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3-81 | 89 | Chapter 5
Sustainment
Sustainment is the provision of logistics, financial management, personnel services,
and health service support necessary to maintain operations until successful mission
completion. (ADP 4-0). Sustainment provides freedom of action, extends operational reach,
and prolongs endurance to unified land operations. It is essential to retaining and exploiting
the initiative. Sustainment provides the support necessary to maintain operations until
mission accomplishment. MEB commanders use their assets to maintain the
momentum of operations and enhance the capabilities of their forces. This chapter
discusses sustainment of the MEB.
PLANNING
5-1. The sustainment warfighting function is defined as the related tasks and systems that provide support
and services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance (see ADP 3-0).
Sustainment encompasses the elements of logistics, personnel services, financial management, and HSS
required for mission accomplishment. Logistics is planning and executing the movement and support of
forces. The elements of logistics include maintenance, transportation, supply, field services, distribution,
operational contract support, and general engineering. The Army HSS is support and services performed,
provided, and arranged by the Army Medicine to promote, improve, conserve, or restore the behavioral and
physical well-being of personnel by providing direct patient care that includes medical treatment (organic
and area support) and hospitalization, medical evacuation (to include medical regulating), and medical
logistics (to include blood management). Personnel services include human resources (HR) support, legal
support, religious support, and band support. Financial management encompasses finance operations and
resource management.
5-2. This chapter discusses how the MEB sustains itself. The MEB is a unique organization that can expand
to employ a wide range of capabilities, each with their own sustainment needs. Operational planners must
ensure that MEB sustainment planning is conducted as early as possible and continue to monitor as the
mission changes to effectively sustain the MEB throughout the operation. Because the MEB no longer has a
BSB, the MEB S-4 must work with the higher echelon headquarters and the sustainment command
headquarters to conduct METT-TC analysis to ensure that the MEB has the required sustainment support to
ensure mission success.
5-3. The MEB staff synchronizes operations across all six warfighting functions to generate and maintain
combat power. It plans tactical logistics. The MEB S-4, S-1, brigade surgeon, and chaplain are the principal
sustainment planners for the MEB. The S-4 is the principal sustainment executer. Logistics synchronization
for the brigade is done between the primary staff sections and S-4. The MEB commander designates who
will oversee logistics synchronization for the brigade. The MEB commander may elect to use the deputy
commanding officers, the XO, or the brigade S-4 to oversee logistics synchronization for the brigade. The
MEB obtains the logistics preparation of the theater information and products from the supporting
sustainment brigade and the higher echelon headquarters concept of operations and integrates this with their
IPB. The S-4 and S-1 maintain a continuous sustainment estimate during all operations. They use the logistics
estimate to determine sustainment capabilities, anticipate support requirements, identify and resolve
shortfalls, and develop support plans. They integrate into all planning what is needed to develop and
synchronize sustainment with maneuver and fire plans. Sustainment commanders and planners must
thoroughly understand the mission, tactical plans, and the MEB commander’s intent. |
3-81 | 90 | Chapter 5
5-4. The MEB must know the—
* Mission, task organization, and concept of operations for all subordinate battalions and
attachments under MEB control.
* Higher headquarters sustainment plans.
* Known and anticipated branch plans and sequels.
* Density of personnel and equipment of each subordinate unit.
* Known and anticipated enemy situation and capabilities.
* Capabilities and limitations of subordinate units.
* Host-nation support and contract capabilities.
* Size and capabilities of local population civil infrastructure.
* Capacity and capability of local government and nongovernmental agencies.
* Cultural considerations in the MEB AO.
5-5. The MEB does not necessarily need to establish a brigade support area. Given the MEB mission, it
will typically be collocated with a support battalion providing general support to the MEB and other units in
the support area. MEB operations may require split-based sustainment operations. The S-4 may conduct
replenishment operations within the MEB support AO or within the AO of a unit that the MEB is supporting.
5-6. Logistics planners must understand the MEB current and projected sustainment capabilities. They use
information collected from personnel and logistics reports and operational reports to determine the personnel,
equipment, and supply status of each unit within the MEB. They consider the disposition and condition of all
supporting sustainment units and individual unit-level capabilities. They analyze this data and the current
situation to determine the MEB logistical capabilities and limitations.
5-7. Sustainment planners must anticipate and understand support requirements of a tactical plan or COA.
Running estimates are a critical tool for achieving shared understanding. The S-1, surgeon, and S-4 analyze
all COAs and modifications to current plans. They assess their sustainment feasibility, identify support
requirements, and determine requirements for synchronization. The S-1 and S-4, like the commander, must
visualize how the operation will unfold to determine critical requirements for each sustainment element. They
consider the requirements for each sustainment element during all phases of an operation. They analyze each
COA and consider the—
* Type and duration of the operation.
* Task organization, tasks, and sustainment requirements of subordinate forces.
* Medical and maintenance profile of units to be assigned or attached.
* Ramifications of tactical operations such as gap (river) crossings, tactical pauses, long movements,
preparatory fires, or defenses.
* Need for special equipment, supplies, or service.
* Requirements to separate, disassemble, configure, uncrate, or trans-load supplies above normal
requirements.
* Requirements for reconstitution.
* Required varieties and quantities of all classes of supplies (especially Class III, V, VIII, and IX).
* Requirements for support of reconnaissance forces, security operations, or deception efforts.
* Need for Class IV/V obstacle material.
* Positioning of combat trains and other supporting logistics elements.
* Casualty numbers and likely locations.
* Large-scale decontamination operations in support of BCTs or consequence management
decontamination operations.
* Area damage control preparations and response.
* Minimal essential stability tasks to support the operation. |
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5-8. The S-4’s analysis also includes estimated attrition based on likely outcomes of subordinate missions.
Analysis of estimated attrition primarily focuses on critical systems. The S-1, in coordination with the
surgeon, assists by projecting potential personnel losses (through development of the casualty estimate). To
perform this analysis, current unit personnel and equipment densities, standard planning factors, operations
logistics software, and historical data are used in conjunction with the operations logistics plan. When
analyzing COAs, this projection helps the commander understand the potential losses and associated risks of
each COA.
5-9. To understand the MEB capabilities and determine support requirements, logistics planners apply a
METT-TC analysis to the operation. Table 5-1 gives an example of general sustainment considerations for
tactical operations.
Table 5-1. Logistics considerations for tactical operations
MEB mission and commander’s intent.
Concept of operations.
Higher headquarters mission and concept of operations.
Mission Higher headquarter concept of support.
Type and duration of operation.
Required supply rate.
Controlled supply rate.
Enemy capabilities and tactics that could threaten sustainment operations.
Enemy Enemy unconventional tactics that could threaten sustainment operations.
Anticipated amount of detainees.
MEB task organization to include supporting logistics units.
Location and condition of all units, including sustainment units.
Current and projected status of personnel, equipment, and classes of
Troops
supply.
Availability and status of services.
Unit level sustainment capabilities.
Effects of weather and terrain on sustainment operations.
Terrain and Weather Additional sustainment requirements of the MEB due to weather and terrain.
Condition of infrastructure such as roads and bridges.
Impact on the ability to build-up supplies and replenish units.
Time Available Planning and preparation time for sustainment units.
Impacts of time on support requirements and distribution methods.
Host nation support and contract services.
Impact of civilian and refugee movements.
Civil Considerations Potential for hostile reactions by civilians against sustainment operations.
Potential detainee or resettlement requirements.
Provision of minimum essential stability tasks.
Legend:
MEB maneuver enhancement brigade
5-10. The S-4, in coordination with the surgeon, S-1, and all elements of the MEB staff, must balance support
requirements and priorities with available sustainment capabilities. They consider existing stockage,
anticipated receipts, capacities, and capabilities. They must assess the status of all sustainment functions
(logistics, personnel services, financial management, and HSS) required to support the MEB and compare them
to available capabilities. They identify potential shortfalls then take or recommend actions to eliminate or
reduce their effect on the operation. |
3-81 | 92 | Chapter 5
5-11. When a sustainment shortfall is identified, the sustainment planners take every available action to
eliminate or reduce its effect. They must understand its potential impact on the force, the risk it presents to
mission accomplishment, its duration, and which requirement exceeded the unit capabilities. They analyze
the shortfall to determine its cause, such as battle losses, supply availability, resource availability (equipment,
man-hours), or distribution shortfall. They consider the following actions to resolve a shortfall:
* Shifting supplies or assets by phase of the operation.
* Requesting support or additional assets from higher headquarters.
* Using alternative distribution methods.
* Considering the use of host-nation support.
* Considering pre-positioning supplies or attaching additional sustainment capabilities to
subordinate forces.
* Modifying the COA or plan.
5-12. Based on the logistics estimate, the sustainment planners develop support plans. The overall
sustainment plan is briefly described in the concept of support. The concept of support provides all
commanders and staffs a general understanding of the commander’s priorities and how the operation will be
logistically supported. Detailed sustainment plans are outlined in Annex F (Sustainment) to the MEB
OPORD or as part of a fragmentary order. The S-4 and executive officer closely monitor the implementation
of the sustainment plan. They adjust sustainment operations or shift resources to account for changing
situations or changes in priorities (such as shifting the main effort) or to replace lost sustainment capabilities.
5-13. The MEB staff plans for the sustainment of a frequently changing task organization with augmentation
from other unified action partners. Attachments to the MEB should arrive with their appropriate sustainment
capability. When a company, team, or detachment is attached to the MEB, the S-4 integrates their sustainment
into the MEB support system. The attachment orders must clearly state who will provide medical,
maintenance, and recovery services and provide support for Class III, V, and IX supplies. When receiving
attachments, sustainment planners require some basic information from the sending unit S-4 to anticipate
how to develop a synchronized concept of support. When the unit is detached, the MEB assists forwarding
any on-hand supplies or equipment to the gaining unit. Some considerations include the following:
* The number and type of vehicles, personnel by specialty, and weapons systems and their current
status.
* Organic medical and maintenance capabilities.
* When the attachment is effective and for how long.
* What support assets are coming with each attachment to the MEB.
* When and where linkup will occur, and who is responsible for linkup.
LOGISTICS ELEMENTS
5-14. Logistics is primarily the responsibility of the MEB S-4 and is provided primarily by the MEB organic
HSC or requested through the support battalion providing sustainment to the support area. Logistics elements
include maintenance, transportation, supply, field services, distribution, operational contract support, and
general engineering. General engineering is primarily planned by the S-3 staff and is not discussed in this
chapter. Field services will be discussed further and include mortuary affairs, shower and laundry capabilities,
field feeding, and water purification. Operational contract support is discussed in greater detail because much
of this information is new or emerging doctrine.
Maintenance
5-15. How maintenance is accomplished in the MEB is dependent on the individual unit capabilities. Most
units, either organic or attached to the MEB, have some organic field maintenance capabilities. The HSC
maintenance support platoon provides field maintenance for organic MEB units and supplemental field
maintenance support to other units attached as required. If the echelon of maintenance required is outside the
MEB capability, the MEB S-4 section will coordinate with the echelon sustainment brigade for support. |
3-81 | 93 | Sustainment
Note. Planners need to coordinate for TCF maintenance support to accompany the unit when
assigned to a MEB. The MEB does not have maintainers with the proper skills or tools to support
main weapons systems (tanks, armored personnel carriers, or Stryker vehicles).
Transportation
5-16. The MEB HSC and signal company have 100 percent mobility of their TOE equipment and supplies
in a single lift using organic equipment. If MEB assigned and attached units require additional lift support,
they will request it through channels to the MEB S-4.
Supply
5-17. Supply is the process by which required materials and equipment are made available to supported units
to help them accomplish the mission. This process includes all classes of supply, to include Class VIII. MEB
resupply to subordinate elements is coordinated through the S-4 sections. Supplies are provided through the
distribution processes established below.
Field Services
5-18. Field services maintain combat strength of the force by providing for its basic needs and promoting its
health, welfare, morale, and endurance. Field services provide life support functions. ATP 4-42 has additional
information on field services. Field services include—
* Shower and laundry. There is no organic laundry or shower capability in the MEB. Support must
be coordinated by S-4 with the sustainment brigade in general support of the MEB.
* Field feeding. With the exception of a TCF, units typically assigned to a MEB do not have organic
field feeding support. The MEB S-4 will need to coordinate field feeding support and Class I
supplies with the supporting sustainment command.
* Water. The MEB has limited organic capability to produce, store, and transport purified water to
meet the MEB support requirements. The MEB S-4 will coordinate with the support sustainment
brigade or command for water support requirements.
* Mortuary affairs. The MEB is dependent on its supported command for processing and
evacuating remains. Internal to the MEB, handling teams are predesignated at the unit level. It is
the unit responsibility to evacuate remains to the mortuary affairs collection point.
* Medical. The MEB is dependent on the Medical Brigade (Support) for all AHS support above
Role 1 medical treatment.
Distribution
5-19. Distribution is the primary means to prolong endurance. Distribution is the operational process of
synchronizing all elements of the logistic system to deliver the “right things” to the “right place” at the “right
time” to support the geographic combatant commander (JP 4-0). The MEB is typically co-located with the
division sustainment brigade or division sustainment support battalion. The MEB S-4 will coordinate with
the supporting sustainment unit for Class I, II, III, IIIP, IV, V, VII, and IX supplies and with the Medical
Brigade for Class VIII supplies.
5-20. There are two standard methods of supply conducted in an operational environment: supply point
distribution and unit distribution. The MEB can use either method when supplying subordinate units.
* Supply point distribution. Supply point distribution requires the supported unit to move to a
supply point to pick up supplies. The supply point issues materiel to the supported unit that
transports their supplies back to the unit with organic transportation. Supply points include supply
support activities for all supply classes.
* Unit distribution. When unit distribution is used, the supported unit receives supplies in its area.
The logistics release point, established by the supported unit, may be any place on the ground
where unit vehicles pickup supplies and then take them forward to their unit. |
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5-21. Normally the MEB uses the supply point distribution method from the supporting sustainment brigade
or a combat sustainment support battalion. If the MEB S-4 determines that the unit distribution method is
required, it coordinates with the supporting sustainment unit to distribute among all the bases in the base
cluster, METT-TC-dependent, or those MEB subordinate units would travel to an established supply
distribution point to pick up supplies. The MEB would not establish supply points for its subordinate units
unless a high degree of control was required. See ATP 4-42 for additional information on the two methods
of supply for an operational environment.
Operational Contract Support
5-22. The Army has consolidated its theater support contracting capabilities into separate table of
organization and equipment units. These units include the contracting support brigades and contracting
battalions. Operational contract support is the process of planning for and obtaining supplies, services, and
construction from commercial sources in support of combatant commander-directed operations. The
contracting support brigade and its subordinate unit primary missions include—
* Providing theater support contracting capabilities to deployed ARFOR and to other military forces,
governmental agencies, and/or nongovernmental agencies, as directed.
* Assisting theater Army and ARFOR staffs in developing operational contract support plans (annex
W of the OPLAN). These plans will include mission-specific contracting and contractor-specific
integration, synchronization, and management information.
* Coordinating the execution of planned theater support contracts and coordination with the
supporting Army field support battalion.
5-23. The contracting support brigades are regionally aligned to a specific theater Army. When deployed,
the contracting support brigade has a direct support relationship with the ARFOR commander in the
operational area and executes its contracting mission under the direction and contracting authority of the
Army contracting command. The ARFOR commander may further delegate this direct support relationship
per METT-TC factors. Theater support contracting actions in support to the MEB will be executed in a
general support manner.
5-24. Contracting is a key source of support for deployed armed forces in unified land operations. Because
of the importance and unique challenges of operational contract support, the MEB commander and staff need
to fully understand their role in planning and managing contracted support in the AO. Current doctrine
describes three broad types of contracted support—theater support, external support, and systems support.
* Theater support contracts. Theater support contracts are contracts awarded by contingency
contracting officers deployed to the operational area. They provide the ability to rapidly contract
for logistics support within a theater of operations. Theater-support contractors acquire goods,
services, and minor construction support, usually from local commercial sources, to meet the
immediate needs of operational commanders. Theater support contracts are the type of contract
typically associated with contingency contracting. MEBs often require activity for theater support
contract support actions related to both internal and external missions. Theater support contracts
in support of MEB missions are normally executed on a regionally aligned basis.
* External support contracts. External support contracts provide a variety of mission support to
deployed forces. External support contracts may be prearranged contracts or contracts awarded
during the contingency itself to support the mission and may include a mix of U.S. citizens, third
country nationals, and local national subcontractor employees. The largest and most commonly
used external support contract is logistics civil augmentation program. This Army program is
commonly used to provide life support, transportation support, and other supporting functions to
deployed ARFOR and other elements of the joint force. In most operations, the MEB is a
supported unit, but not the requiring activity when it comes to logistics civil augmentation program
support.
* Systems support contracts. Systems support contracts are prearranged contracts awarded by and
funded by acquisition program executive officers and project/product management officers. These
contracts provide technical support, maintenance support and, in some cases, Class IX support for
a variety of nontype classified and selected other Army weapon and support systems. System
contractors, made up of U.S. citizens, provide support in garrison, and may deploy with the force |
3-81 | 95 | Sustainment
to both training and real-world operations. They may provide either temporary support during the
initial fielding of a system, called interim contracted support, or long-term support for selected
materiel systems, often referred to as contractor logistic support. The MEB does not normally play
a significant role in planning or coordinating system support contracts, other than coordinating
and executing support of system-support-contract-related personnel.
5-25. For the MEB, the major challenge is ensuring that operational contract support actions are properly
incorporated and synchronized with the overall MEB support effort. The MEB S-4 and resource management
staff will be trained on their roles in the operational contract support planning and execution process as
described below:
* Contract management. The MEB will nominate a contracting officer representative (sometimes
referred to as contract officer technical representative) for every service contract, and a receiving
official for all supply contracts. Quality contracting officer representative (approved by the
supporting contracting office) and receiving official support is key to ensuring that contractors
provide the service or item according to the contract. The MEB must also manage funding for
each contract and request funds in advance of the depletion of current funds, or all contract work
will stop until adequate funds are available.
* Contract close out. The MEB is responsible for completing receiving reports, certifying that
contracted goods or services were received by the Army, and submitting the receiving report to
the contracting officer so the contract can be closed out and the contractor paid. For more
information on operational contract support, see ATP 4-10.
PERSONNEL SERVICES
5-26. Personnel services complement logistics by planning for and coordinating efforts that provide and
sustain personnel. Personnel services are an integral part of unit readiness. The MEB S-1 is the staff officer
responsible for personnel services. MEB capabilities include HR support, financial management, legal
support, and religious support.
Human Resources Support Section
5-27. HR support is an important component of sustainment. The MEB S-1 is responsible for providing or
coordinating the operational and tactical level HR support that sustains the combat potential of the force and
the morale and welfare of Soldiers. HR support is also found at the sustainment brigade level on a general
support or an area basis. They provide HR companies, which can provide planning and coordination for HR
operations, and liaison and technical support to their customers and supported units.
5-28. The MEB S-1 section serves as a conduit between subordinate units and the higher echelon HR
organization. Because of distances and communications capabilities, all reports are submitted through the
MEB S-1 for forwarding to the appropriate agency. Initial personnel data is submitted by subordinate and
attached units of the MEB by using digital technology. The MEB S-1 also provides information to
subordinate units on the status of evacuated/hospitalized personnel and adjusts personnel requirements
accordingly.
5-29. HR support includes personnel accountability, strength reporting, personnel information management,
personnel readiness management, casualty operations management, essential personnel services, personnel
support, postal operations, and morale welfare and recreation and community support.
Personnel Accountability
5-30. The brigade S-1 is responsible for coordinating and managing personnel accountability in the MEB.
Personnel accountability is the process for recording by-name data on Soldiers when they arrive at, and depart
from, the command.
Strength Reporting
5-31. Replacement companies under command and control of replacement battalions at theater or corps level
receive, support, and process replacements. They coordinate movement with the appropriate movement |
3-81 | 96 | Chapter 5
control element. The division replacement section coordinates with the assistant chief of staff, logistics and
higher headquarters transportation officer for movement to the brigade support area. The MEB S-1 processes
and assigns replacements to battalions. The battalion S-1 further assigns replacements to the company level.
Personnel Information Management
5-32. Personnel information management encompasses the collection, processing, storage, display, and
dissemination of information about Soldiers, units, and civilians. Personnel information management is
controlled by the brigade S-1 through the battalion S-1s within the command.
Personnel Readiness Management
5-33. The purpose of the personnel readiness management system is to distribute Soldiers to units based on
documented requirements or authorizations to maximize mission preparedness and provide the manpower
needed. Personnel accounting is the system for recording by-name data on Soldiers when they arrive at, and
depart from, units when their duty status changes (such as from duty to hospital) and when their grade
changes. Strength reporting is a numerical end product of the accounting process. It starts with
strength-related transactions submitted at unit level and ends with a database update through all echelons to
the Total Army Personnel Database. Personnel readiness managers, casualty managers, and replacement
managers utilize a personnel information database when performing their missions.
Casualty Operations Management
5-34. The casualty reporting system is a by-name personnel accounting system that begins at unit level with
the person who knows that a casualty has occurred. DA Form 1156, Casualty Feeder Card, is forwarded as
soon as possible. Reports are prepared using the Army Casualty Information Processing System–Light and
are sent directly to Headquarters, Department of the Army (DA), with copies furnished to other higher
headquarters, as appropriate. The medical section or the medical support company (area support) provides
the disposition log daily to the MEB S-1.
Essential Personnel Services
5-35. Essential personnel operations are coordinated with subordinate commands and higher command
assistant chief of staff, personnel (G-1). This includes providing the MEB with timely and accurate personnel
services that efficiently update Soldier status, readiness, and quality of life. This allows commanders to
effectively manage the force, including actions supporting individual career advancement and development,
proper identification documents for security and benefits entitlements, and recognition of achievements and
service (see FM 4-0).
Personnel Support
5-36. Personnel support encompasses command interest/human interest programs, and retention functions.
Personnel support also includes substance abuse and prevention programs, enhances unit cohesion, and
sustains the morale of the force (FM 4-0).
Postal Operations
5-37. The brigade S-1 is responsible for coordinating and providing postal operations support with
subordinate units of the brigade. The MEB has no dedicated postal support capability and must perform this
function with on-hand assets. The Military Postal Service serves as an extension of the United States Postal
Service; therefore, services are regulated by public law and federal regulation. Postal operation requires
significant logistics and planning for transportation and mail handling (see FM 4-0).
Morale, Welfare, and Recreation
5-38. The brigade S-1 coordinates morale, welfare, and recreation support with subordinate commands in
the MEB. This includes providing Soldiers and other authorized personnel with recreation and fitness
activities, goods, and services. |
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Financial Management
5-39. The MEB has no special financial management capability. The MEB S-3 coordinates for support from
mobile financial management teams. Financial management organizations provide support to MEB units and
individual Soldiers on an area basis. During deployments, mobile teams from corps-level financial
management organizations provide support to forward units. Financial management support units are also
found at the sustainment brigade level on a general support or an area basis. They provide financial
management services, to include paying and preparing certified vouchers, receiving collections, establishing
financial management control processes, tracking commitments and obligations, providing vendor support
and accounting, and establishing disbursing station numbers and a local depository.
Legal Support
5-40. The brigade legal section provides and supervises legal support to MEB leaders. The brigade legal
section provides and coordinates all legal support for the MEB. Paralegal Soldiers in the MEB and
subordinate battalions provide paraprofessional and ministerial support for legal actions. The United States
Army Trial Judiciary and United States Army Trial Defense Service are independent organizations that
provide military judge and trial defense services to the MEB.
Religious Support
5-41. The MEB chaplain is the personnel staff officer responsible for implementing the commander’s
religious support program. The religious support mission is to assist commanders in the responsibility to
provide for the free exercise of religion and to provide religious, moral, and ethical leadership to sustain a
ready force of resilient and ethical Soldiers and leaders. UMTs and chaplain sections, comprised of at least
one chaplain and one religious affairs specialist, possess three core competencies: nurture the living, care for
the wounded, and honor the dead. The religious support mission is executed through two required
capabilities—providing support and advising the command. For additional information on religious support,
see ATP 1-05.3, ATP 1-05.4, and FM 1-05.
HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT SECTION
5-42. HSS encompasses all support and services performed, provided, and arranged by the AHS to promote,
improve, conserve, or restore the behavioral and physical well-being of Army personnel and, as directed,
unified action partners. HSS includes the following—
* Medical treatment (organic and area support).
* Hospitalization.
* Medical evacuation (including medical regulating).
* Medical logistics (including blood management).
5-43. The MEB surgeon’s duties and responsibilities for HSS and FHP may include—
* Advising the commander on the health of the MEB units.
* Planning and coordinating for health services support and FHP for MEB units (including but not
limited to medical treatment, medical logistics, medical evacuation, hospitalization, veterinary
services, dental services, combat and operational stress control, operational public health, and
laboratory services).
* Developing and coordinating the AHS OPLANs to support the MEB commander’s decisions,
planning guidance, and intent in support of unified land operations.
* Recommending task organization of medical units/elements in support to MEB units to satisfy all
medical mission requirements.
* Monitoring troop strength of medical personnel and their utilization.
* Evaluating and interpreting medical statistical data.
* Monitoring medical logistics and blood management operations in the theater.
* Monitoring medical regulating and patient tracking operations for MEB personnel. |
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* Determining MEB training requirements for first aid and for maintaining wellness of the
command.
* Recommending disposition instructions for captured enemy medical supplies and equipment.
* Submitting to the supporting medical brigade (support) and higher headquarters surgeon.
* Coordinating and synchronizing—
Health education and combat lifesaver training for the MEB.
The mass casualty plan developed by the S-3.
Medical care of detainees and civilians in the MEB operations area.
The treatment of sick, injured, or wounded Soldiers.
* Performing medical evacuation, including the use of both of the Army’s dedicated medical
evacuation platforms (air and ground).
* Coordinating medical logistics, including Class VIII resupply, blood management, and medical
maintenance.
* Creating health-related reports and battlefield statistics.
* Collecting and analyzing operational data for on-the-spot adjustments in the medical support
structure and for use in post operations combat and materiel development studies.
Brigade Surgeon Section
5-44. The brigade surgeon section assists the surgeon with the responsibilities listed above. The brigade
surgeon section monitors and tracks operations with medical communications for combat casualty care for
applicable automated systems and provides updated information to the surgeon and the SPO chief for building
HSS and FHP capabilities to meet the MEB medical requirements identified by the surgeon. Other functions
include—
* Planning for the AHS support for the MEB units.
* Identifying and coordinating through the division surgeon section and as authorized directly with
medical brigade elements to support the requirements of the MEB.
* Coordinating and managing medical evacuation and treatment capabilities.
* Coordinating and managing Class VIII resupply capabilities and ensuring that medical support is
integrated and synchronized with the MEB operational support plan.
5-45. The brigade surgeon section is normally staffed with medical operations officers and a medical
operations noncommissioned officer. The primary function of this brigade surgeon section is medical
planning to ensure that adequate AHS support is available and provided in a timely and efficient manner for
the MEB and its attached units. This brigade surgeon section coordinates with the division surgeon section
and, as authorized, with the medical brigade for the placement and support requirements of medical units and
elements located in the MEB operations area.
5-46. The medical treatment team is assigned to the brigade surgeon section and supports the MEB
headquarters. The team provides Role 1 AHS support for MEB headquarters personnel. The medical
treatment leader is a physician assistant and works under the supervision of the MEB surgeon.
Medical Evacuation
5-47. Medical evacuation provides en route care and emergency medical care. En route medical care
enhances the Soldier’s prognosis, reduces long-term disability, and provides a vital linkage between the roles
of care necessary to sustain the patient during transport. Most units assigned/attached to the MEB have
organic ground evacuation capability. The MEB sustainment medical operations officer should coordinate
medical evacuation for those units assigned or attached to the MEB that does not have an organic evacuation
capability. |
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Medical Logistics
5-48. The MEB surgeon coordinates medical logistics support with both the supported higher echelon
surgeon and the EAB medical brigade providing general support to the AO. This includes planning and
executing all Class VIII supply support, contract support, medical hazardous waste disposal, and distribution
of medical gases.
Force Health Protection
5-49. The MEB surgeon’s duties and responsibilities for FHP may include—
* Identifying potential medical-related commander’s critical information requirements (PIR and
friendly force information requirements) as they pertain to the health threat, ensuring that they are
incorporated into the command’s intelligence requirements.
* Coordinating for veterinary support for food safety, animal care, and veterinary services, to
include zoonotic diseases transmissible to man.
* Planning for and implementing FHP operations to counter health threats.
* Planning for and accomplishing redeployment and post deployment health assessments.
* Establishing and executing a medical surveillance program.
* Establishing and executing an occupational and environmental health surveillance program.
* Recommending combat and operational stress control, behavioral health, and substance abuse
control programs.
* Ensuring that general threat, health threat, and medical intelligence considerations are integrated
into AHS support OPLANs and orders.
* Advising MEB commanders on FHP CBRN defensive actions, such as immunizations, use of
chemoprophylaxis, pretreatments, and barrier creams.
* Maintaining situational understanding by coordinating for current FHP information with surgeon
staffs of the next higher, adjacent, and subordinate headquarters.
* Coordinating and synchronizing:
Combat and operational stress control programs with the division surgeon section and
supporting medical brigade.
Operational public health services, to include identification of health threats.
Preventive dentistry support programs for the prevention of cavities and gum disease.
Support of area medical laboratories, to include the identification of biological and chemical
environmental hazards, as required.
