal Will Cause a Power Struggle in the Middle East," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/17/us-withdrawal-power-struggle-middle-east-china-russia-iran/ DOA 4/4/20) MDS The unique mix of …… a future conflict with China.” Contention two is Saudi Arabia Nuclearization Knights writes in 2018 (Michael Knights, senior fellow of The Washington Institute, specializing in the military and security affairs of Iraq, Iran, and the Persian Gulf states. “U.S.-Saudi Security Cooperation (Part 1): Conditioning Arms Sales to Build Leverage.” November 5, 2018. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/u.s.-saudi-security-cooperation-part-1-conditioning-arms-sales-to-build-lev. DOA: 1/17/2019) DE The U.S.-Saudi strategic relationship ……defense industry and general economy. Troop pullout substantially damages our security commitments, Saab 18 confirms(Bilal Saab, Senior Fellow and Director of the defense and security program at the Middle East Institute and Adjunct Assistant Professor at Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program, 22 Aug 2018, “Relocating the Fifth Fleet?”, https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/08/22/relocating-the-fifth-fleet/ DOA 3/12/20)KJR Indeed, it’s impossible to overstate …… their security relationship with Washington. Significantly decreasing security commitments with Saudi Arabia could cause them to proliferate Brown 2017 (J. Wellington Brown, Major and intelligence offer at the USAF. “INDISPENSABLE NATION: US SECURITY GUARANTEES AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION” https://www.hsdl.org/?viewanddid=813351 2017. DoA April 1, 2020) JJ US extended deterrence undergirds …… to prevent forward proliferation movement. The impact is war The Senate committee on foreign relations finds in 08 (COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE, February 2008, “CHAIN REACTION: AVOIDING A NUCLEAR ARMS RACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST” https://fas.org/irp/congress/2008_rpt/chain.pdf DOA 2/19/19) MDS Of any Middle Eastern state, Saudi …… conflict between Arab States and Israel. Contention 3 is Iraq Palani 2020 writes... (Kamaran Palani, Lecturer in IR at Salahaddin University in Erbil. February 18, 2020. Al Jazeera. “Iraq and the US withdrawal conundrum”, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/iraq-withdrawal-conundrum-200218182253463.html . DOA: April 10, 2020.) ALP Newly-appointed Iraqi Prime Minister …… to fuel sectarian tensions in the country. That’s for two reasons. The first is genocide. Turkey has genocidal ambition against the Kurds Ahmed 19 explains, (Qanta Ahmed, a British physician specialising in sleep disorders. She is also an author and commentator, and has contributed articles to The Spectator, Huffington Post and The Jerusalem Post. Oct 22 2019. “The U.S. must engage Kurdistan to stop the humanitarian crisis” nydailynews. https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ny-oped-the-us-must-engage-kurdistan-20191022-tqgqqlgzdbg6vdhrptwzz7t23e-story.html. DOA: April 10 2020) SRW He broke through the ISIS …… of Foreign Relations and member of the USC Shoah Foundation. Other groups are also potentially at risk of spillover Nawzad 20 explains... (Kosar Nawzad, reporter for Kurdistan 24. Jan 10, 2020. “Kurds in disputed Kirkuk say US withdrawal from Iraq ‘will be a disaster’” Kurdistan 24. https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/916ed4bd-58d4-4dba-a7b2-c7a2103dc9b2 . DOA: April 10 2020) SRW The leading proponents of an ….. Kirkuk cafe. “ISIS is still there.” The second impact is terror. When ethnic minorities in Iraq face violence from external actors, they empirically turn to ISIS for protection. After the American withdrawal in 2011, Nowzad 18 explains... (Kosar Nowzad, reporter for Kurdistan 24. Dec 20, 2018. “Over a year later, Islamic State still casts shadow on Iraq's Hawija” Kurdistan 24. https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/f80aff46-7b18-4cfe-a836-a19571e58094. DOA: April 10 2020) SRW In April 2013, former Prime …… renovated or properly cleared away. Thus, Palani 2020 concludes… (Kamaran Palani, Lecturer in IR at Salahaddin University in Erbil. February 18, 2020. Al Jazeera. “Iraq and the US withdrawal conundrum”, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/iraq-withdrawal-conundrum-200218182253463.html . DOA: April 10, 2020.) ALP If Iran-aligned Shia parties ……result in the resurrection of ISIL. Noack 2020 quantifies (Rick Noack, Foreign affairs reporter focusing on Europe and international security, January 10 2020, “Here’s what might happen if the U.S. were to suddenly quit Iraq” The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/01/09/heres-what-might-happen-if-us-were-suddenly-quit-iraq/ DOA: March 21 2020) SP It may end in humanitarian ……effective counter-ISIS campaign,” he said.
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Blake Disclosure Policy
The Blake debate team believes that disclosure serves important educational and competitive goals. We believe that the public forum community is moving in a positive direction and we will support that movement. We will attempt to disclosure our pro and con arguments at the end of each tournament day on this wiki. After we have run a contention level argument we will disclose that verbally if the other team will reciprocate prior to the round. We do think that the wiki is important to do at the end of the tournament day but realize that during the middle of rounds during a tournament day we may not have time so we will verbally disclose. As we run new contentions, new links or new impacts we will then disclose them on the wiki. Please do not look at our wiki information unless you plan to participate and also use the wiki.
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Blake Disclosure Policy
The Blake debate team believes that disclosure serves important educational and competitive goals. We believe that the public forum community is moving in a positive direction and we will support that movement. We will will attempt to disclosure our pro and con arguments at the end of each tournament day on this wiki. After we have run a contention level argument we will disclose that verbally if the other team will reciprocate prior to the round. We do think that the wiki is important to do at the end of the tournament day but realize that during the middle of rounds during a tournament day we may not have time so we will verbally disclose. As we run new contentions, new links or new impacts we will then disclose them on the wiki. Please do not look at our wiki information unless you plan to participate and also use the wiki.
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Blake Disclosure Policy
The Blake debate team believes that disclosure serves important educational and competitive goals. We believe that the public forum community is moving in a positive direction and we will support that movement. We will will attempt to disclosure our pro and con arguments at the end of each tournament day on this wiki. After we have run a contention level argument we will disclose that verbally if the other team will reciprocate prior to the round. We do think that the wiki is important to do at the end of the tournament day but realize that during the middle of rounds during a tournament day we may not have time so we will verbally disclose. As we run new contentions, new links or new impacts we will then disclose them on the wiki. Please do not look at our wiki information unless you plan to participate and also use the wiki.
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Blake OP Neg BRI Version 3
Southern European economies are helping to offset Germany’s downturn (Jack Ewing, New York Times, 8-16-2019, "Germany Has Powered Europe’s Economy. What Happens When Its Engine Stalls?," No Publication, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/16/business/eu-economy-germany-recession.html?auth=login-emailandlogin=email DOA 8/27/19) MDS FRANKFURT — When a debt ... Germany is sickly. BRI goal is to make FTAs (Tu Xinquan, Executive Dean and Professor, the China Institute for WTO Studies at UIBE. Visiting scholar, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS); Visiting researcher, Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP) and WTO Secretariat. Researches the WTO, Chinese trade policy, Agreement on Government Procurement and US-China trade relations., No Date, “Is the Belt and Road Initiative a Chinese-style Regionalism?” http://www.keia.org/sites/default/files/publications/jukas_3.1_is_the_belt_and_road_initiative_a_chinese_style_regionalism.pdf DOA: September 20 2019) SP This chapter concludes ...regional economic integration. FTAs can make recovery more difficult by creating trade deficits (Myriam vander Stichele, an associate at the Transnational Institute monitoring interanational and trade agreements and an advisor to many NGOs. 25 November 1010. “The impact of free trade on the financial crisis … and vice versa,” Transnational Institute, https://www.tni.org/en/paper/impact-free-trade-financial-crisis-and-vice-versa. DOA 8/26/19.) WD The financial and economic ... for some countries face (see below). China will dump steel into Europe and devastate EU industry. (Nicola Casarini, Senior Fellow for East Asia at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and a nonresident Global Fellow at the Wilson Center in Washington. October 2015. IAI. “Is Europe to Benefit from China’s Belt and Road Initiative?”, https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaiwp1540.pdf . DOA: October 18, 2019.) ALP Given the harsh conditions ... resist granting China “market economy status. EU and China accord could lead to Trump putting tariffs (Vasilis Trigkas, Onassis Scholar and research fellow in the Belt and Road Strategy Centre. July 6, 2018. South China Morning Post. “Nato and China summits give Europe a chance to assert its interests and stabilise the global order”, https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/united-states/article/2153948/nato-and-china-summits-give-europe-chance . DOA: July 23, 2019.) ALP In Beijing, EU ... EU’s crown jewels. tariffs on the auto industry would lead to a recession (Anna Isaac, reporter for the Wall Street Journal, was of the Guardian. June 8, 2019. The Telegraph. “Germany braced for catastrophic Trump auto tariffs - which could create a perfect storm for Europe”, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2019/06/08/germany-braced-catastrophic-trump-auto-tariffs-could-create/ . DOA: July 23, 2019.) ALP Germany is braced ... following research in Brussels. EU recession would spread throughout the world (John Mauldin, financial writer, publisher, and New York Times bestselling-author, President of the investment advisory firm Millennium Wave Advisors, LLC. May 24, 2018. Forbes. "The 2020s Might Be The Worst Decade In U.S. History", https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnmauldin/2018/05/24/the-2020s-might-be-the-worst-decade-in-u-s-history/1#49cc3da548d3. DOA: July 22, 2019.) ALP I recently wrote... this tightening cycle. 900 million vulnerable to be pushed back into poverty (IMF, international Monetary Fund. March 14, 2013. IMF.org. “JOBS AND GROWTH: ANALYTICAL AND OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE FUND”, https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/031413.pdf?fbclid=IwAR25z8YmNU34qzj8tb7SOk5yi2xlPWZV6z-LN_jJ-kUZ4JqnCqpiOwr23LM . DOA: July 22, 2019.) ALP At the same ... face of adverse shocks (UN, World Economic Situation and Prospects, 2013). Sand mining putting pressure on rivers (WWF, World Wildlife Fund. AUGUST 22, 2018. “Uncovering sand mining's impacts on the world's rivers,”Phys.org, https://phys.org/news/2018-08-uncovering-sand-impacts-world-rivers.html. DOA: 9/20/19)AO Most sand is used ...and changes to riverside vegetation. BRI uses lots of concrete (William F. Laurance, Distinguished Research Professor at James Cook University, Australia and has been elected as a Fellow of the Australian Academy of Science. He has received an Australian Laureate Fellowship from the Australian Research Council. May 22, 2018. “China’s Global Infrastructure Initiative Could Bring Environmental Catastrophe,” Nexus Media, https://nexusmedianews.com/chinas-global-infrastructure-initiative-could-be-an-environmental-catastrophe-25a40e2d1000. DOA: 9/4/19)AO In biodiversity and environmental ...projects on the planet. China uses a lot of concrete and allows mining in the Mekong (Jeremy Luedi, a Senior Analyst at Global Risks Insights. July 26, 2017. “Under the Radar: Forget the South China Sea, this is Asia’s real water war,” Global Risk Insights, https://globalriskinsights.com/2017/07/mekong-river-asias-real-water-war/. DOA: 9/4/19)AO China’s demand for sand... of oceanic erosion. Mining dries up fish breeding grounds (Fred Pearce, freelance author and journalist based in the U.K. He is a contributing writer for Yale Environment 360 and is the author of numerous books. FEBRUARY 5, 2019. “The Hidden Environmental Toll of Mining the World’s Sand,” Yale Environment 360, https://e360.yale.edu/features/the-hidden-environmental-toll-of-mining-the-worlds-sand. DOA: 9/4/19) AO But the miners simply ... fish breeding grounds. Less sediment means the river cannot replenish itself leading to erosion (Jeremy Luedi, a Senior Analyst at Global Risks Insights. July 26, 2017. “Under the Radar: Forget the South China Sea, this is Asia’s real water war,” Global Risk Insights, https://globalriskinsights.com/2017/07/mekong-river-asias-real-water-war/. DOA: 9/4/19)AO China’s demand for ...of oceanic erosion. Decline in delta health could affect Vietnam’s food supply (Mervyn Piesse, Research Manager, Global Food and Water Crises Research Programme. 17 OCTOBER 2018. “Food and Water Security Implications of Sand Mining,” Future Directions International, http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/food-and-water-security-implications-of-sand-mining/. DOA: 9/6/19) AO Erosion has increased... of saltwater intrusion. Rice prices surged because of ban on export and shortages and increased prices (European Commission, executive branch of the European Union. 20 January 2011. “Causes of the 2007-2008 global food crisis identified,” Science for Environment Policy DG Environment News Alert Service, https://ec.europa.eu/environment/integration/research/newsalert/pdf/225na1_en.pdf. DOA: 10/11/19) AO Of particular concern ... to protect domestic prices. rice prices surged in 2008 because export restrictions/panic buying leading to a billion people pushed into poverty Wailes et al. 2012 (Eric Wailes, lead author of "ASEAN and Global Rice Situation and Outlook", is an agricultural economics and agribusiness professor at the University of Arkansas. Ramon Clarete, author of "Enhancing ASEAN's Resiliency to Extreme Rice Price Volatility", is Dean of the University of the Philippines School of Economics. Roehlano Briones, lead author of "Climate Change and Price Volatility: Can We Count on the ASEAN Plus Three Emergency Rice Reserve?", is a senior research fellow at the Philippine Institute of Development Studies. Framroze Pochara, author of "Commodities Exchange: Options for Addressing Price Risk and Price Volatility in Rice", is a capital markets veteran with over 25 years of experience in the industry. 30 August 2012. “Food Security in Asia: The 2007-2008 Food Price Crisis,” Asian Development Bank, https://www.adb.org/features/has-world-learned-2007-2008-food-price-crisis. DOA: 9/21/19)AO In 2007-2008, rice ...Asia and across the world.
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UBI Definition Kearney and Mogstad 2019 explain (Melissa S. Kearney* and Magne Mogstad, researchers at The Aspen Institute, August 23, 2019, “Universal Basic Income (UBI) as a Policy Response to Current Challenges” https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/UBI-ESG-Memo-082319.pdf DOA: January 10 2020) SP “Table 1 outlines... year, with a few” Enabling wage negotiation Amadeo 2019(Kimberly Amadeo, writer for the balance. Published 12-13-2019, "Should Everyone Get a Guaranteed Income?," Balance, https://www.thebalance.com/universal-basic-income-4160668. DOA January 4 2019) GKH “An unconditional basic ...during a recession.: Employers can not exploit workers IWG (International Workplace Group, a multinational provider of serviced offices and coworking spaces sponsoring MagazineUS. No Date. “How Universal Basic Income could transform work as we know it” IWG. https://www.regus.com/work-us/universal-basic-income-transform-work-know/. DOA: Jan 10 2019) SRW “What’s more, the...otherwise be possible.” Jobs best way out poverty Indrawati 17 (Sri Mulyani Indrawati, Chief Operating Officer and Managing Director at the World Bank, Huffington Post, Dec 6 2017, “Jobs - The Fastest Road Out Of Poverty”, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/jobs~-~--the-fastest-road-o_b_10404594 // DOA: 1/25/20)JDE “Good jobs are...for the poor.” high schoolers dropping out of school are doing so to make time to work. Rosales 15 (John Rosales, contributor for NEAToday, NEAToday, June 8 2015, “Why Students Drop Out: The Economic Pressures That Make Leaving School Unavoidable”, http://neatoday.org/2015/06/08/why-students-drop-out-the-economic-pressures-that-make-leaving-school-unavoidable/ // DOA: 1/26/20)JDE “Among high school...native-born U.S. citizens.” Rosales 15 (John Rosales, contributor for NEAToday, NEAToday, June 8 2015, “Why Students Drop Out: The Economic Pressures That Make Leaving School Unavoidable”, http://neatoday.org/2015/06/08/why-students-drop-out-the-economic-pressures-that-make-leaving-school-unavoidable/ // DOA: 1/26/20)JDE “In some cases...receive food stamps.” UBI solves this problem IWG (International Workplace Group, a multinational provider of serviced offices and coworking spaces sponsoring MagazineUS. No Date. “How Universal Basic Income could transform work as we know it” IWG. https://www.regus.com/work-us/universal-basic-income-transform-work-know/. DOA: Jan 10 2019) SRW “ Smarter school-leavers...manage this transition.” UBI increase graduation Ruckert et al 17 (Arne Ruckert, Senior research associate for the Journal of Public Health, 2-2-2017, "Reducing health inequities: is universal basic income the way forward?," OUP Academic, https://academic.oup.com/jpubhealth/article/40/1/3/2966187, DOA: 1/7/20)ET “Education has a...and overall health” Poverty rate increases for those without a high school diploma Child Fund International 13 (Child Fund International, works with local partner organizations, governments, corporations and individuals to help create the safe environments children need to thrive, Child Fund International, Nov 4 2013, “The Effects of Poverty on Education in the United States”, https://www.childfund.org/Content/NewsDetail/2147489206/ // DOA: 1/26/20)JDE “The poverty rate... in poor health.” Entrepreneurship Santens 2016 (Scott Santens, Writer for Medium; Citizen of Earth and New Orleans; Bachelor of Science in Psychology, “Universal Basic Income Will Accelerate Innovation by Reducing Our Fear of Failure”, Nov 30, 2016, https://medium.com/basic-income/universal-basic-income-will-accelerate-innovation-by-reducing-our-fear-of-failure-b81ee65a254 DOA: January 27, 2019) SP “Meanwhile, entrepreneurship is...paramount to innovation.” UBI afford to create new products Santens 2016 (Scott Santens, Writer for Medium; Citizen of Earth and New Orleans; Bachelor of Science in Psychology, “Universal Basic Income Will Accelerate Innovation by Reducing Our Fear of Failure”, Nov 30, 2016, https://medium.com/basic-income/universal-basic-income-will-accelerate-innovation-by-reducing-our-fear-of-failure-b81ee65a254 DOA: January 27, 2019) SP “If everyone received...of buying power” UBI will increase consumer spending and increase economic growth Schiller 2017 (Ben Schiller, A NEW YORK STAFF WRITER FOR FAST COMPANY. PREVIOUSLY, HE EDITED A EUROPEAN MANAGEMENT MAGAZINE AND WAS A REPORTER IN SAN FRANCISCO, PRAGUE, AND BRUSSELS, 09-13-17, “A Universal Basic Income Would Do Wonders For The U.S. Economy” Fast Company https://www.fastcompany.com/40463533/a-universal-basic-income-would-do-wonders-for-the-u-s-economy DOA: February 6, 2020) SP “The new analysis...taxes increases spending.” ending poverty Murray 08 (Charles Murray, The Foundation for Law, Justice and Society in collaboration with The Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, University of Oxford. Nov 17 2008. “Guaranteed Income as a Replacement for the Welfare State”. FLJS. https://www.fljs.org/files/publications/Murray.pdf. DOA: Jan 8 2020) SRW “Immediate effects 3... GI affect them” UBI life millions out of poverty Heller 18(Nathan Heller, Writer for New Yorker, New York Times, Vouge, Socioeconomics writer. July 2nd 2018. “Who really stands to win from Universal Basic Income” The New Yorker, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/07/09/who-really-stands-to-win-from-universal-basic-income 12/25/19) TCS “Framing basic income... cash as needed?” If we continue our current trajectory, America will tip into recession by next year Marte 2019 (Jonnelle Marte, Economics Researcher for the New York Federal Reserve, Went Columbia Business School, and past Financial Expert for Washington Post, August 21 2019, “3 out of 4 economists predict a U.S. recession by 2021, survey finds” Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/08/19/out-economists-predict-us-recession-by-survey-finds/ DOA: January 21, 2019) SP “Most economists believe..into safer assets.” Boosting the economy is critically effective Nikoforos et. al 2017 (Michalis Nikiforos research scholar working in the State of the US and World Economies program. Published August 2017. Roosevelt Institute, https://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Modeling-the-Macroeconomic-Effects-of-a-Universal-Basic-Income.pdf. DOA January 6 2019) SRW “If the distribution...of the economy.” UBI expands econ Nikoforos 2017 (Michalis Nikiforos research scholar working in the State of the US and World Economies program. Published August 2017. Roosevelt Institute, https://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Modeling-the-Macroeconomic-Effects-of-a-Universal-Basic-Income.pdf. DOA January 6 2019) GH ‘For all three...propensity to consume’ Creating growth to stop any upcoming recession will be crucial Mauldin 2018 (John Mauldin, financial writer, publisher, and New York Times bestselling-author, President of the investment advisory firm Millennium Wave Advisors, LLC. May 24, 2018. Forbes. "The 2020s Might Be The Worst Decade In U.S. History", https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnmauldin/2018/05/24/the-2020s-might-be-the-worst-decade-in-u-s-history/1#49cc3da548d3. DOA: July 22, 2019.) ALP “I recently wrote..this tightening cycle.” IMF 2013 (Olivier Blanchard, Carlo Cottarelli, and Siddharth Tiwari, 03/14/2013, JOBS AND GROWTH: ANALYTICAL AND OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE FUND, https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/031413.pdf DOA: July 16, 2019) SCK “Following very weak..and Prospects, 2013).”
