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3-16 | 21 | Command and Control During Multinational Operations
unity of effort, but also the foundation for the command guidance needed by staffs when conducting
campaigns. During planning, commanders consider national sensitivities, capabilities, and norms.
Multinational forces anticipate that some forces from member nations have direct and near immediate
communications from the operational area to their respective national political leaders. The ability to have
direct communications either eases coordination issues or becomes a source of friction if external leaders
issue guidance directly to deployed national forces.
COMMAND JURISDICTION
2-13. Each participating nation in a multinational operation has its own national caveats (such as prohibited
munitions and other operational or tactical limitations and constraints). Each nation is responsible to its own
national legal authority for the conduct of operations as it views the conflict based on its own national
interests. In addition to their national caveats, most nations will specify their level of support in terms of
committed units and capabilities, duration of support, degree of interoperability, and acceptable command
relationships and authorities.
2-14. Multinational commanders must consider both political and military issues during operations. They
work with each nation’s force and authorities of each nation to understand and work within the caveats
provided by the political leaders. Where these interests overlap or align, commanders have the greatest
latitude.
NATIONAL INTEREST
2-15. The political agendas of participating countries affect unity of effort during multinational operations.
Many nations will not, or are reluctant to, relinquish command of their forces to other countries even when
they work together toward a common objective. On a case-by-case basis, each country’s national government
places national forces under the multinational commander’s operational control. In such cases, parallel chains
of command exist through the coalition force and national authority. The multinational force’s challenge is
to arrange the best command relationships with its subordinate forces to ensure mission success.
2-16. The interests of nations regarding an operation are described in terms of reference between the troop
contributing nations and other multinational partners or the UN if it is involved. The multinational force
develops a written document that outlines command relationships. Partners can write this document as an
annex to an operation plan, an operation order, or a campaign plan.
2-17. The multinational force transfers authority to the multinational commander’s control. This may become
a command relationship issue. Nations may not agree on when the transfer of control occurs. The earlier the
multinational force gains control, the more flexibility it uses to train and conduct operations. Differences in
national interests, objectives, and policies at the national level—and the availability of forces based on
concurrent commitments—delay planning and agreement to subsequent decisions.
COMMAND AND CONTROL INTEROPERABILITY
2-18. Each multinational partner brings a unique mix of capabilities and limitations, potentially including
fundamental differences in C2 doctrine, technologies, processes, and even basic geospatial datum and
formats. Partners joining with incomplete (or incompatible) technological or procedural capability may lack
the procedures, network, and digital tools or trained personnel to effectively share information. Other
multinational partners may have policy or doctrinal constraints that inhibit information sharing across one or
more security domains or with only select mission partners. Each U.S. combatant command may have
agreements for bilateral information sharing with individual multinational partners that differ from potential
partner to partner. The specific mission, roles, and tasks for each multinational partner may impact
information sharing requirements. Varying standard groups exist today that define information exchange
agreements and processes. For example, the Multilateral Interoperability Programme and artillery systems
cooperation activities represent a mix of interoperability agreements and base standards for interoperability
between multinational partners.
2-19. Key to multinational interoperability is the capability to share data freely and securely. Such sharing
enables a commander to create unity of effort with improved speed of C2 while building trust during mission-
partnered operations and a shared information exchange network. Networks for sharing information facilitate
communication, trust, and propagation of data between multinational forces and U.S. forces. This network |
3-16 | 22 | Chapter 2
can support a plug-and-play capability. Integrated and secure information sharing enables multinational
partners to fight as one team in an MPE (see Figure 2-1 for a visual depiction of MPE). This team includes
members of other departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, state and local governments, allies,
coalition, host nations, other nations, multinational organizations, nongovernmental organizations, academia,
and the private sector.
Figure 2-1. Mission partner environment
MISSION PARTNER ENVIRONMENT
2-20. The MPE is the overarching U.S. DOD capability framework for UAP information sharing. As such,
the Army has an interest in informing and influencing how that framework develops. To support future
operational mission planning, preparation, execution and assessment, the Army uses an enterprise MPE. The
DOD MPE enterprise—
• Ranges from strategic to operational levels.
• Is U.S.-owned and -operated under U.S. policy and regulations.
• Aligns with U.S. approved standards and protocols that enables essential collaboration among U.S.
Government; state, local, tribal, and territorial governments; and foreign partners.
This enterprise enables shared understanding and unity of effort as the Army mans, trains, and equips the
multinational force and gains strategic operational awareness. Army units conduct a seamless transition when
directed to an MPE expeditionary mission partner network (MPN) focused by region and mission to
accomplish coalition training and operational missions. An expeditionary MPN is a temporary network
established for a specific purpose to allow information and data exchange among multinational treaty
organizations, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations. An expeditionary MPE also connects
to the enterprise MPE. (Refer to ATP 6-02.61 for additional information on MPN operations.)
2-21. Successful commanders and staffs consider interoperability throughout the operations process,
beginning with the planning phase. Army capabilities inherently integrate information sharing and processes |
3-16 | 23 | Command and Control During Multinational Operations
to ensure shared understanding, mutual trust and confidence, and unity of effort between U.S. Army units
and joint forces. Units conducting multinational operations explicitly address solutions to enable effective
information sharing and task execution. Common best practices for effective interoperability, regardless of
mission type or forces involved, include—
• Designation of a mission partner coordinator reporting directly to the commander and chief of staff
responsible to—
▪ Measure progress towards interoperability.
▪ Develop interoperability plans of action and milestones.
▪ Collaborate with mission partners regarding the plans of action and milestones.
▪ Coordinate and integrate staff section activities to meet plans of action and milestone objectives.
• Identification and requisition of resources related to interoperability.
• Early and routine collaboration with mission partners when developing, implementing, and
assessing interoperability solutions. Such solutions can include a MPN, common processes, KM
planning, and multinational organizations.
• Documented, updated, and published plans directly related to interoperability—such as joining,
membership, and exiting instructions (JMEI), MPN plan and architecture, and KM plan—that
ensure shared understanding as dynamic plans change.
• Establishment of key multinational organizations to support planning, implementing, and
continually assessing the MPN, coalition common operational picture (COP), appropriate
multinational advanced-analytics cells supporting artificial intelligence, advanced analytics, other
information sharing, and decision support functions that depend on effective interoperability.
INTEGRATED INTEROPERABILITY PURPOSE
2-22. Interoperability requirements add complexity to the operations process. Integrated interoperability
involves the commander and staff adding to and integrating with, but not replacing, the activities associated
with planning, preparation, execution, and assessment for a given multinational mission or operation.
Commanders and staffs identify and address interoperability considerations to enable shared understanding,
mutual trust and confidence, and unity of effort across a synchronized multinational force. Leaders adapt to
changing circumstances throughout the operations process. Chapter 3 discusses additional considerations and
desired outcomes specifically for planning in multinational operations.
PLAN
2-23. Planning for interoperability begins with receipt of mission directing the unit to conduct an operation
with one or more multinational partners. Planning continues within the seven steps of the military decision-
making process (known as the MDMP) to orders production, dissemination, and transition. Key planning
considerations for effective interoperability, regardless of mission type or forces involved, include—
• Commander and staff of U.S. units collaborate with designated mission partners after receipt of
mission for a multinational operation or exercise.
• Based on commander’s intent and guidance, U.S. and mission partner staff collaborate to develop a
shared understanding of interoperable processes and associated information-sharing requirements.
• Staff and liaison officers develop, implement, and exchange plans to help develop effective technical
and procedural interoperability solutions.
• Staff plans for effective preparation, execution, and assessment of interoperability considerations.
PREPARE
2-24. Preparation normally begins during planning and continues into execution by units. Preparation helps
the force transition from planning to execution. Like other activities of the operations process, commanders
drive preparation activities with a focus on leading and assessing. Team building is essential during
multinational operations. Commanders ensure all units are treated and exposed equally regardless of national
background. All participants perceive missions as appropriate, achievable, and equitable in burden and risk
sharing. Multinational partners should be included in planning. Their opinions about the type of mission
assignment for their units are important. Planning staffs ensure they understand all national caveats.
Commanders consider national caveats based on legal and policy constraints when assigning missions and
tasks to members. All plans and operations consider these caveats. |
3-16 | 24 | Chapter 2
2-25. As part of preparation, commanders, units, and Soldiers perform activities. While the unit may perform
many preparation activities concurrently, it schedules some preparation activities sequentially. For example,
a unit conducts required individual training for new system operators prior to rehearsals with these systems.
Unit leaders determine specific preparation requirements, activity relationships, and schedules during
planning. Preparation activities critical to successful multinational operations include the following:
• Coordinate and establish liaison. Units train and deploy liaison elements (such as embedded staff,
exchanged staff, or liaison officers) to provide functional expertise to assist mission partner
commanders and staffs during all phases of the operations process.
• Complete task organization. The multinational force completes planned task organization based on
mission analysis and limitations. Mission analysis reveals the operation plan, mission partner
capabilities, and mission partner limitations. The coalition command structure imposes authorities
and relationships.
• Integrate new units and Soldiers. All units include integration activities in the preparation phase of
the operations process with emphasis on team building. This integration enables shared
understanding of coalition-wide—
▪ Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).
▪ SOPs.
▪ KM.
▪ ROE.
▪ Other relevant common plans and orders that affect unit operations.
• Train. Units conduct individual and collective training to build proficiency in integration. Units train
to integrate multinational facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, and personnel.
Proficiency enables effective C2 systems, applications, and common processes and activities (such
as battle rhythm events, reporting, tactical tasks, and maintaining the coalition COP).
• Perform pre-operations checks and inspections. In preparation for multinational operations,
commanders and staff ensure subordinate units and mission partners have trained, rehearsed, and
are prepared to execute operations at the desired level of interoperability.
• Initiate network preparations. Partner nations collaboratively develop network, cyberspace defense,
data, and common services standards reflected in the JMEI and implemented in the MPN. Partner
nations develop and implement data standards as documented in the KM plan. Partner nations test
and validate the network.
• Conduct rehearsals. Multinational units rehearse concept drills, tactical exercises without troops,
communications exercises, staff exercises, and other collective training with mission partners. These
rehearsals improve task proficiency and shared understanding of the scheme of maneuver and
associated TTP and SOPs.
• Revise and refine the plan. Units integrate, train, and rehearse with mission partners to build
understanding of an operational environment, mutual capabilities and limitations, and
interoperability gaps and shortcomings. The resulting understanding helps units revise and refine
operation plans and interoperability solutions.
EXECUTE
2-26. Effective execution is enabled by units seizing the initiative through action and commanders who
accept risk to exploit opportunities. A staff supports the commander by building knowledge and shared
understanding and by enabling rapid decision making and synchronization. Effective interoperability
supports effective execution which will—
• Enable information flow to support the commander’s visualization and decision making.
• Provide collaborative tools and processes to encourage staff synchronization, rapid planning, and
implementation with all mission partners.
• Improve subordinate decision making and reduce reaction time through shared understanding of the
commander’s intent and mission with all mission partners.
• Minimize C2 risks, gaps, and shortcomings during execution of multinational operations.
2-27. Unit leaders ensure mission partners have the same understanding of graphic control measures,
especially changes, during execution. Graphic control measures can include fire support coordination lines,
unit boundaries, and coordination points. The KM plan provides the process and procedure for changes to |
3-16 | 25 | Command and Control During Multinational Operations
orders, to include graphic control measures. The lead nation headquarters sends alerts for changes to orders,
plans, processes, or graphics to all mission partners. Alerts can include chat text messages, email
notifications, and alerts in the appropriate running estimates and commander updates.
2-28. Common services enable improved information flow and shared understanding of a situation.
Commander updates, while still based on the commander’s preference, focus on decision making and shared
understanding of the current and future situations. These updates do not focus on sharing routine information
available in running estimates or other easily accessed KM products.
2-29. A single COP coordination cell effectively and efficiently builds and maintains a quality coalition COP.
The COP coordination cell has representatives from each mission partner. It also has the ability and
responsibility to monitor, correct, and report issues between the coalition COP (published over the MPN)
and national COPs. The COP coordination cell provides a status of the coalition COP in relation to a national
COP. Shared status increases mission partner trust and confidence during execution.
ASSESS
2-30. The interoperability assessment plan guides interoperability assessment. Staffs develop the plan during
planning, and they rehearse and revise the plan during the preparation phase. The assessment plan includes
key measures selected to inform progress against desired levels of interoperability and mission critical
interoperability requirements. For example, if a commander wants to achieve integrated interoperability in
C2 with all mission partners, then the commander establishes a COP coordination cell. An identified mission
critical interoperability requirement to achieve a level 3 is a coalition COP. Measures selected to assess this
requirement include COP accuracy, timeliness, and completeness. To consolidate monitoring and evaluation
of these measures, the commander establishes a COP coordination cell staffed with network, data, and KM
subject matter experts representing all mission partners. Staffs include COP coordination cell assessments in
a running estimate. The assessments are included with the overall assessment of the coalition COP.
Interoperability assessment consists of the following activities:
• Monitoring the current situation, with a focus on the mission critical interoperability requirements
and achieved levels of interoperability between mission partners and across warfighting functions.
• Evaluating the progress toward achieving desired levels of interoperability and meeting mission
critical interoperability requirements. This evaluation uses an interoperability running estimate,
commander updates, or other commander-directed information sharing to determine and report root
causes.
• Directing changes to address interoperability gaps or challenges and improve established process
and coordination.
MONITOR
2-31. The interoperability assessment plan defines responsibilities. This plan identifies a mission partner
coordination center, other designated staff element, or leader as the overall lead for interoperability
assessment. This lead conducts monitoring and aggregates monitoring results from other staff elements and
commands to develop an accurate and complete picture of the current interoperability situation.
2-32. Functional and special staffs identify and report any information flow, procedural, or other
interoperability issues. Staffs monitor established processes, such as the military decision-making process or
KM, for indicators that can be used to determine the extent to which interoperability has been achieved with
mission partners. Indicators, often described as measures of performance and measures of effectiveness, are
key to effective assessments. Measures of performance related to interoperability may include the number of
mission partner staff officers participating in a planning group or the number and placement of liaison officers
between headquarters. Measures of effectiveness related to interoperability may consist of the time required
for mission partners to answer a request for information or provide intelligence in a common database.
2-33. Staff or special organizations are assigned assessment responsibilities for specific interoperability
capabilities. Examples include common services assessments and a coalition network operations and security
center that is responsible for the network. |
3-16 | 26 | Chapter 2
EVALUATE
2-34. The interoperability assessment lead—supported by staff, mission partners, and special
organizations—analyzes the current situation for trends, evaluates root causes for emerging interoperability
issues, and aggregates key indicators into an overall assessment for each mission critical interoperability
requirement. The interoperability running estimate or other reporting mechanism provides the commander,
staff, and mission partners with the current interoperability situation across echelons by mission critical
interoperability requirements.
RECOMMEND
2-35. Designated staff elements implement corrective actions within their functional area or area of
responsibility. Examples include making minor adjustments to a staff battle drill or SOP; modifying network
protocols to improve throughput, connectivity, or security; or augmenting a theater liaison detachment (TLD)
during execution to provide additional required capabilities or capacity. Staff elements communicate any
changes to all mission partners to ensure shared understanding and adaptation to the corrective action.
2-36. Designated staff elements submit major changes as recommendations to the commander. Major
changes affect interoperability or operation plans, or they require actions that may affect operation plans,
scheme of maneuver, or commander’s intent. Staffs submit major changes to a commander with sufficient
information to support the decision-making process.
DIRECT
2-37. Informed by their staffs, commanders use the interoperability assessment to direct changes to resources,
priorities, processes, and authorities to address identified interoperability challenges and improve integration
with mission partners. Substantial changes may warrant the development of a revised interoperability
assessment plan with new indicators to inform subsequent assessment.
STRUCTURES FOR MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS
2-38. All multinational operations have two chains of command regardless of structure or authority. The first
is the multinational chain of command constructed by the UN, alliance, or coalition. The second chain of
command is a national chain of command extending back to the national capitals of the nations involved.
2-39. The UN has three types of operations:
• Operations under the command of the UN reported to the Secretary General. The Security Council
sets the mandate for these operations in a resolution. The Secretary General manages and supervises
the execution of the mandate.
• Operations conducted by a coalition of willing states authorized by the UN. The coalition remains
under the command of a lead state or regional organization and reports to its national or alliance
chain of command. The Security Council that allows the coalition to achieve its specified mission
authorizes these operations.
• Hybrid operations. The UN force operates with a force from another country without any formal
C2.
2-40. Alliances, UN forces, and coalitions create a command structure that meets the needs, diplomatic
realities, constraints, and objectives of the participating nations. Since no single command structure fits the
needs of all alliances, UN, and coalitions, several different command structures evolved. Paragraphs 2-41
through 2-51 describe four types of command structures:
• Lead nation.
• Parallel.
• Integrated (discussed with reference to alliances).
• Combination (discussed with reference to coalitions).
2-41. Command structures of alliances and coalitions are organized along these lines. Some situations exist
when these structures do not apply. Coalitions normally form as a rapid response to unforeseen crises. The
nature of the coalition (for example, whether it is based on a UN mandate or common agreement among
countries) determines the type of command structure. Political agendas of each nation participating in the
coalition influence the nature of the coalition itself. |
3-16 | 27 | Command and Control During Multinational Operations
Note. Some nations use the term “framework nation” instead of “lead nation.”
LEAD NATION COMMAND STRUCTURE
2-42. The lead nation command structure recognizes that one nation has the lead role and its C2 authority
has primacy during the conduct of operations. (See Figure 2-2 for a sample command structure.) Normally,
the lead nation is the country that provides the largest number of forces and most resources for that operation.
An example of a lead nation command structure is the NATO International Security Assistance Force (known
as ISAF) operation in Afghanistan. In this example, the United States deployed the largest number of forces,
supplied the most resources, and was the lead nation among the 50 troop contributing nations.
2-43. The lead nation determines the appropriate C2 procedures and works closely with the other partner
nations. It provides specific equipment and software to a national component headquarters of other nations
when feasible. Other nations provide appropriate liaison personnel to the lead nation headquarters. Robust
liaison is aligned in function and level of expertise. Such liaison is essential to develop and maintain unity of
effort in coalition operations. It often is key to addressing procedural and human gaps in interoperability
within functional and staff areas.
2-44. Staff augmentation from other national contingents supplements a lead nation staff depending on the
size, complexity, and duration of the operation. This augmentation ensures that a lead nation headquarters
represents the entire coalition. Such augmentation includes designated deputies or assistant commanders,
planners, and logisticians. This facilitates planning by providing the coalition commander with a source of
expertise on coalition members. Augmentation is required if a coalition partner possesses specific
organizations or capabilities not found in lead nation forces.
Figure 2-2. Lead nation command structure
PARALLEL COMMAND STRUCTURE
2-45. The parallel command structure is an alternative to the lead nation command structure. No single
coalition commander exists under this structure. The multinational leaders coordinate among the participants
to attain unity of effort. This is not the preferred structure because of the absence of a single coalition
commander and lack of unity of command. (See Figure 2-3 on page 18 for depiction of parallel command
structure.) |
3-16 | 28 | Chapter 2
Figure 2-3. Parallel command structure
INTEGRATED COMMAND STRUCTURE
2-46. In an alliance, a coalition-mandated operation, or a UN-mandated operation, the entire staff comprises
an integrated command structure. The deputy commander and each primary staff officer could be a different
nationality. Subordinate commands and staffs integrate to the lowest echelon necessary to accomplish the
mission. (See Figure 2-4 that illustrates an integrated command structure.)
2-47. Using an integrated command structure in an alliance provides unity of command. The NATO
command structure is a good example of an integrated command structure. In Europe, NATO has allied
command operations, also known as Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe. It has a commander from
one of the member nations. NATO nation members are a part of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers,
Europe staff. This integration also occurs among the subordinate commands and staffs several levels below
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe.
2-48. An integrated alliance command structure has—
• A single designated commander.
• A staff comprised of representatives from all member nations. |
3-16 | 29 | Command and Control During Multinational Operations
Figure 2-4. Integrated command structure
2-49. Another example of a standing integrated command structure is NATO’s Europe Command Allied
Rapid Reaction Corps (known as ARRC). The Allied Rapid Reaction Corps has characteristics of a lead
nation command structure. Figure 2-5 on page 20 illustrates an integrated command structure with lead nation
command structure characteristics. The United Kingdom provides most of the framework of the headquarters
structure and 60 percent of the overall staff. It is an integrated command structure because the primary staff
members are different nationalities. (For example, the assistant chief of staff, operations [G-3] is a U.S.
brigadier general.) The entire staff is integrated, and 15 partner nations contribute the remaining personnel.
The Allied Rapid Reaction Corps’ two subordinate divisions—the multinational division (central) and the
multinational division (south)—are also integrated. Other NATO nations provide forces for specific
operations as the mission dictates. One U.S. division coordinates with the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps in
peacetime for planning and training. |
3-16 | 30 | Chapter 2
Figure 2-5. Integrated with lead nation command structure
2-50. Another example of a standing integrated command structure is the Combined Forces Command,
Korea. This integrated command structure has evolved over years of cooperation between the United States
and the Republic of Korea. The Combined Forces Command staff and the staff of its subordinate ground
component command are fully integrated.
COMBINATION COMMAND STRUCTURE
2-51. The lead nation concept and a parallel command structure can exist simultaneously in a coalition. This
combination command structure occurs when two or more nations are the controlling elements for a mix of
international forces. This structure is more desirable than the parallel command structure. An effort to achieve
a total lead nation command structure for unity of command is preferred to achieve more efficient C2 during
a multinational operation.
PURPOSE OF COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
2-52. The Army has doctrinal definitions for command relationships. Those are the same definitions used by
the joint community and listed in the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. However, as a
member of NATO, the United States agrees to NATO definitions for command relationships. The NATO
definitions differ from the U.S. definitions. Additionally, Combined Forces Command directives define
specific command relationships between the Republic of Korea armed forces and U.S. Forces, Korea.
Commanders understand how each nation defines command relationships to operate in multinational
operations. Multinational force commanders understand what they can and cannot do with forces from each
troop contributing nation. (For a further explanation of the U.S. view of command authority, refer to JP 3-16.)
2-53. To provide an understanding of some of the issues involved in the different aspects of command
authority, see Table 2-1. It illustrates command authorities in NATO definitions. Allied doctrine requires the
national authority to always retain full command authority. |
3-16 | 31 | Command and Control During Multinational Operations
Table 2-1. Comparison of command authorities
Authority Full NATO NATO NATO NATO
command operational operational tactical tactical
command control command control
Direct authority to deal with nations, X
diplomatic missions, and agencies
Granted to a command X X
Delegated to a command X X X
Set chain of command to forces X
Assign mission and designate objective X X
Assign tasks X X X
Direct and employ forces X X X
Establish maneuver control measures X X X X X
Reassign forces X X
Retain operational control X X
Delegate operational control X X X
Assign tactical command X
Delegate tactical command X X X
Retain tactical control X X X
Deploy force (information and within theater) X X X
Local direction and control designated forces X X
Assign separate employment of unit X X
components
Directive authority for logistics X
Direct joint training X
Assign and reassign subordinate commanders X
and officers
Conduct internal discipline and training X
The national authority always retains FULL COMMAND by allied doctrine.
Has this authority
Denied authority or not specifically granted
PURPOSE OF OTHER COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
2-54. Different command relationships have different purposes. Paragraphs 2-55 through 2-78 list operations
and their purposes for use. Other command relationships include—
• Allied operations.
• UN operations.
• Multinational forces control.
• Agency cooperation and coordination.
ALLIED OPERATIONS
2-55. Allied operations provide integration among subordinate commands and staffs several levels down.
Allied operations rely on NATO doctrine to frame operations. (For NATO operations, refer to AJP-01.)
Commanders and staffs use this publication at the operational level; however, commanders and staffs at any
level can use it as a reference. Although NATO forces primarily use AJP-01, the doctrine is instructive and
provides a useful framework for operations conducted by a coalition of NATO, partners, non-NATO nations,
and other organizations. |
3-16 | 32 | Chapter 2
2-56. Although the ABCANZ Armies Program is not a formal alliance nor has an ABCANZ force ever been
employed, these armies have invested decades of research and collaboration to develop and update agreed-
to standards to enable interoperability. In developing interoperability SOPs, units use available ABCANZ
standards as their source material. Sometimes they use another source if the unit is subordinate to a combatant
command with specific interoperability guidance and agreed-to standards (such as United States Army,
Europe and Africa Command [known as USAREUR-AF] aligned to NATO STANAGs or U.S. Eighth Army
in Korea).
UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS
2-57. In UN operations, a single commander employs the force. The Secretary General appoints the force
commander with the consent of the UN Security Council. The force commander reports to the UN Secretary
General or a special representative and has wide discretionary powers over day-to-day operations. The force
commander refers all policy matters to the UN Secretary General or special representative to resolve.
2-58. Most national authorities that provide forces to multinational operations assign national forces under
operational control of the multinational force commander. A smaller nation commits its force’s operational
control to a larger force. The larger force is then under the multinational force commander’s operational
control. Caveats qualify these forces from the respective nations according to national policies. The
multinational force commander’s additional assignments to Service component commanders in an
operational control status are subject to approval by the respective national governments.
2-59. The parent national commander retains the command less operational control of the national forces.
The designated national commander of the respective nations in the multinational force exercises this
command less operational control. The multinational commander and national commanders discuss and
clarify their mutual understanding of the command authorities they receive. This clarification ensures they
share a common understanding of those authorities. It also precludes potential misunderstandings.
2-60. For Army forces, the U.S. commander retains command over all assigned U.S. forces in multinational
operations. The U.S. chain of command runs from the President through a combatant commander to a U.S.
national commander. The chain of command, from the President to the lowest U.S. commander in the field,
remains inviolate.
MULTINATIONAL FORCES CONTROL
2-61. Liaison networks and coordination centers improve control of multinational forces. Liaison officers
come from the major troop contributing nations, close allies who routinely communicate directly with U.S.
and other regional commanders, and the multinational operations commander. Meetings, boards, and
conferences help integrate operations in the multinational force. Effective liaison networks are vital in any
coalition. Differences in doctrine, organization, training, equipment, and national law demand a robust liaison
structure to facilitate multinational operations. The use of the liaison networks is an invaluable human and
procedural dimension tool and a significant source of information for the coalition staff and commander.
Liaison Network
2-62. Regardless of the command structure, effective liaison is vital in any multinational force. Using a
liaison proves invaluable to build confidence between the multinational force and subordinate commands. It
also—
• Fosters a better understanding of mission and tactics.
• Facilitates the transfer of vital information.
• Enhances mutual trust.
• Develops an increased level of teamwork.
2-63. A liaison supplies significant information for the multinational force headquarters about subordinate
force readiness, training, and other factors. Early liaison establishment reduces the fog and friction caused
by incompatible communications systems, doctrine, and operating procedures. Units should provide only the
best officers and noncommissioned officers as liaison officers because their quality directly affects operations
and perceptions about Army forces. |
3-16 | 33 | Command and Control During Multinational Operations
2-64. The command and its higher headquarters, adjacent units, supporting and attached forces, and other
appropriate host-nation and intergovernmental organizations establish their liaisons early. For U.S. forces,
liaison with the American Ambassador if there is one, is essential.
2-65. The commander identifies and requests liaison personnel early. The request includes specific
qualifications. Differences in doctrine, organization, training, and equipment among the multinational nations
demand a hardier liaison structure to facilitate operations than in a national force. Liaison teams cover many
functions on a 24-hour basis. Such coverage requires more liaison personnel than a force normally has
assigned. Liaison personnel need equipment compatible with the multinational force.
2-66. Liaison personnel understand the capabilities and limitations of parent units and nations, including the
structure, capabilities, weapon systems, logistics, and planning methods employed and their national
interests. Whether personnel are language qualified or have interpreter support, they understand the language
and culture of the multinational headquarters to which they are attached. This ensures successful liaison
operations. However, professional knowledge and functional expertise are far more important. Officers who
have participated in schools and training with other multinational nations or have experience in multinational
operations may provide this expertise. Mission success requires careful selection of liaison officers who are
Army professionals in competence, character, and commitment. The sending command provides liaison
teams with knowledge of the doctrine, organization, materiel, and language of multinational partners and an
understanding of appropriate regional information. Liaison officers assigned to the multinational force
headquarters influence decision making. These officers also possess the authority to answer routine
multinational force queries on behalf of their commands.
2-67. Once liaison is established, liaison teams directly represent their respective commanders. They advise,
help, coordinate, and monitor their commands. The liaison teams attend briefings and maintain close contact
with the multinational operations center. However, the command they become a part of does not formally
task their sending unit through the liaison officer. Formal tasking occurs through normal C2 channels.
2-68. The commander determines whether to integrate multinational liaison personnel into the staff of the
multinational force. When integration creates a more effective organization, the multinational force
establishes an orientation program for all liaison personnel. The multinational personnel reception center
performs this requirement. The multinational force determines what staff officer or staff section is responsible
for liaison personnel reporting to the headquarters. Commanders need to identify personnel liaison
requirements early during the planning process and staff accordingly.
2-69. Effective liaison is vital in any coalition. Differences in doctrine, organization, training, equipment,
and national law could demand a robust liaison structure to facilitate operations. Liaison training should
include areas of doctrine, organization, culture, and language. Not only is the use of liaison an invaluable
human and procedural dimension tool, but it is also a significant source of information for the coalition staff
and commander.
Coordination Centers
2-70. Commands provide training in coordination centers to all units or individuals that receive liaison
equipment support to other nations. Training covers liaison capabilities and limitations, employment
considerations, support requirements, onboarding, and planning processes.
2-71. Special operations forces are effective during multinational operations as liaison officers or liaison
teams. Their language capabilities, cultural and customs training, and experience working and training with
another country’s militaries qualify them to improve coordination and communication. Special operations
forces may be useful as liaison during escalation and de-escalation of conflict due to preexisting relationships.
However, commanders use special operations forces judiciously in any enduring role. Special operations
forces are limited in numbers and usually have operational control retained at the joint force command level.
With these attributes, special operations forces are often subject to rapid and frequent retasking and should
usually not be the primary means for maintaining liaison.
2-72. TLDs are assigned to select Army Service component commands. These detachments allow an Army
commander to conduct liaison with subordinate, parallel, or higher joint and multinational headquarters in an
operational area. These detachments have 30 functional staff experts in logistics, intelligence, airspace
management, maneuver, and fires. These experts provide advice and assistance to supported units and ensure |
3-16 | 34 | Chapter 2
rapid and accurate coordination among headquarters. TLDs have organic transportation and Army computer
systems. These detachments receive communications support from Army theater signal units. Qualified
linguists and interpreters with specific language capabilities augment TLDs. Digital liaison may be able to
augment procedural aspects of staff functions even in areas where digital augmentation is not desired or
necessary. In the Republic of Korea, two TLDs coordinate the specific U.S. aspects of combat, information,
protection, and logistics support for the Combined Forces Command. (Refer to ATP 3-94.1 for additional
details on TLDs.)
MULTINATIONAL BOARDS, BUREAUS, CELLS, CENTERS, AND WORKING GROUPS
2-73. The multinational commander and staff determine early in the planning process the multinational
boards, bureaus, cells, centers, or working groups and operational planning teams (known as OPTs). The
commander and staff assess requirements for effectively integrating task execution and the associated critical
information from across warfighting functions to avoid isolating information functions. Based on purpose
and responsibilities, these staff cells and centers may integrate UAPs and national C2 information systems
within the lead nation’s command post. Or these staff cells and centers may send out liaisons to UAPs to
develop and maintain relationships and communications supporting shared understanding, trust, confidence,
and unity of effort among partners.
Coalition Network Operations Security Center
2-74. Effective network operations (known as NETOPS) provide consistent performance in the MPN. A
critical component for network operations in an MPE is standing up a coalition network operations and
security center (CNOSC). This includes setting a network staff with national C2 information systems
provided by network contributing partners. The C2 information systems aid in establishing, operating, and
troubleshooting the MPN. MPN operations include monitoring national networks to identify impacts to the
network, assisting the COP coordination cell in producing the multinational (sometimes called coalition)
COP, and helping mission partners meet JMEI requirements. Integrating the CNOSC with the joint network
operations control center (or similar C2 group) helps avoid unnecessary duplication of effort in a mission
partner operation. (Refer to ATP 6-02.61 for more information on the CNOSC.)
Coordination Cell
2-75. The COP coordination cell includes representatives from each multinational partner with the ability
and responsibility to monitor, correct, and report issues between the coalition COP (published over the MPN)
and national COPs. The COP coordination cell, like the CNOSC, is a requirement for a lead nation
headquarters conducting mission partner operations. The COP coordination cell operates as an effective and
efficient method for building and maintaining a quality coalition COP. The COP coordination cell provides
a status of the coalition COP in relation to each national picture, which increases multinational partner trust
and confidence during execution. (Refer to ATP 6-02.61 for more information on the COP coordination cell.)