5-50. Preventive medicine personnel provide operational public health support for the identification of
endemic and emerging diseases and for employment of the countermeasures required to address health threats
in the brigade area. Effective and timely FHP measures are essential for sustaining combat power during
continuous operations. The MEB first line of protection is the use of operational public health measures and
unit field sanitation teams to protect against food, water, and vector-borne diseases and environmental
injuries. Coordination with supporting veterinary teams is also required for food safety and quality assurance
surveillance and for assisting in foodborne and zoonotic disease surveillance and control. For additional
support, MEB subordinate units coordinate through their medical treatment team or the brigade surgeon
section for operational public health preventive medicine. Personnel from the medical brigade (support)
provide operational public health provide advice and consultation in the areas of disease and nonbattle injury,
environmental sanitation, epidemiology, entomology, medical surveillance, limited sanitary engineering
services, and pest management.
5-51. The mental health section provides training and advice in the control of stressors and the promotion of
positive combat and operational stress behaviors. The mental health element provides early identification,
handling, and management of misconduct stress behavior. The section also assists and counsels personnel
with personal, behavioral, or psychological problems and may refer suspected neuropsychiatric cases for
evaluation. These programs are designed to maximize the return-to-duty rate by identifying combat stress
reactions and providing rest/restoration within or near the Soldier’s unit area. See FM 4-02 for additional
information. |
3-81 | 101 | Appendix A
Synchronize and Coordinate Protection
The support area commander synchronizes, integrates, and organizes protection
capabilities and resources to protect the force, preserve combat power, reduce risk, and
mitigate identified vulnerabilities throughout the support area. Criticality,
vulnerability, and recoverability are some of the most significant considerations in
determining protection priorities. Although all military assets are important and all
resources have value, the capabilities they represent are not equal in their contribution
to overall mission accomplishment. Determining and directing protection priorities
may involve the most important decisions the support area commander makes and their
staffs support.
PROTECTION
A-1. Protection is the preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and
nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or
outside the boundaries of a given operational area (JP 3-0). Protection serves as a warfighting function and
as a continuous and enduring activity. It integrates all protection capabilities to secure routes, prevent
casualties, and protect forces.
A-2. Protection is not linear–planning, preparing, executing, and assessing protection is continuous and
enduring. Protection preserves capability, momentum, and tempo. Protection is an important contributor to
operational reach and closely relates to endurance and momentum. It also contributes to the commander’s
ability to extend operations in time and space. Commanders and staffs synchronize, integrate, and organize
capabilities and resources throughout the operations process to preserve combat power, enable freedom of
action, and prevent or mitigate the effects of threats and hazards.
A-3. The principles of protection provide Army leaders and staffs with a context for implementing
protection efforts, developing schemes of protection, and allocating resources (see ADP 3-37 for additional
information on the protection principles):
* Comprehensive.
* Integrated.
* Layered.
* Redundant.
* Enduring.
PROTECTION WARFIGHTING FUNCTION
A-4. The protection warfighting function refers to the related tasks and systems that preserve the force so
the commander can apply maximum combat power to accomplish the mission (ADP 3-0). Preserving the
force includes protecting personnel (combatants and noncombatants), systems, and physical assets of the
United States and unified action partners. The protection warfighting function enables commanders to
preserve force integrity and combat power by integrating protection capabilities to safeguard friendly forces,
civilians, and infrastructure. Commanders incorporate protection when they understand and visualize
capabilities available for protection. Some of these actions or effects may be generated through the combined
integration of the eight elements of combat power, resulting in an increasingly effective and efficient scheme
of protection. |
3-81 | 102 | Appendix A
A-5. Military operations are inherently complex. Commanders must deliberately plan and integrate the
ethical application of military force against an enemy while protecting the force and preserving combat
power. Commanders develop protection strategies for each phase or transition of an operation. They integrate
and synchronize protection tasks and systems to reduce risk, mitigate identified vulnerabilities, and act on
opportunity.
PROTECTION TASKS
A-6. Army operations and missions are executed through tactical tasks. The support area commander and
staff incorporate protection tasks when they understand and visualize available protection capabilities.
Protection tasks enable the designated support area land owner to preserve the force, safeguard bases/base
camps, and secure routes throughout the support area. When properly integrated and synchronized, the tasks
and systems that comprise the protection warfighting function increase the probability of mission success.
A-7. The support area commander and their staff must consider all protection tasks and systems and apply
them as appropriate. Each task and its associated system are typically associated with a staff or staff
proponent that performs specific duties. The protection warfighting function tasks—
* Conduct survivability operations. Survivability is a quality or capability of military forces which
permits them to avoid or withstand hostile actions or environmental conditions while retaining the
ability to fulfill their primary mission (ATP 3-37.34). Survivability operations enhance the ability
to avoid or withstand hostile actions by altering the physical environment (see ATP 3-37.34 for
additional information on survivability). They accomplish this by providing or improving
camouflage, cover, and concealment via the following four tasks:
Constructing fighting positions.
Constructing protective positions.
Hardening facilities.
Employing camouflage, cover, concealment, and movement.
* Provide FHP. The Army FHP consists of measures that promote, improve, or conserve the
behavioral and physical well-being of Soldiers comprised of preventive and treatment aspects of
medical functions that include: combat and operational stress control, dental services, veterinary
services, operational public health, and laboratory services. This enables a healthy and fit force,
prevents injury and illness, and protects the force from health hazards. Its mission is under the
protection warfighting function. Successful FHP measures require deliberate and consistent
analysis and communication of health threats to inform commanders and individuals; they also
require the implementation and enforcement of unit and individual countermeasures (to include
exposure controls, chemoprophylaxis, and immunizations against diseases both endemic and those
used as warfare agents) needed to reduce associated health risks. Commanders and unit leaders
must remain informed and proactively engaged to ensure the health of the force; reduce health
threats, stressors, and risks; and promote all available countermeasures. See FM 4-02 for
additional information on FHP.
* Conduct CBRN operations. CBRN operations include the employment of tactical capabilities
that anticipate and counter the entire range of CBRN threats and hazards (see FM 3-11 for
additional information). The activities to implement protection include the following:
Understand the environment.
Conduct CBRN information collection through reconnaissance and surveillance.
Conduct CBRN defense.
Cooperate with and support partners.
Establish CBRN response efforts to minimize the effects of a CBRN incident.
* Provide EOD and force protection support. EOD is a key asset in the protection of military and
civilian personnel, critical assets, infrastructure, and public safety. EOD units provide support
through the supporting EOD headquarters across the range of military operations by detecting,
locating, identifying, diagnosing, rendering safe, exploiting, and disposing of all explosive
ordnance, improvised explosive devices, and weapons of mass destruction. See ATP 4-32.1 and
ATP 4-32.3 for additional information on EOD. |
3-81 | 103 | Synchronize and Coordinate Protection
* Coordinate AMD. AMD protects the force from manned and unmanned aerial attacks and enemy
aerial surveillance. Coordinating AMD support protects friendly forces from the effects of
threatening ballistic missiles; cruise missiles; and fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and unmanned aircraft
systems. It enables the freedom of action commanders to require synchronized maneuver and
protects critical capabilities from interdiction. See FM 3-01 for additional information on AMD.
* Conduct personnel recovery. Army personnel recovery refers to the military efforts taken to
prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel (FM 3-50). Personnel
recovery is the overarching term for operations that focus on recovering isolated personnel before
captivity. See FM 3-50 for additional information on personnel recovery.
* Conduct detention operations. Detention involves the detainment of a population or group that
poses some level of threat to military operations. Detention operations are conducted by military
police to shelter, sustain, guard, protect, and account for populations (detainees or U.S. military
prisoners [U.S. military personnel ordered to confinement]) as a result of military or civil conflict
or to facilitate criminal prosecution. Detention operations are essential to setting the conditions for
consolidation of gains during large-scale combat. They lessen enemy capability to prolong a
conflict through protracted resistance by irregular forces. See FM 3-63 for additional information
detention operations.
* Conduct risk management. Risk management is the process to identify, assess, and control risks
and make decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits (JP 3-0). The Army uses risk
management to help maintain combat power while ensuring mission accomplishment during
current and future operations. It is the Army process for helping organizations and individuals
make informed decisions to reduce or offset risk. Risk management applies to operations and to
nonoperational activities. Using this process increases operational effectiveness and the
probability of mission accomplishment. It is a systematic way of identifying hazards, assessing
them, and managing the associated risks. Commanders, staffs, Army leaders, Soldiers, and DA
Civilians integrate risk management into planning, preparing, executing, and assessing operations.
See ATP 5-19 for additional information on risk management.
* Implement physical security procedures. Physical security consists of physical measures that
are designed to safeguard personnel and to prevent unauthorized access to equipment,
installations, material, and documents and safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage,
theft, and terrorism. The Army employs physical security measures in depth to protect personnel,
information, and critical resources in all locations and situations against various threats through
effective security policies and procedures. See ATP 3-39.32 for additional information on physical
security.
* Apply AT measures. AT consists of proactive defensive measures used to deter, detect, delay,
deny, and defend individuals and property against terrorist acts. These measures include limited
response and containment by security forces. AT measures are required to be incorporated into all
military operations. See ATP 3-37.2 for additional information on AT.
* Conduct police operations. Police operations encompass policing and the associated law
enforcement activities to control and protect populations and resources and to facilitate the
existence of a lawful and orderly environment. Police operations and the associated skills and
capabilities inherent in that function provide the fundamental basis on which all other military
police disciplines are framed and conducted. See ATP 3-39.10 for additional information on police
operations.
* Conduct populace and resources control. The function of populace and resources control is
conducted in conjunction with, and as an integral part of, all military operations. Populace and
resources control functions consist of two distinct, yet linked, components: populace control and
resources control. These controls are normally the responsibility of indigenous civil governments.
Combatant commanders define and enforce these controls during large-scale combat,
consolidation of gains, and times of civil or military emergency. See ATP 3-39.30 and
ATP 3-57.10 for additional information on populace and resources control. |
3-81 | 104 | Appendix A
* Area security. Area security is a type of security operation conducted to protect friendly forces,
installations, routes, and actions within a specific area (ADP 3-90). Area security may be the
predominant method of protecting the support areas that are necessary to facilitate the positioning,
employment, and protection of resources required to sustain, enable, and control forces. Area
security often focuses on the following activities:
Tactical AA security.
Base/base camp defense.
Critical asset security.
Node protection.
High-risk personnel security.
Movement corridors.
Response force operations.
LOC security.
Checkpoints and combat outposts.
Convoy security.
Port area and pier security.
Area damage control.
* Conduct cyberspace and security defense. The Army secures and defends the network through
a defense-in-depth approach, incorporating layered security and defenses. The tasks to secure and
defend cyberspace are perform cybersecurity activities and conduct defensive cyberspace
operations–internal defensive measures. See FM 3-12 for more information for cyberspace
planning considerations.
* Conduct electromagnetic protection actions. Many Army capabilities, including
communications, cyberspace operations, information collection, space capabilities, target
detection, and precision guided munitions, depend on assured access to the electromagnetic
spectrum. The tasks to protect Army access to the electromagnetic spectrum are conduct electronic
protection actions, conduct defensive electronic attack, and conduct electromagnetic spectrum
management.
* Conduct OPSEC. Operations security is a capability that identifies and controls critical
information, indicators of friendly force actions attendant to military operations, and incorporates
countermeasures to reduce the risk of an adversary exploiting vulnerabilities (JP 3-13.3). Effective
and disciplined OPSEC is employed during decisive action. Units routinely employ OPSEC
measures to reduce, eliminate, and conceal essential elements of friendly information. Units use
directional antennas and terrain masking to conceal tactical communication signatures and reduce
detection by enemy direction-finding capabilities. This helps to prevent enemy or adversary
reconnaissance and other information collection capabilities from gaining an advantage because
the threat has knowledge of identifiable or observable unit-specific information. For additional
information on OPSEC for division and below, see ATP 3-13.3.
PROTECTION SUPPORT TO ARMY OPERATIONS
A-8. Protection emphasizes the importance of planning and expanding protection priorities, to include
protecting mission partners, civilian populations, equipment, resources, infrastructure, and cultural
landmarks across the range of military operations. The synchronization, integration, and organization of
protection capabilities and resources to preserve combat power from the effects of threats and hazards are
essential. When properly integrated and synchronized, the tasks and systems that relate to protection
effectively protect the force, preserve combat power, and increase the probability of mission success.
A-9. Operations to shape include unit home station activities, including maintaining operational readiness,
training, and contingency planning. Combined exercises and training, military exchange programs, and
foreign military member attendance at Army schools are examples of home station shaping activities. At
home stations, protection tasks maintain safe and secure environments that enable commanders to generate |
3-81 | 105 | Synchronize and Coordinate Protection
and preserve combat power during training and deployment tasks that are associated with Army sustainable
readiness requirements that are in support of unified land operations.
A-10. Army protection capabilities support operations to prevent or deter interference during mobilization
and prevent or mitigate attacks during the transit of ARFOR and cargo, along movement routes, and at initial
staging areas and subsequent AAs where uncertain threat conditions require a delicate balance between
protection and building combat power.
A-11. At the division level and higher, the integration of the protection warfighting function and tasks is
conducted by a designated protection cell and the chief of protection. At brigade level and below, the
integration occurs more informally with the designation of a protection coordinator from the brigade staff or
as an integrating staff function assigned to a senior leader. The protection coordinators participate in various
forums to facilitate the continuous integration of protection tasks into the operations process. This occurs
through protection working groups, staff planning teams, and staffs conducting integrating processes.
A-12. During large-scale combat, commanders and staffs deliberately plan and integrate protection
capabilities to protect the force, preserve combat power, reduce risk, mitigate identified vulnerabilities, and
act on opportunity. Figure A-1 shows the integration and synchronization of protection tasks in support of a
gap crossing, movement corridor, and support area. Commanders also develop a scheme of protection for the
transition of each phase of an operation or major activity. Transitions mark a change of focus between phases
or between the ongoing operation and execution of a branch or sequel. Shifting protection priorities between
offensive, defensive, and stability tasks also involves a transition. Transitions require planning and
preparation well before their execution so that a force can maintain the momentum and tempo of operations.
A force is vulnerable during transitions. Commanders and staffs also identify potential threats and hazards
during planning and identify protection priorities during the transition and follow-on operations.
Figure A-1. Protection in support of large-scale combat operations |
3-81 | 106 | Appendix A
Legend:
AMD air missle defense
BSA brigade support area
CBRN chemical, biological, radilogical, and nuclear
CIV civilian
CSC convoy support center
DET detention
DSA division support area
EOD explosive ordnance disposal
EW electronic warfare
FHP force health protection
OPSEC operations security
PL phase line
PRC populace and resources control
SUST sustainment
TCP traffic control post
Figure A-1. Protection in support of large-scale combat operations (continued)
A-13. As ARFOR transition from large-scale combat to the consolidation of gains, the focus transitions to
area security and stability tasks. Army operations to consolidate gains correspond with stabilize and enable
civil authority phases of a joint operation. Commanders continuously consider the synchronization,
integration, and organization of protection capabilities necessary to consolidate gains and achieve the desired
end state. Consolidate gains activities include the relocation of displaced civilians, detainee operations, the
reestablishment of law and order, providing humanitarian assistance, and the restoration and protection of
critical infrastructure
ASSESSMENTS
A-14. Initial protection planning requires various assessments to establish protection priorities. Assessments
include threats, hazards, vulnerability, and criticality. These assessments are used to determine which assets
can be protected given no constraints, and which assets can be protected with available resources. There are
seldom sufficient resources to simultaneously provide all assets the same level of protection. For this reason,
the support area commander makes decisions on acceptable risks and provides guidance to the staff so that
they can employ protection capabilities based on the protection priorities.
A-15. Protection planning is a continuous process that must include an understanding of the threats and
hazards that may impact operations from the deep area back to the strategic support area. Protection
capabilities are aligned to protect critical assets and mitigate effects from threats and hazards. The protection
cell and protection working group must prioritize the protection of critical assets during operations to shape,
operations to prevent, large-scale combat, and during the consolidation of gains that best supports the
commander’s end state.
A-16. An important aspect of protection planning involves the support area. If conditions in the support area
degrade, it is detrimental to the success of operations. A degraded support area also inhibits the ability to
shape the deep area for the BCTs involved in close operations. Therefore, the protection of support areas
requires planning considerations equal to those in the close areas.
THREAT AND HAZARD ASSESSMENT
A-17. Personnel from all staff sections and warfighting functions help conduct threat and hazard analysis.
This analysis comprises a thorough, in-depth compilation and examination of information and intelligence
that address potential threats and hazards in the AO. The integrating processes (IPB, targeting, and risk
management) provide an avenue to obtain the threats and hazards that are reviewed and refined. Threat and
hazard assessments are continuously reviewed and updated as the operational environment changes.
A-18. Considerations for the threat and hazard assessment include—
* Enemy and adversary threats.
Operational capabilities.
Intentions.
Activities. |
3-81 | 107 | Synchronize and Coordinate Protection
* Foreign intelligence entities (see ATP 2-22.2-1 and ATP 2-22.2-2).
* Criminal activities.
* Civil disturbances.
* Health and safety hazards.
* CBRN toxic industrial materials.
* Cyberspace threats.
* Other relevant aspects of the operational environment.
* Urban environments.
* Incident reporting and feedback points of contact.
A-19. The threat and hazard assessment results in a comprehensive list of threats and hazards and determines
the likelihood or probability of occurrence of each threat and hazard. Table 1-1, page 1-2, shows examples
of potential threats and hazards in an AO. In the context of assessing risk, the higher the probability or
likelihood of a threat or hazard occurring, the higher the risk of asset loss.
CRITICALITY ASSESSMENT
A-20. A criticality assessment identifies key assets that are required to accomplish a mission. It addresses the
impact of a temporary or permanent loss of key assets or the unit ability to conduct a mission. A criticality
assessment should also include high-population facilities (recreational centers, theaters, sports venues) that
may not be mission-essential. It examines the costs of recovery and reconstitution, including time, expense,
capability, and infrastructure support. The staff gauges how quickly a lost capability can be replaced before
providing an accurate status to the commander. The general sequence for a criticality assessment is—
* Step 1. List the key assets and capabilities.
* Step 2. Determine if critical functions or combat power can be substantially duplicated with other
elements of the command or an external resource.
* Step 3. Determine the time required to substantially duplicate key assets and capabilities in the
event of temporary or permanent loss.
* Step 4. Set priorities for the response to threats toward personnel, physical assets, and information.
A-21. The protection cell staff and working group continuously update criticality assessments during the
operations process. As the staff develops or modifies a friendly COA, information collection efforts confirm
or deny information requirements. As the mission or threat changes, initial criticality assessments may also
change, increasing or decreasing the subsequent force vulnerability. The protection cell members monitor
and evaluate these changes and begin coordination among the staff to implement modifications to the
protection concept or recommend new protection priorities. PIR, running estimates, MOEs, and MOPs are
continually updated and adjusted to reflect the current and anticipated risks associated with the operational
environment.
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
A-22. A vulnerability assessment is an evaluation (assessment) to determine the magnitude of a threat or
hazards effect on an installation, personnel, a unit, an exercise, a port, a ship, a residence, a facility, or other
site. It identifies the areas of improvement required to withstand, mitigate, or deter acts of violence or
terrorism or attacks against threats. The staff addresses who or what is vulnerable and how it is vulnerable
against threats. The vulnerability assessment identifies physical characteristics or procedures that render
critical assets, areas, infrastructures, or special events vulnerable to known or potential threats and hazards.
The general sequence of a vulnerability assessment is—
* Step 1. List assets and capabilities and the threats against them.
* Step 2. Determine the common criteria for assessing vulnerabilities.
* Step 3. Evaluate the vulnerability of assets and capabilities.
A-23. Vulnerability evaluation criteria may include the degree to which an asset may be disrupted, quantity
of the asset available (if replacement is required due to loss), dispersion (geographic proximity), and key
physical characteristics. |
3-81 | 108 | Appendix A
A-24. DOD has created several decision support tools to perform criticality assessments in support of the
vulnerability assessment process, including mission, symbolism, history, accessibility, recognizability,
population, and proximity (MSHARPP) and criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, and
recognizability (CARVER) (see ATP 3-37.2 for more information on MSHARPP and CARVER)—
* MSHARPP. The purpose of the MSHARPP tool is to analyze likely terrorist targets and assess
their vulnerabilities from the inside out, with focus on the U.S. military mission. Consideration is
given to local threats, the probable means of attacks, and variables that affect dispositions of
potential targets. After developing a list of potential targets, MSHARPP selection factors are used
to assist in further refining the assessment by associating a weapon or tactic with a potential target
to determine the efficiency, effectiveness, and plausibility of the attack method and to identify
vulnerabilities related to the target. When the MSHARPP values for each target or component are
assigned, the sum of the values indicates the highest-value target (for a particular mode of attack)
within the limits of enemy known capabilities. See ATP 3-37.2 for additional information on the
MSHARPP tool.
* CARVER. The CARVER matrix is a valuable tool in determining criticality and vulnerability.
For criticality purposes, CARVER helps assessment teams and commanders (and the assets that
they are responsible for) determine assets that are more critical to the success of the mission. This
also helps determine which resources should be allocated to protect critical assets (personnel,
infrastructure, and information). The CARVER matrix assesses a potential target from a terrorist
perspective to identify what the enemy might perceive as a good (soft or valuable) target.
ESTABLISH PROTECTION PRIORITIES
A-25. Criticality, vulnerability, and recoverability are some of the most significant considerations in
determining protection priorities that become the subject of support area commanders’ guidance and the focus
of area security operations. The scheme of protection is based on the mission variables and should include
protection priorities by area, unit, activity, or resource.
A-26. Although all military assets are important and all resources have value, the capabilities they represent
are not equal in their contribution to decisive operations or overall mission accomplishment. Determining
and directing protection priorities may involve the most important decisions that commanders make and their
staffs support. There are seldom sufficient resources to simultaneously provide the same level of protection
to all assets.
A-27. Most prioritization methodologies assist in differentiating what is important from what is urgent. In
protection planning, the challenge is to differentiate between critical assets and important assets and to further
determine what protection is possible with available protection capabilities. Event-driven operations may be
short in duration, enabling a formidable protection posture for a short time; condition-driven operations may
be open-ended and long-term, requiring an enduring and sustainable scheme of protection. In either situation,
the support area commander provides guidance on prioritizing protection capabilities and categorizing
important assets.
PROTECTION PRIORITIZATION LIST
A-28. Protection prioritization lists are organized through the proper alignment of critical assets. The
commander’s priorities and intent and the impacts on mission planning determine critical assets. A critical
asset is a specific entity that is of such extraordinary importance that its incapacitation or destruction would
have a very serious, debilitating effect on the ability of a nation to continue to function effectively
(JP 3-26). Critical assets can be people, property, equipment, activities, operations, information, facilities, or
materials. For example, important communications facilities and utilities, analyzed through criticality
assessments, provide information to prioritize resources while reducing the potential application of resources
on lower-priority assets. Stationary weapons systems might be identified as critical to the execution of
military operations and, therefore, receive additional protection. The lack of a replacement may cause a
critical asset to become a top priority for protection.
A-29. The protection cell and working group use information derived from the support area commander’s
guidance, the IPB, targeting, risk management, warning orders, the critical asset list and defended asset list, |
3-81 | 109 | Synchronize and Coordinate Protection
and the mission analysis to identify critical assets. Critical assets at each command echelon must be
determined and prioritized.
A-30. Protection cells and working groups can develop criticality, vulnerability, and threat probability values
to help prioritize critical assets. Figure A-2 provides an example of how criticality, vulnerability, and threat
probability values can help determine risk. Table A-1 provides an example of a protection risk analysis table.
Figure A-2. Example criticality, vulnerability, and threat probability values
Table A-1. Example protection risk analysis table
T Risk Analysis Total
Asset C (1–4) V (1–3)
(1–5) C x V x T
Command post 4 2 4 32
Signal nodes 3 2 4 24
Movement corridor 2 2 4 16
Population center 2 3 2 12
Legend:
C criticality
T threat
V vulnerability
A-31. The protection prioritization list is a key protection product developed during initial assessments. The
protection cell and working group must use criticality, threat vulnerability, and threat probability to prioritize
identified critical assets. Once the protection working group determines which assets are critical for mission
success, it recommends protection priorities and establishes a protection prioritization list. It is continuously
assessed and revised throughout each phase or major activity of an operation:
* Criticality is the degree to which an asset is essential to accomplish the mission. It is determined
by assessing the impact that damage to, or destruction of, the asset will have on the success of the
operation. Damage to an asset may prevent, significantly delay, or have no impact on the success
of the plan.
Catastrophic. Complete mission failure or the inability to accomplish the mission, death or
total disability, the loss of major or mission-critical systems or equipment, major property or
facility damage, mission-critical security failure, or unacceptable collateral damage.
Critical. Severely degraded mission capability or unit readiness, total disability, partial
disability, temporary disability, extensive damage to equipment or systems, significant
damage environment, security failure, or significant collateral damage.
Marginal. Degraded mission capability or unit readiness; minor damage to equipment or
systems, property, or the environment; lost days due to injury or illness; or minor damage to
property or the environment. |
3-81 | 110 | Appendix A
Negligible. Little or no adverse impact on mission capability, first aid or minor medical
treatment, slight equipment or systems damage (remaining fully functional or serviceable), or
little or no property or environmental damage.
* Threat vulnerability measures the ability of a threat to damage the target (asset) using available
systems (people and material). Asset vulnerability is greater if a lower-level threat (Level I) can
create damage or destruction that would result in mission failure or severely degrade its mission
capability. If an asset can withstand a Level I or Level II threat, its vulnerability ability is less and
may not require additional protection assets, depending on asset criticality. The following
mitigating factors must be considered when assessing the vulnerability of a target: survivability
(the ability of the critical asset to avoid or withstand hostile actions by using camouflage, cover
[hardening], concealment, and deception), the ability to adequately defend against threats and
hazards, mobility and dispersion, and recoverability (which measures the time required for the
asset to be restored, considering the availability of resources, parts, expertise, manpower, and
redundancies).
Level I threat. Agents, saboteurs, sympathizers, terrorists, civil disturbances.
Level II threat. Small tactical units. Irregular forces may include significant standoff
weapons threats.
Level III threat. Large tactical force operations, including airborne, heliborne, amphibious,
infiltration, and major air operations.
* Threat probability assesses the probability that an asset will be targeted for surveillance or attack
by a credible/capable threat. Determinations of the intent and capability of the threat are key in
assessing the probability of attack.
Frequent. Occurs very often, known to happen regularly. Examples are surveillance, criminal
activities, cyberspace attacks, indirect fire, and small-arms fire.
Likely. Occurs several times, a common occurrence. Examples are explosive booby
traps/improvised explosive devices, ambushes, and bombings.
Occasional. Occurs sporadically, but is not uncommon. Examples are air-to-surface attacks
or insider threats, which may result in injury or death.
Seldom. Remotely possible, could occur at some time. Examples are the release of CBRN
hazards or the employment of weapons of mass destruction.
Unlikely. Presumably, the action will not occur, but it is not impossible. Examples are the
detonation of containerized ammunition during transport or the use of a dirty bomb.
A-32. The protection prioritization list helps Army commanders to identify or assess assets that require
protection prioritization within their assigned areas. Not all assets listed on the protection prioritization list
receive continuous protection. Some critical assets only receive protection assets based on available
resources. It is the responsibility of the protection working group to provide the assessment and recommended
protection prioritization list to the commander for approval (see table A-2). |
3-81 | 111 | Synchronize and Coordinate Protection
Table A-2. Example protection prioritization list
Legend:
ABCT armored brigade combat team
ADA air defense artillery
AMD air missile defense
BDE brigade
BN battalion
BTYS battery
CAV cavalry
CO company
CL class
DIV division
DIVARTY division artillery
DMAIN division main command post
FA field artillery
ENY enemy
EW electronic warfare
HIMARS high mobility artillery rocket system
IDF indigenous forces
IBCT infantry brigade combat team |
3-81 | 112 | Appendix A
Table A-2. Example protection prioritization list (continued)
Legend:
LOC lines of communication
MEB maneuver enhancement brigade
MLRS multiple launch rocket system
MP military police
MRBC multi-role bridge company
PL phase line
PLT platoon
PPL protection prioritization list
SEAD suppression of enemy air defense
SOF special operations forces
SQDN squadron
TACON tactical control
A-33. Changes to protection prioritization should be anticipated and assets reassessed as transitions occur
throughout operations or with changes to the commander’s priorities (see figure A-3).
Legend:
HIMARS high mobility artillery rocket system
LOC line of communications
MLRS multiple launch rocket system
MRBC multi-role bridge company
Figure A-3. Example of protection prioritization during transitions
SCHEME OF PROTECTION DEVELOPMENT
A-34. The scheme of protection describes how protection tasks support the commander’s intent and concept
of operations. It uses the commander’s guidance to establish the priorities of support to units for each phase
of the operation. A commander’s initial protection guidance may include protection priorities, civil
considerations, protection task considerations, potential protection decisive points, high-risk considerations,
and prudent risk. Figure A-4 provides an example of a scheme of protection. |
3-81 | 113 | Synchronize and Coordinate Protection
Legend:
OPORD operations order
ZULU time zone indicator for Universal Time
Figure A-4. Scheme of protection example
A-35. Planners receive guidance as commanders describe their visualization of the operational concept and
intent. This guidance generally focuses on the COA development by identifying decisive and supporting
efforts, massing effects, and stating priorities. Effective planning guidance provides a broad perspective of
the commander’s visualization, with the latitude to explore additional options.
A-36. The protection working group develops the scheme of protection after receiving guidance and
considering the principles of protection in relation to the mission variables, the incorporation of efforts, and
the protection required. The scheme of protection is based on the mission variables, thus it includes protection
priorities by area, unit, activity, or resource. It addresses how protection is applied and derived during all
phases of an operation. For example, the security for routes, bases/base camps, and critical infrastructure is
accomplished by applying protection assets in dedicated, fixed, or local security roles; or it may be derived
from economy-of-force protection measures, such as area security techniques. It also identifies areas and
conditions where forces may become fixed or static and unable to derive protection from their ability to
maneuver. These conditions, areas, or situations are anticipated and the associated risks are mitigated by
describing and planning for the use of response forces.
