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Table 1-1. Sustainment considerations for imperatives (continued)
Imperatives Sustainment considerations
Designate, weight, and sustain the • Designate main effort and prioritize resources.
main effort.
• Continue information collection.
• Manage personnel replacement operations and personnel tracking.
• Anticipate sustainment requirements of the main effort.
• Position supplies and capabilities according to the commander’s
intent, allowing for freedom of maneuver.
• Provide sustainment estimates and asset visibility.
• Conduct estimates, track funding, and report costs to specific
operations.
• Provide medical materiel, blood, and medical device maintenance
and repair necessary to sustain operations.
• Position medical assets in proximity of supported forces while
pushing medical evacuation capabilities as far forward as possible to
decrease mortality.
Consolidate gains continuously. • Assess resources in order to transition to the next phase.
• Reconstitute the force to transition.
• Exploit sustainment resources/infrastructure.
• Establish and manage personnel tracking and reporting.
• Support displaced persons, detainee operations, and host-nation
civilians.
• Establish, assess, and operate the theater distribution network.
• Identify sustainment shortfalls/gaps against requirements.
• Plan for and incorporate operational contract support.
• Implement in-transit visibility.
• Conduct estimates, track funding, and report costs to specific
operations.
• Conduct audits in order to make resource-informed decisions.
• Assess casualty estimates and return to duty rates.
• Resupply Class VIII medical materiel and blood products, ensure
medical devices are operational, and that sufficient patient movement
items are on hand.
Understand and manage the effects • Maintain awareness of the human indicators of fatigue, fear,
of operations on units and leaders. indiscipline, and reduced morale.
• Maintain well-trained, physically fit Soldiers for cohesive units during
extended operations.
• Plan to match units against missions and rotate units through rest
and recuperation periods.
• Establish and manage personnel replacements, tracking, and
reporting. Manage personnel and postal actions throughout the
competition continuum.
• Support morale, welfare, and recreation activities.
• Plan and support field services.
• Plan and execute religious support.
• Provide predictive sustainment support vs reactive operations.
• Distribute and control funds, provide status of funds, and monitor
obligation rates.
• Forecast upcoming funding requirements based on operational
needs.
• Provide Army Health System support to promote and improve,
conserve, or restore behavioral and physical well-being. |
4-0 | 26 | Chapter 1
SECTION III – THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
1-29. An operational environment is the aggregate of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect
the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). For Army forces, an
OE includes portions of the land, maritime, air, space, and cyberspace domains understood through three
dimensions (human, physical, and information). The land, maritime, air, and space domains are defined by
their physical characteristics. The cyberspace domain is a manmade network of networks that transits and
connects the other domains. The cyberspace domain includes the internet, telecommunications networks,
computer systems, embedded processors and controllers, and portions of the electromagnetic spectrum. For
additional information on cyberspace, see FM 3-12. Sustainment operations are conducted through the land,
air, and maritime domains, enabled by capabilities in the space and cyberspace domains, and cross each
dimension. For additional information, see FM 3-0 and FM 2-0.
1-30. Analyzing operational and mission variables allows commanders and staffs to refine their situational
understanding of the OE. Commanders and staffs analyze and describe an OE in terms of eight interrelated
operational variables: political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment,
and time. These variables help leaders understand the land domain and its interrelationships with relevant
actors and capabilities in the other domains, as well as the information environment. Commanders analyze
information categorized by the operational variables in the context of the missions they are assigned. They
use mission variables, in combination with the operational variables, to refine their understanding of the
situation and to visualize, describe, and direct operations. The mission variables are mission, enemy, terrain
and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations, each of which have
informational considerations. See FM 5-0 for additional information on operational and mission variables.
1-31. Understanding the specific OE in each situation is essential to the successful execution of deployment
and sustainment operations conducted in support of CCDR objectives. Sustainers mitigate risks identified
during OE analysis by conducting sustainment preparation of the OE. Geospatial engineering capabilities
assist sustainers with coordination, integration, and synchronization of resources through a shared
understanding and visualization of the OE. They analyze and identify lines of communications (LOCs) in
support of force projection, identify terrain suitability for intermediate staging and forward operating base
emplacement, emphasize restrictive terrain to assist planners with aerial and ground delivery considerations,
and identify natural resources and infrastructure. For additional information on sustainment preparation of
the OE, see Chapter 3 and ATP 4-93.
1-32. Units sustaining large-scale combat operations are affected by a range of factors in the OE. Sustainers
must be prepared to support operations in a variety of vastly different OEs. Listed below are examples of
specific OE factors that may impact sustainment operations:
• Contiguous and noncontiguous areas of operations where ill-defined or fluid boundaries impact task
organizations, identification of supported units, command and support relationships, distribution
plans, and execution.
• Simultaneous, geographically dispersed operations that may result in long LOCs and stress
sustainment headquarters communications, command and support relationships, distribution plans,
and execution.
• Joint, single-Service, and multinational force interactions with intergovernmental organizations,
nongovernmental organizations, and contractors require more liaisons to and from sustainment
headquarters and units, and longer planning time to ensure all organizations understand the plan.
For more information on multinational, intergovernmental organization, and nongovernmental
organization support, see ADP 4-0.
• Limited availability of, or high competition for, host-nation support (HNS), infrastructure,
commercial services, commodities, and facilities to support setting the theater, rapid deployment
and onward movement of combat forces, and sustainment of the joint security area during military
operations.
CONTESTED LOGISTICS ENVIRONMENT
1-33. A contested logistics environment is an environment in which the armed forces engage in conflict with
an adversary that presents challenges in all domains and directly targets logistics operations, facilities, and |
4-0 | 27 | Army Sustainment Operations
activities in the United States, abroad, or in transit from one location to another (10 USC § 2926[h]). The
following paragraphs describe considerations for conducting logistics operations when contested by a peer
threat. It discusses an overview of peer threat capabilities that affect logistics, provides planning
considerations for conducting operations in a contested logistics environment, and concludes with logistics
considerations for reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) in a contested logistics
environment.
Logistics Threats
1-34. Sustainment commanders and staffs must therefore plan and execute logistics with the assumption that
sustainment forces are always under observation, in contact, and contested. Sustainment forces must be
prepared to operate in a contested logistics environment. Peer adversaries possess the capability and capacity
to observe, disrupt, delay, and attack U.S. forces, infrastructure, and operations in all domains within the
United States, abroad, and while in transit. Contested logistics involve planning, executing, and enabling the
movement and support of military forces across multiple domains (air, land, sea, space, cyberspace,
electromagnetic spectrum) in a contested environment.
1-35. Peer adversaries possess air, space, and cyberspace capabilities, increasing the likelihood that threat
forces can gain and maintain continuous visual and electromagnetic contact with Army forces. Sustainment
leaders must assume they are under constant observation from one or more domains and continuously ensure
they are not providing lucrative targets for the enemy to attack. FM 3-0 describes nine forms of contact in
multiple domains that sustainment forces may face: direct, indirect, non-hostile, obstacle, CBRN, aerial,
visual, electromagnetic, and influence.
1-36. Sustainment forces must anticipate being under continuous visual, electromagnetic, and influence
contact with adversaries during logistics operations. Peer adversaries will deploy persistent visual
surveillance through space and other capabilities to detect and target logistics operations. Peer adversaries
are capable of persistently probing and disrupting logistics operations through the deployment of space and
cyberspace capabilities to maintain contact with logistics forces. Logistics operations are subject to adversary
influence through disinformation and misinformation campaigns targeting Soldiers, their families, and their
friends.
1-37. Sustainment forces must understand that a peer adversary can deploy capabilities that may impact
logistics operations during competition. A peer adversary’s capability to employ effects across multiple
domains can disrupt critical infrastructure at home and locations abroad. This infrastructure includes civilian
transportation infrastructure, power, communications, fuel, water, and other life support. Interdiction of these
types of infrastructure can disrupt, delay, and potentially deny military operations.
1-38. During crisis and armed conflict, sustainment forces should expect an enemy that contests logistics
activities in all domains by employing means to detect and rapidly target sustainment forces and resources.
Forces and resources that are concentrated and static are easy for enemy forces to detect and destroy.
Dispersing these assets has multiple survivability benefits. Sustainment forces must be prepared to operate
dispersed, quickly mass, and then rapidly disperse again to increase survivability. Constant dispersion of
sustainment forces and resources can be used as a form of deception and help to conceal intentions and
capabilities. Dispersion also creates targeting dilemmas for the adversary by reducing the effect enemy strikes
can have on U.S. forces. See ATP 3-37.34 for information on survivability positions and FM 3-13.4 for more
information on deception.
1-39. Adversaries will employ predatory economics, economic coercion, economic warfare, misinformation,
and other means to achieve their objectives short of conflict during competition and set conditions for their
advantage in conflict. Although the Army does not have direct influence over this facet of competition, the
Army and joint force are heavily reliant on contracted good and services, HNS, and access to host-nation
infrastructure. Moreover, peer adversaries have vastly more ability in scope and scale to render contractors
and vendors unable or unwilling to support the U.S. or deny them access to required materials. |
4-0 | 28 | Chapter 1
CONTESTED LOGISTICS CHALLENGES AND PLANNING
CONSIDERATIONS
SETTING THE THEATER
1-40. Adversary actions aim to deny U.S. forces the ability to set the theater by challenging access and
movement, thereby limiting the ability to establish a relevant forward presence of resources and caches.
Potential ways to overcome this include—
• Tailoring regional posture (forward posturing): Forward-postured regional resources reduce risk
and mitigate the severity of loss and impact when adversary antiaccess and area denial efforts target
and successfully impact the force at strategic maneuver distances. Increasing forward sustainment
posture imposes targeting challenges on the adversary.
• Increasing survivability of sustainment modes and nodes: Protection requirements are increased
with the expanded future OE. Protecting sustainment resources is achieved in part through increased
organic lethality, communications redundancy, survivability, deception, and dispersion. Protection
of sustainment nodes, capabilities, and capacities requires the integration and synchronization of
sustainment and other forces.
• Building partner capacity and leveraging regional resources: Limited access and competition
over regional resources poses a challenge for the joint force’s ability to leverage the local area
resources needed to support Army support to other Services and Title 10 missions. Adversaries are
using diplomacy, economic power, and irregular warfare, weaponizing information, and posturing
conventional forces to create stand-off to fracture U.S. alliances and partnerships. These actions can
diminish and deny the U.S. the ability to contract the required sustainment functions and capabilities
to support the joint force. Building regional partnerships while understanding the region's economic
environment and infrastructure complexities is critical to gaining access to resources. During
competition, Army forces must build relationships, agreements, and contracts to shape regional
capabilities and security requirements. Army forces will not win a conflict alone and must shape the
sustainment environment during competition to meet Army, joint, and unified action partner
requirements.
ENABLING POWER PROJECTION
1-41. Peer adversaries will contest U.S. power projection capabilities to delay, disrupt, and interdict Army
forces from rapidly transitioning to conflict. Army forces must develop and maintain a resilient supply
support activity (SSA), balance sustainment force posture, and modernize rapid response capabilities,
creating multiple dilemmas to counter adversary efforts. Ways to achieve this may include—
• Ready a resilient SSA: The Army must inform Department of Defense (DOD) prioritization
regarding U.S. and partner infrastructure enhancements while increasing manned and unmanned lift
assets capable of transporting supplies that require special handling (such as unique CL V missiles
for long-range and air defense artillery). Augmentation provided through these relationships must
not translate to overestimating their capabilities, thus leading to an unacceptable increase in strategic
and operational risks. During competition, Army forces must work with commercial entities and
unified action partners in potential operating theaters to understand their capacities and the duration
of support that would be afforded to U.S. forces and incorporate these into planning.
• Balanced total force sustainment: The total force sustainment posture must be optimized globally
to contribute to deterrence operations in competition and be responsive to sustain large-scale combat
operations. The Army’s contribution to power projection will rely heavily on policy, resourcing,
and planning initiatives to balance the total force to meet rapid deployment timelines.
DEPLOYMENT
1-42. Fort-to-Port: As part of the strategic support area, home station installations, Reserve centers, National
Guard armories, and other designated points of origin such as unit motor pools are where force projection
begins. They present targets that enemy forces may attack to delay, disrupt, and degrade force flow into
theater. Planning to mitigate deployment disruption requires partnerships between Army staffs, local
governments and agencies, and Services to maximize lift assets and other resources. Fort-to-port operations
require agile nodes, accurate and timely information, trained movement personnel at all levels, and the timely |
4-0 | 29 | Army Sustainment Operations
arrival of throughput enablers. In addition, planners should consider maintaining unit integrity and delivering
capabilities rather than entire formations and incorporating force tracking capabilities. Additional fort-to-port
planning considerations include the following:
• Coordinate with local, state, and federal authorities to mitigate deployment disruptions.
• Ensure that units can provide combat-configured forces for worldwide deployment with limited
notice within required times.
• Ensure that unit deployment plans and procedures adequately support limited no-notice deployment.
• Ensure that installation plans and procedures adequately support limited no-notice deployments.
• Ensure unit readiness and establishment of pre-positioned stocks.
• Identify and secure primary and alternate movement nodes to reach ports of embarkation.
• Plan to use alternate and multiple LOCs.
• Incorporate command and control and in-transit visibility capabilities.
• Establish specific cyber defenses for systems and associated data used to support movement.
• Conduct threat planning and mitigation.
• Maximize liaisons.
1-43. Port-to-Port: Port-to-port operations are likely targets of kinetic and non-kinetic attacks to reduce
capabilities or capacity as U.S. forces deploy to the theater. Enemy forces may target ports or vessels while
in-transit with long-range fires, special operations forces, cyberspace attacks, space capability degradation or
denial, and other capabilities. Whether conducting operations at a port during competition, crisis, or armed
conflict, Army forces coordinate with the relevant authorities to mitigate potential complications at or enroute
to the port. This includes—
• Coordinating with host-nation and local authorities to mitigate deployment disruptions at the port
of debarkation/embarkation.
• Establishing OCS and security cooperation for port operations.
• Assembling and organizing personnel into units and force packages to build combat power in
anticipation of a contested environment.
• Understanding port authority structure and capabilities.
• Anticipating problems with frustrated cargo, efficient cargo handling, vessel turnaround, and
reasonable utilization of port facilities.
• Conducting threat planning and mitigation.
• Identifying potential redundancies (for example, if power is lost, can port gantry cranes load
containers).
• Anticipating performing logistics over-the-shore in austere environments or degraded ports.
• Incorporating command and control and in-transit visibility capabilities.
• Planning RSOI.
1-44. RSOI: The theater Army has primary responsibility for conducting RSOI for all joint land forces.
Setting the theater for RSOI operations should not rely solely on organic capabilities, but also consider HNS,
contractor support, and after initial entry, the Component 2 and 3 forces. This is meant to fill required gaps
in mobility, both sequentially and simultaneously. Once hostilities begin, the risk posed to strategic lift by a
peer adversary may degrade the ability of vessels to deliver equipment and forces very far into theater. This
may result in the transition from intertheater to intratheater lift being farther away from the fight and
necessitate reception and staging to take place outside the theater. This will cause onward movement to occur
over extended, contested LOCs of operational and strategic distances. Further complicating the challenge
could be operations that must occur in a largely maritime environment.
1-45. The need for dispersion and disaggregation of forces will cause Army equipment to arrive in numerous
smaller ports. Because 80 percent of sustainment capabilities are in the Component 2 and 3 organizations, it
is important for planners to understand the mobilization and time-phased force and deployment data
(TPFDD) requirements to synchronize force flow into the theater. Additional acquisition and cross-servicing
agreements (ACSAs) enable rapid deployment of combat forces to help bridge gaps of capabilities currently
not in theater. As designated by the CCDR, the TSC transfers tactical control (TACON) of units to the gaining
joint force commander (JFC) in preparation for onward movement. Additional planning considerations
during RSOI include, but are not limited to—
• Planning for risks against velocity. |
4-0 | 30 | Chapter 1
• Maintaining asset visibility of equipment and personnel.
• Identifying threat mitigations of antiaccess and area denial.
• Planning to utilize multiple geographically dispersed nodes (personnel and equipment).
• Understanding and planning for the synchronization of force flow (knowing the friction points).
• Anticipating use of Army pre-positioned stocks (APS) equipment, load reconfiguration, and
integration of capabilities.
• Planning to mitigate Class III (bulk), maintenance, and transportation gaps that may impact
transition from movement to maneuver.
• Conducting threat planning and mitigation required to support RSOI operations.
• Understanding critical infrastructure vulnerable to sabotage and unsuited for the movement of heavy
equipment along surface LOCs (both road and rail).
• Establishing fuel, maintenance, and rest locations along LOCs.
• Establishing security for LOCs to achieve freedom of movement.
• Planning and integrating OCS and host-nation logistics infrastructure support.
• Planning for destroyed, delayed, frustrated, and non-mission capable equipment arriving in theater.
• Incorporating liaison and unit personnel at theater nodes to facilitate onward movement.
ECHELONED SUSTAINMENT FOR DISTRIBUTED OPERATIONS
1-46. The application and tactics of widely distributed operations will increase the demands on the
sustainment enterprise at all echelons. As a result, sustainment forces must maintain effectiveness in
supporting distributed operations at the cost of efficiency. Ways to achieve this may include—
• Increased mobility: Sustaining division-focused, widely distributed operations across domains
requires modernized logistics capabilities operating over diverse, reliable, robust, and resilient
transportation and distribution systems and networks that consist of multiple modes, multiple nodes,
and multiple sources.
• Demand management: Demand management is an essential component of sustainment in the
context of echeloned sustainment for distributed operations. Echeloned operations refer to the
deployment of military forces in a series of phases or echelons, with each phase building on the
previous one to create a layered interdependence towards a defined military outcome. It involves
managing the flow of resources to ensure that they are available when and where they are needed.
The goal being to balance or manage the frequency, volume, and responsiveness of supply,
distribution, redistribution, and retrograde. This is the “art and science” of demand management
during echeloned operations. This is the most essential component of echeloned sustainment to
maneuver during large-scale combat operations. It reduces the risk to sustainment forces. Innovative
measures must reduce reliance on the supply chain, enhance self-sufficiency, and extend operational
reach as the requirements to conduct regular supply is reduced. Additionally, demand reduction
applies to materiel design for reduced weight and energy efficiencies as well as commodities and
lift. Sustainers must exploit technologies to meet requirements at the point of need to reduce delivery
times and burdens on the distribution network.
• Active and passive survivability measures: Adversaries will target sustainment forces, units,
nodes, and capabilities at all echelons. Army forces must adapt operational tactics, techniques, and
procedures to support operations by improving active and passive measures of protection. At each
echelon, sustainment forces must integrate with their respective commands’ planning processes. To
support this, logisticians must develop capabilities for smaller stockpiles, resupply on the move, and
preposition caches for maneuvering formations. For a division-focused force, organic sustainment
redundancy at echelon is necessary to meet increased support requirements, complicate the
adversary’s targeting calculus, preserve combat power, and facilitate persistent sustainment.
RESILIENT, INTEGRATED, AND INTEROPERABLE SUSTAINMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS
1-47. Army sustainment command and control requires resilient information capabilities that are agile,
integrated, predictive, near-real-time, and inform sustainment decisions to meet the operational tempo. Ways
to achieve this may include—
• Data automation, prognosis, and prediction: Operations challenge the Army’s ability to manage
and exploit the massive amount of sustainment data from the point of need to the supply support |
4-0 | 31 | Army Sustainment Operations
area and the defense industrial base with relevant speed. Management of the abundance of
sustainment data relies on a common data repository and automation to perform predictive analysis
and near-real-time assessments. Exploiting information through robotics and other tools will drive
anticipatory sustainment decisions, with commensurate authorities at echelon to act upon timely and
relevant information.
• Accessible, protected, and interoperable sustainment information systems: Army forces must
integrate and synchronize sustainment information systems with those of joint Services, unified
action partners, and allies to achieve better interoperability, visibility, and understanding of
sustainment requirements. Critical sustainment information systems must be secure, protected,
defensible within the Army communications network, and capable of withstanding or mitigating
attacks and degradation. Future enterprise resource planning information, information management,
and battle management systems must have the ability to connect to and be interoperable with the
other Services as part of the overall joint logistics enterprise, along with unified action partners and
allies through the mission partner environment.
• Informed command and control: Leaders base timely decisions on accurate and actionable
information. Future Army forces achieve sustainment decision advantage on the battlefield by
increasing the speed of the decision cycle for commanders at all echelons. Sustainment information
(for example, location, consumption, quantity, current capacity, projected capacity, and availability)
must be integrated and governed by command relationships, authorities, and regulations at echelon
to enable decisions.
SECTION IV – SUSTAINMENT SUPPORT TO MULTIDOMAIN OPERATIONS
1-48. Joint interdependence is the purposeful
reliance of all the Services upon each other's Strategic Framework consists of:
capabilities to maximize the complementary • Strategic support area.
and reinforcing effects of all. The United • Joint security area.
States Air Force provides strategic airlift • Extended deep area.
capabilities to move Army forces quickly • Assigned operational area.
across strategic LOCs. The United States Navy
Operational Framework consists of:
provides strategic sealift into deep draft ports
• Assigned areas (area of operations, zone, and
and land capabilities to supplement Army sector).
theater opening forces entering areas where
• Deep, close, and rear operations.
ports are austere, damaged, or non-existent.
• Main effort, supporting effort, and reserve.
The joint force enables Army sustainment and
provides the services and capabilities needed
to sustain unified action. For additional information regarding joint logistics, see JP 4-0.
1-49. Army sustainment enables operations by providing the support required to keep the Army and its
unified action partners engaged in operations across the strategic and operational frameworks. The strategic
framework accounts for factors in the strategic environment and the connection of strategic capabilities to
operational and tactical-level operations. The strategic framework includes four areas: strategic support area,
joint security area, extended deep area, and assigned operational area. The sustainment warfighting function
enables the freedom of action, extended operational reach, and prolonged endurance needed to conduct and
sustain operations across the strategic and operational frameworks. The operational framework is a cognitive
tool used to assist commanders and staffs in clearly visualizing and describing the application of combat
power in time, space, purpose, and resources in the concept of operations (ADP 1-01). The operational
framework consists of assigned areas; deep, close, and rear operations; and main effort, supporting effort,
and reserve. Sustainment forces can be found throughout the operational framework, with the majority
conducting operations from rear and close areas. Figure 1-3 on page 16 depicts the operational framework in
the context of the strategic framework. For additional information on the operational framework in the
context of the strategic framework, see FM 3-0. |
4-0 | 32 | Chapter 1
Figure 1-3. The operational framework in the context of the strategic framework
1-50. The interrelationship of the air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains requires a shared
understanding of an OE. Sustainment commanders and staffs must understand the friendly and enemy
capabilities that reside in each domain and their potential impacts to sustainment operations. Space and
cyberspace operations that degrade sustainment information system capabilities, as well as the peer threat
employment of conventional, special operations, guerilla, and insurgent forces to interdict friendly air, land,
and maritime operations, can all degrade sustainment operations. Since many friendly capabilities are not
organic to sustainment formations, commanders and staffs plan, coordinate for, and integrate joint and other
unified action partner capabilities in an approach to operations.
1-51. During operations against peer threats, all friendly forces must assume they are under observation and
can potentially come into contact in all domains across both the strategic framework and operational
framework. Understanding and visualizing the physical, information, and human dimensions within the
context of each domain helps commanders and staffs assess and anticipate the impacts of operations. This
includes the impact of peer threat capabilities to contest operations using space and cyberspace capabilities.
Soldiers must be prepared to operate and communicate in denied, degraded, and disrupted environments.
Soldiers and leaders must analyze informational considerations across the human, information, and physical
dimensions from friendly, threat, and neutral perspectives to aid in developing ways to use, protect, and attack
data, information, and capabilities related to sustainment operations. Sustainers at all levels should maintain
the ability to operate in an environment where sustainment operations, data, and information are contested.
(See ADP 3-13 for more information.) |
4-0 | 33 | Army Sustainment Operations
1-52. In a contested logistics environment,
distributed sustainment operations are challenged in
Peer adversaries in a contested logistics
every domain during operations. In such an
environment have the ability to—
environment, sustainment decisions must be made
• Challenge operations in all domains and
quickly and precisely. Precision sustainment is the directly target logistics operations, facilities,
effective delivery of the right capabilities at the and activities.
point of employment enabling commander’s • Contest distributed sustainment operations
freedom of action, extending operational reach, in all domains.
and prolonging endurance. Precision sustainment
• Require that sustainment decisions and
is enabled by predictive logistics. Predictive operations must be quick and precise.
logistics is a system of sensors, communications,
and applications (data support tools and data
visualization) that enables quicker and more accurate sustainment decision making at echelon from
tactical to strategic. Predictive logistics enables decision dominance and greater precision and speed with
running estimates and course of action development. It provides options for commanders and planners to
know precisely where and when to prioritize support to ensure the right commodities go to the unit that most
needs them for success. Sustainers must become accustomed to making decisions at echelon using real-time
data received via predictive logistics sensors and systems.
1-53. Predictive logistics provides decision
support using sensors, communications, and Predictive logistics supports greater precision and
applications that blend logistics data with speed through enabling—
predictive algorithms to inform planning and • Sustainment decision-making using artificial
intelligence and machine learning.
decision making. For example, the information
received from predictive logistics applications can • Predictive algorithms that inform course of
action development and running estimates.
be used to predict product replacement rates and
request replacement products before the product is • Decisions at echelon using real-time data
needed. Predictive logistics systems can also received via predictive logistics sensors and
systems.
monitor Class III (Bulk), Class V, and water
consumption rates, and request replenishment
without manual input. Predictive logistics will also allow monitoring of transportation assets and enable
redirection based on priorities or request replacement parts. Other examples of predictive logistics include
the ability to redirect the Joint Tactical Autonomous Aerial Resupply System (unmanned aerial systems that
have the ability to deliver supplies to the point of employment) to resupply widely dispersed forces, and an
effective communication network that enables timely situational awareness. The continued development of
predictive logistics capabilities will allow precision sustainment to gain efficiencies in—
• Decision dominance.
• Autonomous distribution.
• Demand reduction.
• Advanced power.
• Maritime operations.
1-54. Precision sustainment is the goal for
optimizing resources during operations in a Precision sustainment is enabled by a sustainment
enterprise resource planning and decision support
contested logistics environment. Precision
system with predictive logistics that enables—
sustainment integrates sustainment data and
• The ability to resupply without request and/or
information that can be used at all echelons. It
redirect supplies based on priority.
also provides anticipation and responsiveness
• A real-time common operational picture viewable
for sustainment and operational planners to
by commanders and logisticians at echelon.
react to supply and maintenance trends.
• Significant demand reduction across the total
Precision sustainment also employs the
force to lessen delivery requirements.
principle of economy and ensures sustainment
resources are provided in the most efficient
manner to enable employment of assets to the greatest effect possible. Precision sustainment is enabled by
predictive logistics, which provides sustainment and operational planners with capabilities and decision |
4-0 | 34 | Chapter 1
support tools required to provide operational readiness rates, near real-time total asset visibility, and in-transit
visibility of assets.
ENABLE FREEDOM OF ACTION, EXTEND OPERATIONAL REACH,
AND PROLONG ENDURANCE
1-55. The sustainment warfighting function, guided by the sustainment principles, is essential for generating
combat power and conducting operations as the Army performs its strategic roles. Sustainment provides the
operational commander the freedom of action, extended operational reach, and prolonged endurance
necessary to shape OEs, counter aggression on land during crisis, prevail during large-scale ground combat,
and consolidate gains.
ENABLE FREEDOM OF ACTION
1-56. Freedom of action enables commanders to achieve operational initiative and maintain tempo.
Successful sustainment commanders facilitate freedom of action by planning and executing sustainment
activities able to support the greatest possible number of courses of action for the supported commander in a
particular situation. Effective sustainment execution employs the principles of continuity and responsiveness
needed by supported commanders to operate freely.
1-57. Sustainers enable freedom of action by conducting sustainment preparation of the OE, synchronizing
the sustainment plan with the scheme of maneuver and scheme of protection, and maintaining flexibility and
disciplined initiative while supporting maneuver commanders. The proper application of mission command
to sustainment operations encourages the greatest possible freedom of action for subordinates. Appropriate
sustainment unit command and support relationships equip subordinate commanders with the authority and
flexibility to act boldly and create desired support effects in the absence of continuous direction from higher
headquarters.
EXTEND OPERATIONAL REACH
1-58. Operational reach is the distance and duration across which a force can successfully employ military
capabilities (JP 3-0). Army forces require significant sustainment support and capabilities to strike, disrupt,
or destroy enemy forces throughout their depth, preventing the effective employment of enemy reserves,
enemy command and control nodes, enemy sustainment, and other enemy capabilities not in direct contact
with friendly forces. Operations in depth disrupt the enemy's decision cycle and contribute to protecting the
force by destroying enemy capabilities before the enemy can use them.
1-59. Sustainment operations are critical to extending operational reach. The Army's sustainment capability
assists in providing crucial theater and port opening functions that further enable the strategic and operational
reach of the joint force. Extended operational reach requires gaining and maintaining operational access in
the face of enemy antiaccess and area denial capabilities and actions. The sustainment principles of
continuity, survivability, and integration are integral in extending operational reach and preventing
culmination.
PROLONG ENDURANCE
1-60. Endurance refers to the ability to employ combat power anywhere for protracted periods. It stems from
the ability to organize, protect, and sustain a force, regardless of the distance from its base and the austerity
of the environment. Endurance involves the principles of anticipation, improvisation, and economy.
Anticipating requirements and making the most effective, efficient use of available resources provides
endurance and gives Army forces their campaign quality. Sustainment leaders use improvisation to adapt
operations to situations and circumstances to maintain endurance.
1-61. Sustainment provides the support necessary to ensure operations continue until mission
accomplishment. Sustainment also provides the capabilities necessary for maintaining the personnel and
materiel replacements essential to maintaining combat power. Sustainment support that prolongs endurance
requires the synchronization of the elements of sustainment with the concept of operations. |
4-0 | 35 | Army Sustainment Operations
AUTHORITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
1-62. The remainder of this chapter discusses the command authority of the CCDR, Army Title 10
sustainment requirements, and Army assigned executive agent (EA) responsibilities. Army command and
support relationships are discussed in detail in chapter 2.
COMMAND AUTHORITY OF COMBATANT COMMANDERS
1-63. Title 10, United States Code (USC), Section 162 specifies the force structure prescribed for each
CCMD as follows: “(a) Assignment of Forces.- (1) As directed by the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries
of the military departments shall assign specified forces under their jurisdiction to unified and specified
combatant commands or to the United States element of the North American Aerospace Defense Command
to perform missions assigned to those commands. The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that such
assignments are consistent with the force structure prescribed by the President for each combatant command.
(2) A force not assigned to a combatant command or to the United States element of the North American
Aerospace Defense Command under paragraph (1) shall remain assigned to the military department
concerned for carrying out the responsibilities of the Secretary of the military department concerned as
specified in section 7013, 8013, or 9013 of this title, as applicable. (3) A force assigned to a combatant
command or to the United States element of the North American Aerospace Defense Command under this
section may be transferred from the command to which it is assigned only- (A) by authority of the Secretary
of Defense; and (B) under procedures prescribed by the Secretary and approved by the President. (4) Except
as otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, all forces assigned to a unified combatant command shall
be under the command of the commander of that command. The preceding sentence applies to forces assigned
to a specified combatant command only as prescribed by the Secretary of Defense. (b) Chain of Command-
Unless otherwise directed by the President, the chain of command to a unified or specified combatant
command runs- (1) from the President to the Secretary of Defense; and (2) from the Secretary of Defense to
the commander of the combatant command.”
1-64. Title 10, USC, Section 164 specifies the CCDR's responsibility for authoritative direction for logistics
(doctrinally referred to as directive authority for logistics [DAFL]). Paragraph C1 states: “Unless otherwise
directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, the authority, direction, and control of the commander
of a combatant command with respect to the commands and forces assigned to that command include the
command functions of -(A) giving authoritative direction to subordinate commands and forces necessary to
carry out missions assigned to the command, including authoritative direction over all aspects of military
operations, joint training, and logistics; (B) prescribing the chain of command to the commands and forces
within the command; (C) organizing commands and forces within that command as he considers necessary
to carry out missions assigned to the command;(D) employing forces within that command as he considers
necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command; (E) assigning command functions to subordinate
commanders; (F) coordinating and approving those aspects of administration and support (including control
of resources and equipment, internal organization, and training) and discipline necessary to carry out
missions assigned to the command; and (G) exercising the authority with respect to selecting subordinate
commanders, selecting combatant command staff, suspending subordinates, and convening courts-martial,
as provided in subsections (e), (f), and (g) of this section and section 822(a) of this title, respectively.”
1-65. Combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) over assigned forces is vested only in the
commanders of CCMDs by Title 10, USC and cannot be delegated or transferred. This authority over
assigned forces includes DAFL, which gives the CCDR the authority to organize logistics resources within
theater according to operational needs. The President or Secretary of Defense may extend this authority to
attached forces when transferring forces for a specific mission and should specify this authority in the
establishing directive or order.
Directive Authority for Logistics
1-66. The CCDR uses DAFL to assign responsibility for execution of EA and lead Service responsibilities,
and to make other special arrangements such as assigning common-user support or common-user logistics
(CUL) to a Service or agency. Directive authority for logistics is the combatant commander authority to issue
directives to subordinate commanders to ensure the effective execution of approved operation plans, optimize |
4-0 | 36 | Chapter 1
the use or reallocation of available resources, and prevent or eliminate redundant facilities and/or overlapping
functions among the Service component commands (JP 1, Volume 2).
1-67. DAFL, like other CCMD authorities, cannot be delegated or transferred. However, the CCDR may
assign the responsibility for the planning and execution and/or management of as many common support
capabilities to a subordinate JFC or Service component commander as required to accomplish the subordinate
JFC's or Service component commander's mission. The Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of
Defense may designate one provider as the EA for some commodities, support, or services common to two
or more Services.
1-68. The CCDR must formally delineate assigned responsibilities by function and scope to the subordinate
JFC or Service component commander. When exercising this option, the CCDR must specify the control and
tasking authorities being bestowed upon the subordinate joint command for logistics as well as the command
relationships it will have with the Service components.
Coordinating Authority
1-69. Coordinating authority is a commander or individual who has the authority to require consultation
between the specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Services, joint force components,
or forces of the same Service or agencies but does not have the authority to compel agreement (JP 1, Volume
2). In the event that essential agreement cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to the appointing
authority. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship, not an authority through which command
may be exercised. Coordinating authority is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to
operations. For example, a joint security commander exercises coordinating authority over area security
operations within the joint security area. Commanders or leaders at any echelon at or below CCMD may be
delegated coordinating authority. These individuals may be assigned responsibilities established through a
memorandum of agreement between military and nonmilitary organizations. For additional information, see
JP 1, Volume 2.
Direct Liaison Authorized
1-70. Direct liaison authorized is that authority granted by a commander (any level) to a subordinate to
directly consult or coordinate an action with a command or agency within or outside of the granting command
(JP 1, Volume 2). Direct liaison authorized is more applicable to planning than operations and always carries
with it the requirement of keeping the authorizing commander informed. It is a coordination relationship, not
an authority through which command may be exercised.
Lead Service
1-71. The CCDR may choose to assign specific CUL functions, to include planning and execution, to a lead
Service. A lead Service or agency for common-user logistics is a Service component or Department of
Defense agency that is responsible for execution of common-user item and service support in a specific
combatant command or multinational operation as defined in the combatant or subordinate joint force
commander’s operation plan, operation order, and/or directives (JP 4-0).
1-72. Lead Service assignments can be for single or multiple common-user functions and may also be based
on phases and/or locations within the AOR. The CCDR may augment the lead Service's logistics organization
with capabilities from another component's logistics organizations as appropriate. The lead Service must
issue procedures and sustainment funding for all items issued to other Services as well as a method for
collecting items from other Services.
Common-User Logistics
1-73. Common-user logistics is materiel or service support shared with or provided by two or more Services,
Department of Defense agencies, or multinational partners to another Service, Department of Defense
agency, non-Department of Defense agency, and/or multinational partner in an operation (JP 4-09). It is
usually restricted to a particular type of supply or service and may be further restricted to specific units or
types of units, times, missions, and/or geographic areas. |
4-0 | 37 | Army Sustainment Operations
1-74. While normal Service channels may be an effective means of supporting a joint operation, the Services
will often be precluded from deploying the capabilities necessary to provide 100 percent dedicated Service
support. More often than not, the operational situation will require CUL support to provide effective and
efficient support of one or more major services or supplies. In fact, CUL support occurs in almost all joint
operations, especially in the form of standing inter-Service support relationships. For example, the Army
provides inland petroleum distribution to the joint force.
1-75. When properly executed, CUL can produce significant efficiencies by eliminating duplication among
Service components, DOD agencies, multinational partners, and contractors in theater. By utilizing common-
item and common-service support, the CCDR may be able to produce significant savings in equipment,
personnel, and supplies deployed to a particular joint operations area (JOA). These savings may further
reduce the requirement for strategic lift, the logistics footprint within a JOA, and possibly the overall cost of
an operation. Figure 1-4 displays the CCDR's authorities and sample processes used to execute those
authorities.