2-76. Commanders establish various centers that enhance C2 at each echelon. Commanders in multinational
operations integrate allies, coalition partners, interagency organizations, and intergovernmental organizations
into a variety of centers within a multinational command. Member nations provide liaison officers familiar
with their nations’ activities, and they integrate, coordinate, and synchronize multinational operations by
function. Multinational commanders integrate multinational staff into various centers to enhance control,
such as the operations center, fire direction center, and numerous sustainment operations centers. Joint
intelligence operations centers may be difficult to integrate due to intelligence sharing permissions and
authorities. The joint deployment and distribution center (known as JDDC) is a critical coordination center
that liaisons integrate with to obtain coalition sustainment support. Coalition partners provide liaisons to the
joint movement center to synchronize priorities of movement among coalition partners.
2-77. A multinational commander, operating under a parallel command structure, must establish a
coordination center to integrate, coordinate, and synchronize operations with parallel commands. The
coordination center allows for parallel commands executing independent operations to coordinate their
activities while exercising independent C2. Parallel command structures are discouraged. (Refer to JP 3-16
for more on parallel command structures.) |
3-16 | 35 | Command and Control During Multinational Operations
AGENCY COOPERATION AND COORDINATION
2-78. Multinational force commanders focus on cooperation and coordination rather than C2 when dealing
with most nonmilitary agencies. These agencies have their own purpose with missions and goals. Coalition
commanders have a limited ability to influence these agencies’ actions. Commanders seek agency
cooperation to ensure that they accomplish the mission and achieve the end state while allowing these
agencies to do the same. Agency cooperation also requires that each agency and multinational force staff
coordinate to prevent interference in one another’s missions. A civil-military operations center is one way of
achieving cooperation and coordination with nonmilitary agencies. The civil-military operations center
provides a single point of contact between agencies and the commander.
PURPOSE OF MULTINATIONAL FORCE STAFFING
2-79. The multinational staff organization is based on the option used to form the headquarters, either the
lead-nation concept or a composite headquarters. The commander has a choice if the establishing authority
designates an organization. If the establishing authority uses the lead-nation concept, the lead nation’s
doctrine assigns the commander and staff’s duties. The doctrine is modified as necessary for the specific
situation. If the establishing authority uses a composite headquarters, the commander and staff specify duties
in more detail. A composite headquarters combines national capabilities from participating nations into a
deployable multinational headquarters, specifically designed for commanding task-organized formations.
This approach provides participating nations with a capability that exceeds the sum of their individual
national contributions. The multinational functions’ names change based on sensitivities when working with
organizations such as the UN.
2-80. Appropriate members in key positions from each country that provide forces are a part of the
multinational staff. These positions stem from the mission and type of operations conducted. Multinational
commanders look at force composition as it applies to capabilities, limitations, and required support. The
importance of knowing, trusting, and quickly reaching a comfort level with staff members makes it desirable
for the multinational commander to choose members of the staff such as the G-3 or S-3.
2-81. When mission requirements exceed staff capabilities, the commander requests the necessary personnel,
facilities, and equipment from either the national chain of command or the multinational force’s establishing
authorities. These commands and authorities have experts prepared to augment a multinational force to assist
in the early stages of organization and planning. The staff includes experienced operators for C2 information
systems who establish a trusted COP, procedures, and overall information fusion. Personnel nominated to fill
multinational augmentation billets possess the following attributes:
• Knowledge, confidence, and forcefulness.
• Professionalism, character, and commitment.
• Preparedness to represent their nations and units.
• An understanding that they are the de facto national subject matter experts.
• An ability to work as part of a multinational force without national parochialism.
2-82. The command establishes a staff orientation program to ensure that all individuals joining the staff
become familiar with their surroundings. Establishing a multinational personnel reception center under the
assistant chief of staff is accomplished by the adjutant general-personnel (G-1) or S-1. The buddy system is
another program that the command establishes with the reception center or by itself. This system assigns an
experienced staff member to a new staff member to help with familiarization.
MULTINATIONAL FORCE COMMANDER
2-83. The multinational force commander is responsible to the member nations to accomplish the mission.
The following responsibilities are a guide. Commanders adapt these responsibilities to the specific mission
and forces assigned:
• Exercise control over assigned and attached forces. The commander determines when to transfer
forces to the multinational force operational control or tactical control.
• Develop an operation order or campaign plan in the planning guidelines as directed by the
establishing authorities. |
3-16 | 36 | Chapter 2
• Make recommendations to the establishing authorities on the proper use of assigned and attached
forces for mission accomplishment. This includes identifying requirements for additional forces.
• Request supplemental ROE needed to accomplish the mission.
• Establish combat identification measures.
• Notify establishing authorities when prepared to assume responsibility for an area of operations
(AO).
• Ensure cross-nation support.
• Ensure the force operates as an effective, mutually supporting multinational force.
• Determine the requirement for and provide guidance on establishing the necessary boards, centers,
and bureaus (such as multinational visitor’s bureau or multinational movement center).
• Define the subordinate AOs for each subordinate force, including special operations forces. The
commander—
▪ Ensures accurate accountability of forces deployed.
▪ Monitors the operational situation and maintains daily contact with the establishing authorities.
▪ Coordinates with forces and agencies not assigned or attached, including friendly forces and
governments, multinational nation agencies, or nongovernmental or intergovernmental
organizations.
▪ Builds a cohesive team, including nongovernmental organizations, intergovernmental
organizations, and others.
DEPUTY MULTINATIONAL FORCE COMMANDER
2-84. Normally, the deputy commander is from a different country than the commander. The selection is
based on the mission or the number and type of forces in the multinational force. The deputy usually is of
equal or senior rank to the subordinate force commanders. The deputy possesses a broad understanding of
the operation. The deputy performs special duties as directed by the commander. Examples of these duties
include—
• Chairing committees.
• Coordinating with liaison personnel.
• Coordinating for incoming and outgoing requirements.
• Coordinating interagency requirements.
• Acting in the commander's behalf when the commander is not available or otherwise engaged.
CHIEF OF STAFF
2-85. In most cases, the chief of staff comes from the same country or command as the commander. Because
the staff has officers from different nations, the chief of staff places special emphasis on training,
coordinating, and directing the staff’s work. The chief of staff establishes routine procedures to ensure
necessary coordination and reviews staff actions for completeness and clarity.
Assistant Chief of Staff, Adjutant General-Personnel (G-1)
2-86. The G-1 is the principal staff assistant to the commander on human resources support. The
multinational G-1 considers differences in requirements and procedures that impact personnel management.
The G-1 is responsible for human resources support to include finance and religious ministry. Some areas
that may significantly impact planning and operations include rotation policies, tour lengths, and expected
surges or reductions in personnel based on rotation policies of participating nations. The multinational G-1
also advises the multinational commander on critical shortages for the coalition and specified requirements
for key multinational force enablers such as liaisons, linguists, special documentation, requirements for
travel, and other comprehensive human resource requirements.
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence (G-2)
2-87. The G-2 is the principal staff assistant to the commander for intelligence support. The multinational
G-2 considers differences in requirements and procedures that impact intelligence collection, analysis,
production, and dissemination. The G-2 is responsible for intelligence capabilities, understanding staff and
policy limitations, and information sharing procedures for each nation represented in the multinational force. |
3-16 | 37 | Command and Control During Multinational Operations
Understanding the capabilities and limitations of intelligence operations greatly enhances the G-2 staff’s
ability to produce a timely and accurate intelligence COP. Additional considerations for the G-2 include—
• Managing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) allocation and collection.
• Managing, planning, and maintaining releasable information.
• Developing and answering commander’s critical information requirements.
Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations (G-3)
2-88. The G-3 is the principal staff assistant to the commander for operations. The multinational G-3s have
knowledge of separate and combined capabilities and limitations of multinational forces. G-3s also
understand key differences of multinational forces that inform operational risk. The multinational G-3
considers the following:
• The examination of ROE to ensure collective understanding of and usability by all forces.
• The appropriate method to share information that works with national caveats and authorities.
• The suitability of missions and assignment.
• COP content and timing requirements.
• The implications resulting from differences of national and administrative boundaries relative to
historical events and cultural boundaries.
• The required density, location, and available redundancy of liaisons and interpreters.
(See Chapter 3 for details on operations.)
Assistant Chief of Staff, Logistics (G-4)
2-89. Planning and preparation considerations in multinational operations are extensive and may prove
particularly challenging if overlooked. Early identification of agreements for sharing and the roles between
the nations and forces involved is paramount. Like all other staff functional areas, considering differences in
logistics capabilities, requirements, and limitations can inform operational and strategic risks and
opportunities. All national forces can execute operations to meet the commander’s stated interoperability
objectives, support the concept of operations, understand supporting information exchange requirements, and
understand related management processes. Key areas the G-4 or S-4 considers:
• National caveats related to the contracting, transport, accounting, use, and sharing of logistics
requirements.
• Differences in the capability and availability of supply chain mechanisms.
• Differences in mortuary affairs processes.
• Equipment maintenance times and recovery requirements.
• Differences in national environmental policies.
• Fuel quality requirements.
(See Chapter 5 for sustainment challenges.)
Assistant Chief of Staff, Plans (G-5)
2-90. The assistant chief of staff, plans (G-5) is the principal staff officer for planning operations for the mid-
to long-range planning horizons at division and higher echelons. The G-5, in conjunction with the G-3, has
staff planning and supervisory responsibility for integrating multinational partner capabilities, anticipating
and managing transitions, and managing bilateral and multilateral agreements within the multinational force
as the mission dictates. Early in the planning process, the G-5 balances the diverse set of capabilities and
limitations of the multinational force using the COP to assist with planning considerations across all staff
sections. To manage transitions effectively, the G-5 develops plans with inputs from multinational partners
and synchronizes plans through future operations and current operations to facilitate improved
interoperability throughout the operations process. (See Chapter 3 for planning challenges.)
Assistant Chief of Staff, Signal (G-6)
2-91. Signal staffs in multinational operations determine what communications and information systems are
contributed by each partner and their compatibility and interface with other components. The assistant chief |
3-16 | 38 | Chapter 2
of staff, signal (G-6) has a thorough knowledge of the network architecture. This officer effectively identifies
routing and connections to the enterprise-level network where required, planning for flexibility and
redundancy for the tactical MPN, and supporting operations through multiple classification channels.
Establishment of structures such as the CNOSC can assist in establishing and monitoring a diverse network.
Determining the type, level, redundancy, and location of subject matter expertise is often among the most
critical considerations. (Refer to JP 3-16 for details for establishing communications.)
Assistant Chief of Staff, Information Operations (G-39)
2-92. Contributing partners have varying information operations capabilities, understanding, doctrine, and
policies to coordinate, synchronize, and deconflict. The G-39 knows ways contributing partners define and
perceive information operations in general. This officer considers how applicable cultural lenses, similarities
and differences, and the way operations are conducted aid in developing common and integrated solutions
and risk management.
COMMANDER’S PERSONAL AND SPECIAL STAFFS
2-93. The commander’s personal and special staff groups includes the following:
• Political advisor.
• Translators and interpreters.
Political Advisor
2-94. Commanders routinely work directly with political authorities in the region. The commander
establishes a close, efficient, and effective relationship with the political advisor. The political advisor—
• Works with the commander and helps the national government create policies that meet
multinational objectives it can conduct.
• Acts as the principal contact with ambassadors and informs the appropriate diplomatic personnel of
multinational force plans in the AO.
• Supplies information about policy of the diplomatic agencies relevant to the operation.
Translators and Interpreters
2-95. Translators and interpreters are critical to multinational operations mission success. Communication
with the local populace and multinational forces is hindered without these professionals. Language barriers
cause difficulties when working with other armies and the host nation. Language problems make it difficult
to sustain a rapid decision cycle. Even common tasks such as sharing intelligence may require translation
before a commander shares it. This slows the development of plans and execution. Language capability
speeds command, reduces confusion, and contributes to mutual respect. Forces exchange command
information and other information to work together successfully. Few translators have the technical expertise
and depth of understanding to be fully understood while crossing both language and doctrinal boundaries.
2-96. Planners consider liaison officers, foreign area officers, and language-capable personnel to fill these
positions. Planners determine requirements for language-trained personnel early in the planning cycle.
Translators and interpreters are scarce and require a long lead time to deploy. These language-qualified
personnel require a training period to become familiar with technical terms and procedures of the
organization. Language is more than the direct translation of words. Word choice and mannerisms also
convey information.
2-97. Translator or interpreter requirements do not exist only in liaison teams or headquarters elements.
Stability operations and logistics functions need linguists or interpreters to coordinate with local authorities,
civilian transportation coordinators, dislocated civilian and relief centers, medical staffs, legal offices, and
local police forces. A military translator translates a foreign language into English within a command post,
while an interpreter interactively works to facilitate communication between a foreign party and a command
representative. Commanders consider the physical location for interpreters and functional support. Some
situations may require digital systems to assist with translating. Employing digital systems, operators can
provide face-to-face digital communication between mission partner representatives and speed of translation. |
3-16 | 39 | Command and Control During Multinational Operations
2-98. Translators differ from interpreters. The translator translates into English (one-directional translation),
whereas an interpreter fluently converts the communication into English from the foreign language and back
again. The interpreter’s linguistic capabilities as a two-directional translator depend on the quality of training
provided.
2-99. The time it takes to acquire and train enough translators and interpreters is significant and requires
support from the next higher national echelon. The staff conducts its initial joint task force mission analysis
and planning and identifies all linguist support requirements early in planning. Early planning ensures
availability and timeliness for deployment. (Refer to JP 3-33 for planning for linguists.)
2-100. Host-nation translators and interpreters are important for multinational operations. Vetted local
translators and interpreters are acceptable for many requirements. However, some sensitive positions require
military translators with appropriate security clearances. Host-nation personnel and members of the
multinational force need to trust each other. Without a means of establishing trust, multinational forces are
vulnerable.
COMMUNICATIONS
2-101. Communications are fundamental to successful multinational operations. It is important to prepare for
communications during planning. Mission analysis and assessment provide an opportunity for the
communications officer to identify communications requirements and evaluate in-country capabilities.
INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS
2-102. Commanders solve many communications issues with an equipment exchange and liaison teams.
Continual liaison among communications planners helps alleviate interoperability issues. Communications
requirements vary with the mission, composition, and geography of the AO. Interoperability is constrained
by the least technologically advanced nation. The multinational force addresses the need for integrated
communications among all forces early in the planning phase.
2-103. In a multinational force, a primary communications link is between the lead nation and the national
contingent headquarters. The ability for commanders, staffs, and subordinates to communicate with civilian
agencies across all operations is important. The lead nation and contingent headquarters consider
transitioning links to subsequent units, commercial communications, or to agencies such as the UN early in
an operation.
2-104. A multinational force plans for adequate communications to include using voice (secure and
nonsecure), data, and video teleconferencing. The force needs a deployable communications capability and
enough trained operators for sustained operations with multiple means of communications to avoid a single
point of failure. (For more details for communicating with foreign forces, refer to JP 3-16 and ATP 3-07.10.)
ADEQUATE EQUIPMENT
2-105. In addition to problems of compatibility and security, many units lack communications equipment to
meet mission requirements. During initial planning stages, planners identify communications requirements,
issues of spectrum management, and controls on access to information. Liaison teams, with adequate
communications equipment, reduce the severity of some problems. Effective communications planners
anticipate these requirements during initial planning, evaluate host-nation communications resources, and
integrate the requirements into JMEI, KM and IM plans, and the communications plan. The means available
need to satisfy operational requirements.
PURPOSE OF KNOWING EACH NATION’S CAPABILITIES
2-106. Each nation’s force has finite capabilities it can commit to a multinational operation. Each force’s
national representative knows those limitations for planning and integration.
NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVE INVOLVEMENT IN PLANNING
2-107. Representatives of each nation attend the planning. National representatives ensure that taskings fit
the abilities of the force. If a unit has a mission it cannot accomplish, the plan will not work. If possible, |
3-16 | 40 | Chapter 2
national representatives are available in each staff element. Effective representatives thoroughly understand
their nations’ capabilities and limitations.
INTEGRATION OF EACH NATION
2-108. Each member nation provides its own distinct units and capabilities to a multinational force. These
capabilities differ based on national interests, objectives, arms control limitations, doctrine, organization,
training, leader development, equipment, history, defense budget, and domestic politics. To integrate these
abilities into multinational operations, the member understands the differences in organization, abilities, and
doctrine. The more nations involved, the greater these differences will be for the multinational force.
2-109. Understanding these differences affects whether multinational operations succeed or fail. Units of the
same type in one nation’s army may not perform the same functions as units in another army. An engineer
unit in one army may have capabilities to build roads or buildings, while another army engineer unit may be
limited to laying out minefields or building defensive positions.
2-110. The commander of the multinational force integrates force capabilities to achieve the desired end
state. Selecting the right mix of capabilities is a challenge. The multinational staff understands the capabilities
and limitations of each nation in the multinational force when integrating units.
2-111. National forces operate using their own doctrine internally, while externally their actions conform to
the overall direction of the multinational force. To make this work, however, multinational commanders
consider doctrinal differences among the other nations. Liaison officers or augmentees and supplemental
staff officers help commanders understand differences, capabilities, and variations. When U.S. forces operate
with NATO or ABCANZ countries as part of a multinational military command, they follow the doctrine
and procedures embedded in U.S. doctrine from previously ratified STANAGs and ABCANZ standards. If
time permits, commanders study and understand the doctrine of NATO and multinational partners.
Nonetheless, nothing replaces knowing Army doctrine. Army doctrine comprises a part of NATO and
multinational doctrine in most instances. At a minimum, it is a framework to begin operations.
2-112. Conventional multinational force capabilities include the following assets and operations:
• Air and missile defense.
• Armor.
• Aviation.
• Engineering.
• Field artillery.
• Infantry.
• Intelligence.
• Medical.
• Military police.
• Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN).
• Translators.
• Interpreters.
• Ordnance.
• Personnel.
• Quartermaster.
• Signal.
• Transportation.
Multinational headquarters need to determine the requirements, capabilities, and dependencies of the forces
they will lead across all warfighting functions. These include information about aviation assets, logistics,
bases that enable operations, medical evacuation systems, and communications.
Security Force Assistance Brigades
2-113. The security force assistance brigades (SFABs) have the capacity and capability to advise, support,
liaise, and assess foreign security forces and their supporting institutions in support of theater security |
3-16 | 41 | Command and Control During Multinational Operations
cooperation objectives. The SFABs can conduct liaison activities in support of multinational operations
during large-scale combat and crisis operations in support of U.S. strategic objectives.
2-114. In many cases, a SFAB requires additional support. This could include intelligence, fires, and
protection. An effective multinational force commander clearly understands the support relationships for all
advisor teams within SFABs. The commander also recognizes an advisor team’s ability to expand combined
combat power, enable interoperability, enhance partner performance, and enhance situational awareness
through advise, support, liaise, and assess activities.
2-115. During competition and campaigning, each geographic combatant commander is allocated a persistent
SFAB force package. Conducting security cooperation activities under the threshold of armed conflict, a
SFAB often falls under operational and administrative control of the theater army. Operations inside an
established joint operations area give a multinational force commander significant authority and
responsibilities. The joint force commander assigns subordinate organizations to conduct military operations
in those AOs. The geographic combatant commander assigns tactical- or operational-level security force
assistance tasks to the SFAB. (Refer to ATP 3-96.1 for more information on SFABs.)
2-116. A SFAB works best when its higher headquarters, in coordination with the partnered nation or security
force, gives it objectives for developing or integrating forces. Usually, senior SFAB commanders receive
objectives through a tactical control relationship between themselves and their next higher headquarters. This
allows the SFAB commanders and staffs to use their advisors and resources against those objectives in a
manner best suited to accomplish the SFAB mission.
Special Operations Forces
2-117. Special operations forces capabilities complement conventional capabilities. Selected special
operations forces are regionally oriented and have personnel experienced and conversant in the languages
and cultures of the AO. These forces help with liaison to facilitate interoperability with multinational forces.
When a commander considers using special operations forces, the commander must understand their
capabilities and properly apply those capabilities.
2-118. The multinational force commander designates a joint special operations task force to carry out a
special operation or prosecute special operations to support a theater campaign or other operations in the AO.
A joint special operations task force consists of forces from more than one Service. This commander
commands with the preponderance of special operations forces and the requisite C2. The commander
exercises day-to-day C2 of assigned or attached special operations forces and allocates forces against tasks
to support the command. The command defines a special operations area for use by the special operations
forces. Establishing a joint special operations area delineates and facilitates simultaneous conventional and
special operations in the same general operational area.
2-119. The commander determines where certain special operations forces best fit in the organization. The
G-3 or S-3 integrates liaisons from the supporting special operations task force. The special operations task
force may provide a special operations C2 element to the supported command. Personnel from the special
operations C2 element may combine with the G-3 or S-3 current operations or targeting cells as well as the
G-5 or S-5 plans directorate of the multinational command. This integration facilitates special operations,
conventional, and multinational forces interoperability as well as interdependence. (Refer to AJP-3.5,
ADP 3-05, and TC 3-05.5 for special operations forces and task force planning.)
2-120. At the earliest opportunity, the command’s higher headquarters identifies the requirement for civil
affairs, psychological operations, and public affairs staff augmentation. These units may require Reserve
Component augmentation depending on mission requirements. Staffs understand the delay when requesting
these assets because of the lead time necessary. Civil affairs operations, psychological operations, and public
affairs actions are mutually supportive and have the potential to dramatically affect the perceived legitimacy
of peace operations.
CONSIDERATIONS
2-121. Commanders participating in a multinational operation should consider and be able to answer
affirmatively the following questions about a force’s participation in the operation. |
3-16 | 42 | Chapter 2
COMMAND
2-122. Commanders answer the following command questions about the force’s participation in the
operation:
• Has the command structure been identified? Is it a lead nation, parallel command, combined, or
integrated command structure?
• Have political motivations responsible for each nation’s participation in the operation been
identified? Have potential conflicts that can arise been identified?
• Have the implications of national and regional culture on contemplated multinational operations
been assessed?
• Have appropriate orientation briefings from civilian agencies been requested?
• Have status-of-forces agreements (known as SOFAs) been agreed to? If not, who should conduct
negotiations? Is there an alternative (for example, technical agreements) that provide adequate
protection?
• Have interoperability factors (for example, command, control, communications, or logistics) that
can affect the mission been identified?
• Are there cultural barriers that prevent a harmonious relationship? Has a force structure that
minimizes friction between partners been identified?
• Have supported and supporting relationships been established or referred to higher authority to
resolve inadequacies?
• Has the manner that participating nations view the role and execution of intelligence operations been
identified?
• Have linguist and interpreter needs been identified and met?
• Have the capabilities to obtain more linguists and interpreters as needed been identified and met?
• Have specific capabilities that a national contingent brings to the multinational force been
identified?
• Have constraints imposed on multinational forces by their national authorities been identified?
• Has the composition of an early-entry command post, if required, for senior grade personnel,
staffing, and communications been identified and met?
• Have standards for operational or logistic capabilities been established for certifying units to
participate in the operation? Have nations with deficiencies indicated a method of resolution?
• Have national caveats on the use of multinational forces been identified and disseminated
throughout the command?
• Have deficiencies with multinational commanders been negotiated for resolution?
• Have C2 arrangements been made for individuals in coordinating functions including the
multinational ambassadors, military attachés, and nonmilitary government officials?
• Are forces, logistics support, and command, control, and communications capabilities robust
enough to respond to increased levels of operational intensity?
• Have all multinational legal constraints been considered in planning for C2?
• Have the personnel for the multinational staff been chosen to reflect the required functional skills,
training level, language skill, and avoidance of historic animosities?
• Have minimum communications capabilities been established for each multinational member to
enable successful 24-hour operations?
• Has the command structure been designed to minimize the number of layers?
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
2-123. Commanders answer the following command relationships questions about the force’s participation
in the operation:
• Have command relationships for the control of forces been defined?
• Is there an initiating directive that clearly articulates the command arrangements?
• Have the command relationships been defined and analyzed for the following:
▪ Feasibility of achieving unity of command or unity of effort?
▪ Feasibility of accomplishing the mission defined by the command relationships? |
3-16 | 43 | Command and Control During Multinational Operations
▪ Assistance required from the national government to negotiate unity of command or unity of
effort at the strategic level?
▪ Clarity of relationships and understanding on the part of all multinational elements?
LIAISON
2-124. Commanders answer the following liaison questions about the force’s participation in the operation:
• Have the needs of liaison officers sent to multinational force headquarters and to adjacent,
supporting, and supported units been identified and met?
• Do liaison elements on the staff possess requisite authorities? Do the liaison elements have a full
understanding of both national interests and multinational objectives?
• Do liaison elements have appropriate communications, linguistic, logistics, and office support
capabilities in place?
• Have liaison officers been identified? Have key liaison officers been interviewed for suitability?
• Have the requirements for interagency and multinational coordination been identified and met?
Does the force have adequate liaison officers or liaison officer teams to meet required coordination?
• Have Army forces mobile liaison teams been requested?
LANGUAGE
2-125. Commanders answer the following language questions about the force’s participation in the operation:
• Has the language used for force-wide communications been identified?
• Has the command level been identified that each force will resort to its national language? Are there
sufficient interpreters for planning and execution?
COMMUNICATIONS
2-126. Commanders answer the following communications questions about the force’s participation in the
operation:
• Have the areas been identified that come under multinational control and that remain national
issues?
• Has the requirement for portable communications devices such as cell phones been identified and
met?
• Have commercial companies that establish telephone service for use by multinational forces been
identified?
• If the multinational force establishes a multinational visitor’s bureau, has that communications
capability been identified and determined if required?
• Do national laws require agreements defining payments for using the information systems networks
or military satellite communications (SATCOM) assets?
• Has the responsible party for funding additional communications capability been identified?
• Will nations be expected to provide communications capabilities to other nations’ military forces or
civilian agencies?
• Have plans for expanding the communications system been identified and met if needed?
• Has the policy on morale calls been identified? Who supports them?
• Have steps to ensure procedural compatibility been identified and implemented?
• Has the common identification of friend or foe procedure been identified and implemented?
• Have the data-link protocols been identified and implemented?
• Have the communications equipment capability between forces been identified and implemented?
• Has coordination been accomplished regarding frequency assignment?
• Have C2 information systems required to support diminishing multinational force presence been
identified and implemented?
• Will command channels be used only for execution and national channels be used only for reporting
status and requesting support?
• Are there a means and a plan to provide all forces with a COP?
• Do multinational partners with a lesser C2 capability have appropriate liaison officers, interpreters,
operators, and maintainers to enable adequate C2 in the multinational force? |
3-16 | 44 | Chapter 2
• Is there a policy or plan for the control, release, and dissemination of sensitive information and
cryptographic materials, especially to civilian agencies that require some access to classified
material to accomplish their missions?
• Has the language exchange point been determined?
• Are there sufficient interpreters available for both planning and execution?
• Has the terrain and environment been considered while planning for a communications network?
• Has the rapid dissemination of targeting materials been provided for?
• Have arrangements been made for staff communications?
• Have common databases been provided for?
• Has the nation most capable of providing an integrated, interoperable communications network been
selected to serve as network manager for the multinational C2 infrastructure?
• Have arrangements been made to allow contract host-nation employees to work on staffs without
exposing them to automated data processing and classified information used in daily operations?
• Has the multinational force established a standard datum? Will all products be on that datum?
• Is there a multinational force geospatial information and services plan that designates all mapping,
charting, and geodesy products for use?
• Have the command relationships, locations of headquarters, and the type of services required (such
as tactical satellite, telephone, facsimile, amplitude modulation, and frequency modulation or
modulated) been determined?
• Have the frequency requirements and planning ranges for equipment been identified and
implemented?
• Has the multinational force communications coordinator requested frequencies?
• Has the method the multinational force will use to conduct spectrum management been identified
and implemented? This accounts for frequencies already in use by civilian agencies.
• Has the method the multinational force will use to achieve automated data processing software
compatibility to facilitate file transfers been identified and implemented?
• Has the method the multinational force will use to achieve communications interoperability been
identified and implemented? Will the system satisfy communications requirements from the
national authorities to the lowest information exchange requirement?
• If civilian agencies have separate communications networks and the multinational force provides
security for these agencies, has the method they will request assistance during emergencies been
identified?
• Has the method the multinational force will use to ensure adequate redundancy been identified? Are
multiple assets available and used during operations to ensure information flow?
• Has the method the multinational force will use to handle incompatible communications equipment
among organizations and multinational forces been identified?
• Has communications support provided to civilian agencies been identified? Will support be
provided through the civil-military operations center?
• Has the method and time the multinational force will use to establish its communications
architecture been identified?
• Has the method the multinational force will use to account for and use communications networks
established by civilian agencies been identified? This includes commercially leased circuits,
commercial satellite services, high frequency, and very high frequency radios.
• Has the method the multinational force will use to address the need for secure communications been
identified?
• Has the method the command will use to handle spillage incidents when a person accidentally
transmits classified data over the unclassified computer network been identified?
• Has the policy on implementing communications blackout periods to support multinational
operations security been identified?
• Is there a multinational force standardized email naming convention? |
3-16 | 45 | Chapter 3
Planning Challenges for Multinational Operations
This chapter discusses planning challenges beginning with an overview of campaign
preparation. It then discusses the importance of force protection. The chapter also
addresses the commander’s mission focus and guidance to ensure unity of effort. This
chapter discusses planning for the MPE and establishing the MPN within multinational
forces. The chapter then provides early planning considerations.
CAMPAIGN PREPARATION
3-1. The ability to alert, mobilize, and rapidly deploy forces in any region is critical to mission success.
Understanding the limitations and capabilities of multinational forces’ contributions helps create a secure and
stable environment. Planners review national military contingents and mission partner assets. These
contributions allow the necessary forces to deploy efficiently with the available lift assets. Understanding the
current infrastructure and transportation limitations in the region helps the force allocate resources. Once
resources are committed, national contingent units and liaison offices coordinate with the mission partners
for deployment in the AO. Effective planners anticipate and coordinate requirements to maximize capabilities
and minimize resources for the multinational force. This prevents duplication of effort from the lead nation.
FORCE PROJECTION FOR MULTINATIONAL FORCES
3-2. Force projection for a multinational force is critical to mission accomplishment. From the beginning,
participants must know the multinational considerations to deploy forces and use lift assets. Multinational
operations strive to avoid duplicated effort and unit capabilities. For example, before the UN protection force
deployed to the former Republic of Yugoslavia, each participating nation performed its own engineer
reconnaissance of the infrastructure. This enabled staff to see duplicated efforts and to find omissions in
necessary support. Multinational force planners review assets from national military contingents and mission
partners and then agree on a division of labor.
3-3. Limited lift means maximizing efficiency during deployment of forces and sustainment capabilities.
This lift requires coordination with troop contributing nations, so units do not deploy capabilities already
available, such as port operations forces. In some cases, one multinational force transports another nation’s
forces to the AO. Liaison officers from national contingents coordinate with the nation moving its forces or
with the multinational force headquarters responsible for coordinating the movements with the nation
providing lift. (See Chapter 5 for additional information on sustainment.)
MISSION FOCUS FOR THE COMMANDER
3-4. Mission focus is a planning challenge for commanders. Political considerations and military capabilities
of the multinational force affect the focus that commanders have on multinational operations. The
commander remains focused on the mission and understands the reason each national contingent participates.
This mission focus determines the structure and resultant taskings of the multinational force. Commanders
need to prevent a multinational force from splitting into components operating under differing political
directions. The commander recognizes that political considerations can push an acceptable course of action
rather than the optimum military solution. The commander remains flexible to adjust to unforeseen political
influences, keeps the multinational force focused on the military objective, and avoids mission creep.
3-5. Another challenge to mission focus is national differences in doctrine, training, or equipment. Leaders
assign functions to a smaller group of partners to overcome differences in doctrine, training, or equipment.
For example, the multinational force assigns the mission of support area security to home defense or police
forces. Commanders consider tasking members of the multinational force with specific warfighting functions
or operations based on the threat’s special capabilities and its nation capabilities. Commanders recognize the
strengths and differences of the forces’ cultures. Commanders’ decisions and military leadership use the
capabilities of the forces. Subordinate commanders request control of forces that provide capabilities not |
3-16 | 46 | Chapter 3
organic to that nation’s forces. The guiding principle is to allocate assets, as needed, and maintain
concentrated critical capabilities.
3-6. The commander’s ability to understand and integrate each nation’s capabilities into a cohesive force
binds a multinational operation together. Commanders articulate their intent. This enables each nation to
form the same picture of an end state and the rules governing engagements. Given the language difficulties
found in many multinational forces, commanders clearly and simply state their intent. At a minimum, the
planning guidance states—
• The purpose of the operation.
• A mission statement for the multinational force.
• Broad objectives and tasks for the multinational force.
• Desired end states and guidance on termination or transition.
• Participating nations and expected initial contributions.
