bayes-group-diffusion/wiki_auto · Datasets at Hugging Face

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Yamamoto reasoned that another air attack on the main U.S. Naval base at Pearl Harbor would induce all of the American fleet to sail out to fight , including the carriers .	Yamamoto thought that another attack on the U.S Naval base at Pearl Harbor would make all of the American fleet to sail out to fight , including the carriers .	[]
However , considering the increased strength of American land-based air power on the Hawaiian Islands since the 7 December attack the previous year , he judged that it was now too risky to attack Pearl Harbor directly .	However , because of the many American land-based airplanes on Hawaii , he thought that it was too risky to attack directly .	[]
Instead , Yamamoto selected Midway , a tiny atoll at the extreme northwest end of the Hawaiian Island chain , approximately 1300 mi from Oahu .	Instead , he decided to attack Midway , a tiny atoll at the northwest end of the Hawaiian Island chain , approximately 1300 mi from Oahu .	[]
Midway was not especially important in the larger scheme of Japan 's intentions , but the Japanese felt the Americans would consider Midway a vital outpost of Pearl Harbor and would therefore be compelled to defend it vigorously .	The Japanese did n't need Midway but they felt the Americans would try hard to defend it .	[]
In addition to serving as a seaplane base , Midway 's airstrips also served as a forward staging point for bomber attacks on Wake Island .	Midway 's airstrips were also used for bomber attacks on Wake Island .	[]
During the Battle of the Coral Sea one month earlier , the Japanese light carrier had been sunk , while the fleet carrier had been severely damaged by three bomb hits and was in drydock for months of repair .	During the Battle of the Coral Sea one month earlier , the Japanese light carrier " Sho ̄ ho ̄ " had been sunk and the fleet carrier had three bomb hits , and was in drydock undergoing repairs .	[]
Although the fleet carrier escaped the battle undamaged , she had lost almost half her air group , and was in port in Kure awaiting replacement planes and pilots .	Although the carrier was undamaged , she had lost almost half her airplanes and was in port in Kure awaiting new planes and pilots .	[]
That there were none immediately available is attributable to the failure of the IJN crew training program , which already showed signs of being unable to replace losses .	No new pilots were available because none had been trained .	[]
Instructors from the Yokosuka Air Corps were employed in an effort to make up the shortfall .	Flight instructors were used in an effort to make up the missing aircrew .	[]
The main Japanese carrier-borne strike aircraft were the D3A1 " Val " dive bomber and the B5N2 " Kate " , which was used either as a torpedo bomber or as a level bomber .	The main Japanese carrier-based aircraft were the Aichi D3A1 dive bomber and the Nakajima B5N2 , which was used either as a torpedo bomber or as a bomber .	[]
For a variety of reasons , production of the " Val " had been drastically reduced , while that of the " Kate " had been stopped completely and , as a consequence , there were none available to replace losses .	However , production of the D3A had been reduced , while production of the B5N had been stopped . <SEP> None were available to replace losses .	[]
In addition , many of the aircraft being used during the June 1942 operations had been operational since late November 1941 and , although they were well-maintained , many were almost worn out and had become increasingly unreliable .	In addition many of the aircraft being used during the June 1942 operations had been operating since late November 1941 ; many were almost worn out and had become increasingly unreliable .	[]
These factors meant all carriers of the " Kido Butai " had fewer aircraft than their normal complement , with few spare aircraft or parts stored in the carriers ' hangars .	These factors meant that all carriers of the " Kido Butai " had fewer aircraft than normal and there were not enough spare aircraft or parts .	[]
The main carrier fighter was the fast and highly maneuverable A6M " Zero " .	I Japan 's main carrier fighter was the fast Mitsubishi A6M2 " Zero " .	[]
At about 09:00 on 3 June , Ensign Jack Reid , piloting a PBY from U.S. Navy patrol squadron VP-44 , spotted the Japanese Occupation Force 500 nmi to the west-southwest of Midway .	At about 09:00 on 3 June , a US Navy patrol plane spotted the Japanese Occupation Force 500 nmi to the west-southwest of Midway .	[]
Three hours later , they found Tanaka 's transport group 570 nmi to the west .	Three hours later , the Americans found the Japanese transport group 570 nmi to the west .	[]
Early the following morning , the Japanese oil tanker " Akebono Maru " sustained the first hit when a torpedo from an attacking PBY struck her around 01:00 .	Early the following morning the Japanese oil tanker " Akebono Maru " was hit by a torpedo from an attacking PBY .	[]
At 04:30 on 4 June , Nagumo launched his initial attack on Midway itself , consisting of 36 Aichi D3A dive bombers and 36 Nakajima B5N torpedo bombers , escorted by 36 Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighters .	At 04:30 on 4 June , Nagumo launched his attack on Midway . <SEP> It consisted of 36 dive bombers 36 torpedo bombers , escorted by 36 Mitsubishi Zero fighters .	[]
At the same time , he launched his eight search aircraft ( one from the heavy cruiser launched 30 minutes late ) .	His eight search planes launched 30 minutes late .	[]
Japanese reconnaissance arrangements were flimsy , with too few aircraft to adequately cover the assigned search areas , laboring under poor weather conditions to the northeast and east of the task force .	Japanese reconnaissance plans were poor , with too few aircraft to cover the search areas .	[]
As Nagumo 's bombers and fighters were taking off , 11 PBYs were leaving Midway to run their search patterns .	As Nagumo 's bombers and fighters were taking off , 11 PBYs were leaving Midway to search for Japanese ships .	[]
At 05:34 , a PBY reported sighting two Japanese carriers and another spotted the inbound airstrike 10 minutes later .	They reported sighting two Japanese carriers with empty decks , which meant an air strike was on its way .	[]
Midway 's radar picked up the enemy at a distance of several miles , and interceptors were scrambled .	American radar picked up the enemy at a distance of several miles , and planes were sent off to defend Midway .	[]
Unescorted bombers headed off to attack the Japanese carriers , their fighter escorts remaining behind to defend Midway .	Bombers headed off to attack the Japanese carrier fleet . <SEP> US fighters remained behind to defend Midway .	[]
Midway-based Marine fighters led by Major Floyd B. Parks , which included six F4Fs and 20 F2As , intercepted the Japanese and suffered heavy losses , though they managed to destroy four B5Ns , as well as a single A6M .	Midway-based Marine fighter pilots , flying F4Fs and obsolescent F2As , intercepted the Japanese and had many losses .	[]
Within the first few minutes , two F4Fs and 13 F2As were destroyed , while most of the surviving U.S. planes were damaged , with only two remaining airworthy .	Most of the U.S. planes were shot down in the first few minutes ; several were damaged , and only two could fly . <SEP> In all , 3 F4Fs and 13 F2As were shot down .	[]