Figure 1-4. Combatant commander’s authorities
JOINT COMMAND FOR LOGISTICS
1-76. The CCDR, through exercising DAFL, may assign joint logistics responsibilities to a Service
component to establish a joint command for logistics (JP 4-0). The assignment as a joint command for
logistics is clearly designated by orders and establishes the organization as a joint command. This command
authority is not to be confused with EA, CUL, or any other type of Army support to other Services. Generally,
the CCDR will designate the Service with the preponderance of forces or the most capable logistics structure
to fill the joint command for logistics requirement. The designated joint command for logistics requires staff
augmentation from other Services to meet joint force requirements. See JP 1 Vol 2, JP 3-33, and JP 4-0 for
more information on establishing a joint command. In the event the Army Service component command
(ASCC) is assigned responsibility for establishing a joint command for logistics, the TSC or expeditionary |
4-0 | 38 | Chapter 1
sustainment command (ESC) with staff augmentation from other Service components is designed to fulfill
that mission.
ARMY TITLE 10 SUSTAINMENT REQUIREMENTS
1-77. Title 10, USC and Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5100.1 describe the organization, roles,
and responsibilities for the elements of the DOD to include the statutory requirements for each military
department. In accordance with Title 10, each Service retains responsibility for the sustainment support of
forces it allocates to a joint force. The Secretary of the Army exercises this responsibility through the United
States Army Chief of Staff and the ASCC assigned to each CCMD. For conventional forces not assigned to
CCMDs, the Secretary of the Army established the commanding general of United States Army Forces
Command (FORSCOM) as the Army's Service force provider. The ASCC is responsible for the preparation
and administrative support of Army forces assigned or attached to the CCMD. Theater ASCCs also support
Army special operations forces (ARSOF). United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC)
provides ARSOF to CCMDs to perform theater special operations missions.
1-78. Support provided to other Services while executing assigned EA or lead Service responsibilities is
commonly referred to as Army support to other Services. In both instances, the ASCC supports sustainment
requirements through its designated TSC, ESC, and theater medical command (TMC).
1-79. The Army has twelve Title 10 responsibilities; nine (bold lettering) are sustainment related:
• Recruiting.
• Organizing.
• Supplying.
• Equipping (including research and development).
• Training.
• Servicing.
• Mobilizing.
• Demobilizing.
• Administering (including the morale and welfare of personnel).
• Maintaining.
• Construction, outfitting, and repair of military equipment.
• Construction, maintenance, repairs of building and structures, utilities, acquisition of real
property and interests in real property necessary to carry out the responsibilities.
1-80. The purposeful combination of complementary Service capabilities to create joint interdependent
forces is often the most effective and efficient means by which to sustain a joint force. Therefore, additional
authorities to Title 10 have been developed to provide for interservice and interagency mutual support.
ARMY EXECUTIVE AGENT RESPONSIBILITIES
1-81. Executive agent is a term used to indicate a delegation of authority by the Secretary of Defense or
Deputy Secretary of Defense to a subordinate to act on behalf of the Secretary of Defense (JP 1, Volume 2).
EA refers to Secretary of Defense directives and instructions to the head of a DOD component (such as Chief
of a Service, CCDR, or director of a combat support agency) to provide specific categories of support to other
agencies or Service components. The Secretary of Defense designates and funds the Army as the EA for
numerous DOD common support requirements. Examples of the Army’s sustainment-related responsibilities
and support to other services as provided in DOD directives and joint publications are shown in table 1-2.
These DOD-level EA requirements relate to lead Service responsibilities. EA reduces redundancy of common
support requirements across the DOD. However, in many cases, lead Service requirements will be closely
related to the DOD EA requirements. The CCDR has the authority to assign lead Service responsibilities for
support to a Service that are not EA related. |
4-0 | 39 | Army Sustainment Operations
Table 1-2. Examples of Army sustainment-related responsibilities
Army Executive Agent
Source Support Responsibility
Coordination of Contracting Activities in the U.S. Central
Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum
Command Area of Responsibility
Financial Disclosure Management - Ethics Reporting
Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum
System
DODD 3235.02E DOD Combat Feeding Research and Engineering Program
Management of Land-Based Water Resources in Support of
DODD 4705.01E
Joint Contingency Operations
Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major
DODD 5100.01
Components
DOD Executive Agent for Military Postal Service and Official
DODD 5101.11E
Mail Program
Medical Research for Prevention, Mitigation, and Treatment
DODD 6025.21E
of Blast Injuries
Army Support to Other Services
Source Support Responsibility
JP 3-34 Joint Engineer Operations
JP 3-80 Resource Management
Joint Terminal and Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore
JP 4-18
Operations
JP 4-03 Joint Bulk Petroleum and Water Doctrine
JP 4-0 Provide Logistics Support to Enemy Prisoners of War
DODD 1300.22 Mortuary Affairs Policy
LEGEND: DODD Department of Defense Directive
DOD Department of Defense JP Joint Publication
1-82. The Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense may designate an EA for specific
responsibilities, functions, and authorities to provide defined levels of support for operational missions, or
administrative or other designated activities that involve two or more DOD components. By definition, the
designation as an EA makes that organization responsible for a joint capability. |
4-0 | 41 | Chapter 2
Army Sustainment at Echelon
This chapter provides an overview of sustainment roles, capabilities, and a general discussion
of sustainment organizations at the national strategic, theater strategic, operational, and tactical
levels of warfare. This chapter concludes with a discussion of joint command relationships,
Army command and support relationships, and command and support relationships by echelon.
SECTION I – LEVELS OF WARFARE
2-1. The levels of warfare are a framework for defining and clarifying the relationship among national
objectives, the operational approach, and tactical tasks (ADP 1-01). While the various methods of warfare
are ultimately expressed in concrete military action, the four levels of warfare (national strategic, theater
strategic, operational, and tactical) link tactical actions to achievement of national objectives. For additional
information on the levels of warfare see JP 3-0 and FM 3-0.
2-2. The levels of warfare distinguish four broad overlapping activities: providing national direction and
creating national strategy (national strategic); conducting continuous theater campaigning (theater strategic);
planning and conducting campaigns and major operations (operational); or planning and executing
operations, battles, engagements, and actions (tactical).
2-3. Sustainment organizations execute a series of tasks within the sustainment warfighting function that
enable the continuous provision of sustainment across the levels of warfare throughout all domains. These
tasks are executed across the competition continuum. Figure 2-1 on page 26 provides an overview of select
tasks within each element of the sustainment warfighting function. These tasks are collectively linked to
support operational objectives and unified action partners by enabling freedom of action, extending
operational reach, and prolonging endurance during operations.
2-4. U.S. leaders employ the Armed Forces of the United States, the military instrument of national power,
in coordination with diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments to advance and defend U.S. values
and interests, achieve objectives consistent with national strategy, and conclude operations on terms
favorable to the United States. The Armed Forces of the United States achieve these objectives through
unified action. Unified action is the synchronization, coordination, or integration of the activities of
governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort (JP 1, Volume
2).
2-5. In order to effectively support large-scale combat operations, sustainment leaders must understand
strategic-level sustainment forces and the capabilities each provides. Joint and Army forces receive support
from the strategic support area. The strategic support area describes the area extending from a theater of
operations to a base in the United States or another CCDR’s AOR. It includes the air and sea ports supporting
the flow of forces and sustainment into the theater. The strategic base in the strategic support area includes a
vast array of DOD, government, and private sector agencies that participate in the sustainment enterprise.
The support provided includes strategic lift, materiel integration, financial management support, HR support,
and medical services. This support often includes the ability of strategic providers to integrate and
synchronize support while reaching from the strategic base directly to the end user and integrates with support
received from the operational and tactical levels. An example of this is United States Army Materiel
Command (USAMC) conducting force generation and executing materiel readiness in the strategic support
area, and simultaneously integrating and synchronizing OCS at the theater strategic, operational, and tactical
levels of warfare. Another example of this is United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)
integrating and synchronizing force deployment in the strategic support area and conducting reception,
staging and onward movement of forces at the theater strategic level of warfare. The following paragraphs
describe sustainment providers at the national strategic level of warfare. Sections II through IV of this chapter
describe sustainment capabilities at the theater strategic level, operational level, and tactical levels of warfare. |
4-0 | 42 | Chapter 2
Figure 2-1. Sustainment tasks
SECTION II – OVERVIEW OF NATIONAL STRATEGIC LEVEL OF WARFARE
2-6. The national strategic level of warfare is the level of warfare at which the U.S. government formulates
policy goals and ways to achieve them by synchronizing action across government and unified action partners
and employing the instruments of national power (FM 3-0). The instruments of national power are all of the
means available to the government in its pursuit of national objectives, expressed as diplomatic, economic,
informational, and military. The national strategic level of warfare focuses on developing global strategy and
providing global strategic direction. Strategic direction provides context, tasks, and purpose for the
employment of the instruments of national power. The specifics of strategic direction address long-term,
emerging, and anticipatory issues or concerns that may quickly evolve due to rapidly changing circumstances.
Strategic direction is always evolving and adapting. These organizations have the ability to create and deliver
effects and support from the strategic base to forces in theater.
UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
2-7. USTRANSCOM is a CCMD responsible for providing and managing strategic common-user airlift,
sealift, and terminal services worldwide. USTRANSCOM is responsible for integrating and synchronizing
strategic and theater deployment execution and intertheater distribution operations into each CCDR’s AOR.
It ensures that military deployment and redeployment, as well as DOD global patient movement
requirements, are met using both military and commercial transportation assets based on supported
commander business rules and best business practices. USTRANSCOM determines when commercial
channels can meet requirements and relieve stress on limited military assets. USTRANSCOM’s major
subordinate commands include Air Mobility Command as the Air Force component command, Military |
4-0 | 43 | Army Sustainment at Echelon
Sealift Command as the Navy component command, and the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution
Command (SDDC) as the ASCC. See JP 4-09 and ATP 3-35 for additional information on USTRANSCOM.
2-8. The USTRANSCOM commander is the DOD single manager for global bulk fuel management and
delivery in support of CCDR requirements. As the single manager, USTRANSCOM synchronizes bulk fuel
posture, planning, and execution and advocates for resources, capabilities, and process improvements in
coordination with CCMDs, the Services, and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA).
2-9. The USTRANSCOM commander exercises coordinating authority for joint deployment and distribution
enterprise operations and planning across all domains and collaborates with other CCMDs, the Services, and,
as directed, United States Government departments and agencies. The joint deployment and distribution
enterprise includes equipment, procedures, doctrine, leaders, technical connectivity, information,
organizations, facilities, training, and materiel necessary to conduct joint distribution operations. As such, it
provides JFCs with the ability to move and sustain forces across the range of military operations rapidly and
effectively. The USTRANSCOM commander also serves as the Joint Deployment and Distribution
Coordinator. USTRANSCOM coordinates planning across global deployment and distribution operations
with other CCMDs, Services, and, as directed, the combat support agencies. See JP 4-09 for additional
information on the joint deployment and distribution enterprise and figure 2-2 for a depiction of
USTRANSCOM’s components in it.
Figure 2-2. Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise
AIR MOBILITY COMMAND
2-10. Air Mobility Command is the United States Air Force airlift component command of USTRANSCOM
and serves as the single port manager for air mobility. Air Mobility Command aircraft provide the capability
to deploy the Army’s forces worldwide and help sustain them across the range of military operations.
USTRANSCOM, through Air Mobility Command, executes its single port manager role for aerial ports of
embarkation and aerial ports of debarkation (APODs), performing functions necessary to support the strategic |
4-0 | 44 | Chapter 2
flow of the deploying forces’ equipment and supplies from the aerial ports of embarkation to the theater. For
additional information see ATP 3-35.
MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND
2-11. Military Sealift Command is the Navy’s sealift component command of USTRANSCOM. The mission
of Military Sealift Command is to provide common-user and exclusive-use sealift transportation services to
include ocean transportation of equipment, fuel, supplies, and Army prepositioned stocks and ammunition to
sustain U.S. forces worldwide during peacetime and in war for as long as operational requirements dictate.
MILITARY SURFACE DEPLOYMENT AND DISTRIBUTION COMMAND
2-12. SDDC is an operational-level Army force designated by the Secretary of the Army as the ASCC of
USTRANSCOM and a major subordinate command of USAMC. SDDC exercises administrative control
(ADCON) authority and responsibility on behalf of the USAMC commander over Army forces assigned to
USTRANSCOM and exercises operational control (OPCON) over Army forces as delegated by the
USTRANSCOM commander. SDDC is also the surface transportation service provider as part of
USTRANSCOM’s Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise ATP 3-35 and ATP 4-93 provide additional
detail on SDDC.
SDDC FUNCTIONS AND STAFF RELATIONSHIPS
2-13. SDDC performs single-port management functions necessary to support the strategic flow of the
deploying forces’ equipment and sustainment supply in the seaport of embarkation and hand-off to the CCDR
in the seaport of debarkation (SPOD). SDDC executes its single-port management function from the national
strategic level of warfare through the theater strategic level of warfare. SDDC has port management
responsibility through all phases of the theater port operations continuum. It conducts strategic port site
surveys, coordinates with Army and Navy operational forces for support to enable strategic ship download
and throughput at common-user commercial ports, and commercial contract fixed-port support for
deployment. SDDC’s subordinate brigades are postured across CCMD AORs in order to ensure flexibility
and responsiveness based on the unique needs of the various regions.
2-14. As the single port manager for seaports, SDDC provides strategic deployment status information to the
CCDRs and manages the workload of the SPOD port operator based on the CCDR’s priorities and guidance.
SDDC transportation brigades and other SDDC units operate ports that use stevedores. If United States Army
stevedores are used, transportation brigades are assigned to the CCMD to operate the port. As an ASCC to
USTRANSCOM, SDDC executes the following functions:
• Plans, coordinates, and synchronizes surface transportation movements to move, deploy, and sustain
DOD forces and build operational readiness and lethality.
• Provides surface and multimodal transportation services to DOD and designated multinational and
interagency entities.
• Plans and executes oversight of command acquisitions for transportation services to support CCMD
requirements for enduring and contingency operations and infrastructure.
• Books freight on commercial vessels in accordance with contractual agreements and provides
appropriate support to movements occurring on government and chartered vessels in coordination
with Military Sealift Command.
• Performs water terminal clearance authority functions as required.
• Conducts port surveys, inspections, and certifications via the Transportation Engineering Agency
report.
2-15. SDDC executes assigned Title 10 responsibilities on behalf of USAMC, which has ADCON of SDDC.
SDDC is OPCON to USTRANSCOM for operational and joint training, and other matters for which
USTRANSCOM is responsible.
DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY
2-16. DLA is the nation’s combat logistics support agency, providing nearly 100 percent of the military’s
consumable items, and is the DOD EA for subsistence, construction/barrier material, medical materiel, and
Defense Logistics Management Standards. It also provides distribution and disposal support as appropriate, |
4-0 | 45 | Army Sustainment at Echelon
including the disposal of hazardous waste. DLA supports United States Indo-Pacific Command, United States
Central Command/ United States Special Operations Command, and United States European Command/
United States Africa Command through an established regional command as its focal point. United States
Northern Command, United States Southern Command, United States Strategic Command, and
USTRANSCOM have dedicated liaison officers. DLA participates fully in adaptive planning and execution
across the range of military operations, and when requested through a Global Force Management Request
for Forces or Secretary of Defense-approved standing executive order, establishes and deploys expeditionary
capabilities to support CCMD mission execution. DLA’s deployable capabilities can include personnel to
provide logistics planning and operations support, commodity and logistics services support (Rapid
Deployment Teams that deploy to form a DLA Support Team and Liaison Teams), material disposition and
retrograde (DLA Disposition Services Expeditionary Operations), and material processing centers with
shipping consolidation functions via DLA Distribution Expeditionary. See DODD 5105.22 and JP 4-0 for
additional information.
DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY
2-17. The Defense Health Agency is a combat support agency that enables the Army, Navy, and Air Force
medical services to provide a medically ready force and ready medical force to CCMDs. Defense Health
Agency supports the delivery of integrated health services to Military Health System beneficiaries and is
responsible for driving greater integration of clinical and business processes across the Military Health
System. The Defense Health Agency manages the Armed Services Blood Program and is responsible for
coordinating support to CCMD requirements. For more information, see DODD 5136.13 and DODI 6480.04.
DEFENSE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT AGENCY
2-18. The Defense Contract Management Agency is the combat support agency responsible for providing
contract administration services to the DOD acquisition enterprise and its partners to ensure delivery of
quality products and services to the operating force. Defense Contract Management Agency, along with the
Services, may also serve as an OCS force provider in major contingency and expeditionary operations when
requested by the supported CCDR and as directed by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and
Sustainment). See DODD 5105.64 and JP 4-0 for additional information.
DEFENSE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING SERVICE
2-19. The Defense Finance and Accounting Service is responsible for the delivery and responsive accounting
and financial management services for DOD. It provides timely and useful information to decision makers,
allowing them to manage their resources more effectively. It is an agency supporting the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense, Comptroller—the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense for fiscal matters. As
such, it is the responsibility of Defense Finance and Accounting Service to coordinate and collaborate with
all defense agencies, the military Services, and CCMDs to assist in the establishment and monitor compliance
of theater financial management standards and policy. See JP 3-80 for additional information.
UNITED STATES ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND
2-20. USAMC is the Army’s lead materiel integrator providing national-level sustainment, acquisition
integration support, contracting support, and selected logistics support to Army forces. It also provides related
common support to other Services and multinational and interagency partners. The capabilities of USAMC
are diverse and are employed through its various major subordinate commands and other subordinate
organizations. Some of USAMC’s subordinate commands provide capabilities from the national strategic
level of warfare to the operational level of warfare. See ATP 4-98 and AR 10-87 for additional information.
2-21. USAMC plans and coordinates expeditionary force contracting support operations, providing
contracting support for deployed units and installation-level services, supplies, minor military construction,
the Army organic industrial base, and common-use information technology hardware and software. For
additional information on USAMC contracting, see ATP 4-71.
2-22. USAMC major commands are Installation Management Command (IMCOM), United States Army
Financial Management Command, Army Sustainment Command (ASC), United States Army Contracting
Command (ACC), United States Army Security Assistance Command, the USAMC lifecycle management |
4-0 | 46 | Chapter 2
commands (LCMCs), and SDDC. Discussion of the major USAMC commands and their subordinate
commands follows.
INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT COMMAND
2-23. IMCOM integrates and delivers base support to enable readiness for a globally responsive Army.
IMCOM’s broad range of responsibilities enable installation readiness by providing infrastructure
management, sustainment, installation protection, and training support services. These responsibilities also
provide resilient Soldier and Family programs. Full employment of IMCOM’s capabilities facilitate
execution of pre-deployment activities, deployment, and pre-redeployment activities in support of large-scale
combat operations.
UNITED STATES ARMY FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT COMMAND
2-24. The United States Army Financial Management Command is responsible for the delivery of Army-
wide, headquarters-level financial management functions, including systems support, audit and compliance
support, financial operations support, and Army Enterprise Resource Planning systems business process
standardization support. United States Army Financial Management Command oversees enterprise-wide
finance and comptroller support to Army expeditionary and garrison organizations by providing financial
management and systems technical training, evaluations of financial management units, and technical and
integrated oversight of Army field financial management activities. Additionally, United States Army
Financial Management Command develops, fields, trains, and sustains electronic commerce capabilities in
cooperation with the United States Treasury, Federal Reserve Banks, credit unions, and banks. See JP 3-80
for additional information.
ARMY SUSTAINMENT COMMAND
2-25. ASC integrates and synchronizes the delivery of USAMC and materiel enterprise capabilities at
echelon from the theater strategic level of warfare to the operational level of warfare. ASC delivers materiel
readiness, force generation, and power projection and sets the conditions for future readiness at home station.
ASC forward-stationed capabilities provide command and control to all USAMC assets in theater, shape the
logistics environment, and help set the theater to accelerate force reception into theater. Deployable logistics
support elements (LSEs) provide expeditionary corps and divisions the ability to rapidly integrate into the
theater delivery of USAMC capabilities at echelon for responsive support to Soldier priorities. ASC serves
as the Army’s lead materiel integrator, identifying excess and obsolete major end items and providing
disposition instructions to units. It is responsible for integrating logistics support with strategic partners and
links the national sustainment base with the expeditionary Army. Major mission areas include logistics
synchronization in support of the Regionally Aligned Readiness and Modernization Model, APS, materiel
management, and the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP). Mission execution is through a
global network of organizations to include the ASC staff, Army field support brigades (AFSBs), Army field
support battalions (AFSBns), logistics readiness centers (LRCs), and LSEs embedded at the division and
corps levels. For additional information on ASC subordinate units see ATP 4-98, and for additional
information on how ASC supports theater operations see ATP 4-93.
Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
2-26. LOGCAP is a performance-based program that provides broad, contracted sustainment support to joint
operations, coalition partners, and other federal agencies to address ASCC regional and country planning
requirements where a military capability is not readily available to support setting the theater and theater
sustainment. Pre-awarded task orders are regionally aligned for rapid response to emerging events. Planning
elements are embedded within the AFSB to coordinate annex W (Operational Contract Support) development
and integrate and synchronize LOGCAP capabilities into OPLANs and concept plans, with focus on OCS-
related analysis of the OE, APS, Army power projection platforms, mobilization force generation
installations, theater opening, sustainment, theater distribution, stability operations, noncombatant
evacuation operations, and defense support of civil authorities. LOGCAP is designed to support shaping OEs
and sustainment preparation of the OE. LOGCAP is designated as a preferred source for logistics support
and must be considered by requiring activities as part of OCS market research before establishing a new
contract. See ATP 4-10.1 and AR 700-137 for additional information. |
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Army Field Support Brigades
2-27. The AFSB integrates and synchronizes delivery of USAMC strategic capabilities and enablers to the
operational points of need in support of ASCCs and corps during large-scale combat operations. The AFSB
also synchronizes acquisition, logistics, and technology systems contracted support with sustainment
maintenance support for the theater Army. Senior command representatives from each USAMC LCMC are
OPCON to each AFSB and enable integrated delivery of USAMC capabilities. The representatives provide
a built-in forward technical presence in the tactical environment and anticipate requirements for logistics
assistance representatives throughout each Army strategic role. Logistics assistance representatives provide
expert technical advice and help identify and mitigate systemic readiness issues. Theater AFSBs are OPCON
to the ASCC and are normally permanently stationed forward in their assigned region with their ASCC and
TSC. In certain situations, the AFSB maybe OPCON to the TSC to enhance integration and synchronization
of theater sustainment. The corps-aligned AFSBs deploy an LSE (corps) that is OPCON to the theater AFSB
and operates in direct support of their supported corps during large-scale combat operations. AFSBs are
augmented with additional staff or capabilities to meet expanded or unique operational requirements,
particularly where redistribution property assistance teams may be used to facilitate the turn-in of equipment
for redistribution or retrograde.
2-28. The AFSB is responsible for coordinating acquisition, logistics, and technology support within the
theater. The AFSB synchronizes and coordinates with the Army Medical Logistics Command for strategic-
level medical logistics acquisition and technology support. See ATP 4-98 for additional information.
Army Field Support Battalion
2-29. AFSBns are scalable and tailored Table of Distribution and Allowances organizations. The direct
support-readiness AFSBns integrate and synchronize materiel enterprise capabilities in direct support to
division and tenant units. Theater AFSBns provide general support to units within their designated support
area. APS AFSBns provide the physical management of APS.
2-30. AFSBns conduct three types of mission: provide readiness support, provide technical expertise, and
provide maintenance. Designated AFSBns have habitual support relationships with their supported divisions
and serve as USAMC’s lead materiel integrator for the division and divisional units. The AFSBn employs
logistic assistance representatives to provide equipment technical expertise to assist in identifying and
resolving systemic maintenance and sustaining combat power. AFSBns that have responsibility for logistics
readiness center functions that provide installations support and power projection capability. See ATP 4-98
for additional information on AFSBns.
ARMY CONTRACTING COMMAND
2-31. ACC is a major subordinate command within USAMC. ACC provides its capabilities from the national
strategic level of warfare through the operational level of warfare. ACC provides expeditionary contracting
and contract administration to deployed Army forces through its subordinate contracting support brigades
(CSBs). It provides systems contracting support to Army program executive officers and program managers,
the Head of the Contracting Activity, Senior Contracting Official, and contracting officers for LOGCAP.
ACC, through its subordinate Mission and Installation Contracting Command, also provides installation and
power projection support to the strategic support area, IMCOM, and the AFSB LRCs. The Mission and
Installation Contracting Command is a key enabler for homeland defense and defense support to civil
authorities operations. In addition, ACC provides OCONUS reach-back contracting support from its
CONUS-based contracting centers. ACC CSBs and contracting battalions also perform the contingency
contract administration services mission during expeditionary force operations. See ATP 4-71 for additional
information.
Contracting Support Brigade
2-32. The CSB serves as the Army’s primary theater support and contingency contract administration
services contracting headquarters. The brigade executes theater support contracting actions and contract
administration of external support contracts (for example, LOGCAP in support of Army forces). The CSB
commander also serves as the primary contracting support advisor to the ASCC. Allocation of CSBs is one
aligned to an ASCC and one aligned to a corps. CSBs provide command and control over a number of |
4-0 | 48 | Chapter 2
contracting battalions as determined during the mission planning process. See ATP 4-71 for additional
information.
Contracting Battalions
2-33. The contracting battalion provides command and control over two organic detachments which write,
award, and administer contracts to include contingency contract administration services of external support
contracts. Contracting battalions are normally placed under the direct command of the deploying CSB, but
they may deploy separately from the CSB headquarters in small-scale operations. In major sustained
operations, the contracting battalion may be combined with contracting elements from other Services to form
a regional contracting center. See ATP 4-71 for additional information.
UNITED STATES ARMY SECURITY ASSISTANCE COMMAND
2-34. The United States Army Security Assistance Command leads the USAMC Security Assistance
Enterprise. It enables security cooperation, military engagement, and other activities conducted to build
partner capacity and support and strengthen U.S. global partnerships. The command acts as the primary entry
point for Army materiel, service-related, and non-institutional foreign military sales and security assistance
requirements as requested by partner nations to enable CCMD strategic priorities for the region.
LIFECYCLE MANAGEMENT COMMANDS
2-35. USAMC provides logistics, technology, acquisition support, and selected logistics support to Army
forces as well as USAMC-related common support to other Services and multinational and interagency
partners. This is accomplished principally through national-level maintenance and supply programs managed
and executed by the LCMCs, which are OPCON to AFSBs when deployed. LCMCs are the USAMC
organizations that have the responsibility to mobilize and deploy sustainment-level maintenance forward
repair activities from CONUS LCMC depots and arsenals. LCMCs conduct theater-level contingency
planning with USAMC, ASC, and TSCs during set the theater deliberate planning. The LCMCs include
USAMC staff as well as related Assistant Secretary of the Army, Acquisition, Logistics and Technology
program executive office and program management offices. Together, these elements work to ensure support
for fielded weapon systems and equipment for their entire life cycle. Program executive office and program
management staffs often work in the same office or on the ground in the field along with LCMC item
managers and other technical support personnel. The LCMCs are—
• United States Army Communications-Electronics Command: This command develops, acquires,
fields, and sustains Army communications systems. It provides significant technical support
capabilities to deploying and deployed Army forces.
• United States Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command: This command develops,
acquires, fields, and sustains Soldier and ground systems for the operational Army through the
integration of effective and timely acquisition, logistics, and cutting-edge technology.
• United States Aviation and Missile Command: This command supports Army aviation and missile
systems acquisition with field and sustainment-level logistics development, execution, and
management; industrial base operations; and delivers responsive aviation, missile and calibration
materiel readiness to optimize joint warfighting capabilities at the point of need.
• The Joint Munitions and Lethality Command: This command develops, acquires, fields, and sustains
ammunition for the joint force. Core competencies include: research, development, and engineering;
acquisition and program management; logistics management; industrial operations; serving as the
single manager for conventional ammunition executor and field operating activity; performing
demilitarization and disposal of unserviceable stocks; conducting industrial base management and
executing transformation; providing real time munitions readiness reporting; maintaining
worldwide asset visibility; centrally managing ammunition; and providing integrated lethality
solutions.
• United States Army Medical Logistics Command: This command is the LCMC for medical materiel
and provides strategic-level medical logistics support and executes the medical materiel
management functions in support of ASCCs and, as directed, for CCMDs to sustain operational
medical capabilities. Core capabilities include: integrated logistics support center/medical materiel
transition to sustainment, medical materiel supply chain management, and central management of |
4-0 | 49 | Army Sustainment at Echelon
medical equipping contingency programs and APS; sustainment-level medical maintenance;
industrial base partnerships; vaccine and medication storage and distribution; medical foreign
military sales; and optical fabrication.
DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY
2-36. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency plays a critical role in competition. Its mission is to advance
U.S. national security and foreign policy interests by building the capacity of foreign security forces to
respond to shared challenges. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency leads the broader U.S. security
cooperation enterprise in its efforts to train, educate, advise, and equip foreign partners. It administers security
cooperation programs that support U.S. policy interests and objectives identified by the White House, DOD,
and Department of State. These objectives include developing specific partner capabilities, building alliances
and partnerships, and facilitating U.S. access. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency integrates security
cooperation activities in support of a whole-of-government approach, provides execution guidance to DOD
entities that implement security cooperation programs, exercises financial and program management for the
foreign military sales system and many other security cooperation programs, and assists in the long-term
development of the security cooperation workforces. It also provides guidance the United States Army
Security Assistance Command on executing foreign military sales and security assistance requirements as
requested by partner nations. Sustainers can leverage the Defense Security Cooperation Agency operation to
facilitate partnerships and agreements.
UNITED STATES ARMY MEDICAL RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT COMMAND
2-37. The United States Army Medical Research and Development Command provides Army acquisition
and technology support for medical materiel. This command manages and executes research in five basic
areas—infectious disease, combat casualty care, military operational medicine, chemical biological defense,
and clinical and rehabilitative medicine. The command works closely with the United States Army Medical
Logistics Command to ensure the delivery of lifesaving medical products to the deployed force.
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES COMMAND
2-38. Most Army conventional operating forces are designated as Service-retained forces in the Global Force
Management Implementation Guidance assignment tables and are primarily based in CONUS. FORSCOM
commands Active Component conventional forces (Regular Army, mobilized Army National Guard, and
mobilized Army Reserve), executes training and readiness oversight of Army National Guard forces under
state command, and does the same for non-mobilized Army Reserve units. FORSCOM is the command
responsible for mobilization and demobilization. Based upon the landpower requirements developed by the
CCMDs and validated by the Joint Staff, the Department of the Army and FORSCOM develop task-
organized force packages to facilitate strategic deployment and support the gaining JFC's operational
requirements.
UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
2-39. USASOC is the ASCC of United States Special Operations Command and a force provider of ARSOF
to the CCMDs. USASOC’s mission is to man, train, equip, educate, organize, sustain, and support forces to
conduct special operations across the full range of military operations and spectrum of conflict in support of
JFCs and interagency partners to meet theater and national objectives. USASOC major subordinate
operational commands and units include 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne), special forces groups, 75th
Ranger Regiment (Airborne), Army Special Operations Aviation Command (Airborne), 160th Special
Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne), 4th and 8th Psychological Operations Groups (Airborne), and
95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne).
2-40. ARSOF sustainment organizations include the 528th Sustainment Brigade Special Operations
Airborne, Special Forces group support battalions (GSBs), and Ranger support companies. Each special
forces group has a support battalion, and each Ranger battalion has an organic support company. The
remaining USASOC major subordinate operational commands possess minimal organic sustainment assets.
ARSOF units rely on conventional Army organizations for sustainment support that exceeds the organic |
4-0 | 50 | Chapter 2
capabilities of the supported ARSOF unit. The JFC may assign a command relationship between the
conventional supporting force and the ARSOF supported unit, or the JFC may determine a support
relationship (general support or direct support) is more appropriate. For additional information on special
operations sustainment, see ATP 3-05.40.
SECTION III – OVERVIEW OF THEATER STRATEGIC LEVEL OF WARFARE
2-41. The theater strategic level of warfare is the level of warfare at which combatant commanders
synchronize with unified action partners and employ all elements of national power to fulfill policy aims
within the assigned theater in support of the national strategy (FM 3-0). Based on strategic guidance, CCDRs
with assigned AORs and staffs update their strategic estimates and develop theater strategies with input from
subordinate commands, including theater Armies and supporting commands and agencies. The theater
strategy serves as the basis for development of the CCMD campaign plan.
2-42. Army echelons and sustainment units operate across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels; many
are affiliated with either supported or supporting commands and operate under a variety of command
relationships. Knowing the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of unified action partners is essential to
planning, preparing, executing, and assessing sustainment operations.
THEATER ARMY
2-43. The theater Army is the senior Army headquarters in an AOR and consists of the commander, staff,
and all Army forces assigned to a CCMD. Each theater Army (United States Army Central, United States
Army Europe and Africa, United States Army North, United States Army Pacific, and United States Army
South) has operational and administrative responsibilities. The operational responsibilities include command
of forces, direction of operations, and control of assigned operational areas. The administrative
responsibilities encompass the Service-specific Title 10 requirements for equipping, sustaining, and training
forces; unit readiness; discipline; and personnel matters.
2-44. The theater Army serves as the ASCC of the CCMD. It is organized, manned, and equipped to perform
that role. The ASCC is the command responsible for recommendations to the JFC on the allocation and
employment of Army forces within an AOR. Figure 2-3 depicts the notional AOR for the command and
control of Army forces by the theater Army. See ATP 3-93, ATP 4-93, and FM 3-94 for additional
information on the theater Army. Theater Army tasks and functions include—
• Executing the CCDR's daily operational requirements.
• Opening the operational area (for example: JOA, area of operations [AO], and theater of operations).
• Serving as a joint task force (JTF) or joint force land component for crisis response and limited
contingency operations.
• Serving as the primary interface between the Department of the Army, Army commands, and other
ASCCs.
• Exercising OPCON of deployed Army forces not subordinated to a JFC.
• Exercising ADCON of all Army forces operating within the AOR.
• Exercising OPCON of all joint forces attached to it as either a joint force land component
headquarters or JTF headquarters as required by the CCDR. |
4-0 | 51 | Army Sustainment at Echelon
Figure 2-3. Notional area of responsibility command and control of sustainment forces
THEATER SUSTAINMENT COMMAND
2-45. The TSC is the Army’s command for the integration and synchronization of sustainment in an AOR.
The TSC integrates strategic enablers at the operational level. The TSC is assigned to an ASCC and provides
Title 10 support of Army forces. The TSC manages requirements for sustainment and the physical flow of
forces, equipment, and cargo to meet the daily operational requirements of the ASCC. Working in
conjunction with the joint deployment and distribution operations center (JDDOC) and other strategic
enablers, the TSC establishes priorities, monitors intertheater movements, and identifies and resolves
problems to reduce interference in the intratheater distribution network. The TSC provides guidance to
strategic partners when conflicting priorities exist between operational areas. The command ensures the
information flow from strategic deployment, distribution, and sustainment partners is accurate, timely, and
adequate to support the actions of theater sustainment forces. The TSC has four operational responsibilities
to forces in theater:
• Theater opening.
• Theater distribution.
• Sustainment.
• Theater closing.
2-46. In the event that the ASCC is assigned responsibility for establishing a joint command for logistics, the
TSC or its attached ESC with staff augmentation from other Service components is designed to fulfill that
mission. The JTF's Service component augmentation must follow joint doctrine and, in addition to personnel,
may also include joint command and control equipment and regional language and cultural experts. Once the
joint command for logistics is established, it takes time to receive, train, and integrate new members and then
begin functioning as a cohesive headquarters with common processes, standards, and procedures. For
additional information on the TSC, see ATP 4-93.
THEATER PERSONNEL OPERATIONS CENTER
2-47. The theater personnel operations center (TPOC) is a multifunctional organization assigned to a TSC.
The TPOC consists of a headquarters section and three divisions: the personnel accountability and systems
division, the synchronization and integration division, and the postal operations division. In coordination
with the TSC, the TPOC plans, integrates, and sustains HR and Soldier support systems for the ASCC |
4-0 | 52 | Chapter 2
headquarters, and other echelons as directed by the ASCC G-1/AG. The TPOC is responsible for planning,
coordinating, and synchronizing HR operations with the senior sustainment headquarters and the ASCC. The
TPOC supports the TSC during early entry reception operations. The TPOC establishes and ensures
functionality of the theater personnel database and the Postal Directory Address Database and provides
theater-wide assistance for HR systems issues. The TPOC is responsible for synchronizing theater-level
replacement priorities with the sustainment community. It monitors the execution of the theater gateway
personnel accountability team (TG PAT) and military mail terminal missions at the theater gateway. Refer
to FM 1-0 and ATP 4-93 for additional information on the TPOC.
ARMY FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT CENTER
2-48. The Army Financial Management Center is United States Army Financial Management Command’s
operational element to conduct theater opening and the continuation of setting the theater. It enables joint,
interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations; provides timely procurement and theater
disbursing support through central funding; establishes, coordinates, and maintains finance systems used in
theater; enforces Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) policies and guidelines; and establishes
finance policies. The Army Financial Management Center also supports reconciliation activities, audit
support, and synchronizes theater finance operations. The director of the Army Financial Management Center
is the senior Army disbursing officer and primary liaison with the Defense Finance and Accounting Service
and United States Treasury. Army Financial Management Center teams are attached forward to each TSC to
link strategic banking and disbursing resources to theater sustainment, manage theater finance systems, and
enforce internal controls. The Finance Support Center replaces the Army Financial Management Center team
during transition from crisis to conflict based on mission variables. For additional information on the Army
Financial Management Center, see FM 1-06.
FINANCE SUPPORT CENTER
2-49. The finance support center is an Army Reserve Component staff element that provides theater finance
operations technical coordination. It is mobilized during crisis or armed conflict and OPCON to the TSC.