• Common security interests.
• Specific national limitations, concerns, or sensitivities.
TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY
3-7. The transfer of authority of forces to a multinational commander can impact mission focus. The
designated multinational commander will have some form of authority over national units at some point.
Planners define limits of authority and accomplish transfer of authority as early as possible. The timing of
the transfer is part of the initial negotiations that govern how the multinational force forms. Planners
determine when transfer of authority occurs. Early transfer of authority and deployment of liaison teams
enable a multinational commander to plan and perform effective integration training through three options.
3-8. The first option is to arrange transfer of authority to the multinational force before deploying from a
unit’s home station. Commanders control the unit arrival sequence to best suit operational requirements and
facilitate reception area base operations. This option assumes clear political consensus, timely decisions on
national participation, and a significant lead time for planning and setting up the multinational force
headquarters.
3-9. The second option is to have transfer of authority at an intermediate staging base en route to an
operational area. Forces resolve problems in a secure area. Forces deploy only when fully ready and as
required by the multinational force.
3-10. The third option is to have transfer of authority occur once forces arrive in the AO. This option leaves
each nation responsible to deploy and prepare its contingent for operations. It does not allow the multinational
force positive control of deployment into the AO.
3-11. Centralized control of force flow provides the best support to the multinational force’s requirements
and the best support to the participating forces. Whichever option the commander chooses for transfer of
authority, central coordination of deploying forces is preferred. Such coordination prevents repetitive crisis
management of reception operations.
3-12. Each multinational nation has a different way to plan operations. If a lead nation commands the
multinational force, then the lead nation uses its own planning. At national contingent headquarters, nations
use their own planning.
PLANNING FOR MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS OVERVIEW
3-13. Multinational planning begins before the actual operation and uses generic plans on which to build the
actual plan of execution. Depending on the type and nature of operations conducted, planning includes
governmental agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations. Initial
planning typically addresses pre-deployment, deployment, sustainment, transition, roles, participation, and
redeployment operations.
3-14. Based on the identified mission partners and relationships, the commander determines interoperability
planning and preparation requirements. Commanders consider whether to establish additional organizational
staff coordination centers, such as a mission partner coordination center to support interoperability. They also |
3-16 | 47 | Planning Challenges for Multinational Operations
consider whether to rely on direct coordination between unit and mission partner staff elements to conduct
the required interoperability planning and preparation.
3-15. In accordance with the commander’s decision and final planning guidance, the chief of staff or
executive officer coordinates with staff principals to assist the G-3 or S-3 in developing the plan or order.
Based on the commander’s planning guidance, the chief of staff or executive officer dictates the type of order,
sets and enforces time limits and development sequence, and determines staff section responsibilities for
attachments within the order. Before the commander approves the plan or order, the staff ensures the plan or
order is internally consistent and nests with the higher commander’s intent. Mission partner coordination
centers, staff elements, working groups, and planning teams provide input on final operation plans and
operation orders, and they complete and coordinate required attachments. Input from these planning efforts
vary but may be specified tasks, coordinating instructions, sustainment instructions, and fire support
instructions.
3-16. The unit prepares for multinational operations by implementing planned human, procedural, and
technical dimension solutions. Preparation normally begins during planning and continues into execution by
forces identified but not yet committed. Like the other activities of the operations process, commanders drive
preparation activities with a focus on leading and assessing.
3-17. When the situation permits, commanders seek to improve the contributions of national forces by
planning for training assistance and sharing resources such as radios, vehicles, or weapons. Training
assistance and dedicated liaison teams are important when working with forces that have digital capability
and those with analog means. Effective integration in combat operations requires training beforehand through
multinational command post exercises or through full-scale multinational exercises at combined training
centers such as the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Germany. Commanders make every effort to
integrate mission partners into the exercise design and planning conferences prior to exercise execution. This
practice fosters buy-in and can serve as a substantial training event for the foreign staff officers as they plan
alongside their U.S. counterparts. It also functions as a rehearsal, ensuring all parties understand and agree
to the exercise design and training objectives prior to execution.
PLANNING GROUPS FOR MULTINATIONAL FORCES
3-18. When a multinational force is formed, the commander determines the organization and functions of the
planning group and the methods for the group and the staff sections to interact during planning and execution.
The planning group includes the commander and representatives from appropriate multinational staff sections
and national formations. Challenges from these planning groups range from diversity and different
perspectives to strategic and operational problems and solutions. This planning group should—
• Perform crisis action planning.
• Be the focal point for the operation plan or operation order development.
• Perform future planning.
• Perform other tasks as directed by the commander.
• Analyze and develop the MPE based on the commander’s specific guidance.
MISSION PARTNER ENVIRONMENT PLANNING
CONSIDERATIONS
3-19. Multinational operations present planning challenges for MPE planning. The Army MPE framework
enables the Army, with the joint forces and mission partners, access to an information environment (such as
an MPE MPN). This environment supports required planning, training, and conduct of operations through all
operational phases across the competition continuum. The MPE facilitates shared understanding, fosters
mutual trust and confidence, and is critical to achieving unity of effort with all mission partners. The MPE
generates strategic, operational, and tactical flexibility for national, regional, and deployed commanders by
moving and managing information onto the MPN with appropriate common security enclaves.
3-20. A significant planning challenge for MPE development and implementation involves adjudicating
existing policy with desired MPE capabilities and functions. The foreign disclosure officer gets involved
early in the planning stages to determine appropriate levels of classification. This officer can assist with the
“write to release” process and implementation of the foreign disclosure procedures. The foreign disclosure |
3-16 | 48 | Chapter 3
officer categorizes and is the approval authority for the release of military information to foreign government
representatives. Commanders and staffs must understand what information to share with mission partners to
accomplish the mission. Commanders and staffs need to understand which U.S. systems can and cannot
communicate with mission partners’ systems due to levels of classification. Once the multinational
commander establishes MPE requirements, the staff plans for establishing the MPN tailored to information
requirements of mission partners.
MISSION PARTNER NETWORK PLANNING
3-21. Planning challenges occur with the MPN in multinational operations. The creation of an expeditionary
MPE with an associated MPN supports required planning, training, and the conduct of operations.
Commanders expect expeditionary MPEs to exist only during the mission and partners to be the only ones
contributing to, supported by, or providing support to the specific mission. Planners tailor each specific
expeditionary MPE MPN topology for operations based on an operational environment and specific mission
partners information-sharing requirements. This expeditionary MPE allows connectivity and reachback to
the enterprise MPE. (Refer to ATP 6-02.61 and ATP 6-02.62 for more information on planning MPNs.)
3-22. Key Army requirements to implementing an expeditionary MPE include the following:
• Rapidly configuring and deploying an MPE MPN to support a new operation with a unique mix of
mission partners, mission requirements, and objectives.
• Standardizing information technology services across U.S. MPE contributions to eliminate
duplication. Such services might include network operations, data handling and protection, user
access and permissions, and network security.
• Standardizing common services—such as voice over internet protocol, email, chat, file sharing, and
video teleconferencing—to ensure access and usability for all mission partners.
• Ensuring cybersecurity measures meet security objectives whether implemented by the Army or a
mission partner and are balanced against the need for access and flow of information.
• Assigning and managing appropriate privileges and providing user access to mission communities
of interest.
• Considering and implementing privacy controls across the multinational force to account for
mission partner privacy laws to protect personally identifiable information and personal health
information.
• Enabling authorized mission partner access to the enterprise MPE and permitted communities of
interest data enclaves, with appropriate access controls and data guards to prevent unauthorized
access or data spillage.
• Integrating electromagnetic spectrum operations within MPE planning and implementation.
• Providing a means to coordinate and convert datum, formats, and projections of geospatial data and
information to develop a base map to support a COP, common reporting, and geospatial foundation
data.
• Implementing structured, tailorable, and intuitive data management, IM construct, and KM
construct to facilitate information sharing.
• Developing and implementing technical and procedural dimension solutions to integrate Army-joint
mission partner ground, air, and space operations. The solution must address—
▪ Air support requests, air space control measures, and terminal attack guidance among mission
partners.
▪ Integration of surface fires, rotary-wing aviation, and fixed-wing aviation among mission
partners.
▪ Integration of surface, unmanned aircraft, rotary-wing, fixed-wing, and space-based ISR
capabilities across the collection spectrum.
▪ Integration of air and missile defense capabilities with all mission partners to engage hostile air
assets (such as manned and unmanned aircraft, and missiles) and in accordance with planning
guidance.
TRANSITION PLANNING
3-23. Transitions are conditions based, not time based. Transitions are a process rather than a specific event.
Commanders and their staff should think through the strategic, operational, and tactical situations; assets and |
3-16 | 49 | Planning Challenges for Multinational Operations
resources; political factors; and environmental factors when considering transitioning from one imperative
to another.
3-24. National decision makers determine the political necessities for transition. Commanders and planners
understand that these political factors—whether host-nation, multinational force, alliances, or coalition—are
likely to shape any conditions-based approach. The political environment could affect national institutions,
public services, control of operational environments, or geographical areas. Multinational force commanders
consider how actions taken by the multinational force may impact transition, the overall effect of the mission,
or the national political environment. Transition planning is an integral part of operational planning and a
hedge against the risk.
TYPES OF TRANSITIONS FROM MULTINATIONAL FORCES
3-25. Planning varies for different types of transitions. One type of transition is a multinational force military
relief in place. This transition has normal military operation emphasis on a mission and protecting the force.
The relief in place uses doctrine from the lead nation. Commanders and staff plan by reading the lead nation’s
doctrine.
3-26. A second type of transition is a multinational force military to civilian or UN authorities. This transition
occurs with a normal UN civilian support type mission with emphasis on military support to the civilian and
UN missions. In this transition, planning occurs as both the military and civilian authorities—
• Identify the conditions suitable for handover.
• Identify and agree on responsibilities for C2 of the operation.
• Identify the necessary phases of the operation.
Also in this transition, planning occurs as both the military and civilian authorities escalate or de-escalate.
The command—
• Confirms multinational members.
• Identifies ROE and national differences of ROE.
• Identifies protection issues.
3-27. Another transition is a multinational force military handover to a national government. This transition
is a withdrawal. The military places emphasis on fully handing over responsibilities and allowing the
government to assume power and authority. The commander identifies host-nation capability gaps and the
national decision makers identify those capabilities that remain behind to ensure that an effective handover
of authority and support to the government occurs.
CONSIDERATIONS
3-28. Commanders and their staffs participating in multinational operations use the military decision-making
process. Other doctrinal decision-making processes supporting multinational operations, such as the Army
design methodology or troop leading procedures, may also be relevant.
Note. Units planning for a multinational exercise routinely begin planning for the exercise, to
include the military decision-making process (known as MDMP), in the final months before
execution. The commander and staff assisted by the mission partner coordinator begin planning
and implementing interoperability solutions for an exercise before the initial planning conference.
The commander provides interoperability guidance. The staff develops plans and begins to
implement solutions, such as operator training and MPN development, throughout the exercise
planning process. They use the initial, mid, and final planning conferences as opportunities to
collaboratively plan with mission partners, validate progress against the interoperability plan of
action and milestones, and generate feedback from unit leaders and exercise controllers regarding
progress to meet the commander’s interoperability guidance. |
3-16 | 50 | Chapter 3
STEP 1—RECEIPT OF MISSION
3-29. Commanders answer the following questions about the force’s participation in the operation concerning
Step 1—Receipt of Mission:
• Are the unit’s mission partners, the task organization, command structure, and command
relationships determined between the unit and mission partners?
• Does the commander establish additional ad hoc structure to support interoperability? Or does the
commander rely on direct coordination between unit and mission partner staff elements to conduct
required interoperability planning and preparation?
• Does the commander appoint a mission partner coordinator to assist the staff and advise the
commander in planning, implementation, execution, and assessment of interoperability solutions?
• Did the unit conduct initial coordination and staff or liaison exchanges with mission partners?
• Did the unit identify mission analysis information requirements and share these requirements with
subordinates and mission partners?
• Did the unit issue a warning order to subordinates and mission partners?
STEP 2—MISSION ANALYSIS
3-30. Commanders answer the following questions about the force’s participation in the operation concerning
Step 2—Mission Analysis:
• Are the relevant agreed-to standards determined between U.S. and mission partners?
• If no common standards exist, is a baseline standard determined to tailor to the specific
circumstances?
• Are the force capabilities, limitations, and national caveats of each mission partner determined to
enable shared understanding and unity of effort?
• Are the laws, policies, regulations, and higher guidance with impact on interoperability solutions
determined?
• Is the higher headquarters order examined for interoperability guidance such as force KM plans,
theater ROE, network architecture, and COP data standards?
• Are the mission critical interoperability requirements identified?
• Are the tactical tasks the commander identified with interoperability guidance and associated
information exchange requirements used in KM and network planning?
• Are external resource requirements such as TLDs, translators, and MPN hardware determined?
• Are changes to mission partner mix, command structure, authorities, and task organization identified
to improve interoperability?
• Is a draft plan of action and milestones developed to synchronize and to meet planning and
implementation requirements for interoperability solutions?
• Is a warning order published with updated interoperability requirements, identified standards, and
other interoperability guidance as input to course of action (COA) development?
STEP 3—COA DEVELOPMENT
3-31. Commanders answer the following questions about the force’s participation in the operation concerning
Step 3—COA Development:
• Does the COA account for interoperability? Are changes to the ROE, KM, and coalition TTP
required?
• Is an interoperability assessment plan developed with key measures and a focus on mission critical
interoperability requirements?
• Are initial liaison, training, and rehearsal plans developed?
STEP 4—COA ANALYSIS
3-32. Commanders answer the following questions about the force’s participation in the operation concerning
Step 4—COA Analysis:
• Is the operational COA analyzed for interoperability implications, strengths, and weaknesses?
• Are unique mission partner support requirements identified for each operational COA based on
assigned tasks and scheme of maneuver? |
3-16 | 51 | Planning Challenges for Multinational Operations
• Is mission partner feedback sought on an operational COA?
• Are common plans, such as ROE, KM, interoperability assessment, and liaison, refined?
STEP 5—COA COMPARISON
3-33. Commanders answer the following questions about the force’s participation in the operation concerning
Step 5—COA Comparison:
• Is mission partner input sought for COA comparison?
• Is ensured interoperability included in operational COA evaluation criteria?
• Are revised common plans, interoperability assessment plans, liaison plans, training, and rehearsal
plans based on COA comparison results?
STEP 6—COA APPROVAL
3-34. Commanders answer the following questions about the force’s participation in the operation concerning
Step 6—COA Approval:
• Is interoperability input (provided to ensure internally consistent planning) nested in the higher
commander’s intent?
• Are tasks to mission partners clearly stated and understood?
• Did the unit issue a warning order to subordinates and mission partners with draft common plans
and updated commander’s guidance for interoperability?
STEP 7—ORDERS PRODUCTION, DISSEMINATION, AND TRANSITION
3-35. Commanders answer the following questions about the force’s participation in the operation concerning
Step 7—Orders Production, Dissemination, and Transition:
• Are requests finalized and submitted for external resources to address interoperability requirements?
• Are requests finalized and submitted for waivers, required accreditations, authority to operate, and
others?
• Are common plans completed and integrated—such as ROE, KM, liaison, and JMEI—as
attachments to an order?
• Are TTP and SOPs coordinated and finalized across mission partners and warfighting functions as
attachments to an order?
• Are all preparation activities coordinated and scheduled with subordinate units and mission
partners? Do they include training plans, rehearsal plans, and schedules as attachments to an order?
• Are orders translated and verified for each mission partner? Are completed orders delivered and
acknowledged by higher headquarters, mission partners, and subordinate units? |
3-16 | 53 | Chapter 4
Intelligence During Multinational Operations
This chapter begins by discussing multinational intelligence and multinational
information sharing. It then discusses planning, communications, and processes for
multinational forces operations. multinational forces Next, it discusses intelligence
operations, complementary intelligence capabilities, and information sharing. Lastly,
this chapter discusses information versus intelligence and includes considerations for
commanders and staff.
MULTINATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
4-1. The multinational force synchronizes its intelligence efforts with UAPs to achieve unity of effort and to
meet the commander’s intent. Intelligence unity of effort is critical to accomplish the mission. UAPs
contribute to the intelligence effort. Multinational and interagency partners provide cultural awareness and
unique perspectives that reinforce and complement Army intelligence capabilities. UAPs may have access to
different capabilities, or they may have more of a capability than Army and joint forces have. Some partners
may have unique policies, authorities, or access that provide intelligence opportunities that are not otherwise
available to Army forces. Using appropriate procedures and established policy, multinational force
intelligence leaders provide information and intelligence support to multinational forces. The intelligence
staff section leverages the intelligence enterprise to answer the commander’s requirements.
4-2. Intelligence leaders ensure that the intelligence warfighting function operates effectively and efficiently.
These leaders are the commander’s primary advisors on employing ISR and information collection assets.
Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance is an integrated operations and intelligence activity that
synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors; assets; and processing, exploitation, and
dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations (JP 2-0). Multinational forces need
to approach joint ISR as a unified effort. To drive joint ISR and information collection properly, intelligence
leaders consider and leverage all capabilities provided by the multinational force. Additionally, intelligence
analysts support their commanders with analysis and production of timely, relevant, accurate, and predictive
assessments and products tailored to the commander’s needs. (Refer to ADP 2-0 for more information on
intelligence and the intelligence warfighting function. Refer to JP 2-0 for more on integrating intelligence
and exploitation in operations.)
4-3. Intelligence leaders ensure that multinational forces use the intelligence capability of UAPs. Failure to
employ UAPs or disseminate their products is the same as keeping intelligence capabilities in reserve and
may communicate an insult to the partner, which may result in a change in the level of support from the
partner. Intelligence leaders may need to employ products, personnel, and capabilities from UAPs
innovatively. This may include adding to existing capacity for performing types of collection or analysis, or
generating a new, complementary capability. For example, leaders may use an open-source research
capability to conduct in-depth studies of aspects of operational variables or civil considerations of an
operational environment.
MULTINATIONAL INFORMATION SHARING
4-4. Every multinational operation differs, as do the methods by which the force collects and disseminates
intelligence. As classification and dissemination controls may present problems in releasing information, it
is important for intelligence leaders to avoid over classifying information and to work with the foreign
disclosure officer and foreign disclosure representatives. Together, they ensure leaders can share relevant
information appropriately with partners in the multinational force. (See Executive Order 13526 and
AR 380-10 for guidance on foreign disclosure.)
4-5. Multinational operations require foreign disclosure coordination and security classification policy
guidance to drive write for release at the lowest levels. Staffs at all levels must follow foreign disclosure
guidelines and regulations when sharing information and intelligence with allies and multinational partners. |
3-16 | 54 | Chapter 4
To help intelligence sharing, staffs establish and adhere to procedures, specific guidelines, and policies. These
guidelines and policies improve interoperability, trust, and operational effectiveness in a multinational force.
4-6. To avoid intelligence and information sharing becoming a contentious issue, commanders address
sharing from the planning phases to ensure everyone understands national policy limitations and the risks
versus rewards. Timely sharing of intelligence products and combat information enables prompt responses
to situations. For example, a multinational force establishes processes to rapidly modify, validate, and
downgrade classification, and to release imagery to one or more partners with a need to know. Commanders
educate themselves on the positions of allies and partner nations regarding intelligence sharing and ensure
that intelligence is shared to the degree necessary for mission accomplishment and force protection. Early
information sharing during planning ensures that forces receive requirements that are clearly stated, guidance
supports the commander’s intent, and the multinational force uses procedures supportable by other nations.
(Refer to ATP 3-39.21 for more on expeditionary forensics, ATP 2-22.82 for more on biometrics-enabled
intelligence, and ATP 2-22.85 for more on tactical employment of biometrics.)
4-7. Multilateral and bilateral security sharing agreements fall under the purview of a combatant command
but are the results from policy agreements between the United States and one or more partners. These
agreements cover security cooperation initiatives and operations planned for allies and partner nations. A
combatant command can request that intelligence reports, products, and assessments be made releasable to
multinational partners as necessary. The intelligence officer, in coordination with the foreign disclosure
officer, understands existing agreements (established at the earliest time of UAP formation) before
articulating disclosure guidance to operations planners and facilitates clear communications and
interoperability among elements within a coalition. Intelligence officers consider how national laws and
policies of individual coalition members affect the sharing of information and intelligence. These officers
recognize that each coalition or multinational force will develop unique procedures for intelligence sharing
since sharing authorities vary depending on partners involved. These authorities may also change over time.
Disclosure guidance for a multinational force should maximize existing authorities and include guidelines
for writing for release.
4-8. Writing for release means developing products specifically for disclosure to the partners involved. Often
it carefully excludes information that might reveal sources, collection methods, or other protected
information to reduce the risk of misclassifying information. Intelligence planners apply writing for release
to intelligence production and all aspects of the operation, such as operation orders and update briefings.
Writing for release applies to more than just intelligence production, such as a releasable version of the same
product or a tear line within the product. In situations with diverse UAPs, complicated sharing guidance and
planners often produce multiple versions of the same product with different dissemination controls. These
precautions ensure that every coalition member gets some degree of shared understanding while limiting
risks. Writing for release works best with a command policy that requires planners to prepare products with
releasable versions at their creation instead of requestors asking for releasable versions after the fact.
4-9. A multinational force maximizes potential contributions of each partner through coordination. Although
the communications architecture is an essential element in this area, there are specific intelligence areas
requiring extensive coordination that include—
• Friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum.
• Use of space assets, location of intelligence assets, and location of known or templated threat
locations to collect against.
• Verification that the intelligence effort serves both the multinational and national needs.
4-10. Priority intelligence requirements focus on intelligence concerning the adversary and environment.
Commanders find answers by coordinating at all levels. An established joint center provides TTP available
to commanders to enable improved collaboration and information sharing. Joint centers enable collection and
promote intelligence and information sharing across multiple intelligence sources or nations. Multinational
commanders at various echelons create joint centers to manage the flow of information and intelligence, to
focus information collection to satisfy information requirements, and to process, exploit, analyze, and
disseminate the resulting collection. |
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PLANNING FOR MULTINATIONAL FORCES OPERATIONS
4-11. UAPs may have policy restraints and sovereignty concerns. Such restraints and concerns mean that
nations will likely limit their available assets to a multinational force. As a result, multinational forces accept
that they will often have limited, decentralized control over some of their intelligence assets, and they will
have no direct control over assets restricted by individual nations. These undisclosed assets are managed by
the nation’s national intelligence cell. Multinational forces performing intelligence operations establish an
intelligence fusion cell at the headquarters level through which intelligence tasks will flow. This cell helps
integrate intelligence representatives and liaison personnel at each organizational level and improve access
to intelligence capabilities. A staff bases information collection plans on matching intelligence requirements
of a coalition organization with the available and accessible intelligence assets in the AO.
4-12. The multinational force conducts ISR and information collection with an emphasis on leveraging the
larger intelligence enterprise. The commander provides the intelligence staff with a clear mission statement
and commander’s intent. The intelligence section then develops information and intelligence requirements
that commanders review, matches assets with requirements, and requests joint ISR support. A multinational
force’s ability to gather and process intelligence varies widely. The command’s collection manager accounts
for this variance and tasks various intelligence assets and joint ISR platforms accordingly, matching
collection assets with requirements to answer priority intelligence requirements. Sharing information and
mutual support are key to integrating all resources into a system to best meet the command’s intelligence
requirements.
MULTINATIONAL FORCE COMMUNICATIONS AND PROCESSING
4-13. The ability to collect, process, and disseminate information to many users requires effective lateral and
vertical communications. UAPs come to an agreement during the planning phase of an operation as to what
SOPs and data standards partners will use. The agreement also addresses using existing agreements such as
those articulated in NATO STANAGs, ABCANZ standards, and other STANAGs. A lead nation establishes
appropriate JMEI for the MPN to facilitate interoperability. Liaison officers at the multinational force
headquarters provide subject matter expertise in their national capabilities and supplementary
communications to their parent nations.
4-14. Successful multinational intelligence operations use a common intelligence architecture to leverage
capabilities of participating allies and partners. This architecture enables effective communications within
the multinational force without compromising national security interests. Information and intelligence
exchange requirements for multinational forces focus on enabling a common intelligence picture with two-
way information flows among U.S. military commands and multinational partners. Establishing, testing, and
validating the multinational force’s intelligence architecture during the preparation phase of the operation
contribute to shared situational awareness and the intelligence preparation of the battlefield.
INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
4-15. Intelligence operations are the tasks undertaken by military intelligence units through the intelligence
disciplines to obtain information to satisfy validated requirements (ADP 2-0). Intelligence operations collect
information about the intent, activities, and capabilities of threats and relevant aspects of an operational
environment to support multinational commanders’ decision making. Data and information collected during
intelligence operations are essential to developing timely, relevant, accurate, predictive, and tailored
intelligence products. Intelligence operations use mission orders and standard command and support
relationships. Intelligence operations are shaping operations the commander uses for the main effort.
Flexibility and adaptability to changing situations are critical to conduct effective intelligence operations.
(Refer to ADP 2-0 for more information on intelligence operations and intelligence disciplines.)
4-16. The intelligence disciplines are as follows:
• Counterintelligence.
• Geospatial intelligence.
• Human intelligence.
• Measure and signature intelligence.
• Open-source intelligence. |
3-16 | 56 | Chapter 4
• Signals intelligence.
• Technical intelligence.
4-17. Counterintelligence is also known as CI. Counterintelligence is information gathered and activities
conducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities,
sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons or their
agents, or international terrorist organizations or activities (JP 2-0). (Refer to JP 2-0 and ATP 2-22.4 for more
information on information and counterintelligence.)
4-18. Geospatial intelligence is also known as GEOINT. Geospatial intelligence is the exploitation and
analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and
geographically referenced activities on or about the Earth (JP 2-0). Geospatial intelligence consists of
imagery, imagery intelligence, and other geospatial information. Geospatial intelligence includes full-motion
video platforms. (Refer to JP 2-0 for more on geospatial intelligence.)
4-19. Human intelligence is also known as HUMINT. Human intelligence is a category of intelligence
derived from information collected and provided by human sources (JP 2-0). (Refer to JP 2-0, ADP 2-0, and
FM 2-22.3 for more information on human intelligence.)
4-20. Measure and signature intelligence is also known as MASINT. Measure and signature intelligence is
information produced by quantitative and qualitative analysis of physical attributes of targets and events to
detect, characterize, locate, and identify targets and events; and derived from specialized, technically derived
measurements and signatures of physical phenomenon intrinsic to an object or event (JP 2-0). (Refer to JP 2-0
for more information on measure and signature intelligence.)
4-21. Open-source intelligence is also known as OSINT. Open-source intelligence is publicly available
information collected, exploited, and disseminated to address a specific requirement (JP 2-0). (Refer to JP 2-0
for more information on open-source intelligence.)
4-22. Signals intelligence is also known as SIGINT. Signals intelligence is a category of intelligence
comprising all communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals
intelligence, however transmitted, individually or in combination (JP 2-0). (Refer to JP 2-0 for more details
on signals intelligence.)
4-23. Technical intelligence is also known as TECHINT. Technical intelligence is intelligence derived from
the collection, processing, analysis, and exploitation of data and information pertaining to foreign equipment
and materiel for the purposes of preventing technological surprise, assessing foreign scientific and technical
capabilities, and developing countermeasures designed to neutralize an enemy’s technological advantages
(JP 2-0). (Refer to JP 2-0, ATP 2-22.4, and AR 381-26 for a thorough discussion of technical intelligence.)
COMPLEMENTARY INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES
4-24. Complementary intelligence capabilities contribute valuable information for all-source intelligence to
conduct operations. The complementary intelligence capabilities are specific to the unit and circumstances at
each echelon. These capabilities vary across the intelligence enterprise in a multinational formation,
depending upon what each of the national contingents can provide. The complementary intelligence
capabilities are as follows:
• Biometrics-enabled intelligence.
• Cyber-enabled intelligence.
• Document and media exploitation.
• Forensic-enabled intelligence.
(Refer to ADP 2-0 for more information on complementary intelligence capabilities.)
4-25. Biometrics-enabled intelligence is intelligence resulting from the combination of biometric information
with other intelligence, threat information, or information relating to other aspects of an operational
environment to answer intelligence requirements. (Refer to ADP 2-0 for more on biometrics-enabled
intelligence.) |
3-16 | 57 | Intelligence During Multinational Operations
4-26. Cyber-enabled intelligence is produced by combining intelligence analysis with collaborated
information concerning activity in cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum. (Refer to JP 3-85 for
electromagnetic spectrum operations.)
4-27. Document and media exploitation is also known as DOMEX. Document and media exploitation is the
processing, translation, analysis, and dissemination of collected hardcopy documents and electronic media
that are under the U.S. government’s physical control and are not publicly available. Units can derive threat
intent, capabilities, and limitations through the exploitation of captured materials. (Refer to DODD 3300.03
for more on document and media exploitation.)
4-28. Forensic-enabled intelligence is also known as FEI. Forensic-enabled intelligence is the intelligence
resulting from the integration of scientifically examined materials and other information to establish full
characterization, attribution, and the linkage of events, locations, items, signatures, nefarious intent, and
persons of interest (JP 2-0). (Refer to JP 2-0 for details on forensic-enabled intelligence and ATP 3-39.21 for
more on expeditionary forensics.)
MULTINATIONAL INFORMATION SHARING TASKS
4-29. Every multinational operation and all the tasks the force uses to collect and disseminate intelligence
differs. Classification may present a challenge in sharing information, but keeping as much information at
the lowest appropriate classification level as possible improves interoperability, trust, and operational
effectiveness in the multinational force. Commanders know other nation’s positions on intelligence sharing
and ensure that intelligence is shared as much as possible, especially if required for mission accomplishment
and force protection. Early information sharing during planning ensures that multinational force requirements
are clearly stated, guidance supports the commander’s intent, and the multinational force uses procedures
supportable by other nations.
4-30. The following tasks guide multinational intelligence operations:
• Adjust for national differences in intelligence concepts.
• Create an integrated multinational staff and intelligence fusion center with representatives from all
participating nations within national limits on intelligence sharing.
• View the mission from a multinational and national perspective; treat a threat to one member as a
threat to all members.
• Agree to and plan for multinational intelligence requirements in advance of the operation.
• Plan complementary intelligence operations using all available multinational intelligence resources
focusing on national strengths.
• Exchange liaison officers to limit problems derived from culture, language, doctrine, and
intelligence requirements.
CONSIDERATIONS
4-31. Commanders and their staffs participating in multinational operations consider and answer the
following questions with respect to the intelligence portion of the operation:
• Does the multinational force have an initial collection management working group? What are the
positions in the deployment timetable?
• Does the collection plan incorporate all collection assets available for tasking and account for
differences in capabilities, limitations, and release authorities of the collecting nation?
• Are there any specific cultural, historical, language, customs, or religious relationships between the
multinational force partners and the adversary or the local population?
• What is the intelligence architecture?
• Does the intelligence architecture meet mission requirements? Are there any gaps in coverage?
• Has the C2 system been established to disseminate time sensitive information for targeting or rapid
reaction to all participants?
• What are the procedures for sharing intelligence and information or releasing information policies?
Are all multinational partners treated equally, considering compartmented and national sensitivities?
• What are the levels of interoperability between different intelligence information systems including
database compatibility? |
3-16 | 58 | Chapter 4
• What are the staffing requirements for the intelligence staff—including specialists, linguists, and
liaison officers—and a subordinate joint force intelligence directorate counterintelligence and
human intelligence staff element staff?
• What are the differences in availability and capability of national collection sources?
• How can the differing intelligence authorities be exploited to maximize multinational force
operations?
• Are intelligence liaison officers planned?
• Is the intelligence support package planned for, with capabilities and limitations, explained to
supporting units?
• Are training programs in place with a focus on creating a common view of the enemy, enemy
dispositions, threat characteristics, doctrine, capabilities, and intelligence systems?
• Has an intelligence daily cycle been established? Does it include reporting timelines and routine
briefings and conferences? Have collection management timelines been defined?
• Have all intelligence systems, including communications and information systems, been rehearsed?
• How will national intelligence cells exchange intelligence among multinational partners?
• Have staff and liaison officers at all levels established and tested the intelligence architecture,
including communications and information systems? Are links with the host nation, civilian
agencies, and the media functioning?
• Was the process effective for the national intelligence cells to exchange intelligence among nations?
• Have national intelligence summaries, imagery, and threat assessments approved for dissemination
been shared?
• What are the laws, policies, procedures, and sensitivities regarding the questioning of detainees
captured by or in the custody of each multinational partner?
• What are the levels of interoperability among different intelligence automated information systems
including database compatibility?
• What is the level of interoperability with national collection resources?
• Is there a process to evaluate effectiveness and efficiency and a feedback system?
