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6-99 | 214 | Appendix A
TRANSPORTATION SUPPORT RESPONSE (TRANSSPTRES)
REPORT NUMBER: T030 (USMTF # D826)
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS: Use to reply to a transportation support request. Reference: ATP 4-11.
LINE 1 – DATE AND TIME __________________________________________(DTG)
LINE 2 – UNIT __________________________________________________________(unit making report)
LINE 3 – UNIT IDENTIFIER ______________________________________________________(identifier of unit/agency
responding for transportation
support)
LINE 4 – CALL SIGN ____________________________________________________________(call sign of unit)
LINE 5 – UNIT POC _____________________________________________________________(designated unit POC)
LINE 6 – RANK OR RATE ___________________________________________________(POC rank or rate and rating)
LINE 7 – PRIMARY PHONE ____________________________________________(unit POC primary telephone
number)
LINE 8 – PRIMARY FREQUENCYY _______________________________(unit primary radio frequency)
LINE 9 – POC LOCATION ______________________________________(unit POC location using UTM or
six-digit grid coordinate with
MGRS grid zone designator)
LINE 10 – SECONDARY PHONE ________________________________(unit POC secondary telephone
number)
LINE 11 – SECONDARY FREQUENCY ___________________________(unit secondary radio frequency)
LINE 12 – BILLING ___________________________________________(required billing instructions)
LINE 13 – STATUS ____________________________________________(status: APPROVED,
DISAPPROVED, or MODIFIED)
LINE 14 – SUPPORT UNIT _____________________________________(supporting unit identifier or
designator)
LINE 15 – CALL SIGN _________________________________________(call sign of the supporting unit)
LINE 16 – ON-TIME SUPPORT EQUIPMENT NAME _______________(literal name or nomenclature of
support equipment provided at
on-load point)
LINE 17 – ON-LOAD SUPPORT EQUIPMENT COUNT ______________(number of pieces of support
equipment assigned)
LINE 18 – OFF-LOAD SUPPORT EQUIPMENT NAME ______________(literal name or nomenclature of
support equipment provided at
off-load point)
LINE 19 – OFF-LOAD SUPPORT EQUIPMENT COUNT _____________(number of pieces of support
equipment assigned)
LINE 20 – SUPPORT POC ______________________________________(supporting unit POC name)
LINE 21 – RANK/RATE ________________________________________(rank or rate and rating of
supporting POC)
LINE 22 – PRIMARY PHONE ___________________________________(supporting unit POC primary
telephone number)
LINE 23 – PRIMARY FREQUENCY ______________________________(primary radio frequency of the
supporting unit)
LINE 24 – POC LOCATION _____________________________________(UTM or six-digit grid coordinate
with MGRS grid zone designator of
reporting unit POC)
LINE 25 – SECONDARY PHONE ________________________________(supporting unit POC secondary
telephone number)
LINE 26 – SECONDARY FREQUENCY ___________________________(secondary radio frequency of the
supporting unit)
**Continued on next page. |
6-99 | 215 | Voice Message Format Templates
TRANSPORTATION SUPPORT RESPONSE [TRANSSPTRES]
(continued)
REPORT NUMBER: T030 {USMTF # D826}
LINE 27 – TRANSPORTATION MODE _________________________________ (mode of transportation provided)
LINE 28 – PICKUP TIME ___________________________________________________ (pickup DTG for movement)
LINE 29 – ON-LOAD POINT ____________________________________________________ (on-load point location)
LINE 30 – DELIVERY TIME ____________________________________________________ (delivery DTG for movement)
LINE 31 – OFF-LOAD POINT ____________________________________________________ (off-load point location)
LINE 32 – PRIORITY ___________________________________________________________ (priority assigned by supporting
unit)
LINE 33 – NARRATIVE _________________________________________________ (free text for additional information
required for report clarification)
LINE 34 – AUTHENTICATION _________________________________ (report authentication)
Table A-149. Transportation support response acronym and abbreviation key
DTG date-time group
MGRS military grid reference system
POC point of contact
TRANSSPTRES transportation support response
USMTF United States message text format
UTM universal transverse Mercator |
6-99 | 216 | Appendix A
UNIT SITUATION REPORT [UNITSITREP]
REPORT NUMBER: U001
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS: Use to inform commanders of operational plans, unit readiness, and operational
situations or summaries. This report is similar to NATO situation report (LAND) (SITREPLAND)
STANAG 2020, NATO ATP-105, and NATO situation report (SITREP) STANAG 2627, NATO ATP-97.
References: ATP 3-90.5 and FM 3-96.
LINE 1 – DATE AND TIME ______________________________________________(DTG)
LINE 2 – UNIT _______________________________________________________________(unit making report)
LINE 3 – FROM ____________________________________________________________________(earliest DTG report is valid)
LINE 4 – UNTIL ___________________________________________________________________(latest DTG report is valid)
LINE 5 – MAP_____________________________________________________________________(UTM or six-digit grid coordinate
with MGRS grid zone designator)
LINE 6 – ENEMY ______________________________________________________________(enemy activity reported to include:
nationality, location, mission, and
time of sighting)
LINE 7 – NONHOSTILE _________________________________________(nonhostile information reported)
LINE 8 – OWN _______________________________________________(activities of own forces including
changes in location of units or
formations, and activities of forces
not attached to originating unit)
LINE 9 – TYPE _______________________________________________(type of boundary area or line
described)
LINE 10 – POINT A ___________________________________________(UTM or six-digit grid coordinate
with MGRS grid zone designator of
start point for boundary line or
trace)
LINE 11 – POINT B ____________________________________________(second point to describe line or
trace)
LINE 12 – POINT C ____________________________________________(third point to describe line or trace)
LINE 13 – POINT D ___________________________________________(fourth point to describe line or
trace)
LINE 14 – POINT E ____________________________________________(fifth point to describe line or trace)
LINE 15 – UNIT_______________________________________________(unit designator for the reported
unit)
LINE 16 – LOCATION _________________________________________(UTM or six-digit grid coordinate
with MGRS grid zone designator)
LINE 17 – UNITS _____________________________________________(total number of units reported)
LINE 18 – READY ____________________________________________(total number of units reporting C1,
C2, or C3 readiness)
LINE 19 – UNIT_______________________________________________(unit designator for units with less
than C3 readiness status)
LINE 20 – LOCATION _________________________________________(UTM or six-digit grid coordinate
with MGRS grid zone designator)
LINE 21 – STATUS ____________________________________________(degree to which unit is combat
ready: C4 or C5)
LINE 22 – REASON ___________________________________________(reason unit has less than C3 rating)
LINE 23 – READY ____________________________________________(estimated time unit will achieve
combat readiness status)
**Continued on next page. |
6-99 | 217 | Voice Message Format Templates
UNIT SITUATION REPORT [UNITSITREP] (continued)
REPORT NUMBER: U001
LINE 24 – ADMINISTRATION _________________________________________ (administration and logistics
information reported, to include:
KIA, WIA, MIA, isolated, detained,
captured, NCW, and equipment lost
or damaged)
LINE 25 – GENERAL _________________________________________________________ (general information reported)
LINE 26 – SAFETY __________________________________________________________ (commander’s risk assessment and
guidance for next operation)
LINE 27 – NARRATIVE ___________________________________________ (free text for additional information
required for report clarification)
LINE 28 – AUTHENTICATION _________________________________ (report authentication)
Table A-150. Unit situation report acronym and abbreviation key
CI – C5 category level
DTG date-time group
KIA killed in action
MGRS military grid reference system
MIA missing in action
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCW not complied with
SITREP situation report
SITREPLAND NATO situation report (land)
STANAG standardization agreement
UNITSITREP unit situation report
UTM universal transverse Mercator
WIA wounded in action |
6-99 | 218 | Appendix A
WAR CRIME REPORTABLE INCIDENT REPORT [WCRIR]
REPORT NUMBER: W001
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS: Use to report to the commander a possible, suspected, or alleged violation of the
law of war discovered within the command.
LINE 1 – DATE AND TIME _________________________________________(DTG)
LINE 2 – UNIT ______________________________________________________(unit making report)
LINE 3 – TIME OF INCIDENT ______________________________________________(time the incident occurred)
LINE 4 – TIME OF DISCOVERY _________________________________________________(time the incident was discovered)
LINE 5 – LOCATION OF INCIDENT ______________________________________________(UTM or six-digit grid coordinate
with MGRS grid zone designator
where incident occurred)
LINE 6 – PERSON DISCOVERINNGG _____________________________________________(name or unit that discovered
incident)
LINE 7 – SUMMARY _______________________________________________(narrative description of incident)
LINE 8 – UNITS IN AREA ______________________________________(identity of location and point of
contact for all evidence)
LINE 9 – LOCATION OF EVIDENCE _____________________________(identity of location and point of
contact for all evidence)
LINE 10 – NARRATIVE ________________________________________(free text for additional information
required for report clarification)
LINE 11 – AUTHENTICATION __________________________________(report authentication)
Table A-151. War crime reportable incident report acronym and abbreviation key
DTG date-time group
MGRS military grid reference system
UTM universal transverse Mercator
WCRIR war crime reportable incident report |
6-99 | 219 | Voice Message Format Templates
WARNING MESSAGE-AIR DEFENSE [AIRDEFWARN]
REPORT NUMBER: W005
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS: Use to transmit air defense warnings and weapons control conditions. This report
is similar to NATO threat warning (THREATWARN) STANAG 2627 (Allied Technical Publication-97).
References: ATP 3-01.7 and ATP 3-01.94.
LINE 1 – DATE AND TIME ____________________________________________ (DTG)
LINE 2 – UNIT ______________________________________________________________ (unit making report)
LINE 3 – WARNING ______________________________________________________________ (air defense warning: WHITE,
YELLOW, or RED)
LINE 4 – STATUS ______________________________________________________________ (weapon control status: FREE,
TIGHT, or HOLD)
LINE 5 – EFFECTIVE _________________________________________________________ (effective DTG; transmit only if
effective time is not immediate)
LINE 6 – AREA ___________________________________________________ (area or sector affected)
LINE 7 – BY _________________________________________________ (call sign of declaring authority)
LINE 8 – NARRATIVE ________________________________________ (free text for additional information
required for report clarification)
LINE 9 – AUTHENTICATION __________________________________ (report authentication)
Table A-152. Warning message-air defense acronym and abbreviation key
AIRDEFWARN warning message-air defense
DTG date-time group
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
STANAG standardization agreement
THREATWARN NATO threat warning |
6-99 | 220 | Appendix A
WARNING ORDER [WARNORD]
REPORT NUMBER: W010
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS: Use to convey a preliminary notice of an impending order or action. This report
is similar to NATO warning order (WARNO) STANAG 2199, NATO ATP-3.2.2. This report is similar to
USMTF # E715. References: ADP 5-0.
LINE 1 – DATE AND TIME __________________________________________(DTG)
LINE 2 – UNIT ___________________________________________________________(unit making report)
LINE 3 – WARNORD ____________________________________________________________(warning order number)
LINE 4 – REFERENCES _________________________________________________________
LINE 5 – TIME ZONE ___________________________________________________________(time zone used in WARNORD)
LINE 6 – TASK ORGANIZATIONN ______________________________________________(optional)
LINE 7 – SITUATION ___________________________________________________________
A.ENEMY _______________________________________________________________
B.FRIENDLY _______________________________________________________
C.ATTACH OR DET ____________________________________________
LINE 8 – MISSION ____________________________________________
LINE 9 – EXECUTION INTENT _________________________________
A.CONCEPT _________________________________________________(concept of operation)
B.MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER TASKS _______________________(tasks to movement and maneuver
units)
C.SUSTAINMENT TASKS _____________________________________(tasks to sustainment units)
D.INSTRUCTIONS ___________________________________________(coordinating instructions)
1.CCIR ______________________________________________________(commander’s critical information
requirement)
2.RISK MGT _________________________________________________(risk assessment and guidance)
3.DECEPTION _______________________________________________
4.PRIORITIES ________________________________________________
5.TIME LINE ________________________________________________
6.REHEARSALS _____________________________________________
7.ORDERS GRP MTG _________________________________________
8.EARLIEST MVMT TIME _____________________________________
LINE 10 – SERVICE AND SUPPORT _____________________________
A.SPECIAL EQUIPMENT ______________________________________
B.TRANSPORTATION ________________________________________
LINE 11 – COMMAND AND SIGNAL ____________________________
A.COMMAND _______________________________________________
B.SIGNAL ___________________________________________________
LINE 12 – ACKNOWLEDGE ____________________________________(mandatory)
LINE 13 – CDR NAME/RANK ___________________________________(commander’s name and rank)
LINE 14 – NARRATIVE ________________________________________(free text for additional information
required for report clarification)
LINE 15 – AUTHENTICATION __________________________________(report authentication)
**Continued on next page. |
6-99 | 221 | Voice Message Format Templates
WARNING ORDER [WARNORD] (continued)
REPORT NUMBER: W010
Table A-153. Warning order acronym and abbreviation key
CCIR commander’s critical information requirement
CDR commander
DET detached
DTG date-time group
GRP group
MGT management
MVMT movement
MTG meeting
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
STANAG standardization agreement
USMTF United States message text format
WARNO NATO warning order
WARNORD warning order |
6-99 | 222 | Appendix A
WATER SUPPLY POINT [WTRSUPPT]
REPORT NUMBER: W015 {USMTF # F864}
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS: Use to provide operational information about the water supply. Reference:
ATP 4-44.
LINE 1 – DATE AND TIME _______________________________________(DTG)
LINE 2 – UNIT ______________________________________________________(unit making report)
LINE 3 – SUPPORT UNIT _____________________________________________________(designation of the supporting unit)
LINE 4 – FROM __________________________________________________________________(DTG for beginning of period
applying to operational information)
LINE 5 – TO ______________________________________________________________________(DTG for end of period applying to
operational information)
LINE 6 – POTABLE LOCATIONN _______________________________________________(UTM or six-digit coordinate with
MGRS grid zone designator of
potable water supply point)
LINE 7 – POTABLE STATUS ___________________________________(OPERATIONAL, NOT
OPERATIONAL, or LIMITED)
LINE 8 – POTABLE AVAILABLE _______________________________(gallons of potable water available
at water supply point)
LINE 9 – POINT CAPACITY ____________________________________(daily production capacity in
gallons)
LINE 10 – WATER UNIT _______________________________________(name or designator of unit
providing support shown in line 3)
LINE 11 – NONPOTABLE LOCATION ___________________________(UTM or six-digit coordinate with
MGRS grid zone designator of
non-potable water supply point)
LINE 12 – NONPOTABLE AVAILABLE __________________________(gallons of non-potable water
available at water supply point)
LINE 13 – NONPOTABLE CAPACITY ____________________________(daily production capacity in
gallons)
**Repeat lines 4 and 13 to report multiple mission/mission data. Assign sequential lines to succeeding iterations.
For example, first iteration is 4 through 13; second iteration is 4a through 13a; third iteration is 4b through 13b;
and so on.
LINE 14 – NARRATIVE ________________________________________(free text for additional information
required for report clarification)
LINE 15 – AUTHENTICATION __________________________________(report authentication)
Table A-154. Water supply point acronym and abbreviation key
DTG date-time group
MGRS military grid reference system
USMTF United States message text format
UTM universal transverse Mercator
WTRSUPPT water supply point |
6-99 | 223 | Voice Message Format Templates
WEATHER ADVISORY OR WATCH [WEATHERWATCH]
REPORT NUMBER: W020
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS: Use to send weather advisories and watches. Reference: ATP 2-01.3.
LINE 1 – DATE AND TIME ____________________________________________ (DTG)
LINE 2 – UNIT ______________________________________________________________ (unit making report)
LINE 3 – SUMMARY ____________________________________________________________ (summary of advisory or watch)
LINE 4 – TIME OF WATCH _____________________________________________________ (DTG from and to with DTG of
watch)
LINE 5 – AREA ________________________________________________________________ (area affected)
LINE 6 – NARRATIVE ________________________________________________________ (free text for additional information
required for report clarification)
LINE 7 – AUTHENTICATION _______________________________________ (report authentication)
Table A-155. Weather advisory or watch acronym and abbreviation key
DTG date-time group
WEATHERWATCH weather advisory or watch |
6-99 | 224 | Appendix A
WEATHER FORECAST [WXFCST]
REPORT NUMBER: W025 {USMTF # C251}
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS: Use to provide the command with forecasted weather expected in the area of
operation. Reference: ATP 2-01.3.
LINE 1 – DATE AND TIME _____________________________________________(DTG)
LINE 2 – UNIT __________________________________________________________(unit making report)
LINE 3 – LOCATION _____________________________________________________________(center of forecasted weather
expressed using UTM or six-digit
grid coordinate with MGRS grid
zone designator)
LINE 4 – VARIATION ____________________________________________________________(weather variation with respect to
time: INTERMITTENT,
GRADUAL, or TEMPORARY)
LINE 5 – VALID __________________________________________________(DTG forecast if effective)
LINE 6 – UNTIL ______________________________________________(DTG forecast is no longer in effect)
LINE 7 – CEILING ____________________________________________(lowest forecast ceiling in hundreds
of feet above ground level)
LINE 8 – COVER______________________________________________(total sky coverage in eighths)
LINE 9 – VISBY ______________________________________________(prevailing visibility in meters)
LINE 10 – WEATHER __________________________________________(type of weather phenomena
forecast)
LINE 11 – MAX _______________________________________________(maximum temperature forecasted
in degrees Celsius)
LINE 12 – MIN _______________________________________________(minimum temperature forecasted
in degrees Celsius)
LINE 13 – FREEZE LEVEL _____________________________________(minimum freezing level in
thousands of feet)
LINE 14 – WIND ______________________________________________(direction and variable wind
direction in degrees)
LINE 15 – SPEED _____________________________________________(maximum sustained wind speed in
knots)
LINE 16 – GUSTS _____________________________________________(peak gusts in knots)
LINE 17 – ALTIMETER ________________________________________(altimeter setting in hundredths of
inches of mercury)
LINE 18 – WIND@2,000 FT _____________________________________(wind direction and speed at 2,000
feet)
LINE 19 – WIND@5,000 FT _____________________________________(wind direction and speed at 5,000
feet)
LINE 20 – WIND@10,000 FT ____________________________________(wind direction and speed at 10,000
feet)
LINE 21 – WIND@15,000 FT ____________________________________(wind direction and speed at 15,000
feet)
LINE 22 – WIND@20,000 FT ____________________________________(wind direction and speed at 20,000
feet)
LINE 23 – NARRATIVE ________________________________________(free text for additional information
required for report clarification)
LINE 24 – AUTHENTICATION __________________________________(report authentication)
**Continued on next page. |
6-99 | 225 | Voice Message Format Templates
WEATHER FORECAST [WXFCST] (continued)
REPORT NUMBER: W025 {USMTF # C251}
Table A-156. Weather forecast acronym and abbreviation key
DTG date-time group
FT feet
MAX maximum
MIN minimum
MGRS military grid reference system
USMTF United States message text format
UTM universal transverse Mercator
WXFCST weather forecast
VISBY visibility |
6-99 | 227 | Glossary
SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ABCANZ American, British, Canadian, Australian, New Zealand
ADP Army doctrine publication
AFTTP Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures
APP Allied procedural publication
AR Army regulation
ATP Army techniques publication
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum
DA Department of the Army
DD Department of Defense (form)
DOD Department of Defense
ENGR engineer
FM field manual
GTA graphic training aid
JP joint publication
LAT/LONG latitude/longitude
MCRP Marine Corps reference publication
MCWP Marine Corps warfighting publication
MGRS military grid reference system
MIL-STD military standard
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NATO ATP North Atlantic Treaty Organization allied tactical publication
NTRP Navy tactical reference publication
NTTP Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures
STANAG standardization agreement
STP soldier’s training publication
TC training circular
TM technical manual
U.S. United States
USMTF United States message text format
UTM universal transverse Mercator
VMF variable message format
SECTION II – TERMS
No joint or Army terms are defined in this publication. |
6-99 | 229 | References
All URLs accessed on 26 April 2021.
REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS
These documents must be available to the intended user of this publication.
DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. January 2021.
FM 1-02.1. Operational Terms. 9 March 2021.
RELATED PUBLICATIONS
These documents contain relevant supplemental information.
JOINT PUBLICATIONS
Most joint doctrinal publications are available online at the Joint Electronic Library (JEL) at
https://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/Joint-Doctine-Pubs/. Most CJCS publications are available
online at https://www.jcs.mil/Library/. Most military standards (MIL-STDs) are available
online at https://assist.dla.mil/.
CJCSI 6241.04C. Policy and Procedures for Management and Use of United States Message Text
Formatting. 20 April 2012.
CJCSM 3150.14B. Joint Reporting Structure—Logistics. 02 October 2005.
JP 3-09. Joint Fire Support. 10 April 2019.
JP 3-09.3. Close Air Support. 10 June 2019.
JP 3-15. Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations. 6 September 2016.
JP 3-52. Joint Airspace Control. 13 November 2014.
MIL-STD-6017D. Variable Message Format (VMF). 28 February 2017.
MIL-STD-6040B. U.S. Message Text Format (USMTF) Description. 30 April 2009.
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDIZATION AGREEMENTS
Most standardization agreements (STANAGs) are available on the NATO Standardization Office
website (user registration required): https://nso.nato.int/nso/ .
NATO Standard Allied Tactical Publication-3.2.2, Ed B, Version 1, Command and Control of Allied
Land Forces. North Atlantic Treaty Organization.15 December 2016
NATO Standard Allied Tactical Publication-97, Ed B, Version 1. NATO Land Urgent Voice Messages
(LUVM) Pocket Book. North Atlantic Treaty Organization.03 March 2020.
NATO Standard Allied Tactical Publication-105, Ed A, Version 1. Land Operational Reports. North
Atlantic Treaty Organization. 13 January 2021.
STANAG 2020, Ed. 4. Land Operational Reports. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 13 January
2021.
STANAG 2036 MC ENGR, Ed 6. Land Mine Laying, Marking, Recording and Reporting Procedures.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 27 January 2005.
STANAG 2199, Ed 3. Command and Control of Allied Land Forces. North Atlantic Treaty
Organization. 15 December 2016.
STANAG 2430 ENGR, Ed 3. Land Forces Combat Engineer Messages, Reports and Returns—
AEngrP-2(B). North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 18 August 2004. |
6-99 | 230 | References
STANAG 2627, Ed 2. NATO Land Urgent Voice Messages (LUVM) Pocket Book. North Atlantic
Treaty Organization. 03 March 2020
ARMY PUBLICATIONS
Most Army doctrinal publications are available online at: https://armypubs.army.mil/.
ADP 4-0 . Sustainment. 31 July 2019.
ADP 5-0. The Operations Process. 31 July 2019.
AR 190-45. Law Enforcement Reporting. 27 September 2016.
AR 385-10. The Army Safety Program. 24 February 2017.
AR 638-8. Army Casualty Program. 07 June 2019.
ATP 2-01. Plan Requirements and Assess Collection. 19 August 2014.
ATP 2-01.3. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. 01 March 2019.
ATP 2-22.4. Technical Intelligence. 04 November 2013.
ATP 2-22.6-2. (U) Signals Intelligence Volume II: Reference Guide. 20 June 2017.
ATP 3-01.7. Air Defense Artillery Brigade Techniques. 16 March 2016.
ATP 3-01.94. Army Air and Missile Defense Command Operations. 20 April 2016.
ATP 3-04.1. Aviation Tactical Employment. 07 May 2020.
ATP 3-09.02. Field Artillery Survey. 16 February 2016.
ATP 3-09.12. Field Artillery Target Acquisition. 24 July 2015.
ATP 3-09.30. Observed Fires. 28 September 2017.
ATP 3-09.42. Fire Support for the Brigade Combat Team. 01 March 2016.
ATP 3-09.50. The Field Artillery Cannon Battery. 04 May 2016.
ATP 3-09.70. Paladin Operations. 25 September 2015.
ATP 3-11.32/MCWP 10-10E.8/NTTP 3-11.37/AFTTP 3-2.46. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Passive Defense.
13 May 2016.
ATP 3-20.15/MCRP 3-10B.1. Tank Platoon. 03 July 2019.
ATP 3-20.98. Scout Platoon. 04 December 2019.
ATP 3-21.8. Infantry Platoon and Squad. 12 April 2016.
ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D. Countering Explosive Hazards 21 January 2016.
ATP 3-34.81/MCWP 3-17.4. Engineer Reconnaissance. 01 March 2016.
ATP 3-39.32. Physical Security. 30 April 2014.
ATP 3-52.1/MCRP 3-20F.4/MCWP 3-25.13/NTTP 3-56.4/AFTTP 3-2.78. Airspace Control Multi-
Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Airspace Control. 14 February 2019.
ATP 3-52.2/MCRP 3-20.1/NTTP 3-56.2/AFTTP 3-2.17. TAGS Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for the Theater Air-Ground System. 21 May 2020.
ATP 3-53.2. Military Information in Conventional Operations. 07 August 2015.
ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8. Combined Arms Mobility. 08 March 2016
ATP 3-90.5. Combined Arms Battalion. 05 February 2016.
ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5. Combined Arms Countermobility Operations.
17 September 2014.
ATP 3-91. Division Operations. 17 October 2014.
ATP 4-02.1. Army Medical Logistics. 29 October 2015.
ATP 4-02.2. Medical Evacuation. 12 July 2019.
ATP 4-02.3. Army Health System Support To Maneuver Forces. 09 June 2014.
ATP 4-02.55. Army Health System Support Planning. 30 March 2020. |
6-99 | 231 | References
ATP 4-11. Army Motor Transport Operations. 14 August 2020.
ATP 4-16. Movement Control. 05 April 2013.
ATP 4-31/MCRP 3-40E.1. Recovery and Battle Damage Assessment and Repair (BDAR).
18 November 2020.
ATP 4-33. Maintenance Operations. 09 July 2019.
ATP 4-35. Munitions Operations and Distribution Techniques. 05 September 2014.
ATP 4-43. Petroleum Supply Operations. 06 August 2015.
ATP 4-44/MCRP 3-17.7Q. Water Support Operations. 02 October 2015.
ATP 4-46. Contingency Fatality Operations. 17 December 2014.
ATP 5-0.1. Army Design Methodology. 01 July 2015.
ATP 6-02.53. Techniques for Tactical Radio Operations. 13 February 2020.
ATP 6-02.71. Techniques for Department of Defense Information Network Operations. 30 April 2019.
ATP 6-02.72/MCRP 3-30B.3 [MCRP 3-40.3A]/NTTP 6-02.2/AFTTP 3-2.18. TAC Radios Multi-
Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical Radios. 19 May 2017.
FM 1-0. Human Resources Support. 01 April 2014.
FM 1-05. Religious Support. 21 January 2019.
FM 2-0. Intelligence. 06 July 2018.
FM 3-04. Army Aviation. 06 April 2020.
FM 3-09. Fire Support and Field Artillery Operations. 30 April 2020.
FM 3-11. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Operations. 23 May 2019.
FM 3-12. Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Operations. 11 April 2017.
FM 3-34. Engineer Operations. 18 December 2020.
FM 3-50. Army Personnel Recovery. 02 September 2014.
FM 3-52. Airspace Control. 20 October 2016.
FM 3-61. Public Affairs Operations. 01 April 2014.
FM 3-96. Brigade Combat Team. 19 January 2021.
FM 4-01. Army Transportation Operations. 03 April 2014.
FM 6-0. Commander and Staff Organization and Operations. 05 May 2014.
GTA 03-06-008. CBRN Warning and Reporting System. 23 June 2017.
STP-21-1-SMCT. Soldier’s Manual of Common Tasks, Warrior Skills, Level 1. 07 November 2019.
TC 3-09.81. Field Artillery Manual Cannon Gunnery. 13 April 2016.
TC 3-20.31. Training and Qualification, Crew. 17 March 2015.
TC 3-25.26. Map Reading and Land Navigation. 15 November 2013.
TM 3-11.32/MCRP 10-10E.5/NTRP 3-11.25/AFTTP 3-2.56. Multi-Service Reference for Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Warning and Reporting and Hazard Prediction
Procedures. 15 May 2017
TM 3-34.82/MCRP 3-17.7L. Explosives and Demolitions. 07 March 2016.
TM 3-34.85/MCRP 3-17A. Engineer Field Data. 17 October 2013.
TM 9-2350-314-10-1. Operator’s Manual for Howitzer, Medium, Self-Propelled: 155MM, M109A6.
30 May 2014.
TM 9-2350-314-10-2. Operator’s Manual for Howitzer, Medium, Self-Propelled: 155MM, M109A6.
30 May 2014.
PRESCRIBED FORMS
This section contains no entries. |
6-99 | 232 | References
REFERENCED FORMS
Unless otherwise indicated, DA forms are available on the Army Publishing Directorate website at
https://armypubs.army.mil. DD forms are available on the Executive Services Directorate
website at https://www.esd.whs.mil/Directives/forms.
DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.