The director serves as the principal finance operations advisor to the TSC commander. The finance support
center integrates, synchronizes, and sustains finance support operations by coordinating with partner nations,
national strategic providers, other Services, and United States Army Financial Management Command. Upon
arrival to theater, the finance support center assumes primary responsibility from the Army Financial
Management Center team for theater banking operations, central funding, and disbursing. It has responsibility
to conduct economic analysis, payment systems analysis, illicit activity analysis, finance operations planning
and policy, and internal controls oversight.
2-50. During transition to post-conflict competition, the finance support center may coordinate with unified
action partners to assist host-nation or provisional authorities with banking administration, currency issues,
and ecommerce systems. Upon close of the JOA and a return to competition, the finance support center
transitions banking and disbursing operations to the Army Financial Management Center and redeploys.
FINANCE OPERATIONS CENTER
2-51. The finance operations center serves as the TSC's primary financial management integrator for current
operations, future operations, and plans. It is assigned to the TSC as part of the distribution management
center (DMC). It prepares applicable portions of operation orders (OPORDs), running estimates in support
of orders and plans, forecasts requirements for physical currency, recommends financial management force
structure requirements, monitors finance unit force flow, and recommends allocation and employment of
finance units in theater.
THEATER FINANCE BATTALION
2-52. The theater finance battalion is a Reserve Component battalion OPCON to an ESC or sustainment
brigade in the joint security area that conducts disbursing, payment support, and internal controls during
theater opening and theater distribution when mobilized. The commander is the theater finance battalion’s
primary account holder to the United States Treasury. |
4-0 | 53 | Army Sustainment at Echelon
THEATER MOVEMENT CONTROL ELEMENT
2-53. The theater movement control element (TMCE) is a multifunctional theater-level center allocated to a
TSC. The TMCE provides movement management, container management, highway regulation, and
coordination for personnel and materiel movements. It provides staff augmentation to establish and refine
distribution networks during operations, manage containers (commercial, unit, and DOD), and develop
movement programs for the distribution of sustainment stocks within the AO or JOA as required. The TMCE
coordinates with strategic partners to locate and identify strategic ports of entry into the AOR. It plans,
monitors, and coordinates the intertheater movement program to facilitate military forces moving during
crisis below armed conflict, and it supports large-scale combat operations by committing air and ground
transportation assets in the support of reception, staging, and onward movement of forces entering into
theater. The TMCE also plans, monitors, and implements the intratheater movement program in accordance
with CCDR priorities. For additional information on the TMCE, see ATP 4-93.
THEATER PETROLEUM AND WATER GROUP
2-54. The theater petroleum and water group is normally attached to a TSC. It supports a theater Army in
establishing, managing, and conducting petroleum and water operations. The petroleum and water group is
responsible for planning and providing command and control of the theater petroleum and water units
assigned to build theater stocks, distribution systems, and quality surveillance support structure. It has a SPO
section that coordinates, manages, and synchronizes all bulk petroleum in the theater or corps. For additional
information see ATP 4-43.
THEATER PETROLEUM CENTER
2-55. The theater petroleum center serves as the operational Army link to strategic petroleum partners,
providing liaison between DLA Energy, host/partner nations, the ASCC, Army Petroleum Center, CCMD,
and TSC as needed. It serves as the senior theater Army petroleum advisor to the CCMD through operational
planning support to the TSC petroleum and water branch or ASCC petroleum and water branch staffs. The
theater petroleum and water group operates as a sub-unit of the theater petroleum center and provides the
same capabilities of the theater petroleum center on a smaller scale. Both the theater petroleum center and
the theater petroleum and water group are normally attached to an ASCC, TSC, or ESC as mission dictates.
See ATP 4-43 for additional information.
TRANSPORTATION BRIGADE EXPEDITIONARY
2-56. The transportation brigade expeditionary (TBX) is normally attached to a TSC or ESC. It provides
command and control of Army watercraft and water terminal organizations for port opening and operations
at inland waterway, bare beach, degraded, and improved sea terminals. Water terminal and watercraft units
assigned to the TBX conduct deployment, distribution support, and redeployment in accordance with theater
Army operational requirements. The TBX commander and staff serve as the TSC or ESC commander's
primary experts on port operations. Watercraft assigned to the TBX can also be used to support the movement
and sustainment of maneuver forces and their equipment when required. The TBX also serves as the ARFOR
component of any JTF for joint logistics over-the-shore (JLOTS) operations. As the primary Army
headquarters element with assigned terminal and watercraft units, the TBX provides the Army's organic
capability to conduct specific functions of the Army in support of amphibious operations, riverine operations,
wet-gap operations, JLOTS operations, and intratheater transport of time-sensitive, mission-critical personnel
and materiel. See ATP 4-13 for additional information.
EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL GROUP
2-57. The EOD group conducts mission command, planning, and control for all EOD assets in a theater and
provides EOD liaison to the theater Army. The EOD group can conduct EOD command and control for two
to six EOD battalions. It is attached or placed OPCON to coordinate EOD and weapons technical intelligence
operations to a theater Army, corps, or JTF in support of a specific operation, OPORD, OPLAN, or concept
plan. The group may also form the core of a specialized combined JTF with mission command of various
enablers. If augmented, the group can provide command and control functions to execute missions such as
facilitating collection of technical intelligence or management of captured enemy ammunition. See JP 3-42,
ATP 4-32, ATP 4-32.1, ATP 4-32.2, and ATP 4-32.3 for additional information. |
4-0 | 54 | Chapter 2
EXPEDITIONARY SUSTAINMENT COMMAND
2-58. At the theater echelon, one or more ESCs can be attached to a TSC. The ESC is attached to a TSC and
provides command and control over all assigned and attached units in an operational area as directed by the
TSC. The ESC is capable of planning, coordinating, integrating, and synchronizing sustainment in support
of Army forces and, when directed, joint and multi-national forces. It may perform the function of a forward
command post for the TSC.
2-59. The ESC may form the nucleus of an expeditionary joint command for logistics when provided with
joint force augmentation. The ESC performing as a joint command for logistics will normally locate within
a JOA while another ESC or sustainment brigade assumes the responsibilities for supporting Army forces.
For more information on the ESC, see ATP 4-93.
THEATER MEDICAL COMMAND
2-60. The TMC is the senior medical command in support of the ASCC. The TMC is responsible for
command and control, integration, synchronization, and execution of AHS support within the AOR. The
TMC commander is responsible for maintaining a regional focus in support of the CCDR and ASCC theater
engagement plan, while providing effective and timely direct HSS and force health protection to tactical
commanders and general support to theater forces at echelons above brigade (EAB). The enduring regional
focus of the ASCC drives organizational specialization in the supporting TMC to address unique health
threats, specific needs of the local populace, availability of other Service medical capabilities, and geographic
factors that are distinctly related to a particular region. See FM 4-02 for additional information.
2-61. The TMC integrates and synchronizes all AHS operations and provides command and control of
medical brigades (support) (MEDBDEs [SPT]), multifunctional medical battalion (MMBs), and other AHS
units providing force health protection and HSS to tactical commanders. The TMC employs an operational
command post and a main command post that can deploy autonomously into an operational area and is
employed based on the size and complexity of operations, or the support required. Key tasks of a TMC
include—
• Providing command and control of MEDBDE (SPT) and subordinate medical units assigned and
attached.
• Task-organizing medical elements based on specific medical requirements.
• Monitoring health threats within each operational area and ensuring the availability of required
medical capabilities to mitigate those threats.
• Maintaining situational understanding of medical infrastructure, treatment, and evacuation
capabilities.
• Accomplishing Title 10, USC responsibilities and Army support to other Services for the operational
area.
• Partnering and training with host-nation and multinational health system units.
• Establishing a command relationship with the theater Army and the CCDR.
• Collocating the medical logistics management center (MLMC) with the TSC for coordination and
planning.
• Conducting EA for medical research for prevention, mitigation, and treatment of blast injuries.
MEDICAL LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT CENTER
2-62. The MLMC provides centralized management of Class VIII materiel from the tactical to strategic level.
When deployed, the MLMC forward support team is assigned to the TMC and collocates with the TSC/ESC
DMC. When collocated with the TSC or ESC, the forward support team coordinates with the TMC for
medical materiel requirements in support of theater AHS operations and may be further task-organized based
on mission orders. The forward support team serves as the primary link between national strategic-level
medical logistics capabilities and theater-level distribution.
MEDICAL BRIGADE (SUPPORT)
2-63. The MEDBDE (SPT) provides the command and control and planning capabilities necessary to deliver
responsive and effective AHS support across the range of military operations. The MEDBDE (SPT) ensures |
4-0 | 55 | Army Sustainment at Echelon
the right mix of medical forces and expertise (operational, technical, and clinical) to synchronize AHS
support to operations.
2-64. The MEDBDE (SPT) consists of an early entry module, expansion module, and campaign module. The
design and flexibility of the MEDBDE (SPT) facilitates the AHS’s ability to tailor the unit to meet
expeditionary health system support and force health protection requirements in support of early entry
operations and transition to provide greater capability and capacity based on the size, composition, and
location of supported forces. The MEDBDE (SPT) is assigned to the TMC and may be further task-organized
based on mission orders. See FM 4-02 for additional information.
MEDICAL BATTALION (MULTIFUNCTIONAL)
2-65. The MMB is an EAB headquarters. The unit provides command and control, administrative assistance,
logistics support, and technical supervision for assigned and attached medical functional organizations
(companies, detachments, and teams) task-organized for support to deployed forces operating within the AO.
The MMB can be deployed to provide command and control of medical forces during early entry operations
and facilitate the RSOI of theater medical forces. It is under the command and control of the MEDBDE (SPT)
and/or TMC. All EAB medical companies, detachments, and teams in theater may be assigned, attached, or
placed OPCON to an MMB and may be further task organized based on mission orders. See FM 4-02 for
additional information.
HOSPITAL CENTER
2-66. The hospital center is a modular Role 3 medical treatment facility (MTF) tailored to provide
hospitalization support to operations. It provides essential care within the theater evacuation policy to either
return patients to duty or stabilize them for further evacuation to a Role 4 MTF in CONUS or another safe
haven. The hospital center consists of five modular elements capable of providing mission-specific medical
and surgical support. It may be augmented by one or more medical detachments, hospital augmentation
teams, or medical teams designed to enhance its capabilities to provide AHS support.
CLASS VIII MANAGEMENT AND DISTRIBUTION PROCESS IN THEATER
2-67. The TMC controls and supervises medical logistics support within the theater in coordination with the
TSC, which provides distribution. An MLMC forward team collocates with the DMC of the TSC or ESC to
coordinate medical materiel management and distribution and may be further task organized based on
mission orders. Army Medical Logistics Command subordinate units United States Army Medical Materiel
Center-Europe or United States Army Medical Materiel Center-Korea, and the United States Army Medical
Materiel Center-Southwest Asia (assigned to Army Central Command) execute the theater lead agent for
medical materiel mission. They provide theater-level medical materiel management, medical device
maintenance and repair, optical fabrication, and medical set assembly and reconstitution. The United States
Army Medical Materiel Agency, a subordinate of the United States Army Medical Logistics Command,
integrates with ASC LSEs and issues medical APS unit sets and/or Class VIII contingency program to
supported medical units.
2-68. CCDRs often assign the ASCC (or Army component of a JTF) as the single integrated medical logistics
manager with responsibility to plan and execute medical logistics support to all Services and multinational
partners operating in the theater. The TMC or ASCC designated senior medical commander executes the
single integrated medical logistics manager responsibility. The MLMC forward team provides information
management and distribution coordination support for the single integrated medical logistics manager
mission.
2-69. The MEDBDE (SPT) coordinates with the corps sustainment brigade to plan and synchronize Class
VIII supply and distribution operations at corps and below supply support activities and can serve as the
single integrated medical logistics manager if designated by the CCDR.
2-70. The MMB coordinates with the corps and division sustainment brigades to plan and synchronize Class
VIII supply and distribution operations within the unit’s AO. This battalion can also serve as the single
integrated medical logistics manager if designated by the CCDR. The medical logistics company provides
direct support for medical materiel, medical device maintenance, and single and multi-vision optical lens
fabrication and repair to supported units, including joint forces. The brigade medical supply office in the |
4-0 | 56 | Chapter 2
brigade support medical company (BSMC) provides organic Class VIII and medical maintenance support to
medical elements of the maneuver brigade. For additional information, see ATP 4-02.1.
2-71. At each echelon, sustainment unit support operations (SPO) sections plan and supervise Class VIIIA
resupply to their supported units. This synchronization is critical to ensure that Class VIII is distributed
through routine channels and ambulance backhaul through the corps and division areas forward to the Role
1 providers.
ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES SUSTAINMENT
ORGANIZATIONS
2-72. ARSOF operating and logistics structures differ vastly from Army conventional forces. The GSB
within the special forces group provides direct support to the special forces group or to joint special operations
task force elements when directed by the theater special operations command. The Ranger regiment and
special operations aviation regiment possess organic support assets at the battalion level. Civil affairs and
psychological operations units do not possess organic direct support assets. The special operations aviation
regiment is typically task organized under a joint special operations air component and will be provided direct
support by the joint special operations air component’s direct support elements and the designated CUL
provider. ARSOF elements that do not have organic support elements are sustained by the command they are
attached to for the duration of the operation.
2-73. USASOC serves as the ASCC for ARSOF, but functions similarly to the Army’s generating force and
serves as a global resourcing command in support of United States Special Operations Command. ASCCs
provide sustainment support to ARSOF elements within an AOR through TSCs, ESCs, and sustainment
brigades.
528TH SUSTAINMENT BRIGADE (SPECIAL OPERATIONS) (AIRBORNE)
2-74. The 528th Sustainment Brigade (Special Operations) (Airborne) sets operational-level logistics
conditions (enduring relationships, forward posture, and speed) to enable ARSOF and joint element missions
by providing tailored logistics, signal, medical, and intelligence support to the global SOF network. The
528th enables ARSOF with purpose-built teams of expert sustainers, communicators, and intelligence
specialists; delivers SOF-unique sustainment resources; and on-order, rapidly deploys globally to enable
sustainment for ARSOF.
2-75. The unit consists of a brigade staff, a support operations unit, and three battalions: a special troops
battalion (containing a special troops support company and a forward support company [FSC]), a special
operations signal battalion, and a military intelligence battalion. It leverages small units of action that rapidly
configure and deploy responsive, flexible, and modular teams known as ARSOF support operations teams to
support global special operations requirements. The brigade also benefits from forward-positioned ARSOF
liaison elements. These elements serve as the special operations logistics liaisons to the ASCC and theater
special operations command and are geographically aligned to CCMDs. They are responsible for
coordinating and synchronizing logistics plans and Army common sustainment in support of theater special
operations commands.
2-76. The 528th Sustainment Brigade (Special Operations) (Airborne) provides intelligence processing,
exploitation, and dissemination and signal, logistics, and medical support through individual subject matter
experts, teams, and echelons up to the brigade level. It integrates into ARSOF and the joint force to provide
SOF-specific support capabilities during transitions and within competition, crisis, and conflict.
2-77. The brigade has three special operations resuscitation teams capable of providing damage control
resuscitation and prolonged field care for 2-4 patients for 48 hours. Capable of integrating with joint surgical
assets (Army forward resuscitative and surgical detachment, Air Force special operations surgical team, Navy
forward resuscitative surgical system, Air Force mobile field surgical team), each team can conduct split-
based operations for a limited period to support forces operating in multiple locations. See ATP 3-05.40 for
additional information. |
4-0 | 57 | Army Sustainment at Echelon
SPECIAL FORCES – GROUP SUPPORT BATTALION
2-78. The GSB is the primary sustainment provider in a special forces group. Its mission is to plan,
coordinate, synchronize, and execute sustainment operations such as the SSA, weapons and electronics
maintenance, strategic mobility, and consolidated aerial delivery and rigging operations in support of a
special forces group when it is acting as the joint special operations task force. Due to the unique employment
characteristics of ARSOF units, the GSB habitually does not deploy in its entirety as there is only one in each
special forces group. The GSB must simultaneously support the operations of each battalion, receiving
support from conventional forces as required.
2-79. When ASCC logistics support is unavailable or not established in an operational area, the GSB will be
the primary CUL provider. The GSB can function as a combined and joint headquarters, integrating partner-
nation and sister-Service elements. However, no single support battalion can cover the geographical
dispersion without conventional force logistics support. The GSB coordinates with conventional force
sustainment brigades, division sustainment brigades (DSBs), the ESC, and the TSC to enable an area support
concept for each special operations task force, advanced operations base, and special forces operational
detachment alpha. Area support enables SOF elements in the vicinity of conventional force bases to receive
general sustainment support. See FM 3-05 for additional information.
RANGER SUPPORT COMPANY
2-80. The Ranger support companies are reliant on the Ranger Regiment S-4 section and Ranger support
operations detachment for planning and coordination. The Ranger support company is multifunctional and
organic to each battalion within the Ranger Regiment. Ranger support companies provide field maintenance,
supply support, water production (with limited distribution), transportation, aerial delivery, property
management, limited chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) decontamination and
reconnaissance, and food service. See ATP 3-05.40 for additional information.
SECTION IV – OVERVIEW OF OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WARFARE
2-81. The operational level of warfare is the level of warfare in which campaigns and operations are planned,
conducted, and sustained to achieve operational objectives to support achievement of strategic objectives (JP
3-0). The operational level links the employment of tactical forces to the achievement of strategic objectives.
2-82. The operational level of warfare is generally the realm of CCMDs and their Service or functional
components, and subordinate JTF headquarters and their Service or functional components. This includes the
theater Army headquarters as the Army Service component to a CCMD and any other echelon operating as
an ARFOR, JTF headquarters, or land component command.
FIELD ARMY
2-83. When constituted, the field army’s role is to serve as the ARFOR in a subordinate AO. Army doctrine
distinguishes between the ARFOR of a CCMD and that of a joint force formed by the CCDR. The ASCC of
the CCMD is the ARFOR for the theater and the Army component of the subordinate joint force, the field
army is the ARFOR for multi-corps operations in the subordinate AO. The ASCC maintains control of all
Army units in an AOR until such time that control is passed to the field army. As part of controlling Army
forces, the ARFOR maintains ADCON of Army forces and addresses Service responsibilities such as
coordinating Army support to other Services. An ESC may be attached to a field army to control the
integration and synchronization of sustainment to support field army operations. When attached to the field
army, the ESC provides sustainment support to units identified in the field army task organization in
accordance with the priorities established by the field army commander. See FM 3-94 and ATP 4-92 for
additional information on field armies.
SUSTAINMENT BRIGADE
2-84. The sustainment brigade plans, synchronizes, and executes sustainment operations across the theater
Army, corps, and division echelons. The sustainment brigade is the Army’s primary brigade-level
sustainment headquarters providing command and control for assigned, attached, and OPCON sustainment
units. Sustainment brigades are typically assigned or attached to a TSC, ESC, or division and have a span of |
4-0 | 58 | Chapter 2
control of three to six battalions. At the field army and corps echelons, there are task-organized sustainment
brigades attached to the ESC to provide sustainment support to Army forces and unified action partners
conducting operations in the operational area. For additional information, see ATP 4-92.
COMBAT SUSTAINMENT SUPPORT BATTALION
2-85. The combat sustainment support battalion (CSSB) executes logistics operations within the theater
Army, corps, and division echelons. It is task organized with up to six functional companies, teams, and
detachments that execute transportation operations (mode, terminal, and movement control), maintenance
operations, supply, and field services. CSSBs are normally attached to sustainment brigades and may be
attached to DSBs to support division operations.
SECTION V – OVERVIEW OF TACTICAL LEVEL OF WARFARE
2-86. The tactical level of warfare is the level of warfare at which forces plan and execute battles and
engagements to achieve military objectives (JP 3-0). Activities at this level focus on tactics—the
employment, ordered arrangement, and directed actions of forces in relation to each other (ADP 3-90).
Operational-level headquarters determine objectives and provide resources for tactical operations. Tactical-
level commanders plan and execute operations to include battles, engagements, and small-unit actions.
CORPS
2-87. The corps is the Army’s most versatile headquarters. The corps functions as one of the principal
integrators of land power into campaigns. When a field army is not present, a corps is the primary link
between the operational and tactical levels of war. The corps is organized, manned, and equipped to serve in
four roles:
• Senior Army tactical formation in large-scale combat, commanding two to five Army divisions
together with supporting brigades and commands. This is its primary role.
• ARFOR (with augmentation) within a joint force for campaigns and major operations when a field
army is not present.
• JTF headquarters (with significant augmentation) for crisis response and limited contingency
operations.
• Joint force land component (with significant augmentation) commanding Marine Corps and
multinational divisions together with supporting brigades and commands.
2-88. Each corps has an assigned corps sustainment command (CSC). The CSC is the corps’ command for
the integration and synchronization of sustainment in an operational area. The CSC headquarters is normally
task-organized with sustainment brigades, a petroleum group, finance center, and movement control
battalion. The CSC executes logistics support, HR, financial management, and distribution management
operations at the operational and tactical levels of war. The CSC integrates HSS and medical logistics
operations into the overall sustainment support concept. The CSC manages requirements through the
coordination and synchronization of the physical flow of forces, equipment, and cargo to meet the daily
operational needs of the tactical units. It also monitors movements throughout the assigned JOA or AO and
identifies and resolves problems to reduce interference to distribution networks. For additional information
on the corps and its capabilities, see FM 3-94 and ATP 4-92.
2-89. The corps finance battalion is assigned to the corps CSC, provides command and control of two to six
subordinate finance companies, and is responsible for conducting tactical finance operations. It has the
flexibility to push forward tailored support packages and provide physical currency for early entry operations.
The corps finance battalion’s primary functions include disbursing, payment support, and internal controls.
The commander is the corps finance battalion’s primary account holder to the United States Treasury.
DIVISION
2-90. The division is the Army’s principal tactical warfighting formation during large-scale combat
operations. Its primary role is to serve as a tactical headquarters commanding brigades. The division is
typically the lowest tactical echelon that employs capabilities from multiple domains to achieve convergence
during large-scale combat operations. A division conducts operations in an AO assigned by its higher |
4-0 | 59 | Army Sustainment at Echelon
headquarters—normally a corps. A division typically commands between two and five maneuver brigades,
a combat aviation brigade (CAB), division artillery, and a DSB. It task organizes its assigned and provided
units to accomplish its mission according to mission variables. See FM 3-94 and ATP 4-91 for additional
information on the division.
2-91. The division’s primary purpose is winning battles and engagements. During limited contingencies, it
can organize itself to serve in multiple competencies. When the division is uncommitted to a specific
operation, it focuses on building and sustaining readiness to prevail in large-scale combat operations. A
division may also serve in the following roles:
• Tactical headquarters.
• ARFOR headquarters.
• Joint force land component headquarters.
• JTF headquarters.
DIVISION SUSTAINMENT BRIGADE
2-92. The DSB is assigned to a division. The DSB synchronizes and integrates sustainment for the division.
It can provide command and control for up to seven battalions with two organic and optional space for five
additional battalions. The role of the DSB is to provide command and control to all subordinate units and
plan, synchronize, and integrate all sustainment support (including organic Role 1 medical support) for the
division. The DSB performs the following functions: distribution management and operations, transportation,
supply support, field maintenance, personnel services, and OCS requirements determination in coordination
with subordinate units and the division staff. For additional information on the DSB and its organic
capabilities, see ATP 4-91.
DIVISION SUSTAINMENT SUPPORT BATTALION
2-93. The division sustainment support battalion (DSSB) is a multifunctional battalion that is organic to the
DSB and provides logistics support to a division. Its organizational design includes three organic companies.
The DSSB has the capability to command and control up to four additional companies, detachments, or teams
and synchronizes, integrates, and controls the execution of logistics operations for the division. For additional
information, see ATP 4-91.
DIVISION SUSTAINMENT TROOPS BATTALION
2-94. The DSB also includes an organic division sustainment troops battalion to support tactical-level
sustainment operations. It may command and control up to seven companies or teams based on mission
requirements. This battalion’s role is to provide command and control for organic, assigned, and attached
units and integrate, synchronize, and control the execution of operations for HR, financial management, and
field services (field feeding and mortuary affairs) units supporting division operations.
ADDITIONAL ECHELONS ABOVE BRIGADE SUSTAINMENT CAPABILITIES
2-95. The Army has other organizations that assist with executing sustainment operations in addition to those
discussed above. The motor transport, petroleum support, movement control, EOD, and terminal battalions
provide logistics support to division and corps formations as well as enabling units operating throughout the
AOR. These battalions can be task organized to sustainment brigades and DSBs to provide critical logistics
capabilities in an operational area. The modular ammunition, support maintenance, composite and functional
transportation, composite and functional supply, HR, and watercraft companies and detachments provide
specific capabilities and execute complex operations. These companies can be task organized into DSSBs,
CSSBs, and functional battalions to meet specific requirements.
BRIGADE
2-96. Brigade types include maneuver brigades, multifunctional brigades, and functional brigades. Maneuver
brigades are the Army’s primary combined arms, close-operations force, and principal ground maneuver
units of the division. They have organic capabilities including battalion-sized maneuver, field artillery,
reconnaissance, and sustainment units. Each BCT has organic medical support for Role 1 and 2 medical
operations. The three types of maneuver brigades are armored, infantry, and Stryker. Maneuver brigades
normally operate as part of a division. |
4-0 | 60 | Chapter 2
2-97. There is a wide range of multifunctional support brigades. These brigades provide a variety of functions
in support of operations. Normally attached to a corps or division, these brigades may be under the command
of a joint or multinational headquarters. Multifunctional support brigades include the CAB, division artillery,
TBX, and maneuver enhancement brigade (MEB).
2-98. Functional brigades or groups provide a single function or capability. These brigades can provide
support for a theater, corps, or division, depending on how each is tailored. Functional brigades include the
air and missile defense brigade, division artillery, civil affairs brigade, engineer brigade, expeditionary
military intelligence brigade, signal brigade, military police brigade, MEDBDE (SPT), and theater tactical
signal brigade.
BRIGADE SUPPORT BATTALION
2-99. Sustainment at the brigade echelon is centered on the brigade support battalion (BSB). The BSB is an
organic component of a maneuver brigade. It provides supply, maintenance, motor transport, and Role 2
medical support to the supported maneuver brigade or brigade. It is tailored to support the brigade to which
it is assigned. For example, the BSB of an armored brigade has more fuel distribution and maintenance
capabilities than an infantry brigade BSB. The following paragraphs summarize the BSB’s companies. See
ATP 4-90 for additional information.
2-100. The BSB distribution company role is to provide supply (to include Class VIII) and transportation
support to a brigade. The company provides distribution capability for all classes of supply but does not have
the capability to conduct troop transport missions. It provides munitions support to the maneuver brigade
with the modular ammunition transfer point.
2-101. The BSB field maintenance company role is to provide field-level maintenance support to the BSB
and maneuver brigade. The field maintenance company provides repair capability for automotive and ground
support equipment, and limited support for low-density equipment such as communications, electronics, and
armament.
2-102. The BSMC provides AHS support to a maneuver brigade. The BSMC provides Role 1 and 2 medical
care in support of a maneuver brigade and area medical support to units in the maneuver brigade AO that do
not have organic medical assets. BSMCs are organic to maneuver brigades. The BSMC consists of a company
headquarters, preventive medicine section, behavioral health section, medical treatment platoon, medical
evacuation platoon, and a brigade medical supply office. The brigade medical supply office is responsible
for providing Class VIII to the Role 2 medical company and forward resuscitative and surgical detachment
(when attached). It also provides field-level medical maintenance and repair for medical devices in the
maneuver brigade.
2-103. The FSC provides logistics in direct support or general support to its specific supported battalion with
dedicated logistics assets organized specifically to meet the battalion’s requirements. An FSC provides field
feeding, bulk fuel, general supply, ammunition, and field-level maintenance to its supported maneuver
battalion. FSCs are organic to the BSB and attached, as required, to supported battalions.
MULTI-DOMAIN TASK FORCE
2-104. The muti-domain task force may have a BSB in select configurations. If the multi-domain task force
does not have a BSB, then the staff of the is responsible for logistics planning. The multi-domain task force
BSB synchronizes and integrates logistics and AHS support throughout the multi-domain task force AO. The
BSB is designed with a headquarters and headquarters company, distribution company, field maintenance
company, a multi-domain medical company, and FSCs. The multi-domain medical company provides Role
1 and 2 medical support for the multi-domain task force and area medical support for units in the brigade
support area (BSA) in addition to providing a trauma quick reaction force. The trauma quick reaction force
provides damage control resuscitation, which includes initial burn management and trauma resuscitation
(such as blood products, parenteral fluids, advanced airway management, intravenous/intraosseous/central
line placement). The trauma quick reaction force can also provide limited ancillary services with point of
care lab assay measurement and imaging (such as ultrasound) to assist with initial assessment and ongoing
patient treatment and management. Refer to ATP 4-02.6 for additional information on the multi-domain
medical company and ATP 4-90 for additional information on the multi-domain task force BSB. |
4-0 | 61 | Army Sustainment at Echelon
AVIATION SUPPORT BATTALION
2-105. The aviation support battalion (ASB) is organic to a CAB, an expeditionary CAB, and a theater
aviation brigade. There are primary differences between a BSB and an ASB:
• The ASB is only assigned a medical section and a maintenance platoon. These elements are assigned
to the headquarters and support company and have significantly less capability than a BSMC and a
field maintenance company.
• An aviation support company replaces the field maintenance company and provides aviation
maintenance and recovery support to the brigade.
• The forward support companies are organic to helicopter battalions in the brigade.
• A signal company is added, similar to a MEB.
• The CAB has an ammunition transfer and holding point that supplies munitions to its forward
arming and refueling points (FARPs).
2-106. The ASB performs the following tasks:
• Ground vehicle and aviation maintenance and recovery operations.
• Signal and network security to the CAB for command and control.
• Aviation and ground sustainment operations for the aviation brigade.
• Distribution management operations within the aviation brigade.
• Role 1 medical care for the ASB.
2-107. Additional sustainment support for aviation battalions and squadrons is provided by an organic
aviation maintenance company and FSC. For more information on aviation sustainment, see FM 3-04.
SECTION VI – COMMAND AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS
2-108. As operations continue and theater sustainment matures, leaders should continually re-assess and
make recommendations to their supported headquarters regarding task organization changes necessary to
keep pace with operational requirements. Determining the optimal command and support relationships
between maneuver commanders and sustainment units is critical for both sustainment leaders and those
supported. Command and support relationships directly influence the ability to meet maneuver commander
requirements. Understanding the practical effects of a particular command or support relationship in the
context of a specific operation is critically important. Striking the most effective balance between centralized
and decentralized control of sustainment units requires a clear understanding of the supported commander’s
intent and the tactical situation, as well as the ability to anticipate the various possible outcomes of the combat
operations being supported. Knowing the inherent responsibilities of each command and support relationship
allows commanders to organize their forces effectively and helps supporting commanders understand their
unit’s role in the organizational structure.
2-109. The flexibility to adjust command and control structure and employ different command and support
relationships in an AO gives both maneuver and sustainment commanders the ability to effectively balance
sustainment capabilities across the AOR. Sustainment staff estimates should account for available
sustainment forces, assigned missions, commander priorities, and the validity of previous assumptions. Doing
so effectively requires continuous dialogue between sustainment and maneuver commanders.
JOINT COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
2-110. JP 1, Volume 2 specifies and details four types of joint command relationships:
• COCOM.
• OPCON.
• TACON.
• Support.
COMBATANT COMMAND (COMMAND AUTHORITY)
2-111. COCOM is the command authority over assigned and allocated forces vested only in commanders of
CCMDs or as directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense in the Unified Command Plan and cannot
be delegated or transferred. COCOM only extends to those forces assigned or allocated to the CCMD by the |
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Secretary of Defense. COCOM is established in federal law by Section 164, Title 10, USC. Normally, the
CCDR exercises this authority through subordinate JFCs, Service components, and functional component
commanders. COCOM includes DAFL.
OPERATIONAL CONTROL
2-112. The authority to exercise OPCON is exclusively derived from COCOM authority. Forces provided by
the Services and attached to a CCMD are typically in an OPCON command relationship. OPCON is the
authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving—
• Organizing and employing commands and forces.
• Assigning tasks.
• Designating objectives.
• Giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish missions.
2-113. OPCON normally includes authority over all aspects of operations and joint training necessary to
accomplish missions. It does not include DAFL or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization,
or unit training. OPCON does include the authority to delineate functional responsibilities and operational
areas of subordinate JFCs. In two instances, the Secretary of Defense may specify adjustments to
accommodate authorities beyond OPCON in an establishing directive: when transferring forces between
CCDRs, or when transferring members or organizations from the military departments to a CCMD.
Adjustments will be coordinated with the participating CCDRs.
TACTICAL CONTROL
2-114. TACON is inherent in OPCON. TACON may be delegated to and exercised by commanders at any
echelon at or below the level of CCMD. TACON provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing
the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task. TACON
does not provide organizational authority or authoritative direction for administrative and logistics support;
the commander of the parent unit continues to exercise these authorities unless otherwise specified in the
establishing directive.
JOINT SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS
2-115. Support is a command authority in joint doctrine. A superior commander establishes a supported and
supporting relationship between subordinate commanders when one organization should aid, protect,
complement, or sustain another force. Designating supporting relationships is important. It conveys priorities
to commanders and staffs planning or executing joint operations. Designating a support relationship does not
provide authority to organize and employ commands and forces, nor does it include authoritative direction
for administrative and logistical support. See figure 2-4 for a depiction of joint command relationships.
Note. The joint command relationship of “Support” is distinct from Army support relationships.
2-116. Support is, by design, somewhat vague but very flexible. Establishing authorities ensure both
supported and supporting commanders understand the authority of supported commanders. JFCs often
establish supported and supporting relationships among components. An Army headquarters designated as
the land component may be the supporting force during some campaign phases and the supported force in
other phases. A joint support relationship is not used when an Army commander task organizes Army forces
in a supporting role. When task-organized to support another Army force, Army forces use one of four Army
support relationships. See table 2-1 for a listing of joint support categories. |
4-0 | 63 | Army Sustainment at Echelon
Figure 2-4. Joint command relationships
Table 2-1. Joint support categories
Category Definition
Support given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular
General support
subdivision thereof (JP 3-09.3).
That support which units render each other throughout joint operations, because of
Mutual support their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, or their
inherent capabilities (JP 3-31).
A mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to
Direct support
answer directly to the supported force’s request for assistance (JP 3-09.3).
The action of the supporting force against targets or objectives that are sufficiently
near the support force as to require detailed integration or coordination of the
Close support
supporting action with fire, movement, or other actions of the supported force
(JP 3-31).
ARMY COMMAND AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS
2-117. Command and control of Army sustainment units can pose unique challenges for both sustainment
leaders and those supported. It is important that leaders understand all aspects of command and support
relationships and their effects on the ability to meet the operational requirements. For example, attaching
sustainment units to their supported formations allows them to better anticipate and integrate with their
supported command, but with an adverse effect on economy. This may result in idle assets that cannot be
redirected easily to support elsewhere. Conversely, pooling resources at higher levels can allow planners to
maximize the use of scarce assets such as fuel tankers and heavy equipment transporter systems, but
responsiveness may suffer as a result.
2-118. Sustainment leaders must strive to strike the right balance, considering the supported commander’s
intent and the possible outcomes of combat operations. If a commander expects an attack to turn into a pursuit
of enemy forces, it may be prudent to assign additional Class III and V assets to a unit in order to extend its
operational reach and give the commander the freedom of action to maintain momentum. On the other hand,
if resources are scarce, such a course of action may negatively impact the rest of the formation. The risks to |
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both the operation and the sustainment assets must be weighed carefully and reassessed as the situation
develops.
2-119. Command and support relationships provide the basis for unity of command and unity of effort in
operations. Within planning, commanders are responsible for task organizing the force and prioritizing efforts
as part of the operations process. Task organizing is the act of configuring an operating force, support staff,
or sustainment package to meet a unique task or mission. This allows commanders to allocate resources to
weight the main effort.
2-120. Commanders recognize that effectiveness is built on mutual trust and confidence between superior,
subordinate, supporting, and supported organizations. This trust and confidence is developed through
relationships. Generally, the longer a relationship lasts, a greater degree of trust and confidence results.
Authorities and responsibilities are typically well known between organizations that have had a long-term
habitual relationship. However, the nature of the sustainment structure at EAB forces commanders to place
organizations in unfamiliar situations. In this instance, where trust and confidence between organizations is
limited, command and support relationships establish baseline doctrinal authorities and responsibilities upon
which unfamiliar organizations can operate.
2-121. Command and support relationships vary between different units and echelons. The types of
command and support relationships established are dependent on the mission and the degree of authority a
commander wishes to establish between subordinate units.
ARMY COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
2-122. The five Army command relationships are: organic, assigned, attached, OPCON, and TACON. Each
relationship has specific authorities and responsibilities. Army command relationships identify the degree of
control of the gaining Army commander. Command relationships unify effort and enable maximum
flexibility for commanders to use subordinate forces. The expected duration of a command relationship
normally dictates the type of command relationship between the headquarters involved and identifies the
degree of support the gaining and losing Army commanders provide.
2-123. Commanders designate command relationships to subordinate units in OPORDs. The designation
must indicate the headquarters under which a subordinate unit is placed, the specific command relationship
designated, and the duration of the relationship. The duration may be based on time, duration of a phase, or
on achieving an objective. This information is included in the “Task Organization” paragraph of the OPORD.
