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Is it allowed to destroy political billboards? I see that political posters in Germany during election get destroyed all the time. For example, NPD posters are always teard down or on a ground. Merkel's picture is often with beard and mustache. People write something or tear down AFD posters. Etc So, is this accepted political fight? Am I allowed to destroy political posters? If not, what is the punishment? | No, you are not allowed to destroy or deface other peaple's property (§ 303 StGB) the attempt to do the same is also punishable To whom it belongs to is irrelevant. The Freedom of expression is restricted by Artical 5 (2): the provisions of general laws of which § 303 StGB is only one of in the right to personal honour as well as § 185-188 Criminal Code (StGB) - Insult and Defamation So insulting someone because you disagree with their viewpoint also exceeds the Freedom of expression. Section 303 - Criminal damage (1) Whosoever unlawfully damages or destroys an object belonging to another shall be liable to imprisonment not exceeding two years or a fine. (2) Whosoever unlawfully alters the appearance of an object belonging to another substantially and permanently shall incur the same penalty. (3) The attempt shall be punishable Article 5 [Freedom of expression, arts and sciences] (1) Every person shall have the right freely to express and disseminate his opinions in speech, writing and pictures and to inform himself without hindrance from generally accessible sources. Freedom of the press and freedom of reporting by means of broadcasts and films shall be guaranteed. There shall be no censorship. (2) These rights shall find their limits in the provisions of general laws, in provisions for the protection of young persons and in the right to personal honour. (3) Arts and sciences, research and teaching shall be free. The freedom of teaching shall not release any person from allegiance to the constitution. Section 185 Insult An insult shall be punished with imprisonment not exceeding one year or a fine and, if the insult is committed by means of an assault, with imprisonment not exceeding two years or a fine. Section 186 Defamation Whosoever asserts or disseminates a fact related to another person which may defame him or negatively affect public opinion about him, shall, unless this fact can be proven to be true, be liable to imprisonment not exceeding one year or a fine and, if the offence was committed publicly or through the dissemination of written materials (section 11(3)), to imprisonment not exceeding two years or a fine. Section 187 Intentional defamation Whosoever intentionally and knowingly asserts or disseminates an untrue fact related to another person, which may defame him or negatively affect public opinion about him or endanger his creditworthiness shall be liable to imprisonment not exceeding two years or a fine, and, if the act was committed publicly, in a meeting or through dissemination of written materials (section 11(3)) to imprisonment not exceeding five years or a fine. Section 188 Defamation of persons in the political arena (1) If an offence of defamation (section 186) is committed publicly, in a meeting or through dissemination of written materials (section 11(3)) against a person involved in the popular political life based on the position of that person in public life, and if the offence may make his public activities substantially more difficult the penalty shall be imprisonment from three months to five years. (2) An intentional defamation (section 187) under the same conditions shall entail imprisonment from six months to five years. Sources: § 185-188 Criminal Code (StGB) - Insult and Defamation § 303 Criminal Code (StGB) - Criminal damage Article 5 - Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany | There is actually a rather recent law in Germany which would make nonconsensual distribution of images which could damage the reputation of a person illegal: §201a StGB [de|en] "Violation of intimate privacy by taking photographs or other images". This law says that: whoever, without being authorised to do so, makes available to a third party a photograph or other image of another person which is of such a nature as to significantly damage the reputation of the person depicted incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine. But even if the person has not already done so, just threatening to commit this crime might also be a crime according to §253 StGB [de|en] "Extortion": (1) Whoever unlawfully, by force or threat of serious harm, coerces a person to do, acquiesce to or refrain from an act, and thereby damages that person’s or another’s assets for the purpose of wrongful personal enrichment or enrichment of a third party, incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a fine. (2) The act is unlawful if the use of force or the threat of harm is deemed reprehensible in respect of the desired objective. (3) The attempt is punishable. (4) In especially serious cases, the penalty is imprisonment for a term of at least one year. An especially serious case typically occurs where the offender acts on a commercial basis or as a member of a gang whose purpose is the continued commission of extortion. Considering the repercussions in the Saudi-Arabian culture and legal system for promiscuity, especially for women, it is hard to deny that there is a threat of "serious harm" in this case. So it might be a good idea to file a police report with the police of the federal state where the perpetrator lives. The police of most federal states allow to do that through their respective websites (look for the keywords "Internetwache" or "Strafanzeige"), so there is no need to travel to Germany to do so. This does of course require that there is enough information available to obtain the real identity of the perpetrator, which can be difficult with people you only know through online services. | In practice, almost certainly not. A defamatory statement, in the context of a public figure, is a statement of fact about a person that tends to hurt their reputation, stated with an intent that the factual statement is to be understood by the audience as true, that the person making the statement knows to be false or makes with reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the statement. (This is the New York Times v. Sullivan actual malice standard.) The case law of defamation, moreover, applies a sophisticated reading of the alleged defamatory statement that takes into account the subtleties of advanced ways of using language and not mere a crabbed or unduly literal reading of the allegedly defamatory statement. Pretty much every statement of fact made by the Babylon Bee, a satirical publication akin to the more familiar publication The Onion is not intended to be read as a non-fictional, fact checked account of actual facts. It is inherently a periodical that publishes fictional parodies. The context of the whole page which a comment indicates drives the question, also really has to be taken into account as a whole, in particular, is so patently absurd and obviously false, that the claim there the publication is sincerely making a statement about facts in real life is easily overcome. An image of the page is as follows: Taken as a whole, the actual intent of the series of posts is to make fun of Biden's political opponents who baselessly compare Biden to Hitler when the comparison is not warranted, and not to harm Biden's reputation at all, in a subtle diss of his histrionic conservative critics, not Biden himself. Also, comparisons to Hitler have a strong component of opinion to them in most cases, and the bar for finding that a public figure like the U.S. President, in the context of a politically commentary in satire form has been defamed is extremely high. While it might be possible to imagine some very specific fact pattern that could overcome this legal standard (especially if it hit upon the personal non-official conduct of the President in some way completely unrelated to his official duties, which it is hard to imagine a Hitler comparison being), in practice, it just wouldn't happen. | It is definitely illegal in Russia as well, but the police will do nothing. Previous activity of this group included forcefully attacking people who tried to speak to a girl who disliked it and handling over such people to police to get fined "for hooliganism". Usual practice in Russia is to beat the people whom the random girls around dislike. This group stepped a bit further, involving police. They use illegal or questionable methods, definitely. But they use them in a manner that people would be unlikely to complain to police because they themselves either did something illegal or public opinion is not on their side. The police usually will do nothing even with much more serious violations, like beating somebody. | not in germany Germany has laws about founding, operating and financing political parties, the Parteiengesetz which demands certain organisatorial structures, and the Parteifinanzierungsgesetz, which is very explicit about how they can finance themselves and what a party needs to report. The only allowed gains are property proceeds (like from owning property or selling goods), membership fees, gifts to the party, and state sponsorship. Also, non-citizens are not allowed to give to a party unlimitedly. The parties also are also obligated under the basic law to report all financing they get, down to the cent. Their organisation form is strictly limited: Parteien sind frei gebildete Personenvereinigungen im Sinne des Artikels 9 Absatz 1 GG, die sich auf der Basis des privaten Rechts nach den vereinsrechtlichen Regelungen des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches (§§ 21 bis 79 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch - BGB) gründen. Sie sind in der Regel nicht rechtsfähige Vereine This precludes them from being Aktiengesellschaften: they have to be organizations of people (Personenvereinigungen) that follow the BGB, and thus are not allowed to organize as an AG under the Aktiengesetz, which demands that an AG to not be an organization of people. So, a party can't be a stock company, and selling stock in a political party in Germany is not allowed under the framework and is thus neither possible nor legal. | I don't believe Canada uses the public official/figure distinction. American defamation law uses the distinction to determine whether to require proof of actual malice, but Canada does not require proof of actual malice. Canadian defamation law has a lot of other parallels to American defamation law, though, especially in terms of privilege. I'd expect the University could claim any of several available privileges, including truth, qualified privilege, and fair comment. And because it's a government institution, it's conceivable that it might even claim absolute privilege, though I definitely don't know enough about their interpretations of the privilege to say one way or another. For a broad primer on defamation law in Ontario, you can check out this report from the Law Commission of Ontario. | This is the cited article. Thankfully, the interviewee provided a scan of the police letter he received, so the rest of this question is relatively easy to answer. He was specifically charged with Störung der öffentlichen Ordnung (lit. Disturbance of the public order) persuant to § 81(1) of the Sicherheitspolizeigesetz, which reads (after putting it through Google Translate): Who by a behavior that is likely to arouse legitimate annoyance, disturbs public order, commits an administrative offense and is punishable by a fine of up to 500 euros, unless the behavior is justified, in particular by the use of a constitutionally guaranteed right , In the event of aggravating circumstances, instead of a fine, imprisonment can be imprisoned for up to one week, or up to two weeks for repeated offenses. This law is almost certainly constitutional as it specifically allows exercise of constitutional rights. Note this also includes human rights, as Austria has included the European Convention on Human Rights as part of its constitution. Given that, I'm guessing if the interviewee had wanted to, he would have had a decent shot at having this charge dismissed. | Here's what I had to do : After going through this harrowing phase, I thought I will post an update in case some one is in such a situation. The Northern Territory's Personal Violence Restraining Order act has a clause (section 21) which basically says if the applicant believes a third party knows the defendant's name then the applicant can request the court to order the third party(power, water, electoral roll, etc) to provide the name if the applicant has already made reasonable efforts in finding out the persons name and hasn't been able to. The third parties will only oblige to a court order. I am almost certain every state/territories' act (in Australia) will have such a clause. It was a challenge to get the court registry to accept the application as the front counter staff/supervisor/supervisor's supervisor were all unaware of this provision (to make an application for a PVRO but get the judge to first order the third party). I had to carry with me the act with the highlighted portion for them to read, analyse and consult with other court staff to even take my application in. At least in the NT there are community legal help services available for no fee and I highly recommend them. |
Is the worst version of the accusations against President Trump impeachable? Suppose the president of the US demands foreign leader X have X's state conduct an investigation into corrupt dealings of a family member of a former member of the previous US administration (and a potential rival presidential candidate) - and conditions the transfer of military aid on the carrying out of this investigation. Ignore for a moment the specific details of the current impeachment process and the current composition of the House and the Senate. Can this be considered a "high crime" or "high misdemeanor" according to prevailing legal scholarship? I am obviously no US constitutional lawyer, but in many respects this seems to me like a borderline/gray-area request even in terms of legitimacy (seeing how it is not unreasonable to strive for corruption investigations, albeit not by foreign states) - and thus, as a crime, it doesn't seem to rise to being "high". Note: I described acts, not intent. Perhaps the president did this simply because s/he wanted dirt on a potential political opponent. Perhaps he was personally curious. Perhaps he actually cared about corruption. Perhaps he cares about corruption, but only in order to present the previous administration in a negative light and not in his own administration. etc. The answer may include some relevant details from the current impeachment process, but please don't write an answer focusing on President Trump or his impeachment process. (this comes up repeatedly) No, the Nixon v. US decision (506 U.S. 224 (1993)) does not recognize a power of Congress to impeach arbitrarily or for flimsy causes. | High crimes and misdemeanors is interpreted by Congress While the concept is an import from English law as grounds for removing an officeholder from office, the conduct referred to is better thought of as a breach of trust rather than a specific (criminal) offense. One may commit a 'high crime or misdemeanor' without actually breaking the law. Because impeachment proceedings are political, they are not justicable under US law. As such, what meets the threshold of “high crimes and misdemeanors” is a matter for the individual members of Congress to decide just like what meets the threshold of "beyond reasonable doubt" is a matter for individual jurors to decide. | Yes. The absence of immunity for a U.S. President's unofficial acts was established both in the Nixon Administration and later in the Clinton Administration. In practice, a prosecutor would be loath to file such charges absent very, very solid probable cause, and a court would often be very deferential in accommodating the President's schedule and, for example, in allowing appearances by telephone when allowed by law, or by electing not to seize the President's passport as a bail condition to be free pending trial, as would be common for someone facing felony charges pending trial. But, ultimately, the President does not have the right to either defer the charges until the completion of his term, or to any immunity from charges for his or her unofficial acts. | Political speech is at the core of First Amendment protections on free speech, but there are still legal limits that exist on political speech. (I respectfully disagree with the idea posited by user6726's good answer that political speech is immune from legal restraint.) Direct incitement to imminent lawless action that is likely to occur can technically be prohibited and people can be arrested for it, but the segments I've seen of the most pro-violence of Donald Trump's rallies have not quite risen to that standard. He has been couching his incitement-related language carefully; it sounds much tougher than it actually is. "I will pay to defend you if you commit a crime" or even an approving "back in the day, you used to get a punch in the face for X" is not the same as saying "Punch those people in the face on your way out" or "Let's knock those protestors out of here in 3, 2, 1... GO!" While I'm not saying that a pre-crime promise to cover legal fees can never be enough to rise to the level of conspiracy (that's an interesting question), it also isn't really incitement to riot. But If Donald Trump, or anyone else, used their political position to speak at a public event and directly incite a riot, then they could be arrested under an applicable law without violating the First Amendment. There are also other limits on political speech, such as defamation. While a political speaker has incredibly wide leeway, there are still limits that exist, especially if the speaker targets a private citizen rather than another political figure. | Your question: "How blatant the circumvention of the Constitution has to be for SCOTUS to act?" indicates some confusion about the big picture of how contesting the constitutionality of a law works. SCOTUS doesn't proactively do anything. The Supreme Court cannot simply review a law that has been enacted and say it is unconstitutional of its own accord, or at the request of someone involved in the political process (some countries allow this, the U.S. does not). The U.S. Supreme Court is not equivalent to the institution of a "Constitutional Court" found in many countries. It is just the last court of appeal for all U.S. Courts. It often ends up resolving constitutional questions, but only after other courts have already done so in cases where there are real tangible immediate consequences to the decision. A lawsuit must be brought by someone who is actually injured for the courts to act In your example, nothing would happen unless a home owner could show that soldiers had actually commandeered his home without consent or compensation, or places him in imminent fear of having this done. If someone can't show that, then no lawsuit to determine the constitutionality of the law is allowed even if it is blatantly unconstitutional and the question of the law's validity will remain unresolved by the courts. This limitation is called "standing" and requires that there be an actual case and controversy with a suit brought by someone who has suffered a legal injury before anyone can bring any lawsuit. In point of fact, there are all sorts of laws in the United States that are clearly unconstitutional, but which are never brought before the courts to declare unconstitutional, because the government agrees that those laws are unconstitutional and makes a point of not enforcing those laws. All cases (with exceptions not applicable here) start in trial courts Suppose soldiers do commandeer Bob's house at the express direction of the President without Bob's consent or following any procedure that amounts to due process. What does Bob do? Bob brings a lawsuit against the soldiers and their commanders up through the President and the United States in the U.S. District Court for the state where the house is located or where the defendants live. Suits against the U.S. and its employees must be brought in federal courts rather than state courts. SCOTUS can hear cases as a trial court, but only in cases involving a state or foreign country or a diplomat as a party (and in practice, even those cases are referred to a temporary judge called a special master for evaluation and SCOTUS only considers the case after receiving a recommendation from the special master). None of those circumstances apply in this case. A federal trial judge hears the case and decides if the law is constitutional or not, and if it is held to be unconstitutional may decide that Bob is entitled to a remedy. There will also be other separate issues to decide in the case. For example: Was the lawsuit brought within the statute of limitations? Are the soldiers immune to suit for damages against them personally, which depends upon how clear it was to the soldier that he was acting unconstitutionally? Were the soldiers violating orders or following orders? Did Bob meet other procedural requirements during the course of a lawsuit (like making the proper disclosures of information and showing up to hearing he is required to attend, and presenting evidence in accordance with the rules of evidence)? If the trial judge finds that the law is unconstitutional, the trial judge can issue an order saying so and that is the law of land that binds the parties (including the U.S. in any other case presenting the same issue under a principle called collateral estoppel) unless someone appeals the case. Every state and federal judge in the United States from small claims court judge to a U.S. Supreme Court justice has the power to declare laws unconstitutional if it comes up in a case properly heard in that judge's court, not just SCOTUS. SCOTUS (with exceptions that don't apply) doesn't hear direct appeals A handful of cases are directly appealed from a trial court to SCOTUS (mostly election law cases). But the vast majority of cases, including this one, would go to an intermediate court of appeals first. If someone does appeal the case, it goes to the U.S. Court of Appeals for whatever circuit the state of the District Court is located in. It reviews the judge's ruling in light of the evidence presented and can either reverse the trial judge's decision or affirm it. Only after the U.S. Court of Appeals has ruled (sometimes with one more layer of decision making within the U.S. Court of Appeals), any party can appeal the case by a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. SCOTUS often declines to reconsider Court of Appeals Rulings The U.S. Supreme Court doesn't have to take the case and 98% of the time that cases are appealed to it, it doesn't take the case. If it doesn't take the case, then the U.S. Court of Appeals ruling is the law and that ruling is binding on any other federal court in its jurisdiction in future case. The U.S. Supreme Court will usually only take the case if it feels the decision was wrong, or there are conflicting precedents that have to be resolved from different courts. Whichever judge decides constitutionality (a power not reserved to SCOTUS) that judge will try to follow the law to make the right decision whether the violation of the constitution is blatant or subtle. If the U.S. Supreme Court does decide to take the case, it can affirm that U.S. Court of Appeals ruling (which is then binding on all U.S. Courts as precedent), or it can reverse the U.S. Court of Appeals. In each case, at the trial court level, at the U.S. Court of Appeals level, and at the U.S. Supreme Court level, the only question is whether the law conflicts with the constitution as interpreted by the case law already decided over time. Only a handful of cases in the history of the United States have ever squarely addressed whether a law violates the 3rd Amendment so there isn't a lot of directly applicable precedent, but the judges would also consider how similar provisions of the constitution, like the 5th Amendment, have been treated and would consider law review articles and historical records about the intent of the Third Amendment as well. Judges have quite a bit of freedom in interpreting the law, but will try to rule in the way that most fairly represents what the total body of the law and interpretative information about the law says in the context of the facts before it. In this case the government would probably lose but you can never be sure In a case as clear as your example, the Government would very likely lose although no case is entirely certain, because it allows action at any time even though it is not a time of war, does not consider the home owner's consent, and does not create any meaningful procedure for exercising the right. But, it really doesn't matter if the violation is blatant or if it is subtle. The court even routinely rules that laws are unconstitutional not because they actually violate a provision of the constitution directly, but because they merely "burden" the exercise of a constitutional right. A law that effectively nullifies a constitutional provision would usually be invalidated. Sometimes lawyers informally and in private call an argument that is technically valid (for example, by creating a procedure albeit a meaningless one) "too cute." Arguments like that usually lose. The U.S. Supreme Court routinely invalidates laws that violate the constitution only in very subtle ways (e.g., requirements that have been interpreted to pose minor barriers to voting could be held unconstitutional), and the U.S. Supreme Court now and then refuses to invalidate laws that seemingly blatantly violate the constitution (e.g., "In God We Trust" on U.S. coins). Often a non-constitutional or settled constitutional law question is resolved purposely in a way that avoids the need to rule on an unresolved constitutional question Often, constitutional cases are resolved on the question of standing, or whether the right person has been sued, or by interpreting a law in a manner that is unnatural, in order to avoid having to address the question of the constitutionality of the law itself. For example, in your case, a judge might say that "at any time" in the statute, really means "at any time during a war", and that "regardless of the objections of the owner" really means "over the unreasonable objections of the owner", and that there is a duty to pay fair market value for the use of the house under the statute because the law is silent on that point, even if none of those things, in a cold plain reading of the statute would seem to be reasonable interpretations of its plain language. And then the judge might say that interpreted in this way, the law is constitutional, but the government violated the law and the court might then award a remedy to Bob, because the government violated the law so interpreted rather than because the government enforced an unconstitutional law. But, if it decides to take up a constitutional question because it isn't satisfied with how the U.S. Court of Appeals resolved the issue, it won't hesitate to do so. | First of all, as noted in the comments, Babylon Bee is SATIRE. It's not intended to be news, just entertainment. But the real question is whether or not a President COULD do such a thing. Or perhaps better, could a President attempt to do something like this. If a President did attempt to do this, it would be totally without precedent and also without any constitutional authority. Since the US Constitution enumerates the powers between the branches and gives the President only the authority to appoint, with the advice of the Senate, a SCOTUS justice, trying to change things by giving an existing justice 2 votes would almost certainly be immediately challenged by the Senate. It also seems unlikely that such an action would be upheld as constitutional. Of course this is all speculative since nothing of this nature has happened. | You would think so, but no While at first glance, President Trump sending a staff member to testify under oath in his place (to nullify any personal risk of perjury?) appears to epitomize the concept of "hearsay"-- a statement that: (1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement --there are some subtle but important distinctions and exceptions in play. I'm going to list them off in increasing order of relevance. FOIA penalties are civil, not criminal The official DOJ website lists off the penalties for Freedom of Information Act violations: The court may award reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs against the government when the complainant substantially prevails. See 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(a)(4)(E). Action Against Individual Employees: Sanctions may be taken against individual agency employees who are found to have acted arbitrarily or capriciously in improperly withholding records. Additionally, the court must award attorney fees and other litigation costs against the government. When the statutory requirements are found by the Court to have been met, the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) must promptly initiate a proceeding to determine whether disciplinary action is warranted against the office or employee who is primarily responsible for the withholding. The MSPB, after investigating and considering the evidence, submits its findings and recommendations to the agency concerned which then is required to take the corrective action recommended by the Board. See 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(a)(4)(F). Additionally, there now exists independent jurisdiction for such MSPB investigations under 5 U.S.C. Sec. 1206(e)(1) (1982). Failure to comply with a court order to produce the records in question may also result in punishment for contempt for the responsible employee. See 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(a)(4)(G). So the strongest penalty against any individual government official who violated FOIA would be losing their job, or civil contempt of court. In principle the prohibition against hearsay applies equally to civil cases as criminal ones; in practice, because the stakes are lower, courts may take a somewhat looser attitude towards hearsay in civil cases than they would in a similar criminal case. Rule 807(a), "Residual Exceptions" Rule 807(a) gives courts large latitude to determine whether or not to admit hearsay evidence: (a) In General. Under the following conditions, a hearsay statement is not excluded by the rule against hearsay even if the statement is not admissible under a hearsay exception in Rule 803 or 804: (1) the statement is supported by sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness–after considering the totality of circumstances under which it was made and evidence, if any, corroborating the statement; and (2) it is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts. In this situation, the presiding judge, Reggie Walton of the D.C. District Court, clarified what he would consider "sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness": U.S. District Court Judge Reggie Walton issued the rare order to the White House last week after expressing dissatisfaction with a previous explanation submitted by the Justice Department’s top career official, Associate Deputy Attorney General Bradley Weinsheimer. Weinsheimer said he had checked with an unidentified official in the White House counsel’s office and determined that no new declassification was triggered by Trump’s latest tweets. However, Walton said given Trump’s suggestions of a rogue element undercutting his orders, some assurance directly from the president or someone who had spoken to the president was necessary. As Meadows had, one presumes, literally spoken to the president, this satisfied the presiding judge's own explicit standard of "sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness" for when hearsay may be admitted into evidence. Rule 807(a)(2) is also relevant here, in its caveat that hearsay may be accepted into evidence when it is "more probative...than any other evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts". Arguably, forcing the POTUS to neglect his duties running the country and "ending the pandemic" long enough to testify in what is, in many ways, a run-of-the-mill FOIA case, would take too much effort to be "reasonable". Which brings me to the next point: Rule 804(a)(1) and Rule 804(b)(5), "Unavailability of the Declarant" Rule 804(a)(1) discusses a specific exception to the hearsay rule when the declarant can't or won't personally testify: (a) Criteria for Being Unavailable. A declarant is considered to be unavailable as a witness if the declarant: (1) is exempted from testifying about the subject matter of the declarant’s statement because the court rules that a privilege applies As POTUS, it makes sense that Trump would have some degree of privilege or immunity from being deposed. If a sitting President could be dragged into court at will over any government litigation, no matter how mundane, to personally testify, it would be impossible to perform the functions of their office. Think about all of the live issues winding their way through the courts right now that Trump has tweeted about. Now, imagine the demands on his time if he was dragged into court to testify regarding every single one: "Sorry Angela Merkel, I have to cancel our international summit this year, I'm giving a live deposition in 50 different court cases in the next three weeks and I don't have time to do 'foreign policy' right now. Hope no new World Wars break out! Good luck!" Of necessity, a POTUS has to be permitted to delegate 99.9% of legal representation on matters of public policy to other Executive Branch officials, when it comes to who actually needs to be physically present in court. And since he is privileged from personally testifying, that means exception 804(b)(5) applies: (b) The Exceptions. The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: .... (5) [Other Exceptions .] [Transferred to Rule 807.] We discussed how Rule 807 applies in this circumstance up above. But I want to circle back to the idea that the President has to be able to delegate statements of official policy to other authorized government representatives, such as Meadows, because of the clinching exception: Rule 803(8)(A)(i): Public records of governmental policy aren't excluded by the hearsay rule Rule 803(8)(A)(i) tells us that: statements of public policy (such as, whether the government is going to declassify, or has already declassified, every document relating to the Russia investigation, specifically including Mueller report and FBI interview redactions) made by public offices or their official representatives (such as the POTUS's chief of staff, authorized to speak on behalf of the POTUS, clarifying the Executive Branch's stance on declassification) are not excluded by the hearsay rule: The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay, regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness: .... (8) Public Records. A record or statement of a public office if: (A) it sets out: (i) the office’s activities This makes sense given the purpose of the rule against hearsay. It's supposed to prevent innuendo and rumor from sneaking into the factual record when the facts are in dispute: "I heard the defendant's mom say the defendant said he did it," related by the defendant's mom's bingo buddy, would deservedly raise some eyebrows around the bingo table, but isn't the kind of solid evidence an impartial trial requires. Statements of public policy and government action by public officials, on the other hand, have a lot more authority and credibility than what a friend of a friend of the defendant heard the friend say the defendant said. Meadows isn't (just) some random golf buddy of the President who overheard what the President was thinking when he made these tweets; he's the President's official delegate to the court, conveying the Executive Branch's official position on declassification. Such official statements are ordinarily presumed maximally trustworthy and reliable, at least partly for logistical reasons. Similar to how we can't ask Trump to cancel all the COVID task force meetings to clear his schedule and testify about some tweets, we can't drag every government officer who makes an out-of-court official public statement or record into court to certify it--at least, not every single time. The judicial branch of the government takes the word of other branches of the government mostly at face value†, and does not consider public records or statements in an official capacity as "hearsay" to be excluded from evidence. So the TL;DR version is: No, Meadows coming into court to convey this statement on behalf of his boss would not be excluded by the hearsay rule. †Significantly, statements or records regarding policy might be excluded as hearsay, per 803(8)(B), if the opposition demonstrates that the statement or record is somehow fishy or unreliable: "(B) the opponent does not show that the source of information or other circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness." But in this instance, in order to demonstrate a "lack of trustworthiness", the plaintiffs in the case--BuzzFeed, CNN, and the Electronic Privacy Information Center--would have to show that the government was actually declassifying and unredacting all material related to the Russia investigation, contrary to what Meadows claimed in court. Since the government is not actually doing this, the President's social media rants notwithstanding, the plaintiffs would be unlikely to prevail if they tried to use 803(8)(B) to get Meadows' testimony excluded as hearsay. | The president is not permitted to blackmail the Supreme Court, but what you've described isn't blackmail. Blackmail is a threat to expose someone's crimes. You're probably thinking of something more like extortion, which is outlawed under 18 U.S. Code § 875: Whoever, with intent to extort from any person, firm, association, or corporation, any money or other thing of value, transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to injure the property or reputation of the addressee or of another or the reputation of a deceased person or any threat to accuse the addressee or any other person of a crime, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. There are three problems with your theory I see right away: With the facts: As you noted, the President's statements were "seemingly unrelated," which is essentially an admission that there's no indication one has anything to do with the other. Under those circumstances, you can't establish that he's making any kind of threat. With the statute: "Extortion" is generally understood to refer not merely to a threat to do something unpleasant. Instead, extortion is inducing another person to turn over property by the wrongful use of force, violence, or fear. There's no property at play here, and it's not unlawful to study changes to the court (nor would it be unlawful to actually make changes to the Court, which the president doesn't even have power to do anyway). With the First Amendment: The President has a First Amendment right to advocate for changes to gun laws, and for changes to the composition of the Supreme Court. That right does not evaporate when it is informed by the court's conduct. So the Biden situation is not really a good fit with the hypothetical you've described, which presents a much stronger factual basis from which to find a threat. Because it also appears you're using wrongfully inducing fear of economic injury to obtain another person's property, and because you have no right to do so, you would be liable for extortion, while the President would not. EDIT: Although the top-line questions has been reframed, I'll just note that the answer remains basically the same. Bearing in mind that the president has no power to force any Supreme Court justice into retirement, one might rephrase the question this way: "If the Court rules that a constitutional amendment has Meaning X, can the president threaten to support a constitutional amendment?" The answer should be obvious: The president is free to support policies to change the constitution, at any time, for any reason. | Yes Impeachment proceedings (as are all activities of Congress) are legal proceedings in that they are enabled by the Constitution. While it is true that they are not judicial proceedings, the activities of the legislature as with the executive (like a police interview) and judiciary (like a trial) are legal processes and the Fifth Amendment rights apply. During the McCarthy “red scare” era, pleading the fifth was commonplace by witnesses to Congressional hearings. However, pleading the fifth does not mean you can avoid testifying. If subpoenaed you would need to turn up and answer the questions, pleading the fifth when the answer could incriminate you in a criminal matter. |
Is the vice-president an employee for the purpose of 5 CFR §2635.502? It's been suggested on politcs.SE (but the question was closed as off-topic there) that a US vice-president needs to comply with 5 CFR §2635.502 which sets stricter standards for conflicts of interest than 18 USC § 209. In the regulations the mere appearance of conflict of interest is ground for recusal ("the employee should not participate in the matter"), but allows an "agency designee" to waive this. My impression is that 2635.502 doesn't apply to a US vice-president because he is not an employee but an officer whereas 18 USC § 209 clearly applies to both officers and employees (both categories are mentioned in the latter, only employees in the former). As for why there would be such a discrepancy, i.e. a lower conflict-of-interest standard for the officers, there's parallel with the recusal of supreme justices, who aren't held to the higher recusal standard of 28 USC 455 presumably because the supreme justices are aren't as easily replaceable [on a case] as lower-level federal judges. Is this reasoning correct, basically, i.e. does 5 CFR §2635.502 not apply to a US vice-president? | 5 CFR 2635.102 provides definitions for 5 CFR Part 2635 (which contains 5 CFR 2635.502). (h) Employee means any officer or employee of an agency, including a special Government employee. It includes officers but not enlisted members of the uniformed services. It includes employees of a State or local government or other organization who are serving on detail to an agency, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 3371, et seq. For purposes other than subparts B and C of this part, it does not include the President or Vice President. Status as an employee is unaffected by pay or leave status or, in the case of a special Government employee, by the fact that the individual does not perform official duties on a given day. Subparts B & C pertain to gifts and range from §2635.201-304, whereas the section you are asking about is in Subpart E. So §2635.502 expressly does not apply to the VP. The "why" part is more challenging. The statutory authority invoked for these regulations is 5 USC 7301, 7351, 7353, 5 USC App, acts passed by Congress. The rule-making rationale is in 57 FR 35042, which does not overtly invoke any specific statutory authority for this specific item. In contrast, Subpart B is the implementation of 5 USC §7353, which governs gifts to federal employees, and (d)(2) of that section says the term "officer or employee" means an individual holding an appointive or elective position in the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of Government, other than a Member of Congress. In other words, the mixed definition of "employee" (the VP is an employee only for subparts B, C) under the regulations is because Congress passed some laws that included the VP, but did not pass a law that required non-appearance of conflict. Such a regulation would be within the authority given the president in 5 USC 7301, which simply says that "The President may prescribe regulations for the conduct of employees in the executive branch". Since there is no Congressional authority to subject the VP to 5 CFR 2635.502, it is written to exclude that person (also the president). | No. The relevant provision of the United States Constitution is Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 which states in the pertinent part: The President . . . shall have Power to Grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment. The correct conclusion flows pretty directly from the definition of a "reprieve" and a "pardon", both of which, in the ordinary senses of these words refer to granting forgiveness for acts that have already occurred. One of the leading cases on point which supports this view is Ex parte Garland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307, 380 (1855), which states: The power thus conferred is unlimited, with the exception stated. It extends to every offence known to the law, and may be exercised at any time after its commission, either before legal proceedings are taken, or during their pendency, or after conviction and judgment. This power of the President is not subject to legislative control. Congress can neither limit the effect of his pardon, nor exclude from its exercise any class of offenders. The benign prerogative of mercy reposed in him cannot be fettered by any legislative restrictions. Despite its antiquity, this case remains good law and has been applied repeatedly in subsequent cases (although few on the right of a President to pardon future crimes which just hasn't come up). Other Observations The President's pardon power is limited to federal crimes, so no President may pardon or commute a state or foreign conviction. The nature of the pardon power, if any, with respect to state and local crimes is governed by each respective state constitution and varies rather considerably. The power in the U.S. Constitution is broader than that is some state constitutions. For example, the corresponding provision of the Colorado Constitution, applicable to convictions entered by the state of Colorado, does not allow crimes to be pardoned prior to a conviction. Article IV, Section 7, of the Colorado Constitution provides: "The governor shall have the power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons after conviction, for all offenses except treason * * *." The History Of The Pardon Power One of the most thorough and up to date reviews of the scope and nature of the federal pardon power can be found in the law review article, Todd David Peterson, "Congressional Power Over Pardon and Amnesty: Legislative Authority In The Shadow of Presidential Prerogative" 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1225 (2003). In particular, it has an interesting historical overview of the power at pages 1228-1235 (pagination and footnotes omitted): The President's pardon power derives from the authority that had been invested in English kings since the end of the first millennium. Although the King possessed plenary power to grant pardons, over the years Parliament imposed specific limitations on the pardon power in order to avoid perceived abuses. For example, the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 made it an offense for any person to imprison an English subject outside of the country and, in order to avoid an evasion of the writ, Parliament prohibited the King from granting a pardon for violation of the statute. Nevertheless, English courts frequently took an absolutist view of the King's pardon power. Thus, in Godden v. Hales, the Lord Chief Justice upheld a royal pardon on the ground that the Kings of England were absolute sovereigns; . . . the laws were the King's laws; . . . the King had a power to dispense with any of the laws of Government as he saw necessity for it; . . . he was sole judge of that necessity; that no act of Parliament could take away that power. The Parliament, however, persisted in its efforts to rein in the pardon power and, in 1700, adopted the Act of Settlement, which stated that "no pardon under the great seal of England [shall] be pleadable to an impeachment by the commons in Parliament." This limitation was enforced against the King, although it did not apply to pardons granted to relieve punishments imposed after the impeachment of an official. The royal pardon prerogative was imported into the American colonies whose charters gave the leaders substantial authority to pardon offenses. At the Constitutional Convention of 1787, neither the Virginia plan nor the New Jersey plan contained a pardon power. Nevertheless, at the insistence of Charles Pinckney, Alexander Hamilton, and John Rutledge, a pardon clause similar to the English Act of Settlement of 1700 was added to the draft constitution. Thus, the first report of the Committee on Detail proposed that the clause read: "He [the President] shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons; but his pardon shall not be pleadable in bar of an impeachment." The issue of legislative control over the pardon process was addressed directly by an amendment proposed by Roger Sherman of Connecticut. James Madison's journal notes that "Mr. Sherman moved to amend the power to grant reprieves and pardon' so as to readto grant reprieves until the ensuing session of the Senate, and pardons with consent of the Senate.'" George Mason argued that the Senate already possessed too much authority, and the proposed amendment was rejected by a vote of eight to one. The convention did approve a motion to insert "except in cases of impeachment" after pardon and remove the words "but his pardon shall not be pleadable in bar." Luther Martin then sought to limit the President's power to grant pre-conviction pardons by inserting the words "after conviction," following the words "reprieves and pardons." Martin, however, withdrew his motion after James Wilson argued that "pardon before conviction might be necessary, in order to obtain the testimony of accomplices." Edmund Randolph then offered an amendment to exclude "cases of treason" from the pardoning power. This proposed amendment was defeated, although its exclusion was later to prove controversial. Thus, although the framers realized that the pardon power was subject to potential abuse by the President, they declined to place any limitations on the President's pardon power or grant the legislature any authority to check potential presidential abuses. The debates following the convention's passage of the Constitution reveal more about the framers' views on the pardon power. In the Federalist 74, Alexander Hamilton attempted to respond to the criticism that the President could pardon his accomplices in a case of treason. Hamilton acknowledged that "there are strong reasons to be assigned for requiring in this particular the concurrence of [the legislative] body or of a part of it." Hamilton argued, however, that the reasons against such legislative authority outweighed any in its favor: "[i]t is not to be doubted that a single man of prudence and good sense, is better fitted, in delicate conjunctures, to balance the motives, which may plead for and against the remission of the punishment, than any numerous body whatever." In particular, Hamilton argued, in the case of large scale seditions that attracted significant popular support, we might expect to see the representation of the people tainted with the same spirit, which had given birth to the offense. And when parties were pretty equally matched, the secret sympathy of the friends and favorers of the condemned person, availing itself of the good nature and weakness of others, might frequently bestow impunity where the terror of an example was necessary. Thus, Hamilton argued not only that the power was properly reposed in the President, but that it would be dangerous to grant such power to Congress. Finally, Hamilton argued that it was appropriate to grant the President pardon power in order to ensure that the authority could be exercised with appropriate dispatch: "In seasons of insurrection or rebellion, there are often critical moments, when a well timed offer of pardon to the insurgents or rebels may restore the tranquility of the commonwealth; and which, if suffered to pass unimproved, it may never be possible afterwards to recall. The dilatory process of convening the Legislature, or one of its branches, for the purpose of obtaining its sanction to the measure, would frequently be the occasion of letting slip the golden opportunity. The loss of a week, a day, an hour, may sometimes be fatal. If it should be observed that a discretionary power with a view to such contingencies might be occasionally conferred upon the President; it may be answered in the first place, that it is questionable whether, in a limited constitution, that power could be delegated by law; and in the second place, that it would generally be impolitic before-hand to take any step which might hold out the prospect of impunity." There was little debate about the pardoning power during the state ratifying conventions. George Mason continued to argue that the power should not be given to the President. An opponent in New York suggested that pardons for treason should not be allowed without congressional consent. Ultimately, the Constitution was adopted without any express limitation on the President's pardoning power. The Supreme Court has on a number of occasions discussed the general scope of the pardoning power. For the most part, with exceptions to be discussed later, these decisions contain broad dicta concerning the unfettered nature of the President's power and the inability of Congress to impose any legislative restrictions on it. For example, in United States v. Wilson, the Court held that a pardon must be pleaded in order to be effective. Chief Justice Marshall wrote that the [C]onstitution gives to the [P]resident, in general terms, "the power to grant reprieves and pardons for offences against the United States." As this power had been exercised from time immemorial by the executive of that nation whose language is our language, and to whose judicial institutions ours bear a close resemblance; we adopt their principles respecting the operation and effect of a pardon, and look into their books for the rules prescribing the manner in which it is to be used by the person who would avail himself of it. Marshall further defined the pardon as an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the court. In Ex parte Wells, the Supreme Court considered whether the President could grant a conditional pardon in the form of commutation of a death sentence to a sentence of life imprisonment. The Court noted that pursuant to the Pardon Clause, the President has granted reprieves and pardons since the commencement of the present government. Sundry provisions have been enacted, regulating its exercise for the army and navy, in virtue of the constitutional power of [C]ongress to make rules and regulations for the government of the army and navy. No statute has ever been passed regulating it in cases of conviction by the civil authorities. In such cases, the President has acted exclusively under the power as it is expressed in the [C]onstitution. The Court noted, however, that "[t]here are also pardons grantable as of common right, without any exercise of the king's discretion; as where a statute creating an offence, or enacting penalties for its future punishment, holds out a promise of immunity to accomplices to aid in the conviction of their associates. When accomplices do so voluntarily, they have a right absolutely to a pardon . . . ." Thus, at least in dicta, the Court recognized Congress's authority to regulate clemency in the military and to adopt statutes granting immunity for cooperation in a criminal investigation. In Ex parte Garland, the Court spoke in sweeping dicta about the exclusive power of the President over pardon and amnesty. In Garland, the Court considered the issue whether a former Confederate senator would be permitted to be a member of the Supreme Court Bar without taking the statutorily required oath that he had never voluntarily given aid or comfort to the confederacy. The petitioner had received a presidential pardon and argued that the pardon exempted him from the requirements of the oath to which he could not truthfully subscribe. The Court held that it was "not within the constitutional power of Congress thus to inflict punishment beyond the reach of executive clemency," and therefore, the petitioner was entitled to membership in the Bar. In the course of the opinion, the Court broadly defined the President's pardon power: "The power thus conferred is unlimited, with the exception stated. It extends to every offence known to the law, and may be exercised at any time after its commission, either before legal proceedings are taken, or during their pendency, or after conviction and judgment. This power of the President is not subject to legislative control. Congress can neither limit the effect of his pardon, nor exclude from its exercise any class of offenders. The benign prerogative of mercy reposed in him cannot be fettered by any legislative restrictions." In Ex parte Grossman, the Court considered whether the President's pardon power extended to criminal contempts of court. The Court upheld the President's power to issue such pardons based on the history of royal pardons for contempt in England. The Court also looked to the long history of presidential pardons of criminal contempts of court. In responding to the argument that a presidential pardon of contempt of court would interfere with the ability of the federal courts to protect their own decrees, Chief Justice Taft noted that the Constitution provides a number of powers to the branches which give them the ability to check the other branches of government. With respect to the pardon power, the Court stated: "[t]he executive can reprieve or pardon all offenses after their commission, either before trial, during trial or after trial, by individuals, or by classes, conditionally or absolutely, and this without modification or regulation by Congress." The Court also noted that the President exercised the pardon power without any significant judicial check on his pardoning authority: "It is a check entrusted to the executive for special cases. To exercise it to the extent of destroying the deterrent effect of judicial punishment would be to pervert it; but whoever is to make it useful must have full discretion to exercise it. Our Constitution confers this discretion on the highest officer in the nation in confidence that he will not abuse it. An abuse in pardoning contempts would certainly embarrass courts, but it is questionable how much more it would lessen their effectiveness than a wholesale pardon of other offenses. If we could conjure up in our minds a President willing to paralyze courts by pardoning all criminal contempts, why not a President ordering a general jail delivery?" In Biddle v. Perovich, Justice Holmes wrote an opinion for the Court in which he upheld the President's conditional pardon of a convict sentenced to death on the condition that his sentence be commuted to life imprisonment. Justice Holmes suggested a different rationale for the pardon power than Chief Justice Marshall had enunciated early in the 19th century. Rather than being a private act of grace that must be accepted and proffered to the court by the one pardoned, Justice Holmes saw the President's pardon as serving public policy ends: "A pardon in our days is not a private act of grace from an individual happening to possess power. It is a part of the Constitutional scheme. When granted it is the determination of the ultimate authority that the public welfare will be better served by inflicting less than what the judgment fixed. . . . Just as the original punishment would be imposed without regard to the prisoner's consent and in the teeth of his will, whether he liked it or not, the public welfare, not his consent, determines what shall be done." | The CEO, with his lawyer have tried to convince me that this only apply to current client and any past clients that I have work on. Is this true? No. It will be true only if they make that clarification in the clause or a properly added amendment. The clause currently has no indication that it is limited to "current client and any past clients that [you] have work[ed] on". The CEO's & lawyer's refusal to amend the clause so as to make it consistent with their attempts [to persuade you] would be a red flag. Their inconsistent representations to you suggest that they are not planning to honor the covenant of good faith on which all contracts are premised. Should I expect the CEO to offer a fair contract or is this something you read and negotiate? You should require a contract that seems fair to you. And by "to you" I mean that it has to be in line with your expectations regardless of the average conditions in the labor market. Negotiations are not binding. They are merely a preamble to a contract, and that contract is binding. This is why you should reject a contract that falls short of your requirements. Some clauses are unlawful and/or void and unenforceable as unconscionable or for contravening legislation (unlawful clauses can and do arise even if drafted by attorneys). Thus, although you might not have to worry about those clauses in particular, the company's mere attempt to include them in a contract should alert you of the high risk of ending up with other abusive terms & conditions which are binding and enforceable nonetheless. | You are referring to 32 CFR 47.4. The only reasonable interpretation of that list is that one must meet all of the 5 requirements. The alternative interpretation would make any group that "[has not] already received benefits from the Federal Government for the service in question" eligible to apply. Since this is a regulation, the interpretation of the agency that wrote the regulations is given great deference. An agency's interpretation of the regulations it writes itself is controlling unless "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation". (Auer v. Robbins 1997) Regarding whether there is ambiguity at all, read King v. Burwell for several restatements of the principle that one must read words in context before deciding they are ambiguous: A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme . . . because only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law. They refer to the "fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme". | The Fifth Amendment would not apply, because nothing in the testimony would incriminate the doctor. Indeed nothing would be at all likely to incriminate the President either, it is not a crime to be unable to carry out Presidential duties. It is likely in such a case that the President would waive confidentiality. In that case the doctor could testify freely. If the President insisted on confidentiality, and attempted to prevent the doctor from testifying to Congress, there would be a conflict between the power of Congress to compel testimony, in this case on what is clearly a vital national issue within the scope of the needs of Congress, and traditional doctor-patient confidentiality, let alone the requirements of HIPAA. I am not sure how this conflict would be resolved. There might be an emergency application to the Supreme Court, but the SC does not usually do very well with truly urgent issues. The Pentagon Papers case and Bush V. Gore indicate some of the problems that can arise. If the doctor was prevented from testifying, that might incline members of congress to think the testimony would not be favorable to the President, and thus tend to suggest that they should not approve the President resuming or continuing his or her powers and duties. But that is rather speculative. The 25th has never been invoked, and the detailed procedure that would be followed if it were is not very clear. I am not aware of any similar situation in which medical testimony has been demanded to deal with an urgent issue, but the patient has attempted to block it. I think this case must be considered to be undecided until it actually arises and a court rules. | The Commander-in-chief powers are quite broad. The War Powers Resolution limits his ability to engage unilaterally in military action, by requiring him to report to Congress within 48 hours, and if Congress disapproves, troops must be removed after 60 days. However, this law pertains to armed forces, and would not apply to remotely-launched missiles. Additionally, it is unknown if the resolution is unconstitutional (presidents say it is). No law at all requires POTUS to obtain permission from someone else, in order to engage in a military action. Article 90 of the UCMJ states that it is a punishable offense to "willfully disobeys a lawful command of his superior commissioned officer". The manual also states that An order requiring the performance of a military duty or act may be inferred to be lawful and it is disobeyed at the peril of the subordinate. This inference does not apply to a patently illegal order, such as one that directs the commission of a crime. Murder of a civilian is an example. It also says The lawfulness of an order is a question of law to be determined by the military judge. "Shocking the conscience" is not a grounds allowing disobedience. One can only conjecture how a military judge would evaluate the lawfulness of a presidential order, when there is not a shred of legal evidence that such an order is in fact illegal: I conjecture that the order would be found to be lawful. | Actually this is the only SCOTUS ruling on Impeachment because of what it legally means with respect to SCOTUS and impeachment. Namely, Impeachment is a congressional power and not a judicial one that has no punishment beyond the removal from office upon conviction and that therefor it is not a matter that is Judicial. That is a fancy way to say that SCOTUS or any lower court may not hear appeals rising from the outcome of Impeachment. Because of this, it's unlikely to hear any SCOTUS case as to the matter of impeachment and the only outstanding question they could likely hear is "Who can hear an Impeachment Trial for the Vice President?" but thus far none of the 19 impeachment trials have heard involved a vice president. Nixon v. United States basically held that in matters of impeachment it is the court's position that it is likely to respond to this hypothetical with the legal ruling of "not my monkeys, not my circus" (note: not legal jargon). With that said, this makes the U.S. senate the highest court in the land when it comes to precedents set by impeachment cases. The very first person ever impeached was a U.S. Senator, who was expelled by the Senate the same day the House voted on Articles of Impeachment. The decision not to have the trial did establish some notable precedents: first, Impeachment and conviction are all about removing an officer from office and if at anytime before conviction the officer is removed by other means, the process is stopped as it is moot. Second, and more important, is that members of Congress are not "impeachable" officers as both houses have methods that allow them to expel members by vote. This means that the only people who can be impeached are executive officers (the person who is currently president, vice president, and cabinet secretaries, any other office that is appointed by the president and confirmed by the senate, and federal judges) and that a conviction of impeachment does not bar one from holding another federal office unless the senate enacts an additional punishment after the conviction barring that person from federal office. They cannot bar one from state office. Finally, House and Senate Rules have instructions for procedures in their part in impeachment. The commonality between both is that impeachment takes precidents over all regular buisness so once articles are put to the floor, there speaker must hold the vote with in a certain window of time (three days, I think) and the Senate must hold the trial as soon as possible, though will honor reasonable delays as per the impeached officer's right to delay. As a final note, and because it wasn't clear in the question Nixon v. United States is often confused with another case (United States v. Nixon). The latter one did indirectly relate to impeachment in that it was related to President Nixon handing over evidence to the comittee investigating possible impeachment articles against Nixon, and because of that ruling, Nixon handed over the evidence and later resigned to avoid the Impeachment. The former one not only didn't involve anything related Watergate, it also wasn't related to President Nixon at all, but a (former) Federal Judge Walter Nixon, and specifically was heard because Judge Nixon happened to be the first Judge impeached by a Senate commitee as the jury rather than the full Senate, following a rule change that only held full senate as jury for the President and Vice President and a committee for anyone else. The final rule is that only the President is constitutionally mandated to have the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court act as the judge in an Impeachment trial, while the presiding officer for all other cases is either the Vice President (acting in his role as President of the Senate) or the President pro Tempore of the Senate (acting in his role of "Guy Keeping the Vice President's Seat in the Senate Rotunda Warm" (not technical Jargon)). Which is why the question of "who is the judge in impeachment of the Vice President?" a noodle baking question, and the answer differs from the Chief Justice to the Senate pr Tempore to the rarely serious argument of the Vice President himself. The best answer is that "It has never come up." | Under article II, section 1 of the Constitution: In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected. The 25th Amendment doesn't cover the case of the President and Vice-President becoming incapacitated simultaneously, so instead the original section of the Constitution can be consulted. And unlike the 25th Amendment, this is quite clear: Congress passes a law deciding who the acting President is. The current law is the Presidential Succession Act of 1947. |
Can I (proactively) prevent someone from leaving me something in a will? What can I do to prevent someone from leaving me something in their will? Generally speaking, in North America: Do I have to take responsibility for things left to me in a will or are their other options? | What can I do to prevent someone from leaving me something in their will? Nothing. Allowing other people to legally change someone's will defeats the purpose of a will: To express the writer's last wishes. (That is why the full title is a "Last Will & Testament"). Do I have to take responsibility for things left to me in a will or are there other options? No! You do not have to accept an inheritance. The legal process for rejecting an inheritance is called "disclaiming." It happens often enough that there are plenty of nice summaries of the process on-line. Your next step should probably be to read one of them. | There is not uniformity of law on this question, which is usually decided in the period after a death, but before a will is admitted to probate or an executor is appointed (typically in three to five days). As a result, the legal jurisdiction (usually a country or sub-national state or autonomous region) involved matters a great deal. For example, Italy used to presume that you did not want organ donation if you didn't execute a document during life saying that you did, and now has the opposite presumption. Similarly, many jurisdictions used to give a blood relative priority over a same sex partner, but now recognize a civil union or same sex marriage as having priority over a blood relative. Some jurisdictions give you some say over, for example, whether your body's organs will be donated or your body will be used for medical research. Some have formal documents that can be drafted and there are such things as "negative" provisions that are documents saying who cannot do something with your body. Other jurisdictions, as user6726 suggests, have a fixed priority system for determining who is next of kin and that applies strictly. Needless to say, a critical issue is how any such directive would be enforced. Obviously you, being dead, can't do that, and documents don't simply crawl out of desk drawers and walk themselves into court houses after your death either. Your wishes will never be enforced unless someone takes it upon themselves at the critical moment, to take action, and in that case, local law determines under what circumstances that person's statement regarding your wishes will be honored. Often, the person who might step up to take action doesn't learn of your death and of the location of your body until it is too late. If you die in circumstances where your identity is unknown, or where no relatives can be located and no directives can be located, some public official or whomever else ends up in possession of your body (often a corner) will have to decide for themselves what to do without your input. | That all seems perfectly legal, enforceable and, providing everyone had been given legal advice and agreed to it, would not breach a lawyer’s code of ethics. Of course, my response to a child of mine who proposed it would be to rewrite my will to give them nothing - it’s my money and I’ll do what I like with it. | what responsibilities/liabilities does/will his company have given that it's in possession of my property? None. There is no contract (implicit or otherwise) between the owner and you. The owner receives no consideration from you in exchange for storing your goods, and an essential element of contracts is an exchange of considerations. Thus, he has no obligation to continue storing your goods. Another essential element in contract law is that the agreement --meaning the conditions thereof-- be entered knowingly and willfully. Since the time of making the arrangement and up to now, you were reasonably unaware of the likelihood of an obligation to pay the owner. This preempts the owner's right to start billing you. If anything, you would need to prove special circumstances to avail yourself of a viable claim of promissory estoppel. See Havens v. C & D Plastics, Inc., 124 Wn.2d 158, 171-172 (1994): To obtain recovery in promissory estoppel, plaintiff must establish (1) [a] promise which (2) the promisor should reasonably expect to cause the promisee to change his position and (3) which does cause the promisee to change his position (4) justifiably relying upon the promise, in such a manner that (5) injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. However, the viability and duration of any relief pursuant to promissory estoppel seems very unlikely in the situation you describe. The hardship you are undergoing --and which prompted you to store your goods there-- is unfortunate. But generally speaking, a third party (such as the owner) who is unrelated to the causation or prolongation of that hardship cannot be lawfully forced to aid you for free. | Usually, an attack on the validity or prudence of the underlying order is not a defense to court action to enforce it. Usually, the only exception would be when it was impossible, or practically impossible, to perform the court order for some reason. You could seek to modify the order, but that would be prospective in effect only and usually isn't granted unless there has been a change in circumstances since the original order was entered. You could also bring a motion to set aside judgment (usually this has to be done within six months of entry of an order) on the grounds that this provision was included only due to mistake or irregularities in the process or excusable neglect. But, that only would have only prospective effect. | A deed executed during life trumps a will. The other siblings would have to argue: Your mom did not have the capacity to execute the deed (which is a very low standard in terms of her capacity). The deed was procured from undue influence from you (which requires them to meet a high bar of proof). The deed was really the implementation of an agreement for you to hold the property in trust for everyone (which requires some affirmative evidence of this intent). | The general answer is, no, it is not valid in the US, see this article. Exceptions to laws recognizing e-signatures abound which exclude wills from general laws recognizing electronic signatures. Nevada is the one current exception (conveniently located between Oregon and Arizona). There have been attempts to legalize electronic wills, including in Arizona (SB 1298). Although Tennessee does not recognize e-wills, a gentleman in Tennessee went ahead and did it, and in Taylor v. Holt, 134 S.W.3d 830 the court decided that the will was properly executed and witnessed. Electronic notarization is recognized in Arizona, though apparently for things you file with the government (not things that your heirs will eventually file), whereas in Oregon it is a general-purpose way of getting a document notarized. Since the courts are loathe to completely disregard a person's last will and testament because they didn't narrowly follow requirements, you might be able to "get away with it", but it would not make things easier for the executor. | As Polygnome points out in the comments, the first step is to determine who owns the original copyright on your mother's work now. This will be her heirs. If you are the sole heir then no problem. If the copyright was explicitly left to you in her will, also no problem. If there are multiple heirs and no explicit assignment of the copyright, then problem. The copyright will probably be considered part of the chattels of the estate (i.e. everything except real estate). If those are allocated fractionally (e.g. half each to two siblings) then the copyright probably followed that principle, unless you have already come to some agreement about it. If you are on good terms with the siblings then the best bet is to just make a deal for their part of the copyright. You could just ask them to sign it over to you, or you could cut them in for a percentage of future royalties. That makes the situation 100% clear, and any publisher is going to require 100% clarity before they consider offering a contract. Once you have the whole copyright you can go ahead and register. I've looked through the registration process and it doesn't actually ask about derivative works. What it wants to know is whether you own the copyright, and who were the authors (including works for hire). So just fill it in on that basis. |
Not registering my US born child of 1 US parent as a US citizen I, a US citizen, married my wife, from EU country (not Britain), in the US. We live in the US while my wife finishes school (2-3 years) on an F1 visa and then plan to move to back to the EU. My wife will give birth to our child in the US, but I would like to not register my child as a US citizen. US citizenship has a lot of benefits, but those come with added responsibility. I want that to be my child's choice. Can I choose to not register my child as a US citizen? Can I register them with an 18yoa deadline for them to choose citizenship? | Can I choose to not register my child as a US citizen? No. Your child will be a US citizen regardless of whether you register anything, and (unless you have spent less than 5 years in the US, or less than 2 years after you turned 14) regardless of the place of birth, because (in that case) even if the child is born outside the US he or she will be a US citizen under 8 USC 1401(g). Can I register them with an 18yoa deadline for them to choose citizenship? No. Your child probably (depending on your wife's citizenship, and assuming birth in the US) will be a dual citizen from birth without the need or the ability to choose. On turning 18, the child will be able to renounce either citizenship, but will not be required to renounce US citizenship and will probably not be required to renounce the other citizenship either. (I am not familiar with all EU countries' citizenship laws, so the law of that country might have a requirement to choose, but there is no such requirement in the countries whose laws I am familiar with. If the other country is the Netherlands, the child will risk losing Dutch citizenship on turning 28 unless he or she takes steps to avoid that or unless the law changes.) As pointed out in a comment on Putvi's answer, if you successfully avoid letting the US know about your child's birth, you would be in the awkward position of needing to get a visa for the child if you ever want the child to leave and reenter the country. Otherwise, the child would be an illegal alien in the eyes of the US (this assumes you've managed to hide the child's place of birth). There is no process available to get visas in the US for (non-diplomatic) children born in the US, of course, because such children are citizens of the US. | The legal responsibility to support a child arises from "parentage" and not "genetic relatedness", therefore one of two identical twins will not be assigned such responsibility simply because of genetic relatedness. However, genetic facts can enter into a legal proceeding for support, and can be evidence to establish parentage. In the US, the rules for determining parentage are generally established by the Uniform Parentage Act, instantiated for instance in Washington state RCW Chapter 26.26A. RCW 26.26A.100 spells out the full set of rules: A parent-child relationship is established between an individual and a child if: (1) The individual gives birth to the child, except as otherwise provided in RCW 26.26A.700 through 26.26A.785; (2) There is a presumption under RCW 26.26A.115 of the individual's parentage of the child, unless the presumption is overcome in a judicial proceeding or a valid denial of parentage is made under RCW 26.26A.200 through 26.26A.265; (3) The individual is adjudicated a parent of the child under RCW 26.26A.400 through 26.26A.515; (4) The individual adopts the child; (5) The individual acknowledges parentage of the child under RCW 26.26A.200 through 26.26A.265, unless the acknowledgment is rescinded under RCW 26.26A.235 or successfully challenged under RCW 26.26A.200 through 26.26A.265 or 26.26A.400 through 26.26A.515; (6) The individual's parentage of the child is established under RCW 26.26A.600 through 26.26A.635; or (7) The individual's parentage of the child is established under RCW 26.26A.705 through 26.26A.730. §§300-355 govern the use of genetic tests in determining parentage, according to which genetic test results can be evidence of parentage, but §§600 ff specifically address assisted reproduction and surrogacy agreements – RCW 26.26A.610 for example specifically assigns "parentage" to a person who consents to assisted reproduction by a woman with the intent to be a parent of a child, and under §605, a donor is not a parent of a child conceived by assisted reproduction. | You have not committed a crime or a violation of non-criminal law when you swear something under oath believing in good faith that what you are saying is true, and you are mistaken. The law does not expect omniscience. Also, making a false statement under oath is only sanctionable if you make a false statement of a "material fact." Whether or not you have a Social Security number is not a "material fact" in the context of a passport application where the material facts are that you are the same person as the person described in your birth certificate, that the parents there are to the best of your knowledge your parents, that the birth certificate is authentic, and that you have not renounced U.S. citizenship. The question about a Social Security number is there for administrative convenience, not to make any determination about your right to a passport. You should apply for a Social Security number. If you already have one, your actions consistent with not having one will only corroborate the fact that you were ignorant of that fact when you applied for a passport, and you will have your existing Social Security number provided to you. As a practical matter it is unlikely that you have one. There are no forms that your non-U.S. parents would have to be filled out that would have required one, and you know that you haven't applied for one in the past. Before Social Security numbers of dependents were required on U.S. tax forms, most people didn't get Social Security numbers until they got their first job. | Your options are generally limited by where you have (or can establish) residency, along with where your communal property is held. There are (decreasing numbers of) jurisdictions known as "divorce mills" that have notoriously lenient rules for establishing residency and completing divorces. | Every state requires at least two witnesses to a will unless it is entirely written in your own handwriting. A lawyer as a witness is fine. A spouse as a witness is not ideal as she would be an interested party if there was a dispute over whether it was executed. It may not be prohibited, but I would never do that in my practice ever. I discontinued a will signing just last week because we only had a lawyer and a spouse and not other witnesses. I would be somewhat concerned. | They can't take his citizenship... Since he claims to be a born citizen, he has citizenship by birthright and nothing CBP can do can possibly revoke it. He can voluntarily renounce his citizenship, but he has to do that through the State Dept. (which CBP is not part of). And that is an elaborate and expensive process that can't even be done inside the United States. If someone could do it merely by entering without papers and asking for a self-deport, lots of expats would save a lot of money - and that's not gonna happen :) ...but they could put him to serious inconvenience In this particular case, CBP found his documents suspect. Probably because (if it's the case we've seen documented elsewhere) he was with two other people whose entry was illegal, and they had forged documents. So most likely, if he agreed to self-deport, CBP would use that as prima-facie evidence that he is not a bona-fide citizen, and therefore, that his papers are faked. They certainly will not give fake papers back to someone who has tried to pass them. So the victim would be obliged to go back to SSA, the state, etc. and re-acquire his identity documents. From outside the country. It's a pretty big chore. | Does this person have witnesses to his existence? Particularly before the age of five? Under 8 U.S. Code § 1401, native-born citizens include a person of unknown parentage found in the United States while under the age of five years, until shown, prior to his attaining the age of twenty-one years, not to have been born in the United States; If he appears out of nowhere, he is likely to be suspect of illegal immigration. Age may be a factor there, too. | Insofar as those treaties don't bind the US, the notion of "violating" such laws is moot. Hoda Muthana is, under Yemeni law, a Yemeni citizen (it is immaterial whether she has ever "accepted" or exploited it), and as such stripping her of US citizenship would not leave her stateless. In the case of Hoda Muthana, the action is based on the legal argument that she was not ever a citizen, based on the premise that her father was a foreign diplomat. Under US law, children born to foreign diplomats in the US are not birthright citizens, following US v. Wong Kim Ark. Birthright citizenship cannot be revoked. However, a person can renounce their citizenship, via certain acts, including taking an oath or making an affirmation or other formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state or a political subdivision thereof, after having attained the age of eighteen years;or (3) entering, or serving in, the armed forces of a foreign state if (A) such armed forces are engaged in hostilities against the United States, or (B) such persons serve as a commissioned or non-commissioned officer The defense argument would presumably be that ISIS is not a foreign state (despite their own claims to the contrary) so her affiliation with ISIS does not qualify. There are grounds for denaturalization, including falsifying or concealing relevant facts pertaining to naturalization, refusing to testify before Congress, or joining a subversive organization including Al Qaeda within 5 years of naturalization. |
Which powers can the President delegate to other officers or employees of the Executive Branch? The President is the head of the Executive Branch of the United States Government. As the head of the branch a lot of things are formally done by the President, but in actuality many tasks are performed by other Executive Branch employees. What determines which acts must be done by the President and which acts the President can delegate? It seems pretty clear that signing of legislation must be done by the President directly. How about other things? Can the President delegate the authority to commute or issue pardons? What is the test by which this is analyzed? | As an example, POTUS does not undertake the entire pardon process on his own, instead they are preliminarily processed by the Department of Justice, which makes a recommendation. Only POTUS can "grant" the pardon, and we lack substantive information on how deeply he gets involved (does he just sign documents based on staff recommendations? does he do his own research?). I don't know what physical form Clinton's 450 pardons on January 20, 2001 took, but a president might use an autopen (Obama did use such a device). Questions have been raised and definitive answers from SCOTUS are lacking as to whether hand-to-paper signatures are demanded by the Constitution. DoJ at one point thought it was okay. This article lists the Constitutional functions which cannot be delegated: reporting to the Congress on the state of the Union; convening either or both Houses of Congress and adjourning Congress; signing and vetoing bills; receiving ambassadors and public ministers (recognition); appointing and removing ambassadors, ministers, and certain other public officers; nominating federal judges; and making recess appointments However, the Constitutional function of negotiating treaties or numerous functions as commander in chief of the armed forces is generally delegated, within the executive branch. Numerous statutory functions can be delegated (and Congress may say explicitly that some function can be delegated, in passing the law). The matter of implied power to delegate statutory function is the topic of a couple of centuries of litigation, but as an example in Williams v. United States, 42 U.S. 290 SCOTUS held that a law prohibiting the advance of public money in any case whatsoever to the disbursing officers of government except under the special direction of the President does not require the personal and ministerial performance of this duty, to be exercised in every instance by the President under his own hand. SCOTUS has not established bright lines regarding the extent of permissible delegation. | I would argue the Constitutional basis of these actions would be the Constitution itself, namely Article II, Section 4: The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. and Article I, Section 3, Clause 7: Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law. Note also, that as Hamilton explained in the Federalist Papers, the Impeachment process was a check brought over from England (it predated the formation of Britain by several centuries) as a check on Executive (read Monarchal) power of royal appointments, including Judges. So, to answer your questions directly: Serving out one's term or resigning is not a shield to impeachment, otherwise one could simply play "whack-a-mole", appointing the same individual repeatedly (which is also why future barring of the individual from governmental office is an option). The purpose of impeachment is, per Hamilton, to react to "political crimes"; "mundane" crimes are to be handle by the normal judicial system. Nixon did famously resign rather than be impeached, but he was barred from running again anyway, having served two terms as President. Congress at that time chose not to continue the impeachment process after his resignation (note that disqualification is an option, but not required, punishment that can be levied by Congress in the event of impeachment). See Article I, Section 3, Clause 7, quoted above. | All of them. The "cabinet" refers to the heads of the executive departments listed at 5 USC 101. "Cabinet" isn't defined in the Constitution or legislation, but this interpretation is supported by the American Heritage Dictionary (cabinet), the Appointments Clause of the Constitution, and some discussion in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 US 1 (1976). All of these are consistent with an interpretation of "cabinet" to mean heads of departments of the executive branch. All cabinet appointments require the advice and consent of the Senate (except for recess appointments). The requirement for advice and consent of the Senate is given in individual statutes relating to each department. For the Secretary of State, for example, see 22 U.S. Code § 2651a (a) (2): The Secretary, the Deputy Secretary of State, and the Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. That statute also happens to require some deputies to gain the consent of the Senate. For the Secretary of the Treasury, see 31 U.S. Code § 301: [...] The Secretary is appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. There are hundreds of non-cabinet positions that require the advice and consent of the Senate. These are presented in the report, "Presidential Appointee Positions Requiring Senate Confirmation and Committees Handling Nominations". | colorado No Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-4-304 (5) Each presidential elector shall vote for the presidential candidate and, by separate ballot, vice-presidential candidate who received the highest number of votes at the preceding general election in this state. By law, the electors have to vote for the winner of the statewide popular vote. Nobody has the authority to make them do anything else. And if they try to vote differently of their own accord, the Colorado Secretary of State may void their vote and replace them with another elector. This happened in the 2016 election, and the voiding of the vote was eventually upheld by the US Supreme Court (Baca v. Colorado Department of State). I suppose the legislature might be able to repeal 1-4-304, but the governor could veto, and a 2/3 majority of both chambers would be needed in order to override. There would likely also be court challenges as to whether the repeal could affect an election that had already taken place. | Not directly However, a President who is unable to discharge their duties (by being on vacation or otherwise) can be dealt with by either: the vice-President and Cabinet invoking the 25th amendment and declaring the President unable to perform their duties, by the House impeaching the President for the “high crime and misdemeanour” of not doing her job. If convicted by the Senate, the person is no longer President. | A Presidential candidate has no legal immunity for litigation or prosecution different from that of any other political candidate. The First Amendment provides significant protections for expressive conduct of a candidate for political office. Presidential candidates do have a few special privileges, most notably, secret service protection and at a late stage, access to certain intelligence briefings not available to the general public. Judges and prosecutors often seek to avoid the appearance of impropriety interfering with a Presidential election campaign and this may influence, for example, the scheduling of proceeding against a candidate. But there is no actual immunity from either criminal or civil liability for a Presidential candidate that is different from anyone else. | It looks to me like this is authorized under New York State's Executive Law Section 24. The text is long, but I think it addresses most of the points in your question. The law allows the chief executive of a local government (e.g. mayor of a city) to declare a local state of emergency "in the event of a disaster, rioting, catastrophe, or similar public emergency". Under such a state of emergency, the executive can promulgate local emergency orders, that can include provisions like travel bans, curfews, mandatory evacuation, etc. Violating such an order is a Class B misdemeanor (see paragraph 5). I didn't see any explicit requirement for the executive to weigh safety benefits against restriction of personal liberties. The executive just has to "find" (i.e. decide) that a disaster exists and imperils public safety. However, there are some safeguards. The local state of emergency is limited to 30 days (some orders can be extended for an additional 30 days); see paragraph 1. And the state legislature has the authority to terminate the state of emergency by a concurrent resolution (paragraph 8). Further good reading is a primer (PDF) written by the legal counsel of New York's Office of Emergency Management, giving a guide in layman's language for local chief executives on how to handle state of emergency declarations. I'm slightly puzzled as to why, in this case, the order was given by the governor, when it looks from the law like it should be the mayor's role to do so. It could be that the mayor took the appropriate legal action and just let the governor make the public announcement. Also, Executive Law Article 2-B (Sections 20-29) have many other provisions regarding emergencies. Section 28 gives the governor the power to declare a "disaster emergency", though it's not clear from that section whether this includes the power to issue similar emergency orders. | The law does not require any reference to science of any kind – that is a political choice. The law grant a certain authority to the governor, under certain circumstances, go give extraordinary orders at the governor's discretion. No actions are mandatory during an emergency. The laws may or may not require legislative approval for extending an order beyond a certain point, where the order is issue pursuant to declaring a state of emergency. There are two main bases for appealing to the courts to enjoin against some aspect of an order: lack of initial authority (the statute does not actually grant that power), or, violation of fundamental constitutional rights. The latter is the predominant basis for appeal in the present instances. |
Summary Proceeding in New Zealand - Denying liability but not requesting a hearing I have been accused of a minor offense, and the process that applies is the Summary Proceeding Act 1957, Section 21. I have been served notice, and have denied liability for the defense. (I have denied it more then one time, and in unambiguous terms. The informant is insisting that I either Request a hearing, admit liability and provide a submission or pay the infringement fee. I do not intend to admit liability, nor pay them anything unless the matter has gone before the court. I object to having to ask for a hearing and would prefer not to do this - but this would still be preferable to acquiescing and paying the fine. I am not adverse to appearing in court to defend myself. I am having some difficulty working through Section 21 of Summary Proceedings Act. By my - possibly incorrect - reading, the act is silent on what happens if I simply deny liability but to not ask for a hearing. The informant is claiming that if I do not request a hearing or pay the fine by a certain date, the notice will be referred to the court for collection. Question - If I unambiguously deny liability but do not ask for a hearing can the informant refer the mater to the district court for unpaid fines without a hearing having taken place? | That's the entire point of a summary proceeding. You're allegedly found committing an offence, that isn't worth the court's time to hear but nevertheless requires some penalty. The only way to "unambiguously deny liability" is by requesting a hearing and denying liability in the notice of this. The court doesn't care what you say to everybody else, it cares what you say on its record. The reasoning is, if you're so sure you're not guilty of an offence, why haven't you sought to argue this in court? And if you weren't committing the offence, why did the informant serve the infringement notice in the first place? The act is not silent at all on this. If you don't request the hearing and serve such notice by the date required, you are liable to enforcement action - whether you deny liability out of court is irrelevant. | Can a party unilaterally prohibit any of its output from use as evidence in litigation? The disclaimer is not really a prohibition, but a warning against relying on the underlying report or product for any of the listed purposes. Thereby the issuer informs that it did not apply, did not attempt to apply, and/or ought not be presumed to have applied, the standards that are requisite or reasonably expected for the listed purposes. Absent a disclaimer of that sort, the issuer exposes itself to liability for losses that could have been prevented had the issuer informed the consumer on what to expect from the product as well as the limitations thereof. Will the courts respect such disclaimers? The disclaimer primarily substantiates a party's objection to the adversary's intent (if any) to use the report or product as evidence. If all parties stipulate that such report be used as evidence, the judge might still have discretion on whether to admit it. But that is different from construing the disclaimer as something the issuer prohibits. | In general, court hearings are held in public; and anyone is free to make a fair and balanced report of the proceedings. It is important that justice is seen to be done. However, in some circumstances that is not true—the obvious example is if a child is involved. It is not sufficient though merely that "[the claimant] wants to keep his/her identity confidential". Have a look at the Civil Procedure Rules (part 39): 39.2 General rule – hearing to be in public The general rule is that a hearing [including a trial] is to be in public. ... A hearing, or any part of it, may be in private if – (a) publicity would defeat the object of the hearing; (b) it involves matters relating to national security; (c) it involves confidential information (including information relating to personal financial matters) and publicity would damage that confidentiality; (d) a private hearing is necessary to protect the interests of any child or protected party; (e) it is a hearing of an application made without notice and it would be unjust to any respondent for there to be a public hearing; (f) it involves uncontentious matters arising in the administration of trusts or in the administration of a deceased person’s estate; or (g) the court considers this to be necessary, in the interests of justice. The court may order that the identity of any party or witness must not be disclosed if it considers non-disclosure necessary in order to protect the interests of that party or witness. https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part39#39.2 If you can satisfy the court that one of (a) to (g) apply, the court may make an order anonymizing proceedings (for instance, you would only be referred to as "AB" in reports and judgements) or it might hold the hearing in camera (in private). However the other party may well wish to oppose your application. Indeed, even a newspaper hearing of your case but unable to report it is entitled to object: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2010/1.html (In re Guardian News) Conclusion In these circumstances, when carrying out the ultimate test of balancing all the factors relating to both M's article 8 rights and the article 10 rights of the press, we have come to the conclusion that there is indeed a powerful general, public interest in identifying M in any report of these important proceedings which justifies curtailment, to that extent, of his, and his family's, article 8 Convention rights to respect for their private and family life. For all these reasons, we would set aside the anonymity order in respect of M. ... Therefore, A, K, M and HAY will be named here and in the judgments on the substantive appeals, as Mr Mohammed Jabar Ahmed, Mr Mohammed Azmir Khan, Mr Michael Marteen (formerly known as Mohammed Tunveer Ahmed) and Mr Hani El Sayed Sabaei Youssef (or Hani al-Seba'i), respectively. | I have encountered this problem in Pennsylvania. The PA Code requires a District Attorney to approve all private criminal complaints. If the DA declines to prosecute, then an affiant can petition the Court of Common Pleas to review the decision. However the affiant bears the burden of convincing the court that the DA abused his descretion in declining to prosecute, which is a pretty high hurdle. In the United States the only other legal appeal I am aware of is through federal courts under broad federal laws like 18 USC 242 or 42 USC 1983. | Yes, Defendant may compel Plaintiff to appear and may cross-examine Plaintiff personally. The right to counsel does not include the right to have an attorney testify for you at trial. At trial or deposition, Plaintiff's lawyer generally has no business testifyng at all, and his statements would not be evidence. If the attorney's testimony is necessary for trial, he would likely be disqualified from representing Plaintiff. Defendant is unlikely to persuade the judge to question Plaintiff for him. The judge might ask questions to clarify answers that Defendant elicits himself, but he might also just rule based on whatever information he receives, regardless of how clear it is. | How are such no-show-no-tell boundaries established They largely stem from the rules of evidence which are complicated, vary from state to state and knowing which is a big part of what litigation attorneys are paid for. Parties to litigation become aware of all the evidence/topics that their counterparts wish to broach in the courtroom well in advance — during discovery. They will usually disagree whether some bits and pieces can be presented to the jury. In this case the court will hold admissibility hearings — again, well in advance before the trial. Despite all the preparations, some of these disagreements arise during the trial, and then they are resolved in place by way of voiced objections. The attorneys and the judge talk about them using professional jargon of the rules of evidence — having themselves seen all the evidence in advance. does the jury get to know them No, the jury doesn't need to follow the professional talk. In fact, they should hear as little as possible of it — which is the reason why admissibility disagreements are resolved in advance as much as possible. If serious issues arise during the trial, the judge will ask the attorneys to speak to them in chambers — away from the jury. Or they will ask the jury to take a break while the professionals talk. The jury just needs to listen to the evidence that is allowed in, and disregard any evidence the judge say they have to. is this also in the public record somehow? It is in the court record. It may be accessible to the public if the court allows. If someone wishes to see the record they need to apply to the court, provide reasons and a judge will decide if anything can be released. | Can I sue someone for publicly calling me a sex offender if I'm not one? Yes. However, in this particular case you need to take a preliminary step regardless of your jurisdiction, which I assume is somewhere in the U.S. Prior to filing any complaint (and I will repeat this below), it is in your best interest that you demand a retraction and removal of the defamatory falsehood. Be sure to show the prospective defendant(s) some proof that supports your pre-suit demand. You need to secure your ability to prove in court that you made that demand. For that reason, your requests should be in writing (email, and certified mail if practicable). If it is not by email, you should have the addressee at least sign a receipt copy of your demand letter. A demand of retraction is prerequisite in jurisdictions such as Texas and Florida. If you [or your lawyer] omit that step, the court will easily dismiss your complaint altogether. In other jurisdictions, such as Michigan, the request of retraction is a requirement only if you intend to pursue exemplary and punitive damages. See MCL 600.2911(2)(b). Regardless of the jurisdiction, your request or demand to each prospective defendant needs to be made prior to filing the corresponding complaint/pleadings in court. Even if your jurisdiction does not have that prerequisite, failing to request a retraction and removal of the defamatory falsehoods would allow the defendant to justify itself and/or obtain leniency on the basis that it was not aware that the registry information turned out to be disproved/inaccurate. In your complaint(s), you will pursue injunctive relief that consists of ordering the removal [from each website or post] of the defamatory falsehoods. It is also reasonable for you to also ask for monetary relief. You certainly have a claim of defamation per se, but a ruling granting you an award of substantive damages is doubtful unless the defendant refuses --or neglects-- to remove the inaccurate records. If the website owners/authors promptly remove the false records, it is going to be difficult or impossible to prove actual malice: that is, that they published the falsehoods (1) despite knowing them to be false, or (2) with reckless disregard of their truth. Without the ability to prove actual malice or that you suffered special damages (whether it is a loss of employment or other economic damages), the court would only grant you nominal damages, which is the negligible amount of one dollar. Lastly, beware that even the granting of injunctive relief might be ineffective. I [vaguely] recall a case where federal court ordered a removal from sex offender registry, but apparently the defendant ignored the order. I have no idea how much the plaintiff's lawyer charged him for the futile representation, but the last time I checked neither the problem was fixed nor did it appear that the attorney pushed any further to ensure compliance with the order. I will not disclose the name of the lawyer, since that would facilitate the unintended consequence of identifying the defamed plaintiff. | Yes, subject to the deadline for presenting claims to the estate of the decedent (within sixty days of publication of public notice). If a timely claim is filed against the estate, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code allows a defense in to deficiency claim debt such as this one that the method of the sale of the collateral was unreasonable, but this is rarely a complete defense and is rarely successful in practice. Lack of notice would not automatically invalidate the debt (and the instrument creating the debt probably waives the co-signers right to notice of a sale contractually). |
What kinds of sanctions would be applied if you wrongly invoked the Fifth Amendment? Under the Fifth Amendment, one might say at a hearing, "I refuse to answer on the grounds that it would incriminate me." Suppose the subject matter were embarrassing, but not necessarily criminal. Examples follow: I refuse to comment on an adulterous affair with the defendant. I believe, that adultery is illegal. (In fact, it is illegal in 22 states, although it is almost never prosecuted.) I decline to comment, even though I was a witness to the action, because to get there in time, I would have to admit to speeding. "Speeding" is, in fact, illegal, but "trivially" so. Would someone be within their rights to "take the Fifth" in either or both cases? If they were not lawyers and honestly believed that they were properly invoking the "Fifth" would they get off with a warning? | In the US, a person is "within their rights" to invoke the Fifth Amendment, i.e. refuse to self-incriminate. However, the government can give a person immunity from prosecution for offenses having to do with the testimony, in which case he can be compelled to testify. A person is not required to guess about whether they could actually be convicted based on their testimony. It is the privilege of the court (judge) to determine whether a witness has "a reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer" (Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17). | The Seventh Amendment's jury trial provision does not apply to the states. The Bill of Rights does not inherently restrain the states at all, merely the federal government. The Fourteenth Amendment does restrain the states; notably, it forbids a state from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Courts have read into "of law" the added requirement that the law be compatible with the fundamental rights that are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty; this means that most stuff that would violate the Bill of Rights if done by the feds violates due process if done by the states. However, not all provisions of the Bill of Rights have been incorporated (i.e. applied to the states); the requirement for a jury in a civil trial is one of the few that hasn't been incorporated, because courts do not consider it a fundamental right (merely one protected in the federal courts). Now, many traffic tickets are actually misdemeanor offenses, and a jury-trial requirement for crimes is incorporated. However, even for federal offenses, the courts have generally found that the Constitution doesn't require jury trial for petty crimes (those with a maximum sentence under 6 months). | The Fifth Amendment, in pertinent part, reads: "nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;" which suggests that Crime B is still fair game under double jeopardy. However, if B is a lesser included offense under Blockburger, i.e. A is Aggravated Robbery and B is Robbery, then a prosecution could be barred by Double Jeopardy. Barring that, and jurisdiction specific law, the State isn't barred by the Double Jeopardy clause of the 5th (and 14th) amendment. That does not foreclose Person C from finding an ethical, equitable, statutory remedy or controlling case enforcing a plea bargain. As far as I can tell, commutation is the equivalent of a conviction while a pardon is equivalent to an acquittal. I also imagine if the prosecution isn't barred and tried C for B, the Executive may just pardon/commute C again. Edit to add: Under Santobello, it would appear C may have an additional remedy enforcing a plea bargain. Santobello didn't involve a case dismissed in a plea bargain, nor commutation or pardon. A court might find that commutation or pardon are essentially a breach of the agreement. | There are venue restrictions where political speech is restricted, such as on military bases; content restrictions (transmitting classified information to the world); you cannot defraud by saying false things in order to get something, you cannot defame a person, you cannot speak obscenely (though it's hard to tell what counts as "obscenity"). You cannot appropriate other people's property in speaking (i.e. copyright law is a restriction on speech). The type of speech restrictions seem to pertain to speech and violence caused by such speech. A classic limitation is that you cannot speak "fighting words" (Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire 315 U.S. 568), which in 1942 meant calling someone a "damned racketeer" and "damned Fascist", which the court characterized as "inherently likely to provoke a violent reaction". The court subsequently refined its position on "provocative" speech. In Virginia v. Black 538 U.S. 343 a law against cross-burning was found to run afoul of the First Amendment as a restriction on political expression, but it would be fully consistent with The Constitution to outlaw "cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate". This states may "prohibit only those forms of intimidation that are most likely to inspire fear of bodily harm". The current position is that you cannot incite to the imminent use of force. In Brandenburg v. Ohio 395 U.S. 444, the court stated that the First Amendment does not "permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action". There are myriad laws against threats, for instance in Washington you may not "knowingly threaten(s) to cause bodily injury immediately or in the future to the person threatened or to any other person", and you can't do that ("knowingly cause another to believe that the offender will cause serious physical harm to the person or property of the other person") in Ohio either. You can't get away with threatening "to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person" in California. This class of restrictions on speech seems to be quite robust. You may not induce panic in Ohio, e.g. shout "fire" in a theater -- I don't know if any other state has such a law. | The potential problem is if there is a form which you had to sign which says "I am a US citizen", and you signed the form (who reads the fine print, anyhow?). Unfortunately, that statement is false, and there are consequences for making a false statement. However, that law penalizes false statements with the intent to deceive, not mistaken statements. Nevertheless, this is a matter that a professional really needs to deal with. If there was no form and they didn't verbally ask you to assert that you are a citizen, then there is less of a problem (for you), but still one needs to be extremely cautious in dealing with the court. [Addendum] It is highly likely that the form contained wording like "swear" or "certify" and mentions "perjury", so the error would be in the ballpark of perjury. Perjury is making "a false statement under oath or swears to the truth of a false statement previously made and the statement is required or authorized by law to be made under oath". Aggravated perjury is perjury which "is made during or in connection with an official proceeding and is material". The term "material" means "matters; is not inconsequential". The consequence of a non-citizen improperly serving on a jury is that a mistrial has occurred, which is not inconsequential. Aggravated felony is a third degree felony. The penal code says that An individual adjudged guilty of a felony of the third degree shall be punished by imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for any term of not more than 10 years or less than 2 years. (b) In addition to imprisonment, an individual adjudged guilty of a felony of the third degree may be punished by a fine not to exceed $10,000. I must emphasize that an essential element is "intent to deceive and with knowledge of the statement's meaning", an element that cannot be present if there is no awareness of such a statement. Thus an innocent mistake could be legally excused. When you become aware that a statement made under oath was false (assuming such a statement was made), then in maintaining the falsehood, that would be intentional deceit. This is why it is necessary to consult with a lawyer. On the Houston form, you would have to check the "are a US citizen" box. The Fort Bend county form has you certify and sign on the front page: it does not require you to certify that you are a US citizen, only to certify (and sign) if you are not – so if you failed to read the back side, that isn't a literally false statement. I can't locate an online form for Tarrant county, so dunno if that out is available. | The Constitution does not define any crimes (except for an explicit limit on what can be considered 'treason.') It places limits on what penalties the government may apply for crimes and how crimes are tried in court, but it does not itself actually create any criminal offenses. Rather, state and federal law do that. Having said that, if a state government creates a crime of murder (which, obviously, they all do,) the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment does require that that law protect all people within the jurisdiction of that state. That is, a state cannot make a law criminalizing the murder of a white person, but not of a black person, for example. States can't just pick and choose who is protected by their laws. It would not violate the U.S. Constitution if a state completely decriminalized murder, though. It's exceptionally unlikely to happen, but it would not be a violation of the Constitution. Depending on exactly what you mean by 'murder,' it could be argued that murder by the government is unconstitutional, though. The 14th Amendment bans states from depriving anyone of life without due process of law: No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Similarly, the 5th Amendment provides an equivalent protection from the federal government: No person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law | That's basically correct. The Double Jeopardy clause prevents the federal and state governments from trying you again for a crime that you've already been acquitted of, no matter what new evidence turns up. Even if you confessed to the crime, you could still not be tried. The relevant text of the Fifth Amendment reads: No person shall ... be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. The case of Mel Ignatow is probably among the most famous examples. He was charged with murdering a woman, but acquitted at trial. About a year later, a guy laying carpet at his house pulled up floorboards and found the victim's jewelry, along with pictures of Ignatow murdering the victim. Ignatow confessed, but the state couldn't charge him with murder again, though they could charge him perjury for testifying that he hadn't killed her. So the answer is yes, the Fifth Amendment generally prevents the government from trying you for a crime you've been acquitted of. There are two main caveats here. First is the dual-sovereignty principle, which accounts for the fact that almost anywhere that the Fifth Amendment applies, a person is subject to the laws of two sovereign governments: the federal government and that of whatever state the person is in. For example, robbing a bank in Los Angeles would violate the laws of both the United States and California. If California put you on trial, but you were acquitted, the Double Jeopardy Clause would bar California from trying you again, but it would not be a defense if the federal government wanted to try to charge you again. Second is the language about "the same offence," which is not as clear as it might sound at first. In the course of committing a crime, a person can easily commit many other crimes without thinking of it. In your bank robbery, for instance, you could easily break the following additional laws: trespassing, menacing, carrying a concealed weapon, brandishing a firearm, larceny, grand larceny. This raises the question of what affect your acquittal on the robbery charge has on the possibility of charging you on these other offenses. The answer can be found in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932): The applicable rule is that, where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not. This is easier to understand in practice than in theory. If you want to bring charges for the same conduct without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause, you need to be able to make a Venn diagram where the first charge and the new charge each has at least one element that the other does not. So map out the following possible offenses involved in a robbery: theft: unlawfully taking the property of another person aggravated theft: unlawfully taking the property of another person, when the property is worth more than $1,000 menacing: threatening to injure another person aggravated menacing: threatening to injure another person while brandishing a deadly weapon robbery: unlawfully taking the property of another person, facilitated by a threat to injure another person aggravated robbery: unlawfully taking the property of another person, facilitated by a threat to injure another person while brandishing a deadly weapon So now you have a Venn diagram that looks like this: If you've been acquitted of robbery, a prosecutor who wants to charge you again needs to find an offense that (1) requires proof of a fact that robbery did not, and (2) does not require proof of a fact that robbery did. This means the prosecutor can't bring a charge for the "greater offense" of aggravated robbery, because the earlier robbery charge didn't require proof of anything that aggravated robbery would not. The prosecutor also can't bring a charge for theft or menacing, because neither requires proof of anything that robbery did not. These are called "lesser included offenses." But a charge for aggravated theft would be allowed. Although there's a shared element between aggravated theft and robbery (taking the property of another), there are also unique elements to both aggravated theft (property worth more than $1,000) and robbery (a threat to injure another). A charge for aggravated menacing would also be allowed, as it requires proof of brandishing a deadly weapon, but does not require proof of taking the property of another. | The answer to this question will be almost entirely informed by the why that you've asked us not to consider. If the prosecutor or judge is a witness, the defendant should be able to call them, but that also means they would have to withdraw from the case under either Rule 3.7 or Canon 3. If the defendant believes the prosecution is tainted by some improper motive, the defendant may raise that objection under Crim. R. 12, but he must do so pretrial. I can't think of any circumstances where the defendant could question the judge or prosecutor in the jury's presence. |
An (undetermined) fraud in the terms of use Before asking this question, I should say some words. Because this question seems similar to another question I asked, I worry someone may mark this as a duplicate without understanding - In fact, they were different. Disclaimer: This is only an educational case. I am neither the scammer, the victim, nor someone scheming to scam. Let's say, Tom was scammed by a "bitcoin mining website", the website owner, say, Bob, was a scammer. Suppose that Bob and Tom are all in the US, and are all under the jurisdiction of the US. Below is how this thing happened: One day, Tom opened Bob's website while surfing Google. The website said: "we have a software, which mines bitcoin at a very fast speed - because it uses new technology to mine bitcoin." "It is more than 1000 times faster than traditional mining." Tom was allured by the "potential wealth", so he downloaded the software, and went through the setup, and installed that alleged "New Technology Bitcoin Miner". The software was made by Bob, too. During the setup, there was a window of "terms of use", written by Bob. At the very end of the "terms of use", Bob wrote down this: Our bitcoin mining service has been already suspended in xx/xx/2019, due to legal and financial reasons. You can still use this software, but it will only work as a simulation, therefore, it will not produce real bitcoin. Agreement to this term of use means that any payment you make in the software is regarded as payment for the simulation. However, Tom was too hurry, so he didn't read the tedious "terms of use". He straight clicked "Agree" and installed the software, a/k/a "New Technology Bitcoin Miner". Then, the software began asking for payment. It said to Tom: If you want to mine bitcoin, you should pay $999 for our service first. So, Tom paid $999 and started "mining bitcoin" in this alleged "New Technology Bitcoin Miner". The software simulated the mining process. At last, Tom got no bitcoin into his wallet. (And, in fact, the alleged "New Technology Bitcoin Miner" didn't do real mining at all.) Tom felt he was defrauded, so he was about to report the website owner, Bob. My questions: From the perspective of US law, is Bob doing this regarded a fraud? Is this a criminal case, or a civil case? What evidence can Tom provide to support the lawsuit? | A contract can’t legalise illegality Let’s assume that absent the “simulation” disclosure in the ToS, this would be fraud. The question then becomes, does making the disclosure make it not fraud? Fraud requires dishonesty and deception. These are measured by what a reasonable person would determine from the overall conduct so a small piece of truth in amongst a web of half-truths and outright lies is still dishonest and deceptive. From the perspective of US law, is Bob doing this regarded a scam? No, but only because “scam” isn’t a legal term - it’s slang for fraud and this is fraud Is this a criminal case, or a civil case? Both What evidence can Tom provide to support the lawsuit? Whatever he has. However, in practice, these types of fraudsters are rarely ever caught and it’s even more rare for the victim to recover their money. They are usually off-shore in countries with either poor rule of law or which will not extradite their nationals. | If you were to seek legal recourse for breach of contract (their Terms and Conditions), the best outcome you could hope for would be "making whole", and since they have already offered this a court could award you what the retailer already offered, but make legal costs on both sides the plaintiff's liability (ie. you), since you could have taken the offer and avoided court. The Terms and Conditions associated with the discount code mean that you won't be able to return the gift cards for cash. It will be argued that by using the code, you agreed to those terms and conditions. The second paragraph of their reply looks like an attempt to scare you, but it has legal merit. By using the unauthorised code you could be considered to have made false representation when you entered into the contract. This could render the contract void, and if they could demonstrate it had been done deliberately to gain money it could meet the threshold for fraud (which is what the police would possibly investigate : if it can be shown that you were aware the discount code didn't apply to you it would constitute making "a false representation ... to make a gain for himself" [sub-paragraphs 1-5, paragraph 2 of the Fraud Act 2006]). You may be able to argue that the voucher websites misled you (though it sounds like you, I and the retailer already know that's not true), but since the retailer has offered to repay what you paid there are unlikely to be any damages - and, unless the voucher site took commission from your transaction, a contract between you and the voucher sites would be difficult (possibly impossible) to establish. In the circumstances, returning what you originally paid is a good offer. | Nobody know what constitutes "scamming", because it's not a legal concept. There is no sense in which receiving a gift itself constitutes "scamming". Since scamming is vaguely about dishonesty, there is an imaginable scenario where you could be liable for a false representation, for example if you impersonated someone else in order to receive something of value, you could be prosecuted in California. You should not assume that a police officer saying "That's not our problem" is proof that you committed no crime or civil tort. Your lawyer can give you advice as to whether you have anything to worry about, legally. The other stuff about being called a scammer or having pictures posted might be a violation of Facebook's TOS, and you can always complain to Facebook central authorities. Technically, uploading a picture that someone took is a violation of copyright law, if you didn't give permission to do so. It might run afoul of some state~provincial or national privacy law, depending on where this takes place. | No Let's consider a similar scenario. If you made a beverage which poisoned a number of people, would you be absolved of liability because you gave it away for free? Of course not. As there is no contract between you, they would have to bring an action against you in the tort of negligence or negligent misstatement OR under consumer protection law. To succeed at tort they would need to prove that you owed them a duty of care; from Donoghue v Stevenson "You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonable foresee would be likely to injure ... persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably have them in contemplation ...". Most cases will founder on your inability to foresee the use to which your software may be put. Consumer law is jurisdiction specific but they generally contain warranties that what you provide (gratis or otherwise) is fit for purpose, merchantable and that you do not make false and misleading statements. There is a chance that a case brought under this sort of law could succeed as you have not limited the purpose, specifically declared that it is not of merchantable quality and have (presumable) said what it does so that, if it doesn't do what you said, you have been misleading and deceptive. | The person getting the item by fraud didn't get any ownership. Therefore when you bought it, you didn't get ownership either. It's still the company's property, and they can do with it what they like (within reason, they wouldn't be allowed to make it blow up in your face). If you sent back the item, good on you, because the item is now with its rightful owner. If you don't like it, you can sue the person who sold the item to you. | Check the website's terms of service. Check to see if you're violating these terms, and check to see if the script you are making enables other people to violate them. Courts don't often look kindly on actions whose sole purpose is enabling someone else to do something that is prohibited. If you're making a script that helps people do something they're allowed to do, in a way that's better for at least somebody and makes nobody worse off, that's often a different story. Major websites will generally indicate whether or not you're allowed to do this. Some sites are fairly strict about prohibiting scraping (e.g. Craigslist, which at one point shut down Padmapper's alternative more-useful presentation of their content). Others, like Wikipedia, much more actively encourage reusing content from their sites as long as you meet certain conditions such as a link back to the original source. | The applicable law is the New Zealand Anti-Money Laundering law. The regulations describing exactly what is covered don't mention Bitcoin cleaning, but the "wire transfer" and "currency exchange" bits probably cover such a thing. I certainly wouldn't like to be the test case. There was also this case in Europe. | In all such offers that I have seen, there is an agreement explicitly saying that if the service is not cancelled by the end date of the trial, a recurring charge for the price of the service will be made, and the customer authorizes this. If there was such an agreement, the charges would be authorized, not fraudulent. The question does not say what agreement accompanied the free trial. But any reasonable person would know that credit card info is only provided when a charge is at least possible. Addition: The question now says: Reviewing an example of the vendor's website, it says in big print "Monthly Plan $0.00/mo" and in fine gray print it says "Renews at $5.88/month." In that case it seems to me that the customer agreed to the recurring charge. What was purchased was access to the service, and whether the service was in fact used is not relevant. Unless there is a consumer protection law specifically requiring such terms to be "prominent" or otherwise making this deal unlawful, it seem to me that the customer has agreed, and the charge nis in no way a false claim. But it is possible that a court would rule otherwise. It is my experiences that in such cases the credit card company can and sometimes will act as an agent for the customer, and can often obtain refunds for multiple past charges. No doubt they have mush stronger negotiating power. But such refunds are not a matter of law, I think, rather of business practice and good will. |
What motions to file or action to take with an uncooperative court clerk? I've filed pro se motions in traffic cases before, but this case has me stumped. I was stopped and ticketed for a minor traffic violation of texting while driving and received a court date. When I went in the clerk refused to let me (EDIT: have a hearing), and refused to give me any documentation proving I had been there. Same thing when I came back a month later. Now I'm getting written notices from a law firm to pay the fine. My limited experience led me to think the court clerk can always be trusted. Should I try to file a motion to continuance, or maybe motion to appeal? Maybe by certified mail? UPDATE: I called the court today (Nov 26) and was told there is no trial set so they will call or email me in January to set the date for a trial. This seems really weird for a months-old case but I guess you have no recourse if the court refuses to set a date for any hearing repeatedly? As far as I can tell the county courts have jurisdiction over the Justice of the Peace courts in texas, but if there's no final judgment then no appeal can be filed. | The court clerk was right. A judge is not supposed to interact with a party (at least not in the absence of the adversary) except during court hearings for which the adversary was notified and given an opportunity to attend. Also, there is no need for you to prove the mere fact that you went to court. That in itself is either inconsequential or palpable from the hearing transcripts. When you file in court papers such as a motion or a response to a motion, you may --and should-- bring an extra copy for the clerk to stamp it. That a clerk does with no objections. The stamp reflects the date on which you file your document(s). That stamp incidentally evidences that you or someone on your behalf went to court but, again, that sole fact is inconsequential. There is no such thing as "motion to appeal". A litigant may initiate an appeal, or appellate process, once the judge has decided a case in its entirety or in part. If the ruling to be appealed does not close the case, the upper court might refuse to review the issue(s) appealed until the whole case has been decided (that refusal is known as denial of the appellant's leave to appeal). Your description nowhere indicates that the judge has already made any rulings or that there have been any hearings on your matter. Your mention of prior motions suggests that you should gain acquaintance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and of Appellate Procedure. Those rules cover several aspects of litigation, including motion practice, the allowed methods of service, and the requirements to file an appeal in upper courts. | Would a U.S court honor his request, based on his prior commitment? You are not specifying the purpose of the court hearing, or whether Adam is pro se litigant (which sounds unlikely if this plaintiff is a movie star). If plaintiff Adam is represented by an attorney, Adam's presence is unnecessary in most or all court hearings. In fact, typically neither parties nor their lawyers have to show up in court, whence their absence does not constitute contempt of court. Absence merely implies that they miss the opportunity to [orally] argue their position before the court, and thus would depend on whether the judge bothers to actually read their brief. If you mean a hearing in which Adam needs to be present, his request to reschedule the hearing is most likely to be granted. His contract is strong evidence that his request is not a vexatious attempt to delay proceedings. Since the hearing would be in month 4, the particularity that his contract goes up to month 4 implies that rescheduling would not significantly delay proceedings. Regarding your comment, rescheduling can (and does) happen multiple times even in criminal cases. This post includes an excerpt of the Register of Actions of criminal case 16-870-FH in Michigan state court (Washtenaw county), highlighting several instances of rescheduling as requested by the defense counsel and despite prosecutor's objection. I believe the case got rescheduled a few more times beyond what the snapshots reflect. | A witness who disobeys a court order has automatically broken the law. Indeed, this is the most fundamental of laws; you can't decide "If I turn up to the hearing I may be punished for my crime; but not attending isn't against the law, so goodbye." A witness who goes out of the jurisdiction cannot, of course, be punished while there (though when he returns he may have to explain why he chose to leave having been warned that he must attend or face penalties- that is the meaning of sub poena). But your assumption that anybody who fails to attend probably had a good reason betrays a fundamental, though common, misunderstanding. A court has determined that your evidence is necessary for justice to be done. There is therefore no good reason not to attend. It may well be that a doctor would prefer that you did not go to court that day, and if you apply to the court it may be possible to find some arrangement. But you are not allowed to decide 'my convenience is more important than discovering whether the defendant should go to jail or not". Civilised countries have people who are empowered to make that decision; they are called judges, and the decision has been made. | Was the case Sealed? Or is it considered to be Private? Those are two different cases. I was not able to find any laws regarding sealing, or expunging records of Name Changes, but was able to find the Utah Law for Criminal Records. I can only assume they draw from one another. All that being said, assuming your whatever case is sealed, then Some records are sealed. In these kinds of cases, even information about the existence of the case is not publicly available. A person seeking access to a sealed record must petition the court for permission to unseal the records. Rule 4-202.03 states that, ....no one may access a sealed court record except by order of the court. A judge may review a sealed record when the circumstances warrant. From that I can assume that, The records are not public. The records will not show up in a routine check The records will be known only if a there is a court order. Comparing it with the Expungement Act, Continued Use of Sealed Records After sealing, BCI continues to index and maintain all expunged records of arrests and convictions, but the records will not be released to the public. BCI will not divulge any information contained in the expunged records to any person or agency without a court order, unless authorized by statute to do so. Upon request, the following organizations may receive information contained in expunged records: the Board of Pardons and Parole Peace Officer Standards and Training federal authorities, unless prohibited by federal law the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing and the State Office of Education Both cases above require a court order to get that seal record information. However, from what I gather only expunged criminal records can be access upon request by the Division of Occupational Licences. Bottom line, it sounds like you are safe to mark is no previous name, but you may lose your license in the future if something goes south. I will recommend you to get a professional look into the word of the law and provide you with a written statement of the actual law. Another thing you can try is write to the court who sealed your case, present them the situation and explain what you have found so far, and ask for guidance. | (My expectation is that the proof has to be replicated and the conviction cannot be introduced as evidence). Your expectation is incorrect. The name of the legal doctrine that allows a criminal judgment to have this effect in a civil case is called "collateral estoppel" which is also sometimes called "issue preclusion". See, e.g., A-1 Auto Repair & Detail, Inc. v. Bilunas-Hardy, 93 P.3d 598, 600 (Colo. App. 2004) ("Hardy contends Colorado law does not allow courts to apply collateral estoppel, now commonly known as the doctrine of issue preclusion, when the first adjudication is criminal and the subsequent litigation is civil. We disagree.") Similarly, a case out of California stated: To preclude a civil litigant from relitigating an issue previously found against him in a criminal prosecution is less severe than to preclude him from relitigating such an issue in successive civil trials, for there are rigorous safeguards against unjust conviction, including the requirements of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and of a unanimous verdict, the right to counsel, and a record paid for by the state on appeal. Stability of judgments and expeditious trials are served and no injustice done, when criminal defendants are estopped from relitigating issues determined in conformity with these safeguards. Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal.2d 601, 606, 25 Cal.Rptr. 559, 375 P.2d 439, 441 (1962) (citations omitted). To the best of my knowledge, this is the rule in every U.S. jurisdiction (with the possible exceptions of Puerto Rico and Louisiana which are not common law jurisdictions). It is also the historical rule in British common law, although I don't know if this continues to be the case in non-U.S. jurisdictions. Procedurally, the determination that collateral estoppel applies would usually be made on a motion for summary judgment, or in the preparation of jury instructions which state that liability has been established and that the jury is to limit itself to determining causation and damages, rather than as an evidentiary matter. I've used this doctrine once or twice. For example, I used it in a case where someone fraudulently sold ditch company shares worth several hundred thousand dollars (in Colorado, water is gold) that he didn't own (a transaction that could not be unwound because the buyer was a bona fide purchaser for value and the seller had apparent authority as a trustee of a trust owning the shares even though he didn't have the actual authority to sell them under the trust) and then spent the money he received before he was discovered (if I recall correctly, for gambling debts). He was convicted criminally and then my client, the victim, sued for money damages including statutory treble damages for civil theft and attorney's fees based upon collateral estoppel and an affidavit as to damages in a motion for summary judgment. From a practical perspective the four main difficulties are that (1) people convicted of crimes often lack the income or assets to pay judgments, (2) there are double recovery issues involved in reconciling restitution awards in a criminal case (where the measure of damages is narrower) and damage awards in a civil case (where the measure of damages is broader), (3) there are priority issues involved in reconciling criminal awards for fines, restitution and costs, in each case with civil awards for damages, and (4) if the defendant declares bankruptcy, the non-dischargeability of the civil judgment must be affirmatively raised and proved (often this is elementary but there are strict time limits) in the bankruptcy proceeding. Tactically, it is often better to sue first, collect what you can, and to bring a criminal complaint only when it turns out that the perpetrator is judgment-proof. | A self-represented person, as a practical matter, has no choice but to engage with the court when an oral argument is conducted. A person present in a courtroom likewise has an obligation to acknowledge a judge addressing them. Usually it wouldn't be contemptuous to fail to appear at oral arguments of a fully briefed matter (e.g. a motion for summary judgment, or an appeal), but it would generally be viewed negatively. One could respond to a question from the court with "I don't really have anything more to say, my brief speaks for itself." And, sometimes a court would leave it at that, but if the court insists there is really no other option than to clarify and explain yourself. Most often, this helps more than hurts a pro se party, although I've certainly seen cases with ghost written pleadings (which are authorized if disclosed in many jurisdictions) where this isn't the case. A fairly common tactic in civil litigation is the take a deposition of a party, or to call a party to the witness stand, and to ask them if they really want the relief that their filed legal documents says that they do, as a way to narrow the scope of the claims brought against the questioning lawyer's client. But, this is less of an issue with a pro se party when the person who drafted the legal documents and the person engaging in oral arguments are the same person. This can't be done in criminal litigation, but I could see a prosecutor trying to do something similar in oral argument, although usually in that context, the judge and not the prosecutor, is asking the questions. | If what you show is correct and above-board then you are being sued in superior court. However it sounds unlikely that the plaintiff could have served you with notice of such a lawsuit without you realizing it, so if I were you I would first call the court to see if they do in fact have a case with the docket number listed. Then ask: When and who served the original notice in the case (because if you really didn't get it then whoever said you did majorly screwed up and is probably in trouble) Who the plaintiff's counsel is If the letter was from a real lawyer on the California Bar, and that case really is open in the superior court with you as a defendant, then you really are being sued, and you should either get a lawyer or negotiate a settlement, because if you don't answer and defend then you're just going to have more judgments against you. If any of the above does not check out then whoever sent that letter is in big trouble if you report it to the DA, postal inspector, and (if they are a real lawyer) the Bar. | As the answer by Iñaki Viggers says, you should submit an affidavit, not simply a letter to the court. An unsworn letter will probably not be admissible at all. It is common for a witness to tell his or her story to the lawyer for the side that wishes to use the affidavit, and for the lawyer to then draft the actual affidavit in such a way that it will be acceptable to the court where it will be used. Then the lawyer sends it to the affiant (the person who would be a witness if s/he came to court, who is making the affidavit) with instructions. Generally an affidavit must be notarized or otherwise sworn to in front of an appropriate official. However, a person can draft his or her own affidavit. It is usual for it to be headed with the name and case number of the case where it will be used. It should include a statement that everything in it is true, and that the affiant swears (or affirms) this under penalty of perjury. It should include only relevant facts that the affiant has personally witnessed, not anything heard from anyone else, or guessed at or deduced. The facts should be stated clearly and simply. The affidavit should be signed in the presence of a notary, who will witness the signature and the oath that the contents are true. This WikiHow page describes the process in detail, with a template form. |
