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365,700 | 379,900 | Belt and Road Negative v2 - Holy Cross | ==Contention 1 – An Unchecked China==
====Unfortunately, after the US departure from the UN Human Rights Council – the HRC's effectiveness to combat Chinese oppression has begun to weaken as Hong indicates THIS WEEK that:====
Taehwa Hong, 9-21-2019, "The US Should Rejoin The UNHRC – Analysis," Asia Times, https://www.eurasiareview.com/21092019-the-us-should-rejoin-the-unhrc-analysis/, Date Accessed 9-24-2019 // JM
The US absence from the UN Human Rights Council might have given authoritarian regimes more
AND
the human rights debate instead of ceding the playing field to its rivals.
====Joining the BRI will only legitimize China's standing on the international stage. CSIS wrote in 2019 that:====
CSIS, "How will the Belt and Road Initiative advance China's interests?," https://chinapower.csis.org/china-belt-and-road-initiative/, Date Accessed 6-23-2019 // JP
If successfully implemented, the BRI could help re-orient a large part of
AND
Turkmenistan (22), Pakistan (32), and Sri Lanka (36).
====Reshaping UN Human Rights norms happens when the EU joins the BRI as countries become afraid to speak out against China on the international stage. Andrea Kendall-Taylor argued in August that:====
Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Rachel Rizzo, 8-12-2019, "The U.S. or China? Europe Needs to Pick a Side," POLITICO Magazine, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/08/12/us-china-europe-relations-227614, Date Accessed 8-12-2019 // WS
Choosing the United States does not mean that Europe should forfeit all trade and economic
AND
that it will unequivocally side with America to uphold democratic norms and standards.
====And, this economic leverage has been proven as Patrick Goodenough wrote THIS WEEK that China is sending:====
Patrick Goodenough, 9-24-2019, "Religious Freedom Envoy Dismayed Islamic Countries Won't Condemn China's Abuse of Uighur Muslims," CNS News, Date Accessed 9-26-2019 // JM
It said Sullivan "welcomes global partners in joining the call for China to end
AND
like-minded nations devoted to confronting religious persecution all around the world."
====In a world where China uses its leverage of human rights decisions, they will avoid any condemnation on their organ harvesting ventures - Cathy He wrote on WEDNESDAY that countries;====
Cathy He and Frank Feng, 9-25-2019, "Experts Call on UN to Investigate China's Killing of Religious Dissidents for Their Organs," Epoch Times, Date Accessed 9-26-2019 // JM
While the China Tribunal found that the Chinese regime's actions were "indicative" of
AND
, as well as the possible genocide being committed by the Chinese regime.
**====Not only is this harvesting immoral, but it also increases the spread of diseases as Jesse Jacob argues:====**
Carlos Franco-Paredes, Jesse T. Jacob. Alicia Hidrona, Alfonso J. Rodriguez-Morales,David Kuhara, and Angela M. Caliendoa, March 2010, "Transplantation and tropical infectious diseases," http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1201971209002045, Date Accessed 9-26-2019 // JM
More transplantation procedures are being performed annually, resulting in an increase in the number
AND
through transfusion of blood products during or after the transplantation.3, 4
==Contention 2 – BRI Politics==
====The BRI represents a geopolitical shift of the EU moving towards China and away from the US as it creates a severed alliance. Noah Barkin explains in 2019 that joining the BRI:====
Noah Barkin, 6-4-2019, "The US is losing Europe in its battle with China", The Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/06/united-states-needs-europe-against-china/590887/, Date Accessed 7-19-2019 // SDV
But conversations I had with dozens of officials on both sides of the Atlantic—
AND
power can reverse the course of history and return to its glorious past.
====Seeing this shift away from the US requires a response from Trump – Nahal Toosi explains that economic pressure in an election year is how Trump feels he can make larger progress against Europe – he argues that:====
Nahal Toosi, 8-24-2019, " Democrats can't just unwind Trump's foreign policy," https://www.politico.com/story/2019/08/24/democrats-trump-foreign-policy-1474308, Date Accessed 9-3-2019 // JM
Trump's defenders view the situation differently. They argue that Trump has injected a much
AND
"It'll be interesting if that turns out to be the same man."
====No matter how he gets there, Trump's response is the same – it comes in the form of unleashing tariffs. Vasilis Trigkas furthers in 2018 that if trade negotiations accelerate between China and the EU====
Vasilis Trigkas, 6-6-18, "Nato, China summits a chance for Europe to assert itself," South China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/united-states/article/2153948/nato-and-china-summits-give-europe-chance, Date Accessed 8-27-2019 // WS
In Beijing, EU leaders may have a seemingly easier task negotiating with the Chinese
AND
serve as a model for a prospective commercial rapprochement between Beijing and Washington.
====The impact is sending the global economy into a tailspin. Thomas Duesterberg writes in 2019 that:====
Thomas Duesterberg, 4-5-2019, "Trans-Atlantic Trade Is Headed Toward Disaster," Foreign Policy, http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:wj2zcclEw_sJ:https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/05/trans-atlantic-trade-is-headed-toward-disaster/andamp;hl=enandamp;gl=usandamp;strip=1andamp;vwsrc=0, Date Accessed 7-18-2019 // WS
After an Oval Office meeting last month between U.S. President Donald Trump
AND
the trigger on auto tariffs and send the global economy into a tailspin.
====That's really dangerous as the auto industry is a critical part of the European economy as Cornet argued in 2019 that:====
Andreas Cornet, 01-2019, "A long-term vision for the European automotive industry." McKinsey and Company, https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/automotive-and-assembly/our-insights/a-long-term-vision-for-the-european-automotive-industry, Date Accessed 09-24-2019 // SMV
The European automotive sector has ascended to the top of the global industry. It
AND
follow its own path of success: the European way (Exhibit 3).
====Gina Heeb quantifies that a:====
Gina Heeb, 2-1-2019, "Trump's proposed car tariffs could trigger a global growth recession, BAML says." Market Insider. https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/trump-tariffs-cars-could-trigger-global-growth-recession-baml-2019-2-1027973273, Date Accessed 7-15-2019 // WS
President Donald Trump has doubled down on threats to levy duties on car imports from
AND
posing even greater risks than the global trade tensions that emerged last year.
====Catherine Bosley indicates in 2019 that a European caused recession is worse than other recessions and a Chinese slowdown doesn't matter because:====
William Horobin and Catherine Bosley, 2-13-2019, Europe Looks Like the Real Weak Link in the Global Economy, Bloomberg, Date Accessed 9-7-2019 // JM
"The concern I have right now is in Europe," said Salman Ahmed,
AND
should pick up again. I don't expect a deep or prolonged recession."
====Two harms to this recession. First, it will lead to poverty. Harry Bradford writes that the next====
Harry Bradford, 4-5-2013, "Three Times The Population Of The U.S. Is At Risk Of Falling Into Poverty," HuffPost, span class="skimlinks-unlinked"https://www.huffpost.com/entry/global-poverty-900-million-economic-shock_n_3022420/span, Date Accessed 7-28-2019 // WS
Economic Shock Could Throw 900 Million People Into Poverty, IMF Study Warns A recent
AND
figure is three times the size of the U.S. population.
====Second, in times of recession, economies decrease their investments in green technology. Chris Greenwood indicates in the last recession:====
Sebastian Fritz-Morgenthal, Chris Greenwood, Carola Menzel, Marija Mironjuk, Virginia Sonntag-O'Brien, April 2009, "The global financial crisis and its impact on renewable energy finance", Date Accessed 9-24-2019 // CL
After global renewable energy sector growth had been continually breaking its own record year after
AND
reach completion under difficult circumstances than smaller deals with less well-established counterparties
====Unfortunately, without green tech, people will die. Adam Vaughn indicates that:====
Adam Vaughan, 5-12-2009, "Cleaner air from reduced emissions could save millions of lives, says report," Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/may/12/emissions-pollution-premature-deaths, Date Accessed 8-21-2018 // WS
Tackling climate change by cutting greenhouse gas emissions could AND built without at least partial CCS. | 905,079 |
365,701 | 379,906 | Venezuela Negative v1 - Blake | ==Our Sole Contention is Collective Action==
====Kurt Volker indicated in 2019 that::====
Kurt Volker, 2-21-2019, ""Protect the people, not their abuser"," McCain Institute, https://www.mccaininstitute.org/news/protect-the-people-not-their-abuser/, Date Accessed 4-23-2019 // JM
Once again, UN Security Council members are divided over how to protect millions of
AND
the UN Security Council, when it comes to saving millions of lives.
====Sanctions are the best course of action for two reasons. First, represents a united front. Wilner writes in October that the US wants====
Michael Wilner, 10-1-2019, "Trump's next move against Venezuela's Maduro relies on action from allies," mcclatchydc, https://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/politics-government/white-house/article235668437.html, Date Accessed 12-5-2019 // WS
The next phase of President Donald Trump's pressure campaign on Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro may
AND
, the president's third national security adviser, last month, he said.
====This is happening now as Olufemi Terry writes in 2019 that====
Olufemi Terry, 9-26-2019, "U.S., Rio Treaty partners tackle Maduro threat," ShareAmerica, https://share.america.gov/u-s-rio-treaty-partners-tackle-maduro-threat/, Date Accessed 12-5-2019 // WS
The United States and 15 other members of the Rio Treaty passed a resolution September
AND
in Venezuelan territory demonstrate the active threat posed by the former Maduro regime.
====This is crucial to solving as Berg concludes:====
Ryan C. Berg, 10-1-2019, "Russia Is Gearing Up for a Conflict With the United States in the Caribbean," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/09/russias-putin-venezuela-evade-oil-sanctions-preparing-conflict-united-states/, Date Accessed 12-5-2019 // WS
Since sanctions are most effective when they are multilateral, the United States must show
AND
, the United States must work to ensure that countries uphold their commitments.
====Luc Cohen continues this year that====
Luc Cohen, 9-23-2019, "Latam neighbors agree to impose sanctions on members of Venezuelan government," U.S., https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-un-limagroup/latam-neighbors-agree-to-impose-sanctions-on-members-of-venezuelan-government-idUSKBN1W82CT, Date Accessed 12-4-2019 // WS
Latin American countries on Monday agreed to impose sanctions on some members of Venezuelan President
AND
great significance in favor of peace and legality," the Colombian minister said.
====Thankfully, due to sanctions we have seen some changes happening in the squo as seen in Maduro's recent negotiations with Barbados, as Moises finds ====
Moises, Rendon, The, 9-3-2019, "Are Sanctions Working in Venezuela?," No Publication, https://www.csis.org/analysis/are-sanctions-working-venezuela//CL
There is significant evidence of the impact of sanctions on Maduro's power. Not only
AND
limited than ever in their capacity to travel and engage with financial assets.
====Second, it mobilizes the UN. The status quo action necessitates the UN Security Council to formally use the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. Richard Sindelar indicates in 2019 that:====
Richard Sindelar, 3-19-2019, "Venezuela: A Path Under International Law?," LobeLog, https://lobelog.com/venezuela-a-path-under-international-law/, Date Accessed 4-15-2019 // JM
Evolving international law provides, in theory, avenues for a consortium of nations to
AND
two opposing camps, a version of regime change not contemplated in R2P.
====And, this can only happen trhough collective action as Portilla argues in 2018 that:====
Juan Carlos Portilla, 12-17-2018, "Can The Hague Bring Justice to Venezuela?," FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD AFFAIRS, http://www.fletcherforum.org/home/2018/12/14/can-the-hague-bring-justice-to-venezuela, Date Accessed 4-23-2019 // JM
Neither is the use of force the solution. The UN Security Council may authorize
AND
now, on behalf of humanity, by bringing Maduro to The Hague.
====Solving this crisis has two impacts. First is preventing Venzeulan civil war. Sindelar concludes that:====
Richard Sindelar, 3-19-2019, "Venezuela: A Path Under International Law?," LobeLog, https://lobelog.com/venezuela-a-path-under-international-law/, Date Accessed 4-15-2019 // JM
If nations don't find a way to apply these new humanitarian international standards, Venezuela
AND
region, then a coalition of nations should act under the R2P doctrine.
====Alex Ward argues in 2019 that:====
Alex Ward, 1-25-2019, "Venezuela is in a major political crisis. Here are 5 scenarios for what could happen next.," Vox, https://www.vox.com/world/2019/1/25/18195894/venezuela-guaido-maduro-trump-war-future, Date Accessed 4-25-2019 // WS
The question now is what happens next. After speaking with US officials and experts
AND
could kill thousands and turn the already struggling nation into a failed state.
====Second is restoring economic stability. Venezuelan democracy empirically reduces poverty throught the passage of poverty reduction policies as Riggirozzi wrote in 2019 that:====
Pia Riggirozzi, 2-14-2019, "Venezuela is putting democracy and its legitimacy to test," Conversation, https://theconversation.com/venezuela-is-putting-democracy-and-its-legitimacy-to-test-111466, Date Accessed 11-9-2019 // JM
Long before the current crisis in Venezuela, democracy in Latin America was a damaged
AND
international oil industry downturn, so too did the post-neoliberal project.
====A resurgence to those reforms are crucial as Riggirozzi concludes of the 30 million people in Venezeula:====
Pia Riggirozzi, 2-14-2019, "Venezuela is putting democracy and its legitimacy to test," Conversation, https://theconversation.com/venezuela-is-putting-democracy-and-its-legitimacy-to-test-111466, Date Accessed 11-9-2019 // JM
A state that failed the people The halving of the oil price in 2014 sharply
AND
development, and reconstruct a sense of citizenship and belonging for its people.
====However, all of this comes into question with an affirmative ballot. Hirst indicates:====
Monica Hirst, May 2019, "Venezuela: Towards a peaceful political solution", Peace and Security, http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/15568-20190925.pdf, Date Accessed 12-16-2019 // SDV
Observing developments since 23rd February of this year, what is clear is that the
AND
House and Southern Command, the installation of governments of the right in various
====Without sanctions, the US would have to rely upon precision strike operations which Mora quantifies:====
Frank Mora, 3-19-2019, "What a Military Intervention in Venezuela Would Look Like", https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/venezuela/2019-03-19/what-military-intervention-venezuela-would-look, Date Accessed 12-18-2019 // SDV
A precision military intervention in Venezuela would require operations in the air, at sea
AND
in Haiti, for example, lasted 13 years in a much smaller country
====This military intervention would be disastrous as Gregory Weeks indicated this year that====
Gregory Weeks, 3-25-2019, "The U.S. is thinking of invading Venezuela. That's unlikely to lead to democracy.," Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/03/25/us-is-thinking-invading-venezuela-thats-unlikely-lead-democracy/?noredirect=onandutm_term=.4577208c577d, 4-14-2019 // JM
3. U.S. armed intervention has been bad for Latin Americans Research
AND
regional relations — particularly since even allies have spoken out against this approach. | 905,084 |
365,702 | 379,908 | Belt and Road Affirmative v2 - Bronx Science | ==Contention 1 is the EU's Economy==
====In the world of Brexit, the EU's financial state is extremely fragile as the next budget framework is being crafted. Piotr Arak indicated on September 13 that: ====
Piotr Arak, 9-13-2019, "As recession looms, Europe needs more spending", EU Observer, https://euobserver.com/opinion/145867, Date Accessed 9-22-2019 // JM
Brexit may have another victim and it is the ~~next~~ EU budget for
AND
we must develop in order to keep up with China and the US.
====Unfortunately, this framework has huge cuts to agriculture as a result of a hurt economy – the European Commission explains that:====
European Commission, "Fact check on the EU budget," The European Commission, Europa, https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/eu-budget/how-it-works/fact-check_en, Date Accessed: 9-26-2019 // EE
In 2017, the share of EU spending on farming was 41. In 1985
AND
. This means that EU spending replaces national expenditure to a large extent.
====The impact of low funding for the CAP is the environment, as Gerardo Fortuna writes last month that====
Gerardo Fortuna, 9-26-2019, "Carbon-capture crops need incentives through CAP, EU ministers said," euractiv, https://www.euractiv.com/section/agriculture-food/news/carbon-capture-crops-need-incentives-through-cap-eu-ministers-said/, Date Accessed: 10-18-19 // MN
With around 51 billion tonnes of CO2-equivalent removed from the atmosphere and stored
AND
said grasslands and carbon crops are just one of the main options available.
====And Craig Welch furthers this year that====
Craig Welch, 1-17-2019, "To curb climate change, we have to suck carbon from the sky. But how?," Environment, https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/2019/01/carbon-capture-trees-atmosphere-climate-change/, Date Accessed 10-18-2019 // MN
The world must quickly stop burning fossil fuels. And that is no longer enough
AND
also called, as an essential bridge to a clean-energy future.
====Profeta in 2018 concludes ====
National Geographic Society Newsroom, 3-22-2018, "Study: Cutting Emissions Sooner Could Save 153 Million Lives This Century," https://blog.nationalgeographic.org/2018/03/22/study-cutting-emissions-sooner-could-save-153-million-lives-this-century/?fbclid=IwAR3EAqNS5MygVR3g-UQER5ctSy7aM9KjLdUUom1cNmri7QYQUX8tshi7vCc, Date Accessed 7-18-2019 // WS
A new study suggests that premature deaths linked to air pollution would fall across the
AND
—although more costly—~~we~~ could avoid 153 million premature deaths.
====Luckily There are 2 ways joining the BRI allows the EU more economic capability to make a better budget framework.====
====The first is through market stability. Toumert Ai indicated in August that:====
Toumert Ai, 8-11-2019, "A new world economy on the horizon with BRI serving as an opening alternative,"http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1161079.shtml, Date Accessed 8-27-2019 // JM
The BRI premise is linking economies through smart investment in infrastructure, finance and logistics
AND
. And this time there would be no nation or economy left undamaged.
====And second is through increasing connectivity, as LeCorre writes that:====
Philippe Le Corre, October 2018, China's Rise as a Geoeconomic Influencer: Four European Case Studies, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/WP_LeCorre_China_Final_Web.pdf, Date Accessed 8-28-19 // JM
As China becomes a global actor with ambitions beyond the geoeconomic sphere, the rest
AND
region137 and create more jobs and growth in the key sectors of tomorrow.
====This BRI infrastructure reduces trade times as Alessia Amighini indicates:====
Alessia A. Amighini, 2-3-2018, "Beyond Ports and Transport Infrastructure: The Geo-Economic Impact of the BRI on the European Union," SpringerLink, https://link-springer-com.proxy.swarthmore.edu/chapter/10.1007/978-981-10-7116-4_14, Date Accessed 7-14-2019 // DF
What has been partly overlooked in the design of the EU TEN -T corridors
AND
statistics on the reduction in travel time and cost expected from project completion.
====Matteo Bressan quantifies this year that as a result of these new and improved trade routes ====
Matteo Bressan, 3-4-19, "Opportunities and challenges for BRI in Europe-Belt and Road Portal," No Publication, https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/ghsl/wksl/84696.htm, Date Accessed 7-6-2019 // WS
Although lagging other countries, Italy is playing a leading role in the China-
AND
) may contribute to overcoming the region's traditionally peripheral economic position in Europe.
====This trade is important for economic growth as The World Bank finds that Countries that trade more====
The World Bank, 4-3-2018, "Stronger Open Trade Policies Enable Economic Growth for All," World Bank, https://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2018/04/03/stronger-open-trade-policies-enables-economic-growth-for-all, Date Accessed 8-14-2019 // WS
Trade is central to ending global poverty. Countries that are open to international trade
AND
a global trading system that is more open, reliable and predictable for all
==Contention 2 is Russia ==
====Currently, the EU is fumbling sanctions against Russia as Michael Peel indicates that:====
Michael Peel, 9-24-2019, "EU fumbles over how to tackle Russia's Vladimir Putin," Financial Times, https://www.ft.com/content/bea70078-dde9-11e9-9743-db5a370481bc, Date Accessed 9-27-2019 // JM
Mr Tusk's successor, Charles Michel, this month noted Russia remained a "threat
AND
new era — and you find they are ~~is~~ really fumbling."
====And it's not getting easier — Nasos Koukakis explained this week that as a result of attacks on the Saudi oil fields, there could be:====
Nasos Koukakis, 9-16-2019, "Saudi attacks could push European oil supply closer to Russia," CNBC Markets, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/16/saudi-attacks-could-push-european-oil-supply-closer-to-russia.html, Date Accessed 9-17-2019 // JM
Although Europe's energy dependence on Saudi Arabia is very small, the effects of a
AND
been built at much lower prices in relation to current international oil prices.
====This underlies the key issue – the more the EU is dependent on Russian energy, the less likely they are to sanction Russian behavior. Collins indicates that this:====
Gabriel Collins, 7-18-2017, "Russia's Use of the 'Energy Weapon' in Europe", Baker Institute at Rice University, https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/ac785a2b/BI-Brief-071817-CES_Russia1.pdf, Date Accessed 8-31-2019 // JM
The current dataset lacks information on the most critical potential scenario for energy security planners
AND
further weakening Western Europe's resolve to take such measures in a timely fashion.
====That's important because sanctions are used to curb Russian aggression – Nigel Gould-Davies argues in 2018 that:====
Nigel Gould-Davies, 8-22-2018, "Sanctions on Russia Are Working," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2018-08-22/sanctions-russia-are-working, Date Accessed 9-22-2019 // JM
Nor have sanctions proved counterproductive. Some have argued that sanctions play into Russian President
AND
If anything, sanctions have been used too little, not too much.
====Easing Putin's ability to be aggressive is extremely problematic as he's ramping up Russia's ability to attack in the Balkins as Cipa found that:====
Akri Cipa, 9-20-2019, "EU and US Must Counter Russia and China's Presence in the Balkans," The Globe Post, https://theglobepost.com/2019/09/20/russia-china-balkans/, Date Accessed 9-22-2019 // JM
After the catastrophic and traumatic wars of the 1990s, the Balkans experienced two decades
AND
come from China, which is also expanding its influence in the region.
====And a war in the Balkins would kill millions. Colin Drury explains in 2017 that if:====
Colin Drury, 3-30-2017, "What Would Happen if Russia and Europe Went to War?," VICE, https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/4xe5a3/what-would-happen-if-russia-and-europe-went-to-war, Date Accessed 9-22-2019 // JM
But peace is not inevitable. If you think Europe can't descend into a bar
AND
here really does hang by threads. Maybe go out and play more.
====Thankfully, joining the BRI alleviates energy dependence on Russia. Conrad argues that:====
Bjorn Conrad and Genia Kostka, February 2017, "Chinese investments in Europe's energy sector: Risks and opportunities?", Energy Policy, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421516306711, Date Accessed 8-31-2019 // JM
Europe's economic order is based on the principle of economic openness and the ?rm belief
AND
relationships and a long-term partnership (Gippner and Torney, 2017).
====And re-orienting the energy sector from Russia to China is attractive for the EU as Wu indicated in August that:====
Wenyuan Wu, 8-24-2019, "Will Europe Ever Shake Its Dependence On Russian Energy?," https://finance.yahoo.com/news/europe-ever-shake-dependence-russian-170000966.html, Date Accessed 9-22-2019 // JM
In contrast to Russia's targeted approach, Chinese energy investment in Europe is more expansive
AND
countries as an outgrowth of the strategic Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). | 905,086 |
365,703 | 379,916 | Belt and Road Negative v2 - Bronx Science | =Marist OW – Bronx Science NEG 6.0=
==Contention 1 is BRI Politics==
====Recently Trump has delayed talks of imposing EU auto tariffs in favor of further trade talks as Bryce Baschuk writes last month====
Bryce Baschuk, 9-4-2019, "EU Trade Chief Says U.S. Car Tariff Threat 'Not Based on Facts'," Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-09-04/eu-trade-chief-says-u-s-car-tariff-threat-not-based-on-facts, Date Accessed 9-4-2019 // WS
European Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmstrom said cars made in the EU don't pose a threat
AND
EU and the U.S. endeavor to negotiate a trade pact.
====Unfortunately joining the BRI shows a shift of the EU moving towards China and away from the US in two ways. The first is by creating a severed alliance. Noah Barkin explains in 2019 that joining the BRI:====
Noah Barkin, 6-4-2019, "The US is losing Europe in its battle with China", The Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/06/united-states-needs-europe-against-china/590887/, Date Accessed 7-19-2019 // SDV
But conversations I had with dozens of officials on both sides of the Atlantic—
AND
power can reverse the course of history and return to its glorious past.
====Second, it shows a trade diversion away from the United States. Thomas Canvanna indicates in 2018 that: ====
Thomas Canvanna, 6-5-2018, "What Does China's Belt and Road Initiative Mean for US Grand Strategy?", The Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/what-does-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-mean-for-us-grand-strategy/, Date Accessed 9-3-2019 // JM
The United States' response to a rising China has largely focused on bolstering military capabilities
AND
- and long-term benefits for the American people and the West.
====Seeing this shift away from the US requires a response from Trump – Nahal Toosi explains that economic pressure in an election year is how Trump feels he can make larger progress against Europe – he argues that:====
Nahal Toosi, 8-24-2019, " Democrats can't just unwind Trump's foreign policy," https://www.politico.com/story/2019/08/24/democrats-trump-foreign-policy-1474308, Date Accessed 9-3-2019 // JM
Trump's defenders view the situation differently. They argue that Trump has injected a much
AND
"It'll be interesting if that turns out to be the same man."
====In fact, Burchard puts simply that:====
HANS VON DER BURCHARD, 7-26-2019, "Europe braces for Trump trade war," POLITICO, https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-braces-for-trump-trade-war/, Date Accessed 7-25-2019 // WS
Trump has repeatedly said he wants to slash the U.S.'s $
AND
, that will have "immediate financial consequences for our friends in Europe."
====No matter how he gets there, Trump's response is the same – it comes in the form of unleashing tariffs. Vasilis Trigkas furthers in 2018 that if trade negotiations accelerate between China and the EU====
Vasilis Trigkas, 6-6-18, "Nato, China summits a chance for Europe to assert itself," South China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/united-states/article/2153948/nato-and-china-summits-give-europe-chance, Date Accessed 8-27-2019 // WS
In Beijing, EU leaders may have a seemingly easier task negotiating with the Chinese
AND
serve as a model for a prospective commercial rapprochement between Beijing and Washington.
====Charles Wallace specifies that these tariffs would go on the auto industry as he writes 2 weeks ago that====
Wallace, Charles 10-2-19 "Trump To Put Tariffs On European Imports." Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/charleswallace1/2019/10/02/trump-to-put-tariffs-on-european-imports/~~#7888a7103945. Date Accessed 10-5-19 // AO
Trump also has threatened to impose tariffs on European automakers because of the hefty taxes Europe puts on U.S. cars such as SUVs. The Europeans have threatened to retaliate if tose taxes go ahead.
====That's really dangerous as the auto industry is a critical part of the European economy as Cornet argued in 2019 that:====
Andreas Cornet, 01-2019, "A long-term vision for the European automotive industry." McKinsey and Company, https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/automotive-and-assembly/our-insights/a-long-term-vision-for-the-european-automotive-industry, Date Accessed 09-24-2019 // SMV
The European automotive sector has ascended to the top of the global industry. It
AND
follow its own path of success: the European way (Exhibit 3).
====The impact is sending the global economy into a tailspin. Thomas Duesterberg writes in 2019 that the EU:====
Thomas Duesterberg, 4-5-2019, "Trans-Atlantic Trade Is Headed Toward Disaster," Foreign Policy, http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:wj2zcclEw_sJ:https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/05/trans-atlantic-trade-is-headed-toward-disaster/andamp;hl=enandamp;gl=usandamp;strip=1andamp;vwsrc=0, Date Accessed 7-18-2019 // WS
After an Oval Office meeting last month between U.S. President Donald Trump
AND
the trigger on auto tariffs and send the global economy into a tailspin.
====Gina Heeb quantifies that a:====
Heeb, Gina. "Trump's proposed car tariffs could trigger a global growth recession, BAML says." Market Insider. February 1 2019.//GG, https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/trump-tariffs-cars-could-trigger-global-growth-recession-baml-2019-2-1027973273
President Donald Trump has doubled down on threats to levy duties on car imports from
AND
posing even greater risks than the global trade tensions that emerged last year.
====The impact of preventing this recession is massive as Harry Bradford writes that the next====
Harry Bradford, 4-5-2013, "Three Times The Population Of The U.S. Is At Risk Of Falling Into Poverty," HuffPost, span class="skimlinks-unlinked"https://www.huffpost.com/entry/global-poverty-900-million-economic-shock_n_3022420/span, Date Accessed 7-28-2019 // WS
Economic Shock Could Throw 900 Million People Into Poverty, IMF Study Warns A recent
AND
figure is three times the size of the U.S. population.
==Contention 2 is the Environment==
====Currently the BRI is facing collapse due to a funding gap as Minxin Pei writes in 2019 that ====
Minxin Pei , 2-15-2019, "Will China let Belt and Road die quietly?," https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Will-China-let-Belt-and-Road-die-quietly, Date Accessed 7-10-2019 // WS
The news for China's ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been unrelentingly
AND
eventually lets BRI, at least BRI 1.0, die quietly.
====This is why U Penn quantifies in 2019 that====
U. Penn, 4-30-2019, "China's Belt and Road Initiative: Why the Price Is Too High," Knowledge@Wharton, https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-why-the-price-is-too-high/, Date Accessed 7-12-2019 // WS'
Along with the debt piling up at BRI beneficiary countries, China, too,
AND
have also scaled back, despite their status as arms of government policy."
====Unfortunately voting AFF provide the needed funds to keep the BRI afloat as Horia Cjurtin writes in 2017 that ====
Horia Ciurtin, December 2017, "A PIVOT TO EUROPE: CHINA'S BELT-AND-ROAD BALANCING ACT", European Institute of Romania, http://ier.gov.ro/wp-content/uploads/publicatii/Final_Policy-Brief-5_Horia-Ciurtin-A-Pivot-to-Europe_web.pdf, Date Accessed 7-13-2019 // WS
However, as shown before, China cannot financially and logistically manage such an ambitious
AND
) demands on China, before getting to the actual build-up.
====That's bad because the BRI is an environmental disaster as Isabel Hilton writes in 2019 that====
Isabel Hilton, 1-3-2019, "How China's Big Overseas Initiative Threatens Global Climate Progress," Yale E360, https://e360.yale.edu/features/how-chinas-big-overseas-initiative-threatens-climate-progress, Date Accessed 7-13-2019 // WS
China's Belt and Road Initiative is a colossal infrastructure plan that could transform the economies
AND
century, it would make the emissions targets in the Paris Agreement impossible."
====And Rao Dokku explains that China has an incentive to export coal due to domestic coal regulations. He writes that====
Nagamalleswara Rao Dokku, 9-25-2018, "Is China going green by dumping brown on its BRI partners? ," East Asia Forum, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/09/25/is-china-going-green-by-dumping-brown-on-its-bri-partners/, Date Accessed 7-15-2019 // WS
The ecological impact of the BRI is worrying not just for the local communities directly
AND
oak, the Manchurian ash and the Amur tiger in far eastern Russia.
====OECD furthers that====
OECD, 2018, "China's Belt and Road Initiative in the Global Trade, Investment and Finance Landscape," https://www.oecd.org/finance/Chinas-Belt-and-Road-Initiative-in-the-global-trade-investment-and-finance-landscape.pdf, Date Accessed 10-16-2019 // JM
This has some benefit for China of reducing air pollution in Beijing to the extent
AND
to underline the shift to production abroad and trading the metal globally.18
====There are two impacts. This first is emissions. Simon Zadek of Brookings writes in April that====
Simon Zadek, 4-25-2019, "The critical frontier: Reducing emissions from China's Belt and Road," Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2019/04/25/the-critical-frontier-reducing-emissions-from-chinas-belt-and-road/" Date Accessed 7-18-2019 // WS
While every energy-saving bulb makes a difference, there are only a small
AND
-risked by public institutions, notably export credit agencies and development banks.
====Jackson Ewing of the Hill quantifies that as a result of BRI coal investment====
Jackson Ewing, 4-5-2019, "China's foreign energy investments can swing coal and climate future," TheHill, https://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/437564-chinas-foreign-energy-investments-can-swing-coal-and-climate?fbclid=IwAR0UCb9C9o6WKWc0c4DKoeqHBBnKKAlCEEpVjF4crjAbPdI_9PKs5hfqcrE, Date Accessed 7-23-2019 // WS
When blackouts roiled Pakistan in 2014-15, China stepped in to help the
AND
an emerging fleet of Asian coal-fired power plants leading the way.
====Unfortunately, growing emissions will result in lives lost through increased climate change. Adam Vaughn indicates that:====
Adam Vaughan, 5-12-2009, "Cleaner air from reduced emissions could save millions of lives, says report," Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/may/12/emissions-pollution-premature-deaths, Date Accessed 8-21-2018 // WS
Tackling climate change by cutting greenhouse gas emissions could save millions of lives because of the cleaner air that would result, according to a recent study. Researchers predict that by 2050, about 100 million premature deaths caused by respiratory health problems linked to air pollution could be avoided through measures such as low emission cars. The economic benefits of saving those lives in developing countries such as China and India could also strengthen the negotiating hand of the UK and Europe at a crucial UN climate summit in Copenhagen this December. Johannes Bollen, one of the authors of the report for the Netherlands Environment Agency, said the ~~approximately~~ 100 million early deaths could be prevented by cutting global emissions by 50 by 2050~~.~~,a target consistent with those being considered internationally. The reports warns that if governments continue with business-as-usual energy use, then population growth, ageing demographics and increased urbanisation will cause premature deaths from pollution to increase by 30 in OECD countries, and 100 outside the OECD. The study also has implications for which technologies are chosen to reduce CO2 and other greenhouse gases. The study points out that while carbon capture and storage technology can capture CO2, it does not usually trap other air pollutants. Last month, the energy and climate minister, Ed Miliband, put "clean coal" at the centre of UK energy policy by pledging no new coal-fired power stations would be built without at least partial CCS.
====The second impact is air pollution as EC writes that====
End Coal, https://endcoal.org/health/, Date Accessed 7-28-2019, // SDV
Coal is responsible for over 800,000 premature deaths per year globally and many
AND
disposal of coal ash waste, can have significant impacts on human health.
====And unfortunately, spreading renewable energy won't even make a visible impact, as Kirk states that even though countries are====
Karin Kirk, 8-28-19, "Why It's Premature to Declare Coal Dead," Yale Climate Connections, https://www.yaleclimateconnections.org/2019/08/why-its-premature-to-declare-coal-dead/, Date Accessed 8-28-19//LH
Coal's story across the world is a study in contrasts: up sharply in some
AND
climate, can Earth's over-reliance on fossil fuels end fast enough? | 905,094 |
365,704 | 379,828 | Belt and Road Affirmative v3 - Economic Growth Contention v3 | ==Our sole contention is Economic Growth==
====The EU joining the BRI will revitalize the Global Economy in three ways====
====First is investment experience====
====Currently the BRI is failing to reach large parts of the world due to a lack of international investment experience as David Laundry wrote last year that====
David G. Laundry, 6-27-2018, "The Belt and Road Bubble is Starting to Burst", Foreign Policy, http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:pt2G1OkDgKoJ:https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/06/27/the-belt-and-road-bubble-is-starting-to-burst/andhl=enandgl=usandstrip=1andvwsrc=0, Date Accessed 10-9-2019, // SDV
Through the Go Out policy and the Belt and Road Initiative, China's firms have
AND
that Beijing believes their lending poses a risk to the broader Chinese economy.
====Thankfully the EU's investment experience reverses this trend of failed projects as Wang Bing wrote this year that====
Wang Bing, 4-24-2019, "Participation of EU countries in BRI injecting new momentum," http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2019-04/24/content_74715485.htm, Date Accessed 7-13-2019 // WS
EU participation makes BRI more influential China and the EU have a long history of
AND
for BRI projects, but also enhance China's voice in making international rules.
====The impact is massive as the World Bank finds that ====
World Bank, 6-18-2019, "Success of China's Belt andamp; Road Initiative Depends on Deep Policy Reforms, Study Finds," World Bank, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2019/06/18/success-of-chinas-belt-road-initiative-depends-on-deep-policy-reforms-study-finds, Date Accessed 7-12-2019 // WS
China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) could speed up economic development and reduce
AND
strengthen environmental standards, adopt social safety nets, and improve labor mobility."
====Second is a United Response====
====The EU joining the BRI as a bloc forces the United States back into European investment. Sam Natapoff writes that====
Sam Natapoff, 5-4-2019, "China's belt and road initiative shows how China and the U.S. are swapping roles in global trade," Salon, https://www.salon.com/2019/05/04/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-shows-how-china-and-the-u-s-are-swapping-roles-in-global-trade/, Date Accessed 8-25-2019 // JM
As with many international policy areas, the BRI is forcing countries to choose sides
AND
in line with Myanmar's domestic needs, instead of the Chinese lender's preferences.
====Empirically, Natapoff explains that:====
Sam Natapoff, 5-4-2019, "China's belt and road initiative shows how China and the U.S. are swapping roles in global trade," Salon, https://www.salon.com/2019/05/04/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-shows-how-china-and-the-u-s-are-swapping-roles-in-global-trade/, Date Accessed 8-25-2019 // JM
As with many international policy areas, the BRI is forcing countries to choose sides
AND
in line with Myanmar's domestic needs, instead of the Chinese lender's preferences.
====The US aims their investment into these nations in an attempt to draw them back to the US's sphere of influence and away from China. The impact is supercharging development.====
====Rick Beckett quantifies in 2017 that, with just $50 million dollars in investment, this investment ====
Rick Beckett, 4-26-2017, "Expanding OPIC is Good for America and the World," ImpactAlpha, https://impactalpha.com/expanding-opic-is-good-for-america-and-the-world-775de22193/, Date Accessed 8-23-2019 // WS
We at Global Partnerships know OPIC well. Since 2006, OPIC has invested more
AND
smart, sustainable global development. And the world needs more of it.
====Third is energizing EU markets ====
====The EU economy is plunging toward another recession as Martin Arnold of the Financial Times writes two weeks ago that: ====
Martin Arnold, 9-23-2019, "Eurozone economy faces more 'prolonged sag', Mario Draghi warns," Financial Times, https://www.ft.com/content/02e97d16-ddd0-11e9-9743-db5a370481bc, Date Accessed 9-25-2019 // WS
Mario Draghi said the eurozone economy face~~s~~d a much more "prolonged sag" than was expected even a few months ago, as the European Central Bank president justified the monetary stimulus he announced this month. Mr Draghi's comments came after a key survey of business executives showed that the eurozone's economy was close to stalling, dragged down by a steep drop in German manufacturing activity. The new data hit markets and prompted predictions of imminent recession on Monday. The purchasing managers' index (PMI) for the eurozone fell to a six-year low of 50.4 in September, below forecasts and down from 51.9 in August. The figures, produced by IHS Markit, offer a closely watched snapshot into private sector activity. A reading below 50 signifies economic contraction. "Today's figures confirm one thing in any case: there will be no noticeable improvement in the economy this year," said Ralph Solveen, economist at Commerzbank. "On the contrary, the risk of a recession is increasing." The euro fell 0.4 per cent against the US dollar, bond yields declined and European stock markets fell after the data were released. The pan-European Stoxx 600 index was down almost 1 per cent, while Germany's blue-chip Dax index dropped 1.5 per cent. Germany's 10-year bond yield fell to minus 0.59 per cent. Appearing for the final time as ECB president in front of the European Parliament, where he was widely praised for saving the eurozone from its debt crisis, Mr Draghi said "geopolitical uncertainty" had stopped the bank achieving its inflation target despite the fact that unemployment in the region had fallen to its lowest level for a decade.
====This is why John Carter corroborates that====
John Carter, 4-15-19, "Chance of Europe recession important headwind for China economy, economist says," South China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/economy/global-economy/article/3006233/china-economy-more-risk-eu-recession-us-trade-war-economist, Date Accessed 7-13-2019 // WS
The EU is China's largest trading partner and, according to El-Erian,
AND
time for the benefits to come, but the costs are up front."
====The impact is a global economic crisis, since the EU's economy is interconnected across the globe through an array of trade agreements, an EU recession would inherently affect many other nations as John Maulding writes in 2018 that====
John Mauldin, 12-8-2018, "Why Europe Has No Control Over Its Future," Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnmauldin/2019/01/22/why-europe-has-no-control-over-its-future/, Date Accessed 7-25-2019 // WS
If Europe goes into recession, it will have a profound impact on the world
AND
the Fed or U.S. government could speed up the process.
====The impact of preventing this recession is massive as Harry Bradford writes that the next====
Harry Bradford, 4-5-2013, "Three Times The Population Of The U.S. Is At Risk Of Falling Into Poverty," HuffPost, span class="skimlinks-unlinked"https://www.huffpost.com/entry/global-poverty-900-million-economic-shock_n_3022420/span, Date Accessed 7-28-2019 // WS
Economic Shock Could Throw 900 Million People Into Poverty, IMF Study Warns A recent
AND
That figure is three times the size of the U.S. population
====Thankfully the EU joining the BRI allows the EU to weather their economic storm through increased trade. This occurs in two ways. ====
====First is trade Times. The BRI aims to create new railway connections between China and the EU. This will drastically reduce trade times by moving large amounts of trade from sea to land as Alessia Amighini quantifies in 2018 that the new connections will reduce travel times by 53 on average====
Amighini 18 Alessia A. Amighini ~~University of Piemonte Orientale, Vercelli, Italy; and Catholic University of Milan, Milano, Italy~~, 2-3-2018, "Beyond Ports and Transport Infrastructure: The Geo-Economic Impact of the BRI on the European Union," SpringerLink, https://link-springer-com.proxy.swarthmore.edu/chapter/10.1007/978-981-10-7116-4_14 //WS
What has been partly overlooked in the design of the EU TEN -T corridors
AND
statistics on the reduction in travel time and cost expected from project completion.
====Second is Free Trade Agreements or FTAs. Tristan Kohl writes this year that right now China====
Tristan Kohl, 1-14-2019, "Belt and Road Initiative's effect on supply-chain trade: evidence from structural gravity equations," OUP Academic, https://academic.oup.com/cjres/article/12/1/77/5289371, Date Accessed 9-11-2019 // WS
While China already participates in trade agreements with countries in southern Asia, it does
AND
for trade and welfare is provided in Tables A2 and A3, respectively.
====Thankfully the BRI will results in a New Free Trade Agreement signed between China and the EU as====
====Julien Chaisse further last month that the BRI has====
Julien Chaisse, 9-2-19, "China's 'Belt andandnbsp;Road' Initiative: its strategic, trade, and fiscal implications," https://researchoutreach.org/articles/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-its-strategic-trade-and-fiscal-implications/, Date Accessed 10-3-2019 // WS
The 'Belt and Road Initiative' (BRI) aims to create the infrastructure necessary to
AND
be achieved across the many nations requisite to its construction and ultimate success.
====These two reasons are massive as Matteo Bressan quantifies this year that ====
Matteo Bressan, 3-4-19, "Opportunities and challenges for BRI in Europe-Belt and Road Portal," https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/ghsl/wksl/84696.htm, Date Accessed 7-6-2019 // WS
Although lagging other countries, Italy is playing a leading role in the China-
AND
) may contribute to overcoming the region's traditionally peripheral economic position in Europe.
====This trade is critical for an economy rebound in Europe. Cosmo Beverelli for the World Trade Organization quantifies that ====
Cosmo Beverelli, 2011, "ARE YOU EXPERIENCED? SURVIVAL AND RECOVERY OF TRADE RELATIONS AFTER BANKING CRISES" https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201103_e.pdf , Date Accessed 10-3-19 //WS
In Table 7, all estimates are expressed in terms of hazard ratios. In
AND
the experience coefficient remains unchanged, the coefficient of size becomes slightly smaller.
====This is because The World Bank finds that Countries that trade more====
The World Bank, 4-3-2018, "Stronger Open Trade Policies Enable Economic Growth for All," World Bank, https://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2018/04/03/stronger-open-trade-policies-enables-economic-growth-for-all, Date Accessed 8-14-2019 // WS
Trade is central to ending global poverty. Countries that are open to international trade
AND
global trading system that is more open, reliable and predictable for all. | 904,936 |
365,705 | 379,857 | Belt and Road Negative v4 - Infrastructure Deals Contention | =Marist SV – Nova Negative v1=
==Contention 1 is Infrastructure==
====Wendy Wu indicated on September 29 that:====
Wendy Wu, 9-29-2019 "Is the EU running out of patience with China's trade war obsession?," South China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3030771/chinas-preoccupation-us-trade-war-has-european-union-officials, Date Accessed 10-2-2019 // JM
The European Union is becoming increasingly frustrated at its inability to engage Beijing in economic
AND
first six months, and possibly be even more assertive," he said.
====That's why Michael Peel indicated on September 27 that:====
Michael Peel, 9-27-2019, "Japan and EU sign deal in riposte to China's Belt and Road," Financial Times, https://www.ft.com/content/dd14ce1e-e11d-11e9-9743-db5a370481bc, Date Accessed 10-2-2019 // JM
The EU and Japan have signed an ambitious deal to build infrastructure and set development
AND
in some areas, as well as competitor or potential partner in others.
====However, this deal is mutually exclusive with the BRI because it focuses on renewable energy as Robin Emmott explains ====
Robin Emmott, 9-27-2019, "In counterweight to China, EU, Japan sign deal to link Asia," U.S., https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-japan/in-counterweight-to-china-eu-japan-sign-deal-to-link-asia-idUSKBN1WC0U3, Date Accessed 10-2-2019 // JM
The European Union and Japan signed an infrastructure deal on Friday to coordinate transport,
AND
"utmost attention" to countries' "fiscal capacity and debt-sustainability".
====And Sharma indicated on October 1^^st^^ that:====
Mihir Sharma, 10-1-2019, "Japan and Europe Can Build Their Own Silk Road," Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-10-01/japan-and-europe-can-finance-rival-to-china-s-belt-and-road, Date Accessed 10-2-2019 // JM
But Japan's approach so far has failed on three counts. It hasn't expanded sufficiently
AND
Japan, Europe — and countries such as India — have in common.
====Lili Pike concludes on September 10 the impact would be devastating. They argue that:====
Lili Pike, 9-10-2019, "Belt and Road countries will make or break the Paris Agreement ," No Publication, https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/11509-Belt-and-Road-countries-will-make-or-break-the-Paris-Agreement-, Date Accessed 10-2-2019 // JM
In the coming decades, BRI countries will contribute a much larger share of
AND
also the countries as recipients, we are going to bust through 2C."
====Alan Buis quantifies in 2019 that due to lower crops yields and increased natural disasters====
Alan Buis, 6-19-2019, "A Degree of Concern: Why Global Temperatures Matter – Climate Change: Vital Signs of the Planet," Climate Change: Vital Signs of the Planet, https://climate.nasa.gov/news/2865/a-degree-of-concern-why-global-temperatures-matter/, Date Accessed 10-4-2019 // JM
At 1.5 degrees Celsius warming, the report projects that climate-related
AND
mean 40,000 less people will see their land inundated by 2150. | 905,010 |
365,706 | 379,603 | Interps | Interpretation: If debaters don’t frontline case in second rebuttal, they are conceding it.
Interpretation: Teams should share cases pre-round through an agreed method when asked.
Interpretation: Debaters should provide content warnings before discussing sensitive topics, those that have the potential to resurface trauma, physical or emotional, in affected individuals: for example, drug use or sexual assault.
Interpretation: Debaters must run either resolutional topical cases or theory.
Interpretation: Debaters must not talk faster than 230 wpm.
Interpretation: Debaters should not use exclusive or offensive language in-round. To clarify, debaters should not use offensive language.
Interpretation: Debaters must publish any interpretations for any theory they might run on the NSDA PF wiki or share their interps with their opponents 30 minutes prior to the round. | 904,685 |
365,707 | 379,604 | TOC - Neg | C1: United States key to combating Terrorism in the Gulf States
C2: Troop withdrawal creates weapons surplus that gets funneled to the police increasing Police Militarization
C3: The United States Presence offers a security guarantee that prevents Israeli Preemptive Strike and Our allies from proliferating
Open Source Cases Below. IDRK how to disclose but below R1 is Neg and R7 is Aff | 904,687 |
365,708 | 379,637 | TOC Aff 4 | US troop presence blocks normalizations; withdrawal ? regional states would resolve their differences w/o US to blame, when commitment to regional security ‘appeared to wane’
Tisdall 20~-~-Simon Tisdall, Why instinct and ideology tell Trump to get out of the Middle East, The Guardian, 1/11/20, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jan/11/why-instinct-and-ideology-tell-trump-to-get-out-of-the-middle-east-suleimani-iran
On the Iranian side, the demand that the Americans leave does not arise simply from old grievances dating back to the 1953 coup against the democratically elected prime minister Mohammad Mosaddeq, although they play a part. Nor does Iran merely want the US out of the way so it can gain a free hand – although it is unlikely to abandon its ambitions as a regional power-broker. There is a firm belief in Tehran, common to other post-colonial theatres, that the Middle East as a whole would fare better if it were no longer a venue for great power rivalries, foreign armies and imperial fantasies. Most educated Iranians are instinctively pro-western, not pro-Arab. But the post-1979 US vendetta blocks normalisation. There is also reason to believe antagonistic regional states would resolve their differences if they no longer had the US to fall back on, or to blame, when they get into disputes. As Trump’s commitment to regional security appeared to wane last year, for example, Saudi Arabia and Qatar took steps to patch up their differences. Shared security concerns have led to ongoing, informal contacts between Arab states and Israel, notwithstanding – or possibly because of – Trump’s bias against Palestine.
Troop withdrawal would improve Saudi behavior, prevent future Yemens + improve conciliatory stance w/Iran
Tisdall 20~-~-Simon Tisdall, Why instinct and ideology tell Trump to get out of the Middle East, The Guardian, 1/11/20, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jan/11/why-instinct-and-ideology-tell-trump-to-get-out-of-the-middle-east-suleimani-iran
4 Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states
The shock of large-scale US downsizing would be felt most keenly here. The modern-day prosperity and influence of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Kuwait have been underwritten by American security guarantees, exemplified by the 1990-91 US-led intervention to expel Saddam Hussein’s invasion forces from Kuwait.
Without the Americans to hold their hands and watch their backs, the Saudi royals’ behaviour could improve significantly. No more kidnappings of Lebanese prime ministers, for example, or murders of high-profile journalists. Military adventurism of the type that produced the humanitarian disaster in Yemen would be less likely.
The Saudis and the smaller Gulf states, although better armed than Iran, might also be incentivised by American disengagement to take a more conciliatory line towards Tehran – something that has reportedly already been happening in recent months.
On the other hand, they might look around for new protectors – in the shape of Russia or China, a big Gulf oil customer. No US president could easily countenance such a loss of influence – nor the loss of lucrative Arab world investments and weapons sales. Getting out is not as simple as Trump might think.
GCC states already agree on de-escalation, don’t want confrontation b/c unsure about how their militaries would fare and would destroy econ infrastructure; already perceive US as erratic + unreliable
Aftandilian 20~-~-Gregory Aftandilian, Gulf Arab States Still Worried about a US-Iran War, Arab Center, 1/23/20, http://arabcenterdc.org/policy_analyses/gulf-arab-states-still-worried-about-a-us-iran-war/
Despite the strong anti-Iran stances of several Gulf Arab states, all of the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) called on Washington and Tehran to exercise restraint following the US killing of Iranian al-Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani in early January. The desire to avoid a conflagration in the Gulf region has been the one unifying position within the fractured GCC since the Qatar crisis developed in June 2017.
There has been a sigh of relief that President Donald Trump and the Iranian leadership have not escalated matters since Iran’s retaliatory strikes on Iraqi bases housing US military personnel. Still, however, the Gulf Arab states are still worried that a US-Iran confrontation could transpire down the road, one in which they themselves could be targeted or, at a minimum, see their economic interests adversely affected.
The concerns of these states stem from their feelings of vulnerability and the fact that they perceive the United States increasingly as an unreliable and erratic ally. Despite the hundreds of billions of dollars they have spent on their own defense, the Gulf Arab states are unsure how their militaries would fare against Iran. Moreover, a war in the Gulf would not only disrupt important oil flows but would set back the gains the states have made in building large physical and financial infrastructure projects. These have been the hallmark of Gulf development over the past several decades and thwarting their benefits could lead to sectarian strife within some countries of the region.
Unifying Message of Restraint
Immediately after the US strike and the killing of Soleimani, the Gulf Arab states employed diplomacy and diplomatic language to try to defuse the crisis. Saudi Arabia dispatched Deputy Defense Minister (and former ambassador to the United States) Khaled bin Salman to Washington where he met with President Trump and other high-ranking officials. Bin Salman’s message was to urge the United States to exercise “restraint.” That seemed to have been the buzzword all around. Qatari Foreign Minister Mohammad bin Abdulrahman Al Thani visited Iran and met with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and urged Iran to do the same. His visit to Tehran was followed by that of the Qatari emir himself. Meanwhile, Anwar Gargash, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates, made a public statement calling on all parties to put “wisdom, balance, and political solutions above confrontation and escalation.”
Avoidance of a military escalation in the Gulf region seems to be one unifying message on which all GCC states agreed, as the GCC itself remains fractured following the economic and political boycott of Qatar by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain (along with non-GCC member Egypt) since June 2017. Although there have been some efforts to mend fences in recent months between Qatar and its neighbors, a true rapprochement is still elusive. Nonetheless, the fact that Qatar has developed close relations with Iran (made closer by the boycott) arguably works to the benefit of other GCC states because different states could then use their equities with Washington and Tehran to help calm the situation down.
Backchannels btwn Saudi + Iran opened (esp. to solve Yemen war)
Aftandilian 20~-~-Gregory Aftandilian, Gulf Arab States Still Worried about a US-Iran War, Arab Center, 1/23/20, http://arabcenterdc.org/policy_analyses/gulf-arab-states-still-worried-about-a-us-iran-war/
Despite the harsh language over the past few years between Riyadh and Tehran, as well as between the latter and Abu Dhabi, there have been efforts by both Saudi Arabia and the UAE to open back channels to Iran in recent months. This was probably due in part to the realization that the Yemen war, in which all three countries are belligerents to varying degrees, cannot be solved militarily and that Yemen needs a political solution to end its humanitarian nightmare. In addition, sharp differences between Saudi Arabia and the UAE in Yemen made the Saudi-led military coalition much less viable in recent months, rendering a political solution all the more desirable.
Gulf states fear Iran, military better and battle-tested
Aftandilian 20~-~-Gregory Aftandilian, Gulf Arab States Still Worried about a US-Iran War, Arab Center, 1/23/20, http://arabcenterdc.org/policy_analyses/gulf-arab-states-still-worried-about-a-us-iran-war/
Fear of Iranian Military Strikes…
The Gulf Arab states have substantially developed their military establishments in recent decades, using abundant oil revenues to pay for very expensive military equipment and training. However, as the Yemen war has shown, training and hardware do not necessarily translate into building effective military forces. The Saudi bombing campaign against the Houthi rebels in Yemen has illustrated the limits of such massive investments, as many errant bombs have killed hundreds of civilians, according to the United Nations. While the Gulf Arab states may be able to hold their own against states or groups in the Arabian Peninsula (for example, in the case of possible border clashes), they fear they may not be able to stand up to a major regional power like Iran which has a much larger and more powerful military establishment than their own, and one that has been battle-tested.
Gulf states don’t want war, would crash oil revenue and econ infrastructure eg Vision 2030, and create sectarian civil wars
Aftandilian 20~-~-Gregory Aftandilian, Gulf Arab States Still Worried about a US-Iran War, Arab Center, 1/23/20, http://arabcenterdc.org/policy_analyses/gulf-arab-states-still-worried-about-a-us-iran-war/
A Lot to Lose
Although heightened tensions in the Gulf temporarily led to higher oil prices for a period of time in early January—enabling the Gulf Arab states to collect more revenue—the create economic costs outweighed the short-term gains. First, there was a spike in the cost of shipping crude oil through the Strait of Hormuz, and Saudi Arabia’s oil tanker company, Bahri, actually suspended shipments through this vital waterway for a time. Second, shares of Saudi Aramco, which were recently offered on the world market and which have been on a downward slope since their peak in mid-December 2019, dipped 1.7 percent after the Soleimani killing as investors worried about another Iranian strike on Aramco’s facilities. Even a small dip in the value of these shares can cost the kingdom hundreds of millions of dollars. Importantly, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has been counting on the revenue from these shares to help build up the non-oil sectors of the Saudi economy as part of his “Vision 2030” diversification campaign.
The Gulf states have made enormous investments in both physical and financial infrastructures in recent decades and they are very worried that a US-Iran war could lead to devastating consequences. An unnamed former US intelligence official who had just returned from the Gulf was quoted as stating: “Everyone from Kuwait to Oman is fearful of escalation. Everyone realizes that a military conflict could be a disaster.” This former official then added that if an Iranian missile hits an office tower in Dubai, “its reputation as a financial center is in jeopardy.” One does not have to watch the Travel Channel on cable television to understand that all the efforts to create a western-style commercial center and playground in the Gulf—such as Dubai, which has attracted business people and tourists from around the world—could potentially come crashing down if a war were to envelop the Gulf.
Several of the Gulf states are worried that a US-Iran war might lead to a rekindling of sectarian strife that was manifestly evident in 2011-2012, particularly in Bahrain (whose population is 60 percent Shia but which is controlled by a Sunni monarchy), and Saudi Arabia (whose Shia population resides mostly in the oil-rich Eastern Province). Although most of the Shia in the Gulf Arab states are not loyal to Iran, some militant groups are, and they could foment trouble in the event of a US-Iran war. Efforts to repress such groups could escalate into sectarian clashes and give the Iranian regime an excuse to intervene, something the Gulf Arab states want to avoid at all costs.
Relief for Now but Worries about the Future
There was a great sigh of relief in the Gulf Arab states that the Iranian retaliatory strikes on Iraqi bases housing US military personnel did not lead to American deaths, enabling Trump and the Iranian leaders to stand down. However, this does not mean that the crisis is completely over. With the Iranian regime under enormous stress because of the US “maximum pressure” campaign, it might lash out at US targets in the region or against the economic interests of the Gulf Arab states once again. The regional situation is still very tense; to be sure, it is not unreasonable to assume that there will be another US-Iran clash. The rhetoric in both Tehran and Washington at this stage is still uncompromising. To ease the anxieties in the Gulf Arab states, this rhetoric needs to scale down. Gulf Arab officials should continue to urge restraint on both sides. Though they have no love for Iran, the Gulf Arab states have come to realize that a war into which they are likely to be drawn would have disastrous consequences for their economy and security and for their people. At a minimum, US policy makers should not interfere in these states’ outreach to Iran that may indeed help to defuse tensions; after all, Trump has said he does not seek war with Iran and has campaigned against US involvement in another Middle Eastern quagmire—a sentiment that continues to resonate with the American people.
US protection allows our allies’ destabilizing behaviors
Parsi 20~-~-Trita Parsi, The Middle East Is More Stable When the United States Stays Away, Foreign Policy, 1/6/20, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/06/the-middle-east-is-more-stable-when-the-united-states-stays-away/
As the scholars Hal Brands, Steven Cook, and Kenneth Pollack wrote endorsing the Carter Doctrine and its continuation, “the United States established and upheld the basic rules of conduct in the region: the United States would meet efforts to interfere with the free flow of oil by force; uphold freedom of navigation; demand that regional powers give up their irredentist claims on other states or face grave consequences; and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”
This account is accurate enough (although the last rule on the list always exempted Israel), but the story glosses over how the policy also gave cover to U.S. allies for some fairly destabilizing behaviors of their own. That’s an omission Brands makes in a Bloomberg article, too, where he points to Saudi Arabia’s slaughter of the Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi to argue that a “post-American Middle East will not be stable and peaceful. It will be even nastier and more turbulent than it is today.” And in the words of U.S. Sen. Lindsey Graham in 2018, “If it weren’t for the United States, they’d be speaking Farsi in about a week in Saudi Arabia.”
All this without a nod to the fact that, if anything, the United States’ protection of the Saudi regime has enabled its promotion of terrorism and its destabilizing activities in the region, which have, in turn, prompted further Iranian response.
Apparent US pullout – critics warned of Saudi nuclearization, but instead exercised diplomacy, united w/Qatar, held talks with Iran
Parsi 20~-~-Trita Parsi, The Middle East Is More Stable When the United States Stays Away, Foreign Policy, 1/6/20, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/06/the-middle-east-is-more-stable-when-the-united-states-stays-away/
Further, the region did not fall into deeper chaos as a result of Trump’s earlier refusal to get into a shooting war with Iran after attacks by Iranian proxies against Saudi oil installations in September 2019. Critics lamented the president’s decision as an abandonment of the Carter Doctrine, calling it a disaster for the GCC and warned that it may even prompt Saudi Arabia to seek nuclear weapons.
Instead, recognizing that the U.S. military was no longer at their disposal, Saudi Arabia and the UAE began exercising the diplomatic options that had always been available to them. For its part, Saudi Arabia stepped up direct talks with Houthi rebels in Yemen as a way to ease tensions with their backer, Iran. The level of violence on both sides declined as a result, and more than 100 prisoners of war were released. In November, the United Nations’ Yemen envoy, Martin Griffiths, reported an 80 percent reduction in Saudi-led airstrikes, and there were no Yemeni deaths in the previous two weeks.
Riyadh also opted to reduce tensions with Qatar, a former ally that had become a nemesis. The Saudi government seemingly ordered its notorious Twitter army to tone down the insults against Qatar and its emir, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, and some sporting events between the two countries resumed, according to the New York Times.
Saudi officials also claimed that they had quietly reached out to Iran via intermediaries seeking ways to ease tensions. Tehran, in turn, welcomed the prospective Saudi-Qatari thaw and, according to the New York Times, floated a peace plan based on a mutual Iranian-Saudi pledge of nonaggression.
An even stronger change of heart occurred in Abu Dhabi. In July, the UAE started withdrawing troops from Yemen. The same month, it participated in direct talks with Tehran to discuss maritime security. It even released $700 million in funds to Iran in contradiction to the Trump administration’s maximum pressure strategy.
Some of these measures may have been more tactical than strategic. Saudi Arabia may have reduced tensions with Qatar and the Houthis in order to better situate itself for a confrontation with Tehran down the road or to offset international condemnation of its killing of Khashoggi, human rights abuses at home, and brutal tactics in Yemen. The UAE, too, may have felt that a tactical reduction of tensions was warranted.
Nevertheless, as the United States appeared poised to back out of the region, its erstwhile allies’ calculations tilted toward diplomacy. The Saudis and Emiratis simply had no choice but to cease some of their recklessness because they could no longer operate under the protection of the United States. If stability in the Middle East is the United States’ main goal, Washington should have celebrated rather than bemoaned these developments.
In the wake of the U.S. assassination of Suleimani—which some former U.S. officials have called an act of war—the calculations may change once more. According to Iraqi Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi, Suleimani was in Iraq to bring him Tehran’s response to a message from Riyadh on how to defuse regional tensions, presumably as part of the House of Saud’s renewed interest in diplomacy. The Iraqis, according to him, were mediating between the two rivals, an initiative that has now been thrown into question.
Iran may very well conclude, rightly or wrongly, that Saudi Arabia and the UAE conspired with Washington to assassinate Suleimani and as a result not only end the recent diplomacy but also target Riyadh and Abu Dhabi as part of the revenge for Suleimani’s death. This is yet one more instance, it seems, in which U.S. activities in the region have brought more turmoil than stability.…And by returning to the region in a show of military force, Trump may once again disincentivize the United States’ allies from taking diplomacy seriously. They may even interpret Suleimani’s killing as a license to resume their recklessness—activities like Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s purported kidnapping of the Lebanese prime minister and ordering of the dismemberment of Khashoggi; Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s imposition of a blockade on Qatar; and the two countries’ further destabilization of Libya, Syria, Lebanon, Sudan, and Yemen.
Trump declared withdrawal led to regional diplomacy and de-escalation; post-Suleimani, diplomatic progress faded
Parsi 20~-~-Trita Parsi, The Middle East Is More Stable When the United States Stays Away, Foreign Policy, 1/6/20, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/06/the-middle-east-is-more-stable-when-the-united-states-stays-away/
As the assassination of Suleimani shows, it might be Washington that is the main spoiler in the region. It has been a mantra of U.S. foreign policy for a decade or more that, without the United States, the Middle East would descend into chaos. Or even worse, Iran would resurrect the Persian Empire and swallow the region whole.