A-37. The protection working group considers the following items, at a minimum, as it develops the scheme
of protection:
* Protection priorities.
* Work priorities for survivability assets.
* AMD positioning guidance.
* Specific terrain and weather factors.
* Information focus and limitations for security efforts.
* Areas or events where risk is acceptable.
* Protected targets and areas.
* Civilians and noncombatants in the AO. |
3-81 | 114 | Appendix A
* Vehicle and equipment safety or security constraints.
* Personnel recovery actions and control measures.
* Force protection condition status.
* FHP measures.
* Mission-oriented protective posture guidance.
* Environmental guidance.
* Information environment guidance.
* Explosive ordnance and hazard guidance.
* Ordnance order of battle.
* OPSEC risk tolerance.
* Fratricide avoidance measures.
* Rules of engagement, standing rules for the use of force, and rules of interaction.
* Escalation of force and nonlethal weapons guidance.
* Operational scheme of maneuver.
* Military deception.
* Obscuration.
* Radiation exposure status.
* Contractors in the AO.
A-38. While each protection task and system has its own operational consideration, each must be
synchronized and integrated within the scheme of protection to ensure synergistic protection efforts. For
example, AMD without survivability is less effective. Area security without AT, OPSEC, and physical
security is also less effective. To ensure this synergy, the protection working group develops a scheme of
protection around which MOPs and MOEs can be monitored and evaluated. See FM 6-0 for additional
information on MOPs and MOEs.
A-39. Individuals are protected at the lowest level by awareness, personal protective equipment, an
understanding of the rules of engagement, and fratricide avoidance measures. By implementing additional
protection measures in the area surrounding an individual (fighting positions, vehicles, collective protection,
and FHP measures taken against accidents and disease), the force then provides a layering of protection.
Enhancing survivability measures, applying active and passive defense operations, and implementing AT
and physical security measures add to the next layer of a comprehensive, integrated, layered scheme of
protection. Implementing protection tasks and utilizing protection systems in a comprehensive, layered
scheme of protection preserve the protected priorities throughout the range of military operations in any
operational environment.
PROTECTION COORDINATOR
A-40. The protection coordinator works with the protection working group to integrate and synchronize
protection tasks and systems for each phase of an operation or major activity. The MEB commander
designates a senior staff officer to serve as the protection coordinator and to lead the protection working
group. The protection working group at a minimum should consist of (see ADP 3-37): CBRN personnel,
engineer personnel; personnel recovery; brigade surgeon; and provost marshal. The protection working group
coordinates with the signal staff section to further facilitate the information protection task.
A-41. While the planning cell develops plans, the protection working group attempts to minimize
vulnerability based on the developing COAs. The intent is to identify and recommend refinements to the
COAs that are necessary to reduce vulnerability and ensure mission success. The protection working group
provides vulnerability mitigation measures to help reduce risks associated with particular COAs and conducts
planning and oversight. Representatives from the protection working group may provide input to plans and
future operations, depending on the operational environment and the commander’s preference.
A-42. The protection working group membership does not require representatives from every functional
element of protection. However, dedicated members should coordinate with other personnel and special staff
elements as required. Primary members of the protection working group typically include the chief of |
3-81 | 115 | Synchronize and Coordinate Protection
protection coordinator, an ADA officer, a personnel recovery officer, a military police officer, a CBRN
officer, an EOD officer, an engineer officer, and an AT officer.
TASKS AND SYSTEMS INTEGRATION
A-43. Protection tasks integration throughout the operations process helps establish control measures against
potential threats and hazards (see figure A-5). The layering of protection tasks (some redundant) ensures a
comprehensive scheme of protection. The layered approach of protection provides strength and depth. Units
use their available capabilities to defend the protection priorities, and a layering of capabilities reduces the
destructive effect of threats and hazards.
Legend:
CCIR commander’s critical information requirement
OPSEC operations security
PPL protection prioritization list
Figure A-5. Integration of protection throughout the operations process
A-44. The protection working group ensures the integration of protection equities throughout the operations
process via integrating processes, continuing activities, the MDMP, working groups, planning sessions, and
coordination between warfighting functions. This develops and refines a scheme of protection and a
protection plan that are comprehensive, integrated, layered, redundant, and enduring. All members of the
protection working group provide input and conduct actions that have beneficial output, which develops the
scheme of protection and enhances the overall protection plan. The agenda, frequency, composition, input,
and expected output for the working group are determined by the lead protection working group officer based
on mission variables and MDMP integration. |
3-81 | 116 | Appendix A
INTEGRATING PROCESSES
A-45. The integrating processes of IPB, targeting, and risk management are essential in providing
assessments or key information to assessments. They are a vital part of integrating protection within the other
warfighting functions and throughout the operations process.
A-46. IPB is a systematic process of analyzing the mission variables of threat, terrain, weather, and civil
considerations in a specific area of interest to determine their effects on operations. By conducting the IPB,
commanders gain the information necessary to selectively apply and maximize operational effectiveness at
critical points in time and space.
A-47. The targeting process integrates commander guidance and priorities to determine which targets to
engage and how, when, and where to engage them to assign friendly capabilities to create the desired effect.
The staff then assigns friendly capabilities that are best suited to produce the desired effect on each target.
An important part of targeting is identifying possibilities for fratricide and collateral damage. Commanders
establish control measures, including the consideration for restraint, which are necessary to minimize the
chance of these events. The protection priorities must be integrated within the targeting process to achieve
the desired objectives while ensuring the preservation of combat power.
A-48. Risk management is the process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risks that arise from
operational factors and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits. Threat, hazard,
capability, vulnerability, and criticality assessments are utilized to evaluate the risk to the force, determine
the critical assets, ascertain available resources, and apply security or defensive measures to achieve
protection. Risk management helps commanders preserve lives and resources, avoid or mitigate unnecessary
risk, identify and implement feasible and effective control measures where specific standards do not exist,
and develop valid COAs. Risk management integration during operations process activities is the primary
responsibility of the unit protection officer or operations officer.
MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS
A-49. The military decisionmaking process is an iterative planning methodology to understand the situation
and mission, develop a course of action, and produce an operation plan or order (ADP 5-0). The MDMP
integrates the activities of the commander, staff, subordinate headquarters, and unified action partners to
understand the situation and mission; develop and compare COAs; decide on a COA that best accomplishes
the mission; and produce an OPLAN or order for execution. The MDMP helps leaders apply thoroughness,
clarity, sound judgment, logic, and professional knowledge to understand situations, develop options to solve
problems, and reach decisions. This process helps commanders, staffs, and others think critically and
creatively while planning. The MDMP results in an improved understanding of the situation and in a plan or
order that guides the force through preparation and execution.
A-50. Effective protection integration during operations depends on full integration into the MDMP and the
overall operations process. The protection working group provides input to the commander’s MDMP by
integrating the threat and hazard assessment with the commander’s essential elements of friendly information
and the protection prioritization list. See table A-3 for protection integration to MDMP. |
3-81 | 117 | Synchronize and Coordinate Protection
Table A-3. Protection integration to MDMP
Key Input Steps Protection Actions Protection Output Key Output
• Higher HQ plan or Step 1: • Consolidate protection-related • Protection working • Commander’s
order running estimates from staffs group initial guidance
Receipt of
• New mission Mission • Review consolidated protection • Warning and • Initial allocation of
anticipated by the array of assets reporting systems time
commander • Determine protection working • Protection running
group members estimate
• Ensure protection planner
integration within the unit
planning team
Warning
Order
• Higher HQ plan or Step 2: • Provide input on critical • Consolidated HVT • Problem
order networks or nodes that can be list statement
Mission
• Higher HQ Analysis influenced • RFIs • Mission
knowledge and • Identify requests for information • Initial assessments statement
pin rt oe dll uig ce tsnce • Determine available assets • Recommended • Initial
• Conduct and consolidate initial PPL commander’s
• Knowledge intent
p or ro gd au nc izt as t if oro nm s other OW ra dr en ri ng • a Cs os ne ds us cm t e pn rots tection working • ER Eec Fo Immended • Initial planning
guidance
• D dee vs eig lon p c eo dn )cept (if • Rgr eo cu op m mend and coordinate • I pn ri it oia ril t ip er sotection • Initial CCIRs and
EEFIs
information collection assets for • Input into
protection • Initial OPSEC
information
• Identify EEFI, and establish collection plan planning
guidance
how long it should be protected
(Condition of key units and • Updated IPB and
weapons systems) running estimates
• Determine OPSEC indicators • Assumptions
• Develop essential survivability
and other engineering tasks
• Identify available information
on routes and key facilities
• Analyze protection
considerations of civilians in
the AOs
• Determine available unified
action partner capabilities
• Determine funding sources, as
required
• Determine availability of
construction and other
engineering materials |
3-81 | 118 | Appendix A
Table A-3. Protection integration to MDMP (continued)
Key Input Steps Protection Actions Protection Output Key Output
• Mission statement Step 3: • Determine array of • Recommended • COA statements
• Initial • COA protection assets updates to PPL and sketches
commander’s Development • Integrate protection • Recommended • Tentative task
intent, planning tasks into COA updates to EEFIs organization
guidance, CCIRs, • Determine initial • Determine residual • Broad concept
and EEFIs
scheme of protection risk of operations
• Updated IPB and • Coordinate health • Develop initial • Revised
running estimates
support requirements OPSEC measure and planning
• Assumptions • Ensure that link countermeasures guidance
architecture meets • Initial scheme of • Updated
requirements and has protection assumptions
been allocated from
respective agents
• Recommend
appropriate level of
survivability effort for
each COA based on the
expected threat
• Determine alternate
construction location,
methods, means,
materials, and timelines
to give the commander
options
• Determine real-property
and real estate
requirements
• Identify indicators and
vulnerabilities
• Updated running Step 4: • Identify limitations and • Initial DAL • Refined COAs
estimates • COA Analysis shortfalls of protection • Refined EEFI • Potential
• Revised planning (War Game) tasks for each COA • Refined information decision points
guidance • Determine branches, collection plan • War-game
• COA statements s ue nq inu tee nls d, ed decision points, • Refine OPSEC results
and sketches consequences, and measures and • Initial
• Updated second- and third-order countermeasures assessment
assumptions effects • Initial risk measures
• Develop risk management and risk • Updated
management and tolerance decision assumptions
decision points for risk point matrix •
tolerance • Refined scheme of
• Develop MOE and MOP protection
• Updated running Step 5: • Compare economy-of- • Refined protection • Evaluated COAs
estimates • COA force and risk reduction priorities • Recommended
• Refined COAs Comparison measures • Refined PPL COAs
• Evaluation criteria • Refined EEFI • Updated running
• War-game results • Refined scheme of estimates
• Updated protection • Updated
assumptions
assumptions |
3-81 | 119 | Synchronize and Coordinate Protection
Table A-3. Protection integration to MDMP (continued)
Key Output Steps Protection Actions Protection Output Key Output
• Updated running Step 6: • Brief scheme of • Refined • Commander-
estimates protection protection selected COA and
COA Approval
• Evaluated COAs • Brief protection priorities modifications
• Recommended • Warning Order task specifics, as • Refined EEFI • Refined
COA required • Refined commander’s
intent, CCIRs, and
• Updated • Refined scheme EEFIs
assumptions of protection
• Updated
assumptions
• Commander- Step 7: • Refine and develop • Protection • Approved OPLAN
selected COA with • Orders Production, protection annex annex and or OPORD
any modifications Dissemination, and and supporting supporting • Subordinate
• Refined Transition appendixes appendixes understanding of
commander’s intent, plan or order
CCIRs, and EEFIs • Update EEFIs as
• Updated needed
assumptions
Legend:
AO area of operations
CCIR commander’s critical
COA course of action
DAL defended asset list
EEFI essential element of friendly information
HQ headquarters
HVT high-value target
IPB intelligence preparation of the battlespace
MOE measure of effectiveness
MOP measure of performance
OPSEC operations security
PPL protection priority list
RFI request for information
PROTECTION WORKING GROUP
A-51. Working groups address various subjects depending on the situation and echelon. A working group is
a grouping of predetermined staff representatives who meet to provide analysis, coordinate, and provide
recommendations for a particular purpose or function (FM 6-0). Their cross-functional design enables
working groups to synchronize contributions from multiple command post cells and staff sections. For
example, the protection working group brings together representatives of all staff elements concerned with
protection. It synchronizes the contributions of all staff elements with the work of the protection working
group. It also synchronizes protection with future operations and current operations integration cells.
A-52. The protection working group forms the core membership of the protection working group, which
includes other agencies, as required. Protection working group members differ in that additional staff officers
are brought into the working group. These additional staff officers meet operational requirements for threat
assessments, vulnerability assessments, and protection priority recommendations. The protection working
group calls upon existing resources from the staff and are incorporated into the unit battle rhythm as needed.
Working groups may convene daily, weekly, monthly, or intermittently depending on the subject, situation,
and echelon.
A-53. Protection working group meetings have the same purpose, regardless of the echelon. Protection
functions at different echelons of command differ mostly in the size of the AO and the number of available
protection capabilities. The protection working group—
* Determines likely threats and hazards from updated enemy tactics, the environment, and
accidents.
* Determines vulnerabilities as assessed by the vulnerability assessment team.
* Establishes and recommends protection priorities, such as the critical asset list.
* Provides recommendations for the critical asset list and defended asset list. |
3-81 | 120 | Appendix A
* Reviews and coordinates unit protection measures.
* Recommends force protection conditions and random AT measures.
* Determines required resources and makes recommendations for funding and equipment fielding.
* Provides input and recommendations on protection-related training.
* Makes recommendations to commanders on protection issues that require a decision.
* Performs tasks required for a force protection working group and a threat protection working
group according to DODI 2000.16.
* Accesses assets and infrastructure that are designated as critical by higher headquarters.
* Recommends the mode and frequency of survivability movements.
A-54. Commanders augment the team with other unit specialties and unified action partners, depending on
the operational environment and unit mission. The chief of protection determines the working group agenda,
meeting frequency, composition, input, and expected output. Table A-4 shows a sample purpose, agenda,
and composition of a protection working group with staff inputs and outputs.
Table A-4. Example protection working group activities
Purpose:
• Determines likely threats and hazards
• Determines vulnerabilities
• Establishes and recommends protection priorities
• Provides recommendations for the CAL and DAL
• Reviews and coordinates unit protection measures
• Recommends FPCONs and random AT measures
• Makes recommendations to commanders on protection issues that require a decision
• Performs tasks required for a force protection working group and a threat protection working
group
Purpose and
Frequency • Assesses assets and infrastructure that are designated as critical by higher headquarters.
• Analyzes and provides recommendations for the protection of civilians in the AO
• Develops and refines the protection running estimate
• Develops a scheme of protection, ensuring that it nests with the operational concept
• Develops isolated Soldier guidance.
• Provides input and recommendations for cyberspace network protection.
• Identifies risks to the mission
• Integrates PR requirements into plans, orders, SOPs and staff products.
Frequency: Every other day
Chair: Chief of protection • Public affairs officer.
Attendees: • Staff judge advocate.
• ADA officer • Chaplain.
• AT officer • Surgeon.
• CBRN officer • Medical representative.
• Engineer officer • Veterinary representative
• Electronic warfare element representative • Subordinate unit LNOs
Composition
• EOD officer • Operations representative
• Fire support representative • An area contracting officer
• OPSEC planner • Cyberspace representative
• Provost marshal • Information officer
• Safety officer • Logisticians
• Intelligence representative • Personnel recovery officer
• CA officer |
3-81 | 121 | Synchronize and Coordinate Protection
Table A-4. Example protection working group activities (continued)
Inputs: Outputs:
• Commanders guidance and intent • Update protection assessment
• Operations and warning orders • Scheme of protection
• Current scheme of protection • Protection Running estimate
• Threat and hazard assessment • Protection prioritization list
Inputs and out
puts • Vulnerability assessment • Recommended FPCON
• Criticality assessment • Recommended protection guidance and
• Risk management mitigation measures
• CAL • Recommended changes to EEFI
• DAL • Recommended changes to CAL and
prioritization of DAL
• Roll Call
• Operations/intelligence update (G-3/G-2)
• Protection prioritization list assessment / update (Chief of Protection)
• New vulnerabilities—next 72 hours (Chief of Protection)
Agenda • Mitigation measures (Chief of Protection)
• Recommendations—security posture adjustments, information engagement, resource
allocation, required training (Chief of Protection)
• Guidance (G-3)
• Conclusion (Chief of Protection)
Legend:
ADA air defense artillery
AO area of operations
AT antiterrorism
CA civil affairs
CAL critical asset list
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
DAL defended asset list
EEFI essential elements of friendly information
EOD explosive ordnance disposal
FPCON force protection condition
G-2 assistant chief of staff, intelligence
G-3 assistant chief of staff, operations
LNO liaison officer
OPSEC operations security
PR personnel recovery
SOP standard operating procedure
RUNNING ESTIMATE
A-55. A running estimate is the continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the current
operation is proceeding according to the commander’s intent and if planned future operations are supportable
(ADP 5-0). Failure to maintain accurate running estimates may lead to errors or omissions that result in
flawed plans or bad decisions during execution. Running estimates include recommendations for anticipated
decisions. During planning, commanders use these recommendations to select feasible, acceptable, and
suitable COAs for further analysis. During preparation and execution, commanders use recommendations
from running estimates in decision making. See ADP 5-0 for additional information on running estimates.
A-56. The protection working group develops and refines the protection running estimate (see figure A-6,
page A-22). The protection estimate provides a picture to the command on the protection continuing activity.
It is developed from information (including the facts, assumptions, constraints, limitations, risks, and issues)
pertaining to the protection mission and the scheme of protection. It includes the essential tasks from a higher
order. Integrating process data and continuing activities (assets available, civil considerations, threat and
hazard assessments, criticality assessments, vulnerability assessments, capability assessments, MOEs,
MOPs, essential elements of friendly information, protection priorities, risk decision points, supporting tasks)
feed updates to the running estimate. |
3-81 | 122 | Appendix A
Past 24 hours Protection common operational picture PPL
Next 48 to 72 hours • PPL Asset task
• Threats/hazards organization
Issues/risk decision • Incidents Provost marshal officer
points
• Asset locations
Protection priorities Engineer
Essential elements FPCON AMD CBRN and EOD Safety
of friendly INFOCON ADW MOPP
information
WCS OEG
Explosive hazards
Security banner
Legend:
ADW air defense warning
AMD air missile defense
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
EOD explosive ordnance disposal
FPCON force protection condition
INFOCON information operations condition
MOPP mission-oriented protective posture
OEG operation exposure guide
PPL protection prioritization list
WCS weapons control status
Figure A-6. Example protection running estimate
CONTINUOUS ASSESSMENT
A-57. Assessment is the determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or
achieving an objective (JP 3-0). Commanders typically base assessments on their situational understanding,
which is generally a composite of several informational sources and intuition. Assessments help commanders
determine progress toward attaining the desired end state, achieving objectives, and performing tasks. It also
involves continuously monitoring and evaluating the operational environment to determine what changes
might affect the conduct of operations.
A-58. Throughout the operations process, commanders integrate their assessments with those of the staff,
subordinate commanders, and other unified action partners. The primary tools for assessing the progress of
the operation include the OPORD, the common operational picture, personal observations, running estimates,
and the assessment plan. Staff members develop running estimates that illustrate the significant aspects of a
particular activity or function over time. These estimates are used by commanders to maintain situational
understanding and direct adjustments. Significant changes or variances among or within running estimates
can signal a threat or an opportunity, alerting commanders to take action.
A-59. The assessment plan is enabled by monitoring and evaluating criteria derived from the warfighting
function protection tasks. The criteria used to monitor and evaluate the situation or operation may be
represented as an MOE or MOP. These measures are discrete, relevant, and responsive benchmarks that are
useful in all operations. They may contain the commander’s critical information requirements and the
essential elements of friendly information and may generate information requirements. MOEs and MOPs can
be significant decision support tools and may drive transition periods, resource allocations, and other critical
decisions.
A-60. During preparation, operations to shape, and operations to prevent, the protection working group
focuses on threats and hazards that can influence preparatory activities, including monitoring new Soldier
integration programs and movement schedules and evaluating live-fire requirements for precombat checks
and inspections. The protection working group may evaluate training and rehearsals or provide coordination
and liaison to facilitate effectiveness in high-risk or complex preparatory activities, such as movement and
sustainment preparation. |
3-81 | 123 | Synchronize and Coordinate Protection
A-61. The protection working group monitors and evaluates the progress of current operations to validate
assumptions made in planning and to continually update changes to the situation. The protection working
group continually meets to monitor threats to protection priorities, and they recommend changes to the
protection plan, as required. They also monitor the conduct of operations, looking for variances from the
OPORD that affects their areas of expertise. When variances exceed a threshold value developed or directed
in planning, the protection working group may recommend an adjustment to counter an unforecasted threat
or hazard or to mitigate a developing vulnerability. It also tracks the status of protection assets and evaluates
the effectiveness of the protection systems as they are employed. Additionally, the protection working group
monitors the actions of other staff sections by periodically reviewing plans, orders, and risk assessments to
determine if those areas require a change in protection priorities, posture, or resource allocation.
A-62. The protection working group monitors and evaluates—
* Changes to threat and hazard assessments.
* Changes in force vulnerabilities.
* Changes to unit capabilities.
* The relevancy of facts.
* The validity of assumptions.
* Reasons that new conditions affect the operation.
* Running estimates.
* Protection tasks.
* System failures.
* Resource allocations.
* Increased risks.
* Supporting efforts.
* Force protection implementation measures, including site-specific AT measures. |
3-81 | 125 | Appendix B
Defense Support of Civil Authorities
ARFOR demonstrate the Army’s core competencies by combining offensive,
defensive, and stability or DSCA tasks. The continuous, simultaneous combinations of
offensive, defensive, and stability or DSCA tasks is known as decisive action. In
DSCA, decisive action refers to how ARFOR combine DSCA tasks to support
homeland security and, if required, DSCA tasks with offensive and defensive tasks to
support homeland defense. The MEB is well suited to provide support to civil
authorities because it has the most complete multifunctional staff of any Army brigade.
The MEB also has the skills needed to provide command and control for units that are
frequently needed by civil authorities. This appendix discusses the MEB support to
DSCA.
DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES CORE TASK
B-1. ARFOR conduct four core tasks (figure B-1 illustrates the DSCA core tasks with examples) in support
of DSCA and the overall homeland security enterprise:
* Provide support for domestic disasters.
* Provide support for domestic CBRN incidents.
* Provide support for domestic civilian law enforcement agencies.
* Provide other designated domestic support plan.
Figure B-1. DSCA core tasks with examples |
3-81 | 126 | Appendix B
B-2. These DSCA tasks can overlap. For example, providing Army support of civil law enforcement
agencies can occur during disaster response or its aftermath. In most cases, a MEB may provide support for
the first three tasks. The MEB may provide assistance as a unit or as part of a joint task force in support of
lead civil authorities for DSCA (see JP 3-28). The U.S. laws carefully limit the actions that military forces
conduct within the United States, its territories, and its possessions (see ADP 3-28 for information on laws).
The MEB complies with these laws while assisting affected citizens.
B-3. Doctrine on CBRN consequence management is contained in JP 3-0 and JP 3-41. This chapter uses
the task Respond to CBRN Incident for DSCA and area damage control. Tactical-level doctrine on CBRN
consequence management operations is contained in ATP 3-11.41.
B-4. The MEB is designed to integrate many of the types of units that have the greatest applicability in
support to DSCA (CBRN, engineer, EOD, and military police). The MEB has the broadest multifunctional
capability and training for DSCA tasks of any brigade. The MEB may be the ideal brigade to respond to
certain incidents because of its capability to provide command and control, be assigned an AO, and perform
other related requirements. The brigade is trained to manage airspace and conduct interface with others that
control airspace. This is particularly important in large-scale disasters requiring DOD aviation support. The
MEB can conduct or support most DSCA tasks depending on the nature of the incident and its task
organization. The MEB may be called upon to function as the on-site DOD or Army headquarters or to
complement or support another headquarters (such as a joint task force or the CBRNE operational
headquarters to respond to specific missions). The MEB can provide area damage control as part of support
area or in support of its higher headquarters and assigned units.
B-5. The MEBs in the Army National Guard could be among the first military forces to respond on behalf
of state authorities. Planning DSCA tasks is similar to planning stability tasks; they both interact with the
populace and civil authorities to provide essential services. The MEB tasks are similar, but the environment
is different (domestic versus foreign). The specialized capabilities of the MEB to conduct stability tasks apply
to DSCA, primarily for Tasks 1 and 3. However, the MEB supports the lead civil authority for DSCA. A
civil authority is in the lead for DSCA, while the task force or joint task force (hence MEB) supports the lead
civil authority. See ADP 3-28 for additional information on DSCA.
PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR DOMESTIC DISASTERS
B-6. Natural and man-made disasters occur throughout the United States and its territories. Most domestic
disasters require no federal military support. State and federal emergency management entities receive most
military support from the National Guard in state active duty or Title 32, United States Code (USC) status.
In a catastrophic event, the demand for resources may exceed National Guard capacity, even with assistance
from other states. In such situations, federal ARFOR provide requested support, through either United States
Pacific Command or United States Northern Command.
B-7. DOD defines a complex catastrophe as any natural or man-made incident, including cyberspace attack,
power grid failure, and terrorism, which results in cascading failures of multiple, interdependent, critical,
life-sustaining infrastructure sectors and causes extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage or disruption
severely affecting the population, environment, economy, public health, national morale, response efforts,
and/or government functions (JP 3-28).
B-8. There are two distinguishing characteristics of a complex catastrophe: 1) the extremely large scale of
damage and casualties, and 2) the cascading effects of the failure of critical infrastructure. These cascading
effects impact both the types and quantity of response required in support of the affected populace as well as
the environmental conditions in which the response must occur. Some of the effects include widespread and
long-term power grid failure, degraded or inoperable communications, and severe impacts to the
transportation infrastructure. The cascading effects from these failures could cause numerous problems
beyond the immediate affected area and increase the severity of the situation including, but not limited to,
widespread scarcity of food and water, lack of medical services at fixed sites within the impacted area, and
potentially the breakdown of governance and rule of law.
B-9. DOD installations and activities may receive requests directly from local civil authorities and will
respond, within their capability, under their own immediate response authority in accordance with DODD
3025.18, and mutual aid agreements in accordance with DODI 6055.06. |
3-81 | 127 | Defense Support of Civil Authorities
PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR DOMESTIC CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, OR
NUCLEAR INCIDENTS
B-10. A chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear incident is any occurrence, resulting from the use of
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons and devices; the emergence of secondary hazards
arising from friendly actions; or the release of toxic industrial materials or biological organisms and
substances into the environment, involving the emergence of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
hazards (JP 3-11). The National Response Force integrates governmental jurisdictions, incident management
and emergency response disciplines, and private sector entities into a coordinated CBRN incident response.
B-11. Military forces conduct domestic CBRN incident support under appropriate laws, regulations, and
policies. These include the hazardous waste operations and emergency response standard (Title 29, Code of
Federal Regulations, Part 1910, Occupational Safety and Health Standard Number 1910.120) and the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) (Sections 9601 to
9675 of Title 42 USC). Responders at every level plan and operate in accordance with these laws. These and
other laws define—
* Response authorities for public and private agencies.
* Hazardous substances, emergency planning, and community right to know.
* Cleanup requirements.
* Required protective measures and training for responders within the United States.
B-12. Department of Homeland Security uses the National Fire Protection Association Standard 472,
Standard for Competence of Responders to Hazardous Materials/Weapons of Mass Destruction Incidents, to
establish the qualifications for personnel conducting domestic CBRN incident response. (See National Fire
Protection Standard 472). During domestic CBRN incident response operations, national laws subordinate
military doctrine and military authority outside DOD installations. Command structures are based on the
National Response Framework and the National Incident Management System, with DOD as a supporting
partner. DOD is not the lead unless an incident occurs on a DOD installation.
PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR DOMESTIC CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT
B-13. Providing support for domestic civilian law enforcement applies to the restricted use of military assets
to support civilian law enforcement personnel within the United States and its territories. These operations
are significantly different from operations outside the United States. ARFOR support domestic civilian law
enforcement agencies under constitutional and statutory restrictions, as prescribed by corresponding
directives and regulations. For additional information, see DODI 3025.21.
B-14. Except as expressly authorized by the Constitution of the United States or by another act of congress,
the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 (18 USC 1385) prohibits the use of active Army and Air Force as
enforcement officials to execute state or federal law and perform direct law enforcement functions. Likewise,
United States Navy regulations prohibit the use of the Marine Corps and Navy for performing direct state
and federal law enforcement functions. However, the Posse Comitatus Act does not apply to state National
Guard forces in state active duty status and Title 32, USC status. Nor does the Posse Comitatus Act restrict
the Coast Guard, even when under the OPCON of the Navy, since the Coast Guard has inherent law
enforcement powers under Title 14 USC.
B-15. Domestic law enforcement missions differ substantially from similar stability tasks associated with
civil security and civil control. The rights of civilians take precedence during domestic law enforcement
support except in extreme emergencies.
B-16. Law enforcement support falls into two broad categories: direct and indirect. Direct support involves
enforcing the law and engaging in physical contact with offenders. Indirect support consists of aid to civilian
law enforcement agencies but does not include enforcement of the law or direct contact with offenders.
Federal laws, presidential directives, and DOD policy prohibit federal military forces from enforcing laws
and providing security except on military installations. These laws, policies, and directives specify limited
exceptions to the restrictions. When authorized by the Secretary of Defense, federal military forces may
provide indirect support to civilian law enforcement agencies, but support is limited to logistic, transportation,
and training assistance except in life threatening emergencies. State and territorial governors can use state |
3-81 | 128 | Appendix B
National Guard forces for direct support of civilian law enforcement as a temporary expedient in accordance
with state laws.
