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Glossary SECTION II – TERMS air domain The atmosphere, beginning at the Earth’s surface, extending to the altitude where its effects upon operations become negligible. (JP 3-30) civil administration An administration established by a foreign government in friendly territory, under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, to exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government or in hostile territory, occupied by United States forces, where a foreign government exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil government can be established. (JP 3-05) civil knowledge integration The actions taken to analyze, evaluate, and organize collected civil information for operational relevance and informing the warfighting function. (FM 3-57) civil military integration The actions taken to establish, maintain, influence, or leverage relations between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions to synchronize, coordinate, and enable interorganizational cooperation and to achieve unified action. (FM 3-57) civil-military operations center An organization, normally comprised of civil affairs, established to plan and facilitate coordination of activities of the Armed Forces of the United States within indigenous populations and institutions, the private sector, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, multinational forces, and other governmental agencies in support of the commander. (JP 3-57) civil network A collection of formal and informal groups, associations, military engagements, and organizations within an operational environment that interact with each other with varying degrees of frequency, trust, and collaboration. (FM 3-57) civil network development and engagement The activity by which the civil network capabilities and resources are engaged, evaluated, developed, and integrated into operations. (FM 3-57) countering weapons of mass destruction Efforts against actors of concern to curtail the conceptualization, development, possession, proliferation, use, and effects of weapons of mass destruction, related expertise, materials, technologies, and means of delivery. (JP 3-40) counterintelligence Information gathered and activities conducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons or their agents, or international terrorist organizations or activities. (JP 2-0) forensic-enabled intelligence The intelligence resulting from the integration of scientifically examined materials and other information to establish full characterization, attribution, and the linkage of events, locations, items, signatures, nefarious intent, and persons of interest. (JP 2-0) geospatial intelligence The exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on or about the Earth. (JP 2-0) human intelligence A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. (JP 2-0)
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Glossary intelligence operations (Army) The tasks undertaken by military intelligence units through the intelligence disciplines to obtain information to satisfy validated requirements. (ADP 2-0) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance An integrated operations and intelligence activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors; assets; and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. (JP 2-0) interoperability The ability to act together coherently, effectively, and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. (JP 3-0) interorganizational cooperation The interaction that occurs among elements of the Department of Defense; participating United States Government departments and agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; international organizations; nongovernmental organizations; and the private sector. (JP 3-08) lead agency The United States Government agency designated to coordinate the interagency oversight of the day- to-day conduct of an ongoing operation. (JP 3-08) measure and signature intelligence Information produced by quantitative and qualitative analysis of physical attributes of targets and events to detect, characterize, locate, and identify targets and events; and derived from specialized, technically derived measurements and signatures of physical phenomenon intrinsic to an object or event. (JP 2-0) mission assurance A process to protect or ensure the continued function and resilience of capabilities and assets, including personnel, equipment, facilities, networks, information and information systems, infrastructure, and supply chains, critical to the execution of Department of Defense mission-essential functions. (JP 3-26) mission command (Army) The Army’s approach to command and control that empowers subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation. (ADP 6-0) multinational operations A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (JP 3-16) open-source intelligence Publicly available information collected, exploited, and disseminated to address a specific requirement. (JP 2-0) signals intelligence A category of intelligence comprising all communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, however transmitted, individually or in combination. (JP 2-0) space domain The area above the altitude where atmospheric effects on airborne objects become negligible . (JP 3-14) special operations Activities or actions requiring unique modes of employment, tactical techniques, equipment, and training often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments. (JP 3-05)
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Glossary support to civil administration Assistance given by United States armed forces to stabilize or enhance the operations of the governing body of a foreign country by assisting an established or interim government. (FM 3-57) technical intelligence Intelligence derived from the collection, processing, analysis, and exploitation of data and information pertaining to foreign equipment and materiel for the purposes of preventing technological surprise, assessing foreign scientific and technical capabilities, and developing countermeasures designed to neutralize an enemy’s technological advantages. (JP 2-0) transitional military authority A temporary military government exercising the functions of civil administration in the absence of a legitimate civil authority. (FM 3-07) unity of command The direction of all forces under a single, responsible commander who has the requisite authority to direct and employ those forces. (JP 3-0)
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References All websites accessed on 10 May 2024. REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS These documents must be available to intended users of this publication. DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 15 April 2024. JP 3-16. Multinational Operations. 01 March 2019. FM 1-02.1. Operational Terms. 28 February 2024. FM 1-02.2. Military Symbols. 28 February 2024. RELATED PUBLICATIONS These cited documents contain relevant supplemental information. JOINT PUBLICATIONS Most joint doctrinal and administrative publications are available online at https://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/. Unless otherwise indicated, most Department of Defense issuances are available online at https://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/. DODD 3300.03. DoD Document and Media Exploitation (DOMEX), Change 2. 11 January 2011. JP 1 Volume 2. The Joint Force. 19 June 2020. JP 2-0. Joint Intelligence. 26 May 2022. JP 3-0. Joint Campaigns and Operations. 18 June 2022. JP 3-05. Joint Doctrine for Special Operations. 22 September 2020. JP 3-08. Interorganizational Cooperation. 12 October 2016. JP 3-09. Joint Fire Support. 10 April 2019. JP 3-12. Joint Cyberspace Operations. 19 December 2022. JP 3-14. Joint Space Operations. 23 August 2023. JP 3-26. Joint Combating Terrorism. 30 July 2020. JP 3-30. Joint Air Operations. 25 July 2019. JP 3-31. Joint Land Operations, Change 2. 03 October 2019. JP 3-33. Joint Force Headquarters. 09 June 2022. JP 3-34. Joint Engineer Operations. 06 January 2016. JP 3-40. Joint Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction. 27 November 2019. JP 3-57. Civil-Military Operations. 09 July 2018. JP 3-85. Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations. 22 May 2020. JP 4-0. Joint Logistics. 20 July 2023. JP 4-02. Joint Health Services. 29 August 2023. JP 4-10. Operational Contract Support. 04 March 2019. JP 5-0. Joint Planning. 01 December 2020. ARMY PUBLICATIONS Most Army doctrinal and administrative publications are available online at https://armypubs.army.mil/.
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References ADP 2-0. Intelligence. 31 July 2019. ADP 3-0. Operations. 31 July 2019. ADP 3-05. Army Special Operations, Change 1. 31 July 2019. ADP 3-19. Fires. 31 July 2019. ADP 6-0. Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces. 31 July 2019. AR 34-1. Interoperability. 09 April 2020. AR 380-10. Foreign Disclosure and Contacts With Foreign Representatives. 14 July 2015. AR 381-26. Army Foreign Materiel Program. 30 January 2023. ATP 2-22.4. Technical Intelligence. 29 October 2021. ATP 2-22.82. Biometric-Enabled Intelligence. 02 November 2015. ATP 2-22.85/MCRP 10-10F.1/NTTP 3-07.16/AFTTP 3-2.85. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical Employment of Biometrics in Support of Operations. 30 April 2020. ATP 3-04.16. Airfield Operations. 21 September 2023. ATP 3-07.10/MCRP 3-03D.1/NTTP 3-07.5/AFTTP 3-2.76. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Advising for Foreign Security Forces. 15 June 2023. ATP 3-34.5/MCRP 3-40B.2. Environmental Considerations, Change 1. 10 August 2015. ATP 3-39.21/MCRP 10-10F.5/NTTP 3-07.8/AFTTP 3-2.7/CGTTP 3-93.10. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Expeditionary Forensics. 30 October 2020. ATP 3-94.1. Digital Liaison Detachment. 28 December 2017. ATP 3-96.1. Security Force Assistance Brigade. 02 September 2020. ATP 4-02.55 Army Health System Support Planning. 30 March 2020. ATP 4-10/MCRP 4-11H/NTTP 4-09.1/AFTTP 3-2.41, Change 1. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Operational Contract Support. 16 December 2021. ATP 4-10.1 Logistics Civil Augmentation Program Support to Operations. 28 November 2023. ATP 6-02.61. Expeditionary Mission Partner Network Operations. 06 December 2023. ATP 6-02.62. Expeditionary Mission Partner Network Techniques for Joining, Membership, and Exiting Instructions. 06 December 2023. FM 2-22.3. Human Intelligence Collector Operations. 6 September 2006. FM 3-0. Operations. 01 October 2022. FM 3-07. Stability. 02 June 2014. FM 3-12. Cyberspace Operations and Electromagnetic Warfare. 24 August 2021. FM 3-14. Army Space Operations. 30 October 2019. FM 3-34. Engineer Operations. 18 December 2020. FM 3-52. Airspace Control. 20 October 2016. FM 3-57. Civil Affairs Operations. 28 July 2021. FM 4-0. Sustainment Operations. 31 July 2019. FM 4-02. Army Health System, Change 1. 17 November 2020. FM 5-0. Planning and Orders Production. 16 May 2022. FM 6-27/MCTP 11-10C. The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Land Warfare, Change 1. 07 August 2019. TC 3-05.5. Special Operations Task Force Planning and Operations Handbook. 26 September 2017. NATO PUBLICATIONS Most NATO publications are available online at https://nso.nato.int/nso/home/main/home. AJP-01 (F). Allied Joint Doctrine. 19 December 2022. AJP-3.3 (B) Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations. 08 April 2016.
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References AJP-3.5. Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations. 07 August 2019. (This classified publication is available on the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network [known as SIPRNET]. Contact the preparing agency of this manual for access instructions.) AJP-4 (B) Allied Joint Doctrine for Logistics. 20 December 2018. Allied Technical Publication-45. Warning and Reporting and Hazard Prediction of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Incidents. 20 March 2020. (This classified publication is available on the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network [known as SIPRNET]. Contact the preparing agency of this manual for access instructions.) The North Atlantic Treaty, Article 5 (Collective Defense). https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm. OTHER PUBLICATIONS Executive Order 13526. Original Classification Authority. https://www.archives.gov/federal- register/codification/chapter.html Geneva Conventions of 1949. https://www.loc.gov. STANAG 2019. NATO Joint Military Symbology. 16 October 2017. https://nso.nato.int/nso/home/main/home. The North Atlantic Treaty. 1949. Available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm. Title 10 of the U.S. Code, Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements. http://uscode.house.gov. WEBSITES ABCANZ Armies’ Program coalition operations lessons learned database. https://wss.apan.org/cda/ABCANZ-armies. Center for Army Lessons Learned. https://www.army.mil/call. Joint Lessons Learned Information System. https://www.jllis.mil. PRESCRIBED FORMS This section contains no entries. REFERENCED FORMS Unless otherwise indicated, most Department of the Army (DA) forms are available on the Army Publishing Directorate website: https://armypubs.army.mil/. DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.
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Index Entries are by paragraph number. assessment, contracting, 5-28 chemical, biological, radiological, A health threat, 6-10 and nuclear defense, questions, acquisition and cross-servicing space operations, 11-19 5-52 agreement, 5-14 special operations, 7-2 chief of staff, types, 2-85–2-92 activities, preparation, 2-25 assets, lift, 3-2 civil administration, defined, 8-24 special operations, 7-3 authority, contracting, 5-30 civil affairs, competencies, 8-8– adversary, challenges from, 1-29 logistics and, 5-6 8-15 agency, civilian development, transference of, 2-17, 8-23 civil affairs operations. See CAO 8-40 cooperation, 2-78 B civil knowledge integration, 8-10– human rights and biometric-enabled intelligence, 8-11 democratization, 8-41 4-25 defined, 8-10 agreements, communications, civil military integration, 8-1–8-45 C 4-13 defined, 8-1 C2, air operations, 10-3–10-4 resources, 5-20 civil military liaison, 8-19 interoperability, 2-18–2-19 security sharing, 4-7 maritime challenges, 9-20 civil network, defined, 8-12 aid, humanitarian, 8-26 medical questions, 6-18 civil network development and air and missile defense, 10-11– questions, 2-121–2-126 engagement, 8-12–813 10-13 space questions, 11-31 defined, 8-12 air domain, defined, 10-1 special operations, 7-11 civilian, development agencies, special operations forces, 7-8– air environment, characteristics, 8-40 7-13 10-1 organizations, 8-26–8-41 campaign, preparation, 3-1 support to, 5-11 air operations, 10-1–10-17 benefits, 10-2–10-10 CAO, 8-5–8-7 civil-military operations. See CMO C2, 10-3–10-4 integration, 8-6 civil-military operations center. capabilities, 10-3 capabilities, conventional, 2-112 See CMOC considerations, 10-17 effects of, 2-28 civil-military teaming, 8-20–8-25 planning, 10-5–10-7 integration, 2-108–2-112 CMO, capabilities, 8-4 air tasking cycle, 10-6 intelligence, 4-24–4-28 considerations, 8-45 knowledge of, 2-106–2-121 airfield, forward, 10-15 interorganizational military, 13-1 operations, 10-14–10-16 cooperation, 8-2–8-4 questions, 5-48 placement, 10-14 special operations forces, CMOC, 8-16–8-18 airspace control, 10-8–10-10 2-117–2-120 defined, 8-16 procedures, 10-8 capacity, building, 11-13–11-16 COA analysis, questions, 3-32 airspace control authority, 10-9– centralized, versus decentralized, COA approval, questions, 3-34 10-10 12-30–12-34 COA comparison, questions, 3-33 alliance, 1-7 coalition versus, 1-9 chain of command, 2-38 COA development, questions, challenges, integration, 8-15 3-31 allied, operations, 2-55–2-56 maritime, 9-2, 9-14–9-16, 9-20 coalition, 1-8–1-10 architecture, intelligence, 4-14 mission focus, 3-4–3-17 alliance versus, 1-9 area of operations, maritime, MPE, 3-19–3-20 network operations security 9-17–9-18 operations, 1-12 center, 2-74 Army Health System, functions, partners, 4-11 unity of effort, 1-10 planning, 3-1–3-35 6-3–6-7 collaboration, 2-18, 7-12 politics, 2-15 support from, 6-2 cyber, 12-29 solutions, 2-35 assess, interoperability health, 6-4 sustainment, 5-5 considerations, 2-30 teams, 1-22
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Index Entries are by paragraph number. combination, command structure, confidence, maintaining, 1-15– capabilities, 12-5, 12-18, 12-30 2-51 1-27 communications system, 12-35 command, fires questions, 13-30 considerations, C2, 2-121–2-126 considerations, 12-36 questions, 2-122 host nation, 5-19 integration, 12-5–12-7 command and control, 2-1–2-126. intelligence, 4-31 synchronization, 12-34 See C2 planning challenges, 3-28– cyberspace defense, 12-22 3-35 coordination, 12-19–12-24 command authority, comparison, 2-53 sustainment, 5-47–5-55 cyberspace offense, 12-23–12-24 command relationship, purpose, contract support, arrangements, cyberspace operations, 2-52–2-78 5-28 deconfliction, 12-32–12-33 questions, 2-123 contracting, 8-35 influences, 12-1–12-26 types, 2-54–2-78 limitations, 5-27 staff, 12-25–12-26 stand up, 5-29 synchronizing, 12-12–12-13 command structure, combination, 2-51 contractor concept, 5-34–5-36 D integrated, 2-46–2-50 control, engineers, 13-7 decentralized, versus centralized, lead nation, 2-42–2-44 fires, 13-3 12-30–12-34 parallel, 2-45 fires questions, 13-31 deconfliction, cyberspace space operations, 11-20–11-24 logistics and, 5-7 operations, 12-32–12-33 special operations forces and, multinational forces, 2-61–2-72 7-8 cooperation, 1-5, 1-28 delivery, fires questions, 13-28 types, 2-40–2-51 CWMD, 3-22 deputy commander, multinational commander, collaboration, 8-17 coordination, 12-8 force, 2-84 commander, considerations, 2-68 air and missile defense, 10-13 dimensions, interoperability and, commander, considerations, 2-73 contracting, 5-23 1-28–1-33 foreign disclosure, 4-5 direct, interoperability commander’s intent, 3-6 geospatial, 13-11 considerations, 2-37 commanders, approach by, 2-3 information, 4-9 doctrine, space questions, 11-35 area air defense, 10-11 logistics, 5-36 challenges, 8-15 mission partner network, 12-11 document and media exploitation, considerations, 1-28, 2-14, planning, 3-15 4-27 2-21, 3-14, 6-7, 7-7, 9-22 requirements, 5-4 donor organizations, 8-38 focus, 3-4–3-17 security force assistance, multinational force, 2-1–2-2, 13-17 E 2-83 space operations, 11-21–11-22 electromagnetic interference, questions, 9-23 special operations, 7-5–7-7 space questions, 11-43 responsibilities, 1-2, 1-15, sustainment, 5-1 electromagnetic spectrum, 12-4 1-17, 1-23, 4-2, 6-6, 9-11, coordination cell, 2-75–2-77 11-23, 12-28, 13-8 engineer, functions, 13-5 space operations, 11-10 coordination center, 2-70–2-72 planning questions, 13-32 United Nations operations, logistics, 5-8 support, 13-4–13-7 2-57 COP, coalition, 2-75 enterprise MPE, 2-20 common operational picture. See COP coordination cell, 2-29 environmental monitoring, space COP countering weapons of mass questions, 11-41 communications, 2-101–2-105 destruction. See CWMD equipment, communications, considerations, 2-102–2-104 counterintelligence, defined, 4-17 2-105 equipment, 2-105 countermeasures, medical, 6-13– evaluate, interoperability information and, 4-13–4-14 6-14 considerations, 2-34 need for, 2-12 plans, 2-104 course of action. See COA execute, interoperability questions, 2-126 CWMD, 13-19–13-25 considerations, 2-26–2-29 space operations, 11-28 defined, 3-21 execution, questions, 13-33 communications system, cyber, collaboration, 12-29 experience, rapport, 1-18 cyberspace, 12-35 support from, 12-27–12-29 experts, 5-16 complementary intelligence cyber-enabled intelligence, 4-26 capabilities, 4-24–4-28- cybersecurity, 12-14, 12-21 concept of support, 5-26 coordination, 12-19–12-24 cyberspace, 12-1–12-36
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Index Entries are by paragraph number. F geospatial, 13-9 L sharing, 1-26 fire support, coordination, 13-2– language, questions, 2-125 13-3 information collection, 4-12 laws, application, 11-11 planning questions, 13-27– information sharing, 4-4–4-10 lead agency, 8-28–8-29 13-31 cyberspace, 12-9–12-10 defined, 8-28 force projection, 3-2–3-3 tasks, 4-29–4-30 security force assistance, forces, formation, 1-6–1-10 infrastructure, protection of, 12-17 13-15 joint, 1-29 integrated command structure, lead nation, command structure, support to, 11-6 2-46–2-50 2-42–2-44 foreign disclosure, coordination, integrated interoperability, concept, 5-9 4-5 purpose, 2-22–2-37 planning, 3-12 forensic-enabled intelligence, integration, 5-46, 12-16 staff augmentation, 2-44 defined, 4-28 capabilities, 2-108–2-112 leaders, engineer, 13-6 forward airfield, 10-15 cyberspace, 12-5–12-7 leadership, style, 2-4 relationships, 2-55 funding, questions, 5-49 liaison, benefits of, 2-62–2-63 space domain, 11-3 detachment, 2-72 G space operations, 11-9, 11-26 network, 2-62–2-69 G-1, 2-86 intelligence, 4-1–4-31 questions, 2-124 G-2, 2-87 capabilities, 4-3, 4-24–4-28 space operations, 11-24 disciplines, 4-16 special operations forces, 2-71 G-3, 2-88 effects of, 4-1 training, 2-70 G-4, 2-89 questions, 4-31 limited lift, 3-3 G-5, 2-90 intelligence operations, 4-15-4-23 limits, partners, 2-13 G-6, 2-91 defined, 4-15 logistics, methods, 5-9 G-39, 2-92 intelligence, surveillance, and planning, 5-10–5-13 reconnaissance, defined, 4-2 geospatial intelligence, defined, responsibility of, 5-6–5-9 4-18 intergovernmental organization, support center, 5-33 8-31–8-32 geospatial support, 13-8–13-11 logistics planners, actions, 5-12 intermediate staging base, 5-38 graphic control measures, 2-27 logistics system, United Nations, interoperability, 1-28–1-33 5-31–5-36 ground operations, 1-4 C2, 2-18–2-19 groups, planning, 3-18 defined, 1-13 M guidance, medical support, 6-11– efficiency of, 2-7 maintenance, questions, 5-51 6-12 enabling, 2-56 manning and equipment, STANAG and, 2-9 fundamentals, 2-19 questions, 5-54 history of, 2-6 H integrated purpose, 2-22–2-37 maritime, area of operations, 9-17–9-18 health service support, 6-3 levels, 1-32 challenges, 9-2, 9-14–9-16 maritime, 9-16 health threat, assessment, 6-10 characteristics, 9-1–9-2 mission command, 2-5 host nation, space questions, considerations, 9-1–9-23 practices, 2-21 11-34 flexibility, 9-6–9-7 requirements, 2-22 host-nation considerations, space operations, 11-14 operation characteristics, 9-3– 9-8 support, 5-19 special operations forces, 7-9 operational approach, 9-19– host-nation support, 5-15–5-20 interorganizational cooperation, 9-22 questions, 5-50 CMO, 8-2–8-4 requirements, 9-10 human intelligence, defined, 4-19 defined, 8-2 sustainment, 9-22 human resources, questions, 5-55 interpreters, 2-95–2-100 measure and signature human rights and democratization J intelligence, defined, 4-20 agencies, 8-41 medical, planning, 6-8–6-9 joint forces, 1-29 humanitarian action, principles, planning questions, 6-19 jurisdiction, command, 2-12–2-14 8-27 relationships, 6-5 K medical support, 6-1–6-19 I knowledge, rapport, 1-17 considerations, 6-1, 6-17–6-19 influence, operations, 1-11–1-14 countermeasures, 6-13–6-14 information, acquisition, 11-5 guidance, 6-11–6-12
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Index Entries are by paragraph number. military handover, 3-27 operational approach, maritime, planning guidance, 3-6 missile warning, space questions, 9-19–9-22 political advisor, 2-94 11-40 operational contract support. See politics, challenges of, 2-15 mission, 1-3 OCS transition and, 3-24 mission analysis, questions, 3-30 operations, airfield, 10-14–10-16 positioning, navigating, and mission assurance, defined, 12-20 cyberspace staff, 12-25–12-26 timing, space questions, 11-38 ground, 1-4 mission command, 2-3–2-19 maritime, 9-3–9-8 preparation, special operations, defined, 2-3 types, 2-39 7-6 interoperability, 2-5 prepare, interoperability order production, dissemination, mission focus, 3-4–3-17 and transition, questions, 3-35 considerations, 2-24–2-25 mission partner environment. See organization, forces, 1-6–1-10 principles, special operations, 7-4 MPE priority intelligence requirements, organizations, civilian, 8-26–8-41 mission partner network. See civilian types, 8-30–8-41 4-10 MPN donor, 8-38 procurement, challenges of, 5-17 coordination, 12-11 relationships, 8-42–8-44 protection, infrastructure, 12-17 monitor, interoperability, 2-31– P–Q R 2-33 parallel, command structure, 2-45 rapport, 1-16–1-18 MPE, 2-20–2-21 challenges, 3-19–3-20 partners, abilities, 1-33 receipt of mission, questions, 3-29 planning considerations, 3-19– benefits of, 2-18 reception, 5-39–5-42 3-27 challenges, 3-4, 4-11 requirements, 3-22 characteristics, 1-15 reception, staging, onward confidence in, 1-21 movement, and integration, MPN, planning, 3-21–3-22 coordination, 12-8 5-37–5-46 multinational force commander, CWMD, 3-22 recommend, interoperability 2-1–2-2 limits of, 2-13 considerations, 2-35–2-36 multinational integrated logistics responsibilities, 5-25 relationships, 8-42–8-44 unit, 5-9 partnership, building, 11-13–11-16 command, 2-12 multinational operations, patience, 1-24 establish, 10-4 characteristics, 1-14 health, 6-5 personnel, location, 11-20 defined, 1-1 security force assistance, influences on, 1-11–1-14 plans, communications, 2-104 13-18 structures for, 2-38–2-51 interoperability considerations, relief in place, 3-25 training, 1-12 2-23 resources, differences in, 3-5 multinational staff, characteristics, planning, 3-13–3-17 limits, 11-27 2-81 air operations, 10-5–10-7 movement of, 5-39–5-42 organization, 2-79 attributes, 9-13 planning for, 5-21 positions, 2-80 challenges, 3-1–3-35 considerations, 3-28–3-35 respect, 1-19–1-20 N cyberspace, 12-31 responsibilities, commanders, 1-2, national authorities, 2-58 factors, 6-9 1-17, 1-23 focus, 11-18 staff, 1-2 national interest, 2-15–2-17 initial, 10-7 restrictions, planning, 4-11 nongovernmental organizations, liaison timing, 2-64 8-33–8-37 logistics, 5-10–5-13 risks, execution and, 2-26 categories, 8-34 maritime, 9-21 information sharing, 4-6 characteristics, 8-36 maritime operations, 9-9–9-13 role-specialization nation, 5-9 mandated, 8-34 medical, 6-8–6-9 nonmandated, 8-34 MPE, 3-19–3-27 S MPN, 3-21–3-22 satellite communications, space O OCS, 5-24 questions, 11-37 OCS, considerations, 5-21–5-30 onward movement, 5-45 security, agreements, 4-7 oversight of, 5-23 representative, 2-107 planning, 5-24 restrictions, 4-11 security force assistance, 2-113– 2-116, 13-12–13-18 onward movement, 5-44–5-45 space operations, 11-17–11-19 space questions, 11-32 shared understanding, 1-26–1-27 open-source intelligence, defined, 4-21 transitions, 3-23–3-24 signals intelligence, defined, 4-22 planning group, 3-18
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Index Entries are by paragraph number. situational awareness, maritime, personal and special, 2-93– tasks, information sharing, 4-29– 9-15 2-100 4-30 Soldiers, responsibilities, 1-30 recommendations, 2-73 team building, 1-15, 1-22–1-23 responsibilities, 1-2, 2-30, sovereignty, 12-15 technical intelligence, defined, 2-32–2-33, 5-10 space, 11-1–11-44 tasks, 5-12, 5-19 4-23 activities, 11-7 timing, planning, 3-13 staging, 5-43 capabilities, 11-8, 11-12 tracking, space questions, 11-44 considerations, 11-30–11-44 STANAG, implementation of, 2-8– integration, 11-3 2-9 training, liaison and, 2-70 multinational operations, 1-12 space control, space questions, standardization agreement. See orientation, 2-82 11-42 STANAG planning for, 3-17 space domain, characteristics, standards of care, 6-15–6-16 space questions, 11-36 11-1–11-3 structures, multinational transfer of authority, 3-7–3-12 defined, 11-1 operations, 2-38–2-51 transition, types, 3-25–3-27 types, 11-4 support, Army Health System, 6-2 transitional governance, 8-9 space operations, 11-4–11-12 cyber, 12-27–12-29 command structure, 11-20– for resources, 5-22 transitional military authority, 11-24 host nation, 5-15–5-20 8-22–8-23 communications, 11-28 logistics, 5-33 defined, 8-22 considerations, 11-25–11-29 negotiation of, 5-18 transitions, planning, 3-23–3-24 coordination, 11-21–11-22 questions, 5-48 translator, 2-95–2-100 integration, 11-9, 11-26 security force assistance, interoperability, 11-14 2-114, 13-14 transportation, questions, 5-53 planning, 11-17–11-19 support to civil administration, trust, 1-25 special operations, 7-1–7-14 8-24–8-25 U–V activities, 7-3 defined, 8-25 C2, 7-11 surveillance and reconnaissance, unified action, actions for, 2-10 considerations, 7-1–7-3, 7-14 space questions, 11-39 United Nation, organization, 8-31 coordination, 7-5–7-7 logistics system, 5-31–5-36 sustainability, maritime force, 9-7 criteria for, 7-7 operation types, 2-39 defined, 7-1 sustainment, 5-1–5-55 relationships, 2-57–2-60 principles, 7-4 challenges, 5-5 unity of command, defined, 2-1 considerations, 5-47–5-55 special operations forces, C2, coordination, 5-1 unity of effort, coalition, 1-10 7-8–7-13 maritime, 9-22 increase, 5-3 capabilities, 2-117–2-120, 7-13 planners actions, 5-13 maritime, 9-12 command structure, 7-8 requirements, 3-24 purpose, 2-10–2-12 flexibility, 7-10 unity of effort, 5-2–5-5 success, 2-11 interoperability, 7-9 sustainment, 5-2–5-5 liaison and, 2-71 synchronization, cyberspace, 12-34 W–X–Y–Z staffing, purpose, 2-79–2-100 staffs, augmentation, 2-44 synchronizing, cyberspace weapons, fires questions, 13-29 operations, 12-12–12-13 coordination with, 3-15 writing for release, 4-8 cyberspace, 12-25–12-26 T liaison, 2-65 targeting, space questions, 11-33 organization, 2-79
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FM 3-16 15 July(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:19)(cid:21)4 (cid:37)(cid:92)(cid:3)(cid:50)(cid:85)(cid:71)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:3)(cid:82)(cid:73)(cid:3)(cid:87)(cid:75)(cid:72)(cid:3)(cid:54)(cid:72)(cid:70)(cid:85)(cid:72)(cid:87)(cid:68)(cid:85)(cid:92)(cid:3)(cid:82)(cid:73)(cid:3)(cid:87)(cid:75)(cid:72)(cid:3)(cid:36)(cid:85)(cid:80)(cid:92)(cid:29) (cid:53)(cid:36)(cid:49)(cid:39)(cid:60)(cid:3)(cid:36)(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:42)(cid:40)(cid:50)(cid:53)(cid:42)(cid:40) (cid:42)(cid:72)(cid:81)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:68)(cid:79)(cid:15)(cid:56)(cid:81)(cid:76)(cid:87)(cid:72)(cid:71)(cid:54)(cid:87)(cid:68)(cid:87)(cid:72)(cid:86)(cid:36)(cid:85)(cid:80)(cid:92)(cid:3) (cid:38)(cid:75)(cid:76)(cid:72)(cid:73)(cid:82)(cid:73)(cid:54)(cid:87)(cid:68)(cid:73)(cid:73) (cid:50)(cid:73)(cid:73)(cid:76)(cid:70)(cid:76)(cid:68)(cid:79)(cid:29) (cid:48)(cid:36)(cid:53)(cid:46)(cid:3)(cid:41)(cid:17) (cid:36)(cid:57)(cid:40)(cid:53)(cid:44)(cid:47)(cid:47) (cid:36)(cid:71)(cid:80)(cid:76)(cid:81)(cid:76)(cid:86)(cid:87)(cid:85)(cid:68)(cid:87)(cid:76)(cid:89)(cid:72)(cid:3)(cid:36)(cid:86)(cid:86)(cid:76)(cid:86)(cid:87)(cid:68)(cid:81)(cid:87)(cid:3) (cid:87)(cid:82)(cid:3)(cid:87)(cid:75)(cid:72)(cid:3)(cid:54)(cid:72)(cid:70)(cid:85)(cid:72)(cid:87)(cid:68)(cid:85)(cid:92)(cid:3)(cid:82)(cid:73)(cid:3)(cid:87)(cid:75)(cid:72)(cid:3)(cid:36)(cid:85)(cid:80)(cid:92) 2419313 (cid:39)(cid:44)(cid:54)(cid:55)(cid:53)(cid:44)(cid:37)(cid:56)(cid:55)(cid:44)(cid:50)(cid:49)(cid:29) (cid:36)(cid:70)(cid:87)(cid:76)(cid:89)(cid:72)(cid:3)(cid:36)(cid:85)(cid:80)(cid:92)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:36)(cid:85)(cid:80)(cid:92)(cid:3)(cid:49)(cid:68)(cid:87)(cid:76)(cid:82)(cid:81)(cid:68)(cid:79)(cid:3)(cid:42)(cid:88)(cid:68)(cid:85)(cid:71)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:68)(cid:81)(cid:71)(cid:3)(cid:56)(cid:81)(cid:76)(cid:87)(cid:72)(cid:71)(cid:3)(cid:54)(cid:87)(cid:68)(cid:87)(cid:72)(cid:86)(cid:3)(cid:36)(cid:85)(cid:80)(cid:92)(cid:3)(cid:53)(cid:72)(cid:86)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:89)(cid:72)(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:3)(cid:55)(cid:82)(cid:3)(cid:69)(cid:72)(cid:3)(cid:71)(cid:76)(cid:86)(cid:87)(cid:85)(cid:76)(cid:69)(cid:88)(cid:87)(cid:72)(cid:71)(cid:3)(cid:76)(cid:81)(cid:3)
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FM 3-09 Fire Support and Field Artillery Operations AUGUST 2024 DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. This publication supersedes FM 3-09, dated 30 April 2020.