American anti-aircraft fire was intense and accurate , destroying three additional Japanese aircraft and damaging many more .	American anti-aircraft fire was accurate damaging many Japanese aircraft and destroying four .	[]
Having taken off prior to the Japanese attack , American bombers based on Midway made several attacks on the Japanese carrier force .	American bombers based on Midway made several attacks on the Japanese carrier fleet .	[]
These included six Grumman Avengers , detached to Midway from " Hornet " 's VT-8 ( Midway was the combat debut of both VT-8 and the TBF ) ; Marine Scout-Bombing Squadron 241 ( VMSB-241 ) , consisting of 11 SB2U-3s and 16 SBDs , plus four USAAF B-26s of the 18th Reconnaissance and 69th Bomb Squadrons armed with torpedoes , and 15 B-17s of the 31st , 72nd , and 431st Bomb Squadrons .	These included six Grumman Avengers from the 's VT-8 ( Midway was the first combat mission for the VT-8 airmen , and it was the first combat of the TBF ) , Marine Scout-Bombing Squadron 241 ( VMSB-241 ) , consisting of eleven SB2U-3s and sixteen SBDs , plus four USAAF B-26s , armed with torpedoes , and fifteen B-17s .	[]
The Japanese repelled these attacks , losing three fighters while destroying five TBFs , two SB2Us , eight SBDs , and two B-26s .	The Japanese fought off these attacks . <SEP> The US lost two fighters , five TBFs , two SB2Us , eight SBDs and two B-26s .	[]
In accordance with Japanese carrier doctrine at the time , Admiral Nagumo had kept half of his aircraft in reserve .	Admiral Nagumo had kept half of his aircraft in reserve .	[]
These comprised two squadrons each of dive bombers and torpedo bombers .	These were two squadrons of dive bombers and torpedo bombers .	[]
At 07:15 , Nagumo ordered his reserve planes to be re-armed with contact-fused general-purpose bombs for use against land targets .	At 07:15 Nagumo ordered his reserve planes to be re-armed with bombs for use against land targets .	[]
Re-arming had been underway for about 30 minutes when , at 07:40 , the delayed scout plane from " Tone " signaled that it had sighted a sizable American naval force to the east , but neglected to describe its composition .	At 07:40 a scout plane from " Tone " saw a big American naval force to the east .	[]
Later evidence suggests Nagumo did not receive the sighting report until 08:00 .	It seems that Nagumo did not receive the report until 08:00 .	[]
Another 20 – 40 minutes elapsed before " Tone "'s scout finally radioed the presence of a single carrier in the American force .	Nagumo reversed his order , but it took 40 minutes before " Tone "'s scout finally radioed that there was a carrier in the American force .	[]
This was one of the carriers from Task Force 16 .	This was one of the carriers from TF 16 ; the other carrier was not sighted . <SEP> Neither of the carriers of Spruance 's Task Force 16 was damaged .	[]
" Hiryu ̄ " , the sole surviving Japanese aircraft carrier , wasted little time in counterattacking .	" Hiryu ̄ " , the sole surviving Japanese aircraft carrier attacked .	[]
" Hiryu ̄ " 's first attack wave , consisting of 18 D3As and six fighter escorts , followed the retreating American aircraft and attacked the first carrier they encountered , " Yorktown " , hitting her with three bombs , which blew a hole in the deck , snuffed out all but one of her boilers , and destroyed one anti-aircraft mount .	" Hiryu ̄ " 's first attack consisted of 18 dive bombers and six fighter escorts . <SEP> They followed the retreating American aircraft and attacked the " Yorktown " , hitting her with three bombs , which blew a hole in the deck , put out her boilers , and destroyed several anti-aircraft guns .	[]
Damage control parties were able to temporarily patch the flight deck and restore power to several boilers within an hour , giving her a speed of 19 kn and enabling her to resume air operations .	Despite the damage , repair teams were able to fix the flight deck and fix several boilers in an hour .	[]
Thirteen Japanese dive bombers and three escorting fighters were lost in this attack ( two escorting fighters turned back early after they were damaged attacking some of " Enterprise " 's SBDs returning from their attack on the Japanese carriers ) .	Twelve Japanese dive bombers and four escorting fighters were lost in this attack .	[]
They attacked , crippling " Yorktown " with two torpedoes ; she lost all power and developed a 23-degree list to port .	In the attack , " Yorktown " was struck by two torpedoes ; she lost all power and developed a tilt to port , which put her out of action .	[]
The damage also forced Admiral Fletcher to move his command staff to the heavy cruiser .	Admiral Fletcher moved his command staff to the heavy cruiser .	[]
Nagumo was now in a quandary .	Nagumo was now unsure of what to do .	[]
Rear Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi , leading Carrier Division 2 ( " Hiryu ̄ " and " So ̄ ryu ̄ " ) , recommended that Nagumo strike immediately with the forces at hand : 18 Aichi D3A1 dive bombers each on " So ̄ ryu ̄ " and " Hiryu ̄ " , and half the ready cover patrol aircraft .	Rear Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi recommended that Nagumo strike with the forces at hand : 18 Aichi D3A dive bombers each on " So ̄ ryu ̄ " and " Hiryu ̄ " , and half the cover patrol aircraft .	[]
Nagumo 's opportunity to hit the American ships was now limited by the imminent return of his Midway strike force .	Nagumo 's opportunity to hit the American ships , however , was now limited .	[]
The returning strike force needed to land promptly or it would have to ditch into the sea .	The Midway strike force would be returning shortly and needed to land or crash into the sea .	[]
Because of the constant flight deck activity associated with combat air patrol operations during the preceding hour , the Japanese never had an opportunity to position ( " spot " ) their reserve planes on the flight deck for launch .	Because of the constant flight deck activity , the Japanese did not get their reserve planes on the flight deck for launch .	[]
The few aircraft on the Japanese flight decks at the time of the attack were either defensive fighters or , in the case of " So ̄ ryu ̄ " , fighters being spotted to augment the combat air patrol .	The few aircraft that were ready were defensive Fighter aircraft .	[]
Spotting his flight decks and launching aircraft would have required at least 30 minutes .	Launching aircraft would have required at least 30 to 45 minutes .	[]
Furthermore , by spotting and launching immediately , Nagumo would be committing some of his reserve to battle without proper anti-ship armament , and likely without fighter escort ; indeed , he had just witnessed how easily unescorted American bombers had been shot down .	By launching right away , Nagumo would be using some of his reserve without proper anti-ship weapons . <SEP> He had just seen how easily unescorted American bombers had been shot down .	[]
Japanese carrier doctrine preferred the launching of fully constituted strikes rather than piecemeal attacks .	Japanese carrier rules preferred full strikes , and since Nagumo did not know the American force included a carrier , his response followed Japanese rules .	[]