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Education Aff
C1) Marginalized Students Public schools don’t serve students of color well Fantuzzo et al 11(John Fantuzzo, professor at University of Pennsylvania Graduate School of Education, Whitney LeBoeuf, Heather Rouse, Chin-Chih Chen, “Academic achievement of African American boys: A city-wide, community-based investigation of risk and resilience,” Journal of School Psychology, http://www.aisp.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Academic_achievement_AfAmer_boys_PreviousPhilly.pdf, DOA: 5/20/20 “Since the first national...mathematics than White boys” Culturally sensitive curriculum Almond 12(Monica R. Almond, fall 2012 “The Black Charter School Effect: Black Students in American Charter Schools.” The Journal of Negro Education, www.jstor.org/stable/10.7709/jnegroeducation.81.4.0354. DOA: 31 May 2020)ET “ charters are not operating ...assets of Black children” Providing Social and emotional support Scott et al 14(Lakia M. Scott, Assistant Professor in the Department of Curriculum and Instruction at Rutgers, Ayana Allen, Chance W. Lewis, Spring 2014, " Dispelling Disparities for African American Male Students: A Review of Three Successful Charter School Models ," Journal of African American Males in Education, http://journalofafricanamericanmales.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Scott-Allen-Lewis-20143.pdf, DOA: 5/28/20)ET “schools strive to ...counseling, and parental support.” This is critical as student support systems help low-income students and students of color pass courses Boston College 17(Boston College, 2014, "," Boston College Center for Optimized Student Support, https://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/lsoe/sites/coss/pdfs/Research20brief20ISS.pdf, DOA: 5/31/20)ET “students in an ...for students of color,” Currently very few African American students can access gifted programs in public schools Grissom and Redding 16(Jason A. Grissom, Vanderbilt University, Christopher Redding, Vanderbilt University, 1-19-2016, "Discretion and Disproportionality: Explaining the Underrepresentation of High-Achieving Students of Color in Gifted Programs," AERA open, https://www.aera.net/Newsroom/News-Releases-and-Statements/Does-Student-Race-Affect-Gifted-Assignment/Discretion-and-Disproportionality-Explaining-the-Underrepresentation-of-High-Achieving-Students-of-Color-in-Gifted-Programs, DOA: 5/30/20)ET “Substantial race disparities... increased academic performance” Charter schools fill this gap Scott et al 14(Lakia M. Scott, Assistant Professor in the Department of Curriculum and Instruction at Rutgers, Ayana Allen, Chance W. Lewis, Spring 2014, " Dispelling Disparities for African American Male Students: A Review of Three Successful Charter School Models ," Journal of African American Males in Education, http://journalofafricanamericanmales.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Scott-Allen-Lewis-20143.pdf, DOA: 5/28/20)ET “These schools do...traditional school settings.” The impact is increasing graduation rates. Lake et al 2019(Robin Lake, director for the Center on Reinventing Public Education, Ashley Jochim, senior research analyst at the CRPE, founder of CRPE, research analyst at the CRPE, May 2019, Do the Costs of California Charter Schools Outweigh the Benefits?, Center on Reinventing Public Education, https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED595193.pdf, DOA: 4/28/20) SM “charter high school... of attending college.” Without a highschool diploma poverty rates increase Child Fund International 13 (Child Fund International, works with local partner organizations, governments, corporations and individuals to help create the safe environments children need to thrive, Child Fund International, Nov 4 2013, “The Effects of Poverty on Education in the United States”, https://www.childfund.org/Content/NewsDetail/2147489206/ // DOA: 1/26/20)JDE “People who do ...be persistently poor between ages 25 and 30.” Contention 2 is Competition First, by increasing innovation Finn et al 2017 states (Chester Finn, Jr., distinguished senior fellow and president emeritus at the Thomas B. Fordham Institute and senior fellow at Stanford’s Hoover Institution. Bruno V. Manno, a senior adviser for K-12 education at the Walton Family Foundation. Brandon Wright, editorial director of the Thomas B. Fordham Institute. 8 May 2017. “The Purpose of Charter Schools,” U.S. News and World Report, https://www.usnews.com/opinion/knowledge-bank/articles/2017-05-08/how-charter-schools-improve-traditional-district-education. DOA 5/27/20) WD “. Chartering can advance...in district schools.” This is empirically true Finn continues (Chester Finn, Jr., distinguished senior fellow and president emeritus at the Thomas B. Fordham Institute and senior fellow at Stanford’s Hoover Institution. Bruno V. Manno, a senior adviser for K-12 education at the Walton Family Foundation. Brandon Wright, editorial director of the Thomas B. Fordham Institute. 8 May 2017. “The Purpose of Charter Schools,” U.S. News and World Report, https://www.usnews.com/opinion/knowledge-bank/articles/2017-05-08/how-charter-schools-improve-traditional-district-education. DOA 5/27/20) WD “Washington, D.C. is ...surprising amount of collaboration” Additionally Cordes 18 corroborates (Sarah A. Cordes is assistant professor of policy, organizational, and leadership studies at Temple University, Spring 2018, "Charters and the Common Good: The spillover effects of charter schools in New York City," Education Next, https://www.educationnext.org/charters-and-common-good-spillover-effects-charter-schools-new-york-city/ // DOA: 4/30/20)JDE “after charter school...in school practices.” The second way is through choice Donohue 2014 (Thomas J. Donohue, Chief Executive Officer at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. 15 September 2014. “Five Ways to Improve Education,” U.S. Chamber of Commerce, https://www.uschamber.com/above-the-fold/five-ways-improve-education. DOA 5/13/20) WD “When schools prove ...n will serve students well.” Empirically, charter competition leads to increased achievement Cremata and Raymond 2014 (Edward J. Cremata, the director of research and analytics at Aspire Public Schools, a network of 40 charter schools in low-income communities in California and Tennessee. He previously worked as a researcher and econometrician at Stanford University. Margaret E. Raymond, founder and director of the Center for Research on Education Outcomes (CREDO) at Stanford University since its inception in 1999. 1 March 2014. “The Competitive Effects of Charter Schools: Evidence from the District of Columbia,” Stanford University, https://web-app.usc.edu/web/rossierphd/publications/14/DC20Competitive20Impacts20-20Working20Paper.pdf. DOA 5/18/20) WD “The impact of...significant in every specification.” And Forster in 2016 finds Forster 2016 (Greg Forster, Senior Fellow at EdChoice whose work has appeared in the Washington Post and Los Angeles Times. May 2016. EdChoice. “A WIN-WIN SOLUTION- The Empirical Evidence on School Choice”, http://www.edchoice.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/A-Win-Win-Solution-The-Empirical-Evidence-on-School-Choice.pdf . DOA: June 7, 2020.) ALP “Thirty-three empirical...mproved public schools.” The impact is quality Malin et al 2020 (Joel R. Malin, Assistant Professor of Educational Leadership at Miami University, Christopher Lubienski, Professor of education policy at Indiana University, Queenstar Mensa-Bonsu, Doctoral student at Miami University. 2020. “Media Strategies in Policy Advocacy: Tracing the Justifications for Indiana’s School Choice Reforms,” Sage Journals. journals.sagepub.com/home/epx. DOA: 4/30/20) AO “monopolistic control of ...outcomes across the board”
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SMASH MAINS
Isaac - Lucina Toby - King Dedede
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disclosure
Also if you want me to disclose in a particular way, message me 15 minutes before the round at 929-285-8842 or on FB messenger. Otherwise, we'll assume this is terminal defense on disclosure.
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January - Economic Warfare
open sourced, all evidence cut below
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Contact
Please email [email protected] for disclosure.
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AFF
When the EU joins the BRI they get more leverage in two ways: First, is multilateralism. Precedent proves multilateralism is an effective negotiating strategy when dealing with China. The EU will garner this leverage by joining as a bloc. Zheng Wang of the Diplomat explains that UNCLOS was the first multilateral deal China handled since it joined the UN. China caved in despite UNCLOS being opposite to their goals. Second, is funding Ciurtin of the European Institute of Romania explains that in order to expand the BRI, China needs another 3 trillion dollars of European funding. Since every other world power refuses to join the BRI, Europe is the only possible partner left. If the EU decides to join, they can exploit this leverage to their advantage China knows the most feasible source of funding is Europe. China is willing to bargain anything and everything to save the BRI because as Huileng Tan of CNBC finds, The BRI was enshrined into the Chinese constitution due to its status as Xi Jinping’s pet project, signifying extreme commitment Thus, our sole contention is leverage. Subpoint A is Eu/China relations. As in Sri Lanka, China seeks to debt trap developing countries, but it knows better when dealing with the EU. CNBC noted in 2018 that China uses the BRI explicitly to invest in smaller economies. As we’ve seen from which states in the EU have joined, China has thus far been successful in recruiting the some of the 16 weakest economies in Europe. However, since China wants European support, leverage has shifted in favor of the EU. The Association for South Eastern Asian Nations provides precedent. ASEAN often “punches above their weight in regional affairs, Evelyn Goh, a writer for the ASAN forum notes. ASEAN has this ability because of its multilateral unity. Despite ASEAN members being relatively weak and prime targets for debt traps, multilateral negotiation increased transparency in the loan process and prevented exploitation. Herbling and Li of Bloomberg explain that just last month, China withheld 4.9 billion USD from Kenya and Uganda. This forces countries to try and raise the capital needed to complete the project themselves with the threat of Chinese reappropriation if they fail. At best, Kenya and Uganda lose their largest infrastructure project and all the money they sunk into it. Additionally, Tan 19 of CNBC found that China is incredibly vague in the loaning process which is problematic as citizens can’t hold officials accountable for the debt they accrue while economies stagnate in the face of the hidden debt produced by these deals. The most disastrous consequence of debt trapping is activation of the EU’s excessive deficit procedure. The EDP auto-triggers if budget deficit exceeds 3 of GDP, something inevitable in weaker European states if China continues its strategy. The EDP encourages countries to adopt austerity policies, where governments cut spending and increase taxes. Stiglitz of Oxfam notes that historically austerity policies have consistently failed, leading to violent popular protests. He concludes that up to 25 million more could fall into poverty if austerity continues. Subpoint B is Saving the World According to the Global Environment Institute, China has supported 240 coal power projects in 65 BRI countries in the 15-year period before 2016, preventing poor countries from meeting climate goals. Another study released in January by the Ohio-based Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis found that China is funding over one-fourth of all the coal-fired power plants under development outside the country. The study estimated that China has committed 35.9 billion USD of funding for coal power projects in 27 countries A detailed Tufts study co-authored by Gallagher last year found numerous Chinese government guidelines and regulations for BRI projects, including rules that all must have environmental impact assessments. However, none of the rules seem to have stopped BRI from spreading pollution. According to SourceWatch, there are 500 coal plants which each produces .06 of the world’s emissions. If the EU can close all 15 in China or the 300 that China has built in BRI member countries, they can stop up to 20 of emissions according to Steve Inskeep of NPRnews. The EU has already allocated $45 billion to reducing emissions and is dedicated to reducing emissions according to the LA times The Library of Congress explains that preventing air pollution is a major focus of EU economic policy. The EU won’t have its cash spent on coal plants in other countries, since memoranda of understanding are not legally binding, the EU can cease funding if its money is used to build coal plants. In addition, Dunlop, in a study published by the National Centre for Climate Restoration, indicates that current emission levels will make civilization impossible by 2050 , driving nearly 8 billion into poverty and causing extinction. Thus, we affirm
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Contention 1 is Social Growth. The current trend of economic growth in the United States is significantly misleading - the workforce is in terrible shape and signs of poverty are only increasing. Jana Kasperkevic, 2-2-2019, "Why record job growth in America hides a troubling reality," Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/feb/02/america-record-job-growth-economics-wage-stagnation // IL January marked the 100th consecutive month of job creation in the United States – a record breaking streak of job creation that has left employers scrambling to find workers and dragged the long-term unemployed back into the market. Yet even now, 20m jobs later, there are some parts of the US economy that have yet to reflect the positive image projected by the continuous job growth and low unemployment rate. “That we’ve had the unemployment rate at or below 4 since last February is obviously historically remarkable,” said Mark Hamrick, senior economic analyst at Bankrate.com. “But the composition of the workforce or employment obviously paints a much more complicated story.” US economy adds jobs for record 100th consecutive month What troubles analysts like Hamrick, as well as the central bankers at the Federal Reserve, is the fact that the US economy is now dominated by high skill, high wage jobs and low skill, low wage jobs. Gone are many of the middle skill, middle wage jobs and that, said Hamrick, a trend that has led to “not only the economic divisiveness of our country but to some degree the political divisiveness”. Take manufacturing for example, where about 25 of jobs have disappeared over the last two decades thanks to globalization and automation. It isn’t just middle wage jobs that are missing from this job market. There is also the mystery of stagnant wages. Even as jobs were added, the one thing that remained mostly the same for large part of those 100 months were the wages. In December, wages were up 3.2 from a year earlier, their largest gain since 2008 but nothing to boast about. In January growth slipped to 3.1. According to the Economic Policy Institute (EPI), a left-leaning thinktank, wages would have to grow between 3.5 to 4 for average workers to really feel an impact. The wage growth figures, particularly in the early part of the recovery, should have come with “a sad trombone sound effect” said Hamrick. That low wage growth will be one of the main things people remember about this recovery, he added. If anyone needed a reminder that many Americans live paycheck to paycheck while working full-time, the past month should have done the job. The 35-day government shutdown led to two missed paycheck for about 800,000 workers and many of them had to rely on food banks for their meals, deferred some of their bills and skipped payments on those they couldn’t cover. A recent survey by Bankrate.com found that just 40 of US households have enough money to cover a $1,000 in emergency expenses. Employers think they should be able to get whoever they want at those lower wagesElise Gould, economist Another survey found that 62 of employees received no salary increase in 2018 and just 25 were determined to look for a better job this year. All these dark clouds seem counterintuitive to the numbers coming out of the Department of Labor each month. When the labor market is tight – meaning the unemployment rate is low and fewer people are looking for jobs – the bargaining power is supposed to be in the hands of the workers. The employers competing to fill empty jobs are supposed to be offering better wages and benefits to attract the best candidates. Low unemployment rate number is also supposed to make workers optimistic about their chances of getting a new, better paying job. And yet the shadow of the Great Recession still seems to loom large over America’s workers. People are still scared and mainly want job security, according to Elise Gould, senior economist at EPI. “A little bit of what happened is that in the recession, employers got a lot more bargaining power and strength because workers really needed to try to have whatever job that they could get and some of that’s left over,” she explained. “Employers think they should be able to get whoever they want at those lower wages. And I think that that will turn around, but it’s surprising that it hasn’t yet given the unemployment rate that we’re at today.” Gould pointed out that the unemployment rate only considers people who are actively looking for work. It does not count people who are working part time but want full-time jobs or those long-term unemployed who have stopped looking but are available to work. The rate that does count all of them is called U-6. In January, that number was 8.1 – double the unemployment rate which was 4. The current labor market is still improving and has brought some optimism to the long-term unemployed. “You see them coming back into the labor market every month,” said Gould. And their return is often a successful one. “The one series that is under-appreciated is the share of newly employed workers who said they were not actively searching for work in the previous month. That is at a historic high. You have more than seven in 10 newly employed workers this month that were not actually looking for a job last month.” This is a result of a structural problem with the means tested welfare system, not the people. Alana Semuels, 7-11-2016, " The Near Impossibility of Moving Up After Welfare”, The Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/07/life-after-welfare/490586/ In the wake of welfare reform, unemployed people are pushed to quickly find work, any work. But too often those jobs lead nowhere. Vance, 31, is a single mother of two who hasn’t worked for more than a year. She’s on Wisconsin’s version of welfare, called Wisconsin Works, or W-2, which provides her with $650 a month. In order to receive that money, Vance is required to look for a job, and if she doesn’t find one, she’ll eventually lose her benefits. The challenge, for Vance and for millions of people like her, is that the jobs available don’t provide much of a chance to build a better life. Most of the jobs that she is qualified for pay around the minimum wage, which, at $7.25 an hour in Wisconsin, Vance says, is not enough to cover her rent, groceries, and gas, and allow her to have anything left over. Saving up to go back to college is out of the question, and she’s not allowed to go back to school while she’s receiving W-2. “They say, ‘Go, get a minimum wage job, just to get your butt off W-2, and then you won’t have to depend on us,” she told me. “But we need more than that. You know we need more than that.” Replacing means tested welfare programs with a universal basic income, or UBI, stimulates the workforce for three reasons: First is Protecting Workers Rights. A UBI creates social freedom and political power. Bickman 17(Jed Bickman is an editor at The New Press, a non-profit book publisher. He is the writer for The Sprouter, an online magazine discussing politics in the Trump era., 7-15-2017, "What Are We Worth? Part 5: Counter-counterarguments," Spouter Magazine, https://thespouter.com/what-are-we-worth-part-5-counter-counterarguments-b284cfb7df9a?gi=17911e17b09a) //SM *Brackets in Original* One fear mainstream economists have is that a basic income would create, in the words of Eduardo Porter writing in the New York Times, a “disincentive to work,” especially for the “almost quarter of American households who make less than $25,000 a year. It would hardly be surprising if a $10,000 check each for mom and dad sapped their desire to work.” On whose behalf does Porter feel this anxiety? Ostensibly, for mom and dad themselves. In the paragraph immediately preceding, he says “Work…is not just what people do for a living. It is a source of status. It organizes people’s lives. It offers an opportunity for progress. None of this can be replaced by a check.” If all this is true, why would the check create a disincentive to work? Porter’s true fear is my hope: that the threat of economic desperation will no longer loom over the working poor, and they will be less inclined to let their bosses abuse and take advantage of them. (Other basic income advocates such as Scott Santens and Andy Stern argue for a basic income exactly because it would shrink the workforce. They think that technological change will soon eliminate the need for large sectors of the workforce, and they may very well be right. I don’t know whether their predictions will come true. I don’t disagree with them, but I can’t prove them right, either.) Of course labor is often gratifying, and even waged and salaried work is frequently gratifying, especially to privileged middle-class professionals like myself. But to argue that wage-earning is inherently more dignified and noble than unpaid pursuits ignores the tremendous suffering that people experience on the job. Take, for instance, the experience of Erika Morales, a night-shift janitor who cleaned corporate office buildings in California (her case was described by the excellent journalist Bernice Yeung in her expose, Rape on the Night Shift, which is a must-read). Her boss took advantage of her isolated working conditions to repeatedly harass and even rape her in supply closets. She thought about quitting, but she said, “in that moment…I didn’t have another income for myself and my two children.” Her abuser was a serial rapist who consciously took advantage of the economic vulnerability of the women workers he oversaw, telling a reporter that “these women” were “doing it all for the money.” This representative story, I think, says more about work in America today than any set of statistics. The bargain of many people’s jobs is trading desperation for exploitation. And yet we almost never hear these stories spoken aloud. The ideology that even very low-wage and very degrading wage work confers upon laborers some intangible level of dignity has its roots in the “happy slave” narratives that were used for hundreds of years to excuse slavery?—?a foundational trope in American culture. America has clung to the slavery-era idea that work is an inherent good, but since Blacks are a lazy people, they must be forced to work, for their own good. This trope has easily been subsumed into the contemporary misconception that people who receive welfare and food stamp benefits are lazy. When Arlie Hochschild interviewed white Tea Party supporters in Louisiana to understand their political convictions, many of them talked about welfare as something that set them against the idea of government in general, saying things like, “I think if people refuse to work, we should let them starve,” and “With welfare what it is, it’s not worth it to get a real job,” and that welfare recipients “lazed around days and partied at night.”i All of these people said they were proud of their “hard work” in contrast to these dissolute poor people. Although few of those interviewed had regular interactions with Black people, this sentiment must be put in the context of the racialized discourse around welfare; studies have shown that news stories about welfare and negative stories about poverty continue to be illustrated with Black faces. Meanwhile, stories about poor people overcoming hardship to succeed are predominantly about whites (pdf). Discourse aside, the Black unemployment rate is twice the overall unemployment rate?—?and for the last seventy years, has always been double, in good economic times and bad (pdf). The “unemployment rate” is not a measure of who isn’t working; it’s a measure of who is out actively looking for a job but unable to find one?—?in other words, the people counted by this statistic are desperately seeking employment but shut out of the economy. This is the result of a confluence of problems: divestment in Black communities’ schools; exclusion from unions and other worker protections (the unemployment gap between Black and white people emerged as unionization expanded in the mid-20th century), and employer discrimination. Although this deep attachment to the ideal of “hard work” is not always so explicitly racist, it always carries its racial history along with it. The strong labor movement of the 20th century has left behind a residue of blue-collar pride that said work is essential to masculine dignity because it allows a man to achieve “independence.” People who argue from this vantage point typically have a certain type of work in mind when they wax poetic about the dignity of honest jobs, and it’s not the service and retail jobs that dominate today’s economy. As historian Adolph Reed, Jr. points out, the unionized manufacturing jobs of the 20th century that everyone is so nostalgic about are most often associated with white men, the latter with women, people of color, and women of color, and thus seen as “degraded.” The American ideal of “hard work” is not universal?