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This publication is available at the Army Publishing Directorate site (https://armypubs.army.mil/), and the Central Army Registry site
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*FM 3-09 Field Manual Headquarters No. 3-09 Department of the Army Washington, DC, 12 August 2024 Fire Support and Field Artillery Operations Contents Page PREFACE................................................................................................................... vii INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... ix Chapter 1 FOUNDATIONS OF FIRE SUPPORT AND THE ROLE OF THE FIELD ARTILLERY 1-1 Fire Support and the Threat ...................................................................................... 1-1 Fire Support in Joint and Multidomain Operations .................................................... 1-3 Operational Approach and Operational Framework .................................................. 1-7 The Field Artillery’s Role and Core Competencies ................................................. 1-11 The Fire Support System ......................................................................................... 1-11 Fire Support Functions ............................................................................................ 1-13 Characteristics of Fire Support ................................................................................ 1-14 Principles of Fire Support Planning, Coordination, and Execution.......................... 1-15 Fire Support and Field Artillery Training Considerations ......................................... 1-16 Chapter 2 THE FIRE SUPPORT SYSTEM ................................................................................ 2-1 Section I – Fire Support System: Command and Control ................................... 2-1 Fire Support Personnel .............................................................................................. 2-1 Command Posts ........................................................................................................ 2-5 Field Artillery Command Posts .................................................................................. 2-9 Joint Fire Support Command Posts ........................................................................ 2-11 Fire Support Networks ............................................................................................. 2-13 Section II – Fire Support System – Target Acquisition ..................................... 2-15 Section III – Fire Support System – Attack and Delivery Capabilities ............. 2-16 Surface To Surface Capabilities .............................................................................. 2-17 Air To Surface Capabilities ...................................................................................... 2-18 Cyberspace Operations ........................................................................................... 2-20 Space Operations .................................................................................................... 2-20 Information ............................................................................................................... 2-21 Deception................................................................................................................. 2-21 Chapter 3 FIRE SUPPORT AND THE OPERATIONS PROCESS ........................................... 3-1 Section I – Fire Support Functions ........................................................................ 3-1 Support Forces in Contact ......................................................................................... 3-1 Support the Concept of Operations ........................................................................... 3-2 Synchronize and Converge Fire Support (Lethal and Nonlethal) Across All Domains .. ............................................................................................................................ 3-2 DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release: distribution is unlimited. *This publication supersedes FM 3-09, dated 30 April 2020.
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Contents Sustain and Protect the Fire Support System ........................................................... 3-2 Section II – Processes and Procedures ................................................................ 3-4 Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses ........................................................................ 3-4 Counterfire ................................................................................................................ 3-5 Danger Close ............................................................................................................ 3-9 The Targeting Process .............................................................................................. 3-9 Fire Support Planning and Coordination Principles ................................................ 3-14 Fratricide Prevention and Clearance of Fires Processes and Procedures ............. 3-16 Fire Support and the Military Decision-Making Process ......................................... 3-19 Section III – Fire Support Preparation................................................................. 3-32 Rehearsals .............................................................................................................. 3-32 Section IV – Fire Support Execution ................................................................... 3-36 Principles of Fire Support Execution ....................................................................... 3-36 Integration of Fire Support and Airspace Control/Management During Execution .......................................................................................................................... 3-37 Section V – Fire Support Assessment ................................................................ 3-39 Assessment Working Group ................................................................................... 3-40 Chapter 4 FIELD ARTILLERY OPERATIONS .......................................................................... 4-1 Section I – The Role of the Field Artillery ............................................................. 4-1 Section II – Field Artillery Organizations at Echelons Above Brigade .............. 4-2 Theater Fires Command ........................................................................................... 4-2 Theater Fires Element............................................................................................... 4-3 Field Artillery Brigade ................................................................................................ 4-4 Division Artillery ......................................................................................................... 4-4 Section III – Field Artillery Capabilities in Depth ................................................. 4-5 Section IV – Field Artillery Organization for Combat .......................................... 4-6 The Principles of Fire Support Execution Applied to Field Artillery Organization For Combat ...................................................................................................................... 4-7 Field Artillery Inherent Responsibilities in Army Command Relationships ............... 4-8 Field Artillery Inherent Responsibilities in Army Support Relationships ................... 4-9 Section V – Key Considerations for Field Artillery Employment ..................... 4-12 Five Requirements for Accurate Predicted Fires .................................................... 4-12 Provide Proactive and Responsive Fires That Create Desired Effects .................. 4-13 Section VI – Fire Direction ................................................................................... 4-14 Tactical Fire Direction ............................................................................................. 4-15 Technical Fire Direction .......................................................................................... 4-15 Chapter 5 FIRE SUPPORT DURING COMPETITION AND CRISIS ........................................ 5-1 Section I – Fire Support During Competition ....................................................... 5-1 Security Cooperation................................................................................................. 5-1 Set the Theater ......................................................................................................... 5-2 Section II – Fire Support During Crisis ................................................................. 5-3 Chapter 6 FIRE SUPPORT IN DEPTH DURING LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS .................................................................................................................................. 6-1 Section I – Prevail in Large-Scale Combat Operations ....................................... 6-1 Section II – Fire Support in Deep Operations ...................................................... 6-3 Forcible Entry ............................................................................................................ 6-5 Forcible Entry Planning Considerations .................................................................... 6-6 Section III – The Defense ........................................................................................ 6-7
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Contents The Enemy Attack ..................................................................................................... 6-8 Common Defensive Control Measures ..................................................................... 6-8 Fire Support Considerations and the Characteristics of the Defense ....................... 6-9 Types of Defensive Operations ............................................................................... 6-11 Transition to the Offense ......................................................................................... 6-15 Section IV – The Offense ...................................................................................... 6-15 The Enemy Defense ................................................................................................ 6-15 Types of Offensive Operations ................................................................................ 6-18 Section V – Enabling, Stability and Reconstitution Operations ....................... 6-25 Enabling Operations ................................................................................................ 6-25 Stability Operations and Rear Area Fire Support .................................................... 6-36 Reconstitution Operations ....................................................................................... 6-41 Appendix A DEVELOPMENT OF ESSENTIAL FIRE SUPPORT AND ESSENTIAL FIELD ........... ARTILLERY TASKS ................................................................................................ A-1 Appendix B FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION MEASURES .................................................... B-1 Appendix C DENIED, DEGRADED AND DISRUPTED OPERATIONS ...................................... C-1 Appendix D ENVIRONMENTAL AND TERRAIN CONSIDERATIONS FOR FIRE SUPPORT... D-1 Appendix E TARGETING AND ARMY AIR SUPPORT REQUESTS ..........................................E-1 SOURCE NOTES ................................................................................ Source Notes-1 GLOSSARY ................................................................................................ Glossary-1 REFERENCES ........................................................................................ References-1 INDEX ................................................................................................................ Index-1 Figures Figure 1. Fire support logic chart ....................................................................................................... xi Figure 1-1. The elements of the fire support system.................................................................... 1-13 Figure 1-2. The band of excellence .............................................................................................. 1-16 Figure 2-1. Example of target area of interest .............................................................................. 2-16 Figure 3-1. The Army targeting process ....................................................................................... 3-10 Figure 3-2. D3A Crosswalk and joint targeting process ............................................................... 3-11 Figure 3-3. Air tasking cycle ......................................................................................................... 3-12 Figure 3-4. Planning and execution relationship .......................................................................... 3-16 Figure 6-1. Large-scale combat battlefield framework ................................................................... 6-2 Figure 6-2. Defensive arrangement................................................................................................ 6-9 Figure 6-3. Task organized for a movement to contact................................................................ 6-20 Figure 6-4. Example of Corps attack ............................................................................................ 6-22 Figure 6-5. Exploitation and pursuit.............................................................................................. 6-23 Figure 6-6. Relief in place ............................................................................................................ 6-28 Figure 6-7. Encirclement example................................................................................................ 6-36 Figure 6-8. Division Rear Area ..................................................................................................... 6-40 Figure B-1. Coordinated fire line example ......................................................................................B-2 Figure B-2. Fire support coordination line example .......................................................................B-4
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Contents Figure B-3. Free-fire area example ................................................................................................ B-6 Figure B-4. Gridded reference graphic example ........................................................................... B-7 Figure B-5. Kill box graphic example ............................................................................................. B-9 Figure B-6. Airspace coordination area example ........................................................................ B-11 Figure B-7. No fire area example ................................................................................................. B-12 Figure B-8. Restrictive fire area example .................................................................................... B-13 Figure B-9. Restrictive fire line example ...................................................................................... B-14 Figure B-10. Fire support area and a fire support station ............................................................ B-15 Figure B-11. Zone of fire example ............................................................................................... B-16 Figure B-12. Final protective fire example ................................................................................... B-17 Figure B-13. Boundaries example ............................................................................................... B-18 Figure B-14. Phase line and trigger line example ........................................................................ B-19 Figure B-15. Position area for artillery example........................................................................... B-20 Figure B-16. Critical friendly zone example ................................................................................. B-21 Figure B-17. Call for fire zone example ....................................................................................... B-22 Figure B-18. Artillery target intelligence zone .............................................................................. B-23 Figure B-19. Censor zone example ............................................................................................. B-24 Figure B-20. Common sensor boundary example ....................................................................... B-25 Figure D-1. Maritime strike coordination planning product .......................................................... D-10 Figure E-1. Army Targeting Methodology ...................................................................................... E-1 Figure E-2. Army Air Ground System ............................................................................................ E-2 Figure E-3. Air Support Request Number ...................................................................................... E-6 Figure E-4. Air Support Request Numbering ................................................................................. E-7 Tables Introductory Table 1. New, modified, and rescinded terms ............................................................... x Table 1-1. Fire Support considerations for the tenets of operations.............................................. 1-4 Table 1-2. Fire support considerations for the imperatives of operations ..................................... 1-5 Table 1-3. Operational and fire support considerations for operational approach ........................ 1-8 Table 1-4. Fire support considerations for operational framework .............................................. 1-10 Table 2-1. Fire support titles at brigade and above ....................................................................... 2-2 Table 3-1. Crosswalk of operations, joint targeting cycle, D3A, MDMP, and fire support tasks .......................................................................................................................... 3-13 Table 3-2. Clearance of fires responsibilities ............................................................................... 3-18 Table 3-3. Fire support element during receipt of mission .......................................................... 3-19 Table 3-4. Fire support element during mission analysis ............................................................ 3-21 Table 3-5. Nested Commanders’ intent examples at JFLCC and division levels ........................ 3-23 Table 3-6. Description of scheme of fires .................................................................................... 3-24 Table 3-7. Fire support element during course of action development ....................................... 3-27 Table 3-8. Example of minimum force protection package for FA systems ................................ 3-28
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Contents Table 3-9. Analysis of course of action (wargame) ...................................................................... 3-29 Table 3-10. Course of action comparison .................................................................................... 3-30 Table 3-11. Course of action approval ......................................................................................... 3-31 Table 3-12. Orders production ..................................................................................................... 3-32 Table 3-13 Assessment working group agenda (example) .......................................................... 3-41 Table 4-1. The Seven Field Artillery inherent responsibilities in Army support relationships ...... 4-11 Table A-1. Essential Fire Support Task Development Checklist ...................................................A-1 Table A-2. Essential fire support task example ..............................................................................A-3 Table A-3. Sample matrix for each fire support task ......................................................................A-5 Table A-4. A completed matrix example for essential fire support tasks (memory aid TTLODAC) .... ............................................................................................................................A-6 Table A-5. Sample matrix for fire support tasks (memory aid PLOT-CR) ......................................A-7 Table A-6. A completed matrix example for essential fire support tasks (memory aid PLOT-CR) ............................................................................................................................A-8 Table A-7. Example of an essential field artillery task....................................................................A-9 Table A-8. Essential Field Artillery Task Example .......................................................................A-10 Table A-9. A completed example of essential field artillery task (referred as TTLODAC) ...........A-12 Table A-10. An example of a completed essential field artillery task (memory aid TTLODAC) ..A-13 Table A-11. Attack guidance matrix (example) ............................................................................A-14 Table C-1. The five requirements for accurate predicted fire in fully operational and degraded operations .................................................................................................................. C-4 Table E-1. Planned targets and air missions .................................................................................E-3 Table E-2. Example air tasking order day calendar .......................................................................E-7 Table E-3. Assignment of first letter (example) ..............................................................................E-8 Table E-4. Assignment of second letter (example) ........................................................................E-8 Table E-5. Assignment of the third letter (example) .......................................................................E-8
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Preface This publication is the Army's field manual for fire support and field artillery operations. It provides principles and functions for fire support elements and field artillery units conducting operations in a multidomain environment. It establishes the basis for understanding fire support and field artillery as critical components of the fires warfighting function tasks. FM 3-09 establishes the core competencies, functions, characteristics, and principles of fire support and field artillery. To comprehend the doctrine contained in FM 3-09, readers must understand the fundamentals of large-scale combat operations and multidomain operations described in ADP 3-0 and FM 3-0. They must understand the language of tactics and the fundamentals of the offense and defense, and echelons above brigade described in FM 3-90 and FM 3-94. Users of FM 3-09 should also understand the fundamentals of stability operations described in ADP 3-07 and the functions and principles of intelligence and sustainment found in FM 2-0 and FM 4-0. Army leaders must understand joint doctrine and use it when communicating and coordinating directly with the joint force. JP 3-0 establishes the baseline operations doctrine for the joint force. The principal audience for FM 3-09 is all commanders and their staffs. This publication is intended to provide guidance for echelons above brigade for the planning, preparing, execution, and assessment of fire support and the employment of field artillery in all operations. Trainers and educators throughout the Army will also use this manual. This manual should be studied by those members of the combined arms team or other services who are responsible for the delivery of fires in support of large-scale combat operations. Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure that their decisions and actions comply with all applicable United States, international, and host-nation laws and regulations, and all applicable international treaties and agreements. Commanders at all levels ensure that their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of armed conflict and applicable rules of engagement. (See FM 6-27 for more information on the law of war.) They also adhere to the Army Ethic as described in ADP 6-22. FM 3-09 implements North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) standardization agreements (STANAG) 2484 and 3680. FM 3-09 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. Terms for which FM 3-09 is the proponent publication (the authority) are presented in italics and bold font in the text and marked with an asterisk (*) in the glossary. When first defined in the text, a term for which FM 3-09 is the proponent publication is boldfaced and italicized, and the definition is, boldfaced. When first defining other proponent definitions in the text, the term is italicized, and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition. FM 3-09 applies to the Regular Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated. The proponent of FM 3-09 is the Commandant, United States Army Field Artillery School and Chief of the Field Artillery. The preparing agency is the United States Army Fires Center of Excellence, Directorate of Training and Doctrine. Send comments and recommendations on a Department of the Army (DA) Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Directorate of Training and Doctrine, 700 McNair Avenue, Suite 128, ATTN: ATSF-DD, Fort Sill, OK 73503; by e-mail to: usarmy.sill.fcoe.mbx.dotd- [email protected]; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.
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Introduction This version of FM 3-09 codifies the multidomain approach to fire support and field artillery operations in terms of the combined arms employment of capabilities from multiple domains. A domain is a physically defined portion of an operational environment requiring a unique set of warfighting capabilities and skills (FM 3-0). The aim of this publication is to establish the functions and principles of fire support planning, coordination, execution, and assessment and to describe the fire support system in terms of its major components, functions, and required products. This publication describes the fire support system as a complete entity and gives equal treatment to all the diverse assets and capabilities that are designated as elements of the fire support system. The theme of this publication is that the successful delivery of fires depends on the rapid and continuous integration and synchronization of all forms of fire support assets with all dynamics of combat power, and across all domains for one purpose. This is to place the correct types and volume of fire at the right time and on the right targets, across all domains to ensure the success of the supported commander's concept of operations. This publication provides the foundation for the development of subordinate fire support and field artillery doctrine, force design, materiel acquisition, professional education, and individual and unit training. Fire support and field artillery techniques manuals go into further detail to explain specific duties for those individuals who work within the fire support system. This publication will not describe prototype or non- validated systems. The source document for FM 3-09 continues to be FM 3-0, Operations. Figure 1 on page xii, shows the logic diagram for this publication. The major changes from the 2020 FM 3-09 are listed below: * Aligns with FM 3-0, on the Army strategic context and joint competition continuum, competition below armed conflict, crisis, and armed conflict. * Aligns terms and definitions with FM 3-0. * Updated the logic chart. * Formally recognizes multidomain operations and its tenets. * Added tables aligning the tenets and imperatives of operations with fire support and field artillery procedures. * Updated the difference between the theater fires command and the theater fires element for clarity. * Introduces operational fires command. * Modified multiple fire support definitions to align with multidomain operations doctrine (see introductory Table 1). * Adds a large-scale combat battlefield framework figure in chapter 6. * Adds a maritime section to the appendix on environmental and terrain considerations. * Modified use of maneuver commander to supported commander in appropriate areas to facilitate alignment with multidomain doctrine. FM 3-09 contains six chapters and four appendices: Chapter 1 Covers an overview of the foundations of fire support. Chapter 1 begins by defining fire support, describes the characteristics of fire support, adds fire support considerations for the tenets and imperatives of operations, defines the fire support system, and fire support functions to include joint and multidomain operations. Chapter 2 Covers the components of the fire support system, this includes fire support command and control elements, target acquisition, and attack/delivery systems.
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Introduction Chapter 3 Covers fire support and the operations process. It describes the basic fire support functions it also covers fire support planning, fire support planning principles, and fire support and the military decision- making process. Chapter 4 Covers the role of the field artillery, command and support relationships, field artillery inherent responsibilities, the key considerations for field artillery employment, and fire direction. Chapter 5 Covers fire support operations during competition and crisis. Chapter 6 Covers fire support in large-scale combat operations. Describes general fire support considerations, provides tactics for fire support for the defense, addresses tactics for fire support for the offense, and covers enabling, stability and reconstitution operations. Appendix A Covers the development of essential fire support tasks, and essential field artillery tasks. Appendix B Covers fire support coordination measures to include permissive, and restrictive, coordination measures. Appendix C Covers denied, degraded, and disrupted operations to include types of conditions, and the five requirements for accurate predicted fire during these operations. Appendix D Covers environmental and terrain considerations for fire support and field artillery. Appendix E Targeting and Army air support requests. NEW, RESCINDED, AND MODIFIED TERMS FM 3-09 becomes the proponent of Army terms, introduces new army terms and modifies the following Army terms. See introductory table 1. Introductory Table 1. New, modified, and rescinded terms Term Remarks critical friendly zone Modified danger close Modified and FM 3-09 becomes proponent defensive fires Removed, ADP 3-19 will become proponent when updated. diversion FM 3-09 becomes proponent fire support Modified fire support coordinator Modified fire support officer Modified fire support plan Modified fire support planning Modified force field artillery headquarters Modified harassing fire Modified indirect fire FM 3-09 becomes proponent offensive fires Removed, ADP 3-19 will become proponent when updated.
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Introduction Figure 1. Fire support logic chart
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Chapter 1 Foundations of Fire Support and the Role of the Field Artillery Fire support is a rapid and continuous integration of surface-to-surface indirect fires, target acquisition, armed aircraft, and other lethal and nonlethal attack/delivery systems that converge against targets across all domains in support of the supported commander’s concept of operations. The functions, characteristics, and principles of supporting maneuver with fire and giving depth to operations across all domains--land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace--have origins which are deeply rooted in the universal military experience. They are constant, and in conjunction with the role and core competencies of the field artillery (FA), will apply to future multidomain operations just as they apply to the present. Rapidly emerging technology and future missions and capabilities will change the methods of employing fire support (FS) as well as the degree by which FS is balanced with maneuver. However, the basic premise for why we provide FS will remain unchanged. 1-1. FS is inherently joint, conducted in all domains, and across all dimensions while simultaneously executed at all echelons of command. The commander will utilize organic and joint attack/delivery assets and capabilities to provide joint FS. Joint fire support is joint fires that assist the joint force in creating effects and achieving objectives. (JP 3-0). Fires are the use of weapons systems to create a specific lethal or nonlethal effect on a target (JP 3-0). 1-2. FS is a critical component of the fires warfighting function tasks of integrate and execute that allow the commander to converge effects across all domains to achieve positions of relative advantage in the context of large-scale combat operations (see ADP 3-19). Relative advantage is location or condition, in any domain, relative to an adversary or enemy that provides an opportunity to progress towards or achieve an objective (FM 3-0). 1-3. The commander employs lethal and nonlethal capabilities to support the scheme of maneuver, to mass firepower, and to destroy, neutralize, and suppress enemy forces. Lethal FS attack and delivery systems consist of indirect fire weapons and armed aircraft to include FA, mortars, naval surface fire support, and air- delivered munitions from fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft. Field artillery is equipment, supplies, ammunition, and personnel involved in the use of cannon, rocket, or surface-to-surface missile launchers. In large-scale combat operations, FS could be the principal means of destroying enemy forces. In this event, the scheme of maneuver would be designed specifically to capitalize on the effects of FS. 1-4. Nonlethal capabilities include cyberspace electromagnetic activities (CEMA), information activities, space, and munitions such as illumination and smoke. A nonlethal weapon is a weapon, device, or munition that is explicitly designed and primarily employed to incapacitate personnel or materiel immediately, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property in the target area or environment (JP 3-09). FIRE SUPPORT AND THE THREAT 1-5. Strategic competitors and adversaries have studied our military operations closely over the last thirty years. They know that we excel by emphasizing joint and combined operations; technological dominance; global power projection; strategic, operational, and tactical maneuver; joint fires; sustainment at scale; and mission command initiative. Strategic competitors like China and Russia are synthesizing emerging technologies like artificial intelligence, hypersonics, nanotechnology, and robotics with their analysis of
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Chapter 1 military doctrine and operations. They deploy these capabilities through multiple layers of stand-off in all domains - space, cyber, air, sea, and land by establishing zones of antiaccess (A2)/area denial (AD). Enemy A2 refers to those actions and capabilities, usually long-range, designed to prevent an opposing force from entering an operational area (OA). Operational area is an overarching term encompassing more descriptive terms (such as area of responsibility and joint operations area) of locations for the conduct of military operations (JP 3-0). AD refers to those actions and capabilities, usually of shorter range, designed not to keep an opposing force out, but to limit its freedom of action within the OA. 1-6. Both China and Russia utilize an integrated fires command to employ FS assets. The integrated fires command executes all fire support tasks for the supported command. An integrated fires command is a dedicated combination of command and control (C2) structures and organic and attached joint FS units. The integrated fires command exercises centralized C2 of all allocated, dedicated FS assets retained by its level of command. This can include aviation, artillery, naval gunfire, and surface-to-surface missile units from different commands and services. It also exercises C2 over all reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (TA) assets dedicated to its support. An integrated fires command is tasked to engage designated operational and strategic targets. Integrated fires commands are typically associated with campaign-level headquarters. 1-7. An integrated fires command and its component systems have key vulnerabilities that Army forces can target when supporting joint force operations. Like any military system, it requires sustainment capabilities and other support that Army forces can detect and attack. It has electromagnetic signatures that enable detection from friendly joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) from all domains. Enemy networks depend on C2 nodes Army forces can target. Perhaps most importantly, systems within an integrated fires command are comprised of land-based capabilities, including sensors, fires capabilities, and C2 nodes, all of which Army forces can attack (FM 3-0). For more information on Chinese and Russian integrated fires commands see FM 3-0 and ATP 7-100.3, and the worldwide equipment guide website. 1-8. A peer or near-peer force represents the greatest potential threat to the U.S. forces. Peer threats employ their resources across all domains to attack the vulnerabilities of the U.S. and our allies. The threat is any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm U.S. forces, U.S. national interests, or the homeland (ADP 3-0). They use their capabilities to create lethal and nonlethal effects throughout an operational environment (OE). An operational environment is the aggregate of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). In a new era of great power competition, our nation's adversaries seek to achieve their strategic aims, short of conflict, by the use of layered stand-off in the political, military and economic realms to separate the U.S. from our unified action partners. During large-scale combat operations they will employ A2/AD systems and tactics to separate U.S. forces and our allies in time, space, and function in order to defeat us. Large-scale combat operations are extensive joint combat operations in terms of scope and size of forces committed, conducted as a campaign aimed at achieving operational and strategic objectives (ADP 3- 0). Technological achievements over the past decades have made possible great qualitative improvements in their weaponry to match observed vulnerabilities in U.S. systems and forces. U.S. adversaries seek to delay friendly forces long enough to achieve their goals and end hostilities before they reach culmination. Peer threats will employ various methods to employ their national elements of power to render U.S. military power irrelevant. 1-9. To defeat peer forces in large-scale combat, U.S. forces must first penetrate A2/AD systems, establish a position of relative advantage, retain the initiative and prevent enemy forces from achieving mass, momentum, and sustaining land combat. A balanced application of both firepower and maneuver is essential for US forces to achieve these goals. This calls for FS system synchronization and convergence of effects to attack high-payoff targets (HPTs) across the width and depth of the OA. Convergence is an outcome created by the concerted employment of capabilities from multiple domains and echelons against combinations of decisive points in any domain to create effects against a system, formation, decision maker, or in a specific geographic area (FM 3-0). A high-payoff target is a target whose loss to the enemy will significantly contribute to the success of the friendly course of action (JP 3-60). 1-10. Some threat actors have chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons capabilities and the ability to employ such weapons. Therefore, threat intent to employ CBRN weapons must be assessed. Preparation and planning to conduct operations in a CBRN environment are of paramount importance in any
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Foundations of Fire Support and the Role of the Field Artillery confrontation with a threat actor armed with CBRN capabilities. Understanding threat CBRN weapons doctrine is important, particularly during large-scale combat operations. 1-11. The functions and principles of FS must apply to an ever-increasing number of hostile global situations that extend across the range of military operations. The FS system must be flexible enough to respond to any number of operations across the conflict continuum. Threat operations across all domains will attempt to degrade all aspects of FS, from C2, to TA, and delivery. FIRE SUPPORT IN JOINT AND MULTIDOMAIN OPERATIONS β€œEmploying Army and joint capabilities makes use of all available combat power from each domain to accomplish missions at least cost. Multidomain operations are the Army’s contribution to joint campaigns, spanning the competition continuum. Below the threshold of armed conflict, multidomain operations are how Army forces accrue advantages and demonstrate readiness for conflict, deterring adversaries while assuring allies and partners. During conflict, they are how Army forces close with and destroy the enemy, defeat enemy formations, seize critical terrain, and control populations and resources to deliver sustainable political outcomes.” (FM 3-0) 1-12. Multidomain operations are the combined arms employment of joint and Army capabilities to create and exploit relative advantages that achieve objectives, defeat enemy forces, and consolidate gains on behalf of joint force commanders (FM 3-0). Joint operations encompass all five domains: air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace that includes, the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) and the information environment. The employment of joint and Army capabilities, integrated across echelons and synchronized in a combined arms approach, is essential to defeating threats able to contest the joint force in all domains. Army forces integrate land, maritime, air, space, and cyberspace capabilities that facilitate maneuver to create physical, information, and human advantages joint force commanders exploit across the competition continuum (FM 3-0). FS is most effective when its effects are converged across all domains, and understood through the three dimensions (human, physical, and information). 1-13. Combat power is the total means of destructive and disruptive force that a military unit/formation can apply against an opponent at a given time (JP 3-0). FS must also be integrated with our unified action partners. Unified action partners are those military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and elements of the private sector with whom Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during the conduct of operations (ADP 3-0). An example of an Army FS capability employed as part of the joint force is long range precision surface-to-surface fires used to penetrate and disintegrate the enemy's A2/AD systems both on land and at sea. Disintegrate is to disrupt the enemy's command and control, degrading the synchronization and cohesion of its operations (FM 3-0). They are closely integrated into the joint force commander's (JFC’s) scheme of operations as part of the Army's overall FS contribution. The joint force commander is a general term applied to a combatant commander, subordinate unified commander, or joint task force commander (JP 1, Vol 1). 1-14. The Army supports the joint force by conducting the four strategic roles of shape OEs, counter aggression on land during crisis, prevail during large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains. The strategic roles clarify the enduring reasons for which the U.S. Army is manned, organized, trained, and equipped. Strategic roles are not phases of an operation or a task, and they do not necessarily occur sequentially or on distinct terrain. Rather, the Army contributes to the joint operation specifically by providing forces and conducting operations across all four strategic roles. The supported commander is responsible for conducting these operations on a simultaneous basis. The requirement to integrate and synchronize FS with these strategic roles is inherent with this responsibility. 1-15. The Army’s multidomain operations concept accounts for the constant nature of war and the changing character of warfare. Its balanced approach guides how Army forces operate across the competition continuum given the prevailing characteristics of anticipated OEs now and in the near future (FM 3-0). TENETS OF OPERATIONS 1-16. The tenets of operations are desirable attributes that should be built into all plans and operations; they are directly related to how the Army’s operational concept should be employed. Commanders use the tenets
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Chapter 1 of operations to inform and assess course of action (COA) development throughout the operations process. The extent to which an operation exhibits the tenets provides insight into the probability of success. The tenets of operations are agility, convergence, endurance, and depth. Table 1-1 lists several fire support considerations for the tenets of operations. For more information on the tenets of operations see FM 3-0. Table 1-1. Fire Support considerations for the tenets of operations Tenet of operations Fire Support Considerations (not all inclusive) Agility is the ability to move forces and adjust their β€’Use of Support relationships to dynamically meet FS dispositions and activities more rapidly than the enemy (FM requirements. 3-0). Agility requires sound judgment and rapid decision β€’Balancing centralized vs. decentralized control based on making, often gained by creating and exploiting information OE variables. advantages. Agility requires leaders to anticipate needs or opportunities and trained formations to change direction, β€’Coordinated Sensor and Zone management based on tasks, or focus as quickly as the situation requires. Change enemy SITEMP. can include a transition between phases of an operation or β€’Forward positioning of firing units to extend range fans. the requirement to adapt to a new opportunity or hazard. β€’Observation/ISR/Information nested within targeting process. β€’Planning FSCM/ACMs to facilitate permissive fires environment and expedite deconfliction. β€’Execute FA Tech Rehearsals to validate MCIS information routing and processing. Convergence is an outcome created by the concerted β€’ Mass effects at decisive points. employment of capabilities from multiple domains and β€’ Integrate and synchronize organic and joint assets across echelons against combinations of decisive points in any all domains. domain to create effects against a system, formation, decision maker, or in a specific geographic area (FM 3-0). β€’ Plan continuously throughout the targeting process and Its utility derives from understanding the interdependent adjust dynamically. relationships among capabilities from different domains and β€’ Immediate availability of FS system for the commander. combining those capabilities in surprising, effective tactics β€’ Maximize centralized control to increase synchronization that accrue advantages over time. When combined, the and streamline deconfliction. complementary and reinforcing nature of each friendly capability present multiple dilemmas for enemy forces and β€’ Plan FSCM/ACMs to facilitate permissive fires produce an overall effect that is greater than the sum of environment and expedite deconfliction. each individual effect. The greater the extent to which forces β€’ Synchronize ISR/Observation Plans to aid in target achieve convergence and sustain it over time, the more development and execution of convergence operations. favorable the outcome. Endurance is the ability to persevere over time throughout β€’ Use principles of FS execution and Command and the depth of an operational environment (FM 3-0). Support relationships to best task organize the FS system Endurance enhances the ability to project combat power to meet commander’s intent. (see chapter 3) and extends operational reach; it is about resilience and β€’ Leverage all available assets. preserving combat power while continuing operations for as (Joint/Multinational/National) across all domains. long as is necessary to achieve the desired outcome. During competition, Army forces improve endurance by setting the β€’ Distributed and redundant C2 Nodes. theater across all warfighting functions and improving β€’ Effective Primary-Alternate-Contingency-Emergency interoperability with allies and other unified action partners. communications plans. Endurance stems from organizing, protecting, and β€’ Plan, request, and incorporate protection assets. sustaining a force. β€’ Develop effective HPTL, AGM, and TSS. β€’ Implement responsive maintenance processes which minimize down-time. β€’ Forecast sustainment requirements to meet targeting objectives.