Yet when U.S. President Donald Trump opted not to go to war with Iran after a series of Iranian-attributed attacks on Saudi Arabia last year and declared his intentions to pull troops out of the region, it wasn’t chaos or conquest that ensued. Rather, nascent regional diplomacy—particularly among Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—and de-escalation followed. To be sure, the cards were reshuffled again in January, when Trump ordered the assassination of Qassem Suleimani, one of Iran’s most important military figures. Courtesy of Trump, the region is once more moving toward conflict, and the early signs of diplomatic progress achieved during the preceding months have vanished.
It is thus time for Washington to answer a crucial question that it has long evaded: Has America’s military dominance in the Middle East prevented regional actors from peacefully resolving conflicts on their own? And in that way, has it been an impediment to stability rather than the guarantor of it? | 904,713 |
365,709 | 379,646 | TOC Neg 3 | China fills void
Cohen 19~-~-Ariel Cohen, Will China Replace The U.S. As The Middle East Hegemon? Forbes, 2/14/19, https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2019/02/14/will-china-replace-the-u-s-as-the-middle-east-hegemon/#66b6cda525cd
China has replaced the UAE as the main investor in the Middle East, focusing on energy. However, $3.5 trillion dollars of future opportunities in the Middle East are awaiting Asian investors – from infrastructure projects, to tourism, to industry, says Nasser Saidi, the former Chief Economist of the Dubai International Financial Center and the former Lebanese central banker. Saidi and other top experts spoke at a conference organized by the Middle East Institute of the National University of Singapore (NUS) this week. The event, titled The Middle East Pivot: China’s Belt and Road Initiative – between Geostrategy and Commercial Opportunity, attracted business people and academics from China, the U.S., Singapore, and the Gulf. This author presented a report “Future Calling: Infrastructure Investment in Central Asia”. Throughout the conference, participants and attendees kept coming back to the same critical question: If the U.S. is slowly disengaging from the Middle East, will China necessarily fill the void? The answer is a qualified yes. First, because the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is the most ambitious geopolitical and geo-economic program since the Marshall Plan, and surpasses it in scope and costs. The Marshall Plan dealt with the rebuilding of Europe only, while the U.S. also helped raising Japan from the ashes of World War II. It was limited in time to four years. Belt and Road, proclaimed by Chairman Xi Jinping in 2013, involves over 80 countries in Eurasia, Europe, South and Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Africa. Middle East energy will be the lifeblood of BRI, with China its engine and brain. Western Europe and the developing world will be its market. The United States so far failed to offer a comprehensive, strategic response to Belt and Road, which would need to include an economic, cultural and human dimension. Instead, under both the Obama and the Trump Administration, Washington is sticking to mostly military answers, while ipso facto creating an anti-American block that includes Russia and China – something Henry Kissinger warned against over 40 years ago. Second, Beijing is aggressively bolstering its Near East presence. China is already building strategic partnerships with countries from Algeria to Saudi Arabia to Iran, Iraq, and the UAE. It is targeting major OPEC and Gulf Cooperation Council members, while also focusing on U.S. allies, like Israel, Jordan, Qatar, and Egypt. Following World War II, the British Lion went home to lick his wounds. The British Empire could not sustain its presence in the Middle East after losing its Jewel in the Crown – India – in 1947. In the aftermath of the protracted and costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the American Eagle wants a respite. Vital national interests of the U.S., chief among them energy, are no longer bound to the Middle East region due to the shale gale. Attention is now shifting to the Pacific, as China, the peer competitor, is not flinching over its South China Sea expansion. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy is planning to build four carrier battle groups, and is targeting American aircraft carriers with new ship-busting nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles. China’s high-tech naval railguns and hypersonic cruise missiles are just around the corner. The security of the Middle East and its energy supplies will be defined in the next two decades by the balance of military and economic power between the U.S., China, and Russia. Within the region, the confrontation between Saudi Arabia and the UAE vs. Iran and Qatar will take center stage. Some Chinese participants at the Singapore conference, such as Prof. Wang Suolao of Institute of Area Studies in Beijing University, tried to deny that China is playing geopolitics in the Middle East. However, one cannot help but analyze the region through the prisms of political interests, spheres of influence, proxy management, and exclusive economic zones. China already maintains a sizeable military base in Djibouti, at Bab-el-Mandeb, the entrance to the strategically important Red Sea, which leads to Suez Canal, one of the three principal choke points of global naval routes (the others being the Strait of Malacca, and the Panama Canal). Djibouti is also home to an American Naval Expeditionary Base, Camp Lemonnier, just 11 kilometers away. The two opposing bases present a fitting metaphor of competing national interests on the African continent. Chinese and American forces have even engaged in laser skirmishes there, where China deployed high energy lasers to blind U.S. pilots. This is just a telltale symptom of things to come. China is deploying its economic and diplomatic power in the Middle East first, while the military involvement may come later: the launch of the petro-yuan, which will exclude the dollar; massive Chinese advantage in mobile payment tech which would allow 85 million “unbanked” people in the Middle East to integrate in business and financial activities; the growth of Chinese tourism to the Gulf; the involvement of Chinese Muslim communities with the Middle East – all discussed at the Singapore conference in great detail. These will be the tools used by Beijing to expand its influence from Morocco to Muscat – and beyond. The forum, led by the NUS Middle East Institute Chairman Bilahari Kausikan, highlighted the tremendous opportunities and risks facing Asian (including Singaporean) investments in the Middle East. Experts view pragmatic approaches to industrialization and investment, including in new areas beyond oil and gas, as key. This also applies to political instruments in resolving simmering hostilities, and furthering broad cooperation in fighting religious extremism of both the Sunni and Shia variety. Hydrocarbons, the bread and butter of the Middle East for the past 100 years, may become a stranded resource in just a few decades. Soon, it could be infrastructure, renewables, IT, AI, robotics, high tech, and services that drive the region’s economic development. The U.S. has not yet lost-out to China in the Middle East, but American and European businesses – and strategic planners – will need to work twice as hard to stay competitive.
Russia benefits from higher Middle East instability b/c higher oil costs
Cropsey 19~-~-SETH CROPSEY, GARY ROUGHEAD, A U.S. Withdrawal Will Cause a Power Struggle in the Middle East, Foreign Policy, 12/17/19, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/17/us-withdrawal-power-struggle-middle-east-china-russia-iran/
While some strategically minded thinkers, such as Andrew Bacevich, advocate redeploying U.S. assets in the Middle East to the Pacific, as opposed to the comprehensive retreat their more isolationist counterparts espouse, the general message remains the same: That there is no longer much value in securing geographically strategic points in the Middle East, and that U.S. security does not depend on it. This perspective is mistaken. Foreign Policy’s Dec. 13 article “RIP the Carter Doctrine” is correct that a stable Persian Gulf benefits the United States indirectly, by safeguarding a global economic and security interest in the steady supply of Middle East energy. In a parallel but opposite direction, an unstable Middle East benefits Russia’s interest in higher energy costs.
Pullout from Syria ? Russia fill-in backing Assad
Tisdall 20~-~-Simon Tisdall, Why instinct and ideology tell Trump to get out of the Middle East, The Guardian, 1/11/20, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jan/11/why-instinct-and-ideology-tell-trump-to-get-out-of-the-middle-east-suleimani-iran
If the US is no longer seen as a reliable defender of its friends, and if it no longer needs or wants to be in the Middle East – then surely it is time to leave. Yet if the Americans did pull out, what would happen?
1. Iraq and Syria
Recent events in Iraq and Syria do not encourage confidence in a post-American future. After the Syrian civil war erupted in 2011, the US and its Gulf allies backed disparate rebel forces. But some of these groups harboured jihadists and extremists, which bolstered Bashar al-Assad’s claims to be fighting terrorists and divided the resistance.
The US withdrew its support for the rebels. It also declined to intervene directly when Barack Obama’s “red line” on chemical weapons use was crossed. Trump has since hastened American disengagement, notably by abandoning Syrian Kurd allies. Russia filled the vacuum, and is now winning the war for Assad with a merciless bombardment of Idlib.
Following the invasion of Iraq in 2003, US forces officially left in 2011, but in fact several thousand remain, primarily tasked with fighting Isis. Following the Suleimani killing, Iraq’s parliament demanded all US troops leave. But there are signs of second thoughts, amid doubts over the ability of Iraq’s politicians and security forces to hold a divided country together while containing Isis. Syria is a chilling reminder of what can happen when the US turns its back and walks away.
Russia expands
McLeary 20~-~-Paul Mcleary, 1-14-2020, "China, Russia Press For Mideast Gains While US Talks Of Withdrawal," Breaking Defense,JL
https://breakingdefense.com/2020/01/china-russia-press-for-mideast-gains-while-us-talks-of-withdrawal/
The close encounter between a Russian warship and an American destroyer in the Arabian Sea last week was more than a new round of the Russian military playing high-stakes cat-and-mouse. It was a forceful reminder that Russia hopes to gain influence in the region as the US sends thousands of new troops, aircraft, and ships to a region President Trump has long claimed he’s anxious to leave. As the Trump administration publicly wrangles with the Iraqi government over US troops there and repositions some 18,000 troops it has rushed to the region over the past several months, the Russians and the Chinese are maneuvering for advantage. “There’s no question the Middle East is at the epicenter of great power competition,” said Seth Jones, director of the Transnational Threats Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “The Russians see the US interest in withdrawing forces as an opportunity to expand their power and interests.” Last week, one day after Iraq’s parliament demanded the departure of US troops from their soil in a non-binding vote, China’s ambassador to Iraq paid a visit to Prime Minister Adil Abdul al-Mahdi with an offer to “rebuild and support the Iraqi government and people,” while noting Beijing’s desire to “increase security and military cooperation” with Baghdad.
Gives Iran nukes
Efraim Inbar, Summer 2016, "U.S. Mideast Retreat a Boon for Moscow and Tehran," Middle East Forum,JL
https://www.meforum.org/6042/us-mideast-retreat
The Western loss would be considerable. Russia Benefits Russia is fully alive to the potential for a reassertion of its historic role in the region. Though NATO proclaims that the European theater has diminished in strategic importance,22 Moscow seems to have other thoughts. The Mediterranean region, bordering NATO's southern flank and the Middle East, was the core of all essential dangers to Russia's national interests according to Russian defense minister Sergei Shoigu,23 and continued fallout from the Arab upheavals of the past five years has only increased the region's importance. Shortly after releasing the previous statement, Shoigu announced the decision to establish a navy department task force in the Mediterranean "on a permanent basis."24 Russian president Vladimir Putin (right) meets with Egyptian president Abdel Fattah Sisi. Russia understands the potential for a reassertion of its role in the Middle East in the wake of a U.S. retreat. In addition to intervening in Syria, the Russians are also engaging with Cairo: selling weapons, negotiating port rights, and supplying nuclear reactors. The Russian naval facility in Tartus, on the Syrian littoral (leased since 1971), is a vital base for enhanced Russian naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean, and Moscow has gradually improved its fleet size and stepped up patrols in the area. Its greater military footprint in the eastern Mediterranean is intended to project in-creased power into the Middle East. Putin has taken the major step of intervening militarily in Syria to assure the survival of the Assad regime and, with it, continued access to the Russian naval base. In addition, as a major player in the global energy market, he also wants to protect energy prospects that depend on Assad's survival. Moscow has already signed exploration contracts with Damascus with regard to recent gas discoveries in the Mediterranean basin.25 The preservation of the Assad regime is also vital for Tehran because Damascus is the corridor to Hezbollah, its Shiite proxy in Lebanon. Syria has been an ally of Iran since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979—one of the longest alliances in the Middle East. Moreover, Syria could serve as a launching pad for Iranian destabilization of Jordan, a longstanding U.S. ally. Moscow's efforts on Assad's behalf thus directly serve the interests of the Iranian regime. If successful, those efforts will further Tehran's influence in the region. The confluence of Iranian-Russian interests is also visible outside Syria. Putin is certainly not averse to the Iranian goal of pushing Washington out of the Persian Gulf. Russia is also a clear beneficiary of the nuclear deal, which frees it from international constraints on exporting arms to Tehran. A further outcome of the U.S. withdrawal may well be Iran joining Russia in supporting Kurdish political ambitions in order to weaken Turkey, its main rival for regional leadership. Kurdish aspirations have long been a thorn in Turkey's side. While Tehran and Ankara are supporting opposing sides in the Syrian civil war, the Kurds are busy carving out autonomous regions from the moribund state. Kurdish national dreams might, therefore, actually benefit from the power vacuum created by the disruption of Arab statist structures and the U.S. exit from the region. The emergence of an independent Kurdish entity in northern Iraq seems more probable nowadays with Washington seemingly taking no clear position on such a contingency. Another consequence of the U.S. exit can be seen in changes in Egypt. Moscow, for one, has been well served by Washington's reluctance to support the regime of Abdel Fattah Sisi, who came to power following a military coup against President Muhammad Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Russians are selling the Egyptians weapons, negotiating port rights in Alexandria, and supplying them with nuclear reactors. In Iraq, too, there are harbingers of a Russian presence in coordination with Iran as U.S. influence in that state continues to wane. Iraq signed an arms deal with Russia in October 2012, and a joint intelligence center was set up in Baghdad in October 2015.
Iran is lever for China/Russia to push
Daniels 18~-~-Owen Daniels, How China Is Trying to Dominate the Middle East, National Interest, 8/28/18, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-china-trying-dominate-middle-east-29922
China has acted largely in concert with Russia in Syria, continuing to support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and engaging in diplomatic obstructionism against intervention at the United Nations since the civil war’s early days. While China could potentially play a significant role in Syria’s reconstruction, it remains unclear if Beijing is willing to do so. China and Russia’s support for Iran is likely to remain within limits—it’s unclear whether either country would genuinely support Iran's admittance to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, for example—but Tehran policy will remain a lever for both countries to push should they want to pester America. The BRI will prove an interesting space to observe broader Russian-Chinese dynamics. China’s infrastructure investment around the energy sector could bolster Iran’s ability to export liquified natural gas with the exit of European companies, though secondary sanctions will hamper Iran’s prospects for entering European markets. Russia is satisfied with this status quo and will try to keep Iran’s LNG flowing eastward to maintain its stranglehold over Europe. This arrangement ostensibly suits both Moscow and Beijing. At the same time, however, China is using Iran to develop BRI routes that circumvent Russian territory, leaving Russia in the cold for some of the Belt and Road benefits. | 904,714 |
365,710 | 379,650 | TOC Neg 7 | Charles W. Dunne, 10-02-2019, “A Balance Sheet on America’s “War on Terror” in the Middle East,” Arab Center, http://arabcenterdc.org/policy_analyses/a-balance-sheet-on-americas-war-on-terror-in-the-middle-east/
American intervention in Syria and Iraq in 2014 gradually began to turn the tide, combining massive airstrikes, drone attacks, and Special Forces raids with supplies, logistics, and intel support to the reorganizing Iraqi Security Forces (which had nearly collapsed under the IS onslaught) and the nominally anti-Assad coalition comprising the Syrian Democratic Forces. Over a period of three years, the Islamic State was forced out of virtually all its territorial conquests. IS lost its self-proclaimed capital city of Raqqa in October 2017, a few months before Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi announced that IS had been forced from its last stronghold in Iraq. The Syrian Democratic Forces declared the caliphate finished in March 2019 after its defeat in Baghouz in eastern Syria, the last town it held in the country.
What Has Been Achieved—and What Has Not
There is no denying that US counterterrorism strategy has posted robust victories over al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and other smaller groups, degrading their operational and leadership capacities and reducing their ability to organize and carry out mass-casualty attacks far from their bases of operation. Overall, incidents of worldwide terrorism have fallen; the 2018 global terrorism report by the Institute of Economics and Peace noted that deaths from terrorism fell by 44 percent over the three previous years, matched by a 42-percent drop in terrorism’s global economic impact.
These successes are far from complete, however. While the main jihadi organizations have been broken into smaller pieces, they are scattered throughout the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia, where governance remains weak and the extremists’ ability to pose a serious threat to states, civilian populations, and US interests on the ground remains strong. These smaller groups are harder to track and eliminate and they have amassed significant influence while embedding themselves in local populations, substantially improving their ability to win “hearts and minds” and inspire attacks on US and allied interests in the region and in Europe.
David Pollock, 1-9-2020, “Eight Reasons Why the United States and Iraq Still Need Each Other,” Washington Institute, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/eight-reasons-why-the-united-states-and-iraq-still-need-each-other
The assassination of Qasem Soleimani has brought the tensions in U.S.-Iraqi relations to a boil, with militia factions strong-arming a parliamentary resolution on American troop withdrawal and various European allies contemplating departures of their own. Before they sign the divorce papers, however, officials in Baghdad and Washington should consider the many reasons why staying together is best for both them and the Middle East.
TO SAVE THE VICTORY AGAINST THE ISLAMIC STATE
A continued U.S. military presence in Iraq, modest as it may be, is essential to ensure the enduring defeat of the Islamic State. Conversely, if Soleimani’s death leads to the withdrawal of U.S. troops involved in local operations against the group, it would constitute a major blow to the fight against terrorism. Even after the Islamic State lost the last vestige of its territorial caliphate in March 2019, it was still able to conduct 867 terrorist operations in Iraq alone during the remainder of the year. The quantity and severity of such attacks would surely rise in the absence of U.S. and allied military pressure. Ongoing operations against the group’s equally active vestiges in Syria would be fatally undermined as well. The UN estimates that the Islamic State still has up to $300 million in reserves to sustain its terrorist campaign, and Kurdish officials note that the group is now reorganized underground in Iraq with “better techniques and better tactics.”
All of this is precisely why ministers at the November 14 meeting of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS pledged to keep supporting the Iraqi government in order to “secure an enduring defeat of the terrorist organization.” To fulfill that pledge, the United States must remain in Iraq; otherwise it risks repeating the mistakes of 2011, when premature withdrawal led to the rise of the Islamic State in the first place.
Hal Brands, 3-21-2019, “Why America Can’t Quit The Middle East,” Hoover Institution, https://www.hoover.org/research/why-america-cant-quit-middle-east
Second, however, it is a fantasy to think that the United States can disengage from the Middle East without consequence. This is because America still has pressing interests in that region—and because those interests are as unlikely to protect themselves today as they ever have been in the past. Growing Russian influence, Iran’s hegemonic ambitions, the potential resurgence of key terrorist organizations, and the massive political instability and violence that plagues large swaths of the region are real problems that demand competent management. America’s partners in the region can do more to manage those problems than they have done to date, but they remain manifestly incapable of doing so without significant U.S. support.
Dr. Graham, 5-15-2018, “Nuclear Terrorism: Did We Beat the Odds or Change Them?,” PRISM | National Defense University, https://cco.ndu.edu/News/Article/1507316/nuclear-terrorism-did-we-beat-the-odds-or-change-them/
FACTORS AND ACTIONS THAT HAVE DECREASED THE RISK OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM
Relentless U.S.–led campaign to destroy terrorists who sought to attack the United States.
Development of defenses against terrorism to include the standup of fusion centers within the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the new Department of Homeland Security, and improvements to the Transportation Security Administration and border security.
Multi-billion dollar increase in funding for intelligence groups targeting terrorism.
Heightened public awareness of terrorist threat.
U.S.–Russian nuclear security cooperation.
U.S.–led Nuclear Security Summit process that created action-forcing deadlines.
Complete removal of nuclear-weapons usable material from over a dozen countries
More than 50 civilian research reactors shut down or converted from highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium.
Iran nuclear deal that halted Iran’s nuclear advance.
Willson, 9-28-2017, “The effects of a single terrorist nuclear bomb,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, https://thebulletin.org/2017/09/the-effects-of-a-single-terrorist-nuclear-bomb/
The scale of death and suffering. How many would die in such an event, and how many would be terribly wounded, would depend on where and when the bomb was detonated, what the weather conditions were at the time, how successful the response was in helping the wounded survivors, and more. Many estimates of casualties are based on census data, which reflect where people sleep at night; if the attack occurred in the middle of a workday, the numbers of people crowded into the office towers at the heart of many modern cities would be far higher. The daytime population of Manhattan, for example, is roughly twice its nighttime population; in Midtown on a typical workday, there are an estimated 980,000 people per square mile. A 10-kiloton weapon detonated there might well kill half a million people—not counting those who might die of radiation sickness from the fallout. (These effects were analyzed in great detail in the Rand Corporation’s Considering the Effects of a Catastrophic Terrorist Attack and the British Medical Journal’s “Nuclear terrorism.”)
On a typical day, the wind would blow the fallout north, seriously contaminating virtually all of Manhattan above Gramercy Park; people living as far away as Stamford, Connecticut would likely have to evacuate.
Seriously injured survivors would greatly outnumber the dead, their suffering magnified by the complete inadequacy of available help. The psychological and social effects—overwhelming sadness, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, myriad forms of anxiety—would be profound and long-lasting.
The scenario we have been describing is a groundburst. An airburst—such as might occur, for example, if terrorists put their bomb in a small aircraft they had purchased or rented—would extend the blast and fire effects over a wider area, killing and injuring even larger numbers of people immediately. But an airburst would not have the same lingering effects from fallout as a groundburst, because the rock and dirt would not be sucked up into the fireball and contaminated. The 10-kiloton blast we have been discussing is likely toward the high end of what terrorists could plausibly achieve with a crude, improvised bomb, but even a 1-kiloton blast would be a catastrophic event, having a deadly radius between one-third and one-half that of a 10-kiloton blast.
These hundreds of thousands of people would not be mere statistics, but countless individual stories of loss—parents, children, entire families; all religions; rich and poor alike—killed or horribly mutilated. Human suffering and tragedy on this scale does not have to be imagined; it can be remembered through the stories of the survivors of the US atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the only times in history when nuclear weapons have been used intentionally against human beings. The pain and suffering caused by those bombings are almost beyond human comprehension; the eloquent testimony of the Hibakusha—the survivors who passed through the atomic fire—should stand as an eternal reminder of the need to prevent nuclear weapons from ever being used in anger again.
Global economic disaster. The economic impact of such an attack would be enormous. The effects would reverberate for so far and so long that they are difficult to estimate in all their complexity. Hundreds of thousands of people would be too injured or sick to work for weeks or months. Hundreds of thousands more would evacuate to locations far from their jobs. Many places of employment would have to be abandoned because of the radioactive fallout. Insurance companies would reel under the losses; but at the same time, many insurance policies exclude the effects of nuclear attacks—an item insurers considered beyond their ability to cover—so the owners of thousands of buildings would not have the insurance payments needed to cover the cost of fixing them, thousands of companies would go bankrupt, and banks would be left holding an immense number of mortgages that would never be repaid.
Consumer and investor confidence would likely be dramatically affected, as worried people slowed their spending. Enormous new homeland security and military investments would be very likely. If the bomb had come in a shipping container, the targeted country—and possibly others—might stop all containers from entering until it could devise a system for ensuring they could never again be used for such a purpose, throwing a wrench into the gears of global trade for an extended period. (And this might well occur even if a shipping container had not been the means of delivery.)
Even the far smaller 9/11 attacks are estimated to have caused economic aftershocks costing almost $1 trillion even excluding the multi-trillion-dollar costs of the wars that ensued. The cost of a terrorist nuclear attack in a major city would likely be many times higher.
The most severe effects would be local, but the effects of trade disruptions, reduced economic activity, and more would reverberate around the world. Consequently, while some countries may feel that nuclear terrorism is only a concern for the countries most likely to be targeted—such as the United States—in reality it is a threat to everyone, everywhere. In 2005, then-UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan warned that these global effects would push “tens of millions of people into dire poverty,” creating “a second death toll throughout the developing world.” One recent estimate suggested that a nuclear attack in an urban area would cause a global recession, cutting global Gross Domestic Product by some two percent, and pushing an additional 30 million people in the developing world into extreme poverty.
Hal Brands, 8-20-2015, "Retrenchment Chic: The Dangers of Offshore Balancing," Foreign Policy Research Institute, https://www.fpri.org/article/2015/08/retrenchment-chic-the-dangers-of-offshore-balancing/
The same is true of proliferation. Offshore balancers are right that U.S. policy can appear threatening to its adversaries, and that some countries—China during the Cold War, Iran and North Korea since the 1990s—have sought to develop nuclear weapons in part as a way of countering American pressure and coercion. The trouble, however, is that shifting to offshore balancing would hardly rectify the situation. After all, academic research indicates that there are numerous reasons why “rogue states” seek nuclear weapons, from desires for international or domestic prestige to desires to wield the bomb as a tool of offensive or coercive leverage.9 The causes of proliferation, like the causes of terrorism, are quite complex, and so altering U.S. policy would touch only one piece of the problem.
In fact, it would probably make that problem far worse. What offshore balancers frequently forget is that, far from being an overall stimulant to proliferation, U.S. force presence and security commitments have, on aggregate, massively impeded that phenomenon. U.S. security guarantees have reduced the perceived need for America’s allies to seek nuclear weapons, while giving Washington powerful influence that it can use to dissuade prospective proliferators. In numerous cases since the 1950s—from Germany and Italy, to South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan—these aspects of U.S. policy have proven central to limiting the spread of nuclear arms. Were the United States now to terminate or dramatically reduce its overseas commitments, it stands to reason that it would also lose this non-proliferation leverage. Offshore balancing would therefore likely result in a more proliferated, and more dangerous, world.
Pete Mckenzie, 3-25-2020, "America’s Allies Are Becoming a Nuclear-Proliferation Threat," Defense One, https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2020/03/americas-allies-are-becoming-nuclear-proliferation-threat/164057/
Experts emphasize that the risk of allies rapidly nuclearizing is low. “There’s a number of hurdles that allies would have to get very powerfully motivated to overcome,” said Michael Mazarr, senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. But Volpe observed that “opening that box and having to ask those questions about the U.S. commitment is worrisome…The proliferation risk is low. The problem is that it’s increased. It was an almost 0 percent risk for a long time, and the reason there’s lots of interest is that that risk has gone up in a noticeable way.”
Alexander Lanoszka, November 2018, Atomic Assurance: The Alliance Politics of Nuclear Proliferation, Dartmouth University, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329453903_Atomic_Assurance_The_Alliance_Politics_of_Nuclear_Proliferation?enrichId=rgreq-895ef572a94ca7c9c6257c306da12048-XXXandenrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzMyOTQ1MzkwMztBUzo4MDQ0ODQ5Mzg3NDc5MDVAMTU2ODgxNTU2NDI1OQ3D3Dandel=1_x_2and_esc=publicationCoverPdf
How do guarantors like the United States design commitments that at once mitigate the alliance dilemma and reduce nuclear proliferation risks? To what extent are alliances responsible for curbing the efforts of those states interested in acquiring nuclear weapons? I advance a new theoretical frame- work in chapter 1 that begins with the observation that nuclear security guarantees contain much ambiguity despite involving existential stakes. The recipients of these guarantees have good reason to worry about abandon- ment: no world government exists to ensure that their received commitments would be honored, and the written commitments that they receive are often vague. Consequently, as much as allies pay attention to the foreign policy doc- trines of their guarantors, they desire more than simple pledges of support.
Allies thus tend to believe that in-theater conventional military deploy- ments are necessary for bolstering commitments to extend deterrence. These deployments are not just “trip wires” that help deter an adversary by threat- ening the involvement of the guarantor should its ally be attacked. They have war- ghting capabilities and are tangible representations of the nuclear security guarantees that these states receive.12 States see the credibility of their security guarantees tied to such deployments as troops more so than even tactical nuclear deployments, despite how the latter matter for extended nuclear deterrence. As long as these commitments appear stable, abandon- ment fears will not intensify, and the temptation to develop nuclear weap- ons will be limited. Moreover, these troops have the additional bene t of helping to restrain the ally’s foreign and defense policies. For example, those troops’ participation in joint military planning with the ally’s own armed forces reduces entrapment risks. And so alliances are useful for deterring nuclear proliferation. However, if allies anticipate or suddenly experience
IntroductIon
5
IntroductIon
unfavorable conventional redeployments (i.e., large, unilateral troop with- drawals), then their abandonment concerns rise to a level much higher than normal. They begin to doubt their security guarantees enough to embark on a set of behaviors related to nuclear proliferation, which range from hedg- ing strategies to the active pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability.
Unfortunately, the guarantor will experience severe challenges in its ef- forts to reverse the nuclear proliferation–related behavior of its ally. To be- gin with, the guarantor needs to repair the security guarantee that the ally now perceives as suf ciently broken to warrant nuclear weapons pursuit. To reassert its security guarantees and to soothe intensi ed abandonment fears, new agreements that credibly restore or preserve troop levels are nec- essary. Yet these agreements are dif cult to forge if the underlying circum- stances that broke the security guarantee in the rst place still exist. Other diplomatic levers have limited ef cacy and could be counterproductive: threatening the withdrawal of more troops or the termination of the alliance altogether so as to isolate the ally will only exacerbate abandonment con- cerns. I thus argue that the best possible recourse available to the guarantor is its economic and technological power over the ally. If the ally depends on those nonmilitary goods from the guarantor, then the ally might have to re- consider its nuclear activities in the interest of its own welfare. Absent such leverage, the guarantor will have trouble getting the ally to renounce nuclear weapons credibly. In the event that the ally decides to reverse its nuclear be- havior, it may do so for reasons that have little to do with the coercion— threatened or applied—by its guarantor.
J. Wellington Brown, June 2017, “INDISPENSABLE NATION: US SECURITY GUARANTEES AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION,” Air Force University, https://www.hsdl.org/?viewanddid=813351
A further implication that flows from this research is that if the US demands that its allies shoulder more of their own security, they may actually do so, but in ways that are detrimental to US counterproliferation interests. Unintended blowback from “America First” rhetoric could include, as the South Korean case shows, renewed nuclear proliferation by US allies. US policy has long discouraged nuclear proliferation for a variety of moral, legal, stability, and American primacy reasons. US extended deterrence undergirds this policy by obviating the need for American allies to field their own nuclear weapons. If the United States appears, through statements, actions, or tweets, to be unwilling to defend its allies then it is reasonable that they may turn to nuclear self- help.
Public discussion has increased within South Korea, Saudi Arabia, and even the European Union6 about whether these entities should acquire their own nuclear weapons. Although a nuclear proliferation strategy is currently a fringe idea for most US allies, a significant retrenchment in US security commitments could make these ideas viable, particularly for states facing highly acute threats. As the Allied Proliferation Vector Model prescribes, the United States must keep the perception of its security commitment commensurate to its allies’ threat environment, if it wants to prevent forward proliferation movement.
Recommendations
There are several specific policies that the United States can adopt to counter the potential for allied nuclear proliferation. I make these recommendations in order to reinforce allied perceptions of US commitment as well as moderate the security environment facing our allies.
Uri Friedman, 11-14-2019, “What America’s Allies Really Think About Trump’s Syria Decision,” Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/11/trumps-green-light-moment-in-syria-shook-the-world/601963/
There was a time when the withdrawal of roughly 50 American Special Forces from a couple of outposts in a remote part of Syria wouldn’t have generated a wave of angst across the world about the United States unceremoniously dumping its allies and terminating the international system it has led for more than 70 years.
That time is decidedly not now.
…
The same official noted that Syrian Kurdish forces have been partners in the U.S.-led multinational military campaign against the Islamic State, and that “what happens in Syria is being called ‘other people’s business’ even though ‘other people’s business’ will affect in all likelihood America’s European allies.” Then the official posed the fundamental question raised by the U.S. position, one that will linger over the gathering of anti-ISIS coalition members in Washington, D.C., this week: “What does that mean for our confidence that in a time of crisis or challenge we will have the backing of our American allies?” (The official, like several others in this article, asked to speak about the situation in Syria on condition of anonymity.) “It’s too early to say how this will play out. It will depend on whether the risks can be curtailed. But it’s a question that is the writing on the wall right now.”
The president of France doesn’t think it’s too early to address that question, and the answer is earth-shattering for Europe. In an extraordinary interview with The Economist during the upheaval in Syria, Emmanuel Macron stated that when Trump tells him and other European leaders “‘It’s your neighborhood, not mine’ … we must hear what he’s saying,” which is, essentially, “‘I am no longer prepared to pay for and guarantee a security system for them,’ and so just ‘wake up.’”
Another official with a U.S.-allied government described Trump’s “green light to Turkey to invade Kurdish territory” as a “kind of betrayal.”
…
The premise of America’s network of alliances and collective-security arrangements has been that the U.S. will have its friends’ back, and vice versa, whether out of perceived mutual interests or shared values. These relationships have persisted over decades, despite the fact that Washington has at times left partners in the lurch—the South Vietnamese at the end of the Vietnam War, for example, and even the Kurds repeatedly over the past century. But this latest instance comes at a time in which the postwar system itself is in existential flux, with a rising China, a resurgent Russia, and a more inward-looking United States. Trump, moreover, has indicated that it was not just the U.S. commitment to the Kurds that was problematic; America’s commitments themselves are problematic.
All of this—the melding of the moment and the man—has made allies around the world more inclined to draw generalized lessons from Trump’s disorderly and disorienting decision regarding the Kurds in a way that, say, the West Germans might not have when U.S. forces exited South Vietnam. Simply put: An American ally today cannot feel entirely assured that the U.S. cavalry will ride to its rescue. This disquiet, which is having real-world consequences as I write, is unlikely to dissipate when the Trump presidency ends.
Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer, 01-06-2020, “2020 is the year to worry about nuclear weapons,” Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/01/06/is-year-worry-about-nuclear-weapons/
This year is the 50th anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which has been remarkably successful in stopping nuclear weapons from spreading. Don’t expect much celebration. The United States and other traditional supporters express little enthusiasm for the treaty, while some critics argue it can be replaced by the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) once it enters into force. Governments supporting the TPNW say they are frustrated that the NPT members with nuclear weapons have not yet completely disarmed those weapons.
But the NPT has succeeded in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. Leaders in Saudi Arabia and Turkey speak openly about the appeal of nuclear weapons. If Iran leaves the NPT and acquires nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has announced that his government will develop nuclear weapons, too. Last year, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said “I cannot accept” that Turkey is banned from possessing nuclear weapons.
Meanwhile, the United States’ European link to article about Germany contemplating development and Asian link to article about South Korea contemplating development allies question whether they can rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Some of these states abandoned early interest in nuclear weapons decades ago in exchange for U.S. extended deterrence. In Washington, there is growing concern that the United States should not have nuclear weapons deployed on NATO’s base in Incirlik, Turkey. This heightens NATO allies’ worries that, with Trump in office, the United States is abandoning its commitment to their defense. France has pledged to cover Germany with its own nuclear deterrence. German politicians are arguing over whether to explore nuclear weapons. Australian politicians are having a similar debate.
These discussions don’t necessarily mean the governments will indeed seek to acquire nuclear weapons. However, the discussions themselves weaken the nuclear taboo that has helped keep the weapons out of international conflicts. And nuclear weapons now have a place in domestic political debates that they have not had since the Cold War.
Michael Macarthur Bosack, 11-28-2019, "Revisiting Japan's nuclear arms debate," Japan Times, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/11/28/commentary/japan-commentary/revisiting-japans-nuclear-arms-debate/
Suga’s response may have been concise and resolute, but we are likely to see a revisiting of the nuclear weapons debate in Japan. The region has witnessed North Korea’s development of increasingly devastating nuclear technology and more sophisticated delivery vehicles. Fears of U.S. abandonment will lead many to question whether Japan may indeed pursue its own nuclear arsenal — which is technically feasible given the country’s technology and availability of nuclear material.
Amid these discussions, it is necessary to have the right context for understanding the discourse, including Japan’s positions toward nuclear weapons, as well as the strategic and political costs of pursuing a domestic nuclear arsenal. Given that background, one finds that the most likely outcome is the status quo, no matter how passionate the debate.
John Mecklin, 2-24-2020, "Can the nuclear nonproliferation regime be saved when arms control is collapsing?," Taylor and Francis, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2020.1730605
In this issue of the Bulletin, nonproliferation expert Henry Sokolski details three reasons why, at age 50, there is reason to believe that the NPT’s effectiveness is on the wane, and that, absent international action, nuclear proliferation is apt to increase over the next decade. As Sokolski notes, the trends toward a wider spread of nuclear weapons have not yet produced serial proliferation. But as area experts Oliver Meier and Duyeon Kim write, both Germany and South Korea – longtime bulwarks in support of nonproliferation – have seen serious debates about the possibility of acquiring their own nuclear deterrents. Meier and Kim make clear that, as of now, neither Germany nor South Korea seems intent on stepping away from the US extended deterrent umbrella and acquiring nuclear weapons of their own.
But absent an international effort aimed at reinvigorating nonproliferation efforts, a wide array of countries – particularly in the Middle East – could and likely will be tempted to begin nuclear weapons programs. A renewed nonproliferation effort absolutely requires that the countries with most of the world’s nuclear weapons reengage in the arms control and disarmament process promised by the NPT. Without such an effort, as Sokolski rightly notes, “the NPT will simply be pushed to the margins of history, along with the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which famously banned war just a decade before the globe was engulfed in the most destructive war in recorded history.”
Report to the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, February 2008, “CHAIN REACTION: AVOIDING A NUCLEAR ARMS RACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST,” https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CPRT-110SPRT39674/html/CPRT-110SPRT39674.htm
f any Middle Eastern state, Saudi Arabia is the state most
likely to pursue nuclear weapons in response to the development
of an Iranian nuclear weapon. While acknowledging the
difficulty inherent in accurately predicting the ramifications
of a Saudi nuclear weapon, one can envision a host of likely or
possible outcomes that would dramatically undermine peace and
stability in the Middle East and severely endanger U.S.
interests and security. At some point in the Saudi process of
developing or acquiring a nuclear weapon capability, Israel
would likely detect the Saudi nuclear activity. Israel might
strike a small number of Saudi targets in order to eliminate
the program in its infancy. Even if the Saudis could obtain a
nuclear weapon without Israeli knowledge, it is difficult to
imagine a passive Israeli acceptance of a Saudi nuclear weapon,
which the Israelis would likely view as an existential threat.
If the Israeli response to a Saudi nuclear weapons program took
the form of a military attack it would be seen in the Arab
World in the context of an attack from the Jewish state against
the Islamic holy land and home of the ``two holy mosques.''
Such an Israeli attack on Saudi Arabia would represent one of
the greatest offenses to Muslims in history and would incite an
unprecedented level of radicalization directed against Israel
and the United States, possibly resulting in a regionwide
conflict between Arab States and Israel.
A Saudi nuclear weapon might also spur a regional nuclear
arms race. Iran would likely respond by increasing the number
of nuclear weapons in their arsenal, the accuracy of their
delivery systems, and the variety of their launch platforms. If
Israel took either of these steps~-~-especially in an overt and
explicit manner~-~-it would place tremendous political pressure
on Egypt to respond.\1\ The Egyptian response could consist of
a renunciation of its peace treaty with Israel, a repudiation
of its relations with the United States, or the initiation of
an Egyptian nuclear weapons program. The Egyptian people would
undoubtedly demand the government take some forceful and
substantial action. This interaction between Israel and Egypt
would also be exacerbated by the existence of a Saudi nuclear
weapon.
Adam Taylor, 07-31-17, “Why doesn’t South Korea have nuclear weapons? For a time, it pursued them.”
Even on the Korean Peninsula, it’s easy to see the drawbacks. Faced with the threat of South Korea developing nuclear weapons, the North may be incentivized to launch a preemptive strike. The risk of miscalculation by either side would grow dangerously.
Bradley A. Thayer, "The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Utility of the Non-proliferation Regime," University of Chicago, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.10072F978-1-349-26053-9_5
With respect to the second question, the nuclear non-proliferation
regime does benefit the security interests of the United States because it
complicates the process of acquiring nuclear capabilities. Continued
nuclear proliferation is not in the interests of the US for four reasons. First,
nuclear proliferation increases the risk that nuclear weapons may be used
against the United States itself or against US allies. Secondly, nuclear proliferation jeopardizes the ability of the United States to project power into
regions where there are nuclear powers, e.g. the Gulf, if Iraq's and Iran's
nuclear programmes were to come to fruition; or to South Korea, if North
Korea's nuclear programme is not halted and its nuclear weapons
destroyed." The maintenance and growth of North Korea's nascent arsenal
poses great problems for the United States due to the possibility of a
nuclear attack against South Korea, Japan, or even the United States."
Thirdly, nuclear proliferation increases the risks of starting a chain of proliferation as other adversaries strive to duplicate the capabilities of the
original nuclear state, as Japan may presently be considering the acquisition of nuclear weapons in order to match proliferation by North Korea."
Fourthly, nuclear proliferation increases the risks of nuclear inadvertence,
that is, the possibility that nuclear weapons may be used accidentally,
without authorization, or by third parties, such as terrorists.
Louis Menand, 9-23-2013, “Nukes of Hazard,” New Yorker, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/09/30/nukes-of-hazard
After tracking the flight for several minutes, the Russians concluded that its trajectory would not take the missile into Russian territory. The briefcases were closed. It turned out that Yeltsin and his generals had been watching a weather rocket launched from Norway to study the aurora borealis. Peter Pry, who reported the story in his book “War Scare” (1999), called it “the single most dangerous moment of the nuclear missile age.” Whether it was the most dangerous moment or not, the weather-rocket scare was one of hundreds of incidents after 1945 when accident, miscommunication, human error, mechanical malfunction, or some combination of glitches nearly resulted in the detonation of nuclear weapons.
During the Cold War, there were a few occasions, such as the Cuban missile crisis, in 1962, when one side or the other was close to a decision that was likely to start a nuclear war. There were also some threats to go nuclear, though they were rarely taken completely seriously. In 1948, during a dispute with the Soviets over control of Berlin, Harry Truman sent B-29s to England, where they would be in range of Moscow. They were not armed with atomic bombs, but they were intended as a signal that the United States would use atomic weapons to defend Western Europe.
Matthew Kroenig, 2014, “The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have a Future?,” Journal of Strategic Studies, https://sci-hub.tw/https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2014.893508?needAccess=true
First and foremost, proliferation optimists present an oversimplified
view of nuclear deterrence theory. Optimists argue that since the advent
of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), any nuclear war would mean
national suicide and, therefore, no rational leader would ever choose to
start one. Furthermore, they argue that the requirements for rationality
are not high. Rather, leaders must value their own survival and the
survival of their nation and understand that intentionally launching a
nuclear war would threaten those values. Many analysts and policymakers attempt to challenge the optimists on their own turf and question whether the leaders of potential proliferant states are fully
rational.34
Yet, these debates overlook the fact that, apart from the optimists,
leading nuclear deterrence theorists believe that nuclear proliferation
contributes to a real risk of nuclear war even in a situation of MAD
mong rational states.35 Moreover, realizing that nuclear war is possible does not depend on peculiar beliefs about the possibility of escaping
MAD.36 Rather, as we will discuss below, these theorists understand
that some risk of nuclear war is necessary in order for deterrence to
function. To be sure, in the 1940s, Viner, Brodie, and others argued
that MAD rendered war among major powers obsolete, but nuclear
deterrence theory soon advanced beyond that simple understanding.37
After all, great power political competition does not end with nuclear
weapons. And nuclear-armed states still seek to threaten nuclear-armed
adversaries. States cannot credibly threaten to launch a suicidal nuclear
war, but they still want to coerce their adversaries. This leads to a
credibility problem: how can states credibly threaten a nuclear-armed
opponent? Since the 1960s, academic nuclear deterrence theory has
been devoted almost exclusively to answering this question.38 And
their answers do not give us reasons to be optimistic.
Douglas M. Gibler, Toby J. Rider and Marc L. Hutchison, March 2005, “Taking Arms against a Sea of Troubles: Conventional Arms Races during Periods of Rivalry,” Journal of Peace Research, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/30042270.pdf?casa_token=jO6btwdfNx4AAAAA:tP_BoAZIIofOluDdHcZCuTN4gana22o1pBoUeKCjqspQ8pTejoM6JNirnUWxWtpBsNXybycnM6n0u4H9j5AXPA9npNQ_rQIFTPWosR-2-Wkbq3HkY-Op.
For example, Wallace
(1976) provided the first comprehensive
empirical examination of arms races. He
defined an arms race as a very rapid, simul-
taneous growth in military expenditures
exceeding a certain quantitative threshold for
the ten-year period prior to dispute onset
(Wallace, 1976, 1979). Wallace's (1982)
index estimated the smooth time rate of
change in military expenditures for each state
prior to the dispute and was computed by
taking the product of the change for each
side; all disputes with a 10 or greater
increase in expenditures over the ten-year
period were coded as disputes during arms
races. Using this measure of arms races,
Wallace (1979) found that 23 of 28 arms-
racing disputes escalated to war, while only 3
of 71 non-arms-racing disputes escalated to
war.
…
In an attempt to resolve the differences
among previous studies, Sample (1997) con-
ducted multiple tests with multiple arms
race indices employing data used by
Wallace, Diehl, and Horn. Evaluating
Diehl's criticism of Wallace, Sample found
no empirical evidence to support the claim
that Wallace's index was capturing unilateral
buildups. Sample also eliminated contro-
versial cases from the World Wars in order
to ensure independence in Wallace's sample
of cases. Using Horn's index, she found a
statistically significant relationship between
mutual military buildups and escalation. In
fact, in all of Sample's tests, using various
combinations of the three samples of cases
and both Diehl's and Horn's indices, Sample
consistently found a positive, statistically
significant relationship between mutual
military buildups and escalation. Most
interesting, Sample found that states
involved in arms-racing disputes usually
went to war within five years.3 In a more
recent study, Sample (2002) confirmed the
findings about the relationship between
mutual military buildup and escalation for
minor states, but not for mixed status,
major-minor dyads
…
In addition to escalation, arms races
seem to have an important substantive
impact on the likelihood of conflict,
especially in comparison with the other
variables in our models. For example, as
Table II shows, the chance of a MID Militarized Interstate Dispute for
strategic rivals more than doubles, from
16 on average to 35 during an arms race
year, and the chance of war changes from 1
in 100 to 1 in 20 during arms race years.
These results are especially dramatic in
comparison with the two other variables
that are statistically significant across both
models - contiguity increases the proba-
bility of both types of conflict by just over
23, and an alliance decreases these prob-
abilities by more than half.
Andreas Kluth, 1-9-2020, “The Risk of Nuclear Proliferation (and War) Is Growing,” Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-01-09/game-theory-shows-risk-of-nuclear-war-is-growing-with-iran-rift
Game theory also offers plenty of reasons to worry once soft arms races turn into hard ones. That’s because the world has become more complex since the Cold War. Back then, the U.S. and the Soviet Union used game theory to find a stable strategy for avoiding the worst: mutually assured destruction. (The acronym – MAD — says it all.) It rested on various assumptions. Both sides, for example, must be able to retaliate even after being struck, which is why the U.S., Russia and now also China are so keen to be able to deploy from land, sea, air or even space.
By today’s standards, those old games are laughably simple. They had two players, both assumed to be “rational,” an assumption few people make confidently about some world leaders today. Worse, the number of players keeps growing. So do the permutations of new weapons, such as small nukes for tactical uses or hyper-sonic missiles that give adversaries no time to weigh responses. This leads to a spectacular increase in the possible decisions and responses — and miscalculations. The math quickly gets complex beyond normal human capacities.
Games include, for example, perfectly rational but slippery strategies such as brinkmanship, when actors deliberately “let the situation get somewhat out of hand” just to make it “intolerable to the other party.” The problem is that such situations — such as the skirmishes last year between India and Pakistan, both nuclear powers — can easily go from somewhat, to totally, out of hand.
Alexandra Witze, 3-16-2020, “How a small nuclear war would transform the entire planet,” Nature, https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-00794-y
The worst impact would come in the mid-latitudes, including breadbasket areas such as the US Midwest and Ukraine. Grain reserves would be gone in a year or two. Most countries would be unable to import food from other regions because they, too, would be experiencing crop failures, Jägermeyr says. It is the most detailed look ever at how the aftermath of a nuclear war would affect food supplies, he says. The researchers did not explicitly calculate how many people would starve, but say that the ensuing famine would be worse than any in documented history.
Farmers might respond by planting maize, wheat and soya beans in parts of the globe likely to be less affected by a nuclear winter, says Deepak Ray, a food-security researcher at the University of Minnesota in St Paul. Such changes might help to buffer the food shock — but only partly. The bottom line remains that a war involving less than 1 of the world’s nuclear arsenal could shatter the planet’s food supplies.
“The surprising finding”, says Jägermeyr, “is that even a small-war scenario has devastating global repercussions.” | 904,714 |
365,711 | 379,611 | 1 - SepOct Food insecurity | Contention 2 is Solving food insecurity
Tom Huston, xx Tom Huston, (). "How do we feed the planet in 2050?." Guardian, xx-xx-xxxx, 9-25-2019. https://www.theguardian.com/preparing-for-9-billion/2017/sep/13/population-feed-planet-2050-cold-chain-environment // MHS SG
The numbers are jarring: more than one-quarter of the planet’s 7.5 billion people suffer from malnutrition, and nearly 1 billion are chronically hungry.
Peace Corps, 19 English Language, (). "Global Issues: Food Security." No Publication, 9-16-19, 9-25-2019. https://www.peacecorps.gov/educators/resources/global-issues-food-security/ // MHS SG
Looking at food security globally, the number of people experiencing food insecurity in the United States and other developed nations makes up only about two percent of the global total (9). The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) states that 925 million (10) people in the world are undernourished. The largest percentage of undernourished people live in Asia and the Pacific Islands, followed by Sub-Saharan Africa (9). Fortunately, there is enough food in the world today for everyone to have the nourishment they need for a healthy and productive life (11). A key factor in addressing the world's food security challenges is improving the availability, access, and utilization of food across global communities.
Food Insecurity Solvency
David Uzsoki and Laura Turley, IISD, 18 IISD, (). "Why financing rural infrastructure is crucial to food security." 12-2018, 9-24-2019. https://www.iisd.org/library/rural-infrastructure-food-security // MHS SG
-Explain that Infrastructure would help developing nations and provide food security in 4 key ways
STORAGE INFRASTRUCTURE- About one third of food produced for human consumption is lost or wasted globally, amounting to about 1.3 billion tonnes per year. Storage facilities, including grain and rice silos, warehouses and cold storages, play a critical role in ensuring food security and ending hunger. As much as a quarter of the world’s population lack access to electricity. ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE- Almost 85 percent of these people live in rural, dispersed communities across sub-Saharan Africa and South Africa. Increases in energy prices result in higher food prices, reducing access for poorer households. FEEDER ROADS- Without access routes to obtain inputs and reach markets, other food security investments, including technical assistance and access to finance, underperform. IRRIGATION INFRASTRUCTURE- Agricultural productivity resulting from irrigation can be more than twice as high on a per-hectare basis than rainfed production.
Times of Islamabad, 19 Times of Islamabad, (). "CPEC: This is how CPEC will revamp Pakistan agriculture sector." Times of Islamabad, 9-25-2019, 9-25-2019. https://timesofislamabad.com/28-Oct-2018/cpec-this-is-how-cpec-will-revamp-pakistan-agriculture-sector // MHS SG
China intends to develop various food processing and storage stations across BRI economies to mitigate price fluctuations and increase supply of food products for the domestic market. The report added that in the crop sector, there is a focus on increasing the use of modern machinery and synthetic fertilizers to enhance the yields, while food storage, and processing zones would be constructed to reduce significant post-harvest losses.
David Uzsoki and Laura Turley, IISD, 18 IISD, (). "Why financing rural infrastructure is crucial to food security." 12-2018, 9-24-2019. https://www.iisd.org/library/rural-infrastructure-food-security // MHS SG
Financing infrastructure, including roads, storage and localized energy grids, will help provide food security for the 821 million people estimated to live in hunger worldwide.
Food insecurity impact
Rebecca Lake, 15 Rebecca Lake, (). "World Hunger Statistics: 23 Thought-Provoking Facts." CreditDonkey, 9-11-2015, 9-25-2019. https://www.creditdonkey.com/world-hunger-statistics.html // MHS SG
That's more than one-tenth of the world's population. How many people die of hunger every day? The FAO estimates that as many as 25,000 people lose their lives every day as a result of hunger. That adds up to roughly 9.1 million people who die of starvation each year.
Take this with the UN’s report in 2019 which tells us that the global population will rise to 9.7 billion by 2050 in countries already struggling to feed their population. This means we will see the number of deaths to starvation skyrocket without BRI infrastructure. | 904,694 |
365,712 | 379,633 | 3 - Jan Drugs | 3We Negate Resolved: The United states should end its economic sanctions against Venezuela.
Our sole contention is ending the Narcotics Trade
In the Status Quo
Venezuelan is a mafia state, where criminal activities are endemic to the government.
McCarthy-Jones ’19 McCarthy-Jones, Anthea (Senior Lecturer at UNSW). “Venezuela is fast becoming a ‘mafia state’: here’s what you need to know.” The Conversation, 15 January 2019,https://theconversation.com/venezuela-is-fast-becoming-a-mafia-state-heres-what-you-need-to-know-109887. Premier
A mafia state refers to a state that has effectively been criminalised. Here, criminal entities have successfully infiltrated and compromised government institutions at all levels. Currently, more than 100 Venezuelan government officials – ranging from but not limited to individuals in the ministries of the vice president,defence, foreign affairs, intelligence and the national guard – have been implicated in criminal activity. The clearest example of the complex nexus between criminality and the Venezuelan state has been the emergence of a powerful Venezuelan drug trafficking organisation known as the Cartel of the Suns. The organisation’s name is a reference to the gold stars on epaulettes of military generals but is more generally symbolic of the direct links between serving government officials and the drug traffickingorganisation. Former Vice President Tarek el-Aissami and former President of the National Assembly Diosdado Cabello, are allegedly involved in the Cartel of the Suns and are among a litany of Venezuelan officials who have had sanctions imposed on them by the United States. Venezuela’s first lady, Celia Flores, is also implicated by association. Her nephews have been convicted of trafficking cocaine in the United States, and according to Insight Crime, Ms Flores’s son is also under investigation in relation to drug trafficking activities. Beginning with President Chávez and continuing under President Maduro, Venezuela has evolved into a rampant kleptocracy. The systematic removal of transparency and accountability in the Venezuela political system has allowed tens of billions of dollars to disappear from the treasury over the past two decades.
Venezuela is neck deep in narcotrafficking, with numerous government officials sanctioned.
Bonello ’19 Bonello, Deborah (Reporter for Vice). “Venezuela's Government Is So Corrupt It Basically Has Its Own Cartel.” Vice, 12 March 2019, https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/yw8e4y/venezuelas-government-is-so-corrupt-it-basically-has-its-own-cartel. Premier
When the former head of Venezuela’s intelligence service released a video denouncing President Nicolás Maduro last month, the world listened. In a series of filmed statements circulated on Twitter and comments to the press, Hugo Carvajal Barrios, 58, accused the current government of the troubled South American nation of drug trafficking, corruption, and repression. He was just the latest of a number of people who served under the late Hugo Chávez to implicate senior players in the government in the narcotics trade. Since 2002, a bevy of officials and high-level officers in the armed forces have been accused of or sanctioned for drug trafficking by the United States. For those who might try to dismiss the indictments and sanctions as politically motivated—the US has long been the nemesis of the "socialist revolution" in Venezuela—there’s also the evidence. Like the Air France flight that landed in Paris on September 10, 2013, with some 1.3 tons of cocaine on board (estimated street value: $270 million). The flight departed from Venezuela’s international airport in Caracas, where Venezuela’s Bolivarian National Guard (GNB) is responsible for providing security. The embarrassing incident resulted in the arrest of a number of military personnel including a first lieutenant from the Guard's anti-drug unit, according to subsequent reports. And then there were the nephews of the First Lady (yes, President Maduro’s wife), Celia Flores. Efrain Antonio Campo Flores and Francisco Flores de Freitas were apprehended by the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in Haiti in late 2015 as they attempted to seal a deal to smuggle 800 kilograms of cocaine into the United States. Both were eventually convicted and sentenced to 18 years behind bars for conspiring to import cocaine into the United States. So rife is the Venezuelan state’s role in drug trafficking in Venezuela that it has a name: The Cartel of the Suns, or Cartel de los Soles, as it is called in Spanish, is an umbrella term for the networks that seem to exist within the military and other state apparatus that aid and abet drug trafficking. Its members include the former head of the country’s anti-drug trafficking agency, Nestor Reverol, who stands accused by a United States indictment of receiving payments from drug traffickers in exchange for helping them traffic cocaine destined for the US through Venezuela. Reverol “alerted the traffickers to future drug raids or the locations where law enforcement officers in Venezuela were conducting counter-narcotics activities to allow drug traffickers to change the location where they stored drugs or alter drug transportation routes,” amongst other offenses, federal prosecutors said. Diosdado Cabello, currently a top official in Venezuela’s United Socialist Party and widely regarded as one of the most powerful people in the country, may also be one of the heaviest hitters of the Cartel of the Suns. Cabello was sanctioned by the United States last year; US Treasury Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin said at the time, "We are imposing costs on figures like Diosdado Cabello who exploit their official positions to engage in narcotics trafficking, money laundering, embezzlement of state funds, and other corrupt activities.” Then there’s Venezuela’s current vice president, Tareck El Aissami, who was also sanctioned for his alleged role in international drug trafficking. “He facilitated shipments of narcotics from Venezuela, to include control over planes that leave from a Venezuelan air base, as well as control of drug routes through the ports in Venezuela,” according to the Unites States Treasury. Last week, El Aissami was named in a US indictment for allegedly violating sanctions. What Carvajal didn’t dwell on—understandably—as he implicated his former colleagues was his own role in this network, according to at least a couple of indictments against him in the United States. Those documents allege he was paid by Wilber Varela, the leader of part of the North Valley Cartel of Colombia, to aid his drug trafficking activities through Venezuela. After the death of Varela in 2008, Carvajal continued to work with his cartel and other criminal organizations in the same way, and allegedly even sold hundreds of kilos to cocaine to them, prosecutors said. Carvajal escaped extradition from Aruba in 2014 on the charges against him. At the time he was still protected by the Venezuelan state, which may no longer be the case given his recent media blitz. (Last month, he told the press that any contact he had with drug-trafficking entities during his time in the job was due to investigations he was overseeing against them as intelligence chief.) Whatever Carvajal claims about his own role, it’s clear that the Venezuelan government is up to its neck in the drug trade as well as other criminal economies. “For us there is no doubt that Venezuela is a mafia state," said Jeremy McDermott, the co-founder of InSight Crime, which investigated the progress of organized crime under the socialist regime created by Chávez. "We don’t use the term narco state simply because there are a lot of other criminal activities and economies within Venezuela that have penetrated the upper echelons of government, not simply the drug trade. These include contraband, fuel, black markets for medicines and food, the systematic pillaging of state coffers and the manipulation of the artificial exchange rate. These were all different ways that criminal elements operating within the Venezuelan state made money—or robbed money—from the government and the people of Venezuela." Venezuela’s geography puts its political leaders in a tempting position, offering the kinds of spoils many might find hard to resist. It shares a border with Colombia, the biggest coca producer in the world, and cocaine pours across the international line into Venezuela, where it is then moved north to be dispatched on to the United States and Europe. Corruption is a perennial problem.
Crucially,
Drugs are keeping Maduro’s regime afloat.
Alexander ’19 Alexander, Harriet. “The dirty money and drugs keeping Venezuela's Nicolas Maduro in power.” The Telegraph, 15 August 2019, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/08/15/venezuela-has-turned-continents-worst-narco-state-prop-regime/. Premier
Today the picture is very different. Mr Maduro is still in power, peace talks are spluttering along in Barbados, and the US - which backs Mr Guaido - appears at a loss of how to loosen the Venezuelan leader’s vice-like grip on the country. Yet for anti-narcotics agents, there is no mystery to the remarkable staying power of Mr Maduro: as the country crumbles around him, the 56-year-old, they say, is kept in power by a vast drug trafficking industry that has captured the state. Figures are hard to come by but the United States estimates that a quarter of all Colombian cocaine passes through Venezuela, making it a key staging post in the worldwide trade. But it is the structure of the business that sets Venezuela apart from most of the continent. “In Colombia, in Mexico, the drug traffickers are civilians,” said Mildred Camero, a former head of the Venezuelan anti-drug commission. “Here it is the state itself.” As far back as 2008 Washington indicted members of the Venezuelan elite on trafficking charges; Hugo Carvajal, the then-director of military intelligence; Henry Rangel Silva, the then-director of intelligence; and Ramon Rodriguez Chacin, the former interior minister, were all added to the treasury’s list of major “narcos” under the Kingpins Act. The scale of criminality was shocking even to those within the regime. General Manuel Ricardo Cristopher Figuera was appointed head of SEBIN, the intelligence agency, in October 2018. “I never saw the country’s situation and the government’s corruption as closely as I did during my last six months,” he said at the end of June, having defected and fled to the US. “I quickly realised that Maduro is the head of a criminal enterprise, with his own family involved.” Military officers led what is known as the Cartel of the Suns, named for the sun logo on their uniforms. Ms Camejo said that officials from colonel and above were all implicated. Indeed, the trade that began under Chavez “went stratospheric” under Mr Maduro, according to Mike Vigil, the former chief of international operations for the US drugs enforcement agency (DEA). “Chavez allowed his generals and high-ranking officials to engage in drug trafficking,” said Mr Vigil, a 30-year veteran of the DEA, who spent almost 20 years infiltrating Mexican and Colombian cartels. “He turned a blind eye. But when Maduro came in, the country took a sharp downward spiral, into the abyss of morality. “It was my opinion, and the opinion of many, that towards the end of the Chavez years Venezuela became a narco state. Now, under Maduro, it’s much, much worse. It’s gone from a narco state to a mafia state; the government and military is no longer controlled by the cartels, they actually run them.”
Dirty money enables Maduro to give payouts to his supporters.
McKay ’19 McKay, Hollie (Fox News Digital staff reporter). “Drug trafficking keeping Maduro in power in Venezuela, analysts say.” Fox News, April 2019, https://www.foxnews.com/world/drug-trafficking-maduro-venezuela. Premier
It has been more than three months since the U.S. accelerated its onslaught of economic sanctions on Venezuela, coupled with the back of a new interim President – heightening official expectation that the Nicolas Maduro-led regime would crumble. Only the socialist dictatorship has failed to fall. While there an array of factors to blame, analysts are pointing to illicit trafficking rings as a fundamental Maduro lifeline. “The Venezuelan military forces has become a narco-criminal, armed organization. Most of the top and mid-commanders are deeply involved in corruption, drug operations, and serious human rights abuses,” Johan Obdola, president of Latin America-focused global intelligence and security firm IOSI, told Fox News, noting that cartel-led, massive drug operations continue to spawn the country keeping the top echelon well-fed and financed. “Small pro-regime policing agencies and military units across the nation conduct these criminal operations centered on drug trafficking, kidnapping, and robbery to survive the crisis.” Kevin Ivers, Vice President and Latin America expert at public policy firm DCI Group, pointed out that years ago, the elite of the Venezuelan military was put in charge of the core elements of the domestic economy, such as the importation and distribution of food and consumer goods. “This has encouraged corruption and profiteering that has made key elements of the military part of what can be called the regime’s ‘mafia,’ and this has extended beyond consumer goods to drug trafficking,” he explained. “Maduro has also spent years systematically splintering the military into factions and playing them off each other to make it difficult for them to unite against him.” Emanuele Ottolenghi, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, concurred that many in the upper echelons receive a cut from the regime’s illicit trafficking network – from drugs to food and medicine racketeering. “There aren’t enough incentives (for military leaders) to leave and disincentives to stay to tip the balance, especially at the top,” he noted.
Importantly,
Trump has placed sanctions on Venezuelan officials for drug trafficking.