In addition , the arrival of another land-based American air strike at 07:53 gave weight to the need to attack the island again .	In addition , the arrival of another American air strike at 07:53 made Nagumo want to attack the island again .	[]
In the end , Nagumo decided to wait for his first strike force to land , then launch the reserve , which would by then be properly armed with torpedoes .	Nagumo decided to wait for his first strike force to land , then launch the reserve , which would by then be armed and ready .	[]
In the final analysis , it made no difference ; Fletcher 's carriers had launched their planes beginning at 07:00 ( with " Enterprise " and " Hornet " having completed launching by 07:55 , but " Yorktown " not until 09:08 ) , so the aircraft that would deliver the crushing blow were already on their way .	Fletcher 's carriers had launched their planes beginning at 07:00 , so the aircraft that attacked Nagumo were already on their way .	[]
By chance , at the same time VT-3 was sighted by the Japanese , three squadrons of SBDs from " Enterprise " and " Yorktown " were approaching from the southwest and northeast .	Three squadrons of SBDs from " Enterprise " and " Yorktown " ( VB-6 , VS-6 and VB-3 , respectively ) were approaching from the southwest and northeast .	[]
The two squadrons from " Enterprise " ( VB-6 and VS-6 ) were running low on fuel because of the time spent looking for the enemy .	The two squadrons from " Enterprise " were running low on fuel because of the time spent looking for the enemy .	[]
Air Group Commander C. Wade McClusky , Jr. decided to continue the search , and by good fortune spotted the wake of the Japanese destroyer , steaming at full speed to rejoin Nagumo 's carriers after having unsuccessfully depth-charged U.S. submarine , which had unsuccessfully attacked the battleship .	However , the squadron commander decided to continue the search . <SEP> It was moving to rejoin Nagumo 's carriers after having unsuccessfully depth-charged U.S. submarine .	[]
Some bombers were lost from fuel exhaustion before the attack commenced .	Some bombers were lost from lack of fuel before the attack started .	[]
Late in the afternoon , a " Yorktown " scout aircraft located " Hiryu ̄ " , prompting " Enterprise " to launch a final strike of 24 dive bombers ( including six SBDs from VS-6 , four SBDs from VB-6 , and 14 SBDs from " Yorktown "'s VB-3 ) .	Late in the afternoon , a " Yorktown " scout aircraft located " Hiryu ̄ " . <SEP> " Enterprise " launched a strike of dive bombers ( including 10 SBDs from " Yorktown " ) .	[]
Despite " Hiryu ̄ " being defended by a strong cover of more than a dozen Zero fighters , the attack by " Enterprise " and orphaned " Yorktown " aircraft launched from " Enterprise " was successful : four bombs ( possibly five ) hit " Hiryu ̄ " , leaving her ablaze and unable to operate aircraft .	Despite " Hiryu ̄ " being defended by more than a dozen Zero fighters , the attack by " Enterprise " was successful : four , possibly five bombs hit " Hiryu ̄ " , leaving her on fire and unable to operate aircraft .	[]
" Hornet " 's strike , launched late because of a communications error , concentrated on the remaining escort ships , but failed to score any hits .	( " Hornet "'s strike aimed at the escort ships but it did not get any hits . )	[]
After futile attempts at controlling the blaze , most of the crew remaining on " Hiryu ̄ " were evacuated and the remainder of the fleet continued sailing northeast in an attempt to intercept the American carriers .	After hopeless attempts to control the fire , most of the crew remaining on " Hiryu ̄ " were taken off the ship . <SEP> The rest of the fleet continued sailing northeast to catch the American carriers .	[]
Despite a scuttling attempt by a Japanese destroyer that hit her with a torpedo and then departed quickly , " Hiryu ̄ " stayed afloat for several more hours .	" Hiryu ̄ " stayed afloat for several more hours .	[]
She was discovered early the next morning by an aircraft from the escort carrier , prompting hopes she could be saved , or at least towed back to Japan .	She was discovered by an aircraft from the light carrier " Ho ̄ sho ̄ " . <SEP> This led to hopes she could be saved or towed back to Japan .	[]
Soon after being spotted , " Hiryu ̄ " sank .	However , soon after being spotted , " Hiryu ̄ " sank .	[]
Rear Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi , together with the ship 's captain , Tomeo Kaku , chose to go down with the ship , costing Japan perhaps its best carrier officer .	Rear Admiral Yamaguchi chose to go down with his ship , costing Japan her best carrier officer .	[]
As darkness fell , both sides took stock and made tentative plans for continuing the action .	As darkness fell , both sides thought about the situation and made plans for action .	[]
Spruance knew the United States had won a great victory , but he was still unsure of what Japanese forces remained and was determined to safeguard both Midway and his carriers .	Spruance knew the United States had won a great victory , but he was still unsure of what Japanese forces remained . <SEP> He wanted to protect Midway and his carriers .	[]
To aid his aviators , who had launched at extreme range , he had continued to close with Nagumo during the day and persisted as night fell .	He followed Nagumo during the day and continued to follow as night fell .	[]
Finally , fearing a possible night encounter with Japanese surface forces , and believing Yamamoto still intended to invade , based in part on a misleading contact report from the submarine , Spruance changed course and withdrew to the east , turning back west towards the enemy at midnight .	Finally , fearing a possible night battle with Japanese ships and believing Yamamoto still intended to invade , Spruance pulled back to the east . <SEP> He turned back west towards the enemy at midnight .	[]
For his part , Yamamoto initially decided to continue the engagement and sent his remaining surface forces searching eastward for the American carriers .	Yamamoto decided to continue the attacks and sent his remaining ships searching eastward for the American carriers .	[]
Simultaneously , he detached a cruiser raiding force to bombard the island .	He also sent a cruiser raiding force to bomb the island .	[]
The Japanese surface forces failed to make contact with the Americans because Spruance had decided to briefly withdraw eastward , and Yamamoto ordered a general withdrawal to the west .	The Japanese ships failed to make contact with the Americans due to Spruance 's decision to pull back eastward , and Yamamoto ordered a withdrawal to the west .	[]
One B-26 , after being seriously damaged by anti-aircraft fire , made a suicide run on " Akagi " .	One B-26 , after being seriously damaged by anti-aircraft fire , dove straight toward the " Akagi " .	[]
Making no attempt to pull out of its run , the aircraft narrowly missed crashing directly into the carrier 's bridge , which could have killed Nagumo and his command staff .	The plane just missed the carrier 's bridge , which could have killed Nagumo and his command staff .	[]
This experience may well have contributed to Nagumo 's determination to launch another attack on Midway , in direct violation of Yamamoto 's order to keep the reserve strike force armed for anti-ship operations .	This may have made Nagumo decide to launch another attack on Midway , against Yamamoto 's order to keep the reserve force for anti-ship operations .	[]
