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Note. The theater army retains its role as ASCC, while the contingency command post performs
the duties of the JTF or the theater joint force land component headquarters.
Joint Force Land Component Commander
3-49. Similar to its role as a JTF, the theater army’s contingency command post can also form the base of a
joint force land component for small-scale contingency operations of limited duration. When forming the
joint force land component, the contingency command post becomes the nucleus of the JFLCC’s headquarters
and is further organized according to the JFC’s requirements. These requirements establish responsibilities
of the theater JFLCC and designate the mission and forces assigned. It is normal procedure for the joint force
land component command headquarters to be built around a Service component staff and augmented with
members of the other Service components or forces as noted in a joint manning document. This allows the
joint force land component command staff to have key staff billets allocated, so all Services are appropriately
represented and share equitably in staffing tasks.
3-50. Theater army headquarters are organized with a contingency command post that is capable of
deploying and independently controlling limited contingency operations in an AOR, while the main
command post continues to fulfill the ASCC role in support of the GCC’s long-range campaign plan. The
minimal staff organic to the contingency command post has limited capacity for controlling continuous
operations, but it can be reinforced with additional staff from the main command post or drafted from the
GCC’s other Service components. Significant augmentation, both joint and Army, is required if the theater
army is to serve as a joint force land component command during longer duration or higher intensity
operations. Once established, the theater army as the joint force land component command becomes the
supported land commander in the JOA. In the JOA, the joint force land component command has the authority
to designate target priority, effects, and timing of fires to integrate and synchronize maneuver, fires, and
interdiction in an AO. (See JP 3-31 for more information on joint force land component command.)
PLAN AND COORDINATE FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF GAINS IN THE AOR
3-51. The theater army continuously plans, coordinates, and assesses for the consolidation of gains across
an AOR. The theater army accomplishes this through the execution of 10 USC, and executive agent activities
that shape the theater and engage other regional actors in promoting long-term stability while deterring
aggression.
3-52. However, upon request from the GCC or the activation of the time-phased force and deployment data,
the theater army provides the combatant commander with forces and capabilities specifically tailored to focus
on area security and stability. This requires planning and coordination for refined logistic estimates, security
cooperation plans, infrastructure assessments, civil-military requirements, communications shortcomings,
and other critical capabilities.
3-53. The completion of successful consolidation of gains in a specific operational area requires the theater
army to retrograde equipment; redeploy forces; and manage a long-term security cooperation plan to facilitate
the transition from conflict to competition. The transfer of an AO to a legitimate authority relieves the land
force of area security and stability tasks and represents a transition from operations that consolidate gains
back to operations that shape the operational environment.
THEATER ARMY ASSIGNED FORCES
3-54. Each theater army has assigned theater-level forces for sustainment, signal, medical, military
intelligence, and civil affairs based on specific requirements for an AOR. (See figure 3-1 on page 3-11 as an
example of theater commands and brigades.) Additionally, these commands and brigades perform theater
army tasks to support an AOR. The theater army tailors additional functional or multifunctional support
brigades based on mission variables.
3-55. The command and support relationships for theater army subordinate formations differ depending on
the specific requirements of each AOR. The size and composition of these forces vary based on the continuing
requirements for Army support. Not every theater army will have the forces shown in figure 3-1. In some |
3-94 | 87 | Armies
cases, a brigade is assigned to an Army command and attached to the theater army. In other cases, the theater
army has a brigade instead of a full command. In each case, the attached command or brigade is committed
to the supported theater army and is integrated in all theater planning.
Figure 3-1. Example of theater commands and brigades
Theater Sustainment Command
3-56. The TSC is the Army’s senior logistics headquarters within the AOR. The TSC concentrates on
strategic- and operational-level sustainment support and management. When directed, the TSC provides lead
service sustainment and executive agency support for designated logistics and services to other government
agencies, multinational forces, and nongovernmental organizations.
3-57. The command ensures sustainment flow from strategic deployment, distribution, and sustainment
partners is accurate, timely, and adequate to support the actions of the theater sustainment forces. Figure 3-2
depicts a TSC assigned to an ASCC. (See ADP 4-0 and FM 4-0 for additional information on sustainment.)
Figure 3-2. Theater sustainment force |
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Expeditionary Sustainment Command
3-58. The ESC is the expeditionary command for joint logistics. Normally, the ESC is assigned to a corps;
however, the theater army may task-organize to another formation based upon the requirements of the
operation. The ESC, when assigned as a subordinate element of the TSC, supports the deployed force while
the TSC maintains AOR-wide focus. The ESC concentrates on synchronizing operational-level sustaining
operations to meet the day-to-day and projected operational requirements of the supported force. It
accomplishes this, in part, by establishing mid-range and short-range planning horizons derived from the
supported commanders operation plan, commander‘s intent, commander’s critical information requirements,
tempo, and distribution system capacity. The expeditionary capability of ESCs becomes critical when
multiple JTFs operate in an AOR.
3-59. The ESC commands attached sustainment units in a land AO defined by the JFC. The ESC extends the
ability of the TSC to manage logistics, finance operations, and personnel support by becoming the
forward-deployed sustainment headquarters in the JOA. Additional ESCs may be attached to the TSC if the
combatant commander establishes a JSA or staging base. Depending on the command structure in the theater,
ESCs may support specific Army forces in a JOA or support other ESCs and sustainment brigades with
theater opening or theater distribution capabilities. (See ADP 4-0 and FM 4-0 for additional information).
Signal Command (Theater)
3-60. The signal command (theater) provides Department of Defense information network (DODIN)
operations capabilities to support Army, joint, and multinational forces in theater through its associated
regional cyber center. These capabilities use the Department of Defense information network-Army
(DODIN-A) for network extension and reach back to support the GCC. In coordination with the regional
cyber center, the signal command (theater) operates Army networks in the theater and delivers common user
services to support the GCC and the theater army. With joint augmentation, the signal command (theater)
may also assume joint or multinational DODIN operations responsibility for a JTF. As the theater’s senior
Army signal commander, the signal command (theater) commander may be designated to serve as the
communications system directorate of a joint staff (known as J-6) of an Army-led JTF or the ARFOR chief
of staff, signal (G-6).
Note. In a theater with no assigned signal command (theater), Network Enterprise Technology
Command has a staff organization called the tactical actions center that assumes many of the
engineering and oversight roles formerly performed by the signal command (theater).
Theater Strategic Signal Brigade or Strategic Signal Brigade
3-61. The theater strategic signal brigade or strategic signal brigade provides operational and strategic
support area signal support to serve warfighters in a theater of operations. This support includes long-haul
transport, communications infrastructure, automation, and network management. Each theater strategic
signal brigade or strategic signal brigade is unique and tailored to support unique communications
infrastructure requirements of its theater. The theater strategic signal brigade commands multiple subordinate
strategic signal battalions and activities with different capabilities that assist in providing theater
communications. The strategic signal brigade is assigned to the United States Army Network Enterprise
Technology Command. (See FM 6-02 for more information on signal support.)
3-62. The theater strategic signal brigade or strategic signal brigade has one or more assigned theater network
operations and security regional cyber centers that serve as the operational component of network operations.
These centers provide a single point of contact for Army network services, operational status, service
provisioning, service interruption resolution, and service restoration in their operational area. The theater
network operations and security regional cyber centers are OPCON to the United States Army Information
Warfare Command for day-to-day defense of the Army’s portion of the DODIN-A. (See FM 6-02 for more
information on network operations. See ATP 6-02.71 for more information about the regional cyber center.)
3-63. The strategic signal brigade or theater signal brigade based in the United States includes network
enterprise centers (also known as NECs). When stationed outside the continental United States, a theater |
3-94 | 89 | Armies
strategic signal brigade includes strategic signal battalions that provide communications infrastructure
capabilities, including fixed satellite communications facilities, the network enterprise center, and many other
strategic capabilities. The theater signal brigades plan, engineer, install, operate, maintain, defend, and secure
the Army portion of the global communications synchronization backbone in the form of terrestrial and
satellite radio links and cable systems infrastructure. (See FM 6-02 for more information on network
enterprise centers.)
Theater Tactical Signal Brigade or Corps Signal Brigade
3-64. Theater tactical signal brigades or corps signal brigades and expeditionary signal battalions are the
Army signal formations optimized for deployment. The theater tactical signal brigade or corps signal brigades
are deployable to support large-scale combat operations. Theater tactical signal brigade or corps signal
brigades provide detailed planning, engineering, installation, maintenance, and defense of tactical networks.
Theater tactical signal brigades or corps signal brigades are assigned to the corps and command one or more
expeditionary signal battalions or expeditionary signal battalions-enhanced in large-scale operations.
Expeditionary signal battalions provide line of sight and beyond line of sight communication links and
DODIN operations capabilities to extend information services to supported headquarters. These battalions
reinforce the DODIN operations capabilities of an Army corps, division, BCT, and multifunctional support
brigade headquarters, and provide signal support to other Services components or multinational headquarters
as required. (See FM 6-02 for more information on the theater tactical signal brigade.)
Medical Command (Deployment Support)
3-65. The MEDCOM (DS) serves as the senior medical command in a theater. The MEDCOM (DS)
commands medical units that provide health care in support of deployed forces. The MEDCOM (DS) is a
regionally focused command and provides subordinate medical organizations to operate under the medical
brigade (support) or multifunctional medical battalion (medical battalion [multifunctional]). The MEDCOM
(DS) includes a main command post and an operational command post. (See FM 4-02 for more information
on the MEDCOM [DS].)
Medical Brigade (Support)
3-66. The medical brigade (support) is a subordinate organization of the MEDCOM (DS). It is tailored with
multifunctional and specialized medical units. One or more medical brigades may support Army forces in a
joint operations area. One medical brigade (support) may provide direct support to a division commander,
another may provide Army Health System support on an area basis to another division and corps
headquarters, and a third may provide area medical support to theater sustainment forces in the JSA.
3-67. These organizations often provide simultaneous support to interagency organizations and
multinational operations occurring in their areas of operations. The medical brigade provides all the control
and planning capabilities necessary to deliver responsive and effective medical support. The medical brigade
(support) can provide an early entry module, an expansion module, and a campaign module. It can be tailored
to the operation. As the supported forces grow in size and complexity, the medical brigade (support) can
deploy additional modules that build upon one another to support unified land operations. When required,
the commander of a medical brigade (support) may exercise command and control for task-organized medical
functional teams, detachments, and companies. (See FM 4-02 for more information on the medical brigade
[support].)
Military Intelligence Brigade-Theater
3-68. The military intelligence brigade-theater (MIB-T) is the theater army’s collection and information
analysis capability. An MIB-T is normally attached or OPCON to every theater army. The brigade provides
regionally focused collection and analysis to support theater army daily operations requirements and limited
contingency operations. In particular, the theater army headquarters relies heavily on the MIB-T for threat
characteristics, intelligence estimates, threat and civil considerations, data files and databases, and all-source
intelligence products. These products support theater army planning requirements, including development of
Army plans supporting the theater campaign plan and maintenance of operation plans and contingency plans. |
3-94 | 90 | Chapter 3
3-69. A theater army and its subordinate MIB-T may provide intelligence support to Army and joint forces
in the joint operations area. The theater military intelligence brigade’s regional focus enhances its capabilities
to develop and exploit language skills and cultural insights specific to an AOR. The regional focus also
provides the benefits of continuity and cultural context to its analytic intelligence products. The theater
military intelligence brigade can collect, analyze, and track the threat characteristics and doctrine of partner
nations, enemies, and adversaries over many years, providing indications and warnings of changes in an OE.
These abilities allow the brigade to create and maintain a valuable database of intelligence regarding regional
military forces, persons of interest, and evolving doctrine and capabilities of regional military forces. (See
FM 2-0 for more information on the MIB-T.)
Theater Fires Command/Element
3-70. An Army theater fires command and a theater fires element provides command and control of assigned
strategic fires capabilities, serves as the senior headquarters assigned to an ASCC/theater army to integrate
theater fires assets, and executes critical fire support functions across the competition continuum. The
organizational difference is minimal. The two different organizational structures represent requirements in
different regions and may continue to evolve.
3-71. The theater fires command and theater fires element are designed to develop, nominate, and converge
effects on joint targets across the theater. This support to joint targeting will support the continuous setting
of the theater to enable joint force land component command, field army, and corps operations during
competition below armed conflict and crisis. The theater fires command ensures the Army's contribution to
the joint targeting process is effectively planned and executed during shape and prevent and can seamlessly
transition to large-scale ground combat operations in accordance with the ground force commander's
priorities. This also provides greater deterrence options for the theater. (See FM 3-09 for additional
information on theater fires commands/elements.)
Civil Affairs Command
3-72. The civil affairs command is the theater army civil affairs capability. Each theater army (except for
U.S. Army North) receives support from a civil affairs command. The civil affairs command provides
theater-level civil affairs planning, coordination, policies, and programs to support the geographic combatant
command’s regional civil-military operations strategy and stabilization, reconstruction, and development
efforts. The civil affairs command mobilizes and deploys with one or more civil affairs brigades and civil
affairs planning teams. It also has one or more civil-military operations centers.
3-73. One civil affairs brigade normally supports the land component command; a second brigade may
support the ESC. A civil affairs brigade with its civil-military operations center can become the core of a
joint civil-military operations task force under the OPCON of the JTF. Civil affairs battalions from the civil
affairs brigade are task-organized to Army divisions. Civil affairs planning teams augment the geographic
combatant command, theater army, joint land forces component command, and division, corps, and brigades.
Such augmentation provides liaison, coordination, education and training, and area assessment functions.
(See FM 3-57 for more information on civil affairs brigades.)
THEATER-LEVEL ARMY FORCES FOR THE EXPANDED THEATER
3-74. Campaigns that include large-scale combat operations cause the theater army to expand to support
Army, joint, and multinational forces. This occurs as the combatant commander adapts the joint command
and control mechanism to the demands of the campaign. The theater army maintains its AOR-wide focus
while developing a mature support structure within the joint operations area. The mature theater could include
some or all of the commands listed in paragraphs 3-70 through 3-82. (See figure 3-3 for a depiction of the
expanded theater.) |
3-94 | 91 | Armies
Figure 3-3. Example of expanded theater
Theater Aviation Brigade
3-75. Theater aviation is an Army aviation brigade. Each theater aviation brigade can conduct assault or
general support aviation tasks in support of the theater and its subordinate commands. The theater aviation
brigade comes in a general support variant and an assault variant. The theater aviation brigade general support
provides accurate and timely reconnaissance in permissive environments; positions personnel, supplies, and
equipment; evacuates casualties; conducts search and rescue; and enables command and control in defense
support of civil authorities operations. The theater aviation brigade assault augments other aviation brigades
or operates autonomously at the theater level to air assault maneuver forces; position personnel, supplies, and
equipment; evacuate casualties and conduct personnel recovery; and enable command and control.
3-76. Unlike combat aviation brigades, a theater aviation brigade lacks attack and reconnaissance battalions.
The theater aviation brigade has a mix of lift helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. The brigade can conduct air
assault, air movement, and sustaining operations. It will normally not have attached unmanned aircraft
systems. The theater aviation brigade reinforces combat aviation brigades with additional assault, general
support, heavy lift, and aeromedical evacuation. It can fly fixed-wing sorties in support of the ARFOR,
theater army, and JFC. (See FM 3-04 for more information on the theater aviation brigade.)
Theater Airfield Operations Group
3-77. Army air traffic service units at the theater level consist of the theater airfield operations group with
its subordinate airfield operations battalions. These units establish and operate airfields as needed in an AOR.
Advanced operations bases can operate a fully instrumented airfield with airport surveillance radar approach,
precision approach radar, and controlling airspace necessary to support airfield operations.
3-78. The theater airfield operations group and its subordinate Army air traffic service organizations are an
enabling component of the Army aviation force and can support forcible and early entry contingency missions
and sustained theater aviation operations. Air traffic operations are conducted overseas in contiguous and
noncontiguous areas throughout the range of military operations. (See FM 3-04 for more information on the
theater airfield operation group.)
Theater Aviation Sustainment Maintenance Group
3-79. The theater aviation maintenance sustainment group is resourced to provide aviation sustainment
maintenance and limited depot sustainment support at the theater level. The theater aviation maintenance |
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sustainment group performs repairs and returns components and end-items to their supported units, or to the
supply system through the National Maintenance Program.
3-80. When deployed, the theater aviation maintenance sustainment group is attached to the joint force
sustainment headquarters or expeditionary sustainment command and sets up at a secure location in an AO.
It establishes and provides 24-hour, fixed-base aviation field and sustainment maintenance, logistics, and
other essential aviation sustainment support to aviation units. The theater aviation maintenance sustainment
group performs field maintenance, depot-level crash and battle damage repair, and sustainment and
depot-level repair of major end items. It also performs sustainment-level maintenance for aircraft and aviation
ground support equipment at fixed-land or sea-based locations. The theater aviation maintenance sustainment
group assists deploying aviation operational units in port operations.
Army Air And Missile Defense Command
3-81. The Army air and missile defense command is a headquarters element responsible for the command
of all subordinate Army air and missile defense units as well as the army air and missile defense coordinator
for the land component. When required by the geographic combatant command, the Army air and missile
defense command will be attached to the theater army, if not already assigned. Air and missile defense units
in an AOR are assigned or attached to the Army air and missile defense command.
3-82. The Army air and missile defense command (AAMDC) commander has several responsibilities.
These include command of all subordinate Army air and missile defense units; army air and missile defense
coordinator for the land component and ARFOR; and deputy area air defense commander (known as AADC)
if designated. The AAMDC commander has overall responsibility for planning Army air and missile defense
operations in support of the JFC. To accomplish these duties, the AAMDC task-organizes and assigns
missions to subordinate brigades. It also provides liaison elements to the joint force air component, joint force
land component, and joint special operations task force to integrate air and missile defense operations. If the
AAMDC is not located in the JOA, the ADA Brigade Commander (if one is deployed) may serve as the
deputy area air defense commander. That brigade takes responsibility for planning and providing liaison to
the JFLCC, area air defense commander, and joint force air component commander.
Theater Engineer Command
3-83. The theater engineer command (TEC) is a command and control headquarters. The command provides
theater-wide engineer support as well as engineer support to forces deployed in a JOA. The Army currently
has two theater engineer commands; both reside in the Reserve Component. The engineer command
supervises geospatial support, construction, real property maintenance activities, line of communications
support, engineer sustainment management, and base development. The command has primary responsibility
for theater infrastructure repair or development. The command supports Department of State or host-nation
efforts to restore essential services and aids in infrastructure development. Subordinate units of the command
may include tailored engineer brigades, battalions, and specialized field force engineers such as forward
engineer support teams (known as FESTs), contingency real estate support teams, and environmental support
teams. Within the supervisory role of theater-wide geospatial support, the TEC serves as the in-theater
interface with the theater aligned geospatial planning cell. The TEC facilitates the theater common
operational picture by providing the Standard and Shareable Geospatial Foundation (SSGF) to organizations
operating in the theater; and providing updates to the theater geospatial database from data collected in the
theater to the GPC for incorporation into the Standard and Shareable Geospatial Foundation (SSGF).
3-84. The theater engineer command typically serves as the senior engineer headquarters for the theater army
and all assigned or attached engineer brigades and other engineer units. When directed, it may also command
engineers from other Services and multinational forces and provide oversight of contracted construction
engineers. The theater engineer command provides peacetime training and support of military engagement
for their supported respective combatant commanders. The command also coordinates closely with the senior
contract construction agents in the JOA. (See FM 3-34 for more information on the theater engineer
command.) |
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CBRNE Command
3-85. A chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives (CBRNE) command operates at the
operational level to counter CBRN and explosive ordnance hazards and threats to protect the force. The
command identifies, targets assesses, exploits, supports defeat, disablement and/or disposal of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) by mission command of CBRN, EOD, and other assigned forces. A CBRN
command is tailorable and designed to deploy an operation command post that establishes the core of a JTF
or Army headquarters in support of countering WMD (CWMD) and CBRNE or defense support of civil
authorities (known as DSCA) activities. The CBRNE command integrates, coordinates, deploys, and
provides trained and ready forces, including CBRN and EOD, WMD coordination teams, nuclear
disablement teams, CBRNE analytical and remediation activity and area medical laboratory. It exercises
mission command of CBRN and EOD groups in support of joint and Army force commanders. When the
CBRNE command deploys its operational command post, it can integrate with the supported command
headquarters staff or operate as a separate command to direct CBRN, EOD, and CWMD operations. The
command has the capacity to execute simultaneous missions inside and outside the continental United States
in support of unified land operations. The main command post directs CBRNE operations in the continental
United States. The CBRNE command maintains technical links with the appropriate allied, joint, federal, and
state CBRN and EOD assets and with research, development, and technical communities to ensure CBRNE
readiness. (See FM 3-11 and ATP 3-37.11 for more information on the CBRNE command.)
Theater Military Police Command
3-86. A theater military police command is a headquarters element normally established and assigned
directly to the theater army in a mature theater with two to five military police brigades and a criminal
investigation division group. The military police command focuses on reinforcing and augmenting
tactical-level military police efforts and developing the theater detention or dislocated civilian operations
base requirements. Once established, the senior military police commander serves as the theater army provost
marshal and is normally designated as the commander, detainee operations. The theater army normally
receives one military police command when more than one military police brigade is required. (See FM 3-39
for more information on the theater military police command.)
Psychological Operations Group
3-87. A tailored psychological operations group supports military information support operations for the
combatant commander, JTF commander, theater special operations commander, and joint special operations
task force commanders. It plans, develops, and (when directed) executes military information support
operations. The psychological operations group functions as the central coordination point for all military
information support operations activities executed in an AOR. Psychological operations groups contribute to
the planning and execution of discreet, precise, and scalable military information support operations to
achieve the joint commander’s overall objectives. (See FM 3-05 for more information on the psychological
operations group.)
OTHER ORGANIZATIONS FOR THEATER SUPPORT
3-88. For protracted major operations, the theater army may be reinforced by an array of other capabilities.
Other functional or multifunctional headquarters and units may be made available to the theater army based
on AOR requirements such as forward stationing, base operations, security force assistance missions, theater
security cooperation activities, or ongoing military operations. These functional or multifunctional units may
have either a command or a support relationship with the theater army. In some cases, the Department of the
Army tasks certain functional or multifunctional battalions to support more than one theater army. |
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Digital Liaison Detachment
3-89. A digital liaison detachment provides digital liaison capability to Army units (theater army, corps, and
division headquarters for connectivity with allied and multinational force units and other U.S. Services and
interagency partners. A digital liaison detachment also provides—
* Functional area expertise via LNOs to joint and multinational headquarters.
* Digital information management and communications interface capability for U.S. systems with
a host headquarters.
* U.S. headquarters’ representatives inside a supported multinational headquarters to facilitate
command and control by clarifying orders, interpreting commander’s intent, and identifying and
resolving issues. (See ATP 3-94.1 for more information.)
Theater Expeditionary Intelligence Support Element
3-90. During periods of heightened activity, the MIB-T may be reinforced with an intelligence support
element from the Intelligence and Security Command. The Intelligence and Security Command, when
directed, will provide tailored, multi-discipline, expeditionary intelligence support element(s) to the MIB-T
to enhance intelligence collection and/or analysis at the theater, corps, or division level. The intelligence
support element will consist of intelligence Soldiers from all disciplines. It will be manned from Army-
retained intelligence forces, intelligence Soldiers from the Army Guard, and, upon approval, intelligence
Soldiers from other MIB-Ts. The reinforcing intelligence support element(s) will fall-in on pre-positioned
intelligence equipment maintained by the MIB-T. The intelligence support element will be assigned to the
MIB-T and OPCON to the supported command. The intelligence support element provides collection
management, collection, analysis, and force protection support to the supported command.
Criminal Investigation Division Group
3-91. Normally a criminal investigation division group supports a theater army. The group is placed in
general support of the theater, but it remains under the OPCON of the Army Criminal Investigation
Command. Commanders of criminal investigation command tactical units advise their supported
commanders on criminal investigation division capabilities and on investigations, as appropriate, although
no formal operational command relationship exists. The criminal investigation division group ensures the
connectivity between all criminal investigation command units within and external to the theater. (See
FM 3-39 for more information on the criminal investigation command group.)
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Group
3-92. The EOD group is a command and control headquarters for EOD operations. The group conducts staff
planning and technical control of all EOD assets in a theater and provides an EOD staff liaison to the ASCC.
A theater army supporting major operations is allocated an EOD group. The EOD group is capable of
conducting command and control for two to six EOD battalions. To coordinate counter-improvised explosive
device (IED) and weapons technical intelligence operations, the EOD group is attached or placed OPCON to
a theater army, corps, or JTF in support of a specific operation, operation order, operation plan, or concept
plan. The group may also form the core of a specialized combined JTF with a mission of various protection
and exploitation enablers such as counter-IED, exploitation, or CWMD task forces. The group can also
provide enabling support, analysis, and advisement to execute targeting efforts, theater exploitation, and
CWMD to provide maneuver support and force protection throughout an AO. (See ATP 4-32 for more
information on the explosive ordnance disposal group.)
Information Operations Support
3-93. The Army provides additional information operations support elements to the theater army as required
to support their operations. These elements are dedicated to helping theater organizations analyze situations
and operate in an increasingly complex information environment. These units augment theater forces with
deployable mission-tailored support teams and continental U.S.-based operational planning support,
intelligence analysis, and technical assistance. They train to operate within the Army and joint information
operations doctrinal constructs. These support organizations reside in multiple components of the Army and |
3-94 | 95 | Armies
include the Cyberwarfare Support Battalion from Army Cyber Command; the 1st Information Operations
Command (Land) from the Intelligence and Security Command; and theater information operations groups
in both the Reserves and National Guard. (See paragraphs 4-80 through 4-85 of this manual and FM 3-12 for
more information on cyberspace operations; see FM 3-13 for more information on information operations
support.)
Battlefield Coordination Detachment
3-94. A battlefield coordination detachment is a specialized, regionally focused Army element that serves
as the senior liaison between the ARFOR commander and the air component commander. A battlefield
coordination detachment is co-located with the joint air operations center, combined air operations center, or
the Air Force air operations center. The battlefield coordination detachment is the Army’s interface for
systems connectivity to the joint air operations center and for personnel integration with their joint air
operations center counterparts. Its tasks include facilitating the exchange of current intelligence and
operational data, processing air support requests, monitoring and interpreting the land battle situation,
coordinating airlift, and integrating airspace requirements.
Security Force Assistance Brigade
3-95. Each security force assistance brigade is organized with a headquarters and headquarters company,
two advisory maneuver battalions (either an infantry battalion or a combined arms battalion), one advisory
cavalry squadron, one advisory field artillery battalion, one advisory engineer battalion (with embedded
signal and military intelligence companies), and focused primarily on tactical and operational advising.
Security force assistance brigades provide theater army commanders the capability to support theater security
cooperation activities and build partner-nation security force capacity. Security force assistance brigades
have the capability to conduct tactical advisory missions of host-nation forces up to division size. (See
ATP 3-96.1 for more information on the security force assistance brigade.)
Army Special Operations Forces
3-96. The theater special operations command is a headquarters element and the subordinate special
operations command through which the GCC normally exercises OPCON of all special operations forces in
an AOR. The commander of the theater special operations command serves as the primary advisor to the
combatant commander for applying regionally aligned Army special operations forces. As directed by the
geographic combatant command, the theater army provides support to deployed special operations forces.
The special operations commander coordinates with the theater army for sustainment requirements. The
ADCON of Army special operations forces and logistics support of special operations forces is set up such
that unique items will normally remain in special operations channels. (See FM 3-05 for more information
on Army special operations forces.)
Army Corps of Engineer Elements
3-97. Army Engineers provide infrastructure development support to the theater army commander. The
United States Army Corps of Engineers provides technical engineer support to include engineer
reconnaissance, design and planning of projects (including roads, airfields, and buildings), execution of
contract construction, real estate acquisition and disposal, and environmental assessments and operations.
3-98. Geospatial planning cell engineering detachments assigned to each ASCC provide geospatial
information and services to the theater by generating, managing, and disseminating SSGF data in the theater
geospatial database. Geospatial planning cells provide a tailored theater geospatial databases containing
SSGF data to units assigned to or conducting operations in the theater. Each database contains (at a minimum)
elevation data, orthorectified base map imagery, vector feature data (in a geospatial data model-compliant
data schema), and rasterized finished map products for the theater. (See ATP 3-34.80 for further details.)
Theater Dependencies
3-99. The theater army headquarters depends on theater-enabling units for staff functions or supporting
capabilities. These enablers may vary considerably by size and type between GCCs. |
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3-100. The theater army depends on the Army Materiel Command for support through the Army field
support brigade, contracting support brigade, and logistics civil augmentation program. The Army field
support brigade provides national-level, materiel-focused sustainment support and logistics civil
augmentation program planning and management. The contracting support brigade provides operational
contract support and planning assistance.
3-101. The theater army also depends on several unique teams to accomplish specialized functions. Defense
Logistics Agency personnel provide the theater army logistics reach to the national supply system. Public
affairs detachments or teams augment the organic theater army staff and establish a media support or
broadcast center, if required. An Army band is assigned to the theater army to enhance unit cohesion and
Soldier morale and provide musical support. The theater army depends on the human resources sustainment
center and financial management support center of the TSC for the execution of specified personnel and
finance and comptroller activities. Digital liaison detachments provide liaison between the theater army and
multinational headquarters or partners during operations and exercises.
3-102. The theater army depends on the Army Corps of Engineers for engineering and construction
(including roads and buildings), real estate, and environmental management products and services.
3-103. The supporting criminal investigation division detachment provides protective service details for the
theater army commander, deputy commanders, and other designated high-risk personnel, as required. A force
protection team assists the theater army antiterrorism or force protection section in protection, physical
security, antiterrorism, and response force operations.
JOINT THEATER ENABLERS
3-104. If the theater army assumes an operational headquarters role as a JTF or JFLCC, the combatant
commander provides it with joint enablers. The Joint Enabling Capabilities Command of the
USTRANSCOM provides mission-tailored, joint capability packages to combatant commanders to facilitate
rapid establishment of joint force headquarters, fulfill global response force execution, and bridge joint
operational requirements. This command includes the joint planning support element, joint communications
support element, and joint public affairs support element. The joint planning support element provides rapidly
deployable, tailored joint planners, operators, logisticians, knowledge managers, and intelligence specialists.
The joint communications support element provides rapidly deployable, en route, early entry, and scalable
command, control, communications, computer, ISR capabilities across the range of military operations. The
joint public affairs support element provides a ready, rapidly deployable joint public affairs capability to
combatant commanders. (See JP 3-61 for more information on joint theater enablers.)
THEATER ARMY IN COMPETITION
3-105. During competition, the theater army supports the GCC in conducting missions, tasks, and actions
that shape the environment to assure friends, deter adversaries, and establish conditions for future
contingencies. To accomplish this, the theater army, as the ASCC, executes GCC daily operational
requirements while training and preparing for future contingency operations.
3-106. Executing operational requirements prepares the ASCC to rapidly transition to conflict should the
GCC identify an increased threat and an operational requirement in an AOR. Well in advance of any conflict,
the theater army ensures the ARFOR/JFLCC’s targeting desires are represented during the development of
the modernized integrated database and the resulting joint target list, restricted target list, and no-strike list.
Should the GCC identify a potential crisis, the theater army examines a range of basing and deployment
options. When the combatant commander decides on specific deterrent options, the theater army begins the
process of recommending, requesting, and tailoring landpower. This is done while refining plans for the full
employment of landpower should deterrence fail to resolve the crisis.