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Foundations of Fire Support and the Role of the Field Artillery Table 1-1 Fire Support considerations for the tenets of operations (continued) Tenet of operations Fire Support Considerations (not all inclusive) Depth is the extension of operations in time, space, or β€’ Position assets forward to maximize range. purpose to achieve definitive results (ADP 3-0). While the β€’ Develop HPTL with multiple categories (Sustain, C2, focus of endurance is friendly combat power, the focus of Protection), not just FS; update HPTL categories and depth is enemy locations and dispositions across all priorities IAW operational demands. domains. Commanders achieve depth by understanding the strengths and vulnerabilities of the enemy’s echeloned β€’ Leverage collection assets from across multiple domains. capabilities and then attacking them throughout their β€’ Allocate ISR/Collection to identify HPTs and inform dispositions simultaneously and sequentially. Although enemy SITEMP. simultaneous attacks through all domains in depth are not β€’ Manage sensors and zones to aid in identifying enemy possible in every situation, leaders seek to expand their IFC. advantages and limit enemy opportunities for sanctuary and regeneration. Leaders describe the depth they can achieve β€’ Plan for transitions as targeting objectives are met. in terms of operational reach. β€’ Target systems (Sustainment, IFC, IADS) as opposed to formations. ACM – airspace coordinating measure, AGM – attack guidance matrix, C2 – command and control, FA – field artillery, FS – fire support, FSCM – fire support coordination measure, HPT – high-payoff target, HPTL – high-payoff target list, IAD – integrated air defense, IFC – integrated fires command, ISR – intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, MCIS – mission command information systems, OE – operational environment, SITEMP – situation template, TSS – target selection standards IMPERATIVES OF OPERATIONS 1-17. Imperatives are actions Army forces must take to defeat enemy forces and achieve objectives at an acceptable cost. They are informed by the OE and the characteristics of the most capable threats that Army forces can encounter. For more information on imperatives of operations see FM 3-0. 1-18. Table 1-2 lists several FS considerations for the imperatives of operations. Table 1-2. Fire support considerations for the imperatives of operations Imperatives Fire support considerations (not all inclusive) See yourself, see the enemy, and understand the OE. β€’ Understand the domains and dimensions through pre- Commanders visualize OEs in terms of factors that are mission analysis of the OE in conjunction with cultural relevant to decision making. OEs are dynamic and contain intelligence and civil information. vast amounts of information that can overload C2 systems β€’ Conduct β€œartillerized” IPOE at echelon to determine how and impede decision making. Commanders simplify OE impacts friendly and enemy. information collection, analysis, and decision making by focusing on how they see themselves, see the enemy, and β€’ Develop enemy SITEMP derived from OE impacts to understand the OE. These three categories of factors are enemy doctrine template. interrelated, and leaders must understand how each one β€’ Utilize multiple domains for collection management. relates to the others in the current context. β€’ Understand friendly combat power in relation to the threat. β€’ Conduct systems analysis throughout targeting process. Account for being under constant observation and β€’ Integrating threats across all domains and dimensions forms of enemy contact. Air, space, and cyberspace into planning considerations and execution of capabilities increase the likelihood that threat forces can operations. gain and maintain continuous visual and electromagnetic β€’ Distributed and redundant C2 Nodes. contact with Army forces. Enemy forces possess a wide range of land-, maritime-, air-, and space-based intelligence, β€’ Effective Primary-Alternate-Contingency-Emergency surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities that can (PACE) communications plans. detect U.S. forces. Leaders must assume they are under β€’ Tailoring survivability move criteria and positioning constant observation from one or more domains and guidance to mitigate enemy observation capabilities. continuously ensure they are not providing lucrative targets for the enemy to attack. β€’ Conduct β€œartillerized” IPOE at echelon to determine effects of terrain, line of sight, weather, and EW on friendly operations. β€’ Use of natural or artificial cover and concealment when positioning units or C2 nodes.
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Chapter 1 Table 1-2. Fire support considerations for the imperatives of operations (continued) Imperatives Fire support considerations (not all inclusive) Create and exploit positions of physical, information β€’ Target physical, information, and human factors through and human advantage in pursuit of decision use of lethal and non-lethal methods. dominance. The employment of lethal forces is based on β€’ Coordinated Sensor and Zone management to proactively the premise that destruction and other physical target IFC. consequences compel enemy forces to change their decision making and behavior, ultimately accepting defeat. β€’ Position assets forward to maximize range. The type, amount, and ways in which lethal forces compel β€’ Ongoing military decision-making process and updated enemy forces varies, and this depends heavily on enemy running estimates to inform current and future decisions. forces, their capabilities, goals, and the will of relevant populations. Understanding the relationship between β€’ Leverage all available assets physical, information, and human factors enables leaders to (Joint/Multinational/National) across multiple domains. take advantage of every opportunity and limit the negative β€’ Understand enemy critical capabilities and critical effects of undesirable and unintended consequences. vulnerabilities to create windows of opportunity and relative advantage. Make initial contact with the smallest element possible. β€’ Use the lowest echelon possible to produce the desired Army forces are extremely vulnerable when they do not effect. sufficiently understand the disposition of enemy forces and β€’ Manage cueing schedule to minimize radar signature. become decisively engaged on terms favorable to enemy forces. To avoid being surprised and incurring heavy losses, β€’ Develop AGM to standardize fire orders. leaders must set conditions for making enemy contact on β€’ Target systems as opposed to large formations. terms favorable to the friendly force. Leaders should anticipate when and where to make enemy contact, the β€’ Focus on execution of HPTs as opposed to β€œrandom” probability and impact of making enemy contact, and targets. actions to take on contact. Quickly applying multiple β€’ Leverage all available assets capabilities against enemy forces while preventing the bulk (Joint/Multinational/National) across multiple domains. of the friendly force from being engaged itself requires understanding the forms of contact. Impose multiple dilemmas on the enemy. Imposing β€’ Target the depth of enemy zones multiple dilemmas on enemy forces complicates their (Disruption/Battle/Support). decision making and forces them to prioritize among β€’ Leverage all available assets competing options. This is a way of seizing the initiative and (Joint/Multinational/National) across multiple domains. making enemy forces react to friendly operations. Simultaneous operations encompassing multiple domains β€’ Provide deception fires in support of deception conducted in depth and supported by deception present operations to reinforce pre-conceived notions of the enemy forces with multiple dilemmas. Employing enemy commander. capabilities from multiple domains degrades enemy freedom β€’ Distribute C2, collection, and firing unit locations. of action, reduces enemy flexibility and endurance, and disrupts enemy plans and coordination. The application of β€’ Use reactive and proactive counterfire to deny enemy capabilities in complementary and reinforcing ways creates permissive fires environment. more problems than an enemy commander can solve. This erodes enemy effectiveness and the will to fight. Anticipate, plan, and execute transitions. Transitions β€’ Forecast changes to Command and Support mark a change of focus in an operation. Leaders plan relationships based on demands for future operations. transitions as part of the initial plan or parts of a branch or β€’ Anticipate how the FS system will adjust for branches, sequel. They can be unplanned and cause the force to react sequels, and significant operational changes (Offense, to unforeseen circumstances. Transitions can be part of Defense, Stability). progress toward mission accomplishment, or they can reflect a temporary setback. β€’ Plan for CP transitions (Main CP/Tactical CP) based on mission requirements. β€’ Understand the effects of how weather/seasonal transitions will impact operations and support capabilities (weaponeering). Designate, weight, and sustain the main effort. β€’ Use FS execution principles (see chapter 3) to anticipate Commanders frequently face competing demands for limited the dynamics of large-scale combat operations, maintain resources. They establish priorities to resolve these situational awareness of the OE, and leverage demands by designating, weighting, and sustaining the main interoperable FS C2 systems and attack/delivery effort. They provide the main effort with the appropriate capabilities. resources and support necessary for its success. When β€’ Assign Command and Support Relationships to provide designating a main effort, commanders consider adequate support, flexibility, and most effective fire augmenting a unit’s task organization and giving it priority of support means. resources and support. The commander designates various priorities of support, such as for air and missile defense, β€’ Suitably allocate joint assets to the main effort. close air support and other fires, information collection, mobility and countermobility, and sustainment.
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Foundations of Fire Support and the Role of the Field Artillery Table 1-2. Fire support considerations for the imperatives of operations (continued) Imperatives Fire support considerations (not all inclusive) Consolidate gains continuously. Leaders add depth to β€’ Use FSCMs to account for civil considerations (NFA, their operations in time and purpose when they consolidate RFA). gains. Commanders consolidate gains at the operational β€’ Evaluate appropriate time windows for effects to appear and tactical levels as a strategically informed approach to within the OE (to include cyber effects in populated areas, current operations, considering the desired political outcome destruction of bridges). of the conflict. During competition and crisis, commanders expand opportunities created from previous conflicts and β€’ Methodical decision for use of dud-producing munitions activities to sustain enduring U.S. interests, while improving and their long-term effects when transitioning to civil the credibility, readiness, and deterrent effect of Army authorities. forces. During large-scale combat operations, commanders β€’ Weight support to rear and security operations against consolidate gains continuously or as soon as possible, current or future operations. deciding whether to accept risk with a more moderate tempo during the present mission or in in the future as largescale combat operations conclude. Understand and manage the effects of operations on β€’ Implement β€œhot/cold” cycles for FDCs, radars, and firing units and leaders. Continuous operations rapidly degrade units to afford time for rest, maintenance, and the performance of people and the equipment employed, preparations. particularly during combat. In battle, Soldiers and units are β€’ Adhere to preventative checks (Before/During/After) and more likely to fail catastrophically than gradually. service cycles (hour usage) to maintain equipment Commanders and staffs must be alert to small indicators of serviceability. fatigue, fear, indiscipline, and reduced morale; they must take measures to deal with these indicators before their β€’ Develop shifts or duty cycles for Soldiers within CPs or cumulative effects drive a unit to the threshold of collapse. C2 nodes which are practical for extended-duration Staffs and commanders at higher echelons must consider operations. the impact of prolonged combat on subordinate units. This causes efficiency to drop, even when physical losses are not great. AGM – attack guidance matrix, C2 – command and control, CP – command post, EW – electromagnetic warfare, FDC – fire direction center, FS – fire support, FSCM – fire support coordination measure, HPT – high-payoff target, HPTL – high-payoff target list, IFC – integrated fires command, IPOE – intelligence preparation of the operational environment, OE – operational environment, SITEMP – situation template OPERATIONAL APPROACH AND OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK 1-19. An operational approach provides the logic for how tactical tasks ultimately achieve the desired endstate. It provides a unifying purpose and focus to all operations. Sound operational approaches balance risk and uncertainty with friction and chance. The operational approach provides the basis for detailed planning, allows leaders to establish a logical operational framework, and assists in producing an executable order. (See ADP 3-0 and ADP 5-0 for doctrine on operational art and planning, respectively.) 1-20. An operational framework organizes an area of geographic and operational responsibility for the commander and provides a way to describe the employment of forces. The framework illustrates the relationship between close operations, operations in depth, and other operations in time and space across domains. As a visualization tool, the operational framework bridges the gap between a unit’s conceptual understanding of the environment and its need to generate detailed orders that direct operations. OPERATIONAL APPROACH 1-21. Through operational art, commanders develop their operational approach. Operational approach is a broad description of the mission, operational concepts, tasks, and actions required to accomplish the mission (JP 5-0). An operational approach is the result of the commander’s visualization of what needs to be done in broad terms to solve identified problems. Table 1- 3 lists several operational and FS considerations for operational approach. It is the main idea that informs detailed planning. When describing an operational approach, commanders: * Consider ways to defeat enemy forces in detail and potential decisive points. Defeat in detail is concentrating overwhelming combat power against separate parts of a force rather than defeating the entire force at once (ADP 3-90). * Employ combinations of defeat mechanisms to isolate and defeat enemy forces, functions, and capabilities.
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Chapter 1 * Assess options for assuming risk. Table 1-3. Operational and fire support considerations for operational approach Operational and fire support considerations Operational approach (not all inclusive) Defeating enemy forces in detail. Armed conflict implies the β€’ Understand enemy functions, capabilities, and need to defeat enemy forces. Defeat is to render a force echelonment. incapable of achieving its objectives (ADP 3-0). When used β€’ Target systems (IADS, IFC, Sustainment) as opposed to as a task or effect in operations, defeat provides the large formations. commander maximum flexibility to accomplish the mission. Senior leaders assign defeat as a task when the situation is β€’ Understand enemy critical capabilities and critical still developing, or when the commander on the ground, by vulnerabilities to create windows of opportunity and virtue of experience and proximity to the problem, is relative advantage. uniquely capable of deciding how to employ lethal force to β€’ Leverage all available assets (Joint/Multinational/National) accomplish objectives. across all domains. β€’ Ensure immediate availability of FS system to supported commander. Defeat mechanism is a method through which friendly β€’ Defeat mechanisms: forces accomplish their mission against enemy opposition ο‚§ Destroy is a tactical mission task that physically (ADP 3-0). Army forces at all echelons commonly use renders an enemy force combat-ineffective until combinations of the four defeat mechanisms. Applying more reconstituted (FM 3-90). than one defeat mechanism simultaneously creates multiple dilemmas for enemy forces and complementary and ο‚§ Dislocate is to employ forces to obtain significant reinforcing effects not attainable with a single mechanism. positional advantage in one or more domains, Commanders may have an overarching defeat mechanism rendering the enemy’s dispositions less valuable, or combination of mechanisms that accomplish the mission, perhaps even irrelevant (FM 3-0). with supporting defeat mechanisms for components of an ο‚§ Isolate is to separate a force from its sources of enemy formation or warfighting system. Defeat mechanisms support in order to reduce its effectiveness and can guide the subordinate development of tactical tasks, increase its vulnerability to defeat (ADP 3-0). purposes, and effects in operations, facilitating control and ο‚§ Disintegrate is to disrupt the enemy’s command and initiative. control, degrading the synchronization and cohesion of its operations (FM 3-0). β€’ Use assessments to confirm or deny if targeting is meeting desired effects and adjust, as necessary. β€’ Utilize entirety of FS system to achieve commander’s intent. A stability mechanism is the primary method through which β€’ Stability Mechanisms. friendly forces affect civilians in order to attain conditions ο‚§ Compel refers to using, or threatening to use, lethal that support establishing a lasting, stable peace (ADP 3-0). force to establish control and dominance, affect As with defeat mechanisms, combinations of stability behavioral change, or enforce compliance with mechanisms produce complementary and reinforcing effects mandates, agreements, or civil authority. that accomplish the mission more effectively than single mechanisms. ο‚§ Control involves imposing civil order. ο‚§ Influence refers to altering the opinions, attitudes, and ultimately the behavior of foreign, friendly, neutral, and threat audiences through messages, presence, and actions. ο‚§ Support establishes, reinforces, or sets the conditions necessary for the instruments of national power to function effectively. β€’ Effectively utilize nonlethal effects through multiple domains to account for civil considerations and to consolidate gains. β€’ Use FSCMs to account for civil considerations (NFA, RFA). β€’ Perform IPOE to better understand the complexity of OE. β€’ Clearly define MOP/MOEs to gauge success and inform decision making.
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Foundations of Fire Support and the Role of the Field Artillery Table 1-3. Operational and fire support considerations for operational approach (continued) Operational and fire support considerations Operational approach (not all inclusive) Risk. Commanders accept risk on their own terms to create β€’ Leaders considering risk across the domains. Accepting opportunities and apply judgment to manage those hazards risk in one domain may create opportunities in other they do not control. Risk is an inherent part of every domains. operation and cannot be avoided. Commanders analyze risk β€’ Waiting for near-perfect intelligence and synchronization in collaboration with subordinates to assist in determining may increase risk or close a window of opportunity. the risk level and type and how to mitigate the risk. When considering how much risk to accept with a course of action, β€’ Weighting Civil considerations vs targeting opportunities commanders consider risk to the force against the and FS system responsiveness. probability of mission success during current and future β€’ Tactical Risks, such as forward positioning of firing units, operations. They assess options in terms of weighting the may increase FS system effectiveness but increases risk main effort, economy of force, and physical loss based on of interdiction from enemy IFC. what they have been tasked to do. FS – fire support, FSCM – fire support coordination measure, IADS – integrated air defense system, IFC – integrated fires command, IPOE – intelligence preparation of the operational environment, MOE – measures of effectiveness, MOP – measures of performance, NFA – no fire area, RFA – restricted fire area STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK 1-22. The strategic framework accounts for factors in the strategic environment and the connection of strategic capabilities to operational- and tactical-level operations. It includes the strategic support area, joint security area, extended deep area, and assigned OA. 1-23. The strategic framework has importance in terms of joint operations and Army operational-level operations. For most Army operations, understanding the Army operational framework in the context of the strategic framework, is important. For more information on strategic and operational frameworks see FM 3- 0, JP 3-0, and JP 3-10. OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK 1-24. An operational framework is a cognitive tool used to assist commanders and staffs in clearly visualizing and describing the application of combat power in time, space, purpose, and resources in the concept of operations (ADP 1-01). Commanders build their operational framework on their assessment of the OE, including all domains and dimensions. They may create new models to fit the circumstances, but they generally apply a combination of common models according to doctrine. The three models commonly used to build an operational framework are: * Assigned areas. * Deep, close, and rear operations. * Main effort, supporting effort, and reserve. Note. Commanders may use any operational framework model they find useful, but they must remain synchronized with their higher-echelon headquarters’ operational framework. FM 3-0 provides a detailed discussion on each model. 1-25. FS personnel must understand and properly use the doctrinal terminology, concepts, and considerations for the operational framework. Table 1-4 on pages 1-10 and 1-11 lists several FS considerations for the three operational framework models.
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Chapter 1 Table 1-4. Fire support considerations for operational framework Operational framework models Fire support considerations (not all inclusive) An area of operations is an operational β€’ Area of Operations: Coordinate with area defined by a commander for the supported command to position C2, land or maritime force commander to firing units, and collection platforms Assigned Areas accomplish their missions and protect where most advantageous to their forces (JP 3-0). provide greatest support. β€’ Area of Operations: Understand higher-echelon and adjacent-unit delivery and collection capabilities to limit duplication and provide mutual support. β€’ Area of Operations: Establish FSCMs and ACMs to reduce coordination; understand higher- echelon FSCMs and their effects, limitations, or restrictions within the supported AO. A zone is an operational area assigned β€’ Zone: Establish and understand to a unit in the offense that only has presence of NAIs, and TAIs to rear and lateral boundaries (FM 3-0). support units in offense. A sector is an operational area β€’ Sector: Establish and understand assigned to a unit in the defense that presence of NAIs, EAs, and TAIs to has rear and lateral boundaries and support units in defense. interlocking fires (FM 3-0). Deep Operations Deep operations are tactical actions β€’ Establish FSCMs and ACMs to against enemy forces, typically out of expedite delivery and increase direct contact with friendly forces, responsiveness. intended to shape future close β€’ Create multiple dilemmas for the operations and protect rear operations enemy in their support area by (FM 3-0). targeting in depth through use of multiple domains and joint assets (Air Interdiction). β€’ Target and disintegrate enemy structures and systems (IADS, IFC, Sustainment), prioritizing HPTs necessary to meet commander’s intent. β€’ Set favorable correlation of forces and means for supported command to contact the enemy with the greatest force ratio possible. Close Operations Close operations are tactical actions of β€’ Support Forces in Contact. subordinate maneuver forces and the β€’ Establish FSCMs and ACMs to aid forces providing immediate support to in rapid coordination and air/ground them, whose purpose is to employ deconfliction. maneuver and fires to close with and destroy enemy forces (FM 3-0). β€’ Weight benefits of centralized vs. decentralized control based on conditions and proximity to friendly forces. β€’ Incorporate multiple domains, in addition to FA assets, to create windows of opportunity and increase effectiveness of FS system. β€’ Allocate joint assets (CAS) for immediate response.
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Foundations of Fire Support and the Role of the Field Artillery Table 1-4. Fire support considerations for operational framework (continued) Operational framework models Fire support considerations (not all inclusive) Rear operations are tactical actions β€’ Assess and weight risk of diverting behind major subordinate maneuver FS C2, delivery, and collection forces that facilitate movement, extend assets from supporting deep/close Rear Operations operational reach, and maintain operations to supporting rear desired tempo (FM 3-0). operations. β€’ Allocate multi-domain and joint assets to support rear operations and bolster security for rear operations. Main Effort A main effort is a designated β€’ Use principles of execution (see subordinate unit whose mission at a chapter 3). given point in time is most critical to overall mission success (ADP 3-0). Supporting Effort A supporting effort is a designated β€’ Use principles of execution to inform subordinate unit with a mission that resourcing and types of command supports the success of the main effort and support relationships to the (ADP 3-0). supporting effort (see chapter 3). Reserve A reserve is that portion of a body of β€’ Field artillery is never in reserve. troops that is withheld from action at (see principles of execution chapter the beginning of an engagement to be 3). available for a decisive movement (ADP 3-90). ACM – airspace coordinating measure, AO – area of operations, C2 – command and control, CAS – close air support, EA – engagement area, FA – field artillery, FS – fire support, FSCM – fire support coordination measure, HPT – high-payoff target, IADS – integrated air defense systems, IFC – integrated fires command THE FIELD ARTILLERY’S ROLE AND CORE COMPETENCIES 1-26. A role is the broad and enduring purpose for which the organization or branch is established (ADP 1- 01). A branch has only one role. The role of the FA is to destroy, neutralize, or suppress the enemy by cannon, rocket, and missile fire and to integrate and synchronize all FS assets into operations. This role clearly establishes why the FA was created-what our branch uniquely contributes to the conduct of combined and joint operations. 1-27. A core competency is an essential and enduring capability that a branch or an organization provides to Army operations (ADP 1-01). The FA has two core competencies that describe what our branch contributes to our Nation's security and to the JFC: * To coordinate fire support, which is the planning and executing of fire so targets are adequately covered by a suitable weapon or group of weapons (see JP 3-09). * To deliver indirect fire. Indirect fire is fire delivered at a target not visible to the firing unit. THE FIRE SUPPORT SYSTEM 1-28. Fire support is achieved through simultaneous and coordinated interaction of all the elements of the joint FS system, thorough continuous planning, aggressive coordination, and vigorous execution at all echelons of command. The FS system elements (figure 1-1 on page 1-13) are: * C2 (personnel, command posts (CPs), networks, processes, and procedures). * TA. * Attack/delivery systems. 1-29. These elements are the tools commanders use to make FS work. How they use these tools depends on how well commanders and staffs understand and integrate the core competency of the FS coordination process. This process must occur simultaneously at all echelons of command, but it is more complex at echelons above brigade.
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Chapter 1 1-30. The rapid and continuous integration of the FS system at all echelons of command across the joint forces must be synchronized with maneuver forces. For this reason, the commander seeks and may accept counsel on FS from his fire support coordinator (FSCOORD), but the commander must decide how the command will accomplish its mission. 1-31. The fire support coordinator is the senior field artillery commander for the theater, corps, division, or brigade combat team who is the supported commander’s primary advisor to plan, coordinate, integrate fires, field artillery, and fire support in the execution of assigned tasks. This dual responsibility institutionalizes FS as commander's business and requires the FA commander to know the functions and objectives of the ground force, the operation of the FS system, and the technical aspects of FA fire as the supported commander's most available attack/delivery system. To further understand the FS System, it is necessary to examine each element in greater detail; this will be done in Chapter 2.
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Foundations of Fire Support and the Role of the Field Artillery Figure 1-1. The elements of the fire support system FIRE SUPPORT FUNCTIONS 1-32. A function is the broad, general, and enduring role for which an organization is designed, equipped, and trained (JP 1, Vol 1). By applying the functions, guided by characteristics and principles, an organization
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Chapter 1 or branch generates effects in the unique environment of the land domain to support the Army's operational concept. The four FS functions are the minimum requirements the FS system must fulfill to destroy, neutralize, or suppress the enemy. They give the commander and FSCOORD a frame of reference to evaluate and assess the overall effectiveness of the FS system. These four FS functions are: * Support forces in contact. * Support the concept of operations. * Synchronize and converge FS systems, and effects (lethal and nonlethal) across all domains. * Sustain and protect the FS system. 1-33. These functions serve as unifying factors for the entire FS system and apply to the systems individual components. The four functions do not change or replace the traditional missions, roles, and operations of the different Army and joint FS assets. They do, however, provide a common point of departure for an operationally unified FS system. For example, U.S. Air Force aircraft in support of ground operations must accomplish the four functions simultaneously. However, the Air Force does not consciously plan to work the four functions. Rather, it accomplishes its ground support mission through its execution of close air support (CAS), and air interdiction (AI). The final assessment of the ground support mission must be made in terms of the four functions. The mission command principles in general – disciplined initiative in particular – underpin these functions at all warfighting echelons. To further clarify these points, it is necessary to examine each function in greater detail; this will be done in Chapter 3. CHARACTERISTICS OF FIRE SUPPORT β€œGet the job done, tidy up the battlefield later.” Gen. Jack N. Merritt (Field Artillery) 1-34. The purpose of a characteristic is to clearly establish essential attributes that the organization or function must possess to be effective. These characteristics are inherent in the design, mind-set, and equipment for the FA and provides our branch the ability to accomplish our role. The characteristics of FS are: * To violently apply lethal fires in accordance with the law of war and established rules of engagement (ROE). * To always operate in the spirit of the offense. * To always operate as a single entity. VIOLENTLY APPLY LETHAL FIRES WITHIN THE LAW OF WAR AND ROE 1-35. In large-scale combat operations, the goal of every FSCOORD, is to orchestrate a perfect harmony of intense violence within the law of war and established ROE in support of the supported commander's concept of operations. Law of war is that part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities (JP 3-84). Rules of engagement are directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which U. S. forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered (JP 3-84). Unit commanders always retain the inherent right and obligation to exercise self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. β€œIf you would make war, wage it with energy and severity; it is the only means of making it shorter and consequently less deplorable for mankind.” Gen. Napoleon Bonaparte ALWAYS OPERATE IN THE SPIRIT OF THE OFFENSE 1-36. Fire support must always be conducted in the spirit of the offense. Regardless of whether the maneuver or supported force is engaged in the offense or defense, its FS must be offensively minded as it rapidly and continuously strikes HPTs across all domains. For example, when a maneuver unit seizes an assigned objective and transitions to the defense its FS system continues to aggressively search for and attack HPTs throughout the depth of the maneuver unit's assigned area of operations (AO) in a proactive and responsive manner.
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Foundations of Fire Support and the Role of the Field Artillery OPERATE AS A SINGLE ENTITY 1-37. The FS system is a single entity composed of a diverse group of attack and delivery systems, personnel, and materiel, most of which operate in different ways. All FS capabilities in all three elements of the FS system must function with a unity of effort and purpose. The methods of providing individual FS assets may vary in terms of C2, command and support relationships, and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). However, individual interests and concerns of each FS organization or asset must be made subordinate to the overall mission and to the supported commander to integrate across all domains and function rapidly and continuously as a unified force. "There is a tendency in each separate unit…to be one-handed puncher. By that I mean that the rifleman wants to shoot, the tanker wants to charge, the artilleryman to fire…That is not the way to win battles. If the band played a piece first with the piccolo, then with the brass horn, then with the clarinet, and then with the trumpet, there would be a hell of a lot of noise but no music." GEN George Patton (Armor) PRINCIPLES OF FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING, COORDINATION, AND EXECUTION 1-38. A principle is a comprehensive and fundamental rule or an assumption of central importance that guides how an organization approaches and thinks about the conduct of operations (ADP 1-01). The key to effective FS is the supported commander's ability to bring assets to bear on the enemy in an integrated and coordinated manner that is synchronized with the scheme of maneuver. How well this occurs depends on how well FSCOORDs and staff understand and operate the FS coordination and execution processes. Execution is the act of putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission and adjusting operations based on changes in the situation (ADP 5-0). The principles of FS planning, coordination, and execution are listed below, and will be further described in chapters 3 and 5. 1-39. The principles of FS planning and coordination listed below facilitate integration into the Army's operations process. * Plan early and continuously. * Ensure the continuous flow of target information. * Consider the use of all capabilities. * Use the lowest echelon capable of furnishing effective support. * Furnish the support requested. * Use the most effective FS means. * Avoid unnecessary duplication. * Consider airspace coordination. * Provide adequate support. * Provide for rapid coordination. * Provide for flexibility. * Use fire support coordination measures (FSCMs). 1-40. The principles of FS execution utilize the memory aid AWIFM-N: * Adequate FS for the committed units. * Weight to the main effort. * Immediately available FS for the commander to influence the operation. * Facilitate future operations. * Maximum feasible centralized control (especially in the defense). * Never place artillery in reserve.
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Chapter 1 FIRE SUPPORT AND FIELD ARTILLERY TRAINING CONSIDERATIONS 1-41. FA commanders and leaders at echelon are responsible and accountable for the training and performance of their units to ensure readiness in accordance with headquarters department of the Army standardized mission essential tasks and regionally aligned forces requirements. Commanders must incorporate joint mission essential tasks to ensure interoperability within the joint force. 1-42. FA units that are trained, ready, and can win at the section, team, and platoon level are the foundational requirements to ensuring our supported maneuver formations can win in large-scale combat operations. FA commanders must balance this necessity for small unit proficiency against the requirement for higher level (battalion [BN] and battery) collective training and qualification. For example, a commander may choose to assume risk by reducing resources for qualification of higher qualification tables in order ensure readiness at section, team, and platoon levels by increasing resources for this lower-level training. However, this does not negate the requirement for proficiency at the battery and BN levels (see figure 1-2). Figure 1-2. The band of excellence 1-43. FA and FS training considerations must be in line with the Army's principles for training found in FM 7-0: * Commanders are the primary trainers. * Noncommissioned officers train individuals, crews, and small teams; advise commanders on all aspects of training. * Train using multi-echelon techniques to maximize time and resource efficiency. * Train as a combined arms team. * Train to standard using appropriate doctrine. * Train as you fight. * Sustain levels of training proficiency over time. * Train to maintain. * Fight to train.
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Foundations of Fire Support and the Role of the Field Artillery 1-44. FA and FS training must be efficiently planned, resourced, and executed. FA and FS training must adhere to the operations process (plan, prepare, execute, and assess). Utilizing virtual and constructive training resources enables units to enter into live training better prepared. Simulation can build proper muscle memory without expending valuable, limited live training resources. Constructive training enables the staff to replicate the tempo of targeting and execution in large-scale combat operations. Fully incorporating systems such as warfighter simulation (referred to as WARSIM), call for fire trainer (referred to as CFFT), training aids, devices, simulators, and simulations (referred to as TADSS), and all the capabilities the combat training centers (referred to as CTCs) offer is vital to collective training. Live fire training not only ties this all together with a heightened sense of things, but also places the necessary stresses on the platforms and systems, validating that these weapons with operators can do what they are designed to do under all conditions. COMMANDERS ARE THE PRIMARY TRAINERS 1-45. Commanders and leaders at echelon are responsible and accountable for the training and performance of their units. Commanders train and resource training one echelon down and evaluate to two echelons down. They are responsible for assessing unit training proficiency and prioritizing unit training. Subordinate unit leaders are the primary trainers of their elements. For example, a platoon leader is responsible for the training and performance of the platoon. 1-46. The FA certification and qualification program is a commander's program and is a collaborative effort between the institutional and the operational force. FA commanders continuously assesses the unit's proficiency and readiness to perform its mission essential tasks. Each commander implements gunnery programs to achieve and sustain unit readiness and proficiency in these tasks. The commander uses all the resources available to implement an efficient gunnery program, which maximizes the use of ammunition, training area availability, and Soldier training time to sustain proficiency. Commanders at echelon are required to continuously evaluate readiness within their organizations to ensure their subordinate units are prepared for combat. The FA Certification and Qualification program provides everyone between the commander and the individual section with an objective means to gain that confidence. Through training, education, and experiences, sections, and thereby entire units, proficiency grows in supporting the commander's concept of the operation. NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS TRAIN INDIVIDUALS, CREWS, AND SMALL TEAMS; ADVISE COMMANDERS ON ALL ASPECTS OF TRAINING 1-47. Noncommissioned officers set the foundation for Army training. They train Soldiers, crews, and small teams to be battle-ready. They provide crucial input and advice to the commander on what is trained and how it is trained. This ensures the organization trains on its most important tasks down to the individual Soldier. Noncommissioned officers: * Maintain responsibility for Soldier and small unit training proficiency. * Identify and train Soldier, crew, and small-team tasks. Help identify and prioritize unit collective tasks that support unit mission-essential tasks. * Train and enforce task standards. * Continually focus training on sustaining strengths and improving weaknesses. * Develop junior non-commissioned officer and help officers develop junior officers. * Provide timely and objective training advice to their officers. * Assist in planning, resource coordination, support, risk mitigation, supervision, and evaluation of training. TRAIN USING MULTI-ECHELON TECHNIQUES TO MAXIMIZE TIME AND RESOURCE EFFICIENCY 1-48. The Army fights as a team, and whenever possible, trains at echelon as a team. Additionally, the simultaneous training of multiple echelons on complementary tasks is the most efficient and effective way to train because it optimizes the use of time and resources.