Within six minutes , " So ̄ ryu ̄ " and " Kaga " were ablaze from stem to stern , as fires spread through the ships .	Within six minutes , " So ̄ ryu ̄ " and " Kaga " were on fire .	[]
All three carriers remained temporarily afloat , as none had suffered damage below the waterline , other than the rudder damage to " Akagi " caused by the near miss close astern .	" Akagi " was also seriously damaged .	[]
Despite initial hopes that " Akagi " could be saved or at least towed back to Japan , all three carriers were eventually abandoned and scuttled .	The Japanese hoped that " Akagi " could be saved or towed back to Japan . <SEP> Eventually , all three carriers were eventually abandoned and sunk .	[]
Over the following two days , several strikes were launched against the stragglers , first from Midway , then from Spruance 's carriers .	Over the following two days , first Midway and then Spruance 's carriers launched several attacks .	[]
" Mikuma " was eventually sunk by Dauntlesses , while " Mogami " survived further severe damage to return home for repairs .	" Mikuma " was sunk by Dauntlesses , while " Mogami " survived damage and returned home for repairs .	[]
The destroyers and were also bombed and strafed during the last of these attacks .	The destroyers " Arashio " and " Asashio " were also bombed and machine-gunned during the last of these attacks .	[]
The Battle of Midway has often been called " the turning point of the Pacific " .	The Battle of Midway has been called " the turning point of the Pacific " .	[]
Although the Japanese continued to try to secure more territory , and the U.S. did not move from a state of naval parity to one of supremacy until after several more months of hard combat , Midway allowed the Allies to switch to the strategic initiative , paving the way for the landings on Guadalcanal and the prolonged attrition of the Solomon Islands campaign .	However , even after Midway , the Japanese continued to try to get more territory in the South Pacific . <SEP> The U.S. did not become the more powerful navy until after several more months of hard combat .	[]
It was the Allies ' first major naval victory against the Japanese , won despite the Japanese Navy having more forces and experience than its American counterpart .	Midway was the Allies ' first major victory against the Japanese .	[]
Midway allowed this to occur before the first of the new " Essex " -class fleet carriers became available at the end of 1942 .	Finally , Midway bought the United States time until the first of the new Essex-class fleet carriers became available at the end of 1942 .	[]
Some authors have stated that heavy losses in carriers and veteran aircrews at Midway permanently weakened the Imperial Japanese Navy .	Some authors have stated heavy losses in carriers and veteran aircrews at Midway permanently weakened the Imperial Japanese Navy .	[]
Parshall and Tully have stated that the heavy losses in veteran aircrew ( 110 , just under 25 % of the aircrew embarked on the four carriers ) were not crippling to the Japanese naval air corps as a whole ; the Japanese navy had 2,000 carrier-qualified aircrew at the start of the Pacific war .	Parshall and Tully , however , have stated that the losses in veteran aircrew , while heavy ( 110 , just under 25 % of the aircrew embarked on the four carriers ) , were not as bad for the Japanese naval air-corps as a whole . <SEP> The Japanese navy had 2,000 carrier-qualified aircrew at the start of the Pacific war .	[]
A few months after Midway , the JNAF sustained similar casualty rates in the Battle of the Eastern Solomons and Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands , and it was these battles , combined with the constant attrition of veterans during the Solomons campaign , which were the catalyst for the sharp downward spiral in operational capability .	A few months after Midway , the JNAF sustained similar casualty rates at both the Battle of the Eastern Solomons and Battle of Santa Cruz . <SEP> It was these battles , combined with the constant death of veterans during the Solomons campaign , which weakened Japan .	[]
The loss of four large fleet carriers and over 40 % of the carriers ' highly trained aircraft mechanics and technicians , plus the essential flight-deck crews and armorers , and the loss of organizational knowledge embodied in such highly trained crews , were still heavy blows to the Japanese carrier fleet .	However , the loss of four large fleet carriers , and over 40 % of the carriers ' aircraft mechanics and technicians , plus the flight-deck crews were very damaging to the Japanese carrier fleet .	[]
After the battle , " Sho ̄ kaku " and " Zuikaku " were the only large carriers of the original Pearl Harbor strike force still afloat .	After the battle and were the only large carriers of the original Pearl Harbor strike-force left for offensive actions .	[]
Of Japan 's other carriers , " Taiho ̄ " , which was not commissioned until early 1944 , would be the only fleet carrier worth teaming with " Sho ̄ kaku " and " Zuikaku " ; and were light carriers , while and , although technically classified as fleet carriers , were second-rate ships of comparatively limited effectiveness .	Of Japan 's other carriers , was the only Fleet carrier that could be used with " Sho ̄ kaku " and " Zuikaku " , while , , and , were second-rate ships .	[]
By the time of the Battle of the Philippine Sea in June 1944 , the Japanese had nearly rebuilt their carrier forces in terms of numbers , but their planes , many of which were obsolete , were largely flown by inexperienced and poorly trained pilots .	By the time of the Battle of the Philippine Sea , while the Japanese had somewhat rebuilt their carrier forces , the planes were flown by inexperienced pilots .	[]
By 1942 the United States was already three years into a shipbuilding program mandated by the Second Vinson Act of 1938 .	By 1942 the United States was already three years into a shipbuilding plan which aimed make the navy larger than Japan 's .	[]
Troup County is a county located in the west central portion of the U.S. state of Georgia .	Troup County is a county in the U.S. state of Georgia .	[]
As of the census of 2000 , there were 58,779 people , 21,920 households , and 15,607 families residing in the county .	As of 2000 , 58,779 people lived there . <SEP> As of the 2000 census , there were 58,779 people , 21,920 households , and 15,607 families residing in the county .	[]
1.71 % of the population were Hispanic or Latino of any race .	1.71 % of the people were Hispanic or Latino of any race .	[]
There were 21,920 households out of which 34.60 % had children under the age of 18 living with them , 49.10 % were married couples living together , 17.90 % had a female householder with no husband present , and 28.80 % were non-families .	There were 21,920 households . <SEP> Of these , 34.60 % had children under the age of 18 living with them , 49.10 % were married couples living together , 17.90 % had a female householder with no husband present , and 28.80 % were non-families .	[]
Adrienne Levine ( June 24 , 1966 – November 1 , 2006 ) , better known by the stage name Adrienne Shelly ( sometimes credited as Adrienne Shelley ) , was an American actress , film director and screenwriter .	Adrienne Shelly ( also known as Adrienne Levine ; June 24 , 1966 – November 1 , 2006 ) was an American actress , movie director and screenwriter .	[]

