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3-09 | 198 | Appendix B
Figure B-15. Position area for artillery example
B-58. The PAA is graphically portrayed by a solid black line defining the area and the letters "PAA" within,
followed by the establishing HQ and the effective date-time-group (FM 1-02.2). Based on the commander’s
guidance and FSCOORD input, the maneuver echelon operations officer (G-3 or S-3) establishes PAAs
within the unit AO.
B-59. The artillery unit occupies but does not control the PAA and has neither the authority nor
responsibilities that are associated with a unit assigned an AO. For example, other units can move through a
PAA without clearing that movement with the occupying artillery unit. The artillery unit occupying a PAA
establishes liaison with the unit with authority for the AO where the PAA is located. The echelon FSO is
usually responsible for liaison in accordance with standard command and support relationships.
B-60. The decision to establish a PAA affects airspace control and coordination for rotary-, fixed-wing, and
tilt-rotor aircraft integration. A PAA is a base upon which to establish future gun-target lines for lateral
deconfliction and areas for rotary-, fixed-wing, and tilt rotor aircraft to avoid, depending on high- or low-
angle artillery fires. For more information on PAAs see ADP 3-90.
SECTION IV – TARGET ACQUISITION
B-61. The designation of radar zones provides a means of prioritizing TA radar sectors of search into areas
of greater or lesser importance. Zones focus radar coverage on the combined arms commander's battlefield
priorities. A radar zone is a geometric figure placed around an area that designates the area as more, or less,
important. There are four different types of zones used with the radar:
* Critical friendly zone.
* Call for fire zone.
* Artillery target intelligence zone.
* Censor zone.
CRITICAL FRIENDLY ZONE
B-62. A critical friendly zone a commander designated friendly area of coverage critical to the
protection of an asset whose loss would seriously jeopardize the mission that is employed by weapons
locating radar. A CFZ is graphically portrayed (see figure B-16) by a solid black line defining the area and
the letters "CF ZONE," followed by the identifying name within, plus the effective date-time-group. |
3-09 | 199 | Fire Support Coordination Measures
B-63. The CFZ requires a minimum of 3 and a maximum of six anchor points to define the boundary of the
area. The size and shape of the CFZ is determined by the anchor points and may be circular, rectangular, or
irregular. When possible, the effective date-time-group (moveable and scalable) should be placed within the
graphic boundary, but it may be placed outside the graphic or within a computer drop box if necessary.
Figure B-16. Critical friendly zone example
B-64. CFZs may be phased along the maneuver axis of advance and activated when entered by friendly
forces. This is particularly important in those areas where friendly forces are most vulnerable (for example,
river-crossing sites and areas open to easy visual observation). Typical CFZs include maneuver assembly
areas, CPs, forward arming and refueling points, friendly breaching sites and other troop concentrations. The
supported 072508 commander may also designate critical civilian infrastructure as a CFZ.
B-65. Designation of a CFZ requires WLR coverage of the designated area and attack/delivery assets to
provide counterfire. The supporting FA unit's automated FS system places any WLR acquired enemy indirect
fire into a CFZ in priority ahead of all other counterfire targets with an immediate call for fire.
CALL FOR FIRE ZONE
B-66. A call for fire zone is a weapon locating radar search area from which the commander wants to
attack hostile firing systems. A CFFZ would be placed around an enemy FS position identified as a HPT.
The CFFZ provides the second most responsive priority for fires from the radars.
B-67. On the basis of IPOE and other target indicators, CFFZs are used to monitor suspect areas from which
threat indirect fires may jeopardize the mission. Establishing a CFFZ will facilitate immediate counterfire of
enemy artillery disrupting the friendly scheme of maneuver.
B-68. A CFFZ is graphically portrayed (see figure B-17 on page B-22) by a solid black line defining the area
and the letters "CFF ZONE," followed by the establishing HQ within, plus the effective date-time-group. The
CFFZ requires a minimum of three and a maximum of six anchor points to define the boundary of the area.
The size and shape of the CFFZ is determined by the anchor points and may be circular, rectangular, or
irregular. When possible, the effective date-time-group (moveable and scalable) should be placed within the
graphic boundary, but it may be placed outside the graphic if necessary. |
3-09 | 200 | Appendix B
Figure B-17. Call for fire zone example
ARTILLERY TARGET INTELLIGENCE ZONE
B-69. An artillery target intelligence zone is a weapons locating radar search area in enemy territory
that the commander monitors closely to detect and report any weapon ahead of all acquisitions other
than those from critical friendly zones or call for fire zones.
B-70. Artillery target intelligence zones may be established in areas where we are not sure about threat
indirect fires and need to develop the situation. They can also be used in areas of suspect threat indirect fires
that the commander wishes to monitor closely but are out of friendly indirect fire range. When possible, the
effective date-time-group (moveable and scalable) should be placed within the graphic boundary, but it may
be placed outside the graphic if necessary.
B-71. An artillery target intelligence zone is graphically portrayed (see figure B-18) by a solid black line
defining the area and the letters "ATI," followed by the establishing HQ within plus the effective date-time-
group. The artillery target intelligence zone requires a minimum of three and a maximum of six anchor points
to define the boundary of the area. The size and shape of the CFFZ is determined by the anchor points and
may be circular, rectangular, or irregular. |
3-09 | 201 | Fire Support Coordination Measures
Figure B-18. Artillery target intelligence zone
CENSOR ZONE
B-72. A censor zone is an area from which the weapons locating radar is prohibited from reporting
acquisitions. Normally placed around friendly weapon systems to prevent them from being acquired by
friendly radars. The censor zone can be used to prevent WLRs from reporting acquisitions from other
sensitive areas as well.
B-73. A censor zone is graphically portrayed (see figure B-19 on page B-24) by a solid black line defining
the area and the words "CENSOR ZONE," followed by the defining characteristic within, plus the effective
date-time-group. The censor zone requires a minimum of three and a maximum of six anchor points to define
the boundary of the area. The size and shape of the CFFZ is determined by the anchor points and may be
circular, rectangular, or irregular. When possible, the effective date-time-group (moveable and scalable)
should be placed within the graphic boundary, but it may be placed outside the graphic if necessary. |
3-09 | 202 | Appendix B
Figure B-19. Censor zone example
COMMON SENSOR BOUNDARY
B-74. Target duplication between radars is likely during combat operations. In addition, the sheer volume of
targets being passed from the radars will overwhelm the targeting element, especially if the radars are under
centralized control.
B-75. An effective method of reducing the duplication of these targets for attack is to establish a common
sensor boundary (see figure B-20). A common sensor boundary is a line depicted by a series of grid
coordinates, grid line, phase line, or major terrain feature that divides target acquisition search areas
into radar acquisition management areas. |
3-09 | 203 | Fire Support Coordination Measures
Figure B-20. Common sensor boundary example
SECTION V – AIRSPACE CONTROL
B-76. Airspace control increases operational effectiveness by promoting the safe, efficient, and flexible use
of airspace while minimizing restraints on airspace users. Airspace control includes coordinating, integrating,
and regulating airspace to increase operational effectiveness.
B-77. Airspace control is essential to overall military effectiveness and in achieving JFC objectives. Given
the speed, range, and physical characteristics of air operations, ACMs are integrated into operations to
deconflict airspace users and decrease the potential for unintended engagements against friendly, civil, and
neutral aircraft. For more information on airspace control see JP 3-52.
AIRSPACE COORDINATING MEASURES
B-78. A key to effectively coordinating joint fires is to constantly view the OA as a three-dimensional area.
ACMs are nominated from subordinate HQ through component command HQ and forwarded to the airspace
control authority in accordance with the airspace control plan. Airspace coordinating measures are measures
employed to facilitate the efficient use of airspace to accomplish missions and simultaneously provide
safeguards for friendly forces (JP 3-52).
B-79. Most ACMs affect direct and indirect joint fires trajectories and UAS because of their airspace use.
The establishment of ACMs in coordination with FSCMs results in the most efficient use of airspace for all
friendly airspace users. Some ACMs may be established to permit surface joint fires or UAS operations. The
component commanders ensure that ACMs nominations support and do not conflict with joint operations
prior to forwarding the nominations to the joint AOC. The airspace control authority approves formal ACM
nominations and includes them in the ACO. The airspace control authority is the commander designated for
overall responsibility for airspace control (JP 3- 52). |
3-09 | 204 | Appendix B
B-80. The airspace control authority consolidates, coordinates, and deconflicts the airspace requirements of
the components and publishes the ACMs in the ACO. The ACO is normally published at least daily.
B-81. An airspace control order is an order implementing the airspace control plan that provides the details
of the approved requests for airspace coordinating measures (JP 3-52). It is published either as part of the
ATO, or as a separate document.
B-82. An ATO is a method used to task and disseminate to components, subordinate units, and C2 agencies
projected sorties, capabilities, or forces to targets and specific missions. The ATO normally provides specific
instructions to include call signs, targets, controlling agencies, as well as general instructions. For more
information on conduct and control of air operations see JP 3-52 and JP 3-30.
Note. Altitude typically refers to the height above sea level of a given point. Personnel must ensure
the altitude is correctly displayed in accordance with their system requirements. Some systems
may require altitude to be expressed as height above ellipsoid while others may require expression
in relation to mean sea level. Some systems may require conversion from ft to m to permit system
entry. FS personnel must also be aware that altitude is sometimes expressed as measured from
ground level rather than mean sea level.
B-83. Army commanders use ACMs to facilitate the efficient use of airspace and simultaneously provide
safeguards for friendly forces. Procedural control ACMs are used to delineate an airspace boundary or define
airspace dimensions for enabling other systems (such as FS systems) to discriminate friendly coordination
joint engagement measures from enemy, employ fires across boundaries, and coordinate joint attack of targets
for a particular operation. The ACMs that frequently affect FS include the airspace coordination area, the
coordinating altitude, and the restricted operations zone (ROZ). Those are discussed here. For more
information on additional ACMs see FM 3-52 and JP 3-52.
B-84. An airspace coordination area is a three-dimensional block of airspace in a target area, established by
the appropriate commander, in which friendly aircraft are reasonably safe from friendly surface fires. (JP 3-
09.3).
B-85. A formal airspace coordination area requires detailed planning. Vital information defining the formal
airspace coordination area includes minimum and maximum altitudes, a baseline designated by grid
coordinates at each end, the width (on either side of the baseline), and the effective times. When time for
coordination is limited, an informal airspace coordination area is used. In an informal airspace coordination
area, aircraft and surface joint fires may be separated by time or distance (lateral, altitude, or a combination
of the two). The supported commander requesting CAS or employing helicopters can request an informal
airspace coordination area; the informal airspace coordination area is approved at BN or higher level. Both
types of airspace coordination areas are constructed with the assistance of the ALO to ensure they meet the
technical requirements of the aircraft and weapon systems.
B-86. Army aviation, ADA, military intelligence, maneuver, UAS, EW assets, FS, and joint and
multinational air and ground forces all use airspace. Because they are not organized, trained, and equipped
to conduct airspace control, BCT and lower commander's exercise airspace management as part of a division's
airspace control within division assigned airspace. Airspace control maximizes the simultaneous use of
airspace. At decisive moments, commanders can exploit all available combat power synchronized in time,
space, and purpose.
B-87. Fires are airspace users. Clearance of fires maximizes damage to enemy capabilities while minimizing
the risk of damage to friendly forces and non-combatants. Clearance of fires may be accomplished through
a staff process, control measures, embedded in automation systems, active or passive recognition systems, or
a combination thereof.
B-88. A formal airspace coordination area is graphically shown (see figure B-6 on page B-25) as an area
enclosed by a solid black line. Depicted inside the enclosed area are airspace coordination area (known as
"ACA,") the establishing HQ, the minimum and maximum altitudes, the grid coordinates for each end of the
baseline and the width of the airspace coordination area, the grid coordinates for each point of an irregularly |
3-09 | 205 | Fire Support Coordination Measures
shaped airspace coordination area, and the effective date-time group or the words "on-order." Informal
airspace coordination areas are not normally displayed on maps, charts, or overlays.
COORDINATING ALTITUDE
B-89. The coordinating altitude is an airspace coordinating measure that uses altitude to separate users and
as the transition between different airspace control elements (JP 3-52). Examples of Army airspace control
elements include ADA and Army corps, division airspace elements. Army echelons incorporate airspace
control plan guidance and integrate the ACO, area air defense plan, special instructions, and the ATO via
OPORDs. All airspace users should coordinate with the appropriate airspace control elements when
transitioning through or firing through the coordinating altitude.
B-90. The requirement to integrate airspace use in support of ground fire missions requires the determination
of the firing locations, the impact location, and the airspace that will be transited by the projectile during
flight. Those projectile parameters are integrated with other airspace users. Service liaisons and airspace
control agencies work closely to ensure that appropriate ACMs and FSCMs integrate surface operations and
airspace operations.
COORDINATION LEVEL
B-91. Coordination level is an airspace coordinating measure below which fixed-wing aircraft normally will
not fly (JP 3-52). To prevent friendly fire incidents and manage operational risk, all airspace users should
coordinate with the appropriate airspace control elements when flying or firing through a coordination level.
RESTRICTED OPERATIONS ZONE
B-92. The restricted operations zone is airspace reserved for specific activities in which the operations of
one or more airspace users is restricted (JP 3-52). Some typical uses are to restrict air operations over artillery
launch and target areas, UAS launch, and recovery areas and areas identified by the area air defense
commander as "weapon free" zones.
B-93. A ROZ is graphically shown as an area enclosed by a solid black line. Depicted inside the enclosed
area are "ROZ," the establishing HQ, the minimum and maximum altitudes, the grid coordinates for each end
of the baseline, figure outline grid coordinates, or the center point grid coordinate and radius in m, and the
effective date-time group or the words "on-order."
B-94. For more information on the airspace coordination area, coordinating altitude, ROZ, and other ACMs,
see FM 3-52, ATP 3-52.1, JP 3-09.3, and JP 3-52. |
3-09 | 207 | Appendix C
Denied, Degraded and Disrupted Operations
To effectively operate in denied, degraded, and disrupted environments Commanders
must drive training conditions based on the expected conditions in the OE. This chapter
is an example on how to plan for and train to maintain firing capabilities when all
capabilities are not fully functional. Section I describes the types of degraded
conditions. Section II describes the five requirements for accurate predicted fire during
degraded, disrupted or denied operations.
SECTION I – TYPES OF DENIED, DEGRADED, AND DISRUPTED
CONDITIONS
C-1. The TTP required to conduct denied, degraded, and disrupted operations are perishable skills. It is
imperative that unit leaders institute training programs to conduct operations under all conditions in order to
maintain proficiency and sustain the FS systems ability to continuously support operations.
C-2. As we become more reliant on technology to perform operational tasks, we also become more
susceptible to single points of failures within our system of systems. To counter this we must be prepared to
fight without technology. To ensure organizations can maintain full mission capability in degraded
operations, proper planning and rehearsals at all organizational levels are essential to ensure FS for maneuver
forces within the OE. Denied, degraded, or disrupted space operational environment is a composite of those
conditions and influences in which space-enabled capabilities have been impaired by hostile threats or non-
hostile means (FM 3-14).
THE THREAT TO COMMUNICATIONS
C-3. Enemies and adversaries may seek to contest the use of the information environment as a means of
denying operational access and diminishing the capability of the US and multinational forces. The ability to
perform C2 and communicate with globally deployed forces is a key enabler for protection of US national
interests and, as such, is also a key target for adversaries.
C-4. Enemies and adversaries may deliberately attempt to deny friendly use of the EMS, space, cyberspace,
and terrestrial systems. Due to our heavy joint reliance on advanced communications systems, such an attack
may be a central element of any enemy or adversary A2 and AD strategy, requiring a higher degree of
protection for friendly C2 systems and planning for operations in a denied or degraded environment (JP 6-
0).
C-5. Peer and near-peer adversaries have demonstrated hybrid threat capabilities that threaten the Army's
dominance in cyberspace and the EMS. Communications are a key enabler; therefore, communication and
information networks present a high-value target for enemies and adversaries. Our peer threats understand
the extent of U.S. forces' reliance on satellite communication systems. Enemies and adversaries will contest
the information environment to deny operational access and diminish the effectiveness of our forces.
C-6. Space weather can adversely impact communications systems, to include satellite communications,
GPS, missile warning, and space surveillance and reconnaissance. Knowledge of space weather effects
enables forces to mitigate operational impacts during forecast periods of reduced communications
availability. |
3-09 | 208 | Appendix C
MAINTENANCE OR SYSTEM FAULT
C-7. Another possible reason to operate degraded is because a piece of automated fire control system
temporarily goes down for a maintenance related issue. Unit level TTP, battle drills, and SOPs can allow the
units to reciprocally lay a howitzer, transfer the howitzer or launchers to another FDC, or switch to a backup
piece of fire control equipment. All in order to maintain fires and TA capability.
C-8. Unit TTP and SOPs for maintenance related work arounds vary by the type of equipment and the nature
of the fault. Self-locating howitzers are able to reciprocally lay with another howitzer in order to maintain
firing capability, while a radar system may have to rely on another system to fill its mission while the fault
is being repaired.
THE THREAT TO GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEMS
C-9. One of the greatest threats is a persistent disruption of the GPS affecting positioning, navigation, and
timing in operations. Timing, especially for secure communications, can be controlled by the net control
station and pushed to subordinate radios. Units must ensure they load the proper communications security
(referred to as COMSEC) into their GPS systems to help prevent degradations in the signal quality and
provide the most accurate data possible.
C-10. Pre-combat checks and pre-combat inspections should be performed to ensure GPS receivers are
keyed. A DAGR is keyed through the J1 connector for loading the crypto variable key. DAGRs utilize over-
the-air distribution for updates once they have been physically keyed. DAGRs should be powered on at least
once a month to ensure the updated keys are downloaded. Leaders should verify these checks are being
performed.
C-11. There are multiple technologies and techniques that can be utilized to improve GPS operations when
jamming occurs. The best solution is to use anti jamming equipment if available. If anti jamming equipment
is unavailable, block the signal by placing a barrier (for example, your body) between the device and the
suspected source of jamming. If using your body, slowly pivot 90 degrees every two minutes until the signal
is regained. The EMI emitter is then behind you. Alternatively, the receiver can be placed in a hole six inches
deep. A vehicle hatch may be used as a hole. Allow two minutes for the device to acquire the signal. If neither
of these techniques resolve the issue; move. The emitter is too close for mitigating techniques to have any
effect.
C-12. FA systems can operate in a GPS denied environment. Units must be prepared and trained to execute
their mission using INS, maps, aiming circles and compass when necessary.
THE THREAT TO NETWORK CONNECTIVITY
C-13. Enemy CEMA can disrupt the network affecting key means of communications. Units must ensure
they have an adequate PACE plan. Ensure it is known and rehearsed at all organizational levels in order to
maintain communications and firing capability as long as possible.
C-14. Digital communications are the primary means for transmitting fire commands. If digital
communication is lost or degraded it must be reestablished as soon as possible. Degraded digital
communication uses the AFATDS purely as a technical fire direction computer and the FDC personnel would
transmit the fire command by voice. If one howitzer in the battery or platoon loses digital communications,
the FDC will issue voice commands to that howitzer or the howitzer can fire data from an adjacent section.
If two or more howitzers or launchers lose digital communications, the FDC may direct all howitzers or
launchers to use degraded mode. The howitzers or launchers can then take fire commands by voice only. To
facilitate voice commands, the FDC provides the fire command standards to the section chief after occupation
of the position.
C-15. If digital communication is denied or degraded with the supported element, fire missions, fire plans,
FSCMs, and any other data can be transmitted by voice. If voice communications are not possible courier or
liaison personnel can be utilized. |
3-09 | 209 | Denied, Degraded and Disrupted Operations
TRAINING FOR DENIED, DEGRADED, AND DISRUPTED
OPERATIONS
C-16. Realistic training combined with increased repetitions will improve our leaders and Soldiers ability to
manage operational contingencies and maintain firing capability. Being able to continue to fight while under
D3SOE conditions is an extremely perishable skill and should be trained as a regular part of a unit's annual
cyclic training and certifications. Units must train under D3SOE conditions to include:
* CBRN.
* D3SOE networks.
* D3SOE positioning.
* Navigation and timing.
* D3SOE fire control and fire direction systems.
* D3SOE precision fires.
SECTION II – THE FIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR ACCURATE PREDICTED FIRE
DURING DENIED, DEGRADED, AND DISRUPTED OPERATIONS
C-17. If the requirements for accurate predicted fire cannot be met completely, the firing unit may be required
to use adjust-fire missions to engage targets. Adjust-fire missions can result in reduced effect on the target,
increased ammunition expenditure, and greater possibility that the firing unit will be detected by hostile TA
assets.
C-18. Registrations can be conducted to compute data that will compensate for nonstandard conditions (see
table C-1 on page C-4). There are two types of registrations: precision registration and high-burst or mean-
point-of-impact registration. Applying these corrections to other fire missions will allow the unit to determine
accurate predicted firing data. The purpose of a registration is to determine firing data corrections that will
correct for the cumulative effects of all nonstandard conditions. All registrations yield total corrections. With
these corrections applied to firing data, a unit can rapidly and successfully engage any accurately located
target, subject to range transfer limits and the registration point, and have a first round FFE capability. For
information on registrations see TC 3-09.81. |
3-09 | 210 | Appendix C
Table C-1. The five requirements for accurate predicted fire in fully operational and degraded
operations
Requirements Full operational Degraded methods Potential effects of
capability degradation
Accurate target location Laser designator Map, compass, binoculars Reduction from CAT I – IV
and size /rangefinder TLE to CAT V – VI TLE1
Decreased first round
GPS/INS, PF-D / PF-M
accuracy
Accurate firing unit location GPS/INS survey Aiming circle (direction, Increased occupation
distance, vertical angle times, increased
from known point) counterfire threat
Decreased first round
Map and compass, hasty
accuracy
survey techniques,
registration, observer
adjusts fire
Accurate weapons and Calibration chronograph Predictive muzzle velocity Increased counterfire
munitions information technique, registration, threat, decreased first
observer adjusts fire round accuracy
Accurate meteorological GPS/profiler computer Registration Potential increased fire
information distributed mission processing time
observer adjusts fire
Accurate computational AFATDS, centaur, AFCS Manual fire direction Potential increased fire
procedures mission processing time2
Notes: 1 – Training of observers on degraded methods can improve TLE back to CAT III/IV.
2 – Training of FDC personnel on manual methods can mitigate increase processing time.
ADA – air defense artillery, AFATDS – Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System, AFCS – advanced fire control
system, CAT – category, FDC – fire direction center, GPS – global positioning system, INS – inertial navigation
system, PF-D – precision fires-dismounted, PF-M – precision fires-mounted, TLE – target location error
SECTION III – ACCURATE TARGET LOCATION AND SIZE
ACCURATE TARGET LOCATION AND SIZE
C-19. Accurate target location is critical to achieving effects on targets. The use of position locating systems,
mensuration tools, and laser rangefinders designators operating from known locations are critical to precisely
locating targets. Mensuration is the process of measurement of a feature or location on the Earth to determine
an absolute latitude, longitude, and elevation (JP 3-60). Target coordinate mensuration program is
combination of the following distinct separate critical components and their ability to operate as a whole to
accurately produce mensurated target coordinates: use of one or more National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency (NGA)-validated mensuration tool, a mensuration process, a training syllabus, proficiency
development and maintenance procedures, work center/work environment procedures, access to
imagery, program governance documentation, and certified analysts and/or operators (CJSI 3505.01E).
C-20. When these capabilities are not available and the observer is operating in a degraded mode, the
observer must rely on thorough terrain map study to accurately locate targets. Frequently in these degraded
situations or in emergency situations demanding quick action, the observer may be unable to accurately
locate targets and must correct errors in target location by adjusting fires onto a target, thereby
forfeiting surprise and effects on target. Observers must train and be proficient on using a compass, map,
protractor, and observed fire fans to develop a terrain sketch. They will improve accuracy and improve
speed at which a target can be located. Constant improvement of terrain sketches is a vital skill set that must
be trained and reinforced.
C-21. The observer can obtain an initial location by map-spot and compass, however, should refine
the observation post location and the orientation of the laser rangefinder with more accurate means as
soon as possible. If possible, observer location should be determined by survey. Lacking survey control,
however, the observer has a variety of techniques available to self-locate. An observer should always
use the most accurate means of self-location available that the situation permits in a D3SOE.
C-22. To consistently determine an accurate target location, an observer: |
3-09 | 211 | Denied, Degraded and Disrupted Operations
* Must be prepared to observe with a map and compass.
* Must be able to determine an accurate target location through mensuration using current target
location tools.
* Must be able to use terrain association and map analysis for self-locating procedures.
* Must be able to self-locate to within 10 m (100 m if degraded by lack of position locating systems
or other navigational aids).
* Uses prominent terrain features to relate potential target areas to grid locations on a map.
* Makes a thorough study of terrain by drawing a terrain sketch (in a static location) and visibility
diagram.
* Associates the direction in which the observer is looking with a direction line on the map.
* Ensures that a planned target is always a recognizable point on the ground (except "cannot
observe" missions). This ensures that the observer can consistently find the target location.
C-23. Observers sometimes use a FS vehicle equipped with the Fire Support Surveillance Sensor (referred
to as an FS3) to assist them in locating the target. Binoculars used in conjunction with the M2 magnetic
compass are excellent devices to assist the observer in locating the target. In a GPS denied or degraded
operation the FS vehicles are equipped with an inertial location and navigation system that allow for accurate
position and direction information even after movements over large amounts of terrain.
C-24. The observer can also self-locate by using map spot, resection, or a one burst artillery round. The
preferred method of self-location uses the most current digital forward entry device. For more information
accurate target location and the observer see ATP 3-09.30.
ACCURATE FIRING UNIT LOCATION
C-25. The FA commander is responsible for accurate firing unit location for all indirect fire weapon systems.
The components of accurate firing unit location are position, direction, and altitude. The most accurate
available survey equipment and on-board navigation systems are the primary means to achieve the accuracy
standards listed above. The FDC can also determine the grid location of each piece by using the reported
direction, distance, and vertical angle for each piece from the aiming circle used to lay the battery. For more
information on the accurate firing unit location standards see ATP 3-09.02.
SURVEY
C-26. Survey provides indirect fire platforms as well as target locating assets with a common position and
direction (common grid). With the proliferation of GPS technology in conjunction with onboard navigation
systems, desired location accuracy is easily attained. However, while the proliferation of these systems
facilitates self-location, it places on the FA commander the additional responsibility to ensure that enough
survey control points exist throughout the AO to maintain common grid.
C-27. There is no longer a military occupational specialty dedicated solely to survey. This creates a need to
train non-survey soldiers on how to operate the survey equipment. The commander designates the personnel
to train and form the survey team. The survey team provides survey for the unit. The survey equipment is
assigned to the FA BN.
C-28. The field notes of any survey are the only original record of the survey that the survey party has once
it leaves the field. Therefore, the field notebook must contain a complete record of all measurements made
or determined during the progress of the survey. It should include complete sketches, descriptions, and
remarks, when necessary, to clarify the notes. The best survey fieldwork is of no value to the using unit if the
notes are not accurate, legible, and complete in every detail.
HASTY SURVEY
C-29. Determining location when survey or GPS equipment are not available, the desired location may be
determined through a graphic resection or graphic traverse. For more information on procedures for
determining location, see ATP 3-09.50. |
3-09 | 212 | Appendix C
DIRECTION
C-30. Direction is the most important element of survey control. The mil relation formula states that one mil
of error in direction at 1,000 m will result in a one-meter lateral deviation from the target. As the range
increases, so does the deviation.
C-31. FA personnel will use the M2A2 aiming circle to perform directional control in a GPS degraded,
disrupted, or denied environment. Soldiers can perform directional observations using the sun and stars.
Soldiers can also provide directional control using a declinated lensatic or M2 compass.
Note. Units equipped with the gun laying and positioning system have an organic capability to
establish an orienting station and end of the orienting line for the unit.
ARTILLERY ASTRONOMIC OBSERVATION USING THE SUN
C-32. Using the aiming circle in the artillery astronomic method of determining azimuth; two sides of the
Pole-Zenith Star triangle, the polar distance and colatitude, and one angle are used to solve for the azimuth
angle. This computation is based on the time of the observation. The problem of determining azimuth consists
of taking a horizontal reading at the observer's station between the mark and sun, the azimuth of which can
be computed. The simple operation of subtracting this horizontal angle from the computed azimuth of the
sun gives the desired azimuth to the mark. For more information on this procedure see ATP 3-09.02.
CAUTION
The sun must never be viewed through the telescope without a sun filter.
The filter should be inspected before use to ensure that the coated
surface is free from scratches or other defects.