May a person accept and keep bribes so long as they act lawfully? This isn't a situation I'm in, but rather something I'm curious about. If a private person (outside of any position of authority) is bribed to keep an illegal act they witnessed secret, but chooses to report the crime to the police regardless, is that person able to keep the bribe? I know the contract is compromised by the criminal element, but does that negate the criminal portion of the agreement (letting the witness keep the bribe), negate the entire contract (requiring the bribe be returned to the criminal) or cause another outcome (bribe is surrendered to the state)? Likewise, if the criminal informs police that they bribed the witness in exchange for silence, even though the witness reported the crime anyway and cooperated fully, is the witness thereby guilty of any crimes themselves? | Bribery always involves a public official or person with a legal duty (such as a witness in a legal proceeding). It is illegal for such a person to accept a bribe. See 18 USC 201. We speak metaphorically about "bribing" when we aren't actually talking about the same thing as the legal concept. Seen as a contractual matter outside the legal concept of bribery, a contract requiring a person to cover up a violation of the law would be unenforceable. However, it would be the crime of extortion to threaten to expose the criminal, so to rule that out, we would have to assume that the criminal knew that Jones could rat him out, and he offers Jones money to keep quiet. If the agreement were to "not testify", then that would be bribery. In other words, we have an almost perfectly innocent person, who acted entirely legally (did not extort, is not a public official, did not accept money in connection with testifying in court), and accepted money given for an unenforceable purpose which was breached. Their only fault was accepting payment to not turn a criminal in (and even then, they did turn him in). I can't find relevant US case law that definitely rules one way or the other. I believe though that the court would not order the money returned to the criminal – the court would do nothing to validate such a contract. | Does the party have any legal leverage to engage the police (or other competent authorities apart from private investigators) to help locate the witness and serve the summons on them? Not really. Legal process is not infrequently served by a sheriff's deputy. But the deputy will not generally take any initiative to locate a person to be served beyond what it provided by the litigant. The main reasons to have a sheriff's deputy serve someone with process is the fear that the person served might react violently. Or is it just the party's bad luck that the witness cannot be located and served on? Pretty much. | You don't make plea bargains with police officers. This answer discusses the ethics of plea bargains. Even if you made this deal with the police officer, you could renege on it at trial, and the police officer would have lost his or her opportunity to search the trunk. Extortion is generally defined as (this example from California): this obtaining of property from another, with his consent, or the obtaining of an official act of a public officer, induced by a wrongful use of force or fear, or under color of official right A plea bargain doesn't result in the obtaining of property. The plea bargain exchanges your statement of guilt of crime A for the prosecutions's dropping of charges for crime B. | I feel that a person, not the subject of arrest, should be protected by the 4th amendment if they choose to remain in their vehicle, even if “ordered” to exit the vehicle by an officer. The intuition is fine, but is basically incorrect. I’m most interested to know: How would a driver (1) Politely (2) determine if a given instruction to exit the vehicle must be complied with, and (3) decline the instruction without giving the officer “cause” or otherwise damaging a potential case? From a practical perspective the only workable response is to comply. There are times when this is done without a reasonable suspicion (or in some cases probable cause) or other legal basis, but it is pretty much impossible for you to dispute this one the spot. Most of the time, the officer will have the legal authority to order you to leave the vehicle. If they order you to exit the vehicle despite not having the legal authority to do so, the right course of action is to comply and then to file a complaint with the agency employing the officer or to bring a civil lawsuit against the officer. There are good answers to a basically duplicate question at How can you tell if you have to follow a police officer's instructions? | The linked Bloomberg story quotes the rule as: The recipient is allowed to keep the funds if they [the funds] discharge a valid debt, the recipient made no misrepresentations to induce the payment, and the recipient did not have notice of the mistake. If the recipient, or somone acting on behalf of the recipient, hacked the sender to induce the payment, that sounds like a form of misrepresentation to me. If the hacker is unconnected with the recipient there seems no way that the hacker benefits financially, although I suppose a hacker might simply want to cause an amusing disruption. As I understand it this rule only applies when the sender in fact owes a debt to the recipient that the transfer pays off. If the hacker were working for one of a large group of recipients, most of whom are innocent, and subsequent analysis establishes that there was a hacker, but not who the hacker was or which of the many recipients the hacker was working for, I suspect, but cannot prove, that the doctrine would not apply, because the transfer was not a valid but incorrect act by the sender, but was a fraudulent intervention in the sender's procedures. | Yes, it's illegal new-south-wales s118 of the Crimes Act says: Where, on the trial of a person for larceny, it appears that the accused appropriated the property in question to the accused’s own use, or for the accused’s own benefit, or that of another, but intended eventually to restore the same, or in the case of money to return an equivalent amount, such person shall not by reason only thereof be entitled to acquittal. QED | Let's say you leave fake drugs in someone's yard. Eg, you expect the police to be dumb enough to believe it and arrest the other person Obstructing a public officer, specifically "deliberately hindering a public officer from carrying out official duties". Trespassing. | No enforceable contract can contain illegal clauses and work Contracts can not remove some rights and never can bypass obligations. Talking to the police at times is a requirement by law, as is taking to the labor board. Responding to a subpoena is legally forced by the court. An NDA might limit the amount what you can say, and a contract might limit who you can sue, but can not ban you from suing at all. In germany, a contract that tries to curtail such requirements would be Sittenwidrig and make all clauses that try to limit the rights fully Void and nill ab initio - in fact, it can be used as evidence against the drafting party that they tried to do so. So to stay legal and keep the clause working in the limited fashion where it is not demanded, the clause cuts the contract to explicitly exclude such situations. |
What is US Citizenship status of two persons born to a US mother outside the US before 2017? I have two children both born in the UK before 11th June 2017. I, their father, am a British citizen, their mother was a US citizen and we were not married. Between the birth of the first child and the second, their mother was granted indefinite leave to remain. At no point did their mother register their birth with any US authorities. Accord to the website of the US State Dept (bottom section on Birth Abroad Out-of-Wedlock to a U.S. Citizen Mother), both of my children qualify to apply for US citizenship. https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal/travel-legal-considerations/us-citizenship/Acquisition-US-Citizenship-Child-Born-Abroad.html I am correct in my belief that they do not automatically have US citizenship? Note: I am not asking for advice in seeking US citizenship for them, merely confirming their current status. | Your children may have automatically become US citizens at birth, depending on how long their mother lived in the US before they were born. US law says that any child born abroad to an unmarried US citizen mother is automatically a US citizen, as long as their mother had lived in the US continuously for at least one year before the child was born. There is a clear discussion of the legal requirements in Chapter 3 of the USICS Policy Manual: US Citizens at Birth . Your specific situation is covered by § C.2: Child of a US Citizen Mother (also at the bottom of the page!). (The underlying statute, §1409 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, is here. Like most of the INA, §1409 is not reader friendly.) | "Intention to relinquish" means you actually meant to stop being a US citizen. In practice, the US assumes that normal people doing normal things don't want that. As described on the page you linked, there's an "administrative presumption" that you don't mean to give up US citizenship when you: become a citizen of another country, declare your allegiance to another country, join the military of a country that isn't at war with the US, or take a non-policy-level job with a foreign government. That means the State Department will assume you wanted to keep your citizenship unless you "affirmatively, explicitly, and unequivocally" say that you did not. In practice, if the issue comes up then the State Department will just ask you what your intention was and take you at your word. Unless you actually go to a US embassy or consulate and fill out a form saying "I do not want to be a US citizen any more," you don't really have to worry about it. | The governing law would be the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961). The relevant part is Article 29. Diplomats must not be liable to any form of arrest or detention. Diplomats are also immune from civil and criminal prosecution. Technically, it wasn't a US diplomat but a family member, but by Article 37 they have the same protection. The linked article suggests that her diplomatic immunity ended, but that's a bit of a non-issue. The host nation (the UK in this case) can declare anyone, diplomats or family to be persona non grata which indeed ends diplomatic immunity, but only after the person is allowed to leave the host nation. And when the act happened, the immunity was in place. Immunity cannot retroactively be withdrawn by the host nation. | A question like that is impossible to answer in general, but your question includes some incorrect assumptions. Many countries try to prevent visitors to become de-facto residents through repeated visits. For instance, the Schengen area limits visitors on short-stay visa to 90 days out of every 180-day rolling window, and the UK seems to give their immigration officials more discretion on every re-entry. Many countries give political asylum to people who are persecuted in their home country. A pandemic, or generally bad living conditions, do not count as persecution. Many countries give refugee status to people who have to flee war or disaster in their home country. The default case for these rules is a person who is in danger and wants to travel to a safe country. Then there are rules for force majeure when a person in the country is forced to overstay through no fault of their own. How that is handled usually depends on how cooperative the visitor was at securing a timely return or a visa extension. During the early days of the pandemic, there have been blanket extensions in some countries. As travel re-opened, these have run out. One of the differences between the last three bullet points is how long the stay is permitted. Political asylum tends to be for the long term, refugee status lasts until the end of the disaster, and a force majeure exception might just last a few days. So if this is not just a hypothetical question, contact a lawyer or the immigration authorities where you are now. Generic answers on Stackexchange cannot replace specific, professional advice. | At least one such person was naturalized, according to Wikipedia, in 1868, a time at which I believe naturalization was conferred by district court judges. Although this doesn't perhaps constitute a court case, as asked by the question, it does show that formerly enslaved people who has been born outside the United States were not automatically granted US citizenship. Wikipedia says: Although native-born American former slaves became citizens upon the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in July 1868, this change in status did not apply to the members of the Clotilda group, who were foreign-born. Cudjo Kazoola Lewis became a naturalized American citizen on October 24, 1868. The passage cites Dreams of Africa in Alabama: The Slave Ship Clotilda and the Story of the Last Africans Brought to America by Sylviane A. Diouf | You will probably not be allowed to enter the United States if your visa is expired. Sometimes foreign student advisors at a college or an immigration attorney will know how to expedite the process to get it renewed in time. Also, sometimes the offeror of a scholarship can move it back to accommodate your inability to get a timely visa renewal, assuming that it is possible to get a visa renewal at all. Applications from the Philippines are processed more slowly than applications from any other country as a matter of official policy. It also isn't obvious to me that you are really talking about a green card (lawful permanent residency) as opposed to a student visa. A tourist visa does not suffice in cases where you need either a student visa or a green card. You need professional help ASAP as this is a highly technical, non-intuitive area, even if that means paying an immigration lawyer hundreds of dollars. | The Section 34 of Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand says (highlight mine): […] No person of Thai nationality shall be deported or prohibited from entering the Kingdom. The referenced document points to the most recent 2017 Constitution. So the naive answer is No, however some legal gap may be found by the Constitutional Court (Section 27). More specifically, it would depend on the legal equivalence of terms "Thai citizens" and "person of Thai nationality". | Diversity of citizenship concerns parties to an action. In the given circumstances, Party B is a witness, not a party. That is, whether A sues C or vice versa, neither would name B as a defendant. The determination of diversity jurisdiction occurs in the initial stages of the suit. Because A and C are citizens of the same state, there is no diversity of citizenship. Similarly, if Bob and Alice sign a contract when they live in different states, but then one moves to the other's state, and then a controversy arises under the contract, there is no diversity of citizenship. For reference, 28 USC 1332(a): (a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between— (1) citizens of different States; (2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state, except that the district courts shall not have original jurisdiction under this subsection of an action between citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state who are lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States and are domiciled in the same State; (3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional parties; and (4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States. |
How to reconcile opposing legal answers? A fraud in the terms of use has two opposing answers: one said it was a fraud, while some said it was not. How do I reconcile those answers? | Law is more like sport than mathematics You don’t know how it will turn out until you play the game. If a case goes to trial it’s because at both sides believe they can win. Both sides probably have good reasons for their belief. At least one of them is wrong. | If you were to seek legal recourse for breach of contract (their Terms and Conditions), the best outcome you could hope for would be "making whole", and since they have already offered this a court could award you what the retailer already offered, but make legal costs on both sides the plaintiff's liability (ie. you), since you could have taken the offer and avoided court. The Terms and Conditions associated with the discount code mean that you won't be able to return the gift cards for cash. It will be argued that by using the code, you agreed to those terms and conditions. The second paragraph of their reply looks like an attempt to scare you, but it has legal merit. By using the unauthorised code you could be considered to have made false representation when you entered into the contract. This could render the contract void, and if they could demonstrate it had been done deliberately to gain money it could meet the threshold for fraud (which is what the police would possibly investigate : if it can be shown that you were aware the discount code didn't apply to you it would constitute making "a false representation ... to make a gain for himself" [sub-paragraphs 1-5, paragraph 2 of the Fraud Act 2006]). You may be able to argue that the voucher websites misled you (though it sounds like you, I and the retailer already know that's not true), but since the retailer has offered to repay what you paid there are unlikely to be any damages - and, unless the voucher site took commission from your transaction, a contract between you and the voucher sites would be difficult (possibly impossible) to establish. In the circumstances, returning what you originally paid is a good offer. | I gather that the numerous ramifications you outline are merely contexts and that your main concern is about the application of contract law (contract law in the U.S. does not really vary among states). Thus, I will not really delve in the intricacies of --for instance-- privacy or copyright issues arising from the commercial use of a person's likeness that you mention in one of the scenarios. As a starting point, one needs to bear in mind that: a contract is an exchange of considerations under terms and conditions entered knowingly and willfully by the parties, which can be evidenced by the parties' subsequent conduct (that is, not just by signing a document); and a contract is unenforceable if it contravenes public policy and/or the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Accordingly, the questions are (1) whether a person knew or reasonably should have known about the terms & conditions at or by the time of those events which trigger obligations pursuant to the contract; and (2) whether the provisions therein are unreasonable, illegal, or tantamount to a penalty, especially in the event that the party breaches or repudiates the alleged contract (see the Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 356(2)). The scenario of house for sale entails various difficulties as per contract law and otherwise. Here are some of those issues: Are visitors properly (including "beforehand") notified about the "walkway clause"? If not, the contract is void because it cannot be said that visitors knew about & accepted that condition. Does the house provide alternatives for lawful & informed visitors to safely avoid the walkway? If not, then the seller/owner might end up incurring premises liability with respect to those visitors who get injured in making their reasonable effort not to trigger the "walkway clause". Is the house owner realistically able to prove that use of the walkway by lawful & informed visitors is sufficiently "inconsistent with the offeror's ownership of offered property" so that triggering a house sale is a reasonable consequence (see Restatement at §69(2))? Is the owner-imposed mortgage rate compliant with state law pertaining to granting of credit & loans? These exemplify only some of the burdensome complications when trying to enforce "contracts" which are extravagant or quite one-sided. Lastly, as a side note, the presumption that a person reading the poster and walking in the intended area does not thereby receive consideration is not necessarily accurate. As an example, the "intended area" could have been devised by an entity in the business of enjoyment and recreation, such as a private park. The person who deliberately walks in (regardless of whether he read the poster) certainly receives a consideration, which is the amusement or recreation for which the park was designed. | Usually, your landlord is going to deduct this from your security deposit rather than invoice you for it. As a practical matter, your options to dispute the charges are generally going to be excessively expensive relative to a $40 charge to make it worth fighting, particularly if you don't have contemporaneous evidence that is indisputable like photos that you can authenticate at a hearing, to prove that the landlord is wrong. Your testimony would be admissible to contradict the landlord's claim, and the judge would have to decide who to believe, but generally, it only makes any sense at all to litigate over small dollar amounts if you have unmistakably clear evidence that shows you should win. | This case did not find that Two Live Crew's version was fair use. Rather it held that it could be fair use, contrary to the lower court ruling that its commercial nature precluded a fair use defense based on parody. The court remanded the case to be considered in light of its holding. The two parties settled without getting a final decision on fair use. It was never really contested that this work was parody. The issue was whether the commercial nature rendered it unfair. The Supreme Court told the lower courts to assess the taking under the full four-factor fair use analysis and that commercial use doesn't automatically make a parody unfair. One source of confusion is that you seem to be conflating parody and fair use. Parody is just one purpose (along with criticism, education, and others) that has been generally held to swing the balance in favour of fair use. Last, the "five word plagiarism rule" is not a legal standard. | What legal options do I have here? I don't think I can sue for defamation of character since the email was sent to me only. Your rationale about defamation is accurate with respect to the establishment (henceforth "company"). But you may sue the person(s) who approached the company to falsely accuse you of that crime. Being banned certainly qualifies as special damage (that is, concrete damage), whence you have a viable claim of defamation per quod. If the crime that was falsely imputed to you is a felony or serious crime, then you additionally have a viable claim of defamation per se. I was thinking that I may have some legal recourse since the email clearly threatens to defame my character if I re-enter the establishment You have legal remedies, although not necessarily from this angle. The company can credibly argue that it sought to discourage you from contravening the "safety measure" it adopted in response to the accusations made about you. If it turns out that the company fabricated any false accusations it divulges, though, then you could sue the company for torts related to --and in addition to-- its defamatory falsehoods. So far the information you share here shows no signs of company's involvement in inventing the false accusations. What legal options do I have here? You need to ask the company for source and details of the information. In line with this comment, you should also ensure the company is aware of the mistaken identity. If the company declines to listen to you --and ideally see any proofs you have--, that could evidence some sort of tortious conduct on the company's part. Beware that in Florida a defamed person is required to demand a retraction of the false accusations prior to filing a defamation suit. Absent that request for retraction, it will be very easy for the sued defamer(s) to have your complaint dismissed. If the company refuses to disclose the source of the false information, then you need to seek injunctive relief in court. That means suing the company so as to (1) compel the company to identify the person(s) who accused you, and perhaps (2) strike the ban that the company put in place as a result of the false accusations. Even if you don't prevail in striking the ban, the court proceedings would give you the occasion to set the record straight and prevent the company from defaming you if you legitimately expose (to the public) the arbitrariness of its ban. To be clear, the company can always indulge in defaming you for the sake of justifying its ban, although that would be dumb in light of what you will have proved in court by then. In jurisdictions where a request for retraction is not mandatory, a plaintiff who does not know the identity of his defamer(s) may (1) file suit against "Doe defendants", (2) subpoena the non-party company so as to obtain records related to the false accusations (obviously ensuring that these reveal the authorship thereof), and (3) upon production of subpoena records and requesting the identified defamer for a retraction, amend the complaint to properly identify the defendant. This would be more efficient than filing two suits (one for injunctive relief against the company, and another against the defamers). However, I am uncertain of whether this would work in Florida, given its pre-suit requirement of request for retraction. | This would not be "legal jeopardy" per-se, really the only remedy that Stack Exchange would have in a case like this would be to ban both accounts. It would be different if you caused SE some kind of monetary/reputation damages to the site itself. From SE's Acceptable Use Policy: Identity Theft and Privacy. Users that misleadingly appropriate the identity of another person are not permitted. It seems your described scheme would violate that term. But this isn't a legal problem, just an operational one. You aren't violating any law (unless there are local laws against this) by paying somebody to "be you" on SE. The most that this would earn you and your cohort would be a ban and probably removal of the contributions. | In general, knowingly making a false statement as part of a commercial or financial transaction, or as part of a contract, with the intention that the other party will rely on that statement and be harmed by this is likely to be fraud. However, there are some limitations. For the lie to be common-law fraud: The other party must in fact rely on the false statement. The other party must suffer harm as a result of relying on the false statement. The reliance must be reasonable. If a seller advertises having new 1957 model cars in 2020, a court might well find that this was so improbable that no reasonable person would have relied on hte statement, and that therefore it is not fraud. Whether the reliance is reasonable depends on the overall facts of the case, and the details might affect what is considered reasonable. In some jurisdictions such a false statement might be actionable false advertising even if it is not fraud. If the US mails are used as part of a fraud or attempted fraud 18 U.S. Code § 1341 applies. This law applies whether any actual harm occured or not, adn whether the victim relied on the false statement or not. It is commonly known as "mail fraud". 18 U.S. Code CHAPTER 47 is a US Federal law that prohibits a variety of false statements and false documents. Section 1001 of this chapter prohibits false statements and documents "in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States" but I am not clear if this would apply in the case described in the question. Other sections of chapter 47 deal mostly with false statements made to the US Government, or to obtain money or benefits from the government, Or in connection with various particular regulated activities, and do not seem to apply to the case in the question. According to the Justia article on Fraud: Federal fraud statutes, along with most state laws, require proof of a “scheme or artifice” to defraud. The statutes do not provide an explicit definition of these terms, but courts have developed definitions through precedent. The U.S. Supreme Court held in Carpenter v. United States that the terms apply to any plan intended to deprive another of property, regardless of whether it would cause immediate financial harm. However, I think that a scheme such as the one described in the question would be more likely to be prosecuted by a US State than by the US Federal government. Either the state where the maker of the false statements was at the time of the statements, or the state where the victim was present could prosecute. |
Could there be legal reprecussions for using a TV show/Anime/Series as a design for T-Shirts? For example, if I wanted to make a T-shirt of a character for the Arrow Tv series, but I drew it myself/designed it myself. Is it legal for me to sell products (T-shirts) of it? | You can make a derivative work if: the original is not under copyright, you are the copyright owner, you hold a licence from the copyright owner that says you can, or your usage is fair use or fair dealing as applicable. For your proposal, the image is copyright, you don’t own it, you don’t have a licence and what you propose is neither fair use nor fair dealing. You can’t do it and you can be sued if you do. | The reason is 17 USC 106: the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following... (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work The original picture is the underlying protected work. The ASCII reproduction is a derivative work. If you get permission to make the derivative work, it is okay. Otherwise, it is copyright infringement. There is an escape clause, "fair use", which amounts to taking a chance that you won't be sued and then arguing that you didn't do them any prohibited harm. If you make any money off of the game, you have a major strike against you. I suggest reading the fair use FAQ; basically, it is really hard to know how a fair use defense will fare, but based on prior cases, I'd say it's infringement, not fair use. | Of course you'd be in legal trouble, the contract is still valid. I also don't know why you don't consider virtual goods to be goods. Take this example: You buy a 1 year subscription for (example) netflix. The next day they cancel your subscription but don't give you the money back because its not a "real good". This should make it clear that virtual goods are goods too in the eyes of the law. Question is if police/lawyers care about it as much as for "real" goods. | Whoever "derived" the illegal derivative work most likely has copyright in his derivations, unless they are not worth copyright protections. Say I take the Harry Potter books and add a few chapters and try to sell it - that's copyright infringement of course, but I have the copyright on these additional chapters. However, I don't have the right to allow you to copy the derived work. And even if you have the right to copy the original work, you don't have the right to copy the derived work because it is a different work. I could extract my changes, and allow you to take them and do with them what you like. You could then create an illegally derived work yourself. I couldn't sue you, but the original copyright holder could. To the comments: One, a work and a derivative of the work are not the same, so even if you have the right to make a copy of a work, that doesn’t give you any right whatsoever to copy a derivative work - they are not the same work. Two, the copyright holder has the exclusive right to control copying and the creation of derivative works. If the copyright holder doesn’t want derivatives to exist, then creating them, copying them etc. is always copyright infringement. | Generally, it's illegal. You are creating a derivative work and you are not allowed to do that without the permission of the copyright holder. Some jurisdictions may have exceptions, such as fair use under US law. However, this generally protects uses that are intended to comment on or parody the work. It doesn't sound like that is the purpose of your image modification. NOT including: faceswaps, modifications that would shame or affect negatively the reputation of the actors on the image. That doesn't make it legal. I share it in a way that I don't make any economic profit out of it, and clearly stating that it is a modified image (not sure if inside the image, or in the caption under it) and state who is the legal owner of the original image. That doesn't make it legal, either. | This is known as "film novelization"(For example, the novelizations of the Star Wars movies are film novelizations, created under license), and is copyright infringement unless made under a license from the copyright holder. Specifically, you would be making a derivative work of the original, by changing the medium. One of the rights provided by copyright is the right to control the transference from one medium into another. This, in my (non-lawyer) opinion, is unlikely to be found as fair use. There are four test factors for determining fair use(source), decided on a case by case basis: Transformative Character of the Derivative Work: Unlikely to be found in your favor, as nothing is transformed ("I don't change anything, the name are the same, everything is the same, it's just a conversion to textual form"). Nature of the Original Work: A narrative entertainment film, thus unlikely to be found in your favor. Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Taken: You've taken all of it; not in your favor. Effect on the Potential Market: You are essentially providing a free version of what copyright holders can often charge for; negative effect on their potential market. Not in your favor. | If I lock you in a room without access to anything and tell you "Write a novel" and you write a novel with characters, you have copyright in the work. But it's not absolute: If you use your own characters, you own all the copyright in the work, but not in the idea, as ideas are not copyrightable, see Feist v Rural. If you use someone else's characters extensively (as in more than a short hommage/cameo), you very likely make a derivate. You own a copyright in your part, as in the expression of the story or pictures you created, but you do not gain property interest in the existing characters' expression. Since the copyright to the characters lies with the owner of their IP, you need their OK to release (and also to even make) your work - as with the owner of a copyright is the sole right to decide on distribution and creation of derivates under 17 USC § 106 (2). Also remember that making an unlicensed derivate work risks having nothing you can sue for in case the original copyright owner lifts your ideas and scenes-a-faire parts and adapts them for their own derivate, see Anderson v Stallone The strange case of fanfiction chains... Now, there is a strange situation when a work is based on a work which is based on a work... Then, publishers and editors start with red ink and the result is, that what people know as Twilight now has nothing to do with the fanfiction it started as (It wasn't Vampires in the original draft), and 50 Shades of Grey ended up striking any and all supernatural from it, despite it having been a Twilight fanfiction originally. By making own characters and own expression of the world, there could be no copyright infringement. US law vs Egypt law? Both Egypt and the US have signed the Berne convention, meaning that copyright is very very similar in the broad strokes that the right to allow or disallow derivates is with the copyright holder. Also, since Ben10's copyright owners are to the best of my knowledge in the US (Cartoon Network Studios & Men of Action Studios), they will sue in a US federal court. | Yup, copyright statutes and case law cover these situations. In Canada, look at at Copyright Act Section 30.7: It is not an infringement of copyright to incidentally and not deliberately (a) include a work or other subject-matter in another work or other subject-matter; or (b) do any act in relation to a work or other subject-matter that is incidentally and not deliberately included in another work or other subject-matter. The US doesn't have this in statute, but some defendants used a fair use defence, some successful, some not. (http://www.iposgoode.ca/2010/04/cindy-incidentally-the-incidental-inclusion-exception-in-canadian-copyright-law/) If you're using a piece of art as part of a tutorial, or being illustrative of a point, or subject of commentary, review, or criticism, that may be fair use or fair dealing. |
Could non-smokers successfully sue smokers? I regularly see civil cases where, when one person is harmed, either directly or indirectly by another (for example, builders putting asbestos in a house, lead in pipes, etc), they are able to bring a tort civil case against the person causing the harm, to sue for damages: https://mesowatch.com/asbestos-exposure-lawsuits/ This is because, chemically, asbestos causes cancer, and lead, poisoning. There can even be lawsuits against offensive odours: https://www.legalreader.com/porta-potty-odor-leads-class-action-lawsuit/ Putting the two types of cases together, both a chemical harm (EG causing cancer) and an odour, it strikes me smoking meets both criterion. Second hand smoke has clearly been documented as harmful, and certainly does smell: https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/fact_sheets/secondhand_smoke/general_facts/index.htm Which does mean the harm is foreseeable by a smoker who continues to smoke. And whilst I'm aware tobacco companies have been sued for selling tobacco, they're not the ones actually burning it. Which raises my question, could non-smokers, who either get directly or indirectly harmed by smoke, successfully sue smokers? Why isn't this a more common occurrence given the harm of smoke to others? (Country is unimportant, but I'd be interested to see if it's possible in western and European countries.) | One of the biggest problems here is in proof of injury attributable to an individual... With asbestos, you can prove that direct exposure in a certain instance caused a long-term harm. Just because you were around asbestos doesn't mean you get lung cancer, so if you don't actually suffer any harm (or any harm yet), you won't get awarded damages. Similarly with lead, you have to prove both the exposure, the entity which exposed you to it, and harm that you suffered. Just being around a lead pipe or paint doesn't mean you get damages, you need to have suffered harm. The problem with second-hand smoke is that you can be exposed to it from many different sources. Any problems you have (lung cancer) would need to be proven as a direct consequence of one specific (or prolonged) exposure. I could see this working if a non-smoking spouse developed cancer from a smoking spouse being exposed to it for years, but you can't just say "I walked by Joe Camel in the street while he was smoking now I have cancer and it is his fault". So the issue becomes who is responsible for your damages. You can't narrow it down to one smoker (or even cigarette smoke, as lung cancer can develop from other sources), so just proving that your cause-effect is directly related to smoke will be difficult. After that you can't say one single person caused it (unless they forcefully locked you in a room and chain-smoked for a year). So who do you sue? All of smoking society? You might just as well sue God for putting those people on earth, really the only recourse you would have is to sue the tobacco companies, the individual smokers are not going to be held liable as a group. | Yes, there is legal precedent against this that would only apply to a government employee. First, let's discuss the private sector. In this case, you are a private employee that comes to your place of work and accuses you of "stealing the cookies from the cookie jar" which is a serious criminal offense. They wish to talk and your boss is in the room. You plead the 5th, but your boss says you're fired if you don't talk to the cops. This is legal because you still have the right to refuse to talk, you just lose your job. A private employer has the right to free association, and wants nothing to do with cookie thieves, alleged or actual. However, in the government employ, your boss is an agent of the government. This same situation is different because the government pays the boss and the agent... so in essence the government is saying talk or be fired. This is unconstitutional as the government cannot retalitate against you for your refusal to talk. Generally, in order to talk to you, the investigator would need either a signed Garrity Statement or a Signed Kalkines Statement. The former is a statement saying that they are investigating a wrong doing but you cannot lose your job if you refuse to speak to the investigators, where as Kalkines says you must talk but you are granted immunity for your part in the wrong doing, so long as you make truthful statements. For more on this, check this legal blog. There is also the matter that a false accusation (and let me be clear... this is academic, I'm not saying the accusation in the real life topic is false, nor am I saying that the defense is false... we're merely discussing a possibility) is made to your employer and they do not offer the job on the basis of the accusation alone, this is grounds for defamation actions... and in certain jurisdictions, it's criminal defamation, so there could be jail time. It's interesting you mentioned teachers, because this happens alot. Kids do know that there are certain things that get a teacher fired quickly, so teachers do get the occasional false accusation of sexual assault (I know one teacher who has had multiple accusations over the course of her career). One of the few good things I can say about the Teachers Union is they cover the legal defense of accused teachers. The accusations do get the teacher removed from the class for sometime, but they don't lose their jobs over this matter. It's followed up but the accusation doesn't immediately lead to the teacher getting fired.. | If I attempt to carry such a product into the country, but then honestly declare it at the border (I would like to declare 10 kg of marijuana, sir), can I be prosecuted for attempted smuggling? This depends on the jurisdiction and its definition of "smuggling." In the US, as an example, smuggling implies fraud or "clandestine" action. Openly bringing a forbidden item and declaring it would not meet the definition of this crime. Or will I simply be faced with the choice of turning around or forfeiting my goods and continue without trouble? Depending on the product in question, probably not. In the marijuana example, even if you are not guilty of smuggling, you are guilty of possessing and transporting a controlled substance (see 21 USC subchapter I). You could also be charged with intent to distribute, which would likely be a more serious crime. You could also be charged under the laws of the state in which the port of entry is located. With regard to the methyl alcohol example, I do not know whether bringing it to the customs desk at a port of entry would constitute a crime. | A case for negligence or some other tort would likely never reach the stage where we could answer this question, as lawyers are generally immune from suit for their litigation conduct. I don't know of any case with facts likey you've described, but my understanding is that the litigation privilege precludes virtually any tort action based on a lawyer's statements in the course of the proceedings. Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal, for instance, has specifically acknowledged that claims for defamation, extortion, fraud, perjury, forgery, slander of title, injurious falsehood are unavailable: The policy reasons for the privilege have often been repeated: In fulfilling their obligations to their client[s] and to the court, it is essential that lawyers, subject only to control by the trial court and the bar, should be free to act on their own best judgment in prosecuting or defending a lawsuit without fear of later having to defend a civil action for defamation for something said or written during the litigation. Ponzoli & Wassenberg, P.A. v. Zuckerman, 545 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). | A reasonable hypothetical example of where your clause "C" would be applied: A defendant is written a citation for "spitting on the sidewalk," in violation of a hypothetical Portland city ordinance. In presenting extenuating details, the defendant indicates that the expectoration occurred because she had taken a bite of vended food that was belatedly discovered to have been infested with maggots. The notion of encountering rotted food would clearly not have been contemplated by the definition of the "spitting on the sidewalk" ordinance, where the notion of having a cheekful of chewing tobacco definitely would be. | You may not assault a violator, you may notify the authorities. If your state has passed a law making it a felony to be outside without a mask, you can perform a citizen's arrest (but no state has such a law). So you cannot take the law into you own hands, and you run the risk of being arrested on felony assault charges if you do. There is always a significant risk that you are wrong about whether the order applies to a particular individual. You can always file a lawsuit, but you'd be in highly-experimental legal territory in terms of succeeding, specifically the claim that the person endangered your health (you can't sue on behalf of others, except e.g. as a parent on behalf of harm done to a child). For instance, nobody has successfully sued another person for going out in public having the flu on the grounds that they unreasonably put plaintiff at risk. You would have to experiment with that argument, to show that going out with a mask is reasonable and going out without a mask is unreasonable. | Theoretically, yes it can, but it is highly fact specific The Court of Appeal explicitly answered this question in the case of R v Bown [2003] EWCA Crim 1989; [2004] 1 Cr App R 13. The Court held per Keene LJ that self-harm was capable of being a good reason within the meaning of subsection 4 of s 139 (para 20). While refraining from any abstract holding as to self-harm (which required a fact-based analysis), Keene LJ held (at para 24–5) that this would depend on evidence as to how and in what manner the bladed article was intended to be used and the time and place relating to said use. The burden of demonstrating this fell on the defence and it would require detailed evidence to be a presentable defence. In the case at bar, the absence of any evidence directly linking the possession of the knife to the tendency of the defendant to self-harm meant that there was nothing which could establish the defence to be put to the jury; a high 'degree of particularity was requisite' (para 27). NB: yes, the name of the defendant in this case is actually 'Bown', not 'Brown'—I know it looks like a typo! | I would probably have a legal disclaimer out of an abundance of caution. That being said, you have a right to free speech via First Amendment guarantees. While that right is not absolute and some words “by their very utterance” cause injury or incite an immediate breach of peace, and do not receive constitutional protection, (there is the old adage you do not have the right to shout fire in a crowded movie theater). This (your blog) is not that. To take it to its logical (or illogical) extreme, there are many things on the internet, in magazines, scholarly articles, etc. that could injure someone or cause damage in the event that one who was not qualified or competent to perform the action described undertook to do so. A child could burn themselves following the directions on a mac and cheese box but they shouldn't be cooking in the first place. The same rings true for high voltage electricity - a non-licensed electrician should probably not create a high voltage power supply. But, will some? Yes. But you are not liable for printing a blog about the practice. On another but related note, if you are a licensed electrician your licensing authority may require that you take precautions to ensure you do not inadvertantly direct others to engage in practices of licensed professionals that could cause harm by giving them information. I doubt this but I don't know because I am not an electrician. As far as could you be liable for writing it....under our legal system you can be sued under a theory of negligence for just about any action someone thinks was unsafe or causes injury. And you never know what a jury will do. But I think that to sue someone for simply writing something would be fairly easily dismissed through a motion for summary judgment by a competent attorney in the event you got sued. If everything a person wrote, that if followed by an unqualified person resulted in injury, resulted in liability for damages than it would have a chilling effect on their First Amendment right to free speech. That said, I go back to my original statement that it couldn't hurt to have a simple liability waiver for extra protection. It could be something as simple as: "The information contained herein is not mean to be comprehensive and is for informational purposes only. You should not undertake to perform anything described herein without adequate training and/or supervision. The Author disclaims any responsibility for any injury, damage, or loss as a result of reliance upon the information found on this site/blog." If you do use a liability waiver, make sure it is bold and obvious. Otherwise, it can backfire! |
Can one pass another vehicle if the line dividing the (two-way) roadway is double, dotted, yellow in California? Can one pass another vehicle if the line dividing the roadway is double, dotted yellow in California? Example of such a line: Video: https://youtu.be/EL1gieTP3kM. Note it is a two-way street, where each way has one lane. What I found so far: I found the rules for solid and broken yellow lines (as shown below), but not double, dotted, yellow. | No. Such a marking is equivalent to a solid double yellow line, and passing is not permitted. These raised pavement markers are known as Botts' dots and are commonly used in California together with, or instead of, painted lines. A line of evenly spaced dots is meant to signify a solid line. Since here there is a double line of dots, it is a solid double yellow line. If passing were allowed, you would see a single yellow dashed line, which would be indicated with dots by a group of 3-4 evenly spaced dots, then a longer gap, and repeating. California Vehicle Code section 21460 provides as follows: (a) If double parallel solid yellow lines are in place, a person driving a vehicle shall not drive to the left of the lines, except as permitted in this section. [...] (e) Raised pavement markers may be used to simulate painted lines described in this section if the markers are placed in accordance with standards established by the Department of Transportation. The relevant standards are found in the California Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD). On page 655, Detail 23, you can see a diagram showing exactly this configuration of dots and stating that it is an alternative to a solid double yellow line. It appears that current policy is to phase out the use of Botts' dots, so this question may become moot in the future. | Damaging someone else's property is not protected free speech in the US. Nor is using someone else's property without permission and against the owner's wishes. Scenario 3 would surely be vandalism or "Malicious Mischief" or some similar offense, even if the paint can be fairly easily removed. The same would be petty surely true of scenario 2, as it would take at least some effort to remove the sticker, and it could be a safety hazard until it is removed (obstructed vision). Scenario 1 would probably not be even a minor crime, unless perhaps the person trespassed to attach the string. But the person has no right to insist that the car's owner not remove the sign. I am assuming that the car is owned by someone else, and the the person placing the sign, sticker or paint acted without permission from the owner or any authorized person. | The legal line has to do with title requirements for vehicles. There is no specific law that requires you to do anything in connection with the VIN when replacing parts, and you can swap VIN plates on vehicles, or destroy the plate – but that limits your rights with respect to the car. You need a certificate of title to operate or transfer (but not simply to own) a vehicle, per RCW 46.12.520. According to RCW 46.12.520, when applying for title, you have to include “A description of the vehicle, including make, model, vehicle identification number, type of body, and the odometer reading at the time of delivery of the vehicle”. This is trivially doable with an unmodified vehicle. Once you have that Washington certificate of title, then apparently (based on a reading of RCW 46.16a), you simply have to keep registering it. There is normally no need for a further certificate of title, unless you try to transfer it. If a new certificate of title is required, you may be in trouble for crossing a line. In case you need to apply for title (RCW 46.12.560) on a modified vehicle, the State Patrol may (probably will) perform a VIN inspection, since there would be a discrepancy in the description of the vehicle. The full list of inspection requirements is here and this document seems most relevant, being about “homemade vehicles”, as defined in WAC 308-56A-455. The core features of a homemade vehicle is that it is: (a) A vehicle that has been structurally modified so that it does not have the same appearance as a similar vehicle from the same manufacturer; (b) A vehicle that has been constructed entirely from homemade parts and materials not obtained from other vehicles; or (c) A vehicle that has been constructed by using major component parts from one or more manufactured vehicles and cannot be identified as a specific make and model. In that case, you need notarized bills of sale or certificates of title for all of the major components – by RCW 46.80.010 this includes at least each of the following vehicle parts: (a) Engines and short blocks; (b) frame; (c) transmission and/or transfer case; (d) cab; (e) door; (f) front or rear differential; (g) front or rear clip; (h) quarter panel; (i) truck bed or box; (j) seat; (k) hood; (l) bumper; (m) fender; and (n) airbag. So replacing the seat may trigger the requirement for a VIN inspection by WSP. Of course there is the question of how they would know, but I'm only talking about the law. There are various rules about the documentation that has to be provided, depending on the supplier: for example, if parts come from a private individual, the documentation requires everybody’s name, address, phone, description of parts, price, and the VIN of the original vehicle. If you can't do this, you can apply for ownership-in-doubt registration (no title) and 3 years later you can apply for title. So, an oil change is okay, changing seats is mildly risky. While exchanging parts on a same make-and-model basis is unlikely to cause any problem, real problems could arise if there is ever a comparison between your license plate and vehicle description (if the police run your plates). If you truncate your Explorer into a Mini-Cooper, the mismatch between description and license will be noticeable, and they would have reason to think the vehicle was stolen. | A GPS trace of a car's path, on its own, is unlikely to be covered by copyright in the first place. It is primarily made up of facts (the locations of roads and lanes), and there is no creativity involved in its creation. A database of facts may be protected by copyright as a compilation if there is some amount of creativity in how it is assembled, but this does not extend any protection to the individual contents of the database (cf. Feist v. Rural). | Agreement You say: my landlord added a clause stating: "All moving must be done in rear of driveway or pay $250 (near basement door)" Was this addition made at the time you signed the lease or subsequently? This matters because the terms of a contract cannot be changed unilaterally, they must be agreed. If the change happened after the lease was signed then , unless you agreed to it, it has no effect whatsoever. Since that resolution is boring; I will assume that it was always there. Enforcability Is this actually enforceable, since I did park in a public space and not necessarily on his property? Yes, it is enforceable. People can agree in a contract to do (or not do) anything so long as that thing is not illegal - that is what a contract is; a legally enforceable agreement for two people to do certain things. You agreed "All moving must be done in rear of driveway ... (near basement door)" and you didn't do what you agreed to do. Therefore you broke a term of the contract. It doesn't matter that you don't know why he wanted you to do this or if it was reasonable or if it meant that you couldn't use your parent's truck - if these were issues for you they should have been raised before you agreed to do it. If the clause said "When moving out you will wear a blue double breasted suit with a yellow and purple bow tie" then that is what you must do. Consequences There are a number of options open to the wronged party when the other party breaches a term of a contract. The most relevant in these circumstances is to sue for damages. So how much are damages? Well, they are an amount to restore the wronged party to the position they would have been in if you hadn't broken the agreement. In situations where damages can be hard to calculate, contracts can make a provision for liquidated damages; a pre-agreed amount of what the damage will be: in this case "$250". However: In the United States, Section 2-718(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code provides that, in contracts for the sale of goods: Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only at an amount which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as a penalty. This largely mirrors the common law rule, which applies to other types of contracts under the law of most US states. On the face of it, it would appear that $250 may be "unreasonably large" given the nature of the breach where it appears that the landlord has actually suffered no damage. | Texas and California are actually what are called Presumed Speeding states, unlike most others which are Absolute Speeding states. (There is a little known third category called Basic, but this is uncommon). In a presumed speeding state, a speed-limit violation offers someone in your shoes far more flexibility in building your defense than the more common absolute state. In states that use this presumed system, such as California and Texas, it is not illegal to drive over the posted limit as long as you are driving safely and this can be established. For example, if you are driving 50 mph in a 40-mph zone, you are "presumed" to be speeding, yes. However, despite this prima facie evidence (meaning "on its face") of speed in excess of the posted limit, if you can show you were driving safely you may be able to mount a pretty decent defense. Just because you got a ticket is not prima facie evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that you were speeding. You are presumed innocent. If they prove you were speeding this is all they need to make their case, unless you rebut it. But there is a lot of room to rebut this presumption – and that is if they prove it. They must (as with all criminal cases) prove you did what you are accused of beyond a reasonable doubt – the highest standard of proof in the U.S. So, if everyone was going 80 MPH in a 70MPH zone, you would argue that the road was (I'm assuming) dry, unmarred, you were traveling in heavy enough traffic that to slow your speed to the posted limit would actually be less safe than traveling with the flow of traffic. You can talk about the state of your vehicle (repair, handling, etc.), how you stayed in one lane, and you can describe your skill at driving – especially if you have no other tickets and you have been driving for a long time. If you were weaving in and out of traffic, riding someone's bumper, if it was pouring rain, the road was bumpy or under construction, or if you admitted speeding (if you did this you can still rebut with a showing of safe driving, but ignore all info regarding challenging radar or other means of determining speed), or if any other evidence exists that the officer would testify to that shows you were not driving safely, this will not be successful. A successful example of a speeding defense in Texas: on a clear, dry morning with no other cars on a wide, straight road, a man is pulled over for being clocked going 50 mph in a 40 MPH zone. He had a perfect record and had been driving 22 years. He was driving a 2-year-old car. He convinced a judge that this was driving safely given those conditions and was acquitted. That's because facts presented were sufficient to "rebut the presumption" that by going over the posted limit he was driving at an unsafe speed. NOTE: Never bring up your driving record unless it is spotless. Unless you are a habitual offender it cannot be used against you or be brought into evidence at all, unless you open the door. You can also mount a defense based on the radar detection device, if one was used. You can seek records as to when the calibration fork was last checked, when the last time it was professionally calibrated (rather than self calibrated). You can ask, in a leading way (only if you know) how close the car behind and in front of you were (you don't want to be too close to the car in front of you, however if the cars were tightly grouped it is more likely the radar detector could have read another vehicle): e.g., "Isn't it true that the car behind me was only 1.5 car lengths behind me?" Only do this if you know, but if you can get the officer to admit that the car behind you was close, that can be used to rebut the radar detection and goes to the argument that driving slower would have been dangerous and you were driving safely with the flow of traffic. You should be prepared to put on an entire trial if you fight the ticket. In Texas, I believe speeding is considered a Class C criminal offense (rather than a civil offense as in most absolute states); hence, they have to build the prima facie case against you and prove it beyond reasonable doubt. If you can afford one, get a good traffic violation attorney. Always choose a jury in this type of case. Everyone speeds a little and you are far more likely to be acquitted by a jury than a judge. You should also ask to have the case assigned to the county seat; request this in writing ASAP. If you are trying the case, be prepared to go after the officer. Note any distinguishing marks on your car (if any), recall what you wore, what time of day, the lighting, all that. Even go back to the scene at the same day and time and take video showing the flow of traffic, (hopefully) the straightness of the road, etc. Cross-examine him on all facts with confidence and in a leading manner. Always ask for the calibration reports and you will get all evidence against you in discovery. This thing about 10mph being the minimum they can give a ticket for: ignore that, it's rubbish! It's meant to get you to admit to him that "you were only going 8 or 9 over." Also, that whole percentile argument is not relevant and will not work at all. You must show that you were driving safely given all the facts and circumstances to rebut the presumption that you were driving unsafely by speeding. It is worth fighting as you will also incur surcharges, increased insurance rates, and points on your license that are cumulative and stay for 3 years – a certain amount of which gets you suspended if you get (or have) more violations. | According to Rule 286 of the Highway Code then the actual legal requirement doesn't mention an exchange of insurance details. If you are involved in a collision which causes damage or injury to any other person, vehicle, animal or property, you MUST ... give your own and the vehicle owner’s name and address, and the registration number of the vehicle, to anyone having reasonable grounds for requiring them While you clearly can't provide the registration number of a bicycle, the other details still appear to be legally required. Note that the section on Rules for cyclists specifically states that These rules are in addition to those in the following sections, which apply to all vehicles (except the motorway section). | Not in the state of California. California law prohibits discrimination based on source of income; only discrimination based on amount of income is allowed. See the California Government Code, section 12955. It is not even legal to indicate a preferred source of income in the advertisement; landlords may ask prospective tenants about the source of income, but may not discriminate or indicate preference for a particular source (provided it's a lawful source). Also, you can't really force a city to re-zone based on "I'll make sure this bad thing doesn't happen." If the city doesn't want to re-zone, they won't re-zone. You have no right to force them to re-zone; this is especially true when the property was purchased under those zoning rules (if the buyer didn't like them, they didn't have to buy). |
Differences between Damages and Quantum A Dictionary of Law (9 ed. 2018). Edited by Jonathan Law. Quantum quantum n. (of damages) The amount of money awarded by way of damages. Damages damages pl. n. A sum of money awarded by a court as compensation for a tort or a breach of contract. Damages are usually a lump-sum award (see also provisional damages). The general principle is that the claimant is entitled to full compensation (restitutio in integrum) for his losses. Substantial damages are given when actual damage has been caused, but nominal damages may be given for breach of contract and for some torts (such as trespass) in which no damage has been caused, in order to vindicate the claimant’s rights. Damages may be aggravated by the circumstances of the wrong. In exceptional cases in tort (but never in contract) exemplary damages may be given to punish the defendant’s wrongdoing. Damages may be classified as unliquidated or liquidated. Liquidated damages are a sum fixed in advance by the parties to a contract as the amount to be paid in the event of a breach. They are recoverable provided that the sum fixed was a fair pre-estimate of the likely consequences of a breach, but not if they were imposed as a penalty. Unliquidated damages are damages the amount of which is fixed by the court. Damages may also be classified as general and special damages. I'll cite some uses of 'quantum'. Anson's Law of Contract (2016 30 ed) p 432. Where the covenantee has a legitimate interest which it is entitled to protect, the restriction must not be longer in point of time, or wider in area, or otherwise be more extensive in scope than is necessary to protect that interest. The answer to this question in any individual case, however, must necessarily depend upon the interest to be protected, the nature of the contract and the relative positions of the contracting parties.159 The quantum of the consideration which the covenantor has received in exchange for the restraint is relevant to the determination of the reasonableness of the contract.160 Contract Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (2018 8 ed). p 242. Gardner has put forward the following ((1999) 115 LQR 438, 452) as a possible hypothesis for the remedial regime for proprietary estoppel: The approach is – to vindicate the plaintiff’s expectations (care being taken to achieve the best match between the details of the plaintiff’s expectations and the possible legal responses); – to vindicate those expectations in specie if practicable, but otherwise in a monetary form; but – to resort to some other quantum, not more generous than the expectation measure, if it is impracticable to give relief in the expectation measure; and – to resort to some other quantum, with no ceiling at the expectation measure, in the presence of another factor from a limited range recognised as meriting a departure from expectation relief. p 608. Hoffmann LJ in William Sindall plc v. Cambridgeshire County Council [1994] 1 WLR 1016. Damages under section 2(2) are therefore damages for the misrepresentation as such. What would be the measure of such damages? This court is not directly concerned with quantum, which would be determined at an inquiry. pp 727-728. Robert Goff J. In other cases, however, the actual benefit to the defendant may be considerably more than the appropriate or just sum to be awarded to the plaintiff, in which event the value of the benefit will not in fact determine the quantum of the award. I should add, however, that, in a case of prospecting, it would usually be wrong to identify the discovered mineral as the benefit. p. 817. Lord Lloyd in Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd v. Forsyth [1996] AC 344. Mr Forsyth was, I think, lucky to have obtained so large an award for his disappointed expectations. But as there was no criticism from any quarter as to the quantum of the award as distinct from the underlying principle, it would not be right for your Lordships to interfere with the judge’s figure. | Quantum means “how much” It’s simply a synonym for amount or quantity. It can be applied to damages or anything else that gets measured. The quantum of my height is 180cm, the quantum of my weight I’ll keep to myself. | Is it legal to redefine a term against common sense in a contract? Generally speaking, yes. What matters is that the contract be clear enough for the parties to be aware of the terms and conditions to which they are committing. Both of the scenarios you outline seem lawful. They are binding to the extent that the definitions & language therein duly inform the parties of the substance of the contract. Definitions in a contract are most pertinent where the meaning of a term is intended to supersede and replace the commonplace meaning thereof. A contract would become null and void if the substance of that contract contravenes legislation. If legislation outlaws not only the effect of a clause but also its meaning, then the [un-]lawfulness of that clause is not altered simply by crafting definitions of terms. In other words, laws or legislative intent cannot be elluded by relabeling concepts in a contract. Whenever lawful, the attempt to trick a party with tactics (such as the use of uppercase you mention) is likely to be voidable by that party. The rationale is the same: The draftsman's attempt to confuse the user contravenes the contract law tenet that the parties knowingly enter the contract at issue. Notice that in the preceding paragraph I wrote "whenever lawful" rather than "although lawful". The reason for that choice is that, in some contexts, the draftsman's tricky attempts might constitute a deceptive practice and thus be in violation of the law (for instance, consumer protection laws). | No they are not the same statement. Who has jurisdiction? Let's disentangle a few things: A jurisdiction is an entity that has sovereignty to make, interpret and enforce its own laws. Each country in the world is a jurisdiction. Sub-national entities like states, provinces and municipalities may be a jurisdiction depending on the operation of law in the country they are part of. Some supra-national bodies like the EU and the UN are jurisdictions. To some extent, even companies, clubs and similar bodies are jurisdictions to the extent that they can make, interpret and enforce its own rules. A jurisdiction can decide that it has jurisdiction based on a whole raft of matters including: where the event took place where the party(s) are resident where the party(s) are citizens registration of things like planes, trains and automobiles if money passed through their financial system etc. A court or tribunal has jurisdiction if the jurisdiction has jurisdiction and it is the correct body within its jurisdiction to hear a particular matter. Which laws apply? Once a court or tribunal has decided that it does have jurisdiction it then needs to know what law to apply. This may be the law of their jurisdiction or another jurisdiction or both. Example For example, imagine there is a company in New York, USA that sells a product to a consumer in New South Wales, Australia. Further suppose that the contract says it will be governed by the laws of Ontario, Canada (don't ask me why). In the event of dispute, let's say the consumer begins proceedings in the Local Court in New South Wales. The New York company petitions the court to say that the correct forum is the court in Ontario, or New York, or Mexico where the product shipped from but certainly not New South Wales. The court in New South Wales will consider the jurisdictional arguments and decide if it does or does not have jurisdiction. If it decides that it doesn't then the customer would have to bring an action somewhere else (where the process repeats). Worth noting that the New York company would be precluded from arguing in that forum that New South Wales was the right jurisdiction because they can't have their cake ... If it decides that it does have jurisdiction then it would consider what law applies. Its quite probable that they would accept that the contract is governed by Quebec law. However, Australian law, most specifically the Australian Consumer Law would also apply. If there was a claim on a tortuous basis this might be New South Wales or New York law. They would then proceed to decide the case on the applicable law including working out how to reconcile any incompatibilities. | First of all, there is no breach - they said they would pay it "over the course of the first year"; in what way is the first week not part of the first year? Second, breaching a contract doesn't always allow the aggrieved party to terminate it: in fact, being able to terminate is only for the most egregious of breaches or ones that are specifically spelled out as giving a right to termination. For example, failure to deliver (or pay) on time or in full would not allow termination, only damages. | What do the contracts with your suppliers and the policy with your insurer say? Changes in government regulation do not ipso facto relieve Parties of the obligations under a contract under common (English) law. Contracts are allowed to allocate the risk of force majeure (and indeed, to define it because it has no common law meaning) but if they don’t, then each party bears their own risk and if they fail to honour their obligations they are in breach of contract. Common law does have the doctrine of frustration, however, that is much narrower and must result in the inability of the contract to be completed at all. And then there are consumer rights which may apply. When the dust settles, we are likely to see a lot of litigation around force majeure. Your venue appears to be complying with both the law and their obligations under the contract so you have no breach of contract claim against them and no trigger for the insurance policy. If you choose to cancel, then you broke the contract. Importantly, the position is reversed in civil law jurisdictions - a party unable to fulfil their obligations under a contract is not in breach. | What misrepresentation? Alice said she buried the money there. That the money is not there now is not evidence that she didn’t. it’s evidence that something happened to it between then and now. However, let’s not let the flawed example obscure the question. Let’s pretend instead that Alice said the money was there now. Misrepresentation Pre-contractural false statements of fact by one party that induce the other to enter the contract give a cause of action in contract law; they are not a tort. There are torts that are similar like deceit and negligent misstatement. The link provided is talking about fraud - the criminal equivalent of deceit (and the word fraud is often used when technically it’s talking about the tort of deceit). The out-of-pocket rule applies to torts so Bob can recover his losses. Personal time invested is not an out-of-pocket loss as it represents an opportunity cost, so, Bob cannot recover what he or his excavator might have earned instead. He can recover his fuel costs and depreciation on the excavator as those are “real” out of pocket expenses. If Bob had been an employee of a plaintiff company, they could recover his wages but not what they might have sold his time for. That’s just how it is with torts. Misrepresentation is a different beast. It’s a contractural claim so the damages are the “benefit of the bargain”, in this case $500. However, this is only available if the misrepresentation was fraudulent (Alice knew the money wasn’t there), Alice had no reasonable grounds for believing the statement to be true, or at the court’s discretion. Further Bob must prove that it was this statement that caused him to enter the contract and that he would not have entered it otherwise. Alice’s statement may give Bob more than one cause of action and it’s up to him which he chooses to pursue. If he spent less than $500 on fuel he stands to get more with a misrepresentation claim but if his out of pockets are more than $500 he’s better off with a negligent misstatement claim. In either case, these are tough causes to prove. | There are certain legal arrangements that are implied in law when a project or activity is carried out without forming a legal entity. The classification of the legal arrangements in question govern the legal rights of the parties. These arrangements are surveyed below. This is followed by a brief list, for contrast and completeness, of the main different kinds of entities that must be formed expressly and registered to come into existence. This overview is then applied to the specific questions asked. One is a trust. A trust arises by operation of law when a person (called a settlor) provides money or other property or legal rights to another person (the trustee) for the benefit of one or more persons (people who are called beneficiaries) and often for some purpose specified by the settlor. In the U.S. this was historically governed by case law from both courts of law and courts of equity. The concept of a trust and the broader concept of a fiduciary as a general concept are particular to common law systems and don't have a direct analog in civil law legal systems, although there are legal arrangements in civil law countries that have material differences from common law trusts that can be used in circumstances where trusts are used in common law countries. But, now, many states have adopted a statutory trust code that covers most issues of trust law fairly comprehensively. Guardians, conservators, and receivers, sometimes with rights arising by operation of law, or a private non-governmental appointment, but more often arising from a court order, are close cousins of trustees of trusts. Trustees, guardians, conservators, receivers, and agents are part of a group of kinds of people who are often collectively grouped in a larger category of people in charge of other people's property or rights called "fiduciaries." Most often, the enterprises and properties managed by fiduciaries are not considered to be entities, even though the arrangement is similar to an entity. Some jurisdictions require some kinds of fiduciaries to file some sort of registrations or public filings, but these statutes typical regulate people who are already fiduciaries by operation of law or a court order, rather than requiring registration for the legal arrangement to come into existence. A related form of entity, which requires government registration as an entity in some jurisdictions, and can be formed without registration or similar formalities in others, is a business trust which will often have transferrable beneficial interests, the most common examples of which is a real estate investment trust (REIT) or a mutual fund, both of which are sometimes, but not always, organized as business trusts. Most businesses organized as business trusts are subject to considerable government regulation as securities and under tax law, and also under other laws specific to those entity forms. Another related concept in common law countries is a "bailment" (holding the property of another for safekeeping) by a bailee for a bailor and an escrow arrangement. France has a similar set of concepts in its civil code translated into English as "deposits" meaning "bailments" and "sequestrations" meaning escrow arrangements and similar relationships in Articles 1915 to 1963 of its Civil Code. Another is a general partnership. A general partnership arises by operation of law when two or more people jointly carry on business for the purpose of making a profit (whether or not they actually do), without forming some other entity. There is a uniform state law adopted in every state in some version or another, with minor state-specific variations, that governs general partnerships. A joint venture is almost indistinguishable from a general partnership. While codified now, in common law countries, general partnership law is a natural and organic outgrowth of the laws of trusts, fiduciaries and agency, that has evolved and been modified in the process of codification; while in civil law countries, general partnerships are just another kind of entity that isn't necessarily registered as an entity per se (although civil law countries generally have a category of registration-like regulation and accounting and banking rules that apply to all "merchants" whether or not they operate through entities). A third is an unincorporated association. An unincorporated association arises by operation of law when two or more people jointly carry on an activity for purposes other than making a profit, without forming some other entity. In some jurisdictions this is governed by a statute pertaining to them, while in others (and in part, even in states that have a statute) it is governed by common-law case law (drawn historically from both courts of law and courts of equity). In France, the civil code provides for a similar kind of unregistered entity known in English translation as a "Partnership for Non-Commercial Purposes" in Articles 1845 to 1870 of its civil code. A fourth and related notion, which is somewhere between an unincorporated association and a simple contract – which is not a general partnership because it is not carried out for profit – is a domestic partnership or civil union which is sometimes just a subcategory of contract, but in other cases is treated as a special kind of arrangement subject to case law or statutory regulation. Many state and local governments, and some national governments outside the United States, adopted domestic partnership and/or civil union laws that vary widely in their details, before same sex marriage became legal in the United States, to address the needs of same sex couples and/or unmarried opposite sex cohabitants and/or domestic arrangements involving more than two people. Along the same lines, while all countries allow qualified opposite sex couples and sometimes qualified same sex adult couples to form a marriage with a license from the government or government registration, some jurisdictions recognize marriage-like relationships that can be formed without government registration such as common law marriage, putative marriage, and de facto relationships that have legal rights associated with them. France, for example, in Article 515 of its civil code, has "civil covenants of solidarity" (PACS) akin to a civil union in the U.S. which must be formally registered giving rise to formal rights that are significant but less so than those created by marriage. French civil code Article 515 also defines a different category of relationship translated as "concubinage", which is roughly equivalent to "cohabitation" in English which gives rise only to very limited legal rights, and may be (but need not be) governed by a custom drafted domestic partnership agreement called a "convention de concubinage" in French and can, but need not be, formally recognized in a "certificat de concubinage" or a "declaration sur l'honneur" which has only slight legal effect. The law of a "convention de concubinage" is somewhat akin to the kind of contract contemplated in the OP as it is an "atypical" contract that is not heavily regulated and not entered into primarily for the purpose of making a profit. A fifth is a contract. Sometimes a legal arrangement is contractually entered into and has the character of assigning people legal rights and obligations vis-a-vis each other without constituting an unincorporated entity or trust. A contract would typically involve less discretion than an unincorporated entity or a trust, although this isn't a hard and fast rule. In some respects, all entities are basically standardized and regulated contracts. Often, but not always, contractual rights are assignable. Corporations have their roots in the laws of trusts, contracts, and general partnerships, and eventually were given a statutory treatment not directly derived from those sources. This is governed mostly by case law. One kind of contract that bears similarity to what you describe in your example is called in economics a "dominant assurance contract" also known by the registered trademark specific provider of such arrangements known as "Kickstarter" contracts with a refund bonus, and similar in principle but without profit-making objectives, to a subscription agreement. It also bears similarity to a gift registry. Many leases create de facto partnerships and unincorporated associations, as do some real estate covenants. Another important (and heavily regulated) type of contract, which is often mistaken for an entity type since it is used in lieu of a parent-subsidiary relationship between a business headquarters and a particular location of a business, is a franchising agreement, in which the franchisor receives a share of gross profits and a fee from a franchisee who gets the right and the obligation to conduct business under a trademark in accordance with highly detailed central rules regarding how the business is conducted on a day to day basis, even though particular business locations are not enterprises owned by the franchisor. Legal multilevel marketing arrangements, and very similar illegal pyramid schemes are likewise typically organized on a contractual basis. There is also terminology for certain kind of contractual arrangements for non-business purposes, similar to those described in the question, in many civil law countries such as France (as opposed to countries with common law legal systems), but I am not familiar with all of this terminology itself (much of which lacks a direct and exact English language equivalent). A distinction is made procedurally, and in some formalities and requirements, between commercial contracts on one hand, and a category of contracts often translated as "non-commercial contracts" or "civil contract" on the other. For example, in France, arbitration clauses are usually not permitted in non-commercial contracts, and lawsuits to enforce non-commercial contracts must normally be brought at the defendant's domicile. Civil law countries also make a stronger distinction between "typical" contracts, which are spelled out in detail by statute and to which many default rules of law and mandatory rules apply, and "atypical contracts" which are treated with more skepticism by civil law courts and require more detailed express enumeration of the rights of the parties and of the reasons that the government should enforce those rights, than in common law country jurisprudence (although France eliminated this concept from its civil code in lieu of provisions enforcing substantive fairness in many cases, in an October 2016 overhaul of the contract law provisions of its civil code which had only been lightly amended before that since its original adoption in 1804). A sixth is co-ownership of property or other legal rights. Sometimes more than one person owns property and they have legal rights that arise from co-ownership of that property, even in the absence of any contract formation related to their co-ownership, in the absence of any imposition of a trust relationship on someone as a trustee for someone who is not the legal owner of property, and without an intent to carry out any particular enterprise or project with or without an intent to make a profit. This is mostly governed by case law but typically with modest statutory regulation of specific issues (like the right to bring a partition action if one party wants to end the co-ownership relationship). Sometimes co-owners also have a contract governing their respective rights (or a covenant, which is a contract that runs to successive owners of property, usually real estate). France recognizes along these lines "Agreements Relating To The Exercise of Undivided Rights" in Article 1873 of its Civil Code. A seventh is that when someone conducts business for the purpose of making a profit without working jointly with someone else, and without forming an entity, the enterprise is called a "sole proprietorship" (if business is actively conducted) or an "investment" (if profits arise mostly from passive ownership of property). Custom dictates that certain activities, like renting real estate, are considered investments, even when significant active management is involved, while other activities are usually considered to be sole proprietorships, even when they don't involve particularly pro-active conduct. The common law of agency and tax law are important to the operation and regulation of these businesses. In a related issue, a sole proprietorship or other entity (whether or not registered with the government) may often, either by formal registration or merely by dint of using it in the course of business, depending upon the jurisdiction, acquire legal rights in a trade name of an enterprise (also known as a "doing business as name" or "dba") and/or trademarks associated with goods or services sold by an enterprise or sole proprietorship. An eighth is that when someone engages in a project for purposes other than making a profit without working jointly with someone else, or with an intent to make a profit that is consistently not achieved most of the time for a statutory number and proportion of years, and without forming an entity, that has a character similar to conducting a business, the enterprise is called a "hobby" for tax law purposes. This isn't comprehensive, however. Some economic activity undertaken without involving someone else or forming an entity, and without an intent to make a profit, simply doesn't have any name other than "consumer spending" or a "personal and/or household activity." In contrast, entities formed by registration with the government, more or less exclusively, include corporations (both for profit and not for profit, including most corporations sole which are similar to trusts), limited liability companies, limited liability partnerships, limited partnerships, limited liability limited partnerships, limited partnership associations, mutual companies, and cooperatives. Entity formation is typically cheap and easy, although some kinds of entities such as national banking associations require special regulatory permission. Municipal governments, local governments such as school districts and special districts, and many independent government agencies are also often organized as governmental corporations and governed by specific statutes that apply to them. Is this possible at all or do you automatically found some sort of legal entity the moment you do this? This is often, but not always, the case when more than one person is involved, as the list above illustrates. Does such a stock issue have to be registered with the country’s equivalent of the SEC or are they exempt? If the latter, do you have to apply for such an exemption or is it granted automatically? It depends. In the U.S., the threshold question is whether an interest in the project is a "security". There are many kinds of debt and equity investments that are automatically securities (even debt issued by a natural person, rather than an entity, which is transferrable and sold to members of the general public, could be a security). There is also a residual category called an "investment contract" which counts as a security if it meets a multi-factor legal test. There are various exemptions from the securities laws, and some are automatic, while others are not. But there are also some securities laws that apply to transactions involving securities even if the securities are exempt from formal registration with a government entity. The most notable of these is federal SEC regulation 10b-5 that imposes securities fraud liability when there is fraud within the meaning of the regulation in any transaction involving the purchase or sale of a security, even if that security is exempt from registration as such with a governmental entity. Some transferrable rights that are not necessarily securities but have some similarities to them are publicly traded commodities, security entitlements, negotiable instruments, warehouse receipts (particularly negotiable ones), and cryptocurrencies. In addition to regulation under state and federal securities laws, certain kinds of joint activities have other very specific regulations that apply to them (e.g. churches, or pooled investment funds, or cooperatives, or home owner's associations, or political parties, or election campaigns, or buyer's clubs, or timeshares) and there is really no way to know, in general, what those activities will be, without just learning about them from a general knowledge of a jurisdiction's laws. Is this regulated on a federal, state, or municipal level or does the issuer have to comply with the law on all levels? You have to comply with the laws on all levels. Normally, the legal rights of the parties primarily arise under state law in the U.S., and the disclosure requirements normally arise under both federal and state law. But no one level of government has exclusive jurisdiction to regulate private activities and it isn't unprecedented, for example, for local governments to authorize certain kinds of private enterprises (e.g. neighborhood associations in places that don't have HOAs, or composting co-operatives). Many local governments require all businesses that operate in their territory to be registered or licensed with them, no matter how they are legally organized, and state and local governments also often require special licenses for all businesses (regardless of form of organization) which are obligated to collect particular taxes such as lodging taxes, sales taxes, value added taxes, fuel taxes, alcohol or cigarette taxes, or "head taxes". Similarly, many occupations and professions require government licenses at one level of government or another, and sometimes, more than one level of government. Some licenses are mostly federal (e.g. investment advisors and securities brokers), some are primarily state level (e.g. doctors and lawyers), and some are primarily local (e.g. street vendors and many construction trades). Are there relevant court cases that show what the penalties are for getting this wrong? Yes. But the question is too broad and vague to meaningfully discuss them. These cases are usually particular to the specific type of transaction involved. Does it make a difference in practice if the market capitalization of the project is almost certainly always well below $1 million? This is relevant to the kind of securities law exemptions that apply when a transaction is deemed to be a security under federal and state securities regulations. There are many exemptions and most of them have dollar limitations attached (although some do not). The background is that I want to start an online platform to make this easier for people, but of course I don’t want to get into legal trouble and I don’t want my customers to get into trouble. You haven't even begun to scratch the surface of the myriad legal issues presented. Your example sounds more like some sort of transferrable contract right, rather than a security (although it could be both), since it appears to be purchased primarily for use rather than as a profit making investment. It bears a fair amount of similarity to certain kinds of timeshare rights (and might even qualify as a timeshare under the regulatory and consumer protection rules of some jurisdictions which define them broadly). You need to develop a far more specific idea of what you plan to do and then meet with a lawyer to discuss the entire concept start to finish to spot as many legal issues as possible. This is not something you should try to do without a lawyer. | The clause refers to what might be a lawsuit, which can be adjudicated in appropriate government courts (cf. the choice of law clause), but instead would be submitted to an arbitrator. The contract will spell out the details. An offence is a punishable criminal act, which is outside the scope of civil suits. In US law, the government prosecutes the wrong-doer, not e.g. one of the parties to the contract (if for example the vendor ships an illegal substance to a customer). The same goes for a "breach of law", depending of course what you mean by breach of law. A breach of contract could not be pursued in court, given a mandatory arbitration clause. The fact that the two parties are in different countries does not nullify a mandatory arbitration clause, at least between the US and the UK. |
Curious case of real-estate transaction with predatory tenants This question is looking for some ideas and some underwater rocks that haven't been though of yet. The context: Jurisdiction: Nova Scotia, Canada A buyer and a seller has entered into an sale agreement. The seller agreed to deliver the premises vacant on closing date. Midway to the closing date, the seller is having issues with the tenants who are refusing to leave until well after the closing date. The tenants have the legal right to remain in the property well after the stated closing date. The new owners will not be occupying the property. The seller has no written lease. Although the seller had a handshake agreement with the tenants that they will vacate the property before the closing date, the tenants have turned around requesting a sum of money. The buyers are at the point right before incurring majority of the closing costs. They have just a few days to play with, before they have to continue with the expenses. The questions: Can the seller enter a formal agreement with the tenants in which the seller pays a sum of money and in return the tenants vacate the premises before the closing date, and would such agreement hold over the tenants legal right to remain on premises past the closing date? What happens if the sale goes though under the assumption that the tenants have left, and in fact the tenants are still occupying the premises? What guarantees and proofs can the buyer demand as to the vacant status of the property? What other questions should the buyer be asking? | Can the seller enter a formal agreement with the tenants in which the seller pays a sum of money and in return the tenants vacate the premises before the closing date, and would such agreement hold over the tenants legal right to remain on premises past the closing date? Maybe. It depends on tenancy law in Nova Scotia. Notwithstanding, given that the tenants are “difficult”, what are your plans if they take the cash and don’t move out? What happens if the sale goes though under the assumption that the tenants have left, and in fact the tenants are still occupying the premises? Why would the buyer settle under an “assumption”? At the time of settlement either the tenants have left (so settlement happens) or the haven’t (so the vendor is in breach, settlement doesn’t happen and the buyer decides whether to rescind the contract and claim damages or affirm the contract and claim damages). What guarantees and proofs can the buyer demand as to the vacant status of the property? They take the keys and walk into it. What other questions should the buyer be asking? They should be asking: “Will you be in a position to fulfil your obligations under the contract?” | In general, a properly signed lease is binding. But there are exceptions, and they vary depending on the jurisdiction: country, state/province, and even city or county in many places. You mention a claim that the property should not be leased "because the owner needs it". In some jurisdictions, there is a special exception if the owner personally, or a member of the owner's immediate family, intended to live in the property. It is not clear form the question if such an exception would apply. it might well be that a person in the position described in the question has a valid and enforceable lease, and could simply remain in the property, paying rent, and the owner would have no valid grounds for eviction. But this kind of case will depend on the exact wording of the rental agreement, and on the exact provisions of the applicable laws, which vary widely depending on the location of the property. A person in this kind of situation would b wise to consult a local lawyer who will know local property law, and how the provisions of the agreement and other claims will be treated by local courts. There may also be local tenant assistance organizations, run by the government or by non-profit groups, who will know local law and can assist in such cases. A general answer cannot be gotten from a forum such as this which an individual should rely upon in such a case, particularly when the question does not even state what country, let alone what specific locality, is involved. | Whether or not this would be allowed would generally call for a more fact rich situation than the one presented in the original question, that would cast light upon why a retailer might be inclined to refuse to accept payment. Hypothetical legal questions that presume that people are acting irrationally for no good reason are generally ill posed and don't have meaningful answers. Sometimes, there might be a legitimate privacy interest implicated if the invoicing party acknowledged a payment from a third party. For example, suppose that the invoice was for a paternity test and payment would confirm that the incapacitated person actually obtained a paternity test. Sometimes, there are legal rights beyond payment that are implicated and the reasonableness of a refusal might hinge on those rights. For example, suppose that the invoice was for an option to keep using an oil well. Payment of the invoice by the deadline would keep the oil well operating and the land owner sending the invoice might prefer that it not be paid so that the oil well would be shut down. Quite a few contracts are structured in this way. Maybe the invoice was for the right to purchase a first edition of a book when it was finally released, for example, and not paying it would free up a copy for someone else at a price that had increased in the meantime. Or, suppose that the invoice were for unpaid taxes and payment of the taxes would prevent property from being seized for sale by tax authorities, and the taxing authority would prefer that the invoice was not paid so that the valuable property could be liquidated. But, it is hard to imagine that there would be any reason that an ordinary retailer with an ordinary bill would ever refuse payment, although I suppose that this might trigger an interest or penalty amount owed under the contract for late payment. If that were the case, the principal of mitigation of damages, which says that a party to a contract must take all reasonable steps to mitigate their damages, might obligate the retailers to accept the payment or forfeit the penalty amounts that the retailer could have avoided as damages by accepting payment. I doubt that an undelivered tender of payment from a third party would eliminate the obligation, but, it might limit the damages that could be claimed as in the scenario above. | If the landlord gave you a key, and you can not give it back to him he has every right to charge you for correcting the oversight. I put to you that if you can't provide it back to him, he can't be certain that it has not fallen into the wrong hands, and he would be prudent to change the lock - and indeed, he may not even have another copy of the key in which case he really does not have a lot of alternatives. If you look at the section on "Claims for Damages or Loss" pdf there is a section B - Damage which confirms that Loss includes less tangible impacts including "loss of a service or facility provided under the tenancy agreement" Section C of the same document goes on to assert that "The purpose of compensation is to put the person who suffered the damage or loss in the same position as if the damage or loss had not occurred". There is arguably a question of the amount of loss suffered, and they can't sting you for punitive damages, but they can charge you a reasonable amount to get a new key cut (or possibly to replace the lock) - but that was not your question, and would probably arise if the amount he charges was unreasonable in the circumstance. Depending on if he has already taken action - and if not, how much the bill would be - promptly remedying the breach by finding and returning the key or equivalent action might save you some money. | I am an Ontario-licensed lawyer. The following is a general information about the law and not specific legal advice. You are not my client and I have not given you advice related to your circumstances. First, even when you ask a generic question, define the jurisdiction of interest. For the purpose of your question, Canada is a collection of different jurisdictions with different rules. My answer relates to Ontario, Canada. Other Canadian jurisdictions have different rules. The Law The applicable Section 109 of Ontario's Residential Tenancies Act http://canlii.ca/t/33p is reproduced below for your convenience. EMPHASES MINE. Receipt for payment 109 (1) A landlord shall provide FREE OF CHARGE to a tenant or former tenant, on request, a receipt for the payment of any rent, rent deposit, arrears of rent or any other amount paid to the landlord. 2006, c. 17, s. 109 (1). Former tenant (2) Subsection (1) applies to a request by a FORMER TENANT only if the request is made within 12 months after the tenancy terminated. 2006, c. 17, s. 109 (2). Regulation Ontario Regulation 516/06 http://canlii.ca/t/sjx dictates minimal form: Receipt A document constitutes a receipt for the purposes of section 109 of the Act if it includes, at a minimum, (a) the address of the rental unit to which the receipt applies; (b) the name of the tenants to whom the receipt applies; (c) the amount and date for each payment received for any rent, rent deposit, arrears of rent, or any other amount paid to the landlord and shall specify what the payment was for; (d) the name of the landlord of the rental unit; and (e) the signature of the landlord or the landlord’s authorized agent. O. Reg. 516/06, s. 9. Landlord Compliance A good landlord will provide receipts immediately upon payment, and keep a copy. An very good landlord will provide additionally a summary of payments for the year, in tabulated form, and keep a copy of the yearly receipt instead of the multiple receipts for each payment. An excellent landlord will keep the tabulated information in a computer system and will issue a receipt for the whole tenancy period on termination. Keep a copy. Tenant's Application If your Ontario landlord refuse to comply with the above, file a T2 http://www.sjto.gov.on.ca/documents/ltb/Tenant%20Applications%20&%20Instructions/T2.pdf *A T2 can also be filed online. Remember to ask for cost http://www.sjto.gov.on.ca/documents/ltb/Interpretation%20Guidelines/03%20-%20Costs.html | Some portions of your inquiry are confusing, as in "I insisted that we were going to continue to send money to the mortgage company if we don’t understand what the fees are for". It is unclear why you would continue to send money without understanding the reason for fees, especially since you purportedly sent "the complete payoff" already. What is an appropriate response to an email from a lawyer that says she’s going to withdraw from my case, because I would like to understand the additional fees and charges my mortgage company is charging (over and beyond the plan payment/payoff)? Rather than replying to the lawyer's email, it is more important that you timely file in court a response (with 2 or 3 copies) to her motion to withdraw and that you attend the court hearing (if any is scheduled). Don't forget to also mail your attorney a copy of your response. In the response, you will need to argue that your lawyer's refusal to adequately address your inquiries is in violation of the rules of "professional" conduct (with which attorneys are supposed to comply). By granting the attorney's motion, the court would improperly release her from pending obligations she has with respect to you. For instance, Rule 1.4 of Michigan RPC states: (a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and comply promptly with reasonable requests for information. [...] (b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation. (note: other jurisdictions in the U.S. have equivalent rules, so you will need to refer to their corresponding label) By pushing you to pay another $850 without actually explaining you the details of the "settlement" with mortgage company's counsel, your lawyer clearly is failing her duty to reasonably inform you of the matter for which you retained her. Therefore, your response should substantiate that a granting of the attorney's motion to withdraw ought to be conditioned on the fulfillment of her obligation to provide you with reasonably sufficient information which you as her client are entitled to obtain. It will help if you attach to your motion & brief an exhibit showing that the mortgage company actually directed you to inquire of your lawyer the clarification(s) you are pursuing. Once you take care of that issue, I encourage you to seriously assess (and proceed accordingly) whether your attorney's misconduct merits being reported with the entity in charge of disciplining lawyers for their legal malpractice. If I were knowledgeable of bankruptcy law, I would be happy to address your first question. I can only suggest you to do some research on leagle.com to become acquainted with how courts decide bankruptcy issues. Be sure to set parameter "Search By Court" to "Federal Bankruptcy Court". | The ability to bargain for clauses that are more favorable varies with the type of landlord. Termination clauses are no different in this regard. If the landlord refuses to negotiate/modify early termination clauses, the tenant's subsequent decision to enter the lease evidences that he knowingly and willfully agreed to those terms. The tenant is not allowed to disavow them thereafter. Hence the importance of negotiating the clauses, although rental corporations are unlikely to be any flexible. Unless you find a flexible landlord or manage to arrange alternative housing, entering a standard 12-month lease is a risk you would have to take. Legislation typically requires landlords to mitigate damages in the event of early termination by finding as soon as possible a new tenant. However, in reality it is usually too difficult for a leaving tenant to scrutinize the landlord's efforts of finding a new tenant. The best chances to be able to conduct that scrutiny occur when the matter is brought to court. A landlord could have the incentive to find a new tenant soon if the early termination coincides with certain season. A typical example occurs in college towns, since students need to arrange housing by the time the school year begins. | The fact that you're not a native speaker of English doesn't alter the legal situation. If you literally had no understanding of English but for some reason you signed a piece of paper, then you might argue that there was no agreement in the first place, but obviously you do speak some English. Most people don't actually understand what contracts mean (on both sides). Contracts are still enforced, based on what the contract says. The move-in data is proposed, not firm, and it even indicates what the charges are if your circumstances change and the dates have to change (whereas is their circumstances change, they wouldn't have a basis for charging extra). It also does say that there will be no refund if you change your mind. So the piece of paper says "No refund". The problem seems to be that there's an "agent" whose statements you relied on, who is ultimately responsible for this problem, and s/he implied that you could get a refund. It's not clear what kind of "agent" this is (is he working for you, or for the owners?). You'd have a somewhat different legal basis depending on which it is, but you could sue someone in either event, assuming that you could actually persuade the court that you were given false information which you relied on. The statement "they will refund your money if the guy doesn't move out by the 16th" is false; the statement "they may refund your money if the guy doesn't move out by the 16th" is true. If the latter was the statement that you relied on, then you knew (or should have known) that that isn't a promise, it's just a guess, and if you read the piece of paper you know that it's a promise with no basis. So I would say it comes down to establishing what promise was made to you. Arguing that the agent "made" you sign isn't going to get you anywhere (unless you can prove actual coersion). |
Sue newspaper or the reporter for libel? Are there any reasons to only sue a newspaper (the corporation) for libel and not the individual reporter who libeled you? | In addition to the other answer which, correctly, notes that the publisher is more likely to be in a position of being able to pay any damages awarded, there is one other good reason to sue the publisher rather than the journalist... The journalist cannot print a retraction or correction with the same reach as the original article - only the publisher can do that, and they won’t necessarily do it just because the journalist wants them to. | You didn't bother to state who this appeal is with or even where you are but I'm almost certain I know the answer. Just once. If the appeal is denied, you may be able to appeal to a higher body such as a higher court or an ombudsman. However, any group or court allowing the same appeal ad infinitum until you get what you want would be farcical. | You sue the legal person One of the things that distinguishes legal personhood from other structures is the ability to sue and be sued. You can't sue a business name or a trust for example but you can sue a company. I have in fact been required to make adjudication decisions that I know will be unenforceable in court because the applicant named a trust rather than the trustee. | In Ohio, and in most common-law jurisdictions, this conduct is covered under the tort of defamation. It is a common law tort rather than a statutory tort, so there is no statute to consult. Case law requires a defamation plaintiff to prove: that a false statement of fact was made; that the statement was defamatory; that the statement was published; that the plaintiff suffered injury as a proximate result of the publication; and that the defendant acted with the requisite degree of fault in publishing the statement. Am. Chem. Soc. v. Leadscope, Inc., 133 Ohio St.3d 366, ¶ 77. In the United States, defamation is very rarely going to be a criminal matter in and of itself. Because of the First Amendment's robust protections for free speech, defamation cases are generally doomed to failure, even when the speech in question is demonstrably false. In British Columbia, the elements should be roughly the same, but I don't have a sense of how often these claims are successful or whether there are criminal sanctions for defamation. | A person isn't required to state their evidence that the claim is true when they make the claim, and as a public figure, a defamation suit filed by Trump would be judged under the stronger "actual malice" claim, meaning that the statement was made with knowledge that the claim is false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false. You would have to look at the specific statement. It is generally not defamatory to hurl insults like "rapist!", "pedophile!", "criminal!" etc. against a public figure especially a political figure, since such word don't generally amount to an actual accusation of wrong-doing. On the other hand, a detailed but false claim purporting to relate factual events could cross the threshold. Hyperbole is not actionable. | There have been cases in the UK where paying someone's legal bills was interpreted as joining their case. So when A with no money libels someone, and B with deep pockets pays A's lawyer, then B risks being held liable for damages if A gets convicted. So B should be very careful. Just giving you money is probably the safest. But attorney-client privilege is between attorney and client. I have been laid off twice with my company asking me to take an employment lawyer and paying for it. (Interestingly each time the bill was exactly the maximum amount the company was willing to pay :-) It would have been absurd if my company could demand information that is under attorney-client privilege just because they paid the bill. Why did two companies pay the lawyers bill? Because that way they ensure that the separation is without problems. The lawyer explained the settlement contract and what it meant exactly. They also checked that the contract didn’t contain anything unacceptable which the company would have fixed. So if I had tried to sue them later I would have no chance to win (but there was no reason to sue). Another reason not to sue was that the company offered I settlement that was very significantly more than was legally required, but if you sued them you would only get what you got in court - most likely less than you would get without suing. So basically they paid to make sure I would have no reason to sue them later. | While @jqning is absolutely correct in stating that truth is always an "absolute defense" to a claim of defamation, keep in mind that truth can be a subjective thing. What is one person's version of the truth, may not be another's, even with regard to the same exact experience. Also, while "statements of opinion are not defamation" is typically regarded as true, it has very broad exceptions and is not something that can be relied on in isolation. Defamation is generally defined as a false, published statement that is injurious to the plaintiff's reputation. An online posting, even on an obscure website, will likely be seen by a few people, thus satisfying the publication requirement. A plaintiff cannot succeed in his or her online defamation claim if the defendant's defamatory statement is true. So, for example, if a customer posts a review of your restaurant on Trip Advisor claiming that there were roaches crawling around, you may sue them for defamation. You would then have to prove that there was no roach infestation, and thus, the defendant's statement was false. However, what if there was only one? What if he has a witness who saw it? His truth may be different from yours, and it is up to the trier of fact to decide. Also, getting sued, whether or not you prevail, is at minimum a pain and can be a very expensive ordeal. Opinions are exempt? OK: Following that line of reasoning, restaurant owner shows he's had monthly inspections and prophylactic measures to ensure against pests and the exterminator testifies. The defendant, fearing he's in trouble now, claims that his assertion of roach infestation was just his opinion based on his experience. Opinions are privileged under the law of defamation, right? Not always! Importantly, an opinion may be viewed, generally, as a statement of fact (employing the "reasonable person" standard) if it is something that is either provable or disprovable. What this means is that if the reasonable person would construe your statement to be factual, and not mere opinion, it will be deemed as such and if untrue then you're liable for defamation. The courts may interpret, "I think that [restaurant] has a roach infestation problem," as a statement of fact. This has occurred in numerous cases where people think they can say what they want as long as they couch it as an opinion, with words like "I think..." or "In my opinion...". But when someone says something that factual in opinion form, that is not protected. So, if Jane says, "In my opinion Joe Schmoe is a pedophile..." without absolute proof that Joe is, in fact, a pedophile, then this is libelous (defamation if published or spoken to another). This is because the statement in and of itself is one of "verifiable fact couched in opinion" and it is so damaging to Joe's reputation that if it's not true it is libel per se (defamatory if published – meaning shared). A statement of verifiable fact is a statement that conveys a provably false factual assertion, such as someone has committed murder or has cheated on his spouse. While the law varies some, and sometimes substantially, from state to state, here are some often used examples arising from California courts. Libelous (when false): Charging someone with being a communist (in 1959) Calling an attorney a "crook" Describing a woman as a call girl Accusing a minister of unethical conduct Accusing a father of violating the confidence of son Not-libelous: Calling a political foe a "thief" and "liar" in chance encounter (because hyperbole in context) Calling a TV show participant a "local loser," "chicken butt" and "big skank" Calling someone a "bitch" or a "son of a bitch" Changing product code name from "Carl Sagan" to "Butt Head Astronomer" Since libel is considered in context, do not take these examples to be a hard and fast rule about particular phrases. Generally, the non-libelous examples are hyperbole or opinion, while the libelous statements are stating a defamatory fact. Modified photos that can be shown to scandalize persons or businesses are clearly defamation, and are quite popular on social media. So, for example, if you threw the flyers (I assume you didn't but as an example) all over, and then photographed and published your opinion about the business littering neighborhoods, this would be libelous. The less obvious and absurd the modification, the more likely it is that a court will find it defamatory. So, a picture of a woman with a man's naked torso photoshopped on will not be defamatory, a version photoshopped showing what is to be purported to be her naked body, is. In your case, you face two issues that you should ask yourself: Is your opinion really verifiable (or non-verifiable) facts couched in words that try to make it opinion, or is it truly just your opinion. If fact, is it absolutely true? If the answer is yes, it's fact and yes, it's absolutely true, you're OK. Keep in mind though what I mentioned about truths differing: What if the business didn't know they were put there, or, what if they were placed on cars in a public place and blew in the wind? That could be a problem. While you are most likely fine, you may want to just say, X business's fliers are all over the place, littering the neighborhood and (assuming you called and asked them to pick them up, or wrote them) they refuse to pick up the litter. It sounds like the statements you made are fine, because you don't say that the business littered, or that they put them there; you say they are "plastered" all over, but you don't accuse them openly. That isn't to say it wouldn't be found to suggest fact that they would have to show isn't true (or that they didn't get permission from the property owner). My point is only that, in general, be careful. If he felt that you misrepresented what he did by way of distributing fliers, or if he thought you doctored the photo or set it up, he could sue you if he felt it damaged his business's reputation. | Typically in defamation law, claims made persuiant to litigation are not defamatory, since they are going to be tested for validity if the case goes to trial. I'm not familiar with any differences in what is generally done in settlements between the U.K. and the U.S., but since both are Common Law countries, and Settlements are very common in civil proceedings in the U.S., it's a good start. Generally a settlemant can occur anytime before the verdict of the case is rendered, although usually it will happen after preliminary hearings during the Discovery phase. In the U.S., Discovery is very broad and one need not prove that the requested items contain evidence but might contain evidence. This means that, for example, you could request a substantial amount of e-mail records from the opposing party because somewhere on the company e-mail server, there might be something to help your case. And even if after you sift through the emails and find no smoking guns related to your case, you could find some dirty laundry that's unrelated but still damning... if not more so than the initial case. Many people, especially big compainies, would rather just give the ex-employee some what he/she wants, if it means they don't get to see the proverbial man behind the curtain. Additionally the practice might fall into a legally gray area of the law that, if it reaches trial, could hurt the company or even the industry if a judge rules against the company, effectively saying that this gray area is now definately illegal. Better to eat the loss of capital with the settling out of court than to take the much larger hit of the buisness practice being illegalized all together. Typically in settlements, both parties agree to terms and sign a contract. While the whole of the terms are never discussed, almost all include that the plaintiff will drop the case and never bring the matter to court again and that both parties will sign a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) meaning that they won't discuss the rest of the settlement terms with anyone not party to them. If the plaintiff does break the NDA, the defendant can sue for breech of contract and recover at the least the monitary compensation they awarded in the settlement. Conversely, if the respondent breaks the NDA, the plaintiff can refile their initial suit with the addition of breech of contract (and this time it will get to court... and all the dirty laundry sees the harsh light of day.). While the respondent in a settled case can possibly sue for defamation if the plaintiff said the respondent did what the initial suit claimed they did (legally, it was never proven or disproven), or they were guilty (again, since no verdict was reached at trial, no guilt was established), the breech of contract is a much more airtight case and doesn't open up discovery to the respondent's cupability in the settled case (since the breech is about discussing the settled case at all, not the validity of the accusations of the settled case). Typically they would not go this route because then it opens the can of worms the settlement was trying to keep a lid on. |
What responsibility I have by letting customers take payments from their clients on my system I want to let users add their Stripe, Braintree or other payment processors API keys to my system and then let them send links to their clients where they can pay for services or whatever they are asking for. Question is how much responsibility/liability I have taking into account I will only provide a system to connect their payment processor's accounts. I will never receive money from end-users. But domain, where they will be making payments, is mine. Thank you for your help | You have two downvoted answers here. One of them is actually correct, one is nonsense. Question: Which one? Answer: Doesn't matter. If you provide this service without getting advice from a competent lawyer first, your risk is much too high. Making the wrong decision (either giving up on a good business idea without reason, or providing a banking service without license) will cost you much much more than paying a lawyer for advice. | It isn't necessarily "illegal" (in the sense you are committing a crime) but you may be in violation of a verbal contract (which would fall under tort law). Let's take this a bit further. Perhaps Joe Schmoe gave you his debit card information so that you could make deposits for him and he said you could take $5 out for yourself for the trouble. This is a contract between you and Joe for a service. You can't extend Joe's offer to Jane Doe by saying "here is some debit card information, take $2.50 out for yourself". You have no right to extend your contract with Joe to somebody else. Now specifically for passwords it basically boils down to the same thing. Unless Joe gives you explicit permission to give that to somebody else, you can't just decide to unilaterally give what Joe gave you to somebody else. This may be different if Joe said "here, I'm buying you a subscription to service XYZ because you are a nice guy", this may be construed as a gift which transfers ownership. At that point you have control over what is or isn't done with the account. As another example let's say Joe let you borrow his car. You can't turn around and say to Jane, "here's a car you can use", Joe did not extend the offer to Jane, nor did Joe give you the right to extend the offer to another person. It's a moot point though, in the original context of this question, Netflix does restrict you from sharing your passwords "outside your household". Almost every paid service has some restriction against sharing with others. In the end Netflix may shut off Joe's account and Joe may sue you for damages, but you aren't going to be thrown in jail for this. This would be a civil case (tort) which you may be liable for monetary damages. | This involves interaction between legal liability, the nature of online services, and copyright law. If a person does something that causes damage, they may be liable and required to pay for damage. Given the right protected by copyright law, damage results in making unauthorized copies of a work, and the copier can be made to pay. A person who contributes to bringing about damage can also be held responsible, depending on their exact relationship to the damage (copyright infringement in relevant cases), so in Gershwin Publishing v. Columbia Artists, Columbia organized a musical event where various artists did the infringing performances, knowing very well that there was no permission as required by law. The court held that "one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a 'contributory' infringer". There are various nuances regarding how a potential enabler might or might not be held liable. In MGM v. Grokster, Grokster knew that their software was primarily used to disseminate protected material, and encouraged infringement. Similarly (and earlier), Napster was found to be contributorily liable in A&M v. Napster. On the other hand, in Sony v. Universal, it was found that Sony was not liable for selling VCRs which allowed people to infringe copyright, primarily because Sony did not sell the VCR with the intent of aiding copyright infringement. Such "codification" as exists regarding contributory infringement and liability is due to case law. Congress could, if it wanted to (it does not), pass a law saying that no online service can be held liable for copyright infringement. This would require changes in copyright law, since online services do copy content (taking it from a contributor involves copying, delivering it to a customer does to), and they obviously distribute the material (usually by automated means, but that is still distribution). Any use of digital content in fact involves making many copies, almost all of them automatic (copying from an input port to a data buffer; copying from the buffer to disk storage; copying from disk storage to RAM; from RAM to computer registers; etc. where derivatives are "copied" to the speaker or computer screen). This fact makes digital services particularly vulnerable, since virtually everything that they do involves "making a copy". Congress passed the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act as part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which provided a way for online providers to be protected from liability, as long as they have "clean hands" and follow certain rules. The essence of this law is that if you provide a means for copyright owners to inform you of violations, and you respond expeditiously to proper notices by taking down infringing material, you may be protected. Simply posting a notice that says "we do not condone breaking the law" does not eliminate liability. If one takes reasonable steps to prevent infringement, you would not be liable. Apart from copyright infringement, websites can also be engaged in distributing child pornography, which also is against the law (even more so). And once you go outside the US, and are in a country with limited free speech protection, making forbidden statements can get you shut down. Getting "shut down" can come in multiple forms: one, where the company goes out of business because the damages that they have to pay are substantial, and also because the government can directly order a web site shut down (as in the Napster case). If online services are more susceptible to being shut down compared to other businesses, it is probably due to the mistaken feeling of anonymity and failure to understand copyright law. | The linked Bloomberg story quotes the rule as: The recipient is allowed to keep the funds if they [the funds] discharge a valid debt, the recipient made no misrepresentations to induce the payment, and the recipient did not have notice of the mistake. If the recipient, or somone acting on behalf of the recipient, hacked the sender to induce the payment, that sounds like a form of misrepresentation to me. If the hacker is unconnected with the recipient there seems no way that the hacker benefits financially, although I suppose a hacker might simply want to cause an amusing disruption. As I understand it this rule only applies when the sender in fact owes a debt to the recipient that the transfer pays off. If the hacker were working for one of a large group of recipients, most of whom are innocent, and subsequent analysis establishes that there was a hacker, but not who the hacker was or which of the many recipients the hacker was working for, I suspect, but cannot prove, that the doctrine would not apply, because the transfer was not a valid but incorrect act by the sender, but was a fraudulent intervention in the sender's procedures. | Is that extortion? false advertising? or in any way illegal? Not at all. The owner of the site is simply exercising his right as outlined in the terms and conditions from when the user signed up. And giving users an option for continued use of the site (that is, for him not to exercise a right of which they were always aware) does not constitute extortion. | It is rather unclear what the facts are, and the legal answer would depend crucially on those facts. My understanding is that you bought a domain from a provider, and they allowed you to use a web server for some period. It also appears that you don't have a clear understanding of the contract, which may have been made online and you might not have retained a copy of the agreement (which would allow you to look at the terms). The assumption that failing to pay substitutes for explicitly cancelling a service is incorrect. If under the contract you agree to pay a certain amount per year, then you have been racking up charges for some time, and you would need to actually cancel. Ultimately, they could take you to court to force you to pay what you owe, although usually there are less drastic intermediate steps. In court, they would produce their documents to show that you owe money, and your attorney would somehow counter, perhaps by alleging that you had a good-faith belief that the contract had been terminated. It is possible that they simply messed up and failed to send you an invoice earlier, which could explain the lack of invoice. At any rate, the fact that you haven't gotten an invoice does not legally entitle you to avoid paying for the service, whether or not you use it. On the premise that they haven't taken back the domain (seems like they didn't), you can legally use it. However, if you do use it, then that would trash any claim that you believed the contract had been terminated (to argue "I thought it had been canceled" entails "and thus I didn't use the service"). | Yep, you are. You still need to keep the LICENSE and NOTICE files in the repository, if there were any in your copy of the project. These files contain the terms and conditions for the project, and provide attribution to the original developers. If you're trying to attribute in the UI of your application, you probably should. It's considered courteous and in the spirit of open source as well. This is also related: Do I need to include the full text of the MIT license in the UI of my app? | I decided to rewrite this after the clarification in the comments. You can find the old version in the history. The question is not, actually, about a browser extension. It is about a web service that can be accessed by the browser extension. The way to access the service should make little difference, it could be clay tablets, homing pigeons, or this browser extension, what matters is the service. The service has two functions: Receive PII of the victim, sent by the customer, to calculate the probable email of the victim, and return this PII to the customer. The service operator could argue that the customer is really the data controller under GDPR rules, and that the service operator is only the data processor, but that is not a plausible use case. The customer would need to get and document the consent of the victim before the probable mail is calculated, so why would the customer pay the service operator for a service like this? There is already contact with the victim. Generate a database of specific company email patterns to enable 1. This would also use PII, from random employees of the company in question, and there is no customer to shield the service provider by pretending that consent was collected. The way around the first issue might be to sell the database and have all calculations on the customer's system, but that doesn't resolve the second issue, that of creating the database. This involves looking for patterns in PII of individuals, unless the target company is obliging enough to make the pattern public. |
When are government officials protected by legislative immunity? A legislator is being sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violating a constituent's civil rights. The legislator wants to assert legislative immunity as a defense. What is the test for determining whether his actions fall within the scope of the grant of immunity? EDIT: I already understand that "absolute legislative immunity attaches to all actions taken in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity"; my question is how we know whether an action is in that sphere. For the sake of example, imagine that Pat and Dan are neighbors who have always hated each other. Pat is elected the president of the school board. Pat wants to sue Dan for monetary damages based on the following actions: Voting to reduce the number of teachers at Pat Jr.'s school; Defaming Pat in an e-mail to a principal. The message is sent and received using government e-mail addresses, but its content has no connection to school district business. Refusing to let Pat Jr.'s Eagle Scout troop make a presentation to the school board. Ordering the police to arrest Pat for loudly coughing "bullshit" when Dan says he treats everyone fairly. Punching Pat in the parking lot after the meeting. Under generally applicable common-law principles, which of these claims should a court dismiss on the basis of legislative immunity, and what test should it use to decide which claims survive? | Only "legislative acts" give rise to legislative immunity. Perhaps surprisingly, being a legislator is neither necessary nor sufficient for the privilege to apply. A defendant would need to assert the act in question was essentially a legislative activity. Quoting from the Federal Judicial Center's extensive paper on section 1983: State and local legislators enjoy absolute immunity for their legislative acts. Under the functional approach to immunity, the critical issue is whether the official was engaged in legislative activity. The determination of an act’s legislative or executive character “turns on the nature of the act, rather than on the motive or intent of the official performing it.” Legislative action involves the formulation of policy, whereas executive action enforces and applies the policy in particular circumstances. The primary case cited is Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 49 (1998), Bogan further cites Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367, 372, 372-376 in clarifying questions of the defendant's intent or motive are irrelevant as long as the act is part of a legislative activity. So proposing, drafting, voting or debating (for or against) a specific measure fall within the immunity, regardless of the claimed improper motive for doing them. For example, in Bogan, Scott-Harris made arguments that closing of a government department was motivated by racial animus which violated her civil rights as the only employee in the department. The high court found that closing the departmental was essentially a legislative activity regardless of claims about improper motive for the action. Officials outside the legislative branch are entitled to legislative immunity when they perform legislative functions. Bogan also shows the privilege applied not only to the legislators, but the mayor (an executive), because his actions in drawing up a budget proposing the closing of the department, and his signing the action into law were of essentially parts of the legislative process. IMHO, the hypothetical examples now in the question, only act #1 seems to be making a policy decision similar to legislation activity. | Ballot photos Anti-ballot-photo laws may not be constitutional. Two of them have been struck down for violating the 1st Amendment. Rideout v Gardner Case 1:14-cv-00489-PB Indiana Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Inc., d/b/a American Civil Liberties Union of Indiana v. Indiana Secretary of State, et al., Case 1:15-cv-1356-SEB-DML California's has been amended by the legislature to allow disclosure of a filled-in ballot as long as it isn't part of violating some other law (like vote buying). Open container laws Open-container laws have never been held to be unconstitutional. These are state laws, and states have broad freedom to legislate as long as they don't violate their constitution or elements of the Federal Constitution that have been incorporated by the 14th Amendment. My guess is that they would be upheld because they would pass rational basis review: they are rationally related to a legitimate government interest. Here is an example of an open-container law surviving a constitutional challenge. State are encouraged to pass open-container laws by 23 USC 154. If a state does not have an open container law, they receive less federal highway funding. This kind of condition was upheld by South Dakota v. Dole. | No, it is not. Section 1 allows legislatures to infringe all Charter rights under certain reasonable circumstances. Section 33 is an alternative method by which legislatures can completely ignore the Charter rights that it can be applied to (ss. 2 & 7 to 15). Section 33 is a legislative procedural provision, it is not in itself an inherent right which would be subject to Section 1. Furthermore, reading Section 1 to apply in this way to Section 33 would completely eviscerate the meaning of Section 33 since it is a stronger mechanism for violating Charter rights. Case law on this is few due to the relative rarity of legislatures invoking the Section 33 notwithstanding clause and the fact that invoking it is generally a shield to judicial review. However, while not explicitly confirming what I said, Ford v. Quebec (AG) [1988] 2 SCR 712 basically takes for granted the above and applies it (note it can be a confusing read due to three different Charters being involved). In it, ss. 58 & 69 of Quebec's Charter of the French Language were disputed. Due to legislative hijinks*, it was unclear whether either section was covered by an invocation of the notwithstanding clause. The Court first undertook a procedural analysis to determine whether the notwithstanding clause applied and found that s. 58 was covered, but s. 69 was not (para. 34). Only after that did it address the substantive rights issues. While still analysing both ss. 58 & 69 to fall within the guarantees of Charter s. 2(b), the court only concluded s. 69 to infringe the Charter since (implicitly) s. 58 was not eligible for such a determination by virtue of the notwithstanding clause (para. 60). As Charter rights were found to be infringed, the Court then examined whether s. 69 could saved under Section 1. It could not, thus rendering it an unjustifiable infringement of the Charter (para. 73). *To keep this answer both short and focussed on law, we really do not have time to get into the Quebec government's initial responses to the passage of the Constitution Act, 1982. | There's been recent publicity about an American diplomat in Britain responsible for a car accident that killed someone. She claimed diplomatic immunity and left the country. Could the victim's family sue her in an American court? They could sue, but the case would probably be summarily dismissed, often one of the following two grounds: (1) related to diplomatic immunity, but not specifically covered by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, such as common law sovereign immunity which bars suits against individuals or their employers for actions taken in an official capacity on behalf of a federal government employer (the scope of which is interpreted broadly in the case of diplomatic personnel abroad, much as it is in the case of what conduct of the President of the United States constitutes an action taken in an official capacity), unless waived. Cf. Cruikshank v. U.S., 431 F.Supp. 1355 (D. Hawaii 1977) ("Alleged activities of agents of Central Intelligence Agency in opening and photographing sealed, first-class letters mailed by plaintiff to colleagues in the Soviet Union fell within purview of general waiver of sovereign immunity statute, despite claim that Central Intelligence Agency agents involved could not have been legally authorized to carry out such activities and consequently, as matter of law, were not “acting within the scope of their office or employment,” as that phrase is used in this section.") If a diplomat is acting in an official capacity, lawsuits can be filed against the U.S. government, but not against the individual, and can't only be brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, and only then if an exception to it does not apply. The FTCA is the "exclusive means by which a party may sue the United States for money damages ... in tort" (28 USC § 2679. Exclusiveness of remedy). Accordingly, an FTCA action "can be brought only in a United States District Court" (28 USC § 1346(b)). Regarding the timing of filing, FTCA's § 2401(b) states that the action must be brought "within two years after the claim accrues," or "within six months after ... notice of final denial of the claim by the agency". In addition, under the FTCA, "Liability is determinable in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred" (§1346(b)(1)). More fully, 28 USC § 1346(b)(1) states: Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district courts, together with the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. But, 28 U.S.C. 2680(k) expressly precludes the exercise of jurisdiction under the FTCA over "[a]ny claim arising in a foreign country." See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197 (1993) (FTCA does not apply to claims arising in Antarctica). "It is a longstanding principle of American law `that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.' " Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949). Basically, sovereign immunity is absolute for torts committed abroad in an official capacity by a U.S. government official of any kind. So, if the official capacity conduct claim is barred by diplomatic immunity where it occurred, it is barred everywhere. or (2) in cases not arising from actions taken in the diplomat's official capacity, on the discretionary quasi-jurisdictional grounds of forum non conveniens, even thought American courts, as a general rule, have jurisdiction over all civil claims of private persons arising anywhere in the world against a person who is domiciled in the state where the state or federal court in question is located. For over a quarter century, federal judges have assumed that foreign injury cases, particularly those filed by foreign plaintiffs, are best litigated abroad. . . . Federal judges approach the forum non conveniens decision as if it were a species of choice of law, as opposed to a choice of forum question. Elizabeth T. Lear, "National Interests, Foreign Injuries, and Federal Forum Non Conveniens", 41(2) U.C.-Davis Law Review 559 (2007). One of the leading forum non conviens cases pertinent to this fact pattern is Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981), involving an airplane crash in Scotland in which U.S. defendants were allegedly at fault. Potential loopholes in that decision have been closed by subsequent cases. Federal judges are all that matter in a lawsuit between a foreigner and a U.S. person involving claims in excess of $75,000 (which essentially all personal injury cases worth bringing internationally do), such as the one contemplated in this case, which fall within the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts and can be removed from a state court to a federal court. (And, state courts tend to defer to federal precedents in diversity cases in claims which are not removed from state court to federal court.) The Alien Tort Claim Act expressly authorizes certain lawsuits in U.S. Courts for violations of international law or treaties committed abroad (although whether the judicial power extends to cases where all of the defendants are non-U.S. persons is an issue of ongoing dispute), but not for simple common law torts like the negligence actions that are the basis of most automobile accident cases. There are also other specific statutes that might authorize lawsuits (e.g. civil rights statutes, patent laws, copyright laws, etc.), but none of them would ordinarily apply to a simple automobile accident allegedly causing a wrongful death. It is conceivable that an attorney could find some way to thread a needle through these two strong limitations on bringing suit against U.S. diplomats in U.S. courts for personal injuries caused by ordinary common law torts committed abroad which are barred by diplomatic immunity where they occurred, but it would take extraordinary facts that do not appear to be present in this relatively routine automobile accident allegedly wrongfully causing a death of a non-U.S. person. Could she be criminally prosecuted in America because of what she did in Britain? No. The Vienna Convention only directly limits criminal prosecutions of people with diplomatic immunity in jurisdictions where someone is a credentialed diplomat or head of state. But, usually criminal cases can only be prosecuted in the jurisdiction where they are committed or the jurisdiction to which the crime was directed if a crime is committed outside a prosecuting jurisdiction but directed at a victim or target in the prosecuting jurisdiction. There are federal statutes criminalizing conduct victimizing various U.S. government officials, but very few criminalizing conduct that would otherwise not be a crime subject to U.S. criminal prosecution if it is committed by a U.S. government official abroad (in some cases, a violation of civil rights claims might apply, but not in a car accident case like this one). Note that I am limiting this to a criminally culpable automobile accident against a non-U.S. person while diplomatic credentials were in force. There might be a U.S. prosecution of a diplomat, for example, for espionage in the form of revealing U.S. secrets, or as another example, for a rape of one U.S. person who has diplomatic immunity by some other U.S. person at the same embassy. The cases could arguably be directed at the U.S. or a U.S. person. The most negative U.S. consequence that could arise from criminal conduct that did not take place in the U.S. and was not directed at the U.S. or a U.S. person (for civilians not subject to the U.S. Code of Military Justice) would usually be termination of employment at the U.S. State Department and termination of diplomatic credentials, both of which would have prospective application only. | So can Congress itself just declare someone guilty of insurrection and bar them from standing in elections, without that being considered a bill of attainder? No. Even if it isn't a bill of attainder, the Congress can't do that. Or do they have to delegate the finding of fact (in re insurrection) to another body, e.g. to the judiciary? The issue would be presented when someone ran for public office and their qualifications were challenged, and would be resolved by state and local election officials, subject to judicial review. If that was not done, Congress could nonetheless refuse to recognize a state certification of someone's election on these grounds. | In Wisconsin, right after the perjury law, they have a law prohibiting "false swearing". It applies if a person: Makes or subscribes 2 inconsistent statements under oath or affirmation or upon signing a statement pursuant to s. 887.015 in regard to any matter respecting which an oath, affirmation, or statement is, in each case, authorized or required by law or required by any public officer or governmental agency as a prerequisite to such officer or agency taking some official action, under circumstances which demonstrate that the witness or subscriber knew at least one of the statements to be false when made. The period of limitations within which prosecution may be commenced runs from the time of the first statement. So even if they couldn't actually get you for perjury, they could get you for violating this law. Perjury and false swearing are both class H felonies, so you can expect the same punishment. I am going to guess that the existence of this law suggests that it was needed to cover what would otherwise be a loophole in the perjury law, but I can't say for sure. | In principle, police are liable for the safety of anyone they detain. If an officer creates a hazardous condition, as was described in this scenario, he or his agency (which effectively means the taxpayers who fund his agency) can be held liable for damages resulting from that action. (Whether it is the officer or instead the taxpayers who get stuck with the bill is a separate question of "qualified immunity.") This idea has been formalized under two theories: The "special relationship doctrine" would apply in this case because the officer was detaining the driver. Otherwise, the liability could be argued under the more broad "state-created danger doctrine." | How can incitement of imminent lawless action not be constitutionally protected? The short answer to your question is "because the Supreme Court of the United States said so." In Brandenburg v. Ohio SCOTUS found that the Constitution protects speech that calls for lawless action in the abstract but does not protect speech "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action". The court's per curiam opinion seems to treat the decision as self-evident - it's quite short after discussing the facts of the case. However, Justice William O. Douglas wrote a concurring opinion (his "caveat") that discussed and was critical of previous decisions in such cases, including the use of the 'clear and present danger test', so his opinion is useful for a brief history of First Amendment judgments to that point (Brandenburg). The Declaration of Independence is not law. Following "a history of repeated injuries and usurpations" and failures to reach political settlements it asserts a moral right to overthrow the tyranny of the British crown. It alludes to rights, it does not "enshrine" or create a legal right that the judiciary can interpret. Judges might refer to the Declaration in their judgments, not using it as legal authority but an articulation of fundamental values. |