Yamamoto reasoned that another air attack on the main U.S. Naval base at Pearl Harbor would induce all of the American fleet to sail out to fight , including the carriers .

Yamamoto thought that another attack on the U.S Naval base at Pearl Harbor would make all of the American fleet to sail out to fight , including the carriers .

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However , considering the increased strength of American land-based air power on the Hawaiian Islands since the 7 December attack the previous year , he judged that it was now too risky to attack Pearl Harbor directly .

However , because of the many American land-based airplanes on Hawaii , he thought that it was too risky to attack directly .

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Instead , Yamamoto selected Midway , a tiny atoll at the extreme northwest end of the Hawaiian Island chain , approximately 1300 mi from Oahu .

Instead , he decided to attack Midway , a tiny atoll at the northwest end of the Hawaiian Island chain , approximately 1300 mi from Oahu .

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Midway was not especially important in the larger scheme of Japan 's intentions , but the Japanese felt the Americans would consider Midway a vital outpost of Pearl Harbor and would therefore be compelled to defend it vigorously .

The Japanese did n't need Midway but they felt the Americans would try hard to defend it .

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In addition to serving as a seaplane base , Midway 's airstrips also served as a forward staging point for bomber attacks on Wake Island .

Midway 's airstrips were also used for bomber attacks on Wake Island .

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During the Battle of the Coral Sea one month earlier , the Japanese light carrier had been sunk , while the fleet carrier had been severely damaged by three bomb hits and was in drydock for months of repair .

During the Battle of the Coral Sea one month earlier , the Japanese light carrier " Sho ̄ ho ̄ " had been sunk and the fleet carrier had three bomb hits , and was in drydock undergoing repairs .

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Although the fleet carrier escaped the battle undamaged , she had lost almost half her air group , and was in port in Kure awaiting replacement planes and pilots .

Although the carrier was undamaged , she had lost almost half her airplanes and was in port in Kure awaiting new planes and pilots .

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That there were none immediately available is attributable to the failure of the IJN crew training program , which already showed signs of being unable to replace losses .

No new pilots were available because none had been trained .

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Instructors from the Yokosuka Air Corps were employed in an effort to make up the shortfall .

Flight instructors were used in an effort to make up the missing aircrew .

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The main Japanese carrier-borne strike aircraft were the D3A1 " Val " dive bomber and the B5N2 " Kate " , which was used either as a torpedo bomber or as a level bomber .

The main Japanese carrier-based aircraft were the Aichi D3A1 dive bomber and the Nakajima B5N2 , which was used either as a torpedo bomber or as a bomber .

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For a variety of reasons , production of the " Val " had been drastically reduced , while that of the " Kate " had been stopped completely and , as a consequence , there were none available to replace losses .

However , production of the D3A had been reduced , while production of the B5N had been stopped . <SEP> None were available to replace losses .

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In addition , many of the aircraft being used during the June 1942 operations had been operational since late November 1941 and , although they were well-maintained , many were almost worn out and had become increasingly unreliable .

In addition many of the aircraft being used during the June 1942 operations had been operating since late November 1941 ; many were almost worn out and had become increasingly unreliable .

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These factors meant all carriers of the " Kido Butai " had fewer aircraft than their normal complement , with few spare aircraft or parts stored in the carriers ' hangars .

These factors meant that all carriers of the " Kido Butai " had fewer aircraft than normal and there were not enough spare aircraft or parts .

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The main carrier fighter was the fast and highly maneuverable A6M " Zero " .

I Japan 's main carrier fighter was the fast Mitsubishi A6M2 " Zero " .

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At about 09:00 on 3 June , Ensign Jack Reid , piloting a PBY from U.S. Navy patrol squadron VP-44 , spotted the Japanese Occupation Force 500 nmi to the west-southwest of Midway .

At about 09:00 on 3 June , a US Navy patrol plane spotted the Japanese Occupation Force 500 nmi to the west-southwest of Midway .

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Three hours later , they found Tanaka 's transport group 570 nmi to the west .

Three hours later , the Americans found the Japanese transport group 570 nmi to the west .

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Early the following morning , the Japanese oil tanker " Akebono Maru " sustained the first hit when a torpedo from an attacking PBY struck her around 01:00 .

Early the following morning the Japanese oil tanker " Akebono Maru " was hit by a torpedo from an attacking PBY .

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At 04:30 on 4 June , Nagumo launched his initial attack on Midway itself , consisting of 36 Aichi D3A dive bombers and 36 Nakajima B5N torpedo bombers , escorted by 36 Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighters .

At 04:30 on 4 June , Nagumo launched his attack on Midway . <SEP> It consisted of 36 dive bombers 36 torpedo bombers , escorted by 36 Mitsubishi Zero fighters .

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At the same time , he launched his eight search aircraft ( one from the heavy cruiser launched 30 minutes late ) .

His eight search planes launched 30 minutes late .

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Japanese reconnaissance arrangements were flimsy , with too few aircraft to adequately cover the assigned search areas , laboring under poor weather conditions to the northeast and east of the task force .

Japanese reconnaissance plans were poor , with too few aircraft to cover the search areas .

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As Nagumo 's bombers and fighters were taking off , 11 PBYs were leaving Midway to run their search patterns .

As Nagumo 's bombers and fighters were taking off , 11 PBYs were leaving Midway to search for Japanese ships .

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At 05:34 , a PBY reported sighting two Japanese carriers and another spotted the inbound airstrike 10 minutes later .

They reported sighting two Japanese carriers with empty decks , which meant an air strike was on its way .

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Midway 's radar picked up the enemy at a distance of several miles , and interceptors were scrambled .

American radar picked up the enemy at a distance of several miles , and planes were sent off to defend Midway .

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Unescorted bombers headed off to attack the Japanese carriers , their fighter escorts remaining behind to defend Midway .

Bombers headed off to attack the Japanese carrier fleet . <SEP> US fighters remained behind to defend Midway .

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Midway-based Marine fighters led by Major Floyd B. Parks , which included six F4Fs and 20 F2As , intercepted the Japanese and suffered heavy losses , though they managed to destroy four B5Ns , as well as a single A6M .

Midway-based Marine fighter pilots , flying F4Fs and obsolescent F2As , intercepted the Japanese and had many losses .

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Within the first few minutes , two F4Fs and 13 F2As were destroyed , while most of the surviving U.S. planes were damaged , with only two remaining airworthy .

