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airspace users. Procedural control relies on common published procedures, designated airspace, and
promulgated instructions to activate ACMs and FSCMs to provide effective airspace management in
specified areas. Procedural control of airspace requires disciplined airspace users to follow guidance and
utilize planned and activated ACMs. The JAGIC TTP enables commanders to integrate surface fires with
airspace users. The JAGIC combines Army and Air Force personnel and equipment to maintain situational
awareness and communicate with affected airspace users and other airspace control elements within the OA.
For more information on the JAGIC see ATP 3-91.1.
3-99. Army components of the theater air-ground system who collectively coordinate and integrate airspace
use and are organic to Army brigades and higher are described in chapter 2 and include:
* Airspace Elements.
* JAGICs.
* FSEs.
* Air defense airspace management cells.
* Brigade aviation elements.
* Air and missile defense cells.
* BCDs.
3-100. Airspace elements do not routinely manage the flight path or trajectory of individual airspace users.
Rather, airspace elements integrate the individual airspace user’s planned airspace use for flight paths and
trajectories in planning and execution to manage risk. When two or more airspace users conflict, the airspace
elements direct changes in flight path of manned or UA, or coordinate with the FSE to alter the trajectory or
timing of fires. In some cases, the re-routing of aircraft flight paths is appropriate to accommodate the
delivery of surface-to-surface fires, while in other cases, alternative surface-to-surface fires options are used
to accommodate the delivery of air-to-surface fires. These changes are based on the commanders' mission
priorities and risk guidance. Pilots, UAS operators, and weapon system controllers (FSE, FDC) still maintain
the responsibility to make the directed changes to their flight path or trajectory. Staffs need to identify risk
during COA development and apply mitigation techniques to include the use of integrating ACMs and
FSCMs from PAA to TAIs. This reduces risk to airspace users and communicates the agreed to level of risk
in the supported commander’s plan.
3-101. The FSE coordinates FSCMs with ACMs through close interface with airspace elements and the
TACP. The airspace element works with the FSE to integrate FSCMs with the airspace plan. The airspace
element and the FSE review the ACO to ensure integration between FSCMs and ACMs. FSCMs are normally
sent to higher, lower, and adjacent HQ through fire support channels. In some cases, both the FSE and the
airspace element send related control or coordination measures through their respective channels. The
airspace element and the FSE ensure the SOPs and the airspace control appendix address the procedures for
forwarding FSCMs and associated ACMs through appropriate coordination channels. The airspace element
and the FSE review the ACO to see if there are any ACMs that have the potential to interfere with planned
surface-to-surface fires. If a conflict exists between the fire support plan and the ACO, the airspace element
coordinates with the higher airspace elements to either get approval to correct or modify the appropriate
airspace coordinating measure, or the FSE will have to modify the surface-to-surface fires plan.
3-102. Army planners at the senior tactical and operational levels must actively assist in the development
of the airspace control plan. This is critical if the divisions intend to request the authority to control division-
assigned airspace using the JAGIC technique. Division-assigned airspace is a volume of airspace in which
the airspace control authority has delegated the responsibility for control of that volume, in accordance with
the airspace control plan and ACO, to the JAGIC. Division-assigned airspace is typically between the lateral
boundaries of the division's AO, to include from the rear boundary to the FSCL, and upward to the
coordinating altitude. A JAGIC enabled division is suitably manned and equipped to procedurally control the
tactical airspace over the division AO up to the coordinating altitude. Using planning data from the fires and
aviation planners Army airspace planners can integrate Army airspace requirements into the unit airspace
plan. Integrated planning ensures that the location and altitude of key ACMs, that define division assigned
airspace such as the coordinating altitude, balance both air component and Army force requirements for
airspace. Fires planning data would include planned FA positions, max ordinate for artillery, mortar, rocket,
and missile systems, planned target locations, primary counter fire weapon system and units, and GS artillery
weapon systems. For more information on airspace control and management see FM 3-52 and JP 3-52. |
3-09 | 95 | Fire Support and the Operations Process
SECTION V – FIRE SUPPORT ASSESSMENT
3-103. Assessment is a continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing capabilities
during military operations (JP 3-0). It is also used to determine progress toward accomplishing a task, creating
a condition, or achieving an objective. Assessment involves continuously monitoring the situation and
evaluating progress of an operation. Assessment precedes and guides the other activities of the operations
process and concludes each operation or phase of an operation. However, the focus of assessment differs
during planning, preparation, and execution. During planning, assessment focuses on gathering information
to understand the current situation and developing an assessment plan. During preparation, assessment
focuses on monitoring the progress of readiness to execute the operation and helps to refine the plan.
Continuous assessment during execution is essential to adjusting operations based on changes in the situation.
Assessment during execution involves a deliberate comparison of forecasted outcomes to actual events, using
criterion to judge operational progress toward success.
3-104. Assessment is commander centric, and commanders maintain a personal sense of the progress of the
operation, shaped by conversations with senior and subordinate commanders and battlefield circulation.
Operation assessment complements the commander's awareness by methodically identifying changes in the
OE, identifying, and analyzing risks and opportunities, and formally providing recommendations to improve
progress toward mission accomplishment. Assessment should be integrated into the organization's planning
and operations battle rhythm to best support the commander's decision cycle.
3-105. As an essential part of the overall operation assessment, the staff will assess FS. Staffs should assess
how effectively the joint FS system supports forces in contact, supports the concept of operations, and
associated FS plan, synchronizes FS, and sustains/protects the FS system. Positive indicators include a
continuous flow of targeting information up and down the chain of command; availability of capabilities that
can create both lethal and nonlethal effects; access to the requested type of FS; consistent use of the most
effective FS; patterns of avoiding unnecessary duplication; civilian casualties and collateral damage; efficient
use of airspace; and prompt fire support for troops in contact, along with rapid coordination methods.
Negative indicators include insufficient creation of effects or achievement of objectives, patterns of friendly
fire incidents, or unanticipated or unacceptable amounts of civilian casualties or collateral damage.
3-106. Assessment Indicators. The staff should identify the specific pieces of information needed to infer
changes in the OE supporting them. These pieces of information are commonly referred to as indicators.
Indicators are relevant, observable, or collectible, responsive, and resourced. Assessment plans should
include both quantitative and qualitative indicators. An example of a fire support assessment indicator could
be the speed with which important information is communicated to, and acknowledged by, elements of the
FS system.
3-107. Operation assessments are an integral part of planning and execution of any operation, fulfilling the
requirement to identify and analyze changes in the OE and to determine the progress of the operation.
Assessments involve the entire staff and other sources such as higher and subordinate HQ, interagency and
multinational unified action partners, and other stakeholders. They provide perspective, insight, and the
opportunity to correct, adapt, and refine planning and execution to make military operations more effective.
Operation assessment applies to all levels of warfare and during all military operations. Operation assessment
applies during all military activities and operations, providing the opportunity for correction and adaptation.
Assessment mechanisms and the assessment processes may differ at the tactical, operational, theater, global,
and strategic levels, depending upon the commander’s pace of decision making and the OE analysis
capabilities. An operation assessment is a continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of
employing capabilities during military operations in achieving stated objectives. For more information on
assessments see JP 5-0.
3-108. Ultimately, operation assessment is a process that measures progress toward mission
accomplishment. The commander may direct the formation of a cell, whose primary function is to develop
and execute the assessment plan and to conduct assessments. The assessment cell is a cross-functional
organization with representatives from all staff sections, the SJA, subordinate units, and multinational and
interagency unified action partners. The assessment cell operates during both planning and execution phases
of an operation. FS may have a subordinate assessment team or working group that feeds the command's
assessment cell. For more information on developing and executing a FS assessment plan see JP 3-09. |
3-09 | 96 | Chapter 3
3-109. Combat assessment is the fourth phase of the Army targeting process decide, detect, deliver, and
assess, and the sixth phase of the joint targeting process. It is conducted at all levels of warfare. Combat
assessment evaluates the results of weapons and target engagement and thus provides data for fires and the
Army and joint targeting processes at all levels. Combat assessment is the determination of the overall
effectiveness of force employment during military operations (JP 3-60). Combat assessment is composed of
three major components: (a) BDA; (b) MEA; and (c) reattack recommendation.
3-110. BDA is an element of combat assessment and is the estimate of target damage or effect, which is
based on physical damage assessment, change assessment, and functional damage assessment, as well as
target system assessment, resulting from target engagement.
3-111. MEA is conducted concurrently and interactively with BDA and is the assessment of the military
force applied in terms of the weapon system and munitions effectiveness to determine and recommend any
required changes to the methodology, tactics, weapon system, munitions, fuzing, and/or weapon delivery
parameters to increase force effectiveness. MEA is primarily an operations responsibility, with support from
intelligence as documented in the MEA concept of the operation.
3-112. Reattack recommendation is an assessment derived from the results of BDA and MEA that provides
the commander systematic advice on reattack of targets and further target selection to achieve objectives.
The reattack recommendation is a combined operations and intelligence function. For more information on
combat assessment see FM 3-60 and JP 3-60.
ASSESSMENT WORKING GROUP
3-113. The assessment working group is the battle rhythm event that allows staffs to formally assess
changes in the OE and determine if effects are achieving operational objectives. After operations and target
execution have begun, it is imperative the assessment working group meets before the targeting working
group for the upcoming targeting cycle. This ensures the targeting team is armed with the most up to date
assessment of the OE and understands the progress toward operational objectives. Assessment is a key step
in Army and Joint targeting methodologies and thus makes the assessment working group and targeting
meetings inextricably linked in the battle rhythm. Targeting team members must participate in the assessment
working group as subject matter experts in the application and assessment of their respective effects on the
OE. Targeting specific related inputs to the assessment working group can include the following:
* Current assessment of enemy composition and disposition.
* Assessment of information collection operations during the assessed targeting cycle.
* All portions of the combat assessment from the assessed targeting cycle.
* Relevant Intelligence Analysis of effects created during the assessed targeting cycle that may not
have resulted in measurable BDA.
* All Warfighting functions must provide an assessment of their planned and executed effects for
the assessed targeting cycle. At a minimum if time is constrained the assessment should include:
Fires.
Maneuver.
Intelligence.
Sustainment.
3-114. Supporting organizations must provide an assessment of their planned and executed effects for the
assessed targeting cycle. Table 3-13. is an example assessment working group agenda as displayed in FM 6-
0.The assessment working group is executed in accordance with the organizational battle rhythm. For more
information of assessment working groups and their execution see FM 6-0 or ATP 5-0.3. |
3-09 | 97 | Fire Support and the Operations Process
Table 3-13 Assessment working group agenda (example)
General Information Participants
Title: Assessment working group. Staff lead: G-5.
Purpose: Assess progress of operations toward the Chair: Chief of staff.
mid- to long-range planning horizons. Members: Coordinating, special, and personal
Frequency: Weekly (IAW staff representatives; liaison officers; and others
Organizational Battle Rhythm as required.
to match targeting cycle).
Duration: Two hours.
Location: Plans cell.
Medium: Face-to-face, defense collaboration
services.
Inputs and Outputs Agenda (Responsibly Party)
Inputs: • Roll call (G-5).
• Assessment plan. • Plan review (G-5).
• Higher echelon, subordinate, and unified • Subordinate unit’s assessments (G-5,
action partner assessments. LNOs).
• Running estimates. • Unified action partner assessments (G-5,
LNOs).
Outputs:
• Updated assessment products. • Assessment discussions (staff leads).
• Recommended adjustments to the • Assessment summary (G-5).
assessment and information collection • Guidance (chief of staff).
plans.
• Assessment reports to higher
headquarters.
G-5 -- assistant chief of staff, plans, IAW -- in accordance with, LNO -- liaison officer |
3-09 | 99 | Chapter 4
Field Artillery Operations
This chapter provides a brief overview of the FA and its role and employment in large-
scale combat operations. Section I describes the role of the FA. Section II covers FA
organizations at echelons above brigade Section III covers FA capabilities in depth,
Section IV covers FA organization for combat, Section V discusses key considerations
for combat and Section VI covers fire direction.
SECTION I – THE ROLE OF THE FIELD ARTILLERY
4-1. The role of the FA is to destroy, neutralize, or suppress the enemy by cannon, rocket, and missile fire
and to integrate and synchronize all FS assets into operations.
4-2. The FA, as an integral part of the FS system, is responsible for participating in the planning,
preparation, and execution of lethal and nonlethal effects delivered by FA cannons, rockets, and missiles at
the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. This often includes simultaneous FA fires in support of decisive,
shaping, and sustaining operations, including counterfires. Deep fires, beyond the boundaries of tactical
operations under joint force control, may involve the delivery of operational-level fires directly supporting
the JFCs campaign plan. Such fires may have potential strategic effects.
4-3. FA contributes to operations by massing fires in space and time on single or multiple targets with
precision, near-precision, and area fire capabilities. The synchronized use of massed or selectively applied
FA fires in support of simultaneous decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations is intended to weaken the
enemy at all echelons and deny them the opportunity to hide or rest – effectively contributing to efforts to
impose multiple dilemmas on the enemy. FA can rapidly shift fires throughout the AO in support of the
scheme of maneuver, and to counter unforeseen enemy reaction to create the supported commander's desired
effects. FA cannons are classified according to caliber as mm:
* Light - 120-mm and less.
* Medium - 121 to 160-mm.
* Heavy - 161 to 210-mm.
* Very heavy - greater than 210-mm.
* Rockets - 298-mm.
* Missiles - 607-mm.
4-4. FA is the supported commander's principal means for providing continuous and responsive indirect
fires in support of large-scale combat operations. It can achieve surprise with the instantaneous delivery of
high volumes of fire without warning. As such, it is the most potent and responsive, 24-hour, all weather
combat multiplier available to supported commanders.
4-5. Organic, assigned, attached, or OPCON FA delivery assets include cannon, rocket, missile, and
hypersonic systems that range from tactical to strategic areas. FA provides continuously available fires under
all weather conditions and in all types of terrain. FA can shift and mass fires rapidly without having to
displace.
4-6. FA limitations include a firing signature that makes firing units vulnerable to an electromagnetic
signature susceptible to enemy electronic warfare interference and detection by enemy TA assets, limited
self-defense capability against ground and air attacks, and limited ability to engage moving targets. |
3-09 | 100 | Chapter 4
4-7. FA personnel, from company FIST through fires commands, integrate all means of FS – FA, mortars,
CEMA, and joint fires. FA personnel integrate and synchronize FS within the commander's scheme of
maneuver.
4-8. FA supports ground and air operations by attacking the enemy force throughout the depth of its
formations and provides specific target engagement such as SEAD. FA fires can provide simultaneous
precision strikes of targets at long ranges that other means cannot attack without significant risk. Strike is an
attack to damage or destroy an objective or a capability (JP 3-0). FA can quickly attack enemy forces on key
terrain, flanks, and in dead space, and enables the supported commander to economize and concentrate to
exploit advantages that arise.
4-9. As an element of the FS system TA is key to FA effectively providing timely and accurate artillery
fires. FA specific TA is accomplished by FOs and WLRs. In addition, supported commanders must also
integrate maneuver, UAS, other joint and national collection assets into the information collection plan.
SECTION II – FIELD ARTILLERY ORGANIZATIONS AT ECHELONS ABOVE
BRIGADE
4-10. To meet the JFC's objectives, the joint force synchronizes diverse fires assets from US and
multinational forces. Joint FS requires planning and detailed coordination to integrate and synchronize the
supporting commander's joint FS into the supported commander's operation.
4-11. FA HQ and organizations provide the theater, corps, and division commanders with the C2 and
synchronizing functions to integrate fires. These units at echelon are the TFC, theater fires element (TFE),
multidomain task force, FAB, and the DIVARTY. For more information on the FAB and DIVARTY see
ATP 3-09.24 and ATP 3-09.90.
THEATER FIRES COMMAND
4-12. A TFC will C2 organic assigned theater strategic fires capabilities and serve as the senior HQ assigned
to a theater army to integrate theater fires assets and execute critical fires functions. Theater strategic level
of warfare is the level of warfare at which combatant commanders synchronize with unified action partners
and employ all elements of national power to fulfill policy aims within the assigned theater in support of the
national strategy (FM 3-0). The TFC will develop, nominate, and integrate effects on joint targets across the
theater. The TFC supports joint targeting by continuously setting the theater and setting the conditions to
enable JFLCC/Field Army and corps operations in conflict. Setting the theater is the broad range of activities
continuously conducted to establish conditions for the successful execution of operations in a theater (FM 3-
0).
4-13. The TFC is assigned to an Army Service component command/Theater army to plan, coordinate,
synchronize, and employ multidomain fires to support the Joint Force Land Component Command (JFLCC),
theater army and the Joint Force Air Component Command (JFACC) throughout all periods of multi-domain
operations. The TFC provides the JFLCC/theater army and JFACC with a FFA HQ to integrate multidomain
fires against operational and strategic targets in armed conflict and provides strategic deterrence in
competition and crisis. The primary functions of the TFC are:
* The TFC provides strategic deterrence through forward positioning of Army fires and other
enablers in theater.
* Sets the theater for the rapid employment of multidomain fires and their effects through the
development and implementation of theater-level FSCMs in support of the strategic framework.
* Responsible for an integrated fires network.
* Serves as the land component commander’s (referred to as LCC) coordinating HQ for theater joint
targeting.
* Serve as a FFA HQ for the theater by assigning mission-specific HQs for counterfire, strike, or
setting the conditions for future operations. Also recommends command and support relationships
for all fires organizations in theater (including allies). |
3-09 | 101 | Field Artillery Operations
4-14. The TFC organizes, equips, and trains as a dedicated theater strategic level multidomain fires
organization in support of the JFLCC/theater army. The formation serves in assigned theater to provide the
Joint Force freedom of action during LSCO. The TFC provides strategic reach enabling the TFC to target
and defeat threat capabilities, creating multiple dilemmas for the enemy to gain positions of advantage for
Joint Force and ARFOR exploitation. The TFC roles include:
* Provide accurate and timely information to theater operations and intelligence processes.
* Provide early warning, reaction time, and maneuver space to the supported commander.
* Preserve combat power.
* Operate for extended duration at supporting distances.
* Facilitate movement and transitions for the supported theater commander.
* Facilitate echeloned C2 through situational understanding.
* Represent the theater army in the joint targeting process.
* Integrate coalition/multi-national fires.
THEATER FIRES ELEMENT
4-15. The TFE provides the JFLCC with the ability to accomplish joint force objectives, set the theater and
support the development of an integrated multidomain joint force. The element plans, coordinates,
synchronizes cross-domain fires in support of the JFLCC commander. They serve as the JFLCC's
coordinating element for theater joint targeting providing an integrated theater strategic fires capability.
4-16. The TFE is organized under the G3 and the lead staff proponent for resourcing and coordinating actions
for assigned fires HQs (multi-domain task force, BCD, FAB, Corps FSE). The TFE plans, coordinates, and
synchronizes Army fires in support of the Theater Joint Force Land Component Commander and serves as
the TFLCC's coordinating element for theater joint targeting in support of the Joint Force Commander (JFC).
When designated as a Joint Task Force (JTF), the TFE serves as the nucleus for the Joint Fires Element (JFE)
and is the integrating staff element that plans, coordinates, and synchronizes joint fires on behalf of the JTF
commander. The TFE is structured and organized to:
* Plan, coordinate, and synchronize Army fires in support of the TJFLCC.
* Integrates Joint and Multinational Fires during Theater Joint Targeting.
* Develop targets of ground component interest and shepherd them through the targeting B2C2WG
process (Target Discovery, BTD, ITD, ATD) for vetting and validation onto the joint target list
(JTL) and restricted target list (RTL).
* Lead staff proponent (governance, resourcing, and coordination actions) assigned Fires HQ
(multi-domain task force, BCD, FAB, Corps FSE) in the theater.
* Plan for set the theater activities in support of Campaign Plan and OPLAN.
* Lead integrators for Joint Fires Network (JFN), Fires COP, and AI/ML solutions into the digital
kill chain.
* Maintains situations awareness on the operations floor providing the commander's estimate of blue
and red fires.
* The TFE is not structured or organized to:
Serve as a FFA HQ.
Manage theater level counter fire fight.
Manage theater level fires ammunition.
No command authority to conduct mission command over assigned or attached fires
formations.
Note. If searching for the manning authorizations for the theater fires element (TFE) in the Army’s
Force Management System, the TFE is not found. In its place, you will find the Multidomain Fires
Element. |
3-09 | 102 | Chapter 4
FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE
4-17. A FAB's primary tasks are conducting corps-level strike operations and augmenting division setting
the conditions for future operations. The FAB provides the corps with the capability to mass effects during
shaping operations in the conduct of large-scale combat operations. The FAB can be task organized with
delivery and sensor systems to support mission requirements. A division, corps, JTF or other force may have
a FAB or its units attached or placed under OPCON. The FABs BNs are fully capable of providing DS to
joint, SOF and other joint units. When operating under the control of the JFC or another Service, the theater
Army commander or Army Forces commander exercises administrative control over the FAB. The FAB,
when designated by the JFC, corps, or division commander, can serve as a counterfire HQ, or be assigned a
counterfire mission. For more information on the FAB see ATP 3-09.24.
DIVISION ARTILLERY
4-18. DIVARTY controls the divisions' organic and attached FA units and indirect FS operations,
coordinating closely with the division FSE for continuous operations to the division main, tactical, and rear
area CP. To win in large-scale combat operations quickly, decisively and with minimum friendly causalities,
each division must be supported with the fires of additional FABs equipped with long range precision fires
capability. The DIVARTY can provide the counterfire HQ for the division. If allocated the necessary firing
units, the target processing section of the TA platoon, in conjunction with the DIVARTY CP, can be
designated to coordinate the counterfire fight for the division. For more information on DIVARTY
organization and operations see ATP 3-09.90.
4-19. The primary role of the DIVARTY is to facilitate shaping operations within the division AO. The
DIVARTY serves as the FFA HQ for the division. Additionally, the DIVARTY commander, as the senior
artilleryman in the division, is responsible for standardizing training for FA units that are assigned, attached,
or placed under the OPCON of the division. The DIVARTY commander will mentor the commanders and
leaders of these FA units and typically be assigned other key responsibilities on behalf of the division
commander. Those responsibilities could include management of the assigned or attached 13-series career
management field Soldiers, training oversight, and certification programs.
4-20. The DIVARTY is task organized with firing units based on mission requirements. Task organization
may include a combination of MLRS, or HIMARS, or cannon BNs as well as other enablers. The DIVARTY,
when allocated appropriate rocket and cannon units, brings a long range and precision FS capability to the
division. In large-scale combat operations, the corps commander may attach a FAB’s units to a DIVARTY
utilizing a support relationship. The division commander can task organize the division’s FA units to the
DIVARTY as necessary to support accomplishment of EFSTs.
FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE AND DIVISION ARTILLERY ROLE IN COUNTERFIRE
OPERATIONS
4-21. The corps or division commander can assign the role of counterfire HQ to a FAB, DIVARTY, or a
separate FA BN. The counterfire HQ must be allocated the necessary assets to conduct the counterfire fight.
The counterfire HQ will coordinate with the G-2 to integrate all available units into the counterfire fight in a
proactive manner. The counterfire HQ will require sensor tasking authority from higher HQ, SJA, intelligence
analysis augmentation, additional CAS, and attack helicopter allocation to include JTAC support. The
counterfire HQ duties include:
* Plan and coordinate sensor management.
* Conduct pattern analysis of enemy indirect fire systems.
* Based off pattern analysis conduct zone management in support of the counterfire fight.
* Recommend positioning of counterfire delivery systems.
* Write the TA tab to Annex D.
* Recommend counterfire TTP to facilitate permissive fires.
* Participate in the targeting process.
* Establish counterfire mission procedures and communications architecture. |
3-09 | 103 | Field Artillery Operations
4-22. FAB contributions to the overall counterfire effort include the responsibility to:
* Serve as the counterfire HQ if designated.
* Task organize FAB assets as directed by the supported command and FFA HQ to support the
counterfire fight.
* Plan and direct the counterfire fight for the supported command.
* Centralize the placement and control of detection assets and request additional sensor and attack
assets from higher or other services.
* Position firing assets that are dedicated to the counterfire fight.
* Establish and maintain communications with all acquisition and delivery assets.
* Detect counterfire targets with FA organic assets, reinforced by collection assets allocated by the
supported formation.
* Attack threat FS systems with MLRS/HIMARS, Army Aviation, air component sorties, and
ground maneuver forces that may be available for target attack.
4-23. The DIVARTY can provide the counterfire HQ for the division. If allocated the necessary firing units,
the target processing section of the TA platoon, in conjunction with the DIVARTY CP, can be designated
and coordinate the counterfire fight for the division.
4-24. WLRs supporting the counterfire HQ send all acquisitions acquired by the radars to the counterfire cell
of the counterfire HQ. Counterfire targets are usually generated from CFZs or CFFZs. Targets that meet
target selection standards and are determined to be safe are immediately routed to the dedicated counterfire
delivery unit for execution.
SECTION III – FIELD ARTILLERY CAPABILITIES IN DEPTH
4-25. Deep and simultaneous attacks, executed at increasingly longer range and with precision, are key
elements for division, corps, and JFCs in setting the conditions on the battlefield and accelerating the enemy's
defeat. In both offense and defense, deep operations are conducted to isolate, immobilize, and weaken the
enemy in depth, using fire, maneuver, or a combination of the two. Deep FA fires may be used to limit the
enemy's ability to shift forces to meet attacking friendly maneuver forces and to sustain the momentum of
the attack. Deep fires limit, delay, or disrupt the enemy's attacking echelons and FS, C2, communications,
and logistics. They are intended to reduce the enemy's rate of arrival in the close area to a level manageable
by supported commanders.
4-26. FA systems are fully capable of conducting deep precision strikes and massing fires under all weather
conditions, day, or night. They provide joint and land component commanders the capability to engage HPTs
when and where required. Precision strikes are also important factors in consolidation of gains and stability
operations where the threat of collateral damage is often of primary concern. Collateral damage is a form of
collateral effect that causes unintentional or incidental injury or damage to persons or objects that would not
be lawful military targets in the circumstances ruling at the time (JP 3-60).
4-27. As part of deep operations, proactive TA, and FA counterfires can affect threat indirect fire systems
before they have a major influence on the battle. Similarly, deep attack can interdict or attrit enemy maneuver
forces, surface-to surface missile systems, and logistic units/facilities; alter combat power ratios; and limit
an opponent's freedom of action while simultaneously enhancing friendly options and force protection. FA
fires, either separately or as part of joint and combined arms missions, assist with SEAD and SCAR.
4-28. At corps and division levels, close operations during the offense or defense are undertaken to win the
current battle or engagement. Close operations are tactical actions of subordinate maneuver forces and the
forces providing immediate support to them, whose purpose is to employ maneuver and fires to close with
and destroy enemy forces (FM 3-0). FA fires, in the form of preparations, counterfires, and SEAD support
friendly schemes of maneuver by assisting in denying the enemy favorable avenues of approach, helping
maneuver forces control terrain, and defeating attacks. Counterfires engage enemy artillery and other indirect
fire systems to preserve friendly fighting forces and combat capabilities. They give supported elements the
freedom to maneuver, while obscuration smoke hides friendly movements and illumination exposes enemy
formations at night. Close fires are normally the main concern of DS FA BNs whose fires in support of forces
in contact may be augmented by fires from DIVARTY and FAB units. Commanders and planners must |
3-09 | 104 | Chapter 4
ensure that supported forces receive an appropriate share of available FS to include security forces and
reserves upon commitment.
4-29. Support area operations are conducted to ensure that friendly forces retain freedom of action to support
combat forces engaged in deep and close operations. FA assets are seldom sufficient to dedicate firing units
to consolidation and support area as their sole or primary mission. FA commanders, in the role as FSCOORD,
may assign on-order support relationships to support corps or division rear area operations. They can also
meet rear area FA support requirements by assigning GS and GSR support relationships to cannon units to
range rear and support areas while continuing to perform their primary support relationships. A support area
is the portion of the commander’s area of operations that is designated to facilitate the positioning,
employment, and protection of base sustainment assets required to sustain, enable, and control operations
(ADP 3-0).
SECTION IV – FIELD ARTILLERY ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT
4-30. Successful execution of large-scale combat operations requires careful planning of limited FA
resources and the coordinated employment of TA and assessment means. FSCOORDs and FSEs on corps
and division staffs ensure adequacy in support of operations by varying allocation and control of available
FS resources to include FA formations.
4-31. The corps commander may allocate MLRS/HIMARS units to the divisions utilizing command and
support relationships. The division FSCOORD recommends to the division commander the establishment of
support relationships of FA units in large-scale combat operations. The division commander should consider
assigning the BCT organic FA BNs as OPCON to the DIVARTY prior to execution of operations.
4-32. The FA commander recommends to the supported commander the command and support relationships
of FA units supporting the operation, regardless if they are organic or assigned. This information is vital to
planning fire support for tactical operations.
4-33. Task-organizing is the act of designing a force, support staff, or sustainment package of specific size
and composition to meet a unique task or mission (ADP 3-0). Characteristics to examine when task-
organizing the force include, but are not limited to, training, experience, equipment, sustainability, operating
environment, enemy threat, and mobility. For Army forces, task-organizing includes allocating available
assets to subordinate commanders and establishing their command and support relationships. The objective
of FA-organization is to ensure that each FA unit has an established command relationship or support
relationship that best supports the supported commander's concept of the operation. Dynamic task-organizing
during operations is one way to ensure FA assets are never in reserve.
4-34. The FSCOORD, chief of fires and brigade FSO analyze the mission variables of METT-TC (I),
evaluate the FA assets available and recommend a command or support relationship for each FA unit to the
supported commander. The supported commander approves the FA task organization, which is subsequently
reflected in the OPLAN/OPORD and FS plan. Commanders never place artillery in reserve.
4-35. Commanders consider mutual support when task-organizing FA. Mutual support is that support which
units render each other throughout joint operations, because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to
each other and to the enemy, or their inherent capabilities (JP 3-31). Mutual support exists when positions
and units support each other by direct and/or indirect fire and/or nonlethal activities. Mutual support increases
the strength of all defensive positions, prevents defeat in detail, and helps prevent infiltration between
positions. Supporting range is the distance one unit may be geographically separated from a second unit yet
remain within the maximum range of the second unit's weapons systems (ADP 3-0). Although a FA unit may
be in supporting range of a supported unit, the communications capability must also be considered. If the unit
needing support cannot communicate with the supporting unit, the range capability of a weapon system or
its proximity to the supported force has no effect on the outcome of an operation. For more information on
mutual support see ADP 3-90 and FM 3-90. |
3-09 | 105 | Field Artillery Operations
THE PRINCIPLES OF FIRE SUPPORT EXECUTION APPLIED TO
FIELD ARTILLERY ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT
4-36. Commanders and staffs must consider the principles of FS execution referred to as the memory aid
AWIFM-N when planning the integration of fires into an operation. FS execution principles AWIFM-N
considerations are:
ADEQUATE FIRE SUPPORT FOR THE COMMITTED UNITS
4-37. In large-scale combat operations the minimum adequate FA for committed units is normally one FA
BN for each committed brigade. If a brigade is not committed, commanders must consider assigning a support
relationship of the uncommitted brigade's artillery BN to a committed unit.