DD Form 1972. Joint Tactical Air Strike Request. |
6-99 | 233 | FM 6-99
17 May 2021
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
JAMES C. MCCONVILLE
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
KATHLEEN S. MILLER
Administrative Assistant
to the Secretary of the Army
2113005
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and United States Army Reserve: Distributed in |
3-94 | 1 | FM 3-94
ARMIES, CORPS, AND
DIVISION OPERATIONS
JULY 2021
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
This publication supersedes FM 3-94, dated 21 April 2014. |
3-94 | 2 | This publication is available at the Army Publishing Directorate site
(https://armypubs.army.mil) and the Central Army Registry site |
3-94 | 3 | *FM 3-94
Field Manual Headquarters
No. 3-94 Department of the Army
Washington, D.C., 23 July 2021
ARMIES, CORPS, AND DIVISION OPERATIONS
Contents
Page
PREFACE............................................................................................................ v
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................ix
Chapter 1 ARMIES, CORPS, AND DIVISIONS ................................................................... 1-1
Landpower for the Joint Force ............................................................................ 1-1
The Levels of Warfare ........................................................................................ 1-2
Global Operational Environment ......................................................................... 1-5
Army Strategic Roles ......................................................................................... 1-6
Competition Continuum ...................................................................................... 1-7
Army Forces Along the Competition Continuum ................................................... 1-9
Range of Military Operations .............................................................................. 1-9
Unified Action and Joint Operations .................................................................. 1-12
Unified Land Operations and Decisive Action .................................................... 1-12
Armies, Corps, and Divisions in Operations ....................................................... 1-13
Operational and Administrative Chains of Command.......................................... 1-18
Operational Areas............................................................................................ 1-26
Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 1-28
Chapter 2 OPERATIONAL ART AND SCIENCE................................................................. 2-1
Operational Art .................................................................................................. 2-1
Operational-Level Combat Power Considerations .............................................. 2-12
Leadership ...................................................................................................... 2-13
Information ...................................................................................................... 2-13
Command and Control ..................................................................................... 2-14
Movement and Maneuver ................................................................................. 2-24
Intelligence ...................................................................................................... 2-26
Fires ............................................................................................................... 2-28
Sustainment .................................................................................................... 2-30
Protection........................................................................................................ 2-33
Chapter 3 ARMIES............................................................................................................ 3-1
Armies Overview ............................................................................................... 3-1
Section I – Theater Army.................................................................................. 3-1
Theater Army Headquarters ............................................................................... 3-2
The Role of the Theater Army............................................................................. 3-3
Theater Army Assigned Forces......................................................................... 3-10
Theater Army in Competition ............................................................................ 3-20
Theater Army in Conflict ................................................................................... 3-21
Theater Army Limitations.................................................................................. 3-22
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
*This publication supersedes FM 3-94, dated 21 April 2014. |
3-94 | 4 | Contents
Section II – Field Army ................................................................................... 3-22
The Role of the Field Army ............................................................................... 3-24
Field Army in Competition ................................................................................ 3-27
Field Army in Conflict ....................................................................................... 3-28
Chapter 4 CORPS ROLES, FUNCTONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS ...................................... 4-1
Corps Overview ................................................................................................. 4-1
Roles and Functions .......................................................................................... 4-1
The Corps Headquarters .................................................................................... 4-5
Subordinate Formations ..................................................................................... 4-8
Corps Operations ............................................................................................ 4-16
Chapter 5 DIVISION ROLES, FUNCTIONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS .................................. 5-1
Division Overview .............................................................................................. 5-1
Division Roles and Functions.............................................................................. 5-1
Division Headquarters ........................................................................................ 5-5
Subordinate Formations ..................................................................................... 5-9
Division Operations.......................................................................................... 5-16
Division Operations Along the Competition Continuum ....................................... 5-17
Appendix A COMMAND AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS..................................................A-1
Appendix B ARFOR .............................................................................................................B-1
Appendix C USING THE OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK ......................................................C-1
Appendix D TRANSITION TO A JOINT HEADQUARTERS....................................................D-1
SOURCE NOTES .......................................................................... Source Notes-1
GLOSSARY ..........................................................................................Glossary-1
REFERENCES ................................................................................. References-1
INDEX ...................................................................................................... Index-1
Figures
Figure 1-1. Army echelons and the levels of warfare................................................................ 1-4
Figure 1-2. The competition continuum ................................................................................... 1-8
Figure 1-3. Army operations along the competition continuum................................................ 1-10
Figure 1-4. The operational chain of command and administrative control............................... 1-20
Figure 1-6. Joint task force organized by Service and functional components.......................... 1-23
Figure 1-7. Sustainment, medical command, and support relationships in large-scale combat.. 1-25
Figure 1-8. The area of responsibility and joint operations areas ............................................ 1-27
Figure 1-9. Contiguous and noncontiguous areas of operations ............................................. 1-28
Figure 2-1. Operational art ..................................................................................................... 2-1
Figure 2-2. Components of design ......................................................................................... 2-3
Figure 2-3. Sample line of operations and line of effort ............................................................ 2-6
Figure 2-4. Elements of combat power ................................................................................. 2-12
Figure 2-5. Building understanding ....................................................................................... 2-14
Figure 2-6. Force tailoring.................................................................................................... 2-17
Figure 3-1. Example of theater commands and brigades ....................................................... 3-11
Figure 3-2. Theater sustainment force .................................................................................. 3-11 |
3-94 | 5 | Contents
Figure 3-3. Example of expanded theater ............................................................................. 3-15
Figure 4-1. Example of a corps and available enablers ............................................................ 4-9
Figure 4-2. Example of a task-organized corps operating as a joint force land component
command in a limited contingency operation ....................................................... 4-19
Figure 4-3. Example of a task-organized corps operating as a tactical headquarters in large-scale
combat operations ............................................................................................ 4-20
Figure 5-1. Example division with a variety of subordinate units ............................................. 5-10
Figure B-1. Possible joint task force components ....................................................................B-2
Figure C-1. Multi-domain extended battlefield .........................................................................C-2
Figure C-2. Physical manifestation of enemy capabilities .........................................................C-2
Figure C-3. Nested example of deep, close, and rear operational framework ............................C-5
Figure C-4. Doctrinal template of depths and frontage ........................................................... C-12
Figure D-1. Notional joint task force headquarters ...................................................................D-3
Figure D-2. Notional joint force land component headquarters .................................................D-5
Figure D-3. Forming and transitioning to a joint headquarters...................................................D-6
Tables
Table 1-1. Combatant commanders and their Army Service component commands ................ 1-19
Table 2-1. Protection considerations by echelon ................................................................... 2-34
Table 3-1. Theater armies...................................................................................................... 3-2
Table A-1. Joint command relationships synopsis ...................................................................A-2
Table A-2. Joint support categories ........................................................................................A-3
Table A-3. Army support relationships ....................................................................................A-7
Vignettes
Center of Gravity: Republican Guard Divisions in the 1991 Gulf War ........................................ 2-5
Operational Reach and Basing: Sixth Army in the Philippines Campaign .................................. 2-9
Rapid Task Organization: 30th Infantry Division in the Normandy Campaign........................... 2-18
Desert Storm: A Decisive Offensive Operation ..................................................................... 2-22
Operational Maneuver: Turning Movement at Inchon............................................................. 2-26
Responsiveness and Improvisation: The Red Ball Express .................................................... 2-32
United States Army Pacific as a Theater Joint Force Land Component Commander.................. 3-9
Multi-Corps Command and Control in Korea, 1950................................................................ 3-24
Land Component Commands in World War II ....................................................................... 3-29
Security Cooperation: REFORGER 87 ................................................................................. 4-18
SPARTAN SHIELD: Military Engagement and Security Cooperation ...................................... 5-17
UNITED ASSISTANCE 2014 ............................................................................................... 5-18
JOINT ENDEAVOR............................................................................................................. 5-19 |
3-94 | 7 | Preface
FM 3-94 provides Army doctrine for the theater army, field army, corps, and division. FM 3-94 explains the
organization of the theater army, field army, corps, and division and explains how they conduct operations
in support of the Army’s strategic roles. It establishes the roles for each headquarters, including their
respective contributions to joint operations. It discusses subordinate units and each headquarters’
organization of its units, establishment of command and support relationships, and conduct of operations.
The principal audience for FM 3-94 is theater army, field army, corps, and division commanders and staffs.
It also provides relevant information regarding the organization and operations for commanders and staffs at
subordinate theater-level commands and brigades, geographic combatant commands, other Service
headquarters, and interagency partners.
Commanders, staffs, and subordinates must ensure that their decisions and actions comply with applicable
U.S., international, and in some cases host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels will ensure
that their Soldiers or Marines operate in accordance with the law of armed conflict (LOAC) and applicable
rules of engagement (see FM 6-27).
FM 3-94 implements STANAG 2014, Format for Orders and Designation of Timings, Locations and
Boundaries; STANAG 2019, NATO Joint Military Symbology; STANAG 2248, Glossary of Land Military
Terms and Definitions; STANAG 2281, Coalition Operations Handbook; and AAP-06, NATO Glossary of
Terms and Definitions.
FM 3-94 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the
glossary and the text. When first defined in the text, the term for which FM 3-94 is the proponent publication
is boldfaced and italicized, and the definition is boldfaced. When first defining other proponent definitions
in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition. Following
uses of the term are not italicized.
FM 3-94 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and
United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.
The proponent of FM 3-94 is the United States Army Combined Arms Center. The preparing agency is the
Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, United States Army Combined Arms Center. Send comments and
recommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to
Commander, United States Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATZL-MCD (FM 3-94),
300 McPherson Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337; by email to
[email protected]; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028. |
3-94 | 8 | Acknowledgements
The copyright owners listed here have granted permission to reproduce material from their works. The Source
Notes list other sources of quotations.
Excerpts from On War, indexed edition, by Carl von Clausewitz. Edited and translated by Peter Paret
and Michael E. Howard. Copyright © 1976, renewed 1984 by Princeton University Press.
Quotes from The Art of War, by Antoine Henri de Jomini. Translated by G.H. Mendell and W.P.
Craighill. Copyright © by J.B. Lippincott & Co.
Strategy by Liddell Hart. Copyright © 1954. Reprinted by permission of Houghton Mifflin Harcourt
Publishing Company. All rights reserved.
Excerpt from THE ROMMEL PAPERS, translated by Paul Findlay, edited by B.H. Liddell-Hart
(Boston: HMH, 1953).
Quotes from Memoirs of General William T. Sherman, Volume 1, 2nd edition, revised and corrected.
Copyright © by D. Appleton and Company.
Quote reprinted courtesy Owen Connelly, On War and Leadership. Copyright © 2002 by Princeton
University Press.
Quote reprinted courtesy of Martin Van Creveld and Cambridge University Press, Supplying War:
Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton. Copyright © 1977 by Cambridge University Press.
Reproduced with permission of the Licensor through PLSclear.
Quote from The Ghost of Napoleon by Liddell Hart. Copyright © 1935 by B.H. Liddell-Hart.
Reprinted by permission of Yale University Press. All rights reserved.
Quotes from The Officer’s Manual: Napoleon’s Maxims of War by Napoleon Bonaparte. Copyright ©
1862 by West & Johnston. Online by Project Gutenberg.
Quotes reprinted courtesy Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations, compiled by Robert Debs
Heinl, Jr. Copyright © 1967 by United States Naval Institute.
Quote from The Soul and Body of an Army by Ian Hamilton. Copyright © 1921 by Edward Arnold &
Co.
Excerpt from Field-Marshall Viscount William Slim, Defeat into Victory: Battling Japan in Burma
and India, 1942–1945. Copyright © by Viscount William Slim. This Cooper Square Press
edition published in 2001. All rights reserved. |
3-94 | 9 | Introduction
The Army gives the combatant commander depth and versatility because landpower
expands the friendly range of military options. The Army, uniquely, provides a combination
of armored, medium, light, and airborne forces. Along with a full suite of enablers, this
allows us to provide tailorable and scalable force packages for various contingencies. By
multiplying the range of U.S. capabilities that the adversary must counter, the Army
narrows options that might otherwise work against a lesser opponent or a coalition partner
supported only by U.S. air and maritime power.
ADP 1
The unique and crucial role of the Army is to provide landpower to the geographic combatant commanders.
Landpower, as ADP 1 notes, “is the ubiquitous tool of the joint force—often decisive, sometimes indirect,
but indispensable.” FM 3-94 examines the employment of Army forces within a geographic combatant
command and describes how the Army supports the geographic combatant commander across the range of
military operations in that area of responsibility.
In addition to being the largest of the Armed Forces of the United States, the Army has a greater variety of
units than the other Services, each with a different organization and purpose. Therefore, the Army provides
the combatant commander with an interlocking array of higher headquarters and formations trained and
equipped to apply landpower from the theater level, through the operational level, and down to the tactical
employment of various brigades, groups, and battalions. Together the theater army, field army (when
constituted), corps, and divisions give the combatant commander multiple scalable options necessary for the
employment of landpower in an interdependent joint force.
FM 3-94 describes how armies, corps, and divisions conduct operations as unified action partners in
competition and conflict using the Army’s operational concept—a fundamental statement that frames how
Army forces, operating as part of the joint force, conduct operations (ADP 1-01). The Army’s operational
concept in support of unified action is unified land operations.
FM 3-94 discusses the foundations, tenets, and doctrine of army, corps, and division operations. It serves as
a common reference for commanders and staffs at these echelons.
FM 3-94 lists key higher echelon principles and tenets as a means of organizing ways commanders and staffs
consider military problem solving at army, corps, and division echelons. Narrative discussions and historical
vignettes provide explanations and context about commanding and controlling forces at these echelons. The
proper application of principles and tenets to a particular situation requires situational understanding
informed by professional judgment. FM 3-94 has five chapters and four appendices.
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the higher echelons of the Army. It begins by describing the strategic
environment in which Army forces operate. It describes the roles of these echelons within the context of a
larger joint force. This chapter also discusses operational and administrative chains of command and their
differences. The chapter concludes with a brief review of operational areas.
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the operational art and science that underpins operations at the operational
level of war. It discusses operational art and the design of campaigns at this level. It then describes
operational-level combat power considerations.
Chapter 3 provides an overview of theater and field armies. The chapter summarizes the subordinate units
typically found in the theater army echelon. The chapter then discusses the internal organization of the theater
army and the various command posts available to the theater army commander.
Chapter 4 explains the roles and functions of the corps. The chapter then discusses the internal organization
of the corps headquarters and the various command posts available to the corps commander. The chapter |
3-94 | 10 | Introduction
summarizes the subordinate units normally under the operational or tactical control of the corps. Finally, it
briefly discusses corps-level operations across the competition continuum.
Chapter 5 explains the roles and functions of the division. The chapter discusses the internal organization of
the division headquarters and the various command posts available to the division commander. The chapter
then summarizes the subordinate units normally under the operational or tactical control of the division.
Finally, it briefly discusses division-level operations across the continuum.
Appendix A describes command and support relationships. It begins with a discussion of joint and Army
command and support relationships and other authorities. This appendix concludes with a discussion of
command and control for multinational operations.
Appendix B provides an expanded discussion on the role of the ARFOR. It focuses on the ARFOR’s
administrative and support responsibilities to subordinate Army forces and to other Services within a joint
force.
Appendix C provides an expanded discussion of the multi-domain expanded battlefield framework and the
operational framework. The appendix begins with a description of the multi-domain extended battlefield
followed by a detailed description of the physical components of the operational framework. This appendix
concludes with a friendly force doctrinal template of echelon above brigade frontages and depths.
Appendix D describes some critical considerations for how armies, corps, and divisions transition to a joint
headquarters.
More details on each echelon will be published in three supporting Army techniques publications (ATPs).
One will cover the theater army in detail. Another will provide details and vignettes on the corps and corps
operations. It will also describe how the corps headquarters transforms into a joint task force (JTF) for
contingencies. A third will address the division, with an extensive discussion on decisive action at the tactical
level.
This manual is the proponent for a single term, ARFOR, which is not modified from the previous edition.
FM 3-94 is not the proponent for any new Army terms. It does not rescind any defined terms. |
3-94 | 11 | Chapter 1
Armies, Corps, and Divisions
Chapter 1 establishes the roles of theater armies, field armies, corps, and divisions
within the context of a larger joint force. This chapter begins by describing the strategic
environment, including threats, the Army’s strategic roles, and the competition
continuum. Next, this chapter summarizes how Army forces contribute to joint and
multinational operations through unified land operations. This is followed by a brief
description of these formations, including the roles they perform in operations. Then
this chapter describes operational and administrative chains of command. This chapter
concludes with a description of operational areas.
LANDPOWER FOR THE JOINT FORCE
1-1. The primary purpose of the Army is to provide sustained landpower to the joint force. Landpower is
the ability—by threat, force, or occupation—to gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and
people (ADP 3-0). While landpower can, and often is, tailored to any circumstance or operation, the Army
exists to fight and win wars on terms favorable to the United States and its allies. Army forces are organized,
manned, equipped, and trained for this purpose. While prevailing in large-scale ground combat is the primary
mission of Army forces, Army forces are often called upon to support the joint force across three additional
strategic roles: shaping operational environments, preventing conflict, and consolidating gains. They do this
during competition, crisis, and conflict. The echelons above brigade remain indispensable to these operations.
Joint interdependence is the purposeful reliance by one Service on another Service’s capabilities to maximize
the complementary and reinforcing effects of both (JP 3-0).
1-2. Armies, corps, and divisions provide the joint force flexible, tailorable formations and headquarters
capable of managing crises and conducting large-scale ground combat. These echelons provide combatant
commanders with credible forces that possess the technical and tactical capabilities to conduct successful
operations across the full range of military operations. They provide the ability to conduct prompt and
sustained operations; sustain Army and joint forces; consolidate gains; and enable unified action partners to
interact with, secure, or control populations.
1-3. Armies, corps, and divisions, acting separately or in concert with each other as part of a joint and
multinational force, provide the capability to plan, prepare, execute, and assess joint and multinational
operations. They combine all elements of national, multinational, and joint power in the conduct of
operations. In addition to providing trained and credible Army forces, these echelons may perform one of six
roles during the conduct of operations:
* Army Service component command (ASCC).
* Theater joint force land component command.
* Joint task force (JTF).
* Joint force land component command.
* ARFOR.
* Tactical command.
1-4. Armies, corps, and divisions provide headquarters with the required expertise and capabilities to
conduct continuous multi-domain operational preparation of the environment, rapidly converge effects from
across multiple domains against enemy forces, synchronize that convergence across the depth and breadth of
the extended battlefield, and ensure that overwhelming combat power is generated at the decisive time and
place against enemy forces. This expertise at multiple echelons provides options to compete below the |
3-94 | 12 | Chapter 1
threshold of armed conflict, transition to conflict when necessary, and exploit windows of opportunity to
create and attack enemy vulnerabilities. The remainder of this chapter sets the context in which these echelons
above brigade combined arms formations enable the joint force to achieve its assigned objectives. The
remainder of this manual describes how these echelons enable the joint force and the Nation to achieve their
objectives across the levels of warfare.
THE LEVELS OF WARFARE
1-5. The echelons described in this manual conduct operations that span the levels of warfare. The three
levels are strategic, operational, and tactical. The levels of warfare are a framework for defining and clarifying
the relationship among national objectives, the operational approach, and tactical tasks (ADP 1-01). The level
of warfare correlates to the role and focus of a headquarters on one of three broad roles—creating and
implementing strategy (strategic); planning and executing campaigns and major operations (operational); or
planning and executing battles, engagements, and actions (tactical). The levels of warfare correspond to
specific levels of responsibility and planning of a headquarters with decisions at one level affecting other
levels. Echelons of command or geographic areas do not define the levels of warfare, although they are
related. The specific role assigned to an echelon headquarters determines the level of war in which it operates.
1-6. Between the levels of warfare, the focus and horizons for planning, preparation, and execution differ
greatly. Strategic-level leaders focus on the development and promulgation of national and theater strategies
through the conduct of global, regional, and combatant command campaign plans. Operational-level
commanders typically orchestrate the activities of military and other organizations across large areas to
achieve strategic and operational objectives. Tactical commanders focus primarily on employing combined
arms formations in an area of operations (AO) to accomplish assigned tasks. A string of tactical victories
does not guarantee success at the operational and strategic levels. Tactical success, while required to set
operational conditions, must be tied to attaining operational and strategic objectives.
STRATEGIC LEVEL
The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and
commander have to make is to establish…the kind of war on which they are embarking;
neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This
is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.
Carl von Clausewitz
1-7. The strategic level of warfare is the level of warfare at which a nation, often as a member of a group
of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and
guidance, then develops and uses national resources to achieve those objectives (JP 3-0). The focus at this
level is the development of strategy—a foundational idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of
national power (diplomatic, information, military, and economic) in a synchronized and integrated fashion
to achieve national and multinational objectives. The strategic level of warfare is primarily the province of
national leadership in coordination with combatant commanders. It is expressed in the national security,
defense, and military strategies and other strategic guidance, including—
* Joint Strategic Campaign Plan.
* Unified Command Plan.
* Defense Planning Guidance.
* Global Force Management Implementation Guidance.
(See JP 5-0 for a detailed description of strategic direction and guidance.)
1-8. Based on strategic guidance, combatant commanders and staffs—with input from subordinate
commands (including the theater army) and supporting commands and agencies—update their strategic
estimates and develop plans and strategies. In a practical sense there is a theater strategic level of warfare
that accounts for how a geographic combatant commander (GCC) approaches the implementation of strategic
guidance. A theater strategy is therefore a broad statement of a GCC’s long-term vision that bridges national
strategic guidance and the joint planning required to achieve national and theater objectives. The theater |
3-94 | 13 | Armies, Corps, and Divisions
strategy prioritizes the ends, ways, and means within the limitations established by the budget, global force
management processes, and strategic guidance.
OPERATIONAL LEVEL
1-9. The operational level of warfare is the level of warfare at which campaigns and major operations are
planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas
(JP 3-0). The operational level links employing tactical forces to achieving strategic objectives. A campaign
is a series of related operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time
and space (JP 5-0). A major operation is 1. A series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes)
conducted by combat forces, coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives in
an operational area. 2. For noncombat operations, a reference to the relative size and scope of a military
operation (JP 3-0).
1-10. The operational level of warfare generally is the realm of combatant commands and their Service and
functional components and subordinate JTF headquarters and their Service and functional components. This
includes theater army headquarters as the Army Service component to a GCC and any other echelon operating
as an ARFOR, JTF, or land component commander. The focus at this level is on operational art—the design
of campaigns and operations by integrating ends, ways, and means, while accounting for risk. (See Chapter
2 for detailed information on operational art.)
1-11. Operational-level planning begins with the development of the combatant command campaign plan.
The combatant command campaign plan operationalizes the GCC’s strategy by organizing and aligning
operations and activities with resources to achieve strategic and operational objectives in an area of
responsibility (AOR). The combatant command campaign plan provides a framework within which the GCC
and component commands conduct military engagement and security cooperation activities with regional
partners. The combatant command campaign plan contains contingency plans that are viewed as branches
within the campaign. Contingency plans, in the form of operation plans, identify how the command might
respond in the event of a crisis to include crises involving armed conflict. Contingency plans are often phased
and have specified end states that seek to re-establish conditions favorable to the United States.
1-12. The theater army develops supporting plans to the combatant command campaign plan. These plans
include methods to achieve security cooperation, training and exercise programs, and ongoing Army
activities in the theater, including intelligence, air and missile defense, sustainment, and communications.
The theater army also develops supporting plans for contingencies identified by the GCC to include plans for
large-scale combat operations. Theater army planners routinely develop, assess, review, and update
supporting plans to numbered operation plans to ensure they remain feasible and relevant to the changes in
the area of operations and evolving friendly force capabilities. This includes a review of Army force structure
as well as time phased force and deployment data for identified contingencies. (See Chapter 2 for detailed
information on force tailoring.)
1-13. Actions at the operational level usually involve broader aspects of time and space than tactical actions.
Operational-level commanders need to understand the complexities of the operational environment (OE) and
look beyond the immediate situation. Operational-level commanders seek to create the most favorable
conditions possible for subordinate commanders by shaping future events. Figure 1-1 on page 1-4 illustrates
the links among the levels of warfare using military actions in the Gulf War of 1991. |
3-94 | 14 | Chapter 1
Figure 1-1. Army echelons and the levels of warfare
TACTICAL LEVEL
1-14. The tactical level of warfare is the level of warfare at which battles and engagements are planned and
executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces (JP 3-0). Activities at this
level focus on tactics—the employment, ordered arrangement, and directed actions of forces in relation to
each other (ADP 3-90). Operational-level headquarters determine objectives and provide resources for
tactical operations. The tactical-level commander uses combat power in battles, engagements, and small-unit
actions. A battle is a set of related engagements that lasts longer and involves larger forces than an
engagement (ADP 3-90). Battles can affect the course of a campaign or major operation, and they are
typically conducted by corps and divisions. An engagement is a tactical conflict, usually between opposing |
3-94 | 15 | Armies, Corps, and Divisions
lower echelons maneuver forces (JP 3-0). Engagements are typically conducted at brigade level and below.
They are usually short, executed in terms of minutes, hours, or days.
1-15. In large-scale combat operations, corps headquarters normally function as a tactical land headquarters
under a joint or multi-national land component. The corps headquarters is organized, trained, and equipped
to control the operation of two to five divisions, together with supporting organizations (see Chapter 4).
Divisions are the tactical units of execution for a corps. The division headquarters’ primary role is a tactical
headquarters controlling two to five brigade combat teams (BCTs) and two to four functional and
multifunctional brigades in decisive action. The distinguishing difference between corps and division tactical
operations are their scope and scale. (See chapters 4 and 5 for more information on corps and division
operations.)
1-16. It is important to understand tactics within the context of the levels of warfare. The strategic and
operational levels provide the context for tactical operations. Without this context, tactical operations are
reduced to a series of disconnected and unfocused actions. Strategic and operational success is a measure of
how one or more battles contribute to winning a major operation or campaign. (See ADP 3-90 for more
information on tactical doctrine.)
GLOBAL OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
1-17. The United States faces a strategic environment characterized by the reemergence of long-term
competition with peer and near-peer threats bent on challenging American leadership and remaking the global
order in their favor. This increasingly complex global security environment is a result of increasing long-
term competition between nations, the rapid diffusion of new technologies, and the increased movement of
people across borders. Combined, these factors challenge the international order and provide opportunities
for state and non-state actors to leverage them to their advantage.
1-18. Broad trends like globalization, urbanization, technological advances, and failing states affect land
operations. These trends create instability and contribute to an environment of persistent competition that
encompasses competition below armed conflict, periodic crisis, and episodic armed conflict. Competition is
a fundamental part of international relations, as state and non-state actors seek to protect and advance their
own interests. These actors sometimes cooperate, but more often they compete for strategic advantages.
Adversaries to U.S. interests employ capabilities that counter U.S. interests and impede friendly operations
while advancing their own interests.
1-19. Adversaries often coordinate their actions across all four instruments of national power to create
conditions that challenge U.S. interests. Peer threats, including China and Russia, along with the rogue states
of North Korea and Iran, operate across the competition continuum to achieve their objectives. China and
Russia seek regional dominance by creating conditions advantageous to their objectives, largely at the
expense of neighboring countries. Chinese expansionist policies threaten U.S. partners, allies, and interests.
Recent Russian efforts meld military action and information warfare with coordinated diplomatic and
economic efforts to intimidate their neighbors and threaten the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
and allied partners. North Korea and Iran actively seek to coerce their neighbors in order to advance their
interests and stabilize their governments.
1-20. Rapid technological advances and the diffusion of technology present another threat. U.S. forces no
longer enjoy uncontested access across all domains. Chinese and Russian forces are increasingly capable of
challenging U.S. forces across all domains, while North Korean and Iranian forces are capable of creating
periods of overmatch in critical domains during competition and large-scale ground combat. China and
Russia already possess nuclear arsenals, while North Korea and Iran are actively seeking to develop their
own in an effort to offset U.S. and allied advantages. The proliferation of information technology allows U.S.
adversaries to exploit opportunities through robust information warfare campaigns designed to discredit
friendly action and subvert popular support at home and abroad. |
3-94 | 16 | Chapter 1
ARMY STRATEGIC ROLES
1-21. Army forces are organized, trained, and equipped to conduct prompt and sustained land combat to
defeat enemy ground forces and seize, occupy, and defend land areas. The Army accomplishes its mission
by supporting the joint force and unified action partners in four strategic roles:
* Shape operational environments.
* Prevent conflict.
* Prevail in large-scale ground combat.
* Consolidate gains.
The strategic roles are not tasks assigned to subordinate units; instead, they clarify the enduring reasons for
which the Army is organized, trained, and equipped.
1-22. All operations conducted by Army forces require the use of capabilities from across multiple domains,
the electromagnetic spectrum, and the information environment. Combining capabilities across multiple
domains during operations provides opportunities for exploitation, and Army forces routinely combine
capabilities to effect or compel desired human behavior on land. The convergence of these capabilities is
critical to operations regardless of strategic role. In competition and conflict against a peer threat, all domains
will be contested, and Army forces must account for this during operations.
SHAPE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS
1-23. Army operations to shape bring together all of the activities intended to promote regional stability and
to establish security conditions for outcomes favorable to U.S. interests. Shaping activities include military
engagement; security cooperation; and forward presence to promote U.S. interests, to develop allied and
friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and to provide U.S. forces with
peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. The Army garrisons forces and pre-positions equipment
in areas to allow national leaders to respond quickly to contingencies. As part of operations to shape, Army
forces provide trained and ready forces to GCCs in support of their campaign plans. Army operations to
shape are continuous, occurring before, during, and after a joint operation in a specific operational area.
PREVENT CONFLICT
1-24. Army operations to prevent conflict or escalation of conflict include all activities to deter an
adversary’s undesirable actions. These operations are an extension of operations to shape, and are designed
to prevent adversary opportunities to further exploit positions of relative advantage. Operations to prevent
conflict raise the potential costs to adversaries of continuing activities that threaten U.S. interests. They are
generally weighted toward actions to protect friendly forces, assets, and partners, and to indicate U.S.
intentions to execute subsequent phases of a planned operation.
PREVAIL IN LARGE-SCALE GROUND COMBAT
1-25. During large-scale ground combat operations, Army forces focus on the defeat and destruction of
enemy ground and other forces as part of the joint team. Large-scale ground combat operations are sustained
combat operations involving multiple corps and divisions (ADP 3-0). Army forces close with and destroy
enemy forces in any terrain, exploit success, and break the enemy’s will to resist. Army forces attack, defend,
perform stability tasks, and consolidate gains to accomplish national objectives. Field armies are the key
operational formation, while divisions and corps are the tactical formations central to the conduct of large-
scale combat operations. The ability to prevail in ground combat is a decisive factor in breaking an enemy’s
capability and will to continue a conflict. Conflict resolution requires the Army to conduct sustained
operations with unified action partners as long as necessary to accomplish national objectives while
continuously consolidating gains.