If the task organization is long or complicated, commanders may place it in annex A of the order. Table 2-2
displays the Army command inherent responsibilities. JP 3-0 discusses command relationships for the joint
force. |
4-0 | 65 | Army Sustainment at Echelon
Table 2-2. Army command relationships
Then inherent responsibilities—
Authorities
Unless CDR can
Have modified, Are Establish/ impose
If relation- command May be ADCON assigned maintain Have gaining unit
ship is— relation- task – responsib position Provided communic priorities further
organized liaison to— established
ship ility goes or AO ations command
by— by—
with— through by— with— or support
— relationship
of—
Attached;
OPCON;
Organic Organic Organic Organic
Organic N/A N/A Organic HQ TACON;
HQ HQ HQ HQ
GS; GSR; R;
DS
Attached;
OPCON;
Gaining Gaining Gaining Gaining
Assigned N/A N/A Gaining HQ TACON;
HQ HQ HQ HQ
GS; GSR; R;
DS
Attached;
As required Unit to OPCON;
Gaining Gaining Gaining Gaining
Attached by gaining which Gaining HQ TACON;
HQ HQ HQ HQ
HQ attached GS; GSR; R;
DS
Parent
unit and
gaining
As required OPCON;
unit; As required
Gaining Gaining by gaining TACON;
OPCON gaining Parent HQ by gaining Gaining HQ
HQ HQ HQ and GS; GSR; R;
unit may HQ
parent HQ DS
pass
OPCON to
lower HQ
As required
As required
Gaining Gaining by gaining TACON; GS
TACON Parent HQ Parent HQ by gaining Gaining HQ
HQ HQ unit and GSR; R; DS
HQ
parent HQ
Note: In NATO, the gaining unit may not task organize a multinational force. (See TACON.)
ADCON administrative control HQ headquarters
AO area of operations N/A not applicable
ASCC Army Service component command NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
CDR commander OPCON operational control
DS direct support R reinforcing
GS general support TACON tactical control
GSR general support–reinforcing
Organic
2-124. Organic forces are those assigned to and forming an essential part of a military organization. Organic
parts of a unit are those listed in its table of organization for the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps, and are
assigned to the administrative organizations of the operating forces for the Navy. Joint command
relationships do not include the term organic because a JFC is not responsible for the organizational structure
of units. The organic command relationship is unique in that the relationship is inherent in unit force structure;
units that have an organic command relationship with a parent unit are an integral part of the parent unit’s
table of organization and equipment. As a result, the organic command relationship cannot be further
delegated. Commanders with organic subordinate units may designate any of the other four command
relationships to the subordinate unit. Commanders with organic subordinate units have ADCON authority
and responsibility for the subordinate units. |
4-0 | 66 | Chapter 2
2-125. The Army establishes organic command relationships through organizational documents such as
tables of organization and equipment and tables of distribution and allowance. If temporarily task organized
to another headquarters, organic units return to the control of their organic headquarters after completing the
mission. To illustrate, within a maneuver brigade, the BSB and all other units within the brigade are organic
to the headquarters. In contrast, within most support brigades, there is a base of organic battalions and
companies (or sometimes just a headquarters) and a variable mix of assigned and attached battalions and
companies.
Assigned and Attached
2-126. Commanders establish the assigned and attached command relationships by placing a subordinate unit
under the command of another organization for a specified period of time. An assigned command relationship
is relatively permanent. The gaining organization controls and administers the units or personnel for the
primary function, or greater portion of the functions, of the unit or personnel. An attached command
relationship is relatively temporary. The attachment may be for a specific mission or phase of an operation.
The commander establishes these command relationships in an OPORD issued to the subordinate commander
and specifies the duration of the relationship in the order. Unless specifically stated in the OPORD, these
command relationships include ADCON authority and responsibility for the gaining command.
OPCON and TACON
2-127. Commanders establish the OPCON and TACON command relationships by placing a subordinate
unit under the command of another organization for a specified period of time. OPCON is the authority to
perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands
and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish
the mission. TACON is a command authority over units made available for tasking that is limited to the
detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to
accomplish missions or tasks assigned. The commander establishes these command relationships in an
OPORD issued to the subordinate commander and specifies the duration of the relationship in the order.
Unless specifically stated in the OPORD, these command relationships do not include ADCON authority and
responsibility for the gaining command. Once the duration of the relationship has lapsed, the unit returns to
its parent unit.
Command Relationship Authorities and Responsibilities
2-128. Inherent authorities and responsibilities associated with each command relationship are shown below.
Commanders use these responsibilities to identify and establish the appropriate command relationship based
on the mission requirements.
2-129. Task organization authority:
• Units with an organic command relationship may only be task organized by the organic
headquarters.
• Units with assigned, attached, or OPCON command relationships may be task organized by the
gaining unit.
• Units with a TACON command relationship may only be task organized by the parent unit.
2-130. ADCON authority: Organic, assigned, and attached command relationships incur ADCON authority
on the organic or gaining unit.
2-131. Position/AO assignment: Units with an organic command relationship are assigned a position or AO
by the organic headquarters. In all other command relationships, the gaining unit assigns positions/AO.
2-132. Provide liaison: This is not applicable to units with organic command relationships. For all other
command relationships, a liaison is provided as required by the gaining unit.
2-133. Establish/maintain communications: This is not applicable to units with organic command
relationships. For assigned and attached command relationships, communication is established and
maintained as required by the gaining unit. For OPCON and TACON command relationships,
communication is established and maintained as required by the parent and gaining unit. |
4-0 | 67 | Army Sustainment at Echelon
2-134. Priority establishment: Units with an organic command relationship have priorities established by the
organic headquarters. In all other command relationships, the gaining unit establishes priorities.
2-135. Designation of command or support relationships:
• Units with an organic, assigned, and attached command relationship may be further attached,
OPCON, or TACON to another organization by the parent/gaining unit. The parent/gaining unit
may also impose any support relationship on the unit.
• Units with an OPCON command relationship may be further OPCON or TACON to another
organization by the gaining unit. The gaining unit may also impose any support relationship on the
unit.
• Units with a TACON command relationship may be further TACON to another organization by the
gaining unit. The gaining unit may also impose any support relationship on the unit.
ARMY SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS
2-136. Army support relationships are direct support, reinforcing, general support-reinforcing, and general
support. Army support relationships are not command authorities and are more specific than joint support
relationships.
2-137. Direct support is a support relationship requiring a force to support another specific force and
authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force’s request for assistance (joint doctrine considers direct
support as a mission rather than a support relationship). A unit assigned a direct support relationship retains
its command relationship with its parent unit but is positioned by and has priorities of support established by
the supported unit.
2-138. Reinforcing support is a support relationship requiring a force to support another supporting unit.
Only like units can be given a reinforcing mission. A unit assigned a reinforcing support relationship retains
its command relationship with its parent unit but is positioned by the reinforced unit. A unit that is reinforcing
has priorities of support established by the reinforced unit first, and then by the parent unit.
2-139. General support-reinforcing is a support relationship assigned to a unit to support the force as a whole
and to reinforce another similar-type unit. A unit assigned a general support-reinforcing support relationship
is positioned and has priorities established by its parent unit and secondly by the reinforced unit.
2-140. General support is that support which is given to the supported force as a whole and not to any
particular subdivision thereof. Units assigned a general support relationship are positioned and have priorities
established by their parent unit.
2-141. Commanders establish support relationships when subordination of one unit to another is
inappropriate. Assigning support relationships is one aspect of command and control. Commanders assign a
support relationship when:
• The echelon of the supporting unit is the same as or higher than that of the supported unit. For
example, the supporting unit may be a brigade, and the supported unit may be a battalion. It would
be inappropriate for the brigade to be subordinated to the battalion; hence, the echelon uses an Army
support relationship.
• The supporting unit supports several units simultaneously. The requirement to set support priorities
to allocate resources to supported units exists.
2-142. Units that have a command relationship with a unit are not designated a support relationship with the
same unit. Since a command relationship is established, it provides adequate authority for the gaining unit to
direct support efforts. Support relationships do not alter ADCON.
2-143. Army support relationships allow supporting commanders to employ their units’ capabilities to
achieve results required by supported commanders. Supporting commanders clearly designate support
relationships to subordinate units in OPORDs. The designation must identify the supported unit, the specific
support relationship designated, and the duration of the relationship. The duration may be based on time,
duration of a phase, or based on achieving an objective. This information is included in the “Task
Organization” paragraph of the OPORD. Supported commanders must also identify supporting units to
subordinates in the same paragraph. Commanders may place this information in annex A of the order. The |
4-0 | 68 | Chapter 2
support is more effective if a commander with the requisite technical and tactical expertise controls the
supporting unit rather than the supported commander.
2-144. Support relationships can be an exclusive relationship between two units (direct support), or a broad
level of support extended to all units under the control of the higher headquarters (general support). While
reinforcing and general support-reinforcing relationships are not commonly used by sustainment units, these
relationships are valid for sustainment units and may be designated based on support requirements.
2-145. Although all support relationships are applicable to sustainment units, direct support and general
support are the most commonly used. Direct support requires a unit to support another specific unit and
authorizes it to answer directly to the supported unit’s request for assistance. A unit assigned a direct support
relationship retains its command relationship with its parent unit, but it is positioned by and has priorities of
support established by the supported unit. The parent unit may end or redirect the direct support relationship
at any time if directed to do so by its higher headquarters.
2-146. General support requires a unit to support multiple units simultaneously and not any specific
subdivision of the unit. A unit assigned a general support relationship retains its command relationship with
its parent unit and is positioned and has priorities established by the parent unit. The parent unit may end or
redirect the general support relationship at any time if directed to do so by its higher headquarters. Table 2-3
lists Army support relationships.
Table 2-3. Army support relationships
Then inherent responsibilities—
Authorities a
commander
Are Establish
If Have May be Receives assigned and Have can impose
relation- command task- sustain- position or Provide maintain priorities on gaining
ship is— relation- organized ment an area of liaison to— communi- established unit further
ship command or
by— from— operations cations by—
with— support
by— with—
relationship
by—
Parent unit,
Direct Parent Parent Parent Supported Supported Supported
supported See note 1
support1 unit unit unit unit unit unit
unit
Parent unit, Reinforced
Reinforc- Parent Parent Parent Reinforced Reinforced Not
reinforced unit, then
ing unit unit unit unit unit applicable
unit parent unit
Reinforced Reinforced Parent unit,
General
Parent Parent Parent unit and as unit and as then Not
support- Parent unit
unit unit unit required by required by reinforced applicable
reinforcing
parent unit parent unit unit
As required As required
General Parent Parent Parent Not
Parent unit by parent by parent Parent unit
support unit unit unit applicable
unit unit
Note: 1 Commanders of units in direct support may further assign support relationships between their subordinate units and
elements of the supported unit after coordination with the supported commander.
COMMAND AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS BY ECHELON
2-147. The command and support relationships most commonly used vary by echelon. The relationships
described below are typical examples. However, relationships may vary based on commander’s intent and
mission and operational variables.
STRATEGIC SUPPORT AREA
2-148. The strategic support area contains the organizations and agencies required to integrate and
synchronize mobilization, deployment (strategic power projection), employment, sustainment, and
redeployment of forces. It also includes the air and sea ports that support the flow of forces and sustainment
into a theater. Command authority originating from the strategic support area is described in JP 1, Volume 1,
JP 1, Volume 2, JP 3-0, and JP 4-0. Support originating from the strategic support area can be either direct |
4-0 | 69 | Army Sustainment at Echelon
support or general support. Section I of this chapter described in greater detail the organizations responsible
for integrating and synchronizing support in the strategic support area.
JOINT SECURITY AREA
2-149. Discussion of each type of Army headquarters assumes employment in the joint security area. All
units may or may not be employed. Within the joint security area, sustainment command relationships will
normally be the following:
• The TSC is assigned to the theater Army.
• The ESC is attached to the TSC.
• Sustainment brigades are attached to the ESC. The sustainment brigades will have the same
relationship with the TSC if an ESC is not employed in the joint security area.
• CSSBs are attached to the sustainment brigade.
• Functional logistics and HR companies are attached to the CSSB or special troops battalion.
• Theater finance battalions are attached to ESCs or sustainment brigades.
2-150. Operational medical units also operate in the joint security area. Within the joint security area, medical
command relationships are normally the following:
• The TMC is assigned to the theater Army.
• Task-organized medical formations in the joint security area are assigned to the MEDBDE (SPT)
or TMC.
• The MLMC forward team is assigned to the TMC and collocates with the DMC of the TSC or ESC
to coordinate medical materiel management and distribution. The MLMC forward team may be
further task-organized based on mission orders.
• Elements of the global medical field laboratory may be in general support of the theater Army and
may be assigned to the TMC or MEDBDE (SPT).
CORPS AREA
2-151. The task organization of sustainment units in the corps area may be complex. Multiple sustainment
headquarters may be operating in the area. In addition to the CSC, there could be other ESCs and sustainment
brigades operating in the corps area. An example of this is an ESC operating in the corps area that supports
the TSC and theater level sustainment operations.
2-152. A CSC is assigned to the corps. The theater Army may also attach one or more sustainment brigades
to the CSC. Furthermore, CSSBs, functional logistics battalions, and functional companies will be attached
to the sustainment brigades as required to support the corps mission. All command and support relationships
will be designated in an OPORD issued by the theater Army. The units attached to the corps receive mission
orders from the corps headquarters, normally in support of specific corps operations. The normal support
relationship for all sustainment units in the corps area is general support. However, other support relationships
may be designated based on mission requirements.
2-153. Other ESCs operating in the corps area will remain attached to the TSC and will also have sustainment
brigades, CSSBs, functional logistics battalions, and functional logistics companies attached. Sustainment
units not attached to the corps receive mission orders from the TSC to support broader theater operations.
2-154. The task organization of medical units in the corps area is also complex. Multiple medical command
and control headquarters may be operating in the area. Medical command and control headquarters are
generally in a general support relationship with the corps. However, medical units may be further task-
organized and other support relationships may be designated to ensure that medical commanders have
freedom of action to adjust their units as needed due to changes in mission requirements. Within the corps,
medical command relationships will normally be the following:
• The TMC is assigned to the ASCC and provides direct or general support to the corps through the
MEDBDE (SPT).
• MEDBDEs (SPT) provide direct or general support to the corps and may have hospital centers,
medical battalions (multifunctional), and separate medical and dental companies or veterinary
detachments assigned.
• MMBs may have medical companies, detachments, and teams assigned.
• Role 3 hospital centers may have field hospitals and hospital detachments and teams assigned. |
4-0 | 70 | Chapter 2
• Elements of the global medical field laboratory may be in general support of the corps.
DIVISION AREA
2-155. The task organization of sustainment units in the division area is subject to the same complexities as
the corps area. Multiple echelons above division sustainment units may be operating in the area alongside
the DSB.
2-156. Other sustainment brigades operating in the division area will remain attached to an CSC in the corps
area. Sustainment brigades attached to the CSC will have CSSBs, functional logistics battalions, and
functional logistics companies attached. The CSSBs attached to the sustainment brigade will have functional
companies attached. Sustainment units not assigned to the division receive mission orders from the CSC to
support broader theater operations.
2-157. The DSB and its organic division sustainment troops battalion and DSSB are assigned to the division
and may have additional CSSBs attached as required. The division’s task-organized DSB provides direct
support to the division and general support for all units in or passing through their geographic area. The DSB
commander remains responsible for integration and synchronization of sustainment in the division area.
2-158. The task organization of medical units in the division area is subject to the same complexities as the
corps area. Elements of the MEDBDE (SPT), MMB, and hospital center may be operating in the division
area. The MEDBDE (SPT) and its subordinate units are normally in a general support relationship with the
division commander. Within the division, medical command relationships will normally be the following:
• MEDBDEs (SPT) provide direct or general support to the division and may have hospital centers
and medical battalions (multifunctional) assigned.
• MMBs may have medical companies, detachments, and teams assigned.
• Role 3 hospital centers may have field hospitals and hospital detachments and teams assigned.
BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM AREA
2-159. The BSB is organic to the maneuver brigade headquarters; it is an integral part of the maneuver
brigade table of organization and equipment. The distribution, field maintenance, medical, and forward
support companies are organic to the BSB and have a direct support relationship with the maneuver brigade.
The forward support companies and elements of the medical company may be OPCON to the supported
maneuver battalion for limited periods of time based on mission requirements. This OPCON is normally
limited to the duration of a specific mission or phase of an operation. |
4-0 | 71 | Chapter 3
Sustainment Operations During Competition Below Armed
Conflict
This chapter provides an overview of sustainment operations during competition below armed
conflict. This chapter includes an overview of Army operations during competition and
discusses sustainment planning and describes sustainment roles and responsibilities at each
echelon.
SECTION I – OVERVIEW OF ARMY OPERATIONS DURING COMPETITION
3-1. Competition below armed conflict occurs when an adversary’s national interests are incompatible with
U.S. interests, and that adversary is willing to actively pursue them short of open armed conflict. While
neither side desires, at least initially, to use military force as the primary method to achieve its goal, the
adversary is willing to employ national instruments of power, including military force below the threshold
of actual armed conflict, to achieve its aims. The resulting tension between the two sides creates potential for
violent escalation when one side challenges the status quo. Situations during competition, in which U.S. joint
forces take actions outside of armed conflict against an adversary, are typically nonviolent and conducted
under greater legal or policy constraints than in armed conflict. However, these may include violent action
by U.S. joint forces with allies and partners.
PREPARATION FOR LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS
3-2. Army forces that cannot credibly execute operations during conflict neither deter adversaries nor assure
allies and other unified action partners. Preparation for large-scale combat operations is therefore the primary
focus of Army conventional forces during competition. Some of the activities Army forces execute to prepare
for armed conflict with sustainment implications include—
• Setting the theater, resetting the theater, and conducting RSOI.
• Building allied and partner capabilities and capacity.
• Improving joint and multinational interoperability.
• Preparing to transition and execute OPLANs.
INTERAGENCY COOPERATION
3-3. During competition, it is critical that sustainers work with other agencies to achieve integrated whole-
of-government operations and synchronization of interagency activities such as information sharing, security
cooperation, and foreign assistance. This requires Army sustainers to develop and share detailed time-phased
logistics requirements/estimates with interagency partners. During competition, the Department of State will
play a large role in maintaining or establishing a path toward greater stability, with elements from the
intelligence community and DOD in support. Other agencies that may provide crucial logistics support during
shaping operations are DLA, Department of Treasury, Federal Reserve Bank, and USAMC. Liaison officers
are often the first sustainment planners on ground. Liaison officers begin sustainment preparations and
discussions with the ASCC, TSC, State Department officials, and country teams. The liaison officers may
assist with expediting movement of equipment and logistics planning. USTRANSCOM may also send liaison
officers to facilitate transportation operations.
COMPETITION ACTIVITIES
3-4. Competition involves activities conducted under numerous programs within a CCMD. The CCDR uses
these activities to improve security within partner nations, enhance international legitimacy, gain
multinational cooperation, and influence adversary decision making. Competition activities include obtaining
access for U.S. forces, maintaining sufficient forward-based presence within a theater to influence conditions
in the strategic environment, and mitigating conditions that could lead to a crisis or armed conflict. At any
time during competition, but especially during times of heightened tension, leaders must take great care to |
4-0 | 72 | Chapter 3
ensure Army forces avoid activities that inadvertently provoke crisis or armed conflict. Army forces, as
directed by the theater Army, must stay within an activity level that meets the CCDR’s intent for readiness
without unintentionally increasing tensions.
MILITARY ENGAGEMENT
3-5. Military engagement is the contact and interaction between individuals or elements of the Armed Forces
of the United States and those of another nation's armed forces, or foreign and domestic civilian authorities
or agencies, to build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain
influence (JP 3-0). A military-to-military engagement requires less sustainment support than large-scale
combat operations. Host-nation support is civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign
forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually
concluded between nations. Military engagements can reduce tensions and may preclude conflict; if conflict
is unavoidable, these engagements may allow the United States to enter into it with stronger alliances or
coalitions. Sustainers are involved in all these engagements primarily to facilitate sustainment agreements
and coordinate planning for future operations.
SECURITY COOPERATION
3-6. Security cooperation encompasses all Department of Defense interactions with foreign security
establishments to build relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and
partner military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United
States forces with peacetime and contingency access to allies and partners (JP 3-20). The Department of State
leads and provides oversight for security cooperation efforts.
3-7. Sustainment commands conduct parallel and collaborative planning in order to synchronize sustainment
operations for theater security cooperation activities. The Army approach to supporting the larger DOD
security cooperation effort is either indirect or direct.
3-8. Indirect approach activities involve the United States supporting a nation with security cooperation
programs, given legitimate authorities, designed to enhance its capability and capacity. The sustainment
command supports the following programs and activities typical of the indirect approach:
• International military education and training.
• Multinational and joint exercises and exchange programs.
3-9. Direct approach activities involve U.S. forces assisting the host nation by conducting operations for the
mutual benefit of the host nation and U.S. interests. These operations either provide a capability the host
nation does not possess or increase the capacity of the host nation to conduct the operation.
3-10. Security assistance is a group of programs authorized by federal statutes by which the United States
provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, lease, loan, credit, or
cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives, and those that are funded and authorized through
the Department of State to be administered by Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency,
which are considered part of security cooperation (JP 3-20). Security assistance programs are typically
focused on the transfer of defense articles and services to eligible foreign governments, the provision of
training and education to foreign military personnel, and the sale of construction services in support of partner
nation military establishments. Sustainers are frequently required to provide support and logistics training to
support these activities.
3-11. Security force assistance includes the Department of Defense activities that support the development
of capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions (JP 3-20). Army
sustainers interact with sustainers of partner countries in these operations. These partnerships assist in future
interoperability and enhance partner nation militaries logistics capabilities.
3-12. Foreign internal defense is participation by civilian agencies and military forces of a government or
international organizations in any of the programs and activities undertaken by a host nation government to
free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its
security (JP 3-22). Sustainment support operations are limited by applicable U.S. law without an ACSA.
Such support usually consists of transportation or limited maintenance support, although an ACSA can allow
additional support. Sustainment of combat operations in foreign internal defense is similar to sustainment for |
4-0 | 73 | Sustainment Operations During Competition Below Armed Conflict
other types of operations. However, the political sensitivities and concern for host-nation legitimacy and
minimum U.S. presence change the complexion of sustainment operations in foreign internal defense. As in
security force assistance, sustainers are critical for developing well-established sustainment foundations. SOF
play a critical role in executing foreign internal defense operations.
3-13. In security cooperation, support considerations include support to U.S. forces and support to host-
nation forces based on a variety of authorizations. Support to host or partner nations is primarily driven by
already established ACSAs. If ACSAs are not in place, local State Department officials act as lead for
determining what support can be granted to host nations.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
3-14. The Department of State leads and provides oversight for security cooperation efforts through its
bureaus, offices, and overseas missions. Security cooperation activities are conducted and coordinated
throughout the AOR by, with, or through the ASCC to—
• Build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests.
• Develop multinational and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational
operations.
• Provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.
3-15. The TSC supports all DOD operations during competition. Since the boundaries for Department of
State are different from the boundaries of the CCDRs, the TSC (through the ASCC) may have to coordinate
operations through each Embassy's Security Cooperation Organization or host-nation law enforcement
representatives.
SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIALS
3-16. The senior defense official or defense attaché is the principal military advisor on defense and national
security issues. The senior defense official is also the senior diplomatically accredited DOD military officer
assigned to a U.S. diplomatic mission and the single point of contact for all DOD matters involving the
embassy or DOD elements assigned to or working from the embassy. This individual acts as the in-country
focal point for planning, coordinating, supporting, and/or executing U.S. defense issues and activities in the
host nation, including theater security cooperation programs under the oversight of the CCDR. Army
sustainers may be tasked to assist in establishing and maintaining sustainment foundations to enhance nation
partnerships. For additional information regarding DOD operations at U.S. embassies, see DODD 5205.75.
COMBINED TRAINING AND EXERCISES
3-17. Army forces build partner combat readiness and set conditions for future contingencies through training
and exercises. Combined exercises familiarize both forces with the capabilities and shortfalls of the other
force and develop procedures to leverage capabilities and mitigate shortfalls. These serve to sustain and/or
develop interoperability between nations as well as build partnership capacity.
3-18. These exercises are extremely diverse in size, participation, duration, and sustainment requirements.
The requirements may range from a few aircraft being sustained by HNS or OCS with minimal DOD
sustainment, to large-scale training operations requiring a combination of HNS, OCS, and home-station
sustainment activities. These exercises may be with one United States military agency and another country
or with joint agencies and multiple nations. These events can generate very high support requirements.
Sustainment commands are thoroughly embedded in the planning process to determine support requirements,
specific responsibilities, and support procedures. While the volume of requirements for short-term
multinational training events may not be burdensome, the events are complex and require careful planning
and synchronization. The use of multinational exercises establishes theater gateways and access agreements
for activities like cross-border movements and status of forces agreements. |
4-0 | 74 | Chapter 3
Pacific Pathways: PACOM in Competition
In Autumn 2023, less than a week after being confirmed as the new Army Chief of
Staff, General Randy George attended the 13th Indo-Pacific Armies Chiefs Conference
in New Delhi, the largest conference for land forces in the Indo-Pacific Theater. “This
region is a priority, and the Army is all over the world but exercises more in the Indo-
Pacific because it is a priority” stated General George.
This prioritization of the Indo-Pacific Theater is a consequence of a strategic shift or
‘pivot’ that occurred in 2014 which placed the (then) Pacific Command (PACOM) as
the strategic priority for the U.S. Army. In support of this shift, in 2014, General Vincent
Brooks, commander of U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) created the Pacific Pathways
program. Historically, there had been a long tradition of support to various exercises
throughout PACOM. What was lacking was a coordinated, wholistic, plan for the
deployment and sustainment to U.S. forces throughout the whole region, in support of
all the exercises and any emergent humanitarian crisis (for example, a standing
program to increase the power projection of the U.S. Army throughout PACOM). Pacific
Pathways would fill that void.
In June 2014, the first Pathway departed from Joint Base Lewis-McChord (JBLM) with
elements of the 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division. It sailed to
Indonesia and Malaysia for multilateral exercises and then went to Japan to participate
in exercises with the Japan Self-Defense Force. In November, after sailing for a five-
month, 17,000-mile Pacific journey, they returned to JBLM. The initial 2014 Pathway
was a proof-of-concept exercise in the effort to operationalize the program. In 2015,
three Pacific Pathways, each with elements of a brigade combat team from the 25th
Infantry Division, deployed and participated in multinational exercises in Thailand,
South Korea, Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, and Japan. In successive
years, the three-deployment model became standard for units deployed.
Pacific Pathways’ deployments became a forcing function for the sustainment
enterprise to confront and work through a myriad of issues associated with the
increased complexities of the program’s objectives. Individual exercises did not
challenge or engage the entire sustainment structure of the Pacific Theater. With each
deployment, the entire sustainment enterprise (specifically USAMC, Defense Logistics
Agency, Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, 8th TSC, 593rd ESC, 402nd
and 404th Army Field Support Brigades) had to find ways to operate together to
strategically move a brigade combat team (minus) by sea and air, perform multiple
RSOIs, and provide continuous sustainment for three 90-day periods. One of the
biggest problems to overcome was simply the ‘tyranny of distance’; the distance to
travel to conduct supply operations across the Pacific. In addition to this, issues with
different host-nation customs rules and procedures, movement of Class IX,
dependability and capability of OCS, and suitability and availability of fuel (especially
aviation) were among the challenges faced in the initial deployments.
Since these initial deployments, Pacific Pathways (subsequently named Operation
Pathways) became a staple of power projection for USARPAC. The deployments have
evolved, the time in country has increased to build further partnerships, and the Army
prepositioned stocks system has become more engaged in the program. According to
Major General Jered Helwig, commander 8th TSC, Operation Pathways “set conditions
for the joint interior lines and to build out the architecture, because we know if we don’t
rehearse it in competition, it will be very difficult to execute in crisis and conflict”. |
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SECTION II – PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS DURING COMPETITION
3-19. In addition to the sustainment activities and other considerations for operations during competition
mentioned above, there are additional conditions and planning considerations for sustainment forces.
Sustainment planners must be prepared to meet the challenges of distributing supplies and bulk fuel utilizing
military assets without reliance on OCS and contractors on the battlefield. Additional considerations are
discussed below.
THEATER STRATEGIC, OPERATIONAL, AND TACTICAL
COMPETITION ACTIVITIES
3-20. Certain conditions must be established in theater during competition at the theater strategic, operational,
and tactical levels. These conditions must be in place to enable deployment, employment, sustainment, and
redeployment of forces. They include—
• Whole-of-government initiatives.
• JOA opening:
▪ Theater opening.
▪ Port opening.
▪ RSOI.
• Support to other Services.
• Theater distribution.
WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES
3-21. Whole-of-government initiatives enable access to countries. They involve strategic organizations
establishing host-nation agreements, contracts, and clearances to allow forces to enter ports and airfields and
operate on highways, rail lines, and waterways in theater. They can be complex and time consuming. The
number of governments and defense organizations involved can complicate and prolong the process to gain
access to a country’s infrastructure and commerce.
JOINT OPERATIONS AREA OPENING
3-22. Establishing a JOA relies on the efforts of theater strategic, operational, and tactical-level organizations.
This condition must be tailored to accommodate the size and capabilities of deploying forces. Specific tasks
involved in establishing a JOA include theater opening, port opening, and RSOI.
Theater Opening
3-23. Theater opening involves establishing and operating ports of debarkation (air, sea, and rail), a
distribution system, and sustainment infrastructure. This condition facilitates port throughput for the RSOI
of forces in theater. Specific capabilities include security forces, port opening teams, maintenance companies,
transportation companies, signal companies, medical detachments, and command and control structures.
Coordination between the supported CCDR, USTRANSCOM, and other strategic organizations will
determine the who, what, and how of theater opening.
Port Opening
3-24. The TSC is responsible for port opening and accomplishes this through its task organized elements to
begin initial theater distribution. This size and scope of the units conducting port opening will depend on
mission and operational variables. Multiple port opening options are available to assist the CCDR.
3-25. The Army’s theater petroleum and water group supports the theater port opening mission of the TBX
when assigned. It provides planning, coordinating and operations support to the TBX when the bulk
petroleum portion of the mission exceeds staff capabilities. |
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Joint Task Force-Port Opening
3-26. The joint task force-port opening is an option available to the CCDR. The Air Force’s Air Mobility
Command is responsible for managing APODs, and SDDC is responsible for managing SPODs. The Navy’s
Military Sealift Command provides sealift from its organic fleet or through contracts with commercial ocean
carriers. The joint task force-port opening facilitates joint reception, staging, and onward movement and
theater distribution by providing an interface at the APOD and/or SPOD and distribution node. Joint task
force-port opening capabilities include:
• APOD and SPOD assessment.
• APOD and SPOD opening and initial operation.
• Distribution network assessment.
• Distribution node management.
• Cargo and passenger operations.
• Coordination with movement control for onward movement of arriving cargo and passengers.
• Establishment of joint in-transit visibility and radio frequency identification networks.
3-27. Another key task of the joint task force-port opening is to open and initially operate an associated
forward distribution node (such as cargo marshalling or transload) within 10 kilometers of the airfield ramp
area. The joint task force-port opening may be employed to move the cargo off the ramp at the airfield to the
forward node for eventual distribution into the theater. The Army has an on-call mission to support joint task
force-port opening as needed.
Transportation Brigade Expeditionary
3-28. The TBX provides command and control of assigned and attached port, terminal, and watercraft units
conducting expeditionary port-opening, movement control, and austere intermodal operations at unimproved
seaports. It has the ability to conduct port operations and can provide command and control to both watercraft
and water terminal organizations.
Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration
3-29. RSOI is an ongoing series of four interrelated and overlapping processes that ensure synchronized
clearance of nodes and assembly of combat power that is then rapidly transported to point of need to support
operational requirements.
3-30. Reception is the process of receiving, off-loading, marshalling, accounting for, and transporting of
personnel, equipment, and materiel from the strategic and/or intratheater deployment phase to a sea, air, or
surface transportation point of debarkation to the marshalling area (JP 3-35). The TSC implements reception
from strategic lift activities at or near designated air and seaports of debarkation.
3-31. Staging is assembling, holding, and organizing arriving personnel, equipment, and sustaining materiel
in preparation for onward movement (JP 3-35). Staging is the part of the RSOI operation that unites unit
personnel with their equipment and prepares them for onward movement and employment by the JFC. The
TSC provides sustainment support to units during staging.
3-32. Onward movement is the process of moving forces and sustainment from reception facilities and
marshalling or staging areas to tactical assembly areas or other operating areas. Corps and division
commanders coordinate their movement plans to their projected AOs with all necessary military and civilian
agencies.
3-33. Integration is the synchronized transfer of units into an operational commander’s force prior to mission
execution.
SUPPORT TO OTHER SERVICES
3-34. Support to other Services relies on joint interdependence that is essential to sustainment operations.
Joint interdependence occurs when one Service relies on another Service’s capabilities such as common-user
transportation. This allows Services to maximize optimum use of resources and reduce duplication of effort
and competition for the same resources. The CCDR implements joint interdependence through DAFL and
can assign the Army the task of providing common-user support to other Services. |
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THEATER DISTRIBUTION
3-35. Establishing the theater distribution network is an essential part of sustainment support and is pivotal
to obtaining freedom of movement and action. It provides operational forces with the materiel, supplies, and
retrograde of repairable material needed to maintain readiness. Theater distribution involves four networks:
• The physical network includes the means for distribution (airfields, roads, bridges, railroads,
structures, pipelines) and the capabilities for supporting distribution operations.
• The financial network facilitates distribution operations by providing policies, processes, and
systems for the use of fiscal resources.
• The informational network is the combination of all information systems that support theater
distribution.
• The communication network links the complex elements of distribution. It enables capacity,
reliability, and security of communication networks that support the rapid transmission of global
distribution data. Real-time communications are vital for successful execution of distribution
operations.
3-36. The bulk of planning for Army sustainment in a theater is done by the ASCC and TSC. Planners focus
on the challenges of geographically large and difficult to access areas. Planners develop means to generate
and employ capabilities within the operational area.
3-37. The ASCC plans and coordinates means to identify and mitigate capability gaps. When directed, the
theater Army may contract for the establishment of intermediate staging bases (ISBs), possible locations for
pre-positioned stocks, and possible assembly areas.
3-38. Planners consider sustainment by type of support and across a continuum of possibilities to gain
capabilities from other military partners, host nations, the sustainment enterprise, contracted support, and
organic capabilities. OPLANs and concept plans are the basis for planning to evaluate total requirements and
capabilities. For more information regarding theater distribution considerations, see Chapter 5.
3-39. The following planning considerations may apply to multiple sustainment functions and are important
for sustainers to consider during competition:
• ACSAs.
• International agreements.
• Established contracts (theater, external [LOGCAP], and systems support).
• Customs and agriculture requirements.
• Commercial capabilities.
• Requesting funding authorities.
• Hazardous materials regulations.
• Mobility constraints.
• Noncombatant evacuation operations.
3-40. Risk, uncertainty, and chance are inherent in all military operations. Sustainment planners must seek
to understand, balance, and take prudent risks, rather than avoid risks, to ensure sustainment of the operational
force. Risk considerations (both accumulated and deferred) and other considerations should be addressed,
and mitigation strategies/alternatives developed as part of the sustainment plan. Sustainment commanders
must assess and mitigate risks continuously throughout operations. The following is a sample list of risk
considerations during competition:
• Large APS sites constitute a high value target for potential adversaries (for both lethal targeting and
information collection purposes). How will the loss of an APS site impact operational requirements?
Can we establish multiple sites, and will the cost outweigh the force protection/redundancy benefits?
How can the footprint be minimized while meeting requirements?
• Are APS sites, financial and supply automation, and other systems hardened against cyber-attacks?
How do you validate requirements received through electronic systems? Does the threat have the
capability to change information verses directed denial of service attacks?
• Is the operational plan over-reliant upon HNS, ACSAs, and contingency contracts to support combat
forces? Is there sufficient redundancy and flexibility in the instruments to rapidly adapt to changing
requirements? |
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• Have you negotiated multiple points of access/entry? What happens if a host nation denies country
or movement clearance?
• Has support to and from other Services, agencies, and allies been factored into the support plan and
have the appropriate request/accounting processes been established?
• Can the shaping activities be misunderstood (considered threatening) and cause threat forces to
accelerate their plans?
• Have the LCMCs and DLA coordinated with the industrial base to support potential surge
requirements?
3-41. Operations in a contested environment over extended lines of communication present risks to
sustainment forces. These threats increase the likelihood of attacks at any point in the strategic framework.
It is therefore necessary to continuously plan for and coordinate for protection resources and assets to mitigate
effects of enemy attacks in support areas and maintain freedom of action.
Disperse Deployment and Sustainment
3-42. The theater Army executes deployment and sustainment along multiple dispersed routes. Army
expeditionary forces deploy from the homeland and other regions using joint strategic transportation and
arrive at multiple points in theater, proceed forward along multiple routes, and then occupy dispersed tactical
assembly areas within range of enemy antiaccess and area denial systems. Aviation units employ split basing
between the tactical and operational support areas, or in the case of division formations, between the tactical
support and close areas. Aircraft and units rotate through a network of dispersed, austere locations in the
tactical support and close areas. Sustainment draws on multiple sources for local procurement and
prepositioned supplies, distributed through dispersed supply nodes operated by forward-presence units.
Intensive sustainment-level maintenance of aviation, ground, and electronic combat systems, including battle
damage assessment and repair, is conducted within the operational support area’s lower threat environment.
The Army postures redundant sustainment infrastructure forward, plans and prepares precision logistics
support, and ensures the availability of additional expeditionary capacity through proper balance across the
Active and Reserve Components.