Goodman ’18 Goodman, Joshua. “US Sanctions Venezuelan Socialist Boss for Drug Trafficking.”Associated Press, 18 May 2018, https://apnews.com/ba52a9a0b24b496686d49eab7035460a/US-sanctions-Venezuela-socialist-boss-for-drug-trafficking. Premier
The Trump administration has slapped sanctions on Venezuelan socialist party boss Diosdado Cabello, accusing him of drug trafficking and heading a major corruption network that siphoned off funds from state-run companies to accounts in Russia and other countries. The actions Friday by the Treasury Department freezing any U.S. assets Cabello has and preventing Americans from doing business with him comes as tensions mount between Washington and Venezuela ahead of Sunday’s presidential election, which the Trump administration refuses to recognize. The Treasury Department in a statement said that Cabello, who is considered the second most-powerful man in Venezuela after President Nicolas Maduro, used his different positions in the government over two decades to “personally profit from extortion, money laundering, and embezzlement.” The U.S. has sanctioned dozens of top Venezuelan officials in recent months, including Maduro, over human rights abuses, allegations of drug trafficking and the erosion of democratic safeguards. But Cabello had so far been spared, fueling all sorts of intrigue that the U.S. was somehow protecting the outspoken power broker in order to sow distrust among Maduro’s inner circle. With associates, Cabello is accused of illegally extracting and exporting iron from a state-run conglomerate and laundering the proceeds to Costa Rica and Russia. Additionally, Treasury said he worked with Vice President Tareck El Aissami, who was sanctioned last year for drug trafficking, to organize drug shipments from Venezuela through the Dominican Republic and onward to Europe. With another associate, he allegedly seized drug loads from small-scale traffickers and combined and exported them through a government-owned airport. Proceeds from those drug deals were divided with others including Maduro, Treasury said. “The Venezuelan people suffer under corrupt politicians who tighten their grip on power while lining their own pockets. We are imposing costs on figures like Diosdado Cabello who exploit their official positions to engage in narcotics trafficking, money laundering, embezzlement of state funds, and other corrupt activities,” said Secretary of the Treasury Steven T. Mnuchin. Three others of Cabello’s alleged corruption network were also sanctioned Friday including his brother, Jose David Cabello, who heads Venezuela’s tax office, and his wife, Marleny Contreras, who is tourism minister. The Trump administration also froze the assets of Rafael Sarria, who the Treasury Department said is Cabello’s main frontman, and three Boca Raton, Florida-companies he is linked to as well as 14 properties belonging to him or his companies in Florida and New York.
Maduro has ramped up drug production but the US is using sanctions to lead international pressure against it.
AFP ’19 AFP. “Drug trafficking up sharply under Venezuela's Maduro: US.” Yahoo News, 15 November 2019, https://news.yahoo.com/drug-trafficking-sharply-under-venezuelas-maduro-us-233443214.html. Premier
Drug trafficking to and from Venezuela has shot up 50 percent under President Nicolas Maduro, who is enriching himself by working with organized crime, the United States charged Thursday. Maduro, a leftist who has been in power since 2013, helps crime gangs and has given refuge to terror groups, said Admiral Craig Faller, commander of the US Southern Command based in Miami. "We're seeing an increase in drug trafficking placed out of Venezuela that is aided and abetted by the illegitimate Maduro regime," Faller told a Caribbean security conference. "In fact, the Maduro regime has a negative impact on every single security aspect in this hemisphere. All the challenges are made worse by the Venezuelan crisis," said the admiral. He told journalists that the Maduro government, which the United States no longer recognizes, is getting rich through drug trafficking. "There's over a 50 percent increase of narcotrafficking in and through Venezuela, and Maduro and his cronies are lining their pockets, in cahoots with the illicit narcotrafficking," Faller said. He did not specify a timeframe for this increase. Terror groups like Colombia's National Liberation Army and holdout members of the FARC rebel army who did not embrace a 2016 peace accord with the Bogota government are granted safe haven in Venezuela, he added. The US Treasury has imposed sanctions on 27 entities and 22 people for drug trafficking linked to Venezuela. They include the current industry minister Tareck el Aissami, the former head of a financial intelligence agency, Pedro Luis Martin, and a prominent businessman named Walid Makled. The US is leading international pressure to force Maduro from power and is among more than 50 countries that have recognized national assembly speaker and opposition leader Juan Guaido as Venezuela's acting president. Since 2005, the United States has placed Venezuela on a list of countries it feels do not comply with their commitments to international anti-drug trafficking agreements. It did so again in August, but the administration of President Donald Trump decided against restricting aid to Venezuela, so as to support the opposition led by Guaido.
Sanctions enable the US to extradite and prosecute drug traffickers—empirical examples prove.
Klasfeld ’19 Klasfeld, Adam. “US Indicts Ex-Venezuelan VP for Ducking Drug Sanctions.” Courthouse News Service, 8 March 2019, https://www.courthousenews.com/us-indicts-ex-venezuelan-vp-for-ducking-drug-sanctions/. Premier
Two years after the Trump administration designated the former vice president of Venezuela a drug kingpin, U.S. prosecutors brought an indictment Friday that puts him at the center of a sanctions-busting conspiracy hopping across Turkey and Russia. Appointed to office in 2017 by President Nicolas Maduro, Tareck El Aissami ended his vice presidency last year to serve as minister of industry and national production. “He has used his position of power to engage in international drug trafficking, earning him the designation of Specially Designated Narcotics Trafficker, along with his business partner Samark Lopez Bello,” Angel Melendez, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency’s special agent in charge, said in a statement Friday, referring to El Aissami. The charges mark a new escalation in the legal war between the United States and Maduro’s leftist government. The Obama administration prosecuted and convicted two of Maduro’s relatives, his wife’s nephews, for cocaine smuggling in 2016. Maduro’s government blasted the charges at the time as political, but his power was still formally recognized then by the United States. Now, with the Trump administration openly seeking Maduro’s ouster, federal prosecutors in the same courthouse have set their sights on his minister, El Aissami, as well as U.S. and Venezuelan citizens in the official’s orbit. El Aissami’s ally Samark Lopez Bello, a 44-year-old businessman with companies in Venezuela, Panama and Florida, each face up to 150 years imprisonment if convicted of five counts of sanctions busting. Two of their accused co-conspirators, Victor Mones and Alejandro Leon, face the same possible penalty on charges that they arranged private flights into the United States from Venezuela’s capital to smuggle cash through Florida companies. Prosecutors say Leon set up private flights for El Aissami between Turkey, Venezuela and Russia as recently as this month. While the indictment contends that the privately chartered flights violated sanctions, prosecutors do not allege drugs were smuggled on those flights. Mones established American Charter Services, and Leon created the private flight charter companies SVMI Solutions, named after Simon Bolivar International Airport’s code, prosecutors say. Florida resident Orsini Quintero, 42, is charged separately with one count of violating sanctions. He faces up to 30 years imprisonment if convicted. Authorities arrested Mones and Quintero this morning in Florida. Menendez, the DEA agent, said both men had been “looking to fill their pockets with dirty money” by helping men who “pose a threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.” Venezuela’s Permanent Mission to the United Nations did not immediately return an email request for comment.
Sanctions solve—Maduro is actively funding drug trafficking and the perception of crackdown deters operations.
Bonello ’19 Bonella, Deborah. “This Is Why Cocaine Dealers Should Fear Venezuelan Unrest.” OXY, 3 February 2019, https://www.ozy.com/opinion/this-is-why-cocaine-dealers-should-fear-venezuelan-unrest/92403/. Premier
It’s all eyes on Venezuela … again. Many world leaders rushed to back National Assembly President Juan Guaidó when he declared himself interim president in late January in the hope of prompting the collapse of President Nicolás Maduro’s current government. But those controlling the flow of cocaine throughout the region are likely hoping Maduro and his compañeros stand strong. Why? Because Maduro’s government is believed to be aiding and abetting the powerful crime syndicates producing and transporting drugs, mostly cocaine, out of the region. A lot of Venezuela’s importance in the international drug trade is linked to geography. Venezuela shares a border with Colombia, the biggest cocaine producer in the only coca-growing region in the world. This border is ground zero to a number of criminal gangs and guerrilla groups active in the cocaine trade, and the chaos and corruption next door in Venezuela is helping oil their operations. Cocaine is produced in Colombia in a process that uses, among other substances, government-subsidized Venezuelan petrol that is smuggled over the border. The supply of that is slowing to a trickle due to Venezuela’s social and economic crisis, but cocaine continues to flow the other way across the border into Venezuela. After that, it makes its way, often by plane, to the country’s northern coast and ports to set sail for the United States, Europe, Africa and everywhere in between. In the last few decades, under the nose of Hugo Chávez — the founder of Venezuela’s current ”socialist revolution” — and his successor Maduro, the country has become a major drug transit route. The U.S. government says that the “permissive and corrupt environment” there makes things worse and that Maduro’s administration fails to “adhere to its obligations under international counternarcotics agreements.” That’s actually putting it quite mildly. Investigations point to drug trafficking within the Venezuelan government via a loose-knit network of corruption called the Cartel of the Suns — named after the suns that decorate the uniforms of the army generals. According to InsightCrime, dozens of officials from all branches of government — including Maduro and his vice president Tareck El Aissami, according to the U.S. Treasury Department — have been linked to this “cartel” and crimes related to drug-trafficking via indictments, sanctions and investigations in the United States. If Maduro does fall and a new government takes power, all bets in the cocaine trade are off. “All signs point to a very U.S.-friendly government, in all areas,” says Alejandro Velasco, a Venezuelan historian based at NYU, commenting on the possibility that the opposition prevails. “I don’t think any scenario, at least in the short term, would contemplate an opposition government that is as corrupt and criminal as the current regime.” Perhaps drugs would continue to move through Venezuela, but without so much ease and lacking the support of its new government, which would be keen to oblige the United States. A bilateral crackdown on the drug trade in Venezuela, which could move into action if the opposition takes power, could cause other routes such as those from Colombia straight to Central America and Mexico to get busier as trafficking networks seek alternatives. This would put more pressure on governments of other nations. Should power in Venezuela change hands, the country’s new masters will have to choose between Uncle Sam, who helped them into the driving seat, and the riches promised by the international drug trade.
Venezuela is a cocaine superhighway into the US.
Walsh et al. ’19 Walsh, Nick, Natalie Gallón and Diana Castrillon. “Corruption in Venezuela has created a cocaine superhighway to the US.” CNN, 17 April 2019,https://edition.cnn.com/2019/04/17/americas/venezuela-drug-cocaine-trafficking-intl/index.html. Premier
Cocaine trafficking from Venezuela to the United States is soaring, even as the country collapses. And US and other regional officials say it's Venezuela's own military and political elite who are facilitating the passage of drugs in and out of the country on hundreds of tiny, unmarked planes. A months-long CNN investigation traced the northward route of cocaine from the farmlands where much of it is grown in Colombia, and found that the number of suspected drug flights from Venezuela has risen from about two flights per week in 2017 to nearly daily in 2018, according to one US official. This year, the same official has seen as many as five nighttime flights in the sky at once. Planes loaded with Colombian cocaine used to depart from Venezuela's remote southern jungle regions. Now they take off from the country's more developed northwest region to reduce their flying time, US and regional officials also said. Officials involved in combating the deadly trade describe a ridiculously profitable courier system for the Venezuelan government. "Drug smugglers are more and more exploiting the complicity of Venezuelan authorities, and more recently the vacuum of power," said one US official. Every shipment of cocaine from South America is so lucrative that the planes flown by traffickers are cheap in comparison; most are used only once and then discarded or set on fire upon arrival.
The US is in the midst of a cocaine epidemic, with black communities hit the hardest.
Vestal ’19 Vestal, Christine (Reporter at Stateline). “It’s not just opioids. Deaths from cocaine and meth are surging.” PBS, 16 May 2019, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/health/its-not-just-opioids-deaths-from-cocaine-and-meth-are-surging. Premier
It turns out that the same lethal drug that has been driving the nation’s spiraling opioid epidemic is also causing an historic surge in overdose deaths among cocaine users. That’s according to a new analysis of death certificate data from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention showing that fentanyl — a cheap synthetic opioid that is a hundred times more potent than morphine — and other opioids were involved in nearly three-fourths of all cocaine overdose deaths and an increasing number of methamphetamine deaths. In a drug overdose epidemic that has killed more than 700,000 Americans since 1999, state and local officials have been primarily concentrating on opioids, which were involved in nearly 70 of overdose deaths in 2017. The CDC’s new analysis indicates that public health and law enforcement officials should be just as vigilant when it comes to cocaine, meth and other prescription and illicit drugs of abuse in their communities. “Broader awareness of emerging drug threats and how they intersect with the opioid overdose crisis will help public health officials and the health care community better tailor their prevention and response efforts for all the substances and combinations of substances people are using in their community,” said Christopher Jones, strategy director at the CDC’s National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, in a phone interview with Stateline. In a few places, that’s already happening. John Eadie, a coordinator with the National Emerging Threats Initiative administered by the Office of National Drug Control Policy, is working with communities in Ohio, Vermont and Virginia to create a model drug surveillance system that can be used to design appropriate interdiction, prevention and treatment programs. At least seven other states have signed up to do the same. “One of the reasons we’re pushing this type of data on stimulants and other drugs is so that communities can do the work they need to do and get ahead of the next drug crisis fast, rather than waiting a decade like we did with opioids,” Eadie said. Accidental or Intentional?Roughly 14,000 cocaine users and 10,000 meth users died in the United States in 2017, an increase of more than a third compared with 2016 and triple the number of deaths in 2012. That puts both stimulants — a class of drugs that speeds up physiological and nervous system activity — on par with the opioid depressant heroin, which was involved in 15,000 overdose deaths in 2017, according to the CDC. Three years into what epidemiologists are calling the third wave of the opioid epidemic — in which fentanyl has been involved in the vast majority of opioid overdose deaths — the lethal drug is now showing up in the bodies of nearly as many people who used cocaine and meth as those who used heroin. Misuse of both stimulants has increased in recent years, surpassing nonmedical use of opioids, according to an annual survey by the U.S. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration. In 2016, 2.4 million Americans said they recently had started using cocaine, methamphetamines or prescription stimulants, including Ritalin and Adderall. The total number of current users of illicit and prescription stimulants that year was 13.6 million. But increased stimulants use is not enough to account for the recent surge in deaths, said Jack Killorin, public safety director for the Overdose Response Strategy, a public health and public safety collaboration of the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Program. Whether drug dealers are intentionally lacing the illicit drug supply with fentanyl remains an open question. n general, large seizures of cocaine and methamphetamines coming into the country typically do not contain fentanyl or other opioids, Killorin said. But, he said, in the Atlanta area, street-level seizures of illicit cocaine and meth almost always do. For geopolitical reasons, seizures of both cocaine and meth — which are an indicator of overall supply — are at the highest level seen in years, according to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, and prices are rock bottom. Since overdose death reports are primarily based on autopsies, it is typically unclear whether the deceased used contaminated drugs, combined two drugs in one injection or used both stimulants and opioids sequentially to manage their highs. Killorin and others speculate that an increasing number of drug users may be injecting a mixture of heroin and cocaine, a classic but deadly combination known as a speedball, according to the National Institutes of Health. And meth users may be adding heroin to the mix to create an equally powerful but dangerous combination known as a goofball, according to the CDC. Some may be using stimulants and opioids at different times to manage their highs. And yet another group may be transitioning from heroin to cocaine — ironically, in some cases, to avoid fentanyl. In some places such as San Francisco, a subset of opioid users say they prefer fentanyl to heroin, because the cost is lower and the high is higher, though shorter. But surveys of opioid users by researchers at Brown University and the University of California, San Francisco, indicate that most users consider fentanyl an undesirable contaminant and try to avoid it. Most cocaine users feel the same, addiction experts say. In Baltimore, addiction researcher and treatment practitioner Yngvild Olsen, medical director of the Institutes for Behavior Resources and American Society of Addiction Medicine board member, said she’s seen a recent increase in people who previously had been treated for opioid addiction and returned for help with a cocaine problem. “When I talk to them, virtually everyone says, ‘I don’t want to go anywhere near fentanyl. I don’t look for it, I don’t use it, I use cocaine. I need the upper, and I don’t want anything to do with fentanyl.’” Demographic Variation Hardest hit in the recent stimulant overdose death scourge were Midwestern, Northeastern and Southern states where both meth and cocaine use were on the rise, according to the CDC. The District of Columbia had the highest death rate involving cocaine, at 18 per 100,000 residents, followed by Ohio at 14 per 100,000. West Virginia had the highest death rate involving meth at 14 per 100,000, followed by Alaska at 9 per 100,000. Nationwide, the rate of cocaine deaths rose in 15 states, with the steepest spikes in Wisconsin (85) and Maryland (72). Meth overdose deaths rose in 17 states, with the steepest increases in Ohio (130) and West Virginia (94), the analysis showed. More than twice as many men as women died of stimulant overdoses in 2017, and black people experienced both the highest death rate and the biggest increase in deaths from cocaine. Native Americans and Alaska Natives experienced the highest death rate from meth and the biggest rate increase, according to the CDC.
For these reasons Negate | 904,712 |
365,713 | 379,614 | 0 - Other shells | some of the shells we may read just incase yall wanna prep your self for these bois
Interpretation: Debaters must adhere to NSDA standards for proper citations of all evidence.
NSDA, 16 NSDA, (governing body of debate). "Debate Evidence Guide." NSDA, 14-12-2016, 7-29-2019. https://www.speechanddebate.org/wp-content/uploads/Debate-Evidence-Guide.pdf // MHS JL pg 1
A debater or judge asks to see something read and/or the original source of something read. The opposing debater should provide this information promptly. A debater questions the written source citation of the opponent. When debaters read evidence, they are required to provide a full written citation, to the extent provided by the original source. Requirements include:
1. full name of primary author and/or editor
2. publication date
3. source
4. title of article
5. date accessed for digital evidence
6. full URL, author qualifications
7. Page number
NSDA 7NSDA, (governing body of debate). "Debate Evidence Guide." NSDA, 09-23-2017, 12-01-2017. https://www.speechanddebate.org/wp-content/uploads/NSDA-Code-Of-Honor.pdf// MHS JL pg 1.
“As a member of the National Speech and Debate Association, I pledge to uphold the highest standards of integrity, humility, respect, leadership, and service in the pursuit of excellence.” Integrity: An Honor Society member obeys the highest ethical standards and adheres to the rules of the organization. Members recognize that integrity is central to earning the trust, respect, and support of one’s peers. Integrity encompasses the highest regard for honesty, civility, justice, and fairness.Humility: A member does not regard oneself more highly than others. Regardless of a person’s level of success, an individual always looks beyond oneself to appreciate the inherent value of others.Respect: A member respects individual differences and fosters diversity. They promote tolerance, inclusion, and empowerment for people from a variety of backgrounds, including race, religion, gender, sexual orientation, and ability.Leadership: A member influences others to take positive action toward productive change. Members commit to thoughtful and responsible leadership that promotes the other core values in the Code of Honor.Service: A member exercises their talents to provide service to peers, community, and the activity. At all times a member is prepared to work constructively to improve the lives of others.
Interpretation: Debaters must verbally offer a speech doc before their first speech including all carded evidence
Interpretation All debaters must disclose before the round on the ndca pf wiki, located on debatecoaches.org, all broken cases at least 30 minutes before round under their actual high school and name
Bietz ’10: Bietz, Mike. “The Case for Public Case Disclosure.” NFL Rostrum, Vol. 84, Issue 9. May 2010. https://nationalforensicleague.org/DownloadHandler.ashx?File=/userdocs/publications/05-201020Complete20Rostrum.pdfBig teams already get many, many more flows than the smaller teams just because they have more debaters, more judges and more coaches. Open Disclosure gives everyone access to the same information. Additionally, it helps the ‘little guy’ even more because for many of these debaters, the option of going to a lot of tournaments isn’t available. Open case Disclosure gives them the ability to see what other teams are running prior to showing up to the tournament. Thus, there is an added benefit of equalizing not only information at a tournament, but also equalizing (to some degree) the playing-field for people who do not have the resources to travel as much. | 904,695 |
365,714 | 379,655 | IPV | Not disclosing this ~-~- it has content which is potentially triggering contact us and we will send it personally if it is not triggering to you.
CW: Non-graphic descriptions of intimate partner violence. | 904,716 |
365,715 | 379,672 | TOC NEG | C1 NGOS
Specifically, there are two ways that the U.S. military presence amplifies NGO operations.
First is through logistics.
U.S. military presence is key to collecting and providing intel that allow humanitarian missions to happen. Lawry of the IHD in 2009 confirms that the military provides extensive intelligence information about population movement, security infrastructure conditions, and other information necessary for NGOs to conduct operations. He furthers that since NGOs do not have satellites, intelligence analysts, or other capacities to collect and digest complex and intricate information, the military is critical to the execution of humanitarian missions.
Militaries, too, have various comparative advantages. Without the military in many instances, NGOs would have been unable to provide humanitarian services or less efficient in their programming. • Militaries have a monopoly on security and the use of force. When a population is affected by conflict, external, noncombatant militaries can provide security for humanitarian operations, displaced persons, and both NGO and UN staff and infrastructure. NGOs, with strict neutrality and noncombatant policies and lack of capacity, cannot. • Militaries can provide extensive intelligence information about population movements, security conditions, road, river and bridge conditions, and other information pertinent to conducting humanitarian operations. NGOs do not have satellites, intelligence analysts, or other capacities to collect and digest complex and intricate information. • Militaries have by far the largest airlift capacity globally. Aside from the private sector, the combined load capacity of which is much greater than even the U.S. military, the US military is the largest single organization that can lift humanitarian supplies and materials in almost every condition and in very short notice. NGOs do use aircraft, but normally sporadically and in the worst scenarios for minimal periods. • Militaries have distinct advantages in large-scale communications infrastructure and communications capacities. NGOs often depend on communication capacities from militaries or UN agencies (or both) because large satellite stations, bandwidth, and other regional or global communications are not available at reasonable costs for NGOs. • Militaries can respond to maritime and/or chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosives (CBRNE) emergencies. NGOs have almost no capacity.219
Lawry empirically finds that during the 2003 Iraq invasion of Kuwait, a humanitarian conflict that was developed around the U.S. military directly relayed critical/logistical information to more than 80 NGOs.
There have been other successful military run information-coordination centers in Afghanistan, Kuwait, and Indonesia. A humanitarian operations center, also called a civil-military operations center, run by the U.S. military, was indispensable in Kuwait during the 2003 Iraq invasion.216 Although coordination met with resistance from NGOs in the early stages of the war, ultimately more than 80 NGOs, the UN, and the military met within this center and worked together. Having a neutral and media-free space for close interaction and discussion allowed civil and military actors to consult without having to fight the usual issues of ownership and control. At the HOC-Kuwait, humanitarian information was collected and shared. The vast preponderance of cooperation and collaboration, interestingly, occurred informally over coffee after daily briefings. Lessons learned from this productive experience have been invaluable in easing the often times contentious civilmilitary relationship. Themes that recurred over the years are notable, and include simply agreeing on common definitions of important terms and avoiding use of confusing acronyms and potentially offensive phrases.217 NGOs, for example, agreed to avoid using the term belligerent, and the military agreed not to call the NGOs force multipliers.
Second is security.
Without a dominant military presence, NGOs would be at a serious risk. Penner of the Small Wars Journal in 2013 confirms that NGOs are not security oriented like the military and as a result they are unable to protect themselves in violent environments, resulting in failed missions.
NGO-military cooperation has largely been ad hoc.
Institutional and cultural differences pervade.
NGOs required logistical support for large operations and the military often provided logistical infrastructure for NGOs.
NGOs provided the military with accurate information on troubled areas.
NGOs are highly cognizant of how their actions affect donor support.
NGOs are less security oriented than the military.
The NGO-military relationship works best when both have something to offer the other.
Fortunately, U.S. military cooperation with NGOs has secured operations and brought about the completion of missions and protection of all critical infrastructure. O’Donohue of the JCS in 2019 confirms that the U.S. military gives security to NGOs in all aspects of humanitarian projects, from securing aid supplies, main shipping routes, protecting relief distribution centers, and delivery to facilities like medical clinics where the aid is used, the military protects and ensures humanitarian missions are completed.
The joint force will work with interagency partners and the HN and often works with international organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), PNs, and the private sector during FHA operations. The tenets of multinational unity of effort (i.e., respect, rapport, knowledge of partners, patience, and coordination) applied during an FHA mission cannot guarantee success; however, ignoring them may lead to mission failure.
This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, and it provides considerations for military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational forces, and other interorganizational partners. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs), and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing and executing their plans and orders. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of objectives.
Support Activities. Some activities that may be supported by US military forces under FHA include providing logistical support, such as the transportation of humanitarian supplies or personnel; making available, preparing, and transporting nonlethal excess property (EP) to foreign countries; transferring on-hand DOD stocks to respond to unforeseen emergencies; and conducting some DOD humanitarian demining assistance activities. In some circumstances, medical support and base operating services may be conducted if required by the operation.
In addition to force protection and PR for the joint force, a JFC may also be tasked to provide protection for other personnel and assets. If not clearly stated in the mission, the extent of this security should be addressed in the ROE, to include protection of: (1) Forces of other nations working jointly with US forces in a multinational force. (2) USG, NGO, and international organization personnel and equipment. (3) HA recipients. (4) Affected country personnel and assets. (5) Humanitarian relief convoys, supplies, and main supply routes. (6) Relief distribution centers. (7) Stocks of HA supplies. (8) Ports and airfields. (9) Hospitals and medical clinics.
It is for these two reasons that Lawry writes that without U.S. military presence NGOs would be unable to provide support to areas of dire need.
NGOs are better at managing refugee camps and providing water and sanitation services because of their close relationships with UNHCR. NGO staff members are also often trained or specialized in various aspects of camp management.218 Militaries, too, have various comparative advantages. Without the military in many instances, NGOs would have been unable to provide humanitarian services or less efficient in their programming. • Militaries have a monopoly on security and the use of force. When a population is affected by conflict, external, noncombatant militaries can provide security for humanitarian operations, displaced persons, and both NGO and UN staff and infrastructure. NGOs, with strict neutrality and noncombatant policies and lack of capacity, cannot.
The impact is preventing a humanitarian crisis.
Absent logistical support and protection from the military, NGO operations would fail. The OCHA in 2017 terminalizes that humanitarian partners continue to respond to rising displacement and provide basic assistance to families in new areas. To date, emergency response actors of food, water, and medical kits have been distributed to cover the immediate needs of more than two million people. And absent our military presence, the millions who rely on NGOs and our military are left without basic standards of living.
Iraq: UN and partners scale up humanitarian response to growing needs
As fighting continues in west Mosul Iraq, humanitarian partners continue to respond to rising displacement and provide basic assistance to families in newly accessible areas, where conditions allow. Where access inside west Mosul city allows humanitarian partners to reach civilians, displaced families are provided with ready-to-eat food rations. Resident or returning families in the area are provided dry food rations i.e. to cook themselves. Almost 62,000 people in 14 west Mosul neighbourhoods have received ready-to-eat food rations to date; 64,000 people in eleven west Mosul neighbourhoods have received dry food rations.
West Mosul has been cut off from its main supply route since November 2016, and remains largely inaccessible to humanitarian actors. In western Mosul city, many neighbourhoods face chronic water shortages, with many people drinking untreated water. Humanitarians are concerned over an increased number of displaced children arriving from western Mosul with diarrhoea. Shortages of clean drinking water have likely been exacerbated by ISIL’s recent attacks on the Badush water treatment plant, western Mosul’s largest functioning treatment plant. Ensuring water treatment and sewage treatment facilities in Mosul are operational remains a top priority for humanitarian partners.
Approximately 500,000 people live in ISIL-controlled areas of west Mosul. Iraqi authorities also estimate that some 150,000 civilians reside in 28 currently accessible neighbourhoods of western Mosul. Since the start of military operations to retake Mosul six months ago, nearly half a million people have been displaced from their homes. “The sheer volume of civilians still fleeing Mosul city is staggering,” said Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq Lise Grande. “Our worst case scenario when the fighting started was that up to one million civilians may flee Mosul. Already, more than 493,000 people have left, leaving almost everything behind,” said Ms. Grande.
To date, emergency response packages (of ready-to-eat food, water, hygiene and dignity kits) have been distributed to cover the immediate needs of more than two million people since the fighting began in late October. Front-line organizations have been providing food, water, shelter, emergency kits, medical support and psycho-social services – to both families who have fled and families who have stayed.
C2 ISIS
Rogers 18. Rogers, Michael. “Statement of Admiral Michael S. Rogers.” Congress, 27 February 2018. https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Rogers_02-27-18.pdf
We face a growing variety of threats from adversaries acting with precision and boldness, and often with stealth. U.S. Cyber Command engages with adversaries in cyberspace every day. Accordingly, we have developed substantial knowledge of how malicious cyber actors work against the United States, our allies and partners, and many other targets as well. That knowledge in turn provides insights into the motivations, capabilities, and intentions of those who sponsor such activities, whether they be states, criminal enterprises, or violent extremists. Cyberspace is a global and dynamic operating environment, with unique challenges. A significant story in cyberspace over the past year relates to the progress made against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and USCYBERCOM contributions to the eviction of ISIS fighters from their geographic strongholds. Today, ISIS’s so-called “Caliphate” is crumbling. It has lost 98 percent of the territory it once controlled in Iraq and Syria, and approximately 3.2 million Syrians and 4.5 million Iraqis now have a pathway to begin to rebuild their cities and their lives. Denying sanctuary to ISIS in Iraq and Syria is a victory for civilization, and an important step in stabilizing the nations of that region and building peace in the Middle East. Cyberspace operations played an important role in this campaign, with USCYBERCOM supporting the successful offensive by U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and our Coalition partners. 3 We learned a great deal in performing those missions, and continue to execute some today. Mounting cyber operations against ISIS helped us re-learn and reinforce important lessons learned over the last decade of cyber operations against violent extremists. I should emphasize that this campaign was a Coalition fight, with key international partners conducting and supporting both kinetic and cyberspace operations against ISIS.
Wilson Center, 12-11-2019, "Report: Terrorism on Decline in Middle East and North Africa," https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/report-terrorism-decline-middle-east-and-north-africa
The number of terrorist attacks in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) declined significantly in 2018, according to the Global Terrorism Index, an annual study by the Institute for Economics and Peace. The security situation improved in 17 countries and only worsened in Iran and Morocco. The better conditions were largely driven by the deterioration of ISIS, which lost much of its territory in Iraq and Syria. “Deaths attributed to the group declined 69 per cent, with attacks declining 63 per cent in 2018,” according to the report. “The largest decline in fatalities last year was in Iraq, which had 75 per cent fewer deaths from terrorism in 2018. Syria followed, with nearly a 40 percent reduction.”
Problematically, ICG 19 reports
International Crisis Group, 3-12-2019, “Averting an ISIS Resurgence in Iraq and Syria.”
https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/207-averting-isis-resurgence-iraq-and-syria
In Iraq and Syria, ISIS is down but not out. The group remains active but reduced and geographically circumscribed. Keeping it down requires sustained effort. Any of several events – Turkish intervention in north-eastern Syria, but also instability in Iraq or spill-over of U.S.-Iranian tensions – could enable its comeback. In Iraq, ISIS is waging an active, deadly insurgency. Yet it is an insurgency that is diminished, not just from ISIS’s capabilities at its height in early 2015, but also from the long campaign that preceded the group’s 2014 surge. ISIS’s current war is also one limited mostly to the country’s rural periphery. In much of Iraq today, security is better than it has been for years – despite the violence amid recent protests, which has marred the relative calm.
Hennigan 19~-~-Hennigan, W.J. (W.J. Hennigan covers the Pentagon and national security issues in Washington, D.C. He has reported from more than two dozen countries across five continents, covering war, counter-terrorism, and the lives of U.S. service members.) “ISIS Fighters Are Gaining Strength After Trump’s Syria Pullout, US Spies Say.” Time, 19 November 2019. https://time.com/5732842/isis-gaining-strength-trump-syria-pullout/
The assessment, publicly disclosed Tuesday in a Department of Defense Office of Inspector General report, focused on the abrupt decision to remove all 1,000 U.S. troops from northern Syria. The move created a power vacuum and set off a series of violent developments on the ground that risks upending more than five years of progress in the war against the terrorist group. “ISIS exploited the Turkish incursion and subsequent draw-down of U.S. troops to reconstitute capabilities and resources within Syria and strengthen its ability to plan attacks abroad,” the 116-page report says. “The DIA also reported that without counter-terrorism pressure, ISIS will probably be able to more freely build clandestine networks and will attempt to free ISIS members detained in… prisons and family members living in internally displaced persons camps.” The White House referred questions about the inspector general report to the Pentagon, which responded by email. “ISIS fighters are still operating in the region, and unless pressure is maintained, a reemergence of the group and its capabilities remains a very real possibility,” Commander Sean Robertson, a Pentagon spokesman, said in a statement. “We are committed to keeping that from happening.”
CBS 19~-~- “Defense Dept inspector general says ISIS likely to ‘resurge’ without ‘sustained pressure’.” CBS News, 4 February 2019.
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/defense-isis-likely-to-resurge-without-sustained-pressure/
The U.S. military believes that "absent sustained pressure" on the Islamic State, ISIS could re-emerge in Syria within six to 12 months, according to a new Department of Defense Inspector General report on Operation Inherent Resolve. According to the Pentagon, while U.S.-backed Syrian forces have continued the fight to retake the remaining ISIS strongholds in Syria, ISIS remains a "potent force of battle-hardened and well-disciplined fighters that could likely resurge in Syria absent continued counterterrorism pressure," the report reads.
Brahmi 20~-~- Brahimi, Alia. (Alia Brahimi is a former research fellow at Oxford University and the London School of Economics) “Qassem Suleimani Wanted US Troops Out of Iraq. If They Go, ISIS Will Be Back.” Foreign Policy, 17 January 2020.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/17/qassem-suleimani-expel-us-troops-iraq-isis-will-be-back/
Now, as tensions escalate between the United States and Iran in the wake of the U.S. killing of Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani this month, it is worth remembering that the Islamic State is regrouping in Iraq. Indeed, the militant group’s 14,000-18,000 fighters are returning to their guerrilla roots, assassinating tribal elders, taxing local populations, kidnapping soldiers, burning crops, laying roadside ambushes, and engaging in nighttime hit-and-runs. Training and support from U.S. forces in Iraq is essential to preventing its full-blown revival, but the standoff with Iran may yield the opposite result: removing the U.S. presence from Iraq altogether.
~-~-~-~-
The United States has also provided training and mentoring to Iraqi forces, as well as critical help with battlespace management. The Iraqis are said to be highly capable with regard to signals intelligence and have developed counterterrorism expertise, but they still lack the ability to knit together the moving parts of the intelligence and targeting cycle. However controversial U.S. troop deployments in the Middle East are, for the time being, the 5,000-strong U.S. presence in Iraq is necessary (through of course not sufficient) to retain cohesion on the ground and maintain strategic momentum. “The sad truth is that, if left to their own devices, the Iraqi security forces might rot while they stand, like they did in 2014,” the former commander said. “Maybe not next week, but eventually it would happen.”
Other countries will not fill-in.
Magid (2020), Pesha. “Islamic State Aims for Comeback Amid Virus-Expedited U.S. Withdrawal.” Foreign Policy. APRIL 6, 2020, 5:04 PM.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/06/iraq-islamic-state-comeback-coronavirus-us-withdrawal/
In Iraq, this prediction is already beginning to play out as several coalition members, including France and Britain, have withdrawn their troops from Iraq and halted their training programs to protect their soldiers from the spread of COVID-19.
...
“Iraqi forces are fighting an ISIS insurgency that has abandoned the semi-conventional warfare that the organization had at its height and that is now a much harder target, operating as small guerrilla units in rugged terrain in the country’s rural periphery or attempting to work clandestinely to infiltrate populated areas,” said Sam Heller, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group. “It’s an enemy that ISIS requires a relatively advanced set of technical enablers that the coalition is able to provide.” Chief among these enablers are air support and intelligence gathering to fight it, both of which are primarily provided by the United States. Rasool pointed to the same capabilities while talking about the need for a partnership with the coalition. “The cooperation with the international coalition, especially when it comes to reconnaissance, air support, and intelligence information—that is very important,” he said. “If you don’t have modern planes, then you cannot have a strong army.” The coalition uses its technical capabilities to help coordinate and advise missions with the Iraqi Army and local tribal militias that were mobilized in 2014 to fight the Islamic State.
The impact is on preventing genocide.
ISIS has repeatedly targeted ethno-religious groups in Iraq and Syria, including the Turkmen, Shabak, Yadizis, and Christians.
UN 16~-~-UN Commision of Inquiry on Syria: ISIS is commiting genocide against the Yazidis.” UN, 2016.
https://www.ohchr.org/FR/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=20113andLangID=F
ISIS sought – and continues to seek – to destroy the Yazidis in multiple ways, as envisaged by the 1948 Genocide Convention. “ISIS has sought to erase the Yazidis through killings; sexual slavery, enslavement, and torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and forcible transfer causing serious bodily and mental harm; the infliction of conditions of life that bring about a slow death; the imposition of measures to prevent Yazidi children from being born, including forced conversion of adults, the separation of Yazidi men and women, and mental trauma; and the transfer of Yazidi children from their own families and placing them with ISIS fighters, thereby cutting them off from beliefs and practices of their own religious community”, the report says.
In just two years, ISIS harmed millions.
NBC 16~-~- Jamieson, Alastair. “ISIS Death Toll: 18,800 Killed in Iraq in 2 Years, UN says.” NBC News, 19 January 2016.
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/isis-death-toll-18-800-killed-iraq-2-years-u-n499426
At least18,802 civilians have been killed in Iraq in ISIS-linked violence in under two years, a United Nations report said Tuesday — with millions of others forced from their homes and thousands more held as slaves. “The violence suffered by civilians in Iraq remains staggering,” said the report by the Office of the United Nations High Comissioner for Human Rights PDF link here. ISIS continues to commit “systematic and widespread violence and abuses of international human rights law and humanitarian law,” it said, adding that some of those act amount “crimes against humanity, and possibly genocide.” U.N. monitors recorded at least 55,047 civilian casualties as a result of the conflict between Jan. 1, 2014 and Oct. 31, 2015, with 18,802 people killed and and 36,245 wounded, it said. Over the same period, 3.2 million people became “internally displaced by ISIS” including over one million school-age girls and boys. “The persistent violence and scale of the displacement” limit their access to housing, clean water and education, the report said. It also documented human rights abuses, saying some 3,500 people are believed to be held as captives, mostly women and children from the Yazidi religious minority who have been forced into sexual slavery.
C3 POWER VAC
(Burke) Arleigh A., 1-2-2020, "America’s Failed Strategy in the Middle East: Losing Iraq and the Gulf," No Publication, https://www.csis.org/analysis/americas-failed-strategy-middle-east-losing-iraq-and-gulf
In round two, the United States and its allies ended up fighting these Islamic extremists from 2004 to 2010. Although the United States defeated these extremists in western Iraq with the aid of a massive surge of U.S. ground troops and the aid of Iraqi Sunni popular forces, the United States failed to create a stable Iraqi government and economy. The United States effectively abandoned its nation building efforts after 2009 and withdrew its combat forces from Iraq at the end of 2011 – which createding a power vacuum that opened up Iraq to ISIS – all the while, it was never able to decide on any active strategy for stabilizing Iraq or dealing with the Syrian civil war. It focused on defeating ISIS – relying heavily on Syrian Kurds in the process – and scored another “victory” in 2016-2018 by disbanding the ISIS “caliphate.”
Claire Parker and Rick Noack. Jan 30, 2020. “Iran has invested in allies and proxies across the Middle East. Here’s where they stand after Soleimani’s death.” https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/01/03/iran-has-invested-allies-proxies-across-middle-east-heres-where-they-stand-after-soleimanis-death/
Many — though not all — of the groups Iran sponsors are Shiite. While ideology plays a role in Iran’s foreign policy, experts say the regime’s primary goal is to project power throughout the Middle East to counter U.S., Israeli and Saudi influence. The success of Iran’s strategy rests in large part on its ability to capitalize on power vacuums in the Middle East, Vatanka said. Most recently, Iran has broadened its reach by backing militias in war-torn Yemen and Syria amid the chaos ushered in by the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011. How does Iran do this? Primarily through the Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force, which Soleimani controlled until his death. (The Trump administration designated the Revolutionary Guard a foreign terrorist organization in April). The Quds Force organizinges and trainings fighters with allied militias and provides them with weapons, according to a report by the Soufan Center. Iran also uses soft power to cement economic alliances with countries like Iraq, where Iran has supported local militias in the fight against U.S. forces in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq and later in the fight against the Islamic State.
Ahronheim (2020), Anna. “If US leaves the region, Israel will eventually go to war with Iran.” Jerusalem Post. JANUARY 8, 2020 18:33.
https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/if-us-leaves-from-the-region-israel-will-eventually-go-to-war-with-iran-613446
Should the United States withdraw its forces and Iran continue on its path through Iraq and Syria, Israel will eventually find itself in a war along its entire northern border, Brig.-Gen. (res.) Ilan Lavi has warned. “The United States is the main brakes in the region and its withdrawal would lead to an escalation, since the Iranians will continue to apply gas” to their aspirations of regional hegemony, Lavi said during a conference held by the Alma Research and Education Center in Northern Israel. On Monday evening, a letter sent from the head of the US military’s task force in Iraq to Abdul Amir, deputy director of Combined Joint Operations, sparked concern the US was removing its forces from Iraq after its parliament voted to oust American troops from the country following the assassination of top Iranian General Qasem Soleimani. While Washington later clarified that it was a “mistake” and no troops were being withdrawn, Lavi, who served as deputy head of the Northern Command, said that no one is able to predict what the American president might later decide to do. And if Trump does decide to withdraw, “I’m not optimistic,” he said. “Eventually, and I don’t mean tomorrow or next year, we will have to go to war. The Iranians will continue.”
Saudi Arabia has reacted to Iranian expansion through wars.
Marcus 19
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-42008809
Fast-forward to 2011 and uprisings across the Arab world caused political instability throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia exploited these upheavals to expand their influence, notably in Syria, Bahrain and Yemen, further heightening mutual suspicions. Iran's critics say it is intent on establishing itself or its proxies across the region, and achieving control of a land corridor stretching from Iran to the Mediterranean.How have things got worse? The strategic rivalry is heating up because Iran is in many ways winning the regional struggle. In Syria, Iranian (and Russian) support for President Bashar al-Assad has enabled his forces to largely rout rebel group groups backed by Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is trying desperately to contain rising Iranian influence while the militaristic adventurism of the kingdom's young and impulsive Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman - the country's de facto ruler - is exacerbating regional tensions. He Saudi Arabia is waging a war against the rebel Houthis movement in neighbouring Yemen, in part to stem perceived Iranian influence there, but after four years this is proving a costly gamble. Iran has denied accusations that it is smuggling weaponry to the Houthis, though successive reports from a panel of UN experts have demonstrated significant assistance for the Houthis from Tehran in terms of both technology and weaponry.
Sternman 18
https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/reports/twenty-first-century-proxy-warfare/
It’s a pricey wager and it is still unclear whether it’s a winning bet. Civil wars raging today in the so-called “arc of instability” remain the greatest threats to international security. Proxy Conflict in the Middle Eastthere has displacesd tens of millions of people, killed hundreds of thousands, and devastated large swaths of the region’s economy and infrastructure. Renewed U.S. rivalry with Russia and China and competition among Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Israel for regional primacy are forcing Washington to reconfigure its grand strategy. Current conceptions of proxy warfare do not account for the paradigm shift now underway. A clear-eyed cost-benefits analysis of proxy warfare is needed to make U.S. strategy more effective.
Not only that,
Seth Cropsey, Gary Roughead, 10-31-2019, "A U.S. Withdrawal Will Cause a Power Struggle in the Middle East," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/17/us-withdrawal-power-struggle-middle-east-china-russia-iran/
The unique mix of political forces in the Middle East suggests three possibilities in the event of U.S. naval withdrawal from the Middle East region, and none favor U.S. interests. First, Russia may broker a political arrangement among Turkey, Israel, and Iran, or, alternatively, support a coalition pitting some of those states against another in an e?ort to manufacture a manageable regional balance of power and allowing it to shift its attention back to Europe. The ?nal shape of this strategy would depend on several variables: Turkey’s approach to Syria, Israel’s posture against Iran (and its proxies), the outcome of Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen, the Kurdish question, and the possibility of the Islamic State’s resurgence. Regardless of these factors, Russia will still bid for control of the Mediterranean Sea, which the United States will be hard-pressed to counter, particularly if China can manipulate its European economic partners into limiting or expelling the U.S. Navy from its Mediterranean bases. If that happens, Washington will have to ?ght its way back into the region for the ?rst time since World War II. In the second scenario, Iran defeats Saudi Arabia in a regional confrontation, thereby taking the top leadership spot in the Islamic world, making it a great power in its own right. Control of Middle Eastern oil exports would give Iran the ability to coerce and bully the United States’ European and Paci?c allies, and it would deny the United States any peaceful access to the Levantine Basin. The balancing dynamics against this new great power are di?cult to project, but regardless, the United States’ ability to control the strategic environment would be hampered markedly. Third, a long-term regional war between Tehran and a ?uctuating anti-Iran coalition composed of Saudi Arabia, other Sunni Gulf states, and Israel would cause widespread bloodshed. As the 1980s Iran-Iraq War demonstrated, both Iran and Saudi Arabia would be likely to attempt nuclear breakout. With Iran, this would mean closing the small technological gap that now exists between its low-enriched uranium to the higher level of enrichment needed for a nuclear weapon. | 904,735 |
365,716 | 379,676 | Contact Info | Heyo it's Karina and Sabine, we're happy to disclose if you contact us, preferably at least 20 minutes before round. If the tournament is super time crunched and postings are going out late we're fine disclosing informally if necessary.
Karina Lu | she/her | [email protected], Karina Lu on Messenger
Sabine Wood | sher/her | [email protected], [email protected], http://m.me/sabinetwo | 904,740 |
365,717 | 379,679 | Policy | Disclosure on the wiki is bad for small schools but if you ask before the round we will. | 904,742 |
365,718 | 379,684 | contact | we open source any interps and cases
please email us with any concerns and email hannah if you want a girlfriend and are a girl
Hannah(she/her): [email protected] or Hannah Huang on Messenger
Sabine (she/her): [email protected], [email protected], http://m.me/sabinetwo | 904,746 |
365,719 | 379,696 | Contact | Hi,
We are a primarily novice team. Contact us at [email protected] and [email protected]. Please send all speech docs to those email. Happy debating! | 904,758 |
365,720 | 379,706 | Interp- Disclosure | Debaters must, on a page on the NDCA PF 2019-2020 wiki with their name and the school they attend, disclose the taglines and citations of any pieces of evidence which they have read in their case in a previous round at least one hour before the round. To clarify, disclose your broken cases. | 904,771 |
365,721 | 379,721 | Contact for PF MS National Tourney | Hey its Arnav,
Contact me at least 20 min before round starts at [email protected] and either send me ur opensource link or case doc link. I will have open sourced my cases or will send you the speech doc.
Happy Debating! :)
P.S. tell me b4 round if u are not comfortable with progressive arguments. | 904,790 |
365,722 | 379,735 | Income Inequality | =1AC=
====We negate,====
====Resolved: The US should replace means tested welfare programs with a universal basic income====
====Our Sole Contention is Reducing Inequality====
====Subpoint A: Education====
====Means tested welfare programs like Medicaid increases graduation rates====
SAMUEL KLEINER 14 of the NBER (5-2014, "THE EFFECT OF CHILD HEALTH INSURANCE ACCESS ON SCHOOLING: EVIDENCE FROM PUBLIC INSURANCE EXPANSIONS", doa 2-1-2020, https://www.nber.org/papers/w20178.pdf?fbclid=IwAR1c0A69Lf6w64L1zk6L6WTdKYHHiaXp9hIEMNLYTSMSmBI4LyeK44wk1cI) NY
Table 3 presents the main results from our estimation of equation (3). Each
AND
by 9.7 and increased college completion by 5.5.
====Moreover, increasing welfare increases educational attainment====
ANDREW PALMER 15 of Pomona College (2015, "Impact Of Welfare Spending As A Percent Of GDP On The Schooling Progress of Children Within United States of America", doa 1-31-2020, http://economics-files.pomona.edu/GarySmith/Econ190/Econ190202015/AndrewPalmer.pdf) NY
The marginal effects in our adjusted logistic regression analysis as well as the standard errors
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races where we also see a negative coefficient on the welfare spending regressor.
====Fortunately, better education increases income, and decreases mortality rate====
ANGUS DEATON 02 of Princeton University (3-2002, "Policy Implications Of The Gradient Of Health And Wealth", doa 1-31-2020, https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/pdf/10.1377/hlthaff.21.2.13) NY
Importance of education. One line of thought is that education, not income,
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the effects of education on smoking remain after controlling for that knowledge.27
====For this reason, Kugler 13 finds that means tested welfare increases occupational mobility====
Adriana Kugler, December 2013, American Progress, "", (), accessed 1-31-2020, https://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/TaxTransfers.pdf?fbclid=IwAR2GL-uuUQATOeS9CVuoMdOry2QNBfO3uCQdQsRgKheeEF0YGxsi3v6Dc7Q //LZ
Similarly, more generous transfer programs largely encourage occupational mobility. First, an increase
AND
their investments to improve their labor-market situations fail to work out.
====Overall, Meyer 18 quantifies the benefit of means tested welfare====
BRUCE MEYER 18 of the University of Chicago (2018, "The Poverty Reduction of Social Security and Means-Tested Transfers", doa 1-31-2020, https://sci-hub.tw/10.1177/0019793918790220) NY
Table 1 lists the transfer programs included in some of the key studies analyzing the
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transfers begin to phase out at income levels significantly below the poverty line.
====Subpoint B: Automatic Stabilizers====
====Automatic stabilizers, like means tested welfare, decreases economic volatility====
RICARDO REIS 12 of Columbia University (7-2012, "The role of automatic stabilizers in the U.S. business cycle", doa 1-31-2020, https://economics.yale.edu/sites/default/files/mckay-130402.pdf) NY
Most countries have automatic rules in their tax-and-transfer systems that are
AND
, which raises the volatility of aggregate consumption in response to aggregate shocks.
====Unfortunately, a UBI is not an automatic stabilizer====
ISABEL ORTIZ 18 of the International Labor Organization (2018, "Universal Basic Income proposals in light of ILO standards: Key issues and global costing", doa 1-31-2020, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-ed_protect/—-soc_sec/documents/publication/wcms_648602.pdf) NY
Because of low benefit levels, overall poverty rates would increase significantly. From an economic perspective, UBI does not act as an automatic stabilizer as it does not go up or down in a downturn.
====Because of this, Goulden 18 explains, that a Universal Basic Income would distribute income upwards, spiking child poverty 60====
CHRIS GOULDEN 18 of the JRF (Chris leads the Evidence and Impact team at JRF. They are the guardians of JRF evidence on poverty, providing the knowledge base to underpin and assess our outcome plans and our real-world impact. The team aim to make JRF the leading authority on poverty in the UK through monitoring progress to hold governments to account across the UK. Chris is a former social researcher at the Home Office and Cabinet Office and used to be a cancer researcher in the NHS. He has been a member of the UK Commission for Employment and Skills Policy Expert Group, and of the Social Research Association Board. Chris is currently also a member of the Social Security Advisory Committee, advising the Department for Work and Pensions, and has a Masters degree in Social Research Methods from South Bank University. 4-25-2018, "Universal Basic Income – Not the Answer to Poverty", doa 1-31-2020, https://www.jrf.org.uk/blog/universal-basic-income-not-answer-poverty) NY
So, a central problem is that advocates of UBI either unconsciously or wilfully fail
AND
which isn't really a UBI system at all), funded by tax rises.
====This is tragic as more volatility means more income inequality====
STEPHEN MILLER 15 of UNLV (2015, "The Effect of Growth Volatility on Income Inequality", doa 1-31-2020, https://sci-hub.tw/10.1016/j.econmod.2014.11.020) NY
Both the PMG and MG techniques permit non-stationary series. The MG estimator
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volatility continues to exert a positive and significant effect on income inequality.17
====This directly leads to more deaths as,====
STEVEN BEZRUCHKA 12 of the Boston Review (9-27-2012, "Inequality Kills", doa 1-31-2020, http://bostonreview.net/us/stephen-bezruchka-inequality-kills) NY
The report also includes a long section on the factors for our high death rates
AND
through structural violence. There is no smoking gun with this form | 904,808 |
365,723 | 379,761 | Blake Day 1 Neg | Contention 1: Ending Maduro
Thompson, Reggie. “Maduro's End Would Be Just the Beginning of Venezuela's Road to Recovery.” Stratfor, Stratfor, 13 Feb. 2019, worldview.stratfor.com/article/maduros-end-would-be-just-beginning-venezuelas-road-recovery
“Under the current … importantly, mass unrest.”
Anatoly Kurmaneav, The New York Times, "Venezuela’s Collapse Frays Its Economic Ties With Russia", 06/12/19, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/17/world/americas/venezuela-russia-economy.html
“Yet there is … business, they said.”
board, The editorial. “Nicolás Maduro's Hold on Power Is Starting to Slip Away.” Subscribe to Read | Financial Times, Financial Times, 1 May 2019, www.ft.com/content/3e0d50fe-6c13-11e9-a9a5-351eeaef6d84.
“Military defections are … have thrust them.”
Kevin Sullivan, Washington Post, "Venezuela’s Maduro will be out of power soon, Colombia's Ivan Duque says", 03/03/19, https://outline.com/hHt26z
“Venezuelan President Nicolas … or one day.”
“Stabilizing Venezuela: Scenarios and Options.” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, www.cfr.org/report/stabilizing-venezuela.
“Any new government … and overcome poverty.”
Bahar, Dany, and Meagan Dooley. “Venezuela Refugee Crisis to Become the Largest and Most Underfunded in Modern History.” Brookings, Brookings, 10 Dec. 2019, www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2019/12/09/venezuela-refugee-crisis-to-become-the-largest-and-most-underfunded-in-modern-history/.
“Since 2013 the … and lifesaving medications.”
Contention 2: Military Alternative
Kahn, Carrie, and Alex Leff. “Trump's Venezuela Moves Follow Long History Of Intervention In Latin America.” NPR, NPR, 22 Feb. 2019, www.npr.org/2019/02/22/696057482/trumps-venezuela-moves-follow-long-history-of-intervention-in-latin-america
"Trump said ... to oust Maduro."
Maureen Groppe, USA Today, "Trump Venezuela policy also good 2020 politics in key state of Florida", 02/02/19, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/02/01/trump-venezuela-policy-also-good-2020-politics-key-state-florida-maduro-guaido/2730779002/
“But Pence’s trip … Florida International University.”
Jonathon Blitzer, The New Yorker, "The Fight for the Latino Vote in Florida", 09/16/19, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/09/23/the-fight-for-the-latino-vote-in-florida
“Florida elections always … Miami, told me.”
Spetalnick, Matt. “Exclusive: As Trump Grows Frustrated on Venezuela, U.S. to 'Squeeze' Cuba, Scrutinize Russia.” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 9 Oct. 2019, www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-venezuela-exclusive/exclusive-as-trump-grows-frustrated-on-venezuela-u-s-to-squeeze-cuba-scrutinize-russia-idUSKBN1WO2CL
“The Trump Administration … power in Venezuela.”
Daniel Larison, The American Conservative , "Trump and Military Intervention `", 12/26/17, https://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/trump-and-military-intervention/
“The important thing … he has done.”
Natasha Turak, CNBC, "Mnuchin: US isn't weaponizing dollar; sanctions are alternative to war", 12/14/19, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/14/mnuchin-us-isnt-weaponizing-dollar-sanctions-are-alternative-to-war.html
“Sanctions like those … world military conflicts.”
“US Military Option in Venezuela Risks Long Unpopular War.” Voice of America, www.voanews.com/americas/us-military-option-venezuela-risks-long-unpopular-war
“The possible use … an anti-imperialist leader.”
Mora, Frank O. “What a Military Intervention in Venezuela Would Look Like.” Foreign Affairs, Foreign Affairs Magazine, 13 Nov. 2019, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/venezuela/2019-03-19/what-military-intervention-venezuela-would-look.
“In the worst case … dictatorship has collapsed.”
C3: gold
Lesley Wroughton, Reuters, "U.S. sanctions Venezuela gold mining company for backing Maduro", 03/19/19, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-usa-sanctions/us-sanctions-venezuela-gold-mining-company-for-backing-maduro-idUSKCN1R01VN
“The United States … corrupt Maduro regime.”
Ethan Bronner, Bloomberg, "U.S. Sanctions Venezuelan Gold Company for Supporting Maduro", 03/19/19, https://outline.com/8UmFw4
“Minerven is the … announcing the sanctions.”
Corina Pons, Reuters, "Venezuela gold reserves drop by $1 billion in first half 2019 ", 09/03/19, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-gold/venezuela-gold-reserves-drop-by-1-billion-in-first-half-2019-idUSKCN1VO202
“Gold reserves held … in 75 years.”
CEIC, "Venezuela Gold Production 1990 - 2019 Data and Charts", 2017, https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/venezuela/gold-production
“Venezuela’s Gold Production … kg in 2017.”
Emma Graham-Harrison, The Guardian, "Venezuela crisis threatens disease epidemic across continent - experts \", 02/21/19, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/feb/21/venezuela-crisis-threatens-disease-epidemic-across-continent-experts
“Malaria cases, in … of the disease.”
Bram Ebus, The Free Library, "ARC of desperation: Venezuela's decision to open up the Orinoco belt to mining threatens the Amazon rainforest", 10/22/17, https://www.thefreelibrary.com/ARC+of+desperation3a+Venezuela27s+decision+to+open+up+the+Orinoco+belt...-a0505467406
“Large tracts of … be displaced entirely.” | 904,845 |
365,724 | 379,748 | Apple Valley Aff | C1: Defending the Nation
Mohan Gazula, MIT, "Cyber Warfare Conflict Analysis and Case Studies", May 2017, https://cams.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017-10.pdf
"The low cost ... U.S. information infrastructure."
Beatrice Chirstofaro, Business Insider, "Cyberattacks are the newest frontier of war and can strike harder than a natural disaster. Here's why the US could struggle to cope if it got hit", 05/23/19, https://www.businessinsider.com/cyber-attack-us-struggle-taken-offline-power-grid-2019-4
"James Andrew Lewis ... visible to them."
Steve Ranger, ZDNet, "What is cyberwar? Everything you need to know about the frightening future of digital conflict", 12/4/18, https://www.zdnet.com/article/cyberwar-a-guide-to-the-frightening-future-of-online-conflict/
"However, it's likely ... US Cyber Command,"
Kevin Freiburger, GCN, "On the offense: How federal cybersecurity is changing", 08/27/19, https://gcn.com/articles/2019/08/27/cybersecurity-offense.aspx
"Offensive cybersecurity means ... and military infrastructure."
Michael Sulmeyer, Foreign Affairs, "How the US Can Play Cyber-Offense", 03/22/18, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-03-22/how-us-can-play-cyber-offense
"If subtle measures ... them otherwise useless."
Jen Wieczner, Fortune, "FireEye Stock Plunges As Big Hacks Drop, Earnings Miss, Layoffs Coming", 08/05/16, https://fortune.com/2016/08/05/fireeye-stock-feye-earnings/
"FireEye's stock plummeted ... or five machines."
Paul Mee, HBR, "How a Cyber Attack Could Cause The Next Financial Crisis", September 2018, https://hbr.org/2018/09/how-a-cyber-attack-could-cause-the-next-financial-crisis
"But the next ... on short notice."
Bob Pisani, CNBC, "A cyberattack could trigger the next financial crisis, new report says", 09/13/18, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/13/a-cyberattack-could-trigger-the-next-financial-crisis.html
"So who's right? ... the broader economy."
Olivier Blanchard, IMF, "Jobs and Growth: Analytical and Operational Considerations For The Fund", 03/14/13, https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/031413.pdf
"Although we are ... and Prospects, 2013."
C2: Stopping Iran War with Isreal
Saheb Sadeghi, Foreign Policy, "For Many Iranians, Staying In The Nuclear Deal No Longer Makes Sense", 09/24/19, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/09/24/for-many-iranians-staying-in-the-nuclear-deal-no-longer-makes-sense/
"Talks have little ... will also increase."
The Times Of Isreal, "Iran could enrich enough uranium for nuke in 6-8 months, says former IAEA deputy", 06/5/19, https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-could-make-nuclear-weapon-in-6-8-months-says-former-iaea-deputy/
"A former deputy ... making a weapon,"
Kim Zetter, Wired, "An Unprecedented Look at Stuxnet, the World's First Digital Weapon", 11/03/14, https://www.wired.com/2014/11/countdown-to-zero-day-stuxnet/
"In January 2010 ... being fed gas."
Alex Ward, 6-24-19, “The Weekend in the Risky US-Iran Standoff, explained,” Vox, https://www.vox.com/2019/6/24/18715408/usa-iran-sanctions-cyber-pompeo-coalition
"Multiple outlets reported ... Iran's missile program."
Anna Wagner, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, "Cyber security at nuclear facilities: US-Russian joint support needed - Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists", 12/15/17, https://thebulletin.org/2017/12/cyber-security-at-nuclear-facilities-us-russian-joint-support-needed/
"Civilian nuclear facilities ... a single vendor."
Jon Lindsay, "CYBER OPERATIONS AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS", NAPSNet Special Reports, June 20, 2019, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/cyber-operations-and-nuclear-weapons/
"A nuclear weapon ... credible nuclear threats."
Doreen Horschig, 6-23-19, “If Iran tensions flare, Israel may strike while the world quietly watches,” The Conversation, https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/if-iran-tensions-flare-israel-may-strike-while-the-world-quietly-watches-119062300146_1.html
"Isreal will not ... the Middle East"
Cham Dallas, Conflict and Health, "Nuclear war between Isreal and Iran: lethality beyond the pale", 2013, https://sci-hub.tw/https://www.researchgate.net/publication/236689331_Nuclear_war_between_Israel_and_Iran_Lethality_beyond_the_pale
"No real appreciation ... the selected targeting" | 904,831 |
365,725 | 379,777 | Round 6 | ====Hegemony is high now – political and military resolve are stable====
**Dorfman 12 **~~Zach Dorfman, assistant editor of Ethics and International Affairs, the journal of the Carnegie Council, and co-editor of the Montreal Review, "What We Talk About When We Talk About Isolationism", May 18, http://dissentmagazine.org/online.php?id=605~~
The rise of China notwithstanding, the United States remains the world's sole superpower.
AND
come and go, but the national security state appears here to stay.
====The 1AC is a rejection of liberalism and US military power – Their criticism contributes to neo-isolationism and prevents American dominance – Don't let them get out of the link because the AFF positioned itself in opposition to American power====
**KAGAN 98** senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace ~~Robert, "The Benevolent Empire," Foreign Policy, summer~~
Those contributing to the growing chorus of antihegemony and multipolarity may know they are playing
AND
when they pop the champagne corks in celebration of the next American humbling.
====Any alternative to hegemony risks extinction – It's not worth the risk ====
Thomas P.M. **Barnett 11** Former Senior Strategic Researcher and Professor in the Warfare Analysis and Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College American military geostrategist and Chief Analyst at Wikistrat., worked as the Assistant for Strategic Futures in the Office of Force Transformation in the Department of Defense, "The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S., and Globalization, at Crossroads," March 7 http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8099/the-new-rules-leadership-fatigue-puts-u-s-and-globalization-at-crossroads
It is worth first examining the larger picture: We live in a time of
AND
in all of its forms, deeply embedded in the geometry to come.
====Vote them down – their speech act undermines vital military resolve====
**EYAGO 05** Political Commentary – Sound Politics Reporter ~~7/8, http://www.soundpolitics.com/archives/004721.html, Sound Commentary on Current Events in Seattle, Puget Sound and Washington State~~
Finally, I am angry at those who undermine our efforts to conduct this war
AND
our public leaders. What they do for political gain is completely unconscionable.
====We affirm American military hegemony and stand in staunch opposition to neo-isolationism ====
Mearsheimer 95 Professor of Political Science and the co-director of the Program on International Security Policy at the University of Chicago. West Point graduate, retired Air Force officer
(John, Professor Political Science at the University of Chicago, International Security, Summer, p. 93)
The discussion of institutions up to now has a distinct academic flavor. However,
AND
-causing effects of institutions until they have solid evidence to support their positions
====You should prefer realism, it's the only falsifiable IR theory ====
Thayer 2004 – Thayer has been a Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and has taught at Dartmouth College and the University of Minnesota ~~Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict, University of Kentucky Press, 2004, pg. 68 //adi~~
Evolution provides a better ultimate causal foundation according to the D-N model because
AND
* only if it is falsifiable and no observation sentence has falsified it.