CONSOLIDATE GAINS
1-26. Army operations to consolidate gains are activities to make enduring any temporary operational
success and to set the conditions for a sustainable security environment, allowing for a transition of control |
3-94 | 17 | Armies, Corps, and Divisions
to other legitimate authorities (ADP 3-0). Army forces conduct a combination of offensive, defensive, and
stability operations to successfully consolidate gains. Consolidation of gains is an integral and continuous
part of armed conflict, and it is necessary for achieving success across the range of military operations. Army
forces deliberately plan to consolidate gains during all phases of an operation, and they consolidate gains
with unified action partners. While Army forces consolidate gains throughout an operation, consolidating
gains becomes the primary focus of Army forces after large-scale combat operations have concluded. Armies,
corps, and divisions are integral to these operations.
1-27. The four strategic roles are not tasks assigned to Army units or phases of an operation. While they
provide the larger purpose behind operations, they are not the operations themselves. Army forces execute
various operations as part of a joint force in support of these strategic roles. The Army strategic roles provide
a way for commanders to visualize and execute their operations in a larger strategic framework. Those
operations occur across the range of military operations in a variety of operational environments. They may
be of a short duration or extend for a significant period. They also vary in their intensity. Armies, corps, and
divisions are integral to this effort.
1-28. Generally, Army forces perform operations to fulfill the Army’s strategic roles during periods of
competition, crisis, or conflict.
COMPETITION CONTINUUM
1-29. The competition continuum frames the application of landpower and the Army’s strategic roles. It
describes the environment from an Army perspective in which landpower is applied to achieve objectives.
For strategic and operational commanders, it provides a common way to understand, visualize, and describe
the complexity of strategic relationships and how they correlate with general levels of violence. For tactical
commanders, overlaying the range of military operations on the competition continuum provides a common
way of focusing units on a particular mission theme. This visualization serves as a starting point for
commanders to describe their operations to subordinates by using a framed explanation of the complex and
dangerous environment they will face.
1-30. The competition continuum describes an environment of enduring competition characterized by a
mixture of cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict. The competition continuum
creates a distinction between war and other forms of armed conflict because of the scope and scale of land
forces involved. While the U.S. Army has not been in an officially declared war since World War II, Army
forces fought in several conflicts that rose to the level of war because of the resources involved. In that same
period, Army forces also fought in several armed conflicts below the threshold of war.
1-31. The competition continuum descriptors can be used in two ways: to refer to the relationship between
the United States and another strategic actor, or to refer to U.S. interactions with multiple actors in a specific
theater. When considering a strategic actor that has the capability to act globally, these descriptors refer to
the relationship between the U.S. and another strategic actor in relation to a set of specific objectives allowing
for simultaneous interactions with the same actor at different points along the continuum. When considering
operations inside of an AOR or theater, U.S. interactions with multiple state and non-state actors will vary
along the continuum.
1-32. The competition continuum also places the potential for violence and its corresponding intensity on an
ascending scale. On the far left of the competition continuum is cooperation, where the likelihood of violence
is low. While violence occurs during cooperation, it is limited in scope and duration. War is characterized by
intense violence. In practice, competition does not proceed smoothly along this continuum and back again.
The level of violence may jump from one point to another. For example, competition may erupt in general
war without a gradual escalation, or a general war may end in cooperation over the long term. Armed conflicts
often spark additional violence in a region, creating broad areas of instability that threaten U.S. interests. (See
figure 1-2 on page 1-8.) |
3-94 | 18 | Chapter 1
Figure 1-2. The competition continuum
1-33. Commanders design operations to secure U.S. objectives and create conditions favorable to U.S.
interests. These operations gain or maintain a position of advantage during competition. In conflict,
commanders direct operations to defeat enemy forces. Military power cannot, by itself, guarantee success in
all situations. It must, however, establish global, regional, and local conditions that allow for the other
instruments of national power to exert their full influence. In practice, all instruments of national power
should function together as an interrelated and integrated whole.
COOPERATION
1-34. Cooperation is a selective activity to support or advance U.S. interests and objectives. Depending on
the circumstances, cooperation can take many forms. In some cases, U.S. forces establish open-ended
relationships with allies or partners involving the commitment of military efforts or resources. Security force
assistance activities to build partner military capacity over time are one example. In different circumstances,
U.S. forces may cooperate in a limited fashion with a partner to achieve a specific objective. Often, this
partner is a competitor elsewhere or in relation to other objectives. The combined efforts of the United States
and Russia to limit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is an example of this kind of cooperation.
1-35. There are few circumstances in which a major military action does not have some ramification for at
least one of the United States’ global or regional allies. In most campaigns and major operations, success, as
characterized by a return to a lower level of competition below armed conflict, depends on unified action
involving efforts by multinational military and civilian partners.
COMPETITION BELOW ARMED CONFLICT
1-36. U.S. forces compete at levels below armed conflict to achieve U.S. objectives while preventing
adversaries from achieving objectives detrimental to U.S. objectives. Competition below armed conflict
seeks to improve relative strategic or military advantage without causing an escalation to armed conflict. U.S.
forces achieve the best possible strategic objective within resource or policy constraints. They seek to
improve U.S. advantages without jeopardizing other U.S. interests.
ARMED CONFLICT
1-37. When directed, U.S. forces engage in armed conflict either unilaterally or as part of a multinational
force. Operations conducted during armed conflict involve the destruction of enemy forces in the pursuit of
assigned objectives. Armed conflict may occur during limited contingency and even crisis response
operations, but in this case, the duration is limited and the use of force is focused on protecting designated
parties and deterring further aggression by belligerents. For these reasons, the scope and scale of armed
conflict short of war can vary widely depending upon the objectives. For example, foreign internal defense
and counterinsurgency operations may only involve a handful of Army personnel at one end of the continuum
or involve multiple echelons of command and tens of thousands of Soldiers at the other end.
1-38. When conducting operations during armed conflict, U.S. forces must consider what the transition
period will look like afterwards. Armed conflicts do not end with a stable post-conflict environment. Without
a plan to consolidate gains after conflict, the disruption and destruction resulting from armed conflict create
conditions for widespread stability challenges and further violence.
1-39. General war is armed conflict between major powers in which the total resources of the belligerents
are employed, and the national survival of a major belligerent is in jeopardy. General war usually involves
nation-states and coalitions; however, civil wars may reach this level of violence. The competition continuum
creates a distinction between war and other forms of armed conflict because of the scope and scale of the |
3-94 | 19 | Armies, Corps, and Divisions
land forces involved. In general war, large and heavily armed conventional forces compete for military
supremacy by conducting multi-domain large-scale combat operations.
1-40. Large-scale combat operations are extensive joint combat operations in terms of scope and size of
forces committed, conducted as a campaign aimed at achieving operational and strategic objectives
(ADP 3-0). These operations aim to defeat the enemy’s armed forces and eliminate the enemy’s military
capability. Wars are dominated by large-scale combat operations, but they almost always include irregular
and unconventional warfare. For example, Soviet partisans waged unconventional warfare against German
lines of communications during World War II. Similarly, the Vietcong conducted guerrilla warfare
throughout the Vietnam War, even as the North Vietnamese Army fought conventional battles against U.S.
and South Vietnamese forces.
1-41. The most extreme form of conflict is total war. Total war is characterized by mass mobilization of the
citizenry of at least one belligerent, conventional warfare, the possible use of chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons, and potentially large-scale conflicts in multiple theaters. U.S.
forces campaign during total war with a long-term view to the future transition period at the end of the main
period of hostilities. Wars disrupt political, social, and economic structures in conflict areas. They often
create the conditions that result in large-scale humanitarian crises that require significant resources and
additional commitment of joint and multinational forces to address.
ARMY FORCES ALONG THE COMPETITION CONTINUUM
1-42. Although Army forces are optimized for large-scale combat operations, they must be able to operate
anywhere along the competition continuum. In reality, Army forces often operate on several levels along the
continuum simultaneously. In every case, achieving the end state requires creating conditions that advance
U.S. national strategic interests. Some situations require applying massive force in major combat operations
to eliminate a threat; others involve applying military power more selectively to achieve limited objectives.
The goal at any point is to move conditions to a lower level of violence and competition, returning U.S. forces
to a level of favorable competition below armed conflict.
RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS
1-43. The range of military operations is a conceptual model that helps relate military activities and
operations in scope and purpose to each other. During competition, Army forces conduct operations to shape
the security environment and prevent adversaries from achieving their objectives without using armed force.
In armed conflict and war, Army forces conduct operations to defeat enemy forces. In all cases, Army forces
conduct operations to establish the conditions necessary to achieve their objectives. Grouping military
operations with common characteristics in the four categories of the range of military operations helps to
describe a major operation’s general characteristics, not the details of its execution. Characterizing the
employment of military capabilities as one or another type of military operation has several benefits. For
example, publications can be developed that describe the nature, tasks, and tactics associated with specific
types of diverse operations, such as noncombatant evacuation operations and counterinsurgencies. The four
categories in the range of military operations are—
* Military engagement and security cooperation.
* Crisis response operations.
* Limited contingency operations.
* Large-scale combat operations.
Each category corresponds broadly to a range along the competition continuum and to the Army strategic
roles. (See figure 1-3 on page 1-10.) |
3-94 | 20 | Chapter 1
Figure 1-3. Army operations along the competition continuum
1-44. The range of military operations categories should not be confused with tactical tasks or activities.
Rather, they describe general characteristics of military operations and activities, not the details of their
execution. Some operations listed under one category are routinely conducted within major operations
characterized by another. For example, noncombatant evacuation operations may be conducted during
peacekeeping operations, or security force assistance activities may be performed during large-scale combat
operations. Regardless of the operations, Army forces conduct offensive, defensive, stability, and defense
support of civil authorities operations simultaneously. The preponderance of which type of operation is being
performed depends on the objectives and character of the operation. This focus will shift and change as
operations move either direction along the competition continuum.
MILITARY ENGAGEMENT AND SECURITY COOPERATION
1-45. Military engagement and security cooperation comprise all military activities that involve other
nations; they are intended to shape the security environment. Military engagement and security cooperation
include programs and exercises that the United States conducts with other nations to increase readiness,
improve mutual understanding, and improve interoperability with treaty partners or potential coalition
partners. These activities are designed to support a combatant commander’s objectives within the theater
security cooperation plan. The theater army is the primary Army echelon directing and coordinating these
operations. When directed to, divisions and corps provide forces and echelons of command and control to
support exercises or training events. Military engagement and security cooperation encourage regional
stability that supports U.S. interests. These activities may be long term, such as training teams and advisors
assisting land forces, or short term, such as multinational exercises. They generally do not include combat,
although terrorist attacks against deployed forces are possible, and forward deployed forces are at risk should
deterrence fail. Policy, regulations, and security cooperation plans, rather than doctrine, typically govern
these activities. Military engagement and security cooperation activities are usually conducted bilaterally, |
3-94 | 21 | Armies, Corps, and Divisions
but they can involve multiple nations. Examples of joint operations and activities that fall under military
engagement and security cooperation include—
* Multinational training events and exercises.
* Security assistance.
* Joint combined exchange training.
* Recovery operations.
* Arms control.
* Counterdrug activities.
CRISIS RESPONSE OPERATIONS
1-46. Crisis response operations are conducted in response to a regional or international crisis, and seek to
prevent further conflict. They have an end state clearly defined and limited in scope. Corresponding
limitations are imposed on the supporting operations and the size of the forces involved. These operations
may be phased, but they are not intended to become campaigns. Although crisis response operations are
confined in terms of end state and forces, their execution times may be lengthy. Theater armies are the Army
echelon generally responsible for commanding and controlling these operations, and additional forces are
assigned to them as required. Commanders conducting crisis response operations should carefully consider
all their actions to ensure that they do not further destabilize or inadvertently escalate the situation. Examples
of joint operations and activities that fall under crisis response operations are—
* Noncombatant evacuation operations.
* Foreign humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
* Show of force.
* Strike.
* Raid.
* Sanction enforcement.
* Reduction of weapons of mass destruction.
LIMITED CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS
1-47. Army forces in limited contingency operations strive to create security conditions conducive to a
desired political outcome, primarily through stability operations. Army forces use their offensive and
defensive capabilities to deter external and internal adversaries from overt actions against each other.
Establishing security and control enables civilian agencies to address the underlying causes of the crisis.
Army forces provide specialized support to other government agencies as necessary. Examples of joint
operations and activities that fall under limited contingency operations are—
* Irregular warfare operations.
* Stability operations.
* Peacekeeping operations.
* Counterinsurgency operations.
* Foreign internal defense.
* Security force assistance operations.
LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS
1-48. Large-scale combat operations occur in circumstances usually associated with state-on-state conflict,
formally declared or otherwise. Combat between large formations operating in all domains characterizes
these operations. Large-scale combat operations usually occur within the framework of a larger joint
campaign with an Army headquarters forming the base of a joint force headquarters. These operations
typically entail high tempo, high resource consumption, and high casualty rates.
1-49. Large-scale combat operations often include combat between both uniformed armed forces of nation
states and between irregular forces supported by both sides. In these instances, conventional and
unconventional forces will conduct operations in close proximity to each other. This proximity requires |
3-94 | 22 | Chapter 1
cooperation between forces to ensure success. It also shapes how the conflict is characterized. For example,
in Vietnam, both the United States and North Vietnam deployed their armed forces and, although major
battles occurred, the United States characterized much of the war as a counterinsurgency.
1-50. Large-scale combat operations against peer threats present additional challenges resulting from their
integrated air defense systems, long-range fires, and other advanced capabilities that limit friendly access and
freedom of action across all domains. In this highly contested multi-domain environment, armies, corps, and
divisions play pivotal roles in penetrating enemy integrated air defense systems, disintegrating the integrated
fires complex, exploiting success, and sustaining the high operational tempo across all domains required for
success.
1-51. Successful large-scale combat operations defeat or destroy an enemy’s armed forces and seize terrain.
Commanders assess them in terms of numbers of military units destroyed or rendered combat ineffective, the
level of enemy resolve, and the terrain objectives seized or secured. Not all large-scale combat operations are
protracted. Joint operations may capitalize on superior military capability to quickly overwhelm a weaker
enemy. Doctrine, including the principles of war, was originally developed for large-scale ground combat
operations.
DETERRENCE
1-52. Deterrence applies across the competition continuum. The purpose of deterrence is to dissuade an
adversary from taking undesirable actions because of friendly capabilities and the will to use them.
Deterrence takes different forms according to the particulars of the situation and its location on the
competition continuum. Many of the operations listed in the range of military operations may serve as
deterrents in certain situations. The joint force seeks to deter adversaries from taking a specific action, but
even if that fails, the force will continue to seek ways to deter further unwanted actions. For example, the
joint force seeks to deter an attack against a partner or ally, but even if that occurs it is still possible to deter
the attacker from expanding the war. (See JP 3-0 and FM 3-0 for doctrine on the competition continuum and
Army operations.)
UNIFIED ACTION AND JOINT OPERATIONS
1-53. Army forces operate with a variety of other forces and organizations in a comprehensive approach
called unified action. Unified action is the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities
of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort (JP 1).
Unified action partners are those military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and
elements of the private sector with whom Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during
the conduct of operations (ADP 3-0). These operations ensure unity of effort and create multiple dilemmas
for enemy forces that allow friendly forces to maximize the capabilities of military power.
1-54. Military operations are inherent in unified action, and they are most often joint and multinational in
execution. Joint operations are military actions conducted by joint forces and those Service forces employed
in specified command relationships with each other, which of themselves, do not establish joint forces
(JP 3-0). These operations are the primary way that the Department of Defense (DOD) employs two or more
Services in a single operation, particularly in combat. A joint force is a force composed of elements, assigned
or attached, of two or more Military Departments operating under a single joint force commander (JP 3-0).
The Army depends on and supports air, naval, and space forces across all domains. The Army supports other
Services, combatant commands, multinational forces, and unified action partners in operations as required.
Army forces give the joint force depth and versatility by offering combatant commanders multiple options
to achieve objectives.
UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS AND DECISIVE ACTION
1-55. Unified land operations is the Army’s operational concept and contribution to unified action. Unified
land operations is the simultaneous execution of offense, defense, stability, and defense support of civil
authorities across multiple domains to shape operational environments, prevent conflict, prevail in large-
scale ground combat, and consolidate gains as part of unified action (ADP 3-0). Army forces defeat enemy |
3-94 | 23 | Armies, Corps, and Divisions
forces, control terrain, protect populations, and preserve joint force freedom of action in the land domain.
Unified land operations span the entire competition continuum.
1-56. Army forces conduct decisive action. Decisive action is the continuous, simultaneous execution of
offensive, defensive, and stability operations or defense support to civil authority tasks (ADP 3-0). The
simultaneity of decisive action varies by echelon and span of control. The higher the echelon the greater the
possibility that all elements of decisive action occur simultaneously in its AO. For example, a division, corps,
or field army always performs some combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations
simultaneously. Subordinate brigades and battalions perform some combination of these operations as well,
but they are generally focused on a specific element of decisive action by their immediate priorities.
1-57. Unified land operations span the entire competition continuum. Unified land operations address
combat with armed opponents and the conduct of operations amid populations. This requires Army forces to
defeat threats while simultaneously shaping civil conditions with unified action partners, which is important
to campaign success. The relative emphasis on the various elements of decisive action vary with the purpose
and context of the operations.
ARMIES, CORPS, AND DIVISIONS IN OPERATIONS
1-58. The Army maintains and employs armies, corps, and divisions for two reasons. Foremost, they exist
to prevail in large-scale combat against peer adversaries. Second, they enable political and strategic-level
leaders to compete effectively against threats in theaters where peer adversaries have demonstrated the
capability to challenge U.S. strategic interests with military means, above or below the threshold of overt
armed conflict.
1-59. Armies, corps, and divisions converge effects from multiple domains, the electromagnetic spectrum,
and the information environment to achieve a unified purpose. Brigades and lower echelon forces can mass
effects from the physical domains, but they require significant assistance from higher echelons to converge
effects from all domains, the electromagnetic spectrum, and the information environment. The ability to
converge effects is a significant capability that echelons above brigade provide to the joint force.
1-60. The ability to converge effects rapidly is central to modern operations. First, a peer threat’s ability to
contest the joint and multinational force in all environments means that Army forces cannot rely on
capabilities in only a few domains. They must be able to leverage capabilities from across all domains in the
event that threats are able to secure initial advantages during competition or conflict. Second, by converging
capabilities from multiple directions and domains, Army forces present threats with multiple interrelated
dilemmas that are difficult to overcome. These dilemmas can allow the joint and multinational force to offset
an enemy’s superior numbers or advantages in niche capabilities, seize the initiative, and exploit fleeting
windows of opportunity to defeat the enemy.
ROLES OF THE ECHELONS
1-61. The Army employs theater armies, field armies, corps, and divisions with specific roles and
responsibilities in support of the Army’s strategic roles. These echelons are foundational to the joint and
multinational forces’ ability to conduct sustained operations on land because they provide joint force
commanders (JFCs) capabilities and capacity that exist nowhere else. From a Service perspective, they allow
the Army to tailor organizations to shape and prevent without sacrificing the Army’s ability to prevail in
large-scale ground combat and consolidate gains. From a joint perspective, these echelons provide JFCs with
a range of capabilities and command and control options depending on the mission, operational environment,
and threat.
1-62. The way in which an echelon operates depends on its mission, the operational environment, the threat,
and the type of operation it is supporting. From these considerations, these echelons may perform one of the
following roles:
* ASCC.
* ARFOR.
* Theater army.
* Field army. |
3-94 | 24 | Chapter 1
* Theater joint force land component command.
* JTF.
* Joint or coalition force land component command.
* Tactical command.
1-63. Generally, an echelon can perform no more than two of the roles effectively. ASCC and theater joint
force land component are roles that only the theater army can perform. These roles dictate how each echelon
internally organizes and trains, which doctrine it uses, and which tasks it performs. Army forces performing
joint roles require augmentation. (See Chapter 5Appendix D for information on transitioning echelons above
brigade to a joint headquarters.)
Army Service Component Command
1-64. The Army Service component command is the command responsible for recommendations to the joint
force commander on the allocation and employment of Army forces within a combatant command (JP 3-31).
ASCC is a Service role. Service component commanders retain responsibility for certain Service-specific
functions and other matters affecting their forces, including internal administration, personnel support
training, sustainment (with some exceptions), and Service intelligence operations. There can be only one
ASCC within the combatant command. This is the primary role of the theater army, the specific designation
for an operational ASCC assigned to a combatant commander with an AOR. (See Chapter 3 for more
information on the ASCC.)
Army Forces Command
1-65. The ARFOR is the Army component and senior Army headquarters of all Army forces assigned
or attached to a combatant command, subordinate joint force command, joint functional command,
or multinational command. The ARFOR is the Army component of any joint force. Army doctrine
distinguishes, however, between the Army component of a combatant command and that of a joint force
formed by the combatant commander. The Army component of the combatant command is the ASCC, and
the Army component of the subordinate joint force is an ARFOR.
1-66. The role of the ARFOR in a joint operations area (JOA) entails several responsibilities. The ARFOR
will normally exercise operational control (OPCON) over all Army forces (excluding medical support). It
identifies requirements, establishes priorities of support for Army forces, and coordinates with the theater
army for providing sustainment. The ARFOR in a JOA normally provides administrative control (ADCON)
and Title 10, United States Code (10 USC) authorities and responsibilities for Army forces in the JTF unless
these responsibilities are modified by the theater army commander. (See Appendix A for more information
on the ARFOR.)
1-67. A corps or division tactical command refers to an Army echelon primarily focused on maneuvering
subordinate units (divisions and BCTs). It is a Service role, but it may have joint or multinational forces
assigned to it.
1-68. When performing a Service role, echelons above brigade formations use Army doctrine, techniques,
and procedures. When performing a joint role, they adhere to joint doctrine, techniques, and procedures.
When performing a multinational role, leaders use approved multinational doctrine, techniques, and
procedures to supplement joint or Army doctrine as appropriate. For example, a field army serving as a
multinational joint force land component commander (JFLCC) under NATO control would use NATO
standardization agreements (also known as STANAGs), and joint doctrine, techniques, and procedures. A
corps serving as an ARFOR consisting of U.S., British, and Canadian units would use approved American,
British, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand Armies’ Program (also known as ABCANZ) standards to
supplement U.S. Army doctrine, techniques, and procedures. Likewise, a division serving as a multinational
tactical command in Korea would use approved Combined Forces Command, Korea techniques and
procedures to supplement Service-specific doctrine. |
3-94 | 25 | Armies, Corps, and Divisions
Theater Army
1-69. A theater army is an echelon of command
designated as the Army Service component Army executive agent responsibilities
command responsible for recommendations of Under the authority of the Secretary of Defense and
allocation and employment of Army forces to the 10 USC, the Army has been designated the
geographic combatant commander (JP 3-31). The executive agent by the Secretary of Defense or
Deputy Secretary of Defense for foundational
theater army is organized, manned, and equipped to
activities that are not necessarily landpower
perform four roles:
equities, but functions necessary to the entire joint
* ASCC for the GCC to which it is force. These functions include, but are not limited
assigned. This is its primary role. to—
* JTF headquarters (with augmentation) DOD detainee operations policy.
for a limited contingency operation in DOD Biometrics and Forensics.
that AOR.
Armed Services Blood Program Office.
* Joint force land component (with
Chemical and biological defense program.
augmentation) for a limited contingency
Chemical demilitarization.
operation in that AOR.
* Theater joint force land component DOD Combat Feeding Research and
Engineering Program.
(with augmentation) when designated
by the GCC. DefenseLanguageInstituteForeignLanguage
Center.
1-70. The theater army is responsible to the Department of the Army for Service-specific requirements.
DODLevelIIIcorrections.
Through the theater army, the Department of the Army provides certain support to other Services through
Explosivessafetymanagement.
several types of authorities. These are known collectively asArmy supportto otherServices (ASOS). The
GCC may designate the Army to serve as the lead Service and provide common-user logistics for the entire
theater, areas within a theater, or specific joint operations.
1-71. The theater army always maintains an AOR-wide (theater) focus, providing support to Army and joint
forces across the region, in accordance with the GCC’s priorities of support. Depending on the region and
the GCC’s priorities, the relative emphasis that the theater army places on its operational and administrative
responsibilities can vary greatly. However, the theater army’s operational requirements are generally greatest
during competition, the transition from competition to armed conflict, and the transition from armed conflict
back to competition. This is because the Army usually introduces other echelons into an AOR to relieve the
theater army’s operational burden in a potential or actual operational area when conflict is possible or likely.
This allows the theater army to focus on its Title 10, USC duties that support the theater during armed conflict.
It also frees the theater army to perform tasks that no other Army echelon can accomplish during armed
conflict: shaping the theater to improve the relative positions of advantage that the United States and its allies
enjoy, protecting against threat actions outside of an operational area, and preventing the unintended
expansion of conflict by friendly decision makers and senior commanders. However, theater army
commanders and staffs also play an important operational function during large-scale combat by detecting
and striking enemy capabilities that reside in the theater but outside of an operational area.
1-72. In its role as the ASCC, the theater army executes operational and administrative responsibilities. (See
Chapter 3 for additional information on the theater army. See ATP 3-93 for additional information on
operational and administrative responsibilities.)
Field Army
1-73. A field army is an echelon of command that employs multiple corps, divisions, multifunctional
brigades, and functional brigades to achieve objectives on land (JP 3-31). The field army, when established,
is simply a headquarters. Although it employs subordinate units during the course of operations, these units
are provided by external Army, joint, and multinational sources based on the situation, the field army’s role,
and its mission. When established, the field army will be manned and equipped to perform two roles:
* An ARFOR (with significant augmentation) in a joint force for campaigns and major operations.
* A JFLCC (with augmentation) commanding multiple U.S. and multinational corps as well as
Marine Corps forces together with supporting brigades and commands. |
3-94 | 26 | Chapter 1
1-74. When constituted, the field army provides Army, joint, and multinational forces with a headquarters
capable of performing command and control across the range of military operations. The Army deploys a
field army when a JFC or theater army commander perceives a requirement to command and control multi-
corps operations. These situations occur when multiple corps-sized formations, including U.S. Army and
multinational corps or a Marine expeditionary force, operate in a single operational area. Its most important
Service role is as the ARFOR during the conduct of operations involving multiple corps-sized formations.
The field army is best suited to serve as the JFLCC during these operations, but it requires augmentation to
perform the role successfully.
1-75. Field armies are most likely to be employed in theaters where adversaries have the capability of
conducting large-scale combat. Currently, those regions include U.S. European Command and United States
Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM).
Note. The U.S. Army currently fields one standing field army headquarters, the 8th, which is
located in Korea. However, the 8th Army is optimized for the extremely mature nature of the
Korean Theater of Operations, and for the robust U.S.-South Korean alliance structure that has
developed over the last 70 years. As such, the 8th Army may represent an imperfect model for the
wide range of activities and responsibilities required of a field army operating in another region,
under vastly different conditions.
1-76. Field armies may be constituted in a variety of ways, including from a standing force structure, from
the permanently established operational command post of a theater army, or from a contingency headquarters
constituted for a specific requirement. When constituted, field armies provide JFCs and allied organizations
with additional capability and capacity to counter peer threats. During competition below armed conflict,
they deter such threats by being prepared to transition to large-scale combat operations when the risk for
immediate multi-corps, large-scale combat is high. By focusing on activities that must occur in a subordinate
operational area, a field army allows a theater army to maintain its AOR-wide orientation as the ASCC. With
joint force augmentation, the field army may also perform joint roles during competition when operations are
of such scope that the situation would exceed a corps or division’s capability. During armed conflict, the field
army provides the basis for an ARFOR or JFLCC.
Theater Joint Force Land Component Command
1-77. When designated by the GCC, the theater army serving as the theater joint force land component
supports GCC efforts to posture for a wide range of contingencies. The theater joint force land component
conducts the GCC’s combatant command campaign plan as part of pre-conflict activities. Additionally, the
theater joint force land component is responsible for setting the theater, assessing the theater and threats,
developing the joint land operations plan, and conducting joint reception, staging, onward movement, and
integration activities for the entire land force. When directed, the theater joint force land component may
command and control the land force until a subordinate JTF and JFLCC are established. (See JP 3-31 for
more information on theater joint force land components.)
Joint Task Force
1-78. A joint task force is a joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a
combatant commander, a subordinate unified commander, or an existing joint task force commander (JP 1).
This is a joint role. Army echelons can provide the nucleus for a JTF, but they require significant joint and
multinational augmentation to perform effectively. They may also require robust augmentation from
nonmilitary unified action partners, depending on the mission. (See JP 3-0 and Appendix B of this manual
for more information on JTFs.)
Joint Force Land Component Command
1-79. A joint force land component is a command within a unified command, subordinate unified command,
or joint task force responsible for planning and coordinating land operations and accomplishing assigned
missions. A joint force land component commander is the commander within a unified command, subordinate
unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for recommending the proper |
3-94 | 27 | Armies, Corps, and Divisions
employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking land forces; planning and coordinating
land operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned (JP 3-0). A JFC usually
establishes a functional component command to conduct operations when forces from two or more Services
must operate in the same physical domain or accomplish a distinct aspect of the mission. Normally, joint land
operations involve multinational land forces. When these multinational forces fall under the command and
control of the land component commander, they become a multinational joint force land component or
combined force land component commander. These echelons can perform this role, but they require joint and
multinational augmentation to perform effectively. (See JP 3-31 and Appendix B of this manual for in-depth
information on joint force land component commanders.)