Mitigate Effects of Enemy Attacks in The Support Areas
3-43. The theater and field armies mitigate the effects of enemy attacks in the support areas to enable the
reception of expeditionary forces executing strategic and operational maneuver. Forces in the support areas
employ deception to cause the enemy to expend resources on decoys or targets that have moved, miss fleeting
opportunities, or expend high-value capabilities on less important targets. APS are protected and hardened to
allow the rapid integration of expeditionary forces and the generation of combat power. Army forces in the
support areas build resilience and redundancy by dispersing critical deployment and sustainment capabilities
in mixed clusters and gain residual protection from air and missile defense radars and launchers, aerial
surveillance, and other specialized protection capabilities that they would otherwise not be allocated.
3-44. Sustainment headquarters, including the TSC, ESC, and CSC, use dispersion and multiple command
posts to mitigate the effects of enemy attack and maintain command and control of sustainment operations.
The configuration of the TSC and ESC headquarters is determined by their ability to command forces across
vast land areas while supporting Army forces. TSC and ESC commanders exercise command and control
over widely dispersed formations while maintaining a common operational picture (COP) with higher
headquarters and subordinate units. TSC, ESC, and CSC commanders vet the command and control
capabilities of their organizations using command posts during exercises and training events. The
commander, with the assistance of the staff, determines the communication capabilities required for each
command post during dispersed operations. Key considerations for evaluating command and control
capabilities include staff integration and crosstalk, communication systems, and the ability to maintain a
COP.
CONSIDERATIONS FOR SUSTAINMENT FUNCTIONS
3-45. The paragraphs that follow discuss the key considerations for sustainers during competition by
function. |
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MAINTENANCE
3-46. Maintenance operations during competition focus on planning and preparing for deployment while
continuing to conduct routine equipment maintenance. The AFSB’s LRCs may provide maintenance support
at home station. United States Army Medical Logistics Command and its subordinate units (United States
Army Medical Materiel Agency, United States Army Medical Materiel Command-Europe, and United States
Army Medical Materiel Command-Korea) are able to provide CLVIII maintenance support at home station.
See AR 40-61 for additional information on medical logistics. Successful maintenance operations in theater
require units to deploy with their authorized stockage lists, shop stock, and bench stock items, because the
flow of parts may be greatly restricted within countries during shaping operations. HNS, theater support
contracting (which includes local purchase), external support contracts (reach-back contracting office and
LOGCAP), and/or systems support contracts (reach-back sustainment support) are force multipliers for
maintenance in many of these operations.
TRANSPORTATION
3-47. USTRANSCOM is responsible for moving units and equipment into theater. Once inside the AOR, the
TSC and/or ESC provides recommendations for transit priorities. Special interests include border crossing
agreements, infrastructure capacity (roads, bridges, and ports), customs and diplomatic clearance, and
movement control. During competition, it is critical for sustainers to test transportation nodes and identify
alternate LOCs. Aerial delivery capabilities should be identified and understood during this period, as
requirements for alternate resupply may increase. Transportation plans for operational area opening and
concepts of support may be tested during shaping. Movement boards are a mechanism to review and manage
transportation plans, agreements, policies, and priorities. Movement boards are also a means of reviewing
route status, convoy security requirements, and transportation asset allocation to support distribution
operations. For additional details, see ATP 4-16.
SUPPLY AND SERVICES
3-48. The CCDR assigns lead Service responsibilities, normally through the contingency planning process,
to achieve efficiencies and improve effectiveness through optimizing available modes, nodes, routes, and
suppliers. These lead Service support functions can be for single or multiple common-user functions and
often include general supplies. The lead Service is responsible for forecasting operational requirements to
support all operations from humanitarian assistance to large-scale combat operations. Lead Service
sustainment planners should anticipate increased needs for bulk fuel, ammunition, construction and barrier
material, and repair parts to support concept plans and OPLANS. The lead Service can also request support
from DLA to decrease wait time, reduce cost, and improve military readiness. For additional information on
field services, see Appendix A, Quartermaster Operations.
3-49. ACSAs and OCS may be leveraged to attain several classes of supply. Food may also be provided
through such arrangements. For clothing, individual equipment, tentage, and organizational tool sets, it is
critical that units bring what is required to execute their anticipated tactical tasks with them. ACSAs should
be considered for living arrangements. Use of non-U.S. medical materiel for U.S. personnel requires special
consideration given regulatory requirements. Sustainment personnel should reach out to the U. S. Army
Medical Logistics Command SPO for guidance on procuring foreign medical materiel.
3-50. Bulk fuel and water are provided utilizing existing pipelines, military pipelines, assault hose lines,
contracts, HNS, and agreements (including blanket purchase agreements, into-plane contracts, into-truck
contracts, and bunker contracts), along with host-nation bulk fuel and water agreements. DLA-Energy’s
contract support, interaction with other nations to develop ACSAs, contingency sites, fuel exchange
agreements, and the implementation of a quality surveillance testing program for products are critical to the
overall success of the operation. DLA-Energy has responsibility for centrally procuring bulk petroleum for
DOD. In cases where pre-established agreements with nations in the AOR are absent, DLA-Energy
establishes contracts with local venders. DOD components submit requests to the CCDR’s joint petroleum
office for validation and subsequently gain DLA-Energy’s authorization for local procurement of petroleum
products exceeding the annual limits. Several considerations must be considered:
• Quality surveillance.
• Additization equipment requirements in the event DLA-Energy cannot source additized jet fuel. |
4-0 | 80 | Chapter 3
• Storage capacity and locations.
• Types of fuel required for an operation.
• Requirements for the Army support to other Services Title 10 inland distribution mission.
• Planned receipt methods in the corps rear area including over-the-shore, host-nation
pipeline/storage, DLA-Energy contract deliveries, and rail tank cars.
3-51. For ammunition, planning includes an evaluation of receipt, storage, and issue options to include
dispersion considerations required for net explosive weight. Planning should also include identifying
locations within the AOR for a theater storage area and multiple ammunition supply points to provide
redundant and robust storage capability. Ammunition stocks can be received directly from the port and
distributed laterally between supply points or directly to forward unit holding areas. Units can also consider
the use of ammunition caches in support of operations to continue offensive momentum and prepare for
transitions to the defense. Units should also be aware of the risks that caches may be discovered, interdicted,
and destroyed.
3-52. It is also important to consider foreign ammunition during competition. U.S. forces may be called upon
to receive, store, and dispose of foreign ammunition. Logistics planners can leverage EOD assets that are
trained in foreign ammunition for storage and compatibility determination. Quality assurance specialist
ammunition surveillance personnel can also assist with NATO and foreign ammunition storage and
compatibility requirements.
3-53. Major end items are traditionally brought from home station during competition. In the event a
replacement major end item is needed, supply managers request through current supply systems for
replacement. In addition, paying agents can be used to make local purchases for emerging requirements.
USAMC receives prioritization and authorization from HQDA to redistribute assets based on command
priorities or replacements from other sources. These sources include OCONUS theater sustainment stock,
redeploying unit left behind equipment, and APS. The theater AFSB manages the theater sustainment stocks,
redistribution property assistance yard, and provides integrated issue of major systems. The AFSB also
provides integrated fielding of all components of new equipment, normally at home station, in conjunction
with new equipment training. The Army Medical Logistics Command and medical logistics planners leverage
APS, medical materiel, and medical maintenance support agreements and contracts established during
competition. For critical items not available from those sources, units bring sufficient supplies to sustain
operations.
DISTRIBUTION
3-54. Distribution is the primary means that enables freedom of action, extends operational reach, and
prolongs endurance during operations. Establishing a distribution network is critical to shaping an OE. It is
enabled by a distribution management system designed to achieve support objectives. Distribution
management synchronizes and optimizes transportation, its networks, and materiel management with the
warfighting functions to move personnel and materiel from origins to the point of need in accordance with
the supported commander’s priorities (ADP 4-0).
3-55. Planning, coordinating, and synchronizing strategic and Army capabilities for distribution are essential.
Global distribution extends from the point of origin (garrison or point of supply) to the point of employment
(the Soldier in theater). The Army conducts theater distribution as part of the global distribution system.
Theater distribution is the flow of personnel, equipment, and materiel within theater to meet the geographic
combatant commander’s missions (JP 4-09). The theater segment extends from the ports of debarkation or
source of supply (in theater) to the points of need.
3-56. The TSC or ESC will establish movement boards to manage transportation policies, priorities, LOC
status, convoy protection and synchronization, and transportation asset allocation to support theater
distribution operations.
3-57. The TSC or ESC-validated movement program should be published in an OPORD and executed by
subordinate units like the sustainment brigade or movement control battalion. When transportation assets are
tasked, the movement control board will ensure the transportation movement request is produced to capture
transportation requirements. For additional details, see ATP 4-16. |
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3-58. Petroleum and water distribution planning is a key function of the theater petroleum and water group
during competition. This group (usually assigned directly to the TSC) plans the development, design, and
construction of the petroleum distribution system and storage facilities based on the operational plan of the
theater commander. A critical planning requirement for the group is to create detailed plans for the
purification, distribution, and storage of potable water. It also evaluates host-nation petroleum systems and
plans for their development, rehabilitation, and extension aligning with the operational plan of the theater
commander. The theater petroleum and water group also coordinates construction, rehabilitation, and
maintenance requirements for petroleum facilities with the engineer command. It is dependent on external
support for area signal support, security, construction, facility maintenance, and other supporting functions.
For additional information, see ATP 4-43 and ATP 4-44.
MORTUARY AFFAIRS
3-59. The DOD Mortuary Affairs Program provides for the care, management, and disposition of deceased
Service members, DOD civilians, and covered contractor personnel and the handling of their personal effects.
It covers fatality management and the return of human remains. The three phases of mortuary affairs are
current death (peacetime), concurrent return (theater-level operations during conflict), and temporary
interment (formerly graves registration). For more information see JP 4-0.
3-60. During peacetime, OCONUS CCDRs support the Military Departments in coordinating for the
recovery, preparation, and evacuation of human remains to a DOD mortuary and ultimately for release to a
civilian funeral home for final disposition.
3-61. During the transition from peacetime to conflict, the CCDR makes the decision to move from current
death (peacetime) to concurrent return establishing theater-level mortuary affairs operations and placing the
responsibility of fatality management on the tactical-level units to establish theater mortuary facilities that
meet the anticipated fatality management requirements.
3-62. Fatality management, as a part of the Mortuary Affairs Program, provides for the search, recovery,
presumptive identification, preparation, and temporary disposition of human remains. It provides theater-
level fatality management support to CCMDs operating mortuary affairs collection points, theater mortuary
evacuation points, theater personal effects depots, and mortuary affairs contaminated remains mitigation sites
that have the capability to cremate biologically or chemically contaminated remains in a DOD contracted or
operated crematory. For more information regarding contaminated human remains, see ATP 4-46. The
CCDR may assign the Army as lead Service for recovering and evacuating military fatalities during joint
operations. Sustainment planners must consider fatality estimates, the flow and number of allocated mortuary
affairs assets into the theater, and the sustainment channels with the most expedient available transportation
resources to evacuate human remains. Human remains will be evacuated without delay to preserve forensic
evidence for the Armed Forces Medical Examiner. Establishing roles and responsibilities during competition
is critical to the execution of fatality management and the evacuation of human remains and personal effects
out of the operational area. Sustainers must work with interagency and international partners for the recovery
and evacuation of—
• U.S. citizens.
• Allied and coalition forces.
• Host nation.
• Detainees.
3-63. While evacuation of human remains out of the theater is paramount, mortuary affairs processing
capacities and theater evacuation platforms can be overwhelmed due to the lethality of large-scale combat or
CBRN operations. In this event, the CCDR is empowered by Title 10 to authorize temporary interment for
U.S. forces; that responsibility may not be delegated to subordinate commanders. Temporary interment
should only be considered as a last resort, and only when operational constraints prevent the storage or
evacuation of human remains out of the operational area to a servicing mortuary or when it is deemed prudent
for the protection, health, and welfare of personnel. In extreme circumstances, when a unit is cut off and has
no means to communicate with higher headquarters, the senior commander is responsible for deciding
whether hasty burial will be utilized after all known evacuation options have failed.
3-64. During competition, sustainment planners explore all other options prior to temporary interment, but
must develop plans for temporary storage, identify potential locations, and estimate the engineer assets |
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required to conduct interment. Existing international agreements STANAG 2070 and QSTAG 655 establish
the precedent for interment of allied and coalition fatalities. However, plans for temporary interment overseas
will require additional policies, procedures, and host-nation approval prior to execution. For additional
information, see JP 4-0, ADP 4-0, and ATP 4-46.
GENERAL ENGINEERING SUPPORT
3-65. General engineering support during competition focuses on building, repairing, and maintaining
various infrastructure facilities, providing essential services, and ultimately building partner capacity to co-
develop host-nation capabilities to perform such tasks. Infrastructure development is often a series of
technical tasks that fall under different sectors such as electricity, road and rail transportation, water supply
and sanitation, water treatment, and sewage.
3-66. Shaping the OE requires that engineer planners anticipate the impact of geography, force projection
infrastructure with specific engineer missions, and available engineer forces within the supported AOR.
Engineer planners determine the basic mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment requirements
of the CCDR concept of operations. Engineer planners secure funding within authorities and plan for
procurement of Class IV supplies and services. For more information on engineering, see FM 3-34.
OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT
3-67. Operational contract support is the process of planning for and obtaining supplies, services, and
construction from commercial sources in support of CCDR-directed operations (JP 4-10). At the theater level,
sustainment planners align allocated military resources against forecasted requirements and employ non-
organic sources such as OCS to mitigate risk. Sustainment planners must also be prepared for theaters where
forcible entry operations will be required or an adversary with peer or overmatch capabilities will limit
available OCS support. As part of the military decision-making process, all primary staff and most special
staff have responsibility to develop Annex W and ensure the integration and synchronization of OCS
capabilities within the commander’s operational concept. This synchronization includes the identification of
commercial support requirements, the location and capabilities of contracting support units, and the
procedures and responsibilities for ensuring the safety and accountability of contractors. Commanders at each
echelon must plan for the integration of contracted capabilities and should include planners from the
supporting CSB and AFSB to address specific OCS capabilities.
3-68. Theater support contracts address theater-specific requirements and include micro-purchases. Elements
of ACC deploy with combat forces to provide, or attain and provide, the necessary contracting authority to
award these contracts in support of Army operations. External support contracts provide contingency
requirements on a global scale and often require administrative contracting, quality assurance, and
government property administration support. The LOGCAP program, managed by ASC, provides deployed
forces with the largest, most comprehensive external support contract within the DOD. All Army primary
staff elements are responsible for the integration and synchronization of OCS capabilities in Army operations.
External support contracts with DLA, USTRANSCOM, and other DOD agencies also provide deploying
forces with critical commercial support. Systems support contracts provide field services representatives to
maintain and repair critical systems, both in CONUS and during contingency operations. See ATP 4-10.1 for
additional information.
3-69. Sustainment headquarters at brigade and above include an organic OCS branch within the SPO section
that plans and manages the OCS process. The theater Army (and when constituted, the field army) must form
an OCS integration cell led by the G-4 staff and including participation from all primary and relevant special
staff directorates to ensure effective OCS planning and management. Because commercial support impacts
multiple staff sections and lines of effort, commanders at EAB may establish bureaus, boards, centers, cells,
and working groups to plan, synchronize, and integrate desired effects. Most theater Armies (and when
constituted, the field army) does not have an OCS cell and should form one within the G-4 staff to fulfill
OCS planning and management. The cell members may include representatives from other sections,
including the staff judge advocate. United States Army Pacific has an OCS-theater planning team to
synchronize and integrate desired OCS effects. For additional information, see JP 4-10, ATP 4-10, ATP 4-
71, and ATP 4-98. |
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FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
3-70. Financial managers must be prepared to provide funding support across the competition continuum. As
the financial management strategic enterprise integrator, United States Army Financial Management
Command utilizes its internal capabilities to deliver system support to financial enterprise resource planning
systems, financial audit and compliance support, financial management technical training and evaluation,
banking, and limited accounting for sustainment elements below corps. In addition, it directly coordinates
with interagency enablers to include the Office of Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), the Assistant Secretary
of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller), Federal Reserve Banks, Defense Finance and
Accounting Service, and the United States Treasury in support of the financial management enterprise. These
interagency partners are critical in providing battlefield currency support, ecommerce, financial authorities
and policies, and accounting support.
3-71. Resource management cells (J-8, G-8, and S-8) must forecast and request funding authorization in
advance for future operations through appropriate financial management channels. Operation and
Maintenance, Army is the primary source of funding to support U.S. appropriations to be enacted by Congress
for specific purposes. Special funding appropriations provide support to U.S. and non-U.S. military
personnel. Financial managers must be prepared to execute and account for all special funding with the same
level of effort required to execute and account for Operation and Maintenance, Army funding.
3-72. Support during competition may include funding support for organizing, equipping, and training
foreign forces. Title 22, USC contains the Foreign Assistance Act, the Arms Export Control Act, and other
laws that authorize security assistance, developmental assistance, and other forms of bilateral aid that
financial management personnel must be familiar with to support stability operations. ARSOF and the
supporting or supported conventional force have long used Title 22 funding, provided by the Department of
State, in foreign internal defense operations that occur during stability operations or follow on from a larger
stability operation. Congress has also authorized DOD to provide security cooperation support to foreign
military and security forces, with Department of State coordination and Congressional notification, through
chapter 16 of Title 10, USC.
3-73. United States Army Financial Management Command and the finance support center continuously
work in close coordination with sustainment elements below corps to ensure the readiness of finance units at
the tactical level. Readiness support is provided through combined training opportunities and external
evaluations. Finance units provide pay agent training and payment support through cash and ecommerce
during shaping exercises. Individual and collective training opportunities may be available during theater
security cooperation and exercise events. For more information, see FM 1-06.
PERSONNEL SERVICES
3-74. Personnel services complement logistics by planning for and coordinating efforts which provide and
sustain personnel. Personnel services contribute to personnel welfare (readiness and quality of life).
Personnel services facilitate the Army’s ability to prolong endurance. Personnel services include HR support,
legal support, religious support, and band support.
Human Resources Support
3-75. Successful HR support is dependent on careful planning, coordination, synchronization, and continuous
integration with strategic partners during shaping activities and must occur prior to, during, and after military
action. The objective of HR support is to maximize operational effectiveness by anticipating, manning, and
sustaining military operations. HR support operations accomplish this by building, generating, and sustaining
the force to provide CCDRs with the forces required to set conditions to win future conflicts.
3-76. During competition, HR support involves the national-level capability to plan, resource, manage, and
control the HR management life cycle functions for the Army. It involves integrating HR functions and
activities across the Army staff, among the respective components, and among the Services.
3-77. HR support during competition includes functions and tasks planned, coordinated, integrated, and
executed by operational-level HR organizations and human resources operations branches (HROBs) located
within ESCs, DSBs, and sustainment brigades. These functions and tasks include casualty and postal
operations, personnel accountability, and HR planning and operations. Deliberate coordination and |
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synchronization of these functions with strategic-level partners like the Casualty and Mortuary Affairs
Operations Division for casualty operations, Military Postal Services Agency for postal, and Human
Resources Command (HRC) for replacement operations are necessary in order to prolong endurance during
large-scale combat operations. These habitual support relationships facilitate the CCDR’s ability to extend
operational reach.
3-78. During competition, the ASCC G-1 coordinates with corps and divisions to establish theater
replacement management networks, personnel flow, and postal flow estimates. The ASCC G-1 refines and
validates the casualty estimate and establishes and manages the personnel portion of reconstitution or
reorganization efforts. To ensure initial HR capabilities are established prior to the arrival of the main flow
of forces, HR support elements are included as part of the early entry element of the sustainment brigade
assigned to the theater opening mission. The TG PAT establishes initial theater personnel accountability and
theater replacement networks. Its mission is to conduct personnel accountability in the RSOI process, load
and unload personnel data from the deployed theater accountability system, and conduct limited essential
personnel services for transient personnel.
3-79. Additional TG PATs and military mail terminal teams, with corresponding HR companies and
platoons, could be required if more than one intertheater port of debarkation (POD) is used for RSOI and/or
mail flows. However, with multiple entry points, it may be necessary for initial personnel accountability to
be completed by TG PATs or the deploying units themselves. In this case, the arriving personnel data file
would be passed to the TG PAT at the primary POD.
3-80. The TG PAT mission does not include conducting any other sustainment-related requirements for life
support and RSOI (billeting, feeding, equipping, and transportation of transient personnel). These activities
are conducted by the DSB, sustainment brigade, DSSB, CSSB, or movement control team. For more details,
see FM 1-0. Planning requirements include the number and placement of HR elements and units (to include
bands supporting casualty operations) within a theater of operations. HR support responsibilities for early
entry elements include—
• Initiating and establishing theater personnel accountability and personnel tracking.
• Establishing and operating the theater casualty information center and conducting casualty
operations.
• Establishing, operating, and maintaining a theater personnel database.
• Coordinating and synchronizing the establishment of a military mail terminal to support postal
operations for the theater.
• Estimating intratheater mail movement (usually by ground) between the military mail terminals and
Army post offices.
• Establishing the replacement operations plan.
3-81. The HROB is part of the early entry element of the sustainment brigade SPO, focusing on ensuring TG
PAT personnel are included as part of the early entry element for theater opening and the establishment of
TG PAT support and initial postal support. Early establishment of postal infrastructure during theater opening
or early entry operations limits the requirements for postal restrictions and allows the flow of mail to
commence earlier. The HROB receives technical guidance from the TPOC and higher-level HROBs while
receiving sustainment and execution guidance from the SPO section and the commander.
Legal Support and Religious Support
3-82. Legal support assists commands during competition by providing sound legal advice. Judge advocate
legal services can provide advice on administrative and civil law, contract and fiscal law, military justice,
national security law, and Soldier and Family legal services. Religious support assists the commander in
providing for the free exercise of religion and provides religious, moral, and ethical advice and leadership.
Religious support also advises the commander and staff on religion, ethics, morals, and morale, and their
impact on all aspects of military operations. For additional information see FM 3-84 and FM 1-05.
Band Support
3-83. Army bands support competition by promoting regional stability. Through cultural exchange, bands
are uniquely capable of influencing human behavior and perceptions without ever speaking a word. Army |
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bands support CCDRs by promoting U.S. national interests and building partnerships. Army bands can exert
a low-threat, influential effect when performing in support of the commander’s outreach plan or public and
cultural diplomatic initiatives. Army Bands also provide casualty operations support to HR organizations.
Planning requirements include placement of bands within a theater of operations. See ADP 4-0, ATP 1-0.1,
and ATP 1-19 for more details.
HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT
3-84. HSS capabilities are critical enablers during competition. Army medical personnel provide AHS
support to sustain forces deployed during competition. The HSS mission includes medical treatment (organic
and area support), hospitalization, medical evacuation (including medical regulating), and in coordination
with Army Sustainment, medical logistics (including blood management). The ASCC commander has the
authority to designate command and support relationships to deployed commands to integrate and
synchronize capabilities (such as transportation, engineers, EOD, medical, and logistics) until later enabling
commands arrive in theater. The TMC is responsible for integration, synchronization, coordination, planning,
and execution of AHS support to the deployed force.
3-85. Essential AHS support tasks during competition and crisis include the provision of support to stability
efforts (which include global health engagements), home station medical activities, and generation of medical
capabilities. AHS support operations during competition are executed with the intent of enhancing
international legitimacy and gaining multinational cooperation to mitigate conditions that could lead to a
crisis. Therefore, AHS support to stability operations are critical to mission success throughout the phases of
conflict. Regional health threat assessments, regional medical infrastructure assessments, building partner
medical capacity, establishment/maintenance of support agreements, and other AHS support activities to set
the theater provide the foundation for planning, sustaining, and achieving effective medical support to the
theater campaign plan.
3-86. AHS support activities identified for planning and coordination to set the theater are implemented and
executed during competition. The TMC, MEDBDE (SPT), and their subordinate units provide AHS support
to theater opening, RSOI of early entry forces, integration of joint and multinational medical capabilities for
establishment and execution of the joint trauma system, and global health engagements and other stability
operations in support of security cooperation and deterrence missions to build partner medical capacity,
which promotes regional stability. Other key AHS activities during competition include the provision of AHS
support for medical maintenance and execution of medical support agreements, home station medical
readiness and training activities, force tailoring for generation of medical capabilities, providing Army
operational medical support to other Services and unified action partners, as well as assessment of theater
APS and other medical logistics support. Efforts are also made to identify capability gaps and determine fills.
3-87. The role of Army Medicine in support of the CCMD is to preserve fighting strength by providing
medically ready forces and trained, ready, and rapidly deployable medical forces. Preserving fighting strength
also focuses on maximizing the number of troops available for employment by preventing or mitigating
health threats, maximizing return to duty rates, minimizing morbidity and mortality, and clearing the
battlefield to enable freedom of movement. To accomplish these tasks, Army Medicine leverages the surgeon
sections (staff channel) at each echelon and medical command and control channels to integrate AHS with
Army sustainment staffs (S-4 and G-4) and commands (TSC, ESC, and sustainment brigade) in support of
U.S. national objectives, the CCDR’s theater campaign plan, and the Unified Command Plan across the full
range of military operations.
3-88. Medical staff channels (surgeon sections) conduct integration, coordination, synchronization, and
planning of AHS support with sustainment staff (S-4 and G-4). The chain of medical commanders executes
AHS support to established plans. Starting with the Surgeon General, the surgeon sections at each echelon
identify, assess, counter and/or mitigate health threats throughout the range of military operations. The
surgeon sections with sustainment staff advise commanders on the optimal placement and coordinate use of
medical assets to support operations (for example, forward-positioned forces, APS, and assets in adjacent or
supporting regions).
3-89. During competition, institutional medical organizations within Army Medicine (in coordination with
the Defense Health Agency) conduct home station medical activities to maintain health readiness, support
contingencies, and project medical forces in support of the CCMD. At EAB, organizations without organic |
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medical capabilities receive general support AHS support on an area basis, while organic medical elements
at brigade and below provide direct support to parent units.
SUPPORT TO ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
3-90. Though applicable across the range of military operations, ARSOF support planning and execution
begins during competition below armed conflict. As discussed in Chapter 2, ARSOF sustainment structures
(Ranger support companies, GSBs, and the 528th Sustainment Brigade [Special Operations] [Airborne]) are
lean and unable to provide all sustainment functions required to support ARSOF missions. ARSOF
sustainment structures are designed to perform the following tasks:
• Enable expeditionary ARSOF missions.
• Deploy early and rapidly.
• Fill immediate and critical logistics requirements within organic formations.
• Provide the capability to plug into theater logistics structures to achieve required endurance.
• Tie the ARSOF units to the operational theater support structure.
3-91. ARSOF rely on ASCC logistics structures to provide Service CUL to all Army forces in the operational
area regardless of command structure. ARSOF routinely arrive in the operational area early, execute forcible-
entry operations, and operate independently in small teams. Because of these factors, ASCC sustainment
support to ARSOF is tailored to meet requirements based on the OE.
3-92. For example, a special forces group-led combined joint special operations task force with its organic
GSB cannot simply plug into the distribution network of a single DSB or sustainment brigade and execute
tactical distribution to each of the special forces battalions, companies, and Operational Detachments Alpha.
This is due to the GSB’s lack of organic capability and the fact that special forces groups do not deploy as a
single entity. The GSB often supports a special forces group conducting activities across multiple locations.
For this reason, CUL is required.
3-93. In addition to CUL, ARSOF have requirements for SOF-peculiar equipment that requires supply,
sustainment, and maintenance mechanisms outside of the Army common support structure. SOF-peculiar
sustainment requirements are the responsibility of USASOC and United States Special Operations
Command.
SOF SUPPORT IN UNDEVELOPED THEATERS
3-94. When a SOF unit deploys into an undeveloped theater during competition, it must bring sufficient
resources to survive and operate until it establishes a bare-base support system or makes coordination for
TSC or ESC, host-nation, or third-country support. All SOF units require services pertaining to food, water,
and clothing, as well as medical and personnel needs. Operational project stocks and foreign-nation support
agreements will be utilized as available. A bare-base support system may function from CONUS, afloat
(amphibious shipping or mobile sea bases), or at a third-country support base. The bare-base support system
relies heavily on strategic and tactical airlift or sealift for resupply.
3-95. Deployed SOF units in an undeveloped AO may have to bypass normal logistics support echelons.
These units may maintain direct contact with their parent units or may request a tailored support package
from the 528th Sustainment Brigade (Special Operations) (Airborne) to accompany them into the theater of
operations. The brigade can then request directly from the wholesale logistics system and provide support
and sustainment to the ARSOF units. The brigade may also rely on theater OCS to obtain local support. The
528th Sustainment Brigade (Special Operations) (Airborne) is capable of deploying a tailored brigade
headquarters for command and control of operational-level logistics in support of ARSOF missions until
relieved by ASCC logistics command and control capabilities. The brigade is capable of providing command
and control of Army CSSBs operating in support of ARSOF for up to six months. In practice, the solution
may be some combination of all options.
SOF SUPPORT IN DEVELOPED THEATERS
3-96. In a developed AOR, the ASCC establishes a sustainment structure that provides support to ARSOF.
Pre-positioned war reserve materiel stocks, operational project stocks, and foreign-nation support agreements
may provide support. The logistics force structure of ARSOF has the mechanisms to plug in to all joint and |
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Army sustainment structures required for replenishment operations. Basic life support funding for SOF forces
must be coordinated through financial managers.
3-97. ARSOF elements will require tailored organic ARSOF sustainment capabilities often augmented by
the ASCC or the designated CCMD lead for CUL support. Special operations-peculiar support and services
will be provided by United States Special Operations Command in accordance with Title 10, Section 167.
The nature of the SOF campaign and mission may also require leveraging host-nation, interagency, or
nonstandard logistics capabilities. See ATP 3-05.40 for more information on ARSOF sustainment and FM
6-05 for more information on conventional forces and SOF integration, interoperability, and interdependence.
SECTION III – ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES BY ECHELON
3-98. Sustainment operations during competition differ from sustainment operations during crisis or armed
conflict. For example, sustainment tasks to support military engagement and security cooperation are less
resource intensive than tasks conducted for large-scale combat operations. Regardless of the activities, the
roles of Army organizations do not change. A role is the broad and enduring purpose for which the
organization or branch is established (ADP 1-01).
THEATER ARMY
3-99. The theater Army’s role is ASCC to a CCMD. The theater Army integrates land power within theater
engagement plans and security cooperation activities. Integrating land power requires the theater Army to
train and prepare Army forces for operations and to coordinate training and readiness requirements with
Service force providers. Integrating land power also includes establishing and extending the network,
sustainment infrastructure, and leveraging the intelligence enterprise assets and protection capabilities that
support operations throughout an AOR. The theater Army staff works closely with the TSC to develop plans
to execute sustainment during operations. Together, these staffs apply all the considerations discussed above
to develop the plan, and the TSC executes the plan. Key activities during the planning process are—
• Plan and coordinate sustainment for security cooperation activities such as bilateral and
multinational exercises to improve multinational interoperability and operations.
• Plan and coordinate sustainment for missions to train, advise, and equip foreign forces.
• Provide recommendations to Army representatives negotiating basing and transit rights, establishing
relationships, and formalizing support agreements.
• Participate in OPLAN and concept plan development to include the logistics supportability analysis
and provide logistics estimates to interagency partners.
3-100. During competition, the theater Army supports the CCMD in conducting missions, tasks, and actions
that shape the environment to assure friends, deter adversaries, and establish conditions for future
contingencies. To accomplish this, the theater Army, as the ASCC, executes CCDR daily operational
requirements while training and preparing for future contingency operations.
3-101. Executing operational requirements prepares the ASCC to rapidly transition to conflict should the
CCDR identify an increased threat and an operational requirement in an AOR. Well in advance of any
conflict, the theater Army ensures the ARFOR or joint force land component commander (JFLCC) targeting
desires are documented for future inclusion on the resulting joint target list, restricted target list, and no-strike
list.
3-102. Should the CCDR identify a potential crisis, the theater Army examines a range of basing and
deployment options. When the CCDR decides on specific deterrent options, the theater Army begins the
process of recommending, requesting, and tailoring landpower. This is done while refining plans for the full
employment of landpower should deterrence fail to resolve the crisis.
3-103. As soon as feasible, Army forces attached to the theater deploy and the theater Army receives, stages,
and integrates additional Army forces into an AO. To accomplish this, the theater Army develops additional
basing requirements. As Army forces deploy into a JOA, the theater Army expands its footprint to sustain
and protect Army, joint, and multinational forces as directed by the CCDR. Functions executed by the theater
Army include, but are not limited to—
• Executing CCDR’s daily operational requirements: |
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▪ Provide Army support to other Services.
▪ Conduct theater security cooperation.
▪ Assess and develop infrastructure.
▪ Develop concept and operation plans.
• Setting and maintaining the theater.
• Setting and supporting operational areas:
▪ Conduct RSOI.
▪ Provide sustainment support in an operational area.
THEATER SUSTAINMENT COMMAND
3-104. The TSC concentrates on strategic and operational-level sustainment support and management. When
directed, the TSC provides lead service sustainment and executive agency support for designated logistics
and services to other government agencies, multinational forces, and nongovernmental organizations. The
TSC has four operational responsibilities to forces in theater:
• Theater opening – The ability to establish and operate ports of debarkation (air, sea, and rail), to
establish a distribution system and sustainment bases, and to facilitate throughput for reception,
staging, and onward movement of forces within a theater of operations (ADP 4-0).
• Theater distribution – The flow of personnel, equipment, and materiel within theater to meet the
geographic combatant commander’s mission (JP 4-09).
• Sustainment – The provision of logistics, financial management, personnel services, and health
service support necessary to maintain operations until successful mission completion (ADP 4-0).
• Theater closing – The process of redeploying Army forces and equipment from a theater, the
drawdown and removal or disposition of Army non-unit equipment and materiel, and the transition
of materiel and facilities back to host nation or civil authorities (ADP 4-0).
3-105. The TSC simultaneously plans and synchronizes sustainment operations for theater security
cooperation activities (which include security assistance, joint and multinational exercises, security force
assistance, civil-military operations) and large-scale combat operations.
3-106. The theater petroleum and water group, normally attached to the TSC, operates within the AOR for
distribution of petroleum in the theater. Embedded within the theater Army are staff elements which provide
oversight of petroleum and water supply, storage, reporting, and health safety within the AOR. The G-3 is
responsible for developing the theater Army concept of operations, which will drive fuel requirements. The
G-4 staff is the primary staff concerned with petroleum and water requirements determination.
3-107. The Theater Petroleum Center or petroleum liaison detachments may be assigned or attached to the
theater Army G-4 to support planning and operations at the theater level. The Theater Petroleum Center
serves as the senior Army petroleum advisor to the CCMDs. It provides strategic through operational
planning support to CCMDs, the theater Army, corps, and TSC. It also conducts liaison support with DLA
Energy, the Army Petroleum Center, the joint petroleum office, subarea petroleum office, and other partners
as needed. For additional information, see ATP 4-43.
3-108. Planners use the understanding of an OE and situational understanding developed during the execution
of shaping activities to develop and refine OPLANs as conditions change in various operational areas. For
example, a TSC review of an OPLAN could reveal that a planned port or designated supply route is
inadequate for large-scale combat operations. The TSC forwards a recommended alternative to the ASCC
headquarters.
3-109. The ASCC G-1 is the senior Army HR representative/advisor in the theater. The G-1’s primary
function is to plan and prioritize HR support to assure a unity of purpose and effort that maximizes the
readiness and operational capabilities of forces within the theater. The TSC ensures HR organizations
(military mail terminal, TG PAT, HR company) execute their HR missions in accordance with the policies,
priorities, and timelines established by the ASCC G-1/AG. Refer to FM 1-0 for specific roles and
responsibilities.
3-110. The TSC G-8 is the senior resource management adviser to the TSC commander. The TSC G-8’s
focus is on TSC-specific (internal) resource management support, which is identifying, acquiring, |
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distributing, and certifying funds in accordance with the TSC’s four operational responsibilities and the
commander’s priorities.
3-111. In the DMC, the finance operations center is externally focused on the AOR in concert with the overall
sustainment support operation, ensuring that finance contributes to the desired effects of the supported
commander. The finance operations center plans current and future operations, and coordinates, integrates,
and assesses emplacement and operations of finance units executing disbursing and payment support. The
finance operations center is the key linkage between the strategic support from the United States Army
Financial Management Command to the theater distribution network and finance units executing the financial
management concept of operations. The finance operations center also advises the ASCC G-8 and TSC G-8s
on the status of theater finance operations.
EXPEDITIONARY SUSTAINMENT COMMAND
3-112. The ESC is the expeditionary command for joint logistics. Normally, the ESC is task-organized to the
TSC based upon the requirements of the operation. The ESC, when assigned as a subordinate element of the
TSC, supports the deployed force while the TSC maintains AOR-wide focus. The ESC concentrates on
synchronizing operational-level sustaining operations to meet the day-to-day and projected operational
requirements of the supported force. It accomplishes this, in part, by establishing mid-range and short-range
planning horizons derived from the supported commander’s OPLAN, commander’s intent, commander’s
critical information requirements, tempo, and distribution system capacity. The expeditionary capability of
ESCs becomes critical when multiple JTFs operate in an AOR. The ESC attached to a TSC has two
operational responsibilities to forces in theater:
• Synchronize and integrate sustainment support for a JFC or JTF within a JOA.
• Support reception, staging, and onward movement within a JOA.