Most of the U.S. planes were shot down in the first few minutes ; several were damaged , and only two could fly . <SEP> In all , 3 F4Fs and 13 F2As were shot down .

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American anti-aircraft fire was intense and accurate , destroying three additional Japanese aircraft and damaging many more .

American anti-aircraft fire was accurate damaging many Japanese aircraft and destroying four .

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Having taken off prior to the Japanese attack , American bombers based on Midway made several attacks on the Japanese carrier force .

American bombers based on Midway made several attacks on the Japanese carrier fleet .

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These included six Grumman Avengers , detached to Midway from " Hornet " 's VT-8 ( Midway was the combat debut of both VT-8 and the TBF ) ; Marine Scout-Bombing Squadron 241 ( VMSB-241 ) , consisting of 11 SB2U-3s and 16 SBDs , plus four USAAF B-26s of the 18th Reconnaissance and 69th Bomb Squadrons armed with torpedoes , and 15 B-17s of the 31st , 72nd , and 431st Bomb Squadrons .

These included six Grumman Avengers from the 's VT-8 ( Midway was the first combat mission for the VT-8 airmen , and it was the first combat of the TBF ) , Marine Scout-Bombing Squadron 241 ( VMSB-241 ) , consisting of eleven SB2U-3s and sixteen SBDs , plus four USAAF B-26s , armed with torpedoes , and fifteen B-17s .

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The Japanese repelled these attacks , losing three fighters while destroying five TBFs , two SB2Us , eight SBDs , and two B-26s .

The Japanese fought off these attacks . <SEP> The US lost two fighters , five TBFs , two SB2Us , eight SBDs and two B-26s .

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In accordance with Japanese carrier doctrine at the time , Admiral Nagumo had kept half of his aircraft in reserve .

Admiral Nagumo had kept half of his aircraft in reserve .

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These comprised two squadrons each of dive bombers and torpedo bombers .

These were two squadrons of dive bombers and torpedo bombers .

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At 07:15 , Nagumo ordered his reserve planes to be re-armed with contact-fused general-purpose bombs for use against land targets .

At 07:15 Nagumo ordered his reserve planes to be re-armed with bombs for use against land targets .

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Re-arming had been underway for about 30 minutes when , at 07:40 , the delayed scout plane from " Tone " signaled that it had sighted a sizable American naval force to the east , but neglected to describe its composition .

At 07:40 a scout plane from " Tone " saw a big American naval force to the east .

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Later evidence suggests Nagumo did not receive the sighting report until 08:00 .

It seems that Nagumo did not receive the report until 08:00 .

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Another 20 – 40 minutes elapsed before " Tone "'s scout finally radioed the presence of a single carrier in the American force .

Nagumo reversed his order , but it took 40 minutes before " Tone "'s scout finally radioed that there was a carrier in the American force .

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This was one of the carriers from Task Force 16 .

This was one of the carriers from TF 16 ; the other carrier was not sighted . <SEP> Neither of the carriers of Spruance 's Task Force 16 was damaged .

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" Hiryu ̄ " , the sole surviving Japanese aircraft carrier , wasted little time in counterattacking .

" Hiryu ̄ " , the sole surviving Japanese aircraft carrier attacked .

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" Hiryu ̄ " 's first attack wave , consisting of 18 D3As and six fighter escorts , followed the retreating American aircraft and attacked the first carrier they encountered , " Yorktown " , hitting her with three bombs , which blew a hole in the deck , snuffed out all but one of her boilers , and destroyed one anti-aircraft mount .

" Hiryu ̄ " 's first attack consisted of 18 dive bombers and six fighter escorts . <SEP> They followed the retreating American aircraft and attacked the " Yorktown " , hitting her with three bombs , which blew a hole in the deck , put out her boilers , and destroyed several anti-aircraft guns .

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Damage control parties were able to temporarily patch the flight deck and restore power to several boilers within an hour , giving her a speed of 19 kn and enabling her to resume air operations .

Despite the damage , repair teams were able to fix the flight deck and fix several boilers in an hour .

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Thirteen Japanese dive bombers and three escorting fighters were lost in this attack ( two escorting fighters turned back early after they were damaged attacking some of " Enterprise " 's SBDs returning from their attack on the Japanese carriers ) .

Twelve Japanese dive bombers and four escorting fighters were lost in this attack .

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They attacked , crippling " Yorktown " with two torpedoes ; she lost all power and developed a 23-degree list to port .

In the attack , " Yorktown " was struck by two torpedoes ; she lost all power and developed a tilt to port , which put her out of action .

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The damage also forced Admiral Fletcher to move his command staff to the heavy cruiser .

Admiral Fletcher moved his command staff to the heavy cruiser .

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Nagumo was now in a quandary .

Nagumo was now unsure of what to do .

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Rear Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi , leading Carrier Division 2 ( " Hiryu ̄ " and " So ̄ ryu ̄ " ) , recommended that Nagumo strike immediately with the forces at hand : 18 Aichi D3A1 dive bombers each on " So ̄ ryu ̄ " and " Hiryu ̄ " , and half the ready cover patrol aircraft .

Rear Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi recommended that Nagumo strike with the forces at hand : 18 Aichi D3A dive bombers each on " So ̄ ryu ̄ " and " Hiryu ̄ " , and half the cover patrol aircraft .

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Nagumo 's opportunity to hit the American ships was now limited by the imminent return of his Midway strike force .

Nagumo 's opportunity to hit the American ships , however , was now limited .

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The returning strike force needed to land promptly or it would have to ditch into the sea .

The Midway strike force would be returning shortly and needed to land or crash into the sea .

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Because of the constant flight deck activity associated with combat air patrol operations during the preceding hour , the Japanese never had an opportunity to position ( " spot " ) their reserve planes on the flight deck for launch .

Because of the constant flight deck activity , the Japanese did not get their reserve planes on the flight deck for launch .

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The few aircraft on the Japanese flight decks at the time of the attack were either defensive fighters or , in the case of " So ̄ ryu ̄ " , fighters being spotted to augment the combat air patrol .

The few aircraft that were ready were defensive Fighter aircraft .

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Spotting his flight decks and launching aircraft would have required at least 30 minutes .

Launching aircraft would have required at least 30 to 45 minutes .

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Furthermore , by spotting and launching immediately , Nagumo would be committing some of his reserve to battle without proper anti-ship armament , and likely without fighter escort ; indeed , he had just witnessed how easily unescorted American bombers had been shot down .

By launching right away , Nagumo would be using some of his reserve without proper anti-ship weapons . <SEP> He had just seen how easily unescorted American bombers had been shot down .