Corps
1-80. An Army corps is an echelon of command and tactical formations that employs divisions,
multifunctional brigades, and functional brigades to achieve objectives on land (JP 3-31). The corps is the
Army’s most versatile headquarters. The corps functions as one of the principal integrators of landpower into
campaigns. When a field army is not present, a corps is the primary link between the operational and tactical
levels of war. The corps is organized, manned, and equipped to serve in four roles:
* Senior Army tactical formation in large-scale combat commanding two to five Army divisions
together with supporting brigades and commands. This is its primary role.
* ARFOR (with augmentation) within a joint force for campaigns and major operations when a field
army is not present.
* JTF headquarters (with significant augmentation) for crisis response and limited contingency
operations.
* Joint force land component (with significant augmentation) commanding Marine Corps and
multinational divisions together with supporting brigades and commands.
1-81. When serving under another echelon during multi-corps operations, the corps is a tactical command.
When it is the only U.S. Army corps assigned to a higher echelon, it may serve as the ARFOR. When
operating independently during large-scale combat, the corps may serve as the ARFOR or as the JFLCC, but
it requires significant augmentation from the joint and multinational force to perform the latter role
successfully. It may also form the nucleus for a JTF or JFLCC to respond to situations exceeding a division’s
capability but not requiring more than one corps, although it would require joint force augmentation.
1-82. Regardless of its role, the corps executes both operational and administrative responsibilities for its
subordinate formations. (See Chapter 4 for a detailed description of the corps. For additional information on
operational and administrative responsibilities, see ATP 3-92.)
Division
1-83. An Army division is an echelon of command and tactical formation that employs brigade combat teams,
multifunctional brigades, and functional brigades to achieve objectives on land (JP 3-31). The division is the
primary tactical formation in the Army. The division is organized, manned, and equipped to serve in four
roles:
* Tactical formation in large-scale combat capable of commanding two to five Army BCTs together
with supporting brigades and commands. This is its primary role.
* ARFOR (with augmentation) within a JTF in crisis response and limited contingency operations.
* JTF headquarters (with significant augmentation) for crisis response operations and small limited
contingency operations.
* Joint force land component (with augmentation) under a JTF in crisis response and limited
contingency operations not requiring more than one division.
1-84. The division is a tactical unit of execution for a corps or field army. During large-scale ground combat
and the consolidation of gains, the division is a tactical command that commands and controls multiple units
to accomplish offensive, defensive, and stability tasks in its AO. Once the transition to competition begins
and higher echelons redeploy, the division may assume the ARFOR or JFLCC role in an operational area for
a limited duration, although this would require augmentation. |
3-94 | 28 | Chapter 1
1-85. During competition, the division is capable of fulfilling the ARFOR role for operations of limited scope
and duration. Under such conditions, it may also form the nucleus for a very small-scale JTF or JFLCC,
although it would require significant joint force augmentation. The division can conduct multi-service
training or administration and they can coordinate non-combat activities when serving in a joint role, but they
cannot effectively direct joint forces in combat.
1-86. The division normally focuses on operational responsibilities. Unless the division is serving as the
ARFOR, a higher echelon normally retains ADCON for all units that are not organic, assigned, or attached
to the division. However, in certain instances, the division commander may be designated the deputy ARFOR
with prescribed responsibilities when the situation warrants. (See Chapter 5 for a detailed description of the
division. For additional information on the role of the ARFOR, see Appendix B and ATP 3-91.)
OPERATIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CHAINS OF COMMAND
1-87. Echelons above brigade exercise a mixture of command relationships over subordinate forces. As
described in JP 1, the President and Secretary of Defense exercise authority and control of the armed forces
through two distinct branches of the chain of command. One branch runs from the President, through the
Secretary of Defense, to the combatant commanders for missions and forces assigned to combatant
commands. This is the operational chain of command or OPCON. For purposes other than the operational
direction of combatant commands, the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense,
to the secretaries of the Military Departments, and, as prescribed by the secretaries to the service commanders
of U.S. forces. Each Military Department operates under the authority, direction, and control of the secretary
of that Military Department. This is the ADCON of forces.
1-88. At every echelon, commanders are responsible for the operations and administration of their units and
all Army units assigned or attached to them. In joint commands, OPCON and ADCON of forces becomes
apparent. The joint commander exercises OPCON over all forces assigned to the command, and the senior
Army headquarters assigned to that command is typically responsible for executing the ADCON
responsibilities as the ARFOR for that command. The theater army provides essential support through
sustainment and medical commands as supporting headquarters to units OPCON to a supported JTF,
fulfilling its responsibility to execute ADCON responsibilities for the combatant command. It reduces the
workload imposed on the operational headquarters by shifting sustainment, support to other Services, and
multinational and combatant command support activities requirements from the corps and division. Without
it, the support requirements could overwhelm the ability of the corps and division to exercise effective
operational command of their subordinate forces.
OPERATIONAL CHAIN OF COMMAND
1-89. The assignment of forces to the combatant commands comes from the Secretary of Defense in the
Forces for Unified Commands memorandum. This memorandum is included in section III of the Global
Force Management Implementation Guidance. These force assignments are documented in the Global Force
Management Implementation Guidance assignment tables. These documents are maintained on the classified
SIPRNET and require approved access in order to view them.
1-90. There are three types of combatant commands:
Global Force Management
* Functional combatant commands have global
Implementation Guidance
responsibilities for U.S. military power, but do not have
Guidance issued by the Secretary of
an AOR.
Defense that codifies the processes
* GCC commands have a regional responsibility defined
used by Department of Defense to
by an AOR.
execute Global Force Management.
* Specified combatant commands (there are none The text in this document is updated
currently) are established by the Secretary of the Defense in even fiscal years and the Force
for a specific purpose and are normally composed of Assignment tables are updated every
forces from a single department. fiscal year.
Every combatant command has an ASCC. Table 1-1 lists eleven
combatant commands and their associated ASCC. Unless stated otherwise, any mention of ASCCs in this
manual refers to the theater armies assigned to GCCs. |
3-94 | 29 | Armies, Corps, and Divisions
Table 1-1. Combatant commanders and their Army Service component commands
Combatant Command Army Service Component Command
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (GCC) U.S. Army Pacific (theater army)
U.S. European Command (GCC) U.S. Army Europe-Africa (theater army)
U.S. Central Command (GCC) U.S. Army Central (theater army)
U.S. Africa Command (GCC) U.S. Army Europe-Africa (theater army)
U.S. Southern Command (GCC) U.S. Army South (theater army)
U.S. Northern Command (GCC) U.S. Army North (theater army)
U.S. Transportation Command (FCC) U.S. Army Surface Deployment and Distribution
Command
U.S Cyber Command (FCC) U.S. Army Cyber Command
U.S. Strategic Command (FCC) U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
U.S. Space Command (FCC) U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
U.S. Special Operations Command (FCC) U.S. Army Special Operations Command
FCC functional combatant command U.S. United States
GCC geographic combatant command
1-91. According to the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance, unless otherwise directed by
the President or the Secretary of Defense, all forces operating in the geographic area assigned to a combatant
commander are assigned or attached to that combatant commander. A force assigned or attached to a
combatant commander may be transferred from that commander to another combatant commander only when
directed by the Secretary of Defense and approved by the President. The Secretary of Defense specifies the
command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish).
Establishing authorities for subordinate unified commands and JTFs may direct the assignment or attachment
of their forces to those subordinate commands and delegate the command relationship. (See figure 1-4 on
page 1-20. See JP 1 for more information on assigned or attached forces.) |
3-94 | 30 | Chapter 1
Figure 1-4. The operational chain of command and administrative control |
3-94 | 31 | Armies, Corps, and Divisions
1-92. Inherent in command is the authority that a military commander lawfully exercises over subordinates,
including the authority to assign missions and accountability for their successful completion. Although
commanders may delegate authority to accomplish missions, they may not absolve themselves of the
responsibility for the accomplishment of these missions. Authority is never absolute; the establishing
authority specifies its extent in accordance to DOD directives and U.S. law. The specific command
relationship—combatant command, command authority (COCOM), OPCON, tactical control (TACON), and
support—will define the level of authority each commander has over assigned forces. Of note, joint and Army
command relationships are not the same. (See Appendix A for a brief summary of the joint command and
support relationships.)
1-93. The typical operational chain of command extends from the combatant commander to a JTF
commander, then to a functional component commander or a Service component commander. JTFs and
functional component commands, such as the joint force land component, comprise forces normally assigned
to a Service component command but placed OPCON to a JTF, and subsequently to a functional component
commander. Conversely, the combatant commander may designate one of the Service component
commanders as the JTF commander or as a functional component commander. In some cases, the combatant
commander may not establish a JTF, retaining OPCON over subordinate function commands and Service
components directly. (See Appendix B for possible joint task force components.)
1-94. A JTF is the organization most often used by a combatant commander for contingencies. Combatant
commanders establish JTFs and designate the JFCs for these commands. Those commanders exercise
OPCON of all U.S. forces through functional component commands, Service components, subordinate JTFs,
or a combination of these. (See JP 3-33 for a detailed description of combatant commanders).
1-95. Support is a command authority in joint doctrine. When one organization should aid, protect,
complement, or sustain another force, a supported and supporting relationship is established by a superior
commander between subordinate commanders. Designating a support relationship does not provide authority
to organize and employ commands and forces, nor does it include authoritative direction for administrative
and logistics support.
1-96. JP 1 specifies four categories of support:
* General support.
* Mutual support.
* Direct support.
* Close support.
1-97. General support is support given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision
thereof. Mutual support is that support that units render each other against an enemy because of their assigned
tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, and their inherent capabilities. Direct support is
a mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to the
supported force’s request for assistance. Close support is that action of the supporting force against targets
or objectives sufficiently near the supported force as to require detailed integration or coordination of the
supporting action with the fire, movement, or other actions of the supported force.
1-98. Joint support relationships are somewhat vague but very flexible. Establishing authorities ensure both
supported and supporting commanders understand the authority of supported commanders. JFCs often
establish supported and supporting relationships among components. For example, the maritime component
commander is normally the supported commander for sea control operations; the air component commander
is normally the supported commander for counterair operations. Another example, a field army headquarters
designated as the joint force land component may be the supporting force during some campaign phases and
the supported force in other phases. Often the JFC specifies only a supported and supporting relationship
between forces. In that case, the supporting force will be in general support.
Note. A joint support relationship is not used when an Army commander task-organizes
subordinate Army forces. When task-organized to support another Army force, Army forces use
one of four Army support relationships: direct support, reinforcing, general support, or general
support - reinforcing. (See ADP 3-0 for more information on Army support relationships.) |
3-94 | 32 | Chapter 1
1-99. The JFC may establish a support relationship between functional and Service component commanders.
Conducting operations across a large operational area often involves both the land and air component
commanders. The JTF commander places the joint force land component in general support of the air
component until the latter achieves air superiority. Conversely, in the land AO, the JFLCC becomes the
supported commander and the air component commander provides close air support.
1-100. When a field army or corps headquarters becomes the joint force land component as part of a JTF,
normally subordinate Army units are attached, and OPCON is inherent. Marine Corps forces made available
to a joint force land component are normally under TACON, but the JFC may specify an OPCON
relationship. (See JP 3-31 for more information on OPCON relationships.) The JFLCC makes
recommendations to the JFC on properly using attached, OPCON, or TACON assets; planning and
coordinating land operations; and accomplishing operational missions.
1-101. When the Secretary of Defense assigns Army forces to a combatant command, the transfer is either
permanent or the duration is unknown but very lengthy. The combatant commander exercises COCOM over
assigned forces. When the Secretary of Defense allocates Army units (from United States Army Forces
Command [FORSCOM] or a supporting combatant command) to another combatant command, the transfer
of units is temporary. Allocated forces normally return to their parent combatant command at the end of the
deployment. The combatant commander exercises OPCON of the allocated force. In either case, the
combatant commander normally exercises OPCON over Army forces through the ASCC until the combatant
commander establishes a JTF and functional components. At that time, the combatant commander delegates
OPCON to the JTF commander. When the JFC establishes any command relationship (including a joint
support relationship), the theater army clearly specifies sustainment responsibilities for all affected Army
commanders.
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL
1-102. Administrative control is the direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other
organizations in respect to administration and support (JP 1). This administration and support includes
organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics,
individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not
included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. It is a Service authority, not a
joint authority.
1-103. ADCON is exercised under the authority of and is delegated by the Secretary of the Army. ADCON
is synonymous with the Army’s 10 USC authorities and responsibilities. (See AR 10-87 for more information
on ADCON.) Unless modified by the Secretary of the Army, administrative responsibilities normally flow
from the Department of the Army through the ASCC to those Army forces assigned, attached, or OPCON to
that combatant command. As the ASCC, the theater army delegates ADCON authorities and responsibilities
as required to Army forces attached by the combatant commander to a joint (or joint and multinational) task
force. The ARFOR commander exercises delegated ADCON of Army forces within that JTF as specified by
the theater army commander.
OVERLAPPING OPERATIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CHAINS
1-104. Typically, Army units are either assigned or attached to other Army units and ADCON
responsibilities for those units accompanies this command relationship. Any ADCON responsibilities not
transferred to the gaining command are specified in the order. In circumstances where Army units are
OPCON or TACON to another Army unit, the order should specify what ADCON responsibilities shift to
the gaining command. Similarly, when an Army headquarters receives OPCON of forces from other Services,
any specific support requirements should be detailed in the order. In some limited contingency operations,
the JFC may elect to employ Marine Corps and Army forces as Service components, instead of creating a
functional joint force land component. In that case, the ARFOR and Marine Corps forces would exercise
OPCON and ADCON over their respective Service forces. This arrangement may occur in a forcible entry
operation due to the complexity of parachute, air, and amphibious operations and limited time available for
joint integration. As soon as the JOA matures with the arrival of follow-on forces and headquarters, the JFC
may establish a joint force land component command. |
3-94 | 33 | Armies, Corps, and Divisions
1-105. Figure 1-6 illustrates another case. If Army forces are the only conventional land forces attached to
a JTF, the JFC may conduct operations with the ARFOR serving as both the Service and operational-level
land component of that task force. Since the ARFOR does not control other Service forces, it is not a joint
force land component commander. However, it functions as a co-equal component to the functional
components—the joint force air component commander, joint force maritime component commander, and
joint force special operations component commander—within the JTF. The ARFOR employs landpower to
accomplish the objectives of the campaign. Its focus is at the operational level. As the Service component,
the ARFOR has ADCON over all the Army units attached to the JTF. It does not have OPCON over all the
Army units in this example.
Figure 1-6. Joint task force organized by Service and functional components
1-106. Multinational operations may also complicate the chain of command. In general, multinational
forces will operate under the TACON of a U.S. headquarters. However, the National Command Authority of
the multinational force may impose constraints on the use of their forces. Army forces may operate under the
TACON or in direct support of a multinational headquarters, but they remain subject to U.S. command. The
ARFOR retains ADCON over all Army units under multinational command. The ARFOR and its supporting
sustainment command will often provide support to multinational forces within a coalition. The combatant
commander normally provides a formal agreement negotiated between the supported multinational force and
the U.S. joint force based on agreements concluded at the national level.
1-107. Although nations will often participate in multinational operations, they rarely relinquish national
command of their forces. As such, forces participating in a multinational operation will have at least two
distinct chains of command: a national chain of command and a multinational chain of command. As
Commander in Chief, the President retains and cannot relinquish national command over U.S. forces.
Command authority for a multinational force commander is normally negotiated between the participating
nations and can vary from nation to nation. U.S. Army forces can operate under the TACON of, or in direct |
3-94 | 34 | Chapter 1
support to, a multinational headquarters, but they remain subject to U.S. command. The ARFOR retains
ADCON over all Army units under multinational command. The ARFOR and its associated sustainment
command often provide support to multinational forces. The combatant commander normally provides a
formal agreement negotiated between the multinational forces and the U.S. forces, based on agreements
concluded at the national level. (See JP 3-16 for more information on multinational commands.)
SUSTAINMENT
1-108. Recent changes in sustainment doctrine have revised the Army’s sustainment concept. Each echelon
of command has a command relationship with a sustainment headquarters to support large-scale combat
operations. Every theater army has an assigned theater sustainment command (TSC). Field armies and corps
have an assigned or attached expeditionary sustainment command (ESC). Divisions have an assigned division
sustainment brigade. These units will typically have a general support relationship with all of the subordinate
units in the command. Each of these headquarters will be task-organized with subordinate units based on
support requirements. TSCs, ESCs, and division sustainment brigades all execute six core missions:
* Assist the logistics directorate of a joint staff (known as J-4) or the assistant chief of staff, logistics
(G-4) in determining sustainment requirements and developing the concept of support through
parallel planning.
* Manage sustainment operations at each echelon.
* Provide general support to units assigned to the rear area. Additionally, sustainment units may be
tasked to support units passing through an operational area.
* Provide direct support to units operating in the subordinate maneuver unit AOs.
* Provide general support to all subordinate units of the command.
* Integrate and synchronize all sustainment functions, including medical support, throughout an
operational area.
(See FM 4-0, ATP 4-91, ATP 4-71, and ATP 4-93 for additional information on echelon sustainment.)
MEDICAL SUPPORT
1-109. The medical command (deployment support) (MEDCOM [DS]) is the senior medical command in
a theater, and it is assigned to an ASCC to support large-scale combat operations. The MEDCOM (DS) will
receive medical brigades, multifunctional medical battalions, and hospital centers based on the force structure
and staff estimates. The MEDCOM (DS) provides health service support and force health protection to
tactical commanders at echelons above brigade. Medical units are typically in a command relationship with
the MEDCOM (DS) and a supporting relationship with maneuver commands. Based on the theater concept
of medical support, the MEDCOM (DS), medical brigade, and multifunctional medical battalions coordinate
with the surgeon’s cells from battalion through ASCC level to provide Army health support. The sustainment
command is responsible for the integration and synchronization of sustainment in the AOR. Medical
commands are responsible for command and control, integration, synchronization, and execution of Army
Health System support in the AOR. These medical units work with the surgeon’s cells and sustainment
commands at each echelon to integrate the concept of medical support with the overall concept of support
for that maneuver unit. Medical units are not placed in a command relationship with the sustainment
headquarters. (See figure 1-7 for an example of what this sustainment and medical structure could look like
in large-scale combat operations.) |
3-94 | 35 | Armies, Corps, and Divisions
Figure 1-7. Sustainment, medical command, and support relationships in large-scale combat
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
1-110. Recent doctrine has changed how special operations forces support combatant commanders, JFCs,
and ambassadors across the competition continuum with discrete, precise, and scalable operations. Special
operations forces in a theater will typically remain under the OPCON of the theater special operations
command which may also act as a joint force special operations component commander. When required, a
joint special operations task force, typically commanded by a major general, may be established to command
and control special operations forces in an AO. The overall JTF commander will typically exercise TACON
over the joint special operations task force, and the JTF commander will establish a supporting and supported
relationship between special operations forces and the other components (including land, air, and maritime)
based on the requirements of an operation. (See ADP 3-05 for more information on special operations forces
roles, characteristics, and core competencies.)
1-111. The special operations component may establish a subordinate special operations command and
control element as the focal point for coordination and integration between special operations forces and a
conventional headquarters. A special operations command and control element is task-organized and
provided a tailored communications package depending upon the requirements of an operation. The
personnel may include forces from special forces, Ranger, psychological operations, civil affairs,
sustainment, and special operations aviation units, as well as joint special operations forces. A special
operations command and control element is normally co-located at corps level and above, with smaller liaison
teams operating at division and lower echelons; however, the scale of an operation may require an expansion
of the capabilities provided at echelons below corps. A supported unit provides the special operations
command and control element the required sustainment support. At corps level, the special operations |
3-94 | 36 | Chapter 1
command and control element coordinates with the corps staff to deconflict targets and operations. It provides
near real time locations of special operations units and provides overlays and other data to the fire support
element and the battlefield coordination detachment.
1-112. To integrate fully with conventional and joint operations, Army special operations units must
maintain effective liaison and coordination elements with all components of the force to synchronize effects
created in the joint operational area. To support this effort, joint forces, conventional forces, and special
operations units exchange a variety of liaison and coordination elements in addition to the special operations
command and control element provided by the higher echelon special operations commander. These liaison
and coordination elements range in size from individual liaisons to small coordination elements. Whatever
their size or location, these elements coordinate and synchronize missions in other units’ areas of operations.
1-113. In addition to the exchange of liaisons, the theater army, corps, and division headquarters include
civil affairs and psychological operations personnel in the assistant chief of staff, operations (G-3) and chief
of staff, civil affairs operations (known as G-9) sections. Additionally, corps and division headquarters have
a limited number of special forces personnel in the G-3 section. Field army headquarters can expect to receive
the same personnel when they are established. Their respective commanders can leverage these personnel to
improve integration, interoperability, and interdependence.
OPERATIONAL AREAS
1-114. This manual refers throughout to a hierarchy of operational areas. An operational area is an
overarching term encompassing more descriptive terms (such as area of responsibility and joint operations
area) for geographic areas in which military operations are conducted (JP 3-0). Operational areas have
physical dimensions composed of some combination of air, land, maritime, and space domains. The size of
operational areas and the type of forces employed in them vary depending on the mission.
1-115. GCCs conduct operations with their assigned AOR from the unified campaign plan. An area of
responsibility is the geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a geographic
combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations (JP 1). In an AOR, the combatant
commander exercises COCOM over assigned forces. All U.S. forces in an AOR (assigned, attached, OPCON,
or in transit through the region) fall under the control of that GCC for as long as they remain in the AOR.
The theater army commander exercises OPCON and ADCON for all Army forces in an AOR, except for
Army forces in transit.
Note. Joint doctrine lists three additional operational areas: the theater of war, the theater of
operations, and amphibious operations areas. These operational areas are not used often; therefore,
they are not included in this chapter. (See JP 3-0 for a more detailed description of these areas.)
JOINT OPERATIONS AREAS AND AREAS OF OPERATIONS
1-116. When combatant commanders establish subordinate joint commands, normally JTFs, they assign
them a joint operations area that encompasses the three dimensional volume of sea, land, and air in which the
JTF will operate. A joint operations area is an area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic
combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a joint force commander (normally a
JTF commander) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission (JP 3-0). The JFC may
specify an area for special operations forces, designated as a joint special operations area. A joint special
operations area is an area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a joint force commander to the commander
of a joint special operations force to conduct special operations activities (JP 3-0).
1-117. An area of operations is an operational area defined by a commander for land and maritime forces
that should be large enough to accomplish their missions and protect their forces (JP 3-0). An AO assigned
to the joint force land component does not typically encompass the entire operational area of the JFC. The
JFLCC establishes an operational framework for the AO that assigns responsibilities to subordinate land
commanders and maximizes the operational capabilities of all subordinate areas. This operational framework
typically includes subordinate AOs in which their subordinate forces operate. (See figure 1-8.) |
3-94 | 37 | Armies, Corps, and Divisions
Figure 1-8. The area of responsibility and joint operations areas
1-118. In the AO designated by the JFC, the joint force land component (or ARFOR) commander is the
supported commander. In the AO, the JFLCC (or ARFOR commander) integrates and synchronizes
maneuver, fires, and interdiction. To facilitate this integration and synchronization, these commanders have
the authority to designate target priority, effects, and timing of fires in their AO.
1-119. Synchronization of operations in the land AO with operations in the JOA is of particular importance.
To facilitate synchronization, the JFC establishes priorities for all forces within the JOA, including land
forces. In coordination with the JFLCC, those commanders designated by the JFC to execute AOR- or JOA-
wide functions have the latitude to plan and execute these JFC prioritized operations in the land AO.
However, any commander accomplishing such a mission in a land AO must coordinate the operation to avoid
adverse effects and fratricide. If those operations can adversely impact the land AO, the commander assigned
to execute the JOA-wide functions must re-adjust the plan, solve the problem with the JFLCC, or consult
with the JFC for resolution.
CONTIGUOUS AND NONCONTIGUOUS OPERATIONAL AREAS
1-120. Commanders may divide operational areas one of three ways: contiguous subordinate AOs,
noncontiguous subordinate AOs, or a combination of the two. When they are contiguous, a boundary
separates them. When AOs are noncontiguous, subordinate commands do not share a boundary. The higher
echelon headquarters retains responsibility for the unassigned portion of its operational area.
1-121. In most operations, commanders seek to employ contiguous operational areas to ensure subordinates
are in mutually supporting range of each other while avoiding gaps and seams in responsibility. Contiguous
AOs may also provide additional security for maneuver units and headquarters and support units. In some
operations, an operational area or subordinate AO may be so large that subordinate units operate in a
noncontiguous manner, widely distributed and beyond mutually supporting range of each other. (See
figure 1-9.) |
3-94 | 38 | Chapter 1
Figure 1-9. Contiguous and noncontiguous areas of operations
1-122. Commanders generally consider noncontiguous AOs or the combination of both contiguous and
noncontiguous AOs based on these factors: insufficient forces to cover the entire AO, geographic isolation
based upon terrain, or time constraints for completing the mission. The reasons for using a noncontiguous
area vary, but they begin with geographical separation of important terrain from the remainder of the AO. A
commander’s decision to deploy part of a force in noncontiguous AOs is derived from the commander’s
analysis of the operational and mission variables. In particular, the commander evaluates threat forces and
their ability to mass sufficient combat power to threaten friendly forces. Second, the commander evaluates
the ability of threat forces to sever lines of communication between the noncontiguous AOs. Finally, the
commander assesses the risks of having isolated forces defeated in detail against what may be gained in
mission accomplishment.
1-123. While a commander can always choose to use noncontiguous AOs based upon specific operational
variables, the most obvious AOR requiring the use of noncontiguous areas of operations is the U.S.
Indo-Pacific Command AOR. The geography and distances involved between island chains force a
noncontiguous approach to land combat that relies heavily on joint capabilities.
CONCLUSION
1-124. Armies, corps, and divisions conduct operations from the range of military operations across the
competition continuum as part of a joint and multinational force. These echelons are capable of converging
combat power from multiple domains, the electromagnetic spectrum, and the information environment to
achieve a unified purpose. |
3-94 | 39 | Armies, Corps, and Divisions
1-125. Today’s OE requires Army forces to continuously evaluate and adapt their operations to ensure they
are appropriate. The Army’s conduct of modern operations reveals insights especially relevant for armies,
corps, and divisions:
* The Army operates as part of a joint force and, when necessary, a multinational coalition. This
requires an understanding of joint concepts and multinational considerations to be successful.
* All major operations combine offensive, defensive, and stability operations and tasks executed
simultaneously at multiple echelons.
* An OE evolves over time due to military operations. It also evolves because of outside variables
and interactions.
* Operations conducted during one phase of a campaign or major operation directly affect
subsequent operations and phases. Commanders should conduct current operations in a manner
that sets the conditions necessary for future operations and ultimately the de-escalation from armed
conflict to a lower level on the competition continuum.
* Major operations are conducted not only to defeat an adversary or enemy but also to create the
conditions for the long-term consolidation of gains. The military plays a large role in this effort,
even after major combat operations have ended. However, long-term success is not possible
without the other instruments of national power and a whole-of-nation approach.
* In any campaign or major operation, changing conditions require Army forces to adapt their
tactics, techniques, and procedures to the operational environment. Successfully navigating these
transitions requires collaboration between learning organizations. Commanders need to constantly
assess the situation and desired objectives to ensure they are still desirable.
* Regardless of how long operations are expected to last, commanders should consider transitions
and begin planning early for them. Failure to adequately plan for transitions may result in conflict
mutation as defeated enemy forces transition to different forms of resistance, protracting the
conflict, and changing the nature of operations. |
3-94 | 41 | Chapter 2
Operational Art and Science
Logistics comprises the means and arrangements which work out the plans of strategy and
tactics. Strategy decides where to act; logistics brings the troops to this point.
Antoine Henri de Jomini
Operational art, and the science that informs it, represents the mechanism through
which armies, corps, and divisions generate and apply combat power to achieve
objectives and accomplish missions. This chapter describes operational art and the
elements used in designing operations. The chapter then describes operational-level
combat power considerations.
OPERATIONAL ART
2-1. Military operations require integrating ends, ways, means, and risk across the levels of warfare. Joint
and Army echelons above brigade commanders and staffs do this through operational art. Operational art is
the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience,
creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military
forces by integrating ends, ways, and means (JP 3-0). Operational art applies to all types and aspects of
operations. It helps commanders and staffs understand, visualize, and describe operations, as shown in
figure 2-1.
Figure 2-1. Operational art
2-2. Operational art is not limited to a specific echelon or role. Rather, multiple echelons performing joint
and Service roles within the scope of operational art all contribute to the arrangement of tactical actions in
time, space, and purpose to pursue strategic objectives. Operational art links the echelons above brigade to
each other, and to the joint and multinational force, to ensure unity of effort. Applying operational art requires
commanders and staffs to answer the following questions: |
3-94 | 42 | Chapter 2
* What is the current state of the operational environment (OE)?
* What conditions, when established, constitute the desired end state (ends)?
* How will the force achieve these desired conditions (ways)?
* What sequence of actions helps attain these conditions (ways)?
* What resources are required to accomplish that sequence of actions (means)?
* What is the chance of failure or unacceptable consequences in performing that sequence of actions
(risk)?
DESIGNING CAMPAIGNS AND OPERATIONS
To be practical, any plan must take account of the enemy’s power to frustrate it; the best
chance of overcoming such obstruction is to have a plan that can be easily varied to fit the
circumstances met; to keep such adaptability, while still keeping the initiative, the best way
is to operate along a line which offers alternative objectives.
Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart
2-3. Commanders and staffs use two methodologies in the application of operational art. JFCs use
operational design to develop operation plans and operation orders for the conduct of campaigns and
operations. Operational design is the conception and construction of the framework that underpins a planning
(JP 5-0). The framework is built upon an iterative process that creates a shared understanding of an OE;
identifies and frames problems within that OE; and develops approaches, through the application of
operational art, to resolving those problems, consistent with strategic guidance and policy. The understanding
and products developed from operational design guide more detailed planning during the joint planning
process. (See JP 5-0 for doctrine on operational design and joint planning process.)