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Chapter 1 1-49. Additionally, individual and unit maintenance tasks represent important training opportunities that leaders must exploit. Disciplined units conduct disciplined maintenance to Army standards in garrison, during training, and when deployed. Training to maintain also means leaders train subordinates to be good stewards of Army resources. Building a sense of stewardship and frugality conditions leaders and units to operate more effectively in austere operational conditions. TRAIN AS A COMBINED ARMS TEAM 1-50. The Army fights and trains as a combined arms team by training tasks and weapons by associated warfighting function and functional units. Fire supporters and FA also train using multi-echelon training techniques capitalizing on the inherent relationships among higher, lower, and adjacent units that habitually operate together. 1-51. Commanders must create and integrate realistic training environments. This is accomplished by replicating the complexities of the expected OE, including electronic warfare (EW), denied, degraded, or disrupted space operational environment (D3SOE) across their formations, in addition to operations in a CBRN OE. TRAIN TO STANDARD USING APPROPRIATE DOCTRINE 1-52. Commanders train both the FS and FA components of the FS system within their formations to ensure readiness. They consider their supported commanders' strategy for training the entire combined arms team. They rely on their firm grasp of FA and FS doctrine and TTP, tempered by their experience and military skills when developing training plans. 1-53. The responsibility for training includes the authority to determine the frequencies of the certification and qualification tables described in TC 3-09.8. Critical in determining these frequencies is a dialogue between FA commanders and their supported commanders. TRAIN AS YOU FIGHT 1-54. Commanders must incorporate digital sustainment in their unit training plans. Digital sustainment training must be conducted with attention to detail and adherence to time standards. Digital tasks and troubleshooting procedures are perishable skills that need to be reinforced on a regular basis. Focus of this training must be at the end user level of the FS and FA C2 systems. 1-55. Whenever possible, incorporate multinational partner personnel and units during training events to increase interoperability and shared understanding of capabilities and limitations of FS systems. Multinational operations is a collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance (JP 3-16). 1-56. All efforts must be expended to conduct this training in a field environment or over distances to replicate a field environment. The speed, accuracy, and responsiveness of fires in support of a commander's concept of operations depends on the proficiency with which firing units and TA capabilities utilize when communicating with digital systems. SUSTAIN LEVELS OF TRAINING PROFICIENCY OVER TIME 1-57. Once the unit achieves required task and weapon proficiencies it strives to maintain these proficiencies within the band of excellence. Many factors affect FS and FA training proficiency such as personnel turbulence, skill atrophy, and maintenance of equipment, physical fitness, and new equipment fielding and training. Successful commanders understand these factors and ensure that the training proficiencies attained do not degrade to a less than acceptable level. 1-58. To overcome the anticipated highs and lows of training proficiency, commanders continually re- evaluate training plans, current proficiencies, and strategies. Sustaining high levels of proficiency sometimes proves more difficult than developing proficiency from a starting point.
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Foundations of Fire Support and the Role of the Field Artillery TRAIN TO MAINTAIN 1-59. As discussed earlier in this chapter, we will likely commence combat at a numerical disadvantage in attack/delivery platforms. For that reason, every gun, launcher, fire direction center (FDC), fuel truck, digital system, etc. is a precious commodity. Commanders ensure maintenance occurs at the highest of standards and with competent leader involvement. 1-60. The purpose of command emphasis on maintenance is to maintain combat power by keeping every gun and launcher in the fight during large-scale combat operations. Units train maintenance tasks continuously according to Army standards under a variety of conditions that replicate the challenges of combat operations. FIGHT TO TRAIN 1-61. It is a FA commander’s duty to fight through distractions and protect training. It is the higher echelon commander’s responsibility to defend their subordinate organization’s approved training from un-forecasted requirements and to underwrite associated risk to lower priority missions. Regardless of the quality of planning and preparation, there will be challenges to the execution of training. The ethic, fight to train, separates great trainers and units from the others.
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Chapter 2 The Fire Support System As discussed in chapter 1, FS is the product of a system consisting of three parts. FS C2, TA, and FS attack/delivery systems. Section 1 discusses the C2 element of the FS system including personnel, CPs, and networks. Section II discusses the TA element and section III discusses attack/delivery systems. Because of the diversity of the individual FS parts, the total FS system does not function through a common chain of command as does a maneuver organization. The supported commander does exercise C2 over their organic and attached FS assets, but the commander has limited control over external FS capabilities that are available for use. The commander's ability to employ FS, as a system, and to integrate and synchronize FS results from an established process known as FS planning and coordination (further discussed in Chapter 3). SECTION I – FIRE SUPPORT SYSTEM: COMMAND AND CONTROL 2-1. The elements of the FS system collectively deliver fires where and when needed to support the commander’s objectives. Responsibility for command, control, and coordination of the fire support system belongs to the ground force commander. The commander’s guidance is reflected in the scheme of fires, which must be synchronized with all the dynamics of combat power, but especially with information, mobility, and survivability. The scheme of fires is the detailed, logical sequence of targets and fire support events to find and engage targets to support the commander’s objectives (JP 3-09). 2-2. Direction of the FS system is the responsibility of the FA commander. The supported commander charges the FA commander to ensure that all available FS capabilities are fully integrated and synchronized with the concept of operations. The FA commander serves as the supported commander's FSCOORD and speaks for the commander on all matters pertaining to FS. 2-3. Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission (JP 1, Vol 2). Commanders perform C2 using a C2 system. A command and control system is the arrangement of people, processes, networks, and command posts that enable commanders to conduct operations (ADP 6-0). 2-4. Cooperation among the various FS C2 organizations is necessary for the effective delivery of fires in time and in all domains. This is especially true in joint operations and in operations with unified action partners. Cooperation must be thought of as a product of the C2 the commander exerts to drive the FS system as a whole and the authority the commander gives the FSCOORD to orchestrate it. FIRE SUPPORT PERSONNEL 2-5. FS personnel are located at FA and supported commander’s CPs at every echelon of command. Commanders and staffs use several integrating processes to synchronize functions, organize activities, and create effects based on the commander's intent. For FS personnel, the critical processes include military decision-making process (MDMP) and the targeting process and are discussed in chapter 3. These processes and procedures enable the FA commander to accomplish both aspects of the mission as a commander and FSCOORD. The FSCOORD splits time between the FA CP and supported commander's CP. Army and joint FS personnel, and their duties are described in the following paragraphs.
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Chapter 2 FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATOR 2-6. The FSCOORD commands their respective FA organization and advises the supported commander on all aspects of FS. As the FSCOORD, the FA commander will spend most of his time either with the supported commander or in the respective fire support element (FSE). Both staffs must understand their responsibilities and assist the FSCOORD in facilitating essential fire support tasks (EFSTs). 2-7. It is important that the commander and key staff officers within the supported command recognize and understand that the FA commander is equally responsible for both aspects of the FA and FS mission. Also, the FA commander must recognize and understand that they have full responsibility for ensuring the efficient, effective operation of the FSE, just as they have command responsibility for ensuring timely and effective FA fire. See table 2-1 for FSCOORD titles at command echelon. Table 2-1. Fire support titles at brigade and above Force FSCOORD or Chief of Fires Assisted by Echelon ASCC/TFC FSCOORD DFSCOORD (TFC CDR) ASCC/ Chief of Fires Deputy Chief of Fires TFE Corps FSCOORD DFSCOORD (FAB CDR/OFC CDR) Division FSCOORD DFSCOORD (DIVARTY CDR) Brigade FSCOORD FSO (FA BN CDR) ASCC – Army Service component command, BN – battalion, CDR – commander, DFSCOORD – deputy fire support coordinator, DIVARTY – division artillery, FA – field artillery, FAB – field artillery brigade, FSCOORD – fire support coordinator, FSO – fire support officer, JFE – joint fires element OFC – operational fires command, TFC – theater fires command, TFE – theater fires element 2-8. The theater fires command (TFC) commander is always the FSCOORD for the theater. The operational fires command (referred to as OFC) commander is the FSCOORD for the corps. If an operational fires command is not available, the corps commander can designate a field artillery brigade (FAB) commander as the FSCOORD. The division artillery (DIVARTY) commander is always the FSCOORD for the division. The FSCOORD for the brigade combat team (BCT) is the organic, assigned, or attached FA BN commander. The FSCOORD works closely with the chief of staff or executive officer, the assistant chief of staff, intelligence (G-2) and assistant chief of staff, operations (G-3) to ensure mutual understanding of all aspects of planning, preparation, execution and assessment of fires for operations. At echelons above division, the FSCOORD works closely with the respective air operations center (AOC), battlefield coordination detachment (BCD), and other unified action partners. Some of the FSCOORD's responsibilities include: * Plan, prepare, execute, and assess all EFSTs in support of offensive, defensive and stability operations and provide inputs to the preparation of the operation plan (OPLAN) and operation order (OPORD), including Annex D (Fires). * Develop, with the commander and S-3/G-3, a scheme of fires to support the operation. * Provides oversight and guidance for all effects. * Coordinate the use of named area of interest (NAI) and target area of interest (TAI), HPTs, and additional events that may influence the positioning of FS attack/delivery systems. * Supervise development of proposed high-payoff target lists (HPTL), target selection standards, and attack guidance matrices. * Coordinate positioning of indirect FS assets. * Recommend FSCMs to support current and future operations and manage changes to them. * Recommend and implement the commander's counterfire and target engagement priorities. * Recommend to the commander the establishment, responsibilities, authorities, and duties of a force field artillery (FFA) headquarters (HQ).
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The Fire Support System * Integrate and synchronize joint FS and multinational fires with the other dynamics of combat power. * Lead the targeting working group and facilitate the targeting board. * Accompany the commander during execution of tactical operations (when directed). * Provide for consolidated and focused FS and FA specific certification, readiness, and oversight (personnel management, equipment issues, and training). * Establish standard operation procedures across the brigade, division, corps, and theater. * Oversee the professional development of the 13-series career management field Soldiers. * Mentor, train, and educate junior FS and FA leaders on all aspects of the FS system. CHIEF OF FIRES 2-9. The chief of fires is the senior fires staff officer at echelons above corps who advises the commander on the best use of available fires resources, and provides input to necessary orders (ADP 3-19). The chief of fires is located at the theater Army fires cell or joint task force (JTF), joint fires element (JFE) that does not have a TFC to execute joint fires. Joint fires are fires delivered during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action to produce desired effects in support of a common objective (JP 3- 0). The chief of fires facilitates the fires warfighting function and works closely with the J-3 (referred to as the operations directorate of a joint staff) to ensure mutual understanding of all aspects of planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of fires for operations. DEPUTY FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATOR 2-10. The deputy fire support coordinator (DFSCOORD) is a permanently assigned coordinating staff officer on the TFC, corps, and division staff. The DFSCOORD provides oversight of FS personnel, working groups and boards, and the joint air-ground integration center (JAGIC) when formed. When the FSCOORD is not present, the DFSCOORD performs the duties of the FSCOORD. TARGETING OFFICER 2-11. FSEs from FA BNs through corps, and fires cells at echelons above corps have assigned targeting officers. The targeting officer will drive the targeting process and is the technical subject matter expert on all matters relating to Army and joint targeting. Targeting officers will participate in the MDMP to develop the targeting products HPTL, attack guidance matrix (AGM), and target synchronization matrix. 2-12. The targeting officer recommends weapons locating radar (WLR) guidance and oversees counterfire operations, to include, radar deployment orders, queuing schedules, and threat patterns in support of the targeting process. Weapons locating radar is a continuous target acquisition counterbattery system that detects in-flight projectiles, and communicates point of origin and point of impact locations. Targeting officers will manage requests to higher for effects outside of organic capability. For more information see FM 3-60. FIELD ARTILLERY INTELLIGENCE OFFICER 2-13. The field artillery intelligence officer (FAIO) coordinates with brigade, corps and division internal and external intelligence elements to provide input to the development, nomination, and prioritization of high- value targets originating from the G-2/ or battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer (S-2) all source analysis section. A high-value target is a target the enemy commander requires for the successful completion of the mission (JP 3-60). During planning FAIOs assist the S-2/G-2 targeting (referred to as the G-2T) with target development, coordinate with the targeting officers for no-strike list and restricted target list management, the HPTL and AGM. 2-14. The FAIO is primarily responsible for the development of the target selection standards working with both the information collection manager and the FS noncommissioned officer to determine cutoff values. The FAIO nominates targets to the FSE that are provided by the all-source analysts and fusion cell chiefs. The FAIO assists the S-2/G-2 with target value analysis and NAI/TAI development. When an Army, corps or division is serving as a JTF or joint force land component commander (JFLCC), the FAIO works closely
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Chapter 2 with the J-2 and J-2T for target development. The FAIO is also responsible for the integration of FA C2 systems into the mission command networks in coordination with the FFA HQ S-6 and brigade, division or corps G-6. For more information on the FAIO see FM 3-60. BRIGADE FIRE SUPPORT OFFICER 2-15. A fire support officer is the operational to tactical level field artillery officer responsible for advising the supported commander or assisting the fire support coordinator on fires functions and fire support. The brigade fire support officer (FSO) is the senior FA staff officer responsible for planning, preparing, and executing all aspects of FS for BCT operations. More than any other officer, the FSO must understand the FSCOORD's intent in supporting the operation and understands all of the duties of the FSCOORD listed in paragraph 2-6. For information on the BCT FSO duties see ATP 3-09.42. BATTALION FIRE SUPPORT OFFICER 2-16. The BN FSO is the senior FA staff officer at the supported BN or aviation BN. The BN FSO advises the respective BN commander on fire support planning and employment considerations. The BN FSO plans, prepares, executes, and provides assessment of all aspects of fire support for BN operations and provides bottom-up refinement of the fire support plan. For more information on the BN FSO duties see ATP 3-09.42. COMPANY FIRE SUPPORT OFFICER 2-17. The company/troop FSO works for the company/troop commander during combat operations to accomplish all EFSTs. The FSO is assigned to the FA BN and under the functional supervision of the BN FSO. The FSO devises the FS plan based on the commander's guidance and submits the plan to the commander for approval. The FSO plans, prepares, executes, and provides assessment of all aspects of FS for company operations and provides bottom-up refinement of the FS plan. For more information on the company FSO duties see ATP 3-09.42. FIRE SUPPORT SERGEANT 2-18. The company FS sergeant or FS non-commissioned officer is the senior enlisted assistant to the company FSO. The fire support sergeant performs the duties of the FSO in their absence. The fire support sergeant advises the FSO on the allocation and tasking of joint fires observers, other observers, and trains the fire support team (FIST) and the forward observer (FO) in applicable FS tactics and techniques. A fire support team is a field artillery team provided for each maneuver company/troop and selected units to plan and coordinate all supporting fires available to the unit, including mortars, field artillery, naval surface fire support, and close air support integration (JP 3-09.3). For more information on the FIST and FS sergeant's duties see ATP 3-09.42. FORWARD OBSERVER 2-19. The FO is the fire support representative for the maneuver platoon. The FO's primary duty is to accurately locate targets, then call for, and adjust FS. The forward observer is an individual operating with front line troops and trained to adjust ground or naval gunfire and pass back battlefield information (JP 3- 09). The FO must fully understand their responsibility within the observation plan and provide refinement or submit key targets for inclusion in the company fire plan. A fire plan is a tactical plan for using the weapons of a unit or formation so that their fire will be coordinated. For more information on FO duties see ATP 3-09.30. JOINT FIRES OBSERVER 2-20. A joint fires observer is a certified and qualified Service member who requests, controls, and adjusts surface-to-surface fires; provides targeting information in support of close air support; and performs terminal guidance operations (JP 3-09.3). A joint fires observer cannot perform terminal attack control of CAS missions and does not replace a qualified joint terminal attack controller (JTAC) or forward air controller (airborne) (FAC(A)). Terminal guidance operations are actions that provide electronic, mechanical, voice or
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The Fire Support System visual communications that provide approaching aircraft and/or weapons additional information regarding a specific target location (JP 3-09). OTHER JOINT AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES PERSONNEL AND DUTIES 2-21. FS is inherently joint and executed across all domains. As such, all Army FS personnel routinely interface with multiple joint FS and special operations forces (SOF) personnel at every echelon of command. The following are key personnel that Army FS personnel routinely work with during joint operations. For more information on joint special operations forces and personnel see JP 3-09 and JP 3-30: * Director, AOC: Responsible to the joint force air component commander (JFACC) for integrating the planning, coordinating, allocating, tasking, executing, and assessing tasks for all joint air operations. * Air liaison officer is the senior tactical air control party member attached to a ground unit who functions as the primary advisor to the ground commander on air power (JP 3-09.3). * Naval Ground Liaison Officer: acts as the liaison for a supporting naval task force. They coordinate all naval gunfire that is supporting the ground force commander or that may affect the operations of the ground force commander. They also advise the ground force commander and FSCOORD on all matters pertaining to naval gunfire employment. * Maritime Operations Center Fires Element. Fires and targeting personnel who contribute to the various maritime operations center (MOC) fires functions are organized in the fires element for standardization and coordination. The fires element is led by the fires lead, who coordinates all fires functions. For more information see JP 3-09. * J-2T (Targeting): The deputy director for targets for a joint staff. * United States Air Force (USAF) ISR director: Provides the JFACC with timely, relevant, accurate, and predictive intelligence, targeting support, and collection management expertise to support the air tasking cycle. * Forward air controller (airborne) is a specifically trained and qualified aviation officer, normally an airborne extension of the tactical air control party, who exercises control from the air of aircraft engaged in close air support of ground troops (JP 3-09.3). * Joint terminal attack controller is a qualified (certified) Service member who, from a forward position, directs the action of combat aircraft engaged in close air support and other offensive air operations (JP 3-09.3). * SOF JTAC: Although all SOF operators are capable of employing surface fires and aviation fires from AC-130 aircraft, current and qualified SOF JTACs are recognized across all components of US Special Operations Command as the primary fires employment capability at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. These personnel are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. SOF JTACs are carefully selected to conduct special operations using modified equipment and trained in irregular warfare activities to achieve strategic and operational objectives in austere environments worldwide. SOF also employ SOF aviators as forward air controller, airborne. * Shore Fire Control Party: The supporting United States Marine Corps (USMC) artillery BNs provide shore fire control party's to supported units. The shore fire control party consists of a naval surface fire support liaison team and spotting team. The naval surface fire support liaison team is specifically organized to handle liaison matters for the supported commander, while the spotting team is charged with requesting and adjusting fires of assigned direct support (DS) ships and general support (GS) ships. COMMAND POSTS 2-22. FSEs and fires cells are located in supported commander’s CPs from BN through theater levels. FSEs are located at CPs at every echelon above company and are responsible for targeting coordination and for integrating fires under the control or in support of the force (see JP 3-09). These elements and cells are central clearing houses for planning, coordinating, and synchronizing fire support for the supported commander. The exact way they are organized varies among different organizations. The organization depends on the unit
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Chapter 2 mission, availability of FS assets, and command preferences. The actual makeup of FS elements and cells is flexible. However, it ensures that all FS assets respond to the supported commander's intent. At corps and division levels, FSEs at tactical and rear area CPs are extensions of the main CP FSE. They assist the main FSE and JAGIC controlling assets engaged in close and rear area operations. Below are descriptions of FS elements and cells within each echelon of Army and joint commands. THEATER FIRES COMMAND 2-23. An Army TFC provides C2 of assigned strategic fires capabilities, serves as the senior HQ assigned to a theater Army to integrate theater fires assets, and executes critical FS functions in all phases of operations. The TFC is designed to develop, nominate, and converge effects on joint targets across the theater. This support to joint targeting will shape the OE, to enable JFLCC/Field Army and Corps operations and counter aggression on land during crisis. 2-24. The TFC ensures the Army's contribution to the joint targeting process is effectively planned and executed and can seamlessly transition to large-scale combat operations in accordance with the ground force commander's priorities. This also provides greater deterrence options for the theater. For more information on the theater Army operations see ATP 3-93. JOINT FIRES ELEMENT 2-25. The JFE is an optional staff element established by the JFC and composed of representatives from the J-3 (referred to as the operations directorate of a joint staff); the components (land, maritime, air, and special operations); and other elements of the JFC's staff, to include space and cyberspace operations representatives and the directorates (to include intelligence, logistics, plans, and civil-military operations). The JFE integrates and synchronizes fires planning and coordination on behalf of the JFC and should be near the joint operations center. The JFE works closely with the command's J-2 to ensure the successful execution of the joint targeting cycle. For more information on the JFE see JP 3-09. MULTIDOMAIN TASK FORCE 2-26. The multidomain task force provides the joint force with a formation capable of employing long-range precision fires and other effects from multiple domains in support of the commander’s objectives. It is designed to defeat complex enemy systems through the collection of information and different forms of lethal and nonlethal effects. When required, it can be task-organized to provide capabilities to the JTF or component commander. During competition, the multidomain task force may be forward stationed in a combatant commander’s area of responsibility to employ joint and Army capabilities in support of target development. The multidomain task force all domain operations center (referred to as the ADOC) coordinates and synchronizes the information collection operations of its assigned formations with other theater and national assets. For more information on the multidomain task force see FM 3-0. BATTLEFIELD COORDINATION DETACHMENT 2-27. The BCD is a specialized, regionally focused Army element that serves as the senior Army operational commander’s liaison with the air component. A BCD is co-located with the joint or combined AOC. The BCD is the Army’s interface for systems connectivity to the joint air operations center (JAOC) and for personnel integration with their JAOC counterparts. When a U.S. Army HQ is designated as the JFLCC, the BCD may serve as the land component commander’s liaison to the air component commander when augmented with other unique land force representatives. For more information on the BCD see ATP 3-09.13. BCD tasks include: * Integrate ARFOR/Land Component requirements during joint air tasking cycle. * Facilitating the exchange of current intelligence and operational data. * Processing air support requests. * Monitoring and interpreting the land battle situation. * Coordinating for air and missile defense (referred to as AMD). * Coordinating for airlift.
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The Fire Support System * Integrating airspace requirements. JOINT FORCE LAND COMPONENT FIRES CELL 2-28. The joint force land component commander is the commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for recommending the proper employment of assigned, attached, made available for tasking land forces; planning and coordinating land operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned (JP 3-0). At echelons performing the role of the JFLCC, the fires cell coordinates, integrates, and assigns joint, interagency, and multinational fires to targets. It synchronizes fires, to include Army, joint, interagency, and multinational component air assets; SOF; naval surface fire support (NSFS); cyberspace operations; and EMS operations (JP 3-09). The JFLCC’s primary agency to synchronize and coordinate joint fires and their effects-is either an Army fires cell or a USMC force fires coordination center or fire support coordination center of the J-3 (referred to as the operations directorate of a joint staff). The fires cell or center reviews the JFC's guidance and intent and makes recommendations for the JFLCC to create the desired effects that support achievement of the objectives. The primary responsibility of the JFLCC is to advise the JFC on the best use of available land component fires capabilities and execute the OPORD. For more information on the JFLCC and associated fires cell see JP 3-09 and JP 3-31. OPERATIONAL FIRES COMMAND 2-29. When established, an operational fires command coordinates, synchronizes and employs surface-to- surface fires and integrates lethal and nonlethal effects in all domains to support corps operations. The operational fires command provides the Army corps with a FFA HQ that is also capable of integrating fires across all domains. The operational fires command contains the resident combat power and ISR capabilities to deliver artillery fires and integrate nonlethal effects into multidomain operations, providing the corps the ability to shape its operations. The operational fires command operates in theater, or rapidly deploys into theater, to support an Army corps. 2-30. The commander of the operational fires command performs the duties and responsibilities of the FSCOORD for the corps. The operational fires command maintains the standard staff organization normally utilized across Army formations for functional activities. This functional backbone facilitates normal organization activities to include personnel services, intelligence, operations and planning, sustainment, and communication requirements. CORPS FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENT 2-31. The corps FSE coordinates Army lethal and nonlethal attack/delivery capabilities and joint fires. The corps FSCOORD ensures that the corps FS system supports the corps commander’s guidance for fires, meets joint force requirements, and reacts responsively to the changing operational environment. The FSE accomplishes these actions by developing, recommending, and coordinating the scheme of fires. The FSE may perform artillery sensor management and provide input to information collection. 2-32. The FSE assists the G-2 with target development, conducts targeting within the HQs and provides representatives to the current operations integration cell and rear area CP. When the corps serves as the base organization for a JTF or land component command (referred to as LCC) HQs, the FSE performs functions IAW joint publications. (See JP 3-01, JP 3-03, JP 3-09, JP 3-31, and JP 3-60). The FSE works closely with the FFA HQ, if one is established. A designated FSE can provide augmentation to the corps FSE as necessary. 2-33. To ensure unity of effort and fully integrated use of capabilities in setting the conditions, an emerging TTP within the corps HQ could be used to synchronize all FS assets in consonance with the commander’s guidance. This TTP forms a cell designated as the joint targeting and execution cell (referred to as JTEC), which integrates with the corps FSE, and other Army, joint, and multinational elements of the FS system. DIVISION FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENT 2-34. The division FSE develops, recommends, and briefs the scheme of fires, including effects, recommends targeting guidance to the commander, develops HPTs, selects targets for attack, and
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Chapter 2 coordinates, integrates and assigns allocated joint, interagency and multinational fires to specific targets and target systems. The division FSE synchronizes all fire support for the command to include Army, joint and multinational. Division FSEs also participate in assessment (battle damage, munitions effectiveness, re-attack recommendations); develops planning guidance; provides target intelligence for planning and execution and coordinate with the respective air support operations center (ASOC) as part of the JAGIC. JOINT AIR-GROUND INTEGRATION CENTER 2-35. Located in the Army division current operations integration cell, the JAGIC provides commander’s a technique to coordinate, integrate, and control operations in division-assigned airspace and efficiently collaborate requirements with external airspace elements outside of the division area. The JAGIC co-locates decision making authorities from the land and air component to support the supported commander's objectives and intent. The JAGIC facilitates effective mission execution while managing the level of risk. For more information on the JAGIC see ATP 3-91.1. FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENT 2-36. The FAB has an FSE HQs, an air support section, an air defense airspace management element, a protection, and a lethal effects element. Each of the elements assists the current operations integration cell by providing additional expertise or dedicated manpower on an as needed basis. All elements in the FSE assist with planning by providing expertise or dedicated manpower on an as needed basis. The FAB FSE can augment a corps FSE as needed. For more information on the FAB FSE see ATP 3-09.24. GENERAL FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENT FUNCTIONS AT ECHELONS ABOVE BRIGADE 2-37. General FSE functions include: * Plan, integrate, coordinate, and synchronize joint fires. * Conduct target management including recommendations, receipt, and distribution to subordinate fires units for ROE, HPTL, time sensitive targets, and restricted target and no-strike list. * Lead the targeting working group and facilitate the targeting board as determined by the commander. * When authorized, executes the clearance of fires process for the commander. * Participate in the joint targeting process and development of targeting objectives. * Participate in joint targeting working groups and boards. * Provide access to joint fires for interagency and multinational forces. * Provide input to the air tasking order (ATO), airspace control plan, and airspace control order (ACO) which includes FSCMs and airspace coordinating measures (ACM). * Process and submit AI nominations and remain in continuous contact with AOC/BCD. * Request and coordinate CAS, AI, EW. * Team with the airspace element, air and missile defense cell, and the USAF's ASOS and tactical air control party (TACP) to perform airspace control responsibilities within division assigned airspace. * Provide input to the information collection plan to synchronize surveillance and reconnaissance assets with named areas of interest and designated targets in coordination with the all source analysis section. * Coordinate position areas for FA units under corps control with maneuver and airspace control agencies. * Monitor the ATO and process joint-surveillance and target attack radar systems targets. BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENT 2-38. The BCT FSE plans, coordinates, integrates, synchronizes and deconflicts the employment and assessment of FS for both current and future operations. This includes FA, mortar, electronic attack, air
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The Fire Support System support, naval surface fires support and other joint assets. The Air Force TACP typically collocates with the BCT FSE. The BCT FSE works closely with BN FSEs and company FIST. These organizations ensure responsive and effective fire support is provided to their respective supported commanders and actions are closely coordinated through the BCT main CP and FSE. For more information on the BCT FSE see ATP 3- 09.42. COMBAT AVIATION BRIGADE FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENT 2-39. The combat aviation brigade (CAB) FSE integrates FS into the scheme of maneuver by developing a scheme of fires and leading the targeting working group in close coordination with the CAB battalion or brigade operations staff officer (S-3), S-2, and commander. Both missions are critical to the success of aviation operations. For more information on the CAB FSE see ATP 3-04.1. BATTALION FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENT AND COMPANY FIRE SUPPORT TEAM 2-40. FSEs in the BCT’s maneuver BNs and CABs air reconnaissance squadron provide a fire support coordination capability for BN operations and are organized with an FSO and FS non-commissioned officer an EW non-commissioned officer, and digital systems operators. The BN HQ may also have an Air Force TACP. Infantry and armor company and troop FIST enable effective artillery, mortar, and joint FS for the maneuver force. For more information on the BN and company FSE see ATP 3-09.42. FIELD ARTILLERY COMMAND POSTS 2-41. FA CPs integrate FA operations, targeting, and attack elements and synchronize the execution of FA missions. CPs must aggressively seek information about the current tactical situation (friendly unit locations, obstacles, cleared lanes, and bypassed units), while disseminating this information to all subordinate and supporting units. Because FA CPs are primary enemy targets, they should be as small and mobile as possible to allow for rapid and frequent displacement – this practice enables FS leaders to effectively account for being under constant enemy observation. FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE COMMAND POST 2-42. FAB CPs C2 the operations of subordinate FA BNs. They integrate FS planning and coordination, execution, target production, and information from all intelligence sources. A FAB can serve as the FFA HQ for a Corps or JTF, or the counterfire HQ for a JTF, corps, or division. Army National Guard FABs have a dual role, serving as both the Army National Guard division commander's FFA HQ and as a FAB when required. For more information on the FAB see ATP 3-09.24. DIVISION ARTILLERY COMMAND POST 2-43. As a division's FFA HQs, the DIVARTY plans, directs, coordinates, and controls the fires of all organic, attached, and reinforcing (R) FA units supporting the division. The CP develops FA support plans and ensures that available firepower adequately supports the division concept of operations. The DIVARTY can serve as the counterfire HQs for the division or can delegate that role to a R FA unit since divisional assets engaging division HPTs beyond the close area are limited in large-scale combat operations. 2-44. If the counterfire HQ is delegated to a R FA unit, it is important to remember that the DIVARTY commander remains responsible for the overall division counterfire fight as the division commander's FSCOORD. The DIVARTY CP provides the division with the ability to have an alternate CP if the division CP must displace or is incapacitated. The DIVARTY CP may perform C2 tasks for the division for a limited period only. For more information on DIVARTY organization and operations see ATP 3-09.90. FORCE FIELD ARTILLERY HEADQUARTERS COMMAND POST 2-45. A force field artillery headquarters is a battalion size or higher units designated by the supported commander who specifies its duration, duties, and responsibilities. A command’s organic FA HQ is normally the FFA HQ (DIVARTY). When formations do not have an organic FA HQ (to include a JTF), the respective commander may designate an FFA HQ such as a FAB. Functions of the FFA HQ may include:
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Chapter 2 * Provides C2 for subordinate units which could include an FA BDE, rocket BNs, or cannon BNs to support the commander's concept of operations. * Facilitates single point of contact for outside agency coordination for force protection and additional fires. * Accepts or passes control of fires during passage of lines operations. * Coordinates sustainment and protection of subordinate FA units. * Plans fires and positions all FA units with a support relationship of GS or general support- reinforcing (GSR). * Recommends command and support relationships of FA units to the G-3 and the Commander. * Establishes meteorological (MET), survey, and radar TA plans for the command. * Produces a FA support plan or OPORD. * Assists the corps or division FSE in the production of Annex D (Fires) of the OPORD. * Facilitates targeting for the division and corps deep fight. * Orchestrates the counterfire fight for the commander. * Assigns a subordinate or R FA unit the duties of the counterfire HQ. * Serves as alternate corps or division CP for limited durations. Note: North American Treaty Organization (NATO) FA units are given missions and responsibilities in accordance with NATO Standardization Agreement 2484. Other multinational FA units that are attached or operational control (OPCON) are given missions and responsibilities in accordance with their national guidance. COUNTERFIRE HEADQUARTERS COMMAND POST 2-46. Counterfire is fire intended to destroy or neutralize enemy weapons (JP 3-09). This includes counterbattery and countermortar fire. The counterfire fight is not a separate fight, but one aspect of the overall combined arms fight. Counterfire contributes by providing fires against the enemy indirect fire system; it protects friendly forces, combat functions, and facilities from enemy indirect fires by suppressing, neutralizing, or destroying enemy indirect fire weapons systems. It is also used against the enemy’s C2, ammunition, logistics, and TA capabilities. Counterfire is an integrated aspect of the overall combined arms approach to achieve fire superiority. For more information on counterfire see ATP 3-09.12. 2-47. In large-scale combat operations, the corps and division commanders are responsible for counterfire throughout the depth of their AO. The corps or division commander can assign the role of counterfire HQ to a FAB, DIVARTY, or a separate FA BN. The counterfire HQ must be allocated the necessary assets to conduct the counterfire fight. During large-scale combat operations a corps should be allocated two FABs, one to serve as the counterfire HQ and one to serve as the FFA HQ. The counterfire HQ will coordinate with the division and corps G-2 for sensor tasking authority and additional intelligence capabilities to integrate all available assets into the counterfire fight in a proactive manner. The counterfire HQ duties include: * Plan and coordinate sensor management. * Conduct pattern analysis of enemy indirect fire systems. * Establish artillery target intelligence zones, call for fire zones (CFFZs), critical friendly zones (CFZs), and censor zones. * Based off pattern analysis conduct WLR zone management in support of the counterfire fight. * Recommend positioning of counterfire delivery systems. * Write the TA tab to Annex D. * Recommend counterfire TTP to facilitate permissive fires. * Participate in the targeting process. * Establish counterfire mission digital and voice procedures and communications architecture using primary computer/digital system.