4-38. Commanders never place artillery in reserve. Commander's utilize command and support relationships
to weight the main effort.
WEIGHT TO THE MAIN EFFORT
4-39. The main effort can be weighted by a variety of ways:
* R or GSR support relationships can be assigned to provide additional responsive fires to the
supported forces in contact.
* FA units can be positioned and assigned directions of fire to concentrate their fires in the
appropriate AO. In this manner, units in a GS support relationship can add weight to the main
attack or strength to the most vulnerable area.
* FA ammunition may be allocated to provide for more support in a specific area.
* Priority of FA fires given to the main effort (decisive operation).
4-40. Support relationships from GS to DS provide increasing responsiveness to the main effort's
commander. Minimal essential FS can be allocated to setting the conditions for future operations.
IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE FIRE SUPPORT FOR THE COMMANDER TO INFLUENCE THE
OPERATION
4-41. The force commander should establish command or support relationships for available artillery with
which the commander can immediately influence the operation. The practice of establishing FA support
relationships of GS and GSR enhances flexibility and facilitates ability to provide immediately responsive
fires for the force.
4-42. The artillery commander maintains the capability to shift fires rapidly and add weight when enemy
vulnerabilities are detected, or the force is threatened. As the engagement unfolds, the supported commander
may shift the priority of fires to exploit opportunities as they are presented.
FACILITATE FUTURE OPERATIONS
4-43. Future operations can be facilitated by the assignment of a command or support relationship, the
positioning of FA, and the allocation and positioning of ammunition (to include combat configured loads and
ammunition issued for immediate consumption).
4-44. The assignment of GS and GSR support relationships, as well as on-order command or support
relationships enables the transition to a future mission. Another way to facilitate future operations is to modify
the current command or support relationship in accordance with anticipated requirements. Commanders can
apply CSR to FA units to ensure planned future operations are adequately supported.
Maximum Feasible Centralized Control
4-45. The optimum degree of centralized control varies with each tactical situation. A high degree of
centralized control is preferred in a defensive situation. Since the enemy has the initiative, it is difficult to
accurately predict where and when the enemy will attack. |
3-09 | 106 | Chapter 4
4-46. The commander cannot afford to dissipate fires capabilities on secondary priorities before determining
the enemy's main effort. Less centralized control is essential in an offensive situation because the supported
force has the initiative and unforeseen opportunities require responsive fires to exploit.
Never Place Artillery in Reserve
4-47. Commanders should not place artillery in reserve but may give a change to its support relationship
ensuring artillery is not held in reserve and adequate support is provided to the main effort. These changes in
support relationships can be identified by an on-order mission. An example of an on-order mission is "1-52
FA: GSR 1-50 FA; on-order R 1-50 FA."
4-48. In addition to never leaving FA in reserve and the FS execution principles of AWIFM-N, FA
commanders and FS personnel also consider mission, ammunition, and positioning when planning for FA
system employment. Considerations are:
* Mission. Appropriate FA unit command support relationships assigned based on the commander's
intent and the overall situation.
* Ammunition. Allocate ammunition to provide more support for the main effort. Ensure adequate
ammunition for future operations through positioning, ammunition restrictions, or CSR
parameters during execution and planning.
* Positioning. Continually re-position FA units, ammunition, TA resources, CPs, and assets to best
support the plan as it is being executed. Assign direction of fire to mass fires in the appropriate
AO.
FIELD ARTILLERY INHERENT RESPONSIBILITIES IN ARMY
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
4-49. FA cannon, rocket, and missile systems that are organic, assigned, attached to, or under the OPCON
of FABs, DIVARTY, and BCTs provide commanders with continuously available, adjustable, and tailored
fires under all weather conditions and in all types of terrain. These organizations can be task-organized with
maneuver or supported unit to provide the right combination of indirect fires capabilities for a given situation.
4-50. Command relationships provide the basis for ensuring unity of command and unity of effort in
operations. Command relationships are used in Army force generation, force tailoring, and task-organizing.
Command relationships define superior and subordinate relationships between unit commanders. By
specifying a chain of command, command relationships unify effort and enable commanders to use
subordinate forces with maximum flexibility. Army command relationships identify the degree of control of
the gaining commander. The type of command relationship often relates to the expected longevity of the
relationship between the HQ involved and quickly identifies the degree of support that the gaining and losing
Army commanders provide:
* Organic is assigned to and forming an essential part of a military organization as listed in its table
of organization for the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps, and are assigned to the operating
forces for the Navy (JP 1, Vol 2).
* Assign is to place units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively
permanent, and/or where such organization controls and administers the units or personnel for the
primary function, or greater portion of the functions, of the unit or personnel (JP 3-0).
* Attach is the placement of units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively
temporary (JP 3-0).
* Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate
forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating
objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission (JP 1, Vol 2).
* Tactical control is the authority over forces that is limited to the detailed direction and control of
movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks
assigned (JP 1, Vol 2). |
3-09 | 107 | Field Artillery Operations
FIELD ARTILLERY INHERENT RESPONSIBILITIES IN ARMY
SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS
4-51. In the past, DS, R, GSR, and GS were referred to as FA tactical missions. These tactical missions are
now referred to as support relationships and are used by the rest of the Army to task-organize forces.
4-52. Army support relationships are not a command authority and are more specific than the joint support
relationships. Commanders establish support relationships when subordination of one unit to another is
inappropriate. Commanders assign support relationships when: the support is more effective if a commander
with the requisite technical and tactical expertise controls the supporting unit rather than the supported
commander; the echelon of the supporting unit is the same as or higher than that of the supported unit; or the
supporting unit supports several units simultaneously (ADP 5-0). Organic FA BNs can be assigned a support
relationship by the FFA HQ of the supported command.
4-53. Support relationships allow commanders to employ their units' capabilities to achieve the desired
results required by supported commanders. Support relationships are graduated from an exclusive supported
and supporting relationship between two units-as in DS-to a broad level of support extended to all units under
the control of the higher HQ-as in GS. Support relationships do not normally alter administrative control.
Support relationships are used to task-organize for a mission. FA units may be assigned a support relationship
of DS, R, GSR, or GS.
4-54. The seven FA inherent responsibilities (see table 4-1 on page 4-11) supplement the inherent
responsibilities of an Army support relationship. For more information on command and support
relationships see FM 3-0.
DIRECT SUPPORT
4-55. Joint doctrine considers direct support a mission rather than a support relationship. For the Army, and
FA, direct support is a support relationship requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing
it to answer directly to the supported force's request for assistance (FM 3-0). A FA unit in DS of a maneuver
unit is concerned primarily with the fire support needs of only that unit. The FSE of the supported maneuver
unit plans and coordinates fires to support the maneuver commander's intent.
4-56. The commander of a unit in DS recommends position areas and coordinates for movement clearances
where his unit can best support the supported commander's concept of the operation. When FA units are able
to habitually support the same supported force, coordination and training are enhanced. DS is the most
decentralized support relationship.
REINFORCING
4-57. Reinforcing is a support relationship requiring a force to support another supporting unit (FM 3-0).
Only like units (for example artillery to artillery) can be given an R support relationship. An R support
relationship requires one FA unit to augment the fires of another FA unit.
4-58. When an organic or DS FA BN requires more fires to meet supported force requirements, another FA
BN may be directed to reinforce it. An organic or DS FA BN may be supported by up to 2 R BNs. A FA unit
assigned an R support relationship retains its command relationship with its parent unit but is positioned by
the reinforced FA unit and has priorities of support established by the reinforced FA unit, then the parent
unit.
GENERAL SUPPORT-REINFORCING
4-59. General support-reinforcing is a support relationship assigned to a unit to support the force as a whole
and to reinforce another similar type unit (FM 3-0). The first priority of a FA unit assigned a GSR support
relationship is to furnish artillery fires for the supported force as a whole; the second priority is to reinforce
the fires of another FA unit. |
3-09 | 108 | Chapter 4
4-60. A GSR unit remains under the control of the supported maneuver commander or his FFA HQ. The
GSR support relationship offers the commander the flexibility to meet the requirements of a variety of tactical
mission tasks.
GENERAL SUPPORT
4-61. General support is support which is given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular
subdivision thereof (JP 3-09.3). A FA unit assigned a support relationship of GS of a force has all its fires
under the immediate control of the supported commander or his designated FFA HQ.
4-62. Among Army support relationships, GS provides the highest degree of centralized control of fires. This
provides the commander flexibility to facilitate ongoing operations. |
3-09 | 109 | Field Artillery Operations
Table 4-1. The Seven Field Artillery inherent responsibilities in Army support relationships
Answers
Has its
Army calls for Has as its Furnish Establish Is
Furnishes fires
support fire in zone of liaison COMM Positioned
(FIST): planned
relationship priority fire: officer: with: by:
by:
from:
1.
Provides
Supported
unit. AO of temporary Supported Supported Supported
Direct REP for HQ and
2. supported No RQMNT unit or FFA unit or FFA
Support casualty FSO as
Own unit. losses as required HQ HQ
Observers.1
required
3.FA HQ2
1.
Reinforced Zone of To Reinforced
FA fire of reinforced FA unit HQ Reinforced Reinforced
Reinforcing No RQMNT FA unit HQ
2.Own Reinforced or as FA unit HQ. FA unit HQ
or as
Observers.1 FA. required. required
3.FA HQ2
1.
AO of
Supported
supported 1.
unit. To 1.
unit to Reinforced Supported
General 2.FA HQ.2 include reinforced FA unit HQ Supported unit.
Support 3. No RQMNT FA unit HQ unit.
zone of or as
Reinforcing Reinforced or as 2.FFA
unit. fire of required. required HQ.2 2.FFA
reinforced HQ.2
4.Own
FA unit.
Observers.1
1.
Supported 1. 1.
unit AO of FFA HQ or Supported Supported
General Supported No RQMNT No RQMNT Supported unit. unit.
Support 2.FFA HQ 2
unit. Unit 2.FFA 2.FFA
3.Own HQ.2 HQ.2
Observers
Note: (1). Includes all target acquisition means not deployed with the supported unit. In NATO, the gaining unit may not
task-organize.
Note: (2). If designated by the support commander.
AO – area of operation, COMM – communications, FA – field artillery, FFA – force field artillery, FIST – fire support team,
FSO – fire support officer, HQ – headquarters, REP – replacement, RQMNT -- requirement
NONSTANDARD FIELD ARTILLERY SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS
4-63. Commanders sometimes use a nonstandard support relationship. In many cases, this is simply a
variation of a standard support relationship (DS, R, GSR, or GS) when there are not sufficient FA assets to
cover all the contingencies, or if a FA unit is assigned more than one support relationship over a time period.
4-64. A nonstandard support relationship is also a means by which the commander can tailor his FA assets
in anticipation of future operations. A nonstandard support relationship may involve limitations or guidance
concerning ammunition, positioning, or other critical factors. Examples of nonstandard FA support
relationships include:
* 110 FAB: GSR 7 FAB; do not exceed 25 percent of the CSR in support of 7 FAB.
* 1-89 FA (MLRS, M270A1): GS; provide liaison officer to the corps FSE. |
3-09 | 110 | Chapter 4
SECTION V – KEY CONSIDERATIONS FOR FIELD ARTILLERY EMPLOYMENT
4-65. FA organizations employ indirect fire capabilities which are versatile and responsive, to create desired
effects. In order to create effects, FA units employ and integrate joint fires, cannons, rockets, missiles, and
TA assets. FA units are as mobile and deployable as the forces they support. Indirect fires include anything
from a single precision munition, precision-guided munition, to a multiple BN mass mission.
4-66. A precision munition is a munition that corrects for ballistic conditions using guidance and
control up to the aimpoint or submunitions dispense with terminal accuracy less than the lethal radius
of effects. (Excalibur, GMLRS, ATACMS) A precision-guided munition is a guided weapon intended to
destroy a point target and minimize collateral damage (JP 3-03). In order to deliver fires, FA units must:
* Meet the five requirements for accurate predicted fires.
* Be proactive and responsive to create the desired effects.
* Mass fires.
FIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR ACCURATE PREDICTED FIRES
4-67. The goal of any indirect firing unit is to achieve accurate first-round fire for effect (FFE) on a target.
Fire for effect is a command to indicate that fire for effect is desired; fire that is intended to achieve the
desired result on target (TC 3-09.81). In order to accomplish this goal an artillery unit must compensate for
nonstandard conditions as completely as time and the tactical situation permit. There are five requirements
for achieving accurate first-round FFE. These requirements are accurate target location and size, accurate
firing unit location, accurate weapon and ammunition information, accurate MET information, and accurate
computational procedures. If these requirements are met, the firing unit will be able to deliver accurate and
timely fires in support of the ground-gaining arms. If the requirements for accurate fire cannot be met
completely, the firing unit may be required to use adjust-fire missions to engage targets. Adjust-fire missions
can result in reduced effect on the target, loss of surprise, increased ammunition expenditure, and greater
possibility that the firing unit will be detected by hostile TA assets.
* Accurate Target Location and Size. Establishing the range from the weapons to the target
requires accurate and timely detection, identification, and location of ground targets. Determining
their size and disposition on the ground is also necessary so that accurate firing data can be
computed. Determining the appropriate time and type of attack requires that the target size (radius
or other dimensions) and the direction and speed of movement are considered. Target location is
determined by using TA. Target location error is the difference between the coordinates generated
for a target and the actual location of the target (JP 3-09.3). The following are the target location
error categories expressed by circular error (CE) on ground expressed in feet (ft) and m:
CAT I : CE 0-20 ft/0-6 m
CAT II: CE 21-50 ft/7-15 m
CAT III: CE 51-100 ft/16-30 m
CAT IV: CE 101-300 ft/31-91 m
CAT V: CE 301-1000 ft/92-305 m
CAT VI: CE > 1000 ft/>305 m
* Accurate Firing Unit Location. Accurate range and deflection from the firing unit to the target
requires accurate weapon location. Survey techniques and on-board navigation systems are used
to determine the location of each weapon. See the following survey section and ATP 3-09.02.
* Accurate Weapon and Ammunition Information. The actual performance of the weapon is
measured by the weapon muzzle velocity (velocity with which the projectile leaves the muzzle of
the tube) for a projectile-propellant combination. The firing battery can measure the achieved
muzzle velocity of a weapon and correct it for nonstandard projectile weight and propellant
temperature; this is done through use of the muzzle velocity systems. The corrections that the
muzzle velocity system makes are similar to those found in the muzzle velocity correction table.
Calibration should be conducted continuously by using the muzzle velocity system. Firing tables
and technical gunnery procedures allow the unit to consider specific ammunition information |
3-09 | 111 | Field Artillery Operations
(projectile square weight, fuze type, and propellant temperature); thus, accurate firing data are
possible.
* Accurate Meteorological Information. The effects of weather on the projectile in flight must be
considered, and firing data must compensate for those effects. Firing tables and technical gunnery
procedures allow the unit to consider specific weather information (air temperature, air
density/pressure, wind direction, and wind speed) in determining accurate firing data.
* Accurate Computational Procedures. The computation of firing data must be accurate. Manual
and automated techniques are designed to achieve accurate and timely delivery of fire. The balance
between accuracy, speed, and the other requirements discussed in this chapter should be included
in the computational procedures.
Note. Nonstandard Conditions. If the five requirements for accurate predicted fire cannot be met,
the FDC needs to take steps to improve firing data. For more information see TC 3-09.81.
SURVEY
4-68. FA survey is critical to the first two requirements for accurate predicted fire. FA survey must provide
indirect fire assets and target locating assets with a common grid. The common grid refers to all firing and
target-locating elements within a unified command located and oriented to prescribed accuracies with respect
to a single three-dimensional datum (ATP 3-09.02). Common survey allows the supported commander to
employ FS resources with a guarantee of accurate and timely FS. Common control is the horizontal and
vertical map or chart location of points in the target and position area, tied in with the horizontal and vertical
control in use by two or more units (ATP 3-09.02). Survey planning within the force is based on the following
tactical considerations:
* The commander's target adjustment policy (that is, if the element of surprise is an important aspect
of his tactical plan).
* The requirement for transfer of adjusted target locations to higher and lower echelons.
* The required attack of HPTs onto which fire cannot be adjusted (or if surprise is a factor).
* The planned positioning of indirect fire units during each phase of the operation.
* The planned tasking of TA sensors and the processing of targets to an attack system.
4-69. The supported HQ establishes survey timelines and accuracy requirements in the initial planning stages
of an operation based on the commander's guidance. The supported commander gives the FA BN commander
targeting priorities and the effects required on HPTs. This information translates into survey requirements
for the TA sensors and the designated attack systems, which must be on a common grid by the time required.
The effects on the target and inherent system inaccuracies determine the survey accuracy requirement (hasty,
fourth-order, or fifth-order survey).
4-70. There is no longer a military occupational specialty dedicated solely to survey. This creates a need to
train non-survey soldiers on how to operate the survey equipment. The commander designates the personnel
to train and form the survey team. The survey team provides survey for the unit. The survey equipment is
assigned to the FA BN. For more information on survey see ATP 3-09.02.
PROVIDE PROACTIVE AND RESPONSIVE FIRES THAT CREATE
DESIRED EFFECTS
4-71. Effective gunnery, TA, weapons, munitions, C2 are essential for proactive and responsive FA fires to
supported forces. Procedures must be streamlined to minimize the time between the proactive acquisition of
a target, the call for fire, and the responsive delivery of fires. A call for fire is a standardized request for
fire containing data necessary for obtaining the required fire on a target. Unnecessary delay can result
in a failure to have desired effects on the target. Responsiveness can be achieved by:
* Training especially digital sustainment training.
* Streamlining the call for fire through use of digital systems.
* Planning FS requirements in advance. |
3-09 | 112 | Chapter 4
* Establish a permissive battlefield design, to include airspace.
* Establish permissive FSCMs.
* Rehearsals, especially FA technical rehearsals.
* Time on target.
* Continually training observers in all aspects of FS.
* Limiting radio transmissions on fire nets to time-sensitive, mission-essential traffic only.
4-72. The effectiveness of fires on a target will depend, in part, on the method of fire and type of ammunition
selected to attack the target. The desired effects are created through proper weaponeering, accurate initial
fires, and massed fires. Weaponeering is the process of determining the specific means required to create a
desired effect on a given target (JP 3-60).
4-73. The FA has the ability to deliver effects on a target from multiple formations to engage a target
simultaneously. An essential capability to disrupting the enemy's A2/AD systems is our ability to mass fires.
MASSED FIRES
4-74. Massed fire is fire from a number of weapons directed at a single point or small area (JP 3-02). The
FSCOORD needs to maximize the number of units massing across the fires formation to create the required
effect in the specified EFAT. For more information on EFATs see appendix A. Massing fires within a firing
unit distributes ammunition consumption and lessens the sustainment problem for the FA unit. Further,
synchronized mass fires increase the lethality of the delivered munition by preventing the adversaries' ability
to react to multiple volleys.
4-75. Massed fires maximize effectiveness of the initial volley on the intended target. Massing all available
fires enables the supported commander to maximize the effect of fires on a target or targets. Fires can also
be massed in time (striking multiple targets at the same time) to overwhelm the enemy's ability to react. The
desired effect is created through fires delivered in an instant; since these fires limit the enemy's time to react
and seek protection. Massed fires ensure maximum effect in attacking targets that can easily change their
posture.
Operation Desert Storm.
In a 15 May 1991 letter to the Commandant of the FA School, Major General Raphael
J. Hallada (1987–1991), about the US VII Corps’ 24 February 1991 breaching
operation, the Commanding General of the 1st Infantry Division, Major General
Thomas G. Rhame, related: The performance of the FA in combat has caused all of
us to remember what we had perhaps forgotten, namely its incredible destructive
power and shock effect. The preparation fires I witnessed prior to our assault on the
breachline were the most incredible sight I have seen in 27 years of service. On 24
February 1991 Commander of the US VII Corps Artillery, Brigadier General Creighton
Abrams Jr., and the Commander of the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) Artillery,
Colonel Michael L. Dodson assembled the FA force. In support of the US VII Corps
assault, General Abrams allocated the 42d, 75th, and 142d FA Brigades, two division
artilleries, and 10 Multiple Launch Rocket System batteries to create a Soviet-style
attack at the breach area. General Abrams positioned approximately 22 artillery pieces
for each kilometer of the attack zone. More than 350 FA pieces fired 11,000 rounds
while M270 Multiple-Launch Rocket Launchers shot 414 rockets in a FA preparation
of 30 minutes. Besides crushing Iraqi morale, this massed fires destroyed 50 tanks,
139 armored personnel carriers, and 152 FA pieces.
SECTION VI – FIRE DIRECTION
4-76. Fire direction is the tactical employment of firepower exercising the tactical command of one or more
units in the selection of targets, the concentration and distribution of fire, and the allocation of ammunition |
3-09 | 113 | Field Artillery Operations
for each mission; the methods and techniques used to convert target information into the appropriate fire
commands (TC 3-09.81). A fire direction center is that element of a command post, consisting of gunnery
and communications personnel and equipment, by means of which the commander exercises fire direction
and/or fire control (JP 3-09.3). The FDC receives target intelligence and requests for fire and translates them
into appropriate fire direction.
4-77. The FDC provides timely and effective tactical and technical fire control in support of current
operations. Fire control is all operations connected with the planning, preparation, and actual application of
fire on a target (TC 3-09.81). The FDC is the control center for the gunnery team. The FDC personnel receive
calls for fire through the AFATDS, or by voice. The FDC will then process that information by using tactical
and technical fire direction procedures.
TACTICAL FIRE DIRECTION
4-78. Tactical fire direction is primarily performed at the FA BN FDC. Tactical fire direction includes
processing calls for fire and determining appropriate method of fire, ammunition type and quantity, unit(s)
to fire, and time of attack. The fire direction officer's decision on how to engage the target is concisely stated
as a fire order.
4-79. A fire order is the fire direction officer's decision on what unit(s) will fire and how much and what
type of ammunition will be fired. It is based on the fire direction officer's analysis of the target. The objectives
of tactical fire direction include:
* Providing continuous, accurate, and responsive fires in all conditions.
* Maintaining the flexibility to engage various target types over wide frontages.
* Massing the fires of available units.
* Engaging a number and variety of targets simultaneously.
TECHNICAL FIRE DIRECTION
4-80. Technical fire direction is the process of converting weapon and ammunition characteristics (such as
muzzle velocity, propellant temperature, and projectile weight), weapon and target locations, and MET
information into firing data. Firing data is all data necessary for firing a weapon at a given target. FA firing
data are determined by use of various firing tables and equipment. These tables contain the fire control
information under standard conditions and data correcting for nonstandard conditions. Whether this process
is done through an automated system or manually, the process is the same.
4-81. Firing data provided to both cannon and MLRS units includes the number and type of munitions/shell,
fuze setting and aim point(s), allowing the platform to compute its own firing data (deflection and quadrant
elevation). Deflection is the setting on the weapon sight to place the line of fire in the desired direction. The
azimuth of fire is the direction, expressed in mils, that a firing unit is laid (oriented) on when it occupies a
position (ATP 3-09.50). Cannon units are usually also provided the charge and type of fuze, although this
too can be calculated at the firing platform. For firing units without an on-board technical computation
capability, or operating in a degraded mode, the FDC transmits firing data to the firing unit as fire commands.
4-82. Fire commands are commands used by the FDC to give firing units all the information needed to
conduct a fire mission. Initial fire commands include all elements needed for orienting, loading, and firing
the weapon. Subsequent fire commands include only those elements that have changed from the previous
commands, except quadrant elevation. Quadrant elevation is announced in every set of fire commands and
allows the firing unit to fire in a weapons release status. For more information on fire commands see ATP 3-
09.50. The surface-to-surface attack by FA depends on a number of factors including:
* Meeting the five requirements of accurate predicted fire.
* Identifying an appropriate target (TA process).
* Initiating a call for fire into the FS system (the fire request).
* Analyzing the fire mission to determine the proper method of attack.
* Conducting clearance of fires (which includes coordinating airspace).
* Transmitting the call for fire to the selected FDC(s) or firing element(s). |
3-09 | 114 | Chapter 4
* Conducting technical fire direction.
* Giving fire orders to the firing element if necessary.
* Delivering the required ordnance on the target to create the desired effect on target (deliver fires).
* Determining and reporting effects on the engaged target.
4-83. A fire mission is the specific assignment given to a fire unit as part of a definite plan; an order used to
alert the weapon/battery area and indicate that the message following is a call for fire (TC 3-09.81). FA BN
functions directly associated with surface-to-surface attack are encompassed in the fire mission process. The
FSE or any sensor can initiate a fire mission (for example, FOs, aerial observers, radars). Quick-fire channels
can be established for any observer or sensor. Any brigade or BN FSE or FA CP that is normally in the fire
mission flow, but is bypassed during quickfire operations, should receive a notification of each fire mission
through message of interest processing. To expedite fires, the unit can coordinate the use of various quick-
fire linkages, designed to facilitate rapid mission execution, while achieving desired control. For example, a
quick-fire channel could be established from a FIST, through the BN FSE, and then directly to the FA BN
FDC. For even faster response and more decentralized control, the FIST may send the mission directly to the
FDC that will execute the mission. This is often used for priority targets and FPF.
4-84. A priority target is a target, based on either time or importance, on which the delivery of fires
takes precedence for the designated firing unit or element. An artillery firing unit prepares to engage its
priority target by laying its weapon(s) on the assigned target whenever the firing unit is not engaged in a fire
mission in order to reduce the time required to fire the target. For example, a FPF is a priority target. The
supported commander, after consultation with his FSO, designates priority targets. The supported
commander also gives specific guidance as to when the targets will become priority, the munitions to use,
the accuracy required, and the desired effects. The supported commander designates a priority target based
on time requirements or target importance. When not engaged in fire missions, firing units lay on priority
targets. The purpose of laying on a target is to direct or adjust the aim of a weapon, or setting of a weapon
for a given range, deflection, or both.
4-85. FA BNs normally do not perform airspace deconfliction; instead, the air defense airspace management
/brigade aviation element in coordination with the division JAGIC executes this process for the supported
commander.
4-86. The FA BN primarily uses digital means to plan and execute fires. However, the BN may receive
planned and immediate fire missions from a wide variety of sources, in both voice and digital formats. These
requests may have been generated by lower or higher echelon FSE and by trained FA observers and untrained
observers. UAS may send calls for fire directly to the brigade FSE as the aircraft may be considered a brigade
asset.
DIGITAL FIRE REQUESTS
4-87. Digital fire missions may be received from FA and non-FA digital systems. Procedures and capabilities
may vary depending on which digital systems are interfacing with one another. Training opportunities should
be aggressively sought out. FA technical rehearsals should thoroughly address digital interface issues.
Whenever possible, digital fire missions should be rehearsed along the entire data link, under the same digital
conditions anticipated for the actual operation (for example, extended communications distances, surge
digital traffic capacity, degraded operations, and alternate routes).
VOICE FIRE REQUESTS
4-88. Use of voice may be necessary for unplanned, immediate fire requests or during denied, disrupted,
degraded operations. FDCs must anticipate the circumstances and the types of voice missions they may
encounter. The tactical solution and effects on the target should be essentially the same regardless of whether
the mission is processed voice or digital. However, missions from untrained observers must be rehearsed
during training to establish proper unit techniques. |
3-09 | 115 | Field Artillery Operations
OBSERVED FIRE AND UNOBSERVED FIRE
4-89. Fires are either observed or unobserved. Observed fire is the point of projectile impact or burst that
can be seen by an observer, and can be adjusted on the basis of observation.
4-90. Unobserved fire are projectile points of impact or burst not observed. The observer can attempt to
adjust the round based on the sound of the impact. |
3-09 | 117 | Chapter 5
Fire Support During Competition and Crisis
This chapter begins with a discussion on Army operations during competition. Section
I discusses FS activities during competition. Section II discusses FS activities during
crisis. This chapter ends with the transition to armed conflict.
SECTION I – FIRE SUPPORT DURING COMPETITION
5-1. Competition below armed conflict occurs when an adversary’s national interests are incompatible with
U.S. interests, and that adversary is willing to actively pursue them short of open armed conflict. While
neither side desires, at least initially, to use military force as the primary method to achieve its goal, the
adversary is willing to employ national instruments of power, including military force, below the threshold
of actual armed conflict to achieve its aims. The resulting tension between the two sides creates potential for
violent escalation when one side challenges the status quo. For more information on competition see FM 3-
0.
5-2. FS and FA activities that contribute during competition consist of but are not limited to participating
in activities such as security cooperation, regionally assigned and aligned forces, and setting the theater for
operations. Operations during competition also include foundational training strategy such as training,
maintaining operational readiness, and contingency planning conducted by the various elements of the FS
system. The Army and joint targeting process are critical during competition.
SECURITY COOPERATION
5-3. Security Cooperation. Security cooperation activities include security assistance, security force
assistance (SFA), and foreign internal defense (FID).
* Foreign internal defense is the participation by civilian and military forces of a government or
international organizations in any of the programs and activities undertaken by a host nation
government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism,
and other threats to its security (JP 3-22).
* Security assistance includes U.S. government programs that enable the provision of defense
articles, military training, and other defense related services. Foreign military FS personnel
attendance to FS specific initial entry and professional military education schools such as joint
fires observer, the FA basic officer leader course, and the FA captain's career course are examples
of FS and FA contributions to security assistance.
* Security force assistance is the Department of Defense activities that support the development of
the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions (JP 3-20).
The focus of SFA is building the capacity and capability of foreign security forces (FSF) and their
supporting institutions. Foreign security forces personnel are organized and/or employed for
security, whether they are civil or military, federal, state or provincial, or local (JP 3-20). SFA
encompasses various activities from tactical to ministerial level. FS and FA personnel will
primarily train, advise, and assist foreign security forces at the tactical and operational levels.
When determining goals for the FSF, it's important to fit them to the needs of the force. Success
at SFA is determined by allowing the FSF to meet their own FS needs, not necessarily having
them meet U.S. FS and FA standards. Potential areas that FA personnel can provide advice on
include, but are not limited to, FS planning and integration; clearance of fires; and reconnaissance,
selection, and occupation of a position. They may also advise the supported unit on training |
3-09 | 118 | Chapter 5
management to move them further towards independent growth. For more information on SFA
see ATP 3-96.1.
* The focus of all U.S. FID efforts is to support the host nation's internal defense and development
program to build the capability and capacity of the host nation to achieve self-sufficiency. FID is
an Army SOF core activity. While SFA and FID have much in common, FID activities directly
support organizing, training, equipping, advising, and assisting FSF to combat internal threats,
while SFA prepares FSF to defend against external threats an perform as a part of an international
force. FS personnel, TA systems, and FS attack/delivery systems supporting SOF while engaged
in FID activities are critical to force protection and to assisting FSF defend against internal threats.