3-107. As soon as feasible, Army forces attached to the theater deploy and the theater army receives, stages,
and integrates additional Army forces into an AO. To accomplish this, the theater army develops additional
basing requirements. As Army forces deploy into a JOA, the theater army expands its footprint to sustain and
protect Army, joint, and multinational forces, as directed by the GCC. |
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3-108. Concurrently with actions intended to confront and deter an adversary, the theater army commander
sets the theater to enable landpower to exert its full capabilities. Enabling landpower may include negotiating
and contracting through the GCC with adjacent nations to establish tactical staging bases and realignment of
security cooperation efforts based on emerging threats.
3-109. The theater army requests not only forces involved in deterrence, but also the theater-level units
necessary as the deterrence requirements expand or to support operations if deterrence fails. An important
consideration for the theater army is training for Army forces deployed as a deterrent option.
THEATER ARMY IN CONFLICT
3-110. When the GCC determines deterrence is not working and a situation is moving from competition to
conflict, the GCC seeks to seize the initiative. Once authorized, this involves both defensive and offensive
operations at the earliest possible time. This forces the enemy to react and sets the conditions for decisive
operations on favorable terms. When the GCC determines that joint combat power is sufficient to seize the
initiative, then the theater army’s priority shifts to setting, sustaining and protecting deployed forces in the
joint operations area.
3-111. Throughout the theater, the theater army continues to request and receive Army forces and expand
theater bases in and outside the JOA. During conflict, the theater army expands the number and capability of
its subordinate commands to meet the demand for operations. Concurrently, military engagement, security
cooperation, and deterrence outside the JOA continues.
3-112. Protracted campaigns that include large-scale combat operations cause the theater army to expand
to support Army, joint, and multinational forces. This occurs as the combatant commander adapts the joint
command and control mechanism to the demands of the campaign. This may result in the theater army
deploying the contingency command post to perform its joint roles as the JTF headquarters or the JFLCC.
The contingency command post cannot adequately perform any joint roles without significant reorganization
and retraining. Regardless, the theater army as the ASCC will maintain its AOR-wide focus while developing
a mature support structure in the JOA.
3-113. Because of the limited capability of the contingency command post, the theater army may request a
corps to serve as the land component commander when the required land force is a corps or smaller. However,
when large-scale combat operations involving more than one friendly corps are likely, the theater army
requests the constitution of a field army.
3-114. When a field army is constituted, it performs operational ARFOR tasks, serves as the JFLCC, and
is the Army component of the joint force in an AO. The theater army will then exercise ADCON over the
field army and its subordinate Army forces. This includes 10 USC, common-user logistics, ASOS, Army
executive agent responsibilities, and sustainment and medical support for Army and joint forces operating in
the JOA or the theater of operations where the field army is assigned.
3-115. Regardless if the theater army or a field army is the land component commander, the theater army
plans for operations that follow armed conflict. As early as possible, the theater army develops plans and
requests for forces for approval by the combatant commander. Planning for the transition after a conflict
requires intensive coordination with the Department of the Army, supporting theater armies, the ARFOR,
and theater-level commands such as the TSC. The return to competition often requires different Army
capabilities and headquarters from those required for the conflict.
3-116. The return to competition marks a shift in focus from sustained combat operations to consolidating
gains through decisive action to establish a secure environment, provide essential government services,
emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. The shift in focus may require different and
additional capabilities than those used during large-scale combat, requiring the theater army to plan and
request forces appropriate for the desired end state.
3-117. The theater army will also begin to develop redeployment plans in conjunction with the geographic
combatant command staff and USTRANSCOM for Army units no longer required. Overall, the theater army
adjusts its theater posture in anticipation of the return to competition. Once consolidation of gains has allowed
for the transition of control to legitimate authorities, the cycle is complete and the combatant command |
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resumes daily operations posture. The environment of the theater of operations returns to competition, and
the theater army will continue to consolidate the gains made by adapting its activities accordingly.
THEATER ARMY LIMITATIONS
3-118. The limitations of the theater army headquarters are—
* The theater army is not designed, organized, or equipped to function as a JTF, JFLCC, or a field
army in large-scale combat operations without significant augmentation.
* The main command post operates from a fixed location and is not mobile.
* The main command post can provide personnel for a multinational land component headquarters,
but this degrades the ability of the headquarters to provide and control theater-level support across
an AOR.
* The contingency command post requires joint augmentation for employment as a JTF
headquarters. With augmentation, it can become a JTF for limited contingency operations.
* Although the contingency command post is deployable, it has limited endurance without
reinforcement and additional security.
* Augmentation for both a JTF and for theater-level capabilities is frequently provided by forces
mobilized from the United States Army Reserve and Army National Guard. These forces must be
mobilized and deployed from the continental United States and require potentially lengthy
mobilization timelines.
SECTION II – FIELD ARMY
The functions of an Army are: (1) to defeat the enemy’s main force; (2) seize upon his
vitals.
Sir Ian Hamilton
3-119. As a provisional Army headquarters, a field army does not have an approved organizational design.
However, the field army may consist of a headquarters battalion with subordinate companies, and special
troops; a variable number of attached corps; an attached ESC; a variable number of divisions normally
attached to corps; and other attached functional and multifunctional brigades.
3-120. The field army is an operational headquarters. During operations, forces will be assigned or attached
to the field army. Although it may employ subordinate units during operations, these units are provided by
external Army, joint, and multinational sources based on the situation, and the field army’s role and mission.
When constituted, a field army is specifically tailored to mission requirements and designed to perform
operational ARFOR tasks; it is the Army component to the JFC to which it is assigned.
3-121. The field army provides additional operational capacity to a GCC facing peer adversaries in its AOR.
The field army can conduct land-based activities in competition against that adversary on behalf of the GCC
and, due to its presence, is postured to transition to a warfighting headquarters capable of immediately
commanding and controlling large-scale combat operations should conflict occur. The field army is tailored
based on the capabilities of the peer adversary. As the adversary’s capabilities change, so do those of the
field army. |
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8TH ARMY UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA
Caution: The U.S. Army currently fields one standing field army
headquarters, the 8th, which is located in Korea. The 8th U.S. Army is
optimized for the extremely mature nature of the Korean theater of
operations, and for the robust alliance structure that has developed over
the last 70 years. However, the 8th U.S. Army may represent an
imperfect model for the wide range of activities and responsibilities
required of a field army operating in another region, under vastly
different conditions.
3-122. The Army constitutes a field army when a GCC or theater army commander perceives the
requirement to command and control beyond the capabilities of a theater army or a corps headquarters. These
situations occur when multiple corps-sized formations, including U.S. Army and multinational corps, or a
Marine expeditionary force, operate in a single operational area.
3-123. When constituted, the field army provides Army, joint, and multinational forces with a headquarters
capable of performing in a variety of ways across the range of military operations. Field armies are most
likely to be employed in theaters where peer adversaries have the capability of conducting large-scale combat.
These regions include U.S. European Command, and USINDOPACOM.
3-124. However a field army is constituted, the GCC incurs significant risk in theaters with a peer adversary
without a standing field army, an authorization document to create a field army, or a forward positioned
corps. The time required to transition responsibilities from the theater army to a field army depends on how
quickly additional capabilities can reach full operating capability. In OEs where an enemy has significant
preclusion capabilities, this could be so long that it may not be possible to deny enemy operational and
strategic objectives without incurring unacceptable costs. The same would likely be true if there were no
forward positioned corps that could rapidly assume command and control of Army and other land forces in
an operational area. However, when constituted, field armies provide JFCs and allied organizations with
additional capability and capacity to counter peer threats. The field army headquarters is the preferred choice
for serving as a JFLCC. |
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Multi-Corps Command and Control in Korea, 1950
When North Korea invaded South Korea in June 1950, the conflict found the U.S.
military unprepared to operate in a major land war in East Asia. Those few U.S. Army
elements in Japan and elsewhere in the region had only recently shifted focus from
constabulary operations to preparing for large-scale combat operations. Furthermore,
the Far Eastern Command, then commanded by General Douglas MacArthur, began
the conflict without a suitable operational-level headquarters to command and control
multiple corps and divisions in the land domain. Faced with the immediate requirement
to establish a flexible command and control architecture for the emerging Korean
theater, MacArthur selected the Eighth U.S. Army in Japan to be the land component
command.
Eighth Army had only recently shifted its focus from its constabulary mission in Japan
to training for potential large-scale combat operations. Its commander, General Walton
H. Walker, led a small staff that directly supervised four undermanned and
underequipped infantry divisions because its two subordinate corps headquarters had
been eliminated as the U.S. military downsized following victory in World War II. After
designating Eighth Army as the land component command in Korea, MacArthur
assigned it the additional responsibility of commanding five allied South Korean
divisions. As a further complication, Walker maintained responsibility for directing
logistic operations in Japan even as his headquarters assumed responsibility for
combat operations on the Korean Peninsula.
Senior military leaders recognized Eighth Army’s command and control challenges and
gradually addressed issues stemming from the improvised command arrangement. To
expand Walker’s staff, the Army carefully selected experienced officers for key
positions. In August 1950, MacArthur alleviated the responsibility for logistic duties in
Japan from Walker by assigning them to the new Japan Logistical Command. Most
importantly, the U.S. Army activated the I and IX Corps headquarters to control
divisions for Eighth Army. In July 1950, MacArthur had demanded these echelons,
recognizing that Walker was at the time commanding nine divisions—which exceeded
his headquarters’ span of control. While the combat force in Korea required further
improvement, these additions began the critical process of creating a field army
capable of directing multinational corps towards achievement of strategic aims.
THE ROLE OF THE FIELD ARMY
3-125. When constituted, the field army’s role is to serve as the ARFOR in a subordinate AO. Army doctrine
distinguishes between the ARFOR of a combatant command and that of a joint force formed by the combatant
commander. The ASCC of the combatant command is the ARFOR for the theater and the Army component
of the subordinate joint force, the field army is the ARFOR for multi-corps operations in the subordinate AO.
The ASCC as the ARFOR maintains control of all Army units in an AOR until such time that control is
passed to the field army. As part of controlling Army forces, the ARFOR maintains ADCON of Army forces,
and it addresses service responsibilities such as coordinating ASOS. (See Appendix B of this manual for
more information on the ARFOR.)
3-126. Field armies may execute competition-related tasks as directed by the theater army. However, they
primarily facilitate the transition to armed conflict by focusing on activities that must occur in an AO. This
allows the theater army to maintain its AOR-wide orientation as the ASCC. As the ARFOR, the field army
performs seven functions:
* Execute command and control over multi-corps operations. (See paragraph 3-127.)
* Execute ADCON in the AO. (See paragraph 3-128.) |
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* Execute ASOS in the AO. (See paragraph 3-130.)
* Assume directed Army, joint, and multinational authorities and responsibilities. (See paragraph 3-
133.)
* Shape an assigned operational area. (See paragraph 3-134.)
* Integrate unified action capabilities to support unified land operations. (See paragraph 3-135.)
* Plan and coordinate for the consolidation of gains in an assigned operational area. (See
paragraph 3-137.)
Execute Command and Control over Multi-Corps Operations
3-127. The field army’s ability to command and control multi-corps operations is what distinguishes it from
other echelons. This function is vital to the joint and multinational force’s ability to prevail in large-scale
ground combat and is central to the field army’s ability to perform the ARFOR role and serve as a joint force
land component command. Tasks that the field armies may perform to support this function include:
* Assume command and control of designated Army forces from the theater army when directed.
* Command and control joint or multinational land forces when assigned.
* Task-organize attached forces.
* Manage airspace.
* Coordinate operational-level sustainment.
* Coordinate air and missile defense requirements.
* Conduct area security operations.
* Synchronize operational movement.
* Synchronize decisive action to consolidate gains won through competition.
* Transition from competition to armed conflict.
* Prepare to conduct multi-corps unified land operations to prevail in large-scale ground combat.
* Prepare to conduct populace and resource control.
Execute Administrative Control in the Area of Operations
3-128. As the ARFOR, the field army commander may exercise ADCON over all Army forces in a JTF,
including those subordinate to other components. Depending on the JTF organization, the field army
commander may exercise OPCON of some or all Army forces assigned to the task force and remain
responsible for ADCON of those forces. However, the exercise of OPCON is a delegation of joint command
authority and not a function of ADCON.
3-129. The theater army commander will specify the ADCON responsibilities of the ARFOR. The division
of ADCON responsibilities between the theater and field armies will vary based upon the operation. The
ASCC and the field army monitor changes in joint organization carefully, and they may adjust ADCON
responsibilities based on the situation. Responsibilities for both training and readiness are inherent in
ADCON, and they are exercised by unit commanders for their units.
Execute Army Support to Other Services in the Area of Operations
3-130. The field army provides support to other Services as executive agent and leads Service
responsibilities, inter-Service agreements, or Service support agreements. This is done to provide common
item support in the form of capabilities or resources through common-user logistics or delegated executive
agent responsibilities in a designated AO.
3-131. When executing ASOS, the field army coordinates with the theater army and JFC staff to determine
joint requirements and identify responsibilities. ASOS enables joint forces freedom of action and endurance
by reducing redundancy and creating efficiency.
3-132. In order to fulfill these responsibilities, the field army commander focuses on operational- and
tactical-level support involving combat power generation and sustainment during campaigns and joint
operations. Field army commanders match support and sustainment requirements for a campaign to the Army |
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combat power capabilities that support the JFC’s requirements. Tasks that the field armies may perform to
support this function include—
* Provide and coordinate sustainment support to assigned U.S. forces.
* Anticipate requirements and develop plans for the employment of Army forces in limited
contingency operations, crisis response operations, major operations, and campaigns.
* Support other government agencies as directed by the combatant commander.
* Provide sustainment and other directed support to multinational forces as required by the
combatant commander.
* Manage airspace.
* Coordinate air and missile defense requirements.
* Conduct area security operations.
* Integrate cyberspace electromagnetic activities and space support into operations.
* Command and control military deception efforts within the land area of operations.
* Synchronize cross-domain ISR and information collection throughout the operational area.
* Manage the electromagnetic spectrum in the operational area.
* Protect Army, joint, and multinational networks.
* Prepare to execute CWMD tasks.
Assume Directed Army, Joint, and Multinational Authorities and Responsibilities
3-133. During the course of operations to shape the operational area, the theater army or a JFC may grant
the field army commander with additional authorities or responsibilities to facilitate operations. This is
especially common during the transition to armed conflict. Although the exact requirements depend on the
circumstances, key tasks that field armies may perform to support this function include—
* Serve as the joint force land component command.
* Serve as the multinational headquarters.
* Assume additional directed Army authorities and responsibilities.
* Assume additional directed joint authorities and responsibilities.
* Assume military governance authorities and responsibilities.
Shape an Assigned Operational Area
3-134. During competition, field armies conduct operations to shape AOs. Although the field army’s
emphasis is on deterring armed conflict and facilitating the rapid transition from competition to large-scale
ground combat against peer threats, the field army may also execute operations that achieve competition
objectives when properly resourced by the theater army or JFC. Key tasks that field armies may perform to
support this function include—
* Plan and prepare for large-scale combat operations.
* Refine and conduct detailed planning for major operations to achieve competition objectives.
* Refine and direct intelligence preparation of the battlefield.
* Execute operations to achieve competition objectives.
* Plan and execute flexible deterrent options and flexible response options.
* Rehearse the transition from competition to large-scale ground combat.
* Execute command and control over multiple corps-sized formations and other attached forces.
Integrate Unified Action Capabilities to Support Unified Land Operations
3-135. During conflict, Army forces in an AO must integrate unified action partners to achieve objectives
effectively. This requires Army forces to both support unified action partners while also leveraging their
capabilities to enhance unified land operations. Moreover, they must also prepare to synchronize partner
capabilities to prevail in armed conflict, if necessary. |
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3-136. The field army plays a vital part in integrating unified action capabilities in an operational area.
Building upon the links that the theater army develops with unified action partners during setting and
maintaining the theater, the field army integrates these capabilities into its own combat power in AOs to
present adversaries with multiple dilemmas. This creates advantages over opponents. Key tasks that field
armies may perform to support this function include—
* Integrate space support into operations.
* Synchronize operational-level ground maneuver with joint force air component commander or Air
Force forces operations.
* Integrate maritime effects in support of land operations.
* Integrate information-related capabilities in support of land operations.
* Integrate cyberspace electromagnetic activities to support land operations.
* Integrate unconventional forces into land operations.
* Provide military deception planning and execution management, and support to tactical deception
efforts in the operational area.
* Synchronize cross-domain ISR and information collection throughout the operational area.
* Manage the electromagnetic spectrum in the operational area.
* Protect Army, joint, and multinational networks.
* Liaise with unified action partners in the operational area.
* Integrate unified action capabilities to consolidate gains in the operational area.
* Prepare to integrate land-based capabilities in support of unified action against peer threats.
* Prepare to execute CWMD tasks.
Plan and Coordinate for the Consolidation of Gains in an Assigned Operational Area
3-137. The field army directs and coordinates corps and division consolidation of gains in an assigned
operational area. This requires planning, coordination, and execution for the consolidation of gains
throughout an operation. As part of this, consolidate gains activities may require the field army to employ
forces that perform tasks to—
* Establish area security throughout subordinate AOs.
* Plan offensive and defensive operations to destroy or neutralize remaining threats and protect the
civilian population and infrastructure.
* Conduct stability operations necessary to create conditions that allow for the transition to a
legitimate authority.
* Request additional follow-on forces and capabilities as required.
* Recommend security force assistance to build the capability and capacity of host-nation security
forces.
3-138. Conduct information operations to slow and impair enemy decision making, support commander
decision points and warfighting fighting functions, and as required support joint- and theater-level strategic
messaging. As large-scale combat operations conclude, the field army reorganizes an AO into areas that
facilitate the most rapid consolidation of gains. Operations primarily focus on defeating bypassed enemy
forces and remnants, providing area security in high threat areas, and establishing stability in low threat areas.
Ideally, the field army task-organizes echelons to tasks that consolidate gains, while coordinating transitions
and long-term security cooperation initiatives with the theater army and unified action partners.
FIELD ARMY IN COMPETITION
3-139. When constituted, field armies assist the theater army commander and JFCs with posturing the joint
and multinational force for armed conflict. They do so by relieving the theater army from day-to-day
command and control of Army forces operating in an AOR and by executing competition tasks within the
overall framework established by the geographic combatant command and the theater army. They provide
JFCs with a land component command capability for the transition to large-scale ground combat. This enables |
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the theater army to focus on theater-level matters and allows it to synchronize competition and preparation
for combat activities across the GCC’s entire AOR.
3-140. During competition, the field army can deter threats and prepare to transition to large-scale combat
operations when the risk for immediate, multi-corps, large-scale combat is high. With joint force
augmentation, the field army may also serve as the JFLCC during competition.
FIELD ARMY IN CONFLICT
3-141. During armed conflict, the field army, as the ARFOR, may also serve as the joint force land
component. As the JFLCC, the field army commands and controls multiple corps to enable synchronization
of their maneuver and effects across a land AO. The field army is best suited to serve as the JFLCC during
large-scale combat that involves multiple corps-sized formations against peer threats, because of its ability
to include units of other Services or of allied forces and exercise operational as well as tactical
responsibilities.
3-142. As the joint force and/or coalition land component commander, the field army requires joint and/or
multinational headquarters augmentation. However, once established, the field army as the joint force land
component normally becomes the supported commander in the land AO of the JTF JOA. It will incorporate
additional multinational units and designate subordinate corps’ areas of operations. The field army
headquarters has the authority to designate target priorities, effects, and timing of fires and maneuver in the
assigned land component AO.
3-143. Field armies are primary units of operational maneuver, conducting the decisive operations of the
land campaign. When operating as the land component of a joint force, field armies may be charged with
planning and conducting the land campaign in an area of operations.
3-144. Field army commanders employ subordinate corps to concentrate combat power, to accept or decline
battle, and to exploit the outcome of tactical actions. Field armies and equivalent organizations are primarily
operational headquarters. They may establish priorities for sustainment among their subordinate forces. In
contingency operations, the field army may assume responsibility for the logistic support of Army forces in
the field. In such an operation, the field army would require the assignment of support organizations from
the theater army or unified command. (See JP 3-31 for more information on unified commands.) |
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Land Component Commands in World War II
Having a land component commander is not new to the Armed Forces of the United
States. The Allies in World War II successfully employed separate joint or multinational
land component commander headquarters in several theaters. These land component
commands ensured proper coordination with other components and freed the
multinational force commander to focus on overall strategy. After the Allied losses at
the battle of the Kasserine Pass in February 1943 due to poor command relationships,
General Dwight D. Eisenhower restructured his Allied Forces in North Africa. Not only
were all air elements brought under centralized control, but all land forces were also
consolidated under General Sir Harold Alexander’s 18th Army Group. This structure
was the first modern combined organization with coequal land, maritime, and air
component commanders under separate commanders, and it contributed significantly
to the defeat of the Axis in North Africa by May 1943. For the Normandy invasion in
June 1944, Eisenhower again subordinated U.S. Army forces under a multinational
land component commander, British Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery.
LIMITATIONS
3-145. The limitations of the field army include—
* The field army does not have permanently assigned forces.
* The field army does not have aligned Air Force theater air control system liaison elements (if the
field army is not the land component).
* There are no standing field armies in theaters with peer adversaries who will challenge the joint
force’s ability to respond.
* The Army constitutes a field army when a JFC or theater army commander perceives a
requirement to command and control multi-corps operations, until then the GCC incurs risk.
* The time required to constitute a field army depends upon how quickly additional capabilities can
be brought into theater. In OEs where an enemy has significant preclusion capabilities, this could
be so long that it may not be possible to deny enemy operational and strategic objectives at
acceptable cost. |
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Corps Roles, Functions, and Organizations
[The corps] can engage on an extended front and can carry on a battle until a decision is
reached… In actions of long duration, the divisional units are relieved by fresh units; but
the corps remains until a decision is reached or the strategical plan is changed.
A Manual for Commanders of Large Units
This chapter discusses the roles and responsibilities the corps can fulfill across the
competition continuum. Then it describes the corps headquarters capabilities,
limitations, and organizations to exercise command and control in a variety of roles.
This is followed by a description of organizations typically commanded by a corps.
The chapter concludes with a section on how the corps is employed across the range
of military operations.
CORPS OVERVIEW
4-1. The corps is the most versatile echelon above brigade due to its requirement to potentially operate at
the tactical and operational levels of warfare. While it is organized, manned, trained, and equipped as a
tactical formation, the corps may be called upon to become a joint and multinational headquarters for
conducting operations. When operating as the senior Army headquarters under a JTF, the corps will serve as
the ARFOR. The corps can also serve as the JFLCC when properly augmented with joint and multinational
personnel. If the corps is uncommitted to specific combatant commander requirements, it focuses on building
and sustaining readiness to prevail in large-scale ground combat.
4-2. The characteristics distinguishing corps operations from those of the division are scope and scale.
Instead of focusing on tactical maneuver, the corps focuses on shaping conditions for its divisions by use of
its assets, enablers, and leveraging joint capabilities. Command at this echelon requires operational art,
tactical expertise, and complementary employment of Army and joint capabilities. Joint capabilities are the
primary means available to the corps commander for setting conditions and shaping the environment for
division operations. The ability to execute deliberate and dynamic targeting is a critical capability of the corps
regardless of its assigned role. Likewise, the corps ability to comply with the theater airspace control plan,
process subordinate unit airspace plans, and integrate organic and supporting airspace users is essential to
executing operations in the air domain.
ROLES AND FUNCTIONS
4-3. The corps headquarters has specific roles and performs specific functions. They include acting as the—
* Senior Army tactical formation in large-scale combat, commanding two to five Army divisions
together with supporting brigades and commands.
* ARFOR (with augmentation) within a joint force for campaigns and major operations when a field
army is not present.
* JTF headquarters (with significant augmentation) for crisis response and limited contingency
operations.
* Joint force land component (with significant augmentation) commanding U.S. Army, Marine
Corps, and multinational divisions together with supporting brigades and commands when a field
army is not present. |
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4-4. The nature of an operation will dictate how many roles a corps can perform simultaneously. The
workload associated with performing two roles during large-scale combat operations can overwhelm a corps
commander and staff. Generally, a corps serving as a JTF headquarters should not perform as a tactical
formation, ARFOR, or JFLCC. There should be a separate ARFOR because of the differing responsibilities.
JTFs focus on the operational level of war and use joint rather than Army doctrine. A corps headquarters can
simultaneously provide the nucleus of a land component commander and ARFOR headquarters during major
operations if another headquarters acts as the corps commander’s lead agent for the conduct of ADCON
tasks.
TACTICAL FORMATION
4-5. Large-scale combat operations require a corps headquarters to function as a tactical formation under a
land component command or subordinate to a field army equivalent established under an alliance or coalition.
The corps commander synchronizes the employment of joint capabilities in conjunction with Army decisive
action. Corps operations shape an OE and set the conditions for tactical actions by the division and lower
echelons. In large-scale combat operations, the corps task-organizes and maneuvers divisions to destroy
enemy land forces, seize key terrain and critical infrastructure, and dominate the land portion of the JOA.
4-6. Corps conduct continuous and simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations or defense
support of civil authority tasks through a series of synchronized division and separate brigade operations.
These operations achieve and exploit positions of relative advantage across multiple domains to destroy or
defeat an enemy and achieve the operation’s overall purpose.
4-7. The six primary functions of a corps are—
* Conduct shaping operations in the corps AO.
* Task-organize and employ divisions and brigades.
* Integrate and synchronize operations of divisions and brigades.
* Mass effects at decisive points.
* Allocate resources and set priorities.
* Leverage joint capabilities.
4-8. Large-scale combat operations require the corps to shape operations ahead of their subordinate
divisions by disintegrating enemy systems, such as the enemy’s integrated fires command, to facilitate current
and future operations. The corps task-organizes divisions and its functional and multifunctional brigades with
the necessary capability and capacity to achieve objectives and to weight the main effort. During their
employment, the corps integrates and synchronizes the operations of its assigned divisions and brigades. As
the corps performs these functions, it prepares the formation to bring all of its capabilities and effects to bear
on decisive points at each portion of an operation to achieve objectives and accomplish its mission. To set
the conditions for enabling and sustaining subordinate units to achieve objectives and accomplish the mission,
the corps manages and allocates resources within the corps formation and sets priorities for tasks and support.
The corps uses joint capability (both lethal and nonlethal) to facilitate many of these other functions,
especially shaping operations and massing effects at decisive points.
ARFOR
4-9. The corps headquarters is organized, trained, and equipped to serve as the ARFOR in campaigns and
major operations, controlling the operations of two to five Army divisions and corps troops, supported by
theater-level organizations across the conflict continuum. When the corps is the senior Army headquarters in
a JTF, the corps assumes the role of ARFOR. As ARFOR, the corps executes those ADCON and ASOS
responsibilities delegated by the ASCC for all Army forces assigned or attached to the JTF and OPCON of
all Army units not subordinate to another component of the JTF, such as a joint special operations command
or task force. As the ARFOR, the corps has extensive ADCON requirements, in addition to operational
requirements, and it assumes responsibility through the theater army commander for the Service-specific
support of all Army forces in the JOA, as well as for providing any ASOS with forces deployed in the joint
operations area. (For additional information on the operations and administrative responsibilities of an
ARFOR refer to Appendix B.) |
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JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS
4-10. The corps headquarters is the preferred Army unit to use as the core element for forming a JTF
headquarters for limited contingency and crisis response operations. This is accomplished by adding
augmentation from other Services and special operations personnel to transform it into a JTF headquarters.
This augmentation includes officers inserted into the functional and integrating staff cells, and additional
personal staff sections. This augmentation does not include the personnel needed to augment the corps
headquarters battalion network capability.
4-11. A corps headquarters designated as a JTF headquarters requires a separate ARFOR headquarters
because of the differing roles and responsibilities inherent in each. For example, JTF’s focus on the
operational level of war and use joint rather than Army doctrine. The joint task force commander normally
exercises OPCON over most forces and other resources in the joint operations area. A JTF can include
functional and Service components. In addition to U.S. forces, JTFs often contain multinational forces from
allied and coalition partners, such as in Combined Joint Task Force—OPERATION Inherent Rresolve.
JOINT FORCE LAND COMPONENT COMMAND HEADQUARTERS
4-12. The corps headquarters is the preferred headquarters to form the nucleus of a joint force land
component command in limited contingency operations. The corps headquarters can command joint land
forces with augmentation from the Marine Corps and other unified action partners. It has the necessary staff
and experience to control land operations across a JOA. When a mission dictates, the corps headquarters
identifies and fills needs for specialized skills not organic to the corps headquarters. The headquarters
organizes according to the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) implementing directive. This document
establishes the roles and responsibilities of the joint force land component, assigns the mission, and
designates forces. Normally, the joint force land component staff consists of corps staffs augmented with
members of the other Service components. The distribution of other Service personnel onto the corps staff
allocates key staff billets so that all Services share equitably in staffing tasks. Ideally, the deputy joint force
land component commander or chief of staff comes from a different Service. Replicating this construct
throughout the staff leadership ensures all leaders understand the distinct capabilities of each Service to
optimize employment of the forces. The corps commander as the joint force land component commander
provides the core elements of the staff to assist in planning, coordinating, and executing functional land
component operations.
4-13. When designated as a joint force land component command, the corps exercises TACON or OPCON
over Marine Corps forces, as required by the JFC, in addition to its attached Army forces. A corps functions
as an operational-level headquarters. A corps is likely to become the joint force land component command
when the Army provides most of the land forces. Land operations achieve campaign objectives directly
through land operations or indirectly through supporting other components of the joint force.
4-14. Joint land operations require synchronization and integration of all instruments of national power to
achieve strategic and operational objectives. Normally, joint land operations also involve multinational land
forces. Joint land operations include control of an assigned AO. The joint force land component command
employs land forces, supported by naval and air forces (as appropriate), to achieve military objectives in vital
areas of the operational area. The corps serving as the ARFOR assumes the additional administrative
responsibilities over all Army forces in the operational area. As required by the JFC, a corps normally
receives a special operations liaison element and supports special operations forces throughout the land AO.
4-15. When designated as a joint force land component command, the corps follows joint doctrine. As a joint
force land component headquarters, the corps has tasks that include, but are not limited to—
* Coordinating the planning and execution of joint land operations with the other components and
supporting agencies.
* Designating the target priorities, effects, and timing for joint land operations.
* Providing mutual support to other components by conducting operations in the JOA.
* Coordinating with other functional and Service components in support of achieving the JFC’s
objectives. |
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* Providing a deputy to the area air defense commander (normally the commander of the Army air
and missile defense command) for land-based joint theater air and missile defense operations as
determined by the JFC. The AAMDC provides inputs to the JFC’s joint area air defense plan and
the airspace control plan for the joint force land component command.
* Supporting the JFC’s information operations by developing requirements that support land control
and synchronize land force information operations assets when directed.
* Integrating the joint and Army networks within the DOD information networks throughout the
AO. Performing this function may require joint and Service augmentation.
* Performing joint security functions.
* Establishing standard operating procedures and other directives based on the JFC’s guidance.
4-16. To facilitate joint security operations, the JFC may establish a joint security element with a designated
joint security coordinator to coordinate operations in a JSA. If the JTF commander gives the joint force land
component commander responsibility for a JSA, the corps commander may elect to split the corps
headquarters functions. The deputy corps commander—with part of the corps staff, augmentation from
theater echelon units, and an Army maneuver enhancement brigade (MEB)—receives TACON of the theater
units in the JSA for protection and movement. The deputy corps commander becomes the joint security
coordinator. Alternatively, the commander may designate and organize a subordinate task force to focus
solely on operations in the JSA.