Serious eye damage will result if proper precautions are not taken. If the
sun filter has been damaged or lost, a solar observation may be
completed by use of the card method. The image of the sun is projected
onto a card held 3 to 6 inches behind the eyepiece and the telescope is
focused so that the cross hairs are clearly defined.
ARTILLERY ASTRONOMIC OBSERVATION USING A STAR
C-33. The artillery astronomic method can be used with observations on Polaris or on east-west stars. Used
with Polaris, this method yields the most accurate azimuths. When the artillery astronomic method is used
with east-west stars, the requirement for accurate time is a disadvantage, but the method can be used when
no stars meet the position requirements for the altitude method. Computation of artillery astronomic star is
the same as the computations for artillery astronomic sun. For more information on artillery astronomic
observation see ATP 3-09.02.
MEASURING AN AZIMUTH WITH THE M2 COMPASS
C-34. To read the azimuth scale by reflection, hold the compass in both hands at eye level with arms braced
against body and with the rear sight nearest your eyes. Place the cover at an angle of approximately 45° to
the face of the compass so that the scale reflection can be viewed in the mirror. Level the instrument by
viewing the circular level in the mirror. Sight on the desired object and read the azimuth indicated on the
reflected azimuth scale by the south-seeking (black) end of the compass needle. For more information on
measuring an azimuth with the M2 compass see ATP 3-09.50
C-35. The M2 compass is an alternate instrument for orienting or laying howitzers. The unmounted magnetic
compass is a multipurpose instrument used to obtain angle of site and azimuth readings. |
3-09 | 213 | Denied, Degraded and Disrupted Operations
C-36. This method of lay is used during a deliberate occupation when an aiming circle is not available. The
M2 compass is used to lay one howitzer. Once laid for direction, that howitzer is used to reciprocally lay the
remaining howitzers.
C-37. The steps for laying with the M2 compass are as follows:
* Place the M2 compass on a stable object (such as a collimator cover, and aiming circle tripod, or
a mattock handle) away from magnetic attractions.
* Measure the azimuth to the pantel of the howitzer to be laid.
* Determine the deflection to the howitzer by subtracting the azimuth of fire from the measured
azimuth.
C-38. This method of lay has advantages and disadvantages that must be considered before it is used.
* The main advantage to using this method is that all howitzers will be oriented parallel.
* Disadvantages are the compass is graduated every 20 mils and can be read to an accuracy of 10
mils. The accuracy depends a great deal on the ability of the instrument operator.
Note. A mil is a unit of measure for angles that is based on the angle subtended by l/6400 of the
circumference of a circle (TC 3-09.81). The mil is used because of its accuracy and the mil relation
formula, which assumes that an angle of one mil will subtend an arc of one meter at a distance of
1,000 m. The graphic representation of a mil is a lower-case letter "m" with a virgule (/) through
it.
MEASURING AN AZIMUTH USING AIMING POINT-DEFLECTION METHOD
C-39. The aiming point-deflection method of lay is used during an emergency fire mission when the need to
expedite the mission is more critical than the need for first-round accuracy. A distant aiming point is required
and must be at least 1,500 m from the position. All howitzers must be able to pick up a line of sight to the
distant aiming point. A compass, or a map and protractor are the only equipment needed. For more
information on measuring an azimuth using an aiming point-deflection method see ATP 3-09.50.
MEASURING AN AZIMUTH USING COLLIMATOR AND AIMING POSTS
C-40. The collimator is the primary aiming point for the howitzer. The emplacement distance for the
collimator will vary because of terrain encountered but is normally between 4 and 15 m from the howitzer.
Displacement is corrected by matching the numbers in the panoramic telescope with the corresponding
numbers in the collimator. If the collimator is not emplaced within the distances stated above, the graduations
visible in the collimator will not align properly and the sight picture will be out of focus. Therefore, it will
be impossible to correct for displacement.
C-41. The aiming posts are a secondary aiming point for the howitzer. The aiming posts are emplaced
approximately 50 and 100 m from the gun for the M119-series and M109-series howitzer, or 75 and 150 m
for the M777-series howitzer. The increased spacing of the M777-series howitzer's aiming posts is due to the
pivot point of that weapon system. When firing out of traverse missions, the gunner can lose sight of the
aiming posts at the shorter distances. Increasing the distance of the aiming posts addresses the problem. For
more information on measuring an azimuth using the collimator and aiming posts see ATP 3-09.50.
MEASURING AN AZIMUTH USING THE RECIPROCAL LAYING METHOD
C-42. Reciprocal laying is a procedure by which the 0-3200 line of one instrument and the 0-3200 line of
another weapons on the azimuth of fire. The aiming circle is used to measure horizontal clockwise angles
from the line of fire instrument are laid parallel.
C-43. The aiming circle is the primary means by which the cannon battery orients weapons on the azimuth
of fire. The azimuth of fire is the direction, expressed in mils, that a fire unit is laid (oriented) on when it
occupies a position (ATP 3-09.50). The aiming circle is used to measure horizontal clockwise angles from |
3-09 | 214 | Appendix C
the line of fire to the line of sight to a given aiming point. In reciprocal laying, the aiming point for the aiming
circle is the howitzer panoramic telescope.
C-44. Survey may not be available. To establish directional control and lay units by the orienting angle
method, the orienting line must be established. Without survey, the orienting line can be established by hasty
survey techniques. Once the orienting line is established, the steps shown above apply. The OS grid location
and altitude may be obtained by GPS, map spot or by hasty traverse. If survey data is not available and hasty
survey is not possible, then the next best method is laying by grid azimuth.
C-45. In reciprocal laying, the 0-3200 line of one instrument and the 0-3200 line of another instrument are
laid parallel.
ACCURATE WEAPON AND AMMUNITION INFORMATION
C-46. Accurate weapons and munitions information is developed and provided by firing units, FDCs, and
sustainment cells. The weapon information is normally applied automatically using the AFATDS. If the
AFATDS is not functioning the procedures to apply weapons information manually is found in the applicable
technical manuals and tabular firing tables. Firing tables and technical gunnery procedures allow the unit to
consider specific ammunition information as follows:
* Weight of the projectile.
* Type of fuze used.
* Muzzle velocity variations.
* Propellant temperature.
C-47. Weight of the projectile affects how far or short the round will travel. If the round is heavier than
standard it will have a decreased range, the opposite is also true if the round is lighter than standard it will
have an increased range. Compensation for projectile weight is found in the appropriate tabular firing table
that is being used.
C-48. The type of fuze will determine the information that is set for the fuze. For a point detonating fuze no
information is set on the fuze and the round will function as it hits a solid target. Variable time fuze can set
function at 7 m above the ground by setting the fuze for the appropriate range to be used. Time fuzes can be
set at various heights above the ground to have better effects against soft targets, such as dismounted infantry,
radars, C2 systems, or fuel points. All these fuzes require different settings based on their type, function, and
ranges to be used.
C-49. Muzzle velocity variation is the difference from a standard speed the round departs the barrel with. If
the round is traveling faster than the standard speed it will have an increased range, the inverse is also true if
the round is traveling slower when it leaves the barrel it will have a decreased range from standard. We
measure this with the M90 chronograph or the M94 muzzle velocity system using the appropriate technical
manual. While it is not practical to predict (within ±0.1 m a second) the velocity of every round, it is possible
to approximate velocities to within ±1 or ±2 m a second with current available information. This may be
useful when calibration is not possible, when updating calibration data, or when trying to increase the
accuracy of inferred muzzle velocity techniques. When calibration is not possible, the shooting strength of
the howitzer can be used as the muzzle velocity variation. While this may be enough when no other data are
available, it is important to understand that a muzzle velocity variation consists of more than just shooting
strength. An equation can be created for determining a muzzle velocity variation by using its basic parts. In
the event the muzzle velocity system becomes inoperable the unit can register or extract powder efficiency
data from another system to apply to the inoperable muzzle velocity system weapon's shooting strength data.
C-50. Propellant temperature affects the range a round will travel. Propellant has a standard temperature
based on 70 degrees Fahrenheit. If the propellant is colder than standard the round will have a decreased
range, if the propellant is warmer than standard the round will have an increased range to the target. A
propellant is a low-order explosive that burns rather than detonates (TC 3-09.81). In artillery weapons using
separate-loading ammunition, the propellant burns within a chamber formed by the obturator spindle
assembly, powder chamber, rotating band, and base of the projectile. For cannons using semi-fixed
ammunition, the chamber is formed by the shell casing and the base of the projectile. When the propellant is
ignited by the primer, the burning propellant generates gases. When these gases develop enough pressure to |
3-09 | 215 | Denied, Degraded and Disrupted Operations
overcome initial bore resistance, the projectile begins its forward motion. Table E in the tabular firing tables
lists the magnitude of change in muzzle velocity resulting from a propellant temperature that is greater or
less than standard. Appropriate corrections can be extracted from that table. Propellant temperature should
be determined from ready ammunition on a periodic basis, particularly if there has been a change in the air
temperature. For more information on accurate weapon and ammunition data see TC 3-09.81.
ACCURATE METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
C-51. With today's emphasis on FFE and trends toward longer distances, accurate MET corrections for
artillery fires are crucial. Atmospheric conditions that include wind direction, wind speed, air temperature
and air density along the trajectory of a projectile or rocket directly affect its accuracy and may cause the
projectile or rocket to miss the desired point of impact.
C-52. The Computer Meteorological Data-Profiler (CMD-P) (AN/GMK-2) is a weather measurement system
developed to provide MET data to support artillery and TA units. CMD-P interfaces with the AFATDS via
local area network connection and is operated by the AFATDS operator. The BN AFATDS transmits MET
data to the subordinate FA units. Every effort must be made to obtain the most accurate met corrections
available. The website that provides the information to the Profiler is:
* https://www.kc.army.mil/armywx/
C-53. Meeting the MET requirement in D3SOE conditions can be resolved by a number of techniques if
CMD-P is unavailable:
* MET can be received from other units not affected by the D3SOE.
* MET message via voice.
* Conduct a registration if conditions are permissive.
VERIFYING MET MESSAGES
C-54. When the FDC receives a met message, it should be checked to ensure that it is valid. Any peculiarities
in the message should be noted. If the timeliness or validity of a met message is doubted, that should be
questioned and referred to the BN FDC. While most messages are transmitted digitally, verbal transmission
of met messages may cause copying errors, particularly if the message is copied down on something other
than the standard (computer) met form. FDC personnel should use the procedures outlined in TC 3-09.81 to
verify MET messages.
C-55. Check the computer met message heading as follows:
* Check message type, octant, and location entries for correctness, ensuring validity for the AO. The
location of the met message should be the midpoint between the gun and target areas.
* Check date-time entries to ensure they are current (date-time entries are expressed in Greenwich
Mean Time).
* Check for possible line to line errors in the computer met message as follows:
* Question drastic wind direction changes (1,000 mils or greater) or sudden reverses of wind
direction from line to line, particularly if wind speeds are more than 10 knots. Direction changes
greater than 1,000 mils are common when wind speeds are 10 knots or less.
* Question severe increases or decreases (10 knots or greater) in wind speed from line to line.
* Temperature accuracy is hard to evaluate because of natural erratic changes. Question a severe
increase or decrease (over 20°K) in temperature from line to line.
* Check for increases in pressure. Pressure should decrease smoothly from line to line. Pressure will
never increase with height.
C-56. Computer met messages that do not reflect the correct location or current date-time are invalid and do
not accurately represent the current weather conditions for the AO. Invalid met messages should be brought
to the attention of the BN FDC for the processing of a new, valid met message.
C-57. The line-to-line checks reflect basic weather behavior patterns. Regional and topographical
characteristics can often produce unusual variances in wind direction and speed. The CMD-P numerical
model does not necessarily produce a 100% accurate forecast, but it does not produce non-physical results. |
3-09 | 216 | Appendix C
The deviations noted do not invalidate the met message but should be referred to the BN FDC for
clarification, especially in cases where the message was transmitted verbally.
C-58. In cases where the met message's validity is called into question, the fire direction officer has a few
available options.
* If this is the first met message and it cannot be checked against previous met data, a precision
registration should be conducted in order to account for all nonstandard conditions. If a registration
is not feasible and line to line errors are in question, the met may be applied and a check round
fired to verify accuracy.
* If the met in question is not the first produced by the CMD-P and the FDC has maintained accuracy
during fire mission processing with the current met, a dry-fire verification may be conducted in
order to compare firing solutions. With the current met, compute and record firing data (deflection,
quadrant elevation, and time fuze setting) for a known point. Next, make the new met current and
compute firing data for the same known point, comparing the two firing solutions. As a general
rule, apply the standard tolerances for deflection (±3 mils), quadrant elevation (±3 mils), and time
fuze setting (±0.1 seconds).
Note. Additional analysis may be needed when firing at maximum ranges, where each mil causes
a greater deviation on the ground. Use the appropriate TFT to compare the differences in firing
data at the known point target range.
C-59. The fire direction officer also maintains the option to discard the new met and continue firing with the
current met while maintaining accuracy. While made feasible by the ability of the CMD-P to provide a new
met every 30 minutes, the FDC should strive to improve accuracy with every chance afforded.
C-60. The passage of time may decrease the accuracy of a MET message because of the changing nature of
weather. With existent equipment and technology, the BN FDC has the ability to provide met messages every
30 minutes. A met message at this frequency has been shown to dramatically increase the accuracy and
lethality of munitions. This however may be impractical and could slow the responsiveness of the firing unit.
A firing unit should request a new met message every 2 to 4 hours, depending on the tactical situation.
C-61. It is critical for a firing unit to request and receive a met message when:
* Upon entering the initial firing position.
* Any movements more than 4 kilometers, but the target area remains the same.
* Anytime direction of fire is more than 800 mils from the original target location.
* Anytime there is a significant change in weather; that is, a front comes through, or the temperature
increases or decreases.
* During transition periods.
MANUAL COMPUTATION OF MET
C-62. For manual MET procedures use DA Form 4200 (Met Data Correction Sheet) as outlined in TC 3-
09.81.
ACCURATE COMPUTATIONAL PROCEDURES
C-63. The computation of firing data similarly affects all indirect fire systems, to include mortars, and must
be accurate. Accurate computational procedures are provided by all FDCs. Automated and manual techniques
are designed to achieve accurate and timely delivery of fire. The balance between accuracy, speed, and the
other requirements for accurate fire should be included in the computational procedures.
C-64. In order to reduce firing incidents is to recognize that individuals make errors, and the best safeguard
against those errors is an independent double check of all operations in which human error could cause a
firing incident (sometimes referred to as the two-man rule). A fundamental aspect of safety is that no one
person performs a critical live fire task then checks that task alone. For every critical task required for firing |
3-09 | 217 | Denied, Degraded and Disrupted Operations
artillery safely, there is a person or persons designated to verify the task. Verification of data includes
independent checks including:
C-65. Independent checks are performed on each howitzer by the section chief to verify lay of the howitzer,
emplaced retaining pins, prefire checks, charges, fuze settings, and set deflection and quadrant, as well as
ensuring the announced firing data is applied as announced.
C-66. Independent checks are also performed in the FDC where the database must be verified, either as the
information is input or as a total review once the entire database has been constructed. The checks are
continuous since the FDC must verify any additions, changes, or deletions to the database as they occur.
C-67. A means to assist rapid transmission of commands to the howitzers are terrain gun position corrections.
Terrain gun position corrections are individual howitzer corrections applied to the gunner's aid on the
panoramic telescope (pantel), the correction counter on the range quadrant, and the fuze setting of each
howitzer (TC 3-09.81). The digital link between the AFATDS and the howitzer will at some point fail to
function. The problem may be in the AFATDS, one or more of the Gun Display Unit Replacement (referred
to as a GDU-R), section chief display, or the communications link. When the failure occurs, voice fire
commands must be transmitted to one or more of the howitzers. If the failure is at the AFATDS, voice
commands must be transmitted to each of the howitzers. It is important that terrain gun position corrections
be computed. These corrections, as a minimum, should be computed for the primary, left, and right sectors.
C-68. During some types of degraded howitzer operations, the battery or platoon FDC may assume direct
control of technical fire direction and send firing data to the howitzer. For example, if the digital control
system of an individual howitzer section is degraded or inoperative, the FDC may compute technical firing
data for that section. The preferred method requires an operational howitzer to locate next to the degraded
howitzer and the degraded howitzer uses the operational howitzer's firing data. For more information see the
appropriate technical manual for the specific cannon system and ATP 3-09.50.
C-69. Manual backup should be established as a form of "position improvement" and should not impede
setup or processing with automated means. The manual backup also serves as a basis of a rapid independent
check to the automated solution. One of the elements to the solution of the gunnery problem is the
determination of chart data. Chart data consists of chart range, chart deflection, and angle T. The
determination of chart data requires the construction and operation of a firing chart.
SECTION IV – FIRING CHARTS
C-70. A firing chart is a graphic representation of a portion of the earth's surface used for determining
distance (or range) and direction (azimuth or deflection) (TC 3-09.81). The chart may be constructed by using
a map, a photomap, a grid sheet, or other material on which the relative locations of batteries, known points,
targets, and observers can be plotted. Additional positions, FS coordinating measures, and other data needed
for the safe and accurate conduct of fire may also be recorded.
C-71. A surveyed firing chart is a chart on which the location of all required points (battery or platoon
positions, known points, and observation points) are plotted (TC 3-09.81). These locations can be based on
survey or map inspection. All plotted points are in correct relation to one another and reflect actual map
coordinates.
C-72. Chart data consist of chart range and chart deflection from the firing unit to the target and angle T. In
a manual FDC, two firing charts will be constructed and used to check each other.
C-73. One chart may differ slightly from another because of small differences in construction caused by
human limitations in reading the graphical equipment. Because of these differences, the following tolerances
between charts are permissible:
* Range or distance ±30 m.
* Azimuth or deflection ±3 mils.
* Angle T ±30 mils.
C-74. When survey control and maps are not available, delivery of indirect fires is possible by using observed
firing charts. An observed firing chart is a firing chart on which all units and targets are plotted relative to
each other from data determined by firing a registration (TC 3-09.81). Observed firing charts are an expedient |
3-09 | 218 | Appendix C
method that should only be use under emergency conditions and every attempt should be made to construct
a surveyed firing chart as soon as possible. Since all locations are based upon firing data, observed firing
charts contain errors because of nonstandard conditions. Manual gunnery methods are described in TC 3-
09.81. |
3-09 | 219 | Appendix D
Environmental and Terrain Considerations for Fire Support
The sections of this appendix are designed to be a quick-reference resource of
information on aspects of environmental and terrain considerations that affect FS.
Section I begins with FS considerations in urban terrain. Section II covers FS
considerations in a maritime environment. Section III covers FS considerations in
mountainous terrain. Section IV is devoted to operations in the jungle. Section V covers
FS considerations in desert operations. Section VI covers night operations. Section VII
discusses continuous operations. While section VIII covers cold weather operations.
SECTION I – FIRE SUPPORT CONSIDERATIONS FOR URBAN OPERATIONS
D-1. Urban operations are typically planned and conducted on or against objectives on terrain where man-
made construction or the density of population are the dominant features. The FS planners recommend EFSTs
to support the division and corps scheme of maneuver. Often, the role of FS in an urban environment is to
enable subordinate and supporting units to get into or around the urban area with minimal casualties. This
enables the respective unit commander to have maximum combat power with which to close with the enemy
and finish the fight. Appropriate FSCMs are essential because fighting in urban areas results in opposing
forces engaged in close combat.
PLANNING
D-2. Planning considerations for fires in support of urban operations include:
* Exchange FS and observer plans with adjacent units.
* Conduct target mensuration for precision munitions.
* Coordinate for collateral damage estimates as necessary.
* Develop an observer plan to include observation posts in buildings, location of laser designators,
and overwatch of trigger points and gun-target lines.
* Plan EW assets to defeat explosive threats, disrupt enemy information collection, reconnaissance,
and surveillance efforts, and detect enemy use of the EMS for targeting purposes.
* Identify location of hazardous sites; both above and below ground such as fuel and industrial
storage tanks, gas distribution lines, CBRN sites and any other area where incendiary effects of
detonating artillery and mortar rounds will start fires, or release CBRN or other hazards.
* Identify the general construction or composition of the buildings and road surfaces (may impact
the type of munitions used).
* Where does building masking, overhead power lines, or towers degrade GPS and compass
functioning?
* Will the use of obscurants and illumination favor friendly units or the threat?
* Will buildings or structures require FS personnel to carry or use equipment not normally carried
such as field expedient antennas, climbing rope, wire gloves, axes, or sledgehammers?
* Plan for radar coverage.
D-3. The FSCOORD and fires cell planners often find their major challenges to be in providing FS to
numerous smaller engagements that, while separate, are part of coordinated, larger unit operations.
Prioritizing FS, sustaining FS, and positioning and repositioning FS assets take on greater significance in
urban operations. |
3-09 | 220 | Appendix D
CHARACTERISTICS OF URBAN TARGETS
D-4. The enemy has many covered and concealed positions and movement lanes and may be on rooftops,
in buildings, and in sewer and subway systems. Aerial observers are extremely valuable for targeting because
they can see farther to detect movements, positions on rooftops, and fortifications. Engagements on rooftops
are planned for to clear away enemy FOs, snipers, communications, and radar equipment. Engagement areas
are planned on major roads, at road intersections, and on known or likely enemy positions. Also, restrictive
FSCMs, such as RFAs and NFAs, are needed to protect civilians and identified restricted areas.
D-5. Identifying and anticipating kill zones or EAs is critical to ensuring that indirect fire assets are in
position to provide supporting fires. Practically, the ability and the utility of massed fires is affected in an
urban environment. The natural restrictions in place due to the obstructive nature of urban terrain and the
small-unit operations prevalent in urban combat require an innovative and limited approach to the delivery
of fires. However, major road networks that offer high-speed avenues of approach into and through an area
are suitable for targeting to restrict the flow of enemy forces and supplies into the combat area.
D-6. IPOE leads to the identification of time-sensitive HPTs and is an important consideration for the
FSCOORD and the FSE. The commander or higher HQ normally provides specific targeting guidance and
prioritization for time-sensitive targets within the AO.
FRATRICIDE PREVENTION MEASURES
D-7. Fratricide prevention is a matter of concern in all operations. The risk of fratricide is much greater
when visual identification and precise navigation are inhibited, by either distance or reduced visibility. In
urban operations, the very nature of the physical terrain creates a situation of reduced visibility, resulting in
unique and significant challenges to combat identification and fratricide prevention. The challenge is the
need to minimize fratricide without unreasonably restricting the ability to accomplish its mission.
D-8. There are two basic causes of urban fratricide-procedural and technical. Procedural causes are typically
failures of FS coordination. Technical failures may include failures of controlling equipment or mechanical
malfunctions.
WEAPONS EFFECTS
D-9. Because the conduct and coordination of indirect fires in urban areas is difficult, fires in support of the
maneuvering elements are closely coordinated and planned in detail. Planning and coordination include
considerations of force protection, weapons effects, psychological effects on the populace, and the potential
for collateral damage. For air-delivered munitions, terminal control and positive guidance are required to
ensure the delivering platform has acquired the correct target. Effective ACMs can ensure other missions (for
example, SCAR) can transit or operate in the airspace above and around the urban area.
D-10. The effects of lethal munitions can be significantly different in urban environments. The characteristics
of the urban terrain and the small unit house-to-house nature of urban combat affect both the results and
employment of weapons. Specific weapons effects considerations for urban operations include the risk
estimate distance and quantity of the munitions, the construction of the buildings, and the ability to engage
the target.
D-11. Calculated risk estimate distances are often not valid in urban operations. Buildings provide cover that
can reduce blast and shell fragment effects risk distances to a few m. Inaccurate or stray fires may occur due
to projectiles deflecting off buildings, wires, or other objects. Bomblets, scatterable mines, illumination, and
other ordnance payloads may also be diverted by objects or may have irregular patterns due to swirling upper-
or lower-level winds around large or tall structures.
TARGET ACQUISITION AND OBSERVATION CONSIDERATIONS
D-12. Urban military operations are involved with physical terrain, noncombatants, and infrastructure. Urban
combat almost always will affect all three in greater or lesser degree, and the lethal and collateral effects of
fires have the potential for great destruction and loss of life. In order to maximize desired effects of fires on |
3-09 | 221 | Environmental and Terrain Considerations for Fire Support
the threat while at the same time minimizing undesired adverse effects on the built-up area and its inhabitants,
these fires must often be as precise as technology and planning will allow.
TARGET ACQUISITION
D-13. Target acquisition in an urban environment faces several challenges. Sensors and reconnaissance have
difficulty penetrating the urban environment's increased cover and concealment limiting both TA and battle
damage assessment. Moving personnel or vehicular targets are normally the easiest to acquire. However, the
cover and concealment provided by urban terrain gives moving targets short exposure times, requiring firing
systems to act rapidly on targeting data. In specific circumstances, weapon locating radar TA may be more
effective in locating hostile firing weapons because of the increased use of high-angle indirect fires.
D-14. Targeting challenges are met by innovatively integrating reconnaissance capabilities. Air Force
reconnaissance and surveillance systems contribute significantly to assessing the urban area. These
information collection systems include manned and UAS. These information systems are vulnerable to
weather and staff weather officers should be leveraged to provide weather effects assessments for both the
platforms and sensors based on current and forecast weather conditions. Air Force reconnaissance and
surveillance systems can provide vital data to help assess threat intentions, threat dispositions, and an
understanding of the civilian population. These systems also can downlink raw information in real-time to
Army intelligence processing and display systems, such as the common ground station or division tactical
exploitation system.
OBSERVATION
D-15. Ground observation may be limited. Consider placing observers on overlooking terrain outside the city
and using external routes for observer movement.
D-16. Allow additional time for observer relocations when rubble, downed electrical wires, snipers, and other
obstacles and impediments to movement may exist. Observers may need to take routes around obstacles.
Elevators typically should not be used to avoid becoming trapped in the event of power failure. This can
require time-consuming stairway climbs to gain an adequate vantage point. Fatigue may become a problem.
D-17. FOs should be positioned where they can get the maximum observation so that TA and adjustments in
fire can best be accomplished. This is not necessarily on the tops of buildings. FOs may be placed on upper
floors of buildings to improve visibility. The observers on rooftops are vulnerable to both enemy aircraft
direct fire and artillery or mortar airbursts.
D-18. Ground observation is limited in urban areas. Adjusting fires is difficult since buildings may block the
view of adjusting rounds; therefore, the lateral method of adjustment may be most useful in urban operations.
The impact of initial rounds may be adjusted laterally, until a round impacts on the street perpendicular to
the forward edge of the battle area. When rounds impact on the perpendicular street, they are adjusted for
range. When the range is correct, a lateral shift is made onto the target, and the guns FFE. Adjustments may
be made by sound although this can be deceptive due to echoes off of buildings. Using airburst rounds is
another technique for adjustment.
D-19. Consider the use of aerial observers. Aerial observers are effective for seeing behind buildings
immediately to the front of friendly forces. These observers are extremely helpful when using adjusted fire
because the observer may see the adjusting rounds impact behind buildings. Aerial observers can also relay
calls for fire when communications are degraded due to power lines or masking by buildings. Illumination
rounds fired to burn on the target can mark targets (both visual and infrared) in the daylight amid the smoke
and dust of urban combat.
D-20. FOs must be able to determine where and how large are the dead spaces. Dead space is the area in
which indirect fires cannot reach the street level because of buildings. This area is an enemy haven that is
protected from indirect fires. For mortars and high-angle artillery fires, the dead space is about one-half the
height of the building. For low-angle artillery fires, the dead space is about five times the height of the
building behind which the target sits. |
3-09 | 222 | Appendix D
LETHAL FIRE SUPPORT IN URBAN AREAS
D-21. The physical aspects of the urban environment, such as the height and concentration of buildings, cause
significant masking and dead space. Buildings that stand three or more stories tall hinder close indirect fires.
Tall buildings can potentially mask several blocks of area along the gun-target line of artillery firing at low
angles of elevation. The urban environment also affects the type and number of indirect fire weapon systems
employed. Commanders may prefer high-angle fire because of its ability to fire in close proximity to friendly
occupied buildings. More artillery systems may need to be used to ensure the responsiveness (rather than the
weight) of fires. Careful positioning of artillery and mortar systems reduces the amount of dead space and
permits units to establish more direct sensor-to-shooter links.
D-22. Commanders may consider R units, to include mortar platoons, from units in reserve. This will increase
the number of systems available to support units. MLRS dual purpose improved conventional munitions
rockets may be of limited use in urban areas due to their dud rate. GMLRS unitary rockets are well suited for
this environment due to their precision munition capabilities and low collateral damage. Requirements for
high-angle fire necessitated by confined urban terrain and an increase in point targets make the vertical attack
capability option afforded by Excalibur and GMLRS unitary rockets especially useful.
D-23. Structures affect Army aviation attacks where the enemy is in contact with friendly ground forces.