2-4. Army commanders and their staffs apply operational art and employ Army design methodology in the
development of supporting plans to joint operation plans or operation orders. Army design methodology is a
methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe problems and
approaches to solving them (ADP 5-0). The Army design methodology is best suited to competition short of
large-scale combat. It is a prerequisite for setting the conditions for success because it looks broadly at the
environment. Army design methodology is associated with conceptual planning that helps commanders and
staffs frame an OE, frame problems, and develop an operational approach to resolve identified problems.
Army design methodology informs more detailed planning conducted during the military decision-making
process. (See ADP 5-0 for doctrine on Army design methodology and the military decision-making process.)
While different, operational design and Army design methodology are used to—
* Create a shared understanding of an OE.
* Identify and frame problems within an OE.
* Envision a desired end state.
* Develop an operational approach to achieve the end state.
2-5. A key output of operational design and Army design methodology is an operational approach—a
broad description of the mission, operational concepts, tasks, and actions required to accomplish the mission
(JP 5-0). The operational approach provides the framework for a campaign or operation, serves as the basis
for detailed planning, and facilitates unity of purpose across the force. Operational art and design do not
occur in a vacuum. An echelon’s operational approach—and the context that informs it—is based on the
operational approach of its higher headquarters, and informs subordinates’ development of their operational
approaches. Whenever possible, commanders should also include any unified action partners in these efforts
as early as feasible.
COMPONENTS OF DESIGN
2-6. Several tools are available to assist commanders and staffs in designing campaigns and operations,
including the principles of joint operations, elements of operational design, and the elements of operational
art as listed in figure 2-2. In addition, commanders and staffs consider both defeat and stability mechanisms
when developing their operational approach. These tools help commanders understand, visualize, and |
3-94 | 43 | Operational Art and Science
describe operations and help to formulate their commander’s intent, operational approach, and planning
guidance.
Figure 2-2. Components of design
2-7. The twelve principles of joint operations represent important factors that affect the conduct of
operations across the levels of warfare. The principles are broadly applied considerations and their relevance
varies in each situation, but they are not a checklist. Commanders consider all twelve principles, but they
may not apply them in the same way in every operation. The principles summarize the characteristics of
successful operations throughout history. (See JP 3-0 for a detailed description of the principles of joint
operations.)
2-8. Joint force commanders and staff use the elements of operational design when designing campaigns
and operations. As some elements of operational design only apply to JFCs (for example termination), the
Army modifies the elements of operational design into elements of operational art as shown in figure 2-2.
Echelons above brigade headquarters frequently participate in joint planning and receive joint operation plans
and operation orders. As such, they must be knowledgeable with both the elements of operational design and
the elements of operational art. JP 5-0 describes each element of operational design in detail. The remainder
of this section describes the Army’s elements of operational art and the defeat and stability mechanisms used
in the development of supporting plans to joint campaigns and operations.
End State and Conditions
2-9. A military end state is the set of required conditions that defines the achievement of all military
objectives. It normally represents a point in time and circumstances beyond which the President does not
require the military instrument of national power as the primary means to achieve remaining national
objectives. Determining the military end state of a campaign or joint operation links the operational and
strategic levels of warfare, and is thus the purview of the JFC, not functional commanders or those of Service
echelons. |
3-94 | 44 | Chapter 2
2-10. Military end state and termination are directly related. Termination criteria are the specified standards
approved by the President and/or the Secretary of Defense that must be met before a military operation can
be concluded (JP 3-0). At times, strategic-level leaders may express the standards that a JFC must meet before
military operations can conclude explicitly. When this occurs, these termination criteria inform the military
end state. However, many times such precision is impossible, especially early in a campaign or major
operation. When the termination criteria are implicit, the JFC often develops proposed termination criteria
based on the envisioned military end state. In such cases, the JFC briefs the termination criteria and military
end state to strategic-level leaders, who then approve both elements. As operations progress and conditions
change, the military end state and termination criteria may also change. When this occurs, commanders at
every level must reexamine all aspects of operational design to ensure that their activities remain relevant;
and if not, they determine what changes are necessary to achieve the updated ends. These changes may
require consultation with, and approval from, strategic leaders.
2-11. Army, corps, and division commanders must clearly understand the military end state and termination
criteria when developing the end states for their supporting operations. An operation’s end state is the set of
required conditions that defines achievement of the commander’s objectives (JP 3-0). A condition reflects
the existing state of an OE. Thus, a desired condition is a sought-after change to an OE. Since every operation
should focus on a clearly defined and attainable end state, accurately describing conditions that represent
success is essential. Commanders explicitly describe end state conditions that guide the development of their
operational approach. Commanders summarize the operation’s end state in their commander’s intent. A
clearly defined end state promotes unity of effort, facilitates integration and synchronization of the force, and
guides subordinates initiative during execution.
Center of Gravity
For Alexander, Gustavus Adolphus, Charles XII, and Frederick the Great, the center of
gravity was their army. If the army had been destroyed, they would all have gone down in
history as failures.
Carl von Clausewitz
2-12. A center of gravity is the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action,
or will to act (JP 5-0). The loss of a center of gravity can ultimately result in defeat. Centers of gravity are
not limited to military forces, and they can be either physical or moral. Physical centers of gravity, such as a
capital city or military force, are tangible and typically easier to identify, assess, and target than moral centers
of gravity. Forces can often influence physical centers of gravity solely by military means. In contrast, moral
centers of gravity are intangible and more difficult to influence. Moral centers of gravity exist in the minds
of the people involved in the conflict. They can include a charismatic leader, powerful ruling elite, or the will
of a population.
2-13. As an element of operational art, a center of gravity analysis helps commanders and staffs understand
friendly and enemy sources of strength and weakness. This understanding helps commanders and staffs
determine ways to undermine enemy strengths by exploiting enemy vulnerabilities while protecting friendly
vulnerabilities from enemies attempting to do the same. Understanding friendly and enemy centers of gravity
helps commanders and staffs identify decisive points and determine an operational approach to achieve the
end state. (See JP 5-0 for more detailed information on center of gravity analysis.)
Decisive Points
2-14. A decisive point is a key terrain, key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, enables
commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy or contribute materially to achieving success
(JP 5-0). Identifying decisive points helps commanders to select clear, conclusive, attainable objectives that
directly contribute to achieving the end state. Geographic decisive points can include port facilities,
distribution networks and nodes, and bases of operation. Specific events and elements of an enemy force may
also be decisive points. Examples of such events include commitment of an enemy operational reserve and
reopening a major oil refinery.
2-15. A common characteristic of decisive points is their importance to a center of gravity. Decisive points
are not centers of gravity; they are key to attacking or protecting centers of gravity. A decisive point’s |
3-94 | 45 | Operational Art and Science
importance may cause the enemy to commit significant resources to defend it. The loss of a decisive point
weakens a center of gravity and may expose more decisive points, eventually leading to an attack on the
center of gravity itself.
2-16. Generally, more decisive points exist in a given operational area than available forces and capabilities
can attack, seize, retain, control, or protect. Accordingly, planners study and analyze decisive points and
determine which offer the best opportunity to attack the enemy’s center of gravity, extend friendly operational
reach, or enable the application of friendly forces and capabilities. Operational art includes selecting decisive
points that best lead to establishing end state conditions in a sequence that most quickly and efficiently leads
to mission success.
Center of Gravity: Republican Guard Divisions in the
1991 Gulf War
The coalition campaign to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation in the 1991 Gulf War
provides an example of a military force massing combat power to destroy an enemy
center of gravity. For the defending Iraqi Army, its Republican Guard divisions served
as its operational-level center of gravity and mechanized core of its strategic fighting
capacity. Coalition planners identified this factor and planned accordingly to first
reduce the elite Republican Guard with air and ground fires and then follow with an
envelopment from the West by the VII Corps and XVIII Airborne Corps to destroy or
dislodge the entrenched defenders in the deserts of Southern Iraq.
The Battle of Medina Ridge on 26 and 27 February unfolded on the VII Corp’s left flank
as a decisive maneuver in the campaign. The massive envelopment saw the
1st Armored Division attack through forward Iraqi defenses and then destroy a brigade
of the Tawakalna Division, a brigade of the Adnan Infantry Division, and most
importantly, most of the powerful Medina Division. Its 2nd Brigade alone fought the
single largest armored engagement of the war against its counterpart in the Medina
Division where it destroyed 61 tanks, 34 armored personnel carriers, and 5 air defense
systems in a single hour.
Throughout the Battle of Medina Ridge, the 1st Armored Division experienced over
48 hours of continuous and intense combat while advancing 115 kilometers (71 miles)
into Southern Iraq. Tactical successes like this occurred along the entire corps front
and effectively destroyed the Republican Guard’s ability to fight, and with it, the Iraqi
Army’s capacity and will to defend in depth. At the strategic level, the destruction of
their operational center of gravity convinced the Iraqi national command that they could
not win the war and resulted in a dramatic retreat and the complete liberation of Kuwait.
2-17. Decisive points identified for action become objectives. An objective can be physical (an enemy force
or a terrain feature) or conceptual (established rule of law). In the physical sense, an objective is a location
on the ground used to orient operations, phase operations, facilitate changes of direction, and provide for
unity of effort. In the conceptual sense, an objective is the clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward
which an operation is directed (JP 5-0). Objectives provide the basis for determining tasks to subordinate
units. The most important objective forms the basis for developing the decisive operation. Combined with
end state conditions, objectives form the building blocks for developing lines of operations and lines of effort. |
3-94 | 46 | Chapter 2
Lines of Operations and Lines of Effort
If the art of war consists in bringing into action upon the decisive point of the theater of
operations the greatest possible force, the choice of the line of operations, being the
primary means of attaining this end, may be regarded as the fundamental idea in a good
plan of a campaign.
Antoine Henri de Jomini
2-18. Lines of operations and lines of effort link objectives in time, space, and purpose to achieve end state
conditions, as shown in figure 2-3. A line of operations links a base of operations to physical objectives that
link to end state conditions. Lines of effort link tasks with goal-oriented objectives that focus toward
establishing end state conditions. Commanders describe an operation along lines of operations, lines of effort,
or a combination of both in their operational approach. Commanders may designate one line as decisive and
others as shaping.
Figure 2-3. Sample line of operations and line of effort
2-19. A line of operations is a line that defines the directional orientation of a force in time and space in
relation to the enemy and links the force with its base of operations and objectives (ADP 3-0). Lines of
operations connect a series of intermediate objectives that lead to control of a geographic or force-oriented
objective. Operations designed using lines of operations generally consist of a series of actions executed
according to a well-defined sequence.
2-20. Lines of operations can be categorized as interior and exterior. The choice of using interior or exterior
lines supports a concept based on the length of movement and the supporting lines of sustainment.
Commanders choose interior lines because lines of movement and sustainment in an enclosed area are shorter
than those lines outside the enclosed area. Interior lines are lines on which a force operates when its operations
diverge from a central point. Interior lines allow commanders to move quickly against enemy forces along
shorter lines of operations.
2-21. Exterior lines are lines on which a force operates when its operations converge on enemy forces. This
requires the attacking force to be stronger or more mobile than the enemy force. Exterior lines allow
commanders to concentrate forces against multiple positions on the ground, thus presenting multiple
dilemmas to the enemy force. Exterior lines facilitate seizing opportunities to encircle and destroy the weaker
or less mobile enemy force. While commanders operating on interior lines have the opportunity to set the
width of the battlefield, commanders operating on exterior lines have set the disposition of their forces to
deploy them outside their boundaries. |
3-94 | 47 | Operational Art and Science
2-22. A line of effort is a line that links multiple tasks using the logic of purpose rather than geographical
reference to focus efforts toward establishing a desired end state (ADP 3-0). Lines of effort are essential to
long-term planning when positional references to an enemy or adversary have little relevance. In operations
involving many nonmilitary factors, lines of effort may be the only way to link tasks to the end state. Lines
of effort often enable commanders to visualize how military capabilities can support the other instruments of
national power.
Tempo
2-23. Commanders and staff consider tempo both when planning and executing operations. Tempo is the
relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect to the enemy (ADP 3-0). It reflects
the rate of military action. Controlling tempo helps commanders keep the initiative during operations. During
large-scale combat, commanders seek to maintain a higher tempo than the enemy does; a rapid tempo can
overwhelm an enemy’s ability to counter friendly actions. During other operations dominated by stability
operations tasks, commanders act quickly to control events and deny enemy forces positions of advantage.
By acting faster than the situation deteriorates, commanders can change the dynamics of a crisis and restore
stability.
2-24. Several factors affect tempo, including sustainment and decisions on when and where to consolidate
gains. Having adequate forces to consolidate gains simultaneously while maintaining the offense enables
greater tempo. This is a key consideration for theater-level planning when determining force allocation and
tailoring in support of operation plan development. Commanders and staffs use effective planning to
accelerate tempo by anticipating decisions and actions in advance. This emphasis on increased tempo, while
a guiding principle, is not an unbending rule. Commanders weigh the advantages of acting more quickly
against the advantages of preparing more thoroughly. Army forces expend more energy and resources when
operating at a high tempo. Commanders assess their force’s capacity to operate at a high tempo based on its
performance and available resources. An effective operational approach varies tempo throughout an
operation to increase endurance while maintaining speed and momentum. There is more to tempo than speed.
While speed can be important, commanders balance speed with endurance and reach.
Phasing and Transitions
2-25. Commanders and staffs use planning to determine the sequence of actions—including the phases and
transitions—that best accomplishes the mission and achieves the desired end state. Ideally, commanders plan
to accomplish a mission with simultaneous and integrated actions throughout their area of operations (AO).
However, operational reach, resource constraints, and the size of the friendly force limits what units can do
at one time. In these cases, commanders phase operations. Phasing provides a way to view and conduct
operations in manageable parts.
2-26. A phase is a planning and execution tool used to divide an operation in duration or activity (ADP 3-0).
Within a phase, a large portion of the force executes similar or mutually supporting activities. Achieving a
specified condition or set of conditions typically marks the end of a phase. Commanders phase operations as
required by the specific circumstances of the problem they are trying to solve. A change in phase usually
involves a change of mission, task organization, or rules of engagement. Phasing helps in planning and
controlling operations during execution. Phasing may be indicated by time, distance, terrain, or an event.
Well-designed phases—
* Focus effort.
* Concentrate combat power in time and space at a decisive point.
2-27. Transitions mark a change of focus between phases or between the ongoing operation and execution
of a branch or sequel. Shifting priorities among the offense, defense, and stability also involves transitions.
Transitions require planning and preparation so the force can maintain the initiative and tempo of operations.
Transitions normally occur whenever there is an abrupt change to an OE, threat, or friendly forces.
Transitions can be planned or unplanned, but any transition creates a period of vulnerability for the side in
transition.
2-28. Unplanned transitions present the most danger to a force. Whenever possible, leaders must anticipate
transitions through effective planning and preparation, and they mitigate or exploit their effects accordingly. |
3-94 | 48 | Chapter 2
However, since some transitions may defy anticipation, leaders always design and prosecute operations with
flexibility in mind. Maintaining reserves is one way of maintaining flexibility.
2-29. Anticipating transitions and managing them effectively are a commander’s responsibility. When
commanders anticipate a transition, they, their staffs, and subordinate leaders carefully consider these actions
to ensure success:
* Forecasting in advance when and how to transition.
* Arranging tasks to facilitate transitions.
* Creating a task organization that anticipates transitions.
* Rehearsing certain transitions such as from defense to counterattack or from offense to
consolidating gains.
2-30. Forces are vulnerable during transitions, so commanders establish clear conditions for their execution.
Commanders and staffs identify potential transitions and account for them throughout execution. Effective
commanders consider the time required to plan for and execute transitions. Assessment helps commanders
measure progress toward transitions and take appropriate actions to execute them. Each echelon has a
responsibility to anticipate and facilitate transitions for subordinate echelons.
Operational Reach
2-31. While designing operations, it is critical to consider operational reach—the distance and duration
across which a force can successfully employ military capabilities (JP 3-0). The limit of a unit’s operational
reach is its culminating point. The concept of operational reach is inextricably tied to the concept of basing
and lines of operations. Reach may be constrained by the geography, threats, and environmental conditions
in and around an operational area. Reach may be extended through forward positioning of capabilities and
resources, leveraging host nation and contracted support, and maximizing the throughput efficiency of the
distribution system.
2-32. Sustainment enables operational reach. Commanders and staffs increase operational reach through
deliberate, focused operational design and appropriate sustainment resource allocation. This requires
strategic sustainment capabilities such as materiel, supplies, health services, and other support and the global
distribution systems to deploy, maintain, and conduct operations over great distances for extended periods.
Army forces can increase the joint force’s ability to extend operational reach by securing and operating bases
in the AOR, the use of contracted and local procurements, and the use of aerial delivery. |
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Operational Reach and Basing: Sixth Army in the Philippines
Campaign
In the fall of 1944, the US military expanded its Pacific Campaign to recapture the
Philippines from Japanese control. As the equivalent of a land component command,
this required the U.S. Sixth Army to extend its reach from recently seized positions in
New Guinea to Leyte in the Philippines for an amphibious assault against entrenched
defenders. The offensive, which would enable control of the South Pacific, required an
integrated joint approach with supporting naval and air commands to enable movement
of multiple U.S. Army corps across over 2,550 kilometers (1585 miles) of
noncontiguous maritime spaces.
Once Allied air and naval forces had cleared the way to Leyte, the Sixth Army launched
from New Guinea in mid-October, prepared for the impending attack during transport,
and finally executed a coastal assault from the west on the island. With the X Corps
and the 1st Cavalry and 24th Infantry Divisions attacking to the north and the XXIV
Corps and the 7th and 96th Infantry Divisions attacking farther south, the invasion force
fought through monsoon rains that limited air support. Over the next two months, the
Allies defeated the 65,000 defenders of Japan’s 35th Army in vicious jungle combat.
Basing on Leyte positioned the Sixth Army for its decisive operation: an attack on
Luzon where over 275,000 Japanese troops defended the island. As the U.S. Navy
repelled the Japanese Imperial Navy to retain maritime control, the field army
expanded its reach with new airfields and fortified bases to facilitate the projection,
sustainment, and support of its forces on Luzon. The final offensive to recapture the
Philippines, two years after they were lost, featured aggressive maneuver by both
corps with Filipino support. The 1st Cavalry Division’s final capture of Manila illustrated
the benefits of the Sixth Army’s use of the principle of reach and the success of the
joint campaign.
Culmination
2-33. The limit of a unit’s operational reach is its culminating point. The culminating point is the point at
which a force no longer has the capability to continue its form of operations, offense or defense (JP 5-0).
Culmination represents a crucial shift in relative combat power. It is relevant to both attackers and defenders
at each level of warfare. On the offense, the culminating point occurs when a force cannot continue an attack
and must assume a defensive posture or execute an operational pause. While conducting defensive tasks, it
occurs when a force can no longer defend itself and must withdraw or risk destruction. The culminating point
is more difficult to identify when Army forces conduct stability tasks. Two conditions can result in
culmination: units too dispersed to achieve security and units lacking required resources to achieve the end
state.
2-34. Commanders ensure forces and assets arrive at the right times and places to support the operation and
that sufficient resources will be available when needed in the later phases. Integration and synchronization
of sustainment with the concept of operations can forestall culmination and help commanders control tempo.
At both tactical and operational levels, logistics planners forecast the expenditure of resources associated
with conducting operations over extended distances and times. They respond by generating enough military
resources at the right times and places to enable their commanders to achieve operational objectives before
reaching their culminating points.
Basing
2-35. Basing is an indispensable part of operational art that enables lines of operations and operational reach.
A base is a locality from which operations are projected or supported (JP 4-0). Determining the location and
sequence of establishing bases and base camps is essential for projecting power and sustaining the force. A |
3-94 | 50 | Chapter 2
base may be joint or single Service, and it will routinely support both U.S. and multinational forces and
interagency partners. Commanders designate a specific area as a base or base camp and assign responsibility
to a single commander for protection, terrain management, and day-to-day operations. Basing is always a
critical consideration when arranging operations at any echelon, because bases directly support or
determine—
* The joint and multinational force’s proximity to an operational area.
* The force’s reach and endurance.
* The depth the force can achieve.
* How quickly the force can generate, apply, converge, and reconstitute combat power.
2-36. Bases exist both in the U.S. and in foreign nations, and they may be temporary or permanent. Types of
bases include installations, base camps, intermediate staging bases, forward operating bases, and lodgments.
Units located in the base or base camp are under the TACON of the base or base camp commander for base
security and defense. In large echelon support areas or joint security areas (JSAs), controlling commanders
may designate base clusters for mutual protection and to exercise command and control. When a base camp
expands to include clusters of sustainment, headquarters, and other supporting units, echelon commanders
may designate a support area. These specific areas of operations facilitate the positioning, employment, and
protection of resources required to sustain, enable, and control operations. Army forces typically rely on a
mix of bases and base camps to serve as intermediate staging bases, lodgments, and forward operating bases.
(See JP 3-34 and ATP 3-37.10 for more information on base camps.)
Risk
It is my experience that bold decisions give the best promise of success. But one must
differentiate between strategical or tactical boldness and a military gamble. A bold
operation is one in which success is not a certainty but which in case of failure leaves one
with sufficient forces in hand to cope with whatever situation may arise. A gamble, on the
other hand, is an operation which can lead either to victory or to the complete destruction
of one’s force.
Field Marshal Erwin Rommel
2-37. Risk, uncertainty, and chance are inherent in all military operations. Success during operations depends
on a willingness to identify, mitigate, and accept risk to create opportunities. When considering how much
risk to accept, commanders consider risk to the force and risk to the mission. Commanders need to balance
the tension between protecting the force and accepting risks that must be taken to accomplish their mission.
They apply judgment with regard to the importance of an objective, the time available, and the anticipated
cost.
2-38. The mission command approach requires that commanders and subordinates accept risk, exercise
initiative, and act decisively, even when the outcome is uncertain. Commanders focus on creating
opportunities rather than simply preventing defeat—even when preventing defeat appears safer. Reasonably
estimating and intentionally accepting risk is not gambling. Gambling is making a decision in which the
commander risks the force without a reasonable level of information about the outcome. Therefore,
commanders avoid gambles. Commanders carefully determine risks, analyze and minimize as many hazards
as possible, and then accept risks to accomplish the mission.
2-39. Inadequate planning and preparation put forces at risk, as does delaying action while waiting for perfect
intelligence and synchronization. Reasonably estimating and intentionally accepting risk is fundamental to
successful operations. Experienced commanders balance audacity and imagination against risk and
uncertainty to strike in a manner, place, and time unexpected by enemy forces. This is the essence of surprise.
Planning should identify risks to mission accomplishment. Part of developing an operational approach
includes answering the question, “What is the chance of failure or unacceptable consequences in employing
the operational approach?” Risk decisions range from ways to address resource shortfalls to when to
transition the force or parts of the force to the consolidation of gains. Staffs communicate identified risks to
higher echelon headquarters, and the commander’s planning guidance provides risk mitigation guidance. |
3-94 | 51 | Operational Art and Science
2-40. Risk cuts across the levels of warfare. A risk decision at one level directly affects the other levels. JFCs
and their component commanders are uniquely positioned uniquely to assess risk across the levels of warfare.
They inform strategic-level risk decisions, or act to shape tactical-level risk decisions. They inform strategic-
level risk decisions in several ways. First, they frankly provide their best military advice, and they clearly
articulate their assessment of the probable risks associated with a decision. Second, they provide superiors
insight into how changes to an OE affect U.S. and multinational interests and objectives. Third, when they
determine that an imbalance between the ends, ways, and means available for prosecuting operations is
creating risk, they adjust the ways in which they operate by securing additional means to achieve the desired
end state or by dialoguing with strategic leaders to adopt an end state more achievable with the resources
available.
Defeat and Stability Mechanisms
2-41. Commanders consider defeat and stability mechanisms when developing their operational approach.
Defeat mechanisms relate to offensive and defensive operations, while stability mechanisms relate to stability
operations. Army forces use combinations of four defeat mechanisms: destroy, dislocate, disintegrate, and
isolate.
* Destroy is a tactical mission task that physically renders an enemy force combat-ineffective until
it is reconstituted. Alternatively, to destroy a combat system is to damage it so badly that it cannot
perform any function or be restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt
(FM 3-90-1).
* Dislocate means to employ forces to obtain significant positional advantage, rendering the
enemy’s dispositions less valuable, perhaps even irrelevant (ADP 3-0).
* Disintegrate means to disrupt the enemy’s command and control system, degrading its ability to
conduct operations while leading to a rapid collapse of the enemy’s capabilities or will to fight
(ADP 3-0).
* Isolate means to separate a force from its sources of support in order to reduce its effectiveness
and increase its vulnerability to defeat (ADP 3-0).
2-42. Applying more than one defeat mechanism simultaneously produces complementary and reinforcing
effects not attainable with a single mechanism. Used individually, a defeat mechanism achieves results
relative to the amount of effort expended. Using defeat mechanisms in combination creates enemy dilemmas
that magnify their effects significantly. Commanders and staffs use operational art to formulate the most
effective, efficient way to apply defeat mechanisms. Physically destroying enemy forces deprives them of
the ability to achieve those aims. Temporally dislocating enemy forces anticipates their reactions and nullifies
them before they can become effective. Cognitively disintegrating enemy forces disrupts their decision
making and erodes their will to fight.
2-43. As with defeat mechanisms, combinations of stability mechanisms produce complementary and
reinforcing effects that accomplish the mission more effectively and efficiently than single mechanisms do
alone. The four stability mechanisms are compel, control, influence, and support.
* Compel means to use, or threaten to use, lethal force to establish control and dominance, affect
behavioral change, or enforce compliance with mandates, agreements, or civil authority.
* Control involves imposing civil order.
* Influence means to alter the opinions, attitudes, and ultimately the behavior of foreign friendly,
neutral, adversary, and enemy audiences through messages, presence, and actions.
* Support establishes, reinforces, or sets conditions necessary for the instruments of national power
to function effectively.
Echelons focused on the consolidation of gains employ combinations of both defeat and stability
mechanisms. |
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OPERATIONAL-LEVEL COMBAT POWER CONSIDERATIONS
No army can be efficient unless it be a unit for action; and the power must come from
above, not below.
Lieutenant General William T. Sherman
2-44. Commanders and staff at all echelons must understand and master both the art of command and the
science of control to apply operational art. Understanding an OE and its problems, determining an operation’s
end state, establishing objectives, and sequencing an operation in broad terms are part of operational art.
Many aspects of operations, such as movement rates, fuel consumption, weapons effects, and unit
capabilities, are quantifiable. They are part of the military science that enables operational art. Effectively
generating and applying combat power not only requires an understanding of operational art, but it also
requires a detailed understanding of military science.
2-45. Combat power is the total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a
military unit or formation can apply at a given time (ADP 3-0). Combat power has eight elements: leadership,
information, command and control, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection.
The Army collectively describes the last six elements as warfighting functions—a group of tasks and systems
united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions (ADP 3-0). Commanders apply
combat power through the warfighting functions using leadership and information guided by the principles
of mission command as shown in figure 2-4.
Figure 2-4. Elements of combat power
2-46. Combat power includes all capabilities provided by joint forces and other unified action partners that
are integrated and synchronized to achieve objectives and accomplish missions. All echelons generate and
apply combat power. Theater and field armies (when constituted) tend to focus on generating combat power
and allocating resources to corps and divisions. Corps and division headquarters tend to focus on
synchronizing and applying combat power to accomplish tasks and achieve objectives. The remainder of this
section provides considerations for the generation and application of combat power at the operational and
higher tactical levels. |
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LEADERSHIP
The American soldier…demands professional competence in his leaders. In battle, he
wants to know that the job is going to be done right, with no unnecessary casualties.
General Omar N. Bradley
2-47. Before an operation, combat power is unrealized potential. Through leadership, this potential is
transformed into action. Leadership is the activity of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and
motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization (ADP 6-22). Influencing is persuading
people to do what is necessary. Influencing entails more than simply passing along orders. Through words
and personal example, leaders inspire purpose, provide direction, and motivation. The Army acknowledges
three levels of leadership—
* Direct.
* Organizational.
* Strategic.
2-48. Factors determining a leadership level include the leader’s relationship to a subordinate, number of
subordinates, scope of responsibility, and time horizons of missions. Regardless of which level a leader serves
in, a leader is always a direct leader. Direct leaders are task oriented. Organizational leaders are both task and
mission oriented and lead through subordinate leaders. Strategic leaders apply a global, regional, national,
and societal perspective to the organizations they lead. Organizational and strategic leaders lead through
others.
2-49. Commanders, deputy commanders, and primary staff officers at echelons above brigade headquarters
exercise organizational leadership. Organizational leaders apply the principles of mission command and
exercise leadership through subordinate leaders responsible for leading the various organizations that make
up the larger organization. Since missions for larger organizations are more complex and involve concurrent
efforts, leaders at higher echelons must encourage subordinate initiative. Effective organizational leaders
must delegate authority, support their subordinates’ decisions, and hold them accountable for their actions.
Successful delegation of authority involves convincing subordinates that they are empowered and have the
freedom to act independently. Empowered subordinates understand that they bear more than the
responsibility to accomplish tasks. They have the authority to operate as they see fit, within the limits of the
commander’s intent and available resources. (See ADP 6-0 for more information on the mission command
approach.)
2-50. Organizational leaders, particularly commanders, are responsible for communicating intent two
echelons down and understanding intent two echelons up. This is essential for unity of effort and purpose
among echelons. Organizational leaders operate within their commanders’ intent and communicate that intent
to subordinates as a means of providing room for subordinate initiative and decreasing the number of
decisions they must personally make to keep the organization operating effectively. Organizational
leadership includes responsibility over multiple functions, such as leading and synchronizing major
operations. (See ADP 6-22 for doctrine on Army leadership.)