SET THE THEATER
3-113. Setting the theater is continuous and is conducted as part of competition for contingency or crisis
response operations. Set the theater describes the broad range of activities conducted to establish the
conditions in an operational area for the execution of strategic plans. The CCDR has overall responsibility
for this activity but executes many responsibilities through the TSC of the ASCC. The purpose of setting a
theater is to establish favorable conditions for the rapid execution of military operations and the support
requirements for a specific OPLAN during crisis or conflict.
3-114. Setting the theater involves all of the warfighting functions:
• The focus of the command and control warfighting function is the organization and the command
and control of forces to accomplish missions. The ASCC tailors and controls Army forces in the
AOR. The TSC provides command and control of assigned and attached sustainment forces in the
AOR.
• The movement and maneuver warfighting function focuses on mobilization, deployment,
employment, and redeployment of forces. The ASCC conducts theater opening and is responsible
for RSOI of Army forces. The TSC provides TACON for movement of Army forces into theater,
conducts RSOI, and provides command and control for theater distribution.
• The intelligence warfighting function focuses on planning, collecting, producing, and disseminating
intelligence. The ASCC provides Army intelligence capabilities to support CCMD operations. Part
of that intelligence support is setting the theater from an intelligence perspective that is bigger than
supporting sustainment operations (see FM 2-0). Supporting theater sustainment intelligence
requirements is a significant and complex mission. The TSC G-2 directs, plans, collects, and
disseminates intelligence to subordinate units to meet theater sustainment intelligence requirements.
However, the TSC G-2 also depends on the intelligence enterprise and the theater intelligence
architecture for access to timely, relevant, accurate, and predictive intelligence.
• The fires warfighting function plans and directs Army fires in coordination with joint fires.
Sustainment supports joint and Army fires.
• The protection warfighting function focuses on establishing measures that make Army forces hard
to detect. The ASCC is responsible for protection of Army forces in the AOR. Sustainment plans,
coordinates, and executes protection plans for sustainment forces. |
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3-115. Setting the theater during competition (from a sustainment perspective) involves actions to provide
sustainment (logistics, financial management operations, personnel services, and HSS) to SOF, security force
assistance brigades, military engagements, and security cooperation. It also involves conducting sustainment
preparation of the OE and other activities in support of daily Title 10 requirements, contingency operations,
and crisis response operations.
3-116. The ASCC conducts theater sustainment analysis as part of setting the theater. This analysis begins
during competition and continues during crisis. This analysis identifies risk in terms of access, capabilities,
and capacities across the AOR. It consists of the actions taken by sustainment planners to optimize means
(force structure, resources, and strategic lift) for supporting the command's plan. These actions include
identifying and preparing ISBs and forward operating bases, selecting and improving LOCs, forecasting and
building operational stock assets forward and afloat, and designing a distribution and automatic information
technology network and infrastructure for the theater. Sustainment preparation of the OE is part of setting
the theater and identifies potential risks in terms of access, infrastructure capabilities, and capacities in theater
so planners can develop alternatives and mitigating measures. Logistics planners use the sustainment
preparation of the OE analysis to optimize the distribution system.
3-117. The theater campaign plan is the CCDR's vehicle for operationalizing the theater strategy. It provides
a framework within which the CCDR conducts security cooperation activities and military engagement with
regional partners through cooperative security and development. A theater campaign plan's main function is
to provide guidance to coordinate steady-state components of contingency planning by conducting security
cooperation activities across the AOR.
3-118. The theater Army develops the force structure required to support the theater campaign plan. The
theater Army requests Army forces and the resources required to support them. These resources include
required sustainment capabilities. The theater Army, in conjunction with the sustainment command (TSC or
ESC), provides support to forces participating in exercises to support the theater security cooperation plan,
designs effective and efficient movement plans for land forces into and out of the theater of operations, and
also requests forces to support ongoing Army responsibilities for sustainment.
3-119. Sustainment support to setting the theater involves theater opening and receiving initial forces,
equipment, and supplies, assembling them into mission-tailored units, and transporting them to their final
destination. LOGCAP ensures a rapid response to emerging crises. The Army should also utilize HNS to the
maximum extent possible to give sustainment units time to close in theater. The Army places set the theater
as a priority and provides for holistic operational planning across the Army's strategic roles. LOGCAP
planners are placed at the ASCC, TSC, and corps with LOGCAP decision authority residing at the ASCC.
3-120. Set the theater activities during competition may also include establishing a distribution network,
identifying local procurement requirements, employing the TG PAT, and setting the conditions for medical
operations. The broad range of set the theater activities also includes the synchronization and integration of
sustainment through the establishment of boards, bureaus, centers, cells, and working groups. For more
information on set the theater activities, see JP 3-31, ADP 3-0, ADP 4-0, FM 1-0, FM 3-0, FM 3-94, FM
1-06, ATP 3-93, and ATP 4-10.
3-121. Establishing the distribution network is a complex joint effort. The CCDR typically establishes a
JDDOC. It is an integral component of the CCDR's staff, normally under the staff supervision of the CCMD
J-4. A JDDOC may be co-located with the DMC. Some initial tasks of the JDDOC include—
• Monitoring airlift and sealift flow.
• Providing movement control of arriving supplies, personnel, equipment, and units.
• Establishing theater-wide capabilities required to meet anticipated transportation and throughput
capacities.
Financial Management Support to Set the Theater
3-122. Financial managers assist commanders with setting the theater by tailoring and projecting financial
management support to the force. Some initial tasks include—
• Identifying funding authority for deployment operations and funding in support of operations, to
include special funding authorities throughout the strategic roles. |
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• Determining the requirement for multiple disbursing station symbol numbers and dispersion
throughout theater.
• Securing initial funding for central funding and cash management operations (for example,
establishing a limited depositary account).
• Establishing financial management policies and procedures to address finance and resource
management operations (for example, cash holding authority and fund certification thresholds).
• Analyzing current banking infrastructure throughout the theater and determining the need to expand
synchronization.
• Identifying the mobility of the financial management distribution network between strategic and
operational echelons for replenishment (strategic lift, surface transportation) in the absence of host-
nation capabilities.
Army Health System Support to Set the Theater
3-123. The TMC is assigned to the ASCC and serves as the medical command responsible for
synchronization and execution of AHS support operations within the AOR. AHS is comprised of force
protection and HSS. The TMC commander coordinates with the ASCC surgeon to provide AHS support
within the AOR. The TMC maintains a regional focus that encompasses the CCDR's entire AOR and is
critical for the successful provision of AHS support to set the theater. The medical commander's ability to
assess host-nation medical capability/capacity and the presence of health threats prevalent in the AOR
facilitates the planning and execution of regional strategies for establishment of the theater joint trauma
system and mitigation of identified threats. The TMC assists the CCDR in maximizing the use of scarce
medical resources, shaping the security environment by building partner medical capacity and alleviating
health conditions that impact U.S. military forces and multinational partners, and particular challenges faced
by the host nation. Efforts must also be made to understand the roles and responsibilities of all agencies
involved (to include the Department of State, World Health Organization, partner nations, and others) for
integration and synchronization of all medical capabilities in the region. The TMC also provides AHS support
to set the theater through synchronization, coordination, planning, and integration of strategic medical
capabilities from the U.S. sustaining base. It also provides support through global health engagements,
establishing and maintaining medical support agreements, deploying medical technical expertise for
consultation services and other support, military medical training exercises, and other tasks that include—
• Executing AHS support to other Services.
• Ensuring adherence to eligibility criteria for treatment in U.S. military MTFs.
• Recommending theater evacuation policy adjustments.
• Providing theater food protection support.
• Coordinating with USTRANSCOM for patient movement plans.
• Ensuring integration and interoperability of theater medical capabilities.
• Providing AHS support to foreign humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
• Conducting medical preparation of the OE.
• Maximizing use of host-nation medical capabilities.
• Establishing and executing occupational and environmental health surveillance programs and
countermeasures.
• Coordinating with the National Center for Medical Intelligence, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, and other strategic partners for identification and mitigation of regional health threats.
• Coordinating and planning for AHS support to—
▪ Noncombatant evacuation operations.
▪ Detention operations.
▪ RSOI and theater opening.
▪ Large-scale casualty producing events.
▪ Other Services.
FIELD ARMY
3-124. When constituted, field armies assist the theater Army commander and JFCs with posturing the joint
and multinational force for armed conflict. They do so by relieving the theater Army from day-to-day
command and control of Army forces operating in an AOR and by executing competition tasks within the |
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overall framework established by the CCMD and the theater Army. They provide JFCs with a land
component command capability for the transition to large-scale ground combat. This enables the theater
Army to focus on theater-level matters and allows it to synchronize competition and preparation for combat
activities across the entire AOR.
3-125. During competition, the field army can deter threats and prepare to transition to large-scale combat
operations when the risk for immediate, multi-corps, large-scale combat is high. With joint force
augmentation, the field army may also serve as the JFLCC during competition.
3-126. The field army, when employed, focuses on deterrence and setting conditions for contingency
operations should the adversary attack or the decision be made to initiate armed conflict. While the theater
Army continues to shape the entire theater and address aggression outside this designated AO, the field army
maintains the necessary formations and capabilities to provide credible deterrence and ensure the ability to
quickly respond to escalation within the AO. The field army can conduct a land-based campaign against the
adversary on behalf of the CCDR and, due to its presence, is postured to transition to a JTF headquarters
should conflict arise. The field army is also tailored in its capability and capacity as determined by the nature
and capabilities of the near-peer adversary. As the near-peer adversary’s capabilities change, so do those of
the field army. The following are key activities during the planning process:
• Prepare for potential armed conflict by conducting detailed analysis of critical adversary systems in
conjunction with partners.
• Conduct an aggressive campaign of competition to counter and contain the near-peer threat as an
integral part of the theater campaign.
• Maintain the necessary formations and other capabilities to provide credible deterrence.
• Utilize dispersion, hardened facilities, deception, and multidomain obscuration to create protected
positions of advantage.
3-127. The ESC attached to the field army simultaneously plans and synchronizes operations for field army
security cooperation activities, including joint and multinational exercises, flexible deterrence operations,
and operations during armed conflict in multiple operational areas. The ESC attached to a field army has two
operational responsibilities to forces in theater:
• Synchronize and integrate sustainment support for the field army.
• Support reception, staging, and onward movement within the field army AO.
CORPS
3-128. Army units at the corps and lower echelons execute shaping tasks and provide the forces for security
cooperation. Army forces may support foreign internal defense or security force assistance by participating
in multinational exercises, medical and other civil-military operations, development assistance, and training
exchanges. Army forces at corps echelons and below directly engage with partner forces. Civil affairs forces
engage with governmental and nongovernmental organizations and civilian populations to accomplish their
mission, build rapport, and improve conditions to promote stability.
3-129. When uncommitted to specific CCDR requirements, the corps serves as a tactical echelon that focuses
on preparation to prevail in large-scale combat. When committed to a theater of operations, the theater Army
or field army command and controls corps unless the corps is OPCON to a JFC subordinate to the CCDR. In
such cases, the theater Army maintains an ADCON relationship with the corps due to its theater-wide
ARFOR responsibilities.
3-130. During competition, the corps shapes its assigned AO depending on the role that it is fulfilling. As an
ARFOR, the corps assists higher echelons in their efforts to set, support, and shape operational areas. Corps
do so by executing operational-level tasks, collecting information, providing bottom-up refinement to
planning, and participating in activities to posture the joint and multinational force to prevail in the event that
armed conflict occurs.
3-131. The CSC participates in multinational exercises and supports readiness of corps units at home station.
It may be tasked to support specific shaping operations if the scope of the operation and the command and
control and distribution/materiel management requirements warrant a sustainment command presence. This
may become important in multinational exercises or large-scale humanitarian assistance operations. |
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DIVISION
3-132. Division headquarters are often tasked to be the primary interface for the Army with various unified
action partners during competition. When regionally aligned, a division with a tailored package of its
subordinate brigades and other enablers from both Active and Reserve Components is allocated to a CCDR
to help execute that CCDR’s theater campaign plan.
3-133. Divisions provide trained and ready forces and echelons of command and control in support of
exercises or training events with the intent to shape the security environment, improve mutual understanding,
and improve interoperability with treaty partners or potential coalition partners. Due to the limited scale and
short duration of violence, a division usually serves as a tactical headquarters, joint force or multinational
force land component command, and, if required, as a JTF headquarters or ARFOR. While most U.S. military
engagement and security cooperation typically takes place in the echelons below brigade, there are multiple
exercises where a division is used to assist in command and control or sustainment activities. These exercises
support military engagement and security cooperation efforts in critical theaters.
3-134. During competition activities, the DSB synchronizes and integrates sustainment operations for the
division which include security cooperation activities and exercises. The DSB participates in multinational
exercises and supports readiness of division units at home station. DSBs may be aligned to a specific country
for partnership. If so, DSBs are task organized based on the sustainment command’s deliberate analysis of
requirements to support the CCDR’s mission. Regionally assigned and aligned sustainment forces train and
work together with partner nations in an effort to better understand each other’s capabilities and operating
procedures. These relationships are critical to establishing agreements and contacts that will mutually benefit
both countries.
CONSOLIDATION OF GAINS DURING COMPETITION
3-135. Army forces continuously consolidate gains to maintain an OE that is advantageous to U.S. strategic
interests. Examples of consolidating gains during competition range from transportation system
improvements (including ports, airfields, and rail lines of communications), increasing theater supply stocks,
intelligence cooperation, and providing Army medical personnel to support CCMD humanitarian and civic
assistance activities. Army forces contributing to foreign humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts
with allies and partners help cement existing international relationships or set conditions for new ones in
other places.
3-136. Army sustainment forces play a key role in consolidating gains during competition. Sustainment
forces often times are key contributors to the examples listed in in the preceding paragraph. Sustainment
forces that maintain presence or support relationships reinforce confidence between allies and partner nations.
Providing security, food, water, shelter, and medical treatment to the population are stability tasks that enable
consolidation of gains and help ambassadors, country teams, and JFCs maintain influence and cooperation
with allies and partners as they pursue mutually beneficial objectives.
TRANSITION TO CRISIS AND ARMED CONFLICT
3-137. A transition from competition to crisis and armed conflict can occur rapidly with little notice or
forewarning. Transitions are complex and unpredictable and responses to a transition may lead to differing
perceptions of what has taken place. Decisions made before and during the initial stages of a crisis or armed
conflict have significant impact on the decisions made by adversaries and the ultimate outcome of a particular
situation. Sustainment forces and their leaders must be prepared to anticipate and respond to crisis and
conflicts in the OE. |
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Sustainment Operations During Crisis
This chapter provides an overview of Army operations during crisis. This chapter discusses
sustainment planning considerations, considerations for forcible entry operations, and
describes roles and responsibilities of organizations for sustainment operations by echelon
during crisis.
SECTION I – OVERVIEW OF ARMY OPERATIONS DURING CRISIS
4-1. A crisis is an emerging incident or situation involving a possible threat to the United States, its citizens,
military forces, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic,
or military importance that commitment of military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national
and/or strategic objectives importance that commitment of military forces and resources is contemplated to
achieve national objectives (JP 3-0). A crisis may be the result of adversary actions or indicators of imminent
action, or it may be the result of natural or human disasters. During a crisis, opponents are not yet using lethal
force as the primary means for achieving their objectives, but the situation potentially requires a rapid
response by forces prepared to fight to deter further aggression. When directed, the Army provides a JFC
with capabilities to help deter further provocation and sufficient combat power to maintain or reestablish
conventional deterrence.
4-2. Crisis response operations are characterized by actions to protect friendly forces and indicate the intent
to execute subsequent phases of a planned operation. With the transition from shaping to deterrence, the
theater Army shifts to refining contingency plans and preparing estimates for landpower based on CCDR
guidance.
ARMY SUPPORT TO THE JOINT FORCE DURING CRISIS
4-3. The military supports unified action partners during crisis by providing flexible deterrent and response
options. A flexible deterrent option (FDO) is a planning construct intended to facilitate early decision making
by developing a wide range of interrelated responses that begin with deterrent-oriented actions carefully
tailored to create a desired effect.
4-4. A flexible response option (FRO) is a military capability specifically task organized for effective reaction
to an enemy threat or attack and adaptable to the existing circumstances of a crisis. FDOs and FROs occur
across the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power. They are most
effective when integrated and implemented in a simultaneous manner.
4-5. FDOs are preplanned, deterrence-oriented actions carefully tailored to bring an issue to early resolution
without armed conflict, and they can be initiated before or after unambiguous warning of threat action.
Examples of Army contributions to joint FDOs include—
• Command and control headquarters—establishment of a field army or deployment of a corps or
division.
• Deploying a security force assistance brigade to establish liaison capability or conduct security force
assistance.
• Building or expanding infrastructure and increasing sustainment capacity to facilitate RSOI.
4-6. FROs can be employed in response to aggression by adversaries, and they are intended to facilitate early
decision making by developing a wide range of actions carefully tailored to produce desired effects. Army
contribution examples to joint FROs include—
• Airborne or air assault units positioned to conduct joint forcible entry.
• A maneuver brigade drawing APS.
• Port opening to receive the joint force.
• Multi-domain task force to respond to adversary antiaccess and area denial activities.
• SOF to conduct foreign internal defense, direct action, or special reconnaissance. |
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FORCE PROJECTION
4-7. The demonstrated ability to project Army forces into an operational area is an essential element of
conventional deterrence. Army forces depend upon joint lift capabilities for deployment. Force projection is
the ability to project the military instrument of national power from the United States or another theater in
response to requirements for military operations (JP 3-0).
4-8. Force projection is particularly important during crisis, as Army forces have an unknown amount of time
to shape a developing situation. It can occur, however, in any context. Forces projected forward during
competition to conduct exercises, bolster allies and partners, and conduct other activities are under
observation. Adversaries assess the speed and efficiency of these routine deployments, which can have a
deterrent effect. Given the fluid nature of a crisis, force projection may continue well after a crisis has
transitioned to armed conflict. Force projection includes—
• Opening the theater.
• Mobilization
• Deployment.
• Initial employment of forces.
• Sustainment.
• Redeployment.
OPENING THE THEATER
4-9. During the transition to crisis or armed conflict, Army forces open the theater to receive deploying
forces. Army forces execute existing plans to establish and open air, sea, and rail terminals. Distribution
systems and ISBs may be established where required. Higher echelon (including theater, corps, and division
enablers) and rapidly deployable command and control elements begin to integrate with host-nation forces
as quickly as possible to set the conditions for RSOI of follow-on tactical forces. This includes coordination
with the forces of other supporting nations to assure effective distribution of services, facilities, and supplies
to all deploying units across the alliance or coalition. During theater opening, designated arriving forces draw
available APS. This provides the JFC with increased capacity and capability during the initial stages of a
crisis or armed conflict. Army forces must be prepared for combat while conducting theater opening
operations. The first deploying units require the capability to defend themselves while they provide reaction
time and maneuver space for follow-on forces.
MOBILIZATION
4-10. Mobilization is the process by which the Armed Forces of the United States, or part of them, are brought
to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency (JP 4-05). This includes activating all or part of
the Reserve Components, as well as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and equipment. See JP
4-0 for additional information on mobilization.
DEPLOYMENT
4-11. Deployment is the movement of forces into and out of an operational area (JP 3-35). How the JFC
intends to employ forces is the foundation of the deployment structure and timing. For example, a JFC may
deploy a combat-ready maneuver brigade or division early in a crisis to stabilize a situation or secure ports
for follow-on forces, accepting risks to the movement efficiency of follow-on forces. Corps and division
staffs examine all deployment possibilities and conduct parallel planning.
INITIAL EMPLOYMENT OF FORCES
4-12. The initial employment of Army forces during a crisis will most likely be as part of FDOs or FROs.
This employment may represent the opening stages of a joint operation or a show of force demonstration.
The objective of this early employment is to deter an adversary from further aggression, expand the theater
to receive follow-on Army and joint forces, and form a credible defense with host-nation forces to prevent
adversary gains. |
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SUSTAINMENT
4-13. Sustainment is central to force projection, and sustainment preparation of an OE is the basis for
sustainment planning. Corps, division, and brigade planners focus on identifying the resources available in
an operational area for use by friendly forces and ensuring access to them. There is no fundamental difference
in sustainment preparation of an OE during competition, crisis, or armed conflict, except that sustainment
activities intensify as Army forces respond to crisis and prepare for armed conflict.
REDEPLOYMENT
4-14. Redeployment is the transfer or rotation of forces and materiel to support another commander’s
operational requirements, or to return personnel, equipment, and materiel to the home and/or demobilization
stations for reintegration and/or out-processing (JP 3-35).
SECTION II – OVERVIEW OF SUSTAINMENT ACTIVITIES DURING CRISIS
4-15. Sustainment of operations during crisis requires a force array tailored to the type of operation,
geographic location, permissiveness of the environment, threat, and a host of other considerations determined
during the planning phase of competition. Commanders must also consider possible sequels and branches
during planning to ensure optimal command and support relationships are established and the right mix of
forces are identified for potential follow-on operations. The phased arrival of Army sustainment forces will
require planners to integrate non-Army solutions, including ACSAs and OCS, to enable the rapid deployment
of combat forces.
4-16. The ASCC is responsible for all Army operations, to include receiving forces, sustaining forces, and
preparing to redeploy forces. The ASCC also interacts with theater strategic and operational commands and
organizations essential to the theater distribution network.
4-17. Establishing a host-nation coordination center is a means to enhance stability and interaction between
nations. The lead element for the coordination center is security cooperation (G-9), with representation from
the logistics and medical (G-4, Surgeon), financial management (finance operations center or finance support
center), engineer, and G-3 sections, host-nation representatives, Department of State, and any other
governmental agencies or non-governmental organizations as required. A multinational command, especially
one that operates under a parallel command structure, establishes a coordination center during the shape role
of an operation. It organizes and controls functional areas including logistics and civil-military operations. A
coordination center is the initial focal point for support issues such as force sustainment, medical support,
infrastructure engineering, HNS, and movement control. As a multinational force matures, the center’s role
includes activities such as force provision or force deployment. When a coordination center is activated,
member nations provide action officers who are familiar with its activities. Multinational forces are
encouraged to maintain contact with parent headquarters. For more information, see FM 3-16.
4-18. Establishing a civil-military operations center enables military forces and indigenous populations to
synchronize, coordinate, and enable interorganizational cooperation and to achieve unified action. It is
designed to share information, identify and distribute resources, and assist in the execution of civil affairs
operations and civil-military operations. It can also play a role in planning future operations by integrating
with stabilization-focused departments, agencies, and organizations. The civil-military operations center is
usually in the best position to engage with the civil component on behalf of the G-4 or S-4 for utilization of
local resources. Such resources may include water, energy, food, ports, roads, and other resources to sustain
the force. For more information, see FM 3-57.
4-19. Assessment of sustainment preparation of the OE and sustainment analysis while conducting operations
during crisis are key activities for sustainers. The outcomes of sustainment preparation of the OE are informed
OPLANs and TPFDD. The data also aids in identifying capabilities and capacities needed to successfully
transition from crisis to operations in support of armed conflict or going back to a state of competition. It is
during crisis operations that plans and estimates are refined, the theater distribution network is expanded, and
actions are taken to deploy forces as required. |
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REFINING PLANS AND DEVELOPING ESTIMATES
4-20. The CCMD, in coordination with the Service components and DLA, continues to refine its mission
analysis and logistics estimates to identify joint logistics requirements and continue to set the theater. Actions
may include—
• Changes in inventory positioning (for example, locations and quantities).
• Contract reviews for appropriate surge clauses and operational contingency zones.
• Market research to identify local procurement opportunities.
• Discussions with industrial base partners regarding production capacities.
• Identification of potential acquisition policy waivers that may be required.
• Close coordination with the Services on readiness rates and critical weapon systems.
• A review of unit personnel fill rates and requirements needed to support additional personnel.
• A readiness review of DLA deployable capabilities. DLA may provide additional liaison officers or
deploy a DLA assessment team with forward deployed units to coordinate support.
4-21. The TSC, ESC, CSC, DSB, and sustainment brigade refinement of sustainment plans and estimates is
a continuous process and essential to mission success and risk reduction. Sustainment planners will continue
to conduct detailed analysis and assessment to update support requirements and availability of resources
based on the ever-changing OE. These estimates are provided to the CCMD and interagency partners for
planning purposes. The availability of commercial support will play a particularly important role during the
early stages of crisis operations and may change rapidly due to enemy activity or host-nation policy.
LOGISTICS ESTIMATION
4-22. Sustainers employ tools such as the Operational Logistics Planner that produce class of supply
consumption estimates for units at all levels. Command Post Computing Environment, Mercury Application,
Operational Logistics Planner and the Quick Logistics Estimation Tool enable staffs at all echelons to
estimate mission requirements for all Class I, II, III (bulk and packaged), IV, V, VI (including mail), VII,
VIII, and IX as well as water and ice for their units. It also provides an analysis of the estimated transportation
assets needed to get the supplies to the units. These tools use the latest Army-approved planning rates and
force structures. Units can be customized to add or remove equipment and personnel. Additionally,
sustainment planners use the Army Water Planning Guide for water support operations. For additional
information, see Appendix D.
CASUALTY ESTIMATION AND REPLACEMENT REQUIREMENTS
4-23. The Army G-1 is the functional proponent for overall casualty estimation (killed in action, captured,
missing in action, wounded in action, and disease and non-battle injury) and must coordinate closely with
the Army Surgeon General for Army evacuated rates in support of projected manning requirements.
Replacement requirements consist of the killed in action and evacuated Soldiers not return-to-duty, prisoner
of war, and missing in action. Casualty estimation is conducted at ASCC level and above as part of the
planning process for contingency operations and approved by the CCDR.
4-24. The Director of Military Personnel Management, Army G-1 has designated the Medical Planners’
Toolkit as the casualty estimation tool of record for EAB Army HR planners. The Medical Planners’ Toolkit
integrates several tools, including the Casualty Rate Estimation Tool, which provides the capability for
planners to calculate the combat and noncombat injuries and illnesses that would be expected during military
operations. Casualty estimates can be generated for ground combat, ship attacks, fixed facilities, and natural
disasters. The Casualty Rate Estimation Tool-generated patient streams are based on the casualty estimate
and the user-selected Patient Condition Occurrence Frequency distribution.
4-25. Close coordination with the SPO officers in ESCs, CSCs, DSBs, and sustainment brigades is required
to ensure HR planners are properly synchronized with logistics and medical planners. Casualty estimates
support operations planning, future force planning, and staff training. Casualty estimation and replacement
requirements should be planned during course of action development to assess force strength for missions
within the concept of operations and scheme of maneuver. This allows for establishing communications and
electronic interface for personnel accountability and patient tracking early and enables timely and accurate
information, especially during large-scale combat operations. |
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4-26. Mass casualties must be included in the planning process, as well as processing large-scale
replacements. Mass casualty is defined as any number of human casualties produced across a period of time
that exceeds available medical support capabilities (JP 4-02). The ASCC G-1 must continuously coordinate
with the corps/divisions for proper personnel replacement flow in theater with allocated personnel
replacement seats in the TPFDD. During large-scale combat operations, the Army’s theater planners may
anticipate a sustained percentage of casualties each day. The percentage of casualties per day will be based
on the total number of deployed forces. These casualties will vary in severity of injury and represent killed
in action, wounded in action, and disease and non-battle injuries. Army HR planners should anticipate having
to replace the total casualties killed in action, captured, missing in action, wounded in action, and disease and
non-battle injury. Army medical planners should anticipate having to support the total casualties that are
wounded in action and disease and non-battle injuries.
Note. Medical is responsible for wounded in action and disease and non-battle injuries.
Sustainment is responsible for killed in action.
4-27. The ASCC G-1/AG is responsible for developing personnel replacement requisitions as part of the
deliberate planning process. HRC assists Army commands in developing personnel replacement force
packages by using a reinforcement sourcing process. This process guides collectively trained Soldiers in
crews, teams, or squads to combat in a manner that preserves their morale and fighting spirit, benefiting them
and the units they join. See ADP 4-0, FM 1-0, and ATP 4-93 for more details.
ARMY HEALTH SYSTEM SUPPORT DURING CRISIS
4-28. Army operations during crisis are designed to prevent adversary opportunities to further exploit
positions of relative advantage. AHS support, through synchronization and integration by the TMC, is a
critical asset in the ASCC commander’s mission to prevent/deter the escalation of future combat and
positively impact the wellbeing of the host-nation population. Key AHS activities during crisis include the
provision of medical support to flexible deterrence/response options and setting the theater for possible
escalation. Medical planners continue support to the theater campaign plan and provide medical support to
force projection activities.
4-29. During the transition to crisis, the surgeon sections at each echelon conduct planning refinement,
coordination, synchronization, and integration of AHS support to flexible deterrence/response options. These
options range from mobilization, force tailoring, repositioning forward-stationed medical assets, providing
the medical plan for forces in-transit, and/or employing expeditionary medical assets. Surgeon sections at
EAB derive or refine medical support requirements based on G-1 new or revised casualty estimates and
modify medical plans for capability and capacity sufficiency.
4-30. Surgeon sections at EAB assess, plan, and coordinate medical activities in support of setting the theater
in anticipation of possible expansion of theater operations. This includes continued evaluation of health
threats, leveraging regional medical agreements, and procuring support to expanded medical operations.
Theater-level medical command organizations or agencies, such as Defense Health Agency, continue
conducting home station activities to maintain health readiness, support contingencies, and reassess the
sufficiency of AHS capability generation to support rotational, expeditionary, and escalation force structures
for contingency operations. As required, theater-level medical commanders provide medical support to
enable the RSOI of incoming medical units. The chain of command for forward-positioned, rotational, and
expeditionary operational medical units executes AHS support in accordance with established plans.
MEDICAL PLANNING TOOLS
4-31. The Joint Medical Planning Tool, the Medical Planners' Toolkit, and the Medical Contingency
Requirements Workflow are planning tools approved for calculation of medical requirements. The Joint
Medical Planning Tool and Medical Planners' Toolkit are fully integrated for versatility and enhanced
medical planning efficiency.
4-32. The Joint Medical Planning Tool is a computer-based simulation tool developed by the Naval Health
Research Center. It supports research, medical systems analysis, operational risk assessment, and field
medical services planning. The Joint Medical Planning Tool is based on empirical data, including over 400 |
4-0 | 100 | Chapter 4
patient conditions and their associated medical treatment tasks, times, consumable supplies, and the
equipment necessary to accomplish patient care. It also includes algorithms that calculate died of wounds
due to treatment delay and complications. The Joint Medical Planning Tool spans the spectrum of theater-
based roles of care and emulates all Service MTFs and their respective functional areas, including the number
and type of personnel and the type, speed, and capacity of transportation assets.
4-33. The Medical Planners' Toolkit provides planners an end-to-end solution for medical support planning
across the range of military operations. The Medical Planners' Toolkit combines several tools, the Patient
Conditions Occurrence Frequency tool, the Casualty Rate Estimation Tool, and the Expeditionary Medicine
Requirements Estimator, into a single desktop application. This allows the user to manage the frequency
distribution of probabilities of illness and injury and estimate of casualties in a wide variety of military
scenarios. See JP 4-02, ATP 4-02.55, and ATP 4-02.7 for additional information.
4-34. The Medical Contingency Requirements Workflow is web-based and resides in the unclassified domain
for users to perform Class VIII analysis, run scenarios for contingency supply forecasting, and provide a
variety of theater strategic, operational, and tactical tailorable support through national stock number and
assemblage research capability. Medical Contingency Requirements Workflow also generates materiel item
estimates using clinical treatment protocols supporting military and civilian patient-generating scenarios.
SECTION III – ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES BY ECHELON
THEATER ARMY ROLES DURING CRISIS
4-35. The theater Army commands all Army forces in the AOR until the CCDR attaches selected Army
forces to a subordinate JTF. The theater Army is the lead for RSOI operations for arriving forces. Until
another organization can assume the role, the theater Army initially divides its responsibilities between the
Army component (the ARFOR) in the JOA or theater of operations and Army forces operating in other parts
of the AOR. This may require force tailoring by the theater Army to develop the initial request for forces,
followed by additional task organization as forces arrive in the AOR.
THEATER SUSTAINMENT COMMAND
4-36. The TSC continues to support operations during crisis by conducting set the theater and security
cooperation activities throughout the AOR. The TSC’s priority of effort still focuses on sustaining deployed
forces. If the TSC has an attached ESC, that ESC may focus on select operational activities such as
operational area opening activities, Army support to other Services, and sustaining deployed forces in the
AOR. This division of responsibilities enables the TSC to continue focusing on long-range planning to set
the theater.
4-37. The TSC is responsible for supporting RSOI operations conducted by the theater Army. Effective RSOI
consists of the processes that transform arriving personnel and equipment into forces capable of meeting
operational requirements in accordance with established timelines. During RSOI, Army units are attached
from the supporting commander (usually FORSCOM) to the theater Army. The theater Army task organizes
Army units as TACON to the TSC.
4-38. During crisis, the theater petroleum and water group (in coordination with the supported unit G-4 staff)
continues to refine the petroleum concept of support and begin distribution of petroleum, oils, and lubricants
(POL) and water to forward storage facilities. The theater petroleum and water group staff reviews and refines
fuel consumption estimates and requirements to ensure effective petroleum distribution is available to meet
tactical requirements. Fuel consumption estimates must be accurate in order to develop realistic plans in
support of tactical forces. During crisis operations, POL and water units increase security and quality
surveillance measures to ensure availability and quality of bulk fuel and water to support operational
requirements.
4-39. Risk, uncertainty, operational security, and chance are inherent in all military operations. Sustainment
professionals must seek to understand, balance, and take calculated risks rather than avoid risks to ensure
sustainment of the operational force. Sustainment commanders must assess and mitigate risk continuously
throughout operations. These risk considerations and others should be addressed, and mitigation |
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strategies/alternatives developed as part of the sustainment plan. The following is a list of risk considerations
(not all inclusive) during crisis operations:
• Will the sustainment activities place the tactical plan at risk (for example, provide the enemy with
sufficient information to know the plan)?
• Have risk reduction measures been implemented and operational security measures been established
to mitigate risks to operations? Are there sufficient forces to support combat operations if crisis
operations are not successful?
• Will sustainment activities precipitate transition to armed conflict?
• Are sustainment systems hardened against cyber-attack? How do you validate requirements
received through electronic systems? Does the threat have the capability to change information
verses directed denial of service attacks?
• Is coordination with host nations sufficient to ensure smooth flow into and out of APODs and
SPODs? Have limits of host-nation ports been considered (for example, net explosive weight
limitations and hazmat requirements) and planned to be accommodated?
• Are security measures in place to protect critical resources such as commercial line haul, storage
sites, stocks, caches, and critical infrastructure?
TAILOR ARMY FORCES
4-40. Force tailoring combines two complementary requirements-selecting the right forces and deploying the
forces in the optimal sequence. Much of the effort for selection and deployment order occurs prior to
deploying forces to a theater.
4-41. Throughout the process, sustainment commands work with the theater Army sustainment staff to track
force composition and order of deployment to ensure support is available to sustain the force package. The
right types and number of sustainment units should be integrated early into the force flow.
4-42. Selecting the right force involves identifying, selecting, and sourcing required Army capabilities and
establishing their initial task organization to accomplish the mission. The result is an Army force package
matched to the needs of the CCDR. The theater Army works with force providers (for example, FORSCOM
and USAMC) to match the composition of the force with the forces identified in theater security cooperation
plans or contingency plans. In the deliberate sustainment planning process, it is critical the Center for Army
Analysis analyzes contingency plans and provides battle damage attrition estimates to the theater Army,
TSCs, and USAMC LCMCs to ensure that adequate depot maintenance, calibration, and repair forward
activities support is identified and integrated into the force flow for planning purposes.
4-43. Force tailoring establishes the order of deployment for the force package, given the available lift and
the CCDR's priorities. The organization established in force tailoring is not necessarily the same as the task
organization for combat. It is a macro-level organization established to control the forces through deployment
and RSOI.
4-44. The Army National Guard and the Army Reserve makeup the Army Reserve Components. The Army
National Guard represents Component 2, and the Army Reserve represents Component 3. Together, these
two make up over half of the Army's total force.
4-45. The Army Reserve Components are largely composed of sustainment and maneuver support forces.
Almost 84 percent of the Army's sustainment force structure is in the Army Reserve Components. Army
Reserve sustainment capabilities are essential for the operating force and provide the preponderance of
sustainment, civil affairs, and psychological operations capabilities.
4-46. The Army Reserve Components were not expected to deploy early into an operation. However, as the
OE has changed and the balance of sustainment forces shifted from the Regular Army to the Army Reserves,
Army Reserve Forces maintain higher levels of expeditionary readiness.
RECEPTION, STAGING, ONWARD MOVEMENT, AND INTEGRATION RESPONSIBILITIES
4-47. A critical portion of the deployment process often associated with crisis operations is RSOI. It is this
process that delivers combat power to the JFC in an AOR. RSOI is also a process the Army has not been
challenged with to the extent required for large-scale combat operations in recent history. The increased
challenge will stem from the initial deployment of large forces and will continue with a heavy flow of |
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replacements. Accurate casualty estimates are a critical part of RSOI planning. RSOI goals are to link units
with their equipment while maintaining a balanced flow of supplies, personnel, equipment, and units
consistent with strategic lift capabilities and CCDR priorities.