• Are all positions which require access to classified information tracked for appropriately cleared
acceptable use policy personnel? |
3-16 | 59 | Chapter 5
Sustainment During Multinational Operations
This chapter offers a multinational sustainment overview. It then discusses the unity of
effort among nations and agencies, responsibility for logistics, and planning for
logistics. This chapter then discusses acquisition and cross-servicing agreements, host-
nation support, and operational contract support. Lastly, it discusses the UN logistics
system, movement support in multinational operations, and considerations for the
commander.
MULTINATIONAL SUSTAINMENT OVERVIEW
5-1. A coordinated sustainment effort is needed for the multinational force to accomplish its mission.
Multinational commanders must consider how to coordinate the sustainment effort. They must also consider
the coordination for interagency funding and control processes and reimbursement procedures. Commanders
should also reflect on the environmental and legal considerations, which are essential to multinational
operations. Nations competing for host-nation resources to provide logistics support to troop contributing
units hampers the multinational force’s efforts to accomplish its mission. This competition for resources also
causes harmful inflation to the host-nation economy. The multinational commander strives to achieve unity
of effort in the sustainment effort.
UNITY OF EFFORT AMONG NATIONS AND AGENCIES
5-2. Unity of effort is essential to multinational logistics operations. Unity of effort requires troop
contributing nations and civilian agencies in the AO to coordinate assets and operations. The multinational
force commander is responsible for achieving unity of effort while executing multinational logistics. When
possible, the logistics staff officer (G-4 or S-4 at the battalion or brigade levels) develops the multinational
logistics concepts of support using unity of effort. Effective multinational logistics are flexible, responsive,
and predictive, and they provide timely sustainment support throughout the entire operation for a
multinational force. The plan for multinational logistics incorporates logistics requirements of all
contributing forces.
5-3. To increase unity of effort, effective commanders consider multinational logistics requirements and
support issues early during planning. Commanders should comprehend multinational forces’ doctrine and
have good relations with subordinate commanders and civilian leaders. All partners providing logistics
support and operational elements should understand the concept of support based on national caveats. This
understanding begins during the initial planning phase and continues through all phases of the operation.
5-4. Commanders coordinate logistics based on standardization, multilateral, and bilateral agreements among
troop contributing nations, achievable standardization, and levels of interoperability. Under certain
conditions, creating a single multinational logistics command provides economy of assets and system
efficiency. Even if multinational participants (for national command reasons) maintain a national logistics
structure, assigning a lead for logistics responsibility precludes duplication of effort. The G-4 or S-4
establishes a planning group with members from all participating nations to define the extent of
interoperability that exists among multinational forces. Commanders identify the funding authority early to
support multinational force logistics and develop procedures to prevent an adverse impact on operations.
5-5. Multinational operations complicate logistics support and reduce the degree of flexibility inherent in a
national logistics system. Although responsible for logistics support of its national forces, not all nations have
deployable logistic capabilities. Such nations depend on other nations for all or part of their support. In these
cases, the multinational force provides deployment and sustainment to military and civilian organizations.
For deployment, close liaison with theater airlift C2 helps coordinate approval and facilitate airlift once
approved. When support is required, close liaison ensures clear funding lines. |
3-16 | 60 | Chapter 5
RESPONSIBILITY FOR LOGISTICS
5-6. Logistics is a national responsibility during multinational operations. Some nations do not want to
relinquish authority of logistics assets. However, relations between NATO and the United States have
evolved enough that logistics is a collective responsibility with NATO support agency oversight. The
multinational commander needs the authority and control mechanisms for logistics to accomplish the
mission. Each nation performing logistics functions separately would be inefficient and expensive. The
multinational logistics staff handles mutual logistics support among multinational partners. The planning
staff designs the plans to complement partner nations’ capabilities and minimize weaknesses. After which,
participating nations discuss which nations provide support functions for the multinational force and the
procedures and methods those nations will use to provide that support. (For additional information on
multinational logistics, refer to JP 4-0, AJP-4, FM 4-0, and applicable NATO STANAGs.)
5-7. The multinational force may exercise some control over national logistics units or act as the coordinating
authority. The degree of control depends on existing agreements and arrangements negotiated with troop
contributing nations. The multinational force commander is responsible for delivery of logistics to the
multinational force. This can be accomplished by establishing a logistics coordination center headed by the
G-4 or J-4 to coordinate common logistics support in the AO.
5-8. The logistics coordination center identifies and determines responsibility for common logistics support
capabilities from national authorities. Common logistics support capabilities provided to a multinational
force do not negate national logistics support requirements. Early coordination between national authorities
and multinational force commanders is essential in identifying common logistics support capabilities and
responsibility for their provision.
5-9. Three methods of executing cooperative logistics exist in a multinational force. Each method is executed
as a standalone method or combined with the other methods. Regardless of the method used, national
decisions and commitments are made early in the planning cycle. The three methods:
• The lead nation concept. For this method, one nation provides the framework for one or more
logistics functions to support the multinational force.
• A role-specialization nation. Under this method, one nation provides a particular class of supply or
service for all or most of the multinational force.
• Multinational integrated logistics unit. For this method, two or more nations form an integrated
logistics support structure to provide supply or support functions to the multinational force.
PLANNING FOR LOGISTICS
5-10. It is essential to conduct logistics planning in parallel and collaboration with operational planning to
ensure success in multinational operations. The multinational staff must have required logistics personnel in
place early to facilitate planning and coordination with nations. The multinational logistics staff will develop
the logistics plans to support the commander’s operation and disseminate logistics requirements to individual
nations. Logistics planners share partial planning data with partner nations to facilitate parallel planning.
Staffs—
• Evaluate the level of standardization and interoperability among participating nations.
• Determine and account for differences in logistics doctrine, capabilities, methods for computing
requirements, stockage levels, organizations, and communications and information systems.
• Account for differences in language, values, religious and moral beliefs, economic infrastructure,
nutritional standards, and social outlooks that affect logistics support to multinational forces.
5-11. Nongovernmental organizations may provide logistics support to the local population. However, in
some circumstances when military support is required, logistics planners may be required to address the
requirements of the local population as a part of the logistics plan of the operation order.
5-12. Logistics personnel prepare logistics in the theater of operations for a flexible operational support plan.
Logistics personnel perform actions at all echelons to optimize the means (force structure, multinational and
host-nation resources, and strategic lift) to support the multinational force commander’s plan. Personnel
identify resources available in the theater of operations for use by multinational forces and ensure access to
those resources. (Refer to FM 4-0 for more information on sustainment preparation.) These actions include— |
3-16 | 61 | Sustainment During Multinational Operations
• Identifying and preparing intermediate staging base and forward logistics bases or forward logistics
elements.
• Selecting and improving lines of communications.
• Coordinating multinational logistics support.
• Forecasting and building operational stock assets forward and afloat.
• Identifying resources in Army prepositioned stocks that may support mission partners.
5-13. Sustainment planners collaborate with mission partners to develop appropriate solutions for key
interoperable sustainment procedures, to include—
• Reporting sustainment status information and developing a recognized sustainment picture for the
multinational force.
• Requesting and tracking sustainment support requests for specific classes of supply or other
sustainment capabilities such as transportation and mass vehicle recovery.
• Executing other key sustainment interoperable tasks as required by the specific mission and
commander’s interoperability guidance.
ACQUISITION AND CROSS-SERVICING AGREEMENTS
5-14. An acquisition and cross-servicing agreement is an international agreement with countries or
international organizations that allows U.S. forces to exchange most common types of support, including
food, fuel, transportation, ammunition, and equipment. This agreement sets the terms and conditions under
which the reimbursable acquisition or transfer of logistics support, supplies, and services can occur. Often
the agreement exists between U.S. forces and foreign governments or international organizations with which
the United States has an agreement. An acquisition and cross-servicing agreement does not bind either partner
financially or politically to provide support. Partners to an agreement support requests consistent with
national laws and policies. An implementing arrangement is a supplementary arrangement for logistics
support, supplies, and services. This supplement prescribes details, terms, and conditions to implement
acquisition and cross-servicing agreements effectively. (Refer to JP 3-16 for more on acquisition and cross-
servicing agreements.)
HOST-NATION SUPPORT
5-15. The multinational command analyzes the physical infrastructure in the host nation to determine what
facilities and services are available to support the command and to determine how the command minimizes
the sustainment footprint. The command understands the culture, business practices, laws, religious
implications, and political and social structures of the host nation. Analysis includes location and the
command’s needs. AOs without a functioning government provide limited support. Multinational
commanders integrate host-nation support into the logistics structure of the command to ensure effective use.
Commanders allocate this support based on command priorities. Nations coordinate and agree on methods
of concluding host-nation support at the end of an operation.
5-16. The host nation has legal, financial, acquisition, medical, and administrative experts. These experts
provide liaison support to sustainment staff to identify and procure host-nation support. This support ensures
that the command’s requirements are met and prevents competition between partners.
5-17. While local procurement efforts are beneficial to the host nation, these efforts sometimes undermine
important command goals. An otherwise innocent procurement decision may have a significant political
meaning in the host nation. Procurement actions may inflate local prices with negative impacts on local
groups or civilian agencies. These effects can influence the attainment of the end state and the timing of
withdrawal.
5-18. The command obtains authorization from national authorities to negotiate for host-nation support.
Agreements with the host nation include the authority for the command to deal directly with the host nation
for support. The command develops a list of current host-nation agreements. The command legal advisor and
Department of State or Ministry of Foreign Affairs political advisor negotiate host-nation support
agreements. Negotiable agreements are for local contracting, currency exchange rates, local hire wage scales,
and customs regulations. |
3-16 | 62 | Chapter 5
5-19. The sustainment staff evaluates the effectiveness of current host-nation contracts between the host
nation and civilian agencies in the AO. Then, the staff determines the best lead agency (military or civilian)
to negotiate and contract for host-nation support. (Table 5-1 provides host-nation considerations for support.)
Table 5-1. Host-nation considerations
Items and Considerations
Accommodations Communication
• Billeting • Local
• Offices • International
• Stores and warehouses • Security
• Workshops and vehicle parks Finance Payment for
• Medical • Accommodations, supplies,
• Hardstands communications, equipment, local labor
maintenance, medical, and movement
• Fuel
facilities
• Weapons and ammunition storage
• Emergency facilities
• Transportation, including aircraft
• Personal facilities
• Firing ranges
Fuel
• Training areas and facilities
• Aircraft
• Recreation areas and facilities
• Vehicles
• Laundry and dry-cleaning facilities
• Ships
• Postal facility
• Methods of delivery
• Mortuary facilities
• Storage
Weapons and Ammunition
• Interoperability of refueling equipment
• Security
• Common use of refueling installations
• Storage
Rations
• Collection or delivery
• Fresh
Local Labor
• Pack
• Method of hiring
• Potable water
• Method of payment
Translation
• Administration
• Interpreters and language specialists
Medical
• Translation of documents
• Normal facilities
• Emergency facilities Supplies and Equipment (other than
ammunition, fuel, or rations)
• Reciprocal national health agreements
• Common use items
• Evacuation of casualties
• Medical and blood supply system |
3-16 | 63 | Sustainment During Multinational Operations
Table 5-1. Host-nation considerations (continued)
Items and Considerations
Maintenance Water
• Accommodations • Production and purification capability
• Vehicles • Municipal
• Ships • Other water treatment systems
• Equipment • Distribution capability
• Roads (including snow clearance) • Trucks
• Fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft • Pipeline
• Provision of assembly areas • Hoseline
• Damage control • Storage capability
• Emergency facilities for visitors’ vehicles • Receipt and issue capability
and equipment • Available water sources
• Recovery and transportation of disabled • Wells
vehicles and equipment
• Surface
• Waste and disposal
• Subsurface
Movement • Host-nation water quality standards
• Airheads
Transportation Equipment
• Alternates • Host-nation military vehicles, equipment,
• Facilities ships, aircraft
• Ships • Locally hired vehicles and equipment,
• Equipment ships, aircraft
• Refueling • Policy on drivers and handlers for above
• Ports • Electricity (locally procured or generator)
• Alternates • Trash pick-up
• Draft • Other services
• Bunkering and fueling
• Repair
• Road and rail movement
• Personnel
• Security
• Traffic control
• Pipeline movement
5-20. The national government handles agreements for transferring defense goods and services between
nations. This is cumbersome and time consuming. Support provided and received in multinational operations
should comply with existing legal authorities. Under an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement, national
authorities enter into agreements for acquiring or cross-servicing logistics support, supplies, and services on
a reimbursable, replacement-in-kind, or exchange for equal value basis. The acquisition and cross-servicing
agreement is a broad overall agreement, generally supplemented by an implementing arrangement. The J-4
and the Department of State with the country involved write the agreement in the acquisition and cross-
servicing agreement. The DOD and the country involved provide the approval and sign the agreement. Major
commands in country negotiate the details with their counterparts and document the services (whether used
or not) on a statement of requirements for exchange of support and services. The implementing arrangement
contains details on orders for logistics support. The G-4 or S-4 documents receipt of agreed-upon services to
prevent fraudulent payment for services not provided.
OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT CONSIDERATIONS
5-21. Operational contract support (OCS) is the process of planning for and obtaining supplies, services, and
minor construction from commercial sources in support of combatant commander-directed operations.
Commercial support can provide cost-effective surge capability and skills not organic to the unit (such as |
3-16 | 64 | Chapter 5
translators). Army theater sustainment commands and expeditionary sustainment commands play a key role
in planning and executing OCS operational actions. As the senior command requiring activity for
sustainment-related OCS, these units provide expertise to OCS planning activities. Theater sustainment
commands and expeditionary sustainment commands provide guidance on developing acquisition-ready
requirement packages for theater-wide support requirements. There are second-order effects considerations
when using commercial support such as local population employment and economic stimulation. Integrating
contractors and their equipment into military operations can prove challenging. Contractor challenges involve
additional mission risk when compared to using organic support capabilities, such as potential loss of
flexibility, additional force protection, and security-related requirements. Additionally, the commander has
limited authority to keep contractors on the job, when compared to military members, a fact often not
understood by operational commanders and their staffs. (Refer to JP 4-10, ATP 4-10, and ATP 4-10.1 for
additional information on OCS.)
5-22. Multinational forces rely on contracted support to perform many support functions and tasks. Factors
that have led to this increased reliance include—
• Reductions in the size of military forces (especially in the combat support and sustainment areas).
• Increases in tempo and missions undertaken by the military during large-scale combat operations.
• Increased complexity and sophistication of weapon systems.
• A continued push to gain efficiencies and reduce costs through outsourcing or privatizing
commercially adaptable functions.
5-23. The logistics directorate of a multinational staff oversees OCS and contractors providing support to the
multinational force in a designated operational area. Centralized coordination of contracting efforts is
essential to manage limited resources. This coordination ensures the multinational force OCS priorities.
Through centralized coordination of contracting efforts, a multinational force derives maximum benefits
from volume procurements, optimize competition, avoid price escalation, and minimize opportunities for
local black-market operations.
5-24. Early planning is critical for effective and efficient OCS in multinational operations. From an
operational planning point of view, many considerations influence when commands use contract support in
multinational operations. Common contract support considerations include the—
• Type of operation. Operations with a higher risk of combat, such as initial entry operations and
large-scale combat operations, are less suitable for outsourcing than lower risk operations such as
peacekeeping and stabilization operations.
• Phase of the operation. In the early stages of an operation, military units support military functions
because of high risk, efficiency, operational effectiveness, and security. As an environment
stabilizes and risk reduces, selected support functions transfer to a lead nation or role specialist
nations to provide their contract support.
• Protection of contractors. Although contractors are mostly self-sufficient, they are not combatants.
The force is generally responsible for the security of contractor employees accompanying the force.
5-25. Multinational partners have a collective responsibility for planning and implementing contracted
support. This responsibility encourages partner nations to identify support requirements that host-nation
contracted services, supplies, minor construction, and created contractual arrangements can meet. Through
prior arrangements, these nations share providing as well as using contractor capabilities and resources to
support the force.
5-26. Planning and preparation for providing contracted support in multinational operations begins with a
concept of support. Multinational partners use existing common logistics role specialist agreements, lead
nation agreements, and other available Service, joint, and allied contracting support agencies that provide
contracting services on a reimbursable basis. Properly prepared and funded, contracted support enhances
support to operations, releases military resources for higher priority tasks elsewhere, overcomes identified
sustainment shortfalls, and provides endurance where needed with less impact on military assets than would
be the case without it. (Refer to ATP 4-10 and ATP 4-10.1 for additional information on contract support.)
5-27. As a matter of policy, U.S. contract support to multinational partners is limited to supplies, services,
and minor construction planned and procured for support of U.S. forces. Additionally, standards of support
for contracted services are the same standard established by the national support element providing the |
3-16 | 65 | Sustainment During Multinational Operations
support. Finally, proper funding approval must adhere to national laws and policies of all parties before
receiving or providing contract support. More specifically, U.S. policy and law require an approved
acquisition and cross-servicing agreement, and when appropriate, an implementation agreement before U.S.
forces provide contracted supplies, services, and minor construction to any multinational partner.
5-28. Determining the appropriate contract support arrangements is a critical step in multinational contract
support planning. Three generally acceptable contract support sharing arrangements exist:
• Lead nation. This is the most common form of multinational contract support arrangement in which
one nation is designated the lead common contract support provider.
• Role specialist nation. Similar to lead nation arrangement, this form of multinational contract
support has one or several nations arrange for contracted support for a single service such as fuel,
medical evacuation, security, force protection, food, and maintenance.
• Multinational support capability. Nations normally use multinational contract support only for large-
scale and long-term operations and base it on a formal alliance capability. This type of direct contract
support arrangement is complex and takes significant time to plan and implement.
5-29. During multinational operations, it is possible to stand up a theater allied contracting office to contract
for selected goods and services in limited supply in the operational area or are commonly needed by the entire
force. To coordinate theater allied contracting office activities, the multinational force contractors may
publish a restricted-items list that identifies critical, limited supplies and services in the operational area.
Staffs coordinate this procurement with the contracting coordination center. The theater allied contracting
office negotiates base ordering agreements for use by all participating nations.
5-30. The multinational force’s authority over the control, support, and integration of contractors is limited.
Accordingly, the multinational force contract personnel coordinate contractor management policies and
procedures between the major multinational partners including movement control, minimum government
furnished support arrangements, legal jurisdiction, and visa requirements. (Refer to JP 4-0 for more
information on logistics support of multinational operations.) The multinational logistics procurement
support board helps with multinational force contracts to ensure these policies and procedures are
incorporated into contributing nation’s contracts and included in their national contract oversight.
UNITED NATIONS LOGISTICS SYSTEM
5-31. The UN logistics system requires member states to be self-sufficient at the unit level for 60 to 120 days.
This allows the UN to organize a logistics structure, acquire real estate and facilities, and establish contracts
and local memorandums of understanding and letters of assistance to provide support for the multinational
force.
5-32. A UN survey and assessment team evaluates operational requirements and develops planning data for
sustainment. When participating in UN missions, the command sends a logistics representative with the UN
survey team if possible. The multinational force coordinates with UN forces to improve the unity of effort
and reduce potential conflicts.
FORCE LOGISTICS SUPPORT CENTER
5-33. In most cases, the UN will ask a member state, or states, to form a force logistics support group. The
group incorporates logistics units from participating nations. A state accepting the group role and the chief
logistics officer at the force headquarters establish local contracts to support the force. Even with a force
logistics support group, member states are responsible for specific national elements of resupply—such as
repair parts, clothing, food, and major end item replacements—unless nations establish an agreement to
provide this support. This support is on a reimbursable basis under an arrangement that the UN and
contributing nation’s government agree to before deployment.
CONTRACTOR CONCEPT
5-34. The UN economizes logistics support by using contractors. The goal is to achieve the most economical
logistics organization that meets the demands of the force and releases military manpower for redeployment.
Force headquarters coordinate the process. UN contracting does not fall under the logistics division. It falls
under the purchasing and transportation services division. UN procurement is bureaucratic and slow. It is |
3-16 | 66 | Chapter 5
decentralized and each agency uses its own procedures. The Inter-Agency Procurement Services Office of
the UN Development Programme creates a standard procurement system.
5-35. The UN chief administrative officer does not work for the multinational force commander but reports
to the Special Representative of the Secretary General. The civilian logistics infrastructure officers, including
the budget officer, report to the chief administrative officer. Mission partners require the chief administrative
officer to solve logistics problems. Continuous liaison required between military and civilian counterparts
allows synchronized effort.
5-36. The UN normally coordinates logistics standards for some bulk supplies and services. Logistics support
that extends beyond what the UN agreement outlines is not reimbursable. National standards such as
consumption rates, space requirements, and safety levels typically exceed UN standards. Sophisticated
multinational military equipment requires different standards of support from what the UN has agreed to
provide or fund. The G-4 or S-4 understands UN standards concerning level and quality of support provided
and funded. The multinational force stands prepared to bring its own support in the areas where the UN-
provided support is deficient.
MULTINATIONAL RECEPTION, STAGING, ONWARD MOVEMENT,
AND INTEGRATION
5-37. Movement is critical to multinational force operations. A multinational force headquarters, or its
supporting combatant command, plans and executes all intertheater movement. However, it remains a
national responsibility to move forces into an operational area. The multinational force headquarters
coordinates these deployments to support the commander’s plans and controls intratheater movement through
reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI).
INTERMEDIATE STAGING BASE
5-38. Nations participating in multinational operations consult with the multinational force commander to
determine if the force needs an intermediate staging base. If established, the intermediate staging base will
be outside the operational area. The commander balances numerous requirements, including greater lift
requirements, against better efficiency. Multinational forces assemble and stage in an intermediate staging
base, especially if combat is imminent. Units can better solve problems and correct deficiencies in a
nonhostile environment. The intermediate staging base provides a secure area to assemble, train, equip, and
build the multinational force into a cohesive team. The multinational force headquarters staff assembles first
and works together, followed by the rest of the multinational force. The intermediate staging base provides
sufficient billeting and training capacity to support the entire multinational force at once. Access to airports
and seaports for smooth reception of the force and its subsequent deployment is critical. If the multinational
operation is a lesser regional contingency or a second major regional contingency, an intermediate staging
base is not possible.
MULTINATIONAL RECEPTION
5-39. Reception is the first movement for sustainment in RSOI. At ports of debarkation, units work with host-
nation, contracted host-nation support, and multi-Service personnel to secure the port, discharge equipment,
process equipment and personnel, and move units to marshaling areas. Host-nation forces perform and help
with many of these functions. The multinational force headquarters assigns a troop contributing nation to
oversee and help the host nation perform these functions. If host-nation support forces are not available, then
national units perform those functions. The multinational task force commander plans for all units in the
strategic flow. Some national forces have limited capability, so the commander specifies functions for these
units based on planning staff recommendations.
5-40. Commanders integrate the strategic and theater of operations movement requirements to prevent
congestion at seaports and airports. Establishing intratheater hubs maximizes cargo throughput and improves
theater distribution. Nations provide movement data to the multinational force theater movement control
system. This data provides information for the direct delivery or transloading of passengers and cargo. It
deconflicts strategic movements with other theater of operations movements. |
3-16 | 67 | Sustainment During Multinational Operations
5-41. Civilian agencies help by shipping relief supplies. These agencies often cause transportation choke
points en route to and in the theater of operations. A G-4 or S-4 link with the civil-military operations center
can solve transportation choke points. The civil-military operations center can work with civilian agencies to
gain access to civilian ports of entry and infrastructure.
5-42. The multinational force designates a director of mobility forces. The director is normally a senior
officer familiar with the AO and has an extensive background in airlift operations. The director is the
designated agent for all airlift issues in the AO and for other duties as directed.
MULTINATIONAL STAGING
5-43. Staging is that part of the RSOI operation that reassembles and reunites unit personnel with their
equipment and schedules unit movement to the tactical assembly area, secures or uploads unit basic loads,
and provides life support to personnel. During this phase, the following occurs:
• Units reassemble and unite with their equipment and are scheduled for movement toward the tactical
assembly area.
• Materiel is segregated, prioritized, and prepared for transport.
• Units upload Class V supplies.
• Units provide deploying Soldiers life support until units are self-sustaining.
MULTINATIONAL ONWARD MOVEMENT
5-44. The onward movement phase of RSOI begins when units move to their destination. Multinational units
accomplish such movement to ensure the forward and concurrent movement of troops and supplies. Units
follow a carefully devised movement program that employs convoy, rail, and host-nation contract assets
(such as heavy equipment transporters and other trucks). Centralized control of transportation assets is
required. Real estate management is a problem unless a multinational counterpart to the U.S. joint force
utilization board (usually controlled by engineers) has authority to allocate terrain to all forces and agencies.
5-45. When planning the movement of multinational forces, planners know the details of the organization,
equipment, capabilities, and limitations of the forces. Planners know how to request intratheater movement
of multinational forces consistent with the multinational commander’s operation plan. The movement
complements sequencing of operations and time-phased force deployment. Movement planners consider all
assets (joint, multinational, nongovernmental, governmental, host nation, and third country) and modes (air,
land, or sea) of transport. Planner also consider infrastructure limitations to maximize efficiency. For
example, planners consider tunnel heights and rail gauge when conducting movement in Europe. During
execution of these movements, movement control personnel physically validate actual movements.
MULTINATIONAL INTEGRATION
5-46. Integration is the last phase for sustainment in RSOI. During integration, combat-ready multinational
units transfer to the operational commander and merge into the tactical plan. The transfer may require
interaction and familiarization among multinational units. The transfer may also require that arriving
multinational units meet certain standards before being completely integrated into the combat plan.
Consequently, requirements for integration planning and coordination occur early in the force projection
process. Units modify requirements according to mission variables until units achieve force closure.
CONSIDERATIONS
5-47. Commanders and staffs participating in multinational operations consider and answer the questions in
paragraphs 5-48 through 5-55 with respect to the logistics portion of the operation.
SUPPORT AND CAPABILITIES
5-48. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following support and capabilities questions with
respect to the logistics portion of the operation:
• What areas come under multinational control? What areas remain national issues?
• What logistics service and support are available?
• What impact will current sanctions have on the ability to receive host-nation support (such as
banking, payments, insurance, and worker’s compensation)? |
3-16 | 68 | Chapter 5
• Does the unit have sufficient assets (such as maintenance, communications, and transportation) to
conduct its movement and mission? Will it require support?
• What are the specific logistics capabilities of each nation of the multinational force?
• What mortuary affairs capabilities does the command have?
• What legal restrictions do national laws impose on logistics support?
• Do national legal authorities permit providing logistics support among multinational nations?
• Are mutual logistics support agreements in accordance with existing legal authorities?
• What is the system for property accountability?
• What special clothing and equipment requirements have a long lead time to obtain, such as
nonmilitary supplies or riot control gear?
• What are the procedures to provide support such as transportation, housing, and meals to diplomats
and distinguished visitors? What coordination is there with a joint visitors bureau on this?
• What is the system for preventing fraud, waste, and abuse?
• How does the command assess logistics requests, requirements, and actions to ensure that they are
valid with respect to the operation and authority given to the command?
• How does the command adequately secure logistics assets?
• Will the command establish a common retail store at some point during operations?
• How will the intelligence staff incorporate logistics and engineer assets into the information
collection plan?
• What are the acquisition and cross-servicing agreement procedures to account for and reimburse
nations for services and supplies exchanged between nations?
• What are the common supplies and services that one nation or a multinational organization might
provide?
• Is there an agreement that authorizes forces to exchange mutual logistics support of goods and
services and that accounts for the amounts received?
• Will there be, and if so when and how, a transfer of authority of national logistics assets to the
multinational force?
• What is the multinational force’s authority to redistribute logistics assets and services under routine
and emergency conditions?
• How will the command maintain national asset accountability from the national sustaining base to
the front-line units?
• How will the command ensure compatibility and interoperability of communications and
information systems, including automated data processing interfaces between the multinational and
national support systems?
• How will the command prioritize, allocate, and use common infrastructure capabilities (ports,
airfields, and fire and rescue roads) to support military intervention, occupation, and civil
administration?
• Which entity is responsible to ensure ports have the necessary birthing capacity, depth, and materials
handling equipment to accommodate certain sized and capacity ships?
• Which entity is responsible to identify rail widths and gauging to accept International Organization
for Standardization or NATO standards? What is the plan to establish necessary transfer points to
overcome when differences occur?
• Which entity monitors road networks to understand route capabilities or limitations and general
(surface composition, width, height, weight, and hazardous material or impacts of weather and time
or distance factors?
• What are the existing STANAGs that facilitate multinational logistics support?
• What is the logistics support structure? How will it identify capabilities and responsibilities of troop
contributing nations?
• Does the multinational force have an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement among
multinational nations?
• Does the logistics structure have one officer in charge or a main point of contact for management of
contract personnel?
• Have contractor procedures been established to allow total multinational participation in contracts
led by national personnel and used by multinational personnel? |
3-16 | 69 | Sustainment During Multinational Operations
• Is there a need to establish a multinational logistics command or element? If so, has its staffing been
determined?
• Has the relationship between the multinational and national logistics elements been clearly defined?
• Have lead nations been designated where appropriate?
• Have logistics reporting procedures been established throughout the force?
• Do all forces know and comply with the infrastructure repair plan?
• Is there duplication of effort in the support plan for the operation?
• If there is a need, what is the composition of the multinational logistics command or element?
• Have coordination centers been established for movements, medical support, contracting,
infrastructure engineering, and logistics operations?
• What is the transitional plan for operational assumption of in-place contracts, equipment, facilities,
and personnel belonging to another agency or alliance?
• Are multinational legal representatives available to provide council on national law, international
law, and legal agreements?
• Have customs clearance procedures been established at ports of embarkation?
• Have standards been identified for logistics support? Is there a plan to perform, inspect, and ascertain
compliance with these standards before deployment?
• What is the division of responsibilities among multinational, national, and host-nation logistics
support?
• How will each class of supply be handled?
• What are the multinational force’s capabilities to receive, store, and issue dry cargo, fuel, and water
(including water production and purification capability)?
• Does the multinational force have the means to communicate requirements to the multinational
logistics management center?
• What materials handling equipment is available in the multinational force and host nation?
• Does the multinational force have a load of ammunition? What are ammunition procedures?
• What are the multinational force’s special requirements including tents, cots, reverse-osmosis water
purification units, laundry, latrines, and batteries?
• What are the military assistance program requirements for multinational forces?
• What is the best method for providing potable water?
• Have the engineers, preventive medicine personnel, and other staff officers been consulted about
potable water? Using bottled water has an added advantage of enhancing troop morale.
• What is available in lessons learned databases for specific requirements, planning factors, and
potential problem areas?
• Has liaison been established with other multinational nations and civilian agencies to obtain the
most up-to-date logistics information on the AO?
• What are the personnel augmentation requirements and equipment needed for mission support?
• Have basing rights and diplomatic clearances critical to mobility been secured?
• What are intratheater capabilities and resources of civilian agencies in the AO?
• What current agreements exist with other participating nations that provide for logistics support?
• Does this include agreements governing logistics support with representatives of other nations?
• What quality controls have been established for all services and supplies such as petroleum, oils,
and lubricants, water, and food? How will those controls be monitored?
• What are the procedures to ensure in-transit visibility at all transportation nodes? Lack of in-transit
visibility causes loss of confidence in the supply system and leads to unnecessary reordering, further
clogging the supply lines.
• For UN operations, what standards are followed concerning support?
• What is the support plan for redeployment of forces and materiel?
• What logistics infrastructure, materiel, and capabilities remain in country for use by subsequent
forces or organizations?
• What are the possible environmental impacts on the host nation providing support?
(For additional information on environmental considerations, refer to ATP 3-34.5.) |
3-16 | 70 | Chapter 5
FUNDING
5-49. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following funding questions with respect to the
logistics portion of the operation:
• Has it been determined if, or to what extent, operational-related expenses are reimbursed from
common funding or sources external to national funding by the participating nations?
• Has funding been identified to defense support of civil authorities or reimbursement expenditures?
What are the limits on funding authority?
• What is the availability of common funding of contracting, multinational headquarters
establishment, and general or common support?
• What are the accounting and reimbursement procedures for services and supplies exchanged
between nations? Are replacement-in-kind procedures included?
• Has the probable cost of multinational operations been determined? Is the probable cost acceptable?
• What are the funding requirements for renting facilities for defense support of civil authorities?
• Does the command have funding codes from all multinational nations? What methods and
documentation are required to record all expenditures?
• How will the command capture costs associated with supporting the multinational force?
HOST-NATION SUPPORT
5-50. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following host-nation support questions with respect
to the logistics portion of the operation:
• Has host-nation support been evaluated to determine the logistics support available? Are law
enforcement, sanitation, medical services, facilities, storage, and materiel included?
• What are the capabilities of existing infrastructure? Do they include water treatment plants, power
stations, reservoirs, and bulk and retail fuel storage? Engineers or facility managers provide critical
information on the availability of existing facilities.
• Have negotiations to secure support either been established or completed?
• What is the impact of obtaining host-nation support on the host nation’s economy?