Vertical structures interrupt line of sight and create corridors of visibility along street axes. The result is
shortened acquisition and arming ranges for supporting fires from attack helicopters that affect engagement
techniques and delivery options. Pilots maintain line of sight long enough to acquire targets, achieve weapons
delivery solutions, and fly to those parameters. Tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided heavy antitank
missile systems require 65 m to arm. The Hellfire missile requires at least 500 m to reliably arm and stabilize
on the intended target. Thus, attack helicopters firing from longer ranges improve the probability of a hit.
Heavy smoke and dust rising from urban fires and explosions may hinder target identification, laser
designation, and guidance for rotary- and fixed-winged aircraft. The close proximity of friendly units and
noncombatants requires units to agree on, disseminate, and thoroughly rehearse clear techniques and
procedures for marking target and friendly locations.
AMMUNITION AND SUSTAINMENT
D-24. In the absence of attack helicopters, CAS, and related FS assets, ammunition expenditure is likely to
be high. Moving large convoys through rubbled urban terrain and along narrow city streets can affect the
sustainment effort. The FA may need to rely on several smaller sustainment convoys. Increased time is
allowed for in the planning of logistics activities. Pre-stocked supplies, locally available supplies, and
infrastructure services for power and transportation should be used as much as possible. Use local water
supplies once they have been certified. Security and the risks of sabotage must be considered in the use of all
locally procured items.
D-25. Precision fire provided by Army aviation attack or appropriate joint fires may be employed to engage
observable targets and minimize collateral damage. Remote designators need to be close enough to accurately
designate, but far enough away not to be acquired by the laser-guided munition during its flight path. Consider
using precision-guided munitions to defeat enemy forces in buildings or in fortified positions and to target
small enemy positions, such as snipers or crew-served weapons.
D-26. Considerations for the use of laser designators in urban terrain include:
* Correct positioning of aerial attack-by-fire positions and observation posts that meet any
applicable angle-T requirements.
* Focus on key buildings, avenues of approach, complexes, or terrain where use of precision-guided
munitions is anticipated.
* Intervening tall structures may degrade the effectiveness of the laser designator.
* Maintaining a continuous laser track on moving targets is difficult.
* The presence of large expanses of polished, flat, highly reflective surfaces such as windows may
reflect laser energy and pose a hazard to friendly troops.
* The presence of highly absorptive surfaces such as open windows or tunnels may degrade
designator effectiveness. |
3-09 | 223 | Environmental and Terrain Considerations for Fire Support
* Because of a fluid FLOT, designators may have to reposition more often.
* Weather effects on the employment of laser designators and range finders.
D-27. The mix of munitions used by indirect fire systems will change somewhat in urban areas. Supporting
unit commanders rely on their FSCOORDs to understand ammunition effects and to correctly estimate the
number of volleys needed for the specific target coverage. Increased use of certain munitions (for example
Excalibur and other HE or smoke rounds, and precision guidance kit, delay, and concrete-piercing fuzes)
should be anticipated.
D-28. Special considerations apply to shell and fuze combinations when buildings limit effects of munitions:
* Indirect fires may create unwanted rubble and collateral damage. Precision and precision-guided
munitions can be used to minimize rubbling.
* The close proximity of enemy and friendly troops requires careful coordination of fires.
* Swirling winds may degrade smoke operations.
* White phosphorus may create unwanted fires and smoke.
* Fuze delay should be used to penetrate fortifications or tops of buildings.
* Point detonating fuzes on delay typically penetrate only the first wall or roof of a structure. The
MK 399 concrete piercing fuze is used when added penetration is necessary.
* Use of visible illumination may favor the defender who lacks night vision devices.
* Illumination rounds can be effective; however, friendly positions should remain in shadows, and
enemy positions should be highlighted.
* Tall buildings may mask the effects of illumination rounds. Illumination rounds fired to burn on
the ground or on a building can also be used to mark targets for aerial support.
* Airbursts (variable time or time fuze) and improved conventional munitions are effective for
clearing those antennas and enemy observers located on rooftops and for suppressing enemy fires.
* Variable time fuzes may detonate prematurely due to the proximity of other structures.
* Observer-adjusted time fuzes may be better to use among buildings with varying heights.
* If the area will be crossed by friendly or civilian personnel, units may choose not to use improved
conventional munitions. Such circumstances include residual hazards created by unexploded
ordnance form improved conventional munitions which fail to function or if the enemy is in a
building with several floors which offer overhead protection.
* Scatterable mine effectiveness is reduced when delivered on a hard surface.
DIRECT FIRE
D-29. Artillery may be used in the direct fire mode. Commanders, in consultation with their FSCOORD and
FSEs, determine the parameters under which FA assets can be used as direct fire platforms. Normally, FA is
employed in direct fire only where tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, and other direct fire systems are not
available to engage the target. In this case, subordinate and supporting unit commanders, in coordination with
their respective FSCOORD and fires cell planners, direct the employment of individual howitzer sections to
support the unit in contact. Commanders should identify their most proficient direct fire sections.
D-30. Self-propelled systems can take advantage of the systems' mobility to support multiple elements. FA
used for direct fire will likely require shuttling between indirect fire and direct fire positions. One or more
sections may need to follow a supported force closely if sustained direct FS is needed. Self-propelled
howitzers are effective in neutralizing or destroying bunkers, heavy fortifications, or enemy positions in
reinforced concrete buildings. Concrete-piercing 155-mm rounds can penetrate 36 inches of concrete at
ranges up to 2,200 m. If care is taken, self-propelled artillery can be used to clear or create avenues of
approach. Due to the self-propelled howitzer's limited armor protection, infantry will be required to provide
security from enemy snipers and antitank teams.
D-31. Although towed artillery can be used in a direct fire role, it is not preferred because it does not have
any ballistic crew protection. This lack of protection should not preclude the use of towed artillery if the
situation calls for it and the commander is willing to accept increased risk of crew casualties. For some direct
fire situations, the light 105-mm howitzer may be more adaptable especially for fires against dismounted |
3-09 | 224 | Appendix D
infantry on streets or in open areas. Other direct fire considerations include adequate communications,
protection, and positions. A dedicated radio frequency for the supported HQ communicating directly to the
howitzer section is necessary to control fires and prevent fratricide.
D-32. A Bradley fighting vehicle and a squad of dismounted mechanized infantry, or a squad of light infantry
with anti-armor weapons should protect each howitzer, regardless of weapon type. The infantry must provide
local security and prevent enemy ground assault, sniper fire, and antitank fire (for example, rocket-propelled
grenades).
D-33. The infantry must reconnoiter and occupy positions where the howitzer can provide FS. These
positions must be free from enemy direct fire, but still allow direct fire by the howitzer on the target. Although
self-propelled artillery systems seem formidable, they provide less crew protection than the Bradley fighting
vehicle, and they contain large amounts of onboard ammunition and propellant. Self-propelled howitzers are
susceptible to catastrophic destruction by heavy automatic weapons, light cannon FA, and antitank fire. The
howitzer should provide the necessary support and then move to an alternate position to avoid being identified
by the enemy. Overwatching infantry should always move ahead of and with the howitzer to prevent enemy
ambushes.
POSITIONING AND MOVEMENT
D-34. The urban area may affect the positioning of artillery. Sufficient space may not exist to place battery
or platoon positions with the proper unmasked gun line. This may mandate moving and positioning artillery
in sections while still massing fires on specific targets. Commanders protect artillery systems, particularly
when task organized into small sections. Threats to artillery include raids and snipers. Therefore, firing units
will have to place increased emphasis on securing their positions.
D-35. Use of observation posts and listening posts is more important, as terrain allows the enemy to infiltrate
and get closer to artillery positions. Personnel in the open or in vehicles moving through restricted areas are
particularly exposed to fires from snipers in tall buildings.
D-36. FA should be positioned outside of town on the edge of the urban area, if possible. Existing structures
should be used to harden positions. Barns and other large buildings can be occupied for concealment of
weapons and equipment. Units should also be aware of the dangers presented by overhead and underground
power lines, gas and water pipelines, and similar hazards, especially when combined with the danger of
enemy counterfire.
D-37. When placement in the urban area is necessary, howitzer positions among buildings should, at a
minimum, allow for high-angle firing. Masking should be minimized. Positioning of indirect fire assets is
difficult because of the predominance of concrete surfaces. Spades can be emplaced against a curb or base
plates can be sandbagged if ground is not suitable for normal emplacement.
D-38. Airports, parks, athletic fields, and such may offer good firing positions. Cultivated fields may be too
soft and muddy for use.
D-39. Reconnaissance is more difficult. Armed reconnaissance parties may need to clear an area physically
before occupation is possible. Maneuver or military police assistance may be required.
D-40. Range requirements must be considered. Counterfire targets outside the urban area may be difficult to
range from positions in the city needed for high-angle, close-supporting fires. Firing positions outside the
urban area that allow excellent low-angle fires may be too distant to range counterfire targets on the far side
of the city. Supplementary positions may be needed for counterfire and other missions.
D-41. FA weapons may be placed in buildings or damaged structures for protection. However, building
collapse and fire are possibilities. Overpressure can significantly increase the noise hazard for crews. A 105-
mm howitzer battery may have better mobility than larger self-propelled howitzers in confined areas and may
be quickly moved by helicopter, unhindered by ground obstacles.
SURVEY AND MAPS
D-42. Map spotting may be difficult in large cities. The maps and diagrams used in urban operations are often
a mix of available documents that do not use common datum. Existing survey datum and markers, especially |
3-09 | 225 | Environmental and Terrain Considerations for Fire Support
in developing countries, may be inaccurate or altered. City zoning maps, tourist maps, and sketches from
reconnaissance teams may be used with military maps. Street signs may be non-existent or may have been
altered by the enemy. Higher units should acquire and disseminate high resolution imagery to subordinate
units.
D-43. Forces may use unit building numbering systems and sketches for clearing areas. The staff, FSCOORD
and FSEs must understand all of these problems and work with survey teams and FA FDCs to translate target
locations and friendly force locations accurately into grid locations on the common datum. Firing units will
have the same problems pin-pointing their firing locations. The GPS may be greatly degraded due to satellite-
to-receiver line of sight masking from buildings. Many more targets will be point targets, requiring increased
target location accuracy. Thus, firing unit, observer, TA, and target area survey requirements will increase.
Hasty survey techniques may frequently be necessary.
D-44. Hasty survey is hampered by decreased line of sight. Magnetic interference from buildings and power
lines may interfere with the establishment of directional control. Establishment of multiple survey control
points should be anticipated. Placement of survey control points should be well thought out to ensure that
rubbling or traffic does not destroy the points. Additional survey assets may be required, and additional time
may need to be allotted for survey operations.
WEATHER
D-45. Weather conditions, especially winds, can vary considerably from outside the city to inside the city.
Tall skyscrapers, suburban homes, athletic fields, rivers, and other settings all have different atmospheric
conditions (especially light and low-level winds). Low-level winds may vary greatly from upper-level winds,
and may fluctuate considerably and unpredictably. The FSCOORD and planning cell should engage with the
staff weather officer to obtain weather effects assessments based on current and forecast conditions within
the urban environment. The FSCOORD should coordinate the placement of any weather capability (such as
weather sensors and weather observers including MET teams) with the staff weather officer to obtain
representative weather conditions.
COMMUNICATIONS
D-46. Structures and urban infrastructure reduce radio ranges. Use of wire, messenger, and visual signals
should be increased. Antennas should be set up on upper floors to increase their range. They are vulnerable
if positioned on rooftops. Existing civilian telephone systems should be used for unsecured communication.
Wire and local area network cables should be routed through sewers and buildings for protection. Generators
should be placed near existing walls outside occupied buildings. Units will have an increased dependence on
satellite-based communication platforms.
COMMANDER'S INTENT
D-47. The commander's intent imparts the vision as to how the operation should progress. Clear
understanding of this intent by the FSCOORD and FSEs ensures effective and timely application of FS to
the operation and immediate and the tailored fires needed to deal with situations as they arise. The FSCOORD
and FSE use the commander's targeting guidance to develop ammunition requirements and restrictions.
COUNTERFIRE
D-48. Counterfire is difficult in urban environments. Masking can degrade the performance of radars. It will
be more difficult for air and ground observers to locate enemy artillery by visual, sound, and flash methods.
Radar sites must be carefully selected. If radars are sited too close behind tall buildings, they will be masked
and lose some effectiveness. High terrain outside the urban area should be considered, when possible.
Counterfire ammunition requirements may increase if the enemy effectively uses buildings and available
materials to harden and camouflage those positions. However, counterfire may be limited by the ROE and
fear of collateral damage. |
3-09 | 226 | Appendix D
AIR AND ARMY AVIATION SUPPORT
D-49. Air and Army aviation support is an important aspect of urban operations. Although air-delivered fires
from manned and unmanned fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft can positively and directly affect the conduct of
unit actions in the urban area, the ability of aircraft to provide fires may be limited by the structural makeup
of the urban location. FSEs should consider the use of supporting aircraft to observe, call for, and adjust
indirect fires, and report battle damage assessment.
D-50. Air interdiction (AI) can be a vital component of shaping operations in urban terrain. Often, AI of the
avenues of approach into the urban area isolates the threat by diverting, disrupting, delaying, or destroying
threat forces before they can be used effectively against friendly units. AI is especially effective in major
theater war circumstances where restrictions on airpower are limited, and the threat is likely to be a
conventionally equipped enemy. In addition to setting the conditions for future operations and dominating
the urban operation through firepower, the commander can use aviation support capabilities to improve and
augment the urban transportation and distribution infrastructure. For more on aviation support to urban
operations see ATP 3-06.
NONLETHAL ACTIVITIES
D-51. Aspects of CEMA (such as electromagnetic attack) and nonlethal effects (such as artillery- or air-
delivered military information support operations leaflets) are not designed specifically to minimize fatalities,
but they may be used with the same intent. Nonlethal activities can help the commander maintain the desired
balance between protection, mission accomplishment, and the safety of noncombatants by expanding the
number of options available when the use of deadly force poses problems. In determining nonlethal
capabilities use and employment, the commander should consider risk, threat perspective, legal, ethical, and
environmental concerns, and public opinion:
* Planning EW assets to defeat explosive threats, disrupt enemy information collection (see the
discussion in chapter 4 and FM 3-55), reconnaissance and surveillance efforts, and detect the
enemy's use of the EMS for targeting purposes.
* A threat may interpret the use of nonlethal activities as our reluctance to use force. This may
embolden the enemy to adopt courses of action otherwise not considered.
* Some nonlethal activities may have unintended adverse effects on the local population. This may
arouse adverse public opinion.
* The targeting working group and targeting board must synchronize the use of nonlethal activities.
LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR FIRE SUPPORT IN URBAN
OPERATIONS
D-52. The large numbers of noncombatants potentially affected by urban operations are a major legal concern
and increase the requirement for knowledgeable and active legal support. Whether noncombatants suffer the
negative effects of urban combat or benefit from foreign humanitarian assistance, there are legal requirements
and ramifications to every aspect of the operation. Further, the impact military operations have on the local
infrastructure must be carefully monitored. Some infrastructure provides service to noncombatants that, if
destroyed or significantly curtailed, could result in their displacement, or increase the level of human
suffering. The laws of armed conflict restrict the targeting of certain infrastructure.
D-53. The law of war consists of several general principles that must be considered by the commander in
evaluating all uses of force. Four of the most important ones are discrimination, military necessity,
unnecessary suffering, and proportionality:
* Discrimination - Distinguish between combatants, who may be attacked, and noncombatants who
may not be attacked.
* Military necessity - Use only those measures that are necessary for securing the military objective
as soon as possible, unless forbidden by international or domestic law.
* Unnecessary suffering - The prohibition of using weapons, projectiles, or other materials, which,
by their nature or manner of use, are calculated to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary
suffering. |
3-09 | 227 | Environmental and Terrain Considerations for Fire Support
* Proportionality - The injury to persons and damage to property incidental to military action must
not be excessive in relation to the direct military advantage anticipated.
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
D-54. Legal factors are but one element of the ROE; national policy and political objectives also play an
essential role in the drafting of ROE. Often the ROE will include some restrictions on weapons and targets
and provide the commander with guidelines to ensure the greatest possible protection of noncombatants
consistent with military necessity.
TARGETING CONSIDERATIONS
D-55. One of the major areas of consideration in the law of war is that of targeting. There are few absolutes
in targeting, but the application of the general principles applies. Commanders must confirm that targets
support military objectives. The following may be in that category:
* Members of the armed forces having the status of combatants.
* Non-combatants who lose protected status by taking a direct part in hostilities.
* Objects that by their nature, location, purpose, or use, are either military property, or contributing
to the enemy's war effort. Their destruction provides a military advantage.
D-56. Although civilians, noncombatants, and civilian property may not be specifically targeted, incidental
injury and collateral damage are not unlawful if caused incident to an attack on a lawful target, and the
incidental injury and collateral damage are not excessive in proportion to the anticipated military advantage
gained from the attack. Targeting issues are important not only in urban combat operations, but also in
irregular situations where an enemy, in violation of the law of war, may use civilians to mask attacks or as
unlawful combatants.
SECTION II – FIRE SUPPORT IN MARITIME OPERATIONS
D-57. The maritime domain is the oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, and the airspace above
these, including the littorals (JP 3-32). Maritime environments include littoral regions, divided into two
segments: seaward and landward. Seaward segments include the area from open ocean to the shore, which
must be controlled to support operations ashore. Landward segments are those areas inland from the shore
that can be supported and defended directly from the sea. Maritime littoral regions are divided into five
categories:
* Enclosed and semi-enclosed seas-bodies of water surrounded by a landmass.
* Islands-single land masses surrounded by a body of water.
* Archipelagoes-groups of islands.
* Open seas-unenclosed bodies of water, typically outside of territorial boundaries.
* Marginal seas-portions of open seas or oceans that bound land masses such as peninsulas, islands,
and archipelagos.
D-58. The maritime environment is generally a noncontiguous OE that requires joint execution. Army forces
will likely be the supporting command and rarely the supported command. Targeting in a maritime
environment is extremely complex due to the adversary's non-cooperative nature, mobility, and integrated
defensive capabilities.
D-59. Maritime targets will normally fall under the target system naval forces and ports. Although, targeting
and creating effects on military supply and storage, command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, petroleum, oil and lubricants, and power generation could have an indirect effect on the
adversary's maritime operations. Maritime targets are usually deliberate, planned, scheduled or on-call. Army
integration with maritime forces includes but is not limited to the following:
* Contribute ISR deep sensing in support of find, fix, and track.
* Contribute to target development.
* Contribute lethal and nonlethal capabilities in support of maritime strike.
* Contribute to joint coordination measures, planning, and execution. |
3-09 | 228 | Appendix D
* Provide FS to the JTF.
* Provide FS to maritime component.
* Provide liaison officers to maritime operations center.
* Provide FS to air component.
* Provide theater strategic and operational FS system liaison officers to the air operations center –
master air attack plan cell.
* Posture Army capabilities to support maritime operations.
* Integrate Army digital fires systems within the joint force.
* Participate in joint digital fires rehearsals.
* Conduct FS technical rehearsals.
* Ensure protection planning of theater strategic and operational FS systems.
* Army fires assets may also be designated in a support role to other component commands,
providing SEAD for aerial attack of island-based enemy forces or surface-to-surface fires to defeat
enemy naval forces.
* Establish clearance of fires procedures on landing areas.
* Provide deep fires for forceable entry operations, to defeat enemy A2/AD capabilities.
D-60. The Joint force conducts maritime strikes and target actions to gain and exploit command of the sea,
sea control, sea denial, and to project power from the sea. The Army supports maritime strikes by integrating
Army capabilities with other service component capabilities. The joint force facilitates integration amongst
all services to enable friendly freedom of action. This necessitates integrated operational and tactical C2,
sensors, weapons, nonlethal effects, and support capabilities (see figure D-1). Army FS organizations must
incorporate their FS systems with other applicable joint elements. Additionally, tactical level technical FS
rehearsals should be conducted, when appropriate, to facilitate fire mission processing and execution. Army
organizations and capabilities could be directed to execute FS and effects in support of the JFC or other joint
elements while also potentially being supported by joint fires and effects. For more information on joint
FSCMs and maritime operations see JP 3-02, JP 3-09, and FM 3-0.
Figure D-1. Maritime strike coordination planning product |
3-09 | 229 | Environmental and Terrain Considerations for Fire Support
D-61. Maritime strike force package is a preplanned on-call package specifically designed to support
maritime targeting and strikes. Maritime strike package is executed by a mission commander and consists of
three elements:
* Tactical C2.
* Support element.
* Strike.
D-62. Critical components of an adversary ship are radars, missile launchers, guns, ammunition magazines,
control rooms, engine rooms and hull. Upon assignment of the force package, rehearsal of concepts and battle
drills should be executed to ensure roles, responsibilities, timing, and effects are sufficiently understood by
all participants. When targeting adversary’s maritime forces, the most considered effects are:
* Fire power kill (F-Kill).
* Gun kill (G-Kill).
* Mission kill (M-Kill).
* Sink/seaworthiness kill.
* Mission control kill.
D-63. Target engagement authority in a maritime environment, should be delegated to a C2 node that has the
highest situational awareness and the ability to expedite an integrated joint strike. For more information on
joint FSCMs and maritime operations see JP 3-02, JP 3-09, and FM 3-0.
SECTION III – MOUNTAIN OPERATIONS
D-64. In combat operations, mountains generally are characterized by rugged, compartmented terrain; steep
slopes; and few natural or man-made lines of communication. The weather spans the entire spectrum from
extreme cold, with ice and snow, to extreme heat in some areas. Vegetation can vary from dense jungle to
barren waste. Variability of weather over short periods of time and of vegetation from area to area
significantly influences both maneuver and FS operations.
MUNITIONS
D-65. Munitions effects are affected by the environment and terrain. IPOE helps determine where and what
munitions are most effective. Below are munitions considerations for mountainous terrain.
* In snow:
FA delivered mines may settle into the snow off vertical. At temperatures lower than -15° C,
very little settling occurs.
Variable time and time fuzes are most effective in most cases.
HE - point detonating, HE-delay, and improved conventional munitions are ineffective
because at least 40 percent of the effects are muted by the snow.
The phosphorus in white phosphorus (referred to as WP) can burn undetected in snow for up
to four days.
* In rocky terrain:
* HE-point detonating is very effective because it produces extra fragmentation from splintering
rocks.
Variable time and time fuzes are very effective because the burst covers a larger area than
HE-point detonating on reverse slopes.
FA mines are effective to deny the enemy the use of narrow defiles, valleys, roads, and usable
terrain.
* When smoke and illumination are used:
Swirling winds make smoke employment very difficult to adjust and maintain.
Close coordination is required with adjacent elements to ensure they are not obscured or that
they are not highlighted. |
3-09 | 230 | Appendix D
Mortars are ideal for targets on reverse slopes and over intermediate crests because of their
high-angle fires.
Airbursts on reverse slopes are extremely effective.
TARGET ACQUISITION AND OBSERVATION
D-66. The following are considerations when FOs are involved in mountain operations:
* The observers should be positioned on high ground and spread out to overcome terrain masks and
compartments.
* The observers may need mountaineering equipment to get to the best positions, or they may be
airlifted.
* Terrain sketches and visibility diagrams are useful to deliver fast, accurate fires and to identify
blind spots.
* Heavy fogs or low clouds may obscure observation.
* Observers (without laser rangefinders) who are looking up tend to underestimate range, whereas
observers looking down tend to overestimate range.
D-67. Air observers:
* Are very effective to observe beyond terrain masks, in deep defilade, and on reverse slopes.
* Complement the FIST observers.
* Can be used to detect deep targets.
* May be confined to valleys and lower elevations because thin air at high elevations makes flying
difficult.
D-68. Radar considerations in mountain operations include:
* Radars should concentrate on terrain that can be occupied by artillery and mortars (as determined
by IPOE).
* Terrain masks can degrade the effective range of the radar.
* Additional use of ground surveillance radars and remote sensors may be required.
* More extensive use of shelling reports may be required.
TARGETING
D-69. The intelligence officer's IPOE should identify the following:
* Routes that can be used by the enemy to attack, withdraw, and resupply.
* Likely position areas for enemy indirect fire assets, C2, support assets, and observation posts.
* Terrain that is subject to snows slides, rockslides, or avalanches. These may deny the enemy use
of roads and trails and may destroy elements in defilade.
POSITIONING
D-70. Usually, position areas for mortars and artillery are limited and access thereto may be restricted.
Because of the need to fire high angle, it is important that the mortars and artillery be positioned in defilade
to increase their survivability. Positioning considerations include:
* Helicopters should be used to airlift artillery into position areas. These air assets also may be
required to provide ammunition resupply.
* Helicopters may be useful in performing survey by use of Doppler radar.
* Positioning along dry riverbeds is hazardous because of the danger of flash flooding.
* Towns and cities usually have flat areas (school yards, parks, stadiums, and so forth) that can
accommodate firing batteries. However, these towns and cities are often enemy objectives and
may be targeted.
* Most mountainous flat land is farmland and is difficult for towed artillery to negotiate from spring
to fall. However, in winter, if the ground is frozen, farmland provides good firing positions for
mortars and artillery. |
3-09 | 231 | Environmental and Terrain Considerations for Fire Support
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT
D-71. Because the terrain forces the enemy to concentrate his forces along roads, valleys, reverse slopes, and
deep defilades, CAS is very effective. However, the terrain also restricts the attack direction of the CAS
strikes. The enemy also conducts IPOE to determine the likely direction of the CAS strikes and will weight
his air defenses along those routes. The FSCOORD must aggressively identify the enemy air defense systems
and target them to enhance the survivability of the CAS assets.
COMMUNICATIONS
D-72. Communications considerations in mountain operations include:
* Place antennas on sides of hills or mountains.
* Make maximum use of directional antennas.
* Plan to use retransmission capabilities.
SECTION IV – JUNGLE OPERATIONS
D-73. Jungle operations are usually carried out by infantry forces. FS may be limited to indirect fires and air
support. Because small-unit operations are commonplace, greater challenges accrue to the FS personnel at
company and BN levels.
MUNITIONS
D-74. In jungle terrain, most contact with the enemy is at extremely close range. If the friendly force has a
substantial advantage in FS, the enemy will most likely try to come in as close as possible and maintain that
close contact. Thus, the friendly force commander cannot use his FS advantage without inflicting casualties
on his own troops. Therefore, a knowledge of the type of munitions best suited for the terrain and how to
employ them is vital. For example, in triple-canopy jungle:
* HE-delay penetrates the treetops and splinters the trees, creating additional fragmentation
(splintering effect).
* Smoke has limited effectiveness.
* White phosphorous is effective as a marking round and in initial adjustments.
TARGET ACQUISITION AND OBSERVATION
D-75. The triple-canopy jungle makes observation beyond 25 to 50 m very difficult. The jungle also makes
map reading, self-location, target location, and friendly unit location very difficult.
D-76. Experience from World War II (WWII) and Vietnam showed that FOs must be able to adjust mortar
and FA fire by sound, because often they cannot see the rounds to adjust them. This sound adjustment is very
difficult and requires experience. Greater accuracy can result from the recommended adjustments of two or
more FOs. The battery FDC can help by announcing “splash” to let the FOs know when the round should
impact. The observer then counts the seconds until they hear the rounds detonate. By multiplying the seconds
by the speed of sound, the observer can estimate the range to impact. The speed of sound is approximately
350 m per second. The speed of sound varies according to temperature, wind speed and direction, relative
humidity, and air density; but 350 m per second should be used as a start point.
D-77. The FO must determine the observer location and ensure that the battery FDC has it plotted. The FO
then determines the direction to the target and selects a target grid 1,000 m along the direction to the target.
Using that direction and target grid, the FO sends a call for fire to the FDC. Add 1,000 m to the FO's position
for safety.
D-78. When the initial adjusting round impacts, the FO uses that impact as a known point. The FO determines
the direction to the round, measures the difference between the direction to the target and the impact of the
initial round, computes the lateral correction, and makes a range correction, if necessary. Using the shift from
a known point call for fire, the FO sends the data to the FDC, reporting the new direction. |
3-09 | 232 | Appendix D
D-79. If the FO's position location is poor, the initial round location will be poor too. The FO can use the
initial round to re-determine his location. For example, the FO's call for fire told the FDC to fire grid 123456,
direction 0200. The round impact is nowhere near the target. The FO then determines the direction and range
to the burst. The FO plots a back-azimuth from the burst and estimates range along that direction to replot
the FO's position. Then, using the new position location, FO reinitiates the mission.
D-80. Vietnam and WWII also showed that the first round in adjustment should be white phosphorous.
Because both the FO's location and the location of other friendly elements may have been doubtful, white
phosphorous was usually fired first to avoid inflicting casualties on friendly personnel. (Using a 200-meter
height of burst can help the FO see the first round.)