5-4. Regionally assigned and aligned forces provide a CCDR with scalable, tailorable capabilities during
competition. At the tactical level, units will primarily conduct military engagement through combined
training and exercises. Combined training and exercises allow multi-national forces to validate shared
procedures, terminology, graphics, and standards for FS and the delivery of FA fires. At all levels, units
should maximize interoperable digital systems with multi-national unified action partners, when possible, to
verify the FS communications plan. Regionally assigned and aligned forces can also shape the environment
by identifying ports, runways, roads, potential operation areas, PAAs, and ammunition holding areas for
follow on forces.
5-5. Foundational training activities contribute to operations during competition by providing a competent,
credible, deployable force to leaders at the strategic level. Examples include FS and FA personnel participate
regularly as members of the combined arms team in combat training centers, rotations, and warfighter
exercises. Obtaining necessary skills through attendance at FS and FA functional courses such as joint fires
observer, FA mechanic (additional skill identifier, U6), master gunner, special technical operations (referred
to as STO), and the joint operational fires and effects course are critical to ensuring competent FS personnel
at all levels.
SET THE THEATER
5-6. The theater Army serves as the Army Service component command of the combatant command. The
Army Service component command is the command responsible for recommendations to the combatant
commander on the allocation and employment of Army forces (JP 3-31). As an Army Service component
command, the theater army executes several functions:
* Exercise C2 over Army forces in the theater.
* Execute CCDR's daily operational requirements.
* Provide administrative control of Army forces.
* Set and maintain the theater.
* Set and support OAs.
* Plan and coordinate for consolidation of gains in support of joint operations.
* Perform joint roles in limited scope, scale, and duration.
5-7. During competition, the theater army is the primary Army organization that plans, prepares, and
oversees the execution of operations, activities, and investments conducted by Army forces and assesses the
results of these activities. It supports and enables the commander’s pursuit and maintenance of operational
access critical to achieving advantages throughout an AO while improving the security capabilities of partner
nations. Gaining relative advantages during competition requires intelligence about the adversary’s
capabilities and intent relative to friendly forces. While adversary intent is more difficult to ascertain, both
factors are equally important since capability plus malign intent represent a larger immediate threat than
either factor on its own. This understanding allows theater army commanders to develop their intent and
recommend actions that impede adversary goals or convince adversaries to seek alternative courses of action
more favorable to U.S. interests. For more information on setting the theater during competition see FM 3-
0). |
3-09 | 119 | Fire Support During Competition and Crisis
THEATER FIRE SUPPORT DURING COMPETITION
5-8. The TFC develops, nominates, and integrates effects on joint targets across the theater. This support
to joint targeting enables setting the theater during competition for the JFLCC, field Army, and corps. The
TFC ensures the Army's contribution to the joint targeting process is effectively planned and executed during
the competition phase and can seamlessly transition to execution in a conflict phase. This also provides
greater deterrence options for the theater during crisis.
5-9. The TFE operates in theater as the Army fires synchronization, coordination and targeting development
organization to support theater operations. They integrate into the JFLCC mission command and theater
intelligence enterprise networks, establishing reporting protocols and staff relationships. The TFE
participates in OPLAN development and assesses fires force requirements. They operate from within the
force's HQ, conducting and managing targeting through the joint targeting process to integrate all available
capabilities.
Pacific Pathways
Soldiers of the 25th Infantry Division said their final farewells before heading to
Thailand to participate in Pacific Pathways. Pacific Pathways is an operation
conducted by U.S. Army Pacific that deploys personnel and material to support security
cooperation exercises with ally and partner militaries. Thailand is one of the United
States' oldest partners in Asia and the broad cooperation between the two nations
continues on issues that benefit both countries, the region and beyond. "The division's
area of responsibility is Southeast Asia and the Pacific Region so this gives us an
opportunity to deploy off of the island of Oahu, train, and build holistic readiness with
our Thai counterparts," the Executive Officer of 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment,
3rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division. In addition to multinational
training, Pacific Pathways meets the requirement to provide a force able to rapidly
adapt to emerging challenges across multiple domains. "We trained alongside of them
at JRTC (Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana)," the Executive Officer
said.
"We were very impressed with their professionalism and how they seamlessly
integrated into the team and we're looking forward to training with them over the course
of several months," he added. The ability of both nations' military forces to work
together is beneficial, and was most recently highlighted by the U.S. participation in
the Thai-led effort to rescue the Wild Boar soccer team from a cave in northern
Thailand. "We're hoping to build on the already established relationship with them
(Royal Thai Army) in order to further drive our influence within the Southeast Asian
area of operations," said the Officer in Charge, assigned to 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry
Regiment, 3rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division.
This Pacific Pathways mission has captured the world's attention, and the United
States are very proud to have been asked by Thailand to assist.
SECTION II – FIRE SUPPORT DURING CRISIS
"Enemy leaders must be made to understand clearly that, if they choose to move militarily,
no longer will there be a status quo ante-bellum...something to be restored. Rather, the
situation they themselves have created is one which will be resolved on new terms"
GEN Donn A. Starry
5-10. Army operations during crisis include all activities to deter undesirable actions by an adversary. While
these activities are normally focused on preventing a shift from competition to military conflict, they may
also occur during conflict to prevent further escalation. These operations are typically in response to
indications and warnings that an adversary intends to take military action counter to U.S. interests, or in
response to adversary activities that are ongoing. Activities during crisis are intended to change an adversary's |
3-09 | 120 | Chapter 5
risk calculus. Regardless of the methods used to raise the potential cost of an adversary, the primary deterrent
is the demonstrated ability of a properly manned, equipped, and trained joint force to prevail in large-scale
combat operations.
5-11. FS and FA activities that contribute to operations during crisis consist of, but are not limited to, the
participation in activities such as flexible deterrent operations, flexible response operations, setting the
theater, and force tailoring. Elements of the FS system will also have an important role in initial deployment
into a theater of operations including echeloning CPs and integration with the initial employment of
information collection assets.
5-12. A flexible deterrent option is a planning construct intended to facilitate early decision making by
developing a wide range of interrelated responses that begin with deterrent-oriented actions carefully tailored
to create a desired effect (JP 5-0). An example of a flexible deterrent option for a FA unit be the movement
of a FA BN into a position where it can range potential HPTs. Other examples include, standing up an FFA
HQ, deploying long range fires assets that could provide joint SEAD or strike HPTs, or establishing a
counterfire HQ and deploying the appropriate firing units. Flexible deterrent options are preplanned actions
designed to deescalate the situation that must be carefully weighed by theater-level leaders against the
potential that they may unintentionally elevate tensions.
Flexible Deterrent.
An example of a flexible deterrent is the Regionally Aligned Forces mission assigned
to the multiple launch rocket system rotational battalion in the Korean Theater of
Operations. Each of the firing batteries, with enablers from headquarters and
headquarters battery and forward support company, deploy to a combat outpost for a
total of four and a half months of an eight-month deployment. The battalion’s mission
is to work closely with Republic of Korea forces as a deterrent option to North Korean
aggression.
5-13. Unit's assigned missions during crisis generally have branch plans that describe how they can respond
should a situation escalate. Those plans describe conditions that are created or maintained to reduce the risk
to the overall mission of the force. The sequencing of forces into theater and their subsequent AO considers
risks to the mission.
5-14. Successful operations during crisis ensure that tensions and conditions do not escalate further. The
very nature of these operations implies that the forces assigned to this task have the capacity to conclude the
situation with force. While this is a powerful message to an adversary, there is always the potential for
misinterpretation of friendly actions and those misinterpretations leading to large-scale combat operations.
To reduce the risk of escalation, the theater army considers the initial ROE, force positioning and posture,
weapon control status, and operating parameters for example communication with all echelons of command
for shared understanding, underwriting risk.
5-15. A flexible response is the capability of military forces for effective reaction to any enemy threat or
attack with actions appropriate and adaptable to the circumstances existing (JP 5-0). Flexible response
systems are generally punitive in nature, responding to an offensive action by the enemy, and may mark the
transition from competition to conflict. Often, the ability to provide a credible flexible response system can
act as a flexible deterrent option to deter an adversary's planned offensive action. An example of a flexible
response activity involving FS would be executing strikes with air-to-surface or surface-to-surface fires
against designated HPTs. |
3-09 | 121 | Fire Support During Competition and Crisis
Flexible Response
In Operation Inherent Resolve in 2017, armed Syrian Army units aligned with hostile
paramilitary forces demonstrated threatening actions against US forces and its
partners. After significant and appropriate warnings to cease the threatening actions,
US forces conducted lethal air to surface strikes as a response resulting in multiple
destroyed Syrian ADA and artillery organizations. The remainder of the Syrian Army
units withdrew, and the threatening action ceased.
5-16. Depending on the adversary's indirect fire capabilities, counterfire may also be required as part of a
flexible response option. FS leaders must develop an integrated counterfire plan as part of operations to
prevent and to be fully prepared for what may be a rapid transition from competition to conflict. This should
include the designation of a counterfire HQ and the delineation of counterfire responsibilities among
subordinate units as well as clearly defined ROE to prevent unintentional escalation. For more on counterfire
operations see ATP 3-09.12.
5-17. The CCDR is responsible for setting the theater to establish favorable conditions for the rapid execution
of military operations and the support requirements for a specific OPLAN during crisis or conflict. In
operations to prevent military conflict, the CCDR will establish a JTF HQ. Transitioning from competition
to crisis, targets will be continuously developed, validated, and added to the restricted target list, and the joint
integrated target list. Army HQ in the roles of JTF or land component commander (referred to as LCC) must
ensure personnel within their formation are properly trained and certified to integrate into targeting work
centers capable of basic, intermediate, and advanced target development to the joint standards outlined
in CJSI 3370.01D and CJSI 3505.01E.
5-18. Force tailoring is the process of determining the right mix of forces and the sequence of their
deployment in support of a joint force commander (ADP 3-0). Artillery leaders in the TFC and TFE advise
the Army Service component command on what types of FA units and FS assets will best meet the needs of
the CCDR as well as the suggested sequencing for those units into the AO. Regionally aligned forces
will likely be among the first forces designated for employment by the CCDR. FS personnel at theater level
should begin coordinating with FA units as soon as they are aligned to the region to begin integrating
them into potential theater security cooperation or contingency plans.
5-19. Force projection is the ability to project the military instrument of national power from the United
States or another theater, in response to requirements for military operations (JP 3-0). As a theater
escalates towards military conflict, force projection can become a race between friendly forces and the
potential enemy force to have operational capabilities in theater first. Upon arrival in theater, units will
conduct reception, staging, onward movement, and integration.
5-20. The Secretary of Defense established the immediate response force in 2008 to enhance the nation's
ability to respond quickly to a wide range of contingencies. Immediate response forces are critical to
operations to shape and prevent. The immediate response force is the Army's designated unit for ensuring
joint operational access through the concept of joint forcible entry. The immediate response force can respond
to a hybrid threat in any environment and can execute a wide variety of missions required by CCDRs. Hybrid
threat is the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorists forces, or criminal
elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects (ADP 3-0). These mission profiles include:
* Joint task force mission command.
* Joint forcible entry.
* Conduct raid and direct action.
* Non-combatant evacuation.
* Fixed site security and defense.
* Joint targeting.
* Implementation of an exclusion zone.
* Foreign humanitarian assistance.
* Stability operations. |
3-09 | 123 | Chapter 6
Fire Support in Depth During Large-Scale Combat
Operations
This chapter is divided into five sections and describes FS considerations for large-
scale combat operations. Section I describes the Army’s strategic role to prevail in
large-scale combat operations. Section II briefly describes FS considerations in the
deep area during large-scale combat operations, to include forcible entry, airborne, and
air assault operations. Section III addresses FS in the defense. Section IV covers FS
considerations for the offense. Section V discusses FS considerations for enabling,
stability and reconstitution operations.
SECTION I – PREVAIL IN LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS
Large-scale combat operations are extensive joint combat operations in terms of scope and
size of forces committed, conducted as campaigns aimed at achieving operational and
strategic objectives through the application of force. Large-scale combat on land occurs
within the framework of a larger joint campaign, usually with an Army headquarters
forming the base of a joint force headquarters. These operations typically entail high
tempo, high resource consumption, and high casualty rates. Large-scale combat
introduces levels of complexity, lethality, ambiguity, and speed to military activities not
common in other operations. (FM 3-0)
6-1. During large-scale combat operations, Army forces focus on the defeat and destruction of enemy
ground forces as part of the joint team. Army forces close with and destroy enemy forces in any terrain,
exploit success, and break the opponent's will to resist. Army forces attack, defend, perform stability
operations, and consolidate gains to accomplish national objectives. The ability to prevail in ground combat
is a decisive factor in breaking an enemy's capability and will to continue a conflict. “Conflict resolution
requires the Army to conduct sustained operations with unified action partners as long as necessary to
accomplish national objectives” (ADP 3-0). Echelon above brigade formations and their respective FS staffs
are central to the conduct of large-scale combat operations. They must fight with fires and maneuver in the
deep areas, and support brigade and below operations in the close and rear areas. See figure 6-1 on page 6-2,
for context. |
3-09 | 124 | Chapter 6
Figure 6-1. Large-scale combat battlefield framework
6-2. Joint FS contributes extensively to the Army's ability to defeat and destroy enemy ground forces by
supporting offensive and defensive operations in large-scale combat operations. Simultaneously attacking
HPTs with fires in depth presents an enemy force with multiple dilemmas across all domains, forcing them
to react continually. Retaining the initiative requires employment of sustained, relentless lethal and nonlethal |
3-09 | 125 | Fire Support in Depth During Large-Scale Combat Operations
fires on enemy forces. Commanders maintain this pressure by accomplishing the four basic FS functions
previously discussed.
6-3. FA and FS lethality is enabled by formations maneuvering into positions of relative advantage where
they can mass effects to place enemy forces at risk. Lethality is the capability and capacity to destroy (FM 3-
0). FS formations support the maneuver or supported commanders’ efforts to impose multiple dilemmas on
the enemy by enabling convergence when and where critically needed.
SECTION II – FIRE SUPPORT IN DEEP OPERATIONS
6-4. Deep condition setting with integrated fires executed at increasingly longer ranges with precision in
conjunction with fires in the close area are key elements for JFCs, corps, and divisions setting the conditions
in the OE and accelerating the enemy's defeat in large-scale combat operations. A shaping operation is an
operation at any echelon that creates and preserves conditions for success of the decisive operation through
effects on the enemy, other actors, and the terrain (ADP 3-0). Deep operations and their corresponding fires
are not just tools of the defense. They are, if anything, even more critical in the offense. Deep operations are
tactical actions against enemy forces, typically out of direct contact with friendly forces, intended to shape
future close operations and protect rear operations (FM 3-0). In both offense and defense, operations in the
deep area involve efforts to interdict uncommitted maneuver forces using fire, maneuver, or a combination
of the two to create opportunities to seize and retain the initiative. The deep area is where the commander
sets conditions for future success in close combat (ADP 3-0). Close combat is warfare carried out on land in
a direct-fire fight, supported by direct and indirect fires, and other assets (ADP 3-0). A commander's deep
area generally extends beyond subordinate unit boundaries out to the limits of the commander's designated
AO. For more information on deep operations see ATP 3-94.2.
6-5. Enemy forces in the deep area are not out of contact in a multidomain environment since space,
cyberspace, and the information dimension have few range constraints. Deep operations disrupt the enemy's
movement in depth, destroy HPTs, and disrupt enemy C2 at critical times. They can deny the enemy the
initiative early and limit enemy commander options.
6-6. Joint and Army FS attack and delivery platforms are the most responsive assets an operational-level
commander has to shape enemy forces and before they can employ lethal or non-lethal means against friendly
forces. FS in the deep area might disrupt the movement of operational reserves, for example, or prevent an
enemy from employing long-range cannon, rocket, or missile fires. Planning for operations in the deep area
includes considerations for information collection, airspace control, joint fires, obstacles emplacement,
maneuver (air and ground), and special operations. FS in the deep area is not a luxury; it is an absolute
necessity to winning. FS in the deep area must be tightly coordinated over time with fires in the close area.
Without this coordination, limited resources may be wasted on targets whose destruction in the deep area
actually has little payoff in the close area.
6-7. Corps HQ and their FSEs play a significant role in physical and temporal deep area operations.
Temporally, corps planners must project into the future and decide what conditions can be created and
exploited to defeat the enemy and accomplish the corps mission. Corps deep operations are those activities
which are directed against enemy forces not currently engaged in the close operation, but capable of engaging
or inflicting damage in future close operations. Many of the FS and TA capabilities the corps requires for
deep operations are not organic to the corps. As such, the corps HQ coordinates for these joint and unified
action partner capabilities through planning and the targeting process.
6-8. Division deep operations, reinforced by corps and higher joint capabilities, focus on information
collection, interdiction fires, and maneuver on enemy organizations and capabilities beyond the range of the
BCTs engaged in close operations. They identify opportunities for BCTs to exploit, disrupt enemy C2, and
mass effects against key enemy capabilities, such as long-range fires, to enable rapid movement. Interdiction
fires create windows for friendly unit offensive maneuver.
6-9. In general, corps deep operations occur beyond the area division can effectively employ its combat
power. The extent to which a division conducts deep operations is limited in two ways: using control
measures and by the ranges of the capabilities it controls. Corps deep fires should facilitate division freedom |
3-09 | 126 | Chapter 6
of action in the close and deep areas, both in execution of fires under corps C2 and allocation of capabilities
to the division through task organization and command and support relationships.
6-10. It is important to clearly delineate corps and division FS responsibilities and focus in terms of time,
space, and domains. Failure to do so leads to inefficient application of friendly TA and FS capabilities.
Commanders use control measures, such as boundaries, FSCMs, and airspace coordinating measures, to
assign deep operations and FS responsibilities to the appropriate echelons.
6-11. In the offense or defense, the commander attacks or defends in depth. Information collection adopts
this principle by using a phased, echeloned approach to collecting information to satisfy requirements. Each
echelon conducting information collection plays a critical role in the success of any military operation. In the
offense and defense, units should use an intelligence handover line to utilize the echeloned approach. The
intelligence handover line is a control measure that establishes areas within which each echelon is responsible
for collecting information. Intelligence handover lines are developed to deconflict collection efforts between
echelons and reduce the likelihood of duplication occurring. For more information on intelligence handover
lines see ATP 2-01. Factors to consider when assigning intelligence handover lines:
* The unit's organic intelligence collection capability.
* Availability of processing, exploitation, and dissemination capabilities.
* Facilitate coordination between a unit and its subordinates.
* Direct units to detect and track threat units and HPTs in their areas.
* Transfer collection responsibility for portions of the AO from one echelon to another.
6-12. FS for deep operations may consist of maneuver and FS or of fires alone. Commanders may employ
subordinate maneuver units to conduct deep air or ground maneuver operations (such as forcible entry
operations, and airborne and air assault operations) to exploit the opportunities created by large-scale deep
fires, when the desired effects outweigh the inherent risks.
6-13. Other FS considerations for the deep area:
* The submission of air support requests for AI missions is critical.
* Joint targeting coordination board (referred to as JTCB) and Army targeting boards must be nested
at all levels between division and JTF.
* Ensure close coordination between the CAB commander and the FSCOORD (with staffs).
* Establish proper authorities for the FSCOORD to act on behalf of the commander and G-3 while
fighting in the deep area. (Such as target engagement authority, ISR re-tasking, CAS/AI re-
allocation and prioritization).
* Ensure a common understanding of ISR resources dedicated to target development vs. TA between
FSCOORD/G-2/G-3.
* Ensure continual battle tracking of all friendly and neutral positions (unified action partners,
nongovernmental organizations, SOF, partner forces, other actors on the battlefield) beyond CFL
and FSCL.
* Ensure the ground force commander priorities are adequately communicated/represented in the
Joint Targeting process as operations in the deep area will likely involve numerous joint and
unified action partners with different goals.
* Leverage the federated intelligence enterprise for direct and/or complimentary support for TA.
* Ensure continual communication and common understanding between echelons of command
regarding setting the conditions for future operation expectations and assessments.
* Position FA assets to maximize range and ensure proper security of these assets.
* Ensure adequate TA and attack/delivery platforms to meet the commander's intent in the deep area
are balanced with the natural tension of supporting the ongoing chaos of the close fight.
* Consider close support to SOF and other unified action partners and multinational forces operating
in the deep area.
* Seek opportunities for target handover between SOF and conventional force TA and FS
attack/delivery platforms. |
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* Establish clear delineation of responsibilities and authorities between joint unified action partners
operating in the deep area (especially between Army and USAF).
* Ensure adequate JTAC and SJA representation at all FS nodes with target engagement authority.
* Establish and rehearse a robust communications plan since operations in the deep area will likely
require coordination with unified action partners around the world (processing, exploitation, and
dissemination nodes, the combined air operations center, proper CEMA authorities).
FORCIBLE ENTRY
6-14. Forcible entry is the seizing and holding of a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition or
forcing access into a denied area to allow movement and maneuver to accomplish the mission (JP 3-18). A
lodgment is a designated area in a hostile or potentially hostile operational area that, when seized and held,
makes the continuous landing of troops and materiel possible and provides maneuver space for subsequent
operations (JP 3-18). A forcible entry operation is conducted to gain entry into the territory of an enemy by
seizing a lodgment as rapidly as possible to enable the conduct of follow-on large-scale combat operations
after the enemy's A2/AD capabilities are neutralized. Like FS itself, forcible entry operations are joint in
nature. The requirements for continuous resources of varying, complex capabilities such as C2, fires,
transportation, and sustainment necessitate coordination from all elements of Department of Defense, other
unified action, and often multinational unified action partners. For more information on forcible entry see JP
3-18.
6-15. To set favorable conditions for success, there are fourteen principles that apply to forcible entry
operations. While FS is inherent in all these principles, it is critical in the six principles below:
* Achieve surprise. Planners should strive to achieve surprise regarding exact objectives, times,
methods, and forces employed in forcible entry operations. The degree of surprise required
depends on the nature of the operation to be conducted. FS considerations include the timing of
pre assault fires.
* Visualize the OA. Utilizing joint intelligence preparation of the OE provides the JFC the
composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of
capabilities that bear on the decisions of the commander. FS considerations include the integration
into the joint targeting process for joint integrated prioritized target list nominations, and
coordination with intelligence to understand enemy in the lodgment or that can affect the lodgment
such as reinforcements and counter-attack forces.
* Isolate the lodgment. FS Considerations include the attack/neutralization of enemy capabilities
including ground, sea, and air assets that can react to the assault. HPTs that support isolation of
the lodgment include enemy long-range fires that can range the lodgment area, fixed bridges, and
enemy TA and C2 capabilities.
* Gain and maintain access. FS Considerations include identifying and neutralizing an enemy's AD
capabilities to include their long-range precision fires, ADA radars, ADA delivery platforms,
airfields, and NL capabilities.
* Neutralize enemy forces within the lodgment. The joint force must neutralize enemy forces within
the lodgment to facilitate the establishment of airheads and beach heads and to provide for the
immediate protection of the force. HPTs include enemy security forces, enemy short range air
defense, and C2 nodes. Consider limiting damage to infrastructure (such as an airfield or
communications facility) that may be of value for future use of the friendly force.
* Expand the lodgment. FS Considerations include pushing ISR further into the OA, moving FA
with maneuver forces off the lodgment to increase range, and begin flowing in additional artillery
to reduce initial dependency on CAS, attack aviation, and Naval Gunfire Support.
6-16. Forcible entry capabilities include a combination of amphibious, airborne assault, air assault, and
ground assault operations. Airborne, air assault, and SOF FS considerations are discussed below. For more
information on forcible entry capabilities see JP 3-18 and FM 3-99.
6-17. Airborne forcible entry FS considerations include: |
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* Availability of surface-to-surface FS assets may be initially limited. Initial dependency on CAS,
rotary wing aviation, and naval gunfire until artillery and mortars are available. Ensure proper
ALO, JTAC, and air-naval ground liaison company representation in the assault force.
* Ensure adequate FA systems are introduced early in the airborne operation and following air land
operations to create flexibility by reducing the dependency on CAS, attack aviation, and naval
gunfire.
* SEAD to support transport aircraft (to include enemy ADA as well as enemy aircraft bases and
enemy helicopter army and refueling points).
* Pre-assault fires of the airhead and other critical targets including interdiction fires.
* Deception fires at false landing zones.
* CEMA to disrupt forces in vicinity of the airhead.
* Inclusion of long-range precision fires.
* Establish liaison with all joint and unified action partners supporting the operation.
* Common understanding and visualization of all SOF and unified action partners already operating
in the area.
6-18. Air assault forcible entry FS consideration include:
* Deception. False preparations can be fired into areas other than the objective or landing zone area
to deceive enemy forces.
* Duration of preparation fires. A preparation of long duration may reduce the possibility of surprise.
The preparation fires should begin as the first aircraft of the first lift crosses the release point and
end just before the first aircraft lands.
* Availability of FS assets. When an air assault is executed across extended distances, preparation
fires by CAS or attack helicopters may be the only viable alternative to organic FA.
6-19. Special operations FS considerations include:
* Allocating priorities for CAS.
* Allocating LRPF capabilities as soon as possible; establishing a DS support relationship between
HIMARS or MLRS to SOF forces as appropriate.
* Ensure SOF positions as well as the multinational unified action partners they are supporting are
known and tracked throughout the operation, especially during any pre-assault fires.
* Define and expedite clearance of fires responsibilities between SOF and conventional forces by
establishing a ground force commander and redundant communications.
FORCIBLE ENTRY PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
6-20. Forcible entry operations are conducted in five phases. The five phases of forcible entry are preparation
and deployment, assault, stabilization of the lodgment, introduction of follow-on forces, and termination or
transition of operations. Each phase with FS considerations is discussed below.
6-21. Preparation and deployment, FS considerations include:
* Establishing a PACE plan for enroute communications.
* The availability of joint TA and joint FS attack/delivery platforms including the integration with
SOF forces already in the vicinity of the lodgment.
* Input to the joint integrated prioritized target list and ATO.
* Targeting the enemy's A2/AD capabilities utilizing AI to engage targets in the vicinity of the
lodgment area.
* Integrate CEMA and other information-related capabilities into the operation early as authorities
for use require longer timelines.
* Recommend FS considerations into the GO-NO GO criteria for the operation. Consider ISR
allocation for BDA for answering these criteria. |
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* Develop pre assault fire plan and any deception fires with joint and unified action partners and
ensure all elements executing SEAD also understand the ground force commander's maneuver
plan and HPTs.
* Understand and communicate the JFC SEAD plan that will support the operation to the supported
commander.
* Make recommendations for priority of echeloning FS platforms into the lodgment over time.
* Provide FS to the joint force operating in the land or maritime domain well beyond the established
lodgement.
* Ensure ISR assets are allocated.
6-22. During the assault phase, the FS considerations include:
* Understand the ground tactical plan.
* Establish communications with SOF on the ground for ISR/target handover capabilities.
* Account for the dense airspace utilizing airspace C2 and coordinating measures.
* Strike enemy targets in the lodgment area simultaneously with enemy units that can reinforce or
counterattack.
* Position FA and mortars to support expansion of the lodgment and deconflict with potential
ongoing air landings.
* Decentralized execution of fires.
6-23. During the third phase, stabilization of the lodgment FS considerations include:
* Balance CAS, attack aviation, and AI capabilities as additional indirect FS systems arrive.
* Deconfliction of the saturated airspace.
* Begin moving FA and mortars with supported forces as lodgment expands.
6-24. During the fourth phase, introduction of follow-on forces FS considerations include:
* Utilize FS planning and execution principles to support ground offensives as additional maneuver
forces arrive.
* Be prepared to shift priority of fire.
* Be prepared to shift boundaries and respective FSCMs.
6-25. During the fifth phase termination or transition of operations FS considerations include:
* Increase in nonlethal and information related capability options.
* Redeployment of FA balanced with CAS and AI and attack aviation.
6-26. Deep operations do not occur separately. They are conducted simultaneously with operations in the
close and rear areas. These operations are conducted to protect forces, provide freedom of maneuver, and
facilitate operations in the close area. The following sections will describe the defense and offense in the
close area and FS considerations of each.
SECTION III – THE DEFENSE
6-27. While the offense is more decisive, the defense is usually stronger. The conduct of the defense alone
normally cannot determine the outcome of battles. The purpose of the defense is to create conditions for the
offense that allows Army forces to regain the initiative.
6-28. A defensive operation is an operation to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and
develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability operations (ADP 3-0). The defense is what provides
time for a commander to build combat power and establish conditions to transition to the offense. The defense
is ideally a shield behind which a commander maintains or regains the initiative. Initially, a defending
commander is likely to be at a relative disadvantage against an attacking enemy since and enemy can choose
when and where to strike.
6-29. A defending force does not wait to be attacked, it aggressively seeks ways to attrit and weaken enemy
forces before combat begins. A defending force attacks enemy forces at every opportunity and seeks every
opportunity to transition to the offense. FS is a primary means for the maneuver commander to continually |
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attack the enemy, even as his forces are preparing for and executing the defense. As discussed in Chapter 1,
a characteristic of the FA is to always operate in the spirit of the offense, even when maneuver forces are in
the defense.
THE ENEMY ATTACK
6-30. During offensive operations, enemy forces typically attempt to mask the location of their main effort
with multiple fixing attacks on the ground while using fires to disrupt critical friendly CPs, radars, and FDCs.
Generally, enemy forces seek to reinforce success, massing capabilities at a vulnerable point to achieve large
force ratio advantages to enable a rapid penetration of friendly defenses. The enemy uses mobile forces to
exploit the penetration rapidly to the maximum possible depth in order to make the overall friendly defensive
posture untenable.
6-31. Threat forces can have advantages in both volume and range of fires, so they can simultaneously mass
fires on the point of penetration to enable rapid closure and breakthrough, fix other friendly elements along
the FLOT, and target key friendly C2 and logistics nodes along the depth of the defense. Threat forces prefer
to use fires to move around fixed positions when possible and through destroyed units when necessary. Threat
forces seek to maneuver tactically to a depth that achieves operational objectives in support of his overall
strategic purpose.
6-32. Threat forces may employ ISR, EW, information warfare, SOF, CBRN and other capabilities. For more
information on enemy attack see FM 3-0.
COMMON DEFENSIVE CONTROL MEASURES
6-33. Commanders control a defense by using control measures that provide flexibility needed to allow
defending commanders to concentrate combat power and the decisive point. Below are defensive control
measures that every FS leader should understand in order to best support the commander. For more
information on defensive control measures see ADP 3-90.