PROVIDE OTHER DESIGNATED DOMESTIC SUPPORT
B-17. Providing other designated domestic support encompasses preplanned, routine, and periodic support
not related to disasters or emergencies. Often, this is support to major public events and consists of
participatory support, special transportation, and additional security. Examples are national special security
events such as Olympics, inaugurations, or state funerals. Some missions may involve designated support
requested by a federal or state agency to augment its capabilities due to labor shortages or a sudden increase
in demands. Such support may extend to augmentation of critical government services by Soldiers, as
authorized by the President and directed by the Secretary of Defense. For example, skilled Soldiers replaced
striking air controllers in the Federal Aviation Administration until newly hired civilians completed training.
Soldiers have moved coal during strikes or even operated key commercial enterprises when national security
considerations justified such extreme action.
DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES CONSIDERATIONS
B-18. Commanders, supported by their staffs, use the operations process to drive the conceptual and detailed
planning necessary to understand, visualize, and describe their operational environment; make and articulate
decisions; and direct, lead, and assess military operations. The activities of the operations process are not
discrete; they overlap and recur as circumstances demand. Planning starts an iteration of the operations
process. Upon completion of the initial order, planning continues as leaders revise the plan based on changing
circumstances. Preparing begins during planning and continues through execution. Execution puts a plan into
action by applying combat power to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to gain a position of relative
advantage. Assessing is continuous and influences the other three activities. This section uses the operations
process activities (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) to discuss considerations that are important to the MEB
in conducting DSCA.
PLAN
B-19. The MEB uses Army planning procedures for DSCA, but must be able to participate and integrate its
planning with federal, state, tribal, or local levels as discussed in the following section. Soldiers receive their
orders in an Army format, but these orders must be consistent with the overall shared objectives for the
response. These orders are aligned with the specific guidance that other on-the-ground responders from other
civilian and military organizations are receiving. Soldiers exercise individual initiative to establish and
maintain communication at all levels. Based on the type of support provided, MEB leaders, staffs, and
Soldiers need to be familiar (to varying degrees) with the terminology, doctrine, and procedures that are used
by first responders to ensure the effective integration of Army personnel and equipment. This ensures that
citizens who are affected by the disaster receive the best care and service possible.
B-20. When the MEB conducts DSCA tasks, a lead federal or state government agency has the overall
responsibility depending on the MEB status as a 10 USC or 32 USC Title 10 or Title 32 organizations. The
MEB status as a state or federal asset will determine which documents it should use as legal authorities when
conducting operations. If the MEB is a state asset, it reports to the state National Guard chain of command.
If the MEB is a 10 USC asset (Regular Army), it reports to its federal chain of command.
Note. The military chain of command is not violated while the MEB supports the lead federal
agency to assist citizens who are affected by a disaster. |
3-81 | 129 | Defense Support of Civil Authorities
B-21. The MEB leaders and staff may help support the emergency preparedness planning that is conducted
at the national, state, or local level. The MEB may conduct contingency, crisis response, or deliberate
planning. The MEB leaders and staffs must understand the following documents from the Department of
Homeland Security:
* National-level civil disaster and emergency response doctrine contained within the National
Incident Management System.
* National Response Framework documents.
Note. The MEB leaders must understand the doctrine in JP 3-28.
B-22. The National Response Framework organizational structure includes emergency support function
annexes. There are currently fifteen emergency support function annexes. The emergency support functions
are used to help identify who has what type of resources to provide as part of a disaster response. Possible
considerations for MEB support to DSCA planning include—
* Assisting with interorganizational planning.
* Assisting with initial needs assessments.
* Providing logistics support for civil authorities.
* Providing sustainment in a damaged austere environment.
* Assisting the lead civil agency to define and share COAs.
* Soliciting agency understanding of roles.
* Developing measurable objectives.
* Assisting in the coordination of actions with other agencies to avoid duplicating effort.
* Planning to hand over to the operation civilian agencies as soon as feasible. The end state and
transition are based on the—
Ability of civilian organizations to carry out their responsibilities without military assistance.
Need to commit ARFOR to other operations or the preparation for other operations.
Ability to provide essential support to the largest possible number of people.
Knowledge of the legal restrictions and rules for the use of force.
Establishment of funding and document expenditures (see National Incident Management
System procedures).
* Identifying and overcoming obstacles, including—
Planning media operations and coordinating with local officials.
Maintaining information assurance.
Establishing liaison with the lead federal agency.
PREPARE
B-23. Commanders should prepare for DSCA by understanding the appropriate laws, policies, and directives
that govern the military during response and by planning and preparing with the agencies and organizations
they will support before an incident. There may be little or no time to prepare for a specific DSCA mission.
When possible, the commander helps develop contingency plans and standing operating procedures for
potential natural and man-made disasters. The MEB may plan, receive units, and deploy within hours. It is
possible that the MEB will link up with units on-site during execution as they arrive from across a state or
region.
B-24. Based on METT-TC factors, training before deployment for DSCA aids in preparing for and executing
the necessary tasks. Many stability tasks correlate with DSCA tasks. When possible, the MEB leaders and
staff train with civil authorities.
B-25. The notification for DSCA employment usually requires rapid reaction to an emergency, but
sometimes may allow for deliberate preparation. After notification, the MEB commander and staff leverage
the command and control system to coordinate and synchronize their operations with civilian authorities. |
3-81 | 130 | Appendix B
B-26. The deployment may be within a state or anywhere within the United States or its territories. The MEB
should develop standing operating procedures for the various methods and locations of deployment. Based
on METT-TC, the MEB task-organizes to conduct DSCA. The MEB may deploy an advanced party with
additional staff augmentation as an early-entry command post to provide on-site assessment and an
immediate command and control presence. Deployment is affected whether the DSCA mission warrants the
entire MEB or one or more task forces from the MEB. The MEB task organization may change periodically
as the need for particular services and support changes. A MEB involved in DSCA operations normally will
be task-organized with CBRN, engineer, medical, military police, public affairs and, potentially, units from
other Services. Throughout the coordination effort, it is important for the commander and staff to understand
and inform interagency personnel of the MEB capabilities and limitations.
B-27. Due to nonhabitual supporting relationships and dissimilar equipment, the MEB and the lead
governmental organization must ensure that there is close coordination in all areas. The MEB may co-locate
its headquarters with the lead agency to improve coordination. The MEB headquarters may be established in
tactical equipment or fixed facilities. By using liaison teams, the commander and staff work closely with
interagency and other military elements.
B-28. A defense coordinating officer and assigned staff may not suffice for a complex disaster. When
required, the MEB headquarters can control capabilities that the lead authority requires from the DOD.
Depending on the complexity of the operation, some staff augmentation may be required. The previously
existing task organization of the MEB may require reinforcement with additional functional units to
accomplish assigned missions. The MEB commander task-organizes available assets for the mission and
requests reinforcement as necessary.
B-29. The MEB leaders must understand the complex environment in which the brigade conducts its mission.
The MEB must integrate its activities into the planning effort of the supported civilian agency, understand
support requirements, and be aware of the supported agency’s capabilities and limitations. This leader
understanding creates an atmosphere that permits shared communications and forges a unified effort between
elements. Integrating the MEB command and control system into the command and control systems of the
lead governmental agency and local first responders may be a challenge. The extent to which the MEB
command and control system is able to integrate into the supported agency command and control system
depends on the communications/network compatibility/capability of the supported agency.
B-30. Oftentimes, an agency possesses data that, in its original form, creates compatibility issues with the
MEB format and the common operational picture. It is incumbent upon the MEB to facilitate the exchange
of information with the lead agency. During planning and execution, the MEB can deploy liaison officers to
the lead agency. The network-centric environment of the MEB serves as the conduit for rapidly
communicating information, while stationary or while moving en route to the geographical site for support
operations.
B-31. When the MEB works closely with an agency, the problem sets can be complex and diverse. The MEB
and the agency must leverage their skill sets and resources to better inform leaders and maximize their
greatest potential when preparing to conduct a DSCA operation. By eliminating redundancies and identifying
shortfalls in corresponding capabilities, the MEB creates the conditions for a unified effort. The MEB must
always protect its information, leverage its information collection capabilities and the communications
network to enhance situational awareness, and verify the lead governmental agencies capability to fuse data.
EXECUTE
B-32. The MEB will do what is required to accomplish its mission when conducting DSCA, even though
task organizations may need to be changed. The MEB may not be assigned an AO. The MEB may conduct
the below tasks for DSCA.
Respond to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear Incidents
B-33. Depending on the nature of the incident and initial assessment, the task organization of the MEB may
need to be changed frequently. The controlling headquarters may also change the command or support
relationship of the MEB as additional units or organizations respond to the incident. Key response tasks may
include assessing a CBRN hazard, conducting risk management, responding to a CBRN hazard, planning |
3-81 | 131 | Defense Support of Civil Authorities
and preparing for CBRN consequence management support, and providing mass casualty decontamination
support. CBRN response addresses the short-term, direct effects of a CBRN incident. Major functions
performed are safeguarding lives, preserving health and safety, securing and eliminating the hazard,
protecting property, preventing further damage to the environment, and maintaining the public’s confidence
in the government’s ability to respond to a CBRN incident.
Provide Support to Law Enforcement
B-34. The MEB conducts this task in domestic and foreign locations and is governed by applicable laws and
policies (see ADP 3-28). The efforts are similar to the stability tasks: establish civil security and establish
civil control. Key law enforcement tasks may include conducting law and order operations, providing
guidance on military police 0perations, planning police operations, and providing operational law support.
Conduct Postincident Response
B-35. The MEB organic staff has many of the skills required to conduct most postincident response tasks.
MEB requirements could include many of the tasks from stability and DSCA, to include tasks from support
area operations. Some DSCA would require the MEB to conduct airspace management, unmanned aircraft
system employment, debris removal, medical care, and the employment of specialized search and rescue
teams. The MEB can provide command and control for most search and rescue tasks on land but may require
augmentation and task-organized capabilities depending on the mission. In a domestic incident, United States
Northern Command and United States Pacific Command have a capability area of protection that includes
search and rescue. The United States Army Corps of Engineers provides organic and contracted land-based
search and rescue capabilities.
B-36. Executing DSCA must occur within the guidelines laid out by the lead civil agency. When requested
and within the legal limits of federal and state law, the MEB may leverage attached/OPCON information
collection assets and networks by positioning sensors, robotics, or forces in a manner that provides rapid and
accurate data flow to lead governmental agencies, which enables them to assess the situation and the status
of objectives. The civil agency may require an adjustment to the plan, and the MEB must be ready to modify
its ongoing operations. The information processes the MEB has in place, because of its communication
network, will allow for rapid dissemination of potential issues to the lead agency for resolution.
B-37. When executing DSCA, MEB leaders and staff must—
* Be familiar with the incident command system and be able to follow unified command system
procedures for the integration and implementation of each system.
* Know how the systems integrate and support the incident.
* Be familiar with the overall operation of the two command systems and be able to assist in
implementing the unified command system if needed.
* Know how to develop an Incident Action Plan and identify assets available for controlling
weapons of mass destruction and hazardous material events.
* Coordinate these activities with the on-scene incident commander.
* Be familiar with steps to take to assist in planning operational goals and objectives that are to be
followed on site in cooperation with the on-scene incident commander.
* Know how to interface with and integrate requisite emergency support services and resources
among the emergency operations center management and the incident or unified command on-
scene incident management team.
* Be familiar with the coordination functions and procedures that are to be conducted by and with
the emergency operation center in support of on-scene emergency response activities.
B-38. The tasks of Soldiers are similar to many of the tasks in stability tasks. In most cases, they do not need
to have as much knowledge of the incident command system.
B-39. While DSCA operations vary greatly in every mission, the MEB can expect events to follow a pattern
of planning, preparation, response, and recovery. Military support for DSCA will be provided through
Commander, United States Northern Command; Commander, United States Southern Command; or
Commander, United States Pacific Command depending upon the location of the incident. |
3-81 | 132 | Appendix B
B-40. The Joint Director of Military Support in the operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3) serves as the
action agent for the Assistant Secretary of Defense–Homeland Defense and America’s Security Affairs who
has the executive agent responsibility delegated by the Secretary of Defense. The Joint Director of Military
Support plans for and coordinates the DOD civil support mission and is the primary DOD contact for all
federal departments and agencies during DOD involvement in most domestic operations.
B-41. If DSCA is provided concurrently with homeland defense, the MEB must be prepared to transition to
support the offensive and defensive operations of other military forces.
Preparation
B-42. The MEB preparation for disaster response depends on the priority of other missions. If the MEB is a
10 USC unit, mission priorities may dictate minimal planning and preparation for DSCA operations. On the
other hand, a 22 USC MEB may have enough time to plan and prepare for DSCA with other civil and military
organizations.
B-43. Preparation implements approved plans and relevant agreements to increase readiness through a variety
of tasks. Such tasks may include, but are not limited to—
* Developing standing operating procedures and tactics, techniques, and procedures with expected
supported and supporting elements.
* Task-organizing to fill gaps in duties and responsibilities.
* Training personnel and leaders on nonmilitary terminology and procedures used for DSCA (such
as the incident command system).
* Obtaining (through training) the proper credentials for key personnel.
* Exercising and refining plans with military and civilian counterparts.
* Obtaining the proper equipment to provide the required capability.
* Developing, requesting, and maintaining logistics packages for follow-on resupply and
maintenance of all classes of supplies in support of extended operations.
* Preparing and maintaining Soldier readiness for all personnel to ensure that they are up to date.
* Ensuring that communications equipment, communications security, and controlled cryptographic
items are serviceable and ready to deploy.
Response
B-44. As part of a response, the MEB subordinate units and/or liaison teams enter the affected area and make
contact with relief organizations. They relay pertinent information about the effort of these organizations up
through their military chain of command. The military chain of command relays this information to the lead
civil authority. Planning for the operation, staging command post into the area, establishing security,
deploying MEB subordinate units, and initiating contact with supported activities and other parts of the relief
force occur during this phase of operations.
B-45. The commander considers leading with liaison teams and urgent relief assets, such as debris clearance,
law enforcement, search and rescue, food, and water. The command and control system of the lead unit gives
the MEB units robust early ability to communicate and coordinate with each other and that organization with
which the command and control information systems are compatible. Further, the ability to reconnoiter and
gather information makes MEB units useful in the initial efforts by civil and other authorities to establish
situational awareness, control the area, and oversee critical actions.
Recovery
B-46. Once DSCA is underway, recovery begins. With initial working relationships between all
organizations in place, the MEB maintains steady progress in relieving the situation throughout this phase of
operations. The MEB work includes coordination with its higher headquarters, supported groups, and other
relief forces and the daily allocation of its own assets to recovery tasks.
B-47. The MEB task organization is likely to change periodically as the need for particular services and
support changes. Security, maintenance, the effective employment of resources, and Soldier support all need |
3-81 | 133 | Defense Support of Civil Authorities
continuing attention. The brigade surgeon advises and assists the MEB commander in counteracting the
psychological effects of disaster relief work and exposure to human suffering on MEB Soldiers throughout
the operation.
Restoration
B-48. Restoration is the return of normality to the area. In most cases, the MEB disengages before restoration
begins. The Federal Emergency Management Agency is in charge of restoration operations for DSCA.
B-49. The DSCA ends in different ways. Crises may be resolved or the MEB may hand off a continuing
DSCA to a replacement unit, a relief agency, a police force, or other civil authority. Missions of short duration
or narrow scope may end with completion of the assigned task.
ASSESS
B-50. The MEB command and control system is essential to support the interagency overall assessment. The
MEB network-centric environment provides for a robust exchange of information. A common problem that
the MEB or a nonmilitary agency may encounter is information overload or a different perception on how an
operation is progressing. Commanders share the common operational picture (their interpretation of the
situation) with their civil agency counterpart to ensure a unified effort. Liaison should occur to demonstrate
this capability and to verify the method in which information sharing will occur.
B-51. MEB commanders gauge unit readiness for DSCA missions by assessing proficiency in the tasks of
command and control, sustainment, protection, support area operations, and emergency/incident response or
the specified tasks assigned to an Army National Guard unit for planning. The requirement to deploy into a
domestic operational environment—often with little warning—and to operate requires command and control
that can adapt systems and procedures for a noncombat, civilian-led structure.
B-52. The MEB leverages its command and control system capabilities and supports a degraded or destroyed
civilian command and control/communications system. The MEB brings its mobile network and augments
and/or replaces a devastated civil infrastructure. Most first responder communications are wireless, using
tower-based repeating which is powered by the grid. The MEB augments local law enforcement (and
emergency medical services, fire services, and other first responder communications) with the command and
control network to restore vital services to the AO.
EMPLOYMENT
B-53. An example of a MEB conducting DSCA is a plane that has crashed into a major industrial site and
resulted in mass casualties. A CBRN incident has occurred, with downwind prediction that affects a built-up
area and state Highway 5, and there is an environmental hazard of runoff into the river that provides water to
a built-up area downstream.
B-54. The local officials responded but were overwhelmed. The state governor declared a state of emergency;
directed the state emergency management agency to take over incident command, management, and
response; and requested support from a neighboring state. That state has an Army National Guard MEB ready
to respond to the mission based on an existing support agreement.
B-55. The Army National Guard MEB immediately deploys the deputy commanding officer with an
early-entry command post to collocate with the state emergency management agency on-site command post,
while the rest of the MEB mobilizes and moves to the incident site. The MEB is task-organized with one
engineer battalion, two military police battalions, a CA battalion, two CBRN battalions, and one mechanized
infantry battalion. The state emergency management agency also put their state medical battalion, rotary-
wing squadron, local and state search and rescue teams, and a volunteer local construction company OPCON
to the MEB. The state emergency management agency assigned the MEB an area to control, in which they
will conduct the operations. The key tasks include conducting risk management, responding to a CBRN
incident, providing support to law enforcement, conducting postincident response, improving movement, and
supporting area security in and around the industrial site. Finally, they are to conduct sustainment support
operations (general engineering to construct a berm to control surface runoff) and other critical requirements
that may be identified. |
3-81 | 135 | Appendix C
Lines of Communication Considerations
The forward movement of personnel, equipment, and materiel from the echelon (corps
and division) support areas is vital to the support of decisive action. The protection of
ground supply routes, waterways, rail lines, pipelines, and power generation and
distribution capabilities is used to support operations across the range of military
operations. LOC security is especially challenging during large-scale combat
operations and the consolidation of gains. One of the greatest risks to Army operations
can be threats along MSRs.
LINES OF COMMUNICATION OVERVIEW
C-1. The security, maintenance, and movement control of LOCs is critical to military operations. Line of
communications are a route, either land, water, and/or air, that connects an operating military force with a
base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move (JP 2-01.3). During large-scale combat
operations, the support area commander’s primary focus is the security and maintenance of LOC (rail,
pipeline, highway, waterway[canal or river]) throughout the support area and provides forward movement of
personnel and the distribution of equipment and materiel from the echelon (corps and division) support areas
to units forward.
C-2. LOC security is an operation, not a sustainment function, and Level II and Level III threat conditions
require a dedicated security force. Most units conducting operations throughout the support area can defend
against and defeat Level I threats; however, various types of security forces are normally required to patrol
and respond to incidents on LOCs to defeat Level II and III threats. These security forces include a dedicated
LOC response force and TCF. A response force (normally military police) is a highly mobile, dedicated
security force with the capability to defeat Level I and II threats and delay Level III attacking support area
LOCs.
C-3. Although all LOCs throughout the support area are important, the capabilities they represent are not
equal in their contributions to support area operations and overall mission accomplishment. Determining and
directing protection and maintenance priorities for ground LOCs throughout the support area may involve
the most important decisions that the commander will make. There are seldom sufficient resources to
simultaneously provide the same level of protection to all ground LOCs. See ADP 3-37 for establishing
protection priorities.
C-4. General engineering assets possess the capabilities to develop infrastructure to support mobility, force
protection, logistics, base camps, and force beddown facilities. Infrastructure support includes the
construction, rehabilitation, repair, maintenance, and modifications of landing strips, airfields, check points,
MSRs, LOCs, supply installations, building structures, and bridges. General engineering units (in support of
infrastructure development) can also provide capabilities to repair (and limited reconstruction of) railroads
or water and waste facilities. The basic capabilities of general engineer units can be expanded by augmenting
them with additional personnel, equipment, and training from specialized engineer units. See ATP 3-34.40
for additional information on general engineering support.
C-5. Movement control is a significant component to the control of LOCs, routes, and area security, but it
is focused on control rather than security of the movement. Movement control is the planning, routing,
scheduling, and control of personnel and cargo movements over lines of communications (JP 4-01.5).
Movement control activities also interface with information operations, CA, psychological operations, public
affairs, crowd sourcing, and tactical deception. Security considerations should always be a part of movement
control. Mobility considerations are also critical to providing security. |
3-81 | 136 | Appendix C
LINES OF COMMUNICATION SECURITY
C-6. Security operations are those operations performed by commanders to provide early and accurate
warning of enemy operations, to provide the force being protected with time and maneuver space within
which to react to the enemy, and to develop the situation to allow commanders to effectively use their
protected forces (ADP 3-90). Security operations encompass five primary tasks—screen, guard, cover, area
security, and local security. While the first three tasks are linked to the movement and maneuver warfighting
function, the last two are linked to the protection warfighting function. These last two security tasks are
focused on providing protection, although they may also enhance the movement and maneuver of the force.
The focus of security operations may be either on a force (such as convoy operations), facility (base camp,
dislocated civilian camp, detention site), or LOC for which they are providing security. See ADP 3-37,
ADP 3-90, and chapter 2 for additional information on area and local security.
C-7. Security forces operating in the support area (normally military police [see FM 3-39] or a TCF) may
also conduct counterreconnaissance in the performance of area and local security in support of LOC security.
Counterreconnaissance is a tactical mission task that encompasses all measures taken by a commander to
counter enemy reconnaissance and surveillance efforts. Counterreconnaissance is not a distinct mission, but
a component of all forms of security operations (FM 3-90-1).
ROUTE SECURITY
C-8. Route security is a specialized area security task conducted to protect LOCs or MSRs and friendly
forces moving along them. Enemy attempts to interdict LOCs may have little immediate impact on the corps
or division ongoing decisive and shaping operations because of subordinate unit basic loads. However, the
security of those routes over which the corps and division sustaining operations flow are critical to sustained
land operations.
C-9. The security of the support area LOCs and supply routes, whether rail, pipeline, highway, or waterway,
presents one of the greatest security problems in the support area. Route security operations are defensive in
nature and are terrain-oriented. A route security force prevents an enemy force from impeding, harassing, or
destroying traffic along the route or portions of the route itself. The establishment of base camps and base
clusters along that route permits the concentration of security resources. Route security requires dedicated
resources at almost an infinite number of points or reaction forces to counter possible enemy action. Units
performing missions that require the habitual use of LOCs and supply routes, such as military police,
maintenance, transportation, supply, and field service units, can perform route security operations with their
primary activities. The support area commander can employ the following techniques to provide route
security:
* Active and passive security.
* Route reconnaissance.
* Cordon security.
* Movement corridor.
C-10. While the scope of these operations depends on the mission variables of METT-TC, route security
operations tend to require the commitment of significant resources. A combination of passive and route
reconnaissance is the most common pattern used over secured routes, such as a division MSR.
Active and Passive Security
C-11. Active and passive security is a technique to provide route security without a significant expenditure
of labor or resources. It includes—
* Camouflage.
* Convoy formation and march control to present the least lucrative target possible under prevailing
conditions. |
3-81 | 137 | Lines of Communication Considerations
* Proper selection of routes.
* Capitalizing on security offered by related activities taking place without regard to route security
requirements. These activities include aircraft traversing over all or portions of the route,
maintenance activities taking place along the route, training exercise or troop movement adjacent
to or along the route, military and host-nation police traffic control activities, and the activities of
the civilian population.
C-12. The support area commander employs passive security for all conditions or situations and as an adjunct
to any other technique of route security employed. They are the products of a long-term and continually
improved program for an integrated security system.
Route Reconnaissance
C-13. Route reconnaissance addresses not only the route itself, but also all terrain along the route from which
the enemy could influence the movement of forces. Route reconnaissance takes place at irregular intervals to
avoid developing a regular pattern that an enemy could exploit. See FM 3-90-1 for additional information on
route reconnaissance.
Cordon Security
C-14. It is normally not feasible to secure all points along a route by physically allocating resources to all the
points of the route. Cordon security is the security provided between two combat outposts positioned to
provide mutual support. (ATP 3-91) The support area commander can assign any available air assault,
mechanized, Stryker, or military police unit to combat outposts established at critical locations along the
route. The commander locates these combat outposts within supporting distance of each other when possible.
Units assigned to these combat outposts provide response forces in the event of enemy activity along the
route within their subordinate areas of operations. Forces based at these combat outposts conduct
reconnaissance patrols and offensive actions between their base combat outpost and adjacent combat outposts
designed to counter enemy activities between these two points on a frequent but irregular schedule.
C-15. Normally, each combat outpost contains at least a platoon size element and is equipped with automatic
weapons, communications, and sensors and is supported by those fire support assets available to the support
area commander. The outpost commander rotates personnel between duty at the combat outpost and duty on
patrol. The higher commander of each combat outpost makes frequent contact with each deployed combat
outpost to check its status.
C-16. The establishment of cordon security does little to eliminate those threat forces that require the
adoption of this technique. A commander directing the establishment of cordon security should also direct a
series of parallel corrective actions, including—
* Searching for a new route to bypass an enemy attack/ambush locations.
* Conducting vigorous search and attack operations to destroy the enemy within the support area.
* Rigorously enforcing circulation control measures in coordination with the host nation over the
civilian population.
* Removing cover from areas offering concealment to an enemy.
* Constructing new routes to bypass dangerous areas.
* Mass-evacuating the civilian population from towns and villages along the route. (This is an
extreme measure and requires consultation with host-nation authorities and adherence to the laws
of land warfare.)
Convoy Security
C-17. Convoy security is a specialized area security task conducted to protect convoys. Units conduct convoy
security when there are not enough friendly forces to continuously secure LOCs in an AO and there is a
significant danger of enemy ground action directed against the convoy. The commander may also conduct
them with route security operations. Convoy operations are generally conducted at the battalion level or
below, with brigade oversight. The support area commander is responsible for convoy security in the support
area (which is usually the MEB commander). Likewise, responsibility for the security of convoys transiting |
3-81 | 138 | Appendix C
BCT areas of operations is the responsibility of the appropriate BCT commander. Security of convoys
transiting previously unassigned areas within the division AO will typically be the responsibility of the
commander assigned responsibility for the temporary movement corridor designated by the echelon
headquarters to support that convoy. Planning considerations for the division include—
* Ensuring proper allocation of combat power to the task.
* Coordinating combat enablers (fires, attack aviation, electronic warfare assets) for supported units.
* Allocating information collection assets.
Movement Corridor
C-18. A movement corridor may be established to facilitate the movement of a single element or be
established for a longer period of time to facilitate the movement of a number of elements along a given
route. The support area commander may establish a movement corridor within the support area along an
established MSR or a route designated for unit movement. All airspace requirements above the movement
corridor, such as airspace for aerial recon and fires, must be included in the unit airspace plan to allow the
establishing unit to conduct effective operations.
C-19. The unit commander or convoy commander is responsible for a base level of security during
movement. Most support brigades and functional units have a need for more security that they can organically
provide during their movement and receive little support from maneuver units to provide additional required
security. Units owning an AO may provide additional security support to units moving through or that are
present in their AOs, to include the ability to provide fires. Several tasks and tactics, techniques, and
procedures can be integrated within an AO to set conditions to help secure individual unit movement, to
include—
* Supporting situational understanding.
* Conducting tactical maneuver (performed by the AO owner or assigned maneuver unit).
* Conducting route and convoy security operations.
* Conducting mobility operations.
* Conducting AT activities.
* Conducting CBRN operations.
* Conducting survivability operations.
* Handing off security responsibility when crossing AO borders or at the nearest secure
area/facility/base.
* Integrating fires.
* Coordinating logistics support.
* Conducting tactical troop movement.
* Employing combat patrols.
* Conducting counterambush actions.
* Employing obscurants.
* Providing tactical overwatch.
C-20. The support area commander task-organizes the enablers required to establish a movement corridor
and has the staff necessary to establish integrated operations within it. Military police, engineer, logistics,
EOD, aviation, CBRN, and other forces may establish a combined arms approach to establish a movement
corridor to provide secure movement of military traffic through vulnerable areas (see figure C-1). Based on
published movement tables, the combined movement corridor forces will open and maintain a safe passage
route through uncontrolled terrain. The opening of the route requires a synchronized effort, with each branch
providing unique movement and mobility skills to the route. The sequence may include engineer route
clearance and maintenance activities that are integrated with area security implementation along the corridor. |
3-81 | 139 | Lines of Communication Considerations
Legend:
ACP air control point
CSC convoy support center
EOD explosive ordnance disposal
MP military police
MSR main supply route
NAI named area of interest
SUST sustainment
TCP traffic control post
TRP target reference point
Figure C-1. Example movement corridor
C-21. Engineer and military police forces conduct route reconnaissance missions to determine problems
along the route. Sustainment forces may then establish temporary holding, maintenance, or rest areas along
the corridor as the tactical situation dictates. With the establishment of military police traffic control posts
and convoy escorts of critical commodities of supplies and with aviation convoy security in place, the
convoys move along the protected route to their final destination. The movement corridor opens and closes
for specified periods of time to meet movement table requirements.