====The aff is unethical — postmodern ethics prevent endorsement of U.S. power and condone genocide====
**Reus-Smit 4 **(Christian Reus-Smit 4 IR @ Australian Nat'l, American Power and World Order p. 109-115)
The final ethical position — the polar opposite of the first — holds that the
AND
is needed than the simple yet enticing propos¬ition that might is never right. | 904,878 |
365,726 | 379,804 | theorydisclosure | hello, it is your friends from lovejoy. we may be open to disclose if these things are followed...
1) you contact us thru text
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365,728 | 379,784 | 2 - NOVDEC - Iran-ISIS AC | C1 Iran Flexibility
Freiburger ’19, Kevin Freiburger, 27 August 2019, GCN, https://gcn.com/articles/2019/08/27/cybersecurity-offense.aspx
The U.S. currently deploys offensive cybersecurity strategies with Russia. In what is a more aggressive strategy for the U.S., officials confirmed that they have placed the equivalent of digital land mines into Russia’s electric power grid to serve as a warning to President Vladimir Putin and as a demonstration of Cyber Command’s power. This particular effort adds to a previous cyber strategy already in place meant to overwhelm the computer systems at Russia’s Internet Research Agency ~-~- the entity responsible for the 2016 election meddling. Offensive cyberattacks are conducted remotely, shortening the time for deployment and costing less than conventional weaponry and military infrastructure. And in some ways, offensive cyber strategy has the potential to save lives. In June of this year, the U.S. called off a conventional weapons counterattack on Iran due to the high potential of human casualties. The DOD chose to instead move forward with an unnamed cyberattack.
Ali and Stewart ’19, 16 October 2019, Idrees Ali and Phil Stewart, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-iran-military-cyber-exclusive/exclusive-u-s-carried-out-secret-cyber-strike-on-iran-in-wake-of-saudi-oil-attack-officials-idUSKBN1WV0EK
The impact of the attack, if any, could take months to determine, but cyber strikes are seen as a less-provocative option below the threshold of war. “You can do damage without killing people or blowing things up; it adds an option to the toolkit that we didn’t have before and our willingness to use it is important,” said James Lewis, a cyber expert with the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Rasidi ’19, Yasmeen Rasidi, 23 October 2019, Citizen Truth, https://citizentruth.org/has-the-us-already-declared-a-cyber-war-on-iran/
Conventional battlefields have been replaced by cyber warfare and the U.S. has already conducted two cyber attacks on Iran in 2019. The U.S. is believed to have launched at least two secretive cyber attacks on Iran in the last six months, the most recent came following two drone attacks on Saudi Arabian oil facilities on September 14. To the best of public knowledge, Iran has not conducted any cyber attacks on the U.S in recent months. But given the growing tensions between the two countries and their shared desire to avoid firing bullets, cyberspace could be emerging as the new alternative battlefield of choice. The ongoing U.S.-Iran tension was triggered by Washington’s withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Deal, known as the Joint Comprehension Plan of Action (JCPOA). The U.S. under President Trump claimed the deal was not adequate in halting Iran’s nuclear ambitions despite repeated assurances by an international monitoring agency that Iran was in compliance with the deal. President Trump then also reimposed sanctions on Tehran after withdrawing from the JCPOA. The rift escalated after Iran announced it would reduce its compliance to the JCPOA by enriching uranium exceeding the level allowed in the JCPOA. That announcement was followed by a series of attacks on oil tankers crossing the Strait of Hormuz which the U.S. blames on Iran despite a lack of evidence supporting the U.S. claims. The September 14 cyber attack was reported by two unidentified American officials to Reuters who claimed the operation was aimed at crippling Iran’s ability to spread propaganda. The U.S. attack came in retaliation for the drone strikes on Saudi oil facilities which the U.S. believes Iran carried out despite Houthi rebels in Yemen claiming responsibility. The American officials told Reuters the attack affected “physical hardware” without specifying more detail. The Pentagon refused to comment on the Reuters report, stating, “As a matter of policy and for operational security, we do not discuss cyberspace operations, intelligence, or planning.” Iran also denied the Reuters report with Iran’s Minister of Communications and Information Technology Mohammad Javad Azari-Jahromi telling Reuters: “They must have dreamt it.” It’s possible but unknown whether Washington has carried out any other cyber attacks on Iran since the end of September. However, one thing is clear, the September attack on Iran was not a first and suggests cyber warfare may be increasingly favored by U.S. administrations intent on avoiding actual military confrontations. The U.S. Army conducted a previous cyber attack targeting Tehran last June as retaliation following U.S. allegations that Iran shot down American surveillance drones in international airspace, but which Iran claims were in Iranian airspace. According to The Washington Post, President Trump himself ordered the U.S. Cyber Command to carry out the Iran cyber attack following the drone shooting and recent attacks on oil tankers. The order for the attack reportedly came the same day that Trump called off airstrikes targeting Iran. The attack hit computers used to control the launching of rockets and missiles, but no casualties were reported, according to The Post. U.S. officials claimed the June cyber attack hit a “critical database used by Iran’s paramilitary arm to plot attacks against oil tankers and degraded Tehran’s ability to covertly target shipping traffic in the Persian Gulf,” as the N.Y. Times reported. Officials also brandished the attacks a widespread success, claiming the attacks crippled Iran for months.
Groll ’19, Elias Groll, Foreign Policy, 27 September 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/09/27/the-u-s-iran-standoff-is-militarizing-cyberspace/
That fact has heightened the appeal of cyberweapons to Trump; hesitant to inflict casualties, he canceled at the last minute a retaliatory military strike against Iran after the downing of a U.S. drone in June. Instead, Trump launched cyberattacks against Iranian computer systems that were used in organizing the seizure of tankers. Once again, this time in retaliation for an attack earlier this month on Saudi oil facilities, Trump is reportedly mulling the use of cyberweapons.
Dilanian ’19, Ken Dilanian, NBC News, 21 June 2019, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/if-u-s-strikes-iran-what-might-happen-next-n1020451
A limited U.S. strike on Iran of the sort President Donald Trump says he canceled Thursday night could prompt a potent Iranian reaction that in turn might spark a much larger military conflict, current and former U.S. officials and experts tell NBC News. Iran could do enormous damage to the global economy by mining the Strait of Hormuz, the waterway off its coast through which flows 40 percent of the crude oil traded internationally. That action, even if quickly countered by the U.S. Navy, would cause oil prices to spike. But that may not be Iran's first move in response to a limited American bomb and missile attack, experts say. Iran would likely turn first to its proxies, who could inflict major damage on American allies, experts say. Houthi rebels in Yemen could step up attacks against Saudi Arabian infrastructure with missiles and drones. Shiite militias could destabilize Iraq. Hezbollah, the Iran-backed terrorist organization, could attack Israel or other American interests anywhere in the world. And if Iran wanted to kill Americans, any of those groups could do that on its behalf, with some deniability, said the experts. Shiite militias could overrun the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and seize hostages. Hezbollah, which, before 9/11, had killed more Americans than any other terror group, could strike in places as far flung as Latin America, where the group has a strong presence. "Traditionally, when faced with this sort of American action, Iran doesn't tend to respond directly and immediately, but they do so asymmetrically and over a period of time," said Ray Takeyh, a former State Department official and Iran expert at the Council on Foreign Relations. Trump said in a tweet Friday that he stopped a U.S. attack on Iran that would have targeted three sites. He told NBC's Chuck Todd in an exclusive interview Friday that, after being told the attack could cost 150 Iranian lives, he decided it was not proportional to the downing of an unmanned spy drone. The U.S. and Iran have been attacking one another covertly for decades. President Barack Obama is believed to have ordered a cyberattack that employed malware known as Stuxnet to set back Iran's nuclear program by causing centrifuges to malfunction, for example. Iran built powerful bombs that killed American troops in Iraq. But the last time an American president authorized a military strike on Iranian forces was in the 1980s, when Iran was fighting a war against Iraq and attacking tanker traffic in the Persian Gulf. In April 1988, an Iranian mine wounded 10 sailors on the USS Samuel B. Roberts. American forces responded by destroying much of Iran's small navy and taking out two oil platforms used by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. After a U.S. guided missile cruiser accidentally shot down an Iranian passenger airliner in July 1988, killing 290 civilians, Iran capitulated, believing the shootdown was not an accident. But analysts say Iran's capacity to inflict pain on the U.S. and its allies is much greater than in the 1980s, experts say. In addition to its extensive proxy forces, Iran has a potent cyber capability that could, in theory, take down networks and harm the American economy. Iran is believed to be responsible for a cyberattack that wiped out 35,000 computers at the Saudi oil company Aramco in 2012. The U.S., of course, could inflict massive damage on Iran. American forces could obliterate Iran's entire navy in two days, according to a recent Pentagon analysis, described by multiple U.S. officials. But Iran's clerical regime, which cares most about its survival, may respond to that in unpredictable ways. "Very quickly we could end with miscalculation as both sides fear offensive action by the other or tit for tat that escalates into a much more significant conflict," said Ilan Goldenberg, director of the Middle East Security Program at the Center for New American Security, on Twitter. The U.S. might believe it was sending Iran a message of deterrence by punishing it with limited air strikes. But Iran could interpret those strikes as a precursor to an invasion, and act accordingly. The result could be full-scale war. An all-out effort by the U.S. to depose the Iranian regime could cost trillions of dollars and untold American lives, Goldenberg wrote in a recent analysis. "Even short of such worst-case scenarios, any war with Iran would tie down the United States in yet another Middle Eastern conflict for years to come. The war and its aftermath would likely cost hundreds of billions of dollars and hobble not just Trump but future U.S. presidents. Such a commitment would mean the end of the United States' purported shift to great-power competition with Russia and China," he wrote. Trump has said he doesn't want that. The president told NBC News he is inviting Iran's senior leaders to talk. "I'm not looking for war," Trump said to Todd. "And if there is, it will be obliteration like you've never seen before. But I'm not looking to do that. But you cannot have a nuclear weapon. You want to talk — good. Otherwise you're going to have a bad economy for the next three years."
C2 ISIS
Rogers ’18, Michael S Rogers, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS26/20180411/108076/HHRG-115-AS26-Wstate-RogersM-20180411.pdf
A significant story in cyberspace over the past year relates to the progress made against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and USCYBERCOM contributions to the eviction of ISIS fighters from their geographic strongholds. Today, ISIS’s so-called “Caliphate” is crumbling. It has lost 98 percent of the territory it once controlled in Iraq and Syria, and approximately 3.2 million Syrians and 4.5 million Iraqis now have a pathway to begin to rebuild their cities and their lives. Denying sanctuary to ISIS in Iraq and Syria is a victory for civilization, and an important step in stabilizing the nations of that region and building peace in the Middle East. Cyberspace operations played an important role in this campaign, with USCYBERCOM supporting the successful offensive by U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and our coalition partners. We learned a great deal performing those missions, and continue to execute some today. Mounting cyber operations against ISIS helped us re-learn and reinforce important lessons learned over the last decade of cyber operations against violent extremists. I should emphasize that this campaign was a coalition fight, with key international partners conducting and supporting both kinetic and cyberspace operations against ISIS.
We believe we may also face a further evolution of the cyberspace threat from violent extremist elements. Since its inception, ISIS leaders and their technical experts have maintained a robust online presence, and we assess that they will seek to increase their efforts in and through cyberspace. They and other groups, such as al Qaeda and its affiliates, still use the Internet to market their versions of terrorism, garner financial and material support, and inspire followers. ISIS, like al Qaeda before it, has worked hard to target susceptible individuals and inspire them to commit attacks in the West. That is why USCYBERCOM works with law enforcement, intelligence, and liaison partners to find and destroy the key nodes in ISIS online infrastructure and media operations (along with the analogous infrastructures of other violent extremists).
1 – Recruiting
Temple Raston ’19 ,https://www.npr.org/2019/09/26/763545811/how-the-u-s-hacked-isis
In August 2015, the NSA and U.S. Cyber Command, the military's main cyber arm, were at a crossroads about how to respond to a new terrorist group that had burst on the scene with unrivaled ferocity and violence. The one thing on which everyone seemed to agree is that ISIS had found a way to do something other terrorist organizations had not: It had turned the Web into a weapon. ISIS routinely used encrypted apps, social media and splashy online magazines and videos to spread its message, find recruits and launch attacks.
A response to ISIS required a new kind of warfare, and so the NSA and U.S. Cyber Command created a secret task force, a special mission, and an operation that would become one of the largest and longest offensive cyber operations in U.S. military history. Few details about Joint Task Force ARES and Operation Glowing Symphony have been made public.
"It was a house of cards"
Steve Donald, a captain in the Naval Reserve, specializes in something called cryptologic and cyber operations, and when he is not in uniform, he is launching cybersecurity startups outside Washington, D.C. He's pale, bespectacled and has the slightly shy demeanor of a computer geek. In the spring of 2016 he received a phone call from the leader of his reserve unit. He needed Donald to come in.
"I said, well, I'm not in uniform and he said it doesn't matter — if you have a badge come on in," Donald said. "I can't believe I can actually say this but they were building a task force to conduct offensive cyber operations against ISIS."
Donald had to find a team of specialists to do something that had never been done before — hack into a terrorist organization's media operation and bring it down. Most of the forces flowed in from Joint Forces Headquarters, an Army cyber operation in Georgia. Donald also brought in experts in counterterrorism who understood ISIS and had watched it evolve from a ragtag team of Iraqi Islamists to something bigger. There were operators — the people who would be at the keyboards finding key servers in ISIS's network and disabling them — and digital forensics specialists who had a deep understanding of computer operating systems.
"They can say this is good, this is bad, this is where the files are located that we're interested in," he said. He found analysts, malware experts, behaviorialists and people who had spent years studying the smallest habits of key ISIS players. The mission, he explained to them, was to support the defeat of ISIS — to deny, degrade and disrupt them in cyberspace.
This was more complicated than it sounded.
The battle against the group had been episodic to that point. U.S. Cyber Command had been mounting computer network attacks against the group, but almost as soon as a server would go down, communications hubs would reappear. The ISIS target was always moving and the group had good operational security. Just physically taking down the ISIS servers wasn't going to be enough. There needed to be a psychological component to any operation against the group as well.
"This cyber environment involves people," Neil said. "It involves their habits. The way that they operate; the way that they name their accounts. When they come in during the day, when they leave, what types of apps they have on their phone. Do they click everything that comes into their inbox? Or are they very tight and restrictive in what they use? All those pieces are what we look at, not just the code."
Neil is a Marine reservist in his 30s, and it wouldn't be an exaggeration to say that Operation Glowing Symphony was his idea. "We were down in the basement at the NSA, and we had an epiphany," he said. He had been tracking ISIS's propaganda arm for months — painstakingly tracing uploaded videos and magazines back to their source, looking for patterns to reveal how they were distributed or who was uploading them. Then he noticed something that he hadn't seen before: ISIS was using just 10 core accounts and servers to manage the distribution of its content across the world.
"Every account, every IP, every domain, every financial account, every email account ... everything," Neil said. The group's network administrators weren't as careful as they should have been. They took a shortcut and kept going back to the same accounts to manage the whole ISIS media network. They bought things online through those nodes; they uploaded ISIS media; they made financial transactions. They even had file sharing through them. "If we could take those over," Neil said, grinning, "we were going to win everything."
The young Marine ran into his leadership's office at the NSA, grabbed a marker and started drawing crazy circles and lines on a whiteboard. "I was pointing everywhere and saying, 'It's all connected; these are the key points. Let's go," he recalled. "I felt like I was in It's Always Sunny in Philadelphia, when he's doing the mystery investigation for Pepe Silvia. Pictures on the wall and red yarn everywhere and nobody was understanding me." But as Neil kept explaining and drawing he could see the leaders begin to nod. "I drew this bicycle tire with spokes and all the things that were tied to this one node and then there was another one," he said. "It was a house of cards." We confirmed this account with three people who were there at the time. And from those scrawls, the mission known as Operation Glowing Symphony began to take shape. The goal was to build a team and an operation that would deny, degrade and disrupt ISIS's media operation. The cyber equivalent of a surgical strike
The spring and summer of 2016 were spent preparing for attack. And while members of Task Force ARES didn't reveal everything they did to crack into ISIS's network, one thing they used early on was a hacking standby: a phishing email. ISIS members "clicked on something or they did something that then allowed us to gain control and then start to move," said Gen. Edward Cardon, the first commander of Task Force ARES.
Almost every hack starts with hacking a human, cracking a password or finding some low-level unpatched vulnerability in software. "The first thing you do when you get in there is you've got to get some persistence and spread out," Cardon said, adding that the ideal thing is to get an administrator's account. "You can operate freely inside the network because you look like a normal IT person." (ISIS didn't just have IT people; it had an entire IT department.) Once ARES operators were inside the ISIS network, they began opening back doors and dropping malware on servers while looking for folders that contained things that might be helpful later, like encryption keys or folders with passwords. The deeper ARES got inside ISIS's network, the more it looked like the theory about the 10 nodes was correct. But there was a problem. Those nodes weren't in Syria and Iraq. They were everywhere — on servers around the world, sitting right next to civilian content. And that complicated things. "On every server there might be things from other commercial entities," said Air Force Gen. Tim Haugh, the first deputy commander of JTF ARES working under Cardon. "We were only going to touch that little sliver of the adversary space and not perturb anyone else." If ISIS had stored something in the cloud or on a server sitting in, say, France, ARES had to show Defense Department officials and members of Congress that U.S. cyber operators had the skill to do the cyber equivalent of a surgical strike: attack the ISIS material on a server without taking down the civilian material sitting right next to it. They spent months launching small missions that showed they could attack ISIS content on a server that also contained something vital like hospital records. Being able to do that meant they could target ISIS material outside Syria and Iraq. "And I looked at this young Marine and said, 'How big can we go?' and he said, 'Sir, we can do global.' I said, 'That's it — write it down, we're going to take it to Gen. Cardon.' " That Marine was Neil. He began peppering the leadership with ideas. He talked to them about not just hacking one person ... or ISIS in Syria and Iraq, but how to take down the media operation's entire global network. "That's how these attacks work," Neil said. "They start very simple and they become more complex." There was something else about Task Force ARES that was different: Young operators like Neil were briefing generals directly. "A lot of ideas come up that way, like somebody says, 'Well, we could gain access and do this to the files.' Really? You can do that? 'Oh yeah.' Would anyone notice? 'Well, maybe, but the chances are low.' It's like, hmmm, that's interesting, put that on the list." Cardon said young operators on Joint Task Force ARES understood hacking in a visceral way and, in many respects, understood what was possible in cyberspace better than commanding officers did, so having a direct line to the people making the decisions was key.
"An incredible rush" By the fall of 2016 there was a team, Joint Task Force ARES; there was a plan called Operation Glowing Symphony, and there were briefings — that had gone right up to the president. It was only then that there was finally a go. This account of the first night of Operation Glowing Symphony is based on interviews with half a dozen people directly involved. After months of looking at static webpages and picking their way through ISIS's networks, the task force starting logging in as the enemy. They deleted files. Changed passwords. "Click there," a digital forensic expert would say. "We're in," the operator would respond. There were some unintentionally comical moments. Six minutes in there was very little happening, Neil recalls. "The Internet was a little slow," he said without irony. "And then you know minute seven, eight, nine, 10, it started to flow in, and my heart started beating again." They began moving through the ISIS networks they had mapped for months. Participants describe it like watching a raid team clearing a house, except it was all online. Logging into accounts they had followed. Using passwords they discovered. Then, just as their move through targets started to accelerate, a roadblock: a security question. A standard, "what was your high school mascot"-type security question. The question: "What is the name of your pet?"The room quieted down. "And we're stuck dead in our tracks," Neil said. "We all look to each other and we're like, what can we do? There's no way we're going to get in. This is going to stop the 20 or 30 targets after this." Then an analyst stood up in the back of the room. "Sir, 1-2-5-7," he said. "We're like, what?" Neil says. "Sir, 1-2-5-7." "How do you know that? And he said 'I've been looking at this guy for a year. He does it for everything.' And we're like, all right ... your favorite pet. 1-2-5-7. "And boom, we're in." After that, the momentum started to build. One team would take screenshots to gather intelligence for later; another would lock ISIS videographers out of their own accounts. "Reset Successful" one screen would say. "Folder directory deleted," said another. The screens they were seeing on the Ops floor on the NSA campus were the same ones someone in Syria might have been looking at in real time, until someone in Syria hit refresh. Once he did that, he would see: 404 error: Destination unreadable. "Target 5 is done," someone would yell. Someone else would walk across the room and cross the number off the big target sheet on the wall. "We're crossing names off the list. We're crossing accounts off the list. We're crossing IPs off the list," said Neil. And every time a number went down they would yell one word: "Jackpot!" "We'd draw the line out and I had stacks of paper coming up on the corner of my desk," Neil said. "I knew in about the first 15 minutes that we were on pace to accomplish exactly what we need to accomplish." Once they had taken control of the 10 nodes, and had locked key people out of their accounts, ARES operators just kept chewing their way through the target list. "We spent the next five or six hours just shooting fish in a barrel," Neil said. "We'd been waiting a long time to do that and we had seen a lot of bad things happen and we were happy to see them go away." And there was something else that Neil said was hard to describe. "When you reach through the computer and on the other side is a terrorist organization, and you're that close, and you're touching something that's theirs, that they possess, that they put a lot of time and effort in to to hurt you, that is an incredible rush," he said. "You have the control to take that away." Enough to drive you nuts Brig. Gen. Jennifer Buckner was one of the people who took the reins of Task Force ARES after Glowing Symphony had started. And after that first night, the mission shifted into a second phase, one aimed at keeping pressure on ISIS with essentially five lines of effort: Keep the media operation under pressure, make it difficult for ISIS to operate on the Web more generally, use cyber to help forces on the ground fighting ISIS, hobble its ability to raise money, and work with other agencies in the U.S. and allies abroad. Once the distribution hubs were hamstrung, the second phase of the mission was more creative. Joint Task Force ARES operators started making all those things that drive you crazy about today's technology — slow downloads, dropped connections, access denied, program glitches — and made it start happening to ISIS fighters. "Some of these are not sophisticated effects, but they don't need to be," Buckner said. "The idea that yesterday I could get into my Instagram account and today I can't is confusing." And potentially enraging. When you can't get into an email account, what do you do? You think: Maybe I mistyped the login or password. So you put it in again and it still doesn't work. Then you type it in more deliberately. And every time you type it, press enter, and are denied, you get a little more frustrated. If you're at work, you call the IT department, you explain the issue and then they ask you if you're sure you typed your login and password in correctly. It is enough to drive you nuts. It might never occur to you, or to ISIS, that this might be part of a cyberattack. That's what the follow-on phases of Operation Glowing Symphony were about. Psy-ops with a high-tech twist. A member of ISIS would stay up all night editing a film and ask a fellow ISIS member to upload it. Operators with JTF ARES would make it so it didn't quite land at its destination. The ISIS member who stayed up all night starts asking the other ISIS member why he didn't do what he'd asked. He gets angry. And so on. "We had to understand, how did all of that work?" Buckner said. "And so, what is the best way to cause confusion online?" The ideas that flowed up from operators like Neil were endless. Let's drain their cellphone batteries; or insert photographs into videos that weren't supposed to be there. Task Force ARES would watch, react and adjust its plans. It would change passwords, or buy domain names, delete content, all in a way that made it (mostly) look like it was just run-of-the mill IT problems. "Pinwheels of death; the network's working really slow," Cardon couldn't help smiling as he went through the list. "People get frustrated." According to three people who were privy to after-action reports, ISIS's media operation was a shadow of its former self six months after Neil said "Fire" to start Operation Glowing Symphony. Most of the media operations servers were down and the group had not been able to reconstitute them. There were lots of reasons for that, not the least of which is that getting a new server in the middle of a war zone deep inside Syria isn't easy to do. ISIS had plenty of cash but few credit cards, bank accounts or reputable emails that would allow it to order new servers from outside the country. Buying new domain names, which are used to identify IP addresses, is also complicated.
ISIS's popular online magazine, Dabiq, started missing deadlines and eventually folded. The group's foreign-language websites — in everything from Bengali to Urdu — also never came back up. The mobile app for Amaq Agency, the group's official news service, vanished.
Temple-Raston ’19, Dina Temple-Raston, NPR, 26 September 2016, NPR Interview, https://www.npr.org/2019/09/26/764548436/how-a-classified-u-s-military-operation-hacked-isis
TEMPLE-RASTON: Well, Operation Glowing Symphony was launched in November 2016. We'd heard a little bit about it before now. But what we know now because of our reporting is that it's thought to be the largest and longest offensive cyber operation ever in U.S. history, that the military has ever launched. Cyber operators behind it, Task Force ARES, were using, like, these incredibly ordinary hacks to do it. Now, we hear about zero days or we hear about exploits or tools that NSA builds to get into cyber operations or in networks. In this case, they just used the kinds of things that hackers use, phishing emails and backdoor exploits and that sort of thing, to get inside of ISIS' network. This is how a commander named Neil, who we talked to, talked about the operation. NEIL: And we're crossing names off the list. We're crossing accounts off the list. We're crossing IPs off the list. They were running back and forth on scratch pieces of yellow paper, and I had stacks of paper coming up on the corner of my desk. I knew in about the first 15 minutes that we were on pace to accomplish exactly what we needed to accomplish. TEMPLE-RASTON: And what they accomplished was, basically, they took over these 10 core accounts that these administrators for ISIS were using to basically send out everything - their videos, their tweets, their financial transactions. And once they took those over, ISIS had no access to them. They were frozen in cyberspace. INSKEEP: Why concentrate on their media operation? TEMPLE-RASTON: Well, the media operation - basically, ISIS had been able to weaponize the Internet like no other terrorist group ever had. They had videos. They had tweets. They even had a streaming radio station, and all this was incredibly popular with young Muslims around the world. And it was so effective in 2015 and 2016 that recruits were literally lining up at the Turkish border trying to get into Syria to join the group. So what Glowing Symphony decided to do was to stop that and basically do that by taking down their system. And we got a rare interview with NSA Director General Paul Nakasone. And he told us that, even today, the U.S. is still inside ISIS' networks. This is what he said. PAUL NAKASONE: We were going to make sure that anytime ISIS was going to raise money or communicate with their followers, we were going to be there.
Work ’19, JD Work, Atlantic Council, 17 September 2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-american-way-of-cyber-warfare-and-the-case-of-isis/
There is no mistaking: this is combat between organizations. The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) is a product of utterly modern global communications networks welded to an ideologically twisted variant of a medieval governance model. The systematic nature of the group’s activities in cyberspace comes through clearly in the Operation Glowing Symphony (OGS) declassified concept of operations (CONOPS) and associated briefings. These are functions essential to ISIS’s survival as an organization—internal communications, foreign fighter recruitment, fanatic lone wolves, and the promotion of its global brand for fundraising and material support. The documents make notable reference to the underexplored role of ISIS cadres in acquiring and administering the group’s technology infrastructure, as well as brief mention of the group’s aspirational cyber espionage and attack capabilities. These ISIS members would naturally be a target for operations intended to disrupt and degrade key terrorist activities. The distribution of the ISIS’s online presence also illustrates the importance of global relationships in contemporary cyber conflict. No fight can be pursued without support from allies and partners—particularly when targets cut across traditionally segmented law enforcement or diplomatic instruments. While coalition members may approach operations in different ways, it is apparent that these relationships—including processes for notification and coordination—are featured prominently in these operations.
Bate ’17, American Security Project, Laura Bate, 16 June 2017, https://www.americansecurityproject.org/fighting-isis-in-cyberspace/
A strong defense is always important, but particularly given ISIS’s limited cyber capacity, offensive tools are available as well. Offensive Cyber Operations To better understand the array of cyber options available against ISIS, observers can turn to a small handful of somewhat more informative comments from government officials. As early as last year, then-Secretary of Defense Ash Carter mentioned tools to “to cause them to lose confidence in their networks, to overload their network so that they can’t function.” This sounds like what is typically known as a denial of service (DoS) attack, which may appear to be a bit of an anemic strike; typically, this just brings down a website or server temporarily. However, on the ground, the consequences of website outages can be very real. In addition to inhibiting communication between members of the organization, this could also bring down media platforms critical to recruiting. Recent disclosures suggest that the NSA may have more precise mechanisms for taking down websites. According to recent reports, Operation Global Symphony allowed the Pentagon to deny ISIS access to its own propaganda outlets and delete content that could be used for recruiting. Researchers indicate that “the ISIS brand is contracting,” and with it, “ISIS’ international recruitment rate has collapsed.” Branding matters, and it is not difficult to imagine how U.S. offensive cyber tools may have helped break down ISIS’s capacity for propaganda.
2 – Funding
Windrem and Arkin ’19, Robert Windrem and William Arkin, 1 May 2016, NBC News, https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/how-beat-isis-blow-money-n564956
The U.S. has quietly turned to a new strategy in fighting ISIS — follow the money, then blow it up, U.S. officials tell NBC News. At least four times in the past four months, U.S. military jets have targeted major ISIS financial centers, destroying them in strikes that have turned millions of U.S. dollars into confetti. The U.S. has also killed ISIS financial leaders — its "oil minister" in 2015 and its "finance minister" in March. The strikes are the fruit of a secret cyber war in which the U.S. is tracking, manipulating and even stealing or destroying the financial assets of terrorists. Five years after the SEAL raid that killed Osama bin Laden on May 1, 2011, it's a subtle shift from the U.S. strategy against al Qaeda in which degrading the operational leadership was the priority. Just as unraveling the courier network was critical to tracking bin Laden, the cyber efforts against the ISIS financial network are critical to upending ISIS, say U.S. officials. Unlike al Qaeda, ISIS is trying to run a government and control a big chunk of land, and it has a constant need for hard currency to pay its fighters and bureaucrats and feed its population. The war is not just about tracing the movement of money but the movement of individuals linked to the cash. It's part of what CIA Director John Brennan calls a broader cyber effort against ISIS. "They are murderers and we need to be able to change this narrative — including in the cyber environment, the digital domain, in social media," said Brennan. "It is a question of what type of activities might take place in that cyber environment that we would be able to carry out destructive actions against." Financial transactions, one senior intelligence official tells NBC News, have become one of the most lucrative forms of intelligence on personal relations, foreign fighter movements, and sources of supply. The intelligence community tracks ISIS financial transactions through data collection programs with such secret code names as "Kaching" (CIA), "TRACKFIN" (NSA) and FINO (the National Clandestine Service). Newly created electronic portals for the processing of what is now called financial intelligence (or FININT) — Swordfish, QLIX/HYDRA and Sentry, among others — fuse together conventional banking, transaction and intercepted data. But the most visible actions against ISIS came earlier this year. Starting in January, after a series of strikes on ISIS oil production and distribution assets, the U.S. began targeting financial facilities. On January 11, a coalition airstrike destroyed an ISIS "cash and finance distribution center" in a nondescript building in Mosul, the Northern Iraqi city of 2 million controlled by the group. Video shows missiles hitting the building in the middle of the night, sending a plume of shredded U.S. cash, mostly $100 bills, hundreds of feet into the air. The senior intelligence official said as much as $50 million in financial assets was destroyed in that attack, including $35 million in U.S. paper currency and Euros. The amount is equal to about one-fifth of what the U.S. estimates ISIS looted from Iraqi banks when they ransacked Mosul in June 2014. “You can bet that (ISIS) is feeling the strain on its checkbook,” said CENTCOM commander Gen. Lloyd J. Austin III, describing the first “money bomb.” “We estimate that it served to deprive ISIL (ISIS) of millions of dollars.” U.S. officials say it was no coincidence that a few days later, President Obama referred indirectly to the targeting of money in his State of the Union speech. While describing (and defending) progress against ISIS, he mentioned going after financing first on his list of successes, before airstrikes on fighters, plot disruptions, even before efforts to stop the flow of foreign volunteers.
3 – Kinetic Strikes
Cox ’18, Matthew Cox, military.com, 25 May 2018, https://www.military.com/dodbuzz/2018/05/25/us-coalition-forces-used-cyberattacks-hunt-down-isis-command-posts.html
U.S. and coalition forces launched cyberattacks last year to help identify and destroy several command posts of Islamic State leaders, according to the former head of the task force to defeat ISIS in Iraq and Syria. "This is a vignette that actually played out during and after the battle of Mosul and after the battle of Raqqa," said Gen. Stephen Townsend, who commanded Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve in 2017. Townsend, who now commands Army Training and Doctrine Command, described the multi-domain operation to an audience at the Association of the United States Army's LANPAC Symposium and Exposition in Hawaii. U.S. and coalition forces were scouring the middle Euphrates River Valley, between Al Qa'im in Iraq and Raqqa in Syria, in search of command posts used by ISIS leaders, Townsend said. Friendly forces had located the enemy's primary command post in the area but couldn't find the enemy's alternate sites. "We knew that the enemy had alternate command posts, but we didn't know where they were," Townsend said. "So rather than strike the primary command post and then have the enemy be unknown to us for a while while we reacquired where he went to, one of the subordinate units proposed that we use ... capabilities from space and cyber to deny the enemy's primary command post, forcing him to move to and unveil his alternate command posts," he explained. The plan worked, Townsend said. When the enemy moved, "we struck the alternate command posts kinetically with lethal fires once we identified them, and we worked our way backward to the primary command post." The coordinated strikes were a clear example of multi-domain operations, formally known as multi-domain battle, a strategy U.S. military leaders stress as the key to surviving future wars with near-peer adversaries such as Russia and China.
Vavra ‘19, Shannon “US cyber-offensve use against ISIS continues, and eyes are now on Afghanistan” Cyberscoop. 09/17/19. https://www.cyberscoop.com/isis-jtf-ares-cyber-offensive-afghanistan/
As loyalties among Afghanistan’s Islamic extremists continue to shift, the U.S. military may be poised to rely more heavily on offensive cyber capabilities to target one group in particular — the dispersed but still active membership of ISIS, according to one military cyber commander. Joint Task Force ARES, the outfit charged with running joint and coalition cyber-operations against ISIS, is working to uncover information about how the terrorist group continues to operate in Afghanistan, the deputy commander said Monday. “JTF-ARES is in or around where ISIS is operating,” Brig. Gen. Len Anderson said during a question and answer at an Atlantic Council event Monday. “We are trying to illuminate the network, trying to figure out how they’re communicating, what they’re using, where the money might be flowing, is there money.” Although the Islamic State’s physical caliphate has been crushed in Iraq and Syria, reporting from the Defense Intelligence Agency this year says the group still has a network of thousands of insurgents in Iraq and Syria, as well as militia in Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Security experts are concerned that ISIS is gaining momentum in Afghanistan in part because of the Trump administration’s efforts to establish a peace deal with the Taliban, according to the Financial Times. Taliban hardliners reportedly have been defecting to ISIS in Afghanistan, also known as ISIS-Khorasan or ISIS-K, over concerns the Taliban will establish a deal with the U.S. in exchange for counterterrorism help. Anderson would not discuss specific cyber-operations JTF-ARES is using against ISIS now. The task force was established cyber attacks were used in 2016 to cripple ISIS digitally by developing malware and other tools to knock out computer and communications equipment. Known operations have included an operation in 2017 in which U.S. and coalition forces used digital means to shut down ISIS command posts one by one for two years, forcing ISIS to reveal alternate command posts in Iraq and Syria. This whichallowed the Department of Defense to launch traditional military attacks against the outposts. Other capabilities include obtaining terrorists’ credentials, deleting their files, or disrupting their online campaigns, according to The Washington Post. While prospects for peace in Afghanistan appear to have stalled — President Donald Trump announced earlier this month that he canceled secret talks with the Taliban — Anderson said cyber-operations from the Department of Defense could play a larger role moving forward if the Trump administration follows through on a promise to withdraws troops from the region. “When we don’t have drones or … we don’t have an actual task force or any other other kinetic option, our only option to go in and get after these terrorists is going to be through non-kinetic means or through JTF-ARES,” Anderson told CyberScoop after his remarks. “With ISIS or really ISIS in any region, as we look at the possibility of U.S. forces even leaving, there’s opportunities for us at JTF-ARES.” It is unclear if the proposal to drawdown troops in Afghanistan will come to fruition without a peace deal. After 18 years of war, the U.S. has approximately 14,000 troops in Afghanistan. “Now as that physical caliphate has gone away we’re focused on the digital caliphate which is worldwide, it’s global, and that’s where JTF-ARES is going to be,” he said, noting ISIS-K terrorists in Afghanistan “are one of the higher threats as far as the organizations across ISIS.” ISIS-K terrorists, whose first activity was recorded in 2015, have developed a pattern of attacking vulnerable targets. Just last month the group claimed responsibility for the bombing at a wedding in Afghanistan. In 2017 it was a mosque in Afghanistan; in 2016, a civil hospital in Pakistan; in 2015, a bus.
Duffy ’18, Ryan Duffy, Dyberscoop, 29 May 2018, https://www.cyberscoop.com/u-s-official-reveals-military-combined-cyber-kinetic-operations-hunt-isis/
U.S. Cyber Command, the country’s leading cyberwarfare force, was involved in secretly launching a series of cyberattacks against the terrorist group in 2017 that knocked out its computer systems in Iraq, said Gen. Stephen Townsend, the former commander of the Army’s anti-ISIS coalition. The tactic caused ISIS personnel to leave their heavy command posts, exposing them to attack with kinetic weapons such as missile strikes, Townsend said. The general discussed the covert operation in detail for the first time last week. His comments were first reported by Military.com. It’s unclear how often the U.S. military or its allies use such a combination of tactics against enemy forces, and it’s rare for top officials to even discuss such operations. The general — who commanded Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve in 2017 — told an audience of Hawaii conference-goers via teleconference that the coalition cyberattacks leveled against ISIS were part of “a multi-domain operation that unfolded in air, land, sea, cyberspace and space.” As United States-led forces rebuffed ISIS advances, overtook its territorial holdings and prepared to mount a final offensive, they determined that the Euphrates River Valley was where the terrorist group would make a last stand. Coalition forces combed through a wide swath of land, from Al Qa’im, Iraq to Raqqa, Syria, for ISIS outposts. Though they located the primary command, they couldn’t find other subcommand posts in the area. “We knew they existed, but we didn’t know where they were,” Townsend said. Instead of hitting the primary command post with a missile or special forces raid and risk not finding the other hidden outposts, the task force enlisted “capabilities from space and cyber to deny the enemy’s primary command post, forcing him to move and unveil his alternate command posts,” said Townsend. As ISIS militants scattered to peripheral posts, they unmasked the locations. From there, the task force moved in and struck. ‘Evolutionary not revolutionary’ Since the operation dovetailed into a larger campaign that included intelligence gathering, special forces, overhead surveillance and boots on the ground, it can be best described as an instance of “cyber in warfare” rather than outright cyberwarfare, said Rick Forno, assistant director of the Center for Cybersecurity at University of Maryland, Baltimore County. “Instead of blowing up an outpost with a bomb or missile, maybe we’re able to go in and disrupt the operations with a less lethal way of doing it. That’s not revolutionary, that’s evolutionary – using a new tool to achieve the same outcome,” Forno told CyberScoop. But in many ways, the ongoing cyber campaign against ISIS represents a first. U.S. leaders have publicly touted similar operations in the past, which is especially rare for these types of covert activities. “We are dropping cyber bombs,” Robert Work, then-deputy secretary of defense, told the New York Times in 2016. “We have never done that before.” And former President Barrack Obama referenced the attacks in one public speech in 2016. “The role of cyber-capabilities in joint military operations is something that’s been talked about for a long time. The campaign against the Islamic State probably represents one of the more visible examples of those capabilities in action,” said Ben Buchanan, a postdoctoral fellow at Harvard’s Belfer Center. For some time, the DOD has sought to combine cyber-operations with its more conventional military capabilities, planning and strategy. It has integrated cyber teams — both deployed and stateside — with regional commands over the last 12 months. “Historically, cyberspace operations have been stovepiped and executed independently. As the domain has matured, we have started integrating cyber-operations into all of our planning efforts,” Gen. Joseph Votel, commander of U.S. Central Command, which covers parts of the Middle East and Central Asia, said in September 2017. More broadly, the ISIS vignette also sheds light on the Pentagon’s push to ready its forces for so-called “multi-domain operations.”
Pomerlau ’19, Mark Pomerlau, 17 September 2019, https://www.c4isrnet.com/dod/cybercom/2019/09/17/how-cyber-command-can-limit-the-reach-of-isis/
The U.S. military’s digital team tasked with targeting ISIS is now focused on providing agencies intelligence that will help identify specific individuals and that will limit the group’s financing. “About 90 percent of what we do is intelligence,” Brig. Gen. Len Anderson, deputy commander of Joint Task Force-Ares, said Sept. 16. Joint Task Force-Ares is the U.S. Cyber Command digital offensive against ISIS that worked hand-in-hand with the kinetic operations as part of Operation Inherent Resolve, the global coalition tasked with ridding the group from Iraq and Syria. Originally run by Army Cyber Command, Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace Command was tasked with the mission in the fall of 2018. Anderson explained that the task force has to be everywhere ISIS is and it needs to provide intelligence and battlefield options to military commanders as well as senior leaders who are interested in thwarting the group’s global presence. “Now, as that physical caliphate has gone away, we’re focused on the digital caliphate, which is worldwide … that’s where JTF-Ares is going to be," Anderson said. Anderson said Ares can provide unique intelligence. First, the team can feed information to national agencies. Equating his cyber operators to pilots, he said on the way to a mission, the cyber operators are observing what ISIS is doing online. This could include suspicious terrorist financing that needs to be examined further. “We push all this intelligence right back into the overall national intelligence data. That could be used by Department of State, Department of Treasury, anybody else to get a Treasury designation – that’s a win for JTF-Ares,” Anderson said. “I might not have had to hit an enter key and destroy anybody’s server … but if I can get a terrorist designation on somebody and make it harder for them to move their money across the internet, I won in that particular realm. We’re not letting them operate unfettered out there.” Second, Ares can potentially provide the necessarily intelligence to forces around the world where troops are not on the ground. For example, in Afghanistan, Ares could help make up for a lack of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance forces or a lack of kinetic forces. “Our only option to go in and get after these terrorists is going to be through non-kinetic means or through Joint Task Force-Ares,” he said. In regards to other terrorist organizations, Anderson said while they are “studying” what al-Qaeda is doing, Ares has to prioritize threats given its resources. “Right now, as far as threats to the West or external operations, it’s going to be primarily ISIS focused. They’re the ones that are most dangerous to us now,” he said. “Due to our broad partnership across the counterterrorism industry and not only that but with the National Counterterrorism Center we are aware and will be prepared to act with al-Qaeda or al-Qaeda operatives.”
Impacts
Kirkpatrick and Schmitt ’19, David D Kirkpatrick and Eric Schmitt, New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/21/world/middleeast/isis-syria-us.html
Now, analysts say that Mr. Trump’s pullout has handed the Islamic State its biggest win in more than four years and greatly improved its prospects. With American forces rushing for the exits, in fact, American officials said last week that they were already losing their ability to collect critical intelligence about the group’s operations on the ground. “There is no question that ISIS is one of the big winners in what is happening in Syria,” said Lina Khatib, director of the Middle East and North Africa Program at Chatham House, a research center in London.
Jamieson ’16, Alastair Jamieson, 19 January 2016, NBC News, https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/isis-death-toll-18-800-killed-iraq-2-years-u-n499426
At least 18,802 civilians have been killed in Iraq in ISIS-linked violence in under two years, a United Nations report said Tuesday — with millions of others forced from their homes and thousands more held as slaves. “The violence suffered by civilians in Iraq remains staggering,” said the report by the Office of the United Nations High Comissioner for Human Rights PDF link here. ISIS continues to commit “systematic and widespread violence and abuses of international human rights law and humanitarian law,” it said, adding that some of those act amount “crimes against humanity, and possibly genocide.” U.N. monitors recorded at least 55,047 civilian casualties as a result of the conflict between Jan. 1, 2014 and Oct. 31, 2015, with 18,802 people killed and 36,245 wounded, it said. Over the same period, 3.2 million people became “internally displaced” including over one million school-age girls and boys. “The persistent violence and scale of the displacement” limit their access to housing, clean water and education, the report said. It also documented human rights abuses, saying some 3,500 people are believed to be held as captives, mostly women and children from the Yazidi religious minority who have been forced into sexual slavery
Vavra ‘19, Shannon “US cyber-offensve use against ISIS continues, and eyes are now on Afghanistan” Cyberscoop. 09/17/19. https://www.cyberscoop.com/isis-jtf-ares-cyber-offensive-afghanistan/
As loyalties among Afghanistan’s Islamic extremists continue to shift, the U.S. military may be poised to rely more heavily on offensive cyber capabilities to target one group in particular — the dispersed but still active membership of ISIS, according to one military cyber commander. Joint Task Force ARES, the outfit charged with running joint and coalition cyber-operations against ISIS, is working to uncover information about how the terrorist group continues to operate in Afghanistan, the deputy commander said Monday. “JTF-ARES is in or around where ISIS is operating,” Brig. Gen. Len Anderson said during a question and answer at an Atlantic Council event Monday. “We are trying to illuminate the network, trying to figure out how they’re communicating, what they’re using, where the money might be flowing, is there money.” Although the Islamic State’s physical caliphate has been crushed in Iraq and Syria, reporting from the Defense Intelligence Agency this year says the group still has a network of thousands of insurgents in Iraq and Syria, as well as militia in Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Security experts are concerned that ISIS is gaining momentum in Afghanistan in part because of the Trump administration’s efforts to establish a peace deal with the Taliban, according to the Financial Times. Taliban hardliners reportedly have been defecting to ISIS in Afghanistan, also known as ISIS-Khorasan or ISIS-K, over concerns the Taliban will establish a deal with the U.S. in exchange for counterterrorism help. Anderson would not discuss specific cyber-operations JTF-ARES is using against ISIS now. The task force was established cyber attacks were used in 2016 to cripple ISIS digitally by developing malware and other tools to knock out computer and communications equipment. Known operations have included an operation in 2017 in which U.S. and coalition forces used digital means to shut down ISIS command posts one by one for two years, forcing ISIS to reveal alternate command posts in Iraq and Syria. This which allowed the Department of Defense to launch traditional military attacks against the outposts. Other capabilities include obtaining terrorists’ credentials, deleting their files, or disrupting their online campaigns, according to The Washington Post. While prospects for peace in Afghanistan appear to have stalled — President Donald Trump announced earlier this month that he canceled secret talks with the Taliban — Anderson said cyber-operations from the Department of Defense could play a larger role moving forward if the Trump administration follows through on a promise to withdraws troops from the region. “When we don’t have drones or … we don’t have an actual task force or any other other kinetic option, our only option to go in and get after these terrorists is going to be through non-kinetic means or through JTF-ARES,” Anderson told CyberScoop after his remarks. “With ISIS or really ISIS in any region, as we look at the possibility of U.S. forces even leaving, there’s opportunities for us at JTF-ARES.” It is unclear if the proposal to drawdown troops in Afghanistan will come to fruition without a peace deal. After 18 years of war, the U.S. has approximately 14,000 troops in Afghanistan. “Now as that physical caliphate has gone away we’re focused on the digital caliphate which is worldwide, it’s global, and that’s where JTF-ARES is going to be,” he said, noting ISIS-K terrorists in Afghanistan “are one of the higher threats as far as the organizations across ISIS.” ISIS-K terrorists, whose first activity was recorded in 2015, have developed a pattern of attacking vulnerable targets. Just last month the group claimed responsibility for the bombing at a wedding in Afghanistan. In 2017 it was a mosque in Afghanistan; in 2016, a civil hospital in Pakistan; in 2015, a bus.
Crowcroft ’15, 17 June 2015, https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/isis-worst-refugee-crisis-generation-millions-flee-islamic-state-iraq-syria-1506613
The rise of Islamic State (Isis) has displaced over 3.3 million people in Iraq alone, with millions more fleeing Syria for Lebanon, Turkey and the Gulf, and many of them risking perilous journeys to Europe via Egypt, Libya and the Mediterranean. It was reported in 2015 that asylum applications to rich countries reached their highest level for over two decades in 2014, with 866,000 applications lodged, an increase of 45 on 2013 and two-thirds of those in the European Union. | 904,886 |
365,729 | 379,800 | 5 - MAR - Water-Cyber NC | C1 Water
Cooper ‘08
William and Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review. “Nuclear Nonsense: Why Nuclear Power is No Answer to Climate Change and the World's Post Kyoto Energy Challenges.” https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1040andcontext=wmelpr
With electricity demand expected to grow by approximately fifty percent in the next twenty-five years, continuing to rely on nuclear generators could create a water scarcity crisis. In 2006, the DOE warned that consumption of water for electricity production could more than double by 2030 to 7.3 billion gallons per day in the U.S., if new power plants continue to be built with evaporative cooling.35' This amount is equal to the entire country's water consumption in 1995. 352 The nuclear industry's vast appetite for water has serious consequences, both for human consumption and the environment. Assuming the latest Census Bureau projections, the U.S. population is expected to grow byaboutseventymillionpeopleinthenexttwenty-fiveyears.3 3Suchpopu- lation growth is already threatening to overwhelm existing supplies of fresh and potable water. "Few new reservoirs have been built since 1980... and some regions have seen groundwater levels drop as much as 300 to 900 feet over the past fifty years."354 Further, "most state water managers expect either local or regional water shortages within the next 10 years," according to a recent survey, even under "normal" conditions." In fact, about forty-eight percent ofthe continental U.S. reported drought conditions during the summer of 2002.356 Three stages of the nuclear fuel cycle-uranium milling and mining, plant operation, and nuclear waste storage~-~-consume, withdraw, and contaminate water supplies. As a result of this vast need for water, most nuclear facilities cannot operate during droughts 357 and in some cases can actually cause water shortages.3 Uranium mining, the process of extracting uranium ore from the ground, is extremely water intensive. Since the necessary concentrations of uranium are mostly prevalent at very low concentrations, uranium mining is volume intensive. The problem is that such mining practices can greatly damage and degrade local water supplies. Early mining tech- niques were very similar to other hard rock mining such as copper, gold, and silver, and involved the creation of underground mines. Open-pit mining, the most prevalent type of uranium extraction in the world today, ceased in the U.S. in 1992 due to concerns about environmental contami- nation and the quality of uranium, as most ore found in the U.S. was lower grade uranium from sandstone deposits.5 9 Currently, uranium miners use only one type oftechnique to extract uranium ore in Wyoming, Nebraska, and Texas: in-situ leaching. Uranium miners perform in-situ leaching by pumping liquids into the area surrounding uranium deposits. These liquids often include acid or alkaline solutions to weaken the calcium or sandstone surrounding ura- nium ore.36' Operators then pump the uranium up into recovery wells at the surface, where it is collected. 62 In-situ leaching was deemed more cost effective than underground mining because it avoids the significant expense ofexcavating underground sites and often takes less time to implement. 63 In 2005, nuclear power plants produced an annual output of 781,986 MWh requiring more than thirty million gallons ofwater per day for uranium mining and processing around the world.36' Even though the bulk of these mining and processing facilities are outside of the U.S., the DOE estimates that three to five million gallons ofwater per day are still associated with mining and processing of uranium within the country Nuclear reactors also require massive supplies of water to cool reactor cores and spent nuclear fuel rods, and they use the most water compared to all other electricity generating facilities, including conven- tional coal and natural gas facilities.366 Because much of the water used by nuclear plants is turned to steam, substantial amounts are lost to the local water cycle entirely. One nuclear plant in Georgia, for example, "withdraws an average of 57 million gallons every day from the Altamaha River... but actually 'consumes' 33 million gallons per day from the local supply, that is lost as water vapor"'3-enough to service more than 179,000 Georgia homes."' The Shearon Harris nuclear reactor, operated by Progress Energy in New Hill, North Carolina, near Raleigh, sucks up thirty-three million gallons a day, and loses seventeen million gallons per day due to evaporation." 9 Duke Energy's McGuire Plant on Lake Norman, North Carolina, uses more than two billion gallons of water per day."' Southern Company's Joseph M. Farley nuclear plant in Dothan, Alabama, consumes about forty-six million gallons of water per day, primarily as evaporative loss.371
Sovacool ‘08
William and Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review. “Nuclear Nonsense: Why Nuclear Power is No Answer to Climate Change and the World's Post Kyoto Energy Challenges.” https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1040andcontext=wmelpr
Nuclear plants do not just use water-they also contaminate water it at multiple points of in the cooling cycle: at the point of intake, at the point of discharge, and during unexpected accidents. At the point of intake, nuclear plants bring water into the cooling cycle through filtering structures. To minimize the entry of debris, water is often drawn through screens.374 Seals, sea lions, endangered manatees, American crocodiles, sea turtles, fish, larvae, shellfish, and other riparian or marine organisms are frequently killed as they are trapped against the screens in a process known as impingement.375 Organisms small enough to pass through the screens can be swept up in the water flow where they are subject to mechanical, thermal and toxic stress in a process known as entrainment.376 Billions ofsmaller marine organisms, essential to the food web, are sucked into nuclear reactor systems and destroyed. Smaller fish, fish larvae, spawn, and a tremendous volume of other marine organisms are frequently pulverized by reactor condenser systems. One study esti- mated that more than 90 are scalded and discharged back into the water as lifeless sediment that clouds the water around the discharge area, blocking light from reaching the ocean or river floor, which further kills plant and animal life by curtailing photosynthesis and the production of 377 oxygen During periods oflow water levels, power plants induce even more environmental damage. Nuclear plants must extend intake pipes further into rivers and lakes, but as they approach the bottom of the water source, "they often suck up sediment, fish, and other debris... "371 Impingement and entrainment consequently account for substantial losses of fish and exact severe environmental consequences during the riparian environ- ment's most vulnerable times. For example, federal environmental studies of entrainment during the 1980s at five power plants on the Hudson River in New York estimated grave year-class reductions in fish populations-the percent offish killed within a given age class.379 One study concluded that the power plants were responsible for age reductions as high as 79for some species.8 ° "An updated analysis of entrainment completed in 2000 at three of these plants estimated year-class reductions of 20 percent for striped bass, 25 percent for bay anchovy, and 43 percent for Atlantic tom cod. . ...,' Another study "evaluated entrainment and impingement impacts at nine . . . facilities along a 500 mile stretch of the Ohio River."3 2 The authors estimated that approximately 11.6 million fish were killed an- nually through impingement and 24.4 million fish from entrainment.3 The study calculated recreational related losses at about $8.1 million per year.3 4 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") calculated impingement losses at the Delaware Estuary Watershed at more than 9.6 million age-one equivalents of fish every year, or a loss of 332,000 pounds offishery yield.385 The EPA calculated that entrainment related losses were even larger at 616 million fish, or a loss of sixteen million pounds ofcatch.38 Put into monetary value, the recreational fishing loss from impingement and entrainment at nuclear facilities was estimated to be about $5 million per year.38 ' Scientists also calculated that the cooling intake systems at the Crystal River Power Plant in Florida, ajoint nuclear and coal facility, kill about twenty-three tons offish and shellfish every year.88 Top predators, such as gulf flounder and stingray "have either disappeared or changed their feeding patterns.3 8 9 In other parts of Florida, the economic losses induced from four power plants-Big Bend, PL Bartow, FJ Gannon, and Hookers Point-are estimated to be as high as $18.1 million.3s Similarly, in Southern California, marine biologists and ecologists found "that the San Onofre nuclear plant impinged nearly 3.5 million fish in 2003 ....391 As a less noticed but equally important impact, water intake and discharge often alter natural patterns of water levels and flows. Such flows, part ofthe hydrological cycle, have a natural variability that differs daily, weekly, and seasonally.392 Plants and animals have adapted to these fluctuations, and such variability is a key component ofecosystem health.39 3 Withdrawals and discharges alter this natural cycle by removing water during drought conditions or discharging it at different times ofthe year with potentially serious, albeit not well-understood, consequences to eco- system and habitat health.3 94 Interestingly, in some cases the environment has fought back, literally. "In September 1984, a flotilla of jellyfish 'attacked' the St. Lucie nuclear plant in Florida, forcing both of its reactors to shut down for several days due to lack of cooling water. At the point of discharge, nuclear plant operators often treat cooling water with chlorine, anti-fouling, anti-microbial, and water condi- tioning agents "to limit the growth ofmineral and microbial deposits that reduce... its heat transfer efficiency,"396 while "re-circulating water is treated with chlorine and biocides" to improve efficiency and eliminate nuisance organisms.39 7 What makes such treated water so effective in kill- ing unwanted species, however, also makes it a potent "killer ofl non- target organisms as well."398 Chlorine, biocides, and "their byproducts... present in discharged water plumes... which are often toxic to aquatic life even at low concentrations."3 99 In addition, discharged cooling water is usually higher in temperature than intake waters, "making electric utilities the largest thermal discharger in the U.S."4 °° Significant temperature differ- ences between the intake water and its discharge, or temperature deltas, "can contribute to destruction of vegetation, increased algae growth
Wareham and Green ‘07
Green, Jim and Wareham, Sue. Oct 28 2007. “Nuclear power and water scarcity.” Science Alert. https://www.sciencealert.com/nuclear-power-and-water-scarcity
Less well known is the fact that nuclear power is the most water-hungry of all energy sources, with a single reactor consuming 35-65 million litres of water each day. Water scarcity is already a serious problem for Australia's power-generation industry, largely because of our heavy reliance on water-guzzling coal-fired plants. Current problems in Australia's power industry resulting from water shortages include: expensive long-distance water haulage to some power plants as local supplies dwindle; reduced electrical generating capacity and output at some coal and hydro plants; higher and more volatile electricity prices; increased risks of blackouts; and intensified competition for water between power plants, agriculture, industries, and environmental flows. Introducing nuclear power would exacerbate those problems. A December 2006 report by the Commonwealth Department of Parliamentary Services notes that the water requirements for a nuclear power station are 20-83 per cent higher than for other power stations. Moreover, those calculations do not include water consumption by uranium mines. The Roxby Downs mine in South Australia uses 35 million litres of water each day, with plans to increase this to 150 million litres each day. Mine operator BHP Billiton does not pay one cent for this water despite recording a record $17 billion profit in 2006-07. Australia can ill-afford to replace one thirsty industry, coal, with an even thirstier one, nuclear power.
Environment America ‘12
Environment America Research and Policy Fund. “Too Close to Home Nuclear Power and the Threat to Drinking Water.” https://environmentamericacenter.org/sites/environment/files/reports/Nukes20and20H2020vUS.pdf
According to the new report, “Too Close to Home: Nuclear Power and the Threat to Drinking Water,” the drinking water for 49 million Americans is within 50 miles of an active nuclear power plant – the distance the Nuclear Regulatory Commission uses to measure risk to food and water supplies. Major cities, including New York, Boston, Philadelphia, San Diego, Cleveland and Detroit receive their drinking water from sources within 50 miles of a nuclear plant. Radiation from a disaster like the one in Fukushima can contaminate drinking water and food supplies, as well as harm our health. But disaster or no disaster, and a common leak at a nuclear power plant can also threatens theeir drinking water for millions of people, and as our nuclear facilities get older, leaks are more common. In fact, 75 percent of U.S. nuclear plants have leaked tritium, a radioactive form of hydrogen that can cause cancer and genetic defects.
Lydersen ‘16
Kari Lydersen, 9 Sept 2016, Energy News Network, https://energynews.us/2016/09/09/midwest/nuclear-plants-feel-the-heat-of-warming-water/
Nuclear power proponents say the energy source is crucial to reducing the impact of climate change. But ironically, “We’ll have to solve global warming if we want to keep using nuclear power,” says Union of Concerned Scientists nuclear safety expert Dave Lochbaum. That’s because nuclear power plants need large amounts of water for cooling, and overheating can present a major safety risk. As the lakes and rivers that typically supply cooling water become hotter thanks to climate change — and as droughts dry up some water bodies — nuclear power plants face problems, researchers say. They may need to temporarily shut down or scale back their generation on hot days, which is just when their power is needed most. This challenge is the focus of ongoing research spearheaded by Oak Ridge National Laboratory and also involves the national laboratories at Sandia, Los Alamos and Argonne. Researchers are modeling predictions about population, temperature, electricity demand, precipitation, land use and other factors to predict the water-related stress on power plants. “You need to have enough water to cool the power plants and have drinking water and water for agriculture and other industries,” said Melissa Allen, a leader of the team effort and a post-doctoral researcher at Oak Ridge’s Climate Change Science Institute. “If you have a rise in temperature mid-century and with that rise in temperature the atmosphere is able to hold more water, it rains less and when it does rain it’s in a huge amount all at once, so much of it is being wasted,” Allen said. “During those droughts expected with climate change you can run into a situation where you may not have enough water. At the same time more water is evaporating from lakes and streams, people need more air conditioning to feel comfortable. So at the same time you have extra demand for that resource, you have less ability to meet it because of water shortage or water temperature.”
Stuckenberg ‘18
David Stuckenberg, 18 May 2018, National Security Journal, https://harvardnsj.org/2018/05/water-scarcity-the-most-understated-global-security-risk/
In 2012, the World Economic Forum elevated water scarcity to a Top 5 global economic risk.25 According to World Bank Group (“WBG”), “water is a vital factor of production, so diminishing water supplies can translate into slower growth . . . . Some regions could see their growth rates decline by as much as 6 percent of GDP by 2050 as a result of water-related losses in agriculture, health, income, and property—sending them into sustained negative growth.”26 Impacts from water scarcity slice through all economic dimensions. The shocks from water cannot be isolated to any one economic sector. This potential requires a new look at water, not as a peripheral contributor to a region’s economic health, but rather a primary enabler. One way of measuring the size of water’s economic importance is comparing it to the amount that nations spend on defense, a statistic that receives much more attention. The twelve nations with the largest defense budgets relative to their GDP spent between 1.0 and 10.4 percent of their nation’s GDP on defense in 2015, for an average of 3.23 of GDP.27 In comparison, a WBG Climate Action Plan projects that by 2050 water scarcity in the Middle East and North Africa (“MENA”) could negatively impact that region’s GDP by up to four times this average.28 Where economic segments are concerned, all supply chains and all sectors are increasingly being impacted negatively by water scarcity. In 2016, the Carbon Data Protocol, a survey of more than 1,200 of the world’s largest companies, noted:
C2 Fire and Fury
A) Terror
Seattle Post ‘08
Seattle Post-Intelligencer, July 18, 2008, p. B6
Along with proliferation, there are terrorist threats to existing nuclear reactors, such as Entergy's controversial Indian Point nuclear plant just 24 miles north of New York City. Lovins calls these "about as fat a terrorist target as you can imagine. It is not necessary to fly a plane into a nuclear plant or storm a plant and take over a control room in order to cause that material to be largely released. You can often do it from outside the site boundary with things the terrorists would have readily available."
Spiegel ‘07
Spiegel Online, July 4, 2007, http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/0,1518,492404,00.html
And with the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) insisting that emissions be drastically reduced by 2050 to prevent the world from warming up by 2 degrees Celsius (3.6 degrees Fahrenheit) the nuclear industry is finding an increasingly warm reception. But now a leading British research group is arguing that any nuclear expansion would only be a drop in the ocean in terms of future energy needs. More importantly, it would dangerously increase the risk of proliferation and terrorist attacks. According to the Oxford Research Group, "Even a small expansion in the use of nuclear power for electricity generation would have serious consequences for the spread of nuclear weapons in countries that do not have them, and for nuclear terrorism."
Beyond Nuclear
Beyond Nuclear, no date, The Nuclear Power Danger (Beyond Nuclear was founded by Dr. Helen Caldicott, )http://www.beyondnuclear.org/nuclearpower.html
The opportunity for theft by terrorists of nuclear materials usable in even a "dirty bomb" would substantially increase if nuclear power is expanded. This could result in a level of destruction hitherto unenvisaged. Reactors are themselves terrorist targets and current ones are not even defended to the level of the 9/11 assault – 19 men in four teams, including air attack scenarios. Thirty-two U.S. reactors have fuel pools on the upper levels of the reactor building, shielded only by sheet metal and an open invitation to air attack.
Grunlond ’07
Lisbeth Grunlond, Union of Concerned Scientists, December 2007, Nuclear Power in a Warming World, http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/global_warming/Nuclear-Power-in-a-Warming-World.pdf
Indeed, if a team of well-trained terrorists forcibly entered a nuclear power plant, within a matter of minutes it could do enough damage to cause a meltdown of the core and a failure of the containment structure. Such an attack would have a devastating and long-lasting impact on public health, the environment, and the economy.