6-34. The security area is that area occupied by a unit's security elements and includes the areas of influence
of those security elements (ADP 3-90). It may be located as necessary to the front, flanks, or rear of a
protected unit, facility, or location. FS in the security area engages enemy reconnaissance elements early in
order to delay, disrupt, or limit the enemy's advance. FS is planned to assist the supported commander in
moving and disengaging as well as integrating FS and obstacle plans to ensure obstacles are covered by direct
observation. FS considerations for defensive operations in the security area will be discussed in subsequent
under reconnaissance and security operations. See figure 6-2.
6-35. The main battle area is the area where the commander intends to deploy the bulk of their unit to defeat
an attacking enemy (FM 3-90). Normally, most of the defending force is deployed in the main battle area
(MBA) to defeat the enemy's main attack. The mission of the MBA forces at corps level covers the entire
spectrum of operations. Thus, while the corps as a whole may be engaged in defensive operations, units
within the corps AO (divisions, BCTs, TFs) may be conducting any type of defensive or offensive operation
in the MBA. FS for the MBA is allocated with the priority to the most vulnerable area which usually coincides
with the enemy's most likely avenues of approach and main attack. These areas must be weighed more heavily
with immediately responsive fires such as CAS and DS or (R) FA. Detailed FS considerations for defensive
operations and offensive operations in the MBA are discussed later in this chapter. See figure 6-2.
6-36. The forward edge of the battle area is the foremost limits of a series of areas in which ground combat
units are deployed to coordinate fire support, the positioning of forces, or the maneuver of units, excluding
areas in which covering or screening forces are operating (JP 3-09.3) See figure 6-2. FS short of the forward
edge of the battle area consists of close support tasks such as supporting friendly units in contact, supporting
strongpoints, supporting obstacles, suppressing, and obscuring enemy overwatch positions, supporting
counterattacks, and coordinating CAS and attack aviation to engage enemy armored formations. See figure
6-2.
6-37. The forward line of own troops is a line that indicates the most forward positions of friendly forces in
any kind of military operation at a specific time (FM 3-90). In the defense, it may be beyond, at, or short of
the forward edge of the battle area. FS beyond the FLOT acquires and engages enemy reconnaissance |
3-09 | 131 | Fire Support in Depth During Large-Scale Combat Operations
elements early to delay, disrupt, or limit the enemy's advance into the security area. The CFL should be kept
as close as possible to the FLOT in both offensive and defensive operations. FS personnel must maintain
continual awareness of SOF, multinational and unified action partners operating beyond the FLOT to
expedite clearance of fires and reduce chances of fratricide. See figure 6-2.
Figure 6-2. Defensive arrangement
FIRE SUPPORT CONSIDERATIONS AND THE CHARACTERISTICS
OF THE DEFENSE
6-38. Successful defenses are aggressive and strive to regain the initiative from attacking enemy forces. FS
plays a critical role in facilitating the following characteristics of the defense. The characteristics of the
defense are disruption, flexibility, maneuver, mass and concentration, operations in depth, preparation, and
security.
DISRUPTION
6-39. Disruption actions include deceiving or destroying enemy reconnaissance forces, breaking up combat
formations, separating echelons, and impeding an enemy force's ability to synchronize its combined arms.
FS plays a key role in disrupting an attacker's tempo and synchronization. Considerations include:
* Employ fires to neutralize and destroy enemy artillery and mortar, TA, C2 nodes, and logistics
systems.
* Disrupt enemy sustainment efforts and troop movements (consider destroying bridges).
* Ensure integration of fires in support of obstacles.
* Assist in defeating enemy reconnaissance forces, separating enemy forces, isolating enemy units,
and attacking or disrupting enemy systems. |
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FLEXIBILITY
6-40. Flexibility is the employment of a versatile mix of capabilities, formations, and equipment for
conducting operations (ADP 3-0). Defensive operations require flexible plans that anticipate enemy actions
and allocate resources accordingly. FS must address the need for flexibility and the need to:
* Allocate initial priority of FA fires to forward security forces.
* Quickly shift fires to critical points throughout the AO.
* Execute successive or concurrent programs or fire plans.
* Rapidly shift fires from support of the defense to support the counterattack and offense.
* Coordinate and synchronize air support on known, suspected, and likely enemy locations.
MANEUVER
6-41. Maneuver allows a defending force to achieve and exploit a position of relative advantage. Even in the
defense, there are elements of the offense. FS assists defending forces create opportunities to maneuver
against the attacking force by:
* Delaying the movement of enemy reserves.
* Coordinating all means of available FS to delay, destroy, or limit the enemy's advance, and to
weight the attack(s) of the striking force in a mobile defense.
* Supporting the obstacle plan by placing fires in front of, on top of, to the side of, and behind
obstacles to maximize their effect.
* Providing fires to support the disengagement of maneuver elements and their repositioning to
subsequent battle positions.
* Channelizing enemy movement into EAs.
MASS AND CONCENTRATION
6-42. Defending forces seek to mass and concentrate fires against enemy forces. This produces
overwhelming combat power at specific locations to support decisive operations. Concentrating forces
increases risk of large-scale losses from enemy fires. This risk can be mitigated by using deception and
employment of FS capabilities. FS considerations for this characteristic of the defense include:
* Support the rapid destruction of an enemy force when it is most vulnerable or when it is on the
verge of gaining a significant advantage.
* Allow a commander to accept prudent risk by using minimal maneuver forces in one area in order
concentrate forces in another area.
* Mass fires to create an important demoralizing psychological effect that is not achieved from
smaller-scale fires.
* Use fires, TA, and CFZs to protect concentrating friendly forces.
OPERATIONS IN DEPTH
6-43. Operations in depth is the simultaneous application of combat power throughout an area of operations
(ADP 3-90). The HQ FSE plans the employment of available Army and joint fires to achieve depth and
simultaneity and secure advantages for future operations. This includes disrupting the enemy's approach to
and movement within the MBA, destroying HPTs, denying, or interrupting vital components of enemy
operating systems, and using obscurants to conceal friendly movement. They create conditions favorable to
friendly forces by disrupting enemy long-range fires, sustainment, and enemy C2. The defending commander
directs the delivery of effects in multiple domains to establish positions of relative advantage necessary for a
successful counterattack. Operations in depth prevent enemy forces from maintaining their tempo. FS assets
rapidly and continuously engage enemy forces throughout the operational framework to:
* Disrupt, delay, and attrit the enemy in the deep area.
* Destroy enemy long-range fires, ADA sites, and sustainment efforts.
* Destroy and neutralize enemy sustainment and C2 nodes.
* Allocate responsive fires to support the decisive operation. |
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* Disrupt the enemy's tempo in the close area by attacking enemy forces preparing to attack.
* Plan observation and fires to defeat or disrupt enemy attempts to breach friendly obstacles.
* Plan obscurant fires to deny enemy observation or screen friendly movements between defensive
positions.
* Neutralize enemy threats in the rear areas.
PREPARATION
6-44. Preparation consists of those activities performed by units and Soldiers to improve their ability to
execute an operation (ADP 5-0). Preparation creates condition that improve friendly forces' opportunities for
success. Defending units prepare their AO before attacking enemy forces arrive, or they establish the defense
behind a force performing a security operation. FS preparation consideration:
* Actively participate in the joint and Army targeting processes.
* Plan indirect fires in support of the barrier and obstacle plan.
* Plan fires in support of patrols, convoys, or quick reaction forces.
* Plan targets, observer positions (primary and alternate), triggers, and fires in support of all EAs
for all phases of the defensive operation.
* Recommend FSCMs to support each phase of the defensive operation.
* Plan targets on avenues of approach to disrupt enemy attacks by striking the enemy on the
approach and during their assault.
* Ensure that forward positioned observers are resourced with adequate security, mobility, and
situational understanding.
* Prepare and harden artillery and TA positions.
* Conduct rehearsals on the actual terrain.
SECURITY
6-45. Commanders secure their forces through the performance of security, protection, information
collection, and cyberspace and EW operations. Security operations prevent enemy ISR assets from
determining friendly locations, strengths, and weaknesses. FS must complement and support all security
operations and unit protection plans by providing:
* Support to security forces and actions in the consolidation and support areas.
* Execution of deception fires and support to deception operations.
* Disruption to enemy attacks.
* Counterfire throughout the depth of the AO.
* Suppress and obscure enemy overwatch positions.
* Support friendly strong points.
TYPES OF DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
6-46. There are three basic defensive operations- area defense, mobile defense, and retrograde. These apply
to both the tactical and operational levels of war, although the mobile defense is more often associated with
the operational level. The three operations are significantly different concepts and pose significantly different
challenges in FS and FA planning and execution. Although the names of these defensive operations convey
the overall aim of a selected defense, each typically contains static and mobile elements.
AREA DEFENSE
6-47. The area defense is a type of defensive operation that concentrates on denying enemy forces access to
designated terrain for a specific time rather than destroying the enemy outright (ADP 3-90). The focus of the
area defense is on retaining terrain where the bulk of the defending force positions itself in mutually
supporting prepared positions. |
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6-48. Usually, there is some warning of an enemy attack. The enemy must be brought under the maximum
mass of counter preparation fire as early as possible. Counterpreparation fire is the intensive prearranged
fire delivered when the imminence of the enemy attack is discovered. Counterpreparation fire disrupts
the enemy's preparations for an attack or a counterattack. It does this by striking him in his assembly areas;
breaking up his attack formations; disorganizing his command, control, and communications; impairing his
TA capabilities; and reducing his morale. Counterpreparations are usually scheduled as on call. The
counterpreparation may be phased, although this is not required.
* Phase 1 includes: enemy forward elements, indirect fire systems, observation posts.
* Phase 2 includes enemy CPs, communication and reserves while attacking of indirect fire systems
continues.
6-49. During an area defense, FS assists in shaping operations that constrain the enemy into a specific COA
or fix them in a given location. These actions limit the enemy's options. The supported commander covers
obstacles with fires that turn, or block to limit the options available to the enemy. The main effort focuses
fires into EAs, possibly supplemented by a counterattack. The supported commander directs reconnaissance,
surveillance, and TA WLR assets to determine the locations, strengths and probable intentions of the
attacking enemy force. Specific FS considerations include:
* Providing long-range shaping fires to delay, disrupt, and attrit enemy forces.
* Provide fires for spoiling and counter attacks.
* Positioning firing units forward to support a covering force to include SOF operating in zone.
* Ensure FSCMs, CFZs and CFFZs are established.
* Engaging enemy long-range indirect fire systems prior to the enemy executing preparation fires.
* Massing fires to break the momentum of an enemy attack.
* Providing counterfire support to divisions and BCTs as the enemy enters the EAs allowing the
BCT's organic FA BNs to execute close support fires for maneuver.
* Providing fires to disrupt follow-on echelons.
* Ensuring FS for the battle handover and withdrawal of the security forces.
MOBILE DEFENSE
6-50. The mobile defense is a defensive operation that concentrates on the destruction or defeat of the enemy
through a decisive attack by a striking force (ADP 3-90). In a mobile defense, commanders take advantage
of terrain in depth, military deception, obstacles and mines while employing fires and maneuver to seize
initiative from the attacking enemy force. The commander weights the striking force, with the allocation of
FA and other FS resources available.
6-51. The defending force's planned maneuver must incorporate the movement of FS assets to locations
where they can provide continuous support. FS assets enhance the supported force combat capabilities and
enable the quick defeat of the enemy force.
6-52. The defending commander takes precautions to prevent fratricide by establishing a restrictive fire line
(RFL) and other FSCMs. The commander positions FS assets to support screen and guard forces and allocates
additional artillery to support a covering force. If the security force is assigned a large OA, the commander
may have to position FS assets to provide effective coverage of only the most likely enemy avenues of
approach. This is particularly important for a screen because often the screen force relies on indirect fire to
delay or disrupt the enemy. Providing adequate indirect FS to the security force may require the main body
to position its artillery well forward in its formation. Other FS considerations for a mobile defense include:
* Weight the striking force with the most flexible FS attack/delivery platforms available such as
CAS and attack aviation.
* Positioning two-thirds of the available firing units with the striking force during a mobile defense
and one- third with the fixing force.
* Planning for frequent survivability moves of TA WLR assets based on movement of the FLOT.
* Planning for the use of obscuration or screening smoke to support both the fixing and striking
force.
* Positioning ammunition stocks for each phase of the operation. |
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* Positioning observers forward and along the flanks of both the fixing and striking force to observe
and execute priority targets.
* Employing UA forward of advancing units to detect and identify enemy elements at the earliest
possible time and to locate targets in designated TAIs.
* Monitor WLR acquisitions for indications of mine emplacement by the enemy.
* Integrate reconnaissance, surveillance and targeting acquisition with the fixing force to slow and
disorganize repositioning and withdrawing enemy forces.
* Coordinate and synchronize joint FS with SOF and the air component.
RETROGRADE
6-53. The retrograde is a type of defensive operation that involves organized movement away from the
enemy (ADP 3-90). An enemy may force these operations, or a commander may execute them voluntarily.
In either case, the higher echelon commander of a force executing a retrograde must approve the retrograde
operation before its initiation. A retrograde is a transitional operation. It is not conducted in isolation. It is
part of a larger scheme of maneuver designed to regain the initiative and defeat the enemy.
6-54. The three forms of the retrograde are delay, withdrawal, and retirement. In delays, units yield ground
to gain time while retaining flexibility and freedom of action to inflict the maximum damage on an enemy.
Withdrawing units, whether all or part of a committed force, voluntarily disengage from an enemy to preserve
the force or release it for a new mission. A withdraw is to disengage from an enemy force and move in a
direction away from the enemy (ADP 3-90). A withdrawal is the riskiest of all operations. Deception
operations can reduce this operational risk. A retirement is when a force out of contact moves away from the
enemy (ADP 3-90). In each form of the retrograde, a force not engaged with an enemy moves to another
location, normally by a tactical road march. In all retrograde operations, firm control of friendly maneuver
elements is a prerequisite for success.
Fire Support Planning and Tasks for the Delay
6-55. Initially, position FS assets well forward to exploit range. Prepare a plan of interdiction fires covering
main hostile avenues of approach. Later position assets in depth to provide maximum continuous fires. EFSTs
for a delay are as follows:
* Place fires on barriers and natural obstacles.
* Emplace obstacles with scatterable mines.
* Utilize fires to support strongpoints.
* Provide fires to cover and screen withdrawals. Use smoke extensively.
* Provide fires in support of hasty counterattacks.
* Engage enemy forces congested behind obstacles or minefields and to slow breaching attempts.
* Use fires to attack enemy forces that have breached the obstacles.
* Provide fires to assist maneuver in disengagement.
* Provide maximum continuous fire for maneuver forces as they displace to the rear.
* Provide mass fires to slow the enemy as they deploy to concentrate for attack of friendly delay
positions.
6-56. The FS planning aspects of a withdrawal are very similar to those of a delay, as the FSCOORD must
plan for a withdrawal under pressure. The enemy must be forced to slow down as they concentrate their
forces. Because enemy maneuver units are moving while this occurs, the use of joint precision effects against
HPTs is essential. Deep fires are used in relieving pressure on units in contact with the enemy.
6-57. A retirement is a retrograde operation in which a force that is not engaged with the enemy conducts a
tactical movement to the rear. FA units are integrated with the maneuver units. They are given a GS support
relationship with on-order missions of DS to their organic units. EFSTs in a withdrawal are as follows:
* Mask the movement of friendly forces with smoke.
* Use fires to slow the enemy.
* Cover obstacles with fire and observation. |
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* Jam enemy command nets to slow the enemy's reaction to a withdrawal once it is under way.
* Use deep fires to relieve pressure on units in contact.
* Provide FPF when necessary.
* Be prepared to support a delay.
Planning for Retrograde Operations
6-58. A defensive situation may require the HQ staff to plan for retrograde operations in combination,
sequentially, or subsequent to the defensive mission. Planning and rehearsing a rearward passage of lines of
security forces forward of the MBA is critical to ensuring proper execution while under enemy pressure. The
complexity and fluidity of retrograde operations and the need to synchronize the entire operation dictate the
need for detailed, centralized planning and coordination with decentralized execution. A retrograde may be
forced or voluntary. In either event, a higher echelon commander must approve it.
FIRE SUPPORT CONSIDERATIONS FOR SUSTAINMENT IN DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
6-59. Sustained combat in defensive operations will normally generate the largest requirement for supplies
and services, stress resupply capabilities for fuel and ammunition, and require rapid evacuation of wounded
and equipment repair as far forward as possible. Sustainment for artillery units in a defensive role requires
prepositioning of ammunition and other essential supplies. During a delay operation, supplies should be
prepositioned at subsequent delay lines or positions. Petroleum, oil, lubricants, and ammunition stocks must
also be adequate to support decisive defensive actions.
6-60. As operations shift towards the defense, FS sustainment elements should begin to minimize the amount
of support forward in the defense. Sustainment staffs will be primarily concerned with providing needed
support to firing units engaged in corps-level operations and to divisions in whose area the main enemy effort
is expected.
6-61. FS and sustainment planners in the defense should consider ammunition and fuel availability while
maximizing organic haul capability and minimizing requirements for resupply. They should preposition
additional ammunition and fuel in planned and coordinated cache sites in convenient locations along
anticipated routes of withdrawal while making plans to destroy these stocks, if necessary.
THE RESERVE IN DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
6-62. The defense plan retains a reserve regardless of the defensive operation assigned. The reserve is that
portion of a body of troops that is withheld from action at the beginning of an engagement to be available for
a decisive movement (ADP 3-90). The reserve is more difficult to resource in the mobile defense because so
much of the available combat power is allocated to the striking force.
6-63. EFSTs for the reserve are as follows:
* Plan fires to support the commitment of the reserve during movement.
* Plan fires to strike at objectives in depth as enemy dispositions are revealed. This is to support the
committed reserves and to break up the enemy's coordination of the attack in the area defense.
* Plan fires on the enemy's flanks and rear where counterattacking forces are committed in the
mobile defense.
* Plan fires to deceive the enemy into thinking the reserve is committed elsewhere.
* Plan for FSCMs such as an RFL in case of converging forces in the mobile defense or a RFA to
safeguard strongpoints in the area defense.
* Plan to rearm, refit, and refuel organic and supporting FS before assuming on-order missions.
6-64. As in the offense, a support relationship of GS or GSR is best for artillery units designated to support
reserves once committed. Once the reserve is committed, organic FA is augmented by other lethal and
nonlethal attack/delivery platforms. Unnecessary changes in organization and time-consuming movements
should be avoided to ensure adequate support for the committed reserve. |
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TRANSITION TO THE OFFENSE
6-65. A defending commander seeks a window of opportunity to transition to offensive operations by
anticipating when and where an enemy force will reach its culminating point or require an operational pause
before it can continue. During these windows, the combat power ratios mostly favor a defending force. An
enemy force will do everything it can to keep a friendly force from knowing when it is overextended.
FSCOORDs anticipate the transition to the offense and support their commanders by providing input to the
overall operation assessment process, and by applying the principles of FS planning and coordination and FS
execution.
SECTION IV – THE OFFENSE
6-66. The main purpose of the offense is to defeat enemy forces, destroy enemy forces, and gain control of
terrain, resources, and population centers. The offense supports friendly operations in the land, air, maritime,
space, and cyberspace domains, and in the information environment. The cyberspace domain is the
interdependent networks of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet,
telecommunication networks, computer systems, embedded processors and controllers, and relevant portions
of the electromagnetic spectrum (FM 3-0). Dislocate is to employ forces to obtain significant positional
advantage in one or more domains, rendering the enemy’s dispositions less valuable, perhaps even irrelevant
(FM 3-0). These operations destroy, dislocate, disintegrate, or isolate an enemy force.
6-67. An offensive operation is an operation to defeat or destroy enemy forces and gain control of terrain,
resources, and population centers (ADP 3-0). The offense is the decisive form of war. The offense is the
ultimate means commanders have of imposing their will on enemy forces. Executing offensive operations to
defeat and destroy enemy forces as well as gain control of terrain, resources, and population centers.
Offensive operations can also be conducted to deceive or divert an enemy force, develop intelligence, or hold
an enemy force in position. Commanders seize, retain, and exploit the initiative when conducting the offense.
Taking the initiative from an enemy force requires the conduct of the offense, even in the defense.
6-68. The performance of effective offensive operations capitalizes on timely, relevant, accurate, and
predictive intelligence and other relevant information regarding enemy forces, weather, and terrain.
Commanders maneuver forces to positions of relative advantage before contact. Contact with enemy forces
before the main effort is deliberate and designed to shape the optimum situation for the decisive operation.
Without hesitation, commanders violently execute both movement and fires-within the higher commander's
intent-to break the enemy's will or destroy the enemy.
THE ENEMY DEFENSE
6-69. During offensive operations, the enemy typically attempts to slow and disrupt friendly forces with a
combination of obstacles, prepared positions, and favorable terrain so that they can be destroyed with massed
fires. The enemy is likely to defend in depth, and when provided time, will continuously improve positions
in ways that better protect enemy defending units, make attacks against them more costly, and allow the
enemy to commit the minimum amount of ground combat power forward. Forward positioned enemy forces
are heavily focused on providing observed fires for long range systems and slowing friendly forces long
enough to be engaged effectively by those systems. The enemy is likely to conduct a mobile defense
whenever capable, using a series of subsequent battle positions to achieve depth.
6-70. The enemy commander seeks to use fires and obstacles to prevent decisive engagement of the
defending ground forces as they reposition, while causing friendly forces to move methodically under
continuous fire without fixing the enemy's own forces. The enemy can employ significant EW, ISR, and
information-related capabilities as part of this defensive effort. Several potential enemies can employ CBRN
weapons to include tactical nuclear weapons. The enemy main defense zone is organized in a succession of
integrated kill zones, obstacles, and battle positions.
ECHELONMENT OF FIRES
6-71. Echelonment of fires is a technique for integrating and synchronizing maneuver and fires. Echelonment
of fires is the execution of a schedule of fires fired from the highest caliber to the lowest caliber weapon, |
3-09 | 138 | Chapter 6
based on risk estimate distances (see ATP 3-09.32) and weapons system range capabilities, as the supported
force moves toward an objective. Echelonment of fires helps to ensure that ground forces are able to move
to an objective without losing momentum, helps set the conditions for the direct fire fight, and reduces the
risk of friendly casualties. Echelonment of fires is accomplished when the supported commander wishes to
conduct preparation fires on an objective.
6-72. Echeloning a preparation is a 9-step process. The process is described in greater detail in ATP 3-09.42
the 9-steps are:
* Determine what assets, to include ammunition, are required and what assets are currently available
or allocated.
* Verify risk estimate distances and attack criteria with the commander.
* Plan targets.
* Develop a communications plan.
* Determine what the rate of movement will be.
* Develop the schedule of fires and decide how the preparation schedule will be initiated.
* Brief the plan and confirm the method with the commander.
* Complete the target scheduling worksheet.
* Rehearse and refine the plan.
COMMON OFFENSIVE CONTROL MEASURES
6-73. Orders for the offense include the minimum control measures required to coordinate the operation.
Control measures describe and illustrate the plan, maintain separation of forces, concentrate the effort,
provide subordinates freedom of action, assist the commander in the mission command of forces, and add
flexibility to the maneuver plan. At a minimum, control measures prescribe a line of departure (LOD), a time
of attack, and the objective. In addition, commanders could assign AO and an axis of advance, routes, phase
lines, checkpoints, and FSCMs. They optimally allow subordinates the maximum freedom of action
consistent with necessary synchronization. Below are offensive control measures that every FS leader should
understand in order to best support the supported commander. For more information on offensive control
measures see ADP 3-90.
6-74. Axis of advance is the general area through which the bulk of a unit's combat power must move (ADP
3-90). A commander uses an axis of advance:
* First, to direct the bypass of locations that could delay the progress of an advancing force, such as
known contaminated areas. Plan fires along the route to engage enemy observation posts and direct
fire systems.
* Second, to indicate that a force is not required to clear the AO as it advances. The force will need
to clear the axis in accordance with specified bypass criteria.
* Third, to indicate to a unit involved in offensive encirclement, exploitation, or pursuit operations
the need to move rapidly toward an objective.
6-75. Battle handover line is a designated phase line where responsibility transitions from the stationary
force to the moving force and vice versa (ADP 3-90). The common higher echelon commander of two forces
establishes a battle handover line after consulting both commanders. The stationary commander determines
the location of the line. The battle handover line is forward of the forward edge of the battle area in the
defense or the FLOT in the offense. The commander draws it to keep the passing unit in the supporting range
of the forward combat elements of the stationary unit until the passage of lines is complete. The area between
the battle handover line and the stationary force belongs to the stationary force commander. The stationary
force commander may employ security forces, obstacles, and fires in the area. Other FS considerations
include changes to priority of fire and FSCM changes as units cross the battle handover line.
6-76. Direction of attack is a specific direction or assigned route a force uses and does not deviate from when
attacking (ADP 3-90). It is a restrictive control measure. A commander's use of a direction of attack
maximizes control over a subordinate unit's movement, and it is often used during night attacks, infiltrations,
and when attacking through obscurants. Unit commanders establish a direction of attack through a variety of |
3-09 | 139 | Fire Support in Depth During Large-Scale Combat Operations
means, such as target reference points and checkpoints. When using a direction of attack, unit commanders
designate a point of departure.
6-77. Final coordination line is a phase line close to the enemy position used to coordinate the lifting or
shifting of supporting fires with the final deployment of maneuver elements (ADP 3-90). Before crossing
this line, units make final adjustments to supporting fires to reflect the actual situation versus the anticipated
situation. The location should be easily recognizable on the ground. The final coordination line is not an
FSCM.
6-78. The FLOT normally identifies the forward location of covering or screening forces. It does not apply
to small, long-range reconnaissance assets and similar stay-behind forces. Friendly forces forward of the
FLOT should have a restrictive FSCM, such as an NFA, placed around them to prevent friendly fire incidents.
The CFL should be planned as close as possible to the FLOT without restricting the maneuver operations.
6-79. Limit of advance is a phase line used to control forward progress of the attack (ADP 3-90). The
attacking unit does not advance any of its elements or assets beyond the limit of advance, but the attacking
unit can push its security forces to that limit. Commanders usually select a feature that is easily identifiable,
perpendicular to the direction of attack, and on the far side of the objective as the limit of advance. The use
of a limit of advance prevents an attacking force from overextending and reduces fratricide possibilities and
friendly fire incidents by fires supporting the attack. FSCOORDs plan and execute fires beyond the limit of
advance.
6-80. The line of contact is a general trace delineating the locations where friendly and enemy forces are
engaged (ADP 3-90). Commanders designate the enemy side of the line of contact by the abbreviation
"ENY." In the defense, a line of contact is often synonymous with the FLOT. A line of contact may be
combined with an LOD in the offense.
6-81. A line of departure in land warfare, a line designated to coordinate the departure of attack elements
(JP 3-31). The purpose of an LOD is to coordinate the advance of the attacking force, so that its elements
strike enemy forces in the order and at the time desired. An LOD also marks where a unit transitions from
movement to maneuver. Commanders also use it to facilitate the coordination of fires. Generally, it should
be perpendicular to the direction the attacking force takes on its way to the objective. Units crossing the LOD
trigger fire plans and FSCM changes.
6-82. An objective is a location used to orient operations, phase operations, facilitate changes of direction,
and provide for unity of effort (ADP 3-90). An objective can be terrain or force oriented. Terrain-oriented
objectives should be easy to recognize. A higher echelon commander uses terrain-oriented objectives to focus
the operations of subordinates, focus phase operations, facilitate changes of direction, and provide for unity
of effort. Commanders determine force-oriented objectives based on known enemy positions. FSCOORDs
plan fires on, beyond, and to the flanks of objectives IAW the scheme of maneuver and the commander's
intent. FS attack/delivery systems should be able to range well beyond the objective. A rule of thumb for FA
assets is that two-thirds of their maximum range should be beyond the objective.
FIRE SUPPORT CONSIDERATIONS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OFFENSE
6-83. Audacity, concentration, surprise, and tempo characterize the offense. Commanders maneuver forces
to advantageous positions before the start of an operation. To shape their main effort, they initiate selective
contact with enemy forces. The main effort determines the outcome of the major operation, battle, or
engagement. The main effort will capitalize on the successful application of the characteristics of the offense.
Audacity
6-84. Audacity is a willingness to take bold risks. By executing a bold, aggressive plan, a commander can
seize and retain the initiative, but the risk decisions must be balanced against expected gains. Commanders
can use FS to demonstrate audacity by:
* Aggressively applying firepower by massing in an accurate and timely manner.
* Proactively target and strike critical enemy C2, indirect fire, and sustainment nodes.
* Placing FS assets forward of supported units maximize range. The commander must ensure proper
security of FS assets. |
3-09 | 140 | Chapter 6
* Using FA raids to strike HPTs or gain range for setting the conditions for future operation. For
more information on artillery raid operations see ATP 3-09.23.
Concentration
6-85. Concentration is massing the effects of combat power in time and space at the decisive point to achieve
a single purpose. It is imperative to have concentrated ISR assets to support this effort. Commanders can use
FS to achieve concentration by:
* Allocating FS assets to support the decisive operation.
* Focusing information collection and TA assets.
* Focus fires in support of one aspect of supported unit decisive or shaping operations for brief
periods.
* Massing fires on choke points and key terrain to canalize, slow, and block the enemy's movements.
Surprise
6-86. Commanders surprise enemy forces by attacking at a time or place or in a manner enemy forces did
not prepare for or expect. They achieve this by showing enemy forces what they expect to see while actually
doing something different. FS enables the commander to achieve surprise with the instantaneous delivery of
a high volume of fire on the enemy without warning. Commanders can use FS to achieve surprise by:
* Meet the five requirements for accurate predicted fire, for first round FFE.
* Rapidly shifting FS assets and massing effects.
* Using short duration, intense fires against key enemy functions at critical times.
* Foregoing a preparation to achieve surprise in initiating an attack.
Tempo
6-87. Tempo is the relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect to the enemy
(ADP 3-0). Commanders can use FS to enhance or maintain the tempo of the offense by:
* Using a decentralized organization for combat and decentralized FS planning and fire control
methods (especially in the offense) to facilitate rapid, flexible execution of fires and immediately
available dedicated fires to a designated ground force.
* Providing fires to slow the enemy's retreat during the pursuit.
* Using on-order missions to facilitate transition to subsequent phases, branches, and sequels.
* Providing fires in support of shaping operations that complement the main effort and set the stage
for rapid transition.
* Developing a thorough sustainment plan that properly anticipates potential culminating points.
* Ensuring FSCMs are planned to facilitate a permissive environment.
* Providing fires to stop reinforcements; use smoke to delay and disrupt the enemy retreat.
TYPES OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
6-88. Offensive operations are movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit. During the offense,
the FSCOORD and FSE integrate close-supporting FA, mortars, counterfire, strike, electronic attack; naval
surface FS, CAS and AI aircraft into the operations of the AO owning commander. Such fires may be time
or event driven. The planning also involves the use of surface-to-surface fires necessary to suppress enemy
air defenses to facilitate air component operations within the supported command's AO.