D-81. The creeping method of adjustment is used exclusively during danger close missions. The observer
makes range changes by using corrections of 100 m or less and creeping the rounds to the target. The observer
must know where all friendly troops are to avoid endangering them. All weapons that will FFE are used in
adjustment. For BN missions, batteries should be adjusted individually.
D-82. Marking rounds can be fired to help the FO determine his own location. The use of marking rounds
also helps ensure that the FDC knows in what area the friendly unit is, which ensures more responsive fires.
A marking round is usually white phosphorous fired 300 to 400 m forward of friendly units at 200 m height
of burst. The FDC plots a target, fires a white phosphorous round, and sends the grid of the white phosphorous
impact to the FO. The FO then has a known position on which to orient.
D-83. Because of the close combat, laser range finders may not be of great use; however, night vision devices
are extremely critical.
D-84. Air observers. Air observers can be important in jungle warfare. They can detect enemy movements
that ground forces have no way of seeing. They can act in concert with ground observers to deliver accurate
fires on enemy elements in close contact with friendly forces. Also, the air observers can relay calls for fire
from ground elements to the FDC.
D-85. Air observers can help direct CAS assets against enemy targets. Because ground observers cannot see
the whole battlefield, the air observer marks targets for the CAS sortie (by use of flares, white phosphorous,
or smoke). Caution must be taken, and positive identification of the target must be made.
D-86. WLRs are extremely effective in the jungle, since most indirect fires are high-angle fires. In stability
operations, many targets detected by the radars are fleeting in nature (shoot and move) and the radar must be
tied in with an indirect FS asset to ensure quick counterfire.
D-87. Also, most enemy indirect fires will be directed against friendly unit positions. Therefore, the radars
should be oriented to locate those enemy fires.
TARGETING
D-88. Targeting is very difficult because of the triple canopy and the fluid nature of the conflict. Experience
with the particular enemy will provide some targets indicated by the enemy's past performance and
techniques.
D-89. Plan targets:
* To support the scheme of maneuver.
* Along roads and trails.
* At likely ambush sites.
* Around clearings.
* At river or stream crossings.
* Around built-up areas.
D-90. Also, isolated units will prepare 360-degree defenses. Plan FPFs to support that defensive posture.
Consider recommending to the supporting FA BN commander a munition specific required supply rate to
support the operation. |
3-09 | 233 | Environmental and Terrain Considerations for Fire Support
POSITIONING
D-91. Often, firing positions for FA and mortars are very limited; and some positions may be inaccessible by
roads. While mortars may be dismounted and airlifted into position, artillery will be severely limited in its
movement and ability to position. Platoons may have to be widely separated, increasing the difficulty of
mutual defense and resupply. Each position must have 6,400-mil firing capability, regardless of weapon
types. Remember that a position occupied too long is subject to ground attack. Also, the enemy will quickly
determine the range of weapons in that position and stay out of their range. If GPS are not available, consider
using a helicopter-mounted position azimuth determining system or Doppler radar to survey air-inserted
mortar positions inaccessible by road.
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT
D-92. CAS can be effective in the jungle but hard to control because of the inability of the pilot to see the
friendly ground elements. Also, because the combat is usually of such close nature, the delivery of the
munitions must be closely controlled to avoid injuring friendly personnel.
D-93. Pyrotechnics should be used to mark friendly forces and the target area. A joint fires observer or JTAC,
should monitor the air strike, but only a JTAC or FAC(A) can clear an attacking aircraft. It is extremely
important that the method used for this marking not be duplicated by the enemy. Strict security is required.
D-94. Heavy bombs (2,000 to 3,000 pounds) with fuze extenders can clear away the jungle canopy. Many
cluster munitions are designed to penetrate jungle canopy. Depending on the type and quantity delivered,
bomblets are effective against area targets consisting of personnel, light materiel, and armor.
COMMUNICATIONS
D-95. Communications considerations for jungle operations include:
* Remember that communications in a triple-canopy jungle are severely degraded.
* Elevate antennas above the canopy, when possible.
* Use air observers or airborne command platforms as relay stations.
* Consider using directional antennas.
* Plan to use retransmission assets.
SECTION V – DESERT OPERATIONS
D-96. The three types of desert terrain are mountainous, rocky plateau, and sandy or dune-type desert. FS
planning and considerations vary significantly between operations in each type of desert terrain. Often, those
considerations resemble those for other environments, such as arctic and mountain. The type of terrain in the
AO must be analyzed before effective FS planning can be performed. Tactics, techniques, and employment
of munitions are greatly affected by the different terrain characteristics. Restricted desert terrain can offer
significant disadvantages for movement and emplacement of indirect fire systems, depending on the
trafficability of the surrounding valley areas.
MUNITIONS
D-97. Mountain deserts, munitions effectiveness is the same as in any mountainous region except that the
considerations involving snow usually do not apply. The following are added considerations:
* HE-point detonating is very effective because of the extra fragmentation created by splintering
rocks.
* FA mines are very effective and should be used to deny the enemy the use of roads, valleys, narrow
defiles, and level terrain.
* Smoke and illumination may be degraded by swirling winds. They must be closely coordinated
with adjacent units to ensure that the vision of adjacent troops is not obscured, or troops are not
highlighted. Both smoke and illuminating shells can be used to silhouette the enemy.
* Airbursts on reverse slopes are extremely effective. |
3-09 | 234 | Appendix D
D-98. Rocky plateau deserts, the following are munitions considerations in rocky plateau desert operations:
* HE-point detonating is extremely effective. It creates extra fragments by splintering rocks.
* Variable time and time fuzes are effective.
* Improved conventional munitions are very effective.
* FA delivered mines are very effective and should be employed with the natural terrain to force the
enemy into unnavigable terrain.
* Smoke and illumination may be degraded by high winds but may be used to silhouette the enemy.
D-99. Sandy or dune deserts, the following are munitions considerations:
* HE with point detonating or delay fuze is smothered by deep sand, which makes it ineffective.
* VT and time fuzes are very effective.
* FASCAM are smothered by deep sand, which makes them ineffective.
* Smoke and illumination are effective and can be used to silhouette the enemy.
TARGET ACQUISITION AND OBSERVATION
D-100. Determining location is often very difficult in rocky plateau and sandy or dune deserts. Maps are
often inaccurate, dunes shift, and heat waves hamper distance estimations. Where GPS equipment is not
available, pace count, odometer readings, and resection from available key terrain features may be the best
of a few options for self-location essential for day and night navigation.
D-101. FOs can detect targets by observing dust clouds created by moving enemy forces. Dust clouds
created by impacting rounds sometimes make subsequent adjustments difficult. Usually, adjustment of fires
by a FO is enhanced when the initial round impacts beyond the target. Laser range finders must be used,
especially when heat waves degrade distance estimating by other conventional means.
D-102. The FO should consider using smoke behind the enemy to silhouette him. At night, illumination
burning on the ground behind the enemy has the same effect.
D-103. The sameness of colors in the desert makes specific targets hard to spot. Laser range finders may
need to be adjusted several times a day because of temperature changes.
D-104. Most open desert terrain allows a faster or an unimpeded approach and more maneuver space for
mechanized forces. Use of trigger points and long-range observation capabilities is critical for effective
engagement with available FS systems. Fast-moving formations are best engaged with fixed-wing assets and
attack helicopters.
D-105. Increased equipment failure can be expected as a result of heat, sand, and dust. Especially susceptible
are radios, automation systems, and other electronic equipment.
D-106. Air Observers can be used for TA, coordination of FS, and adjustment of fires in flat terrain or in a
desert of rolling sand dunes. The difficulty of aerial navigation in flat desert terrain is a disadvantage that
must be planned for. The absence of terrain features in an open desert makes aircraft more vulnerable to
enemy air defense.
D-107. Because of the ability to see great distances and the featureless terrain of an open desert, positive
identification of friendly troops requires special measures. More than usual coordination may be required,
with prearranged signals and procedures established for friendly force locations. Maintaining continuous
communications on FS and mission command nets with aviation elements operating in sector is even more
critical.
D-108. Radars are highly effective in the desert. However, they may have to be repositioned more often
because the flat terrain does not provide adequate screening crests.
TARGETING
D-109. A thorough IPOE must be conducted to:
* Identify passable terrain for wheeled and tracked vehicles.
* Identify likely mortar and artillery positions. |
3-09 | 235 | Environmental and Terrain Considerations for Fire Support
* Assess the impact of wadis, gulches, and other significant terrain on friendly and enemy mobility.
* Identify likely enemy forward observation positions.
* Identify antitank guided missile systems and air defense systems as priority targets.
D-110. Plan the correct munitions for targets:
* Improved conventional munitions and FA mines for roads in restricted terrain.
* FA mines to deny the enemy navigable terrain and to try to force him into wadis and gulches.
* Variable time on reverse slopes.
* Variable time and time fuzes on targets in deep, sandy deserts.
* Smoke during the day and ground-burning illumination at night to silhouette the enemy.
* Smoke and white phosphorous against likely enemy observation posts.
* HE with point detonating fuzes on targets in rocky terrain.
POSITIONING
D-111. Common grid, the limited number of available attack/delivery systems requires the use of a common
grid based on the best available survey data. Terrain association techniques (map spots) may be inadequate
for positioning indirect fire systems.
D-112. Concealment, FA, and mortars should move under cover of darkness, because enemy observers can
detect the movement or at least the dust from the movement of vehicles. Resupply should also be conducted
at night, preferably enroute between positions. Appropriate color of equipment and camouflage systems is
essential for effective concealment of firing positions.
D-113. Emplacement in wadis and gulches offers the best concealment. However, it entails some degree of
risk as the result of unexpected flash flooding (size of wadis is relative to degree of risk).
D-114. Movement, trafficability through the dunes may be severely degraded. The absence of roads in the
direction of our movement will further slow moves.
D-115. Position area selection, positioning on rocky soil away from roads reduces the dust hazard during
air assault operations. Sandy deserts may be a problem for some towed artillery and mortars. Solid ground to
secure some firing systems' platforms or baseplates and spades may be rare in certain areas.
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT
D-116. Air support aircraft may be more vulnerable because of the lack of covered approaches. Suppression
of enemy air defenses is very important. However, the greater visibility common in most deserts allows target
engagement from better standoff ranges.
D-117. Detailed planning for CAS is important because of wide dispersion of units. Marker panels or other
visual or electronic signatures are required to help the pilot differentiate between friend and foe.
SECTION VI – NIGHT OPERATIONS
D-118. Some specific reasons for night combat include:
* To achieve surprise and to avoid heavy losses that might be incurred in daylight operations over
the same terrain.
* To compensate for advantages held by an enemy with superior forces or air superiority.
* To counter the enemy night operations.
* To retain the initiative or freedom of action.
* To exploit the technological advantage of our forces at night over a less sophisticated enemy.
D-119. Movement and land navigation are more difficult at night. This is largely because of problems with
terrain recognition. If navigation aids such as GPS equipment is not available, maintaining direction while
moving is extremely difficult at night. |
3-09 | 236 | Appendix D
D-120. Target acquisition and engagement ranges are limited to the capabilities of night vision devices.
Controlling the direct fires is critical at night. Control requires effective communications to ensure
engagement of the correct targets.
FIRE SUPPORT
D-121. The main consideration in supporting night combat with FA, mortars, tactical aircraft, and naval
gunfire is the ability to detect the target and coordinate the attack. Illumination and smoke assets probably
will be in short supply. If their use is critical to the success of an operation, the FSCOORD must know the
specific area in which the commander desires to use smoke and illumination and for what purpose. Plan
smoke at night to degrade enemy night vision capabilities. If too little ammunition is available, take action
to alleviate the shortfall well in advance.
D-122. At night, the adjustment of fires without the aid of radars, artificial illumination, or sound ranging is
virtually impossible. If adjustment of fires on critical targets is required, do it during daylight if possible. If
not possible to adjust the target during daylight, allocate TA assets for adjustment of fires.
D-123. The FSCOORD plays a critical role if CAS, UAS, or attack helicopters are used in night operations.
These weapon platforms may not be equipped with adequate night vision equipment. Their effectiveness will
depend on the ability of the force to illuminate targets. Additional coordination between the FSCOORD, G-
3, G-3 air, and ALO is needed to integrate sorties and plan illumination for their use.
NIGHT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
D-124. In planning a night attack, the commander must decide what type of attack to conduct. Their decision
is based on the required FS.
D-125. Illuminated and non-illuminated attacks. An illuminated attack is used when the possibility of
achieving surprise is remote, when the enemy has night vision devices, and where control of units overrides
the need for stealth.
D-126. Commanders often use non-illuminated attacks when the enemy lacks night vision devices, but
devices are available to friendly forces. Another reason is when friendly forces plan to use stealth to achieve
surprise and close on a position before the enemy discovers the attack. Even though the commander wishes
to conduct a non-illuminated attack, always plan for illumination. It is executed only on the commander's
authority.
D-127. Execution of planned fires using stealth and surprise may be more important to the attack objectives
than the effects expected by preparation fires. Use of preparation fires alerts the enemy to the objectives of
the attack and may compromise any night advantages. However, always plan for these fires. The non-
illuminated attack with on-call fires offers a better opportunity for surprise.
D-128. Night offensive FS considerations include prearranged visual signals such as hand-held flares that
can be used for initiating or canceling fires of air support and schedules of fire such as groups or series.
D-129. When fires are shifted, they should be moved beyond the friendly unit limit of advance. Illuminating
fires may not be fired but should be planned. Time illumination over the objective to burn out approximately
300 m above the ground. Illumination beyond the objective should be allowed to burn on the ground to
silhouette the defenders on the objective and to provide a heading reference for friendly forces. Also,
illumination can be placed on several locations over a wide area to confuse the enemy as to the exact place
of the attack. Once used, illumination should probably be continuous, because friendly troops will have
temporarily lost their night vision.
D-130. Smoke can be used to degrade enemy night vision devices. It should be placed in front of the enemy;
Smoke also can be used when key terrain is to be bypassed. However, smoke on the objective during the final
assault conceals enemy locations. Only thermal devices can see through some types of smoke.
D-131. Place FSCMs on identifiable terrain. Place permissive measures well in front of friendly forces.
Restrictive measures should be used minimally and must provide the safety required yet not complicate
clearing fires at night. These measures must be disseminated and understood by all friendly elements. Plan |
3-09 | 237 | Environmental and Terrain Considerations for Fire Support
suppressive fires for the final assault to the objective and beyond the limit of advance to stop enemy force
retreat or reinforcement.
NIGHT DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
D-132. The effective employment of FS is critical to the successful night defense. As with the offense,
daylight planning and coordination considerations are used in addition to considerations for night defense,
which include:
* Use on-call fires to engage enemy forces as they attack or probe the defense.
* Plan illumination fires although the appropriate supported commander is the approving authority
for defensive illumination fires. This is to preclude accidental illumination of friendly activity such
as patrols and engineer activities. When used, drop visible illumination above and behind attacking
forces to silhouette them.
* Adjust fires, especially FPFs, during daylight, if possible.
* Use smoke to slow, confuse, and disorient attacking forces.
* Plan FA delivered mines in coordination with the engineer to separate forces, disrupt formations,
and plug gaps in the defense.
* Plan permissive FS measures as close to friendly troops as possible; however, measures should be
placed on positively identifiable terrain.
* Plan restrictive measures, if required, on easily identifiable terrain to provide safety to friendly
elements.
SECTION VII – CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS
D-133. Physiological aspects of continuous operations include those factors that degrade the Soldier's
physical ability to function. Sleep loss and fatigue induced by night operations magnify stress. After 48 hours
of sustained activity, loss of sleep becomes the most significant degrader of Soldier performance on the
battlefield. As sleep loss begins to accumulate, both physical and mental effects are observed in varying
degrees. Most of the following effects can occur after 24 hours without sleep:
* Tasks may be omitted as a result of a momentary lapse into sleep (falling asleep with eyes open).
* Vigilance decreases rapidly, resulting in missed critical signals.
* Ability to focus on a task for more than a brief period decreases noticeably.
* Memory becomes faulty, particularly short-term memory. This makes it difficult to learn new
information, follow instructions, or remember recent decisions.
* Response to events or instructions slows. One seems to be operating in a daze.
* The ability to formulate and make sense from information becomes severely degraded. It takes
longer to perform simple tasks such as plotting grid coordinates. Accuracy suffers.
* The ability to reason logically is degraded, which may result in snap judgments.
* Problems with communication arise. One has difficulty understanding or articulating even simple
messages.
* A wide range of mood changes, characterized by depression, anger, lack of patience, and euphoria,
can occur.
D-134. Sleep loss is cumulative over time. The number of hours needed to recover is directly related to the
number of hours sleep was deprived. As a rule of thumb, a minimum of 6 hours rest is required for every 24
hours without sleep. Fatigue is the result of excessive work and sleep loss. The latent effects of fatigue may
linger for about 3 days following sleep deprivation of 48 hours or more.
SECTION VIII – COLD WEATHER OPERATIONS
D-135. Fire planning for cold weather operations is no different than that required for more temperate
regions. However, the FS planner must consider that artillery weapon systems may have limited mobility in
snow and ice that will also affect ammunition supply and increase to time to accomplish tasks. |
3-09 | 238 | Appendix D
MUNITIONS
D-136. The following are considerations in the employment of various munitions in cold weather
operations:
* Make maximum use of airburst munitions.
* HE-point detonating, HE-delay, improved conventional munitions, and FA delivered mines are
ineffective in deep snow and unfrozen bogs. At least 40 percent of the blast from these munitions
is smothered by the snow.
* Hexachloroethane smoke is not effective because canisters are smothered in the deep snow.
* White phosphorous is effective; however, phosphorus may burn undetected in the snow for up to
four days and may be a hazard to friendly troops subsequently moving through the area.
* Overall, variable time or multi-option artillery fuzes are good fuzes for cold weather operations.
However, snow and ice may cause them to detonate prematurely. Also, extreme cold may cause a
higher dud rate.
* Extreme cold weather will affect the range of weapons.
* Low temperature may cause illuminating rounds to malfunction as the result of freezing the
parachute and its components.
TARGET ACQUISITION AND OBSERVATION
D-137. Considerations for employing FOs in cold weather operations include:
* Equip FOs with snowshoes or skis to allow them to move quickly.
* Relieve observers in static positions frequently.
* Update visibility diagrams regularly because drifting snow changes visibility.
* Use amber filters on binoculars and observation devices to reduce the incidence of snow blindness.
* Avoid using ground bursts that may be difficult to observe in deep snow.
D-138. Observers in aircraft are valuable because they can see deep and are not as prone to disorientation
as are ground observers. However, weather conditions may reduce the availability of aircraft.
D-139. WLRs considerations when radars are used in cold weather:
* Extremely cold weather may degrade their operations.
* Remote sensors are rarely effective when used in deep snow.
TARGETING
D-140. Because of terrain and weather phenomena, target detection is difficult. However, ice fogs and snow
clouds created by moving enemy formations will reveal targets. Also, tracks in the snow may indicate enemy
positions.
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT
D-141. The following are considerations in the use of CAS in cold weather operations:
* Frequent poor weather reduces the availability of CAS.
* The sameness of the terrain makes the marking of targets critical.
* Panels or pyrotechnics must be used to indicate friendly locations.
COMMUNICATIONS
D-142. Effective communications are hampered by:
* Electronic interference.
* Weakened batteries. Conventional dry-cell batteries are 40 percent effective below 0° F, 20
percent effective below -10° F, and 8 percent effective below -30° F. A similar problem exists for
nickel-cadmium and lithium batteries.
* Frost from human respiration forms in the radio mouthpiece. Cover it with cloth or a sock. |
3-09 | 239 | Environmental and Terrain Considerations for Fire Support
SURVEY
D-143. Extreme cold in arctic and subarctic regions adversely affects survey equipment operability.
Accuracies may be degraded and impact on transfer data, massed fire, and unobserved fire.
FIELD ARTILLERY MOVEMENT
D-144. Considerations affecting planning for FA cold weather movement include:
* Consider route reconnaissance in FA ground and air.
* Determine ice thickness and load-bearing capacity before the FA crosses frozen lakes and rivers.
* Consider that a vehicle may be required to position towed artillery weapons used in air assault
operations conducted into snowy areas.
* Plan for maximum use of aerial resupply. |
3-09 | 241 | Appendix E
Targeting and Army Air Support Requests
Joint airpower is an extension of fires and should be leveraged to the greatest extent
possible. Identifying air support requirements, submitting air support requests
(AIRSUPREQs), and synchronizing the effects of surface-to-surface fires with air-to-
surface fires increases our effectiveness on the battlefield while simultaneously
safeguarding friendly forces. This appendix provides an overview on the relationship
between targeting and AIRSUPREQs and information necessary to plan, generate,
submit, and track preplanned AIRSUPREQs.
SECTION I – AIR SUPPORT REQUEST
E-1. To leverage joint air assets, Army echelons identify joint air support requirements during the planning
steps of the operations process and the decide function of the Army targeting process (see figure E-1). Joint
airpower can create effects that achieve objectives in support of the ground commander’s concept of
operations. When tactical Army echelons identify targets that require effects exceeding their organic
capabilities or when other requirements for joint airpower are identified during the planning process, FSEs
at echelon create AIRSUPREQs for submission to the supporting joint force air component.
Figure E-1. Army Targeting Methodology
E-2. FSEs utilize the Army air-ground system (see figure E-2 on page E-2) to submit AIRSUPREQs. FSEs
at each echelon send AIRSUPREQs to their next higher HQ for approval. Every Army echelon that receives
AIRSUPREQs from a subordinate unit is responsible for approving or denying the request, verifying |
3-09 | 242 | Appendix E
prioritization of each request, re-prioritizing when necessary, merging the requests into a single air support
list, and forwarding the air support list to their next higher HQ. The senior Army HQ or JFLCC HQ
adjudicates AIRSUPREQs received and may generate additional AIRSUPREQs in sufficient time to be
included in the JFC’s joint targeting cycle and the JFACC’s joint air tasking cycle. For more information on
the Army air-ground system see ATP 3-52.2.
E-3. AIRSUPREQs that support the JFC’s objectives and are submitted in sufficient time to meet the
suspense set by the JFC’s battle rhythm are called preplanned AIRSUPREQs. Preplanned AIRSUPREQs
may result in scheduled and on-call air missions on the ATO. Air missions planned and listed on the ATO in
response to Army AIRSUPREQs are dedicated to support the Army unit specified in the AIRSUPREQ.
AIRSUPREQs submitted after the ATO has been published are called immediate AIRSUPREQs. Immediate
AIRSUPREQs are supported with on-call air missions or by redirecting scheduled air missions that are
already on the ATO. The procedures for tracking preplanned AIRSUPREQs and their associated air missions
are explained in Section II of this appendix. For more information on immediate AIRSUPREQs see JP 3-
09.3.
Figure E-2. Army Air Ground System |
3-09 | 243 | Targeting and Army Air Support Requests
PLANNED TARGETS AND AIR MISSIONS
E-4. Targeting seeks to create specific desired effects through lethal and nonlethal actions. There are two
targeting categories: deliberate targeting and dynamic targeting. Deliberate targeting generally provides more
planning time and a larger pool of resources to leverage against a target, while dynamic targeting is generally
restricted by time, resources available, and command priorities (see table E-1). Deliberate targeting
prosecutes planned targets. These targets are known to exist in the AO and have actions scheduled against
them. Both scheduled and on-call targets are outputs of deliberate targeting. Scheduled targets exist in the
AO and are located in sufficient time so that fires or other actions upon them occur at a specific, planned
time. On-call targets have actions planned, but not for a specific delivery time. The commander expects to
locate these targets in sufficient time to execute planned actions. Scheduled air missions are planned to
execute scheduled targets, while on-call air missions are planned for the execution of on-call targets. Both
scheduled and on-call air missions are requested via the AIRSUPREQ process. For more information on
targets and targeting see FM 3-60.
Table E-1. Planned targets and air missions
Deliberate Targeting
Planned Targets
Targets known to exist in the operational environment with engagement actions planed against them.
Originate
from:
Scheduled Targets On-Call Targets
JTL/RTL
Targets prosecuted at a specific time and Targets with actions planned, but not for a
location. specific delivery time or coordinate, which are
most likely located in time to execute planned
actions.
Planning X X
Deliberate Deliberate
Execution Deliberate Dynamic
Deliberate Targeting
Scheduled Air Missions On-Call Air Missions
AI, CAS, and EW Airborne Alert or Ground Alert, AI, CAS, and EW
AIRSUPREQ (USMTF D670)
A means of digitally submitting requests for joint air support when tactical Army echelons identify
targets that require effects exceeding their organic capabilities or when other requirements for joint
air power are identified during the planning process. Scheduled air missions are tasked to
prosecute JFC approved JIPTL targets. On-call missions are tasked to prosecute non JIPTL
targets withing the Army AO.
AI – air interdiction, AO – area of operations, CAS – close air support, EW – electronic warfare,
JFC – joint force commander, JIPTL – joint integrated prioritized target list, JTL – joint target list,
RTL – restricted target list, USMTF D670 – United States message text format D670
E-5. Scheduled targets are prosecuted with scheduled air missions. Scheduled targets are derived from the
JFC approved joint target list (JTL) and restricted target list (RTL). When scheduled targets are approved for
execution by the JFC, they will be included on the joint integrated prioritized list and sourced on the ATO
for execution at a specific time. Scheduled air missions tasked to execute scheduled targets in support of the
ground force have weapon loadouts tailored to achieve specific effects on targets. Scheduled air missions
provide the greatest effects on targets but have the least flexibility for re-tasking and relatively short on-
station times.
E-6. On-call targets can be prosecuted with on-call air missions. On-call air missions will be listed on the
ATO for a specific block of time as either airborne-alert or ground-alert. The block of time is determined
based on the anticipated target type, disposition, composition, target location or target area, and |
3-09 | 244 | Appendix E
friendly/enemy actions in or near the target area. Aircraft response times will also be listed on the ATO and
must be accounted for in planning. Response times vary depending on the distance from the airbase to the
mission/target area and, for ground-alert type aircraft, the alert status time. Aircraft tasked to execute on-call
air missions require planned airspace within which they can safely operate and communication with the
supported ground force. On-call air missions provide a high level of flexibility in execution, longer planned
on-station times, and weapon loadouts designed to be effective against multiple target types.
E-7. Unscheduled and unanticipated targets, also referred to as targets of opportunity, are prosecuted via
dynamic targeting. Scheduled air missions listed on the ATO can support dynamic targeting efforts only
when those aircraft have been made available for re-tasking. Normally, every available on-call air mission
should be utilized for dynamic targeting efforts prior to re-tasking scheduled air missions. A scheduled target
has been planned, approved by the JFC, and given priority over other targets. When re-tasking scheduled air
missions, the original scheduled target will not get executed as intended. Re-tasking scheduled air missions
may negatively affect the success of future operations. For more information on dynamic targeting see ATP
3-60.1.
NOMINATING TARGETS FOR EXECUTION VIA AIR SUPPORT
REQUESTS
E-8. Tactical Army echelons can nominate targets for execution via preplanned AIRSUPREQs.
AIRSUPREQs should be populated with target data from the JFC approved JTL and/or RTL. Army tactical
echelons submit an air support list containing preplanned AIRSUPREQs to their next HQ for approval or
denial. The air support list is transmitted via the USMTF D670 AIRSUPREQ message. The preferred method
of transmitting the air support list is electronically, utilizing the Army’s digital FS command and control
information system. Currently, this is the AFATDS. The senior Army HQ submits the Army air support list
to the BCD for processing. For more information on air support request forms and transmission methods see
JP 3-09.3.
E-9. The BCD is the Army liaison co-located at the supporting joint force air component HQ, normally the
JAOC. BCD responsibilities include submitting Army AIRSUPREQs to, and coordinating air support
requirements with, the supporting joint force air component during planning stages of the joint air tasking
cycle. For more information on the BCD see JP 3-09 and ATP 3-09.13.
E-10. The rationale and desired effects sections of each AIRSUPREQ should clearly identify how the
requested effects conform to the JFC’s targeting guidance by referencing the specific operational and tactical
objectives or tactical tasks they support. The table of prioritized tactical tasks and associated task codes is
normally found in the air operations directive. The air operations directive is produced during Stage 1
(objectives, effects, and guidance) of the joint air tasking cycle and is normally distributed to the Army by
the BCD.
E-11. Targets nominated for execution via AIRSUPREQs and resourced by joint force assets or joint air
missions must meet validation criteria. Targets are validated and prioritized according to the weight of effort
assigned by the JFC to those specific objectives and tasks as outlined in the JFC’s plans and orders.
Identifying within each AIRSUPREQ the appropriate supported objectives or tasks enables the JFC’s
designated targeting oversight authority to validate and prioritize each target for inclusion on the JFC
approved joint integrated prioritized target list. For more information on joint targeting and the joint air
tasking cycle see JP 3-30 and JP 3-60.