—?it is raced, and gendered. It only applies to some people doing some kinds of jobs. Further, this notion of work is androcentric, as Almaz Zelleke defines it, taking “men’s dominant life patterns…to represent the norm for all…an assumption of an autonomous, independent worker as the model citizen.“ii This valorization of waged work slights unpaid care and domestic work. If such pro-labor advocates do acknowledge the “crisis of care,” as philosopher Nancy Fraser terms it iii, they are likely to embrace policies that make childcare universal in order to allow more women to shed their daytime family responsibilities and become autonomous, independent workers in this model. Universal childcare is a laudable policy goal in conjunction with an unconditional basic income, but in the absence of basic income, most mothers are forced by economic need to go out and work for a wage. Zelleke points out that these policies reinforce the androcentric idea that individual women can only reach their full potential in the public sphere or in jobs?—?i.e. empower women, but only as long as it contributes to the GDP. This doesn’t reduce the incentive to work, however. Santens 16 (Scott . Writer and advocate of basic income for all; Citizen of Earth and New Orleans; Bachelor of Science in Psychology; Moderator of the /r/BasicIncome community on Reddit; Founder of the BIG Patreon Creator Pledge. “Inequality and the Basic Income Guarantee”. 2-26-2016. Medium. https://medium.com/basic-income/inequality-and-the-basic-income-guarantee-c8f84d936640) //TruLe Expansionary monetary policy Funding through money creation would also directly decrease income inequality but it would not be advised as the sole source of funding, as inflation would serve to impact the poor disproportionately, increasing costs of living and eroding the effective value of the basic income. For this reason a basic income should either be funded entirely or mostly by redistribution with only partial funding through any expansion of the money supply. Indirect effects of basic income on income inequality The indirect effects of basic income on inequality are less obvious but very much there. The most notable indirect effects are possible through two channels: large multiplier effects, and increased entrepreneurship. Multiplier effects A recent macroeconomic model showed the surprising results of food stamps not only having the greatest stimulus effects of all U.S. transfer programs, but also the greatest stabilizing effects of any current fiscal policy. The origin of the stimulus is in the redistribution to those with the highest propensity to consume?—?the poorest. This is known as the multiplier effect, and although food stamps have been found as showing the highest multiplier effect of U.S. programs of 1.79 (where the spending of $1 adds $1.79 to the economy), even higher levels have been observed in countries with basic income-like unconditional cash transfers. Some examples of UCT multipliers: Malawi (2.45), Lesotho (2.23), and Ethiopia (2.50). In contrast, the multiplier effect of Wall Street bonuses was calculated to be 0.39. Giving money to the rich slows the economy, while giving money to the poor grows it. Entrepreneurship One notable effect across all projects and pilot experiments of basic income is the increase in numbers of people starting their own businesses. GiveDirectly?—?a charity creating troves of valuable data by transforming the lives of the poorest in places like Kenya and Uganda through nothing but cash has referred to this on their blog with the observation that “there’s no charity for power saws.” In surveying the villages of those given basic incomes, they discovered that people were using their money as startup capital. One couple bought a solar panel to charge others’ cell phones. One person bought a power saw to employ himself as a tree trimmer and wood seller. Another person bought a motorbike to leave the farm behind and go into business for himself. Another person bought a tractor and was then able to create employment on her farm for others in the village. The examples go on. What are the effects of all this enhanced entrepreneurship on future incomes? In Uganda a 49 increase in earnings was found over the first two years and a 41 increase remained another two years later. Meanwhile in Kenya, incomes were found to be 33 higher one year later. These are increases in earnings above and beyond the basic incomes only made possible by receiving them. This kind of result is not an anomaly, but a common finding where a basic income is given. People use the cash given to them to increase their labor market incomes. This effectively decreases income inequality even further than a basic income alone. Direct effects of basic income on wealth inequality Basic income can be funded in a variety of ways and so extends beyond taxing incomes to methods of directly taxing forms of wealth. Although not limited to these four, wealth-based basic income funding options include: land-value taxation, transaction taxes, natural resource royalties, and taxation of corporate stock. Land-value taxation (LVT) A tax on land values would serve as a means of transferring wealth from land-owners to non-land owners when used in combination with a basic income. Advocates of LVT have long seen it as a means of eliminating income taxes entirely, which could have the end result of being regressive in nature. If added as an additional tax to pay for basic income, LVT would serve to redistribute towards those who own no land, helping make it possible for more people to acquire their own land. Natural resource royalties Funding a basic income using natural resources is essentially the Alaska Model. By taking 25 of the revenue earned by charging oil companies for the rights to drill on Alaska-owned land, and depositing it in a large wealth fund, Alaska is able to annually distribute a dividend universally to all its residents. The size of this dividend in 2015 was $2,072 per resident. By charging companies rent for the use of public resources, this method can be seen as a way of making citizens partial owners of all natural resources, reducing the wealth of corporations without actually raising their taxes. Essentially this is a way of transferring money from corporations to the public as a cost of doing business instead of a tax. Transaction taxes A transaction tax could take the form of taxing all transactions as a tiny tax on everything. It could also just focus solely on the financial sector by taxing all trades in general, or more specifically tax only high-frequency trades. In any case, this form of tax would have the largest effect on those with the most money doing the most transactions, reducing wealth gains at the top. Paired with a basic income, this lessened wealth at the top would help grow wealth at the bottom. Stock taxation With most wealth at the top existing in the form of private investments, a tax on corporate stocks might possibly be the most direct taxation of wealth possible. Paired with a basic income, this would serve as a transfer of wealth from the richest (who own most of the stock) to the poorest (who own no stock), also enabling the poorest to actually obtain some of their own stock. Indirect effects of basic income on wealth inequality Aside from the potential direct ways of reducing wealth inequality through a basic income, there exist more long-term secondary effects which go on to reduce wealth inequality even further. These secondary effects of basic income on wealth arise in the same way basic income enhances entrepreneurship – it increases opportunity. It expands on the ability of people to take actions they could not otherwise take. These actions can lead to greater wealth through the newly granted opportunity to gain wealth that would not otherwise exist at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder. Increased education Possibly the greatest long-term effect of basic income is the positive effect it has on education. One of the most impressive observations of such an effect was seen in Canada’s “MINCOME” experiment. In the 1970s, residents of Dauphin were guaranteed a minimum income regardless of work. Although striking in itself that teenagers chose to reduce their hours worked as a result?—?instead choosing to focus more on school in order to graduate?—?even more striking was that graduation rates met and then exceeded 100. This was possible because those who had dropped out of high school actually returned to finish. Aside from high school graduation rates, basic income also has the potential to increase access to higher education, making it more affordable to young students just reaching college age. In addition, workers presently in the labor market looking to return to school to retrain for a new career path would be better enabled to do so. Education is almost universally thought of as a means of increasing one’s wealth, and so more people choosing to pursue their education?—?all else being equal?—?would likely result in further reduced wealth inequality. Enhanced citizenship At present, it should be clear what happens when political power concentrates within a small group of only the wealthiest citizens. This inequality exists due to the undue influence of money on the political process, and it is this inequality that can be reduced through basic income. Although true that each citizen has one vote, vast amounts of cash serve as artificial votes and citizens tired of being effectively disenfranchised by wealthy special interests drop out of the process entirely as a result. Basic income has the potential to reverse this through two routes. On the one hand it would enable citizens to outspend even the rich on a small donation level. Enough voters spending just $50 of their basic income in an election would be sufficient to outspend big money. This would be much more possible than it is now, where currently so many are living paycheck to paycheck. On the other hand, it would enable citizens to actually be citizens, spending more of their time becoming informed of issues and also volunteering their time as active participants of democracy. It is this potential effect of basic income on citizenship that could possibly have the greatest effect of all in decreasing inequality across the board. By transferring political power concentrated at the top of the wealth and income spectrums back to the great majority of people from whence political power is supposed to arise, a basic income may not stop at the redistribution of money. It could extend to the redistribution of political power. As a result, economic growth and employment levels increase. Camille Preston, Phd, Pcc, xx-xx-xxxx, "Promoting Employee Happiness Benefits Everyone," Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbescoachescouncil/2017/12/13/promoting-employee-happiness-benefits-everyone/#633ca680581a This should be easy, but all too often, employees don't feel valued at all. Why not? Too many companies are overly focused on what they do but overlooking and minimizing who is doing the work, as well as how and why they are doing the work. While job security and financial stability are important to job satisfaction, so are opportunities to use one's skills and abilities. The bottom line is that people need to continue to grow in order to remain engaged and productive. Employee happiness has increasingly become an imperative in business. Why? There is now growing evidence that when one's employees are happy, organizations thrive. To put this claim into perspective, consider just a few key statistics. One study found that happy employees are up to 20 more productive than unhappy employees. When it comes to salespeople, happiness has an even greater impact, raising sales by 37. But the benefits don't end there. Happy employees are also good news for organizations: The stock prices of Fortune’s “100 Best Companies to Work for" rose 14 per year from 1998 to 2005, while companies not on the list only reported a 6 increase. Second is Increasing Skilled Workers. There is a lack of skilled workers right now Hurd 19 Hurd, Will, 8-26-19, "It's not realistic to cut US-China economic ties. We should compete and win instead.," USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2019/08/26/america-must-compete-beat-china-global-economy-not-cut-ties-column/2114308001/ IL Washington should also be working to streamline legal immigration so that America continues to be the beneficiary of the decades long “brain drain” of the rest of the world. Today, there are more than 1 million international students studying in the United States, including more than 360,000 from China. The best and brightest from around the world are being educated here, and we need an immigration system that allows more of them to stay, particularly in the fields of science, technology, engineering and math. If the Chinese want to steal our secrets, we should be stealing their engineers and scientists. While we are attracting global talent, we must prepare our American workforce to meet the challenges of a 21st century economy and long-term competition with China. We simply do not have enough people to fill jobs in technology and advanced manufacturing. To continue to be the world leader in innovation, we have to retrain and "reskill" our workforce over time and prepare our kids for jobs that don’t even exist today. To ensure that the free world continues to set the rules of the road in the global economy, America and its allies must work together to continue to be the world’s centers of innovation and technological advancement. By moving past Cold War-era thinking and implementing 21st century solutions to this New War, the United States can remain the world’s most important economy and continue to create opportunity for Americans and millions around the world. People can’t afford to quit jobs for education Zupek of CNN Rachel Zupek,, 3-29-2010, "Employers on online education," No Publication, https://www.cnn.com/2010/LIVING/worklife/03/29/cb.employers.online.education/index.html IL Going back to school is an appealing option for many people, but they can't afford to quit their jobs to be a full-time student. If this sounds familiar, there might be a solution that allows you to go to school and continue working: an online or distance-learning program. Online colleges and distance-learning programs are ideal for full-time professionals because they can earn a degree without driving to a campus or attending classes, and they can learn on their own schedule. While all of this sounds alluring, there are a few things to consider before starting online classes. How long will it take to earn the degree? How much will it cost? How do I know if a school is legitimate? And most importantly, how will employers perceive it? To many people, a degree is a degree ~-~- but to others, there can be an issue of trust, or lack of reputation and familiarity, says Marc Scheer, a career counselor and educational consultant based in New York City. "Traditional programs have been around for hundreds of years, but online programs are relatively new and employers tend to be less familiar with them," he says. Employers are getting there, however. In a survey done by online institution Excelsior College and Zogby International, 61 percent of CEOs and small business owners nationwide said they were familiar with online or distance learning programs. Not only are they familiar with them, but 83 percent of executives in the survey say that an online degree is as credible as one earned through a traditional campus-based program. Employers said such factors as the accreditation of the college or university, the quality of its graduates and the name of the institution awarding the degree were among other things they considered to make an online degree more credible. Dannie McClain, a category manager for Town and Country Linen, says she thinks getting a degree from a school with both online and traditional programs has helped employers view her degree as credible. Initially hired without a degree, McClain now has a double online degree in marketing and business from Michigan-based Baker College, which also has online programs. "I think gaining my degree from a 'true' college that offers online courses in addition to regular ground courses helps in my employer seeing this as a 'true' degree," she says. Not all employers feel the same way, however. Brandon Mendelson, a former business owner, says he wouldn't consider an applicant with an online degree ~-~- even if he had everything he was seeking. He says he thinks that students get only a fraction of the learning experience online. "I want someone who made the full commitment," he says. "These days, there are no excuses. Your job will pay for school; colleges have day-care facilities that are usually free; so actually going to the school gives a candidate the edge in my book." But what about those who don't have time to make it to school every day? Luckily, one of the biggest perks of earning an online degree accommodates that very issue. "Online degree programs are designed to help adult learners with busy lives earn their degree without being tied down to class times and without having to go to campus," says Jeff Caplan, dean of strategic enrollment management at American Sentinel University, an online university. Michael Rogich, director of the center of online learning at Saint Leo University, based in Florida, says studying online is just as effective as studying traditionally, and in some sense is more powerful. "With adult students, your options are either part time or online," Rogich says. "Online, the student has more access to a good program and is constantly connected to instructors and fellow classmates." Tom Johansmeyer, who earned his MBA online and is currently working on his doctorate, is a perfect example. He says an online program was his only option for going back to school. "I was working as a management consultant and spending 40 weeks a year on the road," he says. "With that kind of travel schedule, it would have been impossible for me to get to a classroom." Indeed, online learning can benefit some students more than classroom learning. For example, some students might not learn as well in a classroom if they are shy or disengaged in group settings. In this case, Scheer says online students may benefit from their programs by interacting with students like themselves. Additionally, online discussions can be more inclusive and productive than classroom debates, especially because online forums offer more opportunity for participation. Not having face-to-face interaction with a teacher, however, can be seen as a disadvantage for some students. "Being able to attend when you want means you have no face-to-face, so there are no real-time answers to questions you have," McClain says. "You either have to wait for someone to reply to a forum, e-mail the instructor or hope that there is someone on IM that can answer you." Scheer says it's easy for online programs to be fraudulent and nonaccredited, so there's the possibility of being scammed or unable to transfer credits to another school. Finally, some employers simply don't accept online degrees from any school, accredited or not. A UBI provides enough security to allow people to take time off work to pursue online degrees, complete their education, or become high-skilled workers. Santens 16 (Scott . Writer and advocate of basic income for all; Citizen of Earth and New Orleans; Bachelor of Science in Psychology; Moderator of the /r/BasicIncome community on Reddit; Founder of the BIG Patreon Creator Pledge. “Inequality and the Basic Income Guarantee”. 2-26-2016. Medium. https://medium.com/basic-income/inequality-and-the-basic-income-guarantee-c8f84d936640) //TruLe Expansionary monetary policy Funding through money creation would also directly decrease income inequality but it would not be advised as the sole source of funding, as inflation would serve to impact the poor disproportionately, increasing costs of living and eroding the effective value of the basic income. For this reason a basic income should either be funded entirely or mostly by redistribution with only partial funding through any expansion of the money supply. Indirect effects of basic income on income inequality The indirect effects of basic income on inequality are less obvious but very much there. The most notable indirect effects are possible through two channels: large multiplier effects, and increased entrepreneurship. Multiplier effects A recent macroeconomic model showed the surprising results of food stamps not only having the greatest stimulus effects of all U.S. transfer programs, but also the greatest stabilizing effects of any current fiscal policy. The origin of the stimulus is in the redistribution to those with the highest propensity to consume?—?the poorest. This is known as the multiplier effect, and although food stamps have been found as showing the highest multiplier effect of U.S. programs of 1.79 (where the spending of $1 adds $1.79 to the economy), even higher levels have been observed in countries with basic income-like unconditional cash transfers. Some examples of UCT multipliers: Malawi (2.45), Lesotho (2.23), and Ethiopia (2.50). In contrast, the multiplier effect of Wall Street bonuses was calculated to be 0.39. Giving money to the rich slows the economy, while giving money to the poor grows it. Entrepreneurship One notable effect across all projects and pilot experiments of basic income is the increase in numbers of people starting their own businesses. GiveDirectly?—?a charity creating troves of valuable data by transforming the lives of the poorest in places like Kenya and Uganda through nothing but cash has referred to this on their blog with the observation that “there’s no charity for power saws.” In surveying the villages of those given basic incomes, they discovered that people were using their money as startup capital. One couple bought a solar panel to charge others’ cell phones. One person bought a power saw to employ himself as a tree trimmer and wood seller. Another person bought a motorbike to leave the farm behind and go into business for himself. Another person bought a tractor and was then able to create employment on her farm for others in the village. The examples go on. What are the effects of all this enhanced entrepreneurship on future incomes? In Uganda a 49 increase in earnings was found over the first two years and a 41 increase remained another two years later. Meanwhile in Kenya, incomes were found to be 33 higher one year later. These are increases in earnings above and beyond the basic incomes only made possible by receiving them. This kind of result is not an anomaly, but a common finding where a basic income is given. People use the cash given to them to increase their labor market incomes. This effectively decreases income inequality even further than a basic income alone. Direct effects of basic income on wealth inequality Basic income can be funded in a variety of ways and so extends beyond taxing incomes to methods of directly taxing forms of wealth. Although not limited to these four, wealth-based basic income funding options include: land-value taxation, transaction taxes, natural resource royalties, and taxation of corporate stock. Land-value taxation (LVT) A tax on land values would serve as a means of transferring wealth from land-owners to non-land owners when used in combination with a basic income. Advocates of LVT have long seen it as a means of eliminating income taxes entirely, which could have the end result of being regressive in nature. If added as an additional tax to pay for basic income, LVT would serve to redistribute towards those who own no land, helping make it possible for more people to acquire their own land. Natural resource royalties Funding a basic income using natural resources is essentially the Alaska Model. By taking 25 of the revenue earned by charging oil companies for the rights to drill on Alaska-owned land, and depositing it in a large wealth fund, Alaska is able to annually distribute a dividend universally to all its residents. The size of this dividend in 2015 was $2,072 per resident. By charging companies rent for the use of public resources, this method can be seen as a way of making citizens partial owners of all natural resources, reducing the wealth of corporations without actually raising their taxes. Essentially this is a way of transferring money from corporations to the public as a cost of doing business instead of a tax. Transaction taxes A transaction tax could take the form of taxing all transactions as a tiny tax on everything. It could also just focus solely on the financial sector by taxing all trades in general, or more specifically tax only high-frequency trades. In any case, this form of tax would have the largest effect on those with the most money doing the most transactions, reducing wealth gains at the top. Paired with a basic income, this lessened wealth at the top would help grow wealth at the bottom. Stock taxation With most wealth at the top existing in the form of private investments, a tax on corporate stocks might possibly be the most direct taxation of wealth possible. Paired with a basic income, this would serve as a transfer of wealth from the richest (who own most of the stock) to the poorest (who own no stock), also enabling the poorest to actually obtain some of their own stock. Indirect effects of basic income on wealth inequality Aside from the potential direct ways of reducing wealth inequality through a basic income, there exist more long-term secondary effects which go on to reduce wealth inequality even further. These secondary effects of basic income on wealth arise in the same way basic income enhances entrepreneurship – it increases opportunity. It expands on the ability of people to take actions they could not otherwise take. These actions can lead to greater wealth through the newly granted opportunity to gain wealth that would not otherwise exist at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder. Increased education Possibly the greatest long-term effect of basic income is the positive effect it has on education. One of the most impressive observations of such an effect was seen in Canada’s “MINCOME” experiment. In the 1970s, residents of Dauphin were guaranteed a minimum income regardless of work. Although striking in itself that teenagers chose to reduce their hours worked as a result?