4-17. An associated requirement of the corps headquarters controlling U.S. land forces is for the corps
headquarters to also function as a multinational joint force land component command headquarters for
multinational units operating in its AO. In most cases, the corps exercises TACON over multinational
brigades and divisions. However, in this case, the corps becomes a multinational joint force land component
command, and the corps commander becomes a multinational force LCC commander. National caveats often
exist on the use of multinational forces. The higher grades structured into the design of the corps headquarters
facilitate these concerns. Commanders and staff operating as a joint headquarters must be aware that
multinational brigades normally lack the ability to communicate digitally, or if they do, their systems might
prove incompatible. This creates an additional layer of complexity to planning and execution. The corps also
trains in multinational exercises as part of theater engagement and security assistance managed by the theater
army.
LIMITATIONS
4-18. There are some limitations and dependencies that must be considered when employing a corps in any
of its roles. Those limitations include, but are not limited to Reserve Component mobilization and mobility
and security.
Reserve Component Mobilization
4-19. The multi-component nature of the corps imposes certain limitations on the corps’ capability to
strategically deploy and rapidly initiate large-scale combat operations. The corps has multiple Reserve
Component organizations that require lead-time to mobilize, train, and integrate into their respective roles
and responsibilities. The main command post operational detachment is required to man the corps command
posts. When the corps is preparing to deploy, commanders, staffs, and planners must take care to coordinate
for Reserve Component mobilization with enough time to assemble the formation for deployment.
Alternatively, the corps may not have enough time and must either structure its deployment and employment
to assemble the formation after the main deployment, secure resources and capabilities from other formations,
or operate without the pieces of the formation. The main command post operational detachment provides
additional depth to the corps staff for sustained operations. The MEB is an integral part of command and
control in the corps support area. The corps is also dependent on integration with the MEB to operate the rear
command post. If the corps does not have a MEB, then it must either assign another organization to control
the corps support area or assume direct control. Additionally, without a MEB to integrate with the rear
command post, the corps headquarters would have to integrate with another organization or devote additional
staff and equipment from the main command post and tactical command post to properly staff the rear
command post. When a second field artillery brigade is required to perform counterfire, it will often be |
3-94 | 111 | Corps Roles, Functions, and Organizations
mobilized from the National Guard, requiring the same planning considerations as the main command post
operational detachment and MEB.
Note. The MEB is an integral part of corps’ ability to command and control in the corps support
areas. The mobilization and deployment of the MEB must be prioritized in corps planning and
operations to ensure that it arrives as early as possible. Depending upon the situation, corps
commanders may consider deploying their assigned MEB ahead of their divisional combat power.
Mobility and Security
4-20. The corps headquarters has mobility limitations, and it lacks organic security elements. The corps
headquarters is fully mobile with the exception of intermodal containers, which will require movement
support from a truck company during command post deployment and employment. During employment, the
corps headquarters and headquarters battalion normally receives a company-sized element to secure the corps
headquarters, such as a reinforced military police company or infantry company. However, planners must
account for the sustainment considerations of these security attachments, particularly their mobility.
THE CORPS HEADQUARTERS
4-21. The headquarters and headquarters’ battalion provides the personnel and equipment to support the
corps command posts and mobile command group. The corps headquarters is manned and equipped to form
three command posts (main, tactical and rear area) and a mobile command group as needed. A command post
is a unit headquarters where the commander and staff perform their activities (FM 6-0). Command posts
assist commanders in the exercise of mission command, helping to control operations through continuity,
planning, coordinating, and synchronizing warfighting functions. A corps also has the ability to field an early-
entry command post.
HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS BATTALION
4-22. A battalion operates as a tactical and administrative headquarters for two organic companies: a
headquarters and support company and a signal, intelligence, and sustainment company. It also has a Reserve
Component main command post operational detachment. Each company consists of staff sections which are
organized into three deployable command posts: the main command post, tactical command post, and rear
command post. The main command post and the tactical command post are normally co-located with
elements of the headquarters and headquarters’ battalion providing the administrative and logistics support
to the command posts.
4-23. The headquarters battalion staff provides administrative support, human resources, logistic support,
religious support, and life support to corps headquarters elements. When deployed, the battalion staff sections
are responsible for unit-level communications support, property accountability, transportation, medical
support, and maintenance support for the main command post, tactical command post, rear command post,
and mobile command group. When dictated by terrain or distance, the rear command post may receive area
support for maintenance and medical support from the corps support area owner.
4-24. The headquarters support company provides command and control and company-level administration
and life support to the headquarters and organic maneuver, fires, and protection staff cells. The headquarters
support company will normally co-locate with the main command post for oversight, coordination, and
synchronization of administrative and logistic support for assigned, attached, or OPCON units of the main
command post.
4-25. The signal, intelligence, and sustainment company headquarters provides command and control and
limited company-level administration and life support to the organic staff cells. The headquarters also
provides company-command-level command and control for the signal elements supporting the main
command post and tactical command post. The signal support elements install, operate, and maintain the
corps network enterprise in support of 24-hour operations at the main command post and tactical command
post. The signal, intelligence, and sustainment company headquarters will normally co-locate with the tactical |
3-94 | 112 | Chapter 4
command post for oversight, coordination, and synchronization of administrative and logistics support for
assigned, attached, or OPCON units of the tactical command post.
MAIN COMMAND POST
4-26. The main command post is deployable and is the corps primary command post. The main command
post controls current operations, performs detailed analysis, and plans future operations. The functions
performed in the main command post enable the success of subordinate units in the close area. The main
command post directs tasks that occur in the close, deep, and support areas. It must plan and synchronize the
employment of capabilities across all warfighting functions. Commanders can employ the main command
post to—
* Control every aspect of the overall mission.
* Plan operations, including branches and sequels.
* Integrate intelligence into current operations and plans.
* Synchronize the targeting process, including target development to joint standards.
* Plan and synchronize sustaining operations.
* Assess the overall progress of operations.
* Receive reports for subordinate units and prepare reports required by higher echelon headquarters.
4-27. The main command post includes the command group and most of the coordinating, special, and
personal staffs. It is staffed to organize into five functionally focused cells (including intelligence, movement
and maneuver, fires, protection, and sustainment) with broad responsibilities for coordinating these
warfighting functions across the corps. The movement and maneuver cell, augmented by subject matter
experts from across the staff, organizes into the three integrating cells: the current operations integration cell,
future operations cell, and plans cell. The movement and maneuver cell also includes several specialized
elements, including the airspace element. It also receives USAF elements structured to support the
headquarters’ assigned role. As a tactical headquarters, the corps receives a corps tactical air control party.
As a joint force land component command in limited contingency operations, it receives a joint air component
coordination element. Because there is no command and control functional cell, staff elements responsible
for command and control tasks either receive direction and priorities from the chief of staff or work in an
integrating cell. Liaison elements from higher echelon, adjacent, and subordinate units locate at the main
command post. If provided, the special operations forces coordinating element also locates here.
4-28. The main command post is significantly larger than the other command posts, and it is less mobile.
Although it does have some limited mobility, it requires additional support from a truck company for full
mobility. The main command post is capable of 24-hour operations indefinitely, and it needs to only pause
operations to displace. The main command post is the only command post that can perform all of the functions
of the headquarters without the other command posts functioning. Threat forces can find the main command
post more easily than the other command posts due to its size and electronic signature. Commanders and
staffs plan for placement of the main command post to mitigate vulnerability to threat targeting capabilities.
TACTICAL COMMAND POST
4-29. The primary role of the tactical command post is as the alternate command post of the corps. It provides
a place from which the commander can exercise command and control while the main command post deploys
or displaces. In a high-threat situation, the tactical command post may offset from the main command post
to provide redundancy in the event of an attack on the main command post. Commanders can also employ it
as—
* A task force headquarters.
* The controlling command post for a specific task within a larger operation such as a gap crossing,
a passage of lines, a relief in place, or an air assault operation.
* The controlling headquarters for the decisive operation or a specific shaping operation.
* A forward-positioned headquarters during deployment.
* The controlling headquarters for a JSA. |
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4-30. The tactical command post includes representatives from all five functional cells, including the G-6,
the chief of staff, civil affairs operations, the public affairs officer, the chaplain, the knowledge management
section, the cyberspace and electromagnetic activities section, the office of the staff judge advocate, and
various liaison officers. It also has an engagement element that contains civil affairs, security cooperation,
and military information support operations staff officers.
4-31. The tactical command post is mobile, and it is easily deployed or displaced since most of its
transportation is organic. The tactical command post can control corps operations for a limited time and form
the nucleus of a forward-deployed early-entry command post (sometimes designated as an assault command
post). It is deployed as an extension of the main command post to perform specific tactical tasks. It is capable
of 24-hour operations for limited periods, and it is scalable in size and composition to reflect operational and
mission variables and manpower caps within the corps’ AO. The endurance of the tactical command post is
a function of the intensity of the workload and capacity of its staff.
4-32. Displacing the tactical command post requires transportation assets, initially with inter-theater airlift,
and subsequently with intra-theater assets. The tactical command post should be strategically deployable by
a minimum number of C-17 aircraft. Once in theater, the tactical command post should need minimal
reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (known as RSOI) before becoming functional. By
adjusting the vehicle and equipment mix, the tactical command post may reconfigure for movement by C-130
aircraft to forward locations if ground movement is not feasible or timely.
REAR COMMAND POST
4-33. Depending on the situation, including the threat, size of the rear area, and number of units in the support
area, corps commanders may form a rear command post to assist in controlling operations. The rear command
post enables corps commanders to exercise command and control over disparate combat, functional, and
multifunctional elements operating between the close area and the corps rear boundary that may exceed the
effective span of control of the MEB or corps main command post. This is especially true in the case of large-
scale combat when the number of units operating behind the close area is large. Commanders may use the
rear command post to provide command supervision and general officer oversight for—
* Conducting corps support area operations.
* Performing terrain management and movement control.
* Defeating threats.
* Enabling sustainment operations.
* Coordinating and synchronizing protection.
* Enabling stability operations.
* Enabling transitions.
4-34. Deployed as an extension of the main command post, the rear command post is focused on supporting
operations in the deep and close areas, and it coordinates activities between those areas and the corps rear
boundary. It assists the main command post and the commander in coordinating the activities of the multiple
units operating there by managing terrain and controlling movement. The management of terrain and
movement control responsibilities are intensive, requiring significant effort to be successful. Normally, a
deputy corps commander leads the rear command post. The specific functions assigned to the rear command
post will be designated by the corps commander to their deputy commander through an order or terms of
reference.
4-35. The corps table of organization and equipment provides equipment for the rear command post, but
personnel must come from either the main command post or the tactical command post. The rear command
post may be augmented by other units in the corps support area as required. The MEB, which is required
anytime a corps deploys, is the primary unit that augments the rear command post. When a MEB is not
available, or additional specialties are required, the corps rear command post may use personnel from other
units. The rear command post depends upon a MEB, or other brigade-sized headquarters, for security, life
support, and area control functions. When integrated with a MEB, the rear command post is capable of
coordinating and synchronizing the corps rear operations allowing the main command post to focus on close
and deep operations. |
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EARLY ENTRY COMMAND POST
4-36. The early-entry command post is a lead element of a headquarters designed to control operations until
the remaining portions of the headquarters are deployed and operational (FM 6-0). The early-entry command
post is an ad hoc organization of equipment and personnel from the staffs of the tactical, main, and rear
command posts. The tactical command post usually provides the base for the early-entry command post. The
corps adds or subtracts personnel based on mission requirements. The early-entry command post includes a
mix of current operations personnel, planners, and sustainers able to coordinate the reception of the corps
and plan its initial operations. It is usually led by the corps deputy commanding general.
4-37. The corps early-entry command post is established to maintain forward situational awareness early in
any corps deployment. It facilitates the deployment and onward movement of the corps and its assigned
forces, coordinates with outside military and other government organizations as required, and provides
limited command and control of assigned or attached forces when required. Ideally, manning and equipment
should allow the early-entry command post to deploy aboard a single aircraft, although the composition
adjusts to the lift available. In a non- or semi-permissive area, security for the early-entry command post
typically comes from co-location with an already deployed subordinate unit’s command post. If the
environment is permissive, the early-entry command post may deploy to a host-nation military facility.
MOBILE COMMAND GROUP
4-38. The mobile command group consists of specially equipped vehicles that allow the corps commander
to move by ground in the land portions of the JOA and have network access to the common operational
picture, subordinate commanders, and the corps staff. In addition to the drivers and gunners, the commander
normally selects a small number of staff experts to handle en route communications and coordination. The
mission and the commander’s preference dictate the composition. When distance or circumstances require
air movement, a supporting aviation brigade has specially equipped command and control helicopters that
can substitute for ground vehicles.
4-39. The mobile command group is not capable of exercising command and control to the same degree as
the three command posts. Its primary purpose is to assist the commander with maintaining the necessary
situational awareness to make critical decisions while moving between command posts or subordinate units
during the conduct of operations.
SUBORDINATE FORMATIONS
4-40. The capabilities of a corps are tailored for each mission by adjusting the corps’ composition. Usually,
a corps commands between two to five divisions, a mix of functional and multifunctional brigades, additional
BCTs, and a variety of smaller enabler units. The smaller enablers usually come from higher echelon assets
and augment the corps’ capabilities.
ASSIGNED FORCES
4-41. The corps routinely has units that are attached or assigned to it. This includes two to five divisions,
additional BCTs, an ESC, a MEB, an expeditionary military intelligence brigade, a field artillery brigade, an
engineer brigade, a military police brigade, a corps signal brigade, and a medical brigade. Based on the
assigned tasks of the divisions and the allocation of brigades, the corps commander determines the
appropriate command and support relationships for subordinate divisions and brigades. A corps may retain
some forces to consolidate gains concurrently with other operations.
4-42. The corps routinely controls multinational forces in accordance with their individual national caveats.
The organization of these units varies as will their support and sustainment capabilities. The corps
commander should give particular attention to the national capabilities and limitations of each multinational
partner. Some limitations are tactical, while others may be political. Normally, a corps receives a digital
liaison detachment to support multinational interoperability (see paragraph 3-89 for more on digital liaison
detachments). Figure 4-1 provides an example of the corps and available enablers. |
3-94 | 115 | Corps Roles, Functions, and Organizations
Figure 4-1. Example of a corps and available enablers
Divisions
4-43. Divisions are tactical units of execution for a corps. A division’s primary role is as a tactical
headquarters commanding brigades during decisive action. A division combines offensive, defensive, and
either stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks in an AO assigned by its higher echelon
headquarters, normally a corps. It task-organizes its subordinate forces to accomplish its mission. During
large-scale combat operations, a division operates as a formation. Divisions have both operational and
administrative responsibilities. See Chapter 5 of this manual for more information on the division.
Brigade Combat Team
4-44. BCTs are normally subordinate units for a division; however, a corps may hold a BCT or similar
organization for a specific role, such as the corps reserve or area security. BCTs are versatile, modular
organizations with inherent capabilities that make them effective in any environment. There are three types
of BCTs: armored, infantry, and Stryker. BCTs maneuver against, close with, and destroy enemy forces.
BCTs have organic combined arms capabilities, including battalion-sized maneuver, field artillery,
reconnaissance, and sustainment units. Each BCT has organic medical support.
4-45. A BCT has organic capabilities across the warfighting functions. These capabilities are scalable to
meet mission requirements. Organic BCT capabilities include maneuver, field artillery, intelligence, signal,
engineer, CBRN, and sustainment capabilities. The capabilities enable BCTs to operate independently for up
to three days depending on the mission.
4-46. A higher echelon commander can task-organize a BCT by adding or subtracting smaller units and
capabilities through the use of command and support relationships. Higher echelon commanders may
augment BCTs with additional combat power for specific missions. Augmentation might include aviation, |
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armor, infantry, field artillery, air and missile defense, military police, civil affairs, military information
support elements, engineers, CBRN, EOD, or other forces or capabilities. Some of this augmentation may
come from other BCTs. Multifunctional and functional brigades can also support BCT operations (See
FM 3-96 for additional information on BCT operations).
Expeditionary Sustainment Command
4-47. The ESC is the corps’ command for the integration and synchronization of sustainment in an
operational area. The ESC is assigned to the corps and task-organized with functional and multifunctional
sustainment units that provide general support for all units in the corps AO. The corps’ ESC commands and
controls the sustainment units operating in the corps rear area. The ESC and its subordinate units provide
general support to all units assigned and attached to the corps. A task-organized ESC assigned to a corps
normally includes enablers such as a corps logistics support element, petroleum group, financial management
support center, movement control battalion, and a sustainment brigade.
4-48. The ESC assists the corps sustainment cell with planning and coordinating sustainment, planning for
near-term operations, and synchronizing operational-level sustainment operations to meet current operations.
The corps ESC is dependent on the corps staff for long-range planning capability. The ESC main command
post positions itself where it can best support operations, generally in the vicinity of the corps rear command
post. The ESC tactical command post provides the capability to integrate into other corps command posts as
required. The ESC commander may perform the duties of deputy commanding general (support) if directed
by the corps commander. The ESC also relies upon the corps for additional force protection, signal, and
medical support. (See FM 4-0 for more information on the ESC.)
Maneuver Enhancement Brigade
4-49. The MEB is a multifunctional headquarters with limited organic structure and depends on the task
organization of units for capabilities to conduct support area operations and defense support of civil
authorities for the echelons it supports. Higher echelon commanders base the MEB’s task-organization on
identified mission requirements for the echelon it is supporting. When properly task-organized the MEB can
perform military police, engineer, and CBRN missions simultaneously, in addition to all of the doctrinal
functions associated with being assigned an AO. The MEB performs these functions within its AO:
* Support to base camp and base cluster defense.
* Lines of communication security, maintenance, and movement control.
* Liaison and coordination.
* Construction.
* Host-nation support integration.
* Detainee operations.
* Mobility and countermobility
* Rear command post integration.
4-50. The MEB supports an Army, joint, interagency, or multinational headquarters. The MEB headquarters
is staffed and optimized to conduct combined arms operations integrating a wide range of functional branches
and combat forces. The MEB organizes, provides, or employs battalion task force and company team
combined arms technical experts to conduct maneuver support tasks throughout an AO. The MEB may
include a mix of CBRN, civil affairs, engineer, military police, and potentially air defense artillery units in
addition to a tactical combat force. The number and type of organizations placed under this brigade depends
on the mission, threat, and number and type of battalions or companies operating in the brigade’s AO. The
MEB provides staff planning for and command and control of the units required to conduct decisive action
in the echelon support area. Current Army force structure places all MEBs in the Army Reserve and the Army
National Guard.
4-51. A corps commander can task-organize parts of a MEB to a BCT or other brigade for a specific mission
outside its AO or provide forces to complement or reinforce other organizations conducting select missions
or tasks that support the main effort. However, specific or select missions does not imply long term. If the
MEB becomes a force provider for an enduring period it could become ineffective in its ability to conduct
support area operations. If conditions in the support area degrade, it is detrimental to the success of |
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operations. A degraded support area also inhibits the ability to shape the corps deep area for divisions
involved in the corps’ close operations. Therefore, corps support area operations requires planning
considerations equal to those in the corps close areas. (See FM 3-81 for additional information on MEB
operations.)
Expeditionary-Military Intelligence Brigade
4-52. The Army has three Regular Army expeditionary-military intelligence brigades (E-MIBs) in its force
structure, each assigned to a corps headquarters, and two expeditionary-military intelligence brigades in the
Army National Guard and two in the Army Reserve. The E-MIB provides intelligence capability and capacity
to the corps and subordinate divisions. This facilitates situational understanding for the corps and division
commanders and critical pieces of the sensor-to-shooter linkage necessary for the corps to execute shaping
operations in the corps deep area.
4-53. The E-MIB is designed to receive, integrate, employ, and sustain intelligence capabilities and
capacities in the corps AO and to provide support to subordinate divisions. The nature of this support to the
corps is enhanced capability and capacity in intelligence analysis, processing, exploitation, and
dissemination, multi-domain collection capability, human intelligence, and counterintelligence collection
and processing capability. The E-MIB does not conduct reconnaissance.
4-54. The corps commander retains control of the E-MIB and task-organizes elements, generally one
intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) battalion, of the E-MIB to divisions as required. The IEW battalion
(at corps echelons), organic to the E-MIB, remains with the corps headquarters and provides one detachment
of analysis and processing, exploitation, and dissemination to the corps assistant chief of staff, intelligence
(G-2), one detachment of multi-domain collection capabilities, and one company of human intelligence, and
counterintelligence collection and processing capability in support of corps multi-domain operations.
4-55. One E-MIB is assigned per corps or field army. The E-MIB staff works closely with the corps G-2
analysis and control element. The expeditionary-military intelligence brigade commander and staff also assist
the corps commander in information collection management. E-MIBs are organized with a headquarters, one
IEW battalion (at corps echelon), and one IEW battalion (at division echelon) per division. The IEW battalion
(corps) provides general support counterintelligence and human intelligence capability to the corps. Both
IEW battalions (corps and division) provide direct support analysis as well as processing, exploitation, and
dissemination to their respective G-2s, and multi-domain sensing and target development capability in
support of multi-domain operations. The headquarters is responsible for the training and readiness of the
assigned IEW battalions and can be deployed to serve as the senior military intelligence mission command
headquarters for field armies or other deployed operational Army headquarters. (See ATP 2-19.3 for more
discussion of E-MIB capabilities and operations).
Field Artillery Brigade
4-56. A field artillery brigade’s primary task is conducting corps-level strike operations and augmenting
division-level shaping operations. It is capable of employing Army indirect fires and incorporating electronic
warfare. In addition, a field artillery brigade can request joint fires and coordinate with Army airspace
elements. The field artillery brigade can detect and attack targets using a mix of its organic target acquisition
and fires capabilities, a supported organization’s information collection capabilities, and access to higher
echelon headquarters information collection capabilities.
Note. A corps conducting large-scale combat operations requires two field artillery brigades. One
field artillery brigade serves as the counterfire headquarters and the other is the corps force field
artillery headquarters.
4-57. Field artillery brigades are typically the force field artillery headquarters for the formation to which
they are aligned. The brigade commander is designated as the corps fire support coordinator, allowing them
to better facilitate fires and targeting for the corps. However, in the case where there are two field artillery
brigades assigned, attached, or OPCON to the corps and no operational-level field artillery command, the
corps will employ the corps fires support element as the force field artillery headquarters. In this case, one |
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field artillery brigade will serve as the counterfire headquarters and the other will service the corps
commander’s targeting priorities and support division assets. (See FM 3-09 for additional information in field
artillery brigade operations.)
Engineer Brigade
4-58. The corps assigned engineer brigade controls the mission-tailored engineer battalions that are not task-
organized to subordinate divisions and brigades. These battalions typically have capabilities from the three
engineer disciplines: combat engineering, general engineering, and geospatial engineering. Their purpose is
to enhance mobility, countermobility, survivability, and sustainment.
4-59. An engineer brigade develops plans, procedures, and programs for engineer support. These include
requirements determination, operational mobility and countermobility, general engineering, power
generation, area damage control, military construction, geospatial engineering, engineering design,
construction materials, and real property maintenance activities. The corps engineer brigade integrates and
synchronizes engineer capabilities across the corps AO and reinforces subordinate corps units in the
execution of engineer tasks by allocating mission-tailored engineer forces.
4-60. Engineer tasks alter terrain to overcome obstacles (including gaps), create, maintain, and improve lines
of communication, create fighting positions, improve protective positions, and build structures and facilities
(including base camps, aerial ports, seaports, and utilities). An engineer brigade is also capable of rapid
deployment in modular elements to support the needs of the operational commander. These elements are
capable of providing a wide range of technical engineering expertise and support. (See FM 3-34 for additional
information about engineer operations.)
Military Police Brigade
4-61. The Army allocates a military police brigade to a corps when the magnitude of military police
requirements exceeds the capability of the MEB to control military police activities. The military police
brigade is a functional brigade of the Army and is capable of planning, integrating, and directing the execution
of military police missions conducted by up to five mission-tailored military police battalions; integrating
capabilities from all three military police disciplines (police operations, detention operations, and security
and mobility support); and integrating police intelligence operations. It may also command other units
focused on performing area support, detention, or dislocated-civilian tasks and on synchronizing military
police support across multiple organizations that control an AO in support of stability tasks. During
large-scale combat operations, a military police brigade is required to allocate, synchronize, control, and
provide technical oversight when there are more than two military police battalions’ worth of capabilities
within a corps or division AO. Some functional military police elements remain under control of the MEB,
even if a corps or higher echelon headquarters provides a functional military police brigade to the corps (See
FM 3-39 for additional information on the military police brigade and military police operations).
Corps Signal Brigade
4-62. A corps signal brigade provides signal support for corps and division operations. In large-scale combat
operations, the corps signal brigade commands one or more expeditionary signal battalions or expeditionary
signal battalions-enhanced. Corps signal brigades provide communications and information systems support
to a theater army headquarters, their subordinate units, and as required, to joint, inter-organizational,
interagency, and multinational partners throughout the corps AO. The corps signal brigade and its subordinate
units install, operate, maintain, and secure their portions of the DODIN-A. Each corps signal brigade
leverages network extension and reach back capabilities to provide joint communications and information
systems services to the GCC and subordinate commanders to support command and control and enable the
other warfighting functions. (See FM 6-02 for more information on the corps signal brigade.)
PROVIDED FORCES
4-63. Based upon the corps’ role and mission, it can receive a variety of forces to assist the corps in matching
capabilities to requirement. Provided forces consist of functional brigades, multifunctional brigades, and
smaller units and enablers. The most common of the provided forces are a combat aviation brigade; |
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expeditionary combat aviation brigade; air defense artillery brigade; civil affairs brigade; CBRN operations
brigade; EOD group; psychological operations battalion; USAF support; Army space support team; military
history detachment; mobile public affairs detachment; cyberspace and electromagnetic activities forces; and
special operations forces. These forces can be attached, OPCON, or TACON to the corps.
4-64. A corps tailored for major operations may have three to five Army divisions, numerous functional and
multifunctional brigades, separate brigades and various detachments and smaller units. A corps receives
direct support from the signal and air defense brigades commanded by the theater signal command and Army
air and missile defense command, respectively. The corps commander uses the brigades under corps
command to reinforce subordinate divisions and to conduct shaping operations for subordinate units. These
brigades also support the corps as a whole. A corps ESC, enabled by other theater level assets, provides
sustainment support. Depending on the situation, a corps may receive direct or general medical support from
an additional medical brigade under MEDCOM (DS).
Combat Aviation Brigade
4-65. A combat aviation brigade is organized and equipped to synchronize the operations of multiple aviation
battalions simultaneously to support corps or division operations. The commander can reorganize a combat
aviation brigade in response to the situation. It can provide tailored support to adjacent, supported maneuver
commanders at the BCT and below. The combat aviation brigade commander is normally the senior Army
aviation officer in the corps or division structure, and advises adjacent and higher echelon commanders on
manned and unmanned aviation system employment.
4-66. The combat aviation brigade provides a corps or division commander with a maneuver advantage that
can overcome the constraints of limiting terrain and extended distances. Attack, reconnaissance, utility, and
cargo aircraft may maneuver independently under corps or division control in the deep area or in an assigned
AO. Alternatively, the combat aviation brigade’s attack, reconnaissance, utility, and cargo assets may be
under OPCON, TACON, general support, or direct support to another brigade as situationally appropriate.
Furthermore, a combat aviation brigade may receive OPCON of ground maneuver forces to conduct security
or reconnaissance operations or to accomplish other economy of force missions. The use of aviation assets
requires additional detailed planning and synchronization using specific airspace control processes to
maximize results. (See FM 3-04 for additional information on Army aviation operations.)
Expeditionary Combat Aviation Brigade
4-67. The expeditionary combat aviation brigade is a multifunctional unit designed to air assault maneuver
forces; position personnel, supplies, and equipment; evacuate casualties; conduct personnel recovery; and
provide command and control. When task-organized with an attack reconnaissance battalion or attack
reconnaissance squadron, expeditionary combat aviation brigades also provide accurate and timely
information collection; provide reaction time and maneuver space; and destroy, defeat, disrupt, or delay
enemy forces. (See FM 3-04 for additional information on Army aviation operations.)
Air Defense Artillery Brigade
4-68. Air defense artillery brigades are structured to perform several functions supporting the Army air and
missile defense commands and designated GCC. Air defense artillery brigade functions include command
and control activities, integration, planning, and liaison with joint, higher echelon units, and subordinate
battalions. Air defense artillery brigades are the force providers for the Army air and missile defense
commands, meeting the commander’s air and missile defense objectives. Air defense artillery brigades, both
Regular and Reserve Component, must be prepared to integrate a mix of Regular and Reserve Component
forces. Air defense artillery brigades are generally aligned under the AAMDC and deployed to control the
fires of subordinate units. Each brigade consists of a headquarters, brigade staff, and its subordinate
battalions.
4-69. Air defense artillery brigades deploy early to protect aerial ports of debarkation, seaports of
debarkation, early arriving forces, and critical supplies, in accordance with the JFC’s initial defended asset
list. As a lodgment expands, air defense artillery forces may reposition to better protect critical assets,
communications, transportation, and maneuver forces. Air defense artillery brigades and any available joint |
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and multinational air and missile defense forces combine to form integrated defenses after completion of
deployment operations. Echelon commanders, with staff support, designate their echelon priority assets. The
JFC and joint staff take these echelon priority asset lists into consideration during the development of an
adjusted JTF defended asset list. JFC’s requirements and mission considerations may allow for an air defense
artillery brigade to be placed under operational or tactical control of a corps. Support relationships, such as
direct and general support, may also be used to enhance air and missile defense of maneuver echelons. Corps
and divisions (when further delegated) may integrate air defense artillery firing units and radars into their
defense plans, ensuring that they integrate into local security measures. At the division level, the air defense
artillery brigade units complement the division’s organic short-range air defense forces. (See FM 3-01 for
additional information on Army air defense artillery operations.)
Civil Affairs Brigade
4-70. A civil affairs brigade provides a civil affairs capability to joint force and land component commanders.
The civil affairs brigade mitigates or defeats threats to civil society and conducts actions normally performed
by civil governments across the range of military operations. This occurs by engaging and influencing the
civil population and authorities through the planning and conducting of civil affairs operations or enabling
civil-military operations to shape the civil environment and set the conditions for military operations.
4-71. The civil affairs brigade headquarters provides a control structure and staff supervision of the
operations of its assigned civil affairs battalions or other attached units. Civil affairs force structure contains
expertise in five functional specialty areas. These specialty areas include security, justice and reconciliation,
humanitarian assistance and social well-being, governance and participation, and economic stabilization.
Within each functional specialty area, civil affairs functional specialists advise commanders and help or direct
their civilian counterparts. Civil affairs brigades are capable of establishing or support civil-military
operations centers during operations. (See FM 3-57 for additional information on civil affairs.)
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Brigade
4-72. A CBRN brigade typically provides support to a corps and echelons above corps. However, in some
instances, the brigade may also support a division. When a CBRNE command is deployed, it may command
a CBRN brigade. CBRN brigades consist of a headquarters and two to five battalions with a wide range of
CBRN capabilities, including CBRN reconnaissance, decontamination, and biological detection. With the
advice of the staff and the supported unit CBRN section, the CBRN brigade commander evaluates and
determines the CBRN unit support requirements for the supported unit. The brigade commander may advise
the supported unit commander about the employment and sustainment of CBRN assets. A CBRN brigade is
dependent on other organizations for administrative, logistic, medical, and maintenance support. In some
instances, a division, corps, or echelon above corps may only be assigned or supported by a CBRN battalion.
(See FM 3-11 for more information on CBRN units.)