INFORMATION
2-51. Information, as an element of combat power, is used in three ways. First, information is used as a
resource to create the situational understanding necessary for accurate decision making. Second, Army forces
use information to direct and coordinate actions in the execution of those decisions. Third, information is
used to affect relevant actor behavior, including friendly, neutral, and threat audiences.
2-52. Information enables commanders at all levels to make informed decisions about the application of
combat power. Success in operations demands timely and effective decisions based on applying judgment to
available information and knowledge. As such, commanders and staffs seek to build and maintain situational
understanding throughout an operation. Situational understanding is the product of applying analysis and
judgment to relevant information to determine the relationships among the operational and mission variables
(ADP 6-0). They also use information to build shared understanding of the situation and purpose of operations
across the force. |
3-94 | 54 | Chapter 2
2-53. Multiple processes and activities such as planning, assessment, intelligence, information collection,
reporting, collaboration, rehearsals, and liaison all help build, maintain, and share understanding. Knowledge
management and information management assist commanders with progressively adding meaning at each
level of processing and analyzing to help build and maintain understanding as shown in figure 2-5. (See
ATP 6-01.1 for more information on knowledge management.)
Figure 2-5. Building understanding
2-54. Based on their situational understanding, commanders and staffs use information to direct action. Plans
and orders are the primary means for communicating direction. Commanders issue plans and orders to
subordinates to communicate their visualization of operations and to direct actions. Plans and orders
synchronize the action of forces in time, space, and purpose to achieve objectives and accomplish the mission.
They inform others outside the organization on how to cooperate and provide support.
2-55. Information is also a powerful tool to influence the behavior of relevant actors in an OE. Commanders
and their units must coordinate what they do, say, and portray. Every engagement, battle, and major operation
requires complementary information operations to slow and impair enemy decision making, as well as work
in consonance with public affairs to inform a global audience and with PSYOP to influence audiences in an
operational area. Fundamental to this effort is integration of information related capabilities to provide
options for the commander and support warfighting functions. At the operational level information operations
affects enemy decision making, supports commander decision points and warfighting functions, and
complements the joint and theater level strategic messaging. (See FM 3-13 for doctrine on information
operations).
Note. Joint doctrine lists information as a joint function. The information function encompasses
the management and application of information and its deliberate integration with other joint
functions (command and control, intelligence, fires, protection, and sustainment) to influence
relevant actor perceptions, behavior, action or inaction, and support human and automated
decision making. (See JP 3-0 for a description of the joint functions.) The Army considers
information an essential element of all warfighting functions.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
In general, campaign projects have to be adjusted to conditions (time, weather), the
number of the enemy. …The more one foresees obstacles to his plans, the less one will find
of them later in the execution. In a word, everything must be foreseen; find the problems
and resolve them.
Frederick the Great
2-56. Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander
over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission (JP 1). Commanders exercise their
authority and direction through the command and control warfighting function—the related tasks and a
system that enable commanders to synchronize and converge all elements of combat power (ADP 3-0). The
command and control tasks are—
* Command forces.
* Control operations.
* Drive the operations process.
* Establish the command and control system. |
3-94 | 55 | Operational Art and Science
2-57. The command and control system is the arrangement of people, processes, networks, and command
posts that enable commanders to conduct operations (ADP 6-0). The command and control system supports
the commander’s decision making, disseminates the commander’s decisions to subordinates, and facilitates
controlling forces. Commanders employ their command and control system to enable the people and
formations conducting operations to work towards a common purpose. (See ADP 6-0 for a detailed
description of the command and control tasks and the command and control system.)
2-58. Mission command and its principles guide commanders and
staffs in the exercise of command and control. Mission command Principles of Mission Command
is the Army’s approach to command and control that empowers Competence.
subordinate decision making and decentralized execution Mutual trust.
appropriate to the situation (ADP 6-0). Mission command requires
Shared understanding.
an environment of trust and shared understanding among
Commander’s intent.
commanders, staffs, and subordinates. It requires building
effective teams and a command climate in which commanders Mission orders.
encourage subordinates to accept risk and exercise initiative to Disciplined initiative.
seize opportunities and counter threats within the commander’s
Risk acceptance.
intent. Through mission orders (what to do, not how to do it),
commanders focus leaders on the purpose of the operation rather
than on the details of how to perform assigned tasks. Doing this minimizes detailed control and allows
subordinates the greatest possible freedom of action to accomplish tasks. Finally, when delegating authority
to subordinates, commanders set the necessary conditions for success by allocating appropriate resources to
subordinates based on assigned tasks. (See ADP 6-0 for a detailed description of the mission command
approach and its principles.)
2-59. Similar to the leadership levels (direct, organizational, and strategic) described in paragraph 2-47, the
exercise of command and control varies by echelon. Higher echelons generally have longer planning
timelines and often must anticipate and make decisions concerning operations well in advance of execution.
The scale and scope of authority and direction required is also significantly different among echelons.
Delegating authority and empowering subordinate commanders and leaders to accomplish tasks and missions
is essential at higher echelons.
2-60. The tasks and subtasks associated with command and control are numerous, ranging from planning
operations to establishing communications networks. In addition to developing an operational approach, two
related command and control tasks set the framework for echelons above brigade operations. They are—
* Organize the force.
* Establish an operational framework.
ORGANIZING THE FORCE
2-61. Organizing the force, including establishing command and support relationships, is essential for
establishing unity of effort. How commanders organize their force affects how they generate and apply
combat power. Commanders organize their force through two methods, each of which considers the
appropriateness of means at echelon based upon the operational and mission variables. The methods of
organizing the force are—
* Force tailoring.
* Task-organizing.
Force Tailoring
2-62. Force tailoring is the process of determining the right mix of forces and the sequence of their
deployment in support of a joint force commander (ADP 3-0). Force tailoring combines two complementary
requirements—selecting the right forces and deploying the forces in the optimal sequence. The first—
selecting the right force—involves identifying, selecting, and sourcing required Army capabilities and
establishing their initial task organization to accomplish the mission. The result is an Army force package
matched to the needs of the combatant commander. The second requirement of force tailoring establishes
order of deployment for the force package, given the available lift and the combatant commander’s priorities. |
3-94 | 56 | Chapter 2
Tailoring the force is a complicated and intensely managed Army-wide process, and the theater army plays
a critical role in it.
2-63. Most Army conventional operating forces are designated as “Service Retained” forces in the Global
Force Management Implementation Guidance assignment tables and are primarily based in the continental
United States. United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), the largest of the Army commands,
commands Active Component conventional forces (Regular Army, mobilized Army National Guard, and
mobilized Army Reserve), executes training and readiness oversight of Army National Guard forces under
state command, and it does the same for non-mobilized Army Reserve units.
2-64. Based upon requirements developed by the theater armies and validated by the combatant commander
and the joint staff, the Department of the Army and FORSCOM develop force packages for deployment and
employment into an AOR. This includes forces for contingencies and forces needed to support security
cooperation activities. A tailored force package is task-organized by FORSCOM to facilitate strategic
deployment and support the gaining JFC’s operational requirements. FORSCOM is not the sole provider of
Army forces; other supporting ASCCs may contribute forces as directed by the Secretary of Defense. The
result is a set of trained and ready Army forces intended either for contingencies or for planned deployments,
such as a rotation of forward-based forces.
2-65. The theater army recommends the optimum deployment sequence for Army forces to the GCC’s staff.
The GCC’s staff may modify this recommendation in coordination with FORSCOM and United States
Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) based upon factors such as available lift, location, and readiness
of deploying forces, and surface transportation requirements. The theater army adjusts support provided by
theater assets to match the requirements of the joint and Army forces on the ground. Figure 2-6 shows an
example of force tailoring. |
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Figure 2-6. Force tailoring
Task-Organizing
2-66. Task-organizing is the act of designing a force, support staff, or sustainment package of specific size
and composition to meet a unique task or mission (ADP 3-0). It includes providing forces to subordinate
commanders and establishing their command and support relationships. This occurs in tailored force
packages as commanders organize subordinate units for specific missions and employ doctrinal command
and support relationships. As task-organizing continues, commanders reorganize units for subsequent
missions. The ability of Army forces to rapidly task-organize gives them extraordinary agility. It lets
commanders configure their units to best use available resources. It also allows Army forces to match unit
capabilities to tasks. The ability of sustainment forces to tailor and task-organize ensures commanders have
freedom of action to change with mission requirements. |
3-94 | 58 | Chapter 2
Rapid Task Organization: 30th Infantry Division in the Normandy
Campaign
From June to October of 1944 in the European theater of operations in the Second
World War, the U.S. Army executed 9 changes in corps alignment under field armies
and more than 65 changes of division alignment under corps commands. This required
corps, divisions, brigades, and battalions to execute task organization changes rapidly,
often while in contact with the enemy, to provide maximum flexibility and options to
higher commands. By making organizational transitions a routine action, the Allies
were able to converge and mass combat power at decisive points to achieve the
objectives of the Normandy invasion, break through the German defenses, and
advance into the French interior.
The wartime experience of the 30th Infantry Division and its 14,000 Soldiers illustrated
the opportunities and challenges created by rapid and continuous changes to task
organization. On 11 June, “Old Hickory” joined the war with an uncontested landing on
the Normandy beaches under command of the VII Corps. Less than a week later, it
reported to XIX Corps to execute its first combat action with one regiment even as the
rest of its forces came ashore. The division, when fully consolidated, next defended
the vulnerable lines between American beachheads to allow the Allies to mass combat
power and then subsequently the division attacked across the Vire River to repel a
German counterattack.
Beginning on 15 July, the 30th Division served as a lead element in Operation Cobra
as the Allies broke through the German defenses surrounding Normandy. The division
initially secured the departure point for the entire Allied operation, then executed a
mid-night reassignment to VII Corps, and finally resumed its advance the next morning.
Seeking to exploit success, the command transferred back to XIX Corps to repel a
German counterattack, moved to the V Corps, and then rejoined XIX Corps to repulse
a major counterattack at Avranches. This flexibility in changing task organization
ultimately allowed field commanders to continuously mass and reallocate combat
power at decisive points in the campaign.
Command and Support Relationships
2-67. Establishing clear command and support relationships is the basis for establishing an effective task
organization. These relationships establish responsibilities and authorities between subordinate and
supporting units. Some command and support relationships limit the commander’s authority to prescribe
additional relationships. Knowing the inherent responsibilities of each command and support relationship
allows commanders to effectively organize their forces and helps supporting commanders understand their
unit’s role in the organizational structure.
2-68. Army echelons above brigade commanders and staffs must clearly understand joint command
relationships and authorities as well as Army command and support relationships. Differences stem from the
way Army forces task-organize internally and the need for a system of support relationships between Army
forces. Another important difference is the requirement for Army commanders to handle the ADCON of
forces. These differences allow for flexible allocation of Army capabilities within various Army echelons.
Army command and support relationships are the basis for building Army task organizations. (See Chapter
5Appendix A for a detailed description of command and support relationships.)
Span of Control
2-69. Span of control is an important consideration when task-organizing the force. Span of control refers to
the number of subordinates or activities under the control of a single commander. A commander’s span of |
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control should not exceed that commander’s capability to command effectively. The optimal number of
subordinates is situation dependent. The more fluid and rapidly changing the situation, the fewer subordinate
elements a commander can command and control effectively. Within this situation-dependent range, a greater
number of subordinates allows greater flexibility, and this increases options and combinations. However, as
the number increases, commanders, at some point, lose the ability to control all subordinate forces. At this
point, the only way to reintroduce flexibility is to group elements into a smaller number of parts, creating
another echelon of command. Establishing a field army headquarters to control multiple corps and divisions
in large-scale combat operations is an example.
ESTABLISH AN OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK
2-70. The operational framework provides an organizing construct for how commanders intend to organize
their AO geographically (deep, close, rear, and support areas), by purpose (decisive, shaping, and sustaining
operations), and by effort (main and supporting). When establishing their operational framework,
commanders consider the physical, temporal, virtual, and cognitive factors that impact their AOs.
Collectively, these considerations allow commanders and staffs to better account for the multi-domain
capabilities of friendly and threat forces.
Land Force Area of Operations
2-71. Based on their visualization of an operation, the JFC may designate land and maritime AOs as
described in Chapter 1. Depending on how the joint force is organized, the land AO may be assigned to a
land component commander or divided into land AOs by Service commanders (for example ARFOR and
Marine Corps).
2-72. For land operations, an AO includes subordinate AOs assigned by Army commanders to their
subordinate echelons. The Army commander or JFLCC is the supported commander within an AO designated
by the JFC for land operations. In their areas of operations, commanders integrate and synchronize combat
power. To facilitate this integration and synchronization, commanders designate targeting priorities, effects,
and timing of fire and maneuver in their AO. Component commanders with assigned AOs designate
subordinate AOs in which their subordinate forces operate. The use of unit boundaries delineates
responsibilities of subordinate units, facilitates control, and enables freedom of action. Unit responsibilities
in an assigned AO include—
* Terrain management.
* Information collection.
* Civil-military operations.
* Movement control.
* Clearance of fires.
* Security.
* Personnel recovery.
* Airspace control.
* Minimum essential stability tasks.
2-73. Commanders consider a unit’s area of influence when assigning it an AO. An area of influence is a
geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations by maneuver or fire
support systems normally under the commander’s command or control (JP 3-0). Understanding an area of
influence helps commanders and staffs plan branches to the current operation in which the force uses
capabilities outside the AO. An AO should not be substantially larger than the unit’s area of influence.
Ideally, the area of influence would encompass the entire AO. An AO too large for a unit to effectively
control increases risk, allowing sanctuaries for enemy forces and limiting joint flexibility.
2-74. An area of interest is that area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas
adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory (JP 3-0). This area also includes areas occupied by enemy
forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. An area of interest for stability or defense
support of civil authorities may be much larger than that area associated with the offense and defense. The |
3-94 | 60 | Chapter 2
area of interest always encompasses aspects of the air, cyberspace, and space domains, since capabilities
resident in all three enable and affect operations on land.
Deep, Close, Rear, and Support Areas
2-75. In their assigned AOs, Army commanders designate deep, close, rear, and support areas to describe
the physical arrangement of forces in time, space, and focus. These areas are typically defined by the
boundaries assigned by the higher echelon headquarters. A boundary is a line that delineates surface areas
for the purpose of facilitating coordination and deconfliction of operations between adjacent units,
formations, or areas (JP 3-0). Boundaries may require adjustment based on actual and projected rates of
maneuver or changes to the situation. Paragraphs 2-76 through 2-81 provide a summary of the geographic
areas. (See Appendix C for a detailed description of the areas within a unit AO and the interrelationships of
those areas among echelons.)
Deep Area
2-76. The deep area is where the commander sets conditions for future success in close combat (ADP 3-0).
Operations in the deep area involve efforts to prevent uncommitted enemy forces from being committed in a
coherent manner. A commander’s deep area generally extends beyond subordinate unit boundaries out to the
limits of the commander’s designated AO. The purpose of operations in the deep area is often tied to setting
conditions for future events in time and space. Operations in the deep area might disrupt the movement of
operational reserves or prevent enemy forces from employing long-range fires. Planning for operations in the
deep area includes considerations for information collection, airspace control, joint fires, obstacle
emplacement, maneuver (air and ground), special operations, and information and supporting deception
operations. Field army, corps, and division deep areas often overlap. Commanders coordinate and de-conflict
operations in these areas through the use of control measures (for example, phase lines, fire support
coordination line, kill boxes) and by target and target sets. (See ATP 3-94.2 for a more detailed description
of deep operations.)
Close Area
2-77. The close area is the portion of the commander’s area of operations where the majority of subordinate
maneuver forces conduct close combat (ADP 3-0). Commanders plan to conduct decisive operations using
maneuver and fires in the close area, and they position most of the maneuver force in it. In the close area,
depending on the echelon, one unit may conduct the decisive operation while others conduct shaping
operations to fix a specific enemy formation or defeat remnants of by-passed or defeated enemy forces.
Planning for operations in the close area includes fire control measures, movement control measures,
maneuver, and obstacle emplacement. Operations in the close area are inherently lethal because they often
involve direct fire engagements with enemy forces seeking to mass direct, indirect, and aerial fires against
friendly forces. The field army and corps close area includes the AOs of committed division and separate
maneuver brigades. The division close area is primarily where BCTs operate.
Rear Area
2-78. The rear area is that area in a unit’s AO extending forward from its rear boundary to the rear boundary
of the area assigned to the next lower level of command. It is an area where most forces and assets locate that
support and sustain forces in the close area. Rear operations include—
* Security.
* Sustainment.
* Terrain management.
* Movement control.
* Protection.
* Infrastructure development.
2-79. Similar to a rear area, JFCs establish a JSA. A joint security area is a specific area to facilitate
protection of joint bases and their connecting lines of communications that support joint operations (JP 3-10).
Corps and divisions have rear areas that expand during offensive operations. The field army’s rear area is |
3-94 | 61 | Operational Art and Science
normally the JSA; however, the field army may expand its rear area beyond the JSA as it shifts the rear
boundaries of its subordinate corps.
Support Area
2-80. Commanders designate support areas within the rear area. A support area is the portion of the
commander’s AO that is designated to facilitate the positioning, employment, and protection of base
sustainment assets required to sustain, enable, and control operations (ADP 3-0). It is where most of the
echelon’s sustainment capabilities originate from and includes lines of communication, bases, and base
clusters. The support area is generally the AO assigned to a maneuver enhancement brigade (MEB). The
MEB is responsible for terrain management, movement control, mobility support, clearance of fires, and
tactical combat forces for security. This allows sustainment units to focus on their primary function. Field
armies, corps, and divisions may have one or multiple support areas, located as required to best support the
force.
Decisive, Shaping, and Sustaining
2-81. This decisive, shaping, and sustaining framework lends itself to a broad conceptual orientation of the
operation. When used in conjunction with the other frameworks, it provides greater understanding of the
purpose that the formation is trying to accomplish. The decisive operation is the operation that directly
accomplishes the mission (ADP 3-0). It is the focal point around which commanders design their entire
operation. The commander conducts decisive operations by—
* Task-organizing for the decisive operation.
* Allocating resources by establishing priorities of support.
* Echeloning combat power.
* Assigning appropriate areas of operations.
* Employing other forces to shape conditions to guarantee success of the decisive operation.
2-82. Commanders identify a single decisive operation and arrange all other operations around that
operation. A decisive operation may include multiple subordinate units to ensure its success. This is
especially true at higher echelons where the size and scale of enemy forces may make it impossible for a
single unit to complete the decisive operation. No echelon will have more than one decisive operation unless
its mission changes or conditions in an OE change to such a degree that it requires a reconsideration of
objectives. Commanders will assign the preponderance of their combat power to the decisive operation, while
shaping operations receive the minimum combat power necessary for their operations. Weighting the decisive
operation requires the commander to accept risk to guarantee the success of the decisive operation. If shaping
and decisive operations require more combat power than can be provided simultaneously, the commander
phases the operation to allow combat power to transfer from shaping operations to the decisive operations
when the decisive operations begin. |
3-94 | 62 | Chapter 2
Desert Storm: A Decisive Offensive Operation
On 24 February 1991, after a 38-day major shaping operation by the U.S. Central
Command air component with land component support, Army forces began one of the
most decisive land combat operations of modern warfare. Army forces attacked Iraqi
forces as part of a coalition offensive. XVIII Airborne Corps was in the west with VII
Corps on its right flank. First (Tiger) Brigade, 2d Armored Division, attacked as part of
the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force in the east. Army forces quickly penetrated Iraqi
defenses, rapidly seizing their objectives. Soldiers used advanced technology that
allowed vehicle and air crews to acquire and engage targets from beyond the range of
Iraqi weapons systems. The shock effect of armor and well-trained infantry, coupled
with overwhelming aviation deep and close attacks, massed indirect fires in depth, and
responsive sustainment shattered the Iraqi army. XVIII Airborne Corps maneuvered
100 miles north and 70 miles east into Iraq; VII Corps maneuvered 100 miles north and
55 miles east. Coalition forces destroyed 3,800 of 4,200 tanks, over half the personnel
carriers, and nearly all of the 3,000 artillery pieces belonging to the Iraqi Army. Coalition
forces captured over 60,000 prisoners. After 100 hours of combat, only 7 of 43 Iraqi
divisions remained combat effective. The coalition had crushed the fourth largest army
in the world and liberated Kuwait.
2-83. A shaping operation is an operation at any echelon that creates and preserves conditions for success
of the decisive operation through effects on the enemy, other actors, and the terrain (ADP 3-0). These
operations may occur throughout an AO involving various combinations of forces and capabilities. Shaping
operations set the conditions for the success of the decisive operation by preparing and isolating the
battlefield, disrupting the enemy’s ability to synchronize forces, deceiving the enemy, and delaying the entry
of enemy reinforcements to the main battle area. They also set conditions for the success of subordinate
echelons and their freedom of action. At higher echelons, commanders generally identify more than one
shaping operation to support the decisive operation. At the operational level, depth and timing distinguish
shaping operations. Given the operational reach of the joint force, shaping operations extend to, in some cases
beyond, the limits of the operational area, although the majority of shaping occurs in an AO.
2-84. A sustaining operation is an operation at any echelon that enables the decisive operation or shaping
operations by generating and maintaining combat power (ADP 3-0). Sustaining operations are inseparable
from decisive and shaping operations; they require the same detailed planning and coordination. Proper
sustainment is necessary to maintain the desired tempo throughout an operation and to set the conditions for
future operations. A failure to sustain may result in mission failure or an unacceptable loss of personnel and
materiel in the conduct of operations, thus jeopardizing future missions. Sustaining operations are not limited
to support areas, they occur throughout the AO.
2-85. Effective sustainment ensures freedom of action, extends operational reach, and prolongs endurance.
Because operational reach underpins all maneuver, sustainment is intrinsic to the scheme of maneuver at
these echelons. The success of sustaining operations is dependent on the supporting and supported
commanders’ understanding of requirements, capabilities, and priorities.
2-86. Operational-level maneuver demands anticipation, careful planning, and the synchronization of
sustainment with operations. Sustainment at this level depends on preparation well before the decisive
operation occurs and becomes closely linked with shaping operations. In other words, headquarters not only
shape to set conditions for the decisive operations, they shape to ensure the success of sustaining operations.
Sustaining operations focus on friendly forces rather than on the enemy or environment. The operational-level
commander considers the operational reach of the corps in terms of logistics capacity, distribution, evacuation
and treatment of casualties, and personnel services. Their commander and staff continually—
* Assess the sustainment posture of the formation.
* Position and protect sustainment and medical units.
* Establish priorities of support. |
3-94 | 63 | Operational Art and Science
* Secure and maintain lines of communications with Army and host-nation forces.
* Manage movement of subordinate forces and coordinate across the formation for movement of
sustainment units.
2-87. At the tactical level, sustainment remains the key to freedom of action. Properly integrated, the support
provided by sustainment units allows formations to maneuver, concentrate their capabilities, and adjust their
task organization quickly. If poorly coordinated, sustainment becomes a major contributor to loss of
momentum and inadequate operational reach. Staffs give particular attention to integrating their sustainment
units’ requirements into their concept of operations. This includes careful selection and security of support
areas in their AOs, and planning for their displacement based upon adjustments to the tactical AO. This
displacement planning is based on movement, general engineering, security, and protection capabilities. The
displacement of the support area normally entails more time and effort than shifting a subordinate formation.
Main and Supporting Efforts
2-88. The final component of the operational framework is establishing main and supporting efforts.
Commanders designate main and supporting efforts to establish clear priorities of support and resources
among subordinate units. The main effort is a designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given point in
time is most critical to overall mission success (ADP 3-0). It is usually weighted with the preponderance of
combat power. Typically, commanders shift the main effort one or more times during execution.
2-89. Designating a main effort temporarily prioritizes resource allocation. When commanders designate a
unit as the main effort, it receives priority of support and resources to maximize combat power. However,
the higher echelon commander may withhold certain resources from the main effort to ensure their
availability for the decisive operations. This carries a certain amount of risk that the commander must balance
between current operations, the upcoming decisive operation, and possible future missions.
2-90. Commanders may designate a unit conducting a shaping operation as the main effort until the decisive
operation commences. However, the unit with primary responsibility for the decisive operation then becomes
the main effort upon the execution of the decisive operation.
2-91. A supporting effort is a designated subordinate unit with a mission that supports the success of the
main effort (ADP 3-0). Commanders resource supporting efforts with the minimum assets necessary to
accomplish the mission. Because they are not resourced the same as the main effort, it is critical that higher
echelon commanders clearly identify the task and purpose for their operations so that they do not create a
situation that could potentially endanger the success of the main effort or the decisive operation.
COMMAND AND CONTROL IN MULTIPLE DOMAINS
2-92. Through command and control, Army forces converge effects from all domains (land, air, maritime,
space, and cyberspace), and the information environment and the electromagnetic spectrum, to accomplish
missions. Convergence involves the continuous integration of capabilities from multiple domains, the
electromagnetic spectrum, and the information environment, to create multiple dilemmas for the enemy. To
converge effects from all domains, Army forces must understand the authorities, processes, procedures, and
time it takes to receive effects from other domains and for Army forces to create effects in those domains.
To converge combat power throughout operations, Army echelons serving as a functional or Service
component to a joint force must integrate into various theater command and control processes and procedures
addressed in these joint publications: JP 3-12, JP 3-13, JP 3-14, JP 3-30, JP 3-31, JP 3-32, and JP 3-52.
2-93. Liaison and coordination are vital to Army headquarters in gaining access to capabilities and effects
from other components of the joint force. Liaison is that contact or intercommunication maintained between
elements of military forces or other agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of effort. Most
commonly used for establishing and maintaining close communications, liaison activities enables direct face-
to-face communications between commands and with unified action partners. Liaison activities augment the
commander’s ability to integrate and converge effects from multiple domains into the concept of operations.
Liaison activities ensure—
* Cooperation and understanding among commanders and staffs of different headquarters.
* Coordination to achieve unity of effort. |
3-94 | 64 | Chapter 2
* Coordination and synchronization of lethal and nonlethal effects.
* Understanding of implied or inferred coordination measures to achieve synchronized results.
2-94. Based on the situation, commanders may receive or request a liaison (individuals and teams) to assist
them with command and control in the various domains. Liaisons include, but are not limited to—
* An Army cyberspace operations support team.
* A military information support operations unit.
* An Army space support team.
* An air defense liaison/fire control team.
* An air liaison officer and associated United States Air Force (USAF) elements.
* A naval gunfire liaison officer.
* Special operations forces.
2-95. In addition to receiving liaison officers and teams, Army forces send liaison and coordination elements
to other joint components. An essential coordination element is the battlefield coordination detachment. The
battlefield coordination detachment is a specialized, regionally focused Army element that serves as the
senior liaison between the ARFOR commander and the air component commander. A battlefield coordination
detachment is co-located with the joint air operations center, combined air operations center, or the Air Force
air operations center. The battlefield coordination detachment is the Army’s interface for systems
connectivity to the joint air operations center and for personnel integration with their joint air operations
center counterparts. Battlefield coordination detachment tasks include facilitating the exchange of current
intelligence and operational data, processing air support requests, monitoring and interpreting the land battle
situation, coordinating air and missile defense, coordinating airlift, and integrating airspace requirements.
The battlefield coordination detachment also provides continuous feedback and information from the JAOC,
including the air tasking order, airspace control order and special instructions (known as SPINS). Digital
liaison detachments can provide liaison capability among Army, joint or multinational forces and
headquarters to ensure communication, interoperability, mutual understanding, and unity of purpose. (See
ATP 3-94.1 for doctrine on digital liaison detachments)
2-96. When a U.S. Army headquarters is designated as the joint forces land component command, the
battlefield coordination detachment may serve as the land component commander’s liaison to the air
component commander when augmented with other unique land force representatives. Army corps relay
requirements and requests to the land component, which, in turn, relays land component requirements and
requests for joint force air component support to battlefield coordination detachment. Depending on the
theater, this may also include space, cyber, and electronic warfare support requests. The battlefield
coordination detachment represents the JFLCC throughout the joint air tasking cycle in the joint air operations
center. (See JP 3-31, ATP 3-09.13, AFTTP 3-3.AOC for information on the battlefield coordination
detachment.)
MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER
2-97. The movement and maneuver warfighting function is the
related tasks and systems that move and employ forces to Movement and Maneuver
achieve a position of relative advantage over the enemy and Warfighting Task
other threats (ADP 3-0). Movement involves the positioning of Move.
combat power to gain a positional advantage over an enemy Maneuver.
force. Movements range from operational movement associated
Employ direct fires.
with force projection to tactical troop movements in an AO.
Occupy an area.
Maneuver is the employment of forces in the operational area,
through movement in combination with fires and information, Conduct mobility and
countermobility.
to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy
(JP 3-0). For the Army, maneuver is movement in conjunction Conduct reconnaissance and
with fires (ADP 3-90). A unit’s scheme of maneuver—a surveillance.
description of the employment of maneuver units that includes Employ battlefield obscuration.
the form of maneuver or defense—provides the bases for the |
3-94 | 65 | Operational Art and Science
unit’s concept of operations and various schemes of support such as the scheme of fires, scheme of protection,
and concept of sustainment.
2-98. While division and lower echelons focus on planning and executing tactical movement and maneuver
tasks (see ADP 3-90), theater armies, field armies, and corps focus on operational movement and maneuver.