Grunlond ‘07
Lisbeth Grunlond, Union of Concerned Scientists, December 2007, Nuclear Power in a Warming World, http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/global_warming/Nuclear-Power-in-a-Warming-World.pdf
The NRC stages mock attacks to determine if plant owners can defend their reactors against DBT-level attacks. Test results reveal poor performance, and the integrity of the tests themselves is in question. The federal government is responsible for defending against attacks more severe than the DBT, but it has no mechanism for ensuring that it can provide such protection.
B) Cyber
Wolff ’18
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/02/opinion/trumps-reckless-cybersecurity-strategy.html.
The idea of using offensive cyberattacks for defensive purposes is not a new one — discussions about the potential risks and rewards of “hacking back,” especially in the private sector, go back more than five years. But for the American government to embrace this strategy is a sharp change from the cautious, defense-oriented approach of the past decade. President Barack Obama was notably restrained in his authorization of offensive cyber missions. When deciding whether to use the Stuxnet worm to compromise uranium enrichment facilities in Iran in 2010 (his administration’s most famous use of offensive cyber capabilities), he reportedly expressed repeated concerns about the precedent it would set for other countries. The Obama administration’s forbearance and careful decision-making around cyberattack authorization aligns with the 2015 Department of Defense cyber strategy, which identified controlling the escalation of cyber conflicts as a key strategic goal. That goal is conspicuously absent from the Department of Defense’s new strategy.The Trump administration’s shift to an offensive approach is designed to escalate cyber conflicts, and that escalation could be dangerous. Not only will it detract resources and attention from the more pressing issues of defense and risk management, but it will also encourage the government to act recklessly in directing cyberattacks at targets before they can be certain of who those targets are and what they are doing.
Firdosi ’19
Ahad Firdosi, Medium, 3 January 2019, https://medium.com/datadriveninvestor/cybersecurity-2019-artificial-intelligence-and-iot-devices-in-sight-6108b6ba5c27
According to the report, cyber terrorists will exploit Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems and use their techniques to improve attacks. Automated systems powered by AI could probe networks and systems to search for undiscovered vulnerabilities that could be exploited. In turn, the AI could be used to make more sophisticated some phishing attacks and social engineering, from the creation of much more realistic videos and audios or well-designed emails to deceive specific people. This highly credible resource will also easily allow the spread of fake news.
Johnson ’18
Larry Johnson, 21 Dec 2018, https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/325142
In the next few years, artificial intelligence, machine learning and advanced software processes will enable cyber attacks to reach an unprecedented new scale, wreaking untold damage on companies, critical systems and individuals. As dramatic as Atlanta’s March 2018 cyber “hijacking” by ransomware was, this was nothing compared to what is coming down the pike once ransomware and other malware can essentially "think" on their own. This is not a theoretical risk, either. It is already happening. Recent incidents involving Dunkin Donuts' DD Perks program, CheapAir and even the security firm CyberReason's honeypot test showed just a few of the ways automated attacks are emerging “in the wild” and affecting businesses. (A honeypot experiment, according to Wikipedia, is a security mechanism designedto detect, deflect, or, in some manner, counteract attempts at unauthorized use of information systems.) In November, three top antivirus companies also sounded similar alarms. Malwarebytes, Symantec and McAfee all predicted that AI-based cyber attacks would emerge in 2019, and become more and more of a significant threat in the next few years. What this means is that we are on the verge of a new age in cybersecurity, where hackers will be able unleash formidable new attacks using self-directed software tools and processes. These automated attacks on their own will be able to find and breach even well-protected companies, and in vastly shorter time frames than can human hackers. Automated attacks will also reproduce, multiply and spread in order to massively elevate the damage potential of any single breach.
Dixon ’19, Dixon, William. June 19 2019. “3 ways AI will change the nature of cyber attakcs.” World Economic Forum. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/06/ai-is-powering-a-new-generation-of-cyberattack-its-also-our-best-defence/
Not only will AI-driven attacks be much more tailored and consequently more effective, their ability to understand context means they will be even harder to detect. Traditional security controls will be impotent against this new threat, as they can only spot predictable, pre-modelled activity. AI is constantly evolving and will become ever-more resistant to the categorization of threats that remains fundamental to the modus operandi of legacy security approaches. The cybersecurity community is already heavily investing in this new future and is using AI solutions to rapidly detect and contain any emerging cyberthreats that have the potential to disrupt or compromise key data. Defensive AI is not merely a technological advantage in fighting cyberattacks, but a vital ally on this new battlefield. Rather than rely on security personnel to respond to incidents manually, organizations will instead use AI to fight back against a developing problem in the short term, while human teams will oversee the AI’s decision-making and perform remedial work that improves overall resilience in the long term. AI-powered attacks will outpace human response teams and outwit current legacy-based defenses; therefore, the mutually dependent partnership of human and AI will be the bedrock of defense strategies in the future. The battleground of the future is digital, and AI is the undisputed weapon of choice. There is no silver bullet to the generational challenge of cybersecurity, but one thing is clear: only AI can play AI at its own game. The technology is available, and the time to prepare is now.
Wilson Center ’19, April 4 2019. “AI raises the risk of cyberattacks – and the best defense is more AI.” World Economic Forum. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/04/how-ai-raises-the-threat-of-cyberattack-and-why-the-best-defence-is-more-ai-5eb78ba081/
Artificial intelligence promises to accelerate the speed and success rate of cyber attacks by sophisticated actors and eventually by those less-skilled (if off-the-shelf tools are developed and made available). It will also further blur traditionally understood lines between cyber offence and defence. Whichever side better deploys these automated technologies fastest will hold an advantage. AI will bring about attacks for which a majority of the public and many private sector companies will not be prepared. The good news is that the cybersecurity industry is using the same methods for defence. But these services require sustained investment and incentives for evolving cybersecurity defences that do not yet exist at scale. In protecting networks against adversaries, humans will continue to be important players in defending their own networks. But, it is imperative that autonomous systems play a central role in any such strategy. Effectively using artificial intelligence for defensive purposes will require a hybridization of various tactics and tools of both a proactive and responsive nature. Policymakers must encourage analysis of best practices for employing such tools and consider setting standards for their use.
Nuclear Security Index 18
3 Sept 2018, NTI Index, https://ntiindex.org/news-items/cyber-threat-to-nuclear-facilities/
The cyber threat has expanded exponentially in recent years. A series of damaging, high-profile attacks has made headlines around the world, and recent attacks against banking and commerce systems, private companies, and governments highlight the growing gap between the threat and the ability to respond to or manage it. Like all critical infrastructure, nuclear facilities are not immune to cyberattack. That reality is particularly worrisome, however, given the potentially catastrophic consequences of a cyberattack on a nuclear facility. Such an attack could facilitate the theft of nuclear materials or an act of sabotage. For example, facilities’ access control systems could be compromised, allowing the unauthorized entry of persons seeking to obtain nuclear materials or to damage the facility. Accounting systems could be manipulated so that the theft of materials goes unnoticed. Reactor cooling systems could be deliberately disabled, potentially resulting in a Fukushima-like disaster. The pace of cyberattacks, including those involving nuclear facilities, has accelerated in recent years. For example, in 2016, three publicly known cyberattacks or attempts on information systems at nuclear facilities occurred at: the University of Toyama’s Hydrogen Isotope Research Center in Japan; the Gundremmingen Nuclear Power Plant in Germany; and one incident that affected both the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Department of Energy in the United States. In 2017, the Wolf Creek Nuclear Station in Kansas had its business systems compromised in a series of attacks targeting the energy sector. Government authorities and facility operators are struggling to keep pace with this new threat, and national and international guidance is still evolving. As this edition of the NTI Index highlights, some countries are making progress while many others are not. Furthermore, countries with new nuclear programs face additional challenges. Not only do those countries need to establish appropriate regulatory systems, they also must attract or train cyber-nuclear experts, who are in short supply globally. Looking forward, cyber risks to critical infrastructure (including nuclear facilities) will continue to grow, and much more work is needed to address the threat. Nuclear facilities must be protected from dangerous attacks through a combination of technology and expertise, and governments must provide assistance by sharing threat information and surge capacity provided by skilled computer emergency response teams who specialize in responding to computer security incidents.
NPR ‘16
7 April 2016, https://www.npr.org/2016/04/07/473379564/unable-to-compete-on-price-nuclear-power-on-the-decline-in-the-u-s
Renewable energy and new technologies that are making low-carbon power more reliable are growing rapidly in the U.S. Renewables are so cheap in some parts of the country that they're undercutting the price of older sources of electricity such as nuclear power. The impact has been significant on the nuclear industry, and a growing number of unprofitable reactors are shutting down. When the first nuclear power plants went online 60 years ago, nuclear energy seemed like the next big thing.
National Interest ‘19
The official National Commission for Radiation Protection in Ukraine lists two million official “victims” of Chernobyl?—?and claims no fewer than 500,000, including 35,000 liquidators, have died. The commission calculates that the cancer rate for victims is three times the normal rate. Infant mortality for children of victims increased by a third. | 904,902 |
365,730 | 379,817 | 1 - K - Computational Cosmotechnics | The affirmative is a speculative project that smooths the wheels of computational capitalism – their suturing of ethics to politics universalizes a reliance on technics that maintains and reproduces unstable regimes of racial capitalism through their monolithic teleology of technoscience. The collective unconscious of racial capitalism thinks in and through the aff to recreate the very antiblack modes of fascism that they resist.
Beller, 18 (Jonathan Beller, Professor of Humanities and Media Studies and Director of the Graduate Program in Media Studies at Pratt Institute, "Jonathan Beller — The Computational Unconscious" Boundary2, https://www.boundary2.org/2018/08/beller/)
In the new idolatry cathetcted to inexorable computational emergence, the universe is itself currently
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social revolution in planetary communicativity is being farmed and harvested by computational capitalism.
Their mediatic investment in futurity is the intensification of cybernetic feedback, adding to an imperial archive of control and resignification that redeploys the aff in the interests of cybernetic racial capitalism.
Eshun, British-Ghanaian writer, theorist and filmmaker, 3
~Kodwo, Further Considerations of Afrofuturism CR: The New Centennial Review, Volume 3, Number 2, Summer 2003, pp. 287-302 (Article), Published by Michigan State University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/ncr.2003.0021~~//AD
CONTROL THROUGH PREDICTION Fast forward to the early twenty-first century. A cultural
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such statistical delirium reveals the fervid wish dreams of the host market.
The AFF's technological futurism as the conduit to racial liberation re-elaborates anti-black fantasies of mastery and reaffirms the racial-colonial structures of the liberal subject – Turns Case
Atanasoski and Vora 19 ~Neda, Prof. Feminist Studies and Critical, Race, and Ethnic Studies and Legal Studies @ UC Santa Cruz, and Kalindi, Assoc. Prof Gender, Sexuality and Women's Studies and Dir., Feminist Research Institute, Surrogate Humanity: Race, Robots, and the Politics of Technological Futures, pp. 33-8ak47~
This literary history of the robot slave can productively be put into conversation with the
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physical violence against racialized workers in the face of joblessness caused by automation.
The aff codifies the production of sociality into informatic relations that are captured to extend necropolitical cybernetics. This metabolic capture produces bodies as media, linking together melancholic affects with resilient survivalism to routinize capitalist control qua accumulation.
Beller, 17 (Jonathan Beller is the director of the Graduate Program in Media Studies, Pratt Institute, "The Fourth Determination," E-Flux, https://www.e-flux.com/journal/85/156818/the-fourth-determination/)
Inequality, now sedimented into institutions and machines as materialized abstractions and designed into apparatuses
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, from the ways that the oppressed outflank domination and persist in living.
The alternative is a decolonial cosmotechnic that refuses the technoliberal future of the affirmative. This is a critical pedagogy that differentially refuses, reappriopriates, and renegotiates technology against the drive to accelerate or humanize, tying recalibration to political experimentation in revolutionary decolonial praxis.
Means 15. Means, A. (2015). Department of Social and Psychological Foundations of Education, SUNY, Buffalo State, "On accelerationism— decolonizing technoscience through critical pedagogy," Journal for Activism in Science and Technology Education, 6(1).
*MAP = the manifesto for an accelerationist politics
We need to revive the
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, technoscience must be remobilized through critical education to construct decolonized biotechnical futures. | 904,919 |
365,731 | 379,903 | OCO Negative v1 - China Contention | =Marist LV – Blue Key NEG v1=
==Contention One is China==
====Currently, tensions between the US and China are high as Swaine '19 indicates,====
Michael D. Swaine, 1-16-2019, "A Relationship Under Extreme Duress: U.S.-China Relations at a Crossroads," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/01/16/relationship-under-extreme-duress-u.s.-china-relations-at-crossroads-pub-78159, Date Accessed 10-31-2019 // CL
Amid this dangerous downward spiral, both Beijing and Washington have fewer incentives to undertake
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standing One China policy that has ensured peace with Beijing for forty years.
====China's a major threat to US regarding cyber-attacks as the Department of Defense reports that====
Department of Defense, 06-08-2018, "Cyberspace Operations." Joint Publications, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_12.pdf, Date Accessed 10-23-2019 //SMV
Several government and industry sources highlight China's substantial role in cyber-enabled IP theft
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targeting the US Government, its allies and US companies for cyber espionage."
====Unfortunately, OCO's don't deter aggression from major powers as Allen '19 finds,====
Greg Allen, 03-17-2019, "America's plan for stopping cyberattacks is dangerously weak." https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/3/27/15052422/cyber-war-diplomacy-russia-us-wikileaks, Date Accessed 10-23-2019//SMV
Cyberwarfare appears to be distinctive in that, so far, deterrence appears to be
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who thereafter operate undetected in the targeted network for days or even years.
====Instead the use of OCO's increases the likelihood of retaliation as Slayton explains,====
Rebecca Slayton, 4-22-2015, "Why Cyber Operations Do Not Always Favor the Offense," Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/why-cyber-operations-do-not-always-favor-offense, Date Accessed 7-31-2019 // WS
Making offensive cyber operations a national priority can increase instabilities in international relations and worsen
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civil society to mitigate those vulnerabilities, leaves critical infrastructure vulnerable to attack.
====There are two impacts to retaliation. First, ensures great power war. Ellers reports,====
Maria Ellers, 10-23-2019, "How America's Cyber Strategy Could Create an International Crisis." National Intrest, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/skeptics/how-americas-cyber-strategy-could-create-international-crisis-90526, Date Accessed 10-31-2019//SMV
Buchanan argues that Washington's poor understanding of the indistinguishability between offense and defense is the
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the most destructive factor to any strategy that attempts to deter escalating conflict.
====And this would be disastrous as Jeremy Straub writes that====
Jeremy Straub, 8-18-19, "A Major Cyber Attack Could Be Just as Deadly as Nuclear Weapons, Says Scientist", Science Alert, https://www.sciencealert.com/a-major-cyber-attack-could-be-just-as-damaging-as-a-nuclear-weapon, Date Accessed:// 10-24-19, LNW
Unfortunately, there are signs that hackers have placed malicious software inside US power and
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something analogous could happen in the software and hardware of the digital realm.
====Second, it crushes internet development as Vishwanath finds,====
Arun Vishwanath, 07-09-2019, "The Internet is already being weaponized. The U.S. cyberattack on Iran won't help." Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/07/09/internet-is-already-being-weaponized-us-cyberattack-iran-wont-help/, Date Accessed 10-22-2019//SMV
Even without open cyberattacks, the United States already tends to be a convenient scapegoat
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world should agree that the Internet should not be used as a battlefield.
====Internet development is crucial to creating jobs as====
Eloise Todd, 09-28-2015, "Why connecting everyone to the internet could help end extreme poverty." One, https://www.one.org/international/blog/why-connecting-everyone-to-the-internet-could-help-end-extreme-poverty/, Date Accessed 10-31-2019//SMV
Connectivity can mean that people living in poverty are empowered to make their own decisions
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could increase their life expectancy thanks to better monitoring and adherence to treatment. | 905,082 |
365,732 | 379,829 | Belt and Road Affirmative v2 - Multilateralism Contention v2 | ==Contention One is Multilateralism==
====Richard Gowan writes last year that US multilateralism is on the decline due to recent isolationist moves such as leaving the UN Human Rights Council or the Paris Climate accord. ====
Richard Gowan, 7-30-2018, "Multilateralism in Freefall?," No Publication, https://cpr.unu.edu/the-multilateral-freefall.html, Date Accessed 10-2-2019 // WS
How do multilateral systems collapse? It is a question that will have occurred to
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deal. Common sense suggests that multilateral diplomacy should now be in freefall.
====Thankfully, The EU joining the BRI as a bloc forces the US back into Multilateralism via investment. Sam Natapoff writes that====
Sam Natapoff, 5-4-2019, "China's belt and road initiative shows how China and the U.S. are swapping roles in global trade," Salon, https://www.salon.com/2019/05/04/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-shows-how-china-and-the-u-s-are-swapping-roles-in-global-trade/, Date Accessed 8-25-2019 // JMNatapoff
As with many international policy areas, the BRI is forcing countries to choose sides
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in line with Myanmar's domestic needs, instead of the Chinese lender's preferences.
====Empirically, Natapoff explains that:====
Sam Natapoff, 5-4-2019, "China's belt and road initiative shows how China and the U.S. are swapping roles in global trade," Salon, https://www.salon.com/2019/05/04/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-shows-how-china-and-the-u-s-are-swapping-roles-in-global-trade/, Date Accessed 8-25-2019 // JM
As with many international policy areas, the BRI is forcing countries to choose sides
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in line with Myanmar's domestic needs, instead of the Chinese lender's preferences.
====The US aims their investment into these nations in an attempt to draw them back to the US's sphere of influence and away from China. The impact is supercharging development.====
====Rick Beckett quantifies in 2017 that, with just $50 million dollars in investment, this investment ====
Rick Beckett, 4-26-2017, "Expanding OPIC is Good for America and the World," ImpactAlpha, https://impactalpha.com/expanding-opic-is-good-for-america-and-the-world-775de22193/, Date Accessed 8-23-2019 // WS
We at Global Partnerships know OPIC well. Since 2006, OPIC has invested more
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smart, sustainable global development. And the world needs more of it. | 904,937 |
365,733 | 380,214 | February Aff - Unions, Welfare Cliff, and Small Businesses | paraphrased/cut-card case open-sourced under "Plano West-Chen-Kumar-Aff-Harvard-Triples.docx" | 905,522 |
365,734 | 379,602 | Interps | Interpretation: If debaters don’t frontline case in second rebuttal, they are conceding it.
Interpretation: Teams should share cases pre-round through an agreed method when asked.
Interpretation: Debaters should provide content warnings before discussing sensitive topics, those that have the potential to resurface trauma, physical or emotional, in affected individuals: for example, drug use or sexual assault.
Interpretation: Debaters must run either resolutional topical cases or theory.
Interpretation: Debaters must not talk faster than 230 wpm.
Interpretation: Debaters should not use exclusive or offensive language in-round. To clarify, debaters should not use offensive language.
Interpretation: Debaters must publish any interpretations for any theory they might run on the NSDA PF wiki or share their interps with their opponents 30 minutes prior to the round. | 904,684 |
365,735 | 379,653 | Disclosure interp | Debaters must disclose all broken positions on the NDCA 2019-2020 PF wiki under their own school, name and correct side with cites, tags, and text of all cards read at least 30 minutes before the round or once pairings come out. | 904,714 |
365,736 | 379,642 | TOC Aff 5 v3 | Trump and Democrats both want to end all Middle East presence, withdrawal inevitable
Cropsey 19~-~-SETH CROPSEY, GARY ROUGHEAD, A U.S. Withdrawal Will Cause a Power Struggle in the Middle East, Foreign Policy, 12/17/19, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/17/us-withdrawal-power-struggle-middle-east-china-russia-iran/
Members of the restraint camp in U.S. foreign policy decry what they see as an ongoing waste of resources on overseas commitments. Notwithstanding differences over withdrawing U.S. military assistance to the Kurds in northern Syria, both the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump and the front-runners for the Democratic presidential candidates nomination agree on ending “endless wars”—which is code for narrowing the scope of all U.S. engagement abroad, particularly in the Middle East. With the Islamic State mostly defeated and the threat of terrorism on the decline, the thinking goes, the United States no longer needs an active presence in the region.
Trump policy in Middle East incoherent
Cropsey 19~-~-SETH CROPSEY, GARY ROUGHEAD, A U.S. Withdrawal Will Cause a Power Struggle in the Middle East, Foreign Policy, 12/17/19, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/17/us-withdrawal-power-struggle-middle-east-china-russia-iran/
The United States should reexamine its global commitments, especially those in the eastern Mediterranean, with a view to Russia’s expanding power. The Trump administration’s foreign and security policies in the region have included several bright spots: the strengthening of U.S.-Israel relations, an aggressive military campaign against the Islamic State, economic sanctions against Iran, and denial of F-35 fighter jet sales to Turkey following its purchase of Russian S-400 surface-to-air missiles. But these have yet to be linked in a coherent strategic policy. Questions that need answers include: What is America’s goal in the region? Is growing Russian military and diplomatic presence consistent with U.S. regional goals? Should Washington leave the blossoming relations between Moscow and Ankara to run their course, and what is to be done if a true alliance between Russia and Turkey emerges? If regime change in Iran is not an option for U.S. policy, what should the goal be? Is it sufficient to assist Israel and Saudi Arabia and hope that they will manage regional tensions that could lead to war with Iran? An examination of the global commitments recommended here should include the possibility of a comprehensive U.S.-Israel treaty that would gather together all the existing nontreaty agreements between the two nations on such matters as military aid, intelligence sharing, defense industrial cooperation, and free trade—to name a few. The United States still retains strong interests in the Middle East. These include the untrammeled flow of oil to allies in Europe and Asia, the defense of democratic Israel, the security of NATO allies bordering the Mediterranean, and preventing conflict between regional powers.
US already began withdrawing troops due to coronavirus (but still only 3k, higher than pre-Suleimani numbers)
Evans 20~-~-Zachary Evans, U.S. Begins Limited Troop Withdrawals from Middle East after Iran Hit Hard by Coronavirus, National Review, 3/10/20, https://www.nationalreview.com/news/u-s-begins-limited-troop-withdrawals-from-middle-east-after-iran-hit-hard-by-coronavirus/
The U.S. has begun withdrawing troops originally sent to the Middle East in the wake of the killing of top Iranian commander Qasem Soleimani, as Iran sees the worst outbreak of Wuhan coronavirus in the region. Around 1,000 troops have returned from Kuwait over the past two weeks, while an additional 2,000 are expected to return in the near future, the Wall Street Journal reported. After President Trump ordered the drone strike on Soleimani, the Pentagon deployed additional troops to bases in the region to counter a possible Iranian reprisal against American or allied targets. While Iran did attack American positions in Iraq, leaving dozens of troops with concussions and traumatic brain injuries with ballistic missile strikes, there has been no other major retaliation.
Trump wants pullout
Tisdall 20~-~-Simon Tisdall, Why instinct and ideology tell Trump to get out of the Middle East, The Guardian, 1/11/20, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jan/11/why-instinct-and-ideology-tell-trump-to-get-out-of-the-middle-east-suleimani-iran
The crisis triggered by Donald Trump’s assassination of General Qassem Suleimani has crystallised Iran’s official thinking around a single, overriding demand: that American military forces should pack up their weapons, close their bases, and leave the Middle East for ever. The odd thing is, Trump seems to agrees. Referring to last week’s retaliatory strikes on US targets, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s leader, declared: “Military action like this is not sufficient. What is important is ending the corrupting presence of America.” Hassan Rouhani, the country’s president, said the only answer was to “kick all US forces out of the region”. This long-held Iranian position does not differ greatly from Trump’s views, at least in theory. The US president has repeatedly argued in favour of reducing the American troop presence around the Middle East. In northern Syria last autumn, he got his way – with chaotic results that dismayed allies and delighted Turkey, Russia and the Syrian regime. Trump has never proposed an across-the-board retreat. In Israel’s case, he has sought closer political and security ties. He has cosied up to the wealthy Saudi royals. Yet, judging by his speeches and tweets, Trump is unconvinced by traditional arguments that stress the region’s vital strategic importance to the US. His attitude is part ideological, part gut. When Trump vowed in 2016 to end America’s “forever wars” in his presidential campaign, he was specifically referring to the Bush-Obama legacy in Iraq and Afghanistan. Trump has dismissed both occupations as misconceived, and a waste of lives and tax dollars. For him, liberal, Tony Blair-type ideas about the international community as a collective, the imperative of “humanitarian intervention”, and nation-building are an anathema. Trump is interested in markets, not morality. He holds no vision of the greater good, has no sense of a US global mission, other than putting America first. Speaking last week about a hypothetical rapprochement with Iran, his businessman’s focus was on its untapped economic potential and natural resources. There are other reasons, on the American side, for asking how long the US will continue to maintain a military presence that includes extensive bases and facilities in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, Oman and Afghanistan. One reason, mentioned by Trump last week, is that the present-day US is much less reliant on imported oil.
Carter doctrine declared Persian Gulf US protectorate
Tisdall 20~-~-Simon Tisdall, Why instinct and ideology tell Trump to get out of the Middle East, The Guardian, 1/11/20, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jan/11/why-instinct-and-ideology-tell-trump-to-get-out-of-the-middle-east-suleimani-iran
The so-called Carter doctrine, announced by president Jimmy Carter after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, declared the region (and its oil) to be a de facto US protectorate. “An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the US ... and will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force,” Carter declared. In effect, Carter was completing America’s post-1945, post-Suez takeover from Britain as the Middle East’s leading external power – and as time passed, its footprint grew. But now times are changing again. Thanks to the shale oil boom, the US has become the world’s leading producer of crude oil. Middle East supply-lines no longer matter so much.
Navy pullout of Gulf inevitable
Samet 20~-~-Daniel J. Samet, To deter Iran, the Gulf states need stronger navies, Atlantic Council, 2/20/20, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/to-deter-iran-the-gulf-states-need-stronger-navies/
The Trump administration’s hands-off approach toward Iranian aggression in the Gulf should serve as a wake-up call for Arab countries. Although Washington has assumed the burden of defending Gulf waterways for decades, obituaries for the Carter Doctrine suggest that the Trump administration is not inclined to commit US ships in the Gulf in perpetuity. This comes at a time when the US Navy has cut its shipbuilding budget even as it inches toward its goal of 355 vessels. What is more, the Indo-Pacific has become the most important theater for the US military—and particularly the navy—in response to China. The military brass will not be enthusiastic about devoting resources to purportedly peripheral US interests when many see the fleet as overextended. The writing is on the wall.
Add this to dwindling dependence on Middle Eastern oil at home and you have a recipe for US retrenchment in the Gulf. Those who say otherwise may point to the international coalition to protect commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz that Washington has cobbled together, which includes the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain. Yet it’s unclear how far-reaching this commitment will be. Separately, the United Kingdom and Japan have dispatched warships to the region, but solely for their own merchant vessels. If the Gulf states expect other countries to provide all the naval support in their neighborhood, they would do well to reconsider that assumption.
Many different alt causes to perception that US is leaving the region. A) pivot to Asia + exclusion from US-Iran nuclear deal negotiations, led to Yemen war B) Trump actions on Qatar blockade C) Abandonment of the Kurds + withdrawal from Syria D) Inaction after Iran attacks on Saudi…the result is more negotiation
Ulrichsen 20~-~-Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, REBALANCING REGIONAL SECURITY IN THE PERSIAN GULF, Baker Institute, 2/20, https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/de9f09e6/cme-pub-persiangulf-022420.pdf
Perceptions matter in shaping and influencing policymakers’ views of the world around
them and the options they feel are open to them at any given time. During the Obama years, a sense of “abandonment” by the U.S. arose in certain Gulf capitals as ruling figures expressed concern over the U.S. decision to accept the fall of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and subsequent election victories for the Muslim Brotherhood.24 Officials in GCC states expressed further frustration at being cut out of the negotiations between the U.S. and Iran and later between the P5+1 and Iran that culminated in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in July 2015. Tensions were palpable at a U.S.-GCC summit held at Camp David in May 2015 when the emirs of Kuwait and Qatar were the only GCC heads of state to attend, as King Salman of Saudi Arabia pointedly chose to stay away.25 For many observers in GCC capitals, their sense of incomprehension at U.S. policy during the Obama administration was encapsulated in the phrase “pivot to Asia,” even though this always was more rhetoric than reality, and never implied that it was the Persian Gulf that was being pivoted “away” from.26 One Gulf leader went so far as to ask a visiting American dignitary “where’s the coach?”, “I don’t know where the coach is” in an apparent reference to the lack of visible U.S. leadership or regional policy.27 Regional figures reacted strongly to a March 2016 interview Obama gave to The Atlantic during which the president had said “free riders aggravate me,” despite there being no explicit reference to any of the Gulf states in his comment, which appeared in context to have been directed against the U.K. 28 A former Saudi ambassador to the U.S., Prince Turki al-Faisal Al Saud, responded furiously in an op-ed in Arab News that began “No, Mr. Obama. We are not ‘free riders’.”29 In a sign that feelings of ill-will were mutual, Ben Rhodes, deputy national security adviser throughout Obama’s two terms in office, told The New Yorker that the Saudis and Emiratis were “more responsible for the image of Obama as being soft in the Middle East than anyone else. They trashed us all around town.”30 The breakdown in trust and confidence was a factor in the Saudi and Emirati decision to launch “Operation Decisive Storm” in Yemen on March 26, 2015, the same day the P5+1 and Iran began an intense week of negotiations in Lausanne that produced a framework agreement on the nuclear deal on April 2. Angered at being cut out of the P5+1 process, the military intervention in Yemen signaled to the White House and the international community that the Saudis and Emiratis rejected the idea that it was possible to focus solely on one issue (Iran’s nuclear ambition) at the expense of the broader picture of what they saw as regionally destabilizing Iranian behavior.31 Officials in GCC states, especially in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, largely welcomed the Trump administration and made strenuous efforts to reach out to key figures in the new White House as they settled into office in 2017.32 While the Trump White House has provided political support to its GCC partners engaged in the Yemen war by blocking congressional pressure to end the conflict, and resisted calls to hold the Saudi leadership to account for the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, the volatility and unpredictability of Trump’s unconventional approach to regional policymaking has, gradually, sapped regional confidence in a second consecutive U.S. presidency. Further doubts were generated by Trump’s initial and subsequent responses to the blockade of Qatar launched by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt in June 2017. Trump’s initial support for the move and his castigation of Qatar as a sponsor of terror at the highest level, caused shockwaves in Doha and called into question the entire basis of Qatar’s defense and security planning, while his later reversal in favor of a mediated solution was greeted with dismay by Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, which had courted White House support for the move.33 For the first time in the post-1990 era, it had not been the U.S. that was seen to have come to the defense of one of their number when faced with external threat. This realization caused concern in Kuwait City and Muscat, to say nothing of the consternation in Doha, as it called into question, as never before, the role of the U.S. as the security guarantor of last (or, indeed, first) resort.34 For the Saudis and the Emiratis, that moment of reflection came two years later, in 2019, when the lack of a U.S. response to the attacks on maritime shipping and energy infrastructure prompted a reassessment of the very basis of deterrence.35 The newfound sense in GCC capitals that they were more on their own than they may ever have thought possible is likely what prompted the sudden flurry of outreach to Iran, directly or via intermediaries, that began after the Abqaiq and Khurais attacks and intensified after the killing of Soleimani and the Iranian response. A White House in disarray produced “policy without process,” as a very senior former official who retired in 2019 put it.36 This breakdown in the traditional structure and discipline of decision-making was manifest in sudden breaks with settled policy (and subsequent reversals or pullbacks), such as Trump’s December 2018 declaration (on Twitter) that the Islamic State had been defeated in Syria and that U.S. forces would withdraw; or the White House announcement in October 2019 of a pullout of troops from northeast Syria, a decision widely perceived as abandoning Syria’s Kurds, hitherto a partner of U.S. forces in the battles against the Islamic State; to a Turkish military incursion that started days later. 37 The fallout from the December 2018 announcement led Secretary of Defense James Mattis and the special presidential envoy for the global coalition to counter ISIL, Brett McGurk, to resign in protest, while the October 2019 announcement came after a telephone call with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and against the advice of U.S. military leaders.38 The cavalier and peremptory manner by which Trump seemingly dismissed the longstanding American partnership with the Kurds, and the way he was perceived to have gone against political and military views in doing so, made an impression on policymakers in GCC capitals.39 If Trump could abruptly abandon the Kurdish-led forces in Syria that had fought alongside U.S. counterparts in the battles against Islamic State, might he do the same, on a larger scale, to the Gulf states, as he had appeared momentarily to do to Qatar in 2017? The doubts over the reliability of the U.S. as a partner that had first appeared in regional capitals in and after 2011 widened during Trump’s second and third years in office.40 In 2019, the pattern of attacks on maritime and energy targets in and around the Persian Gulf in 2019—widely linked with but not formally attributed to Iran or its regional proxies—brought to a head the growing concerns in GCC capitals about the reliability of a partnership that once seemed sacrosanct.41 Tensions in the Persian Gulf escalated almost immediately after the Trump administration launched its “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran in April and May 2019 with the introduction of new sanctions on Iranian officials, further restrictions on exports of Iranian oil, and the designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including the Quds Force commanded by Qassim Soleimani, as a foreign terrorist organization.42 A series of “incidents” of varying severity began within weeks to target the maritime and energy sectors linked to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the two U.S. partners that had been the most hawkish toward Iran as well as the most closely associated with the Trump administration’s regional policy agenda. These included attacks on four commercial ships off the coast of the Emirati port of Fujairah on May 12, a drone attack against a Saudi oil pipeline on May 13, further attacks on two oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman on June 13, and the shooting down of a U.S. drone on June 20 that reportedly violated Iranian airspace after having taken off from a U.S. airbase in Abu Dhabi.43 Most spectacular of all—and the most cathartic for U.S. partners in the Persian Gulf—was the drone and missile strike on Saudi oil infrastructure on September 14 that targeted Aramco’s giant oil-processing facility at Abqaiq as well as the Khurais oilfield. The swarm of drones and cruise missiles fired from an (as-yet) unknown location evaded Saudi missile defense systems and knocked out, albeit only temporarily, 5.7 million barrels of Saudi Arabia’s total of 9.8 million barrels of oil produced per day.44 The scale and the success of the attacks underscored the vulnerability of the expensively procured defensive systems in Saudi Arabia and other GCC states to guard against asymmetric rather than conventional threats.45 A “Saudi security analyst,” speaking to Reuters on condition of anonymity, captured the sense of shock in the kingdom when s/he stated that “The attack is like September 11th for Saudi Arabia, it is a game changer (…) Where are the air defense systems and the U.S. weaponry for which we spent billions of dollars to protect the kingdom and its oil facilities? If they did this with such precision, they can also hit the desalination plants and more targets.”46 Just as shocking to leaders in Saudi Arabia and the UAE as the need to urgently reassess threat perceptions and defense capabilities was the Trump administration’s reactions to the pattern of attacks between May and September 2019. The lack of a visible U.S. response to the attacks on shipping or to the assault on the nerve center of the Saudi economy made the Saudis and other American partners in GCC states reassess the nature of the U.S. security guarantee they had until then (largely) taken for granted.47 Trump denied he had offered the Saudis any pledge of protection after the Aramco attacks and added pointedly that “That was an attack on Saudi Arabia, and that wasn’t an attack on us.”48 The inaction was all the more pronounced when compared with Trump’s response to the downing of the U.S. drone in June 2019, when the U.S. launched a cyber attack against Iran’s electronic warfare capabilities, 49 or after the killing of an American contractor and the storming of the U.S. embassy compound in Iraq in December, when Trump ordered the drone attack that killed Qassim Soleimani on January 3, 2020. 50 Statements by officials and prominent commentators in late 2019 and early 2020 illustrated the concerns many in GCC states felt at U.S. decision-making and prompted policymakers in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to re-examine their own hitherto assertive approaches to regional affairs. A delegation from the UAE traveled to Iran in late July 2019 to discuss coast guard and related maritime security issues, shortly after the UAE had announced a troop redeployment and drawdown in Yemen as well.51 In the weeks after the Saudi attacks in September, the Saudi leadership made discreet approaches to their counterparts in Pakistan and Iraq in a bid to open back-channels of dialogue with Iran to de-escalate tension. Iraq’s prime minister, Adel Abdul Mahdi, stated in late September that “There is a big response from Saudi Arabia and from Iran and even from Yemen, and I think these endeavors will have a good effect.”52 Ali Larijani, the speaker of the Iranian parliament, appeared to endorse such sentiment, telling Al Jazeera that “Iran is open to starting a dialogue with Saudi Arabia and other countries in the region.”53 Pronouncements in GCC states increasingly began to diverge from the U.S. approach in the final months of 2019 and later evolved into different reactions to the sharp escalation in U.S.-Iran tension that accompanied the killing of Soleimani and the Iranian retaliation against U.S. military targets in Iraq. Abulkhaleq Abdulla, a retired Emirati academic often described as an advisor to Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, blasted Trump after the Saudi attacks, stating that “in his response to Iran, he is even worse than Obama (…) Now an Arab Gulf strategic partner has been massively attacked by Iran—which was provoked by Trump, not by us—and we hear Americans saying to us, ‘you need to defend yourselves’!”54 After the U.S. decision to kill Soleimani in January 2020, attitudes hardened, with a “Gulf diplomatic source” voicing (anonymously) a concern felt across the GCC that “Our most important ally, a world power who is here on the pretense of stabilizing the region, is destabilizing the region and taking all of us with them without a second thought.”55
Middle East no longer as important a) interstate conflicts replaced by intrastate violence, b) Asia more impt, c) oil less impt ? US exists in “purgatory,” has no political capital to make investments that actually change the region; only difference is emboldening allies to act aggressively
Karlin 19—Mara Karlin, America’s Middle East Purgatory, Foreign Affairs, Jan-Feb 2019, https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/Enduring20American20Presence20in20the20Middle20East.pdf
In that regard, Trump is strikingly like his predecessor. Trump may talk about the Middle East differently than Obama did. But the two seem to share the view that the United States is too involved in the region and should devote fewer resources and less time to it. And there is every reason to believe that the next president will agree. The reduced appetite for U.S. engagement in the region reflects not an ideological predilection or an idiosyncrasy of these two presidents but a deeper change in both regional dynamics and broader U.S. interests. Although the Middle East still matters to the United States, it matters markedly less than it used to. U.S. strategy toward the Middle East, however, has yet to catch up with these changes. The United States thus exists in a kind of Middle Eastern purgatory—too distracted by regional crises to pivot to other global priorities but not invested enough to move the region in a better direction. This worst-ofboth-worlds approach exacts a heavy price. It sows uncertainty among Washington’s Middle Eastern partners, which encourages them to act in risky and aggressive ways. (Just look at Saudi Arabia’s brazen assassination of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi or its bloody campaign in Yemen.) It deepens the American public’s frustration with the region’s endless turmoil, as well as with U.S. efforts to address it. It diverts resources that could otherwise be devoted to confronting a rising China and a revanchist Russia. And all the while, by remaining unclear about the limits of its commitments, the United States risks getting dragged into yet another Middle Eastern conflict. 25 To say that the Middle East matters less to the United States does not mean that decreased U.S. involvement will necessarily be good for the region. The Middle East is in the midst of its greatest upheaval in half a century, generating an all-out battle for power among its major players. The region’s governments, worried about what Washington’s growing disregard for the Middle East means for their own stability, are working hard to draw the hegemon back in. But it is time for Washington to put an end to wishful thinking about its ability to establish order on its own terms or to transform selfinterested and shortsighted regional partners into reliable allies—at least without incurring enormous costs and longterm commitments. That means making some ugly choices to craft a strategy that will protect the most important U.S. interests in the region, without sending the United States back into purgatory. A LESS RELEVANT REGION In response to the Iraq war, the United States has aimed to reduce its role in the Middle East. Three factors have made that course both more alluring and more possible. First, interstate conflicts that directly threatened U.S. interests in the past have largely been replaced by substate security threats. Second, other rising regions, especially Asia, have taken on more importance to U.S. global strategy. And third, the diversification of global energy markets has weakened oil as a driver of U.S. policy. During the Cold War, traditional state-based threats pushed the United States to play a major role in the Middle East. That role involved not only ensuring the stable supply of energy to Western markets but also working to prevent the spread of communist influence and tamping down the Arab-Israeli 26 conflict so as to help stabilize friendly states. These efforts were largely successful. Beginning in the 1970s, the United States nudged Egypt out of the pro-Soviet camp, oversaw the first Arab-Israeli peace treaty, and solidified its hegemony in the region. Despite challenges from Iran after its 1979 revolution and from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq throughout the 1990s, U.S. dominance was never seriously in question. The United States contained the Arab-Israeli conflict, countered Saddam’s bid to gain territory through force in the 1990–91 Gulf War, and built a seemingly permanent military presence in the Gulf that deterred Iran and muffled disputes among the Gulf Arab states. Thanks to all these efforts, the chances of deliberate interstate war in the Middle East are perhaps lower now than at any time in the past 50 years. But today, the chief threat in the Middle East is not a state-onstate conflict but the growing substate violence spilling across borders—a challenge that is harder to solve from the outside. The terrorism and civil war plaguing the Middle East have spread easily in a permissive environment of state weakness. This environment was fostered by the U.S. invasion of Iraq and then, more generally, by the dysfunctional governance that led to the Arab uprisings of 2010–12 and the subsequent repressive responses. The region’s most violent hot spots are those where dictators met demands from their citizens with force and drove them to take up arms. The United States cannot fundamentally alter this permissive environment for terrorism and chaos without investing in state building at a level far beyond what either the American public or broader foreign policy considerations would allow. And so it simply cannot hope to do much to counter the Middle East’s violence or instability. 27 Some of the chaos directly threatens U.S. partners. Jordan’s vulnerability skyrocketed in 2014 as hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees fled there (which is the reason the United States ramped up its aid to the country). Saudi Arabia’s critical infrastructure has proved dangerously exposed (which is why the United States deepened its support there, as well). But today, the primary threats to these partners are internal. In Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere, dysfunctional stateled economic systems and unaccountable governments are failing to meet the needs or aspirations of a large, young, reasonably healthy, and globally connected generation. Change will have to come from the Arab states themselves, and although the United States can support reformers within Arab societies, it cannot drive this kind of transformation from the outside. Some argue that these problems still matter a lot to the United States and that there is still much it could do to solve them if it were willing to go all in. Proponents of this maximalist approach believe that with sufficient resources, the United States could decisively defeat ISIS and other extremists, stabilize and reconstruct liberated communities, and lay the foundations for a lasting peace by pushing states to overhaul the social contract between rulers and ruled. This outcome is not impossible to imagine. But the experience of the United States in Iraq, Libya, and Syria suggests that this path would be rockier than it might first appear and that it would be extremely challenging to sustain domestic political support for the large, long-term investments that these goals would require. Even as the Middle East’s problems have become less susceptible to constructive outside influence, the United States’ global interests have also changed—most of all when it 28 comes to Asia. For decades, U.S. policymakers debated whether China could rise peacefully, but the country’s destabilizing behavior, especially its insistence that its neighbors accept its territorial claims in the South China Sea and over Taiwan, have led many to worry that it will not. Both Obama and Trump recognized that Asia has become more important to U.S. grand strategy. As the former put it when announcing what became known as the “rebalance” to Asia, “After a decade in which we fought two wars that cost us dearly, in blood and treasure, the United States is turning our attention to the vast potential of the Asia-Pacific region.” Russia, meanwhile, has generated growing concern ever since its invasion of Crimea in 2014, and fears about European security and stability have pushed the Middle East even further down the list of U.S. priorities. Then there is oil—the fuel that first drew the United States into the Middle East after World War II. Middle Eastern oil remains an important commodity in the global economy, but it is weakening as a driver of U.S. policy. One reason is the more abundant global supply, including new domestic sources aided by technologies such as fracking. Another is a widely anticipated stall in global demand, as technological advances and concerns about greenhouse gas emissions cause countries to shift away from fossil fuels. The result is a Middle East that is less central to global energy markets and less able to control pricing—and a United States that can afford to worry less about protecting the flow of oil from the region. Many of the things that mattered to the United States when it first became involved in the Middle East still matter today. The United States should still care about protecting freedom of navigation in the region’s major maritime passages, preventing oil producers or troublemakers from suddenly 29 turning off the flow, and containing would-be regional hegemons and other actors hostile to Washington. The question is how crucial these priorities are relative to other ones, and how much the United States should invest in them. The answer is that the United States should probably be less involved in shaping the trajectory of the region than it is. LOST ILLUSIONS For a long time, policymakers have been tempted by the notion that there is some kind of golden mean for U.S. engagement in the Middle East. Somehow, the argument runs, the United States can develop a strategy that keeps it involved in the most critical issues but avoids allowing it to be drawn into the region’s more internecine battles. In this scenario, the United States could reduce its military presence while retaining a “surge” capacity, relying more on local partners to deter threats and using aid and trade incentives to build coalitions among local actors to advance stabilizing policies, such as conflict resolution. But this Goldilocks approach rests on the false assumption that there is such a thing as a purely operational U.S. military presence in the Middle East. In reality, U.S. military bases across the Gulf countries have strategic implications because they create a moral hazard: they encourage the region’s leaders to act in ways they otherwise might not, safe in the knowledge that the United States is invested in the stability of their regimes. In 2011, for example, the Bahrainis and the Saudis clearly understood the message of support sent by the U.S. naval base in Bahrain when they ignored Obama’s disapproval and crushed Shiite protests there. In Yemen, U.S. support for the Emirati and Saudi military campaign shows how offering help can put the United States in profound dilemmas: the United States is implicated in air strikes that kill civilians, but any proposal to halt its supplies of its precision-guided missiles is met with the charge that denying Saudi Arabia smarter munitions might only increase collateral civilian casualties. U.S. efforts to train, equip, and advise the Syrian Democratic Forces in the fight against ISIS are yet another reminder that none of Washington’s partnerships has purely operational consequences: U.S. support of the SDF, seen by Ankara as a sister to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, has made the United States’ relationship with Turkey knottier than ever. Supporters of the Goldilocks approach also suggest that the United States can substitute military engagement with vigorous diplomacy. But U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s experience with the negotiations over the Syrian civil war, where his efforts were undercut by Obama’s reluctance to involve the United States, demonstrated that diplomacy without teeth doesn’t get you very far. Goldilocks proponents imagine that the United States can somehow escape the pushpull dynamic of Middle Eastern involvement, but all this approach ends up accomplishing is prolonging the time in purgatory. Yet it is not enough to simply propose that the United States do less in the region without explaining what that would look like in practice. It is clear that Washington should reduce its role in the Middle East; how it scales back and to what end are the critical questions. A new approach to the region should begin with accepting a painful tradeoff: that what is good for the United States may not be good for the Middle East. U.S. policymakers and the public already seem surprisingly comfortable watching repressive Arab rulers consolidate power in some countries, while brutal insurgents displace civilians and destroy cities in 31 others. But a superpower must make tough choices, prioritizing the conflicts and issues that matter most for its global strategy. During the Cold War, for example, the United States took a relatively hands-off approach to most of Africa, backing anticommunist strongmen and proxies in a few places even at the cost of long-term stability. This had terrible consequences for the people of, say, Angola or what was then Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo), but it was a tolerable decision for U.S. interests. The same is likely to be true in the Middle East today. It is not enough to just set limits on its commitments; the United States must also clearly communicate those limits to other countries. At a summit at Camp David in 2015, Obama alarmed Gulf partners when he told them that the United States would protect them from external threats but pointedly declined to mention internecine ones. Obama was right to put the onus on Gulf states to address their own internal challenges and to make clear that the United States had no dog in most of their regional fights. Today, likewise, the United States should put its regional partners on notice that it will not back some of their pet political projects, such as the United Arab Emirates’ attempt to resuscitate the Palestinian politician Mohammad Dahlan in the Gaza Strip or its effort, along with Egypt, to back the military commander Khalifa Haftar in Libya. Washington must also set clear guidelines about when it will and won’t use force. It should clarify, for example, that it will target terrorists who threaten the United States or its partners but will not intervene militarily in civil wars except to contain them (as opposed to resolving them through force). Since a less engaged United States will have to leave more of the business of Middle Eastern security to partners in the 32 region, it must rethink how it works with them. For example, the U.S. military is fond of talking about a “by, with, and through” approach to working with local partners—meaning military “operations are led by our partners, state or nonstate, with enabling support from the United States or U.S.-led coalitions, and through U.S. authorities and partner agreements,” as General Joseph Votel, commander of U.S. Central Command, explained in an article in Joint Force Quarterly in 2018. But that model works only if the partners on the ground share Washington’s priorities. Consider the Defense Department’s doomed program to train and equip rebels in Syria. Rightly mistrustful of those partners, fearing they might drag the United States into a war with Bashar alAssad, Washington was unwilling to provide sophisticated support. And although the fighters were instructed to prioritize attacking ISIS over regime forces that were shelling their hometowns, they changed course when Turkey invaded Afrin and began fighting the Turks instead, stalling the campaign against ISIS elsewhere. The United States has worked well with Kurdish militias in the fight against ISIS in northeastern Syria—but as soon as Trump expressed his desire to pull U.S. forces out, the rebels began to explore cutting a deal with Damascus. It is also crucial that the United States accept the limitations of its partners and see them for what they truly are, warts and all. Sometimes, these partners won’t be able to confront security challenges without direct help from the United States. In these cases, U.S. policy-makers will have to accept that if the effort is imperative for U.S. national security interests, Washington will have to do the work itself. For example, the United States has spent decades trying to build a security alliance among Gulf states. Even before the current Gulf rift 33 began, this effort had started going off the rails, with many countries allowing mutual hatreds to get in the way of a cooperative effort against Iran. Now that Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates are blockading Qatar, this alliance is looking even more like a pipe dream.
After withdrawal, counterterror + sustaining freedom of navigation still protected b/c pertain directly to US interests
Karlin 19—Mara Karlin, America’s Middle East Purgatory, Foreign Affairs, Jan-Feb 2019, https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/Enduring20American20Presence20in20the20Middle20East.pdf
WHAT STILL MATTERS 34 These recommendations all removing US presence involves accepting what doesn’t matter to U.S. interests. But there are issues in the Middle East that still greatly concern the United States. Those who prefer that Washington withdraw from the region entirely underestimate how dangerous the resulting power vacuum could be. The United States does have important interests in the region to protect. One of them is sustaining freedom of navigation for the U.S. Navy and for global commercial traffic through the Middle East’s major maritime passages—the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab el Mandeb Strait, and the Suez Canal. Fortunately, this is a global priority. Outside the Persian Gulf itself, the littoral states and other concerned parties across Asia and Europe share Washington’s objective. Chinese naval forces have participated in antipiracy efforts in the Horn of Africa, and the Chinese navy recently built its first overseas base to support that mission, in Djibouti. The United States could encourage China to participate in the 33-member Combined Maritime Forces and Combined Task Force 151, which fight piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the eastern coast of Somalia, to ensure that China’s activities are focused on shared maritime security. This would allow the United States to rely more on other concerned parties to address the piracy challenge. Still, doing so would come with its own costs—particularly as China has sought to rewrite the rules on freedom of navigation in its own region. Fighting terrorism also remains a priority. To secure the American people, including U.S. forces stationed abroad, and the most important U.S. partners, the United States will have to prevent new threats from emerging in the Middle East. Like the Obama administration, the Trump administration has emphasized the need to lower the level of U.S. involvement in 35 counterterrorism efforts. But this approach has its limits. Washington should recognize that its partners will inevitably permit or even encourage the activities of terrorist groups if doing so aligns with their short-term interests. Qatar, for example, has proved willing to work with extremist groups that, at a minimum, give aid to terrorist groups with international ambitions. The United States should recognize that it cannot control everything its partners do and focus its efforts on discouraging their relationships with terrorist groups that might pursue operations beyond their immediate neighborhood or acquire game-changing capabilities. Finally, the United States still has an interest in seeing its main partners—however imperfect they are—stable and secure, and it should weigh its investments in security cooperation and economic aid accordingly. Washington also needs to ensure that problems in the Middle East don’t spill over into neighboring regions (a lesson from the Bosnian war in the 1990s that policymakers forgot when confronted with the Syrian war). Preventing conflicts from spreading does not mean launching all-out military interventions. But it will sometimes require the United States to actively contain the fighting and engage in coercive diplomacy designed to bring civil wars to a swifter end. | 904,713 |
365,737 | 379,629 | 2 - NovDec Escalation | Goes nuclear despite deterrence AND rationality
Erik Gartzke and Jon R. Lindsay 17. Gartzke is at the Department of Political Science, University of California, San Diego; Lindsay is at the Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto. 03/01/2017. “Thermonuclear Cyberwar.” Journal of Cybersecurity, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 37–48.