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Group
4-73. An EOD group may be attached or under the operational control of a CBRNE command, corps, or
echelons above corps conducting large-scale combat operations or limited contingencies operations such as
Task Force Atlas in Operation INHERENT RESOLVE and Task Force Paladin in Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM. An EOD group commander exercises command and control of two to six explosive ordnance
disposal battalions. An EOD group may be task-organized with forces from other Services. An EOD battalion
conducts staff planning and control of EOD assets typically within a division AO. EOD groups and battalions
position their EOD companies at locations where they can best provide support throughout an AO. (See
ATP 4-32.1 and ATP 4-32 for doctrine on explosive ordnance disposal.)
Psychological Operations Battalion
4-74. Psychological operations battalions are trained, organized, and equipped to support corps- or division-
level operations. They support corps with military information support operations across the range of military
operations. They can also support the staffing and augmentation of a psychological operations task force in
a mature theater of operations. The tactical psychological operations companies are task-organized to support
divisions. (See FM 3-53 for more information of military information support operations.) |
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U.S. Air Force Support
4-75. Air support is vital to the conduct of successful corps operations, regardless of the corps' assigned role.
The corps depends on joint fires and maneuver provided by fixed-wing aircraft to support many of the corps'
decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations to include the USAF air functions of close air support, air
interdiction, cyberspace and electromagnetic activities, and airlift missions. The USAF interface with a corps
depends on the corps' role. As a tactical headquarters, a corps receives an enhanced corps tactical air control
party (Note. this level of support does not enable airspace control from the corps level like the joint air ground
integration center [JAGIC] at the division. Depending on mission environment should the need arise to have
an air support operations center at the corps, this document does not adequately provide information to enable
that configuration.). As a JTF or land component command in a limited contingency operation, the corps
headquarters also receives a joint air component coordination element as its USAF interface.
Army Space Support Team
4-76. If requested, an Army space support team can be tasked to augment the corps organic space support
element if the corps is serving as a JTF or land component command headquarters. (See FM 3-14 for more
information on the corps space support element ) The Army space support team plans, coordinates, and
analyzes space-enabled capabilities, and provides input to the corps staff. (See ATP 3-14.3 for more
information on the space brigade).
Military History Detachment
4-77. Military history detachments are small teams of officers and enlisted Soldiers that carry out directed
collection of historical material during combat and contingency operations for use when writing official
history. They are trained and equipped to gather historical documents and materials, conduct oral interviews,
photograph events, and advise supported units about preserving historical information. The military history
detachment provides expertise, advice, and assistance to the corps command historian. (Refer to ATP 1-20
for more details on the military history detachment).
Mobile Public Affairs Detachment
4-78. A mobile public affairs detachment provides public affairs support to corps units during operations. A
mobile public affairs detachment is assigned, attached, or under the OPCON of echelons above brigades. It
may support the ASCC, theater sustainment command, or corps public affairs staff sections.
4-79. A mobile public affairs detachment increases the public affairs capabilities of the corps organic public
affairs section. A mobile public affairs detachment can establish or support a media operations center to
support corps operations. A mobile public affairs detachment has limited capability to conduct independent
public affairs activities and requires higher echelon command guidance, administrative support, and life
support. Because of its limited capability, the corps public affairs officer exercises planning and supervisory
authority over the mobile public affairs detachment. (Refer to FM 3-61 for more details on public affairs
operations.)
Cyberspace and Electromagnetic Activities
4-80. The corps G-3 contains a cyberspace and electromagnetic activities section that coordinates and
synchronizes cyberspace and electronic warfare operations for effective collaboration across staff elements.
The cyberspace and electromagnetic activities section is key to the collaboration of cyberspace and electronic
warfare operations. The section participates in the planning and targeting process and leads the cyberspace
and electromagnetic activities working group to support the military decision-making process.
4-81. Corps staffs request augmentation for cyberspace operations, first from the regional cyber center and
then from the Army Cyber Operations and Integration Center. This support can cover the range of military
decision-making process activities including planning for and executing DODIN operations, offensive
cyberspace operations, defensive cyberspace operations, and electronic warfare operations. The regional
cyber center working with the Army Cyber Operations and Integration Center will both provide support and
determine any additional units, assets, or agencies that may be required to achieve military decision-making
process effects. |
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4-82. The Army Cyber Operations and Integration Center is an operational element of the Army Cyber
Command headquarters, and it is the top-level control center for all Army cyberspace activities. It provides
situational awareness and DOD information network operations reporting for the DODIN-A. The center
coordinates with the regional cyber centers and provides operational and technical support as required.
4-83. The regional cyber center is the single point of contact for operational status, service provisioning,
incident response, and all Army network services in its assigned theater. It coordinates directly with tactical
units to provide DODIN-A services and (when required) defensive cyberspace operations to enable command
and control and the warfighting functions (See FM 3-12 for more information on the cyber protection
brigade).
Cyber Warfare Support Battalion
4-84. A cyber warfare support battalion enables the defeat of an adversary’s information and unconventional
warfare capabilities in and through the cyberspace domain and the electromagnetic spectrum by means of
offensive cyberspace operations and defensive cyberspace operations. Its purpose is to deny the enemy access
to mission-relevant terrain in cyberspace, repel enemy cyberspace attacks, and counterattack when directed.
The cyber warfare support battalion deploys rapidly and can operate using pre-positioned and deployable
infrastructure. Generally, the cyber warfare support battalion deploys in support of the theater or field armies.
The cyber warfare support battalion is organized with a headquarters company and three cyber warfare
companies capable of providing tailored support to corps and divisions.
Expeditionary Cyberspace Electromagnetic Activities Teams
4-85. The cyber warfare support battalion deploys expeditionary cyberspace electromagnetic activities teams
in support of corps operations. Expeditionary cyberspace electromagnetic activities teams are specifically
designed to provide cyberspace electromagnetic activities support to corps and below. Each expeditionary
cyberspace electromagnetic activities team consists of three platoons: a cyber warfare platoon, an
infrastructure support platoon, and a capability development platoon.
Special Operations Forces
4-86. In a corps’ AO, conventional forces and special operations forces often operate near each other to
accomplish the joint force commander’s mission. Army special operations forces provide capabilities that
expand the options available to a corps commander. During mission planning, the corps staff and special
operations force planners include options regarding how to integrate conventional forces and special
operations ground elements. A corps may receive a special operations command and control element, which
provides capability to coordinate unilateral special operations with a conventional ground force headquarters
and with a supported conventional force commander.
CORPS OPERATIONS
4-87. The corps has the versatility to command and control many different types of operations. It may
become a joint and multinational headquarters responsible for conducting crisis response and limited
contingency operations. In campaigns and major operations, the corps serves as a tactical formation
comprised of multiple divisions and attached brigades. The corps commander synchronizes Army and joint
capabilities to shape the environment and set conditions for tactical actions by subordinate forces.
4-88. During combat operations, the corps task-organizes and maneuvers divisions to destroy enemy land
forces, seize key terrain and critical infrastructure, and set conditions for the successful achievement of
assigned objectives. During operations where stability tasks are the priority, such as a foreign humanitarian
crisis, the corps commander integrates Army operations with those of host-nation forces, other government
agencies, and nongovernment agencies.
MILITARY ENGAGEMENT AND SECURITY COOPERATION
4-89. When uncommitted to specific combatant commander requirements, the corps serves as a tactical
echelon that focuses on preparation to prevail in large-scale combat. When committed to a theater of |
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operations, the theater army or field army command and control corps unless the corps is subject to the
operational control of a JFC subordinate to the GCC. In such cases, the theater army maintains an ADCON
relationship with the corps due to the theater army’s theater-wide ARFOR responsibilities.
4-90. During competition, a corps shapes its assigned AO, depending on the role that it is fulfilling. As an
ARFOR, a corps assists higher echelons in their efforts to set, support, and shape operational areas. Corps do
so by executing operational-level tasks, collecting information, providing bottom-up refinement to planning,
and participating in activities to posture the joint and multinational force to prevail in the event that armed
conflict occurs. During the course of shaping an AO during competition, a higher echelon may invest the
corps commander with additional authorities or responsibilities to facilitate operations. Key tasks that corps
may perform to support shaping during competition include—
* Deploying.
* Refining and conducting detailed planning for major operations and achieving competition
objectives.
* Managing assigned airspace.
* Executing target development in accordance with joint standards
* Sustaining Army forces in the assigned AO.
* Synchronizing protection, including air and missile defense support.
* Executing security force assistance tasks.
* Executing operations to achieve competition objectives.
* Contributing to flexible deterrent options and flexible response options.
* Transitioning to a joint force land component command or multinational joint force land
component command.
* Transitioning to a JTF.
* Assuming ARFOR and other (as directed) authorities and responsibilities in the operational area.
* Assuming selected field army tasks, if that echelon is unavailable (see Chapter 3).
* Redeploying.
* Conducting training and exercises. |
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Security Cooperation: REFORGER 87
In September of 1987, the III Armored Corps deployed from Fort Hood, Texas to the
Federal Republic of Germany as a major part of Exercise REFORGER 87. III Corps
reinforced NATO forces already consisting of V Corps and VII Corps, stationed in
Germany. The scenario placed III Corps as the Northern Army Group opposing forces
penetrating into Northern Germany. III Corps deployed all forces from Fort Hood as an
exercise in strategic and operational mobility, as well as assuring NATO allies against
Warsaw Pact aggression.
The deployment involved 35,000 Soldiers from the 4th Infantry Division, 2d Armored
Division, 1st Cavalry Division, 45th Infantry Brigade, 6th Cavalry Brigade (Air Combat),
420th Engineer Brigade (Reserve), III Corps Artillery, III Corps Combat Support
Brigade, and 13th Corps Support Command. The deployment involved extensive
planning and preparation, deploying the corps main command post to monitor and
control movement, marshalling and staging equipment, and drawing equipment in
theater. III Corps demonstrated that it could move 11,000 vehicles across Germany
from densely populated areas to densely wooded areas with speed while navigating
peacetime constraints and obstacles imposed by limited facilities.
Despite the limitations, obstacles, time, and distance, Exercise REFORGER 87 was
the single largest deployment of U.S. Army forces overseas during peacetime. It was
also the first deployment of a U.S. corps to Europe since World War II. This
demonstration of strategic mobility assured NATO and Warsaw Pact members the
level of U.S. commitment in defending NATO members.
CRISIS RESPONSE
4-91. During crisis response, the corps is the preferred Army echelon for use as a JTF headquarters because
of the seniority of its staff and its deployability. A corps acting as a JTF requires a separate ARFOR because
of the differing roles and responsibilities inherent in each. JTFs focus on the operational level of war and use
joint rather than Army doctrine. Normally, the commander of the JTF exercises command and control over
all forces and other resources in a JOA. Once constituted as a JTF, the corps operates according to joint
doctrine. Figure 4-3 on page 4-20 shows an example task organization for a corps operating as a JTF in a
limited contingency operation or crisis response.
4-92. Corps support higher echelons’ efforts to leverage joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and
multinational capabilities during competition. Unlike large-scale ground combat, the emphasis on other
instruments of national power during competition requires increased integration of the corps with
non-military unified action partners. This requires higher echelons to resource corps with additional
capabilities and authorities when conducting operations to achieve competition objectives.
LIMITED CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS
4-93. In a limited contingency, a corps normally fills the role of the JTF or the joint force land component
command. Normally, the commander of the JTF or joint force land component command exercises command
and control over all forces and other resources in a JOA or ground forces in a JOA. If the corps is functioning
as the joint force land component command, then it is also capable of filling the ARFOR role, and it often
does. Figure 4-2 shows an example task organization for a corps operating as a JTF in a limited contingency
operation or crisis response. Figure 4-3 on page 4-20 is an example of a corps task organization when
operating as a joint force land component command in limited contingency operations.
4-94. JFCs may also task a corps to serve as a JTF or joint force land component command during
competition when situations emerge in a theater or operational area beyond a division’s ability to command
and control. During limited contingency operations, a corps may serve as a JTF or joint force land component |
3-94 | 125 | Corps Roles, Functions, and Organizations
command subordinate to the GCC. This normally occurs when the GCC intends to conduct limited
contingency operations on land and the scope, scale, and duration of such operations exceed the command
and control capability of a division or sister Service organization. In such cases, the theater army provides
support to the corps using an ADCON relationship. This often occurs through an element subordinate to the
corps that its commander designates as the ARFOR. Corps require significant augmentation from the joint
and multinational force to perform the joint force land component command or JTF roles successfully.
4-95. To effectively synchronize multi-domain effects requires corps headquarters capable of managing the
technical employment of space, air, and maritime-delivered assets, as well as information-related capabilities.
Understanding these capabilities is fundamental to the operations process. The corps headquarters’ assigned
and task-organized capabilities enable it to prioritize effects in support of assigned or attached forces and
synchronize them with subordinates’ operations to achieve assigned objectives. The corps has access to a
wide variety of Army and joint information-related capabilities, ISR, and military deception or tactical
deception capabilities and authorities that are combat multipliers during large-scale combat operations and
essential enablers during competition. When fulfilling the role of a JTF or joint force land component
command, the corps joint targeting requirements necessarily increase. Augmenting the corps joint targeting
and execution capability allows the corps to perform the joint targeting cycle and conduct deliberate and
dynamic targeting to joint standards.
Figure 4-2. Example of a task-organized corps operating as a joint force land component
command in a limited contingency operation |
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LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS
4-96. During large-scale combat operations, the corps’ primary purpose is to command and control multiple
division operations as a tactical command. Large-scale combat operations require the corps headquarters to
function as a tactical land headquarters under a multinational force land component or subordinate to a field
army equivalent headquarters. This function is vital to the joint and multinational force’s ability to prevail in
large-scale combat against peer threats.
4-97. During large-scale combat operations, a corps operates as a tactical echelon exercising OPCON over
two to five divisions and a variety of supporting brigades or battalions. It is likely to exercise TACON over
various multinational and U.S. Marine Corps units, and it is supported by various theater sustainment
organizations. Due to the scarcity of some specialty units, like CBRNE commands, chemical brigades and
EOD groups, the land component commander or another higher headquarters may retain capabilities outside
of corps control. However, because large-scale combat operations generally involve allied or partner forces,
the corps is more likely to receive attached or OPCON multinational forces and liaison elements from other
alliance contributors.
Figure 4-3. Example of a task-organized corps operating as a tactical headquarters in large-
scale combat operations |
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4-98. Operations in the corps deep area involve efforts to prevent uncommitted enemy forces from being
committed in a coherent manner. A corps deep area generally extends beyond division boundaries out to the
limits of the corps designated AO. The purpose of operations in the corps’ deep area is often tied to setting
conditions for future events in time and space. Operations in the corps’ deep area might disrupt the movement
of operational reserves, prevent enemy forces from employing long-range fires, or neutralize a portion of
enemy integrated air defenses. Planning for operations in the corps’ deep area includes considerations for
information collection, airspace management, joint fires, obstacle emplacement, maneuver (both air and
ground), special operations, and information and deception operations.
4-99. Considerations when task-organizing the force include, but are not limited to, the mission, training,
experience, unit capabilities, sustainability, the operational environment, and the enemy threat.
Task-organizing the corps includes allocating assets to subordinate divisions and functional and
multifunctional brigades, and establishing their command and support relationships. This occurs within
tailored force packages as the corps organizes subordinate units for specific missions and employs doctrinal
command and support relationships. As task-organizing continues, the corps reorganizes units for subsequent
missions. The ability of a corps to task-organize gives it extraordinary agility by configuring its units to best
use available resources. It also allows the corps to match unit capabilities to tasks. The ability of sustainment
forces to tailor and task-organize ensures commanders have freedom of action to change with mission
requirements.
4-100. A corps integrates and synchronizes the operations of its divisions and brigades in depth so that their
timing multiplies their effectiveness across multiple domains throughout the corps AO. The timing could be
simultaneous or sequenced in a way to maneuver friendly forces or compel enemy forces to move. A corps
must consider its entire AO, enemy forces, and information collection activities as it synchronizes combat
power to conduct operations that fix, suppress, or surprise enemy forces. Such actions nullify an enemy
force’s ability to react in a coherent fashion.
4-101. A corps achieves mass by concentrating the effects of its combat power at the most advantageous
places and times to produce decisive results. Massing is enabled by the other functions of the corps in
large-scale combat operations. A corps shapes the deep area and maneuvers its task-organized subordinate
formations into positions of advantage to enable the concentration of effects to achieve the most decisive
results. A corps, as a senior tactical echelon, ensures these tactical results to support operational objectives.
4-102. A corps sets priorities to achieve objectives. A corps uses management techniques to ensure it has
the resources to shape the deep area and that its subordinate divisions and brigades have the necessary
resources to win in their assigned missions. A corps can change the allocation of resources by condition or
phase of an operation to switch between the priority of a main effort or shaping operations in the deep area.
4-103. A corps leverages joint capabilities that will assist its other corps functions during large-scale combat
operations. Joint capabilities enhance a corps’ ability to conduct shaping operations, provide additional
combat power effects to concentrate, and provide additional logistic services to aid in resource distribution. |
3-94 | 129 | Chapter 5
Division Roles, Functions, and Organizations
...the smallest formation that is a complete orchestra of war and the largest in which every
man can know you.
Sir William Slim
The division is the Army’s primary formation for decisive action against threats with
peer capabilities during large-scale combat operations. This chapter discusses an Army
division’s roles and functions across the competition continuum and throughout the
range of military operations. It also discusses the various command and control nodes
it can create along with a short description of its typical subordinate units.
DIVISION OVERVIEW
5-1. The division is the Army’s principal tactical warfighting formation during large-scale combat
operations. Its primary role is to serve as a tactical headquarters commanding brigades during decisive action.
A division conducts decisive action in an AO assigned by its higher headquarters— normally a corps. It task-
organizes its subordinate forces according to the mission variables to accomplish its mission. A division
typically commands between two and five BCTs, a mix of functional and multifunctional brigades, and a
variety of smaller enabler units. Winning battles and engagements remains the division’s primary purpose.
During limited contingencies, it can organize itself to serve in multiple roles.
5-2. While the division is manned, trained, and equipped as a tactical formation, it can, with significant
augmentation, transition to a joint or multinational headquarters for operations other than large-scale combat
operations. When it is the senior Army formation assigned to a joint task force, it may also serve as the
ARFOR. When the division is uncommitted to a specific operation, it focuses on building and sustaining
readiness to prevail in large-scale combat.
DIVISION ROLES AND FUNCTIONS
5-3. An Army division can perform one of four roles, although its primary role is that of a tactical
headquarters during operations on land. An Army division may serve in the following roles:
* Tactical headquarters.
* ARFOR headquarters.
* Joint force land component command.
* JTF headquarters.
5-4. It is important to note that the ARFOR and joint roles require significant augmentation. While it is
possible for a division to serve in multiple roles, this should be avoided whenever possible. A division should
avoid performing a Service and a joint role simultaneously because these roles can overwhelm the
commander and the staff, even with augmentation. However, if necessary, a division can perform the ARFOR
and joint force land component command roles in a limited contingency or crisis response operation for a
limited duration. This requires significant reorganization and retraining of the headquarters to succeed. When
a division is tasked to form a JTF headquarters, a different headquarters is required to perform the joint force
land component command or ARFOR responsibilities. |
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DIVISION TACTICAL HEADQUARTERS
5-5. The division is organized, trained, and equipped to command between two and five BCTs in combat
as well as support the BCTs with a mix of functional and multifunctional brigades and other enablers. A
division headquarters may command any mix of armored, infantry, and Stryker BCTs, as well as joint and
multinational land forces. Divisions employ BCTs to conduct operations in the close fight against enemy
formations. Divisions conduct deep operations against an enemy to set conditions for success in the current
and future close fights. They synchronize and coordinate rear operations to maintain tempo and operational
reach for the division.
5-6. A division’s core functions as a tactical headquarters are—
* Task-organizing, employing, integrating, and synchronizing brigades and battalions.
* Training and preparing for large-scale combat operations.
* Conducting shaping operations in the division AO.
* Massing effects at decisive points.
* Employing joint capabilities.
* Assuming directed Army, joint, and multinational authorities and responsibilities.
5-7. When serving as a tactical formation, divisions conduct battles and engagements as part of a larger
campaign under the control of a corps. Engagements typically last from less than an hour up to 48 hours,
while battles (a series of engagements) can last from less than a day to seven days. In large-scale combat
operations, these engagements and battles are likely to occur against large, well-trained, and heavily armed
enemy conventional forces operating in concert with unconventional forces. A division commander employs
BCTs with aviation, fires, intelligence, and joint capabilities as part of a combined arms approach during
operations. Joint capabilities coordinated through the corps are enablers for the division, allowing the division
commander to shape conditions for subordinate brigades and weight the decisive operation or main effort. A
division commander conveys requirements for joint shaping through the corps commander while limiting
most division shaping efforts to those things affecting close operations.
5-8. The division commander translates the division’s higher echelon headquarters’ operational objectives
into tactical tasks assigned to subordinate brigades and other supporting units. Divisions plan combined arms
operations, direct and coordinate BCT maneuver, use fires to exploit maneuver, and make coordinated use
of all subordinate units. The division commander focuses on the current operation and potential branches to
the current operation while visualizing the concept of operations for the next tactical phase (sequels). The
division commander continuously allocates and re-allocates combat power under division control to support
its brigades during phases of an operation and when conditions change. Planning horizons for the division
are shorter than those for the corps, cycling, as necessary, within the longer campaign horizons of the corps.
5-9. While the corps commander develops operations informed by estimates of operational reach, the
division commander develops operational approaches informed by calculations related to mutual support,
supporting range, and supporting distance. The division commander also carefully monitors the endurance
of subordinate brigades in terms of days and hours until their organic sustainment units require replenishment.
The tempo of operations becomes as important as the distance between the division’s brigades and supporting
sustainment elements; these factors determine the relative endurance of the division.
DIVISION AS ARFOR
5-10. In limited contingencies, or when a division is the joint force land component, the Army division
becomes the ARFOR. As the ARFOR, the division retains OPCON of all Army forces not subordinated to
another component of the JTF. To function effectively as both a joint force land component and an ARFOR,
a division headquarters requires additional sustainment support. The theater sustainment command normally
operates in general support-reinforcing to a division acting as the ARFOR. This enables the division to
oversee logistics and administrative support to all Army forces, while also providing logistics support to other
Services and multinational units. Without augmentation, the ARFOR responsibilities for sustainment degrade
the operational focus of the division. If the tactical situation permits, the division headquarters and
expeditionary sustainment command co-locate to closely integrate operations and sustainment. |
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Of transitioning from a division headquarters to an ARFOR headquarters, absorbing the
responsibilities and the broader horizons expected of an ARFOR headquarters, was really
a demand that was truly a challenge.
Major General Stephen L. Arnold
Cited in Operation RESTORE HOPE Oral History Interview
5-11. The role of the ARFOR is significantly more diverse and broad than a division operating as a tactical
headquarters as part of a corps. When serving as an ARFOR, a division continues to perform all of the
functions of a tactical headquarters and—
* ASOS.
* ADCON of all Army forces in the JTF, including those subordinate to other components.
* Service-specific matters involving administration and support of Army forces.
* Common-user logistics.
* Providing Army executive agent support to unified action partners in the AO.
5-12. The ARFOR focuses on tactical operations in its AO and providing operational-level support to U.S.
forces and others through the JOA. The ARFOR participates in operational planning and decision making
for force provision and deployment, fires, sustainment, and force protection. (For additional information on
ARFOR see Appendix B.)
DIVISION AS JOINT FORCE LAND COMPONENT COMMAND
5-13. The JFC may organize a JTF with a division as the joint force land component for limited contingency
operations. The joint force land component of such a JTF may have TACON of Marine Corps or
multinational forces. When a Marine Corps’ brigade-size or smaller Marine air-ground task force is under
control of an Army division, the division employs it as a BCT with unique capabilities. When operating as a
joint force land component command, a division headquarters receives staff augmentation from the Marine
Corps and other Services, and individual Army augmentation and communications support from higher
echelons. When it is the joint force land component, the Army division may also be the ARFOR, although
this is not optimal because of the potential task saturation that would degrade the overall effectiveness of the
staff.
5-14. The division’s higher echelon headquarters—corps, Marine expeditionary force, or combined JTF—
assesses the additional load placed on the command and control systems of the division headquarters as
multinational forces come under the division’s control. A division headquarters requires communications and
personnel augmentation to fill liaison requirements. As the intensity of combat increases, the higher echelon
headquarters should assess the span of control of any division commanding multiple multinational brigade
equivalents.
5-15. When the division serves as a joint force land component command, it has all the functions of a tactical
headquarters, plus the additional functions of—
* Setting the land JOA.
* Assessing the threat in the land JOA.
* Developing the joint land operations plan.
* Receiving and employing the land force.
* Contributing to operation or campaign success.
* Coordinating with other component and functional commands.
(See JP 3-31 for additional information on joint force land component commands.) |
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Note. A division can command multinational forces either as a tactical headquarters or as a joint
force land component. Normally, these forces are under TACON of a division. Depending on the
size of the multinational force, the division commander reorganizes the staff and command group
to accept some members from the other nations to assist and ensure understanding of the various
national caveats and requirements. The division commander may deploy the tactical command
post to the command post of a large multinational formation to ensure that the multinational force
has full connectivity with the division main command post. Normally, a division receives a digital
liaison detachment to support this requirement.
DIVISION HEADQUARTERS AS JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS
5-16. In limited contingency operations involving peacekeeping operations, humanitarian operations, or
limited combat, a division headquarters may become the base for a JTF headquarters. A division may
integrate with a small theater army command post already deployed and use some of its personnel to
accelerate JTF staff integration. When it becomes a JTF headquarters, a division headquarters organizes and
operates in accordance with joint doctrine, which requires extensive augmentation from both joint and Army
forces. The combatant commander provides joint network capabilities, and each Service provides command
and control detachments. The USAF provides the JTF with a joint air component coordination element. If
present, Navy forces normally have a supporting relationship with the JTF. A theater sustainment command
augments the deployed Army force.
5-17. When a division headquarters becomes a JTF headquarters, it requires an ARFOR. The quickest
solution is to designate either the division’s tactical command post or rear command post as the ARFOR
headquarters. The tactical command post or rear command post, with an assistant division commander, co-
locates with the largest brigade’s command post and exercises OPCON over land forces while the division
commander and the main command post forms the JTF headquarters. A less desirable option is to task a
subordinate brigade with the ARFOR responsibilities, because of the augmentation required.
5-18. When the division serves as a joint task force, it has all the functions of a tactical headquarters, plus
the additional functions of—
* Providing the overall mission, purpose, and objectives for military operations.
* Defining the JOA.
* Developing and promulgating the rules of engagement and use of force tailored to the situation.
* Establishing and assisting liaison with U.S. embassies and foreign governments involved in the
operation.
(See JP 3-33 for additional information on JTFs.)
LIMITATIONS
5-19. There are limitations and dependencies that must be considered throughout a division’s employment.
Those limitations include, but are not limited to division mobility, security concerns, and Reserve Component
mobilization.
Mobility and Security
5-20. The division main command post is not 100-percent mobile; it requires additional transportation to
displace. It is also not fully transportable by C-130 aircraft and requires numerous C-17 sorties to deploy by
air. Normally the main command post deploys by a combination of air and sealift; it also requires reception,
staging, onward movement, and integration to reach full capacity. No command post has an organic security
force. The division headquarters tasks a subordinate unit to secure command posts as required.
Reserve Component Mobilization
5-21. Two critical Reserve Component organizations mobilize to support a division when it deploys. These
are the main command post operational detachment and the MEB. The main command post operational |
3-94 | 133 | Division Roles, Functions, and Organizations
detachment provides additional depth to the division staff for sustained operations. The MEB is integral to
command and control of the division support area. If a division does not have a MEB, then it must either
assign another organization to control the division support area or assume direct control itself. Additionally,
without a MEB to collaborate with the rear command post, a division headquarters would either have to
integrate with another organization or devote additional staff and equipment from the main command post to
properly staff the rear command post. When a division is preparing to deploy, commanders, staffs, and
planners must take care to coordinate for Reserve Component mobilization with enough time to assemble the
formation for deployment. Alternatively, the division may not have enough time to incorporate mobilizing
members prior to deployment and must assemble the entire formation in theater, secure resources and
capabilities from other formations until mobilized forces arrive, or operate without the key elements of the
formation.
Note. The MEB is an integral part of a division’s ability to command and control in the division
support area. The mobilization and deployment of the MEB must be prioritized in division
planning and operations to ensure that it arrives as early as possible. Depending upon the situation,
division commanders may consider deploying their MEB ahead of their BCTs.
DIVISION HEADQUARTERS
5-22. A division headquarters is organized and equipped for sustained combat operations. By design, it
resembles the corps headquarters, but it has different manning and equipment. The headquarters and
headquarters’ battalion consists of a main command post, a tactical command post, a rear command post, and
a mobile command group. When necessary, a division can form an early entry command post. Plans and
operations across the staff sections, cells, command posts, and echelons are facilitated by a network and suite
of command and control systems to enhance collaboration and synchronization. The division commander
may command the division from any of the command posts.
HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS BATTALION
5-23. The division headquarters and headquarters’ battalion provides all administrative support, life support,
communications, and transportation for the division’s command posts and mobile command group. The
headquarters and headquarters’ battalion has a complete battalion staff. The headquarters and headquarters’
battalion consists of two companies with distinct missions: the headquarters and support company, and the
signal, intelligence, and sustainment company. Based on the mission and operational variables, a division
headquarters may require additional security elements to augment the headquarters and headquarters’
battalion.
5-24. The organization of the division headquarters and headquarters’ battalion is similar to that of the corps
headquarters and headquarters battalion. The headquarters and support company includes life support and
maintenance sections for the division command posts and provides administrative support to the movement
and maneuver, fires, and protection sections of the staff. The signal, intelligence, and sustainment company
provides administrative support to the signal, intelligence, and sustainment sections of the division staff. It
connects the division headquarters into the Army global network enterprise, and through it, into the DODIN.
The signal company ties into the network through a supporting expeditionary signal battalion from either the
corps or theater signal brigade, depending upon the division’s role. Both companies task-organize to support
the division command posts. |
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DIVISION MAIN COMMAND POST
5-25. The main command post is the primary command post of the division. It controls division operations.
The division main command post is responsible for the sustained conduct of current operations, future
planning, analysis for current and future operations, targeting, and other staff functions. The division staff at
the main command post operates under the general supervision of the division chief of staff. The main
command post can accomplish its command and control responsibilities without the tactical command post.
Main command post responsibilities include—
* Synchronizing division operations with adjacent units and the higher echelon.
* Controlling all division operations.
* Planning operations.
* Monitoring and assessing current operations for impact on future operations.
* Conducting shaping operations in the deep and close areas.
* Producing operation and contingency plans.
* Preparing and maintaining division running estimates, plans, and orders to support future
operations.
* Integrating intelligence operations into both current and future operations.
* Coordinating and managing force structure, to include requests for forces and equipment.
* Synchronizing the division’s targeting process.
* Controlling division-assigned airspace with the assigned joint air ground integration center.
* Preparing all reports required by higher headquarters.
5-26. Division assigned airspace is normally the airspace assigned by the airspace control authority from the
division rear boundary to the fire support coordination line and between the division’s lateral boundaries up
to the coordinating altitude. The airspace control authority assigns airspace based on the size of the area, the
terrain, the volume of aircraft in the airspace, and the organized and trained capability of the unit to conduct
airspace control in accordance with the requirements.
5-27. The main command post consists of a command group, functional cells, and integrating cells. There
are five functional cells—intelligence, movement and maneuver, fires, protection, and sustainment. The
movement and maneuver functional cell forms three integrating cells—current operations, future operations,
and plans—to which other staff cells attach subject matter experts. The functional cells are scalable to
accommodate joint staff augmentation when required, such as when a division becomes a joint force land
component or JTF headquarters.