—?instead choosing to focus more on school in order to graduate?—?even more striking was that graduation rates met and then exceeded 100. This was possible because those who had dropped out of high school actually returned to finish. Aside from high school graduation rates, basic income also has the potential to increase access to higher education, making it more affordable to young students just reaching college age. In addition, workers presently in the labor market looking to return to school to retrain for a new career path would be better enabled to do so. Education is almost universally thought of as a means of increasing one’s wealth, and so more people choosing to pursue their education?—?all else being equal?—?would likely result in further reduced wealth inequality. Enhanced citizenship At present, it should be clear what happens when political power concentrates within a small group of only the wealthiest citizens. This inequality exists due to the undue influence of money on the political process, and it is this inequality that can be reduced through basic income. Although true that each citizen has one vote, vast amounts of cash serve as artificial votes and citizens tired of being effectively disenfranchised by wealthy special interests drop out of the process entirely as a result. Basic income has the potential to reverse this through two routes. On the one hand it would enable citizens to outspend even the rich on a small donation level. Enough voters spending just $50 of their basic income in an election would be sufficient to outspend big money. This would be much more possible than it is now, where currently so many are living paycheck to paycheck. On the other hand, it would enable citizens to actually be citizens, spending more of their time becoming informed of issues and also volunteering their time as active participants of democracy. It is this potential effect of basic income on citizenship that could possibly have the greatest effect of all in decreasing inequality across the board. By transferring political power concentrated at the top of the wealth and income spectrums back to the great majority of people from whence political power is supposed to arise, a basic income may not stop at the redistribution of money. It could extend to the redistribution of political power. This increased education increases wages. Rose, Stephen J., xx-xx-xxxx, "The College Payoff," CEW Georgetown, https://cew.georgetown.edu/cew-reports/the-college-payoff/ IL A Bachelor’s degree is worth $2.8 million on average over a lifetime.A college degree pays off–but by just how much? In The College Payoff, we examine just what a college degree is worth–and what else besides a degree might influence an individual’s potential earnings. This report examines lifetime earnings for all education levels and earnings by occupation, age, race/ethnicity and gender. The data are clear: a college degree is key to economic opportunity, conferring substantially higher earnings on those with credentials than those without. Bachelor’s degree holders earn 31 percent more than those with an Associate’s degree and 84 percent more than those with just a high school diploma. Women who work full-time, full-year earn 25 percent less than men at similar education levels. At the highest education level, African Americans and Latinos earn close to a million dollars less than their white and Asian counterparts over a lifetime. Third is Upstarting Businesses. Hoynes, Hilary, 8-15-18, "Universal Basic Income in the US and Advanced Countries," No Publication, https://gspp.berkeley.edu/assets/uploads/research/pdf/Hoynes-Rothstein-UBI-081518.pdf IL In section IV, and throughout the paper, we embed our discussion in the U.S. program ecosystem. While it is necessary to adopt a particular setting to provide the needed quantitative analysis, the main conclusions of the paper are qualitative and will apply in all advanced countries. It is worth pointing out, however, that the U.S. provides much less generous income transfers, with much more of a focus on work, than do most other developed countries. A UBI would thus be a larger change, both philosophically and in terms of the distribution of funds, in the U.S. than elsewhere. UBI grants people the power to reject low-paying, unfavorable jobs in favor of having valuable work, bolstering economic security. Guppta 16 (Kavi Guppta. I write about technology and how it impacts workforce transformation. “Basic Income Might Be The Answer To Society's Productivity Crisis”. 9-22-2016. Forbes. https://www.forbes.com/sites/kaviguppta/2016/09/22/basic-income-might-be-the-answer-to-societys-productivity-crisis/#26cb8b3162b3) //TruLe SS: Basic income isn't the only solution, but it's arguably the best solution because it's the solution that actually does the most. Look at education for example. It's been shown that increasing the incomes of parents does more for educational outcomes than something like pre-K. So why spend money on pre-K instead of parental incomes? If the reason kids aren't doing as well in school as they would if their parents just earned more money to improve household environments, why give money to schools instead of parents? It's the difference between treating the symptoms and treating the causes. Treating symptoms is wasteful and never ends. Treat the causes. Better yet, vaccinate against diseases so people don't get sick in the first place. When it comes to work, we as a society have a serious problem with how we look at it. We don't look at all the work going on that's unpaid as work, even though it's arguably the most important kind of work. Think of care work and volunteering in our communities and the open-source movement, and even art. All of this work is valuable but unpaid. Meanwhile there are countless jobs full of work that we arguably shouldn't be doing. Maybe because it's harmful to people or the environment, or because it's work better done by machines, or perhaps because it's work that actually takes 4 hours instead of 8 but we pretend to be busy when we're not. Meanwhile, jobs that people don't like doing for the most part pay very little, while more enjoyable jobs pay more, which is all backwards. But it's the way it is because people must accept jobs if they can't say no to them. Those facing destitution say yes to working poverty because at least it's better than absolute poverty. Basic income changes all of this by granting people the power to say no. With the ability to say no to jobs no one wants to do, those employers must pay more for people to do them, or reduce the hours, or invest in automation. With the power to say no also comes the ability to say yes. People can choose to do the unpaid work that is arguably more valuable. They can choose to use their basic incomes as basic venture capital to startup new businesses, and people with basic incomes can even afford to work at these startups for free in exchange for something like stock options that will reward them far more down the road if the idea is successful than a wage would have, because they have the real ability to work for free. Basic income also changes the entire way we look at the growing gig economy. Right now Uber drivers might only be driving for Uber because they are barely getting by and need more money to meet their needs. With basic income operating as an income floor, Uber drivers have their basic needs covered and they are driving because they simply choose to drive for additional money (until a self-driving Uber provides far cheaper rides). On-demand labor with a basic income means that everyone has both greater ability to earn additional income and a feeling of economic security. On-demand labor without basic income means growing insecurity as more and more people try to just scrape by and monthly incomes vary so much that people are constantly falling behind and ceaselessly living on the edge. And finally basic income changes the automation discussion from will robots take our jobs to let's give our jobs to robots. I think it's extremely odd that we've developed our technology to the point it can not only do our muscle work for us, but also a great deal of our mind work, and we're all worried it will do our work for us. That makes no sense to me. The fact anyone is even worried at all that machines might actually do our jobs for us is a big bright signal that we're doing something wrong, and what we're doing wrong is that we require employment in order to live. If we break that connection and allow people to live without employment, then we dissolve our fear of technological unemployment. Goldschein, Eric, 1-31-2020, "Small Businesses Pay Employees More to Compete in a Tight Market," Fundera Ledger, https://www.fundera.com/blog/small-businesses-pay IL The WSJ says small businesses across the country are increasing their wages at a faster rate than medium-size or even large firms. All industries with businesses made up of 49 or fewer employees saw a pay bump of just over 1. This trend reflects the new reality for small businesses: The job market is tightening, Workers are armed with more data than ever about what people in their position could be making, thanks to sites like Glassdoor, More than half of small businesses owners reported having trouble filling needed roles. So, while the dominating ethos of our culture—with some notable exceptions—is that companies are less profitable if they spend more money on their employees, that way of thinking is seen as increasingly untenable by thousands of business owners. Paying people more money is the new black. Joanna Douglas, the owner of Clean Affinity, a house-cleaning service, says she recently raised employee wages by a whopping 20. Why? “It’s a great way to stay motivated—the more good work they put in, the better it will be for my business,” she says. “20 seemed appropriate based on the increasing cost of living in the area. My employee retention is at an all-time high, and since they have been with me for quite a while now and have continued to show excellence in their work, they fully deserve the raise.”Douglas doesn’t see this is as just a bonus for good work, however. It’s an investment. “It will mean more success for the company. I don’t have to hire new people, because all my employees are good at what they do,” she says. “They are all very accommodating, respectful, and fun to be around, and our customers love it. Our reputation becomes better, and it increases the trust between us and our customers.” The impact is cyclical wage growth Note: The levy model used by the Roosevelt Institute assumes cyclical wage growth. The cyclical wage growth is the reason for the 12.56 increase in GDP; thus cyclical wage growth causes this 12.56 growth in GDP. Steinbaum, Marshall. August 2017, "Modeling the Macroeconomic Effects of a Universal Basic Income," Roosevelt Institute, http://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Modeling-the-Macroeconomic-Effects-of-a-Universal-Basic-Income.pdf IL How would a massive federal spending program like a universal basic income (UBI) affect the macroeconomy? We use the Levy Institute macroeconometric model to estimate the impact of three versions of such an unconditional cash assistance program over an eight-year time horizon. Overall, we find that the economy can not only withstand large increases in federal spending, but could also grow thanks to the stimulative effects of cash transfers on the economy. We examine three versions of unconditional cash transfers: $1,000 a month to all adults, $500 a month to all adults, and a $250 a month child allowance. For each of the three versions, we model the macroeconomic effects of these transfers using two different financing plans - increasing the federal debt, or fully funding the increased spending with increased taxes on households - and compare the effects to the Levy model’s baseline growth rate forecast. Our findings include the following: For all three designs, enacting a UBI and paying for it by increasing the federal debt would grow the economy. Under the smallest spending scenario, $250 per month for each child, GDP is 0.79 larger than under the baseline forecast after eight years. According to the Levy Model, the largest cash program - $1,000 for all adults annually - expands the economy by 12.56 over the baseline after eight years. After eight years of enactment, the stimulative effects of the program dissipate and GDP growth returns to the baseline forecast, but the level of output remains permanently higher. When paying for the policy by increasing taxes on households, the Levy model forecasts no effect on the economy. In effect, it gives to households with one hand what it is takes away with the other. However, when the model is adapted to include distributional effects, the economy grows, even in the tax-financed scenarios. This occurs because the distributional model incorporates the idea that an extra dollar in the hands of lower income households leads to higher spending. In other words, the households that pay more in taxes than they receive in cash assistance have a low propensity to consume, and those that receive more in assistance than they pay in taxes have a high propensity to consume. Thus, even when the policy is tax- rather than debt-financed, there is an increase in output, employment, prices, and wages. Levy’s Keynesian model incorporates a series of assumptions based on rigorous empirical studies of the micro and macro effects of unconditional cash transfers, taxation and government net spending and borrowing (see Marinescu (2017), Mason (2017), Coibion et al (2017), and Konczal and Steinbaum (2016)). Fundamentally, the larger the size of the UBI, the larger the increase in aggregate demand and thus the larger the resulting economy is. The individual macroeconomic indicators are (qualitatively) what one would predict given an increase in aggregate demand: in addition to the increase in output, employment, labor force participation, prices, and wages all go up as well. Even in a deficit-financed policy, an increase in the government’s liabilities is mitigated by the increase in aggregate demand. Specifically, the Levy model assumes that the economy is not currently operating near potential output (Mason 2017) and makes two related microeconomic assumptions: (1)unconditional cash transfers do not reduce household labor supply; and (2) increasing government revenue by increasing taxes levied on households does not change household behavior. Other macroeconomic models would make different, likely less optimistic forecasts, because they would disagree with these assumptions. Estimating the macroeconomic effects of UBI is a critical component of any policy evaluation, because what would appear to be a zero-sum transfer in static terms (money is simply transferred from some households to others) turns out to be positive sum in the macro simulation, thanks to the increase in aggregate demand and therefore in the size of the economy. If the same program were financed by increased redistributive taxes, the growth impact would be smaller, producing an additional 2.62 of GDP growth over 8 years. But the federal deficit would also, according to the model, shrink by 1.39. In both scenarios, unemployment would also decrease.The model also includes a labor market in which labor force participation and employment rates are a positive function of the level of economic activity. The nominal wage increases with the level of capacity utilization, which is pro-cyclical. Finally, the price level is a positive function of the unit labor cost and the price level of imported goods. The Levy Institute has been constructing and updating its model for many years in order to provide factual predictions about the macroeconomy by comparing its forecasts with realized outcomes. The approach taken in this paper uses the Levy model to forecast the macroeconomy eight years into the future, holding current policies constant. This is the “baseline” forecast, for our purposes. We then perform a series of policy counterfactuals related to enacting a UBI of different sizes and target populations, and compare the eight-year prediction for the macroeconomy given the policy counterfactuals to the baseline forecast. We report the difference in key macroeconomic and labor market indicators between these counterfactuals and the baseline as the “effect” of UBI. Even a modest UBI helps James King, 10-19-2017, "Even A Modest Basic Income Could Improve Economic Security," People’s Policy Project, https://www.peoplespolicyproject.org/2017/10/19/even-a-modest-basic-income-could-improve-economic-security/ IL The idea of a universal basic income (UBI) – a cash payment made to every person in the country with no strings attached – is becoming increasingly popular in experimental policy circles. Most proposals for a universal basic income are “complete” UBI proposals: payments large enough to guarantee a minimum standard of living to every person independent of work. In the US, that would be roughly $12,000 per person based on the poverty line. However, it is more likely that any universal cash payment passed in the US would be more modest to begin with, e.g. a low UBI of a few hundred dollars a month. As UBI advocates continue to advance their policy objectives, it is imperative to make the case that any UBI, even a small one, has significant benefits. In 2016, the Federal Reserve reported that nearly half of all Americans would not be able to cover a $400 emergency expense without either borrowing money or selling valuables. Although the financial status of Americans has been improving since the Great Recession, the majority of Americans earning less than $30,000 a year still worry about paying their bills every month and maintaining their standard of living. Money may not buy happiness, but even a partial UBI could help buy Americans peace of mind and provide many Americans an avenue to save money for emergencies. Opponents of a UBI might claim that such a low UBI would just get absorbed into each family’s normal consumption level and thus not improve their overall financial security. But the experience of the Alaska Permanent Fund (APF) suggests otherwise. The APF is a state-owned wealth fund that pays an annual dividend to every Alaska resident, typically between $1000 and $2000. In addition to being overwhelmingly popular among Alaskans, survey data show that the vast majority of recipients either save their dividend money or use it to pay off debt. Just 1 in 4 Alaskans report spending most of the money they receive each year. Of those who spend the money, only 1 in 5 report spending it on things they otherwise couldn’t afford. So, it seems, a modest UBI really would help cushion families’ financial security. A low UBI would also have significant ramifications for America’s financial sector, for the better of many Americans. It is no secret that it is expensive to be poor in America. Financial institutions make a significant amount of money every year by taking advantage of people who are unable to make ends meet in the short term. A low UBI would substantially diminish many Americans’ reliance on exploitative financial products, saving billions in fees and interest payments on top of the cash payments themselves. Two products that would be directly addressed by a partial UBI are overdraft fees and payday loans. According to the CFPB, banks raised as much as $17B in revenue through overdraft fees alone in 2016, with nearly 30 percent of all people with checking accounts paying an overdraft fee. It isn’t cheap to overdraw your bank account: even though the average overdraft amount is only $25, the average bank overdraft fee is $34. Many banks will also charge an additional overdraft fee on accounts that remain overdrawn for 5 to 10 days. Besides being exorbitant, overdraft fees also heavily target a specific group of exploitable people: nearly 75 percent of all overdraft fees are paid by just 8 percent of consumers. These “routine overdrafters” overdraft at least ten times a year, and as a result, pay hundreds of dollars in fees. Giving Americans even $100 a month could save millions of Americans their overdraft fees, taking that fee revenue from the banks and giving it back to consumers. Payday loans rely on the inability of Americans to make ends meet. Over ten million people take out payday loans every year, with 70 percent of borrowers needing the money for recurring expenses, like rent and utilities. They pay billions in interest to do so. The advertised cost of a payday loan is typically $15 per $100 borrowed for a two week loan, which is almost a 400 percent APR. Because most payday loans require full payment as a lump sum, many people end up borrowing again to pay off the original loan, creating a recurring debt trap. A modest UBI could substantially curb the demand for payday loans by giving Americans an extra stream of income to make their monthly expenses. For these reasons, a universal cash payment program in the United States, of even a relatively small amount, would make millions of American lives better and put money from banks’ bottom lines back into consumers’ pockets. The income boost from a low UBI would give Americans more economic freedom and security. Because more people find higher quality jobs and economic growth is further stimulated, Ralph Callebert, 3-8-2016, "How a universal basic income could completely change the world," Independent,https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/what-is-universal-basic-income-and-how-could-it-lift-millions-out-of-poverty-a6919021.html IL The example of South Africa is telling. In a comparatively rich country where youth unemployment runs at more than 60 per cent, pensions, childcare and disability grants are for many households the most important source of income. Yet many slip through the cracks of this limited welfare state. Giving every resident an unconditional grant, regardless of whether you are a billionaire or destitute, is a significant departure from our existing welfare state. The latter offers only limited and conditional support when working is not an option. Support for a basic income comes from very disparate political and ideological circles. Some libertarians like basic income because it promises a leaner state without a large bureaucracy checking people’s eligibility and policing their behavior. Others see it as enabling entrepreneurialism – the poor helping themselves. On the left, many see basic income as an opportunity to plug numerous holes in the social safety net or even to free people from “wage slavery.” For feminists, basic income is a successor to the old demand for wages for housework. Pilot projects suggest that simply giving money to the poor could successfully tackle poverty. In Namibia, poverty, crime and unemployment went down, as school attendance went up. In India, basic income recipients were more likely to start small businesses. As a healthy adult male, you stand little chance of either receiving a government benefit or finding decent employment, as economic growth has been largely jobless. For an adult without children, disability is the only access to these crucial grants.In the early 2000s, a movement emerged in support of a very modest Basic Income Grant (BIG) of 100 rand (around £7.50 in 2002) per month. Significantly, this campaign received the support of the government-appointed Taylor Committee. Its report concluded that a BIG was likely fiscally sustainable and would lift as many as six million people out of poverty. It argued that this result could not be achieved by expanding existing welfare programs. However, the proposal was dismissed by the ANC, which continued to see employment as the only solution to poverty and inequality. Not surprisingly, basic income campaigns have been prominent in countries with high socioeconomic inequality, like South Africa. These countries have both significant resources and a need for redistribution. In neighboring Namibia, another country with extreme inequality, a similar campaign has received growing support. Furthermore, as the Club of Rome already realised in 1972, the productivist bias of our usual answers to inequality – grow more, produce more and grow the economy so that people can consume more – is ultimately unsustainable. Surely, in a world already characterised by overproduction and overconsumption, producing and consuming more cannot be the answer. Yet, these seem to be the answers with which we are stuck: grow, grow, grow.