E-12. Army corps or divisions operating as tactical HQ are the most appropriate echelons at which to update
the rationale and desired effects sections of AIRSUPREQs. The rationale and desired effects fields of the
USMTF D670 should clearly state which prioritized tactical task the AIRSUPREQ supports by referencing
the prioritized tactical task codes listed in the air operations directive. Each Army echelon is responsible for
verifying that all required information is clearly stated in the AIRSUPREQ. Listing the prioritized tactical
task codes in AIRSUPREQs assists with correct prioritization of Army targets nominated for execution. |
3-09 | 245 | Targeting and Army Air Support Requests
PREPLANNED AIR SUPPORT REQUESTS FOR SCHEDULED
TARGETS (SCHEDULED AIR MISSIONS)
E-13. The normal suspense for nominating targets for execution via AIRSUPREQs is prior to Stage 2 (Target
Development) of the joint air tasking cycle. Air support list submission prior to Stage 2 is required to provide
the targeting and effects team at the JAOC time to verify collateral damage estimates and generate weapon
aimpoints. Aimpoints are described as desired point of impact, joint desired point of impact, desired mean
point of impact, and nonlethal reference points.
* AIRSUPREQs for scheduled air missions should be populated with target data (critical elements)
from the JFC approved JTL and/or RTL.
* Army target nominations submitted prior to Stage 2 (target development) may be resourced by the
following scheduled air missions:
CAS.
AI.
PREPLANNED AIR SUPPORT REQUESTS FOR ON-CALL TARGETS
(ON-CALL AIR MISSIONS)
E-14. The normal suspense for submitting AIRSUPREQs for on-call air missions is prior to Stage 3
(weaponeering and allocation) of the joint air tasking cycle. Air support list submission prior to Stage 3 is
required to provide the master air attack plan team at the JAOC the time necessary to conduct weaponeering.
The master air attack plan team also works with joint airspace planners to ensure airspace is planned for each
air mission. When requesting on-call air missions, Army units should clearly identify which tactical objective
and tactical task the air mission will support. It is highly recommended to add any additional target
information to the remarks section of the USMTF D670 AIRSUPREQ message (to include target type, size,
composition, disposition, and target area). AIRSUPREQs for on-call air missions must be within the
tolerance of the JFC’s air apportionment decision and the JFACC’s air allocation guidance for the planned
ATO period. See JP 3-30 for more information on the joint air tasking cycle.
* AIRSUPREQs for on-call air missions are not processed during the joint targeting cycle and are
not required to contain data from the modernized integrated data base, JTL, or RTL.
* AIRSUPREQs for on-call air missions are submitted to the joint force as part of the Army air
support list.
* AIRSUPREQs for on-call air missions submitted prior to Stage 3 (weaponeering and allocation)
may be resourced by the following on-call air missions:
XCAS/XINT (airborne-alert CAS/AI).
GCAS/GINT (ground-alert CAS/AI).
EW.
TARGETING, AIR SUPPORT REQUESTS, AND AIR-GROUND
OPERATIONS
E-15. The targeting and preplanned AIRSUPREQ processes are crucial to the success of air-ground
operations. Commanders conduct air-ground operations to make use of available combat power from the land
and air domains to accomplish missions and defeat enemy forces. The goal of air-ground operations is to
safely integrate surface-to-surface fires and air-to-surface fires while delivering effects on targets that achieve
commanders’ objectives. Identifying requirements for joint airpower during the targeting process, clearly
stating what effects the commander wants to achieve, how the requested effects support the JFC’s objectives,
and submitting the associated AIRSUPREQs to the supporting air component are critical tasks that must be
accomplished at the appropriate Army echelon.
E-16. Identifying requirements for air support during targeting and conducting effective air-ground
operations provides commanders the ability to create and exploit advantages against enemy forces. The use
of joint airpower supports air-ground operations and provides certain benefits when compared to traditional
surface-to-surface fires. Ordinance delivered by fixed wing aircraft are predominantly precision guided and |
3-09 | 246 | Appendix E
have low probability of error resulting in less chance of fratricide and collateral damage while achieving
lethal effects on targets. Aircraft are more effective against mobile, armored targets and can engage targets
of opportunity immediately upon discovery during a mission. Pilots can provide BDA and additional
intelligence via inflight reports during or shortly after target engagements, enabling commanders to make
well informed decisions. Traditional surface-to-surface fires also support air-ground operations by providing
specific target engagements to suppress enemy air defense systems. Surface-to-surface fires can provide
simultaneous precision strikes of targets at long ranges that aircraft cannot attack without significant risk.
SECTION II – AIR SUPPORT REQUEST NUMBERING PROCESS
E-17. Each AIRSUPREQ requires a unique number for tracking, processing, and pairing with the tasked air
mission(s). The Army air support list can’t be processed digitally at the JAOC unless each AIRSUPREQ in
the list is correctly numbered; AIRSUPREQ numbers are a required field in the USMTF D670 AIRSUPREQ
message. AIRSUPREQ numbers are also a recognized field by which C2 information systems can sort the
ATO, allowing requesting units to quickly locate information about which aircraft have been tasked to
support them. Army echelons that don’t use AIRSUPREQs to nominate targets for execution should assign
AIRSUPREQ numbers to each target nominated for execution. This will aid in identifying on the ATO which
air missions are servicing Army-nominated targets.
E-18. The senior Army HQ is responsible for establishing AIRSUPREQ numbers for use by Army units.
Units are assigned a series of AIRSUPREQ numbers via the operations order (OPORD), Annex D (Fires),
Appendix 5 (Air Support). While AIRSUPREQ numbers do not originate in the special instructions, they
may be published in special instructions to ensure joint force visibility. The AIRSUPREQ number is
comprised of 2 letters which identify the ATO day, three letters that identify the requesting unit, and a three-
digit sequence number. See figure E-3.
Figure E-3. Air Support Request Number
E-19. AIRSUPREQs are planned for specific ATO days. The AIRSUPREQ number uses its first two
characters to identify which ATO day joint airpower and effects are requested for. The next three letters
identify the specific Army unit that is submitting the AIRSUPREQ. The first letter identifies the senior Army
HQ (for example Theater Army, JFLCC). The second letter identifies the upper echelon tactical HQ (Corps
or Division). The third letter identifies the lower echelon tactical HQ (DIV or BDE). (See figure E-4). |
3-09 | 247 | Targeting and Army Air Support Requests
Figure E-4. Air Support Request Numbering
E-20. The two-letter ATO day designation is created by assigning the number of the month and day to their
corresponding letters in the alphabet. Since January is the first month of the year and “A” is the first letter of
the alphabet, January would be designated as “A”, February “B”, March “C”, etc. The first day of the month
would also use the letter “A”, resulting on January 1st being annotated as ATO day “AA” and January 26th
being annotated as ATO day AZ. When the date of the month exceeds the number 26, the second letter starts
over at “A”. See table E-2.
Table E-2. Example air tasking order day calendar
Air Tasking Order for March 2023
SUN MON TUE WED THU FRI SAT
26 27 28 1 2 3 4
BZ BA BB CA CB CC CD
5 6 7 8 9 10 11
CE CF CG CH CI CJ CK
12 13 14 15 16 17 18
CL CM CN CO CP CQ CR
19 20 21 22 23 24 25
CS CT CU CV CW CX CY
26 27 28 29 30 31 1
CZ CA CB CC CD CE DA
FRI – Friday, MON – Monday, SAT – Saturday, SUN – Sunday, THU – Thursday, TUE – Tuesday, WED – Wednesday
E-21. The three-letter unit identification portion of the AIRSUPREQ number is used to identify the
requesting unit. The first letter signifies the senior Army HQ. The senior Army HQ is the highest Army
echelon of command, for example theater Army or JFLCC. Each unit is assigned a letter that represents their
HQ. Table E-3 on page E-8, is a notional example of the first letter of the unit identification portion of an
AIRSUPREQ number. |
3-09 | 248 | Appendix E
Table E-3. Assignment of first letter (example)
Senior Army Headquarters Letter
USARCENT C
USAREUR-AF E
USASOC F
ARNORTH N
USARPAC P
ARSOUTH S
ARNORTH – U.S. Army North, ARSOUTH – U. S. Army South, USARCENT – U.S. Army Central,
USAREUR-AF – U.S. Army Europe and Africa, USARPAC – U.S. Army Pacific,
USASOC – U.S. Army Special Operations Command
E-22. The second letter in the unit identification of the AIRSUPREQ number indicates the upper echelon
tactical HQ. If an Army corps is operating in a tactical role, this letter should identify the Army corps where
the request originated. If the corps is not operating as a tactical HQ, then an Army division should be the
upper echelon tactical HQ. Table E-4 is a notional example of letter assignment for upper echelon tactical
HQ.
Table E-4. Assignment of second letter (example)
Upper Echelon Tactical Headquarters Letter
I Corps A
III Corps B
V Corps C
XVIII Airborne Corps D
E-23. The third letter in the unit identification of the AIRSUPREQ number indicates the lower echelon
tactical HQ. When operating beneath a tactical corps HQ, the third letter should identify the tactical division
HQ where the request originated. In the absence of a tactical corps HQ, the third letter should identify the
brigade within the division that submitted the AIRSUPREQ. When Army divisions operating as upper
echelon tactical HQ submit AIRSUPREQs in support of a maneuver brigade’s operations, the third letter may
be used to identify the brigade being supported. Table E-5 is a notional example of letter assignment for
lower echelon tactical HQ.
Table E-5. Assignment of the third letter (example)
Lower Echelon Tactical Headquarters Letter
3rd Infantry Division A
10th Mountain Division B
82nd Airborne Division C
101st Airborne Division D
7th Infantry Division E
25th Infantry Division F
11th Airborne Division G
1st Infantry Division H
1st Cavalry Division I
1st Armored Division J
4th Infantry Division K
3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment L
E-24. The last three characters in the AIRSUPREQ number are used as sequence numbers, identifying the
number of the request submitted by the unit. The numbers do not represent the type of air mission. Using the
data in Tables E-2 through E-5, an AIRSUPREQ submitted by 82nd Airborne Division for March 1st, 2023,
with XVIII Airborne Corps as their HHQ, operating in the CENTCOM AOR, would have the following
AIRSUPREQ number assigned:
* CACDC001. |
3-09 | 249 | Targeting and Army Air Support Requests
CA is the ATO day the AIRSUPREQ is planned for - March 1st, 2023.
CDC identifies the requesting unit - ARCENT, XVIII Airborne Corps, 82nd Airborne
Division.
001 identifies the AIRSUPREQ as the first request submitted by 82nd Airborne Division. |
3-09 | 251 | Source Notes
This division lists sources by page number. Where material appears in a paragraph, it
lists the page number followed by the paragraph number.
1-14 “Get the job done, tidy up the battlefield later.” Gen. Jack N. Merritt (Field Artillery). Available
at https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-
books/FtLeavenworth_Philosophy.pdf.
1-14 “If you make war,’ he would say to General d’Hédouville in December 1799, ‘wage it with
energy and severity; it is the only means of making it shorter and consequently less deplorable
for mankind.’79”, ― Andrew Roberts, Napoleon: A Life, ASIN : 0143127853, Publisher :
Penguin Books; Reprint edition (October 20, 2015), Page 51.
1-15 “There is still a tendency in each separate unit… to be a one-handed puncher. By that I mean that
the rifleman wants to shoot, the tanker wants to charge, the artilleryman to fire…That is not
the way to win battles. If the band played a piece first with the piccolo, then with the brass
horn, then with the clarinet, and then with the trumpet, there would be a hell of a lot of noise
but no music.” GEN George S. Patton’s speech to the Third Army, June 5th, 1944. Available
at https://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/publications/90-6Book_PAOCleared.pdf.
3-1 “The Artillery was my strongest tool… repeatedly said that it was more a matter of the infantry
supporting the artillery than the artillery supporting the infantry. This was an overstatement,
but not too much of one… I wish I knew the countless times that positions were taken or held
due solely to TOT’s. I also wish I knew the innumerable times… when counterattacks we
smeared by the artillery.” General R. O. Barton, commanding the 4th Division. Page 254–255,
Frank E. Comparato, Age of Great Guns: Cannon Kings and Cannoneers Who Forged the
Firepower of Artillery, Harrisburg, PA. Stackpole, 1965.
4-14 “In a 15 May 1991 letter to the Commandant of the FA School, Major General Raphael J. Hallada
(1987–1991), about the US VII Corps’ 24 February 1991 breaching operation, the
Commanding General of the 1st Infantry Division, Major General Thomas G. Rhame, related:
The performance of the FA in combat has caused all of us to remember what we had perhaps
forgotten, namely its incredible destructive power and shock effect. The preparation fires I
witnessed prior to our assault on the breachline were the most incredible sight I have seen in
27 years of service. On 24 February 1991 Commander of the US VII Corps Artillery,
Brigadier General Creighton Abrams Jr., and the Commander of the 1st Infantry Division
(Mechanized) Artillery, Colonel Michael L. Dodson assembled the FA force. In support of
the US VII Corps assault, General Abrams allocated the 42d, 75th, and 142d FA Brigades,
two division artilleries, and 10 Multiple Launch Rocket System batteries to create a Soviet-
style attack at the breach area. General Abrams positioned approximately 22 artillery pieces
for each kilometer of the attack zone. More than 350 FA pieces fired 11,000 rounds while
M270 Multiple-Launch Rocket Launchers shot 414 rockets in a FA preparation of 30 minutes.
Besides crushing Iraqi morale, this massed fires destroyed 50 tanks, 139 armored personnel
carriers, and 152 FA pieces. ” page 6. Boyd L. Dastrup, "Artillery Strong: Modernizing the
Field Artillery for the 21st Century” (2018). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GOVPUB-
D110-PURL-gpo90442/pdf/GOVPUB-D110-PURL-gpo90442.pdf.
5-3 “Soldiers of the 25th Infantry Division said their final farewells before heading to Thailand to
participate in Pacific Pathways. Pacific Pathways is an operation conducted by U.S. Army
Pacific that deploys personnel and material to support security cooperation exercises with ally
and partner militaries. Thailand is one of the United States' oldest partners in Asia and the
broad cooperation between the two nations continues on issues that benefit both countries, the
region and beyond. "The division's area of responsibility is Southeast Asia and the Pacific
Region so this gives us an opportunity to deploy off of the island of Oahu, train, and build |
3-09 | 252 | Source Notes
holistic readiness with our Thai counterparts," the Executive Officer of 3rd Squadron, 4th
Cavalry Regiment, 3rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division. In addition to
multinational training, Pacific Pathways meets the requirement to provide a force able to
rapidly adapt to emerging challenges across multiple domains. "We trained alongside of them
at JRTC (Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana)," the Executive Officer said.
"We were very impressed with their professionalism and how they seamlessly integrated into
the team and we're looking forward to training with them over the course of several months,"
he added. The ability of both nations' military forces to work together is beneficial, and was
most recently highlighted by the U.S. participation in the Thai-led effort to rescue the Wild
Boar soccer team from a cave in northern Thailand. "We're hoping to build on the already
established relationship with them (Royal Thai Army) in order to further drive our influence
within the Southeast Asian area of operations," said the Officer in Charge, assigned to 3rd
Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment, 3rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division.
This Pacific Pathways mission has captured the world's attention, and the United States are
very proud to have been asked by Thailand to assist. HI, United States (dvids) 02.19.2020,
Story by Sgt. Ryan Jenkins, 25th Infantry Division, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, Hawaii.
Available at https://www.dvidshub.net/news/363680/leaving-pacific-pathways.
5-3 “Enemy leaders must be made to understand clearly that, if they choose to move militarily, no
longer will there be a status quo ante-bellum...something to be restored. Rather, the situation
they themselves have created is one which will be resolved on new terms" Extending the
Battlefield, Military Review, March 1981, pages 32-58, GEN Donn A. Starry. Available at
https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/online-publications/documents/1981-mr-donn-
starry-extending-the-battlefield.pdf.
5-4 “U.S. Army Europe has led the Department of Defense’s Atlantic Resolve land efforts by bringing
units based in the U.S. to Europe for nine months at a time. Atlantic Resolve provides these
rotational units with the ability to build readiness, increase interoperability and enhances the
bond between ally and partner militaries through multinational training events. There are three
types of Atlantic Resolve rotations – armored, aviation and sustainment task forces. These
rotations are overseen by a US Army Division (Forward), a regionally aligned headquarters
based in Poznan, Poland. These deployments of ready, combat-credible U.S. forces to Europe
in support of Atlantic Resolve is evidence of the strong and unremitting U.S. commitment to
NATO and Europe.” Available at https://www.dvidshub.net/feature/AtlanticResolve.
5-4 “An example of a flexible deterrent is the Regionally Aligned Forces mission assigned to the
multiple launch rocket system rotational battalion in the Korean Theater of Operations. Each
of the firing batteries, with enablers from headquarters and headquarters battery and forward
support company, deploy to a combat outpost for a total of four and a half months of an eight-
month deployment. The battalion’s mission is to work closely with Republic of Korea forces
as a deterrent option to North Korean aggression.” Pages 68-69, 2018 Fires Red Book,
January-February 2019. Available at
https://tradocfcoeccafcoepfwprod.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/fires-bulletin-
archive/2019/jan-feb/jan-feb.pdf..
5-4 “In Operation Inherent Resolve in 2017, armed Syrian Army units aligned with hostile paramilitary
forces demonstrated threatening actions against US forces and its partners. After significant
and appropriate warnings to cease the threatening actions, US forces conducted lethal air to
surface strikes as a response resulting in multiple destroyed Syrian ADA and artillery
organizations. The remainder of the Syrian Army units withdrew and the threatening action
ceased" As stated by a U.S. representative. HIMARS deploys to Syria for first time, UPI,
Defense News 14 Jun 2017. Available at https://www.upi.com/Defense-
News/2017/06/14/HIMARS-deploys-to-Syria-for-first-time/8771497458424/. |
3-09 | 253 | Glossary
SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
A2 antiaccess
ACM airspace coordinating measure
ACO airspace control order
AD area denial
ADA air defense artillery
AFATDS Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System
AGM attack guidance matrix
AI air interdiction
AIRSUPREQ air support request
ALO air liaison officer
AO area of operations
AOC air operations center
ASOC air support operations center
ATACMS Army Tactical Missile System
ATO air tasking order
BCD battlefield coordination detachment
BCT brigade combat team
BDA battle damage assessment
BN battalion
C2 command and control
CAB combat aviation brigade
CAS close air support
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CCDR combatant commander
CE circular error
CEMA cyberspace electromagnetic activities
CFFZ call for fire zone
CFL coordinated fire line
CFZ critical friendly zone
CMD-P Computer Meteorological Data-Profiler
COA course of action
CP command post
CSR controlled supply rate
D3SOE denied, degraded, or disrupted space operational environment
DA Department of the Army |
3-09 | 254 | Glossary
DFSCOORD deputy fire support coordinator
DIVARTY division artillery
DS direct support
EA engagement area
EFAT essential field artillery task
EFST essential fire support task
EMS electromagnetic spectrum
EW electronic warfare
FA field artillery
FAB field artillery brigade
FAC(A) forward air controller (airborne)
FAIO field artillery intelligence officer
FDC fire direction center
FFA force field artillery
FFE fire for effect
FID foreign internal defense
FIST fire support team
FLOT forward line of own troops
FM field manual
FO forward observer
FPF final protective fire
FS fire support
FSCL fire support coordination line
FSCM fire support coordination measure
FSCOORD fire support coordinator
FSE fire support element
FSO fire support officer
ft feet
G-2 assistant chief of staff, intelligence
G-3 assistant chief of staff, operations
GARS Global Area Reference System
GMLRS Global Positioning System Multiple Launch Rocket System
GPS Global Positioning System
GRG gridded reference graphic
GS general support
GSR general support-reinforcing
HE high explosives
HIMARS High Mobility Artillery Rocket System
HPT high-payoff target
HPTL high-payoff target list
HQ headquarters |
3-09 | 255 | Glossary
IADS integrated air defense system
INS inertial navigation system
IPOE intelligence preparation of the operational environment
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
JACCE joint air component coordination element
JADOCS Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination System
JAGIC joint air-ground integration center
JAOC joint air operations center
JFACC joint force air component commander
JFC joint force commander
JFE joint fires element
JFLCC joint force land component commander
JFMCC joint force maritime component commander
JP joint publication
JTAC joint terminal attack controller
JTF joint task force
JTL joint target list
LOD line of departure
m meters
MAGTF Marine air-ground task force
MBA main battle area
MDMP military decision-making process
MEA munitions effectiveness assessment
MET meteorological
METT-TC (I) mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available,
and civil considerations, and informational considerations
millimeter
mm
multiple launch rocket system
MLRS
maritime operations center
MOC
named area of interest
NAI
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NATO
no-fire area
NFA
naval surface fire support
NSFS
operational area
OA
operational environment
OE
operational control
OPCON
operation plan
OPLAN
operation order
OPORD
position area for artillery
PAA
primary, alternate, contingency and emergency
PACE
reinforcing
R |
3-09 | 256 | Glossary
RFA restrictive fire area
RFL restrictive fire line
ROE rules of engagement
ROZ restricted operations zone
RTL restricted target list
S-2 battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer
S-3 battalion or brigade operations staff officer
SCAR strike coordination and reconnaissance
SEAD suppression of enemy air defenses
SFA security force assistance
SJA staff judge advocate
SOF special operations forces
SOP standard operating procedure
SOTF special operations task force
TA target acquisition
TACP tactical air control party
TAI target area of interest
TC training circular
TCF tactical combat force
TFC theater fires command
TFE theater fires element
TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures
UA unmanned aircraft
UAS unmanned aircraft system
U.S. United States
USAF United States Air Force
USMC United State Marine Corps
USMTF United States message text format
WLR weapons locating radar
ZF zone of fire
SECTION II – TERMS
air interdiction
Air operations to perform interdiction conducted at such distances from friendly forces that detailed
integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required. (JP 3-03)
air liaison officer
The senior tactical air control party member attached to a ground unit who functions as the primary
advisor to the ground commander on air power. (JP 3-09.3)
airspace control
The exercise of delegated authority over designated airspace and users through control procedures and
coordination measures to maximize operational effectiveness. (JP 3-52) |
3-09 | 257 | Glossary
airspace control authority
The commander designated for overall responsibility for airspace control. (JP 3-52)
airspace control order
An order implementing the airspace control plan that provides the details of the approved requests for
airspace coordinating measures. (JP 3-52)
airspace coordinating measures
Measures employed to facilitate the efficient use of airspace to accomplish missions and
simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces. (JP 3-52)
airspace coordination area
A three-dimensional block of airspace in a target area, established by the appropriate commander, in
which friendly aircraft are reasonably safe from friendly surface fires. (JP 3-09.3)
allocation
Distribution of limited forces and resources for employment among competing requirements. (JP 5-0)
*altitude
The vertical distance of a level, a point or an object considered as a point, measured from mean sea
level or height above ellipsoid.
area defense
A type of defensive operation that concentrates on denying enemy forces access to designated terrain
for a specific time rather than destroying the enemy outright. (ADP 3-90)
Army Service component command
Command responsible for recommendations to the combatant commander on the allocation and
employment of Army forces. (JP 3-31)
artillery target intelligence zone
A weapons locating radar search area in enemy territory that the commander monitor closely to detect
and report any weapon ahead of all acquisitions other than those from critical friendly zones or call for
fire zones.
assessment
A continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing capabilities during military
operations. (JP 3-0)
assign
To place units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively permanent, and/or
where such organization controls and administers the units or personnel for the primary function, or
greater portion of the functions, of the unit or personnel. (JP 3-0)
attach
The placement of units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively temporary.
(JP 3-0)
attack
A type of offensive operation that destroys or defeats enemy forces, seizes and secures terrain, or both.
(ADP 3-90)
*attack guidance matrix
A targeting product approved by the commander, which addresses the how and when targets are
engaged and the desired effects.
axis of advance
The general area through which the bulk of a unit’s combat power must move. |
3-09 | 258 | Glossary
azimuth of fire
The direction, expressed in mils, that a firing unit is laid (oriented) on when it occupies a position.
(ATP 3-09.50)
backbrief
A briefing by subordinates to the commander to review how subordinates intend to accomplish their
mission. (FM 6-0)
battle handover line
A designated phase line where responsibility transitions from the stationary force to the moving force
and vice versa. (ADP 3-90)
boundary
A line that delineates surface areas for the purpose of facilitating coordination and deconfliction of
operations between adjacent units, formations, or areas. (JP 3-0)
breach
A tactical mission task in which a unit breaks through or establishes a passage through an enemy
obstacle. (FM 3-90)
*call for fire
A standardized request for fire containing data necessary for obtaining the required fire on a target.
*call for fire zone
A weapons locating radar search area from which the commander wants to attack hostile firing
systems.
*censor zone
An area from which the weapons locating radar is prohibited from reporting acquisitions.
chief of fires
The senior fires staff officer at echelons above corps who advises the commander on the best use of
available fires resources, and provides input to necessary orders. (ADP 3-19)
*clearance of fires
The process by which the supported commander ensures that fires or their effects will have no
unintended consequences on friendly units or the scheme of maneuver.
close air support
Air action by aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces and that
require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. (JP 3-09.3)
close combat
Warfare carried out on land in a direct-fire fight, supported by direct and indirect fires, and other
assets. (ADP 3-0)
close operations
Tactical actions of subordinate maneuver forces and the forces providing immediate support to them,
whose purpose is to employ maneuver and fires to close with and destroy enemy forces. (FM 3-0)
close support
Action of the supporting force against targets or objectives that are sufficiently near the supported
force as to require detailed integration or coordination of the supporting action with fire, movement, or
other actions of the supported force. (JP 3-31)
collateral damage
A form of collateral effect that causes unintentional or incidental injury or damage to persons or
objects that would not be lawful military targets in the circumstances ruling at the time. (JP 3-60) |
3-09 | 259 | Glossary
combat assessment
The determination of the overall effectiveness of force employment during military operations. (JP 3-
60)
combat power
The total means of destructive and disruptive force that a military unit/formation can apply against an
opponent at a given time. (JP 3-0)
command and control
The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and
attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. (JP 1, Volume 2)
command and control system
The arrangement of people, processes, networks, and command posts that enable commanders to
conduct operations. (ADP 6-0)
commander’s intent
A clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired objectives and military
end state. (JP 3-0)
common control
The horizontal and vertical map or chart location of points in the target and position area, tied in with
the horizontal and vertical control in use by two or more units. (ATP 3-09.02)
common grid
Refers to all firing and target-locating elements within a unified command located and oriented to
prescribed accuracies with respect to a single three-dimensional datum. (ATP 3-09.02)
*common sensor boundary
A line depicted by a series of grid coordinates, grid line, phase line or major terrain feature that divides
target acquisition search areas into radar acquisition management areas. Also called CSB.
concept of operations
A statement that directs the manner in which subordinate units cooperate to accomplish the mission
and establishes the sequence of actions the force will use to achieve the end state. (ADP 5-0)
consolidate gains
Activities to make enduring any temporary operational success and to set the conditions for a
sustainable security environment, allowing for a transition of control to other legitimate authorities.
(ADP 3-0)
controlled supply rate
The rate of ammunition consumption that can be supported, considering availability, facilities, and
transportation. It is expressed in rounds per unit, individual, or vehicle per day. (ATP 3-09.23)
convergence
An outcome created by the concerted employment of capabilities from multiple domains and echelons
against combinations of decisive points in any domain to create effects against a system, formation,
decision maker, or in a specific geographic area. (FM 3-0)
coordinated fire line
A line beyond which conventional surface-to-surface direct fire and indirect fire support means may
fire at any time within the boundaries of the establishing headquarters without additional coordination
but does not eliminate the responsibility to coordinate the airspace required to conduct the mission. (JP
3-09)
coordinating altitude
An airspace coordinating measure that uses altitude to separate users and as the transition between
different airspace control elements. (JP 3-52) |
3-09 | 260 | Glossary
coordination level
An airspace coordinating measure below which fixed-wing aircraft normally will not fly. (JP 3-52)
core competency
An essential and enduring capability that a branch or an organization provides to Army operations.