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The Fire Support System JOINT FIRE SUPPORT COMMAND POSTS 2-48. Below are descriptions of additional joint FS agencies that most commonly interface with the Army during joint and multidomain operations. For more detailed information on each of these elements of the joint FS system see JP 3-09. JOINT AIR OPERATIONS CENTER 2-49. The JAOC is structured to operate as a fully integrated command center and should be staffed by members of all participating components, to include key staff positions, to fulfill the JFACC's responsibilities. A JAOC provides the capability to plan, coordinate, allocate, task, execute, monitor, and assess the activities of assigned or attached forces. 2-50. Through the JAOC, the JFACC monitors execution of joint air operations and directs changes as the situation dictates. As the lead C2 mechanism of the theater air-ground system, the JAOC should have secure and redundant communications with operations, logistics, weather, intelligence centers, and higher and lateral HQ, as well as subordinate units, to preclude degradation in its ability to control joint air forces. More information on the JAOC see JP 3-30. AIR SUPPORT OPERATIONS CENTER 2-51. The ASOC is the primary control agency within the theater air control system for execution of air operations that directly support land operations within division-assigned airspace. The ASOC is an extension of, and directly subordinate to, the JAOC. 2-52. Normally co-located with the division FSE, the ASOC performs a current operations function, while planning and execution functions are performed by members of the TACP. ASOC and TACP personnel at the Army division may be integrated with the division FSE and airspace element to form a JAGIC. JOINT AIR COMPONENT COORDINATION ELEMENTS 2-53. The JFACC may establish one or more joint air component coordination elements (JACCEs) with other functional component commanders' HQ to include the JFLCC, joint force special operations component command, joint force maritime component command to better integrate joint air operations with their operations. When established, the JACCE is a component-level liaison that serves as the direct representative of the JFACC. 2-54. The JACCE does not perform any C2 functions and the JACCE director does not have command authority over any air forces. The JACCE may be provided to the supported JTF HQ (if the theater JFACC is designated in support to a JTF) to better integrate air component operations within the overall joint force. TACTICAL AIR CONTROL PARTY 2-55. The TACP is an air liaison element co-located with ground maneuver units. TACPs are under the OPCON of the ASOC and have two primary missions: to advise ground commanders on the capabilities and limitations of air operations (the responsibility of the air liaison officer [ALO]) and provide terminal attack control of CAS aircraft (the responsibility of the JTACs). Terminal attack control is the authority to control the maneuver of and grant weapons release clearance to attacking aircraft (JP 3-09.3). MARITIME COMPONENT COMMAND AND CONTROL 2-56. The JFC may designate a joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC) to conduct joint maritime operations. The JFMCC is the supported commander for operations within the JFC-designated maritime AO (including airspace above the AO). When designated the supported commander, the JFMCC has authority to designate target priorities, effects, and timing of fires within the AO. 2-57. The primary responsibilities of the JFMCC regarding joint FS are to advise the JFC on the best use of available maritime component fires capabilities, provide maritime component joint FS requirements to the
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Chapter 2 supporting commander(s) (if designated the supported commander), conduct component planning, and execute the OPORD. MARITIME OPERATIONS CENTER 2-58. The MOC is the organization within the joint force maritime component command HQ through which the commander employs assigned and attached forces. The MOC should be viewed as integral to the joint force maritime component commander’s decision-making process at the operational level of warfare, especially during crisis or conflict. 2-59. Provides maritime capabilities in support of the combatant commander and JFC, the mission of the MOC is to assess, plan and direct maritime operations for all forces assigned. MOCs function as the core organizational construct for a numbered fleet commander or a joint force maritime component commander to support operational level assessment, planning and execution. For more information see JP 3-32. The MOC provides the commander with a functionally organized staff and C2 suite capable of executing Navy, joint and combined responsibilities. Duties of the MOC include: * Position organic and joint air assets (if assigned) to enable subordinate commanders. * Coordinate maneuvers with JFLCC and JFACC when appropriate, to include the positioning of air defense units. * Take joint air support requests (AIRSUPREQ) from the tactical commander. * Request joint air support from the JFACC if needed. * Coordinate with the airspace control authority for local and regional airspace around assets under OPCON. * Nominate targets. * Develop dynamic targeting guidance. * Synchronize the MOC's maritime targeting cycle with the joint targeting cycle to include the MOC fires element representative at the joint targeting working group. * Orchestrate a battle rhythm that incorporates air operations. UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND CONTROL AGENCIES USMC forces may be employed as, or part of, the joint force land component; as, or part of, the joint force maritime component; or as the joint force air component. USMC forces will operate as a Marine air- ground task force (MAGTF) consisting of a command element, a ground combat element, an aviation combat element, and a logistics combat element. Various agencies and elements within the MAGTF help commanders to execute fires. These agencies may be used for either a landing force or sustained land operations. The MAGTF command element organizes a fires and effects coordination center, which coordinates overall fires. At each level below the command element (division, regiment, and BN), a fire support coordination center is established to advise and coordinate fires within the ground combat element. The fires and effects coordination center and each fire support coordination center are staffed with subject matter experts and representatives of the various USMC and Navy supporting arms. Commander Amphibious Task Force In the initial phases of an amphibious operation, commander, amphibious task force (referred to as a CATF) exercises overall responsibility for coordination of naval surface fire support, air support, and landing force (referred to as a LF) artillery fire support. When the commander landing force (referred to as a CLF) is established ashore, the commander amphibious task force may pass this responsibility to the commander landing force. Once the passage of control ashore is executed, the commander landing force will coordinate fires within designated operational areas. While embarked, the MAGTF commander and staff direct the actions of the LF from C2 facilities aboard the amphibious ships. The MAGTF C2 may remain afloat throughout the expeditionary operation.
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The Fire Support System Air-Naval Ground Liaison Company 2-63. The air-naval ground liaison company provides the MAGTF commander a liaison capability to plan, coordinate, and conduct the terminal control of fires in support of joint and multinational forces operating within or adjacent to the MAGTF AO. Each air-naval ground liaison company contains USMC and Navy personnel qualified to plan, coordinate, and integrate all fire support assets available to the MAGTF, as well as joint and multinational forces. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMPONENT FIRE SUPPORT COMMAND AND CONTROL ORGANIZATIONS AND ELEMENTS 2-64. The joint force special operations component commander (referred to as JFSOCC) coordinates all FS in support of special operations and, when tasked, FS using SOF assets in support of other elements of the joint force. Special operations coordinate FS through both external and SOF channels. 2-65. Liaison between SOF and other elements of the joint force is critical to both effective support and the prevention of friendly fire incidents. SOF liaison elements provide special operations expertise to coordinate, synchronize, and deconflict operations in support of conventional forces and when special operations are conducted unilaterally. SOF C2 organizations, such as a special operations C2 element, may provide (or act as) liaison elements to coordinate FS with their respective Service components. Within SOF channels, various elements are established to assist commanders in the execution of their FS responsibilities. SOF organizations and elements that provide C2 capabilities with integrated FS functions include: * Special operations joint task force (referred to as SOJTF). A SOJTF is the principal organization designed to meet all special operations requirements in major operations, campaigns, or a contingency. The SOJTF commander plans, integrates, and executes all special operations in a designated OA. The SOJTF is a general officer-/flag officer-led modular, tailorable, and scalable special operations task force (SOTF) designed to integrate and enable joint SOF made available to the combatant commander (CCDR) and JFCs. * Joint special operations task force (referred to as JSOTF). The JSOTF is formed to execute special operations in support of a campaign or other operations. The JSOTF is normally an O-6-led modular, tailorable, and scalable SOTF designed to provide a capability to C2 multiple SOTFs or a SOJTF consisting of both conventional forces and SOF. * Joint special operations air component (referred to as JSOAC). The JSOAC plans and executes joint special operations air activities and ensures effective coordination, synchronization, and deconfliction of such activities with conventional air operations. Another key responsibility of the JSOAC is to ensure close liaison is accomplished with other SOF components. The JSOAC also has direct liaison with the special operations liaison element (referred to as SOLE). The JSOAC commander will normally be the commander with the preponderance of aviation assets or the greatest capacity to plan, coordinate, allocate, task, control, and support assigned and attached special operations aviation assets. * Special operations task force (SOTF). A SOTF is a grouping of SOF assets formed to carry out a specific operation or a continuing mission. SOTFs are scalable organizations built around the nucleus of Army SOF, USMC special operations units, or naval special warfare units. A SOTF establishes a FSE for targeting coordination and for integrating fires delivered on surface targets by fire-support means, under the control, or in support, of the tactical-level force. * Special operations command and control element (referred to as SOCCE). The SOCCE synchronizes special operations with land and maritime operations. The SOCCE is normally employed when SOF conduct operations in conjunction with a conventional force. It co-locates with the command element of the supported commander and performs C2, or liaison functions directed by the special operations commander. The focus of fires coordination is on the synchronization and deconfliction of joint fires. FIRE SUPPORT NETWORKS 2-66. FS digital systems provide C2, deconfliction and targeting architecture in an automated environment. FS and C2 systems that are interoperable with all forces help maintain information flow between
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Chapter 2 commanders, their staffs, and subordinate units. The primary FS systems used by Army FS personnel include Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS), Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (JADOCS), joint targeting integrated command and coordination suite (referred to as JTIC2S), and the forward observer system, both mounted and dismounted. 2-67. The JADOCS is a software application that presents and manipulates command, control, communications, intelligence, information, and communications interfaces to and from various systems to obtain, coordinate, and disseminate information. It maintains a comprehensive fires common operation picture, through the visualization of friendly air and land tracks, including artillery and radar positions as well as hostile air tracks received from the air defense systems integration server. It maintains comprehensive target entity databases including access to the modernized integrated database as well as enemy and friendly order of battle databases received digitally from the intelligence distributed common ground station - Army. This digital integration of U.S. and allied fires provides a forum for nominating, vetting and validating suspect targets, determining methods of engagement, conducting target area risk mitigation in a coordinated and collaborative digital environment for both deliberate and dynamic targeting. JADOCS can be utilized on any classification of network and resides at BCT and above. JADOCS works with AFATDS via a direct server- client interface to execute both deliberate and dynamic targeting. 2-68. The AFATDS is a multi-service, integrated FA system that receives call for fires, processes fire missions, air support requests, counterfire missions, conducts technical and tactical fire direction of firing units, issues orders to firing batteries and WLRs, and communicates other related information to coordinate and maximize the use of all attack/delivery assets. It meets the needs of the FS community for planning the use of critical resources and for managing, collecting, and passing vital fires data. AFATDS can create, store, and check FSCMs and ACMs for violations during fire mission processing. It establishes attack guidance and target selection standards for the expedited execution of the scheme of targeting. It performs detailed weaponeering and attack analysis for effective target engagement in accordance with the commander's desired effects. AFATDS can send both preplanned and immediate AIRSUPREQs through each echelon of command to the supporting AOC via the BCD. AFATDS transmits preplanned and immediate AIRSUPREQs to the theater battle management core system (referred as TBMCS) via the United States message text format D670 message. AFATDS can export the United States message text format (USMTF) D670 AIRSUPREQ message as an excel file formatted like a DD Form 1972 (Joint Tactical Air Strike Request), for record keeping or email transmittal. AFATDS possesses limited capabilities to validate suspect targets and should be used with JADOCS for execution of deliberate and dynamic targeting. It is fielded from echelons above corps down to firing battery levels. The AFATDS can link digitally into the artillery and TA channels to achieve a rapid counterfire capability from either ground or air systems. AFATDS can communicate over a variety of networks using standard messaging formats such as variable message format, U.S. message text format, and Link-16. It is interoperable with select coalition partner fire control systems via the artillery systems cooperative agreement protocol. 2-69. The forward observer system is an automated FS system used by commanders, FSEs/FSCOORDs, FSOs, FOs, and surveyors located at or employed remotely from the FS agencies at corps, division, regiment, brigade, squadron, BN, company, battery, troop, and platoon echelons. The forward observer system provides automated decision-making, planning, and execution capability, which provides seamless integration of synchronized and accurate fires into the supported commander's scheme of maneuver. The forward observer system performs automated, calls for fire, fire mission processing, artillery target intelligence, fire planning, clearance of fires, and survey and geometry processing supporting the FA mission. Forward observer system networks with AFATDS which receives its digital messaging using variable message format transmitted on either tactical radio networks or local area networks. JOINT AIR OPERATIONS COMMAND AND CONTROL NETWORKS 2-70. Normally, the joint air operation C2 system will be built around the C2 system of the Service component commander designated as the JFACC. Each Service component has an organic system designed for C2 of their air operations. Those service systems provided are: the Air Force's theater air control system (referred to as TACS), the Army air-ground system (referred to as AAGS), Navy tactical air control system (referred to as NTACS), Marine air command and control system (referred to as MACCS) and the special operations air-ground system (referred to as SOAGS). When all elements of the theater air control system, Army air-ground system, NTACS, MACCS hierarchy, and SOAGS integrate, the entire system is labeled the
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The Fire Support System theater air-ground system (referred to as TAGS). For more information on joint air operations and control networks see JP 3-30. SECTION II – FIRE SUPPORT SYSTEM – TARGET ACQUISITION 2-71. Success in battle relies heavily on the ability to accurately identify, locate, and attack HPTs. This calls for rapid and accurate target development, TA, and post-strike assessment. FS planners and FSCOORDs work closely with intelligence personnel and the FAIO to identify TA requirements and focus on detecting HPTs. As an element of the FS system, Target Acquisition is the detection, identification, and location of a target in sufficient detail to permit effective employment of capabilities that create the required effects (JP 3- 60). Staffs evaluate target information from all sources and route it to the appropriate supporting commands. This includes information from all echelons and from adjacent and supporting elements. A target is an entity or object that performs a function for the threat considered for possible engagement or other action (JP 3-60). 2-72. Target acquisition is conducted in accordance with the five principles of the law of war/law of armed conflict to permit the effective employment of weapons. TA can occur at numerous points along the execution timeline and at all levels of command, including the attack and deliver system performing the final attack (for more information see JP 3-09). The target engagement authority utilizes information collection, TA assets and NAI/TAIs to detect and engage targets. TARGET ENGAGEMENT AUTHORITY 2-73. Engagement authority is an authority vested with a joint force commander that may be delegated to a subordinate commander, that permits an engagement decision (JP 3-01). The authority and responsibility to engage targets rests with the JFC responsible for the AO. The JFC communicates engagement criteria to the force through ROE specific to each AO. The JFC may delegate target engagement authority to subordinate commanders. In large-scale combat operations, especially during the offense, it is critical that Target engagement authority be delegated to the absolute lowest echelon that has the proper resources to identify and attack enemy formations, facilities, and other capabilities in-accordance with the Law of War and established ROE. This empowers agility by entrusting engagement decisions to leaders at the tactical edge. INFORMATION COLLECTION AND TARGET DETECTION 2-74. Target acquisition requirements often comprise a large portion of the overall information collection effort especially when conducting deep operations or employing sophisticated cross domain fires like cyberspace operations. In some cases, especially during large-scale combat operations, units must be prepared to fight in order to acquire targets. The challenges to TA against a peer threat include integrated air defense systems, long-range fires, counter reconnaissance, cyberspace and EW operations, deception operations, and camouflage. Commanders allocate maneuver, fires, and multidomain ISR capabilities to enable TA. For more information on how the staff and intelligence sections overcome collection gaps see FM 2-0. NAMED AREA OF INTEREST TO TARGET AREA OF INTEREST 2-75. To effectively target the enemy, the intelligence and FS staffs develop NAIs and TAIs. The staff also develops an HPTL that can include geographic NAIs and TAIs as well as enemy organizations, networks, and individuals identified as key or critical to the OE and are taken into account in each COA, and branches and sequels. NAIs should not be tied to a specific terrain; rather, they should be based upon the enemy locations or suspected locations. NAIs are used both to confirm or deny an enemy COA and locate HPTs. TAIs cannot exist outside of an NAI as they are both inextricably linked to the commander’s priority information requirements and decision points. For a graphic example of a TAI see figure 2-1. The G-3 tasks ISR assets to observe NAIs and TAIs. * A named area of interest is the geospatial area or systems node or link against which information that will satisfy a specific information requirement can be collected, usually to capture indications of enemy and adversary courses of action (JP 2-0). * A target area of interest is the geographical area where high-value targets can be acquired and engaged by friendly forces (JP 2-0). Not all TAIs (see figure 2-1) will form part of the friendly
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Chapter 2 COA; only TAIs associated with high priority targets are of interest to the commander. These are identified during the COA development and refined during wargaming and the targeting integrating process. TAIs differ from engagement areas (EAs) in degree. EAs plan for the use of all available weapons; TAIs might be engaged by a single weapon and lead to the establishment of geographical targets, to include point, area, and linear, as recorded on the target list worksheet. Figure 2-1. Example of target area of interest TARGET ACQUISITION ASSETS 2-76. Target acquisition capabilities range from visual identification by Soldiers to sophisticated electronic means. Target acquisition is most effective when comprised of complementary and unique collection assets and capabilities across echelons and warfighting functions. The expression of accuracy of TA assets is target location error and is criteria captured by the targeting team on the target selection standards. Target selection standards are criteria applied to enemy activity (acquisitions and battlefield information) and used in deciding whether the activity is a target. Target selection standards put nominations into two categories: targets and suspected targets. Targets must meet accuracy and timeliness requirements for engagement. Suspected targets must be confirmed before any engagement. 2-77. Some of the many possible TA assets include satellites and other national assets, joint ISR systems to include the USAF distributed common ground system, unmanned aircraft system (UAS), WLR, FOs, scouts, and SOF. When planning the TA portion of information collection, it is useful to group those assets into the four primary information collection tasks and missions of reconnaissance, surveillance, security operations, and intelligence operations. For more information on intelligence collection capabilities by command echelon, see FM 2-0. SECTION III – FIRE SUPPORT SYSTEM – ATTACK AND DELIVERY CAPABILITIES 2-78. This section discusses lethal and nonlethal weapon systems capabilities including –
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The Fire Support System * Joint FS surface-to-surface and air-to-surface capabilities. * CEMA. * Space operations. * Information activities. 2-79. For more technical information on joint surface-to-surface and air-to-surface capabilities see ATP 3- 09.32. SURFACE TO SURFACE CAPABILITIES 2-80. Army, Navy, and USMC surface-to-surface indirect fires include cannon, rocket, and missile systems as well as mortars organic to maneuver elements. FA attack/delivery systems provide continuously available fires under all weather conditions, and in all but the most restrictive terrain. FA provides close-support fires to supported forces. FA can perform counterfire, interdiction, suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), and integrate into strike coordination and reconnaissance (SCAR) missions. FA employs a wide range of munitions, to include long range precision and near precision munitions that provide all-weather precision strike capability at great distances. FA support can range from tactical fires in a company AO to strategic fires across combatant command boundaries. Units must be cognizant that FA units have inherent limitations. These limitations include: * A firing signature that makes the unit vulnerable to detection by enemy TA assets. * Limited self-defense capability against ground and air attacks. * Limited ability to adequately engage moving targets. ROCKETS AND MISSILES 2-81. The multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) and High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) supplements cannon artillery by delivering a large volume of fires in a very short period of time against HPTs at increasingly greater ranges. MLRS/HIMARS is used for counterfire and deliberate attacks against enemy air defense, light materiel, and personnel targets. The all-weather MLRS/HIMARS fires free-flight and guided rockets and missiles. Free-flight or guided rocket options include warheads with either unitary high- explosive or dual-purpose improved conventional munitions or alternate warhead munitions such as the Global Positioning System Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) – alternate warhead. 2-82. The GMLRS conventional and alternate warheads provide commanders with increased accuracy and much greater range. The extended range GMLRS will double the range of the current capability. Their extremely high altitude of delivery (apex of missile trajectory, maximum ordinate) requires close coordination with air planners and liaisons to ensure aircraft are not in the vicinity during launches and descents. 2-83. The Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) provides long-range, fire support. ATACMSs are fired from an MLRS/HIMARS platform and may consist of antipersonnel/antimaterial submunitions or a unitary high-explosive warhead. The ATACMS retains the responsiveness of rockets, though it possesses a much greater range. The ATACMS antipersonnel/antimaterial warhead is designed to engage soft targets and the unitary high-explosive warhead is designed to engage fixed infrastructure. Due to the range and altitude of the ATACMS, target engagements require detailed airspace coordination and integration. For more information on MLRS/HIMARS and ATACMS, see ATP 3-09.60. 2-84. The Precision Strike Missile is a surface-to-surface long range missile fired from MLRS/HIMARS systems with greater range and lethality. This missile will be able to attack targets on the ground or at sea and will be a key capability used to penetrate and disintegrated adversary A2/AD capabilities. 2-85. The U.S. Navy Tomahawk is an all-weather, long-range, subsonic cruise missile used for deep land attack warfare, launched from U.S. Navy surface ships and submarines. The Tomahawk conventional variant adds the capability to reprogram the missile while in-flight via two-way satellite communications to strike any of fifteen pre-programmed alternate targets or redirect the missile to any Global Positioning System (GPS) target coordinates.
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Chapter 2 CANNON ARTILLERY AND MORTARS 2-86. Cannon artillery can perform close support of maneuver, counterfire, interdiction, obscuration, and SEAD at increasingly extended ranges which will allow these systems to strike operationally or strategically relevant targets. Cannon artillery provides near immediate response times, 24-hour availability, and 6400 mil coverage. Cannon artillery offers area and precision fires, such as the Excalibur and precision guidance kit (referred to as PGK). The Excalibur is a precision-guided, extended-range, 155-millimeter (mm) high- explosive cannon artillery projectile with an integrated global-positioning system that utilizes an inertial navigation system (INS) guidance and unitary warhead. It provides artillery capabilities in urban areas and restrictive terrain, while minimizing collateral damage. The precision guided kit is a trajectory-correcting fuse kit compatible with standard 155mm munitions. It operates in all weather conditions, engages targets with increased accuracy, and has a near-vertical terminal trajectory. The replacement for dual purpose improved conventional munition, is the cannon-delivered area effects munitions. Until this is fielded, units plan on utilizing the Bonus Mk 2 projectile currently in use by unified action partners. The projectile carries two sensor-fuzed munitions expelled during flight that detect and attack armored vehicles from above. 2-87. Extended range cannon artillery will provide increased lethality, and range, to provide the division commander with overmatch and accuracy. Its increased rate of fire will provide the capability to mass fires at specific points and, to strike targets in the division deep area in order to shape for BCTs. 2-88. Organic mortars are organized as platoons in maneuver and ranger BNs and as sections in Stryker and infantry BCT rifle companies. Mortars are high-angle, relatively short-range, high rate-of-fire, area fire weapons. Their mobility makes them well suited for close support of maneuver. Mortars can also be used for final protective fire (FPF), obscuration, and illumination. For more information on mortars see TC 3-22.90. NAVAL SURFACE FIRE SUPPORT 2-89. Naval surface fire support is fire provided by Navy surface gun and missile systems in support of a unit or units (JP 3-09.3). When supporting an amphibious assault, the commander, amphibious task force, prepares the overall NSFS plan. In general, the mission of NSFS units in an amphibious assault is to support the assault by destroying or neutralizing shore installations that oppose the approach of ships and aircraft and to deliver fires against enemy forces that may oppose the landing force, including its post-landing advance. 2-90. When the number of ships permits, individual ships will be assigned as DS to BNs conducting an amphibious assault. The DS mission establishes the priority in which the ship will process calls for supporting fire and the anticipated zone of fire (ZF). The ship delivers fires on planned targets and targets of opportunity in the ZF, which normally corresponds to the zone of action of the supported unit. The GS mission requires an NSFS ship to support the force, or that portion of the force assigned to the ship, by attacking targets in the ZF. 2-91. Limitations of naval surface fire support include the observer must remain abreast of the gun-target- line relationship because the characteristic flat trajectory of naval gunfire results in a pronounced dispersion pattern along the gun target line (referred to as the GTL) range dispersion. The flat trajectory and high muzzle velocity of naval gunfire make the adjustment of naval gunfire difficult, particularly on flat terrain. The fall of shot of naval gunfire can be described as a narrow, elongated pattern as seen along the gun-target-line. The size of the pattern varies with range. AIR TO SURFACE CAPABILITIES 2-92. Fixed-Wing Aircraft. Fixed-wing aircraft provide flexibility, range, speed, lethality, precision, and the ability to mass fires at a desired time and place. Fixed wing aircraft support the joint fires tasks of strategic attack, countering air and missile threats (including SEAD and offensive counterair), and interdiction. Fixed- wing aircraft provide joint FS with AI, CAS, airborne C2, ISR, SCAR, SEAD, and FAC(A). The capacity of aircraft to deliver precision-guided munitions limits collateral damage. Also, aircraft may provide real-time attack assessment. * Air interdiction is air operations to perform interdiction conducted at such distances from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required (JP 3-03).
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The Fire Support System * Close air support is air action by aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces and that require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces (JP 3-09.3). * Strike coordination and reconnaissance is an air mission to detect targets and coordinate or perform attack or reconnaissance on those targets. (JP 3-03). SCAR missions are flown in a specific geographic area and are an element of the C2 interface to coordinate multiple flights, detect and attack targets, neutralize enemy air defenses, and provide battle damage assessment (BDA). * Suppression of enemy air defenses is activity that neutralizes, destroys, or temporarily degrades surface-based enemy air defenses by destructive and/or disruptive means (JP 3-01). 2-93. Rotary-wing aircraft can employ a variety of weapons, including precision-guided weapons beyond line of sight. They can quickly reach and move throughout the depth and breadth of the battlefield. This mobility and flexibility help the commander seize or retain the initiative. They can also provide terminal guidance for other weapon platforms, as well as operate during periods of limited visibility. The US Army normally employs attack helicopters as maneuver units to conduct two basic types of attack missions: attacks against enemy forces in close, friendly contact with other Army maneuver forces and attacks against enemy forces out of direct fire contact with friendly forces. Both can be executed as either hasty or deliberate attacks and are typically supported with integrated joint fires. This type of attack requires detailed planning and the full integration of manned and unmanned aircraft (UA), and the simultaneous or sequential employment of CAS, indirect fires, and other enabling capabilities to mass effects, isolate, and destroy key enemy forces and capabilities. U.S. Army attack helicopters can also perform CAS in support of another component. The USMC employs its attack rotary-wing aviation primarily as a CAS platform. For more information on Army fixed-wing aircraft and attack helicopters see ATP 3-09.32. 2-94. In addition to Army aviation responsibilities during SCAR, tactical level maneuver commanders can employ a method similar to the SCAR - a coordinated attack interdiction mission in which the ground maneuver commander plans/coordinates/employs a coordinated attack using supporting CAS, Attack Aviation, UAS, and artillery against HPTs and targets of opportunity inside the ATO cycle planning horizon and in close proximity to friendly forces (examples include EAs, enemy penetrations, and Level III threats in a rear area). This method, previously referred to as a joint air attack team or JAAT is a capability a tactical maneuver commander retains to ensure they can integrate rotary wing and fixed wing aircraft, supported by other fire support attack/delivery platforms (artillery, CEMA, NSFS, mortars) to locate and attack targets of opportunity in the close fight. 2-95. In situations such as this, the maneuver commander can designate the Army aviation commander with the highest situational awareness and ability to provide C2 as the on-scene commander (usually the Air Mission Commander). The on-scene commander is an individual in the immediate vicinity of an isolating event who temporarily assumes command of the incident (JP 3-50). The commander will coordinate directly with the appropriate tactical maneuver HQ FSE and FAC(A)/JTAC to execute the attack. The aviation commander designated as the on-scene commander temporarily assumes command of the coordinated attack. This method can be employed anywhere on the battlefield (including the rear area), across the range of military operations. CAS procedures may or may not be required depending on the proximity to friendly forces. Maximum synergy occurs when the on-scene commander of the coordinated attack possesses the authority to coordinate the attack directly with the other team members. When CAS is not available, direct attack coordination is more efficient because there is no requirement for JTAC/FAC(A) control. 2-96. The long endurance of UA enables them to provide extended support to time sensitive targets (TST), high-value targets, and HPT missions. UA can also support or conduct CAS, SCAR, AI, and other joint fires missions. Specific tasks for the UA may include TA and marking, terminal guidance of ordnance, providing precision coordinates for GPS-aided munitions, delivery of onboard precision-guided ordnance, BDA, signals intelligence, communication/data relays, and retargeting to include shoot-look-shoot. UA should be requested, tasked, routed, controlled, and deconflicted in a manner similar to methods used for fixed-winged and rotary-winged manned aircraft, with exceptions made for their unmanned nature (such as the inability to see and avoid other air traffic). When the necessary equipment, network, and personnel are included it becomes a UAS. For more information on UAS employment see ATP 3-04.1.
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Chapter 2 STANDOFF WEAPONS 2-97. A standoff weapon is a medium-range, precision-guided, air to-surface glide weapon employing a variety of munitions that can be employed against land and sea targets. It is a launch-and-leave weapon that employs a GPS-aided INS and is capable of day, night, and adverse weather operations. Standoff weapons provide an ability to engage targets at extended ranges while minimizing the risk to friendly forces. Some examples of air-to-surface standoff capabilities include: * The Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (referred to as JASSM) and its extended-range variant, which are air-launched, low-observable, subsonic cruise missiles specifically designed to penetrate air defense systems. The missiles incorporate GPS-aided INS guidance with an infrared seeker in the terminal phase of flight. Optimizing JASSM's full-precision and low-observable capabilities requires prior coordination with both strike units and target intelligence agencies. * The small diameter bomb (referred to as SDB), which is an air-launched, precision guided, glide weapon. It provides strike aircraft with high-loadout, all-weather, autonomous, standoff-attack capability outside of point defenses. SDB increment I provides precision capability through a GPS-aided INS against fixed targets, while SDB increment II incorporates a GPS-aided INS and additional tri-mode seeker, optimized for engaging fixed, relocatable, moving targets, at any time of day and in adverse weather conditions. CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS 2-98. Cyberspace operations are the employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace (JP 3-0). Both the offensive cyberspace operations and defensive cyberspace operations-response action missions may rise to the level of use of force, where physical damage or destruction of enemy systems require use of fires in cyberspace. offensive cyberspace operations are intended to project power by the application of force in and through cyberspace and defensive cyberspace operations-response action uses defensive measures, including fires, outside the defended network to protect it. 2-99. Cyberspace attack are actions taken in and through cyberspace that create denial (i.e., degradation, disruption, or destruction) or manipulation effects in cyberspace and are considered a form of fires (JP 3-12). 2-100. Cyberspace attack actions are a form of fires, are taken as part of an offensive cyberspace operations or defensive cyberspace operations-response action mission, are coordinated with other USG departments and agencies, and are carefully synchronized with planned fires in the physical domains. For more information on CEMA see FM 3-12. SPACE OPERATIONS 2-101. Many lethal and nonlethal fires capabilities depend on space capabilities to support, integrate, and deliver fires. Army space capabilities are integrated throughout the fires warfighting function, providing robust and reliable planning, contributing to target development, and providing positioning, navigation, and timing, satellite communications, imagery, geolocation, weather, and terrain capabilities. 2-102. As a FS attack/delivery capability, space control operations that create a desired effect on enemy space systems across all domains by employing a variety of measures to assure the use of space and attribute enemy attacks. These include terrestrial fires to defend space operations and assets. A capability for, or employment of, fires may deter threats and/or contain and de-escalate a crisis. 2-103. When deliberate, nonlethal FS attack/delivery capabilities are directed into the space domain, they must be coordinated between the affected combatant commands if time permits. By honoring the boundaries of the space domain, CCDRs help preserve space situational awareness, spacecraft life span, and space system performance. For more information on space operations see JP 3-14. Space domain is the area above the altitude where atmospheric effects on airborne objects become negligible (JP 3-14).
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The Fire Support System INFORMATION 2-104. Army forces integrate all relevant military capabilities through the execution of five information activities (enable, protect, inform, influence, and attack). An information activity is a collection of tasks linked by purpose to affect how humans and automated systems derive meaning from, use, and act upon, or are influenced by, information (ADP 3-13). Each information activity incorporates several tasks and subtasks from the warfighting functions to achieve a variety of friendly and threat-based objectives. The five information activities are as follows: * Enable. * Protect. * Inform. * Influence. * Attack. 2-105. The fires warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that create and converge effects in all domains against the threat to enable operations across the range of military operations. These tasks and systems create lethal and nonlethal effects delivered from Army, joint, and multinational forces. The fires warfighting function contributes to the enable, protect, influence, and attack information activities. 2-106. The fires warfighting function contributes to enabling the exercise of C2 through the targeting process. The delivery of fires contributes to protecting data and information, affecting threat C2 targets, and influencing target audiences. Through the targeting process, commanders identify, select, and prioritize targets and match the appropriate capability (or delivery platform) to targets to create desired effects. This includes identifying and attacking enemy C2 nodes, information systems, radars, ground control stations, and sensors to affect the enemy’s decision cycle. Capabilities used to attack these targets range from cannons, rockets, and missiles to offensive cyberspace operations, electromagnetic attack, and offensive space operations. See ADP 3-19 for more information on the fires warfighting function. See ADP 3-13 for more information on information and information activities. DECEPTION 2-107. Army forces support or conduct three types of deception, military deception, tactical deception, deception in support of operations security. 2-108. Deception applies to all levels of warfare, across the range of military operations, and is conducted during all phases of military operations. Physical attack/destruction can support military deception by shaping an enemy's intelligence collection capability through destroying or nullifying selected ISR capabilities or sites. Attacks can mask the main effort from the enemy. When properly integrated with operations security and other information activities, deception can be a decisive tool in altering how the enemy views, analyzes, decides, and acts in response to friendly military operations. For more information on Army support to military deception, tactical deception, and deceptions in support of operations security see ADP 3-13 and FM 3-90.