Operational movement and maneuver involves positioning of forces to achieve a decisive outcome in the
conduct of a campaign or major operation. It includes moving or deploying forces into an operational area
and maneuvering them to operational depths for offensive and defensive purposes. It also includes assuring
the mobility of friendly forces. Operational movement and maneuver combines global force projection with
maneuver against an operational objective. Operational maneuver sets the terms of battle initially and then
projects forces into or through the depth of the enemy’s defenses. In a defensive campaign or major operation,
operational maneuver shifts uncommitted forces into positions of potential advantage and directs them into
attacks that capture the initiative or stabilize a defense.
OPERATIONAL MOVEMENT
2-99. Operational movement can be broken down into two subsets. One is operational movement from
strategic distances or inter-theater movement. Inter-theater operational movement involves the movement of
forces from outside of the AOR into the AO to conduct operations, and it is directly tied to force tailoring
and setting the theater. The other is intra-theater operational movement. Intra-theater operational movement
involves the shifting or repositioning of forces inside the AO, and it is tied to tactical actions or opportunities.
The movement of large unit formations over operational distances requires considerable planning and careful
control during execution.
2-100. Maneuver of forces at the field army and corps levels are predicated on sustained movement, often
over extended distances, prior to the engagement of forces. This sustained movement places a premium on
developing and maintaining lines of communication and alternate movement routes, sustainment, and
detailed planning to deconflict the movement of units as necessary. Field armies and corps do not need to
solve maneuver problems for the divisions as much as they need to ensure that divisions and BCTs are
positioned to maneuver with the necessary support. Without effective movement planning, and an effective
movement control and sustainment effort, large formations cannot be positioned where maneuver is required.
2-101. The potential commitment of multiple corps and divisions with their supporting formations into AOs
with limited road infrastructure makes the successful integration of movement operations with maneuver an
operational imperative. Successful planning must account for the movement of field artillery, air defense,
aviation support, engineers, intelligence, and sustainment units to ensure uninterrupted support to the
commander’s scheme of maneuver. Limited and dispersed mobility corridors place a premium on echelons
above brigade headquarters’ abilities to control the movement of large units and sustain them.
2-102. Operational movement establishes basic dispositions for forces and limits the range of possible
subsequent movements and maneuver. At the operational level, movement involves establishing a base(s) of
operation and distributing forces along lines of operation to facilitate their future commitment. It is important
that initial force deployments can support the entire campaign because it is difficult to change lines of
operation at the operational level after their establishment. The availability of lines of communication exert
a dominant influence on the movement and operation of large forces.
OPERATIONAL MANEUVER
2-103. Operational maneuver involves the movement of large ground forces in conjunction with joint fires.
Operational maneuver is the means by which the commander sets the terms of battle, declines battle, or acts
to take advantage of tactical actions. Army and corps commanders posture their forces for initial and
subsequent operations based on their visualization of the operational end state. The decision on where to
position forces in preparation for operations is a critical one. Prior to the conduct of operations, commanders
posture their forces to influence the enemy and to support their plans for future operations. Although initial
deployment is important, operational commanders posture for subsequent operations based upon their
understanding of their higher echelon commander’s intent. Changing the positions of large units once they
are in place requires significant effort, therefore time spent planning where units are positioned is essential.
A commander has to evaluate multiple factors that will affect operations, either favorably or unfavorably, |
3-94 | 66 | Chapter 2
during planning. For many of these factors, a commander may have to look weeks or possibly months into
the future in an attempt to account for their potential impacts.
Operational Maneuver: Turning Movement at Inchon
On 25 June 1950, North Korean forces invaded South Korea. By August, the North
Korean People’s Army occupied most of the peninsula, with U.S. and Republic of
Korea forces confined to a shrinking perimeter behind the Naktong and Nam Rivers.
For over a month, both sides engaged in a series of bloody attacks and counterattacks.
On 15 September, while United Nations and North Korean forces were decisively
engaged far to the south, X Corps conducted a two-division amphibious landing at
Inchon, on the west coast of Korea north of Seoul. This operational turning movement,
code-named Operation CHROMITE, caught the North Korean People’s Army
completely by surprise. Simultaneously, United Nations’ aircraft bombarded North
Korean forces along the Naktong River to support an Eighth Army counteroffensive.
During the following days, American and South Korean Marines pressed toward Seoul.
The remainder of X Corps captured the Seoul-Suwon area and severed North Korean
People’s Army supply lines. Army forces soon averaged 10 miles per day over rugged
terrain, with the North Korean retreat soon turning into a general rout. By October 1950,
the North Korean People’s Army had dissolved into disorganized remnants fleeing into
borderlands adjacent to Manchuria and the Soviet Union.
INTELLIGENCE
From adequate and timely military intelligence the commander is able to draw logical
conclusions concerning enemy lines of action. Military intelligence is thus an essential
factor in the estimate of the situation and in the conduct of subsequent operations.
FM 100-5, Operations (1941)
2-104. The term intelligence is used in three contexts: 1) The
product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, Intelligence Warfighting Tasks
evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of available information Provide intelligence support to
force generation.
concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces
or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations; 2) The Provide support to situational
activities that result in the product; 3) The organizations engaged understanding.
in such activities (JP 2-0). In other words, intelligence is a Conduct information collection.
product, a process, and a function that facilitates situational
Provide intelligence support to
understanding of the enemy, terrain, weather, and civil targeting and information
considerations, and other aspects of an OE. Intelligence is operations.
inherently joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and
multinational. Every aspect of intelligence is synchronized
among echelons and with unified action partners. This synchronization occurs through national to tactical
intelligence support. A single collection capability is not persistent and accurate enough to provide adequate
intelligence during large-scale ground combat operations. Army forces will have to fight for intelligence.
Army forces both benefit from and contribute to national to tactical intelligence and focus the Army
intelligence effort through the intelligence warfighting function.
2-105. The intelligence warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding
the enemy, terrain, weather, civil considerations, and other significant aspects of the operational environment
(ADP 3-0). Specifically, other significant aspects of an operational environment include threats, adversaries,
the operational variables, and can include other aspects depending on the nature of operations. The
intelligence warfighting function synchronizes information collection with the tactical tasks of
reconnaissance, surveillance, security, and intelligence operations. Intelligence is driven by commanders,
and it involves analyzing information from all sources and conducting operations to develop the situation. |
3-94 | 67 | Operational Art and Science
The Army executes intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) through the operations and
intelligence processes, with an emphasis on intelligence analysis and information collection. (See ADP 2-0
for more information on the intelligence warfighting function.)
INTELLIGENCE AT ECHELONS ABOVE BRIGADE
2-106. Commanders and staffs at each echelon need timely, accurate, relevant, and predictive intelligence
to understand threat centers of gravity, goals and objectives, capabilities, capacity, and courses of action.
Commanders must also have detailed knowledge of threat strengths, vulnerabilities, organizations,
equipment, capabilities, and tactics to plan for and execute friendly operations. The intelligence warfighting
function supports operations from the theater army down to the battalion level.
2-107. The basic intelligence support provided by the intelligence staff at each echelon is the same. What
differs is the size, composition, and number of supporting capabilities for the intelligence staff; access to
broader-scope information and intelligence; additional ISR capability and capacity, number and complexity
of the requirements; and the time available to answer those requirements. In general, the higher the echelon,
the greater the volume, depth, and complexity of analysis and intelligence production the intelligence staff
can perform. Lower echelon intelligence staffs often depend on the higher echelon for certain intelligence
products and support. Therefore, commanders and staffs must understand the intricacies of the intelligence
warfighting function across each echelon.
INTEGRATING INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE
2-108. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance is 1. An integrated operations and intelligence
activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and processing,
exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. 2. The
organizations or assets conducting such activities (JP 2-01). The Army executes ISR through the operations
and intelligence processes (with an emphasis on intelligence analysis and leveraging the larger intelligence
enterprise) and information collection. Information collection is an activity that synchronizes and integrates
the planning and employment of sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination
systems in direct support of current and future operations (FM 3-55).
2-109. At the operational level, whether considering an entire theater or a JOA, intelligence staffs manage
information collection by weighing the need for answering their own requirements against the capability or
capacity gap of subordinate formations to answer their own requirements. Additionally, higher level
requirements can sometimes be answered by lower echelon assets, which can simply result in a task for an
operation. For example, a corps may need information about the condition of a bridge. Rather than tasking
corps assets to answer these requirements, the corps can task the division responsible for the area containing
the bridge to answer these requirements. The division would further task a subordinate brigade, and so forth
until a maneuver unit receives the task for an area reconnaissance or similar task to answer the requirement
and provide a report, ultimately, back to the corps. When tasking subordinate formations for reconnaissance,
a higher echelon must be clear about its information requirements and provide adequate time to collect the
information.
2-110. In addition to organic and supporting information collection assets, echelons above brigade have
access to joint ISR assets upon request. The joint ISR request process typically requires significant prior
planning and approval. In order to receive joint apportionment and allocation for ISR, the theater army and
corps intelligence staffs collaborate and coordinate early in the joint planning process. These staffs must also
understand the various joint ISR scheduling and collection management mechanisms, such as joint targeting
and the joint air tasking cycle.
2-111. Joint ISR assets are a scarce resource. The platforms are limited in number, and in most cases, can
only collect for limited periods. Many have limited range and are negatively impacted by terrain,
infrastructure, enemy jamming and air defense, and both terrestrial and space weather. Dedicated ISR assets
become more available at higher echelons, but the inability to collect everywhere and all the time still presents
challenges in prioritizing collection missions. Beyond sensor availability, analytical capacity to conduct
processing, exploitation, and dissemination is also limited, and this can result in delays from the time
information is collected to when it is received by a tactical headquarters. |
3-94 | 68 | Chapter 2
2-112. Peer adversaries possess weapons systems, such as theater ballistic missiles, with ranges that exceed
the collection range of tactical-echelon information collection systems. Unlike irregular warfare campaigns,
where aerial assets, like unmanned aerial systems, can be flown directly over or in close proximity to the
collection area, threat air defense and tactical aircraft in large-scale combat may force those assets to operate
well to the rear of the forward edge of the battle area. Additionally, national ISR platforms may be neutralized
through cyber, anti-satellite, counterspace, or electronic warfare attacks.
2-113. To mitigate these shortcomings, units first leverage all organic assets to the utmost capacity.
Information collection assets should not be held in reserve. Selecting the appropriate capability to answer the
intelligence requirement also enhances collection efficiencies. Once organic assets are exhausted, units
request support from higher echelons for both collection and analytical support. Low technology information
collection assets, such as ground reconnaissance, open-source intelligence, and surveillance and human
intelligence collection teams, should be leveraged to mitigate the effects when higher technology capabilities
are degraded or neutralized by enemy cyber, anti-space, or electronic warfare attacks.
FIRES
If after the battle is over, your infantry don’t like you, you are a poor artilleryman.
Captain Henry Reilly, The Field Artillery Journal (Sept–Oct 1940)
2-114. Success in operations is dependent on the ability of Army forces to employ fires. Fires enable
maneuver. Commanders enable maneuver through the fires warfighting function—the related tasks and
systems that create and converge effects in all domains against the adversary or enemy to enable operations
across the range of military operations (ADP 3-0). These tasks and systems create lethal and nonlethal effects
delivered from both Army and joint forces, as well as other unified action partners.
2-115. Commanders must integrate and execute fires, in combination with the other elements of combat
power, to create and converge effects and achieve the desired end state. Fires tasks are those necessary actions
that must be conducted to create and converge effects in all domains to meet the commander’s objectives.
The tasks of the fires warfighting function are—
* Execute fires across the five domains and in the information environment, employing—
Surface-to-surface fires.
Air-to-surface fires.
Surface-to-air fires.
Cyberspace operations and electronic warfare.
Space operations.
Multinational fires.
Special operations.
Information and deception operations.
* Integrate Army, multinational, and joint fires through—
Targeting.
The operations process.
Intelligence analysis and collection management.
Fire support planning and coordination.
Air and missile defense planning and integration.
Electromagnetic spectrum management.
Multinational integration.
Rehearsals.
(See ADP 3-19 for a detailed description of the fires warfighting function. Refer to FM 3-09 for a detailed
description of fire support at the corps and division level.) |
3-94 | 69 | Operational Art and Science
CROSS-DOMAIN AND MULTI-DOMAIN FIRES
2-116. Commanders are responsible for the integration of fires in their AO. Commanders consult the fire
support coordinator, air liaison officer, fire support officer, and experts on air and missile defense,
cyberspace, electronic warfare, space, special operations, as well as information and deception operations for
advice on the allocation, integration, and use of available fires resources. Fires in all domains require detailed
coordination and planning to support the commander’s objectives. Employment of these systems requires the
use of common terminology and coordination measures across the joint force. It includes surface-to-surface
fires, air-to-surface fires, and nonlethal means that the commander uses to support the concept of the
operation.
2-117. Commanders use Army and joint targeting to select and prioritize targets (and to integrate lethal and
nonlethal effects from different domains, either simultaneously or in close succession), to create an even
greater effect than would have been achieved if each effect was created individually. Convergence involves
the massing of capabilities from multiple domains to create effects in a single domain. Convergence
overwhelms enemy forces, giving them too many dilemmas to address simultaneously, which creates gaps
for exploitation by the friendly force. The convergence of multiple effects in an operational area requires
careful integration prior to execution to ensure effects do not interfere with one another or pose a risk to the
force.
2-118. Cross-domain fires are fires executed in one domain to create effects in a different domain
(ADP 3-19). Cross-domain fires provide commanders with the flexibility to find the best system to create the
required effect and to build redundancy into their plan. Cross-domain fires also present a more complex
problem to the adversary or enemy than fires within a single domain. For example, a commander may employ
naval surface fires in conjunction with other fire support assets to attack critical targets.
2-119. Multi-domain fires are fires that converge effects from two or more domains against a target
(ADP 3-19). Surface-based fires converged with other effects across domains creates multiple dilemmas,
taxing the enemy’s ability to effectively respond. For example, a commander may employ offensive
cyberspace operations to attack an enemy air defense network while surface-to-surface fires destroy enemy
air defense radars and air-to-surface fires destroy the air defense command and control nodes. The converged
effects reduce risk to friendly aircraft.
INTEGRATING FIRES
2-120. To enable freedom of action, commanders must synchronize the effects created with fires with the
actions of the rest of the force. This synchronization initially takes place during planning, where commanders
and their staffs determine the timing of the creation of the effect and link that timing to a clearly defined,
conditions-based trigger. During large-scale combat operations, domains are likely congested, which will
require close coordination and integration during planning to bring maximum combat power to bear while
mitigating risk to the force. The successful delivery of fires depends upon the rapid synchronization and
integration of all fire support assets with the other elements of combat power across all domains. In the
physical domains, this may be accomplished through the use of graphic control measures such as maneuver
control measures, fire support coordination measures, and airspace coordinating measures. In cyberspace, the
electromagnetic spectrum, and the information environment, this may be accomplished through spectrum
management and the delegation or retention of authorities.
2-121. Commanders ensure the coordinated use of indirect fires, and joint fires to create windows of
opportunity for maneuver and put the enemy in a position of disadvantage. This is accomplished through the
operations process, fire support planning, airspace management and planning, and targeting. These processes
ensure the proper detection and delivery assets capable of producing the desired effects on the enemy are
allocated against targets to enable friendly maneuver. Fire support is a rapid and continuous integration of
surface to surface indirect fires, target acquisition, armed aircraft, and other lethal and nonlethal
attack/delivery systems that converge against targets across all domains in support of the maneuver
commander’s concept of operations (FM 3-09). Fire support planning, coordination, and execution allows
for the rapid and responsive delivery of fires by establishing permissive and restrictive control measures.
Commanders use long-range fires (including missile, rocket, cannon, naval, cyberspace electromagnetic
activities, and air support—rotary and fixed wing) to engage enemy forces throughout the depth of their AO. |
3-94 | 70 | Chapter 2
Units focus operations in their deep areas to set conditions that allow their subordinate units success in their
operations in their respective AOs. The land component and corps coordinates and synchronizes joint fires
as its primary tool to shape in their deep area. (See ADP 3-19 for more information on fires in the operations
process. Refer to FM 3-09 for a detailed discussion of fire support planning and execution.)
2-122. Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response
to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities (JP 3-0). Units use the Army targeting process
and the joint targeting cycle to integrate and synchronize lethal and nonlethal capabilities into operations,
creating the desired effects in time and space. During the targeting process, fires cells in the theater armies
and fire support elements in the corps and divisions recommend targeting guidance to the commander,
develop targets, select targets for attack, and coordinate, integrate, and assign allocated joint, interagency,
and multinational fires to specific targets and target systems. (See JP 3-60 for more information on the Army
targeting process and the joint targeting cycle.)
2-123. Fires cells (at the theater army) and fire support elements (at the corps and division) develop,
recommend, and brief the echelon scheme of fires, recommend targeting guidance to the commander, develop
targets, select targets for attack, and coordinate, integrate, and assign allocated joint and multinational fires
to specific targets and target systems. The scheme of fires links organizations and systems capable of
detecting and tracking enemy targets with fires organizations capable of producing the desired effects on
those targets.
SUSTAINMENT
Before a commander can even start thinking of maneuvering or giving battle, of marching
this way and that, of penetrating, enveloping, encircling, of annihilating or wearing down,
in short of putting into practice the whole rigmarole of strategy, he has—or ought—to make
sure of his ability to supply his soldiers.
Martin Van Creveld
2-124. Sustainment is the provision of logistics, financial
management, personnel services, and health service support necessary Principles of Sustainment
to maintain operations until successful mission completion (ADP 4-0). Anticipation
Sustainment is accomplished through the coordination, integration, and Continuity
synchronization of resources from the strategic level through the
Responsiveness
tactical level in conjunction with our joint and multinational partners.
Integration
Sustainment operations enable force readiness and endurance.
Sustainment maintains Army forces by manning it with trained Soldiers Survivability
and leaders; funding it with required resources; equipping it with the Improvisation
materiel (individual and unit), maintaining Soldier and Family Simplicity
readiness; and enabling Army forces for decisive Action.
Economy
2-125. The sustainment warfighting function is the related tasks and
systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extended operational reach, and
prolong endurance (ADP 3-0). Sustainment determines the depth and duration of Army operations.
Successful sustainment enables freedom of action by increasing the number of options available to the
commander. Sustainment is essential for retaining and exploiting the initiative. The sustainment warfighting
function consists of four elements:
* Logistics.
* Finance and comptroller operations.
* Personnel services.
* Health service support.
(See ADP 4-0 for doctrine on sustainment.)
2-126. Sustainment must be integrated and synchronized with operations at every level (strategic,
operational, and tactical). Sustainment focuses on building an operationally ready Army, delivering it to the
combatant commander as part of the joint force, sustaining its combat power across the depth of the
operational area, and with the endurance to achieve the desired end state. At the operational level, sustainment |
3-94 | 71 | Operational Art and Science
is inherently joint. The combination of Army and joint sustainment capabilities enables the combatant
commander to maximize the effect of the Army’s capabilities in an operational area. The Army’s robust
sustainment capability assists in providing theater and port opening functions enabling joint forces to conduct
strategic reach. Army sustainment capabilities provide the bulk of support in a theater, including ASOS, in
the forms of executive agent, common-user logistics, lead service, and other common sustainment resources.
ASOS enables joint forces with operational reach, freedom of action, and endurance. (See Appendix B for
more information on ASOS.)
STRATEGIC TO TACTICAL SUSTAINMENT
2-127. The strategic support area describes the area extending from the JSA in a theater to the continental
United States or another combatant commander’s AOR. The strategic support area also includes the air and
sea ports that support the force projection, flow, and sustainment of forces into the JSA in a theater. In the
United States, sustainment originates in the strategic support area. The strategic support area generates Army
sustainment capabilities, which enable sustained operations through end-to-end processes that drive
efficiencies across military Services, agencies, and industries.
2-128. The theater army is responsible for providing support to Army forces and common-user logistics
and support to other Services as directed by the combatant commander and other authoritative instructions.
The TSC is assigned to the theater army. As directed, the TSC provides lead service and executive agency
support for designated logistics and services to other government agencies, multinational forces, and
nongovernmental organizations. The TSC is the Army’s command for the integration and synchronization of
sustainment in the AOR. A MEDCOM (DS) is also assigned to the theater army. It is responsible for
command and control, integration, synchronization, and execution of Army Health System support in the
AOR with strategic ties to the Defense Health Agency. The MEDCOM (DS) commander coordinates with
the theater army surgeon to provide Army Health System support in the AOR.
2-129. Field army and corps headquarters are responsible for the integration and synchronization of
operational sustainment in their assigned AO. A corps is supported by its assigned ESC. When constituted,
a field army receives an attached ESC to provide sustainment support. The ESC will typically command and
control sustainment units supporting the rear area while providing general support to the forward units. The
ESC commander may perform the duties of deputy commanding general (support) if directed by the
commander. The ESC assists the sustainment cell with planning, coordinating, and executing sustainment
operations.
2-130. Division headquarters are responsible for the integration and synchronization of sustainment in their
assigned AO. The division’s assigned, task-organized division sustainment brigade provides general support
for all division units. The division sustainment brigade coordinates and synchronizes tactical-level
sustainment operations to meet current and future operations. Additional modular combat sustainment
support battalions and companies may be attached to the division sustainment brigade to sustain large-scale
combat operations. (See FM 4-0 for a detailed description of sustainment at different echelons.)
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
2-131. Sustainment enables the success of campaigns and operations by providing commanders the
operational reach, freedom of action, and endurance to achieve operational objectives. Sustainment should
be planned in concert with operations. At the operational level, this requires a detailed understanding of all
sustainment requirements, as the overall feasibility of an operation is often a function of its sustainability.
Some of the major operational planning considerations for sustainment are—
* Concurrent planning.
* Sustainment force flow.
* Sustainment nodes and modes.
Concurrent Planning
2-132. It is important for sustainment planners to conduct concurrent planning with operational planning.
Commanders plan for sustainment as the operational concept is developed. This ensures their courses of
action are feasible from a sustainment perspective, allows commanders to request additional assets if |
3-94 | 72 | Chapter 2
required, and gives sustainers additional time to position resources required to support their commander’s
plan.
2-133. Often, sustainment actions to support an operation must occur prior to commencement of the
operation itself, as when the priority of support shifts to the main effort for the next phase of an operation in
order to ensure operations can continue uninterrupted. While the pace of operations will dictate the frequency
required, planners should reconcile the operations and logistics synchronization matrices often to validate the
plan and adjust sustainment operations to the changing operational picture.
2-134. The inherent joint nature of operations at this level will require the Army to provide support to other
services, both sustainment and non-sustainment. As Army planners develop the concept of sustainment at
each echelon, they must ensure all ASOS requirements are accounted for. This will mitigate the risk of
sustainment shortfalls that could lead to early culmination of the operational plan.
Responsiveness and Improvisation: The Red Ball Express
To remain effective, sustainers must continually respond to the needs of the
commander. Often sustainers must improvise to meet those requirements in a timely
fashion.
After the breakout from Normandy in July 1944, an acute shortage of supplies and
transportation plagued the Allied advance. Some 28 divisions were advancing across
France and Belgium, each requiring 700–750 tons of supplies a day. The Army did not
have enough trucks or drivers to support the divisions. Patton’s Third Army was in
danger of culminating due to a lack of supplies. Controlled supply rates of fuel and
ammunition were imposed, not due to a lack of supply, but because of the challenges
in moving the supplies to the units that needed them. The key to maintaining the pursuit
was a continuous resupply of fuel and ordnance. The solution was the Red Ball
Express.
The Army Service Forces consolidated its trucks into provisional units. Soldiers from
all over the U.S. forces became drivers. The first convoys quickly bogged down in
civilian and military traffic. In response, a priority route, marked by signage featuring
the Red Ball, was established on two parallel highways between the Normandy
beachhead and the city of Chartres, France and the Red Ball Express was born. Truck
drivers drove around the clock to push supplies to the front. Their herculean effort in
sustaining the Allied drive became famous.
At peak operation, the Red Ball Express was running 5,938 vehicles a day carrying
12,342 tons of supplies to forward depots. While lasting only 3 months, from August to
November 1944, the Red Ball Express saved the Allied advance. Without it, the Allied
offensive would have culminated, prolonging the war. The Red Ball Express was an
innovative solution to maintain the offensive momentum. The improvisation and
responsiveness of Army Service Force leaders gave the Allies the operational reach
and endurance to continue operations in their press toward Berlin. Because of its
effectiveness, the term and concepts of the Red Ball Express continues to this day.
Sustainment Force Flow
2-135. In order for the Army to maintain its strategic reach, it must be able to project combat power to an
operational area. Sustainment commands conduct reception, staging, onward-movement, and integration of
forces for the commander. There are several key units that perform the functions to execute reception, staging,
onward-movement, and integration; manage ports; and move the elements of combat power to assembly
areas. It is important to plan for adequate sustainment capacity to both conduct reception, staging,
onward-movement, and integration and support the force as it flows into theater. |
3-94 | 73 | Operational Art and Science
2-136. As the size of the operational force increases, so must the sustainment force required to support it.
Planners must ensure that sustainment units are built into the force flow to complement operations. As much
of the Army’s sustainment capability resides in the Reserve Components, planners need to anticipate and
plan for the additional lead-time required to mobilize and deploy those forces. Additionally, once operations
commence and friendly forces seize terrain, additional sustainment units will need to traverse the additional
distance between the JSA and the forward line of troops. For every increase of approximately 100 miles
(161 kilometers) in operational depth, an additional echelon of distribution resources will need to conduct
sustainment operations.
Sustainment Nodes, Lines of Communication, and Modes
2-137. In developing the initial concept of sustainment, commanders will place their assigned sustainment
resources to support operations. Sustainment headquarters at each echelon also bear the responsibility for
integrating additional sustainment assets, such as Army Health Support and forward-positioned assets from
higher echelon headquarters into the overall plan. At the operational level, maintaining the lines of
communication is vital to ensure continual support to the mission. This is typically accomplished in
conjunction with the echelon’s rear command post, as these units may occupy a significant amount of terrain
in the rear area and will often require security assistance.
2-138. As friendly forces advance, additional sustainment nodes will need to ensure sustainment remains
responsive to operational demands. The security of these nodes and the lines of communication that connect
them will require additional combat power to secure. Commanders introduce protection assets, such as air
defense, route clearance, and maintenance, to ensure uninterrupted movement of sustainment forward.
Movement control, particularly in the corps and division areas, becomes vital, as the ability to distribute
needed materiel forward can be constrained by the availability of transportation or the capacity of the lines
of communication to accommodate the required traffic. Constant coordination between the corps and division
transportation officers, ESC, and division sustainment brigade, and their supporting MEBs is required to
prevent shortfalls of critical supplies in close operations.
PROTECTION
2-139. Protection is the preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and
nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or
outside the boundaries of a given operational area (JP 3-0). Commanders protect the force through the
protection warfighting function—the related tasks and systems that preserve the force so the commander can
apply maximum combat power to accomplish the mission (ADP 3-0). The protection warfighting function
includes these tasks:
* Conduct survivability operations.
* Provide force health protection.
* Conduct CBRN operations.
* Provide explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) support.
* Coordinate air and missile defense support.
* Conduct personnel recovery.
* Conduct risk management.
* Implement physical security procedures.
* Apply antiterrorism measures.
* Conduct police operations.
* Conduct detention operations.
* Conduct population and resource control.
* Conduct area security.
* Perform cyberspace security and defense.
* Conduct electromagnetic protection.
* Implement operations security.
* Airspace planning and management. |
3-94 | 74 | Chapter 2
2-140. A shared understanding of the joint protection function enables Army leaders to integrate the Army’s
protection warfighting function with unified action partners. Army leaders anticipate that joint support will
be limited in large-scale combat operations and protect the force using a combination of measures. The joint
protection function focuses on preserving the joint force fighting potential in four organically available ways:
* Active defensive measures to protect friendly forces, civilians, and infrastructure (including
biometrics collection and vetting).
* Passive defensive measures (including camouflage, cover, concealment) to make friendly forces,
systems, and facilities difficult to locate, strike, and destroy when active measures are limited or
unavailable.
* The application of technology and procedures to reduce the risk of fratricide.
* Emergency management and response to reduce the loss of personnel and capabilities due to
accidents, health threats, and natural disasters.
2-141. Planning, preparing, executing, and assessing protection is continuous and enduring. Protection
preserves the capability, momentum, and tempo that contribute to operational reach. All military activities
have some inherent or organic protection capability (including survivability, antiterrorism measures, and
local and area security). Effective protection can deny the enemy’s ability to achieve certain positions of
advantage.
2-142. Commanders deliberately plan and integrate the application of military force against an enemy force
while protecting the friendly force and preserving combat power. Commanders develop protection strategies
for each phase of an operation or major activity. They integrate and synchronize protection tasks and systems
through the operations process to reduce risk, mitigate identified vulnerabilities, and act on opportunities.
When properly integrated and synchronized, the tasks and systems that comprise the protection warfighting
function increase the probability of mission success. Units consider all protection tasks and systems and apply
them as appropriate. Each task and its associated system are typically associated with a staff or staff
proponent that performs specific duties. (See ADP 3-37 for additional information on the protection
warfighting function primary tasks.)
2-143. Protection is also achieved by changing tempo, taking evasive action, or maneuvering to gain
positional advantage in relation to a threat. Formations often derive protection by exploiting terrain and
weather conditions, or by using the cover of darkness to mask movement. The use of key physical terrain
features supports protection measures and complements the positioning of forces during planning. The ability
to protect and preserve the force and secure an AO is vital in seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative
to shape an OE, prevent conflict, consolidate gains, and win wars as a part of unified action.
2-144. Initial protection planning requires various assessments to establish protection priorities critical to
friendly operational success. Assessments include threats, hazards, vulnerability, and criticality. These
assessments are used to determine which assets can be protected with available resources and which assets
require additional resources to protect. In protection planning, the challenge is to differentiate between critical
assets and important assets and to determine what protection is possible with available protection capabilities.
Table 2-1 provides examples of possible protection priorities at the theater, corps, and division levels.