• What are the possible environmental impacts on the host nation providing this support?
• What technical agreements—such as environmental cleanup; customs duties and taxes; and
hazardous material and waste storage, transit, and disposal—need be developed to augment host-
nation support agreements?
(For additional information, refer to sections 2341 through 2350 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code, Acquisition
and Cross-Servicing Agreements.)
MAINTENANCE
5-51. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following maintenance questions with respect to the
logistics portion of the operation:
• Do the multinational forces have maintenance support?
• Do the multinational forces have the means to order and receive repair parts?
• Do multinational forces have wreckers, stake and platform trailers, or heavy equipment transporters?
• Do the multinational forces have communications repair facilities?
CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR DEFENSE
5-52. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following CBRN defense questions with respect to
the logistics portion of the operation:
• What logistics resources exist to assist multinational forces to counter CBRN hazards to include
toxic industrial materials such as at medical treatment facilities or industrial facilities? (Are U.S.
policies and guidelines acceptable to other nations if none exists?)
• Is the necessary CBRN protection, detection, and reconnaissance equipment available to troops to
counter the threat and continue their mission in a CBRN environment?
• Are adequate unit and theater stocks of individual protective equipment available?
• What plans exist to protect and train military dependents, contractors, and locally hired civilians
against threats of weapons of mass destruction? |
3-16 | 71 | Sustainment During Multinational Operations
TRANSPORTATION
5-53. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following transportation questions with respect to the
logistics portion of the operation:
• What is the multinational transportation command structure?
• What are the available multinational air and sea lines of communications?
• What are assigned airlift and sealift capabilities and allocations? Are the requirements to support
both military and civilian agencies included?
• What are the requirements for and capabilities, limitations, and availability of airfields, seaports,
and inland transportation systems in the departure, intermediate staging, and objective areas?
• What resources are required for new construction or necessary improvements to existing facilities?
• What is the multinational RSOI process?
• What is the ability of the host nation to receive personnel and equipment at ports and airfields?
• What are the access rights in the AO? The command coordinates diplomatic efforts to arrange for—
▪ Support, country, and diplomatic clearances.
▪ Over-flight rights.
▪ Basing for forces in transit from one locality to another.
• What is the capability of transportation systems to move forces once they arrive in the theater of
operations?
• Do multinational forces have tactical rotary- and fixed-wing assets for intratheater supply?
• Who supplies transportation supply throughput from the multinational logistics center for
multinational forces?
• Do multinational forces have transportation assets for moving troops?
• How will the command control movement into and out of airfields and seaports?
• How will transportation facilities be shared with civilian agencies and contractors?
• Is rail a feasible transportation method? If so, can rail cars transport tactical equipment (tanks)?
• Are the railhead facilities usable?
• Are there sufficient on and off load capabilities?
• What are the security requirements for rail transport by the multinational force or host nation?
• Will nontactical vehicles be needed for the operations? If so, how many and what types (such as
vans, sedans, and buses)?
• Will the host-nation or multinational force provide or contract nontactical vehicles?
• Will there be other transportation requirements based on mission location, weather, or lack of
transportation infrastructure?
MANNING AND EQUIPPING
5-54. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following manning and equipping questions with
respect to the logistics portion of the operation:
• Have deploying units provided planning numbers of deploying forces?
• Have deploying units provided planning numbers of deploying equipment, types of containers, and
number of containers?
HUMAN RESOURCES SUPPORT
5-55. The G-1 or J-1 is the principal staff assistant to the commander on human resources support. This
individual provides guidance, oversight, and coordination of manpower and personnel issues. The G-1 or J-1
coordinates finance support and manages the religious ministry and legal personnel support. The G-1 is
responsible for human resources support for national contingents. Commanders and staff consider and answer
the following questions with respect to the human resources portion of the operation:
• How are multinational forces accounting for losses and conducting replacement operations?
• What are the processes for ensuring postal operations continue during operations?
• How is personnel accountability being conducted at theater ports of debarkation?
• How are government civilians and contractors being tracked and accounted for? |
3-16 | 73 | Chapter 6
Medical Support During Multinational Operations
This chapter begins by discussing multinational considerations for medical support. It
continues by discussing Army Health System support and functions, medical planning,
and health threat assessment. This chapter then discusses medical support policies and
issues, medical countermeasures, and standards of care. Lastly, this chapter provides
considerations for commanders and staffs.
MULTINATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR MEDICAL SUPPORT
6-1. The multinational force commander ensures that forces deliver medical care rapidly, effectively, and
efficiently without interfering with the multinational force mission. Medical care is a national responsibility.
The command assesses medical support requirements and capabilities both quantitatively and qualitatively
and provides guidance to enhance the effectiveness of medical support through shared use of assets. Any
medical services that a nation cannot provide requires coverage by agreements between national governments
of the nations in the multinational force. This agreement requires coordinating all medical assets, providing
a detailed support plan, and performing effective liaison among senior medical officers of each nation. The
multinational command surgeon plans, coordinates, and synchronizes the medical support plan based on
actual capabilities of troop contributing nations with standing medical agreements among the troop
contributing nations. The concept of one nation’s forces being treated by another nation’s medical personnel
or in another nation’s medical treatment facilities should be achievable.
ARMY HEALTH SYSTEM SUPPORT TO MULTINATIONAL
OPERATIONS
6-2. Military medical operations are typically joint in nature and often conducted with the armed forces of
two or more partner nations. Army medical units may be tasked to conduct multinational operations in pursuit
of common objectives. Each multinational operation is unique. Key considerations involved in planning and
executing these types of operations vary with the international situation and perspectives, motives, and values
of the organization’s members. Partner nations are primarily responsible for providing medical support to
their forces. Nations can also transfer responsibility for this support through agreements with other nations
or the appropriate multinational planning staffs and multinational force commanders. Due to differences in
medical standards, national sensitivities, customs, and training, the United States relies on national resources
to provide joint health services to the maximum extent. (Refer to FM 4-02 for more information on the Army
Health System. Refer to JP 4-02 and JP 3-16 for information on health services.)
ARMY HEALTH SYSTEM FUNCTIONS
6-3. Army Health System support includes both the health service support and force health protection
missions as well as the capabilities in each of the 10 medical functions. The 10 medical functions are medical
treatment (organic and area support), hospitalization, dental services, medical logistics (including blood
management), medical evacuation (including medical regulating), combat and operational stress control,
veterinary services, force health protection, laboratory services, and medical C2. The medical C2 function
integrates, coordinates, and synchronizes the other nine functions into operation plans and operation orders.
Army medical units from each of the 10 medical functions may support multinational operations to ensure
the highest standard of care to wounded or ill Service members.
6-4. The Army medical command (deployment support)—known as MEDCOM (DS)—is the theater medical
command responsible for C2, integration, synchronization, and execution of Army Health System support
throughout the area of responsibility. The Army medical command is assigned to the Army Service
component command and works with the theater army surgeon, multinational force surgeon, and surgeon
cells at each echelon. Together they provide the continual planning, coordination, and synchronization
necessary to reduce health risks, evacuate casualties, provide medical care, and return personnel, as
appropriate, to the fight. The Army medical command integrates and synchronizes all Army Health System |
3-16 | 74 | Chapter 6
operations and provides C2 through its subordinate medical brigades, medical battalions (multifunctional),
and Army medical units providing health service support and force health protection to the deployed force.
(Refer to FM 4-02 for a detailed description of the Army Health System and the deployable Army medical
units that may be tasked to provide this support.)
6-5. During multinational operations, the command clearly defines applicable directives command and
support relationships for providing medical support. The authority creating the multinational force issues
these directives to each national component commander. The national component commander delegates
operational (technical) control of national medical support resources to the senior medical officer to help
coordinate resources in the theater of operations. It may not be possible to establish C2 over all participants.
Some nations have constraints that limit how much command authority a multinational or national
commander can exercise over their forces. Command in its formal sense does not exist and a system of
cooperation exists in its place.
6-6. During operations, the responsibilities of the commander or surgeon at each level include—
• Advising the commander on the health of the command.
• Informing the commander and staff on matters affecting the delivery of healthcare.
• Developing, preparing, coordinating, and monitoring medical support policy and procedures with
commanders of National Health Service units.
• Exploiting medical intelligence data and information derived from national and other Service
sources.
• Monitoring the activities of medical support assets assigned to their command.
• Providing recommendations to minimize health risk to personnel.
• Providing medical education and training.
6-7. The commander and the senior medical officer of each nation understand the legal limits of using non-
national medical treatment facilities and supplies, especially blood, by their nations’ forces. Exchanging
blood between nations is a sensitive issue and requires early coordination. Mutual medical support complies
with existing legal directives. During multinational planning, medical staffs address coordination for any lead
nation, role specialization, or the acquisition and cross-servicing agreement authority. Casualty evacuation,
especially outside the AO, and using non-national medical treatment facilities requires careful planning and
an agreement. Even using locally sourced medical materiel, such as regionally unique antivenins, are subject
to individual national statutory and regulatory standards.
MEDICAL PLANNING
6-8. Medical planning occurs at all levels. Medical planning develops a system that provides the best possible
use of medical support resources in each situation. Considerations include the operational situation
(commander’s overall mission) and medical threat information including endemic diseases and climate
appropriate to the theater of operations. Planners and commanders identify issues specific to the operation
and consider these issues in planning. (Refer to ATP 4-02.55 for detailed information on Army Health System
support planning.)
6-9. The following factors are critical aspects of medical planning:
• Mission and type of operation.
• Operation concept or plan.
• Anticipated duration of the operation.
• Theater evacuation policy.
• Selection and consideration of the medical support plan.
• Health threat assessment, including medical countermeasures.
• Health surveillance.
• Casualty estimates (provided by the G-1 or S-1).
• Provision of patient estimates by the staff and effects on health care delivery.
• Availability of and limitations on resources.
• Availability of and access to host-nation facilities.
• C2 requirements and limitations.
• Medical management of CBRN casualties. |
3-16 | 75 | Medical Support During Multinational Operations
HEALTH THREAT ASSESSMENT
6-10. The health threat assessment is a composite of several conditions:
• Ongoing or potential enemy actions.
• Adverse environmental, occupational, and geographic and meteorological conditions.
• Endemic diseases.
• The use of CBRN weapons or accidental release of CBRN substances.
• Specific training and equipment requirements for environment (such as altitude or extreme cold
weather).
Each of these conditions has the potential to affect the short- or long-term health (including psychological
impact) of personnel. The health threat assessment can preserve the effectiveness of the multinational force
by mitigating wounds, injuries, diseases, and psychological stressors.
MEDICAL SUPPORT POLICIES AND ISSUES
6-11. The multinational force surgeon establishes medical support policies to cover medical support in
multinational operations. The multinational force surgeon establishes policies with medical officers of troop
contributing nations.
6-12. The multinational force policy and coordination should include—
• Medical care eligibility for noncombatants, contractors, dislocated persons, dislocated civilians, and
indigenous civilians plus appropriate reimbursement for nations.
• Medical support coordination provided to or received from a multinational force or other friendly
nations including using host-nation facilities.
• A mass casualty response plan including options for limited resource challenges.
• Liaison establishment with each nation’s surgeon.
• Medical regulations, to include evacuating patients to non-national medical treatment facilities.
• Policies on medical countermeasures and vaccinations.
• Policies on exchanging medical equipment accompanying patients.
• Policies on transferring a patient from one nation’s medical evacuation system to another.
• A mechanism for returning patients to their parent nations after medical treatment in another
nation’s medical treatment facility.
• Medical support to detainee operations and facilities.
• Medical support for CBRN patients.
• An established policy for handling contaminated remains for both temporary storage and transport.
• Policies for mortuary affairs.
• An established evacuation system for the theater of operations, including a theater’s holding and
evacuation policy, mission responsibility, and evacuation control system.
• A requirement for medical reports, including format, content, and frequency.
• Clinical documentation, policy format, and the exchange of clinical records that include the
following:
▪ Medical records of the clinical condition with treatment of each patient so that continuing
treatment in relation to past events and post-deployment actions.
▪ Information to notify the patient’s next of kin.
▪ Information to units for preparing personnel strength returns.
▪ Statistical data for planning purposes and historical records.
▪ Materials for medical research.
▪ Translation of foreign care records.
▪ Information to track patients whose whereabouts are unknown.
• Policies on blood supply source, screening standards, storage, and use.
• Policies on pharmaceutical source, acceptance standards, storage, and use.
• Policies on collecting, sharing, exchanging, and archiving occupational and environmental health
surveillance data and reports. Data and reports include— |
3-16 | 76 | Chapter 6
▪ Air, soil, and water sampling results.
▪ Individual or group exposure results.
▪ Any other environmental sampling.
MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES
6-13. Historically, disease and nonbattle injuries have rendered more Soldiers combat ineffective than actual
operations casualties. The 2019 Coronavirus (known as COVID-19) pandemic highlighted the impact an
infectious disease can have on operations. Medical countermeasures can reduce disease and nonbattle
injuries. The capability to assess the Soldier’s health continuously and improve Soldier sustainability is
required to protect the force.
6-14. The following medical countermeasures ensure effective force medical protection:
• Continuous health surveillance.
• Medical countermeasures, disease prevention, and immunization policies approved by the
multinational force commander and implemented by all troop contributing nations.
STANDARDS OF CARE
6-15. The multinational medical support ensures continuity of patient management at a standard acceptable
to all nations. Achieving the desired degree of patient management depends on the successful interoperability
of treatment principles and clinical policies. As a national responsibility executed under national standards
of care and practice, each nation sets medical policy for its soldiers. As such, multinational commanders
cannot direct a sovereign nation’s armed forces to adopt a different standard for the sake of uniformity across
their command. Patient management is a continuous part of medical care that attends to the clinical needs of
a patient during competition or conflict. While optimal patient management is never compromised unless
dictated by the operational situation, it is also a balance of many conflicting factors. These factors include
the following:
• Treatment.
• Evacuation.
• Resources.
• Environmental and operational conditions.
6-16. Dental support is arranged in levels, reflecting an increase in capability at each succeeding level. The
functions of each lower level of dental support are contained within the capabilities of each higher level. A
preventive dentistry program is provided in the theater of operations.
CONSIDERATIONS
6-17. Commanders and staffs participating in multinational operations consider and answer the questions in
paragraphs 6-18 and 6-19 with respect to medical support.
MEDICAL COMMAND AND CONTROL
6-18. Commanders and staffs answer the following medical C2 questions with respect to medical support:
• How experienced are the commander, surgeon, and staff?
• Are the medical command relationships clearly defined?
• Are there adequate arrangements for coordination and liaison among medical elements, including
translation of foreign care records?
• Has a command surgeon been appointed?
• Are there health services representatives on the assessment team?
• Have troop contributing nations provided staff or a liaison to the multinational force surgeon? |
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MEDICAL SUPPORT PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
6-19. Commanders and staffs answer the following medical support planning considerations questions with
respect to medical support planning:
• Does the health service support plan conform to the operation and administrative plans?
• Is the allocation of medical evacuation capabilities synchronized with the placement of medical
treatment facilities to sustain proximity throughout the continuum of care?
• Does the support plan include flexibility for unseen contingencies (such as weapons of mass
destruction)?
• Are medical support assets sufficiently mobile to provide support to the force?
• Have the following medical protection issues been addressed:
▪ Health threat assessment.
▪ Medical countermeasures and vaccination.
▪ Health surveillance system.
• Who is eligible for treatment?
• Are mass casualty plans established and synchronized?
• When will limited resource triage be initiated?
• How will casualty evacuation be coordinated (dedicated, designated, and platform of opportunity)?
• How will casualty numbers be reported and from whom?
• How will patients be accounted for during unregulated movement?
• Are there sufficient medical evacuation assets?
• Does the theater evacuation policy support available hospitalization, intratheater, and intertheater
medical evacuation capabilities?
• What medical support reports will be available to the multinational force commander?
• What are the arrangements for force health protection measures?
• Are there adequate dental services available?
• What provisions exist for preventing, identifying, and managing combat and operational stress
reactions?
• How will multinational forces obtain Class VIII supplies?
• How will medical equipment be repaired?
• What is the blood supply system?
• How are patient movement items managed?
• Does the support plan include provision of, or access to, limited critical medical equipment such as
magnetic resonance imagery?
• Does the support plan identify any unusual soldier physical screening standards necessary for this
operation?
• What are the medical support requirements for detainee operations and facilities? |
3-16 | 79 | Chapter 7
Special Operations During Multinational Operations
This chapter begins by discussing the considerations for special operations in
multinational operations. It then discusses applicable special operations principles. The
chapter then provides general considerations and coordination. It moves then to a
discussion of C2 for special operations forces. The chapter concludes with
considerations for commanders and staffs including special operations.
MULTINATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS
7-1. Special operations is activities or actions requiring unique modes of employment, tactical techniques,
equipment, and training often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments (JP 3-05).
Special operations forces consist of Active and Reserve Components forces of the Services specifically
organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. For the Army, special operations
include civil affairs, psychological operations, rangers, special forces, special mission units, and Army
special operations aviation forces assigned to the United States Army Special Operations Command.
7-2. As planning for multinational force operations begins, special operations planners add an evaluation of
foreign capabilities. This evaluation helps determine the overall capabilities available to the multinational
force special operations component commander (known as MNFSOCC). Army special operations forces
(known as ARSOF) routinely conduct this evaluation as they accomplish missions in support of the
combatant commander’s campaign plan. These evaluations help the multinational force special operations
component commander make informed decisions. These decisions cover task organizing a nation’s special
operations force contributions, assigning roles and missions, accounting for interoperability requirements,
integrating national capabilities with each other, and creating interdependence among multinational force
special operations echelons or subordinate task forces.
7-3. Army special operations forces contribute to multinational operations by conducting special operations
core activities:
• Direct action.
• Special reconnaissance.
• Countering weapons of mass destruction.
• Counterterrorism.
• Unconventional warfare.
• Foreign internal defense.
• Security force assistance.
• Hostage rescue and recovery (select Army special operations units only).
• Counterinsurgency.
• Foreign humanitarian assistance.
• Military information support operations.
• Civil affairs operations.
PRINCIPLES OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS
7-4. No single activity is ever conducted in isolation. An operation applies any combination of the activities
that make up a special operation. The core principles of discreet, precise, and scalable special operations
enable the achievement of objectives unilaterally, or with or through indigenous forces and populations.
Discreet, precise, and scalable operations provide joint and multinational force commanders a flexible
application of military capabilities in politically sensitive and culturally complex environments. These
operations enhance the credibility and legitimacy of the indigenous population, host nation, or partner nation
with which special operations forces work. (Refer to ADP 3-05 for a discussion on the principles of special
operations.) |
3-16 | 80 | Chapter 7
COORDINATION CRITERIA
7-5. Multinational and bilateral relationships with other nations’ special operations forces often play a critical
part for Army special operations forces executing their role during multinational operations. Shared doctrine,
such as AJP-3.5, facilitates interoperability, integration, and interdependence among these forces.
Commanders carefully coordinate existing relationships between countries’ forces when creating a
multinational force.
7-6. To prepare for large-scale combat operations, the multinational force focuses its training and priorities
on armed conflict against peer and near-peer adversaries. Within the multinational force, special operations
forces fulfill unique requirements to support government agencies, combatant commanders, allies, and
partners across the range of military operations. Special operations forces provide support by preparing
environments for successful large-scale combat operations. Special operations conducted during military
engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence are critical for success when an operational environment
demands crisis response, limited contingency operations, or armed conflict.
7-7. Commanders consider five basic operational mission criteria when determining whether special
operations forces are the appropriate force for their operational requirement:
• The mission is an appropriate special operations force mission or task.
• The mission or task should support the combatant commander’s campaign or operation plan.
• The mission or task is operationally feasible.
• Required resources are available to execute and support the mission.
• The expected outcome of the mission justifies the risk.
(Refer to ADP 3-05 for a full discussion on operational mission criteria.)
COMMAND AND CONTROL FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
DURING MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS
7-8. The command structure for Army special operations forces strongly resembles the structure for U.S.
joint operations. The multinational force commander may establish a special operations component command
as a component of the multinational force. Those Army units capable of establishing a special operations
joint task force (known as SOJTF) or joint special operations task force (known as JSOTF) can lead a
multinational force special operations component command. It is likely that the 1st Special Forces Command
is tasked to establish the core of a special operations’ joint tasks force. The 1st Special Forces Command is
a scalable element organized to establish a special operations joint task force. This capability allows the
command to execute joint, multinational, or combined force special operations component responsibilities
for the operation or theater. The combatant commander must establish appropriate command relationships
among special operations units, such as the theater special operations command, the joint force special
operations component, the special operations joint task force, the joint special operations task force, and the
special operations task force.
7-9. An established special operations joint task force improves interoperability and interdependence among
special operations forces, other joint forces, multinational forces, allies, and partners. The special operations
joint task force can plan and coordinate all special operations in the joint operations area, to include
employing and sustaining U.S. and multinational special operations forces. The special operations joint task
force increases synergies in intelligence, communications, and information sharing; improves manpower
efficiency; improves integration of conventional forces and special operations forces; and enhances
coordination between all special operations forces in theater.
7-10. The most versatile special operations task force is the joint special operations task force. It is a scalable
element organized around a single special operations group or regiment-sized unit, and it is commanded by
a colonel, brigadier general, or Service equivalent. It is a joint task force comprised of special operations
units from more than one Service and may serve as the joint, multinational, or combined force task force
special operations component in deterrence, crisis response, and limited contingency operations. This task
force may serve as a subordinate, tactical headquarters during security cooperation, deterrence, crisis
response, limited contingency operations, or large-scale combat operations. (For more information on Army
special operations forces, refer to ADP 3-05.) |
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7-11. As a supporting commander, the multinational force special operations component commander
employs a special operations C2 element. This element helps with special operations duties while supporting
the multinational force commander and the multinational force’s subordinate ground force commanders. The
element remains under the operational control of the special operations commander. The special operations
C2 element assists the joint special operations task force commander in fulfilling the supporting commander’s
responsibilities.
7-12. The establishment of liaisons with other component commanders as well as partner organizations is a
best practice. Special operations forces liaison and integration capabilities are especially suited to the
multinational environment. JP 3-05 contains information on various special operations forces liaison
solutions to support cooperation, integration, interoperability, and interdependence among special operations
forces task forces or units and other echelons in a joint task force or multinational force, an American
Ambassador’s country team, a host nation, or a partner nation. To gain the most utility from these liaison
capabilities, commanders grant the appropriate level of direct liaison authorized to special operations forces
personnel. This enables special operations forces liaisons to act in timely manner.
7-13. Special operations forces’ capabilities, enabled by technological and ISR advances, allow for timely
action against time-sensitive targets. However, these capabilities also present C2 challenges to commanders
and staff, particularly regarding weapons release criteria and authorities. In addition, the complexity of the
multinational environment generally compounds C2 challenges. JP 3-05 discusses unique C2 structures that
allow special operations forces to capitalize on timely information while meeting higher headquarters
reporting and information requirements.
CONSIDERATIONS
7-14. Commanders exercising command over special operations forces consider the following actions:
• Provide a clear chain of command to create unity of command with the authority to accomplish
assigned tasks.
• Establish clear organizational relationships to achieve unity of effort.
• Provide supported commands special operations forces staff with sufficient experience and expertise
to plan, conduct, and support operations.
• Integrate special operations forces with coalition, multinational, and host-nation forces early in the
planning process.
• Match special operations forces unit capabilities with mission requirements.
• Understand synchronization of special operations within joint operations as part of unified action.
• Maintain a clear chain of command for special operations forces units and continuity of C2 within
operational areas, especially during distributed operations. |
3-16 | 83 | Chapter 8
Civil Military Integration During Multinational Operations
This chapter discusses civil military integration. It addresses civil-military operations
(CMO) and interorganizational cooperation. This chapter discusses civil affairs core
competencies as they affect unified action within the multinational headquarters and
for the mission. The chapter also covers civil-military liaison and civil-military
teaming. It then discusses key civilian organizations and civilian-based relationships.
The chapter concludes with considerations for commanders and staffs.
CIVIL MILITARY INTEGRATION
8-1. Multinational commanders must understand the capabilities required to achieve civil military integration
(CMI). CMI is imperative to achieving unified action. Civil military integration is the actions taken to
establish, maintain, influence, or leverage relations between military forces and indigenous populations and
institutions to synchronize, coordinate, and enable interorganizational cooperation and to achieve unified
action (FM 3-57). This Army action supports the joint activity of CMI as it applies to joint doctrine. CMI is
the common activity performed in support of mission command and the operations process. (Refer to JP 3-08
for additional information about interorganizational cooperation.)
CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS AND INTERORGANIZATIONAL
COOPERATION
8-2. CMO are activities of a commander performed by designated military forces that establish, maintain,
influence, or exploit relations among military forces and indigenous populations and institutions by directly
supporting the achievement of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a
region or host nation. CMO are integrated into the commander’s intent. Commanders may rely on
components and Service capabilities to support the CMO effort. (For more information regarding CMO, refer
to JP 3-57.) Interorganizational cooperation is the interaction that occurs among elements of the Department
of Defense; participating United States Government departments and agencies; state, territorial, local, and
tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; international organizations;
nongovernmental organizations; and the private sector (JP 3-08). Commanders involved with CMO and
interorganizational cooperation recognize the need to establish stability mechanisms and CMI mechanisms
into planning and force composition. These mechanisms may include establishing a joint interagency task
force, joint interagency coordination group, or civil-military operations center (CMOC). (Refer to JP 3-08
for more information regarding interorganizational cooperation.)
8-3. Successful multinational CMO require established and maintained civil networks with people and
organizations operating in the civil component. General liaison, civil-military teaming, meetings, and
collaborative engagements with both civilian and military representatives achieve CMI. These integration
mechanisms and activities facilitate various levels of cooperation ranging from information sharing to
integrated and synchronized planning.
8-4. CMO can be executed by all capabilities at the commander’s disposal including infantry, armor, and
artillery units. Typical CMO capabilities could include medical, engineer and military police units. Army
units have civil affairs staff and units that enable and coordinate the commanders CMO. (Refer to JP 3-57
for more information regarding CMO.)
CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS
8-5. Civil affairs operations (CAO) are expeditionary capabilities organized to achieve unified action. These
operations allow the commander to synchronize, coordinate, and integrate governmental and
nongovernmental entities in the civil component with Army operations. Civil affairs forces collect, analyze,
and evaluate civil information to produce civil knowledge that is integrated into the operations process. Civil |
3-16 | 84 | Chapter 8
affairs forces develop and engage civil networks and ensure the appropriate control and continuity of
government functions in occupied or liberated territory.
8-6. CMI is a key tenet of CMO and interorganizational cooperation. CAO promote CMI into any
headquarters and at echelons above brigade. Commanders consider CAO early in the planning and
preparation of the operations process.
8-7. The Army rules of allocation apply to all echelons. A civil affairs company is assigned to brigade combat
teams, civil affairs battalion headquarters to divisions, civil affairs brigades to corps or joint task force. Lastly,
civil affairs commands (known as CACOMs) are assigned to a theater army, land component command, or
geographic combatant command.
CIVIL AFFAIRS COMPETENCIES
8-8. Civil affairs forces focus on the interests, functions, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of populations,
institutions, government apparatus, and UAPs that reside or operate in and around an AO. The civil affairs
branch has the following core competencies:
• Transitional governance.
• Civil network development and engagement (known as CNDE).
• Civil knowledge integration (known as CKI).
• CMI.
TRANSITIONAL GOVERNANCE
8-9. CAO focuses on winning the battle for moral authority and legitimacy. Legitimacy is promoted in the
eyes of the world’s community of nations by inclusion of as many nations as possible into the mission. Some
nations will not provide military forces, but they may provide civilian entities. Many UAPs must be integrated
through CMI. The populace only perceives legitimacy as achieved within an AO. Civil security and civil
control are performed as stability tasks. These tasks require the continuity of government functions and
appropriate control throughout conflict to establish or maintain stability. Only through stability will the
indigenous populace confer legitimacy. CMO plays a crucial role in achieving stability and legitimacy.
CIVIL KNOWLEDGE INTEGRATION
8-10. Civil knowledge integration is the actions taken to analyze, evaluate, and organize collected civil
information for operational relevance and informing the warfighting function (FM 3-57). The resulting civil
knowledge is integrated with other knowledge about an operational environment to create shared
understanding among commanders, UAPs, international organizations, and civilian partners. Civil affairs
forces use civil knowledge integration primarily to inform, focus, and direct CAO and CMO at all echelons.
8-11. In addition, civil knowledge integration enables the commander’s understanding of an operational
environment and development of the COP. Commanders incorporate civil knowledge integration using the
Army’s integrating processes: intelligence preparation of the battlefield, information collection, targeting,
risk management, and KM. Civil affairs units also use this information as inputs to the civil network
development and engagement process to refine information requirements and to shape branches, sequels, and
other future missions.
CIVIL NETWORK DEVELOPMENT AND ENGAGEMENT
8-12. Civil network development and engagement is the activity by which the civil network capabilities and
resources are engaged, evaluated, developed, and integrated into operations (FM 3-57). Developing and
engaging civil networks provides commanders with a more complete understanding of an operational
environment while providing access to use those networks to shape operational outcomes. A civil network is
a collection of formal and informal groups, associations, military engagements, and organizations within an
operational environment that interact with each other with varying degrees of frequency, trust, and
collaboration (FM 3-57). Civil networks can be mobilized or self-motivated to bring collective action, social
pressure, and political pressure around an area of common interest. Civil network development and
engagement enables commanders to understand the civil component of an operational environment. |
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8-13. European and other allied partners leading a multinational command may employ a civil-military
cooperation (CIMIC) concept of operations. Within the CIMIC concept of operations, CIMIC capabilities
coordinate and develop communications networks between military and nonmilitary organizations. This
activity is referred to as civil-military interaction (not to be confused with CMI). Commanders and staffs of
a unit with Army CAO capabilities supporting multinational commands ensure they understand the
differences and similarities of civil-military interaction and CMI.
CIVIL MILITARY INTEGRATION
8-14. Civil affairs forces conduct CMI as a core competency. Commanders and UAPs conduct CMI to
achieve unity of effort and to integrate planning, preparation, and execution. To achieve unity of effort, CMI
is essential to effective integration of operations with commanders and UAPs.
8-15. Multinational or combined commands consist of two or more national forces or agencies of two or
more allies or UAPs operating together. Civilian agencies, as well as some military partners, within the
combined or multinational force may not possess the same information sharing access as some or most
members. This presents a C2 dilemma for the commander. Civilian agencies may follow a different C2
system from the multinational force. Some host nations or other military partners may also not possess the
access to sensitive or classified information which is often shared within the command post or joint operations
center. The commander can opt to mitigate these obstacles through several civil-military integrating
mechanisms to include civil-military liaison, civil-military teaming, CMOCs, or a joint CMO task force.
These mechanisms integrate, coordinate, and synchronize with intergovernmental organizations, indigenous
populations and institutions, and UAPs operating in the AO. Some of these mechanisms may not be under
the C2 system of the combined or multinational commander.
CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER
8-16. The civil-military operations center is an organization, normally comprised of civil affairs, established
to plan and facilitate coordination of activities of the Armed Forces of the United States within indigenous
populations and institutions, the private sector, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations,
multinational forces, and other governmental agencies in support of the commander (JP 3-57). The primary
CMI mechanism is the CMOC. In allied or multinational commands, the CMOC may be referred to as a
CIMIC center. Civil affairs forces are trained, manned, and equipped to establish a CMOC at every echelon.
The CMOC provides with an alternate operations center to the commander. This center includes partners
who may not possess the commensurate information access authorities to permit entry to the command post
or joint operations center. An Army civil affairs unit (from a civil affairs command to company levels)
possesses the organization, manning, and equipment necessary to establish a CMOC to support units from a
geographic combatant command to brigade levels. The CMOC provides the structure, equipment, and
manning to establish the appropriate information sharing architecture to share information with UAPs who
lack the required information access.
8-17. The CMOC enables the commander to integrate, synchronize, coordinate, and collaborate with
multinational forces, indigenous populations and institutions, nongovernmental organizations, international
organizations, the private sector, and interagency forces when conducting multinational operations.
Commanders create and sustain shared understanding and purpose through collaboration and dialogue within
their organizations and with UAPs to facilitate unity of effort. Through this collaboration of the civil
component and multinational forces, the CMOC becomes the location to collect, process, and share
information, synchronize actions, and enable unified action in an operational environment. The CMOC
supports mission command by providing commanders an integrating venue and capability. Civil affairs forces
conducting CMI enable commanders to interface, collaborate, and inform the various elements of the civil
component as well as synchronize these efforts with the military forces in the AO.
8-18. CMOCs are tailored for each mission. When a unit establishes a CMOC, the supported command
should invite representatives of other entities. These entities might include the following:
• U.S. Agency for International Development.
• Department of State, country team, and other U.S. Government departments and agencies.