Bought a book that is in the public domain ... but the T&A of company says I can't redistribute it I purchased an ebook that I'm 100% sure is in the public domain (published in 70's, no copyright notice or copyright reg with us office). However, the company I bought the ebook from has this in their terms and agreements that I had to agree to before checking out: "all content included on this site, such as ... digital downloads ... is the property of [company]". To clarify the website that I purchased the book from is the same company that originally published/ wrote the book. So, my question: While this document is in the public domain, can I legally redistribute it, or due to the terms and agreements can I not? | The text may be public domain in the United States It depends on when it was created/published. The eBook is subject to its own copyright The eBook itself is a derivative work and subject to its own copyright protection. The translation of an ink and paper book into an eBook contains enough artistic choice to trigger copyright protection. If the original is really public domain, you can copy the text but not the eBook. | Their code, their rules A copyright holder is free to offer their work under none, one or many licences. They can, at the same time, use their own work however they see fit without regard to the licences they have given/sold to others (except, they can only give one person an exclusive licence). As an analogy, let’s say I own a fleet of cars. I can drive my cars anytime I want. I can let Jim drive my cars anytime he wants for free. I can let Mary drive a specific car on Thursdays and only within 10km of the depot. I can let Joe drive my cars providing he pays me $50 a day. And I’m not going to let Fred drive them at all because Fred’s a jerk. Each of those is a different licence. | Basically, statement 3 above is correct. The owner of the copyright in a work may release that work unmder different, even incompatible, licenses, as many times as s/he chooses to do. None of these releases cancels or invalidates any other. A person who obtains a work from a site where it is listed under a particular license, may rely on that license grant. The owner may (if the site allows) modify the license or remove the posted work, but this does not invalidate the license granted to those who obtained the work before any modification or removal. An incorrect or incomplete copyright notice does not, under current law. invalidate the copyright, and to the best of my understanding will not invalidate either of the license mentioen in the question. | It's not clear to me that your website is, per se, illegal. (Though good luck finding a webhost with a hard drive large enough to store it. Harry Potter and the Philosopher's Stone is roughly 38,000 characters. If I've done my calculations correctly, storing all of the strings of this length or shorter would require something like 1053760 GB of storage. Give or take.) The main problem is in distributing the "index" of the string containing the text of Harry Potter and the Sorcerer's Stone. This index is just the integer obtained by taking the entire text as a string and treating it as a number in base 26 (A = 1, B = 2, etc.) In other words, all of the information contained in the book is also contained in the index number, and in a relatively simple way. Distributing this number is therefore entirely equivalent to distributing the text; you don't need the website at all. It's entirely analogous to e-mailing the text to someone else; in that process, the text is transformed into a number (in binary, under a different encoding scheme) along the way. But you couldn't seriously argue in a court of law that you were not distributing the text, you were just telling a friend about a very large number. Just to back this up with some actual law citation: US copyright law gives the copyright owner the exclusive right to make and distribute copies of the work. And a "copy" is defined as follows: “Copies” are material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. In other words, J.K. Rowling (and/or her publishers) have the exclusive rights to distribute that integer, since the work is "fixed" in it by its very nature, and since the work can be reproduced from it. | You can't, in general, know whether a distributor of a work has permission to distribute, or is a pirate site. I verified that they have posted an illegal copy of a work that I created, and I know that I did not grant permission to them (or anyone) to infringe my copyright. Both hosting and downloading works without permission is a violation of copyright law, so both parties are liable. Downloaders may erroneously rely on the "I didn't know!" defense, which in the US carries no legal weight. Even so, if you download my book, it will probably cost me vastly more to sue you for infringement than the damages that I might be awarded over your infringement. Usually, copyright holders go after the pirate sites, and only rarely go after particularly egregious serial downloaders. | Under U.S. copyright law, the First Sale Doctrine protects such conduct. As the U.S. Justice Department explains: The first sale doctrine, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109, provides that an individual who knowingly purchases a copy of a copyrighted work from the copyright holder receives the right to sell, display or otherwise dispose of that particular copy, notwithstanding the interests of the copyright owner. The right to distribute ends, however, once the owner has sold that particular copy. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) & (c). U.S. law with respect to the First Sale Doctrine is typical, and copyright law is fairly uniform internationally due to some relevant intellectual property treaties. But there are hundreds of countries in the world, and some of them might not include the First Sale Doctrine in their jurisprudence. For example, I do not know how this would be handled under the laws of the People's Republic of China, or under Islamic law. | You also retain the right to license the work to others. Therefore you can sell similar rights to MusicBook and anyone else, as long as you do not grant an exclusive license (you have already licensed another party to distribute). They do not gain the right to sub-license your work. If you had executed a copyright transfer, you would have no rights to the work whatsoever (leaving out moral rights for jurisdictions that have them and where they are absolute). | Everything you see there is copyright and trademark the Tolkien estate or a derivative work thereof. It's all illegal. |
What does the US Constitution mean by "bribery"? The US Constitution mentions several specific crimes as impeachable offences. Among these is "bribery". In the English language as it existed at the time of the framers, did this single term refer to "offering a bribe", "soliciting a bribe", or both? | TL;DNR: At the time of the Founding, bribery covered both giving and taking a bribe. Two definitions of bribery from the Founding Era. It is often hard to say exactly what a word meant "in the English language as it existed at the time of the framers." However, in this case, it's not hard. It’s easy! There are plenty of examples of people defining bribery to include both giving and receiving. I’ve picked two. The first is Lord Mansfield, one of the most distinguished English judges of the 18th century. In 1769, he defined bribery in the case of Rex v. Vaughan, which involved an attempt to bribe a privy councilor. Mansfield’s definition was widely quoted by American judges and treatise writers well into the 20th Century: Wherever it is a crime to take, it is a crime to give. They are reciprocal. And in many cases...the attempt is a crime. The second definition comes Noah Webster. He defined bribery in 1828, in the first edition of his American Dictionary of the English Language. Bribery: The act or practice of giving or taking rewards for corrupt practices; the act of paying or receiving a reward for a false judgment, or testimony, or for the performance of that which is known to be illegal, or unjust. It is applied both to him who gives, and to him who receives the compensation… A Bonus: James Madison on the language of the Constitution James Madison was one of the architects of the Constitution. He played a major role in drafting the Constitution and the Bill of Right, and in the campaigns to get them ratified. It is not clear that he thought the meaning of the words at the Founding would be all that useful in figuring out what the Constitution means. In Federalist 37, he discussed the role of language in deciding what the Constitution meant. He was writing to answer critics who claimed the text of the Constitution was too unclear and vague. Here is what he said: All new laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill, and passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and adjudications. Madison went on to say that human language is so deeply flawed that when God uses it, even His messages are “rendered dim and doubtful by the cloudy medium through which it is communicated.” Although Madison's prose can be hard to follow, Federalist # 37 is worth a look. | Trespass to chattels — which is "intentionally… dispossessing another of the chattel, or using or intermeddling with a chattel in the possession of another." But don't hold your breath re having a valid case. An attempt to sue would likely be dismissed as de minimis. This is just a trivial interpersonal issue. | I don't think that's an accurate interpretation of the statement. The key difference between the two scenarios is the defendant's legal assessment of who owns the necklace. In the first he thinks he is the owner and can claim mistake of law; in the second, he he thinks someone else is the owner, so he cannot. To say he believes "the law allows for someone to do whatever they want with lost property even if they know who the rightful owner is" is very different from saying he thinks he's the owner. He doesn't think he's the legal owner, he just thinks he has legal rights that include some rights associated with ownership. So if the defendant's statement had actually been, "I thought I was the owner," that would have been a successful defense when the crime requires depriving the owner of the property. The defense was actually, "I thought I was allowed to deprive the owner of the property," which is an admission of guilt when the crime requires depriving the owner of the property. There are a couple questions here: a. A different crime that did not require intent -- or even required a different kind of intent -- could still lead to a conviction. A legislature is free to define larceny differently, so it could say that anyone who recklessly or negligently deprives another of property is guilty. Or it could say that your state of mind doesn't matter and that depriving another of property is larceny regardless of intent. b. In most cases, the mistake of law defense requires that the defendant honestly believe in the mistake; unlike mistake of fact, it does not require that his belief also be reasonable. Either way, the question of reasonableness would probably be a question for a jury, so a judge wouldn't be able to reject it (except in a bench trial). c. Mistake of law is a potential defense to any crime that requires an intent to do something that requires an assessment of what the law is. So if it's illegal to intentionally have sex with a woman who is not your wife, and you mistakenly believed you were in a legal marriage, sex with your non-wife would not be a crime. It has potentially very broad implications, but keep in mind that in many cases, the mistake a defendant would have to claim would be pretty far out there. If it were illegal to intentionally let anyone under 21 years old into your bar, I guess you could argue that you only let a 20-year-old in because you thought the law started calculating at conception, but I doubt you'll convince a jury. Mistake of law defenses still pop up pretty regularly. Here's one just yesterday from the Tenth Circuit. And this one is a Kansas case where a conviction for carrying a weapon while a felon was overturned because the court wouldn't allow a mistake-of-law defense. The Kansas case, though, uses the more modern definition of mistake of law, which also includes reasonable reliance on official statements from the government. In that case, the felon's parole officer had told him that it was OK to carry a pocketknife, but in reality, the law titled "Criminal possession of a firearm by a convicted felon" prohibited carrying knives, as well. | It sounds less like bribery (where you give someone a benefit in exchange for an official act) than like extortion (where you threaten some harm in the absence of an act). | I've retracted and replaced my previous answer. It is a citation to legal authority. It is probably a reference to the book "Hale, The History of the Pleas of the Crown Hale PC" (originally published 1736 with later editions also printed) (see 4.2.3) with Hale abbreviated "Hal.", "pl." being an abbreviation for "plea" (see 4.2.2) and "cr." being an abbreviation for "crown". Standard citation form is to spell it out, but if it is cited repeatedly later instances might be abbreviated. The link is to a scanned version of the out of copyright historical legal treatise on criminal procedure and substantive criminal law. Wikipedia also discusses it as does a law library Wiki. | Is official misconduct simply the act of "abusing public office" (or close to that)? There is no clear definition of malfeasance in office, or rather, there are many different definitions because there are so few appeals court judgments about it. Common elements of what definitions there are, are: First, malfeasance in office requires an affirmative act or omission. Second, the act must have been done in an official capacity—under the color of office. Finally, that that act somehow interferes with the performance of official duties—though some debate remains about "whose official" duties. It does not, necessarily, require that the malfeasance be criminal or unlawful in and of itself (i.e. things that would be unlawful if the person wasn't a public official), however, it really helps in obtaining a conviction. Did the judge act outside of the scope of his duties by even considering standing in a probable cause determination? Absolutely not. Standing is one of the matters a judge is required to consider. He may have got the decision wrong but that is why we have appeals courts. What in the citizen's complaint rule provides for the citizen's "closeness" to the crime? If nothing, then what else could the judge have based that decision on? It is a fundamental part of the common law that a person must have standing to bring a case. A statute can specifically grant or deny a class of people standing but if it doesn't the common law rule flows through. For a person to have standing absent a grant in the specific statute they must be sufficiently close to the act or omission that they have suffered damage or may yet do so. In general, just because the act or omission affects "all citizens" or "all taxpayers" is not generally enough - it must affect you personally and substantially enough to warrant the state dedicating scant resources to it. Time a court spends dealing with any particular case is time it cannot spend on every other case - probable cause is the judicial equivalent of medical triage. | The main legal impediment to such action is that nonviolent political actions are not rebellion or insurrection. Interpreting the meaning of these terms arises in litigating insurance claims (where there is often a clause denying coverage in case of insurrection or rebellion), e.g. Younis Bros. v. CIGNA Worldwide Ins. where the matter was the Liberian civil war. Neither "insurrection" nor "rebellion" are defined under the statute, therefore they have their ordinary meanings. The ordinary meaning of "insurrection" does not include Congress overstepping its authority (if that happened), nor, in general, would it include an illegal act by a public official. Reference to 18 USC 2381, 2382, 2383 2384 is common in suits files under sovereign citizen theories of law, which courts deftly dispose of because the plaintiff has no standing in criminal matters. However, various Freedom of Information cases involving FBI investigations such as Shaw v. FBI, Friedman v. FBI, 605 F. Supp. 306 have suggested that the FBI can investigate a possible violation of 18 USC 2383 which does not involve open civil war. Various cases like Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Scalia dissent), Padilla v. Hanft have supported the proposition that persons engaged in open war against the US can be prosecuted under this section. As far as I can determine, no case has supported the notion that a nonviolent action exceeding legal authority constitutes violation of that law. In US v. Silverman, 248 F.2d 671 the court mentions that "conspiring to overthrow the Government by force and violence" is prohibited by that statute. Furthermore, since the actions in this specific instance involve stuff that happened on the floor of the House, they are constitutionally completely immune. Article 1, Section 6 of the Constitution says of Congress They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place. So while a Congressman can be arrested for racketeering or breach of the peace traveling to a session, they cannot be tried for what they say in session. I think they could be arrested for assassinating the Speaker while in session, but not for advocating assassination in a speech or debate. | In general, you cannot contract to do anything illegal. However, ... An argument could be made that permission has been granted to, for example, enter property and remove the item. If permission has been granted, entering property and taking an item is not a crime. |
Copyright of vocabulary collections? I recently stumbled across an answer to a question stating that certain content could not be copyrighted. I wonder if this is also the case for collections of vocabs found online. Can they be copyrighted? Are they intellectual property? Does it make a difference if the vocab list has a title? If the original author of the vocabs gives me permission to use them in certain ways (licenses them and grants me certain rights), am I allowed to obtain them from the platform they uploaded them to (if the vocabs are publicly available there) or does the platform need to consent as well? Edit: to clarify what kind of lists I'm talking about, here's their "format" (if it matters): A (quite short) title Sorted (not alphabetically, order chosen by copyright holder) vocab and translation + eventually annotations in vocab or translation Random example by me (in the spirit of, but not one of the collections I'm talking about): Title: "Some Connectors for Argumentative Texts" Vocabs like: thereafter (english vocab) (causal) (annotation): demnach/demzufolge (german vocab) (wie "because of this") (annotation) | Words themselves are not protected by copyright. Curated lists of words, however, are (what's protected is the artful collection of words chosen for a purpose). Hence Hasbro owns the copyright in the list of playable words, though it is a matter for future possible litigation to see if the courts agree. If you have permission from the copyright holder, that permission (license) should state how you can use the list (it does not matter if there is a title). However, you may need to obtain the list from the copyright holder. The website operator presumably already has a license, the terms of which may allow them to prevent you from copying from the website. E.g. the author may have granted the website operator the right to use the list as long as they don't restrict redistribution; but that license may also require restricting redistribution. So you also have to study the website terms of use – or get a copy directly from the copyright holder (assuming that that is the original author). | You cannot claim copyright protection of the underlying work, but you can claim protection for your contribution. Under 17 USC 101, the resulting work is a derivative work: A “derivative work” is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a “derivative work”. As an "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression", the work is protected by copyright law: but that only applies to the modifications that you added. | Yes because the translated song is a derivative work. 17 U.S. Code § 103 (a) The subject matter of copyright as specified by section 102 includes compilations and derivative works Derivative works is defined in § 101 A “derivative work” is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation... FWIW, § 102 says (a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship include the following categories... (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; | The term in copyright law for such a "platform" is a "collective work" or "compilations ". US law, 17 USC 101, says: A “collective work” is a work, such as a periodical issue, anthology, or encyclopedia, in which a number of contributions, constituting separate and independent works in themselves, are assembled into a collective whole. The laws of other countries are similar in this respect. Each individual item in a collective work has a separate copyright, held by the author, author's employer, or whoever the copyright may have been transferred to, as the case may be. There is a copyright in the collective work itself. This protects the selection and arrangement of the individual items, as well as editorial matter such as an introduction, index, and notes on individual items furnished as part of the collection. Even when individual items are in the public domain, the collection may have a copyright. For example, if someone prepares a CD of Best Bach Fugues the individual compositions are of course in the public domain, and the recordings might well be, depending on the circumstances. But the choice of which fugues are "Best", which recordings of those fugues to select, and what order to p-resent them in are all the creative work of to compiler, and those are protected by copyright. If some other person published a CD of Great Bach Fugues copying the selection and arrangement of the individual recordings, that would be an infringement (unless permission had been obtained). This is true only when there is creative effort in the selection and arrangement. A collection of all known Bach fugues, arranged chronologically, would be a "natural or obvious" arrangement, and not protected by copyright, just as would a complete collection of the works of Dickens, say, arranged in alphabetical order. See Feist vs Rural for more on the degree of originality needed in a collection. Of course, sometimes the publisher of a collection obtains the copyrights of individual items. It was once common for magazines to purchase the copyright of articles that they published, but now it is more common that they merely obtain a limited license for their use. But the copyrights are still separate, even if the holder is the same. To quote the US law on the topic, 17 USC 103 provides that: (a) The subject matter of copyright as specified by section 102 includes compilations and derivative works, but protection for a work employing preexisting material in which copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in which such material has been used unlawfully. (b) The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only to the material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material. The copyright in such work is independent of, and does not affect or enlarge the scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright protection in the preexisting material. M<y understanding is that on this point the laws of most other countries are similar. | The closest that you can come to an official list is the registry maintained by the US copyright office. That tells you which copyrights have been registered, and does not tell you much about items not on the list. But, if a work is registered (and the copyright has not expired, which you can calculate), you know it is not in the public domain. The question is a bit odd, because I don't see how you could ever need to prove legally that a random work is not in the public domain. Copyright is inherent in the act of creating a work and requires no additional actions, under current law. If you know the date of creation of the work, you can figure out whether the work is old enough that its copyright has expired. If you know that the work is "prepared by an officer or employee of the United States Government as part of that person’s official duties", you know that it never was protected. These are the main sources of "being in the public domain" under US law, but the law doesn't actually talk about "public domain", it says when things are or are not protected by copyright. A third source for being "in the public domain" is a "public domain" license, there an author says something sounding like "anybody can use this work as they see fit". CC0 is one attempt to emulate the concept of "public domain", by waiving rights and granting permission. Still, the work is protected by copyright if not in one of the two actual public domain categories. Also, under 17 USC 203 such a license can be terminated under certain conditions (during a period between 35 to 40 years after creating the work, approximately). | Arguably not (or, the example terms are not restricted by copyright, but not for the reasons given, which means this protection may not extend past the examples given in all cases). The protection for "stock characters" comes from the "Scènes à faire" doctrine, which protects elements that are elementary and near-required to be part of a genre. For example, a fairy tale is "obligated" to start with "Once upon a time" and end with "And they lived happily ever after". Character classes, by virtue of being character classes, do not qualify under this doctrine to me, simply by virtue of being "character classes". What matters are: a) the terms used for the classes are generic b) there is prior art to any claimed copyright, with uses of such terms in fantasy fiction stretching back at least hundreds of years and predating, for example, modern English. Note that the above is not universal to all character classes. For example, if you had classes whose names that directly related to various other copyrighted works IP (e.g. "Jedi Councilor", "Yogo Wardmaster", "Grey Warden", "Aes Sedai", "Asha'man" "Eversor Assassin"), those could still be infringing copyright. | Here's one way to avoid the issue altogether: Wikipedia, or anyone for that matter, can't copyright information (only its expression). You can reword (automate the process?) the content (ie, w/out doing "independent research") and it's yours! Of course, I'm not a lawyer so consult one of those. | Let’s work it through Is the work copyright? Yes. Are you making a copy or a derivative work? Yes. Do you have permission? No. At this point, it is prima facie copyright violation. However, various copyright laws have defences for breach. You don’t say where you are but as the USA is the most permissive in this regard we’ll use the USA. If it’s not legal there, it’s not legal anywhere. If it is legal there, it’s still likely to be not legal everywhere else. is it fair use? Almost certainly not. Wizards of the Coast (the copyright owner) already do this. While this service is free for creatures from the Monster Manual, it does drive traffic to their web site where they sell stuff. They also licence (presumably for money) others to do the same. Your usage would negatively affect the copyright owners market. This counts against fair use. Because it’s already being done, your work has virtually nil transformative value. This counts against fair use. You are copying a substantial part of the work. This counts against fair use. You are not using it commercially but neither is it for educational use. This is unlikely to matter. On balance: not fair use. TL;DR This is copyright violation. |
Court Decisions where Ethereum Blockchain was used to determine a verdict I asked on https://ethereum.stackexchange.com/, and was directed here. Where can I find actual cases where Blockchain (particularly Ethereum Blockchain) was used in a case, or better yet, decided the verdict of a case. Blockchain technology can be used to create "smart contracts". So far, I searched findlaw.com, and I get articles on the promise of Blockchain. | Where can I find actual cases where Blockchain (particularly Ethereum Blockchain) was used in a case, or better yet, decided the verdict of a case The results of this query reflect that that has not happened in U.S. courts yet. Mentions of Ethereum in those rulings are marginal and essentially unrelated to the blockchain technology on which major cryptocurrencies are implemented. That being said, the notion of smart contracts in Ethereum is quite distant from the disputes decided under contract law. In Ethereum, "smart contracts" is the term for programs that will execute a transaction in accordance to a predetermined schedule and/or conditions. Its involvement in contract law seemingly might only be in terms of (1) parties not furnishing the requisite keys, thereby frustrating the execution of that transaction, or (2) the implementation of those programs departing from what was agreed upon between the parties. Neither of these aspects has anything to do with the novelties spoken of Blockchain. Moreover, the expertise that programming and Blockchain entail implies that verdicts (or more precisely, the fact-finding therefor) would be premised on testimony provided by an expert witness. The average juror is unlikely to have the knowledge and skills set to assess the evidence (e.g. Blockchain, smart contracts, etc.) more directly. | The primary field of research where the kind of studies you are thinking about are done is often called "empirical legal research." There is a fairly rich literature, that a substantial minority of practitioners in the relevant areas are guided by, in the area of issues related to jury trials: how jury composition influences outcomes, how juries make decisions, the difference in outcomes between jury trials and bench trials, the fact patterns that are prone to wrongful convictions or mistakes about the facts in civil cases, techniques that influence jury decision making outcomes, and the kinds of awards juries tend to make of non-economic damages in particular kinds of cases. Another area where there is a fairly rich literature that a smaller minority of practitioners reference concerns the facts that influence likelihood of success on appeal, which in turn influences the decision to appeal or not appeal a case, or to bring collateral attacks on a trial court decision (e.g. in habeas corpus review of a criminal conviction). A third area where empirical studies guide a minority of practitioners is the more general literature on negotiation which is used to influence how both transaction negotiations and settlement discussion negotiations, are conducted. In most other areas, empirical literature is used mostly to evaluate risk, either to determine its materiality in connection with worrying about it in planning a transaction, or in the early stages of a lawsuit. In these areas this is incorporated holistically into the general career experience and life experience of the attorneys involved. For example, there is an empirical literature that demonstrates that small business bankruptcies rarely successfully reorganize a business and usually result in tax creditors receiving most of the available assets, while big business bankruptcies usually do successfully reorganize (with some industries more successful than others) and tend to pay different kinds of creditors different proportions of their claims. This literature influences the decisions of individual creditors regarding what kind of cases to pursue more or less aggressively, and also influences how lawyers familiar with this literature advise clients about the risks involved in particular investments. Likewise, there is a literature on the likelihood of small business success over particular time frames with additional other factors considered (e.g. franchise v. non-franchise). | This is a developing area within the law. In the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (Computer Fraud and Abuse Act) governs. However, the law is broadly written. This means creative prosecutors can and do win federal criminal cases by arguing the law should apply. Whether violating a website's terms of service should be considered a federal crime subject to the Act has been a subject of hot debate. In United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012), the 9th Circuit decided violations of use should be considered breaches rather than crimes. However, the district court refused to dismiss some charges against Nosal when the case was returned, and a jury conviction resulted in a prison sentence. At least three different circuits have arrived at other interpretations of the CFAA. Draft legislation (H.R. 2454 and S. 1196) would limit the scope of the CFAA by excluding TOS violations, however, it hasn't been adopted as of this writing. That CAPTCHA breaking violates website terms of service isn't really in question. For example, see U.S. v. Lowson, 10-cr-114, U.S. District Court, District of New Jersey (Newark) in which the judge brought a criminal case to which two defendants plead guilty to wire fraud, one plead guilty to misdemeanor computer crimes, and a fourth went on the lam. But does for-profit CAPTCHA solving violate U.S. law? Given the state of the law, one could make a case either way. Given the industry's reputation, serious questions about intended use, and questionable labor practices, that's a significant risk. | The GDPR does indeed require that the password be stored "securely". It does not specify the technology which must be used for that purpose. Hashing the PW is a common method, and should be sufficient if properly implemented (strong hash function, use of salt, etc). But other methods of securing the password might be sufficient. Encrypting the PW rather than hashing it, so that an authorized person could decrypt it temporarily might be OK. Or perhaps a security app can separately retrieve only the specified characters of the PW through some sort of encryption. Or perhaps the ISP is not using proper security. In the case of Knuddles in the linked news story, an actual breach occurred which led to the poor security being reported. You could send a report to the appropriate national Data Protection Authority. | Because your legal fees and contract damages are not "in addition to" your risk; they are your risk. If you pay the retainer and lose, you don't lose anything more than the retainer and damages. If you pay the retainer and win, you don't win anything more than the retainer and damages. The only kind of argument I can see here is that you're incurring some kind of psychic cost by enduring the uncertainty surrounding the litigation, but I can't remember ever seeing a case -- in Florida or elsewhere -- in which the court recognized taking on risk as a compensable harm, especially in a contract case, where damages are much more limited than in other kinds of cases. Risk is just a necessary feature of an adversarial legal system. | As always, it depends. However, it is by no means certain that any public facing hobby project, such as a web app, is exempt from having to comply with the GDPR. Since the GDPR is only a few days old, we have of course no case law based upon the GDPR itself yet. However, when considering this, one should take the following two facts into consideration. 1. The "personal use exeption" in the GDPR is not new. The personal use exemption is unchanged from the article 3(2) of Directive 95/46/EC. (There as a lot of lobbying for removing "purely" from the sentence – but drafters wanted to keep it.) 2. Case-law under the previous regulation restricts the scope of the exception The ECJ has ruled on the scope of the personal use exception in two cases: C-101/01 C-212/13 In both these cases, the ECJ took an extremely restrictive view, and concluded that the personal use exemption did not apply to the processing done by these individuals. In C-101/01 it can be argued that the hobby project as a blogger was connected to the controllers professional activity (she was a catechist in a local church, and blogged about her work. including her colleagues). But in C-212/13, there no such connection to professional or commercial activity. Here, the controller operated a CCTV to protect his home, but set it up to also capture public space, and that was enough for the ECJ to decide that the personal use exception did not apply. Discussion Case-law based upon Directive 95/46/EC is in no way binding for a future court that need to rule based upon the GDPR. We need to wait for case-law decided under the GDPR to be able to have some degree of certainty about the scope of the "private use exception" under GDPR. However, given what we know about how the ECJ has ruled in these cases in the past, I think it is hazardous to think that just because what you are doing on the web is just a "hobby project" not connected to professional or commercial activity, you are exempt from complying with the GDPR. Conclusion IMHO, you may be exempt, or you may not be exempt. I think it really depends on your activity in your hobby project, and to what extent this project processes the personal data of other people than yourself. | You are missing something. The fact that you have a tick box and its state is saved in the database is enough. The burden of proof is only "on a balance of probabilities", so someone arguing that they didn't consent would have to demonstrate that you falsified the database entry somehow. In terms of GDPR requirements in general you don't need a greater level of proof than this, the key thing is that you have a robust system in place to obtain proof (such as not allowing data into the database without a tick in the box). | Courts only decide disputes If the written contract says X but the parties agree they meant Y, then the court adopts Y. However, if the written contract says X but one party asserts Y and the other Z, the court takes the written contract as definitive. The parol evidence rule would prevent any evidence being introduced if X is unambiguous. Plaintiff presents contemporaneous evidence that the parties did not intend the Written Agreement to be integrated, even though the template they used contains the integration clause. The plaintiff can’t introduce that evidence in the first place unless there is some ambiguity to be resolved. If it’s plain on the face that integration (whatever that is) was intended then we’re done here counsel, move along. But what if at the same time that they signed the Written Agreement in question the parties signed another agreement covering some of the same subjects? If the documents don’t create a practical conflict then we’re in the same place as before. If they do then the court will try to resolve that within the written documents - a later document will usually prevail over an earlier one and a more detailed document over a more general one. Extrinsic evidence is almost always excluded. Or what if there is incontrovertible evidence that both parties subsequently and intentionally acted contrary to some term of the Written Agreement? That would suggest that the Written Agreement did not represent the Actual Agreement. No, that would constitute a waiver by one or both parties - you can choose not to enforce (waive) your rights under a contract. This can be one off or, if repeated often enough, a waiver for all future breaches. Alternatively, the parties are free to change the terms of their contract; maybe that’s what happened. |
Which legislation makes abortion illegal in Scotland? A recent article in The Scotsman said that— ... thanks to archaic Victorian laws means [abortion] is still technically punishable by jail sentences ... What is the legislation that has this effect? | Like a lot of Scottish criminal law, there's no specific legislation, but it is illegal through common law. This was also true in the rest of the UK until the 1800s, when statutes were passed with the aim of making abortion law clearer (generally forbidding it). This didn't extend to Scotland leaving much of its abortion law unclear. The 24 weeks limit that the Scotsman article references is from Section 1 of the Abortion Act 1967 (as amended). This act did apply to Scotland. The act specifies conditions under which abortion within the first 24 weeks is legal, and that it is always legal when there is grave risk to the woman's health. When the circumstances of the pregnancy fall outside the provisions of the act, the existing Scottish common law prevails. For further information, this UN document provides a good summary of abortion law in the UK. | The specific elements of the crime in question are going to be defined by Maltese law, which appears to be a blend of a European-style civil code with English-style common law. However, under ordinary Anglo-American standards, the alleged acts do seem to meet the legal definitions of these terms. At common law, an "assault" consists of placing someone in fear of an unwanted touching, and a "battery" is a completed assault; that is, an actual unwanted touching. If Mr. Suda, as alleged, took the victim's hand and touched it to his own genitals, without her consent, he committed an assault and battery. Any touching can constitute a battery, from a tap on the shoulder to a bullet in the head. Likewise, at common law, "violence" is any degree of physical force. If he tricked her into touching his genitals, that would not be a crime of violence; if he physically moved her hand to his genitals with his own hand, then he used physical force, or violence, to commit the crime. Again, what actually needs to be proven will depend on specifics you would need a Maltese lawyer to go into--but under general common law principles, neither "assault" not "violence" are particularly surprising. | There is a relevant Q&A here about how ex post facto is defined in the United States. Not all law is about crime, and that includes NY rent control laws; violating them does not lead directly to a criminal prosecution, hence a sufficiently strict definition of ex post facto cannot apply to them. And such a sufficiently strict definition has been the explicit one since 1798, when the Supreme Court ruled in Calder vs. Bull ("law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal [...] law that aggravates a crime, makes it greater than it was [...] law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime", etc.). Notice that Article 1 Section 9 prohibits Congress (i.e., the Federal Government) from doing exactly the same thing, so if ex post facto refers to any kind of law, then there could not be any retroactive laws passed in the United States, period. However, the Supreme Court has apparently already set further, more recent, precedents, making it clear that this rule does not apply to tax law. I would assume in this case the intention is to retroactively extend the old law, i.e., if the old law expired on the 15th and the extension passes on the 20th, that extension will be retroactive to the 15th. If the extension then continues until a new law is in place, there will be no time period under which one or the other did not apply. Despite the wording in the news article, I do not think the intention is to make the new law retroactive, only the extension of the old one, for the simple reason that the legislature would never agree to pass such a brand new law later and no matter what it contains say it will be retroactive back to the original expiration date of a law it replaces even after they already extended that until there was a new law. That is borderline non-sensical. The Daily News blurb certainly makes it sound like it might be that way, but I think this is a bit of intentional obfuscation -- the way in which a partial quote is used in the first paragraph is indicative, and the Daily News is, well, the Daily News. | Leonard's law says that the school can restrict speech if it is against the religious tenets of the organization. Now I don't think school uniforms fall are part of the tenets of Catholicism, so why can private schools enforce dress codes? I see there's a misunderstanding of the Leonard's law. But I fault the California legislators (not you) for that confusion, since the statutory language is ambiguous and leads to the reasonable interpretation your inquiry reflects. The statute reads: (c) This section does not apply to a private postsecondary educational institution that is controlled by a religious organization, to the extent that the application of this section would not be consistent with the religious tenets of the organization. It is not that a religious school is allowed to restrict speech if it contravenes the tenets of that religion, but that the statute altogether is inapplicable to religious schools because it is considered an infringement of fundamental liberties to which religious institutions are entitled in the US. The [religious] school would prevail on the basis of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. See Dermody v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 530 S.W.3d 467, 474 (2017): The ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine prohibits courts from deciding cases "dependent on the question of doctrine, discipline, ecclesiastical law, rule, or custom, or church government[.]". (Please note that I strongly disagree with the application of that doctrine in the Dermody case and I consider it impermissibly outdated for the controversy litigated therein, but that is a separate issue). A religious school could convincingly argue that the judicial review of its uniforms policy infringes matters of ecclesiastical discipline/rule/custom, aspects which ultimately "involve an internal church dispute over religious authority or dogma" Roman Cath. Archbishop of LA v. Super. Ct., 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 209, 220 (2005). Infringements of ecclesiastical abstention and akin doctrines would be outweighed only in "compelling" [cases] because "the duty to prosecute persons who commit serious crimes is part and parcel of the government's `paramount responsibility for the general safety and welfare of all its citizens'" Roman Cath. Archbishop of LA v. Super. Ct. at 225 (brackets added in this answer). A free speech controversy such as the school's uniform policy simply does not meet that threshold. | I presume that Dad will check with the college attorneys, so this is for information purposes only. Smith v. Daily Mail 443 U.S. 97 concerns a newspaper which published the name of a minor arrested for allegedly murdering someone (having legally obtained that information). SCOTUS held that The State cannot, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, punish the truthful publication of an alleged juvenile delinquent's name lawfully obtained by a newspaper. The asserted state interest in protecting the anonymity of the juvenile offender to further his rehabilitation cannot justify the statute's imposition of criminal sanctions for publication of a juvenile's name lawfully obtained There was a state law prohibiting a newspaper from publishing a minor's name involved in a criminal proceeding – it specifically singled out newspapers, hence the holding includes the mention of newspapers, but the footnotes in the case indicate that they "don't need to go there" (the equal protection question was unanswered), because "First Amendment rights prevail over the State's interest in protecting juveniles". The First Amendment right would be the same, applied to video, and classroom use. | This occurred in Hong Kong, so Hong Kong law applies here. Hong Kong law's definition of rape is explicitly male on female (nonconsensual male-male is covered by sodomy laws instead). It is impossible for her to be charged with rape. Assuming you were over 16 at the time, the only offence that could be possible is indecent assault. As far as I can tell, there is no statute of limitations. However, the chance of her being charged is basically zero. | I have bad news. California's vandalism law prohibits maliciously: defacing property with graffiti defacing property with inscribed material damaging property destroying property Chalking the sidewalk probably doesn't sound very malicious, but maliciousness includes “an intent to do a wrongful act, established either by proof or presumption of law.” So the questions is whether you intended to do a wrongful act -- meaning that you intended to do the act, which happens to be wrongful, not that you intended to act wrongfully. So unless you drew on the sidewalk accidentally, the malicious-intent requirement isn't going to help you. So then you have to ask if your conduct is described by the statute. In Mackinney v. Nielsen, the Ninth Circuit said that sidewalk chalking did not violate the law, but California has since amended the law to add the "deface with graffiti" language. I haven't seen any chalk cases since then, but another case, In re Nicholas Y., from the Second District, dealt with someone who used a marker on a window. He argued that it could be easily erased, but the court said it was still vandalism because: it "mars the surface with graffiti which must be removed in order to restore the original condition" the definition of "deface" "does not incorporate an element of permanence" "marring of the surface is no less a defacement because it is more easily removed." Given that language, I'd argue that the vandalism statute includes sidewalk chalking. But one important element here is that most sidewalks are owned or controlled by the government, so any effort to restrict "expressive conduct such as writing with chalk" (Guilliford v. Pierce County) expressive activity" there must comply with the First Amendment. The government has varying degrees of latitude on the restrictions it can impose, depending on the character of the space involved. So in a courtroom, whose function is incompatible with free-wheeling public debate, a judge can set quite a few rules about how people may speak. But sidewalks are considered a "public forum," where the government's ability to regulate speech is a lot more limited. So how does the First Amendment apply? There's a D.C. Circuit case (Mahoney v. Doe) dealing with abortion protesters who wanted to use chalk on the streets and sidewalks outside the White House. Police told them they would be arrested for violating D.C.'s defacement statute, so they brought a First Amendment challenge. The court upheld the law, saying that it satisfied all three prongs of the public-forum test: The law must be content neutral, meaning that it prohibits conduct without reference to what is being said. The Court said the defacement statute was content neutral because people could be prosecuted regardless of what they wrote or drew. The law must be narrowly tailored, meaning that it serves a significant governmental interest and does not restrict more speech than is necessary to achieve that goal. The Court said the defacement statute was narrowly tailored because it served the government's interest in maintaining the aesthetic appeal of the area in front of the White House and didn't restrict any speech that does not deface public property. The law must leave open ample alternatives for communication, meaning that even if you can't express yourself in the way restricted, you still have meaningful opportunities to express yourself. The Court said the defacement statute law allowed adequate alternatives for communication because the group could still congregate, march, speak, hold signs, and hand out leaflets. There's an interesting wrinkle there in terms of whether the interest in aesthetics is heightened because we're talking about the White House, but generally speaking, aesthetic concerns can still justify speech restrictions. So the bad news is that unchaining your inner six-year-old may subject you to criminal liability. That leaves the question of whether you want to unleash your inner teenager and do it anyway. This could help put you in a frame of mind for making the decision. | You have a couple major misconceptions about US law. First, crimes against the person are generally punished at the state level. States are not restricted to any sort of enumerated powers, and can pass any law they want to promote the general welfare unless there's a reason they can't. This is called the "general police power," and it lets them make everything from contract law to laws against murder. The federal government has to justify what gives it the authority to pass a law, and cities and counties have to justify their authority with state law or a state constitution, but a state government never has to preemptively justify why they have the authority to pass a law. States are especially not limited to powers listed in the federal constitution. The US Constitution sets up the federal government. State governments are set up by state constitutions, and derive their authority directly from the consent of the people of the state exercising their right to democratic self-determination. The only powers the US Constitution gives to states are minor technical powers involving state-federal relations (e.g. deciding how their presidential electors are appointed). But as I said, they aren't generally limited to any sort of enumerated powers by their state constitution either. Even the federal government isn't limited to "protecting rights listed in amendments." That's very little of what it does, in fact. Congress has powers listed (for the most part) in Article I and Article IV. It can pass laws banning murder in DC because Article I lets it exercise exclusive jurisdiction (meaning general police power) over DC and over federal enclaves. Article IV lets it exercise general police power over US territories, and pass laws regarding other federal property (I think it has a general police power there too, at least according to current law). The Necessary and Proper clause gives Congress the power to protect its own operations by, for instance, criminalizing the murder of a federal judge. Etc. Where there isn't a clear thing that lets the feds regulate something, they can probably get away with cramming "in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce" in the law, secure in the knowledge that practically everything affects interstate commerce. I'm not sure where you got the idea that laws are passed exclusively to enforce rights protected by the Constitution. They are not. They are not passed primarily for that purpose. Such laws do exist (e.g. deprivation of rights under color of law, which was passed pursuant to the 14th Amendment), but they're protecting you from government infringement of that right. |
Threatening to discontinue a service for a client Say someone advertises for their website and says "Its 100% free to sign up" then have them check a checkbox acknowledging that the owner of the site can cancel the service for any reason when they are signing up. Now 5 months later the owner of the site sends the user an email saying "If you don't start paying us $20 a month we will shut down your service". Is that extortion? false advertising? or in any way illegal? | Is that extortion? false advertising? or in any way illegal? Not at all. The owner of the site is simply exercising his right as outlined in the terms and conditions from when the user signed up. And giving users an option for continued use of the site (that is, for him not to exercise a right of which they were always aware) does not constitute extortion. | You ask permission, preferably with legal counsel to handle the details. It really is that simple. Unsurprisingly, most companies don't want to give their code away- especially to a competitor. If you even get a response, they will expect something in return i.e. money. Realistically though, it's unlikely they will respond, much less deal with you. | It is not obvious that it violates the TOS (which is a complex wall of text and links to chase). §3 states that "we need you to make the following commitments", followed by some subsections – you can re-interpret this as an agreement on your part to do this stuff. Those subsections relate to "legitimate accounts and users" (not relevant), "what you can do" (potentially relevant), "permissions you give" (granting them license to use your stuff), not infringing on their copyright. The second subsection about what you can "do" says that you can't "violate these or other terms", or do anything unlawful, or infringing, nor may you upload viruses, or scrape Facebook data. So it turns out that there is nothing specific in that subsection, but it does say that you won;t violate "other terms". §5 presents a bunch of other possible terms and policies: Community Standards, Commercial Terms, Advertising Policies, Self-Serve Ad Terms, Facebook Pages, Groups and Events Policy, Meta Platform Terms, Developer Payment Terms, Community Payment Terms, Commerce Policies, Meta Brand Resources, Music Guidelines and Live Policies. Those primarily apply to advertisers, group-pages, developers, commercial use and content broadcast via Meta. Community Standard applies to everybody, and as you should predict there is a long list of specific sub-categories such as "Violence and Criminal Behavior", "Safety", "Objectionable Content", "Inauthenticity" etc. You would have to hire a lawyer to do an exhaustive search and interpretation. However, it appears that using an ad blocking app is not forbidden on FB, and that seems to be what that extension is. But you should read it for yourself. All. Of. It. It may have violated the older TOS, but that clause seems to me missing from the present TOS. | Canadian law defines "theft" thus: Every one commits theft who fraudulently and without colour of right takes, or fraudulently and without colour of right converts to his use or to the use of another person, anything, whether animate or inanimate, with intent (to deprive the owner, pledge as security, mess it up) In this case, you accepted what seemed to be an offer of a free pizza, so if you took and consumed the pizza you did so with a colorable claim of right and without fraud. Perhaps you misunderstood, but it is not a crime to misunderstand another person's intent. They could sue you for the cost of the pizza (assuming that you took it and did not pay), in which case the question would be whether whatever they said to you could reasonably be interpreted as an offer of a free pizza (if not, pay for the pizza). As an advertising stunt, this would not be unusual. However, if they fix the pizza but then demand money before handing over the pizza, you now know that you have no right to the pizza (if you abscond with the pizza in that circumstance, it would be theft). You may of course pay for the pizza, but you can also not pay and not take the pizza. Again, they could sue you, and in this case your defense would be that there was no contract (no agreement). An important question would be how reasonable it is to believe that you were offered a free pizza. People are offered "free" steak dinners all the time (at the cost of sitting through a sales pitch), so that is a reasonable belief. If a Lexus yacht salesman appears to be offering you a free $5M yacht, it is not reasonable to think that this is an ordinary advertising stunt, if you're not a celebrity. | No, this isn't legal. Had you authorized the purchase, then it would have been legal; this is similar to a store credit for returns without a receipt. But since you claim they charged you in error and you did not authorize the transaction, then they must refund the money directly to you (unless you agree to another method of compensation). In fact, a direct refund should have been the default unless they gained your permission to receive it in a different form. Why are you unable to contact the company? That seems like the simplest resolution so this. | Let me be sure that I understand the situation. You set up an account with Big Company, which uses BigCo as a trademark. You want email about that account to reach you with a unique address, so you set up '[email protected]" and gave that as your email when setting up tha account. You don't plan to use that address for any purpose but communications from BigCo to you and from you to them. (Of course these aren't the actual names.) Have I understood the situation correctly? It seems that you ar not using 'BigCo" in trade, nor are you likely to be confused with an official representative of BigCo, so you are not infringing their trademark. However, someone using such an email more generally could perhaps be so confuse, so BigCo has a somewhat legitimate concern, as they cannot know the very limited use you plan to make of this address. The only way that the could force you not to use such an email address would be via a court order as part of a suit for trademark infringement, whcih under the circumstances I doubt they would get. However, unless they have some sort of contract with you to the contrary, they can control who registers on their site. and could refuse to register you using an email address that includes their name or alias. Convincing them to accept your registration, even though it does no harm to them, will almost surely be more trouble than it is worth. Give them "[email protected]" or something else that is not their name, but will suggest their name enough that you will know who it is. This will serve your purpose fully, and avoid a long argument with people who are reading from a script (once you get past the automated process, if you can even do that). This is all assuming that I have understood the situation correctly. I am also largely assuming US law, since you didn't mention a jurisdiction. (EDIT: UK law should not be very different on these points.) | which of these conditions are enforceable (as in I could collect damages from a person for using the wrong plan)? The validity of the contract does not depend on the outlined conditions being that weird. These weird conditions are merely a way of saying that [almost] everyone is required to pay $10/month for using the website. What determines the validity of the contract is the issue of whether users knew or [reasonably] should have known the ToS. If the website does not contain functionality toward reasonably ensuring that users become aware of the ToS prior to using the website, it will be unlikely or impossible for the website owner to establish that a contract was formed. In terms of Restatement (Second) of Contracts at §§ 17-20, users' reasonable misunderstanding would preclude a finding of mutual assent on which contracts are premised. | Yes, you can. An excellent example is this very website - at the bottom of this page you will find a series of links in the footer, one of which is "Terms of Service". I think you will agree that most people using the Law SE are making no money from it or paying no money to use it and yet the terms of service sets out in black and white what a user of this site can do, and what the repercussions can be if they breach the ToS, so it serves a purpose as an excellent example for your question. |
Is the car in my possession part of my household effects? The Netherlands have a tax on the acquisition or import of private motor vehicles (BPM) which can be fairly expensive depending on what car you have. I am moving from Germany to the Netherlands and planned to bring my car with me. The conditions for exemption from this tax include (source) : You move from another country to the Netherlands and you take your motor vehicle with you. The motor vehicle forms part of your household effects. You will use the motor vehicle which you bring with you for the same purpose as you used it abroad. You bought the motor vehicle which you bring with you at least 6 months before you moved to the Netherlands and you used the motor vehicle during this period. You lived at least 12 months abroad before you moved to the Netherlands. My question regards point 2.: The car in question was bought by my parents in Germany in 2009 and is registered to one of them since then. Since 2010 the car has been in my possession, with me being listed as one of its drivers in the insurance, while the ownership of the car still lies with my parents. For the purpose of exemption of the tax listed above, can the car be considered part of my 'household effects' ? | ECJ case C170/3 covers this (BPM on car imports to the Netherlands, when the car was not originally owned by the driver/importer) specifically. There are two requirements: You must own the car at the moment that you import it. Prior to import, you must have had a connection to the car. The first condition is logical; if your parents would still own the car they'd be exporting it to the Netherlands. The second one is satisfied by the fact that you drove the car since 2010. In ECJ C170/3 Mr. Feron imported a car that was originally bought by his employer, but it's otherwise similar enough. | Would capital gains taxes come into play given that the house is his daughters primary residence, but not his? Yes. He sold something that was his property, i.e., his [long term] asset. The fact that it was not his primary residence is irrelevant in this regard. The issue of primary vs. non-primary residence might be relevant only for purposes of computing the applicable credits and/or deductions, but that is very jurisdiction-specific. | If you buy a house and your wife signs a quitclaim deed to you, that transfers to you whatever rights she has in the house. Similarly, if you and your wife sign an agreement that anything deposited in a particular bank account in your name would be your separate property, that would override the pre-nup as far as that account was concerned. Such an agreement could include a dollar limit per month or per year, or an explicit purpose, such as savings for a down payment. (It could be thought of as a gift to you of her share of any funds deposited.) Giving property to your parents or others with the understanding that it will be returned on your request might be seen as an attempt to evade the pre-nup, and a court might hold that the property was actually shared, if you ever do divorce. There might also be gift tax issues if the value is high enough. Whether asking your wife to agree to a quitclaim or any sort of agreement to modify the pre-nup would help or harm your marriage I cannot know, nor did you ask that. But I would think that for most people being open would work better than going behind a spouse's back. None of this should be taken as legal advice. I am not a lawyer. | Of course it doesn't work. You haven't discovered an end-around to property ownership I gave someone a car and want it back (they refuse) You no longer own this car. It is now titled in their name. Your interest in the car is now exactly zero whether or not they paid for it. I use a shell company to buy my own debt Okay. This has nothing to do with the car. You're now out of the cash it took you to set up this new entity. How are you doing this? I assume it means paying off your creditors with money you already have. You will also have to come up with some type of bogus documents that explain to the future court why this was even done. If you have the money, why do you have debt? My shell company sues me for conveying the car to conceal it from creditors Um, Ok. Now you're also out filing fees. Let's assume you know how to do this without paying an attorney to do it for you. I settle Makes sense, since you're suing yourself. The shell company now gets a court order to seize the car Seize the car how? This is a stretch. A judgement would be against you for the value of the car. You can't settle a lawsuit using assets you do not own. A court won't order something repossessed because of an unrelated squirrelly lawsuit. An exception would be a bankruptcy court that rules the item was sold or disposed of outside the court's orders. I would expect an astute court to hit you with contempt or sanctions for trying to use it to further your interests with some sort of end-around to property ownership. Expect more fees for this use of the court's time. The shell seizes the car No. Now I have the car back No. | In most common-law jurisdiction, a purchaser buys a house subject to any existing lease. If that is true in your jurisdiction, the notice to vacate was illegal, and you are entitled to remain until the end of the current lease. The return of the deposit will depend on the condition of the property when you move out, and will be governed by the specific law of your jurisdiction. Residential leases are highly regulated in many places, and the laws vary widely. Often they vary even by individual cities or towns within a country. Without the specific locality in which the hosue is, no specific answer is possible. | Barring manufacturer negligence (and even this is a dubious theory, given that recovery would be for pure economic loss), there is probably no legal theory that would allow recovery of any loss of resale value. I am assuming that the promise to replace/repair the engine if it fails is part of the contract of sale. This is typical for a warranty that the manufacturer will repair certain failures. Assuming the manufacturer fulfils what it agreed to in the warranty, then the buyer is getting exactly what they contracted for and there is no contractual theory that would support any further recovery: there is no breach. The buyer bought a car that included a warranty to repair. I cannot imagine that they bought a car that included a promise that it would not fail. | Question: Do I need a EU passport or EU ID card to legally work in the EU (or establish that I have the right to work in the EU)? Or is a certificate of citizenship sufficient? Legally, your right to work is not contingent on this and there is no Europe-wide rule that makes holding any document mandatory. Importantly, if you do start working anyway, you are not committing a crime and cannot possibly be banned or forced to leave the country. You do have the right to work from the day you became an EU citizen and if any doubt arises down the line, you should be able to clear it up later. In practice, employers are sometimes supposed to check you are allowed to work (and for that would require some proof of your citizenship) but they don't necessarily need a passport or ID. What's typical on the other hand is that you have to provide an official proof of address (in the countries where you have to register your address with the authorities) and the local social security, insurance, or national tax number. Both of these will require dealing with the authorities and will be considerably more difficult, if not downright impossible, without a national ID card or passport (in fact it can even be difficult with a passport). I worked in multiple EU countries and I don't recall always having to present my ID to employers. I recall at least one instance (in Germany) where I could start working without one (it had just been stolen) and another one (in the Netherlands) where I started on the day after I arrived, without official address nor tax number (BSN). In both cases, I was expected to solve these issues within the first month and you risk a fine if you don't register within a week or two but it was neither illegal nor impossible to start working before all the formalities were completed. None of this means I would be completely comfortable about being months without a passport. But the main issue for you will be entering the country and what your employer's HR department is prepared to tolerate, not any sort of legal obligation to hold a passport to work. Note that in one of the cases I described above I went to the local consulate to get an emergency passport. It wouldn't have been possible back in my country of citizenship but there are some special procedures when you reside abroad. These rules change all the time and depend on your country of citizenship but that could be worth a try. | It depends on the laws of the jurisdiction. In Washington, speed limits are implemented via Chapter 46.61 RCW, the very first section of which states: The provisions of this chapter relating to the operation of vehicles refer exclusively to the operation of vehicles upon highways except: (1) Where a different place is specifically referred to in a given section. (2) The provisions of RCW 46.52.010 through 46.52.090, 46.61.500 through 46.61.525, and 46.61.5249 shall apply upon highways and elsewhere throughout the state We then turn to the question of what a "vehicle" is (this is the discussion of a number of legal treatises). Title 46 is about motor vehicles, but still you should look at the definition, if any, of "vehicle". We have two definitions of vehicle in RCW 46.04.670. Definition 1 says that "Vehicle" includes every device capable of being moved upon a public highway and in, upon, or by which any persons or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a public highway, including bicycles Definition 2 omits the italicized bicycle inclusion, and explicitly excludes A bicycle, for the purposes of chapter 46.12, 46.16A, or 46.70 RCW, or for RCW 82.12.045((.)) This is a bit of a mess arising from legislative screwup, which should be resolved by appeal to RCW 1.12.025. The explicit-exclusion sections are about registration, dealers and taxes, and not speed limits. The latter version was recently reaffirmed effective July 23, 2023. The courts could therefore be somewhat inclined to not apply speed limits to bicycles, because bicycles were recently removed from the set of explicit vehicles. But as notes in the Eskridge's extensive discussion of a hypothetical ban on vehicles in Lafayette Park, there are multiple principles for interpreting laws, and "legislative intent to assure safety" would be one prominent consideration, in case the wording of the law is not crystal clear – as it is not, in this case. |
Is a 10 hour workday in Germany 9AM until 7PM or 9AM until 7:45PM? From what I found in the google-translate of (what I believe is) the relevant Ministry of Justice page, it seems that lunch and breaks count towards the maximum of 10 hours per day in Germany. Pauses fixed in advance - such as the lunch break - do not count as breaks for working hours. The google-translate version sounds weird, but if we take it at face value, it sounds as if the maximum working day is 9:15 hours working + 45 min required break. I believe this is different from how most other countries treat lunch breaks... Note: That may not be the MoJ page, I can't really tell | 7:45 PM (10 hours work, 45 minutes break) for the maximum allowed workday that starts a 9 AM. In this sense working hours means the actual time you are working (and being paid for) so a break does not belong to the working hours the working hours are being interrupted by the break A break must take place after a period of 6 hours. Insurance coverage during work (Arbeitsunfall): The time from/to the place of work (without interuption), from home the place where you eat during a break including time to an external restaurant you are insured as if you are working. You are not insured: while you eat (or go shopping) during a break when going home: stop at a restaurant or go shoping when going to work: from home to the end of shopping Google Translate often has problems with the verbs, depending on where they are placed. Im voraus feststehende Pausen - etwa die Mittagspause - zählen als Ruhepausen nicht zur Arbeitszeit. Pauses fixed in advance - such as the lunch break - breaks do not count as part of the working hours. here Google uses stopped instead of interrupted: The work must be interrupted [unterbrochen] by a pre-fixed rest period of at least 30 minutes with a working time of more than six hours and 45 minutes with a working time of more than nine hours. After the end of the daily working hours, workers must have an uninterrupted rest period of at least eleven hours. The original law formulates this slightly differently and is translated properly other than using Workers instead of Employees Arbeitszeitgesetz (ArbZG) § 4 Ruhepausen Die Arbeit ist durch im voraus feststehende Ruhepausen von mindestens 30 Minuten bei einer Arbeitszeit von mehr als sechs bis zu neun Stunden und 45 Minuten bei einer Arbeitszeit von mehr als neun Stunden insgesamt zu unterbrechen. Die Ruhepausen nach Satz 1 können in Zeitabschnitte von jeweils mindestens 15 Minuten aufgeteilt werden. Länger als sechs Stunden hintereinander dürfen Arbeitnehmer nicht ohne Ruhepause beschäftigt werden. The work must be interrupted by a minimum of 30 minutes' rest in advance for a working time of more than six to nine hours and 45 minutes for a working time of more than nine hours. The rest breaks according to sentence 1 can be divided into periods of at least 15 minutes each. Employees may not be employed without rest for more than six hours in a row. In general, the legal text found at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de translate well with only occasional changes needed (Android Application). | It is not necessary for an agreement to be verbose and written by a lawyer, for it to be binding. There is some danger in having untrained people writing up agreements (they don't know the distinction between "what the law says" versus "what we had in mind"). The agreement is binding, but their interpretation of the contract language does not automatically prevail. The statement "ALL TUTORS ARE PAID 8 HOURS, unless told otherwise" is slightly problematic since it is not true (you can't pay time, you pay money for time spend). With no other statements about time and payment, and just looking at the words, this says that an employee will be paid for 8 hours work, period. Unless they say something different. That could mean "even if you work 20 hours, you only get paid for 8" (illegal under various labor laws), or it could be "even if you only work 2 hours, you get paid for 8" (the most reasonable interpretation). The interpretation "You are limited to 8 hours of work per pay period / contract" is not a reasonable interpretation: that isn't what the clause says. Such a limit could be clearly expressed ("can work up to 8 hours" is a clear way to state the limit), and since they didn't say anything like that, that is not how the courts will read the clause. They can, however, inform you otherwise, e.g. say "your minimum automatic pay is now 2 hours", or "we will only guarantee 2 hours work", and at that point that's what the number is. Since this is (presumably) a take-it or leave it contract which they wrote up and you didn't actually negotiate, any unclarities are legally interpreted in your favor. If you have worked more than 8 hours and they are using the contract language to argue that you won't be paid for the overage, that is not at all likely to hold up in court. Under terms of the contract (interpreted as stating a minimum guarantee of hours), they can inform you that your new minimum is 0 hours. Also, unless there is some kind of tenure clause, they can terminate the contract at will, and maybe they'll hire you under a different contract. What the terms of employment were for you in the past does not matter, what matters is what the current terms are. If you did not pay attention to the fact that they changed the terms of the agreement as of this quarter, that is not their problem. If they decided to change to "actual hours worked" after the current contract was formed, and they informed you of that fact later, then thereafter that is what the agreement is. Until you are notified of that change, the guaranteed minimum is what it says in the contract. In case their argument is "The university sets this policy, the department made a mistake in not informing you", the university has to take responsibility for the errors of their inferiors. | Get a lawyer. That employer is skating on very, very thin ice. You can’t have a non-compete agreement in Germany at all without the employer paying reasonable compensation. What is reasonable is decided by courts, but half your last regular salary is not “reasonable”. Especially if this would endanger your status of being allowed to work in Germany. If you were a non-German EU citizen, any non-compete agreement would be immediately invalid because it violates the right of free movement; how nonEU citizens are affected, I don’t know. The rest of the agreement seems quite illegal to me. I would think that any good employment lawyer would love to take your case. | There seems to be one national law about leave, the Factories Act, 1948 §79, which grants an adult employee 20 days of paid leave after a year of employment, assuming the person has worked the required number of days within the year. Sub-section 3 addresses accrued leave at the end of employment (for whatever reason), that he: shall be entitled to wages in lieu of the quantum of leave to which he was entitled immediately before his discharge, dismissal, quitting of employment, superannuation or death, calculated at the rates specified in sub-section (1), even if he had not worked for the entire period specified in sub-section(1) or sub-section (2) making him eligible to avail of such leave In the case of a person quitting, the law continues and such payment shall be made (i) where the worker is discharged or dismissed or quits employments before the expiry of the second working day from the date of such discharge, dismissal or quitting As for accumulation of leave, sub-section (5) says If a worker does not in any one calendar year takes the whole of the leave allowed to him under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), as the case may be, any leave not taken by him shall be added to the leave to be allowed to him in the succeeding calendar year: Provided that the total number of days of leave that may be carried forward to a succeeding year shall not exceed thirty in the case of an adult or forty in the case of a child So there is a statutory "use it or lose it" element. That said, the question is whether you are a "worker" as defined by that act. The definitions say: "worker" means a person employed directly or by or through any agency (including a contractor) with or without the knowledge of the principal employer whether for remuneration or not in any manufacturing process, or in cleaning any part of the machinery or premises used for a manufacturing process, or in any other kind of work incidental to, or connected with the manufacturing process, or the subject of the manufacturing process but does not include any member of the armed forces of the Union Tech work is typically not considered to be "factory work" and is not obviously part of manufacturing, but writing software might be work "connected with the manufacturing process". There is an act implemented at the state level (Maharashtra version here), the Shops and Establishment Act. Ch VII of the act governs leave: the terms are similar to the above act in terms of accrual, number of days, prior service. However the payout on termination wording is different: If an employee entitled to leave under sub-section (1) [or (1-A)] is discharged by his employer before he has been allowed the leave, or if, having applied for and having been refused the leave, he quits his employment before he has been allowed the leave, the employer shall pay him the amount payable under section 36 in respect of the leave The important difference is that the payout condition is conditioned on either being fired, or having applied for the leave and being refused (after which point you may resign). If you don't make a claim for leave and you resign, then the conditions of that law don't appear to apply. But, in another state, the wording could be different, so it depends on your state. The definition of "commercial establishment" includes "legal practitioner, medical practitioner, architect, engineer, accountant, tax consultant or any other technical or professional consultant". It is possible that a different state's version of the act includes a payout requirement. | The DAAD has published a summary of the legal constraints when working as a foreign student in Germany. While the document is only available in German, it is complete and rather authoritative. I summarize the main points here. On a student visa, you are eligible for 120 full days or 240 half days in accordance with §16b (3) AufenthG. This is a legal constraint. It is not up to interpretation. Only mandatory internships constitute a right to further work. In individual cases, the Ausländerbehörde (foreign registration office) can grant authorization for additional work. The authorization will only be granted if the extra work will not jeopardize the purpose of your stay in Germany, which is studying full-time. In particular, work in a study-related job such as a student assistant will generally be eligible for an extension. This is up to the judgement of the office. Thus, there can be differences between different cities. If you intend to surpass the 120/240 day limit, you must get prior authorization. You are otherwise violating the conditions of your visa, which can result in fines and deportation. Additionally, no upstanding employer wants to provide illegal work as they would be subject to penalties themselves. Links: DAAD guidance on working in Germany (German): https://static.daad.de/media/daad_de/pdfs_nicht_barrierefrei/in-deutschland-studieren-forschen-lehren/daad-infoblatt_erwerbstaetigkeit.pdf §16b AufenthG (English): https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_aufenthg/englisch_aufenthg.html#p0275 | This seems to fall under the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act, and is defined as "waiting time." From Employment Law Handbook: On-duty waiting time should be counted as hours worked. It is time spent by an employee, typically during normal work hours, waiting for direction from their team lead, supervisor, or manager. These on-duty waiting time periods usually last only for a short time and can be unpredictable as to when they occur and how long they will last. The employee is generally not allowed to leave the workplace during a period of on-duty waiting time. Essentially, because the employer benefits from having the employee available for immediate engagement in work and the employee is not otherwise able to use the time effectively for their own personal purposes, on-duty waiting time must be counted as hours worked. Examples of on-duty waiting time that should be counted as hours worked include a messenger waiting for his or her next assignment, a warehouse worker waiting for a truck to arrive, factory workers waiting for machinery to be fixed, and a firemen waiting for an emergency call. Each of these examples represents a situation where the hallmarks of on-duty waiting time are present: the employee is not engaged in the work for which they were hired; remains subject to the direction of his or her employer; is not able to effectively use the time for themselves; and is unsure as to when the waiting period will occur and/or how long it will last. Employees who work away from their employer’s place of business can also be on-duty while waiting for work. Repairmen for utility companies represent a good example of when workers may experience on-duty waiting time while away from the employer’s workplace. If a repairman must wait for a home or business owner to allow them into their premises or wait for a new service call to come in, that time should be counted as hours worked for purposes of minimum wage and overtime calculations. | No What it means is that no German can be forced by the government into a job, education or place of work. So for example, the Government cannot come and say "we are short on railroad workers, the next 200 graduates of this school will report to Hamburg Station for training and become rail workers in Munich". That might be blindingly obvious today, but when this was written, the government that had just ceased to exist had heavily dictated who was allowed into which profession, not on personal qualification, but on things like faith, nationality, heritage and skin color. And other governments forming from the ashes right next door were indeed not capitalistic and their socialist central planning meant that they would direct at least parts of their workforce which jobs to take and sometimes even where. In contrast, in Western Germany, whether or not one becomes a rail worker, which company educates them and where they work in the end is their choice. Obviously choices are limited by reality. I can choose to be a railworker on an island in the North Sea, but I will be unemployed, because there is no rail line there and I won't get a permit to build my private one. I can choose to study philosophy, but if I cannot find an employer in need of philosophers, I will have to fall back on making money driving an Uber. I can choose to become a Pilot. But I will have a hard time finding a spare 747 to train on if I don't train with one of the big airlines. The may have their own, totally capitalistic goals. For example, contracts that say "if we train you, you have to stay for X years and work for us or pay X amount of money" are totally normal and legal in those businesses. And if their training center with the big 747 simulators is in city A, I can choose to train in city B, but I will obviously fail their program. So no, this law does not imply any kind of automatic success on a personal level. You still need to qualify for the training you want, be able to pay rent in the city you want to live in and find an employer that employs you, or customers to become a successful freelancer. Maybe you cannot do that for personal reasons. But the government will not dictate instead. You are then free to choose the next alternative. | This is the cited article. Thankfully, the interviewee provided a scan of the police letter he received, so the rest of this question is relatively easy to answer. He was specifically charged with Störung der öffentlichen Ordnung (lit. Disturbance of the public order) persuant to § 81(1) of the Sicherheitspolizeigesetz, which reads (after putting it through Google Translate): Who by a behavior that is likely to arouse legitimate annoyance, disturbs public order, commits an administrative offense and is punishable by a fine of up to 500 euros, unless the behavior is justified, in particular by the use of a constitutionally guaranteed right , In the event of aggravating circumstances, instead of a fine, imprisonment can be imprisoned for up to one week, or up to two weeks for repeated offenses. This law is almost certainly constitutional as it specifically allows exercise of constitutional rights. Note this also includes human rights, as Austria has included the European Convention on Human Rights as part of its constitution. Given that, I'm guessing if the interviewee had wanted to, he would have had a decent shot at having this charge dismissed. |
Hiding order invoice information, GDPR I have a software where we can show order invoice information by typing in the order number and buyer email. Now the thing is that I need to hide the sensitive order information like: Name Surname Address 11 Germany as example I want to hide this data and show it as: N*** S****** A****** ** G****** I think that showing the exact number of letters and numbers by just replacing them with asterisks is not quite safe, but I want to make sure if it's not breaking the laws of GDPR. | The GDPR is wide in scope, and flexible in application. Therefore it is not possible to give an absolute yes/no as to whether masking text with asterisks is or is not lawful. We can gain a deeper insight by looking at the GDPR itself. Firstly, the definition of processing (Art. 4 lit. 2): any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as collection, recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction As mentioned by amon, the principles relating to processing of personal data (Art. 5) are highly relevant, insofar as the activity constitutes processing. In particular, purpose limitation: [Personal data shall be] collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes ...and data minimisation: [Personal data shall be] adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are processed I would argue that making available the personal data on an invoice is processing. There are two separate operations: Making the data available to authenticated users; and Making the data available to non-authenticated users The purpose of making it available to authenticated users may be different to the purpose of making it available to non-authenticated users. Again acknowledging amon, the necessity of making the data available to non-authenticated users must be examined, as too must the means by which a non-authenticated user gains access to an invoice: are they using a URL that contains a token of some kind? Is this unique in some way? It could be that the presentation of a token itself constitutes authentication and thus authorisation to view the entire invoice, in which case further redaction may not be necessary if there is a clear necessity to disclose the entire contents to such a user. Whether the token expires or is limited to a certain referrer would be part of complying with the integrity and confidentiality principle and Art. 32 (Security of processing) by implementation of technical measures. When considering pseudonymisation and anonymisation, you will note that the redaction of name and address data from a certain view of the invoice, while nevertheless displaying the invoice number, constitutes pseudonymisation, since it would be possible with unfettered access to the remaining data, to determine the name and address from the invoice number, but not for the non-authenticated user whose view is redacted. In such a case, I fail to see how or why the replacement of a string with the same number of asterisks, or starting with the real character is secure or even practical, when the entire field could simply be replaced with a fixed-width string of asterisks or other filler, thus providing the user with no right or necessity to view the personal data with no further insight into what the personal data may or may not be. | These are only tangentially related to the GDPR A government entity processing data in accordance with a member state law is ipso facto in compliance with the GDPR. That’s because lawful government data processing is a legitimate reason for processing data under the GDPR. If Germany, for example, passes a law saying German police can record every phone call in Germany, then that would be a lawful basis for processing under the GDPR. There may be constitutional or other legal limitations on such a law but as far as the GDPR is concerned, they’re fine. | [I'm not so well-versed on US and Russian law, thus I will limit my answer to EU law.] Your specific use of a user identifier, as I understood from your question, can be classified as personal data, so in your case, the GDPR seems to apply. This means that you need to have a) legitimate purposes to process that personal data (e.g. crash reporting) and b) a legal justification for each purpose of processing: it could be based on consent or another legitimate purpose (inc. your own legitimate interests). Consent might not be the best option for you, but it's up to you to decide. In any case, you need to assess the risks to the data subjects (your users) before you decide. How likely is it that you will get breached, and what potential harm will that cause to your users? These are some guidelines; my recommendation is that you read the law and the guidelines by the Article 29 Working Group and European Data Protection Board, or hire some good experts on this. There is no easy answer, or one size fits all solution. The GDPR isn't so hard to understand or implement, but it does require some change in mindset. With the new law, processing personal data carries a higher risk of penalties, so you should do it only when it's absolutely necessary, and with respect to the rights of your users. | Yes. Art 13 requires you to provide “the identity and the contact details of the controller”. You are the data controller. Your name and address are necessary to establish your identity. Using AdSense means you're offering an internet society service commercially. In that case, there's also probably some EU fair competition directive that was implemented in your countries national law and will provide equivalent requirements. For example, my country Germany has a far-reaching Impressumspflicht. Not sure if this is the most relevant EU law, but Art 22 of Directive 2006/123 requires that your country passed laws to ensure that you make available “the name of the provider, his legal status and form, the geographic address at which he is established and details enabling him to be contacted rapidly and communicated with directly and, as the case may be, by electronic means”. I think you would be in scope of this directive since you're acting commercially. This legally mandated self-doxxing is unfortunate for private bloggers, but it's also essential for making it possible to enforce data subject rights: if you were to violate someone's privacy rights, how could they sue you if they don't know where to serve you with a lawsuit? However, all things are a balancing act. These requirements are not intended to limit freedom of expression. If you're just trying to communicate something to the public without jeopardizing your anonymity, then paradoxically social media services can be more attractive. | The European Convention on Human Rights has an article about privacy (article 8). Note that this is from the Council of Europe, which is not the same as the European Union: non-EU member states such as Russia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan are also part of the Council of Europe and therefore the ECHR. I'm not sure if you first have to go to a lower court, but the European Court of Human Rights is the authority on this (commonly mistaken for the European Court of Justice, but they are distinct entities). According to this ruling of the ECtHR, it is not illegal to monitor your employees' communications per se. However, the monitoring has to be: for legitimate purposes ("the employer had only accessed the account in the sincere belief that it contained only messages of a professional, not personal, nature"), proportionate ("it was the only possible way available"), and communicated to the employee (or, if the monitoring is not announced, at least the restriction on personal use should be communicated, for example through company policy). In the European Union, there is also the GDPR, but this does not change much. It applies to your employer the same as any other organisation and basically says that they have to be reasonable about it: collect only what they need, for a legitimate purpose, and tell you about it. I think you should be able to request a copy of any data they collected about you, ask a human to review an automated decision, and your other usual rights. They don't need your consent to start collecting data, as Esa Jokinen already commented: "GDPR doesn't even require consent to handle PII data, but the consent is just the last option when there's no other legitimate reason to process the data." In fact, your employer probably cannot ask you for consent: because of the employer–employee imbalance of power, the consent would probably not be considered to be freely given (where this article mentions "The GDPR states", I think they are referring to recital 43). | You could, but how should the companies that want to handle your data know this? If they have no affirmation from you that you allow them to process your data in any way, other than those they are already allowed to because of the exceptions, they have to - under GDPR - assume you don't want them to process your data, and thus have to ask you. | To do so I used some images and Gifs which may be under copyright but since I don't earn money for myself and there is no company backing me I was hoping that there is some protection for private persons like me who just want to showcase the project. Sorry. If your website is public facing (i.e. not password protected and available only to family and close friends), you need to follow copyright law. There is no exception to copyright just because a project is run by an individual for non-commercial purposes. I am also insecure about the GDPR regulations since I give users the ability to create an account and try it out. Your profile says you're in the EU. Then you need to comply with the GDPR. Is there any way to protect me against greedy lawyers and companies? Could I write something like: "This website is a peace of art" and save myself with arguments like "artistic freedom" or "free speech"? Nope. A controversial website run by Peter Sunde had at one point a "free speech" disclaimer (similar to the one you propose) posted. However, Sunde did never use this defense in court: Finnish court slaps Peter Sunde with €350k fine. If he had shown up in court, I am pretty sure the court would have told him that such a disclaimer has no legal merit. The only protection that will make you completely safe is to adhere to the law. | GDPR forces companies and employees to keep personal data confidential and to use it only for its allowed uses. That obligation continues after the work contract ends. If the employee breaches confidentiality, it does not matter if he provides the data as a file in an USB-drive or if he provides it from memory; it is a breach of confidentiality. Access logs will help to determine which employees have had access to your data, in case a leak is suspected. The part of the question about human memory seems to come from a deep misunderstanding of how human memory works1. I can remember tomorrow something that I have totally forgotten now. Even worse, there is no telling of what can make me remember you; your name might not ring a bell but I may remember you by seeing someone walking a dog. And nobody will ever be able to tell if I have complied with any of your requests or if I am just lying. And of course, there is only one proven way to erase memories, and I am pretty sure the GDPR does not allow for the execution of employees (Disclaimer: IANAL and IANYL, check with a lawyer before murdering anyone if you have doubts). 1 The classical example: You can certainly delete a file from a disk. But just try to stop thinking about white bears |
Copyright, privacy rights I made the mistake of buying an essay online, due to having surgery and no time to write it. Now the website is trying to get more money from me threatening to call the university and the Board to show the paper and my name and the conversation we had because they claim I have to pay for copyright, not just the price for writing the essay. They say they did not know about this, as I asked why did they not tell me about this additional cost before, so I should know the essay is just for me to read, and not submit it to the University, as I stated clearly what I am going to be using it for. Please, could you help me clarify this? Thank you. | As Putvi says, you are being extorted and this is a criminal matter and thus a matter for the authorities in your jurisdiction. However, you have a second problem entirely apart from that - you almost certainly broke academic ethical rules by submitting a piece of work that you did not write as your own (these things are pretty cut and dried in academic circles). This will not go away. Regardless of whether your extortionists are brought to justice, they can still release your details at any point in time and ruin your career, or it can come out in other ways. Own up to this with your university as soon as possible, and see if you can make it right. This will be hanging over you for the rest of your life, and can drop at any moment - these sorts of things have ruined people before. | You would need a court order to force them to take it down. There is virtually no chance a court will order them to take it down, because it would be almost impossible to do so without violating the First Amendment. You would have to prove that forcing a publisher to stop saying that you teach at the university would advance some compelling governmental interest, and that there isn't a better way to advance that interest. It's not clear what you mean by "cyberstalking," but if you're talking about someone sending you harassing messages, then the court would probably conclude that the better option would be to punish the harasser, rather than limit the publisher's speech. You could try paying them off or sending a threatening legal demand, but I doubt either would go far. I suspect that the best course would be a persistent campaign to escalate up their chain of command to find a sympathetic person willing to help. Even that, though, I would expect to be tough, because I'm sure you wouldn't be the first person trying this. | The work and the copyright to the work are different property rights Buying one does not give you rights to the other. Copyright laws differ by country so its impossible to say which need transfers to be in writing and which don't. For example, the United States requires them (and also allows owners to rescind the transfer after a number of years) but in Australia, it isn't necessary and the Copyright Act makes a number of presumptions in civil actions (ss126-131) which favor the person claiming the copyright so that, in the absence of contrary evidence, their assertion will prevail. | You're misreading the law. You need to keep reading the section you referenced (emphasis added): The disclosure...shall be made in writing and delivered through the consumer’s account with the business, if the consumer maintains an account with the business, or by mail or electronically at the consumer’s option if the consumer does not maintain an account with the business Thus, the option to have the disclosure sent by mail only applies to consumers who do not have an account with the business. Since presumably a large number of sites only maintain personal information for users with accounts, such sites need not provide a mail option. Further, it doesn't say there needs to be a button: you just need the ability to say you'd like it mailed to you in the request somehow, and then they need to comply when you do. | A cease and desist letter is basically a formal way of them saying, "stop what you are doing, and please don't do it again." It is not proof of tortious conduct by you, nor is it proof of illegal conduct by you. It does not open up an avenue for the university to sue you, nor does it open up an avenue for the university to have you committed to a mental institution. Your behaviour after receiving such a letter does matter however. What is most likely their next step should you continue emailing members of the university, is to apply for an injunction. It is possible that should the injunction be granted, you may be liable to pay fees. Breaching an injunction can have serious consequences, including jail. I would recommend against writing a letter apologizing. You are doing the very thing they asked you not to do. If you do feel in inclined to apologize, you should write the letter to the general counsel and ask them to forward it along. They probably won't. Obviously you have to be quite careful with the content of the letter. You are almost certainly within your rights to continue to email their general counsel. In addition, they almost certainly cannot stop you from communicating with the state agency responsible for the university. | A proof can be protected by copyright. The underlying facts of math cannot. But if one has copied details of the order of the proof, or of the selection of theorems to use, and if several other choices would have been possible, then the new proof may constitute a trivially modified copy, or a derivative work, and in either case making of it might be copyright infringement. However, making and distributing a copy, even with no changes at all, for purposes of comment and criticism, might be fair use in the US, fair dealing in the UK or some other parts of the Commonwealth, or fall under an exception to copyright in other countries (these generally vary significantly by country). This is usually a very fact-driven question. | No. Copyright protects expressions of ideas, not ideas themselves and not historical facts either. Conceivably, the persons written about might have a commercial right to use of their person or image, but the doctrine there is not copyright and the analysis is different. | Go to court and find out There is no doubt that humming a tune and recording it (or performing it in public) is a derivative work - a right reserved to the copyright owner. Whether it is fair use depends on the specifics of the case. From the tweet, we simply don’t have enough information, however, at a guess, it is probably not fair use. Fair use in law is Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 17 U.S.C. § 106 and 17 U.S.C. § 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include: the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; the nature of the copyrighted work; the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors. Most people miss “for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research,” - if you aren’t doing one of those things then you start behind the 8-ball when yo move to the 4 factor test. Note that the “criticism, comment, news reporting,” etc. must be about the copyrighted work - I can’t use your copyrighted work to, for example, parody a politician unless you are that politician. Many people have completely the wrong idea about what copyright infringement and fair use actually are, in part because the use of music on YouTube is allowed, not because it’s fair use but, because YouTube was smart enough to negotiate and pay for a permissive licence with music producers. For a full explanation, see this video. |
Does "solicit" mean the solicitor must receive what is being solicited in context of 52 U.S. Code Section 30121? Background The impeachment of Trump over the Trump-Ukraine scandal has been all over the news as of late for the public hearings. One of the things under scrutiny is the fact that President Trump violated 52 U.S. Section 30121 when he asked President Zelensky for an investigation into the Bidens. The law states the following: (a)Prohibition It shall be unlawful for— (1)a foreign national, directly or indirectly, to make— (A)a contribution or donation of money or other thing of value, or to make an express or implied promise to make a contribution or donation, in connection with a Federal, State, or local election; (B)a contribution or donation to a committee of a political party; or (C)an expenditure, independent expenditure, or disbursement for an electioneering communication (within the meaning of section 30104(f)(3) of this title); or (2)a person to solicit, accept, or receive a contribution or donation described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (1) from a foreign national. However, the aid was eventually delivered to Ukraine and Ukraine ended up not conducting an investigation into the Bidens. This lead me to wonder if the legality of soliciting is contingent upon receiving the thing solicited by. In other words, I am asking... Question Does the word "soliciting" in the cited law above meant that thing of value being solicited must be received by the solicitor? | "Solicit" means "ask for". A solicitation can be refused, and it is still a solicitation. That's why the law says "solicit, accept, or receive". | While it is hard to say with respect to the exact phrasing and psychology, this is one common way to pose what is called a "leading question" which is usually only allowed in cases of cross-examination or examinations of a hostile witness. A leading question is a question which clearly suggests an answer. The reason that leading questions are allowed with witnesses presumed by be hostile to the lawyer asking the question is that it forces the witness to commit to, or to disagree with, an exactly worded proposition. If asked an open ended question, as a lawyer must when questioning a friendly witness in direct examination, a hostile witness might be prone to respond with "weasel words" that are not truly responsive to the fine detail of a point that the lawyer asking the question wants the witness to testify regarding. "Did you not ..., " and "Is it not true ..." are phrases that turn an assertion of fact that the lawyer wants someone to agree or disagree with into a question. | You would think so, but no While at first glance, President Trump sending a staff member to testify under oath in his place (to nullify any personal risk of perjury?) appears to epitomize the concept of "hearsay"-- a statement that: (1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement --there are some subtle but important distinctions and exceptions in play. I'm going to list them off in increasing order of relevance. FOIA penalties are civil, not criminal The official DOJ website lists off the penalties for Freedom of Information Act violations: The court may award reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs against the government when the complainant substantially prevails. See 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(a)(4)(E). Action Against Individual Employees: Sanctions may be taken against individual agency employees who are found to have acted arbitrarily or capriciously in improperly withholding records. Additionally, the court must award attorney fees and other litigation costs against the government. When the statutory requirements are found by the Court to have been met, the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) must promptly initiate a proceeding to determine whether disciplinary action is warranted against the office or employee who is primarily responsible for the withholding. The MSPB, after investigating and considering the evidence, submits its findings and recommendations to the agency concerned which then is required to take the corrective action recommended by the Board. See 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(a)(4)(F). Additionally, there now exists independent jurisdiction for such MSPB investigations under 5 U.S.C. Sec. 1206(e)(1) (1982). Failure to comply with a court order to produce the records in question may also result in punishment for contempt for the responsible employee. See 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(a)(4)(G). So the strongest penalty against any individual government official who violated FOIA would be losing their job, or civil contempt of court. In principle the prohibition against hearsay applies equally to civil cases as criminal ones; in practice, because the stakes are lower, courts may take a somewhat looser attitude towards hearsay in civil cases than they would in a similar criminal case. Rule 807(a), "Residual Exceptions" Rule 807(a) gives courts large latitude to determine whether or not to admit hearsay evidence: (a) In General. Under the following conditions, a hearsay statement is not excluded by the rule against hearsay even if the statement is not admissible under a hearsay exception in Rule 803 or 804: (1) the statement is supported by sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness–after considering the totality of circumstances under which it was made and evidence, if any, corroborating the statement; and (2) it is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts. In this situation, the presiding judge, Reggie Walton of the D.C. District Court, clarified what he would consider "sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness": U.S. District Court Judge Reggie Walton issued the rare order to the White House last week after expressing dissatisfaction with a previous explanation submitted by the Justice Department’s top career official, Associate Deputy Attorney General Bradley Weinsheimer. Weinsheimer said he had checked with an unidentified official in the White House counsel’s office and determined that no new declassification was triggered by Trump’s latest tweets. However, Walton said given Trump’s suggestions of a rogue element undercutting his orders, some assurance directly from the president or someone who had spoken to the president was necessary. As Meadows had, one presumes, literally spoken to the president, this satisfied the presiding judge's own explicit standard of "sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness" for when hearsay may be admitted into evidence. Rule 807(a)(2) is also relevant here, in its caveat that hearsay may be accepted into evidence when it is "more probative...than any other evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts". Arguably, forcing the POTUS to neglect his duties running the country and "ending the pandemic" long enough to testify in what is, in many ways, a run-of-the-mill FOIA case, would take too much effort to be "reasonable". Which brings me to the next point: Rule 804(a)(1) and Rule 804(b)(5), "Unavailability of the Declarant" Rule 804(a)(1) discusses a specific exception to the hearsay rule when the declarant can't or won't personally testify: (a) Criteria for Being Unavailable. A declarant is considered to be unavailable as a witness if the declarant: (1) is exempted from testifying about the subject matter of the declarant’s statement because the court rules that a privilege applies As POTUS, it makes sense that Trump would have some degree of privilege or immunity from being deposed. If a sitting President could be dragged into court at will over any government litigation, no matter how mundane, to personally testify, it would be impossible to perform the functions of their office. Think about all of the live issues winding their way through the courts right now that Trump has tweeted about. Now, imagine the demands on his time if he was dragged into court to testify regarding every single one: "Sorry Angela Merkel, I have to cancel our international summit this year, I'm giving a live deposition in 50 different court cases in the next three weeks and I don't have time to do 'foreign policy' right now. Hope no new World Wars break out! Good luck!" Of necessity, a POTUS has to be permitted to delegate 99.9% of legal representation on matters of public policy to other Executive Branch officials, when it comes to who actually needs to be physically present in court. And since he is privileged from personally testifying, that means exception 804(b)(5) applies: (b) The Exceptions. The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: .... (5) [Other Exceptions .] [Transferred to Rule 807.] We discussed how Rule 807 applies in this circumstance up above. But I want to circle back to the idea that the President has to be able to delegate statements of official policy to other authorized government representatives, such as Meadows, because of the clinching exception: Rule 803(8)(A)(i): Public records of governmental policy aren't excluded by the hearsay rule Rule 803(8)(A)(i) tells us that: statements of public policy (such as, whether the government is going to declassify, or has already declassified, every document relating to the Russia investigation, specifically including Mueller report and FBI interview redactions) made by public offices or their official representatives (such as the POTUS's chief of staff, authorized to speak on behalf of the POTUS, clarifying the Executive Branch's stance on declassification) are not excluded by the hearsay rule: The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay, regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness: .... (8) Public Records. A record or statement of a public office if: (A) it sets out: (i) the office’s activities This makes sense given the purpose of the rule against hearsay. It's supposed to prevent innuendo and rumor from sneaking into the factual record when the facts are in dispute: "I heard the defendant's mom say the defendant said he did it," related by the defendant's mom's bingo buddy, would deservedly raise some eyebrows around the bingo table, but isn't the kind of solid evidence an impartial trial requires. Statements of public policy and government action by public officials, on the other hand, have a lot more authority and credibility than what a friend of a friend of the defendant heard the friend say the defendant said. Meadows isn't (just) some random golf buddy of the President who overheard what the President was thinking when he made these tweets; he's the President's official delegate to the court, conveying the Executive Branch's official position on declassification. Such official statements are ordinarily presumed maximally trustworthy and reliable, at least partly for logistical reasons. Similar to how we can't ask Trump to cancel all the COVID task force meetings to clear his schedule and testify about some tweets, we can't drag every government officer who makes an out-of-court official public statement or record into court to certify it--at least, not every single time. The judicial branch of the government takes the word of other branches of the government mostly at face value†, and does not consider public records or statements in an official capacity as "hearsay" to be excluded from evidence. So the TL;DR version is: No, Meadows coming into court to convey this statement on behalf of his boss would not be excluded by the hearsay rule. †Significantly, statements or records regarding policy might be excluded as hearsay, per 803(8)(B), if the opposition demonstrates that the statement or record is somehow fishy or unreliable: "(B) the opponent does not show that the source of information or other circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness." But in this instance, in order to demonstrate a "lack of trustworthiness", the plaintiffs in the case--BuzzFeed, CNN, and the Electronic Privacy Information Center--would have to show that the government was actually declassifying and unredacting all material related to the Russia investigation, contrary to what Meadows claimed in court. Since the government is not actually doing this, the President's social media rants notwithstanding, the plaintiffs would be unlikely to prevail if they tried to use 803(8)(B) to get Meadows' testimony excluded as hearsay. | Possibly. I am analyzing this issue under generally applicable, majority, common law rules of law (applicable in the U.S. (except Puerto Rico and Louisiana) and in most countries that are or were part of the British Commonwealth), when not modified by statute or regulation. If there is a contract regarding what is to be done, the measure of damages is "the benefit of the bargain". And if the benefit of the bargain included an express or implied warranty that the transaction would be conducted in a manner that obtained a tax benefit and that tax benefit was not obtained, the difference between the economic value of the agreed result and the actual result would be recoverable as monetary damages (which would then raise the meta issue of the tax treatment of the recovery which is beyond the scope of this answer). Two other kinds of claims in addition to a straight breach of contract claim are also plausible. One is a claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing arising in every contract, which requires that someone who has discretion in the way that they perform a contract to do so in a manner that reflects the intent of the parties regarding the objectives and purposes of the contract when carrying it out. By intentionally disregarding the intent of the parties, in how the transaction would be carried out, damages in the form of additional taxes could be incurred. Another is a claim for breach of fiduciary duty in a case where the person carrying out the transaction and the person for whom the transaction was carried out are in a fiduciary relationship, such as a customer and a broker with discretionary authority, or an agent and principal, or a lawyer and client. Usually, when someone is entrusted with discretionary management of someone else's money or property, a fiduciary relationship arises by operation of law. The taxes unnecessarily and intentionally incurred in this case could also be damages for a breach of fiduciary duty. On the other hand, in contracts and transactions of this character, there would frequently be an express contractual waiver of any right to recover for taxes incurred, allegedly wrongfully, in the transaction. This waiver would be effective against a claim for breach of contract or a claim alleging that a fiduciary negligently violated a duty of care owed to the person upon whose behalf the transaction was conducted. But, waivers of rights are generally ineffective and void as contrary to public policy, when the wrongdoing purportedly waived is intentional or conducted in bad faith in a manner that is knowingly contrary to the mutual intent of the parties to a transaction. So, while a waiver would be effective if someone accidentally incurs additional taxes for someone else, it generally wouldn't be effective if someone screwed up the tax outcome intentionally as the question proposes in its example. | I find that Petri Mäntysaari: The Law of Corporate Finance: General Principles and EU Law: Volume II, p. 115-140 can pretty much explain the reasoning for this. It is in chapter 5.3 on Terms non-binding as intended. The contract might not contain all legal requirements for some reason, or a clause might become invalid due to law changes. Sometimes the contract becomes unenforceable for some reason or another in part or full. The salvatorian clause is there to fix the defective clause to become the closest estimate to the written form that is legal and not deficient instead of being just dropped from the contract. This can save a contract from becoming unenforceable or making it void in whole. Especially look at Page 140: If a contract term is invalid because of a mandatory provision of law, it will be replaced by legal background rules(§306(2) BGB). One of the standard ways to address the situation is to use a so-called salvatorian clause. [...] This [reinterpretation/fixing of deficiencies] would not happen without a specific contract term. (See §139 BGB. On the other hand see also §140 BGB. Compare DCFR II.-7:302 and II.-7:303) A caveat though: if the alteration to the clause needed is too big and substantial, the contract as a whole can become void and null, no matter what the salvatorian clause said. It cannot overcome some burdens and there are regularly courts (I know this for Germany) voiding contracts due to such serious deficiencies. Notes BGB is the German "Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch", an english translation exists §139 says "If a part of a legal transaction is void, then the entire legal transaction is void, unless it is to be assumed that it would have been undertaken even without the void part." Example: a sale lacking any payment is not a sale (which starts a legally required warranty) $140 says "If a void legal transaction fulfils the requirements of another legal transaction, then the latter is deemed to have been entered into, if it may be assumed that its validity would be intended if there were knowledge of the invalidity." Example: a sale lacking any payment can be interpreted as a gift if the intent was to do so (and does not grant warranty) DCFR is the EU Draft Common Frame of Reference, so the above rules are to be found in the document as follows II.–7:302: Contracts infringing mandatory rules - p. 565. Paraphrased: "if a clause in a contract violates a law, substitute the law for it, courts shall decide if that alters or voids the contract. They may fix contracts to cure them." II.–7:303: Effects of nullity or avoidance - p. 574. Paraphrased: "void contract (parts) can constitute unjustified enrichment, transfer of items might not have happened, courts may fix contracts to cure." From the DCFR document one can read what happens in absence of a Salvatorian clause, especially for UK law. II.–7:302: I. Contracts contrary to law 1 All European systems deal with contracts which contravene some rule of law, as opposed to contracts which are contrary to fundamental principles of morality or public policy. 5 In ENGLISH, IRISH and SCOTTISH law the standard texts all include chapter headings such as “Illegality”, or “Statutory Invalidity”. See further Enonchong, McBryde, Law of Contract in Scotland1 , paras. 19.28-19.36, and, for the confused development of Scottish law, Macgregor in Reid & Zimmermann vol. II, chap. 5. II. Effects of infringement 8 The general starting point in most European legal systems is that contracts violating legal rules are void. There is often, however, considerable flexibility in the law. 14 In ENGLISH and SCOTTISH law, while an illegal contract may be void, it is more often presented as “unenforceable”, in that neither specific performance nor damages are available to the parties. Thus a party may withdraw from an illegal contract with impunity. Courts will take notice of illegality of their own motion and dismiss actions accordingly (Chitty on Contracts I27, no. 16-199; MacQueen and Thomson, Contract Law in Scotland, § 7.15; McBryde, Law of Contract in Scotland1 , paras. 13.31-13.34, 19.17-19.27).). Again, however, there is flexibility in the law on contracts infringing statutory provisions. There are several cases in which the courts have considered whether giving effect to the statute requires the nullity of the contract as a supporting sanction (see e.g. St John Shipping Corp. v. Joseph Rank Ltd. [1957] 1 QB 267; Archbolds (Freightage) Ltd. v. S Spangletts Ltd. [1961] 2 QB 374, CA). English law is currently under review by the Law Commission: see its Consultation Paper on Illegal Transactions. The Commission’s provisional proposals were to the effect that courts should have the discretion to decide whether or not illegality should act as a defence to a claim for contractual enforcement. But the discretion should be structured by requiring the court to take account of specific factors: (1) the seriousness of the illegality involved; (2) the knowledge and intention of the party seeking enforcement; (3) whether denying relief will act as a deterrent; (4) whether denial of relief will further the purpose of the rule rendering the contract illegal; and (5) whether denying relief is proportionate to the illegality involved. II.–7:303: Notes 5 In ENGLISH law the general rule is against restitution but it is possible in exceptional cases where the claimant is not in pari delicto with the recipient, or the transaction has not been completely executed, or if the claim can be formulated without reference to the prohibited contract (Treitel, The Law of Contract9 , 490-504). IRISH law is similar (Clark 314-19), and so is SCOTTISH law (Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia vol. 15, paras. 764-765), although in one Scottish case where, by statute, contracts using old Scottish measures were void, restitutionary recovery was allowed in respect of a sale of potatoes by the Scottish acre, on the ground that there was no moral turpitude in such a transaction (Cuthbertson v. Lowes (1870) 8 M 1073; see further Macgregor, (2000) 4 ELR 19-45; McBryde, Law of Contract in Scotland1 , paras. 13.31-13.34, 19.22-19.26). The English Law Commission in its Consultation Paper on Illegal Transactions suggested that a court should have discretion to decide whether or not illegality should be recognised as a defence to a claim for restitution, various factors being taken into account. In addition the court should have a discretion to allow a party to withdraw from an illegal contract and to have restitution where this will reduce the likelihood of the completion of an illegal act or purpose, although it must be satisfied that the contract could not be enforced against the claimant, that there is genuine repentance of the illegality, and that it is not too serious. | Lon Fuller, in a classic article titled "Consideration and Form" posited three purposes of consideration: an evidentiary function, a cautionary function, and a channelling function. He quotes from Austin to say, consideration can be "evidence of the existence and purport of the contract, in case of controversy". The requirement for consideration can also just slow down the transaction, give the party time to consider their actions more carefully before committing to obligations. Other formal requirements can have a similar effect (requirement for a contract to be in writing, in certain domains, for example). He argues that the requirement for consideration provides a useful "channelling" function, in that it assists in carving out as a class those promises which people will be held to be bound to. Most of the article is devoted to explaining the ways in which this channelling function produces a worthwhile categorization. As for your specific question about peppercorn or "nominal" consideration, Fuller writes: The proper ground for upholding these decisions would seem to be that the desiderata underlying the use of formalities are here satisfied by the fact that the parties have taken the trouble to cast their transaction in the form of an exchange. The promise supported by nominal consideration then becomes enforceable for reasons similar to those which justify the enforcement of the promise under seal. In your example though, I actually don't see the contract issue. You ask, "what's the point of not enforcing a contract where Alice gives Bob the plane with no consideration from Bob?" But Alice can absolutely choose to gift an airplane to Bob. For a gift, there merely needs to be transfer, donative intent, and acceptance. That does not involve a contract law issue. The transfer would be complete and there would be no further obligation either side could be in breach of. If you rephrase your question to "what's the point of not enforcing a contract where Alice promises to give Bob the plane with no consideration from Bob?" then the contract issue appears: does Alice now have an obligation to give Bob the airplane or otherwise be in breach? | Mr. Comey answered this in his testimony. LANKFORD: Okay. Fair enough. If the president wanted to stop an investigation, how would he do that? Knowing it is an ongoing criminal investigation or counterintelligence investigation, would that be a matter of going to you, you perceive, and say, you make it stop because he doesn't have the authority to stop it? How would the president make an ongoing investigation stop? COMEY: I'm not a legal scholar, but as a legal matter, the president is the head of the executive branch and could direct, in theory, we have important norms against this, but could anyone be investigative or not. I think he has the legal authority. All of us ultimately report in the executive branch to the president. LANKFORD: Would that be to you, or the attorney general or who? COMEY: I suppose he could if he wanted to issue a direct order could do it anyway. Through the attorney general or issue it directly to me. This issue also came up in United States v Texas. The obligation to refrain from interference with the FBI is a norm, not a legal requirement. And, like many executive powers, an act that is sometimes legally permitted can become illegal given an improper motive. It is also possible for Congress to find legal acts to be untenably corrupt. | The most relevant federal Obstruction of Justice type is from 18 USC 1505: Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law under which any pending proceeding is being had before any department or agency of the United States, or the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which any inquiry or investigation is being had by either House, or any committee of either House or any joint committee of the Congress— I'm not sure if passed Articles of Impeachment count as an "inquiry", and I'm not sure whether failing to "send" them to the other house is "corruptly impeding". Even if those two conditions are met, members of Congress are immune to judicial process for acts taken while they are in session, as part of the Speech or Debate clause of the Constitution (Article 1, Section 6, Clause 1): ...shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their attendance at the Session of their Respective Houses, and in going to and from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place. So, if the person in question is not a member of Congress acting in their official capacity and intentionally endeavors to prevent passed Articles of Impeachment from being sent from the House to the Senate (e.g. a courier intentionally failing to deliver them, or an IT person preventing the electronic form from being copied into the Senate's database), I do not know whether that could be considered Obstruction of Justice, as I doubt such a situation has ever been adjudicated. Given the publicity of the proceedings, such an impediment would probably be found out or overcome so quickly that no one would be inclined to do more than fire the perpetrator. |
How can you have a "quorum of 11" when the Grand Chamber requires 15 judges? Nigel Foster. EU Law Directions 6 ed. 2018. p. 60 2.5.1 Composition and organisation The CoJ presently consists of 28 judges, one for each member state (as from 1 July 2013) and 11 Advocates-General (AGs) (as from 7 October 2015) (Article 252 TFEU), nominated and appointed by unanimous agreement by the governments of the member states for a renewable period of six years. ... The Court can sit as a full court with a quorum of 17 judges, a Grand Chamber of 15 judges with a quorum of 11 to hear cases involving either member states or Union institutions, or in chambers of three or five judges and of which there are 10 in total. Alina Kaczorowska-Ireland. European Union Law 4 ed. 2016. p. 98. Both text-books imply that the Grand Chamber requires 15 judges. See Foster – isn't the "quorum" 15? How can there be a "quorum of 11"? See Alina – If you have a chamber of 5 judges, how can quorum be 3? If quorum is 3, then you have a chamber of 3, not 5! | A quorum is the minimum number of members of a deliberative assembly (a body that uses parliamentary procedure, such as a legislature) necessary to conduct the business of that group. So the Grand Chamber is 15 members, if at least 11 turn up they can conduct their business, if 10 or less turn up, they can’t. Similarly, there are 28 judges in the full court of which 15 need to turn up. Quorum are extremely common - they allow the business of the body to proceed even if some of their members are sick, or on holiday, or stuck in traffic, or slept through their alarms etc. | As far as I know, no single president has ever been in office long enough to see all supreme court judges retire, resign or die. So waiving his right to appoint new judges would just achieve two things: He would have less judges in his favor than if he'd just appoint a new one. He would help the next president, possibly from the other party, who could then appoint more judges to his taste, or possibly reap the rewards by not doing so. I guess no sane president would do that (and no insane president, either). | The answer is going to vary from state to state and, even within a state, from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. However, in general terms, non-judicial court officers, such as clerks of court and prothonotaries, will have specific tasks delegated to them by the court; they can make decisions on matters that the legal system does not consider to require judicial discretion and judgment. These are often described as "ministerial." They may include significant decisions with significant consequences: for example, dismissing a case, or granting judgment against a party, where a party has missed a deadline. In some if not all cases, these decisions can be appealed to a judge, but are unlikely to be overruled. There are also another class of non-judges, such as magistrate judges and administrative law judges, who take on more traditional, non-ministerial judicial roles, acting and making decisions that call for the exercise of judgment; again, these are generally appealable to a regularly appointed or elected judge. The short answer, then, is: Clerks of court cannot do everything a judge can do, but they can act on their own discretion when the matter falls within their ministerial authority. This authority can include, in appropriate cases, deciding who wins and who loses a lawsuit. | Most likely, they chose enough victims to ensure a long prison term while having plenty of additional victims to charge if something went wrong at trial. Plus limiting the number of victims limits the amount of repetitive testimony and evidence the prosecutors had to introduce proving the death of each victim. If you charge with 19 counts when there are 492 victims and something goes wrong at trial, whether you think but can’t prove that the mob paid off a juror or whether you just get an oddball juror that votes to acquit, you can always pick some of the remaining 473 victims to bring charges. The prosecutors could have failed in 24 straight trials for 19 charges of manslaughter and still been able to bring charges a 25th time (though that would have been highly unusual). If you charge a defendant with manslaughter, you have to prove the death of a particular person. So there has to be evidence that Bob Smith went to the club, Bob Smith’s body was recovered and identified, Bob Smith was autopsied and the cause of death was smoke inhalation, etc. That gets repetitive after a time and jurors start thinking of the victims as numbers rather than people. Limiting the number of charges makes it much easier to make the victims seem like distinct humans to the jury. You can show pictures of the victims at trial and jurors can recognize particular individuals not just “1 of 492 dead people”. | Because they are only apparent with hindsight The judge writing the judgement does not decide what is dicta and what is obiter - that is for some future judge considering a different case and deciding if they are looking at a binding (dicta) or persuasive (obiter) precedent. First of all, the vast majority of cases follow precedent; they do not set it. If you are trying to disentangle dicta and obiter then you are usually looking at the case of an appeal, not a trial judgement. Most trials turn on the facts, not precedent-setting points of law - usually, there is no dispute about the law at all. Even then, most appeal decisions don't set a precedent either and sink into obscurity until at some point in the far future when a lawyer doing research on a particularly tricky case has an "ah-ha" moment and says "Look at what Justice Bozo said in paragraph 365 of this 56 page judgement about a tangentially related issue between different people at a different time in a different place - I need to spin this as dicta." Meanwhile, the lawyer on the opposite side has a different precedent from a different case that contradicts this one - one of them must be wrong. So a trial judge faced with this paradox has to resolve it; they don't get to say "this is too hard". Basically they have 2 methods of doing so: The decide that one (or both) are obiter and make the decision based on the precedent that remains. They decide that both are ratio and write a judgement that they know has to be appealed because they have to follow both precedents and they can't. At least in Australia, this is becoming more and more common. The judge basically says "I have two conflicting binding precedents, I pick this one for [reasons]. Now go off to the Court of Appeals to see if I got it right. I look forward to finding out." Of course, the winner isn't going to appeal and it may not be in the loser's commercial interest to do so. So maybe the question just gets kicked down the road for some other poor bloody judge to have to deal with. | It is difficult to quantify in a useful way. Part of the issue is that calling the courts "dispute resolution forums" is misleading. Courts are "rights enforcement forums." They are designed to provide remedies to people whose rights have been violated, not to neutrally resolve disputes between parties. And, most lawsuits are mostly one sided, not circumstances where both sides have legitimate grievances for which they seek redress. The vast majority of cases brought in courts, by raw number, are debt collection actions, evictions, and foreclosures. These cases are overwhelmingly brought by landlords against tenants and by lenders (mostly banks and big businesses that extend credit) against borrowers. I'll note those in bold. For example, in Colorado, in 2010, there were 116,346 civil cases filed in District Court in Colorado (the state trial court of general jurisdiction). Summary mortgage foreclosure actions accounted for 39,404 of those cases. State tax lien filings accounted for another 45,528 filings. These case make up 73% of the district court civil docket. There were 30,236 cases of other types on the District Court civil docket in the state. About 5,809 are claims that fit in the heartland of tort law: cases involving personal injuries including worker's compensation cases that end up in court) and wrongful deaths, breach of warranty, public nuisance, sexual harassment cases, fraud cases and malpractice cases (of all kinds) as well as motions to approve transfers of structured settlements. About 3,527 involve judicial efforts to establish title to or possession of specific pieces of property often in connection with the collection of a debt. A big portion of the remainder of the cases, 13,165 involve contractual disputes or rights in real estate or other property (a fair share of which are basically debt collection cases such as mechanic's lien foreclosures and large dollar non-payment of contractual debts that aren't seriously disputed). There were 722 appeals from municipal or county courts and 72 cases to confirm arbitration awards. There were 5 public utility cases, 236 cases reviewing acts by local governments and by government officials, and 31 special district cases, 470 declaratory judgment cases, 583 injunctive relief cases, 1,484 cases classified simply as "other", 29 restraining order cases, and 334 contempt of court cases. These courts also handle divorces, child custody cases, paternity cases, probate cases, felony cases, and post-trial collateral attacks on criminal convictions. County courts in Colorado (at the time state courts with a $15,000 jurisdictional limit) had 148,425 debt collection money claims, 42,689 eviction cases, 531 cases to repossess personal property, 13,257 restraining order cases, 1,496 name change petitions, 27 purely administrative registrations of foreign judgments, and 529 cases classified as "other." These courts also handle misdemeanors and traffic violation cases. About 93% of civil cases in county courts in Colorado are debt collection and eviction cases. Overwhelmingly, the landlords and money lenders win these laws and are more wealthy than the tenants and borrowers who overwhelmingly lose these lawsuits. A very larger share of the time these cases are lost by default. In very large share of the cases in which there is a default, it is because there is no viable defense: the promissory note or credit card was not paid as agreed, usually because the debtor was unable to pay it. In eviction cases, usually, the rent was not paid on time, often for the same reason. When there is not a default, there is usually a settlement or payment plan. We focus on the very rare cases that go to trial, but those are edge cases. There are good studies that show that defendants in debt collection and eviction lawsuits secure better results for themselves when they are represented by counsel, which they usually aren't, than when they are not. But defendants in debt collection and eviction lawsuits who are represented by counsel still usually lose anyway, just on somewhat less harsh terms. So, to do any nuanced analysis of the role played by affluence and wealth in litigation, you need to start by having a fairly sophisticated sense of what is and is not a win, and this is far from obvious. In contrast, tort lawsuits for personal injury are usually brought by ordinary individuals from all walks of life who get injured due to bad luck against either other ordinary individuals backed by the resources of an insurance company to defend and settle their cases, or against property owners, or against businesses. There is typically not an affluence divide in these cases, or if there is, the injured person is less affluent, and the injured person usually secured money from the person who they claim caused the injury, either at trial, or far more often, in settlement reached in the shadow of what would have happened if they case went to trial. Lawyers rarely commence personal injury lawsuits were there isn't a good argument that their client should win. Personal injury tort cases make up a thin sliver of cases filed and judgments entered relative to debt collection and evictions lawsuits. These cases make up about 2-3% of the total court system docket (but account for about 75% of civil jury trials). There is litigation other than debt collection, eviction and personal injury litigation. But in some of those kinds of cases, like probates and divorces and bankruptcies, where determining who is the winner and who is not is even more challenging. Indeed, in many such cases that are actively litigated, everyone ends up losing and no one ends up winning. In the law and economics literature, the classic study (Leeson 2011) looked at who won disputed land title disputed in medieval England in the days of trial by combat. It turns out that back then, the wealthier party, who could afford to hire better champions in a trial by combat, usually won. The question asked feels like it is trying to build on that model and determine if that kind of law and economics finding can be applied to modern day litigation with the controlling factor being who hires the best lawyers to go to trial for them, rather than who hires the best champion in trials by combat. Many cynical people think that this is how the legal system works now. But overwhelmingly, at the threshold of who gets any relief relative to the status quo from a court in litigation, the answer is almost always the person who brings the lawsuit, 95%+ of the time, either in a settlement, or at trial, and whether the person bringing the lawsuit is usually more affluent or less affluent than the defendant is dominantly a function of what basis for the lawsuit, while whether the parties have lawyers, and if so, how good they are, are only second or third order considerations. None of this is to say that hiring good lawyers, who, on average, are more expensive than mediocre lawyers, doesn't improve one's outcomes at the margins, or that affluent people are more able and willing, on average, to hire good lawyers than less affluent people. But, to see the difference, you need to think about relative degrees of winning or losing, and you need to recognize that the nature of the lawsuit matters. Along the same lines, studies comparing people who have private criminal defense counsel (because they can afford to do so) with people who have public defenders (who are by definition indigent defendants), usually show that the outcomes at the guilt-innocence phase are very similar between the two, although public defendants pay much less attention to their clients and provide much less "customer service". The divide in those cases is not mostly on guilt-innocence outcomes, but in the ability of affluent defendants with expensive criminal defense lawyers to have more satisfying lawyer-client relationships and experiences, and to take better advantage of alternative sentencing options, rather than just getting thrown in jail or prison. To some extent, this is a long winded way of saying that the research you are looking for, in the plainest terms as stated in the question, doesn't really exist. This is, in part, because in many contexts at a shallow level, it is obvious, and in part, because, viewed more deeply, it is extremely subtle and requires very rich data to discern which makes it hard to gather and hard to compare. | There are times when having a large law firm work on a case can be an advantage. It is rare for the number of lawyers working on a particular case to be more than three or four plus a few paralegals, even in a case where there are virtually unlimited resources at a party's disposal. In those cases, the primary benefit of having a large law firm at your disposal is that by paying top dollar for those attorneys, you may (but certainly don't always) get particularly competent attorneys at firms that have good systems in place. If you are willing to spend the money you can also have the attorney and paralegal team work exhaustively to leave no stone unturned in terms of legal research, style and proofreading, "wild goose chase" factual and legal research of matters like trial court arguments from other cases that the opposing counsel has participated in, and trial presentations with lavish presentation quality. For example, in one case where my firm was litigating against a large law firm in state supreme court arguments, the firm had seven law firm partners who had served as clerks in that court earlier in their careers participate in mock oral arguments to help the appellate lawyer who would be presented the case in oral arguments to the Colorado Supreme Court prepare (with four members of your core team and seven mock justices plus some paralegals participating this was a $5000+ per hour activity). A typical run of the mill appellate brief prepared competently might take 100 hours, while a large firm might devote 800 hours to the same task (both of these are hypothetical round numbers suggested just to get the point across). This incredibly intense working up of cases, moreover, often involves attorneys who aren't really starting from scratch as they has handled many similar cases before in their careers, while their smaller firm competition may have only encountered the issues presented for the first time. You are also paying for connections and experience. For example, a large law firm may have an easier time retaining the most decorated expert witnesses to argue on their behalf. These attorneys may also have handled numerous cases in front of the judge or judges who will be deciding the case (and if they haven't someone else in the large firm probably has) and thus can better predict what approach will be received best by that particular judge. The exception to the rule that the maximal economies of scale are reached with a quite small group of lawyers is that in addition to this core group of lawyers, some cases, such as class action lawsuits, or cases involving complex transactions (e.g. construction project disputes in a large project with hundreds of contractors) may require an immense amount of factual discovery in the trial court in the form of depositions of dozens or hundreds of people with relevant knowledge, and/or review of vast volumes of documents (e.g. I've had several cases with whole rooms stacked floor to ceiling with relevant documents in banker's boxes). In cases like those, you need an army of senior paralegals and junior attorneys to interview witnesses, take depositions and review and summarize documents to get to the bottom of the factual matters needed to prove a case. The down side of this approach, however, is that it is extremely expensive relative to the alternatives per task, and frequently impossible to recover your costs and attorney fees from the other party, perhaps because they aren't permitted to be awarded, perhaps because a judge would find some or all of your fees and costs to be unreasonable, or perhaps because the other side simply can't afford to pay them. So, using a firm like this really only makes sense if the stakes involved are very high, or if there are long term strategic reasons to litigate. Spending $1,000,000 on attorneys' fees and costs is a very expensive way to litigate a $100,000 one off dispute. But spending $1,000,000 on attorneys' fees and costs is perfectly sensible if there is $100,000,000 in controversy in the case at hand, or if a favorable outcome will influence the outcome of a large number of future disputed of the same type. The other dirty little secret is that lots of the work done by large law firms for which their clients pay an immense amount of money isn't done very well. One inherent down side of being large is that a large law firm is bureaucratic and prone to the kinds of mistakes that all large organizations have, for example, in diffusing responsibility for mistakes that can allow mistakes to fall through the cracks. Also, while the typical large law firm lawyer is typically more knowledgable than the typical small firm lawyer about the field at issue, this doesn't always happen. Sometimes junior attorneys get assigned too much responsibility on cases in areas where they have blind spots in their knowledge, and sometimes a large firm attorney ends up working a case due to personal connections with the client rather than because that attorney is the most qualified person in the firm to handle it. Also, while some very brilliant lawyers do indeed work at large law firms, technical competence isn' the only consideration in hiring. Successful large firm lawyers need to be team players, need to conform and function well in a large bureaucracy, and need to have the social capital to be comfortable on a day to day basis with the firm's other lawyers and their affluent and big business clients. Many large firm lawyers have those soft skills while having only competent rather than excellent legal acumen. Further, since most large law firm lawyers go straight from law school to a big firm (sometimes with a detour clerking for a judge for a couple of years), and large law firms handle mostly very big cases that are usually settled by lead attorneys before going to trial, most large law firm attorneys aren't particularly experienced at trial work. Some large law firms compensate for that by laterally hiring former prosecutors, former criminal defense lawyers and former high volume personal injury litigators to do that work, but often, large law firms have few lawyers in the courtroom with much trial experience relative to how many years they have practiced law. They may be very well prepared, but often there is no substitute for hands on trial experience. Still large law firms tend to fight extremely hard in trial, but tend to be pushovers in settlement discussions. This is driven by the reality that the client will incur huge amounts of attorneys fees and costs to go the distance, and by the fact that professionally, the worst thing that a large firm lawyer can do it to have an unexpected and unpredictable bad outcome at trial. So, large firm attorneys seek to give their clients low expectations about what is possible in litigation in order to make it possible to make cases with significant uncertainty go away with settlements larger than would really have been necessary to settle the case with a more total client litigation and settlement cost sensitive law firm. | One can argue both ways. On one side, yes, zero representation in the Senate for all states is equal suffrage in the Senate. On the other side, no, depriving all states of all representation in the Senate deprives them of their suffrage in the Senate (without needing to consider the question of whether the suffrage is equal). Since this question has never been considered by a court, we can't do much more than speculate how one might rule. There has never been an amendment proposed to modify the composition of the Senate -- at least not one that was seriously considered. The spirit of the law works in favor of the second interpretation. Furthermore, a strict application of abstract logical reasoning was probably not the intention of the framers. A strategy that might seem more likely to succeed would be to introduce amendments reducing the Senate's power in the legislative process, similar to the evolution of the House of Lords in the UK. If the goal were to sideline one state, this might work, but if the goal is to address the complaint that the Senate is undemocratic because people in smaller states have proportionally more influence there, there's no way the amendment would pass 3/4 of the states' legislatures. The number of states with one or two representatives is 13, by itself a sufficient number to block the adoption of an amendment. |