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Chapter 3 Fire Support and the Operations Process This chapter further discusses FS in the Operations Process in detail. Section 1 further explains the four FS functions. Section II describes key FS processes and procedures (as an element of C2) and the principles of FS planning and coordination. Section III describes FS preparation, primarily rehearsals. Section IV discusses the principles of FS execution (AWIFM-N). Section V discusses operational and combat assessment as they relate to FS. β€œThe artillery was my strongest tool. I repeatedly said it was more a matter of the infantry supporting the artillery than the artillery supporting the infantry…. I wish I knew the countless times that positions were taken or held due solely to TOT’s ….” –Major General R.O. Barton, US 4th Infantry Division World War II SECTION I – FIRE SUPPORT FUNCTIONS 3-1. The four functions of FS are the basic requirements the FS system must fulfill to destroy, neutralize, or suppress the enemy. The basic FS functions describe what FS must do and are used as screening criteria during FS planning, rehearsals, and assessment of the overall conduct of the FS system. SUPPORT FORCES IN CONTACT 3-2. The commander must provide responsive FS that ensures freedom of maneuver to forces engaged with the enemy in the close, deep, and rear areas. A force is always in some form of contact. FM 3-90 describes the nine forms of contact as: visual; direct; indirect; non-hostile; obstacles; aircraft; CBRN; electromagnetic, and influence. Units may experience all forms of contact simultaneously. Commanders should assume that friendly forces are always in contact in one or more domains, both during competition and conflict. Peer adversaries or enemies have both the cyberspace and space enabled capabilities to observe friendly forces routinely. 3-3. Throughout large-scale combat operations, FS must: * Provide deep fires to disrupt, delay, and destroy uncommitted enemy forces before they can engage friendly forces. This includes enemy A2/AD, CPs, airfields, air defense artillery (ADA), missiles, bridges and logistical infrastructure. * Plan counterfire to destroy, neutralize, or suppress the enemy's indirect fire weapon systems. It Includes counterbattery and countermortar fire. * Provide close supporting fires. Close support is action of the supporting force against targets or objectives that are sufficiently near the supported force as to require detailed integration or coordination of the supporting action with fire, movement, or other actions of the supported force (JP 3-31). These fires are used to engage enemy troops, weapons, or positions that are threatening or can threaten the force in either the offense or defense. They allow the commander to multiply combat power effects. Close support expands the battlefield depth, erodes enemy forces, and inflicts damage well beyond direct fire ranges. * Provide fires to suppress known enemy air defense weapons immediately before and during flight by friendly aircraft within the AO. * Provide fires in support of rear area operations.
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Chapter 3 SUPPORT THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 3-4. The FS system responds to the supported commander's plan through the scheme of fires, with integration and delivery of proactive, timely, and accurate FS. The concept of operations is a statement that directs the manner in which subordinate units cooperate to accomplish the mission and establishes the sequence of actions the force will use to achieve the end state (ADP 5-0). 3-5. The supported commander must retain direct control over sufficient firepower to influence the battle by attacking HPTs. Of particular concern to the supported commander in large-scale combat operations is counterfire, SEAD, deep fires, and support of rear area operations. SYNCHRONIZE AND CONVERGE FIRE SUPPORT (LETHAL AND NONLETHAL) ACROSS ALL DOMAINS 3-6. Synchronization is the arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time (JP 2-0). It is essential that FS planning is performed concurrently with the development of the scheme of maneuver and unit airspace plan. Synchronization must occur within the FS system itself and with the other dynamics of combat power. 3-7. FS must be synchronized with other joint force activities to include air operations, cyberspace operations, ISR functions, special operations, personnel recovery, and information related activities to optimize limited resources and avoid friendly fire incidents. Synchronization of FS is primarily done through the Army’s targeting process decide, detect, deliver, and assess and the joint targeting cycle. Tactical and technical rehearsals of the FS plan are also key to synchronization of FS across all domains. Successful use of this methodology helps attack the right target with the best weapon at the right time. SUSTAIN AND PROTECT THE FIRE SUPPORT SYSTEM 3-8. Sustainment is a central, potentially decisive aspect of ensuring the FS system functions effectively; additionally, it is an essential component of the endurance tenet of multidomain operations and as such leaders should strive to integrate it into all FS plans and operations (see table 3-1 on page 3-13). It is not a separate function or afterthought. Sustainment is the provision of logistics, financial management, personnel services, and health service support necessary to maintain operations until successful mission completion (ADP 4-0). FS and FA planners must enable sustainment operations to ensure all elements of the FS system can continuously and rapidly integrate FS in all domains and ensure proper personnel services and health support. Ammunition, fuel, food, water, maintenance, transportation, and medical support are all critical to sustaining the FS system. 3-9. FS planners must also ensure proper protection measures are executed to ensure survivability of CPs, personnel, networks, TA, and attack/delivery systems. Protection is the preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the boundaries of a given operational area (JP 3-0). The FSCOORD, who is also a commander, is responsible for providing the leadership that ensures that the FS system is sustained, protected, and can support the operation. FSCOORD identifies sustainment and protection requirements associated with all the elements of the FS system and takes necessary actions to ensure that they are satisfied. The FSCOORD plans and monitors logistics readiness and training within the command and ensures that subordinate leaders understand and use external sustainment resources to the best effect. The FSCOORD ensures that coordination is made with supporting sustainment and protection elements outside the command. SUSTAINMENT 3-10. The FSCOORD must ensure the following: * Formulate tactical plans to reflect logistics limitations and to exploit logistics capabilities. * Stocks and supplies are properly positioned to sustain FS systems. In large-scale combat operations, this is particularly critical for FA systems because of the high tonnage of munitions.
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Fire Support and the Operations Process * Weapon systems and all other equipment are maintained in a high state of readiness and sustainment systems are properly understood and used. * Strict controls and priorities on supplies are employed to ensure strength at the decisive point. While fire support plans help determine a required supply rate. Required supply rate is the amount of ammunition expressed in terms of rounds per weapon per day for ammunition items fired by weapons, in terms of other units of measure per day for bulk allotment, and other items estimated to be required to sustain operations of any designated force without restriction for a specified period (ATP 3-09.23). They must be adjusted to conform to the controlled supply rate (CSR). Controlled supply rate is the rate of ammunition consumption that can be supported, considering availability, facilities, and transportation. It is expressed rounds per unit, individual, or vehicle per day (ATP 3-09.23). The FSCOORD must identify and mitigate the risk in the gap between the required supply rate and CSR. The FSCOORD advised by their staffs will determine an appropriate CSR and how supplies will be distributed to achieve their assigned mission. * Develop and communicate clear logistical requirements to supporting sustainment elements. FA personnel must ensure that logistics personnel understand the types and amounts of ammunition required to support each phase of an operation. Properly submitting required logistical status reports is critical to this effort. FA units must identify and maintain situational awareness of their and the supporting logistical units’ ammunition haul capacity. At times, FA units may be required to draw ammunition in excess of their CSR for a specific requirement such as a preparation. The additional haul capacity will also need to be forecasted. In this case, ammunition may be issued for immediate consumption and is considered expended when issued. * Synchronize combat configured loads to support the current and future fires plans informed by the FS planning and coordination process. Combat configured loads are preplanned packages of ammunition transported as a single unit for routine resupply, yet flexible enough to provide for a variety of operations. * Resupply triggers across all classes of supply are aligned against essential field artillery tasks (EFATs) and are understood by the unit's sustainment personnel. * Ensure adequate reconstitution operations are planned and rehearsed for the FS System. PROTECTION 3-11. The FSCOORD must ensure the following: * Additional force protection resources (air defense, engineer, military police, maneuver, and aviation assets) are dedicated or designated as needed. Consider the use of multinational capabilities whose national caveats allow defensive actions, but not offensive actions. (See table 3-1 on page 3-13). * Subsequent firing positions for FA units are prepared before the operation, if possible. * All elements of the FS system take action to counter the enemy's firepower and maneuver by ensuring that personnel, equipment, and systems are difficult to locate, strike, and destroy using dispersion, decoys, camouflage, and frequent survivability moves. * Deception is employed to mislead the enemy (see FM 3-13.4). * Communication networks are protected, resilient, and redundant. * Conduct appropriate adjacent unit coordination for mutual support opportunities. * Engineers provide survivability and mobility assets for radars and firing units. * Plan and coordinate for opportunity surveillance by manned and unmanned air platforms as well as maneuver forces transiting the area to include routes, position areas artillery and CPs. * Ensure protection battle drills are developed and rehearsed to account for reaction to enemy air, ground, CBRN, indirect fire, jamming, or CEMA attacks. * Coordinate for and utilize handheld UASs to recon and surveil NAIs developed for protection. TECHNICAL SUPPORT OF THE NETWORK 3-12. The FSCOORD must ensure the following:
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Chapter 3 * Establish the communications priorities, primary, alternate, contingency and emergency (PACE) plan. * C2 (CPs, people, processes, and networks) is redundant where possible. * FS personnel are well trained and proficient with analog and digital systems, and training must be continuous. Ensure unit digital sustainment training is planned, resourced, and emphasized at command levels. * Develop and utilize a detailed digital standard operating procedure (SOP). * FS meteorology, survey, and communications are accurate, redundant, and timely. * Request additional communications support if needed. SECTION II – PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES 3-13. As discussed in chapter 2, processes and procedures are a component of the overall C2 system. The primary FS processes are targeting, FS planning and coordination, and the MDMP process. It is important to understand that all these processes occur continuously and simultaneously with the overall operations process (see table 3-1 on page 3-13). Two critical FS procedures that all FS planners must understand and integrate into the operations process are SEAD and counterfire. Since these are so critical, they are described up front in this section. For more detail on SEAD refer to JP 3-01. For more information on counterfire see ATP 3- 09.12. SUPPRESSION OF ENEMY AIR DEFENSES 3-14. Army SEAD operations are designed to support operational and tactical plans by protecting Army aviation assets near the forward line of own troops (FLOT) or during cross-FLOT operations. SEAD also includes the protection of air component aircraft (such as CAS aircraft) supporting the ground commander's operation. The basic principle of Army SEAD operations is see-kill. This means that enemy air defense systems are attacked immediately upon detection, consistent with the commander's intent and the best application of resources. SEAD fire planning can be conducted and coordinated at division level or higher and may involve other services. For more information on countering air and missile threats see JP 3-01. TARGETING AND SYNCHRONIZATION 3-15. The targeting process for SEAD is the same as for any other target set: it is conducted within the intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE) framework; it leverages the decide, detect, deliver, and assess process; and it must support the four FS functions identified in CH 1. The synchronization of SEAD is even more critical and difficult than the synchronization of FS for ground maneuver forces because of the time sensitivity of air operations. The responsibilities for SEAD targeting and synchronization run across the corps and division staff sections and are directed through the FSE. The FSCOORD manages and directs the corps or division SEAD effort. 3-16. SEAD objectives are specified by the JFC, who will consider the unique capabilities of each component to contribute to counterair operations. Counterair is a mission at the theater level that integrates offensive and defensive operations to attain and maintain a desired degree of control of the air and protection by neutralizing or destroying enemy aircraft and missiles, both before and after launch (JP 3-01). Traditionally, there are three categories of SEAD (AO-/joint operations area-wide joint air defense system suppression, localized suppression, and opportune suppression), each of which reduces friendly attrition from an adversary's air defense system and creates more favorable conditions for friendly air operations. For each category, there are two means of executing SEAD, destructive and disruptive. AIR COMPONENT CAPABILITIES 3-17. SEAD assets are often used in conjunction with other air operations such as AI, offensive counterair, attack operations, and airborne operations when surface air defenses are a factor. Specially trained aircrew and specially equipped aircraft are designed for SEAD missions, especially against an enemy integrated air defense system (IADS). SEAD dedicated aircraft are normally equipped with special electronic detection and EA equipment capabilities (directed energy, antiradiation missiles, electromagnetic jamming, flares, chaff,
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Fire Support and the Operations Process and decoys). SEAD assets may be scarce and categorized as high demand/low-density assets. Thus, during large-scale combat operations, they usually will not be tasked for missions without a SEAD requirement. Other fighter-attack and multi-role fighter crews normally are trained to support the SEAD mission, especially against the enemy air defense infrastructure. SURFACE COMPONENT CAPABILITIES 3-18. Based on the JFC guidance, the land and maritime surface components' fires cells and FSEs will determine the weapon systems available to conduct SEAD. Examples of these capabilities include FA, mortars, naval surface fire, attack helicopters, EW, and surface-to-surface missiles (referred to as SSMs). To ensure unity of effort and conservation of force, components need to coordinate SEAD activities within their AO with the JFACC to ensure they meet mission requirements and do not interfere with other planned operations. The BCD can assist localized suppression operations by coordinating the means to request surface FS. A rapid and free exchange of SEAD target information between the JFACC and Army commanders is required for effective surface suppression. THREAT 3-19. Air defense threats can encompass many national or multinational systems normally integrated into an IADS. Adversaries' IADS have become increasingly complex and can differ widely from country to country in terms of organization, sophistication, and operational procedures. An adversary's IADS needs to be analyzed in-depth for strengths and weaknesses, especially seams in coverage. The goal is to identify target critical capabilities and vulnerabilities, C2 reliability/redundancy, and defensive weapons systems. SEAD operations target the HPTs of an IADS: * C2 nodes/centers. * Surface-to-air missile sites. * Surface-to-air missile carriers and storage bunkers. * Antiaircraft artillery. * Early warning and fire control radars and ground control intercept sites. * Air defense operations and maintenance personnel. * Naval air defense assets. * Directed energy weapons. * EW systems. 3-20. SEAD operations are accomplished through denial, degradation, destruction, and disruption. * Denial eliminates the utility of an enemy's targeted system, usually without physical damage. Denial prevents an enemy from acquiring accurate information about friendly forces. * Degradation permanently impairs (partially or totally) the enemy's targeted systems, usually with physical damage. Degradation may confuse or delay the actions of an enemy. * Destruction seeks the destruction of the target system or operating personnel. * Disruption temporarily denies, degrades, delays, or neutralizes enemy surface air defense systems. ο‚§ Means include offensive cyberspace operations, EA, and tactics such as avoidance or evasive flight profiles. ο‚§ UA can be used to actively employ disruptive means. COUNTERFIRE 3-21. Like friendly FS systems, threat FS systems can inflict serious damage on friendly maneuver forces, FS systems, and supporting infrastructure; therefore, the enemy's FS system must be acquired and eliminated. Counterfire contributes to the combined arms fight by providing fires against the enemy integrated fires complex; it protects friendly forces, combat functions, and facilities from enemy indirect fires by neutralizing, or destroying enemy weapons, TA assets, observers (to include special purpose forces), C2 facilities, and communications and logistics sites. Counterfire gains freedom of maneuver for all friendly forces.
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Chapter 3 Counterfire is tied to current and future operations and is part of the overall combined arms fight to achieve fire superiority. 3-22. In large-scale combat operations, the corps commander is responsible for counterfire throughout the depth of the corps AO. They determine the best way to protect the corps combat forces and to defeat, delay, or disrupt the threat array. This estimate or analysis includes an assessment of the counterfire capabilities of the corps and its subordinate divisions. For more information on corps operations see ATP 3-92. The corps commander's counterfire responsibilities include the following: * Segmenting the battlefield by delineating maneuver boundaries and assigning areas of responsibility for corps and its subordinate divisions. This helps establish the delineation of counterfire responsibilities within the corps zone. * Assigning missions and responsibilities, to include specific requirements to information collection assets through the collection manager. * Allocating resources. Corps assets may be retained at corps or allocated to subordinate divisions. Conversely, in some situations, the corps commander may require the use of division assets to support a corps counterfire responsibility. They should provide guidance for use of certain critical assets such as the any corps aviation assets, AI, ISR capabilities, SOF, and CEMA resources. * Requesting additional TA and attack/delivery systems from theater or JTF level or from other joint HQ. * Detecting and attacking. The corps detects and attacks targets within its AOR, the corps also may attack targets within a division AO when the division has forwarded such a request to corps based on priority and need. Within its capability, the corps may respond to requests for additional fires from adjacent units. * Assessing. Finally, the corps commander must assess the protection of his combat units and the effects of counterfire against threat fire support systems. As appropriate, commander adjusts information collection and/or attack priorities for protection of his force and attack of enemy targets. Commander may reallocate assets and modify the missions of subordinate units. 3-23. The corps commander decides how the corps will conduct counterfire operations. They influence how subordinate division commanders fight through the allocation of corps assets, the issuance of attack guidance, and the identification of corps HPTs. The corps commander can support a division commander's counterfire efforts by attacking threat fire support systems at depth; by setting the conditions division counterfire fight. In addition to allocating assets to divisions, the corps commander can further support a division counterfire fight by responding to the division requests with AI, MLRS, CEMA, and EW. With respect to counterfire in the division AO, the corps commander: * Assigns missions to division and corps fire support assets and delineates their areas of responsibility by establishing boundaries. * Detects and attacks targets forwarded by the division. As appropriate, the corps, after coordinating with the division FSE, may attack threat fire support targets within the division zone by massing fires to achieve required effects. Procedures for attacking threat systems firing from across boundaries also must be coordinated. * Task-organizes and allocates assets based on the commander's intent and the mission variables of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations, each of which have informational considerations (METT-TC (I)), the corps commander can give the divisions' added assets for detection and attack of threat fire support. Most often, corps provides non divisional FA delivery assets to augment DIVARTY fire support capabilities. This can be done by either of the following actions: * Assigning a FAB, a support relationship of R or GSR to a DIVARTY. * Attaching the FAB to the division requiring augmentation. The FAB is normally further attached to the DIVARTY. 3-24. Typically, most of the reactive counterfire fight takes place within the division AO. Most of the threat active fire support systems are in this area. The responsibilities of the division commander mirror those of the corps commander. Although his assets are fewer in number and variety, the division commander does have organic TA, target processing, and delivery assets to conduct counterfire. The FSCOORD for the
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Fire Support and the Operations Process division is responsible for orchestrating the division counterfire effort. When a FAB from corps is available to the division, the DIVARTY commander may assign it the counterfire role. Responsibility for the execution of the division counterfire effort, however, remains with the DIVARTY commander. PROACTIVE COUNTERFIRE 3-25. Proactive counterfire is the specific targeting of enemy indirect fire systems including their C2, sensors, platforms, and logistics before they engage friendly forces. The goal of proactive counterfire is to identify, locate, and attack to eliminate the enemy's strike capability before it can impact friendly operations. The proactive measures consist of zone management, site analysis, and position survivability considerations. The proactive counterfire process begins with targeting and continues throughout the operation. The G-2 and the targeting officer develop named areas of interest and target areas of interest where the enemy indirect fire assets are expected. Rocket BNs from the FAB and AI aircraft normally perform the bulk of proactive counterfire in support of division operations, using TA and fires as well as allocated, joint, national, or multinational assets to acquire and disable attack components of the enemy's strike capability. Examples of target sets include cannon, rocket, and missile delivery units, prepared launch sites, artillery ammunition storage facilities, FDCs, counterfire radars, FOs, fixed or rotary wing airfields and fire support communication infrastructure. Information collection assets must be synchronized and integrated to accurately locate targets; and attack assets (such as artillery, mortars, CAS, attack helicopters, naval surface fire support, and CEMA) must be dedicated against the threat total FS system. Considerations for conducting proactive counterfire include: * All available artillery units participate. * Integrate all available joint FS attack/delivery systems. * Requires augmentation by Army and joint collection assets to locate and accurately target the enemy indirect fire systems. * The G-2/S-2 typically has a leading role in managing this effort; intelligence feeds into common ground station and cross-cueing radars and UAS are critical. * Establishing digital interface between the MLRS/HIMARS and cannon FA BN S-2s and the S- 2/liaisons is critical. * Making maximum use of permissive FSCMs to facilitate the clearance of fires; for example, in defense the fire support coordination line (FSCL) may be positioned close to friendly troops to facilitate quick engagements. * Managing no-fire areas (NFAs) that protect SOF, long-range surveillance detachments, reconnaissance troops, and scouts is critical. * Use of AFATDS to clear fires should be maximized. * Establishing radar zones as required. REACTIVE COUNTERFIRE 3-26. Reactive counterfire provides immediate indirect and joint fires to neutralize, destroy, and suppress enemy indirect fire weapons once acquired. The FS system responds primarily to enemy mortar and artillery fires during or immediately following enemy engagement of friendly forces. Reactive counterfire usually requires quick response capabilities for optimum effectiveness and can benefit from the establishment of quick-fire channels. 3-27. FA units employ a variety of counterfire acquisition assets to accurately locate enemy indirect fire assets as they are engaging friendly forces establishing sensor-to-shooter links to attack the enemy systems. Ensure that the mission fired report and artillery target intelligence is sent to the all-source analysis section. Other key considerations for conducting reactive counterfire include airspace clearance, the use of both permissive FSCMs that facilitate quick engagements and restrictive measures such as NFAs to protect critical assets, establishing quick-fire channels with sensor-to-shooter links, and designating radar zone managers.
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Chapter 3 THE COUNTERFIRE IMPERATIVES 3-28. Nested with the FS planning, coordination, and execution principles are the 10 counterfire imperatives. These 10 imperatives are a good tool to use in assessing and coordinating the overall counterfire fight. * Provide commander's intent and guidance to enable counterfire operations and scheme of fire in support of the commander's objectives. Counterfire planning begins during the MDMP and continues throughout the targeting process feeding the targeting working group, targeting decision board, and information collection plan. Commander's guidance (corps, division, BCT) sets the conditions for planning counterfire operations. The commander's guidance must be clear, concise, and easily understood. Whenever commander's guidance for counterfire and targeting is not clearly understood during the planning of an operation, fire support planners should solicit that guidance from the commander. Commanders must include endstate in their planning guidance for counterfire, to promote unity of effort and the integration, and synchronization of available FS and collection assets. Successful counterfire operations may require commanders to accept risk elsewhere while seeking to exploit opportunities. * Develop and execute an information collection plan that supports the targeting and counterfire fight. Successful counterfire operations require proactive and continuous collection and analysis of the enemy FS system. WLRs and collection assets must be prioritized, integrated, and synchronized with counterfire operations. The counterfire officer and the information collection manager at each echelon ensures that TA assets are properly integrated and synchronized into the overall collection and FS plan. The FSCOORD is responsible for positioning FS assets to respond to counterfire requirements. Position radars to support the observation and collection plans considering the enemy FS capabilities and range. Combat assessments, BDA, munition effectiveness assessment (MEA) and reattack criteria will drive intelligence collection requirements for counterfire operations. * Develop a permissive battlefield design using geometries and FSCMs. Using battlefield geometries to delineate the AO between corps and divisions is essential to effective counterfire operations and future planning. Permissive FSCMs allow for maximum use of destructive combat power to facilitate the attack of enemy indirect fire systems, while mitigating the risk to friendly forces. The commander adjusts battlefield geometries and FSCMs as required to keep pace with operations. * Plan and manage terrain and distribute on common graphics (logistics sites, position area for artillery (PAA) - primary and alternate). Ensure FA units and sensors are positioned to support counterfire operations at points of vulnerability such as obstacles, canalizing terrain, bridges or gap crossings. The counterfire HQ is responsible for logistic support and recommends positioning of sensors and counterfire delivery systems and ensures PAA and radar position areas are distributed and common graphics. Plan for primary, alternate, and tertiary PAA and radar position areas. * Plan airspace that allows for responsive counterfire (ACMs/airspace coordination areas/counterair). Close coordination is required to integrate air and space with counterfire operations. Counterfire operations in large-scale combat operations will require high volumes of air and space. ATACMS and guided multiple launch rocket system target engagements will require detailed airspace planning, coordination, and de-confliction. Unit airspace plans must be developed during MDMP and throughout the targeting and operational process to account for counterfire operations. When division-assigned airspace is delegated from the airspace control authority, the JAGIC is the airspace control element serving as the execution node for fires and airspace control. * Designate and resource the counterfire HQ (role/manning/location). Define the FFA HQ role verses counterfire HQ role in the counterfire fight. The corps or division commander can designate the role of the counterfire HQ to a DIVARTY, FAB, or separate FA BN. The DIVARTY can provide the counterfire HQ for the division if task organized with the necessary firing units, sensors, target production section, and TA platoon to coordinate the counterfire fight. FABs can serve as the FFA HQ or the counterfire HQ for a division or corps. Army National Guard FABs are routinely assigned to support the divisions and corps as the counterfire HQ.
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Fire Support and the Operations Process * Develop a sustainment and protection plan for all TA and attack/delivery capabilities. The execution of sustainment operations across all class of supply are critical to counterfire operations. CL V sustainment, haul capability, triggers, required supply rate and CSR are crucial to the counterfire fight. Radar sections do not have the capability to provide force protection for themselves and firing units often need protection augmentation. A protection plan must be developed during MDMP to include engineer support, local force protection to secure movement along main supply and alternate supply routes, short-range air defense, cueing schedules, frequency management, and deception. * Communicate at distance using PACE plans, digital architecture, AFATDS database management, and liaison officers. When conducting counterfire in large-scale combat operations be prepared to operate in a degraded environment. Establish a PACE plan for the analog and digital architectures from sensor to shooter. AFATDS database must be verified and continuously updated to include FSCMs, firing unit data, sensor data, targeting data, and communications architecture. Establish liaison officers at echelon and in adjacent units for cross boundary fires. * Conduct tactical fire direction: Tactical fire direction and firing unit management is key to ensuring responsive fires. During MDMP and the targeting process develop target selection standards and attack guidance that enables rapid decision making and responsive fires. Plan for a dedicated all weather counterfire shooter using hot and cold status. * Maximize radar foundational training strategy. Develop and rehearse the counterfire fight drill from sensor to shooter covering all elements of the PACE plan and all TA resources possible. Develop a weekly digital sustainment program that is focused, and event driven at all echelons. DANGER CLOSE 3-29. Danger close for air-to-surface and surface-to-surface missions is a mandatory call alerting of an elevated risk to the closest friendly troops from the intended point of a weapon’s impact requiring specific procedures for risk mitigation. This is included with the method of engagement when the predicted impact of around or shell is within 600 meters (m) of friendly troops for mortars or artillery and 750 m for naval surface fires. The creeping fire method of adjustment (no adjustment greater than 100 m for mortars/artillery or 200 m for NSFS) will be used exclusively during danger close missions. Do not confuse the creeping fire method with risk-estimate distances or minimum safe distances. See JP 3-09.3 for procedures on air-to-surface danger close engagement. THE TARGETING PROCESS 3-30. The supported commander's FS requirements are continually identified, planned, and executed as part of the targeting process. Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities (JP 3-0). Targeting helps integrate and synchronize FS with other Army and joint functions (C2, intelligence, movement and maneuver, protection, sustainment, and information). The Army targeting process and the joint targeting cycle coordinates and synchronizes fire support to shape enemy forces in the deep area to set conditions for subordinate units. Units use the Army targeting process for their organic systems and the joint targeting cycle for joint systems as appropriate according to organizational echelon. 3-31. The Army targeting process is integrated with the operations process, joint targeting cycle, and the MDMP (see figure 3-1 on page 3-10, and table 3-1 on page 3-13). Targeting occurs continuously throughout an operation. decide, detect, deliver, and assess functions nest with the operations process: planning, preparing, executing, and assessing. Furthermore, Army units that require joint capabilities to conduct shaping operations employ and interface with joint planning and processes, for example, the joint targeting cycle. Therefore, echelons above brigade Army commanders and staffs must understand and interface with both the Army’s decide, detect, deliver, and assess targeting processes, and those processes used within the joint targeting cycle.
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Chapter 3 Figure 3-1. The Army targeting process 3-32. The joint targeting cycle is a six-phase iterative process: commander's objectives, targeting guidance and intent, target development and prioritization, capabilities analysis, commander's decision and force assignment, mission planning and force execution, and combat assessment (see figure 3-2). Steps may occur concurrently, but it provides an essential framework to describe the steps that must be satisfied to conduct joint targeting successfully. To enable joint targeting the JFC establishes a joint targeting coordination board. A joint targeting coordination board is a group formed by the joint force commander to accomplish broad targeting oversight functions that may include, but are not limited to, coordinating targeting information; providing targeting guidance, synchronization, and priorities; and approving the joint integrated prioritized target list (JP 3-60). For more information on the Army targeting process and the joint targeting cycle see FM 3-60 and JP 3-60.
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Fire Support and the Operations Process Figure 3-2. D3A Crosswalk and joint targeting process 3-33. The joint air tasking cycle begins with the JFC's objectives, incorporates guidance received during JFC and component coordination, and culminates with assessment of previous actions. The ATO (see figure 3-3 on page 3-12) articulates the tasking for joint air operations for a specific execution timeframe, normally 24 hours. The joint air tasking cycle is synchronized with the JFC's battle rhythm. The JAOC normally establishes a 72- to 96-hour ATO planning cycle. The battle rhythm articulates briefings, meetings, and report requirements. It provides suspense for targeting, friendly order of battle updates to produce the air battle plan that includes the ATO message and other products. The battle rhythm is essential to ensure information is available when and where required to provide products necessary for the synchronization of joint air operations with the JFC's concept of the operation and supporting other components' operations. Nonetheless, air operations must be responsive to a dynamic OE and the joint air tasking cycle must be flexible and capable of modification during ATO execution. 3-34. The timing of targeting working group sessions is critical. While the time-focus for sessions of the targeting working group is normally 24 to 96 hours out, the employment of assets and certain targeting decisions, such as target nominations and air support requests, and other effects requests must be planned in advance and in conjunction with the division, corps, theater Army, and the joint air tasking cycle. However, commanders must choose a targeting cycle based on the pace of operations. These cycles may be 6-12 hours apart if required. The targeting officer at echelon schedules internal targeting huddles so that lethal and nonlethal effects, to include EW activities related to target nominations, arrive within the BCT and higher echelon target nomination windows.