• Military (including foreign military) and civilian liaison personnel from participating countries. |
3-16 | 86 | Chapter 8
• Host-nation or local government agencies.
• Intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, indigenous populations and
institutions, regional organizations, and the private sector (as appropriate).
CIVIL MILITARY LIAISON
8-19. Civil affairs units have designated civil-liaison teams organized in their unit structures at the battalion,
brigade, and civil affairs command levels. These civil-liaison teams are established to conduct liaison
functions for the division through joint force command level with interagency, intergovernmental, and host-
nation entities.
CIVIL-MILITARY TEAMING
8-20. Civil-military teams are temporary organizations of civilian and military personnel which are task-
oriented to provide an optimal mix of capabilities and expertise to accomplish specific planning or assessment
tasks or to conduct synchronized or integrated activities at the strategic, operational, or tactical level. A civil-
military team helps stabilize an AO in a province, district, state, or locality through its combined diplomatic,
informational, military, and economic development and enforcement of the rule of law. The team provides
the joint force commander with a means to understand the benefits of competencies that are normally external
to the military. The team helps integrate the knowledge, expertise, and unique capabilities of U.S.
Government departments and agencies with multinational military forces and civilian elements of
multinational partners. Civil-military teams help the joint force commander understand the unique roles,
responsibilities, parallel relationships, and objectives of other international and nongovernmental actors and
organizations that may be present in an operational environment, but over whom neither the joint force
commander nor the chief of mission exercises authority.
8-21. Civil-military teaming provides the multinational command with a means to achieve horizontal
integration while preparing, planning, executing, and assessing operations. A civil-military team combines
diplomatic, informational, military, and economic capabilities to enhance the legitimacy and the effectiveness
of the host-nation government. A civil-military team can focus on combined military and civil efforts to
diminish the means and motivations of conflict while developing local institutions so they can take the lead
role in national governance of providing basic services. (Refer to JP 3-57 for more information on CMO.)
TRANSITIONAL MILITARY AUTHORITY
8-22. Transitional military authority is a temporary military government exercising the functions of civil
administration in the absence of a legitimate civil authority (FM 3-07). When asserting transitional military
authority, the military is the lead agency and conducts stability operations to ensure the continuity of
governance functions, specifically civil security and civil control. The multinational force commander is the
de facto military governor. The military government may draw assistance from experienced civilian agencies
and organizations. These agencies and organizations have the expertise to establish a system of government
that fosters the gradual transition to an interim or indigenous authority. Transitional military authority is an
interim solution. It continues only until the indigenous institutions and infrastructures can resume their
functions and responsibilities. Sometimes, however, sufficient civilian expertise is not present, or conditions
of an operational environment do not support introducing such civilian expertise. Military forces may then
be required to lead until they stabilize the security situation and can safely transition responsibility for the
stability sectors to civil authority.
8-23. The occupying force maintains an orderly administration and transfers authority to an interim authority,
indigenous authority, or other civilian authority. Transfer of authority does not necessitate military
withdrawal. Transferring authority to an interim authority may require support to civil administration.
Transition occurs within its capabilities and is subject to the principle of military necessity arising from any
ongoing combat or security operations. The multinational force commander analyzes military activities likely
to increase tensions and those likely to facilitate and accelerate a return to civil administration or government
subject to the requirements of the military situation. The commander’s analysis is important in multi-ethnic
or multicultural environments where one or more of the parties to a conflict view the COA as partisan. |
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SUPPORT TO CIVIL ADMINISTRATION
8-24. Multinational commanders must ensure the continuity of governance functions by performing civil
administration activities in an occupied territory. Civil administration is an administration established by a
foreign government in friendly territory, under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, to
exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government or in hostile territory, occupied by
United States forces, where a foreign government exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority until
an indigenous civil government can be established (JP 3-05). Multinational commanders act on the authority
of a nation, alliance, coalition of nations, or the UN. The military controls the territory under administration.
8-25. Civil affairs forces assist an established government of an interim civilian authority through support to
civil administration. Support to civil administration is assistance given by United States armed forces to
stabilize or enhance the operations of the governing body of a foreign country by assisting an established or
interim government (FM 3-57). U.S. forces provide support to civil administration with security cooperation,
or transitional governance as authority transitions from military authority to an interim authority, indigenous
authority, or other civil authority.
KEY CIVILIAN ORGANIZATIONS
8-26. Civilian organizations perform many activities encompassing humanitarian aid. This aid includes
human rights; protection of minorities, refugees, and displaced persons; legal assistance; medical care;
reconstruction; agriculture; education; arts and sciences; and general project funding. CAO staff and
personnel understand the mandate, role, structure, methods, and principles of civilian organizations.
Collectively, with local populations and their representatives, these staff and personnel represent the other
half of the CAO equation. It is impossible to establish an effective relationship with civilian organizations
without this understanding.
PRINCIPLES OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION
8-27. Commanders review the four humanitarian principles to understand the civil-military relationship. This
differs from the commanders’ requirement to understand the different roles and mandates of the various
civilian organizations. The international community adopted these four humanitarian principles. Most civil
aid organizations base operations and humanitarian action on these principles:
• Humanity. Human suffering must be relieved, and the dignity and other human rights of individuals
and groups must be respected.
• Impartiality. Humanitarian assistance must be provided without discrimination. Relief is given
without regard to nationality, political or ideological beliefs, race, religion, sex, or ethnicity, but
only if needs are urgent.
• Neutrality. Humanitarian participants do not take sides in hostilities or engage in controversies of
a political, racial, religious, cultural, or ideological nature at any time.
• Independence. Humanitarian participants maintain the right to independence of their own actions
and resist any attempts to place conditions on their actions or movements in return for cooperation
with military authorities.
LEAD AGENCIES
8-28. The international community mandates a lead agency to coordinate civilian organization activities. A
lead agency is the United States Government agency designated to coordinate the interagency oversight of
the day-to-day conduct of an ongoing operation (JP 3-08). These civilian organizations volunteer for an
operation. It is normally a major UN agency such as UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UN Children’s
Fund, or the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, which is part of the UN secretariat.
8-29. Specific responsibilities of a lead agency include—
• Acting as a point of contact for other agencies, particularly in the areas of planning and information
sharing.
• Coordinating field activities to avoid duplicating effort and wasting resources.
• Acting as an interface with the military at the theater level. |
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Often the lead agencies coordinate field activities through field offices of another agency or organization.
Although the latter is from UN High Commissioner for Refugees or the World Food Programme,
nongovernmental organizations such as Save the Children have filled this role in the past. Lead agencies have
also contracted other intergovernmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations to implement
health, food, or transportation programs or to operate refugee camps. The International Organization for
Migration has assisted in these areas. The International Committee of the Red Cross performed its activities
with the other agencies in this field. In such situations, nongovernmental organizations operate under legal
agreements involving them as partners with the host-nation government and a UN agency. The relationship
between the coalition and the lead agency is critical. A memorandum of understanding between the
multinational force and the lead agency helps to make the relationship work.
TYPES OF ORGANIZATIONS
8-30. Three principal types of civilian organizations operate outside formal national government structures:
• Intergovernmental organizations.
• Nongovernmental organizations.
• International and national donors.
Intergovernmental Organizations
8-31. Intergovernmental agreements establish intergovernmental organizations and operate at the
international level such as the various UN organizations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe. Five major UN organizations are involved in humanitarian relief:
• UN High Commissioner for Refugees.
• UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
• UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.
• World Food Programme.
• UN Children’s Fund.
8-32. Intergovernmental agreements did not establish the International Committee of the Red Cross. This
organization is impartial, neutral, and independent. Its humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity
of victims of war and internal violence and to provide them with assistance. It directs and coordinates the
international relief activities performed by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in
situations of conflict and the aftermath. The International Committee of the Red Cross has a distinct status.
It fulfills a role conferred upon it by international treaties such as the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (and the
additional protocols of 1977) to which nearly all countries belong. The states party to the Geneva Conventions
in 1986 adopted the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.
Nongovernmental Organizations
8-33. Governments do not always fund nongovernmental organizations because those organizations are
voluntary. Nongovernmental organizations are primarily nonprofit organizations independent of government,
intergovernmental organizations, or commercial interests. While many nongovernmental organizations come
to the AO from foreign nations, local nongovernmental organizations may also operate. A nongovernmental
organization legally differs from UN agencies and other intergovernmental organizations because each writes
its own charter and mission.
8-34. Nongovernmental organizations fall into one of two categories:
• Mandated.
• Nonmandated.
A mandated nongovernmental organization has a lead intergovernmental organization that has officially
recognized the nongovernmental organization in a crisis and authorized it to work in the affected area. A
nonmandated nongovernmental organization has no official recognition or authorization and works as a
private concern. An intergovernmental organization or a mandated nongovernmental organization can
contract or subcontract these nongovernmental organizations. In other cases, these nonmandated
nongovernmental organizations obtain funds from private enterprises and donors. |
3-16 | 89 | Civil Military Integration During Multinational Operations
8-35. An implementing partner denotes a nongovernmental organization, local or international, mandated
and contracted by a UN lead organization or other donor or intergovernmental organization to carry out work
on its behalf. Implementing partners carry out specific functions for the nongovernmental organizations
through funding by both government and private entities.
8-36. The number of nongovernmental organizations and levels of sophistication are increasing. In any
potential AO, hundreds of these organizations exist. A nongovernmental organization generally remains
strongly independent from political control to preserve its independence and effectiveness. In many cases,
the nongovernmental organization’s impartiality is a great benefit; its impartiality permits the only available
means to rebuild relations when political dialogue has broken down. A nongovernmental organization is
often highly professional in its field, extremely well motivated, and prepared to take physical risks in
appalling conditions. Host nations usually accredit a nongovernmental organization before it is authorized to
operate in the country. When a nongovernmental organization is not accredited by its host nation, it can create
local tensions.
8-37. A perception of increased competition among nongovernmental organizations exists due to the need
for funding. This perception accentuates the idea of a lack of structure in the nongovernmental organization
community. Nongovernmental organizations cooperate at the local level assisted by civil affairs teams. Civil
affairs teams persuade nongovernmental organizations by reason and not by authority with an emphasis on
networking and building multinational relationships.
International and National Donor Organizations
8-38. The following international and national donor organizations are responsible for funding, monitoring,
and evaluating development programs:
• U.S. Department of State Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration.
• U.S. Agency for International Development.
• Department for International Development (United Kingdom).
• Canadian International Development Agency.
• Australian Agency for International Development.
• European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Office.
• The World Bank.
These donors are present during humanitarian emergencies and work with the lead agency or with the civil
administration or government.
Additional Agencies
8-39. In addition to the lead agencies and types of organizations, other agencies of humanitarian actions exist.
These involve civilian development and human rights agencies that are also important.
Civilian Development Agencies
8-40. Several civilian development agencies are concerned mainly with reconstruction. Many of these
agencies provide technical assistance to developing countries. For example, the UN Development
Programme administers and coordinates technical assistance provided through the UN system. Civilian
development agencies often spend a longer time in the affected area than the military does. In these cases,
the CAO staff identifies any need for military involvement in reconstruction with the local government and
lead agencies to enable the organizations to begin work and continue under the most favorable conditions.
The reconstruction agencies allocate resources based on need to plan and develop projects throughout the
affected area.
Human Rights and Democratization Agencies
8-41. Human rights and democratization agencies focus on protecting human rights and promoting
democracy. The primary agencies in this area are the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe, although the latter only operates in Europe. These agencies protect human rights in states where |
3-16 | 90 | Chapter 8
abuses are rampant. These agencies seek to instill democratic values and the rule of law at all levels of
government. Additionally, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe can arrange for and
monitor elections and coordinate programs instilling democratic institutional values.
RELATIONSHIPS AMONG CIVIL ORGANIZATIONS,
GOVERNMENTS, AND THE MILITARY
8-42. Governments handle humanitarian needs in their own countries. Civil organizations establish contacts
with government and local authorities to develop their activities. The military works closely with the civil
organizations, national governments, local authorities, or a combination of these organizations in CAO. In
some cases, the military only plays a supporting role. In other situations, CAO occur to establish and develop
the necessary initial contacts. This latter situation occurs when no civil authority is in place, which is a
common occurrence.
8-43. Military forces, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, government donors,
and the UN contain their own organizational cultures characterized by national, professional, and institutional
differences. The degree of involvement, liaison, and influence of each organization varies greatly depending
on the situation. The various organizations have difficulty achieving cooperation and consensus due to the
requirement for each one to maintain relationships on three levels:
• In the field, relationships are maintained at the tactical level.
• Between national parties (host government or authorized government body), relationships are
maintained at the operational level.
• For the international community and supporting donors, relationships are maintained at the strategic
level.
8-44. The military commander has a legal responsibility for matters relating to relief activities in the joint
operations area in which the law of occupation applies. With this responsibility comes the legal authority to
regulate the activities of relief and civil agencies. A commander has this authority in operations performed
under Chapter VII of the UN charter where “all necessary measures” are authorized and humanitarian
assistance is part of the mandate. Civil affairs teams conduct CAO professionally and cooperatively.
CONSIDERATIONS
8-45. Commanders and staffs participating in multinational operations consider and answer the following
questions with respect to CMO:
• Is there a comprehensive campaign plan? Does it address CAO issues?
• Have CAO planners been included in the assessment team for the operation?
• What areas of CAO come under multinational force control? What areas remain national issues?
• What are the political and civil implications of the desired strategic and operational end states?
• What are the civil end states implied by the military end states?
• What are the civil centers of gravity that need to be addressed? What are the associated decisive
points?
• What are the CAO culminating points?
• Have measures been established to synchronize the CIMIC activities with the campaign plan’s lines
of operation?
• What are the required civil and military resources to achieve the operational objectives?
• What key civil organizations will be operating in the AO? Has an analysis been conducted on their
respective end states, cultures, languages, customs, religions, objectives, and methods? How will
they affect military operations?
• What structures, reinforcements, policies, committees, and liaison are needed at the strategic level
to support the operational commander?
• Where the operational commander is to rely on host-nation support, does the force have sufficient
sustainment resources available? Are memorandums of understanding and technical agreements for
this support in place? What will be the impact on the local economy as human and personnel
resources are drawn to military host-nation support?
• Is the national civil-military plan coordinated with the other governmental departments? |
3-16 | 91 | Civil Military Integration During Multinational Operations
• Have national civil-military plans been coordinated with multinational force headquarters?
• Has the multinational force headquarters established a relationship with coalition ambassadors and,
if a UN operation, the special representative of the Secretary-General?
• Is the civil administration sound, or will one be established? If the latter, what resources will be
required?
• What are the requirements for restoring or rebuilding the local infrastructure?
• What are the requirements for restoring or providing essential services in the short-, medium-, and
long-terms? The short-term tasks (such as urgent provision of shelter, water, sanitation, and power)
may become military tasks. The military will need to plan accordingly.
• What support is required to assist or establish the host-nation civilian law and order system?
• Has an operational estimate for CAO been conducted?
• Are there adequate CAO personnel available to assist planners?
• Has a CMOC been established at an appropriate level to coordinate CAO?
• Is there a lead agency or lead agencies for humanitarian assistance such as UN or International
Committee of the Red Cross?
• What international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and international and national
donor agencies will be operating in the joint operations area?
• Is there a process in place for the commander to deal with rogue nongovernmental organizations?
Is it linked to a lead agency?
• What is the policy for dealing with international organizations or nongovernmental organizations
that are political or economic fronts to corporations, political action groups, rogue nations, allies of
the combatants, criminal organizations, or terrorist groups?
• What legal authority does the commander have to take a more prescriptive approach to CAO if this
should be necessary?
• Is there a synchronization plan that articulates a common operational effect across boundaries (such
as military, social, political, cultural, religious, media, or economic boundaries)?
• What areas of CAO support can nations provide and what areas can nations not provide?
• Do all participating nations understand CAO or CIMIC?
• Do all nongovernmental organizations subscribe to the code of conduct for the International Red
Cross and Red Crescent Movement and nongovernmental organizations in disaster relief?
• Do civilians in the AO need mine awareness and unexploded ordnance training?
• What other CAO engineering requirements exist in the theater?
• Is there separate funding to support these requirements? |
3-16 | 93 | Chapter 9
Maritime Considerations During Multinational Operations
This chapter begins by discussing the characteristics of a maritime environment. It then
discusses the characteristics of maritime forces, planning considerations, and an
operational approach in a maritime environment. Lastly, the chapter provides
considerations for commanders and staffs.
CHARACTERISTICS OF MARITIME ENVIRONMENT
9-1. In a maritime environment, key terrain is any land that friendly or enemy forces can occupy to attain a
physical position of relative advantage. The maritime environment includes littoral and Arctic regions as well
as land masses surrounded by large bodies of water. The littoral region has two segments: seaward and
landward. Seaward segments include the area from open ocean to the shore. Landward segments are those
areas inland from shore that forces can support and defend directly from the sea. The arctic region
encompasses part of the areas of responsibility of three different geographic combatant commands, eight
countries, and all time zones.
9-2. The maritime environment challenges planners to account for operational reach. Planners must consider
the impact of space and time on reinforcement of the existing forward-stationed forces and allies. The
distance between bases throughout maritime regions hinders mutually supporting operations, sustainment,
and reinforcement from supporting echelons in the theater. Isolation and distance increases vulnerability to
amphibious raids by special purpose enemy forces, attacks from adversary long-range aircraft or missiles,
and potential physical isolation by blockade from naval forces.
CHARACTERISTICS OF MULTINATIONAL MARITIME FORCES
9-3. Multinational maritime operations cover a range of military activities undertaken by multinational
forces, across the competition continuum, to exercise sea control or project power ashore. Maritime forces
are primarily navies. However, air forces, land forces, Army watercraft and port terminal detachments, and
other government agencies all contribute to multinational operations in a maritime-dominated environment.
9-4. The qualities that characterize maritime forces as political and military instruments that support coalition
policies are readiness, flexibility, self-sustainability, and mobility. Maritime forces reassure or support allies
and partners, deter aggression, influence unstable situations, and respond to aggression. Multinational
maritime operations are built on multinational partnerships. Multinational partnerships enhance and expand
the flexibility and mobility to respond promptly to developing crises. Multinational maritime operations
require Army and multinational partners capable of being readily deployed globally to display the flexibility
and mobility necessary to conduct operations in maritime environments.
MARITIME FORCE FLEXIBILITY
9-5. Maritime forces provide a wide range of weapons systems, military options, and logistics in support of
multinational operations by land forces. Since the end of World War II, maritime forces resolved many
international crises. These forces control the seas and provide diplomatic leverage in peace or times of crisis.
They perform tasks ranging from forcible entry and strike operations to noncombatant evacuation operations,
disaster relief, and humanitarian assistance. Strategic and tactical command, control, and communications
capabilities of maritime forces provide for a distinctly controlled force that complements diplomatic efforts.
Maritime forces offer a presence without occupation and a deterrence without commitment. These enable
and protect the strategic lines of communication upon which multinational land forces depend.
MARITIME FORCE MOBILITY
9-6. Maritime forces are less constrained by political boundaries than air or ground forces. Maritime forces
deploy virtually anywhere in the world and transit the seas according to international law. With their strategic,
operational, and tactical mobility, maritime forces— |
3-16 | 94 | Chapter 9
• Monitor a situation passively.
• Remain on station for a sustained period.
• Respond to a crisis rapidly.
• Deploy in combat with authority.
9-7. Mobility enables maritime forces to respond from over the horizon, becoming selectively visible and
threatening to adversaries as needed. If diplomatic, political, or economic measures succeed, maritime forces
withdraw without further action ashore. Maritime forces respond to indications of pending crises by
relocating rapidly through the theater of operations or from one theater of operations to another, usually
independent of fixed logistics. In combat, the ability to position maritime forces quickly provides
commanders with significant tactical and operational advantages.
MARITIME FORCES SELF SUSTAINABILITY
9-8. Maritime forces maintain self-sufficiency as the norm. Often the nature of the operation and the types
of committed units determine the degree of self-sustainment achievable. Maritime forces operate in forward
areas at the end of long supply lines without significant land-based supply structure. With replenishment-at-
sea, on-station replacement of personnel and ships, and the resilience of ships (an ability to sustain damage
and continue the mission), maritime operations may continue indefinitely.
OPERATIONAL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
9-9. A maritime environment requires some unique planning considerations. Complex details are required to
coordinate the movement and landing of troops, equipment, and supplies using air and maritime means. The
most critical planning in a maritime-dominated theater involves collaboration among the components of the
multinational force and between supporting organizations and agencies.
9-10. Basic planning considerations are universal at all echelons. The success of multinational operations in
the maritime environment has three critical requirements:
• Commanders’ involvement and guidance.
• Unity of effort.
• Integrated and collaborative planning with other assigned headquarters and subordinate echelons.
9-11. The multinational force commander stays involved and provides guidance to maritime operations. Most
commanders for maritime operations will likely be a senior naval officer. Because of physical distances and
the relative isolation typically associated with land operations in a largely maritime environment,
commanders maintain situational understanding through collaboration. They ensure their operations or
activities do not have a negative unintended effect on other operations or units. This may include integration
with multinational amphibious or like maritime units.
9-12. The commander ensures unity of effort across the multinational force. Unity of effort includes ensuring
the task and purpose of operations nest with the overall multinational operational concept. In the maritime
environment, the unity of effort should include the commanders and staffs identified for the maritime, air,
and land elements.
9-13. Integrated and collaborative planning has two critical attributes in maritime operations: integration
across functional areas at every echelon and collaborative planning by multinational commanders and staffs.
Ideally, commanders and their staffs conduct planning for maritime operations in the same location. When
this is not practical, the exchange of liaison officers facilitates planning functions. This is crucial for any
operation conducted across extended maritime distances.
CHALLENGES
9-14. A maritime environment presents specific challenges. The obvious differences in uniforms and
equipment can cause misidentification. The lack of standardized markings and unit identifiers can present
the potential for fratricide. The problem can be exacerbated because allies and partners can have similar
equipment to potential enemies.
9-15. Situational awareness is paramount in a maritime environment. All participating units at all echelons
ensure they share the same level of situational awareness regarding the disposition of adjacent unit locations. |
3-16 | 95 | Maritime Considerations During Multinational Operations
Partners share and use trusted COPs to help mitigate the potential for fratricide. Current operations and plans
personnel also consider differences in the way various naval forces use symbology and graphics in a maritime
environment. Units should consider a liaison officer exchange, when possible, to deconflict operational
differences. Embedded liaison officers can provide mission analysis and identify critical coordination points
and times to mitigate potential risks.
9-16. An Army formation that has interoperable multinational partners in a maritime environment is
substantially more capable than one that lacks partners. Effective interoperability includes understanding
technical challenges across joint components, developing methods to bridge gaps, and understanding the
maritime capabilities of each member in the multinational force.
AREA OF OPERATIONS
9-17. An AO is the operational area defined by a commander for land and maritime forces. This area needs
to be large enough to both accomplish the mission and provide flexibility regarding COAs. The designation
of subordinate AOs in a maritime environment enables freedom of action, maintains tempo, and maximizes
available combat power. Larger island landmasses may allow multinational forces to operate with a
contiguous AO, with the unit boundaries directly adjacent to each other. Smaller archipelagic island chains
may require a noncontiguous AO and may even leave some islands in a designated AO completely
unoccupied by friendly forces depending on the operational requirements and threat.
9-18. Ideally, the AO is equal to or less than the area of influence. Commanders balance the available
multinational forces against the capabilities of the total multinational force. The commander and staff
estimate the area of influence. The estimate accounts for using capabilities—and their resulting effects—in
air and maritime domains. The size difference between an AO and area of influence requires balancing
available forces with the size of the AO. If an AO is too large, the assigned multinational force may not
accomplish its mission due to a lack of resources. If an AO is too large for a unit to effectively control, then
the situation increases risk, allows sanctuaries for enemy forces, and limits joint force flexibility. If the AO
is too small, the assigned multinational force may fail to use subordinate forces to their full capabilities.
OPERATIONAL APPROACH FOR A MARITIME ENVIRONMENT
9-19. When developing the operational approach for a maritime environment, naval and air components often
become the key enablers for the multinational commander. The multinational force develops a nested
operation plan that accounts for the overall multinational commander’s strategic priorities. This nested
approach accounts for all domains of the operation across a competition continuum.
9-20. C2 in a maritime environment may have significant challenges. Given the size of an AO for most
maritime dominant environments and the distance between land masses, there may be multiple active
assigned AOs, each with separate headquarters. Synchronization and communication between units is critical
when conducting operations in a maritime environment. Commanders and staff access each mission partner’s
capability to obtain and maintain C2 to facilitate mission success.
9-21. Operations planners consider the multinational force’s capability to defeat enemy antiaccess and area
denial to enable offensive operations. Operations in a maritime environment are likely to be contested
throughout armed conflict. The multinational force may be required to seize key terrain for emplacing air and
missile defense systems to defeat the enemy antiaccess and area denial. This enables offensive operations,
which are likely to be conducted in two complex forms of forcible entry operations: vertical envelopment
and amphibious landing. Forcible entry operations seize and hold lodgments against armed opposition into a
denied area to allow movement and maneuver to accomplish the mission. (Refer to FM 5-0 for more on
planning.)
9-22. Commanders and staffs should also consider the possible challenges of sustaining a multinational force
in a maritime environment. Sustainment in a maritime dominant environment requires collaboration. The
multinational force provides theater and port opening functions to maintain strategic and operational
capabilities. The extended distances in most maritime dominant AOs may require bringing pre-positioned
stocks of all classes of supply ashore. This may require detailed planning as part of the movement plan.
Floating stocks may be discharged in support of armed conflict and require detailed early planning. The life
support demands and maintenance footprint may quickly exceed the capabilities of a small island port. |
3-16 | 96 | Chapter 9
Coordination with host nations that have access to suitable, deep draft port facilities, infrastructure, and
support equipment should be considered in the early planning of the operation.
CONSIDERATIONS
9-23. Commanders and staffs participating in multinational operations consider and answer the following
questions with respect to maritime operations:
• What are the land and air components’ relationship with the maritime component?
• Are maritime forces operating in the littoral environment to project forces ashore as part of a
multinational operation?
• What is the scope of support from the maritime component in terms of time and space?
• Are maritime forces contributing to operations ashore by conducting operations in direct or indirect
support of land and air operations?
• What is the multinational structure of the maritime component and what capabilities does it possess?
• What is the potential for sea basing?
• What control procedures will be used to de-conflict air (to include unmanned aircraft systems),
indirect fire, and afloat assets including small boats?
• Who has control and requires access to the recognized maritime picture and intelligence products?
• How does the maritime component link to the COP?
• If there is a maritime interdiction operations concept of operations, does it support achieving
specified objectives?
• Are there any commercial or national constraints on using contracted vessels?
• Can all multinational partners be supported by the maritime component?
• What medical treatment facilities exist in the maritime component?
• Are casualty and medical evacuation assets available? |
3-16 | 97 | Chapter 10
Air Considerations During Multinational Operations
This chapter begins by discussing the characteristics of the air environment. It then
discusses air operations in multinational operations, air and missile defense, and
airfield operations. Lastly, the chapter provides considerations for commanders and
staffs.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AIR ENVIRONMENT
10-1. The air domain is the atmosphere, beginning at the Earth’s surface, extending to the altitude where its
effects upon operations become negligible (JP 3-30). As with other domains, unique characteristics of the air
domain directly impact operations in other domains, including on land. Conversely, characteristics of the
land domain (such as airfield locations, obstacles to approach, and landing zones) create effects in the air
domain. The multinational ground force commander contributes to operations in and receives support from
the air domain. Multinational forces frequently cannot achieve mission success in one domain without
controlling key terrain in the other.
MULTINATIONAL AIR OPERATIONS
10-2. Multinational air operations gain and maintain sufficient control of the air to conduct operations against
objectives in the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare. To simultaneously meet the various
objectives against which air operations can be planned, multinational commanders achieve unity of effort
between air and ground operations. The most important principles for achieving unity of effort include the
following:
• Unified air action.
• Centralized control.
• Decentralized execution.
(Refer to AJP-3.3 and JP 3-30 for more information on unity of effort.)
COMMAND AND CONTROL DURING AIR OPERATIONS
10-3. The multinational commander designates a multinational air component commander, an area air
defense commander, and an airspace control authority to control the capabilities of air operations. The
multinational commander establishes the authority and command relationships of the multinational air
component commander and assigns responsibilities. Responsibilities include planning, coordinating,
allocating, and tasking joint air operations based on the multinational commander’s concept of operations
and air apportionment decision. These activities rely on the full representation and expertise of all elements
of the multinational force contributing to the air operations plan. At the tactical level of operations, the
multinational air component commander’s authority includes exercising tactical command over assigned and
attached forces and tactical control over other military capabilities or forces available for tasking.
10-4. The multinational commander establishes supporting and supported relationships between components
to facilitate operations. The commander retains the option of controlling air operations directly using the
multinational headquarters staff. The multinational commander vests authority to a component commander
to carry out the duties of the airspace control authority and area air defense commander. The multinational
air component commander is the most likely choice for appointment as the airspace control authority and
area air defense commander. The multinational air component commander is responsible for air operations
and airspace control measures. Any division of these responsibilities requires detailed coordination for safe
and effective air operations.
AIR OPERATIONS PLANNING AND TASKING
10-5. Air operations planning develops the concept of operations that describes the best COA and produces
the air operations plan. This plan articulates and communicates multinational air component commander’s |
3-16 | 98 | Chapter 10
strategy for achieving the multinational commander’s operation plan. This is a continuous process developed
as units use air tasking orders and airspace control orders. The multinational force uses this process to ensure
it has adequate air assets to achieve the commander’s objectives. Air operations planning involves—
• Identifying air objectives that contribute to the multinational campaign objectives.
• Determining the air strategy to exploit multinational air assets to support the multinational
objectives.
• Identifying centers of gravity to satisfy the multinational force’s strategic, operational, and tactical
objectives.
10-6. The air tasking cycle that uses orders—such as the air tasking order and airspace control order—
promotes efficient and effective use of the available multinational air capabilities and assets. It begins with
the multinational commander’s air apportionment and culminates with the combat assessment of previous
missions and sorties. The cycle provides repetition for planning, coordinating, allocating, and tasking air
missions and sorties while following the multinational commander’s guidance. The cycle accommodates
changes in an operational situation or to the commander’s guidance. It also accommodates late notice requests
for support from other commanders. The air tasking cycle is an analytical, systematic approach that focuses
targeting efforts on supporting operational requirements to produce an air tasking order. A timely
multinational air tasking order is critical. Other commanders conduct planning and operations based on the
content and scheduling in the air tasking order, and they depend on its accuracy. (Refer to FM 3-52 for more
information on air tasking cycle.)
10-7. During the initial planning of operations, commanders and staff consider methods to sustain and
maintain air assets for the entire operation. Planners consider the host nation’s support and use of established
airfields, airports, and maintenance infrastructure. Sustaining aerial platforms during large-scale combat
operations could pose significant issues if the force is using air assets further away from their sustainers
during offensive operations. Maintaining the fleet of air assets might hinder planners if units overuse certain
assets. Commanders and staffs must know the capabilities and limitations of all air assets as well as methods
to sustain and maintain each platform in the multinational force.
AIRSPACE CONTROL
10-8. Airspace control complements and supports a multinational commander’s campaign plan without
adding undue restrictions and with minimal adverse impacts on the capabilities of any multinational forces.
Each commander uses the airspace with maximum freedom consistent with the degree of operational risk
directed by the multinational commander. Airspace control procedures—
• Prevent mutual interference.
• Facilitate the classification and identification of aerial platforms.
• Accommodate and expedite the safe flow of all air traffic.
• Enhance combat effectiveness to support the multinational objectives.
• Prevent fratricide.
10-9. When designated by the multinational commander, the airspace control authority can—
• Establish an airspace control system.
• Prepare the airspace control plan.
• Promulgate the relevant airspace control orders.
• Implement airspace control means.
• Harmonize regional airspace control plans.
• Synchronize subordinate unit airspace plans.
10-10. The airspace control authority should establish an airspace control system that responds to the needs
of the multinational force commander. The airspace control system rapidly distributes airspace control orders
and updates to all multinational force commanders in an area of responsibility. All component commanders
comply with the airspace control plan. However, the multinational commander provides procedures to
adjudicate differences that the airspace control authority and the component commanders cannot resolve.
Centralized direction by the airspace control authority does not imply that it assumes operational control or
tactical control over any air assets. |
3-16 | 99 | Air Considerations During Multinational Operations
AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE
10-11. Air and missile defense is a multinational force responsibility. Multinational air and missile defense
integrates the capabilities of all component air and missile defense assets to protect and influence an
operational environment associated with the multinational campaign plan. If area air defense commanders
are not airspace control authorities, they coordinate with those authorities to synchronize the area air defense
plans and airspace control orders to support air and missile defense operations. Area air defense commanders
plan and direct the multinational air and missile defense operations that the component commanders execute.