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Japanese carrier doctrine preferred the launching of fully constituted strikes rather than piecemeal attacks .

Japanese carrier rules preferred full strikes , and since Nagumo did not know the American force included a carrier , his response followed Japanese rules .

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In addition , the arrival of another land-based American air strike at 07:53 gave weight to the need to attack the island again .

In addition , the arrival of another American air strike at 07:53 made Nagumo want to attack the island again .

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In the end , Nagumo decided to wait for his first strike force to land , then launch the reserve , which would by then be properly armed with torpedoes .

Nagumo decided to wait for his first strike force to land , then launch the reserve , which would by then be armed and ready .

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In the final analysis , it made no difference ; Fletcher 's carriers had launched their planes beginning at 07:00 ( with " Enterprise " and " Hornet " having completed launching by 07:55 , but " Yorktown " not until 09:08 ) , so the aircraft that would deliver the crushing blow were already on their way .

Fletcher 's carriers had launched their planes beginning at 07:00 , so the aircraft that attacked Nagumo were already on their way .

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By chance , at the same time VT-3 was sighted by the Japanese , three squadrons of SBDs from " Enterprise " and " Yorktown " were approaching from the southwest and northeast .

Three squadrons of SBDs from " Enterprise " and " Yorktown " ( VB-6 , VS-6 and VB-3 , respectively ) were approaching from the southwest and northeast .

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The two squadrons from " Enterprise " ( VB-6 and VS-6 ) were running low on fuel because of the time spent looking for the enemy .

The two squadrons from " Enterprise " were running low on fuel because of the time spent looking for the enemy .

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Air Group Commander C. Wade McClusky , Jr. decided to continue the search , and by good fortune spotted the wake of the Japanese destroyer , steaming at full speed to rejoin Nagumo 's carriers after having unsuccessfully depth-charged U.S. submarine , which had unsuccessfully attacked the battleship .

However , the squadron commander decided to continue the search . <SEP> It was moving to rejoin Nagumo 's carriers after having unsuccessfully depth-charged U.S. submarine .

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Some bombers were lost from fuel exhaustion before the attack commenced .

Some bombers were lost from lack of fuel before the attack started .

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Late in the afternoon , a " Yorktown " scout aircraft located " Hiryu ̄ " , prompting " Enterprise " to launch a final strike of 24 dive bombers ( including six SBDs from VS-6 , four SBDs from VB-6 , and 14 SBDs from " Yorktown "'s VB-3 ) .

Late in the afternoon , a " Yorktown " scout aircraft located " Hiryu ̄ " . <SEP> " Enterprise " launched a strike of dive bombers ( including 10 SBDs from " Yorktown " ) .

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Despite " Hiryu ̄ " being defended by a strong cover of more than a dozen Zero fighters , the attack by " Enterprise " and orphaned " Yorktown " aircraft launched from " Enterprise " was successful : four bombs ( possibly five ) hit " Hiryu ̄ " , leaving her ablaze and unable to operate aircraft .

Despite " Hiryu ̄ " being defended by more than a dozen Zero fighters , the attack by " Enterprise " was successful : four , possibly five bombs hit " Hiryu ̄ " , leaving her on fire and unable to operate aircraft .

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" Hornet " 's strike , launched late because of a communications error , concentrated on the remaining escort ships , but failed to score any hits .

( " Hornet "'s strike aimed at the escort ships but it did not get any hits . )

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After futile attempts at controlling the blaze , most of the crew remaining on " Hiryu ̄ " were evacuated and the remainder of the fleet continued sailing northeast in an attempt to intercept the American carriers .

After hopeless attempts to control the fire , most of the crew remaining on " Hiryu ̄ " were taken off the ship . <SEP> The rest of the fleet continued sailing northeast to catch the American carriers .

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Despite a scuttling attempt by a Japanese destroyer that hit her with a torpedo and then departed quickly , " Hiryu ̄ " stayed afloat for several more hours .

" Hiryu ̄ " stayed afloat for several more hours .

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She was discovered early the next morning by an aircraft from the escort carrier , prompting hopes she could be saved , or at least towed back to Japan .

She was discovered by an aircraft from the light carrier " Ho ̄ sho ̄ " . <SEP> This led to hopes she could be saved or towed back to Japan .

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Soon after being spotted , " Hiryu ̄ " sank .

However , soon after being spotted , " Hiryu ̄ " sank .

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Rear Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi , together with the ship 's captain , Tomeo Kaku , chose to go down with the ship , costing Japan perhaps its best carrier officer .

Rear Admiral Yamaguchi chose to go down with his ship , costing Japan her best carrier officer .

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As darkness fell , both sides took stock and made tentative plans for continuing the action .

As darkness fell , both sides thought about the situation and made plans for action .

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Spruance knew the United States had won a great victory , but he was still unsure of what Japanese forces remained and was determined to safeguard both Midway and his carriers .

Spruance knew the United States had won a great victory , but he was still unsure of what Japanese forces remained . <SEP> He wanted to protect Midway and his carriers .

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To aid his aviators , who had launched at extreme range , he had continued to close with Nagumo during the day and persisted as night fell .

He followed Nagumo during the day and continued to follow as night fell .

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Finally , fearing a possible night encounter with Japanese surface forces , and believing Yamamoto still intended to invade , based in part on a misleading contact report from the submarine , Spruance changed course and withdrew to the east , turning back west towards the enemy at midnight .

Finally , fearing a possible night battle with Japanese ships and believing Yamamoto still intended to invade , Spruance pulled back to the east . <SEP> He turned back west towards the enemy at midnight .

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For his part , Yamamoto initially decided to continue the engagement and sent his remaining surface forces searching eastward for the American carriers .

Yamamoto decided to continue the attacks and sent his remaining ships searching eastward for the American carriers .

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Simultaneously , he detached a cruiser raiding force to bombard the island .

He also sent a cruiser raiding force to bomb the island .

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The Japanese surface forces failed to make contact with the Americans because Spruance had decided to briefly withdraw eastward , and Yamamoto ordered a general withdrawal to the west .

The Japanese ships failed to make contact with the Americans due to Spruance 's decision to pull back eastward , and Yamamoto ordered a withdrawal to the west .

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One B-26 , after being seriously damaged by anti-aircraft fire , made a suicide run on " Akagi " .

One B-26 , after being seriously damaged by anti-aircraft fire , dove straight toward the " Akagi " .

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Making no attempt to pull out of its run , the aircraft narrowly missed crashing directly into the carrier 's bridge , which could have killed Nagumo and his command staff .

The plane just missed the carrier 's bridge , which could have killed Nagumo and his command staff .

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This experience may well have contributed to Nagumo 's determination to launch another attack on Midway , in direct violation of Yamamoto 's order to keep the reserve strike force armed for anti-ship operations .