MOVEMENT TO CONTACT
6-89. Movement to contact is a type of offensive operation designed to establish or regain contact to develop
the situation (FM 3-90). It is conducted when the information related to enemy positions, situation and
deployment is not clear. In a movement to contact the supported commander has lost contact with the enemy
main body and attempts to reestablish it, using all available sources of intelligence to develop the situation.
The commander may know the location of enemy reserve and follow-on forces see figure 6-3 on page 6-20. |
3-09 | 141 | Fire Support in Depth During Large-Scale Combat Operations
6-90. Since a movement to contact involves an unclear or uncertain situation, the positioning of FA units
must facilitate responsive execution of EFSTs. The positioning and movement of FA assets must be
coordinated with maneuver. Position FA assets as far forward as practical to allow maximum flexibility once
enemy contact is made. TA assets focus on locating enemy indirect fire systems throughout the movement
to contact. As the situation develops TA assets will transition to support setting the conditions for future
operation and counterfire missions. Specific FS and FA considerations include:
* Allocate preponderance of CAS and attack aviation to cover and guard forces.
* Be prepared to rapidly change priorities of fire and establish FSCMs.
* Integrate DIVARTY and FAB WLRs, survey, MET, and counterfire coverage in support of the
BCTs to allow BCT organic FA BNs to continue to maneuver with the BCT; coordinating
handover of support to BCTs once the situation is developed.
* Integrate FA, joint fires, and TA WLR assets to assist in securing the unprotected flanks of
vulnerable division, corps, or other supported command assets during advances.
* Attack bridges and other mobility corridors to limit enemy mobility options and facilitate setting
the conditions for a meeting engagement.
* Position FS assets well forward to facilitate responsiveness and the ability to mass fires.
* Position the CP forward to facilitate control of FS operations.
* Provide responsive cannon, rocket, and missile fires to the BCTs to enable their organic FA BNs
to continue to move during the movement to contact.
* Plan artillery movement to maintain force momentum and provide adequate immediately
responsive support.
* Use UAS searching forward of advancing MLRS and HIMARS batteries as an aid to reconnoiter
routes and position areas-particularly to identify by-passed enemy forces.
* Plan on-order targets on likely enemy defensive locations, EAs, observation posts, and obstacles.
They are placed into effect and cancelled as the lead element can confirm or deny enemy presence.
* Transition FA units from GS or GSR to R once the situation is developed and the BCTs begin to
conduct follow-on offensive or defensive operations.
* Position a FA unit to follow close behind the advance guard to provide responsive fires to lead
elements.
* Position WLRs, observers, and UAS to detect enemy forces forward and along the supported unit's
flanks.
* Position WLRs to cover critical friendly assets that are vulnerable to enemy indirect fire from
bypassed regular or irregular forces.
* Plan for alternate position areas and survivability moves.
* Plan for obscuration or screening smoke.
* Synchronize the positioning and movement of FA with the tempo of the supported unit. |
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Figure 6-3. Task organized for a movement to contact
ATTACK
6-91. Attack is a type of offensive operation that destroys or defeats enemy forces, seizes and secures terrain,
or both (FM 3-90). Attacks are violent engagements incorporating movement supported by fires against an
enemy position with a force whose disposition is known and reasonably understood. However, based on
mission variable analysis the commander may decide to conduct an attack using only fires. Attacks may be
either a decisive or setting the conditions for future operation and, depending on the time available for
planning, are characterized as either hasty or deliberate. An attack differs from a movement to contact
because, in an attack, the commander knows part of the enemy's disposition. This knowledge enables the
commander to better synchronize the attack and employ combat power more effectively in an attack than in
a movement to contact. For more information on attack see FM 3-90.
6-92. During the attack, less centralized control of fires is used because the supported force will have the
initiative. Allocation of FA fires for the supported command's main effort helps control the tempo of offensive
operations. The main effort must be weighted by providing adequate FA fires.
6-93. As the attacking force moves forward, preparation fire destroys, neutralizes, or suppresses enemy
positions and weapons systems. As defined in chapter 3, preparation fire is a brief, intense bombardment on
selected targets or a prolonged effort over time covering a large number of targets. In planning fires, the
supported commander and FSCOORD must weigh the probable effects of preparation fire against the
achievement of surprise and the creation of obstacles capable of impeding friendly force movements.
Preparation fire can continue while ground maneuver elements are moving. Preparation fire is planned by the
commander planning the attack. The preparation fire may be phased as follows: |
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* Phase 1: Attack of enemy FS capabilities and observation capabilities, including artillery HQ and
CPs.
* Phase 2: Attack of enemy main CPs, communication facilities, assembly areas, and reserves.
* Phase 3: Attack of enemy defensive areas in the forward portions of the enemy's AO, and targets
that pose an immediate threat to attacking forces.
6-94. Timely displacements of FA units are essential for successful offensive operations. FA units move well
forward prior to an attack, sometimes beyond the FLOT, displacing by echelon to provide continuous fires
to the supported force. Units may be in danger of being left behind unless repositioning is frequent and
synchronized to support the forward progress of the maneuver force. Displacements should maximize
continuous delivery of fires and be completed as rapidly as possible. During the attack, TA WLR assets focus
on identifying enemy systems that can interdict the supported unit as it moves toward the objective. Radars
and observers linked to FS systems enable the supported unit's attack see figure 6-4 on page 6-22. Specific
considerations to support an attack include:
* Attack enemy operational reserves and second echelon forces outside the AO to isolate first
echelon forces.
* Support air operations with SEAD.
* Conduct strikes to slow and disorganize repositioning and withdrawing enemy forces.
* Destroy enemy C2 facilities to prevent coordination of their defense.
* Execute strikes in support of division, corps, JTF, or other supported command setting the
conditions for future operations.
* Provide fires to support the penetration of enemy positions.
* Recommend support relationships for a BCT's FA BN when the BCT is held in reserve.
* Plan FS for follow-on offensive operations (pursuit, exploitation); ensuring routes have sufficient
mobility to move rapidly.
* Plan for and provide preparation fires to facilitate attacks by the supported unit.
* Mass effects of fires against HPTs to meet criteria established by the force commander to set
conditions for crossing the LOD.
* Provide fires to disorganize and disrupt enemy R or reserve formations.
* Mass fires against counterattacks.
* Provide fires to support raids and spoiling attacks.
* Plan for obscuration or screening smoke.
* Ensure radars are in position in time to support the assault on the objective and subsequent
consolidation.
* Use echeloned movement to provide continuous radar coverage to the supported force. |
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Figure 6-4. Example of Corps attack
EXPLOITATION AND PURSUIT
6-95. Exploitation is a type of offensive operation following a successful attack to disorganize the enemy in
depth (FM 3-90). Exploitation is the primary means of translating tactical success into operational advantage.
It exacerbates enemy force disorganization, confusion, and disruption of the C2 system caused by tactical
defeat. Exploitation takes advantage of tactical opportunities to degrade enemy forces to the point where they
have no alternative but surrender, be destroyed, or take flight. Typically, the supported commander does not
assign a subordinate unit the mission of exploitation before starting a movement to contact or attack but
reorganizes internally to reflect the existing mission variables of METT-TC (I) when the opportunity to
exploit success occurs. Exploitation demands a force with sufficient mobility to maintain pressure on the
fleeing enemy force. Joint fires, to include CAS, are the most flexible assets in an exploitation and pursuit. |
3-09 | 145 | Fire Support in Depth During Large-Scale Combat Operations
6-96. FA units reposition to where they can support a renewed attack. Aviation assets can provide support
while artillery systems reposition. A commander may need to request additional resources to include
reconnaissance, surveillance, and TA WLR assets to help identify targets for attack.
6-97. Pursuit is a type of offensive operation designed to catch or cut off a disorganized hostile force
attempting to escape, with the aim of destroying it (FM 3-90). A pursuit normally follows a successful
exploitation. Unlike an exploitation, which may focus on seizing key or decisive terrain instead of the enemy
force, the pursuit always focuses on completing the destruction of fleeing enemy forces by destroying their
ability and will to resist. The commander in a pursuit tries to combine direct pressure against the retreating
forces with an enveloping or encircling maneuver that fixes the enemy in positions where the enemy force
can be defeated in detail. Fires can restrict movement of the enemy force and delay and disrupt its ability to
quickly execute the maneuvers vital to protecting itself see figure 6-5.
Figure 6-5. Exploitation and pursuit
6-98. An aggressively executed pursuit keeps the moving enemy unprepared, and unable to defend,
ultimately faced with the options of surrendering or complete destruction. Pursuits require swift maneuver
and attacks by forces to strike the enemy's most vulnerable areas. There are two options in conducting a
pursuit; each involves assigning a subordinate the mission of maintaining direct pressure on the rearward
moving enemy force. The first is a frontal pursuit that employs only direct pressure. The second is a
combination that uses a subordinate element to maintain direct-pressure and one or more other subordinate
forces to encircle the enemy. In the pursuit, the most decisive effects result from combining a direct pressure
force and an encircling force (FM 3- 90).
6-99. There is generally little time to establish and affect new task organizations or support relationships
between an attack and exploitation or pursuit. These operations transition very quickly from one to another. |
3-09 | 146 | Chapter 6
During exploitation and pursuit, it is important to have decentralized execution authority and support
relationships. Considerations for supporting a unit during exploitation and pursuit include:
* Conduct strikes on repositioning and withdrawing enemy forces to disrupt or slow the enemy's
retreat.
* Exploiting forces should be allocated as much CAS and attack aviation as possible.
* Support CAB attack operations with SEAD.
* Destroy enemy C2 facilities to disrupt the enemy's ability to consolidate and reorganize.
* Use available aviation assets and joint fires to facilitate continuous fires on fleeing enemy forces
while units are repositioned or moved with the exploiting or pursuing force.
* Plan fires to support the flanks and rear of pursuing or exploiting forces.
* Provide fires to destroy enemy hasty defenses and allow the continued pursuit of the enemy main
body.
* Request, monitor, and update FSCMs as the exploitation and pursuit continues.
* Provide fires on obstacles and chokepoints to continue destruction of retreating enemy forces.
* Plan for greater use of retransmission capabilities.
* Plan for increased use of Class III (petroleum, oil, and lubricants) and Class V (ammunition of all
types) supplies.
* Position WLRs to cover critical friendly assets that are vulnerable to indirect fire from bypassed
regular or irregular forces.
* Monitor WLR acquisitions for indications of scatterable mine emplacement by the enemy.
THE RESERVE IN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
6-100. In the offense, a sizable reserve force exists. At the corps, the reserve may be a division, while at the
division the fixed figure for a reserve force should not be estimated. The commander establishes its planning
priorities for likely contingencies. A reserve reinforces or maintains the attack's momentum by-
* Exploiting success when the opportunity arises.
* Countering tactical reverses, such as an enemy counterattack against committed units.
* Sustaining the attack of a committed unit.
* Countering threats to the corps or division rear areas that exceed the capabilities of local forces to
defeat.
6-101. In organizing the artillery for combat and in allocating other FS assets, the following must be
considered:
* A plan for the use of FS organic assets to the reserve force until it is committed.
* Provision of adequate support to the force at the time of commitment.
6-102. Support relationships of GS to the corps, GSR to DIVARTY of a committed division and DS to a
brigade are ideal missions for artillery of a reserve force. Positioning and ammunition expenditures can be
controlled by the FFA HQ that has overall responsibility for FS. This helps the units make an easy transition
to their on-order support relationship once their force is committed.
6-103. Plan fires to support the commitment of the reserve during movement. Fires are planned:
* On the flanks to protect the force.
* On the way to the objective.
* On the objective to destroy, neutralize, or suppress targets.
* Mass fires at the breakthrough point or at the point of assault to create a hole in the enemy defenses.
* Beyond the objective to prevent counterattacks, to help consolidate the objective, and to prevent
reinforcement of the objective area.
* On enemy elements that have been bypassed.
* FSCMs such as CFLs must be well forward to ensure the force will not outrun them. |
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SUSTAINMENT FOR FIRE SUPPORT IN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
6-104. As units move forward and offensive combat operations are initiated, lines of communication
extend, and detailed planning is required to accommodate increased rates of consumption. FS operations
must be sustainable with fuel, ammunition, maintenance, and medical support by aerial and ground means.
FS and sustainment planners must arrange for fuel to be pushed forward to allow artillery units to refuel with
minimum disruption to operations. Planning should consider access to prepositioned forward corps and
division assets to include refuel-on-the-move options and equipment recovery support. Refueling on the
move is the preferred option for operations in the offense. During movement to contact, units should
anticipate a disruption of resupply. They should carry sufficient supplies to support them through the
movement to contact and ensuing battle.
6-105. Prior to crossing the LOD in support of offensive operations, firing units should use prepositioned
ammunition stocks to fire preparations or other programs requiring extensive expenditure of ammunition.
This will conserve up-loaded ammunition and permit advance into enemy territory with a maximum amount
of accompanying ammunition stocks.
6-106. Sustainment operations during deliberate attacks should focus on weighting the main effort and the
resupply of critical items such as fuel and ammunition and the provision of medical and maintenance support.
Follow-on operations must be considered to ensure a swift transition into exploitation or pursuit operations.
TRANSITION TO THE DEFENSE
6-107. Commanders retain greater flexibility for defensive operations if they begin preparations before the
force culminates. This may allow commanders to dictate where they conduct defensive operations.
Commanders can plan future activities to aid defensive operations, minimize vulnerability to attack, and
facilitate renewal of offensive operations as a force transitions to branches or sequels of an ongoing operation.
For example, some of a commander's subordinate units may move into battle positions before the entire unit
terminates the offense. Commanders can echelon sustainment assets forward to establish a new echelon
support area.
6-108. If a force achieves its objectives, and the situation makes focusing on defensive operations
inappropriate, then commanders transition to a security and stability focus. The commander's intent and
concept of operations drives the design and planning for security and stability. Generally, commanders focus
on meeting the minimum-essential stability tasks by providing security and ensuring the provision of essential
food, water, shelter, sanitation, and medical services to the local inhabitants in their AO. This occurs in
coordination with indigenous population and institutions and unified action partners before addressing the
other stability concerns.
SECTION V – ENABLING, STABILITY AND RECONSTITUTION OPERATIONS
6-109. Commanders direct tactical enabling operations to support the performance of all offensive,
defensive, and stability operations. Enabling operations are usually conducted by commanders as part of
shaping operations and supporting efforts. A supporting effort is a designated subordinate unit with a mission
that supports the success of the main effort (ADP 3-0). Enabling operations apply to all elements of decisive
action. See For more information on enabling, stability, and reconstitution operations see ADP 3-90 and ATP
3-90.4.
ENABLING OPERATIONS
6-110. The tactical enabling operations are reconnaissance, security, troop movement, relief in place,
passage of lines, mobility operations, and countermobility operations. They will be discussed in the following
paragraphs.
RECONNAISSANCE
6-111. Reconnaissance is mission undertaken to obtain information about the activities and resources of an
enemy or adversary, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, geographic, or other |
3-09 | 148 | Chapter 6
characteristics of a particular area, by visual observation or other detection methods (JP 2-0). Reconnaissance
accomplished by small units primarily relies on the human dynamic rather than technical means.
Commanders orient their reconnaissance assets by identifying a reconnaissance objective within an AO.
Reconnaissance is a focused collection effort. The reconnaissance objective is the most important result
desired from that specific reconnaissance effort (FM 3-90). Although all units conduct reconnaissance,
ground cavalry, aviation attack reconnaissance units, scouts, and Special Forces are specifically trained to
conduct reconnaissance operations. The five types of reconnaissance operations are:
* Area reconnaissance.
* Reconnaissance in force.
* Route reconnaissance.
* Special reconnaissance.
* Zone reconnaissance.
6-112. FS considerations during reconnaissance operations are as follows:
* Orient fires on the reconnaissance objective.
* Use fires to help the reconnaissance force retain freedom of maneuver.
* Provide deception fires.
* Consider attaching FA assets to the supported reconnaissance force.
* FA units must have the mobility equal to that of the supported force.
* Main body FA units should be positioned forward to support reconnaissance elements.
* FS plans should only be executed if surprise is lost. While a fundamental of the reconnaissance is
to gain and maintain enemy contact, it is not normally the intent of the reconnaissance elements
to become engaged with the enemy.
* Report all information quickly and accurately.
SECURITY OPERATIONS
6-113. The main difference between conducting security operations and reconnaissance is that security
operations orient on the force or facility being protected while reconnaissance orients on the enemy and
terrain. The ultimate goal of security operations is to protect the force from surprise and reduce the unknowns
in any situation. A commander may conduct security operations to the front, flanks, or rear of the friendly
force. Setting the conditions for operation, economy of force is often a consideration when planning security
operations. The four types of security operations are area, cover, guard, and screen. For more information on
types of security operations see ADP 3-90.
6-114. FS considerations during security operations are as follows:
* Provide responsive fires for all security forces due to the typically limited number of maneuver
units operating over a large area.
* Provide deceptive fires for covering forces and security forces in the offense, and fires to deceive
the enemy in the defense. For example, by delivering effects in an area away from the friendly
defensive positions. Forcing the enemy to deploy out of a traveling formation believing that they
had made contact with the MBA forces.
* Provide proper FS allocations for covering and security forces which operate on a wide front, in a
large area, and at great distances from the main body causing an imbalance of relative combat
power. This includes additional CAS and attack helicopter allocations. For FA units, this could
mean extreme decentralization of assets. The allocation of one FA BN in a DS relationship for
each BN sized maneuver element in a covering force is appropriate.
* Plan fires for hasty attack and/or hasty defense.
* Plan fires for forward passage of lines for MBA forces in the offense, and rearward passage of
lines of security forces in the defense. The control of indirect fires passes to MBA forces as
covering forces hand over the battle. Detailed coordination between passing and stationary force
commanders and FSCOORDs is essential.
* FA unit displacements in the offense and defense will be frequent, plan for routes and PAAs well
in advance. |
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* Fire plans should be simple, most fires will be against targets of opportunity.
* Main body FA units should be positioned forward to support covering and other security forces.
* In the offense, FSCMs should be permissive and on-order, well in front of the rapidly moving
covering force.
* On order CFLs should be established in conjunction with phase lines, as close as possible to
friendly troops.
* FA units must have the mobility equal to that of the supported forces.
* Execute fires to assist maneuver in moving and disengaging.
* Suppress and obscure enemy overwatch positions.
TROOP MOVEMENT
6-115. Troop movement is the movement of Soldiers and units from one place to another by any available
means (FM 3-90). Troop movements are made by different methods, such as dismounted and mounted
marches using organic combat and tactical vehicles; motor transport; and air, rail, and water means in various
combinations. FS considerations for troop movement are similar to the FS considerations for security
operations listed above and by applying the FS functions.
RELIEF IN PLACE
6-116. A relief in place is an operation in which, by the direction of higher authority, all or part of a unit is
replaced in an area by the incoming unit and the responsibilities of the replaced elements for the mission and
the assigned zone of operations are transferred to the incoming unit (JP 3-07.3). There are three techniques
for conducting a relief: sequentially, simultaneously, or staggered. Simultaneous relief takes the least time to
execute but is more easily detected by the enemy. Sequential or staggered reliefs can occur over a significant
amount of time. These three relief techniques can occur regardless of the operational theme in which the unit
is participating see figure 6-6 on page 6-28.
6-117. A relief does not normally require artillery units to relieve weapon system for weapon system, unless
the terrain limits the number of firing positions available. Generally, the relieved unit's artillery and other FS
assets remain in place until all other relieved elements displace and are available to reinforce the fires of the
relieving unit in case the enemy tries to interfere. If the purpose of the relief is to continue the attack, the FS
attack/delivery systems of both forces generally remain in place to support the subsequent operation. FS
considerations during a relief in place include:
* The relieving unit adopts the FS plan of the unit being relieved.
* The FS assets of both units support the relief. This maintains FS if the enemy detects the relief and
tries to exploit the situation.
* Plan fires to deceive the enemy and expedite the relief.
* FS attack/delivery systems maintain normal activity patterns. For example, a unit continues to
expend the same average number of artillery rounds per day during the relief that it expended
before the initiation of the relief.
* The commander does not relieve FA units at the same time as the units they support. Relieving
FA units do not occupy previously used firing positions. Instead, relieving firing units establish
firing positions near those firing positions of the relieved unit and carefully integrate their fire with
that of the relieved unit.
* Occupying firing positions at night or during periods of poor visibility enhances operations
security. |
3-09 | 150 | Chapter 6
Figure 6-6. Relief in place
PASSAGE OF LINES
6-118. Passage of lines is an operation in which a force moves forward or rearward through another force's
combat positions with the intention of moving into or out of contact with the enemy (JP 3-18). A passage
may be designated as a forward or rearward passage of lines. A commander conducts a passage of lines to
continue an attack or conduct a counterattack, retrograde, or security operation when one unit cannot bypass
another unit's position. The conduct of a passage of lines potentially involves close combat. It involves
transferring the responsibility for an AO between two commanders.
6-119. Commanders must recognize that the transfer of control has impacts on FS. For example, the FS
support attack/delivery system may have an on-order support relationship. Responsibility for FS coordination
passes from the FSCOORD of one force to the FSCOORD of the other force at the time the force commanders
change C2.
6-120. Close coordination of plans between the commanders and staffs of the involved forces is mandatory.
Once the passage of lines is ordered, the FSCOORD of the passing force in a forward passage of lines should
send a liaison section to the FSCOORD of the force in contact. In a rearward passage, the FSCOORD of the
stationary force should send a liaison section to the FSCOORD of the passing force. FSCOORDs define and
assign mutually agreed upon FS responsibilities to facilitate the passing force. Information that the two
FSCOORDs should share and areas that should be coordinated are shown below. The important point to
remember is that each unit will be in the AO of another unit for a period of time and that detailed coordination
is vital to ensure that each of the two units understands how the other operates. The units must do the
following:
* Exchange unit SOPS.
* Exchange existing targets and fire plans. |
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* Provide status of unit TA assets.
* Exchange attack guidance and casualty criteria.
* Exchange control measures in effect; for example, FSCMs, passage points, passage lanes, and
contact points.
* Coordinate recognition signals.
* Provide information on obstacles and barriers.
* Coordinate position areas.
* Exchange intelligence.
* Coordinate clearance of fire procedures.
6-121. During forward passage the FA assets of the passing force should be infiltrated early from the rear
assembly area to the designated primary positions to support the operation. These positions should be near
the passage lanes but not so close that they interfere with the supported force movement. On a forward
passage, position priority goes to the passing force. During the passage of lines, the passing force FSE and
CP collocate with the stationary force FSE and CP. Position areas forward of the passage points are selected
based on anticipated rate of movement of the supported forces and terrain availability. Also, they are selected
away from passage points.
6-122. During rearward passage the FA assets of the stationary force should be positioned well forward to
provide deep fires to support the withdrawal of the passing force. Again, these positions should be away from
passage lanes. In the rearward passage, the stationary force has positioning priority. As the passing force FA
assets moves through, it should position behind the stationary FA assets and move laterally away from the
passage lanes.
6-123. FS planning considerations for a forward passage of lines are as follows:
* Ensure the stationary force supports the close operation while the passing force indirect fire assets
complete the passage.
* Ensure counterfire is planned and controlled by the stationary force.
* Obscure the enemy's forward observation of the passage.
* Plan fire on HPTs; for example, enemy direct-fire systems, C2, enemy FS assets, and air defense
targets.
* Plan fires to support the deception plan.
* Plan smoke to screen friendly movement through passage points.
* Plan fires to interdict enemy counterattacks and reinforcements in the area of passage.
* Plan appropriate FSCMs as follows:
Plan on-order CFL.
Consider restrictive fire areas (RFAs or NFAs) on passage points.
* Ensure passing force plans fires to support operations after the passage of lines.
* Plan CFZs on passage points and assembly areas.
* Continually update the CFL. FSCOORDS and FSOs must know the lead element's position
continuously.
* Assign priority of fire to the passing force.
6-124. FS planning considerations for a rearward passage are as follows:
* Plan obscurants to conceal movement through passage points.
* Plan massed fires to disengage forces.
* Plan fires to support obstacle and or barrier plans.
* Plan fires to support the deception plan.
* Plan FSCMs as follows:
RFAs or NFAs at passage points.
On-call CFLs.
* Plan CFZs on passage points and assembly areas. |
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* Ensure the stationary force supports the close operation while the passing force indirect-fire assets
complete the passage.
* Ensure counterfire is planned and controlled by the stationary force.
* Plan fires on passage points to be fired after friendly units have passed through. Consider use of
scatterable mines to close passage lanes.
* Ensure the stationary force plans fires to support operations after the passage of lines.
* The FSE of the stationary force sends liaison to the FSE of the passing force.
MOBILITY OPERATIONS
6-125. Freedom to move and maneuver within an OA is essential to the application of combat power and
achieving results across the range of military operations. An OE will present numerous challenges to
movement and maneuver. These are typically overcome through the integration of combined arms mobility
and countermobility in support of mission requirements.
BREACHING OPERATIONS
6-126. The plan must synchronize combat multipliers to isolate the point of penetration. Breach is a tactical
mission task in which a unit breaks through or establishes a passage through an enemy obstacle. (FM 3-90).
The breaching force employs all available means to break through or establish a passage through an enemy
defense, obstacle, minefield, or fortification. As a general rule, obstacles are covered by fire; a primary role
for the FA is to suppress the weapons systems that can engage the rupture force. The staff integrates
maneuver, CAS, artillery, mortars, Army aviation, electronic attack, the employment of scatterable mines,
air defense, obscuration, and deception to create the conditions for the success of the breaching operation.
Additionally, the maneuver force must continue to fight well beyond the breach area to stop the enemy from
counterattacking or repositioning to reinforce the enemy unit targeted for penetration. Detecting and engaging
the enemy's reserve is a primary concern. The FS planners must carefully balance resource requirements
(such as Army indirect fires and CAS) for isolating the point of penetration with the requirements of the
element conducting the breach. The breaching fundamentals are suppress, obscure, secure, reduce, and
assault. They can be remembered with the memory aid SOSRA.
6-127. Suppress:
* Suppress enemy's direct fire systems near the breach site.
* Suppression must also be effective against the enemy's indirect fires that can range the breach site.
* The FSCOORD should designate the breach site as a CFZ for WLRs.
* Suppress the enemy to allow the follow-and-support force to get into the support by fire position.
6-128. Obscure:
* Reduce effectiveness of direct fire weapons against the breach and assault elements.
* Screen the follow-and-support force movement to the support by fire position, if necessary.
* Smoke should be used with fog or darkness to maximize effectiveness.
* The commander must decide on the priority for the munition types.
* Smoke may attract enemy attention or degrade friendly TA or control.
6-129. Secure:
* Mortars and FA continue suppression and obscuration as necessary while maneuver forces secure
the breach site.
* Support stay-behind forces.
6-130. Reduce:
* As maneuver forces with engineer support reduce the obstacle and creates lanes the FA and
mortars should continue suppression fires and be prepared to lift or shift fires.
* CAS and attack helicopters should disrupt enemy counterattack forces.
* Upon reduction of the obstacle and after a foothold is established on the far side of the obstacle,
obscuring smoke should be lifted. |
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6-131. Assault:
* As the maneuver force assaults through breach to destroy the enemy, FA and mortars should
continue suppression fires and be prepared to lift or shift fires as the force approaches the enemy
battle positions.
6-132. Key EFSTs in support of a breaching operation include:
* Mortars - provide suppression and obscuration or screening fires.
* FA - isolate the breach area and suppress the enemy; provide obscuration/screening fires, and in
coordination with the S-3, establish/manage radar CFZs.
* CAS - isolate and suppress the enemy; disrupt the enemy counterattack.
* Attack helicopters - isolate and suppress the enemy; disrupt the enemy counterattack.
* Intelligence - locate and identify HPTs among enemy units in the vicinity of the breach area.
* Electronic attack - identify, locate, and jam the enemy communications associated with units in
the vicinity of the breach area.
* Obscuration (projected and generated) - isolate the breach area.
* Scatterable mines - prevent repositioning of enemy forces without hindering friendly actions on
the objective; disrupt the enemy counterattack.
6-133. FSE work closely with the G-2 during IPOE and information collection. Scouts and other observers
can often provide accurate targeting. The FSCOORD and FSE planners may designate the reduction area (or
points of breach) and support-by-fire positions providing cover as WLRs CFZs so that they are treated as
priority targets for counterfire support. The key is getting targeting information into the FS system and
executing fires at the critical time. Scouts and other observers can also be effective in setting and controlling
fires for obscuration within the breach area by adjusting fires and correcting for the actual conditions of wind
speed and direction.
6-134. In accordance with the scheme of fires, tasks to be executed by FS (to include mortars) in support
of the breach may include:
* Provide fires for obscuration and suppression.
* Destroy or suppress enemy artillery and mortars.
* Destroy or suppress enemy antitank weapon systems.
* Destroy or suppress enemy dismounted infantry positions.
* Delay, disrupt, and neutralize enemy repositioning forces.
* Destroy, suppress, or obscure enemy observation posts.
6-135. The commander designates and assigns priority targets to make indirect fires more responsive to the
supported unit execution. Observers must be employed to effectively engage such targets during a maneuver
force breaching operation. The FSCOORD, FSE and fire control personnel monitor the command network
and lift and shift fires at the critical time, should the primary executor be unable to execute.
6-136. Attack/delivery systems cross the obstacle with the forces they support to extend the breach and
ensure continuous support of follow-on operations. Positioning is critical at the breach area. FS assets should
be positioned to support the breaching operation, but not interfere with the approach, the breach, or assault
forces. Breaching operations consume a significant amount of ammunition. Planners must consider pre-
positioning stocks of smoke, HE, and precision munitions.
6-137. In coordination with the G-3, the FSCOORD and FSE consider the requirements for protection at
the breach area. They also plan for WLRs zones and consider the enemy phases of fire for defensive
operations. The FSCOORD and FSE consider CFZs and FSCMs between the enemy and the breach area, and
the support and breach force positions. They also consider establishing NFAs or RFAs around scouts or other
observers, and RFLs for forces converging on the objective.
6-138. The commander may give the priority of indirect fires to the unit most likely to encounter an
obstacle. The FSE maintains a focus on the critical tasks and continuously adjusts the plan as required to
accomplish the mission. FS planning guidelines for breaching operations include:
* Use IPOE techniques to designate enemy high-value targets and identify HPTs for attack. |
3-09 | 154 | Chapter 6
* Plan EA assets to defeat explosive device threats, disrupt enemy information collection,
reconnaissance, and surveillance efforts, and detect enemy use of the EMS for targeting purposes.
* Use scouts or other observers to identify and monitor target around the breach area prior to arrival
of main body.
* Refine targets based on intelligence and the knowledge of the actual breach area.
* Plan target handoff with observers or scouts.
* Position primary and alternate observers focused on identification of HPTs.