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Chapter 3 Figure 3-3. Air tasking cycle
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Fire Support and the Operations Process Table 3-1. Crosswalk of operations, joint targeting cycle, D3A, MDMP, and fire support tasks Operations Joint Targeting D3A MDMP Fire Support Task Process Cycle 12 August 2024 FM 3-09 3-13 tnemssessA suounitnoC Plan Commander’s Decide Mission Analysis Perform target value analysis to develop Objectives, Targeting high- value targets. Guidance, and Intent Begin identifying high-payoff targets based on initial high-value target and initial fire support tasks. Provide fire support activities input to the commander’s targeting guidance and desired effects. Target Development Further develop and refine high-payoff and Prioritization Course of Action target lists. Development Deconflict and coordinate potential high- payoff targets. Develop high-payoff target list. Establish target selection standards. Develop attack guidance matrix. Develop fire support tasks. Develop associated MOP, and MOE. Course of Action Refine the high-payoff target list. Capabilities Analysis Analysis Refine target selection standards. Refine the attack guidance matrix. Refine fire support tasks. Refine associated MOP. Commander’s Decision Refine associated MOE. and Force Assignment Develop the target synchronization matrix. Draft airspace control means requests. Orders Finalize the high-payoff target list. Production Finalize target selection standards. Finalize the attack guidance matrix. Mission Planning and Force Execution Finalize the targeting synchronization matrix. Finalize fire support tasks and execution matrices. Finalize associated MOP and MOE. Submit information requirements to battalion
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Chapter 3 Table 3-1. Crosswalk of operations, joint targeting cycle, D3A, MDMP, and fire support task (continued) Operations Joint Targeting D3A MDMP Fire Support Task Process Cycle 3-14 FM 3-09 12 August 2024 tnemssessA suounitnoC Execute Information Collection Plan. Assess Combat Detect Orders Update information requirements as they Production are answered. Assessment Update the high-payoff target list, attack guidance matrix, and targeting synchronization matrix. D3A Update fire support tasks. Execute Update associated measures of MDMP performance and measures of effectiveness. Execute fire support tasks in accordance Deliver with the attack guidance matrix and the targeting synchronization matrix. Execute Information Collection Plan. Assess task accomplishment (as Assess determined by measures of Prepare performance). Assess effects (as determined by measures of effectiveness). D3A – decide, detect, deliver, and assess, MOE – measures of effectiveness, MOP – measures of performance, MDMP – military decision-making process FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING AND COORDINATION PRINCIPLES 3-35. The commander's ability to orchestrate and employ all available FS resources as a system and to integrate and synchronize fire support with the concept of operations results from an established process known as fire support planning and coordination. Fire support planning is the continuous process of analyzing, allocating, integrating, synchronizing, and scheduling fires to describe how the effects of fires facilitate supported force actions. Successful FS planning is the result of the FSCOORD's aggressive contribution to the supported commander's planning and decision-making process. Fire support coordination is the planning and executing of fire, so targets are adequately covered by a suitable weapon or group of weapons (JP 3-09). Formal coordination binds FS resources together to create a unity of effort so that the multiple effects of each fire support asset across all domains are rapidly and continuously integrated and synchronized with the scheme of maneuver. 3-36. Fighting in large-scale combat operations requires more careful FS planning because of the limited resources available to acquire and attack targets at extended ranges, and requires detailed coordination and employment of TA, attack, and assessment needs across all domains. 3-37. The FSCOORD utilizes the principles of fire support planning and coordination when advising the commander on the execution of fire support. These principles are extensions of our functions of fire support. The fire support planning and coordination principles are: * Plan early and continuously. To effectively integrate fire support with the commander's concept of the operation, planning must begin when the commander states the mission and provides commander's guidance. The commander's guidance must be clear, concise, and understood. Whenever commander's guidance is not understood during the planning of an operation, fire support planners should solicit that guidance from the commander. Planning is continuous and must keep pace with the dynamics of the operation. * Ensure the continuous flow of targeting information. The FSCOORD ensures that TA
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Fire Support and the Operations Process formation. Ensure that target information from all sources are evaluated and routed to the appropriate attack means to include information from all echelons and from adjacent and supporting elements. * Consider the use of all lethal and nonlethal attack capabilities. The FSCOORD considers the full range of fires and other capabilities available at all levels. This includes coordinating for attack/delivery assets from available joint and multinational forces. * Use the lowest echelon capable of furnishing effective support. FS is delivered by the lowest level that has the effective means to accomplish the mission. Planners decide what is needed and, if their assets are inadequate, coordinate for additional support from the appropriate echelon. * Furnish the type of support requested. The fire support requester is in the best position to determine what is needed. However, the FSCOORD is in a position to weigh the request against the commander's guidance and the current and future needs for fire support. If a request for fire support is disapproved, the FSCOORD notifies all concerned. If possible, a new fire support means is substituted, and all affected agencies must be informed. * Use the most effective fire support attack/delivery system. The FSCOORD considers the nature and importance of the target, the engagement time window, the availability of attack assets, and the effects desired. In some circumstances, it may be necessary to sequence the attack by fixing the enemy with immediately available fire support assets while coordinating a subsequent, more detailed attack by more effective assets. An example of this is a situation in which air support is the most desired means but is about 20 minutes away. In this case, indirect-fire attack/delivery systems can fix the target until aircraft arrive. * Avoid unnecessary duplication. A key task for the FSCOORD is to ensure that duplications of fire support requests are resolved when possible while the desired effects are achieved. * Consider airspace coordination. The FSCOORD at the BCT and higher levels provides input concerning fire support use of airspace to those agencies and personnel engaged in airspace management to ensure that conflicts between surface-based indirect fire and air operations are minimized. For more information on airspace control see FM 3-52. * Provide adequate support. The commander's guidance determines the amounts and types of FS needed for success. The FSCOORD must inform the supported commander when fire support requirements exceed capabilities. * Provide for rapid and continuous coordination. The FSCOORD must know the capabilities of the various fire support attack/delivery systems and have immediate information on their availability. The FSCOORD must be aware of changes as they develop in order to attack both planned targets and targets of opportunity and to ensure that coordination channels are functioning smoothly. For rapid coordination, the following must be considered: ο‚§ Exact locations of all friendly forces. ο‚§ Scheme of maneuver of the supported force. ο‚§ Supported commander's guidance and SOP. ο‚§ Active FSCMs. ο‚§ Rules of engagement. * Provide for flexibility. FS personnel anticipate and provide for future contingencies. On-order missions and careful positioning of assets give the commander the flexibility to respond to changing battlefield conditions. * Use of FSCMs. A fire support coordination measure is a measure employed by commanders to facilitate the rapid engagement of targets and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces (JP 3-0). They ensure that FS will not jeopardize troop safety, will interface with other fire support means, and will not disrupt adjacent unit operations. Any change to a FSCM must be communicated to all units affected. For more information on the use of FSCMs see appendix B. 3-38. In large-scale combat operations, FS planning is a top-down process with bottom-up refinement and continual coordination. FS planning at echelons above brigade involve deep operations, coordination of FS for future and current battles, and allocation of resources to subordinate units. At brigade and below levels,
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Chapter 3 FSEs are more involved in the execution of the current battles, and they fight within the parameters established by the higher HQ and with the resources they have been allocated see figure 3-4. Figure 3-4. Planning and execution relationship 3-39. This is not meant to imply that brigade and BN FSEs need not plan fires in advance of operations. They just don't plan as far into future battles as the FSEs at corps and division. In fact, the FS principle of use the lowest echelon capable of furnishing effective support, must always be considered by FS planners. FS planning, coordination, and execution should be done at the lowest level possible with the fewest number of elements necessary to accomplish the mission. For example: * A FAB asset with a GSR mission to a DIVARTY makes positioning extremely difficult. A preferred method in the offense is to make that unit R with the necessary restrictions to facilitate future operations. * SEAD should be planned and fired by the unit using the air support. FRATRICIDE PREVENTION AND CLEARANCE OF FIRES PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES 3-40. FA personnel must always maintain a mindset of violently applying lethal fires in accordance with the Law of War and established ROE. However, we must simultaneously reduce the risk that lethal fires cause unintentional killing and destruction to a prudent, acceptable level. This is done in a large part through fratricide prevention and clearance of fires processes. 3-41. Fratricide is the unintentional killing or wounding of friendly or neutral personnel by friendly firepower (ADP 3-37). Fratricide increases the possibility of mission failure, causes unacceptable loss of personnel and equipment, and erodes leadership effectiveness. 3-42. Minimizing exposure to potential fratricide is a command responsibility. Although the potential for fratricide is greatest during combat when chaos and confusion are at their greatest, it can also occur during training activities and combat simulations. Leaders must be knowledgeable of conditions that cause fratricide and implement fratricide countermeasures regardless of the environment. Efforts must be made to overcome potential hazards such as mistaken identity, navigation errors, or inaccurate or dysfunctional reporting procedures. 3-43. Although weapon systems can detect, engage, and destroy targets at maximum ranges, weapons sighting equipment does not have sufficiently high resolution of targets at extended ranges, especially under limited visibility conditions. Situational awareness helps overcome this deficiency in part and improve friendly capabilities to positively identify potential targets.
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Fire Support and the Operations Process FRATRICIDE COUNTERMEASURES 3-44. Fratricide countermeasures preserve and conserve the force. During the wargaming phase of the MDMP, commanders must identify control measures that reduce potential fratricide situations to an acceptable level. These must be incorporated into orders and plans to subordinate and adjacent commanders. In addition, rehearsals can be used to verify and modify the appropriateness of control measures and to ensure subordinates understand the operation. During execution, FSEs and FA CPs must track the location of friendly elements. This is especially critical during rapidly paced advances such as during attacks, exploitations, or pursuits. Specifics include: * Individual errors are as simple as mistaken identity. If there is a possibility that enemy and friendly forces are intermixed in the target area, units must positively verify their identity after detection prior to engagement. Weapons errors include lapses in unit and individual discipline that allow powder charge errors, accidental discharges, incorrect gun data, and similar incidents. Unit errors include errors in the use of weapons-engagement areas or sectors or in using fire control measures. * Strict adherence to procedural control measures such as permissive and restrictive maneuver and FSCMs. Fratricides can occur when FSCMs are not used and not disseminated. Continuous FSCM management reduces the risk of fratricide. * Dissemination and receipt of warnings and reports in sufficient time to allow for appropriate actions and synchronization. * Preclusion of land navigation errors to prevent units from straying out of sector, reporting wrong locations, becoming disoriented, or unknowingly engaging targets out of sector. * Adequate unit-leader experience. Ensure that junior leaders have the opportunity to gain the necessary experience and judgment to make rapid decisions under ambiguous, stressful conditions. Crews must be properly trained to increase the likelihood that they will not engage friendly forces. * Special caution during periods of limited daytime visibility and at night. * Judicious use of materiel solutions, using active and passive measures to provide friendly forces a unique signature to distinguish friend from foe. These may include marking devices and combat vehicle identification systems such as thermal beacons, thermal tape, and navigational aids. CLEARANCE OF FIRES 3-45. The scheme of fires must also provide for clearance of fires. Clearance of fires is the process by which the supported commander ensures that fires or their effects will have no unintended consequences on friendly units or the scheme of maneuver. Clearance of fires ensures that fires attack enemy capabilities at the time, place, and with the effects the commander desires without resulting in casualties to friendly forces or noncombatants. It may be accomplished through a staff process and control measures, embedded in automated C2 information systems, or through passive or active recognition systems. Creating a permissive environment begins during planning and is crucial for the rapid delivery of fires, especially during large-scale combat operations. It remains a command responsibility at every level. General clearance of fires responsibilities is shown in table 3-2 on page 3-18.
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Chapter 3 Table 3-2. Clearance of fires responsibilities Position Responsibilities Clears fires. Normally this is delegated to their CP and Supported Commander executed by the battle staff under the lead of the FSE. Recommends clearance of fires guidelines to the FSCOORD commander. Ensures friendly force safety through adherence to ROE, and use of coordination measures, MCM, FSCM and ACM. Use MCMs, FSCMs, and ACMs to facilitate clearance of fires. Coordinate airspace for fires with AE at echelon (AE, JAGIC, or ADAM/BAE). FSE Coordinate for clearance of fires across boundaries as required. Use automated systems to request clearance of fires. Warn controlling HQ if FSCMs or commander's attack guidance is about to be violated. Use rehearsals to validate responsibilities for clearance of fires. ACM – airspace coordinating measure, ADAM/BAE – air defense airspace management brigade aviation element, AE – airspace element, CP – command post, FSCM – fire support coordination measure, FSCOORD – fire support coordinator FSE – fire support element, HQ –headquarters, JAGIC – joint air-ground integration center, MCM – maneuver control measure ROE – rules of engagement 3-46. During the planning process, staff officers must consider how to position sensors not only to collect information but also to support information requirements that will assist in assessment and the clearance of fires. Although sensor placement may primarily focus on gathering enemy information, information collected on friendly forces is equally important. 3-47. Clear and understandable maneuver control measures are also a significant first step in the clearance of fires. Again, digital systems will enhance the accurate and rapid transmission of these measures. FSCMs not only assist in the integration of fires by facilitating the rapid engagement of targets. They also safeguard friendly forces. 3-48. Permissive measures (if positioned correctly and disseminated to all higher, adjacent, and subordinate units), such as coordinated fire lines (CFLs) and free-fire areas, offer the opportunity for responsive fires on targets of opportunity. The size of restrictive measures such as NFAs, restrictive fire areas (RFAs) should be verified to preclude unwarranted delays for otherwise responsive fires. 3-49. A procedure to consider in certain circumstances is pre-clearing fires. In some very specific instances, units can clear fires during the planning phase. For example, pre-clearing fires on a planned target or into a target engagement zone such as a CFFZ requires coordination of both air and ground. Missile flight paths for selected munitions must be generated and added to the unit airspace plan so that friendly airspace users are aware of planned munition trajectories. The CFFZ must have been planned in advance and published in the radar deployment order. Preplanned targets will have definable triggers, specific target types (HPT), and are engaged according to the scheme of fires. 3-50. When fires are requested that are not pre-cleared or allowed by a permissive FSCM, they must be positively cleared. This procedure should be a battle drill in CPs. The best method is a redundant drill where a call for clearance is transmitted over two nets, the FS net, and the maneuver net. 3-51. Positive clearance of fires is normally facilitated through prior planning, rehearsals, and careful placement of FSCMs. However, the clearance of targets of opportunity often presents special challenges. They must be delivered on short notice without undue delay in responsiveness and without jeopardizing friendly force security. For positive clearance of fires, the following should be obtained: * Best available method of target location. * Positive identification of targets as enemy. * Eyes on target, if possible. * Clearance from appropriate external elements if target is outside unit boundaries. * Coordination with affected airspace users based on munition trajectory.
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Fire Support and the Operations Process FIRE SUPPORT AND THE MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 3-52. The FS staff and FA planners must strive to conduct parallel planning with the higher HQ staff. It is important that staff estimates, to include the intelligence estimate, sustainment estimate, engineer estimate, FS estimate, and the commander's estimate are updated prior to beginning MDMP and updated continuously throughout the process. RECEIPT OF MISSION 3-53. Upon receipt of mission (see table 3-3), the commander and staff consider implications of the new mission on the current fight and the friendly force current situation. After an initial assessment, FS assets and supporting FA units are alerted as soon as practicable to initiate their own collaborative and parallel planning efforts (first warning order). FSEs, and FAIOs should also ensure that all IPOE products to include likely enemy COAs are released to subordinate HQ as soon as cleared by the force G-2/S-2 to enhance parallel planning and IPOE preparation at the lower levels of command. This warning order should provide subordinate FA elements the following as a minimum: FS planning begins with mission analysis. During mission analysis FS planners provide recommendations for possible FS task inputs based on the commander's guidance for FS and desired effects. * Type of operation to be conducted. * General outline of the AO. * Any known or anticipated changes in the FA organization for combat. * FSCMs, communications, and sustainment plan. * Initial timelines. 3-54. The supported commander's planning guidance normally establishes options to be considered and essential tasks to be addressed. They may include enemy and friendly COAs to be pursued or rejected, associated priorities, and a time plan for mission planning, preparation, and execution. The accompanying commander's proposed intent provides the foundation for developing the eventual concept of operations. By outlining considerations for developing a scheme of maneuver, the commander also sets the stage for the allocation of forces and the design of supporting plans and annexes to include the FS and FA support plans. Table 3-3. Fire support element during receipt of mission MDMP STEP 1: RECEIPT OF MISSION Staff Actions Key FSE Actions FSE Output β€’Alert the staff and β€’Collect higher HQ OPLAN/OPORD, β€’Updated fires running other key maps, current IPOE, and fires running estimate. participants. estimate. β€’Provide updated facts to β€’Gather the tools. β€’Update fires running estimate; gather higher, lower, and adjacent HQ. β€’Update running facts from higher, lower, and adjacent β€’Fire support input to IPOE and estimates. FSEs, Fires Cells, and FA CPs. reconnaissance and β€’Conduct initial β€’Provide FS input during formulation of the surveillance tasking. assessment. commander’s initial guidance and initial warning order. β€’Issue the commander’s initial guidance. β€’Issue the warning order. CP – command post, FA – field artillery, FS – fire support, FSE – fire support element, HQ – headquarters, IPOE – intelligence preparation of the operational environment, OPLAN – operation plan, OPORD – operation order Fire Support Running Estimate 3-55. The FS running estimate helps the commander build and maintain situational understanding and a realistic analysis of the effort allowing the commander to determine the effectiveness of attacks, revise support plans based on observed results, and re-prioritize the FS requirements. A running estimate is the
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Chapter 3 continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander's intent and if planned future operations are supportable (ADP 5-0). 3-56. Any variable that could affect the mission is a factor. Before the estimate is started, available relevant information must be collected. Once this information has been assembled and the factors that could affect the plan have been identified, they should be listed and arranged in priority. The estimate includes analysis in the context of the commander's intent for the ongoing and future operations. For more information on running estimates see ADP 5-0. The FSCOORD and FSE produce and maintain the FS running estimate and consider: * The higher HQ specified and implied tasks. * Active ACMs affecting friendly fires. * The task organization of subordinate forces and their missions. * The capabilities and limitations including the status of FA weapons, FA ammunition, FA WLRs, CAS, and other related fixed wing support, and any other possible asset from the holistic FS system at each echelon of command (AI/SEAD). * The position of friendly and enemy fires capabilities. * FA and WLR survey support. * Established and recommended FSCMs. * The impact of ROE and law of land warfare. * The impact of terrain, and weather on friendly and enemy forces (such as smoke, CAS, and AI.) * Information collection plan support and requirements. * Initial HPTL. * FS input to the IPOE analysis. ο‚§ COAs open to the enemy artillery commander, especially the most probable COA. These are derived from the intelligence estimate and knowledge of enemy artillery doctrine. ο‚§ The enemy dispositions (including frontage and depth), the degree of protection afforded the enemy, objectives for subordinate forces or units, the number of phases, and the likely frontage and depth of the assault. These will affect the allocation of fire support resources to subordinate units. ο‚§ The mobility of the enemy artillery and its speed of movement to contact and withdrawal. * The enemy EW situation. * The identification of HPTs (derived from target value analysis and IPOE). * The commander's information requirements (derived from the intelligence estimate). * The availability and condition of roads, trails, and likely position areas. This leads to the coordination of movement and position areas with the operations staff. * Ammunition consumption factors (type and quantity), pre-positioning requirements, and priority of sustainment. * The reliability and range of communications. * EFSTs and purposes. * The time required for positioning and technical preparation to engage targets. * The time to be ready to support the operation. Mission Analysis 3-57. Mission analysis by the FSCOORD and the FA staff starts parallel planning activities. Mission analysis begins with a review of the commander's intent one and two levels higher and focuses on the rapid development of the supported commander’s IPOE; identification of specified, implied, and essential tasks to include those for FA formations; an initial assessment of FS survivability and employment considerations; and a restatement of the mission. By providing the most current running staff estimates after the first warning order, FA CPs can assist in updating the supported HQ FS, graphics, facts and assumptions, and staff running estimates. FA unit input includes but is not limited to analysis on enemy indirect fires systems and formations through the reverse IPOE process and ammunition, positioning, and security requirements.
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Fire Support and the Operations Process 3-58. A thorough mission analysis is crucial to planning. Mission analysis (see table 3-4) consists of the tasks identified in ADP 5-0. Participation by FS personnel in the IPOE is critical to setting the conditions for EFSTs and targeting decisions later in the MDMP. Table 3-4. Fire support element during mission analysis MDMP STEP 2: MISSION ANALYSIS Staff Actions Key FSE Actions FSE Output β€’ Analyze the higher HQ plan β€’ Understand next two higher β€’ FS system status. or order. HQ operations and fire β€’ Specified targets from β€’ Perform IPOE. support plans. higher HQ FS IPOE. β€’ Determine specified, β€’ Receive IPOE products and β€’ FS asset range arc provide FS input to IPOE implied, and essential depictions. including enemy courses of tasks. β€’ FS limitations and action and high-value β€’ Review available assets constrains. targets by phase or critical and identify resource events from G-2 and β€’ FS portion of the mission shortfalls. intelligence cell. analysis briefing. β€’ Determine constraints. β€’ Conduct FS running β€’ FS related input to the β€’ Identify critical facts and estimate; organize and commander’s critical develop assumptions. analyze facts. information requirements. β€’ Begin risk management. β€’ Identify specified and β€’ Initial FS rehearsal β€’ Develop initial implied tasks for FS. guidance and times. commander’s critical β€’ Translate status of FS β€’ Commander’s approval of information requirements assets and resources into initial EFSTs or and essential elements of fire support capabilities, modification. friendly information. limitations, and β€’ Update FS input to the vulnerabilities. β€’ Determine initial warning order after the reconnaissance and β€’ Analyze the effects of IPOE mission analysis brief. surveillance on fire support. β€’ FS input to commander’s synchronization tools. β€’ Develop draft EFSTs with planning guidance. β€’ Determine initial task and purpose. β€’ Updated FS-related reconnaissance and β€’ Identify long-lead time fire operational timeline. surveillance plan. support tasks. β€’ Initial high-payoff target list β€’ Update plan for the use of β€’ Update the FS running β€’ Initial target lists / Target available time. estimate. List Worksheet. β€’ Develop a proposed β€’ Provide input for restated problem statement. mission, commander’s β€’ Develop a proposed intent, guidance, and mission statement. warning including: β€’ Present the mission β€’ Desired effects from fire analysis briefing. support. β€’ Develop and issue initial β€’ Initial high-payoff targets commander’s intent. from among the high-value targets. β€’ Develop and issue initial planning guidance. β€’ Attack guidance. β€’ Develop COA evaluation β€’ Allocation/positioning of fire criteria. support assets. β€’ Issue a warning order. β€’ Sustainment and protection for FS. COA – course of action, EFST – essential fire support task, FS – fire support, FSE – fire support element, G-2 – assistant chief of staff, intelligence, HQ – headquarters, IPOE – intelligence preparation of the operational environment, MDMP – military decision-making process
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Chapter 3 Mission Analysis Briefing 3-59. The mission analysis briefing informs the commander of the results of the staff's analysis of the situation. It helps the commander understand, visualize, and describe the operation. Throughout the mission analysis briefing, the commander, staff, and other unified action partners discuss the various facts and assumptions about the situation. Staff officers present a summary of their running estimates from their specific functional area and how their findings impact or are impacted by other areas. This helps the commander and staff to focus on the interrelationships among the mission variables METT-TC (I) and to develop a deeper understanding of the situation. The commander issues guidance to the staff for continued planning based on situational understanding gained from the mission analysis briefing. 3-60. A comprehensive mission analysis briefing helps the commander, staff, subordinates, and other unified action partners develop a shared understanding of the requirements of the upcoming operation. Time permitting, the staff briefs the commander on its mission analysis using the following outline: * Mission and commander's intent of the HQ two echelons up. * Mission, commander's intent, and concept of operations of the HQ one echelon up. * A proposed problem statement. * A proposed mission statement. * Review of the commander's initial guidance. * Initial IPOE products, including civil considerations that impact the conduct of operations to include: ο‚§ Weather. ο‚§ Satellite communication impacts. * Specified, implied, and essential tasks. * Pertinent facts and assumptions. * Constraints. * Forces available and resource shortfalls. * Initial risk assessment. * Initial EFSTs (task and purpose). * Initial high-payoff target list. * Proposed commander's critical information requirements and essential elements of friendly information. * Initial information collection plan. * Recommended timeline. * Recommended collaborative planning sessions. * Proposed evaluation criteria. 3-61. During the mission analysis briefing or shortly thereafter, commanders approve the mission statement and commander's critical information requirements. They then develop and issue their initial commander's intent and planning guidance. COMMANDER'S INTENT AND CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 3-62. The commander's intent is a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired objectives and military end state (JP 3-0). FS personnel at all echelons must thoroughly understand the commander's intent and end state to design a FS and FA plan that best support the concept of operations and rapidly and effectively adjust to exploit advantages that arise. For an example of commander's intent (see table 3-5).
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Fire Support and the Operations Process Table 3-5. Nested Commanders’ intent examples at JFLCC and division levels Joint Force Land Component Commander's Intent. Purpose: Is to enable Atropian security and regional stability by defeating any ground forces Ariana employs to attack Atropia. Key Tasks: Project combat power into Atropia and rapidly maneuver 23rd Armored Division east of the Agshu River. Deny enemy seizure of the Atropian capital and critical oil sites; and reinforce the Atropian defenses of their capital. Defeat enemy forces by synchronizing Joint Fires against Arianan forces in depth and destroying the 17th and 18th DTGs, and the 21st Integrated Fires Command. Protect long range fires platforms, WLRs, and attack aviation. Endstate: Arianan aggression has been deterred or defeated and JFLCC forces restore the international border. 52nd Division Commander's Intent. Purpose: The purpose of this operation is to enable partners, restore the sovereignty of Atropia, and defeat Arianan aggression. Key Tasks: Tempo: Anticipate transitions to synchronize fires, maneuver, and sustainment to rapidly cross the Agshu River, seize OBJ TEXAS, and destroy the 17th and 18th DTG. Aggressive Reconnaissance: Employ heavy advanced guard to enable flexibility and mass combat power at the decisive point. Fires: Maneuver to emplace fires forward and leverage information collection to detect and destroy division HPTs. Protection: Disciplined and consistent use of tactical dispersion, camouflage, entrenchment, active patrolling and aggressive counter reconnaissance to protect the force. Partnership: Partner with Atropian Security Forces to build the capacity for Atropia to exercise its authority within its boundaries. Endstate: Friendly. 52nd ID has seized OBJ DAKOTA, COLORADO, and TEXAS allowing the re-establishment of the International Border, creating a zone of separation. 52nd ID is partnered with Atropian forces securing major population centers and critical infrastructure. Enemy. 17th and 18th DTGs destroyed and 19th DTG defeated. Remnants of OSC 2 have withdrawn from Atropia. 995th Commando BDE (SPF) is neutralized within Atropian borders. Terrain. A zone of separation between Ariana and Atropia is established. Civilian. Conditions are set for the Government of Atropia to exercise its authority within its boundaries. DTG – division tactical group, HPT – high-payoff target, ID – infantry division, JFLCC – joint force land component commander, OBJ – objective, OSC – operational strategic corps, SPF – special forces, WLR – weapons locating radar 3-63. The concept of operations is a statement that directs the manner in which subordinate units cooperate to accomplish the mission and establish the sequence of actions the force will use to achieve the end state (ADP 5-0). The scheme of fires (see table 3-6 on page 3-24) is an integral part of the concept of operations. It describes how to integrate and synchronize the use of FS lethal and nonlethal capabilities to create desired effects and achieve the commander’ objectives.
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Chapter 3 Table 3-6. Description of scheme of fires Annex D (Fires) Scheme of Fires. Describe how fires support the commander’s intent and concept of operations to establish the priorities of fires to units for each phase of the operation. The scheme of fires must be concise but specific enough to clearly state what fires are to accomplish in the operation. The scheme of fires must answer the β€œwho, what, when, where, and why” of the fires to be provided, but provide enough flexibility to allow subordinate commanders to determine the β€œhow” to the maximum extent possible by ensuring necessary procedural and positive control. The scheme of fires may include a general narrative for the entire operation that should address the fire support task and purpose, allocation of assets, positioning guidance for fire support assets and observers, and attack guidance to include the entire scalable range of effects (lethal to nonlethal effects) to include restrictions. Add subparagraphs addressing fire support tasks for each phase of the operation use the following format: task, purpose, execution, and assessment in matrix form. Refer to the base plan or order and Annex C (Operations) as required. (FM 5-0) Commander's Guidance for Fire Support 3-64. Commanders drive the operations process through understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading, and assessing operations (ADP 5-0). The supported commander must provide clear and concise guidance on effects expected from fires. Fire support personnel must thoroughly understand the commander's intent, scheme of maneuver, and guidance for fire support. Commanders must ensure fire support personnel understand the larger picture of the battle. It provides the staff and subordinate units with the general guidance and restrictions for the employment of fires, desired effects and the planning and execution of targeting functions. Commander's guidance for fire support must include the priority of fires. Priority of fires is the commander's guidance to the staff, subordinate commanders, fires planners, and supporting agencies to employ fires in accordance with the relative importance of a unit's mission. Mission orders for FA units should include the supported commander's intent, concept of operations, and priority of fires, EFSTs, and coordinating instructions. 3-65. The commander's guidance for FS describes the desired effects to be generated by FS attack/delivery systems, both lethal and non-lethal. An effect is 1. The physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. 2. The result, outcome, or consequence of an action. 3. A change to a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom (JP 3-0). Capabilities associated with one desired effect may also contribute to other desired effects. For example, delay can result from disrupting, diverting, or destroying enemy capabilities or targets. 3-66. The most important part of providing guidance for FS is that the FSCOORD and the commander have a shared understanding of the commander's visualization and description of what FS must accomplish in support of the concept of operations. Some common terms that commanders may use to describe the desired effects when providing their guidance for FS are listed below and include: * Deceive in military deception are actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military, paramilitary, or violent extremist organization decision makers, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. FS supports tactical deception by misleading the enemy decision makers' understanding of friendly intent. Tactical deception is a friendly activity that causes enemy commanders to take action or cause inaction detrimental to their objectives (FM 3-90). This greatly improves the chances the enemy will assume risks that can expose the enemy to the effects of friendly fires and maneuver. For example, preparation fire of a false landing zone may contribute to the belief a friendly attack is about to occur in one place when in fact it is about to occur in another. Deception fires are best employed to reinforce the pre-conceived notion of the enemy commander. Operations security is the foundation of deception. This includes the use of nets, camouflage, communications, and noise and light discipline. * Defeat is to render a force incapable of achieving its objectives (ADP 3-0). Defeat manifests itself in some sort of physical action, such as mass surrenders, abandonment of positions, equipment and supplies, or retrograde operations. A commander can create different effects against an enemy to defeat that force. For example, a commander's employment of FA fires to attack an enemy force may result in the enemy no longer having sufficient personnel, weapons systems, equipment, or supplies to carry out its mission. Likewise, the delivery of massed, synchronized, and intense fires can cause enemy personnel to lose the will to continue to fight.
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Fire Support and the Operations Process * Degrade is to reduce the effectiveness or efficiency of a threat. Strategic effect terms, the standard dictionary definition applies. * Delay is when a force under pressure trades space for time by slowing down the enemy's momentum and inflicting maximum damage on enemy forces without becoming decisively engaged (ADP 3-90). When enemy forces are delayed, friendly forces gain time. For delay to have a major impact the enemy must face urgent movement requirements, or the delay must enhance the effect(s) of friendly operations. When delayed enemy forces mass behind a damaged route segment a more concentrated set of targets and a longer period of exposure to friendly fires results. * Deny is task to hinder or prevent the enemy from using terrain, space, personnel, supplies, or facilities (ATP 3-21.20). An example of deny is to destroy the threats communications equipment as a means of denying his use of the EMS; however, the duration of denial will depend on the enemy's ability to reconstitute. Denial operations are actions to hinder or deny the enemy the use of terrain, supplies, or facilities (FM 3-90). * Destroy is a tactical mission task that physically renders an enemy force combat-ineffective until reconstituted (FM 3-90). Alternatively, to destroy a combat system is to damage it so badly that it cannot perform any function or be restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt. * Destruction in the context of the computed effects of field artillery fires, destruction renders a target out of action permanently, or ineffective for a long period of time, producing 30- percent casualties or materiel damage. * Destruction fire is an element of the method of engagement portion of the call for fire requesting destruction fire; delivered for the sole purpose of destroying materiel (TC 3-09.81). * Disrupt 1. A tactical mission task in which a unit upsets an enemy’s formation or tempo and causes the enemy force to attack prematurely or in a piecemeal fashion. 2. An obstacle effect that focuses fire planning and obstacle effort to cause the enemy to break up its formation and tempo, interrupt its timetable, commit breaching assets prematurely, and attack in a piecemeal effort (FM 3-90). * Diversion is the act of drawing the attention and forces of an enemy from the point of the principal operation; an attack, alarm, or feint that diverts attention. Diversion causes enemy forces to consume resources or capabilities critical to enemy operations in a way that is advantageous to friendly operations. Diversions draw the attention of enemy forces away from critical friendly operations and prevent enemy forces and their support resources from being employed for their intended purpose. Diversions can also cause more circuitous routing along lines of communication, resulting in delays for enemy forces. An option for FA employment in support of a commander's diversion is to use high explosives (HE) fires to encourage an enemy to adopt a different route. * Interdiction is an action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy's military surface capability before it can be used effectively against friendly forces or otherwise be used to achieve enemy objectives (JP 3-03). * Interdiction fires are employed to disrupt, delay, or destroy enemy forces. Interdiction fires create windows for friendly unit movement and maneuver. * Isolate is to separate a force from its sources of support in order to reduce its effectiveness and increase its vulnerability to defeat (ADP 3-0). * Neutralization in the context of the computed effects of field artillery fires renders a target ineffective for a short period of time, producing 10-percent casualties or materiel damage. * Neutralization fire is fire delivered to render the target ineffective or unusable. * Neutralize is a tactical mission task in which a unit renders the enemy incapable of interfering with an operation (FM 3-90). A tactical mission task that results in rendering enemy personnel or materiel incapable of interfering with a particular operation (FM 3-90). * Preparation fire is a brief, intense bombardment on selected targets or a prolonged effort over time covering a large number of targets. Commanders must be clear on what they hope to achieve by this sort of fire. The effectiveness of preparation fire varies with each situation; and its feasibility depends on such factors as surprise, deployment, ammunition supply, and type of weapons available. Preparation fire is planned by the commander planning the attack. Normally, fire begins before H-hour and may extend beyond it.
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Chapter 3 * Counterpreparation fire is the intensive prearranged fire delivered when the imminence of the enemy attack is discovered. It is designed to break up enemy formations; disorganize the enemy's system of command, communications, and observation; decrease effectiveness of artillery preparation; and impair the enemy's offensive spirit. * Suppress is a tactical mission task in which a unit temporarily degrades a force or weapon system from accomplishing its mission (FM 3-90). * Suppression in the context of the computed effects of field artillery fires, renders a target ineffective for a short period of time producing at least 3-percent casualties or materiel damage. * Suppressive fire are fires on or about a weapons system to degrade its performance below the level needed to fulfill its mission objectives during the conduct of the fires. * Counterbattery fire is fire delivered for the purpose of destroying or neutralizing indirect fire weapon systems. * Harassing fire an unpredictable and intermittent fire designated to disturb enemy troops not physically engaged in combat with the intent to curtail movement, readiness, ability to fight, and lower morale. 3-67. The commander can also provide targeting restrictions as part of his guidance for FS support. Targeting restrictions fall into two categories-the no-strike list and the restricted target list: * No-Strike List is a list of objects or entities characterized as protected from the effects of military operations under international law and/or rules of engagement (JP 3-60). The no-strike list is not a target list. Deliberately engaging or not taking sufficient precaution to avoid these objects or entities may violate the law of war. * Restricted target list is a list of restricted targets nominated by elements of the joint force and approved by the joint force commander or directed by higher authorities (JP 3-60). A restricted target list is a list of valid military targets that could be on the joint integrated prioritized target list that have restrictions placed upon their engagement by the JFC or directed by higher authorities. (for more information see JP 3-60). Examples of possible restrictions are: ο‚§ Limit collateral damage by a defined amount and do not strike during daytime. ο‚§ Strike only with a certain weapon. COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT 3-68. Simultaneously with the supported staff, fire support planners develop a fire support execution matrix in conjunction with the MDMP COA development, and HPT refinement (see table 3-7) for general considerations during COA Development). FS planners develop EFSTs based on identified HPTs and commanders’ guidance. The HPTL, target selection standards, and AGM are developed to ensure each EFST is adequately addressed. Once EFSTs are completed a FS execution matrix is finalized to create the FS plan. FA planners develop a FA support plan as an annex to the FS plan.