C-22. This paragraph discusses support to movement beyond the support area commander’s assigned support
area by using the technique of movement corridors. There are several techniques that the support area
commander may use to support movement beyond its assigned support area. Where an MSR passes from the
support area AO through a division-controlled area directly into a BCT AO, the division could designate an
AO around the MSR and assign it to the support area commander as part of the support area. The support
area commander could create a movement corridor from the support area boundary to the BCT AO. In this
case, the support area commander would be responsible for all actions within the movement corridor. The
division would provide the required information collection and fires support. The support area commander
would coordinate with higher headquarters and the units conducting the movement to provide the required
capabilities to support ongoing operations. The support area commander would transfer responsibility for
units moving along the corridor to the BCT at their boundary. The BCT could extend the movement corridor
within their AO to their brigade support area or to their other boundary if the MSR passes through the AO.
The support area commander’s support to movement that does not move on an MSR could also be provided
within a movement corridor. A movement corridor that does not use an established MSR may require
additional information collection and other forces to set conditions. |
3-81 | 140 | Appendix C
RAILWAY AND RAILHEAD SECURITY
C-23. Support area commanders support the security of railheads, terminals, and railways that run through
the support area and are critical to the forward movement of personnel, equipment, and materiel from the
echelon (corps and division) support areas. As with air and sea ports and terminals, railheads and terminals
may be collocated with a base camp located in the support area.
C-24. Security forces operating in the support area support Army rail operations through local and area
security. As with planning to support other intermodal operations, the support area commander and security
forces need to understand the basics of those operations. (See ATP 4-14 for more information on Army rail
operations.) It is important to understand the critical assets associated with rail operations (tracks,
locomotives and rolling stock, switching modes, tunnels and bridges, marshalling yards) and the items
(materiel and personnel) that are being transported. The basics associated with route security apply to the
tracks, while those associated with local security apply to the protection of sites and specific points within
the rail system. Military police may also be involved in providing security as part of the security force on the
rolling stock itself (to include armored trains and cars), and many of the basics associated with convoy
security will apply. See ATP 3-39.30 and FM 3-39 for additional information on military police support to
the security of critical sites.
C-25. Security forces support to rail security operations is to prevent the theft, damage, and interference of
rail operations during the transport phase. Therefore, security forces support of rail security focuses on high-
value or sensitive military equipment. The overall rail security is the responsibility of the train commander
or shipper; however, security forces are integrated into rail security if a viable threat has been identified or
the sensitivity of the cargo requires additional trained security personnel.
C-26. When planning for security forces support in rail security operations, security forces need to consider
host-nation security regulations and close coordination with host-nation law enforcement agencies or other
regulatory agencies. Planning considerations for security forces rail security activities include—
* Developing a security plan for rail transport, including establishing preventive security
assumptions/measures to ensure that transport is undisturbed.
* Establishing initial security rules before the rail operations begin; for example, military working
dog teams or security forces conduct security checks of rail wagons and/or stocks and supplies.
* Obtaining a detailed threat assessment of the route before movement to identify likely threats and,
based on the threat assessment, applying the correct level of security measures for rail operations.
* Conducting route/railway reconnaissance, if necessary.
* Coordinating and liaising with host-nation law enforcement activities and host-nation security
forces before movement to minimize vulnerable points. When feasible, a detailed movement plan
should be given to allied forces.
* Defining where security monitoring/patrolling are required.
* Determining host-nation and other national border-crossing requirements to ensure undisturbed
transport via crossing points.
PIPELINE SECURITY
C-27. Pipelines assist in maintaining storage levels to meet daily demand and required stock objectives for
the distribution of petroleum. Pipelines reduce the number of convoys and personnel required in distributing
the product. The support area commander tasks security forces to provide pipeline security through local and
area security tasks to protect pipelines. Security forces (normally military police) conduct mobile security
patrols and employ sensors and unmanned aircraft systems to detect and defeat Level I and Level II enemy
threats disrupting pipeline distribution. |
3-81 | 141 | Lines of Communication Considerations
TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL
C-28. Traffic management and control are conducted to enable the unencumbered movement of personnel
and resources along road networks in the most efficient manner possible. Although focused on supporting
movement, traffic management can also be selectively applied to enable maneuver. Traffic management and
control also contributes to the commander’s protection efforts. Reconnaissance is an essential component of
effective traffic management and control.
C-29. Traffic management and control is the direction, control, supervision, and execution of the activities
required to enable freedom of movement for persons, vehicles, and resources. Traffic management
holistically involves transportation, military police, engineer, and other technical capabilities. The four
primary components of traffic management and control are—
* Movement control (a transportation task under sustainment).
* Traffic management and enforcement (performed by military police as part of their military police
disciplines).
* MSR and ASR regulation and enforcement (performed by military police as part of security and
mobility support discipline).
* Engineering support focused on traffic engineering.
MOVEMENT CONTROL
C-30. Regulating movements entails the additional actions to synchronize the flow of movement over LOCs
which includes, but is not limited to, planning and executing route synchronization and distribution network
designs, managing convoys at distribution hubs/convoy support centers/border crossings/entry control points,
and diverting the movement of a convoy or single shipment when necessary.
C-31. A key aspect of regulating movements is route synchronization. Route synchronization is the planning,
routing, and scheduling of movement on ground supply routes and is a control measure that regulates the
flow of movement supporting military operations. Route synchronization is executed by commanders with
the responsibility to provide order, prevent congestion, and enforce movement priorities for the ground
supply routes in their operational area.
C-32. The support area commander regulates movement throughout the support area. If the movement is
conducted on MSRs or ASRs designated by higher headquarters, the support area commander regulates
movement in coordination with the division transportation office/movement control battalion/movement
control teams. Units may not move through ground LOCs within the support area without clearance from the
AO responsible unit. The support area commander designates, maintains, secures, and controls movement
along the routes within the support area unless the higher headquarters directs otherwise. Most routine
movement on MSRs/ASRs is handled by the unit conducting the movement or the supporting headquarters.
The support area commander must assert control when security conditions require it and stop, reroute, or
delay movement even if coordinated or approved by others.
C-33. The higher headquarters must provide clear guidance on the roles and responsibilities for movement
control, protection, and defense of forces moving through the support area or originating in the support area
AO that move into other AOs. Active participation by the SA commander and tenant units with higher
headquarters planners will help to ensure proper guidance. The support area commander has responsibility
for movement control, protection, and defense within the support area. The higher headquarters, through its
movement control battalion and movement control teams, has primary responsibility for movement control
within the AO. The convoy commander has primary responsibility for convoy protection, security, and
defense. The support area commander may be assigned TACON for force protection in certain circumstances.
When a unit wants to move within the support area, it coordinates with the BDOC or BCOC. The BDOC or
BCOC will coordinate with the support area commander to obtain movement support: intelligence updates,
additional security, fires, and final approval. When the unit plans to leave the support area, the support area
commander will coordinate with the supporting movement control team as required to obtain movement
clearance for use of the MSRs and ASRs. The base camp or base cluster commander adjusts perimeter
security after a unit loads out for movement or integrates a new unit into existing plans to ensure a
comprehensive security posture. When a unit moves through the support area, it coordinates with the
supporting movement control team. |
3-81 | 142 | Appendix C
C-34. Sustainment headquarters pushing convoys into a support area and the sustainment headquarters
receiving the convoy coordinate with the support area BCOC or BDOC to ensure that the convoys do not
conflict with movement and maneuver, protection, or fires warfighting functions. This is especially important
for major unit moves supported by transportation units. The support area owner S-3 is ultimately responsible
for controlling all movement through the support area. If possible, the support area owner may place a liaison
officer at the higher headquarters to assist in controlling sustainment movements.
C-35. The support area commander’s staff plans and conducts the required operations to support movement.
The CBRN officer determines likely areas for enemy use of CBRN, and designates decontamination sites for
restoring contaminated units. The CBRN officer also coordinates with task-organized CBRN assets to
position CBRN detection sensors and to establish the corresponding process for receiving, validating, and
disseminating CBRN alerts, precautions, and downwind messages to subordinate, adjacent, and higher units.
The engineer coordinates mobility support, monitoring route status and directing required route maintenance.
The EOD staff, in coordination with the engineer and intelligence staff, monitors and conducts trend analysis
within the support area. The military police coordinates traffic control and directs required military police
security. The S-6 ensures that the required codes, loads, administrative data, and procedures for accessing
dedicated communication nets or networked systems are current, available, operational, and packaged for
dissemination by the operations section to organic, tenant, or passing units. They coordinate with subordinate
electronic warfare officers to ensure that electronic countermeasure devices and equipment are properly
installed, tested, and deconflicted with noncomplementary devices of similar purpose within the support area
TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT AND ENFORCEMENT
C-36. Traffic management and enforcement and MSR and ASR regulation and enforcement collectively
include active and passive measures used to control traffic circulation, enforce traffic regulations, investigate
traffic collisions, and enable safe movement of vehicular and pedestrian traffic. Traffic management and
enforcement focuses on mitigating traffic disruptions created by threats, dislocated civilians, and congestion
due to breakdowns, weather, and degradation of road surfaces. Traffic control elements coordinate with
movement control teams to update and share information on MSR interdiction, traffic congestion, or other
situations influencing movement in the AO. Military police provide temporary traffic control through manned
traffic control posts and emplace temporary traffic control devices (signs, roadblocks, traffic cones, warning
devices, other traffic control measures). Traffic management and enforcement and MSR and ASR regulation
and enforcement conducted by military police may include—
* Supporting movement associated with tactical missions, such as traffic control in support of
breaching and gap crossing (traffic control posts, defiles, temporary route signing).
* Supporting movement control priorities through execution of published traffic control plans and
enforcing highway regulations.
* Supporting passage of lines (forward or rearward) mobility support through traffic control (to
include management of dislocated civilians, stragglers, and detainees) for stationary and passing
units.
* Enforcing traffic laws and building host-nation police capacity to perform traffic control and
enforcement tasks consistent with the rule of law.
C-37. Military police trained as traffic management and collision investigators can conduct traffic surveys to
assess traffic problems on specific existing road structures. Based on these assessments, they can provide
recommendations for implementation of traffic control measures to mitigate acute traffic flow problems. (See
ATP 3-39.10.) Traffic flow problems that require major construction or cover large road networks (such as
those found within large cities) require comprehensive traffic studies and expertise from traffic engineers
supported by transportation, military police, and other technical specialties. |
3-81 | 143 | Lines of Communication Considerations
LINES OF COMMUNICATION MAINTENANCE
C-38. Engineering support to traffic management and control can include repairing and clearing roads,
improving trafficability and facilitating movement to major construction projects, and designing and building
highways. In support of traffic studies, engineers also provide technical expertise on the design and
installation of permanent traffic control devices into the road network. See ATP 3-34.40 for additional
information on general engineering support. |
3-81 | 145 | Appendix D
Support Area Tenant Units
Many of the units not staffed to control terrain become tenants within the support area.
Support area operations are conducted by the assigned area owner. Support area
operations do not include the mission support operations conducted by tenants within
the support area. The support area commander will synchronize their operations with
tenant units in the support area to prevent or minimize interference with command and
control and support operations and to provide unimpeded movement of friendly forces;
protection; operations to find, fix, and destroy enemy forces or defeat threats; and area
damage control. The support area commander will have some command and control
authority over the tenant and transient organizations within the support area for security
and defense; this may be TACON for security and defense. This chapter provides an
overview of support area tenant units and their capabilities.
Note: See chapter 2, Section II, for an overview of possible MEB task-organized units and their
capabilities.
ENGINEER
D-1. Engineers not assigned to BCTs are organized in capability-based units of multidiscipline combat,
general, and geospatial capabilities. Army engineer forces operate as integral members of the combined arms
teams and echelons above the BCT during peace and war to provide a full range of engineering capabilities.
These capabilities are generally provided by three engineer disciplines—combat, general, and geospatial
engineering. Table D-1 provides an overview of engineer capabilities at the brigade and battalion level that
may be a tenant unit of the support area. For additional information on engineer operations, see FM 3-34.
Table D-1. Engineer mission planning and capabilities
Organization Capabilities
Engineer Brigade • Provide command and control, plan, integrate, and employ engineer
capabilities (combat, general, and geospatial engineering) in support of
division, corps and theater areas of operations.
• Oversee contract construction, labor, and indigenous personnel.
• Plan and supervise terrain analysis and topographic operations.
• Decoy emplacements (if necessary field expedient decoys/on-site
fabrication).
Engineer Battalion • Provide command and control, plan, integrate, and employ up to 5 task
organized companies, one forward support company.
• Coordinate engineer support, subunit task organization, and resource
management.
• Plan and support mobility, countermobility, and survivability operations.
• Plan and supervise the collection of engineer related information and
development of engineer information. |
3-81 | 146 | Appendix D
Table D-1. Engineer mission planning and capabilities (continued)
Organization Capabilities
Engineer Battalion • Provide technical advice, assistance, and training in mine warfare, field
(continued) fortifications, camouflage, demolitions, and engineer reconnaissance
techniques.
• Plan, supervise, and coordinate survey and design teams when
augmented by engineer brigade for construction or clearance missions.
• Coordinate with medical brigade to provide for site preparation,
construction or modification of waste disposal areas for combat support
hospitals.
• Emplace division managed multi-spectral decoys, construct decoy
positions, and support decoy pattern of life.
MILITARY POLICE
D-2. Military police units are manned, equipped, and trained to operate across the range of military
operations. Military police organize for purpose and provide technical capabilities that enhance the support
area commander’s ability to control terrain, protect populations, defeat enemy forces, and consolidate gains.
Military police do this through their three military police disciplines of police operations, detention
operations, and security and mobility support. Military police headquarters cannot generally conduct all three
military police disciplines at the same level of priority; therefore, commanders must anticipate, prioritize,
and synchronize the employment of military police assets. Table D-2 provides an overview of military police
capabilities at the battalion level and below that may be a tenant unit of the corps or division support area.
For additional information on military police operations, see FM 3-39.
Table D-2. Military police capabilities
Organization Capabilities
Military police • Provides command and control for the operation of the brigade and for all task
brigade organized units.
• Provides staff planning, coordination, and supervision required for all task organized
and attached units, including unit allocation and resource management.
• Coordinates with CA operations staff officer for planning and execution of civil-military
operations, appropriate Army, joint, interagency, and multinational headquarters, host-
nation civil authorities, nongovernmental organizations, and private volunteer
organizations.
• Provides logistical and administrative support to the headquarters and task organized
units.
• Integrates police intelligence operations and vulnerability assessments into the
common operational picture.
• Provides management of detainee operations.
• Provides MWD program management, and coordinating MWD employment and
sustainment within the brigade AO.
• Coordinates and supervises protective service operations for designated personnel.
• Brigade commander serves as Commander of Detainee Operations when required.
• Provides staff planning, coordination, and supervision required for all task organized
and attached units.
• Coordinates and supervises protective service operations for designated personnel. |
3-81 | 147 | Support Area Tenant Units
Table D-2. Military police capabilities (continued)
Organization Capabilities
Military police • Conducts the command and control of battalion operations for 2 to 5 military police
battalion companies and other assigned or attached elements.
• Provides staff planning, coordination, and supervision required for all task organized
and attached units executing police operations, detention operations, and security and
mobility support.
• Coordinates with the headquarters and headquarters detachment, military police
brigade, host-nation military organizations, and the civil police authorities concerning
host-nation support.
• Conducts vulnerability assessments of critical facilities.
• Provides management of detainee operations and supervises the staff for collection
and evacuation of detainees and/or dislocated civilians.
• Prepares the command and control of subordinate elements that support counterdrug
operations pursuant to controlling law and within the provisions of DOD policy.
• Integrates Police Intelligence Operations and vulnerability assessments into the
common operational picture
• Supervises the selection, organization, training, equipment, and employment of host-
nation military and paramilitary police units.
• Provides military police investigative support within the battalion AOs.
• Provides protective service details for designated high-risk personnel when they are
properly trained or supervised by a CID special agent.
Military police • Conducts command and control of operations for assigned and attached units.
detention • Provides administrative, field feeding, clothing, religious, and recreational support to
battalion
detainees. When organized to support U.S. military prisoners or detainees, field
feeding provided is limited to the procurement/distribution of rations, menus, and field
kitchen equipment and the supervision of qualified U.S. military prisoners or detainees
in the preparation of meals. Complete field-feeding services are provided to high-risk
detainees.
• Coordinates and supervises work projects for detainees or U.S. military prisoners.
• Provides limited health support services and operations public health services during
detainee operations and escorts qualified personnel providing medical care and
operations public health services.
• Screens/inspects incoming and outgoing detainee mail for contraband items.
• Maintains organic equipment in the headquarters and headquarters company and
assigned military police detention companies and detention camp liaison
detachments.
• Operates and maintains battalion internal radio and wire communication nets.
• Provides organic personnel to maintain detention facilities and utilities, heat, lights,
and water.
• Consolidates supply and HR support to U.S. Soldiers assigned to subordinate units.
Legend:
AO area of operations
CA civil affairs
CID criminal investigations division
DOD Department of Defense
HR human resources
MWD military working dog
U.S. United States |
3-81 | 148 | Appendix D
CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR
D-3. Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations include the employment of capabilities that
assess, protect against, and mitigate the entire range of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
incidents to enable freedom of action (FM 3-11). CBRN capabilities support operations across the range of
military operations by assessing CBRN threats and hazards, providing protection against CBRN hazards,
mitigating CBRN incidents, and providing hazard awareness and understanding. The CBRN functions of
assess, protect, and mitigate share a common fundamental purpose that fits within the protection warfighting
function to achieve or contribute to support area operations. Table D-3 provides an overview of CBRN units,
planning requirements, and capabilities at the battalion level and below that may be task-organized to the
support area designated land owner or a tenant unit of the corps or division support area. For additional
information on CBRN operations, see FM 3-11.
Table D-3. CBRN mission planning and capabilities
Organization Capabilities
• Provide command and control for the operation of the brigade and up to
five CBRN battalions.
• Provide staff planning and sustainment coordination with the CBRN staff
within division, corps, or theater Army sector.
CBRN brigade
• Operate a tactical command post and a main command post.
• Allocate units and resources in support of CBRN reconnaissance,
detection, decontamination, and chemical weapons of mass destruction
operations throughout the theater of operation.
• Command and control and supervision of personnel assigned to the
CBRN battalion and up to six CBRN/CBRNE companies.
• Operate a battalion main command post.
• Conduct staff planning and sustainment coordination with the CBRN
CBRN battalion staff within the brigade, division, corps, or theater army sector.
• Allocate task organized units and resources in support of CBRN
reconnaissance, surveillance, decontamination, biological detection, and
CWMD operations to the theater army area, corps, division, and brigade
areas of operation.
Legend:
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CBRNE chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives
CWMD countering weapons of mass destruction
CIVIL AFFAIRS
D-4. CA forces execute CA core competencies and functions. The CA branch provides three core
competencies nested within CA operations–CA activities, military government operations, and CA supported
activities. CA functions are structured under each competency, organizing tasks and systems (people,
organizations, information, and processes) into executable capabilities to create the desired effects. CA core
competencies form the basis for training, organizing, equipping, and employing CA forces. The core
competencies nest within the commander’s overall responsibility for planning and executing civil-military
operations. The following are CA operations core competencies and their nested functions:
* CA activities. Civil affairs activities are activities specifically planned, executed, and assessed by
civil affairs forces that support the commander in order to synchronize, coordinate, and integrate
indigenous populations and institutions, unified action partners, and interagency (FM 3-57). CA
activities provide unique capabilities to the commander. CA activities consist of the following
functions:
Civil reconnaissance.
Civil engagement.
Civil information management. |
3-81 | 149 | Support Area Tenant Units
Civil-military operations center.
CA operations staff support.
* Military government operations. Military government operations are operations executed by
civil affairs to provide expertise in the civil sector functions in order to establish transitional
military authority or conduct support to civil administration (FM 3-57). While the Department of
State has the lead for stabilization and reconstruction, the DOD has a requirement to support that.
DODD 5100.01 directs the Army to establish military government when occupying enemy
territory, and DODD 2000.13 identifies military government as a directed requirement under CA
operations. Although CA forces enable military government by conducting military government
operations, there is currently no overarching concept or doctrine within DOD or the Army on how
to establish a transitional military authority. CA forces provide expertise in civilian sector
functions that are typically the responsibility of civilian authorities to establish local government
capability or to enhance its capacity. This core competency is normally executed in support of
Department of State operations or when directed in the absence of other U.S. government
capabilities. Military government operations include the following functions:
Transitional military authority.
Support to civil administration.
* CA supported activities. Civil affairs supported activities are activities in which civil affairs
plays a key planning, coordinating or synchronizing role, but for which they are not the proponent
or primary executor (FM 3-57). CA supported activities are comprised of the following functions:
Foreign assistance.
Foreign humanitarian assistance.
Populace and resources control.
Civil-military engagement.
D-5. Table D-4 provides an overview of CA units, planning requirements, and capabilities for units that
may be task-organized to the support area designated land owner or tenant unit of the corps or division support
area. For additional information on the capabilities of CA units, see ATP 3-57.70 and FM 3-57.
Table D-4. CA mission planning and capabilities
Organization Capabilities
• Plan, enable, shape, and manage civil-military operations.
• Develop and maintain a civil common operational picture for the corps’
AOs.
• Plan, assess, and manage CA operations in support of unified land
operations.
CA Brigade • Plan, assess, and support military government operations (Subnational).
• Support stabilization, reconstruction, and development.
• Enable indigenous populations and institutions, interagency, and
interorganizational coordination to achieve unified action.
• Enable command and control.
• Enable transitions to consolidate gains. |
3-81 | 150 | Appendix D
Table D-4. CA mission planning and capabilities (continued)
Organization Capabilities
• Plan, enable, shape, and manage civil-military operations
• Develop and maintain a civil common operational for the division’s AOs.
• Plan, assess, and execute CA operations in support of unified land
operations.
CA Battalion • Plan and assess stability activities
• Enable indigenous populations and institutions, interagency, and
interorganizational coordination to achieve unified action.
• Enable mission command.
• Enable transitions to consolidate gains.
Legend:
AO area of operations
CA civil affairs
AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE
D-6. Air and missile defense is the direct (active and passive) defensive actions taken to destroy, nullify, or
reduce the effectiveness of hostile air and ballistic missile threats against friendly forces and assets (JP 3-01).
More precisely, ADA is the dedicated Army systems, personnel, and forces that provide active, land-based
defense against air and missile attacks. ADA forces execute AMD operations under the joint counterair
operational framework based on the integration of offensive and defensive counterair operations. Offensive
counterair are offensive operations to destroy or neutralize enemy aircraft, missile launch platforms, and
their supporting structures and systems both before and after launch, and as close to their source as possible
(JP 3-01). Defensive counterair are all defensive measures designed to neutralize or destroy enemy forces
attempting to penetrate or attack through friendly airspace (JP 3-01).
D-7. During support area operations, the designated support area land owner may be task-organized an ADA
element (SHORAD) to counter low-altitude unmanned aircraft systems, high-speed fixed-wing and rotary-
wing aircraft, reconnaissance, intelligence, and surveillance and target acquisition assets. Table D-5 provides
an overview of the ADA battalion capabilities that may be a tenant unit of the corps or division support area.
For additional information on ADA battalions (SHORAD), see FM 3-01.
Table D-5. ADA mission planning and capabilities
Organization Capabilities
• Air defense against low altitude hostile aircraft
• Air defense airspace management coordination elements to supporting
high and medium ADA battalions
• Early warning information and air defense command and control
ADA Battalion
information to supported units
(SHORAD)
• Unit administration; religious support; field feeding; and communications-
electronics support for units of the battalion
• A force protection element to conduct coordinated defense of the unit’s
area or installation, unit movements, and other missions
Legend:
ADA air defense artillery
SHORAD short-range air defense
AVIATION BRIGADE
D-8. Army aviation formations are organized, trained, and equipped to support the combined arms team at
the tactical and operational levels. Army aviation operations in the support area typically include air
movement, aeromedical evacuation, and command and control support, but they may also include |
3-81 | 151 | Support Area Tenant Units
reconnaissance, attacks, and security operations if there is a threat to the support area. When conducting
attacks, reconnaissance, and security operations, Army aviation typically operates as a combined arms team
with the ground unit designated with the security mission for the support area. The aviation brigade and
theater-aviation EAB require large AAs usually located inside the division support area. An aviation brigade
may need as much as 145,000 square meters to park aircraft and equipment. The space is required because
of the minimum space required around helicopters during takeoff and landing in unimproved areas.
D-9. Table D-6 provides an overview of Army aviation formations capabilities that may be a tenant unit of
the corps or division support area. For additional information on Army Aviation formations, see FM 3-04.
Table D-6. Aviation brigade capabilities
Organization Capabilities
• Conduct command and control of helicopters and equipment to enhance
command, control, communications, and intelligence.
• Provide attack/recon helicopters for rapid employment as a part of the
combined arms team to destroy enemy forces.
• Provide utility and cargo helicopters for air assault and air movement, aerial
mine warfare, downed aircraft recovery team, casualty evacuation, and
intermediate and deliberate search and rescue operations in support of the
division.
Combat Aviation
• Provide air ambulance helicopters to evacuate critically wounded or other
Brigade
patients consistent with evacuation priorities and operational considerations,
from points as far forward as possible, to appropriate role of care.
• Conduct air reconnaissance, surveillance, and security operations in support of
the division.
• Provide air traffic services for division and transit aircraft.
• Provide unmanned aircraft systems for tactical reconnaissance, surveillance
and target acquisition and manned unmanned teaming to increase the
commander’s situational understanding and operational reach.
• Conduct command and control of helicopters and equipment to enhance
command, control, communications, and intelligence.
• Provide utility and cargo helicopters for air assault and air movement, aerial
mine warfare, Downed Aircraft Recovery Team, casualty evacuation, and
Expeditionary intermediate and deliberate search and rescue operations in support of the
Combat Aviation Division/Corps.
Brigade
• Provide air ambulance helicopters to evacuate critically wounded or other
patients consistent with evacuation priorities and operational considerations,
from points as far forward as possible, to appropriate role of care.
• Conduct Air Traffic Services for Division/Corps and transit aircraft.
LOGISTICS CAPBILITIES
D-10. Logistics include maintenance, transportation, supply, field services, distribution, operational contract
support, and general engineering. Field services maintain the force by providing life, morale, and welfare
support. Field services include shower and laundry, field feeding, water production and distribution, clothing
and light textile repair, aerial delivery, and mortuary affairs. Table D-7, page D-8, provides an overview of
sustainment capabilities that may be a tenant unit of the corps or division support area. For additional
information on sustainment, see FM 4-0. |
3-81 | 152 | Appendix D
Table D-7. Sustainment capabilities
Organization Capabilities
• Provide sustainment support which includes logistics support, conduct
human resources support, conduct financial and comptroller support, and
provide health service support.
Expeditionary
• Plan, integrate, synchronize and assess Army common and special
Sustainment Command
operations forces sustainment requirements.
• Rapidly deploy to conduct theater opening, distribution management and
reception, staging and onward movement of forces.
• Provide responsibility for the integration, synchronization, and execution
of sustainment operations for a division.
• Command and control of up to seven battalions.
Division sustainment
• Coordinate and synchronize tactical-level sustainment operations to meet
brigade
current and future operations.
• Provide general support to units assigned or attached to the division and
operating in the division areas of operations.
ARMY HEALTH SYSTEM
D-11. The Army Health System is a component of the Military Health System that is responsible for
operational management of the HSS and FHP missions for training, pre-deployment, deployment, and
postdeployment operations. Army Health System includes all mission support services performed, provided,
or arranged by the Army Medicine to support health service support and force health protection mission
requirements for the Army and as directed, for joint, intergovernmental agencies, coalition, and multinational
forces (FM 4-02). The AHS is a complex system of systems, divided into ten medical functions and aligned
with medical disciplines. These systems are interrelated and interdependent and must be continuously and
meticulously synchronized. The AHS uses medical command and control organizations to manage the
subordinate units providing AHS and FHP (see table D-8).
Table D-8. Medical capabilities
Organization Capabilities
MEDCOM (DS) • Command and control of theater medical units providing AHS support within the
AO.
• Management, coordination, and patient tracking procedures with the theater patient
movement center staff section.
• Synchronization of intratheater evacuation plans with the intertheater evacuation
plan to ensure a seamless transition between tactical and strategic evacuation
systems.
• Coordination and orchestration of medical logistic operations to include Class VIII
supply, distribution, medical maintenance and repair support, optical fabrication,
and blood management.
• Veterinary technical supervision for animal medical care, food protection, and
veterinary public health support.
• Operations public health support for medical and (OEH surveillance, potable water
inspection, pest management, food facility inspection, and control of medical and
nonmedical waste.
• Assistance with coordination and integration of strategic capabilities from the
sustaining base to units in the AO.
• Staff planning, supervision of operations, and administration of assigned and
attached medical units. |
3-81 | 153 | Support Area Tenant Units
Table D-8. Medical capabilities (continued)
Organization Capabilities
Medical Brigade • Command and control of subordinate and attached units.
(Support) • Advises commanders on medical aspects of their operations.
• Medical staff planning, operational and technical supervision, and
administrative assistance for subordinate or attached units and hospitals
operating in the division or corps AO.
• Coordination with the supporting theater patient movement requirements center
for medical regulating and medical evacuation from medical battalion
(multifunctional) and hospitals to support theater Army unit’s MTFs.
• Medical consultation service and technical advice in Operations public health,
behavioral health, dental services, medical laboratory support, nutrition, and
veterinary support.
• Control and supervision of Class VIII supply and resupply to include blood
management. Serves as the single integrated medical logistics manager when
designated by the geographical combatant commander.
• Joint capable C2 capability when augmented with appropriate joint assets.
Medical Battalion • Medical command and control, staff planning, supervision of operations,
(Multifunctional) medical and general logistics support as required, and administration of
activities of subordinates in accomplishing the AHS mission.