(ADP 1-01)
counterair
A mission at the theater level that integrates offensive and defensive operations to attain and maintain a
desired degree of control of the air and protection by neutralizing or destroying enemy aircraft and
missiles, both before and after launch. (JP 3-01)
*counterbattery fire
Fire delivered for the purpose of destroying or neutralizing indirect fire weapon systems.
counterfire
Fire intended to destroy or neutralize enemy weapons. (JP 3-09)
countermobility
A set of combined arms activities that use or enhance the effects of natural and man-made obstacles to
prevent the enemy freedom of movement and maneuver. (ATP 3-90.8)
*counterpreparation fire
The intensive prearranged fire delivered when the imminence of the enemy attack is discovered.
covert crossing
A planned crossing of an inland water obstacle or other gap in which the crossing is intended to be
undetected. (ATP 3-90.4)
*critical friendly zone
A commander designated friendly area of coverage critical to the protection of an asset whose loss
would seriously jeopardize the mission that is employed by weapons location radar.
cyberspace attack
Actions taken in and through cyberspace that create denial (i.e., degradation, disruption, or destruction)
or manipulation effects in cyberspace and are considered a form of fires. (JP 3-12)
cyberspace domain
The interdependent networks of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the
Internet, telecommunication networks, computer systems, embedded processors and controllers, and
relevant portions of the electromagnetic spectrum. (FM 3-0)
cyberspace operations
The employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or
through cyberspace. (JP 3-0)
*danger close
For air-to-surface and surface-to-surface missions is a mandatory call alerting of an elevated risk to the
closest friendly troops from the intended point of a weapon’s impact requiring specific procedures for
risk mitigation.
decisive operation
The operation that directly accomplishes the mission. (ADP 3-0)
deep area
Where the commander sets conditions for future success in close combat. (ADP 3-0)
deep operations
Tactical actions against enemy forces, typically out of direct contact with friendly forces, intended to
shape future close operations and protect rear operations. (FM 3-0) |
3-09 | 261 | Glossary
defeat
To render a force incapable of achieving its objectives. (ADP 3-0)
defeat in detail
Concentrating overwhelming combat power against separate parts of a force rather than defeating the
entire force at once. (ADP 3-90)
defensive operation
An operation to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable
for offensive or stability operations. (ADP 3-0)
delay
When a force under pressure trades space for time by slowing down the enemy’s momentum and
inflicting maximum damage on enemy forces without becoming decisively engaged. (ADP 3-90)
deliberate crossing
The crossing of an inland water obstacle or other gap that requires extensive planning and detailed
preparations. (ATP 3-90.4)
denial operations
Actions to hinder or deny the enemy the use of terrain, supplies, or facilities. (FM 3-90)
denied, degraded, and disrupted space operational environment
A composite of those conditions and influences in which space-enabled capabilities have been
impaired by hostile threats or non-hostile means. (FM 3-14)
deny
A task to hinder or prevent the enemy from using terrain, space, personnel, supplies, or facilities. (ATP
3-21.20)
destroy
A tactical mission task that physically renders an enemy force combat-ineffective until reconstituted.
(FM 3-90)
*destruction
In the context of the computed effects of field artillery fires, destruction renders a target out of action
permanently, or ineffective for a long period of time, producing at least 30-percent casualties or
materiel damage.
direction of attack
A specific direction or assigned route a force uses and does not deviate from when attacking. (ADP 3-
90)
direct support
A support relationship requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer
directly to the supported force’s request for assistance. (FM 3-0)
disintegrate
To disrupt the enemy’s command and control, degrading synchronization and cohesion of its
operations. (FM 3-0)
disrupt
1.A tactical mission task in which a unit upsets an enemy’s formation or tempo and causes the enemy
force to attack prematurely or in a piecemeal fashion. 2. An obstacle effect that focuses fire planning
and obstacle effort to cause the enemy to break up its formation and tempo, interrupt its timetable,
commit breaching assets prematurely, and attack in a piecemeal effort. (FM 3-90)
dislocate
To employ forces to obtain significant positional advantage in one or more domains, rendering the
enemy’s dispositions less valuable, perhaps even irrelevant. (FM 3-0) |
3-09 | 262 | Glossary
*diversion
The act of drawing the attention and forces of an enemy from the point of the principal operation; an
attack, alarm, or feint that diverts attention.
domain
A physically defined portion of an operational environment requiring a unique set of warfighting
capabilities and skills. (FM 3-0)
effect
1.The physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another
effect. 2. The result, outcome, or consequence of an action. 3. A change to a condition, behavior, or
degree of freedom. (JP 3-0)
encirclement
Where one force loses its freedom of maneuver because an opposing force is able to isolate it by
controlling all ground lines of communications and reinforcement. (FM 3-90)
engagement authority
An authority vested with a joint force commander that may be delegated to a subordinate commander,
that permits an engagement decision. (JP 3-01)
execution
The act of putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission and
adjusting operations based on changes in the situation. (ADP 5-0)
exploitation
A type of offensive operation following a successful attack to disorganize the enemy in depth. (FM 3-
90)
*field artillery
Equipment, supplies, ammunition, and personnel involved in the use of cannon, rocket, or surface-to-
surface missile launchers.
final coordination line
A phase line close to the enemy position used to coordinate the lifting or shifting of supporting fires
with the final deployment of maneuver elements. (ADP 3-90)
final protective fire
An immediately available, prearranged barrier of fire designed to impede enemy movement across
defensive lines or areas. (JP 3-09.3)
fire direction center
That element of a command post, consisting of gunnery and communications personnel and
equipment, by means of which the commander exercises fire direction and/or fire control. (JP 3-09.3)
*fire plan
A tactical plan for using the weapons of a unit or formation so that their fire will be coordinated.
*fire support
A rapid and continuous integration of surface-to-surface indirect fires, target acquisition, armed
aircraft, and other lethal and nonlethal attack/delivery systems that converge against targets across all
domains in support of the supported commander’s concept of operations.
fire support area
An appropriate maneuver area assigned to fire support ships by the naval force commander from which
they can deliver gunfire support to an amphibious operation. (JP 3-09)
fire support coordination
The planning and executing of fire so targets are adequately covered by a suitable weapon or group of
weapons. (JP 3-09) |
3-09 | 263 | Glossary
fire support coordination line
A fire support coordination measure established by the land or amphibious force commander to
support common objectives within an area of operation, beyond which all fires must be coordinated
with affected commanders prior to engagement and, short of the line, all fires must be coordinated with
the establishing commander prior to engagement. (JP 3-09)
fire support coordination measure
A measure employed by commanders to facilitate the rapid engagement of targets and simultaneously
provide safeguards for friendly forces. (JP 3-0)
*fire support coordinator
The senior field artillery commander for the theater, corps, division, or brigade combat team who is the
supported commander’s primary advisor to plan, coordinate, integrate fires, field artillery, and fire
support in the execution of assigned tasks.
*fire support officer
Is the operational to tactical level field artillery officer responsible for advising the supported
commander or assisting the fire support coordinator on fires functions and fire support.
*fire support plan
A plan that addresses each means of fire support available and describes how Army indirect fires, joint
fire support, and target acquisition are integrated into operations to facilitate success.
*fire support planning
The continuous process of analyzing, allocating, integrating, synchronizing, and scheduling fires to
describe how the effects of fires facilitate supported force actions.
fire support station
An exact location at sea within a fire support area from which a fire support ship delivers fire. (JP 3-
02)
fire support team
A field artillery team provided for each maneuver company/troop and selected units to plan and
coordinate all supporting fires available to the unit, including mortars, field artillery, naval surface fire
support, and close air support integration. (JP 3-09.3)
fires
The use of weapon systems or other actions to create specific lethal or nonlethal effects on a target. (JP
3-09)
flexibility
The employment of a versatile mix of capabilities, formations, and equipment for conducting
operations. (ADP 3-0)
flexible deterrent option
A planning construct intended to facilitate early decision-making by developing a wide range of
interrelated responses that begin with deterrent-oriented actions carefully tailored to create a desired
effect. (JP 5-0)
flexible response
The capability of military forces for effective reaction to any enemy threat or attack with actions
appropriate and adaptable to the circumstances existing. (JP 5-0)
*force field artillery headquarters
A battalion size or higher unit designated by the supported commander who specifies its duration,
duties, and responsibilities.
force projection
The ability to project the military instrument of national power from the United States or another
theater, in response to requirements for military operations. (JP 3-0) |
3-09 | 264 | Glossary
force tailoring
The process of determining the right mix of forces and the sequence of their deployment in support of
a joint force commander. (ADP 3-0)
forcible entry
Seizing and holding of a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition or forcing access into a
denied area to allow movement and maneuver to accomplish the mission. (JP 3-18)
foreign internal defense
Participation by civilian and military forces of a government or international organizations in any of
the programs and activities undertaken by a host nation government to free and protect its society from
subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. (JP 3-22)
foreign security forces
Personnel organized and/or employed for security, whether they are civil or military, federal, state or
provincial, or local. (JP 3-20)
forward air controller (airborne)
A specifically trained and qualified aviation officer, normally an airborne extension of the tactical air
control party, who exercises control from the air of aircraft engaged in close air support of ground
troops. (JP 3-09.3)
forward edge of the battle area
The foremost limits of a series of areas in which ground combat units are deployed to coordinate fire
support, the positioning of forces, or the maneuver of units, excluding areas in which covering or
screening forces are operating. (JP 3-09.3)
forward line of own troops
A line that indicates the most forward positions of friendly forces in any kind of military operation at a
specific time. (FM 3-90)
forward observer
An individual operating with front line troops trained to adjust ground or naval gunfire and pass
battlefield information. (JP 3-09)
fratricide
The unintentional killing or wounding of friendly or neutral personnel by friendly firepower. (ADP 3-
37)
free-fire area
A specific region into which any weapon system may fire without additional coordination with the
establishing headquarters. (JP 3-09)
function
The broad, general, and enduring role for which an organization is designed, equipped, and trained. (JP
1, Volume 1)
general support
Support which is given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof.
(JP 3-09.3)
general support-reinforcing
A support relationship assigned to a unit to support the force as a whole and to reinforce another
similar type unit. (FM 3-0)
graphic control measure
A symbol used on maps and displays to regulate forces and warfighting functions. (ADP 6-0)
*harassing fire
Unpredictable and intermittent fire designated to disturb enemy troops not physically engaged in
combat with the intent to curtail movement, readiness, ability to fight, and lower morale. |
3-09 | 265 | Glossary
hasty crossing
The crossing of an inland water obstacle or other gap using the crossing means on hand or those
readily available, and made without pausing for elaborate preparations. (ATP 3-90.4)
high-payoff target
A target whose loss to the enemy will significantly contribute to the success of the friendly course of
action. (JP 3-60)
high-value target
A target the enemy commander requires for the successful completion of the mission. (JP 3-60)
hybrid threat
The diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorists forces, or criminal
elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects. (ADP 3-0)
information activity
A collection of tasks linked by purpose to affect how humans and automated systems derive meaning
from, use, and act upon, or are influenced by, information. (ADP 3-13)
*indirect fire
Fire delivered at a target not visible to the firing unit.
interdiction
An action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s military surface capability before it can be
used effectively against friendly forces or otherwise be used to achieve enemy objectives. (JP 3-03)
*interdiction fires
Employed to disrupt, delay, or destroy enemy forces.
isolate
To separate a force from its sources of support in order to reduce its effectiveness and increase its
vulnerability to defeat. (ADP 3-0)
joint fires
Fires delivered during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action
to produce desired effects in support of a common objective. (JP 3-0)
joint fires observer
A certified and qualified Service member who requests, controls, and adjusts surface-to-surface fires;
provides targeting information in support of close air support; and performs terminal guidance
operations. (JP 3-09.3)
joint fire support
Joint fires that assist the joint force in creating effects and achieving objectives. (JP 3-0)
joint force commander
A general term applied to a combatant commander, subordinate unified commander, or joint task force
commander. (JP 1, Volume 1)
joint force land component commander
The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force
responsible to the establishing commander for recommending the proper employment of assigned,
attached, and made available for tasking land forces; planning and coordinating land operations; or
accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. (JP 3-0)
joint targeting coordination board
A group formed by the joint force commander to accomplish broad targeting oversight functions that
may include, but are not limited to, coordinating targeting information; providing targeting guidance,
synchronization, and priorities; and approving the joint integrated prioritized target list. (JP 3-60) |
3-09 | 266 | Glossary
joint terminal attack controller
A qualified (certified) Service member who, from a forward position, directs the action of combat
aircraft engaged in close air support and other offensive air operations. (JP 3-09.3)
kill box
A three-dimensional permissive fire support coordination measure with an associated airspace
coordinating measure used to facilitate the integration of fires. (JP 3-09)
large-scale combat operations
Extensive joint combat operations in terms of scope and size of forces committed, conducted as a
campaign aimed at achieving operational and strategic objectives. (ADP 3-0)
law of war
That part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. (JP 3-84)
lethality
The capability and capacity to destroy. (FM 3-0)
Level I threat
A small enemy force that can be defeated by those units normally operating in the echelon support area
or by the perimeter defenses established by friendly bases and base clusters. (ATP 3-91)
Level II threat
An enemy force or activities that can be defeated by a base or base cluster’s defensive capabilities
when augmented by a response force. (ATP 3-91)
Level III threat
An enemy force or activities beyond the defensive capability of both the base and base cluster and any
local reserve or response force. (ATP 3-91)
limit of advance
A phase line used to control forward progress of the attack. (ADP 3-90)
line of contact
A general trace delineating the locations where friendly and enemy forces are engaged. (ADP 3-90)
line of departure
In land warfare, a line designated to coordinate the departure of attack elements. (JP 3-31)
lodgment
A designated area in a hostile or potentially hostile operational area that, when seized and held, makes
the continuous landing of troops and material possible and provides the maneuver space for subsequent
operations. (JP 3-18)
main battle area
The area where the commander intends to deploy the bulk of their unit to defeat an attacking enemy.
(FM 3-90)
main effort
A designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given point in time is most critical to overall mission
success. (ADP 3-0)
maritime domain
The oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, and the airspace above these, including the
littorals. (JP 3-32)
massed fire
Fire from a number of weapons directed at a single point or small area. (JP 3-02)
mensuration
The process of measurement of a feature or location on the Earth to determine an absolute latitude,
longitude, and elevation. (JP 3-60) |
3-09 | 267 | Glossary
mobile defense
A type of defensive operation that concentrates on the destruction or defeat of the enemy through a
decisive attack by a striking force. (ADP 3-90)
movement to contact
A type of offensive operation designed to establish or regain contact to develop the situation. (FM 3-
90)
multidomain operations
The combined arms employment of joint and Army capabilities to create and exploit relative
advantages to achieve objectives, defeat enemy forces, and consolidate gains on behalf of joint force
commanders. (FM 3-0)
multinational operations
A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually
undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (JP 3-16)
mutual support
That support which units render each other throughout joint operations, because of their assigned tasks,
their position relative to each other and to the enemy, or their inherent capabilities. (JP 3-31)
named area of interest
The geospatial area or systems node or link against which information that will satisfy a specific
information requirement can be collected, usually to capture indications of enemy and adversary
courses of action. (JP 2-0)
naval surface fire support
Fire provided by Navy surface gun and missile systems in support of a unit or units. (JP 3-09.3)
*neutralization
In the context of the computed effects of field artillery fires renders a target ineffective for a short
period of time, producing at least 10-percent casualties or materiel damage.
*neutralization fire
Fire delivered to render the target ineffective or unusable.
neutralize
A tactical mission task in which a unit renders the enemy incapable of interfering with an operation.
(FM 3-90)
no-fire area
An area designated by the appropriate commander into which fires or their effects are prohibited. (JP
3-09.3)
nonlethal weapon
A weapon, device, or munition that is explicitly designed and primarily employed to incapacitate
personnel or materiel immediately, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and
undesired damage to property in the target area or environment. (JP 3-09)
no-strike list
A list of objects or entities characterized as protected from the effects of military operations under
international law and/or rules of engagement. (JP 3-60)
objective
(Army) A location used to orient operations, phase operations, facilitate changes of direction, and
provide for unity of effort. (ADP 3-90)
*observed fire
The point of projectile impact or burst that can be seen by an observer, and can be adjusted on the basis
of observation. |
3-09 | 268 | Glossary
offensive operation
An operation to defeat or destroy enemy forces and gain control of terrain, resources, and population
centers. (ADP 3-0)
on-scene commander
An individual in the immediate vicinity of an isolating event who temporarily assumes command of
the incident. (JP 3-50)
operational approach
A broad description of the mission, operational concepts, tasks, and actions required to accomplish the
mission. (JP 5-0)
operational area
An overarching term encompassing more descriptive terms (such as area of responsibility and joint
operations area) of locations for the conduct of military operations. (JP 3-0)
operational control
The authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing
and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative
direction necessary to accomplish the mission. (JP 1 Volume 2)
operational environment
The aggregate of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of
capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 3-0)
operations in depth
The simultaneous application of combat power throughout an area of operations. (ADP 3-90)
organic
Assigned to and forming an essential part of a military organization as listed in its table of organization
for the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps, and are assigned to the operating forces for the Navy. (JP
1 Volume 2)
passage of lines
An operation in which a force moves forward or rearward through another force’s combat positions
with the intention of moving into or out of contact with the enemy. (JP 3-18)
phase line
An easily identified feature in the operational area utilized for control and coordination of military
operations. (JP 3-09)
position area for artillery
An area assigned to an artillery unit to deliver surface to surface fires. (FM 3-90)
precision-guided munition
A guided weapon intended to destroy a point target and minimize collateral damage. (JP 3-03)
*precision munition
A munition that corrects for ballistic conditions using guidance and control up to the aimpoint or
submunitions dispense with terminal accuracy less than the lethal radius of effects.
preparation
Those activities performed by units and Soldiers to improve their ability to execute an operation. (ADP
5-0)
*preparation fire
A brief, intense bombardment on selected targets or a prolonged effort over time covering a large
number of targets. |
3-09 | 269 | Glossary
principle
A comprehensive and fundamental rule or an assumption of central importance that guides how an
organization approaches and thinks about the conduct of operations. (ADP 1-01)
*priority of fires
The commander’s guidance to the staff, subordinate commanders, fires planners, and supporting
agencies to employ fires in accordance with the relative importance of a unit’s mission.
*priority target
A target, based on either time or importance, on which the delivery of fires takes precedence over all
the fires for the designated firing unit or element.
protection
Preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and nonmilitary
personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside
the boundaries of a given operational area. (JP 3-0)
pursuit
A type of offensive operation to catch or cut off a disorganized hostile force attempting to escape, with
the aim of destroying it. (FM 3-90)
rear operations
Tactical actions behind major subordinate maneuver forces that facilitate movement, extend
operational reach, and maintain desired tempo. (FM 3-0)
reconnaissance
A mission undertaken to obtain information about the activities and resources of an enemy or
adversary, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, geographic, or other
characteristics of a particular area, by visual observation or other detection methods. (JP 2-0)
reconnaissance objective
The most important result desired from that specific reconnaissance effort. (FM 3-90)
reinforcing
A support relationship requiring a force to support another supporting unit. (FM 3-0)
relative advantage
A location or condition, in any domain, relative to an adversary or enemy that provides an opportunity
to progress towards or achieve an objective. (FM 3-0)
relief in place
An operation in which, by direction of higher authority, all or part of a unit is replaced in an area by
the incoming unit and the responsibilities of the replaced elements for the mission and the assigned
zone of operations are transferred to the incoming unit. (JP 3-07.3)
required supply rate
The amount of ammunition expressed in terms of rounds per weapon per day for ammunition items
fired by weapons, in terms of other units of measure per day for bulk allotment, and other items
estimated to be required to sustain operations of any designated force without restriction for a specified
period. (ATP 3-09.23)
reserve
That portion of a body of troops that is withheld from action at the beginning of an engagement to be
available for a decisive movement. (ADP 3-90)
restricted operations zone
Airspace reserved for specific activities in which the operations of one or more airspace users is
restricted. (JP 3-52) |
3-09 | 270 | Glossary
restricted target list
A list of restricted targets nominated by elements of the joint force and approved by the joint force
commander or directed by higher authorities. (JP 3-60)
restrictive fire area
A location in which specific restrictions are imposed and into which fires that exceed those restrictions
will not be delivered without coordination with the establishing headquarters. (JP 3-09)
restrictive fire line
A specific boundary established between converging, friendly surface forces that prohibits fires or their
effects from crossing. (JP 3-09)
retirement
When a force out of contact moves away from the enemy. (ADP 3-90)
retrograde
A type of defensive operation that involves organized movement away from the enemy. (ADP 3-90)
risk management
The process to identify, assess, and mitigate risks and make decisions that balance risk cost with
mission benefits. (JP 3-0)
role
The broad and enduring purpose for which the organization or branch is established. (ADP 1-01)
rules of engagement
Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations
under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces
encountered. (JP 3-84)
running estimate
The continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the current operation is
proceeding according to the commander’s intent and if planned future operations are supportable.
(ADP 5-0)
scheme of fires
The detailed, logical sequence of targets and fire support events to find and engage targets to support
the commander’s objective. (JP 3-09)
sector
An operational area assigned to a unit in the defense that has rear and lateral boundaries and
interlocking fires. (FM 3-0)
security area
That area occupied by a unit’s security elements and includes the areas of influence of those security
elements. (ADP 3-90)
security force assistance
The Department of Defense activities that support the development of the capacity and capability of
foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. (JP 3-20)
setting the theater
The broad range of activities continuously conducted to establish conditions for the successful
execution of operations in a theater. (FM 3-0)
shaping operation
An operation at any echelon that creates and preserves conditions for success of the decisive operation
through effects on the enemy, other actors, and the terrain. (ADP 3-0)
space domain
The area above the altitude where atmospheric effects on airborne objects become negligible. (JP 3-14) |
3-09 | 271 | Glossary
stability operation
An operation conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national
power to establish or maintain a secure environment and provide essential governmental services,
emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (ADP 3-0)
strike
An attack to damage or destroy an objective or a capability. (JP 3-0)
strike coordination and reconnaissance
An air mission to detect targets and coordinate or perform attack or reconnaissance on those targets.
(JP 3-03)
support area
The portion of the commander’s area of operations that is designated to facilitate the positioning,
employment, and protection of base sustainment assets required to sustain, enable, and control
operations. (ADP 3-0)
support area operations
The tactical actions securing lines of communications, bases, and base clusters that enable an echelon’s
sustainment and command and control. (FM 3-0)
supporting effort
A designated subordinate unit with a mission that supports the success of the main effort. (ADP 3-0)
supporting range
The distance one unit may be geographically separated from a second unit yet remain within the
maximum range of the second unit’s weapons systems. (ADP 3-0)
suppress
A tactical mission task in which a unit temporarily degrades a force or weapon system from
accomplishing its mission. (FM 3-90)
*suppression
In the context of the computed effects of field artillery fires, renders a target ineffective for a short
period of time producing suppression of enemy air defenses at least 3-percent casualties or materiel
damage.
suppression of enemy air defenses
Activity that neutralizes, destroys, or temporarily degrades surface-based enemy air defenses by
destructive and/or disruptive means. (JP 3-01)
*suppressive fire
Fires on or about a weapons system to degrade its performance below the level needed to fulfill its
mission objectives during the conduct of the fires.
sustainment
The provision of logistics, financial management, personnel services, and health service support
necessary to maintain operations until successful mission completion. (ADP 4-0)
synchronization
The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat
power at a decisive place and time. (JP 2-0)
tactical combat force
A rapidly deployable, air-ground, mobile combat unit with appropriate combat support and combat
service support assets assigned to, and capable of, defeating Level III threats including combined arms.
(JP 3-10) |
3-09 | 272 | Glossary
tactical control
The authority over forces that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or
maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. (JP 1,
Volume 2)
tactical deception
A friendly activity that causes enemy commanders to take action or cause inaction detrimental to their
objectives. (FM 3-90)
target
An entity or object that performs a function for the threat considered for possible engagement or other
action. (JP 3-60)
target acquisition
The detection, identification, and location of a target in sufficient detail to permit the effective
employment of capabilities that create the required effects. (JP 3-60)
target area of interest
The geographical area where high-value targets can be acquired and engaged by friendly forces. (JP 2-
0)
target coordinate mensuration program
The combination of the following distinct separate critical components and their ability to operate as a
whole to accurately produce mensurated target coordinates: use of one or more National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency (NGA)-validated mensuration tool, a mensuration process, a training syllabus,
proficiency development and maintenance procedures, work center/work environment procedures,
access to imagery, program governance documentation, and certified analysts and/or operators.
(CJSI 3505.01E)
targeting
The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them,
considering operational requirements and capabilities. (JP 3-0)
target location error
The difference between the coordinates generated for a target and the actual location of the target. (JP
3-09.3)
task-organizing
The act of designing a force, support staff, or sustainment package of specific size and composition to
meet a unique task or mission. (ADP 3-0)
tempo
The relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect to the enemy. (ADP 3-0)
terminal attack control
The authority to control the maneuver of and grant weapons release clearance to attacking aircraft. (JP
3-09.3)
terminal guidance operations
Actions using electronic, mechanical, voice, or visual communications that provide approaching
aircraft and/or weapons additional information regarding a specific target location. (JP 3-09)
theater strategic level of warfare
The level of warfare at which combatant commanders synchronize with unified action partners and
employ all elements of national power to fulfill policy aims within the assigned theater in support of
the national strategy. (FM 3-0)
threat
Any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm United States
forces, United States national interests, or the homeland. (ADP 3-0) |
3-09 | 273 | Glossary
trigger line
A phase line located on identifiable terrain used to initiate and mass fires into an engagement area at a
predetermined range. (FM 3-90)
troop movement
The movement of Soldiers and units from one place to another by any available means. (FM 3-90)
unified action partners
Those military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and elements of the private
sector with whom Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during the conduct of
operations. (ADP 3-0)
*unobserved fire
Projectile points of impact or burst not observed.
*weapons locating radar
A continuous target acquisition counterbattery system that detects in-flight projectiles, and
communicates point of origin and point of impact locations.
weaponeering
The process of determining the specific means required to create a desired effect on a given target. (JP
3-60)
withdraw
To disengage from an enemy force and move in a direction away from the enemy. (ADP 3-90)
zone
An operational area assigned to a unit in the offense that only has rear and lateral boundaries. (FM 3-0)
zone of fire
An area into which a designated ground unit or fire support ship delivers, or is prepared to deliver, fire
support. (JP 3-09) |
3-09 | 275 | References
All URLs accessed on 3 January 2024.
REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS
These documents must be available to the intended users of this publication.
DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. April 2024.
FM 1-02.1. Operational Terms. 28 February 2024.
FM 1-02.2. Military Symbols. 28 February 2024.
RELATED PUBLICATIONS
These documents contain relevant supplemental information.
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDIZATION AGREEMENTS
Most North Atlantic Treaty Organization publications are available at https://nso.nato.int/nso/.
(Requires account registration).
STANAG 2484 Allied Artillery Publication-5 (B) Version 1. NATO Fire Support Doctrine: 11 May
2015.
STANAG 3680 Allied Artillery Publication-5 Version 1. NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions
(English and French). 12 April 2002.
JOINT PUBLICATIONS
Most Department of Defense publication are available online: https://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/.
Most joint publications are available online: https://www.jcs.mil/doctrine.
Most CJSI publications are available online at https://www.jcs.mil/Library/
CJSI 3370.01D. Target Development Standards (S/NF), 08 April 2022.
CJSI 3505.01E. Target Coordinate Mensuration, Certification, and Program Accreditation, 10 August
2022.
JP 1. Volume 1. Joint Warfighting. 27 August 2023.
JP 1. Volume 2. The Joint Force. 19 June 2020.
JP 2-0. Joint Intelligence. 26 May 2022.
JP 3-0. Joint Campaigns and Operations. 18 June 2022.
JP 3-01. Countering Air and Missile Threats. 06 April 2023.
JP 3-02. Amphibious Operations. 04 January 2019.
JP 3-03. Joint Interdiction. 26 May 2022.
JP 3-07.3. Peace Operations. 01 March 2018.
JP 3-09. Joint Fire Support. 10 April 2019.
JP 3-09.3. Close Air Support. 10 June 2019.
JP 3-10. Joint Security Operations in Theater. 25 July 2019.
JP 3-12. Joint Cyberspace Operations. 19 December 2022.
JP 3-14. Joint Space Operations. 23 August 2023.
JP 3-16. Multinational Operations, 01 March 2019. |
3-09 | 276 | References
JP 3-18. Joint Forcible Entry Operations. 11 May 2017.
JP 3-20. Security Cooperation. 09 September 2022.
JP 3-22. Foreign Internal Defense. 17 August 2018.
JP 3-30. Joint Air Operations. 25 July 2019.
JP 3-31. Joint Land Operations. 03 October 2019.
JP 3-32. Joint Maritime Operations. 04 December 2023.
JP 3-50. Personnel Recovery. 14 August 2023.
JP 3-52. Joint Airspace Control. 22 October 2022.
JP 3-60. Joint Targeting. 28 September 2018.
JP 3-84. Legal Support. 02 August 2016.
JP 5-0. Joint Planning. 01 December 2020.
JP 6-0. Joint Communications. 04 December 2023.
ARMY PUBLICATIONS
Unless otherwise indicated, most Army publications are available online at: https://armypubs.army.mil.
ADP 1-01. Doctrine Primer. 31 July 2019.