This may have made Nagumo decide to launch another attack on Midway , against Yamamoto 's order to keep the reserve force for anti-ship operations .

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Within six minutes , " So ̄ ryu ̄ " and " Kaga " were ablaze from stem to stern , as fires spread through the ships .

Within six minutes , " So ̄ ryu ̄ " and " Kaga " were on fire .

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All three carriers remained temporarily afloat , as none had suffered damage below the waterline , other than the rudder damage to " Akagi " caused by the near miss close astern .

" Akagi " was also seriously damaged .

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Despite initial hopes that " Akagi " could be saved or at least towed back to Japan , all three carriers were eventually abandoned and scuttled .

The Japanese hoped that " Akagi " could be saved or towed back to Japan . <SEP> Eventually , all three carriers were eventually abandoned and sunk .

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Over the following two days , several strikes were launched against the stragglers , first from Midway , then from Spruance 's carriers .

Over the following two days , first Midway and then Spruance 's carriers launched several attacks .

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" Mikuma " was eventually sunk by Dauntlesses , while " Mogami " survived further severe damage to return home for repairs .

" Mikuma " was sunk by Dauntlesses , while " Mogami " survived damage and returned home for repairs .

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The destroyers and were also bombed and strafed during the last of these attacks .

The destroyers " Arashio " and " Asashio " were also bombed and machine-gunned during the last of these attacks .

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The Battle of Midway has often been called " the turning point of the Pacific " .

The Battle of Midway has been called " the turning point of the Pacific " .

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Although the Japanese continued to try to secure more territory , and the U.S. did not move from a state of naval parity to one of supremacy until after several more months of hard combat , Midway allowed the Allies to switch to the strategic initiative , paving the way for the landings on Guadalcanal and the prolonged attrition of the Solomon Islands campaign .

However , even after Midway , the Japanese continued to try to get more territory in the South Pacific . <SEP> The U.S. did not become the more powerful navy until after several more months of hard combat .

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It was the Allies ' first major naval victory against the Japanese , won despite the Japanese Navy having more forces and experience than its American counterpart .

Midway was the Allies ' first major victory against the Japanese .

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Midway allowed this to occur before the first of the new " Essex " -class fleet carriers became available at the end of 1942 .

Finally , Midway bought the United States time until the first of the new Essex-class fleet carriers became available at the end of 1942 .

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Some authors have stated that heavy losses in carriers and veteran aircrews at Midway permanently weakened the Imperial Japanese Navy .

Some authors have stated heavy losses in carriers and veteran aircrews at Midway permanently weakened the Imperial Japanese Navy .

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Parshall and Tully have stated that the heavy losses in veteran aircrew ( 110 , just under 25 % of the aircrew embarked on the four carriers ) were not crippling to the Japanese naval air corps as a whole ; the Japanese navy had 2,000 carrier-qualified aircrew at the start of the Pacific war .

Parshall and Tully , however , have stated that the losses in veteran aircrew , while heavy ( 110 , just under 25 % of the aircrew embarked on the four carriers ) , were not as bad for the Japanese naval air-corps as a whole . <SEP> The Japanese navy had 2,000 carrier-qualified aircrew at the start of the Pacific war .

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A few months after Midway , the JNAF sustained similar casualty rates in the Battle of the Eastern Solomons and Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands , and it was these battles , combined with the constant attrition of veterans during the Solomons campaign , which were the catalyst for the sharp downward spiral in operational capability .

A few months after Midway , the JNAF sustained similar casualty rates at both the Battle of the Eastern Solomons and Battle of Santa Cruz . <SEP> It was these battles , combined with the constant death of veterans during the Solomons campaign , which weakened Japan .

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The loss of four large fleet carriers and over 40 % of the carriers ' highly trained aircraft mechanics and technicians , plus the essential flight-deck crews and armorers , and the loss of organizational knowledge embodied in such highly trained crews , were still heavy blows to the Japanese carrier fleet .

However , the loss of four large fleet carriers , and over 40 % of the carriers ' aircraft mechanics and technicians , plus the flight-deck crews were very damaging to the Japanese carrier fleet .

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After the battle , " Sho ̄ kaku " and " Zuikaku " were the only large carriers of the original Pearl Harbor strike force still afloat .

After the battle and were the only large carriers of the original Pearl Harbor strike-force left for offensive actions .

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Of Japan 's other carriers , " Taiho ̄ " , which was not commissioned until early 1944 , would be the only fleet carrier worth teaming with " Sho ̄ kaku " and " Zuikaku " ; and were light carriers , while and , although technically classified as fleet carriers , were second-rate ships of comparatively limited effectiveness .

Of Japan 's other carriers , was the only Fleet carrier that could be used with " Sho ̄ kaku " and " Zuikaku " , while , , and , were second-rate ships .

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By the time of the Battle of the Philippine Sea in June 1944 , the Japanese had nearly rebuilt their carrier forces in terms of numbers , but their planes , many of which were obsolete , were largely flown by inexperienced and poorly trained pilots .

By the time of the Battle of the Philippine Sea , while the Japanese had somewhat rebuilt their carrier forces , the planes were flown by inexperienced pilots .

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By 1942 the United States was already three years into a shipbuilding program mandated by the Second Vinson Act of 1938 .

By 1942 the United States was already three years into a shipbuilding plan which aimed make the navy larger than Japan 's .

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Troup County is a county located in the west central portion of the U.S. state of Georgia .

Troup County is a county in the U.S. state of Georgia .

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As of the census of 2000 , there were 58,779 people , 21,920 households , and 15,607 families residing in the county .

As of 2000 , 58,779 people lived there . <SEP> As of the 2000 census , there were 58,779 people , 21,920 households , and 15,607 families residing in the county .

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1.71 % of the population were Hispanic or Latino of any race .

1.71 % of the people were Hispanic or Latino of any race .

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There were 21,920 households out of which 34.60 % had children under the age of 18 living with them , 49.10 % were married couples living together , 17.90 % had a female householder with no husband present , and 28.80 % were non-families .

There were 21,920 households . <SEP> Of these , 34.60 % had children under the age of 18 living with them , 49.10 % were married couples living together , 17.90 % had a female householder with no husband present , and 28.80 % were non-families .

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Adrienne Levine ( June 24 , 1966 – November 1 , 2006 ) , better known by the stage name Adrienne Shelly ( sometimes credited as Adrienne Shelley ) , was an American actress , film director and screenwriter .

Adrienne Shelly ( also known as Adrienne Levine ; June 24 , 1966 – November 1 , 2006 ) was an American actress , movie director and screenwriter .

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