• Task organization of EAB health care assets to meet the projected patient
workload.
• Planning and coordination of Role 1 and Role 2 medical treatment, to include
staff advice on a support basis for EAB units without organic health assets.
• Monitoring and supervision of medical logistics operations, to include Class VIII
supply or resupply, medical equipment maintenance and repair support, optical
fabrication and repair support, and blood management.
• Consultation, planning, and coordinating air and ground medical evacuation
within the battalion AO. Coordinating aeromedical evacuation support
requirements with the supporting aviation unit, and synchronizing the air
evacuation plan into the overall medical evacuation plan.
• Coordination of medical regulating and patient movement with the medical
brigade (support) patient movement branch or the MEDCOM (DS) theater
patient movement center, as required within the AO.
• Consultation and technical advice on operations public health (disease vectors
and pest management, medical and OEH surveillance, food facility inspection,
waste and water management, operational hearing services), combat
operational stress control and behavioral health, medical records
administration, veterinary services, nursing practices and procedures, dental
services, and automated medical information systems to supported units.
Legend:
AHS Army Health System
AO area of operations
C2 command and control
EAB echelons above brigade
MTF medical treatment facility
MEDCOM (DS) medical command, deployment support
OEH occupational and environmental health |
3-81 | 154 | Appendix D
REGIONAL SUPPORT GROUP
D-12. The regional support group mission enables a commander to support personnel. The regional support
group is a deployable headquarters that manages base camps or base clusters with a population of 6,000 or
more personnel and requires services beyond basic life support (see ATP 3-90.20). The regional support
group headquarters is designed to relieve the burden of base camp management and operations from the
combatant commander.
D-13. A regional support group provides the command, control, and administrative support structure for
operating a base camp or base cluster with a population of 6,000 or more personnel. The population consists
of military forces, DA Civilians, other government agency personnel, nongovernmental organization
personnel, government contractors, and transients. Usually a regional support group falls under a general
officer command during contingency operations. This mission set includes—
* Commanding assigned or attached units.
* Supporting units and personnel as directed.
* Providing contract requirements definition and oversight assistance.
* Determining base camp support requirements.
* Operating and manning a 24/7 BDOC.
* Commanding smaller contingency bases within the general officer command’s operational area.
* Overseeing base camp management and operations. |
3-81 | 155 | Appendix E
Base Camp and Base Cluster Security and Defense
Support areas are subject to both conventional and unconventional threats. These
threats will attempt to disrupt support area operations by attacking sustainment
operations and command and control nodes, disabling AMD systems, and seizing key
terrain. Every unit in the support area is responsible for its own defense. The
establishment of base camps and base clusters throughout the support area builds on
the concept of integrating mutual support into a viable defense.
BASE CAMP AND BASE CLUSTER OVERVIEW
E-1. A base camp is an evolving military facility that supports the military operations of a deployed unit
and provides the necessary support and services for sustained operations (ATP 3-37.10). Establishing base
camps is a complex task that balances mission, protection, sustainment, and construction requirements. This
task is further complicated by changes in missions; fluctuating troop levels; threat factors; and the
complexity, lethality, and speed of military operations. Added to this are time and resource constraints,
theater entry conditions, mission duration, access to resources, competing requirements, and environmental
considerations.
E-2. The use of base camps for sustainment and related activities are unavoidable during the conduct of
large-scale combat operations. Commanders must be able to establish base camps and enable access for
onward movement and sustainment of forces. Base camps, due to their size and immobility, are difficult to
conceal and are generally considered high-value targets for enemy attacks due to the concentration of friendly
forces and materiel. Securing and protecting base camps and infrastructure is essential to the force ability to
compete and win. Base camps are highly contested and difficult to sustain forward on the battlefield. All
activities forward on the battlefield, including LOCs, critical infrastructure, and hasty base camps or AAs,
must be resilient and mobile.
E-3. The base camp is the focal point for base defense planning and is responsible for defending itself
against Level I threats. The base camp engages Level II and Level III threats and delays them until reinforcing
military police or a TCF arrives to assist in defeating the threat. Each base establishes a BDOC to plan,
coordinate, and supervise base camp defense operations.
E-4. Base camps are nonpermanent by design and are geographically small, defendable areas with defined
perimeters and established access controls. Base camps should be situated and designed to take advantage of
natural and man-made terrain features. The area may vary from high ground with good observation and fields
of fire to highly congested areas, obscuring observation and limiting fields of fire.
E-5. Lethality and the speed of operations may require the establishment of AAs, hasty base camps, and
base clusters using physical terrain features and dispersion to support the protection of forces. The designated
base camp commander assigns areas to tenant units and requires them to tie in fires and observation with
adjacent units. The BDOC is normally located near the center of the base camp. Unit locations in the base
camp are assigned areas based on their future mission, their combat power, and the presence of enemy
avenues of approach within their AO. The base camp commander ensures that observation posts are
established at key points around the entire perimeter along the most likely enemy avenues of approach. When
possible, hasty base camps should provide—
* Concealment from air and ground observation.
* Adequate entrances, exits, and internal routes. |
3-81 | 156 | Appendix E
* Space for dispersion.
* Cover from direct fire.
* Good drainage and soil conditions that can sustain unit vehicles and individual Soldier
movements.
* Terrain masking electromagnetic signatures.
* Sanctuary from enemy artillery fires.
* Sufficient space for basecamp specific purposes.
E-6. Base camps may have a specific purpose, or they may be multifunctional. While base camps are not
permanent bases or installations, the longer they exist, the more they exhibit many of the same characteristics
in terms of the support and services that are provided and the types of facilities that are developed
E-7. A base camp can contain one or more units from one or more Services and typically support U.S. and
multinational forces and other unified action partners operating anywhere along the range of military
operations. (See JP 3-10.) A base camp has a defined perimeter and established access controls. The perimeter
encircles the base camp site and employs crew served-weapons, fighting positions, and observation posts.
E-8. Base camps provide a protected location from which to project and sustain combat power.
Commanders apply operational art to decide when, where, and for what purpose to operate from base camps.
The arrangement and location of base camps (often in austere, rapidly-emplaced configurations) throughout
the support area complement the ability of U.S. forces to conduct sustained, continuous operations, enabling
commanders to apply combat power in support of large-scale combat operations.
E-9. Base camps throughout the support area may be developed for specific purposes. A base camp can
serve as an AA or a sustainment base; support onward movement, integration, or detention operations; or
perform multiple functions. The designated purpose and operational requirements of tenant units serve as the
primary guides for designing a base camp.
E-10. The support area commander designates an area or facility as a base camp and designates the senior
officer as the base camp commander responsible for protection, terrain management, and day-to-day
operations of the base camp. This allows other units in the base camp to focus on their primary functions.
Units located within the base camp are under the TACON of the base camp commander for security and
defense.
E-11. Construction standards for a base camp in support of large-scale combat operations normally fall within
the initial construction standards. An initial construction standard is characterized by facilities with minimum
capabilities, requiring minimal engineer effort and simplifying material transport and availability. Organic
construction is a subset of the initial construction standard. It is intended for immediate use by units upon
arrival in theater for up to 90 days; however, it may be used for up to 6 months. Units use their organic/table
of organization and equipment capabilities to the fullest extent possible to construct base camps. Organic
capabilities may vary based on the type of unit, training, experience, and equipment available. They typically
provide for initial force presence and maneuver activities until force flow supports the arrival of engineer
resources. See ATP 3-37.10 for additional information on base camp construction standards.
E-12. Base camps may be grouped together into a cluster. Within the support area, the support area
commander may designate base clusters for the mutual protection and accomplishment of mission objectives.
A base cluster has no defined perimeter. However, each base camp within the base cluster does. The senior
commander within the base cluster is the base cluster commander. The base cluster commander operates the
BCOC and is responsible for the base cluster defense plan.
E-13. A number of base clusters may exist within the echelon support area, but there will only be limited
assets to assist in their defense. The support area commander will determine which base camps or base
clusters have protection priority and submit the unit protection prioritization list to the appropriate echelon
for consideration of additional protection assets. See appendix A for additional information on developing a
protection prioritization list. |
3-81 | 157 | Base Camp and Base Cluster Security and Defense
BASE CAMP PRINCIPLES
E-14. The base camp commander and staff use the base camp principles as a guide for analytical thinking.
These principles are not a set of rigid rules, nor do they apply in every situation (see ATP 3-37.10 for
additional information on base camp master planning principles). They should be applied with creativity,
insight, and boldness. These principles are—
* Survivability. A primary purpose of base camps is providing a protected location from which to
project and sustain combat power. Base camps depend on the application of effective protection
strategies, generally achieved by developing a comprehensive protection plan consistent with the
principles of protection discussed in ADP 3-37.
* Scalability. Scalability is the ability to tolerate population fluctuations and incorporate changes
in the base camp mission, level of services, or force protection level without the need for
redesign.
* Sustainability. Sustainability is the ability to maintain the necessary level and duration of
sustainment/logistics support to achieve military objectives. This means that base camps must
achieve and maintain effectiveness within the means of available resources (materials, labor,
energy, and funds) without placing any unnecessary strain on existing sustainment systems.
* Standardization. The standardization of base camp policies, Service standards, guidance, system
solutions, standard designs, and construction provides consistent expectations for commanders
and drives the repetitive use of proven best practices and tactics, techniques, and procedures. It
helps achieve a higher degree of sustainability, reliability, and efficiency.
BASE CAMP ACTIVITIES
E-15. Base camp activities are interrelated and interdependent; each activity provides an action that mutually
supports the others. The foundation of all activities is master planning. The base camp activities are—
* Master planning. Master planning is an integrated strategy for the design, construction, and
maintenance of required facilities and infrastructure that integrates base camp improvements for
protection, quality of life for residents, and efficiencies and effectiveness.
* Operations and maintenance. This activity includes all of the tasks needed for constructing,
maintaining, operating, and repairing base camp facilities and infrastructure.
* Protection. Base camp protection includes the consideration of all of the protection tasks within
the protection warfighting function articulated in ADP 3-37 (see appendix A for more information
on protection).
* Sustainment. Sustainment activities provide support in two major areas: sustainment/logistics and
field services.
SITE SELECTION AND LAYOUT
E-16. Numerous competing demands and considerations influence a base camp site selection and layout,
such as tactical and operational objectives, mission concerns, military constraints, environmental factors,
division or corps directives, and commander guidance. A site selection and layout assessment assists in
identifying the potential benefits, vulnerabilities, and protection requirements associated with a base camp.
E-17. In all situations, a site selection and layout assessment aids in estimating base camp characteristics and
the suitability of the site to meet protection requirements. It is important to recognize that some problems are
inherent, such as high ground and snipers overlooking the entire base camp interior, or a location where
floods occur while other problems can be mitigated. Knowledge regarding base camp protection measures
improves throughout the process, from initial selection and layout to design and establishment of the base
camp. Protection considerations deliberately integrated from inception into the site selection, layout, design,
and establishment process greatly reduces the resource requirements (materials, time, and labor) needed to
protect personnel and assets. |
3-81 | 158 | Appendix E
SITE SELECTION CONSIDERATIONS
E-18. Many factors influence site selection, including the tactical situation, access to transportation and
infrastructure, proximity to the civilian population, terrain, weather, protection considerations, and effects of
selecting an alternate location. Site selection can be crucial to effective operations. The primary concern
during site selection is mission accomplishment. However, protection considerations cannot be ignored. A
poorly located base camp may be difficult to secure and could hinder rather than enable the mission. Early
identification of protection and security requirements reduces construction requirements and manpower
demands and helps ensure adequate protection of personnel and assets commensurate with the threat. See
ATP 3-37.10 for additional information on site selection.
DESIGN AND LAYOUT CONSIDERATIONS
E-19. Planners responsible for the base camp layout and design should consider many variables, such as
operational and functional issues, infrastructure requirements, protection and security measures, health and
safety, and emergency response. Each base camp should be prepared to defend against the effects of hostile
actions, nonhostile or unintended events (such as fire), and environmental conditions such as flooding or
other man-made or natural disasters. Many of the base camp layout considerations are similar to site selection
criteria. However, layout concerns and constraints are typically base camp-specific. Throughout the design
process, planners should recognize conflicts, establish priorities, and focus on the most favorable solutions.
The base camp layout should—
* Facilitate current and future operations.
* Maintain a layered, defense-in-depth security approach.
* Include entry control points that maintain security and control vehicle and personnel access.
* Protect critical assets and provide accessible protective shelters (bunkers) throughout the base
camp.
* Allow for the dispersion of units and structures and maintain interior LOCs to support rapid
incident response.
* Maximize protection of high-occupancy structures using measures such as overhead and
sidewall protection designs.
* Maximize utilization of existing buildings and other infrastructure.
E-20. Protection measures that reduce vulnerability and diminish potential threats and hazards to personnel
and critical assets should be addressed during base camp design. These measures include the establishment
of standoff and facilities separation distances, perimeter security, vehicle barriers, entry control points, access
control, intrusion detection, and mass warning.
SECURITY AND DEFENSE
E-21. All commanders are responsible for the protection of forces on base camps within their AOs. The base
camp and base cluster commanders integrate the appropriate protection tasks as part of mission planning and
throughout the operations process. The framework for base camp protection consists of three primary areas:
an outer security area, a perimeter zone, and an inner security area. These are shown conceptually in figure
E-1. The base camp commander implements protection measures for tenant units on the base camp, and the
base cluster commander coordinates, synchronizes, and integrates protection capabilities to safeguard base
camps, secure routes, and protect forces within the base cluster. Protection and defensive measures are
applied within and beyond the confines of the base camp to safeguard personnel, physical assets, and
information. Protecting and defending base camps include consideration of all of the protection principles |
3-81 | 159 | Base Camp and Base Cluster Security and Defense
within the protection warfighting function in ADP 3-37 and the associated defensive tasks detailed in
FM 3-90-1, including—
* Comprehensive. Base camp and base cluster protection is an all-inclusive utilization of
complementary and reinforcing protection tasks and systems available to base camp commanders
to preserve the force.
* Integrated. Base camp and base cluster protection is integrated with other activities, systems,
efforts, and capabilities associated with base camp missions to provide strength and structure to
the overall effort. Integration must occur vertically and horizontally throughout the process.
* Layered. Base camp and base cluster protection capabilities are arranged using a layered approach
to provide strength and depth. Layering reduces the destructive effect of a threat or hazard.
* Redundant. Base camp and base cluster protection efforts are often redundant anywhere that a
vulnerability or point of failure is identified. Redundancy ensures that specific activities, systems,
efforts, and capabilities that are critical for the success of overall base camp protection have a
secondary or auxiliary effort of equal or greater quality.
* Enduring. Ongoing base camp and base cluster protection activities maintain the objectives of
preserving combat power, populations, partners, essential equipment, resources, and critical
infrastructure throughout the base camp life cycle.
Figure E-1. Framework for base camp security and defense
E-22. Base camp and base cluster security and defense capabilities are employed using a layered approach
to provide strength and depth. Layering reduces the destructive effect from any single attack or hazard
through the dissipation of energy or the defeat of the attacking force. A layered defense slows threat attacks
and provides time for friendly defensive forces to assess, decide, and respond. Obstacles, such as barbed wire
fences, jersey barriers, T-walls, berms and ditches, bastion barriers, networked munitions, and direct-fire
positions and elements are deployed in depth, in a concentric fashion, to provide maximum protection. |
3-81 | 160 | Appendix E
E-23. These obstacles, direct-fire positions, and active deterrents can be in the form of—
* Wire, concrete, or other barriers used to reinforce the perimeter.
* Entry control points and associated obstacle/countermobility plans used to canalize and control
incoming personnel or vehicles.
* Barriers employed to block high-speed avenues of approach, externally on approaches to the
perimeter and internally to protect high-risk targets.
* Perimeter guard towers and observation posts.
* Ditches, berms, or other earthen obstacles.
* Mobile security patrols.
* Communications signal/electromagnetic signature masking.
BASE CAMP AND BASE CLUSTER SECURITY
E-24. Base camps provide a protected location to project and sustain combat power. While some base camps,
especially smaller base camps built in high-threat areas, may be required to focus on defense rather than just
security, the primary focus for most base camps is not on conducting defense, except in rare instances. In
these cases, normal mission operations on the base camp cease and the focus of all available assets is shifted
to defense until the threat is eliminated or repelled. Once the threat is defeated, the base camp and its tenant
or transient units return their focus to their primary missions.
E-25. Security operations are those operations performed by commanders to provide early and accurate
warning of enemy operations, to provide the forces being protected with time and maneuver space within
which to react to the enemy, and to develop the situation to allow commanders to effectively use their
protected forces (ADP 3-90). The five fundamentals of security are—
* Provide early and accurate warnings. Early and accurate warnings of an enemy approach are
essential to successful base camp and base cluster protection/force protection. The base camp and
base cluster commanders need information to shift and concentrate forces to meet and defeat the
enemy. The use of OPs, patrols, security forces, and sensors provide long-range observation;
observe enemy movement; and report the enemy’s size, location, and activity.
* Provide reaction time and maneuver space. Base camp and base cluster security assets—forces,
sensors, and patrols—should work at a sufficient distance to allow the base camp and base cluster
commanders time to review rapidly reported information. This timely review gives the base camp
and base cluster commanders the reaction time necessary to order indirect fire to slow the enemy’s
rate of advance; maneuver direct-fire elements into place to engage, exploit, and defeat the enemy;
and initiate coordination for a response force or TCF if required, based on the threat level.
* Orient on the force, area, or facility to be protected. Base camp and base cluster organic,
security, and reinforcement forces must be aware of any enemy movement and must reposition
their elements accordingly to maintain their position relative to any threats. The force must
understand the base camp and base cluster commander’s scheme of protection, including where
the security force is in relation to enemy movement.
* Perform continuous area security operations. Base camp and base cluster personnel conduct
continuous area security operations to gain as much information as possible about the AO and any
threats. This can be accomplished through OPs, mounted and dismounted patrols, and remote
sensors, such as unmanned aircraft systems deployed to observe dead space.
* Maintain threat contact. Once enemy forces are detected, base camp forces must continuously
collect information on the enemy’s activities and disposition to assist the base camp or base cluster
commander in determining the potential and actual enemy COA and deny the enemy the element
of surprise. This requires security forces to maintain continuous visual contact to be able to use
direct and indirect fires to influence enemy actions and gain time for the base camp and base
cluster commander. Once the base camp security forces make enemy contact, they do not break
contact unless the base camp or base cluster commander or a designated security force commander
specifically directs it. |
3-81 | 161 | Base Camp and Base Cluster Security and Defense
E-26. Although not a fundamental of security operations, the use of dispersion is an important technique that
commanders should consider. Dispersing units, command posts, equipment, and personnel reduces
vulnerability against enemy direct- and indirect-fire threats and CBRN attacks. However, units should be
close enough to provide mutual support against enemy ground attacks. Commanders must determine where
risk is acceptable.
E-27. Base camps and base clusters typically protect their personnel and assets through the application of
security activities. Some essential security activities include communications security, cybersecurity,
information security, OPSEC, personnel security, and physical security. Of the five security tasks listed in
ADP 3-90—screen, guard, cover, area security, and local security—only area security and local security
typically apply to base camps and base clusters. Area security preserves the base camp and base cluster
commander’s freedom to move reserves, position fire support means, provide for mission control, conduct
sustaining activities, and coordinate for reinforcing forces (see chapter 2). Local security provides immediate
protection to base camp forces and assets. See ADP 3-37 and ADP 3-90 for additional information on area
and local security.
BASE CAMP DEFENSE
E-28. Defensive operations are operations to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and
develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability operations (ADP 3-0). Base defense refers to the local
military measures, both normal and emergency, required to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of enemy
attacks on, or sabotage of, a base to ensure the maximum capacity of its facilities is available to United States
forces (JP 3-10). Successful base camp and base cluster defenses share the following characteristics:
disruption; flexibility; maneuver; massing effects; and operations in depth, preparation, and security. The
basic defensive tasks are applicable to the area and perimeter of the base camp. See ADP 3-90 for a discussion
of these characteristics.
Area Defense
E-29. Conducting area defense is a defensive task that concentrates on denying enemy forces access to a base
camp, base cluster, or surrounding terrain. The focus of the area defense is on retaining terrain where the bulk
of the defending force positions itself in mutually supporting, prepared positions. Units maintain their
positions and control the terrain between these positions. An area defense capitalizes on the strength inherent
in a closely integrated base camp defense. The higher commander may assign subordinate units or tenant
organizations the task of conducting an area defense as part of their mission. Subordinate echelons defend
within their assigned AOs as part of the larger-echelon operation. See FM 3-90-1 for more information on
area defense.
Perimeter Defense
E-30. The commander can employ perimeter defense as an option when conducting an area defense or in the
conduct of base camp and base cluster defense in the echelon support. A perimeter defense is oriented in all
directions. The prerequisites for a successful perimeter defense are aggressive patrolling and security
operations outside the perimeter. The unit within the perimeter can perform these activities; or another force,
such as the territorial defense forces of a host nation, can perform them. The unit can organize a perimeter
defense to accomplish a specific mission, such as protecting a fire base. A unit may also form a perimeter
when it is located in the friendly echelon support area within the confines of a base camp or base cluster.
E-31. A major characteristic of a perimeter defense is a secure inner area, with most of the combat power
located on the perimeter. Another characteristic is the ease of access for resupply operations. The commander
coordinates direct- and indirect-fire plans to prevent accidentally engaging neighboring friendly units and
noncombatants. Normally, the reserve centrally locates to react to a penetration of the perimeter at any point.
See FM 3-90-1 for more information on perimeter defense. |
3-81 | 162 | Appendix E
BASE DEFENSE OPERATIONS CENTER
E-32. A base defense operations center is a command and control facility established by the base commander
to serve as the focal point for base security and defense (JP 3-10). Other contingency locations may also
establish BDOCs as the situation requires. A base camp’s commander provides and exercises base camp
defense through a BDOC. Through the BDOC, the base camp commander plans, directs, integrates,
coordinates, and controls all base camp defense efforts (see ATP 3-90.20).
E-33. The BDOC resembles a typical command post. A command post is a unit headquarters where the
commander and staff perform their activities (FM 6-0). Personnel and equipment are arranged to facilitate
coordination, the exchange of information, and timely decision making. Well-designed BDOCs integrate
command and staff efforts by matching personnel, equipment, information systems, and procedures against
their internal layout. (See ADP 6-0 or FM 6-0 for more information on command posts.) The protection
functions of a BDOC include the following:
* Plan and execute force protection, AT, and physical security operations according to published
guidance.
* Conduct a protection working group and threat working group.
* Ensure that all units within the perimeter conduct active and passive security measures.
* Monitor and direct security forces.
E-34. The composition of the BDOC depends on the combination of forces involved and may include other
Services and multinational, host-nation, and other U.S. agency personnel, depending on the combination of
forces located at each base camp. Multi-Service, other agency, host-nation, and multinational representation
should be part of the BDOC when elements of their armed forces, police, or paramilitary forces are directly
involved in the overall base defense effort, or when they are a major tenant organization. The BDOC normally
consists of three primary sections: command, intelligence, and operations. There may be additional sections
designated as deemed necessary (see ATP 2-22.2-1).
E-35. Similar to a BDOC, the BCOC is a command and control facility that serves as the base cluster
commander’s focal point for defense and security of the base cluster (see JP 3-10). The BCOC is established
to control several subordinate base camps that may be grouped together in a cluster for mutual support for
protection. The base and base cluster commanders also coordinate and integrate security operations with the
BCOC as appropriate. Other contingency locations may also need to coordinate with BCOCs as the situation
requires. Such coordination normally involves TACON over forces assigned or attached to the base primarily
for the purpose of base defense and security. The base commander may also exercise TACON over other
forces (such as medical or emergency services) residing on the base for primary purposes other than base
defense. For example, when these forces perform functions related to base defense or local security missions
as part of the overall base defense plan, they typically fall under TACON of the base commander (see
ATP 3-90.20). This TACON relationship may not exist at other contingency locations; the echelon (corps or
division) commander should provide guidance in those situations. The BDOC typically conducts 24-hour
operations. Basic BDOC functions include the following:
* Provide organization for coordinated base camp security.
* Prepare plans to implement the commander’s base camp defense guidance.
* Monitor assigned, attached, and tenant-unit forces and resources and provide the commander
information to aid, allocate, and move forces and materiel to meet base defense requirements.
* Inform the base commander of security concerns.
* Develop and execute a reconnaissance and surveillance plan to ensure proper security from
standoff threats within base camp boundaries, and coordinate with the base camp and base cluster
commanders for the area outside the base camp boundary.
* Coordinate with the base camp commander or tenant commander to deconflict security activities
from combat and stability operations.
* Identify and share emergency response and area damage control capabilities, to include medical
support, engineering, EOD, and firefighting, as required. |
3-81 | 163 | Base Camp and Base Cluster Security and Defense
* Evaluate actions to identify operational deficiencies, lessons learned, and best practices.
* Develop methods to improve combined operational effectiveness, to include coordinating
training and exercising security measures.
Base Defense Planning
E-36. Base camp defense planning is a methodical process that combines site selection considerations,
mission objectives, mitigation strategies, identified security requirements, and protection operations. Early
identification of protection requirements is essential to base camp defense planning. Requirements
established before construction reduce construction and manpower costs. Security measures established in
the planning process are more easily applied than after construction.
E-37. The base camp defense plan is necessary for the development and implementation of a comprehensive
protection program. The base camp defense plan should focus efforts and resources toward cohesive defense
operations. A sample plan template is provided in appendix D. The base defense plan should—
* Convey the base camp commander’s intent.
* Provide a clear, concise mission statement.
* Provide tasks and activities, constraints, and coordinating instructions.
* Permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plans.
* Focus on subordinate activities.
* Promote initiative.
* Include annexes containing subordinate information not included in the main defense plan.
E-38. Base camp defense planning should be conducted using a team approach. Essential members include
the base commander, tenant-unit commanders, and the protection team.
Base Camp Commander
E-39. Base camp commanders are responsible for protection planning and operations and should use all
available assets to establish required security levels. Base camp commanders normally exercise TACON for
the purpose of base defense over forces assigned or attached to the base. The commander may also exercise
TACON over other forces residing in the base for primary purposes other than local base defense when these
forces are called on to perform functions related to base camp defense or local security missions as part of
the overall base camp defense plan.
E-40. Base camp commanders also have direct interest in the security of the area surrounding the base. As
such, the commander coordinates base defense efforts with the TCF or host-nation forces providing exterior
security, if available. Base camp commanders establish a BDOC to serve as the focal point for protection,
security, and defense within the base camp boundary. Through the BDOC, the commander plans, directs,
integrates, coordinates, and controls all base camp defense efforts.
E-41. Critical to the success of the protection mission is the need for coordination and cooperation among
assigned or attached units. These units should build operational relationships based on mutual support. For
example, tenant-unit communications equipment may not be compatible with host-unit equipment. In this
case, tenant-unit commanders should coordinate with the base commander to ensure compatibility. |
3-81 | 164 | Appendix E
Tenant-Unit Commanders
E-42. Tenant-unit commanders actively participate in base camp defense planning. Tenant units normally
provide for their own security and contribute personnel to the protection mission. These assigned or attached
forces fall under the base camp commander’s TACON. This relationship may not necessarily exist at all
contingency locations. Regardless, tenant-unit commanders should ensure that provided personnel are
properly equipped and trained. Key tenant-unit concerns include training, rehearsals, coordination, and
competing requirements between security and operational tasks. Tenant-unit commander responsibilities
include—
* Participating in the preparation and execution of base camp defense plans.
* Providing for unit internal security.
* Conducting individual and unit training to ensure readiness for assigned defense tasks.
* Providing an appropriate share of facilities, equipment, and personnel for the BDOC.
* Advising the base camp commander on operational concerns specific to their units.
* Sustaining and administering unit forces.
* Providing unit requirements for common-user communications systems to the base camp
commander’s communications element.
Protection Working Group
E-43. A working group approach should be used to develop the base defense plan and protection measures
and to manage protection operations. To interact efficiently, team members should understand the concepts,
roles, and capabilities of other members. A working-group approach facilitates protection plan development,
intelligence sharing, and coordination between tenant units.
BASE CAMP THREATS
E-44. In most cases, base camps are located where the risk of Level III threats have been eliminated or
effectively mitigated by the designated AO commander. During large-scale combat operations, base camps
often become focal points for bypassed or reconsolidated Level III threats. The support area commander must
be prepared to conduct defensive and offensive tasks by deploying the TCF to repel a Level III attack when
the threat assessment indicates the possibility of a Level III threat in the support area, regardless of whether
the element of decisive action/simultaneous activities is currently dominant. Preparations may involve
significant increases in area denial measures; offensive actions; hardening, dispersal, and other protection
measures; and immediate reaction to hostile actions.
E-45. On initial occupation of the base camp site, friendly forces take offensive actions to identify levels of
enemy presence and eliminate enemy threats in the immediate area, if required. Once the area is cleared and
the necessary elements of the base camp defense have been established, the base camp commander continues
managing area security tasks to provide an early warning and to mitigate the risks of threat elements operating
within the base camp AO. The base camp commander and staff identify gaps in security and requirements
for additional support or assets. The base camp commander, supported by the staff, coordinates with the AO
commander to fill identified capability gaps.
E-46. Base camps are purposely designed and constructed to be resistant to enemy attack and to recover
quickly so that they can continue to operate. The ability to quickly recover from an enemy attack is enhanced
through detailed planning and rehearsals of procedures. Base camps must be prepared to defend in any
direction through flexible base camp defense plans that include the use of dedicated initial-response forces
positioned to respond to the widest possible range of contingencies. |
3-81 | 165 | Base Camp and Base Cluster Security and Defense
E-47. The two principal types of attacks that a base camp commander and their staff focus on are categorized
as penetrating attacks or standoff attacks. Infiltrated attacks from inside the base camp are likely to occur as
well. Screening and vetting local workers are paramount to disrupting the threat’s potential to gain access as
a base camp worker or visitor. Hybrid threats will use the difficulties of positive identification of threat actors
as threat actors to their advantage, and often these actors will provide signatures similar to friendly or neutral
actors, gaining them access to the base camps.