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Contention 1 is Iran Iran is currently trying to jam US systems. Farda 19 of RFE writes, Radio Farda, 08/08/19, “Iran Accused of Interfering With Commercial Ships' Navigation System,” https://en.radiofarda.com/a/iran-accused-of-interfering-with-commercial-ships-navigation-system/30099771.html dpet The U.S. Department of Transportation's Maritime Administration and the central command of U.S. forces in the region (CENTCOM), have warned against hacking and infiltration of navigation systems (GPS) of commercial vessels in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz and the Sea of Oman. The MARAD (Maritime Administration) warned that "Vessels operating in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman may encounter GPS interference and/or other communications jamming with little to no warning." Apparently, because Iran is trying to jam the GPS systems of commercial vessels to lead them to make a mistake and enter its territorial waters. The region mentioned in the MARAD statement has been the scene of attacks on oil tankers, and detention of commercial vessels in recent months as tensions between Iran and the United States have risen. According to Maritime Administration several incidents have occurred in the region since May. These include six attacks against commercial vessels, shoot-down of U.S. Navy remotely piloted aircraft over international waters, attempted at-sea interdiction of Isle of Man-flagged M/V British Heritage, seizure of ex-Panama-flagged M/V Riah, seizure of U.K.-flagged M/V Stena Impero, and the detention and subsequent release of Liberian-flagged M/V Mesdar. The maritime Administration further warned that heightened military activity and increased political tensions in this region continue to pose serious threats to commercial vessels, adding that there is also a potential for miscalculation or misidentification that could lead to aggressive actions. Based on the statement, at least in two of these incidents interference with the GPS system was reported, while in another case, the Automatic Identification System (AIS) of the ship was shut off before it was seized, complicating response efforts. Thankfully, US offensive cyber operations prevents this conflict by destroying their systems. Doffman 19 of Forbes writes that Zak Doffman, August 29, 2019, "Secret U.S. Cyber Mission Devastated Iran's Attack Capabilities, Officials Say," Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2019/08/29/secret-cyber-mission-devastated-irans-attack-capabilities-us-officials-say/#1b5429ff5cb3 The cyber conflict between Iran and the U.S. is now a constant—it doesn't diminish simply because the headlines go away. And it's a constant that alternates between computer networks and the media. Now, unnamed U.S. officials have told the U.S. media that covert attacks on Iranian intelligence systems in June had such a devastating impact, that the country has yet to recover its capabilities. Those systems, the officials say, were used to direct targeting against commercial vessels in the Gulf. And so Iran's ability to mount further attacks has—for the time being—been seriously degraded. Schneider 19 of the Washington Post explains that Schneider, Jacquelyn. 10/1/19, “Are cyber-operations a U.S. retaliatory option for the Saudi oil field strikes? Would such action deter Iran?” Washington Post https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/10/01/are-cyber-operations-us-retaliatory-option-september-oilfield-strikes-would-this-deter-iran/ However, cyberattacks are less likely to deter adversaries for the same reasons they are less likely to lead to escalation. Deterrence is all about sending signals to other countries that there will be consequences if they behave badly. How cyber operations can help manage crisis escalation with Iran As other scholars have noted, the best deterrence signals are ones that are costly, visible and credible. Here’s why cyber-operations often fail this test: are hard to detect, hard to attribute to their source and hard to turn into a credible threat, because they may rely on vulnerabilities that are easy to plug if the target knows about them. making cyber-operations less escalatory, but also harder to use to send clear signals. Moreover, as Sanger and Barnes notes, the United States is in a particularly vulnerable position when it uses cyberattacks, because the U.S. way of life is more dependent on digitally dependent technologies than Iranian society. So if Iran retaliates to a cyberattack with another cyberattack, the United States may come off worse. The impact is a Financial Fiasco Gardus 19 of CNBC finds, Lizzy Gurdus, 07/09/19, (Lizzy Gurdus is a multimedia producer for CNBC’s “Fast Money,” with a focus on its “Trading Nation,” “Futures Now,” “Options Action” and “ETF Edge” franchises. She was formerly a digital producer for “Mad Money” with Jim Cramer.), “Oil prices are in a ‘sweet spot,’ but for 2 risky reasons,” CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/09/oil-prices-are-in-a-sweet-spot-but-for-2-risky-reasons.html You could call it a crude reality. Oil prices inched higher Tuesday, rising on OPEC’s newly extended production cuts and tensions with Iran, but still under pressure from demand concerns tied to slowing global growth and the trade dispute between the U.S. and China. That push-and-pull dynamic is putting crude prices are in a unique kind of “sweet spot,” said Amy Harder, energy reporter at Axios. “We really are in this Goldilocks moment of oil prices, and therefore gasoline prices, here in America, and Iran is just one part of the two big pressure points that are countervailing each other,” Harder said Tuesday on CNBC’s “Futures Now.” However, seizures raise oil prices as Dhillon 19 of Bloomberg explains, Harkiran Dhillon, 07/18/19, “Oil Jumps as Tanker Seizures Escalate Persian Gulf Tensions,” Blomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-18/oil-set-for-biggest-weekly-decline-since-may-on-demand-worries Oil jumped in the after-market trading following the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp seizing an British oil tanker and a Liberian-flagged ship in the Strait of Hormuz, raising stakes in the critical oil chokepoint. Brent futures rose as much as 1.4 from its settlement, while WTI futures also edged higher after the seizure of the tankers. U.K. Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt said Friday that he is “extremely concerned by the seizure of two naval vessels by Iranian authorities in the Strait of Hormuz.” “With all the noise about potential negotiations with Iran, the reality is that geopolitical risk is enormously high in the heart of the oil producing gulf and key transport corridor,” said Joe McGonigle, an energy policy analyst for Hedgeye Risk Management and a former senior official at the U.S. Energy Department. “Iran’s only response to maximum pressure by the U.S. is maximum chaos in the region that tries to win concessions from the U.S. Iran’s seizure of the British tanker is just one example and we think the market should get prepared for more risk ahead.” Despite the escalating conflict in the Middle East, New York futures ended the week 7.6 lower, the biggest weekly loss in nearly two months, amid fears about waning demand. The U.S.-China trade war and expanding American fuel stockpiles have also weighed on prices. “The biggest factor driving oil prices today is the Iran-U.S. tension story,” said Phil Flynn, senior market analyst at Price Futures Group Inc. “The rallies appear to show the conflict in Strait of Hormuz might be more serious and that stakes are raised going into this weekend.” Riding 19 of Financial Times explains, Siobhan Riding, 09/28/19, “Saudi strikes and spiking oil price raise spectre of ‘black swan’,” https://www.ft.com/content/cab81d35-50a8-3241-a380-fe1583bc425e dpet Investors are jittery as about any further strikes against Saudi oil facilities or retaliation by the US against Iran, which the superpower blames for the incursion. such an escalation would further disrupt oil supply and cause prices to spike, increasing the risk of a global recession. Kristina Hooper, chief global market strategist at Invesco, says the recent hostilities serve as a reminder to investors of the risk of so-called black swan events — unforeseen developments with drastic consequences. “It is definitely a wake-up call for investors. The Saudi attacks are one of a variety of possible black swans that can have an impact on portfolios,” she says. “My takeaway from this is that we need to be very diversified and prepare for the unexpected.”Stefan Kreuzkamp, chief investment officer at DWS, says the attacks demonstrate how easily investors’ base scenarios can be derailed. “They show a new level of geopolitical threat that the world economy will have to cope with,” he says. Keshner 19 of Marketwatch furthers, Andrew Keshner, 09/17/19, “Could a spike in gas prices scare Americans into a recession?,” MarketWatch, https://www.marketwatch.com/story/could-rising-gas-prices-scare-consumers-into-closing-their-wallets-and-bring-on-a-recession-one-expert-says-yes-2019-09-17 “This type of uncertainty in the world oil market will make consumers more nervous than they are already,” said Professor Shanjun Li, an economist at Cornell University’s SC Johnson College of Business who has studied the links between gasoline prices and consumer behavior. Companies could also be cautious about making investments, like expanding capacity and hiring more workers. Rising gas prices in the early 2000s, coming as they did on the back of the subprime mortgage crisis, contributed to the Great Recession, he said. The average annual gallon price was $2.02 in 2000 and $3.61 in 2008, according to Energy Department figures. The federal statistics were adjusted for inflation in 2015. A gallon of gas currently costs $2.56 according to AAA’s national average price. Previous research from the Federal Reserve said it can be tricky to know how much oil price shocks ignite a recession. Credit contractions and oil price increases usually happen around the same time, it said in a 2014 paper. Whatever their big picture macroeconomic effect, gas prices can loom large for individual drivers. Rising gas prices can “lead to an immediate deterioration in subjective well-being,” said researchers looking self-reported life satisfaction from 1985 to 2005. Consume rs spent $2,109 on gas, motor oil and other fuels last year, up 10 since 2016, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Oil prices surged Monday, with barrel prices up 14, marking the steepest daily rise in more than 10 years. Oil shocks will cause a financial crisis as Wilson 19 of Financial Articles explains, Lorimer Wilson, 6-3-2019, "5 Red Flags That Economic Collapse Is Imminent” munKNEE, http://www.munknee.com/5-warning-signs-that-economic-environment-is-about-to-decline-rapidly/ Essentially everything on this planet depends on oil; food, transportation, heating. and cooling, and basically every consumer item you can think of. The world economy cannot sustain high prices of oil without collapsing. We saw that very clearly in 2008 when the price of oil hit a high of $146/barrel in June, and by September of that year we were in a full blown financial crisis… If the price of light sweet crude oil rises to, and stays above $120/barrel, then you have only a few months before a major financial crisis unfolds. The financial crisis of 2008 was ‘solved’ by atrocious US Gov’t spending of more than a trillion dollars/per year. That particular solution won’t be available to use in the next crisis. Does ‘the powers that be’ have another card up their sleeve for the next financial crisis? I don’t know, but I assume the answer is “no”. The IMF terminalizes, IMF 2013 (IMF, international Monetary Fund. March 14, 2013. IMF.org. “JOBS AND GROWTH: ANALYTICAL AND OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE FUND”, https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/031413.pdf?fbclid=IwAR25z8YmNU34qzj8tb7SOk5yi2xlPWZV6z-LN_jJ-kUZ4JqnCqpiOwr23LM . SM Across OECD countries, the gender wage gap is estimated at 16 percent (OECD 2012). Although we are on track to meet the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of halving the proportion of people living in extreme poverty (on less than $1 a day) by 2015 relative to 1990 levels, over 900 million people are expected to remain vulnerable to being pushed back into poverty in the face of adverse shocks (UN, World Economic Situation and Prospects, 2013). Contention 2 is Counterterrorism ISIS capabilities are on the decline. Abdelilah 18 of Aljazeera finds, Bendaoudi Abdelillah, 5-8-2018, "After the “almost 100 percent” Defeat of ISIS, What about its Ideology?," No Publication, http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2018/05/100-percent-defeat-isis-ideology-180508042421376.html Thus, ISIS lost around 21,400 square miles or 96 of their the territory, mirroring almost 100 percent territorial lost that President Trump mentioned in his speech. The following map from the U.S. State Department illustrates ISIS’s territorial losses in 2017. Source : US State Department Just by looking at the map, the losses in 2017 are significant compared to previous years(4). But even as the group is being decisively defeated on the battlefield after losing key territories including its de-facto capital Raaqa in October 2017, the organization is far from being uprooted; and it is premature to claim ISIS has been extinguished from the face of the Earth. The organization is simply going underground and it is a part of a cyclical process of this group; it is not linear. The organization does not have a start and end date; however, its power has shifted between controlling territory and losing territory. In other words, ISIS switches from governing mode to insurgency mode. Some observers like Stephen Walt points out that “we should be wary of a premature “Mission Accomplished” moment and be judicious in drawing lessons from an outcome that otherwise merits celebration.”(5) Callimachi 19 of the New York Times reports, Rukmini Callimachi, Mar 23, 2019 “ISIS Caliphate Crumbles as Last Village in Syria Falls,” The New York Times, https://www.google.com/search?q=the+last+ISIS+stronghold+in+Syria+Callimachiandoq=the+last+ISIS+stronghold+in+Syria+Callimachiandaqs=chrome..69i57j33.1692j0j1andsourceid=chromeandie=UTF-8 A four-year military operation to flush the Islamic State from its territory in Iraq and Syria ended on Saturday as the last village held by ISIS the terrorist group was retaken, erasing a militant theocracy that once spanned two countries. Cornered in Baghuz, Syria, the last 1.5-square-mile remnant of the group’s territory in the region, the remaining militants waged a surprisingly fierce defense and kept the American-backed coalition at bay for months. The war on terror has cost the U.S. billions and has been fought for nearly 20 years. Who are we fighting? Thankfully, Offensive Cyber Operations have contributed to decreasing terrorist capabilities in two ways. First is Supercharging Conventional Conflict, While in the past, cyber operations and military operations acted independently of one another, the United States has been increasingly integrating cyber capabilities into conventional military strategies. Smeets 18 of Stanford University explains, Max Smeets, Fall 2018, “The Strategic Promise of Offensive Cyber Operations,” https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-12_Issue-3/Smeets.pdf Could offensive cyber operations provide strategic value? If so, how and under what conditions? While a growing number of states are said to be interested in developing offensive cyber capabilities, there is a sense that state leaders and policy makers still do not have a strong conception of its strategic advantages and limitations. This article finds that offensive cyber operations could provide significant strategic value to state-actors. The availability of offensive cyber capabilities expands the options available to state leaders across a wide range of situations. Distinguishing between counter force cyber capabilities and countervalue cyber capabilities, the article shows that offensive cyber capabilities can both be an important force-multiplier.for conventional capabilities as well as an independent asset. They can be used effectively with few casualties and achieve a form of psychological ascendancy. Yet, the promise of offensive cyber capabilities’ strategic value comes with a set of conditions. These conditions are by no means always easy to fulfill—and at times lead to difficult strategic trade-offs. These attacks can disable defense systems prior to an attack ensuring that offensive measures receive less pushback and leave terror organizations more vulnerable. This is not simply a hypothetical but has proven success as Ward 19 of Vox explains Alex Ward, 6-24-2019, "The weekend in the risky US-Iran standoff, explained," Vox, https://www.vox.com/2019/6/24/18715408/usa-iran-sanctions-cyber-pompeo-coalition On Friday, Yahoo News reported that the US military used unknown digital weapons to disrupt the computers of an Iranian spy group, the Trump administration blames for supporting strikes on oil tankers. Subsequent reports added further details, including that the US also targeted computers involved in Iran’s missile program. A former US defense official familiar with cyber plans for Iran told me the digital strikes were likely meant to coincide with the planned missile strikes. Temporarily disabling Iran’s defenses. makes it safer for US warplanes and weapons to hit their targets. Trump tweeted that he called off the missile attack about 10 minutes before it happened, meaning the cyber weapons already would have been deployed to provide “extra layers of protection” by that point. No one died from last week’s cyber assault, but it’s likely The strike was extremely damaging to some of Iran’s military systems. Iran, however, says the cyber strike failed. “They try hard, but have not carried out a successful attack,” Mohammad Javad Azari Jahromi, Iran’s minister for information and communications technology, tweeted Saturday. These strikes have been critical to debilitating terrorist groups as Vavra 19 of Cyberscoop writes, Shannon Vavra, 8-3-2019, "U.S. cyber-offensive against ISIS continues, and eyes are now on Afghanistan, general says," CyberScoop, https://www.cyberscoop.com/isis-jtf-ares-cyber-offensive-afghanistan/ Anderson would not discuss specific cyber-operations JTF-ARES is using against ISIS now. The task force was established in 2016 to cripple ISIS digitally by developing malware and other tools to knock out computer and communications equipment. Known operations have included an operation in 2017 in which U.S. and coalition forces used digital means to shut down ISIS command posts one by one, forcing ISIS to reveal alternate command posts in Iraq and Syria. This allowinged the Department of Defense to launch traditional military attacks against the outposts. Other capabilities include obtaining terrorists’ credentials, deleting their files, or disrupting their online campaigns, according to The Washington Post. Second is Manipulating Funding, CBS 16 illustrates that US CBS News, February 26, 2016, "AP: U.S. military launches aggressive cyberwar on ISIS," CBS News, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/isis-targeted-us-military-cyberwar/ The surge of computer-based military operations by U.S. Cyber Commnd began shortly after Defense Secretary Ash Carter prodded commanders at Fort Meade, Maryland, last month to ramp up the fight against ISIS on the cyber front. U.S. officials confirmed that operations launched out of Fort Meade have focused on disrupting the group's online activities The officials said the effort is getting underway as operators try a range of attacks to see what works and what doesn't. They declined to discuss details, other than to say that The attacks include efforts to including preventing the group from distributing propaganda, videos, or other types of recruiting and messaging on social media sites such as Twitter, and across the Internet in general. Other attacks could include attempts to stop insurgents from conducting financial or logistical transactions online. For example, according to Raston 19 of NPR, the US was able to successfully use OCOs to hack into ISIS’s main server, allowing them to Dina Temple-Raston, 9-26-2019, "How The U.S. Cracked Into One Of The Most Secretive Terrorist Organizations," NPR.org, https://www.npr.org/2019/09/26/764790682/how-the-u-s-cracked-into-one-of-the-most-secretive-terrorist-organizations NEIL: Fire. TEMPLE-RASTON: After