JOINT AIR GROUND INTEGRATION CENTER
5-28. A JAGIC is located in the Army division current operations integration cell (known as COIC) to
provide commanders a technique to coordinate, integrate, and control operations in division-assigned
airspace and efficiently collaborate requirements with external airspace elements outside of the division area
(ATP 3-91.1). The JAGIC co-locates USAF and Army personnel with a shared situational understanding to
support the maneuver commander’s concept of operations while meeting JFC and joint force air component
commander objectives and intent. The JAGIC organization is unique to the division. The USAF provides an
air support squadron that includes an air support operations center (ASOC) and tactical air control party. The
ASOC works with the division JAGIC to execute the air tasking order, integrate airspace use and users,
control close air support and other air support missions in the division AO during current operations (See
ATP 3-91.1 for more information on the JAGIC). The joint air ground integration center is responsible for—
* Executing the air tasking order and airspace control order as directed by the joint, combined, or
multinational force air component commander.
* Managing airspace assigned to the division.
* Providing procedural control of close air support aircraft operating in the AO.
* Establishing, maintaining, and operating the air communications architecture.
* Processing and sourcing immediate air support requests. |
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* Serving as decentralized execution air space control element that obtains clearance of airspace for
fires and other warfighting functions.
* Deconflicting use of immediate air support and obtaining clearance of fires for the appropriate
fires echelon.
* Integrating, coordinating, directing, and controlling other air component missions.
* Coordinating air missions that fly in the division-assigned airspace but do not directly support the
ground component and other supporting arms activities to de-conflict with ground force maneuver
and fires, in addition to receiving target and threat updates.
* Assisting with dynamic targeting and friendly force location information.
* Advising the division commander on close air support employment, target nominations for those
air interdiction and suppression of enemy air defenses missions that support the ground force,
airborne surveillance, and airlift that directly supports the division.
* Integrating division fires, joint fires, and other complementary and reinforcing functions for
effects in the land and air domains.
5-29. As currently organized, trained, and equipped, USAF ASOCs are optimized for the division echelon,
but could potentially be positioned to support corps operations as a tactical headquarters. The corps tactical
air control party would continue its complementary planning and execution functions. USAF does not
position ASOCs subordinate to other ASOCs since they are an extension of the combined air operations
center, so a consequence of positioning the ASOC at the corps echelon would be the commander, Air Force
forces, retaking control of the airspace previously delegated to divisions. The commander, Air Force forces,
should consider collocation with the ground element most capable of integrating fires and effects and
executing airspace control when determining ASOC placement. Placement of an ASOC is dependent on
mission variables. Movement of capabilities, personnel, and equipment to align an ASOC at the corps echelon
to execute airspace management and control responsibilities requires detailed planning and analysis,
including systems interoperability and range capabilities and the ability to manage and integrate large
volumes of fire and air missions. This configuration has not been tested, exercised, or trained yet.
DIVISION TACTICAL COMMAND POST
5-30. A division employs a tactical command post to control specific operations. The tactical command post
contains a robust network capability with many of the same command and control systems as the main
command post. A tactical command post maintains continuous communication with subordinates, higher
echelon headquarters, other command posts, and supporting joint organizations. One of the two deputy
commanding generals usually controls operations from the tactical command post as directed by the
commander. The G-3 section is usually responsible for the operation of the tactical command post, supported
by other staff sections as required by the mission.
5-31. The tactical command post focuses on specific actions, activities, or tasks within a larger operation.
Potential roles for the tactical command post include—
* Controlling forces committed to a specified operation. Examples include brigade-sized air
assaults, wet-gap crossings, deliberate breaching operations, or passage of lines involving multiple
subordinate units.
* Temporarily controlling division operations. When the main command post displaces or otherwise
is not available, the tactical command post may serve as the main command post until the main
command post is re-established. The tactical command post requires augmentation from the main
command post to control continuous operations for periods extending beyond 48 hours.
* Serving as the headquarters of a multi-brigade task force organized from divisional units for a
mission. For example, during an offensive operation, the commander may establish the tactical
command post to control forces eliminating bypassed enemy forces along a line of operations,
while the main command post maintains control (and focus) on operations in the close and deep
areas.
* Controlling decisive and shaping operations. The division commander may distribute control of
decisive and shaping operations between command posts in complex operations. For example, the |
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tactical command post may control a BCT and supporting units in a covering force mission while
the main command post controls defensive preparations in the main battle area.
* Employing and deploying forces simultaneously with the main command post. In protracted
operations, the main command post can control the deployment of forces into an AO while the
tactical command post is in the AO controlling initial operations. These roles could be reversed
over time, with the main command post controlling operations in the AO and the tactical command
post managing the onward movement and integration of forces into the AO.
* Augmenting the main command post. In protracted operations, the commander may combine the
tactical command post and the main command post into a single co-located command post. This
may be done to increase the capacity to control particularly complex tasks or as part of
reorganization after losses during operations.
* Serving as an ARFOR. When the division serves as both a JTF and an ARFOR, the division
commander can designate the division tactical command post, with an assistant division
commander, as the ARFOR headquarters. This role requires substantial augmentation to enable
sustained 24-hour operations.
5-32. The tactical command post is completely mobile and can move all its personnel and equipment with
organic transportation. Factors that influence the movement of the tactical command post include the flow of
operations, the threat of enemy action, and the desires of the commander. Based on the threat environment
and the typical close location of the tactical command post to the close area, frequent displacements are
typically required to enhance survivability and maintain tempo.
DIVISION REAR COMMAND POST
5-33. A rear command post enables the division commander by unifying the efforts of the various units, both
under division control and not under division control, that operate in the division’s rear area, between the
close area and the division rear boundary. When synchronized, these efforts enable the division to maintain
tempo and operational reach. A rear command post performs seven functions, or possesses linkages to the
main command post in order to command and control the division’s rear. Commanders may use the rear
command post to provide command supervision and general officer oversight for—
* Conducting division support area operations.
* Performing terrain management and movement control.
* Defeating threats.
* Enabling sustainment operations.
* Coordinating and synchronizing protection.
* Enabling stability operations.
* Enabling transitions.
5-34. A rear command post may also control particularly complex sustaining operations such as reception,
staging, and onward integration; or reorganization involving multiple subordinate brigades. The deputy
commanding general for support usually controls operations from the rear command post. The G-4 section
is generally responsible for the operation of the rear command post, with augmentation from the other staff
sections as required. The division table of organization and equipment provides equipment for the rear
command post, but personnel must come from either the main or tactical command posts. The rear command
post is dependent on other units for security and life support. A properly resourced rear command post allows
the main command post to focus on operations in the close and deep areas.
MOBILE COMMAND GROUP
5-35. A mobile command group allows a division commander to—
* Provide personal leadership, intent, and guidance at the critical place and time.
* Make a personal assessment of the situation.
* Maintain situational understanding while moving around the area of operations.
* Travel with key staff officers necessary to provide information relevant to the current operation. |
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5-36. A mobile command group allows a division commander to move to the point of decision. Division
commanders move about the AO to interact with their subordinate commanders and different staffs, assess
the operation, make decisions, and issue guidance. What division commanders learn and see helps them
mentally visualize adjustments needed in current and future operations. The mobile command group allows
the commander to command from anywhere in the division AO. A mobile command group requires a security
force. Usually, the unit tasked to secure the headquarters and headquarters’ battalion secures the mobile
command group.
5-37. A division commander selects the individuals who staff the mobile command group. These personnel
are normally functional representatives of those staff sections which control combat operations (such as
maneuver, fires, and intelligence) in addition to the air liaison officer, and when needed, a joint terminal
attack controller. The mission and staff available, however, dictate its makeup.
DIVISION EARLY-ENTRY COMMAND POST
5-38. The early-entry command post is an ad hoc organization comprised of equipment and personnel from
the staff of the tactical, main, and rear command posts. The tactical command post usually provides the base
for the early-entry command post. The division adds or subtracts personnel based on mission requirements.
The early-entry command post includes a mix of current operations personnel, planners, and sustainers able
to coordinate the reception of the division and plan its initial operations. For joint forcible entry operations,
the assault command post is the early-entry command post.
SUBORDINATE FORMATIONS
5-39. The capabilities of a division are tailored for each mission by adjusting the division’s composition.
Usually, a division commands between two and five BCTs, a mix of functional and multifunctional brigades,
and a variety of smaller enabler units. The smaller enablers usually come from higher echelon assets and
augment the division’s capabilities. See figure 5-1 on page 5-10 for an example tailored division. |
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Figure 5-1. Example division with a variety of subordinate units
ASSIGNED FORCES
5-40. A division routinely has units assigned to it. This includes two to five BCTs, a division sustainment
brigade, a division artillery (DIVARTY) brigade, a combat aviation brigade, and a main command
post-operational detachment.
Brigade Combat Teams
5-41. BCTs conduct decisive action to seize and retain key terrain, exerting constant pressure on the enemy,
and break the enemy’s will to fight by maneuvering against, closing with, and destroying the enemy. BCTs
are the principal ground maneuver units of a division. The three BCT designs—armored, infantry, and
Stryker—make up the ground maneuver combat power of a division. All divisions can command any type of
BCT. The three types of BCTs currently have two to three maneuver battalions, a cavalry squadron, a field
artillery battalion, a sustainment battalion, and an engineer battalion. (See FM 3-96 for more details on
BCTs.)
Division Sustainment Brigade
5-42. The division sustainment brigade is assigned to a division. The division sustainment brigade
commander is the senior advisor to the division commander and to the deputy commanding general (support)
for the sustainment warfighting function. The commander is responsible for the integration, synchronization,
and execution of sustainment operations at echelon. The division sustainment brigade employs sustainment
capabilities to create desired effects in support of the division commander’s objectives. |
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5-43. The division sustainment brigade and its subordinate units provide general support to all units assigned
and attached to the division as directed by the division commander. The division sustainment brigade
coordinates and synchronizes tactical-level sustainment operations to meet current and future operations. The
division sustainment brigade is dependent on the division staff for long-range planning capability. Depending
on the operational and mission variables, the division sustainment brigade can command up to seven
battalions. A division sustainment brigade includes an organic division special troops battalion and an organic
division sustainment support battalion to support tactical-level sustainment operations. Additional modular
combat sustainment support battalions and companies will need to be attached to a division sustainment
brigade to sustain large-scale combat operations. (See FM 4-0 for more details on division sustainment
brigades.)
Division Artillery
5-44. A DIVARTY is a brigade-level command assigned to each division that plans, prepares, executes, and
assesses fires for a division. The DIVARTY commander is the fire support coordinator for the division and
is also the primary advisor to the division commander for the fires warfighting function. The division artillery
brigade can also serve as the division’s force field artillery headquarters as required.
5-45. The DIVARTY is not allocated organic firing units, but is task-organized, from corps- or theater-level
field artillery brigades, with additional units based on mission requirements. The DIVARTY command post
provides the division with the ability to have an alternate command post, and it can perform command and
control functions for a limited time. (See ATP 3-09.90 for more details on the DIVARTY.)
Combat Aviation Brigade
5-46. A combat aviation brigade is organized to synchronize operations of multiple aviation squadrons,
battalions, and joint aviation units. The core competencies of the combat aviation brigade are to provide
accurate and timely information collection; provide reaction time and maneuver space; destroy, defeat,
disrupt, or delay enemy forces; air assault maneuver forces; position personnel, supplies, and equipment;
evacuate casualties and conduct personnel recovery; and enable command and control in support of the
combined arms team. A division is usually assigned a combat aviation brigade.
5-47. A combat aviation brigade consists of a headquarters and headquarters company, an air cavalry
squadron, an attack helicopter battalion, an assault helicopter battalion, a general support aviation battalion,
and an aviation support battalion. A combat aviation brigade is modular and tailorable, and it is typically
task-organized as required to support offensive, defensive, and stability operations in support of ground
maneuver forces. A combat aviation brigade may split into four aviation maneuver battalion or squadron task
forces, and one aviation support battalion. It can also operate the subordinate battalions as organic
organizations. A combat aviation brigade can receive two additional aviation battalion or squadron task forces
without staff augmentation, but it will require additional maintenance personnel and equipment. A combat
aviation brigade can also be task-organized with ground maneuver, joint aviation, and other non-aviation
joint and Army units.
Main Command Post-Operational Detachment
5-48. The main command post-operational detachment is a unit that augments the division staff with a
collection of specialists from the National Guard or Reserves during both training exercises and deployments.
Nine of the Army’s divisions have a National Guard main command post operational detachment. However,
the 25th Infantry Division has a reserve main command post-operational detachment. The 2d Infantry
Division does not have a main command post-operational detachment.
PROVIDED FORCES
5-49. Based on the division’s role and mission, it can receive a variety of forces to assist it in matching
capabilities to requirements. The most common of the provided forces are rocket or cannon battalions from
a field artillery brigade; an expeditionary-combat aviation brigade or subordinate battalions; a MEB; a
military police battalion; an intelligence and electronic warfare battalion from the corps
expeditionary-military intelligence brigade; civil affairs battalion; EOD battalion; CBRN battalion; tactical |
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psychological operations company; theater tactical signal support element; military history detachment;
mobile public affairs detachment; cyberspace electromagnetic team; Army space support team; and special
operations forces. These forces can be attached, OPCON, or TACON to the division.
Field Artillery Brigade
5-50. A field artillery brigade conducts operations to provide shaping and decisive fires. A division will
normally receive support from one of the corps field artillery brigade’s subordinate battalions, not from the
entire brigade. That supporting battalion has either a direct, general, or general support-reinforcing
relationship to the DIVARTY. A field artillery brigade is capable of employing Army and joint fires,
supporting special operations forces, and electronic warfare. Field artillery brigades have the ability to
reconnoiter, detect, and attack targets and confirm the effectiveness of their fires. They have the necessary
capabilities to facilitate the efficient application of fires. A field artillery brigade provides a division with—
* Fires and counterfire.
* Close reinforcing fires in support of BCTs.
* Fires, counterfire, and radar coverage for units lacking organic capability such as combat aviation,
expeditionary-military intelligence brigade, MEB, and sustainment brigades.
* Field artillery headquarters for a division.
5-51. A field artillery brigade and each of its subordinate elements can be task-organized as required. This
may include a combination of one to five battalions that include a mixture of rocket and cannon systems and
other enablers. Organic field artillery brigade assets include a brigade support battalion, a signal network
company, a target acquisition platoon, and a headquarters and headquarters battery. A support battalion is
organized to provide sustainment support (including supply, maintenance, field services, and transportation)
to the organic units of the brigade. The signal network support company deploys, installs, operates, and
maintains the command and control networks that support brigade operations and integrate with the division
networks. The target acquisition platoon is organized with meteorological, survey, and target acquisition
capabilities. The field artillery brigade headquarters and headquarters battery and its assigned staff provide
expertise across a broad range of functional areas. (See ATP 3-09.24 for more details on field artillery
brigades.)
Expeditionary Combat Aviation Brigade
5-52. An expeditionary combat aviation brigade from the Reserve or National Guard organization is typically
employed as a standalone organization to support the theater, corps, or division headquarters. The core
competencies of the expeditionary combat aviation brigade are to air assault maneuver forces; position
personnel, supplies, and equipment; evacuate casualties; conduct personnel recovery; and enable command
and control in support of the combined arms team. When task-organized with an attack reconnaissance
battalion or an attack reconnaissance squadron, expeditionary combat aviation brigades also provide accurate
and timely information collection; provide reaction time and maneuver space; and destroy, defeat, disrupt, or
delay enemy forces.
5-53. An expeditionary combat aviation brigade consists of a headquarters and headquarters company, two
assault helicopter battalions, a general support aviation battalion, and an aviation support battalion. An
expeditionary combat aviation brigade is modular and tailorable, and it is typically task-organized as required
to support offensive, defensive, and stability operations in support of ground maneuver forces. An
expeditionary combat aviation brigade can organize as pure battalions or into three battalion task forces. An
expeditionary combat aviation brigade can receive two additional aviation battalion or squadron task forces
without staff augmentation, but it will require additional maintenance personnel and equipment. (See
FM 3-04 for more details on Army aviation.)
Maneuver Enhancement Brigade
5-54. A MEB receives and controls forces that provide protection and mobility capabilities. A MEB is
responsible for security in its assigned area of operations, which typically includes the division support area
and the division main supply routes. Typical missions include area security; line of communications security |
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and maintenance; mobility; countermobility; vertical and horizontal construction; CBRN defense; and
limited offensive and defensives tasks.
5-55. Currently all MEBs reside in either the National Guard or Army Reserve. The organization of a MEB
varies based upon the mission. A typical force mix includes engineer, CBRN, and military police. EOD units
may be designated to provide EOD support to a MEB. In some circumstances, such as when the division is
an initial entry force, the MEB may receive direct support from short-range air defense units, including
counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar systems. The MEB can also command and control a tactical combat
force from a BCT when assigned an area security mission.
5-56. The presence of a MEB in the support area of operations does not supplant unit self-defense
responsibilities. Units remain responsible for self-protection against level I threats. The MEB provides forces
to respond to level II threats and, when task-organized with a tactical combat force, it can respond to level
III threats. If a CBRN command or CBRN brigade are not deployed, the MEB may have wider responsibilities
for CBRN operations. The MEB may also have wider responsibility for air and missile defense when it
controls these types of units. (See FM 3-81 for more details on MEBs.)
Engineer Battalion
5-57. A division will normally be augmented by one or more engineer battalions, each capable of
commanding and controlling up to five engineer companies. Engineer battalions are capable of planning,
integrating, and directing the execution of engineer combat and general engineering and construction tasks.
One or two engineer battalions can be assigned or attached to a divisional MEB. But if the division has three
engineer battalions and/or must conduct a wet-gap crossing, an engineer brigade should be assigned to the
division.
Military Police Battalion
5-58. A military police battalion is a functional battalion capable of planning, integrating, and directing the
execution of military police operations conducted by up to five mission-tailored military police companies,
integrating capabilities from all three military police disciplines (police operations, detention operations and
security and mobile support) and integrating police intelligence operations. It may also command other units
that focus on conducting area support, detention, or dislocated-civilian tasks. The military police battalion
synchronizes military police support across multiple organizations that control the area of operations. The
battalion is instrumental in the execution of key stability tasks including traffic management and control,
host-nation police development, as well as area security.
5-59. A military police battalion is required when military police missions exceed the command and control
command capability of the MEB, which is most likely to occur during large-scale combat operations. (Refer
to FM 3-39 for more details on the military police battalion).
Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Battalion (Division)
5-60. Intelligence and electronic warfare battalions (division) from the E-MIB will be co-located in direct
support with the divisions they support. They may be further task-organized based upon the mission when
deployed. The intelligence and electronic warfare battalion (division) provides direct support analysis;
processing, exploitation, and dissemination; and multi-domain sensing and target development capability to
the division G-2 and the division commander. This facilitates situational understanding for the division
commander and critical pieces of the sensor-to-shooter linkage necessary for the division to execute shaping
operations in the division deep area. The intelligence and electronic warfare battalion (division) is designed
to receive, integrate, employ, and sustain intelligence capabilities and capacities in the division AO. A typical
expeditionary-military intelligence brigade battalion task-organized to a division consists of three processing,
exploitation, and dissemination platoons, one multifunctional platoon, and two counterintelligence operations
management teams.
5-61. The intelligence and electronic warfare battalion (division) staff works closely with the division’s G-
2 analysis and control element. The battalion commander and staff assist the division commander in
information collection management. The intelligence and electronic warfare battalion (division) does not |
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conduct reconnaissance. (See ATP 2-19.3 for more details on expeditionary-military intelligence brigade
military intelligence battalions.)
Civil Affairs Battalion
5-62. The role of civil affairs is to understand, engage, and influence unified action partners and indigenous
populations and institutions, conduct military government operations, enable civil-military operations, and
provide civil considerations expertise through the planning and execution of civil affair operations. Civil
affairs facilitates situational understanding and addresses civil factors that influence military objectives and
support unified action. A civil affairs battalion focuses on planning, enabling, and shaping civil affairs
operations in support of the division. The majority of civil affairs that work with conventional forces are
located in the Reserves, impacting their availability. Division commanders and staff must account for
mobilization times and request forces early during planning in order to ensure their availability.
5-63. A civil affairs battalion is task-organized based on mission requirements, but it usually consists of two
to five civil affairs companies and can operate a civil-military operations center. The battalion can command
and control up to seven civil affairs companies without staff augmentation. The civil affairs battalion can also
provide a civil affairs planning team to assist the assistant chief of staff, civil affairs operations and division
staff with planning and integrating civil affairs operations throughout the division AO. (See FM 3-57 for
more details on civil affairs operations.)
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Battalion
5-64. The EOD battalion is a functional headquarters that directs EOD operations. The EOD battalion is
responsible for detecting, identifying, evaluating, rendering safe, exploiting, and achieving final disposition
of all explosive ordnance, including IEDs, in its AO. The battalion can also provide enabling support,
analysis, support to targeting efforts, CWMD operations, and counter mine and theater exploitation. The
EOD battalion is capable of supervising EOD operations for three to seven EOD companies. The EOD
battalion is organic to the EOD group. The battalion may be attached or OPCON to a JTF, division, corps,
or echelon above corps. (See ATP 4-32.1 and ATP 4-32 for more details on EOD units.)
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Battalion
5-65. A CBRN battalion usually supports a division by providing a mix of units that specialize in
decontamination, CBRN reconnaissance, and bio-detection. CBRN battalions support allocation, alignment,
and logistics management for all assigned CBRN formations. CBRN battalions also provide the capability to
assess, protect against, and mitigate CBRN threats and hazards and support CWMD operations.
5-66. CBRN battalions are scalable, tailorable, and multifunctional formations that consist of a headquarters
and two to five CBRN companies. A CBRN battalion may also be task-organized to a CBRN brigade, a
MEB, or as an independent CBRN battalion to the division. A CBRN battalion depends on the division for
sustainment support. (See FM 3-11 for more details on CBRN battalions.)
Psychological Operations Company
5-67. A division normally receives a psychological operations company. This company enables a division
commander to influence—either directly or indirectly—foreign populations and militaries to achieve
behavior changes consistent with stated objectives. A psychological operations company develops messages
and actions in a series to address operational requirements of the maneuver unit. Series development consists
of developing both product concepts and actions for a psychological effect. Tactical psychological operations
companies develop messages and talking points for Soldiers and leaders. The company command section
augments the division staff to provide military information support operations, senior leader engagement,
and military deception planning assistance in coordination with the information operations staff element and
the military deception officer. The psychological operations company commander works with the division
staff to integrate attached military information support forces. The company requires sustainment support
from a division as its organization does not include sustainment assets. (See FM 3-53 for more details on the
psychological operations company.) |
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Theater Signal Brigade
5-68. A theater signal brigade provides functional signal support to division operations, through the
division’s organic signal assets. The signal brigade augments the division’s organic assets as the division’s
operational reach expands. Additionally, the signal brigade provides augmentation to subordinate division
units without organic signal capabilities. (See FM 6-02 for more details on the theater signal brigade.)
Military History Detachment
5-69. Military history detachments are a small team of officers and enlisted Soldiers that carry out directed
collection of historical material during combat and contingency operations for use when writing official
history. They are trained and equipped to gather historical documents and materials, conduct oral interviews,
photograph actions and events, and advise supported units on planning and conducting historical operations.
They also assist the division information management element in packaging and forwarding collected
information to appropriate agencies. Military history detachments are attached or assigned to divisions during
all operations. (See ATP 1-20 for more details on the military history detachment.)
Mobile Public Affairs Detachment
5-70. A public affairs detachment consists of one officer and nine enlisted Soldiers that provides support to
Army, combined, joint, or multinational operations. A public affairs detachment is either assigned, attached,
or under OPCON of a division. A public affairs detachment may be used as a liaison with the Department of
State press attaché office, host nation, or multinational partner public affairs staff. A public affairs detachment
has personnel and equipment to—
* Assist and advise commanders on public affairs programs and missions.
* Plan, prepare, and execute information strategies.
* Facilitate, assess, and monitor media activity.
* Acquire and process public affairs digital video, audio, and imagery.
5-71. A public affairs detachment has limited capability to conduct independent public affairs activities and
requires higher command guidance and support. The unit generally co-locates with, and is under the planning
and supervisory guidance of, the division assistant chief of staff, public affairs (known as G-7). (See FM 3-61
for more details on public affairs operations.)
Expeditionary Cyberspace Electromagnetic Activities Team
5-72. Divisions can request augmentation to execute cyberspace electromagnetic activities operations.
Divisions plan, integrate, and synchronize all aspects of cyberspace and electronic warfare operations across
the warfighting functions. The division may receive an expeditionary cyberspace electromagnetic activities
team from the cyber warfare support battalion, if required. Expeditionary cyberspace electromagnetic
activities teams are designed to provide cyberspace electromagnetic activities support to corps echelons and
below. Each expeditionary cyberspace electromagnetic activities team consists of three platoons: a cyber
warfare platoon, an infrastructure platoon, and a capability development platoon.
Army Space Support Team
5-73. Divisions can request augmentation in the form of an Army space support team. The Army space
support team is a six-Soldier space-enabled capabilities analysis team, comprised of two officers and four
enlisted Soldiers, each having unique space-related skills, knowledge, and abilities to provide situational
awareness of space capabilities, assets, and products available to the division. Army space support teams
plan, coordinate, and analyze space-enabled capabilities and provide input to the division staff. Army space
support teams work with the division’s organic space support element. (See FM 3-14 for more details on
space support units.)
Special Operations Forces
5-74. A division may have special operations forces operating in its AO. When this is the case, a division
may receive a special forces liaison element to synchronize special operations forces activities with division |
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operations. This element should locate at the command post where it can most effectively support the
division. (See FM 6-05 for more details on special operations forces integration.)
DIVISION OPERATIONS
5-75. Divisions operate in a joint, multinational, and multi-domain environment, integrating their assigned
forces and available joint capabilities and synchronizing their effects to achieve objectives. During the
planning and conduct of operations, the division commander develops an operational framework to focus the
division’s combat power most effectively over time and space and across domains. Operational-level
commanders at the corps echelon and above are focused on the ability to orchestrate complex joint operations
and campaigns. A division commander is normally focused on conducting decisive, shaping, and sustaining
operations simultaneously across the depth and width of the division’s assigned AO.
5-76. Division commanders seek to attack the enemy across the depth of the battlefield in ways that create
multiple dilemmas for the enemy and opportunities for friendly forces. They create opportunities by accepting
risk in some areas to mass the effects of combat power in others, usually but not always in support of their
decisive operation. They set the conditions that enable the freedom of action by subordinate brigades acting
in concert with their intent, seeking to avoid presenting division elements as lucrative targets to enemy
long-range fires. Operations in depth expand the battlefield in ways that create greater numbers of
opportunities and allow the division commander to control the tempo of operations and establish positions of
relative advantage.
5-77. Division commanders task-organize their assigned and attached forces in accordance with their
judgment of the tactical situation. They designate command and support relationships to ensure subordinate
and supporting commanders understand their roles in the operation and support the division commander’s
intent. Commanders consider five related guidelines when organizing a division for decisive action:
* The BCTs are organized, trained, and equipped to operate as a combined arms force. The division
commander normally reinforces the BCTs with additional Army and joint capabilities and adjusts
the tasks assigned to the BCTs accordingly.
* Multifunctional brigades are more effective when they operate as they organized and trained. The
division commander maintains the tailored organization of multifunctional brigades until tactical
circumstances require temporary task organization of forces from one brigade to another.
* The division operates more effectively when the commander adjusts tasks to subordinate units
rather than constantly adjusting the division’s task organization.
* The division commander determines the effective span of control for each brigade and does not
exceed it. Additional units can slow the operations process in a brigade, particularly as the tactical
situation becomes more fluid.
* When task-organizing brigades with multinational forces, the division commander considers
reducing the brigade’s span of control, depending on the situation. The effective integration of
multinational forces into a brigade will require significant effort and coordination.
5-78. An effective division task organization—
* Facilitates the division commander’s intent and concept of operations.
* Retains flexibility within the concept of operations.
* Facilitates massing combat power at the decisive point.
* Weights the division’s decisive operation.
* Adapts to conditions imposed by the mission variables.
* Maintains or creates effective combined arms teams.
* Provides mutual support among brigades.
* Ensures flexibility to meet unforeseen events and support future operations.
* Allocates resources with minimum restrictions on their employment.
* Ensures unity of command and synchronization of effort through command and support
relationships. |
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* Offsets limitations and maximizes the potential of all available forces.
* Exploits enemy vulnerabilities.
DIVISION OPERATIONS ALONG THE COMPETITION CONTINUUM
5-79. No matter what role a division serves in, a division is capable of executing operations across the
competition continuum and throughout the range of military operations. These categories describe operations
that share general characteristics of military operations and activities but not necessarily the details of their
execution. Divisions can simultaneously command and control and support several subordinate efforts across
the competition continuum and throughout the range of military operations that are focused in one theater.
MILITARY ENGAGEMENT AND SECURITY COOPERATION
5-80. Divisions provide trained and ready forces and echelons of command and control in support of exercise
or training events with the intent to shape the security environment, improve mutual understanding, and
improve interoperability with treaty partners or potential coalition partners. Due to the limited scale and short
duration of violence, a division usually serves as a tactical headquarters, joint force or multinational force
land component command, and if required, as a JTF headquarters or ARFOR. While most U.S. military
engagement and security cooperation typically takes place in the echelons below brigade, there are multiple
exercises where a division is used to assist in command and control or sustainment activities. These exercises
support military engagement and security cooperation efforts in critical theaters.
SPARTAN SHIELD: Military Engagement and Security
Cooperation
Operation SPARTAN SHIELD is a combined forces security cooperation and
contingency operation based in Kuwait. SPARTAN SHIELD has been a continuous
DOD operation since 2012, and it enables U.S. Central Command to counter, protect,
defend, and prepare while building partner capacity. This operation contributes to
regional deterrence, reacting to a possible threat in the Middle East, and performing
security cooperation missions in U.S. Central Command area of responsibility.
The 29th Infantry Division (National Guard) commanded Task Force Spartan from
December 2016 to July 2017. The task force consisted of five brigades from multiple
divisions and components that deployed on a rotational basis. The task force was
responsible for improving readiness across 13 countries, facilitating multiple training
exercises, and maintaining a strategic rapid reaction force. The division headquarters
was responsible for executing the theater security cooperation program with partner
nations in the Middle East and Center and South Asia regions.
The division headquarters successfully integrated brigades from multiple divisions and
components, prepared for large-scale combat, and conducted shaping operations
throughout the AO. The division also supported combat actions conducted by
Operation INHERENT RESOLVE in Northern Iraq and Syria. The division completed
a transfer of authority to the 35th Infantry Division (National Guard) in July 2017.
CRISIS RESPONSE
5-81. In crisis response, because of the clearly defined end state and limited scope, divisions can serve as a
tactical headquarters, joint force, or joint force land component command, and if required, as a JTF or
ARFOR. Even with a well-defined end state, forces, and scope, a division’s execution of these operations
may take considerable time. Commanders conducting crisis response operations carefully consider all actions
to ensure they do not further destabilize the situation or inadvertently escalate it. A division, while smaller
than a corps or army, still provides a robust and experienced combined arms team and three general officers
to lead any U.S. military efforts in response to a crisis. |
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UNITED ASSISTANCE 2014
Liberia experienced an outbreak of the Ebola virus in December 2013. Ebola
overwhelmed the medical capacity of Liberia, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and the
international emergency health response community. This outbreak quickly became a
public health, humanitarian, and socioeconomic crisis with devastating impact on
families, communities, and multiple West African countries. During this outbreak, over
11,000 died and over 28,000 were infected. The severity of this outbreak prompted the
United States to employ military assets to assist in controlling the spread of the virus.