Cyber warfare is routinely overhyped as a new weapon of mass destruction, but when used in conjunction with actual weapons of mass destruction cause, severe, and underappreciated, dangers emerge. One side of a stylized debate about cybersecurity in international relations argues that offensive advantages in cyberspace empower weaker nations, terrorist cells, or even lone rogue operators to paralyze vital infrastructure 4–8. The other side argues that operational difficulties and effective deterrence restrains the severity of cyber attack, while governments and cybersecurity firms have a pecuniary interest in exaggerating the threat 9–13. Although we have contributed to the skeptical side of this debate 14–16, ***BEGIN FOOTNOTE*** 14. Gartzke E. The myth of cyberwar: bringing war in cyberspace back down to earth. Int Security 2013;38:41–73. Google ScholarCrossRef 15 Lindsay JR. Stuxnet and the limits of cyber warfare. Security Stud 2013;22:365–404. Google ScholarCrossRef 16 Lindsay JR. The impact of China on cybersecurity: fiction and friction. Int Security 2014;39:7–47. Google ScholarCrossRef ***END FOOTNOTE*** the same strategic logic that leads us to views cyberwar as a limited political instrument in most situations also leads us to view it as incredibly destabilizing in rare situations. In a recent Israeli wargame of a regional scenario involving the United States and Russia, one participant remarked on “how quickly localized cyber events can turn dangerously kinetic when leaders are ill-prepared to deal in the cyber domain” 17. Importantly, this sort of catalytic instability arises not from the cyber domain itself but through its interaction with forces and characteristics in other domains (land, sea, air, etc.). Further, it arises only in situations where actors possess, and are willing to use, robust traditional military forces to defend their interests. Classical deterrence theory developed to explain nuclear deterrence with nuclear weapons, but different types of weapons or combinations of operations in different domains can have differential effects on deterrence and defense 18, 19. Nuclear weapons and cyber operations are particularly complementary (i.e. nearly complete opposites) with respect to their strategic characteristics. Theorists and practitioners have stressed the unprecedented destructiveness of nuclear weapons in explaining how nuclear deterrence works, but it is equally, if not more, important for deterrence that capabilities and intentions are clearly communicated. As quickly became apparent, public displays of their nuclear arsenals improved deterrence. At the same time, disclosing details of a nation’s nuclear capabilities did not much degrade the ability to strike or retaliate, given that defense against nuclear attack remains extremely difficult. Knowledge of nuclear capabilities is necessary to achieve a deterrent effect 20. Cyber operations, in contrast, rely on undisclosed vulnerabilities, social engineering, and creative guile to generate indirect effects in the information systems that coordinate military, economic, and social behavior. Revelation enables crippling countermeasures, while the imperative to conceal capabilities constrains both the scope of cyber operations and their utility for coercive signaling 21, 22. The diversity of cyber operations and confusion about their effects also contrast with the obvious destructiveness of nuclear weapons. The problem is that transparency and deception do not mix well. An attacker who hacks an adversary’s nuclear command and control apparatus, or the weapons themselves, will gain an advantage in warfighting that the attacker cannot reveal, while the adversary will continue to believe it wields a deterrent that may no longer exist. Most analyses of inadvertent escalation from cyber or conventional to nuclear war focus on “use it or lose it” pressures and fog of war created by attacks that become visible to the target 23, 24. In a US–China conflict scenario, for example, conventional military strikes in conjunction with cyber attacks that blind sensors and confuse decision making could generate incentives for both sides to rush to preempt or escalate 25–27. These are plausible concerns, but the revelation of information about a newly unfavorable balance of power might also cause hesitation and lead to compromise. Cyber blinding could potentially make traditional offensive operations more difficult, shifting the advantage to defenders and making conflict less likely. Clandestine attacks that remain invisible to the target potentially present a more insidious threat to crisis stability. There are empirical and theoretical reasons for taking seriously the effects of offensive cyber operations on nuclear deterrence, and we should expect the dangers to vary with the relative cyber capabilities of the actors in a crisis interaction. Nuclear command and control vulnerability General Robert Kehler, commander of US Strategic Command (STRATCOM) in 2013, stated in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, “we are very concerned with the potential of a cyber-related attack on our nuclear command and control and on the weapons systems themselves” 28. Nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) form the nervous system of the nuclear enterprise spanning intelligence and early warning sensors located in orbit and on Earth, fixed and mobile command and control centers through which national leadership can order a launch, operational nuclear forces including strategic bombers, land-based intercontinental missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and the communication and transportation networks that tie the whole apparatus together 29, 30. NC3 should ideally ensure that nuclear forces will always be available if authorized by the National Command Authority (to enhance deterrence) and never used without authorization (to enhance safety and reassurance). Friendly errors or enemy interference in NC3 can undermines the “always-never” criterion, weakening deterrence 31, 32. NC3 has long been recognized as the weakest link in the US nuclear enterprise. According to a declassified official history, a Strategic Air Command (SAC) task group in 1979 “reported that tactical warning and communications systems … were ‘fragile’ and susceptible to electronic countermeasures, electromagnetic pulse, and sabotage, which could deny necessary warning and assessment to the National Command Authorities” 33. Two years later, the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering released a broad-based, multiservice report that doubled down on SAC’s findings: “the United States could not assure survivability, endurability, or connectivity of the national command authority function” due to: major command, control, and communications deficiencies: in tactical warning and attack assessment where existing systems were vulnerable to disruption and destruction from electromagnetic pulse, other high altitude nuclear effects, electronic warfare, sabotage, or physical attack; in decision making where there was inability to assure national command authority survival and connection with the nuclear forces, especially under surprise conditions; and in communications systems, which were susceptible to the same threats above and which could not guarantee availability of even minimum-essential capability during a protracted war. 33 The nuclear weapons safety literature likewise provides A number of troubling examples of NC3US nuclear command glitches that illustrate some of the vulnerabilities attackers could, in principle, exploit 34–36. The SAC history noted that NORAD has received numerous false launch indications from faulty computer components, loose circuits, and even a nuclear war training tape loaded by mistake into a live system that produced erroneous Soviet launch indications 33. In a 1991 briefing to the STRATCOM commander, a Defense Intelligence Agency targeteer confessed, “Sir, I apologize, but we have found a problem with this target. There is a mistake in the computer code …?. Sir, the error has been there for at least the life of this eighteen-month planning cycle. The nature of the error is such that the target would not have been struck” 37. It would be a difficult operation to intentionally plant undetected errors like this, but the presence of bugs does reveal that such a hack is possible. Following many near-misses and self-audits during and after the Cold War, American NC3 improved with the addition of new safeguards and redundancies. As General Kehler pointed out in 2013, “the nuclear deterrent force was designed to operate through the most extreme circumstances we could possibly imagine” 28. Yet vulnerabilities remain. In 2010, the US Air Force lost contact with 50 Minuteman III ICBMs for an hour because of a faulty hardware circuit at a launch control center 38. If the accident had occurred during a crisis, or the component had been sabotaged, the USAF would have been unable to launch and unable to detect and cancel unauthorized launch attempts. As Bruce Blair, a former Minuteman missileer, points out, during a control center blackout the antennas at unmanned silos and the cables between them provide potential surreptitious access vectors 39. The unclassified summary of a 2015 audit of US NC3 stated that “known capability gaps or deficiencies remain” 40. Perhaps more worrisome are the unknown deficiencies. A 2013 Defense Science Board report on military cyber vulnerabilities found that while the: nuclear deterrent is regularly evaluated for reliability and readiness …?, most of the systems have not been assessed (end-to-end) against a sophisticated state cyber attack to understand possible weak spots. A 2007 Air Force study addressed portions of this issue for the ICBM leg of the U.S. triad but was still not a complete assessment against a high-tier threat. 41 If NC3US Nuclear Command vulnerabilities are unknown, it is also unknown whether an advanced cyber actor would be able to exploit them. As Kehler notes, “We don’t know what we don’t know” 28. Even if NC3 of nuclear forces narrowly conceived is a hard target, cyber attacks on other critical infrastructure in preparation to or during a nuclear crisis could complicate or confuse government decision making. General Keith Alexander, Director of the NSA in the same Senate hearing with General Kehler, testified thAnswers to: our infrastructure that we ride on, the power and the communications one of the things that is a source of concern … we can go to backup generators and we can have independent routes, but?… our ability to communicate would be significantly reduced and it would complicate our governance?…?. I think what General Kehler has would be intact?… but the cascading effect?… in that kind of environment?… concerns us. 28 Kehler further emphasized that “there’s a continuing need to make sure that we are protected against electromagnetic pulse and any kind of electromagnetic interference” 28. Many NC3 components are antiquated and hard to upgrade, which is a mixed blessing. Kehler points out, “Much of the nuclear command and control system today is a the legacy system that we’ve had. In some ways that helps us in terms of the cyber threat. In some cases it’s point to point, hard-wired, which makes it very difficult for an external cyber threat to emerge” 28. The Government Accountability Office notes that the “Department of Defense uses 8-inch floppy disks in a legacy system that coordinates the operational functions of the nation’s nuclear forces” 42. While this may limit some forms of remote access, it is also indicative of reliance on an earlier generation of software when security engineering standards were less mature. Upgrades to the digital Strategic Automated Command and Control System planned for 2017 have the potential to correct some problems, but these changes may also introduce new access vectors and vulnerabilities 43. Admiral Cecil Haney, Kehler’s successor at STRATCOM, highlighted the challenges of NC3 modernization in 2015: Assured and reliable NC3 is fundamental to the credibility of our nuclear deterrent. The aging NC3 systems continue to meet their intended purpose, but risk to mission success is increasing as key elements of the system age. The unpredictable challenges posed by today’s complex security environment make it increasingly important to optimize our NC3 architecture while leveraging new technologies so that NC3 systems operate together as a core set of survivable and endurable capabilities that underpin a broader, national command and control system. 44 In no small irony, the internet itself owes its intellectual origin, in part, to the threat to NC3 from large-scale physical attack. A 1962?RAND report by Paul Baran considered “the problem of building digital communication networks using links with less than perfect reliability” to enable “stations surviving a physical attack and remaining in electrical connection … to operate together as a coherent entity after attack” 45. Baran advocated as a solution decentralized packet switching protocols, not unlike those realized in the ARPANET program. The emergence of the internet was the result of many other factors that had nothing to do with managing nuclear operations, notably the meritocratic ideals of 1960s counterculture that contributed to the neglect of security in the internet’s founding architecture 46, 47. Fears of NC3 vulnerability helped to create the internet, which then helped to create the present-day cybersecurity epidemic, which has come full circle to create new fears about NC3 vulnerability. NC3 vulnerability is not unique to the United States. The NC3 of other nuclear powers may even be easier to compromise, especially in the case of new entrants to the nuclear club like North Korea. Moreover, the United States has already demonstrated both the ability and willingness to infiltrate sensitive foreign nuclear infrastructure through operations such as Olympic Games (Stuxnet), albeit targeting Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle rather than NC3. It would be surprising to learn that the United States has failed to upgrade its Cold War NC3 attack plans to include offensive cyber operations against a wide variety of national targets. Hacking the deterrent The United States included NC3 attacks in its Cold War counterforce and damage limitation war plans, even as contemporary critics perceived these options to be destabilizing for deterrence 48. The best known example of these activities and capabilities is a Special Access Program named Canopy Wing. East German intelligence obtained the highly classified plans from a US Army spy in Berlin, and the details began to emerge publicly after the Cold War. An East German intelligence officer, Markus Wolf, writes in his memoir that Canopy Wing “listed the types of electronic warfare that would be used to neutralize the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact’s command centers in case of all-out war. It detailed the precise method of depriving the Soviet High Command of its high-frequency communications used to give orders to its armed forces” 49. It is easy to see why NC3 is such an attractive target in the unlikely event of a nuclear war. If for whatever reason deterrence fails and the enemy decides to push the nuclear button, it would obviously be better to disable or destroy missiles before they launch than to rely on possibly futile efforts to shoot them down, or to accept the loss of millions of lives. American plans to disable Soviet NC3 with electronic warfare, furthermore, would have been intended to complement plans for decapitating strikes against Soviet nuclear forces. Temporary disabling of information networks in isolation would have failed to achieve any important strategic objective. A blinded adversary would eventually see again and would scramble to reconstitute its ability to launch its weapons, expecting that preemption was inevitable in any case. Reconstitution, moreover, would invalidate much of the intelligence and some of the tradecraft on which the blinding attack relied. Capabilities fielded through Canopy Wing were presumably intended to facilitate a preemptive military strike on Soviet NC3 to disable the ability to retaliate and limit the damage of any retaliatory force that survived, given credible indications that war was imminent. Canopy Wing included 50: “Measures for short-circuiting … communications and weapons systems using, among other things, microscopic carbon-fiber particles and chemical weapons.” “Electronic blocking of communications immediately prior to an attack, thereby rendering a counterattack impossible.” “Deployment of various weapons systems for instantaneous destruction of command centers, including pin-point targeting with precision-guided weapons to destroy ‘hardened bunkers’.” “Use of deception measures, including the use of computer-simulated voices to override and substitute false commands from ground-control stations to aircraft and from regional command centers to the Soviet submarine fleet.” “Use of the technical installations of ‘Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’ and ‘Voice of America,’ as well as the radio communications installations of the U.S. Armed Forces for creating interference and other electronic effects.” Wolf also ran a spy in the US Air Force who disclosed that the Americans had managed to penetrate the Soviet air base at Eberswalde’s ground-air communications and were working on a method of blocking orders before they reached the Russian pilots and substituting their own from West Berlin. Had this succeeded, the MiG pilots would have received commands from their American enemy. It sounded like science fiction, but, our experts concluded, it was in no way impossible that they could have pulled off such a trick, given the enormous spending and technical power of U.S. military air research. 49 One East German source claimed that Canopy Wing had a $14.5 billion budget for research and operational costs and a staff of 1570 people, while another claimed that it would take over 4 years and $65 million to develop “a prototype of a sophisticated electronic system for paralyzing Soviet radio traffic in the high-frequency range” 50. Canopy Wing was not cheap, and even so, it was only a research and prototyping program. Operationalization of its capabilities and integration into NATO war plans would have been even more expensive. This is suggestive of the level of effort required to craft effective offensive cyber operations against NC3. Preparation comes to naught when a sensitive program is compromised. Canopy Wing was caught in what we describe below as the cyber commitment problem, the inability to disclose a warfighting capability for the sake of deterrence without losing it in the process. According to New York Times reporting on the counterintelligence investigation of the East German spy in the Army, Warrant Officer James Hall, “officials said that one program rendered useless cost hundreds of millions of dollars and was designed to exploit a Soviet communications vulnerability uncovered in the late 1970's” 51. This program was probably Canopy Wing. Wolf writes, “Once we passed Hall’s documents about Canopy Wing on to the Soviets, they were able to install scrambling devices and other countermeasures” 49. It is tempting to speculate that the Soviet deployment of a new NC3 system known as Signal-A to replace Signal-M (which was most likely the one targeted by Canopy Wing) was motivated in part by Hall’s betrayal 50. Canopy Wing underscores the potential and limitations of NC3 subversion. Modern cyber methods can potentially perform many of the missions Canopy Wing addressed with electronic warfare and other means, but with even greater stealth and precision. Cyber operations might, in principle, compromise any part of the NC3 system (early warning, command centers, data transport, operational forces, etc.) by blinding sensors, injecting bogus commands or suppressing legitimate ones, monitoring or corrupting data transmissions, or interfering with the reliable launch and guidance of missiles. In practice, the operational feasibility of cyber attack against NC3 or any other target depends on the software and hardware configuration and organizational processes of the target, the intelligence and planning capacity of the attacker, and the ability and willingness to take advantage of the effects created by cyber attack 52, 53. Cyber compromise of NC3 is technically plausible though operationally difficult, a point to which we return in a later section. To understand which threats are not only technically possible but also probable under some circumstance, we further need a political logic of cost and benefit 14. In particular, how is it possible for a crisis to escalate to levels of destruction more costly than any conceivable political reward? Canopy Wing highlights some of the strategic dangers of NC3 exploitation. Warsaw Pact observers appear to have been deeply concerned that the program reflected an American willingness to undertake a surprise decapitation attack: they said that it “sent ice-cold shivers down our spines” 50. The Soviets designed a system called Perimeter that, not unlike the Doomsday Device in Dr. Strangelove, was designed to detect a nuclear attack and retaliate automatically, even if cut off from Soviet high command, through an elaborate system of sensors, underground computers, and command missiles to transmit launch codes 54. Both Canopy Wing and Perimeter show that the United States and the Soviet Union took nuclear warfighting seriously and were willing to develop secret advantages for such an event. By the same token, they were not able to reveal such capabilities to improve deterrence to avoid having to fight a nuclear war in the first place. Nuclear deterrence and credible communication Nuclear weapons have some salient political properties. They are singularly and obviously destructive. They kill in more, and more ghastly, ways than conventional munitions through electromagnetic radiation, blast, firestorms, radioactive fallout, and health effects that linger for years. Bombers, ICBMs, and SLBMs can project warheads globally without significantly mitigating their lethality, steeply attenuating the conventional loss-of-strength gradient 55. Defense against nuclear attack is very difficult, even with modern ballistic missile defenses, given the speed of incoming warheads and use of decoys; multiple warheads and missile volleys further reduce the probability of perfect interception. If one cannot preemptively destroy all of an enemy’s missiles, then there is a nontrivial chance of getting hit by some of them. When one missed missile can incinerate millions of people, the notion of winning a nuclear war starts to seem meaningless for many politicians. As defense seemed increasingly impractical, early Cold War strategists championed the threat of assured retaliation as the chief mechanism for avoiding war 56–59. Political actors have issued threats for millennia, but the advent of nuclear weapons brought deterrence as a strategy to center stage. The Cold War was an intense learning experience for both practitioners and students of international security, rewriting well-worn realities more than once 60–62. A key conundrum was the practice of brinkmanship. Adversaries who could not compete by “winning” a nuclear war could still compete by manipulating the “risk” of nuclear annihilation, gambling that an opponent would have the good judgment to back down at some point short of the nuclear brink. Brinkmanship crises—conceptualized as games of Chicken where one cannot heighten tensions without increasing the hazard of the mutually undesired outcome—require that decision makers behave irrationally, or possibly that they act randomly, which is difficult to conceptualize in practical terms 63. The chief concern in historical episodes of chicken, such as the Berlin Crisis and Cuban Missile Crisis, was not whether a certain level of harm was possible, but whether an adversary was resolved enough, possibly, to risk nuclear suicide. The logical inconsistency of the need for illogic to win led almost from the beginning of the nuclear era to elaborate deductive contortions 64–66. Both mutually assured destruction (MAD) and successful brinksmanship depend on a less appreciated, but no less fundamental, feature of nuclear weapons: political transparency. Most elements of military power are weakened by disclosure 67. Military plans are considerably less effective if shared with an enemy. Conventional weapons become less lethal as adversaries learn what different systems can and cannot do, where they are located, how they are operated, and how to devise countermeasures and array defenses to blunt or disarm an attack. In contrast, relatively little reduction in destruction follows from enemy knowledge of nuclear capabilities. For most of the nuclear era, no effective defense existed against a nuclear attack. Even today, with evolving ABM systems, one ICBM still might get through and annihilate the capital city. Nuclear forces are more robust to revelation than other weapons, enabling nuclear nations better to advertise the harm they can inflict. The need for transparency to achieve an effective deterrent is driven home by the satirical Cold War film, Dr. Strangelove: “the whole point of a Doomsday Machine is lost, if you keep it a secret! Why didn’t you tell the world, eh?” During the real Cold War, fortunately, Soviet leaders paraded their nuclear weapons through Red Square for the benefit of foreign military attaches and the international press corps. Satellites photographed missile, bomber, and submarine bases. While other aspects of military affairs on both sides of the Iron Curtain remained closely guarded secrets, the United States and the Soviet Union permitted observers to evaluate their nuclear capabilities. This is especially remarkable given the secrecy that pervaded Soviet society. The relative transparency of nuclear arsenals ensured that the superpowers could calculate risks and consequences within a first-order approximation, which led to a reduction in severe conflict and instability even as political competition in other arenas was fierce 61, 68. Recent insights about the causes of war suggest that divergent expectations about the costs and consequences of war are necessary for contests to occur 69–73. These insights are associated with rationalist theories, such as deterrence theory itself. Empirical studies and psychological critiques of the rationality assumption have helped to refine models and bring some circumspection into their application, but the formulation of sound strategy (if not the execution) still requires the articulation of some rational linkage between cause and effect 19, 62, 74. Many supposedly nonrational factors, moreover, simply manifest as uncertainty in strategic interaction. Our focus here is on the effect of uncertainty and ignorance on the ability of states and other actors to bargain in lieu of fighting. Many wars are a product of what adversaries do not know or what they misperceive, whether as a result of bluffing, secrecy, or intrinsic uncertainty 75, 76. If knowledge of capabilities or resolve is a prerequisite for deterrence, then one reason for deterrence failure is the inability or unwillingness to credibly communicate details of the genuine balance of power, threat, or interests. Fighting, conversely, can be understood as a costly process of discovery that informs adversaries of their actual relative strength and resolve. From this perspective, successful deterrence involves instilling in an adversary perceptions like those that result from fighting, but before fighting actually begins. Agreement about the balance of power can enable states to bargain (tacit or overt) effectively without needing to fight, forging compromises that each prefers to military confrontation or even to the bulk of possible risky brinkmanship crises. Despite other deficits, nuclear weapons have long been considered to be stabilizing with respect to rational incentives for war (the risk of nuclear accidents is another matter) 77. If each side has a secure second strike—or even a minimal deterrent with some nonzero chance of launching a few missiles—then each side can expect to gain little and lose much by fighting a nuclear war. Whereas the costs of conventional war can be more mysterious because each side might decide to hold something back and meter out its punishment due to some internal constraint or a theory of graduated escalation, even a modest initial nuclear exchange is recognized to be extremely costly. As long as both sides understand this and understand (or believe) that the adversary understands this as well, then the relationship is stable. Countries engage nuclear powers with considerable deference, especially over issues of fundamental national or international importance. At the same time, nuclear weapons appear to be of limited value in prosecuting aggressive action, especially over issues of secondary or tertiary importance, or in response to aggression from others at lower levels of dispute intensity. Nuclear weapons are best used for signaling a willingness to run serious risks to protect or extort some issue that is considered of vital national interest. As mentioned previously, both superpowers in the Cold War considered the warfighting advantages of nuclear weapons quite apart from any deterrent effect, and the United States and Russia still do. High-altitude bursts for air defense, electromagnetic pulse for frying electronics, underwater detonations for anti-submarine warfare, hardened target penetration, area denial, and so on, have some battlefield utility. Transparency per se is less important than weapon effects for warfighting uses, and can even be deleterious for tactics that depend on stealth and mobility. Even a single tactical nuke, however, would inevitably be a political event. Survivability of the second strike deterrent can also militate against transparency, as in the case of the Soviet Perimeter system, as mobility, concealment, and deception can make it harder for an observer to track and count respective forces from space. Counterforce strategies, platform diversity and mobility, ballistic missile defense systems, and force employment doctrine can all make it more difficult for one or both sides in a crisis to know whether an attack is likely to succeed or fail. The resulting uncertainty affects not only estimates of relative capabilities but also the degree of confidence in retaliation. At the same time, there is reason to believe that platform diversity lowers the risk of nuclear or conventional contests, because increasing the number of types of delivery platforms heightens second strike survivability without increasing the lethality of an initial strike 78. While transparency is not itself a requirement for nuclear use, stable deterrence benefits to the degree to which retaliation can be anticipated, as well as the likelihood that the consequences of a first strike are more costly than any benefit. Cyber operations, in contrast, are neither robust to revelation nor as obviously destructive. The cyber commitment problem Deterrence (and compellence) uses force or threats of force to “warn” an adversary about consequences if it takes or fails to take an action. In contrast, defense (and conquest) uses force to “win” a contest of strength and change the material distribution of power. Sometimes militaries can change the distribution of information and power at the same time. Military mobilization in a crisis signifies resolve and displays a credible warning, but it also makes it easier to attack or defend if the warning fails. Persistence in a battle of attrition not only bleeds an adversary but also reveals a willingness to pay a higher price for victory. More often, however, the informational requirements of winning and warning are in tension. Combat performance often hinges on well-kept secrets, feints, and diversions. Many military plans and capabilities degrade when revealed. National security involves trade-offs between the goals of preventing war, by advertising capabilities or interests, and improving fighting power should war break out, by concealing capabilities and surprising the enemy. The need to conceal details of the true balance of power to preserve battlefield effectiveness gives rise to the military commitment problem 79, 80. Japan could not coerce the United States by revealing its plan to attack Pearl Harbor because the United States could not credibly promise to refrain from reorienting defenses and dispersing the Pacific Fleet. War resulted not just because of what opponents did not know but because of what they could not tell each other without paying a severe price in military advantage. The military benefits of surprise (winning) trumped the diplomatic benefits of coercion (warning). Cyber operations, whether for disruption and intelligence, are extremely constrained by the military commitment problem. Revelation of a cyber threat in advance that is specific enough to convince a target of the validity of the threat also provides enough information potentially to neutralize it. Stuxnet took years and hundreds of millions of dollars to develop but was patched within weeks of its discovery. The Snowden leaks negated a whole swath of tradecraft that the NSA took years to develop. States may use other forms of covert action, such as publicly disavowed lethal aid or aerial bombing (e.g. Nixon’s Cambodia campaign), to discretely signal their interests, but such cases can only work to the extent that revelation of operational details fails to disarm rebels or prevent airstrikes 81. Cyber operations, especially against NC3, must be conducted in extreme secrecy as a condition of the efficacy of the attack. Cyber tradecraft relies on stealth, stratagem, and deception 21. Operations tailored to compromise complex remote targets require extensive intelligence, planning and preparation, and testing to be effective. Actions that alert a target of an exploit allow the target to patch, reconfigure, or adopt countermeasures that invalidate the plan. As the Defense Science Board points out, competent network defenders: can also be expected to employ highly-trained system and network administrators, and this operational staff will be equipped with continuously improving network defensive tools and techniques (the same tools we advocate to improve our defenses). Should an adversary discover an implant, it is usually relatively simple to remove or disable. For this reason, offensive cyber will always be a fragile capability. 41 The world’s most advanced cyber powers, the United States, Russia, Israel, China, France, and the United Kingdom, are also nuclear states, while India, Pakistan, and North Korea also have cyber warfare programs. NC3 is likely to be an especially well defended part of their cyber infrastructures. NC3 is a hard target for offensive operations, which thus requires careful planning, detailed intelligence, and long lead-times to avoid compromise. Cyberspace is further ill-suited for signaling because cyber operations are complex, esoteric, and hard for commanders and policymakers to understand. Most targeted cyber operations have to be tailored for each unique target (a complex organization not simply a machine), quite unlike a general purpose munition tested on a range. Malware can fail in many ways and produce unintended side effects, as when the Stuxnet code was accidentally released to the public. The category of “cyber” includes tremendous diversity: irritant scams, hacktivist and propaganda operations, intelligence collection, critical infrastructure disruption, etc. Few intrusions create consequences that rise to the level of attacks such as Stuxnet or BlackEnergy, and even they pale beside the harm imposed by a small war. Vague threats are less credible because they are indistinguishable from casual bluffing. Ambiguity can be useful for concealing a lack of capability or resolve, allowing an actor to pool with more capable or resolved states and acquiring some deterrence success by association. But this works by discounting the costliness of the threat. Nuclear threats, for example, are usually somewhat veiled because one cannot credibly threaten nuclear suicide. The consistently ambiguous phrasing of US cyber declaratory policy (e.g. “we will respond to cyber-attacks in a manner and at a time and place of our choosing using appropriate instruments of U.S. power” 82) seeks to operate across domains to mobilize credibility in one area to compensate for a lack of credibility elsewhere, specifically by leveraging the greater robustness to revelation of military capabilities other than cyber. This does not mean that cyberspace is categorically useless for signaling, just as nuclear weapons are not categorically useless for warfighting. Ransomware attacks work when the money extorted to unlock the compromised host is priced below the cost of an investigation or replacing the system. The United States probably gained some benefits in general deterrence (i.e. discouraging the emergence of challenges as opposed to immediate deterrence in response to a challenge) through the disclosure of Stuxnet and the Snowden leaks. Both revelations compromised tradecraft, but they also advertised that the NSA probably had more exploits and tradecraft where they came from. Some cyber operations may actually be hard to mitigate within tactically meaningful timelines (e.g. hardware implants installed in hard-to-reach locations). Such operations might be revealed to coerce concessions within the tactical window created by a given operation, if the attacker can coordinate the window with the application of coercion in other domains. As a general rule, however, the cyber domain on its own is better suited for winning than warning 83. Cyber and nuclear weapons fall on extreme opposite sides of this spectrum. Dangerous complements Nuclear weapons have been used in anger twice—against the Japanese cities Hiroshima and Nagasaki—but cyberspace is abused daily. Considered separately, the nuclear domain is stable and the cyber domain is unstable. In combination, the results are ambiguous. The nuclear domain can bound the intensity of destruction that a cyber attacker is willing to inflict on an adversary. US declaratory policy states that unacceptable cyber attacks may prompt a military response; while nuclear weapons are not explicitly threatened, neither are they withheld. Nuclear threats have no credibility at the low end, where the bulk of cyber attacks occur. This produces a cross-domain version of the stability–instability paradox, where deterrence works at the high end but is not credible, and thus encourages provocation, at low intensities. Nuclear weapons, and military power generally, create an upper bound on cyber aggression to the degree that retaliation is anticipated and feared 22, 83, 84. In the other direction, the unstable cyber domain can undermine the stability of nuclear deterrence. Most analysts who argue that the cyber–nuclear combination is a recipe for danger focus on the fog of crisis decision making 85–87. Stephen Cimbala points out that today’s relatively smaller nuclear arsenals may perversely magnify the attractiveness of NC3 exploitation in a crisis: “Ironically, the downsizing of U.S. and post-Soviet Russian strategic nuclear arsenals since the end of the Cold War, while a positive development from the perspectives of nuclear arms control and nonproliferation, makes the concurrence of cyber and nuclear attack capabilities more alarming” 88. Cimbala focuses mainly on the risks of misperception and miscalculation that emerge when a cyber attack muddies the transparent communication required for opponents to understand one another’s interests, redlines, and willingness to use force, and to ensure reliable control over subordinate commanders. Thus a nuclear actor “faced with a sudden burst of holes in its vital warning and response systems might, for example, press the preemption button instead of waiting to ride out the attack and then retaliate” 85. The outcome of fog of decision scenarios such as these depend on how humans react to risk and uncertainty, which in turn depends on bounded rationality and organizational frameworks that might confuse rational decision making 89, 90. These factors exacerbate a hard problem. Yet within a rationalist framework, cyber attacks that have already created their effects need not trigger an escalatory spiral. While being handed a fait accompli may trigger an aggressive reaction, it is also plausible that the target’s awareness that its NC3 has been compromised in some way would help to convey new information that the balance of power is not as favorable as previously thought. This in turn could encourage the target to accommodate, rather than escalate. While defects in rational decision making are a serious concern in any cyber–nuclear scenario, the situation becomes even more hazardous when there are rational incentives to escalate. Although “known unknowns” can create confusion, to paraphrase Donald Rumsfeld, the “unknown unknowns” are perhaps more dangerous. A successful clandestine penetration of NC3 Nuclear command can defeats the informational symmetry that stabilizes nuclear relationships. Nuclear weapons are useful for deterrence because they impose a degree of consensus about the distribution of power; each side knows the other can inflict prohibitive levels of damage, even if they may disagree about the precise extent of this damage. Cyber operations are attractive precisely because they can secretly revise the distribution of power. NC3 neutralization may be an expensive and rarified capability in the reach of only a few states with mature signals intelligence agencies, but it is much cheaper than nuclear attack. Yet the very usefulness of cyber operations for nuclear warfighting ensure that deterrence failure during brinksmanship crises is more likely. Nuclear states may initiate crises of risk and resolve to see who will back down first, which is not always clear in advance. Chicken appears viable, ironically, because each player understands that a nuclear war would be a disaster for all, and thus all can agree that someone can be expected swerve. Nuclear deterrence should ultimately make dealing with an adversary diplomatically more attractive than fighting, provided that fighting is costly—as would seem evident for the prospect of nuclear war—and assuming that bargains are available to states willing to accept compromise rather than annihilation. If, however, one side knows, but the other does not, that the attacker has disabled the target’s ability to perceive an impending military attack, or to react to one when it is underway, then they will not have a shared understanding of the probable outcome of war, even in broad terms. Consider a brinksmanship crisis between two nuclear states where only one has realized a successful penetration of the rival’s NC3. The cyber attacker knows that it has a military advantage, but it cannot reveal the advantage to the target, lest the advantage be lost. The target does not know that it is at a disadvantage, and it cannot be told by the attacker for the same reason. The attacker perceives an imbalance of power while the target perceives a balance. A dangerous competition in risk taking ensues. The first side knows that it does not need to back down. The second side feels confident that it can stand fast and raise the stakes far beyond what it would be willing to if it understood the true balance of power. Each side is willing to escalate to create more risk for the other side, making it more likely that one or the other will conclude that deterrence has failed and move into warfighting mode to attempt to limit the damage the other can inflict. The targeted nature and uncertain effects of offensive cyber operations put additional pressure on decision makers. An intrusion will probably disable only part of the enemy’s NC3 architecture, not all of it (which is not only operationally formidable to achieve but also more likely to be noticed by the target). Thus the target may retain control over some nuclear forces, or conventional forces. The target may be tempted to use some of them piecemeal to signal a willingness to escalate further, even though it cannot actually escalate because of the cyber operation. The cyber attacker knows that it has escalation dominance, but when even a minor demonstration by the target can cause great damage, it is tempting to preempt this move or others like it. This situation would be especially unstable if only second strike but not primary strike NC3 was incapacitated. Uncertainty in the efficacy of the clandestine penetration would discount the attacker’s confidence in its escalation dominance, with a range of possible outcomes. Enough uncertainty would discount the cyber attack to nothing, which would have a stabilizing effect by returning the crisis to the pure nuclear domain. A little bit of uncertainty about cyber effectiveness would heighten risk acceptance while also raising the incentives to preempt as an insurance measure. Adding allies into the mix introduces additional instability. An ally emboldened by its nuclear umbrella might run provocative risks that it would be much more reluctant to embrace if it was aware that the umbrella was actually full of holes. Conversely, if the clandestine advantage is held by the state extending the umbrella, allies could become unnerved by the willingness of their defender to run what appear to be outsize risks, oblivious of the reasons for the defender’s confidence, creating discord in the alliance and incentives for self-protective action, leading to greater uncertainty about alliance solidarity. The direction of influence between the cyber and nuclear realms depends to large degree on which domain is the main arena of action. Planning and conducting cyber operations will be bounded by the ability of aggressors to convince themselves that attacks will remain secret, and by the confidence of nuclear nations in their invulnerability. Fears of cross-domain escalation will tend to keep instability in cyberspace bounded. However, if a crisis has risen to the point where nuclear threats are being seriously considered or made, then NC3 exploitation will be destabilizing. Brinksmanship crises seem to have receded in frequency since the Cuban Missile Crisis but may be more likely than is generally believed. President Vladimir Putin of Russia has insinuated more than once in recent years that his government is willing to use tactical nuclear weapons if necessary to support his policies. Cyber power and nuclear stability Not all crises are the same. Indeed, their very idiosyncrasies create the uncertainties that make bargaining failure more likely 75. So far our analysis would be at home in the Cold War, with the technological novelty of cyber operations. Yet not every state has the same cyber capabilities or vulnerabilities. Variation in cyber power relations across dyads should be expected to affect the strategic stability of nuclear states. The so-called second nuclear age differs from superpower rivalry in important ways 91. There are fewer absolute numbers of warheads in the world, down from a peak of over 70 000 in the 1980s to about 15 000 today (less than 5000 deployed), but they are distributed very unevenly 92. The United States and Russia have comparably sized arsenals, each with a fully diversified triad of delivery platforms, while North Korea only has a dozen or so bombs and no meaningful delivery system (for now). China, India, Pakistan, Britain, France, and Israel have modest arsenals in the range of several dozen to a couple hundred weapons, but they have very different doctrines, conventional force complements, domestic political institutions, and alliance relationships. The recent nuclear powers lack the hard-won experience and shared norms of the Cold War to guide them through crises, and even the United States and Russia have much to relearn. Cyber warfare capacity also varies considerably across contemporary nuclear nations. The United States, Russia, Israel, and Britain are in the top tier, able to run sophisticated, persistent, clandestine penetrations. China is a uniquely active cyber power with ambitious cyber warfare doctrine, but its operational focus is on economic espionage and political censorship, resulting in less refined tradecraft and more porous defenses for military purposes 16. France, India, and Pakistan also have active cyber warfare programs, while North Korea is the least developed cyber nation, depending on China for its expertise 93. It is beyond the scope of this article to assess crisis dyads in detail, and data on nuclear and cyber power for these countries are shrouded in secrecy. Here, as a way of summing up the arguments above, we offer a few conjectures about how stylized aspects of cyber power affect crisis stability through incentives and key aspects of decision making. We do not stress relative nuclear weapon capabilities on the admittedly strong (and contestable) assumption that nuclear transparency in the absence of cyber operations would render nuclear asymmetry irrelevant for crisis bargaining because both sides would agree about the terrible consequences of conflict 94. We also omit domestic or psychological variables that affect relative power assessments, although these are obviously important. Even if neither India nor Pakistan have viable cyber–nuclear capabilities, brinksmanship between them is dangerous for many other reasons, notably compressed decision timelines, Pakistan’s willingness to shoot first, and domestic regime instability. Our focus is on the impact of offensive and defensive cyber power on nuclear deterrence above and beyond the other factors that certainly play a role in real-world outcomes. First, does the cyber attacker have the organizational capacity, technical expertise, and intelligence support to “compromise” the target’s NC3? Can hackers access critical networks, exploit technical vulnerabilities, and confidently execute a payload to disrupt or exploit strategic sensing, command, forces, or transport capacity? The result would be some tangible advantage for warfighting, such as tactical warning or control paralysis, but one that cannot be exercised in bargaining. Second, is the target able to “detect” the compromise of its NC3? The more complicated and sensitive the target, the more likely cyber attackers are to make a mistake that undermines the intrusion. Attribution is not likely to be difficult given the constricted pool of potential attackers, but at the same time the consequences of misattributing “false flag” operations could be severe 95. At a minimum, detection is assumed to provide information to the target that the balance of power is perhaps not as favorable as imagined previously. We assume that detection without an actual compromise is possible because of false positives or deceptive information operations designed to create pessimism or paranoia. Third, is the target able to “mitigate” the compromise it detects? Revelation can prompt patching or network reconfiguration to block an attack, but this assumption is not always realistic. The attacker may have multiple pathways open or may have implanted malware that is difficult to remove in tactically meaningful timelines. In such cases the cyber commitment problem is not absolute, since the discovery of the power to hurt does not automatically disarm it. Successful mitigation here is assumed to restore mutual assessments of the balance of power to what they would be absent the cyber attack. Table 1 shows how these factors combine to produce different deterrence outcomes in a brinksmanship (chicken) crisis. If there is no cyber compromise and the target detects nothing (no false positives) then we have the optimistic ideal case where nuclear transparency affords stable “deterrence.” Transparency about the nuclear balance, including the viability of secure second strike forces, provides strategic stability. We also expect this box to describe situations where the target has excellent network defense capabilities and thus the prospect of defense, denial or deception successfully deters any attempts to penetrate NC3. This may resemble the Cold War situation (with electronic warfare in lieu of cyber), or even the present day US–Russia dyad, where the odds of either side pulling off a successful compromise against a highly capable defender are not favorable. Alternately the attack may be deemed risky enough to encourage serious circumspection. However, the existence of Canopy Wing does not encourage optimism in this regard. TABLE 1 OMITTED Conversely, if there is a compromise that goes undetected, then there is a heightened risk of “war” because of the cyber commitment problem. This box may be particularly relevant for asymmetric dyads such as the United States and North Korea, where one side has real cyber power but the other side is willing to go to the brink where it believes, falsely, that it has the capability to compel its counterpart to back down. Cyber disruption of NC3 is attractive for damage limitation should deterrence fail, given that the weaker state’s diminutive arsenal makes damage limitation by the stronger state more likely to succeed. The dilemma for the stronger state is that the clandestine counterforce hedge, which makes warfighting success more likely, is precisely what makes deterrence more likely to fail. The United States would face similar counterforce dilemmas with other dyads like China or even Russia, although even a strong cyber power should be more circumspect when confronted with an adversary with a larger/more capable nuclear and conventional arsenal. More complex and cyber savvy targets, moreover, are more likely to detect a breach in NC3, leading to more ambiguous outcomes depending on how actors cope with risk and uncertainty. Paradoxically, confidence in cyber security may be a major contributor to failure; believing one is safe from attack increases the chance that an attack is successful. If the successful compromise is detected but not mitigated, then the target learns that the balance of power is not as favorable as thought. This possibility suggests fleeting opportunities for “coercion” by revealing the cyber coup to the target in the midst of a crisis while the cyber attacker maintains or develops a favorable military advantage before the target has the opportunity to reverse or compensate the NC3 disruption. Recognizing the newly transparent costs of war, a risk neutral or risk averse target should prefer compromise. The coercive advantages (deterrence or compellence) of a detected but unmitigated NC3 compromise will likely be fleeting. This suggests a logical possibility for creating a window of opportunity for using particular cyber operations that are more robust to revelation as a credible signal of superior capability in the midst of a crisis. It would be important to exploit this fleeting advantage via other credible military threats (e.g. forces mobilized on visible alert or deployed into the crisis area) before the window closes. One side may be able gain an unearned advantage, an opportunity for coercion via a “bluff,” by the same window-of-opportunity logic. A target concerned about NC3 compromise will probably have some network monitoring system and other protections in place. Defensive systems can produce false positives as a result of internal errors or a deception operation by the attacker to encourage paranoia. It is logically possible that some false positives would appear to the target to be difficult to mitigate. In this situation, the target could believe it is at a disadvantage, even though this is not in fact the case. This gambit would be operationally very difficult to pull off with any reliability in a real nuclear crisis. Cyber–nuclear coercion and bluffing strategies are fraught with danger. Detection without mitigation might put a risk-acceptant or loss-averse target into a “use-lose” situation, creating pressures to preempt or escalate. The muddling of decision-making heightens the risk of accidents or irrational choices in a crisis scenario. Worry about preemption or accident then heightens the likelihood that the initiator will exercise counterforce options while they remain available. These pressures can be expected to be particularly intense if the target’s detection is only partial or has not revealed the true extent of damage to its NC3 (i.e. the target does not realize it has already lost some or all of what it hopes to use). These types of scenarios are most usually invoked in analyses of inadvertent escalation 23–27. The essential distinction between “use-lose” risks and “war” in this typology is the target’s knowledge of some degree of NC3 compromise. Use-lose and other cognitive pressures can certainly result in nuclear war, since the breakdown of deterrence leads to the release of nuclear weapons, but we distinguish these outcomes to highlight the different decision making processes or rational incentives at work. A “spiral” of mistrust may emerge if one side attempts a compromise but the defender detects and mitigates it. Both sides again have common mutual estimates of the relative balance of power, which superficially resembles the “deterrence” case because the NC3 compromise is negated. Unfortunately, the detection of the compromise will provide the target with information about the hostile intentions of the cyber attacker. This in turn is likely to exacerbate other political or psychological factors in the crisis itself or in the crisis-proneness of the broader relationship. The strange logical case where there is no compromise but one is detected and mitigated could result from a false positive misperception (including a third-party false flag operation) that could conflict spiraling 96, 97. The bluff and coercion outcomes are also likely to encourage spiraling behavior once the fleeting bargaining advantage dissipates or is dispelled (provided anyone survives the interaction). The risk of crisis instability is not the same for all dyads. It is harder to compromise the NC3 of strong states because of the redundancy and active defenses in their arsenal. Likewise, strong states are better able to compromise the NC3 of any states but especially of weaker states, because of strong states’ greater organizational capacity and expertise in cyber operations. Stable deterrence or MAD is most likely to hold in mutually strong dyads (e.g. the United States and the Soviet Union in the Cold War or Russia today to a lesser extent). Deterrence is slightly less likely in other equally matched dyads (India–Pakistan) where defensive vulnerabilities create temptations but offensive capabilities may not be sufficient to exploit them. Most states can be expected to refrain from targeting American NC3 given a US reputation for cyber power (a general deterrence benefit enhanced by Stuxnet and Snowden). The situation is less stable if the United States is the attacker. The most dangerous dyad is a stronger and a weaker state (United States and North Korea or Israel and Iran). Dyads involving strong and middle powers are also dangerous (United States and China). The stronger side is tempted to disrupt NC3 as a warfighting hedge in case deterrence breaks down, while the weaker but still formidable side has a reasonable chance at detection. The marginally weaker may also be tempted to subvert NC3, particularly for reconnaissance; the stronger side is more likely to detect and correct the intrusion but will be alarmed by the ambiguity in distinguishing intelligence collection from attack planning 98. In a brinksmanship crisis between them, windows for coercion may be available yet fleeting, with real risks of spiral and war.
Even if you don’t buy Gartzkey and Lindsey, offensive postures will shift perceptions and reframe even minor intrusions as serious threats.
Veleriano and Jensen ’19 Veleriano, Brandon (Donald Bren Chair of Armed Politics at Marine Corps University) and Jensen, Benjamin (associate professor at the Marine Corps University and a scholar-in-residence at American University's School of International Service). “The Myth of the Cyber Offense: The Case for Restraint.” Cato Institute, 15 January 2019, https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/myth-cyber-offense-case-restraint. Premier
More worryingly, with a more offensive posture, it will be increasingly difficult for states to differentiate between cyber espionage and more damaging degradation operations.55 What the United States calls defending forward, China and Russia will call preemptive strikes. Worse still, this offensive posture will likely lead great powers to assume all network intrusions, including espionage, are preparing the environment for follow-on offensive strikes. According to cybersecurity scholar Ben Buchanan, “in the aggressor state’s own view, such moves are clearly defensive, merely ensuring that its military will have the strength and flexibility to meet whatever comes its way. Yet potential adversaries are unlikely to share this perspective.”56 The current new strategy risks producing a “forever cyber war” prone to inadvertent escalation because it implies all cyber operations should be interpreted as escalatory by adversaries.57
Risks are exacerbated by a lack of interagency checks. That ensures misperception
Veleriano and Jensen ’19 Veleriano, Brandon (Donald Bren Chair of Armed Politics at Marine Corps University) and Jensen, Benjamin (associate professor at the Marine Corps University and a scholar-in-residence at American University's School of International Service). “The Myth of the Cyber Offense: The Case for Restraint.” Cato Institute, 15 January 2019, https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/myth-cyber-offense-case-restraint. Premier
The new policy framework for offensive cyber operations risks compounding common pathologies associated with strategic assessments and planning. 62 Removing interagency checks increases the risks that an operation will backfire on the attacker or compromise ongoing operations. Misperception is pervasive in insulated decisionmaking processes for several reasons.63 First, small groups unchecked by bureaucracy tend to produce narrow plans prone to escalation during crises.64 Second, leaders often give guidance to planners during crises that reflects their political bias or personality traits rather than a rational assessment of threats and options.65 Third, offensive bias in planning may have little to do with the actual threat and more to do with a cult of the offensive and the desire of officers to ensure their autonomy and resources.66 Removing interagency checks therefore risks compounding fundamental attribution errors and other implicit biases. Cyber operations are too important to be left to the generals at Cyber Command alone. | 904,706 |
365,738 | 379,608 | 2 - NovDec Nato | NATO is planning on having a fully functioning cyber command by 2023
Robin Emmott, 10-16-2018, "NATO cyber command to be fully operational in 2023," U.S., https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-cyber/nato-cyber-command-to-be-fully-operational-in-2023-idUSKCN1MQ1Z9
A new NATO military command center to deter computer hackers should be fully staffed in 2023 and able to mount its own cyber-attacks but the alliance is still grappling with ground rules for doing so, a senior general said on Tuesday. While NATO does not have its own cyber weapons, the U.S.-led alliance established an operations center on Aug. 31 at its military hub in Belgium. The United States, Britain, Estonia and other allies have since offered their cyber capabilities.
However, NATO is fully reliant on the United States for offensive cyber operations until then.
Patrick Tucker 19, 5-24-2019, "NATO Getting More Aggressive on Offensive Cyber," Defense One, https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2019/05/nato-getting-more-aggressive-offensive-cyber/157270/
At an event in May, Gottemoeller said NATO was in the processes of establishing a new innovation board to “bring together all of the parts of and pieces of NATO that have to wrestle with these new technologies to really try to get a flow of information. Many of you having served in any international institution or government, you know how things can get stove-piped. So we are resolved to break down those stove-pipes, particularly where innovation is concerned,” she said. NATO is building a cyber command that is scheduled to be fully operational in 2023 and will coordinate and conduct all offensive cyber operations. Until then, whatever NATO does offensively, it will rely heavily on the United States and the discretion of U.S. commanders, according to Sophie Arts, program coordinator for security and defense at the German Marshall Fund, who explains in this December report.
And the U.S will have full control of these offensive cyber operations but will do them through NATO
Idrees Ali, 10-3-2018, "With an eye on Russia, U.S. pledges to use cyber capabilities on behalf of NATO," U.S., https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-nato-russia-cyber/with-an-eye-on-russia-u-s-pledges-to-use-cyber-capabilities-on-behalf-of-nato-idUSKCN1MD0C
The United States is expected to announce in the coming days that it will use offensive and defensive cyber capabilities on behalf of NATO if asked, a senior Pentagon official said, amid concerns about Russia’s increasingly assertive use of its cyber capabilities. The 29-nation NATO alliance recognized cyber as a domain of warfare, along with land, air and sea, in 2014, but has not outlined in detail what that entails. “We will formally announce that the United States is prepared to offer NATO its cyber capabilities if asked,” Katie Wheelbarger, the principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, told reporters during a trip to Europe by U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis. Wheelbarger said the United States will keep control of its people and capabilities but use them in support of NATO if asked. She added that it was a part of a British-led push to increase NATO’s cyber capabilities. In a recent summit, member nations said NATO would create a cyberspace operations center to coordinate NATO’s cyber activities. NATO has also talked about integrating individual nations’ cyber capabilities into alliance operations. Last year, officials said the United States, Britain, Germany, Norway, Spain, Denmark and the Netherlands were drawing up cyber warfare principles to guide their militaries on what justifies deploying cyber attack weapons more broadly. In Europe, the issue of deploying malware is sensitive because democratic governments do not want to be seen to be using the same tactics as an authoritarian regime. Senior Baltic and British security officials say they have intelligence showing persistent Russian cyber hacks to try to bring down European energy and telecommunications networks, coupled with internet disinformation campaigns. U.S. intelligence officials have found that in the campaign leading up to the 2016 U.S. presidential election, Russian hackers breached the Democratic National Committee and leaked confidential information. “It sends a message primarily aimed at Russia,” Wheelbarger said. She added that the move would make clear that NATO is capable of countering Russian cyber efforts and would help in creating a more coherent cyber policy across the alliance. “U.S. together with the United Kingdom clearly lead in the level and sophistication of capabilities and if used, they would likely lead to tactical success,” said Klara Jordan, director of the Cyber Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council think tank in Washington.
The United States Increasing Offensive cyber operations through NATO is key to deter Russia
Kimberly Marten, 03-xx-2017, "," Reducing Tensions Between Russia and NATO, https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2017/03/CSR_79_Marten_RussiaNATO.pdf
In this new Council Special Report, Kimberly Marten, a professor of political science at Barnard College, at Columbia University, and director of the program on U.S.-Russia relations at Columbia’s Harriman Institute, addresses the rising tensions between Russia and both the United States and the rest of NATO. Marten is convincing when she writes about the tensions between NATO and Russia—tensions that could boil over into conflict if there were an accidental or intentional encounter between Russian and NATO militaries, a Russian incursion into NATO territory, or a hybrid war that included cyberattacks and sowing seeds of discontent in Eastern Europe. Marten also recommends several policy steps that the United States and NATO should take to avoid any such crisis. She weighs the needs of viii Foreword deterrence—including the United States publicly committing to uphold NATO’s defense clause, positioning troops in vulnerable NATO countries, and enhancing cyber defense and offense capabilities across the NATO bloc—and reassurance—including treating Russian President Vladimir Putin and other Russian leaders with respect, refraining from undermining each other’s domestic political stability (including formally stating that the United States does not seek Russian regime change), reestablishing arms control negotiations and agreements, and halting further NATO expansion, especially in Ukraine. Operating firmly in the tradition of foreign policy realism, Marten makes the case that both deterrence and reassurance measures are necessary and can in fact work in harmony.
This is critical, Russia’s planning to use cyberattacks against NATO~-~~-~-it’ll spark World War 3
O’Hanlon 19—Senior fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, where he specializes in U.S. defense strategy, the use of military force, and American national security policy. He is also director of research for the Foreign Policy program at Brookings. He is an adjunct professor at Columbia, Princeton, and Syracuse universities and University of Denver Michael E., April 2019, The Senkaku Paradox: Risking Great Power War Over Small Stakes, Chapter 2: Plausible Scenarios, pgs 36, Brookings Institution Press, ProQuest Ebook, Accessed through the Wake Forest Library
A NATO military response to the postulated Russian aggression seems very likely. Perhaps evidence of its preparations to move forces into position to defend its ally and liberate its territory from Russian occupation would be enough to catalyze a diplomatic resolution of the crisis. If not, however, the stage would be set for the possible eruption of World War III. Russia might try to impede a deployment through cyber-, space, and other such attacks, which would likely only slow the deployment, not stop it. Thus escalation could easily result. 62 Once shots were fired, NATO would be unlikely to back down. Not every nation would necessarily send significant military forces, to be sure, but some key countries would probably remain resolute. Much more likely than acceptance of defeat would be a redoubled commitment to complete the mission—and, if Russian nuclear weapons had been used by that point, even in a limited attack, to respond in kind. Put differently, if Russia did choose to try to physically prevent the deployment of large forces into eastern NATO territory in likely preparation for a counterattack, there would be two possibilities. If that attempt failed, a showdown in the east on land would still loom. If it succeeded, NATO would then face a momentous decision: accept defeat, or reinforce dramatically with conventional forces (perhaps after a period of repairing damage and building more equipment and weaponry, depending on how many losses it had already suffered), or escalate to the nuclear level. In situations of this sort, the parties to the conflict might find themselves living scenarios like those that nuclear theorists pondered throughout the Cold War. They could be engaged in behavior that Thomas Schelling might have described as “the threat that leaves something to chance” or that Herman Kahn might have placed on the lower rungs of a nuclear escalation ladder that reached potentially to all-out war. 63 American planners saw these kinds of escalatory ladders and options as ideas that might serve U.S. interests; thus it would not be too surprising to see Russian planners invoke them now. 64 And whatever the dangers during the deployment phase, they would snowball during any actual maneuver warfare in eastern Europe. For example, it is entirely imaginable that an operation designed to liberate a Baltic state from a Russian occupation would trespass onto Russian territory to cut off supply lines and possible reinforcements. 65 Moscow may or may not simply take NATO’s word that it has no designs on the country’s government. In other words, it might even fear that NATO’s counteroffensive could aspire to regime change in Russia. It may or may not have a clear picture of the kind of attack it is experiencing, as command and control systems would be compromised in the course of conventional battle, quite possibly including those systems commonly used for nuclear weapons.
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US-OCO unifies NATO
Kimberly Marten, 03-xx-2017, "," Reducing Tensions Between Russia and NATO, https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2017/03/CSR_79_Marten_RussiaNATO.pdf
The most significant NATO actions in response to the perceived Russian threat were announced at the 2016 Warsaw Summit, envisioning the establishment over the next year of an “enhanced forward presence” in NATO’s east. Four new battalions (together equivalent to approximately one new combat brigade) will be deployed. The United Kingdom will oversee a new battalion in Estonia; Canada, a battalion in Latvia; Germany, one in Lithuania; and the United States, one in Poland, where this new multinational division will be headquartered.52 Although details have not been made public, reportedly each new battalion will include around one thousand troops.53 NATO also expressed How to Assess and Respond to a Crisis 27 some support for Romania’s ideas about a new multinational Black Sea maritime presence but announced no new NATO deployments there. Furthermore, at its 2014 Wales Summit, NATO had declared that cyber defense was part of its collective defense planning, and, at the Warsaw Summit, current Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg affirmed that cyberspace is an operational domain of conflict, potentially making way for member states with offensive cyber programs (including the United States, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) to use such weapons on NATO’s behalf.54 The force increases envisioned in the Warsaw Summit are far below the recommendations of more hawkish Western defense analysts. But they do establish persistent multinational forces near Russia’s borders and are a strong symbol of NATO’s deterrent tripwire. When capable allies—such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Canada—demonstrate that they are willing to put themselves in harm’s way to answer an outside attack, it sends a strong signal that the alliance will hold. Recent enhanced NATO military cooperation with earby neutral states, including Sweden and Finland, has also helped demonstrate a unified Western deterrent
Strong NATO relations deter adversaries, and promote democracy, freedom, and solutions to inequalities
James Stavridis April 4, 2019, 7-11-2018, "Why NATO Is Essential For World Peace, According to Its Former Commander," Time, https://time.com/5564171/why-nato-is-essential -world-peace/
Moreover, despite all the frustrations of coalition warfare, most observers would agree with Winston Churchill that “there is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting without them.” The greatest single advantage the U.S. has on the global stage is our network of allies, partners and friends. That network is under deliberate pressure: from China, with its “One Belt, One Road” competitive strategy, and from Russia, with its relentless attacks on coalition unity. A strong NATO means not only having allies in a fight, should it come to that, but also a powerful deterrent to the aggression of ambitious adversaries. Perhaps NATO’s greatest accomplishment is not even its unblemished record of deterring attack against its members but rather the fact that no alliance nation has ever attacked another. NATO’s most fundamental deliverable has been peace among Europe’s major powers for 70 years after two millennia of unhesitating slaughter on the continent. The disasters of the 20th century alone pulled the U.S. into two world wars that killed more than half a million Americans. History provides few achievements that compare to those seven decades of peace. They were built not on the ambitions of cold-eyed leaders but something more noble. NATO is a pool of partners who, despite some egregious outliers, by and large share fundamental values–democracy, liberty, freedom of speech, freedom of expression, gender equality, and racial equality. Admittedly we execute those values imperfectly, and they are stronger in some NATO countries than in others. But they are the right values, and there is no other place on earth where the U.S. could find such a significant number of like-minded nations that are willing to bind themselves with us in a defensive military treaty. So what can NATO do to ensure the alliance continues to provide value for all the members in general, and for the U.S. in particular? What would a NATO 4.0 look like? The alliance should up its game in cybersecurity, both defensively and in the collective development of new offensive cybertools. Geographically, the alliance needs more focus on the Arctic; as global warming opens shipping lanes and access to hydrocarbons, geopolitical competition will increase. We should taper off the Afghan mission, perhaps maintaining a small training cadre in country and continuing to help the Afghan security forces push the Taliban to negotiate peace. There is work to do in consolidating the Balkans, where tensions among Serbs, Croats and Balkan Muslims threaten to erupt into war again. NATO can continue to have a small mission there to help continue the arc of reconciliation. The alliance will need to be forthright in dealing with Russia, confronting Putin where we must–in its invasion and continued occupation of Ukraine–but at the same time attempting to reduce operational tensions and find zones of cooperation. Geographically, the biggest challenge ahead will be the Middle East. The NATO nations do not agree on an approach with Iran, which is an aggressive actor in the region with significant ambitions that will impact NATO. Developing better partnerships with the Arab world, which began in earnest with the Libyan campaign and continued into Syrian operations against the so-called Islamic State alongside various NATO allies in the U.S.-led coalition, makes sense. Working far more closely with Israel would pay dividends for the alliance. And what of other tiny, would-be members, the next Montenegros? NATO should accept North Macedonia to stabilize the south Balkans, then halt expansion. It should build global partnerships with democracies like Japan, Australia, New Zealand, India and other Indo-Pacific nations. Should we be prepared to fight and die in a NATO campaign? Yes. On balance, the alliance still provides strategic benefit to the U.S. We should support this venerable organization, encourage our allies to increase their defense spending and push them to operate with us on key challenges. We should demand that they help us build a NATO 4.0 that is even more fit for the decades ahead. We should also remember how dangerous the world can be. As NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander for four years, I signed more than 2,000 personal condolence letters; about a third of them were to the grieving family members of European soldiers. I visited the thousands of non-U.S. troops in Afghanistan often, and they were uniformly brave, professional and motivated. As a democracy, it is right that we should debate whether NATO is worth dying for. I can tell you that our NATO allies have shown time and again they are willing to fight and die for us. | 904,692 |
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Specifically, there are two ways that the U.S. military presence amplifies NGO operations.
First is through logistics.
U.S. military presence is key to collecting and providing intel that allow humanitarian missions to happen. Lawry of the IHD in 2009 confirms that the military provides extensive intelligence information about population movement, security infrastructure conditions, and other information necessary for NGOs to conduct operations. He furthers that since NGOs do not have satellites, intelligence analysts, or other capacities to collect and digest complex and intricate information, the military is critical to the execution of humanitarian missions.
Militaries, too, have various comparative advantages. Without the military in many instances, NGOs would have been unable to provide humanitarian services or less efficient in their programming. • Militaries have a monopoly on security and the use of force. When a population is affected by conflict, external, noncombatant militaries can provide security for humanitarian operations, displaced persons, and both NGO and UN staff and infrastructure. NGOs, with strict neutrality and noncombatant policies and lack of capacity, cannot. • Militaries can provide extensive intelligence information about population movements, security conditions, road, river and bridge conditions, and other information pertinent to conducting humanitarian operations. NGOs do not have satellites, intelligence analysts, or other capacities to collect and digest complex and intricate information. • Militaries have by far the largest airlift capacity globally. Aside from the private sector, the combined load capacity of which is much greater than even the U.S. military, the US military is the largest single organization that can lift humanitarian supplies and materials in almost every condition and in very short notice. NGOs do use aircraft, but normally sporadically and in the worst scenarios for minimal periods. • Militaries have distinct advantages in large-scale communications infrastructure and communications capacities. NGOs often depend on communication capacities from militaries or UN agencies (or both) because large satellite stations, bandwidth, and other regional or global communications are not available at reasonable costs for NGOs. • Militaries can respond to maritime and/or chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosives (CBRNE) emergencies. NGOs have almost no capacity.219
Lawry empirically finds that during the 2003 Iraq invasion of Kuwait, a humanitarian conflict that was developed around the U.S. military directly relayed critical/logistical information to more than 80 NGOs.
There have been other successful military run information-coordination centers in Afghanistan, Kuwait, and Indonesia. A humanitarian operations center, also called a civil-military operations center, run by the U.S. military, was indispensable in Kuwait during the 2003 Iraq invasion.216 Although coordination met with resistance from NGOs in the early stages of the war, ultimately more than 80 NGOs, the UN, and the military met within this center and worked together. Having a neutral and media-free space for close interaction and discussion allowed civil and military actors to consult without having to fight the usual issues of ownership and control. At the HOC-Kuwait, humanitarian information was collected and shared. The vast preponderance of cooperation and collaboration, interestingly, occurred informally over coffee after daily briefings. Lessons learned from this productive experience have been invaluable in easing the often times contentious civilmilitary relationship. Themes that recurred over the years are notable, and include simply agreeing on common definitions of important terms and avoiding use of confusing acronyms and potentially offensive phrases.217 NGOs, for example, agreed to avoid using the term belligerent, and the military agreed not to call the NGOs force multipliers.
Second is security.
Without a dominant military presence, NGOs would be at a serious risk. Penner of the Small Wars Journal in 2013 confirms that NGOs are not security oriented like the military and as a result they are unable to protect themselves in violent environments, resulting in failed missions.
NGO-military cooperation has largely been ad hoc.
Institutional and cultural differences pervade.
NGOs required logistical support for large operations and the military often provided logistical infrastructure for NGOs.
NGOs provided the military with accurate information on troubled areas.
NGOs are highly cognizant of how their actions affect donor support.
NGOs are less security oriented than the military.
The NGO-military relationship works best when both have something to offer the other.
Fortunately, U.S. military cooperation with NGOs has secured operations and brought about the completion of missions and protection of all critical infrastructure. O’Donohue of the JCS in 2019 confirms that the U.S. military gives security to NGOs in all aspects of humanitarian projects, from securing aid supplies, main shipping routes, protecting relief distribution centers, and delivery to facilities like medical clinics where the aid is used, the military protects and ensures humanitarian missions are completed.
The joint force will work with interagency partners and the HN and often works with international organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), PNs, and the private sector during FHA operations. The tenets of multinational unity of effort (i.e., respect, rapport, knowledge of partners, patience, and coordination) applied during an FHA mission cannot guarantee success; however, ignoring them may lead to mission failure.
This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, and it provides considerations for military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational forces, and other interorganizational partners. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs), and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing and executing their plans and orders. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of objectives.
Support Activities. Some activities that may be supported by US military forces under FHA include providing logistical support, such as the transportation of humanitarian supplies or personnel; making available, preparing, and transporting nonlethal excess property (EP) to foreign countries; transferring on-hand DOD stocks to respond to unforeseen emergencies; and conducting some DOD humanitarian demining assistance activities. In some circumstances, medical support and base operating services may be conducted if required by the operation.
In addition to force protection and PR for the joint force, a JFC may also be tasked to provide protection for other personnel and assets. If not clearly stated in the mission, the extent of this security should be addressed in the ROE, to include protection of: (1) Forces of other nations working jointly with US forces in a multinational force. (2) USG, NGO, and international organization personnel and equipment. (3) HA recipients. (4) Affected country personnel and assets. (5) Humanitarian relief convoys, supplies, and main supply routes. (6) Relief distribution centers. (7) Stocks of HA supplies. (8) Ports and airfields. (9) Hospitals and medical clinics.
It is for these two reasons that Lawry writes that without U.S. military presence NGOs would be unable to provide support to areas of dire need.
NGOs are better at managing refugee camps and providing water and sanitation services because of their close relationships with UNHCR. NGO staff members are also often trained or specialized in various aspects of camp management.218 Militaries, too, have various comparative advantages. Without the military in many instances, NGOs would have been unable to provide humanitarian services or less efficient in their programming. • Militaries have a monopoly on security and the use of force. When a population is affected by conflict, external, noncombatant militaries can provide security for humanitarian operations, displaced persons, and both NGO and UN staff and infrastructure. NGOs, with strict neutrality and noncombatant policies and lack of capacity, cannot.
The impact is preventing a humanitarian crisis.
Absent logistical support and protection from the military, NGO operations would fail. The OCHA in 2017 terminalizes that humanitarian partners continue to respond to rising displacement and provide basic assistance to families in new areas. To date, emergency response actors of food, water, and medical kits have been distributed to cover the immediate needs of more than two million people. And absent our military presence, the millions who rely on NGOs and our military are left without basic standards of living.
Iraq: UN and partners scale up humanitarian response to growing needs
As fighting continues in west Mosul Iraq, humanitarian partners continue to respond to rising displacement and provide basic assistance to families in newly accessible areas, where conditions allow. Where access inside west Mosul city allows humanitarian partners to reach civilians, displaced families are provided with ready-to-eat food rations. Resident or returning families in the area are provided dry food rations i.e. to cook themselves. Almost 62,000 people in 14 west Mosul neighbourhoods have received ready-to-eat food rations to date; 64,000 people in eleven west Mosul neighbourhoods have received dry food rations.
West Mosul has been cut off from its main supply route since November 2016, and remains largely inaccessible to humanitarian actors. In western Mosul city, many neighbourhoods face chronic water shortages, with many people drinking untreated water. Humanitarians are concerned over an increased number of displaced children arriving from western Mosul with diarrhoea. Shortages of clean drinking water have likely been exacerbated by ISIL’s recent attacks on the Badush water treatment plant, western Mosul’s largest functioning treatment plant. Ensuring water treatment and sewage treatment facilities in Mosul are operational remains a top priority for humanitarian partners.
Approximately 500,000 people live in ISIL-controlled areas of west Mosul. Iraqi authorities also estimate that some 150,000 civilians reside in 28 currently accessible neighbourhoods of western Mosul. Since the start of military operations to retake Mosul six months ago, nearly half a million people have been displaced from their homes. “The sheer volume of civilians still fleeing Mosul city is staggering,” said Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq Lise Grande. “Our worst case scenario when the fighting started was that up to one million civilians may flee Mosul. Already, more than 493,000 people have left, leaving almost everything behind,” said Ms. Grande.
To date, emergency response packages (of ready-to-eat food, water, hygiene and dignity kits) have been distributed to cover the immediate needs of more than two million people since the fighting began in late October. Front-line organizations have been providing food, water, shelter, emergency kits, medical support and psycho-social services – to both families who have fled and families who have stayed.
C2 ISIS
Rogers 18. Rogers, Michael. “Statement of Admiral Michael S. Rogers.” Congress, 27 February 2018. https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Rogers_02-27-18.pdf
We face a growing variety of threats from adversaries acting with precision and boldness, and often with stealth. U.S. Cyber Command engages with adversaries in cyberspace every day. Accordingly, we have developed substantial knowledge of how malicious cyber actors work against the United States, our allies and partners, and many other targets as well. That knowledge in turn provides insights into the motivations, capabilities, and intentions of those who sponsor such activities, whether they be states, criminal enterprises, or violent extremists. Cyberspace is a global and dynamic operating environment, with unique challenges. A significant story in cyberspace over the past year relates to the progress made against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and USCYBERCOM contributions to the eviction of ISIS fighters from their geographic strongholds. Today, ISIS’s so-called “Caliphate” is crumbling. It has lost 98 percent of the territory it once controlled in Iraq and Syria, and approximately 3.2 million Syrians and 4.5 million Iraqis now have a pathway to begin to rebuild their cities and their lives. Denying sanctuary to ISIS in Iraq and Syria is a victory for civilization, and an important step in stabilizing the nations of that region and building peace in the Middle East. Cyberspace operations played an important role in this campaign, with USCYBERCOM supporting the successful offensive by U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and our Coalition partners. 3 We learned a great deal in performing those missions, and continue to execute some today. Mounting cyber operations against ISIS helped us re-learn and reinforce important lessons learned over the last decade of cyber operations against violent extremists. I should emphasize that this campaign was a Coalition fight, with key international partners conducting and supporting both kinetic and cyberspace operations against ISIS.
Wilson Center, 12-11-2019, "Report: Terrorism on Decline in Middle East and North Africa," https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/report-terrorism-decline-middle-east-and-north-africa
The number of terrorist attacks in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) declined significantly in 2018, according to the Global Terrorism Index, an annual study by the Institute for Economics and Peace. The security situation improved in 17 countries and only worsened in Iran and Morocco. The better conditions were largely driven by the deterioration of ISIS, which lost much of its territory in Iraq and Syria. “Deaths attributed to the group declined 69 per cent, with attacks declining 63 per cent in 2018,” according to the report. “The largest decline in fatalities last year was in Iraq, which had 75 per cent fewer deaths from terrorism in 2018. Syria followed, with nearly a 40 percent reduction.”
Problematically, ICG 19 reports
International Crisis Group, 3-12-2019, “Averting an ISIS Resurgence in Iraq and Syria.”
https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/207-averting-isis-resurgence-iraq-and-syria
In Iraq and Syria, ISIS is down but not out. The group remains active but reduced and geographically circumscribed. Keeping it down requires sustained effort. Any of several events – Turkish intervention in north-eastern Syria, but also instability in Iraq or spill-over of U.S.-Iranian tensions – could enable its comeback. In Iraq, ISIS is waging an active, deadly insurgency. Yet it is an insurgency that is diminished, not just from ISIS’s capabilities at its height in early 2015, but also from the long campaign that preceded the group’s 2014 surge. ISIS’s current war is also one limited mostly to the country’s rural periphery. In much of Iraq today, security is better than it has been for years – despite the violence amid recent protests, which has marred the relative calm.
Hennigan 19~-~-Hennigan, W.J. (W.J. Hennigan covers the Pentagon and national security issues in Washington, D.C. He has reported from more than two dozen countries across five continents, covering war, counter-terrorism, and the lives of U.S. service members.) “ISIS Fighters Are Gaining Strength After Trump’s Syria Pullout, US Spies Say.” Time, 19 November 2019. https://time.com/5732842/isis-gaining-strength-trump-syria-pullout/
The assessment, publicly disclosed Tuesday in a Department of Defense Office of Inspector General report, focused on the abrupt decision to remove all 1,000 U.S. troops from northern Syria. The move created a power vacuum and set off a series of violent developments on the ground that risks upending more than five years of progress in the war against the terrorist group. “ISIS exploited the Turkish incursion and subsequent draw-down of U.S. troops to reconstitute capabilities and resources within Syria and strengthen its ability to plan attacks abroad,” the 116-page report says. “The DIA also reported that without counter-terrorism pressure, ISIS will probably be able to more freely build clandestine networks and will attempt to free ISIS members detained in… prisons and family members living in internally displaced persons camps.” The White House referred questions about the inspector general report to the Pentagon, which responded by email. “ISIS fighters are still operating in the region, and unless pressure is maintained, a reemergence of the group and its capabilities remains a very real possibility,” Commander Sean Robertson, a Pentagon spokesman, said in a statement. “We are committed to keeping that from happening.”
CBS 19~-~- “Defense Dept inspector general says ISIS likely to ‘resurge’ without ‘sustained pressure’.” CBS News, 4 February 2019.
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/defense-isis-likely-to-resurge-without-sustained-pressure/
The U.S. military believes that "absent sustained pressure" on the Islamic State, ISIS could re-emerge in Syria within six to 12 months, according to a new Department of Defense Inspector General report on Operation Inherent Resolve. According to the Pentagon, while U.S.-backed Syrian forces have continued the fight to retake the remaining ISIS strongholds in Syria, ISIS remains a "potent force of battle-hardened and well-disciplined fighters that could likely resurge in Syria absent continued counterterrorism pressure," the report reads.
Brahmi 20~-~- Brahimi, Alia. (Alia Brahimi is a former research fellow at Oxford University and the London School of Economics) “Qassem Suleimani Wanted US Troops Out of Iraq. If They Go, ISIS Will Be Back.” Foreign Policy, 17 January 2020.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/17/qassem-suleimani-expel-us-troops-iraq-isis-will-be-back/
Now, as tensions escalate between the United States and Iran in the wake of the U.S. killing of Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani this month, it is worth remembering that the Islamic State is regrouping in Iraq. Indeed, the militant group’s 14,000-18,000 fighters are returning to their guerrilla roots, assassinating tribal elders, taxing local populations, kidnapping soldiers, burning crops, laying roadside ambushes, and engaging in nighttime hit-and-runs. Training and support from U.S. forces in Iraq is essential to preventing its full-blown revival, but the standoff with Iran may yield the opposite result: removing the U.S. presence from Iraq altogether.
~-~-~-~-
The United States has also provided training and mentoring to Iraqi forces, as well as critical help with battlespace management. The Iraqis are said to be highly capable with regard to signals intelligence and have developed counterterrorism expertise, but they still lack the ability to knit together the moving parts of the intelligence and targeting cycle. However controversial U.S. troop deployments in the Middle East are, for the time being, the 5,000-strong U.S. presence in Iraq is necessary (through of course not sufficient) to retain cohesion on the ground and maintain strategic momentum. “The sad truth is that, if left to their own devices, the Iraqi security forces might rot while they stand, like they did in 2014,” the former commander said. “Maybe not next week, but eventually it would happen.”
Other countries will not fill-in.