Table 2-1. Protection considerations by echelon
Theater Echelon Considerations Corps and Division Echelon Considerations
Terminal high altitude area defense Support areas
Army pre-positioned stocks Critical fixed sites
Aerial port of debarkation or sea port of Command posts
debarkation
Lines of communication Lines of communication (including movement
corridors)
Critical infrastructure (including chemical weapons Radars
storage facilities, communications, bridges, and
highways)
Signal nodes |
3-94 | 75 | Operational Art and Science
2-145. Not all assets listed on the protection prioritization list receive continuous protection. Some critical
assets only receive protection assets based on available resources. Event-driven operations may be short in
duration, enabling a formidable protection posture for a short time; condition-driven operations may be
open ended and long term, requiring an enduring and sustainable scheme of protection. In either situation,
commanders must provide guidance on prioritizing protection capabilities and categorizing important assets.
Each echelon must determine and prioritize the critical assets derived from the commander’s guidance,
intelligence preparation of the battlefield, targeting, risk management, warning orders, the critical asset list,
defended asset list, and mission analysis. Commanders and staffs ensure effective physical security measures,
like any defensive measures, overlap and are deployed in depth. Prioritization of protection capabilities is
situationally dependent and resource informed. (See ADP 3-37 for additional information on protection
prioritization.)
2-146. Protection is continuous and occurs throughout operations to shape, operations to prevent,
large-scale ground combat operations, and operations to consolidate gains. Commanders focus protection
activities on deterring and preventing the enemy, adversaries, or hazards from actions that affect the force.
Protection capabilities support operations during mobilization, the transit of Army forces and cargo, along
movement routes, at initial staging areas, and subsequent assembly areas where uncertain threat conditions
require a delicate balance between protection and building combat power. Protection tasks enable
commanders to preserve the force, safeguard bases and base camps, and secure routes.
2-147. Commanders may direct and redirect the way that combat power is applied or preserved, and they
may adjust the tempo of operations through synchronization. The continuous and enduring character of
protection makes the continuity of protection capabilities essential during execution. Commanders implement
control measures and allocate resources that are sufficient to ensure protection continuity and restoration.
Commanders and staffs monitor and evaluate the progress of operations, monitor threats to protection
priorities, and recommend changes to the protection plan, as required.
2-148. One important aspect of protection planning, preparing, executing, and assessing involves corps and
division support areas. If conditions in the support area degrade, it is detrimental to the success of operations.
A degraded support area also inhibits the ability to shape the deep area for the BCTs operating in the close
area. Therefore, the protection of support areas requires considerations equal to those in the close area.
2-149. There are seldom sufficient resources to provide the same level of protection to all assets
simultaneously. All military assets are important, and all resources have value. The capabilities they represent
are not equal in their contribution to decisive operations or overall mission accomplishment. Determining
and directing protection priorities may involve the most important decisions that commanders make and their
staffs support. |
3-94 | 77 | Chapter 3
Armies
A war should only be undertaken with forces proportioned to the obstacles to be overcome.
Napoleon
This chapter provides an overview of the theater and field armies. The chapter is
divided into two sections. Section I describes the roles, functions and tasks of the
theater army. The section concludes with a description of the theater army’s
organization and limitations. Section II describes the roles, functions and tasks of the
field army. Section two concludes by describing the field army’s limitations.
ARMIES OVERVIEW
3-1. An army is organized with multiple echelons, each of which can be task-organized with an appropriate
mix of capabilities and sizes to perform specific roles. Each echelon commands and controls a number of
subordinate functional and multifunctional units, employing them in a coherent, coordinated, and
synchronized fashion to achieve its objectives. The higher echelon ensures unity of purpose, directing and
orchestrating the individual subordinate units to achieve success.
3-2. The theater and field army (when constituted) are the two senior Army echelons available to a GCC.
They provide the GCCs flexibility in employing land power as well as planning and coordinating for the
consolidation of gains in support of joint operations. Both echelons command and control multiple
subordinate echelons as they execute operations across the competition continuum.
SECTION I – THEATER ARMY
The nature of armies is determined by the nature of the civilization in which they exist.
B.H. Lindell Hart
3-3. The theater army consists of a headquarters and all assigned or attached Army forces in the AOR not
assigned or attached to a subordinate joint force of the geographic combatant command. Each theater army
provides its respective GCC with capabilities and support in the form of landpower. When properly
augmented and directed, an element of the theater army headquarters can assume the role of a JTF
headquarters or joint force land component command.
3-4. The theater army is optimized to meet the requirements of their AOR based upon available Army
resources. Theater armies are culturally aware and continuously involved with their security cooperation
partners in the region. Even when it supports large-scale combat in an operational area, the theater army
retains the responsibility to shape the operational environment, prevent additional conflict, and consolidate
gains elsewhere in theater. When other Army echelons are committed to the AOR it must remain focused on
shaping the theater-wide environment while setting the theater to support operations in JOAs. No other Army
echelon headquarters is capable of fulfilling that requirement. The theater army must maintain its AOR-wide
focus to be able to fulfill its Service and ASOS responsibilities while continuing to provide support to specific
joint operations with JOAs.
3-5. The theater army’s mission is one of the most diverse and complex of any Army echelon. The
headquarters is tailored to a specific GCC AOR with the ability to conduct both operational and
administrative command and control over Army forces theater-wide. It also provides enabling capabilities
appropriate to theater conditions such as theater casualty evacuation, theater signal, theater sustainment, and
theater intelligence. In theaters without assigned field armies, corps, or divisions, the theater army must |
3-94 | 78 | Chapter 3
assume greater responsibilities to enable its tactical commands to succeed. Depending on the circumstances,
this may require temporary augmentation from other sources, or permanent changes to its table of
organization and equipment or table of distribution and allowances.
3-6. Every combatant command has an ASCC, and the theater army is the ASCC for the geographic
combatant commander. Currently the Army has six theater armies, one for each GCC as shown in table 3-1.
Each of these theater armies is a formation with the ability to command and control subordinate corps and
division formations during limited contingency operations and tailor the appropriate force to meet the GCC’s
operational requirements. However, during large-scale combat operations and in the absence of a field army,
the theater army requires significant headquarters augmentation to serve as the land component command
for a multi-corps operation in a joint operations area.
Table 3-1. Theater armies
Geographic Combatant Theater Army
Command
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command U.S. Army Pacific
U.S. European Command U.S. Army Europe - Africa
U.S. Central Command U.S. Army Central
U.S. Africa Command U.S. Army Europe - Africa
U.S. Southern Command U.S. Army South
U.S. Northern Command U.S. Army North
THEATER ARMY HEADQUARTERS
3-7. The theater army is a formation consisting of a headquarters and assigned theater-level enabling
forces. The theater staff must be able to plan, prepare, and assess operations across the theater and in a JOA.
Because the requirements for each geographic combatant command are unique, each theater army must tailor
the organization of its headquarters to address specific AOR challenges. To accomplish its roles and
responsibilities, the theater army headquarters has a main command post and a contingency command post.
MAIN COMMAND POST
3-8. The theater army main command post performs operational-level command and control of day-to-day
operations and maintains crisis action planning capabilities. It assists in the development and maintenance of
operation plans, contingency plans, and Service supporting plans for the combatant commander’s campaign
plan. It controls Army forces involved in operations, training exercises, and other security cooperation
activities.
3-9. The main command post can also coordinate collaborative planning with any Army headquarters
designated to deploy in the AOR. It provides planning support to the contingency command post when it
deploys command forces involved in limited contingencies or to participate in exercises and other theater
security cooperation activities. The main command post has limited operational responsibilities for Army
forces operating in a JOA; however, it provides support such as intelligence analysis and long-range planning.
3-10. The theater army’s main command post performs all of the ASCC functions, including 10 USC;
ADCON; ASOS; and support to a JOA. These functions support the combatant commander’s daily
operational requirements.
3-11. The main command post also manages the support given Army, joint, and multinational forces
deployed to joint operations areas established in the AOR. This support includes theater opening, reception,
staging, onward-movement, and integration; common-user logistics; and other services associated with Army
support responsibilities. Most of these responsibilities are sustainment related and supported by a subordinate
TSC. (See ATP 3-93 for more information on the organization and responsibilities of a main command post.) |
3-94 | 79 | Armies
CONTINGENCY COMMAND POST
3-12. The contingency command post enables the theater army to provide the GCC with a small-scale crisis
response or limited contingency command post for thirty days or less without significant augmentation. This
includes command of up to two BCTs or their equivalent. These operations vary from humanitarian response
through hostile action. This is most appropriate for crisis response situations such as humanitarian assistance
or disaster relief missions. The contingency command post is deployable by intra-theater aircraft. However,
the contingency command post should redeploy as soon as an adequate JTF headquarters is operational.
3-13. The contingency command post is organized with a command group, and support elements from the
headquarters and headquarters battalion, and a staff organized under functional cells for intelligence,
movement and maneuver, fires, protection, and sustainment. Unlike the main command post, the contingency
command post is organized with only two of the three integrating cells: a robust current operations integrating
cell and a small future operations cell. The contingency command post depends upon the main command
post for long-range planning and special staff functional support, if required. The contingency command post
staff can access and employ joint capabilities (such as fires, intelligence, and signal) and coordinate additional
required capabilities through the main command post. The contingency command post special staff normally
includes personnel from the main command post’s knowledge management and public affairs sections.
Sometimes the special staff may include representatives from other special staff elements. The table of
organization and equipment (known as TO&E) for individual contingency command posts is designed to
meet the specific requirements of each AOR. The contingency command post does not include security
elements so the theater army must provide additional forces for this function.
3-14. Employing the contingency command post for a mission involves a trade-off between the contingency
command post’s immediate responsive capability and its known limitations. These limitations address the
scope, scale, complexity, intensity, and duration of operations that it can effectively command without
significant augmentation. (See ATP 3-93 for more information on the organization and responsibilities of a
contingency command post.)
THE ROLE OF THE THEATER ARMY
3-15. The theater army is the ASCC to a geographic combatant command, and this is a role it cannot be
divested of. As an ASCC, the theater army performs certain functions that can be found in 10 USC;
Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5101.1; and the combatant commander’s requirements. The seven
functions performed as the ASCC are—
* Execute combatant commander’s daily operational requirements (see paragraph 3-17).
* Provide ADCON of Army forces (see paragraph 3-28).
* Set and maintain the theater (see paragraph 3-32).
* Set and support operational areas (see paragraph 3-33).
* Exercise command and control over Army forces in the theater (see paragraph 3-40).
* Perform joint roles of limited scope, scale, and duration (see paragraph 3-42).
* Plan and coordinate for the consolidation of gains in support of joint operations (See paragraph 3-
51).
3-16. Theater army operations during competition are critical to deterring potential adversaries and to
securing advantages should deterrence fail. The theater army sets conditions for the joint force to conduct
operations in both competition and conflict. Their operations to shape the environment and establish
conditions for the employment of forces provide flexibility to strategic commanders and decision makers.
COMBATANT COMMANDER’S DAILY OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
3-17. The theater army is primarily responsible to the GCC for daily operational requirements in the AOR.
It translates the GCC’s plans and requirements into concrete actions by Army forces using operational art
and science. During competition, the theater army’s focus is on enabling the United States and its allies to
compete effectively below the threshold of armed conflict in ways directed by the GCC. This allows strategic-
level leaders to frustrate threats’ attempts to achieve their objectives. As part of their daily activities, theater
armies support GCC activities that set conditions for military success in the event that threatened or actual |
3-94 | 80 | Chapter 3
violence is required to deter adversary aggression. This includes these tasks that occur across the competition
continuum:
* Provide ASOS.
* Conduct theater security cooperation.
* Assess and develop infrastructure.
* Develop concept and operation plans.
* Maintain threat orders of battle and provide indications and warnings of changes in an OE.
Provide Army Support to Other Services
3-18. In addition to providing support to Army forces, the theater armies provides support to other Services
as directed by executive agent and lead Service designations, inter-Service agreements, or Service support
agreements. This is done to provide common item support in the form of capabilities or resources through
common-user logistics or delegated executive agent responsibilities.
3-19. In order to fulfill these responsibilities, theater army commanders focus on operational-level theater
support involving combat power generation and sustainment during campaigns and joint operations. They
match support and sustainment requirements for a campaign to the Army combat power capabilities that
support the combatant commander’s requirements. ASOS enables joint forces freedom of action and
endurance by reducing redundancy and creating efficiency. During force planning, theater armies must
account for not only the support requirements for Army forces but also those ASOS requirements to enable
the joint force.
3-20. In addition to controlling Army forces, the theater army coordinates ASOS. ASOS includes provision
of common-user logistics and executive agent support to the joint force commander as required by the JFC
establishing authority. The theater army coordinates support to other services including, but not limited to—
* Missile defense.
* Fire support.
* Base defense.
* Transportation.
* General engineering.
* Intra-theater medical evacuation.
* Veterinary services.
* Logistics management.
* Communications.
* Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations.
* Counter weapons of mass destruction.
* Explosive ordnance disposal.
3-21. An additional aspect of ASOS is providing common user logistics throughout the AOR. Common-user
logistics are materiel or service support shared with or provided by two or more Services, Department of
Defense agencies, or multinational partners to another Service, Department of Defense agency, non-
Department of Defense agency, and/or multinational partner in an operation (JP 4-09). 10 USC authorizes a
GCC to designate a Service (usually the dominant user or most capable Service) to provide common-user
logistics for the entire theater, areas in a theater, or specific operations.
3-22. Examples of common-user logistic responsibilities that the GCC may task the Army component with
providing other services include—
* Wartime supply of Classes I, II, III (B), IV, and IX in-theater receipt, storage, and issue.
* Single integrated medical logistics management.
* Finance and comptroller operations.
* Airdrop equipment and systems.
* Billeting, medical, and food service support for transient personnel during other than unit moves. |
3-94 | 81 | Armies
Conduct Theater Security Cooperation
3-23. GCCs shape their regions through many cooperative actions with partner nations. The theater army
executes theater security cooperation through exercise programs, military-to-military engagement, providing
equipment, training, and financial assistance that the United States provides to partner nations to improve
their abilities to secure themselves. Security cooperation communicates U.S. intent and capabilities to
potential adversaries in that region. This assistance often improves access to key regions. These are tangible
effects of the Army’s role in security cooperation and assistance. Other benefits are less tangible; these
develop through face-to-face training involving U.S. Soldiers and the soldiers of partner nations. The
impression U.S. Soldiers make upon multinational forces, local leaders, and other government agencies can
produce lasting benefits and trust. (See FM 3-34, ATP 3-34.40, and ATP 3-37.10 for more information on
shaping and security cooperation.)
Assess and Develop Infrastructure
3-24. Infrastructure is essential to ensuring effective operations in theater and executing many of the
combatant commander’s daily operational requirements. The theater army and its supporting commands
assess the adequacy of infrastructure in the AOR to support anticipated military operations, determine
requirements for additional infrastructure, and manage infrastructure development programs assigned to
Army forces for execution. The theater army develops these plans, in close collaboration with its assigned
TSC, the geographic combatant command logistics directorate of a joint staff, and the Army Corps of
Engineers. Infrastructure development activities may include identifying requirements for forward basing
and air, land, and sea transit rights through the sovereign territories of partner or neutral nations in the AOR.
Identifying such requirements enables the appropriate U.S. Government agency to engage the relevant partner
or neutral nations. (See ATP 3-93 for more information on infrastructure development.)
Develop Concept and Operation Plans
3-25. The theater army designs operations and develops detailed plans to employ Army forces in accordance
with the GCC’s guidance. This includes supporting a JFC’s campaign to compete effectively with peer or
near-peer adversaries below the threshold of armed conflict, or conducting Army-led operations that create
relative advantages over an adversary. It may also include collaborating with unified action partners in
contingency planning in anticipation of armed conflict, or responding to unforeseen events in the AOR, such
as humanitarian crises or natural disasters. (For more information on concept plans and OPLANS, see
ATP 3-93.)
Maintain Threat Orders of Battle and Provide Indications and Warnings of Changes in an
Operational Environment.
3-26. The theater army is the only Army echelon with the persistent presence in a geographic AOR to enable
continuous shaping and the ability to transition quickly to prevention or conflict. Theater armies in
conjunction with joint and interagency partners, conduct continuous multi-domain operational preparation of
the environment and multi-domain reconnaissance and surveillance across the theater to build threat patterns
of life and orders of battle. The theater army serves as the primary conduit for strategic reach back to national
assets and resources, the functionally aligned ASCCs, AMC, and the Theater Special Operations Command.
It is responsible for establishing intelligence enterprise interoperability in the theater including establishing
and maintaining agreements for rapid information sharing and coalition response to contingencies and
emergency situations.
3-27. The theater army executes the combatant commander’s daily operational requirements while
simultaneously conducting adversary systems warfare analysis; target system analysis and development;
manages target lists; and setting the conditions to enable the immediate transition to armed conflict should
deterrence fail. The theater army coordinates with other joint and partner forces, and inter-organizational
agencies for their supporting capabilities, as well as those forces, organizations, and agencies located in
adjacent geographic regions. It is their responsibility to establish the necessary linkage to these capabilities
to meet the necessary requirements during competition and ensure that the theater can rapidly accept and
integrate functional units that expand capabilities when and where needed. |
3-94 | 82 | Chapter 3
PROVIDE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF ARMY FORCES
3-28. ADCON is not a command relationship. ADCON is direction or exercise of authority over subordinate
or other organizations in respect to administration and support. The exercise of ADCON fulfills a military
department’s statutory responsibilities. ADCON is synonymous with administration and support
responsibilities identified in 10 USC. The Secretary of the Army’s United States Code responsibilities are
exercised through ADCON. ADCON includes organization of Service forces, control of resources and
equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization,
demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions. The theater army
headquarters is responsible for ADCON of all Army forces in the AOR in peacetime and wartime. (See AR
10-87 for more information on ADCON.)
3-29. The Secretary of the Army exercises ADCON through theater army commanders assigned to the
combatant commands, unless otherwise specified by the Secretary of Defense. ADCON normally extends
from the Secretary of the Army through the ASCC, to Army units assigned to the ASCC; or through the
ASCC and an ARFOR to Army units assigned or attached to an Army headquarters in a joint command
subordinate to a CCMD. ADCON is not tied to the operational chain of command. The Secretary of the Army
may redirect some or all Service responsibilities outside the normal ASCC channels. In similar fashion, the
ASCC may distribute some administrative responsibilities outside the ARFOR. The primary considerations
are the effectiveness of Army forces and the care of Soldiers (administration, support, and force protection).
3-30. The theater army commander answers to the Secretary of the Army for the administration, support,
and force protection of all Army forces assigned or attached to the combatant command, or transiting through
the AOR. This is the authority necessary to fulfill Military Department statutory responsibilities for
administration and support.
3-31. The theater army commander remains responsible to the Department of the Army for Service-specific
requirements. This falls under the ADCON chain of authority. This authority establishes a hierarchy for Army
support to deployed forces without modifying the operational chain of command that runs from the combatant
commander through subordinate JFCs. For example, theater army commanders establish centers in the AOR
to train individual replacements; complete collective training, theater orientation, and theater acclimation;
and manage force modernization of Army forces before their employment by the JFC in the JOA. (See
ADP 3-0 for more information on Service-specific requirements.)
SET AND MAINTAIN THE THEATER
3-32. The term set the theater refers to a broad range of actions necessary to employ landpower before and
during a crisis. Setting the theater includes a whole-of-government initiatives, including bilateral or
multilateral diplomatic agreements that allow U.S. forces access to ports, terminals, airfields, and bases in
the AOR to support future military contingency operations. Setting the theater is a continuous shaping activity
and is conducted a part of steady-state posture and for contingency or crisis response operations. This includes
base development; theater opening; reception, staging, onward movement, and integration; and other
operational activities which set the conditions for operations in the AOR. The theater army, in conjunction
with its associated theater fires command, prepares fires estimates, and participates in the joint targeting
process to set conditions for future operations. The theater army, in conjunction with its associated TSC,
prepares sustainment estimates that outline the responsibilities and requirements for setting the theater where
U.S. military presence is forward stationed or deployed. The theater army executes many of these
responsibilities through the TSC. (See ATP 3-93 for more information on setting the theater.)
SET AND SUPPORT OPERATIONAL AREAS
3-33. In addition to setting and maintaining the overall theater, theater armies play an important part in
setting and supporting specific operational areas for JFCs. They orchestrate and synchronize Army activities
that create conditions of advantage for the joint and multinational force. While setting and maintaining the
theater are inherently strategic, actions to set and support operational areas focus on the operational and
tactical levels of warfare. Examples of key tasks that theater armies may perform to support this include
reception, staging, onward movement, and integration; force tailoring; force protection; and provide |
3-94 | 83 | Armies
sustainment support in the operational area. (See ATP 3-93 for more information on supporting operational
areas.)
Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration
3-34. Reception, staging, onward movement, and integration refers to all the steps and processes of receiving
forces and their equipment in a theater and all of the activities required for that force to be positioned in a
tactical assembly area and prepared to conduct operations. The steps of reception, staging, onward movement,
and integration include—
* Reception operations including all those functions required to receive and clear personnel,
equipment, and materiel through the port of debarkation.
* Staging operations to assemble, temporarily hold, and organize arriving personnel, equipment, and
materiel into forces and capabilities. Staging also prepares forces for onward movement, tactical
operations, or Service reintegration if the theater army is supporting other Services.
* Onward movement as the process of moving forces, capabilities, and accompanying materiel from
reception facilities, marshalling areas, and staging areas to tactical assembly areas at which time
they come under OPCON to the ARFOR in the JOA.
* Integration as the synchronized transfer of capabilities into the ARFOR, in the JOA, prior to the
mission.
Force Tailoring
3-35. Tailoring a force is a combination of two requirements: selecting the right forces and deploying those
forces in an effective force flow. As an ASCC, the theater army plays a critical role in the success of force
tailoring. Through collaboration and analysis, the ASCC recommends the allocation and employment of
Army forces to the geographic combatant command. The result of the theater army’s efforts is a force package
matched to the needs of the combatant commander. (See Chapter 2 for more information on force tailoring.)
Force Protection
3-36. The Unified Command Plan directs force protection responsibility for all 10 USC DOD forces
stationed in, operating in, residing in, or transiting an AOR to the GCC. This responsibility will usually go
to the theater army commander for all Army forces in the AOR. The tasks of the theater army include the
exercise of TACON over 10 USC Army forces stationed in, operating in, residing in, or transiting the AOR.
Since there is not an Army theater-level protection command, staff responsibilities for planning and oversight
falls entirely on the theater army staff. If a JFLCC or joint security coordinator is required, the GCC normally
assigns that responsibility to the theater army commander.
3-37. In addition to assets that provide protection, such as CBRN and EOD units, the theater army staff
focuses on two enablers of protection: command and control and sustainment. The theater requirements for
air and missile defense, for example, often exceed the capabilities available. Therefore, as the force is tailored,
the theater army staff coordinates with the GCC and is supported by the GCC’s aligned air and missile defense
command. The theater army staff estimates the command and control and sustainment assets necessary for
both the campaign and an increased threat across the AOR. The theater army staff also requests forces to
meet the combatant commander’s priorities. Through these activities, the ASCC provides the best protection
available. (See ATP 3-93 for more information on protection enablers.)
Provide Sustainment Support in an Operational Area
3-38. The theater army provides the GCC with sustainment capabilities to support a subordinate OA. With
the initial deployment of forces, the theater army tailors its organization to provide the required support to
joint operations. The theater army’s support function has a major impact on the design and conduct of joint
operations. The theater army must get the right Army forces to the right place at the right time to enable the
GCC to concentrate forces and logistics to generate decisive combat power.
3-39. The theater army is closely involved with decisions concerning competing demands for limited
resources. It assists the combatant command in developing support priorities, including those affecting other |
3-94 | 84 | Chapter 3
Services. To support the ARFOR, the theater army also coordinates the projection of additional required
support from the continental United States, another theater, or an intermediate staging base using air lines of
communication and sea lines of communication. (See ATP 3-93 for more information on support priorities.)
EXERCISE COMMAND AND CONTROL OVER ARMY FORCES IN A THEATER
3-40. The theater army is the ASCC and has the responsibility to control attached and assigned Army forces
in the AOR through ADCON and OPCON or TACON. As the Army component of the combatant command,
the ASCC is the ARFOR for the theater. When a subordinate JTF is established containing Army forces, the
senior Army headquarters in that JTF is normally designated as its ARFOR. Army doctrine distinguishes
between the Army component of a combatant command and that of a joint force formed by the combatant
commander.
3-41. The theater army initially maintains control of all Army units assigned to an AOR until control is
passed to the senior army force or ARFOR in a subordinate JOA. As part of controlling Army forces, the
ARFOR maintains ADCON of Army forces and addresses service responsibilities such as coordinating
ASOS. (See ADP 4-0 for more information on ASOS.)
PERFORM JOINT ROLES IN LIMITED SCOPE, SCALE, AND DURATION.
3-42. While serving as the ASCC, the theater army has the capability to perform three joint roles for the
GCC. With augmentation, the theater army can be the theater JFLCC, a JTF headquarters, or the JFLCC.
However, these roles can only be performed in limited scope, scale, and duration, unless the JFC provides
significant augmentation.
Theater Joint Force Land Component Commander
3-43. Prior to the establishment of a JOA or a subordinate JTF, the GCC may designate a theater joint force
land component for coordination and synchronization of day-to-day operations across the AOR. The most
likely candidate for a theater JFLCC is the GCC’s assigned theater army.
3-44. Normally the theater joint force land component will be limited to coordinating authority over other
land components and provide the GCC with a means to synchronize land force activities. This includes the
initial development of an accurate, timely, and persistent common operational picture of all land force
activities occurring through the theater. This enhances effectiveness and creates efficiencies across the land
domain.
3-45. The primary responsibilities of the theater JFLCC may include but are not limited to—
* Developing the joint land operations plan.
* Developing operation plans or operation orders in support of the GCC’s concept of operations and
optimize the operations of task organized land forces.
* Providing pre-hostility coordination with other theater-level functional components.
* Advising the GCC on the prioritization and allocation of land force capabilities.
* Maintaining a land domain common tactical picture for inclusion into the joint operational
common operational picture.
* Providing general support to subordinate commanders and JTFs in the AOR.
* Conducting and coordinating land component planning.
* Tracking key leader engagements.
* Tracking land-based operations, actions, and activities.
* Conducting joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration for land forces.
* Conducting personnel recovery in support of joint land operations and for isolating events
occurring in an assigned operational area or as tasked by the GCC.
3-46. In the case of the U.S. homeland, and the joint operations of homeland defense and defense support
of civil authorities, the designation of a JFLCC to provide coordination for unity of effort between state-
formed JTFs has become a recurring requirement. A theater JFLCC, normally USA North, is a command
option used by U.S. Northern Command to provide command and control for 10 USC, land operations for |
3-94 | 85 | Armies
defense support of civil authorities. This option provides for a single 10 USC, functional component
headquarters capable of providing general support to achieve unity of effort between federal and state
response forces. (See JP 3-31 for additional responsibilities.)
United States Army Pacific as a Theater Joint Force Land
Component Commander
In September 2013, to achieve unity of effort among joint forces in the land domain,
the commander, USINDOPACOM, prepared an initiating directive for the designation
of a theater JFLCC and deputy. This resulted in the February 2014 formal designation
of the commander, United States Army Pacific, as the theater JFLCC; the commander
of U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific, as his deputy; and with support from the
commander, Special Operations Command, Pacific as the Chief of Staff. While having
only coordinating authority over the Marines and special operations forces, the theater
JFLCC provided the United States Pacific Command commander not only with a
means to synchronize land force activities during persistent military engagement and
contingency operations, but also initially developed an accurate, timely, and persistent
common operational picture of all land force activities occurring through the theater.
To enhance effectiveness and create efficiencies in the land domain across the
Services, the theater JFLCC advises the USINDOPACOM commander on the
prioritization and allocation of land force capabilities; maintains a land domain common
operational picture; coordinates land component planning; and tracks key leader
engagements and land-based operations, actions, and activities. The theater JFLCC
also had an established battle rhythm to enable coordination among the Commander,
United States Army Pacific, Marine Forces Pacific, and Special Operations Command,
Pacific. To operationalize the theater JFLCC, commander, United States Army Pacific
also established the Theater Joint Land Force Component Command Coordination
Center. With the change of USINDOPACOM and Service component leadership over
time, the theater JFLCC role has evolved to the commander, United States Army
Pacific remaining as the theater JFLCC but with reduced involvement of the other
Service components with land activities as only supporting commands. The
commander, United States Army Pacific, as the JFLCC, focuses on coordination for
defense support of civil authorities as evidenced in support to Typhoon Yutu in Guam
in November 2018, land based homeland defense planning and exercises, and
continued synchronization of land component activities. The challenge of unity of effort
remains with only coordination authority for day-to-day operations, but in crisis
response and contingency planning, USINDOPACOM and its Service components
value the synchronization that the theater JFLCC provides to maximize use of joint
land capabilities. (See JP 3-31 for more information on theater JFLCCs, as it is the
source of this vignette.)
Joint Task Force
3-47. The theater army may form the core element of a JTF headquarters. The theater army’s contingency
command post is capable of forming the nucleus of a joint headquarters. When directed, a theater army uses
its contingency command post as the nucleus of a JTF headquarters for a small-scale contingency operation
of less than thirty days. An operation lasting longer than thirty days requires significant augmentation.
3-48. The contingency command post offers the GCC an option for forming and deploying a JTF
headquarters. The GCC uses the theater army’s contingency command post as the core element of a JTF
headquarters and augments it with additional personnel, either Army or other Service, to accomplish the
mission. Because of its established habitual internal staff working relationship, the theater army poses a viable
option to support short notice and limited duration operations. (See JP 3-33 for more information on JTFs.) |
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