In October of 2014, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) headquarters deployed to
Liberia as a JTF and assumed control of Joint Forces Command-United Assistance
from U.S. Army Africa who had established the JTF in September 2014. The division
headquarters was also tasked as the ARFOR, the JFLCC, and with establishing an
austere theater of operations. The division was responsible for the command, control,
and synchronization of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational assets
to combat Ebola in West Africa. Among these attached assets were a medical brigade,
Marine Corps and Army aviation assets, engineers, logistics support elements, and
contractor support. The main lines of effort for the division were to provide logistics
support in theater, provide life support for all forces, and construct medical treatment
facilities.
During this operation, the division headquarters served in multiple roles and performed
multiple functions including shaping operations, massing effects, assuming directed
Army and joint authorities and responsibilities, leveraging joint capabilities, and
organizing and employing brigades and battalions. The 101st Airborne Division (Air
Assault) headquarters executed a disciplined operation that supported the United
States Agency for International Development (the lead federal agency) and
demonstrated the versatility and capability of the division.
LIMITED CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS
5-82. Divisions are uniquely suited to create safe and secure environments in limited contingency operations.
Divisions provide offensive, defensive, and stability capabilities to deter or defeat adversaries and establish
security. They provide specialized support to other government agencies as necessary, and they can serve as
a tactical headquarters, ARFOR, JTF, or joint forces land component. |
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JOINT ENDEAVOR
In April 1992, civil war erupted in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and by the end of 1995,
between 140,000 and 250,000 people had been killed. Ethnic cleansing created over
1.3 million refugees. During this time dozens of diplomatic solutions failed. In late 1995,
the Dayton Peace Accord was signed, allowing a NATO military force to enter the
country to enforce the peace.
1st Armored Division served as the land forces command for the units involved, and it
served as the nucleus for multinational Task Force Eagle. Task Force Eagle consisted
of 31,000 Soldiers in 42 different battalions organized into roughly 15 brigades, of
which approximately one-third were from multi-national partners.
1st Armored Division, as the senior Army headquarters, retained ARFOR
responsibilities in its assigned AO, where it conducted all logistics support and 10 USC
responsibilities. U.S. Army Europe (Forward) provided these capabilities to the rest of
U.S Army forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 1st Armored Division task-organized,
employed, integrated, and synchronized brigades and battalions, conducted shaping
operations in the division AO, massed effects at decisive points, leveraged joint
capabilities, and assumed directed Army, joint, and multinational authorities and
responsibilities. Task Force Eagle concluded its operation on 20 December 1996,
transferring responsibility for its AO to the stabilization force in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS
5-83. During large-scale combat operations, divisions act as combined arms tactical formations organized to
defeat or destroy enemy forces and seize terrain. This usually means that a division operates as one of several
in a corps, and its headquarters only serves in a tactical role.
5-84. As a tactical headquarters, a division uses the operational framework of deep-close-rear-support areas
to do three things simultaneously. It shapes enemy forces in the deep area, synchronizes subordinate forces
in the close area, and coordinates friendly activities in the support areas. The division commander allocates
resources to all areas to ensure synchronization of all of the division’s actions in executing his operation.
Priorities of support may change with phases of an operation, but the division should preserve unity of effort
throughout its AO all of the time.
5-85. A division operates deep in both time and space to develop both the friendly and enemy conditions
necessary for its subordinate BCTs to be successful. While a corps focuses deep to determine how the enemy
is preparing for the next phase of an operation, a division is focused on identifying the enemy’s course of
action, identifying the enemy’s main effort, and disintegrating enemy forces into smaller elements of combat
power that, under favorable conditions, BCTs can defeat. For a division to do this, it needs time and space to
make decisions. In terms of time, deep planning for a division is roughly 72–96 hours into the future.
Spatially, a division’s deep area is usually beyond the BCT’s coordinated fire line and focused on
uncommitted or out of contact enemy forces. In terms of geographic control measures, the deep area often
encompasses physical space between the coordinated fire line and the fire support coordination line.
5-86. As the division shapes enemy forces, it simultaneously conducts combined arms operations by
planning and coordinating BCT maneuver and by using fires to exploit that maneuver in close operations.
While many division assets are focused on deep operations at any given time, the division can attrit enemy
forces in the close area with lethal and nonlethal effects in support of a particular course of action. In support
of close operations, the division synchronizes the maneuver of the BCTs with mobility, countermobility, and
protection capabilities by modifying the task organization and support relationships of the units under
division control. It further allocates protection assets like air defense and engineer assets to mitigate threats
against the friendly forces in the close and support areas. Enemy disruption to friendly activities in the support
area has almost immediate negative impacts on operations in the close and deep areas. |
3-94 | 148 | Chapter 5
5-87. As the division is either defeating or destroying an enemy and seizing terrain, it also ensures that
activities in the division’s rear are synchronized and secured. The division’s rear, which encompasses both
the support areas and the physical space between the BCT rear boundaries and the division rear boundaries,
grows as a division conducts offensive operations and shrinks as the corps shifts its rear boundary forward.
The rear typically has one or more support areas during sustained offensive operations. Divisions have a wide
variety of tasks associated with their rear, including defeating bypassed enemy forces and performing
minimum essential stability tasks, terrain management, lines of communication security, route clearance,
movement control, and security. A large number of different units are located in the division’s rear (inside
and outside of the support area), not all of which are under division control, but which support the division
(and corps).
5-88. In support areas, the focus is on maintaining and extending friendly operational reach to prevent
friendly culmination. This requires anticipation by the staff and commander. While a division is planning
72 to 96 hours out in terms of shaping operations, it generally plans even further out in terms of sustaining
operations because of the physics associated with moving large amounts of supplies and distributing them.
Generally, a MEB is responsible for the security of the support area, which allows sustainment units to focus
on their primary mission. A division may have one or multiple support areas to avoid presenting a single
lucrative target and to facilitate sustainment when the division is operating along multiple axes on a wide
front, exceeding the MEB’s security capabilities. In this case, the division commander directs other units to
provide additional security or accepts risk. |
3-94 | 149 | Appendix A
Command and Support Relationships
Echelons above brigade commanders and staffs must clearly understand both joint and
Army command and support relationships. This appendix defines and describes joint
command relationships and other authorities, followed by a discussion of Army
command and support relationships. It concludes with a discussion of command and
control considerations for multinational operations.
CHAIN OF COMMAND
A-1. The President and Secretary of Defense exercise authority and control of the Armed Forces through
two distinct branches of the chain of command, as described in Chapter 1. One branch runs from the
President, through the Secretary of Defense, to the combatant commanders for missions and forces assigned
or attached to combatant commands. Within their commands, combatant commanders establish joint
command relationships among forces as described in paragraphs A-3 through A-11.
A-2. For purposes other than the operational direction of the combatant commanders, the chain of command
runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the secretaries of the military departments and, as
prescribed by the secretaries, to the commanders of military Service forces. The military departments,
organized separately, operate under the authority, direction, and control of the secretary of that military
department. The secretaries of the military departments exercise ADCON over Service forces through their
respective Service chiefs and Service component commanders as described in paragraphs A-16 through A-17.
JOINT COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
A-3. Command is central to all military action, and unity of command is central to unity of effort. The
authority that a military commander lawfully exercises over subordinates, including the authority to assign
missions and accountability for their successful completion, is inherent in command. Although commanders
may delegate authority to accomplish missions, they may not absolve themselves of the responsibility for the
accomplishment of these missions. Authority is never absolute; the extent of authority is specified by the
establishing authority, directives, and law. The four types of joint command relationships are—
* Combatant command (command authority) (COCOM).
* OPCON.
* TACON.
* Support.
A-4. The specific command relationship (COCOM, OPCON, TACON, or support) defines the authority a
commander has over assigned or attached forces as each is summarized in this section. (See JP 1 for the full
discussion of the authorities for each joint command relationship).
COMBATANT COMMAND (COMMAND AUTHORITY)
A-5. Combatant command (command authority) is the nontransferable command authority, which cannot
be delegated, of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces
involving organizing and employing commands and forces; assigning tasks; designating objectives; and
giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to
accomplish the missions assigned to the command (JP 1). COCOM is the command authority over assigned
forces vested only in commanders of combatant commands or as directed by the President or the Secretary
of Defense and cannot be delegated or transferred. The combatant commander exercises COCOM of assigned |
3-94 | 150 | Appendix A
forces and may delegate OPCON, TACON, or establish support relationships of assigned and attached forces
as shown in table A-1.
Table A-1. Joint command relationships synopsis
Combatant command (command authority)
Authority unique to a combatant commander to—
Plan, program, budget, and provide execution process input.
Assign subordinate commanders.
Develop relationships with DOD agencies.
Provide directive authority for logistics.
Operational control, when delegated, to—
Provide authoritative direction for all military operations and joint training.
Organize and employ commands and forces.
Assign command functions to subordinates.
Establish plans and requirements for ISR activities.
Suspend subordinate commanders from duty.
Tactical control, when delegated, to provide local Support relationship, when assigned, to aid, assist,
direction and control of movements or maneuvers to protect, or sustain another organization.
accomplish a mission.
A-6. COCOM includes directive authority for logistics—combatant commander authority to issue
directives to subordinate commanders to ensure the effective execution of approved operation plans, optimize
the use or reallocation of available resources, and prevent or eliminate redundant facilities and/or overlapping
functions among the Service component commands (JP 1). Combatant commanders exercise directive
authority for logistics and may delegate directive authority for a common support capability (for example,
fuel distribution) to a subordinate commander as required. While logistics support is primarily a Service
responsibility, Army forces provide logistic support to other Services as directed by combatant commanders
through directive authority for logistic and executive agent responsibilities designated by the Secretary of
Defense. (See Appendix B for a discussion of ASOS.)
OPERATIONAL CONTROL
A-7. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces
involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and
giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission (JP 1). OPCON is inherent in COCOM
and may be delegated to commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command.
A-8. OPCON includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training
necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. This authority should be exercised through the
commanders of subordinate organizations, normally through subordinate JFCs and Service and functional
component commanders. OPCON provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ
those forces as the commander exercising OPCON considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions.
Commanders of subordinate commands, including JTFs, will be given OPCON of assigned forces and
OPCON or TACON of attached forces by the superior commander.
TACTICAL CONTROL
A-9. Tactical control is the authority over forces that is limited to the detailed direction and control of
movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned
(JP 1). TACON is a command authority inherent in OPCON, and it may be delegated to and exercised by
commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. TACON provides sufficient
authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of support assets within the
mission or assigned task. TACON does not provide organizational authority or authoritative direction for |
3-94 | 151 | Command and Support Relationships
administrative and logistic support; the commander of the parent unit continues to exercise these authorities
unless otherwise specified in the establishing directive.
SUPPORT
A-10. Support is the action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force in accordance
with a directive requiring such action (JP 1). Support is a command authority in joint doctrine. A supported
and supporting relationship is established by a superior commander between subordinate commanders when
one organization should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force. Designating supporting
relationships is important. It conveys priorities to commanders and staffs planning or executing joint
operations. Designating a support relationship does not provide authority to organize and employ commands
and forces, nor does it include authoritative direction for administrative and logistic support.
A-11. The Secretary of Defense assigns support relationships between combatant commanders for the
planning and execution of joint operations. JFCs establish support relationships among functional and Service
component commanders, such as for the coordination of operations in depth involving the JFLCC and the
joint force air component commander. Within a joint force, the JFC may designate more than one supported
commander simultaneously, and components may simultaneously receive and provide support for different
missions, functions, or operations. Joint doctrine divides support into the categories listed in table A-2.
Table A-2. Joint support categories
Category Definition
General support Support given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision
thereof (JP 3-09.3).
Mutual support That support which units render each other against an enemy, because of their
assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, and their
inherent capabilities (JP 3-31).
Direct support A mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to
answer directly to the supported force’s request for assistance (JP 3-09.3).
Close support That action of the supporting force against targets or objectives that are sufficiently
near the supported force as to require detailed integration or coordination of the
supporting action (JP 3-31).
Note. A joint support relationship is not used when an Army commander task-organizes Army
forces in a supporting role. When task-organized to support another Army force, Army forces use
one of four Army support relationships as described in paragraphs A-24 through A-29.
JOINT ASSIGNMENT AND ATTACHMENT
A-12. All forces under the jurisdiction of the secretaries of the military departments (except those forces
necessary to carry out the functions of the military departments as noted in 10 USC 162) are assigned to
combatant commanders or Commander, United States Element, North American Aerospace Defense
Command, or designated as Service retained in the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance. A
force assigned or attached to a combatant commander, or Service retained by a Service Secretary, may be
transferred from that command to another combatant command only when directed by the Secretary of
Defense and under procedures prescribed by the Secretary of Defense and approved by the President. The
Secretary of Defense specifies the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing
commander will relinquish).
Note. Assigned and attached are not command relationships in joint doctrine. They are terms used
to describe the relative permanency for the transfer of forces among commands. When forces are
assigned or attached, the command relationship (COCOM, OPCON, or TACON) is specified. |
3-94 | 152 | Appendix A
A-13. Forces, not command relationships, are transferred between commands. When forces are transferred,
the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish)
over those forces must be specified. When transfer of forces to a joint force will be permanent (or for an
unknown or extended period) the forces should be reassigned. Combatant commanders will exercise
COCOM, and subordinate JFCs will exercise OPCON, over reassigned forces. When transfer of forces to a
joint force will be temporary, the forces are attached to the gaining command, and JFCs, normally through
the Service component commander, will exercise OPCON over the attached forces. Establishing authorities
for subordinate unified commands and JTFs direct the assignment or attachment of their forces to those
subordinate commands as appropriate. When the JFC establishes a command relationship of an Army force,
the ASCC clearly specifies ADCON responsibilities for all affected Army commanders.
OTHER AUTHORITIES
A-14. Other authorities outside joint command relationships include—
* ADCON.
* Coordinating authority.
* Direct liaison authorized.
These authorities are described in paragraphs A-15 through A-18.
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL
A-15. Administrative control includes organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment,
personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization,
discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other
organizations. ADCON is a Service authority, not a joint authority. ADCON is exercised under the authority
of and is delegated by the Secretary of the Army. ADCON is synonymous with the Army’s 10 USC
authorities and responsibilities. (See AR 10-87 for more information on ADCON.)
A-16. ADCON does not necessarily follow the operational chain of command at echelons above brigade.
Unless modified by the Secretary of the Army, administrative responsibilities normally flow from
Department of the Army through the ASCC to those Army forces assigned or attached to that combatant
command. As the ASCC, the theater army delegates ADCON as required to Army forces assigned or attached
by the combatant commander to a joint (or joint and multinational) task force. The ARFOR commander and
associated headquarters exercise ADCON of Army forces within that JTF specified by the theater army
commander. (See Appendix B for a discussion of echelon above brigade ADCON responsibilities.)
COORDINATING AUTHORITY
A-17. The coordinating authority is a commander or individual who has the authority to require consultation
between the specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Services, joint force components,
or forces of the same Service or agencies, but does not have the authority to compel agreement (JP 1).
Commanders or individuals may exercise coordinating authority at any echelon at or below the level of
combatant command. The common task to be coordinated will be specified in the establishing directive
without disturbing the normal organizational relationships in other matters. Coordinating authority is a
consultation relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. Coordinating authority
is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. For example, a division commander
may delegate coordinating authority to an assistant division commander for operations in the rear area.
DIRECT LIAISON AUTHORIZED
A-18. Direct liaison authorized is that authority granted by a commander (any level) to a subordinate to
directly consult or coordinate an action with a command or agency within or outside of the granting command
(JP 1). Direct liaison authorized is more applicable to planning than operations and always carries with it the
requirement of keeping the commander granting direct liaison authorized informed. Direct liaison authorized
is a coordination relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. |
3-94 | 153 | Command and Support Relationships
ARMY COMMAND AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS
A-19. Army command and support relationships are similar but not identical to joint command relationships.
Differences stem from the way Army forces task-organize internally and the need for a system of support
relationships between Army forces. Another important difference is the requirement for Army commanders
to provide administration and support to subordinate Army forces. These differences allow for flexible
allocation of Army capabilities within various Army echelons.
ARMY COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
A-20. Army command relationships define superior and subordinate relationships between unit commanders.
By specifying a chain of command, command relationships unify effort and enable commanders to use
subordinate forces with maximum flexibility. Army command relationships identify the degree of control of
the gaining Army commander. The type of command relationship often relates to the expected longevity of
the relationship between the headquarters involved and quickly identifies the degree of administration and
support that the gaining and losing Army commanders provide. Army command relationships include—
* Organic.
* Assigned.
* Attached.
* OPCON. (See paragraphs A-7 and A-8.)
* TACON. (See paragraph A-9.)
Organic
A-21. Forces that are organic are assigned to and forming an essential part of a military organization as listed
in its table of organization for the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps, and are assigned to the operating
forces for the Navy (JP 1). For example, combined arms battalions, field artillery battalion, cavalry squadron,
brigade engineer battalion, brigade support battalion, and headquarters and headquarters company are all
organic units to an armored BCT. The Army establishes organic units through organizational documents such
as tables of organization. Army commanders exercise OPCON and ADCON of organic forces.
Assigned
A-22. Assign is to place units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively permanent,
and/or where such organization controls and administers the units or personnel for the primary function, or
greater portion of the functions, of the unit or personnel (JP 3-0). For example, BCTs, DIVARTY, and a
sustainment brigade are assigned to a division. Army assigned units remain subordinate to the higher echelon
headquarters for extended periods, typically years. Assignment is based on the needs of the Army, and it is
formalized by orders rather than organizational documents. Although force tailoring or task-organizing may
temporarily detach units, they eventually return to either their headquarters of assignment or their organic
headquarters. Army commanders exercise OPCON and ADCON of assigned forces.
Attached
A-23. Attach is the placement of units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively
temporary (JP 3-0). A unit temporarily placed into an organization is attached. When an Army force is
attached to another Army headquarters, the attachment order specifies the command relationship of OPCON
or TACON. The gaining unit exercises ADCON of the attached Army force unless modified. |
3-94 | 154 | Appendix A
ARMY SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS
A-24. Army support relationships are not a command authority, and they are more specific than the joint
support relationships. Army commanders establish support relationships when subordination of one unit to
another is inappropriate. They assign a support relationship when—
* The support is more effective if a commander with the requisite technical and tactical expertise
controls the supporting unit, rather than the supported commander.
* The echelon of the supporting unit is the same as or higher than that of the supported unit. For
example, the supporting unit may be a brigade, and the supported unit may be a battalion. It would
be inappropriate for the brigade to be subordinated to the battalion, hence the use of an Army
support relationship.
* The supporting unit supports several units simultaneously. The requirement to set support
priorities to allocate resources to supported units exists. Assigning support relationships is one
aspect of command and control.
A-25. Army support relationships allow supporting commanders to employ their units’ capabilities to achieve
results required by supported commanders. Support relationships are graduated from an exclusive supported
and supporting relationship between two units—as in direct support—to a broad level of support extended to
all units under the control of the higher headquarters—as in general support. Support relationships do not
alter ADCON. Commanders specify and change support relationships through task-organizing. The Army
support relationships include—
* Direct support.
* Reinforcing.
* General support-reinforcing.
* General support.
(See table A-3 for a list of the inherent responsibilities for each support relationship.)
A-26. Direct support is a support relationship requiring a force to support another specific force and
authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force’s request for assistance. A unit assigned a direct
support relationship retains its command relationship with its parent unit, but it is positioned by and has
priorities of support established by the supported unit. A field artillery unit in direct support of a maneuver
unit is concerned primarily with the fire support needs of only that unit. The fire support element of the
supported maneuver unit plans and coordinates fires to support the maneuver commander’s intent. The
commander of a unit in direct support recommends position areas and coordinates for movement clearances
where the direct support unit can best support the maneuver commander’s concept of the operation.
Note. Joint doctrine considers direct support a mission rather than a support relationship.
A-27. Reinforcing is a support relationship requiring a force to support another supporting unit. Only like
units (for example, artillery to artillery) can be given a reinforcing mission. A unit assigned a reinforcing
support relationship retains its command relationship with its parent unit but is positioned by the reinforced
unit. A unit that is reinforcing has priorities of support established by the reinforced unit, then the parent unit.
For example, when a direct support field artillery battalion requires more fires to meet maneuver force
requirements, another field artillery battalion may be directed to reinforce the direct support battalion.
A-28. General support-reinforcing is a support relationship assigned to a unit to support the force as a whole
and to reinforce another similar-type unit. A unit assigned a general support-reinforcing relationship is
positioned and has priorities established by its parent unit and secondly by the reinforced unit. For example,
an artillery unit that has a general support-reinforcing mission supports the force as a whole and provides
reinforcing fires for other artillery units.
A-29. General support is that support given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular
subdivision thereof. Units assigned a general support relationship are positioned and have priorities
established by their parent unit. A field artillery unit assigned in general support of a force has all of its fires
under the immediate control of the supported commander or his designated force field artillery headquarters. |
3-94 | 155 | Command and Support Relationships
Table A-3. Army support relationships
Then inherent responsibilities—
Authorities a
commander
Are Establish
Have can impose
If relation- command May be Receives assigned Provide and Have on gaining
ship is— relation- task- sustain- position or liaison maintain priorities unit further
organized ment an area of communi- established
ship to— command or
by— from— operations cations by—
with— support
by— with—
relationship
by—
Parent
Direct Parent Parent Parent Supported Supported unit, Supported
See note1
support1 unit unit unit unit unit supported unit
unit
Parent
Reinforced
Reinforc- Parent Parent Parent Reinforced Reinforced unit, Not
unit, then
ing unit unit unit unit unit reinforced applicable
parent unit
unit
Reinforced
Reinforced
unit and Parent unit,
General unit and as
Parent Parent Parent as then Not
support– Parent unit required
unit unit unit required reinforced applicable
reinforcing by parent
by parent unit
unit
unit
As As
General Parent Parent Parent required required Not
Parent unit Parent unit
support unit unit unit by parent by parent applicable
unit unit
Note: 1 Commanders of units in direct support may further assign support relationships between their subordinate units
and elements of the supported unit after coordination with the supported commander.
MULTINATIONAL COMMAND AND SUPPORT CONSIDERATIONS
A-30. Multinational operations is a collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two
or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance (JP 3-16). An alliance is
the relationship that results from a formal agreement between two or more nations for broad, long-term
objectives that further the common interests of the members. Alliances have standing headquarters,
organizations, and standardized agreements for the conduct of operations. Examples include NATO or the
Combined Forces Command, Korea. Operations conducted with units from two or more allies are referred to
as combined operations.
A-31. A coalition is an arrangement between two or more nations for a common action. It is formed for a
limited purpose and time. Coalitions are formed by different nations with specific objectives, usually for a
single occasion or for longer cooperation in a narrow sector of common interest. Operations conducted with
units from two or more coalition members are referred to as coalition operations.
A-32. Army forces routinely serve in multinational operations, and echelons above brigade headquarters may
form the core of a multinational headquarters. As such, it is important echelons above brigade commanders
and staffs understand multinational command structures and authorities.
MULTINATIONAL COMMAND STRUCTURE
A-33. All multinational operations have two chains of command regardless of structure or authority. The first
is a national chain of command extending back to national capitals. The second is the multinational chain of
command constructed by the United Nations, alliance, or coalition. As unity of command is all but impossible
given parallel national chains of command, multinational commanders strive for unity of effort. In doing so,
multinational commanders develop a high level of mutual trust and comfort with other national contingents.
A-34. The United Nations, alliances, and coalitions create a command structure that meets the needs,
diplomatic realities, constraints, and objectives of the participating nations. No single command structure fits |
3-94 | 156 | Appendix A
the needs of all alliances and coalitions. Therefore, there are three types of basic structures for multinational
operations:
* Integrated.
* Lead nation.
* Parallel.
A-35. Regardless of how a multinational force is operationally organized, each nation furnishing forces
normally establishes a national component, often called a national command element, to ensure effective
administration of its forces. The national component provides a means to administer and support the national
forces, coordinate communication to the parent nation, tender national military views and recommendations
directly to the multinational force command, facilitate the assignment and reassignment of national forces to
subordinate operational multinational organizations, and maintain personnel accountability. In an
administrative role, these national components are similar to a Service component command at the unified
combatant command level in a U.S. joint organization. The logistic support element of this component is
referred to as the national support element.
Integrated Command Structure
A-36. Integrated commands have representative members from the member nations in the command
headquarters. Multinational commands organized under an integrated command help ensure the capabilities
of member nations are represented and employed properly. A good example of this command structure is
found in the North American Aerospace Defense Command (also known as NORAD), where the commander
is American, the deputy commander is Canadian, and each of the regional commands has a commander and
deputy commander from a different nation. In addition, the North American Aerospace Defense Command
staff is binational.
Lead Nation Command Structure
A-37. A lead nation command structure exists when all member nations place their forces under the control
of one nation. The lead nation command can be distinguished by a dominant lead nation command and staff
arrangement with subordinate elements retaining strict national integrity.
Parallel Command Structure
A-38. Under a parallel command structure, no single force commander is designated. The multinational force
leadership must develop a means for coordination among the participants to attain unity of effort. This can
be accomplished through the use of coordination centers. Nonetheless, because of the absence of a single
multinational force command, the use of a parallel command structure should be avoided if possible.
COMMAND AUTHORITY
A-39. The Army and joint force have doctrinal definitions for command and support relationships. However,
these definitions and authorities only apply to U.S. forces. In multinational operations, each nation determines
the authority it will delegate to multinational commanders for the employment of its forces. Each nation also
establishes national caveats. Command authority for a multinational force command is normally negotiated
between the participating nations and can vary from nation to nation. Command authority will be specified
in the implementing agreements and may include aspects of OPCON, TACON, support relationships, and
coordinating authority. A clear and common understanding of what authorities are specified in the
implementing agreement is essential to operations. This is particularly important when similar terms have
different meanings to the various participants. For example, both the U.S. and NATO use the term operational
control and the acronym OPCON, but the authorities of U.S. OPCON are more encompassing than the
authorities of NATO. (See Allied Tactical Publication 3.2.2 for NATO command and support relationships.)
A-40. In many cases, coordinating authority may be the only acceptable means of accomplishing a
multinational mission. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship between commanders, not an
authority by which command and control may be exercised. Normally, it is more applicable to planning than
to operations. Use of coordinating authority requires agreement among participants, as the commander
exercising coordinating authority does not have the authority to resolve disputes. (See FM 3-16 for further
details on multinational operations.) |
3-94 | 157 | Appendix B
ARFOR
This appendix discusses the role of the ARFOR. While an ARFOR controls forces
operationally, this appendix discusses the ARFOR’s administrative and support
responsibilities to subordinate Army forces and to other Services in a joint force.
ARFOR OVERVIEW
B-1. The ARFOR is the Army component and senior Army headquarters of all Army forces assigned or
attached to a combatant command, subordinate joint force command, joint functional command, or
multinational command. The ARFOR is the Army component of any joint force. Army doctrine
distinguishes, however, between the Army component of a combatant command and that of a joint force
formed by the combatant commander. The Army component of a geographic combatant command is called
the ASCC, and the Army component of the subordinate joint force is an ARFOR.
Note. The Army’s designation for an ASCC assigned to a geographic combatant command is the
theater army.
ARMY SERVICE COMPONENT COMMAND
B-2. The ASCC is the senior Army command assigned to a combatant command. It consists of the Army
Service component commander and all those Army forces, such as individuals, units, detachments,
organizations, and installations under that command, including the support forces assigned to a combatant
command or further assigned to a subordinate unified command.
B-3. ASCC commanders exercise command authorities, normally OPCON, of assigned and attached Army
forces as delegated by the combatant commander, and ADCON as delegated by the Secretary of the Army.
ADCON is the Army’s responsibility to administer and support Army forces even while in a combatant
command AOR. OPCON is the basic authority for command and control of the same Army forces.
B-4. ADCON for Army units in a combatant command normally extends from the Secretary of the Army
through the ASCC, through an ARFOR, and then to the Army units assigned or attached to an Army
headquarters in that command. However, ADCON is not tied to the operational chain of command. The
Secretary of the Army may redirect some or all Service responsibilities outside the normal ASCC channels.
In similar fashion, the ASCC may distribute some administrative responsibilities outside the ARFOR.
ARFOR IN A SUBORDINATE JOINT FORCE
B-5. All joint force commands that include Army forces have an ARFOR. JTFs are the organizations most
often used by a combatant commander for contingencies. The typical JTF has a combination of service and
functional components (See figure B-1 on page B-2). JTF commanders normally exercise OPCON of all U.S.
forces through functional component commands, Service components, subordinate JTFs, or a combination
of these. The senior Army officer assigned to a JTF, other than the JFC and members of the JTF staff,
becomes the ARFOR commander. The ARFOR commander answers to the Secretary of the Army through
the ASCC for most ADCON responsibilities. |
3-94 | 158 | Appendix B
Figure B-1. Possible joint task force components
ARFOR RESPONSIBILITIES
B-6. The theater army provides sustainment to all Army forces stationed in, transiting through, or operating
in an AOR. It also provides most ASOS, common-user logistics, and Army executive agent support to unified
action partners in an AO. The theater army executes these sustainment responsibilities through its assigned
TSC. (See Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of the theater army.)
B-7. The ARFOR in a subordinate joint force provides administrative and logistics support to all Army
forces and retains OPCON over Army units not subordinate to another component of the JTF. Since the
preferred approach to establishing a JTF headquarters is use of an existing Service headquarters, the JTF
commander (if an Army headquarters) retains all responsibilities associated with both headquarters (the
ARFOR and JTF). This can overload the JTF headquarters unless the commander delegates authority for
Service-specific matters to another commander. For example, when a corps headquarters transitions to a JTF
headquarters, the corps commander becomes the JTF commander. The corps retains ARFOR responsibilities
through the ASCC back to the Army, unless the corps commander shifts Service responsibilities to another
headquarters. The corps commander normally designates a subordinate Army commander and staff as the
deputy ARFOR commander to perform those duties.
Note. Generally, an Army headquarters that transitions to a JTF headquarters designates a
subordinate Army commander and staff as the deputy ARFOR commander for performing
ARFOR duties. |
3-94 | 159 | ARFOR
ARMY SUPPORT TO OTHER SERVICES
B-8. In addition to controlling Army forces, the ARFOR coordinates ASOS. ASOS includes provisions of
common-user logistics and executive agent support to the JTF as required by the JTF establishing authority.
ASOS is directed through 10 USC, DOD executive agent, and combatant commander directed authorities.
The ARFOR headquarters manages support to other Services including, but not limited to—
* Missile defense.
* Fire support.
* Base defense.
* Transportation.
* Fuel distribution.
* General engineering.
* Intra-theater medical evacuation.
* Veterinary services.
* Logistics management.
* Communications.
* CBRN defense.
* Consequence management capability.
* Explosive ordnance disposal.
B-9. Sustainment operations are critical to enabling operational reach. The Army’s sustainment capability
provides crucial theater support that further enables the strategic and operational reach of the joint force.
Much of this support is provided through ASOS.
B-10. In all joint operations, sustainment is a Service responsibility except as specified by DOD directives,
combatant commanders’ lead Service designations, or inter-Service support agreements. Each Service retains
its responsibility for sustainment. Combatant commanders direct theater army commanders to provide
common-user logistics and ASOS, agencies, or multinational forces, as required. However, shared
sustainment responsibility or common-user logistics is more effective, especially for joint operations. Title
10, USC authorizes combatant commanders to assign common-user logistics responsibilities that overlap the
military department’s prescribed functions. Additionally, directive authority for logistics is the additional
authority used by combatant commanders to eliminate duplicated or overlapped sustainment responsibilities.
The theater army coordinates with the combatant command staff to determine joint sustainment requirements,
identify responsibilities, and enable commanders to exercise command and control for sustainment. Theater
army commanders focus on operational-level theater support involving force generation and sustainment
during campaigns and joint operations.