In Arizona, can a company require you to cancel a subscription service in person? A subscription service in Arizona is claiming their service can only be cancelled at the customer's home office, in-person, which is the one that the customer originally signed up with. What if the customer lives very far away from the office or even out of state? The website states that not even the corporate office can make changes to the account; everything must be done in-person at the home office. Is there some sort of protection against this that would allow a customer to cancel over the phone with a corporate office if they live a certain distance away? | Various states have cancellation laws guaranteeing a certain right of convenience to cancelling a renewable contract: Arizona is not one of them. (Additionally, some states have service-specific laws such as gym membership cancellation laws, which I assume is not relevant here though in Arizona it includes cancellation by certified letter). In general, the terms as stated in the contract will hold. If the contract says that you have to physically go in to the office where you initially signed up, you have to physically go in to the office where you initially signed up, regardless of the inconvenience. If cancellation by certified letter is not allowed under the contract, then you may have to be inconvenienced. One possible alternative is to grant someone a Special Power of Attorney, or more generally, hire a lawyer to do the cancelling for you. You can't use that POA form if you don't live in Arizona. | A financial institution (including a pawnbroker) cannot unilaterally change the terms of an agreement and obeying the law. This section in particular limits the interest rate to 2% per month. It would be illegal and a misdemeanor to raise the interest rate above the statutory limit. They also cannot change (shorten or lengthen) the maturity date of the loan, nor can they obligate you to wait until the maturity date to pay off the loan. They are in a bit of a bind if they lost their FFL. There is nothing illegal about transferring inventory to another store. They cannot compel you to redeem the item immediately, and you cannot compel them to violate the law and keep the item without the required license. In case what happened is that you went past the original maturity date because there is no viable public transportation to the new location and you've gone over the 30 day "grace" period (hence the extra charges), you might successfully argue in (small claims) court that the shop is responsible for your tardiness. The fact that the item is located 40 miles away is not per se an unconscionable burden on you, but if it is impossible or very expensive for you to get there because of the new location, they could have some responsibility to mitigate the situation (e.g. give you a ride to and from). | Various Privacy Laws may Apply If you live in the EU, the site may be required to delete this information under the GDPR. If you live in the UK, you may have the right to deletion under the UK-GDPR. In each case the procedure for enforcing such a right if the business does not respond depends on the law of your country, and would involve a suit in the courts of that country. Even if a judgement including a court order is obtained, enforcing this on a US firm may not be easy. If you live in California, you may have a right to the deletion of the info under the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) (soon to be replaced by a modified version, the California Privacy Rights Act (CPRA)). If you live in Virginia, you may have rights under the Virginia Consumer Data Protection Act (VCDPA). All these right are subject to various exceptions. Several other states, including Colorado, have passed similar laws, but they have not yet gone into effect. See also "Consumers’ “Right to Delete” under US State Privacy Laws" published by Consumer Privacy World and written by By Glenn A. Brown on March 3, 2021. Since the information was collected (posted) when you were less than 12, your parents may have the right to request deletion under the Federal Children's Online privacy Protection Act (COPPA) The DMCA deals with alleged copyright violations, not with personal privacy issues. CCPA / CPRA The CCPA right to delete applies only to information supplied by the Data Subject (DS). The CCPA right to delete is given by California Civil Code section 1798.105 The Buisness has 10 days to acknowledge a request, and 45 days to respond, which may be extended for an additional 45 days. Note also that the CCPA requires various notices to be delivered to the consumer, and normally requires a privacy policy to be posted. This must include notification of the consumer's rights. Under the CCPA a consumer may not sue a firm directly to enforce the right to delete. Instead a complaint may be made to the California Attorney General, who is empowered to take enforcement action. Only in cases of a data breach ca a consumer sue a firm directly. Note that he CCPA appliws only to firms that: are for-profit businesses that do business in California and Have a gross annual revenue of over $25 million; or Buy, receive, or sell the personal information of 50,000 or more California residents, households, or devices; or Derive 50% or more of their annual revenue from selling California residents’ personal information. See also the official page "California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA)" VCDPA Section 59.1-573 (A) provides that (A) A consumer may invoke the consumer rights authorized pursuant to this subsection at any time by submitting a request to a controller specifying the consumer rights the consumer wishes to invoke. A known child's parent or legal guardian may invoke such consumer rights on behalf of the child regarding processing personal data belonging to the known child. A controller shall comply with an authenticated consumer request to exercise the right: ... (A) 3. To delete personal data provided by or obtained about the consumer; (A) 4. To obtain a copy of the consumer's personal data that the consumer previously provided to the controller in a portable and, to the extent technically feasible, readily usable format that allows the consumer to transmit the data to another controller without hindrance, where the processing is carried out by automated means; and (A) 5. To opt out of the processing of the personal data for purposes of (i) targeted advertising, (ii) the sale of personal data, or (iii) profiling in furtherance of decisions that produce legal or similarly significant effects concerning the consumer. Under subsection B the controller (firm) has 45 days to respond, which may be extended for up to an additional 45 days Under 59.1-574 (A) a controller has verious obligations including to: Limit the collection of personal data to what is adequate, relevant, and reasonably necessary ... and to: Not process sensitive data concerning a consumer without obtaining the consumer's consent, or, in the case of the processing of sensitive data concerning a known child, without processing such data in accordance with the federal Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (15 U.S.C. з 6501 et seq.). Under subsectiuon (B) the rights may not be waived by contract. Under subsection (c) the controller must provide: a reasonably accessible, clear, and meaningful privacy notice and this notice must contain: one or more secure and reliable means for consumers to submit a request to exercise their consumer rights under this chapter. Such means shall take into account the ways in which consumers normally interact with the controller, the need for secure and reliable communication of such requests, and the ability of the controller to authenticate the identity of the consumer making the request. Controllers shall not require a consumer to create a new account in order to exercise consumer rights pursuant to з 59.1-573 but may require a consumer to use an existing account. various exemptions are provided for in the VCDPA. As with the CCPA, the previsions may only be enforced by the state Attorney General, not by private lawsuit. The VCDPA only applies to: persons that conduct business in the Commonwealth or produce products or services that are targeted to residents of the Commonwealth and that (i) during a calendar year, control or process personal data of at least 100,000 consumers or (ii) control or process personal data of at least 25,000 consumers and derive over 50 percent of gross revenue from the sale of personal data. In many ways it is quite similar to the CCPA. COPPA COPPA is a federal law that applies to services, including websites, that collect personal information about children under age 13. It imposes various responsibilities and restrictions on such providers, and give the parents of such children various rights. According to the FTC pagw "Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule: A Six-Step Compliance Plan for Your Business"" Even if parents have agreed that you may collect information from their kids, parents have ongoing rights — and you have continuing obligations. If a parent asks, you must: give them a way to review the personal information collected from their child; give them a way to revoke their consent and refuse the further use or collection of personal information from their child; and delete their child’s personal information. The FTC's FAQ on COPPA states: The primary goal of COPPA is to place parents in control over what information is collected from their young children online. The Rule was designed to protect children under age 13, while accounting for the dynamic nature of the Internet. The Rule applies to operators of commercial websites and online services (including mobile apps and IoT devices, such as smart toys) directed to children under 13 that collect, use, or disclose personal information from children, or on whose behalf such information is collected or maintained (such as when personal information is collected by an ad network to serve targeted advertising). The Rule also applies to operators of general audience websites or online services with actual knowledge that they are collecting, using, or disclosing personal information from children under 13, and to websites or online services that have actual knowledge that they are collecting personal information directly from users of another website or online service directed to children. Operators covered by the Rule must: ... Provide parents access to their child's personal information to review and/or have the information deleted; ... Maintain the confidentiality, security, and integrity of information they collect from children, including by taking reasonable steps to release such information only to parties capable of maintaining its confidentiality and security; Retain personal information collected online from a child for only as long as is necessary to fulfill the purpose for which it was collected and delete the information using reasonable measures to protect against its unauthorized access or use; The same page says that COPPA: applies to operators of commercial websites and online services (including mobile apps and IoT devices) directed to children under 13 that collect, use, or disclose personal information from children. It also applies to operators of general audience websites or online services with actual knowledge that they are collecting, using, or disclosing personal information from children under 13. The Rule also applies to websites or online services that have actual knowledge that they are collecting personal information directly from users of another website or online service directed to children. The FTC, some other federal agencies, and US states may enforce the COPPA Rule. | There are no rules against private sales of firearms in Arizona. If you (or your mother) own the guns, you can sell them to anyone you like unless you have reason to believe they are a prohibited possessor. There is no legal requirement for you to validate their identity. There is no limit on the number of guns you can sell to one person. A bill of sale is optional. You don't need a lawyer and, honestly, I'm not sure what a lawyer would do to help you sell a gun. The laws, being what they are, lead some to conclude that this must be how prohibited possessors get their guns. It's not. Most "illegal" guns are bought through straw purchases in which a person with a clean record buys a gun for someone who is not legally allowed to own one. You can work through a licensed dealer if it makes you feel better. If you don't want to use a dealer, you can simply require that a buyer have a concealed carry license as evidence that they are not a prohibited possessor. The CCW is not a surefire way to guarantee anything though. Personally, I would transact a private party sale with individuals via a dealer. You're in AZ. There is no shortage of gun buyers! At the risk of breaking site rules, you can also list guns online. For example, www.gunbroker.com is a popular site and follows an eBay-style bid structure (I have no affiliation to them). This model ensures that you get market price for the gun rather than trusting that a dealer is going to give you a fair price (they won't; they make their money buying cheap and selling at market rate). | Such a right would only exist if the legislature has created it by some act. Insurance is excluded under the class of covered contracts under The Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) Regulations 2000 (see schedule 2), and The Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013. The only restriction on automatical renewal clauses under Consumer Rights Act 2015 is that the deadline for objecting to renewal cannot be unreasonably early (schedule 2, unfair terms); and in general, the terms may not be vague. Since there is no law restricting a contract from requiring written notice, or telephone notice, or whatever they demand, then it comes down to what the contract says. If it says "you must call", then you must call. | I just put in for a transfer to another location my company has there and will transfer back to my original location when we move back. I don't believe I should have to go and change my state of residency, drivers license, car registration/plates, insurance etc) since I consider where I am now my permanent home. It's just a temporary relocation. While this arguably works for the common law concept of domicile, as a practical matter, if you live someplace for the majority of a year, and often more than 30 days, you are considered to reside there. You should change your driver's license, car registration/plates, insurance, voter's registration, etc., unless there is an extremely compelling reason to do otherwise, and not just different tax rates and more bureaucratic inconvenience. A planned three year stay doesn't cut it, especially, if you don't own a home or have a residential lease on a residence in the state you want to claim as your residence. The main exceptions would be someone who is in an institutional setting, such as attending college residentially for nine months a year while supported by their parents, in a prison, or in military service, where different conventions sometimes apply. Legally, could I leave everything as is since the apartment "technically?" isn't mine (I'd just be staying there with her? No. Residency and who owns or leases the place where you are living are two entirely different things. The many people who don't have a lease or own a home are still residents of the places where they live. For that matter, even if you are not a citizen of the U.S., you can still be a resident of a particular state or locality. I'd be filing my taxes as someone that commutes out of state to work and residing in their current home state etc. Nope. For state income tax purposes, you reside in the state where you sleep a majority of the nights in a year. There are sometimes more complicated rules that apply to apportion income between states, but that is the strong general rule. Is there anything I'm missing/not aware of that would make this a bad idea? Or is this a normal thing people do commonly and I'm overthinking it. This is a bad idea and not a normal thing that people do commonly. At a minimum, it will leave you with bureaucratic tangles and at risk of serious state tax audits (which, reading between the lines, seems like the most plausible reason you are thinking about this approach). At worst, you could be exposed to liability for having improper tax payments and car insurance in place, and potential criminal liability for misrepresenting your residence. It might not end up coming to a head and being a problem, but the probability that it will is significant. | Not for normal correspondence There are laws that require a specified channel of communication for specific purposes such as a physical address for the service of legal notices, but there is no general requirement. How, or if, a company communicates with its customers about complaints will either be specified in the contract or up to the company to determine and advertise. For example, this site specifies “ will be deemed to have been duly given when received, if personally delivered or sent by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested; when receipt is electronically confirmed, if transmitted by facsimile or e-mail; or the day after it is sent, if sent for next day delivery by recognized overnight delivery service” - any other method of delivery (Whatsapp, Facebook, even their own chatrooms etc.) is not a valid method of service, if you use those methods, then legally, you have not communicated. So, if the company requires complaints to deal with by online chat, they can safely ignore any letter or email you might send them. | When I signed up over 5 years ago, I signed a contract agreeing to a specific service at a specific price and I was locked-in for 24 months, lest I be charged a penalty for early breach of contract As the original 24-month fixed term has expired long ago, the service provider is no longer obliged to provide the service at the original terms. They may terminate the contract at any time, and equally you are allowed to quit any time as well. The notice you have now got is essentially a termination notice combined with an offer for a new contract. You can accept it, or give them a counteroffer, or walk away to another ISP. |
What an employer can legally ask to monitor about user activity I work for a Belgian company as systems engineer, and I'm asked by the HR department to give them logs of a specific user's activity. This is about a concern they have when it comes to this user's activity while working from home (VPN). I'm aware the employer can't ask to audit a user activity without him being notified (I do not know the legal process/laws for this). We've got tools such as Netwrix Auditor that could even get us a video of user's activity if enabled (currently disabled because we are unaware of the legal aspects, plus it takes a lot of storage). My question is : what can my employer ask me to audit/monitor ? What is the legal process if the employer want to know details about a user's activity (European/Belgian laws)? What should I sign or ask prior to begin the investigation, so I'm somewhat protected as employee ? In the meantime, can I simply give them Active Directory logons events, from the VPN IP pool, for that user ? Or is that already too much from a legal point of view ? Thanks for your help ! | Belgium enacted an implementing law, the Act of 30th July 2018 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data. This, along with the GDPR, are the key legislative references that relate to your question. On 5th September 2017 the ECHR judged that it "considers that States should ensure that, when an employer takes measures to monitor employees' communications, these measures are accompanied by adequate and sufficient safeguards against abuse". This case set a precedent relevant to employee monitoring in Belgium. This is most definitely a data protection or privacy law matter and the DPO should be consulted. If they have to do research, that shouldn't be your concern as that is their job. The company must support the DPO in what they need to do that job, as such is literally written into the GDPR. Furthermore, in this case it would, by my evaluation, be necessary to conduct a Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) for the monitoring activity, and if one has been done, it should document the recommendations and requirements or what is already in place. You as an individual may also ask a question of the Data Protection Authority: (NL) https://www.gegevensbeschermingsautoriteit.be/verzoek-klacht-indienen (FR) https://www.autoriteprotectiondonnees.be/introduire-une-requete-une-plainte You might ask them about your position and liability as an employee, but I would be more concerned, if I were you, with verifying that your actions are above board rather than trying to cover your ass just in case they aren't. Do the right thing, even if that means questioning the direction you've been given. AD logons still identify the person logging on, and may include source IP, which is specifically listed in the GDPR as within the scope of 'personal data'. So while there may be a legitimate need to process such data, it needs to be gone about in the right way. Actions taken by an employee are taken by the organisation in terms of processing personal data, so whatever you are asked or ordered to do, will be done by the company. If you are being offered no legal justification for doing so, you might document the direction you are given and question it respectfully, pointing out that if found to be unlawful, it is the company that would be in trouble, all while knowing that should there be for example an unfair dismissal, you have a record of who asked you to do what, how you challenged or questioned it, and what was the outcome. | I don't think you would be responsible for whether your software is used in a GDPR-compliant manner. For GDPR compliance, it is important who the data controller is. The data controller is whoever determines the purposes and means of a personal data processing activity, i.e. the why and how. The data controller alone is responsible for their GDPR compliance. When a data controller wants to run some software, it's the data controller's responsibility to ensure that this software is used in a GDPR-compliant manner (or possibly not at all). Determining purposes and means of processing When someone other than the developer runs a software, the question is who might be a controller: you as the developer, they as the operator, or neither, or both? The operator is clearly a controller: they determine a purpose for data processing (e.g. to manage staff) and have determined means to perform that processing (e.g. to use the software). The developer may or may not be a controller. Clearly, the developer has made choices about how the processing of personal data will be performed, i.e. has determined some means of processing. E.g. the developer has developed a particular architecture, chosen a way to store personal data, and has implemented some security measures. But determining some means is not sufficient to be a data controller, see discussion below. Has the developer participated in determining the purposes of processing? I think this will depend on the specific functionality provided by the software in question. If the software just does what it says and processes the data for the operator's purposes, everything should be fine. If the software also processes data for the developer's purposes, that developer might be a controller. For example, if analytics or crash reports are collected by the developer, that would be a clear indication that the developer would be a (joint) controller. So depending on specific factors, the operator might be the sole controller, or the operator and developer might be joint controllers. Essential vs non-essential means What about the developer determining some means? When does this make the developer a joint controller? The EDPB has created a theory of essential vs non-essential means: 40. As regards the determination of means, a distinction can be made between essential and non-essential means. “Essential means” are traditionally and inherently reserved to the controller. While non-essential means can also be determined by the processor, essential means are to be determined by the controller. “Essential means” are means that are closely linked to the purpose and the scope of the processing, such as the type of personal data which are processed (“which data shall be processed?”), the duration of the processing (“for how long shall they be processed?”), the categories of recipients (“who shall have access to them?”) and the categories of data subjects (“whose personal data are being processed?”). Together with the purpose of processing, the essential means are also closely linked to the question of whether the processing is lawful, necessary and proportionate. “Non-essential means” concern more practical aspects of implementation, such as the choice for a particular type of hard- or software or the detailed security measures which may be left to the processor to decide on. – EDPB guidelines 07/2020 on the concepts of controller and processor in the GDPR, added formatting for legibility Looking through that list of essential means, some might be determined by a software's developer, but I wouldn't expect this to be the case for this kind of open source software. types of personal data: the software certainly sets a framework for processing specific kinds of personal data, e.g. by providing database fields for names, contact details, and schedules. But ultimately, the developer does not control which data is actually collected and filled into those fields – the developer does not cause specific kinds of personal data to be processed with the system. duration of processing: unless the software is programmed with a fixed retention schedule, it should be impossible to argue that the developer has determined the duration of processing. Even then, it would also be the operator who has determined this duration to be appropriate, rather than editing the open-source software to change the duration. But typically, no such retention schedule is enforced, and retention would depend solely on the operator (who can use an admin interface or a database console to erase old records). categories of recipients: typically, the developer does not determine to whom the data in the system will be given. But if the system sends data to third parties by itself, this might change. For example, if the system is pre-configured to store data in an existing cloud database instance, or to a specific analytics server, the developer might be acting as a controller. Here, good software engineering and legal risk minimization coincide. Best practices for web apps state that account credentials and connection strings shouldn't be hardcoded or committed to a repository, and should instead be provided externally (e.g. via environment variables). categories of data subjects: this depends solely on how the software is used. The developer has no way to determine whose data the operator will enter into the system. If the developer isn't a controller, might they be a data processor instead? In a GDPR context, a data processor is whoever processes personal data on behalf of a controller. The developer is clearly not a processor in this scenario because both the “processing” and “on behalf” criteria fail. The developer has no access to the data in the operator's instance, so cannot process the personal data. There is no direct relationship between the developer and the operator. The operator has not delegated authority to the developer so that the developer would be acting “on behalf” of the operator. There is a legal relationship between the two roles (the developer has licensed the software to the operator) but that is entirely irrelevant in a data protection context. The GDPR isn't directly about cookies While the GDPR does cover how personal data can be processed with cookies, the famous “cookie law” is actually separate: those cookie consent requirements stem from EU member state's implementations of the ePrivacy directive. Instead of talking about “controllers”, ePrivacy has concepts such as the “provider of an information society service”. While this role fits perfectly to an operator/provider who runs a web app in a publicly accessible manner, it does not fit a developer who merely makes some source code available. Is the developer even subject to the GDPR? The GDPR can only apply to data controllers and processor who process personal data. As discussed above, the developer is probably not processing personal data at all. Even if the developer were processing personal data, it is questionable if GDPR would apply assuming the developer has no “establishment” in the EU (e.g. an office). Then, the question would be whether those processing activities are either related to offering goods or services to data subjects in Europe, or whether the processing activities involve monitoring the behavior of people who are physically in Europe. Unless the developer is actively targeting European businesses with marketing for this software, the answer is very likely “no”. Could the operator sue the developer for providing software that isn't GDPR-compliant? The operator can sue anyone for any reason, but is probably not going to win. As discussed, the operator is a data controller. They are responsible for ensuring that their purposes and means are GDPR-compliant. That involves selecting suitable software. The data controller would be neglecting their own responsibilities if they just download some random software and start feeding personal data into it. Things might be different if the operator specifically advertises GDPR compliance features but you're not going to do that. It's also worth noting that common open source licenses like the Apache License 2.0 include a warranty and liability disclaimer. To which degree they protect the developer ultimately depends on national laws, but they make it difficult for the operator to make a legal argument that they're entitled to a GDPR-compliant product. See also the related question: Do warranty disclaimers in software licenses carry any legal weight? What can you do? First, don't worry too much. Given how much bad software there is on the internet, surprisingly few developer get into legal trouble for writing source code that's buggy or missing some features. Second, consider choosing a license for your project that includes a reasonable warranty/liability disclaimer. Third, make the state of your project clear in your README file. If someone knows that this is alpha-quality software and that no compliance features were implemented, it's their own fault if they actually use that software. | HIPAA imposes obligations on some people, but not all people. In the case of security and privacy questions, you would consult 45 CFR Part 164. A patient's actions are not subject to government sanctions, so a patient can provide or decline to provide email addresses following their own judgment. A healthcare or insurance provider would be required to securely keep PII under wraps. The regulations also do not impose obligations on unknowing potentially involved third-parties, i.e. no obligation is imposed on Google to know that an individual is using a Gmail account to transmit PII-related information. The medical provider has an obligation to store and transmit such information securely, which would mean for example that they do not send insecure plain text emails saying "Sally Jones at 12345 67th Ave SW was treated for a loathsome disease, we're coding that as 0102, and we want $500". That obligation is passed on to employees via employment-contractual obligations, for example that may dictate what computer or software you can use to do the job. If the provider passes the buck to the employee (and I assume that the employee is just an employee), they have violated the security rule. In that case, they may be attempting to mitigate the consequences of their actions or at least check if there were identifiable violations of the privacy rule. In the scenario where SmithMed provides all of the infrastructure needed to bill insurance companies, it is not a HIPAA violation to inspect computer logs, email etc. to verify that the employee has been complying with security and privacy policies. It would likewise not be a HIPAA violation to inspect third-party accounts (Gmail etc) to determine whether there has been a security / privacy rule violation. That is as far as HIPAA takes you. Whether or not the ex-employee has an obligation to turn over their email account information is mostly determined by the employment contract, but it is highly unlikely that any such contract has a "gimme your personal email on termination" clause. It is not inconceivable that the employee negligently used their personal account rather than opening a new billing-job only account. Also depending on the email service provider, it may well be a violation of the terms of service to hand over your account information. (Instead, for a certain email provider, the company is expected to set up and pay for a company account). Those are considerations bearing on possible legal impediments to turning over the email information. Needless to say, don't share passwords etc. because that exposes you legally, but that is not about HIPAA. | 34 CFR Subpart D covers this topic ("Under what conditions is prior consent not required to disclose information?"). This includes The disclosure is to other school officials, including teachers, within the agency or institution whom the agency or institution has determined to have legitimate educational interests so that raises the question of whether there is a legitimate educational interest. Additionally, the question is raised as to the status of an SRO (they are not teachers). Disclosure is allowed to A contractor, consultant, volunteer, or other party to whom an agency or institution has outsourced institutional services or functions may be considered a school official under this paragraph provided... the conditions being that the person Performs an institutional service or function for which the agency or institution would otherwise use employees; Is under the direct control of the agency or institution with respect to the use and maintenance of education records; and Is subject to the requirements of §99.33(a) governing the use and redisclosure of personally identifiable information from education records I would take this model memorandum as the most likely agreement, though your district may have a totally different memo where SROs are purely security guards. An SRO is to advance the program objective which include "Education of children regarding the role of laws, courts, and Police in society", which is the hook into "legitimate educational interest". This nothwitstanding the part that says that they "are police officers and not school teachers, school administrators, nor school counselors. The officers will assist teachers with classroom presentations on relative topics when requested and able" (there is no principle that only teachers, administrators, or counselors can have a legitimate educational interest). This model memo does not say anything that indicates that the conditions "Is under the direct control" and "Is subject to the requirements of §99.33(a)" are true, but those conditions could be satisfied external to the MOU. There are some additional exceptions of the "if required by law" type, such as a state law "adopted before November 19, 1974, if the allowed reporting or disclosure concerns the juvenile justice system and the system's ability to effectively serve the student whose records are released"; or, after that date, is "subject to the requirements of §99.38" which refers you to §99.31(a)(5)(i)(B). If that is confusing, here are the two self-referring sections: §99.38(a) If reporting or disclosure allowed by State statute concerns the juvenile justice system and the system's ability to effectively serve, prior to adjudication, the student whose records are released, an educational agency or institution may disclose education records under §99.31(a)(5)(i)(B). §99.31(a)(5)(i)(B). The disclosure is to State and local officials or authorities to whom this information is specifically...Allowed to be reported or disclosed pursuant to State statute adopted after November 19, 1974, subject to the requirements of §99.38. So state law is one possibility; "legitimate educational interest" is a remote possiblity. Massachussetts law does include governmental third party disclosures: 603 CMR 23.07(4)(c) A school may release information regarding a student upon receipt of a request from the Department of Social Services, a probation officer, a justice of any court, or the Department of Youth Services under the provisions of M.G.L. c. 119, sections 51B, 57, 69 and 69A respectively. That does not directly apply to local police, but it is possible that a police officer is operating as a probation officer or an agent of the Department of Youth Services. Under paragraph (e), A school may disclose information regarding a student to appropriate parties in connection with a health or safety emergency if knowledge of the information is necessary to protect the health or safety of the student or other individuals. This includes, but is not limited to, disclosures to the local police department Mass. law allows the possibility of treating a police officer as "authorized school personnel" if they are "providing services to the student under an agreement between the school committee and a service provider, and who are working directly with the student in an administrative, teaching counseling, and/or diagnostic capacity" – which is not completely out of the question but is a bit of a stretch (especially in the context of a blanket statement "we share records", not "we may share yours, if you get special counseling"). Tne law also says "Any such personnel who are not employed directly by the school committee shall have access only to the student record information that is required for them to perform their duties", so sharing of all records would not be allowed. | As the comment by Ron Beyer mentions when a company wants to impose such restrictions they are normally done through non-compete, non-solicitation, and non-disclosure agreements, as well as via trade secret law. Note the word "agreements". "Restrictions on working in the field" are simply a form of non-compete agreements. A company cannot, legally, simply impose such agreements on its employees. It can require an employee to sign such an agreement as a condition of employment, and it can often require such an agreement from a departing employee as a condition of a severance payment. Exactly what is covered by such an agreement depends on its terms, and those vary widely. In most US states there are limits on the scope and duration of such an agreement. In some states the restrictions can be broad and of fairly long duration, in others they must be narrow and of fairly short duration. An agreement that goes beyond a given state's limits will not be enforceable in court, if the defendant brings that fact up. Trade secret law can prevent an employee from disclosing the trade secrets of a former employer to a new employer, or indeed to anyone else. But that does not prevent a former employee from getting a new job in the field, as long as the employee does not disclose any trade secrets. If an employee has signed, or is asked to sign, such an agreement, it is a good idea to consult a lawyer with employment law experience. If the state is known, I could edit this answer to include the limits, if any, on such agreements in that state. | Asking as such is hardly ever illegal. Any stranger can ask you to pick up their kids from school, like you always can tell them where to go. What I guess you are actually asking is whether the PI can require you to do it. No they probably cannot: it would have nothing to do with the matter of your contract or nature of your professional relationship with them. However, if they are in the position of power, they will have discretion in making decisions that will affect you. Whereas you legally can tell them where to get off, it might be good idea to attempt some interpersonal workplace tactics first. | Anyone who processes personal data using electronic means or with some filing system is a data controller, as long as they fall within the GDPR's territorial scope, they're not doing the processing on behalf of another data controller, and they're not only doing the processing for purely personal or household purposes. In todays world, it's almost certain that electronic means are involved. And establishing a rental contract generally involves some personal data. We can also assume that both parties are in the UK, and that both are acting on their own behalf. So this leaves the household exception. Larry the landlord will not be covered by the household exception since they're using the personal data for a business purpose. Larry is a data controller. If Tim the tenant is renting a place to live in himself, he's probably acting for purely personal or household purposes and would not be a data controller. If Tim the tenant is renting space for his office, for a church, or for a chessclub in which he is a member, he's no longer acting for purely personal or household means. Depending on context, Tim or Tim's organization may be a data controller. The ICO's guidance on controllers and processors has a checklist “Are we a controller?” that lists common factors establishing controllership. On another page, they write: Wherever personal data is used for purposes other than personal or household processing, the organisation behind it is a controller. Personal or household processing means the personal data you’d usually have in your home, such as family photo albums, friends’ addresses and notes on the fridge, none of which would be covered by data protection laws unless there was another connection to a professional or commercial activity. | "The company you are working for ..." Stop. We're done. An employer owns the IP created by an employee in the course of their employment: the hackathon is in the course of your employment. |
Falsely Accused of Crime and Banned From Establishment I recently attended an event at a local venue and received an email falsely accusing me of a crime that I did not commit and banning me for life. The email goes on to state that if I attempt to re-enter the establishment or slander the name of establishment, they will make known what I am being accused of with more than just the authorities. What legal options do I have here? I don't think I can sue for defamation of character since the email was sent to me only. I was thinking that I may have some legal recourse since the email clearly threatens to defame my character if I re-enter the establishment but not sure. I believe that this was clearly a case of mistaken identity as the seat that I purchased was occupied by another person at our table and as a courtesy, I simply sat in his seat since it wasn't a big deal. I really like the venue, so I'm looking to clear my name so I am welcome to attend future events. What's the best way for me to approach this matter? | What legal options do I have here? I don't think I can sue for defamation of character since the email was sent to me only. Your rationale about defamation is accurate with respect to the establishment (henceforth "company"). But you may sue the person(s) who approached the company to falsely accuse you of that crime. Being banned certainly qualifies as special damage (that is, concrete damage), whence you have a viable claim of defamation per quod. If the crime that was falsely imputed to you is a felony or serious crime, then you additionally have a viable claim of defamation per se. I was thinking that I may have some legal recourse since the email clearly threatens to defame my character if I re-enter the establishment You have legal remedies, although not necessarily from this angle. The company can credibly argue that it sought to discourage you from contravening the "safety measure" it adopted in response to the accusations made about you. If it turns out that the company fabricated any false accusations it divulges, though, then you could sue the company for torts related to --and in addition to-- its defamatory falsehoods. So far the information you share here shows no signs of company's involvement in inventing the false accusations. What legal options do I have here? You need to ask the company for source and details of the information. In line with this comment, you should also ensure the company is aware of the mistaken identity. If the company declines to listen to you --and ideally see any proofs you have--, that could evidence some sort of tortious conduct on the company's part. Beware that in Florida a defamed person is required to demand a retraction of the false accusations prior to filing a defamation suit. Absent that request for retraction, it will be very easy for the sued defamer(s) to have your complaint dismissed. If the company refuses to disclose the source of the false information, then you need to seek injunctive relief in court. That means suing the company so as to (1) compel the company to identify the person(s) who accused you, and perhaps (2) strike the ban that the company put in place as a result of the false accusations. Even if you don't prevail in striking the ban, the court proceedings would give you the occasion to set the record straight and prevent the company from defaming you if you legitimately expose (to the public) the arbitrariness of its ban. To be clear, the company can always indulge in defaming you for the sake of justifying its ban, although that would be dumb in light of what you will have proved in court by then. In jurisdictions where a request for retraction is not mandatory, a plaintiff who does not know the identity of his defamer(s) may (1) file suit against "Doe defendants", (2) subpoena the non-party company so as to obtain records related to the false accusations (obviously ensuring that these reveal the authorship thereof), and (3) upon production of subpoena records and requesting the identified defamer for a retraction, amend the complaint to properly identify the defendant. This would be more efficient than filing two suits (one for injunctive relief against the company, and another against the defamers). However, I am uncertain of whether this would work in Florida, given its pre-suit requirement of request for retraction. | In an adversarial legal system, the parties are responsible for framing the issues in dispute and adducing relevant evidence. The parties, and perhaps more importantly their lawyers, also have an obligation of candour to the court. Courts routinely accept unchallenged assertions because there are serious consequences for misleading the court, and the opponent (rather than the court which should remain neutral) is in the best position to investigate and prove any suspected dishonesty. It is a matter for the party commencing proceedings (plaintiff or prosecutor) to decide how the parties will be named. People often change their names, and may use multiple spellings. It is not uncommon for typographical or other errors to appear. Generally, it is in the interest of at least one party to name the parties "correctly," ie. consistently with other government records that will be used to enforce any judgment, but a person's name is ultimately a formal matter that can be corrected if necessary. In cases of uncertainty, aliases can be specified, as occurred in Microsoft v McDonald (aka Gary Webb) [2006] EWHC 3410 (Ch). A person who is genuinely known by an alias (ie. the use of the alias is not part of an attempt to mislead the court) should use their "real" name in court, but could potentially conduct litigation using the alias without anybody noticing. However, court proceedings are public and this would not necessarily protect the person's identity. To achieve this, an anonymity order under CPR 39.2 is required, as explained in XXX v Camden London Borough Council [2020] EWCA Civ 1468 [13]–[22]. | Probably not until and unless the process server gets the correct address and actually serves you. Then the documents should explain the matter fully. If the person who was attempted to be served took note of the court involved, and told you what court it was, you could call the Clerk of the Court and inquire. Otherwise you would need to ask every possible court, which would take a great deal of time and effort. You have not been lawfully served (at least not in most US jurisdictions) until you have been served in person, or perhaps by mail, or by publication in a newspaper, or in some other way considered lawful in your jurisdiction, but serving a person at your old address is not likely to be valid service. (Valid methods differ from one jurisdiction to another, and in some situations differ by the kind of case involved.) If the person at your old address gave the server your new address, s/he will probably be along shortly. If a process server is given an address by the client (plaintiff), s/he may well go there first, and only do research later in case the first address is wrong. One need not worry about it until the papers are served, but it might be wise to read the legal ads in any nearby large newspapers for a few weeks, in case of service by publication. The papers should give the name of a court, and perhaps the name of a judge. You can call the clerk of the court and find out if the papers are legit. There may well be a docket no or case no or some other identifying umber, as well. This will help in verification. Docketed cases may be listed on a court web site. A comment asks is service by publication is still possible. It can be. According to the Michigan Court Rules Rule 2.106 (D): (D) Publication of Order; Mailing. If the court orders notice by publication, the defendant shall be notified of the action by (1) publishing a copy of the order once each week for 3 consecutive weeks, or for such further time as the court may require, in a newspaper in the county where the defendant resides, if known, and if not, in the county where the action is pending; and (2) sending a copy of the order to the defendant at his or her last known address by registered mail, return receipt requested, before the date of the last publication. If the plaintiff does not know the present or last known address of the defendant, and cannot ascertain it after diligent inquiry, mailing a copy of the order is not required. In addition, subrule (E) provides that: If the court orders notice by posting, the defendant shall be notified of the action by (1) posting a copy of the order in the courthouse and 2 or more other public places as the court may direct for 3 continuous weeks or for such further time as the court may require; and (2) sending a copy of the order to the defendant at his or her last known address by registered mail, return receipt requested, before the last week of posting. If the plaintiff does not know the present or last known address of the defendant, and cannot ascertain it after diligent inquiry, mailing a copy of the order is not required. The moving party is responsible for arranging for the mailing and proof of mailing. Thus if the plaintiff does not know and cannot determine the defendant's address, or has an incorrect address but thinks that it is correct, a service by publication (or even by posting) may be lawful, if the Judge so orders, without the defendant getting an individual copy of the documents by mail. This requires some unlikely events, but is possible. | I'm not sure it makes sense to talk about having "jurisdiction" over an IP address, for the purposes you're discussing. If you wanted to sue the IP address itself--something that is possible under limited circumstances--then you might need to locate it for jurisdictional purposes. But I don't think that's what you're talking about. You're talking about taking civil or criminal action against the people who are using the IP address to commit crimes. What matters, in that case, is not a theoretical legal question about the location of an IP address. It's questions like: where do these people live? Where do the people downloading the illegal content live? Where are the physical servers located? ("In the cloud" is not an answer--there are physical servers somewhere making up that cloud). For jurisdictional purposes, the chair they're sitting in when they upload the illegal data, and the location of the AC power outlet the physical server is plugged into, are as important as, if not more important than, the metaphysical "location" of the IP address of the server. | The only way in which you could be "incorrectly listed as a defendant" is if somehow your name was typed in as a party (there would be a glaring gap, that no paragraph of the complaint says anything about you as a defendant). Assuming the situation is nothing so bizarre as a typo, you are a defendant. Whether or not you are liable in this case is a matter of fact and law, and the plaintiff's attorney has probably done due diligence in suing everybody imaginable. Perhaps the plaintiff lied to his attorney about material facts (read the complaint); or perhaps there is a credible legal theory under which you would be liable (read the complaint). Your attorney will take care of your problems, to the best of his ability. He may be able to persuade the plaintiff's attorney that they stand no realistic hope of winning and some chance of getting smacked for pointlessly involving you. If the plaintiff's attorney isn't persuaded by the argument, your attorney could submit the legal arguments as a motion to dismiss. If the judge is not persuaded (at this stage), you (your attorney) will have to counter the arguments presented at trial. | If a defendant has committed a crime, they would choose to self-represent to ensure that no one else would know about the circumstances of their crime. Although lawyers are ethically bound to not disclose information that would not be in the interest of their client, the decision to breach this duty would be up to the sole discretion of the individual in question. In cases where the exchanged information may used to provide evidence against the client, the lawyer is compelled to disclose the truth to the courts/law enforcement. This is deeply misguided. Criminal defense lawyers usually represent people who are guilty and there is no ethical problem with doing so, nor does this mean that the lawyer will disclose privileged information that is prejudicial to the defendant in the course of the representation. The notion that a lawyer would be compelled to testify against his client to the courts/law enforcement is simply not how the system works. It is true that a lawyer cannot ethically put you on the stand to offer testimony when the lawyer knows that your testimony to the court will be an outright flat lie, and that this lie is your strategy to prevail in your defense, but that is the sole meaningful limitation on what a lawyer can do for you. However, I can't think of a single instance, in which a desire to defend yourself at trial with a lie has caused someone to represent themselves. Usually, someone with that kind of motive will simply lie to their lawyer as well. It never makes sense to represent yourself if you are innocent and want to be acquitted of the charges against you. But, keep in mind that this is a small subset of all criminal defendants. Criminal defendants are overwhelmingly guilty of something. Usually, a criminal defense lawyer works to either exploit prosecution mistakes or lack of knowledge that prevent the prosecution from proving that guilt, or work to make sure that the defendant is not convicted of a more serious crime than the one committed, and/or work to see to it that their client does not receive an unnecessarily harsh sentence when alternatives are available. In real life, people represent usually themselves, either because they are denied access to counsel (which can be done in a criminal cases where the prosecutor waives the right to seek incarceration as a sentence), or because they are "crazy". Many people who represent themselves in a criminal cases do so because they want to proudly claim that they committed the crime as a means of obtaining of forum for public recognition of what they believe was righteous action even if this could lead to their death. Many terrorists, domestic and foreign, fall into this category. For example, the fellow committed a massacre at a Colorado abortion clinic tried to do this (if I recall correctly, he was later found incompetent to face a trial and has been committed to a mental institution until he becomes competent, if ever). Other people represent themselves out of a strongly felt guilt that they feel a moral duty to confess to, even if this means that they will face severe punishment for doing so. One subset of this group of people are people known as "death penalty volunteers" who try to get sentenced to death and try to waive all appeals and post-trial review. Sometimes they also plead guilty in the belief (often, but not always, inaccurate) that their swift guilty plea when they aren't actually guilty will protect someone else whom they know to be actually guilty. Other people represent themselves because they have deeply held, but paranoid and inaccurate views about the legal system such as members of the "Sovereign Citizens Movement" who think that if they say the "magic words" that they cannot be convicted and that lawyers are a part of a conspiracy designed to prevent them from doing so. Another situation that comes up is when an affluent person who is not entitled to a public defender as a result, chooses to represent themselves, usually with respect to a fairly minor charge like a traffic violation that carries a risk for a short term of incarceration, to save money. But, this is rarely a wise choice. But, unless you plan on pleading guilty or being found guilty at trial, self-representation does not make sense, and even if you plan on pleading guilty, a lawyer is usually worth it. For example, even if the direct consequence of a guilty plea is minor, the collateral consequences of that conviction (e.g. loss of eligibility to work in certain jobs and/or deportation and/or loss of a right to own a firearm) may be consequential and something that a non-lawyer would not realize was happening. Or, maybe you think you are guilty of crime X so there is no point in fighting the charges, but actually, the language of that statute has been defined in a manner that means you are really only guilty of less serious crime Y. | If a statement is true, it cannot be defamatory. In your hypothetical, the credit bureau calculates a score based on correct information. There is no false statement anywhere, so there can be no defamation. Can you add some explanation of how giving someone a credit score lower than what his credit history merits is different from simply lying about that person's credit history? When I say "merits" I mean a score that would result in treatment by lenders that is significantly more consistent with what people with similar histories typically get. I presume that credit bureaus use a deterministic algorithm to calculate credit scores, in which case it wouldn't be possible to "give someone a credit score lower than what his credit history merits." More accurately, it wouldn't be possible to do that without bypassing the algorithm in some way. You might be able to argue defamation if you could prove that the credit bureau did in fact bypass its algorithm when it assigned your credit rating. You would probably have to show that your reputation was damaged because someone (i.e., a lender) knew that the ratings were deterministic and drew incorrect conclusions about you based on your incorrect score. The problem here will be to show that the credit rating was erroneous given the credit bureau's algorithm. To do that, you'd have to get your hands on the algorithm, which seems like it would be impossible to do, so you could do the calculation yourself. Even if you can do that, a more likely strategy would be to pursue the credit bureau under the Fair Credit Reporting Act or some other consumer protection law. | Calling someone an "asshole" is, at least in the US, an expression of opinion and so is not defamation. Saying that someone has committed a crime may be defamation, but not if that person has in fact already been convicted of that crime. In general if a statement is provably true, it is not defamation. If all that this hypothetical firm does is to post facts as found in court decisions, along with their unfavorable opinions of losing parties who they did not represent, it is hard to see any defamation case being valid. And I don't see any other obvious legal problem with doing this. It would probably anger other lawyers, and might make it harder to negotiate settlements or do other deals. If this firm announce that they refuse to accept as clients "cheats, crooks and similar people" and then make it public that they refused to represent some specific person, A, then A might claim that this portrayed him or her as a "cheat or crook" and was defamatory. The exact wording of their publicly announced policy, and of any announcements that they decline to represent A, would matter a good deal, as would the jurisdiction's exact law of defamation. In some places, codes of ethics promulgated by a Bar Association might be violated by such a policy, but such codes are usually not enforceable in the general case. I don't see any obvious grounds for disbarment proceedings. |
Elements of bribery: what is a "thing of value"? There is lately some suggestion that a US president who withholds aid to a foreign country on the condition that the foreign country investigate a political opponent constitutes bribery. The definitions I've found of that offense all involve a "thing of value." It is clear how such an investigation could be valuable to a US president, for the investigation would damage the reputation of the president's political opponents, probably making it easier for the president (or the president's political allies) to win the next election. But I am asking here on Law because curious: Is there precedent for such an intangible act to serve as a "thing of value" in a bribery prosecution (or impeachment)? For the purpose of this question, I am not particularly interested in promises of employment, since employment implies a salary. It seems like the distinguishing characteristic is that the thing of value is an act that only indirectly benefits the person seeking the performance of the act. Suggestions about other distinguishing elements are welcome. The question principally concerns US federal law, but because the delegates to the constitutional convention would have understood bribery as a common-law offense, it would also be helpful to know about common-law precedent from before 1789, which may have influenced their understanding of the word bribery. | The Federal Election Commission (FEC) recently put out a summary of what constitutes a thing of value. While it is a summary from the FEC, I still think it's relevant because it uses the term thing of value, which, as the summary notes, appears in (quoting from the summary) "many criminal statutes throughout the United States". Because of that, I will quote the summary here, minus the footnotes. THE LAW OF A ‘THING OF VALUE’ A Summary of the Sorts of Tangible and Intangible Goods and Services that have been Found to have ‘Value’ by the Commission and Other U.S. Government Entities October 2019 What is a “thing of value” under the law? The Federal Election Campaign Act (the “Act”) defines a contribution to include “any gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything of value made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office.” “Anything of value” includes all “in-kind contributions,” defined as “the provision of any goods or services without charge or at a charge that is less than the usual and normal charge for such goods or services.” Goods or services provided at the usual and normal charge may not constitute a contribution under the Act. Commission regulations permit any person or company to provide goods or services to a political committee, without making a contribution, if that person or company does so as a “commercial vendor,” i.e., in the ordinary course of business, and at the usual and normal charge. The legal concept of a “thing of value” is not unique to the Act. The words “thing of value” “are found in so many criminal statutes throughout the United States that they have in a sense become words of art,” wrote the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. “The word ‘thing’ notwithstanding, the phrase is generally construed to cover intangibles as well as tangibles.” Federal courts have consistently applied an expansive reading to the term “thing of value” in a variety of statutory contexts to include goods and services that have tangible, intangible, or even merely perceived benefits, for example: promises, information, testimony, conjugal visits, and commercially worthless stock. The word “anything” means “all things.” “Read naturally, the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning, that is, ‘one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind,’” according to the Supreme Court. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit explained, “The United States Supreme Court and this Court have recognized on many occasions that the word ‘any’ is a powerful and broad word, and that it does not mean ‘some’ or ‘all but a few,’ but instead means ‘all.’” The summary goes on to provide a list of examples: The Commission has held a long and diverse list of goods and services (both tangible and intangible, both easy and difficult to value) to qualify as contributions, including: opposition research; an activist’s contact list; an email list; staff time; a business name or logo; a severance payment; the production elements for an event; election materials; a rent-stabilized apartment; office space; a boat; stocks and commodities; barter credit units and cryptocurrency mining awards; a gold coin; poll results; and more generally, securities, facilities, equipment, supplies, personnel, advertising services, membership lists, mailing lists. Thus, the Commission has, consistent with judicial rulings, interpreted “anything of value” broadly under the Act. The Commission has found that even where the value of a good or service “may be nominal or difficult to ascertain,” such good or service is nevertheless a “thing of value” under the Act. | Embezzlement is criminally prohibited by 18 USC 666, and this DoJ manual page on what is embezzlement cites the answer in Moore v. United States, 160 U.S. 268 that Embezzlement is the fraudulent appropriation of property by a person to whom such property has been entrusted, or into whose hands it has lawfully come. It differs from larceny in that the original taking was lawful, or with the consent of the owner, while in larceny the felonious intent must have existed at the time of the taking Following other case law, the elements of the crime are there was a trust or fiduciary relationship between the defendant and the private organization or State or local government agency; the property came into the possession or care of the defendant by virtue of his/her employment; the defendant's dealings with the property constituted a fraudulent conversion or appropriation of it to his/her own use; and the defendant acted with the intent to deprive the owner of the use of this property. This page lists over 32,000 disbursements; filtering just for rent give over 2,400 disbursements, a number of which are recent and made to some business with Trump in the name (Trump Tower LLC etc). The conversion would have to be fraudulent to be embezzlement. There actually is not any evidence provided that a transfer violated FEC regulations (we have dates, amounts, and recipient), so we would have to speculate about what else is true. There are processed disbursement images up to 10/21/2020 such as this receipt for 3 charges for food and lodging paid to Trump Hotel Collection. In fact this payment was made by Donald J Trump for President, Inc. although the search term was the aforementioned PAC: I will overlook that anomaly. This is the FEC page on that committee (you have to follow the committee number because the name was also used in the 2016 campaign but was terminated). There vast numbers of filings linked there, but nothing that I saw indicates that Trump is in any sense an employee of the organization, so there is no actual evidence that there were any "Trump actions". First, it would have to be shown that there were Trump actions. Second, it would have to be show that the action was fraudulent. Technical misappropriation is not fraudulent. This FEC page describes the safe harbor provisions for misappropriation. This page specifically addresses embezzlement. Although they use the word "embezzlement", they do not purport that misappropriation constituted embezzlement as defined above, to point out that civil penalties may result from violation, see 11 CFR Part 104. Ultimately, the legal propriety of the disbursements depends on its purpose: here is what the FEC say about illegal conversion for personal use (food for daily consumption, mortgage or rent for personal residence, tuition...). The available evidence does not even suggest embezzlement. | I would argue the Constitutional basis of these actions would be the Constitution itself, namely Article II, Section 4: The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. and Article I, Section 3, Clause 7: Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law. Note also, that as Hamilton explained in the Federalist Papers, the Impeachment process was a check brought over from England (it predated the formation of Britain by several centuries) as a check on Executive (read Monarchal) power of royal appointments, including Judges. So, to answer your questions directly: Serving out one's term or resigning is not a shield to impeachment, otherwise one could simply play "whack-a-mole", appointing the same individual repeatedly (which is also why future barring of the individual from governmental office is an option). The purpose of impeachment is, per Hamilton, to react to "political crimes"; "mundane" crimes are to be handle by the normal judicial system. Nixon did famously resign rather than be impeached, but he was barred from running again anyway, having served two terms as President. Congress at that time chose not to continue the impeachment process after his resignation (note that disqualification is an option, but not required, punishment that can be levied by Congress in the event of impeachment). See Article I, Section 3, Clause 7, quoted above. | This is a rather elaborate version of receiving stolen property. It is a crime because you know that the property is not yours and you know who it belongs to. The fact that funds were returned mitigates the punishment that might be imposed, but disgorgement of profits as well as principal would be a typical criminal restitution in such a case. A prosecutor could decline to press charges (and often would decline to do so), but would have the authority to do so. An analogous case that comes up more frequently is when an attorney takes client funds out of his trust account (either accidentally or intentionally) and then uses the funds in a way that produces a profit or avoids, for example, a late payment penalty, and then returns the funds improperly withdrawn from the trust account. This is still conduct for which attorneys are routinely disbarred and prosecuted criminally. Even if the person didn't know that the money belonged to someone else when it was used, the true owner of the money could sue for unjust enrichment for both the funds and the proceeds from the funds. For example, if funds were accidentally deposited in your bank account rather than the correct one due to a transposition of numbers in the account number, and you didn't notice this error, you would have liability to return not just the accidentally deposited funds, but also the profits from those funds, because both would be unjust enrichment. But, in an accidental case where there was no knowledge that the funds were wrongfully placed in your account, you could deduct from the amount to be returned any banking charges you incurred with respect to the transactions and it would not be a crime. | This is likely to be a matter of policy rather than law That is, it’s not likely there is a law prohibiting it but it is highly likely that the person’s training and their employer’s policy on the matter is that they must complete a ticket once they start it. It’s a pretty universal anti-corruption measure - it prevents the situation where they are writing the ticket, the owner appears and offers them half the value of the fine in cash to stop: well, they can’t stop so they can’t be tempted by the bribe. Of course, the bribe can be offered before they start but, when fighting corruption, you minimise the opportunities rather than eliminate them. I know that police and rangers (private people can’t issue tickets) in new-south-wales are so restricted. | The language argument about the constitution is that the Constitution uses the pronoun "he" in referring to the president – they would not have used the construction "he or she", or "s/he". Article I also uses "he" to refer to qualifications of representatives and senators (residency, age). Then in creating the office of predident pro tempore of the Senate, it uses "he" to refer to a Vice President who is exercising the office of President of the United States. In Article IV Section II it states: A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another state, shall on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime. Thus women cannot be extradited, if the "'he' means male" theory prevails. In 1872, Victoria Woodhull ran for president, and while it is true there were questions about her eligibility, that was because of her age rather than sex. Belva Lockwood ran for president in 1884 and 1888. This is not strong enough to constitute proof that being female was not a bar to holding the office, but it is indicative of that conclusion. The strongest evidence that the use of "he" in the Constitution had no significance is the fact that Jeanette Rankin was elected US Representative from Montana in 1916, 2 years before Congress approved the 19th Amendment. Since the only way to impose any restrictions on the presidency is via the Constitution (i.e. Congress can't pass a law redefining the qualification for office), and since the use of "he" has never been strictly interpreted to preclude female senators and representatives, we have to conclude that there never has been a prohibition against a female president. | Speech of foreign nationals is not treated the same as that of citizens. In the case Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, the Supreme Court rules on the constitutionality of various statutory limits on campaign spending. Some parts of the law were upheld, others were overturned in 1st Amendment grounds. They upheld limits on contributions to candidates and volunteers' incidental expenses, and overturned limits on expenditures. In the decision, the court observed that [n]either the right to associate nor the right to participate in political activities is absolute and "governmental 'action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny'" The court stated that Even a 'significant interference with protected rights of political association' may be sustained if the State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms. This is reasonably-standard strict scrutiny boilerplate language: what it remind you is that no Constitutionally-protected right is absolute, and all rights are subject to limitation, when that right conflicts with a compelling government interest. In the case of the federal contribution laws, that interest is the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption spawned by the real or imagined coercive influence of large financial contributions on candidates' positions and on their actions if elected to office. The court then found that under the rigorous standard of review established by our prior decisions, the weighty interests served by restricting the size of financial contributions to political candidates are sufficient to justify the limited effect upon First Amendment freedoms caused by the $1,000 contribution ceiling. 52 USC 30121 imposes a prohibition which, if placed on US persons, would be held to violate the 1st Amendment. That law prohibits, among others, a contribution or donation of money or other thing of value, or to make an express or implied promise to make a contribution or donation, in connection with a Federal, State, or local election by "a foreign national", defined to not include lawful permanent residents but otherwise includes all foreign citizens and entities. The constitutionality of this law was challenged on First Amendment grounds but affirmed in Bluman v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281 (written by Kavanaugh in his previous job), and upheld in a one-sentence affirmation by SCOTUS. So, 1st Amendment rights of foreign nationals are not protected to the same extent as those of US citizens. It should be noted that the court also (expressly) did not decide if Congress could also constitutionally ban contributions by LPRs, or could prohibit foreign nationals from engaging in other forms of speech (issue advocacy and speaking on issues of public policy) – that matter was left undecided. | This negotiation tactic is not a crime, but it does implicate an ethical rule for attorneys, Rule of Professional Conduct 4.5, which exists in some states, but has been dropped from the national model rules promulgated by the American Bar Association and is a controversial matter from state to state with several variant forms in different states. In Colorado, the relevant rule of professional conduct for lawyers (Rule 4.5 Threatening Prosecution) states: (a) A lawyer shall not threaten criminal, administrative or disciplinary charges to obtain an advantage in a civil matter nor shall a lawyer present or participate in presenting criminal, administrative or disciplinary charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter. (b) It shall not be a violation of Rule 4.5 for a lawyer to notify another person in a civil matter that the lawyer reasonably believes that the other's conduct may violate criminal, administrative or disciplinary rules or statutes. The concern about the statement in the question is that mentioning that certain allegations would be put in a publicly filed complaint is an implicit threat to expose criminal acts of the other party if the other party doesn't cooperate, but to refrain from doing so if the other party cooperates. This violates Rule of Professional Conduct 4.5(a) above, and goes beyond Rule 4.5(b) above which states that it is not improper to simply tell someone that it may have been illegal and a crime to do the things that he did. The critical distinction is the implied promise not to disclose these crimes publicly if the other party cooperates by not filing the proposed complaint. Under Rule 4.5, a lawyer can tell someone that certain conduct is probably illegal, and can unilaterally report illegal conduct, but can't hold open the possibility of not reporting illegal conduct to gain a civil advantage. The theory is that it is contrary to public policy for a lawyer to put himself or his client in a position where he is promising to help cover up a crime or other violation of the law. This is controversial, and is not adopted in all states, because it makes some very subtle distinctions that often hinge on strongly implied concepts, and that it provides benefit when applied in many cases to someone who has broken the law, instead of making their violation of the law something that makes them worse off in civil cases as well as in other contexts. There is not a counterpart to Colorado Rule of Professional Conduct 4.5 in the Rules of Professional Conduct of New York State, New Jersey, or Florida. So, to the extent that this conduct is subject to ethical rules in any of these states, it would only be indirectly through, for example, through Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4 in each of these states, which is a general catch all clause prohibiting lawyers from committing culpable crimes or that is dishonest or that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. Rule 8.4 is the counterpart for lawyers of the substantive offense in military justice that a military officer has failed to comport himself as an officer and a gentleman. The history of the decision to remove an express prohibition on threatening prosecution from the ethical rules for lawyers is explained in a 2008 ABA article that also discusses how liability might arise under Rule 8.4. In general, there is nothing wrong with making threats in a negotiation. Often that is precisely what negotiations are about. What is (arguably) wrong is making criminal, administrative or disciplinary charge threats in a civil lawsuit to gain advantage in a civil lawsuit. A prosecutor is perfectly free to make those threats in a criminal case, for example. Similarly, it is perfectly acceptable to make a threat of civil legal action, such as filing a lawsuit, in a civil matter, so long as it doesn't imply a threat to bring criminal, administrative or disciplinary charges if the other side doesn't cooperate. Whether it is proper for an attorney to do this depends heavily upon the state in which this negotiation is taking place, which is not identified in the question. |
How can loss be difficult to quantify, but be a familiar type for which damages are frequently awarded? Richard and Damian Taylor. Contract Law Directions (2019 7 ed). pp. 318-319. As to the application of the law to the facts of the case Lord Reed continued by saying, at paras [98]–[99]: I now quote Lord Reed. Doesn't the emboldened phrase contradict itself? This is a case brought by a commercial entity whose only interest in the defendants’ performance of their obligations under the covenants was commercial. Indeed, a restrictive covenant which went beyond what was necessary for the reasonable protection of the claimant’s commercial interests would have been unenforceable. The substance of the claimant’s case is that it suffered financial loss as a result of the defendants’ breach of contract. The effect of the breach of contract was to expose the claimant’s business to competition which would otherwise have been avoided. The natural result of that competition was a loss of profits and possibly of goodwill. The loss is difficult to quantify, and some elements of it may be inherently incapable of precise measurement. Nevertheless, it is a familiar type of loss, for which damages are frequently awarded. It is possible to quantify it in a conventional manner, as is demonstrated by Mr Hine’s report. The case is not one where the breach of contract has resulted in the loss of a valuable asset created or protected by the right which was infringed. Considered in isolation, the first defendant’s breach of the confidentiality covenant might have been considered to be of that character, but in reality the claimant’s loss is the cumulative result of breaches of a number of obligations, of which the non-compete and non-solicitation covenants have been treated as the most significant, as explained in para 17 above. | I don't believe it is contradictory. Some kinds of injury are inherently difficult to calculate (e.g. damage to reputation caused by slander) but the judge or jury, as the case may be, will review the evidence and do the best they can. Lord Reed says as much in paragraph 38 of his judgment. ... and as a practical matter, it appears the damages, in this case, were both calculable and supported by evidence. The Court's primary focus was not whether damages could be calculated but rather the measure of damages (i.e. the method of calculation). | No The term "sword and shield" is allegorical rather than legal and may be called up in any number of contexts. Such as ... Waiver of privilege In the particular instance, Anthem was claiming that the reports were privileged and hence protected from discovery, presumably because they were prepared in contemplation of litigation - this litigation, one supposes. However, privilege is lost or waived if the privileged information is disclosed, as it was by relying on the conclusion of the report in its defense. As such, the entire suite of reports is no longer protected. Basically, if you want to keep privilege you have to keep what is privileged secret. Note, the could have lost privilege if they had disclosed the findings of the report in any way such as by press release or by simply leaving the document in a public place. In this context, the judge is stating that they cannot use the "shield" of privilege to protect a report that they have used as a "sword" to make a attack their opponent. | (Standard disclaimer: I am not your lawyer; I am not here to help you.) Under American common law, the distinction here would relate to the harm to B: either a damages issue or a "special harm" issue. The Restatement elements of defamation are falsity, publication, fault, and inherent actionability or special harm. See Rest. 2d Torts § 558. The last element captures the traditional doctrine that slander (not libel) is only actionable if it falls into one of four or five specific categories ("slander per se"), or if it actually causes economic injury. Your example doesn't seem to fit into any of the special categories. But see Rest. 2d Torts § 573 (imputations affecting business or office). If the statement to C is oral rather than written, and C doesn't believe it or otherwise nothing comes of the statement, B may not be able to prove special harm and therefore fail to recover anything. If D, on the contrary, avoided doing business with B, B may be able to show special harm supporting a claim. Similarly, C's disbelief or D's belief may be relevant to determining the actual damages B suffered and is therefore entitled to recover from A. | Here be dragons Financial services regulation is very complicated. Non-compliance can have severe consequences. Professional legal counsel could assist in navigating the complex web of law, regulation, and precedent. It may seem unfair that things are so difficult - that's a result of financial services being inherently complicated topics, ones which are fought over by wealthy people/firms, and where there has been a long history of dodgy dealings of many kinds. As an example of the difficulties involved, the law in general would like to distinguish between Investment advice given to a specific individual, taking all their personal circumstances and wishes into account, and Newspaper reports giving dispassionate information to the general public about the movement of share prices, but not telling them what to do in response; or completely generic advice like "it's good when the wiggly line goes up". The second is "meant" to be basically OK and not the concern of the regulators; the first one is where all kinds of legal duties and protections come into play, since people might be disadvantaged by advisors who are inept or unscrupulous. Intuitively, D's app is somewhere between these, because it's not as if users are sitting down with a financial advisor and making trades, but they're also not just consuming generic data like a stock ticker. There is an element of prediction, expressing a range of envisaged outcomes, and potentially with "extra filters" that add some more personalization. So what does the law say about this? Just looking at the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001, Part II Chapter 12 and its form after two decades of tweaking tells us that there is a lot of complicated detail just in this regulation. We don't have to read or understand the words to see that there are a lot more of them, taking the apparently simple distinction above and trying to capture or carve out a range of activities not originally envisaged. If we do start looking at the actual words, we can see several concepts that become relevant - "advice on the merits", "leading or enabling persons to buy or sell", and so on. These, and their predecessor words in older laws, have been thrashed out in the courts in ways that are not completely obvious. A recent case in the Court of Appeal, Adams v Options Personal Pensions UK LLP [2021] EWCA Civ 474, looks at some of this territory in paragraphs 69-82. We see here some phrases about whether the context of the information presented includes elements of comparison, evaluation, or persuasion; influencing the decision of the recipient as a result of a value judgement; giving purely factual information as opposed to matters such as a characterization of risk; and others. But, as quoted here from another decision, Rubenstein v HSBC Bank plc [2011] EWHC 2304 (QB), "To attempt any greater definition of the giving of advice in an investment context would be unwise and is probably impossible", which tells us that it's not easy to decide whether developer D's app is in or out. You say "the app won't instruct users whether to buy or not" but courts have found a concept of "implied advice", where the context of the giving of information means that the customer will take it as advice. In Australia, the Federal Court recently found an implied recommendation, amounting to personal advice, had been given in a certain situation when customers were told supposedly general advice - even though there was an up-front disclaimer (ASIC v Westpac [2019] FCAFC 187). The specific law and facts are not the same as in this question, but the observation holds that disclaimers may not help if the surrounding marketing is communicating something else. Similar remarks apply to the predictive model, where there is also plenty of regulation. In the FCA's Conduct of Business Sourcebook 4.5A.14, for example, there are binding rules about information on future performance. Whether these rules apply to what D is doing, and how they can comply, are hard questions. There is an entire publication, the Perimeter Guidance Manual, about how to know whether someone is covered by the regulator, but even that is full of maybes. Aside from concerns with the regulators themselves, users may be very upset with D from time to time, and their anger might spill over into a legal claim. There is, again, a large body of law to do with such topics as negligence in giving investment advice. All of the above is evidence that the question of compliance for a particular app or business is not completely simple. Professional advice can look at the whole context, as well as relevant law, and assist D in understanding their options. | It might or it might not be fraud. The outcome will depend on how the facts and evidence are interpreted at trial. A more general version of this question is: If two parties discuss and orally agree to X; then sign a contract that states they agree to Y, what are the parties bound to? X? Y? Or something else? In your version, X is a fraudulent statement. And Y is an obfuscated writing. One party will argue fraud. The other will argue not fraud on the basis that all the facts were disclosed in writing. The party alleging fraud will carry the burden of proof. The standard of proof will be preponderance of evidence (more than 50%). Generally speaking, written evidence outweighs oral evidence if not accompanied by substantiating facts. Substantiating facts could be: emails or other written correspondence, a prior history or pattern of making false claims to others regarding this investment, the respective behavior of the parties after the agreement was made or anything else that corroborates the oral testimony presented at trial. | Venue The location where you file the claim is the court that will hear it unless: you both agree the judge orders a different venue based on submissions from the parties (unlikely in a small claim) Costs Costs awards in small claims are rare and generally do not extend to the legal fees and if they do, the amount is capped. Costs for reasonable expenses of witnesses are slightly more common. In general, costs are limited to what is reasonable - to get the costs of travel and accommodation for the Liverpool solicitor, the party would have to argue that there was no available equivalent representation available locally. This might be arguable if you need a QC expert in say, international maritime law, it seems unlikely for a small claims matter. Personal Comment Don't go to court for £100 - settle the damn thing or walk away. In the time and worry you spend on it you could earn that sum five times over. | My understanding of contract law is the original fees are implied if no new explicit agreement is signed and therefore the invoice amount should be $1,000. Is that correct? No. At the outset, the presumption that the price would be equal to that of filings covered in the engagement letter is inaccurate. The actual terms of the engagement letter might support a different conclusion, though, which is why I asked about them. The offer in the engagement letter seems to be just a marketing practice, and as such it is neither uncommon nor unlawful. The rationale for that marketing practice is that offering [in this case] the first two tax filings at a lower price is likelier to persuade new customers to try the services the company provides. Thereafter, those customers will be billed what the company would call a normal or ordinary price. Statutory law does not provide specific constraints to how greater the ordinary price. But the details would help ascertain whether an excessive, unannounced increase amounts to what is known as unfair and misleading practices or otherwise contravenes consumer protection laws. These laws vary by jurisdiction and might or might not defeat the argument that the customer bears the risk of mistake. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts at §154(b). | In the event of a dispute, the person resolving the matter, probably an arbitrator in the case of a commission dispute between two realtors and either an arbitrator or a judge and jury depending upon what your listing agreement says about that issue, would hear the testimony from both parties and decide. The intent of the parties is supposed to govern in cases of clerical errors, but a signed document has a lot of weight, especially in such a prominent term. It is a little hard from the way the question is posed to determine who is willing to correct the typo and who insists on enforcing the contract containing the typo. |
HR wants me to sign a confidentiality on something I reported. How big is the scope of the agreement? Basically what happened is a coworker made a false statement about me, relating to my work, on Social Media. I reported it to HR. HR wants me to sign the following. I'm concerned with how broad and general it is. By participating in the investigation brought to my attention, I understand that I have been asked to participate in providing information under a current open investigation process. In that regard, unless it is necessary to obtain professional advice, I agree to not disclose, or discuss with anyone, any matters relating to the investigation which includes but is not limited to: • The issues discussed with the investigator at any time. • The fact that I am participating in an investigation. • My opinions on the validity or nature of the complaint. • Whether and what other individuals might also be participating in the investigation. • All documents created by me or shared with me during the investigation. Does this only apply to the investigation, or does this mean I cannot talk about the reported event at all, or only information that comes to light after signing the agreement? What is the scope? Are the terms even enforceable, like is the first one saying I can neither confirm nor deny I have reported something to HR? Could signing this in any way limit legal action I could take? I'm in Canada but the company was recently bought out by an American company so the HR department is in the US. | tldr; the agreement is a mess, one-sided, do not sign. This agreement does little to serve your interests, and a lot to harm them. It is also fairly poorly phrased, I have doubts that someone with legal knowledge wrote it. It states: I agree to not disclose, or discuss with anyone, any matters relating to the investigation You are agreeing not to talk to the investigator. If you do talk to them, you will be in breach of the terms you've agreed to. I'm sure they'll just say "oh, that's not what it means" - but that is not how contracts work, they mean what they say. It also says: which includes but is not limited to: ... All documents created by me or shared with me during the investigation. This applies to documents created during the investigation, not in relation to the investigation, not for use in the investigation, not related to the complaint. And again, you can't share these documents with anyone, including the investigator. It may well be unenforceable, as it gives you nothing in exchange for the rights you are giving up, and the concept of "consideration" is key to the common law of contracts in the USA, and also Canada (stemming from British common law) which means both parties must receive something of value: Here's a wiki article on Consideration in US law and a page on Consideration in Canadian law With all of these flaws and the fact that it may well be unenforceable, it would not be wise to sign it. If it did the following, it might be a more useful agreement: Had time limits, after which the restrictions are lifted Allowed you to acknowledge the case and state that you can't discuss it while it is ongoing Applied only to the workplace, talking to the press and publishing details to the public internet, such as social media - this may already be in your contract of employment (relating to bringing the company into disrepute) if so it isn't really a restriction being applied by this agreement, but a re-iteration of the existing agreement Promised a fair investigation in a timely manner, with a report at the end, and appropriate action is taken if claims are substantiated, and libel has occurred Or, they could offer you money right now for your silence, that would absolutely be consideration, in some jurisdictions, the sum may need to be considered reasonable, but this is not universal. There are also cases where NDAs turn out to be invalid: 11 ways NDAs can be invalidated An actual case where an NDA was found to be too broad | "Legal problem" is too vague to be included. "Investigation" needs a bit of refining; "lawsuit" is relatively simple (as long as you mean "actual lawsuit" not "idea that maybe we could sue"). There is no central list of all lawsuits against a given party, but you could theoretically check every jurisdiction to see if there is a lawsuit. That's a really big list, maybe in the millions if you want to be complete. You can use ordinary Google search to find announced lawsuits, typically by government agencies. Finding investigations is even more difficult: you will not be able to determine what investigations I am conducting. Even determining the existence of investigations by police including e.g. the FBI is hard to do. A government attorney is the one most likely to reveal that they are investigating some party with the intent to sue them. Again, you can't get a complete list, you can use Google to get an indication of who has announced an investigation (your results will generally not say whether the investigation was closed, unless you pursue that question as well). | The Canadian law governing interception of communication (wiretapping and recording) is explained here. Canada is a one-party country, so as long as one party (you, for example) consent, this would not be a violation of that statute. That source also believes (not unreasonably) that is would not constitute the tort of invasion of privacy since under the act The nature and degree of privacy to which a person is entitled … is that which is reasonable in the circumstances, giving due regard to the lawful interests of others (bearing in mind that is it allowed w.r.t. Section 184(1) of the Criminal Code: that is, it is reasonable to do so). | I can't find any law that would prevent an employer from requiring this. Under current Florida law, an employer can even demand passwords and access to an employee's social media accounts. A bill was proposed to prohibit this, but it hasn't passed. Generally, an employer can require anything they want as a condition of employment, as long as it is not illegal. Florida has at-will employment so the employer could certainly fire the employee if they don't comply. | If two parties agree to the terms of an exchange, then there exists an enforceable contract. A signature is not needed to create a contract. However, an intent to negotiate a contract is not, per se, a contract. Absent some specific and explicit measures (which for major deals may be codified in an MOU or LOI that itself contains contractual terms), if you can't reach an agreement on terms then there is no contract. It's up to the particulars of "the verbal agreement to start the hiring process" whether an agreement on exchange has been reached, or merely proposed. E.g., "You and I agree that I will pay you $X in exchange for Y due Z" is a contract. "You and I agree that we'd like to work together, and we'll hammer out the terms X, Y, and Z by the end of the week" is merely a proposal to contract, not an actual contract. Of course, this doesn't mean you're immune to liability for failing to reach a contract in this hypothetical: you can always be sued! | Is a text message legally binding? Yes, but the terms of the message need to be clear enough to ascertain the parties' intent at the formation of that contract or agreement. A contract does not even need to be in writing. There are also oral contracts and implied contracts, the latter referring to contracts which are inferred from the parties' conduct. A contract such as the agreement you describe here is binding regardless of its form. It is just easier to prove the existence of a contract if it is in writing. You did not specify your jurisdiction. If it is in the US, the price tag --rather than the downpayment-- of the object of the contract (i.e., the puppy you intend to buy) determines whether your complaint would need to be filed in Small Claims court. Generally speaking, parties to a dispute in Small Claims court have to represent themselves. Two remarks are pertinent. First, developing writing skills is utmost important not only for litigating a dispute, but also during the process of formulating the terms and conditions of a contract/agreement. Your post indicates that you seriously need to work on that. Second, the end of your post reflects that one of your managers violated labor law(s), which to most of us would be more worrisome than the controversy about the puppy. Legislation in most or all jurisdictions outlaws the act of withholding an employee's compensation regardless of its form (salary, commissions, and so forth). You might want to gain acquaintance with the labor laws of your jurisdiction so you can assess whether or how to proceed (does legislation require the employee to "exhaust administrative remedies" prior to filing in court? are administrative remedies optional? do these exist at all?), even if only to ascertain whether the deadline for filing the corresponding claim has elapsed. | My lawyer answers my question, thinking he is giving legal advice to a non-client when he is actually answering a client's question. But if you read the FAQ, posts at law.stachexchange are not legal advice. In fact, questions that are so specific as to risk becoming a request for legal advice are routinely closed. But let's go further: The issue at hand is not the one your lawyer is hired to help you with. He is not your lawyer for that issue. Even if we considered the relationship through law.stackexchange legal representation, the conversation would not be privileged. You are posting in a public forum, and expecting reply in the same way. You are free to waive the privilege of communication with your lawyer, and you are doing that by using this way of communicating with him. At this point, the only thing your lawyer would have done would be voluntarily giving for free some info that he could have billed you for. What exactly would be the issue here? It is exactly what pro bono is for. The only way to breach confidentiality would be if your lawyer were to convey things that you said to him confidentially to the public, but here it would not be relevant if the OPs author were already his customer or not. | Am I correct in arguing that the LHD never really had implied consent to begin with? In other words, does the failure to honour the express refusal inform us about the legitimacy of prior claims of implied consent? No. They had implied consent and had not intent at the outset to dishonor it. They have violated the patient's privacy right when consent was expressly withdrawn, and they discovered that they cannot easily comply and therefore did not comply. The fact that they have made it expensive for themselves to comply with their legal obligations going forward does not imply that they lacked implied consent at the outset, so they should have no liability for the time period from when the training materials started to be used until the time when implied consent ended. They are only responsible going forward for their failure to honor the patient's wishes. It is not at all exceptional for a legal obligation to turn out to be more difficult to comply with when it arises than was anticipated when the systems that make the legal obligation difficult to comply with were implemented. Health care companies aren't expected to be prophets who can foresee the complex confluence of factors that has painted them in a corner, particularly when a situation has never come up before the current one. It is likely that no one person was ever even simultaneously aware of all the facts necessary to know that this could happen. Someone in the IT department will often not be intimately familiar with what is going on in the training part of the operation and what the privacy rules that apply are and even if someone was, that someone may have been in no position to do anything about it at the time. Health care providers aren't supposed to be evaluated with 20-20 hindsight. Given that they almost surely did not and could not easily have known that they had made a future express withdrawal of consent very difficult to effectuate, scienter can't be attributed to it. And, honestly, they are in more than enough trouble simply trying to deal with the problem post-express withdrawal of consent when they did start to violate privacy laws. |
Does a non-competition clause bond me to a minimum term of employment? I am an IT instructor in a private educational institution in British Columbia, Canada. They gave me a agreement which includes a section “non-competition clause” with these lines: He or she agrees that they will not, either directly or indirectly, either as a partner or as an officer, director, shareholder, employee or agent or servant of any corporation or partnership, for a period of two (2) years after leaving the said employment, solicit orders from any customers, clients or agents of the employer for such products as are sold by the employer in any area of the world. Is it a bond for 2 years for that institution? If I signed, will I have to work for 2 years with them? If I signed and later leave the institution and join another one, will this clause cause problems for me? | Some jurisdictions tend to favor non-compete agreements, others hold most of them to be unenforceable. From a very quick search, BC is a little reluctant to enforce them, but they can be valid if sensibly drawn. However, the text you included in the question is not a non-compete agreement at all, it is a non-solicitation agreement, a much less restrictive agreement, which is significantly more likely to be upheld. The agreement quoted in the question does not mandate the employee continuing to work for the employer for any minimum time, not two years, and not six months. (Another provision might specify a required notice period, but that was not quoted and may not be in the agreement.) The agreement quoted does not prohibit the employee, after s/he leaves the job, from working for a competitor of the former employer, not even for a brief period. What the agreement quoted does do, is prohibit the employee from asking individuals and businesses who were customers of the former employer for orders for the same products as are sold by the former employer. This applies to orders on behalf of the employee personally, on behalf of a new employer, or on behalf of a business in which the employee has some sort of ownership stake (such as partner or shareholder). That is all that the quoted language prohibits. This means that the employee cannot ask those who were customers of the old employer, to buy from or through him, the same products that the old employer sells. It does not mean that the former employee cannot sell such products, if the inquiry comes from the customer. This sort of agreement is primarily aimed at preventing a salesperson from taking a client list with him or her to a new employer, and trying to get them to move their business from the salesperson's old employer to his or her new employer or business. If the employee is primarily an instructor and does not also act as a salesperson, this agreement will have almost no effect on him or her. This site discusses such agreement an myths about them in BC, Canada. It says: Non-competition clauses can be enforced by courts in BC. It is true that employers face an uphill battle in getting a judge to agree to enforce a non-compete, but it can and does happen. If you are wondering whether your non-compete will stick, ask an employment lawyer. Enforceability of a non-compete depends on the specifics of the wording of the clause itself and the overall employment contract. Some key considerations are whether the clause is clearly worded, and whether it is limited in time, geography and scope of what is covered. If a non-competition clause is enforced by a judge, it will only be applied to prevent the employee from the specific activities listed. If the employer has missed something from the clause, or there is a “loop-hole,” that is generally fair game. Many contracts include non-solicitation (aka non-solicit) clauses, which are meant to prevent the employee from contacting clients. Non-solicitation clauses are still an uphill battle to enforce, but slightly easier than a non-competition clauses. This is because non-solicits don’t dictate where an employee can work, just what business they can seek out. Even if there is no contract, obligations to respect confidential information, and fiduciary duties (in the case of key employees) last beyond the end of employment and can limit competition. An online paper on "Is my Employee’s Non-Compete Agreement Enforceable?" by Lisa Stam says: In Canada, courts have generally been reluctant to uphold agreements that have the effect of restricting an individual’s ability to earn a living or pursue the job of their choice. Indeed, courts take the initial position that restrictive covenants in employment agreements are unenforceable, unless the employer can demonstrate otherwise. A restrictive covenant must jump through several hoops to be deemed enforceable. ... A non-solicitation agreement will allow a former employee to work for a competitor, but prevent them from soliciting the clients (and possibly the employees) of their former employer for a specific period of time. Former employees may have close relationships with clients. Allowing them to solicit these clients may give them an unfair advantage against the former employer in the marketplace. If the employee does not solicit the client, but the client leaves to follow them anyway, there is little an employer can do. ... If a court finds a restrictive covenant clause unreasonable, for example it restricts solicitation for 12 months when 6 would have been reasonable, they will not read it down to fix it. Canadian courts require the employer to get it right the first time and a flawed clause will therefore normally be unenforceable. In short, the above quoted agreement may not be enforceable. But if it is, it only restricts solicitation, not competition, and does not require the employee to work for the employer for a period of two years, or any other minimum time. | is contract text itself subject to copyright? What are my options? It largely depends on the originality of your contract. C & J Management Corp. v. Anderson, 707 F.Supp.2d 858, 862 (2009) points to multiple references against preclusion of "a copyrightable interest in a contract". But you would need to prove that your competitor copied "original elements" of your contract including "a minimum degree of creativity and originality required to support a valid copyright". See Donald v. Uarco Business Forms, 478 F.2d 764, 766 (1973). Your post provides no information that would help identifying or ruling out this issue in your matter. Without realizing, you might have paid dearly for boilerplate language that your lawyer copied from somewhere else. Indeed, there is so much regurgitation and copy/pasting in the legal "profession" (judges included, as is notorious in judicial opinions they release and in the similarities --verbatim-- among the procedure law of many, many U.S. jurisdictions). That regurgitation is not bad in and of itself, though, since what matters is the expeditious administration of justice and the protection of your rights, rather than obtaining creative expressions authored by some lawyer. You might end up wasting valuable energy and money if you went after the competitor for something like this without first assessing the extent of originality in your contract. Focus instead on the much more detrimental fact that your competitor "plays dirty in general". | canada ontario Speaking from the perspective of law in Ontario, Canada, the clause may indeed be defective, contrary to the currently accepted answer. Consider what is mentioned at Termination Clauses and Continuation of Benefits: A Warning and Reminder for Employers in Ontario (August 2015): Employers often seek to limit their termination liability with termination clauses. If a termination clause does not meet the minimum requirements of the Employment Standards Act, 2000 (“ESA”), then the termination clause will not be valid and an employee will be entitled to reasonable notice at common law, thus increasing an employer’s liability [...] [...] The ESA requires employers to continue benefits during the ESA notice period when terminating employment without cause, whether or not working notice is provided. Where an employer fails to expressly state in a contract that an employee’s benefits will continue throughout the ESA notice period, the termination clause may be unenforceable. [...] In Stevens v Sifton Properties Limited (2012, ONSC) (“Stevens”), the termination clause stated that payment in lieu of notice in accordance with the ESA would be provided where the employer terminates the relationship without cause. The termination clause stipulated that such payment satisfied all future claims against the employer. The Court determined that the clause, in addressing benefits implicitly, did so in a way that “purports to take those [rights of benefits] away upon mere payment of the required pay in lieu of notice.” The Court held that this was contrary to the ESA, as the language denied benefit continuation during the ESA notice period and the termination clause was therefore void. Also, on the saving clause attempt, see Ontario Court of Appeal rules “saving clause” in employment agreement unenforceable (December 2019). Consider what's mentioned in Why employment contracts are now being rewritten all over the country (December, 2020): The Court of Appeal for Ontario has determined that all ambiguous language must be read in the employee’s favour and the presence of ambiguity will nullify a termination provision. Any ambiguity will be fatal. For example, simply stating that the employee will get the greater of their employment standards entitlements or some greater amount, if not worded precisely and correctly, will not hold up because the courts will find the language to be ambiguous. Also, see Ontario Court of Appeal Limits Severability of Termination Clauses in Employment Contracts (August 2020), which says: In addition, the Court of Appeal refused to give effect to the employment contract’s severability clause. The Court stated that a severability clause cannot affect clauses that have been made void by statute. Having concluded that the termination provisions must be considered together, the severability clause in this case could not be applied to sever the offending “for cause” portion of the termination provisions. All emphasis above is mine. I am not a lawyer. | This is not an NDA (non-disclosure agreement), it is a non-compete agreement. An NDA would tell you that you cannot disclose anything you did or saw at your old employer's place. A non-compete agreement is what you have here, an agreement that limits your ability to get work. If what you say is correct, then your employer is not exactly the brightest. You stay that you haven't been given a written notice, and your contract says that a "Notice of termination will only be valid if it is given in writing". So you haven't been given valid notice. There is no reason why you would sign the non-compete agreement. If they plan to fire you without notice if you don't agree, they have a problem: Your contract doesn't allow them to do that. And they have apparently not given any written notice yet. So what they can do is as soon as they decide that you are not signing, they can give you one month written notice. | You probably would not be "obligated" to do anything. However your employer also would not be "obligated" to continue employment. If you agreed to something verbally, that is a contract. Verbal contracts can be difficult to enforce, but in this case the employer does not need to enforce it but rather take the easier solution of terminating your employment. | Its just free enterprise, right? Well ... except when there is a law that says its not allowed. I am unfamiliar with Indian law but the relevant law in Australia is the Trade Practices Act which deals with this under the category of Misuse of Market Power. In a nutshell: A business with a substantial degree of power in a market is not allowed to use this power for the purpose of eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor or to prevent a business from entering into a market. By preferring their products over a competitor's in their search engine they are "... eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor ...". | If you want to protect yourself or any property interests you may have in this circumstance you have to talk to a lawyer. You cannot get (or trust) legal advice from the internet. I will, however, make the following personal observations: I only provide a W-9 to people who are paying me money, and who request it as a condition of paying me. I don't know of a legal requirement to supply it after the fact. However, not providing it to someone who did pay you more than $600 in a tax year could certainly make it difficult for them to comply with their tax filing obligations. I do not sign any agreements, assignments, or contracts, without what I consider to be fair consideration. E.g., if on leaving a job (as has happened) I am asked by a former employer to sign something that I am not already obligated to sign due to some prior contract, then I negotiate what is commonly called a "severance package." They pay me and/or extend benefits, and I sign something that limits their liability. | Am I right to assume that once the notice has been issued to the other party, me and the client still work on the project for 14 days until the notice period expires and that the client is required to pay for the work that has been done in those 14 days In the absence of any other wording to the contrary, a contract continues as normal up until the day of termination. The fact that a party has given notice to terminate merely establishes the termination date, unless the notice clause says something different. Note that there is nothing to stop you drafting a clause which explicitly states this. Indeed, it is often useful to explicitly state things which are already implied as it helps to avoid any dispute from arising in the first place. |
Filing US tax returns over bank account-related interests I do know that in the US, bank-account interests are taxable as passive incomes, but what I don't understand is the point of filing tax returns on bank account interests, since the government (or the IRS), or whatever, has access to bank accounts and can directly deduct taxes (not seizing, I'm not talking about unpaid taxes or fraud istances), without henceforth requiring a tax return filing, since they could deduct the money themselves. | The "point" of including bank-interest income on your tax return rather than having the government automatically deduct what it feels that you would owe is that the government is not legally empowered to take money away from you in that fashion. The government is legal empowered to compel you to pay your taxes, and there are numerous rules enacted as law or as a consequence of laws passed. You can read the various relevant laws here. There simply is no general law that says that banks must withhold taxes on interest. There might be a specific case when an entity is subject to backup withholding (as a response to a taxpayer not following certain rules). There are also special rules regarding non-resident alien withholding, which could require interest withholding. Apart from the intrinsic political unpopularity of imposing new withholding requirements on people, it is difficult to compute the correct amount to withhold, since not all interest is taxable. In theory, a set of rules could be constructed to require withholding of interest income, if Congress were to pass a law similar to 26 USC 3402. | The main tax law is that you have to pay income taxes on your income even when you're in a foreign country. You may also be subject to income tax requirements in the foreign country, so that depends on local law and the existence of tax treaties between the US and that country (which will also involve details of the employer, employment and why you are in that country). For example, if you're working for a solely-US company (not e.g. Amazon) and go to Norway for 3 months "working holiday", just doing your job online in a different country while skiing, you almost certainly would not have any Norwegian tax liability. It just depends on the specifics. | There might be some relevant state law. Michigan has a Social Security Number Privacy Act, which limits use of SS numbers, such as publically displaying an amount of a number, use it as an account number, require it to be transmitted insecurely over the internet, mail it etc. However, it is allowed under 3(a) to mail a number in a document if the purpose is to identify an individual, especially 3(a)(iv), to Lawfully pursue or enforce a person's legal rights, including, but not limited to, an audit, collection, investigation, or transfer of a tax, employee benefit, debt, claim, receivable, or account or an interest in a receivable or account. It would depends on your state, but it is highly likely that debt collection is an allowed purpose (even if it not a real debt, just a good-faith mistake). This gives a brief overview of state laws. | Neither of those clauses has anything to do with whether a tax on the use of Whatsapp is legal: The first clause tells users that they are responsible for any taxes that may be owed. It says nothing about whether such a tax is or is not legal. The second clause says that users may not charge for Whatsapp services. It says nothing about whether the government may impose a tax for the use of the services. That is all beside the point, though. Even if the TOS explicitly said, "No one may tax the use of our services," that would have no legal effect. Saying that you're exempt from taxation does not make you exempt from taxation. | In most cases, there is no direct legal recourse for such a withdrawal. Money in a joint account is co-owned, and any account holder may withdraw any of it for any lawful purpose. As the article "What is a joint bank account?" from Bankrate.com states: The money in joint accounts belongs to both owners. Either person can withdraw or spend the money at will — even if they weren’t the one to deposit the funds. The bank makes no distinction between money deposited by one person or the other, making a joint account useful for handling shared expenses. But a joint bank account should only be opened with someone whom you trust, since that person has equal control over the account’s funds. If the account holders have a contract or legal agreement that controls what money can be withdrawn and for what purposes, then a violation of such an agreement might be a cause for legal action. But merely opening a joint account does not create such an agreement nor imply it. | Direct taxes were understood at that time as taxes directly on individuals such as a flat-per-person head tax (poll tax,aka a capitation) or an ad valorem (by value) property tax. Taxes on imports and exports, and excise or "use" taxes, such as a tax on the manufacture and sale of whiskey, were not considered to be direct taxes. In 2007 a US Court of Appeals said, in Murphy v. Internal Revenue Service and United States, (case no. 05-5139, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit) that: "Only three taxes are definitely known to be direct: (1) a capitation [ . . . ], (2) a tax upon real property, and (3) a tax upon personal property." In section 17 of Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan and Trust Company (link below) the Supreme Court wrote: Ordinarily, all taxes paid primarily by persons who can shift the burden upon some one else, or who are under no legal compulsion to pay them, are considered indirect taxes; but a tax upon property holders in respect of their estates, whether real or personal, or of the income yielded by such estates, and the payment of which cannot be avoided, are direct taxes. This opinion goes into great detail on the history of the apportionment clause, and of direct and indirect taxes. See also The Wikipedia article on Direct Tax. After a na6tional income tax was imposed in 1894, it was held (in 1895) to be unconstitutional under this provision. This was in Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan and Trust Company, 157 US 429 (1895). An earlier income tax was passed in 1861, and repealed about 10 years later without challenge. The 16th amendment was passed (ratified in 1913) to declare income taxes not to be subject to this provision. See History of the US Income Tax and the LII page on Income Tax. To the best of my understanding, no current federal tax is considered a direct tax subject to apportionment under this provision. Indeed the apportionment requirement, which was copied from the previous articles of Confederation, was so awkward that taxes which would be subject to it were never or almost never imposed, but ways were found to make any desired taxes not "direct". This provision is, accordingly, obsolete as far as taxes go. | Likely not, unless A finds a jurisdiction with sufficiently lax accounting and taxation standards. As described in the question, A, B, and C are distinct legal entitites. For each entity, the tax office would want to know what the revenue, expenses, and net income are. By providing a service (use of the house) free of charge between two entites of the shell construct, profits are moved from C to A. This is usually illegal. The required paperwork might not have to look like a normal rental contract between a tenant and a landlord, since many questions are resolved by the ownership, but it would have to specify payments. The tax office should complain if they differ too much from the going market rate. Consider that C might be a LLC, and that C might be a civil judgement against C. Someone would look at the assets owned by C, and that includes the house D. | Money Laundering The primary crime that you have described is called money laundering. Note that money laundering includes: "structuring financial transactions in order to evade reporting requirements." Unlike some other forms of money laundering, this does not require that the source of the funds be criminal, or that the actual transfer be criminal, so long as it is intended to avoid reporting requirements. Along the same lines is the even less obvious offense of smurfing. So, this does not cease to be money laundering because: "A legally possesses the money and has a perfectly legal (and very private) reason to pay it to B." The transfer would typically have had to be reported on a Form W-2 (wage and salary income), a Form 1099 (most transfers that are usually taxable income), a Form 709 (gift tax return), a Form 1098 (mortgage interest), or 1040 Schedule A (deductible payments), or on a cash transaction form if conducted in that manner. The fact that you are reporting it as income, and that there would have been some disclosure requirement if paid to person B, implies that there is some reporting requirement that is avoided. Tax Crimes There are also multiple tax related crimes that could be implicated, not all of which require that taxes due by the person charged by reduced. See, e.g., Conspiracy to Defraud the United States (18 U.S.C. § 371); Attempts To Interfere With Administration of Internal Revenue Laws (I.R.C. § 7212); Fraudulent Returns, Statements or Other Documents (I.R.C. § 7207); Identity Theft (18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7)), etc. Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, for example, is defined as follows: If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for such misdemeanor.f "Conspiracy to defraud the government is a very broad concept." Tax Crimes Handbook at 132. Conspiracy to defraud the government is not limited to efforts to obtain money or property, but includes conspiracies where the object of the conspiracy is to obstruct, impair, interfere, impede or defeat the legitimate functioning of the government through fraudulent or dishonest means. Thus, conspiracy to defraud is not confined by reference to common law definitions of fraud. It is a separate crime to interfere with the lawful functions of the government without regard to the monetary consequences. Thus, § 371 involves both efforts to defraud the government of funds as well as interference with the lawful function of the government. The conspiracy to defraud prong of § 371 includes conspiracies to impede, impair, obstruct or defeat the lawful functions of the Treasury Department in the collection of income taxes. United States v. Klein, 247 F.2d 908, 915 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 924 (1958). Arguments have been presented that § 371 was not intended to encompass conspiracies to violate the internal revenue laws or conspiracies to defraud the Service but these arguments have been rejected. Although decided in 1957, Klein is the leading case regarding conspiracies to impede and impair the Service and such conspiracies are commonly referred to as "Klein conspiracies." In Klein the defendants were acquitted of the tax evasion charges but were convicted on the conspiracy count. The wording of the conspiracy count read, in part, as follows: "... to defraud the United States by impeding, impairing, obstructing and defeating the lawful functions of the Department of the Treasury in the collection of the revenue; to wit, income taxes." In part, it was alleged in Klein that as "part of said conspiracy that the defendants would conceal and continue to conceal the nature of their business activities and the source and nature of their income." The defendants concealed the source and nature of their income by altering and making false entries in their books, filing false income tax returns, and providing false answers to interrogatories. Thus, a money laundering plan may result in a conspiracy to obstruct the Treasury. United States v. Sanzo, 673 F.2d 64, 69 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 858 (1982). In Sanzo, one defendant argued that there was no direct evidence that the other party to the plan would not report the laundered money or claim deductions. The court felt there was enough circumstantial evidence from which the jury could find that the defendant knew his accomplice would not report large sums of laundered money as income and that he would have to falsify business records to hide the laundering activities. Sanzo, 673 F.2d at 69. Note, it is not necessary to prove that the Service was actually impeded in its efforts to assess and collect the revenue. Tax Crimes Handbook at 132-136 (in the pertinent parts, with most citations omitted). Caveat Regarding Legal Alternatives It is also worth noting that there are legal ways for person A to transfer money to person B without making it apparent, for example, in his check book or on his tax return that the funds were transferred to person B (exactly how is beyond the scope of this answer). Generally speaking, they are distinguishable because the IRS is fully and accurately informed of what is going on in a way that the IRS is not allowed to disclose publicly. But, the crude method used here does not achieve that end. |
Employer withholds last paycheck in Virginia I signed my exit interview form that stated I gave back my property that I had from the company during my employ and that I was receiving my last paycheck. The employer only put the check number on my exit interview form and did not put the check amount and I believe that was bait and switch to be able to change the check amount that they would give me if I didn't sign the nondisclosure Agreement. After I signed the exit interview form they did not give me my check. They said, "In consideration for those, meaning my checks, I had to sign the nondisclosure agreement." Is that considered extortion or is it illegal? I know in the state of Virginia it's illegal to withhold someone's paycheck but did they commit a crime of extortion or any other crime when they told me I had to do something to get what was rightfully mine? I have them on tape saying what I just disclosed to you. ADDED....Also the employer in the general release form they offered to forgo let's say $2,000 worth of vacation time for me to sign the release form. This mirrors the characteristics of a severance agreement. At the time that they presented that general release to me I was over 50 years old which would have given me certain rights and they would have had to do certain things that they did not do. For instance for older adults being offered a severance agreement they would have had to have given me 7, or 21 days or something to the resend it if I wanted to. I would have had to have been told to consult with a lawyer before I signed it and I think I should have been given time to look it over like seven days or something like that by law. But they called it a general release not a severance pay agreement or a severance agreement. My question is just because they called it a general release does that not make it a severance agreement? When I pulled up severance agreement form or template it was exactly the same as this general release so in my view they should have treated me and the general release form with the rules that govern a severance agreement. paragraph a paragraph that general release form was exactly the same as the severance agreements that I pulled up from online. My question is should they have been held to the standard of a severance agreement when it had all of the characteristics of a severance agreement? Thanks. | They have exactly zero legal grounds to withhold your last paycheck. From Code of Virginia 40.1: All employers operating a business shall establish regular pay periods and rates of pay for employees except executive personnel. All such employers shall pay salaried employees at least once each month and employees paid on an hourly rate at least once every two weeks or twice in each month, except that (i) a student who is currently enrolled in a work-study program or its equivalent administered by any secondary school, institution of higher education or trade school, and (ii) employees whose weekly wages total more than 150 percent of the average weekly wage of the Commonwealth as defined in § 65.2-500, upon agreement by each affected employee, may be paid once each month if the institution or employer so chooses. Upon termination of employment an employee shall be paid all wages or salaries due him for work performed prior thereto; such payment shall be made on or before the date on which he would have been paid for such work had his employment not been terminated. The Virginia Department of Labor and Industry unfortunately does not take claims if there is a written contract and recommends you pursue the matter in court. You may want to consult with a local labor attorney to get an idea of where to go from here, even if you plan to file in small claims court. Virginia extortion law doesn't appear to apply to withholding stolen property, but their claim that release of the last paycheck is consideration for signing the NDA may be some other civil wrong, like conversion. I do not know whether you could recover damages above the wage owed for that. | The criteria used by the IRS suggest that for federal tax purposes, the cashier would be properly classified as a contractor. Behavioral Control: A worker is an employee when the business has the right to direct and control the work performed by the worker, even if that right is not exercised. There is probably some training involved here, but it seems negligible. Has the company actually retained the right to direct and control the cashier? Is he obligated to use their register, as they tell him to use it? Is his work evaluated for compliance with those instructions? I'd guess that in most cases, the company doesn't actually care about any of this. As long as the company got all the money it was owed, would it really care if the cashier just stuck the money in his pockets until the end of the day? I'd also argue that it isn't really the employer controlling the when and where of the contractor's work, but rather the circumstances. Classifying him as an employee because he has to be at the event doesn't really make any more sense than saying your plumber is an employee because he has to come to your house to do the job. Financial Control: Does the business have a right to direct or control the financial and business aspects of the worker's job? The investment in the cash register seems relatively nominal. The company probably does not reimburse the cashier for expenses incurred in getting the job done. The cashier is presumably free to offer his services to others. The cashier is presumably being paid a one-time, flat fee. As you noted, though, the fact that there isn't much profit-loss opportunity is one factor pointing in the other direction. Relationship: The type of relationship depends upon how the worker and business perceive their interaction with one another. The fact that this is a single, hours-long job is probably the strongest evidence that the cashier is a contractor. Further, the cashier's job is not a key part of the business, as it is only a minor portion of an event that the company has never performed before and has no apparent intention of repeating. I assume that the company is not providing health benefits, sick time, etc., and that any contract with the cashier includes no language suggestive of an employer-employee relationship. Conclusion: The employee-contractor distinction is pretty fact-intensive, but based on what you've provided, there seems to be a much stronger argument that the cashier would be a contractor. | Having done a bit of brief research, I find that "legit" is a synonym for "good". So, no. The header announcing a "principal amount" serves no purpose and could be misinterpreted as indicating that there is a loan. There is no reason to indicate the date twice, which gives rise to two different values of "date". The phrase "For value received" can be interpreted in at least two ways, one being "in exchange for some unspecified value to be received at some future date by Promisor", and "in exchange for a specific value already received by Promisor". Under the later interpretation, Promis(s)ee probably could not breach but under the former, Promis(s)ee could. So it makes a difference. You can just pay to the Promis(s)ee, and not imply that you are creating a pay-to-order instrument such as a check. That still leaves you the option to pay with a check. Or was the intent to say "pay on demand"? The expression "the sum of £500 shall the Promisor fail to meet his target" is not grammatical in US English, and I'll leave it to a UK speaker to judge if this is, over there. I assume that this is supposed to express conditionality, in which case "if" is a useful term. Then the meat of the contract, I guess, is that if the Promisor fails to meet somebody's target of 47.5 work hours per week, then Promisor has to pay Promissee £500 (and not otherwise). It's really not clear how anyone would know whether "meet a target of 47.5 work hours per week" has come to pass. Does that mean "work at least 47.5 hours per week"? Does that mean "for each of the three weeks within the time period" (or did you mean "work 47.5 hours within some one week, within the 3 week period"). Being explicit that the work obligation extends for 3 weeks would be legit (vide supra). Supposing that the second clause means "Promisor will pay £500 by 5:00pm 2 July 2016", you should put it that way. Or if you mean "Promisor will pay £500 by 5:00pm 3 July 2016", say that. Deadlines for performance should be stated very directly and clearly, and require no calculation and interpretation. And I'd suggest including a clause stating that "Promissor" and "Promisor" are used interchangeably in this contract. Or else be consistent in spelling. Note that almost any contract can be given some interpretation. From the perspective of creating a contract, the first concern should be over clearly expressing the intentions of the two parties in written form. After all, you don't have a contract if there is no meeting of the minds. | IANAL. I am not your lawyer. The following is not legal advice. The insurance company, regardless of how you feel about their process, has it appears, to have discharged their duties, namely they have paid out two separate claims. The personal property claim has been paid to the estate as the beneficiary, while the property claim has been paid out with the mortgage company as the beneficiary. The mortgage company seems, to me (disclaimer, I work at a financial institution, albeit in an IT role), to also be reasonable. Six months is an extremely long time without contact or payment (where I work, the loss mitigation department is sent all loans that are 3 months delinquent); the fact that you, the estate executor were not aware of the passing of the debtor is of no consequence. Also, many loans contain clauses that allow the lender to accelerate the loan (i.e. demand "immediate" payment of the whole outstanding balance). So they've started foreclosure proceedings, probably about 3 months ago. As for the foreclosure proceedings: The received $45,000 will be applied to the loan. The property (not just the house, but the entire lot) will be sold at public auction, as all foreclosed houses are in the state of New York. Proceeds from the sale of the house shall be applied to paying off the loan. If the proceeds exceed the outstanding mortgage amount, the estate will be sent the remaining proceeds. If the proceeds are less than the remaining amount, the estate is retains (i.e. owes) the remaining debt. EDIT: As an example of why the noting of jurisdiction is important on this stack-exchange, Nate Eldredge has informed me that in New York, it is possible for a judge to reduce the "remaining debt" of the estate by declaring that the sold house had a higher "fair market value" than it sold for. | TL;DR: It is a $100.000 lawsuit. Talk to a lawyer. If getting out of lawsuits was as easy as acting through a company and selling it afterwards, nobody would ever get paid damages. In addition to that, any answer will depend heavily on a lot of data that you do not disclose (location, kind of company, what is the basis for the lawsuit, etc.). Talk to a lawyer. But, a couple of points to help you understand the situation: the only reason she was 51% shareholder was because my father wanted a certain tax exemption for minority women owning businesses. It does not matter the reason, she was the shareholder. And in fact, I would not publicly use that reason as an excuse before checking with a lawyer, because perhaps it could be considered fraud1. she gave up her rights to the business. Exact wording of the agreement will be important for your lawyer. Did she return ownership of the stock? Or did she just agreed not to manage the business? In C corporations, stockholders are only liable for the money invested (i.e., the value of their stock may drop to zero, but no one can sue them for more). In other kind of companies (unlimited companies), owners can be forced to pay (fully or partially) for the debts of the company. does it matter if she sells her shares at this point or will she still be sued? Who exactly is going to buy the stock? It does not sound like the company is publicly traded, but just a small operation. Unless her 51% is worth more than she is being sued for -or the buyer thinks that the lawsuit will fail-, people won't be interested. Of course, it might be tempting to "forget" telling about the lawsuit to prospective buyers, but that probably will end with the buyer suing your mother when they discover that she has not fully disclosed the status of the company. Talk to a lawyer. 1But explain all of the details to your lawyer, s/he may make use of them and convince your father to take full responsability. And your lawyer will not inform the authorities. Talk to a lawyer. | Your employer is most likely bluffing. It is better to be fired than to quit voluntarily. The problem with quitting voluntarily is that you won't get unemployment benefits (Arbeitslosengeld I) for a while. So don't quit voluntarily if you aren't keen on living from savings for three months. If you want to quit, get another job first. (You should get another job anyway instead of working for a toxic employer.) Your employer can only terminate your employment under certain circumstances, and with certain notice periods. Germany is very employee-friendly. Your company's establishment is currently large enough that the Kündigungsschutzgesetz (KSchG) applies. To be clear, it doesn't matter how large the company is overall, only how many employees there are in the office, shop, or other place of business. Part-time employees are counted partially. Contractors are counted as well. The KSchG fully applies if there are typically more than 10 (11 or more) employees. The KSchG does not apply to company leadership, e.g. C-level executives. Under the KSchG, the employer can terminate employment for one of three reasons: reasons in your person, reasons in your behavior, and operational reasons Personenbedingte Kündigung: Your employment can be terminated for reasons in your person if you are unable to carry out work in the future, for example if you need sick days so frequently that this puts an unreasonable burden on the employer. It is generally impossible to use this reason without the normal notice periods. Verhaltensbedingte Kündigung: You can be fired for reasons in your behavior if you committed some gross misconduct. Typically this requires an Abmahnung (written warning) so that you have opportunity to cease the problematic behavior. For example, you might get an Abmahnung the first time you skip a shift, and get fired the second time. In especially severe cases of misconduct, it is possible to skip the Abmahnung and/or the notice period and to fire an employee on the spot. For example, this might happen if you embezzled funds or stole your employer's property, even if the monetary damage was very small. As such dismissal with cause stems from your behavior, you would not get unemployment benefits for three months. Betriebsbedingte Kündigung: If the company has to downsize for economic reasons, it can lay off workers. However, the employer must apply social criteria for selecting the employees to lay off. Factors are: the length of employment, age, support obligations for children or other dependents, and disability status. That is, a young, new, childless and able-bodied employee is more likely to get axed. If you have a union (Betriebsrat) they can veto a termination in certain cases. These criteria can be clarified via collective bargaining agreements, but cannot be circumvented in an individual contract. So your employer will not be able to find any error in the contract that will allow them to fire you. The best they could do is to go really carefully over your application and paperwork to find any misrepresentation, and use that as the basis for a Verhaltensbedingte Kündigung. However, it is quite unlikely that they will find a misrepresentation so severe that it could serve as grounds for firing you without notice. Minimum notice periods are given in law. The minimum is one month notice. Your contract cannot have a shorter notice period in your context. In case of a dismissal for exceptional reasons (e.g. theft), no notice period is necessary. If you are terminated, go to a lawyer. You only have three weeks to file a lawsuit. Contacting the lawyer should be the second thing you do after getting fired, with the first thing being the registration with the Arbeitsagentur to start the clock for unemployment benefits. If your employer is making unprofessional threats like claiming that there could be a “critical error” in your contract, it is quite possible that the termination notice could be deficient in some way. If the dismissal was improper, a court can award compensation (lost wages) and reinstate the employment, though this is unlikely to be desired. Your wage from subsequent jobs (or wages you could have earned if you had looked for a job) will be subtracted from the lost wages. To summarize this large text dump, firing an employee is difficult unless the employee does something very stupid like stealing from the employer. Therefore: reasonable employers that want to get rid of an employee don't look for errors in the contract. Instead: They watch you very closely to find any behavior that merits a written warning (Abmahnung). This builds a case for a termination with cause. They offer an agreement to terminate the contract (Aufhebungsvertrag). With such an agreement you mutually terminate the employment. You won't get unemployment benefits for three months since this was your decision, so typically these agreements provide for generous compensation. A reasonable employer knows that paying for the notice period + additional compensation is cheaper than dealing with an unhappy employee + a potentially invalid termination + a prolonged legal battle. Of course, less reasonable employers resort to bullying to get you to quit yourself. This is cheaper than paying compensation with an Aufhebungsvertrag. | As seen here, the laws of the employee's state and city are controlling, and not that of the employer. A person working for a North Dakota company in Seattle is owed at least Seattle minimum wage. This to "were the employee usually is working" so it does not suddenly switch when the employee takes a working vacation. | There is no significance to using the words "I" or "we", nor does it matter that you didn't sign the surrender paper (after al, you did not have possession of the vehicle and it is not yours to surrender). You will have gotten a notice, at the beginning of this process (when the loan was taken out) that provides information like this, in particular The creditor can collect this debt from you without first trying to collect from the borrower. The creditor can use the same collection methods against you that can be used against the borrower, including suing you or garnishing your wages. If this debt is ever in default, that fact may become a part of your credit record. When you are a loan co-signer, that means the creditor can go after you and you alone to get the money. Since it seems the creditors are pursuing you both, that beats the alternative that you have to sue her to get anything. Since there is no question that money is owed, the point of the trial is to decide who pays it: it will be one or both of you, and it won't be that the bank has to take a loss. Your attorney's job is to argue that it should not be you (her attorney's job is to argue that it should be you). Your concern should be that it's too difficult to get the money from her, and easy to get the money from you, which is why you need to hire a good attorney. |