Area air defense commanders—
• Protect the force from hostile air activity.
• Integrate and coordinate the force’s air and missile defense assets into a multinational air and missile
defense plan (including host-nation air and missile defense systems).
• Promulgate and employ common procedures for managing air operations and reducing mutual
interference.
• Control and coordinate all air and missile defense operations by component commanders.
• Coordinate with the air component authority to ensure that the airspace control plan supports air and
missile defense operations.
10-12. An Army air and missile defense command (AAMDC) is the Army’s operational lead for Army
theater air and missile defense. In wartime, the AAMDC deploys to the theater of operations to support the
Army commander or, if designated, the joint force land component commander. The joint force air
component commander ensures that Army theater air and missile defense operations are properly coordinated
and integrated with those of joint and multinational forces.
10-13. Based on mission variables and augmentation with Army, joint, interagency, and multinational
personnel, the AAMDC serves as an operational protection integrator for Army forces or the joint force. In
peacetime, the AAMDC ensures Army air defense artillery forces for echelons above corps are properly
trained and ready to support theater air and missile defense operations. The AAMDC plans and executes
various training activities such as exercises and simulations to ensure force readiness. It also coordinates with
joint and multinational partners to develop procedures for combined theater air and missile defense
operations, interoperability, and training. The AAMDC also supports homeland defense operations.
AIRFIELD OPERATIONS
10-14. Aviation combines speed, mobility, and lethality to gain advantages as the aerial maneuver element
of the multinational force. Unlike ground combat systems, aviation requires secure airfields to conduct
sustained operations. Multinational forces manage airfields to enhance the safety, sustainability, and
survivability of aircraft and aircrews to ensure successful mission accomplishment. Efficient management
and thoughtful airfield design contributes to the timely response of aviation in large-scale combat operations
and contingency operations. Locations for aviation airfield operations include but are not limited to—
• Highway landing strips.
• Improved and unimproved austere airfields.
• Captured enemy airfields.
• Host-nation and adjacent nation airfields.
10-15. Expansion of the AO at each echelon may depend on forward operating airfields that enable the
commander to seize the initiative and influence operations at critical points. Aviation, including armed and
unarmed unmanned aircraft systems, expands the ground commander’s AO in both time and space. A forward
airfield enhances—
• Aviation maneuver across all core competencies.
• More depth and breadth for information collection and joint or coalition fires against either a
conventional or an asymmetric threat.
• Economy of force and resources ensuring that aviation can fly anywhere in the AO.
• Aviation’s ability to conduct attacks, shape operations, and support sustainment as well as to provide
aerial C2 platforms for supported tactical and operational commanders. |
3-16 | 100 | Chapter 10
• The mobility, long-range fires, and sophisticated sensors of attack reconnaissance aircraft blocking
enemy detection and engagement beyond the range of ground direct fire systems.
• Conventional and asymmetric operations.
10-16. Well-established and properly maintained airfields contribute to aviation tactical sustainment
operations. Such operations include air movement and aerial sustainment to support special operations,
infantry, airborne, air assault, and heavy forces. These airfields also support high priority resupply and air
movement throughout the theater of operations. (Refer to ATP 3-04.16 for more information on airfield
operations.)
CONSIDERATIONS
10-17. Commanders and staffs participating in multinational operations consider and answer the following
questions with respect to the integration of air capabilities into operations:
• Has the multinational commander designated a multinational air component commander?
• Has the multinational commander designated an airspace control authority?
• Has the multinational air operations center and the other appropriate headquarters established
liaisons?
• What are the capabilities and limitations of multinational airpower? Have commanders and staffs
been briefed?
• Have planners considered all elements of airpower when employing multinational fires?
• Has the multinational air component commander published special instructions? Are they consistent
with ROE?
• Has an airfield operations manual been published?
• Have administrative and tactical movements been performed?
• Have precision direct-fire engagements been performed?
• What are the recognized aural signatures?
• Can the host nation provide support such as airports, airfields, and infrastructure?
• What is the maintenance plan for aircraft?
• How will weather affect the air operation portion of the plan?
• What are the U.S. air and missile defense capabilities?
• What capabilities are multinational forces providing?
• What is the desired air and missile defense organization for early entry forces?
• What is the control structure for U.S. and multinational air and missile defense forces? Have air
defense regions and sectors been established?
• Has the multinational commander designated an area air defense commander?
• Has the area air defense commander designated a deputy for air and missile defense?
• What are the ROE for air and missile threats?
• What are the U.S. air and missile defense capabilities? What capabilities are the multinational forces
providing?
• What is the desired air and missile defense organization for early entry forces?
• What is the control structure for U.S. and multinational air and missile defense forces?
• Have air defense regions and sectors been established? |
3-16 | 101 | Chapter 11
Space Considerations During Multinational Operations
This chapter begins with a discussion on the characteristics of the space domain. Next,
the chapter discusses space operations in multinational operations and building
capacity and partnership through multinational operations. It then discusses space
planning considerations and command structure for space operations in multinational
operations. The chapter concludes with considerations.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SPACE DOMAIN
11-1. The space domain is the area above the altitude where atmospheric effects on airborne objects become
negligible (JP 3-14). It is where military, civilian, and commercial space activities are conducted, and the
upper limit extends infinitely outward. (Refer to FM 3-14 and JP 3-14 for more information on space
domains.)
11-2. Ground forces leverage space capabilities to support multinational operations from large-scale combat
operations to individual Soldiers at the tactical level of warfare. Space capabilities enhance ground forces’
ability to effectively communicate, navigate, accurately target the enemy, protect and sustain our forces, and
enable intelligence preparation of the battlefield. Like other domain relationships, multinational forces cannot
achieve mission success in the space domain without controlling key terrain on the ground.
11-3. Effective integration requires all personnel engaged in supervising multinational operations to have a
common and clear understanding of how space capabilities (military, civilian, commercial, national, and
multinational) contribute to multinational operations. Personnel understand methods to integrate military
space capabilities and effects into operations to achieve alliance security objectives. They also recognize that
adversaries will increasingly seek to exploit an access to space products with military utility; many products
are now available from commercial sources.
SPACE OPERATIONS IN MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS
11-4. Ground forces use space capabilities that operate across all domains. The physical space domain is the
location where space-based satellites transmit and receive signals. Land-based space forces conduct the
planning, coordination, integration, and synchronization of space capabilities and effects across all functions
within multinational operations from the land domain. While joint and multinational forces can complete
their assigned mission in a denied, degraded, and disputed space operational environment, these forces are
more agile and efficient when using space capabilities to their fullest ability.
11-5. Information acquired through space capabilities supports ground forces and helps foster an information
advantage. Many space-enabled and space-enhanced devices on the battlefield are used to conduct C2,
targeting and precision fires, movement, maneuver, communications, protection, sustainment, intelligence
preparation of the battlefield, and other information-related requirements.
11-6. Army space operations, duties, and responsibilities support multinational ground forces through the use
and exploitation of joint space capabilities. A space capability is the ability of space forces to accomplish a
mission or operation in, to, and from any space segment. (Refer to JP 3-14 for various discussions about
space capability.) The joint space capabilities that multinational ground forces rely on are as follows:
• Space situational awareness.
• Space control.
• Positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) to include Global Positioning System (GPS).
• SATCOM.
• Missile warning based on detection of high-energy infrared (heat) events.
• Environmental monitoring.
• Space-based ISR. |
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11-7. Many space-enabled or space-enhanced tasks and activities are not codified in joint doctrine
specifically as space capabilities. Instead, they are combined, derived, or listed as second-order tasks and
actions enabled by space capabilities. These include, but are not limited to—
• Information advantage—supported by the information acquired through space capabilities.
• Joint friendly force tracking—supported by PNT and SATCOM (when mission dictates).
• Network transport of data.
• Commercial imagery.
• National reconnaissance office overhead systems.
• Tactical exploitation of national capabilities (known as TENCAP) program that uses all joint space
capabilities.
• National-to-theater program interfaces.
• Geospatial intelligence.
• Integrated broadcast service.
• Common interactive broadcast.
11-8. Space-based capabilities provide a significant advantage for multinational operations through the
ability of global maneuver. Satellites use their ability to loiter over a designated area or have frequent revisit
times over a target location to collect and transmit data to ground receiving stations. Effects provided by
space capabilities can be temporary, permanent, reversible, or nonreversible on certain adversary systems.
The collection means and effects provided by satellites are not easily influenced by adversary antiaccess and
area denial (known as A2/AD) strategies used on ground, maritime, and airborne forces thus making them
an invaluable tool.
11-9. Many integrated space operations exist among the many multinational forces. Each space operation is
based on its own national priorities, funding, laws, and technology implementation. Sharing capabilities
provides increased effectiveness, resilience, and flexibility to space operations and complicates an
adversary’s decision making. The most frequently used space capabilities pertain to weather, PNT,
SATCOM, missile warning, and space situational awareness.
11-10. The multinational force commander understands the ground forces rely on space-based capabilities
for success in multinational operations. Those capabilities include PNT, communications, space and
terrestrial weather, ballistic missile warning notification, and information collection products. These systems
are critical enablers for joint and multinational forces to plan, communicate, move and maneuver, maintain
AO space situational awareness, engage the enemy, and protect and sustain forces. Space operations experts
enable and enhance operations when involved in planning and mission execution. Space planning and
coordination with multinational forces occurs with Army space professionals attached at the corps and
division levels. These professionals provide expertise, advice, and planning to the commander on space-
related issues that directly affect multinational operations. Space-based capabilities enhance awareness of
deliberate interference activities such as attempts to jam or spoof friendly communications.
11-11. When U.S. space assets are involved, space professionals ensure that space activities and operations
comply with the law of armed conflict, any treaties or international agreements, domestic law and policy,
and any applicable host-nation laws. During planning and execution, legal counsel assesses compliance with
applicable laws, policy, or agreements and provides guidance for operations.
11-12. Space-enabled capabilities are ubiquitous and widely used to maintain space situational awareness
within an operational environment. Space-based systems enable multinational operations during combat and
the subsequent stages of force projection operations by—
• Providing unclassified, commercial imagery products releasable to multinational forces to support
targeting, fires, and geospatial engineering efforts.
• Providing rapid communications that enable a commander to gain and maintain the initiative by
developing the situation faster than the enemy can. The commander can—
▪ Visualize the AO and share a COP, retain the ability to recognize and protect multinational
friendly forces, synchronize force actions with adjacent and supporting units, and maintain
contact and coordination critical to multinational operations.
▪ Receive updates on the solar environment and the impact to both terrestrial and space-based
segments of friendly communications systems. |
3-16 | 103 | Space Considerations During Multinational Operations
▪ Monitor terrestrial areas of interest through information collection assets to help reveal the
enemy’s location and disposition; reveal route, area, zone, and force reconnaissance; and
attempt to identify the enemy’s intent.
▪ Receive GPS status and accuracy of PNT for planning and conducting mission and maneuver
operations to support fires and targeting effects.
▪ Receive meteorological, oceanographic, and space environmental information which the staff
has processed, analyzed, and leveraged to produce timely and accurate weather effects and
impacts on operations.
BUILDING CAPACITY AND PARTNERSHIP THROUGH
MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS
11-13. Space operations continuously support multinational operations throughout a combined space
operational environment. This persistent space support is technology driven and often transparent. Not all
allies or international partners own the same or equal amounts of organic space capabilities, but all understand
the synergy and unity of effort created when capabilities are synchronized to support the commander’s intent
and concept of operations. Conducting multinational space operations demonstrates the importance of
building capacity within responsible and capable partner nations for current and future operations.
11-14. Interoperability is constrained by our mission partners’ capabilities and limitations. Some
multinational forces lack the ability or sufficient experience to dedicate personnel to a space position and
assign space operations as an additional duty. However, those forces still have requirements for space
operations in a multinational environment. In these cases, elements such as the theater space support element
can assist in generating requests and providing useful information.
11-15. Forces can use space operations systems in multinational operations to build partnership capacity and
improve resilience and interoperability in the following ways:
• Terrestrial and space weather monitoring for operational planning.
• GPS accuracy reports.
• Geolocation and neutralization of mobile signal jammers.
• Satellite imagery from military and commercial collection systems.
• Notification of ballistic missile launch events or attacks.
• Resolution of SATCOM electromagnetic interference.
11-16. Some space operations systems, capabilities, or effects may not be authorized for disclosure to
multinational forces due to their classification. This does not prevent the capability or effect from being
included in planning and used in operations. To avoid compromise or spillage of information to noncleared
forces, these capabilities and effects are segmented and require special considerations during their planning,
integration, and execution.
SPACE PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
11-17. The space planner ensures all COAs meet the requirements for suitability, feasibility, and acceptability
regarding the integration of space capabilities and effects. The space planner ensures shared knowledge is
suitable. This suitability includes understanding the level of knowledge that partner nations’ armies have
regarding the use of space products and services. Feasibility involves early planning. The early involvement
of space planners in the development of the commander’s intent and planning enables collaboration and
integration with missions, functions, and tasks. A consideration of space operations is the lead-time required
for capabilities and effects.
11-18. Space planners anticipate requirements during initial planning, evaluate host-nation resources, and
integrate the requirements into the operation plan. Space planners participate in all aspects of COAs
development, analysis, and comparisons. During COA development, the principal focus of space planners
should be to—
• Determine how space operations can best support commander’s intent.
• Determine how to integrate space capabilities and effects into mission operations.
• Provide input on which COAs are most supportable with effective space operations. |
3-16 | 104 | Chapter 11
11-19. The space planner determines if space operations are acceptable. During the planning process of
multinational space operations, planners consider how the integration of space operations will affect other
operations. It is rare for units to conduct space operations independently of other operations. Planners are
aware of how space operations will affect or impact operations in all domains. Acceptable COAs have fewer
risks.
COMMAND STRUCTURE FOR SPACE OPERATIONS IN
MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS
11-20. When determining the placement of space operations personnel within the command structure, the
multinational force commander considers the complexities of an operational environment and the
relationships used by space operations to integrate and coordinate with other elements of the staff. In a theater
of operations, the individual designated as space coordinating authority has the responsibility to plan,
integrate, and coordinate space operations. The space coordinating authority is responsible for coordinating
joint and multinational space operations and integrating all space capabilities and effects within a theater of
multinational operations. The space coordinating authority helps coordinate joint and multinational space
operations and integrates space capabilities and effects to support the multinational force commander. The
space coordinating authority is the ultimate decision maker regarding space operations in a theater. The
multinational force commander does not direct tasking authority of space assets. However, the commander
can request allocation of space assets.
11-21. Coordination of space operations within multinational operations typically occurs at a combined
headquarters such as a joint forces command, Service component command, the Combined Space Operations
Center, or the U.S. Space Command. Within these headquarters, liaison officers from participating allies and
partner nations come together to directly interact, collaborate, and coordinate on plans and space support
requests sent to them. Liaison officers review plans and requests, identify capabilities based on the desired
effect, determine unintentional effects of the capabilities used, and identify capability gaps required to
support specific operations. Once a space support request has been assessed and verified, it is sent to the
director of space forces to be prioritized. The space support request is submitted to the Combined Space
Operations Center for asset assignment and inclusion into the air tasking order.
11-22. The U.S. Army typically takes the lead in the coordination process since it possesses the most robust
and holistic complement of space resources. Though robust, U.S. assets do not represent every capability.
Through liaison officers’ coordination, allies and partner nations provide their unique capabilities, often
discrete or specialized, and incorporate these capabilities through data layering into the concept of operations
to improve mission results.
11-23. Each combatant commander normally has a chief of space force on staff. The chief of space force is
a U.S. Space Force officer who oversees all space operations activities and forces conducted by all Services
in a theater of operations. The chief of space forces is responsible for—
• Accomplishing the duties of the space coordinating authority.
• Conducting day-to-day functions of the space staff.
• Integrating space capabilities, space control operations, and planning into joint and multinational
operations.
• Providing advice on space capabilities and employment.
11-24. In a multinational headquarters, space liaison officers are granted significant authority and reachback
capabilities, and they are considered invaluable assets for coordination. Army space operations personnel are
typically assigned under an Army echelon G-3 or an established command and support relationship. In the
absence of an established or codified command structure, space operations personnel create a support
relationship with lead nation forces and other supporting liaisons formally or informally if sufficiently
important to transient requirements. In these instances, normalizing space capabilities into terms more
commonly used for planning such as fires, maneuver, and intelligence alleviates confusion and simplifies
requests for support. In doing so, space operations personnel can integrate space capabilities and effects into
joint targeting, the air tasking order, and the COP. |
3-16 | 105 | Space Considerations During Multinational Operations
CONSIDERATIONS FOR COMMANDERS AND STAFF
11-25. Space operations bring essential capabilities with unique tools to influence, enable, and enhance all
mission areas during ground operations. Unit commanders have a clear understanding of the space
capabilities available that contribute to mission operations and ways to use those capabilities.
11-26. The commander of the multinational force integrates space capabilities and effects from different
nations to achieve the desired end state. The multinational staff understands the capabilities and limitations
of space resources used by other nations in the multinational force and incorporates them into the overall
plan. Many allies and partners desire space capabilities to defend and protect their national interests. Shared
education, experience, and capabilities increase commitment to defend and protect combined space assets
and leverage capability gaps in a fiscally constrained environment.
11-27. The capacity of resources significantly limits space operations. Once a COA is approved, space force
personnel synchronize all planned effects to deconflict redundancy and prioritize the use of resources to
create convergence through unity of effort.
11-28. Staffs communicate space-related information at the appropriate security classification level and with
the broadest releasability allowed by policy and foreign disclosure processes to prevent disclosure of export-
restricted information. To effectively integrate space capabilities and effects into multinational operations,
commanders and staff need to know the classification, releasability, and disclosure level of space capabilities.
Classification guides designed to protect information are often obsolete or not thorough enough to properly
identify information that partners and allies need without placing capabilities at risk.
11-29. Host-nation organic space capabilities greatly benefit multinational operations and overall mission
success. However, host-nation organic space capabilities are not the only means of supporting space
operations interoperability. Some nations without an abundance of space capabilities may provide other
operational benefits such as various means of access and basing availability. These options increase the
flexibility of the multinational force commander.
CONSIDERATIONS
11-30. Commanders and staffs participating in multinational operations consider and answer the questions
in paragraphs 11-31 through 11-44 with respect to space operations portion of the operations.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
11-31. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following C2 questions with respect to the space
operations portion of the operations:
• Can space operations enhance effectiveness?
• Has the multinational commander designated a multinational space component commander?
• Has the multinational commander designated a space control authority?
• What is the multinational space operations mission?
• What are the multinational space operations specified tasks?
• Are there any multinational space operations implied tasks?
• What multinational space control assets are available?
• Are multinational space operations assets for communications and information systems protected
against possible attacks?
• What is the multinational CBRN threat assessment? Can space operations forces help identify and
monitor threats and hazards?
• What is the multinational plan for recovery of critical space operations equipment and resources?
PLANNING
11-32. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following planning questions with respect to the
space operations portion of the operations:
• What space control electromagnetic warfare capabilities are available? Is the use consistent with the
ROE? Do the ROE authorize their employment? How are the space capabilities and effects
integrated into the targeting cell or board? |
3-16 | 106 | Chapter 11
• What is the established space control electromagnetic warfare policy by the space force J-6?
• What are the capabilities and limitations of multinational space operations? Have commanders and
staffs been briefed?
• Has the adversary’s use of space assets been analyzed? Have requests for denying militarily useful
space capabilities to the adversary been considered?
• Are the correct authorities in place to conduct space operations?
TARGETING
11-33. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following targeting questions with respect to the
space operations portion of the operations:
• Is there a multinational space control and targeting process or surveillance and target acquisition
plan and battle damage assessment process? What countersurveillance control measures are in
force?
• Are there multinational targets that can be affected by space capabilities?
• What multinational targets should be affected by space capabilities?
• When and where are the targets likely to be identified, accessed, or otherwise engaged to create
desired effects?
• How long will the targets remain accessible?
• What are the related information collection requirements essential to the targeting effort, and how
and when is the information to be collected, processed, and disseminated?
• When, where, how, why, and in what priority should the targets be affected?
• What are the measures of performance and measures of effectiveness of a strike on the target?
• What or who will obtain assessment or other information required for determining the success or
failure of each engagement of target nodes?
• Who receives and processes necessary information, how rapidly, and in what format?
• What space capabilities are available and sharable at the multinational level? Which space
capabilities can provide national support only?
• Do the weapons depend on GPS signals for accuracy?
• What is the status and accuracy of the GPS signal predicted to be during operations?
• Has there been positive identification of a military target recently?
HOST-NATION ISSUES
11-34. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following host-nation issues questions with respect
to the space operations portion of the operations:
• Has the multinational headquarters coordinated to provide the host-nation with space operations
support?
• Has the multinational headquarters anticipated and considered host-nation cultural issues that will
likely impact multinational space operations?
• Has the multinational headquarters coordinated to provide the host nation restricted frequency use?
• Are there any agreements that could affect space operations?
DOCTRINE
11-35. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following doctrine questions with respect to the space
operations portion of the operations:
• Is there common multinational space operations doctrine, including definitions and procedures?
• If no common multinational doctrine exists, can space operations doctrine be developed?
• What are the applicable doctrinal publications?
• What are the applicable NATO STANAGs or ABCANZ standards? |
3-16 | 107 | Space Considerations During Multinational Operations
TRAINING
11-36. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following training questions with respect to the space
operations portion of the operations:
• When will training occur—at home, en route to operation, or in a secured area?
• Will commanders and staffs get generalized training for them to better understand the capabilities
and effects space capabilities can provide?
• Will intratheater ranges be available?
• What will be the policy on test firing weapon systems intratheater?
SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS
11-37. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following SATCOM questions with respect to the
space operations portion of the operations:
• What military SATCOM assets are available and will they fulfill mission requirements?
• How much bandwidth or capacity is needed?
• Are there validated requirements to support the mission?
• What kinds of ground terminals are available?
• Does an international agreement prohibit the use of specific communications or frequencies?
• What is the organization’s priority for restoration and has it been communicated to the combatant
command communications system directorate of a joint staff?
• Are leased commercial SATCOM links required and or available?
• What kind of terrain, weather (terrestrial or space), vegetation, and or buildings may interfere with
terrestrial or SATCOM equipment?
• What are the jamming or interception capabilities of threat forces?
• Does the unit have a spectrum analyzer to detect and locate SATCOM interference?
• How can the unit deny the enemy access to SATCOM?
POSITIONING, NAVIGATION, AND TIMING
11-38. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following PNT questions with respect to the space
operations portion of the operations:
• Does the command require a capability to jam or deceive (also known as spoofing) commercial PNT
receivers?
• Does the threat force have the capability to jam or deceive PNT receivers?
• What systems (such as GPS) is the threat using for PNT?
• Do the supported commands have sufficient military issue GPS receivers?
• Will the supported commands require a GPS differential capability?
• What unit equipment requires the timing signal from GPS?
• Can friendly communications or radar equipment interfere with the PNT signal?
• What friendly force tracking devices do the supported commands have? How are they tracked?
• What personal locator beacon devices do the supported commands have and how are they tracked?
• How do the supported commands handle PNT electromagnetic interference issues?
• How does the unit track allied and partner nation forces?
• Are all unit friendly force tracking and personal locator beacon devices registered with the friendly
force tracking mission management center?
• How many and what type of commercial PNT devices are used by the unit?
SPACE-BASED SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE
11-39. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following space-based surveillance and
reconnaissance questions with respect to the space operations portion of the operations:
• What areas may imagery need to be requested?
• What type of information is needed and at what resolution?
• Can another system such as unmanned aircraft systems provide the information?
• How is the collections manager contacted? |
3-16 | 108 | Chapter 11
• Does the collection manager address sensors for change detection?
• What is the collection priority of the request?
• What website does the unit use for archived imagery?
• Is archived imagery available and sufficient to meet the need?
• Are there electromagnetic interference issues that might impact collection operations and how might
the issues be mitigated?
MISSILE WARNING
11-40. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following missile warning questions with respect to
the space operations portion of the operations:
• What is the threat missile capability?
• What missile warning sensors or communications networks are available to the command?
• How quickly does the operations center need the information?
• How quickly does the information need to be disseminated?
• What communications networks are available to handle voice or data warning reports?
• Does the command need a separate voice or data system for missile warning?
• Do the missile defense forces have their tactical receiver equipment filters set correctly to receive
the integrated broadcast service or other missile warning?
• Are there areas that could benefit from having terrestrial radar capable of providing missile warning?
• Are resources available to correlate terrestrial radar and space-based warning data?
ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING
11-41. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following environmental monitoring questions with
respect to the space operations portion of the operations:
• What effects will space weather have on operations?
• What effects will terrestrial weather have on data gathered and transmitted by space assets?
• Does the G-2 or staff weather officer know how to get system-specific weather matrix?
• Has the collections manager requested synthetic aperture radar for times of low visibility?
SPACE CONTROL
11-42. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following space control questions with respect to the
space operations portion of the operations:
• How may space control capabilities can be used to defeat adversary antiaccess, area denial
strategies?
• What space control capabilities are necessary to enable forcible entry into an antiaccess, area denial
environment?
• How may the unit integrate space control capabilities in the tactical fight?
• What are the appropriate echelons to employ space capabilities to ensure freedom of actions?
• Are space control effects and counter operations incorporated into the multinational force
commander’s operation plan during the planning phases?
• How does each unit integrate space control operations, cyberspace operations, and electromagnetic
warfare operations to achieve the desired effects?
• Do the supported commands know how to detect PNT interference and navigation warfare
indications?
• Do the supported commands have specific TTPs to counter navigation warfare impacts?
• To what degree does the adversary rely on GPS and dual-use technologies to ensure access to PNT?
• To what extent will each unit operate in a denied, degraded, and disrupted space operational
environment and still effectively accomplish the mission?
• How does each unit ensure access to PNT capabilities in a denied, degraded, and disrupted space
operational environment?
• What asymmetric effects cross domains and operational boundaries (such as targeting of economic
or civil infrastructure) that may cause each unit problems? |
3-16 | 109 | Space Considerations During Multinational Operations
• Are navigation warfare effects and counter operations incorporated into the multinational force
commander’s operation plan during the planning phases?
• How do supported command’s space operations, cyberspace operations, and electromagnetic
warfare operations achieve the desired navigation warfare effects?
• What indigenous ability exists in each unit to characterize the PNT environment to provide PNT
situational awareness in support of mission command and joint combined arms operations?
• What options, if any, are available to counter adversary attempts to deny, degrade, or disrupt PNT
support capabilities to warfighters?
ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE
11-43. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following electromagnetic interference questions
with respect to the space operations portion of the operations:
• Is the equipment physically damaged?
• Does the device have the current encryption and was it initiated in an electromagnetic interference-
free area?
• Has the frequency been verified against the joint restricted frequency list?
• Is an alternate frequency available?
• Is there something obstructing the receiver’s view of the satellites?
• Has the device been verified against another device in the same location?
• Have the known data for forecasted PNT interference, such as space weather, multiple satellite
outages, and the GPS Interference and Navigation Tool, been referenced?
• Has the equipment been tried at a different location after completing the above troubleshooting?
• Has the spectrum manager verified appropriate use of frequencies by nearby forces?
• Has a joint spectrum interference resolution online report been submitted?
FRIENDLY FORCE TRACKING
11-44. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following friendly force tracking questions with
respect to the space operations portion of the operations:
• Does the multinational force have friendly force tracking capability?
• Have the known data for forecasted PNT interference, such as space weather, multiple satellite
outages, and the GPS Interference and Navigation Tool, been referenced?
• Has the mission management center verified system status and device registration with the joint
friendly force tracking global network? |
3-16 | 111 | Chapter 12
Cyberspace Considerations During Multinational
Operations
The chapter begins with a discussion of influences of cyberspace operations on
multinational operations. Next, the chapter describes cyberspace operations support to
multinational partners. Then the chapter discusses the cyberspace operations command
structure, followed by a discussion of synchronization with other operations and then
communications systems principles. The chapter concludes with a checklist for
considerations for commanders and staffs.
INFLUENCES OF CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS ON
MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS
12-1. Cyberspace operations impact multinational operations on land and in the other domains. These
operations rely heavily on the electromagnetic spectrum and integration of cyberspace with other capabilities.
IMPACT OF CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS ON MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS
12-2. Cyberspace can vastly impact a multinational operation. C2, fires, intelligence, sustainment data, and
even the local news can pass through cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum. To understand the impact
cyberspace has in multinational operations, commanders must understand U.S. and multinational partner’s
reliance on cyberspace-enabled capabilities. They also must recognize how units move and store data and
information. Lastly, commanders understand how sharing information provides Army, joint, and
multinational forces an ability to gather knowledge and project power.
12-3. Knowing when and how to leverage cyberspace capabilities can help multinational commanders
achieve positions of information advantage. Having the ability to act faster, commanders can affect threat
decision cycles and guide the perceived available threat COAs by leveraging cyberspace-enabled capabilities.
DEPENDENCY ON THE ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM
12-4. The multinational force largely depends on the electromagnetic spectrum. The electromagnetic
spectrum is a major transport medium for cyberspace. Commanders can use the electromagnetic spectrum to
send and receive friendly communications and to generate effects. Friendly, neutral, and threat users develop
and implement wireless cyberspace capabilities using spectrum-dependent devices, all of which are
vulnerable to detection and electromagnetic effects.
INTEGRATING CYBERSPACE WITH OTHER CAPABILITIES
12-5. Cyberspace operations, integrated with lethal and other nonlethal capabilities, may provide separate or
complementary effects. Some of these capabilities include—
• Cyberspace as it addresses—
▪ Cybersecurity.
▪ Cyberspace defense.
▪ Cyberspace attack.
▪ Cyberspace situational awareness.
• Weapon platforms as they address—
▪ Long-range precision fires.
▪ Rocket and cannon artillery.
▪ Maneuver platforms.
• Information advantage as it addresses—
▪ Military information support operations.
▪ Public affairs.
▪ Social media. |
3-16 | 112 | Chapter 12
▪ Intelligence.
▪ Media polarization.
12-6. A multinational force prevents threats from gaining an advantage in cyberspace while seeking to create
and exploit weaknesses for the threat. Delivering strategic-level effects across the globe is almost
instantaneous. Staffs observe carefully when planning, integrating, and synchronizing cyberspace effects
with capabilities from other domains to prevent unintended effects in friendly and neutral systems that depend
on cyberspace.
12-7. Members from multiple countries in a multinational force may contribute capabilities or manning to
the cyberspace element of a combined joint task force. When transitioning to become a part of a combined
joint task force, joint and multinational military units have the option of maintaining the cyberspace and
electromagnetic warfare section separately from the joint electromagnetic spectrum operations cell.
COORDINATING WITH MULTINATIONAL PARTNERS
12-8. Organizing and executing cyberspace operations within multinational operations require a robust
liaison effort. Effective liaison mitigates complications caused by differences in policy and facilitates system
integration and information sharing. Differences in national standards and laws pertaining to sovereignty in
cyberspace may affect the willingness or the legality of a partner’s participation in cyberspace operations.
INFORMATION SHARING
12-9. Multinational forces coordinate with information sharing. Information sharing with multinational
partners is essential when multinational forces operate together. Connectivity issues can compound
interoperability challenges among multinational partners. Hardware and software incompatibilities, differing
technical standards, and information security or cybersecurity policy may cause gaps in security or
capabilities that require additional effort to overcome. These issues often hinder all coordination in the
collection, dissemination, and sharing of information among multinational partners.
12-10. It is necessary to communicate cyberspace-related information at the appropriate security
classification level with the broadest releasability allowed by policy. To effectively integrate cyberspace
capabilities and effects into multinational operations, commanders and staff need to understand foreign
disclosure processes and the classification and releasability considerations for cyberspace capabilities.
MISSION PARTNER NETWORK
12-11. Multinational forces coordinate using the MPN. The MPN relies on common technical standards,
configurations, and security policies among partner nations to maintain a secure network. U.S. forces mitigate
information sharing challenges by planning and executing operations using a secret releasable MPN.
SYNCHRONIZING CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS
12-12. Multinational forces coordinate by synchronizing cyberspace operations. Most planning and
synchronization in a multinational operation occurs on a secret releasable MPN, whereas most cyberspace
operations planning takes place at a higher security classification. Security restrictions may prevent full
disclosure of some cyberspace capabilities or planning, which may severely limit synchronization efforts.
12-13. Effective synchronization requires the use of systems and information at the lowest appropriate
security classification level. It is easier to coordinate cyberspace mission operations with allies and NATO
partners than it is with nonallied multinational partners. This is based on the foreign disclosure processes,
releasability of information, national capabilities, political leadership, common mission analysis and
execution methodologies, and a common language.