B-11. ASOS affords support external to Army forces to increase or improve capabilities. Paragraphs B-12
through B-26 provide descriptions focused on a few key capabilities provided through ASOS. A few of the
key examples of ASOS provided at theater and operational levels include general engineering, protection,
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear, air and missile defense, and signal. The ARFOR commander
advises the JFC on the employment of Army organizations and their capabilities and ensures a clear
understanding of capability requirements and gaps.
General Engineering
B-12. Specialized engineer units are typically employed at theater and operational levels to augment
capabilities. The general engineering support is fully coordinated with combat operations, while planners
consider and anticipate the impact of geography, force projection infrastructure, and available assets. General
engineers perform engineering tasks, including support to construction management, lines of communication,
infrastructure development, theater opening and closing, and protection.
B-13. Engineer assets providing support to the theater and field armies focus on those operations that help to
set the theater. General engineer units such as echelon above brigade engineer construction companies and
specialized units enable force projection, expeditionary logistics, and the development of the infrastructure
needed to support the joint force. Military construction in an AO is characterized by using the minimum |
3-94 | 160 | Appendix B
necessities when possible, and maximizing the use of host-nation facilities such as ports, airfields, roads, and
barracks. Missions include base camps and improving ports and airfields. Engineer assets in the corps and
divisional support areas are primarily focused on mobility and limited protection tasks to improve
survivability. Theater commanders decide on construction standards early in the planning process. (See
ATP 3-34.40 for information on constraints or planning considerations for construction missions.)
Protection
B-14. Combatant commanders must take protection into consideration as large-scale combat operations entail
significant operational risk. Protection emphasizes the importance of planning and expanding protection
priorities, including protecting mission partners, civilian populations, equipment, resources, infrastructure,
and cultural landmarks across the range of military operations. The synchronization, integration, and
organization of protection capabilities and resources to preserve combat power from the effects of threats and
hazards are essential.
B-15. The ARFOR plays a significant role in setting the theater, which includes conducting activities to
ensure protection of the force while preserving combat power and increasing the probability of mission
success. Combatant commanders must consider protection requirements for assets such as aerial ports of
debarkation, seaports of debarkation, lines of communication, and critical infrastructure at theater level, and
requirements such as support areas, command posts, and signal nodes at corps and division level. The
ARFOR anticipates changes to protection prioritization and prepares for reassessment and transition of assets
throughout operations to coincide with the commander’s priorities.
B-16. Protection occurs throughout all operations, and ARFOR responsibilities include executing key
protection tasks such as survivability, coordination of air and missile defense support, CBRN operations,
police operations, and population and resource control.
B-17. If the JFC elects to establish a JSA in the JOA, the ARFOR normally determines its structure and its
controlling headquarters. The options for the JSA depend on the threat and the mission variables, particularly
the forces available. If the threat to the JSA is low to moderate, the theater army commander may tailor the
ARFOR with a MEB specifically for controlling the JSA. The MEB may include additional military police
and intelligence assets. If the threat to theater bases and lines of communications is significant, the theater
army may tailor the ARFOR with an additional BCT to control that AO. A third option, in the case of very
high threat levels, is to assign the mission to an Army division with BCTs and one or more MEBs.
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
B-18. CBRN capabilities support operations conducted across the range of military operations by assessing
CBRN threats and hazards, providing protection against CBRN hazards, mitigating CBRN incidents, and
providing hazard awareness and understanding. All CBRN functions share a common fundamental purpose
that fits within the protection warfighting function to achieve or contribute to national objectives.
B-19. The ARFOR staff integrates CBRN considerations as part of protection. They are responsible for
understanding the current CBRN conditions and integrating this understanding into the intelligence
preparation. Ultimately, the ARFOR commander identifies the need and directs protection considerations
and guidance concerning CBRN hazards to the force.
Signal
B-20. As commanders operate across the range of military operations, signal capabilities must be tailorable
to meet the commander’s requirements. The way signal formations deliver communication services varies
based on the mission. Communications requirements during theater security cooperation activities from fixed
posts, camps, or stations differ from a BCT commander’s requirements during a movement to contact mission
in large-scale combat operations. Signal staff officers and leaders need to articulate to commanders what
communications capabilities are available during critical points of an operation and how these capabilities
support the exercise of command and control. |
3-94 | 161 | ARFOR
B-21. Networks enable the exercise of command and control and the conduct of support operations through
the wide dissemination of data and relevant information. Networks allow commanders to communicate
information and control forces, and they are key enablers of successful operations.
B-22. Signal operations are critical to flexibility and redundancy. While standard operating procedures,
various communications prioritization efforts, and trained staff personnel can mitigate some of the challenges
with command and control, effective signal operations remain central to the operational success of armies,
corps, and divisions. When planning to operate in a degraded or austere environment, these echelons,
especially the corps and division, need to build plans from the bottom up. They need to start with lower line
of site and non-line-of-sight systems, and then scale up to upper and beyond line of sight systems as
conditions permit.
B-23. Operations in degraded environments require units to develop redundant networks that are not solely
reliant on space-based assets to function properly. Truly redundant primary, alternate, contingency, and
emergency communications plans mix space- and terrestrial-based systems and networks to ensure the
greatest possible flexibility.
Air and Missile Defense
B-24. Air and missile defense mutually supports all Services by contributing capabilities necessary for
mission success. Unity of effort, centralized planning and direction, and decentralized execution are key
elements in countering air and missile threats. Typically, air and missile engagements will be conducted in
accordance with guidelines and rules established by area air defense commander who is normally the joint
force air component commander. A joint force air component commander is a commander from the Service
with the preponderance of air assets and the capability to plan, task, and control joint air operations in an AO,
generally from either the Air Force or Navy.
B-25. The AAMDC is the Army’s lead organization for Army air and missile defense forces. The Army air
and missile defense commander in the roles of the theater army air and missile defense coordinator and
deputy area air defense commander is involved in this development process by assisting the ARFOR
commander and area air defense commander in the planning and coordination of the critical asset list and
creating the defended asset list.
B-26. The ARFOR plays a significant role in identifying the priorities for air and missile defense operations.
As part of the planning and development of the Air and Missile Defense Appendix of the operations order,
the ARFOR details a prioritized list of critical assets in coordination with the AAMDC. This coordination
extends to collaborative and exhaustive planning with joint and multinational air and missile defense partners.
THEATER ARMY SUPPORT TO THE ARFOR
B-27. The theater army assists the combatant command in developing support priorities, including those
affecting other Services. To support the ARFOR, the theater army also coordinates the projection of
additional required support from the continental United States, another theater, or an intermediate staging
base using air lines of communication and sea lines of communication. (See ATP 3-93 for more information
on theater army support.)
B-28. The theater army is the ASCC and has the responsibility to control attached and assigned Army forces
in the AOR through ADCON and OPCON or TACON. As the Army component of the combatant command
the ASCC is the ARFOR for the theater, and once delegated to a subordinate Army formation, the Army
component of the subordinate joint force is an ARFOR for the JOA.
B-29. The theater army commander will specify the ADCON responsibilities of the ARFORs with the theater
army normally retaining control of reception, staging, onward-movement, and integration; logistic support
of the deployed force; personnel support; finance operations support; and medical support. Administrative
responsibilities normally retained by the ARFOR include internal administration and discipline, training in
the JOA, and Service-specific reporting. The theater army normally retains OPCON of Army sustainment
and medical commands operating in the JOA. The theater army commander establishes an Army support
relationship between the ARFOR and these units. It commands all Army forces in the region until the
combatant commander attaches selected Army forces to a JFC. |
3-94 | 162 | Appendix B
B-30. The theater army initially maintains control of all Army units assigned to an AOR until that control is
passed to the senior Army force or ARFOR in a subordinate JOA. As part of the controlling of Army forces,
the ARFOR maintains ADCON of Army forces and addresses Service responsibilities such as coordinating
ASOS. (See ADP 4-0 for more information on ASOS.)
FIELD ARMY AS AN ARFOR
B-31. Large-scale combat operations often require the Army to conduct land operations with multiple
corps-sized formations as part of a joint or multinational command. Large-scale combat operations could
require a theater army headquarters to expand and transform into an operational land headquarters (field army
equivalent) exercising command over multiple Army corps and a Marine expeditionary force.
B-32. A field army (when constituted) performs operational ARFOR tasks and is the Army component of the
joint force to which it is assigned. A field army, specifically tailored to mission requirements, may be
assigned to a joint force command with an enduring operational requirement. Typically, a subunified
command is established instead of a JTF when a military operation is anticipated to be enduring. In this case,
a field army would be appropriate as the Army component or ARFOR to the subunified command. The
theater army exercises ADCON over the field army and its subordinate Army forces, and it provides the field
army and its joint force command with all Army Service functions.
CORPS AS AN ARFOR
B-33. The corps headquarters is organized, trained, and equipped to serve as the ARFOR in campaigns and
major operations. This is done when commanding two or more Army divisions, while also coordinating with
supporting theater-level organizations, across the range of military operations. As the ARFOR for the JFC,
the corps serves as an operational-level headquarters, conducting land operations as the Service component.
A corps commander and staff should not attempt to simultaneously perform the roles of a JTF and an ARFOR
headquarters during major operations. The workload associated with simultaneously conducting these two
roles can overwhelm the commander and staff. The corps can control up to five Army divisions in large-scale
combat operations. The corps normally has an assigned ESC and one medical brigade (support) in direct or
general support. Other theater-level assets are attached as required. The corps allows other theater-level assets
to adapt to operational- or tactical-level roles depending upon the combatant commander’s requirements.
B-34. In addition to operational requirements, the corps has extensive ADCON responsibilities as the
ARFOR. When it serves as the ARFOR, the corps is responsible through the theater army commander for
the Service-specific support of all Army forces in a JOA and for providing any ASOS with forces deployed
in a JOA. The Army force package attached to the ARFOR receives the sustainment necessary to conduct
land operations effectively and indefinitely. The corps commander must balance responsibility for Service
component actions while communicating requests for support from various theater-level commands and
units.
B-35. The JTF commander sets priorities for Army sustainment and support to other Services while
delegating most 10 USC tasks and ASOS to these commands. Sustainment is assigned to the corps ESC.
Medical units remain in a general support role to all forces in an AO. Air units require centralized control of
air and missile defense engagements through the joint air operations center, and signal units must integrate
into an AOR-wide network. Therefore, these units may remain attached to the theater commands and provide
direct or general support. Attachment of units—such as the civil affairs, engineers, military police, and
aviation—allows the corps commander to allocate their capabilities among the division, corps, and
multinational units.
DIVISION AS AN ARFOR
B-36. A division commands multiple Army brigades and is one of the Army’s tactical headquarters for
decisive action. When required it may serve as a JTF or joint force land component headquarters in a limited
contingency operation. As required, a division may be the ARFOR and the joint force land component in a
JTF. When the division headquarters serves as a JTF headquarters or a joint force land component
headquarters, it requires joint augmentation. |
3-94 | 163 | ARFOR
B-37. A division headquarters may serve as a joint force land component headquarters with staff
augmentation in a limited contingency operation. With extensive joint augmentation, it may serve as a JTF
for a limited contingency operation. When serving as the ARFOR or joint force land component, a division
is primarily concerned with the conduct of operational tasks. The theater army provides most of the ADCON
and Army support to forces deployed in a JOA. Joint manning documents specify other Service augmentation
according to the role determined by the combatant commander, either as a JTF or as a joint force land
component headquarters. When serving as a JTF headquarters, the division headquarters organizes and
operates in accordance with joint doctrine. (See JP 3-33 for doctrine for the JTF. See JP 3-31 for doctrine for
the joint force land component command.)
B-38. When it is the joint force land component, an Army division becomes the ARFOR. As the ARFOR,
the division retains OPCON of all Army forces not subordinated to another component of the JTF. To
function effectively as both the joint force land component and the ARFOR, the division headquarters
requires strong coordination with the TSC. This enables the division to oversee logistic and administrative
support to all Army forces while also providing logistic support to other Services and multinational units.
Without it, the ARFOR responsibilities for sustainment would degrade the operational focus of the division. |
3-94 | 165 | Appendix C
Using the Operational Framework
This appendix describes the multi-domain expanded battlefield framework, followed
by a detailed description of the physical components of the operational framework
introduced in Chapter 2. The appendix concludes with a friendly force doctrinal
template of echelons above brigade frontages and depths.
INTRODUCTION TO USING THE OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK
C-1. An operational framework is a cognitive tool used to assist commanders and staffs in clearly
visualizing and describing the application of combat power in time, space, purpose, and resources in the
concept of operations (ADP 1-01). Operational frameworks provide an organizing construct for visualizing
and describing activities in time and space within the context of an AO, area of influence, and area of interest.
This appendix expands upon the description of the operational framework in Chapter 2 by describing the
physical arrangement of forces in time, space, and purpose. The primary purpose of this appendix is to
provide a logical architecture that assists commanders and staffs with differentiating responsibilities between
the four echelons discussed in this manual: theater army, field army, corps, and division.
C-2. The multi-domain extended battlefield is not easily translated into two-dimensional operational
graphics for the conduct of operations without a commonly understood mental model. The operational
framework provides a means of orienting friendly forces relative to enemy forces in the context of large-scale
combat operations and many, if not most, limited contingencies involving combat by division and higher
echelon formations. Each formation fits into and employs the operational framework in complementary ways
when each shares mutual understanding of the overall friendly, enemy, and environmental situations. The
perspectives of each echelon within the framework differ because the focus, roles, and responsibilities of
each echelon differ, but each perspective is linked to a common purpose defined by the higher commander's
intent and an operational course of action.
MULTI-DOMAIN EXTENDED BATTLEFIELD FRAMEWORK
C-3. Adversaries of the United States are increasingly able to contest the joint force in all domains and the
electromagnetic spectrum. The same is true for the informational environment. Some adversaries have
capability overmatch. Peer threats, including China and Russia, have expanded the battlefield, and they can
effectively contest multiple domains, the electromagnetic spectrum, and the information environment in ways
that threaten U.S. interests.
C-4. Peer threats seek to employ capabilities inside of U.S. AOs from a distance. Commanders and their
staffs must consider and know this to account for the full range of possible enemy actions. For this reason,
while AOs portray a geographic representation of where a formation is positioned, Army forces are concerned
with enemy capabilities well outside of their assigned AOs.
C-5. The joint force has similar offensive capabilities that can be employed from strategic distances.
Commanders and their staffs plan for and request these capabilities early to ensure that they are available
when needed. The ability of echelons above brigades to successfully converge these capabilities with
maneuver in an operational area is critical; indeed it is this convergence that distinguishes the operational
level of warfare and armies, corps, and divisions from other echelons.
C-6. Figure C-1 (on page C-2) illustrates the multi-domain extended battlefield. It is a generalized spatial
depiction of the nature of operational environments when space, cyberspace, electromagnetic warfare, and
information capabilities are accounted for during operations. These capabilities have a global reach and can
be located far outside of an operational area and affect operations. The multi-domain extended battlefield is |
3-94 | 166 | Appendix C
an expanded framework consisting of four areas: the strategic support area, the joint security area, the
assigned operational area, and the deep area.
Figure C-1. Multi-domain extended battlefield
C-7. Figure C-2 illustrates how space, cyberspace, electronic warfare, and information capabilities can
have strategic, operational, and tactical effects depending upon where and how they are used. In certain
instances, an effect at one level can also have effects at multiple levels of operations. Commanders need to
account for adversary capabilities that reside outside of the assigned AO that can directly impact their
operations. Although they do not have the authority or ability to target those capabilities, commanders must
protect against them and request assistance from higher echelons to combat them. Higher echelons have to
set the conditions for subordinates to successfully contend with enemy capabilities originating outside of
their assigned AOs.
Figure C-2. Physical manifestation of enemy capabilities |
3-94 | 167 | Using the Operational Framework
STRATEGIC SUPPORT AREA
C-8. The strategic support area describes the area extending from a theater of operations to a base in the
United States or another combatant commander's AOR. It contains those organizations, lines of
communications, and other agencies required to support forces in the field. It also includes the airports and
seaports supporting the flow of forces and sustainment into a theater. Finally, a strategic support area may
also contain key operational capabilities, such as cyber assets, that may be employed inside of an operational
area from outside of it. Most friendly nuclear, space, and cyberspace capabilities, and important network
infrastructure, are controlled and located in the strategic support area. Army strategic support areas will often
transition through or reside in other combatant command close and deep areas.
JOINT SECURITY AREA
C-9. A JSA is an area inside, or immediately adjacent to, an operational area where forces and sustainment
are postured to support operations. The JSA is where friendly forces posture combat power, sustain
operations, and project power into an AO.
C-10. A joint security area is a specific surface area, comprised of mainly of land areas but it may have
limited sea areas as well, designated by the JFC to facilitate protection of joint bases and their connecting
lines of communication that support joint operations in an operational area. A significant amount of joint
forces position themselves in the JSA to conduct operations.
ASSIGNED AREA OF OPERATIONS
C-11. Inside of an assigned AO, Army forces will generally have a rear-close-deep orientation. These areas
will overlap with operational and strategic areas on their edges. Paragraphs C-15 through C-40 describe this
framework in greater detail.
EXTENDED DEEP AREAS ON THE MULTI-DOMAIN BATTLEFIELD
C-12. Operational deep areas are generally those areas immediately beyond the land component's initially
assigned AO. These areas may or may not be in the boundaries of a JOA or a theater of operations.
Operational deep areas are often beyond the feasible movement of conventional forces without significant
support from the joint force.
C-13. Operational deep areas are often highly contested and contain enemy supporting formations and
capabilities for their main forces. Enemy forces can generate significant combat power from these areas, and
capabilities that reside here are often vital to their conduct of operations. In most campaign designs,
operational objectives for friendly forces reside initially in the operational deep area.
C-14. Strategic deep areas are the areas beyond the feasible range of movement for conventional forces, but
they are where joint fires, special operations forces, information, and virtual capabilities can be employed.
These areas are either beyond the operational reach of conventional forces, or they are prohibited by policy
to employ capabilities there. Many enemy space, cyberspace, and information physical capabilities reside in
strategic deep areas across international boundaries and outside the JOA, and they often comprise multiple
geographically noncontiguous areas.
DEEP, CLOSE, REAR, AND SUPPORT AREAS
C-15. In their assigned AOs, Army commanders designate deep, close, rear, and support areas, to describe
the physical arrangement of forces in time, space, and purpose. The areas are dynamic and require continuous
adjustment as the situation changes throughout an operation. Each of the echelons reflects these adjustments
in perspective by modifying existing graphic control measures and creating new ones. Careful management
of graphic control measures to reflect a common understanding of the operational framework and simplify
command and control facilitates subordinate echelons’ freedom of action necessary to create and exploit
opportunities. The locations of the deep, close, and rear areas shift in relation to each when unit boundaries
change at the direction of a higher headquarters. |
3-94 | 168 | Appendix C
C-16. Figure C-3 illustrates the overlap between areas of different echelons and their relationship with each
other. For simplicity, this figure only illustrates a single formation at each echelon (division, corps, and field
army) for ease of explanation. In practice, these may often overlap. Two additional examples of contiguous
and noncontiguous areas of operations using multiples of each echelon are described in paragraphs C-46
through C-52.
DEEP AREA
C-1. The deep area is where the commander sets conditions for future success in close combat (ADP 3-0).
Division, corps, and army commanders conduct deep operations against uncommitted enemy forces to set
the conditions for subordinate commanders conducting operations in the close area. Commanders strike
enemy forces throughout their depth and prevent the effective employment of reserves, command and control
nodes, logistics, and other capabilities not in direct contact with friendly forces. Deep operations extend
operations in time, space, and purpose. They are not necessarily a function of geographic distance, but rather
a function of the intent of the operation. Deep operations may include actions to divert, disrupt, delay, or
destroy enemy forces and capabilities before their commitment and efforts to prevent or limit their coherent
employment against friendly forces. Commanders combine maneuver, joint fires, military information
support operations, and cyberspace electromagnetic activities supported by intelligence to conduct deep
operations. (See ATP 3-94.2 for a detailed description of the deep area.)
C-2. The purpose of deep operations is to prevent uncommitted enemy forces or capabilities from being
employed in an effective manner. Deep operations are normally those conducted against an enemy’s forces,
functions, or resources not currently committed or in contact with friendly maneuver forces. Deep operations
might aim to disrupt the movement of operational reserves or prevent enemy forces from employing
long-range cannon, rocket, or missile fires. In an OE where enemy forces recruit insurgents from within a
population, deep operations might have a temporal rather than geographic focus to interfere with the
recruiting process, disrupt the training of recruits, or eliminate the underlying factors that enable an enemy
to recruit.
C-3. During major operations, the effects of deep operations are typically more influential when directed
against an enemy's ability to command, mass, maneuver, supply, and reinforce available conventional combat
forces. Deep operations are more difficult against an enemy that employs a covert force structure, a simple
supply network, and unconventional tactics. However, with timely accurate intelligence and persistent
operations, deep operations can disrupt enemy supply operations, destroy weapons caches, and deny
sanctuary. Commanders may use any number of tactical tasks during the execution of deep operations to
divert, disrupt, delay, and destroy enemy forces. These actions are not mutually exclusive, as actions
associated with one effect may also support the others. For example, deep operations conducted to disrupt an
enemy force's movement may force the enemy commander to divert to an alternate avenue of approach,
thereby delaying enemy forces from advancing. |
3-94 | 169 | Using the Operational Framework
Figure C-3. Nested example of deep, close, and rear operational framework |
3-94 | 170 | Appendix C
DEFINING THE DEEP AREA
C-4. A commander's deep area is that area that extends beyond subordinate unit boundaries and is not
assigned to subordinate units. The establishing commanders, supported by their staffs, plan and control
execution of all operations in the deep area. Deep operations are combined arms operations. Deep operations
are not simply attacking an enemy in depth; they are the sum of all activities that influence when, where, and
in what condition enemy forces can be committed into close operations. Deep operations typically include a
combination of information collection, target acquisition, ground and air maneuver, fires, cyber,
electromagnetic activities, and information operations. Deep operations are inherently joint, since many of
the capabilities employed by Army formations reside in other domains outside of an Army AO.
C-5. The theater army’s deep operations planning begins before the onset of hostilities while conducting
operations to achieve competition objectives. It determines the desired cyberspace, space, and information
capabilities required for large-scale combat operations against a specific threat. The theater army also begins
planning for the return to competition and the long-term consolidation of gains.
C-6. Army and corps headquarters play a significant role in physical and temporal deep area operations.
Their planners must project into the future and decide what conditions must be created and exploited to
achieve their objectives. A field army employs Army and joint capabilities to shape enemy forces beyond the
range of corps systems; field armies also have longer range planning horizons that allow them to set
conditions for corps operations. A field army may leverage capabilities that do not reside in the operational
area against enemy capabilities that may or may not reside in the operational area. Corps deep operations are
those activities directed against enemy forces not currently engaged in the close operation, but capable of
engaging or inflicting damage in future close operations. Corps headquarters also coordinate the anticipatory
sustainment necessary to support divisional maneuver in the deep area to exploit windows of opportunity.
C-7. Division deep operations, reinforced by corps capabilities, focus on enemy forces and capabilities
beyond the range of the BCTs engaged in close operations. They identify opportunities for BCTs to exploit,
disrupt enemy command and control, and destroy key enemy capabilities to enable the rapid maneuver of
BCTs. Division headquarters coordinate the anticipatory sustainment necessary to support BCT maneuver in
the deep area to exploit windows of opportunity.
C-8. Unit boundaries serve as a clear delineation in time and distance for where each echelons’ deep areas
start and end. The distances and times will change based upon the mission and operational variables of every
operation. It is in the designation and assignment of deep areas where there is often significant overlap
between echelons. Corps and division deep areas will overlap with each other as well as with their adjacent
units. For example, enemy forces moving laterally in depth may not concern the nearest friendly division,
but they may be of great interest to a neighbor. Similarly, some enemy elements positioned in a division’s
deep area may not have the same priority for the division as they do for the corps.
C-9. Field army, corps, and division commanders can employ a wide range of lethal and nonlethal
capabilities to conduct deep operations. These capabilities include artillery strikes, manned and unmanned
aviation attacks, airborne and air assault operations, raids, reconnaissance in force, information and deception
operations, and cyberspace electromagnetic activities. Additionally, commanders may coordinate for assets
from other unified action partners to support deep operations through strategic reconnaissance or lethal and
nonlethal engagements. Commanders may use these capabilities individually, but they normally use them in
combination to create the desired effect. Deep operations may assume high levels of risk when air or ground
maneuver forces are employed. Therefore, commanders and staffs must clearly understand the purposes and
objectives of deep operations. They must also know the capabilities, experience, and training of friendly and
enemy units to appreciate or justify the risks involved in maneuvering aviation or ground forces in the deep
area.
Planning Considerations for the Deep Area
C-10. There are number of focus areas that echelons above brigade and their supporting formations consider
when planning deliberate deep operations. This list is not all-inclusive, and commanders may adjust it based
on differing mission and operational variables. Commanders and staffs—
* Converge capabilities from multiple domains to isolate, penetrate, and disintegrate an enemy's
integrated fires commands and integrated air defense systems. |
3-94 | 171 | Using the Operational Framework
* Develop and coordinate appropriate coordination measures (graphic control measures, maneuver
control measures, fires support coordination measures, airspace coordination measures) to enable
attack and reconnaissance aircraft, deployment of unmanned aircraft systems or other ISR
platforms to confirm target locations and dispositions, and fixed-wing aircraft for close air support
and air interdiction.
* Develop an integrated and synchronized fire plan for the movement to engagement that includes
continuous target refinement, joint suppression of enemy air defenses from fire support platforms,
and integrated electronic warfare as part of joint suppression of enemy air defenses attacks.
* Consider triggers and conditions for initiating attacks through maximizing the element of surprise
by attacking from unexpected areas, directions, or at unexpected times; executing during hours of
limited visibility; and using terrain to mask maneuver routes and attack by fire positions.
* Move forward arming and refueling points forward to enable increased tempo and multiple
attacks.
* Maximize use of combined arms rehearsals, aviation rehearsals, tactical and technical field
artillery rehearsals, and sustainment rehearsals.
* Consider methods of command and control, including the location of command posts, especially
when conducting deep maneuver in contested environments.
C-11. Deep operations are generally shaping operations for a campaign or major operation, but they can be
a branch or sequel designed to take advantage of an opportunity. Their planning and execution require
detailed planning and execution from most staff sections to ensure their success. Deep operations are usually
begun in the future operations or plans cell before being handed over to the current operations cell for
execution. (See ATP 3-94.2 for a more detailed description of deep operations.)
CLOSE AREA
C-12. The close area is the portion of the commander's area of operations where the majority of subordinate
maneuver forces conduct close combat (ADP 3-0). It contains the current battles and engagements of its
major maneuver units. Each echelon focuses on providing its subordinate formations with the capabilities
required to for success. Close operations require speed and mobility to exploit windows of opportunity by
rapidly concentrating overwhelming combat power at the right time and location (either physical or virtual).
This enables formations to exploit success while maintaining the initiative and setting the tempo for
successful operations. Theater and field armies do not typically conduct close operations; however, their deep
and rear operations directly affect the ability of the corps and divisions to conduct close operations.
Defining the Close Area
C-13. A corps’ close area includes the deep, close, rear, support, and consolidation of gains operations of its
committed divisions and separate maneuver brigades. Corps headquarters focus on assigning tasks and
resourcing their divisions and separate brigades with capabilities that help identify and exploit windows of
opportunity. These capabilities include information collection, cyberspace operations, space, and electronic
warfare. Corps headquarters also reinforce divisions with supporting capabilities, including aviation, fires,
mobility, intelligence, and sustainment.
C-14. A division's close area is primarily where BCTs operate. The division headquarters focuses on
information collection, sustainment, and planning that enable freedom of action for its brigades. The division
headquarters also provides or coordinates capabilities in support of its BCTs to shape close operations
through operations in the division deep area or to reinforce BCTs in close operations. These capabilities
include indirect fires, air and missile defense, aviation support, electronic warfare, mobility, and joint fires.
C-15. The size of the close area is dependent upon multiple factors, including missions, friendly capabilities,
enemy capabilities, terrain, and subordinate unit mobility. This area might expand or even contract during
the course of operations to allow subordinate units to focus combat power or to provide the flexibility to
exploit opportunities. Controlling and accounting for this elasticity is critical.
C-16. A field army’s close area is where its committed corps and divisions conduct operations. The field
army gives guidance and direction to corps and divisions conducting combined arms operations in the close |
3-94 | 172 | Appendix C
area. The field army’s focus is on setting the conditions for corps and divisions to defeat enemy formations
to achieve their initial objectives and prepare for future operations. Field armies have access to diverse
capabilities across domains and warfighting functions to support the BCT as the primary executor of combat
operations in the close area.
Planning Considerations for the Close Area
C-17. In the close area, the primary considerations of the corps and division formations are enabling
subordinate units operations against enemy maneuver formations. Corps and division commanders and staffs
enable subordinate operations by—
* Controlling the movement of large units.
* Maintaining an uninterrupted flow of sustainment activities to enable sustained combat operations.
* Maintaining tempo to prevent enemy forces from regaining the initiative.
* Creating and maintaining the flexibility to exploit windows of opportunity across domains.
* Sustaining the ability to converge capabilities across domains against enemy vulnerabilities.
* Protecting critical infrastructure and key lines of communication for future operations.
* Managing boundaries and control measures.
* Massing combat power at decisive points, spaces, and times.
C-18. Operations in the close area are planned in future operations but they are executed by current
operations, primarily in the current operations integration center. Commanders may choose to deploy a
tactical command post to provide command and control of a critical part of an operation.
REAR AREA
C-19. Rear area operations occur in the portion of the commander’s AO that extends forward from the
commander’s rear boundary to the rear boundary of the commander’s subordinate units. It is an area where
most of the forces and assets locate that support and sustain forces in the close area. Rear operations are
controlled from the support area, but they generally occur across the width and depth of the broader AO.
Within a division or corps, rear command posts have designated coordinating authorities to ensure that
operations are deconflicted and synchronized with the overall plan. Theater and field armies do not have a
separate command post to assist in the management of rear area operations; all of their operations are usually
controlled out of their main command posts.
Defining the Rear Area
C-20. Rear area operations are focused on ensuring freedom of action and reach in current and future
operations. In linear terms, these actions occur behind lead maneuver formations. At the tactical level, these
operations ensure the tempo of combat, ensuring that commanders have the agility to exploit opportunities
without hesitation or delay. At the operational level, these operations focus on the next phase of the campaign
or major operation. These operations are numerous, complex, and continuous. Four activities in particular
occur in the rear area, and they must be accounted for: assembly and movement of reserves, redeployment of
fire support, the movement of tactical units through the area, and the maintenance and security of sustainment
and command and control.
C-21. Reserves must be positioned to support their anticipated commitment, and their probable routes must
be free of obstruction. Likewise, fire support assets must be deployed and redeployed to support current and
future operations. While the majority of sustainment and command and control assets will be deployed inside
of the support area, they will have elements conducting operations outside of the support area that must be
accounted for by the rear command post. Finally, tactical units will be moving through the rear area into and
out of the close area and combat operations. All of these activities will compete for limited terrain and lines
of communications to support their operations. (See paragraphs C-29 through C-37 for more information on
the support area.)
C-22. A JFC normally establishes JSAs in the territory of a sovereign host nation. Because of this, theater
and field army rear areas generally reside in an area where the host nation retains some level of control and |
3-94 | 173 | Using the Operational Framework
overall responsibility for security, movement, and terrain management. In such cases, theater and field armies
are responsible for robust coordination and liaison with the host nation.