PENETRATING ATTACKS
E-48. Defending against penetrating attacks relies on a strong perimeter defense that incorporates obstacles
and integrated fires from well-protected firing positions. When applying defensive elements to a base camp
perimeter, the type and extent of barrier and fires integration may be restricted based on mission and
operational variables. Base camps within complex terrain, especially in support of stability tasks, will likely
be restricted in the amount and types of obstacles and corresponding fires allowed in the outer security area;
this is especially true for indirect fires.
E-49. Security forces must be capable of disrupting and delaying the penetration of the base camp perimeter
until reinforced by a response force or TCF. Base camp defenders should have tactical mobility with as much
personal protection as possible. Security forces must be equipped with reliable and multiple means of
communication. They should also have the necessary sensors and devices to execute reconnaissance and
surveillance to the limits of the security area. This helps provide adequate detection and early warnings during
periods of limited visibility.
E-50. Joint fires may be employed to augment the organic direct- and indirect-fire capabilities of the base
camp or base cluster. Security force personnel (augmentation and selectively armed personnel) may be
directed to secure key facilities within the base camp, such as command posts, ammunition storage areas,
and aircraft revetments. They may also support finding, fixing, containing, and defeating any attacks that
may penetrate the perimeter. Adequate fire-control measures must be employed to prevent fratricide.
STANDOFF ATTACKS
E-51. Standoff attackers are typically elusive targets. Level I and Level II threats may rely on blending in
with the legitimate populace, only revealing themselves as combatants when they engage in a hostile act.
Standoff attacks are mitigated by conducting area security tasks within and beyond the base camp AO to—
* Deny hiding places to the enemy.
* Disrupt enemy planning, reconnaissance, and organization.
* Detect the enemy as it moves into position and posture forces to quickly neutralize detected forces.
* Deny enemy anonymity through identity activities.
E-52. These preemptive actions rely on timely, accurate, relevant, and predictable intelligence, including
human intelligence, within the base camp outer security area and beyond. For imminent threats that originate
outside the base AO for which the AO commander is unable to assist, the base camp commander must use
organic base camp combat power to counter the threat or, with the permission of the support area commander,
assume the risk of enemy standoff attacks. |
3-81 | 166 | Appendix E
BASE CAMP SECURITY FORCES
E-53. Within a support area, various types of security forces are assigned to secure the security area and
LOCs. These include dedicated base camp and base cluster security forces, LOC security forces, and TCFs.
A response force (normally military police) is a highly mobile, dedicated security force with the capability
to defeat Level I and II threats and delay Level III threats within a support area. All base camp and base
cluster units and/or detachments must maintain a readiness posture. Important rehearsals include commitment
of base camp response forces, commitment of cluster response forces, commitment of the support area TCF,
battle handover, and fire plan rehearsals.
E-54. A base camp may or may not have a force dedicated to its security and defense. Therefore, it is
important for base camp commanders to be aware of the assets available for base camp security and defense.
When there is not a dedicated security force, the base camp commander requires TACON of tenant-unit
personnel to augment security and defense of the base camp. Base camp security and defense is an economy-
of-force mission, so it is imperative that all organic, tenant, and transient forces residing on the base camp
provide assistance to the base camp commander to fulfill these requirements as necessary. See ATP 3-37.10
for additional information on security forces.
BASE CAMP DEFENSE PLAN
E-55. The base camp commander plans, directs, integrates, coordinates, and controls all base camp defense
efforts. The commander also coordinates and integrates security operations with the BCOC as appropriate.
Such coordination normally involves TACON over forces assigned or attached to the base primarily for the
purpose of local base camp defense. The base commander may also exercise TACON over other forces
residing on the base for primary purposes other than local base camp defense (such as medical). For example,
when these forces perform functions related to base defense or local security missions as part of the overall
base camp defense plan, they fall under TACON of the base camp commander. TACON may be authorized
at the first common higher headquarters. Figure E-2 provides a sample format for a base camp defense plan. |
3-81 | 167 | Base Camp and Base Cluster Security and Defense
[CLASSIFICATION]
Place the classification at the top and bottom of every page of the OPLAN or OPORD. Place the
classification marking Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential in parentheses at the front of each paragraph
and subparagraph. Refer to AR 380-5 for classification and release marking instructions.
Note. Omit areas that do not apply.
Copy ## of ## copies
Issuing headquarters
Place of issue
Date-time group of signature
Message reference number
The first line of the heading is the copy number that is assigned by the issuing headquarters. Maintain a
log of specific copies issued to addressees. The second line is the official designation of the issuing
headquarters (for example, 1st Infantry Division). The third line is the place of issue. It may be a code
name, postal designation, or geographic location. The fourth line is the date or date-time group that the
plan or order was signed or issued and becomes effective unless specified otherwise in the coordinating
instructions. The fifth line is a headquarters internal control number assigned to all plans and orders
according to unit SOPs.
OPLAN/OPORD [number] [(code name)] [(classification of title)]
Number plans and orders consecutively by calendar year. Include code name, if any.
References: List documents (JP 3-10 and ATP 3-37.10) that are essential to understanding the OPLAN
or OPORD. List references concerning a specific function in the appropriate attachments.
(a)List maps and charts first. Map entries include the series number, country, sheet names or
numbers, edition, and scale.
(b)List other references in subparagraphs labeled as shown.
Note. Doctrinal references for this attachment include JP 3-10, ADP 3-37, FM 3-81, FM 3-90-1,
and ATP 3-90.20.
Time Zone Used Throughout the OPLAN/OPORD: State the time zone used in the AOs during
execution. When the OPLAN or OPORD applies to units in different time zones, use ZULU time.
Task Organization: Describe the organization of forces available to the issuing headquarters and their
command and support relationships. Refer to Annex A (Task Organization) if long or complicated.
The organization for defense should clearly specify the base units providing the forces for each defense
element. Attached or transient units and the names of commanders should be included. The defense
requirements of U.S., HNs, TCNs, and other civilian organizations quartered on the base also should be
identified. Their capabilities to assist in the defense are determined and integrated into the base defense
plan.)
1.Situation. The situation paragraph describes the conditions of the operational environment that impact
operations in the following subparagraphs (Under the following headings, describe the environment in
which defense of the base will be conducted, in sufficient detail for subordinate commanders to grasp the
way in which their tasks support the larger mission):
a.Area of Interest. Describe the area of interest. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.
[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]
Figure E-2. Example format for a base camp defense plan |
3-81 | 168 | Appendix E
[CLASSIFICATION]
b.Area of Operations. Describe the AO. Refer to the appropriate map by its subparagraph under
references; for example, “Map, reference (b).” Refer to appendix 2 (Operation Overlay) to Annex C
(Operations) as required.
(1)Terrain. Describe the aspects of terrain that impact operations. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as
required.
(2)Weather. Describe the aspects of weather that impact operations. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence)
as required.
(Place the classification and title of the OPLAN or OPORD and the issuing headquarters at the top of the
second and any subsequent pages of the base plan or order.)
c.Enemy Forces. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence). (Describe the threat to the base, to include the
composition, disposition, location, movements, estimated strengths, including terrorist organizations and
reconnaissance elements.)
d.Friendly Forces. Refer to base order, Annex A (Task Organization), and Annex C (Operations). (List
information on friendly forces not covered by this OPORD, to include the mission of the next higher
headquarters and adjacent bases as well as units not under base command whose actions will affect or assist
the defense of the base. These units may include security forces, fire support, special operations forces,
cyberspace operations forces, engineers, CBRN units, military police, EOD, HN military or police
organizations, and government and nongovernmental organizations of both the U.S. and HN.)
e.Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations. Identify and describe other
organizations in the AO that may impact physical security or the implementation of physical security
procedures.
f.Civil Considerations. Describe the critical aspects of the civil situation that impact base defense. Refer
to Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations) as required. View civil considerations through a base defense
perspective by using operation and mission variables.
g.Attachments and Detachments. If pertinent, list the units or assets that are attached to or are
detached from the issuing headquarters. State when each attachment or detachment is effective (for example,
on order or on commitment of the reserve) if different from the effective time of the base order. Do not repeat
information that is already listed in Annex A (Task Organization).
h.Assumptions. List the assumptions that are specific to base defense which support the OPORD
development.
2.Mission. Provide a clear concise statement of the base commander’s defense mission.
3.Execution.
a.Commander’s Intent. (The commander discusses how the development of the defense is envisioned
and establishes overall command priorities. This subparagraph should provide subordinates sufficient
guidance to act upon if contact is lost or disrupted.)
b.Concept of Operation. (Briefly describe how the commander believes the overall operation should
progress. Define the areas, buildings, and other facilities considered critical, and establish priorities for their
protection.)
(1)Phasing. (Set forth, if necessary, the phases of the operation as they are anticipated by the
commander.)
(2)Scheme of Maneuver. (Describe the organization of the ground security forces, the assignment of
elements to counter standoff and penetrating attacks to include the base boundary patrol concept of operation
and establishment of a defense with primary, alternate, and supplementary defensive positions, as well as
reaction force responsibilities. Describe the purpose of counterattacks and set work priorities.)
(3)Scheme of Fires. (State plans for employing AMD and supporting fires, such as mortars and other
indirect-fire assets, smoke, and aviation support.)
c.Tasks for Subordinate Elements. (If not previously described, this and succeeding subparagraphs should
set forth the specific tasks for each subordinate defense element listed in the Task Organization.)
d.Reserve. (The next-to-last subparagraph of paragraph 3 contains instructions to the base’s mobile
reserve.)
Figure E-2. Example format for a base camp defense plan (continued) |
3-81 | 169 | Base Camp and Base Cluster Security and Defense
[CLASSIFICATION]
e.Coordinating Instructions. (Always the last subparagraph of paragraph 3. Contains those instructions
applicable to two or more elements or to the command as a whole.)
(1)Control Measures. (Define and establish restrictions on access to and movement into critical areas.
These restrictions can be categorized as personnel, materiel, and vehicles. Security measures also may be
outlined here.)
(a)Base Boundary. (Define and establish the base boundary as coordinated with the area commander.
Include a description of plans to cope with enemy standoff attacks.)
(b)Personnel Access. (Establish control pertinent to each area or structure.)
1.Authority. (Give authority for access.)
2.Criteria. (Give access criteria for unit contractor personnel and local police and armed forces.)
3.Identification and Control
a.(Describe the system to be used in each area. If a badge system is used, give a complete
description to disseminate requirements for identification and control of personnel who conduct business on
the base, if applicable.)
b.(Describe how the system applies to unit personnel, visitors to restricted or administrative areas,
vendors, contractor personnel, and maintenance and support personnel – if applicable.)
(c)Materiel Control Procedures.
1.Incoming.
a.(List requirements for admission of materiel and supplies.)
b.(List special controls on delivery of supplies to restricted areas.)
2.Outgoing.
a.(List required documentation.)
b.(List special controls on delivery of supplies from restricted areas.)
c.(List classified shipments.)
(d)Vehicle Control
1.(State policy on registration of vehicles.)
2.(State policy on search of vehicles.)
3.(State policy on parking.)
4.(State policy on abandoned vehicles.)
5.(List controls for entering restricted areas.)
(e)Train Control
1.(State policy on search of railcars.)
2.(State policy on securing railcars.)
3.(State policy on entry and exit of trains.)
(2)Security Aids. (Indicate the manner in which the following security aids will be implemented on the base.)
(a)Protective Barriers
1.Definition.
2.Clear Zones.
a.Criteria.
b.Maintenance.
3.Signs.
a.Types.
b.Posting.
Figure E-2. Example format for a base camp defense plan (continued) |
3-81 | 170 | Appendix E
[CLASSIFICATION]
4.Gates.
a.Hours of operation
b.Security requirements
c.Lock security.
d.Protective lighting system. (Use and control, inspection, direction, actions during power failures,
emergency lighting.)
(b)Intrusion Detection System
1.Types and locations.
2.Security classifications.
3.Maintenance.
4.Operation.
5.Probability of Detection.
a.Limitations.
b.Compensating measures.
c.Redundant capabilities.
(c)Protection of Classified Information
1.Security containers.
2.Personnel access to areas containing classified material.
3.Vetting and verification of clearance.
4.Classified material handling procedures.
5.Emergency destruction plan.
(3)Interior Guard Procedures. (Include general instructions that apply to all interior guard personnel, fixed
and mobile. Attach detailed instructions such as special orders and standing operating procedures as
annexes. Ensure that procedures include randomness.)
(a)Composition and organization. (Note: During security and support operations, the interior guard may
be a contracted civilian security force.)
(b)Tour of duty.
(c)Essential posts and routes.
(d)Weapons and equipment.
(e)Training.
(f)Military working dogs.
(g)Method of challenge.
(h)Mobile security force.
1.Composition.
2.Mission.
3.Weapons and equipment.
4.Location.
5.Deployment concept.
(4)Rules of engagement. (Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the
circumstances and limitations under which U.S. forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with
other forces encountered.)
[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]
Figure E-2. Example format for a base camp defense plan (continued) |
3-81 | 171 | Base Camp and Base Cluster Security and Defense
[CLASSIFICATION]
(5)Contingency Plans. (Indicate actions in response to various emergency situations. List as annexes any
detailed plans, such as combating terrorism, responding to bomb threats, active shooter response, hostage
situations, emergency destruction of classified information, natural disasters, and firefighting.)
(a)Individual actions.
(b)MSF actions.
(6)Security Alert Status.
(7)Air Surveillance.
(8)Noncombatant Evacuation OPLANs.
(9)Coordination with HN or Adjacent Base Plans.
(10)Measures for Coordination with Response Force and Tactical Combat.
(11)Procedures for Update of This OPORD. (If the OPORD is not effective upon receipt, indicate when it
will become effective.)
4.Sustainment. Identify priorities of sustainment for physical security key tasks, and specify additional
instructions as required. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) as required.
5.Command and Signal.
a.Command.
(1)Location of the Commander. State the locations of the provost marshal and military police
commanders within the AO.
(2)Liaison Requirements. State the physical security liaison requirements that are not covered in SOPs.
b.Control.
(1)Command Posts. Describe the employment of command posts within the AO, including the location
of each command post and its time of opening and closing.
(2)Reports. List police operations-specific reports that are not covered in SOPs. Refer to Annex R (Reports)
as required.
c.Signal. Address police operations-specific communications requirements. Refer to Annex H (Signal) as
required.
ACKNOWLEDGE: Include only if the attachment is distributed separately from the base order.
[Commander’s last name]
[Commander’s rank]
The commander or authorized representative signs the original copy of the attachment. If the representative
signs the original, add the phrase “For the Commander.” The signed copy is the historical copy and remains in
the headquarter files.
DISTRIBUTION: Show only if distributed separately from the base order or higher-level attachments.
[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]
Legend:
AMD air missile defense JP joint publication
AO area of operations MSF mobile security force
AR Army regulation OPLAN operation plan
ATP Army techniques publication OPORD operation order
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and SOP standard operating procedure
nuclear TCN third country nationals
EOD explosive ordnance disposal U.S. United States
FM field manual ZULU time zone indicator for Universal Time
HN host nation
Figure E-2. Example format for a base camp defense plan (continued) |
3-81 | 173 | Glossary
The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Where Army and
joint definitions differ, (Army) precedes the definitions.
SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
AA assembly area
ADA air defense artillery
ADP Army doctrine publication
AHS Army Health System
AO area of operations
AMD air missle defense
AR Army regulation
ARFOR Army forces
ASCOPE areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events
ASR alternate supply route
AT antiterrorism
ATP Army techniques publication
attn attention
BCT brigade combat team
BCOC base cluster operations center
BDOC base defense operations center
BSB brigade support battalion
CA civil affairs
CARVER criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, and
recognizability
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CBRNE chemical, biological, radiologial, nuclear, and explosives
CERCLA Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
COA course of action
DA Department of the Army
DC dislocated civilian
DOD Department of Defense
DODD Department of Defense directive
DODI Department of Defense instruction
DSCA defense support of civil authorities
EAB echelons above brigade
EOD explosive ordnance disposal
F&Es Fire and Emergency Services |
3-81 | 174 | Glossary
FHP force health protection
FM field manual
FY fiscal year
G-1 assistant chief of staff, personnel
G-9 assistant chief of staff, civil affairs operations
HR human resources
HSC headquarters support company
HSS health service support
IPB intelligence preparation of the battlespace
J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff
JP joint publication
JSA joint security area
LOC line of communications
MDMP military decisionmaking process
MEB maneuver enhancement brigade
METT-TC mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time
available, and civil considerations
MO Missouri
MOE measure of effectiveness
MOP measure of performance
MSCoE Maneuver Support Center of Excellence
MSHARPP mission, symbolism, history, accessibility, recognizability, population, and
proximity
MSR main supply route
NO. number
OPCON operational control
OPORD operation order
OPLAN operation plan
OPSEC operations security
PMESII-PT political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical
environment, and time (operational variables)
PIR priority intelligence requirement
S-1 battalion or brigade manpower and personnel staff officer
S-2 battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer
S-3 battalion or brigade operations staff officer
S-4 battalion or brigade logistics staff officer
S-5 battalion or brigade plans staff officer
S-6 battalion or brigade signal staff officer
S-9 battalion or brigade civil affairs operations staff officer
SHORAD short-range air defense
SPO support operations
TACON tactical control |
3-81 | 175 | Glossary
TC training circular
TCF tactical combat force
UMT unit ministry team
U.S. United States
USC United States Code
SECTION II – TERMS
This section contains no entries. |
3-81 | 177 | References
All websites accessed on 27 August 2021.
REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS
These documents must be available to intended users of this publication.
DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. August 2021.
FM 1-02.1. Operational Terms. 9 March 2021.
FM 1-02.2. Military Symbols. 10 November 2020.
RELATED PUBLICATIONS
These documents contain relevant supplemental information.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND JOINT PUBLICATIONS
Most Department of Defense publications are available online at https://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/. Most
joint publications are available online at http://www.jcs.mil/doctrine/.
DODD 2000.13. Civil Affairs. 11 March 2014.
DODD 3025.18. Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). 29 December 2010.
DODD 5100.01. Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components. 21 December
2010.
DODI O-2000.16 Volume I. (U) DoD Antiterrorism Program Implementation: DoD Antiterrorism
Standards. 17 November 2016.
DODI O-2000.22. Designation and Physical Protection of DoD High-Risk Personnel. 19 June 2014.
DODI 3025.21. Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies. 27 February 2013.
DODI 6055.06. DoD Fire and Emergency Services (F&Es) Program. 3 October 2019.
JP 2-01.2. (U) Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence in Joint Operations (on SIPRNET only). 6
April 2016.
JP 2-0. Joint Intelligence. 22 October 2013.
JP 2-01.3. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. 21 May 2014.
JP 2-03. Geospatial Intelligence in Joint Operations. 5 July 2017.
JP 3-0. Joint Operations. 17 January 2017.
JP 3-01. Countering Air and Missile Threats. 21 April 2017.
JP 3-10. Joint Security Operations in Theater. 25 July 2019.
JP 3-11. Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments.
29 October 2018.
JP 3-13.3. Operations Security. 6 January 2016.
JP 3-26. Joint Combating Terrorism. 30 July 2020.
JP 3-28. Defense Support of Civil Authorities. 29 October 2018.
JP 3-34. Joint Engineer Operations. 6 January 2016.
JP 3-36. Joint Air Mobility and Sealift Operations. 4 January 2021.
JP 3-52. Joint Airspace Control. 13 November 2014.
JP 3-41. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response. 9 September 2016. |
3-81 | 178 | References
JP 4-0. Joint Logistics. 4 February 2019.
JP 4-01.5. Joint Terminal Operations. 2 November 2015.
ARMY PUBLICATIONS
Unless otherwise indicated, Army publications are available online: https://armypubs.army.mil/.
ADP 1-01. Doctrine Primer. 31 July 2019.
ADP 3-0. Operations. 31 July 2019.
ADP 3-07. Stability. 31 July 2019.
ADP 3-28. Defense Support of Civil Authorities. 31 July 2019.
ADP 3-37. Protection. 31 July 2019.
ADP 3-90. Offense and Defense. 31 July 2019.
ADP 4-0. Sustainment. 31 July 2019.
ADP 5-0. The Operations Process. 31 July 2019.
ADP 6-0. Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces. 31 July 2019.
AR 380-5. Army Information Security Program. 22 October 2019.
ATP 1-05.1. Religious Support and the Operations Process. 31 July 2018.
ATP 1-05.3. Religious Support and External Advisement. 31 January 2019.
ATP 1-05.4. Religious Support and Internal Advisement. 23 March 2017.
ATP 3-11.41/MCRP 3-37.2C/NTTP 3-11.24/AFTTP 3-2.37. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management
Operations. 30 July 2015.
ATP 2-22.2-1. Counterintelligence Volume I: Investigations, Analysis and Production, and Technical
Services and Support Activities. 11 December 2015.
ATP 2-22.2-2. Counterintelligence Volume II: Operations and Collections Activities. 22 December
2016.
ATP 3-21.20. Infantry Battalion. 28 December 2017.
ATP 3-09.12. Field Artillery Targeting Acquisition. 24 July 2015.
ATP 3-13.3. Army Operations Security for Division and Below. 16 July 2019.
ATP 3-34.5. Environmental Considerations. 10 August 2015.
ATP 3-34.40. General Engineering. 25 February 2015.
ATP 3-34.80. Geospatial Engineering. 22 February 2017.
ATP 3-37.2. Antiterrorism. 19 July 2021.
ATP 3-37.10. Base Camps. 27 January 2017.
ATP 3-37.34. Survivability Operations. 16 April 2018.
ATP 3-39.10. Police Operations. 24 August 2021.
ATP 3-39.30. Security and Mobility Support. 21 May 2020.
ATP 3-39.35. Protective Services. 31 May 2013.
ATP 3-39.32. Physical Security. 30 April 2014.
ATP 3-57.10. Civil Affairs Support to Populace and Resource Control. 6 August 2013.
ATP 3-57.70. Civil-Military Operations Center. 5 May 2014.
ATP 3-90.4. Combined Arms Mobility. 8 March 2016.
ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5. Combined Arms Countermobility Operations. 17 September 2014.
ATP 3-90.20. Regional Support Group. 16 January 2018.
ATP 3-91. Division Operations. 17 October 2014.
ATP 4-01.45/MCRP 3-40F.7/NTTP 4-01.6/AFTTP 3-2.58. Multi-Services Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for Tactical Convoy Operations. 26 March 2021. |
3-81 | 179 | References
ATP 4-10/MCRP 4-11H/NTTP 4-09.1/AFMAN 10-409-O. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for Operational Contract Support. 18 February 2016.
ATP 4-14. Expeditionary Railway Center Operations. 29 May 2014.
ATP 4-16. Movement Control. 5 April 2013.
ATP 4-32.1. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Group and Battalion Headquarters Operations.
24 January 2017.
ATP 4-32.3. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Company, Platoon, and Team Operations.
1 February 2017.
ATP 4-42. Material Management, Supply, and Field Services Operations. 2 November 2020.
ATP 5-19. Risk Management. 14 April 2014.
FM 1-05. Religious Support. 21 January 2019.
FM 3-0. Operations. 6 October 2017.
FM 3-01. U.S. Army Air and Missile Defense Operations. 22 December 2020.
FM 3-04. Army Aviation. 6 April 2020.
FM 3-09. Fire Support and Field Artillery Operations. 30 April 2020.
FM 3-11. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Operations. 23 May 2019.
FM 3-12. Cyberspace Operations and Electromagnetic Warfare. 24 August 2021.
FM 3-22. Army Support to Security Cooperation. 22 January 2013.
FM 3-34. Engineer Operations. 18 December 2020.
FM 3-39. Military Police Operations. 9 April 2019.
FM 3-50. Army Personnel Recovery. 2 September 2014.
FM 3-52. Airspace Control. 20 October 2016.
FM 3-55. Information Collection. 3 May 2013.
FM 3-57. Civil Affairs Operations. 28 July 2021.
FM 3-63. Detainee Operations. 2 January 2020.
FM 3-90-1. Offense and Defense Volume I. 22 March 2013.
FM 3-94. Armies, Corps, and Division Operations. 23 July 2021.
FM 4-0. Sustainment Operations. 31 July 2019.
FM 4-02. Army Health System. 17 November 2020.
FM 4-30. Ordnance Operations. 1 April 2014.
FM 6-0. Commander and Staff Organization and Operations. 5 May 2014.
FM 6-02. Signal Support to Operations. 13 September 2019.
FM 6-27/MCTP 11-10C. The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Land Warfare. 7 August 2019.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS
These publications are available at http://uscode.house.gov/.
10 USC. Armed Forces.
14 USC. Coast Guard.
22 USC. Foreign Relations and Intercourse.
32 USC. National Guard.
42 USC. The Public Health and Welfare.
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act.
https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/comprehensive-environmental-response-compensation-
and-liability-act-cercla-and-federal. |
3-81 | 180 | References
WEBSITES
Occupational Safety and Health Administration Standard 1910.120. Hazardous Waste Operations and
Emergency Response. https://www.osha.gov/laws-regs/interlinking/standards/1910.120
accessed on 17 August 2021.
Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 (18 USC 1385. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/STATUTE-
75/STATUTE-75-Pg195-2 accessed on 1 September 2021.
Standard for Competence of Responders to Hazardous Materials/Weapons of Mass Destruction
Incidents. https://www.nfpa.org/codes-and-standards/all-codes-and-standards/list-of-codes-
and-standards/detail?code=472 accessed on 17 August 2021.
PRESCRIBED FORMS
This section contains no entries.
REFERENCED FORMS
Unless otherwise indicated, DA forms are available on the Army Publishing Directorate website at
https://armypubs.army.mil/.
DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.
DA Form 1156. Casualty Feeder Card.
RECOMMANDED READINGS
ADP 2-0. Intelligence. 31 July 2019.
ADP 3-19. Fires. 31 July 2019.
ADP 7-0. Training. 31 July 2019.
ADRP 1-03. The Army Universal Task List. 2 October 2015.
AR 525-13. Antiterrorism. 3 December 2019.
ATP 3-28.1/MCRP 3-36.2/NTTP 3-57.2/AFTTP 3-2.67/CGTTP 3-57.1. Multi-Service Tactics
Techniques, and Procedures for Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). 11 February
2021.
ATP 3-53.2. Military Information in Conventional Operations. 7 August 2015.
ATP 3-57.60. Civil Affairs Planning. 27 April 2014.
ATP 3-60. Targeting. 7 May 2015.
ATP 3-92. Corps Operations. 7 April 2016.
ATP 3-93. Theater Army Operations. 27 August 2021.
ATP 4-41. Army Field Feeding and Class I Operations. 31 December 2015.
ATP 4-45. Force Provider Operations. 24 November 2014.
ATP 4-93. Sustainment Brigade. 11 April 2016.
ATP 4-98. Army Field Support Brigade. 30 June 2021.
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) and Federal
Facilities. https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/comprehensive-environmental-response-
compensation-and-liability-act-cercla-and-federal, accessed on 17 August 2021.
FM 1-0. Human Resources Support. 25 August 2021.
FM 1-06. Financial Management Operations. 15 April 2014.
FM 4-02. Army Health System. 17 November 2020.
ATP 4-33. Maintenance Operations. 9 July 2019.
FM 4-40. Quarter Master Operations. 22 October 2013.
JP 1. Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 25 March 2013.
JP 3-13. Information Operations. 27 November 2012. |
3-81 | 181 | Index
Entries are by paragraph number.
division. 1-12
A P
air and missile defense. A-54 E personnel recovery. A-54
analysis. 4-15 EOD. A-54 police intelligence. 2-30, 4-15
antiterrorism. A-54 police operations. 2-29
F
area security. A-7 priorities. C-31
force health protection. 5-49
C freedom of movement. 2-30 R
CBRN. A-54 railheads and terminals
H
civil control. 2-30, 4-15 security. C-23
higher-echelon headquarters.
combat power. 1-72, A-9 1-12 reconnaissance. 1-48
combined arms. 1-48, 4-61 reconnaissance and surveillance.