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Fire Support and the Operations Process Table 3-7. Fire support element during course of action development MDMP STEP 3: COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT Staff Actions Key FSE Actions FSE Output β€’ Assess relative combat β€’ Assist G-2 and intelligence cell in β€’ For each COA developed includeβˆ’ power. conjunction with the G-3 in β€’ Scheme of fires. β€’ Generate options. d coe lv lee clo tip oi nn g p lt ah ne ain nf do r im tsa st uio pn port for β€’ Initial FSCMs. β€’ Array forces. targeting. β€’ Draft high-payoff target list. β€’ Develop a broad concept. β€’ Determine where to find and attack β€’ Target list worksheet. (digital or manual) β€’ Assign HQ. adversary or enemy fire support β€’ Draft FS execution matrix. formations. β€’ Develop COA statements and β€’ Target list/overlay. sketches. β€’ Identify high-payoff target in those formations. β€’ Draft observer and TA plan. β€’ Conduct a COA briefing. β€’ Refine EFSTs. β€’ Draft targeting synchronization matrix or β€’ Select or modify courses of modified (high-payoff target list, target action for continued analysis. β€’ Plan assessment for EFSTs, selection. including measures of performance and measures of effectiveness. β€’ Target selection standards and attack Quantify the execution for EFSTs. guidance matrix). β€’ Analyze relative fires combat β€’ Draft FS input to the unit airspace plan. power. β€’ Draft risk management plan. β€’ Ensure staff considers all fire β€’ FS-related portions of reconnaissance support aspects of combat power. and surveillance plan. β€’ Develop scheme of fires for each β€’ Initial EFSTs and associated measures COA and assess risk, including of performance and measures of fratricide. effectiveness. β€’ Nominate high-payoff targets for β€’ Refined asset locations. each COA. β€’ Refined FSCMs. β€’ Integrate CEMA and other nonlethal input. β€’ Draft Annex D, Fires. β€’ Array FS assets/resources needed ο‚§ Begin request of assets for to support each COA and propose reconnaissance and surveillance, generic FS organization for combat. CAS, nonlethal effects to include Identify planned attack locations cyber electromagnetic activities. and sequence of attacks: ο‚§ Determine radar positioning and β€’ Allocate assets to acquire targets. sector search for all radars. β€’ Allocate assets to attack targets. ο‚§ Determine radar maintenance and cueing schedule. β€’ Apportion force protection for FS assets. β€’ Ensure FS is integrated with movement and maneuver and other warfighting functions. ο‚§ Integrate triggers with maneuver COA. ο‚§ Prepare scheme of fires for each COA and sketch for each COA. β€’ Develop FSCMs. CAS – close air support, CEMA – cyberspace electromagnetic activities, COA – course of action, EFST – essential fire support task, FS – fire support, FSCM – fire support coordination measure, FSE – fire support element, G-2 – assistant chief of staff, intelligence, G-3 – assistant chief of staff, operations, MDMP – military decision-making process, TA – target acquisition Developing Essential Fire Support Tasks 3-69. The purpose of the EFSTs are to ensure that the supported commander's guidance for fires is accomplished. The audience for EFSTs is the supported commander and staff. The EFSTs let the commander know that fires personnel understand and have specific tasks that accomplish the intent for fires. EFSTs drive the development of Annex D. The task describes what effects (for example, delay, disrupt, divert or destroy) fires must create on a target. The purpose describes why the task contributes to commander's objective. The
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Chapter 3 effect quantifies successful accomplishment of the task. Once EFSTs are determined the FSCOORD directs the development of EFATs. For more information on the development of EFSTs and EFATs see annex A. Force Protection 3-70. The MDMP is the initial point to apportion force protection assets for FS assets. This will allow the entire staff to be involved in how it affects the mission. When possible, units should standardize force protection packages for planning purposes. Additionally, these attachments must be listed in coordinating instructions and specific tasks to subordinate units, not simply Annex D, for clarity and adherence to survivability standards. Table 3-8 is an example of force protection package minimums: Table 3-8. Example of minimum force protection package for FA systems Equipment Force Protection Requirement Weapons locating radar section 1 infantry squad or military police section (with transportation). MLRS/HIMARS battalion 1 mechanized infantry platoon per battalion Ammunition cache 1 infantry squad or military police section (with transportation). HIMARS – High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, MLRS – multiple launch rocket system Determine Evaluation Criteria 3-71. Before beginning the war game, FS planners develop evaluation criteria to measure the effectiveness and efficiency of the FS contributions for each COA. They use these to compare courses of action during COA comparison. These criteria are listed in the FS running estimate and become the outline for the COA analysis subparagraphs. The FSCOORD and FSE planning personnel develop the criteria for evaluating the effects of fires by using fires-specific criteria that allow them to explain the FS related advantages and disadvantages of each COA. Evaluation criteria that may help discriminate among various courses of action may include: * Lead time required for implementing EFSTs. * The number of decision points that require FS. * The cost of fires versus the expected benefits. * The risk to friendly assets posed by enemy fires. COURSE OF ACTION ANALYSIS 3-72. COA analysis or war gaming (see table 3-9) identifies which COA accomplishes the mission with minimum risk of casualties while positioning to retain the initiative. The war game provides detail and refinement, validates capabilities, and synchronizes the FS plan. During war gaming and COA comparison the FSCOORD and DFSCOORD must understand and be able to brief the commander on the strengths and weaknesses of each COA from a fire support perspective.
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Fire Support and the Operations Process Table 3-9. Analysis of course of action (wargame) MDMP STEP 4: COURSE OF ACTION ANALYSIS AND WARGAMING Staff Actions Key FSE Actions FSE Output β€’ Gather the tools. β€’ Gather FS running estimate, FS β€’ Refined scheme of fires. β€’ List all friendly forces. portions of event templates, β€’ Refined draft Annex D (FIRES) target value analysis results. See β€’ List assumptions. FM 3-60. and appendices. β€’ List known critical events and β€’ Confirm fire support assets for all β€’ Refined draft fire support execution matrix. decision points. courses of action. β€’ Select the wargaming method. β€’ Validate FS relevant facts and β€’ Refined draft target list worksheet (automated or β€’ Select a technique to record and assumptions. manual) and target overlay. display results. β€’ Validate/refine EFSTs and the β€’ Refined draft targeting β€’ Wargame the operation and FA contribution to EFSTs. synchronization matrix or assess the results. β€’ Validate/refine evaluation criteria modified targeting β€’ Conduct a war-game briefing to measure the effectiveness of synchronization matrix (high- (optional). the FS contributions for each payoff target list, target selection COA. standards, attack guidance β€’ Validate/refine fire support matrix). execution matrix for each COA. β€’ Refined draft FSCMs. β€’ Provide likely adversary FS β€’ Refined draft NAI and TAIs. actions to the G-2; determine where to find and attack enemy fire support capabilities. β€’ Ensure FS is integrated into the commander’s emerging concept of operations throughout the war game. β€’ Formulate a list of advantages and disadvantages of each COA from fire support perspective. β€’ Identify synchronization requirements including modifications to FS coordination and airspace coordinating measures. β€’ Identify decision points, named areas of interest, decisive terrain and additional critical events and how these may influence positioning or posturing of FS assets. β€’ Refine high-value targets, high- payoff targets, the FS portion of event templates, and develop a draft high-payoff target list, target selection standards and attack guidance matrix. β€’ Integrate nonlethal effects to include CEMA into these targeting products. β€’ Provide recommendations for the commander’s attack guidance. β€’ Actively participate in all phases of wargaming. CEMA – cyberspace electromagnetic activities, COA – course of action, EFST – essential fire support task, FA – field artillery, FS – fire support, FSCM – fire support coordination measure, FSE – fire support element, G-2 – assistant chief of staff, intelligence, MDMP – military decision-making process, NAI – named area of interest, TAI – target area of interest
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Chapter 3 COURSE OF ACTION COMPARISON 3-73. During COA comparison (see table 3-10), the corps/division staff compares feasible courses of action to identify the one with the highest probability of success against the most likely enemy COA and the most dangerous enemy COA. The staff evaluates the advantages and disadvantages of each 12 and presents their findings. The staff outlines each COA in terms of the evaluation criteria established before war gaming and identifies the advantages and disadvantages of each with respect to the others. The FS staff records this analysis in paragraph three of the FS running estimate. 3-74. After the analysis, the G-3, G-2, and the FSCOORD compares strengths and weaknesses, highlights advantages and disadvantages from the perspective of the fires warfighting function and other warfighting functions. The staff assess risks and determine which COA promises to be most successful. Table 3-10. Course of action comparison MDMP STEP 5: COURSE OF ACTION COMPARISON Staff Actions Key FSE Actions FSE Output β€’ Conduct advantages and β€’ Participate with staff in β€’ Final drafts of the: disadvantages analysis. comparing strengths, β€’ Scheme of fires. β€’ Compare courses of action. w die sa ak dn ve as ns tae gs e, sa d ov f a Fn Sta fg oe r s e, a a cn hd β€’ Annex D (FIRES) and β€’ Conduct a COA decision COA. appendices. briefing. β€’ Update FS and information- β€’ FSEM related capabilities estimates. β€’ Target list worksheet. β€’ Brief results of FS analysis β€’ Target overlay including best COA from FS β€’ Observer plan perspective. β€’ TSM or modified (HPTL, TSS, β€’ Refine fires paragraphs and and AGM). annexes to include EFSTs, FSEM, target list and overlay, β€’ FSEMs TSM or modified FS products β€’ NAIs and TAIs. (HPTL, TSS, AGM). β€’ Airspace requirements and β€’ Integrate information collection associated recommended capabilities and CEMA input into ACMs. targeting products. β€’ Provide inputs to the information collection plan. β€’ Update FS running estimate. β€’ FSCOORD briefs FS plan for each COA. ACM – airspace coordinating measure, AGM – attack guidance matrix, CEMA – cyberspace electromagnetic activities, COA – course of action, EFST – essential fire support task, FS – fire support, FSE – fire support element, FSCM – fire support coordination measure, FSCOORD – fire support coordinator, FSEM – fire support execution matrix, HPTL – high-payoff target list, MDMP – military decision-making process, NAI – named area of interest, TAI – target area of interest, TSM – target synchronization matrix, TSS – target selection standards COURSE OF ACTION APPROVAL 3-75. The inputs to COA approval and the following step, orders production, are the outputs of COA analysis and comparison. After completing the COA comparison, the corps/division staff identifies its preferred COA (see table 3-11) and recommends it to commander. The FSCOORD translates the recommended COA into a FS recommendation for approval by the commander. The commander approves a COA (as presented, or with any directed modifications). It is a summary of the concept of operations, the scheme of fires, and associated EFSTs including: * Priority of fires. * Allocation of FS resources. * FA organization for combat. * Command and support relationships. * Final HPTL, target selection standards, AGM, or if used the target synchronization matrix.
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Fire Support and the Operations Process Table 3-11. Course of action approval MDMP STEP 6: COURSE OF ACTION APPROVAL Staff Actions Key FSE Actions FSE Output β€’ Recommends a COA, usually β€’ Assess implications and take β€’ For the approved COA: in a decision briefing. actions as necessary to finalize β€’ Refined scheme of fires. β€’ The commander decides which s ine cle luc dt ie nd g s ac th tee nm de a no tf Hfi Pre Ts L, β€’ Refined Annex D (FIRES) and COA to approve. TSS, and AGM. appendices. β€’ The commander issues final β€’ Integrated information β€’ FSEM. planning guidance. collection capabilities and β€’ Target list worksheet. β€’ Issues warning order to CEMA input into these subordinate HQ. targeting products. β€’ Target overlay. β€’ Observer plan. β€’ Participates in COA approval briefing. β€’ TSM or modified (HPTL, TSS, and AGM). β€’ Include scheme of fires and EFSTs. β€’ FSEMs. β€’ The FSCOORD assists the β€’ NAIs and TAIs. commander in the β€’ Airspace requirements and development of the refined associated recommended commander’s intent and ACMs. planning guidance. β€’ Prepare FS portions of warning order including changes to CCIR, risk guidance, time sensitive reconnaissance tasks and EFSTs requiring early initiation. β€’ Prepare tentative FS portions of OPORD. β€’ Participate in rehearsals. ACM – airspace coordinating measure, AGM – attack guidance matrix, CCIR – commander’s critical information requirements, CEMA – cyberspace electromagnetic activities, COA – course of action, EFST – essential fire support task, FS – fire support, FSCM –fire support coordination measures, FSCOORD – fire support coordinator, FSE – fire support element, FSEMs – fire support execution matrix, HPTL – high-payoff target list, MDMP – military decision-making process, NAI – named area of interest, OPORD – operation order, TAI – target area of interest, TSM – target synchronization matrix, TSS – target selection standards 3-76. During the staff's COA approval briefing to the corps/division commander, the FSCOORD briefs the scheme of fires as a part of each COA brief. The level of detail for this brief, including the portion briefed by the FSCOORD varies depending on the commander's level of participation in the war game and any specific briefing requirements that FSCOORD has issued. Normally, the FSCOORD covers the key details of the OPORD scheme of fires subparagraph 3e, emphasizing each EFST and any critical FS restrictions, limitations, or considerations pertinent to that COA. The FSE generally provide a sketch, map overlay, or terrain model to help convey details of the FS plan more clearly. If the FSCOORD perceives the need, they may request for additions or changes to the commander's intent or guidance for FS. 3-77. Once a COA is approved, the commander may refine the commander's intent and issue additional planning guidance. The FSCOORD and FSE prepare the FS portions of the order and participate in the required back-briefs and rehearsals. The warning order issued after COA approval contains information that executing units require to complete planning and preparation. Possible fires input to this warning order includes: * FS contributions to the commander's intent or concept of operations. * Changes to the commander's critical information requirements. * Additional or modified risk guidance. * Time-sensitive reconnaissance tasks and EFSTs requiring early initiation.
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Chapter 3 DEVELOP THE FIRE SUPPORT PLAN AND ORDERS PRODUCTION 3-78. A fire support plan is a plan that addresses each means of fire support available and describes how Army indirect fires, joint fire support, and target acquisition are integrated into operations to facilitate success. An effective fire support plan clearly defines FS requirements and focuses on accomplishing the commander's EFSTs. The fire support plan is an integral part of the OPLAN or OPORD (see table 3-12) and is normally comprised of the fires paragraph in the OPLAN or OPORD and Annex D, FIRES (if used), and its associated appendices, tabs, or enclosures. The FS Plan reflects a detailed understanding of the commander's intent. The FS Plan also requires the expertise necessary to assemble, to coordinate, and to direct appropriate information collection, TA, and attack/delivery systems toward a common objective. Preparation for and execution of the plan also includes the responsibility for both technical and tactical rehearsals. The fire support plan is refined at the lowest level utilizing top-down planning and bottom-up refinement. Table 3-12. Orders production MDMP STEP 7: ORDERS PRODUCTION Staff Actions Key FSE Actions FSE Output β€’ Refines approved course β€’ Expand scheme of fires into full β€’ Warning order to subordinate action into clear concise FS plan, reflecting current and supporting FS assets. concept of operations and events, guidance and β€’ Scheme of fires subparagraph required supporting capabilities. 3e to OPORD. information. β€’ Confirm specific command and β€’ Annex D (FIRES) to division β€’ Develops OPORD. support relationships. OPORD. β€’ Implements risk controls by β€’ FA tactical mission β€’ FSEM. coordinating and integrating assignments. them into appropriate β€’ HPTL, TSS, AGM, and target β€’ EFSTs. paragraphs and graphics of the synchronization matrix. β€’ FS back brief. order. β€’ Integrate information related β€’ Manage refinement. β€’ The commander reviews and activities and CEMA input into β€’ Conduct FS rehearsal. approves order. the targeting products. β€’ Commander briefs subordinate β€’ Information collection commanders and staffs and requirements. conducts confirmation briefings. β€’ Assessment requirements. β€’ Implement hazard controls. β€’ Assist subordinate staff/units with planning and coordination. β€’ Present FS portions of OPLAN or OPORD briefing, including EFSTs. AGM – attack guidance matrix, CEMA – cyberspace electromagnetic activities, EFST – essential fire support task, FA – field artillery, FS – fire support, FSE – fire support element, FSEM – fire support execution matrix, HPTL – high-payoff target list, MDMP – military decision-making process, OPORD – operation order, TSS – target selection standards SECTION III – FIRE SUPPORT PREPARATION 3-79. Fire support preparation facilitates and sustains transitions, including those to branches and sequels. Preparation requires action by fire support personnel at every echelon. Preparation consists of those activities performed by units and Soldiers to improve their ability to execute an operation (ADP 5-0). Preparation creates conditions that improve friendly forces' opportunities for success. It requires commander, staff, unit, and Soldier actions to ensure the force is trained, equipped, and ready to execute operations. Preparation activities help commanders, staffs, and Soldiers understand a situation and their roles in upcoming operations. Mission success depends as much on fire support preparation as on fire support planning and coordination. REHEARSALS 3-80. Rehearsals allow leaders and their Soldiers to practice key aspects of the concept of operations. These actions help Soldiers orient themselves to their environment and other units before executing the operation. Rehearsals help Soldiers build a lasting mental picture of the sequence of key actions within the operation.
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Fire Support and the Operations Process A rehearsal is an effective organizational tool in gaining support, improving strategic and operational understanding, and fostering mutual trust within a commander's sphere of control. The commander and staff are able to visualize the terrain, and enemy and friendly units arranged by military action in time, space, and purpose. For more information on rehearsals see FM 6-0. 3-81. Each rehearsal type achieves a different result and has a specific place in the preparation timeline. Once a rehearsal is complete subordinate leaders must backbrief the commander. The four types of rehearsals are the: * Combined arms rehearsal. * Support rehearsal. * Battle drill or SOP rehearsal. * Conduct CP displacement rehearsals. 3-82. Fire support personnel are involved in every type of rehearsal. Multiple rehearsals ensure that maximum integration and synchronization in supporting the scheme of maneuver with fires. When time is limited, the number and scope of rehearsals are reduced. In these cases, rehearsals may focus on EFSTs or aspects of the supported commander’s plan and the associated FS plan. The FS rehearsal, in coordination with the FA technical rehearsal, should be conducted prior to the combined arms rehearsal and if possible, include members of the operations and intelligence staff and other members of the targeting team. 3-83. Rehearsals are based on a completed OPORD. Units may rehearse a contingency plan to prepare for an anticipated deployment. The rehearsal is a coordination event, not an analysis. It does not replace war- gaming. Commanders avoid making major changes to OPORDs during rehearsals. They make only those changes essential to mission success and risk mitigation. Risk management is the process to identify, assess, and mitigate risks and make decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits (JP 3-0). For more information on risk management see ATP 5-19. BACKBRIEF 3-84. A backbrief is a briefing by subordinates to the commander to review how subordinates intend to accomplish their mission (FM 6-0). These briefs allow commanders to clarify the commander's intent early in subordinate planning. Commanders use the backbrief to identify any problems in the concept of operations and to increase understanding and synchronization through the passage of information. At a minimum the FSCOORD should cover the following items during the backbrief: * Commander's guidance for fires. * Initial scheme of fires. * Priorities of fires by phase. * HPTs. * Initial FSCM recommendations. * Command and support relationship recommendations. 3-85. Backbriefs should not be confused with confirmation briefs that commanders use immediately after issuing a plan to determine how well a subordinate commander understands the mission, task, and/or directive. It differs from a confirmation brief in that leaders are given time to complete their plan rather than briefing the commander immediately following receipt of an order. Typically, the confirmation brief occurs at the conclusion of the orders or OPLAN brief when all subordinate commanders are available. The commander adjourns the session only when they are confident their subordinates understand their mission, and assigned task and purpose, the commander's intent and the higher commander's intent, the concept of operation, scheme of maneuver, priorities, the time plan, and type and location of rehearsals. COMBINED ARMS REHEARSAL 3-86. The combined arms rehearsals are conducted from corps to BN echelon. The fire support plan must be integrated into the combined arms rehearsal. Key fire support personnel representing or supporting the fire support system at the combined arms include the FSCOORD, DFSCOORD, DIVARTY or FAB FSE, JAGIC personnel, BCT FSOs (as available), air defense airspace management and brigade aviation element, ALO,
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Chapter 3 staff weather officer, subordinate and supporting unit FSE representatives, SOF representative, targeting officers, chief of staff, FAB and DIVARTY S-2s, S-3s, S-4s, S-6s. Assigned and attached combined arms units that comprise or support the command will participate when possible. Normally, the chief of staff directs the rehearsal using a synchronization matrix or execution checklist; the FSCOORD or DFSCOORD, should use the fire support execution matrix. 3-87. Usually, the combined arms rehearsal takes place after the Joint Targeting Cycle and Army Targeting Process have commenced. Much of the FS Plan for the operation will be refined based on the ongoing Targeting Cycle to include HPTs, TAIs, ISR plan and allocation, AI nominations, CAS allocations, Priorities of Fire, FSCMS ACMs, and overall scheme of fires. 3-88. For each phase or time period discussed at the combined arms rehearsal, the FSCOORD should ensure the following are integrated: * EFSTs. * HPTs and TAIs. * Trigger points for each target and the target engagement criteria. * Target Acquisition resources and allocation for each HPT/TAI. * Communications plan for each TA resource. * Attack guidance, such as unit(s) to fire, shell and fuze combination, and number of volleys, specified for each target. * Alternate method of attack when GPS enabled weapons are primary and the area becomes denied, degraded, and disrupted. * FSCMs and ACMs including triggers for moving FSCMs. * Priorities of fire. * Fire support attack/delivery systems (lethal and nonlethal) available and allocated for each HPT/TAI. * Rear Area FS plan. * CAS, AI, and SCAR apportionment, allocation, and request processes. FIRE SUPPORT REHEARSAL 3-89. The FS rehearsal is a support rehearsal. It should occur before the combined arms rehearsal and ensure the integration and synchronization of the fire support effort with the information collection plan, unit airspace plan, and the supported commander’s plan. As with the combined arms rehearsal, the FS rehearsal likely occurs after the initiation of the targeting process. Fire support rehearsals are more detailed than the combined arms rehearsal and serve to refine the fire support plan and fire support execution matrix with the supported unit and prove the feasibility of executing EFSTs. If it is held before the combined arms rehearsal, changes from the combined arms rehearsal may require a second FS rehearsal. A fire support rehearsal may include all key supported and fire support personnel involved in planning and executing the fire support plan, to include the supporting FA unit CPs, the corps or division commander or his deputies, FSCOORD, DFSCOORD, JAGIC personnel, chief of staff, the G-3, the G-2, the G-4, the G-6, staff judge advocate (SJA), targeting officer, ALO, TACP representative, the FAIO, and liaison officers. There is also a requirement for SOF representation, FSOs, and unified action partners as necessary. For more information on FS rehearsals see FM 6-0, ATP 3-09.23, ATP 3-09.42, and ATP 3-09.90. 3-90. The FSCOORD ensures the following are discussed during the FS rehearsal: * A clear understanding of the supported commander's intent and guidance for FS. * Establishment of TAIs, NAIs, and HPTs that allow for targeting against specific enemy formations in accordance with the commander's targeting guidance (information collection plan). * Airspace integration requirements such as ACMs affecting fires, ensuring FSCMs are added to the unit airspace plan, clearance of fires procedures above and below the coordinating altitude. * Allocated primary and alternate TA and FS attack and delivery capabilities for each TA. * A clear understanding of the scheme of fires. * A clear understanding of the ROE and procedures for clearing fires.
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Fire Support and the Operations Process * PACE plan. * Alternate attack systems to be used in the engagement of specific targets. * Positioning of munitions, observers, and weapon systems. * Execution of EFSTs. * Fire support execution matrix. * Practicality and functionality of FSCMs. * Purpose and triggers of FSCMs. * Clear understanding of attack guidance matrix and target selection standards. * Priority of fires. * FS procedures in the rear area. FIELD ARTILLERY TACTICAL REHEARSALS 3-91. FA tactical rehearsals are support rehearsals that ensure the FA unit OPLAN or OPORD properly plan and synchronize FA tactical fire control. An FA tactical rehearsal may include the FSCOORD/FA Commander, supporting and subordinate firing unit commanders (and staffs), FSOs, key firing unit staff to include the S-2, S-3, S-4, S-6, SJA, Fire Control and Fire Direction personnel, select observers, and the radar platoon leader. These personnel must be thoroughly familiar with clearance of fires procedures, restrictive and permissive FSCMs, FA target lists and schedules, trigger points and events, movement and displacement plans, combat service support provisions, and C2, and communications handover requirements. The FA Commander also ensures the following are discussed during the FA tactical rehearsal: * Scheme of maneuver, friendly, and enemy actions that initiate each phase. * Enemy situation. * Concept of operations. * Commander's guidance for fires. * EFSTs. * FA organization for combat and command and support relationships. * Required supply rate and CSR implications. * Tactical execution of FA essential tasks, the FA support matrix, schedules of fires, and schedules of targets - primary and backup methods. * Tactical fire control and mission routing procedures. * Clearance of fires requirements and procedures. * Commander's attack criteria and priority of fires considerations. * Effectiveness of FA movement and positioning plans, primary and alternate, for firing, control, and sustainment elements. * Targeting, counterfire, and suppression enemy air defense (SEAD) operations. * WLR positions and zones. * Mutual support and continuity operations. * Communications requirements - use and positioning of retransmission equipment, use of voice versus digital. Utilizing a PACE plan. * Survey requirements. * Timing and synchronization of FA efforts with maneuver, maritime, space, cyberspace, and airspace operations. * Clear understanding of ROE and procedures for clearing fires. * MET requirements. * Resupply triggers, especially for low-density munitions. * CBRN decontamination operations. * Protection requirements for FA units (infantry, ADA, engineer, military police). * Ensure protection battle drills are developed and rehearsed to account for reaction to enemy air, ground, CBRN, indirect fire, jamming, or CEMA attacks.
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Chapter 3 * Reconstitution procedures. FIELD ARTILLERY TECHNICAL REHEARSALS 3-92. FA technical rehearsals are support rehearsals that ensure the supported higher HQ' fire support plan will be executed by the FSEs, fire control elements, the JAGIC, and subordinate FA unit's OPLAN or OPORD properly addresses FA technical fire direction and exercise the technical fire direction process. It is a network rehearsal technique. FA technical rehearsals focus include: * Technical execution of FA essential tasks and the FA support matrix - digital links and primary and backup methods. Integration of voice and digital operations. Rehearsal of backups includes evaluation of reactions to catastrophic loss of digital or voice capability. * Integration of tactical and technical fire control processes and computation of firing solutions, to include the communication and interaction among the FSEs, fire direction, and firing elements. * Identification of technical fire direction issues - site to crest, high-angle fire, minimum safe distance, target, ammunition, range, FSCM and ACM conflicts. * Digital database verification - setup, communications, positions, FSCMs, ACMs, target and attack guidance, mission routing and intervention points, target list, and scheduling data. * Digital continuity of operations - actions for minor and catastrophic failure. * Digital interface requirements -fire direction system, digital version differences, and any other digital systems, including Air Force, Navy, Marine, and multinational unified action partners. * Technical rehearsal of the echelons above brigade TA capability sensor-to-shooter links. 3-93. Safeguards must be taken to prevent live rounds from being fired at technical rehearsal targets while maintaining the capability to react to real threats. Units must retain the ability to terminate or postpone rehearsals instantly when an actual fire mission needs to be processed. FIRE SUPPORT BATTLE DRILL OR STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES REHEARSALS 3-94. FS related battle drills or SOPs should be rehearsed either independent from the above rehearsals or preferably, integrated as vignettes into the combined arms rehearsal and FS Rehearsal. Examples include: * Clearance of fires (air and ground). * Cross boundary fires. * Unplanned SCAR procedures and coordinated attack see ATP 3-60.2. * Counterfire. * FSCM movement triggers. * Reconstitution operations. SECTION IV – FIRE SUPPORT EXECUTION 3-95. FS execution begins when the supported commander issues the execute order for the operation to commence and continues until the operation is terminated or the mission is accomplished. FSCOORDs and their staffs simultaneously support the supported commander's plan while continuing the planning process for subsequent operations. PRINCIPLES OF FIRE SUPPORT EXECUTION 3-96. The FSCOORD uses the principles of FS execution to anticipate the dynamics of large-scale combat operations, maintain situational awareness of the OE, and leverage interoperable FS C2 systems and attack/delivery capabilities. FS planners utilize the memory aid AWIFM-N to remember the FS execution principles and communicate their status to the supported commander: * Adequate Fire Support for the Committed Units. FS personnel use the allocation of CAS, attack aviation and nonlethal capabilities to ensure adequate FS for committed units. Adequate Fire Support for the Committed Units. FS personnel make use of available FA assets and the allocation of CAS, attack aviation, and nonlethal capabilities to ensure adequate FS for committed units. In
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Fire Support and the Operations Process large-scale combat operations, the minimum adequate FA support for committed units is normally one FA BN for each committed brigade. * Weight to the main effort. The main effort is a designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given point in time is most critical to overall mission success (ADP 3-0). The purpose for weighting the main effort is to concentrate the effects of combat power at the most advantageous place and time. The main effort can be weighted in a variety of ways. The main effort or the decisive operation can be weighted in a variety of ways with FS: ο‚§ Allocation of additional lethal and nonlethal FS attack/delivery systems. ο‚§ Command and support relationships designated to expedite execution of attack. ο‚§ Ammunition allocation. ο‚§ Focused TA assets. ο‚§ Priorities of fires. * Immediately available fire support for the commander to influence the operation. This can be accomplished through proper allocation of CAS, armed UAS, and attack aviation retained by the appropriate commander. Sufficient FS resources to include FA are normally retained under centralized control to concentrate fires at the decisive place and time. Establish FA support relationships of GS and GSR (discussed in Chapter 4) to enhance flexibility and facilitate the ability to provide immediately responsive fires. The supported commander lifts or shifts the priority of fires to exploit opportunities as they are presented. This is essential to ensure success in the face of unforeseen events. * Facilitate future operations. To ensure smooth transition from one phase of an operation to another during execution and planning. This principle can be implemented through the assignment of command and support relationships, positioning of artillery, positioning of ammunition, and positioning of TA assets. The assignment of an on-order mission or command and support relationship allows a unit to anticipate FS attack/delivery system support need in a future situation. Applying limitations on ammunition expenditure in an earlier phase of an operation in order to support the future main effort is another way of facilitating future operations. * Maximum feasible centralized control. The optimum degree of centralized control varies with each tactical situation. A higher degree of centralized control may be appropriate in a defensive situation, since the enemy has the initiative, and it is difficult to accurately predict where and when they will attack. The FSCOORD must anticipate and plan for the transition to offensive operations for a lesser degree of centralized control because the supported force has the initiative. * Never leave artillery in reserve. In large-scale combat operations, commanders (advised by their FSCOORDs) ensure FA units (MLRS, HIMARS, and cannons) always remain in the fight. This is accomplished by continuously adapting command and support relationships and also by continuously repositioning fires capabilities to create desired effects. Refer to the principle of "facilitate future operations" when applying this execution principle. INTEGRATION OF FIRE SUPPORT AND AIRSPACE CONTROL/MANAGEMENT DURING EXECUTION 3-97. Airspace control is the exercise of delegated authority over designated airspace and users through control procedures and coordination measures to maximize operational effectiveness (JP 3-52). Airspace control relies upon airspace management capabilities provided by airspace control elements. Plans and procedures that support airspace control and airspace management activities are addressed throughout the operations process and are approved by the JFC or the designated airspace control authority. An airspace control system that promotes decentralized execution by utilizing the capabilities of airspace control elements in assigned sectors improves responsiveness and flexibility to rapidly execute fire missions and coordinate airspace users' activities inside a manageable volume of airspace. 3-98. Clearance of fires during current operations are streamlined when ground force commanders properly plan for airspace use and implement the JAGIC TTP. The JAGIC is recognized by the joint force as an airspace control element of the airspace control system with delegated decentralized execution authority inside an assigned volume of airspace. The Army primarily uses procedural control to control forces and