C-23. During operations, commanders may need to establish AOs for subordinate formations in their
echelon’s rear area. This is particularly true in the offense as friendly force gains territory, to exploit tactical
success while enabling freedom of action for forces operating in other areas. When designated, these areas
may have all of the characteristics of the close area as subordinate forces conduct operations. The purpose of
establishing these AOs is to unencumber units conducting close operations and enabling the higher echelon
headquarters to focus on close operations, deep operations, and future planning.
C-24. When these AOs are initially established by corps and divisions they are focused on the reduction of
bypassed enemy forces, securing routes and population centers, and setting the conditions for broader, more
focused stability operations in the future, as conditions allow. As the overall operation develops, commanders
may identify areas where operations can transition to consolidating initial military gains and setting
conditions for the eventual transition to follow-on forces or other legitimate authorities. Operations in these
AOs may be overseen by the either the rear command post or the main command post depending upon the
overall pace of operations and the commander’s guidance.
C-25. Corps and divisions may establish multiple subordinate AOs in their respective rear areas during
operations. Once these AOs are established, they must be managed as units request boundary shifts to support
future operations. As tactical formations continue their advance, they pass responsibility for these AOs to
their higher echelon headquarters when the span of control exceeds their capability to effectively command
and control them. These transfers allow them to maintain their focus and the tempo of operations. The higher
headquarters then decides whether to continue operations or shift the focus of those formations to other tasks.
The land component command, or field army when constituted, plans and coordinates the capabilities
necessary to exploit military success across an AO. Although field armies may not initially control forces
directly, it may become necessary for them to assume responsibility for any areas handed off by corps and
divisions. When field armies assume responsibility for these areas, they will also assume control of the units
operating in them. By doing so, they unencumber their subordinate tactical headquarters allowing them to
remain focused on combat operations.
C-26. The land component command, or field army, in conjunction with the theater army, prioritize longer
term stability operations in areas where ground combat is largely concluded to set the conditions for the
successful consolidation of gains as part of fulfilling the strategic objectives for the conflict. Field armies
also coordinate with the theater army for the eventual transition of these areas to other legitimate authorities.
The theater army plans and coordinates the capabilities necessary to sustain the long-term consolidation of
gains during and after conflict. This planning begins as early as possible and in close coordination with the
field army to ensure success. Oftentimes, this planning will run in parallel with planning for large-scale
ground combat operations.
Planning Considerations for the Rear Area
C-27. During rear operations, the primary considerations of commanders and their staffs are the positioning,
employment, and protection of assets required to sustain, enable, and control operations. These
considerations include—
* Security.
* Sustainment.
* Terrain management.
* Movement control.
* Protection.
* Infrastructure development.
* Coordination with host-nation and multinational governmental organizations.
* The orderly transferring of areas to another headquarters as their units continue to advance or their
mission changes.
* Focusing initial operations on establishing security, limiting human suffering, and providing basic
life support to prevent the further movement of refugees or displaced persons on the battlefield. |
3-94 | 174 | Appendix C
* Maintaining freedom of maneuver for friendly forces through the AO.
C-28. Rear area operations are planned in the main command post, but they are controlled by the rear
command post. Normally, corps and division commanders will designate a deputy commander responsible
for coordinating these operations. What authorities are designated to the rear command post need to be
established in unit standard operating procedures or identified in the base operations order and updated as
necessary in subsequent fragmentary orders. (See ATP 3-94.2 for more information on rear area operations.)
SUPPORT AREA
C-29. A support area is the portion of the commander’s area of operations that is designated to facilitate the
positioning, employment, and protection of base sustainment assets required to sustain, enable, and control
operations (ADP 3-0). Commanders assign a support area as a subordinate area of operations to support
functions. In a division or corps support area, a designated unit such as a BCT or MEB, provides
reconnaissance; area security; terrain management; movement control; mobility support; clearance of fires;
CBRN operations; and required tactical combat forces. This allows sustainment units to focus on their
primary functions.
Defining the Support Area
C-30. Corps and divisions are likely to designate support areas beyond the JSA, while armies are not. The
headquarters that establishes the support area is the one that orchestrates the sustainment and protection tasks
essential to ensuring freedom of action in the deep and close areas. It will orchestrate movement and terrain
management, protection of sustainment assets, and planning to support continuous operations. These
headquarters will control movement short of their subordinates’ boundaries and allocate resources. Planning
in the support area largely influences current and future operations in the deep, close, and consolidation areas.
Support areas are generally positioned out of range of most of the enemy’s weapons systems when possible.
However, security considerations must be balanced with maintaining responsiveness to subordinate units
conducting close and deep operations.
C-31. The field army support area is usually in the JSA. The JSA is a specific area, designated by the JFC,
to facilitate protection of joint bases and their connecting lines of communications that support joint
operations. It performs the same functions as the other support areas; the main difference is that Army forces
may only be tenants instead of in control of it. The field army may not have a command or support
relationship with the unit tasked to command and control the JSA. Field army planning in the JSA largely
influences current and future operations in its deep area. It also influences the conduct of corps operations in
the close and consolidation areas through the allocation of resources. The field army's temporal horizon for
sustainment planning is from 96 hours out to 9 days in large-scale combat operations.
C-32. Corps support areas often contain subordinate division support areas that have not yet displaced
forward during offensive operations or are positioned out of the range of enemy long-range fires during
defensive operations. Some corps controlled activities co-locate in subordinate division AOs to facilitate
better support. Corps planning in the support area largely influences current and future operations in the deep,
close, and consolidation areas. Their temporal horizon for sustainment planning is from 72 hours out to 6 days
in large-scale combat operations.
C-33. Division support areas include assigned division assets and additional corps assets that may be
co-located to facilitate the conduct of operations. Units in the division support area will conduct those tasks
essential to ensuring freedom of action in the division deep and close area. They will also provide limited
support to division consolidation areas when they are established. The division headquarters controls
movement short of the BCT boundaries. The division headquarters orchestrate the movement and terrain
management in the division support area, the protection of sustainment assets, and planning to support
continuous operations. The division headquarters temporal horizon for sustainment planning is 48–96 hours
in large-scale combat operations.
C-34. Field army, corps, and division commanders position critical sustainment, command and control, and
protection capabilities in the support area. These capabilities are focused on enabling close operations,
supporting operations in the consolidation area, supporting deep operations, and setting the conditions so that
formations can exploit windows of opportunity during operations. Commanders may also chose to co-locate |
3-94 | 175 | Using the Operational Framework
some of their assets in their subordinate units’ support areas to facilitate timely support to their operations.
Corps are most likely to do this to maintain tempo.
Planning Considerations for Support Areas
C-35. In the support area, the primary considerations of commanders and their staffs is the positioning,
employment, and protection of assets required to sustain, enable, and control operations. Some critical
considerations are—
* Command and support relationships between units in the support area.
* Transportation networks (including road, rail, inland waterways, and air) into and out of the area.
* Protection from enemy indirect fire assets.
* Survivability of critical assets.
* Terrain management and security responsibilities.
* Displacement considerations to sustain tempo and shorten lines of communication.
* Movement control into, through the support area, and out of units enabling combat operations.
C-36. Planners must account for the differing nature of the majority of units performing functions in the
support area and plan accordingly. Some capabilities may not arrive quickly in theater due to mobilization
and movement restrictions. Therefore, planners must consider when capabilities arrive in theater. To
compensate for any limitation or critical need, options include other Services, multinational partners, host-
nation contractors, and DOD logistics contracts when available.
C-37. During large-scale combat, operations in the support area are vital to the overall success of an
operation. Displacing the corps or division support areas require significant planning and preparation for
successful execution. Support area operations are integrated into all planning efforts and accounted for in any
course of action and subsequent scheme of maneuver. Commanders may decide to control these operations
from their main command post or delegate that control to their rear command post based upon the situation
and overall operations.
DOCTRINAL TEMPLATE
C-38. Paragraphs C-55 through C-68 briefly explain a doctrinal template for the operational framework based
upon relevant friendly and enemy weapons systems. The purpose of this template is to provide commanders
and staffs with a common point of reference to which they can apply the variables specific to their operations
during planning. This template is one expression of the science of operations.
C-39. Figure C-4 on page C-11 shows a generic AO for corps, divisions, and field armies in large-scale
combat based upon some basic calculations using current Army capabilities. Frontages were determined
using the ranges of direct fire weapon systems, available ISR systems, and the operational reach of select
systems (air and missile defense, unmanned aircraft system, and reconnaissance and aviation assets). Physical
depth of the battlefield is primarily driven by the effective ranges of friendly joint and adversary fire systems
combined with the reconnaissance assets assigned to those echelons. The depth of the close and deep areas
are based on friendly indirect fires systems, the ability to observe fires, and the ability to detect enemy forces.
These calculations do not account for specific types of operations or the terrain. Commanders and staffs must
analyze the mission variables to determine the actual frontage echelons can reasonably command and control.
FRONTAGES
C-40. Using the information listed in paragraph C-55, the following frontages can be derived for the division,
corps, and field army:
* A division’s frontage is from 18 to 28 kilometers (11 to 17 miles), depending upon whether the
division has 2 or 3 BCTs abreast and those individual frontages.
* A corps’ frontage is from 55 to 85 kilometers (34 to 53 miles), depending upon whether the corps
has 2 or 3 divisions abreast and those division's individual frontages.
* A field army’s frontage is from 110 to 250 kilometers (68 to 155 miles), depending upon whether
the field army has 2 or 3 corps abreast and those corps’ individual frontages. |
3-94 | 176 | Appendix C
Figure C-4. Doctrinal template of depths and frontage |
3-94 | 177 | Using the Operational Framework
DEPTHS
C-41. The depths of the division and corps close and deep areas are defined in kilometers beyond the forward
line of troops. Using the information in paragraph C-55, depths can be derived for the division, corps, and
field army:
* The division close area extends out to 15 kilometers (9 miles).
* The division deep area extends from 15 to 24 kilometers (9 to 15 miles).
* The corps close area extends out to 24 kilometers (15 miles).
* The corps deep area extends from 24 to 45 kilometers (15 to 28 miles).
* The field army close area extends out to 45 kilometers (28 miles).
* The field army deep area extends from 45 to 300 kilometers (28 to 186 miles).
C-42. The placement of support areas is influenced by enemy artillery and rocket ranges. Support areas are
generally placed out of range of the majority of the enemy’s indirect fire systems to increase their
survivability. These general considerations results in the minimum distances behind the forward line of
troops:
* The division support area extends from 29 to 36 kilometers (18 to 22 miles) behind the forward
line of troops.
* The corps support area extends from 70 to 90 kilometers (44 to 56 miles) behind the forward line
of troops or 40 to 60 kilometers (25 to 37 miles) behind the division’s support areas.
* The field army support area extends from 300 to 500 kilometers (186 to 311 miles) behind the
forward line of troops depending on where the enemy is able to position its long-range munitions.
C-43. These distances are generic, and they do not account for specific mission variables such as the terrain,
availability for friendly mobility assets, types of formations, and specific missions.
C-44. Consolidation areas are areas designated by the commander to facilitate the security and stability tasks
necessary for freedom of action in the close and deep areas. As such, their placement will generally be behind
the rear boundary of each echelon's subordinate units. Although this may not be true in all instances, in
large-scale combat operations they most probably will because of the inherent fluidity, lethality, and tempo
of close operations.
C-45. This construct is generic and not tied to specific terrain. In a scenario like that on the Korean peninsula
the frontages could be much narrower based upon the terrain and the enemy with less available depth to
protect critical support assets. In a European scenario, these frontages could be much wider.
CONTIGUOUS AND NONCONTIGUOUS AREAS OF OPERATIONS
C-46. The previous construct portrayed a linear construct for operations using only one formation for each
echelon. It also did not display areas of influence and areas of interest. AOs can also be organized
contiguously or noncontiguously depending upon the situation.
C-47. An area of influence is a geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing
operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under the commander’s command or control
(JP 3-0). This area is bounded by the ranges of the commander’s assigned maneuver and fire support units.
It is not dependent upon those capabilities that can be requested from higher echelons but are not assigned to
the formation. A commander’s area of influence is normally larger than that commander’s assigned AO, but
it is smaller than their area of interest.
C-48. An area of interest is that area of concern, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and
extending into enemy territory. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize
the accomplishment of the mission (JP 3-0). An area of interest will vary in size and shape from operation to
operation. It should include all enemy activities that might affect a friendly force throughout the duration of
an operation. An area of interest will usually surround an AO, extending forward and to the flanks of the AO.
Depending upon the operation, it may also extend rearwards. During offensive operations, portions of the
area of interest may become part of an AO as friendly forces advance. |
3-94 | 178 | Appendix C
C-49. Commanders generally consider noncontiguous or the combination of both contiguous and
noncontiguous AOs based upon these factors: insufficient forces to cover the entire AO, geographic isolation
based upon terrain, or time constraints for completing the mission. The reasons for using a noncontiguous
area vary, but they begin with geographic separation of important terrain from the remainder of the AO. A
commander’s decision to deploy part of a force in noncontiguous AOs is derived from the commander’s
analysis of the operational and mission variables. In particular, the commander evaluates threat forces and
their ability to mass sufficient combat power to threaten friendly forces. Second, the commander evaluates
the ability of threat forces to sever lines of communication between the noncontiguous AOs. Finally, the
commander assesses the risks of having isolated forces defeated in detail against what may be gained in
mission accomplishment.
C-50. While a commander can always chose to use noncontiguous AOs based upon specific operational
variables, the most obvious AOR requiring the use of noncontiguous areas of operations is the U.S. Indo-
Pacific Command AOR. The geography and distances involved between island chains force a noncontiguous
approach to land combat that relies heavily on joint capabilities.
C-51. Contiguous AOs ensure that subordinates are in mutually supporting range of each other while
avoiding gaps and seams in responsibility. Contiguous AOs may also provide additional security for
maneuver units and headquarters and support units.
C-52. In noncontiguous AOs, subordinate units are not mutually supporting to each other and there are gaps
between their boundaries. These gaps remain the responsibility of the higher echelon headquarters, and they
can present added risks to an operation. |
3-94 | 179 | Appendix D
Transition to a Joint Headquarters
This appendix addresses the transition of Army echelons to a joint headquarters.
Forming and transitioning an Army echelon into a JTF or joint force land component
headquarters is a key organizational decision that will influence the conduct of joint
land operations. This appendix describes the significant activities involved in manning,
training, and equipping an Army echelon above brigade as it forms and transitions into
a joint headquarters.
JOINT HEADQUARTERS OVERVIEW
D-1. The Army provides the combatant commander with trained and equipped headquarters that can apply
land power from the theater to the tactical level. Armies, corps, and divisions are the echelons prepared to
fulfill a joint headquarters role in the conduct of operations. They provide the necessary options for the
employment of land power in an interdependent joint force. The primary joint headquarters roles these Army
echelons fulfill is that of the JTF headquarters and the joint land component headquarters.
JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS
D-2. A JTF headquarters is a joint force headquarters that is constituted and designated by a JFC, such as
the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or a state governor (for
JTF-state). This is done in accordance with the National Security Act of 1947 (50 USC 3001), 10 USC, and
32 USC.
D-3. A JFC establishes a JTF headquarters when the scope, complexity, or other factors of an operation
require capabilities from at least two Military Departments operating under a single JFC. JTF commanders
are responsible for establishing command relationships between subordinate commanders and for
accomplishing any operational missions.
D-4. Based upon the decision of the establishing JFC, the commander of a JTF may exercise OPCON or
TACON over assigned and attached forces. Establishing authorities for subordinate unified commands and
JTFs normally direct the delegation of OPCON over forces attached to those subordinate commands. A JFC
with assigned or attached OPCON forces has the authority to organize to best accomplish the mission. The
organization of these forces is usually based on the commander’s intent, concept of operations, and the
consideration of Service organizations. If the commander has TACON of assigned or attached forces, the
force can be tasked but not reorganized. See Appendix A for more information on command relationships.
D-5. JTF headquarters’ responsibilities are driven by mission requirements. These requirements further
drive the required capabilities of the staff, and, ultimately the organization and manning needed to support
the combatant commander. For instance, the JTF staff must have awareness of joint terminology and
familiarity with joint staff processes. Also, the commander, JTF, and the commander’s staff have critical
roles in ensuring unified action.
Note. A designated Service headquarters can be considered a JTF-capable headquarters once the
establishing authority (combatant commander) is satisfied with its level of training and readiness.
D-6. Army echelons above brigade can provide expertise and be the nucleus for JTFs of various sizes and
durations. This is because Army echelons above brigade are organized for scope and scale. Army echelons
habitually train personnel and exercise missions to perform command and control in operations requiring
unified action. Therefore, with augmentation, these echelons have the expertise, knowledge, and staff |
3-94 | 180 | Appendix D
organization to form and transition to a JTF headquarters. Figure D-1 is an example of a notional JTF
headquarters. (See JP 1-0, JP 3-0, and JP 3-33 for additional information on JTFs.) |
3-94 | 181 | Transition to a Joint Headquarters
Figure D-1. Notional joint task force headquarters |
3-94 | 182 | Appendix D
JOINT FORCE LAND COMPONENT HEADQUARTERS
D-7. A joint force land component headquarters is a component of a unified command, subordinate unified
command, or JTF. It is responsible to the establishing commander for recommending the proper employment
of assigned, attached, and available land forces; planning and coordinating land operations; or accomplishing
such operational missions as may be assigned.
D-8. A JFC establishes a joint force land component headquarters when the scope, complexity, or other
factors of an operation require capabilities from at least two military departments operating in the land
domain. Joint force land component headquarters, at the direction of the JFLCC, are responsible for
establishing command relationships between subordinate land component commanders and for
accomplishing assigned operational missions.
D-9. In some limited contingency operations, the JFC may elect to employ Marine Corps and Army forces
as Service components, instead of creating a functional joint force land component. In that case, the ARFOR
and Marine Corps forces would exercise OPCON and ADCON over their respective Service forces. This
arrangement may occur in a forcible entry operation due to the complexity of vertical insertion, or amphibious
operations and limited time available for joint integration. As soon as the JOA matures with the arrival of
follow-on forces and headquarters, the JFC may establish a joint force land component headquarters. Figure
D-2 is an example of a notional joint force land component headquarters. |
3-94 | 183 | Transition to a Joint Headquarters
Figure D-2. Notional joint force land component headquarters
FORMING AND TRANSITIONING
Nothing is so important in war as an undivided command.
Napoleon |
3-94 | 184 | Appendix D
D-10. Once granted by the Secretary of Defense, the JFC has the authority to form a joint headquarters under
a named operation. Through this authority, the JFC establishes subordinate commands, assigns
responsibilities, establishes or delegates appropriate command relationships, and establishes coordinating
instructions for the component commanders. This contributes to the forming of a joint headquarters.
D-11. Forming a joint headquarters provides for unity of command, centralized planning and direction, and
decentralized execution. Unity of command is necessary for effectiveness and efficiency. Centralized
planning and direction are essential for controlling and coordinating the efforts of the forces. Decentralized
execution is essential because no one commander can control the detailed actions of a large number of units
or individuals.
D-12. In order for an Army echelon to fully exercise its new joint authorities and provide new capabilities, it
must first man, train, and equip for its new joint role. There are many challenges associated with an Army
echelon above brigade preparing to form and transition to a joint headquarters. These challenges come in
terms of the time it takes to form, and other activities such as planning and managing transitions, manning
the headquarters, equipping the headquarters, training the staffs, and exercising the headquarters. Paragraphs
D-13 through D-43 focus on the activities an Army headquarters executes as it forms and transitions into a
joint headquarters. Figure D-3 (on page D-6) is an example of a process and activities the headquarters may
perform to reach joint headquarters capability. (See TC 6-6 for more information on transitioning to a joint
headquarters.)
Figure D-3. Forming and transitioning to a joint headquarters
TIME TO FORM
D-13. Ideally, Army units designated for transition to a joint headquarters have six months or more before
transitioning. Six months provides the unit time to complete the recommended Army training tables, which
are found in TC 6-6. However, a typical transition to a joint headquarters is less than 42 days.
D-14. In cases where an Army unit must transition quickly, there are a number of products and resources that
assist commanders, joint task forces, and staffs in expediting the process of forming the JTF headquarters
and organizing the staffs for an effective transition. Some of these products and resources can be found on |
3-94 | 185 | Transition to a Joint Headquarters
the joint force headquarters training websites non-classified Internet Protocol Router Network at
https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp. These products include notional JTF headquarters templates that contain
joint manning documents to assist in manning; command and control architectures, systems, software,
telecommunications, and video requirements for equipping; and the Joint Force Headquarters Training
website on the Joint Electronic Library Plus with learning resources for training the JTF staff.
D-15. In addition, there are numerous organizations that may provide subject matter expertise to a rapidly
forming joint headquarters. Such organizations include—
* The joint enabling capabilities command. It provides global, rapidly deployable, temporary joint
expeditionary capabilities across the range of military operations to assist in the initial
establishment, organization, and operation of joint force headquarters.
* National intelligence support. It is sourced from intelligence and communications experts from
across the national intelligence community.
* The Defense Threat Reduction Agency integrates, synchronizes, and provides expertise,
technologies, and capabilities to safeguard the U.S. and its allies from global weapons of mass
destruction and improvised threats.
* The Joint Information Operations Warfare Center. It provides information-related subject matter
expertise and advice to the joint staff and combatant commands and develops and maintains a joint
information assessment framework that measures and reports performance of information-related
capabilities supporting joint operations.
* The joint communications security monitoring activity. Provides information security monitoring
and analysis support to JTFs.
* The Joint Warfare Analysis Center. It assists in preparation and analysis of joint operation plans
and Service chiefs’ analysis of weapons effectiveness.
(For more organizations and information on rapidly forming a joint headquarters, see JP 3-33 and JP 3-31.)
PLANNING AND MANAGING TRANSITIONS
D-16. Upon notification, commanders with support from their existing staffs immediately begin planning and
managing transitions and apply transition techniques towards the end state of becoming a joint headquarters.
The transition of operational responsibilities from a combatant command to a joint headquarters usually
occurs in the early stages of a crisis. Transitioning to a joint headquarters is not a discrete event. The staffs
may overlap some activities over time. Eight techniques recommended in TC 6-6 are—
* Plan early and often.
* Build flexibility into plans.
* Be as transparent as possible.
* Integrate transitions across lines of operations.
* Ensure key leaders actively manage transitions.
* Adjust staff processes to account for increased requirements.
* Design organizations and processes with consideration for their short-term and long-term
consequences.
* Develop a plan for the transition to a joint headquarters.
D-17. Additionally, there are things staffs should identify and understand, as part of planning, to promote a
smooth transition. The staffs should identify and understand—
* Authorities of the joint headquarters.
* The joint operational area.
* Interoperability issues.
* Lines of communications.
* Classification for headquarters developed products.
* Techniques for creating situational and shared understanding.
D-18. Joint headquarters forming on short notice may not have the opportunity to conduct the level of detailed
planning they would like to or have the time to develop relationships with staff augments, unified action |
3-94 | 186 | Appendix D
partners, and stakeholders. However, by organizing early in the transition process, seeking support from the
joint community, following the eight techniques in paragraph D-16, promoting shared understanding, and
executing timely decision making the echelon may overcome most challenges during transition. (See TC 6-6
for more information on transition.)
MANNING THE HEADQUARTERS
D-19. A joint manning document must be developed to effectively form a joint headquarters from an Army
echelon, in its routine Service-related mission, to that of a joint headquarters. A joint manning document
defines the joint headquarters’ overall manpower requirements needed to complete its mission.
D-20. The commander, in coordination with the current and the establishing commander’s staffs, develops
and organizes a draft joint headquarters joint manning document that clearly establishes required sourcing to
assign mission tasks or accomplish joint headquarters mission tasks. The joint manning document can be
filled through multiple sourcing methods, including units, multinational partners, other government agencies,
and contractors. The joint manning document provides the venue for requesting the joint individual
augmentation necessary to staff the joint headquarters. (See JP 1-0 for more information on augmentation.)
D-21. Key staff considerations include manning staffs using those with the expertise to assist in the
integration of joint enablers as well as interagency, mission partner, and coalition members. The staff
framework is based on doctrine, standard operating procedures, and requirements to the combatant command.
This may require the establishment, or manipulation of existing positions, to support key billets. Some of
these may include—
* Deputy commanders.
* Chiefs of staff.
* Command senior enlisted leaders (equivalent to Army command sergeants major).
* Principal staff officers.
* Political advisors or foreign policy advisors.
* Interagency liaisons.
* Coalition members.
* Other liaison officers as required.
* The commander’s action group or commander’s initiative group.
* Executive officers.
D-22. In general, the roles and responsibilities of key staff positions are the same regardless of mission set.
However, specific guidance on roles and responsibilities outside of normal operations and functions should
be identified. For example, special consideration of joint service involvement for assignment needs to ensure
subject matter expert participation and create collaboration in the joint headquarters construct. Integration of
an existing staff that will form the future joint headquarters becomes more complex, and special attention
must be given to apportioning roles and responsibilities for inclusion and building teamwork.
D-23. The chief of staff, in coordination with the staff, ensures the joint manning document is complete and
supports the commander’s intent. Once complete, the staff submits the joint manning document in accordance
with the establishing authority’s guidance. The document is then forwarded to the establishing commander
where it is validated and approved. (See JP 1-0 for more information on joint manning.)
Organizing the Staffs
D-24. The commander, JTF, and staff establish and maintain cross-functional organizations such as working
groups and boards to enhance planning and decision making in the headquarters. They establish, modify, and
dissolve these entities as the needs of the headquarters evolve.
D-25. Commanders decide how to organize and transition the headquarters. They consider several options:
* A standard application of the Army warfighting functions of command and control, intelligence,
fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment.
* A functional organization of a command group; logistics group; and knowledge management,
information superiority, planning, and operations sections. |
3-94 | 187 | Transition to a Joint Headquarters
* A mission-based command group, strategic communications, reconstruction, security, and
political and military sections.
* A hybrid organization with typical joint staff sections, current operations, future operations, future
plans; or the joint-code structure with commander, personal and special staff, deputy commanders,
chiefs of staff, and joint staff sections.
D-26. Commanders arrange their organization to best support decision-making requirements, to support
higher echelon headquarters and mission partner information requirements, and to set conditions for
subordinate success. They direct how the headquarters monitors, assesses, plans, and directs operations. The
commander must dedicate time to identifying headquarters functions and determining the appropriate
organization and processes before focusing on specifics of manning.
Joint Enablers
D-27. Upon deciding the type and functions of the headquarters, the commander codifies staff roles and aligns
Service strengths with a joint manning plan. This plan identifies billets and the means to man the headquarters
through by-name-requests, enabler augmenters, unit sourcing using requests for forces, and joint individual
augmentees. Commanders continually assess these plans and adjust as necessary to accomplish the mission
while maintaining agility and flexibility.
Establishing a Battle Rhythm
D-28. A battle rhythm provides a logical arrangement of cross-functional, repetitive staff events that integrate
the commander’s decision cycle across the three event horizons (current operations, future operations, and
future plans). Ultimately, every event of the battle rhythm supports the commander’s decision making and
produces shared understanding across staff sections. When developing a battle rhythm, the staffs first
consider which higher echelon headquarters events they must participate in, followed by determining where
to locate the JTF commander’s touchpoints that best facilitate the decision cycle. Identifying the right time
to receive guidance so that planning and product development can continue and timely, well-informed
decisions can be made is essential.
D-29. The commander formalizes the battle rhythm by establishing boards, bureaus, centers, cells, working
groups, and operational planning teams. The commander directs the chief of staff to ensure they support
commander-centric decision making.
D-30. Each of the boards, bureaus, centers, cells, working groups, and operational planning teams is
organized for its respective purpose or function. This facilitates a cross-functional approach, leverages
expertise, and allows for relevant stakeholder interface to solve problems required to coordinate and
synchronize efforts across time and space. Logical arrangement of boards, bureaus, centers, cells, working
groups, and operational planning teams allow staffs to manage activities across three event horizons and to
effectively support the commander’s decision-making process. Consideration on the participation and
frequency of boards, bureaus, centers, cells, working groups, and operational planning teams is important as
to not overwhelm the manning, capability, and capacity of the staffs involved. Assistant chiefs of staffs, under
the direction of the chief of staff and commander, lead this effort.
EQUIPPING THE HEADQUARTERS
D-31. Equipping the JTF headquarters to execute the mission is a deliberate and essential process that sets
the conditions for transitioning and mitigates potential delays. Commanders emphasize the importance of
developing an equipping plan that includes the necessary equipment for a joint capable headquarters. Special
attention must be paid to command and control and other communications equipment to ensure systems are
integrated for joint operability.
D-32. Designated Service headquarters commanders emphasize the development of a joint mission essential
equipment list of joint command and control systems, applications, communications systems, and support
equipment for the JTF headquarters.
D-33. The preparation of a command and control equipping plan that includes the joint mission essential
equipment list, identifies required manning and system-specific training for command and control systems |
3-94 | 188 | Appendix D
and applications, and addresses how command and control capability shortfalls or gaps will be sourced.
Command and control equipment planning helps joint-capable headquarters have a joint command and
control systems, applications, and communications capability that is interoperable with the supported
combatant command’s command and control architecture, functional component commands, subordinate
Service and multinational tactical forces, and potential mission partners.
D-34. The chief of staff, in coordination with the staff, ensures that the joint mission essential equipment list
is complete and supports the combatant command’s order and the joint headquarters commander’s intent.
The joint headquarters ensures that a commander O-6 (or federal employee level 15) or above signs the joint
mission essential equipment list as the certifying official indicating that the joint mission essential equipment
list is valid in content and accuracy. Upon completion of the joint mission essential equipment list, the
command forwards the joint mission essential equipment list to the establishing authority for record of
completion.
D-35. The assistant chief of staff for personnel (known as G-1), G-4, G-1 noncommissioned officer in charge,
and G-4 noncommissioned officer in charge lead the effort to build the sustainment and manning plan. The
G-6 briefs the command post action plan and the commander approves it, then the G-6 sends the requests to
higher echelons for approval of command post architecture. Once approval is received, the operations
sergeant major works with the personnel and logistics sections on the command post sustainment and
manning plan. The sustainment and manning plan includes but is not limited to—
* All required classes of supply.
* Command post meal schedule.
* Shift work considerations.
* Mail.
* Trash.
* Parking.
* Command post protection.
* Mechanic support.
* Host-nation constraints.
* Operating tempo.
D-36. The final step in the planning process for equipping the headquarters is for each section to build their
initial load out plan. This plan entails all equipment the section brings to the JOA.
TRAINING STAFF MEMBERS
In no other profession are the penalties for employing untrained personnel so appalling or
so irrevocable as in the military.
Douglas MacArthur
D-37. Staffs develop ongoing training efforts to improve their joint and multinational capabilities at the
individual and collective levels. Various resources may be available to provide checklists for these training
efforts. Staffs analyze training resources and produce recommended timelines to serve as a guide for setting
the conditions for transitioning to a joint headquarters.
D-38. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Operations, Plans, and Training section (also known
as the G-3/5/7) leads the effort to establish a joint training plan. The joint training plan is tailored to the
mission, operational environment, coalition participation, commander’s intent, and direction from higher
echelon headquarters. Commanders give their staffs guidance on which direction to take and which areas to
focus on to build the joint training plan. The joint training plan encompasses all joint and coalition partners
to the extent possible. The joint training plan covers the multi-domain battlefield and encompasses specific
areas of emphasis as outlined by the commander.
D-39. The Joint Training System is used to instill this training. The Joint Training System is divided into
four phases: the requirements phase, plans phase, execution phase, and assessment phase. (See TC 6-6 for
training tables for transition to a joint headquarters for commander, staff, command post, and essential signal
capabilities.) |
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