* Plan priority of fires to the rupture force and then to the follow-and-assume force.
* Plan and firing smoke to cover movement of the follow-and-assume force into the support-by-fire
position. Fires for obscuration or screening should start before the follow-and-assume force enters
the direct fire range of enemy systems.
* Determine the placement (wind condition), density, and timing of obscuration smoke on enemy
positions and screening smoke between the enemy and the reduction area.
* Plan triggers to lift or shift fires from obscuration to suppression when necessary.
* Plan FSCMs such as RFAs and RFLs and WLR CFZs at the breach area, support-by-fire
position(s), and the objective once it has been secured by the rupture force.
* Recommend that the units focus on antitank weapon systems and dismounted infantry and suggest
additional smoke, if required.
* Rehearse and communicate when the conditions have been met to commit the breach force.
6-139. Once the follow-and-assume force is deployed, it must rapidly develop and disseminate a fire plan
designating sectors of fire and observation to ensure all possible enemy positions are covered. Observation
is particularly critical. Observers with the follow-and-support force initially bring indirect fires on enemy
positions to fix them in place. The observers should also cue the organic FA and its R artillery to prepare
immediate counterfire. The follow-and-assume force then adjusts obscuration. The follow-and-assume force
is responsible for controlling fires for suppression and obscuration and for setting the conditions for the
breach.
6-140. Effective suppression must be applied against the enemy's fires since the rupture force will be
exposed for a lengthy period. Air support and electronic attack is planned for and employed, if available. FA
and mortars provide smoke for obscuration. Attack/delivery assets should be positioned to fire the mission.
Obscuration fires can be fired simultaneously with suppressive fires so that the smoke builds before the
friendly forces move forward. Smoke is targeted and adjusted to obscure or screen the breach from direct
fire. It is difficult to use smoke to obscure enemy fires on the obstacle during the breach because of the close
proximity to friendly troops. Using a combination of HE and smoke as the last rounds fired during a
preparation on the assault objective provides some obscuration to conceal the breach area. Additional smoke
and HE munitions may be required to keep the breach force obscured and seeking cover depending on the
gap to be breached, the proficiency of the breach force, weather, and other factors.
6-141. Fire control measures are essential, as both the follow-and-assume and the rupture forces are firing
on the enemy when the operation begins. Suppression of enemy observer positions continues, and other
enemy forces remain fixed by fires until the breach has been achieved and the enemy is destroyed or
dislodged. The rupture force should assume control for direct fire on the assault objective as follow-and-
assume force fires are lifted or shifted.
6-142. The FSCOORD integrates all types of FS attack/delivery capabilities to create the conditions for the
success of the breaching operations. FS plays a role in every fundamental of breaching, but especially during
suppress and obscure. Below are some example FS considerations during breaching operations:
* Synchronize with supported units to isolate the point of penetration.
* Suppress enemy weapons systems that can engage the rupture force.
* Obscure all likely enemy observation locations or screen friendly movement; use obscurants for
deception in order to protect the breach site.
* Establish CFZs on breaching sites. |
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* Ensure TA resources adequately set conditions at breach site prior to the arrival of the main body.
Correctly identifying where to penetrate, suppress and obscure, and communicating that
information quickly, is imperative.
* Predict likely enemy locations, and plan on-call fires accordingly.
* Plan for the shifting of priority of fires to the support force, then to the assault force. Establish the
triggers.
GAP CROSSING
6-143. Corps and divisions can be expected to conduct gap crossings as part of offensive and defensive
operations. Like the passage of lines, gap crossings are usually implied tasks rather than primary missions.
Gap crossings involving corps and divisions present several challenges to be overcome, particularly in the
area of FS. The six phases of a gap crossing are discussed below.
* Set the Conditions (Phase I). This phase consists of all planning and continued fires targeting
operations in the deep, close, and support areas designed to defeat deep and close enemy forces to
synchronize one or more gap-crossing operations with all warfighting function capabilities across
all domains.
* Advance to the gap (Phase II). The second phase is the attack to seize objectives that secure the
nearside terrain, which offers favorable crossing sites and road networks and provides enough area
to stage crossing forces while preventing congestion and an undesirable massing of assets.
* Assault across the gap (Phase III). The third phase involves units assaulting across the gap to seize
the far side objective, eliminating direct fire into the crossing sites.
* Advance from the far side (Phase IV). The fourth phase is the attack to secure the exit bank and
intermediate objectives that eliminates direct and observed indirect fires into the crossing area.
* Secure the bridgehead line (Phase V). The fifth phase includes the tasks necessary to secure
bridgehead objectives, defeating any enemy counterattacks. This gains the necessary time and
space for the buildup of forces for the attack out of the bridgehead.
* Continue the attack (Phase VI). The sixth phase is the attack out of the bridgehead to defeat the
enemy at a subsequent or final objective. It is considered as a phase of the gap crossing because
the timing and initiation of this phase are typically dependent on the success of the other five
phases of the gap crossing.
6-144. Commanders must plan to quickly cross whatever rivers or streams are in the path of advance. A
wet-gap crossing requires special planning and support. The size of the obstacle and the enemy situation will
dictate how to make the crossing. Attackers should strive to cross rivers without loss of momentum regardless
of how they get across. The planning requirements for each type of gap crossing are similar. However, the
required degree of detail and necessary conditions for a high degree of success will vary based on the type
and the unique features associated with a crossing mission. For more information on gap crossing see, ATP
3-90.4. The gap crossing types:
* Deliberate crossing is the crossing of an inland water obstacle or other gap that requires extensive
planning and detailed preparations (ATP 3-90.4). It requires the use of rafting (nonbridging) and
bridging assets. The use of assault craft, rafting, or ferries and the emplacement of bridging assets
may occur sequentially or concurrently. The objective in deliberate wet-gap crossings is to project
combat power to the exit bank of a river or other type of significant water obstacle at a faster rate
than the enemy can concentrate forces for a counterattack. Typically, wet-gap crossings are one
of the most difficult types. They generally require significant augmentation of mobility support
assets.
* Hasty crossing is the crossing of an inland water obstacle or other gap using the crossing means
on hand or those readily available, and made without pausing for elaborate preparations (ATP 3-
90.4). Hasty gap crossings are usually focused on a combined arms activity to project combat
power across a terrain feature (wet or dry) that can be overcome by self-bridging assets within the
BCT. These assets may be organic, provided to the BCT as augmentation, or found as expedient
crossing materials within the AO. Typically, a hasty gap crossing is a gap that is 65 ft or less in
width. They are normally accomplished with tactical bridging. A hasty gap crossing may also
include support bridging and the use of expedient bridging or gap crossing by other means. |
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* Covert crossing is a planned crossing of an inland water obstacle or other gap in which the crossing
is intended to be undetected (ATP 3-90.4). The primary purpose of the covert crossing is to
facilitate undetected infiltration of the far side of a gap. A covert crossing is normally conducted
by BN and smaller forces. It is used when surprise is essential to infiltrate over a gap and when
limited visibility and terrain present the opportunity to reduce or defeat the enemy obstacle (gap)
without being seen. Through surprise, the commander conceals capabilities and intentions and
creates the opportunity to position support and assault forces to strike the enemy unaware or
unprepared.
6-145. Commanders use the same organic C2 nodes for gap crossings as they do for other missions. These
nodes, however, take on additional functions in deliberate gap crossings. This may require some temporary
collocation of HQ cells and an increase in communication means. Commanders conducting a deliberate gap
crossing organize their units into assault, assured mobility, bridgehead, and breakout forces discussed below:
* Assault force seizes the far side objective to eliminate direct fire on the crossing sites.
* Assured mobility forces such as combat engineer companies, mobility augmentation companies
and mobility assault companies, bridge companies, military police, and CBRN units that provide
crossing means, and traffic control.
* Bridgehead force assaults across a gap to secure the enemy side (the bridgehead) to allow the
buildup and passage of a breakout force during gap crossing.
* Breakout force attacks to seize objectives beyond the bridgehead as a continuation of the offense.
6-146. A successful gap crossing is characterized by applying gap-crossing fundamentals. These
fundamentals are applied when a gap is encountered in the OA. These fundamentals are as follows:
* Surprise.
* Extensive preparation (less for hasty crossing).
* Flexible planning.
* Traffic management.
* Organization.
* Speed.
6-147. FS Considerations for gap crossings are below:
* Plan fires at depth to isolate the bridgehead area from enemy reinforcement.
* Plan fires to soften enemy defense and crossing sites and to seal- off exit bank positions.
* Establish CFZs on crossing sites and staging areas.
* Make fires immediately available to crossing forces. If necessary, have GS artillery fire while DS
artillery is crossing.
* Assign priority of fires to assault forces.
* Assign nonstandard missions to GS units. Change the priority of calls for fire, fire planning, and
other inherent responsibilities as necessary.
* Plan smoke and suppression fires in greater than normal amounts if necessary.
* Use smoke to screen both actual and dummy crossing sites.
* Use smoke to obscure enemy direct-fire positions in the bridgehead area until the crossing forces
can engage them.
* Suppress enemy forces in the bridgehead area until the assault force can provide its own
suppressive fires.
* Use all available TA assets to identify targets in the bridgehead area.
* Have indirect-fire weapons cross the river with the forces they support.
* Use CAS and attack aviation to expand the bridgehead.
COUNTERMOBILITY
6-148. Countermobility a set of combined arms activities that use or enhance the effects of natural and man-
made obstacles to prevent the enemy freedom of movement and maneuver (ATP 3-90.8). The primary
purposes of countermobility operations are to shape enemy movement and maneuver and to prevent the |
3-09 | 157 | Fire Support in Depth During Large-Scale Combat Operations
enemy from gaining a position of advantage. Countermobility operations are conducted to support forces that
are operating along the range of military operations. Countermobility operations directly support offensive
and defensive operations. For more information on countermobility operations see ATP 3-90.8.
6-149. Commanders must ensure that obstacles are integrated with observation and fires to defeat or disrupt
enemy attempts to breach friendly obstacles. These fires must be fully synchronized with the concept of
operations to avoid hindering any friendly-force mobility. Consider the use of scatterable mines to prevent
repositioning of enemy forces without hindering friendly actions, and to disrupt the enemy counterattack.
ENCIRCLEMENT
6-150. Encirclement is no longer an enabling operation but is still a desired outcome. There are special
planning considerations required to create, maintain, reduce, and when encircled, break out of an
encirclement. Encirclements are an outcome that can result from offensive operations to isolate and destroy
enemy forces or result from a friendly force being isolated by enemy forces. Encirclement is where one force
loses its freedom of maneuver because an opposing force is able to isolate it by controlling all ground lines
of communications and reinforcement (FM 3-90). A unit can conduct offensive encirclement operations
designed to isolate an enemy force or they could become encircled resulting from the unit's isolation by the
actions of an enemy force see figure 6-7 on page 6-36.
6-151. Defending forces can become encircled at any time during large-scale combat operations. This is
especially true during noncontiguous operations. An encircled force can continue to defend encircled,
conduct a breakout, exfiltrate toward other friendly forces, or attack deeper into enemy-controlled territory.
A commander's form of maneuver once becoming encircled depends on the senior commander's intent and
the mission variables METT-TC (I). It is important for the encircled force to continue its mission, establish
communication with higher HQ, and act on its own initiative within the intent of the higher commander. The
most likely COA facing the encircled force is to try a breakout toward friendly forces and prepare for linkup
operations.
6-152. The following must be considered in a breakout toward friendly troops:
* Plan fires to support the immediate defense and the breakout.
* Reorganize available FS assets, and coordinate with FS elements outside the encircled force for
additional FS.
* Establish FSCMs.
* RFAs around encircled forces and RFLs between converging breakout and linkup forces should
be considered. Airspace coordination areas in the vicinity of the breakout point are necessary if
CAS is used.
* Concentrate massed and continuous fires at the breakout point to open a gap for the rupture force.
* Plan for WLR sectors of search, use CFFZs over known and suspected enemy locations and place
CFZs over the encircled force.
* Plan for linkup operations by establishing FSCMs to facilitate FS operations between friendly
forces.
* Make use of all lethal and nonlethal capabilities to deceive the enemy as to the location of the
breakout.
6-153. Offensive encirclement operations are conducted by corps and division to isolate targeted enemy
forces. Typically, encirclements result from penetrations and envelopments, or are extensions of exploitation
and pursuit operations. As such, they are not a separate form of the offense but an extension of an ongoing
operation. They may be planned sequels or result from exploiting an unforeseen opportunity.
6-154. Once a decision is made to reduce an encirclement, the commander normally uses one of two
possible methods of reduction-fire alone or fire and maneuver. Reduction by fire alone implies that the
encircling friendly commander will use FS as the primary or sole means of reducing the encirclement. This
includes employing artillery, direct fires, CAS, CEMA, attack helicopters and armed UAS against the enemy
perimeter. Reduction by fire alone reduces the number of casualties suffered by the friendly encircling force.
For more information on offensive and defensive encirclement see FM 3-90. |
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Figure 6-7. Encirclement example
STABILITY OPERATIONS AND REAR AREA FIRE SUPPORT
6-155. Large-scale combat operations involve the combination of offense, defense, and stability operations.
A stability operation is an operation conducted outside the United States in coordination with other
instruments of national power to establish or maintain a secure environment and provide essential
governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief (ADP 3-0). The
priorities and effort given to stability operations vary within subordinate unit AO. Corps and division
commanders analyze the situations they face to determine the minimum-essential stability operations and the
priority associated with each operation. This analysis includes a planned transition to consolidation of gains
in OAs once large-scale combat operations culminate.
6-156. Consolidate gains are activities to make enduring any temporary operational success and to set the
conditions for a sustainable security environment, allowing for a transition of control to other legitimate
authorities (ADP 3-0). Consolidation of gains is an integral and continuous part of armed conflict, and it is
necessary for achieving success across the range of military operations. Operations to consolidate gains will
be conducted simultaneously with all other strategic roles, to include large-scale combat operations. Army
forces deliberately plan to consolidate gains during all phases of an operation. While Army forces consolidate
gains throughout an operation, consolidating gains becomes the focus of Army forces after large-scale combat
operations have concluded. Operations to consolidate gains require combined arms capabilities and the ability
to employ fires and manage airspace, but at a smaller scale than large-scale combat operations.
6-157. The four FS functions, planning principles, and principles of FS execution during stability operations
are the same as during offensive and defensive operations. The actions of FS personnel are framed by the
disciplined application of force while adhering to the ROE. Considerations for FS during stability operations
include: |
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* Stability operations are often conducted in noncontiguous areas of operation. This can complicate
the use of FSCMs, the ability to mass and shift fires, and clearance of fires procedures.
* Fires may be used more frequently to defend key sites than to seize them.
* Additional planning for the use of precision and near precision munitions and employment of
additional nonlethal capabilities may be necessary to limit collateral damage.
* Planning FS to demonstrate capabilities, provide a show of force, or to provide AD fires.
* An increase in the amount and types of restrictive FSCMs may be appropriate.
REAR AND SUPPORT AREA OPERATIONS
6-158. Rear operations are tactical actions behind major subordinate maneuver forces that facilitate
movement, extend operational reach, and maintain desired tempo (FM 3-0). Support area operations are the
tactical actions securing lines of communications, bases, and base clusters that enable an echelon’s
sustainment and command and control (FM 3-0). In large-scale combat operations, a maneuver enhancement
brigade is assigned to the rear and support area, and it provides support to forces in contact with the enemy.
Threats In The Support and Rear Area
6-159. Threats in the support and rear areas are categorized by the three levels of defense required to counter
them. Any or all threat levels may exist simultaneously. Emphasis on base defense and security measures
may depend on the anticipated threat level described below:
* A level I threat is a small enemy force that can be defeated by those units normally operating in
the echelon support area or by the perimeter defenses established by friendly bases and base
clusters (ATP 3-91). A level I threat for a typical base consists of a squad-sized unit or smaller
groups of enemy soldiers, agents, or terrorists.
* A level II threat is an enemy force or activities that can be defeated by a base or base cluster's
defensive capabilities when augmented by a response force (ATP 3-91). A typical response force
is an MP platoon (with appropriate supporting fires); however, it can be a combined arms
maneuver element. Level II threats consist of enemy special operations teams, long-range
reconnaissance units, mounted or dismounted combat reconnaissance teams, and partially attrited
small combat units.
* A level III threat is an enemy force or activities beyond the defensive capability of both the base
and base cluster and any local reserve or response force (ATP 3-91). It consists of mobile enemy
combat forces. Possible objectives for a level III threat include seizing key terrain, interfering with
the movement and commitment of reserves and artillery, and destroying friendly combat forces.
The division response to a level III threat is a tactical combat force (TCF). A tactical combat force
is a rapidly deployable, air-ground, mobile combat unit with appropriate combat support and
combat service support assets assigned to and capable of, defeating Level III threats, including
combined arms (JP 3-10). The TCF requires tactical mobility and enough combined arms
capability to deal with the threats it is likely to face. It should include or be supported by fires,
aviation, and engineer assets. (FM 3-0). Should the TCF with its supporting artillery be committed,
the FSO will coordinate with the FSE for additional FS attack/delivery systems as needed to assist
base, base cluster, or other response forces countering level II or III threats. The TCF will retain
priority of fires.
FIRE SUPPORT CONSIDERATIONS
6-160. With few exceptions, indirect-fire assets should not be employed against a level I threat or against
those level II threat forces that can be defeated by base or base cluster units or by the response force. These
threats are usually individual or small-unit operations, are of limited scope and duration, and provide too
fleeting a target for successful engagement by indirect-fire assets. Considerations that affect the application
of FS in the rear area include:
* The reduction of FS capabilities to the MBA.
* The responsiveness of the available weapons systems.
* The precision and collateral damage effects of the weapon systems. |
3-09 | 160 | Chapter 6
* The availability of observers to identify and adjust targets.
6-161. Rear area operations are conducted to ensure friendly forces retain freedom of action to support
combat forces engaged in deep and close area operations. The focus is on protecting the most critical
capabilities and attacking bypassed enemy forces. There are not enough FA assets to dedicate firing units to
rear area support as their sole or primary mission. Additionally, surface fires may not be the most responsive
asset available for FS in the rear area, given range and clearance requirements. The FSCOORD assigns
support relationships to corps or division rear area operations. They meet these requirements by assigning
GS and GSR relationships to FA units able to range the rear area while continuing to perform their primary
missions in support of deep and close operations.
6-162. Fires must be planned in support of maneuver forces conducting reconnaissance and establishing
security while eliminating pockets of resistance in the rear area. Fires are planned to support forces
conducting a hasty defense to block possible enemy counter attacks. FS and fire planning must be tailored to
the more restrictive ROE and the potential congestion of the rear area. The most responsive FS assets in the
rear area are Army armed attack aviation, CAS, armed UAS and mortars.
6-163. All maneuver forces assigned to the rear area must have adequate FS assets to execute fires in support
of area security, base and base cluster security, and defense. FS assets will destroy enemy remnants, enemy
SOF, and protect forces transiting through the rear area. FS attack/delivery systems located in the rear area
do not constitute FS in reserve. For example, FA units supporting the TCF or other units in the rear areas are
committed FA. Other considerations for FS in the rear areas are:
* Army aviation or CAS aircraft may be the most responsive FS asset for use in the rear areas.
Attack helicopters provide one of the most rapidly available assets to engage rear area incursions.
Army aviation also may be used to rapidly displace towed artillery to critical firing positions.
Commanders should consider allocating dedicated CAS missions to the rear area.
* Terrain management, airspace management, and clearance of fires present unique challenges to
FS in the rear area. The rear area CP must be augmented with FS personnel to address these
challenges (to include JTACs).
* Since the TCF is considered a committed force, the functions for FS coordination apply. This
coordination includes a DS BN supporting a brigade size TCF. A BN size TCF is supported by a
cannon battery.
* The allocation of some of the artillery committed to the TCF for support of the overall rear area
may be appropriate since one BN split into battery fire bases could cover a considerable area of
the rear area until the TCF is committed to ensure 6400 mil coverage. Also, consider the use of
FA units undergoing reconstitution operations as partially available to provide a level of FS for
the rear area.
* FSCMs must be more restrictive to protect friendly units. Permissive FSCMs must be approved
by the division or corps FSE.
* Consider leveraging multinational FS attack/delivery platforms that are not permitted to conduct
offensive operations by national caveats but are permitted to conduct defensive operations.
Airspace Control In The Rear Area
6-164. Divisions require the capability to control airspace while corps participate in airspace control
through the commander’s guidance and subordinate divisions. The commander’s priorities, timing, and
effects as well as the airspace control appendix of the operations order (Appendix 10 to Annex C) provide
guidance on the use of airspace. Airspace control in the consolidation and support areas may be accomplished
by a variety of methods. For example, the JFC designated airspace coordination area may delegate airspace
control to a division responsible for the rear area which enables the corps to coordinate airspace for fires and
other airspace users.
6-165. If the corps is primarily conducting rear operations to consolidate gains, then it may choose to
temporarily locate a division JAGIC at the corps CP to maintain situational awareness of the entire rear area.
The nature of corps sustainment operations and long-range fires requires a responsive airspace control
system. To account for anticipated surface fires, the corps should include specific coordination measures (to
include position areas for artillery and missile flight paths) as part of their unit airspace plan. |
3-09 | 161 | Fire Support in Depth During Large-Scale Combat Operations
CLEARANCE OF FIRES
6-166. The rear area CP must be staffed with the necessary intelligence, FS, and airspace control personnel
to plan, answer calls-for-fire, and coordinate additional enablers for support area security forces and units
transiting through the rear area. The commander must decide how to deconflict fires in the rear area. Liaison
personnel can facilitate the deconfliction of fires in support of units moving in the rear area.
6-167. The BCTs air defense airspace management cell must be tied into the division JAGIC to clear
airspace for the rear area. In this instance the BCT commander must clear fires for the rear area. Targeting
working groups and target coordination boards must be aligned with close, deep, and rear operations to
compete for resources.
6-168. FSCOORD and FS personnel must be aware of their left and right boundaries and the FS assets of
adjacent units. They must have FSCMs in place and be aware of clearance procedures for cross boundary
fires. CAB assets should be task organized to respond to threats in the rear area. The FSCOORD and FS
personnel must integrate base cluster defenses into rear area support plans.
6-169. Conditions and triggers must be established for shifting the FSCMs. In addition, triggers must be
established for moving the division and BCT rear boundaries forward as the rear area conditions change.
There must also be procedures in place for the battle hand over NAIs, TAIs and any significant activities
logs.
6-170. Figure 6-8 on page 6-40, shows the complexity of FS in the rear area. In addition to coordinating FS
for the BCT in a division's rear area, the rear area CP or rear area FSCOORD must also consider airspace
and terrain deconfliction for division- and corps-level GS and GSR shooters supporting the close and deep
area operations. Additionally, movement along critical lines of communication (main supply routes and
alternate supply routes) may be contested and may require FS within the rear area to facilitate movement to
and from supported units in the close area. The HQ elements, support nodes, and base clusters likely in and
around the support area will present large target signatures and increased ground and air traffic, requiring
additional assets and coordination through the rear area CP. The fight in the rear area is complex and will
require detailed planning and rehearsal to adequately support operations in the close and deep areas. |
3-09 | 162 | Chapter 6
Figure 6-8. Division Rear Area |
3-09 | 163 | Fire Support in Depth During Large-Scale Combat Operations
RECONSTITUTION OPERATIONS
6-171. The scale, complexity, and increased destructive power of large-scale combat operations assumes
an all-encompassing fight, potentially resulting in the greater loss of personnel, weapon platforms, supplies,
and equipment of our warfighting formations. Under exceptional conditions, with severely degraded units,
constrained time, and limited or no personnel replacements, commanders may make the decision to execute
reconstitution. Reconstitution must be planned and resourced from the beginning of any operation. The
commander directing the reconstitution mission uses assets under their control, along with those provided by
higher echelons.
6-172. Reconstitution of organizations will likely occur in the rear area. The maneuver unit assigned
responsibility for the rear area is primarily concerned with defeating bypassed forces but must be prepared
to facilitate reconstitution operations. This includes training replacement personnel, receiving equipment,
and integrating with civil authority operations.
6-173. Reconstitution consists of two major elements-reorganization and regeneration. Reorganization is
the expedient cross-leveling of internal resources within an attrited unit in place to restore necessary combat
effectiveness as directed by the unit commander. Regeneration is the intentional restoration of a unit's combat
power that requires time and resource intensive operations which includes equipment repairs or replacements,
supply replenishment, mission essential training, and personnel replacements in accordance with theater
commander guidance. Reorganization may include such measures as:
* Cross-leveling equipment and personnel.
* Matching operational weapons systems with crews.
* Forming composite units (joining two or more degraded units to form a single mission-capable
unit).
6-174. Immediate reorganization is the rapid and usually temporary restoration of attrited units to minimum
levels of effectiveness. Normally, the commander implements immediate reorganization in the combat
position or as close to that site as possible to meet near-term needs. Immediate reorganization consists of
cross-leveling personnel and equipment, matching weapon systems to crews, or forming composite units
(joining two or more attrited units to form a single mission capable unit) (for more information see FM 4-0).
6-175. Deliberate reorganization is conducted when more time and resources are available. It usually occurs
farther away from hostile activity than immediate reorganization. Procedures are similar to those for
immediate reorganization; however, some replacement resources may be available. Also, equipment repair
is more intensive and more extensive cross-leveling is possible (for more information see FM 4-0).
6-176. Regeneration is the intentional restoration of a unit's combat power and is considerably more
resource-intensive than reorganization. Regeneration is also time-intensive and normally requires days to
weeks to execute. It requires large-scale replacement of personnel, equipment, and supplies. Regeneration
involves reestablishing or replacing the chain of command and conducting mission-essential training to get
the regenerated unit to a required readiness standard. Because of the intensive nature of regeneration, it occurs
at a designated regeneration site after the unit disengages from combat operations. The regeneration site is
normally situated in a relatively secure location away from the battlefield, but still most conducive to
regenerate combat power under the constraints of time and geography (for more information see FM 4-0).
6-177. Regeneration is a deliberate operation to rebuild the unit. It is directed by a higher commander that
has the resources to accomplish the mission, often two or more echelons above the attrited element. Unit
leadership and cohesion will be preserved when it is possible. The regeneration operation will always include
a training program to focus on essential collective tasks to obtain a specific level of combat effectiveness for
the upcoming mission. |
3-09 | 165 | Appendix A
Development of Essential Fire Support and Essential Field
Artillery Tasks
This appendix includes an overview of development of EFSTs and EFATs. An EFST is
an essential element of the FS plan. An EFAT is a task given to a FA unit or organization
that supports the commander’s scheme of maneuver. An EFST is a critical element of
the FS plan that must be accomplished for mission success. The task must be clear,
concise, and include the elements of task, purpose, method, and effect. EFATs must
accomplish a well-defined result in execution of the EFST.
SECTION I – ESSENTIAL FIRE SUPPORT TASK
A-1. The EFST states the supported maneuver task and the type(s) of effects the fires delivery unit (Army
or joint) must provide for that phase of the operation. The task describes what FS must accomplish to support
the operation. It consists of the objective, formation, and function. The purpose defines the friendly maneuver
goal and states the supported commander's purpose and desired end state for the targeted enemy formation,
function, or capability. The purpose describes the why of the EFST. The method is how we will engage the
target using priority, allocation, and restrictions. The effect identifies the desired result or outcome the
delivered fires and effects are to create. As the FSCOORD and FS planner’s war-game a EFST during
planning, they identify assets to accomplish the task, and describe the desired effect to be created.
A-2. The fire support tasks that must be accomplished to achieve the supported commander’s mission are
designated as EFSTs. Failure to achieve an EFST may require the commander to alter the tactical or
operational plan. Fully developed EFSTs consist of a task, purpose, method, and effect. The FA BN uses
EFSTs that have a method of "FA" as the start point for defining EFATs. The task is described as the effect
that fires must have on an enemy formation's function or capability. The task is enemy oriented. The purpose
is described in terms of the benefit that accomplishment of the EFST gives to the supported commander. This
is described as being friendly oriented. The effect is the quantified, observable result of successful
accomplishment of the task. The effect is stated as relative condition of the friendly force in relationship to
the enemy. For an example of an EFST checklist, (see table A-1).
Table A-1. Essential Fire Support Task Development Checklist
Purpose of fires – From the commander’s intent for fires
Phase
Task:
Objective.
Disrupt.
Degrade.
Delay.
Destroy.
Neutralize.
Suppress.
Formation – Number and type of enemy vehicles
Function – “The enemy’s ability to… Prevent the enemy from doing ”
Purpose: “To enable, to allow… (friendly maneuver goal) |
3-09 | 166 | Appendix A
Table A-1. Fire Support Task Development Checklist (continued)
Method :
Priority.
FA priority of fire.
Mortar priority of fire.
Close air support – priority to destroy____________.
Special munitions – priority to engage____________.
Allocation.
Shooter.
Target number.
Description.
Munitions.
Trigger.
Alternate shooter.
** return to a) until all targets in essential fire support tasks are addressed.
Targets and final protective fire delegated – tied to a trigger.
Mortar position.
Azimuth of fire.
Position area.
Targets.
Close air support target.
Suppression of enemy air defenses targets?
Marking round?
Any other special instructions.
Restrictions.
a)Ammunition restrictions.
b)Fire support coordination measures.
1)Fire support coordination line.
2)Coordinated fire line.
3)Airspace coordinating area.
4)Restricted fire area.
5)No fire area.
c)Rules of engagement.
D.Effects.
1.Maneuver task oriented, complete fire support tasks.
a)“Unable to identify battle positions”
b)“Vehicles screened, no direct fire”
2.Quantify number of vehicles.
a)Separate by fire type.
b)Effect for each target.
A-3. As the staff, FSCOORD, and FS planners build the COA, they determine how best to create the
commander's desired effects. FS planning serves as a basis for identifying EFSTs and for preparing the
subsequent FS plan. The staff and FS planners determine where to find and attack enemy formations to create
desired effects.
A-4. EFSTs are synchronized and executed with other combined arms tasks. The FSCOORD considers the
enemy COA and the IPOE, of where the enemy formations, functions or capabilities can be found and
attacked. The staff graphically portrays these locations using target areas of interest or EAs. Certain sub-
elements, capabilities, or equipment sets within the formations may be more vulnerable to attack or provide
the highest payoff if attacked. These are further identified or refined as HPTs. See table A-2 for an example
of an EFST. |
3-09 | 167 | Development of Essential Fire Support and Essential Field Artillery Tasks
Table A-2. Essential fire support task example
Essential Fire Support Task 1
Task: Degrade enemy indirect fire system’s ability to place effective fires on the wet gap crossing.
Purpose: Allow unimpeded crossing.
Method:
Priority of fires: BN mortars to AN/TPQ-Q-50 radar; FA to A Company on-order B Company; CAS to C Company.
Allocations: A Company 1x FA platoon priority target.
Positioning guidance: BN mortars occupy mortar firing position 1 not later than H-6.