months of looking at static webpages and picking their way through ISIS' networks, the ARES operators started logging in as the enemy. They deleted files, closed accounts, and changed passwords. They began moving through the ISIS networks they had mapped for months like a raid team clearing a house, except it was all online - until they hit an unexpected obstacle. TEMPLE-RASTON: What's your call sign? NEIL: My call sign is shadow recon. That's the hacker handle that I use. TEMPLE-RASTON: Neil is a Marine reservist in his 30s. And we're only using his first name because he wasn't just the one who said go to start Operation Glowing Symphony; it began as his idea. He was in the basement of the NSA with other members of Task Force ARES, and they realized that the entire ISIS media network was sitting on the same 10 nodes. That meant all their key servers - domains, accounts, websites - depended on those domain controllers. NEIL: Every account, every IPs, every domain, every financial... TEMPLE-RASTON: If Joint Task Force ARES could gain access an These styles of attacks are important as Pomerleau 19 furthers that the intelligence gained from this OCO can Mark Pomerleau, 9-17-2019, "How Cyber Command can limit the reach of ISIS," C4ISRNET, https://www.c4isrnet.com/dod/cybercom/2019/09/17/how-cyber-command-can-limit-the-reach-of-isis/ Anderson said Ares can provide unique intelligence. First, the team can feed information to national agencies. Equating his cyber operators to pilots, he said on the way to a mission, the cyber operators are observing what ISIS is doing online. This could include suspicious terrorist financing that needs to be examined further. “We push all this intelligence right back into the overall national intelligence data. That could be used by Department of State, Department of Treasury, anybody else to get a Treasury designation – that’s a win for JTF-Ares,” Anderson said. “I might not have had to hit an enter key and destroy anybody’s server … but if I can get a terrorist designation on somebody and make it harder for ISIS to move their money across the internet, I won in that particular realm. We’re not letting them operate unfettered out there.” Second, Ares can potentially and provide the necessarily intelligence to forces around the world where troops are not on the ground. For example, in Afghanistan, Ares could help make up for a lack of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance forces or a lack of kinetic forces. “Our only option to go in and get after these terrorists is going to be through non-kinetic means or through Joint Task Force-Ares,” he said. Overall, for these reasons, Keating 18 of Slate concludes that Joshua Keating, August 16, 2018, "ISIS’s Demise Has Been Greatly Exaggerated," Slate Magazine, https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/08/has-isiss-demise-been-greatly-exaggerated.html But while reports of the demise of ISIS may have been exaggerated, some of the more pessimistic predictions about the group’s future have also not come to pass. Many observers, including myself, worried that as the group transitioned away from governing territory, and as foreign fighters returned from the battlefield to their home countries, there could be an uptick in ISIS attacks globally. That has yet to happen. For one thing, there hasn’t been a major flow out of the Middle East—only about a dozen have returned to the U.S., most of them quickly arrested. And there certainly hasn’t been a wave of terrorist violence. As the Post’s Adam Taylor noted this week, 2018 is on course to be the fourth consecutive year that the number of terrorist attacks around the world—from all groups, not just ISIS—dropped. And despite the atrocious incidents noted above, the level of terrorist violence is declining overall in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia as well. As for ISIS itself, the number of attacks carried out by ISIS fell 10 percent and fatalities dropped 40 percent, according to data from the University of Maryland’s Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism program. What’s becoming clear is that despite the losses it’s suffered over the last four years or so, ISIS today is organizationally stronger than we might have hoped, but still less deadly than we might have feared. Diminishing ISIS capabilities is crucial for two reasons Lee 16 of the New York Times explains that ISIS has killed thousands in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan creating massive instability and igniting attacks abroad that cause the death of even more. Limiting their ability to attack and resurge would limit the death toll as Keating furthers that in the past year ISIS capabilities have been slashed causing Joshua Keating, August 16, 2018, "ISIS’s Demise Has Been Greatly Exaggerated," Slate Magazine, https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/08/has-isiss-demise-been-greatly-exaggerated.html But while reports of the demise of ISIS may have been exaggerated, some of the more pessimistic predictions about the group’s future have also not come to pass. Many observers, including myself, worried that as the group transitioned away from governing territory, and as foreign fighters returned from the battlefield to their home countries, there could be an uptick in ISIS attacks globally. That has yet to happen. For one thing, there hasn’t been a major flow out of the Middle East—only about a dozen have returned to the U.S., most of them quickly arrested. And there certainly hasn’t been a wave of terrorist violence. As the Post’s Adam Taylor noted this week, 2018 is on course to be the fourth consecutive year that the number of terrorist attacks around the world—from all groups, not just ISIS—dropped. And despite the atrocious incidents noted above, the level of terrorist violence is declining overall in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia as well. As for ISIS itself, the number of attacks carried out by ISIS fell 10 percent and fatalities to drop 40 percent, according to data from the University of Maryland’s Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism program. What’s becoming clear is that despite the losses it’s suffered over the last four years or so, ISIS today is organizationally stronger than we might have hoped, but still less deadly than we might have feared. Second is Stabilizing Middle Eastern Development. ISIS has continued to ignite conflict after conflict within the middle east. This has been detrimental to middle eastern economic development as Collier of Oxford reports that Paul Collier, January 1999, “On the Economic Consequences of Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers, http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website01241/WEB/IMAGES/28150.PDF The explanation proposed in this paper is that the decline is partly Because conflict directly reduces production and partly because it causes a gradual loss of the capital stock due to destruction, dissaving, and the substitution of portfolios abroad. These affect sectors differentially. The sector intensive in capital and transactions (manufacturing), and the sectors which supply capital (construction) and transactions (transport, 15 distribution and finance), contract more rapidly than GDP as a whole. The sector with opposite characteristics (arable subsistence agriculture) expands relative to GDP. Civil war is a sufficiently devastating phenomenon that it is likely to have large effects on both the level and composition of economic activity. This paper has proposed simple theoretical frameworks for these effects and tested them for war and post-war periods. during civil war conflict GDP per capita declines at an annual rate of 2.2 per cent relative to its counterfactual.
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Contact Info
Hi this is Akhil the first speaker for Centennial and if you want us to disclose contact me at 214-885-0949 at least 15 minutes before round!
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MARCH NC
ACCIDENTS Perrow- nuclear plants inherently unsafe and prone to accidents https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2016.1145910 In his classic.......this unsettling possibility. MIT ~50 chance in next 10 years https://www.technologyreview.com/s/536886/the-chances-of-another-chernobyl-before-2050-50-say-safety-specialists/ And there's a ....... accidents ever undertaken Levy - precludes political support for nuclear energy in the future https://apnews.com/4f2e590fb6724967bf32d3eff764c17e The accident that ......... the United States. MPI ~hurts 20 million people https://www.mpg.de/5809418/reactor_accidents A major nuclear... 21 million people Stapleton- very bad for environment http://www.pollutionissues.com/Co-Ea/Disasters-Nuclear-Accidents.html Of all the...bone marrow cells. WASTE Gemma- lots of toxic radioactive waste, 200 lb per 1 uranium lb https://earth911.com/eco-tech/what-you-need-to-know-about-nuclear-power/ By some estimates… have already occurred. EA News- 49 million american’s water https://environmentamerica.org/news/ame/nuclear-power-plants-threaten-drinking-water-49-million-americans The drinking water... here, key below. Alemu- 1 inc water contamination bad https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28582990 Methods: The study… sustainable economic growth TRADEOFF Chestney: energy inv. 55b https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-renewables-investment/u-s-clean-energy-investment-hits-new-record-despite-trump-administration-views-idUSKBN1ZF259 Clean energy investment… showed on Thursday. 50 electricity by 2030 https://www.fool.com/investing/2019/07/20/nextera-energy-us-can-hit-50-renewable-energy-by-2.aspx But sharp-eyed investors...every other public estimate Guterres: on track for Paris https://www.voanews.com/science-health/un-us-track-meet-climate-accord-targets The United States is...were within reach. Cooper: manipulating markets http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.175.2423andrep=rep1andtype=pdf At the state level...new nuclear reactors UC USA: needs subsidies https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/2019-09/nuclear_subsidies_summary.pdf Government subsidies to… and renewable energy Rosen: subsidies draw from gtech http://www. Nuclearpolicy. info/wp/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Why-nuclear-energyis-not-an-answer-to-global-warming. pdf Direct and indirect state...out of soil Porritt: previous example of tradeoff http://www.jonathonporritt.com/sites/default/files/users/BRIEFING20520-20Climate_and20energy20security_27_April202012.pdf Lastly, there is... increase those funds Porritt: requires priv. investment http://www.jonathonporritt.com/sites/default/files/users/BRIEFING20520-20Climate_and20energy20security_27_April202012.pdf Lastly, there is... increase those funds Cooper: 3x renewables http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.175.2423andrep=rep1andtype=pdf The commitment to...Western European nations Saxena: dev world cannot adopt https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/atoms-africa-there-future-civil-nuclear-energy-sub-saharan-africa.pdf High capital costs...unlikely in 9 Wood: exporting billions in renewables https://www.renewableenergyworld.com/2011/02/24/policy-and-markets-exporting-us-renewables/#gref The Trade Promotion… fastest growing segment Berwyn: 25 reduction in emissions https://psmag.com/social-justice/new-research-says-tech-transfer-cut-emissions-25-percent But there's new...a few years Green: 5x more effective https://www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/806/nuclear-power-no-solution-climate-change?__cf_chl_jschl_tk__=bafed27a5c6e4c26bd2547784a6f2a4c03473f36-1583395310-0-AfA2R6RJqsiAQgudrYAjWp_V_c6gQpLyVMIyLw_YP0dWpN5_qpsxygoZBarM71z-oSCtARJGQInMPEQLoU-3Up8g8JaES7pjujajIfbfQ8DF6uVTXGjOF1pazesWAy-HD2vUY3XtYnStozDAoX4xxQYNIYLFRP8wLNQUP9aJUf_gi65FeO3i5BRA4Bo5CTv9yY6oHidFpj1sNgRdcAvTZeeFtrgP0lwJkM2dDNOEgkvKKSxKbdBGyXMEyNsDU9Gj5IVuEqarzAsKRzbZSR5cm_M0BOv0ffW0UHcxeWrGBfintPBcjKlNjTOSvO0JJ5Zjs06EmwQSp4yrWTHVuxocDZsOua-AhvGVf8bDs0kECwUG Offshore wind power...mitigating climate change National Research Council: 15 reduction crops http://dels.nas.edu/resources/static-assets/materials-based-on-reports/booklets/warming_world_final.pdf Figure 13. Yields...above that value Jacobson: 7 million annually https://www.ecowatch.com/jacobson-stanford-solar-wind-2476930081.html Californian scientists said...1.5°C or less Profeta: 153 mil die https://blog.nationalgeographic.org/2018/03/22/study-cutting-emissions-sooner-could-save-153-million-lives-this-century/ The research funded...of the Environment.
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Contact Info
Just let us know if you want us to disclose! We will only do so if you disclose as well, and we will upload cases after the tournament is over. Ella Furman- Email: [email protected] or [email protected] Phone: 952-465-6137 Kate McKinney- Email: [email protected] or [email protected] Phone: 952-463-0064
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Interps we want you to meet
Interp – debaters must not use gendered language in the debate space (ie 'you guys') Interpretation – solvency arguments must have a solvency author Interpretation - K alternatives must have implications outside of the debate round. (Debaters must have a realistic alternative with implications outside of the debate round.) Interpretation - Debaters Must read content warnings for potentially traumatizing arguments Word PIK - debaters must not use the word "minorities" or any other version of the word Interpretation - teams must email or text us before the round with any specific interpretations they would like us to fill
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Zoom Boom Neg
cites in doc
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UBI Queer Aff
See open source.
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2 - Jan Neg v2
open-sourced
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Trigger Warning Shell
A. Interpretation: Before starting a speech, debaters must verbally disclose if their speech discusses nongraphic or graphic potentially triggering subject matters such as sexual assault, other triggering material they read, as well as offer to alter their speeches according to the requests of their opponents or judges. To clarify, read trigger warnings. B. Violation: they didn’t C. Standards Our sole standard is safety: Trigger warnings keep survivors safe. Innocent Lives Foundation. "Importance of Trigger Warnings". The Innocent Lives Foundation, No Date, https://www.innocentlivesfoundation.org/importance-of-trigger-warnings/. (JL) While each of these symptoms is equally awful, we wanted to offer you a way you could help survivors cope with everyday life. Trigger warnings are simple ways to help survivors avoid reliving the event, reduce distress, and allow them to prepare themselves mentally. The American Psychological Association shares that vivid memories of trauma are more distressing if they happen without any warning than if the survivor intentionally thinks about their trauma. Instead, unprompted triggering information can cause a host of other issues from mental health disorders like panic attacks, difficulty sleeping, and more. Trigger warnings are respectful ways to communicate about deeply personal issues while refraining from delegitimizing someone’s experience. This does not mean that you must avoid the topic altogether—it simply means that you should address the topic with nuance. People argue that trigger warnings do not allow the survivor to heal from the PTSD, and this article does not dispute this claim. Rather, trigger warnings acknowledge and respect that people must deal with their trauma when they are ready; therefore, it does not force them to deal with their triggers if they are not ready. Ultimately, it is up to the survivor to decide when they are ready to deal with their PTSD. Like the American Psychological Association said, memories of trauma are worse without warning. Safety is an independent voter which outweighs all other concerns in the round because actions that harm the safety of this event harm vulnerable individuals, push people out of debate and erode it as an activity. Safety is also the strongest internal link to fairness, because if debaters do not feel safe in a round, they cannot debate, which is definitionally unfair as well as destroys any educational benefits from a round. D. Voters Education is a voter because it’s the only portable skill from debate. Fairness is a voter because we concede fair adjudication of arguments when we make them. Drop the debater, two justifications: 1) Wins and losses determine the direction of this event. Them losing to this shell tells them and others to read trigger warnings in PF. 2) Once the safety of a round has been jeopardized, it cannot be undone.
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0- DISCLOSURE INFO
What's up, this is Parth, the second speaker from Centennial. If you have any questions (disclosure, email chain, etc.) here's my contact info: Email: [email protected] FB Messenger: Parth Wokhlu If I don't respond within 15 minutes, here's my number: 469-996-6189
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2 - SEPTOCT - Energy v2
Lack of grid connectivity a barrier to renewable energy development Dorcas Kariuki, Energy Today, "Barriers to Renewable Energy Technologies Development", January 25, 2018, https://www.energytoday.net/economics-policy/barriers-renewable-energy-technologies-development/ "On the other hand, lack of physical facilities ... reliable and readily available." GEI uses power grids to provide even distant and poor areas with renewable energy Phillip Cornell, Atlantic Council, "Energy governance and China’s bid for global grid integration - Atlantic Council", May 30, 2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/energy-governance-and-china-s-bid-for-global-grid-integration/ "Energy projects have always ... last three five-year plans" GEI investment will exceed 7 trillion, create 200 million new jobs in Europe Jing Shuiyu, China Daily, "BRI energy investment to hit $27 trillion by 2050 - World - Chinadaily.com.cn", April 27, 2019, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201904/27/WS5cc3ef61a3104842260b8bba.html "Investment in energy ... the agreements will help," The Strait Times in 2019 EU won't meet its goal for renewables by 2020 or 2030, needs more solar renewables and infrastructure The Strait Times, The Strait Times, "France among members putting EU 2020 renewables target at risk, Europe News and Top Stories - The Straits Times", June 6, 2019, https://www.straitstimes.com/world/europe/france-among-members-putting-eu-2020-renewables-target-at-risk "France is one of six ... investment in grid infrastructure," China is forced to cut solar subsidies and supply because of oversupply risk David Stanway, Reuters, "China blocks new solar in 3 NW regions amid overcapacity fears - Reuters", February 14, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-solarpower/china-blocks-new-solar-in-3-nw-regions-amid-overcapacity-fears-idUSKCN1Q404G "China’s energy regulator ... percent in Xinjiang." Solar energy could provide 41 times the energy demand in European countries with the BRI Carly Britton, AAAS, "Solar energy could turn the Belt and Road Initiative green | EurekAlert! Science News", June 27, 2019, https://eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2019-06/cp-sec062019.php "Our model provides ... fuels within a decade." Pollution especially from carbon emissions have caused over half a million deaths in the EU each year Deborah Berthier, European Data Journalism Network, "Air pollution kills more than 500,000 Europeans each year / Data news / News / Home - edjnet", November 5, 2018, https://www.europeandatajournalism.eu/eng/News/Data-news/Air-pollution-kills-more-than-500-000-Europeans-each-year "Atmospheric pollution causes ... 17,700 by ozone" Every degree increase in warming can lead to a 15 decrease in crop yields and a 400 increase in wildfires The National Research Council, NRC, "Warming World: Impact by Degree", 2018, http://dels.nas.edu/resources/static-assets/materials-based-on-reports/booklets/warming_world_final.pdf "In general, each degree ... human impact on climate." We could avoid 150 million CC deaths by limiting emissions David Wallace-Wells, Vox, "The Uninhabitable Earth: David Wallace-Wells on the horrors of climate change - Vox", February 24, 2019, https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2019/2/22/18188562/climate-change-david-wallace-wells-the-uninhabitable-earth "Wallace-Wells isn’t ... managed in ignorance.”