Can a website incur liability for linking to a funding campaign for a lawsuit against it? A large website that hosts user-created content has recently announced that it is redacting links to a fundraising campaign for a lawsuit against it "under direction from [its] legal team." Is there a theory of liability under which there is some legal risk for hosting said links? Assume any action would be under Second Circuit and New York state law. | Yes The directors of a company have a fiduciary duty to act within the law for the benefit of their shareholders - not to their customers, not to the government, not to the environment and not to the public. A lawsuit against the company will incur financial loss irrespective of if it is won or lost. It is difficult to see how it is in the shareholder's interest for the company to be enabling the funding of a lawsuit against it. | If an infringement suit is filed, the plaintiff(s) would have rights of discovery. They could subpoena the source code in such a case for comparison. They could take the depositions of EvilCorp's developers and ask them about the libraries that they used. There might well be other ways to achieve the same effect. | Maybe. It might fall under "fair use", which overrides the general requirement to get permission. The way to find out is to do it, get sued, then try to defend your action by using the fair use defense. If they win in the lawsuit, you can't, if you win, you can. There are four "factors" that have to be "balanced", plus a fifth. The factors are "the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes", "the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole", "the nature of the copyrighted work" and "the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work". The fifth consideration is "transformativeness". W.r.t. purpose of the use, your use would likely be found to be "fair", except for the Youtube monetization problem. The "nature of the copyright work" question is primarily about "artistic works" versus "factual works", so it would depend on what you are taking from. One second might not be substantial, unless that one second is the only reason people pay to watch the copyrighted work. That interacts with the substantiality desideratum: could people get the crucial amusement content of the paid work for free by watching your video? You can read some case law in the links here, and you basically have to get an attorney to analyze your plans to tell you what your risks are. | However, this uses the text "rights in an invention"; does that cover copyright? Yes. (Is this the correct law?) It certainly seems to be. Does "Relate … to the employer's business" cover the entirety of software engineering, or just the particular software engineering my employer does? Imagine that you work for a company that writes trading software. In your spare time, you develop a photo editing tool. Do you think a court would find that your project "related to the employer's business"? I do not. Or does my employer own copyright on everything down to the love letters I write? Google does not own everything their employees create; they only claim to. If someone challenged them on it, a court would decide, and probably not in their favor. | You're talking about sites like Youtube, so I'll focus on that. That quote, which you bolded, was over-simplified. The actual law is 17 USC 512 (c) Information Residing on Systems or Networks At Direction of Users. (1) In general. A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or, except as provided in subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider, if the service provider (A) -- (I) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the material on the system or network is infringing; -- (ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or -- (iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material; (B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control such activity; and (C says and complies with a DMCA takedown notice). What you're talking about is membership fees (e.g. Youtube Premium)... or general advertisements that would be placed on any video without awareness of it being infringing. That does not violate Safe Harbor per se. At least not on a legitimate site which is dominated by legitimate content and makes an honest, credible effort to keep it that way. The important clause in (B) is "In a case..." Under (B), they lack the ability to control each activity (upload or view). Youtube's inability is due to receiving 500 hours (30,000 minutes) of uploaded video every minute, obviously requiring 30,000++ staff seats working 24x7 to curate. That would amount to about 200,000 staff - all of Google is around 50,000 right now. Even if a small site were able to moderate all content, they might still have a Safe Harbor defense if they could credibly say that they did not know the material was infringing. If someone created a "Juan Brown" username and uploaded blancolirio's videos from YouTube, they could say "we did not know that was not the real person". But if the video started with an HBO splash screen and tones, then heck no. But non-moderation is not an airtight defense. When sites are neglectful toward removal, they can soon develop a reputation as a haven for such infringing content - which the sites tend to embrace, since it brings many customers! This was the undoing of several music sharing sites in the 00's, since this awareness of their reputation, plus a lack of diligent removal, failed them on all three arms of 1(A) above. Remember that a competently run website that relies on user submissions is well aware of the DMCA and its case law, and has tailored its rules and enforcement to make it easy to defend a copyright claim. For instance, in the case of music, Youtube uses some human intervention but largely automated means to either take it down and give the uploader a copyright "strike" leading to a ban (which alienates their biggest contributors, especially when a popular Youtuber like blancolirio winds up with a distant car stereo in background noise, remember the detection is by "bot" and no human ever sanity-checks it). de-monetize the suspect video (uploader gets nothing, but, neither does YouTube). monetize it, but give the revenue stream to the rights holder due to an agreement with them. The last one is Youtube's preference with regards to music. As this was vastly easier, more practical and better for the community all-around, allowing whole classes of content to be created that would be prima-facie illegal otherwise. And it's content people are already creating and Youtube can't stop them, so it solves a big policing problem too. | You could probably hire a Pennsylvania lawyer to intervene in the case on your behalf and file a motion to seal the evidence in the case, and there is a good chance that it would be granted, and quite possibly, unopposed by the parties. But, the fact that it has already been made available to the public on the Internet could cause the court to deny your request on the grounds that it is futile to do so. | THE FOLLOWING OPINION IS NOT LEGAL ADVICE Based on your screenshot and description, I don't see anything infringing. If the data you are using is from your own sources, and what you show is not a scan or photo of their guide, and your layout is thus unique in specifics (not a direct copy), it wouldn't be an "infringement" as far as copyright law is concerned. Things you cannot copyright: A font (except as a computer font file but not as used in a document). A concept (a main issue here). A idea for a "way" or "order" to display data. Mere data or facts can not be copyrighted nor can ideas. Anything sourced from the US government (trail data, topos, etc.) Something not in printed, physical, or recorded form. That is, the copyright only extends to those things as they are realized in print, or as a recording for audio or video, or a physical statute, etc. A live performance is not copyrightable for instance, nor are ideas. The Law: In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. For instance, an icon of a TENT is the common form (like a font) of indicating a camp ground. They may be able to copyright the specific instance of their tent icon, but they cannot prevent you from using some other triangle to represent a tent for a campground. And in facts yours is completely different. Displaying data a particular "way" like 1e for 1 mile east is not copyrightable when it is common for the type of guide. It's just data. CONCEPTS AND DATA ARE NOT COPYRIGHTABLE, only the ACTUAL specific page or work in total as rendered. More below, but your page seems totally different. OTHER FORMS OF IP PROTECTION Now, just because some intellectual property can't be protected by copyright, does not mean it is a free-for-all. For instance, a "way" of doing something can be PATENTED (process patent). And "ornamental design" can be given a design patent. A logo or brand name can be given a trademark. Here's an interesting court ruling on the subject of data display. Basically it can't be an abstraction/concept. It has to be in a definable, physical, novel form. NOTE: it has been possible to copyright a "look and feel" but that applies to software, not static printed media. And the courts have been reversing on that a lot as time goes on. BUT WAIT...THERE'S MORE So, I am going to GUESS that you are talking about AT Guide by David Miller? It's pretty rich of him to claim copyright over the "manner of the display of data" when APPARENTLY he is using concepts of data display as described by EDWARD TUFT So, LOL. Is this the guide they claim you are "copying"?? THESE AREN'T THE ICONS YOU'RE LOOKING FOR Okay, so let's go one by one and their claims against you: 1. The way of representing distances between shelters "The Way" of presenting something is not copyrightable, only an expressive or final form. Some forms of "organization or selection" that may make a work in total copyrightable, but not on their own in isolation. 2. The sideways orientation of the elevation profile Presenting some elements "sideways" is not copyrightable (WTF LOL OMG RUS) the same as number 1. Turning an element sideways does not, on it's own, rise to the level of "creative or non-obvious." 3. The icons Your icons are completely different. If you copied and used his ACTUAL icons, you might have had some issue, but your icons are not even remotely the same. Using icons to indicate services or features is COMMON. Not copyrightable. http://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/works-not-covered-copyright In general, copyright does not protect individual words, short phrases, and slogans; familiar symbols or designs; or mere variations of typographic ornamentation, lettering, or coloring; mere listings of ingredients or contents. (However, copyright protection may be available, if the artwork of the symbol or design contains sufficient creativity.) 4. The convention of representing direction/distance for waypoints. Again, "The Way" of doing something is not copyrightable, nor is data or facts. 1.1E or 2.3NW are common are they not? I've seen similar treatments elsewhere. It's "obvious and not novel." FINAL FORM, EXPRESSIVE FORM is copyrightable NOT FORMATTING CONCEPTS. Basically, he is saying something along the lines of "I'm formatting paragraphs with a double space, so you can't." The "actual" icon drawings he used are copyrightable. Your icons are clearly different. I assume your mountain-top profile line is taken from some publicly available survey source? So long as you never used a scan of the actual line he uses (and even then?), because he cannot copyright the mountain top profiles themselves! DOES HE EVEN HAVE A VALID COPYRIGHT? For that question, I'd say yes with limitations. His work is a compilation of data. Data can not be copyrighted, but the unique arrangement can in context of the work in total. These three conditions must ALL be present (from http://www.rbs2.com/ccompile.pdf): The collection and assembly of pre-existing material, facts, or data. The selection, coordination, or arrangement of those materials The creation, by virtue of the particular selection, coordination, or arrangement of an original work of authorship. So It seem to be that his guide meets these, but his copyright is for his work in total. You are NOT using his data. You are using your OWN data. Based on my reading of Key vs Chinatown Today you are not even close to infringing. You are doing your OWN selection, and your OWN arrangement. It does not matter that you may be using some similar typographic or charting conventions. Those cannot be copyrighted. You are doing your own thing, and "similarity is not infringement." SEARCH AND YOU WILL FIND On the subject of the copyright, here's the copyright on AT guide: https://cocatalog.loc.gov/cgi-bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?Search_Arg=A.T.+Guide&Search_Code=TALL&PID=FgMjtJ244OxoFULrVoob_CEI8bc_M&SEQ=20190506230418&CNT=25&HIST=1 If the link doesn't work due to expiration or a cookie, it should look like this: It's a matter of using the USPTO search engine "its way" — it's not Google and requires specific search strings. Looks like the assignee or owner is https://antigravitygear.com ? Did THEY contact you or David Miller? Or did they claim to be an attorney? I'd love to see the email. Attorneys don't email dunning letters, by the way (though they may if it was a DMCA takedown request I suppose, but I still doubt it.) If it was an attorney it would be via US mail on attorney letterhead. To the best of my knowledge, you can't file proof of service on an email, it has to be USPS or trackable. This means the guy that made the other PDF is annoyed or whatever. If he claimed to be an attorney, that's VERY illegal if he's not. And one final note: Just being non-profit does not absolve you of copyright infringement. But as I said, I see no infringement here. The other answer that asserted these are covered under "works of art" is not withstanding. There is nothing "expressive" about Miller's guide. Also that other answer cited a source for AUSTRALIAN law, not US. Mere typographic elements do not rise to "an expressive work of art". A mountain profile that is nothing but a illustrative line based on data also does not. | No-ish, it is not. The relevant sticking point would be in their DMCA takedown notice, where they have to follow 17 USC 512(c)(3)(A) and include in their notice (v) A statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law. (vi) A statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and under penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed. The key here is having a "good faith belief". There is a credible scenario where a company A could file multiple notices for the actually same material B posted by the exact same person C, where the person has the right to post that material, and do so in good faith. If A was not able to locate evidence of the permission to C, then they would shift the burden of proof to C – "good faith belief" doesn't mean that they have to be right, just that they have to actually think they are. If C also uses the name D, A would not be able to determine that the work was licensed to D based on the fact (once they know that) that it is licensed to C. DMCA abuse is not an permanently open escape hatch. 17 USC 512(4) states Any person who knowingly materially misrepresents under this section— (1) that material or activity is infringing, or (2) that material or activity was removed or disabled by mistake or misidentification, shall be liable for any damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, incurred by the alleged infringer, by any copyright owner or copyright owner's authorized licensee, or by a service provider, who is injured by such misrepresentation, as the result of the service provider relying upon such misrepresentation in removing or disabling access to the material or activity claimed to be infringing, or in replacing the removed material or ceasing to disable access to it. See Automattic Inc. v. Steiner, 82 F. Supp. 3d 1011. The ruling judge found that "Defendant could not have reasonably believed that the Press Release he sent to Hotham was protected under copyright". The appeal court drew on precedent and dictionary to fill in gaps w.r.t. "good faith belief", that the person should have known if it acted with reasonable care or diligence, or would have had no substantial doubt had it been acting in good faith, that it was making misrepresentations In this case, the abuser was flagrantly abusing the takedown system, and there is some reason to believe that in the instant case, the abuser had actual knowledge of non-infringement. Rossi v. Motion Picture Association of America provides an alternative outcome. In this case, Rossi operated a website that appeared (note the word appear) to offer free downloads of movies, and the rights-holder MCAA filed a takedown notice. In fact, it did not offer any such downloads, but MCAA's investigation stopped prematurely. This court held that "good faith belief" is subjective, so Rossi did not prevail. It is no doubt crucial that Rossi actually counted on his customers thinking that you could get actual downloads of protected material. Whether or not a DMCA abuse suit would succeed would depend very much on the factual details of why the material is not infringing, and how easily the rights-holder could know that there was no infringement. |
Is there a legal path for overturning Nixon vs US (not to be confused with US v Nixon)? Nixon v US established that impeachment is not justiciable. However, this provides a path for it to become a carte blanche unrestrained power of Congress. This is a far cry from its intended aim of being a power which would only be exercised with a great self-restraint by Congress. Can this decision reach the SCOTUS only via a case brought by another impeached party? Or is there another legal path for SCOTUS to consider it again? Is there a path through an injunction? I am not asking what would guarantee its overturn. I am only asking about how the legal system works to make it possible (if a plaintiff succeeds in all challenges which they bring). | While this does not really directly answer your question of overturn, but this might somewhat directly address your original concern. This provides a path for it to become a carte blanche unrestrained power of Congress. This statement seems a bit misleading. It seems to indicate that Congress now is unfettered to abuse its impeachment power, but this is not true, because Congress is divided into two halves that place check on each other: The House of Representatives ... shall have the sole Power of Impeachment. The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. | If President Trump refuses to execute the war, does that become an act of treason on his part? Probably not, but it depends on the definition of treason. Congress could decide that it is, impeach him, and remove him from office. They could also remove him from office without using the term treason. Is he required to act on such a resolution? Not really. As chief executive, he has discretion to prioritize the tasks assigned to him by congress. Furthermore, there is plenty of precedent in international affairs for countries being legally in a state of war without any actual combat or other hostilities. If he doesn't, is there any recourse other than impeachment to force US armed forces to attack RF interests at home and abroad? There's always political pressure. But there's no way to relieve the president of his command of the armed forces without relieving him of his office. Aside from impeachment by the congress, this can be temporarily achieved by the cabinet, as specified in the 25th amendment. POTUS is the commander-in-chief, but, at the same time, he is not allowed to unilaterally decide who may or may not cross the border into the United States. The president's ability to make immigration policy and the fact that such policy is subject to judicial review are unrelated to his powers as commander in chief. Immigration is a civil and criminal matter, not a military one. The president's powers in this regard are delegated to him by congress, not specified in the constitution. On the other hand, the president's role as commander in chief of the military is explicit in the constitution. Do the judges also have a power to compel armed forces to take actions which a sitting President is refusing to take? The judiciary does not have the power to order military operations. | Maybe I'm reading Walsh wrong, but it seems to me to be saying that Stout might apply in some cases, but it doesn't in that specific case. I think you are indeed reading it wrong. In the Walsh case, the court says: We have not had occasion to decide the question up to this time, but now that it is presented, we not only reiterate the doubt which we expressed in the McAlpin case (supra), but we think that the question of the defendant's negligence was erroneously submitted to the jury in the Stout case, and that we ought not to follow it as a precedent. It's clearly repudiating Stout here, and not just as it applies to that case. It literally says they think it should not be followed as precedent. | SHORT ANSWER Suppose a President can see that such a vote is coming and will pass, shortly before an election. Can that President resign just before the vote in order to effectively avoid the disqualification penalty? Probably yes. But, there is no historical precedent for this happening. Nixon resigned before the House voted to impeach him, not midway into the impeachment proceedings. Neither Andrew Jackson nor Bill Clinton resigned prior to not being convicted on the basis of a U.S. House impeachment. Several federal judges and one cabinet official, however, have resigned midway through impeachment proceedings prior to being convicted, and in those cases, the case was dismissed and no judgment was entered by the U.S. Senate, so they were not disqualified from holding future federal public offices. LONG ANSWER Relevant Constitutional Language The pertinent provisions of the U.S. Constitution include the following: Article I, Section 2, Clause 5: The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment. Article I, Section 3, Clauses 6 and 7: 6: The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present. 7: Judgment in Cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law. Article II, Section 4: The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. Article II, Section 2, Clause 3: The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed. Analysis The key language is in Article I, Section 3, Clause 7 of the U.S. Constitution which states in the pertinent part that: Judgment in Cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States[.] This means that a President who is impeached by the House and convicted by the U.S. Senate may be prohibited from holding any federal office from President to dogcatcher in the future. But, this can only be done in a "judgment" of the U.S. Senate in connection with an impeachment based upon a conviction in the U.S. Senate following a House impeachment, which has never happened. The history of the impeachment language and the limitation to removals from office, suggest that only a person who is current serving in office may be impeached. Otherwise, the proceeding would be invalid as moot, and would be dismissed (as it has been in the case of many judges who have resigned after investigations are initiated or after a House impeaches but prior to a conviction of impeachment). A U.S. Senate ruling that someone is disqualified from holding future office can only be entered in a judgment of conviction for impeachment, so cannot apply to a past President. If this were done it would probably be an invalid "Bill of Attainder" or "Ex Post Facto" law. See U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 9, Clause 3 ("No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed"). And, the U.S. Senate can't pass a law unilaterally, or enter a judgment convicting someone on an impeachment unless the House initiates the proceeding. There is no precedent concerning whether if someone who was convicted by the U.S. Senate and removed from office based upon an impeachment initiated by the U.S. House, in which the judgment did not disqualify the person impeachment from holding future federal public offices, the U.S. Senate could amend its judgment later on to also disqualify the person so removed from office from holding further public office. I suspect that if the question were presented that the federal courts would hold that the amendment of the impeachment judgment was not valid because the word "judgment" implies an immediate ruling upon a case and not a perpetual right to hold the person subject to the judgment in limbo regarding the consequences of his impeachment conviction. | Donald Trump did not waive executive privilege: it was denied to him. In Trump Loses Big on Executive Privilege (Thursday, January 20, 2022) the Lawfare Institute says The Supreme Court Wednesday evening denied a motion by former President Trump to block the National Archive from turning White House materials to the House Select Committee on the January 6 Attack. The peculiar, four-page order, is a complicated document, but in combination with the broad and underdiscussed D.C. Circuit opinion it leaves in place, it has profound implications for Trump’s ability, and that of his allies, to make executive privilege claims in response to demands for testimony and information from the committee. On its face, the Supreme Court’s order yesterday appears to mitigate the consequences for Trump of a D.C. Circuit opinion that rejects a number of his key claims in resisting the committee. The D.C. Circuit opinion has been hanging around since early last month with little notice or discussion—probably because the Supreme Court was poised to jump in any time. But in fact, the Supreme Court action does not mitigate the matter for Trump. Put simply, the former president, whether he knows it or not, is now in a dramatically weaker position than he was only recently with respect to the committee. The new legal landscape, for example, almost certainly means that two top Trump officials—former White House Chief of Staff Mark Meadow and former top adviser Steve Bannon—can no longer argue that the privilege prevents them from cooperating with the committee. The same applies to other potential witnesses, and to the former president himself, should the committee seek his testimony. All, of course, may well continue to resist anyway—but if so, they proceed at much greater risk to themselves. | Yes, this is allowed. A famous example was the Rodney King beating, where police officers were acquitted at the state level but convicted federally. US v. Lanza formalized the rule, and it has survived the application of the double jeopardy rule to the states. It's called the separate sovereigns doctrine, and also applies to prosecutions by two states (see Heath v. Alabama) and by an Indian tribe and the feds (see US v. Wheeler). It does not apply between DC and the feds or territories and the feds, because DC and territorial laws are established under the power of the federal government. These prosecutions are uncommon. As far as the feds go, they normally consider a state prosecution to have satisfied the federal interest in the case (win or lose). But prosecution by multiple sovereigns is not barred by the Fifth Amendment. | Sort of The 25th Amendment is crystal clear that the VP and a majority of the cabinet can declare in writing to the president pro tem of the Senate and the speaker of the house a presidential inability, whereupon the VP becomes the acting president. The president can then immediately transmit in writing his declaration that there is no inability, and then he resumes his position as president until the VP and majority of cabinet (not necessarily the same members) again declare a disability, within 4 days. If that happens, then Congress decides the matter. There is a 28 day period for a super-majority of Congress to make that decision, plus 48 hours for assembling of Congress is not in session. The problem is that the amendment says that the president resumes his powers unless something happens within 4 days. It does not say that he must wait 4 days to see what the VP response is. If the VP does not counter-respond immediately, then it is possible, but not guaranteed, that the president regains power until the VP reaffirms the disability. This is a question that would have to be decided by SCOTUS. In the presumably short interim, there would be serious constitutional questions as to the legality of the actions of either POTUS or VPOTUS. | An individual obtains due process rights upon entering into the United States. For a recent write-up on this question, see this piece at Reason. The people Trump is talking about generally aren't being denied admission at an established, legal border crossing; they're coming across wherever they can get through, and only being discovered by federal agents thereafter. Because they're already in the United States, they have due process rights. As for cross-border interactions with ICE or CBP, the extent of due process protections is still an open question. SCOTUS took it up last year, but it kicked the case back to a lower court rather than deciding it. |
Are vigilantes actions on DDoSing child porn sites illegal? There still exist many illegitimate child porn sites on the web. Some vigilantes organized and DDoS those child porn sites, typically because they think the government is inadequate to seize the child porn site owners, are these vigilantes themselves committing a crime? | This would be illegal in Australia (Criminal Code Act 1995 part 10.7: any unauthorised impairment of electronic communication to or from a computer), the US (Computer Fraud and Abuse Act) and any other jurisdiction that I can think of. There is no exception allowing vigilante action in case a person has a reasonable belief that the material on a website is offensive or illegal. In general, the law does not allow immunization against criminal prosecution in case the victim of an attack is himself a criminal. Only the government has the right to punish criminals. | Check the website's terms of service. Check to see if you're violating these terms, and check to see if the script you are making enables other people to violate them. Courts don't often look kindly on actions whose sole purpose is enabling someone else to do something that is prohibited. If you're making a script that helps people do something they're allowed to do, in a way that's better for at least somebody and makes nobody worse off, that's often a different story. Major websites will generally indicate whether or not you're allowed to do this. Some sites are fairly strict about prohibiting scraping (e.g. Craigslist, which at one point shut down Padmapper's alternative more-useful presentation of their content). Others, like Wikipedia, much more actively encourage reusing content from their sites as long as you meet certain conditions such as a link back to the original source. | Since there are cases where it is legal to break into a car, is it legal to publish a guide on how to break into a car online? It is legal to publish this guide. Indeed, it is legal to do so even if there are no cases where it is legal to do so. Does it need to have a disclaimer saying to comply with all applicable laws? No. Could the author be held responsible if someone uses the instructions to illegally break into a car? Generally not. I could imagine that there might be some very specific and exceptional fact pattern where it might, but that would be the rare exception. But see man sentenced to twenty-years in prison after pledging support to ISIS and uploading a bomb making video related to that pledge. | Assuming the USA, since that's where they appear to be located. Spreading misinformation is not illegal- it is protected by the first amendment. There are exceptions but I can't see how any would apply here. You haven't mentioned any that you think apply. If some of the videos on the site guaranteed results or made medical claims, maybe that could be considered false advertising. However, I see no evidence of this. Users are advertised that paying for access to a bunch of hocum videos will get them access to a bunch of snake oil and this appears to be the case. | In general, a ToS document for a web site or online service is simply a contract or agreement. Normally violations of such an agreement are possible grounds for a civil suit, but are not crimes. Moreover, some terms that some TOS documents claim are not legally enforceable. For example some insist that a user waive a right that the law says cannot be waived. The kind of terms mentioned ion the question are probably enforceable in most jurisdictions. If a person intentionally supplies false information to a site operator or service provider, with the intention of gaining some financial benefit that would not be available without the false statements, under circumstances where it would be reasonable for the site operator to rely on the statements, that would be fraud in many jurisdictions. Fraud is often a matter for a civil suit, but in some cases it can be a crime also. Those cases vary in different jurisdictions, and the question does not specify any particular jurisdiction. Criminal fraud is the only case where I can think of where a ToS violation would be a crime. Some TOS documents prohibit things which are already crimes. For example a communication site might include in its ToS that users are not to use it to assist in committing a crime, or to unlawfully harass someone. If a user violated those provisions, they would also be committing a crime, but only because those actions would be crimes even if the TOS had never mentioned them. It is a crime to plan a murder via a chat site, whether the TOS says so or not. But that is because it is a crime to plan a murder in general, with nor without the chat site. There are some specifically online crimes. For example, posting so-called "revenge porn" is a crime in many jurisdictions. But that is a crime because of a law against it, not because of a TOS that prohibits it. In all usual cases, a ToS violation will be dealt with via a civil suit, or by limiting or canceling the user's access, if it is dealt with at all. CFAA In the united-states the Computer fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), specifically 18 U. S. C. §1030(a)(2), makes it a crime for anyone who ... intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access ... The recent case of Van Buren v. United States, 593 U.S. ___ (2021) dealt with the "exceeds authorized access" language. (See the Wikipedia article) In that case, Van Buren, a police officer, accessed official databases to determine id the holder of a given license plate was in fact an undercover police officer. Van Buren thought that this information was being provided to a criminal, and was paid $6,000 for it. Van Buren knew that the access policy prohibited access for "personal use" or any "non-official purpose". He was charged with a felony violation of the CFAA on the ground that he accessed information with an "improper purpose", although he would have been authorized to access that same information with a proper purpose. After a long discussion of the meanign of the words "so" and "entitled" in the stsatute, the court opnion says: If the “exceeds authorized access” clause criminalizes every violation of a computer-use policy, then millions of otherwise law-abiding citizens are criminals. Take the workplace. Employers commonly state that computers and electronic devices can be used only for business purposes. So on the Government’s reading of the statute, an employee who sends a personal e-mail or reads the news using her work computer has violated the CFAA. Or consider the Internet. Many websites, services, and databases—which provide “information” from “protected computer[s],” §1030(a)(2)(C)—authorize a user’s access only upon his agreement to follow specified terms of service. If the “exceeds authorized access” clause encompasses violations of circumstance-based access restrictions on employers’ computers, it is difficult to see why it would not also encompass violations of such restrictions on website providers’ computers. And indeed, numerous amici explain why the Government’s reading of subsection (a)(2) would do just that—criminalize everything from embellishing an online-dating profile to using a pseudonym on Facebook. ... ... For example, one police department might prohibit using a confidential database for a non-law-enforcement purpose (an access restriction), while another might prohibit using information from the database for a non-law-enforcement purpose (a use restriction). Conduct like Van Buren’s can be characterized either way, and an employer might not see much difference between the two. On the Government’s reading, however, the conduct would violate the CFAA only if the employer phrased the policy as an access restriction. An interpretation that stakes so much on a fine distinction controlled by the drafting practices of private parties is hard to sell as the most plausible. In sum, an individual “exceeds authorized access” when he accesses a computer with authorization but then obtains information located in particular areas of the computer—such as files, folders, or databases—that are off limits to him. This case clearly says that a person who has authorization to access a computer, but does so for a purpose prohibited by system policy, perhaps as expressed n a TOS contract, is not subject to criminal prosecution under the CFAA. It does not directly deal with the case where, as a condition of access, a person must furnish truthful ID information, or comply with some other condition, and whether violating such a condition would constitute a crime under the CFAA. But it casts significant doubt on any interpretation of the CFAA which would treat that as a crime | Background of the question You are talking of David Hahn, aka the "Radioactive Scout". In 1995 he was 17 when he impersonated a licensed person to acquire radioactive material. But he never got enough material to build a reactor: he built a neutron source from a block of lead, into which he had stuffed lots of somewhat purified radioactive material. He also conducted radioactive experiments without a licensed lab - which is decidedly illegal. Now, he realized that his neutron source was starting to generate dangerous radiation and dismantled his setup - which was what got FBI and consorts to the table. They cleaned up what they found - while his mother already had disposed of most of the experiments via the normal garbage - also decidedly illegal. Since he was 17 and his mother did commit suicide during the year after the events and before her disposing of waste was discovered, neither was prosecuted at that point. Someone alleged in 2007, he was again amessing radioactive material, the FBI investigated but found the tip not enough to warrant more investigation after standing in front of the door with a radioactivity detector and talking to him on the phone, as a report shows: "No immediate threat existed with regards to allegations that Hahn possessed a nuclear reactor within his residence." Later in 2007 he was found guilty of stealing smoke detectors, which some people alleged he planned to extract Americium from. This claim was never at trial, so is to be taken with a grain of salt. The charge was Larceny. Not attempt of obtaining NCBR-Material illegally. Answer To work with materials of radioactive means, you need to be compliant with NCR rules and acquire the needed license. There are companies that have the license to dismantle and extract the radioactive material from smoke detectors - and USPS provides a list of companies that take them and are allowed to - because they make them in the first place and may handle it because of that license. There is no exception for ownership/handling of small amounts of Americium in 10 CFR 30.70 Schedule A, but the smoke detector itself, as a fully contained unit is under 10 CFR 30.15 (a)(7): (a) Except for persons who apply byproduct material to, or persons who incorporate byproduct material into, the following products, or persons who initially transfer for sale or distribution the following products containing byproduct material, any person is exempt from the requirements for a license set forth in section 81 of the Act and from the regulations in parts 20 and 30 through 36 and 39 of this chapter to the extent that such person receives, possesses, uses, transfers, owns, or acquires the following products: (7) Ionization chamber smoke detectors containing not more than 1 microcurie (μCi) of americium-241 per detector in the form of a foil and designed to protect life and property from fires. (b) Any person who desires to apply byproduct material to, or to incorporate byproduct material into, the products exempted in paragraph (a) of this section, or who desires to initially transfer for sale or distribution such products containing byproduct material, should apply for a specific license pursuant to § 32.14 of this chapter, which license states that the product may be distributed by the licensee to persons exempt from the regulations pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section. However, NCR also found that it would need 10-million used smoke detectors in normal trash to become a problem - but that assumes them to be full units, not someone ripping them apart. | ...due to the international registration of multiple domains to generate ad revenue by recycling stories across sock puppet networks, giving the impression of multiple, independent companies. None of that is illegal on its face. Internet domains are freely registerable by anyone, anywhere (with the exception of some laws in some nations that restrict such Internet-related activity), and registered privately or publicly, and websites can be hosted anywhere. Writing articles and "spinning" and copying articles (even if that writing is sales gibberish in broken English) among the same copyright owner is legal, and using the same design and layout for a network of sites is legal. The formation of multiple, related companies and shell companies to give the impression that companies are separate and independent is legal (again, with the exception of some business and corporate laws in some nations that restrict such activity). These are all common business practices. Some business practices may appear to be unethical - trying to fool customers in order to make money and get clicks and sell ads. And what you may be feeling is that such activity is unethical. And that's OK. But feeling that they are unethical doesn't make the practices illegal. Many common activities that are considered to be unethical are illegal; but not all. Buyer beware. One way some of that activity may be illegal is if those articles are factually incorrect and promote quack medical treatments, are financial scams requiring payments, are gambling sites or promote other clearly illegal things. But then you get into the complexity of exactly how they are illegal, which jurisdictions are involved, and on and on. | In some states there is a law know as Caylee's Law, for example Connecticut General Statutes 53-21a(d) which requires reporting a child's disappearance: Any parent, guardian or person having custody or control, or providing supervision, of any child under the age of twelve years who knowingly fails to report the disappearance of such child to an appropriate law enforcement agency shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor. For the purposes of this subsection, “disappearance of such child” means that the parent, guardian or person does not know the location of the child and has not had contact with the child for a twenty-four-hour period. Assume that they have done as the law requires, i.e. reporting the disappearance. It could be a crime for the parents to fake the kid's death, depending on what you did to "fake" the death. They might legally do things that could lead a person to think the child died; but telling the police, in the course of an investigation, that the child died in an accident, would be a crime. The parents would not have to convince the school district of anything, though someone at the school might alert the authorities that the child was gone (but they would know that anyway). They might well have to convince the police of something (i.e. that they didn't kill the child). It would certainly be a felony to lie to the IRS (i.e. claim the child as a dependent). It would also be a crime to continue to receive welfare payments or other benefits based on the fact of having a child. |
Cleaner leaving defamatory messages on fridge - is this a crime? Come across a situation with a friend of mine which I'm not sure is actually illegal or just really bad practice, they live in university accommodation and while all residents are out one of the staff/cleaners arranged fridge magnets into offensive messages about the residents, due to prior tension this triggered an altercation between them, has the cleaner broken a law or is this just bad practice? | Defamatory and offensive are not the same “He is a child molester” is defamatory and illegal (unless he is, of course). “She is a two-faced f___ing b___h with the morals of an alley cat and the integrity of a politician” is offensive and legal. Neither is a crime. | NJ Rev Stat §9:6-1 may be the source of the rumor (since it was in the news), but that law prohibits "the habitual use by the parent or by a person having the custody and control of a child, in the hearing of such child, of profane, indecent or obscene language". The NJ Supreme Court recently declined a First Amendment argument for overturning the law. Otherwise, a candidate is disorderly contact, NJ Rev Stat § 2C:33-2(b), A person is guilty of a petty disorderly persons offense if, in a public place, and with purpose to offend the sensibilities of a hearer or in reckless disregard of the probability of so doing, he addresses unreasonably loud and offensively coarse or abusive language, given the circumstances of the person present and the setting of the utterance, to any person present. N.J. v. Burkett somewhat tests this law, though the specific acts (which were found to be puerile yet legal) are not adequately described to test the limit on this ban on profanity (as a subcase of coarse language). The statute still stands, but seems not to have been otherwise prosecuted. | Theft is of course illegal in all US states, and pretty much every other jurisdiction. In the US that is a matter of state law, not federal. It could be reported to the local police, but it might be hard to prove. Both landlord/tenant law and privacy law are largely matters of state law in the US, not federal law. Such laws vary a good deal in different states. In many states a landlord is allowed to enter the rented premises, usually on "reasonable" notice, or without notice if there is an emergency. If the landlord actually lives in another part of the house, and simply rents a room to the tenant, the landlord may be able to enter the room more freely than if it was a separate apartment or house. In many cases where there is a written lease or rental agreement, it will specify under what conditions the landlord or landlord's agent may enter, and how much notice is required. What does the lease in the current case say about that? | Defamation requires communication to a third-party I can say (or write) anything I want about a person directly to that person and, unless it is a threat, they have no recourse at all. I can call them a liar, a thief, a Nazi, or a goat fornicator. Of course, I have to be careful – calling them a “bastard” might be a slur on their mother communicated to a third-party (them) which would give her a right to sue although that would require a literal and largely archaic use of the term. That said, you do need to check with your lawyer if you can redact names in the face of a subpoena - complying with a legal obligations is a legitimate use of personal data under GDPR. | I can't speak for the US but in Australia this would not be binding. You entered a contract for the vacuum cleaner the terms of conditions of which were made known to you at the time of purchase – the ticketed price, any store or website displayed terms and whatever was written on the outside of the box. Any alleged terms that were not made known when you entered the contract e.g. because they are inside the box are just that: alleged. In addition, the manufacturer would have committed an offence under Australian Consumer Law by misleading you that such terms were binding. This could lead to a fine in the multiple millions of dollars if the breach is widespread and egregious enough. | The tenants have a right to the "quiet enjoyment" of the house, but the only way to enforce that is to sue the landlord, and the probable remedy is money damages, with an injunction possible. Neither of those really solves the problem here. The California Tenants Guide notes, onpages 63-4, the "Special rights of tenants who are victims of domestic violence, sexual assault, stalking, human trafficking, or elder/dependent adult abuse." These special rights allow a tenant who is a victim to move out on 14 days notes without penalty, rather than a longer period that would otherwise be required. But here the tenants, it seems don't really want to move out, they want the landlord to move into an appropriate care facility. It is also not clear to me if this provision would apply when the aggressor is also the landlord. There is no simple way for the tenants to force this. They could, as interested parties, file a petition witj the proper court claiming that the landlord is incompetent to manager her own affairs, is a danger to herself and/or others, and is in need of a guardian. But such a petition is unlikely to go anywhere unless someone is wiling and able to act as a guardian, someone who would be acceptable to the court. One of th tenants would probably not be acceptable, even if one was willing. One option is to keep calling 911 on every violent outburst, and to document the violence on cell-phone videos, or in any other way possible. This might eventually lead to the police or other authority intervening in s helpful way, but that is far from assured. | This article basically says "it depends": If it is genuinely used to improve tenant safety then that is OK, but if it is used to track your private life then that is not acceptable. Cameras that cover communal areas used by several properties are generally acceptable, but cameras covering individual properties are much less so. It sounds like this falls into the latter category. Assuming you haven't got the camera yet, I suggest you write to the Landlord asking for a written justification of the cameras, and a policy for the use of the camera. E.g. it will only be viewed if an incident is reported. Once you have the justification you can then look for inconsistencies (e.g. if they aren't planning to snoop at random times, how are they going to notice someone up to no good? And how would they tell?) You could also just say "no". The installation of this camera probably counts as a material variation of the rental agreement. You could also propose a compromise: you will install the camera, but only provide footage as you see fit rather than allowing your landlord to view the camera at any time. CCTV installations are covered by the GDPR, so you should ask your landlord for the associated paperwork. Amongst other things they will need to state how long they want to keep the footage and provide a justification for that. "We might want to re-run it" is not a justification. Having all this stuff written down will help if you ever suspect he is abusing the footage. Edit Another thought: does the landlord own other properties? Are they having cameras installed too? If not, why not? They should have a policy about this. | She never said that She said: When I joined that family, that was the last time, until we came here, that I saw my passport, my driver's licence, my keys. All that gets turned over With respect to my adult children and their passports, the same is true in my house. I ask them for their passports when they aren’t needed, they give them to me, I store them in a safe place and I give them back to them when they need them. That’s just a sensible precaution against them being lost and in no way illegal. Now if I took their passports without permission and withheld them when they wanted them, that would be illegal as it would for anyone else including the Queen (who, I’m sure, had absolutely nothing to do with it - that’s the job of the Keeper of the Royal Passports or some such). Similarly, if you came to my house and I offered to take your coat and you gave it to me and I gave it back when you left, that would be perfectly legal. When I pull up in my car, I put my keys in a bowl in the laundry (unless I forget and then I can’t find them and it’s really annoying). I would prefer instead to have an employee jump into the car, park it and put the keys in their bowl so that when I want the car latter, it’s their job to remember where they left the keys. But I can’t afford that. |
Volunteer Labor Union in New York State In the state of New York, is it legal for a group of volunteers to form a labor union? If not clearly legal, is there anything that prohibits a labor union of volunteers? Clarifing edit I am specifically interested in a labor union, of volunteers supporting web sites. The particular company I wonder about is headquartered in New York, it is SE and we are all the volunteers in question. | Yes. The formation of a labor union -- or virtually any other group -- is permitted by the First Amendment, which protects your right to associate with other people and your right "peaceably to assemble." As a group of volunteers, there would likely be meaningful barriers to its recognition for the purposes of enforcement of collective-bargaining laws. In that case, whatever organization the volunteers are serving would likely not have a duty to negotiate with the union, though it may still choose to do so. | You're forgetting city and county health codes, business permits, zoning regulations, fire and occupation regulations, business and property insurance, labor laws, etc. These can differ between the city and the county, and depending on if you own or lease the building. Best thing to do is start with your city/county business permit office; they can provide information. Call the fire department and ask. Ask the county health department. Find out if a business incubator exists in your city/county and ask them: https://esd.ny.gov/certified-business-incubator | The only real answer is that the US Supreme Court, in interpreting the constitution, and specifically the argument that the 13th Amendment prohibits a draft for compelled military services has totally rejected that argument. For many years now the US has not used a draft, and it is obviously possible for the US to have an enduring and powerful military without any draft, which was perhaps not apparent to the Justices in 1918. A draft had been common in this country from the colonial period, through the Revolution, the Civil War, World Wars I and II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. In reaction to the problems during the Vietnam War, and the great opposition to any draft at that time, the US has not used a draft since, although it retains a legal requirement to register for a possible draft, and the legal authority to impose one should it be thought wise. Note that this was not because of the 13th Amendment. Note also that compelled service by the citizens (or residents) in a locality, particularly to fight fires and floods, when the usual forces are inadequate to that end, has been commonly used. Such compulsory service has never been thought to be prohibited by the 13th Amendment. Also, as mentioned in comments, citizens can be compelled to do jury duty, which could in theory be considered "involuntary servitude" but has never been thought to be prohibited by the 13th amendment. The answer by Trish (now deleted) thoroughly described the many differences between a slave and a drafted soldier. Still, drafted military service might be thought to be a form of involuntary servitude. But the Court (and the laws and other courts as well) have not treated it as such. In the Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) the Court thought the idea that compulsory military service constituted involuntary servitude was so wrongheaded that it thought a very brief mention sufficient to refute this contention. It wrote (at 245 U. S. 390): Finally, as we are unable to conceive upon what theory the exaction by government from the citizen of the performance of his supreme and noble duty of contributing to the defense of the rights and honor of the nation, as the result of a war declared by the great representative body of the people, can be said to be the imposition of involuntary servitude in violation of the prohibitions of the Thirteenth Amendment, we are constrained to the conclusion that the contention to that effect is refuted by its mere statement. It is clear from the text of that opinion that the justices thought that the existence of a power to draft soldiers was essential to the implementation of the constitutional power (article I section 8): To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water; To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years; To provide and maintain a Navy; To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces; The opinion discusses the history of compelled military service in the United States, in the colonies before there was a United States, and in Great Britain before that. The opinion says that: Compelled military service is neither repugnant to a free government nor in conflict with the constitutional guaranties of individual liberty. Indeed, it may not be doubted that the very conception of a just government and its duty to the citizen includes the duty of the citizen to render military service in case of need, and the right of the government to compel it. and Further, it is said, the right to provide is not denied by calling for volunteer enlistments, but it does not and cannot include the power to exact enforced military duty by the citizen. This however but challenges the existence of all power, for a governmental power which has no sanction to it and which therefore can only be exercised provided the citizen consents to its exertion is in no substantial sense a power. One may disagree, but that is the law of the land as interpreted by the final body authorized to make such interpretations, the Supreme Court, and it remains good law today. | I have a really good pizza place near my home but the bastards won't deliver when I go interstate! Now, that's discrimination! Yes, it's discrimination. However, it's not unlawful discrimination. Discrimination is not unlawful unless it is on the basis of a protected class. Geography isn't a protected class of itself. It can be if it's used as a proxy for a protected class, such as excluding certain neighbourhoods which correspond with racial or religious groups, but that's not the case here. | Volokh commented on this. There is no 2nd Amendment issue, nor does federal law. It may be illegal in some states, depending on whether age is included in public accommodation anti-discrimination laws. For instance, Conn. Gen. Stat. §§46a-64 says (a) It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section: (1) To deny any person within the jurisdiction of this state full and equal accommodations in any place of public accommodation, resort or amusement because of race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, gender identity or expression, marital status, age, lawful source of income, intellectual disability, mental disability or physical disability, including, but not limited to, blindness or deafness of the applicant, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons; §46a-63 defines "public accommodation" (1) “Place of public accommodation, resort or amusement” means any establishment which caters or offers its services or facilities or goods to the general public, including, but not limited to, any commercial property or building lot, on which it is intended that a commercial building will be constructed or offered for sale or rent Public accomodation laws are how states deal with discrimination in sales, such as selling wedding cakes Illinois 775 ILCS 5/1-103 likewise prohibits age discrimination in public accomodations, but defines "age" as "the chronological age of a person who is at least 40 years old". Connecticut used to define "age" as "any age between forty and sixty-five, inclusive", but that clause was deleted. Lousiana also prohibits age discrimination (La. Rev. Stat. §51:2247). Their statement about age likewise limits anti-discrimination protection to "individuals who are at least forty years of age". Maryland in MD State Govt Code § 20-304 also bans age discrimination, and does not redefine "age" or limit the scope of those ages that are protected. So while it is generally legal to refuse to sell goods to the young (and sometimes mandatory, e.g. alcohol, firearms, tobacco), there are a few states where such a policy would violate state anti-discrimination laws. There can also be city laws (Seattle has very broad anti-discrimination laws), but they exclude age from the Public Accommodation subset of discrimination. | Does CCPA impact whether or not this is allowed? Probably not. Public schools are divisions of state government and there are limits to how much the federal government can dictate the operations of state and local governments. Limitations on whether public schools can monetize data collected from students (13+) would arise under state law. The state law could certainly expressly authorize the practice (and to some extent does already with profit generating sports teams and yearbooks). State law could likewise prohibit the practice. For the most part, state law is silent and it doesn't happen that much because it isn't very profitable. Is there different guidance for public (government-managed and nonprofit) vs private schools? The legal analysis is very different. I'm not as familiar with this area of law, however, and will leave that question to someone else. As a practical matter, private schools are in a very good position to obtain express consent to do so from parents and students, so that is usually how the issue is resolved, I suspect. | In the US, there is no general legal duty to aid. Certain states (Wisconsin, Minnesota, Washington – about 10 states) have imposed such a duty. Otherwise, duty arises only because you have caused the peril, or because you have certain pre-existing relations with the person. Pennsylvania does have a duty to assist law, applicable to drivers of vehicles involved in an accident that results in injury or death (involved in, not just caused). PA also has a Good Samaritan law which relieves a person of liability for a good faith rendering of assistance, which does not otherwise impose a positive duty on individuals. | The question is definitely specific to a jurisdiction. I think this is legal in the jurisdiction you specify. Wikipedia shows incest in New York defined as: Persons known to be related to him or her, whether through marriage or not, as an ancestor, descendant, brother or sister of either the whole or the half blood, uncle, aunt, nephew or niece. I don't think "our children have married" means the couple is related "as brother and sister through marriage". In England and Wales, this would definitely be legal. Wikipedia lists the relationships that cannot marry, and co-parents-in-law are not on the list. (The table is probably out of date, in that the "for men" and "for women" column should almost certainly be merged.) |
What is the Basis in Law that an "Investigation 'Quid Pro Quo'" is Unlawful or Unconstitutional? In cases of investigating election fraud, there seems to be a potential for a conflict of interest no matter who investigates it. So, why can't the White House investigate campaign issues (involving the Ukraine, Clintons, and Bidens), regardless of any perceived conflict of interest? How is it unlawful/unconstitutional for a President to order Executive Branch employees to investigate election fraud, (or if they were to solicit foreign allies to do the same with reciprocity)? Suppose that any given sets of facts regarding President Trump's actions are true and constitute "basis in fact". But, what would be the "basis in law" to impeach over those acts? Aren't these types of negotiations expected of heads of state? | "Conflict of interest" has a specific meaning w.r.t. various federal laws, which have financial gain as their underpinning. The so-called conflict which your referring to is an abstract moral duty, eforced at the polls every few years: there is no conflict of interest. "Obstruction of justice" is defined in 18 USC 73. The law does not require a person to passively submit to an investigation, thus you can file motions with a competent court to resist a subpoena. If there is a criminal investigation of a US criminal statute, it is illegal to willfully endeavors by means of bribery to obstruct, delay, or prevent the communication of information relating to a violation of any criminal statute Saying "you don't have authority to tell me to do that" is not obstruction of justice. I have not seen any (credible) claim that it is unconstitutional for the president to order an investigation of election fraud, for example Executive Order 13799. That commission was disbanded, but a new commission could be ordered via the same mechanism. Congress has the power to defund any such commission, and there was an unsuccessful attempt to use that power in the previous instance. | I do not know the exact circumstances for the alleged obstruction (and whether there was a political or diplomatic purpose to prompt the questioning would be off-topic here) so I have just focused on the relevant legislation in answer to: What is the law here? SHORT ANSWER It's not a crime to answer a police question with "I would like to speak to my lawyer"? But it is a(n alleged) crime to obstruct or otherwise fail to comply with an examination under the Terrorism Act 2000. This Act is one of a very small number of laws that makes it compulsory for someone to answer questions or provide information, but as they are not under arrest there is no statutory requirement for them to have independent legal advice. What they say or provide cannot be used against them (with some exemptions, below) and failure to comply is an offence. LONG ANSWER A police officer is an examining officer, and under paragraph 2 Schedule 7, Terrorism Act 2000: (1) An examining officer may question a person to whom this paragraph applies for the purpose of determining whether he appears to be a person falling within section 40(1)(b). section 40(1)(b) says: (b) is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism. Under Paragraph 5: A person who is questioned under paragraph 2 or 3 must— (a) give the examining officer any information in his possession which the officer requests; (b) give the examining officer on request either a valid passport which includes a photograph or another document which establishes his identity; (c) declare whether he has with him documents of a kind specified by the examining officer; (d) give the examining officer on request any document which he has with him and which is of a kind specified by the officer. BUT, under paragraph 5A (1) An answer or information given orally by a person in response to a question asked under paragraph 2 or 3 may not be used in evidence against the person in criminal proceedings. (2) Sub-paragraph (1) does not apply— (a) in the case of proceedings for an offence under paragraph 18 of this Schedule, (b) on a prosecution for perjury, or (c) on a prosecution for some other offence where, in giving evidence, the person makes a statement inconsistent with the answer or information mentioned in sub-paragraph (1). Failure to comply with paragraph 5 is an offence under paragraph 18 (1) A person commits an offence if he— (a) wilfully fails to comply with a duty imposed under or by virtue of this Schedule, (b) wilfully contravenes a prohibition imposed under or by virtue of this Schedule, or (c) wilfully obstructs, or seeks to frustrate, a search or examination under or by virtue of this Schedule. Once they're arrested on suspicion of this offence then they are entitled to free and independent legal advice under section 58 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. | Defendants in the US would be charged with racketeering, not bribery, since government officials were not bribed. The DoJ indictment against Webb et al. is here: most of the defendants are not citizens of the US, though none are listed as being government officials. DoJ could certainly seek an indictment of ministers, senators or presidents of foreign countries. If said official were in the US on an ordinary passport, they could be arrested. They also might be arrested by e.g. Argentinian policy and extradited to the US, but whether that would be legal depends on the country (some countries don't extradite their own citizens; there would have to be an extradition treaty between that country and the US). It is inconceivable that any nation would hand over a sitting president because of an indictment by the US, and generally unlikely for any government official, but the official could be locally deposed first. But whether a government would do this is basically a political question, not a legal one. | As far as I know, the leading case on the matter is Hale v. Henkel, 201 US 43. There, the court explains While an individual may lawfully refuse to answer incriminating questions unless protected by an immunity statute, a corporation is a creature of the State, and there is a reserved right in the legislature to investigate its contracts and find out whether it has exceeded its powers. There is a clear distinction between an individual and a corporation, and the latter, being a creature of the State, has not the constitutional right to refuse to submit its books and papers for an examination at the suit of the State; and an officer of a corporation which is charged with criminal violation of a statute cannot plead the criminality of the corporation as a refusal to produce its books. The court specifically denies that corporations have 5th Amendment rights: The benefits of the Fifth Amendment are exclusively for a witness compelled to testify against himself in a criminal case, and he cannot set them up on behalf of any other person or individual, or of a corporation of which he is an officer or employe. This contrast with protection against unreasonable searched of corporations, per the 4th Amendment: A corporation is but an association of individuals with a distinct name and legal entity, and, in organizing itself as a collective body, it waives no appropriate constitutional immunities, and, although it cannot refuse to produce its books and papers, it is entitled to immunity under the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures, and, where an examination of its books is not authorized by an act of Congress, a subpoena duces tecum requiring the production of practically all of its books and papers is as indefensible as a search warrant would be if couched in similar terms. Similarly, in Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, the constitutional privilege against testifying against himself cannot be raised for his personal benefit by an officer of the corporation having the documents in his possession. ... An officer of a corporation cannot refuse to produce documents of a corporation on the ground that they would incriminate him simply because he himself wrote or signed them, and this even if indictments are pending against him. Likewise, United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 ("The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is essentially a personal one, applying only to natural individuals") and Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85: Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination held not available to member of dissolved law partnership who had been subpoenaed by a grand jury to produce the partnership's financial books and records, since the partnership, though small, had an institutional identity and petitioner held the records in a representative, not a personal, capacity. The privilege is "limited to its historic function of protecting only the natural individual from compulsory incrimination through his own testimony or personal records." So only natural persons can plead the fifth. | John Edwards was charged and acquitted on similar facts. Note, though, that Cohen isn't being charged with unduly influencing the election. As far as campaign-finance laws are concerned, there's nothing wrong with influencing an election by paying hush money to a candidate's side piece. Instead, the law simply asks that you disclose the money you spend when you file your campaign finance reports, and it prohibits direct corporate contributions to a campaign, as well as individual contributions in excess of $2,700. Cohen went wrong by coordinating his work with "Individual-1" to help his campaign by providing valuable legal services and paying hush money to "Woman-1" and "Woman-2" without the campaign paying for it and without the campaign disclosing it. Had Cohen been on the campaign's payroll, and had the hush money come out of the campaign treasury, and had the campaign disclosed it all on their campaign-finance reports, I think he would not be in any legal trouble (although there is the tax evasion, too). I think it's probably safe to say that campaigns make these types of payments to people with damaging information somewhat frequently, and they don't get in trouble because the money comes from campaign funds (why would you want to go out of pocket, anyway?) and they report the expenditures as required. Because the campaign-finance laws are so loose, "disclosing" the expenditure isn't going to give anything away, because you can basically just say "$100,000 to Stephanie Clifford for personal services." | The policy of the Justice Department is that the President of the United States can not be indicted. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-russia-indictment-explainer/can-a-sitting-us-president-face-criminal-charges-idUSKCN1QF1D3 All federal prosecutors are part of the Justice Department and that means the guidelines for them say it is prohibited. There is not an actual law saying you can or can't indict the president. The idea is that impeachment is the right way to handle presidential wrongdoing, because the president shouldn't be distracted and he could be charged after leaving office or if he was impeached. The president can be investigated though and some have. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-03-13/trump-nixon-five-times-the-fbi-went-up-against-the-president/9539192 | Mrs. X is under investigation for an alleged crime (say, embezzling from her employer). Prosecutors have obtained a search warrant and seized her computer. X's attorney files a motion arguing against the validity of the computer search, and a court date is selected for a hearing before a judge. At that hearing, the prosecutor requests that the courtroom be closed to the public Search warrants Search warrants are generally issued ex parte (i.e. without an adversarial hearing) and are routinely kept secret until they have been carried out. Targets of search warrants are often, but hardly always, the subject of criminal investigations. Search warrants can only be issued upon a showing a probable cause to believe that the search will reveal evidence pertinent to a crime that has been committed. If a search warrant is issued wrongfully, the remedies are a motion to suppress illegally obtained evidence, and/or a civil lawsuit for money damages, after the search has been completed. Conceivably, a search warrant target could argue that the affidavit providing a basis for the search should continue to be kept under seal, but, unless this was necessary for a grand jury investigation to continue in secrecy, this request would usually be denied. Subpoenas A subpoena does not require a showing of probable cause to issue and can be contested before documents are turned over pursuant to it by the person to whom it is directed (and sometimes other people as well), but a subpoena is rarely issued to an actual target of a criminal investigation. A prosecutor can usually maintain secrecy by conducting an investigation through a grand jury which has subpoena power. Protecting the privacy of a subpoena target would not be a valid reason for closing the courtroom. But a prosecutor's desire to not tip off other subjects of the grand jury investigation, which a public hearing on quashing a grand jury subpoena might do, would be a basis for a valid request from the prosecutor to close the hearing to the public. Have any of X's rights been violated? No. There is a constitutional right of the public and the press to attend court hearings in most circumstances. There is no constitutional right to not have your reputation tarnished by criminal prosecutors in the course of a criminal investigation. Also, generally speaking, prosecutors have absolute immunity from liability for any conduct they commit in the course of a courtroom process. Did she have any right to not have her name tarnished before enough evidence was gathered to even charge her with a crime? No. Similar arguments were soundly rejected by an appellate court panel, for example, in the classified documents criminal investigation of former President Trump. | It would not prohibit Colorado from passing the law, but it could prohibit implementing the law. SCOTUS rulings (Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486; Term Limits, 514 U.S. 779) establish that neither Congress nor the States can require additional qualifications of federal candidates beyond those listed in the Constitution. The relevant question is whether a law imposes an additional "qualification" on a candidate for president. Every state imposes at least one requirement on a person seeking to be a candidate on the ballot in a state: they must somehow "register" as a candidate. So the Qualifications Clause is not interpreted to mean "anybody can run for president as long as age and natural-born". The Anderson-Burdick doctrine allows certain kinds of requirements to be imposed on candidates, namely those that relate to a state's interest on properly managing elections. A no-felon law would clearly go way beyond the accepted state interest (regarding management of elections) reflected in Anderson-Burdick, and would be found to be as unconstitutional as requiring a candidate for president to have a law degree, or prohibiting a candidate from having a law degree. |
Can a president be evicted from the White House? Currently, there are impeachment investigations going on for the POTUS. Lets say the POTUS is formally impeached and Trump is removed from office. However Trump refuses to leave the White House on claims that the "witch hunt" impeachment is false and not legally valid. Is it possible to remove the President from the White House by force? | If the Senate has convicted by the necessary majority, Trump would no longer be the President - Mike Pence would be. There is no legal difficulty in removing ordinary citizens from the White House. Of course, President Pence might decide that he didn't mind ex-President Trump remaining in the White House, and I think the law enforcement agencies would be obliged to respect that. | Yes. The President can pardon everyone (with the possible exception of himself) of crimes, and can pardon people by category rather than by name. But, the President can only pardon federal crimes that have been committed and are mentioned in the pardon. However, the federal crimes do not have to have resulted in convictions or even charges to be pardonable. Many mass pardons of this type were made after the U.S. Civil War. Another notable mass pardon was of draft dodgers after the Vietnam War was over by President Carter. The President cannot (in the opinion of many, it hasn't been authoritatively resolved) pardon himself. The President cannot pardon a state or local crime or a crime against the law of another country. The President cannot use the pardon power to eliminate the right of one person to sue another person. The President cannot pardon a crime that was not committed at the time that the pardon was issued. | Impeachment of a president does not on conviction automatically disqualify the convicted party from becoming president again. However, after conviction, the Senate can vote to add to the punishment of removal from office "disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States." This requires only a simple majority vote. Does impeachment by the House of Representatives, with or without subsequent removal from office by the Senate, actually disqualify one from being re-elected to the same Presidential office? See above. It requires impeachment by the House, conviction by the Senate, and a separate vote by the Senate to impose the punishment of disqualification. It's conceivable that the Senate could disqualify the convicted party only from becoming president, though it looks like in the two prior instances where this punishment was imposed it was the broader disqualification. But if a person disqualified only from being president is in an office that would normally be in the line of succession, that person is simply omitted from the line of succession. This happens routinely with naturalized citizens, and there's no reason to think it would be any different for a former president who had been disqualified only from the office of the president after being convicted on articles of impeachment. | Willfully telling an untruth or making a misrepresentation under oath is perjury; the reason you do so or the substance of it is irrelevant. It is the act of perjury itself that is an offense and led to the impeachment. | The question actually asked, "what legal theories would support or harm...", is somewhat unclear. But what the questioner seems to be asking is, basically, what would happen if you tried it? The answer, it seems to me, is pretty straightforward. In the hypothetical case, you have been publishing a notice for years, saying "I have not been served with a subpoena." You then get served with a subpoena that includes a gag order. The gag order, presumably, includes wording prohibiting you from revealing the existence of the subpoena. You then cease publication of the warrant canary. By doing so, you have revealed the existence of the subpoena, and you are in violation of the gag order. You will be subject to whatever penalties you would be subject to if you violated it in some other way; for example, by publishing a notice that said, "Hey! We got a subpoena! It's a secret!" The distinction between revealing the existence of the subpoena by action, rather than by inaction, is a false one. It's exactly the kind of cutesy legal formality that non-lawyers love to rely on, but real judges ignore. If you tell someone: "Hey, you know John Smith's three sons, Joe, Ted, and Bill? Joe and Ted are good people; they have never molested any children. As for Bill--well, I don't have anything to say about Bill." If Bill is not a child molester, you have defamed him, and you are not going to convince a judge otherwise. The EFF link you link to tries to claim it'll "work" because courts are reluctant to enforce speech. Even if that were true, that might mean your canary would be effective in the sense of giving the public notice of the subpoena. That doesn't mean you wouldn't be liable for giving the public notice. For example: I put up a billboard saying "Bill Smith is a pedophile." Even if the court can't force me to add the word "not", that doesn't mean the billboard isn't defamatory. Realistically, though, courts compel speech all the time. Court-ordered apologies, disclosures, and notices are not unusual. And if ever a court would be inclined to compel speech, it would be in a situation like this one, where a company intentionally set out to get around a gag order with this kind of convoluted sea-lawyering. | The DoJ under the executive branch has attorneys, judges are under the independent judicial branch. US attorneys serve at the pleasure of the president, so in the worst case they can be fired and some were by the previous administration. It is common for US attorneys to resign at a change of administration, but an administration can press for resignations as in the 2017 dismissal of Obama appointees (where some "solicited" resignations were not accepted). Ultimately the attorney can be fired, as Geoffrey Berman was (fired for different reasons). | Anyone can meet with anyone to discuss impeaching POTUS – it happens all the time. Senators are not under any special First Amendment disability that prohibits them from talking on that topic. "Meeting to discuss" sometimes "convening a session to officially debate an action". The House impeaches, the Senate convicts, so Senators do not debate or "discuss" a motion to impeach. There are (were) private discussions regarding procedure, and it is reasonable to assume, regarding the substance of the charges. The Senate is allowed to set its own rules, so if the Senate wants to conduct an impeachment behind closed doors, it can. Treason is if one, owing allegiance to the United States, levies war against them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason What you describe is politics, which is legal. | There is no general legal obligations be truthful Such an obligation only arises where specifically called out by law or where there is a relationship of trust between the parties, e.g. they are negotiating a contract, they have a doctor-patient relationship etc. In any event, the President has legal immunity for actions performed as President. Presidents answer for their misdeeds at the ballot box, not the courthouse. |
Conflict between a religious belief that accounts for the existence of transgender people vs. one that doesn't Country: US State: Michigan Example: Ann belongs to a denomination that accepts the existence of transgender people as what they claim they are. Ann starts a company that grows to over 25 employees, at which point the company must follow EEOC regulations, which include nondiscrimination on the basis of religion. Then let's say a different Christian, Christine, applies for a job at Ann's company. Christine previously worked for a Christian organization that belongs to a denomination which believes that transgenderism is against God. When Ann sees this past experience on Christine's resume, she immediately excludes Christine from consideration for employment. If Christine wanted to sue Ann's company, would she have a case? Let's assume that Ann gave written evidence to Christine that she was excluded because of her past religious work - clearly, few employers would be stupid enough to do this, but let's grant that assumption for the purposes of this question. How would the law settle a dispute like this - one that is between two Christians with divergent beliefs. | The law doesn't distinguish between two Christians with divergent beliefs, or between an atheist and a Christian (obviously with divergent beliefs). The law simply does not care what religion you have, or whether you have one. The law just says "follow the law!". The complication is that part of the First Amendment which says that the law is to be neutral as to religion also has what's known as the "Free Exercise Clause", the part that says "or prohibiting the free exercise thereof", which has been taken to refer to actions undertaken because of that belief. There have been various rulings on the conflict between religious doctrine and laws requiring or prohibiting certain actions (mandatory flag salutes, conscription, religious pamphleting). When a law conflicts with a fundamental right such as a right protected by the First Amendment, such a law is allowed only in narrow circumstances (known as strict scrutiny). It is up to Congress to state what kinds of First Amendment-based exceptions there are to laws. In a case involving the draft, SCOTUS held in US v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 that The test of religious belief within the meaning of the exemption in § 6(j) is whether it is a sincere and meaningful belief occupying in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualified for the exemption This view underlies the current regulation on employment and religious discrimination in 29 CFR 1605.1 that In most cases whether or not a practice or belief is religious is not at issue. However, in those cases in which the issue does exist, the Commission will define religious practices to include moral or ethical beliefs as to what is right and wrong which are sincerely held with the strength of traditional religious views. The question that EEOC or the courts would have to answer is, what fundamental life belief is being violated by compelling a certain action? Forcing Muslims to eat pork violates a fundamental belief of Muslims. Prohibiting Muslim employers from discriminating against pork-eaters does not violate those beliefs, because there is no fundamental life belief held by Muslims that it is a mortal sin to hire pork eaters. In this case, Ann is at a disadvantage because she can't maintain that being forced to hire Christine violates a fundamental belief of hers (it's like refusing to hire pork-eaters). If Christine was obnoxious in espousing her viewpoint in a manner that reflected badly on Ann's business, Ann can fire Christine. Ann might, on those same grounds, refuse to hire Christine if there was a well-justified belief that such damage to her business will result (you don't have to wait until your business is destroyed). The (implied) fact on Christine's resume is not sufficient evidence that Christine will cause a problem for Ann's business. Instead, it is a plain instance of religious discrimination, which is prohibited by law. | In the case of the US, the only anti-discrimination laws that would cover an event is the Civil Rights Act of 1964, under the rubric "public accommodation", in Title II. But that law does not prohibit sex discrimination. The extent of "public accommodation" is not clearly defined, but generally is held to be about "a place", and would include "entrance into this facility". It might be illegal in California, though, since the Unruh Civil Rights Act is more generic, not excluding sex on this point. The main issue would be whether this organization is a "business". | In this case the Plaintiff, James Maloney, has previously been charged with a crime for possession of nunchucks. He is apparently suing to enjoin further enforcement of the law under which he was previously charged. US Federal courts will only take up a "case or controversy", which means an issue where actual, not theoretical rights are at stake, and in order to vindicate a constitutional right, it must either have previously been violated, or there must be a plausible and immediate threat to it. Claiming that a law is unconstitutional as part of a defense to a charge of violating that law is a common and probably the best known method of challenging a law (or a government action) for unconstitutionality. But there are other ways. One way is to apply for an injunction against enforcement of the law. That is the procedure that was followed in, for example, the recent case where there was a ruling against the ADA in a district court. In order to use that procedure, the plaintiff must present evidence that there is a credible threat that the law will be invoked against him (or her) if the action which the plaintiff claims is protected by a constitutional right is taken. In short, one need not put oneself in a position where one goes to prison or is found guilty of a crime if one loses the case to challenge the constitutionality of a law or of a government policy or action. But one must establish that it is a real "case or controversy", with real parties in opposition to each other, and real rights at stake, not a mere law student's exercise, nor a collusive case, with both "sides" having the same actual goal. In the case reported, the previous criminal charge helps to establish that this is a real issue. | Excluding "ridiculously unacceptable conditions", it is legal to have "non-uniform" contract terms (where a company treats different classes of individuals differently), provided that the basis for distinction is not statutorily prohibited (race, religion, age, sex... depending on jurisdiction). There is a extremely slim chance that apparently legal income-discrimination can be a proxy for another form of illegal discrimination. However, "ridiculously unacceptable conditions" are unlikely to be found to be enforceable, regardless of any demographic properties associated with the condition. E.g. a clause requiring the surrender of a first-born female child would be unenforceable as "unconscionable". The specific circumstances surrounding such a finding by the court can't easily be summarized, since it relies heavily on prior case law, statutes, and legislative declarations. The underlying premise behind using the doctrine of unconsionability in such a case is that the clause in question is not something that a reasonable person would agree to, but they have no power to disagree. In the US, the case Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture is the leading case on this view. The clause in question was about a payment plan for furniture and the condition that no furniture could be paid off until all of it was. The consequence of the clause was that all of the furniture could be repossessed if any payment was missed, regardless of how much had already been paid. Various factors went into the court's ruling (that the condition was unenforceable), such as "absence of meaningful choice", "terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party", :gross inequality of bargaining power". In the circumstance that you allude to, it is not obvious that the courts would follow Williams in making their ruling – it would depend on the extent to which one could reasonable conclude that the customer understood and freely accepted the term. There are upper limits on what a court can enforce, so a contract requiring a party to commit suicide would be utterly unenforceable (in most countries), and a contract requiring a party to break the law would be likewise. | Your bank is not discriminating against you. Your reasons for not having the required amount of funds pass thru your account has nothing to do with your marital status. In general, it's problematic to make a chain-of-cause-and-effect argument for discrimination. For example. Your argument is analogous to the following. My boss fired me for being late to work. But I was late to work because my child woke up late and missed the school bus; so I had to drive her to school. Therefore, my boss fired me for having children. That type of chain-of-cause-and-effect argument for discrimination just doesn't hold water. It is non sequitur and a requires a leap of logic. | Federal law isn't yet settled on whether employers can discriminate based on sexual orientation (see the other answer), so instead let's take a look at Michigan state and local laws: Based on my reading of this Wikipedia page, it appears that the 1967 "Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act" (pdf) has, as of 2018, been interpreted by the Michigan Civil Rights Commission to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. So, yes, if the company qualifies (looks like there are some exceptions for certain "private clubs" and religious organizations), it appears to be a violation of Michigan law to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation for hiring and/or employment decisions. I'd also encourage you to take a look at this list of Michigan cities/municipalities that have passed additional protections for gender orientation. If your business is any any of those areas, you might be subject to more restrictive laws. Regarding an employee who refuses to work with a gay coworker, I'd strongly recommend consulting with a local attorney; my suspicion is that taking action against the gay coworker would be illegal, firing or disciplining the complaining employee would not. (I'm not an attorney, this is not legal advice, I'm just a dude who knows how to read Wikipedia, don't taunt Happy Fun Ball, etc...) | Maybe I'm reading Walsh wrong, but it seems to me to be saying that Stout might apply in some cases, but it doesn't in that specific case. I think you are indeed reading it wrong. In the Walsh case, the court says: We have not had occasion to decide the question up to this time, but now that it is presented, we not only reiterate the doubt which we expressed in the McAlpin case (supra), but we think that the question of the defendant's negligence was erroneously submitted to the jury in the Stout case, and that we ought not to follow it as a precedent. It's clearly repudiating Stout here, and not just as it applies to that case. It literally says they think it should not be followed as precedent. | The employer might be liable for a discrimination claim, under the doctrine of disparate impact. See Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. The Inclusive Communities Project, Inc and references cited therein. The idea is that an employer can be liable absent proof of intentional discrimination when a practice disproportionately affects protected classes of individuals, and the practice is not justified by reasonable business considerations. So it would depend on why this particular state of affairs in employment came about. There is a test known as the 80% rule which attempts to quantify the notion of "under-representation" as evidence of discrimination. This test (not widely respected by the courts these days) might constitute evidence of discrimination, if a protected class is demonstrably under-represented. The current standard seems to be by comparison to random selection. In EEOC v. Sambo's of Georgia, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 86, the court found that a grooming policy had a disparate impact on members of a religion (Sikhism), and was thus contrary to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, although a requirement to shave does not obviously discriminate on the basis of religion. This points to an important element of a successful disparate impact claim, that there has to be a policy with a causal effect. In the above scenario, there is no proposed policy that has this effect. Note that the burden of proof is on the person suing for relief – they must have a theory of something the company does that causes this hiring pattern, a practice that is discriminatory. The identified policy (whatever it might be) could be justified by a business necessity defense (Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424), by showing that the practice has a demonstrable relationship to the requirements of the job. That, b.t.w., would not excuse a racially or religiously discriminatory hiring policy for a factory manufacturing menorahs or kinaras. If a company recruiting locally in Boise ID had a 75% black work force, it would be reasonable to suspect that something was up. But legally, without showing that this results from a unjustified policy of the company, mere statistically anomalous distribution is does not sustain a claim of discrimination. |
Freelance and taxes for under 18 I'm 17 years old and I live in Azerbaijan. I've been working as a freelancer for about 2 months. Do I have to pay taxes and do I have the right to work for money? | The English version of the taxman's web page does not indicate any specific exemption or reduction of taxation due to being under 18, however provision 102.3 says that The monthly taxable income of disabled people of I and II groups (except for veterans of war), persons under age of 18 with limited levels of health from any type employment shall be reduced by the amount of 200 manats. Provision 106.2, about exempt income says that Income tax rate for production enterprises owned by public organizations of disabled people, or children with limited levels of health shall be reduced by 50 percent if not less than 50 percent of employees at such enterprises are disabled people, or persons under age of 18 with limited levels of health. These provisions imply that it is legal for people under 18 to work. The Azerbaijan Labor Code section 42(3) says A person who has reached the age of fifteen may be a party to an employment contract. and 58(6) says that Employees under age of 18 may be allowed to hold multiple jobs if their total daily working hours do not exceed the reduced work hours provided for them in Section 91 hereof. which again implies that those under 18 may work for money. There are a number of other provisions that address employees under age 18. A freelancer is not an employee, so the labor code is technically not applicable to you, but it suggests that it is legal to freelance if you are under 18. Usually, restrictions are placed on people working for others and it is assumed that people can be self-employed relatively freely. One would have to hire a lawyer to be sure, though. | They provide a snail- and e-mail way to end the contract here. This will not eradicate the €50 that they say you owe, but you can sort that out separately. That email address might also respond to inquiries about the validity of the charge. At any rate, they also give a link to online dispute resolution per Art. 14, para 1 of the EU Online Dispute Resolution Regulations. GDPR does not give one the right to be deleted so as to avoid an existing liability. | Yes it is kind of possible what country would the legal action need to originate from? Would one file in the US and note the foreign defendant or would one file, as a foreigner, in the home country of the defendant? You can go either way. It is not obtaining the judgment that is the biggest trouble here, but enforcing it. You will need: A UK mailing address. Services like ScanMyPost will suffice. Some money to pay the court fees. Time, tenacity and patience to follow through the procedure and fill all necessary forms. Be lucky in that the defendant actually has something to pay the debt with. There are two stages: Obtain a court judgment in your favour. Unless the defendant pays you, enforce the judgment. Obtaining court judgment in the UK In the UK, the "small claims court" functions are executed by HM Courts & Tribunals Service. The specific service is called "Claim for money" which can be filed online via their old or new system. So, basically, you file the online form, pay the fee by credit card and wait for defendant's response. If they do not respond, you ask the court to make a judgment (in my case it took 10 weeks from filing claim to getting judgment). If the defendant responds and defends themselves, expect much longer wait and uncertain outcome. Enforcement So, you and the defendant have both received court judgment saying that they must pay you. But they are not paying. There is a range of options you can choose from: County Court Warrant of Control (claims from £50 to £5,000). Court bailiff will go to the defendant's address and try to seize goods that can be easily sold. High Court Writ of Control (claims from £600). Attachment of earnings order (you ask the court to order the defendant's employer to deduct his earnings in your favour). Third-party debt order (a.k.a. "Garnishee Order") — if you know the defendant's bank account details. Read about potential pitfalls here. Charging order: you will only get paid if the defendant sells their land. Bankrupt the defendant (big court fees!). Alternatively, you could always hire a UK lawyer but then you would probably not need this answer. | As Putvi says, you are being extorted and this is a criminal matter and thus a matter for the authorities in your jurisdiction. However, you have a second problem entirely apart from that - you almost certainly broke academic ethical rules by submitting a piece of work that you did not write as your own (these things are pretty cut and dried in academic circles). This will not go away. Regardless of whether your extortionists are brought to justice, they can still release your details at any point in time and ruin your career, or it can come out in other ways. Own up to this with your university as soon as possible, and see if you can make it right. This will be hanging over you for the rest of your life, and can drop at any moment - these sorts of things have ruined people before. | What's the worst that can happen? If you do nothing, it's a bit inconvenient. If you delete all that company's stuff, who knows what they could sue you for. I'm not saying they would be right, but being sued can be expensive, no matter whether you are wrong or right. Send a letter by registered mail, with a witness to the contents, that you are the only one with admin rights to these sites, and asking them how they would like to take over these sites, and informing them that you will delete anything on your personal email after a reasonable time if you don't hear from them. And since anything you do is work for you, you should expect some appropriate compensation. Deleting their property, even if it affects you, is risky. | If you are on Tier 4 (students on full-time degree), you have more restrictions besides the number of hours. One of this is no self-employment (which includes freelance and consultancy or creating your own company). | You are mistaken: The U.S. governments (both federal, and states that impose income tax) assert a right to tax both: Income earned within their jurisdiction (e.g., "on their soil"), and Income earned by citizens (or residents, in the case of states). So it is perfectly legal for a resident U.S. citizen to operate a foreign business entity, earn profit, pay himself, and even bank the money overseas. However, a resident in such a situation would be in violation of tax law if he failed to report his interest in the foreign entity and his earnings, as prescribed by the IRS, on his tax filings. | Look at the form letters from the consumer advice center, e.g. Lower Saxony. Keep in mind that the entity may be allowed/required to keep some of your data. Anything that impacts their taxes, for starters. And your information/deletion request might also have to go on file, to mirror their record of a before-due-date deletion. |
How to find/choose a criminal lawyer in another state? I am seeking an attorney, in a state other than my own (in the USA), to provide me with guidance in the area of criminal law. (I have some specific questions.) How might I go about finding such an attorney other than look at ads? What might indicate a really knowledgeable criminal attorney? First update: 1. What type of work experience might indicate a really knolwedgeable criminal law attorney. For example, one attorney has 10 years experience as an Assistant United States Attorney. Is that a big plus or a Ho-hum? (Such information is available on https://www.justia.com/lawyers.) 2. Is there any value to such designations as "super lawyer": https://attorneys.superlawyers.com/ Second update: 3. Super doctor/lawyer websites seem to be a scam, per these reviews: https://www.propublica.org/article/top-doctors-award-journalist https://abcnews.go.com/Health/top-doctor-awards-deserved-abc-news-investigation/story?id=16771628 Third Update: 4. One comment said there was a legitimate ranking site for lawyers: https://chambers.com Unfortunately, it seems not to rate criminal law attorneys: https://chambers.com/research/practice-area-definitions-usa 5. These two sites say that "super lawyer" sites are a scam: https://www.larrybodine.com/lawyers-cheering-the-uncloaking-of-bogus-accolades http://www.abajournal.com/news/article Fourth Update: 6. This site rates attorneys and seems legit: https://www.avvo.com/ | The ABA has aspirational rules for lawyer referral services. The rules include having a method for handing complaints from consumers and requiring that all lawyers on their panel be in good standing and have malpractise insurance. Regarding qualifications - The service must establish subject matter panels and establish minimum requirements for eligibility. The number of subject panels necessary will vary from service to service depending upon the needs of the community served. Requirements for eligibility should include sufficient experience to ensure that the lawyer is qualified in the field of practice. The service should require proof of compliance with the requirements so established, which may include certification in affidavit or affirmation form. You might ask any referral organization you contact how and to what extent they comply with these aspirational rules that are full of "shoulds". It may be that any attorney who is not under any disciple at the moment can get on their list. | The evidence will almost certainly be inadmissible And, of course, you will be disbarred and never work as a lawyer again, you might also go to jail for attempting to pervert the course of justice. Whether the person is convicted or not will depend on the strength of the other evidence the state has. In the notorious case of Lawyer X, Nicola Gobbo was acting as a barrister for a number of Melbourne underworld figures while simultaneously acting as a police informer. A number of those convicted have successfully appealed their convictions on the basis that they didn’t get a fair trial. In their judgement on AB (a pseudonym) v. CD (a pseudonym); EF (a pseudonym) v. CD (a pseudonym) [2018] HCA 58 the High Court said: But where, as here, the agency of police informer has been so abused as to corrupt the criminal justice system, there arises a greater public interest in disclosure to which the public interest in informer anonymity must yield. EF's actions in purporting to act as counsel for the Convicted Persons while covertly informing against them were fundamental and appalling breaches of EF's obligations as counsel to her clients and of EF's duties to the court. Likewise, Victoria Police were guilty of reprehensible conduct in knowingly encouraging EF to do as she did and were involved in sanctioning atrocious breaches of the sworn duty of every police officer to discharge all duties imposed on them faithfully and according to law without favour or affection, malice or ill-will. As a result, the prosecution of each Convicted Person was corrupted in a manner which debased fundamental premises of the criminal justice system. | No Besides this being clearly unworkable, the requirements for the state providing public defense attorneys include being in need (you will need to provide an affadavit or similar to the effect) and when the defendant is at risk of significant time of confinement. The 5 to 15 minutes of the traffic or Terry stop are not considered significant. Nor are the processing times of arresting you and taking you in. Trying to make the officer provide you with an attorney (or declaring you aren't doing anything without one) before complying with their orders may well result in your incarceration and subsequent assignment of a public defender. | Is there a bright line / contours as to what constitutes practicing law? For the most part, no. There are some activities that clearly constitute the practice of law almost everywhere (e.g. representing someone in a court proceeding), and there are some activities that clearly do not constitute the practice of law almost anywhere (e.g. preparing your own tax return based upon your interpretation of the tax laws). There are many activities that are in gray areas and the definition varies from state to state. For example, analyzing deeds to determine who is in title to real estate on a commercial basis is considered the practice of law in New York State, but not in Colorado. What are the elements ('litmus tests') to recognize practicing law As applicable to the example in the question (there are an infinite number of possible situations so a full treatment is too broad), evaluating the law for purposes of guiding your own actions is generally not considered the practice of law. An individual can represent themselves in any court proceeding to which they are a party (although usually they can't represent entities that they own) without practicing law. Similarly, the Community Association Manager has to make one decision or another, and the law (outside of court proceedings) rarely requires that one hire a lawyer simply to make a decision that you are required to make in the course of your job. Consulting a lawyer increases the odds that the CAM will make the right decision, but interpreting the law as it applies to what you personally are required to do in carrying out your job responsibilities will very rarely constitute the practice of law. On the other hand, if someone who was a former Community Association Manager held himself out as a "consultant" for current Community Association Managers, and in the course of that consultant work told Community Association Managers what the law required them to do, this would very likely be the practice of law, because it applies legal knowledge to particular facts for someone other than yourself. The term "attorney" in its broadest definition means someone who takes action on behalf of another, and if someone is doing something on behalf of another, and it involves legal knowledge or a legal dispute, usually this will be found to constitute the practice of law. | There is no direct equivalent to the American-style plea bargain, but there are some similar procedures: Basis of Plea A defendant can offer a written guilty plea to a lesser offence with the same (or closely similar) facts as the offence charged, which has to be accepted by the court to take affect. The prosecutor must consult with and seek the views of all victims, and if the plea is accepted it must not be misleading or untrue. The Attorney General's Guidance provides more information on the process and the detailed requirements (which are too long to repoduce here). Assisting Offenders The Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 offer the option for a "minor-player" defendant to assist the prosecution and/or police by providing information to secure convictions of the principle offenders in return for immunity from prosecution (section 71), a restricted use undertaking (a version of immunity) (section 72) or a reduced sentence (section 73). Immunity requires full and frank disclosure of all previous offending (referred to as "cleansing"), but for whatever reason the defendant does not "cleanse" they may still be eligible for a lesser sentence. Either way the assistance - either as evidence at trial or as intelligence given in confidence - should be substantial and verifiable to be eligible. Statistics There is, as far as I can, no publicly available detailed statistics on these procedures, presumably the reason is that vast majority of the former cases go unreported and, despite some being public, there is a real risk of retribution to the informant in the latter. | I'm not familiar with the lawsuit, but generally speaking, a court's finding that a lawyer falsified evidence would not directly result in the lawyer being disbarred, as the trial court does not have authority to regulate the practice of law. Instead, a court that reached that conclusion -- either by a verdict, or because a judge was persuaded by the evidence without reaching a verdict -- would likely report that outcome to whatever organization is responsible for licensing attorneys in that jurisdiction. | Would a U.S court honor his request, based on his prior commitment? You are not specifying the purpose of the court hearing, or whether Adam is pro se litigant (which sounds unlikely if this plaintiff is a movie star). If plaintiff Adam is represented by an attorney, Adam's presence is unnecessary in most or all court hearings. In fact, typically neither parties nor their lawyers have to show up in court, whence their absence does not constitute contempt of court. Absence merely implies that they miss the opportunity to [orally] argue their position before the court, and thus would depend on whether the judge bothers to actually read their brief. If you mean a hearing in which Adam needs to be present, his request to reschedule the hearing is most likely to be granted. His contract is strong evidence that his request is not a vexatious attempt to delay proceedings. Since the hearing would be in month 4, the particularity that his contract goes up to month 4 implies that rescheduling would not significantly delay proceedings. Regarding your comment, rescheduling can (and does) happen multiple times even in criminal cases. This post includes an excerpt of the Register of Actions of criminal case 16-870-FH in Michigan state court (Washtenaw county), highlighting several instances of rescheduling as requested by the defense counsel and despite prosecutor's objection. I believe the case got rescheduled a few more times beyond what the snapshots reflect. | There are great jurisdiction by jurisdiction differences in the statutes of limitations that apply to crimes. Some jurisdictions have no statute of limitations for any serious crime (e.g. Canada and if I recall correctly Virginia). Others have statutes of limitations for almost all serious crimes other than murder (e.g. Colorado). Where there is a statute of limitations, the primary issue is that the ability of the prosecution and defense to secure reliable evidence that will allow a jury to enter an accurate verdict. This potential to conduct a fair trial can be compromised by a delay in pressing charges. Alibi witnesses can die or disappear to someplace that they can't be located, the location of the alleged crime can change in ways pertinent to proof, memories of witnesses in general can fade. Records or correspondence that could show intent can be destroyed. This is particularly a burden for an innocent criminal defendant who did not know that he or she needed to prepare a defense and gather evidence to respond to criminal charges. Some states toll statutes of limitations during a period of a victims minority or incapacity when brining charges may not be feasible. Other states have a long statute of limitations in rape cases where there is DNA evidence available that can conclusively tie a defendant to the scene of the crime (lack of consent would still have to be established), but a shorter statute of limitations in other rape cases. Murder and fraud are the most common offenses to lack a statute of limitations, in the first case, because it is considered the most serious crime and because the victim is unable to report the crime, and in the latter case, because fraud, by its nature and by the perpetrator's design, may go undiscovered for very long periods of time. Is there a line of reasoning to decide which classes of crime have a limited window for prosecution? While I've given some examples of the considerations that apply, ultimately, this is a legislative and political decision and not a legal one. You can't determine by reason alone which classes of crimes will have a limited window for prosecution. Different legislative bodies make different decisions on the same issues at different times and in different places. |
Aliens voting in Federal elections I've read that a Federal law prohibits non-citizens from voting in Federal elections. I'm not a lawyer, but from reading the original Constitution and all the amendments, I don't see anything that empowers Congress to enact such a law. I would have thought that allowing resident aliens to vote would be up to the individual states. What is the Constitutional basis for this law? | TL;DNR: Madison, Hamilton, Justice Harlan & Justice Scalia agree with you. Justice Black does not. You raise an interesting question. As you point out, the Qualifications Clause, Art I, § 2.1, (those who vote for the House of Representatives “in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature”) gives states the power to establish voter qualifications. Yet 18 U.S.C. § 611, passed as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, (the IIRIRA) makes it illegal for most aliens to vote in federal elections. What gives? First, the IIRIRA is purely symbolic. It literally has no effect on who can vote in the US. For almost a century, every state has prohibited aliens from voting in state elections. Under the Qualifications Clause, this means no aliens can vote in federal elections. (Before WWI, many states allowed aliens to vote.) Second, some people argue Congress has control over voter qualifications under the "Elections Clause," Art. I, § 4.1, which gives Congress the power to regulate the "Times Places and Manners of holding elections." Like Dale M, these people read, "Manners of holding elections” to include the qualifications for voting. This reading of the Elections Clause is inconsistent with several of the sources of constitutional authority Americans typically consult, including the text, the intent of the Founder and precedent. All of these support the “Qualifications Clause” reading of the Constitution. 1) Constitutional Text: Reading the Elections Clause as giving Congress control over voter qualifications, renders the Qualifications Clause almost completely meaningless. Yet everyone agrees the Constitution should be read so that all its parts mean something – no part should be rendered superfluous. 2) Intent of the Founders: When the Founders debated voting qualifications, they were clearly worried that politicians would manipulate the electoral rules to favor them. The Founders believed the Qualifications Clause kept both national and state politicians from stacking the electoral deck. First, by giving the power of deciding who could vote to the states, the Clause prevented national politicians from choosing their own electorate. Secondly, by requiring the states to use the same qualifications for voters in state and national elections, the Clause prevented state politicians from manipulating the rules in national elections. As for the Electoral Clause, in Federalist 60, Hamilton was clear who controlled voter qualifications: “The qualifications of the persons who may choose or be chosen…are unalterable by the [federal] legislature…” 3) Precedent and practice: For most of our history, people acted consistently with Hamilton’s statement. They tolerated a wide variation in who was allowed to vote across states. As noted above, many of those states specifically allowed aliens to vote. (And, starting in 1787 with the passage of the Northwest Ordinance, Congress passed a series of laws allowing aliens to vote in territories.) When Americans did make nationwide changes to voting qualifications, they did so by amending the Constitution. There are only a handful of Supreme Court decisions involving federal control over voting qualifications. In 1970 the Supreme Court upheld a federal law changing the voting age to 18. The opinion of the Court, written by Justice Black, relied on the Elections Clause to say that Congress had the power to change voting requirements. None of the other Justices shared Black's views on the Elections Clause. Instead, they agreed with Justice Harlan, who said, “nothing” in the Constitution, “lends itself to the view that voting qualifications in federal elections are to be set by Congress.” (These Justices used the Equal Protection Clause as the basis for federal control over voter qualifications.) Since then, no Justice has followed Justice Black. Instead, they have followed Justice Harlan. For example, in 2013, Justice Scalia, (in an opinion joined by Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan, Kennedy, Roberts, and Sotomayor) said, “the Elections Clause empowers Congress to regulate how federal elections are held, but not who may vote in them.” From this evidence, I’d say you were right to be puzzled about the constitutional authority for the IIRIRA. A federal law preventing aliens from voting in federal elections undermines the text of the constitution by rendering the Qualifications Clause superfluous, goes against the clear intent of the Founders, and is inconsistent with 200+ years of history and precedent. It only survives because it has no practical effect on voting in the US. | No, it means the following are eligible: Natural born citizens Citizens of the United States, at the time of the adoption of the constitution The second part was to allow people that were citizens of the US in 1788 (but were obviously not "natural born citizens", since the US didn't exist when they were born) to be eligible for the Presidency. Check out Alexander Hamilton's draft of this clause: No person shall be eligible to the office of President of the United States unless he be now a Citizen of one of the States, or hereafter be born a Citizen of the United States. | There is arguably a legal right to non-citizen nationality either by statute or under customary international law, but the U.S. Constitution does not afford such a right and Article I, Section 8 grants Congress broad authority over the governance of such territories and over immigration and naturalization (i.e. to define citizenship beyond the minimum established in the 14th Amendment). | Only the currently unmarried may lawfully marry in the US US laws generally prohibit a marriage if either person is currently in a valid marriage to a third person, whether in the US or anywhere else. If a current marriage is valid it must be ended by divorce or in some other lawful way before a valid US marriage can occur. Marrying in the US while already married to another person is the crime of bigamy, and will also render the later marriage invalid and void. All this is true regardless of immigration status, it would be true for citizens, green-card holders, holders of any visa type, and undocumented people. No one may contract a marriage while currently married to someone else. I believe this is true in all US states and territories. Committing the crime of bigamy could possibly have negative impact on the immigration status of a non-citizen, in addition to potential criminal penalties. I am not sure why you would think it might be OK to proceed with such a marriage without first obtaining a divorce, annulment, or other lawful termination of any existing marriage, inside or outside the US, but it is not. | The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution does not prohibit people with no affiliation with the government from trying to convert people to their religion in a way not endorsed by a government official or agency. It could be that there is some content neutral prohibition on strangers accosting young school children if that person is so persistent that it amounts to content neutral harassment, or that the person might actually be a sex offender prohibited from contacting children. But, the facts of the question don't seem to compel this conclusion. Even if it violates any law to do this, it is not a violation of the U.S. Constitution. | You are subject to the laws of the jurisdiction that you are in. However, some of the laws of the jurisdiction you reside in or are a citizen of have extra-territorial applicability, so you have to comply with those laws too. | This document from the Michigan Sec'y of State says that "A US citizen who has never resided in the US and has a parent, legal guardian or spouse that was last domiciled in Michigan is eligible to vote in Michigan as long as he or she has not registered or voted in another State". You then use the Federal Post Card Application or the Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot, which you can get here. | Citizens likely have an absolute right to enter the US. This hasn't been addressed directly by the Supreme Court, but here are some cases that come close. The Fifth Circuit, in William Worthy, Jr. v. US, 328 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1964): We think it is inherent in the concept of citizenship that the citizen, when absent from the country to which he owes allegiance, has a right to return, again to set foot on its soil. The Supreme Court, in Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS 533 U.S. 53 (2001) said that conferring citizenship on a person would give "the absolute right to enter [the US]". This wasn't necessary for the holding in this case, which was about whether the person was a citizen, so this could be considered dicta. Fikre v. FBI, 23 F. Supp. 3d 1268 (D. Or. 2014). (not an appellate case) said: U.S. citizen’s right to reenter the United States entails more than simply the right to step over the border after having arrived there. At some point, governmental actions taken to prevent or impede a citizen from reaching the [border] infringe upon the citizen’s right to reenter the United States. Even if we assume that citizens do not have an absolute right to re-entry, the Equal Protection Clause likely bars a religion-based criteria for citizen re-entry. Citizens are protected by the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. This prohibits the government discriminating based on a suspect classification (race, religion, national origin) unless such law passes strict scrutiny. Without making a prediction about whether such a hypothetical statute could pass strict scrutiny, I'll go as far as I can and strongly guess that the government could not prohibit citizen re-entry to the United States based solely on their declared religion. |
Is it illegal for a family member to keep a U.S. certificate of naturalization or passport from its adult owner? In the U.S. is it legal for a family member to withhold certificate of naturalization & passport from another legal adult? What can be done to retrieve the documents? | If the passport that was stolen is a U.S. one, you should report it by any of the channels outlined on the State Department's page Lost or Stolen Passports. The paper-reporting option is via form DS-64, which asks, among other things, whether you filed a police report; so it might be good to do that first. Form N-565 is a similar form for requesting the reissue of a naturalization certificate, and it, likewise, asks about any police report. Withholding someone's ID documents, knowing that they are necessary for travel, would be "false imprisonment" under both state and federal statutes. Also, 18 USC §§1426 and 1427 cover the crimes of "Reproduction of naturalization or citizenship papers" and "Sale of naturalization or citizenship papers"; a 10-year felony for a first offence. "Whosoever unlawfully ... disposes of a ... certificate of naturalization, ... shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ... 10 years (in the case of the first or second such offense, if the offense was not committed to facilitate such an act of international terrorism or a drug trafficking crime)," If the police take your report but don't scare the possessor of your documentation into immediately returning it, you could sue him or her for the actual expenses of obtaining replacements in Small Claims court. If the mispossessed passport causes big enough damages, I guess you could sue in any court that has jurisdiction. | You don't need to "report" it to anyone in the US or do anything else. The US doesn't have any national registry of marriage. Any marriage or divorce conducted anywhere in the world is automatically recognized anywhere in the US (with some exceptions like polygamous marriages); the same is true in many other countries. How does the U.S. find out, for tax or insurance purposes? Obviously there's a little box that says [] Married but how would they know if I lied if I'm not registered in the United States? They don't, and don't need to. (The same is true for marriages in the US -- they don't directly "know".) You are required to use an appropriate filing status for your marriage status at the end of the year for each year's tax returns. If you don't, you are committing fraud. There are lots of things that you can intentionally lie about on tax returns, and they may not immediately "find out"; but when they do, you are in big trouble. Am I legally required to report it when I return? No. Would the Canadian/provincial government inform the U.S./state government? No. | Children own their personal property Although legal guardians may place limits on access or use. Unless the aunt is a legal guardian she has no right to retain them. Ask for their return. If she refuses, sue for their return. | One official form of ID should be enough. Two pieces of ID is more than most people ever carry. And not selling to you because you’re black would be illegal discrimination. But that would be hard to prove. The most likely explanation is stupidity. Or lack of training. Might be an employee who is already deep into overtime, or just not mentally present. Some people go on auto-pilot and if you showed them an age card that isn’t accepted that’s fixed in their brain. Or maybe the passport photo doesn’t look like you. If it is an unusual form of ID like a 100% valid Japanese driving license, or a damaged passport, or a library card, those might be reasonably rejected. The best course of action would be to ask for the manager. The manager should either be able to give you a sensible reason why your passport is not acceptable, or give you the goods. And if not, your case for illegal discrimination is much stronger if a supposedly competent manager refuses to serve you. (Reading the other answer: Obviously if you are too young to buy the item, which is not true in your case, then showing 100 legal IDs wouldn't get you the item. And if you look so young that a reasonable person would think it's more likely that your ID is an excellent forgery than you being 18, they could deny the sale). | Citizenship is essentially an imaginary label that sovereign states assign to people to say "this person is one of us". How those imaginary labels are granted, recorded, proved, maintained etc. is up to the sovereign state to decide. I assume that citizenship is any time period in which all officers of a given state would agree to issue identification documents for that human. Not accurate. Identification documents simply identify persons. They may or may not convey information about citizenship. Some (like driver's licences) do not. Other (like alien's passports) explicitly mean that the holder is not a citizen of the issuing sovereign state. Conversely, having troubles to get a passport does not necessarily mean that the person is not a citizen. In some circumstances it may be difficult to prove citizenship (e.g. emigrated as an infant with no birth record), and court proceedings may be needed to convince the authorities. | I have never heard of anything like this. I guess when you say "registered in that place" you are referring to Russian resident registration. The US doesn't have such a system, so this sort of certificate wouldn't even make sense. | In general, in the absence of a reason to the contrary, an individual parent can consent to medical care for the parent's child, even if the other parent wouldn't have agreed to it. This is where to begin the analysis. Often, when parents aren't married there is a custody decree from a court that spells out who does and does not have custody of a child with respect to issues like medical care, but it does not appear that this is the case here. The way paternity law works is that there are certain circumstances which cause someone to be presumed to be a parent until disproven (a couple of which are conclusive presumptions that can't be overcome with facts at some point), but a lack of a presumption doesn't mean that you aren't a parent, just that it is harder to prove that you are a parent. Someone who is, or is presumed to be, a parent, continues to be a parent until that status is legally terminated (usually in a legal proceeding, but sometimes by operation of law). Since you are an actual parent, you continue to be a parent and have that authority, until that status in terminated for purposes of the law or until a court order limits your parental authority. A lack of a father's name on a birth certificate does not create a presumption that a child does not have a father or that you are not a father, although the name of a different man on a birth certificate does create a presumption which can become conclusive at some point, that the person named on the birth certificate is the father. Often this presumption becomes conclusive after five years, although I haven't (as I write this) confirmed that this is the case in New York. It isn't clear from the question if there is a different man named as a father on the birth certificate although it sounds as if it simply fails to name any father. And, often paternity petitions are disfavored or disallowed once a child turns eighteen for at least some purposes. A written acknowledgement of paternity delivered to the appropriate vital statistics record keeping office can establish paternity if not contested. The standard version of this form must be signed by both parents, in each case before two witnesses. The extent to which you are acknowledged as the parent of the child by the mother and others, and the extent to which you are involved in a child's life is also relevant to legal paternity, because a termination of parental rights can proceed in the absence of showing these things. The fact that the child share's your last name and that you are actively involved enough in the child's life to make it seem unlikely that this could be established even if a proceeding was brought, and in the absence of a formal termination of parental rights proceeding, you would not normally have your legal status as a parent terminated. So, probably, you are legally the child's parent whose authority is not limited by any custody decree, and therefore, you are entitled to authorize a vaccination. But, for a wide variety of reasons, it would be prudent to have your paternity formally established under the law if you are going to have an ongoing involvement in your child's life. Also, as DaleM notes, if you have the child with you, even if you are not the legal parent, you would usually be considered "in loco parentis" and have the authority to do this even in the absence of actual paternity. | Per Art 12(6), they are allowed to ask for additional identify verification: where the controller has reasonable doubts concerning the identity of the natural person making the request referred to in Articles 15 to 21, the controller may request the provision of additional information necessary to confirm the identity of the data subject. Additionally, Recital 64: The controller should use all reasonable measures to verify the identity of a data subject who requests access, in particular in the context of online services and online identifiers. A controller should not retain personal data for the sole purpose of being able to react to potential requests. There is no consensus regarding what this means in practice: Must the controller use all measures that they can be reasonably be required to use? Or only those measures to verify the identity to a reasonable level of certainty? I agree with you that asking for a passport is excessive, and that email verification would be sufficient. However, that is just my personal opinion. The GDPR can also be interpreted in a way that asking for a copy of your passport is OK. Where they process a copy of your passport, that is personal data as well. You also have data subject rights with regards to this processing, for example the right to be informed of the purpose of this processing and of when the data will be deleted. If it is only used for the purpose of verifying your identity, the copy of your passport should be deleted immediately afterwards. The data controller may have additional obligations because a passport or ID card is a very sensitive document. E.g. Art 87 allows member states to impose additional rules. Most sensible controllers will therefore want to avoid processing passports, unless they only operate in specific EU member states. |
Trademark: "Lyft" and acquired dictinctiveness I want to understand why "Lyft" was trademarked for "transportation of passengers by motorized vehicle". When Lyft Inc originally filed for "Lyft" trademark in 2012 (serial# 85/743120), the use was essentially restricted to a computer and telecommunication service. Then Lyft Inc filed another application in 2014 (serial# 86/183891) for use in "transportation of passengers by motorized vehicle". This time, the attorney's response was that (1) the mark is not "merely descriptive of the identified services" and (2) "the mark has acquired distinctiveness among consumers". Said application was approved by USPTO. Obviously Lyft had a very good attorney at that time, and the first argument (which was fairly well written) was probably enough to convince the examiner. Still, I am bugged by the second point. Under the trademark law, shouldn't be mark have been used for at least five (5) years before acquired distinctiveness be claimed? My question is, is a five-year period an absolute minimum for acquired distinctiveness, or do examiners make exceptions to such rule? | I supposed the five year requirement you referred to follows from U.S.C. § 1052(f): The Director may accept as prima facie evidence that the mark has become distinctive, as used on or in connection with the applicant’s goods in commerce, proof of substantially exclusive and continuous use thereof as a mark by the applicant in commerce for the five years before the date on which the claim of distinctiveness is made. It only relates the "five years" requirement to "accept[ing] as prima facie evideice." It does not say that dictinctiveness cannot be acquired before a trademark has been used for less than five years. | Is there any consumer protection against the manufacturer repeatedly replacing items under warranty until the customer simply gives up? There are two implied warranties that people should knno about - fitness for a particular purpose and merchantabilty. You are concerned with merchantability. The implied warranty of merchantability basically says that goods are reasonably fit for the general purpose for which they are sold. If something keeps breaking it is not merchantable (generally). The warranty of merchantability is found in the Uniform Commerical Code and in Texas' Business and Commerce Code. Both at Section 2.314. You can read it, it is not very long, but one important part is, "fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used." This is an implied warranty, which means it is automatic unless disclaimed. Some states prohibit sellers from disclaiming implied warranties; Texas is not one of them (no surprise there). 2.316 is where we find out how to disclaim the warranty. This is how to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous 2.316 also says Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that "There are no warranties which extend beyond the description on the face hereof." So a buyer needs to see if the seller and the manufacturer both disclaimed the implied warranties. If so the buyer is going to be limited to the expressed warranties. If they did not disclaim then the remedy is to return the item and get the money back. So yeah, this is like a lemon law for stuff. There is a requirement that the seller be a "merchant with respect to goods of that kind." That just means that the buyer didn't buy shoes at a car dealer. That it was the seller's business to sell the thing. A last note on this. Implied warranties differ from state to state as to who they can be applied against. 2-318 offers three options. Texas chose option 3 - which means that the courts decide if the buck stops at the retailer or if it extends to the manufacturer. This chapter does not provide whether anyone other than a buyer may take advantage of an express or implied warranty of quality made to the buyer or whether the buyer or anyone entitled to take advantage of a warranty made to the buyer may sue a third party other than the immediate seller for deficiencies in the quality of the goods. These matters are left to the courts for their determination. In other words, unless the implied warranties were disclaimed by both the retailer and the manufacturer, the buyer can go after either for the refund. And what is cool1 is that a 2013 Texas Supreme Court case found that a buyer of a used engine has a claim against the manufacturer. MAN Engines & Components, Inc. v. Shows. This is different because some states require privity of contract - meaning that only the original buyer can exercise the warranty and they can only exercise against the seller. EDIT 2.316(c)(2) says when the buyer before entering into the contract has examined the goods or the sample or model as fully as he desired or has refused to examine the goods there is no implied warranty with regard to defects which an examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed to him This basically says that if you know about the defect you waive the implied warranty. There are two ways to look at this. The first way is that the first defective item is the "the goods or the sample or model" that you have now inspected, so you now know about the defect, and if you buy another you are buying it with defects revealed which waives the warranty. The other way to look at it is that you do not know that the first one is representative of all the products so it is not until you get the second, or third, that the defect with the goods or the sample or model is representative of all the products, and that it is not until you have this knowledge that the defect is "revealed." In other words, it depends. 1Cool for consumers, not manufacturers. | There is ample reason to conclude that "non-commercial" would include a church, as well as advocating a political cause or candidate. The hard part of "personal". In the context of (Canadian) bankruptcy law, it can mean "non-business use"; in the context of "personal use property", it can be "A type of property that an individual does not use for business purposes or hold as an investment. In other words, property that an individual owns for personal enjoyment". US tax law takes "personal purposes" to refer to non-business purposes. But in the context of copyright (especially music downloading / copying), it is taken to refer to the use of or by an individual. Distributing free copies of a protected work does not get legally sanctioned due to the copying being non-commercial. The alternative term "private" is much clearer, in identifying "just you", but is probably avoided in this kind of context so as to avoid the wrong inference that you can only play Pokemon in the privacy of your own home. So the slightly less clear term "personal" is used instead of "private" especially in copyright-related contexts. "Personal" and "private" are not exactly the same, but when it's about use, I don't see any difference, and I think there is no question that use to attract to a church or political candidate is not "private", it is public. Since the license does not define "your own personal purposes" and there is not an existing crystal-clear definition of "personal purposes", the phrase could be given its "ordinary (plain) meaning". Of course, plain meaning has to give way to contractual intent, so we have to figure out what the parties intended. Except, you don't have a contract with Niantic, but still, plain meaning surely has some place in the law of licenses. At this point, in a lawsuit, both sides would hire an expert witness like a linguist or English teacher to make the case that a church or other non-commercial non-private use is / is not included in the meaning of "personal purpose". A silly argument could be made to the effect that if you personally have an interest in doing something then it is a personal purpose (if specifically commercial, it would be precluded by the term "noncommercial"). What makes this silly is that everybody does things for personal purposes (even acting in a way that benefits others, since you do so for the personal reason that you should do so), and thus "personal" would not mean anything. That is, "personal purposes" does not mean "whatever motivation or interest you personally have". You can also gain a certain understanding of what "personal purposes" means by looking at similar licenses. In the context of academic publishing, authors are typically granted license to copy "for personal, professional, or teaching purposes". Professional purposes and teaching purposes are things that the person has an interest in, so by mentioning these things separately, we must conclude that "teaching" is not a "personal purpose". And so: I would conclude that a court could find that using a product to support a political campaign, philosophy, or religion, is a "public" purpose, not a "personal" purpose. At the same time, at least as I understand it, a lure module is a thing that others besides yourself personally can see (I admit, I don't go), which implies that the purpose of the thing is not entirely private. In addition, there is a fair amount of buzz out there about how a lure could be good for business, which is (1) clearly in contradiction of the license terms and (2) clearly a golden opportunity for Niantic, perhaps in a few weeks after everybody gets hooked and then they will offer non-personal licenses. Their license terms also say that you will not "use the Services or Content, or any portion thereof, for any commercial purpose or for the benefit of any third party or in a manner not permitted by these Terms". I would say that that definitively says "No don't do it", and it also means that you can't be nice to a neighbor. So what they literally say and what they really intend are probably completely different things. | "LearnIT" and "Learn it" are both descriptive, and thus are generally weak trademarks. It is not unlikely that a challenge would result in cancellation of any trademark on either, or in allowing a similar trademark in an unrelated category of business. For the matter of that, you don't seem to have determined whether the other company is making any trademark claims. In some countries there is no trademark protection unless a mark is registered. In others, including the US, use without registration can create some protection for a mark. It will also be relevant where the other company is doing business, and where you plan to. Trademark protection is always specific to a particular country, and generally requires proof of use in commerce in each such country (or of a plan to start such use in the near future). Domain registration is a different thing, and is not necessarily tied to a trademark (although registering a domain that infringes an existing trademark will often be disallowed). It appears that "learnit.net" is listed as available. That does not mean that a dispute filed by the other company would not be successful. The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) states in section 2 that: By applying to register a domain name, or by asking us to maintain or renew a domain name registration, you hereby represent and warrant to us that (a) the statements that you made in your Registration Agreement are complete and accurate; (b) to your knowledge, the registration of the domain name will not infringe upon or otherwise violate the rights of any third party; (c) you are not registering the domain name for an unlawful purpose; and (d) you will not knowingly use the domain name in violation of any applicable laws or regulations. It is your responsibility to determine whether your domain name registration infringes or violates someone else's rights. If you register a domain name, and another person or firm complains that the name is "confusingly similar" to an existing name or to a valid trademark, you might be required to participate in an arbitration proceeding under the UDRP, or else forfeit the registration. Note that nothing happens if no one complains. Section 4(s) of the policy reads: You are required to submit to a mandatory administrative proceeding in the event that a third party (a "complainant") asserts ... that (i) your domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and (ii) you have no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and (iii) your domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith. In the administrative proceeding, the complainant must prove that each of these three elements are present. "Bad faith" can be shown by evidence that you obtained the domain for purposes of selling or renting it, not for use; that you intended to prevent a valid trademark owner from obtaining the name, and have engaged in a pattern of such conduct; that your purpose was to disrupt the business of the other; that you intended to attract users who were looking for the other site. The page "What Are 'Look-Alike' Domain Names?" states: An essential element of any domain name dispute is whether the domain name bears some important resemblance to a relevant trademark. The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) refers to this as the “identical or confusingly similar” test. In many cases, a disputed domain name actually contains the trademark, and in other cases it may contain a typographical variation of the trademark (such as by omitting a single letter; transposing two letters; or substituting one letter for another, often adjacent to it on a keyboard). Yet in other cases, a disputed domain name may simply look like the trademark at issue, even if the domain name doesn’t contain the trademark or fall into any of the popular cybersquatting tricks described above. I refer to these simply as “look-alike domain names.” You may wish to determine if the operator of the learnit.com site has in fact obtained a trademark on "learn it". Most national trademark systems provide a means to search the trademark registers. This will not be conclusive, but may give a reasonable idea. One option is to consult a lawyer skilled in trademark law. Another might be to reach out to the exposition firm and ask if they would have any objection to your proposed blog. If they don't object, the will be no problem. Another option is to choose a domain that is not as similar to that of the existing site. One technique that can help avoid an accusation of bad faith is to provide an notice where someone first opening the blog site will see it, something like: This is XY.net. You may have been looking for XX.com,which is about {short description} If co, click here. with a link to the other site. Such a notice might help establish that you were not using the domain to improperly attract traffic looking for the other site. | The question is always, would a reasonable customer be confused into thinking that the two are the same, or that there is some relation or sponsorship or attribute to one product or firm the rightful reputation of another. That is always dependent on the specific facts and the specific market involved. So-called "famous" marks get extra protection. The exact markets involved will matter. Any stylizations such as colors and typefaces may matter. Logos may matter. I can't say if one of those specific names would be found to infringe on the other. | No However, there are laws against misrepresentation. If you use the expression ‘Houston Bar’ for something not made or associated with Houston you may be violating these. In addition, the World International Property Organisation recognises geographic identifications which have the effect of law in many jurisdictions. These are a subset of US trademark law. | The Kentucky restriction against "hit and run" is KRS 189.580, which says that The operator of any vehicle, whose vehicle…is involved in an accident …shall immediately stop and ascertain the extent of the injury or damage and render reasonable assistance Notice that the legal requirement is for the operator to do something: the law requires nothing of the vehicle itself. Supposing that you are correct that the vehicle was operated by someone who hit and ran, then if the police gain suspicions that such is the case, and if those suspicions are reasonable, then then could obtain a warrant to obtain evidence from the vehicle, which could be used against the operator. The fact that you (might) now own the vehicle would not transfer legal responsibility to you – responsibbility goes with the actor, not the instrument. | It is not required. The companies undoubtedly prefer that you include those designations, and they may even write to say that you should, but that is just them doing their due diligence in policing their brands. In the instances you cited, there is probably some agreement between those companies to include those markers. If you don't have such an agreement, there is no obligation to notify the users of your website that some third party has trademarked a name that you mention. |