ADP 3-0. Operations. 31 July 2019.
ADP 3-07. Stability. 31 July 2019.
ADP 3-13. Information. 27 November 2023.
ADP 3-19. Fires. 31 July 2019.
ADP 3-37. Protection. 10 January 2024.
ADP 3-90. Offense and Defense. 31 July 2019.
ADP 4-0. Sustainment. 31 July 2019.
ADP 5-0. The Operations Process. 31 July 2019.
ADP 6-0. Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces. 31 July 2019.
ADP 6-22. Army Leadership and The Profession. 31 July 2019.
ATP 2-01. Collection Management. 17 August 2021.
ATP 3-04.1. Aviation Tactical Employment. 07 May 2020.
ATP 3-06. Urban Operations. 21 July 2022.
ATP 3-09.02. Field Artillery Survey. 16 February 2016.
ATP 3-09.12. Field Artillery Counterfire and Weapons Locating Radar Operations. 26 October 2021.
ATP 3-09.13. The Battlefield Coordination Detachment. 24 July 2015.
ATP 3-09.23. Field Artillery Cannon Battalion. 24 September 2015.
ATP 3-09.24. The Field Artillery Brigade. 30 March 2022.
ATP 3-09.30. Observed Fires. 28 September 2017.
ATP 3-09.32/MCRP 3-31.6/NTTP 3-09.2/AFTTP 3-2.6. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for the Joint Application of Firepower (JFIRE). 29 November 2023.
ATP 3-09.34/MCRP 3-31.4/NTTP 3-09.2.1/AFTTP 3-2.59. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for Kill Box Planning and Employment. 07 October 2022.
ATP 3-09.42. Fire Support for The Brigade Combat Team. 01 March 2016.
ATP 3-09.50. The Field Artillery Cannon Battery. 04 May 2016.
ATP 3-09.60. Techniques for Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) and High Mobility Artillery
Rocket System (HIMARS) Operations. 29 July 2020.
ATP 3-09.90. Division Artillery Operations and Fire Support for the Division. 12 October 2017.
ATP 3-21.20. Infantry Battalion. 28 December 2017. |
3-09 | 277 | References
ATP 3-52.1/MCRP 3-20F.4/NTTP 3-56.4/AFTTP 3-2.78. Multi-service Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for Airspace Control. 21 June 2023.
ATP 3-52.2/MCRP 3-20.1/NTTP 3-56.2/AFTTP 3-2.17. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques and
Procedures for the Theater Air-Ground System. 21 May 2020.
ATP 3-60.1/MCRP 3-31.5/NTTP 3-60.1/AFTTP 3-2.3. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques and
Procedures for Dynamic Targeting. 05 January 2022.
ATP 3-60.2/MCRP 3-20D.1/NTTP 3-03.4.3/AFTTP 3-2.72. Multi-service Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance. 31 January 2018.
ATP 3-90.4/MCTP 3-34A (MCWP 3-17.8). (CUI) Combined Arms Mobility. 10 June 2022.
ATP 3-90.8. Combined Arms Countermobility. 30 November 2021.
ATP 3-91. Division Operations. 17 October 2014.
ATP 3-91.1. The Joint Air Ground Integration Center. 17 April 2019.
ATP 3-92. Corps Operations. 07 April 2016.
ATP 3-93. Theater Army Operations. 27 August 2021.
ATP 3-94.2. Deep Operations. 01 September 2016.
ATP 3-96.1. Security Force Assistance Brigade. 02 September 2020.
ATP 5-0.3/MCRP 5-10.1/NTTP 5-01.3/AFTTP 3-2.87. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for Operation Assessment. 07 February 2020.
ATP 5-19. Risk Management. 09 November 2021.
ATP 7-100.3. Chinese Tactics. 09 August 2021.
FM 2-0. Intelligence. 01 October 2023.
FM 3-0. Operations, 01 October 2022.
FM 3-12. Cyberspace Operations and Electromagnetic Warfare. 24 August 2021.
FM 3-13.4. Army Support to Military Deception. 26 February 2019.
FM 3-14. Army Space Operations. 30 October 2019.
FM 3-52. Airspace Control. 20 October 2016.
FM 3-55. Information Collection. 03 May 2013.
FM 3-60. Army Targeting. 11 August 2023.
FM 3-90. Tactics. 01 May 2023.
FM 3-94. Armies, Corps, and Division Operations. 23 July 21.
FM 3-99. Airborne and Air Assault Operations. 06 March 2015.
FM 4-0. Sustainment Operations. 31 July 2019.
FM 5-0. Planning and Orders Production. 16 May 2022.
FM 6-0. Commander and Staff Organization and Operations. 16 May 2022.
FM 6-27/MCTP 11-10C. The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Land Warfare. 07 August 2019.
FM 7-0. Training. 14 June2021.
TC 3-09.8. Fire Support and Field Artillery Certification and Qualification. 30 March 2020.
TC 3-09.81. Field Artillery Manual Cannon Gunnery. 13 April 2016.
TC 3-22.90. Mortars. 17 March 2017.
WEBSITES
U.S. Army Profiler Weather Data Download Portal. https://www.kc.army.mil/armywx/.
Login is required to access information.
PRESCRIBED FORMS
This section contains no entries. |
3-09 | 278 | References
REFERENCED FORMS
Unless otherwise indicated, DA forms are available on the Army Publishing Directorate (APD)
website at https://armypubs.army.mil.
DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.
DA Form 4200. MET Data Correction Sheet.
DD Form 1972. Joint Tactical Air Strike Request. |
3-09 | 279 | Index
Entries are by paragraph numbers.
defensive control measures, 6-33 6-91, 6-92, 6-94, 6-95, 6-97, 6-
A
105, 6-107, 6-150, 6-163
airspace coordinating measures F
S
(ACM), 2-33, 2-61, 3-28, 3-56, fire direction, 2-62, 3-28, 3-92, 4-
3-87, 3-88, 3-90, 3-92, 3-93, 3- 75, 4-76, 4-77, 4-78, 4-79, C- security operations, 2-71, 6-34, 6-
98, 3-100, 3-102, 6-10, A-17, a- 14, C-16, C-58, C-59, C-68 45, 6-113, 6-114, 6-115
20, B-17, B-18, B-19, B-23, B- Suppression of enemy air
fire support assessment, 3-106
77, B-78, B-79, B-80, B-81, B- defenses (SEAD), 2-74, 2-80,
83, B-90, B-94, D-9 fire support preparation, 3-79 2-86, 3-5, 3-13, 3-14, 3-15, 3-
airspace coordination area, 3-28, fire support rehearsals, 3-89 16, 3-17, 3-18, 3-19, 3-20, 3-39,
6-152, B-13, B-27, B-28, B-31, fire support system, 2-1, 3-22, 3- 3-56, 3-91, 4-8, 4-27, 4-28, 5-
B-83, B-84, B-85, B-88, B-94 23, 3-24, 3-86 12, 6-17, 6-23, 6-94, 6-99, A-
21, D-59
Army command relationships, five requirements for accurate
4-49 predicted fire, 4-65, 4-81, 6-86 SOSRA, 6-126
Army Support relationships, 4-51, J T
4-61
joint fires observer, 2-18, 2-20, 5- target area of interest (TAI), 2-8,
attack guidance matrix, 2-11, 3- 3, 5-5, D-93 2-14, 2-66, 2-69, 3-87, 3-88, 3-
92, A-30 90, 3-100, 6-52, 6-169, A-15
joint fires element (JFE), 2-9, 2-
Attack and delivery systems, 1-3, 25, 4-16 U
1-37
joint air-ground integration center unmanned aircraft system (UAS),
B (JAGIC), 2-10, 2-22, 2-31, 2-32, 2-71, 2-88, 2-90, 3-11, 3-25, 3-
battlefield coordination 2-49, 3-28, 3-86, 3-89, 3-92, 3- 96, 3-100, 4-9, 4-85, 6-90, 6-
detachment (BCD), 2-8, 2-26, 98, 3-99, 3-102, 4-84, 6-165, 6- 154, 6-162, B-29, B-79, B-86,
2-34, 2-62, 3-18, 3-99, 4-16, E- 167 B-92, D-14, D-123
8, E-9, E-10 joint air operations center (JAOC),
W
2-26, 2-46, 2-47, 2-48, 3-33, E-
C 9, E-13, E-14, E-17 weapons locating radar (WLR), 2-
clearance of fires, 2-34, 2-63, 3- joint targeting cycle, 2-25, 3-7, 3- 12, 2-44, 2-62, 2-71, 3-28, 3-56,
25, 3-40, 3-45, 3-46, 3-47, 3-51, 30, 3-31, 3-32, E-2, E-14 3-91, 4-9, 4-24, 6-49, 6-52, 6-
3-90, 3-91, 3-94, 3-98, 4-81, 5- 90, 6-94, 6-96, 6-99, 6-127, 6-
3, 6-19, 6-37, 6-157, 6-163, B- M 133, 6-137, 6-138, 6-152, B-65,
9, B-17, B-30, B-50, B-87, D-59 B-72, D-86, D-139
missiles, 2-75, 2-91, 2-100, 3-3, 3-
counterfire imperatives, 3-28 16, 3-17, 3-18, 4-2, 4-64 Z
D O zone of fire, 2-84, B-45, B-46, B-
47
deep operations, 2-60, 2-68, 3-38, offensive control measures, 6-73
4-25, 4-27, 6-4, 6-5, 6-7, 6-8, 6-
offensive operation, 3-96, 6-30, 6-
9, 6-10, 6-12, 6-26
35, 6-65, 6-67, 6-68, 6-69, 6-89, |
3-09 | 281 | FM 3-09
12 August(cid:3)(cid:21)(cid:19)(cid:21)4
(cid:37)(cid:92)(cid:3)(cid:50)(cid:85)(cid:71)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:3)(cid:82)(cid:73)(cid:3)(cid:87)(cid:75)(cid:72)(cid:3)(cid:54)(cid:72)(cid:70)(cid:85)(cid:72)(cid:87)(cid:68)(cid:85)(cid:92)(cid:3)(cid:82)(cid:73)(cid:3)(cid:87)(cid:75)(cid:72)(cid:3)(cid:36)(cid:85)(cid:80)(cid:92)(cid:29)
(cid:53)(cid:36)(cid:49)(cid:39)(cid:60)(cid:3)(cid:36)(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:42)(cid:40)(cid:50)(cid:53)(cid:42)(cid:40)
(cid:42)(cid:72)(cid:81)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:68)(cid:79)(cid:15)(cid:56)(cid:81)(cid:76)(cid:87)(cid:72)(cid:71)(cid:54)(cid:87)(cid:68)(cid:87)(cid:72)(cid:86)(cid:36)(cid:85)(cid:80)(cid:92)(cid:3)
(cid:38)(cid:75)(cid:76)(cid:72)(cid:73)(cid:82)(cid:73)(cid:54)(cid:87)(cid:68)(cid:73)(cid:73)
(cid:50)(cid:73)(cid:73)(cid:76)(cid:70)(cid:76)(cid:68)(cid:79)(cid:29)
(cid:48)(cid:36)(cid:53)(cid:46)(cid:3)(cid:41)(cid:17) (cid:36)(cid:57)(cid:40)(cid:53)(cid:44)(cid:47)(cid:47)
(cid:36)(cid:71)(cid:80)(cid:76)(cid:81)(cid:76)(cid:86)(cid:87)(cid:85)(cid:68)(cid:87)(cid:76)(cid:89)(cid:72)(cid:3)(cid:36)(cid:86)(cid:86)(cid:76)(cid:86)(cid:87)(cid:68)(cid:81)(cid:87)(cid:3)
(cid:87)(cid:82)(cid:3)(cid:87)(cid:75)(cid:72)(cid:3)(cid:54)(cid:72)(cid:70)(cid:85)(cid:72)(cid:87)(cid:68)(cid:85)(cid:92)(cid:3)(cid:82)(cid:73)(cid:3)(cid:87)(cid:75)(cid:72)(cid:3)(cid:36)(cid:85)(cid:80)(cid:92)
2422106
(cid:39)(cid:44)(cid:54)(cid:55)(cid:53)(cid:44)(cid:37)(cid:56)(cid:55)(cid:44)(cid:50)(cid:49)(cid:29)
(cid:36)(cid:70)(cid:87)(cid:76)(cid:89)(cid:72)(cid:3)(cid:36)(cid:85)(cid:80)(cid:92)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:36)(cid:85)(cid:80)(cid:92)(cid:3)(cid:49)(cid:68)(cid:87)(cid:76)(cid:82)(cid:81)(cid:68)(cid:79)(cid:3)(cid:42)(cid:88)(cid:68)(cid:85)(cid:71)(cid:15)(cid:3)(cid:68)(cid:81)(cid:71)(cid:3)(cid:56)(cid:81)(cid:76)(cid:87)(cid:72)(cid:71)(cid:3)(cid:54)(cid:87)(cid:68)(cid:87)(cid:72)(cid:86)(cid:3)(cid:36)(cid:85)(cid:80)(cid:92)(cid:3)(cid:53)(cid:72)(cid:86)(cid:72)(cid:85)(cid:89)(cid:72)(cid:17)(cid:3)(cid:3)(cid:55)(cid:82)(cid:3)(cid:69)(cid:72)(cid:3)(cid:71)(cid:76)(cid:86)(cid:87)(cid:85)(cid:76)(cid:69)(cid:88)(cid:87)(cid:72)(cid:71)(cid:3)(cid:76)(cid:81)(cid:3) |
4-0 | 1 | FM 4-0
SUSTAINMENT
OPERATIONS
AUGUST 2024
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
This publication supersedes FM 4-0, dated 31 July 2019;
FM 4-01, dated 3 April 2014; FM 4-30, dated 1 April 2014; and
FM 4-40, dated 22 October 2013. |
4-0 | 2 | Foreword
Advances in civilian and military technology have changed the character of warfare and the conduct of Army
and joint force operations. The dilemmas posed by the integration of new technologies into the future
battlefield have changed the way the Army and the joint force sustain multidomain operations. In the future,
sustainment will be more complex, demanding, visible to the enemy, vulnerable, and therefore, must be more
synchronized, dispersed, and responsive than ever before. FM 4-0 provides a doctrinal approach for armies,
corps, divisions, and brigades to address sustainment challenges across the range of military operations, the
competition continuum and the strategic contexts in which Army forces conduct operations. As the keystone
sustainment doctrine, it describes how sustainment is embedded into all military operations, tasks, and
activities. FM 4-0 also identifies the sustainment implications for the Army’s operating concept and describes
how sustainment forces are arrayed against the operational framework to include sustainment considerations
for operations in a maritime environment.
The currently ongoing Russo-Ukrainian conflict is the most recent example of the current character of war,
and it has provided many critical insights into how the U.S. Army will need to support large-scale combat
operations in the future. FM 4-0 integrates many of these lessons learned into its doctrinal framework. The
Army and joint force must quickly learn and adapt to the challenges of the modern battlefield to survive,
sustain, fight, and win in the future. The wide variety of sensors and intelligence disciplines employed by our
adversaries will make the future battlefield transparent and contested across its breadth and depth.
Sustainment units, nodes and routes can and will be seen by the enemy. Sustainment nodes and assets will
be targeted with direct and indirect fires delivered by air, land, maritime, cyberspace, space, and special
operations forces. The enemy will employ unmanned aerial systems of every size and description to find and
engage sustainment formations. These fundamental truths of warfare must be understood by all leaders,
especially sustainment leaders, and integrated into all aspects of operations.
The geography, terrain, infrastructure, and vast distances in the Pacific and European theaters will also
challenge Army and joint force freedom of action, operational reach, and endurance. These theaters have
environmental conditions ranging from arctic to jungle and include complex urban, littoral, mountainous,
and island terrain. In many cases, the terrain and the threat of enemy long-range fires will increase the distance
between maneuver and sustainment forces and make it imperative that sustainment be precise, predictive,
and data centric. The state of port, airfield, road, and rail infrastructure will also challenge Army and joint
force sustainment. The Army must be able to sustain operations in austere environments where infrastructure
is non-existent, unimproved, damaged, or destroyed.
The Army must continually transform to counter emerging threats and the challenges of the Pacific and
European theaters. We must continue to transform in contact developing our ability to leverage data and
invest in predictive logistics capabilities to make sustainment more precise. We must integrate autonomous
technology into our formations, offloading risk to machines while adding depth, breath, and speed to our
distribution capabilities. Reducing the demand and logistics footprint of all Army formations will also be
critical to prolonging operational reach and endurance. Advancements in operational energy and alternative
methods of generating and distributing power, as well as water purification and production of repair parts at
or near the point of need, will help significantly reduce Army distribution requirements. Investments will be
made in Army watercraft to enable movement and maneuver in maritime environments. Sustainment doctrine
must also evolve to meet the challenges of the multidomain contested operating environment and describe
how the Army executes sustainment operations.
Finally, success in operations requires leaders that understand and apply doctrine with judgement and
discipline. FM 4-0 incorporates a chapter on leadership and training to emphasize the importance of building
effective leaders and cohesive units. Now more than ever before, leaders must be innovative, adaptive,
disciplined, and able to communicate at all levels.
This We’ll Defend!
MICHELLE K. DONAHUE
MAJOR GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY |
4-0 | 3 | This publication is available at the Army Publishing Directorate site
(https://armypubs.army.mil) and the Central Army Registry Site |
4-0 | 5 | *FM 4-0
Field Manual Headquarters
No. 4-0 Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 14 August 2024
SUSTAINMENT OPERATIONS
Contents
Page
Preface ................................................................................................................................................. vii
Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... ix
CHAPTER 1 ........................................................................................................................................... 1
ARMY SUSTAINMENT OPERATIONS ......................................................................................... 1
Section I – Overview of Army Sustainment .......................................................................... 1
Sustainment Warfighting Function ............................................................................................ 1
Principles of Sustainment .......................................................................................................... 2
Section II – Overview of Army Operations ............................................................................ 3
Strategic Contexts ..................................................................................................................... 4
Large-Scale Combat Operations ............................................................................................... 5
Tenets of Operations ................................................................................................................. 6
Imperatives ................................................................................................................................ 7
Section III – The Operational Environment ......................................................................... 10
Contested Logistics Environment ............................................................................................ 10
Logistics Threats ..................................................................................................................... 11
Contested Logistics Challenges And Planning Considerations .............................................. 12
Section IV – Sustainment Support to Multidomain Operations ........................................ 15
Enable Freedom of Action, Extend Operational Reach, and Prolong Endurance .................. 18
Authorities and Responsibilities............................................................................................... 19
Army Title 10 Sustainment Requirements ............................................................................... 22
Army Executive Agent Responsibilities ................................................................................... 22
CHAPTER 2 ......................................................................................................................................... 25
ARMY SUSTAINMENT AT ECHELON ........................................................................................ 25
Section I – Levels of Warfare................................................................................................ 25
Section II – Overview of National Strategic Level of Warfare ........................................... 26
United States Transportation Command ................................................................................. 26
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
*This publication supersedes FM 4-0, dated 31 July 2019; FM 4-01, dated 3 April 2014; FM 4-30, dated 1 April
2014; and FM 4-40, dated 22 October 2013. |
4-0 | 6 | Contents
Defense Logistics Agency ....................................................................................................... 28
Defense Health Agency .......................................................................................................... 29
Defense Contract Management Agency ................................................................................. 29
Defense Finance and Accounting Service .............................................................................. 29
United States Army Materiel Command .................................................................................. 29
Defense Security Cooperation Agency ................................................................................... 33
United States Army Medical Research and Development Command .................................... 33
United States Army Forces Command ................................................................................... 33
United States Special Operations Command ......................................................................... 33
Section III – Overview of Theater Strategic Level of Warfare ........................................... 34
Theater Army .......................................................................................................................... 34
Theater Sustainment Command ............................................................................................. 35
Theater Medical Command ..................................................................................................... 38
Army Special Operations Forces Sustainment Organizations ................................................ 40
Section IV – Overview of Operational Level Of Warfare ................................................... 41
Field Army ............................................................................................................................... 41
Sustainment Brigade ............................................................................................................... 41
Combat Sustainment Support Battalion .................................................................................. 42
Section V – Overview of Tactical Level Of Warfare ........................................................... 42
Corps ....................................................................................................................................... 42
Division .................................................................................................................................... 42
Brigade .................................................................................................................................... 43
Section VI – Command and Support Relationships .......................................................... 45
Joint Command Relationships ................................................................................................ 45
Army Command and Support Relationships ........................................................................... 47
Command and Support Relationships by Echelon ................................................................. 52
CHAPTER 3 ..........................................................................................................................................55
SUSTAINMENT OPERATIONS DURING COMPETITION BELOW ARMED CONFLICT ......... 55
Section I – Overview of Army Operations During Competition ....................................... 55
Preparation for Large-Scale Combat Operations ................................................................... 55
Interagency Cooperation ......................................................................................................... 55
Competition Activities .............................................................................................................. 55
Section II – Planning Considerations During Competition ............................................... 59
Theater Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Competition Activities ....................................... 59
Considerations for Sustainment Functions ............................................................................. 62
Support to Army Special Operations Forces .......................................................................... 70
Section III – Roles and Responsibilities by Echelon ......................................................... 71
Theater Army .......................................................................................................................... 71
Field Army ............................................................................................................................... 75 |
4-0 | 7 | Contents
Corps ....................................................................................................................................... 76
Division .................................................................................................................................... 77
Consolidation of Gains During Competition ............................................................................ 77
Transition to Crisis and Armed Conflict ................................................................................... 77
CHAPTER 4 ......................................................................................................................................... 79
SUSTAINMENT OPERATIONS DURING CRISIS ....................................................................... 79
Section I – Overview of Army Operations During Crisis ................................................... 79
Army Support to the Joint Force During Crisis ........................................................................ 79
Force Projection ...................................................................................................................... 80
Section II – Overview of Sustainment Activities during Crisis ......................................... 81
Refining Plans And Developing Estimates .............................................................................. 82
Logistics Estimation ................................................................................................................. 82
Casualty Estimation and Replacement Requirements ............................................................ 82
Army Health System Support During Crisis ............................................................................ 83
Medical Planning Tools ........................................................................................................... 83
Section III – Roles and Responsibilities by Echelon ......................................................... 84
Theater Army Roles During Crisis ........................................................................................... 84
Corps Roles During Crisis ....................................................................................................... 89
Division Role During Crisis ...................................................................................................... 89
Consolidation of Gains During Crisis ....................................................................................... 90
Transition to Competition and Armed Conflict ......................................................................... 91
CHAPTER 5 ......................................................................................................................................... 93
SUSTAINMENT OPERATIONS DURING ARMED CONFLICT .................................................. 93
Section I – Armed Conflict and Large-Scale Combat Operations .................................... 93
Operating as Part of the Joint Force ....................................................................................... 93
Conducting Large-Scale Combat Operations .......................................................................... 93
Sustaining Large-Scale Combat Operations ........................................................................... 94
Sustaining Enabling Operations .............................................................................................. 94
Sustaining Troop Movement .................................................................................................... 95
Sustaining Mobility ................................................................................................................... 96
Enemy Threat Considerations For Sustainment Forces ......................................................... 96
Sustainment Planning Considerations .................................................................................... 99
Mission Analysis: Requirements, Capabilities, and Shortfalls ............................................... 107
Assessment ........................................................................................................................... 111
Sustainment Synchronization ................................................................................................ 112
Rear Operations .................................................................................................................... 113
Army Health System Support During Large-Scale Combat Operations................................ 118
Section II – Sustainment of Defensive Operations .......................................................... 122
Overview of Sustaining Defensive Operations ...................................................................... 122 |
4-0 | 8 | Contents
Sustainment Fundamentals for Defensive Operations ......................................................... 123
Planning Considerations for the Defense ............................................................................. 125
Echelons Above Brigade Sustainment .................................................................................. 129
Maneuver Brigade Sustainment ............................................................................................ 131
Aviation Brigade Sustainment ............................................................................................... 133
Area Defense ........................................................................................................................ 134
Mobile Defense ..................................................................................................................... 135
Retrograde ............................................................................................................................ 136
Defensive Operational Framework Considerations .............................................................. 138
Transition to Offense ............................................................................................................. 139
Section III – Sustainment of Offensive Operations ......................................................... 139
Overview of Sustaining Offensive Operations ...................................................................... 139
Sustainment Fundamentals for Offensive Operations .......................................................... 140
Planning Considerations for the Offense .............................................................................. 141
Sustainment During Offensive Operations............................................................................ 146
Movement to Contact ............................................................................................................ 149
Attack .................................................................................................................................... 150
Exploitation ............................................................................................................................ 151
Pursuit ................................................................................................................................... 152
Operational Framework Considerations ............................................................................... 153
Transition to Defense and Stability ....................................................................................... 154
Transition to Post-Conflict Competition ................................................................................. 154
CHAPTER 6 ........................................................................................................................................155
SUSTAINMENT OPERATIONS IN A MARITIME ENVIRONMENT .......................................... 155
Section I – Maritime Environment Overview .................................................................... 155
Characteristics of the Maritime Environment ........................................................................ 155
Planning Considerations for the Maritime Environment ........................................................ 157
The Operational Framework in a Maritime Environment ...................................................... 160
Section II – Sustainment Considerations for the Maritime Environment ...................... 161
Maritime Command and Control ........................................................................................... 161
Support of Joint Offensive Operations .................................................................................. 162
Sustaining Large-Scale Combat Operations in a Maritime Environment ............................. 162
Section III – Army Watercraft Operations ......................................................................... 165
Notional Army Watercraft Operations in the Corps Area ...................................................... 166
Notional Riverine Operations ................................................................................................ 166
CHAPTER 7 ........................................................................................................................................169
LEADERSHIP AND TRAINING FOR SUSTAINMENT OPERATIONS .................................... 169
The Operations Process ....................................................................................................... 169
Sustainment Commander’s Role in the Operations Process ................................................ 170 |
4-0 | 9 | Contents
Sustainment Commander and Operational Art ..................................................................... 171
Adapting Sustainment Formations for Missions and Transitions .......................................... 172
Training Considerations for Sustainment Units ..................................................................... 175
Sustainment Leader Development ........................................................................................ 178
Planning Considerations for Sustainment Leaders ............................................................... 179
APPENDIX A ...................................................................................................................................... 181
QUARTERMASTER OPERATIONS .......................................................................................... 181
APPENDIX B ...................................................................................................................................... 185
TRANSPORTATION OPERATIONS ......................................................................................... 185
APPENDIX C ...................................................................................................................................... 189
ORDNANCE OPERATIONS ...................................................................................................... 189
APPENDIX D ...................................................................................................................................... 193
ARMY SUSTAINMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS ................................................................. 193
APPENDIX E ...................................................................................................................................... 201
LOGSTAT AND PERSTAT REPORTING ................................................................................. 201
APPENDIX F ...................................................................................................................................... 207
SUSTAINMENT SYMBOLS ....................................................................................................... 207
Source Notes ..................................................................................................................................... 213
Glossary ............................................................................................................................................ 215
References ........................................................................................................................................ 225
Index .................................................................................................................................................. 231
Figures
Introductory figure. FM 4-0 logic chart .................................................................................................... x
Figure 1-1. Principles of sustainment ..................................................................................................... 3
Figure 1-2. Army strategic context and operational categories .............................................................. 4
Figure 1-3. The operational framework in the context of the strategic framework ............................... 16
Figure 1-4. Combatant commander’s authorities ................................................................................. 21
Figure 2-1. Sustainment tasks .............................................................................................................. 26
Figure 2-2. Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise .................................................................... 27
Figure 2-3. Notional area of responsibility command and control of sustainment forces..................... 35
Figure 2-4. Joint command relationships ............................................................................................. 47
Figure 5-1. Distribution network .......................................................................................................... 101
Figure 5-2. Example of echeloned support ........................................................................................ 103
Figure 5-3. Examples of echeloned maintenance support to an armored brigade ............................ 108
Figure 5-4. Examples of a logistics release point ............................................................................... 109
Figure 5-5. Support area operations at echelon (joint security area/corps) ....................................... 116
Figure 5-6. Support area operation at echelon (division and brigade) ............................................... 117
Figure 5-7. Example of a long site refuel on the move configuration ................................................. 144
Figure 6-1. Notional Army watercraft operations in the corps and division area ................................ 166
Figure 6-2. Notional Army watercraft conducting riverine operations ................................................ 167
Figure 7-1. The operations process.................................................................................................... 170
Figure E-1. Notional example of a LOGSTAT report page 1 ............................................................. 203 |
4-0 | 10 | Contents
Figure E-2. Notional example of a LOGSTAT report page 2 ............................................................. 204
Figure E-3. Notional example of a PERSTAT report page 1 ............................................................. 205
Figure E-4. Notional example of a PERSTAT report page 2 ............................................................. 206
Tables
Introductory table. New, modified, and rescinded terms ........................................................................ xi
Table 1-1. Sustainment considerations for imperatives ......................................................................... 7
Table 1-2. Examples of Army sustainment-related responsibilities ..................................................... 23
Table 2-1. Joint support categories ...................................................................................................... 47
Table 2-2. Army command relationships ............................................................................................. 49
Table 2-3. Army support relationships ................................................................................................. 52
Table 5-2. Hospital center logistics and transportation planning factors ........................................... 119
Table F-1. Sustainment symbols ....................................................................................................... 207 |
4-0 | 11 | Preface
FM 4-0, Sustainment Operations augments ADP 4-0, the Army’s principal doctrine on providing sustainment
in support of operations. It describes how Army sustainment forces, as part of the joint team, provide support
to Army and other forces with an emphasis on support to operations. This manual serves as a companion
manual to FM 3-0. FM 4-0 describes how the Army as part of a joint team is sustained during operations.