4-48. Sustainment commands are assigned responsibilities for RSOI operations by the ASCC. The TSC will
normally be assigned the responsibility of RSOI. Subordinate units of the TSC from an ESC, sustainment
brigade, CSSB, down to a movement control team can be assigned specific tasks in support of RSOI. Specific
tasks include feeding, billeting, limited supply, finance, personnel accountability, medical, battlefield
orientation, maintenance, and transportation of replacements to their assigned units. Support for execution of
RSOI is provided by some combination of theater support contracts, external support contracts (primarily
LOGCAP), regionally available commercial HNS, military assets, and Component 2 or 3 units deployed
early. It requires sufficient capabilities and capacity to provide the support required by arriving units at PODs.
For example, heavy vehicle operators and mechanics are required to move and repair vehicles being
downloaded from ships for onward movement. The TSC and/or ESC directs the operation of the theater's
PODs and the AOR distribution networks to minimize bottlenecks that may impede the flow of cargo and
forces into and throughout the theater.
4-49. Effective RSOI consists of the processes that transform arriving personnel and equipment into forces
capable of meeting operational requirements in accordance with established timelines. Army units are
attached from the supporting commander (usually FORSCOM) to the ASCC. The ASCC subsequently passes
TACON of the unit to the sustainment command managing RSOI activities. RSOI is an ongoing series of
four interrelated and overlapping processes that ensure synchronized clearance of nodes and assembly of
combat power that is then rapidly transported to point of need to support operational requirements. Reception
is the process of unloading personnel and equipment from strategic modes of transport, marshaling the
deploying units, transporting them to staging areas, and if required, providing life support. Staging is the
process of rapidly assembling and organizing arriving personnel and equipment into units and force packages
that constitute combat power, and then preparing units and forces for onward movement. Life support is
provided during reception and staging until the unit becomes self-sustaining. Onward movement is the
process of moving combat power and supplies from reception facilities and staging areas to tactical assembly
areas or other locations as designated by the CCDR, moving arriving non-unit personnel and replacements
to gaining commands, and moving arriving sustainment materiel from reception facilities to distribution sites.
The sustainment command then transfers TACON of the units to the gaining JFC or joint functional command
for integration.
4-50. The role of the DSB during RSOI operations is to go through RSOI and then provide support to its
division going through RSOI. The sustainment command responsible for conducting RSOI must consider the
DSB a tactical unit and not part of the RSOI support structure. The DSB must be able to complete the RSOI
process and move forward to a tactical assembly area with its supported division.
4-51. Success of RSOI is measured by force closure. Force closure is the point in time when a supported JFC
determines that sufficient personnel and equipment resources are in the assigned operational area to carry out
assigned tasks. It is essential during RSOI operations that data relating to arriving unit personnel, unit
equipment, contractors, and containers be captured at each point of entry into the theater (for example,
APODs, SPODs, railheads, and border crossings) to facilitate personnel/asset accountability and force
closure reporting. For more information on force projection, see JP 3-35, ATP 3-35, and FM 1-0.
4-52. The execution and support of RSOI requires a complement of various capabilities and units, which
when synchronized and integrated, can efficiently and effectively receive and move forces (personnel and
equipment) to key staging areas for assembly and onward movement while sustaining forces remaining
behind. The optimal mixture of support and enablers tailored to receive forces will minimize the time it takes
for units to maneuver through the RSOI process. Three main nodes/functions (APOD, SPOD, and ISB) are
each slightly different in their makeup, yet connected to each other through the transportation of equipment,
personnel, and materials. The amount of distribution assets on ground during the early phases of conflict
directly correlate to a commander's ability to rapidly transition from crisis operations to large-scale combat
operations. Planners should focus on the early deployment of sustainment assets during crisis. RSOI planners
will need to assess the threat risk as well as mission priority when determining the arrival and integration of
units and enablers executing and supporting RSOI. The most common enablers from Army sustainment
formations required for RSOI are— |
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• Transportation assets: Inland cargo transfer companies for their materiel handling equipment and
vessel offload capabilities, transportation truck companies, heavy equipment transportation
companies for movement of tracked vehicles, and movement control teams for traffic circulation.
• Quartermaster assets: Quartermaster companies for feeding, materiel storage and distribution, POL
companies for fuel storage and distribution.
• Ordnance assets: Modular ammunition company to provide ammunition to units prior to their
onward movement. Maintenance assets augmented by contracted support to maintain vehicle
readiness throughout the process.
• Medical assets: Operational medical units to provide AHS support to units prior to their onward
movement.
• HR assets: Typically located at theater gateways and various intratheater ports of debarkation to
assist with initiating and establishing theater personnel accountability and personnel tracking.
• Financial management assets: Finance units assist arriving units with disbursing and payment
support. Arriving unit resource managers coordinate technical arrangements with the theater Army
G-8 for funding, capturing costs, and reporting requirements.
4-53. In addition to the sustainment capabilities mentioned above, there are other assets that play a vital role
in RSOI. These assets provide additional infrastructure capabilities, security, protection, and command and
control of the RSOI process. EOD personnel provide commanders the ability to quickly respond to explosive
ordnance threat situations as they occur. Military police provide force protection for units conducting RSOI
and convoy escorts for units moving from reception to staging areas. The United States Army Corps of
Engineers can provide infrastructure improvements, establish power grids, and determine power distribution
for APODs, SPODs and ISBs. CBRN capabilities must also be part of the RSOI effort. CBRN reconnaissance
elements will assess for any CBRN hazards, and decontamination elements support contamination mitigation.
These assets must be requested and incorporated early in the flow of forces into theater to support RSOI at
the APODs, SPODs, and ISBs.
INTERMEDIATE STAGING BASE
4-54. An ISB is a temporary location used for staging forces and sustainment and inserting and extracting
forces into and out of an operational area. The ISB is the critical staging area with the focus of assembling
all equipment, containers, and personnel as well as classes of supply (including mail) to support onward
movement for a limited contingency operation.
4-55. ISBs enable the forward staging forces to accomplish tasks and provide support from a location closer
to the contingency operation. To best use ISBs for forcible entry operations, planners can pair those two tasks
with these three purposes: build capacity, conduct intermodal transfer, and disaggregate and aggregate forces.
Sustainment planners should develop contingency plans for the use of multiple ISBs or points of entry into
the JOA, as economic and political situations can rapidly deteriorate and result in the unexpected closure of
bases. For more detailed discussion of ISBs, see JP 3-34, JP 3-35, ATP 3-37.10, and ATP 3-35.
PRINCIPLES OF THEATER DISTRIBUTION
4-56. The principles of distribution include centralized management; optimized infrastructure; maximized
throughput; rapid and precise response; continuous, seamless, two-way flow of resources; and time-definite
delivery. All these principles rely upon solid asset visibility, which enables distribution operations.
Commanders, logistics planners, and logisticians performing theater distribution functions must understand
each of these principles and consider how they are applied when developing strategic, operational, and
tactical plans. See ATP 4-93 for additional information on the principles of theater distribution.
Centralized Management
4-57. Centralized management of the supply and transportation systems is essential for efficient and effective
distribution operations. At the strategic level, USTRANSCOM’s deployment and distribution operations
center provides centralized management of distribution. At the operational and tactical level, the TSC or ESC
DMC provides centralized management of the distribution system. |
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Control
4-58. Control of the distribution system is the focal point of centralized management. Sustainment command
headquarters and staffs control distribution by providing direction and oversight of distribution processes and
flow of materiel. Logisticians performing theater distribution functions exercise control through the
identification of shipments and the monitoring of their location as shipments move through the distribution
system.
Visibility
4-59. Visibility is the ability to see forces and commodities moving within the distribution system. Visibility
includes asset visibility and in-transit visibility. Asset visibility provides situational understanding of the flow
of materiel, including arrival and departure of unit personnel, equipment, and all cargo at all nodes, from
origin to destination on all modes. In-transit visibility provides visibility and near-real-time status on the
movement of all classes of supply.
Capacity
4-60. Capacity includes the measure of personnel and materiel that can move through the distribution system
and the capability of the infrastructure to support a two-way flow of forces and materiel. The theater’s
infrastructure (roadways, sea and aerial ports, warehouses) will determine the capacity of its distribution
system and logistics support framework. Availability of transportation assets, materiel handling equipment,
air and ground transportation, and watercraft determine the capacity of the distribution system to deliver and
accept materiel.
Optimized Infrastructure
4-61. Optimizing the theater infrastructure (roads, railways, waterways, structures, seaports, airports and
open staging areas, other structures, distribution nodes, and warehouses) means synchronizing the movement
of forces and materiel moving over or through the existing infrastructure. Planners must maintain a balance
between distribution capability and the infrastructure capacity to support operations. The available vehicles
(air, ground, and watercraft), sustainment units and personnel (Army and contractor), and assets (physical
and organizational) affect distribution system optimization.
Maximized Throughput
4-62. Throughput refers to the quantity of cargo and passengers that can pass through a port or a
transportation terminal on a daily basis. An efficient distribution system maximizes tonnage, minimizes
handling, and improves velocity using containerization, pallets and flatracks. Maximizing throughput reduces
the surface traffic on the physical network and therefore reduces Soldier risk.
Rapid and Precise Response
4-63. Rapid and precise response is the ability to receive, prioritize, and fill supported unit requests in the
minimum time possible, and in the exact quantity, quality, and point of need requested. The effectiveness of
rapid and responsive distribution can be measured by assessing the following attributes, or key performance
indicators:
• Speed is moving requirements according to priority at the rate that meets “the right time” condition
of distribution.
• Accuracy is delivering requirements while meeting the “right thing” and “right place” conditions of
distribution.
• Continuous, seamless, two-way flow of resources.
• Continuous and seamless pipeline.
Continuous, Seamless, Two-Way Flow of Resources
4-64. The continuous and seamless two-way flow of resources describes the flow of sustainment materiel
and retrograde cargo between the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. It ensures transportation assets |
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are maximized in the delivery of sustainment and in support of retrograde and redeployment activities.
Maximized transportation assets not only increase efficiency but also reduce operational energy consumption
and enables all nodes and modes to operate effectively.
Time-Definite Delivery
4-65. Time-definite delivery is the consistent delivery of requirements at a specified time and destination.
Time definite delivery is ensuring the right materiel is at the required location, in the right quantity, and
within the required timeframe. It is based on the logisticians performing theater distribution functions and
logistics planners anticipating needs to support operational requirements.
DISTRIBUTION NETWORK
4-66. Sustainment commands establish the initial distribution network in the operational area and
synchronize and integrate intratheater deployment and distribution operations. These commands monitor all
segments of the distribution network. The TSC establishes the initial distribution network in the operational
area. The TSC synchronizes and integrates intratheater deployment and distribution operations. The TSC
manages the strategic-to-operational links of the global distribution network. This includes the segment of
the distribution network that begins at the strategic source of support and extends to the point of need. The
ESC manages the operational-to-tactical links of the global distribution network. This includes the segment
of the distribution network that begins at the POD or theater source and ends at the point of employment.
Both the TSC and ESC have distribution management responsibilities executed through a DMC. The TSC or
ESC will establish movement boards to manage transportation policies, priorities, LOC status, convoy
security and synchronization, and transportation asset allocation to support theater distribution operations.
The sustainment commands also provide command and control of organizations that execute distribution and
distribution management and control capabilities.
CORPS ROLES DURING CRISIS
4-67. During crisis, the corps headquarters may deploy into an operational area as a tactical headquarters
with subordinate divisions and brigades. Corps typically deploy an early entry command post, comprising
selected personnel from within the headquarters, to provide command and control of arriving forces. Should
crisis become armed conflict, large-scale combat operations may require the corps headquarters to function
under the command of a multinational force land component or become subordinate to a field army equivalent
established as part of a multinational coalition.
LIMITED CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS
4-68. In a limited contingency, a corps normally fills the role of the JTF or the joint force land component
command. Normally, the commander of the JTF or joint force land component command exercises command
and control over all forces and other resources in a JOA or ground forces in a JOA. If the corps is functioning
as the joint force land component command, then it is also capable of filling the ARFOR role, and it often
does.
CORPS SUSTAINMENT COMMAND
4-69. The CSC synchronizes and integrates sustainment operations for the corps during Army operations
during crisis. It has two operational responsibilities in limited contingency operations:
• Synchronize and integrate sustainment support for the JOA.
• Support reception, staging, and onward movement within the JOA.
DIVISION ROLE DURING CRISIS
4-70. The division headquarters performs many of the same activities as the corps headquarters. The division
headquarters fulfills its primary role as a tactical headquarters staffed, trained, and equipped to command two
to five maneuver brigades and other subordinate brigades and battalions. One or more of these brigades may
be allied formations. Upon deployment into a theater, a division may undergo significant task organization
in preparation for its assigned roles during operations. During crisis, a division initially conducts defensive,
security, and stability tasks in support of joint operations. The primary role of a division during crisis is to |
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demonstrate credible coercive force as a combined arms formation. Divisions should expect to conduct short-
notice training exercises with multinational partners and perform other activities that demonstrate capabilities
as part of crisis response. In an immature theater, a division headquarters should be prepared to accommodate
the command structure of the next higher echelon until that echelon’s systems are in place.
4-71. Some adversaries possess significant capability to employ antiaccess and area denial strategies across
all domains. Countering those strategies is the responsibility of the JFC. The land component commander's
challenge is conducting forcible entry operations and deploying significant combat power in an environment
where the enemy has an initial advantage.
4-72. Forcible entry is the seizing and holding of a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition or
forcing access into a denied area to allow movement and maneuver to accomplish the mission. (JP 3-18)
These operations are complicated and always joint. In the case of a no-notice and/or crisis response mission,
only hours separate the alert from the deployment.
4-73. The phases of a forcible entry operation are (1) preparation and deployment, (2) assault, (3) stabilization
of the lodgment, (4) introduction of follow-on forces, and (5) termination or transition operations. Once an
assault force seizes a lodgment, it normally defends to retain it while the JFC rapidly deploys additional
combat power by air and sea.
4-74. Sustainment of these operations is normally divided into three echelons during deployment: assault,
follow-on, and rear echelons. Sustainment of forces during early entry operations focuses on supply and
distribution. This is accomplished by leveraging resupply by air including planned resupply, immediate
airdrop resupply, and emergency airdrop resupply requests. The assault force is supported by both organic
and external elements organized to distribute supplies, materiel, fuel, and ammunition forward by air or water
LOCs. The exact organization and disposition of the assault and follow-on sustainment elements is a function
of the assault force’s mission and anticipated follow-on operations.
4-75. The DSB provides the foundational capabilities for enabling forcible entry. DSBs may perform
specialized roles in rapid deployment operations from home station in support of forcible entry. Once
deployed, the DSB and its task-organized subordinate units focus on sustaining both the assault and
introduction of follow-on forces.
4-76. As sustainers plan for support of the force entering the theater, they also consider requirements during
crisis operations that may differ in scale, scope, or type from those associated with other operations. Planners
identify and account for unique requirements such as—
• Establishing civil security and control.
• Supporting essential services requirements.
• Integrating non-organic sustainment capability.
• Providing support to infrastructure development, such as general engineering support.
• Providing direct or indirect support to unified action partners.
• Building POL stockage objectives and intertheater and intratheater days of supply.
CONSOLIDATION OF GAINS DURING CRISIS
4-77. During and after crisis response, Army forces consolidate gains to deny adversary forces the means to
extend the crisis or create a similar crisis in the future. This will often entail maintaining an enhanced force
posture in a JOA for a period of time to demonstrate U.S. willingness to defend allies and partners. Army
forces continue to support improvements to host-nation capabilities through a security cooperation plan
designed to make them less vulnerable to future crisis. If an adversary directly targets partner forces, or acts
through a proxy, the United States must be prepared to reconstitute the partner’s forces as quickly as possible.
The ability of Army forces to reconstitute partner nation forces is especially important to JFCs since, in many
areas, only the Army has the capacity to conduct a comprehensive security cooperation program. Many allies
and partners rely primarily on their armies and do not have robust navies or air forces. Consolidating gains
during and after crisis response creates enduring change that reinforces deterrence against adversaries and
improves relative advantages for U.S., allied, and partner forces. |
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TRANSITION TO COMPETITION AND ARMED CONFLICT
4-78. During a crisis, partner-nation security forces and government institutions may suffer losses that reduce
capability and capacity due to the actions of adversary or proxy forces. Army forces may be tasked to execute
security cooperation programs to help restore or maintain partner-nation capabilities and capacity as a means
to consolidate gains. Army forces seek to restore partner security forces and government institutions as
quickly as possible to maintain popular support. Doing so reduces the need for large numbers of U.S. forces
to deploy in the future or be maintained in theater to support or enable a partner nation’s security. A quick
recovery also highlights the strength of the alliance or bilateral relationship of a partner nation with the United
States.
4-79. Army forces responding to a crisis are prepared for and expect to fight. This saves time during the
transition and requires an understanding of the OPLAN or likely concept of operations as early as possible.
Forward-positioned forces reposition into battle positions or tactical assembly areas and take all available
measures to protect themselves from attack in every domain as they prepare for combat. When located with
allied or partner units, Army forces synchronize their activities to ensure unity of purpose and mutual support. |
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Sustainment Operations During Armed Conflict
This chapter provides an overview of sustainment operations during armed conflict. This
chapter covers sustainment of large-scale combat operations, sustainment of defensive
operations, and sustainment of offensive operations. This chapter concludes with a discussion
on the transition from conflict to competition or crisis.
SECTION I – ARMED CONFLICT AND LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS
5-1. Armed conflict encompasses the conditions of a strategic relationship in which opponents use lethal
force as the primary means for achieving objectives and imposing their will on the other. The employment
of lethal force is the defining characteristic of armed conflict, and it is the primary function of the Army.
5-2. During armed conflict, operations usually reflect combinations of conventional and irregular warfare
approaches. Leaders apply doctrine for large-scale combat operations during limited contingencies that
require conventional warfare approaches. Irregular warfare includes counterinsurgency and unconventional
warfare. The initial actions of large-scale combat operations will likely overlap with actions initiated during
competition and crisis.
5-3. Large-scale combat operations are extensive joint combat operations in terms of scope and size of forces
committed, conducted as campaigns aimed at achieving operational and strategic objectives through the
application of force. Large-scale combat on land occurs within the framework of a larger joint campaign,
usually with an Army headquarters forming the base of a joint force headquarters. These operations typically
entail high tempo, high resource consumption, and high casualty rates. Large-scale combat introduces levels
of complexity, lethality, ambiguity, and speed to military activities not common in other operations.
5-4. Large-scale combat operations occur in circumstances usually associated with state-on-state conflict,
and they encompass divisions and corps employing joint and Army capabilities from multiple domains in a
combined arms manner. Irregular warfare activities often complement large-scale combat operations, with
conventional, irregular, and special operations forces conducting operations close to each other.
5-5. Successful large-scale combat operations defeat enemy armed forces while establishing control over
land and populations to achieve operational and strategic objectives. They may capitalize on superior military
capability to quickly overwhelm a weaker enemy and consolidate gains as part of a rapid campaign. Large-
scale combat operations against more capable enemy forces are likely to be of longer duration, lasting months
or longer.
OPERATING AS PART OF THE JOINT FORCE
5-6. The Army always fights as part of a joint force, and usually as part of a multinational coalition during
large-scale combat operations. Because CCDRs often assign the senior Army commander as the JFLCC, it
is imperative that Army leaders from the JFLCC to division level understand the integration of operations on
land with those in the other domains for the joint force.
5-7. The Army supports the joint force by providing the capabilities and capacity to apply sustained combined
arms landpower through movement, close combat, and fires at whatever scale is necessary to defeat enemies
on land. It does this by employing capabilities from the land, maritime, air, space, and cyberspace domains
in support of ground operations on land and employing ground-based capabilities to enable operations in the
other domains.
CONDUCTING LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS
5-8. During large-scale combat operations, Army forces conduct offensive, defensive, and stability
operations to defeat enemy forces. Defeat of enemy forces in close combat is normally required to achieve
campaign objectives and national strategic goals after the commencement of hostilities. Divisions and corps |
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are the formations central to the conduct of large-scale combat operations, as they are organized, trained, and
equipped for the deep, rear, and support operations that enable subordinate success during close combat. The
ability to prevail in ground combat is a decisive factor in breaking an enemy’s will to continue a conflict.
Conflict resolution requires the Army to conduct sustained operations with unified action partners as long as
necessary to achieve national objectives.
SUSTAINING LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS
5-9. Large-scale combat operations require greater sustainment than other types of operations across the
operational framework. See FM 3-0 for additional information on the operational framework. Their high
tempo and lethality significantly increase maintenance requirements and expenditure of supplies,
ammunition, and equipment. Large-scale combat incurs the risk of mass casualties, which increase
requirements for medical, fatality management, and large-scale personnel and equipment replacements.
Large-scale combat operations demand a sustainment system that can move and distribute a tremendous
volume of supplies, personnel, and equipment.
5-10. Army sustainment is a key enabler of the joint force on land. Army forces provide sustainment to other
elements in the joint force according to the direction of the JFC. The JFC has the overall responsibility for
sustainment throughout a theater, but the JFC headquarters executes many of its sustainment responsibilities
through the TSC. When directed, Army sustainment capabilities provide the bulk of Army support to other
Services through executive agency, CUL, lead Service, and other common sustainment resources. See JP 4-0
for more information on joint sustainment.
5-11. Successful sustainment operations strike a balance between protecting sustainment capabilities and
providing responsive support in the execution of deep, close, and rear operations. A well-planned and
executed logistics operation permits flexibility, endurance, and application of combat power. Plans must
anticipate and mitigate the risk posed by enemy forces detecting and attacking friendly sustainment
capabilities. Sustainment formations pursue operations security, survivability, and protection with the same
level of commitment as all other forces. While most rear and support operations are economy of force
endeavors when allocating combat power in divisions and corps, the continuity and survivability of those
operations are vital to deep and close operations.
5-12. Dispersion of assets and redundancy help protect sustainment formations as part of rear operations.
Dispersing sustainment formations makes it less likely that enemy long-range fires can destroy large
quantities of materiel. Dispersion also creates flexibility, as several nodes can execute the sustainment
concept without a single point of failure. However, dispersed sustainment operations complicate command
and control and can be less efficient than a massed and centralized approach. Commanders balance the risk
between dispersion and efficiency to minimize exposure to enemy fires while maintaining the ability to
enable the supported formation’s tempo, endurance, and operational reach.
5-13. Commanders must plan for the possibility of heavy losses to personnel, supplies, and equipment. Even
with continuous and effective sustainment support, units may rapidly become combat ineffective due to
enemy action. Commanders at all levels must be prepared to conduct reconstitution efforts to return
ineffective units to a level of effectiveness that allows the reconstituted unit to perform its future mission.
For additional information see ATP 3-94.4.
SUSTAINING ENABLING OPERATIONS
5-14. Enabling operations set the friendly conditions required for most operations. Commanders direct
enabling operations to support the conduct of offensive, defensive, and stability operations and defense
support to civil authorities tasks. The execution of enabling operations alone does not directly accomplish
the commander's end state, but enabling operations must occur to complete the mission. Examples of enabling
operations are reconnaissance, security, troop movement, relief in place, passage of lines, countermobility,
and mobility. While sustainment supports all enabling operations, troop movement and combined arms
mobility require the most sustainment support. See FM 3-0 for additional information on enabling operations. |
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SUSTAINING TROOP MOVEMENT
5-15. Troop movement is the movement of Soldiers and units from one place to another by any available
means (FM 3-90). Troop movements are made by different methods such as dismounted and mounted
marches using organic combat and tactical vehicles; motor transport; and air, rail, and water means in various
combinations. The method employed depends on the situation, the size and composition of the moving unit,
the distance the unit must cover, the urgency of execution, and the condition of the troops. It also depends on
the availability, suitability, and capacity of the different means of transportation. Troop movements may also
be used as a form of deception. Concealing troop movements may deceive the adversary and divert their
efforts from the main objective. See ADP 3-90 for additional information on troop movements. Troop
movements over extended distances have extensive sustainment considerations. Movement control boards
are critical for planning and enabling troop movement. Movement control boards support synchronization
and coordination of troop movement against distribution priorities. For additional information, see ATP 4-16.
ROAD MOVEMENT
5-16. Road movement is a route synchronization plan that involves movement of forces from PODs,
redeployment of forces to ports of embarkation, movement of supplies and equipment, and movement of
units. The goal of route synchronization planning is to sustain movements according to the commander's
priorities and make the most effective and efficient use of the road networks. It requires synchronization and
coordination with planners of unit movement and maneuver. Planning is done in a logical sequence and
results in the publication of the route synchronization plan. The unit movement officer coordinates movement
planning during deployments, redeployments, and other moves. For additional information, see ATP 3-35
and ATP 4-16.
ARMY AIR MOVEMENT
5-17. Army air movements are operations involving the use of utility and cargo rotary-wing assets for other
than air assaults. Commanders conduct air movements to move troops and equipment, to emplace systems,
and to transport ammunition, fuel, and other high-value supplies. Commanders may employ air movements
as a substitute for ground tactical movements. Air movements are generally faster than ground tactical
movements, but air movements can be vulnerable to enemy air defense systems or influenced by bad weather.
The same general considerations that apply to air assault operations also apply to Army air movements. For
additional information, see FM 3-0, FM 3-04, and FM 3-99.
RAIL AND WATER MODES
5-18. Operating forces can use rail and water modes of transportation to conduct troop movements if these
are available in an AO. Their use can provide flexibility by freeing other modes of transport for other missions
or circumventing closed or high-threat highway routes. Their use normally involves a mixture of military and
commercial assets, such as defense freight railway interchange railcars pulled by privately owned diesel-
electric engines to transport tanks along railroad rights-of-way from one rail terminal to another.
Responsibility for coordinating the use of railroads and waterways resides in the ARFOR headquarters in the
theater of operations.
MOVEMENT CONTROL DURING LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS
5-19. Sustainment of troop movement is achieved through movement control. Movement control links the
tactical employment and sustainment of forces to national and operational objectives. During the execution
of large-scale combat operations, movement control prioritizes and synchronizes movements to support
actions in the division rear, close, and deep areas. Coordination and synchronization of organizational
movements are planned and initiated from the theater strategic level and flow from the TSCs DMC through
the TMCE, ESC DMC, and the corps transportation officer. At the operational and tactical level, the division
transportation officer, sustainment brigade SPO officer, movement control battalion, and movement control
team ensure the seamless execution of all movements generated from a transportation movement request. A
movement control team can be attached or OPCON to a corps or division headquarters and placed under the
control of the corps transportation officer or division transportation officer to augment that staff and assist in
providing a range of transportation support planning, programming, and operations required to support the |
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range of military operations. For additional information on the movement control process, see ATP 4-16,
ATP 4-91, ATP 4-92, ATP 4-93.
SUSTAINING MOBILITY
5-20. Freedom to move and maneuver within an operational area is essential to the application of combat
power and achieving results across the range of military operations. An OE will present numerous challenges
to movement and maneuver. These are typically overcome through the integration and synchronization of
mobility and countermobility in support of mission requirements. Sustainment units should be prepared to
support gap crossing operations and aviation assets during the movement of maneuver troops. For additional
information, see ADP 3-37, ATP 3-39.30, ATP 3-90.4, and ATP 3-90.8.
SUSTAINMENT OF GAP CROSSING OPERATIONS
5-21. Gap crossing operations require maneuver forces to break formations, concentrate within lanes or at
crossing points, and reform on the far side before continuing to maneuver. Gap crossing types are deliberate,
hasty, and covert. Gap crossings require large amounts of indirect fire support for obscuration and
suppression that generate logistics requirements for ammunition and transportation. The amount of resources
required to obscure the crossing is dependent on multiple variables such as duration required, weather, and
terrain. Obscuration requires close coordination, control, and detailed planning to maximize the desired
effects on the enemy while not degrading friendly capabilities. Artillery units conducting suppression and
obscuration missions will displace frequently for survivability, requiring pre-positioning of munitions at
various firing positions and position areas.
AVIATION OPERATIONS
5-22. Aviation operations related to sustainment increase mobility for light forces, offer aeromedical
evacuation support, and provide additional options for distribution. These operations may include rotary,
fixed-wing, and unmanned aerial systems. Sustainment forces should expect fuel and ammunition
requirements to increase during aviation operations. Sustainment units should be prepared to conduct aerial
resupply for maneuver forces. Planning considerations for aerial delivery should include type of airdrop asset
and type of aerial delivery operation. Special planning considerations must include the fuel required by the
aviation force at fluctuating rates. For example, a company of CH-47 Chinooks could consume as much as
40,000 gallons of fuel in as little as two days, or it could consume almost no fuel in two days based on weather
and operational considerations. The brigade aviation element is critical to coordinating aviation as an enabler.
See FM 3-04 for additional details.
ENEMY THREAT CONSIDERATIONS FOR SUSTAINMENT FORCES
5-23. Enemy forces possess a wide range of space, air, maritime, and land-based intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance capabilities that can detect U.S. forces. These capabilities present risk to U.S. forces and
risk to mission accomplishment. Leaders must assume they are under constant observation from one or more
domains and continuously ensure they are not providing lucrative targets for the enemy to attack. One way
of accomplishing this is reducing power usage and electromagnetic signatures. The challenges posed by
enemy forces are massed and precision fires against static or fixed forces; air and missile threats including
loitering munitions and other unmanned aircraft systems; degraded communications; areas and resources
contaminated by CBRN; fixed and bypassed enemy formations; enemy infiltration and targeting of
vulnerable units first; and enemy influence campaigns.
5-24. Army sustainment forces must prepare for continuous visual, electromagnetic, and influence contact
with adversaries. Sustainment forces are under persistent visual surveillance by enemy space and other
capabilities. Sustainment forces and individuals are in constant electromagnetic contact with adversaries who
persistently probe and disrupt individual, group, and Army capabilities dependent on space and cyberspace
domains. Army forces are subject to adversary influence through disinformation campaigns targeting
Soldiers and their families and friends through social media and other platforms. |
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The Russo-Ukraine War and Large-Scale Combat Operations
Sustainment Challenges
In February 2022, after a months-long build-up of troops on their shared international
border, armed forces of the Russian Federation invaded Ukraine. Though low-level
fighting had been ongoing between Russian backed separatists and the Ukrainian
Armed Forces since 2014, this invasion was a massive escalation, seemingly aimed
at capturing the whole of the eastern Donbas region as well as the capital of Kyiv. An
initial multi-pronged assault employed ballistic missile strikes, fixed and rotary wing
aviation, paratroopers, and mechanized units. It was, and as of this writing continues
to be, the largest ground conflict in Europe since the end of the Second World War.
There are multiple sustainment lessons that can be extracted from this conflict on the
strategic, operational, and tactical levels. At the strategic level, the most pertinent one
may be that conduct of large-scale combat operations is a war of ‘materiel’. It has and
will continue to consume munitions, combat systems, and supplies at a rate that has
not been seen in decades.
At the operational level, the conflict has highlighted the challenges with conducting
reconstitution of battle-damaged formations while continuing combat operations in the
same theater of operations. Allies and partners, for both sides, will continue to play an
essential role in the rebuilding of combat power.
At the tactical level, the Russo-Ukraine War has shown the vulnerability of sustainment
nodes to interdiction and attack. The proliferation of multiple sensors across the
battlefield, from a soldier with a cell phone to commercial drones and unmanned
aircraft systems, make the operating environment ‘transparent’ to a degree not seen
before in warfare. This has caused both combatants to move their supply nodes and
other sustainment assets well behind the front lines. The challenge of tactical
distribution in large-scale combat operations is one that will require dispersion,
precision, and innovativeness of logistics commanders and forces.
5-25. During competition, enemy forces are capable of employing multiple methods of collecting on Army
sustainment forces to develop an understanding of sustainment capabilities, readiness status, and intentions.
Enemy forces are capable of doing this inside and outside the continental United States. They employ space-
based surveillance platforms to observe unit training and deployment activities. They employ cyberspace
capabilities to penetrate networks and gain access to individual and group cyberspace personas to create
options for future intimidation, coercion, and attack. During armed conflict, the enemy can employ networked
land, maritime, air, and space-based capabilities to detect and rapidly target sustainment forces with fires.
U.S. forces that are concentrated and static are easy for enemy forces to detect and destroy. Dispersion of
sustainment forces and resources has multiple survivability benefits. It increases opportunities to use cover
and concealment to reduce probability of detection. In the event the enemy detects elements of sustainment
forces, dispersion acts as a form of deception, helping to conceal their intentions. Sustainment leaders must
only concentrate forces when necessary and balance the survivability benefits of dispersion with the negative
impacts dispersion has on mission effectiveness.
5-26. A threat is any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm
United States forces, United States national interest, or the homeland (ADP 3-0). Threats may include
individuals, groups of individuals, paramilitary or military forces, nation-states, or national alliances. In
general, a threat can be categorized as an enemy or an adversary.
5-27. FM 4-0 is focused on sustaining large-scale combat operations against peer threats in an OE with
challenges across multiple domains. A peer threat is an adversary or enemy with capabilities and capacity to
oppose U.S. forces across multiple domains worldwide or in a specific region where it enjoys a position of |
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relative advantage. Peer threats present credible challenges to sustainment forces through the use of
information warfare, isolation, systems warfare, preclusion, and sanctuary. Other considerations such as
contested LOCs and antiaccess and area denial techniques coupled with challenges across multiple domains
challenge sustainment support to operations. Sustainment commanders must consider the OE and all factors
that affect their ability to sustain operations during planning.
5-28. Peer threats have the ability to influence and direct irregular forces, criminal elements, and hostile
populations and impose disruptive effects in cyberspace that will challenge Army sustainment during pre-
deployment, deployment, employment, and redeployment. These disruptive effects may occur at unit home
stations, ports of embarkation, while in transit to the theater, and upon arrival at ports of debarkation as well
as within the theater.
5-29. Peer threats employ their capabilities across multiple domains to attack U.S. vulnerabilities, including
sustainment facilities, networks, and formations. They use their capabilities to create lethal and nonlethal
effects throughout an OE. During combat operations, threats seek to inflict significant damage across multiple
domains in a short period of time. They seek to delay U.S. forces long enough to achieve their goals and for
U.S. forces to reach culmination. One effective way to delay U.S. forces, which generally operate on very
long LOCs, is to disrupt sustainment operations and nodes. Peer threats can also disrupt contracted support
capabilities through predatory economics, cyber-attacks, intimidating contractors or companies,
misinformation and disinformation that disrupt host/local support, competing for resources, and bidding up
prices. The adversary will build up their capability to do these things to favor their objectives during
competition, and to set conditions in their favor if competition transitions to conflict. See FM 3-0 for
additional information on peer threats.
5-30. Threat forces may employ tactics that force the United States Army into conducting large-scale combat
operations in urban areas. Currently more than 50 percent of the world’s population lives in urban areas, and
this is likely to increase to 70 percent by 2050, making large-scale combat operations in cities likely. Large-
scale combat operations in urban terrain are complex and resource intensive. In most urban operations, the
terrain, dense population, military forces, and unified action partners will further complicate sustainment
operations. For additional information on operations in urban areas, see ATP 3-06.
5-31. Threat use of subterranean spaces and structures (any space or structure located below ground) as a
means to covertly maintain the initiative against a more powerful military opponent may occur during large-
scale combat operations. Such spaces and structures can be used for command and control, defensive
networks, operations, storage, production, or protection. Continued improvements in the construction of
subterranean environments have increased their usefulness and their proliferation. For additional information,
see ATP 3-21.51.
IMPLEMENTING DISPERSION FOR SUSTAINMENT FORCES
5-32. Dispersion is the spreading or separating of troops, materiel, establishments, or activities, which are
usually concentrated in limited areas to reduce vulnerability (JP 5-0). Sustainment leader efforts to preempt
and mitigate enemy detection are essential, but they cannot eliminate the risk of enemy massed and precision
fires, including CBRN and weapons of mass destruction. To improve survivability from enemy indirect fires,
Army sustainment forces must maintain dispersion and remain as mobile as possible to avoid presenting
themselves targets to the enemy systems. If sustainment forces are required to remain static, those forces
employ survivability techniques to avoid or withstand hostile actions or environmental conditions. See ATP
3-37.34 for information on survivability operations.
5-33. Sustainment commanders, including the TSC and ESC, have options for achieving dispersion. They
can use split command post operations to achieve dispersion while maintaining command and control over
widely dispersed forces. At the operational level, sustainment commanders maintain dispersion by employing
multiple staging areas, base clusters, and multiple LOCs. Vetting the ability to maintain command and control
of over widely dispersed forces in base clusters can be tested during training and exercises. At the tactical
level, sustainment commanders achieve dispersion by increasing the distance between sustainment
formations and among the elements of the supported force. In the offense, sustainment forces should utilize
multiple routes and longer march intervals as practical to support the maneuver commander’s intent and only
concentrate forces enough in base clusters to support the massing of effects. In the defense, sustainment
forces occupy areas far enough away from anticipated action to prevent their detection and destruction by |
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enemy deep fires. See FM 3-0 for additional information on being under constant observation and all forms
of enemy contact.
RECONSTITUTION OPERATIONS
5-34. The scale, complexity, and increased destructive power of large-scale combat operations results in
greater loss of personnel, weapon platforms, supplies, and equipment than other types of operations. The
objective of reconstitution operations is to restore combat power and build and maintain unit strength within
a limited window of time. Under exceptional conditions, with severely degraded units, constrained time, and
limited or no personnel replacements, commanders may make the decision to execute reconstitution.
Reconstitution operations are extraordinary actions that commanders take to restore degraded units to an
acceptable level of combat effectiveness as determined by the commander, commensurate with mission
requirements, available time, and resources. Reconstitution must be planned and resourced during
competition. Commanders directing reconstitution missions use assets under their control, along with those
provided by higher echelons. For additional information, see ATP 3-94.4.