Is process service on an old address valid? Pick your favorite jurisdiction in the U.S. Hypothetical Facts A wants to serve B with a complaint and notice to appear in court. The address on B's ID card is address C. B does not live at nor have any contact with anyone at C. (And hasn't for several months.) A serves court papers for B at address C via process server who rings the doorbell and when an adult answers the door, hands the service paperwork to adult D. Question Is A's service of B valid? | Under Fed. R. Civ. P. One can be served according to the state law or: (2) doing any of the following: (A) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual personally; (B) leaving a copy of each at the individual’s dwelling or usual place of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there; or (C) delivering a copy of each to an agent authorized None of those would apply to your facts. Thus you would have to find some jurisdiction that would allow service of process under your fact. I dare say that none will and that due process would come into play. In NJ, due process applies and service may be made (1) Upon a competent individual of the age of 14 or over, by delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to the individual personally, or by leaving a copy thereof at the individual's dwelling place or usual place of abode with a competent member of the household of the age of 14 or over then residing therein, or by delivering a copy thereof to a person authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process on the individual's behalf; It has to be the current place of abode. | The location of your residence entrance is irrelevant for the law, what matters most is your "street address", i.e. mailing address. That is the address (therefore city) that you use for voter registration, and basically how you identify "where I live". If you lives 5 miles out in the country in an unincorporated area, you'd still use Needles (e.g.) as you mailing address: but you would not be able to vote for a mayor of Needles, just based on your mailing address. Both municipalities might claim jurisdiction based on the physical location of the property, especially for matters of building code. It should not be possible for both municipalities to tax the full value of your property, but they could split the assessment proportionally. The cities themselves are not collecting the tax, the county is (though property straddling a county line raises an interesting question). | This is a matter of state law, and so could in theory vary from state to state. But I think that in most, if not all, US states, a public utility like a water or electric company must take any customer unless they have a history of unpaid bills or the like. They don't have to lay new pipes or run new wires to bring service to you if it is at a location not previously served, however. In the Maryland code, § 7-307 ( Termination of service to low income customers) provides: (1) Subject to paragraph (2) of this subsection, the Commission shall adopt regulations concerning the prohibition against or limitation of authority of a public service company to terminate service for gas or electricity to a low income residential customer during the heating season for nonpayment. (2) In adopting the regulations required under paragraph (1) of this subsection, the Commission shall consider and may include provisions relating to: (i) the circumstances under which service may and may not be limited or terminated; (ii) the minimum heating levels required to maintain life, health, and safety; (iii) the medical, age, disabling, or other individual characteristics that are relevant to a prohibition against or limitation on the termination of service; (and other provisions) That the Public Service Commission is empowered, and indeed obliged, to issue binding regulations on when service may be terminated might imply a duty to provide service in the first place, but that is not as clear as I would like. I know that in practice a utility runs a credit check and may demand a deposit if the results are not satisfactory, but I do not see a law compelling that behavior. It may be in regulations adopted by the commission. | I gather that the numerous ramifications you outline are merely contexts and that your main concern is about the application of contract law (contract law in the U.S. does not really vary among states). Thus, I will not really delve in the intricacies of --for instance-- privacy or copyright issues arising from the commercial use of a person's likeness that you mention in one of the scenarios. As a starting point, one needs to bear in mind that: a contract is an exchange of considerations under terms and conditions entered knowingly and willfully by the parties, which can be evidenced by the parties' subsequent conduct (that is, not just by signing a document); and a contract is unenforceable if it contravenes public policy and/or the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Accordingly, the questions are (1) whether a person knew or reasonably should have known about the terms & conditions at or by the time of those events which trigger obligations pursuant to the contract; and (2) whether the provisions therein are unreasonable, illegal, or tantamount to a penalty, especially in the event that the party breaches or repudiates the alleged contract (see the Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 356(2)). The scenario of house for sale entails various difficulties as per contract law and otherwise. Here are some of those issues: Are visitors properly (including "beforehand") notified about the "walkway clause"? If not, the contract is void because it cannot be said that visitors knew about & accepted that condition. Does the house provide alternatives for lawful & informed visitors to safely avoid the walkway? If not, then the seller/owner might end up incurring premises liability with respect to those visitors who get injured in making their reasonable effort not to trigger the "walkway clause". Is the house owner realistically able to prove that use of the walkway by lawful & informed visitors is sufficiently "inconsistent with the offeror's ownership of offered property" so that triggering a house sale is a reasonable consequence (see Restatement at §69(2))? Is the owner-imposed mortgage rate compliant with state law pertaining to granting of credit & loans? These exemplify only some of the burdensome complications when trying to enforce "contracts" which are extravagant or quite one-sided. Lastly, as a side note, the presumption that a person reading the poster and walking in the intended area does not thereby receive consideration is not necessarily accurate. As an example, the "intended area" could have been devised by an entity in the business of enjoyment and recreation, such as a private park. The person who deliberately walks in (regardless of whether he read the poster) certainly receives a consideration, which is the amusement or recreation for which the park was designed. | Wave Broadband is a private company; they can probably decide to not provide service to an address that is in arrears or collections. I'm sure there is a clause in their service contract that states they can do that, and there would be local or state laws to support that. Whatever public service commission governs the state may also allow that. It's possible that Wave is breaking the law by denying service to a whole address, but doubtful. You can check with the state level public service commission. | Yes 15 USC 1501, which is part of the Lanham Act, the basic US trademark law, provides in subsection (a)(2) that: (2) The application [for registration of a trademark] shall include specification of the applicant’s domicile and citizenship, the date of the applicant’s first use of the mark, the date of the applicant’s first use of the mark in commerce, the goods in connection with which the mark is used, and a drawing of the mark. This clearly implies that the applicant may have a citizenship other than US, or else ther ewould be nbo point in specifying the citizenship in the application. subsection (e) of the same section provides, in relevant part: If the applicant is not domiciled in the United States the applicant may designate, by a document filed in the United States Patent and Trademark Office, the name and address of a person resident in the United States on whom may be served notices or process in proceedings affecting the mark. This makes it cleat that an applicant need not be resident in the US., 15 USC 1141a provides that: (a) In general The owner of a basic application pending before the United States Patent and Trademark Office, or the owner of a basic registration granted by the United States Patent and Trademark Office may file an international application by submitting to the United States Patent and Trademark Office a written application in such form, together with such fees, as may be prescribed by the Director. (b) Qualified owners: A qualified owner, under subsection (a), shall— (b)(1) be a national of the United States; (b)(2) be domiciled in the United States; or (b)(3) have a real and effective industrial or commercial establishment in the United States. 1141a (b2) and (b)(3) make it clear that an applicant need not be a national (citizen) of the US. The USPTO's page "Trademark FAQs" lists under the heading "General - Trademark Help - Getting Started - Other" the following Q&A: Must I be a U.S. citizen to obtain a federal registration? No. However, your citizenship must be provided in the application. If you have dual citizenship, then you must indicate which citizenship will be printed on the certificate of registration. | No. Refusing to tell the address alone is not a reason to detain somebody. But there are situations where the authorities can demand that a person identifies himself or herself, including such details as the address (or lack of a permanent residency). In such a situation, failure to identify yourself can get you locked up. Also, the tone of your posting seems to question the legitimacy of the UK government and legal system as a whole. That is a box you're putting yourself into, and the company you find there is not very pleasant. | A contract need not be written to be valid and enforceable. However, if there is no written contract, then in a dispute the burden of proving (via a preponderance of evidence) a contractual obligation falls on the party asserting it. In the scenario you describe it sounds like that would be impossible for the processing company. |
Got a ticket in Quebec for violating pedestrian red light. Name spelled wrong Last year, I got a ticket from the police for violating a pedestrian redlight signal. They issued the ticket to me but spelled my name wrong. I emailed them to fight it in court, and now they have just sent it to my address for a hearing date. Should I go? Since the ticket is not issued in my name, I feel that it is not applicable to me. | Whatever crime or infraction you are charged with, it applies to you personally however they spell your name and however you spell your name. Whether or not you should go depends on the alternative that you face (large fine or jail time for failure to appear?). An argument that you didn't commit the offence because they misspelled your name would hold zero water. | Yes A police officer (or other emergency service driver) will turn their lights and siren on as soon as they have a need to do so. This may be in response to something they've seen or in response to an emergency call. Since you can't see and hear what they can see and hear this may seem sudden or arbitrary to you. Your obligations, as spelled out in the 2019 California Drivers Handbook (p. 74) are: Emergency Vehicles You must yield the right-of-way to any police vehicle, fire engine, ambulance, or other emergency vehicle using a siren and red lights. Drive to the right edge of the road and stop until the emergency vehicle(s) have passed. However, never stop in an intersection. If you are in an intersection when you see an emergency vehicle, continue through the intersection and then, drive to the right as soon as it is safe and stop. ... You have to get out of their way. However, they are still obliged to drive safely subject to the circumstances (e.g. that they are on the wrong side of the road traveling fast) and, in the event of a collision, you may not necessarily be at fault. | One issue is whether that left-turn (that's what it's normally for, not a u-turn) has a sign that allows u-turns. If it isn't marked, then I think these rules would control: U-turns are prohibited in these locations (from Oregon's DMV): Intersections controlled by a traffic signal, unless a sign permits the turn. Between intersections in a city. Any location within city limits where your vehicle cannot be seen by traffic coming from either direction within 500 feet. Any location outside city limits where your vehicle cannot be seen by traffic coming from either direction within 1,000 feet. At or on a railroad crossing. Any location where U-turns are prohibited by official signs or markings. I find them a little contradictory, but that may be because my state, California, is more permissive with u-turns. I also live in an area that's too crowded so it's easier to get the space and time to make a u-turn 'between intersections.' | Generally yes, but it depends on both context and jurisdiction. For example, if you arrived from a different street segment at 4-way stop at the same time as another car, and give a flash to indicate "go ahead," that by itself is not likely to be sustained as sufficient to justify a stop. If you come up close behind another car and flash your high beams as part of aggressive driving (e.g. message "get out of my way") then that may form a key contribution to a justification for pulling you over for aggressive driving. Many states also prohibit use of high beams when other cars are around because they have a tendency to blind other drivers (and blinded drivers are more likely to be in an accident), so if the officer observes you committing that offense it would be probable cause to pull you over for that. Here's an example from NY State where flashing high beams, alone, did not provide probable cause for an officer to pull over a vehicle. NY's law about high beams blinding other drivers specifies that the high-beams have to interfere with the other driver's operation of the vehicle for it to be an offense. See also citations near the end of this decision, which says: The Court of Appeals has indicated: "The mere flashing of lights, alone, does not constitute a violation of the statute (see People v. Meola, 7 NY2d 391, 397 [1960]; People v. Hines, 155 AD2d 722, 724 [1989], lv denied 76 NY2d 736 [1990]; People v. Lauber, 162 Misc 2d 19, 20 [1994]). Also, if you are flashing the police car, the officer may think you are trying to get his/her attention for some reason and that you are initiating a traffic stop. However, do be careful. This driver in Texas flashed his high beams at another car (which turned out to be a police car) because he thought the other car had its high beams on (the officer says it was just a new car; at least two other drivers had apparently flashed the officer for the same reason). The officer then applied the same law that driver was concerned about, forbidding the use of high beams that blind others. The driver was tased, shot, and killed as the officer applied the instant death penalty for his offenses, and the penalty was ruled justified. A dead driver cannot practically contest that stop later on, even though the family might try. See also Headlight Flashing: Legality on Wikipedia. | I think you have understood it correctly. And the diagrams make things clearer as to why, when you are intending to use an exit other than the first exit, it is better to enter the two-lane roundabout via the left lane. The reason is because if you are in the right lane and do not exit, you must be alert to the need to yield to left-lane traffic that might be exiting. Using the left lane when you have planned ahead-of-time that you will not be using the first exit helps avoid a potential yield situation. The guide seems to emphasize that the lane you enter is the lane you should stay in throughout and is the lane you should end up exiting from. This is clear from the diagrams showing that you can exit directly from the left lane (by crossing through the right lane on the way out); it's captioned "Vehicle H must yield to vehicle G." As far as I can tell, none of that is prescribed by regulation other than the requirement to yield to left-lane traffic. But the material in the guide might inform the standard of care (see also an Alberta example), and following the guide might be expected as part of a driving test. | It would not work. There is apparently a common misconception in Georgia that this would be the case, based on Article IX, Section II, Paragraph III (b)(1) of the Georgia constitution, which says: No county may exercise any of the powers listed in subparagraph (a) of this Paragraph [including police protection] or provide any service listed therein inside the boundaries of any municipality or any other county except by contract with the municipality or county affected. What many people miss is the clause right before that: "Unless otherwise provided by law." Georgia courts have held that the law does provide otherwise when pursuing someone for a traffic offense: The plaintiff contends that when the collision occurred, the policeman-deputy sheriff had no authority to be pursuing the Mitchell car because he was outside the county in which he had a power of arrest. While ordinarily a peace officer has power of arrest only in the territory of the governmental unit by which he was appointed, there are two exceptions to the rule present in this case. Code Ann. s 92A-509, which deals with arrests for traffic offenses, provides by implication that certain officers (including deputy sheriffs) have arrest powers for these offenses outside their appointed territories. City of Winterville v. Strickland, 127 Ga. App. 716, 718, 194 S.E.2d 623, 625 (1972). What that case decided in 1972, the principle was in place well before the boys began their hijinks. I don't know of any state where the law is different, though the answer would be different if the boys crossed into another state. | It is true that in the US, valid Federal law supersedes state law or regulation when there is a conflict. Precisely because of this, state laws and regulations are normally carefully written to avoid such conflicts. It is very unusual for a federal law issue to apply in traffic court. The question does not say what Federal law issue you think will apply to your case. Most issues where Federal law might plausibly affect a state court process, such as a fourth amendment violation on a search and seizure issue, would not apply in traffic court, although they might apply in a criminal court proceeding. Federal law does not generally deal with traffic issues, nor does it preempt state traffic laws, because there is normally no conflict. There is a group of people, who often call themselves "sovereign citizens" who have a habit of making wildly invalid legal claims, and trying to claim that much of the law does not apply to them. Such people often assert elaborate theories about why certain laws do not apply, not infrequently involving the Federal Supremacy Clause. Such claims are invalid, and will not be received well by a court. A claim that one travels by "conveyance" rather than by "car" and thus state laws do not apply is such an invalid claim. The argument made in this answer is such an invalid claim. Chapter 18 of the US code does regulate commercial vehicles to some extent. Therefore in that chapter "motor vehicle" does mean "commercial vehicle" because those federal regulations do not apply to private vehicles. This does not mean that state regulations that apply to private vehicles are preempted or otherwise invalid. If you think a Federal Issue will apply during a traffic court session, it would be wise to consult a lawyer in advance. Many lawyers offer free or low-cost initial consultations. If you think a relevant legal issue is not being addressed, politely, briefly, and clearly explain the issue that you think applies. Do not yell at the judge or other court personnel. Do not try to "make up your own rules". You will be given a chance to indicate your side of the issue. Response to recent edit, and related comments Without a record of the actual court hearing you describe, there is no way to determine if the judge was acting correctly or not. Even with the record there might well be no way to determine what the judge had in mind, or why s/he acted as s/he did. I maintain that any argument that state traffic codes are in fact preempted by federal law, or apply only to commercial vehicles, or that an ordinary personal car is not a "motor vehicle" because of a definition in Blacks or any other dictionary, is legally unsound and frivolous, and could well subject a person who makes it in court to penalties for contempt. A particular judge might not want to bother with the matter, of course. I think i have answered the question as asked, in a way likely to be most helpful to people in general. Others may have other views. | General Question Having an intention is never enough for punishments (both Strafe and Bußgeld) of the German state. But having an intention and be right at the start of doing the offense (details are complicated) is sometimes punished as an attempt of the offense (Versuch). This is defined in § 13 Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz (Act on Regulatory Offences). § 13 OWiG (= §§ 22-24 Strafgesetzbuch (Criminal Code)) (1) Whoever, in accordance with his understanding of the act, takes a direct step towards the realisation of the factual elements of the offence, shall be deemed to have attempted a regulatory offence. (2) The attempt may be sanctioned only if expressly provided by law. (3) If the perpetrator voluntarily renounces further execution of the act or prevents its completion, he shall not be sanctioned for attempt. If the act will not be completed without the contribution of the abandoning party, his voluntary and earnest efforts to prevent its completion shall be sufficient. (4) If more than one person participates in the act, the one who voluntarily prevents its completion shall not be sanctioned for an attempt. However, his voluntary and earnest efforts to prevent the completion of the act shall suffice if the act is not completed without his contribution or is committed independently of his earlier participation. If you started the offense but stopped, so you don't fulfill offense, you don't get sanctioned, if you stopped voluntarily (freiwillig), § 13 III OWiG. (The details are more complicated.) This may be the case in your example, but beeing seen by a police officer is no reason for Freiwilligkeit. So you may have attempted the offence. But an attempted offence gets only sanctioned if this is expressly provided by law, § 13 II OWiG. This is provided for no traffic violation. (But for some of the Straftaten in context of traffic, e.g. § 315b StGB Dangerous disruption of road traffic.) So the answer to your question is a clear: No Specific aspects of your case I have searched the norms for your case, a red light offence for cyclist: § 37 II Nr. 1, Nr. 2, Nr. 6 Straßenverkehrsordnung: the rules for traffic light § 49 III Nr. 2 StVO: declaring violations of § 37 StVO as regulatory offences (legal basis: § 24 I Straßenverkehrsgesetz) Nr. 132a Anlage 1 Bußgeldkatalog-Verordnung: sets 60 € fine for red ligth violations of cyclists (legal basis: § 1 I BKatV) Nr. 132a Anlage 1 BKatV: sets 100 € fine for red ligth violations of cyclists after at least one second Nr. 3.2.19 Anlage 13 Fahrerlaubnis-Verordnung: sets fine of one point in Fahreignungsregister (driving ability register) for these offences (legal basis: § 40 FeV) In none of these laws a sanction for attempt is defined. I'm not sure what you did after getting of your bike, you migth have violated the red ligth walking. For this you can get a 5 € fine (Nr. 130 Anlage 1 BKatV), strictly speaking not a Bußgeld (fine), but only a Verwarnungsgeld (warning fine). But the competent authority can but doesn't have to sanction the offence, § 47 I OWiG. So the officer just didn't gave you the warning and thought it is OK. |
Is the following nondiscrimination policy itself discriminatory against Christians? Country: US State: Michigan Situation: I work for a large employer in Michigan. We have over 10,000 employees total. My employer bans discrimination on the basis of an incredibly long list of characteristics, including sexual orientation and gender identity. It seems to me that they have crafted this policy specifically to keep Christians away by making the company unwelcome to us. Had they told me the policy before I was hired, I might have voluntarily withdrawn myself from the hiring process, and they could claim "not a culture fit". But doesn't their culture discriminate against Christian employees by being incompatible with Christian views? It would seem that: The policy named above, that bans discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity, discriminates against Christians who believe that deviant sexualities are against God. | What discrimination? As explained in Conflict between a religious belief that accounts for the existence of transgender people vs. one that doesn't the Constitutional protection of the Free Exercise Clause applies to the exercise of a deeply held belief (religious or not). So, let's accept that a person believes that certain sexual practices or gender identity is morally repugnant for whatever reason and that belief triggers the Constitutional protections. That means, that the person cannot be forced to engage in those sexual practices or adopt a different gender identity. It does not mean that they have a licence to discriminate against people who do in a work or public environment - they can, of course, choose to avoid such people in their private life. Alternatively, if the person believes that they are required by their faith to discriminate on the basis of those characteristics then such a belief does not get Constitutional protection as it is now affecting the rights of others. In the same way that someone who believed in human sacrifice would not get Constitutional protection. | Anti-discrimination laws only apply to people, see here – "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be otherwise subjected to discrimination under any program to which this part applies". Genetic information anti-discrimination laws are limited to employment and insurance, see here. In addition, I'm betting that your dog cannot meet the university admission standards (lack of a transcript is fatal to the plan). | It is discrimination. However, it is legal, and generally not grounds for a lawsuit. Discrimination is legal, except when it is based upon certain specific categories, such as race, sex, and religion. For example, it is perfectly legal to discriminate for a position based on the possession of education degrees, skill certification or availability to work specific hours or days of the week. Immigration status (and specifically, needing a H1B sponsor in the future) is not a protected category, and as such it is legal to discriminate against this as a factor. Additionally, there are several downsides for hiring a H1B candidate, and foremost of which is sponsoring someone for an H1B visa is not a sure thing, since the H1B system is run as a lottery; as such, you may not receive a visa or extension, and thus be ineligible to legally work. | I can't find any law that would prevent an employer from requiring this. Under current Florida law, an employer can even demand passwords and access to an employee's social media accounts. A bill was proposed to prohibit this, but it hasn't passed. Generally, an employer can require anything they want as a condition of employment, as long as it is not illegal. Florida has at-will employment so the employer could certainly fire the employee if they don't comply. | Article 15 of the Indian Constitution states that "The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex or any of them", thus a government hospital could not discriminate based on religion. There are also specific statutory non-discrimination mandates such as The Equal Remuneration Act 1976, The Maternity Benefit Act 1961, The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act 2016, primarily addressing matters of employment. The HIV/AIDS (Prevention and Control) Act prohibits discrimination based on HIV/AIDS status in the realm of employment, service accommodations, property rentals, and insurance. But India does not have a comprehensive law that outlaws discrimination on religious grounds that applies to private parties. The protection offered by law is solely protection against the government. | This potentially (i.e. almost certainly) runs afoul of laws against religious discrimination. However, you can have such a requirement provided you make an accommodation for those with sincerely held religious beliefs or practices against bacon-eating. You can also have such a requirement (despite the beliefs) if not having the requirement imposes an undue hardship on the business. For example, if the job is "bacon taste-tester", then there's no reasonable accommodation. This applies to religious objections, since religion is protected class, but not "I don't like bacon" as an objection; nor does this apply to people who object to meat-eating on economic grounds. | In Does v Enfield, the ACLU, the ACLU of Connecticut and Americans United for Separation of Church and State sued the Enfield, Connecticut Board of Education. In that case, the school district agreed to stop holding the ceremonies in church. The lawsuit was brought based on the fact that the church had significant Christian iconography and banners reading "Jesus Christ is Lord" and "I am GOD." The school district agreed to stop holding ceremonies in the church after a federal judge declared plans to hold ceremonies in the church unconstitutional. The lawsuit was dropped once the school district agreed to abandon the church venue for school functions. In Elmbrook School District v. Doe, the seventh circuit court of appeals ruled against the town's plans to hold graduation ceremonies in a church and the Supreme Court declined to hear the town's appeal. In each of these cases, the school districts argued that merely using the facilities of a religious institution did not endorse the religion in violation of other Supreme Court precedents. The plaintiffs argued that exposure to the messages found within the church was enough to trigger a violation. Elmbrook School District is in the 7th circuit and the Enfield, Connecticut Board of Education is in the 3rd district. North Carolina is in the 4th district. Note that for the 7th district case, the appeals court initially found for the school district. The full circuit reconsidered and, in a 7-3 split, found that the venue could not avoid being coercive and violated the 1st amendment. In each of the cases presented here there were significant religious symbols in the venue as well as religious pamphlets, publications and bibles. The challenges were not brought based on the venue but, rather, based on the unavoidable messaging found inside those venues. It would be a completely different challenge if a graduation ceremony were held on church property in an unadorned building such as an auditorium with no religious symbols or messages. An example is Wayne Community College, in North Carolina, which has scheduled their 2017 graduation ceremony at Love Temple United Holy Church. When looking at photos of the church's auditorium one notices a lack of religious iconography and messaging. Without exposure to such iconography or other religious messaging it's possible that a public school's choice of such a venue would withstand legal challenge. | Yes, it is illegal in North Carolina, which defines your sex as what's on your birth certificate. At any point in your transition, even when it's long complete, you'll still have to use the restroom for the gender on your birth certificate (hypothetically assuming the law is still in place). See e.g. this CNN coverage and this followup. Will you actually be arrested? Probably only if there's a complaint. The police haven't yet figured out how they're supposed to enforce this law. |
Given SCOTUS precedent, how do I legal counter specifically religious solicitation? (USA) USA Supreme Court has ruled that politicians, religious groups, the Girl Scouts and others have a constitutional right to go door-to-door promoting their causes without first getting permission from local officials. Banning door-to-door religious solicitation may violate rights of free speech, free exercise of religion and freedom of the press depending on the circumstances. It is noted that some religious groups knock on doors occupied by tenants and not occupied by the landlord. What then can a reasonable person, tenant or landlord do to protect their right to quiet enjoyment when religious solicitors selectively knock on the doors of private residences? Clearly, law favors and protects free exercise, so what are the possible solutions to peacefully counter the religious solicitors? Given the fact that the solicitors do not visit every house and selectively choose which door to knock, is there any law, case law, municipal code, ordinance that applied in this situation to convey to solicitors to keep out based on non-uniform business practices? Installing a gate/fence is not practical in this situation. Reporting to the police is not legally viable due to Supreme Court precedent. | California state law criminally restricts trespassing via Cal. Pen. 602.8(a): Any person who without the written permission of the landowner, the owner's agent, or the person in lawful possession of the land, willfully enters any lands under cultivation or enclosed by fence, belonging to, or occupied by, another, or who willfully enters upon uncultivated or unenclosed lands where signs forbidding trespass are displayed at intervals not less than three to the mile along all exterior boundaries and at all roads and trails entering the lands, is guilty of a public offense. However, subdivision (c) states exceptions, that this does not apply to: ...(2) Any person on the premises who is engaging in activities protected by the California or United States Constitution. (There are other exceptions for process-servers, surveyors, and labor union activities). Additionally, anyone who remains on property after having been told to go away is guilty of trespass: simple entering when there is a no-trespassing sign is allowed in the case of religious or political canvassing. So at the state level, a division is made between protected activities (First Amendment issues) and non-protected ones (Commerce Clause issues), where criminal trespass is not applicable to religious or political solicitations. Aliso Viejo limits canvassing thusly: No person shall enter upon any residence or place of business and ring the doorbell, or rap or knock upon any door, or create any sound in any other manner calculated to attract the attention of any occupant of such premises, for the purpose of securing an audience with the occupant and engaging in peddling, solicitation or canvassing in defiance of a notice described in subsection (C) of this section. and subsection (c) says: Notice by the owners or occupants of any residence or place of business of their unwillingness to receive any uninvited peddlers, solicitors, canvassers, or handbills shall be given by displaying a weatherproof card, decal, or sign easily seen from the public right-of-way or the normal entryway to a house or dwelling. The notice must be placed upon or near the main entrance door to the residence or place of business and must state: “No Solicitors,” or words to that effect, with the letters at least one inch high. Solicitors and peddlers, but not canvassers, are also required to have a license. By their definitions, solicitors request things of value, and peddlers engage in commerce: canvassers engage in First Amendment protected activities, including disseminating commercial information (but not making sales). Violation of the code is punished variably, basically at the discretion of the prosecutor (there being a choice between infraction and misdemeanor dispositions). The Santa Monica police say that "There are many legitimate organizations that solicit door-to-door, either to sell products and services or to promote a religious, political or charitable cause. However, there are also a growing number of individuals who illegally solicit with the purpose of committing fraud. So when someone knocks at your door, ask the person to produce the required license before he/she begins a sales pitch". The implication is that you have to have a license to engage in "canvassing", which is almost guaranteed to be incorrect (First Amendment thing). The Santa Monica Code says in 6.32.040 that "Every person engaged in soliciting, canvassing, taking orders or peddling of goods, wares, merchandise or services shall pay a license fee in accordance with Section 6.12.010(a) of this Code" (that section however does not demand a fee for activities not generating money, i.e. political and religious disseminations). Santa Monica also limits door to door operations via a signage ordinance: No solicitation or peddling shall be conducted at any place of residence in the City where any sign prohibiting trespassing or solicitation has been posted or displayed. If the sign posted or displayed limits the hours of trespassing or solicitation, no solicitation or peddling shall be conducted at any place of residence in the City during the time period posted or displayed It is of interest that the signage ordinance does not mention canvassing (and canvassing is not defined), but the license law does. So in terms of legal prohibitions, it depends on municipality, and perhaps interpretation of local ordinances. Of course, one can always put up a sign saying "No Religious Solicitations" and hope that persuades the person, and one can sue for damages, if there are arguably any damages. "Do Not Disturb" might be more effective. SCOTUS noted in Martin v. City of Struthers that "Whether such visiting shall be permitted has in general been deemed to depend upon the will of the individual master of each household, and not upon the determination of the community" and ruled that Struthers may not "make this decision for all its inhabitants" (on First Amendment grounds). Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell addressed a licensing requirement (struck down as overly vague and broad) that covered canvassing, and said A municipality has the power to enforce reasonable door-to-door soliciting and canvassing regulations to protect its citizens from crime and undue annoyance. The Court has consistently recognized that a narrowly drawn ordinance that does not vest in municipal officials the undefined power to determine what residents will hear or see may serve these interests consistent with the First Amendment so a license requirement for religious canvassers could be consistent with the SCOTUS stance: if it is narrowly tailored. Subsequently, in Watchtower v. Stratton, the court stated (regarding a licensing requirement) that § 107 of the ordinance, which provides for the posting of "No Solicitation" signs and which is not challenged in this case, coupled with the resident's unquestioned right to refuse to engage in conversation with unwelcome visitors, provides ample protection for the unwilling listener A "No Solicitation" sign then has the desired effect: it is legal to make it illegal to solicit in the presence of a No Soliciting sign. The specific ordinance was not narrowly tailored (to "preventing fraud"); requiring a surrender of anonymity. Other cases such as Ohio Citizen Action v. City of Englewood, 671 F.3d 564, Bd. of Trustees of State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 have overturned anti-solicitation laws as not being narrowly tailored: for instance, solicitations too early in the morning or too late at night are constitutional; and in general, a sign by the owner means "keep out", and the first amendment does not overrule private property rights. It is unlikely that any ordinance mandating "uniform business practices" would survive; the concept is too vague and unlimited, and would be a significant burden on any business. And, of course, religions have constitutional protections that businesses lack. | There is no law against lying in these circumstances. In fact, for a very modest sum, security companies sell dummy CCTV cameras to make this lie more convincing. However, trespass only happens if people have been warned so this works for literate people who speak English and see the sign. That leaves a very large group of people who would not be trespassing even with the sign. A further problem with a sign on the house is that people have no idea how far away they have to get in order to stop trespassing. In addition, legitimate visitors (uninvited or not) are not trespassers. It seems that people are coming onto your property because they are thirsty. A better way to deal with this is go to your local hardware store and replace the tap with a vandal proof tap that has a removable head. Keep that inside and put a sign next to the tap saying "Refrigerated Water $2 - knock on front door". | The only real answer is that the US Supreme Court, in interpreting the constitution, and specifically the argument that the 13th Amendment prohibits a draft for compelled military services has totally rejected that argument. For many years now the US has not used a draft, and it is obviously possible for the US to have an enduring and powerful military without any draft, which was perhaps not apparent to the Justices in 1918. A draft had been common in this country from the colonial period, through the Revolution, the Civil War, World Wars I and II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. In reaction to the problems during the Vietnam War, and the great opposition to any draft at that time, the US has not used a draft since, although it retains a legal requirement to register for a possible draft, and the legal authority to impose one should it be thought wise. Note that this was not because of the 13th Amendment. Note also that compelled service by the citizens (or residents) in a locality, particularly to fight fires and floods, when the usual forces are inadequate to that end, has been commonly used. Such compulsory service has never been thought to be prohibited by the 13th Amendment. Also, as mentioned in comments, citizens can be compelled to do jury duty, which could in theory be considered "involuntary servitude" but has never been thought to be prohibited by the 13th amendment. The answer by Trish (now deleted) thoroughly described the many differences between a slave and a drafted soldier. Still, drafted military service might be thought to be a form of involuntary servitude. But the Court (and the laws and other courts as well) have not treated it as such. In the Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) the Court thought the idea that compulsory military service constituted involuntary servitude was so wrongheaded that it thought a very brief mention sufficient to refute this contention. It wrote (at 245 U. S. 390): Finally, as we are unable to conceive upon what theory the exaction by government from the citizen of the performance of his supreme and noble duty of contributing to the defense of the rights and honor of the nation, as the result of a war declared by the great representative body of the people, can be said to be the imposition of involuntary servitude in violation of the prohibitions of the Thirteenth Amendment, we are constrained to the conclusion that the contention to that effect is refuted by its mere statement. It is clear from the text of that opinion that the justices thought that the existence of a power to draft soldiers was essential to the implementation of the constitutional power (article I section 8): To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water; To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years; To provide and maintain a Navy; To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces; The opinion discusses the history of compelled military service in the United States, in the colonies before there was a United States, and in Great Britain before that. The opinion says that: Compelled military service is neither repugnant to a free government nor in conflict with the constitutional guaranties of individual liberty. Indeed, it may not be doubted that the very conception of a just government and its duty to the citizen includes the duty of the citizen to render military service in case of need, and the right of the government to compel it. and Further, it is said, the right to provide is not denied by calling for volunteer enlistments, but it does not and cannot include the power to exact enforced military duty by the citizen. This however but challenges the existence of all power, for a governmental power which has no sanction to it and which therefore can only be exercised provided the citizen consents to its exertion is in no substantial sense a power. One may disagree, but that is the law of the land as interpreted by the final body authorized to make such interpretations, the Supreme Court, and it remains good law today. | Under 42 USC 2000a(a): All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin. So a business may be generally prohibited from discriminating against you on the basis of your religion, but I don't know of any law that requires stores to accommodate whatever aversion or hostility you may feel toward gay people or their allies. On the contrary, such businesses have a First Amendment right to display such decor. So legislation that required them to stop speaking out in support of nice gay people would be struck down as unconstitutional. | Under Fed. R. Civ. P. One can be served according to the state law or: (2) doing any of the following: (A) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual personally; (B) leaving a copy of each at the individual’s dwelling or usual place of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there; or (C) delivering a copy of each to an agent authorized None of those would apply to your facts. Thus you would have to find some jurisdiction that would allow service of process under your fact. I dare say that none will and that due process would come into play. In NJ, due process applies and service may be made (1) Upon a competent individual of the age of 14 or over, by delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to the individual personally, or by leaving a copy thereof at the individual's dwelling place or usual place of abode with a competent member of the household of the age of 14 or over then residing therein, or by delivering a copy thereof to a person authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process on the individual's behalf; It has to be the current place of abode. | This depends on the nature of the "ban" ---i.e., who issued it, what legal power they have, and what it actually requires you to refrain from doing. You say it is "their ban" so I am going to assume that this is just a decision that the store has made not to allow you entry. If it is indeed the store itself that has "banned" you, this would not prevent you from calling them to apologise for whatever you did. Calling a business on the phone cannot generally be considered a trespass --- at most, if you were to repeatedly call and harass a business over and over again, it might give rise to a nuisance suit. Unless you have extremely strange laws in your jurisdiction, it is almost certainly not against the law for you to call a business that has banned you, a fortiori if this phone call is made for the purposes of apologising for whatever you did that led to the ban. Although it does not appear to be the situation in this case, if this ban was an actual restraining order of some kind issued by a Court, then it might indeed prevent you from contacting the business (in which case breaching it would lead to an action for contempt of court, not trespass). If a Court were to issue you with an injunction or restraining order of some kind to ban you from a business, then that instrument would specify what you are prevented from doing. You would then need to be very careful to comply with that order. In short: there is a great deal of difference between a "ban" made by a store as the owner of property, and a ban issued by a court through an injunction or restraining order. | The First Amendment is never interpreted as a complete prohibition against laws that could affect a religion, nor is it interpreted to mean that you can say or write anything whatsoever that you want. You cannot sacrifice humans when in the name of a religion, and you cannot sacrifice (murder) humans for fun. One part of the First Amendment regarding religion is the Free Exercise clause which says that you cannot prohibit the exercise of a religion, and another, the Establishment Clause, prohibits favoring a religion, or favoring religion over atheism. The clauses about free speech also do not mean that you can commit fraud and you cannot threaten people's lives. What decides how far the government can go is "strict scrutiny", a doctrine that limits the extent to which the government can infringe on fundamental rights – First Amendment rights are the canonical example of a fundamental right. The main hurdle that a law so scrutinized has to pass is that the law is necessary for a compelling government interest. Preventing massive deaths is generally seen as such an interest. Then, the law has to be narrowly tailored to affect "just those cases", and it has to be the lest restrictive means of accomplishing that end. Although the prevention of massive deaths is a compelling government interest, a government might screw this up in their legal arguments, as they seem to have done in Capitol Hill Baptist Church v. Bowser, where mass political protests were allowed but smaller religious meetings were prohibited. The government essentially "waived" that compelling interest, replacing it with an interest in preventing church meetings, which is plainly a violation of the First Amendment – they substantially burdened religious practices. | There are exemptions, and "justifications", in 24 CFR 100. The exemption is 100.10: (c) Nothing in this part, other than the prohibitions against discriminatory advertising, applies to: (1) The sale or rental of any single family house by an owner, provided the following conditions are met: (i) The owner does not own or have any interest in more than three single family houses at any one time. (ii) The house is sold or rented without the use of a real estate broker, agent or salesperson or the facilities of any person in the business of selling or renting dwellings. So such a restriction could be allowed if e.g. you live in the house and rent only a few rooms, or a single family home marketed and managed in the right way. There is also an exemption for religious organizations and private clubs allowing rental to members only. 100.500 lays the groundwork for disparate impact hot water. It says: (a) A practice has a discriminatory effect where it actually or predictably results in a disparate impact on a group of persons or creates, increases, reinforces, or perpetuates segregated housing patterns because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin. So only renting to students in a particular seminary would most likely have a disparate impact. There is, however, the possibility of justifying the policy, following 100.500: (b) (1) A legally sufficient justification exists where the challenged practice: (i) Is necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests of the respondent, with respect to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. 3612, or defendant, with respect to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. 3613 or 3614; and (ii) Those interests could not be served by another practice that has a less discriminatory effect. (2) A legally sufficient justification must be supported by evidence and may not be hypothetical or speculative. The burdens of proof for establishing each of the two elements of a legally sufficient justification are set forth in paragraphs (c)(2) and (c)(3) of this section. So let's say that the offended party has made the case that the practice will have a discriminatory effect, then the accused can set forth the aforementioned justification: (c)(2) Once the charging party or plaintiff satisfies the burden of proof set forth in paragraph (c)(1) of this section, the respondent or defendant has the burden of proving that the challenged practice is necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests of the respondent or defendant. (c3)(3) If the respondent or defendant satisfies the burden of proof set forth in paragraph (c)(2) of this section, the charging party or plaintiff may still prevail upon proving that the substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests supporting the challenged practice could be served by another practice that has a less discriminatory effect. The crux of the matter is having a "substantial, legitimate nondiscriminatory interest", i.e. why would you want to rent to only seminary students. |
Can an American material witness be forced to "learn" what s/he does not know? My understanding is that a witness is supposed to prepare for a deposition. My first concern is how well prepared or knowledgeable for a deposition. Suppose a material witness made a point of studying his adversary's liabilities thoroughly, and his own side's superficially. The witness then recites chapter and verse about his adversary's liability, and honestly says, "I don't know" about his side's. Can the opposing lawyer ask him, with effect, "why do you know so much about some topics, and so little about others?" Will the witness have fallen short in his duty? Can s/he be forced to learn more to be more responsive to the opposing lawyer's questions? | A witness can only testify to what they witnessed That means their testimony can only be what they personally saw or heard (or, more rarely, touched, smelled and tasted). They cannot testify to the truth of what someone else told them (although they can testify that they were told it) - that’s called hearsay and it’s inadmissible. A witness cannot learn things after the event and testify to them. | No, a defendant may not remain silent on cross-examination. Witnesses who voluntarily testify in their own defense are subject to cross-examination on that testimony. In Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304, (1900), a murder defendant testified that he was at two bars and then his cabin the night of the crime. The trial court held that having waived his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, the defendant was subject to cross examination about what he was wearing that night, his connections to a co-defendant, the co-defendant's clothes, and who else was at the cabin with him. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that if a defendant voluntary makes a statement about the crime at trial, the prosecution may cross-examine him with as much latitude as it would have with any other witness: The witness having sworn to an alibi, it was perfectly competent for the government to cross-examine him as to every fact which had a bearing upon his whereabouts upon the night of the murder, and as to what he did and the persons with whom he associated that night. Indeed, we know of no reason why an accused person, who takes the stand as a witness, should not be subject to cross-examination as other witnesses are. Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304, 315 (1900). | Signing as a witness binds you to nothing. Do not sign if you do not qualify as a witness (e.g. Time known, occupation) but otherwise go for it. It is unlikely that anyone would check your bona-fifes but if they did a statutory declaration would probably be satisfactory. Remember, the point of witnessing is to show the form was actually signed by the person. | In U.S. practice, double jeopardy protections attach once the jury is seated and this scenario contemplates the change in position arising at trial. A mistrial could be called, or a continuance obtained, if the defendant suddenly claimed an alibi defense, since that amounts of a defendant waiver of double jeopardy protections. But without proof that the witness was tampered with, obtained at the last moment, it can be difficult or impossible to get proof of tampering or to contradict the story with other evidence to undermine the credibility of the witness. The prosecution would probably request a recess in the trial to regroup and try to admit evidence that the testimony changing witness made a prior inconsistent statement to impeach the testimony of that witness, from whomever that witness told the first time (probably a law enforcement officer). But this is still far less convincing to a jury than an affirmative statement from a witnesses about a key fact. If the prosecution could find evidence of defense side tampering and present it to the judge in the hours or small number of days before the trial ends, it might be able to get a mistrial declared. But it is much harder to get a mistrial for witness tampering when the witness shows up and testifies contrary to prosecution expectations than it is when the witness is, for example, killed or kidnapped and doesn't appear to testify at trial at all. But if evidence of neither type could be obtained before the jury was sent to deliberate and evidence was closed, and the jury then acquitted the defendant, it would be very hard for the prosecution to change this result. Perhaps not completely impossible, but very nearly so. The witness could be (and in this circumstance, despite the extreme rarity of perjury prosecutions, probably would be) prosecuted for perjury, but that wouldn't change the acquittal. If a link to the defendant could be found, the defendant could also be prosecuted for witness tampering or obstruction of justice or something similar. But that is hard to prove (and the witness would probably have to be convicted or provided with use immunity for his testimony) to do so. In English criminal law practice, in contrast, the likelihood of having the verdict of acquittal set aside and getting a new trial would be much greater (and the likelihood of getting a recess mid-trial would be greater in far more common bench trials in lower level criminal cases), but it would still be a serious burden for the prosecution that it might not be able to overcome. Lawyers aren't entitled to expect that witnesses will testify exactly the way that they discussed things with the lawyers before trial, and this can be explained away with a variety of excuses that are usually true ("after thinking it over after meeting with you, I realized that I was confused and getting it wrong"), but are sometimes a cover for a change of story that is not sincere. I've had similar things happen a few times in civil litigation and there is only so much you can do about it. | Your question slightly misrepresents what the article says: Yes, the judge denied the motion which led to the collapse of the case, he did not make a ruling on the substance of the case. The distinction is significant to my mind as the judge was using non-evidentiary knowledge (i.e. what he read in the paper) to make a decision on process; in this case a process that would have put a lot of people to a lot of inconvenience. It would not be proper for the judge to have used such knowledge to inform a judgement. It is also not clear from the article if the academic paper in question was actually introduced by the defendant as evidence. If that was the case then it is only right and proper for the judge to consider it. As to why a judge is allowed to read the news and a jury is not, I can offer several ideas: A judge must document their reasoning process in a judgement which is subject to review - if they were to make a decision based on matters not supported by the evidence then an appeals court could correct it. Alternatively, juries are specifically prohibited from revealing their reasoning process to anyone. Judges do their jobs for years, perhaps a whole career - to prohibit them from consuming media is a) unworkable and b) a serious impediment on their lifestyle. Juries are empaneled for weeks or months - such sacrifices are more reasonable. Judges are (supposedly) trained and impartial professionals who are more readily able to make the distinction between evidence and news. Newsworthy cases are relatively rare | Misstating the truth is not perjury Perjury is deliberately lying under oath to gain a material advantage. For the situation you describe: You might be wrong and they actually do live where they say they do they might be wring and they genuinely think they live where they say they do, being wrong is not perjury it’s unlikely to administrate info in the form actually carries the penalty of perjury, it probably isn’t testimony unless it will positively and substantially affect the outcome of the case in their favour, it isn’t material You lack standing to interfere in the case in any event If this were brought to the attention of the court the most likely outcome would that it would just be corrected. | Parties may only call witnesses for the purpose of adducing* admissible evidence. Evidence is only admissible if it is relevant. If a witness cannot give any relevant evidence, then a party has no right to call them or invoke the court's power to compel them to give evidence. In practice, if there were any doubt about the witness's ability to give relevant evidence, it is likely that the court would allow the defendant to call the witness, if only for the purpose of a preliminary hearing where the parties can argue about whether the proposed evidence is actually admissible. If a judge or juror is able to give relevant evidence about a case, they should recuse themselves. If a judge does not recuse, or does not permit the defendant to call some other witness having decided that the witness could not give relevant evidence, these decisions can be reviewed on appeal. The standard required to overturn the judge's decision varies depending on the jurisdiction, but generally the defendant would have to show that the evidence they were not permitted to adduce was also material. This might prevent a mistrial from occurring in cases where, for example, the defendant was not permitted to call the President to give evidence about something that occurred at a public event the President attended. The President's knowledge of the event might be technically admissible, but plainly not likely to advance either side of the case, given the other evidence available. Of course, if the President can give relevant, admissible and material evidence about a fact in issue then the defendant would be entitled to call them. *Adduce: cite as evidence. | If you have something to say, you should have said it before now When a judge is about to hand down a decision the case is all but over. Just like figure skating at the Olympics, the points are scored even if nobody but the judges know what they are yet. The onus is on the parties to bring forward all the evidence and make all the submissions on the law that they want the judge to consider before and during the hearing. If they didn't then that's their fault and they can't introduce new stuff now. Now, it's not uncommon for a judge to share their thoughts during the hearing or in writing when considering written submissions. This is because their thinking on the law is at variance with what the parties are contending. The plaintiff says the law is X, the defendant says the law is Y, the judge thinks they're both idiots and the law is clearly Z. They will usually call for submissions on this because the judge's role is to decide the dispute between the parties on the evidence the contend -not to impose the judge's interpretation on them; by doing this the parties may relies the judge is right and a lot of the dispute disappears or they may convince the judge that they are wrong (it's not unknown) and move on from a clear agreed position. |
Can the jeopardy of being judged be fought against in court? Can the right to take people to the court be itself subject to judicial challenge? In other words, if someone attempts to sue you, would you ever be able to successfully argue in the court to prevent them from doing so? (Let's exclude the obvious cases where a person is declared vexations / abusing the process and is prohibited from filing lawsuits). Will the answer change if "attempts to sue" is replaced with "attempts to prosecute" — in jurisdictions where the right to prosecute is not exclusive to the state i.e. private prosecutions are allowed? Can the jeopardy of being prosecuted be litigated against? The right to sue seems fundamental and untouchable, but what are the doctrines behind this? (If the question is too broad, let's assume common law / English-centric jurisdictions). | In some jurisdictions, California probably being the most well-known in the US, there are Anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statutes, which allow a defendant to file an anti-SLAPP claim (for sake of clarity I'm going to keep calling that person the "defendant") when the plaintiff's suit appears to have been filed for the purpose of infringing upon the defendant's rights by forcing them to bear the costs of litigation or settle the claim in order to avoid them, and itself has little merit or the plaintiff clearly does not expect it to succeed. In California, if the Anti-SLAPP claim succeeds and the plaintiff's claim is dismissed as a SLAPP, the defendant is normally awarded attorney's fees from the plaintiff. The Anti-SLAPP claim also halts discovery in order to reduce the costs on the defendant, so in effect it allows a defendant to challenge the plaintiff's right to sue them on the particular issue before the defendant has to bear the majority of costs. | Modern legal systems frown on individual retribution. A victim of a crime is not allowed to punish the perpetrator of the crime; that falls to the state. The answer is therefore yes; the person could be arrested, tried, and punished, including by imprisonment. | Threat of lawsuit can't be illegal It is a basis of functioning legal systems, that if you have a case, you can sue. However, nothing in any such legal system requires them to sue. Instead, offering a resolution out of court - like arbitration or offering to relinquish a claim for payment - is legal. Adding pressure by saying "This is my offer, otherwise I sue" is not extortion, because after the suit is filed, it is with the courts. Should the claimant file a frivolous lawsuit, then the court will deal with it - dismissing the case and sanctioning the claimant and their lawyer. See also these questions: Why is threatening to sue not considered extortion? Why should one never threaten to sue? What is the point of sending a demand letter? | Only if counsel challenged the point during the trial Difficult as it might be, you can’t allow the judge to be wrong during the trial without calling them on it: very, very politely. For example, there is case law that says you can’t successfully appeal because the judge was asleep through significant parts of the trial; appeals courts are clear that you have to wake them up. If you don’t then you accepted that you didn’t want the judge to hear the parts of the case they slept through, it’s your choice how you present your case. Frankly some cases are better if the judge misses half the evidence. Of course, if the error of law makes it through to the oral or written judgement then you can appeal even if you didn’t take issue with it. | In the US, a person is "within their rights" to invoke the Fifth Amendment, i.e. refuse to self-incriminate. However, the government can give a person immunity from prosecution for offenses having to do with the testimony, in which case he can be compelled to testify. A person is not required to guess about whether they could actually be convicted based on their testimony. It is the privilege of the court (judge) to determine whether a witness has "a reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer" (Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17). | I have encountered this problem in Pennsylvania. The PA Code requires a District Attorney to approve all private criminal complaints. If the DA declines to prosecute, then an affiant can petition the Court of Common Pleas to review the decision. However the affiant bears the burden of convincing the court that the DA abused his descretion in declining to prosecute, which is a pretty high hurdle. In the United States the only other legal appeal I am aware of is through federal courts under broad federal laws like 18 USC 242 or 42 USC 1983. | You are deeply confused, probably by the blogs of a conspiracy theorist (perhaps discussing the Sovereign Citizen Movement mentioned in the comments), whom it would be helpful for you to reference. In fact, people with and without lawyers claim common law rights in the ordinary courts of the UK every day, in the lion's share of civil lawsuits. For example: There is a common law right to sue for damages when someone breaches a contract by not paying a bill that they owe. A defendant, meanwhile, has a common law right to defend against such a suit on grounds, for example, that the debt has been paid or that the debt is not owed because there was no agreement to pay in the first place. The substantive right of an owner of real property to evict a tenant who breaches a lease arises at common law, even though statutes spell out the process for enforcing that right. Furthermore, the way that ownership of real property is established (i.e. through a chain of title involving purchases by deeds) likewise arises at common law. The defendant meanwhile has a common law defense to a claim for rent for the remainder of the period in a lease after an eviction for failure of the landlord to mitigate damages if the landlord does not make a reasonable effort to find a new tenant. The right to sue someone who negligently caused an accident that injured you is a common law right. | State governments (and state courts, employees, etc., as part of that government) are generally immune from lawsuits for all liability. See Governmental Tort Liability : 2017 Tennessee Code : Justia. You're really not going to be able to sue the state, the court, the prosecutor or parole officer over what you see as a negligent decision, considering the individuals' previous record or freedom while on parole, and/or whether they are charged as an adult or a minor. Most any lawyer will advise you of this. You could contact a local legal aid clinic Legal Aid/Legal Services | Tennessee Bar Association for more of an explanation and explore the possibilities. |
Given the doctrine of Contra proferentem wouldn't it be better for the non-drafting party to not point out ambiguity? This question is a follow up to If a party says something about interpretation of contract, is it binding? Since courts usually interpret an ambiguous term in the favor of the party that did not draft it, why would the non-drafting party want clarification? If the party that didn't draft the term gets the benefit of the doubt, wouldn't it make more sense for him not to point out any ambiguities and to not ask clarifying questions before agreeing? Am I looking at this right? | Because disputes are expensive, time-consuming and generally not fun An ambiguous term is a dispute waiting to happen. Far better to resolve the ambiguity and correctly allocate (and price) the risk at the start of a contract when nothing is at stake then have that term be at the centre of a dispute with $10 million on the table that both parties think is theirs. At best, a dispute strains the relationship, at worst, it involves time and costs putting the matter before an arbitrator or a judge and hope the resolve the ambiguity your way. I prefer to play roulette at a casino not a courtroom. Contra preferentum is unlikely to be a successful argument in any form of non-determinative dispute resolution - essentially the proffering party is never going to agree that it applies. Further, contra preferentum is a last-resort resolution mechanism. Maybe what you read as ambiguous is actually clear. Or clear in context, or clear when industry norms are considered or when past dealing or current dealings between the parties are considered. Relying on it is a real long shot. Also, almost all B2B contracts explicitly exclude contra preferentum as a method of resolving ambiguous terms. | No Only the ratio decidendi of a case sets binding precedent. By definition, that has to be in the decision of the court’s majority because that’s what decided the case. If a minority decision disagrees with the majority on ratio, then the majority is the binding precedent. If the point is obiter, then it’s merely persuasive, not binding, irrespective of where it is. | Normally, the term "benefit of the doubt", if it was used, would mean that ambiguities should be resolved in favor of the person entitled to it. This could be applied to contract interpretation or to statutory interpretation. Here is an example: When dealing with restrictions on campaign spending and speech, a court's construction must “give the benefit of the doubt to speech, not censorship. The First Amendment's command that ‘Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech’ demands at least that. Colorado Educ. Ass'n v. Rutt, 184 P.3d 65, 75–76 (Colo. 2008) (ultimately holding that union activities to organize volunteers to walk precincts with a political candidate did not constitute a "campaign expenditure" of a union within the meaning of a state law restriction campaign contributions by unions). | An oral contract is (usually) entirely legally binding (exceptions include things like land sales). Written notes do not change that. The important thing about nearly contemporaneous notes is that if the contract runs into difficulty and you need to litigate, they are likely to be accepted by a court as good evidence of what was agreed. They will be much more difficult for the other party to challenge later (they can be challenged now of course - which is part of why they are considered good evidence of what was agreed). | If a contract sometimes uses the wrong name, is it still valid? Yes. It is valid as long as the contract as a whole permits identifying the parties (unequivocally) and ascertaining their role with respect to the contract. Using "Contractor" and "Consultant" interchangeably despite only the former being explicitly defined seems a bit sloppy, but it does not by itself alter or invalidate the meaning of the contract. The excerpt you reproduce is self-explanatory. Its first sentence identifies the parties, and there are only two. Thus, there is no reasonable way to dispute that the second sentence means "Contractor shall indemnify Company", since a clause of the sort "he will indemnify himself" makes no sense. Moreover, the legal definitions of Indemnitor and Indemnitee (Black's Law Dictionary) clearly make reference to "the person" (who protects or is protected, accordingly) and "the other" (that is, not to self). | Conditions stated in a will should be objectively verifiable, to avoid later ligation of the "yes he is / no he isn't" type. In this case, it would appear that your concern is over the beneficiary not actually being competent to take care of themselves. The courts often have to make that judgment, when a party seeks conservatorship over an adult. So it seems that the situation you are addressing can be summarized by saying "has not been found legally incompetent". You should discuss with your attorney what the exact wording ought to be, and also whether that describes your actual intents. For example, the description of disqualification probably should not include execution of a temporary power of attorney for a specific purpose, nor would it include a DNR order. Hiring an attorney who knows the terminology would steer clear of vague or mistaken terms. | First, I don’t believe the author is using quotation marks to indicate an actual quotation, it is being used for emphasis and to group the words as a concept. That concept is that while it may seem undemocratic for a judge to overturn a law enacted by a democratically elected assembly, the “higher democracy” is that it protects the democratic institutions themselves by limiting the power of the legislature to what the higher law of a constitution allows. | Actually, the concept "right" means that it can be waived: you may exercise the right, but do not have to. If it is an obligation, you can't "waive" the obligation; but the right to free speech does not mean that you must speak, and the right to bear arms does not mean that you must bear arms. You may decline to exercise, or waive, a right. Sternlight 16 Ohio St. J. On Disp. Resol. 669 (2001) in "Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial" partially addresses this (the focus though is on binding arbitration). One thing to note is that the Seventh Amendment does not appear to apply to issues in state court (it is a separate and fascinating question to wonder what parts of The Constitution are incorporated against states, and why). All is not lost for the constitutional question, we just need a different constitution. By the agreement terms, "This Agreement is governed by the laws of the State of New York". Therefore, New York's Constitution (Article 1 Sect 2) is also applicable: Trial by jury in all cases in which it has heretofore been guaranteed by constitutional provision shall remain inviolate forever; but a jury trial may be waived by the parties in all civil cases in the manner to be prescribed by law. Thus, the right may be waived. Waiver of a right to jury trial is not the same as waiver of the right to trial: what the agreement says is that litigants would have a civil bench trial, where the judge determines whether there was a breach. In New York, NY CPLR § 4102 allows parties to waive civil trial by jury (and unlike California), such waiver terms have been upheld, but the courts have recognized that there is a problem, so it's not always obvious whether such waivers in contracts are legal. |
Is it against a Terms of Service/End-User License Agreement to not read it? In many Terms of Service/End-User License Agreements, there is a statement either as art of the confirmation check box to agree to said agreement and/or as a part of the agreement itself that says something along the lines of "Please read this agreement in its entirety, by agreeing to this agreement/checking this box, you are acknowledging that you have read, understand, and agree to all terms/linked terms/linked agreements/etc." What I'm wanting to know is if by not fully reading and understanding these agreements, am I in violation of these terms and the agreement? | You have read it: legally It doesn’t matter if you haven’t read it in fact. At law, you have. Therefore you cannot avoid obligations or consequences by saying “ I didn’t read it”. It’s an extension of the common law principle that if you affix your ‘mark’ to a document you were acknowledging that you understood it and would abide by it: even if your mark was an X because you were illiterate. There are protections. At common law an unconscionable term is unenforceable and may void the contract entirely. Additionally, many jurisdictions have passed legislation to make unfair contract terms unenforceable, particularly in contracts of adhesion. Further, consumer protection laws often have non-excludable warranties that operate in spite of the contract. | You are free to sell or not to sell to whoever you like (unless it is illegal discrimination, like not selling to white Christians), but it doesn't make a difference, because anyone who buys the software from you can legally sell it on to anyone they want. So you cannot control who ends up owning the software. If I want the software and you don't sell it to me, and I still want it, I'll just ask a friend to buy it and give them the money. Other people would just get a pirated copy if you refuse to sell to them (and would have very little bad conscience since they offered you cash and you refused to take it). You can put terms into a license, and in the USA this is binding. The customer may not agree with the license, and in that case they have the right to get a refund for the software. In the EU, I don't think a license is binding, so you'd have to sign a legally binding contract with the buyer. Apart from all that, you have very little chance to find out if the software is used against your wishes and to do anything about it. | It's not illegal to say things in your profile. SE requires you to license your content to them on a non-exclusive basis pursuant to CC BY-SA 4.0. "Non-exclusive" means that you can also license the material to others on some other basis, e.g. CC0. In that case, a person who uses your material can rely on the other license that you granted. If SE wanted to, it could prohibit putting licenses in a user profile, in which case you would have to promulgate your more generous license elsewhere. | You cannot do this through any established public license that I know of, but you could write your own. The model would be any educational use or non-commercial use license, such as CC NC licenses. The main challenge is defining the excluded classes of usage. That is why you should engage an attorney to draft this for you. I don't think there is any point in adding a $5M penalty clause. You offer a separate paid license for individuals who do not want to comply with the particular terms of your license, and set the fee to whatever you want. Saying that you're gonna fine violators is a bad idea because penalty clauses are illegal. Instead, the standard approach is a liquidated damages clause, where you state what a reasonable estimate of your damages would be. In the case of software that is available for purchase, illegal copying of the software obviously results at least in the cost of the software qua lost revenue as damages. Plus shipping and handling. | The notification that you saw is not useful legal information for you: stuff always belongs to whoever owns the stuff. It might be interpreted as saying "it doesn't belong to us", but you can't count on that (it's virtually guaranteed that at least some of the content there is owned by the website owner). A more informative statement would be "You will have to get permission from the content owner to copy their stuff", and "We're not going to spend time figuring out who owns what". You could read the terms of service (try this with Stack Exchange) to see what the site tells people. The TOS here says that if you contribute anything, it "is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license". You can then look up what that license says and learn what that allows. Websites are kind of tricky, though, because it's not hard to change the wording of a TOS, and you need to know what specific TOS was promulgated at the time a particular contribution was unleashed. Usual practice is to think it through carefully and not frequently tweak the TOS, but it's not illegal to change the TOS. Note that copyright law does not prohibit you from using other people's stuff, it prohibits you from copying. The distinction is clearer when you see a post that explains an algorithm with actual code, you read and learn and make use of that, but write your own code. As a user out there, if there isn't a clear indication that stuff posted is there for the taking, under some public license (as is the case with SE), then getting specific permission to copy, from the owner of the content (possibly untraceable), would be necessary. Now assume that you're a moderator or site-owner of some forum: presumably (hopefully) you have a TOS that addresses that situation, which says that moderators have the right to edit or delete content at their sole discretion, and also you say what kinds of posts are prohibited. Such an statement is not absolutely mandatory for all things, but it may be necessary to avoid litigation over some acts. One one end of the spectrum, it would be illegal for a forum to host child porn, stolen credit card numbers, or protected digital content. If a user were to post such stuff, the site would need to eliminate that stuff, and the poster could not legally rely on an argument of the type "That's my stuff, you have no right to mess with it". On the other hand, if a forum actually requires paid membership, then there may be a strong contractual expectation that the user is getting something of value, so you would have to watch for statements that could be interpreted as broad permission to put stuff out there without any interference. (For instance, a file-hosting service would have only minimal restrictions on content, aimed at protecting their own legal interests; whereas a political-advocacy site would have maximal interest in prohibiting the expression of views counter to the cause). Thus the SE TOS has you "grant Stack Exchange the perpetual and irrevocable right and license to use, copy, cache, publish, display, distribute, modify, create derivative works", which allows moderators to correct typos, delete offensive wording, and obliterate entire posts. If a site fails to have any such clauses in their TOS, then it might be a matter that has to be settled in court, whether they have the right to eliminate "spam" (i.e. advertising for a service, especially if the reason for getting an account was to provide an advertising platform). In light of the limited use sanctioned by the TOS, per the below comment, legal copying will be quite limited. However, "fair use" a situation where copying is allowed, regardless of what the TOS may say. (You could be banned from the site, but you could not be sued for infringement). Fair use was invented precisely so that people could make comments like "Jones advocates an absurd law, saying '...[quote from Jones]...'". Thus you can comment on a post and quote the relevant part ("The lines '[... quoting the code ...]' results in an infinite loop"). See the Fair Use FAQ for more details. | They may or may not be violating the license. It's quite possible, even likely, that Microsoft has a license agreement of some sort in place with MongoDB that permits their use. Neither party, however, would be under any obligation to disclose this license to 3rd parties. If indeed there is a violation, a legal action might eventually take place. The usual first step, however, is a demand letter. Again, unless or until a court filing actually takes place, we're in the dark. Totally hypothetical here but the result could be anywhere from an agreement between the parties to damages to cease-and-desist orders. Perhaps some combination of these. I believe Microsoft has offered this service for some years now, so the lack of any visible action on MongoDB's part seems to indicate that they are good with what is going on. Microsoft has almost certainly made an agreement with MongoDB that covers this use. Note also that the license you refer to is not necessarily the only license that this product is offered under. Many companies, and I don't think MongoDB is any exception, offer "free" or low cost licenses for some purposes and then also offer "enterprise" licenses for commercial/large-scale use. As the licensor here, MongoDB is under no obligation to offer one and only one license option to potential licensees. | First, copyright means that permission from the author is generally required. The courts find three sorts of such permission: direct author-to-recipient explicit licensing (typical in the case of a book author to publisher relation), indirect licensing arising from platform usage (in using Stackexchange, you probably unknowingly click-agreed to allow me and everybody else to copy and redistribute your creations), and implicit licensing – where permission to use is reasonably inferrable, though not explicitly stated. Since the latter doesn't involve written-out statements of the conditions under which you are licensed to copy text, the courts don't rely heavily on implicit licensing. But implicit licensing is what makes it possible to legally read a web page without first signing an agreement. If we assume in your scenario that the author is fully aware that their responses are automatically distributed to various servers, then even in lieu of a platform license, an implicit license can be found. Second, irrespective of the desideratum of having permission, one is in the US allowed to copy without permission, for certain purposes known as "fair use". This is a complicated area of legal analysis, where one has to weigh factors such as whether the content is artistic vs. factual, whether your use simply re-propagates vs. makes a comment, whether the use is for profit vs. free and educational, and whether the use has a negative effect on the market for the original work. | What are exactly the legal consequences of "All rights reserved"? Almost none. You have to explicitly grant copyright rights. You don't even need the Copyright notice for them to apply. My "almost" is because the notice makes it harder for somebody to argue "they didn't realize". Do I still need an additional SW License Agreement or is the Copyright notice above + a Disclaimer of liability sufficient? If this is free software (I know you said it isn't), do yourself (and everyone else) a favour by picking a license you like. Preferably either GPL or MIT (depending on your taste). There are far too many free licenses already. Please don't add another. (It also makes it much easier for any user of your software: "Oh yeah, GPL v2. We understand that. We can use it." as opposed to "What are the implications of using this one??" As this is not free software, I think you need a paid-for lawyer (who understands IPR in your juridiction.) Edit: In principle, I believe you don't need anything. The code is copyright, so the customer can't do anything with it (without explicit permissions that you haven't granted). However if the customer doesn't realize that or thinks you won't mind, you then have to go to court to enforce your rights (and probably end up with a disgruntled customer). A short, clear, license will make it clear to the customer what they are allowed to do, and save all that aggravation. |
Can a landlord ask a tenant to sign an addendum to the lease that changes the terms of the first lease? If a landlord asks a tenant who signed a 12 month lease to sign an addendum after they have already moved in that changes the terms of the lease to move out within 3 months of the landlord's death, and receive $5,000 for the inconvenience of moving out, is the tenant obligated to sign this addendum? Also, let's say that the addendum was originally referred to as the "garage lease" but became the addendum when it specified changes to the original lease. The rental is hypothetically in Chicago, Illinois. | You are never obligated to sign a contract. You already have a lease agreement in place, which will be enforceable for the agreed-upon duration. The lease can be changed if both parties agree to it, but one party cannot unilaterally demand that other agree to any changes to the contract - a landlord can't, for example, change your lease agreement to increase your rent payment in the middle of your lease term and demand that you sign it. The landlord is certainly allowed to ask, in the hopes that both parties can come to an agreement, but again, both parties need to agree in order for an existing contract to be changed. | In most common law jurisdictions, yes. The new owner would be bound by the lease just as the old owner was. | You need absolute written buy in from the landlord. His agreement is with you, not this new person. If the new person stops paying for whatever reason, then landlord is coming after you. | Not even real roaches are an emergency. The event was foreseeable and scheduleable. According to the terms of your lease, you are entitled to a 2 day warning. From your description, the landlord did not violate the lease, but he came close to it, perhaps to the point that the courts would consider it as good as a breach. In Chicago, §5-12-050 of the municipal code mandates 2-day notice, and the following section says that If the landlord makes an unlawful entry or a lawful entry in an unreasonable manner or makes repeated unreasonable demands for entry otherwise lawful, but which have the effect of harassing the tenant, the tenant may obtain injunctive relief to prevent the recurrence of the conduct, or terminate the rental agreement pursuant to the notice provisions of Section 5-12-110(a). In each case, the tenant may recover an amount equal to not more than one month's rent or twice the damage sustained by him, whichever is greater. | The relevant law in California is here. In your situation, it is presumed (as you both agree) that you have a month to month agreement. §1946 states that A hiring of real property, for a term not specified by the parties, is deemed to be renewed as stated in Section 1945, at the end of the term implied by law unless one of the parties gives written notice to the other of that party’s intention to terminate the same, at least as long before the expiration thereof as the term of the hiring itself, not exceeding 30 days; In other words, the landlord has to give you 30 days advance notice to terminate the lease, and you have to give 30 days advance notice to terminate the lease (and it must be written notice). The section continues: provided, however, that as to tenancies from month to month either of the parties may terminate the same by giving at least 30 days’ written notice thereof at any time and the rent shall be due and payable to and including the date of termination. which effectively says the same thing, specifically appliedd to month to month leases. There is some leeway on terminating a lease: It shall be competent for the parties to provide by an agreement at the time the tenancy is created that a notice of the intention to terminate the same may be given at any time not less than seven days before the expiration of the term thereof. The notice herein required shall be given in the manner prescribed in Section 1162 of the Code of Civil Procedure or by sending a copy by certified or registered mail addressed to the other party. But you would have to establish that there was such an agreement (I assume there was not). §1946.1 asserts that a hiring of residential real property for a term not specified by the parties, is deemed to be renewed as stated in Section 1945, at the end of the term implied by law unless one of the parties gives written notice to the other of his or her intention to terminate the tenancy, as provided in this section. That is, a lease is automatically renewed in your situation unless notice has been given. Moreover, A tenant giving notice pursuant to this section shall give notice for a period at least as long as the term of the periodic tenancy prior to the proposed date of termination. What you are proposing contravenes this provision of the law – from your description of the facts, you did not give notice 30 days before now. So your obligation to the landlord exists to the end of May. Bear in mind that the law imposes obligations on both landlord and tenant: just as the landlord cannot throw you out without proper notification, you cannot walk away from your obligation without proper notification. §1951.2 addresses breach of lease and abandonment by lessee (you) if a lessee of real property breaches the lease and abandons the property before the end of the term or if his right to possession is terminated by the lessor because of a breach of the lease, the lease terminates. Upon such termination, the lessor may recover from the lessee: (1) The worth at the time of award of the unpaid rent which had been earned at the time of termination; (2) The worth at the time of award of the amount by which the unpaid rent which would have been earned after termination until the time of award exceeds the amount of such rental loss that the lessee proves could have been reasonably avoided; (3) Subject to subdivision (c), the worth at the time of award of the amount by which the unpaid rent for the balance of the term after the time of award exceeds the amount of such rental loss that the lessee proves could be reasonably avoided; and (4) Any other amount necessary to compensate the lessor for all the detriment proximately caused by the lessee’s failure to perform his obligations under the lease or which in the ordinary course of things would be likely to result therefrom. There are, also, no special exceptions about landlords selling their property that allow instant termination. That is, you still owe the month's rent, even though the lease is ending at the end of the month. You could of course ask the landlord to forgive you that last month's obligation. I am assuming that the lease was terminated properly by the landlord. If it was not, the landlord has not legally terminated the lease and it will continue until someone does properly terminate the lease. That might provide incentive for the other party to just forget the last month's rent, but it also might not. | Unfortunately, your relative is more in the wrong here First, the COVID situation does not change anyone's rights and obligations under a contract (see What effect does an event like the current Covid-19 pandemic have on contractural obligations?). So the landlord (through their agent) is obliged to provide the property and your relative is obliged to pay the rent and to occupy the premises (most residential leases contain a requirement for the tenant to live in the premises and not leave it empty). Your relative (through you) has indicated that she will be in breach of her contract. The agent has considered her position and has offered two (IMO generous) alternatives: Allow her to continue with the lease without taking possession providing the rent is paid. To release her from her obligations under the contract and return the rent. To put it in perspective, if your relative simply "walked away", she would be liable for the rent until a new tenant was found and, if that new tenant was paying less rent than she was, the difference for the duration of the lease plus the costs of finding a new tenant - advertising, agent's fees (usually 1 month's rent) etc. Now, the landlord has an obligation to minimise your costs so advertising the property could just be prudent. However, if they lease it when your relative's contract has not been properly terminated then it is they who are in breach. Surely they can't take the rent and offer to re-let the property at the same time? Surely they can. What they can't do is relet the property without properly terminating your relative's lease. Would they even be entitled to retain the deposit under these circumstances? Absolutely. The deposit is to cover their losses if your relative breaks the lease - as she has indicated she is going to do (this is called anticipatory breach). Finally, I'd rather not go down this route but is there any protection for my relative for not being forcefully 'evicted' - since she's paid the deposit, rent - and those haven't been returned? Having never taken possession, she is not being evicted. | Can they legally charge this fee if it was not stated in the lease we signed? No. The landlord's conduct is in violation of Virginia Code § 55-248.7, which in its item G reads: No unilateral change in the terms of a rental agreement by a landlord or tenant shall be valid unless (i) notice of the change is given in accordance with the terms of the rental agreement or as otherwise required by law and (ii) both parties consent in writing to the change. Per your description of the lease, the fee of $400 is an unilateral change (by the landlord) to which you and the tenant never consented, let alone in writing. You might still want to check whether Virginia Code § 55-248.37 applies to your situation at all, although the issue rather seems to be just the landlord's unilateral change. | If she rents the room to Bob mostly furnitured, then by default the termination period is two weeks to the end of the month. However, it is three months by default if she rents it to Bob without furniture. Is my understanding correct so far? This is covered in §573c BGB (the German civil code). By default the notice period is three months. (But is increased for the lessor (Alice) after 5 and 8 years.) For residential space that is only leased for temporary use, a shorter notice period may be agreed. (This applies e.g. to hotel rooms.) For residential space under §549(2)(2), notice of termination is allowed at the latest on the fifteenth day of a month to the end of that month. (This is almost, but not quite, 2 weeks.) Where §549(2)(2) describes: residential space that is part of the dwelling inhabited by the lessor himself and has largely to be furnished with furniture and fixtures by the lessor himself, provided that permission to use the residential space has not been given for permanent use to the lessee with his family or with persons with whom he maintains a joint household set up permanently. This seems to apply here since Alice and Bob are sharing the flat. is it possible to define a shorter termination period in the contract, say one month? Or is the legal default of three months always applicable and cannot be changed by contract? Per §573c (4), these notice periods are minimums: “An agreement deviating from subsections (1) or (3) to the disadvantage of the lessee is ineffective.” Thus, the rental contract could allow Bob to leave on a shorter notice period, but Alice can't kick out Bob with shorter notice period. Notice periods only matter when one party wants to terminate the contract against the interests of the other party. If both voluntarily agree that it's best to part ways, they can sign a termination agreement effective for some arbitrary date, no notice period required. |
Business contact based on observed activity - is it right? My mother recently posted this on Facebook, but I'm interested in terms of the legalities regarding communication and observation. Earlier this year I joined a gym. Small one, based in local town, training in groups of four or fewer. Paid in advance for six months, because that is how their membership works. I stopped going in July because of an injury, and started back in October. Round about the same time I returned, I started going to another gym as well to see a personal trainer. This second gym is closer, has no stairs, has a car park and the trainer is cheaper. Also, the work I do is different and I find it more enjoyable, and it is pay as you go. But because I had paid in advance I arranged to go to gym 1 once a week, and to see the new trainer in gym 2 once a week as well. Just had a call from gym 1 to say someone had seen me in gym 2(!) and had gym 1 done something to upset me. Is this normal gym protocol? It has seriously pissed me off. Surely you can go to as many gyms as you want? I'm not intending to take any action legal or otherwise, I'm just curious on the potential legalities/ethics of the observations etc. Please feel free to edit the question title or content as I'm finding it hard to word. We are in the UK. Thanks | Is the question just whether a company can contact its customers to ensure that they're happy with the company's services? If so, the answer is generally yes. I can think of no reason why this would change based on the fact that someone saw her using the services of a competitor. Your mother seems to be treating the phone call as an accusation, but it appears to be standard customer-relationship maintenance. If she chooses to approach it differently, she can use it to improve her bargaining power with Gym 1. | You're misreading the law. You need to keep reading the section you referenced (emphasis added): The disclosure...shall be made in writing and delivered through the consumer’s account with the business, if the consumer maintains an account with the business, or by mail or electronically at the consumer’s option if the consumer does not maintain an account with the business Thus, the option to have the disclosure sent by mail only applies to consumers who do not have an account with the business. Since presumably a large number of sites only maintain personal information for users with accounts, such sites need not provide a mail option. Further, it doesn't say there needs to be a button: you just need the ability to say you'd like it mailed to you in the request somehow, and then they need to comply when you do. | It is the tenant's responsibility to understand the written contract. Oral statements about the contract do have to be consistent with the written contract (that is, in the context where you ask the landlord what a particular clause means before signing -- not in the case where you are modifying an existing contract). If I were renting a room and the contract says "Du må betale $1000 hver dag", which I don't understand because my Norwegian is terrible, I would ask about this, and the landlord might say that it means "You must pay $1000 every month", which could be a decent deal. Actually, the clause says "You must pay $1000 every day". When the reality of the situation becomes clear, then it is obvious that we didn't have an agreement in the first place. Perhaps he mis-spoke, or his English is as bad as my Norwegian, but I would not be held to rate in the written contract, assuming that I could back up my claim that he gave me that interpretation: the lease would probably be voided, as not an actual agreement. The underlying principle is that there has to be a "meeting of the minds" where the parties understand what they will get and what they must give, and there was a demonstrable failure of understanding. On the other hand, if I sign a contract without really reading it carefully, and there is a clause in English (which I speak) saying that I have to pay $1000 a day, but I didn't really think about the clause so that in a sense I didn't understand what I had agreed to, well, I may still be on the hook. (On the third hand, a court would probably say that's a ridiculous rent and void the contract on policy grounds). In general, "not my first language" is not a get-out-of-contract card, though attempts to trick people into signing documents in languages that they really have no understanding of won't be successful. Virtually nobody but a lawyer actually understands contractual language, yet contracts are enforced all the time. A contract can be explicitly modified by verbal agreement, or can be entirely verbal, but oral agreements face evidence problems, namely, what exactly did A and B say? It's scientifically well established that parties can be morally certain that the conversation went "A" (for one person) and "Not A" (for the other person). Using "could" rather than "would" in speech makes a huge difference in interpretation. There is a rule, the parol evidence rule, which essentially says that unless there is a good reason to not do so, the contract as written is what is enforced. Even if the conversation had been written into the contract, there's no basis in the contract for objectively determining whether a thing is old and "just broke". So even as an additional clause in the contract, it doesn't afford you a clear escape hatch. You might be able to prove with expert testimony that indeed the pipes had been corroding for a hundred years, and you could not have caused the pipes to burst. | From a German perspective, it would be absolutely normal and expected that you're providing identity & contact information publicly. Per §5 TMG (Impressumspflicht / Anbieterkennzeichnung) this is required for German tele-media offerings, such as websites or email providers, even if non-commercial. Whereas for you as an upstanding and diligent email provider an abuse@... address should be enough, the German context expects a street address where you could be served with a lawsuit… There absolutely are privacy and free speech issues with this compelled self-doxxing. But by running an email service, you're not just acting as a private person. Your privacy interests and the transparency and security interests of other people have to be balanced. Now since you are not in Germany, the TMG does not apply to you. You have no legal obligation to provide this information. However, the ISP also has no legal obligation to to deliver your email. The ISP does have an obligation to apply appropriate organizational and technical safety measures. It seems that one organizational measure they have found appropriate is that they will only deliver emails from providers that provide public contact information, as would be the norm in Germany. I am not entirely sure how the GDPR applies here. The GDPR doesn't really allow or prohibit disclosures of personal data, it just requires that every purpose of processing for personal data has a legal bases per GDPR Art 6. One such legal basis is a legitimate interest, which boils down to a balancing test between your rights and freedoms and other people's interests. I'm also not sure if the contact information should be classified as personal data in this context, because the contact info primarily relates to your role as an email provider. I'm also not sure if the ISP is processing your personal data in the sense of the GDPR when they merely require you to publish it on your own site. They would be processing it as soon as they scrape, store, or otherwise use this info. | The official judgements do not reveal the funding for these lawyers; so where can I find this information? Nowhere. The commercial arrangements between lawyers and their clients are private and confidential like any other business transactions. You have no more right to know this then you do to know how your neighbour pays their mortgage. how could she have funded litigation in the EWHC and then EWCA before the UKSC? She may have rich parents or another benefactor who has in interest in her or the outcome of the case. She may have won the lottery. She may be the heiress of a dead rich uncle. By the way, "having" student loans does not mean you "need" student loans. Interest rates on student loans are cheap - if I need to pay $10,000 for a course and have $10,000 earning 5%, I would be nuts to use that if I could take out a loan at 3%. | "Checking someone's digital footprint" could be stalking, depending on the circumstances. The better question to ask is about the legality of a certain action, and not the specific name used in a jurisdiction (although indeed in Washington there is a defined crime of "stalking"). I don't know what you mean by "checking someone's digital footprint", and it is not defined by law. Looking at RCW 9a.46.110, we can first discern that it does not matter for the definition of the crime where these people live or where the robbery took place. If two people from Alberta travel to Alaska and harass or murder a person from Texas, Washington law does not enter into the equation. The crime that you're asking about is the snooping, so for Washington to have jurisdiction, the snooping has to be "in" Washington. That does not mean that both parties have to be in Washington – there can be complex jurisdictional laws if the accused is in another state or country. The accused can easily be prosecuted in his own state, he can also be prosecuted in a foreign country, if he is caught there or if he is extradited to that country. For the act to be stalking, the first element is that "He or she intentionally and repeatedly harasses or repeatedly follows another person; and...". Harassment is defined in that section as a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person which seriously alarms, annoys, harasses, or is detrimental to such person, and which serves no legitimate or lawful purpose. The course of conduct shall be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and shall actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner, or when the course of conduct would cause a reasonable parent to fear for the well-being of his or her child. Since there was no communication between the parties, there is no harassment in the legal sense. There is no "following" either, therefore the act fails to constitute stalking w.r.t the first elements. Since the crime is defined by a conjunction of elements and your scenario fails on the first conjunct, it is not "stalking" (it is also not "harassment" as defined in RCW 9A.46.020, 9A.46.060. | Yes australia This is a straight up and down case of “deceptive and misleading conduct”. There is plenty of case law to support that testimonials (which this is) must be genuine, not paid for as they are from an actor. Further, they cannot be cherry-picked. If 5 real people reacted and 2 reacted negatively, you cannot just show the 3 who reacted positively - you have to show them all or otherwise disclose that 3 out 5 people loved the product. When actors (or people who are otherwise getting paid) are used that fact must be disclosed if it is not clear from the context. In a typical ad where people are just shown using the product without giving a personal endorsement it’s sufficiently clear that they are actors. However, in the type of ad you describe if they were actors this would need to be stated. Television and radio personalities must disclose when they are being paid for an endorsement under enforceable codes. Influencers are required to do so under non-binding codes, however, it is likely that breach of these codes would also be a breach of the law. | http://www.healthinfoprivacybc.ca/confidentiality/when-can-and-cant-they-tell-others is a pretty good summary. Different rules apply to private practices than public clinics and hospitals. I will assume that the clinic on campus is private. This is a summary of the summary about who your information can be shared with: Health care professionals can share information within your "circle of care". Specifically, they are allowed to assume your consent to this but you can explicitly withdraw that consent. This would include doctors within the same practice. Admin staff can access your information for administrative purposes. Anyone you have authorised them to share it with e.g. relatives, friends etc. The Medical Services Plan for billing and admin If you are unable to drive If there is suspected of child abuse If you are wounded by a gun or a knife If you are a danger to others For your specific questions: I asked about it and they said it's confidential, but confidential to the clinic. Correct, unless you explicitly revoke this. the counselling department can share information with the doctors This is tricker, these people may be either within your "circle of care" or they may be part of the same organisation. Notwithstanding, councillors are not doctors and are governed by the everyday laws related to confidentiality i.e. information given in confidence is confidential and everything else isn't. If you are told the limits of the confidentiality i.e. they tell the doctor, then those are the limits unless you renegotiate them. he would know I only have one kidney? Well you said "the counselling department can share information with the doctors" and this would require the information going the other way i.e. the doctor sharing with the councillor. Even if this type of sharing was OK in general (and I'm not sure it is, see above); the information shared should only be what is required for the councillor to do their job - the number of kidneys you have is probably irrelevant to this. What laws apply to situations like this where confidential information in one entity (medical office) decides to share it without the consent of the patients to another entity (the counselling dept.)? Well, we are not sure there are 2 entities: legally there may only be 1 - the university. Anyway, the laws are the Personal Information Protection Act and common law (Smith v. Jones, [1999] 1 SCR 455) |
Is Plummer v State still valid under contemporary law? Apparently, in Plummer v State back in 1893, the court ruled an individual may act in self-defense against a police officer provided there is unlawful use of force. Note, this does not mean self-defense is acceptable against an unlawful arrest. So, can this still be used as precedent today? Because what I learned from my Criminal Justice education was that a person can only act in self defense if they did not know the officer was an officer or if the officer turned out to be someone impersonating an officer. Unlawful arrest or even misuse of force can only be legally remedied by civil suits not self-defense. | It appears that Plummer v. State is still valid, but only in a very limited fact pattern. It is often quoted on the internet to justify the idea that a person may resist any unlawful arrest with force. That may have been true when Plummer was decided, and it was the clear holding of Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529 (1900) But Bad Elk is bad law today -- the wide adoption of the Model Penal Code starting in 1962 removed the right to resist a merely unlawful arrest. The right to use self-defense against excessive force by an officer remains, but is narrowly limited, and courts rarely find such resistance justified. In State v. Mulvihill 57 N.J. 151 (1970) The Supreme Court of New Jersey held: If, in effectuating the arrest or the temporary detention, the officer employs excessive and unnecessary force, the citizen may respond or counter with the use of reasonable force to protect himself, and if in so doing the officer is injured no criminal offense has been committed. However, the Mulvihill court cautioned: State v. Koonce, 89 N.J. Super. 169 (App. Div. 1965) held that "a private citizen may not use force to resist arrest by one he knows or has good reason to believe is an authorized police officer engaged in the performance of his duties, whether or not the arrest is illegal under the circumstances obtaining." (89 N.J. Super. at 184.) The opinion put to rest the notion that the common law rule existing in some jurisdictions, which permits a citizen to resist, even with reasonable force, an unlawful arrest by a police officer, was applicable in New Jersey. ... Accordingly, in our State when an officer makes an arrest, legal or illegal, it is the duty of the citizen to submit and, in the event the seizure is illegal, to seek recourse in the courts for the invasion of his right of freedom. The Mulvihill court explained the difference in the two csase by saying: Despite his duty to submit quietly without physical resistance to an arrest made by an officer acting in the course of his duty, even though the arrest is illegal, his right to freedom from unreasonable seizure and confinement can be protected, restored and vindicated through legal processes. However, the rule permitting reasonable resistance to excessive force of the officer, whether the arrest is lawful or unlawful, is designed to protect a person's bodily integrity and health and so permits resort to self-defense. Simply stated, the law recognizes that liberty can be restored through legal processes but life or limb cannot be repaired in a courtroom. And so it holds that the reason for outlawing resistance to an unlawful arrest and requiring disputes over its legality to be resolved in the courts has no controlling application on the right to resist an officer's excessive force. People v. Curtis, 70 Cal. 2d 347, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 719. The Mulvihill court further warned that: [A citizen] cannot use greater force in protecting himself against the officer's unlawful force than reasonably appears to be necessary. If he employs such greater force, then he becomes the aggressor and forfeits the right to claim self-defense ... Furthermore, if he knows that if he desists from his physically defensive measures and submits to arrest the officer's unlawfully excessive force would cease, the arrestee must desist or lose his privilege of self-defense. The court said that the duty to desist and submit if that would stop the excessive force is analogous to the duty to retreat rather than use force in self defense when this is feasible. The Nolo Press page "Resisting Arrest When Police Use Excessive Force" says: It’s rare that someone being placed under arrest has the right to forcefully resist. But in most states, if the arresting officer uses excessive force that could cause “great bodily harm,” the arrestee has the right to defend him or herself. That’s because most states hold that an officer’s use of excessive force amounts to assault or battery, which a victim has a right to defend against. ... An officer’s use of force is “excessive” if it is likely to result in unjustifiable great bodily harm (serious injury). Most states consider whether a “reasonable person” under the circumstances would have believed that the officer’s use of force was likely to cause great physical harm (including death). If the answer is “yes”—if a reasonable person would have felt it necessary to resist in self-defense, and if that person used a reasonable degree of force when resisting, then the resistance is typically justified. But this is a very high standard to meet, such that courts hardly ever find that an arrestee’s forceful resistance was defensible. This article from policeone.com citing California law, says that forceful resistance to an arrest is almost never justified. It does agree that resistance to excessive force can be used; Section 693 requires that even if the officer were committing a public offense (crime), only that "self-defense" force that is sufficient to prevent the offense may be used. In other words, the subject may only use force to simply stop the assault/battery under color of authority and never any more than that. and says that: It is a rare circumstance when this assault/battery under color of authority actually occurs and an officer is charged, not because of some great law enforcement driven conspiracy but because it rarely happens. In short, Plummer is still valid, but limited to the fact pattern when the person being arrested is actually being subjected to excessive force likely to cause great bodily harm, or death, and only justifies sufficient force to prevent such harm. The lawfulness of the arrest does not matter, it the the danger caused by the excess force that justifies possible resistance. As a practical matter, if resistance is likely to escalate rather than prevent harm, it is highly unwise. When Plummer is cited, often with Bad Elk, to justify resistance to an unlawful arrest because of its unlawfulness, that is no longer valid law and has not been for decades. Note that is a person who is not a law enforcement officer (LEO) but who is pretending to be one, tries to make an "arrest" this would not be an arrest at all, but an assault or an attempted abduction, and the victim would be justified in using reasonable force in self-defense, although not excessive force. This is not the Plummer rule, but the normal law of self-defense. However any arrestee should be careful. Claiming that the arresters are impersonators when they are in fact plainclothes LEOs will not go well. If a reasonable person should have known that they were LEOs, there is no right to resist unless excessive force is used. Note further that if non-LEOs attempt to make a "citizen's arrest", not impersonating officers, the right to self-defence only applies if excessive force is used, or there is a reasonable fear of excessive force likely to cause great bodily harm or death. Basically the Plummer rule still applies. Also, all of this is a matter of state law, and while Plummer should be good law in most if not all states, the exact rule may vary by state. In 2012 a few US states retained the common-law rule that any unlawful arrest justified resistance, according to the Nolo page linked above. That may have changed, or may change when a case arises. The question does not specify a state, and a precise answer depends on the specific state. | The terminology used may vary some by jurisdiction, but in many it will be said that Bob provoked the confrontation, or that Bob was the aggressor, or that Bob was engaged in a felony and so cannot claim self-defense. This fact patter is highly unlikely to arise in real lie, because if Bob has even a half-competent lawyer, the issue of self-defense, sure to fail, will not be raised. Doing so only wastes the court's time, and may well make them think worse of Bob, which may cost him. In less open-and-shut cases, the general rule is that one who provokes a confrontation, or who is the aggressor, may not claim self-defense. But the exact rule varies by jurisdiction, and the line will be drawn in different ways in different jurisdictions. In some one who seeks a confrontation may be denied a right of self-defense. | No. Self-defence law does The right of self-defense (also called, when it applies to the defense of another, alter ego defense, defense of others, defense of a third person) is the right for people to use reasonable or defensive force, for the purpose of defending one's own life (self-defense) or the lives of others, including –in certain circumstances– the use of deadly force. Whether you would succeed in such a defence depends on the exact circumstances. Good Samaritan laws protect you from trying to help, screwing up, and causing further damage. | Your question convolutes a number of different circumstances and legal questions. When is a person justified in using deadly force against a driver? When the person can convince a prosecutor, judge, or jury that a reasonable person would consider it necessary to prevent grievous bodily harm (and other situation-dependent defenses – for more nuance see self-defense). When can a law enforcement officer assault people with his vehicle? When he his performing official duties, and is performing them in a manner reasonably consistent with his training and official obligations. When can a driver assault people with his vehicle? When the driver can convince an inquiry that a reasonable person would consider it either not an act of assault, or else a justified act of self-defense. When are pedestrians liable for collisions with vehicles? When they are obstructing or infringing a traffic right-of-way; or when a judicial inquiry determines that they are at fault. Pedestrians in such situations could also be cited for many other offenses (Disorderly Conduct, Jaywalking, etc.). | When the LEO violently assaulted the citizen on the easement is he out of his jurisdiction? No. Federal law enforcement officers' jurisdiction generally* includes the entire US. Federal and state jurisdiction are said to be concurrent with one another. If the federal law enforcement officer has a lawful basis to effect an arrest, the arrest can be effected on a state† highway easement. Is there any immediate or long term consequence for an officer committing crimes or doing so egregiously (with or without qualified immunity) out of his jurisdiction as opposed to doing so in his jurisdiction? If the officer were outside his jurisdiction (which isn't the case here) then the officer is generally treated as any other private individual. In this case, "outside his jurisdiction" means "in another country," which brings up all sorts of additional complications that aren't really in scope here, largely because the laws and legal systems of other countries are different from those in the US. Are there any nuances to jurisdiction and law enforcement by LEOs that a first amendment auditor should be aware of? There are plenty, but perhaps the most prominent one, if the internet is any guide, is that an officer is not required to articulate the basis for reasonable suspicion or probable cause at the time of a Terry stop or an arrest. The time for this is much later, after a judge is involved. Arguing with an officer on this score is just going to make things worse. Instead, one should cooperate while stating one's objections clearly and calmly, especially making it clear that cooperation does not imply consent. * Some categories of officers do have more limited jurisdiction: thanks to cpast for the example of park rangers, whose jurisdiction is essentially restricted to national parks. The officers in this case are CBP field officers. There is a wide misconception that CBP officers' jurisdiction is limited to within 100 miles of the border, but that 100-mile limit only applies to their power to board and search vessels and vehicles without a warrant in order to prevent illegal entry into the US. Their power to make warrantless arrests "for any offence against the United States" committed in their presence is not geographically restricted. † The original video was filmed in South Portland, Maine, and the roadway is a municipal street, Gannett Drive, to be precise. The point remains, however, that it is a public right-of-way, and federal officers are not "out of their jurisdiction" simply because they've left a federal facility and entered a public place. | None No law requires police to keep people apart when making statements. Doing so is good police practice. In some police organizations internal regulations or procedures may specify that officers should do so. But those are not laws. In some cases witnesses may have had a chance to confer and agree on a story before police arrive, the police cannot prevent that. The trier of fact can take into account that witnesses had a chanc to agree on a false story. | No More generally, government agencies have no duty to protect. In the cases DeShaney vs. Winnebago and Town of Castle Rock vs. Gonzales, the supreme court has ruled that police agencies are not obligated to provide protection of citizens. In other words, police are well within their rights to pick and choose when to intervene to protect the lives and property of others — even when a threat is apparent. In the united-kingdom , the situation is the same with the relevant case being Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire, a precedent followed in australia. However, the police, fire fighters, ambulance officers etc. do owe the same common law duty of care as everyone else where such a duty exists if and when they do choose to act, unless specifically exempted by law. For example, they owe a duty to people in custody or innocent bystanders. | The law on self-defence in England is very clear Under Common law, a person is allowed to use necessary, reasonable and proportionate force to defend themselves, another or their property from imminent attack. Further, Section 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967 provides that: (1) A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large. (2) Subsection (1) above shall replace the rules of the common law on the question when force used for a purpose mentioned in the subsection is justified by that purpose. Is John's action self-defence? It would appear that John could avail himself of both the common law, because he is being attacked, and statutory defences because the attack would appear to be a criminal assault. Both defences require that the force used be reasonable. The definitive statement on reasonable force comes from Palmer v The Queen [1971] AC 814, 832: The defence of self-defence is one which can be and will be readily understood by any jury. It is a straightforward conception. It involves no abstruse legal thought. … Only common sense is needed for its understanding. It is both good law and good sense that a man who is attacked may defend himself. It is both good law and good sense that he may do, but may only do, what is reasonably necessary. But everything will depend upon the particular facts and circumstances. … It may in some cases be only sensible and clearly possible to take some simple avoiding action. Some attacks may be serious and dangerous. Others may not be. If there is some relatively minor attack it would not be common sense to permit some action of retaliation which was wholly out of proportion to the necessities of the situation. If an attack is serious so that it puts someone in immediate peril then immediate defensive action may be necessary. If the moment is one of crisis for someone in imminent danger he may have [to] avert the danger by some instant reaction. If the attack is all over and no sort of peril remains then the employment of force may be by way of revenge or punishment or by way of paying off an old score or may be pure aggression. There may no longer be any link with a necessity of defence… If a jury thought that in a moment of unexpected anguish a person attacked had only done what he honestly and instinctively thought was necessary that would be most potent evidence that only reasonable defensive action had been taken. Essentially, if the jury is satisfied that John struck out to stop an ongoing attack, this would be self-defence. If the attack was over, and John struck the aggressor as they were leaving, this would not be self-defence. |
What legal protections exist for people entering into polyamorous relationships in the United States? Polyamorous relationships exist when at least one partner in a relationship has additional partners. Consider the following hypothetical arrangement: Person A is married to Person B. Person B has a romantic relationship with Person C. Person C is married to Person D. People C and D have other partners. (They are omitted in the rest of the question for brevity). Some states have laws against these kinds of relationships. As an example from the web, Kansas law says: Adultery. (a) Adultery is engaging in sexual intercourse or sodomy with a person who is not married to the offender if: (1) The offender is married; or (2) the offender is not married and knows that the other person involved in the act is married. (b) Adultery is a class C misdemeanor. (Source: KSA 21-5511) Under that law, it would seem that People B and C are likely committing adultery. Partners in this kind of relationship are subject to certain legal risks. For example, should the relationship between C and D sour, B may be accused of adultery. Is there any legal "thing" that can help people in polyamorous relationships protect themselves from legal risks arising from their relationships? For example, could they construct a contract or MOU which outlines their mutual expectations that they will have other partners? | I know of no laws at the federal or state level that explicitly extend their protection to poly relationships. However, any law that purports to outlaw a polyamorous relationship among consenting adults should be looked at very skeptically, as it would likely be found unconstitutional under Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003): The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government. While that case dealt with homosexual relationships, it seems unlikely that the courts would conclude that heterosexual couples, throuples, etc., are entitled to less protection. Adultery laws exist in many jurisdictions, and many of them have survived constitutional challenges. But as far as I know, all those challenges relied on legal principles and precedents -- in particular, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) -- that Lawrence explicitly overruled. In this regard, I would not expect anyone in a polyamorous relationship to encourter meaningful legal jeopardy as a result of that relationship, assuming that the relationship(s) were otherwise legal and out in the open. If A is unaware of her spouse's relationship with C, for instance, that could cause problems in a divorce proceeding. I don't know of any legal options specifically designed for this sort of arrangement, but the more interconnected and interdependent these groups are, the more likely it becomes that some sort of written agreement would become worthwhile -- not as a response to legal danger arising from the polyamorous nature of the relationship, just to address the fact that someone is eventually going to fall short, potentially causing problems for the whole group. There are many lawyers who specialize in LGBT issues, and I'd imagine that some of them would be able to provide more detailed advice about how to deal with this type of situation. | united-states The treatment of how paternity is handled in cases of rape, from which child support and child custody determinations flow, varies by U.S. state in the United States as a result of an ongoing and recent wave of legislative innovation, prompted by cases in which convicted male rapists sought child custody in connection with children conceived in acts of rape for which they were convicted. A state by state summary of the applicable laws as of January 2020 (which oversimplifies the situation in which there are additional distinctions not noted, some of which are differences in wording that could be relevant to how these statutes apply in the OP case) can be found here. All of these laws are targeted at the case of a woman raped by a man who becomes pregnant, which is factually predominant, something that happens many thousands of times each year in the United States as a whole, and not at the case of a man who, in the course of being raped by a female, causes the female to become pregnant as a result. Cases of men being raped that are handled by the legal system, and do not involve statutory rape, predominantly involve sexual interaction that is not reproductive, i.e. something other than a man involuntarily having vaginal sex with a woman, often prison rape by a same sex inmate or rape with an object, and also, as in other cases of rape, often doesn't result in a conception of a child due to random chance. Likewise, many women convicted of rape are convicted as co-participants in a crime that involves physical penetration of a victim by a man or an object, rather than sexual intercourse with the woman convicted of the crime. So, the number of cases that could potentially be litigated with respect to this issue is much smaller. It is also worth noting that under U.S. criminal law, sexual intercourse procured by deception (other than deception regarding the person with whom one is having sex, for example, because of a blindfold or darkness, or deception regarding one's status as a medical practitioner making a medical examination, or as a law enforcement officer making a legally authorized cavity search) is not a crime and does not constitute rape. Also, generally speaking, having sex consensually in a manner not intended to lead to conception, which, in fact, does result in conception with consent to the sex giving rise to conception (e.g. where there is an agreement to "pull out" that isn't performed due to the acts of one or both parties involved), will almost never be prosecuted criminally as rape, whether or not a jury with perfect knowledge of the facts of the interaction could convict under the law of the minority of U.S. states where this might be possible. As @user6726 notes, the primary fact pattern related to the OP historically has involved instances of intercourse that are consensual in fact, but constitute statutory rape due to the age of the father which makes it impossible for him to legally consent, and in those cases, the default rule that the biological father of a child is recognized as the father for custody and child support purposes has been the predominant rule. But much of that case law predates modern rapist-paternity statutes and there is an equal protection argument that those statutes should have a parallel construction, although to the best of my knowledge, there are no reported appellate cases that have tested that issue. It remains an open issue of first impression in most, if not all, jurisdictions that have adopted rape-paternity statutes. In Minnesota, which had not adopted such a statute as of January 2020, being raped would not be a defense to a paternity, child custody, or child support claim. | Its worth actually reading through the law again - they're meant for different categories of drugs - and its worth looking up the relevant laws as a whole. You can't cherrypick which law you charge them under in this case. It depends on what the suspect has in posession, and if you have more serious charges, they're probably going to be preferred unless the prosecution decides to throw the entire library at the suspect and charge them with everything they can, or a larger subset. A quick search on the internet - which shouldn't be taken as legal advice, brings up this link. Category 1 drugs are addictive and seen as therapeutically useless - you shouldn't have any realistic reason to have quantities of it in your posession. Category 3 is drugs with therapeutic use - stuff like codine. You could get a prescription for that, but there's potential for abuse. They're aimed at different classes of drugs - and the confusion is over a misinterpretation of what the law is about. As an aside, this is why you need to usually read more than just a specific statute or law to get what its about. | Keep in mind that there are two kinds of legal consequences. One is criminal liability for violating a criminal statute, in a prosecution that must usually be brought by a government official. Merely causing emotional distress, in and of itself, is not generally a crime. For that matter, inducing someone to have sex with you through lies about anything other than the identity of the person having sex is usually not a crime. But inducing someone to disclose secrets or take actions that they otherwise would not have taken based upon a statement like this could be wire fraud, theft, extortion, or a variety of other crimes, depending upon what the person A was induced to do by the messages. Knowing what was sent, in isolation, doesn't tell you everything you need to know. While practicing medicine or other healing arts without a license is a crime or at least a civil offense, this wouldn't necessarily qualify, because person B is pretending to create someone treating person B, not pretending to practice medicine on person A. No one who wasn't in on the prank had medicine purportedly practiced upon them. But if the text were use to cause someone to act in reliance on a medical opinion (e.g., to get an employer to grant family leave to person A) then it might be illegal practice of medicine. The second is civil liability, in the form of a lawsuit for committing a civil wrong, called a "tort" or breaching a contract, or for other private individual initiated requests for remedies. The conduct in the question, conceivably gives rise to civil liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress, or civil fraud. But to know that it isn't enough to know what was said. One also has to know what happened on the other end of the communication. Did person A believe the text? Did person A suffer extreme emotional distress? Did person A part with money or information that couldn't have been obtained without a false statement of fact? Was person A's reputation harmed somehow? | Yes. In a civil case, there are two parties and the case is about finding out who has which obligations to whom. In a civil case, the plaintiff has to prove that they actually incurred damage through the actions of the defendant. A criminal case is the state vs. the defendant. The "wronged party" is the society as a whole, usually represented by the prosecutor. The victim, if there is one, just plays the role of yet another witness to find out if the defendant needs to be punished and how. There are also examples of crimes which are completely victimless but still punished by some societies. For example, in many places sexual intercourse between two consenting adult siblings is a crime (incest), even though there is no victim. Also, for some crimes it is even a crime to attempt to commit it. So one can be punished in a criminal court even though they didn't actually succeed in causing any damage to anyone. Example: I throw a rock at your car. When I hit, you can sue me in a civil court and force me to pay for the repairs. When I miss, I caused no damage to you, so there is nothing you could sue about. But what if I throw a rock at you and miss? That's attempted assault, maybe even attempted murder. When law enforcement finds out about it, I could be arrested, prosecuted and convicted to a prision sentence, even though you are perfectly fine. | The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is governed by Shari`ah law. See this work for an overview of Shari`ah as it relates to compensatory damages in personal injury cases. It is a principle under Ijma (a second-order source of Islamic law) that if one is insulted or emotionally injured by another party, you are entitled to be monetarily compensated. Sharia law in Saudi Arabia is not codified, so there exist differences among the four schools of Shari`ah regarding compensating a victim monetarily for emotional distress, which may alternatively be answered with physical punishment. Under Shari`ah, it is highly likely that moral harm would be found, since privacy is a fundamental right in Islam (see this source, with numerous citations). The standards for "intrusion into seclusion" under Shari`ah are stricter that they are under common law. However, other premises of the hypothetical are a problem under Shari`ah law (e.g. the whole dating thing). | If the purported husband (PH) has not attempted to enter the UK under false pretenses, and has not submitted documents containing false statements to the UK government, it is hard to see how he might be charged with a crime by the UK in connection with the invalid marriage. But since the PH is now said to have submitted an application for entry clearance based on the bigamous marriage, a marriage that it appears that he knew or should have known was invalid, he has submitted an official document based on a false statement. That is presumably an offense under UK law, and may well affect the PH's future immigration treatment. If the deceived wife has not knowingly made false statements to the UK government, it is hard to see how she would be charged in the UK. She would be wise to promptly inform the UK government that the marriage was invalid, to withdraw any statements or applications based on its validity, and to take legal steps to correct the record so that the marriage does not show as valid. This might be by annulment or some other procedure, probably depending on the law in the Bahamas where the purported marriage took place. (Under chapter 125, section 21(b) a prior marriage is valid grounds for an annulment or decree of nullity.) She might also want to notify the US authorities. The purported husband might have been guilty of bigamy in the Bahamas, depending on just how their law is written. Whether the authorities there will seek to extradite and prosecute him one cannot say. | No. The constitution protects the right of consenting adults to have sex in private "without the intervention of the government." Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (U.S. 2003). |