The principal audience for FM 4-0 is all members of the profession of arms. Commanders and staffs of Army
headquarters serving as a joint task force or multinational headquarters should also refer to applicable joint
or multinational doctrine concerning the range of military operations and joint or multinational forces.
Trainers and educators throughout the Army will also use this publication.
Commanders, staffs, and subordinates must ensure that their decisions and actions comply with applicable
United States, international, and in some cases host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels
will ensure that their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of armed conflict and the rules of
engagement. (See FM 6-27/MCTP 11-10C.)
FM 4-0 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the
glossary and the text. Terms for which FM 4-0 is the proponent publication (the authority) are boldfaced and
italicized in the text and are marked with an asterisk (*) in the glossary. For other definitions shown in the
text, the term is italicized, and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition.
FM 4-0 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and
United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.
The proponent of FM 4-0 is the United States Army Combined Arms Support Command. The preparing
agency is the G-3/5/7 Doctrine Division, United States Army Combined Arms Support Command. Send
comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank
Forms) to Commander, United States Army Combined Arms Support Command, ATTN: ATCL-TD (FM
4-0), 2221 Adams Avenue, Fort Gregg-Adams, VA 23801-1809; by e-mail to usarmy.gregg-
[email protected]. |
4-0 | 13 | Introduction
The publication of FM 3-0 in October 2022 codified multidomain operations as the Army’s operational
concept. FM 4-0 describes sustainment operations in support of the Army’s operational concept and how the
Army supports the joint force in the execution of campaigns. It is the Army’s doctrine for sustainment
operations across the competition continuum at the theater strategic, operational, and tactical levels of
warfare. This publication emphasizes sustainment fundamentals and tactics to provide all commanders,
staffs, and Soldiers an understanding of sustainment operations. The contents of FM 4-0 are consistent with
the principal sustainment doctrine contained in ADP 4-0 and serve as the doctrinal foundation for all Army
sustainment operations. FM 4-0 describes how the Army and its organizations conduct sustainment
operations and is the keystone Army doctrine reinforced in Army techniques publications including ATP
4-91, ATP 4-92, and ATP 4-93.
The doctrine discussed in this manual is nested with the FM 3-0 series doctrine. Sustainment is crucial to the
success of operations. The endurance of Army forces is primarily a function of their sustainment (ADP 3-0).
Sustainment determines the depth and duration of Army operations. It is essential to seizing, retaining, and
exploiting the initiative. Sustainment is inherently joint and facilitates the joint force commander’s ability to
enable freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance. Sustainment must be planned,
integrated, and synchronized with operations at every level of warfare. Sustainment is dependent upon joint
and strategic integration and should be coordinated to ensure resources are delivered to the point of
employment. The Army’s sustainment capabilities assist in providing crucial operational area opening
functions enabling joint forces to achieve strategic and operational reach. Army sustainment capabilities
provide the bulk of Army support to other Services, common-user logistics, and other common sustainment
resources in support of the combatant commander.
The logic chart in the introductory figure on the next page is better understood if read from top to bottom.
The chart depicts the peer threats and methods expected to be employed and the characteristics of the
anticipated operational environment. The logic chart reflects the joint operational concept of unified action
and defines multidomain operations as the Army’s operational concept and how the sustainment warfighting
function contributes to unified action. The logic chart displays the strategic context through which forces
conduct operations and how sustainment capabilities are task organized to support operational forces at
echelon across all domains. The chart concludes by portraying how sustainment of large-scale combat
operations requires integration into the operations process to enable freedom of action, extend operational
reach, and provide the prolonged endurance necessary to accomplish missions, consolidate gains, and win
our nation’s wars. |
4-0 | 14 | Introduction
Introductory figure. FM 4-0 logic chart |
4-0 | 15 | Introduction
FM 4-0 contains seven chapters and six appendices:
Chapter 1 provides an overview of Army sustainment operations, introduces the four elements of the
sustainment warfighting function, and discusses the principles of sustainment. It also provides an overview
of Army operations and sustainment challenges presented by the spectrum of violence. The chapter also
describes the Army strategic context and the tenets of operations and imperatives in which sustainment forces
must operate. It describes the operational environment and contested logistics environment. The chapter
concludes describing sustainment of multidomain operations, the authorities and responsibilities vested in
the combatant commander, and Title 10 sustainment requirements and various executive agent
responsibilities.
Chapter 2 provides an overview of sustainment roles, capabilities, and a general discussion of sustainment
organizations at the national strategic, theater strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare. This
chapter concludes with a discussion of joint command relationships, Army command and support
relationships, and command and support relationships by echelon.
Chapter 3 provides an overview of sustainment during competition below armed conflict. It also discusses
sustainment planning considerations during competition and describes sustainment roles and responsibilities
by echelon during competition.
Chapter 4 provides an overview of Army operations during crisis. It discusses sustainment planning
considerations, considerations for forcible entry operations, and describes roles and responsibilities of
organizations for sustainment operations by echelon during crisis.
Chapter 5 provides an overview of sustainment operations during armed conflict. It discusses the link
between sustainment organizations and their associated tasks in the strategic, operational, and tactical levels
of warfare. This chapter also discusses sustainment of large-scale combat operations, sustainment of
defensive operations, and sustainment of offensive operations.
Chapter 6 describes sustainment operations in a maritime environment. It begins with a discussion on the
characteristics of the maritime environment and the challenges they pose. It also discusses planning
considerations for sustainment in a maritime environment.
Chapter 7 describes the operations process and the sustainment commander’s importance in driving the
operations process. It describes how sustainment commanders use operational art. The chapter also discusses
how sustainment commanders can adapt their formations for missions and transitions. It concludes with
training considerations for sustainment units and sustainment leader development.
Appendix A describes quartermaster operations and the functions of the Quartermaster Corps.
Appendix B describes transportation operations and the functions of the Transportation Corps.
Appendix C describes ordnance operations and the functions of the Ordnance Corps.
Appendix D discusses Army sustainment information systems and the importance of linking them to
command and control systems.
Appendix E discusses and provides examples of logistics status reports and personnel status reports.
Appendix F describes the sustainment symbols within FM 4-0.
The introductory table outlines changes to Army terminology reflected in FM 4-0.
Introductory table. New, modified, and rescinded terms
Term Action
precision sustainment New term
predictive logistics New term |
4-0 | 17 | Chapter 1
Army Sustainment Operations
This chapter introduces Army sustainment operations, presenting the four elements of the
sustainment warfighting function and examining the foundational principles underpinning
sustainment. Moreover, it offers insights into Army operations and the challenges pertaining to
sustainment that emerge within the competition continuum, a dynamic spectrum encompassing
phases from peaceful competition to potential armed conflict. The chapter delves into Army
sustainment forces operations and contributions within the strategic environment. The chapter
culminates by delineating the provisions for sustaining multidomain operations, outlining the
scope of authority and duties delegated to combatant commanders and explaining the requisites
for Title 10 sustainment alongside the diverse responsibilities assumed by various executive
agents.
SECTION I – OVERVIEW OF ARMY SUSTAINMENT
1-1. For the Army, sustainment is the provision of logistics, financial management, personnel services, and
health service support necessary to maintain operations until successful mission completion (ADP 4-0).
Sustainment is accomplished through the integration and synchronization of national and global resources
and ensures Army forces are physically available and properly equipped, at the right place and time, to
support the combatant commander (CCDR). The sustainment warfighting function leverages joint,
interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and other available capabilities to provide sustainment
support to the force.
1-2. Sustainment improves force readiness and maintains Army forces by manning them with trained Soldiers
and leaders; funding them with required resources; equipping them with materiel (individual and unit);
maintaining Soldier and Family readiness; and enabling Army forces to conduct operations. Army
sustainment is based on and enabled by an integrated process (people, systems, materiel, health service
support [HSS], and other support), inextricably linking sustainment to operations. Sustainment operations
focus on building an operationally ready Army, delivering it to the CCDR as part of the joint force, and
sustaining its combat power across the depth of the operational area.
SUSTAINMENT WARFIGHTING FUNCTION
1-3. The sustainment warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that provide support and services
to enable freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance (ADP 3-0). A collection of
select primary related tasks that are embedded in the sustainment warfighting function are described in
chapter 2. Systems consist of personnel, networks, information systems, processes and procedures, and
facilities and equipment that enable sustainment commanders to support operations. The sustainment
warfighting function consists of four elements: logistics, financial management, personnel services, and HSS,
each of which must be integrated and synchronized across all warfighting functions to ensure the appropriate
level of support. For additional information see ADP 3-0, ADP 4-0, and FM 3-0.
LOGISTICS
1-4. The elements of logistics are maintenance, transportation, supply, field services, distribution, operational
contract support (OCS), and general engineering. Appendix A, Quartermaster Operations, describes supply,
field services, and liquid logistics. Appendix B, Transportation Operations, describes the transportation
elements of logistics. Appendix C, Ordnance Operations, describes the maintenance element of logistics and
discusses ammunition and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD).
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
1-5. Financial management provides support to the Army and its unified action partners through the execution
of the two core competencies of finance operations and resource management. Finance operations consists |
4-0 | 18 | Chapter 1
of the functions of disbursing, banking, payment support, accounting, internal controls, and financial data
analytics. Resource management consists of the functions of programming, budget formulation, budget
distribution, budget execution, accounting, internal controls, and financial data analytics. For detailed
information on financial management, see FM 1-06.
PERSONNEL SERVICES
1-6. Personnel services are sustainment functions that man and fund the force, maintain Soldier and family
readiness, promote the moral and ethical values of the nation, and enable the fighting qualities of the Army
(ADP 4-0). Personnel services include planning, coordinating, and sustaining personnel efforts at the
operational and tactical levels. Personnel services include human resources (HR) support, legal support,
religious support, and band support. For detailed information see ADP 4-0, FM 1-0, FM 1-05, FM 3-84, and
ATP 1-19.
HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT
1-7. Army health service support is support and services performed, provided, and arranged by Army
Medicine to promote, improve, conserve, or restore the behavioral and physical well-being of personnel by
providing direct patient care that include medical treatment (organic and area support) and hospitalization,
medical evacuation to include medical regulating, and medical logistics to include blood management (FM
4-02). Army HSS is a critical capability embedded within formations across all warfighting functions. For
additional information, see FM 4-02.
1-8. The Army Health System (AHS) is a component of the Military Health System that is responsible for
operational management of the health service support and force health protection missions for training, pre-
deployment, deployment, and post-deployment operations. The Army Health System includes all mission
support services performed, provided, or arranged by the Army Medicine to support health service support
and force health protection mission requirements for the Army and as directed, for joint, intergovernmental
agencies, coalition, and multinational forces (FM 4-02). The force health protection mission falls under the
protection warfighting function and will not be covered in detail in this publication. For additional
information on force health protection, see ADP 3-37. For a complete description of AHS see FM 4-02.
PRINCIPLES OF SUSTAINMENT
1-9. A principle is a comprehensive and fundamental rule or an assumption of central importance that guides
how an organization approaches and thinks about the conduct of operations (ADP 1-01). Army sustainment
operations are guided by fundamental principles that apply in large-scale combat operations as well as any
other operation along the conflict continuum.
1-10. The eight principles of Army sustainment operations (integration, anticipation, responsiveness,
simplicity, economy, survivability, continuity, and improvisation) are shown in figure 1-1. These principles
are interdependent and must be synchronized in time, space, and purpose. The principles of sustainment are
essential to enabling freedom of action, extending strategic and operational reach, and prolonging endurance.
For additional information, see ADP 4-0. Army sustainment leaders should consider application of the
principles using the following:
• Integration. Sustainment leaders must integrate sustainment with joint and multinational partners
to maximize effects and resources.
• Anticipation. Sustainment leaders must visualize and prepare resources for future operations.
• Responsiveness. Sustainment leaders must be able to deliver capabilities and resources to meet a
rapidly changing situation.
• Simplicity. Sustainment leaders must remove unnecessary complexity of processes and procedures
to deliver effective support.
• Economy. Sustainment leaders must practice efficient management, discipline, prioritization, and
allocation of resources.
• Survivability. Sustainment leaders must incorporate protective measures to increase survivability
in all training and operations.
• Continuity. Sustainment leaders must strive to seek integrated and focused networks linking
sustainment to operations. |
4-0 | 19 | Army Sustainment Operations
• Improvisation. Sustainment leaders must be able to improvise operational and tactical actions to
meet a changing operational environment (OE).
Figure 1-1. Principles of sustainment
SECTION II – OVERVIEW OF ARMY OPERATIONS
1-11. The Army’s primary mission is to organize, train, and equip its forces to conduct prompt and sustained
land combat to defeat enemy ground forces and seize, occupy, and defend land areas. It supports four strategic
roles for the joint force. Army forces shape OEs, counter aggression during crisis, prevail during large-scale
ground combat, and consolidate gains. The Army fulfills its strategic roles by providing forces for joint
campaigns that enable integrated deterrence of adversaries outside of conflict and the defeat of enemies
during conflict or war. Sustainment supports the Army in achieving its primary mission through the provision
of logistics, financial management, personnel services, and HSS. The integration and synchronization of each
element of the sustainment warfighting function is essential in enabling freedom of action, extending
operational reach, and prolonging endurance. The integration and synchronization of the sustainment
warfighting function with the other warfighting functions is key to success during operations.
1-12. Multidomain operations are the combined arms employment of joint and Army capabilities to create
and exploit relative advantages to achieve objectives, defeat enemy forces, and consolidate gains on behalf
of joint force commanders (FM 3-0). Multidomain operations span the competition continuum and are the
Army’s contribution to joint campaigns. Sustainment supports the Army’s execution of multidomain
operations through the provision of task-organized sustainment capabilities that support maneuver forces at
echelon. Task-organized sustainment capabilities conduct sustainment operations across all domains to
support and sustain large-scale combat operations. Below the threshold of armed conflict, multidomain
operations are how Army forces accrue relative advantages and demonstrate readiness for conflict, deterring
adversaries while assuring allies and partners. During conflict, multidomain operations are how Army forces
close with and destroy the enemy, defeat enemy formations, seize critical terrain, and control populations
and resources to deliver sustainable political outcomes (FM 3-0). |
4-0 | 20 | Chapter 1
1-13. Since Army forces conduct operations in support of joint campaigns, which for the most part occur as
part of a larger coalition operation, leaders must understand the interdependencies between their own
assigned forces and the forces or capabilities provided by others to generate the complementary and
reinforcing effects of combined arms approaches. Army forces employ unified action partner capabilities to
the degree they are available. Sustainment increases the effects of capabilities employed by unified action
partners through efforts such as training exercises, agreements, and standard operating procedures (SOPs).
However, because peer threats can contest the force in all domains, sustainment forces must be prepared to
conduct operations when some or all unified action partner capabilities are unavailable to support mission
accomplishment.
STRATEGIC CONTEXTS
1-14. Army forces must meet a diverse array of challenges and contribute to national objectives across a wide
range of operational categories. Sustainment operations shape OEs and set conditions that are favorable for
future operations. Employing sustainment capabilities during competition increases cooperation between
coalitions and allies and builds partner capacity. Army forces build partnerships, capabilities, and mutual
trust through combined training exercises, standardization, and increasing interoperability between coalitions
and allied partners.
1-15. Figure 1-2 provides an illustration of the Army strategic contexts. Combatant commands (CCMDs)
and theater Armies campaign across the competition continuum and Army tactical formations typically
conduct operations within a context dominated by one strategic relationship at a time. The theater sustainment
command (TSC) and task-organized elements can be simultaneously engaged in supporting sustainment
operations during competition in one operational area within the area of responsibility (AOR) while providing
sustainment support to crisis in another operational area and sustainment support to armed conflict in yet
another operational area within the AOR. See JP 3-0 and FM 3-0 for additional information.
Figure 1-2. Army strategic context and operational categories
COMPETITION BELOW ARMED CONFLICT
1-16. Competition below armed conflict exists when two or more state or non-state adversaries have
incompatible interests, but neither seeks armed conflict. Nation-states compete with each other using all
instruments of national power to gain and maintain advantages that help them achieve their goals. Low levels
of lethal force can be a part of competition below armed conflict. Sustainment operations in support of
competition include support to CCDR daily operational requirements, Title 10 requirements, Army support
to other Services, support to military engagement, security cooperation, and set-the-theater tasks. These
operations build trust and confidence in our allies and partners while ensuring the United States is prepared
for future operations. During these operations, sustainment forces invest in facilities and infrastructure
development as well as civilian engagement to build partnerships for required capabilities, capacities, and
support needed during operations. For additional information see FM 3-0, ATP 3-93, and ATP 4-93. |
4-0 | 21 | Army Sustainment Operations
CRISIS
1-17. A crisis is an emerging incident or situation involving a possible threat to the United States, its citizens,
military forces, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic,
or military importance that commitment of military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national
and/or strategic objectives (JP 3-0). Sustainment forces must be prepared for a crisis that results from a
military action of the adversary or crisis response that results from human or natural disasters. Sustainment
is key to providing Army forces the freedom of action, operational reach, and endurance required to disrupt
the enemy’s decision cycle to deter further aggression and return to competition. Sustainment actions during
crisis response can be key in stabilizing the situation and demonstrating to our adversary that our forces are
prepared for any transition that may occur. For detailed information see JP 3-29, ADP 3-07, FM 3-0, ATP
4-92, and ATP 4-93.
ARMED CONFLICT
1-18. Armed conflict occurs when a state or non-state actor uses lethal force as the primary means to satisfy
its interests. Armed conflict can range from irregular warfare to conventional warfare and combinations of
both. Sustainment is key to Army forces entering armed conflict as it enables freedom of action, extends
operational reach, and prolongs endurance for Army commanders conducting operations within armed
conflict. Sustainment also provides the ability to deploy, employ, sustain, and redeploy required Army forces
and materiel needed by a commander within an operational area to sustain armed conflict. For additional
information see FM 3-0, ATP 4-91, ATP 4-92, and ATP 4-93.
CONSOLIDATING GAINS
1-19. Army commanders must exploit successful operations by continuously consolidating gains during
competition, crisis, and armed conflict. Consolidate gains are activities to make enduring any temporary
operational success and to set the conditions for a sustainable security environment, allowing for a transition
of control to other legitimate authorities (ADP 3-0). Sustainment forces play a key role in supporting forces
as they consolidate gains made during competition, crisis, and armed conflict. Sustainment forces can assist
with regenerating combat power for continued operations, restoring infrastructure and key facilities,
providing governance to local populations, and providing medical support. For additional information, see
FM 3-0 and ATP 4-93.
LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS
1-20. The focus of Army readiness is on large-scale combat operations. Large-scale combat operations are
extensive joint combat operations in terms of scope and size of forces committed, conducted as a campaign
aimed at achieving operational and strategic objectives (ADP 3-0). During ground combat, they typically
involve operations by multiple corps and divisions, and they typically include substantial forces from the
joint and multinational team. Conflicts encompassing large-scale combat operations are more intense and
destructive than limited contingencies, often rapidly amassing heavy casualties. Large-scale combat
operations place a significant strain on sustainment operations and often include both conventional and
irregular forces on both sides. For additional information on large-scale combat operations, see FM 3-0.
1-21. During large-scale combat operations, the enemy has a wide range of capabilities to detect, identify,
interdict, and destroy sustainment forces. These enemy observation capabilities can be employed to monitor
sustainment forces at home station in the United States, abroad, and while moving within the AOR.
Sustainment forces must be prepared to counter these measures from the strategic support area through the
tactical area. Sustainment forces use mitigation techniques such as dispersion and masking of electromagnetic
signatures to mitigate adversary effects and act as sensors for targeting. Sustainment forces must also be
prepared for the pace and intensity of combat operations and trained, manned, and equipped commensurate
with the supported unit to match the pace of maneuver units and maintain freedom of action and operational
reach. Sustainment units should be prepared for the increased casualties that can result from large-scale
combat operations. The ability to deliver replacement personnel and materiel to maneuver units will be
essential in large-scale combat operations in all environments. |
4-0 | 22 | Chapter 1
TENETS OF OPERATIONS
1-22. Tenets of operations are desirable attributes that should be built into all plans and operations, and they
are related to how operations should be conducted. Commanders use the tenets of operations to inform and
assess courses of action throughout the operations process. The tenets of operations are:
• Agility.
• Convergence.
• Endurance.
• Depth.
AGILITY
1-23. Agility is the ability to move forces and adjust their dispositions and activities more rapidly than the
enemy (FM 3-0). Agility is integral to survivability during large-scale combat operations. Sustainment forces
will be able to rapidly displace to avoid enemy detection. Sustainment forces must train and master the ability
to expediently disaggregate and aggregate to increase capabilities at echelon and facilitate greater freedom
of action and endurance. Sustainment forces must also train and master the ability to quickly change direction,
task, or focus and reorganize and reintegrate as the operational situation dictates. Changes may come due to
a transition between phases of an operation or the requirement to adapt to a new opportunity or hazard.
CONVERGENCE
1-24. Convergence is an outcome created by the concerted employment of capabilities from multiple domains
and echelons against combinations of decisive points in any domain to create effects against a system,
formation, decision maker, or in a specific geographic area (FM 3-0). Convergence occurs when a higher
echelon and its subordinate echelons create effects from and in multiple domains in ways that defeat or disrupt
enemy forces long enough for friendly forces to effectively exploit the opportunity. Sustainment units support
convergence by setting conditions that enable deterrence, provide options during crisis, and enable success
at the outset of armed conflict. Sustainment units set the theater, position forces, and establish agreements
with allies and partners that facilitate situational understanding, decision making, and integration and
synchronization of capabilities during armed conflict. Sustainment commanders at all levels must understand
the concept of operations to anticipate sustainment requirements on a dynamic battlefield where convergence
creates exploitable opportunities that enable freedom of action and mission accomplishment. For additional
information on convergence, see FM 3-0.
ENDURANCE
1-25. Endurance is the ability to persevere over time throughout the depth of an operational environment
(FM 3-0). Endurance is key to sustaining operations for as long as necessary to achieve the desired outcome.
Sustainment units must anticipate requirements and support the force for as long as necessary, regardless of
distance. Sustainment units must train to continuously operate and deliver sustainment using land, maritime,
and air capabilities while making the most effective and efficient use of resources. When possible,
sustainment units employ a space and cyberspace-enabled communications network to transmit sustainment
requirements and coordinate the delivery of materiel or services. However, leaders must anticipate degraded
communications and combine analog systems for communication with predictive analysis and disciplined
initiative to ensure commanders can maintain acceptable tempo for as long as necessary.
DEPTH
1-26. Depth is the extension of operations in time, space, or purpose to achieve definitive results (ADP 3-0).
Sustainment units create depth by improving the infrastructure for force projection and by improving
interoperability with multinational forces to the degree required by operation plans (OPLANs) and
contingency operations. Leaders describe the depth they can achieve in terms of operational reach.
Operational reach is the distance and duration across which a force can successfully employ military
capabilities (JP 3-0). Sustainment leaders must ensure they clearly articulate their units’ capabilities as
sustainment determines the depth and limits on friendly operations. |
4-0 | 23 | Army Sustainment Operations
IMPERATIVES
1-27. Imperatives are actions Army forces must take to defeat enemy forces and achieve objectives at
acceptable cost. They are informed by the OE and the characteristics of the most capable threats Army forces
can encounter. Imperatives include—
• See yourself, see the enemy, and understand the OE.
• Account for being under constant observation and all forms of enemy contact.
• Create and exploit relative physical, information, and human advantages in pursuit of decision
dominance.
• Make initial contact with the smallest element possible.
• Impose multiple dilemmas on the enemy.
• Anticipate, plan, and execute transitions.
• Designate, weight, and sustain the main effort.
• Consolidate gains continuously.
• Understand and manage the effects of operations on units and Soldiers.
1-28. Sustainment leaders must be familiar with the tenets of operations and imperatives. They should
consider how the tenets and imperatives impact their units and how they impact the units they support when
planning and executing sustainment operations. Table 1-1 below lists the imperatives and provides select
sustainment considerations intended to provoke thought for the elements of the sustainment warfighting
function. For additional details on tenets of operations and imperatives, see FM 3-0.
Table 1-1. Sustainment considerations for imperatives
Imperatives Sustainment considerations
See yourself, see the enemy, and • Analyze the operating environment and refine or update the
understand the operational sustainment estimates.
environment.
• Describe the environmental impacts to operations.
• Evaluate the threat and evaluate and plan for dispersed operations.
• Analyze personnel running estimates against operational
requirements.
• Determine sustainment funding requirements against available
budget.
• Plan for central funding banking, finance and operations plans, and
finance system support.
• Determine personnel projections and casualty estimates.
• Analyze health service support across the formation in theater.
• Analyze potential theater evacuation and hospitalization.
Account for being under constant • Modify combined obstacle overlay and deception plan.
observation and all forms of enemy
• Observe fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles,
contact.
and cover and concealment.
• Consider all forms of contact, including influence.
• Understand terrain, weather, and line of sight analysis.
• Monitor potential electromagnetic and cyber reconnaissance.
• Limit personnel movements that can indicate imminent action or
intent. Use multiple dispersed staging locations and smaller footprint
to avoid detection.
• Synchronize and integrate protection capabilities to reduce risks and
mitigate vulnerabilities from detection, threat effects, and hazards.
• Understand and participate in the development of the scheme of
protection.
• Practice operations and physical security.
• Alternate logistics routes to avoid predictability.
Create and exploit positions of • Maintain situational understanding of domains and dimension
physical, information, and human interrelationships.
advantage in pursuit of decision
• Identify the enemy’s decision cycle.
dominance.
• Conduct collection management.
• Continue to manage personnel tracking and reporting. |
4-0 | 24 | Chapter 1
Table 1-1. Sustainment considerations for imperatives (continued)
Imperatives Sustainment considerations
Create and exploit positions of • Continue development of plans for precision sustainment and
physical, information, and human predictive logistics capabilities.
advantage in pursuit of decision
• Continue to predict required funding for banking; update finance and
dominance (continued).
operations plans.
• Continue development of plans for precision and predictive medical
logistics capabilities.
• Support displaced persons and detainee operations and support to
host-nation civilians.
Make initial contact with the • Conduct course of action development.
smallest element possible.
• Conduct collection management.
• Understand enemy forces/dispositions.
• Decisively engage on terms that are favorable.
• Continue to manage personnel tracking and reporting.
• Conduct detainee and displaced persons processing.
• Provide operational reach to extend deep operations.
• Anticipate rapid resupply operations to multiple small, dispersed
elements for judicious employment of friendly forces.
• Continue to provide predictive spending, funding, and banking in
support of combatant commander initiatives.
• Anticipate rapid Class VIII resupply operations to multiple small,
dispersed elements while conducting casualty and medical
evacuation.
Impose multiple dilemmas on the • Maintain situational understanding of domains and dimension
enemy. interrelationships.
• Consider use of multiple supply nodes.
• Identify/exploit enemy weaknesses.
• Practice operations and physical security.
• Conduct forcible entry operations.
• Set favorable logistics conditions.
• Plan, prepare, and support feints/deception operations.
• Provide operational reach to extend deep operations.
• Utilize multiple logistical nodes (ports of embarkation and ports of
debarkation).
Anticipate, plan, and execute • Plan and arrange operations for transitions.
transitions.
• Enable task organization that anticipates follow on phases of
operations.
• Rehearse critical transitions (defense to offense).
• Ensure the force understands changes to rules of engagement
during mission transitions.
• Understand potential risks. Conduct collection management.
• Continue to plan and execute non-unit related personnel replacement
operations.
• Plan and prepare for unit replacement.
• Manage personnel tracking and reporting.
• Continue development of plans for precision and predictive logistics
capabilities.
• Reprioritize resupply operations to maintain momentum.
• Identify sustainment shortfalls/gaps against operational
requirements.
• Continue to provide predictive spending, funding, and banking in
support of combatant commander’s initiatives.
• Anticipate rapid Class VIII resupply while conducting medical
evacuation.
• Analyze health service support across the formation in theater. |
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