L 4-16
convoy security. 4-62
law enforcement. 2-30, 4-15
corps. 1-12, 1-15 S
countermobility operations. M security. 2-30, 1-48
4-92 main command post. 2-7 security operations. C-6
counterreconnaissance. C-7 military police disciplines. 2-29 stability. 1-13, 1-44
critical asset list. A-54 mission variables. 1-55, 1-59 support area. C-22
critical asset security. A-7 mobility considerations. C-5 surveillance. 1-48
cyberspace. A-54 movement control. C-5 sustainment. 5-1, 5-14
D N T
defended asset list. A-54 nonlethal. D-2, 2-28 tactical command post. 2-6
detainee operations. 2-29 O theater. 1-12
detention. 2-30
offensive tasks. 1-44 U
detention and resettlement.
operational area security. 4-29 U.S. military prisoners. 2-29
2-29
operational variables. 1-54
disciplines. 2-28, 2-29, D-2 W
operations security. A-7
military police disciplines. warfighting function. 5-1
2-29 |
3-81 | 183 | FM 3-81
09 November 2021
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
JAMES C. MCCONVILLE
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
MARK F. AVERILL
Acting Administrative Assistant
to the Secretary of the Army
2131202
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and United States Army Reserve. To be distributed in |
6-99 | 1 | FM 6-99
U.S. ARMY REPORT AND
MESSAGE FORMATS
MAY 2021
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
This publication supersedes FM 6-99, dated 19 August 2013. |
6-99 | 2 | This publication is available at the Army Publishing Directorate site
(https://armypubs.army.mil/) and the Central Army Registry site |
6-99 | 3 | *FM 6-99
Field Manual Headquarters
No. 6-99 Department of the Army
Washington, D.C., 17 May 2021
U.S. Army Report and Message Formats
Contents
Page
PREFACE....................................................................................................................ix
INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................................xi
Chapter 1 INSTRUCTIONS ........................................................................................................ 1-1
Report and Message Formats ................................................................................... 1-1
Message Organization ............................................................................................... 1-1
Chapter 2 HOW TO USE THIS MANUAL.................................................................................. 2-1
Manual Organization ................................................................................................. 2-1
Report Formats Numbering System .......................................................................... 2-1
General Instructions .................................................................................................. 2-1
Chapter 3 VARIABLE MESSAGE FORMAT ............................................................................. 3-1
Variable Message Format Explanation ..................................................................... 3-1
Message Standard Functional Areas ........................................................................ 3-1
Variable Message Format Development ................................................................... 3-2
Appendix A VOICE MESSAGE FORMAT TEMPLATES ............................................................ A-1
Accident Report/Serious Incident Report [SIR] .........................................................A -2
Acknowledge Message [AKNLDG] ............................................................................A -4
Adversary Message Spot Report [ADMSSPTREP] .................................................. A-5
Air Defense Command Message [AIRDEFCOM] ......................................................A -6
Air Mission Request Status/Tasking [REQSTATASK] ..............................................A -7
Air Support Request [AIRSUPREQ] ..........................................................................A -8
Airlift Request [AIRLIFTREQ] ..................................................................................A-10
Airspace Coordinating Measures Request [ACMREQ] ...........................................A-12
Airspace Control Order [ACO] .................................................................................A-13
Ammunition Fire Unit-Ammunition Status [AFU.AMS] ............................................A-14
Ammunition Fire Unit-Ammunition Supply Rate [AFU.ASR] ...................................A-15
Ammunition Fire Unit-Deployment Command [AFU.DCMD] ...................................A-16
Ammunition Fire Unit-Fire Status [AFU.FUS] ..........................................................A-18
Ammunition Fire Unit-Firing Site Data [AFU.FSD] ..................................................A-20
Ammunition Fire Unit-Mission Fired Report [AFU.MFR] .........................................A-21
Artillery Target Intelligence-Artillery Target Criteria [ATI.TCRIT] ............................A-23
Artillery Target Intelligence-Artillery Target Report [ATI.ATR] ................................A-24
Asset/Multiple Asset Status Report [ASTSTATREP] ..............................................A-26
Aviation (Army Rotary Wing) Mission/Support Request [AVIAREQ] ......................A-27
Basic Wind Data Message [BWD] ...........................................................................A-28
Battle Damage Assessment Report [BDAREP PHASE 1] ......................................A-29
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited.
*This publication supersedes FM 6-99, dated 19 August 2013. |
6-99 | 4 | Contents
Bed Availability and Element Status [BEDAVAIL] .................................................. A-31
Bed Designations [BEDDESIG] .............................................................................. A-33
Bed Request [BEDREQ] ......................................................................................... A-35
Blood Shipment Report [BLDSHIPREP] ................................................................. A-37
Bridge Report [BRIDGEREP] .................................................................................. A-39
Bulk Petroleum Allocation [POLALOT] ................................................................... A-40
Bulk Petroleum Contingency Report [REPOL] ....................................................... A-41
Bulk Petroleum Requirements Forecast [POLRQMT] ............................................ A-42
Bulk Class III Request/Forecast [BKLIIIREQ] ......................................................... A-43
Casualty Report [CASREP] .................................................................................... A-44
CBRN 1CHEM/BIO/RAD/NUC Report [CBRN 1] ................................................... A-45
CBRN 2 CHEM/BIO/RAD/NUC Report [CBRN 2] .................................................. A-47
CBRN 3 CHEM/BIO/RAD/NUC Report [CBRN 3] .................................................. A-48
CBRN 4 CHEM/BIO/RAD/NUC Report [CBRN 4] .................................................. A-50
CBRN 5 CHEM/BIO/RAD/NUC Report [CBRN 5] .................................................. A-51
CBRN 6 CHEM/BIO/RAD/NUC Report [CBRN 6] .................................................. A-52
CBRN Hazard Warning Message [CBRN HAZWARN] ........................................... A-53
CBRN Situation Report [CBRN SITREP] ................................................................ A-54
Cemetery Status [CEMSTAT] ................................................................................. A-55
Chemical Downwind Message [CDM] ..................................................................... A-57
Close Air Support Summary [CASSUM] ................................................................. A-59
Commander’s Situation Report [SITREP] ............................................................... A-60
Computer Network Attack [COMNETATK] ............................................................. A-63
Crew Manning Report [CREWMNQREP] ............................................................... A-64
Crossing Report [CROSSREP] ............................................................................... A-65
Cyber Effects Request Format [CERF] ................................................................... A-66
Cyberspace Operations Mission Request Status/Tasking [CYOPREQSTATSK] .. A-68
Daily Blood Report [DBLDREP] .............................................................................. A-69
Direct Support Unit Report [DIRSPTREP] .............................................................. A-70
Effective Downwind Message [EDM] ...................................................................... A-71
Electronic Attack Data Message [EADAT] .............................................................. A-72
Electronic Warfare Frequency Deconfliction Message [EWDECONFLICT] ........... A-73
Electronic Warfare Mission Summary [EWMSNSUM] ............................................ A-74
Electronic Warfare Requesting/Tasking Message [EWRTM] ................................. A-76
Enemy/Friendly/Unit Minefield/Obstacle Report [MINOBREP] ............................... A-79
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Support [EODSPT] ................................................. A-81
Fire Mission-Beacon Location [FM.BEALOC] ......................................................... A-83
Fire Mission-Request To Fire [FM.RF] .................................................................... A-84
Fire Planning-Compute A Fire Plan [FP.COMPFP] ................................................ A-85
Fire Planning-Fire Plan Executive Orders [FP.FPO] .............................................. A-86
Fire Planning-Fire Plan Target List [FP.FPT] .......................................................... A-87
Fire Planning-Reserve Fire Unit [FP.RESFU] ......................................................... A-88
Fire Support Element-Commander’s Criteria [FSE.CRITER] ................................. A-89
Fire Support Element-Friendly Unit Location [FSE.FRD] ....................................... A-90
Flight Control Information [FLTCONTINFO] ........................................................... A-91
Fragmentary Order [FRAGORD] ............................................................................ A-92
Friendly Nuclear Strike Warning [STRIKWARN] .................................................... A-93
General Administrative Message [GENADMIN] ..................................................... A-94
Handover Message [HANDOVER] ......................................................................... A-95
Highway Situation Report [HWYSITREP] ............................................................... A-97
Human Remains Search And Recovery Status Report [REMAINSARSTAT] ........ A-98
Intelligence Report [INTREP] .................................................................................. A-99
Intelligence Summary [INTSUM] ........................................................................... A-100
Isolated Soldier Guidance [ISG] ............................................................................ A-102
Isolated Soldier Guidance Execution Report [ISGX] ............................................ A-104 |
6-99 | 5 | Contents
Logistics Resupply Request [LOGRESREP] ........................................................ A-105
Logistics Status Report [LOGSTAT] ..................................................................... A-106
Mail Distribution Scheme Change [MAILDISTCH] ............................................... A-108
Maintenance Support Request [MAINTSPTREQ] ................................................ A-109
Maintenance Support Response [MAINTSPTRES] ............................................. A-110
Major Ammunition Malfunction-Initial Report [AMMOMALFUNCREP] ................ A-111
Meaconing, Intrusion, Jamming, and Interface (MIJI) Feeder Report
[MIJIFEEDER] ................................................................................................ A-112
Media Contact Report [MEDIACOTREP] ............................................................. A-113
9-LINE Medical Evacuation Request [MEDEVAC] ............................................... A-114
Medical Situation Report [MEDSITREP] .............................................................. A-116
Medical Status Report [MEDSTAT] ...................................................................... A-117
Message, Audience, Reaction, Carrier, Origin Report [MARCOREP] ................. A-118
Message Correction or Cancellation [MSGCORRCAXN] .................................... A-120
Meteorological-Computer Message [MET.CM] .................................................... A-121
Meteorological-Fallout Message [MET.CF] .......................................................... A-122
Meteorological-Target Acquisition Message [MET.TA] ........................................ A-123
Military Information Support Operations Report [MISOREP] ............................... A-124
Military Postal Facility Request [POSTREQ] ........................................................ A-125
Missile Intercept Report [MIR] .............................................................................. A-126
Modification-Attack Criteria [MOD.ATTACK] ........................................................ A-127
Modification-Attack Exclude Criteria [MOD.XCLUDE] ......................................... A-128
NMC Summary Report [NMC] .............................................................................. A-129
Operation Order [OPORD] ................................................................................... A-130
Operation Plan Change [PLANORDCHG] ........................................................... A-133
Operation Report [OPREP] .................................................................................. A-134
Operations Summary [OPSUM] ........................................................................... A-135
Patrol Report [PATROLREP]................................................................................ A-136
Personnel Recovery Incident Report [PRIR] ........................................................ A-137
Personnel Recovery Request [PRREQ] ............................................................... A-138
Personnel Recovery Situation Summary Report [PRSIT] .................................... A-139
Personnel Status Report [PERSTAT] ................................................................... A-140
Preliminary Technical Report [PRETECHREP].................................................... A-142
Psychological Action Report [PSYACTREP] ........................................................ A-143
Public Affairs Operation Report [PUBAFFOPSREP] ........................................... A-144
Radar Status Report [RADSTAT] ......................................................................... A-145
Reconnaissance Exploitation Report [RECCEXREP] .......................................... A-146
Reconnaissance Following Report [RECON 4] .................................................... A-147
Reconnaissance Nickname Report [RECON 1] ................................................... A-148
Reconnaissance Scheduling Report [RECON 3] ................................................. A-149
Reconnaissance Track Report [RECON 2] .......................................................... A-151
Religious Support Report [RSREP] ...................................................................... A-153
Request Confirmation [REQCONF] ...................................................................... A-155
Request for Information [RI] ................................................................................. A-156
Response to Request For Information [RRI] ........................................................ A-157
Road Clearance Request [ROADCLRREQ] ......................................................... A-158
Route Report [ROUTEREP] ................................................................................. A-160
Rules of Engagement Authorization [ROEAUTH] ................................................ A-161
Rules of Engagement Implementation [ROEIMPL] .............................................. A-162
Scatterable Minefield Record [SCATMINREC] .................................................... A-163
Scatterable Minefield Request [SCATMINREQ] .................................................. A-164
Scatterable Minefield Warning [SCATMINWARN] ............................................... A-165
Sensitive Items Report [SENITREP] .................................................................... A-166
Severe Weather Warning [SVRWXWARN] .......................................................... A-167
SLANT Report [SLANTREP] ................................................................................ A-168 |
6-99 | 6 | Contents
Sortie Allotment [SORTIEALOT] ........................................................................... A-169
Source, Content, Audience, Media, Effect Report [SCAMEREP] ......................... A-170
Spill Report [SPILLREP] ....................................................................................... A-173
Spot Report [SPOTREP] ....................................................................................... A-174
Summary Report Of Nuclear Detonations [NUDETSUM] ..................................... A-175
Support-Air Corridor [SPRT.AIRCOR] .................................................................. A-176
Support-Battlefield Geometry [SPRT.GEOM] ....................................................... A-178
Support-Damage Avoidance Area [SPRT.DAACAT] ............................................ A-180
Surveillance and Reconnaissance Plan Report [SURRECONREP] .................... A-182
Survey-Control Point Access Request [SURV.TPAC] .......................................... A-183
Survey-Control Point Storage (Input/Output) Message [SURV.SCPST] .............. A-184
System-Reply or Remarks Message [SYS.RRM] ................................................. A-185
System-Request for Report [SYS.RFR] ................................................................ A-186
Tactical ELINT Report [TACELINT] ...................................................................... A-187
Temporary Burial Site Request [TEMPBURIALSITEREQ] ................................... A-188
Track Management Message [TRKMAN] ............................................................. A-190
Track/Point Report [TRKREP] .............................................................................. A-191
Transportation Support Request (TRANSSPTREQ) ............................................ A-192
Transportation Support Response (TRANSSPTRES) .......................................... A-194
Unit Situation Report [UNITSITREP] .................................................................... A-196
War Crime Reportable Incident Report [WCRIR] ................................................. A-198
Warning Message-Air Defense [AIRDEFWARN] .................................................. A-199
Warning Order [WARNORD] ................................................................................ A-200
Water Supply Point [WTRSUPPT] ........................................................................ A-202
Weather Advisory or Watch [WEATHERWATCH] ................................................ A-203
Weather Forecast [WXFCST] ............................................................................... A-204
GLOSSARY ................................................................................................ Glossary-1
REFERENCES ........................................................................................ References-1
Figures
Figure 1-1. Sample message ......................................................................................................... 1-2
Tables
Introductory table 1. Deleted and added reports ............................................................................. xii
Introductory table 2. Modified reports with name changes .............................................................. xii
Introductory table 3. Reports modified ............................................................................................. xii
Table A-1. Accident report/serious incident report acronym and abbreviation key ....................... A-3
Table A-2. Acknowledge message acronym and abbreviation key ............................................... A-4
Table A-3. Adversary message spot report acronym and abbreviation key .................................. A-5
Table A-4. Air defense command message acronym and abbreviation key ................................. A-6
Table A-5. Air mission request status/tasking acronym and abbreviation key .............................. A-7
Table A-6. Air support request acronym and abbreviation key ...................................................... A-9
Table A-7. Airlift request acronym and abbreviation key ............................................................. A-11
Table A-8. Airspace coordinating measures request acronym and abbreviation key ................. A-12
Table A-9. Airspace control order acronym and abbreviation key ............................................... A-13 |
6-99 | 7 | Contents
Table A-10. Ammunition fire unit-ammunition status acronym and abbreviation key ..................A-14
Table A-11. Ammunition fire unit-ammunition supply rate acronym and abbreviation key ..........A-15
Table A-12. Ammunition fire unit-deployment command acronym and abbreviation key ............A-17
Table A-13. Ammunition fire unit-fire status acronym and abbreviation key ................................A-19
Table A-14. Ammunition fire unit-firing site data acronym and abbreviation key .........................A-20
Table A-15. Ammunition fire unit-mission fired report acronym and abbreviation key .................A-22
Table A-16. Artillery target intelligence-artillery target Criteria acronym and abbreviation key ...A-23
Table A-17. Artillery target intelligence-artillery target report acronym and abbreviation key......A-25
Table A-18. Asset/Multiple asset status report acronym and abbreviation key ...........................A-26
Table A-19. Aviation (Army rotary wing) mission/support request acronym and abbreviation key .. A-
27
Table A-20. Basic wind data message acronym and abbreviation key ........................................A-28
Table A-21. Battle damage assessment report acronym and abbreviation key ..........................A-30
Table A-22. Bed availability and element status acronym and abbreviation key .........................A-32
Table A-23. Bed designations acronym and abbreviation key .....................................................A-34
Table A-24. Bed request acronym and abbreviation key .............................................................A-36
Table A-25. Blood shipment report acronym and abbreviation key .............................................A-38
Table A-26. Bridge report acronym and abbreviation key ............................................................A-39
Table A-27. Bulk petroleum allocation acronym and abbreviation key ........................................A-40
Table A-28. Bulk petroleum contingency report acronym and abbreviation key ..........................A-41
Table A-29. Bulk petroleum requirements forecast acronym and abbreviation key ....................A-42
Table A-30. Bulk class III request/forecast acronym and abbreviation key .................................A-43
Table A-31. Casualty report acronym and abbreviation key ........................................................A-44
Table A-32. CBRN 1 report acronym and abbreviation key .........................................................A-46
Table A-33. CBRN 2 report acronym and abbreviation key .........................................................A-47
Table A-34. CBRN 3 report acronym and abbreviation key .........................................................A-49
Table A-35. CBRN 4 report acronym and abbreviation key .........................................................A-50
Table A-36. CBRN 5 report acronym and abbreviation key .........................................................A-51
Table A-37. CBRN 6 report acronym and abbreviation key .........................................................A-52
Table A-38. CBRN hazard warning message acronym and abbreviation key .............................A-53
Table A-39. CBRN situation report acronym and abbreviation key .............................................A-54
Table A-40. Cemetery status acronym and abbreviation key ......................................................A-56
Table A-41. Chemical downwind message acronym and abbreviation key .................................A-58
Table A-42. Close air support summary acronym and abbreviation key .....................................A-59
Table A-43. Commander’s situation report acronym and abbreviation key .................................A-62
Table A-44. Computer network attack acronym and abbreviation key ........................................A-63
Table A-45. Crew manning report acronym and abbreviation key ...............................................A-64
Table A-46. Crossing report acronym and abbreviation key ........................................................A-65
Table A-47. Cyber effects request format acronym and abbreviation key ...................................A-67
Table A-48. Cyberspace operations mission request status/tasking acronym and abbreviation
key ................................................................................................................................................A-68
Table A-49. Daily blood report acronym and abbreviation key ....................................................A-69 |
6-99 | 8 | Contents
Table A-50. Direct support unit report acronym and abbreviation key ........................................ A-70
Table A-51. Effective downwind message acronym and abbreviation key ................................. A-71
Table A-52. Electronic attack data message acronym and abbreviation key .............................. A-72
Table A-53. Electronic warfare frequency deconfliction message acronym and abbreviation key . A-
73
Table A-54. Electronic warfare mission summary acronym and abbreviation key ...................... A-75
Table A-55. Electronic warfare requesting/tasking message acronym and abbreviation key ..... A-78
Table A-56. Enemy/friendly/unit minefield/obstacle report acronym and abbreviation key ......... A-80
Table A-57. Explosive ordnance disposal support acronym and abbreviation key ..................... A-82
Table A-58. Fire mission-beacon location acronym and abbreviation key .................................. A-83
Table A-59. Fire mission-request to fire acronym and abbreviation key ..................................... A-84
Table A-60. Fire planning-compute a fire plan acronym and abbreviation key ........................... A-85
Table A-61. Fire planning-fire plan executive orders acronym and abbreviation key ................. A-86
Table A-62. Fire planning-fire plan target list acronym and abbreviation key ............................. A-87
Table A-63. Fire planning-reserve fire unit acronym and abbreviation key ................................. A-88
Table A-64. Fire support element-commander’s criteria acronym and abbreviation key ............ A-89
Table A-65. Fire support element-friendly unit location acronym and abbreviation key .............. A-90
Table A-66. Flight control information acronym and abbreviation key ........................................ A-91
Table A-67. Fragmentary order acronym and abbreviation key .................................................. A-92
Table A-68. Friendly nuclear strike warning acronym and abbreviation key ............................... A-93
Table A-69. General administrative message acronym and abbreviation key ............................ A-94
Table A-70. Handover message acronym and abbreviation key ................................................. A-96
Table A-71. Highway situation report acronym and abbreviation key ......................................... A-97
Table A-72. Human remains search and recovery status report acronym and abbreviation key A-98
Table A-73. Intelligence report acronym and abbreviation key ................................................... A-99
Table A-74. Intelligence summary acronym and abbreviation key ............................................ A-101
Table A-75. Isolated Soldier guidance acronym and abbreviation key ..................................... A-103
Table A-76. Isolated Soldier guidance execution report acronym and abbreviation key .......... A-104
Table A-77. Logistics resupply request acronym and abbreviation key .................................... A-105
Table A-78. Logistics status report ............................................................................................ A-107
Table A-79. Mail distribution scheme change acronym and abbreviation key .......................... A-108
Table A-80. Maintenance support request acronym and abbreviation key ............................... A-109
Table A-81. Maintenance support response acronym and abbreviation key ............................ A-110
Table A-82. Major ammunition malfunction-initial report acronym and abbreviation key .......... A-111
Table A-83. MIJI feeder report acronym and abbreviation key .................................................. A-112
Table A-84. Media contact report acronym and abbreviation key ............................................. A-113
Table A-85. Medical evacuation request acronym and abbreviation key .................................. A-115
Table A-86. Medical situation report acronym and abbreviation key ......................................... A-116
Table A-87. Medical status report acronym and abbreviation key ............................................ A-117
Table A-88. Message, audience, reaction, carrier, origin report acronym and abbreviation key .... A-
119
Table A-89. Message correction or cancellation acronym and abbreviation key ...................... A-120 |
6-99 | 9 | Contents
Table A-90. Meteorological-computer message acronym and abbreviation key ...................... A-121
Table A-91. Meteorological-fallout message acronym and abbreviation key ........................... A-122
Table A-92. Meteorological-target acquisition message acronym and abbreviation key .......... A-123
Table A-93. Military information support operations report acronym and abbreviation key ...... A-124
Table A-94. Military Postal Facility Request acronym and abbreviation key ............................ A-125
Table A-95. Missile Intercept report acronym and abbreviation key ......................................... A-126
Table A-96. Modification-attack criteria acronym and abbreviation key.................................... A-127
Table A-97. Modification-attack exclude criteria acronym and abbreviation key ...................... A-128
Table A-98. NMC summary report acronym and abbreviation key ........................................... A-129
Table A-99. Operation order acronym and abbreviation key .................................................... A-132
Table A-100. Operation plan change acronym and abbreviation key ....................................... A-133
Table A-101. Operation report acronym and abbreviation key ................................................. A-134
Table A-102. Operations summary acronym and abbreviation key .......................................... A-135
Table A-103. Patrol report acronym and abbreviation key ........................................................ A-136
Table A-104. Personnel recovery incident report acronym and abbreviation key .................... A-137
Table A-105. Personnel recovery request acronym and abbreviation key ............................... A-138
Table A-106. Personnel recovery situation summary report acronym and abbreviation key ... A-139
Table A-107. Personnel status report acronym and abbreviation key ...................................... A-141
Table A-108. Preliminary technical report acronym and abbreviation key ................................ A-142
Table A-109. Psychological action report acronym and abbreviation key ................................ A-143
Table A-110. Public affairs operation report acronym and abbreviation key ............................ A-144
Table A-111. Radar status report acronym and abbreviation key ............................................. A-145
Table A-112. Reconnaissance exploitation report acronym and abbreviation key ................... A-146
Table A-113. Reconnaissance following report acronym and abbreviation key ....................... A-147
Table A-114. Reconnaissance nickname report acronym and abbreviation key ...................... A-148
Table A-115. Reconnaissance Scheduling Report acronym and abbreviation key .................. A-150
Table A-116. Reconnaissance track report acronym and abbreviation key ............................. A-152
Table A-117. Religious support report acronym and abbreviation key ..................................... A-154
Table A-118. Request confirmation acronym and abbreviation key ......................................... A-155
Table A-119. Request for information acronym and abbreviation key ...................................... A-156
Table A-120. Response to request for information acronym and abbreviation key .................. A-157
Table A-121. Road clearance request acronym and abbreviation key ..................................... A-159
Table A-122. Route report acronym and abbreviation key ....................................................... A-160
Table A-123. Rules of engagement authorization acronym and abbreviation key ................... A-161
Table A-124. Rules of engagement implementation acronym and abbreviation key ................ A-162
Table A-125. Scatterable minefield record acronym and abbreviation key .............................. A-163
Table A-126. Scatterable minefield request acronym and abbreviation key ............................. A-164
Table A-127. Scatterable minefield warning acronym and abbreviation key ............................ A-165
Table A-128. Sensitive Items Report acronym and abbreviation key ....................................... A-166
Table A-129. Severe weather warning acronym and abbreviation key ..................................... A-167
Table A-130. SLANT report acronym and abbreviation key ..................................................... A-168 |
6-99 | 10 | Contents
Table A-131. Sortie allotment acronym and abbreviation key ................................................... A-169
Table A-132. Source, content, audience, media, effect report acronym and abbreviation key . A-172
Table A-133. Spill report acronym and abbreviation key ........................................................... A-173
Table A-134. Spot report acronym and abbreviation key .......................................................... A-174
Table A-135. Summary report of nuclear detonations acronym and abbreviation key ............. A-175
Table A-136. Support-air corridor acronym and abbreviation key ............................................. A-177
Table A-137. Support-battlefield geometry acronym and abbreviation key ............................... A-179
Table A-138. Support-damage avoidance area acronym and abbreviation key ....................... A-181
Table A-139. Surveillance and reconnaissance plan report acronym and abbreviation key ..... A-182
Table A-140. Survey-control point access request acronym and abbreviation key................... A-183
Table A-141. Survey-control point storage (input/output) message acronym and abbreviation
key .............................................................................................................................................. A-184
Table A-142. System-reply or remarks message acronym and abbreviation key ..................... A-185
Table A-143. System-request for report acronym and abbreviation key ................................... A-186
Table A-144. Tactical ELINT report acronym and abbreviation key .......................................... A-187
Table A-145. Temporary burial site request acronym and abbreviation key ............................. A-189
Table A-146. Track management message acronym and abbreviation key ............................. A-190
Table A-147. Track/Point report acronym and abbreviation key ............................................... A-191
Table A-148. Transportation support request acronym and abbreviation key ........................... A-193
Table A-149. Transportation support response acronym and abbreviation key ........................ A-195
Table A-150. Unit situation report acronym and abbreviation key ............................................. A-197
Table A-151. War crime reportable incident report acronym and abbreviation key .................. A-198
Table A-152. Warning message-air defense acronym and abbreviation key ............................ A-199
Table A-153. Warning order acronym and abbreviation key ..................................................... A-201
Table A-154. Water supply point acronym and abbreviation key .............................................. A-202
Table A-155. Weather advisory or watch acronym and abbreviation key ................................. A-203
Table A-156. Weather forecast acronym and abbreviation key ................................................. A-205 |
6-99 | 11 | Preface
FM 6-99 provides a standardized, readily available reference for Army forces to extract common voice reports
and message templates. This manual is a collection of reports used by units of all sizes and forms the basis of
Army voice information exchange in a degraded network environment. FM 6-99 facilitates a common
understanding of voice reporting and communicating throughout U.S. Army elements and is the keystone manual
for voice report and message formats.
The principal audience for FM 6-99 is all members of the profession of arms. Commanders and staffs of Army
headquarters serving as joint task force or multinational headquarters should also refer to applicable joint or
multinational doctrine, such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or American, British, Canadian,
Australian, New Zealand (ABCANZ) doctrine, related to the range of military operations and joint or
multinational forces. Joint and multinational doctrine aids interoperability. Trainers and educators throughout the
Army also will use this manual. Note that some reports in FM 6-99 may contain portions that unit standard
operating procedures eliminate or modify.
Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable U.S.,
international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their Soldiers
operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement.
This publication is not the proponent for any Army terms.
FM 6-99 applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and
the United States Army Reserve, unless otherwise stated.
The proponent of FM 6-99 is the United States Army Combined Arms Center. The preparing agency is the
Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, United States Army Combined Arms Center. Send written comments and
recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Commander,
United States Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-MCD (FM 6-99), 300
McPherson Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337; by email to
[email protected]; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028. |
6-99 | 13 | Introduction
While U.S. forces are among the most technologically advanced forces in the world, the need for redundancy
and interoperability between joint and multinational forces requires the continued use of analog
communication systems. Other circumstances that require the use of voice message formats include attacks
on communication networks, failures of equipment, and inhospitable locations. This manual provides the
Army with an effective means of communicating with joint and multinational forces that do not operate on
parallel communication platforms. As U.S. Army communications strategies evolve, the need to
communicate expeditiously and succinctly via voice remains.
FM 6-99 is the U.S. Army’s doctrinal library for report and message voice templates. It saves units time and
resources in developing internal formats. FM 6-99 formats are derived from United States message text
format (USMTF), variable message formats (VMFs), command post computing environment (also known as
CPCE) systems, NATO standardization agreements (STANAGs), historical Army reports, and allied
procedural publications (APPs). The authorities for the United States message text formats in FM 6-99 are
MIL-STD-6040B and CJCSI 6241.04C.
As a user’s manual, FM 6-99 influences future Army information systems, user interfaces, and report and
message graphics. Formats included in FM 6-99 are the means through which the Army adapts multiple
reporting sources into a user-friendly, standardized message format library. FM 6-99 enables Army units to
synchronize with joint and multinational communication structures without modifying their normal mode of
operation with similar reports.
Units use FM 6-99 report and message formats for all voice reporting. A unit will not modify these formats
unless authorized by the unit commander to allow for expanded critical information requirements, which
should be articulated in a unit standard operating procedure. This manual does not include many
branch-specific or technical report and message formats that are contained in FMs and other publications
published by their respective proponents. FM 6-99 does not supersede branch-specific or technical reports,
but units should use FM 6-99 formats whenever possible.
Chapters 1 and 2 instruct users how to transmit written and voice reports and messages. Appendix A contains
message formats.
This manual reflects updated changes in doctrine and procedures from previous editions. FM 6-99 now
provides users with reports that are easier to transmit and pertinent to the modern battlefield. This revision—
(cid:122) Removes some reports or messages and retains only the most widely used today.
(cid:122) Adds new reports and messages reflecting modern formats and needs.
(cid:122) Modifies existing reports or messages to correspond with evolving battlefield and staff needs.
(cid:122) Consolidates numerous reports to provide effective messaging and reduce repetitive messages.
(cid:122) Eliminates repetitive lines for message brevity and clarity.
(cid:122) Updates references and terminology to reflect the latest doctrine.
FM 6-99 deletes, adds, or modifies reports listed in introductory tables 1, 2, and 3 on page xii to adapt to
modern needs and as requested from the field, centers of excellence, and the community of interest. Some
report and message formats contained in FM 6-99 are similar to USMTFs but vary slightly to accommodate
modern U.S. Army needs—these formats do not have associated USMTF numbers. |
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