Magid (2020), Pesha. “Islamic State Aims for Comeback Amid Virus-Expedited U.S. Withdrawal.” Foreign Policy. APRIL 6, 2020, 5:04 PM.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/06/iraq-islamic-state-comeback-coronavirus-us-withdrawal/
In Iraq, this prediction is already beginning to play out as several coalition members, including France and Britain, have withdrawn their troops from Iraq and halted their training programs to protect their soldiers from the spread of COVID-19.
...
“Iraqi forces are fighting an ISIS insurgency that has abandoned the semi-conventional warfare that the organization had at its height and that is now a much harder target, operating as small guerrilla units in rugged terrain in the country’s rural periphery or attempting to work clandestinely to infiltrate populated areas,” said Sam Heller, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group. “It’s an enemy that ISIS requires a relatively advanced set of technical enablers that the coalition is able to provide.” Chief among these enablers are air support and intelligence gathering to fight it, both of which are primarily provided by the United States. Rasool pointed to the same capabilities while talking about the need for a partnership with the coalition. “The cooperation with the international coalition, especially when it comes to reconnaissance, air support, and intelligence information—that is very important,” he said. “If you don’t have modern planes, then you cannot have a strong army.” The coalition uses its technical capabilities to help coordinate and advise missions with the Iraqi Army and local tribal militias that were mobilized in 2014 to fight the Islamic State.
The impact is on preventing genocide.
ISIS has repeatedly targeted ethno-religious groups in Iraq and Syria, including the Turkmen, Shabak, Yadizis, and Christians.
UN 16~-~-UN Commision of Inquiry on Syria: ISIS is commiting genocide against the Yazidis.” UN, 2016.
https://www.ohchr.org/FR/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=20113andLangID=F
ISIS sought – and continues to seek – to destroy the Yazidis in multiple ways, as envisaged by the 1948 Genocide Convention. “ISIS has sought to erase the Yazidis through killings; sexual slavery, enslavement, and torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and forcible transfer causing serious bodily and mental harm; the infliction of conditions of life that bring about a slow death; the imposition of measures to prevent Yazidi children from being born, including forced conversion of adults, the separation of Yazidi men and women, and mental trauma; and the transfer of Yazidi children from their own families and placing them with ISIS fighters, thereby cutting them off from beliefs and practices of their own religious community”, the report says.
In just two years, ISIS harmed millions.
NBC 16~-~- Jamieson, Alastair. “ISIS Death Toll: 18,800 Killed in Iraq in 2 Years, UN says.” NBC News, 19 January 2016.
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/isis-death-toll-18-800-killed-iraq-2-years-u-n499426
At least18,802 civilians have been killed in Iraq in ISIS-linked violence in under two years, a United Nations report said Tuesday — with millions of others forced from their homes and thousands more held as slaves. “The violence suffered by civilians in Iraq remains staggering,” said the report by the Office of the United Nations High Comissioner for Human Rights PDF link here. ISIS continues to commit “systematic and widespread violence and abuses of international human rights law and humanitarian law,” it said, adding that some of those act amount “crimes against humanity, and possibly genocide.” U.N. monitors recorded at least 55,047 civilian casualties as a result of the conflict between Jan. 1, 2014 and Oct. 31, 2015, with 18,802 people killed and and 36,245 wounded, it said. Over the same period, 3.2 million people became “internally displaced by ISIS” including over one million school-age girls and boys. “The persistent violence and scale of the displacement” limit their access to housing, clean water and education, the report said. It also documented human rights abuses, saying some 3,500 people are believed to be held as captives, mostly women and children from the Yazidi religious minority who have been forced into sexual slavery.
C3 POWER VAC
(Burke) Arleigh A., 1-2-2020, "America’s Failed Strategy in the Middle East: Losing Iraq and the Gulf," No Publication, https://www.csis.org/analysis/americas-failed-strategy-middle-east-losing-iraq-and-gulf
In round two, the United States and its allies ended up fighting these Islamic extremists from 2004 to 2010. Although the United States defeated these extremists in western Iraq with the aid of a massive surge of U.S. ground troops and the aid of Iraqi Sunni popular forces, the United States failed to create a stable Iraqi government and economy. The United States effectively abandoned its nation building efforts after 2009 and withdrew its combat forces from Iraq at the end of 2011 – which createding a power vacuum that opened up Iraq to ISIS – all the while, it was never able to decide on any active strategy for stabilizing Iraq or dealing with the Syrian civil war. It focused on defeating ISIS – relying heavily on Syrian Kurds in the process – and scored another “victory” in 2016-2018 by disbanding the ISIS “caliphate.”
Claire Parker and Rick Noack. Jan 30, 2020. “Iran has invested in allies and proxies across the Middle East. Here’s where they stand after Soleimani’s death.” https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/01/03/iran-has-invested-allies-proxies-across-middle-east-heres-where-they-stand-after-soleimanis-death/
Many — though not all — of the groups Iran sponsors are Shiite. While ideology plays a role in Iran’s foreign policy, experts say the regime’s primary goal is to project power throughout the Middle East to counter U.S., Israeli and Saudi influence. The success of Iran’s strategy rests in large part on its ability to capitalize on power vacuums in the Middle East, Vatanka said. Most recently, Iran has broadened its reach by backing militias in war-torn Yemen and Syria amid the chaos ushered in by the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011. How does Iran do this? Primarily through the Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force, which Soleimani controlled until his death. (The Trump administration designated the Revolutionary Guard a foreign terrorist organization in April). The Quds Force organizinges and trainings fighters with allied militias and provides them with weapons, according to a report by the Soufan Center. Iran also uses soft power to cement economic alliances with countries like Iraq, where Iran has supported local militias in the fight against U.S. forces in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq and later in the fight against the Islamic State.
Ahronheim (2020), Anna. “If US leaves the region, Israel will eventually go to war with Iran.” Jerusalem Post. JANUARY 8, 2020 18:33.
https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/if-us-leaves-from-the-region-israel-will-eventually-go-to-war-with-iran-613446
Should the United States withdraw its forces and Iran continue on its path through Iraq and Syria, Israel will eventually find itself in a war along its entire northern border, Brig.-Gen. (res.) Ilan Lavi has warned. “The United States is the main brakes in the region and its withdrawal would lead to an escalation, since the Iranians will continue to apply gas” to their aspirations of regional hegemony, Lavi said during a conference held by the Alma Research and Education Center in Northern Israel. On Monday evening, a letter sent from the head of the US military’s task force in Iraq to Abdul Amir, deputy director of Combined Joint Operations, sparked concern the US was removing its forces from Iraq after its parliament voted to oust American troops from the country following the assassination of top Iranian General Qasem Soleimani. While Washington later clarified that it was a “mistake” and no troops were being withdrawn, Lavi, who served as deputy head of the Northern Command, said that no one is able to predict what the American president might later decide to do. And if Trump does decide to withdraw, “I’m not optimistic,” he said. “Eventually, and I don’t mean tomorrow or next year, we will have to go to war. The Iranians will continue.”
Saudi Arabia has reacted to Iranian expansion through wars.
Marcus 19
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-42008809
Fast-forward to 2011 and uprisings across the Arab world caused political instability throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia exploited these upheavals to expand their influence, notably in Syria, Bahrain and Yemen, further heightening mutual suspicions. Iran's critics say it is intent on establishing itself or its proxies across the region, and achieving control of a land corridor stretching from Iran to the Mediterranean.How have things got worse? The strategic rivalry is heating up because Iran is in many ways winning the regional struggle. In Syria, Iranian (and Russian) support for President Bashar al-Assad has enabled his forces to largely rout rebel group groups backed by Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is trying desperately to contain rising Iranian influence while the militaristic adventurism of the kingdom's young and impulsive Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman - the country's de facto ruler - is exacerbating regional tensions. He Saudi Arabia is waging a war against the rebel Houthis movement in neighbouring Yemen, in part to stem perceived Iranian influence there, but after four years this is proving a costly gamble. Iran has denied accusations that it is smuggling weaponry to the Houthis, though successive reports from a panel of UN experts have demonstrated significant assistance for the Houthis from Tehran in terms of both technology and weaponry.
Sternman 18
https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/reports/twenty-first-century-proxy-warfare/
It’s a pricey wager and it is still unclear whether it’s a winning bet. Civil wars raging today in the so-called “arc of instability” remain the greatest threats to international security. Proxy Conflict in the Middle Eastthere has displacesd tens of millions of people, killed hundreds of thousands, and devastated large swaths of the region’s economy and infrastructure. Renewed U.S. rivalry with Russia and China and competition among Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Israel for regional primacy are forcing Washington to reconfigure its grand strategy. Current conceptions of proxy warfare do not account for the paradigm shift now underway. A clear-eyed cost-benefits analysis of proxy warfare is needed to make U.S. strategy more effective.
Not only that,
Seth Cropsey, Gary Roughead, 10-31-2019, "A U.S. Withdrawal Will Cause a Power Struggle in the Middle East," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/17/us-withdrawal-power-struggle-middle-east-china-russia-iran/
The unique mix of political forces in the Middle East suggests three possibilities in the event of U.S. naval withdrawal from the Middle East region, and none favor U.S. interests. First, Russia may broker a political arrangement among Turkey, Israel, and Iran, or, alternatively, support a coalition pitting some of those states against another in an e?ort to manufacture a manageable regional balance of power and allowing it to shift its attention back to Europe. The ?nal shape of this strategy would depend on several variables: Turkey’s approach to Syria, Israel’s posture against Iran (and its proxies), the outcome of Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen, the Kurdish question, and the possibility of the Islamic State’s resurgence. Regardless of these factors, Russia will still bid for control of the Mediterranean Sea, which the United States will be hard-pressed to counter, particularly if China can manipulate its European economic partners into limiting or expelling the U.S. Navy from its Mediterranean bases. If that happens, Washington will have to ?ght its way back into the region for the ?rst time since World War II. In the second scenario, Iran defeats Saudi Arabia in a regional confrontation, thereby taking the top leadership spot in the Islamic world, making it a great power in its own right. Control of Middle Eastern oil exports would give Iran the ability to coerce and bully the United States’ European and Paci?c allies, and it would deny the United States any peaceful access to the Levantine Basin. The balancing dynamics against this new great power are di?cult to project, but regardless, the United States’ ability to control the strategic environment would be hampered markedly. Third, a long-term regional war between Tehran and a ?uctuating anti-Iran coalition composed of Saudi Arabia, other Sunni Gulf states, and Israel would cause widespread bloodshed. As the 1980s Iran-Iraq War demonstrated, both Iran and Saudi Arabia would be likely to attempt nuclear breakout. With Iran, this would mean closing the small technological gap that now exists between its low-enriched uranium to the higher level of enrichment needed for a nuclear weapon. | 904,736 |
365,742 | 379,701 | Contact | Hi,
We are a primarily novice team. Contact us at [email protected] and [email protected]. Please send all speech docs to those email. Happy debating! | 904,764 |
365,743 | 379,690 | Round 2 Tab N Dab | C1. Payday Loans
C2. Helping Rural America
MITCHEN 2017 CARD
“Independent local businesses employ an array of supporting services by “buying locally” themselves. They hire architects, designers, cabinet shops, sign makers and contractors for construction. Local accountants, insurance brokers, computer consultants, attorneys, advertising agencies help run it. Local retailers and distributors also carry a higher percentage of locally-produced goods than chains, meaning more jobs for local producers.
In contrast, a new chain store typically is a clone of other units, eliminates the need for local planning, and uses a minimum of local goods and services. A company-owned store’s profits promptly are exported to corporate headquarters. That’s simply good, efficient business for them, but not so good for our communities.
Dollars spent at community-based merchants create a multiplier in the local economy, meaning that from each dollar spent at a local independent merchant, 2 to 3.5 recirculates in the local economy compared to a dollar spent at chain-owned businesses. This “local multiplier effect” means shifting more local purchasing to independent businesses is a key tool for creating more local jobs.”
Tal 19’ :
By removing the link between income and work for one’s physical survival, the value for various types of labor, paid or unpaid, will begin to even out. For example, under a UBI system, we’ll begin seeing an influx of qualified individuals applying for positions in charitable organizations. That’s because the UBI makes involvement in such organizations less financially risky, rather than a sacrifice of one’s income-earning potential or time. But perhaps UBI’s most profound impact will be on our society overall. It’s important to understand that the UBI isn’t just a theory on a chalkboard; there have been dozens of tests deploying a UBI in towns and villages around the world—with largely positive results. For example, a 2009 UBI pilot in a small Namibian village gave community residents an unconditional UBI for a year. The results found that poverty fell to 37 percent from 76 percent. Crime fell 42 percent. Child malnutrition and school dropout rates crashed. And entrepreneurship (self-employment) rose 301 percent. On a more subtle level, the act of begging for food disappeared, and so too did the social stigma and barriers to communication begging caused. As a result, community members could more freely and confidently communicate with each other without the fear of being seen as a beggar. Reports found this led to a closer bond between different community members, as well as greater participation in community events, projects, and activism. In 2011-13, a similar UBI experiment was piloted in India where multiple villages were given a UBI. There, just as in Namibia, community bonds grew closer with many villages pooling their money for investments, such as repairing temples, buying community TVs, even forming credit unions. And again, researchers saw marked increases in entrepreneurialism, school attendance, nutrition, and savings, all of which were far greater than in the control villages. As noted earlier, there is a psychological element to UBI as well. Studies have shown that children who grow up in income-depressed families are more likely to experience behavioral and emotional disorders. Those studies also revealed that by raising a family’s income, children are more likely to experience a boost in two key personality traits: conscientiousness and agreeableness. And once those traits are learned at an early age, they tend to carry forward into their teenage years and into adulthood.
Porter 18:
This is, of course, not news to the people who live in rural and small-town America, who have been fighting for years to reverse this decline. But now, the nation’s political class is finally noticing. The election of Donald Trump, powered in no small degree by rural voters, has brought the troubles of small-town America to national attention, with an urgent question: What can be done to revive it? Can rural America be saved? There are 60 million people, almost one in five Americans, living on farms, in hamlets and in small towns across the landscape. For the last quarter century the story of these places has been one of relentless economic decline Rural America is getting old. The median age is 43, seven years older than city dwellers. Its productivity, defined as output per worker, is lower than urban America’s. Its families have lower incomes. And its share of the population is shrinking: the United States has grown by 75 million people since 1990, but this has mostly occurred in cities and suburbs. Rural areas have lost some 3 million people. Since the 1990s, problems such as crime and opioid abuse, once associated with urban areas, are increasingly rural phenomena. Rural communities once captured a greater share of the nation’s prosperity. Jobs and wages in small town America played catch-up with big cities until the mid 1980s. During the economic recovery of 1992 to 1996, 135,000 new businesses were started in small counties, a third of the nation’s total. Employment in small counties shot up by 2.5 million, or 16 percent, twice the pace experienced in counties with million-plus populations.
USDA CARD:
For decades, the poverty rate has been higher in rural America than in metropolitan areas, a situation often attributed to an older, lower paid, and less educated rural population. A new USDA report says the gap between rural and urban areas widened, to 3.5 percentage points, during the economic recovery that began a decade ago.
STAVROS:
The basic idea: As the relative economic importance of agriculture, extractive industries and mass-production manufacturing declines, these sectors need to be replaced by higher-skill activities such as information technology, bio-technology, healthcare and customized manufacturing.
Zeltzer 17:
President Trump’s corporate tax cuts will likely generate enormous deficits, even if the administration’s rosiest economic forecasts come true, setting Republicans up to claim that the time has come to cut Social Security, Medicare, and welfare to reduce the expected $1 trillion deficit, created by those very tax cuts, over the next 10 years.
Speaker of the House Paul Ryan has already announced that the GOP plans to cut federal health care and anti-poverty programs because of a deficit that his party is about to balloon. “We’re going to have to get back next year at entitlement reform,” he said on a talk-radio show, “which is how you tackle the debt and the deficit.”
This is exactly how what President Ronald Reagan’s budget director, David Stockman, called “starving the beast” works. By creating a fiscal straitjacket through lower taxes, conservatives leave Washington with less money and raise the specter of deficits damaging the economy as a rationale to take away the benefits that millions of Americans depend on. If they are not fiscally conservative right now, they can be when it comes time to talk about spending on the poor and disadvantaged. While the right usually encounters a fierce backlash whenever they try to retrench specific federal benefits, as the GOP recently discovered with their failed attempt to repeal and replace the Affordable Care Act, cutting budgets in the name of deficit reduction has traditionally offered a less toxic mechanism for achieving the same goal.
LaRochelle Block Grants Card
Ryan LaRochelle. (2019) How Combining Federal Social Programs into Block Grants May Erode Funding and Foster Inequality | Scholars Strategy Network. Retrieved February 01, 2020, from https://scholars.org/contribution/how-combining-federal-social-programs-block-grants-may-erode-funding-and-foster
Over the past several decades, lawmakers have increasingly sought to transform the U.S. welfare state by combining programs into block grants that allow state authorities to move funds around. In the early 1980s, Ronald Reagan’s budget plans replaced a slew of categorical grants with consolidated block grants. In 1996, President Bill Clinton worked with Republicans in Congress to convert the nation’s cash welfare program for the poor from an entitlement to a block grant. In 2005, President George W. Bush tried unsuccessfully to create ten new block grant programs in a wide range of fields including education, infrastructure, social welfare, and law enforcement. Within the past two years, Republicans have proposed to turn parts of the Affordable Care Act and Medicaid into block grants. Is it a good idea to shift existing social welfare programs into block grants? Social scientific research suggests that block-granting tends to erode program funding. And because this approach gives more power to state and local governments, it can end up exacerbating racial and economic inequalities.
Goodnough Block Grant Card
Abby Goodnough, 1-30-2020, "Trump Administration Unveils a Major Shift in Medicaid," New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/30/health/medicaid-block-grant-trump.html
WASHINGTON — The Trump administration said on Thursday that it would allow states to cap Medicaid spending for many poor adults, a major shift long sought by conservatives that gives states the option of reducing health benefits for millions who gained coverage through the program under the Affordable Care Act.
___________________ FIND PAGEN
___________________FIND ALL DEBT CARDS
Investopedia 19
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/payday-loans.asp
A payday loan is a type of short-term borrowing where a lender will extend high-interest credit based on a borrower’s income and credit profile. A payday loan’s principal is typically a portion of a borrower’s next paycheck. These loans charge high-interest rates for short-term immediate credit. These loans are also called cash advance loans or check advance loans.
Chamber of Commerce 20
https://www.chamberofcommerce.org/payday-loan-statistics
Sure enough, 12 million Americans a year use payday loans to fill the gaps in cash flow, but are they worth the high interest? We’ve compiled some useful information and statistics to better educate you on the ins-and-outs of payday loans — and why they should be avoided if possible. What is a payday loan? Unlike loans used to cover large expenses like a mortgage loan or a student loans, a payday loan is a small loan based on the borrower’s pay–a loan amount usually around $500 and rarely over $1000–intended to tide the borrower over during financial emergencies until they can pay the loan back along with interest within 1-2 weeks using their next paycheck. The fee attached to an average payday loan is $55 dollars to be paid back within two weeks, and the typical loan requires a lump-sum repayment of $430, i.e, paying in installments is not permitted with this type of loan. Despite the fact that payday loans are advertised as being helpful for unexpected circumstances or emergencies, research shows that 70 of borrowers use them for regular, recurring expenses like rent, utilities, and car payments. Taking out a payday loan typically requires employment and income verification, as well as valid identification, although a credit check is not necessary. Attempting to search for the best deal on a payday loan is mostly futile, as the market is not price competitive, with lenders generally charging the maximum amount possible under state law. Laws vary from state-to-state on the maximum fee allowed for a payday loan, although $15 dollars for every $100 borrowed is a common fee. This calculates into a whopping 400 annual percentage rate (APR), which dwarfs the APR on most types of loans and credit. For example, credit cards typically have an APR of 12-30. While some say that APR is not a good way of assessing a short-term loan like a payday loan, not everyone is able to pay back the loan within the customary two-week period, as we’ll see later. That interest can add up fast.
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (government agency) 17
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/what-is-a-payday-loan-en-1567/
Many state laws set a maximum amount for payday loan fees ranging from $10 to $30 for every $100 borrowed. A typical two-week payday loan with a $15 per $100 fee equates to an annual percentage rate (APR) of almost 400 percent. By comparison, APRs on credit cards can range from about 12 percent to about 30 percent. In many states that permit payday lending, the cost of the loan, fees, and the maximum loan amount are capped.
Smith 19
https://www.forbes.com/sites/advisor/2019/10/27/the-true-cost-of-payday-loans/#32d46b246947
While rates vary depending on state regulations, a typical two week payday loan carries a fee of $10 to $30 for every $100 borrowed, according to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. Even a low end fee of $15 per $100 works out to an annual interest rate of 400, the CFPB points out. But payday loans are often not repaid after two weeks. Instead, in those states that permit it, the loans are often rolled over with a new charge.
Step 1: Divide the finance charge by the amount financed.
Finance charge / Amount financed = X
So, for example: On a $500 loan, there is a $100 finance charge, or 20. The term of loan is 14 days.
100/500 = 0.20
Step 2: Multiply it by the total number of days in a year.
X * Total number of days in a year, or 365 = Y
0.20 * 365 = 73
Step 3: Divide that by the term of the loan.
Y/Term of loan = Z
73 / 14 = 5.214
Step 4: Multiply by 100.
Z * 100 = True annual percentage rate of the payday loan
5.214 * 100 = 521.43
Camp of Finder
https://www.finder.com/payday-loans-statistics
Payday loan usage by demographics
Age 25 - 49
People ages 25 to 49 are more likely to use payday loans compared to other age groups. Senior citizens ages 70 and older are least likely to use payday loans.No four-year college degreeThose who haven't completed a four-year college education are more likely to take out payday loans. Beyond that, there isn't much difference based on level of education.African American African Americans are twice as likely to take out a payday loan than people of other races/ethnicities.Income: $15,000 - $25,000/yearThose with household incomes less than $40,000/year are almost three times more likely to take out a payday loan than those with higher incomes. People in households making between $15,000 and $25,000/year are the most likely to take out a payday loan.RenterRenters are more than twice more likely to use payday loans than homeowners.DisabledThose who are disabled or unemployed are more likely to use payday loans than those who are employed.ParentParents are more likely to use payday loans than those without children.Separated or divorcedThose who are separated or divorced are twice as likely to use payday loans than people of any other marital status.
Kim 17 Journal of Financial Counseling and Planning https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/EJ1162059.pdf Limited research exists on the debt use of low-income households and debt issues, specifically surrounding the time period of the Great Recession. This study examined the debt profile of low-income households from 2007 to 2013 by addressing the following research hypotheses. While controlling for household characteristics, we expect that households in severe poverty were more likely to have a higher amount of debt, less likely to meet debt-to-income ratio guidelines, and more likely to have debt delinquency problems. | 904,752 |
365,744 | 379,695 | HD AFF | hey! it's Danielle. if you want me to disclose taglines my email is [email protected]. I ask for you not to read theory because this is my partners first non-local circuit tournament and isn't used to flow debate. I don't want to throw her in the deep end and discourage her with theory or k's. i hope you all would understand | 904,757 |
365,745 | 379,708 | Interp- Content Warnings | Before starting a speech, debaters must verbally disclose if their speech discusses nongraphic or graphic potentially triggering subject matters such as sexual assault, other triggering material they read, as well as offer to alter their speeches according to the requests of their opponents or judges. To clarify, read trigger warnings. | 904,773 |
365,746 | 379,720 | UBI Neg-1 | opensourced | 904,789 |
365,747 | 379,738 | 0 - Contact Info | he/him
email me at [email protected] for any thing related to theory, disclosure, content warnings etc I'll try to meet any reasonable things - this is terminal defense to all theory or independent voting issues if you don't contact me before hand | 904,819 |
365,748 | 379,729 | Hunger AC | =1AC=
====We affirm====
====Our Sole Contention is Depriving the People====
====Subpoint A: Water====
====Sanctions cut of necessary equipment for water infrastructure repairs, causing a water crisis – Fox 20====
Alex Fox 20 (Michael Fox 20, 1-10-2020, "The human cost of the US sanctions on Venezuela," DW, https://www.dw.com/en/the-human-cost-of-the-us-sanctions-on-venezuela/a-50647399 Cooper
The United States has been clear about its goal of imposing the sanctions to push
AND
Venezuela, they would not be doing what they are doing right now."
====Unfortunately, Venezuela's water crisis is spilling over to the agriculture sector affecting nearly everyone in the country – Rendon 19====
Moises Rendon 19, 12-10-2019, "Unraveling the Water Crisis in Venezuela," No Publication, https://www.csis.org/analysis/unraveling-water-crisis-venezuela Cooper
Despite ranking as one of the world's top 15 countries in renewable fresh water resources
AND
waterborne viruses, especially threatening the lives of children and the most vulnerable.
====The is problematic as food shortages cause mass hunger – Stott 19====
Michael Stott 19, 8-20-2019, "Fears grow of Venezuela malnutrition time-bomb," Financial Times, https://www.ft.com/content/b6459434-b531-11e9-8cb2-799a3a8cf37b Cooper
It is a cry increasingly heard across Venezuela. As socialist president Nicolás Maduro and
AND
of how to look after people who will remain zombies for 30 years."
====Overall this food crisis is likely to cause a famine killing thousands – Hynes 19====
Michael Stott 19, 8-20-2019, "Fears grow of Venezuela malnutrition time-bomb," Financial Times, https://www.ft.com/content/b6459434-b531-11e9-8cb2-799a3a8cf37b Cooper
It is a cry increasingly heard across Venezuela. As socialist president Nicolás Maduro and
AND
of how to look after people who will remain zombies for 30 years."
====Subpoint B: Petrocaribe====
====Petrocaribe, an energy alliance of 15 countries, counts on Venezuela to deliver oil to countries at a cheaper cost. Problematically, Sanctions have killed Petrocaribe by cutting off financial debt repayments, shipping, and financial transactions – Charles 19====
Jacqueline Charles 19, 1-28-2019, "U.S. sanctions on Venezuela are affecting Caribbean nations' ability to pay for oil," miamiherald, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article228172349.html Cooper
For more than a decade, an energy alliance with Venezuela guaranteed a stable flow
AND
so that they could feed themselves, instead of offering symbolic politicized aid."
====Killing Petrocaribe is a major issue as petrocaribe has already helped guarantee food to the millions of people in Latin America and the Caribbean. FAO 15:====
FAO 15, 2015, " PETROCARIBE: 10 YEARS OF STRUGGLE AGAINST HUNGER AND POVERTY" Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, http://www.fao.org/3/a-i4918e.pdf Cooper
In the whole zone covered by the Petrocaribe Agreement, it is possible to see
AND
by 81 its minimum requirements, and its inhabitants have more slack.
====For these 2 reasons, the United Nations concludes that Latin America is starving====
United Nations, 9-11-2018, "FAO: Hunger increases in the world and in Latin America and the Caribbean for the third consecutive year," FAO, http://www.fao.org/americas/noticias/ver/en/c/1152157/ ZA
For the third consecutive year, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO
AND
World Food Program (WFP) and the World Health Organization (WHO). | 904,802 |
365,749 | 379,722 | Case cites | Huawei
Chris and I affirm
Text
Subpoint A: Huawei is viewed as a threat to national security
Leaders of US intelligence and defense operations warn about letting Chinese tech companies enter the US market.
Emily Stewart 18, 12-11-2018, "The US government’s battle with Chinese telecom giant Huawei, explained," Vox, https://www.vox.com/technology/2018/12/11/18134440/huawei-executive-order-entity-list-china-trump. Stewart is a reporter for Vox covering business and politics.
But Huawei, which brought in more than $100 billion in revenue last year, isn’t your ordinary technology company
...AND...
e.” In other words, officials are worried that Huawei will help the Chinese government spy on or attack the US.
Subpoint B: The US government will not ban Huawei
The US continues to give Huawei chances and extends the duration before a ban will take effect.
Colin Lecher 19, THIS MONDAY 11-18-2019, "Huawei is getting three more months before US ban takes effect," Verge, https://www.theverge.com/2019/11/18/20970684/huawei-us-ban-delay-trump-china. Colin Lecher is a senior reporter at The Verge covering technology's effects on policy, government, labor, and more.
Huawei has been given yet another reprieve from the Trump administration’s ban on its products, according to Com
...AND...
al security concerns, President Trump has suggested that Huawei’s fate could be part of a trade deal with China.
Subpoint C: Failure to ban Huawei emboldens China and weakens the US
If China is allowed to rise technologically through Huawei, it will allow for Chinese control of networks.
Julian Baird Gewirtz 19, 8-27-2019, "China’s Long March to Technological Supremacy," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-08-27/chinas-long-march-technological-supremacy. Gewirtz is Academy Scholar at Harvard’s Weatherhead Center for International Affairs.
The goal of surpassing other countries technologically does not mean that China’s rulers seek global military su
...AND...
ests. Technology will remain at the heart of U.S.-Chinese tensions well beyond the end of the current trade war.
Further, it is critical to stand up to China in some capacity as the US continues to delay a ban.
Joseph Marks 19 TUESDAY, 11-19-19, "The Cybersecurity 202: Trump administration's failure to follow through on Huawei ban worries China hawks," Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-cybersecurity-202/2019/11/19/the-cybersecurity-202-trump-administration-s-failure-to-follow-through-on-huawei-ban-worries-china-hawks/5dd2d04488e0fa10ffd20f12/. Joe Marks writes The Cybersecurity 202 newsletter focused on the policy and politics of cybersecurity. Before joining The Washington Post,Marks covered cybersecurity for Politico and Nextgov, a news site focused on government technology and security. He also covered patent and copyright trends for Bloomberg BNA and federal litigation for Law360.
The Trump administration's failure to follow through on a key promise to punish Huawei is spiking fears among cy
...AND...
t on Huawei” and sending a signal to China’s communist leaders they can keep threatening U.S. national security.
Subpoint D: Offensive cyber operations are the only option left
Collective cyber action by the United States and allies can thwart Huawei. This has empirically been able to change the behavior of Huawei.
Annie Fixler 19, 2-13-2019, "Cyber Deterrence Done Right: The Coordinated Actions Against Huawei," Defense One, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/02/coordinated-actions-against-huawei-are-cyber-deterrence-done-right/154870/?oref=d1-related-article. Annie Fixler is the deputy director of the Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
Together, a cyber coalition of the willing can open the innovation floodgates by protecting private companies fr
...AND...
rican economy and national security are most at risk. Collaboration with our closest allies is our best defense.
Further, offensive cyber operations are critical to ensuring nations recognize our power.
Michèle Flournoy, former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and Michael Sulmeyer, Director of the Belfer Center at Harvard University 18, Sept/Oct 2018, "Battlefield Internet," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-08-14/battlefield-internet. Michèle Flournoy is Co-Founder and Managing Partner of WestExec Advisors. From 2009 to 2012, she served as U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. Michael Sulmeyer is Director of the Cyber Security Project at the Belfer Center at the Harvard Kennedy School. From 2012 to 2015, he served as Director for Cyber Plans and Operations in the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense.
Since public declarations alone are unlikely to deter all nations from conducting cyberattacks, the United State
...AND...
will not be established overnight, but demonstrating credibility through consequences will bolster it over time.
Extensions
Subpoint A: Huawei is a threat to US nat’l sec
Transcript from US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Hearing on Feb 13, 2018
U.S. Select Committee on Intelligence 18, 2-13-2018, "OPEN HEARING ON WORLDWIDE THREATS," U.S. Select Committee on Intelligence, https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/hearings/open-hearing-worldwide-threats-0
Senator Cotton. Okay, thank you. I'd like to turn my attention to the threat posed by China and specifically Ch
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hat companies, State governments, local governments might face if they use Huawei or ZTE products and services?
Subpoint B: The US government will not ban Huawei
The US is has such a posture that we’ve begun approving licenses for our companies to work with Huawei.
Washington Post 19, 11-20-2019, "U.S. approves first licenses for tech sales to Huawei," https://www.washingtonp
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s-tech-sales-huawei/?wpisrc=nl_cybersecurity202andamp;wpmm=1. By Jeanne Whalen, Joseph Marks, and Ellen Nakashima.
AT: Banning Huawei solves
Collective action is needed, but Europe will not ban Huawei.
Julianne Smith and Torrey Taussig 19, Sept/Oct 2019, "The Old World and the Middle Kingdom," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-08-12/old-world-and-middle-kingdom. Julianne Smith oversaw Europe and NATO policy in the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense from 2009 to 2012 and served as Deputy National Security Adviser to U.S. Vice President Joe Biden from 2012 to 2013. Torrey Taussig is a Nonresident Fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Center on the United States and Europe.
That success is reducing the EU’s leverage over China. For example, Brussels has been unable to craft a united r
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c investments, and the regulation is much less ambitious than those that the G-7 countries have already adopted. | 904,792 |
365,750 | 379,758 | Apple Valley NEG | C1: Eternal Blue
Steve Ranger, ZDNet, "What is cyberwar? Everything you need to know about the frightening future of digital conflict", 12/4/19, https://www.zdnet.com/article/cyberwar-a-guide-to-the-frightening-future-of-online-conflict/
"However, it's likely ... US Cyber Command"
Nicole Perlroth, The New York Times, "Hackers Hit Dozens of Countries Exploiting Stolen N.S.A Tool", 5/12/17, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/12/world/europe/uk-national-health-service-cyberattack.html
"Hackers exploiting malicious ... less ambitious attacks."
Kalev Leetaru, Forbes, "As Eternal Blue Racks Up Damages It Reminds Us There Is No Such Thing As A Safe Cyber Weapon", 05/25/19, https://www.forbes.com/sites/kalevleetaru/2019/05/25/as-eternalblue-racks-up-damages-it-reminds-us-there-is-no-such-thing-as-a-safe-cyber-weapon/#5e48136c7603
"Eternal Blue marked ... be future breaches."
Collin Anderson, Carnegie, "Iran's Cyber Threat: Conclusions and Prescriptions", 01/04/18, https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/01/04/iran-s-cyber-threat-conclusion-and-prescriptions-pub-75143
"Yet Iran will ... goes with them."
James Sanders, Tech Republic, "Financial impact of ransomware attacks increasing despite overall decrease in attacks", 09/24/19, https://www.techrepublic.com/article/financial-impact-of-ransomware-attacks-increasing-despite-overall-decrease-in-attacks/
"Ransomware attacks are ... derives from EternalBlue"
Bob Pisani, CNBC, "A cyberattack could trigger the next financial crisis, new report says", 09/13/18, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/13/a-cyberattack-could-trigger-the-next-financial-crisis.html
"cybersecurity threats "have ... the broader economy."
Rajiner Tumber, Forbes, "Cyber Attacks: Igniting The Next Recession", 01/05/19, https://www.forbes.com/sites/rajindertumber/2019/01/05/cyber-attacks-igniting-the-next-recession/#1830a95dbe4f
"Cybercrime is predicted ... the hard way."
Olivier Blanchard, IMF, March 2013, https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/031413.pdf
"Although we are ... of adverse shocks."
C2: Nuclear War
1. Arms Race
Ackerman, Daily Beast, "Revealed: Pentagon Push to Hack Nuke Missiles Before They Launch", 05/22/18, , https://www.thedailybeast.com/revealed-pentagon-push-to-hack-nuke-missiles-before-they-launch
"They've sought what's ... missile supply chain."
Andrew Futter, University of Leicester, "Why We Must Prohibit Cyberattacks On Nuclear Systems: the Case For Pre-Emptive US-Russia Arms Control", No Date, https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/valday/Why-We-Must-Prohibit-Cyberattacks-on-Nuclear-Systems-the-Case-for-Pre-Emptive-USRussia-Arms-Control-
"The problem is ... for all involved."
Douglas Gibler, Journal of Peace Research, "Taking Arms Against A Sea of Troubles: Conventional Arms Races During Periods of Rivalry", 2005, http://saramitchell.org/Gibleretal.pdf
"In addition to escalation ... arms race years."
2. Miscalc
Andrew Futter, Arms Control Organization, "xxx", August 2016, https://www.armscontrol.org/print/7551
"The introduction of cyberattack ... might strike first."
David Axe, National Interst, "A ‘Limited’ Nuclear War Quickly Could Kill 90 Million People", 10-3-2019, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/E28098limitedE28099-nuclear-war-quickly-could-kill-90-million-people-85686
"A small nuclear ... a few hours." | 904,842 |
365,751 | 379,762 | UBI Neg - RIP WILLIAM MCKINLEY PETROV DEFENSE SPECIAL PURPOSE ENTITIES TO AVOID SANCITONS YANG 2024 NUKE SUBS BILLY JOEL HENRY | Contention one is Medicaid.
Medicaid gives excellent coverage
CBPP, Hannah Katch, June 2nd, 2017 https://www.cbpp.org/research/health/medicaid-works-millions-benefit-from-medicaids-effective-efficient-coverage
"A wide body ... by health care."
And,
"Medicaid is much ... cost to beneficiaries."
Medicaid’s scope cannot be overstated.
Patricia Gaboe, Health Affairs, July 29th, 2015 https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20150729.049632/full/
"Medicaid and the ... many essential services."
Elimination of this program would be devastating. A UBI is insufficient for individuals on Medicaid to get proper healthcare.
Medium, Ed Dolan, September 23rd, 2019 https://medium.com/basic-income/how-much-basic-income-can-we-afford-52cc8e9da65
"One is that ... have costly accidents."
This is common practice for those without insurance in America:
John Tozzi, Bloomberg, March 26th, 2018 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-03-26/why-some-americans-are-risking-it-and-skipping-health-insurance
"Across America there ... a car wreck."
In short,
Current Affairs, Nathan J. Robinson, July 5th, 2019 https://www.currentaffairs.org/2019/07/andrew-yangs-curious-plans
"Average disability payments ... "hedge fund manager"."
The terminal impact is death.
PNHP 17, 6-26-2017, (Physicians for a National Health Program) "Lack of health insurance and U.S. mortality," https://pnhp.org/news/lack-of-health-insurance-and-u-s-mortality/ // BP
"Although estimates range ... deaths per year."
Health insurance keeps people alive through incentivizing medical care use.
The Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, Bob Reischauer, February 2003 https://www.kff.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/sicker-and-poorer-the-consequences-of-being-uninsured-executive-summary.pdf // HZN
"Researchers have found ... to underlying bias."
Contention two is a Spending Spree.
Currently, all economic indicators point to a strong economy
Harriet Torry 20, 2-3-2020, "U.S. Economy Heads Into 2020 With Steady Growth," WSJ, https://www-wsj-com.ezp3.lib.umn.edu/articles/fourth-quarter-economic-growth-11580386835?mod=searchresultsandamp;page=1andamp;pos=4 // BP
"The U.S. economy ... upbeat American consumers."
A UBI would be a massive government program, necessitating huge deficit spending and tax increases that would destabilize the status quo, triggering recession. More specifically,
Robert Greenstein 19, 6-13-2019, "Commentary: Universal Basic Income May Sound Attractive But, If It Occurred, Would Likelier Increase Poverty Than Reduce It," Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, https://www.cbpp.org/poverty-and-opportunity/commentary-universal-basic-income-may-sound-attractive-but-if-it-occurred // BP
"Suppose UBI provided ... federal government collects."
Regardless of how we pay for it, the costs of a UBI are immense.
David R. Henderson 19, 6-13-2019, "Universal Basic Income, In Perspective," Hoover Institution, https://www.hoover.org/research/universal-basic-income-perspective // BP
"But assuming unrealistically ... work and production."
Thus,
Mariko Paulson 18, 3-29-2018, "Options for Universal Basic Income: Dynamic Modeling — Penn Wharton Budget Model," Penn Wharton Budget Model, https://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/issues/2018/3/29/options-for-universal-basic-income-dynamic-modeling // BP
"When the "deficit ... by 9.3 percent."
A massive shock to the US economy would trigger a global collapse.
Kimberly Amadeo 19, 12-7-2019, "Your Survival Guide to an Economic Collapse," Balance, https://www.thebalance.com/u-s-economy-collapse-what-will-happen-how-to-prepare-3305690 // BP
"A U.S. economic ... became dirt cheap."
The impact is poverty.
Olivier Blanchard, Carlo Cottarelli and Siddharth Tiwari 13, 3-14-2013, IMF, “Jobs and Growth: Analytical and Operational Considerations for the Fund” // BP
"Although we are ... of adverse shocks."
Recessions are regressive and exacerbate wealth inequality.
Pfeffer et al (Fabian T. Pfeffer, Sheldon Danziger, Robert F. Schoeni) 13, (Fabian T. Pfeffer, Ph.D. in sociology from the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Research Assistant Professor at the Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research and serves as Co-Investigator of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Sheldon Danziger, and Robert F. Schoeni, “Wealth Disparities before and after the Great Recession”, available in PMC 2014 Nov 1 (Ann Am Acad Pol Soc Sci. 2013 Nov; 650(1): 98–123. doi: 10.1177/0002716213497452) https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4200506/ // BP
"The collapse of ... and minority households." | 904,846 |
365,752 | 379,772 | Round 2 | ====Hegemony fails and destabilizes regional powers – no impact to the transition – turns case – disregard their fearmongering====
**Posen** **14 – **Ford International Professor of Political Science at MIT and the director of MIT's Security Studies Program (Barry, "Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy," Cornell University Press, p. 60-62, June 24, 2014, tony)
Partisans of Liberal Hegemony might accept some of the factual statements above but would argue
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about making the theory the basis for U.S. grand strategy.
====No impact to retrenchment – Multilateralism check escalation====
Fuller, 14 – ~~Roslyn Fuller, research Associate at the INSYTE Group, Lecturer at Trinity College and the National University of Ireland, 2014, "The Ukraine and the beginning of the multipolar world", RT.com, 3/7/14, http://rt.com/op-edge/ukraine-beginning-multipolar-world-430/~~ Jeong
That was the theory, anyway. What happened, unfortunately, was that a
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to start rebuilding confidence in our international system and international law. Together!
====The pursuit of U.S. Primacy leads to war with Russia– That escalates and goes nuclear====
**Roberts, 6-2** – ~~Paul Craig Roberts, Senior Research Fellow in the Hoover Institution, PhD in Economic Policies from the University of Virginia, 6-2-2015, "Nuclear War our Likely Future": Russia and China won't accept US Hegemony, Paul Craig Roberts, http://www.globalresearch.ca/nuclear-war-our-likely-future-russia-and-china-wont-accept-us-hegemony-paul-craig-roberts/5453098~~ Jeong
The White House is determined to block the rise of the key nuclear-armed
AND
history leaves out of the story the Red Army's destruction of the Wehrmacht."
====Hegemony causes prolif – nations want to check U.S. power ====
**Posen** **14 – **Ford International Professor of Political Science at MIT and the director of MIT's Security Studies Program (Barry, "Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy," Cornell University Press, p. 31-33, June 24, 2014, tony)
Internal balancing aims to strengthen a state militarily or deliberately to improve a state's economic
AND
the United States spends a great deal of money trying to prevent it.
====Prolif spirals out of control – states engage in preemptive nuclear war with biological weapons====
**Utgoff 02** – Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analysis (Victor, "Survival: Proliferation, Missile Defense and American Ambitions," p. 87-88, tony)
Further, the large number of states that became capable of building nuclear weapons over
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building other types of weapons of mass destruction, such as biological weapons.
====The pursuit of U.S. Primacy leads to war with Russia and China – That escalates and goes nuclear====
**Roberts, 6-2** – ~~Paul Craig Roberts, Senior Research Fellow in the Hoover Institution, PhD in Economic Policies from the University of Virginia, 6-2-2015, "Nuclear War our Likely Future": Russia and China won't accept US Hegemony, Paul Craig Roberts, http://www.globalresearch.ca/nuclear-war-our-likely-future-russia-and-china-wont-accept-us-hegemony-paul-craig-roberts/5453098~~ Jeong
The White House is determined to block the rise of the key nuclear-armed
AND
history leaves out of the story the Red Army's destruction of the Wehrmacht."
====Data disproves heg impacts====
Fettweis 11 (Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO)
It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship
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global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.
====Hegemony doesn't lead to peace—statistics show it actually leads to war====
**Montiero 12—Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University**
Nuno, Unrest Assured, International Security, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Winter 2011/12), http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Unrest_Assured.pdf
How well, then, does the argument that unipolar systems are peaceful account for
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higher. 47 These figures provide no evidence that unipolarity is peaceful.48
====Regional cooperation fills in- also proves pursuit of heg isn't inevitable====
Sachs, 11 – Director of The Earth Institute, Quetelet Professor of Sustainable Development, and Professor of Health Policy and Management at Columbia University. He is also Special Advisor to United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (Jeffrey, "A World of Regions," 5/26, http://www.social-europe.eu/2011/05/a-world-of-regions/)
In almost every part of the world, long-festering problems can be solved
AND
, rather than backward, to its long-standing rivalries and conflicts. | 904,872 |
365,753 | 379,793 | 1 - SEPTOCT - Reform NC | Reform NC
Intro
Hillman ‘19
Jonathan Hillman, 20 June 2019, Axios, https://www.axios.com/without-reforms-chinas-belt-and-road-projects-could-fall-short-23c1eee7-be8a-4e30-b57b-fc494578560c.html
Yes, but: Building infrastructure does not automatically create value, the study warns. Success depends on picking the right projects and delivering them effectively, otherwise they destroy more value than they create. While Chinese officials sell the BRI as “win-win,” some partner countries, like Mongolia and Tajikistan, could lose out as the costs of infrastructure exceed the gains. They also face particularly high risks of default from BRI–related financing. About half of BRI transportation projects are expected to provide little value, according to another recent World Bank study. Where it stands: China likes the BRI just the way it is. Part of the problem is that its state-owned enterprises are eager to build regardless of economic viability; having poured more concrete between 2011 and 2013 than the United States used during the entire 20th century, they have run out of things to build at home. In the absence of transparency and effective oversight, these firms can bribe local officials in recipient countries to greenlight more and bigger projects.
Chin ’18
Stephen Chin, 10 October 2018, The ASEAN Post, https://theaseanpost.com/article/bri-corruption-magnet
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was intended to empower developing countries with improved infrastructure and trade relations. In the five years since it was mooted, the BRI is now being demonised as a debt-trap that ensnares poor nations into subservience to China. Another unintended consequence is its alleged connection to corruption. Infrastructure projects are notoriously vulnerable to corruption, featuring inflated costs and kickbacks. According to Will Doig in his book, High-Speed Empire, local politicians often have opportunistic motivations to approve BRI projects. They can claim credit for bringing development to their constituents while getting kickbacks for themselves. Interestingly, a large number of BRI-linked countries rank high on the global corruption perception index. This increases the likelihood of corruption when massive funds come to town. In Kyrgyzstan, government officials there were accused of colluding with Chinese contractors to embezzle BRI funds by grossly overpricing project costs. Two former prime ministers were arrested on corruption charges. Allegations of corruption in BRI-related projects have even caused the downfall of several governments. Sri Lanka’s President Mahinda Rajapaksa was ousted in 2015 elections. Malaysia’s decades-long rule by the National Front coalition was ended this year. Likewise, the incumbent party lost in Pakistan’s elections. Most recently, Maldives’ authoritarian President Abdulla Yameen lost in the country’s presidential election.
Kastner ’19
Jen Kastner, 14 January 2019, Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business, http://knowledge.ckgsb.edu.cn/2019/01/14/belt-and-road-initiative/belt-and-road-initiative-changing-rapidly/
The next phase looks set to bring BRI further in line with international standards. This could lead to fundamental changes in the way the initiative operates. Beijing appears to understand that the darkening outlook for emerging markets means that reforms are urgently needed. “Current international conditions are very uncertain, with lots of economic risks and large uctuations in interest rates in newly emerged markets,” said Hu Xiaolian, head of the Export- Import Bank of China, one of China’s two state policy banks, in July. “Our enterprises and Belt and Road Initiative countries will face financing difculties.” In August, Beijing issued policy papers to SOEs involved in BRI projects covering best practices in due diligence, project feasibility and ongoing operations. According to Deloitte, Chinese firms involved in BRI are looking to reduce their interest and exchange risks and financing interest associated with long-term loans. This is leading to greater involvement for Western banks and financing companies and a more balanced portfolio of funding. Most tellingly, several major Chinese institutions are stepping up cooperation with multilateral lenders. In April, Beijing set up the new China-IMF Capacity Development Centre (CICDC), which has the aim of developing the capacity to address implementation challenges on issues arising from BRI. “IMF is the acknowledged leader on dealing with balance of payment crises,” said Henry Chan, an adjunct research fellow at the East Asia Institute in Singapore, in August. “The new economic realities mean that China must accelerate the learning process.” The two Chinese policy banks, Ex-Im Bank and the China Development Bank, are also discussing cooperation with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) with a view to co-lending with it. If the two sides agree a deal, it would be a watershed moment, as the EBRD would likely insist that co-funded BRI projects adhere to international standards, including the opening of bidding processes to non-Chinese contractors. Using a Chinese company to carry out projects has usually been a precondition for Chinese loans. Research by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) found that 89 of BRI projects used a Chinese contractor. “EBRD has a long experience of nancing projects, and a strong geographical knowledge of the market it covers, and both of these are clearly desirable for Ex-Im and CDB, who wish to learn about them,” says Agatha Kratz, Associate Director at the Rhodium Group, whose research focuses on Chinese outward investment and infrastructure diplomacy. As China focuses more on sustainability and implementation, this opens up more opportunities for global companies to get involved by using their expertise to help Chinese contractors navigate headwinds. ABB, a Switzerland-based conglomerate, helped 400 Chinese rms resolve inter- country differences in design and industrial standards in 2016 alone. Gauff, a German engineering rm, is working closely with Chinese SOEs on several major African projects, including the Maputo-Katembe Bridge in Mozambique, which will be the longest suspension bridge in Africa when completed. General Electric has also received orders worth billions of dollars through BRI projects and is bidding for $7 billion worth of new business over the next year or so, according to Deloitte. The key question, according to Kratz of the Rhodium Group, is whether China will be willing to nance major infrastructure projects without insisting that Chinese companies deliver at least part of them. “That means making sure Chinese banks’ participation really comes with no strings attached,” says Kratz.
Chandran ‘19
Nyshka Chandran. Jan 18 2019. https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/18/countries-are-reducing-belt-and-road-investments-over-financing-fears.html
Under the trillion-dollar endeavor, Chinese state-owned entities flush with cash offer participating countries cheap loans and credit to build large-scale projects such as ports and railways. These arrangements are usually negotiated government-to-government with below-market interest rates but many nations are growing wary over their debt loads. Sierra Leone, one of Africa’s poorest countries, also scrapped plans to build a $318-million airport with a Chinese company last year while Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed has suspended $22 billion worth of Chinese-backed projects. Shock waves rippled throughout the developing world when Colombo handed over a strategic port to Beijing in 2017, after it couldn’t pay off its debt to Chinese companies. It was seen as an example of how countries that owe money to Beijing could be forced to sign over national territory or make steep economic concessions if they can’t meet liabilities. The phenomenon has been dubbed debt-trap diplomacy, which Chinese President Xi Jinping’s government has denied engaging in. The worries among BRI countries aren’t surprising given the numerous warnings of sovereign debt risks — the Center for Global Development last year said 23 countries faced high risks of debt distress. His comments come as criticism mounts on China’s globe-spanning infrastructure program known as the Belt and Road Initiative. One of the biggest complaints about the project is its reliance on Chinese workers and unsustainable loans which many participating nations may not be able to afford in the long term. If emerging economies can’t generate enough cash to pay the interest on China’s loans, Beijing may seek economic or political concessions as compensation as was the case with Sri Lanka. The phenomenon has been dubbed debt-trap diplomacy, which Chinese President Xi Jinping’sadministration has denied engaging in.
Akpaninyie ‘19
March 12 2019. https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/chinas-debt-diplomacy-is-a-misnomer-call-it-crony-diplomacy/
Some small countries “take on loans like it’s a drug addiction and then get trapped in debt servitude,” opined the influential Indian strategist Brahma Chellaney. “It’s clearly part of China’s geostrategic vision.” Through debt diplomacy, China exerts bilateral influence by bankrupting partner nations with unsustainable debt and then demanding steep concessions as part of the debt relief – or so the thinking goes.
Tan ‘19
Tan, Weizhen. Jun 11 2019. “China’s loans to other countries are causing ‘hidden’ debt. That may be a problem. CNBC. https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/12/chinas-loans-causing-hidden-debt-risk-to-economies.html
One example of those opaque loans is how Chinese loans to Venezuela were denominated in barrels of oil, according to a speech last year from David Malpass, the current president of the World Bank who was then the U.S. Treasury Undersecretary for International Affairs. “This has the effect of masking the exact amount of payments that China made to Venezuelan officials and that Venezuelans are expected to make to China in the future,” he said. “If you ask China for its terms you will not find them,” he said in that speech. Both the IMF and World Bank have called for more transparency on those loan amounts and terms in their annual Spring Meetings in April this year.
Link 1 – Legitimacy/Leverage
Bohman ‘17
June 18 2017. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-america-must-participate-chinas-belt-road-initiative-21206
Against this background, it becomes imperative that Western governments consider attending events such as last month’s forum. The meeting cemented the general direction of many large projects and might have been the last chance to join the inner circle of participants. It was an important opportunity for observation and could have been a starting point for Western efforts to steer the initiative toward economic development rather than Chinese geopolitical dominance. At the same time, idly participating in BRI-related events and mechanisms will change little and may even help China legitimize some of its dubious projects. Like-minded governments should therefore join hands and make clear that their support for the BRI will come only in exchange for a high level of transparency and the implementation of fair, collective decision-making processes. Chinese strategists may be reluctant to accept, but dominant voices in China often prioritize economic success over geostrategic expansion. If successful, these efforts would ensure that the BRI becomes the peaceful economic project that China portrays it to be, rather than a covert geopolitical tool
Li ‘19
Li, Dandan. July 18 2019. “China’s built a railroad to nowhere in Kenya.” Bloomberg. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2019-07-19/china-s-belt-and-road-leaves-kenya-with-a-railroad-to-nowhere
Construction of what was intended to be a flagship infrastructure project for Eastern Africa was halted earlier this year after China withheld some $4.9 billion in funding needed to allow the line’s completion. Beijing’s sudden financial reticence appeared to catch the governments of Kenya and Uganda off guard: Both may now be forced to reinstate a colonial-era line in a bid to patch the link and boost regional trade. The reason for China’s attack of cold feet may lie in the project’s high profile. Chinese state media repeatedly used the Mombasa-Nairobi Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) project as a showcase for President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative. But with concerns rising globally that Belt and Road was loading poorer nations with unsustainable debt, Xi signaled in April that Beijing would exert more control over projects and tighten oversight. The Chinese “are adopting a more cautious approach to their debt exposure in Africa,” said Piers Dawson, a consultant at London-based investment consultancy Africa Matters Ltd. He cites “increased noise around its sustainability and potential default.”
Ciurtin ’17
Horia Ciurtin, December 2017, European Institute of Romania, “A Pivot to Europe: China’s Belt and Road Balancing Act”, http://ier.gov.ro/wp-content/uploads/publicatii/Final_Policy-Brief-5_Horia-Ciurtin-A-Pivot-to-Europe_web.pdf
However, as shown before, China cannot financially and logistically manage such an ambitious project on its own. And, this time, prominent regional actors such as Russia, Iran and Turkey (who are unable) or India and Japan (who are unwilling) cannot be counted upon to build the Belt and Road. The only possible – and the truly necessary – partner is the European Union. The path to Europe can open up only with Europe’s support and financial participation. For this reason, the EU is in the position to exercise its considerable leverage and make limited (but strong) demands on China, before getting to the actual build-up.
Bespalov ’19
Anton Bespalov, 7 January 2019, Valdai Discussion Club, http://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/global-china-neighbours-fears/
France and Germany are entirely different: if they decide to join the Belt and Road, it will drastically change the situation. “China’s official argument for the BRI is to promote global economic and social connectivity, he writes. The BRI “would help maintain the importance of multilateral institutions in the world, especially the UN and the WTO, thereby reducing international conflict. France and Germany are more or less on the same page with China on this and their support is crucial. On the other hand, the real success of the BRI depends on a sustained flow of international investment. Italy cannot deliver either of these. China alone cannot ensure that this project works in the long run. The BRI is doomed to failure if it cannot leverage third party financing, or stimulate a multinational joint-venture in investment projects, especially huge infrastructure projects.”
Khanna ’19
Parag Khanna, 30 April 2019, Politico, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/04/30/washington-is-dismissing-chinas-belt-and-road-thats-a-huge-strategic-mistake-226759
Europe is showing how to engage with China while competing with it at the same time. It is precisely because Europeans have so much to gain from BRI that they successfully wrested concessions from China on cutting industrial subsidies and forced technology transfer before signing the final communique at the April 9 EU-China Summit in Brussels with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang. And as Europe pursues free-trade agreements with Japan, the Association of Southeast Nations and India, BRI will give European countries better access to Asia’s other wealthy markets as well. Each year, eastbound trains to Asia are catching up to westbound trains from China in volume. The more connected Europe becomes to Asia, the more it can compete commercially and diplomatically to dilute Chinese influence across the region.
Van Loon and Smith ’19
Fabio Van Loon, Jeff Smith, The Heritage Foundation, 30 May 2019, https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/xi-goes-rome-course-correction-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative
Lastly, the MoU was controversial in an international context — so much so that the U.S. National Security Council issued an unusual tweet warning: “Endorsing BRI lends legitimacy to China’s predatory approach to investment and will bring no benefits to the Italian people.” The concern was well-founded: shortly following Italy’s decision, Switzerland signed an MoU to cooperate with China in third countries participating in the BRI and New Zealand signaled a potential softening of its opposition to the initiative. Arguably more problematic is the prospect that Italy’s decision could ease the pressure on Beijing to reform the initiative. From Sri Lanka to the Maldives, and from Australia to Kenya, critics have been raising legitimate concerns about the BRI’s lack of transparency, accountability, high standards, and fiscal sustainability. There are signs Beijing had begun to internalize this pushback, and perhaps even adapt the BRI in response to these criticisms. If the Chinese government believes it has successfully assuaged these concerns, however, it could weaken the motivation to implement more meaningful reforms.
Link 2 – EU Connectivity Plan
Hillman ‘19
Jonathan Hillman, 20 June 2019, Axios, https://www.axios.com/without-reforms-chinas-belt-and-road-projects-could-fall-short-23c1eee7-be8a-4e30-b57b-fc494578560c.html
Yes, but: Building infrastructure does not automatically create value, the study warns. Success depends on picking the right projects and delivering them effectively, otherwise they destroy more value than they create. While Chinese officials sell the BRI as “win-win,” some partner countries, like Mongolia and Tajikistan, could lose out as the costs of infrastructure exceed the gains. They also face particularly high risks of default from BRI–related financing. About half of BRI transportation projects are expected to provide little value, according to another recent World Bank study. Where it stands: China likes the BRI just the way it is. Part of the problem is that its state-owned enterprises are eager to build regardless of economic viability; having poured more concrete between 2011 and 2013 than the United States used during the entire 20th century, they have run out of things to build at home. In the absence of transparency and effective oversight, these firms can bribe local officials in recipient countries to greenlight more and bigger projects.
Chin ’18
Stephen Chin, 10 October 2018, The ASEAN Post, https://theaseanpost.com/article/bri-corruption-magnet
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was intended to empower developing countries with improved infrastructure and trade relations. In the five years since it was mooted, the BRI is now being demonised as a debt-trap that ensnares poor nations into subservience to China. Another unintended consequence is its alleged connection to corruption. Infrastructure projects are notoriously vulnerable to corruption, featuring inflated costs and kickbacks. According to Will Doig in his book, High-Speed Empire, local politicians often have opportunistic motivations to approve BRI projects. They can claim credit for bringing development to their constituents while getting kickbacks for themselves. Interestingly, a large number of BRI-linked countries rank high on the global corruption perception index. This increases the likelihood of corruption when massive funds come to town. In Kyrgyzstan, government officials there were accused of colluding with Chinese contractors to embezzle BRI funds by grossly overpricing project costs. Two former prime ministers were arrested on corruption charges. Allegations of corruption in BRI-related projects have even caused the downfall of several governments. Sri Lanka’s President Mahinda Rajapaksa was ousted in 2015 elections. Malaysia’s decades-long rule by the National Front coalition was ended this year. Likewise, the incumbent party lost in Pakistan’s elections. Most recently, Maldives’ authoritarian President Abdulla Yameen lost in the country’s presidential election.
Elmer ’19
Keegan Elmer, 27 April 2019, South China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3007878/eus-connectivity-plan-more-sustainable-beijings-belt-and-road
The EU’s strategy for connecting Europe and Asia is greener and more sustainable than China’s “ Belt and Road Initiative”, but there remains scope for the two sides to work together, a senior European official said on Friday. Speaking in an interview on the sidelines of the second Belt and Road Forum in Beijing, European Commission Vice-President Maros Sefcovic said the European Union would be happy to increase its cooperation with Beijing as long as it could improve the transparency of its grand plan for boosting trade and infrastructure. “For us, connectivity is a little bit wider than the concept covered by the belt and road,” he said of the EU’s global development ambitions. “We The EU focuses on sustainable financing, avoid debt traps and always do our due diligence. We are also very careful about environmental assessments and the impact {of projects} on the public. This is something that makes the European approach to infrastructure very attractive.” The EU released its connectivity plan for Asia last year, with the promise to redouble its efforts to build transport, digital and energy infrastructure across a region in which China is already very active. Sefcovic, who said in a recent article that countries were are increasingly turning to the EU for their connectivity needs, was the first senior official to meet Chinese Premier Li Keqiang when the forum opened on Thursday. He said he told Li that Europe was happy to boost trade with China – currently worth about €1.6 billion (US$1.78 billion) a day – and cooperation on the belt and road, as long as Beijing dealt with the concerns of European businesses. At the EU-China Summit in Brussels last month, several member states threatened to walk away from the talks as a result of Beijing’s failure to follow through on its promises for market reforms. It was only at the last minute that a joint statement – in which the two sides agreed to create a mechanism for monitoring each other’s pledges regarding the opening up of their markets – was drafted and approved. “Our trade relationship has become so important that it forces the EU to have a very close look at the current and future relationship with China,” Sefcovic said. “Therefore we spent quite a lot of time discussing our relationship, which was reflected in our new China strategy.”
Cameron ’18
Fraser Cameron, 19 September 2018, The Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2018/09/europes-answer-to-chinas-belt-and-road/
Today’s The adoption by the European Commission of a new “Connectivity Strategy” linking Europe and Asia throws down the gauntlet to an increasingly assertive China. The new strategy, released on September 19, will offer a different approach to that taken by Beijing with its flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The EU emphasis is on sustainability, proposing that investments should respect labor rights, not create political or financial dependencies, and guarantee a level playing field for businesses. Given the rapidity of China’s economic development in the past 30 years, it has taken the EU some time to acknowledge the growing power and influence of Beijing. Not only has China become a trading giant, it sits on the world’s largest currency reserves and is an increasingly important provider of foreign investment, including in Europe. Recently, however, a number of developments have generated a sense of caution among European politicians and policymakers. China’s refusal to tackle the dominant position of its state-owned enterprises led the EU to refuse to grant China market economy status. Beijing’s targeting of European technology has also led to plans for screening of Chinese investments in Europe. But it was the massive infrastructure investments under BRI that raised the most concerns in Brussels, as well as Washington, New Delhi, and other capitals, about the implications of China’s approach. This spring, EU ambassadors in China penned a report critical of the BRI for being economically, environmentally, socially, and financially unsustainable. The report also criticized China for discriminating against foreign businesses, the lack of transparent bidding processes, and the limited market access for European businesses in China. China’s involvement in the EU and its neighborhood also rang warning bells. In 2014, Montenegro concluded an agreement with China Exim Bank on the financing for 85 percent of a highway construction project, with the estimated cost close to 25 percent of the country’s GDP. The IMF has repeatedly stated that construction should only continue on the basis of concessional funds. Many believe that a debt default is likely, which may result in the involuntary handover of critical infrastructure to China. There is already worrying precedent in that regard. Sri Lanka has been unable to repay Chinese loans for the construction of the Hambantota port. As a result, the port and surrounding acres of land, strategically located at the crossroads of the Indian Ocean, the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea, will now be under Chinese control until the year 2116. Likewise, China’s entire or partial acquisition of ports in Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, and most notably Greece, has not gone unnoticed. Without serious hindrance, China is buying up critical infrastructure in Europe, whereas European foreign direct investment in China is decreasing. China has already reaped some political benefit from these investments, with some EU member states blocking resolutions critical of human rights in China or condemning Beijing’s conduct in the South China Sea. Similarly, European officials have also questioned the environmental and economic sustainability of various Chinese connectivity projects. The planned construction of six coal-based power plants in Pakistan, whose joint output capacity equals 27 percent of the country’s current capacity, has been criticized as environmentally unsustainable. These examples have increased EU concerns as China has expanded its influence in Asia, Central Asia, and Europe. This influence is not only about money and politics. It also extends to technical standards and distorting trade flows. But the EU was well aware that mere peer pressure would not drive China to reconsider its strategy. To secure its own political and economic interests, the EU had to put forward an ambitious and comprehensive response, which was to strengthen its own links with the host countries and to present them with a credible and sustainable alternative offer for connectivity financing. The new strategy will give Asian and European states a much clearer idea on the basis of which the EU wishes to engage with them, and what they can expect.