SUSTAINMENT PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
5-35. Commanders and staffs should be very deliberate in planning sustainment support and only plan for
support that is absolutely essential to mission accomplishment. Planning considerations include a known or
anticipated support requirement, a known or anticipated problem, a readiness issue, a capability shortfall,
enemy threat, or an aspect of operational or mission variables that influence sustainment support. If identified
and used properly, planning considerations assist planners in identifying specific support or operational
requirements based upon available information. Sustainment planners must also plan for execution of all
sustainment functions (logistics, financial management, personnel services, and HSS) and their associated
sub-functions at all echelons. This includes personnel replacement, casualty reporting, medical treatment,
medical evacuation, and medical logistics/supply.
5-36. Planners must consider the scope of support provided by the DSBs. All units attached to the division
are supported by the DSB and its organic DSSB. This includes the attached maneuver brigades as well as
other organizations supporting the division's operation. Units such as engineer, military police, CBRN, and
air defense may operate in the division's rear and support areas. If the scope of support requirements exceeds
the capacity of the organic DSSB, additional modular logistics companies or an additional CSSB may be
required. The division G-4 and the DSB commander must continually assess the situation and make
organizational changes as necessary. Division units that have small or inadequate logistics planning and
execution capabilities, such as the division artillery, should share information with the division G-4 and
coordinate with the DSB for logistics planning and execution.
5-37. Planning for non-essential support puts unnecessary demands on already limited distribution and
transportation assets and puts capability at needless risk. This may also deprive units of support for which
they have a legitimate requirement. As an example, if heavy equipment transporter system support is needed
for a mission with no additional transportation requirements, commanders should request a heavy equipment
transporter system company, not a composite truck company (heavy). The composite truck company comes
with additional, unneeded types of trucks that will only burden the mission and waste a critical asset that can
be legitimately used elsewhere. Another example is the use of laundry and shower units. These may be
desirable but unnecessary for mission accomplishment.
5-38. The tempo and lethality of large-scale combat operations may overwhelm maintenance, medical,
personnel replacement, and mortuary affairs capabilities. Additionally, the strain of support to other Services
and multinational partners will exact a heavy toll on already constrained sustainment resources. For example,
the quantity of air and ground distribution assets required to fulfill the Army's role as lead service for bulk
petroleum (when designated) will place significant demands on the Army in support of large-scale combat
operations. As another example, the Army provides the single integrated medical logistics management and
serves as theater lead agent for medical materiel for United States Central Command, United States European
Command, United States Africa Command, and United States Forces Korea. Managing theater CL VIII
supply support for the joint force will add complexity, especially given the variation in medical materiel used
by each of the Services. Because of these factors, sustainment planning should include coordination,
integration, and synchronization at all levels for reinforcing sustainment support to the joint force and
multinational partners. |
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3rd Corps Support Command and Large-scale combat operations
in OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM
On March 19, 2003, ground operations for OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM began. The
planning and coordination for sustainment operations, however, began well before that
date. Advance elements of the 3rd Corps Support Command (COSCOM) led by BG
Charles Fletcher arrived in Kuwait on January 10, 2003. 3rd COSCOM not only had to
coordinate with V Corps, the lead invasion force under LTG William Wallace, but also
with its upper echelon, the Combined Forces Land Component Commander and Third
Army Commander, LTG David McKiernan, and the 377th TSC under MG David
Kratzer.
In the beginning, 3rd COSCOM had two corps support groups, the 7th and the 16th,
and three separate battalions attached to it, totaling approximately 4,000 Soldiers. By
the end of summer, it had quadrupled in size to approximately 17,000 soldiers in six
corps support groups, five separate battalions, and a rear operations center. The
personnel comprised an even split between Active Duty, Army Reserve, and National
Guard components.
The 3rd COSCOM crossed the berm on March 21st behind the 3rd Infantry Division
(Mechanized), the main striking force. BG Fletcher utilized four command posts
reaching from Camp Arifjan up to the forward, embedded division elements to operate
sustainment activities. From March 21st to April 18th, 3rd COSCOM moved with V
Corps for a total of 828 miles. On April 19, the lead elements of 3rd COSCOM and the
24th Corps Support Group occupied the airbase near Balad, 45 miles north of
Baghdad, and established Logistics Support Area – Anaconda. This became a primary
sustainment hub for Operation Iraqi Freedom until American withdrawal from Iraq in
December 2011. The establishment of the logistics support area signaled the change
from offensive operations to defensive operations operating along a system of ground
and air supply routes for American and allied forces in Iraq. 3rd COSCOM transferred
responsibility to the 13th COSCOM on January 31, 2004.Logistics Planning
Considerations
5-39. The high tempo of large-scale combat operations will result in gaps and seams that create both
opportunities and risks as enemy formations disintegrate or displace. The variety of possible situations arising
during large-scale combat operations requires that sustainment operators establish a flexible and tailorable
distribution system in support of tactical commanders.
5-40. Distribution management, using all modes of transportation, is the method by which sustainment
commanders and staffs move materiel and personnel from an originating point to the point of employment.
The distribution system extends from ports of debarkation and supply points in the joint security area and
extends to the forward line of troops. Distribution execution becomes ever more complex and threatened by
enemy action as it moves from higher to lower echelons. Distribution planners must understand that
retrograde of materiel, casualties, and human remains is a significant component of distribution and requires
extensive planning and management. Well-developed distribution plans, synchronized across all warfighting
functions and echelons with redundancy, are critical to ensure all units have the materiel and personnel
needed for maximum capability. Figure 5-1 displays a graphic depiction of a distribution network. |
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Figure 5-1. Distribution network
5-41. Sustainment planning is not a singular activity, but both a continuous and a cyclical part of the
operations process. While planning may start based upon receipt of a specific mission as part of an iteration
of the operations process, planning does not stop with the production of an order. During preparation and
execution, the plan is continuously assessed against pre-established requirements and refined as the situation
changes. Sustainment plans must be continually assessed to diagnose problems and determine trends that
may positively and negatively affect operations. Thorough assessment of measures like died-of-wounds rates,
percentage of requisitions filled, operational readiness rates, and funding authorities and funds available
(status of funds) can indicate areas that require additional analysis and emphasis during execution. Feedback
from subordinate units and supported formations can also contribute to this insight.
5-42. Sustainment planners should expect maneuver units to be degraded to a large degree in supplies,
communications, and equipment readiness due to equipment failure attributed to tempo and operational loss.
Planning considerations must factor in major end item battle loss attrition, battle damage sustainment, and
how the depots project OCONUS capabilities to support the OPLAN. During the set the theater planning
process, theater Armies and their supporting TSCs must coordinate with the Center for Army Analysis and
develop OPLAN battle loss and battle damage estimates with USAMC and its subordinate LCMCs. The
TSCs, in conjunction with ASC and the LCMCs, need to plan for the footprint, support requirements, and
force protection of depot maintenance forward repair activities. |
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5-43. Contracted sustainment support should include considerations for operational security and address the
constraints and limitations of contracted support. Planning should address under what conditions contracted
support should be used and where to emplace it on the battlefield. During large-scale combat operations,
planners should be aware of the location of contracting organizations forward of the corps rear boundary.
This is for both operational security and effectiveness. Many contracting vendors use local nationals that may
gather essential elements of friendly information and communicate that information to threat entities which
could compromise an operation and lead to failure. Although local contracting for services and commodities
might be limited due to operational area effects and constraints, these elements are present to support the
maneuver forces with requirements anticipation, development, and provision of support.
5-44. The transition from offensive operations to defensive operations requires sustainment forces to have
Class IV stocks on-hand. Forces require every option to defend from attacks, and these include protective
barrier material such as concertina wire, bastions, and lumber for overhead cover. Transitioning back to
offensive operations may require aggregate for road repair, ford sites, and gap crossing preparation. Class IV
is also required for detainee collection points and holding areas and theater detention facilities.
5-45. Sustainment planners should anticipate increased expenditures of munitions during large-scale combat
operations that could exceed the availability in theater. The munitions section of the TSC and ESC DMC
must monitor expenditure rates in relation to stockage levels, forecasts regarding current and future
operations, and limitations to re-supply and recommend controlled supply rates to the CCDR. Reconciling
controlled supply rates and required supply rates is informed by OPLANS and anticipated expenditure rates.
5-46. Ammunition planning includes determining ammunition requirements, echeloning capabilities and
ammunition units, establishing split-based operations where required, pre-configuring ammunition and
resupply, and, when required, using civilian, contractor, allied, and host-nation capabilities. A combat
configured load is a mixed ammunition package designed to provide for the complete round concept, type of
unit, type of vehicle, capacity of transporter, and weapons system (ATP 4-35). Contents of the package are
predetermined and provide optimum distribution velocity, quality, and mix to support a particular weapon
system or unit. Combat configured loads can be built at either the national-provider level or in a theater.
Combat configured loads built at the national-provider level may be reconfigured in theater at an ammunition
supply point as required and delivered as far forward to the using unit as possible.
5-47. Building, storing, transporting, and rebuilding the configured load with unused Class V requires
significant amounts of personnel, facilities, haul, and security. Sustainment and supported units should
consider building combat configured loads to meet the Class V demands for initial entry operations and large-
scale combat operations. Configured loads represent a way of requesting or pushing ammunition rapidly with
a mix of all or most of the munitions a weapons platform or unit needs. Combat configured loads can be
quickly distributed to the platform level with little to no intermediate handling but are resource intensive.
5-48. The supported unit commander determines ammunition required supply rates based on desired effects
(obscure, destroy, defeat, suppress), knowledge of upcoming tactical operations, and input from subordinate
organizations including the supporting sustainment unit. The supported commander should also ensure a
sustainment representative participates in targeting boards to provide subject matter expertise. The supporting
unit commander manages the allocation and distribution of munitions based upon the supported commander's
sustainment priorities. The supporting commander calculates and recommends composition of combat
configured loads based upon the controlled supply rate, forecasting, and historical data.
5-49. Explosive ordnance threats may be present across the competition continuum during the conduct of
operations both in CONUS and OCONUS. EOD detects, identifies, evaluates, renders safe, disposes of, or
directs other disposition of explosive ordnance, including weapons of mass destruction. EOD facilitates
technical collection of captured enemy materiel related to ordnance or weapons systems. Commanders
manage risk posed by explosive ordnance by synchronizing and integrating EOD during the planning and
execution of operations to protect life, property, and priority assets.
5-50. Sustainment planning must be executed in parallel and collaboratively with operational planning to
ensure complete integration and synchronization. Sustainment commanders and leaders at all levels must
have a complete understanding of the maneuver unit's concept of operation. This is the only way to
understand and proactively anticipate the requirements to support current and future operations. It allows
commanders to use command and control and the operations process to plan, prepare, execute, and assess the |
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appropriate support functions. Interaction with the supported unit planners is critical to this understanding.
At the brigade or division level, this requires interaction with the maneuver battalion headquarters. At
echelons with staff, the interaction must be with the S-1/G-1, S-3/G-3, S-4/G-4, S-8/G-8, and the unit
surgeon.
5-51. The concept of operations drives requirements determination for all sustainment functions. Ideally, it
will identify support priorities in terms of units, support functions, and commodities. This allows sustainment
commanders to understand the sustainment requirements and plan accordingly.
5-52. In addition to the concept of operations, sustainment commanders must understand the OE and the
problems it presents to support operations. This is one of the most critical aspects of supporting large-scale
combat operations. Time, space, enemy, and environmental threats all impact a sustainment commander's
ability to develop an executable support concept. Planning for echeloned sustainment support should be done
on a continuous basis. Figure 5-2 depicts an example of echeloned sustainment using field, combat, and
company trains. Operational and mission variables should be considered when actually selecting locations
and determining distances between locations. The purpose of the field trains is to receive, configure and
deliver all classes of supply forward and synchronize with the BSB. The purpose of the combat trains is to
support application of combat power and return it to the unit’s fighting formations and to execute sustainment
operations with company trains. Additional information on field and combat trains can be found in ATP 4-90.
Figure 5-2. Example of echeloned support
5-53. Risk, uncertainty, and chance are inherent in all military operations. Sustainment planners must seek
to balance and understand risks, rather than avoid them, to ensure continuous sustainment of the operational
force. Sustainment planners should develop mitigation and risk reduction strategies to reduce and/or
minimize the effects of risks. Military deception activities seek to hold the adversary's attention and can
mitigate the impact of hazards that drive risk. Sustainment capabilities can be used at echelon by operational
commanders to deceive an adversary. Conducting joint logistics-over-the shore operations at multiple ports |
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can deceive the adversary as to the true intent of the United States. Sustainment commanders must assess and
mitigate risks continuously throughout operations. The ability to sustain units in the corps, division, and
brigade areas of operation will incur significantly high risks resulting from conventional and hybrid threats.
Sustainment units must be trained and prepared to execute reconnaissance and security tasks when military
police are unavailable to ensure they can accomplish their sustainment missions.
5-54. To deal with expected direct enemy attack by aircraft and long-range artillery, commanders plan to
disperse into smaller bases and base clusters. This applies to all bases from the BSA to bases operating in the
joint security area. Units should train on communicating and securing base clusters with available personnel
and equipment to prevent communications disruptions and potential fratricide. Dispersion mitigates effects
of long-range fires and attack aircraft, but commanders still consider all security integration implications of
the base cluster. Commanders ensure base defense measures are adequate to detect and defeat small unit
operations (Level I or Level II threats) and that units use adequate cover and concealment measures to prevent
detection by enemy forces. A Level I threat is a small enemy force that can be defeated by those units
normally operating in the echelon support area or by the perimeter defenses established by friendly bases and
base clusters (ATP 3-91). A Level II threat is an enemy force or activities that can be defeated by a base or
base cluster’s defensive capabilities when augmented by a response force (ATP 3-91). Security of base
clusters should be integrated into planning.
5-55. Dispersion is essential, but it must be orderly enough to enable sustainment operations to continue after
a brief period of reorganization and resupply with collaborative multi-echelon planning and coordination.
Both command and control nodes and support capabilities in the support and rear areas are lucrative targets
for the enemy. While dispersion may provide protection against long-range fires, it potentially makes
defending against other threats like irregular forces or SOF more difficult. For sustainment of large-scale
combat operations, there can be no massive stockpiles outside of sanctuary with appropriate assets assigned
to maintain them. Sustainment commanders ensure as much dispersion as tactically prudent to prevent
destruction. Wide dispersion of forces and lengthening LOCs create challenges for movement control, in-
transit visibility, terminal operations, mode operations, and many other sustainment activities. The POL
pipeline presents the same challenges. Pipeline security can be a significant challenge and cover a very large
or isolated geographical area. Sustainment commanders must anticipate mitigating challenges presented by
the need to disperse versus priorities of support. Shortfalls in transportation assets will require deliberative
planning to overcome these mobility challenges.
5-56. Dispersion and the distributed nature of large-scale combat operations create increased requirements
on transportation assets. Two corps with six divisions engaged in tactical formation for offensive operations
may occupy an area roughly the size of Connecticut (5,000 square miles), significantly impacting demands
on transportation assets. Planners must consider transportation requirements such as distribution and
retrograde of materiel and personnel. For line haul operations, planners should consider one trip per day
covering approximately 60 kilometers one way to support materiel and personnel moving from the BSB to
the FSC. For local haul operations, planners should consider two or more trips per day covering 20 miles
each way to support materiel and personnel moving from the FSC to forward locations. Transportation
requirements that exceed Army capabilities must be mitigated through support from contracting, the joint
Services, multinational partners, or other unified action partners.
PERSONNEL SERVICE PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
5-57. Units will also have large numbers of casualties that require immediate treatment and evacuation. Units
should identify potential medically related commander's critical information as it pertains to the health threat.
A rapid and accurate assessment of supported unit status and support capability is critical. This is normally
accomplished using command and control systems and specifically through logistics status (LOGSTAT) and
personnel status (PERSTAT) reporting generated from the lowest levels through all command echelons.
Sustainment planners at all echelons must ensure synchronization of replacement operations to sustain units
suffering high casualties during large-scale combat operations. Corps, division, and brigade echelons require
capability to receive, orient, and integrate replacements. HR planners send prioritized replacement requests,
based on current strength and anticipated losses, to maintain units in combat at or near full strength. Units
should have an SOP and plan to execute deliberate reorganization as a routine operation to integrate personnel
replacements and equipment. |
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5-58. The planning process must include planning for mass casualties as well as processing and integrating
large-scale replacements at echelon. The ASCC G-1 must continuously integrate with the TSC, ESC, corps,
and divisions for proper replacement flow in theater.
5-59. The ASCC G-1/AG is responsible for developing casualty estimates (arranged by skill and grade),
corresponding replacement requirements, and identifying replacement staging bases as part of the deliberate
planning process to support the OPLAN. Replacements are sourced as part of the TPFDD. For replacement
units, HQDA will task an Army command, ASCC, and direct reporting unit commanders to provide
replacement units to the requesting commander. HRC, in coordination with HQDA Deputy Chief of Staff,
G-1 and FORSCOM, executes total Army manning and assists Army commands in developing replacement
force packages (buddy teams, squads, crews, platoons, companies). HRC is responsible for implementing
non-unit related personnel distribution to support replacement operations.
5-60. Sustainment planners must consider fatality estimates, the flow of allocated mortuary affairs assets into
the theater, and the sustainment channels with the most expedient available transportation resources to
evacuate human remains. The evacuation of human remains should be without delay to preserve forensic
evidence for the Armed Forces Medical Examiner. Sustainment channels also provide for the evacuation of
personal effects to the Joint Personal Effects Depot in CONUS. Evacuation of human remains and personal
effects may place a significant strain on the transportation system. Planning must include transportation for
U.S. citizens, multinational forces, host nation, and detainees.
5-61. Despite the increased demand for unit replacements expected in large-scale combat operations, the
requirement for individual replacements always exists. To begin the personnel flow as soon as possible after
deployment, the Army initially uses a push system based on personnel requirements from approved casualty
estimates and existing personnel shortages. As soon as possible after deployment, data on actual battlefield
losses is used to adjust the push packages. While not a requisition system, the push package eventually
reflects actual wartime requirements rather than casualty estimates. After utilization, the replacement system
will transition to a pull operation based on theater requirements. The ASCC G-1 consolidates replacement
requirements from subordinate organizations, receives replacement priorities from the ASCC G-3, and passes
to the national HR provider.
5-62. Theater replacement operations entail the coordinated support, accountability, and distribution of
individual replacements from the point of origin to requesting commanders. The TSC commander ensures
that replacements are delivered from higher to lower echelons as far forward on the battlefield as possible
based on distribution priorities established by the theater commander and requirements provided by the
theater G-1. Normally, replacements are processed through the theater gateway, integrated into the theater
database for accountability, and placed into the distribution network for movement to the unit of assignment.
The sustainment brigade then coordinates transportation for distribution of replacements based on established
priorities to unit of assignment. Unit of assignment decisions are relayed from the ASCC through the TSC to
the sustainment brigade responsible for theater distribution or from the supported unit to the HROB at other
echelons. The HROB is the key integrator between G-1/AG at echelon and the sustainment enterprise.
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
5-63. Financial management planners analyze the commander's tasks and priorities and identify the resource
requirements that will enable the commander to accomplish the mission. Financial management planners
develop running estimates which may include facts and assumptions. Examples of financial management
facts include, but are not limited to—
• Current budget and currency availability.
• Disbursing and payment support information.
• Banking facilities available.
5-64. Examples of financial management assumptions include, but are not limited to—
• Potential supplemental or special authority appropriations.
• Economic impacts of operations.
• Expected paying agent population. |
4-0 | 122 | Chapter 5
5-65. Financial management key tasks or significant activities are addressed in the plan or order to achieve
the commander's desired end state. Resource management technical planning considerations include, but are
not limited to—
• Command resource requirements submission.
• Identification of funding sources.
• Determination of costs.
5-66. Finance operations technical planning includes, but is not limited to—
• Banking.
• Central funding.
• Disbursing.
HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
5-67. AHS formations are designed as tailorable and modular units but may require significant additional
transportation resources for mobility. A Role 3 hospital can take 48-72 hours to displace the MTF.
Transporting the Role 3 hospital to a new site may require 22 additional flatbed trucks to move the hospital
in a single serial. At the new site, the Role 3 hospital may require 72-96 hours to be fully operational. For
additional information on the Role 3 hospital, refer to ATP 4-02.10.
5-68. Medical formations are designed for modularity that facilitates augmentation, cross-leveling, and
reinforcement of Role 1 and 2 medical capabilities within the division or with assets from the MEDBDE
(SPT). Role 1 and Role 2 capabilities consist of the following medical modules:
• Combat medic section (Roles 1 and 2).
• Ambulance squad (Roles 1 and 2).
• Treatment squad (Roles 1 and 2).
• Area support squad (Role 2).
• Patient holding squad (Role 2).
FATALITY MANAGEMENT PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
5-69. Evacuation of fatalities may not occur during large-scale combat operations based on the availability
of transportation platforms and the tactical and operational situation. Casualty estimates indicate the capacity
for human remains processing by mortuary affairs companies will be exceeded during large-scale combat
operations and may require the establishment of an in-theater mortuary. Mortuary affairs companies prepare
and temporarily store human remains until transportation to a CONUS port mortuary is available.
Sustainment planners must coordinate for adequate cold storage capacity within close proximity to the theater
mortuary evacuation point. Cold storage platforms such as refrigerated shipping containers and multi-
temperature refrigerated container systems normally used for Class I storage may be used for the temporary
storage of remains. It is important to note that these containers can be returned to service for Class I storage
through a process of cleaning and disinfecting as outlined in TG 195A. Although a last resort, temporary
interment operations may be the only option to account for and safeguard human remains until the cessation
of hostilities. For additional information, see JP 4-0, ADP 4-0, and ATP 4-46.
MOBILITY PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
5-70. Large-scale combat operations will require significant mobility and constant displacement to avoid
indirect fires and other threats. The need to constantly displace will create competition for transportation
assets that will be required to shift from executing distribution operations to assisting with the mobility of
various headquarters to prevent their destruction. Commanders will have to weigh risks and establish
priorities of support.
5-71. It is essential to understand mobility planning considerations for units operating within the corps and
division areas. Mobility is critical to survivability during large-scale combat operations. At the corps echelon
and below, mobility can be broken down into tactical mobility and sustainment mobility. Competition for
transportation assets is high when planning for mobility, and considerations should be made for the trade-
offs between tactical mobility and sustainment mobility. |
4-0 | 123 | Sustainment Operations During Armed Conflict
Tactical Mobility
5-72. Tactical mobility is the ability of friendly forces to move and maneuver freely on the battlefield relative
to the enemy (ADP 3-90). By design, tactical units are generally more mobile and therefore require fewer
external transportation assets to relocate. However, corps and division enablers have limited organic
transportation assets and require significant assistance to move rapidly over long distances. Achieving tactical
mobility varies based upon unit composition and operational requirements. Sustainment units generally
require external support from transportation enablers. It is difficult, but not impossible, for the DSB to
conduct sustainment operations while displacing. The DSB requires augmentation from a corps sustainment
brigade and prioritization of effort. Augmentation extends the division's tactical reach by enabling the DSB
to push supplies to the BSB and the BSB to subsequently push supplies to supported units. Additional
information on the mobility ratings and requirements for specific units can be found in the Section 1 narrative
of the Table of Organization and Equipment.
Sustainment Mobility
5-73. Sustainment mobility is the ability to support logistics, financial management, personnel services, and
HSS operations. Motor transport operations provide essential distribution and lift capabilities for supporting
sustainment mobility. The DSB's composite truck company requires augmentation to support sustainment
mobility. Without augmentation, the composite truck company's capacity is consumed with supporting
tactical mobility. The lack of augmentation requires BSBs to pull supplies from the division support area
instead of receiving supplies from the DSB. The FSCs in turn must then pull supplies from the BSA and push
supplies to the forward line of own troops multiple times a day. By design, maneuver brigades have two
mobile days of supplies with one day of supplies located at the FSC and one day of supplies located at the
BSB. The third day of supplies is not mobile and is stored at the BSA.
MISSION ANALYSIS: REQUIREMENTS, CAPABILITIES, AND
SHORTFALLS
5-74. For sustainment planning, the most important factors are requirements, capabilities, and shortfalls. For
example, insufficient transportation assets impact the ability of sustainment units to rapidly disperse or
displace. Extended supply lines present significant challenges to bulk petroleum distribution. Peer threats
impact the Army’s ability to outsource fuel distribution, forcing sustainment commands to use military assets
over extended supply lines. The inability to leverage OCS or host-nation assets may result in operational
pause or culmination before reaching an objective. Commanders and staffs at all echelons assess what is
needed to support the force, what is on hand, and how to mitigate any shortfalls in space and time. The results
developed by applying command and control systems and analytics in support of large-scale combat
operations differ from those during prevent operations in scope and composition, but the analytical process
is the same. The same is true of capability assessment.
5-75. Protection planning is a continuous process that must include a thorough understanding of the OE.
Sustainment planners must also consider requesting additional security and control measures (military police
escort, route clearance, checkpoints, traffic control posts) to protect movements or alleviate traffic concerns
along an area of a specific route. Sustainment planners must be active participants in the protection working
group to articulate, organize, and synchronize needed security resources and activities. Additional security
and control measures may be established to facilitate the movement of a single element, or they may be
established for a longer period of time to facilitate the movement of a number of elements along a given
route. The owner of an AO should apply protection measures within the AO along an established main supply
route or a route designated for unit movement when there is an increased enemy threat. See ADP 3-37 for
additional information on protection.
5-76. Maneuver brigades with organic BSBs and FSCs have relatively robust logistics capability to fulfill
maintenance requirements in most cases. However, a shortfall exists in armored and Stryker brigades because
these lack track and specialized armor maintenance capabilities beyond the FSC. Commanders in the two-
level maintenance system have multiple options available for maximizing maintenance capabilities. They
may choose to utilize maintenance surge teams in armored and Stryker brigades to address the shortfall in
maintenance capabilities. Commanders may want to consider echeloning maintenance and recovery assets to
maintain responsive support to sustain momentum and preserve combat power. Commanders may choose to |
4-0 | 124 | Chapter 5
utilize multiple maintenance collection points to optimize repair and limited recovery resources.
Commanders may also authorize battle damage assessment and repair, controlled exchange, or overrides to
deficiencies so equipment can be operated under the specific limitations directed by higher authority.
Establishing timelines, standards, and resources for these actions should be addressed in unit SOPs.
5-77. Figure 5-3 depicts an example of echeloned maintenance capabilities for an FSC in support of an
armored brigade. In this example, the FSC commander arrays the field maintenance section and recovery
section in three echelons. In the first echelon, a field maintenance team with two or more maintainers and a
tracked recovery vehicle are located in each of the company trains. The teams assist the company’s vehicle
operators and personnel with verifying faults, repairing minor issues, and ordering parts.
5-78. Vehicles requiring repairs that exceed the timelines established in unit SOPs are evacuated from the
company trains to the second echelon. In this example, the maintenance collection point containing the
majority of the FSC maintainers is the second echelon. The maintainers work on vehicles and equipment to
repair and return forward in accordance with unit SOP timelines.
5-79. Vehicles and equipment at the second echelon that exceed repair timelines in the unit SOP are further
evacuated to the third echelon shown as the BSA. The FSC commander keeps a small team of maintainers in
the field trains located in the BSA. Their role is to make a final attempt to repair equipment at field-level
maintenance before it is coded out and turned in for sustainment-level maintenance.
5-80. If the armored brigade must move forward, the maneuver commander must choose to either leave the
maintenance collection point in place, move the maintenance collection point forward with the unit, evacuate
the equipment in the maintenance collection point back to the BSA, or move the BSA forward to the
maintenance collection point. There is significant risk associated with each course of action and the
commander chooses the optimal one based on operational requirements.
Figure 5-3. Examples of echeloned maintenance support to an armored brigade
5-81. Maneuver brigades also have relatively robust logistics capability to fulfill other support requirements.
Their personnel services and medical capability is similar, with limitations and dependencies on EAB
formations and their support relationships. Field artillery units have organic sustainment organizations, but
lack certain capabilities (such as commodity maintenance, separate distribution, and brigade support medical
companies) that maneuver brigades possess.
5-82. Maneuver brigades most commonly execute supply point distribution to fulfill requirements by means
of logistics release points (LRPs). LRPs may be any place on the ground where distribution unit vehicles take |
4-0 | 125 | Sustainment Operations During Armed Conflict
supplies and are met by the supported unit that then takes the supplies forward to their unit for subsequent
distribution.
5-83. Units use LRPs to maximize efficient use of distribution assets and reduce the amount of time and
distance supported units must travel in order to receive supplies needed for missions. LRPs are often located
between the combat trains and the emplaced maneuver battalion’s company trains. They are normally
established and secured for only a limited duration. Resupply operations at LRPs are planned, coordinated,
and synchronized operations conducted to mitigate shortfalls. Figure 5-4 depicts an example of an LRP on a
battlefield.
Figure 5-4. Examples of a logistics release point
5-84. At EAB, Army sustainment capability is modular and based on the specific task organization of TSCs,
ESCs, TMCs, DSBs, sustainment brigades, MEDBDEs (SPT), TBXs, CSSBs, and DSSBs. Planners must
also consider other sources of support (for example, DLA, HNS, contracted support, and support from other
Services). As discussed in the previous chapter, planners assess support capabilities and build task
organizations. How these capabilities are arrayed on the battlefield forms the foundation of the sustainment
concept of support.
5-85. Analysis does not end with the formation of the task organization and concept of support. Commanders
and staffs track and assess readiness of systems, personnel, and equipment as a baseline for adjusting support
plans. The G-4 has coordinating staff integrating responsibility for the G-1, G-8, transportation officer, and
the surgeon. At the brigade and battalion levels, the S-4 is the primary staff officer for logistics. The G-4 or
S-4 prepares annex F (Sustainment), annex P (Host-Nation Support), and, in coordination with the AFSB and
CSB, prepares annex W (Operational Contract Support) with appendices 1, 2, and 3 (as these are key to
setting the theater for contracting support and completing the OPORD or OPLAN). The logistics planner in
the theater, corps, or division G-5 provides sustainment input to annex A (Task Organization), annex C
(Operations), and annex M (Assessment) to the OPORD or OPLAN. The G-1 prepares appendix 2 (Personnel
Services Support). The surgeon prepares appendix 3 (Health Service Support) of annex F and also appendix |
4-0 | 126 | Chapter 5
9 (Force Health Protection) of annex E (Protection). The sustainment staffs provide input to the operations
staffs for the COP. The G-9 refines the civil affairs operations aspects of the plan and order by publishing
Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations). In addition to Annex K, the civil affairs operations staff is involved in
the development of Annex V (Interagency Coordination), in conjunction with the G-3/S-3 and operations
staff. In addition, the civil affairs operations staff must take interest in Annex P (Host-Nation Support).
5-86. The sustainment staffs determine sustainment requirements for subordinate units, track the sustainment
status of subordinate units, and establish support priorities in accordance with the commander’s priorities
and intent. The S-4 or G-4 monitors logistics requirements, the S-1 or G-1 does the same for personnel
readiness, the S-8 or G-8 for financial management, and the surgeon for HSS. The staffs work in close
coordination with the sustainment organizations supporting their echelon.
5-87. For logistics, the primary staff section in the TSC and ESC is the DMC. For HR, the TPOC
synchronizes external HR support with the TSC DMC and the HROB within the ESC DMC and
DSB/sustainment brigade SPO sections. The surgeon sections within the ESC and DSB/sustainment brigade
plan and assess medical operations; this includes medical treatment, medical evacuation and regulating, and
medical logistics within ESC and sustainment brigade units. The ESC and DSB/sustainment brigade surgeons
advise their commanders on the health of the command and coordinate with the TMC and MEDBDE (SPT)
for AHS support at EAB. The ESC and DSB/sustainment brigade surgeon sections work closely with the
corps or division surgeon sections to ensure synchronization with medical evacuation, casualty evacuation,
and the distribution plans for Class VIII. The DSB, sustainment brigade, TBX, DSSB, CSSB, and BSB all
have SPO sections. The SPO staff supports the headquarters staff with the sustainment preparation of the OE
and determining supply, maintenance workload, and AHS support requirements. In a support unit, the unit’s
current operations cell maintains the COP with sustainment specific input from the unit DMC or SPO staff.
5-88. LOGSTAT and PERSTAT reports are tools used to collect data for tracking and assessing readiness of
systems, equipment, and personnel. Reports are primarily entered electronically through sustainment
automation systems when operating in a permissive environment. Data is stored, processed, and disseminated
using cloud computing. Cloud computing is a model for enabling convenient, on-demand network access to
a shared pool of configurable computing resources—networks, servers, storage, applications, and services—
that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction.
Users can access cloud services without geographic limitations, as long as they have a connection to the
Department of Defense Information Network. Commanders, staffs, and other users pull data from the cloud
to create valuable information in the form of a COP for informed decision-making. For additional information
on signal support operations see FM 6-02.
5-89. Commanders should not assume that cloud computing or continued connections to the Department of
Defense Information Network will be available in contested environments or during the conduct of large-
scale combat operations. Communication plans should include requirements for operating in denied,
degraded, or disrupted environments. These plans should identify primary, alternate, contingency, and
emergency plans for maintaining connectivity and submission of LOGSTAT and PERSTAT reports and
maintaining a COP. LOGSTAT and PERSTAT reports are submitted using available command and control
or sustainment information systems. The content of the reports generated are based upon the data and
information requirements of the commander and staff. Reports may be submitted via radio if required.
Commanders plan for LOGSTAT and PERSTAT report submission during periods of degraded
communications. Analog reports are a means for providing status reports during periods of denied, degraded,
or disrupted operations. Effective LOGSTAT and PERSTAT reporting requires command emphasis. The
timing of sustainment status report submissions is based on both the commander’s requirements and unit
battle rhythm. Typically, these reports are submitted at least once daily and whenever a significant change
occurs. The commander may require more frequent status updates during periods of increased intensity. See
appendix E for analog LOGSTAT and PERSTAT reports.
5-90. The Army has a deployed theater accountability system for use in a deployed theater. In the event the
deployed theater accountability system is not available (due to lack of bandwidth, degraded communications,
or other issues), manual reports such as the PERSTAT, personnel summary, and personnel requirements
report can be used. Within a deployed theater, the ASCC G-1/AG establishes PERSTAT reporting
requirements for unit strengths to include required “as of” times. When operating in a joint environment, the |
4-0 | 127 | Sustainment Operations During Armed Conflict
joint PERSTAT requires the same data elements as the PERSTAT. Standardized analog LOGSTAT and
PERSTAT reports are located in appendix E.
ASSESSMENT
5-91. Assessment is a continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing capabilities
during military operations (JP 3-0). Assessment is a critical part of planning considerations for sustainment
operations. Assessment allows commanders, staffs, and leaders to gain situational awareness of current
conditions and measure the effectiveness of sustainment operations. If conducted properly, assessment
provides commanders, staffs, and leaders with the necessary information to determine all sustainment support
requirements and adjust plans. Assessment should include the following requirements at a minimum:
• Assess the threats and hazards that may impact the freedom of sustainment operations throughout
the OE, as well as the suitability of protection resources and activities to meet current and future
operational objectives.
• Assess the status of the support capability of organic, attached, and assigned units. This includes,
but is not limited to, status of personnel strength, equipment readiness, critical equipment on hand,
critical supplies on hand by class, casualty status, organic medical capability (if applicable), and
operational losses. This information is used to determine support requirements by sustainment
function. It identifies problem areas such as combat ineffective units and shortages of critical
supplies such as precision munitions.
• Assess the status of supported units to determine specific sustainment requirements in order to
develop a concept of support that can effectively meet those requirements.
• Assess the status of sustainment support capability to determine if the support assets available have
the required capability to support operations. This assessment should determine if the sustainment
task organization is adequate to support the mission and identify shortfalls in terms of sustainment
functionality.
• Assess time to execute sustainment operations, as it should also be a factor in determining
sustainment support capability. Timing and windows for execution will vary during operations
against a peer threat. Planners must know the time available versus time to execute.
• Assess the OE to identify aspects that will present problems or cause difficulty in executing the
support concept. All operational and mission variables should be examined to determine if any
would impact the operation and impede freedom of action.
5-92. Ultimately, assessment allows commanders and staffs to diagnose problems and determine operational
adjustments needed to ensure the support concept is adequate to achieve the desired results. It also provides
commanders and staffs with information on how sustainment operations are progressing and identifies
problem areas where commanders can expect friction or conflict.
5-93. Assessment precedes and guides every operations process activity and concludes each operation or
phase of an operation. While assessment is listed as the last operations process task, it is continuous.
Throughout execution, staffs use running estimates to assess if support operations are occurring as planned
and if the desired results are being achieved. This information is passed up through the chain of command
and is compiled at each echelon. It must be reported parallel through maneuver and sustainment channels to
build a COP of the sustainment status.
5-94. Assessment should also determine specific sustainment functional gaps in capability and report to
higher headquarters for appropriate action. It includes, but is not limited to, the following:
• Status of required supplies by class of supply. This should be in terms of quantities on hand to allow
planners to balance on-hand quantities with required quantities. Planners should also assess supply
positioning to ensure supplies are positioned properly to support operations and priority efforts.
• Status of field maintenance capability to ensure it is adequate to repair damaged equipment to meet
operational readiness requirements and timetables. The assessment should include critical
maintenance equipment such as testing and fabrication equipment.
• Status of transportation capability to ensure it is adequate to transport required commodities. All
types of transportation assets should be assessed: light, medium, heavy, aircraft, aerial delivery,
water, rail, and petroleum transportation.
• Status of shower and laundry, field services, and mortuary affairs capability and location. |
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