Can the US Senate disqualify a former President? In summary, the answer to "Can a US President, after impeachment and removal, be re-elected or re-appointed?" was "Yes, unless the Senate votes by simple majority to add the penalty of disqualification to a removal from office." Suppose a President can see that such a vote is coming and will pass, shortly before an election. Can that President resign just before the vote in order to effectively avoid the disqualification penalty? | SHORT ANSWER Suppose a President can see that such a vote is coming and will pass, shortly before an election. Can that President resign just before the vote in order to effectively avoid the disqualification penalty? Probably yes. But, there is no historical precedent for this happening. Nixon resigned before the House voted to impeach him, not midway into the impeachment proceedings. Neither Andrew Jackson nor Bill Clinton resigned prior to not being convicted on the basis of a U.S. House impeachment. Several federal judges and one cabinet official, however, have resigned midway through impeachment proceedings prior to being convicted, and in those cases, the case was dismissed and no judgment was entered by the U.S. Senate, so they were not disqualified from holding future federal public offices. LONG ANSWER Relevant Constitutional Language The pertinent provisions of the U.S. Constitution include the following: Article I, Section 2, Clause 5: The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment. Article I, Section 3, Clauses 6 and 7: 6: The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present. 7: Judgment in Cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law. Article II, Section 4: The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. Article II, Section 2, Clause 3: The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed. Analysis The key language is in Article I, Section 3, Clause 7 of the U.S. Constitution which states in the pertinent part that: Judgment in Cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States[.] This means that a President who is impeached by the House and convicted by the U.S. Senate may be prohibited from holding any federal office from President to dogcatcher in the future. But, this can only be done in a "judgment" of the U.S. Senate in connection with an impeachment based upon a conviction in the U.S. Senate following a House impeachment, which has never happened. The history of the impeachment language and the limitation to removals from office, suggest that only a person who is current serving in office may be impeached. Otherwise, the proceeding would be invalid as moot, and would be dismissed (as it has been in the case of many judges who have resigned after investigations are initiated or after a House impeaches but prior to a conviction of impeachment). A U.S. Senate ruling that someone is disqualified from holding future office can only be entered in a judgment of conviction for impeachment, so cannot apply to a past President. If this were done it would probably be an invalid "Bill of Attainder" or "Ex Post Facto" law. See U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 9, Clause 3 ("No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed"). And, the U.S. Senate can't pass a law unilaterally, or enter a judgment convicting someone on an impeachment unless the House initiates the proceeding. There is no precedent concerning whether if someone who was convicted by the U.S. Senate and removed from office based upon an impeachment initiated by the U.S. House, in which the judgment did not disqualify the person impeachment from holding future federal public offices, the U.S. Senate could amend its judgment later on to also disqualify the person so removed from office from holding further public office. I suspect that if the question were presented that the federal courts would hold that the amendment of the impeachment judgment was not valid because the word "judgment" implies an immediate ruling upon a case and not a perpetual right to hold the person subject to the judgment in limbo regarding the consequences of his impeachment conviction. | Yes, so long as you are still a US citizen, it does not matter if you no longer maintain residence in the United States. If you no longer have any sort of residence that can be claimed as a current residence, you simply register at whatever the last residence you used was when you lived in the United States (even if someone else lives there now). You would then have an absentee ballot mailed to you overseas. However, if you don't maintain any sort of residence in the United States, you will only be eligible to vote for federal offices (president, senate, house). You won't be allowed to vote in state or local elections. The keywords you'll need for voting are: UOCAVA, which is a program that allows for easier voting overseas (in some cases the ballot can actually be emailed to you and you are only responsible for printing it out, filling it out, and mailing it back). FPCA, which is the form you fill out. It actually doubles as a registration and an absentee ballot request, so you only have to fill out one form. The absentee request is good for all elections in the calendar year it is submitted, so you only have to fill it out once for both the primary and the general. | The other answer is incorrect. In fact, the question you're asking turns on the meaning of the phrase "the whole number of electors appointed." This could be interpreted either way, and as far as I know this ambiguity has never been considered by a court or by congress. It would only matter under the following conditions: Some states appoint fewer electors than the number to which they are entitled. The candidate with the greatest number of votes has more votes than half the number of electors actually appointed, but less than or equal to half the number of electors that should have been appointed. One way to look at this ambiguity is that it depends on how you parse the structure of the amendment. It could be either: a majority of (the whole number of electors) (appointed) a majority of the whole number of (electors appointed) In the first case, "appoint" refers to the sentence in Article 2 that specifies, determines, or "appoints" the number of electors. This reading is supported, for example, by the first definition of appoint at Merriam-Webster online, which is to fix or set officially, as in "to appoint a trial date." However, if you look at Article 2, it says Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress. Here, appoint is used in its second sense, to name officially. This suggests that a failure by any state to appoint any elector to which it is entitled reduces "the whole number of electors appointed" because some available places in the Electoral College have not had anyone appointed to fill them. I favor the second interpretation, but I suspect that if the conditions outlined above actually did arise, Congress would choose the politically expedient interpretation. That is, if the candidate with the most votes was of the party in control of Congress, they would take the second interpretation, and if that candidate of the other party, they would take the first. I further suspect that the courts would not get involved. | No, it means the following are eligible: Natural born citizens Citizens of the United States, at the time of the adoption of the constitution The second part was to allow people that were citizens of the US in 1788 (but were obviously not "natural born citizens", since the US didn't exist when they were born) to be eligible for the Presidency. Check out Alexander Hamilton's draft of this clause: No person shall be eligible to the office of President of the United States unless he be now a Citizen of one of the States, or hereafter be born a Citizen of the United States. | Yes. In 1872 President Grant was stopped for speeding (on horseback, mind you). The officer, observing that he had stopped the President of the United States, initially let him go with nothing but a verbal warning. Later the same day, the same officer stopped Grant again speeding in the same place. The officer then informed Grant that he would have to be taken in, to which Grant gave a reply encouraging the officer to do his duty. Grant was then taken to the police station where he was charged with speeding, and held until he paid a $20 fine, at which point he was released. In summary, POTUS was: Charged with an offence Deprived of his liberty for committing said offence Held until he served his punishment (paying $20) ... all without impeachment. Now, this was a long time ago. I think that today, this is unlikely, since Secret Service would (legal or not) shield the President from arrests (national security reasons). However if a state level authority did manage to arrest the President for a crime and refused to let him go, then the Vice President and cabinet would invoke the 25th Amendment (on the grounds that the President is unable to discharge his duties due to imprisonment), so that the imprisoned person would now be a former president. | Yes Presidential pardons only deal with breaches of Federal law. So, if the punishment is a fine then that penalty is waived. However, if the fine is punishment for breach of state law, the pardon does not touch it - he would need a pardon from the relevant state Governor(s). But Anthony Levandowski is not being punished with a fine, he was punished with a jail term. What he owes Google is damages for breach of contract or a tort, both civil matters and almost certainly under California law, not a punishment for an offence. This is not something he can be pardoned for by a President (if under Federal law which is unlikely) or a Governor (if under state law). His actions constituted both an offence against the state, which can be pardoned, and caused damage to another person (Google) which can’t. He owes this money as a debt just as if he had bought something from them or borrowed money from them. | Art. 1 Sect 5 of the Constitution empowers both houses to make their own rules. That means that they can articulate rules regarding what or how you can talk on the floor. It is held that the president of the senate can issue a ruling, and the ruling can be overridden by majority vote. If the Constitution were amended to be more specific about rules of conduct, then some such Senate rules might be unconstitutional and SCOTUS could invalidate the rule. The only specific constitutional requirement on conducting business is that a majority constitutes a quorum. | Section 11302 of the California Elections Code makes it crystal clear - as soon as an office becomes vacant, the recall election proceeds anyway, unless as of that moment there are not enough signatures to proceed to the vote. So the resignation tactic can only be used to stop a recall election while they are still in the signature-gathering phase - it will not work if they have already gotten enough signatures. California's recall law as it applies to statewide elected officials is, frankly, idiotic (it should be like an impeachment, next officer in line gets the post), but it is designed specifically to stop a shenanigan like you describe. The Lieutenant Governor would become Governor if Newsom resigned, but only subject to the results of the Recall - if Newsom is recalled (despite already having resigned), the person with the plurality on part two of the ballot would become the next Governor. |
What determines the time factor in a court reaching a decision? Aside from scheduling, what factors determine how long it takes for a court to reach a decision? My specific prompt for asking is the news that John Bolton is willing to defy the White House and testify if a court clears the way and the Democrats' having a concern that such lawsuits are a delaying tactic but I am also wondering generally. Is it that judges need time for their clerks to research precedent? Given that there are hundreds of years of case law, is this research open-ended, or does a judge have an immediate "gut" decision on a case and then research is done to find any relevant case law to support it? (I realize this is a very naive question so if it is not appropriate here let me know and I will delete it) | Generally speaking, courts take whatever time they need to write their decision and then release it close to immediately. In cases where a judge believes she has the information she needs, she may rule "from the bench," announcing a decision and entering an order for the parties to comply, and then follow up with a written order later. The research process is fairly open-ended, but legal research databases are pretty advanced, and a good researcher can generally get his hands on the vast majority of what he'll need in very short order. But practically speaking, there are few limits on how long that process takes. A litigant who was growing impatient could seek a writ of procedendo to force a court to move faster, but my experience indicates that most attorneys wouldn't attempt that move unless a decision had been pending for at least a year with no action, which would be unusual. | It's happened before in real life. Here is a 1994 article describing an Illinois criminal trial where defense counsel pulled the old switcheroo and sat a different person with him at the defense table instead of the defendant. The defendant, instead, sat somewhere else in the courtroom. After a witness misidentified the perp as the person at the defense table (not the defendant), the judge directed a not-guilty verdict to settle the case but sanctioned the defense attorney instead. The appellate and state supreme courts upheld the sanction (by a one-vote margin in both cases) but dissenting opinions noted counsel and defendant technically broke no rules. From the article: The dissent said Mr. Sotomayor's intent was only to show the unreliability of the prosecution's witness. Moreover, seating a client at counsel's table is customary but not required. Nor is a lawyer obliged [...] to help a witness make an identification. Also, here is a similar but not duplicate question. | The court receives petitions for something like 8,000 cases annually, but it only hears something like 75 to 100 cases. There is not enough time or manpower to address each case that comes up, so the vast majority of the cases are simply rejected without comment. There are some notable exceptions, but a review of the order list from the day before Trump's order might give you a better feel for the caseload the court is dealing with and how unremarkable it is for an order to be brief, unsigned, and with no noted dissents. The only significance of the Court disposing of Trump's case this way is that it indicates none of the justices considered the issues he was raising to be serious enough to merit their attention. | There have been instances where the US Supreme Court has held over cases to the next term, and instances where they ordered a case re-argued in the next term. Brown vs Board of Education was a particularly well known case that was reargued. I believe that such occasions are rare, and that the court makes a significant effort to decide each case in the same term where certiorari is granted. Once exception is when the Court has a vacancy and is waiting fora new Justice to be confirmed, and the Justices in office are tied. Then cases with 4-4 splits are often held and re-argued. More often, the Justices decide, after granting certiorari, that this was a mistake, and dismiss the case altogether. The phrase used is that the writ is "dismissed as improvidently granted" or "DIGed". This has the same ultimate effect as if certiorari had never been granted -- the lower court decision is left standing, and no Supreme Court precedent is created. This is still fairly rare. To the best of my knowledge there is no rule requiring decision within any specific time, but I have never heard of a case held over for more than one term. | These questions are typically left to the discretion of the judge in whose courtroom the presentation is happening. It is very common to see these types of devices in trial courts, but they are much less common in appellate courts, and I doubt you'd ever see one in the United States Supreme Court, where the arguments are essentially limited to oral presentations. | The difficult part is deciding when two cases are similar. Precedents from higher courts govern what the law is in a case. But, a lot of what trial court judges do is to boil down a mountain of evidence to determine authoritatively what facts actually transpired before applying the law to those facts. This involves immense amounts of discretion and judgment. Also, while in some cases the law provides very clear guidance to a judge about what to do, in other cases, the law is vague enough that two different judges can reach two different verdicts, both of which are legally correct, on the same set of facts. For example, in a divorce case (involving made up facts and law to illustrate the idea), suppose that the two main assets of the family are a house and retirement account of equal value and that the facts as applied to the relevant law say that the value of the assets must be divided equally between the husband and wife. One judge could award the house to the husband and the retirement account to the wife, while another judge could award the retirement account to the husband and the house to the wife. But both judges would have complied perfectly with the law. Similarly, in a divorce there are a variety of different custody plans for children that could all conform to the law and different judges could choose different plans and each be correct. As another example, suppose that a bulldozer destroys a house and the person whose house is destroyed sues for money damages. The judge is presented with two different appraisals from equally qualified appraisers for the value of the house, both of whom superficially at least, are using proper appraisal methods. But one appraiser says the house was worth 1,000,000 and another says that the house was worth 1,500,000. Realistically, any verdict the judge renders between 1,000,000 and 1,500,000 could be upheld as legally correct. Because the process of turning evidence into legal verdicts involves so much discretion and so many judgment calls, and because it is rare that two cases are factually identical, the goal of giving similar verdicts for similar cases, is difficult to achieve and difficult even to evaluate in real life. It is almost certain that similar cases often result in dissimilar verdicts, and not infrequently the reasons for this (like using personal ideologies as opposed to what the law demands to resolve close cases) are not good ones. But deciding how common that is, or in what kinds of cases it is most troubling that this happens, is very hard to determine. | I'm sorry to deflate what is clearly a very philosophically interesting question, but the law is straightforward here. The truth, essentially, is the set of facts that you believe to be true. Yes. It means that you will not lie by omission, and that you will provide the relevant facts. No, you don't need to recount history since the first instant of the big bang. Only expert witnesses may answer by giving their opinion or evaluation. This is presumed accurate by their experience and where it is not accurate, the other side may present opposing expert witnesses to contest their conclusion or evaluation. Laypeople are permitted to answer only with their recollection of facts. Lawyers may not ask them what their opinion is, although by your definition every question is about opinion, since perception and memory is limited. But the question "What colour was Mr Smith's house?" and "What architectural style informed the facade of Mr Smith's house?" require different amounts of expertise and opinion. "Truth" isn't jargon, or even technical language here. I generally aim to be truthful, and so when someone asks me what time it is, I don't feel compelled to answer to the nano/picosecond. Would you call me a liar? Am I lying by omission? Similarly, if someone asks me what colour a car is, I don't feel compelled to say "I can't possibly know, because my perception may differ from yours. If you honestly feel that when someone asks you to be truthful about something, then you must either be lying, or lying by omission if you don't start your answer with the first instant of the big bang, your problem is not one of law. | You cannot legally force police to wait to carry out the search. They can search even if you are not present. In fact, they are required to execute the warrant within a certain time frame, which precludes delaying the execution of the warrant. You can inspect the warrant to see if it is "proper" (has the judges name, correct address, is a search warrant and not a warrant of removal/deportation...). Calling a lawyer is always wise, but that does not stop the search. |
Paying to leave without notice in at-will employment state Checking up here on a question that appeared on workplace.stackexchange.com: Someone signed a contract saying "If you leave the assignment without giving 15 days prior notice you will be liable to pay these days.". This is in the USA in an at-will employment state, which means the employer can fire the employee at any time without notice, and without these terms the employee could quit at any time without notice. So the question is: In a US state with at-will employment, are contract terms enforceable that say the employee has to pay the employer if they leave without giving notice? (Extra question: Would it be enforceable if the contract just says that the employee has to give 14 days notice, and would it be enforceable if both employer and employee agreed that 14 days notice are required for each side?) Or does the state law that anyone can cancel an employment contract at any time without reason override this? (Probably should have mentioned: In this case the OP posting on workplace had just started a low-paid job, figured out that for medical reasons she couldn't do it, wanted to quit, and then found this term in the contract. So Inaki's answer is very useful in general, while user662852's answer is most helpful in this particular case). | are contract terms enforceable that say the employee has to pay the employer if they leave without giving notice? Yes, as long as the penalization is not of punitive nature. The doctrine of at-will employment is only the default condition, but a contract may supersede it. As for the extra question, reciprocity of sanctions (as in leaving without notice) is not a requirement for enforceability of a contract. In general, the lack of reciprocity only signals that there is a difference in the parties' bargaining power, but usually that does not affect enforceability. | The German law mandates minimum notice periods for work contracts. But there is no restriction on maximum notice periods, as long as the employee does not have a longer notice period than the employer (§622 BGB de|en). So yes, in theory you could negotiate that the company is not allowed to fire you in the first 4 years. But I would find it unlikely that they would agree to that. When the stock options are really your only reason why you want to avoid getting terminated in the first 4 years, then they are more likely to be open to negotiations about the stock option clause than about the termination clause. | The relevant law in California is here. In your situation, it is presumed (as you both agree) that you have a month to month agreement. §1946 states that A hiring of real property, for a term not specified by the parties, is deemed to be renewed as stated in Section 1945, at the end of the term implied by law unless one of the parties gives written notice to the other of that party’s intention to terminate the same, at least as long before the expiration thereof as the term of the hiring itself, not exceeding 30 days; In other words, the landlord has to give you 30 days advance notice to terminate the lease, and you have to give 30 days advance notice to terminate the lease (and it must be written notice). The section continues: provided, however, that as to tenancies from month to month either of the parties may terminate the same by giving at least 30 days’ written notice thereof at any time and the rent shall be due and payable to and including the date of termination. which effectively says the same thing, specifically appliedd to month to month leases. There is some leeway on terminating a lease: It shall be competent for the parties to provide by an agreement at the time the tenancy is created that a notice of the intention to terminate the same may be given at any time not less than seven days before the expiration of the term thereof. The notice herein required shall be given in the manner prescribed in Section 1162 of the Code of Civil Procedure or by sending a copy by certified or registered mail addressed to the other party. But you would have to establish that there was such an agreement (I assume there was not). §1946.1 asserts that a hiring of residential real property for a term not specified by the parties, is deemed to be renewed as stated in Section 1945, at the end of the term implied by law unless one of the parties gives written notice to the other of his or her intention to terminate the tenancy, as provided in this section. That is, a lease is automatically renewed in your situation unless notice has been given. Moreover, A tenant giving notice pursuant to this section shall give notice for a period at least as long as the term of the periodic tenancy prior to the proposed date of termination. What you are proposing contravenes this provision of the law – from your description of the facts, you did not give notice 30 days before now. So your obligation to the landlord exists to the end of May. Bear in mind that the law imposes obligations on both landlord and tenant: just as the landlord cannot throw you out without proper notification, you cannot walk away from your obligation without proper notification. §1951.2 addresses breach of lease and abandonment by lessee (you) if a lessee of real property breaches the lease and abandons the property before the end of the term or if his right to possession is terminated by the lessor because of a breach of the lease, the lease terminates. Upon such termination, the lessor may recover from the lessee: (1) The worth at the time of award of the unpaid rent which had been earned at the time of termination; (2) The worth at the time of award of the amount by which the unpaid rent which would have been earned after termination until the time of award exceeds the amount of such rental loss that the lessee proves could have been reasonably avoided; (3) Subject to subdivision (c), the worth at the time of award of the amount by which the unpaid rent for the balance of the term after the time of award exceeds the amount of such rental loss that the lessee proves could be reasonably avoided; and (4) Any other amount necessary to compensate the lessor for all the detriment proximately caused by the lessee’s failure to perform his obligations under the lease or which in the ordinary course of things would be likely to result therefrom. There are, also, no special exceptions about landlords selling their property that allow instant termination. That is, you still owe the month's rent, even though the lease is ending at the end of the month. You could of course ask the landlord to forgive you that last month's obligation. I am assuming that the lease was terminated properly by the landlord. If it was not, the landlord has not legally terminated the lease and it will continue until someone does properly terminate the lease. That might provide incentive for the other party to just forget the last month's rent, but it also might not. | If the tenant finds a new place to live before the end of the two months' notice and wishes to leave early, is the tenant required to [give] one month's notice that they are leaving? No, the tenant is not required to give notice if they has already received notice from the landlord. In addition, the tenant is required to pay rent up to the end of the notice period, even if they move out sooner (for now; but see also below). If they don't move out, they must still pay the rent. If the tenant...moves out of the property half way through their rental period, can the tenant claim a refund on the rent already paid which reflects the time between when they left the property and when the rental period would expire? For a tenancy which started before 1 October 2015, there is no automatic right to a refund. The tenant can of course ask the landlord for one, though the landlord would only be obliged to refund rent if a new tenant moves in before the end of that period. For tenancies made after 1 October 2015, s35 of the Deregulation Act 2015 amends s21 of the Housing Act 1988 to allow the 2 months' notice to end on any day (after the end of a fixed term), not just the end of a rental period. s40 then adds a new section which requires the landlord to repay any rent applying during that final period, but after the tenant moves out. If the tenant is not in a strong enough financial position to put together enough money for the deposit for their next home, or have simply been unsuccessful in finding a property which is suitable based on their current income, what course of action should they take? Firstly, the date specified in a s21 notice is not the date by which the tenant must move out -- even though, in practice, this is how it is normally treated. Instead, it is earliest date on which the landlord can begin legal proceedings. So, after that date, there is likely to be a delay until the case can appear before a court. The judge has some discretion as to when the tenancy will actually end, so you can ask for a little more time -- but note that the only way to prevent an eviction under s21 is to show that the landlord failed to follow the correct procedure. See also Shelter's comprehensive guide on the subject for more details. | Unless it is prohibited by law in some state (such as California), a server's employment contract can have a clause holding the server responsible for an unpaid tab. Even in lieu of such a clause, since in most states employment is at-will, the employee can be fired if they do not do as told. There is a limit to the effect that their wage cannot be reduced below minimum wage. The question of the political rationale of this practice is outside the scope of law, but there are some legal factors that can lead to getting compensation from a server, even if pay-docking is prohibited. If a server intentionally colludes with a dine-and-hash customer, the server is liable. The server might also be negligent, for example they may have failed to notify management of evidence of an impending dine-and-dash such as overhearing a conversation, or watching the customers trickle out; or, disappearing for an unreasonable time for a smoke break (leaving the table unattended). Liability requires a lawsuit where the court decides if the server should pay. | An employee is an agent of the employer when working and owes a duty of loyalty to the employer. One of the obligations associated with a duty of loyalty is to refrain from receiving anything other than the employer authorized compensation for the work, rather than benefitting personally from work done on behalf of the employer. By appropriating additional benefit from the customer in a way that is unauthorized by the employer (the employer would be within its rights to sanction and authorize this conduct if desired), an employee who does not turn the profit in this transaction over to the employer has breached a fiduciary duty to the employer for which the employer would have a right to sue the employee for the amount by which the employee was unjustly enriched in the transaction. Would it actually play out this way in real life for these sums of money? Probably not. The stakes involved wouldn't justify the time and money of a lawsuit. But, breaching a fiduciary duty of loyalty to your employer in this context probably constitutes good cause to terminate the employment of the employee without paying severance that would otherwise be payable under Canadian employment law (in theory anyway, I've never seen a reported court case on point). | I have read that Assured Shorthold Tenancies of less than 6 months are allowed, but you are not allowed to evict a tenant before 6 months. That applies only to section 21 ("no fault") evictions. Specifically, according to section 21 of the Housing Act 1988, a notice can't be served in the first 4 months of a tenancy (section 21(4B)), and can't take effect in the first 6 months (section 21(5)). Section 8 evictions, which require one or more of the reasons listed in Schedule 2 of the Act, do not have this restriction - though only some of them can be used during the fixed term part of the tenancy, and they must be listed in the tenancy agreement in order to be used in that way. Will I have to wait until he has actually left before I can arrange an AST with new tenants? Yes, but that's always true. It's very unwise for a new tenancy agreement to be signed until the previous tenants have moved out, because if they don't leave before the new agreement takes effect, the landlord is now committed to finding accommodation for the new tenants. This is why tenancy agreements are often only signed on the first day of the tenancy. | This is an increasingly common practice in the UK for dismissals, especially for reasons of redundancy. What is going on here is that they are attempting to enter into what until recently was known as a compromise agreement, and is now termed settlement agreement. Normally, when you are made redundant, you are entitled to statutory redundancy pay (amount depends on age and length of service; see https://www.gov.uk/redundant-your-rights/redundancy-pay). You can take this and do not need to sign anything. However, sometimes companies make slightly more generous offers in exchange for you agreeing not to take them to tribunal/court or discuss/disclose certain matters. This would often involve more money and an agreed reference. These agreements only have legal standing if you have taken legal advice from a person qualified to give it. The UK's national conciliation and arbitration service ACAS has information on settlement agreements at http://www.acas.org.uk/index.aspx?articleid=4395 Therefore the employer is offering to pay legal fees because they need you to get advice before you sign a document which protects them. They are suggesting solicitors because they know of solicitors willing to do this work for the price they are willing to pay. Some companies will do this for every dismissal and have a have a standard package for enhanced redundancy. Other companies decide for each case. Before you proceed to arrange a solicitor, you should check: That you are free to choose another solicitor who will do the same for £500. That this will be paid whether or not you agree to the terms. What your length of service is, what your statutory entitlement is and what the difference is between that and what you are being offered. You should also think carefully about whether you have any potential claims against the employer - for instance, if you think you are not being made redundant because the employer is doing less of a particular type of work but because you have raised issues of discrimination. You are probably being asked to give up your right to pursue this. In terms of choice of solicitor, a solicitor which gets work from employer recommendations probably won't be too forthright in encouraging you to challenge unfavourable terms (even if they do not work for employers). If you are a member of a trade union, they will be able to suggest lawyers who do settlement agreements for employees on a regular basis. If not (and I assume not as otherwise they would be helping you through this), I would suggest finding a firm that specialises in representing employees - some solicitors' firms like Thompsons and Morrish are pretty open about their focus. |
Does company have the right to purchase my vested shares after I quit? Here's some context in case it's relevant. I worked at a startup which issued shares (not options) to employees. A good chunk of my shares have vested over the 4-year vesting period. I have voluntarily quit without being fully vested. The company would like to purchase all my shares back. I understand that I don't get to keep my unvested shares, but I'm under the impression that the vested shares are mine to keep. I have already bought them and paid the taxes. I filled out IRS form 83b. This is the relevant part of my shareholder agreement if such person’s employment is terminated without Cause, such person shall only be required to sell his or her Unvested Shares hereunder and shall not be required to transfer his or her Vested Shares. I was not terminated. I voluntarily quit and left in good standing. The shareholder's agreement doesn't seem to address what happens to employee shares if they quit. What's the default here? That is, if there was no mention of share buyback, is the company allowed to purchase my shares without my agreement? What recourse do I have if they insist on buying it back? What happens if I simply refuse to sign any offer deal? Thank you in advance for you time | Possibly Your employment contract is only one part of your deal You are also bound by the company’s constitution and any shareholder agreement that may exist. Companies often have wide ranging powers to repurchase their own shares at fair market value or following a pre-specified formula. It’s not uncommon for private companies to get an option to purchase shares automatically from ex-employees. | Can the seller enter a formal agreement with the tenants in which the seller pays a sum of money and in return the tenants vacate the premises before the closing date, and would such agreement hold over the tenants legal right to remain on premises past the closing date? Maybe. It depends on tenancy law in Nova Scotia. Notwithstanding, given that the tenants are “difficult”, what are your plans if they take the cash and don’t move out? What happens if the sale goes though under the assumption that the tenants have left, and in fact the tenants are still occupying the premises? Why would the buyer settle under an “assumption”? At the time of settlement either the tenants have left (so settlement happens) or the haven’t (so the vendor is in breach, settlement doesn’t happen and the buyer decides whether to rescind the contract and claim damages or affirm the contract and claim damages). What guarantees and proofs can the buyer demand as to the vacant status of the property? They take the keys and walk into it. What other questions should the buyer be asking? They should be asking: “Will you be in a position to fulfil your obligations under the contract?” | @Rick aptly answers your first question (and I totally agree with his answer including his conclusion that the cited provisions apply to single member LLCs). So, I'll touch on issues associated with your second one. Would there be anything legally wrong with my intentionally wasting the company's money or doing something similarly pointless and harmful to the business, considering I'm the only actual person (as in human, not legal person) who is harmed in any way? If the way you use the money wastefully is considered by a court to be a de facto distribution by the LLC to you, its sole member, and this renders it insolvent (as defined in ORS 63.229 (Limitations on distributions), you could have personal liability for the distribution to the company. See ORS 53.235. Creditors of the company could then garnish that obligation to collect their debts owed to the company from you (a garnishment is technically a right to obtain money or property from someone who owes a debt to a judgment debtor, usually a bank or employer, but not always as in this case). Intentionally wasting the company's money would probably constitute a "fraudulent transfer" on the part of the LLC which could expose you to liability to third-party creditors if those actions left the company unable to pay its debts as they came due, or with assets with a fair market value that was lower than the fair market value of its current and currently anticipated liabilities. This parallel liability would arise under the Oregon Fraudulent Transfers Act and related provisions of Oregon law found at ORS 95.200 to 95.310. If you were anticipating or in the process of divorcing, it could constitute economic waste that could be held against you (treating the wasted assets as if they still existed and were allocated to your in a property division). Likewise, if the waste reduced your income for child support purposes, a court would seriously consider imputing the income you could have had if you had not acting in that matter to the income you actually had, in order to calculate your child support obligation. And, you might be disallowed a deduction for the waste of the company's money, rather than having it treated as an expense, which could increase your income tax and self-employment tax liability. But, to the extent that you are the sole owner of the company, no creditor, spouse or child has rights impaired by your actions, and you don't claim the wasted assets as income tax deductions, there would be no one with standing to complain about your conduct in court. | An agreement to agree is void There is a multitude of case law on this point. If the NDA was not available to you when you signed the employment contract and the term was couched as you describe; then the term would be unenforcable. That is, your employment contract would be binding except for that term i.e. you could not be compelled to sign the NDA. Now, there may be a requirement on you to negotiate in good faith in an attempt to find an NDA you can agree to but if you can't find one you can't find one. You cannot (legally) be fired for this reason. Now, if the NDA was available, and you were told where to find it, and irrespective of if you did or didn't find it, you would be bound to the NDA. | The parties to the contract have not changed; they are still the purchaser company and the scrap vendor. The obligations have not changed; they are presumably based on amounts of stock and monetary value. The only changes are in the name of one party and its ownership, so unless the contract permits termination for those reasons (not unheard of, if a contract has been intended to provide/avert support from/by a particular party or symbolism) the contract still stands with all its terms. A novation is not needed. | In business dealings, you would have a contract with a company, not with its owner. The new owner inherits both the assets and liabilities of the company. It's up to the buyer of the business to do due diligence before buying the company. The old owner may escape obligations to clients and suppliers once the sale of the business is complete, but the new owner could sue the old owner for fraud. (It may be possible to escape some liabilities by declaring bankruptcy, but that's not the situation you described. One unethical accounting trick that a company can use is to split the company into two corporations such that one branch inherits the liabilities, and it go defunct.) | Yes, You May According to this page from Invest-faq It is perfectly legal for non-resident aliens to trade equities on exchanges in the United States using US brokerage houses directly. (A “non-resident alien” (NRA) is the US government’s name for a citizen of a country other than the US who also lives outside the US.) ... Of course there are certain formalities concerning tax treatment of such accounts, and these formalities must be clarified with the brokerage house when the account is opened. Individuals who are not US citizens must complete a W-8 form, which is a certificate of foreign status, and return it to the brokerage house. The specific rules of how these accounts are taxed are described in IRS Publication 515 (Withholding of tax on non-resident aliens) and IRS Publication 901 (Tax treaties). The tax treaty is especially important. If the individual’s country of residence has an agreement (tax treaty) with the US government, those rules apply. The relevant Investopedia page says: There is no citizenship requirement for owning stocks of American companies. While U.S. investment securities are regulated by U.S. law, there are no specific provisions that forbid individuals who are not citizens of the U.S. from participating in the U.S. stock market. However, even if a non-U.S. citizen can legally trade U.S. stocks and bonds, it may still be required (in addition to being advisable) for them to consult with an investment firm and use the services of a professional. ... One of the goals of the Patriot Act of 2001, passed following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, was to prevent individuals with any links to terrorist activities from funding their illegal activities through the American capital markets. The act led to brokerage firms implementing more stringent requirements for verifying customer identities, particularly for non-U.S. citizens. Part of this legislation also requires stockbrokers to report any suspicious account activity to the U.S. government. However, these regulations obviously do not impact the majority of international investors because the vast majority of investors do not have any criminal associations. Some brokerage firms may require non-U.S. citizens to produce additional types of identification documents in order to comply with their individual policies. This can include visa information, a valid Social Security number, or a Certificate of Status of Beneficial Owner for United States Tax Withholding and Reporting form (also called a W-8BEN). Some brokerages may also require non-U.S. citizens to submit paper applications versus submitting online applications to open accounts. The Forbes article: "If You Trade Around The World, You Need To Know IRS Rules" says: Non-resident aliens are subject to tax withholding on dividends, certain interest income and sales of master limited partnerships like energy companies. They have U.S. source income — effectively connected income (ECI) — on real property and regular business operations located in the U.S. A non-resident alien living abroad can open a U.S.-based forex or futures trading account and not owe any capital gains taxes in the U.S. U.S. tax law has long encouraged foreign taxpayers to invest and trade in U.S. financial markets ... A non-resident alien living abroad can also open a U.S.-based securities account, but there could be some dividend tax withholding. If the non-resident spends more than 183 days in the U.S., he owes taxes on net U.S. source capital gains, even though he may not trigger U.S. residency under the substantial presence test. Thus having a visa of any kind is not required. Anyone anywhere in the world who is not associated with terrorism may trade on US exchanges provided they comply with the appropriate tax, identification, and other laws of the US in doing so. | Given that they told me I would get back pay and I worked conditional on that information, am I entitled to it? You are entitled to backpay in accordance with the terms you accepted from HR. The employer's refusal to pay you from October 1st is in violation of Austria's Allgemeines bürgerliches Gesetzbuch at § 860a. At this point you have fully complied with the conditions on which your continued employment was contingent. From then on, the employer's belatedness in revoking its commitment to backdate your start date to October 1st is not cognizable: Prior to your full compliance with the conditions of academic nature, there was no possible way for you to be aware of the employer's repudiation of its obligations regarding the October-December compensation. The employer's failure to timely notify you of the unilateral change is especially notorious and hard to justify. Your employment & relocation to Austria suggests that the employer had --and waived-- ample opportunity to inform you that any work you perform prior to addressing the contingent aspect will not be compensated. Even if the employer ventures with a dubious allegation of that sort, it is unlikely to survive § 1152. |
Doesn't the use of precedent constitute a bandwagon fallacy? I see widespread use of precedent in courts across the world. In essence, to me this appears as follows: "Just because some other people responded to x with y, then any time we see something significantly similar to x, we always respond with y." Doesn't this constitute a logical fallacy; Argumentum ad populum? It prevents people from forming their own opinions about x, just because some other people already made an opinion about something similar. If abused it can mean that the particularities about this specific x are ignored. The use of precedent seems to imply that it's more important to settle similar cases uniformly, rather than to settle them fairly and justly based on their individual merits. | First, the relevant term is "precedent". You have misstated the nature of "precedent". Precedent is simply the addition of further information about what the law is. A legislature may set forth a law that say "If A, then (if you B, you will suffer consequence C)". But it is not self-evident in a given instance whether A is true, or B is true, or what exactly C refers to. In addition, law is an integrated system, so Law #39 may seem to contradict Law #12: does that mean that Law #39 doesn't apply, or is it that Law #12 (if #12 is a Constitutional provision, #39 is just wrong – laws exist in a hierarchy). Therefore, laws must be interpreted. "Precedent" refers to the creation of a rule of interpretation, one which is logically consistent with existing rules of interpretation (which are arranged in some logical hierarchy). If the Supreme Court establishes a rule that laws penalizing "hate speech" contradict the First Amendment (R.A.V v. St Paul) and therefore cannot be a law in the US, then any similar law is, by rule, also not actually a law. Creation of precedent itself follows rules, though ones that are harder to discern – this is what "jurisprudence" is about. For example, some justices believe that they should appeal to an inherent feeling of justice; others believe that a law should be interpreted according to perceived legislative intent; still others focus on the wording of the legal text (statute, usually). This does not involve appeal to popular sentiment. It does mean (usually) that law is seen to be a system of rules, and not case-by-case feelings. | In any court, there will be situations where a judge has discretion to make some decision. The judge might have to decide "did X meet the burden of proof", and due to the situation two reasonable and competent judges could come to different conclusions. You couldn't blame either for the decision, even though they would make opposite decisions. On the other hand, a judge might make gross mistakes. The judge might decide "X met the burden of proof" when this is clearly a mistake. That's what the appellate court is interested in. An appellate court checks whether the judge made mistakes that a judge shouldn't make. So in this situation, the appellate court doesn't decide whether X met the burden of proof. The appellate judge decides "did the trial judge make a decision that a trial judge shouldn't have made". An appellate judge might think to himself or herself: "well, I would have decided differently, but this trial judge’s decision was one that a reasonable judge could have made", and if that is what he or she thinks, the original decision will stay intact. | The main rules in a civil case are the rules of evidence, the rules of civil procedure, and a set of largely unwritten rules governing issues such as the order in which matters are presented in a trial and courtroom conduct. Basically, the rules of evidence are really a subset of a larger set of written and unwritten rules about courtroom conduct the unwritten parts of which are assumed to be known by people using them. Robert's Rules of Order do not apply to courtroom proceedings. The judge also has the "direct contempt" power to summarily punish disrespectful conduct in the courtroom without a trial, with fines or incarceration, even if it wouldn't be a crime outside the courtroom. But what if a party to the proceedings who does not "have the floor" wishes to do things like the following: Obtain a restatement (perhaps because it was unintelligible, or perhaps as a ploy for emphasis) of something uttered by another. If you are a party asking a question (or more likely an attorney for a party asking a question on behalf of a party) it is not improper to say, "I'm sorry, I couldn't hear you." It is also not generally improper for a non-questioning party to interject and state that they can't hear a witness to a judge. Obtain clarification of a statement. This can be done by a party only when it is the party's turn to cross-examine or redirect as the case may be. A judge can ask for clarification, but a party cannot do so when it is not their turn. Determine or clarify the purpose of an ongoing statement or line of questioning Generally the party not asking a question objects and the court asks the party asking the question to clarify the reason. Sometimes, in a jury trial, the party asked to clarify will say "may we approach the bench" and a private discussion will be held between counsel for both sides and the judge regarding an ongoing issue. Determine whether the judge will allow something later in the proceedings. (E.g., "At some point I hope to speak to point X. May I do that now? Or will I be afforded that opportunity at some later point before the conclusion of this hearing?") Lawyers are expected to know this for the most part without having to ask. Also, usually before the court starts to take evidence, and at breaks, the judge will ask "are there any preliminary matters that need to be addressed?" or "are there any procedural matters that need to be addressed?" and questions such as this can be raised at that time. | Not going to hold up. Dutch Supreme Court confirmed 2012-09-21 in LJN BW6135 that arbitration is still covered by the the right to an independent judge, as established in Golder v UK, ECHR 1975-02-21, nr. 4451/70. Stack Exchange can't decide the rules themselves. (The Dutch case confirms that sector-wide arbitration is in fact legal, with regard to a standard arbitration clause commonly used in the Dutch building sector. The arbiter was found to be independent in that case precisely because they weren't picked by the builder involved.) The GDPR is only indirectly relevant, but the fact that it's mentioned does mean that there is an indisputable intent to provide services to EU consumers. (See section 23 of the GDPR, or its national equivalents). As such, you can't hide behind a US business address. If you intend to do business in the EU, it's under EU laws - all of them. You can't say that only the GDPR applies, and not other rules. I'm having a bit of a problem finding a source, but I'm fairly confident that consumers have the right to sue at their own, local court, overruling the default of suing in the court where the counterparty is located. Finally, I have the right under national law (Dutch: BW 6:236 start and sub-n) to strike the arbitration clause up to 30 days after the conflict arises, and demand a court decision. That's not 30 days after I accept the "Public Network Terms", that's 30 days after the arbitration is invoked. Dutch law explicitly allows arbitration abroad, and arbiters may apply foreign law, but as written the arbitration clause has no legal basis in the Netherlands, and any arbitration resolution would therefore not be considered valid. You may wonder if it matters to Stack Exchange that the arbitration decision would not hold in the EU. Well, consider a clause like Indemnification, which demands the user indemnifies Stack Exchange. That's a pretty empty demand if it's not enforceable. | It's supposed to be carte blanche, i.e. "blank check". The quotation has left out several words. You can find the full decision at https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/458/176/case.html. The complete sentence is: It thus seems that the dissent would give the courts carte blanche to impose upon the States whatever burden their various judgments indicate should be imposed. | The core principle of stare decisis is that the law should not depend on what judge you got; two cases with the same facts should have the same outcome. In the common-law tradition, there weren't really written statutes; there was only "what's been done in the past," and so the only reference you'd have to what the law should be in some situation is past court decisions. If judges didn't have some constraints to rule similarly to before, there really wouldn't be any legal standards (because there was no written law to go back to; in civil-law countries, there always has been a written law, so precedent isn't so important). Stare decisis doesn't actually directly stop a judge from entering a decision that goes against binding precedent. However, judges are expected to obey precedent, and for the most part do what they're supposed to do. If they don't, the case will likely be reversed on appeal. Binding precedent only applies within the area a court serves; a court doesn't have to listen to precedent from a different court that has nothing to do with the case. The rule is that precedent from any court up the appeals chain is binding; federal district courts are bound by their circuit court and SCOTUS, state courts are bound by higher state courts and SCOTUS (but not other federal courts, as the case can't be appealed to them). A court can sometimes overrule its own precedent, but the cases where it can do that are rare (and so applying a higher court's precedent can also be viewed as "if you appeal to them they'll say X, so we're saying X.") | Under U.S. law, double jeopardy prevents you from being charged with the same charge twice, and also from being charged with any offense which is a lesser included offense of the charged offense, or a charge so substantially similar that for constitutional purposes it amounts to the same crime. Basically, the test is whether a prior acquittal would be inconsistent with a new criminal charge. For example, even though there is an additional element of the crime of murdering a postal officer to the crime of murdering someone on federal property, double jeopardy would probably bar a retrial of a murder on federal property case simply because the victim happened to be a postal worker and that element wasn't charged in the original indictment. This is because the acquittal of the first murder charge would almost always imply a jury determination that a murder didn't take place which would be inconsistent with a murder of a postal worker charge. On the other hand, a trial on a murder charge would probably not bar, for example, a trial on a burglary charge (which at common law involved trespassing with an intent to commit a crime), even if the burglary charge arose from the same conduct. This is because an acquittal on a murder charge isn't necessarily inconsistent with the existence of a trespass, or with the intent to commit some crime other than the murder for which the defendant was acquitted. But the exact way that the line gets draw is tricky and while what I have described is a good general summary of the cases interpreting the double jeopardy clause, it isn't a perfect one. This issue has been litigated many, many tines over the years, so there are a lot of cases that are squarely on point addressing specific fact patterns in precedents that are binding case law that are not always a perfect fit to the general principles. In these circumstances, the binding case law is going to control, at least until a court with appellate authority over the court whose case established the precedent in question decided to overrule a prior precedent from the lower court, or in the case of U.S. Supreme Court precedents, until the U.S. Supreme Court revisits one of its own prior precedents as wrong decided or wrongly interpreted, which happens now and then, although it is a rare event. | In a deposition, attorneys are supposed to keep their objections short and refrain from making an objection that indicates to the witness how he should answer. A question might be objectionable because it lacks foundation, because it is compound, because it calls for speculation, etc. Example 2, for instance, could be said to assume that Ms. Redacted was involved, and I might not want my client to discuss how he would act in that situation. Some attorneys in that situation might say, "Objection, assumes that Ms. Redacted had anything to do with this, which you haven't proved, and it's impossible to say what would have happened under circumstances that never happened." This gives my client a pretty clear signal that he ought to make clear that Ms. Redacted wasn't around, and that he should try to avoid getting pinned down on any questions about what he would have done if she had been. This practice -- known as "a speaking objection" -- can be used to signal to the witness how best to answer, and it leads to huge fights in a deposition. To avoid those fights, courts have developed a practice of requiring lawyers to simply "object to the form," rather than coaching the witness. That puts the objection on the record so it isn't waived, and if it's truly problematic, the parties have an opportunity to explain in greater detail after the deposition is concluded. |
Can a Condominium Association Incorporate Without All Owners? If after purchasing a property in a Condominium Association, and it is discovered that the corporation was administratively "dissolved" years ago, can that association refile Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws without 100% approval of the owners? The association was dissolved administratively because they were not filing with the State of Washington. | As is often the case, the answer is "it depends." In this case, it depends on: 1) When the condo was organized. Washington law says that all condo associations organized after July 1, 1990, "shall be organized as a profit or nonprofit corporation." Since incorporation is a legal requirement for these condos, the Board must file for incorporation, regardless of whether members approve. NOTE: Washington law does not impose any penalty on condo associations that do not incorporate. https://app.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=64.34.300 2) What your By-laws say. As I recall, before July 1, 1990, Washington law did not require condo associations to incorporate. If I am right, the Association does not have to file for incorporation. Whether the Board has to get approval from the members before filing for incorporation depends on your Association's By-laws. The By-laws tell who has the power to make which decisions. 3) It may be worth it for you to talk to an attorney who specializes in condo law about your condo association. Washington law imposes many requirements on HOAs, and many HOAs ignore these requirements. An attorney can give you practical advice about bringing your condo into compliance with these requirements. | Since you did not provide the full text of your bylaws I will proceed by how I would imagine the language was written. I will give an alternative at the end of the answer. Your organization (HOA) created a set of bylaws. The bylaws indicated the method by which they can be amended. Later on the HOA added an amendment to these bylaws authorizing dues and instituting a specific procedure by which the dues could be increased. Now assuming this amendment was properly adopted (i.e. the original requirement was followed to amend the bylaws) it is now on equal footing to any other part of the bylaws. What this means is you now there is a process which can voluntarily be followed for increasing dues. You can either continue using the old process to amend bylaws and increase the dues that way or you can use this new process to increase dues through a majority vote of the members in good standing. Either way is valid to increase the dues. Thus the procedure as you described is a valid way to increase dues. However, if the language in your bylaws was poorly worded I might come to the opposite conclusion, which is possible. Suppose the amendment to the bylaws, which originally created dues, specified the dues as part of the bylaws (like exact dollar amount). Suppose that the language about increasing dues was poorly written and said exactly what you quoted: “Any increase in this amount must be approved by a majority vote of the Members in good standing of the Association”. Then there really needs to be an analysis of what procedure was indeed meant by the original adopters of the language or relevant case law in your state. It is unlikely, but possible, that this language could be interpreted to put another, separate, requirement on amendments to the bylaws that specifically increase the dues. I.e. dues increasing amendments must be both approved by the majority of the members and majority of the members in good standing. However, if at all competently written the bylaws should not require this method of approval unless it was intended to require this method. | Possibly If the texts are sufficiently precise that they constitute offer and acceptance then they would create a contract notwithstanding that “some documents” were never provided. First, your offer must have been sufficiently clear that it was open to acceptance by a simple “yes” or “ok”. Given that you had a lease, a simple offer to have another one would be enough as “on the same terms” is implied. Second, she must have accepted your offer unconditionally. “Yes, I’ll put together some documents to sign” is an unconditional acceptance even if the documents never appear. “Yes, I’ll put together some documents to sign first” or “Yes, I’ll put together some documents with the terms” aren’t. The first is a conditional acceptance and the condition wasn’t met. The second is a rejection with an intention to make a counter-offer that never eventuated. Third, real estate is heavily regulated. There may be specific requirements (such as a particular form of contract, or that it be witnessed) that mean there is no binding lease even though there would be a contract at common law. | No they can't. The lease says the premises need to be cleaned without going into details how. You cleaned them yourself before moving out. If the landlord was not happy with that, they should have raised their concerns and discussed options. The security deposit that the landlord holds is only supposed to be used when something goes wrong. When something goes wrong, the landlord is supposed to talk, not to silently chop off a slice of the deposit as they please (unless the lease allows it, which it does not here). If the landlord refuses to refund, read the manual and go to small claims court to tell them where to get off. | It depends on the location and the nature of the structure. In Seattle, for example, it requires a permit. Usually, any such structure does require a building permit, which means that the government has to approve the plans w.r.t. offset requirement, height requirements and so on. There may be a view ordinance, or not; you may have a view easement, or not. Whatever the case may be, you should not assume that the government agency in charge will vigorously work to protect your interests over the neighbor's interest. You own attorney is the one who will vigorously and professionally defend exclusively your interests (likewise, the neighbor's attorney). Your description doesn't explain how this would "invite residents to congregate directly in front of my living room windows", which seems unlikely for a dwelling. If for instance this is really a bar and not a dwelling, then zoning issues about businesses arise. | Fully enclosed area means being inside something, likely a non-see-through fence. You will not convince anyone that a trash can is "fully enclosed; it is a container, which is called out. Your chance of litigating this successfully is approximately zero unless your goal is to spend money and force the HOA to do the same. You can certainly ask what the expectation is or examples that meet the requirement. Your ability to fight your issue by citing other installations is limited unless they are forcing you to do something other homes are not required to do. "I can see your can with a drone" will not let you leave your trash can out. | The landlord may be confused about what is legal. Growing pot without a license (they do not have one: it cannot be grown at home, and certainly not if there is a minor present) is not legal, not even in Seattle (medical marijuana now requires a general marijuana license, and home-grown is not legal – some Dept. of Health pages don't reflect the new law). Under RCW 59.18.065, the landlord must provide a copy of the executed agreement to each tenant, and a replacement copy on request. Under RCW 59.18.150, the landlord may enter the unit in case of an emergency, and otherwise shall give the tenant at least two days' written notice of his or her intent to enter and shall enter only at reasonable times. The notice must state the exact time and date or dates of entry or specify a period of time during that date or dates in which the entry will occur, in which case the notice must specify the earliest and latest possible times of entry. The notice must also specify the telephone number to which the tenant may communicate any objection or request to reschedule the entry. The tenant shall not unreasonably withhold consent to the landlord to enter the dwelling unit at a specified time where the landlord has given at least one day's notice of intent to enter to exhibit the dwelling unit to prospective or actual purchasers or tenants A lease cannot be terminated without cause and a legal process (eviction hearing), rather, it runs out at a specific time (the end of July). The situation with dog-washing is unclear, since normally a landlord can't decide to use a person's apartment for a dog-washing operation (the common law right to quiet enjoyment). If there is such a clause in the lease then that would be allowed, but they can't now decide that they have this right (the terms of a lease can't be changed in the middle). They can restrict the cats from areas outside your unit. You may however have some (legal) misunderstanding about what exactly "your unit" is, specifically, is the dog wash part of a "common area" that isn't actually part of what you have an exclusive right to. | If an amendment restates the entire trust, I have been told by an attorney that you can throw away the original trust documents because they are no longer valid. Note: I am not an attorney. I do not have any formal training is law so my answer is not reliable. |
How do I object to the FTC and Equifax settlement? The FTC has a press release with some court documents at Equifax to Pay $575 Million as Part of Settlement with FTC, CFPB, and States Related to 2017 Data Breach. The release includes the link to the document proposed settlement. My field is data security and I have been studying data breaches for almost 20 years. In fact, I was an early contributor to the DatalaossDB project, which tracked breaches in the early years before they became popular in the press. My observations are lawyers and judges know nearly nothing about data security and identity theft, and they will agree to just about anything. This often leads to unfavorable terms for the victims, and re-victimizes them. I find some of the terms of the settlement are ambiguous, and some of the terms settlement are obscene. I would like to object to the settlement, and state where some of the gaps are. Some of them are listed below as examples. The settlement document does not appear to state how to object to the terms or how to offer suggestions for improvement. How do I object to the FTC and Equifax settlement? The settlement does a good job at securing 10 years of credit monitoring. However, the settlement does not stipulate or require a "detailed report", and consumers will only receive a "summary report" which are the warez credit bureaus hock to consumers. I would like a quarterly detailed report. As anther example, the selections of monitoring services also lack Early Warning, which is one of the best fraud detection services available. Early Warning was created by the largest US banks and they share information on consumers in real-time, including anonymous account information (anonymous to avoid poaching of customers). I would like a quarterly detailed report from Early Warning. As a final example, the traditional credit bureaus maintain VIP databases, which includes actors, politicians, judges, athletes and other influential people. Reports for VIPs are scrubbed for potential inaccuracies and negative entries so actors don't speak out for a cause and politicians don't write unfavorable legislation. I would like the same treatment for life, just like the VIPs. An example of "... lawyers and judges know nearly nothing about data security ..." is on page 15 from the settlement: Implementing protections, such as encryption, tokenization, or other at least equivalent protections, for Personal Information collected, maintained, processed, or stored by Defendant, including in transit and at rest... In data security and risk management, we say "complimentary security control", not "at least equivalent protections". It is quite painful for me to watch the legal system stumble through the non-legal stuff. | You can either object to the terms of the settlement, or opt out of the settlement by filing papers with the appropriate court by the November 19, 2019 deadline. If you do not do so, you will be bound by the settlement ultimately approved, which is functionally a class action lawsuit, a form of lawsuit that can bind people who don't affirmatively sign up to be a part of it. | The expected value formula involves multiplying the estimated dollar amount of each possible outcome by the estimated probability of that outcome adding up the result for every possibility. The results for each outcome have to include the ability to pay if you win and the cost of collecting if you win and the time value of money if not settling delays getting you paid. This formula is routinely used in litigation to evaluate settlements, but it is only a starting point, it isn't the only factor that should be considered. You need to consider the margin of error in the estimates. A big margin of error in the best or worst case scenario, or in a small probability, can make a huge difference. You also need to recognize that it is well known that the best lawyers who ultimately get the best results, routinely overestimate the strength of their own cases, and that clients usually overestimate the strength of their own cases as well. This is a well known cognitive bias and you need to correct for it. You need to include reaching a settlement later on, but before trial, in your list of possibilities. Often, even if it make sense to settle, making an offer at just the right moment instead of a less opportune time can make a big difference. Similarly, you have to consider the case from the other side's point of view to get a realistic sense of what the other side might be willing to pay. If it seems very likely that they would be willing to pay more, you might not want to accept an offer even if the amount offered would be good enough to be an acceptable result for you. You need to consider the future litigation costs that are avoided by settling, both in terms of dollars paid to lawyers and litigation costs, and in terms of lost time, expense and opportunity costs to you or your firm. You need to consider the economic harm that you may suffer from not having the matter resolved now rather than later. For example, suppose that your firm is about to have a public offering of stock, and if the litigation is not settled, the litigation will have to be disclosed and will have a disproportionate negative effect on the price investors will be willing to pay in the public offering. It may pay to settle a case for "more than its worth" to avoid the economic harm caused by having the litigation still outstanding. You need to consider the economic harm potentially caused by information disclosed in the context of a public trial which would reveal information that there is economic value in keeping secret, or that might encourage others to bring additional lawsuits. You need to consider the long term strategic impact of each possible outcome when considering each possibility and in considering settlement, and not just the impact in the immediate transaction. Once something has been proven in court, that loss in one case can frequently be held to have been judicially established in future cases in many circumstances. For example, if a contract term is determined to have a particular meaning in a lawsuit, and the court interprets it in an unfavorable way, that could influence the economic value of another 200,000 outstanding contracts with the same language where the meaning of this term has not been resolved in litigation, and it could open the door to a class action lawsuit against you on behalf of a class consisting of all 200,000 counter-parties with you on this contract. If it the contract interpretation makes only a $5 difference in each case, the incentive to prevent that from being resolved against you in court could be huge. On the other hand, if a corporation that engaged in many transactions gets a reputation for easily settling weak cases for generous amounts, they will be bombarded with frivolous lawsuits. Expected value really only makes sense with these adjustment and also only for repeat players in cases where the outcome of any particular case will not materially affect the person considering a settlement and there are no long term strategic effects, such as large employers and large companies in consumer cases that try to force other parties to resolve disputes with them on a case by case basis in confidential arbitration hearings that don't create precedents. It is less useful for one time participants in the legal system in a case with life changing consequences, as the benefits and costs of an outcome may be non-economic or may be non-linear (although this can be solved by more accurately valuing the dollar amounts in an expected value formula to consider the total impact of a particular result rather than the naive immediate payment). This non-linear factor is critical in these cases, however, because the personal utility value of an outcome is not strictly a matter of average dollar return. To give a simple and fairly common example, suppose that you have a case where you have a 70% chance of winning and a 30% chance of losing. If you lose you get nothing and pay nothing. If you win, you get $10,000,000. The expected value is $7,000,000. But, if you have someone who has never had real money in their life and will never have an opportunity to get real money in their life ever again, settling for a 100% chance of getting $3,000,000 could very well be better than getting a 70% chance of getting $10,000,000, because to that person the difference between getting $3,000,000 and $10,000,000 may not be very important, but the difference between getting at least $3,000,000 and getting $0 would be huge. One of the reasons that plaintiffs like to use class action lawsuits is that handling one big all or nothing cases causes businesses to stop thinking like expected value repeat player robots, and to start thinking like individuals who participate in litigation one time with high stakes, causing them to accept less optimal settlements for them relative to expected value to avoid the risk of a big disaster. Paying settlements or losing a modest percentage of small cases now and then won't harm anyone's career. Losing a big life or death of the company case after going to trial when a settlement that was a better deal was an option will cost the entire management team their careers and get many of the lawyers at the firm handling the defense of the case fired as well. | The potential problem is if there is a form which you had to sign which says "I am a US citizen", and you signed the form (who reads the fine print, anyhow?). Unfortunately, that statement is false, and there are consequences for making a false statement. However, that law penalizes false statements with the intent to deceive, not mistaken statements. Nevertheless, this is a matter that a professional really needs to deal with. If there was no form and they didn't verbally ask you to assert that you are a citizen, then there is less of a problem (for you), but still one needs to be extremely cautious in dealing with the court. [Addendum] It is highly likely that the form contained wording like "swear" or "certify" and mentions "perjury", so the error would be in the ballpark of perjury. Perjury is making "a false statement under oath or swears to the truth of a false statement previously made and the statement is required or authorized by law to be made under oath". Aggravated perjury is perjury which "is made during or in connection with an official proceeding and is material". The term "material" means "matters; is not inconsequential". The consequence of a non-citizen improperly serving on a jury is that a mistrial has occurred, which is not inconsequential. Aggravated felony is a third degree felony. The penal code says that An individual adjudged guilty of a felony of the third degree shall be punished by imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for any term of not more than 10 years or less than 2 years. (b) In addition to imprisonment, an individual adjudged guilty of a felony of the third degree may be punished by a fine not to exceed $10,000. I must emphasize that an essential element is "intent to deceive and with knowledge of the statement's meaning", an element that cannot be present if there is no awareness of such a statement. Thus an innocent mistake could be legally excused. When you become aware that a statement made under oath was false (assuming such a statement was made), then in maintaining the falsehood, that would be intentional deceit. This is why it is necessary to consult with a lawyer. On the Houston form, you would have to check the "are a US citizen" box. The Fort Bend county form has you certify and sign on the front page: it does not require you to certify that you are a US citizen, only to certify (and sign) if you are not – so if you failed to read the back side, that isn't a literally false statement. I can't locate an online form for Tarrant county, so dunno if that out is available. | Typically in defamation law, claims made persuiant to litigation are not defamatory, since they are going to be tested for validity if the case goes to trial. I'm not familiar with any differences in what is generally done in settlements between the U.K. and the U.S., but since both are Common Law countries, and Settlements are very common in civil proceedings in the U.S., it's a good start. Generally a settlemant can occur anytime before the verdict of the case is rendered, although usually it will happen after preliminary hearings during the Discovery phase. In the U.S., Discovery is very broad and one need not prove that the requested items contain evidence but might contain evidence. This means that, for example, you could request a substantial amount of e-mail records from the opposing party because somewhere on the company e-mail server, there might be something to help your case. And even if after you sift through the emails and find no smoking guns related to your case, you could find some dirty laundry that's unrelated but still damning... if not more so than the initial case. Many people, especially big compainies, would rather just give the ex-employee some what he/she wants, if it means they don't get to see the proverbial man behind the curtain. Additionally the practice might fall into a legally gray area of the law that, if it reaches trial, could hurt the company or even the industry if a judge rules against the company, effectively saying that this gray area is now definately illegal. Better to eat the loss of capital with the settling out of court than to take the much larger hit of the buisness practice being illegalized all together. Typically in settlements, both parties agree to terms and sign a contract. While the whole of the terms are never discussed, almost all include that the plaintiff will drop the case and never bring the matter to court again and that both parties will sign a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) meaning that they won't discuss the rest of the settlement terms with anyone not party to them. If the plaintiff does break the NDA, the defendant can sue for breech of contract and recover at the least the monitary compensation they awarded in the settlement. Conversely, if the respondent breaks the NDA, the plaintiff can refile their initial suit with the addition of breech of contract (and this time it will get to court... and all the dirty laundry sees the harsh light of day.). While the respondent in a settled case can possibly sue for defamation if the plaintiff said the respondent did what the initial suit claimed they did (legally, it was never proven or disproven), or they were guilty (again, since no verdict was reached at trial, no guilt was established), the breech of contract is a much more airtight case and doesn't open up discovery to the respondent's cupability in the settled case (since the breech is about discussing the settled case at all, not the validity of the accusations of the settled case). Typically they would not go this route because then it opens the can of worms the settlement was trying to keep a lid on. | What legal options do I have here? I don't think I can sue for defamation of character since the email was sent to me only. Your rationale about defamation is accurate with respect to the establishment (henceforth "company"). But you may sue the person(s) who approached the company to falsely accuse you of that crime. Being banned certainly qualifies as special damage (that is, concrete damage), whence you have a viable claim of defamation per quod. If the crime that was falsely imputed to you is a felony or serious crime, then you additionally have a viable claim of defamation per se. I was thinking that I may have some legal recourse since the email clearly threatens to defame my character if I re-enter the establishment You have legal remedies, although not necessarily from this angle. The company can credibly argue that it sought to discourage you from contravening the "safety measure" it adopted in response to the accusations made about you. If it turns out that the company fabricated any false accusations it divulges, though, then you could sue the company for torts related to --and in addition to-- its defamatory falsehoods. So far the information you share here shows no signs of company's involvement in inventing the false accusations. What legal options do I have here? You need to ask the company for source and details of the information. In line with this comment, you should also ensure the company is aware of the mistaken identity. If the company declines to listen to you --and ideally see any proofs you have--, that could evidence some sort of tortious conduct on the company's part. Beware that in Florida a defamed person is required to demand a retraction of the false accusations prior to filing a defamation suit. Absent that request for retraction, it will be very easy for the sued defamer(s) to have your complaint dismissed. If the company refuses to disclose the source of the false information, then you need to seek injunctive relief in court. That means suing the company so as to (1) compel the company to identify the person(s) who accused you, and perhaps (2) strike the ban that the company put in place as a result of the false accusations. Even if you don't prevail in striking the ban, the court proceedings would give you the occasion to set the record straight and prevent the company from defaming you if you legitimately expose (to the public) the arbitrariness of its ban. To be clear, the company can always indulge in defaming you for the sake of justifying its ban, although that would be dumb in light of what you will have proved in court by then. In jurisdictions where a request for retraction is not mandatory, a plaintiff who does not know the identity of his defamer(s) may (1) file suit against "Doe defendants", (2) subpoena the non-party company so as to obtain records related to the false accusations (obviously ensuring that these reveal the authorship thereof), and (3) upon production of subpoena records and requesting the identified defamer for a retraction, amend the complaint to properly identify the defendant. This would be more efficient than filing two suits (one for injunctive relief against the company, and another against the defamers). However, I am uncertain of whether this would work in Florida, given its pre-suit requirement of request for retraction. | The essential parts of a trade secret are that (a) it is something that you keep secret, and (b) something that gives you an advantage in trade because you know it and others don't. A trade secret remains a trade secret if you give it to someone else under a non-disclosure agreement. If it is available where anyone can download it, either intentionally or by carelessness, then it isn't a trade secret anymore (as soon as it actually gets downloaded). If it gets made public through some illegal activity, well, that's too complicated for me. Anyway, YOU don't have to pretend anything. A claim that something is a trade secret doesn't make it one. And if something is a trade secret, no claim about it is necessary. If you download the software without doing anything illegal then it isn't a trade secret. To reply to the comment: If the sequence of events is this: I download the source code. I read the license. The license says "by using the software ..." then clearly I have the source code before using the software. At that point the trade secret status is lost. We don't need to discuss whether the license would have been enforcible, because the software is already downloaded before the license starts applying. I can tell anyone in the world about it. (I can't give the software to anyone, because that is copyright infringement, a totally different matter). | Submit emails in their totality Your testimonial affidavit can quote or cite them as applicable. There is no protection of anyone’s privacy in court. By the way, the email where admissions were made is probably inadmissible if it was sent were in the course of bona fide negotiation to resolve the dispute. If the other party objects they will be thrown out - I wouldn’t hang my case on them. | The line they'll rely on for GDPR compliance is the first part of that sentence - "If you agree to this during the order process", which suggests that there will be a separate request to opt in to marketing communications at some other time in the process. Check any order documents. There's likely to be a tick box or similar on at least one. If that implies opting out rather than opting in there may be grounds to argue with that under GDPR, but there's nothing in the quoted text that suggests a problem. |
Secret Warrants If a US citizen (or any citizen in a country with a similar system) is targeted by a secret warrant from something like the FISA court, how can they know and how can they defend themselves? Is there some method or do you just have to hope that nobody mistakes you for a bad guy? | There is no general means for a person to determine that he is of has been the target of a surveillance warrant request. You can read details of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Even apart from national security cases, the police don't notify mobsters that they are being wiretapped, when they have a warrant. The Act expands police powers for certain specific kinds of cases, for example, POTUS can authorize the Attorney General to collect information without a warrant for up to a year provided that it is only to collect foreign intelligence information, as long as there is not a substantial likelihood that a United States person is a party to such communication. Or, a warrant will be granted if the surveillance targets a foreign power or agents of a foreign power. It is difficult to track the exact rules which change, in part via secret rulings from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court such as the 2011 ruling that allowed the NSA to search communications of Americans. | In this specific case and location, the precise location of the incident was explicitly made a public space via state law not too long before this actual event. They therefore most certainly have no right to privacy. What is interesting to me though is the other side of this, does someone have the right to record others in public spaces, or is it simply not illegal? For instance if I non-destructively and non-violently "jam" your camera by shooting a low-power IR beam at your lens, have I abridged a legal right of yours? I don't think it would be illegal to do this. I am not even positive its against the 1st Amendment. The 1st Amendment relates only to the dissemination of information, not the collection of it. The Constitution doesn't seem to compel the gov't to make information available, or even to make things/events/spaces observable. The various "sunshine" laws after-all had to be enacted, it wasn't part of an interpretation of the 1st Amendment. To put a finer point on it, is recording events in public spaces legal or merely lawful? | This is known as a retroactive or ex post facto law. Such laws are explicitly forbidden by the US Constitution (Wikipedia reference), and are generally frowned on in jurisdictions where the rule of law applies, partly because it is difficult to prove criminal intent when your action was not at the time criminal. | united-states "I know is it illegal for authorities to question a suspect when their lawyer isn’t present" This is not really true, at least in the US. The suspect must explicitly ask for a lawyer. Even saying "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer" (ie Davis v. U.S. (512 U.S. 453 (1994)) isn't enough, they have to say "I want a lawyer". Until they invoke the right, an officer can question all they want (provided they were informed of these rights, except for certain situations which are relatively complicated. See Miranda Rights). So no, an officer questioning you without a lawyer is neither a crime nor illegal. Once you invoke your Miranda right though, they have to respect that. With or without your lawyer, this is called interrogation. You can filter your responses through a lawyer, or waive your right to a lawyer and answer directly. | First off, you cannot booby trap your property, period. It is both illegal and tortious. But, as you noted, there are already questions/answers that deal with this issue. Sure enough, if the police get a no-knock search warrant, that in and of itself is the Court order allowing entry by any means necessary. When the officers, there by right of law, breach the outer perimeter and stop at the warnings, they will not be seeking any other court orders to have you allow them "safe entry". Their warrant gives them all the right they need, as probable cause of crime and violent intent or intent to destroy evidence was already presented to a judge. If, in real life, you actually put up signage or state explicitly that they're being forewarned that you intend to harm, trap, maim, or otherwise make it unsafe to enter; or that doing so will result in an attempt to destroy evidence, that is something they have already assumed (hence the seeking and granting of the no-knock vs. a regular search warrant). However, the signs in and of themselves are not protected speech, but rather overt threats, and that would put you in a very precarious position indeed. If the police get a "no knock" warrant (the most invasive, difficult to get warrants, whereby there is a grave risk of destruction of evidence or injury to persons), the police will ensure they have safe passage – they've come prepared for dangerous entry long before your signs, but once they see them, you could rest assured they will take them as they are intended: as a direct threat to their safety, and they will deploy a SWAT or other heavily armed entry team (who is usually there anyway for these dangerous entries). You could expect things like smoke/out canister and teargas, flash bangs, and heavily armed and well armored officers attempting to force you from your dwelling. Presumably, if you need to disarm traps to escape the situation, they can enter. Assuming you're home when they invade with chemical weapons, whether you come out or not, they will force you to disarm whatever booby trapping you may have in place that may destroy evidence, likely walking you in as their human shield in the event you're lying about any dangerous ones. That is probably your best case scenario. They may just decide to throw you through the perimeter once they get their hands on you, just to see what happens! If you don't exit and are home or if you are lucky enough to be out, the bomb squad, ATF, and SWAT will converge on your property in less than typical means. Because from your warning they can assume some incendiary or explosive device exists, bringing it into the jurisdiction of other agencies. If they cannot disarm the trap, they would send a robot in first to set it off, or cut through your roof, or knock down a wall – whatever it takes to get in without using a typical means of ingress/egress, so as not to chance your trap. Regardless, you can rest assured that they will get in, and you will pay for the trap you set for law enforcement. Further, to whatever charges you'd have been faced with from evidence flowing from the original warrant will now be added additional charges like attempted murder of a peace officer; if you have any roommates or known associates: conspiracy to do those things; attempted destruction of evidence, criminal interference with a police investigation ... all at a minimum. If anyone is actually harmed, your signage offers you no shield from criminal or tort liability, and you will be lucky to live through the experience once they get their hands on you. Police tend to not like being the targets of intentional maiming, dismemberment or death. You have to understand that, according to this hypothetical, you are intentionally trying to harm law enforcement, or destroy evidence of your dangerous criminal activity. These are not invaders, or intruders according to the law; they are the people whose job it is to enforce the laws, collect the evidence (if you weren't getting arrested pursuant to the fruits of the warrant, you certainly would be at that point). The signs themselves would make excellent exhibits in the coming case of State v. you. BTW: The only reason they have left John Joe Gray alone is that he knows the Henderson County Sheriff Ronny Brownlow, who has been told that the ATF, FBI, and State SWAT, would all be happy to enter and get or kill Mr. Gray if need be. Since the Sheriff never filed any federal charges, and has determined that he doesn't want to breach (and it's in his jurisdiction to determine this), the Sheriff, aware that Gray's entire family is holed up in the "compound", decided it's not worth going in. It's as well known as it is anomalous. When the police want in, and have the right to get in, they will get in. That Sheriff just decided it's not worthwhile. | In case there is no way of knowing, thus no way to sue, would this seem like a loophole that practically abolishes the 4th amendment ? The 4th amendment only means that the officer needs a probable cause/reasonable suspicion to detain you. It absolutely does not mean that he has to tell you what that is. In fact, not telling you what the probable cause is is often a part of the officer's job because, if you are indeed a perpetrator, letting you know what the suspicions are could make you do things that would allow you to escape justice. There is certainly always a way to sue i.e. file a lawsuit, for which you do not need to know what the probable cause was. Instead, you contend that there was not any. And from this point the officer has to tell the court what it was, if any. If he fails to provide one, you win and get redressed for harassment — this is how your 4th amendment rights work. If he does provide a good probable cause, you lose because in this case you either: actually did something suspicious and knew there was a probable cause; OR jumped to the conclusion that the officer harassed you when he was simply doing his job. | Considering that the US legal system is more or less similar in practice to the English Courts, yes it is possible to plea bargian a deal. I'm linking to the wikipedia article on the matter with a specific link to the England and Wales for guidence. Normally, I'd explain, but I'm an American and the differences between Magistrate and Crown courts are big enough differences that I can't tell you what the differences in the case is. I should point out this is a legal area where America differences with much of the world. 90% of the United States criminal cases (and a good number of civil cases, which are settled privately before discovery phase) are plea bargained to lesser sentences. Additionally remorse has nothing to do with the plea bargain. You might only be sorry that you got caught breaking the law and can still plea. The lighter sentence is sort of a "thank you" for saving the state money in not having to build their case against you. It is also used to coerce cooperation with the police, as they may have the accused dead to rights and can prosecute him successfully, but he's a little fish who can give intel to a big fish (this usually comes with the caveat of it being a sworn statement, so they can still prosecute you for something if you're lying... OR that the deal holds on condition that everything is factually true. If evidence contradicts you, you're charged as if you never made a deal). It's also important to note that the police will not honor their deals made for your confession... but they will offer you deals (In the United States, police are allowed to lie to you and do it all the time). However, the prosecutor will honor their deals. Another thing to be aware of is that a prosecutor who offers a plea could be doing so because they have a weak case. If you are absolutely sure the prosecutor has the wrong guy, it may be to your benefit to go to trial and have them prove it. Innocent people do go to jail all the time because they think there is something worse on them than the plea deal and its hard to fight off as you cannot appeal a plea deal as easily as a court conviction. Finally, most jurisdictions allow the judge final say at sentencing, so if the prosecutor does honor the deal and advises the sentence, don't get upset if the judge is tougher and gives you a harsher sentence on the crime, or rejects your plea outright (expect him to scold the prosecutor for wasting his time with a horrible deal, too. Watch the Law and Order SVU episode Raw for a particularly wonderful instance of this rare event occurring). As a part of US federalism, the rules about this change from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, so make sure you understand this. Another thing to be aware of is that a prosecutor who offers a plea could be doing so because they have a weak case. If you are absolutely sure the prosecutor has the wrong guy, it may be to your benefit to go to trial and have them prove it. Innocent people do go to jail all the time because they think there is something worse on them than the plea deal and its hard to fight off as you cannot appeal a plea deal as easily as a court conviction. I would definitely do some leg work into the English Legal system's opinions on plea bargains. Just because they have it does not mean the state lawyers like employing it and many jurisdictions see it as full on corruption in other parts of the world, even the Common Law jurisdictions. | This particular list of excluded branches seems to refer to those who are able to excercise whistleblowing protections through the U.S. Office of Special Counsel. It does not mean that employees excluded by these rules would be unable to whistleblow at all. Rather, the government channels through which they are able to seek protection are likely through a different office. In so far as I can tell, USOSC might restrict the FBI from protection services because they protect employees who go to the Media. FBI agents often handle classified material which would not be allowed to be disclosed to the media and many intel agency employees are required to submit any documents they intend to publish based off knowledge aquired from their employment for a pre-publishing review to make sure no classified material is leaked, and would thus limit the way the employee could whistleblow. Just because this particular office does not provide protection services to the listed employees, it does not mean there is an agency or department that does provide them (Usually the Office of General Inspector for the particular agency in question. While they are attached to the agency they cover, they are not within the chain of command of the agency itself and are independent to them.). For that reason, just because the rules that apply to most do not cover FBI Whistle Blowers, it does not mean an FBI employee cannot become a whistle blower. They just cannot use the services of USOSC in their whistleblowing efforts. |
Laws that Protect Inventions I would like to patent something. What laws are on the books that would protect invention from being stolen by patent attorney by someone at the US patent office Please share references | It just doesn’t happen. It is prohibited for a patent examiner to get a patent or any interest in a patent other than by inheritance Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. 4, patent examiners, other Office employees, and Office officers may not apply for a patent or acquire any right or interest in any patent during the period of their employment with the Office and for one year thereafter. and a patent attorney would lose their USPTO registration and law license at a minimum for violating their oath. Very few inventions have the potential to make enough money to risk a career. You will need to trust in the professionalism of many people on the path to making your idea a profitable reality. | It's a fact that anyone can sue anyone in civil court for anything, including patents and Intellectual Property rights. Have you read about Patent Trolls? See Patent troll - Wikipedia and patent trolls - Google Search. You could possibly be sued for patent infringement even after being granted a patent for your own invention, because the judgement whether a patent is sufficiently unique and different from any other given patent and can be subjective at times. That's the wiggle room the patent trolls use to sue. They go to court in an attempt to convince the court that the patent office erred and they deserve damages for infringing on their patent and profits. And the court could rule on damages or court costs, and possibly to relinquish profits or pay for losses that a third-party suffers. Specific legal advice is off-topic on Law SE. So the best thing to do is get real legal advice about the patent process and prior art searches, and, after your patent is granted, what you may have to deal with if you get a C&D letter or are taken to court for infringement. | I'll ignore whether a recipe is actually a good example, but I assume you're asking how a person who owns the exclusive rights to copy a thing (copyright) or to use a thing (patent) can allow multiple other entities to copy or use the thing. This is possible by granting each a non-exclusive licence. In the case that the piece of knowledge is not protected by any intellectual property regime, the holder of the information could just treat it as a secret. The information holder could enter into contracts to sell that information to various entities, each promising in return not to further disclose that information. This is the case for lots of sports data. | Before the AIA in 2012 both companies could apply for a patent and if one of the applicants thought they were both trying to patent the same thing they could initiate an interference proceeding. In that proceeding before the board, they each present their evidence as to date of conception and diligent effort from that point to the date of the first filing. The board decided which application went forward. Now the U.S. is with the rest of the world in first-to-file. It doesn’t matter who conceived first unless one actually stole the idea from the other. There is a new derivation procedure to try to prove that. I don’t think it has ever yet happened. One of the "simultaneous" inventors could publish the invention, putting into the public domain. If published before the other's filing date, it would theoretically prevent the other from getting a patent. In any case a patent owner can stop the other from making their product or charge a royalty. There is a narrow case under the AIA where one company has been using a process that another later patents and can retain a limited right to keep using that process but can’t move or expand operations. This is called Prior User Rights. | Adding to what Martin Bonner said: If you are a startup, and your grand plan is to be bought by a big company for a lot of money, and that big company thinks your use of React makes it risky to buy you, then you will lose out. It doesn't matter whether there is a risk, what matters is whether a potential buyer believes there is a risk. And if that is your plan, then you need to re-read Martin's answer from the point of view of a bigger company. You may not have any valuable patents, but that bigger company might. If I have an LLC with no money, then I can say "I don't care if Facebook sues me for 100 millions, I'll just let the LLC go bankrupt and start another one". If the company is worth millions or more, then the risk is much higher. | The relevant section of US patent law was already posted in an answer on one of the questions you linked, but I'll repeat it: 35 USC 271 (a): Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent. Merely making a patented invention is infringement; it isn't relevant whether you sell it. It is also infringement if you use it yourself, regardless of who made it or whether you paid them, or whether you would have otherwise bought it from the patent holder. There are some special exceptions for things like certain kinds of pharmaceuticals, but I browsed the rest of 35 USC Chapter 28, and didn't see anything that would appear to be relevant in this case. | They don't actually claim to have a patent. Lots of people license a patent, and then they are using "patented technology". The only effect of this statement is: If you want to copy their product, you better find out what patent they are licensing, otherwise you might be in legal trouble. And their statement means you should have known that your copy of their product is covered by some patent, so you lose some defenses if you are accused of using a patent without license. And of course many customers think if something is patented then it must be good. Which is not true obviously. But logically who owns the patent doesn't make a difference to that, so their statement isn't misleading IMHO. | The UK Government released an article last year that explains some of the issues relating to ownership of copyright This article is informative. The headline point: Ownership of literary, dramatic, musical, artistic and film works created by an employee during the course of their employment, automatically vests in their employer by virtue of section 11(2) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. The meaning of during the course of their employment has been interpreted by the courts to mean during the course of normal or specifically assigned duties, and that these duties include the creation of intellectual property for the employer. Patents are similarly affected - if the role does not specify or would not imply the creation of patents and other IP, it may not vest in the company automatically. This is a standard clause and is designed to protect the interests of the company, in the event that you create intellectual property as part of your role. Bear in mind here that there's no real need for this property to be created during work hours. That is, if part of your role is to design new software, ownership of that software vests in the company, whether you spent substantial amounts of work hours making it or not. Conversely, if your role does not include, or would be expected to include, the creation of intellectual property, then if you do so - even if it is during work hours - ownership may not necessarily vest in the company. IP you create in the course of your employment will vest in the company in the course of your employment will probably mean: if you are employed to create IP generally, all any IP resulting from your work, or; if you are employed to create a specific work, that work and possibly related works. This is a fairly standard clause, for most companies - I have had several jobs (though none of them technology-related) and they all include some clause to this effect |
Is "prima facie case" only used in the context of criminal law? Is "prima facie case" only used in the context of criminal law? Or can it be used in administrative and/or civil law? | The concept of prima facie is common also in civil proceedings (and, impliedly, administrative ones). See the results from this query, most of which are civil cases. For instance, this memorandum opinion begins by acknowledging that the plaintiff-appellees "have met their burden of establishing a prima facie case for defamation". In theory, the purpose of prima facie elements is to establish "high-level" uniformity as to what items a plaintiff or prosecutor, as the case may be, will need to prove in order to prevail in a case. That uniformity is necessary for --and consistent with-- the so-called "equal protection of the laws". From a standpoint of equal protection, there is no reason why a case being criminal vs. civil should make a difference regarding the applicability of the concept of prima facie elements. | In the United States, we use the phrase "Reasonable Person" which is not to say an average person or a simple man, but an individual who understands the limitations of the situation and would act in accordance with that knowledge. For example, if a doctor improperly rendered help a patient, his actions would be evaluated based on reasonable knowledge of people with his medical knowledge, where as a person practicing medicine without a license would be subjected to a more common-man standard. The phrase person is therefor substituted for a reasonable individual and thus, a "Reasonable Landlord/Renter" could exist in housing cases, or a "Reasonable Doctor" in medical torts or "a Reasonable Woman" in sexual assault cases, so the "Reasonable Person" is often used to allow the jury to put themselves in the shoes of the witnesses and the accused and see how they would react (Historically, the term was called a "Reasonable Man" though "Reasonable Person" was used to make the term more neutral to what the definition of "Man" was (A human male or a member of the Human Species, regardless of gender). | "Regina" or "R" or "The Crown" or "The Queen" is the respondent. These are different ways of expressing the same concept. However, it is not typical to name "Crown Prosecution Service" in the citation, or the formal heading of the case. This differs from Scottish practice where appeals look like "Adam v HM Advocate". Other public prosecutions can be brought by bodies other than CPS, such as the Health and Safety Executive, so R does not invariably mean the CPS. For England and Wales, the philosophy is that criminal prosecutions are brought by the Crown as the fount of justice, and maintained as such on appeal, and it so happens that the interests of the public are represented by agencies such as the CPS. They are not representing their own interests and are not parties to the case. We do see "Adam v Crown Prosecution Service" in judicial review cases, which are civil rather than criminal. For example, SXH v Crown Prosecution Service [2017] UKSC 30 was about challenging the CPS's decision on whether to prosecute somebody. An "appeal by way of case stated" may also arise in this way, where there is a point of law to be decided in the Administrative Court of Queen's Bench, such as Chambers v Director of Public Prosecutions [2012] EWHC 2157 (Admin). The DPP is the head of the CPS. The distinction is that a judicial review is about whether the public body's decisions were lawful - they are the ones being scrutinized - whereas in a criminal case, the prosecution is mounted on behalf of the public in general, with the CPS merely happening to be the agency usually responsible. Equally, the CPS can be a party to employment disputes and things like that. "R (Crown Prosecution Service)" looks a little unusual because "R (Somebody) v Anotherbody" usually means a judicial review on behalf of the Somebody, against Anotherbody, with the R being a vestige of the historical basis for this kind of review. It would be odd for the CPS to be in that position. If you look through recent Court of Appeal judgements you will see some variations in presentation, but a common pattern of saying something like this: In the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) On appeal from Oxford Crown Court Mr Justice Glossop Before: Lord Justice Tibbs Mrs Justice Bloggs Mr Justice Dubbs Between: Regina (Respondent) and Adam (Appellant) B Smith (instructed by Appeals-R-Us Solicitors) for the Appellant C Jones QC (instructed by Crown Prosecution Service) for the Respondent | Primary Theory I suspect there might not be a legal answer to this question. I have always suspected a sort of pseudo-intellectual elitism (or simple preference or carelessness) with passive voice sentence construction in general. I sense license writers have not (yet) escaped this general trend. I would love someone to prove this theory incorrect. But, alas, I doubt it will happen. Alternative Theory But because this is a Law Q&A site, I will advance the following alternative theory. I don't believe it's correct. But I will advance it because it's the only possible explanation I can think of that might be even remotely based on legal reasoning... Maybe they are just basing their construction on the way the law itself is written? For example, if the law says, "Permission must be granted..." Then it would follow that a writer who wants to comply with the law might choose, "Permission is hereby granted..." instead of something like "The authors hereby grant permission..." or, as the OP suggested, "You may..." | There are great jurisdiction by jurisdiction differences in the statutes of limitations that apply to crimes. Some jurisdictions have no statute of limitations for any serious crime (e.g. Canada and if I recall correctly Virginia). Others have statutes of limitations for almost all serious crimes other than murder (e.g. Colorado). Where there is a statute of limitations, the primary issue is that the ability of the prosecution and defense to secure reliable evidence that will allow a jury to enter an accurate verdict. This potential to conduct a fair trial can be compromised by a delay in pressing charges. Alibi witnesses can die or disappear to someplace that they can't be located, the location of the alleged crime can change in ways pertinent to proof, memories of witnesses in general can fade. Records or correspondence that could show intent can be destroyed. This is particularly a burden for an innocent criminal defendant who did not know that he or she needed to prepare a defense and gather evidence to respond to criminal charges. Some states toll statutes of limitations during a period of a victims minority or incapacity when brining charges may not be feasible. Other states have a long statute of limitations in rape cases where there is DNA evidence available that can conclusively tie a defendant to the scene of the crime (lack of consent would still have to be established), but a shorter statute of limitations in other rape cases. Murder and fraud are the most common offenses to lack a statute of limitations, in the first case, because it is considered the most serious crime and because the victim is unable to report the crime, and in the latter case, because fraud, by its nature and by the perpetrator's design, may go undiscovered for very long periods of time. Is there a line of reasoning to decide which classes of crime have a limited window for prosecution? While I've given some examples of the considerations that apply, ultimately, this is a legislative and political decision and not a legal one. You can't determine by reason alone which classes of crimes will have a limited window for prosecution. Different legislative bodies make different decisions on the same issues at different times and in different places. | If that which you describe in your comment ( Facebook post as only basis for warrantless search) is, and can be shown, to be the only basis for the search, and there was no evidence of a crime in plain view when they arrived.....then yes, it is likely the search and all evidence acquired from the search would be excludable. As to whether the individual could still be prosecuted, that depends if a case could be built independent of the evidence collected during the search. | ...in this case the officer has "definite cause." Why is probable used? "Probable cause" is a standard for when a property search can be conducted or a warrant issued. According to the Wikipedia article you linked to, Ballentine's Law Dictionary defines probable cause as a reasonable amount of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong to justify a prudent and cautious person's belief that certain facts are probably true We do not talk about "definite cause" because there is no such legal standard. Having "definite cause" as you suggest here simply means you have a very strong case to satisfy the legal standard of probable cause. Referring to the above definition, the officer whose drug-sniffing dog alerts at a traffic stop certainly has a "reasonable amount of suspicion." The officer may actually have an incredibly high amount of suspicion, but that's irrelevant to the probable cause standard. It is merely sufficient that the officer's level of suspicion is "reasonable" and backed by suitable evidentiary circumstances. It just seems like any way you try to interpret the word "probable" it doesn't make sense, you either have cause to search/arrest/etc. or you don't where is the probability? The probable cause standard is "probable" because it does not impose exacting requirements on law enforcement. (Note that the U.S. Constitution uses "probable" slightly differently from its modern meaning; see another answer.) It need not be blatantly obvious that a crime is being committed but likely that a crime is being committed. Of course, the exact standard of how likely is likely enough to satisfy the standard of probable cause (and what evidence constitutes a particular threshold of likelihood) is a test for the court to determine. | Criminal charges are filed and prosecuted by the government, on behalf of the public, and there is no requirement for approval or cooperation by the victim. As a policy matter, a DA may decide to not charge a person in case the victim is unwilling (though less so in cases of domestic violence), perhaps because of the widespread impression that the victim has to "press charges" (which indeed they would have to do in the case of private prosecution, which is no longer allowed in the US). The alleged victim's reddit exchanges on the topic are here. An uncooperative victim does not make a good witness, even if they are compelled to testify. The police statement that they cannot pursue an investigation should not be interpreted as a statement of law, it's probably a statement of policy and practicality. |
Why do legal documents often have a place next to the date? I am talking about Switzerland. So why is there often a line for the place next to the date? Is it for some historic reason, to be easier to archive or is it to prevent fraud? Does anybody know more since when this is done and why? | The validity of the execution of a contract is governed by the law of the place where it was signed. A location next to the date establishes that place and hence often, the governing law for the validity of that signature. If the contract does not expressly state what law governs, the contract itself is governed by the law of the place where the last signature that causes the contract to come into being, since that is where the contract was formed. The role this plays in allowing someone to prove or disprove forgery is secondary, but sometimes pertinent. The practice of noting a location as well as a date remains in place for notarized documents and court documents even in modern U.S. practice which has abandoned many of the conventions of Roman civil law and no longer routinely includes a locations next to a date line in ordinary contract executions. The location is also important in notarized documents in addition to the other reasons, because the location establishes whether the notary is acting within the notary's jurisdiction which historically involves very small geographical areas, although the modern trend has to expand the geographic range of a notary's jurisdiction. This is particularly important in a place like Switzerland, where there are relatively few good clues regarding where a contract was signed in the absence of a designation (since short distances can result in a change of jurisdiction and multiple countries share any likely language in which the contract is written) and where the substantive law that applies to the contract can vary from canton to canton even within the country. This practice proximately dates to the reception of Roman civil law in the late Middle Ages following a "lawless" period from the fall of the Roman empire through the early Middle Ages. This revived a practice that existed for most of the Roman Empire and predecessor Roman Republic in the middle Iron Age. A similar practice was used, however, in diplomatic and royal correspondence in the broad Eastern Mediterranean and Fertile Crescent region during the Bronze Age. This was done at that time partially for authentication, partially to provide context for a communication (at a time when messages wouldn't necessarily be delivered in sequence), and partially to create a historical record of a diplomat or aristocrat's travels. | This wouldn't be customary and is probably improper, but the judge may have been trying to do you a favor. In the absence of being under oath, the judge could not consider anything said in your closing statement as evidence. If you are under oath, the judge can weigh something you say in your closing statement against the other evidence when making a ruling. | Living Wills A "living will" which is a "pull the plug" document that isn't customized to an individual's preferences (probably 95%+ done by lawyers are not customized anyway) through a service like LegalZoom is probably fine, although doing it yourself you don't get the same guidance about how to use it in practice and are more likely to screw up the formal execution of the document (e.g. not having the proper witnesses and notary observe the execution, or signing in the wrong place, etc.). But this document is usually prepared by a lawyer at little or no extra cost when you have your last will and testament done, so the cost of not screwing up the execution of it isn't great. And, lawyer drafted documents are less likely to be contested in practice, even when a non-lawyer on paper does everything right. Someone who does their own living will also often doesn't realize the important of also having medical powers of attorney and durable powers of attorney for property which are also necessary. Simple Wills A "simple will" is quite another matter. First, I've never met a layperson who doesn't think that they need no more than a "simple will" when in fact they often do, either because they are affluent, or have a blended family, or need testamentary trusts to manage property for children or young adults or black sheep or for tax purposes or because some family members are non-citizens. In general, a lot of the value of having a lawyer do the work comes from the lawyer's ability to spot issues that are exceptional and take you out of the "simple will" solution by itself. Often an issue spotted can result in larger monetary savings or a much smoother probate process. For example, a lawyer can identify cases where a probate proceeding in more than one state is likely to be required and suggest steps to avoid that expensive result. Second, many non-lawyers have a very hard time thinking about all possibilities. They do fine thinking about what rules make sense if everybody alive today is still alive when you die and you own what you own now when you die, but have a very hard time thinking about what would be appropriate if people predecease them or if their assets change substantially. Lawyers are much better at working through what is sensible in all of these possibilities, many of which won't happen, but some of which will happen. This matters because a will never expires unless it is expressly revoked. I've probated wills drafted during WWII in basic training (as required) before the decedent went off to war and never amended over the next 60 years, and it is very hard to be that thoughtful when you are doing it yourself. Third, it is very common for non-lawyers to use language that isn't obviously ambiguous or otherwise problematic until you are forced to apply it in practice. Estate planning lawyers are much more aware of these traps in the "moving parts" of an estate plan and of the possibilities that need to be provided for. To give one example, suppose that you leave your second wife your house, and leave the remainder of your estate to your children (her stepchildren). It is very easy to say this in a way that does not make clear whether she takes the house subject to the mortgage, or if the mortgage is a debt to be paid before the remainder of the estate is distributed to the children. Similar issues often come up in relation to tax elections and allocation of tax debts among heirs. Providing for the disposition of pets is another thing that few non-lawyers manage to do well. Lawyers, in contrast, generally draft in a manner that avoids these ambiguities and sets forth rules that are sensible, fair and will work in practice. The issues are even more fraught if businesses or investment real estate is involved. And, non-lawyers (even sophisticated, affluent business people) routinely fail to grasp that a Will only governs assets which don't have beneficiary designations and is subject to forced marital share and minimum family inheritance laws that act by operation of law as well as other "gap filling" presumptions that modify the literal meaning of certain kinds of language in a Will. Finally, screwing up the execution of a Will is very common, while lawyer drafted wills are much less likely to be contested. In my twenty years of experience as a lawyer who does estate planning as part of his practice and teaches lawyers, financial planners and paralegals about the topic, I find that the increased litigation costs associated with a do it yourself will (on average) is about ten times as large as the savings associated with doing it yourself. Sure, one time in three or four or five, somebody does their own will and doesn't screw it up and it all goes fine, but a majority of the time, do it yourself will drafters do something that would be considered malpractice if a lawyer did it. Pay lawyers now, or pay lawyers more later. Honestly, if all you need is a "simple will" and you are not willing to spend the $500-$2,000 to have a lawyer draft appropriate documents, and help you execute them, you are probably better off doing nothing at all and dying intestate (i.e. without a will so that the default provisions of the law apply), which often isn't a horrible result in a plain vanilla, unblended nuclear family that isn't particularly affluent. | I haven't used the extension, but here are the concerns I would have: Does RECAP detect and handle documents filed under seal? Under some circumstances, IIRC, Pacer gives certain attorneys access to documents sealed from the general public. If you access these sealed documents through PACER and thereby submit them to the RECAP public repository, you have violated the Court order sealing the documents and might well be found in contempt. It is not unheard of for a Court to order a document replaced by a corrected version; this is most common when a document was inadvertently filed with information not redacted that should have been. As long as nobody but the parties and their lawyers have accessed it, this can prevent that information from being public. If you log on to PACER and see your client's personal information...you can no longer keep it private by asking the Court for that remedy, because you just submitted it to a public repository. Enjoy your malpractice suit. Does the use of RECAP constitute a waiver of work product protection? Under some (admittedly limited) circumstances, your use of PACER might constitute attorney work product, which would ordinarily be protected from disclosure in a manner similar to a privilege. Revealing your research pattern to a third party could waive that protection. | There is no significant difference between the two and it is simply a matter of (modern) legal writing style. Traditionally, contracts were always written in the third person, but starting sometime in the late 20th century (if I had to hazard a guess, I'd say sometime in the 1980s), the innovation of writing in the first and/or second person was developed and found to be more readable for most people, especially in contracts of adhesion. | This is very, very weird. I've never heard of a case like this one. Is there some context that could explain why anyone would refile a divorce someplace new twelve years after getting divorced the first time around? The logical thing to do if Canadian civil procedure is at all analogous to U.S. civil procedure on this point, would be to have a Canadian lawyer file a motion in the Canadian divorce case to set aside the judgment on the extraordinary grounds that you were not married any longer at the time that the 2015 divorce was filed, seeking to set aside the 2015 case ruling. In most U.S. jurisdictions with civil procedural rules modeled on the federal rules of civil procedure (California's are not), this would be a motion under Rule of Civil Procedure 60, but obviously, the Canadian rule numbering would probably be different. Alternatively, if the home is in California, you could bring an action for declaratory judgment declaring that the Canadian judgment is invalid because it was brought in a divorce action between people who were already divorced and probably also lacked jurisdiction over you and the property. I'm not sure what you mean by CPL in this context. Normally, in a real estate context, a CPL would mean a "closing protection letter", but in the context you are using it, it sounds like you are referring to something akin to a lis pendens or a lien. Perhaps you mean a "certificate of pending litigation" which is another name of a lis pendens in at least some Canadian jurisdictions (but is terminology rarely used in the U.S.). This sounds like slander of title, or "abuse of process" or the filing of what is known as a spurious lien, any of which are actionable, but without knowing what a CPL actually is, it is hard to know. | The parenthesized part means that if you are being compelled by law to disclose some confidential information, you must promptly notify the company of that fact. They could they respond by trying to get you excluded as a witness, or to limit your testimony, but you don't have to care what they do once they've been notified that you were subpoenaed. It may well be that every time the opposing side asks you a question, "your" side will object, and the judge will decide whether to sustain or overrule the objection. The only way in which you would defer to the company lawyer is by not answering the question before the question is finished (i.e. give the attorney 2 seconds to voice an objection). You would not have to "bring" the employer's lawyer along to a deposition, but that lawyer would probably be present and would similarly raise objections, if he felt like it. Your duty is simply to tell the company that you are being compelled to testify. In case the police or a detective agency are investigating the matter and they come to interview you, you are not compelled by law to answer (or to hand over documents), therefore you are supposed to decline to answer (and you are not obligated to inform the company that someone asked a question). As for an administrative subpoena, the perhaps tricky part will be knowing whether you are being compelled to testify, or invited to testify. The wording of the paperwork should inform you whether this is compulsory. | is there a chance that that any of that still exists somewhere - a transcript/notes/etc from the Orphan's Court hearings, the auditor's report, and/or the transcript/notes/etc from the PA Supreme Court - anything with more detail than is found in the reported brief There are probably even odds that the judgment of the Orphan's Court remains, mostly likely in microfiche form in a file cabinet somewhere if it exists at all. There is an outside chance the the court filings in the case are still archived somewhere. Most states have destroyed them, but a few states, mostly in the East, have retained very old records of courts of probate jurisdiction which have been used by economic history researchers to estimate the amount and distribution and character of wealth in the early U.S. The odds that the transcript, exhibits in the case, the full trial court record that was considered in the case on appeal, or the judge's notes still exists is very low. Where would such records be stored, if they exist, such that I could request copies? In roughly the order of likelihood: The archives of the clerk's office of the successor court to the Orphan's Court. The state archivist's records. The historical records department of the local library that included the location of the Orphan's Court. The records of the historical society closest to the location of the Orphan's Court. The notes of the judge, if the case was notable enough, might be in the personal papers of the judge, if the judge was notable enough to have deposited his records. This would be most likely with a college or university that the judge attended, or a college or university near where the judge died, or a local library or local historical society near where the judge died or near where the judge lived most of his professional life. The name of the judge should be present in the appellate decision. This said, the likelihood that there is anything about this case in category 5 is remote. I would suggest beginning with a Google search of "Pennsylvania Orphans Court records" including the name of the relevant county (Philadelphia, in this case). One particularly notable link to these records is this one. This states: Probate matters in Philadelphia County are handled by the Orphans' Court and start when the county was created. In addition to wills and administrations, the Orphans' Court also handles: audits of accounts of executors, administrators, trustees, and guardians; distribution of estates; appointments of guardians; adoptions; appeals from the Register of Wills; inheritance tax appeals, and various petitions and motions. Online Probate Indexes . . . . 1683-1994 Pennsylvania Probate Records 1683-1994 at FamilySearch |
Playing cards, other than for stakes, in licensed premises (UK) You hear a great deal of rumour and out-of-date information about the legality of playing cards in pubs. If I play cribbage or dominoes with my son, who's under 18, in a pub but with no money or anything else being involved, just to pass the time of day, are there any restrictions on that? I am confused by much of the discussion and legislation which, in the excerpt form typically used in discussions and blogs, seems always to assume a wager part. I do know that cribbage and dominoes are explicitly mentioned in some pieces of legislation so have good reason to think that the precedent of Magic: The Gathering meetups, iPhone games, etc, are probably not sufficient. | Explanatory note #176 on the Gambling Act 2005 specifies: There are some exceptions to the general prohibition on gambling by children and young people. Children and young persons may participate in all forms of private or non-commercial gaming and betting. Young persons may participate in lotteries and pool betting on association football. Children and young persons may use the category of gaming machine with the lowest stakes and prizes (Category D). They may also take part in equal chance prize gaming at certain premises, as provided under Part 13 of the Act. Cribbage and Dominoes are both exempt forms of "Equal Chance Gambling" which can be played on alcohol licensed premises (e.g. pubs). As @richardb points out, while young people (i.e. your son) are normally allowed to take part in Equal Chance Gambling there are explicitly excluded from doing so on alcohol-licensed premises using the "Exempt gaming" provisions as outlined in Sec.280 Children and young people must be excluded from the gaming. So you can't play for money (assuming the absence of a suitable Family Entertainment Centre license or similar), however playing not-for-stakes doesn't fit the definition of "Gambling" in terms of the act. Gambling is defined as either "Gaming", "Betting" or a "Lottery" It's not "gaming" without a prize: In this Act “gaming” means playing a game of chance for a prize. It's not "betting" without a prize: For the purposes of section 9(1) a person makes a bet (despite the fact that he does not deposit a stake in the normal way of betting) if— (a)he participates in an arrangement in the course of which participants are required to guess any of the matters specified in section 9(1)(a) to (c), (b)he is required to pay to participate, and (c)if his guess is accurate, or more accurate than other guesses, he is to— (i)win a prize, or (ii)enter a class among whom one or more prizes are to be allocated (whether or not wholly by chance). And it's not a Lottery either (I won't quote the whole section here as it's a bit wordy but you can check for yourself here) So as long as there is literally no stakes or prize (whether money or otherwise) you can play with a young person in a pub. | "I don't recall" will protect you from perjury only if it's true. Let me try an example. You're asked: "Did Mr. Blatter hand you an envelope full of cash?" You say: "Not to my recollection." Now the government introduces a videotape of you receiving and counting the money, and a thank-you note you wrote to Blatter saying "Thanks for the awesome bribe!" You can defend yourself from perjury charges if you can convince the finder of fact that you had forgotten all of those things...but it's not very likely, is it? "I don't recall" isn't a magic bullet. It's like any other statement: it's perjury unless it's true. | "...claiming that the license can be revoked at any time." Of course a game company can revoke their license at any time. The company grants you a license to use the product, and a license is not an obligation on their part to provide the product, or a right to use it on your part. There's nothing illegal about a license or TOS that has clauses which stipulate when the license or TOS can be revoked changed or revoked. | My question is, because I am not making any income from the distribution of the game, would the use of the copyrighted music fall under Personal Use? There are some "private use" exemptions in Australian copyright law but they have some fairly narrow conditions. These exemptions are fairly narrow because the point of copyright law is not to prevent you from making money with someone else's intellectual property but to protect the other person's ability to make money with it. If Alice writes a song and Bob distributes it free of charge, Alice loses revenue. Similarly, it is Alice's right to decide whether that song should be included in a freely available open-source software product, and her right to decide whether to allow that use without charge or in exchange for a license fee. | No California has no laws on social gambling so it is treated identically to commercial gambling. Since betting on outcomes other than sports betting is illegal in California, such a bet would be illegal. While it’s unlikely to be prosecuted, as a contract it would be void its illegality and thus unenforceable. | Your friend's relationship with the game company is one of contract. You don't say what the contract terms are, so it's impossible to say whether they were breached by your friend or the company. In any case, it is likely that the only remedy your friend could seek is damages, probably limited to whatever outstanding portion of the subscription they have not had the benefit of. It seems unlikely that it will be a large enough amount to be worth pursuing. As a private company the game provider can choose to contract with who they wish, or not as the case may be (unless they can be shown to be discriminating against protected characteristics). | In the case of McKee v. Isle of Capri Casinos, we can tell because that case has been legally decided. As the court says, there was a contract and "the patron was not entitled to the bonus under those rules", and plaintiff "failed to prove the necessary elements of either promissory or equitable estoppel". They did not "represent to her that a bonus would be available if she played the game", and did not "promise to pay the $41 million after the notice was displayed". The (very complex) rules of the game are easily available on the machine, and there is a prominent disclaimer that "MALFUNCTION VOIDS ALL PAYS AND PLAYS". Under the rules, the winning configuration stated that she was entitled to $1.85. The problem was that it also announced "Bonus Award - $41797550.16". This was due to an inexplicable software error which in communicating with the central computer awarded a "legacy bonus", which is no part of the game in question. The maximum legacy bonus is $99999.99; the manufacturer knows of the possibility of this kind of error and has implemented a fix that is thought to eliminate the problem. The first point then is that the casino didn't just claim there was a malfunction, they proved that there was one. Second, the terms of the contract hold: she was entitled to $1.85, and the extraneous message was not part of the contract. That is, she did not actually win the large payout, the malfunction was in saying that she received a bonus. If a patron could likewise prove that they had actually won but the machine malfunctioned to represent the situation as a loss, they would of course be entitled to the appropriate winnings. The problem simply resides in the difficulty of a patron proving that. | (I am not your lawyer. I am not here to help you. If you are reading this because someone has died, please stop and instead read the Scottish Courts and Tribunals guide to dealing with a deceased's estate in Scotland, or contact a solicitor.) Yes, in general. Section 1 of the Wills Act 1963, which is in force in Scotland, specifies that "[a] will shall be treated as properly executed if its execution conformed to the internal law in force in the territory where it was executed." Furthermore, Section 4 states that "[t]he construction of a will shall not be altered by reason of any change in the testator’s domicile after the execution of the will." "Construction" here refers to interpreting the language and effect of the will. So if the will was validly executed in England, it should also be in force in Scotland, and a Scottish court will give it the same meaning it would have had under English law. Furthermore, the same rule of validity seems to apply in both England and Scotland: Wills Act 1837 section 9. There may be other Scottish laws affecting the disposition of the estate that differ from English law. Relevant statutes include Succession (Scotland) Act 1964, section 21A, which seems consistent with Wills Act 1963. (I am trained in U.S. rather than English or Scottish law; I'm trusting the accuracy of the UK's excellent online legislation archive for the proposition that the statutes cited are in force in Scotland. I haven't checked the case law for contrary interpretations.) |
Are there any Social Security loopholes I can use to justify my inability to pay rent to my parents? I received $750 in SSI until May 2018, plus $130 in SNAP, and every year, they ask if I'm paying room rental. Then my mother usually signed an 801 form. However, this was the first time I heard about that since the investigator who was working on my case was different from the one who usually called me in the past. As of March 2017 to April 2018, I haven't been able to pay my parents who are head of the household because I had endured severe medical hardship, and then I accumulated credit card debts so I could survive, and I am currently paying for phone and internet, and, because I'm blind, I take cabs a lot, like Uber and Lyft. I also buy my own groceries and meals. Since the house is being mortgaged, and the money I should be paying would help them pay for it, was I legally obligated to pay them in any way? Since my mother told Social Security that I wasn't paying rent, my SSI was cut, which made it more problematic for me to get out of credit card debt, plus twenty months of rent. However, my attorney and I have a hearing in a few days and are going to argue Nobody from Social Security, until that investigator called me in March 2018, told me that I had some obligation to pay rent, or that they were also required to go and confirm it with my parents. Similarly, my mother's telling me to pay her could be considered hearsay since it was second-hand information. As far as I know, I had never signed any 801 forms until April 2018. On Friday, 17 February 2017, I asked the investigator who was checking up on me if I needed to report any new credit cards I opened. They assured me and said I didn't have to because I'd be paying for those. So, based on that statement, I assumed that as long as I was paying for something, I didn't have to pay my parents. | If I said that I wasn't paying, my SSI could be cut If you are telling SSI that you are paying rent so they give you more money, and you aren't paying rent, that's fraud. If you're filling out the form honestly, then your only obligation is to your parents. They are free to charge you or not charge you. Unless your name is on the mortgage, you have no obligation to the bank. | Essentially, if there is no written agreement or receipt of payment, the only records that exist will be in the payment itself. If it was paid by cash, there's probably no recourse without additional facts. However, if it was paid electronically, then even if there's no narration (description) that claims that the payment was for rent, it is still possible that you would be able to file a summons requiring the recipient bank to produce the information relating to the entity that holds the account the money was sent to. The information they have may be limited, but generally this would include: Name Address Date of birth (for natural persons) Phone number The above information is typically required under anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist funding legislation. Additionally, if it was paid electronically, the regularity of the payments and the regular amounts may be persuasive. Finally, it's not proof, but you can swear an affidavit or a statutory declaration attesting to the truth of your assertions, but without additional evidence (the aforementioned transaction information), it doesn't really hold weight on its own. | In the US, when a person has unpaid debts and dies, those debts are to be paid from any assets of the estate (as in, any assets). The executor has the responsibility to use those assets to pay the debts. Presumably the executor did that, and there are no co-signed accounts or anything like that, so your mother isn't responsible for these debts in some obscure way. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act has a provision that you can tell a collection agency to stop communicating with you, and they must then stop communicating with you except to say they are stopping attempts to collect, to indicate possible remedies (i.e. lawsuits), or notify of an actual remedy (they have actually filed suit). Since they are no longer allowed to discuss anything with you once you give them the go-away notice, one should probably hire an attorney to exercise the nuclear option. You can also request proof that you owe the money: they are suppose to notify you of the right to dispute the debt with 5 days of first contact, which gives you 30 days to dispute the debt. Persuading a debt collector that they are pursuing the wrong person is probably easier than persuading a jury in a lawsuit. | Usually I would think one answer to a question is enough. But since your edits have transformed a reasonable procedural question into what appears to be a rant about unfairness of the sort which any bankruptcy court has heard hundreds of times before, I will give another piece of advice: Focus on one thing at a time. The judge at the hearing of the application will be deciding (if your question is accurate) the single point whether a house should be sold. The submission "There is an application to annul the bankruptcy to be heard on XXX; if it succeeds this application is a waste of money and if it fails there will still be time for this application before the time limit, so you should adjourn till YYY" is a reasonable one that he will take into account. Saying "The bankruptcy order should never have been made; it was a mistake by my accountants and HMRC, and a High Court Judge joined in the conspiracy" will get you precisely nowhere. Even if the judge believed you rather than the written evidence, it has no bearing on the point he is being asked to decide. More generally; besides casting your arguments into proper shape, there is another good reason to consult a professional, namely that he can tell you when to give up. The courts are bound by laws and regulations; however unfair you may think the result, at some point it is necessary to accept the reality rather than wasting time and money making points that the law cares nothing about. (And no, I see no point discussing this further in comments. This answer can be upvoted if you think it helpful or downvoted if you think it "not useful"; it isn't something to argue against.) | If it were me, I would leave. Who wants to rent a room in a home where you are not wanted? However, there should be concessions. I would ask for 1.5 months rent refunded, but would happily settle for one month. I am sure there are many nice rooms, close by, where you are welcomed. Given additional information commented by the OP, the landlord is looking to increase his rents. Evidentially this municipality has strict rent controls. In this case, I would enter negotiations with the landlord. I would offer him a percentage of his anticipated rent increase and probably start at 50%. If the OP has been a good tenant (always paid on time, and low maintenance) the landlord might see this as a bargain. No need to find a new tenant and no need to vet one that might pay poorly. The better the tenant has been, and the more strict the renter protection laws the more appeal this offer will have to the landlord. The benefit for the OP is they don't have to move, or find a new place with its associated costs and inconvenience. If the landlord is just a mindless corporate drone with no decision making power, this will not work. | You are likely now a holdover tenant, as you have stated that you continue to pay your original monthly rental payments. Check original lease and investigate what happens at end of lease. P.S. As your original question does not state a rent increase, may want to pay the $50. | There's a lot of variables here, as many leases are built in different ways within the leeway allowed by law. You will want to contact a local lawyer to see how you can mitigate the damage to yourself, and contact your landlord and see if you can re-negotiate the lease. If the landlord doesn't want to re-negotiate, you're probably facing eviction if you can't come up with the full rent by yourself; many leases don't allow non-related adults to live on the premises if they're not on the lease (this can also result in eviction). However, your roommate will also get an eviction record and be responsible for any damages if the lease survives long enough to cause an eviction. Actually having a random person move in from Craigslist might also cause your roommate to suffer additional liability if they're not allowed to sublet their lease agreement, which many leases do not allow (landlords like knowing who's living on their properties). Having them move in might cause both you and your roommate to be evicted. You probably don't have any rights to sue your roommate until actual damages occur (in other words, after you've already been evicted). You should speak with your landlord as soon as possible to get a new lease. An eviction record will cause problems for your roommate as well, so you might urge them to consider staying long enough to get things sorted out legally. When you ask your landlord, simply ask something like, "My roommate wants to move out. What are my options?" They will tell you what they are willing to accept. | I am sorry for your loss, and that you have to deal with bills on top of everything else. The quick answer is yes, you might have to sell the house to pay your mother's bills. As you probably know, the estate includes both your mother's assets (cash, house, car, and so on) and her debts. In general, to "settle the estate," the executor must pay all debts before she gives away any of the assets. Legal Aid of West Virginia has a helpful website about West Virginia probate law. Here is what it says about this issue: If you can’t pay all of your family member’s creditors from the person’s available money, you must sell off the family member’s property and pay the creditors in the order listed in W. Va. Code § 44-2-21; W. Va. Code §§ 44-1-18 to -20. You may have to sell the family member’s land or home in order to pay creditors. W. Va. Code § 44-8-7. Added after comments Under WV law, it does not matter that you were bequeathed your mother’s house. The law gives debtors priority over heirs. This means debtors are paid before any heir. Heirs are “paid” from whatever is left in the estate after the debts are paid. So if the estate is underwater, if it owes more than it is worth, there will be nothing left in the estate to give to the heirs. As executor, your job is to carry out West Virginia law. The nuts and bolts of what happens if you refuse to the sell the house depends on WV law. You might be able to find the details by searching on line, but your best bet is to probably to talk to an attorney who specializes in WV probate law. An attorney will know both the law on the books, and how that law is implemented. They will be able to advise you on what options you really have, and the costs and benefits of those options. If the estate is underwater, you could buy the house from the estate. If you do that, you will not be liable for any of your mother’s debts; those are owed by the estate. Depending on how the sale is handled, this may be your (financially) best option. (Depending on whether the price covers the debt, and on what other heirs are bequeathed, the court might worry about you selling yourself the house at a discount price, and thus look at the sale very carefully.) |