CYBERSECURITY
12-14. Multinational forces implement cybersecurity when coordinating with mission partners. Commanders
ensure adherence to cybersecurity procedures when conducting cyberspace operations with nongovernmental
organizations and multinational partners. Planning with nongovernmental organizations may be necessary
for foreign humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping operations, and CMO. Incorporation of these organizations
into an operation requires the commander to balance the need of the nongovernmental organization for |
3-16 | 113 | Cyberspace Considerations During Multinational Operations
information with operations security considerations. Strategic-level planning to include nongovernmental
organizations into multinational operations often requires coordination with cyberspace defense.
SOVEREIGNTY
12-15. Each nation has sovereignty over cyberspace components within its geographic area. The use of a
nation’s cyberspace requires coordination and negotiation through formal approvals and certifications.
Additionally, coordination seeks to develop an interoperable cyberspace defense capability. Considerations
for coordination are given to adjacent countries, particularly if forces stage, train, or operate within these
countries. Likewise, compatibility of protective measures, such as countermeasures, is essential to avoid
system fratricide that degrades protection for all.
MULTINATIONAL INTEGRATION
12-16. Multinational forces coordinate and integrate cyberspace operations to achieve unity of effort. The
commander of the multinational force integrates cyberspace capabilities and effects from different nations to
achieve the desired end state. The multinational staff understands the capabilities and limits of cyberspace
resources used by other nations in the multinational force and incorporate them into the plan. Shared
education, training, experience, and capabilities increase the multinational force’s ability to protect combined
cyberspace assets and mitigate capability gaps in any single nation’s cyberspace capacity.
PROTECTING HOST-NATION INFRASTRUCTURE
12-17. Multinational forces coordinate to protect the host-nation infrastructure. Host-nation organic
cyberspace infrastructure presents a significant attack surface for threat cyberspace attacks aimed at
disrupting key civil activities, such as transportation, power generation, banking, and media. For example, a
cyberspace attack may attempt to disrupt rail transportation necessary to evacuate noncombatants from a
potential conflict zone. Some nations’ cyberspace defense capabilities may not be adequate to defeat these
attacks. Multinational forces coordinate to set the conditions to protect the host-nation infrastructure through
surveys prior to conflict, identifying vulnerabilities and potential targets. Interagency and industry
partnerships coordinate the expedited acquisition and implementation of cyberspace defense capabilities and
measures. When multinational forces augment host-nation cyberspace defense, cyberspace professionals
ensure their activities and operations comply with the law of armed conflict, treaties or international
agreements, domestic laws and policies, and applicable host-nation laws. Coordinating multinational forces
and partner efforts protects the host nation’s ability to continue necessary civil functions if the situation
crosses the threshold into crisis or armed conflict.
UNDERSTANDING CYBERSPACE CAPABILITIES
12-18. Multinational forces coordination relies on commanders understanding cyberspace capabilities.
Multinational force commanders at all echelons understand the defensive and offensive capabilities that
cyberspace operations contribute to multinational operations, the risks associated with not understanding
cyberspace capabilities, and the impact to operations when friendly forces are denied the use of cyberspace
capabilities. Cyberspace operations bring essential capabilities with unique tools to influence, enable, and
enhance all mission areas. Unit commanders clearly understand available cyberspace capabilities that
contribute to operations and how best to use those capabilities. (Refer to FM 3-12 for more information about
defensive and offensive cyberspace capabilities.)
CYBERSECURITY AND CYBERSPACE DEFENSE
12-19. Multinational forces coordinate when preparing cybersecurity and cyberspace defense. It is critical
that commanders and staffs identify and plan for the security and defense of mission-critical capabilities and
key cyberspace terrain. Key terrain corresponds to nodes, links, processes, or assets in cyberspace, whether
part of the physical, logical, or cyber-persona layer. (Refer to FM 3-12 for more information about key terrain
in cyberspace.) Key terrain in cyberspace may include—
• Locations in cyberspace where information and intelligence can be collected.
• Locations in cyberspace that support network connectivity.
• Entry points to friendly networks that require priorities for defense.
• Locations in cyberspace that friendly forces require access for essential functions or capabilities. |
3-16 | 114 | Chapter 12
12-20. The defense of cyberspace assets supports mission assurance. Mission assurance is a process to
protect or ensure the continued function and resilience of capabilities and assets, including personnel,
equipment, facilities, networks, information and information systems, infrastructure, and supply chains,
critical to the execution of Department of Defense mission-essential functions (JP 3-26). Units protect
friendly cyberspace to enable the conduct of their missions and provide indirect support to other operations.
Cybersecurity
12-21. Cybersecurity establishes baseline network protection, network monitoring and threat detection,
incident analysis and response, and cyber incident mitigation and remediation. Cybersecurity personnel apply
measures to secure the network against all known vulnerabilities and exploits. A network attack identified
during network monitoring and threat detection will trigger cyberspace defense actions.
Cyberspace Defense
12-22. Cyberspace defense preserves the ability to use friendly cyberspace capabilities and protect data,
networks, cyberspace, enabled devices, and other designated systems by defeating on-going or imminent
malicious cyberspace activities. Intelligence estimates inform cyberspace defense efforts to recommend
defensive measures to deny threat actors the ability to access and affect friendly networks. Cyberspace
defense forces integrate and synchronize their activities at all echelons to share network situational
awareness, assess network security, maintain readiness, and recommend changes to the network
cybersecurity baseline.
Cyberspace Offense
12-23. Offensive cyberspace capabilities provide commanders a way to deny, degrade, disrupt, destroy, and
manipulate an enemy’s ability to maneuver in cyberspace. Preserving friendly freedom of action in
cyberspace while denying the same to the enemy allows commanders to achieve an information advantage.
12-24. Commanders understand that cyberspace effects can support maneuver efforts all the way from the
strategic level (influence and deterrence) to the tactical level (disruption or destruction of threat capability)
to destroy or otherwise limit an enemy’s ability to tactically maneuver. Targeting for cyberspace follows the
existing targeting process. However, due to the restrictive authorities for cyberspace offense, commanders
and staffs identify potential targets early through the joint targeting process and add them to the geographic
combatant commander’s target list with sufficient time for approval before the effects are needed. (Refer to
FM 3-12 for more information about requests for cyberspace effects.)
CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS STAFF
12-25. Multinational forces coordinate for information sharing. When attached to a multinational force
headquarters, dedicated cyberspace personnel understand the available range of cyberspace capabilities and
provide input during mission analysis, planning, and targeting. Cyberspace operations staffs understand the
commander’s intent, mission, and schemes of fire and maneuver to integrate cyberspace capabilities and
effects thoroughly into planning.
12-26. The cyberspace operations staff informs commanders of available cyberspace assets and recommends
how to best use cyberspace capabilities in all phases of an operation to support the overall scheme of
maneuver. Commanders and staffs must understand that effects in the land, maritime, air, and space domains
can also create effects in cyberspace. The cyberspace operations staff can identify and nominate cyberspace
targets for lethal and nonlethal targeting. Once a commander approves a COA, the staff synchronizes desired
cyberspace effects through the targeting process to deconflict with lethal and other nonlethal fires capabilities
and to prioritize the use of resources.
CYBER SUPPORT TO THE MULTINATIONAL TASK FORCE
12-27. Currently, no cyberspace multinational operations doctrine exists. Each alliance or coalition develops
its own protocols and plans. U.S. planning for joint operations accommodates and complements such
protocols and plans for the potential use of U.S. cyberspace forces to protect multinational force networks.
(Refer to JP 3-12 for more information on cyber support.) |
3-16 | 115 | Cyberspace Considerations During Multinational Operations
12-28. Combatant commanders direct joint cyberspace operations within their respective areas of
responsibility with support from USCYBERCOM and assigned cyberspace forces. USCYBERCOM assigns
operational cyberspace forces to the joint operations commander based on the needs of the operational
environment and availability.
12-29. The joint cyberspace center and theater network operations control center collaborate with
USCYBERCOM cyberspace support element, the Defense Information Systems Agency (known as DISA)
enterprise operations center, and Service component Department of Defense information network (known as
DODIN) operations centers to ensure effective operation and defense of the theater network.
CENTRALIZED VERSUS DECENTRALIZED OPERATIONS
12-30. Clearly established command relationships, unity of command, and unity of effort ensure timely and
effective employment of cyberspace capabilities. However, the complex nature of cyberspace operations—
where cyberspace forces can simultaneously operate at the global, theater, or joint operations area, and
tactical levels—requires adaptations to traditional C2 structures. Multinational forces generally employ
centralized planning and decentralized execution of operations. Due to their ability to create effects far
outside the AO, cyberspace operations require constant and detailed coordination at the theater and global
levels to deconflict with other operations in theater.
12-31. Certain cyberspace operations functions, including cyberspace defense and pursuit of global
cyberspace threats, lend themselves to centralized planning and execution to meet multiple, near-real time
requirements for response. Multinational force commanders should integrate and synchronize centrally
controlled cyberspace operations with regional or local cyberspace operations conducted by forces in the AO.
For these reasons, there may be times when commanders exercise C2 of forces executing simultaneous global
cyberspace operations and theater cyberspace operations using supported and supporting command
relationships under separate, but synchronized, chains of command. The supported commander integrates
and synchronizes cyberspace operations into the concept of operations and detailed plans and orders.
DECONFLICTION WITH NATIONAL-LEVEL CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS
12-32. In partnership with USCYBERCOM, the combatant command in the geographic location coordinates
regionally with interorganizational and multinational partners to deconflict combatant commander-directed
cyberspace operations with DOD or other U.S. Government cyberspace activities within the area of
responsibility. As early as possible in the planning process, combatant commands gather cyberspace
requirements from U.S. forces and UAPs in theater. The combatant command uses that information to
provide USCYBERCOM with enough details about combatant commander-planned cyberspace operations
to deconflict them with other U.S. Government cyberspace activities.
12-33. Each combatant command with a geographic mission has a theater-aligned combat mission team to
provide cyberspace operations expertise and enable the combatant command staff to integrate operational-
and tactical-level cyberspace activities into operation plans. Joint force headquarters-cyberspace exercises
operational control of combat mission teams and aligns teams to specific target sets within the area of
responsibility. The combatant command staff and joint force headquarters-cyberspace establish unity of
command and unity of effort for the combatant commander’s (or combined joint force commander’s)
cyberspace operations through direction of the combat mission teams.
SYNCHRONIZATION WITH OTHER OPERATIONS
12-34. Cyberspace operations may create effects in the land, maritime, air, and space domains. Commanders
can use cyberspace operations to affect threat capabilities. Commanders use their resources and knowledge
of systemic operational behaviors to identify and mitigate unintended consequences. These unintended
consequences can affect the following:
• Cyberspace security governance addressing—
▪ Policy and doctrine.
▪ Key risk indicator identification.
▪ Third-party cyberspace risk assessment. |
3-16 | 116 | Chapter 12
• Information technology and systems assessments such as—
▪ Digital.
▪ Cloud.
▪ Network.
▪ Critical operations.
• Security assessments:
▪ Network.
▪ Data center.
▪ Cloud.
▪ Configuration.
▪ Threat vulnerability.
▪ Cyber.
• Cyberspace operations centers:
▪ Log monitoring.
▪ Threat intelligence.
• Cyberspace training and awareness for multinational operations:
▪ Security awareness.
▪ Phishing simulation.
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM PRINCIPLES
12-35. The complex nature of communications in cyberspace operations requires systems guided by
principles in order to ensure mission success. The multinational force capitalizes on information and near-
simultaneous dissemination to turn information into actions. An effective system helps the commander
conduct distributed operations. Force employment decisions are influenced by the system’s ability to network
the force in an often-contested operational environment. The network must be interoperable, agile, trusted,
and shared to provide the flexibility to meet mission objectives. (See Figure 12-1 for the principles of an
effective network.) The network increases the operational effectiveness of multinational forces by enabling
dispersed forces to operate, communicate, and maneuver more efficiently. That same network also enables
forces to populate, access, and share a COP to attain the desired end state at all echelons. The communications
system directorate of the multinational force’s staff integrates each partner nation’s network into the
multinational communications system. |
3-16 | 117 | Cyberspace Considerations During Multinational Operations
Interoperable
When information can be exchanged directly between communications systems or
equipment, and between them and or their users. Facilitated by—
• Common equipment.
• Compatibility of equipment.
• Standardization.
• Liaison.
Agile
System agility attributes to—
• Responsiveness.
• Flexibility.
• Innovation.
• Adaptation.
Trusted
Trusted communications attribute to—
• Survivability.
• Security.
• Sustainability.
Shared
• Mutual use of information, services, or capabilities.
Figure 12-1. Communications system principles
CONSIDERATIONS
12-36. Effective C2 of multinational forces depends on the ability to share the right information with the
right people at the right time. This synchronization improves unity of effort, reduces decision time, increases
adaptability of forces, improves situational understanding, and provides greater precision in mission planning
and execution. Information sharing requires sustained and responsible collaboration among all federal, state,
local, tribal, territorial, private-sector, and multinational partners. While innovation has enhanced the ability
to share information, increased sharing creates potential vulnerabilities, requiring comprehensive
cybersecurity practices. Commanders and staffs participating in multinational cyberspace operations should
understand and consider—
• Partner nations’ capabilities and limitations in creating cyberspace effects, including limitations due
to national laws and policies.
• Applicable provisions of the law of armed conflict, treaties, national and international agreements,
domestic laws and policies, and host-nation laws.
• Challenges in connectivity and compatibility between U.S. and partner nations’ cyberspace
capabilities.
• Challenges in information sharing, releasability, and foreign disclosure to synchronize cyberspace
operations among partner nations.
• Anticipation of and accounting for cyberspace and electromagnetic warfare effects, capabilities,
constraints, and limitations.
• Shared situational understanding and common objectives for the operation. |
3-16 | 119 | Chapter 13
Additional Factors During Multinational Operations
This chapter provides additional factors to commanders to help them assign key roles
and responsibilities, and to improve the operational effectiveness of the force. It
addresses support for fires, engineer, geospatial, security force assistance, and
countering weapons of mass destruction. Lastly, this chapter provides planning
considerations for commanders and staffs.
MILITARY CAPABILITIES
13-1. Military capabilities differ based on national interests and objectives, national character, doctrine,
training, leader development, organizations, and materiel. Multinational commanders consider the unique
abilities and limitations of each nation when deciding how to allocate resources and employ assets. U.S.
forces provide robust capabilities for many of the additional considerations this chapter discusses. However,
countries cannot always share and employ their organic assets evenly across the force.
FIRE SUPPORT
13-2. The multinational force commander ensures that the force develops good fire support coordination.
This optimizes the effects of fires and minimizes the possibility of fratricide, collateral damage, and
disruption to the civilian populace. Fire support coordination in multinational operations demands special
arrangements with multinational force members and local authorities. These special arrangements include
communication and language requirements, liaison personnel, and interoperability procedures. A
multinational force fire support staff establishes SOPs for fire support to achieve the most effective results
for use by the multinational force.
13-3. Effective joint fire support contributes to multinational success. Effective control of multinational force
firepower is the key to its use. The staff analyzes whether resources and requirements are balanced correctly
to support the multinational campaign or operation. Staff analysis of firepower also ensures an appropriate
balance of forces and capabilities exist. Joint detailed integration of joint fire support with maneuver of the
multinational force is critical. (Refer to JP 3-09 and ADP 3-19 for more information on fires.)
ENGINEER SUPPORT
13-4. Multinational forces require multiple engineer support functions. Engineers are responsible for
supporting several operational environment functions including—
• Combat engineering (mobility, countermobility, and survivability).
• General engineering.
• Geospatial engineering. (This is referred to as geomatic by some multinational forces.)
• Defense support of civil authorities and stability operations.
• Environmental considerations.
(Refer to FM 3-34 and JP 3-34 for more discussions of the engineer operational environment functions and
engineer operations.)
13-5. The tasks associated with the three engineer operational environment functions include—
• Providing a full range of operational- and tactical-level combat engineering (mobility, counter-
mobility, and survivability) support.
• Providing a full range of general engineering support. This includes protection construction, diving,
firefighting, facilities engineering, environmental considerations, infrastructure, sustainment
support, and power generation and distribution. In some Services and multinational forces, engineer
support includes CBRN functions.
• Providing a full range of operational- and tactical-level geospatial engineering support. |
3-16 | 120 | Chapter 13
13-6. To ensure efficient and effective engineer effort, the multinational headquarters requires both a senior
engineer and a supporting engineer staff to plan and coordinate engineer efforts to support the multinational
commander’s plan. The senior engineer and associated staff controls force-level designated engineer units
on behalf of the multinational commander. This control includes—
• Planning.
• Setting engineer standards.
• Supervising and coordinating.
• Controlling engineer support to the force and, when necessary, to the local population.
• Potentially exercising C2 for other nonengineer capabilities and assets.
13-7. Engineers are also responsible for managing civilian engineer contractors who complete tasks in the
AO. Control of engineer support aligns with the multinational commander’s priorities and intent.
Multinational commanders and staffs remain aware of the significant difference in the doctrinal traditions
between NATO allies and former Warsaw Pact militaries, particularly when it comes to the role of engineer
assets in traditional combat engineering functions. While NATO battalion and brigade combat team
commanders are accustomed to the decentralized integration of engineer operations at the tactical level,
former Warsaw Pact nations have traditionally employed these assets in a much more centralized manner at
division and corps levels. As a result, tactical commanders perform engineering tasks associated with
building integrated obstacles and mutually supporting engagement areas at the battalion and brigade levels.
An understanding of these tasks and many other differing doctrinal traditions manage expectations and result
in better integration of multinational forces.
GEOSPATIAL SUPPORT
13-8. The successful conduct of land operations relies on commanders at all levels understanding the terrain
where operations are conducted. The better the understanding of this terrain, the greater the degree of
certainty of successful prosecution of operations. Up-to-date and accurate geospatial information enhances
geospatial knowledge and situational understanding. It also helps commanders understand more clearly how
terrain influences operations.
13-9. Multinational force commanders and staffs receive geospatial information. This information comes
from the host nation, one or more multinational partners, or a combination of sources. This information
increases friendly advantages and minimizes the adversary’s advantage gained by local knowledge. The
information provided helps the force commander to understand, visualize, and describe an operational
environment and further direct, lead, and assess military operations. Timely and relevant topographic support
has the potential to be a significant combat multiplier in multinational operations.
13-10. A geospatial specialist can quickly acquire and provide appropriate and relevant geospatial
information. This is generally a resource-intensive undertaking. Topographic support relies on availability of
a fundamental layer of geospatial information. Each nation provides topographic support to its national
component forces, but efficiencies and synergies come from this support. This is particularly true with
acquiring and providing the geospatial data set. As a guiding principle, one nation has lead responsibility to
acquire and provide geospatial information with other nations assigned supporting roles. This division of
responsibilities is a high-priority requirement addressed early in the planning.
13-11. The highest command level echelon coordinates geospatial information because of the complexities
involved with acquiring and providing it. The multinational force engineer commander coordinates
geospatial information. Longer-term information densification and maintenance responsibilities also need to
be addressed early in planning. This is in case, the multinational force remains in that AO for a long duration
or units have been compromised. The multinational force engineer commander has access to an appropriate
level of topographic advice from the engineer staff assigned. |
3-16 | 121 | Additional Factors During Multinational Operations
SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE SUPPORT
13-12. The Army conducts security force assistance (SFA) missions when it has the objective to—
• Increase the capability and capacity of allied and partner nation foreign security forces (FSFs) and
their supporting institutions enabling their interoperability and provide the U.S. Government access,
presence, and influence.
• Develop situational understanding.
• Enhance FSF and joint force interoperability.
Ultimately, SFA aims to create FSFs that are competent, capable, committed, and confident. Such FSFs build
a security apparatus that supports U.S. policy related to achieving regional stability.
13-13. UAPs conduct SFA to address deficiencies in FSF capabilities or capacity, improve multinational
interoperability, or demonstrate resolve and support. Each multinational SFA effort is unique, dynamic,
analyzed, and framed to accommodate both U.S. objectives and foreign partner concerns and constraints. To
increase the effectiveness of SFA activities, planners thoroughly assess and analyze the following throughout
planning, preparation, and execution of the operation:
• An operational environment (including civil and sociocultural considerations).
• Legal and fiscal authorities.
• The core grievances and potential threats (possibly including the prerequisites of insurgency).
• FSF institutional functions (governance, executive, generating, and operating).
• Methods, successes, and failures of FSF security efforts.
• The state of training at all levels, and the specialties and education of leaders.
• FSF equipment and the priority and capability placed on maintaining that equipment.
• Sustainment and infrastructure structure and the ability to meet the force’s requirements.
• Laws, regulations, and doctrine governing the FSF, and their relationships to national leaders.
• Theater security cooperation plans.
• Integrated country strategies—operation plan or concept plan requirements.
• Other provisional or specialized SFA teams as needed.
13-14. The United States tailors its contribution to multinational forces to support a multinational SFA effort.
Support may include one or more of these sources:
• Special operations forces.
• Conventional forces.
• SFABs.
• Ministry of Defense advisors.
• Civilian expeditionary workforce.
• Contract support to SFA.
13-15. When operating inside an established joint operations area, the DOD is usually the lead agency with
the U.S. Department of State as the supporting agency. In this scenario, SFAB commanders operate in the
DOD-nested concept of operations for SFA. Under most circumstances when operating in an established
joint operations area, a SFAB is assigned to the joint or combined force land component commander for
employment.
13-16. If given responsibilities outside of its primary SFA mission, the SFAB requires augmentation to
conduct terrain management, information collection, CMO, air and ground movement control, clearance of
fires, security, personnel recovery, medical support, and other functions based on the environment. That
augmentation can come in the form of other military forces or, in some cases, FSFs.
13-17. The SFAB works best when its higher headquarters, in coordination with the partnered nation or
security force, gives it objectives for developing or integrating FSFs. Usually, this is done through a tactical
control relationship between senior SFAB commanders and their next higher headquarters. This allows SFAB
commanders and staffs to use their advisors and resources against those objectives in a manner best suited to
accomplish the SFA mission and expand the amount of available interoperable combined combat power. |
3-16 | 122 | Chapter 13
13-18. Properly established command and support relationships are critical to the success of the SFAB and
its SFA mission. The SFAB’s Army Service component command headquarters consider the following SFAB
traits prior to establishing their command relationships:
• SFABs are optimized to operate at the advisor team level. Breaking teams apart degrades their
ability to conduct advisor team activities.
• SFABs can task-organize advisor teams from across a brigade against unique FSF requirements by
location.
• SFABs are designed to manage, coordinate, and adjust SFA tasks at the tactical and operational
levels to support strategic goals.
• SFABs have no capability to conduct independent combat operations against an enemy force.
• SFABs have a very limited ability to sustain themselves.
• SFABs expand combined combat power up to two echelons above a unit type. For instance, a
captain-led team could integrate a battalion and a lieutenant colonel-led battalion advising team
could integrate a division.
• SFABs enable partner forces access to joint fires and effects.
COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION SUPPORT
13-19. Despite the existence of a broadly accepted regime of international agreements, adversaries continue
to develop and field weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to gain an advantage against the United States and
its allies. To prevent, dissuade, or deny adversaries or potential adversaries from possessing or proliferating
WMD, U.S. forces work with UAPs to support countering WMD, prevention, protection, and response
efforts.
13-20. The United States, its partners, and allies face an increasing WMD threat from actors who operate
transregionally and require U.S. forces and allies to counter with a coordinated approach. The DOD
contributes to the U.S. Government efforts by providing joint forces to deter the use of WMD.
13-21. Countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) operations have a greater likelihood of success if
planned in cooperation with allies and partner nations. Countering weapons of mass destruction are efforts
against actors of concern to curtail the conceptualization, development, possession, proliferation, use, and
effects of weapons of mass destruction, related expertise, materials, technologies, and means of delivery
(JP 3-40). Unity of command and unified action are essential to CWMD. CWMD shaping activities planned
and executed in cooperation with partners can alleviate concerns regarding acquiring, developing or using
WMD and alleviate the need for more aggressive and costly action later. (Refer to JP 3-40 for details on
CWMD operations.)
13-22. CWMD programs are a part of a network. When operating with a partner or host nation, it can be
expected, and generally encouraged, for the partner or host nation to take the lead in dealing with the local
populace. A host nation understands the adversary language and culture making the host nation better at
communicating transportation, financing, production, and storage capabilities to other partners. An in-
country source understands the WMD threat an adversary might use. Language similarities between partners
or host nations and adversaries may aid in information collection.
13-23. Multinational doctrine helps guide employing the forces of two or more nations in coordinated action.
In some cases, multinational doctrine is required for CWMD. For example, NATO has developed doctrine
for CBRN defense and CWMD. The increased potential of forces to encounter CBRN hazards during CWMD
activities necessitates planning interoperability of warning and reporting systems. Standardization of reports
among partner nations improves communication. Partners prepare standardized reports to clearly
communicate WMD hazards to enable understanding and response. Many partner nations use NATO Allied
Technical Publication-45 to standardize exchanging CBRN information.
13-24. Integrated multinational sustainment may improve efficiency and effectiveness, but unique national
equipment requirements for CBRN environments pose challenges. Operations in CBRN environments can
increase demand on the logistics system for consumables that may be unique to each nation. For example,
filter systems and protection equipment may not be interoperable with all nations. The United States and
many NATO countries may follow NATO standardization recommendations and STANAGs to unify |
3-16 | 123 | Additional Factors During Multinational Operations
standards. During planning, CBRN staffs of the United States and partner nations perform capability gap
analysis to understand where interoperability exists and where separate logistics are required.
13-25. Planning the dismantling of WMD facilities, stockpiles, or programs is required to prevent
reconstitution of any WMD programs. If directed, operational commanders and staffs facilitate the transfer
of CWMD operations to other U.S. Government agencies, international agencies, or host nations to continue
destruction, monitoring, and redirection activities. If transfer is not directed, commanders stand prepared to
complete the remaining activities and request coordination with, and technical assistance from, applicable
agencies as necessary.
CONSIDERATIONS
13-26. To help commanders and staff in planning operations, the following considerations are provided for
other support.
FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING
13-27. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following fire support planning questions with
respect to multinational operations:
• What is the nature of the multinational operation? For example, is it littoral or land and air phases?
• Where is the operation in the range of military operations?
• What are the development and dissemination of surface-to-surface and air-to-surface ROE?
• Are the ROE agreed upon and understood by multinational forces according to national caveats?
• Are request procedures streamlined and tested?
• What is the likely duration of the operation? What are the issues of rotation and sustainability?
• Are there contingency measures to meet the requirement for increased force levels? Will it be from
national backfilling or fall under a call-up of reserve forces policy?
• What is the intended end state and exit strategy?
• What is the commander’s intent?
• Is the national asset authority understood and agreed upon by multinational forces?
• Where is the AO? How does the AO affect the climatic, terrain, cultural, political, language, and
socioeconomic issues?
• What is the overall multinational force structure?
• What capabilities are at the multinational level? Which will provide national support only?
• What fire support assets is the multinational force providing? What are their capabilities and
command status?
• What is the desired fire support organization for early-entry forces?
• What is the deployment timeframe?
• How will the deployment be carried out (land, sea, or air)?
Delivery Systems
13-28. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following delivery systems questions with respect to
multinational operations:
• What is the desired order of arrival of fire support assets?
• What are the characteristics, capabilities, and quantity of fire support assets, including range,
tactical, and operational mobility and authorized munitions?
• What is the multinational policy for survey, meteorology, and calibration?
Weapons
13-29. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following weapons questions with respect to
multinational operations:
• What is the capability and interoperability of multinational munitions to include proofing
compatibility and ballistic data contained in fire control computers?
• What are the planned ammunition stocks and expenditure rates?
• What are the key interoperability constraints? |
3-16 | 124 | Chapter 13
• Are there any special ammunition handling, storage, and environmental considerations or national
limitations on the employment of weapons or weapon systems?
• Do the weapons depend on GPS signals for accuracy?
• What is the status or accuracy of the GPS signal predicted to be during operations?
• Are there any occupational health and safety constraints?
• Are volumetric (blast) munitions available? If so, what are the constraints on their employment?
• What nonlethal weapons are available, and are there any national restrictions on their use?
Command
13-30. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following command questions with respect to
multinational operations:
• What are the multinational levels of command?
• What will be the command relationships for fire support assets?
• What is the command arrangement for conducting multinational long-range fires?
• What are the liaison arrangements?
Control
13-31. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following control questions with respect to
multinational operations:
• Will terrain requirements to support offensive operations be considered in the overall deconfliction
of real estate by the G-3 or S-3?
• What operational environment control procedures deconflict air, aviation, indirect fire, and
unmanned aircraft system assets?
• What operational management requirements exist in relation to electromagnetic warfare?
• What is the policy for using indirect fire systems using nonprecision munitions in the ROE?
• What is the policy for using obscurants and illumination in the ROE?
ENGINEER PLANNING
13-32. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following engineer planning questions with respect
to multinational operations:
• What is the engineer command structure for the mission?
• What are the engineer coordination interfaces?
• When will these coordination measures take effect?
• What are the capabilities of the allies’ engineer forces? Have these capabilities been passed on to
other multinational forces?
• Who is the lead nation and what force engineer capabilities is the lead nation providing?
• What capabilities is the host nation providing?
• What multinational documents and agreements apply to the mission, such as ABCANZ standards?
• What are the technical standards for the mission and who is the technical authority?
• What are the specific AO characteristics that affect interoperability, such as severe climatic
conditions?
• Who is the lead nation for mapping? Who is maintaining the common map database?
• Are engineers involved in targeting to assess or estimate the work required to repair infrastructure
and utilities? Are engineers involved in clearing the area and route of mines and unexploded
ordnance at the end of the hostilities?
• What are the phases and flow of engineer units, capabilities, and materiel to the mission area to
support the plan?
• Is this flow reflected in the multinational time-phased force and deployment list?
• Are there any specific multinational engineer capabilities that could facilitate deployment?
• Is there a clear multinational engineer control structure to facilitate force deployment and reception?
• Has a common multinational facilities survey been conducted and coordinated at the force engineer
level? |
3-16 | 125 | Additional Factors During Multinational Operations
• Is an engineer materiel management system in place?
• What is the agreed command critical engineer resources list?
• What are the multinational funding arrangements for multinational engineer tasks?
• Are there engineer contracts with the host nation or other contractors outside the host nation?
• What is the host nation actually providing in terms of engineer services?
• How is engineer effort coordinated in the theater of operations?
• What is the multinational engineer priority of work?
• What are the control mechanisms to affect common engineer tasks in the multinational force?
• Who is conducting the environmental health site assessment?
• Who is conducting the environmental baseline survey?
EXECUTION
13-33. Commanders and staffs consider and answer the following execution questions with respect to
multinational operations:
• Have there been any modifications to the engineer command structure?
• What are the ongoing new engineer support agreements?
• What multinational documents and agreements apply to the mission, such as STANAGs and
ABCANZ standards?
• What, if anything, is the impact of nongovernmental organizations and CAO activity in the theater
of operations on the engineer plan?
• What are the interoperability disconnects between multinational engineer partners? Are they being
addressed?
• What are the intratheater engineer coordination mechanisms? Are these mechanisms capturing
lessons learned and informing all nations to allow intratheater adaptations to doctrine and new
problems?
• Are there any host-nation cultural constraints and restrictions that could impact multinational
engineer operations? |
3-16 | 127 | Glossary
The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. The proponent
publication for terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.
SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
AAMDC Army air and missile defense command
ABCANZ American, British, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand
ADP Army doctrine publication
AJP allied joint publication
AO area of operations
AR Army regulation
ATP Army techniques publication
C2 command and control
CAO civil affairs operations
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CIMIC civil-military cooperation
CMI civil military integration
CMO civil-military operations
CMOC civil-military operations center
CNOSC coalition network operations and security center
COA course of action
COP common operational picture
CWMD countering weapons of mass destruction
DA Department of the Army
DOD Department of Defense
DODD Department of Defense directive
FM field manual
FSF foreign security force
G-1 chief of staff, adjutant general-personnel
G-2 chief of staff, intelligence
G-3 chief of staff, operations
G-4 chief of staff, logistics
G-5 chief of staff, plans
G-6 chief of staff, signal
G-39 chief of staff, information operations
GPS Global Positioning System
IM information management
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance |
3-16 | 128 | Glossary
J-1 manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff
J-4 logistics directorate of a joint staff
J-6 communications system directorate of a joint staff
JMEI joining, membership, and exiting instructions
JP joint publication
KM knowledge management
MPE mission partner environment
MPN mission partner network
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OCS operational contract support
PNT positioning, navigation, and timing
ROE rules of engagement
RSOI reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
S-1 battalion or brigade personnel staff officer
S-3 battalion or brigade operations staff officer
S-4 battalion or brigade logistics staff officer
S-5 battalion or brigade plans staff officer
SATCOM satellite communications
SFA security force assistance
SFAB security force assistance brigade
SOP standard operating procedure
STANAG standardization agreement
TLD theater liaison detachment
TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures
U.S. United States
UAP unified action partner
UN United Nations
USCYBERCOM United States Cyber Command
WMD weapons of mass destruction |
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