Emmott ’18
Robin Emmott, Reuters, 19 September 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-asia/eu-unveils-asia-infrastructure-plan-denies-rivalry-with-china-idUSKCN1LZ1XF
Jan Weidenfeld, an expert on Europe-China relations at the Mercator Institute for Chinese Studies (MERICS) in Berlin, said the EU plan was “very much a response to Belt and Road.” “The main message is that when you’re creating large-scale infrastructure projects, you need to abide by certain norms or standards, whether they be environmental or financial. The EU sees a window of opportunity to steer Chinese policies here,” Weidenfeld said.
Herrero and Xu ’19
Alicia García-Herrero and Jianwei Xu, February 2019, “Countries’ perceptions of China’s Belt and Road Initiative: A big data analysis”, Bruegel Working Paper. https://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/WP-2019-01final.pdf
The fact that the BRI is backfiring is not only demonstrated in its worsening image globally, but also by the announcement of alternative proposals both by the US, through the Indo-Pacific Strategy with Australia, India and Japan, and the European Union, in the form of its EU-Asia Connectivity Plan. The US confronts mainly the geopolitical aspects of the BRI, as it focuses on the political and military coordination among states in the Indo-Pacific region through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD). The European Union’s response, on the other hand, is clearly narrower, focusing on the economics behind the BRI, in particular on physical connectivity. Beyond the Indo-Pacific Strategy, the US-led trade war could also be seen as an economic response to China’s rise, not only domestically, but also in other countries through BRI. Although the response seems painful for China, it is not a completely disastrous as it provides an opportunity for the big country to learn how to acquire international soft power. In fact, such backlash offers China an opportunity to shift from its earlier BRI strategy to a more sustainable one. China seems to be realising that creating confrontation with the US might not be a winning strategy in spite of the economic benefits. Given the diminishing returns on investment, China needs to expand in the overseas markets. Against this backdrop, the next step for China’s Belt and Road is definitely to take a more flexible and open pathway to building its soft-power image. To that end, China has recently made a number of strategic changes regarding the BRI, which have probably remained unnoticed given the much more low-key approach. First, China has sharply increased the number of countries signing memorandums of understanding (MOUs) from the original 63 to 126. The key is to make the Belt and Road less targeted to ease the West’s geopolitical concerns about this project. Second, China is trying to use a more multilateral framework to push the BRI, i.e. the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Such multilateral framework retains Chinese characteristics, allowing China to keep ultimate control of key projects, but at the same time offers room for other developed countries to get involved, especially the European countries and Korea. In other words, China is willing to make compromises and share benefits with other countries, but it ultimately strives to preserve the BRI’s non-Western model.
Impact
World Bank ’19
18 June 2019, 18 June 2019, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2019/06/18/success-of-chinas-belt-road-initiative-depends-on-deep-policy-reforms-study-finds
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) could speed up economic development and reduce poverty for dozens of developing countries—but it must be accompanied by deep policy reforms that increase transparency, improve debt sustainability, and mitigate environmental, social, and corruption risks, a new World Bank Group study on the BRI transportation corridors has found.
If implemented fully, the initiative could lift 32 million people out of moderate poverty—those who live on less than $3.20 a day, the analysis found. It could boost global trade by up to 6.2 percent, and up to 9.7 percent for corridor economies. Global income could increase by as much 2.9 percent. For low-income corridor economies, foreign direct investment could rise by as much as 7.6 percent. At the same time, the cost of BRI-related infrastructure could outweigh the potential gains for some countries. | 904,895 |
365,754 | 379,792 | 3 - JAN - Intervention NC | C1 Losing Leverage
Donmez ‘20
Beyza Donmez, Jan 2 2020, Anodolu Agency, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/maduro-says-venezuela-ready-for-talks-with-us/1690317
Venezuela's President Nicolas Maduro said he is ready to set up talks with the U.S. after a year of tension. "I am a man of dialogue! With U.S. President Donald Trump or with whom the U.S. governs: whenever, wherever and however they want, we are ready for a dialogue with the highest respect and dignity to establish new basis of relations that contribute to the stability of the region," Maduro tweeted late Wednesday, showing his will to open a new page in 2020 with the Trump administration. Tension escalated between two countries after the U.S. threw support behind opposition leader Juan Guaido at a time when he engaged in a power battle with Maduro at the beginning of 2019. Washington has been focusing on economic and diplomatic strain against Maduro, including imposing sanctions against him, his top officials and several governmental departments as it seeks to increase pressure on Caracas.
Mendrala ‘19
Emily Mendrala is a former National Security Council and State Department official in the Obama administration. She is the executive director of the Center for Democracy in the Americas, where she promotes U.S. policies of engagement toward the Americas, December 26, 2019, https://thehill.com/opinion/international/475791-bipartisan-consensus-on-venezuela-talks, Bipartisan consensus on Venezuela talks
As time passes, it becomes clear that the only way forward is for Venezuela’s parties to negotiate a path toward new elections. It’s true. Several rounds of negotiations between Venezuela’s two main factions have ended without agreement, but the Trump administration could effectuate the bipartisan congressional goal of successful negotiations between Maduro and Guaidó by making clear that it would consider partial sanctions relief if conditions for free and fair elections are agreed upon. Congress unequivocally has signaled its bipartisan support for negotiations and for an active, productive U.S. role. Now, action rests with the Trump administration. For its part, the State Department has demonstrated some willingness to consider sanctions flexibility. Just last week, U.S. Special Representative for Venezuela Elliott Abrams said of negotiations toward free and fair elections, “The sooner the better … that’s the way out.” In October, in public remarks, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Carrie Filipetti stated, “Sanctions are why Nicolás Maduro came to the table in the first place. And they continue to be a negotiating point, as we are committed to removing sanctions in exchange for concrete and meaningful actions to restore the democratic order, end human rights abuses, and combat corruption in Venezuela.” As time passes, it becomes clear that the only way forward is for Venezuela’s parties to negotiate a path toward new elections. It’s true. Several rounds of negotiations between Venezuela’s two main factions have ended without agreement, but the Trump administration could effectuate the bipartisan congressional goal of successful negotiations between Maduro and Guaidó by making clear that it would consider partial sanctions relief if conditions for free and fair elections are agreed upon.
Chovanec ‘18
Steven Chovanec. June 11 2018. “Venezuela's Elections Were Not Free or Fair – They Were Undermined by the US.” Venezuelan Analysis. https://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/13870
The government had been engaged in internationally mediated talks with the opposition for two years prior to the elections. After arduous negotiations, the two sides agreed on a number of points and were prepared to sign an agreement. On the day of the planned signing, the government showed up but the opposition didn’t, announcing that they would not sign. The blame for the breakdown was clearly placed by mediators and witnesses. In a similar fashion, one of the main demands of the United States and the opposition was—for years—for elections to be moved forward. The implied message being that Maduro would lose them if they were, his refusal to do so therefore meaning that he is stalling for time. During the negotiations, the election date of April 22 was agreed upon by both sides as a compromise, according to UN Rapporteur Alfred de Zayas and international mediators. After the talks broke down, the government announced that the vote would still be held on the agreed upon April 22 date. The opposition immediately denounced the move and vowed to boycott the vote, saying the date did not provide them with enough time.
Domnez ‘19
Beyza Donmez. Nov 11 2019. “Venezuela: Gov't, opposition agree on major deals.” AA. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/venezuela-govt-opposition-agree-on-major-deals/1649610
Delegations of Venezuelan government and opposition agreed on three points that focus on economic and political matters at the National Table established for dialogue. President Nicolas Maduro also participated in the meeting held at Miraflores Palace on Monday, according to the Caracas-based TV channel TeleSur. Claudio Fermin, leader of Solutions for Venezuela Party, said after the meeting that during two months of negotiations they have made important progress and "Venezuelans already see a way to start designating a new National Electoral Council", in the face of the 2020 parliamentary elections. Fermin also said complementary tables have been set up to discuss emergency economic measures and political party issues. Communication and Information Minister Jorge Rodriguez detailed the three points advanced at the dialogue table as follows: 1. Establishment of an electoral board guaranteed for the 2020 parliamentary elections, which includes a new National Electoral Council. 2. Actualization of the exchange of oil for medicine and food and eliminate taxes on a large number of items, which will lower the price and make it affordable for everyone. 3. National reconciliation.
Fiola ‘19
Anthoy Fiola, December 25, 2019, Washington Post, Christmas in Caracas: Socialist Venezuela flirts with the free market, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/a-fake-walmart-cases-of-dom-perignon-and-the-almighty-dollar-inside-socialist-venezuelas-chaotic-embrace-of-the-free-market/2019/12/23/ca4f2072-21c3-11ea-b034-de7dc2b5199b_story.html?arc404=true
CARACAS, Venezuela — Last Christmas, devastated Venezuela saw shortages of everything from tinsel to toilet paper. This year, the socialist government has given a weary nation an unexpected holiday gift. A dose of the free market. President Nicolás Maduro is making tentative moves away from the socialist policies that once regulated the prices of basic goods, heavily taxed imports and restricted the use of the U.S. dollar. As a result, the South American nation’s economic free fall is beginning to decelerate. The national inflation rate — still the world’s highest — has slowed from a blistering 1.5 million last year to a relatively breezy annualized rate of 15,000 percent. The changes might be temporary, and amount largely to an economic Band-Aid. There are no signs, for instance, of a larger strategy to reverse the agricultural land grabs and company seizures that helped lay the groundwork for one of the worst economic implosions of modern times. But as the new measures take hold, once-empty store shelves have overflowed this holiday season with beef, chicken, milk and bread — albeit at prices so high that a significant segment of the population is actually worse off. More moneyed Venezuelans, however, are flocking to dozens of newly opened specialty stores — including at least one fake Walmart — brimming with stacks of Cheerios, slabs of Italian ham and crates of Kirkland Signature Olive Oils, much of it bought and shipped in containers to Venezuela from Costco and other bulk retailers in Miami. Maduro remains deadlocked in a political standoff with opposition leader Juan Guaidó and his backers in Washington, who have ratcheted up pressure to force his ouster. But U.S. sanctions against Venezuela do not appear to have crimped surging imports — mostly because they prevent Americans from doing business with only the government, not private Venezuelans. “The government had been unable to restart the economy any other way, so it’s doing what the people want” by giving in to the free market, said Ricardo Cusano, president of Fedecamaras, Venezuela’s chamber of commerce. The socialists are still in power, he said, but “they have lost the ideological war.” Plagued by hyperinflation and economic collapse, depressed Venezuelans dubbed last Dec. 25 the “Christmas without lights” — a day largely bereft of the traditional holiday bunting and toys for children. But as the economy begins to show modest signs of life — particularly in the relative bubble of Caracas, the capital — there have been visible changes on the streets. Meager Christmas markets opened to peddle baubles to a slightly more optimistic populace. More holiday decorations popped up inside stores, along with, proprietors say, more parents buying toys and clothing for children. The capital is suffering its worst traffic jams in years as car owners with greater access to imported spare parts drag long out-of-commission vehicles back onto clogged roads. The eased restrictions have made the holiday season merrier for a small minority of rich Venezuelans, many of whom live in mansions behind high walls in Eastern Caracas. The tip piggy bank in an imported goods store in Caracas is stuffed with dollar bills. (Andrea Hernández Briceño/For The Washington Post) Adult-sized mannequins in Santeria Iyawo attire tower over a child-sized mannequin at El Cementerio market in Caracas. (Andrea Hernández Briceño/For The Washington Post) “There were things you just couldn’t get — dishes you just couldn’t make,” said Pablo Gianni, manager of Anonimo, a lavish new Caracas eatery that opened this month complete with a glass-walled wine cellar stocked with shelves of four-figure vintages of Dom Pérignon. “But now, it’s like legal contraband,” he said. “They’re letting everything in.” The changes taking shape here are the product of a combination of factors. For years, the government strictly limited the use of the U.S. dollar, long portrayed as an instrument of Yanqui imperialism. But last year, the government freed the exchange rate and more broadly legalized dollar transactions. It also eliminated massive import taxes on a host of goods. But those measures have begun to work through the economy really only in recent months, as the government has taken the further step of abandoning attempts to control retail prices. Stocks of bread, chicken and beef that once sold for nearly nothing are now being sold at market rates, at least partly normalizing farm production and sales through supply chains. Just as importantly, there are simply far more dollars in the Venezuelan economy now. About 4.5 million Venezuelans have fled starvation and poverty in recent years, creating a global diaspora that collectively sent $3.5 billion in remittances this year — more than triple the amount two years ago, according to Ecoanalitica, a Caracas-based economic analysis firm. In addition, economists say, the economy is awash in dollars from illegal mining, drug trafficking and other illicit activities. By some estimates, there are three times as many dollars in circulation as bolivars, creating a de facto dollarization of the economy that is stabilizing inflation. Last month, even Maduro seemed to hail the almighty dollar. “I don't see the process they call dollarization as bad,” he said in nationally televised comments. “It can aid the recovery of the productive areas of the country and the functioning of the economy.” Across Venezuela, mechanics and electricians, engineers and architects are increasingly charging in greenbacks. More companies are supplementing their employees’ salaries with U.S. currency. Collectively, economists say, 60 to 70 percent of families here are now regularly receiving some dollars — buying even some Venezuelans of more modest means a merrier Christmas this year. Maduro’s ex-spy chief lands in U.S. armed with allegations against Venezuelan government “Last year was very hard for us. There was practically no Christmas,” Yelitza Mineros, 33, said as she eyed the prices in dollars at a Caracas toy store with her 7-year old son and 3-year old daughter. Her husband, a mechanic, began earning in dollars a few months ago, she said, giving them the extra money they needed to buy new clothes for their children. Her son, Rodrigo, held up a Spider-Man action figure with a big grin as she spoke. “This year, we’re doing better, and we can get them their toys,” she said. “That gives me a lot of joy.” After last year’s “Christmas without Lights,” the decorations have returned to Caracas. (Andrea Hernández Briceño/For The Washington Post) Venezuela remains deeply mired in the worst economic crisis in modern Latin American history. Years of chronic mismanagement and, to a lesser extent, U.S. sanctions including an oil embargo have severely damaged the lifeblood of the economy: petroleum production. Venezuelans, including residents of the relatively shielded capital, are struggling with worsening gasoline shortages, lingering blackouts and broken state hospitals. And more food on store shelves doesn’t mean everyone can eat. In western Caracas, for instance, a grocery store that last year sold price-controlled products and suffered from shortages was now well now stocked with goods ranging from imported motorcycle helmets to Diet Coke. But with two chicken thighs at $1.70 and butter at $2 in a nation with a minimum wage of $6 a month, the aisles were mostly devoid of shoppers.
Rapoza ‘19
Kenneth Rapoza, Senior Contributor to Forbes, May 3, 2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2019/05/03/no-u-s-sanctions-are-not-killing-venezuela-maduro-is/#659c9f8e4343
But Venezuela is not the Middle East. U.S. policies are not the reason why Venezuela is a mess, as Omar said this week on the Democracy Now! radio program. The U.S. is not making Venezuela any worse than it is or will become under existing leadership. Her view mimics many left-of-center voices critical of the regime change policies that began under Bush and Cheney. The ruling Socialists United of Venezuela is, point blank, the only reason why Venezuela is a mess. And president Nicolas Maduro is its leader. Maduro governs a failed state. Fifty other countries, including Colombia, Brazil, the U.K. and Spain, all agree. Brazil and Colombia are currently catering to around one million Venezuelans who have fled the country. Some have preferred taking their children out of school and living in United Nations tents in Colombia instead of Maduro's Venezuela. Maduro's incompetence, of which the Socialists United rallies around, is killing Venezuela. Not Trump. Not Elliot Abrams. Not Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. This is not a pre-emptive strike, searching for terrorists under beds and weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. The economy began its deep decline years ago, in the Obama years. It has been in an economic depression for three years. Obama first sanctioned members of the Maduro Administration in 2015. Trump later sanctioned Maduro's Vice President Tareck El Aissami for drug trafficking in February 2017. Later that year, U.S. companies were banned from providing financial assistance (as in loans) to one company only, oil firm PdVSA.
Herbst ‘19
John E. Herbst and Jason Marczak, September 2019, Atlantic Council, “Russia’s intervention in Venezuela: What’s at stake?,” https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/russias-intervention-in-venezuela-whats-at-stake/
Meanwhile, day-to-day life in Venezuela continues to deteriorate. Food insecurity and malnutrition are at sky-high levels. As noted in the Bachelet report, in April 2019 the Venezuelan minimum wage, which sits around $7 per month, only covers 4.7 percent of the basic food basket. More than 80 percent of households in Venezuela are food insecure, with the majority of those interviewed as part of the Bachelet investigation consuming only one meal per day.39 The report highlights that, as a result of hyperinflation and the disintegration of Venezuelan food production, an estimated 3.7 million Venezuelans are malnourished. Children and pregnant women are the demographics most likely to suffer from malnutrition in Venezuela. Survival is a struggle. As a result, Venezuelan refugees filed more asylum claims globally in 2018 than citizens of any other country, including Syria.40 If the situation does not improve, the number of Venezuelan migrants and refugees is expected to reach around 8 million in 2020, surpassing total Syrian migration numbers by more than 3 million.
C2 Intervention
Intro
Hodgson ‘19
Fergus Hodgson, 21 March 2019, Frontier Centre for Public Policy, https://fcpp.org/2019/03/27/six-takeaways-from-venezuelas-dystopia/
Venezuela is now in a stalemate that gives two bad options: another Cuba, with poverty and tyranny for generations, or a military intervention akin to Panama in 1989-1990. The latter would be a difficult undertaking, given the presence of Cuban, Russian, and Chinese agents, along with major organized-crime syndicates and terrorist organizations.
France 24 News ‘19
12 Feb 2019, https://www.france24.com/en/20191202-pompeo-defends-military-restraint-on-venezuela-1
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo made clear Monday that the United States did not plan a military intervention in Venezuela even as he vowed that leftist leader Nicolas Maduro would one day fall. In a speech on Latin America, Pompeo renewed President Donald Trump's promise to battle socialism across the hemisphere but said his policy in Venezuela was "mixed with restraint." "We've seen folks calling for regime change through violent means, and we've said that all options are on the table to help the Venezuelan people recover their democracy and prosperity," Pompeo said at the University of Louisville.
Telesur ‘17
29 August 2017, https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/Venezuela-Constituent-Assembly-Debates-Response-to-US-Sanctions-20170829-0009.html
The president of the assembly, Delcy Rodriguez, recalled that opposition leaders had issued a communique at the weekend, "calling for and justifying all these actions and calling on other governments to apply similar sanctions." She explained that U.S. President Donald Trump’s financial sanctions are an alternative to military intervention, which was met with rejection even from U.S.-allied regional right-wing governments. Rodriquez stated that the purpose of these attacks' was to further destabilize the country and “intensify the economic aggression against the Venezuelan people.”
1 – Reelection
Sesin and Lederman ‘19
Carmen Sesin and Josh Lederman. April 7 2019. “Venezuelan-Americans welcome Trump's tough talk. Republicans hope that will mean votes.” NBC News. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/venezuelan-americans-welcome-trump-s-tough-talk-republicans-hope-will-n991131
DORAL, Fla. — As Richard Yepez and his daughter sat down for lunch at El Arepazo, a popular Venezuelan restaurant in this South Florida suburb dubbed “Dorazuela” for its large Venezuelan population, their thoughts turned to someone a thousand miles away: President Donald Trump. “Trump is the first president to follow through on his promise for Venezuela,” said Yepez, a 50-year-old audio-visual engineer, who said he was convinced Trump backs the exile community because of his hawkish criticism of embattled leftist president Nicolás Maduro. Asked if he will vote for Trump in 2020, Yepez said, “I sure will.” His U.S.-born daughter, Catherine, a 25-year-old Democrat who attends college in the Washington area, said she’s also also considering voting for Trump, adding: “I have strong feelings, being Venezuelan.” Republicans working for a second term for Trump and other GOP victories in 2020 are looking for a boost from Venezuelan-American voters like Yepez and his daughter and other Latinos who they say will reward the president for his forceful push against Maduro. The Trump administration has tightened the screws on Venezuela, slamming sanctions on individuals, oil and banks and recognizing opposition leader Juan Guaidó, who declared himself interim president in January. Trump has also pulled U.S. diplomats out of the country and even hinted at potential U.S. military action, saying "all options are on the table." In turn, the administration’s bold moves against what it calls Venezuela’s “socialist” government appear to be energizing Venezuelan-Americans and other Latino voters in this swing state, where races are won by thin margins. “I think that will be a huge impact,” said Yali Nuñez, the Republican National Committee’s director of Hispanic media. “You’re going to see Venezuelans voting for Republicans. You’re going to see a lot of people based on this issue solely voting for President Trump.” Rick Wilson, a Florida-based Republican strategist critical of Trump, said that while opposing the Venezuelan government was good politics in his state, any net benefit for Trump would probably be marginal. Although Trump lost the Latino vote badly in 2016 — winning only 28 percent nationally and 35 percent in Florida according to exit polls — he doesn’t need to win a majority to have an impact. In a battleground state that Trump carried in 2016 by only 112,911 votes, even small fluctuations can be important.
Smiley ‘19
David Smiley. May 25 2019. “Donal Trump must win Florida in 2020 if he wants to remain president. And he knows it.” https://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/article230401629.html
Donald Trump must win Florida in 2020 if he wants to remain president. And he knows it. The part-time Florida resident has spent more time here than any location outside of Washington since becoming president, and not just because he likes golf. His campaign is dedicating resources to the state and its 29 electoral college votes as if it were an entire region. He’s made further inroads in South Florida’s diverse Hispanic community by increasing financial pressures against leftist regimes in Venezuela and Cuba. And according to the L.A. Times, Trump now plans to roll out his 2020 campaign with an event located along the Interstate-4 corridor, which cuts across battleground Central Florida
Groppe ‘19
Martin Groppe and Deirdre Shesgreen, 1 Feb 2019, USA Today – Knox News, https://www.knoxnews.com/story/news/politics/2019/02/01/trump-venezuela-policy-also-good-2020-politics-key-state-florida-maduro-guaido/2730779002/
Embattled Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro might not have been listening Friday when Vice President Mike Pence gave a microphone to exiled Venezuelans living in South Florida. But Pence's trip to Miami, to showcase the administration's hard-line efforts to oust Maduro, is likely to resonate with an all-important bloc of Latino voters in the nation's largest swing state. And that could help another embattled president: Donald Trump. No Republican presidential candidate has won the White House in nearly a century without carrying Florida – a state also known for its razor-thin election margins. "It’s very hard to see a scenario where the president gets re-elected without winning Florida," said Democratic strategist Steve Schale who ran Barack Obama's 2008 campaign in Florida. Trump's tough stance on Maduro is very popular in Florida among that state’s Cuban and Venezuelan populations, which account for more than 1.5 million of the state's 21 million residents. It also resonates with the Colombian community, which is growing in political importance in Florida's most populous county: Miami-Dade.
2 – China/Russia
McKay ‘19
McKay, Hollie. Jan 30 2019. “Why Russia, China are fighting US push against Venezuela’s Maduro.” Fox News. https://www.foxnews.com/world/why-russia-china-are-fighting-us-push-against-venezuelas-maduro
“Russia and China are using Venezuela as a proxy conflict to challenge the U.S. This is more than just economic support. Russia and China are leveraging its economic support to establish a military-industrial presence in Venezuela,” Joseph Humire, executive director of the Center for a Secure Free Society, an independent global research group, told Fox News. “It's a geopolitical chess game.” But if it's a chess game, it's one that goes along with a massive and sobering military threat that's no game at all, with China and Russia standing to lose a lot if Maduro is replaced by a U.S.-backed government. For starters, China has a satellite tracking facility at the Capitán Manuel Rios Air Base in Guárico, while Russia has a cyberpresence at the Naval Base Antonio Diaz "Bandi" in La Orchilla, an island north of Caracas. “This adds space and cyberspace capabilities that the Maduro regime does not have,” Humire pointed out. “For Russia and China, pressuring the U.S. via Venezuela adds leverage to their regional ambitions in Ukraine and Eastern/Central Europe (for Russia) and Taiwan and South China Sea (for China).” Yet the weaker Venezuelan becomes, the greater the potential Russian or Chinese hand in the region. “Maduro still sits on the largest proven oil reserves in the world. That’s the grand prize. China could say that the more Venezuela becomes a pariah, the cheaper they want it,” noted the intelligence insider. “And the more leverage Russia then has to build a bigger base in the Western Hemisphere, and closer to the United States nonetheless.”
Blackwell ‘19
Blackwell, Ken. Dec 2 2019. “Venezuela: U.S. National Security and the Threats of Russia and China.” Townhall. https://townhall.com/columnists/kenblackwell/2019/12/02/venezuela-us-national-security-and-the-threats-of-russia-and-china-n2557291
The thought of the world’s largest supply of recoverable oil falling into the hands of Russia and China is not a far flung idea. And with that, a fleet of warships docked on the coast of the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico, positioned to threaten the American national security. If America eventually surrenders its influence in Venezuela, this scenario could become Reality. As of now, Nicolas Maduro is the ruthless socialist dictator of a crumbling Venezuela. Desperate to maintain his grip on power, it is very likely he will cede control of Venezuela’s oil industry to the Russians and Chinese in exchange for the two countries doubling down on financially backing his country’s collapsing economy and his withering dictatorship. President Trump has taken the right approach by enacting tough sanctions on the illegitimate Maduro government and has correctly thrown his administration’s support behind the opposition party leader, Juan Gauido, but improving the situation for the people of Venezuela is slow-going. China and Russia continue to bankroll the Maduro regime to protect their investment in Venezuela’s massive oil reserves, the largest oil fields in the world. Russia is financially backing Maduro with debt-for-oil deals and military hardware, while Maduro has agreed to grant Russian warships access to Venezuelan ports, de facto naval outposts for Russian operations in the Western Hemisphere. Maduro and members of his government have also attended meetings with Vladimir Putin to bolster their ongoing relationship with Russia. There is an estimated 300 to 500 billion barrels of recoverable oil in Venezuela with an estimated value well into the trillions. It makes little sense to allow a global energy asset to fall into the hands of Russia and China. If America’s energy industry is forced to vacate Venezuela, it leaves the fractured nation wide open to becoming a Russian or Chinese puppet state and much better positioned to be a serious threat to U.S. national security. This scenario can be averted if the Trump team continues to allow American energy companies ongoing permission to operate in Venezuela. American energy companies have become a lifeline for many Venezuelans still living and working there. The Trump administration has so far permitted American energy operations to remain online, which should continue. The economic sanctions that President Trump imposed on the Maduro government are working and the president is right to collaborate with other nations in bringing an end to the Maduro regime. But America should not sacrifice a 100-year relationship with Venezuela’s energy industry, and forfeit access to the world’s largest oil fields as part of a plan to end Maduro’s corrupt regime.
O’Connor ‘19
Tom O’Connor. Jan 29 2019. “CHINA JOINS RUSSIA IN BACKING VENEZUELA AGAINST U.S. MOVES, WARNS OF 'SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES' TO DONALD TRUMP'S PLAN.” Newsweek. https://www.newsweek.com/china-back-venezuela-warns-consequences-1309716
Beijing and Moscow have increasingly attempted to align their foreign policies in recent years in the face of what they see as Washington's hegemony abroad. The U.S. has, for its part, accused its top two global competitors of undermining a "rules-based international order." The U.S. has also sought to counter growing Chinese and Russia influence in Latin America, where Washington has for decades intervened against leftist and socialist movements, including an alleged CIA role in the 2002 coup attempt against Maduro's predecessor, Hugo
Ellyatt ‘19
Holly Ellyatt. Jan 29 2019. “Russia and China condemn new US sanctions on Venezuela.” CNBC. https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/29/russia-and-china-condemn-new-us-sanctions-on-venezuela.html
Russia is also heavily involved in Venezuela’s energy industry with Russian energy firm Rosneft holding a large stake in a subsidiary of PDVSA. PDVSA used 49.9 percent of its shares in its U.S. subsidiary Citgo as collateral for loan financing from Russia’s majority state-owned Rosneft in 2016. Russia thus stands to suffer from U.S. measures to freeze PDVSA’s oil transactions and those of its U.S. asset Citgo (to which most of the Venezuela’s exports destined for the U.S. go). Citgo has already become a focus for Maduro’s rival Guaido. Just ahead of U.S. sanctions Monday, the self-proclaimed interim president ordered Congress to appoint new boards of directors to PDVSA and Citgo.
Starr ‘19
Barbara Starr. April 15 2019. “Pentagon developing military options to deter Russian, Chinese influence in Venezuela.” CNN. https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/15/politics/pentagon-venezuela-military-options/index.html
The Pentagon is developing new military options for Venezuela aimed at deterring Russian, Cuban and Chinese influence inside the regime of President Nicolas Maduro, but stopping short of any kinetic military actions, according to a defense official familiar with the effort. The deterrence options are being ordered following a White House meeting last week where national security adviser John Bolton told acting Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan to develop ideas on the Venezuela crisis. The official emphasized strongly that the initial work is being done by the Pentagon's Joint Staff, which conducts planning for future military operations along with the Southern Command, which oversees any US military involvement in the southern hemisphere.
Hynes ‘19
H. Patricia Hynes, Common Dreams, 25 August 2019, https://www.commondreams.org/views/2019/08/25/economic-sanctions-war-another-name
Recall the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 from grade school history? President James Monroe proclaimed that European nations could not colonize nor otherwise interfere in North and South American countries. Ironically, since 1890, the U.S. has intervened in Latin American elections, civil wars and revolutions at least 56 times, according to historian and author Mark Becker, to bolster US corporate interests and to eliminate democratically elected governments and leftist movements.
Shepp ‘19
Jonah Shepp, 29 January 2019, NY Magazine, http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/01/venezuela-trump-more-harm-than-good.html
It’s too early to say whether Guaidó will ultimately prevail, but he still has many cards to play, while Maduro — no mastermind of statecraft — is running out of ways to placate the public and the armed forces amid a crumbling economy caused by his government’s catastrophic mismanagement. While it’s hard to gauge public opinion in an authoritarian country, the socialist ruling party appears to have lost a great deal of public support as the economy has collapsed and the humanitarian crisis has mounted. Maduro continues to receive support in the international sphere from Russia, China, Turkey, Iran, Cuba, and a few other countries, lending a Cold War feel to the standoff. The wild card remains the military: The top brass remains loyal to the regime, but the rank and file may be swayed by Guaidó’s amnesty proposal, which could change the generals’ calculus as well.
New York Times ‘17
New York Times. Aug 12 2017. “Trump Alarms Venezuela With Talk of a ‘Military Option’. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/12/world/americas/trump-venezuela-military.html
President Trump’s remarks on Friday that he would not rule out a “military option” to quell the chaos in Venezuela set off a late-night diplomatic duel, with the defense minister accusing Mr. Trump of “an act of madness” and the White House saying it had turned away a call from Venezuela’s president. About an hour later, the White House issued a statement saying that Mr. Trump had refused to take a phone call on Friday from Venezuela’s president, Nicolás Maduro. “Today, Nicolas Maduro requested a phone call with President Donald J. Trump,” the White House said. “President Trump will gladly speak with the leader of Venezuela as soon as democracy is restored in that country.” “We have many options for Venezuela, including a possible military option, if necessary,” Mr. Trump said. The defense minister said to expect a more detailed diplomatic response on Saturday.
Mora ‘17
Frank O. Mora. November 8 2017. “What Would a U.S. Intervention in Venezuela Look Like?” Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-11-08/what-would-us-intervention-venezuela-look
In August, U.S. President Donald Trump said that the United States was considering using military force to resolve the crisis in Venezuela. His announcement was quickly condemned by the United States’ allies in Latin America and the Caribbean as reckless and counterproductive. Yet there are some, mostly in the Venezuelan exile community, who still insist that a U.S. military intervention to remove the dictatorship of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro would be worth the cost. Not since the United States invaded Panama in 1989 had a U.S. president threatened to use force for political ends in the Americas, and for good reason. There are no longer any military challengers to the United States in the region. Today, the Pentagon focuses on helping Latin American governments dismantle drug trafficking networks, deal with insurgents, and respond to natural disasters. It does not plan military interventions in the region, although it certainly could, if ordered to do so. If the military were to make such plans for Venezuela, policymakers would need to answer a few important strategic questions. First, they would need to lay out the political goals of the intervention. When states use or threaten military force, their objectives are usually straightforward: they tend to seek either a shift in policy or regime change. In Venezuela’s case, that might mean pressuring the Maduro government to recommit to the rule of law and to enter into a serious dialogue with the opposition, or removing it from power entirely.
Impact
Mora ‘19
Frank O. Mora, March 19 2019, "What a Military Intervention in Venezuela Would Look Like," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/venezuela/2019-03-19/what-military-intervention-venezuela-would-look
In the worst-case scenario, a precision strike operation would last for months, killing possibly thousands of civilians, destroying much of what remains of Venezuela’s economy, and wiping out the state security forces. The result would be anarchy. Militias and other armed criminal groups would roam the streets of major cities unchecked, wreaking havoc. More than eight million Venezuelans would likely flee. The chaos would likely lead the United States to send in ground troops in order either to finally dislodge the regime and its security forces or to provide security once the dictatorship had collapsed. Such a scenario is not improbable. Indeed, the most likely outcome of a campaign of air strikes is that the Venezuelan armed forces would disintegrate. The United States, perhaps with international partners, would then have no option but to send troops to neutralize Venezuela’s irregular armed groups and restore order while a new government and security apparatus established themselves. How long such a peacekeeping occupation would last is hard to say, but the difficulty of the project and the complexity of the country's geography suggest that troops would stay in Venezuela for a lot longer than the few months for which they might initially be sent. The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, for example, lasted 13 years in a much smaller country. GROUND INVASION Rather than launching precision strikes and getting sucked into a ground war later, the United States might choose to go all-in from the beginning. That would mean a major intervention, including both air strikes and the deployment of at least 150,000 ground troops to secure or destroy airfields, ports, oil fields, power stations, command and control centers, communications infrastructure, and other important government facilities, including the president’s residence, Miraflores Palace. The invading army would face 160,000 regular Venezuelan troops and more than 100,000 paramilitaries. The most recent large-scale U.S.-led military interventions, in Afghanistan in 2001 and in Iraq in 2003, both required U.S. troops to remain after the initial invasion for nearly 20 years. By 2017, the two interventions had involved more than two million U.S. military personnel and cost more than $1.8 trillion. More than 7,000 U.S. service members have died in Afghanistan and Iraq. The costs of an intervention in Venezuela, which is free of the kind of sectarian divides that plague Afghanistan and Iraq, would likely not come near those numbers, but they would likely be significant. There’s no such thing as risk-free military action. But in this case, the social, economic, and security costs of intervening far outweigh the benefits. Whether the United States launched limited air strikes or a full ground invasion, it would almost certainly get sucked in to a long, difficult campaign to stabilize Venezuela after the initial fighting was over. Such an engagement would cost American lives and money and hurt the United States’ standing in Latin America. An extended occupation would reignite anti-Americanism in the region, particularly if U.S. soldiers committed real or perceived abuses, and it would damage U.S. relations with countries outside the region, too. Finally, a war-weary American public is unlikely to stand for yet another extended military campaign | 904,894 |
365,755 | 379,811 | 1 - 1AC - Artificial Planetarity | Artificial Planetarity
Tournament: Harvard | Round: Quarters | Opponent: Kentucky EH | Judge: Callahan, Fitz, Solice
*Contention One: Artificial Planetarity*
Artificial Planetarity
Geopolitics as we knew it is gone. In its place we now have platform sovereignty. In place of Westphalian statecraft, there is only the Stack. What the resolution calls international cooperation is an architectural design program that seizes on a rapidly datatizing world as a problem of design - reformulating the world along lines of computational control
Bratton 16. Benjamin, Professor of Visual Arts and Director of the Center for Design and Geopolitics at the University of California, San Diego; Program Director of The New Normal programme at Strelka Institute of Media, Architecture and Design in Moscow; Professor of Digital Design at The European Graduate School and Visiting Faculty at SCI'Arc (The Southern California Institute of Architecture). The Stack: On Software and Sovereignty (The MIT Press; 1 edition (February 19, 2016).
A New Architecture? In an address to the Council on Foreign Relations
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long run, this may be for the better—and maybe not."
The aff is a speculative and pre-figurative planetarity that is essential for the planetary design initiatives of the next century
Bratton 19. Benjamin, Program Director of The New Normal programme at Strelka Institute of Media, Architecture and Design in Moscow; Professor of Visual Arts and Director of the Center for Design and Geopolitics at the University of California, San Diego; Professor of Digital Design at The European Graduate School and Visiting Faculty at SCI Arc (The Southern California Institute of Architecture). The Terraforming. Strelka Press (September 1, 2019).
PREFACE: THE TERRAFORMING
This short book was written in July 2019. Each
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the world as it gazes back at us through the technologies we’ve made.
All planetary technologies are also planetary computational technologies, rendering the world as informatic on the quest towards a new planetary computation that seizes on the early Viking probes to Mars and upgrades them with computational methods to become a comparative computational means for understanding all astronomical entities and events.
The aff is a new geo-design that changes the trajectory of the future by channeling knowledge and uncertainty in new and unforeseen ways—away from humanistic security influenced behavior management and towards speculative configurations that pluralize politics and economics and reshape our relationship with technologies ,and economics - no longer towards mastery like the aff but as a practical confrontation with planetaty tech that inaugurates a new geopolitics
Bratton 16. Benjamin, Professor of Visual Arts and Director of the Center for Design and Geopolitics at the University of California, San Diego; Program Director of The New Normal programme at Strelka Institute of Media, Architecture and Design in Moscow; Professor of Digital Design at The European Graduate School and Visiting Faculty at SCI'Arc (The Southern California Institute of Architecture). The Stack: On Software and Sovereignty (The MIT Press; 1 edition (February 19, 2016).
69. Earth Layer to Come: God Bows to Math; Will Leviathan?
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US cooperation with Russia and China in the area of National Space Policy.
*Contention Two: Inherency, Solvency, and the Other Stuff Too*
Solvency
Currently debates are in response to the question of the topic, the question of IR, of cooperation and of new networks, communication and computation, we firstly aim to revisit Karl Deutsch’s vision of political cybernetics, precisely because he applies cybernetic theories of command and control to the "nerves" or "neural networks" or social entities and collectives like the international community, but also communication in communities like debate.
The way we understand nation states and international cooperation, their agential power, comes from their being defined as a complex net, a nervous system that forms a social group through labeled decisions and anticipated results all understood via the processing of results from the system’s past and the blocking of incompatible data from the system’s future.
Multinational security communities are a large general-purpose communication net of human beings and in this way are both homologous and analogous to the debate community in terms of their operation. Our 1ACs cybernetic reading of the historical evolution of debate as a complex system comes out through this analogy and shows how both debate and IR respond to emergence as spheres of social communication at different scales
Alker 11. Hayward R., Professor of International Relations at the University of Southern California School of International Relations, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), and Yale University European Journal of International Relations 17(2) 351–378 © The Author(s) 2011.
Introduction As history for the present and the possible future (Carr, 1967),
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these ideas will be presented here as interpretive (and explanatory) hypotheses.
Much like IR is a complex system, so too is debate: forcibly regulated because of an incapacity to deal with emergence. Platform sovereignty describes a form of statecraft whose modus operandi is an automated response to emergent conditions of difference. Systems theory is about how all systems must reckon with cosmic entropy – an eternal tendency towards disorganization – however, the nexus question is whether we can affirm debate as an enclave of organization even in an entropic world.
Alker 11. Hayward R., Professor of International Relations at the University of Southern California School of International Relations, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), and Yale University European Journal of International Relations 17(2) 351–378 © The Author(s) 2011.
Wiener on the ‘adventure of the ~last~ century’
Deutsch’s cybernetics comes
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conditions that are far more uniform’ (Wiener, 1964: 92).10
Thus, our theorization of debate is as follows: debate is complex system that grows through machinic evolution, that is through a mode of evolution specific to becoming alien to itself through exterior elements, which are incorporated then in complementary ways. Debate is a dynamic living system. One way to describe the organization dynamics of such a machinic system is called ‘autopoietic’ where the organization dynamic of a system produces only the system itself.
All relations within debate according to an autopoietic read are unified by the constant production of the systematic organization on account of the relations of the parts. The system rest on a distinction between pure autonomy – which is not possible – and impurity and heteronomy. The emergence of new components does not, in fact, destroy the system’s organization – such fear merely produces deadlock. Instead, the complex machine of debate is not pregiven, but part of a network that grows through misfigurings, deformations and reformations, breakdowns and rebuilds.
Our argument is to rethink autopoiesis in terms of evolutive and collective alterior relations that gives up on purity in favor of heterogenous ontology of debate as machinic system undergoing autopoietic evolution. The consequence of not doing so is a technocratically regulated social machine that attempts to program its own organization. The 1AC on the other hand is an alien thought-praxis that decodes this regulatory machine in favor of a new social machine of debate
Ansell-Pearson 97. Keith, Professor of Philosophy and Director of Graduate Research at the University of Warwick. Viroid Life (Routledge Studies in Development) 1st Edition (October 1, 1997).
The transhuman imagination does not rest content w'th anthropocentric prejudices about machines but seeks to
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, and ignoble (learn to growl, burrow, and distort yourself).
The 1AC embraces autopoietic openness through the simulation of an alien-IR model. Our argument is that the pathologies of governmental performance are grounded in their propensity to prefer self-referential symbols to new information from the outside world, the overvaluing of some and the undervaluing of other sources of information flowing.
As such, discourse is not just to a speech act or text in context, but to the field, the system through which the reality of debate and IR are made and constructed, where knowledge is produced and reproduced. Whereas discourse is naturally a self-elaborating and heterogeneous ensemble, discourse in debate has fashioned itself within a closed world-system much like that of Cold War SAGE military communications tech. This codes a thermodynamics of suspicion into debate’s DNA.
Alker 11. Hayward R., Professor of International Relations at the University of Southern California School of International Relations, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), and Yale University European Journal of International Relations 17(2) 351–378 © The Author(s) 2011.
Three helpful interpretive hypotheses from science and technology studies Books by Edwards (1996)
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and his all-devouring, self-replicating Golem is taking place. | 904,913 |
365,756 | 379,827 | Disclosure Policy | Interpretation - Debaters competing at the 2020 Plastic TOC Tournament must open source all cases they plan to read in constructive at least 15 minutes before rounds on the NDCA 2019-2020 PF wiki. | 904,931 |
365,757 | 379,898 | Offensive Cyber Operations Affirmative v1 - Apple Valley | =Marist LV – Apple Valley Affirmative v1=
==Contention 1: Boko Haram==
====Boko Haram has been mostly defeated as Erezi wrote a couple weeks ago that:====
Dennis Erezi, 10-16-2019, "Boko Haram now 'substantially' defeated, says Buhari," https://guardian.ng/news/boko-haram-now-substantially-defeated-says-buhari/, Date Accessed 11-6-2019 // JM
"The nation is appreciative of the gallantry and sacrifices of officers and men of
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continue to be one of the priorities of this Administration," Buhari said.
====Despite this, Boko Haram still remains a major threat to Nigerian stability as Duncan finds in 2018 that:====
Austin Duncan, 06-06-2018, "Revitalizing U.S. Strategy in Nigeria to Address Boko Haram." The Strategy Bridge, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2018/6/6/revitalizing-us-strategy-in-nigeria-to-address-boko-haram, Date Accessed 11-05-2019//SMV
Despite progress since the height of Boko Haram in 2014, this violent extremist organization
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another terrorist group does not emerge to recreate the horrors of Boko Haram.
====That's problematic as Anderson indicates in 2015 that:====
Ms. Angela J. Anderson, 2015, "Marine Corps University JOURNAL, " US Marine Corps, https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/HD20MCUP/MCUP20Pubs/MCU20Journal206-220Fall202015.pdf?ver=2018-10-11-094115-450, Date Accessed 11-06-2019 / /SMV
Since 2009, the Nigerian Islamist group Jama'a Ahl as-Sunna Lida'wa wa-
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security in Nigeria is one of our highest foreign policy priorities in Africa.
====Luckily, the use of offensive cyber operations remains the gift that keeps on giving. Sulmeyer indicates at its core OCO's exist based on their:====
Michael Sulmeyer, 3-22-2018, "How the U.S. Can Play Cyber-Offense," https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-03-22/how-us-can-play-cyber-offense, Date Accessed 11-7-2019 // JM
Such actions need not send a message that hacking the United States doesn't pay.
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only in indirect ways because they rely on the cooperation of foreign governments.
====Specifically, The Embassy reported in 2017 that the use of OCO's have fostered cooperation between Nigeria and the US specifically:====
U.S. Mission Nigeria 5-24-17 "U.S. Government Supports Nigeria in Fight against Cybercrime and Financial Fraud." U.S. Embassy and Consulate in Nigeria, https://ng.usembassy.gov/u-s-government-supports-nigeria-fight-cybercrime-financial-fraud. Date Accessed 11-6-19 // AO
Abuja – On May 23 U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria W. Stuart
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to protect citizens, resources, and financial networks from dangerous criminal attacks.
====This cooperation is imperative as Nigeria cannot fight off Boko Haram alone as O'Flaherty indicates in 2018 that:====
Kate O'Flaherty 11-26-18 "The Nigerian Cyber Warfare Command: Waging War In Cyberspace." Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/kateoflahertyuk/2018/11/26/the-nigerian-cyber-warfare-command-waging-war-in-cyberspace/~~#52f879382fba. Date Accessed 11-5-19 // AO
In 2016, the Nigerian Army announced plans to take the war against insurgency to
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don't see how it could be effective without bringing in some experienced people."
====Gudaku 19 emphasizes that this guidance is critical in the fight against Boko Haram====
Benjamin Tyavkase Gudaku, 03/19, ",", https://www.eajournals.org/wp-content/uploads/Harnessing-Cyberspace-Intelligence-and-the-Fight-against-Boko-Haram-in-North-Eastern-Nigeria.pdf, Date Accessed 11-8-2019 //CL
How to trace the dynamic evolution, communication and movement of terrorist groups across different
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, the paper discovers that the Nigerian state is ill equipped and prepared.
====This cooperation will defeat Boko Haram for two reasons. First is that OCOs take out social media recruitment platforms as Ogunlana finds in 2019:====
Sunday O. Ogunlana, "Halting Boko Haram / Islamic State's West Africa Province Propaganda in Cyberspace with Cybersecurity Technologies." Journal of Strategic Security 12, no. 1 (2019): : 72-106. https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol12/iss1/4, Date Accessed 11-6-2019 // JM
The ISIS has a significant influence on most of the terrorist organizations operating from Africa
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flagged on Twitter will not appear on Facebook or another social media platform.
====She continues that,====
Sunday O. Ogunlana, "Halting Boko Haram / Islamic State's West Africa Province Propaganda in Cyberspace with Cybersecurity Technologies." Journal of Strategic Security 12, no. 1 (2019): : 72-106. https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol12/iss1/4, Date Accessed 11-6-2019 // JM
Moreover, a key measure of the effectiveness of technologies arises from the number of
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for intelligence organizations, law enforcement agencies, and other security apparatuses in Nigeria
====Empirically, OCOs have been used to destroy these platforms as seen in combatting ISIS as Lamothe '17 indicates,====
Dan Lamothe, 12-16-2017, "How the Pentagon's cyber offensive against ISIS could shape the future for elite U.S. forces." New York Times, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/12/16/how-the-pentagons-cyber-offensive-against-isis-could-shape-the-future-for-elite-u-s-forces/, Date Accessed 11-07-2019//SMV
The U.S. military has conducted cyber attacks against the Islamic State for
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Command to become more involved in the campaign to defeat the Islamic State.
====Second, US-Nigeria cyber operations increase effectiveness of kinetic operations as Duncan '18 finds,====
Austin Duncan, 6-6-2018, "Revitalizing U.S. Strategy in Nigeria to Address Boko Haram," Strategy Bridge, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2018/6/6/revitalizing-us-strategy-in-nigeria-to-address-boko-haram, Date Accessed 11-7-2019//CL
In addition to the current intelligence support to Nigerian forces, an improved U.
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what they can benefit from is increased proficiency incorporating aviation and nonlethal effects.
====This solves as Lionel '19 explains, ====
Ekene Lionel, 06-22-2019, "Options for the Nigerian Air Force to Go on the Offensive in the Counterinsurgency War." Real Clear Defense, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2019/07/22/options_for_the_nigerian_air_force_to_go_on_the_offensive_in_the_counterinsurgency_war_114597.html, Date Accessed 11-07-2019//SMV
The NAF distributes its platforms and combines them with an integrated observation system. This
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distributed environment; precision munitions with greater over-the-horizon capability.
====Empirics are on our side as Duffy '18 furthers,====
Ryan Duffy, 5-29-2018, Cyberscoop, "The U.S. military combined cyber and kinetic operations to hunt down ISIS last year, general says", https://www.cyberscoop.com/u-s-official-reveals-military-combined-cyber-kinetic-operations-hunt-isis/WS
The military used cyber-operations alongside more conventional weaponry in an important battle against
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the locations. From there, the task force moved in and struck.
====The overall impact is saving lives as Singh '18 reports,====
Landry Singh, 2-26-2018, Brookings Institute, "Boko Haram's Campaign Against Education and Enlightenment", https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2018/02/26/boko-harams-campaign-against-education-and-enlightenment/, Date Accessed 11-6-2019 // JM
Nelson Mandela once said, "Education is the most powerful weapon which you can
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insecurity, violent disorder, and indiscriminate crimes to control and maintain power. | 905,077 |
365,758 | 379,911 | Belt and Road Affirmative v1 - Holy Cross | Our sole contention is the Polar Silk Road
The BRI is here to stay. Despite China’s economic slowdown, Xi will continue to support the BRI as Hutchinson of CBR writes this year that Xi has a geopolitical motive to keep BRI support high and can fund the program with China’s capital reserves.
Arctic development is also inevitable, but only with cooperation. Nong Hong explains this year that no individual country can enter the region alone due to development challenges.
Subpoint a is Sino-Russian Cooperation:
Because of this Russia and China have begun to collaborate to enter the region. Olga Alexeeva writes in 2019 that the two countries have begun working together to enter the arctic through the BRI.
But the cooperation between Russia and China is dangerous as Christopher Hsuing explains this year that this relationship allows Russia and China to shift their focus away from each other and towards security issues elsewhere. Dimitri Simes furthers in May that this collaboration could lead to Russia endorsing China’s militaristic stance in the South China Sea. With Russian military support, the South China Sea would become “a bipolar situation” with an American bloc on one side and a Sino-Russian bloc on the other. This shift to bipolarity would cause conflict in the region which Gordon Chang explains could quickly escalate to nuclear war due to China’s geographic advantage in the region. Holloway quantifies that even a non-nuclear war between US and China would kill up to 12 million people.
Luckily, joining the Belt and Road Initiative allows the EU to insert themselves into the Polar Silk Road conversations and disrupt this cooperation. Alexandre Cornet explains in 2018 that, despite thinking of themselves as a political partner in the Arctic, the European Union is a global power that could use its economic and political power in the BRI.
Subpoint B is Adaptation:
There are two specific reasons why the Chinese-EU cooperation happens in the Arctic. First, China needs European Arctic expertise and technology. Adam Stepien furthers in 2019 that in order for China to improve their “capacity and capability in Arctic technology” they need European technological solutions - such as “shipping safety and services, and environmental technology.” This expertise is unique to the EU due to its “geographical location” which allows them to specifically design materials and services that can survive the Arctic.
Second, both countries need each other for diplomatic leverage in the region. Joanna Cap explains that while the EU is not a permanent member – joining the Polar Silk Road is vital as China is a permanent member status – this diplomatic leverage allows them to step up EU’s Arctic policy. Humphrey Hawksley wrote in 2019 that despite this Chinese leverage - the geographic location of the EU allows them to control the development that is completed in the Arctic.
This Chinese-EU cooperation is crucial for two reasons. First, this arctic cooperation will focus on adaptation strategies for climate change. Ernesto Gallo writes in 2019 that “Research and exploration in the Arctic are fundamental to understanding and tackling climate change issues. With the melting of Arctic ice, the polar region could provide an opportunity to better understand the effects of global warming.” And understanding the effects is the only way to adequately develop adaptation strategies. This understanding and adaptation is the only way to survive global warming. Bruce Guile indicates in 2018 that since we cannot stop global warming, the only option we have is to adapt. Investment in adaptation is needed to develop collaborative solutions to climate change related issues such as human health, infrastructure, natural resource management and food security.
And without this adaptation, many people will die from food insecurity as Brown finds that rising global temperatures decrease corn, wheat and crop yield’s by 10. This is significant as Shiferaw reports that 30 of 4.5 billion people’s diet is dependent on corn, wheat and rice. Jen 19’ furthers that food shortages would cause 529,000 adult deaths and force 100 million people into extreme poverty by 2030.
Second, this arctic cooperation is vital to mitigating Arctic miscalculation. Ping Su writes in 2018 that Chinese cooperation in the Arctic produces more scientific diplomacy that is based on trust rather than only action. Specifically, science diplomacy allows China to integrate “into regional politics while mitigating threat perceptions by developing alternative communications channels result in rising levels of generalized mutual trust internationally.
Without this cooperation in the Arctic, Arctic miscalculation could quickly escalate to war as Alice Hill writes that as Russia militarizes the region, the U.S. will attempt to counteract this with their own troops. This dual militarization increases the chance of miscalculation and conflict significantly. Katie Weston quantifies the impact this month that a Russian-U.S. war would cause up to 34.1 million deaths. | 905,089 |
365,759 | 379,861 | Belt and Road Negative v1 - Industrial Displacement Contention | ==Contention 1 – Industrial Displacement==
====By connecting economies and forcing increased interdependence the EU joining the BRI will facilitate a rapid increase in Chinese exports priced below market value into the EU as Nicola Cararini writes in 2015 that ====
Cararini, Nicola. "Is Europe to Benefit from China's Belt and Road Initiative?" Instituto Affari Internazionali. October 2015.
There are growing concerns in Europe that through the Belt and Road initiative, China
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US – may be tempted to resist granting China "market economy status."
====This is empirically proven as Jaimie Dettmer writes in 2019 that====
Jaimie Dettmer, 3-22-2019, "China's New Silk Road May Hurt Italian Workers, Analysts Say." VOA. https://www.voanews.com/europe/chinas-new-silk-road-may-hurt-italian-workers-analysts-say, Date Accessed 7-16-2019 // WS
Some Italian officials in the economy and finance ministry have also offered behind-the
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, but the rest of the coalition doesn't," observed an Italian official.
====This is bad because Dettmer continues that:====
Jaimie Dettmer, 3-22-2019, "China's New Silk Road May Hurt Italian Workers, Analysts Say." VOA. https://www.voanews.com/europe/chinas-new-silk-road-may-hurt-italian-workers-analysts-say, Date Accessed 7-16-2019 // WS
Some Italian officials in the economy and finance ministry have also offered behind-the
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, but the rest of the coalition doesn't," observed an Italian official.
====Most specifically, the World Bank finds that:====
World Bank. 2019. "Belt and Road Economics: Opportunities and Risks of Transport Corridors." https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/31878/9781464813924.pdf, Date Accessed 8-31-2019 // JM
A reduction of trade costs imposes adjustment costs, especially in the short and medium
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adjustment. And trade-specific adjustment programs may play a complementary role. | 905,013 |
365,760 | 379,835 | Belt and Road Affirmative v4 - Chinese Economic Strategy Contention | ==Contention 2: Chinese Economic Strategy==
====Daniel Blasingame indicates that unless their economic strategy changes – China will be stuck in the middle income trap. He argues:====
Daniel Blasingame, 5-9-2018, "The 'Middle-Income' Trap: Is the One Belt, One Road Initiative Key to China's Ascension to a High-Income Economy?, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3176047, Date Accessed 10-20-2019 // JM
The "middle-income" trap theory was first introduced in 2006 during the
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determine how a country overcomes the threat of the middle-income trap.
====Two reasons why the affirmative changes this. As a part of the BRI negotiations means the EU uses its leverage to force China to reform its State Owned Enterprises in order to guarantee labor cooperation. Elmer indicates:====
Keegan Elmer, 9-24-2019, "European businesses urge EU to take 'defensive' measures against China's state-owned enterprises", South China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3029996/european-businesses-urge-eu-take-defensive-measures-against, Date Accessed 9-27-2019 // JM
European businesses have called on the EU to step up "defensive" measures against
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by 2016, while the private sector accounted for just 11 per cent.
====In fact, Scimia indicated on October 10 that:====
Emanuele Scimia, 10-10-2019, "Why Trump's tariffs might not forge a China-EU trade alliance," South China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3032007/will-trumps-tariffs-forge-new-eu-china-alliance-not-unless-beijing, Date Accessed 10-12-2019 // JM
But before working on a comprehensive trade deal, China and the EU are focusing
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European investment negotiations will gain significant traction without a breakthrough on this issue.
====Shuli indicates that:====
Hu Shuli, 5-6-2015, "How China can avoid the middle-income trap," South China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1787446/how-china-can-avoid-middle-income-trap, Date Accessed 10-20-2019 // JM
Concern about the "middle-income trap" has grabbed public attention again.
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experiences of the 12th plan to create an innovative and more efficient economy.
====The impact is being stuck in the middle income trap diminishes long term gains and prevents future economic growth and Cai indicates:====
Cai, F. (2012). Is There a "Middle-income Trap"? Theories, Experiences and Relevance to China. China and World Economy, 20(1), 49–61.doi:10.1111/j.1749-124x.2012.01272.x Date Accessed 10-19-2019 // JM
This, in reality, hints at a general theoretical explanation for the middle-
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income to the high-income phase (Indermit and Kharas, 2008)
====Huang quantifies that this transition out of the middle income trap is vital as:====
Huang, Yiping. "The Questions About China's Steady Climb Towards High Income." East Asia Forum. Oct. 2015. https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/10/11/the-questions-about-chinas-steady-climb-towards-high-income/ //RJ
When its GDP per capita hit almost US$7500 in 2014, China entered
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the world could lose one-third of its global economic growth engine. | 904,941 |
365,761 | 379,842 | OCO Affirmative v3 - Federal Use Contention | ==Contention 2: Federal Use==
====Federal use of offensive cyber operations eliminates the need for private corporations to start "hacking back" for cyber attacks for two reasons. First, federal use of OCO's creates a legal standard. Bennett indicates in 2018 that:====
Wade Bennett, 6-21-2018, "US gov't should have CYBERCOM 'hack back' against attacks, intel experts say," American Military News, https://americanmilitarynews.com/2018/06/us-should-have-cybercom-hack-back-against-attacks-intel-experts-say/, Date Accessed 11-22-2019 // JM
A cyber security panel this week encouraged the U.S. government to adapt
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are not allowed to access computers outside their own network without expressed permission.
====Second, federal use of OCO's demonstrate their expertise comparatively to private companies. Duffy argues in 2018 that:====
Ryan Duffy, 6-19-2018, "Private sector warms to Cyber Command hacking back," CyberScoop, https://www.cyberscoop.com/cyber-command-hack-back/, Date Accessed 11-18-2019 // CDM
The U.S. government should decide how to retaliate against the worst attacks
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that provides a really good view" to the government, said Amoroso.
====This use is advantageous for two reasons. First, federal use of OCO's actively prevent conflict – whereas private companies use of OCO's incite conflict. Kallberg indicates in 2018 that:====
Jan Kallberg, 10-9-2018, "Legalizing Private Hack Backs leads to Federal Risks," https://cyberdefense.com/private-cyber-retaliation-undermines-federal-authority, Date Accessed 11-21-2019 // CDM
The demarcation in cyber between the government sphere and the private sphere is important to
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control, and is counterproductive for the national cyberdefense and the national interest.
====In fact, it would spill over into other countries policies and magnify the impact of cyber conflict – Nojeim indicates that private sector hacking back leads====
Greg Nojeim, 7-22-2017, "Letting Cyberattack Victims Hack Back Is a Very Unwise Idea," Wired, https://www.wired.com/story/letting-cyberattack-victims-hack-back-is-a-very-unwise-idea/, Date Accessed 11-21-2019 // CDM
What's more, if the US allows hacking back by private-sector firms,
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that American laws cannot reach, along with an increase in financial damages.
====Sorcher argues that:====
Sara Sorcher, 4-6-2015, "Influencers: Companies should not be allowed to hack back," Christian Science Monitor. https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/Passcode-Influencers/2015/0401/Influencers-Companies-should-not-be-allowed-to-hack-back, Date Accessed 11-22-2019 // JM
Even as companies are hit by increasingly sophisticated cyberattacks, 82 percent of Influencers say
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than full scale 'hack back' is acceptable and even more commonplace." - Influencer
====That's why Knake concludes that:====
Robert Knake, 5-30-2018, "Instead of Hacking Back, U.S. Companies Should Let Cyber Command Do It for Them," Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/blog/instead-hacking-back-us-companies-should-let-cyber-command-do-it-them, Date Accessed 11-21-2019 // JM
Private companies hacking back scares many people in the cybersecurity policy community because, particularly
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and a counter offensive capability, while maintaining government responsibility for these activities.
====Second, federal use of OCO's maintain intelligence gathering techniques whereas private companies hacking inherently disrupt our intelligence gathering capabilities. Lynch indicates in 2018:====
Justin Lynch, 10-24-2018, "Top NSA official skeptical of 'hack back'", Fifth Domain, https://www.fifthdomain.com/industry/2018/10/24/top-nsa-official-skeptical-of-hack-back/, Date Accessed 11-21-2019 // CDM
Senior Adviser to the National Security Agency Rob Joyce criticized the idea that private businesses
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they will quickly lead to unintended diplomatic and intelligence consequences, Cooper said.
====Harming our intelligence capabilities crushes our diplomatic power in resolving international conflicts. There are two warrants – first, we use it to negotiate treaties. The USPO indicates that====
US Government Printing Office, 1996, Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence : Report of the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, Chapter 2 - Role of Intelligence, p. 20-21, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-INTELLIGENCE/pdf/GPO-INTELLIGENCE-6.pdf, Date Accessed 11-22-2019 // JM
The United States emerged from the Cold War as the world's only multidimensional (e
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for U.S. diplomatic initiatives in bilateral and multilateral treaty negotiations.
====Second, we use it to rally the international community around international law violations. Pinkus explains empirically:====
Jonathan Pinkus, 2014. "Intelligence and Public Diplomacy: The Changing Tide." Journal of Strategic Security, https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol7/iss1/4, Date Accessed 11-22-2019 // JM
Intelligence can be an effective tool to inform the public of the pros and cons
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did not know. This issue is explored in the case studies below.
====Diplomacy is vital as Regan quantifies:====
Regan, Patrick, and Aysegul Aydin. 2006. "Diplomacy and Other Forms of Intervention in Civil Wars. Journal of Conflict Resolution 50(5): 736–56. // JM
We find the most interesting results when we examine the effects of timing of diplomacy
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conflicts is as important as the tools at the disposal of potential interveners. | 904,961 |
365,762 | 380,047 | 0 - wHaT nExT srey | hi everyone,
idk what we did going pf at peach state, we literally trolled the fuck out of everyone. idek if ill do pf again, if i dont qual in ld ill come back cuz i literally just wanna go to toc lmao. if i come back to pf get ready for some trolling. maybe if i troll a little harder ill get a gold bid lmao xd. bye everyone, and always remember ld \ policy \ pf
p.s.
marist (sv), we're coming for you
~srey | 905,267 |
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