Restrictions/ FSCMs: ROZ 22 in effect 0600-0900; critical friendly zone 1 in effect; ROZ FALCON in effect 1145-
1430Z.
Effect: Enemy indirect fire systems are not able to interfere with wet gap crossing.
BN – battalion, CAS – close air support, FA – field artillery, FSCM – fire support coordination measure, H – hour, ROZ
–restricted operations zone
DEVELOPING THE FIRES PARAGRAPH
A-5. To prescribe the procedures for formulating and formatting the fires paragraph of a OPORD or
OPLAN. As a subparagraph to the concept of operations, the fires paragraph describes the scheme of fires
that, along with the scheme of maneuver communicates how the force as a whole will achieve the
commander's intent. The primary audience for the fires paragraph is the subordinate commanders and their
staffs and must clearly describe the logical sequence of EFSTs and how they contribute to the concept of
operations.
A-6. The overall paragraph organization should mirror that of the scheme of maneuver paragraph. If the
maneuver paragraph is phased or otherwise organized, the fires paragraph will take on the same organization.
A-7. The internal format for the fires paragraph uses four subcategories: task, purpose, method, effects.
Within each phase of an operation, each EFST will be described in the sequence of planned execution using
task, purpose, method, effects. The fires paragraph must be concise but specific enough to clearly state what
fires are to accomplish in the operation.
ESSENTIAL FIRE SUPPORT TASK DEVELOPMENT
A-8. Based on the FS planning guidance, the EFSTs are refined from the commander's intent and scheme
of fires. The following paragraphs describe the process of developing an EFST using task, purpose, method,
effects.
TASK
A-9. Task describes the targeting objective fires must create against a specific enemy formation's function
or capability. These formations are HPTs or contain one or more HPT. The task is developed by considering
the objective, formation, and function.
A-10. The objective outlines several terms to describe the targeting objective. The most common terms used
are degrade, disrupt, delay, destroy, neutralize, and suppress. Examples and definitions of the common terms
are found in chapter 3.
A-11. A formation can be a specific element or sub-element of the enemy. It can be specified by a specific
vehicle type or target category as long as the element or sub-element is clear.
A-12. The enemy’s function is a capability of the formation that is needed for it to achieve its primary task
and purpose. For example, what is the formation doing that is unacceptable? What do we want the formation
to do or not to do? The following is an example of a developed task sentence: Disrupt the ability of (objective)
the enemy maneuver force at the point of penetration (formation) to place effective direct fire against friendly
breach force (function). |
3-09 | 168 | Appendix A
PURPOSE
A-13. The purpose describes the maneuver or operational purpose for the task. When describing purpose use
the maneuver purpose from the OPORD. Identify the maneuver formation that will leverage the targeting
effect and describe in space and time what the effect will accomplish. An example of the purpose, "To allow
the maneuver element to occupy far side positions while conducting wet gap crossing operations without
becoming decisively engaged by enemy forces."
METHOD
A-14. The method describes how the task and purpose will be achieved. It ties the detect function with the
deliver function in time and space and describes how to achieve the task. Method is developed using priority,
allocation, restriction. It includes:
* Priority of fire.
* FPF.
* Observers (primary and alternate).
* Positioning.
* Command and support relationship.
* Naval gun fire.
* AI.
* FSCMs.
* Execution triggers.
* Special munitions restrictions.
* Target allocation.
* Priority targets.
* CAS.
* Attack aviation.
* Other specific instructions.
A-15. Priority assigns priority of fires to execute the task outlined. FA, other observers, or acquisition means.
When an acquisition asset focuses exclusively on a task, that information can be communicated here. An
example of CAS using priority would be, "CAS is to destroy the tanks in the enemy reserve." This part of the
method can also provide focus by using NAIs, TAIs, targets, or EAs to describe where the attacks will occur.
A-16. Allocation is the distribution of limited forces and resources for employment among competing
requirements (JP 5-0). For the shooter, it describes the distribution of attack/delivery assets to accomplish
the EFSTs. Attack/delivery assets may include FA fires to destroy, neutralize, suppress, obscure, or screen,
CAS, and attack helicopters. In method, the FA and other attack/delivery assets can identify their part of
accomplishing the EFST. It is from the method of a FS task that the FA and other FS and TA assets develop
their tasks.
A-17. Restriction which is the method can also outline any limitations or restrictions on accomplishing the
tasks. Ammunition such as no improved conventional munitions on the objective, FSCMs, ACMs, or other
restrictions that may affect the accomplishment of the FS task.
A-18. FS planners use the memory aids of target, trigger, location, observers, delivery, attack guidance,
communications (refers as TTLODAC) and purpose, location observer, trigger, communications, and
resources (ref as PLOT-CR). TTLODAC lends itself best to organizing FS planning and publishing
information in annex D (fires) and use during technical rehearsals within the fires warfighting function.
PLOT-CR is a better method for briefing specific targets during tactical rehearsals with the supported force.
For instructions and examples see tables A-3 through A-6, page A-5 through A-8.
EFFECTS
A-19. The effects quantify the successful accomplishment of the task. Effects provide the observer or TA
asset with a measure of completion of the task. If multiple delivery assets are involved it helps delineate what |
3-09 | 169 | Development of Essential Fire Support and Essential Field Artillery Tasks
each effect must accomplish. Effects provides a measure of when the task is accomplished. It also provides
the basis for the assess function in targeting and determines if there is a need to reengage the target.
Table A-3. Sample matrix for each fire support task
Phase: State the phase of the operation or descriptor if required.
Task (what): State the supported or maneuver commander task and the type(s) of effects the fires unit must provide
for that phase of the operation (suppress, neutralize, interdict, divert, exploit, deny, delay, deceive, disrupt, degrade,
destroy, obscuration, or screening)
Purpose (why): State the supported or maneuver commander purpose and the desired end state for the targeted
enemy formation, function, capability. (There may be more than one task or purpose per phase).
Priority of fire: State the priority of fire to subordinate units for all fires assets under the unit’s command or control.
Allocations: List any additional assets assigned to subordinates for planning. Examples are priority targets, radar
zones, attack aviation.
Positioning guidance: Provide positioning guidance to assets such as mortars or observers required for execution.
Restrictions: List all restrictions for the phase.
FS Task (T) (T) (L) (O) (D) (A) (C)
Target Trigger Location Observers Delivery Attack Communications
System(s) Guidance
List the List the State the Give the State the State the State the State the
task target trigger location of observer of delivery attack frequency and
number number tactical or the target. the target system for guidance or communication
the target or type technical (primary the target method of network the
supports. of target. for the and (primary engagement target will be
target. alternate). and for the target. called in on
alternate). (primary,
alternate,
contingency, or
emergency).
Notes: This is an alternate location that may include allocation of resources, positioning guidance, restrictions, and
coordination information. List information deemed necessary. Describe the scheme of cannon, rocket, and missile fires
in support of operations. Include specific tasks to subordinate FA headquarters. Address any potential requirements for
massing fires that may affect organic, direct support, or reinforcing fires units. Identify the timing and duration of specific
identified fire plans, such as counterfire, preparations, suppression of enemy air defenses, or joint suppression of enemy
air defenses. Refer to Appendix 4 (FA Support) to Annex D (Fires) as required. |
3-09 | 170 | Appendix A
Table A-4. A completed matrix example for essential fire support tasks (memory aid
TTLODAC)
Phase: II Decrease effectiveness of indirect fire on wet gap crossing
Task (what): Essential Fire Support Task (EFST) 1: Provide counterfire to disrupt the enemy’s ability to place accurate
indirect fire on wet gap crossing.
Purpose (why): EFST 1 Purpose 1: Allow the unimpeded crossing of the wet gap.
Priority of fire: BN mortars to AN/TPQ-Q-50 radar; FA to A Company on-order B Company; CAS to C Company.
Allocations: A Company 1x FA PLT priority target.
Positioning guidance: BN mortars occupy mortar firing position 1 not later than H-6.
Restrictions/FSCMs: ROZ 22 in effect 0600-0900; critical friendly zone 1 in effect; ROZ FALCON in effect 1145-
1430Z
FS (T) (T) (L) (O) (D) (A) (C)
Task Target Trigger Location Observer(s) Delivery Attack Communications
System(s) Guidance
EFST 1x 82-mm 0600– Vicinity of Primary: FIST 1 Primary: 105-mm 3 Primary -
1 mortar 0900Z EV (with joint 1xPLT x volleys AFATDS FH300;
section; 3 12344567 terminal attack 105-mm high Alternate - BCT
personnel (TAI 156) controller) explosive/
Alternate: CAS ALO, FH 570.
& white or Alternate: CAS (F-16 x 2); variable
gray (F-16) call sign time; CAS
pickup Maverick; Q-53 1 x joint
truck
direct
attack
munition
EFST KE2000 1200– NAI 20 Primary: Primary: 5 rounds Primary - BN
1 1400Z A Company 120-mm high Mortar Net
as Alternate: mortar explosive FH570
acquired Alternate- Fires
B Company Alternate:
Net FH350
105-mm
EFST KE2005 1200– NAI 21 Primary: 120-mm 5 rounds Primary - BN
1 1400Z A Company mortar high mortar net
as explosive FH570;
Alternate:
acquired Alternate - Fires
B Company
net FH350
Notes: none
AFATDS – Advance Field Artillery Tactical Data System, ALO – air liaison officer, AN/TPQ – Army/Navy (Marine)
transportable radar special purpose (multipurpose), BCT – brigade combat team, BN – battalion, CAS – close air support,
EFST – essential fire support task, FH – frequency hopping, FIST – fire support team, mm – millimeter,
NAI – named area of interest, net – network, PLT – platoon, ROZ – restricted operations zone,
TAI – target area of interest, Z -- zulu |
3-09 | 171 | Development of Essential Fire Support and Essential Field Artillery Tasks
Table A-5. Sample matrix for fire support tasks (memory aid PLOT-CR)
Phase: State the phase of the operation or descriptor if required.
Task (what): State the supported or maneuver commander task and the type(s) of effects the fires unit must provide
for that phase of the operation (suppress, neutralize, interdict, divert, exploit, deny, delay, deceive, disrupt, degrade,
destroy, obscuration, or screening)
Purpose (why): State the supported or maneuver commander purpose and the desired end state for the targeted
enemy formation, function, capability. (There may be more than one task or purpose per phase).
Priority of fire: State the priority of fire to subordinate units for all fires assets under the unit’s command or control.
Allocations: List any additional assets assigned to subordinates for planning. Examples are priority targets, radar
zones, attack aviation.
Positioning guidance: Provide positioning guidance to assets such as mortars or observers required for execution.
Restrictions: List all restrictions for the phase.
FS Task (T) (P) (L) (O) (T) (C) (R)
Target Purpose Location Observer(s) Trigger Communications Resources
List the List the Purpose of Give the State the State the State the frequency State the
task Target the planned location observer of trigger and delivery
number number fires and the of the the target (tactical or communications system for
the or type desired end target. (primary technical) network the target the target
target of target. state. and for the will be called in on (primary and
supports alternate). target. (primary, alternate, alternate).
contingency, or
emergency).
Notes: This is an alternate location that may include allocation of resources, positioning guidance, restrictions, and
coordination information. List information deemed necessary. Describe the scheme of cannon, rocket, and missile fires
in support of operations. Include specific tasks to subordinate FA headquarters. Address any potential requirements for
massing fires that may affect organic, direct support, or reinforcing fires units. Identify the timing and duration of
specific identified fire plans, such as counterfire, preparations, suppression of enemy air defenses, or joint suppression
of enemy air defenses. Refer to Appendix 4 (FA Support) to Annex D (Fires) as required. |
3-09 | 172 | Appendix A
Table A-6. A completed matrix example for essential fire support tasks (memory aid PLOT-CR)
Phase: II Assault on Objective Bears
Task (what): Essential Fire Support Task (EFST) 1: Provide obscuration fires to disrupt the enemy's ability to observe
breaching operations.
EFST 2: Provide suppressive fires to disrupt the enemy mechanized infantry platoons’ ability to place effective direct
fire on the breach site.
Purpose (why): EFST 1 Purpose 1: Enable the successful breaching operation.
EFST 2 Purpose 2: To enable the successful breaching operation.
Priority of fire: Field Artillery: A Company; Mortars: B Company.
Allocations: A Company 1x Critical Friendly Zone; C Company 1x FA Priority Target.
Positioning guidance: Mortars move along Route REDLEG and occupy mortar firing position 1 (azimuth of fire 1600);
in place ready to fire not later than H+ 30 minutes.
Restrictions/FSCMs: Coordinated fire line is Phase Line RED; No-Fire Areas 1 & 2 in effect.
FS Task (P) (L) (O) (T) (C) (R)
Target Purpose Location Observer(s) Trigger Communications Resources
EFST 1 AB1000 Disrupt NG1234 Primary: A Company Primary: Primary: BN
enemy's 4567 A Company lead element BN mortar net mortars.
ability to crosses FH800 Alternate:
Alternate:
observe Phase Line
Alternate: FA 20
breaching C Company Blue.
operations. FA fire direction net minutes x
FH700 200 meters
smoke
EFST 2 AB1005 Disrupt the NG4567 Primary: When Primary: Primary:
enemy’s 1234 B Company support by FA fire direction net FA BN, 6
mechanize FIST HQ fire position 1 FH700 rounds high
d infantry is set. explosive/
Alternate: Alternate:
platoons’ variable
ability to 1/B FO BN fire support net time;
place FH600
Alternate:
effective
Attack
direct fire
aviation
on the
breach site.
Notes: none
BN – battalion, EFST – essential fire support task, FA – field artillery, FH – frequency hopping, FIST – fire support team,
FO – forward observer, FS – fire support, FSCM – fire support coordination measure, HQ – headquarters
ESSTENTIAL FIELD ARTILLERY TASK DEVELOPMENT
A-20. A task for the FA that must be accomplished to achieve an EFST. A fully developed EFAT has a task,
purpose, method, and effects. The task describes the effects of fires against a specific enemy formation. The
effects of fires include destroy, neutralize, suppress, screen, or obscure. The purpose is a summary of the task
and purpose from the EFST. The method describes how the task will be accomplished by assigning
responsibilities to the FA firing unit. The method is described by covering three categories priority,
allocation, and restrictions. Priority provides the firing unit with priority of fires and priority of survey.
Allocations include movement triggers, routes, PAA, azimuth of fire, priority targets, FPF, and radar zones.
Restrictions cover FSCMs, ACMs and survivability movement criteria. Effects is a quantification of the
EFAT and positioning of FA units. For an example of an EFAT check list, (see table A-7 and table A-8 on
page A-10). |
3-09 | 173 | Development of Essential Fire Support and Essential Field Artillery Tasks
Table A-7. Example of an essential field artillery task
Phase: II (Attack)
TASK: Destroy/Neutralize/Suppress/Degrade/Disrupt/Delay (QUANTIFY #/%) on FORMATION IVO LOCATION AT
TRIGGER/TIME IN SUPPORT OF MANEUVER/SUPPORTED COMMANDERS TASK.
• EFAT 1: Destroy 30% of 19th FAB/ 11th IN BDE Medium Artillery (6/18 x 2S19 and 2/6 x 2A36/ 2A65) and
counter BTRY radars (2/4 x IL 220s) IVO TAI XX NLT H-4hrs IN SUPPORT OF 1-1 BN seizure of OBJ Bronze.
• EFAT 2: Suppress 2/2 ZSU IVO Hill 509 from H-4min to H+4min ISO 2-2BN air assault on OBJ Silver
PURPOSE: State the supported/ maneuver commander quantifiable task and desired end state for the targeted enemy
formation/function/capability.
Priority 1: Enable 1-1 BNs attack to seize OBJ Bronze with 80% or greater combat power; 11th BTG unable to defend
OBJ Bronze.
Priority 2: ZSUs unable to effectively engage RW assets; min force 7/9 RW chalks successfully arrive LZ
METHOD: Primary CF BTRY is Bravo BTRY, BTRY 9 HE or BTRY 3 DPICM. B BTRY remains in PAA 3 during this
phase to ensure 2/3rds range at 5H beyond OBJ Bronze; Alternate PAA is PAA 2. Alternate CF BTRY is Charlie
BTRY from PAA 4; Alternate PAA is PAA 5.
Primary BTRY for targets for dynamic engagement is Alpha BTRY, BTRY 9 HE or BTRY 3 DPICM for PLT sized
elements and larger. Alpha moves from PAA 2 to PAA 5 as 1-1 BN crosses PL Ironwood in order to maintain a
minimum of 2 launchers available to range on OBJ Bronze. Suppression missions are BTRY 3 HE or BTRY 1 DPICM
or duration as required. The Alternate dynamic target BTRY is Charlie BTRY in position at PAA 4 during this phase;
Alternate is PAA 7.
EFFECTS:
MOP: A measure of performance is used to measure a friendly action that is tied to measuring task accomplishment
(JP 3-0). “Are we accomplishing tasks to standard?”-(Adjudication Tables)
• MOP 1: Enemy ARTY engaged within 8 mins of a counter-battery radar accusation and shoot back criteria met
from TSS. Enemy ARTY engaged upon positive identification of stationary ARTY / MRL PLT or higher
• MOP2: 8 Min sustained rate of fire 155MM HE/VT during air assault. PLT survivability as required in PAA.
• MOE: A measure of effectiveness is used to measure changes in system behavior, capability, or operational
environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of
an effect (JP 3-0) “Are we creating the effect(s) or conditions in the OE that we desire?”
• MOE 1: BDA: 4/19 x 2S19 fire power kill, 2/6 2A36 fire power kill, 1/4 1 launcher 220 NMC 1/4 1 launcher 220
immobile, radar still FMC: Repeat criteria met.
• MOE2: 1X ZSU conducted survivability move and unable to engage, 1X UH-60 engaged conducted emergency
landing on LZ.
ARTY – artillery, BDA – battle damage assessment, BN – battalion, BTG – battalion tactical group, BTRY – battery,
BDE – brigade, CF – counterfire, DPICM – dual purpose improved conventional munition, EFAT – essential field
artillery task, FMC – fully mission capable, H – hour, HE – high explosive, IN – infantry, IVO – in vicinity of, LZ –
landing zone, MIN – minutes, MOE – measure of effectiveness, MOP – measure of performance, MRL – multiple
rocket launcher, NLT – no later than, NMC – non-mission capable, OBJ – objective, OE – operational environment,
PAA – position area for artillery, PL – phase line, PLT – platoon, RW – rotary wing, TAI – target area of interest, TSS –
target selection standards, UH – utility helicopter, VT – variable time, ZSU -- Zenitnaya Samokhodnava Ustanovha
(Soviet self-propelled, radar guided anti-aircraft weapon system) |
3-09 | 174 | Appendix A
Table A-8. Essential Field Artillery Task Example
Essential Field Artillery Task
Task: must include the desired___________ (effect) on the enemy formation. (Degrade, disrupt, delay, destroy,
neutralize, suppress, and obscure) (formation size – platoon, company, battalion, or number of systems)
*** Special munitions (precision, smoke) (derived from the method of essential fire support task)
Purpose: Task and purpose from essential fire support task. (Task can be written verbatim or summarized)
Method: Tell the story.
Priority: Field artillery priority of fire and field artillery priority of survey. (Survey can be technical, manual, or it can
include other units and delivery assets.)
Allocation: Command post (support relationship), battery (support relationship), weapons locating radar, survey, field
artillery task.
*Movement: routes, triggers, order of march, release points, start points, check points. In-place ready to observe, in-
place ready to fire, time of movement (no earlier than, not later than) position area for artillery, azimuth of fire.
*Targets: Special munitions, priority and alternate shooters, attitudes and width, type of ammunition, target number and
location, triggers, final protective fires, priority targets. Other: radar zones, survey control points.
Restrictions: Fire support coordination measures, survivability movement criteria, ammunition constraints. Other
considerations, such as target dwell times, special munition approval authority.
Effects: Quantification of field artillery task (number of enemy systems destroyed), and positioning of field artillery
units at the end of phase.
A-21. An EFAT is defined as a task that the FA must accomplish in order to achieve an EFST in the supported
commander's OPORD. Those EFSTs that do not have "FA" as the method are not EFATs. A fully developed
EFAT has a task, purpose, method, and effects. The task describes the effects of the fires against a specific
enemy formation in terms of degrade, disrupt, delay, destroy, neutralize, and suppress it can also include
obscure or fire SEAD. The purpose must clearly tie the EFAT to the EFST it supports. It is a statement of the
EFST task and purpose. The method is a concise statement of how the EFAT will be accomplished. Tell the
"story" of what must be done to complete the EFAT. This entails describing priorities of fire and survey;
position areas and routes to them; azimuths of fire; target numbers, priority targets and FPFs; radar zones;
triggers for movement and survivability move criteria; FSCMs. These are referred to as Priorities, Allocations
and Restrictions. The effect is a description of what success will look like: As much as possible, quantify the
effect as an observable result. Describe the location of the firing elements to include will the firing unit move
after executing the task.
A-22. After being assigned the EFST, the commander would give the staff planning guidance to include
planning guidance for fires: "FSCOORD use fires to delay from 2100Z18Augxx until 0500Z19Augxx the
enemy movement along route RED to prevent enemy forces from interfering with the wet gap crossing". The
FSCOORD and FSE planners using the OPORD then develop tasks to subordinate FA units. See table A-7
on page A-9, for an example of an EFAT.
A-23. The commander determines the desired effect for each target. Effects can be created by selection of
the appropriate weapon system, number and type of munitions fired and the method used to engage a target.
Commanders analyze mission variables of METT-TC (I) to create effects using a range of capabilities to
destroy, disrupt, neutralize, interdict, and suppress enemy forces.
A-24. In planning for EFATs, the FSCOORD considers the elements of the task - the task description itself,
its purpose, and the desired effect. Task describes the objectives that fires must achieve against a specific
enemy capability. The task has three parts: targeting objective, enemy formation, and function. Disrupt,
delay, and destroy are all examples of objectives. Formation is the size of the threat, and function is the
capability of this threat to achieve its task and purpose. |
3-09 | 175 | Development of Essential Fire Support and Essential Field Artillery Tasks
A-25. The purpose describes how the task will contribute to achieving the commander's intent. As with a FS
task, this should identify the decisive point that will leverage the targeting effect. It is constructed very
similarly, if not identical to a FS Task.
A-26. To develop the method the FSCOORD, plans and details the priorities, allocations, and restrictions of
the EFAT. The planning addresses movement functions and priorities, critical tasks to subordinate firing
units during execution of the EFAT and other required tasks. The FSCOORD prescribes priority of fires,
primary and alternate position areas, triggers for movement, priority of survey support, concept of movement,
and the scheme of fires to achieve the EFAT.
A-27. The desired effect quantifies the successful accomplishment of the task. An example of a desired effect
is two BMPs destroyed, the desired effect is assessment-oriented and assists in the decision to reattack or not.
A-28. To assess the required effects, sensors include observers, TA assets, infantry, Army aviation, and
scouts. Effects are more than destroying the enemy equipment; they are quantifiable and observable. Accurate
assessment and confirmation that the system has been destroyed or the desired effect has been created is the
end result of the task. Disseminate the developed EFAT in the FA BN OPLAN or OPORD or in subparagraph
3e of the higher HQ OPORD as the FA support plan.
A-29. For completed examples of a EFAT using the memory aid target, trigger, location, observers, delivery,
attack guidance, communications (refers as TTLODAC) see table A-9 page A-12 and table A-10 on page A-
13. |
3-09 | 176 | Appendix A
Table A-9. A completed example of essential field artillery task (referred as TTLODAC)
Phase: IIa Buildup of combat power in PAA BLUE
Task (what): Essential Field Artillery Task (EFAT) 1: Provide suppressive fires on 841st armored formations (support
brigade EFST 1)
Purpose (why): Allow Army attack aviation and CAS to destroy enemy motorized formations crossing international
border, along PL Betty.
Priority of fire: FA POF 1-71, 1-87, 2-22
Allocations: C BTRY POF to 1-71, B BTRY POF to 2-22, A BTRY POF to 1-87
Positioning guidance: C BTRY PAA BLUE 18T VP 40897612 AOF 1000; A BTRY PAA BLUE 18T VP 40897612
AOF 1300 on order PAA RED 18T VP 47558085 AOF 2200; B BTRY 18T VP 40897612 AOF 1600 on order PAA
PURPLE 18T VP 44508200 AOF 0800
Restrictions/FSCMs: FSCL along PL Betty; CFL along PL Archie; NFA and CFZ over all friendly unit locations; RFA
over villages of Razish, Guba, Barasu, and Nabran
FA (T) (T) (L) (O) (D) (A) (C)
Task Target Trigger Location Observers Delivery Attack Communications
System(s) Guidance
EFAT KC0001 Identification 18T VP P: 1-71 P: C BTRY P: BTRY 2 P: FD1
1 of 30% of 506 856 A: Army A: A BTRY rd HE/PD A: FD2
841st
attack (155mm)
C: B BTRY
motorized
aviation A:BTRY 4
elements
rd HE/PD
crossing
(105mm)
PL Betty
EFAT KC0005 Identification 18T VP P: 1-71 P: C BTRY P: BTRY 2 P: FD1
1 of 30% of 521 824 A: Army A: A BTRY rd HE/PD A: FD2
841st attack (155mm)
C: B BTRY
motorized aviation A:BTRY 4
elements
rd HE/PD
crossing
(105mm)
PL Betty
EFAT KC0010 Identification 18T VP P: 1-71 P: C BTRY P: BTRY 2 P: FD1
1 of 30% of 526 805 A: Army A: A BTRY rd HE/PD A: FD2
841st attack (155mm)
C: B BTRY
motorized aviation A: BTRY 4
elements
rd HE/PD
crossing PL
Betty (105mm)
Effects:
MOE1: 30% of 841st motorized BN tactical group vehicles mobility or firepower kills.
MOP: Suppression of 841st motorized vehicles achieved in less than 10 minutes.
A – alternate, AOF – azimuth of fire, BTRY – battery, CFL – coordinated fire line, CFZ – critical friendly zone, CAS –
close air support, EFAT – essential field artillery task, EFST – essential fire support task, FA – field artillery, FD1 – fire
direction network 1 (Digital), FD2 – fire direction network 2 (Voice), FSCL – fire support coordination line, HE – high
explosive, mm – millimeter, MOE – method of effectiveness, MOP – method of performance, NFA – no fire area, P –
primary, PAA – position area for artillery, PD – point detonating, PL – phase line, POF – priority of fire, rd – round, RFA
–restrictive fire area |
3-09 | 177 | Development of Essential Fire Support and Essential Field Artillery Tasks
Table A-10. An example of a completed essential field artillery task (memory aid TTLODAC)
Phase: IIa Buildup of combat power in PAA BLUE
Task (what): Essential Field Artillery Task (EFAT) 2: Provide counter-fire on enemy fire support assets in AO
WARRIOR.
Purpose (why): Deny 841st motorized battalion group fire support assets the ability to mass indirect fires on 1BCT.
Priority of fire: FA POF 1-71, 1-87, 2-22
Allocations: C BTRY POF to 1-71, B BTRY POF to 2-22, A BTRY POF to 1-87
Positioning guidance: C BTRY PAA BLUE 18T VP 40897612 AOF 1000; A BTRY PAA BLUE 18T VP 40897612
AOF 1300 on order PAA RED 18T VP 47558085 AOF 2200; B BTRY 18T VP 40897612 AOF 1600 on order PAA
PURPLE 18T VP 44508200 AOF 0800
Restrictions/FSCMs: FSCL along PL Betty; CFL along PL Archie; NFA and CFZ over all friendly unit locations; RFA
over villages of Razish, Guba, Barasu, and Nabran
FA (T) (T) (L) (O) (D) (A) (C)
Task Target Trigger Location Observer(s) Delivery Attack Communications
System(s) Guidance
EFAT KC0020 Identification 18T P: Q53 P: C BTRY P: BTRY 3 P: FD1
2 of 841st MRL VP A: UAS A: A BTRY rd HE/PD A: FD2
units
(155mm)
578 858 C: B BTRY
A: BTRY 3
rd HE/PD
(105mm)
EFAT KC0025 Identification 18T P: Q53 P: C BTRY P: BTRY 3 P: FD1
2 of 841st VP A: UAS A: A BTRY rd HE/P A: FD2
155mm SP
(155mm)
588 871 C: B BTRY
units
A: BTRY 3
rd HE/PD
(105mm)
EFAT KC0030 Identification 18T P: Q53 P: C BTRY P: BTRY 3 P: FD1
2 of 841st MRL VP A: UAS A: A BTRY rd HE/PD A: FD2
units (155mm)
505 910 C: B BTRY
A: BTRY 3
rd HE/PD
(105mm)
EFAT KC0040 Identification 18T P: Q53 P: C BTRY P: BTRY 3 P: FD1
2 of 841st VP A: UAS A: A BTRY rd HE/PD A: FD2
155mm SP
(155mm)
515 915 C: B BTRY
units
A: BTRY 3
rd HE/PD
(105mm)
Effects:
MOE1: 30% of 841st motorized battalion tactical group vehicles mobility or firepower kills.
MOP: Suppression of 841st motorized vehicles achieved in less than 10 minutes.
A – alternate, AOF – azimuth of fire, BCT – brigade combat team, BTRY – battery, CFL – coordinated fire line, CFZ –
critical friendly zone, EFAT – essential field artillery task, FA – field artillery, FD1 – fire direction network 1 (Digital),
FD2 – fire direction network 2 (Voice), FSCL – fire support coordination line, FSCMs – fire support coordination measures
HE – high explosive, mm – millimeter, MOE – method of effectiveness, MOP – method of performance, MRL – multiple
rocket launcher, NFA – no fire area, P – primary, PAA – position area for artillery, PD – point detonating, PL – phase
line, POF – priority of fire, Q53 – weapons locating radar, rd – round, RFA – restrictive fire area, SCAR – strike
coordination and reconnaissance, SP – self-propelled, UAS – unmanned aircraft system |
3-09 | 178 | Appendix A
SECTION II – ATTACK GUIDANCE MATRIX
A-30. The attack guidance matrix is a targeting product approved by the commander, which addresses
the how and when targets are engaged and the desired effects. The AGM sample in table A-11 provides
guidance on what HPT should be attacked and when and how they should be attacked. Units may develop
their own AGM format. The AGM includes the following elements:
* High-payoff target. The HPT column is a prioritized list of HPTs by phase of the operation.
* WHEN. The WHEN column indicates the time the target should be engaged. (See the table A-11)
* HOW. This column indicates the weapon system that will engage the target.
* EFFECT. The desired effects on the target or target system are stated in this column.
* REMARKS. Remarks concerning whether or not BDA is required, whether coordination must
take place, and any restrictions are indicated in this column.