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2 - SEPTOCT - Power Grids
Protectionism forces hinder EU countries from joining BRI Liu Xin, CGTN, "What is stopping EU countries from joining BRI? - CGTN", March 30, 2019, https://news.cgtn.com/news/3d3d674d33457a4e33457a6333566d54/index.html "There are divisions, but that's not because of China ... a systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance." Huawei projects complementary with BRI Bojan Stojkovski, ZD Net, "US-China tech cold war heats up: But Huawei has other irons in the fire | ZDNet", June 25, 2019, https://www.zdnet.com/article/us-china-tech-cold-war-heats-up-but-huawei-has-other-irons-in-the-fire/ "One such region is Eastern Europe ... So China has been filling the void." Huawei is a national security threat James Vincent, The Verge, "Don’t use Huawei phones, say heads of FBI, CIA, and NSA - The Verge", February 14, 2018, https://www.theverge.com/2018/2/14/17011246/huawei-phones-safe-us-intelligence-chief-fears "The heads of six major US intelligence agencies ... now causing problems for the company’s push into consumer electronics." Europe wants Huawei regardless of allegations Ellen Nakashima, The Washington Post, "U.S. pushes hard for a ban on Huawei in Europe, but the firm’s 5G prices are nearly irresistible - The Washington Post", May 29, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/for-huawei-the-5g-play-is-in-europe~-~-and-the-us-is-pushing-hard-for-a-ban-there/2019/05/28/582a8ff6-78d4-11e9-b7ae-390de4259661_story.html?utm_term=.2d7183fee6cb "Over the past decade, Huawei has made ... self-driving cars, military operations and more." China has committed cyberattacks and espionage before in Europe Jack Stubbs, Global News, "China hacked 8 major technology firms in elaborate ‘Cloud Hopper’ attack: report - National | Globalnews.ca", June 26, 2019, https://globalnews.ca/news/5432525/china-cyberattack-computer-services-cloud-hopper/ "Hacked by suspected Chinese cyber spies five times ... many victims may not be aware they were hit." Brussels entire power grid was taken out as its extremely vulnerable Iowa Climate Science Education, Iowa Climate Science Education, "Europe Reminded Of Its Power Grid Vulnerability As Brussels Blacks Out! | Iowa Climate Science Education", February 10, 2017, https://iowaclimate.org/2017/02/10/europe-reminded-of-its-power-grid-vulnerability-as-brussels-blacks-out/ "Europe Reminded Of Its Power Grid Vulnerability ... boost their manpower at main sites around Brussels." China has the capability to attack power grids Adam Segal, Council of Foreign Relations, "China and the Power Grid: Hacking and Getting Hacked | Council on Foreign Relations", December 3, 2014, https://www.cfr.org/blog/china-and-power-grid-hacking-and-getting-hacked "Two weeks ago, Admiral Mike Rogers ... the ICS information security situation will continue to be grim." Threats to cyber security involve cyber attacks on power girds, millions without basic necessities, US proves Han Koren, ASAP, "Cyber Security", February 18, 2016, https://www.asapsecured.com/2016/02/ "If there is one topic prominent in today’s security ... aren’t any more protected than those breached in Ukraine." Power grid failure could kill over 200 million Keagen Harsha, Fox News, "The power grid doomsday scenario no one is talking about | FOX31 Denver", May 25, 2016, https://kdvr.com/2016/05/25/the-power-grid-doomsday-scenario-no-one-is-talking-about/ "It's a real-life threat no one wants to imagine, ... a cyberterrorist could hack into the system and shut down the grid."
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4 - JAN - Invasion
Discussions over democracy occurring right now Michael Crowley, New York Times, "Trump Imposes New Sanctions on Venezuela - The New York Times", August 6, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/06/us/politics/venezuela-embargo-sanctions.html The White House ... to Peru’s government. Military action used to be on the table for the US Jennifer Hansler, CNN, "Pompeo says military action in Venezuela 'possible' - CNNPolitics", May 1, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/01/politics/mike-pompeo-venezuela-military-action/index.html Secretary of State ... Venezuela's disputed leadership. Sanctions considered the alternative to intervention Ola Karrar, NCBI, "Economic sanctions and academia: Overlooked impact and long-term consequences", October 1, 2019, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6772044/ Financial sanctions are ... impose economic sanctions. 2 warrants: 1 - Political Support Trump's tough stance on Maduro popular with 1.5m Cubans/Venezuelans Maureen Groppe, Knox News, "Trump Venezuela policy also good 2020 politics in key state of Florida", February 1, 2019, https://www.knoxnews.com/story/news/politics/2019/02/01/trump-venezuela-policy-also-good-2020-politics-key-state-florida-maduro-guaido/2730779002/ Embattled Venezuelan President ... 2020, he said. 2 - Oil Trump has stated he's willing to go to war to control Venezuelan oil Alex Ward, Vox, "McCabe book: Trump wanted a Venezuela war because of oil - Vox", February 20, 2019, https://www.vox.com/world/2019/2/20/18233394/mccabe-trump-venezuela-war-oil-lawrence In a July ... with the president. Instead, Trump is sanctioning PDVSA to control oil revenue to VZ right now Madeline Roache, Al Jazeera, "Sanctions, Venezuela, and US intentions | USA News | Al Jazeera", February 28, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/sanctions-venezuela-intentions-190226124044497.html In November 2017 ... the Venezuelan people. More aggressive action is a possibility Jennifer Jacobs, Bloomberg, "Trump Loses Confidence in Venezuela's Opposition Head Juan Guaido - Bloomberg", December 6, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-12-06/trump-revisits-venezuela-strategy-as-confidence-in-guaido-wanes While Washington has ... hurting vulnerable Venezuelans. The invasion would be “worse than Vietnam,” which killed over 4 million people in a long and bloody conflict Hjelmgaard ’19 Hjelmgaard, Kim “Venezuela's Nicolas Maduro says any US invasion would be worse than 'Vietnam'.” USA Today, 31 Jan 2019, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2019/01/31/venezuela-nicolas-maduro-says-u-s-invasion-would-worse-than-vietnam/2729781002/ One week after ... relationship with democracy.
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GEI
Cornell of the Atlantic Council in 2019; China expands GEI https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/energy-governance-and-china-s-bid-for-global-grid-integration/ That strategic plan... the modern global economy. Clini; GEI has power to spread clean energy through multiple methods. https://energypost.eu/china-plans-uhv-transmission-lines-that-span-continents/ The aim of ... to boost end-use efficiency. Cierten from the European Union Institute in 2017; EU funds https://bruegel.org/2017/05/china-cannot-finance-the-belt-and-road-alone/ It seems that China ... under the Belt and Road. Bing of China in 19; Legitimization http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2019-04/24/content_74715485.htm In short, as more EU countries ... sides will continue to emerge, so watch this space. Wang; China is planning to invest into GEI https://www.nextbigfuture.com/2016/03/china-proposes-50-trillion-global-uhv.html By 2050, the total ... new materials and electric vehicle. National Renewable Energy Lab; https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/can-the-world-run-on-renewable-energy/ And it’s at least ... of the country.” UN reports in 2018; that GEI can distribute power to one-fifth of the world’s population who still have no access to electricity. world health organization in 2019; lots of people depend on polluting material. UN evidence https://unfccc.int/news/global-energy-interconnection-is-crucial-for-paris-goals The organization calculates that energy interconnectivity could not only reduce carbon emissions, but also enable distribution of power to one-fifth of the world’s population who still have no access to electricity, relying on firewood, coal, and animal waste for cooking and heating. W.H.O. evidence https://unfccc.int/news/global-energy-interconnection-is-crucial-for-paris-goals The organization calculates that energy interconnectivity could not only reduce carbon emissions, but also enable distribution of power to one-fifth of the world’s population who still have no access to electricity, relying on firewood, coal, and animal waste for cooking and heating. W.H.O. evidence further https://www.who.int/airpollution/en/ From smog hanging over cities to smoke inside the home, air pollution poses a major threat to health and climate. The combined effects of ambient (outdoor) and household air pollution cause about 7 million premature deaths every year, largely as a result of increased mortality from stroke, heart disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, lung cancer and acute respiratory infections. Wang in 2018; GEI will reduce carbon emissions world wide. World Bank in 2019; 2 degrees Celsius can save millions. http://www.minesandcommunities.org/article.php?a=12490/////// https://qz.com/1276934/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-bri-extends-to-space-too/ A group of 27 leading climate ... industries will achieve net zero emissions. https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1742-6596/52/1/012079/pdf According to forecasts, ... will achieve net zero emissions. world banks https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/climatechange/overview According to the latest ...compared with 2°C. preventing premature deaths. https://interestingengineering.com/cutting-carbon-emissions-could-prevent-153-million-air-pollution-related-deaths This could help avoid ...n deaths will be avoided. Xinhua; 100 million jobs http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-03/28/c_137072515.htm The studies estimated ... total of over 100 million jobs. Business Today https://www.businesstoday.in/current/economy-politics/chinese-firm-unveils-plans-to-provide-free-worldwide-wifi-with-272-satellites/story/295835.html A Chinese internet.... to a media report Thursday. Kilbride of ABC News; will help poverty Kilbride https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-11-30/chinese-company-to-provide-free-internet-worldwide-by-2026/10568434 LinkSure already services ... activity by $6.7 trillion The Center for Strategic and International Studies; BRI has connectivity https://chinapower.csis.org/china-belt-and-road-initiative/ Chinese President Xi Jinping ... some 4.4 billion people. He in 2019; China is suffering https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/15/economy/china-gdp-growth/index.html China's economic growth ... war with the United States. Wharton in 2019; BRI fell in investment https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-why-the-price-is-too-high/ BRI lending by major ... arms of government policy.” Huang from Quartz in 2018; BRI spends money on satellite watches Quartz https://qz.com/1276934/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-bri-extends-to-space-too/
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2- Round 1 Neg
http://economics-files.pomona.edu/GarySmith/Econ190/Econ190202015/AndrewPalmer.pdf) The marginal effects… AND … welfare spending regressor. Adriana Kugler, December 2013, American Progress, "", (), Accessed: 1-31-2020, https://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/TaxTransfers.pdf?fbclid=IwAR2GL-uuUQATOeS9CVuoMdOry2QNBfO3uCQdQsRgKheeEF0YGxsi3v6Dc7Q Similarly, more generous… AND … to work out. (3-2002, "Policy Implications Of The Gradient Of Health And Wealth", Accessed: 1-31-2020, https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/pdf/10.1377/hlthaff.21.2.13) AN Importance of education... AND … for that knowledge. REIS 12 (7-2012, "The role of automatic stabilizers in the U.S. business cycle", Accessed: 1-31-2020, https://economics.yale.edu/sites/default/files/mckay-130402.pdf) AS Most countries have… AND … to aggregate shocks. (2018, "Universal Basic Income proposals in light of ILO standards: Key issues and global costing", Accessed: 1-31-2020, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-ed_protect/—-soc_sec/documents/publication/wcms_648602.pdf) DB Because of low … AND … in a downturn. (2015, "The Effect of Growth Volatility on Income Inequality", Accessed: 1-31-2020, https://sci-hub.tw/10.1016/j.econmod.2014.11.020) DB Rather than examining… AND … across income quintiles. (2015, "The Effect of Growth Volatility on Income Inequality", Accessed: 1-31-2020, https://sci-hub.tw/10.1016/j.econmod.2014.11.020) DB Both the PMG… AND … on income inequality.17 4-25-2018, "Universal Basic Income – Not the Answer to Poverty", Accessed: 1-31-2020, https://www.jrf.org.uk/blog/universal-basic-income-not-answer-poverty) DB So, a central… AND … by tax rises. (9-27-2012, "Inequality Kills", Accessed: 1-31-2020, http://bostonreview.net/us/stephen-bezruchka-inequality-kills) DB The report also… AND … discussion about it. CHRIS GOULDEN 18 4-25-2018, "Universal Basic Income – Not the Answer to Poverty", Accessed: 1-31-2020, https://www.jrf.org.uk/blog/universal-basic-income-not-answer-poverty) So, a central problem…. AND …. funded by tax rises. BRUCE MEYER 18 (2018, "The Poverty Reduction of Social Security and Means-Tested Transfers", Accessed: 1-31-2020, https://sci-hub.tw/10.1177/0019793918790220) Table 1 lists…. AND …. the poverty line. Samuel Kleiner, May 2014, NBER, "", (), Accessed: 1-31-2020, https://www.nber.org/papers/w20178.pdf?fbclid=IwAR1c0A69Lf6w64L1zk6L6WTdKYHHiaXp9hIEMNLYTSMSmBI4LyeK44wk1cI Across outcomes and… AND … completion by 5.5. October 2016, Coalition for Human Needs, "", (), Accessed: 1-31-2020, https://www.chn.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/EITC-CTC-Outcomes-2016-Update.pdf?fbclid=IwAR1uaT9QYH2LeK-AWoBBwYTquSsyY8UUOv_3ZtgAYaTdaNQv6GbQi0rgVCs Tax credits improve… AND … and minority children.
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1 - Email Chain Interp
Public Forum Debaters at the online TOC should disclose the entirety of their constructive evidence in cut card format before their first speech
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3 - gendered language
interp – debaters must not use gendered language in the debate space full shell in open source
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PTOC R6
open source
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MARCH AFF
os
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0 - Contact Info
text me: 9546960680
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0- Contact Info
contact either of us Mateo- messenger: Mateo Aristizabal email: [email protected] ill prob respond faster on messenger
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Insurgency DA
Terrorism/extremism/insurgency in the Middle East inevitable – too many factors and unpredictable leaders Arleigh A., 4-9-2018, "Stability in the Middle East: The Range of Short and Long-Term Causes," No Publication, https://www.csis.org/analysis/stability-middle-east-range-short-and-long-term-causes The Middle East has long been one AND upheavals and wars that began in 2011are a key case in point. ====US training has been deciding factor against ISIS and also brings long-term benefits==== New America, xx-xx-xxxx, "Iraq After ISIS: What To Do Now," https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/reports/iraq-after-isis-what-do-now/the-state-of-us-iraqi-ties-and-areas-for-improvement/ Training provided by the United States AND initiatives and can be achieved discreetly and at relatively low cost. ====Iraqi forces have moved on from basics and now need higher-level training: only US can provide this.==== Vance Serchuk, March 6, 2020. Foreign Policy, "Big Ideas for NATO’s New Mission in Iraq," https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/06/iraq-islamic-state-military-nato-advisors/ The Trump administration would AND elements under consideration for deployment to Iraq ====If the US pulled out, then Iraqi anti-terrorism forces will merge with Iranian forces==== Noack,Rick 1-10-2020, "Here’s what might happen if the U.S. were to suddenly quit Iraq" https://outline.com/j7yTAw "Once the U.S. umbrella is AND Iraqi state, which the U.S. has sought to strengthen." ====Iranian militia doesn’t care about ISIS==== Smith,Crispin 1-28-2020 "After Soleimani Strike, Iran-Backed Militias Threaten Iraq’s Stability: An Explainer" In short, the Hashd al-Sha’abi is AND Iranian — influence in and around Iraq. ====Terrorism is genocide==== Seth Frantzman, 4-22-2019, "The Insidious Genocidal Evil of Terrorism," Middle East Forum, https://www.meforum.org/58312/genocidal-evil-terrorism The attack on churches on AND far-right religious-inspired terror attacks. ====ISIS genocide killed thousands. Don’t allow it to repeat.==== Un Ocha, 8-1-2019, "Five years after the genocide, Yazidis share their forgotten stories and demand justice," ReliefWeb, https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/five-years-after-genocide-yazidis-share-their-forgotten-stories-and-demand-justice Five years after Islamic State (ISIS) militants AND mass graves are still open and unprotected.
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Disclosure Shell
1 OFF – Disclosure Shell Interpretation: Teams must disclose previously used case positions including general tags before the round preemptively on the NDCA PF wiki at least 30 min before the round. Violation: They did not disclose on the wiki in time while we did. Standards: 1. Fairness-It’s impossible to predict what they will run unless they disclose on the wiki. We can’t do research on their arguments if we don’t know what it is. That provides an unfair advantage because they can look at our arguments. 2. Education -We can compare arguments and evidence better if we can prepare for the specific arguments. There’s no education if only one side knows what their opponent is running. Good disclosure is important because Nails 2013 explains that “disclosure streamlines research… providing knowledge … everyone can build off of.” Nails, Jacob. October 10, 2013.A Defense of Disclosure (Including Third-Party Disclosure) by Jacob Nails. http://nsdupdate.com/2013/10/10/a-defense-of-disclosure-including-third-party-disclosure-by-jacob-nails/ .DA=1/26/17.-SVJK I fall squarely on the side of disclosure. I find that the largest advantage of widespread disclosure is the educational value it provides. First, disclosure streamlines research. Rather than every team and every lone wolf researching completely in the dark, the wiki provides a public body of knowledge that everyone can contribute to and build off of. Students can look through the different studies on the topic and choose the best Studies ones on an informed basis without the prohibitively large burden of personally surveying all of the literature. The best arguments are identified and replicated, which is a natural result of an open marketplace of ideas. Quality of evidence increases across the board. There are 2 voters – First is Predictability: Predictability is key to fairness because if one side is more prepared they will always win. They know what our arguments are but we do not have an opportunity to gain that same advantage. Debate is a competitive activity designed to determine the better debater; adjudicating unfair debates only determines who was arbitrarily advantaged, not who gave the better performance. Second is Clash: More education leads to more clash and more educational experiences for everyone pre-and during round. Lack of grounds and predictability destroys in round clash, taking away the opportunity to have more productive and educational debates with each team testing each other at our fullest capability. Drop the Debater: Judge, you can’t agree with the strategy my opponent is using because they are clearly ruining the educational value and fairness of PF just to try and win. You cannot allow this to happen and help show it is wrong by voting down my opponent. This sends a signal to other teams that they should disclose and corrects for the time skew that occurs from us addressing this unfairness. No fairness RVI’s because you do not win the round by proving you don’t cheat. They have to Prefer reasonability over competing interpretations with an emphasis on clear demonstrations of in round violations. If it is reasonably true that my opponents have violated our interp and why that’s significant, then you should drop them. Competing interpretations only allow in round abuse to be masked by blippy theory debates and sidestep meaningful engagement with the arguments presented in this debate.