Table A-11. Attack guidance matrix (example)
High-payoff target When How Effect Remarks
Artillery A FA Neutralize Coordinate and
ensure CFFZs,
CFZs are
emplaced and
active
ADA and EW A FA, CEMA Destroy Ensure FSCMs
Radars and ACMs are
coordinated and
in place for
immediate
engagement of
targets
Command posts P CEMA Neutralize Jam
communications
at H-1
Ammunition caches I Maneuver Destroy Destroy in place
or secure
Engineer assets A Maneuver, UAS Neutralize Capture or
destroy
ACM – airspace coordinating measure, ADA – air defense artillery, CEMA – cyberspace electromagnetic activities,
CFFZ – call for fire zone, CFZ – critical friendly zone, EW – electronic warfare, FA – field artillery, FSCM – fire support
coordination measure, UAS – unmanned aircraft system |
3-09 | 179 | Appendix B
Fire Support Coordination Measures
FSCMs enable the employment of fires and effects. Locations and implementing
instructions for FSCMs are disseminated electronically by message, database updates,
or overlays through command and FS channels, to higher, lower, and adjacent
maneuver and supporting units. The establishment or change of a FSCM is typically
initiated through the operations cell and ultimately approved by the establishing
commander. FSCMs enhance the expeditious engagement of targets; protect forces,
populations, critical infrastructure, and sites of religious or cultural significance; and
set the stage for future operations. The commander positions and adjusts FSCMs
consistent with the operational situation and in consultation with superior, subordinate,
supporting, and affected commanders. The operations cell informs coordination
elements of the change and effective times. Conditions that dictate the change of
FSCMs are also coordinated with the other agencies and components as appropriate.
As conditions are met, the new FSCM effective time can be projected and announced.
Following direction to execute the change, the current operations integration cell
should confirm with all liaison elements that the FSCM changes have been
disseminated.
Note. The airspace coordinating and FSCM graphics depicted in this chapter are examples for
illustrative purposes only. The authority for constructing such graphics is FM 1-02.2, JP 3-09, JP
3-52, and Military Standard (MILSTD 2525).
SECTION I – PERMISSIVE FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION MEASURES
B-1. Permissive FSCMs facilitate the attack of targets. Fires must be cleared with both terrain owners and
other airspace users. FSCMs will change frequently during large-scale combat operations. The commander
adjusts FSCMs as required to keep pace with operations.
COORDINATED FIRE LINE
B-2. A coordinated fire line is a line beyond which conventional surface-to-surface direct fire and indirect
fire support means may fire at any time within the boundaries of the establishing headquarters without
additional coordination but does not eliminate the responsibility to coordinate the airspace required to
conduct the mission (JP 3-09). The purpose of the CFL is to expedite the surface-to-surface attack of targets
beyond the CFL without coordination with the ground commander in whose area the targets are located. A
brigade commander or equivalent, usually establishes the CFL, but it can be established by a BN with higher
HQ approval. For example, in amphibious operations a maneuver BN could establish the CFL. The division
or corps commander may reserve the right to establish or consolidate CFLs. Locate the CFL as close to the
establishing unit as possible without interfering with the supported forces. The CFL does not eliminate the
requirement or responsibility to coordinate the airspace required to conduct the mission. Such fires must still
comply with ROE and law-of-war targeting constraints; designation of a CFL is not authorization to fire
indiscriminately into the area. The CFL should be placed on identifiable terrain, however, additional
considerations include the limits of ground observation, the location of the initial objectives in the offense,
and the requirement for maximum flexibility in both maneuver and the delivery of supporting fires. |
3-09 | 180 | Appendix B
B-3. A dashed black line, with "CFL" followed by the establishing HQ above the line and the effective date-
time group below the line provides graphic portrayal of the CFL (see figure B-1). Locations for CFLs are
disseminated by message or overlay through maneuver and FS channels to higher, lower, adjacent maneuver,
and supporting units.
Figure B-1. Coordinated fire line example
FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION LINE
B-4. A fire support coordination line is a fire support coordination measure established by the land or
amphibious force commander to support common objectives within an area of operation, beyond which all
fires must be coordinated with affected commanders prior to engagement and, short of the line, all fires must
be coordinated with the establishing commander prior to engagement (JP 3-09). The optimum placement of
the FSCL varies with specific AO circumstances, but considerations include the ground force positions and
anticipated scheme of maneuver during the effective time period of the FSCL and their indirect FS systems’
range limits, where typically the preponderance of lethal effects on the AO shifts from the ground component
to the air component. For more information see JP 3-09. |
3-09 | 181 | Fire Support Coordination Measures
B-5. FSCLs facilitate the expeditious attack of surface targets of opportunity beyond the coordinating
measure. The FSCL is not a boundary-the synchronization of operations on either side of the FSCL is the
responsibility of the establishing commander, out to the limits of the land or amphibious force boundary. The
FSCL applies to all fires of air, land, and sea-based weapon systems using any type of ammunition. The
JFLCC and JFMCC cannot employ fires long of the FSCL without coordination with affected commanders,
and the JFACC cannot employ fires short of the FSCL without coordination with the JFLCC or JFMCC.
Supporting elements attacking targets beyond the FSCL must ensure that the attack will not produce adverse
effects on, or to the rear of, the line. The appropriate land or amphibious force commander controls all air-
to- ground and surface-to-surface attack operations short of a FSCL. The FSCL should follow well-defined
terrain features to assist identification from the air. Coordination of attacks beyond the FSCL is especially
critical to commanders of air, land, and SOF. For more information on coordination of attacks beyond the
FSCL see JP 3-09.
B-6. Establishing a FSCL close-in, yet at sufficient depth to not limit the tempo of maneuver forces, eases
target engagement coordination requirements within their areas of operations by forces that may not be under
their direct control. The commander adjusts the location of the FSCL as required to keep pace with operations.
In large-scale combat operations, the FSCL will change frequently. The JFC should establish a time standard
and guidance for shifting an FSCL.
B-7. The FSCL is a term oriented to land and airspace operations and is normally located only on land. In
certain situations, such as littoral areas, the FSCL may affect both land and sea areas. If possible, the FSCL
should follow well-defined terrain features to assist identification from the air. The commander of the landing
force normally establishes the FSCL for amphibious operations. Changes to the FSCL require notification of
all affected forces within the AO and must allow sufficient time for these forces to incorporate the FSCL
change. When friendly forces are operating beyond the FSCL restrictive FSCMs such as RFAs and NFAs
should be employed to protect those forces.
B-8. A solid black line extending across the assigned areas of the establishing HQ provides the graphic
portrayal of the FSCL (see figure B-2 on page B-4). The letters "FSCL" followed by the establishing HQ are
annotated above the line, and the effective date-time-group below the line. FSCLs do not have to follow
traditional straight-line paths. Positioning the FSCL on terrain identifiable from the air is a technique that
may further assist in fratricide prevention. Curved or enclosed FSCL have applications in joint operations
conducted in non-contiguous areas of operation. |
3-09 | 182 | Appendix B
Figure B-2. Fire support coordination line example
B-9. The decision on where to place or even whether to use a FSCL requires careful consideration. If used,
its location is based on estimates of the situation and concept of operations. The establishment of a FSCL
does not create a FFA beyond the FSCL. Engagements beyond the FSCL must be consistent with the
establishing commander's priorities, timing, and desired effects. Location of enemy forces, anticipated rates
of movement, concept and tempo of the operation, organic weapon capabilities such as wide-area munitions,
or those with delayed effects, and other factors are all considered by the commander. The FSCL is normally
positioned closer to the FLOT in the defense than in the offense; however, the exact positioning depends on
the situation. Placing the FSCL at greater depths will typically require support from higher HQ and other
supporting commanders. Also, when the FSCL is positioned at greater depth, there is greater requirement for
detailed coordination with the establishing commander and can slow the expeditious clearance of fires short
of the FSCL.
B-10. Attacks on surface targets short of the FSCL, during the conduct of joint interdiction operations, must
be controlled by, and/or coordinated with, the appropriate land or amphibious force commander. |
3-09 | 183 | Fire Support Coordination Measures
B-11. The establishing commander adjusts the location of the FSCL as required to keep pace with operations.
A series of disseminated "on-order" FSCLs will help accelerate the coordination required. The establishing
commander quickly transmits the change to higher, lower, adjacent, and supporting HQ to ensure that
appropriate controlling agencies coordinate engagement operations. Changes to the FSCL require notification
of all affected forces within the AO and must allow sufficient time for these forces and/or components to
incorporate the FSCL change. Current technology and collaboration tools between the elements of the joint
force determine the times required for changing the FSCL.
B-12. Varying capabilities for acquisition and engagement may exist among adjacent commanders in a
multinational operation. Normally, commanders at senior tactical echelons establish an FSCL to support their
operations. Layered FSCLs and multiple, separate, noncontiguous corps and/or MAGTF FSCLs positioned
at varying depths, create a coordination and execution challenge for supporting commanders (e.g., tracking
effective times, lateral boundaries, and multiple command guidance). In cases such as these, when the
components share a mutual boundary, the JFC or a designated component commander may consolidate the
operational requirements of subordinates to establish a single FSCL. When possible, a single FSCL best
facilitates air ground operations synchronization.
FREE-FIRE AREA
B-13. A free-fire area is a specific region into which any weapon system may fire without additional
coordination with the establishing headquarters (JP 3-09). Where indirect fires and aircraft share an FFA,
consider establishing an airspace coordination area to assist in deconfliction. Only the military commander
with jurisdiction over the area (usually, a division or higher commander) may establish an FFA. Preferably,
the FFA should be located on identifiable terrain; however, grid coordinates or the Global Area Reference
System may be used to designate the FFA.
B-14. The FFA is graphically portrayed (see figure B-3 on page B-6) by a solid black line defining the area
and the letters "FFA" within, followed by the establishing HQ and the effective date-time-group. For more
information on establishment of a free-fire area see FM 1-02.2. |
3-09 | 184 | Appendix B
Figure B-3. Free-fire area example
GRIDDED REFERENCE GRAPHIC
B-15. A gridded reference graphic (GRG) (see figure B-4 for an example) are detailed gridded maps or
imagery that have a military grid reference system grid and may contain information including building
numbers, FSCMs, phase lines, helicopter landing zones, and named areas of interest. It is the responsibility
of the ground unit that owns a particular OA to produce GRGs for that area, ensure dissemination to
subordinate, adjacent, and higher echelons, and maintain version control on the products as they are updated
or revised. The developing unit should consider selecting grid sectors based on what the aircrew or aircraft
sensors can most easily see such as rivers, road junctions, buildings, and bridges. For more information on
the GRG see JP 3-09.3 Below are recommendations for GRG creation:
* Ensure the collection manager provides the clearest and most recent image of the area.
* Imagery should contain a north arrow and the picture should be oriented north-up whenever
possible.
* Easting and northing lines should be labeled at the top and left side of the GRG, respectively.
* Buildings may be numbered from northwest to southeast for large area GRGs, or from the
objective building clockwise for smaller scale single-objective GRGs. |
3-09 | 185 | Fire Support Coordination Measures
Figure B-4. Gridded reference graphic example
KILL BOX
B-16. Description. A kill box is a three-dimensional permissive fire support coordination measure with an
associated airspace coordinating measure used to facilitate the integration of fires (JP 3-09). A kill box is a
coordination measure, not a mission.
B-17. Purpose. The kill box reduces execution coordination because all requirements for target engagement
in the target area (to include, guidance, clearance of fires, timing, and deconfliction from other assets) are
accomplished while planning and coordinating the kill box in support of approved targets on a component’s
target nomination list or joint integrated prioritized target list.
* Kill boxes are established to support interdiction efforts as an outcome of the JFC’s joint targeting
process.
* Kill boxes allow attacks against surface targets without further coordination with the AO
commander, and without the requirement for terminal attack control.
* When use of air-to-surface, subsurface, and surface-to-surface indirect fires are desired, the kill
box will have ACMs that provide airspace in which participating aircraft are deconflicted from
friendly surface fires. These ACMs also prevent nonparticipating aircraft and maneuver forces
from entering kill boxes. The goal of excluding nonparticipating forces is to reduce the
coordination required to engage targets while preventing friendly fire.
B-18. Missions. Specific missions applicable to this publication are AI.
Note. All users must understand that kill boxes are not part of a reference system but are
specialized CMs consisting of FSCMs with an associated ACM. The Global Area Reference
System (GARS) naming and numbering conventions are used to facilitate joint fires integration. |
3-09 | 186 | Appendix B
B-19. Kill Box Types. The following kill box color definitions are specific to munition delivery methods (to
include air-to-surface only or air-to-surface and surface-to-surface).
* Blue Kill Box. The primary purpose of a blue kill box is to facilitate the attack of surface targets
with air-to-surface munitions without further coordination with the AO commander see figure B-
5.The blue kill box extends from the surface to a ceiling altitude. Altitude is the vertical distance
of a level, a point or an object considered as a point, measured from mean sea level or heigh
above ellipsoid. Indirect fire munitions impacting within or passing through an active blue kill
box must be coordinated with the designated airspace control element, kill box coordinator, or the
aircrew on station in the blue kill box.
* Purple Kill Box. The purple kill box enables joint fires in the kill box to maximize potential for
engaging targets. The primary purpose of a purple kill box is to facilitate the attack of surface
targets with subsurface-to-surface, surface-to-surface, and air-to-surface munitions without further
coordination with the AO commander. The purple kill box contains an altitude floor below which
aircraft will not fly, that enables subsurface-to-surface and surface-to-surface fires. Indirect fires
that remain beneath the ACM floor do not require further coordination; however, airspace
coordination along the munition flight path outside the kill box must still occur.
B-20. Kill Box Operating Status Terminology.
* Established. A status that identifies the kill box is published on the ACO.
* Effective Time. The scheduled date and time of the kill box on the ACO.
Active. There is activity in the kill box. A descriptor identifying an established kill box has a
fires and airspace status affecting aircraft and fires operating in the kill box.
Inactive. There is no activity in the kill box. A descriptor identifying an established kill box
is without a fires and airspace status affecting fires or aircraft operating in the kill box.
Additional coordination is required to activate an inactive kill box.
* Cancelled. The kill box is no longer established and is deleted from the ACO.
B-21. Kill Box Fires Status and Airspace Status Terminology. An active kill box status is described in two
parts: fires and airspace. The fires status addresses effects in the kill box’s target area. The airspace status
addresses the availability of and restrictions for using the airspace above the target area.
B-22. Fires Status. An active kill box’s fires status is either HOT or COLD.
* HOT. A status that describes a kill box or portion of a kill box where fires are permitted without
further coordination.
* COLD. A status that describes a kill box or portion of a kill box where fires are not permitted
without further coordination.
B-23. Airspace Status. An active kill box’s airspace status is either OPEN or CLOSED.
* OPEN. A status that describes a kill box or portions of a kill box where aircraft may be approved
to operate inside the kill box ACM or designated segments.
* CLOSED. A status that describes a kill box or portion of a kill box that restricts aircraft from
operating within the confines of the kill box or designated segments. Indirect subsurface-to-surface
and surface-to-surface fires trajectories may transit through them.
B-24. Airspace Control Element. The airspace control element is the assigned tactical C2 echelon assigned
to control a given kill box on the ACO. All airspace users should contact the assigned airspace control element
prior to entry into a kill box. When the kill box is inactive, or active without a kill box coordinator, the
assigned airspace control element is responsible for coordination regarding the kill box.
B-25. A kill box facilitates the expeditious air-to-surface lethal attack of targets (such attacks can be
augmented with surface-to-surface indirect fires). A "blue" kill box permits air-to-surface fires within its
boundaries and typically extends from the surface to a ceiling altitude; a "purple" kill box within its boundary.
B-26. Kill Box Lateral Dimensions and Subdivision. The lateral dimensions of a kill box should be defined
using GARS. Using GARS cells, quadrants, and keypads to define kill boxes facilitates airspace and fires
joint integration and deconfliction by the assigned airspace control elements. For more information on kill
box employment see JP 3-09 and ATP 3-09.34. |
3-09 | 187 | Fire Support Coordination Measures
* Cell. GARS cells divide the surface of the earth into 30-minute by 30-minute cells (approximately
55-kilometers (km) by 55 km).
* Quadrant. Each 30-minute cell is divided into four 15-minute by 15-minute quadrants
(approximately 28 km by 28 km).
* Keypad. Each 15-minute quadrant is divided into nine 5-minute by 5-minute areas (approximately
9 km by 9 km).
* As GARS cells move away from the equator GARS cells get smaller.
Figure B-5. Kill box graphic example
AIRSPACE COORDINATION AREA
B-27. Airspace coordination area is a three-dimensional block of airspace in a target area, established by the
appropriate commander, in which friendly aircraft are reasonably safe from friendly surface fires. (JP 3-09.3). |
3-09 | 188 | Appendix B
B-28. A formal airspace coordination area requires detailed planning. Vital information defining the formal
airspace coordination area includes minimum and maximum altitudes, a baseline designated by grid
coordinates at each end, the width (on either side of the baseline), and the effective times. When time for
coordination is limited, an informal airspace coordination area is used. In an informal airspace coordination
area, aircraft and surface joint fires may be separated by time or distance (lateral, altitude, or a combination
of the two). The supported commander requesting CAS or employing helicopters can request an informal
airspace coordination area; the informal airspace coordination area is approved at BN or higher level. Both
types of airspace coordination areas are constructed with the assistance of the ALO to ensure they meet the
technical requirements of the aircraft and weapon systems.
B-29. Army aviation, ADA, military intelligence, maneuver, UAS, EW assets, FS, and joint and
multinational air and ground forces all use airspace. Commanders of BCTs and lower exercise airspace
management as part of a division's airspace control within division assigned airspace because they are not
organized, trained, and equipped to conduct airspace control. Airspace control maximizes the simultaneous
use of airspace. At decisive moments, commanders can exploit all available combat power synchronized in
time, space, and purpose.
B-30. Fires are airspace users. Clearance of fires maximizes damage to enemy capabilities while minimizing
the risk of damage to friendly forces and non-combatants. Clearance of fires may be accomplished through
a staff process, control measures, embedded in automation systems, active or passive recognition systems, or
a combination thereof.
B-31. A formal airspace coordination area is graphically shown (see figure B-6) as an area enclosed by a
solid black line. Depicted inside the enclosed area are airspace coordination are (known as "ACA,") the
establishing HQ, the minimum and maximum altitudes, the grid coordinates for each end of the baseline and
the width of the airspace coordination area, the grid coordinates for each point of an irregularly shaped
airspace coordination area, and the effective date-time group or the words "on-order." Informal airspace
coordination areas are not normally displayed on maps, charts, or overlays.
Note. In NATO FA tactical doctrine the airspace coordination area is a FSCM and is defined as
"a restricted area or route of travel specified for use by friendly aircraft and established for the
purpose of preventing friendly aircraft from being fired on by friendly forces" (Allied Artillery
Publication-5). |
3-09 | 189 | Fire Support Coordination Measures
ACA 52ID(M)
MIN ALT: 400 FT AGL
MAX ALT: 8000 FT AGL
GRID HN 3425 to HN 3540
050500ZDEC23 –
060800ZDEC23
ACA – airspace coordination area,
AGL – altitude above ground level, ALT – altitude,
ID(M) – infantry division (mechanized),
MAX – maximum, MIN – minimum
Figure B-6. Airspace coordination area example
Note. The depiction of airspace coordination area on a two-dimensional surface such as on a map
does not display the possibly irregularly shaped airspace coordination area dimensions (such as
Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missile or Excalibur flight paths) that may be
constructed within automation systems, which can provide information for airspace clearance.
SECTION II – RESTRICTIVE FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION MEASURES
B-32. Restrictive FSCMs are those that provide safeguards for friendly forces and noncombatants, facilities,
or terrain.
NO-FIRE AREA
B-33. A no-fire area is an area designated by the appropriate commander into which fires or their effects are
prohibited (JP 3-09.3). There are two exceptions.
* When the establishing HQ approves joint fires within the NFA on a mission-by- mission basis. |
3-09 | 190 | Appendix B
* When an enemy force within the NFA engages a friendly force and the engaged commander
determines there is a requirement for immediate protection and responds with the minimal force
needed to defend the force.
B-34. Any size unit may establish NFAs. If possible, the NFA is established on identifiable terrain. It may
also be located by a series of grids or by a radius from a center point.
B-35. The NFA is graphically portrayed (see figure B-7) as an area outlined with a solid black line with black
diagonal lines inside. The letters "NFA" are within, followed by the establishing HQ and the effective date-
time group.
Figure B-7. No fire area example
RESTRICTIVE FIRE AREA
B-36. A restrictive fire area is a location in which specific restrictions are imposed and into which fires that
exceed those restrictions will not be delivered without coordination with the establishing headquarters (JP 3-
09). |
3-09 | 191 | Fire Support Coordination Measures
B-37. A maneuver BN or higher echelon normally establishes a RFA. Usually, the RFA is located on
identifiable terrain, by grid, or by a radius from a center point. To facilitate rapidly changing operations, on-
call RFAs may be used. The dimensions, locations, and restrictions of the on-call RFAs are prearranged.
B-38. A RFA is graphically portrayed with solid black line defining the area and the letters "RFA" within,
followed by the establishing HQ and the effective date-time group provides graphic portrayal of the RFA.
(See figure B-8). The restrictions may be included within the graphic if space allows, or reference may be
made to a specific OPORD or OPLAN (FM 1-02.2). For example, a commander may identify a particular
type of ammunition to preclude its firing within the RFA.
Figure B-8. Restrictive fire area example
RESTRICTIVE FIRE LINE
B-39. A restrictive fire line is a specific boundary established between converging, friendly surface forces
that prohibits fires or their effects from crossing. (JP 3-09). The purpose of the RFL is to prevent fratricide
and duplication of engagements by converging friendly forces.
B-40. A RFL (see figure B-9 on page B-14) is graphically portrayed by a solid black line, with "RFL"
followed by the establishing HQ above the line and the effective date-time group below the line. The
commander common to the converging forces establishes the RFL. It is located on identifiable terrain when
possible. In link-up operations, it is usually closer to the stationary force to allow maximum freedom of action
for the maneuver and FS of the linkup force. |
3-09 | 192 | Appendix B
Figure B-9. Restrictive fire line example
SECTION III – ADDITIONAL GRAPHIC CONTROL MEASURES
B-41. Additional graphic control measures can be permissive or restrictive. A graphic control measure is a
symbol used on maps and displays to regulate forces and warfighting functions (ADP 6-0). These control
measures include boundaries, phase lines, trigger lines and PAA.
FIRE SUPPORT AREA AND A FIRE SUPPORT STATION
B-42. In amphibious operations when engagement groups are formed and separate landing areas are
designated, the commander, amphibious task force may assign each engagement group commander the
responsibility for control of naval gunfire support within the area. The officer in tactical command, typically
the commander, amphibious task force, establishes FS areas and FS stations. A fire support area is an
appropriate maneuver area assigned to fire support ships by the naval force commander from which they can
deliver gunfire support to an amphibious operation (JP 3-09). A FS area is normally associated with
amphibious operations but can be used whenever it is desirable to have a FS ship occupy a certain geographic |
3-09 | 193 | Fire Support Coordination Measures
position. The FS station designation is used to station ships within boat lanes of the assaulting force, or in
areas where maneuvering room is restricted by other considerations. A fire support station is an exact location
at sea within a fire support area from which a fire support ship delivers fire (JP 3-02).
B-43. FS areas are designed with Roman numerals (for example "FSA I, II, or III") and are graphically
portrayed on the naval surface FS operations overlay. FS stations are designated by numbers (for example
"FSS 1, 2, or 3") and are shown on the naval surface FS operations overlay as an "X" indicating the exact
position of the ship. Figure B-10 provides an example of a graphic representation of the FS area and FS
station.
Figure B-10. Fire support area and a fire support station
ZONE OF FIRE
B-44. A zone of fire is an area within which a designated ground unit or fire support ship delivers, or is
prepared to deliver, fire support (JP 3-09). Fire may or may not be observed. Gunfire support ships and units
are assigned land divided into zones of fire to coordinate their efforts with each other and with the scheme of
maneuver of the supported ground unit. Units and ships assigned zones of fire are responsible for engaging
known targets and targets of opportunity according to their mission and the guidance of the supported
commander. |
3-09 | 194 | Appendix B
B-45. Graphically portray a ZF (see figure B-11) using broken lines (solid lines if unit boundaries are used
as depicted), with designating Arabic numerals, for example "ZF3" For more information on zone of fire
establishment see JP 3-09.
Figure B-11. Zone of fire example
Note. JP 3-09 directs the use of only Arabic numerals to identify a ZF. The AFATDS software
uses the zone of responsibility graphic to implement a ZF. The zone of responsibility line or area
name field allows the use of uppercase alphabetic characters (A-Z), numeric characters (0-9), and
blank spaces to identify that graphic.
B-46. The commander of the maritime force providing naval surface fire support establishes and assigns
zones of fire for the forces. The ZF for an artillery BN or a ship assigned the support relationship or mission
of DS normally corresponds to the AO of the supported unit. The ZF for an artillery BN or a ship assigned
the support relationship or mission of GS should be within the boundaries of the supported unit. When used
in conjunction with naval gunfire, the size and shape of a ZF will depend on the following:
* Boundaries. To permit ready identification by the spotter and the individual FS ship, the
boundaries of the zones of fire should be recognizable both on the terrain and on a map. It may be
necessary to divide a large ZF into two or more smaller zones due to considerations discussed in
subsequent paragraphs. The boundaries of zones of fire of DS ships should correspond to the zones
of action of the landing force units supported.
* Size. The size of each ZF should be such that the FS ships, or ships assigned to observe and destroy
targets, will be able to accomplish the mission in the time allocated. When zones of fire are
delineated, known or suspected targets scheduled for destruction in each zone are plotted, and then
the number and type of targets are compared to the capability of the ship. |
3-09 | 195 | Fire Support Coordination Measures
* Visibility. Observation from seaward is a desirable feature for zones of fire since it permits a ship
to deliver more accurate and rapid fire.
* Accessibility to Fire. The zones of fire must be accessible to the trajectory of the FS ship(s)
assigned to the zone.
B-47. A FA unit's higher HQ may also assign a FA unit a ZF. The ZF for artillery units assigned to a maneuver
unit or assigned the DS support relationship corresponds to the AO of the parent or supported unit. The ZF
for an artillery unit assigned the R support relationship corresponds to the ZF of the reinforced artillery unit.
The ZF for an artillery unit assigned the GSR support relationship corresponds to the AO of the supported
unit including the zones of fire of the reinforced artillery unit. The ZF for an artillery unit assigned the GS
relationship corresponds to the AO of the supported unit. For more information on amphibious operations
see JP 3-02.
FINAL PROTECTIVE FIRE
B-48. Final protective fire is an immediately available, prearranged barrier of fire designed to impede enemy
movement across defensive line or areas (JP 3-09.3). An FPF provides continuous fires on a planned target.
FPFs should be integrated with maneuver crew served weapons final protective lines. When the adversary
initiates the final assault into a defensive position, the defending unit initiates its FPFs to kill adversary forces
and suppress armored vehicles.
B-49. The FPF consists of a single black line. Two anchor points, one at each end of the line, determine the
line's length and orientation. The target number followed by the firing unit responsible and the caliber of that
unit's weapons below the line. Figure B-12 portrays the assigned FPFs of Alpha Battery, 1st BN 16th FA
(155-mm), a priority target for that unit.
Figure B-12. Final protective fire example
BOUNDARIES
B-50. A boundary is a line that delineates surface areas for the purpose of facilitating coordination and
deconfliction of operations between adjacent units, formations, or areas (JP 3-0). Boundaries divide up areas
of operation and define responsibility for clearance of fires. Boundaries are both permissive and restrictive
in nature (see figure B-13 on page B-18).
B-51. They are permissive in that a maneuver commander, unless otherwise restricted, enjoys designation of
priority, effects, and timing of fire and maneuver within their own boundaries. Thus, units may execute joint
fires without close coordination with neighboring units unless otherwise restricted. They are restrictive in
that normally units do not fire across adjacent or forward boundaries unless the fires are coordinated with the |
3-09 | 196 | Appendix B
affected unit or the fires are allowed by a permissive FSCM, such as a CFL. These restrictions apply to
conventional and special munitions and their effects. For more information on boundaries, see ADP 3-90.
Figure B-13. Boundaries example
PHASE LINE AND TRIGGER LINE
B-52. A phase line is an easily identified feature in the operational area utilized for control and coordination
of military operations (JP 3-09). Phase lines (see figure B-14) are usually easily identifiable from a ground
or air vantage point and may include features such as ridgelines, tree lines, hilltops, roads, and rivers. Phase
lines can be used to identify limits of advance and to coordinate fires.
B-53. A trigger line is a phase line located on identifiable terrain used to initiate and mass fires into an
engagement area at a predetermined range (FM 3-90). The commander designates a phase line as the trigger
line for FS attack assets. The trigger line's location is based on such variables as the time of flight for artillery
shells, positioning of the guns, and the existence of quick-fire links. A trigger line's location varies from
situation to situation. Its position reflects the distance that the enemy force is likely to traverse in the time it
takes from when fires are requested to when artillery rounds impact (see figure B-14). This gives time for the
FS delivery systems to respond to the initial call for fire. Fires unit commanders must determine the
appropriate planning response time for their unit based on their weapon system and training proficiency to
recommend the placement of a trigger line. |
3-09 | 197 | Fire Support Coordination Measures
Figure B-14. Phase line and trigger line example
B-54. The commander can establish another trigger line for the most accurate long-range weapon system in
the vicinity of the area where the FS impacts to capitalize on the asymmetric attack. However, dust and debris
resulting from the artillery fire may prevent the direct fire systems from engaging the enemy. The commander
establishes other trigger lines for shorter-range systems. The commander may give guidance to extremely
proficient crews to engage the enemy at longer than normal ranges or give them different engagement
priorities than the rest of the force, such as giving priority to engaging air defense or engineer-breaching
systems. This could result in losing the effect that the sudden application of massed fires has on an enemy.
B-55. When the enemy reaches these closer trigger lines, the commander establishes a decision point to help
determine should longer-range systems continue to fire in depth or to concentrate fires on a single point.
Many factors impact the decision, most of which concern the enemy and how they maneuver and the effects
of the defending force's fires.
B-56. The purpose of each phase line and any actions required by forces affected by the phase line will be
specified on the OPORD of the establishing HQ. Any commander given an AO can establish a phase line.
For more information on phase lines see ADP 3-90.
POSITION AREA FOR ARTILLERY
B-57. A position area for artillery is an area assigned to an artillery unit to deliver surface to surface fires
(FM 3-90) see figure B-15 on page B-20. The supported commander assigns PAA as a terrain management
technique. A PAA potentially attracts enemy counterfire so other units should stay away from that area to
avoid enemy artillery attacks. The exact size of a PAA depends on the mission variables of METT-TC (I). A
Paladin platoon normally requires a PAA encompassing over four square kilometers, and a MLRS platoon
requires twelve square kilometers. Units equipped with M119A3 or M777A2 requires one square kilometer
PAA. |
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