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Contact Information
Contact us for disclosure! We would be happy to disclose previously read arguments. Peyton Ronkin Email: [email protected] FB Messenger is preferred: Peyton Ronkin Caleb Samson Email: [email protected] or email our coach: [email protected]
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Aff
Verchick 96, Policymakers should look to perspectives of society’s most vulnerable. Women and POC are more vulnerable because they have less power and control. Public fear of catastrophes will irrationally lead policymakers to battle less threatening hazards, while accepting more harmful localized hazards which are unevenly distributed on the basis of race and income. Risk means more than the expected number of fatalities. It must include the voices of those excluded from its practice. Mead 17 Structural violence is important because it harms certain populations. In the context of health disparities among minorities, structural violence highlights the existing systems that work to disadvantage and harm marginalized populations, which negatively impact their health. KFF ‘20 states that in the status quo, 10.8 million US women are uninsured. Jacobin ‘17 states that coverage is tied to employment status, which harms women seeking part-time jobs or taking time off during child-rearing. Furthermore, majority-female workforces and minimum-wage jobs, where women are more likely to work, have on net worse health coverage. Magnuson and Malinow of Women eNews ‘19 conclude that women are more likely to have low-paying jobs without health benefits, which makes pregnant women and new mothers especially vulnerable. Health Affiar ‘17 finds that in the 9 months leading up to pregnancy, 58 of women changed insurance status, and 62 were uninsured for at least one month. This is devastating as the CDC states that preconception health care protects the health of the baby in the future. Thus, Health Affiar ‘17 concludes that lack of insurance will lead to high risk of adverse bith outcomes. To make the matter worse, children of uninsured parents are likely to be uninsured too. Second is after delivery: Health Affiar ‘17 finds that only 40 of women receive postpartum care after giving birth. This is disastrous as uninsured women struggle to manage common pregnancy-related conditions, such as postpartum depression. The ACOG recommends screening all women at least once for depression after bith. However, uninsured women will not have this luxury. Health Affiar ‘17 furthers that untreated postpartum depression could lead to disastrous outcomes. Luckily, Medicare for All would be able to solve this problem. Women’s eNews ‘19 states that Medicare for All means health insurance would no longer be tied to one’s employment or marital status. This leads to a secure and long-term healthcare system that women can rely on, especially during pregnancy. The impact is death: Deck 18 for Global Citizen finds that US women suffer the highest maternal mortality rate compared to other countries with single-payer healthcare. MayoClinic finds that untreated postpartum depression can become a chronic depressive disorder. Healthline then quantifies that depression can decrease a woman's life span by 10 years. In addition, according to the National Institutes of Health, of the 4 million babies born every year in the United States, those without insurance are 2.6 times more likely to die. These impacts are intersectional: The NIH continues that health insurance status is associated with infants survival risks. Tragically, the CDC reports that black newborns are more than twice as likely to die as white babies after being born. Young 20 of the Brookings Institute finds that Half of those 30 million uninsured are people of color. For example, Hispanic people make up 17.3 of the population yet 33 of the uninsured. This is because health insurance is too expensive for many people of color. Caruso 15 of Harvard finds the median net worth of black and Hispanic families was $6k and $7k vs. $110k for whites, a 15-fold difference. Thus, family deductibles would bring financial ruin to African American and Hispanic households. Unfortunately, Sohn 16 finds that uninsured people lack access to health services. Many health care providers require insurance coverage from their patients or charge a high fee. Medicare for all would help by giving 15 million people of color health insurance. The Philip Randolph Institute says Medicare for All would challenge structural biases as it would support the health and economic security of patients of color. For example, Breen 01 found that if Hispanic women were given health insurance, they would see an 11 increase in screenings. African American men would see a 5 percentage point increase in colorectal screening. All in all, Blanton 05 of Health Affairs writes that because inadequate coverage plays a key role in racial disparities, expanding health coverage should be a major component of any strategy to reduce racial/ethnic disparities in healthcare For example, New York City data found that Black Americans are two times more likely to die from COVID than white Americans. And Latinx populations are more than 50 percent more likely to die from COVID.
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Gulf and Iran worked together Abdullah Hamidaddin (PhD candidate in King’s College London), Al Arabiya, 9-20-2013 "A window for Iranian-Gulf relations?" https://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2013/09/20/A-window-for-Iranian-Gulf-relations-Accessed4-3-2020 // RZ Thus if I can ... for Saudi-Iranian normalization. Gulf has new strategy House 18, https://www.wsj.com/articles/rethinking-saudi-arabia-1543595189 Still more worrisome ...l oil-shipping lanes. Iran wants to negotiate Suzanne Maloney, 7-26-2019, "Iran’s threats are an attempt to negotiate," Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/07/26/irans-threats-are-an-attempt-to-negotiate/ But a funny... a Japanese company. USMP stopped diplomacy Ulrichsen ‘20 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Rice University Baker Institute for Public Policy, February 2020, “REBALANCING REGIONAL SECURITY IN THE PERSIAN GULF”, https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/de9f09e6/cme-pub-persiangulf-022420.pdf Accessed 4-11-20 Even within the ...became glaringly obvious. GCC can do diplomacy Kirsten Fontenrose, Atlantic Council, "Gulf partners could give Iran and the US a way out of their collision course - Atlantic Council", March 31, 2020, https://atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/gulf-partners-could-give-iran-and-the-us-a-way-out-of-their-collision-course/ With increasing strikes...in the region. Gulf negotiates Fassihi 19 (Farnaz Fassihi and Ben Hubbard, 10-4-2019 "Saudi Arabia and Iran Make Quiet Openings to Head Off War", NYT, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/04/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-iran-talks.html)//PSR 4-12-2020 Iran has long … known as MBS. Emboldenment Beckley 15 (Michael, 5-01-15, "The myth of entangling alliances: Reassessing the security risks of US defense pacts", MIT Press Journal) https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00197 // PSR Firm security commitments...Greece and Turkey.43 Violence grows Benson 11 (Benson, 10-1-2011 "Unpacking Alliances: Deterrent And Compellent Alliances And Their Relationship With Conflict, 1816–2000", Vanderbilt University, https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1017/S0022381611000867?mobileUi=0)//PSR 4-14-2020 As expected, when... pacifying than dangerous. USMP is US assurance Hunzeker 16 (Michael Allen., Winter 2016, "Landpower and American Credibility", City University of London, https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/15415/1/HunzekerLanoszkaParameters.pdf) //PSR 4-14-2020 We first explain.. kill and win. No negotiations Emma Ashford, Strategic Studies Quarterly, "Unbalanced: Rethinking America’s Commitment to the Middle East", Spring 2018, https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/articles/ashford-ssq-november-2018.pdf Yet perhaps the... these developing ties. Violence down Parsi 20 (Trita Parsi, 1-6-2020 "The Middle East Is More Stable When the United States Stays Away", Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/06/the-middle-east-is-more-stable-when-the-united-states-stays-away/) //PSR 3-25-2020 Further, the region ...previous two weeks. Talks good Center for Security Studies ‘12, 12-27-2012 "Human Security Report 2012, Chapter 6: Persistent Armed Conflict - An Increasing Threat?" https://css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/156459 3-14-2020 // PSR (EJ) Victories have long ...persistent civil conflicts. More violence Wood 12 Reed Wood, professor of politics and global studies, “Armed intervention and civilian victimization in intrastate conflicts”, Journal of Peace Research, http://www.public.asu.edu/~rmwood4/woodkathgent_jpr.pdf // PSR Research has begun...employed by combatants. Rebels get rebellious Reed 15, (William, May 27th, 2015, "The role of external support in civil war termination." Journal of Conflict Resolution, University of Maryland) http://www.kathleengallaghercunningham.com/uploads/4/5/5/8/45589607/jcr_finalversion_wnames.pdf // PSR Specifically, more fungible.. problem for rebels. Millions on the brink NRC 20 (Nrc, 1-8-2020 "US-Iran tension threatens lifeline to millions across the Middle East", ReliefWeb, https://reliefweb.int/report/world/us-iran-tension-threatens-lifeline-millions-across-middle-east) //PSR 4-15-2020 Tens of millions … Occupied Palestinian Territories.
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2 - SEPTOCT - Energy v1
BRI could increase global trade by 12 and decrease trade costs by half Eric Lam, Bloomberg, "China's BRI could increase global trade by 12, halve trading costs: ING | Business Standard News", June 7, 2018, https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/china-s-bri-could-increase-global-trade-by-12-halve-trading-costs-ing-118060700620_1.html "China’s Belt and Road campaign could increase global trade ... even over a long period, could lead to large impacts on international trade.” EU has large interest in solar energy, wants to become 20 of market share by 2030 Terje Osmundsen, Energy Post, "Solar consumption and manufacturing: can Europe re-take the lead? - Energy Post", March 21, 2019, https://energypost.eu/solar-consumption-and-manufacturing-can-europe-re-take-the-lead/ "As a solar consumer Europe already plans ... Poland have the establishment of manufacturing as objective." China willing to cooperate with EU on green energy with solar Zheng Xin, China Daily, "Fresh ray of hope for solar firms - Chinadaily.com.cn", October 22, 2018, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201810/22/WS5bcd2728a310eff303283ae4.html "China's Ministry of Commerce also described ... from a huge supply of cheaper modules." BRI can be powered with solar energy Yvaine Ye, Harvard, "Solar energy could turn the Belt and Road Initiative green | Harvard John A. Paulson School of Engineering and Applied Sciences", July 12, 2019, https://www.seas.harvard.edu/news/2019/07/solar-energy-could-turn-belt-and-road-initiative-green "The region covered by the Belt and Road Initiative ... 'And I'm optimistic about that.'" Every degree increase in warming can lead to a 15 decrease in crop yields and a 400 increase in wildfires The National Research Council, NRC, "Warming World: Impact by Degree", 2018, http://dels.nas.edu/resources/static-assets/materials-based-on-reports/booklets/warming_world_final.pdf "In general, each degree C of global temperature increase ... would greatly increase the size and duration of human impact on climate." 1.5 degrees increase in temperature can cause 350 million more deaths annually ECL, The Earth Chronicles of Life, "If the Earth warms by 1.5 degrees, the world will die annually to 350 million people | Earth Chronicles News", April 1, 2017, http://earth-chronicles.com/science/if-the-earth-warms-by-1-5-degrees-the-world-will-die-annually-to-350-million-people.html "Because of the warming of only 1.5 degrees Celsius, every year ... Here, people will suffer from heat stress 100 times more than in 1979."
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3 - NOVDEC - Escalation
Escalation occurs in 3 ways: First is Spurring an Arms Race. Complex digital arms race has begun with our cyberattacks Steve Ranger, Tech Republic, "Inside the secret digital arms race: Facing the threat of a global cyberwar - TechRepublic", Steve Ranger, https://www.techrepublic.com/article/inside-the-secret-digital-arms-race/ As I watched ... we are today. Cyber operations provoke a digital arms race, countries stockpile code Damian Paletta, WSJ, "Cyberwar Ignites a New Arms Race", October 11, 2015, https://outline.com/Wum53Z A series of ... remain fair game. Second is Triggering Preemptive Attacks. Cyberwar has created a hair trigger, countries preemptively attack Fred Kaplan, Slate, "A new era for cyberwar as U.S. hacks Russian power grid.", June 17, 2019, https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/06/trump-cyber-russia-power-hacking.html One thing is ... with no warning. This increases the chance of miscalculation Bruce Cain, The American Interest, "Arms Races to the Bottom - The American Interest", June 27, 2018, https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/06/27/arms-races-to-the-bottom/ The risk of ... lead to misinterpretation. Third is Misinterpretation of Operations. Countries see all US operations as escalatory, we are in a forever war Benjamin Jensen, CATO Institute, "The Myth of the Cyber Offense: The Case for Restraint | Cato Institute", January 15, 2019, https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/myth-cyber-offense-case-restraint Contrary to observed ... action in cyberspace. This increases ambiguity between actors and creates misinterpretation with countries like Russia Condé Nast, Wired, "How Not To Prevent a Cyberwar With Russia | WIRED", June 18, 2019, https://www.wired.com/story/russia-cyberwar-escalation-power-grid/ One very plausible ... hard to disentangle. The impact is Harming Small Businesses. Cyberattacks target 43 of small businesses but only 14 can defend, forcing 60 out of business Scott Steinberg, CNBC, "Cyberattacks cost small companies $200K, putting many out of business", October 13, 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/13/cyberattacks-cost-small-companies-200k-putting-many-out-of-business.html With 43 of ... cause serious disruption. Cyberattacks against small business could spark the next recession due to the critical role they play in the economy Devin Smith, Eurasia Review, "Small Business Cyberattacks Could Prompt The Next Recession - OpEd - Eurasia Review", August 2, 2019, https://www.eurasiareview.com/02082019-small-businesses-cyberattacks-could-prompt-the-next-recession-oped/ The risk to … especially payment systems. The last recession put about 4.9 million into poverty Elizabeth Kneebone, Brookings, "The Great Recession and Poverty in Metropolitan America", October 7, 2010, https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-great-recession-and-poverty-in-metropolitan-america/ The latest data ... to alleviate poverty.
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3 - NOVDEC - Iran
Handler 19 OCOs de-escalate ME tensions Simon Handler, Nextgov, "The Zero-Day War? How Cyber is Reshaping the Future of the Most Combustible Conflicts - Nextgov", November 4, 2019, https://www.nextgov.com/ideas/2019/11/zero-day-war-how-cyber-reshaping-future-most-combustible-conflicts/161055/ As tensions rage ... to regional conflict. This occurs in Iran in 2 ways: First is Providing an Alternative. Gilchrist 19 Trump replaced conventional strike with OCO against Iran, killed 0 Karen Gilchrist, CNBC, "US-Iran cyber strike marks a military 'game changer,' says tech expert", July 2, 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/02/us-iran-cyber-strike-marks-a-military-game-changer-says-tech-expert.html After the U.S ... its nuclear ambitions. Rasidi 19 OCOs in Iran have not let to human casualties Yasmeen Rasidi, Citizen Truth, "Has the US Already Declared a Cyber War on Iran? - Citizen Truth", October 23, 2019, https://citizentruth.org/has-the-us-already-declared-a-cyber-war-on-iran/ Conventional battlefields have ... hoped to deter. Walsh 19 US conventional strike triggers US-Iran conflict Nick Walsh, CNN, "Iran: Zarif threatens 'all-out war' in case of military strike after Saudi oil attack - CNN", September 20, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/19/middleeast/iran-zarif-saudi-intl/index.html Iran's foreign minister ... that they did it." Calamur 18 Syrian war in ME drew in multiple other actors Krishnadev Calamur, The Atlantic, "The War in Syria Is Getting More Complicated - The Atlantic", April 13, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/04/the-syrian-war-is-many-wars/557990/ Over the seven ... incentive to pursue. Halti 19 US-Iran war would be worse than Iraqi war in 03, kill hundreds of thousands John Haltiwanger, Businesss Insider, "Trump, Iran near brink of a war that would likely devastate both sides - Business Insider", September 19, 2019, https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-iran-near-brink-of-a-war-that-would-likely-devastate-both-sides-2019-5 A war with ... 250,000 reserve personnel. Second is Halting Nuclearization. Zetter 14 Stuxnet prevented Iran from obtaining nukes within the year, they still don't have any Kim Zetter, November 3, 2014, "An Unprecedented Look at Stuxnet, the World's First Digital Weapon | WIRED", Wired, https://www.wired.com/2014/11/countdown-to-zero-day-stuxnet/ The performance of ... designed to do. Horschig 19 Israel would preemptively strike Iran if they obtained a nuke Doreen Horschig, Business Standard, "If Iran tensions flare, Israel may strike while the world quietly watches | Business Standard News", June 23, 2019, https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/if-iran-tensions-flare-israel-may-strike-while-the-world-quietly-watches-119062300146_1.html Israel will not ... world quietly watches. Dallas 13 7 million could die from Iran-Israel conflict Cham Dallas, BMC, "Nuclear war between Israel and Iran: lethality beyond the pale | Conflict and Health | Full Text", May 10, 2013, https://conflictandhealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1752-1505-7-10 No real appreciation ... attack on Tehran.
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1 - Infrastructure
EU banks want to help BRI "European companies would love ... globe-spanning investment initiative" Rosenfield 19, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/25/eu-official-china-needs-to-reform-belt-and-road-for-many-to-sign-up.html If the EU joined, they would see a major increase in trade. "Aggregate results suggest ... 16.6 and 12.4 respectively" Michele Ruta, World Bank, https://blogs.worldbank.org/trade/hurry-how-belt-and-road-initiative-changes-trade-times-and-trade The EU needs this, as they have a large trade deficit right now. "the EU’s trade deficit ... 68.8 BILLION USD” Brussels 19, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eurozone-economy-trade/eu-trade-surplus-with-us-expands-deficit-with-china-larger-idUSKCN1TJ0V1 Deficit can be reduced with more trade from China "As Chinese markets ... trade deficit will shrink" Xinhua 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-04/27/c_138015129.htm More money going into EU "China's direct investment ... to $400 billion, Song said" Nan, China Daily, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201904/23/WS5cbe4b9aa3104842260b7a07.html This will also increase their economic growth "an increase in ... income per person" Romer, International Monetary Fund, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/117025.pdf?ab_segments=02Fdefault-22Fcontrolandrefreqid=search3A717d3b4e731ef2d0612a0000fa0aef1d EU needs this as they have very little economic growth right now. "The euro zone’s GDP ... trade conflicts and uncertainty over Brexit." Reuters, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eurozone-economy/euro-zone-gdp-slows-in-second-quarter-as-growth-in-germany-shrinks-idUSKCN1V40UD This is going to cause a recession if we don’t increase economic growth. "Europe has a 70 ... growth last quarter." Market Insider, 2019, https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/mohamed-el-erian-europe-has-70-chance-falling-into-recession-2019-8-1028458673 Recession would push millions into poverty "Like previous recessions ... by 1.5-2.4 million." Parrott, 2019, https://www.cbpp.org/research/recession-could-cause-large-increases-in-poverty-and-push-millions-into-deep-poverty
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contact info
**for quarantined tournament** hello, we are eesha and enya. **pronouns** enya - she/her; they/them eesha - she/her; they/them let us know yours :) __**for quarantined, all of our prep/speeches we will be breaking new.**__ we'll disclose after (maybe) here's our contact info if u wanna harass us ab disclosing enya pinjani - 460-786-7206 or facebook message at Enya Pinjani eesha suri - 214-784-9049 or facebook message at Eesha Suri if you don't contact us before round we get auto-meets on your interps :) you have been warned
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1 - Gendered Language Interp v2
Debaters should refrain from using gender discriminatory language in round to promote inclusion and prevent misgendering fellow debaters or judges.
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1 - Gendered Language Interp
Debaters using "you guys" to describe non-male identifying folk is creeping sexism and a reminder of our inferiority in the debate space—reject the team to preserve debate as a safe space for all identities.
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1 - contact info
1st speaker - Jack Merkel (mains corrin) (78 rps) 2nd speaker - Griffin Amos (mains cloud) (62 rps) email or text me if u want anything, i dont check facebook [email protected] 804-971-0754 send any theory interp b4 the round so we can meet it (this functions as a we meet)
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