Facebook vs GDPR - Private Messages I sent to others will never be deleted/erased from Facebook servers I asked this question to Facebook: I would like to know how can I permanently delete private messages from both sides of the conversation. For example, conversations I had in the past with other Facebook users that I don't want them to be able to see/read anymore. If this is currently possible, or will be possible in the future, how can I apply this action also to messages I have already deleted from my side in the past? And they replied this: Messenger works like texting (SMS) and other mobile messaging apps to let you reach people instantly on their phones. When you send a message on Messenger a copy will be saved to your device. Only you and the people you’re in a conversation with can see your messages. Deleting a message permanently removes it from your inbox and your copy is removed from our servers. Keep in mind that deleting a message or conversation from your inbox won't delete it from your another person's inbox. As with messages sent via text message or by email, it isn't possible to delete sent or received messages from another person's inbox. Since I don't agree with this answer, I replied: While I understand what you mean regarding Messenger working like texting (SMS), there is a difference in that SMS messages do not stay saved on the servers permanently. Even with Whatsapp, as far as I know, messages are deleted from the servers once they reach the recipient's device. This seems more like texting (SMS). So, regarding Messenger, I would like to have a way to delete messages from Facebook's servers (including those I deleted so far), in both my side and recipient's side, even if a copy stays on recipients' devices. With a final reply from Facebook: As previously mentioned deleting a message permanently removes it from your inbox and your copy is removed from our servers. However, deleting a message or conversation from your inbox won't delete it from your another person's inbox. As with messages sent via text message or by email, it isn't possible to delete sent or received messages from another person's inbox even if you delete your account. Is this being GDPR compliant? I'm sure they are aware that private messages can have a lot of PII data, such as photos, addresses, private information that can easily identify an individual, etc... (or even my name, if they keep it attached to the message threads) If I decide to delete my account, apparently all the private messages I sent to others will never be deleted from Facebook servers, unless the recipients have deleted from their side. I don't see this as being compliant to the Art. 17 GDPR - Right to erasure. Am I correct? | Art. 17 GDPR Right to erasure (‘right to be forgotten’) The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller the erasure of personal data concerning him or her without undue delay and the controller shall have the obligation to erase personal data without undue delay where one of the following grounds applies: Assuming private messages contain personal data, if at least one of the following points (a..f) applies, it would have to be deleted. (a) the personal data are no longer necessary in relation to the purposes for which they were collected or otherwise processed; The original main purpose was probably Article 6(1)(b) (performance of a contract). If you delete your account, that would no longer apply. However, for the receiver of the private message, Article 6(1)(f) (legitimate interests pursued by a third party) would apply. The receiver might still want to read that message. So there is still a purpose to process this data. So point (a) does not apply. (Note that a Facebook private message can be considered a hosted version of SMS messages. A receiver does not expect SMS messages to be automatically deleted after they have reached the recipient's device. A receiver expects full control of the storage of SMS messages. I think a receiver expects the same for messages on facebook.) (b) the data subject withdraws consent on which the processing is based according to point (a) of Article 6(1), or point (a) of Article 9(2), and where there is no other legal ground for the processing; Data processing was not based on consent, so point (b) does not apply. (c) the data subject objects to the processing pursuant to Article 21(1) and there are no overriding legitimate grounds for the processing, or the data subject objects to the processing pursuant to Article 21(2); Article 21(1) allows you to object to processing based on Article 6(1)(f), unless there are compelling legitimate grounds for the processing which override the interests, rights and freedoms of the data subject. While I think processing is based on Article 6(1)(f), I also think there are legitimate grounds to refuse your objection. As explained before, the receiver might still want to read that message. The receiver was able before to read your message, so one can assume he/she has already knowledge of the personal data in the message. As it is a private message, no one else will be able to read that message. (At least Facebook will not allow it). So if the message is not deleted, the privacy implications for you are low. That's why I think the interests of the receiver will prevail. However, in the end, a judge will be the only person which can make such a consideration. So you would have to got to court to get a final decision about this. Article 21(2) is for direct marketing, that does not apply to this situation. So I think point (c) does also not apply. (d) the personal data have been unlawfully processed; (e) the personal data have to be erased for compliance with a legal obligation in Union or Member State law to which the controller is subject; These points do not apply. (f) the personal data have been collected in relation to the offer of information society services referred to in Article 8(1). This data processing was not based on consent, so even if you are a child below the age of 16 years, point (f) does not apply. Article 17(2) and Article 17(3) wont help you either. So in my opinion Facebook is right in this case. | Invasion of privacy and false light torts would probably not be applicable here. Very few states have adopted the false light tort because of its conflict with First Amendment principles and there was no agreement or even request to keep the text private. The copyright issue is trickier. First all, the TOS may provide that the copyright belongs to the text service provider or that there is a license. But, even in the absence of an express license, sending someone a message which is equivalent to sending them a letter, probably gives rise to an implied license that the person to whom it is sent can use the message that arises merely from the act of sending it without restriction or qualification. Implied license and fair use also heavily overlap. Publishing the text exactly as it was sent to you protects you from defamation liability because it is true. On the whole it would be extremely unlikely for there to be any legal liability for publishing a text from someone that they sent to you. Of course, one can imagine exceptions. If the person receiving the text was in an attorney-client relationship, or priest-parishioner making confession relationship, or was communicating regarding classified national security matters, or there was a non-disclosure agreement in place, among other possibilities, an evidentiary privilege and duty of confidentiality could apply and disclosing the material without the permission of the privilege holder could breach a duty of confidentiality and give rise to liability. If the picture was a nude picture of a minor, there could be a criminal and/or civil liability issue, and some states have also made posting "revenge porn" a criminal offense and/or a basis for civil liability. If the disclosure was effectively a way to facilitate insider trading that could be a problem. If the contents of the text were accurately transmitted but known to be false and were disseminated without disclosure of its falsity for the purpose of defrauding a third party, that could be a problem. But, no facts that obviously flag any exception are identified in the question. The mere fact that the posting may be embarrassing, or hurt someone's reputation, or was made without someone's express consent, in general, would not be a basis for liability. | Quoting content may or may not constitute copyright infringement, depending on the various factors that go into the fair use defense. Short quotes which are made for the purpose of discussion, research and commentary and not for copy would be squarely in the domain of "fair use" under US law. That means that the copyright owner would not succeed in suing you for quoting them: under the statutory mechanism for recognizing his right to his intellectual product, there is a limit on how much control he can exert over your behavior (since the two of you have not worked out some kind of agreement -- copyright law creates rights even when there is no contract). As for Facebook, you have a contract with them, embodied in the terms of service. You have been given permission to access material that they host (permission is required, under copyright law), and their permission is conditional. It says "you may access stuff on our platform only as long as you do X": if that includes a clause "don't be nasty", then that limits your right to speak freely and be as nasty as you'd like. If it says "don't quote even a little", that means you cannot quote even a little, even when you would have the statutory right to quote a little (or, to be nasty). Fair use would mean that you can't be sued for copyright infringement of the stuff that you quoted a little of. You can, however, be expelled from Facebook. You probably cannot be sued for "accessing Facebook without permission". There is a federal law against unauthorized access of computer networks, and there was a failed attempt to construe violation of a TOS as "unauthorized access" – it isn't. But accessing Facebook necessarily involves copying (that's how computers work), and there is no "fair use" defense whereby everybody has a fair use right to access Facebook. Theoretically you could be sued for copyright infringement, for accessing Facebook's intellectual property without permission. Also, Facebook can rescind your permission to access their content (see this case), and once you have been banned, it is a crime to further access their network. This assumes that there is no overriding limit on contracts that would nullify a no-quoting condition. There is no such limit on contracts in the US, so such a contract would be enforceable. There is also nothing illegal (unenforceable) about a TOS which prohibits automated methods of access. | The site would combine the data in novel ways, which is processing the data. Processing personal data which is publicly available is still processing personal data. You would have to take GDPR into account. That does not mean the processing is forbidden, but you need a legal basis for doing it. In many ways, having the informed consent is the easiest legal basis, but there are others. The data subject would have the right to demand information about the data you hold, and to demand the correction of wrong data. There is not necessarily a right to demand deletion, but if consent is withdrawn and you have no other basis for data processing, you have to delete. Note also that the consent basis would mean you have to actively contact the people whose consent you seek before the processing starts, and document how you do it. That makes pay-per-request models difficult. But consider that the news media can process some data about some people without the consent of the subjects of their activities. They just need to balance privacy and other legitimate interests all the time. | Let's assume that I created a mobile app for iPhone that is tracking rides on a bike [...] So the app is processing that data in the way I programmed it but I as a person do not have access to that data. I assume in such case I am not the data controller according to GDPR because I do not have access to that data is that correct? Yes, as far as I can see that is correct. The GDPR defines a data controller as someone who "determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data" - you just provide a tool, you don't control for what purposes your customers use their ride data. This is also discussed in this question: How does the GDPR apply to software developed by one company and used by another? What if additionally to that I will program my app for example in such way that it will sometimes send current GPS coordinate to an online service controlled by external company such as Apple [...] But still my app would send this data directly to Apple server so I will still not have any access to that data. Does this change anything and does GDPR now apply to me? Yes, and yes. In that case, you are telling Apple to process data for you, so you would become the data controller (because you "determine[s] the purposes and means of the processing of personal data"), and Apple is a data processor for you. That means also the usual mechanisms kick in - you need to inform your users about this processing, you need to make sure Apple plays by the rules, etc. etc. I also do not know if Apple save this request on their servers or if they just automatically convert received gps coordinates to a name and return the answer without saving the request. This is exactly the kind of situation the GDPR is meant to address. Under GDPR, saying "I do not know what X does with the data" is not an option. This is something many companies tried in the past, that is why GDPR explicitly assigns responsibility to the data controller (i.e., you). As explained in a EU document, What is a data controller or a data processor?: The duties of the processor towards the controller must be specified in a contract or another legal act. For example, the contract must indicate what happens to the personal data once the contract is terminated. A typical activity of processors is offering IT solutions, including cloud storage. [...] So, no, you cannot just say "I do not know if Apple saves this request". Instead, you must make a contract with Apple which says whether (and how, and for how long...) they save the request, and you must inform your users about this in your privacy policy. And if Apple refuse to make such a contract with you, you must find a different company to work with. | That's an old idea that has been tried several times before (such as the first, being Unvarnished: Website Lets You Review People (And Trash Them) | HuffPost, which no longer exists); and one of the latest incarnations is Peeple (mobile application - Wikipedia). There are lots of legal liabilities, including defamation and harassment/stalking, even with the Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act | Electronic Frontier Foundation which (mostly) protects the website owner from others' speech posted on the site (your mileage may vary due to jurisdiction). The only way such a site would survive is to do what Peeple and other sites have done: greatly limit the speech allowed, such as limiting to only positive reviews, giving the subject complete control over what does appear on their profile, only allowing "opt-in" profiles, verify identities, etc. You would have to implement full GDPR compliance; but various lawsuits will either shut you down before you get far enough to launch or soon after and force you to greatly limit the scope of the site. Most lawyers would advise you to find something else to do with your time and money. | Yes, it triggers the GDPR obligations Considerations: Can you surely identify those residing in Europe? In that case you should ask them to sign up again and confirm the consent. A lot of mailing lists are doing just that. Did they previously give consent and you can document it? If so, then you can argue that you have the required consent. Do you have business in Europe? If not then I don't think they would bother to go after you. You could just walk away from the fine. What other personal informastion are you storing? If you know who reside in Europe then you already have more info than just the email. The email address itself wouldn't be much of a documentation issue, SAR or Portability task. | I assume this refers to the case covered here: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2023/may/22/facebook-fined-mishandling-user-information-ireland-eu-meta The gist is: Under GDPR you can only transfer personal data from inside the European Union to the outside if you have procedures in place that ensures it is still protected to European standards. Facebook was found to have failed in that regards, specifically when it came to access by US spy agencies. It seems indeed quite plausible that it is not possible to transfer personal data from the EU to the US in a way that is compatible with both EU and US law. The EU and the US are in negotiations to find a way to make this legally possible. But until then, it seems that if you do have a European subsidary and want to keep all of your account data in the same place, it needs to be a place with robust privacy protections. That doesn't require it to be in the EU, but something like US, Russia or China would be illegal. |
Credit card debt after the death of the cardholder Question pertains to United States: California. I am including as much information as may be pertinent. My mother died a few weeks ago. I was estranged from her as my parents divorced when I was a child and grew up with my father. Because of the estrangement I knew nothing of her finances, and only by going through paperwork to clean out her apartment did I learn any financial information. Because she rented an apartment there is no house to be considered. Her vehicle was stolen a few months before her death so no assets there. To the best of my knowledge/research she had no land ownership. She did have an IRA from her employer before she was let-go/fired/no-longer-employed. I am listed on the IRA account as beneficiary. Outside of the IRA there is, that I know of, 1 account with her name on it. She left no written will or living trust, that I know of, and no Power of Attorney (PoA) paperwork. As living descendant (I'm assuming I become defacto estate executor) I called all financial institutions and CC numbers I could find and informed each of them that she is dead. A few weeks have passed since calling and so far one Credit Card (CC) company has called about estate payment. As CC are unsecured debts does the balance, ~$1,000 for this card, die with her? PS: Anything I ought to be aware of and know? Never done this before and prefer to know legal rights/requirements. | Debts do not just die with debtors. The creditors have legal rights to wet their beaks in whatever monies/valuables are left from the deceased. Expect the $1k CC debt to be deducted from the IRA and/or the account left it her name. | Two people can have an equal interest in real property without being married, and being incarcerated doesn't affect a person's property rights. What matters is that now your ex-wife has a legal interest in the property. As a separate issue, she presumably also has a legal obligation w.r.t. the mortgage (otherwise the quitclaim deed makes no sense). The easiest solution is for the other party to voluntarily transfer their interest in the property to you via a quitclaim deed. A difficult solution is to use the judicial process to remove a person from the title. This could be done if there was fraud involved in the property transfer process, for example if the quitclaim deed was forged (presumably not the case here). You might sue to correct an error which doesn't reflect the terms of the transaction, via a reformation action, but that doesn't seem to be the case (a party not understanding the consequences of transferring an interest isn't an error in the relevant sense). You need to hire an attorney to solve the problem (he will look at all of the documentation relevant for your case for a possible solution). | To add to user6726's answer: In general, you can only collect a judgement if there are assets or income available to be collected (i.e., owned by the debtor, and not protected from collection, such as personal items or part of the wages). If you suspect the debtor has assets you do not know about, you can formally ask the debtor to declare their assets. In Nevada (and in many other US states), this is called an Examination of Judgment Debtor (or just Debtor's examination). The basic idea is: You ask the court to order a debtor's examination. The court (after checking your judgement) orders a hearing where the debtor must appear (or they may be imprisoned for contempt of court). In the hearing, you can ask the debtor about their assets, and they must answer truthfully (usually under oath). Details vary, as usual. See for example this page from the Las Vegas Justice Court: Examination of a Judgment Debtor. As a practical note: The whole process, as usual, means additional work and possibly legal cost for the creditor - so it only makes sense if there is a realistic possibility of finding previously unknown assets. As usual, this is a decision the creditor must make. | Yes, the second home will be part of the New York bankruptcy estate. Congress broadly defined property within the bankruptcy estate as all property, "wherever located and by whomever held," subject to limited exemptions. Florida's homestead exemption is among the broadest in the Unite dStates; the value of the property that can be protected is unlimited. See Florida Constitution, Article X, Section 5. As such, I have broken down your question into two parts: May the debtors use the Florida homestead exemption for their Florida home even if they are domiciled in New York? If not, may the debtors use either the Federal or New York state homestead exemptions to protect their Florida home? Exemption Eligibility The debtors can choose between either the federal exemptions of section 522(d) or the exemptions available under New York state and nonbankruptcy federal law; the debtors may not choose the exemptions available under Florida state law. Section 552 of the Bankruptcy Code is the operative statute. To take advantage of a state's exemption scheme, the debtor must either: Be domiciled in the state for the 730 days immediately prior to filing its petition; or If the debtor has not been domiciled in a single state for such period, the state in which the debtor was domiciled for the 180 days immediately preceding the 730-day period (or for the longer portion of that 180 day period). 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1)(A): . . . any property that is exempt under Federal law . . . or State or local law that is applicable on the date of the filing of the petition to the place in which the debtor’s domicile has been located for the 730 days immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition or if the debtor’s domicile has not been located in a single State for such 730-day period, the place in which the debtor’s domicile was located for 180 days immediately preceding the 730-day period or for a longer portion of such 180-day period than in any other place; As a result, the debtor may only utilize either the Federal or New York homestead exemptions. Federal Homestead Exemption Section 522(d)(1) provides a homestead exemption in the amount of $22,975 in value for the debtor's residence. (1) The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed $ 22,975 in value, in real property or personal property that the debtor or a dependent of the debtor uses as a residence, in a cooperative that owns property that the debtor or a dependent of the debtor uses as a residence, or in a burial plot for the debtor or a dependent of the debtor. (The linked statute says that the federal homestead exemption is capped at $15,000. But pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 104, the amount is adjusted every three years to account for changes in the cost of living. Effective April 1, 2013, the cap is $22,975). Essential to the right to a homestead exemption is designation and occupancy of the property as a residence. Residence and domicile are not necessarily the same thing. Courts seem to be split as to whether a debtor may hold multiple "residences" at the same time. For example, the court in In re Lawrence, 469 B.R. 140 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2012) held: By choosing not to limit the residence qualified for exemption under § 522(d) to a principal or primary residence, Congress presumably intended to encompass a broader category than principal residences, namely any residence . . . . To sum up, on the date of their bankruptcy petition the [debtors] owned two residences, one in Massachusetts and one in Maine. They used them both. They were entitled to exempt either one, but only one, under § 522(d)(1). See also In re Demeter, 478 B.R. 281 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2012); In re Gandy, 327 B.R. 807 (Bankr. S.D.Tex. 2005). But the New Jersey Bankruptcy Court in In re Stoner, 487 B.R. 410 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2013) read the term "residence" in a manner "requiring some measure of permanence." I couldn't find any cases from New York discussing this issue, making it difficult to determine whether a New York bankruptcy court would allow the debtors to apply the federal homestead exemption to their Florida home. But given that the exemption is capped at only $22,975, it is unlikely to have a significant impact on the bankruptcy. New York Homestead Exemption The New York homestead exemption is more generous than the federal exemption. It provides exemptions capped between $75,000 to $150,000. However, it is limited to property located within New York and used as a primary residence. As such, the Florida property is not subject to the exemption. New York Civil Practice Law and Rules § 5206: Property of one of the following types, not exceeding one hundred fifty thousand dollars for the counties of Kings, Queens, New York, Bronx, Richmond, Nassau, Suffolk, Rockland, Westchester and Putnam; one hundred twenty-five thousand dollars for the counties of Dutchess, Albany, Columbia, Orange, Saratoga and Ulster; and seventy-five thousand dollars for the remaining counties of the state in value above liens and encumbrances, owned and occupied as a principal residence, is exempt from application to the satisfaction of a money judgment, unless the judgment was recovered wholly for the purchase price thereof: a lot of land with a dwelling thereon, shares of stock in a cooperative apartment corporation, units of a condominium apartment, or a mobile home. | They don't have to inform you that they are a debt collector. Because that can be a violation of 15 U.S.C. Section 1692b(2) by exposing that the person they are attempting to collect from has a debt. They are required to: identify himself, state that he is confirming or correcting location information concerning the consumer, and, only if expressly requested, identify his employer -- 15 U.S.C. Section 1692b(1) They also may not use any language indicates that the debt collector is in the debt collection business or that the communication relates to the collection of a debt 15 U.S.C. Section 1692b(5) What they do not have the right to do is harass you. They can not attempt to contact you again 15 U.S.C. Section 1692b(3) unless they have reason to believe you lied. I would contact the company back and inform them that you wish to have your number removed from their calling list, and that future calls may be a violation of 15 U.S.C. Section 1692b(3). Also, send them a notice in the mail. If they continue to attempt to contact you, report them to the FTC. You may also be entitled to monetary damages as well. See FTC The judge can require the debt collector to pay you up to $1,000, even if you can’t prove that you suffered actual damages. You also can be reimbursed for your attorney’s fees and court costs. To file a claim with the FTC, go to there online claim for debt collectors Its worth it to show that you won't joke with them. I had a "debt" with T-Mobile (really, I had a billing error in their favor, and they admitted to it, but would not stop the debt collectors) and they violated the rules. I tried to work with them, 6 months later, they damaged my credit. I contacted FTC about it and T-Mobile with in 3 days had the debt cleared and reversed on my credit. They also paid for my damages. All I wanted was the debt cleared. Note: for calls being recorded, always make sure you follow local laws and inform the other party that the call is recorded. If they have a right to record you, you have a right to record them. You must always infrom them as well. | The easiest way would be to hire a collection agency to collect the debt (for a fee of course), because collection agencies routinely include debts that they are collecting in credit reports. Credit reporting agencies differ in what other kinds of debts they will report. Recording a judgment lien in real property records will trigger a credit report entry with some agencies, but not others. Some agencies report all judgments entered in courts, but others don't. You could also contact a credit reporting agency and ask it if it will simply report your judgment without further action if you send them a copy. | We don't want this issue to adversely affect our credit and got legal consulting which suggested we should pay the debt collector to protect our credit score, and then sue the landlord for the money back in small claims court. I'm a little worried about this strategy since it requires to hand away the money first, and am trying to get second opinions. The debt collector is probably either the owner of the claim against you, if it is an assignee of the claim, or an agent of the landlord for purposes of collection. Thus, payment to the debt collector is equivalent to payment of the landlord. The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction regarding whether payment constitutes of waiver of a right to sue over the debt. Sometimes it is necessary to designate the payment "under protests" or "reserving all rights", but that is not a uniform rule of law that applies in all jurisdictions, and I do not have the time and familiarity with that state's law to research Massachusetts case law on that point accurately. | She could refer this to the Cyrpriot Commissioner for Personal Data Protection, but I would try contacting the company first and telling them to remove her Personal Data from the public website - or delete it completely. If they don't give a satisfactory response, mention the CPDP. This could lead to the data being removed within a few days, while an official complaint is likely to take longer. She may have grounds for legal action which would result in the company being compelled to take down the data (or to close the website), but if your friend is thinking in terms of compensation, what compensation would she seek? If she can demonstrate and quantify financial losses that occurred specifically because of this disclosure there might be a possibility, but I suspect that would be difficult to prove. |
Why do so many YouTube channels ask people if it's OK to show them in their videos? My understanding is that it's not illegal to film people in public where there can be no reasonable expectation for privacy. However, if that's the case, why do so many channels on YouTube ask people if it's OK to show them in their videos? Are they being polite, or is it part of YouTube's policy? Is it possible I don't understand the law correctly and that filming people in public does actually require consent? | This has some basis in law. You need permission from a person to commercially exploit their likeness especially in California, and a waiver is a way of staving off future lawsuit over right of publicity. YT has a privacy policy whereby a person who have been filmed can request removal of the video (see also this, because they don't explain the policy in a single place). Because YT is commercially exploiting people's personalities, this is necessary. | You're talking about sites like Youtube, so I'll focus on that. That quote, which you bolded, was over-simplified. The actual law is 17 USC 512 (c) Information Residing on Systems or Networks At Direction of Users. (1) In general. A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or, except as provided in subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider, if the service provider (A) -- (I) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the material on the system or network is infringing; -- (ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or -- (iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material; (B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control such activity; and (C says and complies with a DMCA takedown notice). What you're talking about is membership fees (e.g. Youtube Premium)... or general advertisements that would be placed on any video without awareness of it being infringing. That does not violate Safe Harbor per se. At least not on a legitimate site which is dominated by legitimate content and makes an honest, credible effort to keep it that way. The important clause in (B) is "In a case..." Under (B), they lack the ability to control each activity (upload or view). Youtube's inability is due to receiving 500 hours (30,000 minutes) of uploaded video every minute, obviously requiring 30,000++ staff seats working 24x7 to curate. That would amount to about 200,000 staff - all of Google is around 50,000 right now. Even if a small site were able to moderate all content, they might still have a Safe Harbor defense if they could credibly say that they did not know the material was infringing. If someone created a "Juan Brown" username and uploaded blancolirio's videos from YouTube, they could say "we did not know that was not the real person". But if the video started with an HBO splash screen and tones, then heck no. But non-moderation is not an airtight defense. When sites are neglectful toward removal, they can soon develop a reputation as a haven for such infringing content - which the sites tend to embrace, since it brings many customers! This was the undoing of several music sharing sites in the 00's, since this awareness of their reputation, plus a lack of diligent removal, failed them on all three arms of 1(A) above. Remember that a competently run website that relies on user submissions is well aware of the DMCA and its case law, and has tailored its rules and enforcement to make it easy to defend a copyright claim. For instance, in the case of music, Youtube uses some human intervention but largely automated means to either take it down and give the uploader a copyright "strike" leading to a ban (which alienates their biggest contributors, especially when a popular Youtuber like blancolirio winds up with a distant car stereo in background noise, remember the detection is by "bot" and no human ever sanity-checks it). de-monetize the suspect video (uploader gets nothing, but, neither does YouTube). monetize it, but give the revenue stream to the rights holder due to an agreement with them. The last one is Youtube's preference with regards to music. As this was vastly easier, more practical and better for the community all-around, allowing whole classes of content to be created that would be prima-facie illegal otherwise. And it's content people are already creating and Youtube can't stop them, so it solves a big policing problem too. | Unless the Youtube Video shows them committing a crime, then no, they couldn't be arrested and tried for a crime. Them saying it, not under oath, is just hearsay that has no evidentiary value unless there is already other evidence they have committed a crime. In that case, its an admission. But there must be other, either circumstantial, or actual physical evidence of a crime. Past intoxication is not a crime, either. Possession of drugs, if caught with them is. But saying you got high is not. People have walked into police stations and confessed to murders. But with no evidence, no body, no name of a missing person, they can't even be held after the holding period for investigatory purposes expires. If the video shows them committing assault, or breaking and entering (there actually are idiots who post this stuff), the video is actual evidence of a crime and it is often used against them. The statements can be used to begin an investigation, but people don't usually confess to anything worth pursuing even an investigation. The fact that someone says they used to do something criminal is not enough. For all you ( meaning anyone ) knows, the statute of limitations has expired because they "pirated games" 10 years ago. Your comment is right on. | germany In Germany, taking pictures - and publishing them - is legal, if they're taken from public areas, from the general perspective of a passer-by, and if the picture doesn't make individual persons recognizable. (There are some restrictions about making persons recognizable; if you take a picture of a monument or other building that would typically be photographed by tourists, and if the topic of the picture is clearly the monument, not a random bystander, then it's OK to publish even if the bystander's face is visible. But that doesn't work for individual's houses). Still, Street View got into trouble because their cameras are mounted on roofs of a car, in a height of 2.5-3 meters, so they violated the "perspective of a passer-by" rule. To return to the example of "bathroom", the camera could well be able to see you nude when a passer-by would only be able to see a small portion of the ceiling next to the window. Because of this, and because many Germans were uneasy with seeing their houses on the internet, as a condition to permit Street View at all, the German government insisted on allowing people to request their house to be removed; in 2010, approximately 250000 people made use of that (source: https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-11595495). Because of the high resistance against Street View in Germany, Google published what they had in 2011, but stopped collecting more images. This is explained in https://bigthink.com/strange-maps/germany-street-view/, which also explains some of the reasons why Germans are so heavily biased for privacy. | Copyright almost certainly exists in the images, since presumably someone took those pictures and so they would own the copyright of those images. However, that doesn't mean you don't own the film, you just that don't own the copyright. You can have it developed to see what's there without copying the images. Just tell the developer you only want the film developed and for no prints to be made. If there's child pornography you could end up in a lot of hot water. While you'd be innocent of any crime, if the developer reports the images to the police you'll have to convince them that you had no idea what was on the film. It's extremely unlikely that there's anything untoward on the film however. I'd note however that unless the film is only a couple years old then it's likely the pictures have faded significantly. If it's ten or more years old, there might not be anything recognizable. | It is illegal to take or publish a picture of someone without his consent in France. There are five exceptions : people related to news events of public interest, public information purposes (when right to inform the public is bigger than right to privacy), people present in a public location when focus is not on them, public figures during their public functions and activities, people shown in a large group without distinction of one or several individuals. If you respect one of the 5 conditions, you do not require consent. Policemen do not have extended or extra protection regarding these rights: they are treated as any individual. This is described in a report from the CNDS (Commission National de Déontologie de la Sécurité): "[Les forces de l'ordre] doivent considérer comme normale l’attention que des citoyens ou des groupes de citoyens peuvent porter à leur mode d’action. Le fait d’être photographiés ou filmés durant leurs interventions ne peut constituer aucune gêne pour des policiers soucieux du respect des règles déontologiques." which translates approx. to: "Policemen must consider as normal the attention that citizens or citizen groups can pay to their mode of action. Being photographed or filmed during their interventions cannot be seen as as an embarrassment to the officers concerned to comply with ethical rules." See also this Wikimedia Commons internal policy that summarise the French law and (fr) the exceptions on droit-image.fr | Let's deal with the somewhat misguided notion of "public space": what it means and what it doesn't: "publicly owned" is not equivalent to "public space" - Camp David is "publicly owned"; it is not "public space". "privately owned" can be "public space" - the publically accessible parts of shopping malls are privately owned public spaces. "public space" does not mean you have unconditional access. Access may be limited or subject to restrictions placed on it by whoever has lawful authority over it. For example, the aforementioned shopping mall is not public when the mall is closed, roads may be closed for maintenance, street festivities or emergencies etc. So: if you are in a place where you have permission of the lawful authority to be (public spaces give you this implicitly, private spaces require explicit permission), and the lawful authority has not placed restrictions on photography, and the subject does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy (like they would in a public toilet), and the subject matter is legal (e.g. considering restrictions on sexual or commercial activities), then you can take photographs. | You clearly cannot provide data that you haven't stored – and not storing data is a good thing under the Art 5(1)(c) Data Minimization Principle. Despite the Art 20 data portability right being conditional on that the data subject has provided data and not on that data has been stored, I think responding to such a request with “sorry, as per our privacy policy we do not store this data” would be perfectly fine. It is also curious that you are using consent as the legal basis for the purpose of selecting the website language. How do you obtain consent from visitors? How can you prove that you got consent? In many ways, consent is the legal basis of last resort, and I'd think that legitimate interest would be a much more straightforward approach in your case. |
If Virginia ratified the Equal Rights Amendment, would it go into effect? In the Nov 2019 election, the Democrats won the majority of both Virginia state houses, and there is some discussion that Virginia could be the 38th state to ratify the (proposed) Equal Rights Amendment. (See this law.SE question for discussion of the ERA's possible effects.) Approval by 3/4ths of the States would normally be enough to pass a Constitutional Amendment, but there are apparently two problems: Even if Virginia acts as expected next year, there is no guarantee the amendment would take hold. A handful of the states that initially ratified the ERA have since rescinded those decisions and the most recent congressional deadline passed about four decades ago. Despite those roadblocks, activists believe they are well-positioned -- legally and politically -- to push the amendment, which was written by the suffragist Alice Paul in 1923, over the line. 1. Withdrawn ratifications Apparently four states (Nebraska, Tennessee, Idaho, Kentucky) have "rescinded" their ratifications, after initially approving them, and one state (South Dakota), added a "sunset" provision to their ratification if it wasn't approved in whole by the original deadline. Are these "take backs" valid? Could they prevent the Amendment from going into effect? How would this question be adjudicated? Is there any relevant case law on the matter? 2. Congressionally-imposed Deadlines The original resolution by the 92nd Congress included the following preface (emphasis added): Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House concurring therein), That the following article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of its submission by the Congress In 1978 another resolution was passed, extending the deadline to 1982, although this extension was passed by simple and not 2/3rds majority. Despite these deadlines, the Amendment was ratified by Nevada in 2017 and Illinois in 2018. Are these post-deadline ratifications (and a hypothetical 2020 one from Virginia) valid? Would Congress simply need to pass a new (future) deadline, and all the past ratifications would take effect? Wikipedia does list some purportedly relevant case law, can anyone help me understand how these might apply to these questions? | The true answer is this is fundamentally unclear and ratification would definitely set up for a Supreme Court showdown. The Supreme Court would in my opinion need to resolve 3 issues: Are Congressionally imposed deadlines in resolutions proposing an amendment to the States for ratification binding? Does a state withdrawal of its ratification of an amendment annul its ratification of the amendment? Who decides when an amendment is ratified? For the first question this is perhaps the most unresolved question. Clearly if the deadline is imposed in the text of the amendment it is binding. For example, see the text of the 18th amendment, Section 3. What is not clear is what if any binding effect a deadline in the text of the resolution proposing an amendment has as to the validity of the proposed amendment. Article V makes no provision on such deadlines. In fact the most recent amendment ratified was submitted for ratification on September 25, 1789, but ratified May 5, 1992. In this instance the Archivist of the United States declared the amendment ratified, but Congress also acted to do so and several members scolded the Archivist for doing so before Congress acted. However, there was no resolution of who had to actually approve the ratification. For the second question there is absolutely no answer to this question except Coleman v. Miller which suggests this is a political question. This essentially means that the question should be resolved by Congress, not the courts. Lastly, for the third question see also my response to the first question. If Congress is indeed the ratifier, what happens if one Congress decides the amendment was not ratified, but a future one decides it was? Honestly, ratification of the ERA would open a whole can of worms and make it difficult to really resolve this issue. Probably the most direct method to force the Supreme Court to rule on this issue would be someone challenging their requirements to register with the Selective Service System. | Constitution of the USA, Article IV, Section 1: Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof. and the Commerce Clause (Article I, Section 8, clause 3): [The Congress shall have Power] To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes; SCOTUS has found the former to mean that states that do not allow same-sex marriages in their laws must recognize same-sex marriages registered by other states - Obergefell v. Hodges. Maybe one could argue that driver licenses are not equivalent among states, but I would expect judges (SCOTUS) to require a very well reasoned explanation. For example, maybe Alaska could refuse to recognize licenses from Florida because Florida drivers do not know how to cope with snowed roads. But even in that case Alaska probably would need to produce data showing that these measures aim to serve the public interest (avoid accidents) and that there are no other ways of getting the same result. OTOH the Commerce Clause has been successfully used to avoid states mandating racial segregation of travellers, so it is quite reasonable to see it being used to prevent a state from trying to limit the mobility of citizens from other states (again, in the supposition that the state restricting it cannot show a compelling reason to do so). AFAIK, only the Federal Government could invoke the Commerce Clause; I would expect a lot more people (in your example, the PA government or maybe even any PA driver) would have standing. | The newly elected Congress does all of the work in electing a new President. Under the 20th Amendment, the newly elected Congress takes office on January 3. Then three days later, on January 6, 3 USC § 15: Counting electoral votes in Congress, requires the new Congress to meet in Joint Session to count the electoral votes. If this session does not produce a President or Vice President, there is what is called a contingent election. In a contingent election the House begins immediately to choose a President from among the top three electoral college vote getters, while the Senate chooses a Vice President from among the top two electoral college vote getters. Both Houses use majority rule. The House votes by state, so a majority is 26, while the Senators vote individually, so a majority is 51. If the House does not pick a President by Inauguration Day, January 20th, the Vice President serves until a President is picked. If neither a President nor a VP has been picked by the 20th, the Presidential Succession Act applies, and the Speaker of the House, President pro tempore or a cabinet officer serves as Acting President. It wasn't always done this way: The 20th Amendment was passed in 1933 to take control over elections away from the lame duck Congress. Before the 20th A was adopted, the terms for P, VP and Congress all ended on Inauguration day, March 4. That meant the lame duck Congress had to deal with electoral matters. By giving Congress and the P/VP different expiration dates, the Amendment meant new Congress could deal with the election. Setting the election counting date after the new Congress was seated (on January 6), meant only the new Congress could. | You can certainly do so: it's been done many times in the past, and can be done even with a written constitution. The most recent famous example that I know of would be how the Nazi party used the Enabling Act, 1933 and Reichstag Fire Decree, 1933 to amend the constitution by essentially neutering all the safeguards, and used force to ensure that they could stay in power. Julius Caesar's reforms follow in a similar vein. For someone to successfully force change like this, you generally need a political system that is unstable and has no strong (or at least effective) checks and balances. Additionally, you need the support of the military because otherwise they will generally support the existing structure. Other less extreme examples I can think of where a system has changed to another system would be former colonies adopting new constitutions (e.g. Ireland and Pakistan), or where there has been significant change in the country's model (e.g. South Africa). Again, you need support, but this time it is within the existing political and judicial framework. | In Roe v. Wade, the primary holding is that "a person may choose to have an abortion until a fetus becomes viable, based on the right to privacy contained in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Viability means the ability to live outside the womb, which usually happens between 24 and 28 weeks after conception". The opinion finds that there does exist a right to privacy, and that it is protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. It is immaterial that there is no mention of abortion in The Constitution. There is also no mention of TV and radio transmissions, the internet, speech-amplifying devices, or automated forms of text reproduction and yet the vague words of the First Amendment w.r.t. "press" and "speech" are interpreted as protecting your right to blog. Revolvers and various other firearms that did not exist at the time of the writing of the constitution are not mentioned, but they (the right to have them) are protected under the Second Amendment. Lack of specific mention is irrelevant to determining constitutional protection. §VIII of the opinion discusses the right of privacy, and the ruling roots the recognition of that right in Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U. S. 250, and numerous other SCOTUS rulings – Stanley v. Georgia, 394 US 557; Terry v. Ohio; Katz v. US, 389 US 347; Boyd v. US, 116 US 616, Olmstead v. US, 277 US 438; Griswold v. Connecticut, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 and so on. You might then look at the Dobbs ruling to see whether those arguments are addressed and refuted. That, at least, is where you would start in understanding the legal background. | Volokh commented on this. There is no 2nd Amendment issue, nor does federal law. It may be illegal in some states, depending on whether age is included in public accommodation anti-discrimination laws. For instance, Conn. Gen. Stat. §§46a-64 says (a) It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section: (1) To deny any person within the jurisdiction of this state full and equal accommodations in any place of public accommodation, resort or amusement because of race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, gender identity or expression, marital status, age, lawful source of income, intellectual disability, mental disability or physical disability, including, but not limited to, blindness or deafness of the applicant, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons; §46a-63 defines "public accommodation" (1) “Place of public accommodation, resort or amusement” means any establishment which caters or offers its services or facilities or goods to the general public, including, but not limited to, any commercial property or building lot, on which it is intended that a commercial building will be constructed or offered for sale or rent Public accomodation laws are how states deal with discrimination in sales, such as selling wedding cakes Illinois 775 ILCS 5/1-103 likewise prohibits age discrimination in public accomodations, but defines "age" as "the chronological age of a person who is at least 40 years old". Connecticut used to define "age" as "any age between forty and sixty-five, inclusive", but that clause was deleted. Lousiana also prohibits age discrimination (La. Rev. Stat. §51:2247). Their statement about age likewise limits anti-discrimination protection to "individuals who are at least forty years of age". Maryland in MD State Govt Code § 20-304 also bans age discrimination, and does not redefine "age" or limit the scope of those ages that are protected. So while it is generally legal to refuse to sell goods to the young (and sometimes mandatory, e.g. alcohol, firearms, tobacco), there are a few states where such a policy would violate state anti-discrimination laws. There can also be city laws (Seattle has very broad anti-discrimination laws), but they exclude age from the Public Accommodation subset of discrimination. | Yes The only accurate thing in the linked article is: "I am not a Constitutional lawyer." That could be taken further into "I have no real idea how our legal and political systems work." One of the tasks of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court is to interpret the laws of Massachusetts including the Massachusetts Constitution. In Goodridge v. Department of Public Health the court decided that the Constitution provided for equal protection and due process and that if the state wished to discriminate against people on the basis of sex they needed a good reason. The reasons the state put forward were: providing a 'favorable setting for procreation'; ensuring the optimal setting for child rearing, which the department defines as 'a two-parent family with one parent of each sex'; and preserving scarce State and private financial resources. On 1. the court said marriage is irrelevant for procreation and vice-versa. On 2. they said Massachusetts law on child welfare dealt with the "best interests of the child" and that it is not in those interests for the state to deprive the child of benefits because it doesn't like the sexual orientation of the parents. On 3. they said equal protection means equal protection. In a common law legal system like Massachusetts where courts have the power to strike down legislation then that takes effect as soon as the decision is published. The law ceases to exist without the legislature or the executive doing anything. Now, the people of Massachusetts are free to amend their constitution to outlaw same-sex marriage or remove equal protection rights if they want. However, at the time and subsequently, the majority don't want. | No, votes would not have to be postponed. The Constitution has nothing specific to say about this. (It's not that long - you can and should read it through and check for yourself, and searching is even easier.) The Constitution's only reference to the Speaker of the House is Article I Section 2: "The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers [...]". (Other than the 25th Amendment which prescribes the role of the Speaker in receiving declarations as to whether the President is incapacitated.) The House's procedures, and the Speaker's role in them, are left up to the Rules of the House of Representatives, which the House makes for itself. (US Constitution, Article I, Section 5: "Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings [...]".) Rule I, Section 8 provides: (a) The Speaker may appoint a Member to perform the duties of the Chair. Except as specified in paragraph (b), such an appointment may not extend beyond three legislative days. (b)(1) In the case of illness, the Speaker may appoint a Member to perform the duties of the Chair for a period not exceeding 10 days, subject to the approval of the House. If the Speaker is absent and has omitted to make such an appointment, then the House shall elect a Speaker pro tempore to act during the absence of the Speaker. So if the Speaker is ill, she can appoint a temporary substitute (Speaker pro tempore), who can preside over all House business, including votes. If she cannot or does not do so, the House may elect a Speaker pro tempore with the same authority. (That election itself would be presided over by the Clerk of the House, an administrative official, as specified by Rule II Section 2(a).) Either way, there would be no need for votes to be postponed. |
As a victim of debit card fraud, what are my legal options? I have just been a victim of debit card fraud where someone over five hours away in another state purchased over $500 in computer equipment last night. Nevermind, that my credit union seems so non-chalant about it and that unlike Capital One, they seem to have no checks in place to notice that there are several usual small purchases in my city of residence and then one whooping purchase late at night at a computer store several states away and not a single red flag was raised. I caught it because I am always checking my bank account periodically. Anyway, what can I legally do about this? Who would legally take this seriously? | Under the Electronic Fund Transfer Act you must report the fraud right away: if you act within 2 days your liability is limited to $50. Since you acted very quickly, that's the most you can lose. It could be zero under the terms of your bank agreement. This section states the specifics of your liability. | FDIC Regulation 500 prohibits discrimination in making loans on the basis of "National origin" but not on the basis of immigration status. This story from The Nation says that Bank of America is denying accounts to non-citizens, and arguing that it is legal because of increased risks, although there are current court challenges to this. Perez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A is a case now pending challenging loan denials based on immigration status. This has particularly come up in regard to DACA recipients, rather than people with LPR status. The US "public accommodation" laws probably do not apply, as a bank is not usually considered a place of public accommodation. Any specific state laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of immigration status might apply. In short, this is an issue still not clearly settled. There seems to be no law or regulation requiring banks to ask for citizenship information, much less to deny accounts based on it, and it would be well to seek a bank with a different policy if possible. The above is very US-specific. Many countries do limit banking access based on citizenship, i understand. I am not a lawyer, and this is not legal advice. Before challenging any bank action, you may well wish to seek advice from a lawyer. | Being as general as possible - refund policies are governed by bank and scheme policies, and so aren't necessarily the domain of law. There may be jurisdiction-specific regulations that limit your liability as a consumer, but there's not usually a legal requirement. This is almost certainly wholly governed by your credit card terms of use.¹ You can report this to your local authorities, but without proof of a crime, it's unlikely to be actionable. The website isn't necessarily to blame, either - if your computer or your connection to the website was somehow compromised, then your details may have been obtained in that way, and the website could have had nothing to do with it. Again, this is almost certainly wholly governed by their scheme agreement.¹ 1. Some off-topic information here, which may or may not be accurate, and which you should not seek clarification for here (check Money SE instead, and first check whether it is on-topic there) - generally, bank policies will refund you for fraudulent transactions below a certain quantity or value. In this case, the bank tends to take a loss and chargeback rights are not exercised. In other cases, the bank will require the merchant to prove that the authorised cardholder did in fact authorise the transaction. The level of proof is governed by the way in which the transaction was conducted and verified at the time of purchase - whether the CVV2 code was verified, whether address verification was completed, whether 3D verification was completed. If the merchant is unable to prove, according to the scheme guidelines, the transaction will be charged back to their account. | Sorry to hear about this. It is possible that your friend’s Facebook account was hacked and the hacker scammed you. It is unlikely that you can get your money back. If the taxi fare cost $80, then $30 wouldn’t have got them home. Unless you paid the taxi company direct, whoever you corresponded with had access to electronic banking of some sort. One would imagine that someone with $500 at home probably has access to $80 electronically themselves. It is a pretty bad day when getting scammed by a stranger is the optimistic case, but I post this answer in the hope that it’s not your friend who scammed you. Before writing off the friendship, you might want to phone or visit your friend to check whether their Facebook account was hacked. | So, in short, the bank did what you asked them to do (close your account). What do you think they did that might be unlawful? | Suppose I obtain the ability to access someone else's cryptocurrency. This sounds like fraud e.g. I overheard them saying the password to their wallet out loud or I am a custodian of their assets. Nope, STILL fraud, possibly even Computer Misuse aka hacking... and because you use internet: it's Wire Fraud I now borrow those assets, keep them for some period of time, and then return them, without the owner's consent. hmmm, let's take california... Luckjy you, it is not embezzlement because you were not entrusted with the cryptocurrency, you gave yourself access. 503. Embezzlement is the fraudulent appropriation of property by a person to whom it has been intrusted. No it is plainly... theft under California law: 484. (a) Every person who shall feloniously steal, take, carry, lead, or drive away the personal property of another, or who shall fraudulently appropriate property which has been entrusted to him or her, or who shall knowingly and designedly, by any false or fraudulent representation or pretense, defraud any other person of money, labor or real or personal property, or who causes or procures others to report falsely of his or her wealth or mercantile character and by thus imposing upon any person, obtains credit and thereby fraudulently gets or obtains possession of money, or property or obtains the labor or service of another, is guilty of theft. In determining the value of the property obtained, for the purposes of this section, the reasonable and fair market value shall be the test, and in determining the value of services received the contract price shall be the test. If there be no contract price, the reasonable and going wage for the service rendered shall govern. For the purposes of this section, any false or fraudulent representation or pretense made shall be treated as continuing, so as to cover any money, property or service received as a result thereof, and the complaint, information or indictment may charge that the crime was committed on any date during the particular period in question. The hiring of any additional employee or employees without advising each of them of every labor claim due and unpaid and every judgment that the employer has been unable to meet shall be prima facie evidence of intent to defraud. Giving it back doesn't matter. The person taking the crypto for any amount of time without being entitled to them is committing theft. You see, California doesn't interest that you just want to borrow. They don't even require Mens Rea for the mere taking - only for fraudulent pretense there is an intent question. In fact, it might even be automatically Grand Theft: 484d. As used in this section and Sections 484e to 484j, inclusive:[...] (2) “Access card” means any card, plate, code, account number, or other means of account access that can be used, alone or in conjunction with another access card, to obtain money, goods, services, or any other thing of value, or that can be used to initiate a transfer of funds, other than a transfer originated solely by a paper instrument. 484e. (a) Every person who, with intent to defraud, sells, transfers, or conveys, an access card, without the cardholder’s or issuer’s consent, is guilty of grand theft. YIKES! and now, intent to defraud comes in, but that is actually minimal: that just means taking without being allowed to by the owner in many cases. | There might be some relevant state law. Michigan has a Social Security Number Privacy Act, which limits use of SS numbers, such as publically displaying an amount of a number, use it as an account number, require it to be transmitted insecurely over the internet, mail it etc. However, it is allowed under 3(a) to mail a number in a document if the purpose is to identify an individual, especially 3(a)(iv), to Lawfully pursue or enforce a person's legal rights, including, but not limited to, an audit, collection, investigation, or transfer of a tax, employee benefit, debt, claim, receivable, or account or an interest in a receivable or account. It would depends on your state, but it is highly likely that debt collection is an allowed purpose (even if it not a real debt, just a good-faith mistake). This gives a brief overview of state laws. | This would be wire fraud, which is any type of fraud committed using electronic communications (the term originally comes from the use of telegrams to commit fraud... just like how "wiring" money devised from paying the bill at one telegram station and having the bill collector take an equal amount of money from a different station.). Wire Fraud is basically a fraud crime over electronic communications, so it doesn't matter how you defraud someone, the fact that you did it in this manner is guilty... using a bank system to fraudulently create more money in your digit account would qualify. The bank would be the victim since it does have a set amount of money in assets that it owes to its customers (account holders) and Federal Insurance (which prevents the Bank Run scene in "It's a Wonderful Life" from happening) requires the bank to carefully keep books. Additionally, Wire Fraud comes with a $100,000 fine against the perpetrator for committing the crime where a financial institution is a victim, so it's in the Bank's interest to report a sudden income surge of fake dollars to the authorities lest they have to pay the fine out of their own pocket, risk their federal insurance, or lose their consumer confidence with account holders (who will pull their money and go to a more honest bank). |
What is the recourse for defamation? I came across this question today https://interpersonal.stackexchange.com/questions/23296/i-was-mistakenly-identified-as-a-criminal-and-this-has-caused-rumors-how-can-i and I think OP is taking the issue way too lightly. What kind of recourse can OP pursue to swiftly clear their name? Do they have a strong case for egregious defamation? Full story below in case the IPS link goes bad in the future: A while ago, I was at a popular, busy local nightclub (this is in the Unites States) and ran into a friend of a friend. Let's call her Anne. After a bit of conversation with Anne, and mutual name-dropping of our overlapping social networks, a bouncer approached me and said that he was asked to escort me off the premises. I had no idea why, and the bouncer said he did not know either, only that I had to leave immediately. I know enough not to argue when the door staff have made up their mind, so I agreed to leave without complaint. I assumed it was because maybe I looked a little intoxicated-- I wasn't really, I had 2.5 drinks over 2 hours-- and thought nothing more of it. A week later, a different friend contacted me and informed me that I had been 86'd from the club because I am a "known sex offender." After I had been escorted out, the bouncer had told Anne this. Anne, by the way, volunteers as a rape counselor and is a strong and feminist advocate for social justice. Over the past week she had defriended me on social networks and starting contacting our mutual friends to inform them of this "fact" out of concern. Because I am defriended I cannot see what she is saying about me nor can I respond. I only heard about this from a friend of a friend of a friend. This is a clear case of mistaken identity. I hadn't been in that club in more than five years, so there was no way I was a person that would have been known to them. I have done a search of the local sex offenders registry and I am not in it. I have never been arrested, let alone indicted of a crime. I am obviously devastated by this and very depressed. I am not sure what to do about it. My friend suggested I go back to the club and confront the manager, but my feeling is that in a situation like that the manager has to side with their employees. I considered reaching out directly to Anne, but my gut tells me, given the situation, that she would interpret this as a form of intimidation and it would simply make things worse. What can I do to fix this situation? My goal is to quash the rumors and cleanse my reputation in my social circle. | What kind of recourse can OP pursue to swiftly clear their name? The OP's "recourse" is to prove the truth - that he is not a convicted or accused (by a prosecutor) sex offender - to those who defamed him, who are presumably the bar owner(s), who instructed the bouncer to remove the OP because he was a sex offender; and possibly the bouncer, who may have told Anne that the OP was a sex offender; and possibly others who later on social media said the OP is a sex offender, such as Anne herself. The facts of who may be a sex offender and who may have falsely asserted someone is must be sorted out, and that's usually done by lawyers before a lawsuit (with a possible settlement from "We're going to sue" threat letter by the OP's lawyer); or in the discovery process of an actual lawsuit; or in court by a jury. It's entirely up to the OP to take legal action, hopefully under the advice of a lawyer; and it's not a good idea for the OP to confront the bouncer, Anne or others and possibly complicate his own situation. As for anything happening "swiftly", that's another point entirely. The OP could sue for damages to his reputation and/or to require the defamers to retract their statements, or for other compensations. Many personal injury lawyers give free initial consultations. See Defamation | Legal Information Institute for definitions and the laws regarding defamation, libel and slander (which can vary due to jurisdiction; in some areas, defamation is criminal as well as civil). Libel is published defamation, as in defaming someone in messages on social media; slander is spoken defamation, such as what the bar bouncer may have done. Do they have a strong case for egregious defamation? The likelihood of "a strong case" is for the OP's legal counsel to determine; they will look at the evidence of defamatory statements, the likelihood of getting monetary damages from the bar and/or the individuals involved, and other factors. | Statutes of limitations (hereinafter "SOL") vary from jurisdiction-to-jurisdiction. If it is only one-year in New York (I've not confirmed this) that would not be surprising. SOLs exist for all civil matters and nearly all criminal matters. I'd just like to point out that your question is not really limited to defamation or to the time frame for which the specific SOL runs for libel/slander ... at least as I've read it. It seems you are asking the broader question pertaining to what the philosophical or practical purpose(s) for SOLs in general are, as well as what effect these limits can have on the ability of a would-be claimant/plaintiff to get relief through the courts. So, to answer whether a person who believes they've been defamed can still bring a cause of action after the SOL has passed: the short answer is no. But, that is only the short answer. SOL is an affirmative defense, meaning that it can only be asserted if it is pled in the answer to a complaint. So, if John Doe feels he's been defamed by a libelous statement in the Times, and he files suit 4 years after the statement was made (and the SOL is 1 year), the court will still accept the filing of the complaint and Times must still be served. You do not lose the right to file your claim, when the SOL has passed, which is a very common misconception of the law. And, Times must still file an Answer to avoid defaulting. However, in that answer Times (no doubt by and through qualified counsel) will most likely assert a variety of affirmative defenses pro forma, which will include the passage of SOL (the claim is stale). If, in fact, the SOL has passed and the affirmative defense is pled, the next thing the Times will do is file a motion to dismiss. The judge will view the complaint in a light most favorable to Doe, the plaintiff, which will lay out all the facts (including when the libelous statement was published). If the cause of action accrued (this just means when the injury was sustained) and the claim was not filed prior to the expiration of the SOL, Doe's case will be dismissed. If the Times does not assert SOL though, it is deemed to have been waived for that and any subsequent related proceedings. There are ways to toll (extend) the statute of limitations. There is a discovery rule (this does not mean Doe didn't read it until after the SOL, even though he was able to). It means that the SOL can be tolled in cases where one could not have discovered the tort occurred. In these instances, the SOL doesn't begin to run until the discovery was either made or should have been made. This is most typically seen in medical malpractice cases (e.g., a surgeon leaves a sponge or instrument in your abdomen, and after years of failed treatments for IBS your doc sends you for an x-ray and an MRI and it's discovered) or in asbestos cases (you don't know you breathed it until you have asbestosis) – those types of scenarios. In cases like that, the SOL begins to run when you find out the tort occurred. This has also been successful in recovered memory cases where childhood sexual abuse occurred but was suppressed. Incapacitation is another way the SOL can be tolled. So, in Doe's libel case, the SOL can be tolled if he is incapacitated (in a coma and didn't wake for 4 years, in a mental hospital in a break from reality for 5 years) – in such circumstances you can still file a claim and have it survive a motion to dismiss based on SOL once you are rehabilitated. Also, Absence due to military service is reason to toll in some jurisdictions. Lastly, (at least the last one I can recall) is that minors can often toll the SOL however long the statute is (say 1 year) after they turn 18. As for why there are SOLs: That is more public policy than anything else. It is one of the oldest rules of law known to modern man, dating back all the way to early Greek and Roman law. Statutes of limitations are a fundamental part of EU and US law, as well as most other modern legal systems. They function to prevent fraudulent and stale claims from arising after all evidence has been lost or after the facts have become dubious and unclear due to the progression of time, which can lead to lost or uncertain memories, death of witnesses (for each side), or disappearance/inability to locate witnesses. The policies behind SOLs are also for judicial economy and to protect defendants from having a never-ending potential suit looming over them. Often, the seriousness of the crime or the tort, or some element of it, dictates the time frame of the SOL. It is a means to ensure that plaintiffs pursue their claims with reasonable diligence: I.e., if it matters to you, file it. Also, as I touched on above, time disadvantages defendants. Plaintiffs are the "injured" party, so they tend to retain evidence much longer than a defendant, who might not even realize he has done wrong – especially in civil matters. So, in a libel case, the whole basis of the claim is the irreparable damage to your reputation. If more than a year has passed and you didn't know about it, one could assume the damage never rose to the level of having sufficed to make a valid claim in the first place. That is why they run fast in those cases. They run fast in medical malpractice claims too, but this is a result of tort reform – the public policy that litigation against doctors/hospitals causes increased health care costs for everyone. So, policy suggests it's best for society to dispose of these claims quickly (not so much if you're the plaintiff). Whereas most regular negligence claims can have SOLs as long as six years in some jurisdictions where I have practiced. So there are clearly policy determinations going into these legislative acts. The Golden Rule of Law that I tell all of my clients is this: If you think you have a claim, talk to a lawyer right away, because if you don't you can lose the right to pursue relief, much, much quicker than one may ever imagine! I know this is a long answer, but I get asked this (type) of question all the time. Plaintiffs feel the SOLs run too fast, while Defendants cannot believe they can still be on the hook! | Online conversations are generally allowed evidence. However, EVERYTHING in the chat should be considered, as well as any later actions. Were there later conversations that said something different? Did the lease you signed have different terms? One line in a WhatsApp does not make your case a "slam dunk". It may only be one piece of evidence in a much larger context. | Nothing in the description strikes me as illegal or unlawful, so I am unsure of the grounds your friend would have for legal action. The questions a lawyer would ask (in addition to that) would be likely to include : How does your friend quantify the damage? The law is great for pursuing financial compensation, but does not handle abstract concepts. Has your friend used psychological counselling services, and what was the cost? What additional financial costs has your friend borne? If your friend has written to the University and has expected a response, what is the evidence of diminished trust? (The letter suggests otherwise.) Would a reasonable person (the proverbial "man in the street") be psychologically damaged by the events experienced by your friend? Is there evidence of a pre-existing condition? You've also mentioned yourself as a witness. Did you witness the eviction, or would you be attesting to your friend's state of mind? If the latter, what are your psychological qualifications? In the main Western jurisdictions, the answer to the question "can my friend sue?" is usually "yes", but whether they stood a chance of winning the suit would probably be a better question to ask. Your friend would only be likely to win a case against the University or the Security company if they could demonstrate unlawful or counter-contractual activity by staff, and were able to demonstrate financial damages that had been caused by that activity. | No, there is no recourse. An yes, the potential "costs", both personal, financial, social, can be high and are not compensable under an investigatory hold scenario; however, it doesn't usually happen like that. There is no investigatory hold that long without arrest. If the police want to talk to you but don't have enough to arrest you, you can leave any time. If you call your lawyer, he/she will come to the police station and tell the cops to release or arrest you. If the police really want you to stay, likely there is probable cause and they can keep you anyway. The police can arrest you and keep you, without a warrant so long as there is "probable cause" to believe that a crime has been committed (by you). Once arrested without a warrant, this is what is usually referred to as an investigatory hold, where the law says you must be arraigned within 72 hours (some states it must be 48 hours, 1 day less than supreme court says is reasonable). During this time they can investigate their case against you and decide what, if any, charges they will bring. There is no recourse for this, (in the event they bring no charges) unless you can establish that you were held for no reason (including not being falsely identified) and that it was only to intentionally deprive you of your right to liberty. This is nearly impossible to prove, unless you really did nothing and the cop was just messing with you (for instance in a personal vendetta) and you can show that. | To start off, you appear to be confusing assault and battery. Assault does not require physical contact in order for it to occur. Verbal assault is still a crime, but in your situation it doesn't appear that any verbal assault has occurred - he is not actively threatening you with harm, and you are not in fear of being harmed. Yelling can sometimes qualify as verbal assault, but any form of verbal assault is very hard to prove because it leaves no evidence. Unless someone other than the two parties involved comes forward, it likely won't go anywhere. Assuming this has been going on for some time, what you appear to be experiencing is harassment which usually qualifies as a civil matter, and police will not take any action other than asking one of you to leave in order to resolve the issue. Most often, they will ask you (as the person being harassed) to leave, but that can also be in your benefit. If you can prove the other person's harassment caused you to have to leave in order to be comfortable again, then you can claim damages and can sue that other person for the harassment - basically suing for damages of not being able to live in and enjoy your residence which you pay for, as well as any additional costs you encountered by having to find an alternate place to live because of their actions. Again, this is difficult to prove without someone else who has witnessed the continued harassment stepping forward (e.g. your guest who might have only witnessed it once is probably not an incredibly strong witness, because harassment is often defined as having persisted over time, and they cannot testify to more than what they saw in one night). The case would likely just devolve to a matter of "he-said" between the two of you - he will likely claim you just didn't like him and are making things up to get money out of him. You'd need to make sure you have other evidence that supports your side of the story. As far as claiming self-defense, my completely non-legal and mostly combination of "I wish this were common sense" and "I hate when people try to justify unneeded violence" advice is never rely on the self-defense plea. Unless you are in fear of your life, your best course of action if he threatens violence or actually hits you is to leave and let the police handle it. If you have physical marks on you and he has none on him, the case becomes much more clear-cut. If you fight back, and you both have marks, then it again becomes a case of "he-said" and it's hard to prove who initiated the confrontation without cooperating witnesses, and you'd likely both end up being arrested when the police showed up if they can't determine who the instigator was. Just because you know something was in self-defense doesn't necessarily mean the police, a judge, or a jury will believe you. Ultimately, if you're uncomfortable with the place you're living, you should start planning to move elsewhere immediately (which you appear to be doing). If you can both a) avoid financial damages to yourself by preventing yourself being put into a situation that requires you to move quickly without much planning and b) prevent the continued harassment - then you should. Don't let the pot just keep boiling over until it explodes all over the kitchen. You have the power to make this stop too, and you shouldn't rely on other people making the situation go away for you (e.g. your landlord is bound by a contract, and evicting a tenant based on your word can open them to a lot of legal troubles - they have to be very careful with how they handle such a situation). Yes, it sucks that it's not your fault you have to go through the extra effort or move away to resolve the situation, but getting yourself out of the situation should be your number one priority, and doing it yourself is often the easiest solution. | First of all, there are 3 crimes here: the hit and run committed by you the accessory after the fact crime committed by your friend the "attempt to pervert the course of justice" (different jurisdictions call it different things) committed by you and your friend. Second, the lawyer is your friend's lawyer - they have no client privilege towards you. Third, your lawyer cannot help you break the law - any attempt to get them to do so by say, attempting to pervert the course if justice, is not privileged. | "If it were not assize-time, I would not take such language from you." (said while grabbing the handle of sword) This is a famous conditional threat where the speaker/actor was not found to express intent to do harm; perhaps better called a negative condition. This probably confuses matters but if you are to search for more answers this could be a good place to start. One of the elements of common law assault is that the threat must be able to be carried out immediately; it must be imminent. I do not have a cite for this but I recall that this means that conditional threats are excluded from assault. So calling a politician on the phone and telling them that if they do not drop out of a race you will hurt them is not assault. So, "You cut that out now or you’ll go home in an ambulance" sounds a lot like, "stop or you will get hurt." The victim has the opportunity to avoid the danger; the threat is not imminent. But the facts here are interesting because the speaker touched the victim while speaking which might mean fear of imminent was real. But they were in a crowded room in front of cameras - could the victim really feel that threat was imminent? Plus, the "you will go home" implies a future harm. Oh, and the speaker does not say "I will hurt you," maybe she was actually trying to protect the victim from someone else's actions. Like when my teacher knew someone was waiting outside the classroom to fight me and she told me, "if you go out there you will get hurt!" I would hope that a jury would consider this hard bargaining. |
Legality of creating bot accounts in Facebook/Twitter/Instagram I am a programmer and have a job offer to create a script that will automate the creation of a Bot Farm. So my boss wants me to develop a program to mass-create Facebook/Twitter/Instagram accounts. The accounts have to pull the images to use as profiles. I guess those images belong to real people and will be used without their agreement. I wonder if it is legal to create such bot accounts in Facebook/Twitter/Instagram? Is it possible that I could face legal repercussions as a developer of this program? Or is I merely write the program but don't run it can I be held responsible for its misuse? | You have several issues. Breach of Contract When you sign up with each of those services you are entering a legally binding contract and must comply with the terms of that contract. For example, this is taken from Facebook's terms: Here are some commitments you make to us relating to registering and maintaining the security of your account: You will not provide any false personal information on Facebook, or create an account for anyone other than yourself without permission. You will not create more than one personal account. I haven't checked but its a fair bet that the other services have similar terms. Unless you have permission, what you are doing breaches these terms of service. If what you do causes damage to Facebook et al then they can sue you and your employer for damages. Even if it doesn't they can probably bar you from having an account for as long as they like. Improper use of images This is jurisdictional but it is generally required to have the permission of the subject of a photograph where that photograph is used for commercial gain. There are exceptions where the person is not the primary subject (e.g. crowd shots, or images primarily of something else where the person happens to be in the shot) but the type of photos you would use for these services are not going to be exempt. The sanctions for breaching this will be dependent on jurisdiction. Breach of Copyright Somebody owns the copyright in those photographs. If you do not have a licence to use them in the way you propose then you are breaching their copyright. The copyright holder can sue for damages (if any) and any profits you make. Vicarious Liability An employer is strictly liable for the actions of their employees, jointly and severally with the employee. That means a plaintiff can go after either the employer, the employee or both. An employee may have some statutory or contractual indemnity but this is by no means common. | TL;DR In theory there's nothing wrong with your method, it's just a way to authenticate the user, and without authentication a user has no right to request anything anyway. But in practice it looks like your method doesn't have a way to deal with situations where users lose or forget their authentication data and want to be able to recover their account. Failing to deal with that in a modern system might be considered an unacceptable bad practice and so be against the GDPR principles of security and privacy by design. EXTENDED VERSION I might be wrong or not understand the question correctly, but I don't see how this is different from many other common cases where encryption is not involved. Think about it, you aren't able to give the user their own personal data unless they provide the ID and encryption keys. How is this significantly different from the fact you aren't able to (or rather you should not) show a user their own data unless they provide their own username and password, or they convincingly authenticate themselves in any way? Just like you can't ask Facebook to show you all the data collected about Donald Trump only by claiming you are Donald Trump, you can't be required to give a user their own data unless they provide the encryption key. It can be seen as your way to authenticate users (among other things). Edited: multiple IDs/keys I didn't understand your method involved multiple IDs and keys. In theory, the situation is still the same, only with multiple pieces of data for authentication, like the user had to remember multiple usernames and passwords. Failing to provide all IDs and all keys will result in a partial authentication. But with such an approach a potential problem becomes more evident: your authentication scheme might be against the GDPR principles of "security and privacy by design and by default". Basically, your methods might be considered bad practice because they fail to deal with the common issue of lost or forgotten passwords. If a user tells you they have lost a USB drive containing all their IDs and keys and they don't have them anymore, what do you do? You can't delete their data because you aren't able to know what their data is, without another way of authenticating. And their data is now at risk, because somebody else might have their IDs and keys. If you had an email address associated with all the user's IDs and data, then you might be able to confirm their identity (for example sending an email with a link) and delete all their data. As you see, things can get pretty complicated, it all depends on the details of your implementation, and just adding or removing one detail might change the whole scenario. | The existence of a robots.txt file and the directory and file inclusions/exclusions in a robots.txt file do not constitute a legally binding contract for the use of the website by the visitor; if it exists, the Terms of Service would usually establish the contract for use of the site. Many TOSs prohibit bots, crawlers and any automated means from crawling or scraping a site, and you are contractually obligated to honor those stipulations simply by visiting the site. Violating a TOS is typically a civil matter, depending on jurisdiction. Simply crawling a site to "map" it, and crawling a site to "scrape" it and copy all content are two different things. Crawling could violate the TOS. Scraping content can violate the TOS and also be copyright infringement, depending on jurisdiction. See https://law.stackexchange.com/search?q=scraping I suppose a TOS could state that users are legally bound to the restrictions in a robots.txt, but I've never seen that in a TOS. | Whether this is considered a trade secret (at least in the US) depends partly on whether you've taken reasonable action to keep it secret. If an employee thought it was OK to publish the algorithm, that's evidence that you didn't try very hard to keep it from getting out. Even if nobody's noticed it yet, getting the blog post taken down in't going to get it off the internet. You may as well try to do it anyway. If nobody has noticed the algorithm by now, you want to make it harder for them to find. You need an IP lawyer pronto. Depending on where you are, you might be able to get a patent on the algorithm still, but patents are hard to enforce, and it appears to be getting harder in the US to patent algorithms. (There's a Stack Exchange site so people can look at patent applications and see if they can invalidate the application with prior art.) You can't license out the algorithm without having some legal way of stopping other places from just using it. If you have more proprietary algorithms or things that aren't generally known that give you a competitive advantage, it would be a good idea to inform employees that they aren't supposed to reveal them. Check with your IP lawyer to see what you should do. | When the question is "Can I be sued for..." there can't ever be a really useful answer, because anyone can be sued for just about anything. The suit may be tossed as pointless early in the process, but it can be filed. That said, could there be a valid ground of suit against a developer for creating a scraper? Possibly. Scraping a site could be against the site's TOS. It could be largely a way of committing copyright infringement. It could be unlawful in some other way. For most sites, scraping is not unlawful. Google does it all the time. If there is no legitimate use for the scraper, or very nearly none, so that any user is likely to be acting maliciously and unlawfully, and if the developer knows this, or any reasonable developer should know this, then the developer could possibly be found liable for the illegitimate actions of those who use the scarper. If there is a legit use for the scraper, or the developer would plausibly think that there is, then such development is not illegal, and a successful suit against the developer is unlikely. | Yes (probably), under COPPA The FTC has stated that YouTube content creators could be held liable under the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), a United States law that "imposes certain requirements on operators of websites or online services directed to children under 13 years of age, and on operators of other websites or online services that have actual knowledge that they are collecting personal information online from a child under 13 years of age." (source) The FTC's FAQ on complying with COPPA notes that "operators will be held to have acquired actual knowledge of having collected personal information from a child where, for example, they later learn of a child’s age or grade from a concerned parent who has learned that his child is participating on the site or service." It also has the following question/answer (emphasis added): I operate a general audience video game service and do not ask visitors to reveal their ages. I do permit users to submit feedback, comments, or questions by email. What are my responsibilities if I receive a request for an email response from a player who indicates that he is under age 13? Under the Rule’s one-time response exception (16 C.F.R. § 312.5(c)(3)) you are permitted to send a response to the child, via the child’s online contact information, without sending notice to the parent or obtaining parental consent. However, you must delete the child’s online contact information from your records promptly after you send your response. Assuming the FTC is correct that content creators (not just the service itself) are responsible for COPPA compliance, a Discord server administrator would likely be required to ban/delete the account of a user upon discovering (acquiring actual knowledge) that the user is under 13. It may be a defense that they believed the user's retraction and claim that it was a lie, but I wouldn't want to be stuck arguing that in court (an underage user who doesn't want to be banned certainly would have a good reason to lie about their age upon finding out that they would be banned for having admitted their actual age). | This seems to be a mix of question about law and a meta-question about this site, but I'll treat it as an on-topic question about law. The author of a question, or answer, owns the copyright to their contributions, and they can re-publish to their heart's content. Any user who posts here grants a license to SE and other users to use content posted here, so I don't have to ask you permission to quote you. As part of the permission granted by SE to use this website, you have agreed to "follow the rules" set by SE. There are many rules, some spelled out more clearly that others. For example, if you post a question, you indirectly agreed that your content can be upvoted or down-voted. Certain content can be "closed" and deleted, when the content is deemed to violate the rules in particular ways (is spam, porn, abuse, or judged to be poor-quality). Judgment (on different matters) can be rendered by community managers, moderators, or other users. The agreement is here, see especially here. If we take the post that you linked to, it is quite possible that it was deleted because it is not a general legal question, in violation of the acceptable use policy. If you want a historical analysis of your particular case, it should be asked on Law Meta. | If you do, you will probably be faced with a lawsuit. If the program did something that they don't do, it might be okay (but hire a lawyer to be sure). Perhaps a plumbing app would be safe. They (Meta) do state that Meta is one of their trademarks, and you can verify that here. That means that they have the exclusive right to use the mark "Meta" in the particular spheres where they operate, namely G & S: Identification verification services; Online social networking services; Personal concierge services for others comprising making requested personal arrangements and reservations and providing customer-specific information to meet individual needs; Providing access to computer databases and online searchable databases in the fields of social networking; Social introduction and networking services; Social networking services related to sports, fitness, and coaching activities provided through a community website online and other computer and electronic communication networks; User verification services; Social introduction, networking and dating services as well as Computer hardware; Application programming interface (API) for software which facilitates online services for data retrieval, upload, download, access and management; Computer peripheral devices; Virtual, augmented, and mixed reality software for use in enabling computers, mobile devices, to provide virtual reality experiences; Software for integrating electronic data with real world environments for the purposes of entertainment, education, communicating; Virtual reality computer hardware; Virtual reality software for use in enabling computers, mobile devices, to provide virtual reality experiences; Motion tracking sensors for virtual reality technology; Motion tracking sensors for augmented reality technology; Digital media streaming devices; Wearable computing devices comprised primarily of software and display screens for connection to computers, mobile devices, and in order to enable virtual reality and augmented reality world experiences; Software for tracking motion in, visualizing, manipulating, viewing, and displaying augmented and virtual reality experiences; Software, firmware and hardware for use in visual, voice, audio, motion, eye and gesture tracking and recognition; Hardware and software for operating sensor devices; Electronic sensor devices, cameras, projectors, and microphones for gesture, facial, and voice detection, capture and recognition; Hardware and software for detecting objects, user gestures and commands; Wireless computer peripherals; Computer software for modifying photographs, images and audio, video, and audio-visual content with photographic filters and augmented reality (AR) effects, namely, graphics, animations, text, drawings, geotags, metadata tags, hyperlinks; Computer software, downloadable computer software and mobile application software for facilitating interaction and communication between humans and AI (artificial intelligence) platforms, namely, bots, virtual agents and virtual assistants; Application programming interface (API) software for allowing data retrieval, upload, access and management; Software for organizing images, video, and audio-visual content using metadata tags; Application programming interface (API) for use in developing AI (artificial intelligence) platforms, namely, bots, virtual agents and virtual assistants; Computer software for sending and receiving electronic messages, graphics, images, audio and audio visual content via the internet and communication networks; Downloadable software, namely, instant messaging software, file sharing software, communications software for electronically exchanging data, audio, video images and graphics via computer, mobile, wireless, and communication networks; Computer software for personal information management, and data synchronization software; Computer software for use in facilitating voice over internet protocol (VOIP) calls, phone calls, video calls, text messages, instant message; Communication software and communication computer hardware for providing access to the Internet; Electronic display screens; Computer peripherals for remotely accessing and transmitting data; Computer hardware for displaying data and video; Computer peripherals for displaying data and video; Software to view virtual images in creating augmented reality; Computer software for setting up, configuring, operating and controlling wearable devices, computers, and computer peripherals; Computer software for accessing, monitoring, searching, displaying, reading, recommending, sharing, organizing, and annotating news, sports, weather, commentary, and other information, content from periodicals, blogs, and websites, and other text, data, graphics, images, audio, video, and multimedia content; Computer software for accessing, browsing and searching online databases; Computer software for accessing, monitoring, searching, displaying, reading, recommending, sharing, organizing, and annotating news, sports, weather, commentary, and other information, content from periodicals, blogs, and websites, and other text, data, graphics, images, audio, video, and multimedia content; Computer software for controlling the operation of audio and video devices; Computer software for creating, editing, uploading, downloading, accessing, viewing, posting, displaying, tagging, blogging, streaming, linking, annotating, indicating sentiment about, commenting on, embedding, transmitting, and sharing or otherwise providing electronic media or information via computer the internet and communication networks; Computer software for integrating electronic data with real world environments for the purposes of entertainment, communicating, and social networking; Computer software for modifying and enabling transmission of images, audio, audio visual and video content and data; Computer software for modifying photographs, images and audio, video, and audio-visual content with photographic filters and virtual reality, mixed reality and augmented reality effects, namely, graphics, animations, text, drawings, geotags, metadata tags, hyperlinks; Computer software for processing images, graphics, audio, video, and text; Computer software for sending and receiving electronic messages, graphics, images, audio and audio visual content via computer the internet and communication networks; Computer software for sending and receiving electronic messages, alerts, notifications and reminders; Computer software for social networking and interacting with online communities; Computer software for the collection, managing, editing, organizing, modifying, transmission, sharing, and storage of data and information; Computer software for the redirection of messages, Internet e-mail, and/or other data to one or more electronic wearable wireless communication devices from a data store on or associated with a personal computer or a server; Computer software for wireless content, data and information delivery; Computer software to enable accessing, displaying, editing, linking, sharing and otherwise providing electronic media and information via the internet and communications networks; Computer software to enable development, assessment, testing, and maintenance of mobile software applications for portable electronic communication devices, namely, mobile phones, smartphones, handheld computers and computer tablets; Computer software to enhance the audio-visual capabilities of multimedia applications, namely, for the three-dimensional rendering of graphics, still images and moving pictures provided as updates for or in combination with head-mounted display screen devices; Computer software, downloadable computer software and mobile application software for creating, managing and accessing groups within virtual communities; Computer software, namely, an application providing social networking functionalities; Computer software, namely, an interpretive interface for facilitating interaction between humans and machines; Downloadable computer software for finding content and content publishers, and for subscribing to content; Downloadable computer software for viewing and interacting with a feed of images, audio, audio-visual and video content and associated text and data; Gesture recognition software; Software for detecting objects, user gestures and commands; Software for operating sensor devices; Software to view virtual images in creating virtual, augmented and mixed reality; Interactive entertainment software; Location-aware computer software, downloadable computer software and mobile application software for searching, determining and sharing locations; Messaging software; Mixed reality software; Mixed reality software for interactive entertainment; Mixed reality software for navigating a mixed reality environment; Mixed reality software for object tracking, motion control and content visualization; Social assistant software; Software and firmware for enabling electronic devices to share data and communicate with each other; Software development tools; Software driver programs for electronic devices for enabling computer hardware and electronic devices to communicate with each other; Software for advertisers to communicate and interact with online communities; Software for alerts, messages, emails, and reminders, and for recording, organizing, transmitting, manipulating, reviewing, and receiving text, data, audio, image and digital files and display screens; Software for creating and managing social media profiles and user accounts; Software for creating, editing, uploading, downloading, accessing, viewing, posting, displaying, tagging, blogging, streaming, linking, annotating, indicating sentiment about, commenting on, embedding, transmitting, and sharing or otherwise providing electronic media or information via computer and communication networks; Software for creating, managing and accessing groups within virtual communities; Software for creating, managing, and interacting with an online community; Software for integrating electronic data with real world environments for the purposes of entertainment, education, communicating, and social networking; Software for modifying and enabling transmission of images, audio, audio visual and video content and data; Software for processing images, graphics, audio, video, and text; Software for social networking; Software for streaming multimedia entertainment content; Software and firmware for use in visual, voice, audio, motion, eye and gesture tracking and recognition; Software, namely, an interpretive interface for facilitating interaction between humans and machines; Video display software; Computer software, firmware and hardware for use in visual, voice, audio, motion, eye and gesture tracking and recognition; Computer hardware and software for operating sensor devices; Computer hardware and software for detecting objects, user gestures and commands; Computer software driver programs for electronic devices for enabling computer hardware and electronic devices to communicate with each other; Cameras; Wireless computer peripherals; Video receivers; Sensors for monitoring physical movements and dozens of other also-registered areas. |
Is it legal to "shoot down" a drone on your property in the US? 18 U.S.C 32 states ... to include destruction of any aircraft in the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States or any civil aircraft used, operated or employed in interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce. According to the FAA, drones fall under the category of UA (unmanned aircraft): The US Federal Aviation Administration has adopted the name unmanned aircraft (UA) to describe aircraft systems without a flight crew on board. More common names include UAV, drone, remotely piloted vehicle (RPV), remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), and remotely operated aircraft (ROA). Under these circumstances, it is illegal. But do non-government/non-commercial drones fall under this category? (drones owned by the average civilian) According to FAR 119-91C Over other than congested areas. An altitude of 500 feet above the surface, except over open water or sparsely populated areas. In those cases, the aircraft may not be operated closer than 500 feet to any person, vessel, vehicle, or structure. It's common to see people flying drones at lower altitudes than this. So assuming that drones are considered aircrafts and fall under these laws... Question If someone flew their drone under 500 feet over your property, would it be legal to shoot it down under a circumstance such as self defense? Could the shooter be charged under 18 USC 32? To avoid potential gun laws from interfering with information gathering: What if an imitation firearm, such as a BB gun , was used? What if no firearm was used? (Take the drown down by hitting it with a towel or broom) Feel free to include info relating to real firearm use (handgun, rifle, etc..), just know it's not what I'm truly asking about. | 18 USC 32(a) says Whoever willfully— (1) sets fire to, damages, destroys, disables, or wrecks any aircraft in the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States or any civil aircraft used, operated, or employed in interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce... shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years or both 18 USC 31(1) defines "aircraft": The term “aircraft” means a civil, military, or public contrivance invented, used, or designed to navigate, fly, or travel in the air. A personal private drone is not public or military, but it is "civil". In the definitions (b), it also says: In this chapter, the terms “aircraft engine”, “air navigation facility”, “appliance”, “civil aircraft”, “foreign air commerce”, “interstate air commerce”, “landing area”, “overseas air commerce”, “propeller”, “spare part”, and “special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States” have the meanings given those terms in sections > 40102(a) and 46501 of title 49. The Title 49 definition (16) say “civil aircraft” means an aircraft except a public aircraft. So on that count alone, it is illegal, a federal crime. On a second count, it is illegal: it would count as destruction of property. In Washington under RCW 9A.48.070 it is a Class B felony: (1) A person is guilty of malicious mischief in the first degree if he or she knowingly and maliciously... (c) Causes an impairment of the safety, efficiency, or operation of an aircraft by physically damaging or tampering with the aircraft or aircraft equipment, fuel, lubricant, or parts. The exact details depend on what state this happens in. FAA restrictions for drones is that they should be flown below 400 ft, specifically §107.51 says A remote pilot in command and the person manipulating the flight controls of the small unmanned aircraft system must comply with all of the following operating limitations when operating a small unmanned aircraft system... (b) The altitude of the small unmanned aircraft cannot be higher than 400 feet above ground level, unless the small unmanned aircraft: (1) Is flown within a 400-foot radius of a structure; and (2) Does not fly higher than 400 feet above the structure's immediate uppermost limit. If the drone is actually trying to hit you, you can avail yourself of the defense of self-defense, but that is not available if you simply dislike it that someone flies too high over your property. There is no specific minimum distance from the aircraft and the ground, but the operator must fly the thing safely, and not above people. And finally, apart from the criminal aspects of shooting a drone out of the sky, you can also be sued for property damage, and is thus illegal. That said, in light of Boggs v. Meredith, this does not mean you will get anywhere if you sue the gunner for blasting your plane, at least if your venue is the western district federal court in Kentucky. You can sue in state court for trespass to chattels, and the FCC could (but did not) seek an action against the offender for blasting a plane out of the sky, but there is a narrow path for suing in federal court. The district court found that the plane-owner stepped off the path (the case was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction). A state court could decide whether the airspace in question is in the exclusive jurisdiction of the US. | Clauses (a) and (c) are potentially relevant. You have to look in the Rules & Regulations to see what exceptions are permitted. Although firearms and especially shotgun shells are of a "dangerous, flammable or explosive character", it is reasonable to believe that when stored properly, they do not unreasonably increase the danger of fire or explosion, and would not be considered hazardous or extra hazardous by any responsible insurance company. On the latter point, you could ask any responsible insurance company if they would consider such shells to be hazardous. While in ordinary language simple possession of a firearm is not a threat of violence, the wording of clause (c) is open to a wider interpretation, since acts considered to be a threat of violence include displaying or possessing a firearm, knife, or other weapon that may threaten, alarm or intimidate others. The fact is that many people are alarmed by the simple existence of a weapon, so simply possessing a weapon could be interpreted as a "threat" in this special sense. Since you are not in the position of having signed the lease and now need to deal with the consequences of this clause, the simplest solution is to explain your interest, and ask them if having your gear in your apartment would be a violation of the lease. Be really clear about this and get it in writing in some form, if they say "no problem". Then either pick a different place, pick a different hobby, or find a separate storage facility. | Under current federal law, we would have to wait for some legislative body to change the law. If ATF changes the federal regulations, they might be classed as "machine guns" (under the "frame designed for converting" clause), which are banned. As the above Docket No. 2017R–22 (from December 26, 2017) says, DoJ expects to plan to discuss changing the rules. They might then be outlawed by executive action (though a court test could be necessary, since executive wish is not the final word on interpreting statutes). The relevant part of the definition of machine gun, which could apply to bump stocks, is: The term shall also include the frame or receiver of any such weapon, any part designed and intended solely and exclusively, or combination of parts designed and intended, for use in converting a weapon into a machinegun, and any combination of parts from which a machinegun can be assembled if such parts are in the possession or under the control of a person. But "such" weapon is one that shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger The definition does not say anything about a single finger action, so there is a reasonable probability that including bump stocks within the scope of existing legislation would be held to exceed congressional authority. | There is pretty much never a right to retaliate against harm to oneself, even blatantly unlawful harm. There is a right to defend oneself and others. One can use force to stop someone from inflicting unlawful or unjustified harm, or to prevent someone from inflicting such harm when the harm is imminent. One is not permitted to use more force than is "reasonably required" under the actual circumstances. This is true in pretty much every jurisdiction that i know of. The details on how much force will be considered "reasonable" will vary. In some jurisdictions there is, under some circumstances, a s"duty to retreat". This generally means that if a person attacked can avoid the harm by fleeing with reasonable safety, that person must do so rather than using force in self-defense. In some jurisdictions this "duty to retreat" applies id the victim is attacked in public, but not in the victim's own home. The right to self defense does not apply when the "attacker" is an agent of the state acting lawfully. For example, a prison guard taking a condemned prisoner to a death sentence cannot be attacked on the grounds that the prisoner is engaging in self defense. In theory a police officer engaging an excessive force, particularly unjustified deadly force, may be resisted in self-defense. But courts are quite reluctant to find such resistance justified in practice. There generally must be very clear evidence of egregious misconduct for the court to rule for the non-police person in such a case. Note that "self" defense can equally be defense of another person. Pretty much all the same rules apply. Self defense applies no matter who the attacker is, but that force is reasonable may vary depending on the attacker. Only such force as is reasonably required to stop or prevent the harm may be used with a justification of self-defense. | First of all, the wording in your question hints at the UK deliberately launching a missile (even if it is a test one) towards the USA. Nothing in the news piece you link to support that supposition, the general idea is a missile that was launched towards the Atlantic Ocean that steered off route. From your link: The treaty recognizes five states as nuclear-weapon states. The NPT limits other states from researching (including testing) nuclear weapons and/or delivery vehicles. In exchange, they get access to nuclear technology for civilian purposes. Treaty preambles are general, introductory texts that explain the intent of the treaty. They are not binding, and the language clearly shows it (Hint: It states "Desiring to", "Recalling to". Binding agreements use "Shall", "Shall not", "May" or "May not", and are more specific about what are the restrictions). As stated above, the test was not "in North-America". It was from international waters "towards Africa", probably to be sunk before it reached land1. There is no notion anywhere that there was an intention of violating the airspace of any country. Certainly, the UK would be responsable if one of their missiles test fails and the missile ends causing damages, and the USA can protest any violation of its airspace, even if unintentional. But it is not "a test of ballistic missiles in North America", and certainly the USA has no more rights outside its territorial waters than, say, Gambia does. The only restriction would be the internationally stablished procedures for testing missiles, which are setup to avoid any kind of issues (the test scheduled date and path is published2 with time enough for third parties to take notice). So yes, it is business as usual. 1Idea: African countries are countries, too, and they have the same right as the USA for their airspace not to be violated by the military from other countries. 2Both to allow for air traffic to avoid dangerous areas, and to ensure that anybody detecting the launch does not think that it is an attack. | IMO this is a perfectly reasonable question, amenable to a common law analysis: (1) indicates that A has committed the tort of false imprisonment (Restatement of Torts, 2d, §35). Because of 2-4, we can see that A intends to confine B (though vide infra). The confinement is complete (§36), this being a single aisle plane although the same would be true if this was a 5-aisle plane. A has no authority to confine B (§ 41) and is not otherwise privileged, and is accomplished with a physical barrier (§38). B knows that he has been confined (§42). B is "privileged to use any means of self-defense to protect himself against confinement which he is privileged to use to protect himself against a harmful or offensive contact or other bodily harm" (§68). B uses reasonable and minimal force not likely or intended to cause death or serious bodily harm (§63), force which is privileged and thus protects B from being subject to liability (§10). A commits the tort of battery (and a second round of false imprisonment) by taking B down (§13). A is not privileged to use force in self-defense. There is no reasonable belief that B will spontaneously turn on A and use further, unprivileged force – A is simply punishing B for his minimal use of force in self defense, so A's final act is not privileged. There is a related but distinct scenario that adds a material fact, which could change the analysis: C calls out "Excuse me, my flight flight leaves in 15 minutes, may I pass?" whereby A allows C to step ahead of him in the queue. A has no obligation to let anyone jump the queue, but may consent to inconsequential contact which might constitute battery. It is reasonable to conclude that there is apparent consent (§50) given to anyone (§52) when A makes way ("making way" is a publicly-available fact, but "for C to pass" is a private fact of A's state of mind which B cannot reasonably infer: except, B has heard the "May I pass?" request). So the analysis really hinges on how to interpret 2 and 4. Coupled with 6, we (jurors) have a preponderance of evidence showing that A intended to confine B, and battered him when his confinement failed. | CO Rev Stat § 18-12-105.5(1) says that A person commits a class 6 felony if such person knowingly and unlawfully and without legal authority carries, brings, or has in such person's possession a deadly weapon as defined in section 18-1-901 (3) (e) in or on the real estate and all improvements erected thereon of any public or private elementary, middle, junior high, high, or vocational school or any public or private college, university, or seminary... but there are exceptions such as presenting an authorized demonstration, or for some authorized extracurricular reason. The meme about under 3.5 inches derives from the general statute pertaining to concealed weapons, where CO Rev Stat § 18-12-101 defines "knife" as being over 3.5 inches long (and it is a misdemeanor to carry a concealed knife). We'll come back to this. The applicable part of the definition of "deadly weapon" in the school-specific law is (II) A knife, bludgeon, or any other weapon, device, instrument, material, or substance, whether animate or inanimate, that, in the manner it is used or intended to be used, is capable of producing death or serious bodily injury. This raising a question that I encourage you not to test, whether the school deadly weapon definition excludes knives that are longer that 3.5 inches. The definition section for Article 12 starts by saying (1) As used in this article, unless the context otherwise requires so that means that "knife" is redefined in a special way (in terms of length), and that is for the entire article which includes the school weapon section. The actual definition of "knife" in the definitions section of Article 12 is (f) "Knife" means any dagger, dirk, knife, or stiletto with a blade over three and one-half inches in length, or any other dangerous instrument capable of inflicting cutting, stabbing, or tearing wounds, but does not include a hunting or fishing knife carried for sports use. The issue that a knife is a hunting or fishing knife must be raised as an affirmative defense. The modifier "with a blade over three and one-half inches in length" might be thought to refer to all of the preceding terms, or just the last one – stiletto. These is a rule of legal interpretation that a modifier should be interpreted as referring to the last antecedent, meaning that the length limit pertains to stilettos. The punctuation (lack of comma) supports the interpretation "stiletto with a blade over three and one-half inches in length", meaning that a knife is a knife. Whether or not a literal knife with a blade under 3.5 inches long constitutes a redefined knife, it certainly constitutes a "dangerous instrument capable of inflicting cutting, stabbing, or tearing wounds". In the context of a specific law restricting the possession of weapons (concealed or not) in schools, the context requires that the definition explicitly mentioned in 18-1-901(3)(e), which is outside Article 12, is being referred to. The reason the law was explicitly written to refer to that definition was so that the general definition in article 12 would be overridden. My point is that this is a not atypical example of the problem of legal definitions, which can get rather convoluted. If someone has told you that a knife under 3.5" is legally not a knife, you probably now know why they would say that, but also you should know what that's simply not true when it comes to weapons in school. I omitted one complication, which in this instance is not applicable, namely the kirpan exception. In Singh v. Thompson, 36 F.3d 1102, it was ruled that a prohibition against knives (in school), in that instance, violates the Free Exercise clause (the kirpan must be worn at all times). On the other hand, TSA does forbid taking a kirpan into the secure zone, a matter which has so far not been litigated. | In Washington state, RCW 9A.32.030(c) encodes the felony murder rule w.r.t. first degree murder: (c) He or she commits or attempts to commit the crime of either (1) robbery in the first or second degree, (2) rape in the first or second degree, (3) burglary in the first degree, (4) arson in the first or second degree, or (5) kidnapping in the first or second degree, and in the course of or in furtherance of such crime or in immediate flight therefrom, he or she, or another participant, causes the death of a person other than one of the participants: There being a list of crimes in the statute, we needn't be concerned over whether kidnapping is inherently dangerous. Because Bob is not a participant in Alice's kidnapping scheme, a crucial element of the crime is missing, but there is exceptional stuff after the colon – Except that in any prosecution under this subdivision (1)(c) in which the defendant was not the only participant in the underlying crime, if established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, it is a defense that the defendant: (i) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, request, command, importune, cause, or aid the commission thereof; and (ii) Was not armed with a deadly weapon, or any instrument, article, or substance readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury; and (iii) Had no reasonable grounds to believe that any other participant was armed with such a weapon, instrument, article, or substance; and (iv) Had no reasonable grounds to believe that any other participant intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious physical injury. As you can see, the exception lays out exceptions where a participant might not be found guilty. So, not guilty here. There is also second degree murder per RCW 9A.32.050(b), that He or she commits or attempts to commit any felony, including assault, other than those enumerated in RCW 9A.32.030(1)(c), and, in the course of and in furtherance of such crime or in immediate flight therefrom, he or she, or another participant, causes the death of a person other than one of the participants but since kidnapping is not "other than" the previously mentioned crimes, we needn't consider this case any further. So under Washington law, Alice is only guilty of kidnapping. |
Is it legal to rent exclusively to members of a religious college? According to the Civil Rights act, one is not allowed to discriminate based on religion when it comes to housing. What about one who wants to rent only to members of a certain religious institution (such as students in a religious seminary). | There are exemptions, and "justifications", in 24 CFR 100. The exemption is 100.10: (c) Nothing in this part, other than the prohibitions against discriminatory advertising, applies to: (1) The sale or rental of any single family house by an owner, provided the following conditions are met: (i) The owner does not own or have any interest in more than three single family houses at any one time. (ii) The house is sold or rented without the use of a real estate broker, agent or salesperson or the facilities of any person in the business of selling or renting dwellings. So such a restriction could be allowed if e.g. you live in the house and rent only a few rooms, or a single family home marketed and managed in the right way. There is also an exemption for religious organizations and private clubs allowing rental to members only. 100.500 lays the groundwork for disparate impact hot water. It says: (a) A practice has a discriminatory effect where it actually or predictably results in a disparate impact on a group of persons or creates, increases, reinforces, or perpetuates segregated housing patterns because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin. So only renting to students in a particular seminary would most likely have a disparate impact. There is, however, the possibility of justifying the policy, following 100.500: (b) (1) A legally sufficient justification exists where the challenged practice: (i) Is necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests of the respondent, with respect to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. 3612, or defendant, with respect to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. 3613 or 3614; and (ii) Those interests could not be served by another practice that has a less discriminatory effect. (2) A legally sufficient justification must be supported by evidence and may not be hypothetical or speculative. The burdens of proof for establishing each of the two elements of a legally sufficient justification are set forth in paragraphs (c)(2) and (c)(3) of this section. So let's say that the offended party has made the case that the practice will have a discriminatory effect, then the accused can set forth the aforementioned justification: (c)(2) Once the charging party or plaintiff satisfies the burden of proof set forth in paragraph (c)(1) of this section, the respondent or defendant has the burden of proving that the challenged practice is necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests of the respondent or defendant. (c3)(3) If the respondent or defendant satisfies the burden of proof set forth in paragraph (c)(2) of this section, the charging party or plaintiff may still prevail upon proving that the substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests supporting the challenged practice could be served by another practice that has a less discriminatory effect. The crux of the matter is having a "substantial, legitimate nondiscriminatory interest", i.e. why would you want to rent to only seminary students. | Probably not. The impediment is the claim that you have a genuinely held religious belief. Changing the context a tiny bit, your employer is statutorily required to make an accommodation for the requirements of your religion, therefore they cannot fire you for refusing to work on the Sabbath, unless it would impose an unreasonable burden on them. If they fire you, you complain to the EOC and the EOC sanctions them. The employer's defense would be that you did not request a reasonable religion-based accommodation (you failed to explain that this was about Sabbath). The employer does not scrutinize the validity of your claim (does not demand proof of what your religion requires). In your planned announcement, you are not requesting a statutory accommodation from the government, analogous to requesting an accommodation from an employer, you are offering a defense in the case the government takes action against you for violating the law. There is a statutory exception to the prohibition against employment discrimination based on religion, that (roughly speaking) a church is not required to hire a rabbi instead of a mullah to deliver sermons. There is no statutory exception w.r.t. public accommodations and religious discrimination. Therefore, to implement your plan, you would have to have the law or the EOC's interpretation of it overturned as unconstitutional. To succeed in your argument, you would have to show that the law unconstitutionally restricts your free exercise of your religion. One part would be a demonstration that your religion prohibits... The least likely scenario is that your religion prohibits doing business with a person outside of your religion. I don't of any religion that maintains a requirement of absolute religious segregation, but that is hypothetically a path to argue – that you will burn in hell forever if you do business with a Christian, or a Muslim. I am maximally skeptical that the courts would ever take such a claim seriously. A more likely possibility would involve "compelled speech" as well, where you are forced under the law to express a viewpoint that contradicts your fundamental religious beliefs. You cannot be compelled by law to express a viewpoint. What is less clear is what constitutes expressing a viewpoint, see this. For example, there is a federal law withholding federal funds from schools which discriminate against military recruiters. Some law schools argued in Rumsfield v Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights that allowing military recruiters amounts to forcing the schools to express a viewpoint, but the court held that "the Solomon Amendment regulates conduct, not speech". The upshot of 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis is that "The First Amendment prohibits Colorado from forcing a website designer to create expressive designs speaking messages with which the designer disagrees". A proposal to refuse to service Christians plainly does not fall within the penumbra of that ruling. Nor does a refusal to print books containing religious material (which you already created). You have to cater to Christians, but you do not have to create Christian messages. You could draw a line between a simple ISP who you pay to make available your religious website (you create it), versus hiring a company to design the website, which clearly involves "expression". The issue is simplified if you don't make a claim based on a specific belief system, instead rely on simple "compelled speech" doctrine. General beliefs do not enjoy the same "Free Exercise" protections that religions enjoy. What matters is what you are "expressing", not what you are doing (like, printing). | Article 15(2) of the Indian Constitution prohibits restriction to any citizen of India on entry to a public hotel, restaurant or place of entertainment on the grounds "only of religion, race, caste, sex [and/or] place of birth". It is a fundamental right guaranteed to all citizens of India. The Supreme Court of India has held a "public place" to mean any place which is open to the public and to also include private places functioning to serve a non-exclusive group of people. Hence, a club or premise opened only to serve its affiliates or members shall not be considered a public place for the purpose of this provision of law. Hence, if a citizen of India is not denied admission purely on the basis of his/her religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth, his admission to a restaurant or a hotel owned and operated by the government or private concerns may be prohibited as the rights of admission may be reserved with the management of the premises. Just to conclude you can sue the hotel for denying entry | This is a very difficult situation. Discrimination is not the right frame within which to view this as your roommate doesn't have authority over you the way that an employer or landlord would. The basic legal issue would be whether your roommate is constructively evicting you from you residence without valid justification for doing so. And, the answer might very well be yes. But, even if that is the case, since the roommate is not an agent of the landlord, your roommate's actions probably don't relieve you from your duties under the lease. So, your relief might be to vacate the premises and then to sue the roommate for the rent you have to pay without receiving anything in return. This is expensive relative to the likely returns, and there is no certainty that you would win or that you would get your attorneys' fees if you prevailed. This would also be a slow solution taking several months at a minimum. Or, in the alternative, you could leave and cease paying the rent, forcing the roommates who remain to pay it if they don't want to be evicted as they are probably jointly and severally liable for the rent. (If they sued you for your share of the rent, constructive eviction by one of them would probably be a good defense.) The landlord could sue all of the roommates if they don't pay, causing them to be evicted and you to be on the hook for any rent or other amounts that they owe, including the landlord's attorneys' fees (and hurting your credit). You could probably cross-claim for indemnification of any amounts you were required to pay in that lawsuit against your roommate. But, this too would be an expensive, complex and slow solution if the remaining roommates don't decide to simply keep paying the rent. It would be very hard for you to evict your problem roommate for breaching the lease by denying you your equal rights to the premises, since you are not the landlord, although it isn't impossible that a court would allow this relief and it would be relatively quick. It would also leave open the question of who was responsible for the evicted roommate's rent. The remaining roommates would be liable vis-a-vis the landlord, and would face eviction if they don't pay, and probably couldn't get a new roommate without the landlord's permission. And, the evicted tenant would probably remain on the hook vis-a-vis the landlord, but might not have a duty to indemnify the roommates who stayed. Also, in any lawsuit where you sue the roommate, the roommate would likely counterclaim against you for non-disclosure of HSV2, and while that would probably not prevail in the end, it would make the legal process hellish for you. The trouble is that there are really no good solutions that you could easily impose on them. A mutual agreement between the landlord and the other tenants to release you from the lease so you could find somewhere else, or to release the problem tenant from the lease so that you and your other roommate could replace that person, is probably the best solution, but that takes mutual agreement of multiple parties. | Religious protection from federal warrants is not a First Amendment issue. If protected at all, the best argument would be in RFRA, the federal statute implemented in 42 U.S.C. §2000bb-1 et seq. It provides that the "Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion..." except if the burden "is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest." It is my guess that every court in the U.S. would agree that a search warrant issued upon probable cause is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest, and having an agent or two walk through the house (or whatever is necessary in order to exercise that warrant) is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. | No, it’s not legal, § 7 Ⅰ | 1 AGG (“employee” includes applicants, § 6 Ⅰ 2 AGG), unless the the job requires a certain sex, § 8 Ⅰ AGG, example: porn actor. If you’re a good lawyer, you can argue that a women’s shelter hires females only, but only as far as the specific position includes interaction with patrons (i. e. janitor, or accountant must still be open to everyone). Advertising unwarranted gender-discriminatory positions is already illegal, § 11 AGG. There are some people who abuse their legal rights and apply for such a position, include a discreet statement about their sex, and after receiving a rejection file a lawsuit for damages, § 15 AGG, usually 3 months worth of wage. | Is blocking certain people while allowing everybody else to view some content discrimination Yes. and violate anti-discrimination laws Probably not, at least in the US. There is no federal law prohibiting "discrimination" in general. There are specific laws regarding discrimination against certain groups in certain contexts. They would probably not apply to an individual determining who is allowed to view their social media posts. That said, there are some specific contexts where this might be illegal. They would generally involve non-personal use of the account. The courts recently ruled that Donald Trump may not block people on his Twitter account, because he's using it in an official presidential capacity rather than just his individual capacity. Also, racial discrimination in housing is illegal, so if you're selling your house and you block all black people from viewing your house photos, that would probably be illegal as well. Also is not being able to consume information available on a public platform a violation against right to freedom. I'm not sure what you think a "right to freedom" would entail. But I don't think you have the right to demand that a person allow you to access their social media accounts. | You are correct that the federal law does not prohibit sex discrimination in "public accommodations", the category that includes your examples. State laws tend to be more restrictive, see for example Washington's RCW 49.60.215 which declares that It shall be an unfair practice for any person ... to commit an act which ... results in any distinction ... except for conditions and limitations established by law and applicable to all persons, regardless of race, creed... sexual orientation, sex... PROVIDED, That behavior or actions constituting a risk to property or other persons can be grounds for refusal and shall not constitute an unfair practice. The definitions allow for a few exceptions as to what kind of place is so restricted, most notably a facility "which is by its nature distinctly private", nor "any educational facility, columbarium, crematory, mausoleum, or cemetery operated or maintained by a bona fide religious or sectarian institution". Here is a paper that summarizes the situation with women'-only clubs. For example, New Jersey law has the exception that nothing herein contained shall be construed to bar any place of public accommodation which is in its nature reasonably restricted exclusively to individuals of one sex, and which shall include but not be limited to any summer camp, day camp or resort camp, bathhouse, dressing room, swimming pool, gymnasium, comfort station, dispensary, clinic or hospital, or school or educational institution which is restricted exclusively to individuals of one sex... So it depends on the state, but most states prohibit any sex discrimination in public accommodations. |
AR Code § 21-8-402 (2018) I am concerned the wording that appears in 21-8-402 5.B.vii may be too vague. Included below for your convenience. (vii) (a) Anything with a value of one hundred dollars ($100) or less. (b) The value of an item shall be considered to be less than one hundred dollars ($100) if the public servant reimburses the person from whom the item was received any amount over one hundred dollars ($100) and the reimbursement occurs within ten (10) days from the date the item was received; I do not see a requirement, as written, that the reimbursement be of equal value to the initial gift. This seems to invite a means for misconduct that goes against the spirit of the law. This same choice of language appears elsewhere in Arkansas Law. I am seeking one of two things 1) Some clarification of the AR Code or other source that verifies there can be no misuse of this clause by unethical individuals. 2) A verification that this clause, or one like it, has been the basis of unethical conduct previously. Should the second scenario be validated, I will post a follow up on what would eliminate such a loophole, but that is being excluded from here. | What you linked to is a list of definitions of terms used in the laws of Arkansas. The actual Arkansas law on gifts to elected officials reads as such: Persons elected or appointed to select offices, including members of the general assembly, shall not solicit or accept a gift from a lobbyist or a person acting on behalf of one. A lobbyist shall not offer or pay for food or drink at more than 1 planned activity in a 7 day period. Does not prohibit the acceptance of: (1) Food, drink, informational materials, or other items included in a conference registration fee; and (2) Food and drink at events coordinated through the regional or national conference and provided to persons registered to attend. Ark. Const. art. XIX,§ 30. http://www.ncsl.org/research/ethics/50-state-table-gift-laws.aspx The official is just not supposed to accept gifts, besides the provision for lobbyists to pay for food or drink. It's not that they can take a gift and pay $100 dollars. | The Rent Ordinance para (e) explicitly precludes that possibility: Any waiver by a tenant of rights under this Chapter 37 shall be void as contrary to public policy. If he attempts to enforce such a clause or in any way dislodge you from the unit, he is liable for a substantial penalty. The legality of a rebate scheme is not clear, but probably would also be deemed illegal, because there already exists provision for buyout, which has specific restrictions. For the rest of the week, tenant buyouts are subject to these provisions. The problem is that the horse may have left the barn. The landlord has to have provided you with a Pre-Buyout Disclosure Form (which is to be signed and filed) before any negotiation / discussion with the tenant. Since we're talking about obeying the law, it has to occur to the landlord that there is a buyout option, and then he has to give you and file the disclosure form before he opens his mouth. He also has to know what the requirements of a buyout agreement will be in the future. Starting on Monday, the law regarding buyouts changes (it doesn't clearly make an agreement impossible, but it's a reminder that the law can be changed). In terms of legally-enforceable agreements, you could agree to a buyout in the far future, but the agreement might not be enforceable under future law. For example, the disclosure form requires new information to be provided, so if he doesn't do that, the disclosure is invalid (the preamble to the amendment points out that the change in law was directed at legal actions that were considered to violate the spirit of the law). Hence a buyout for two years in the future is legally risky. | Imputed income is a legitimate concept, but it is hard to prove, particularly when there is an earning history to back up the claim that there is no malingering. Ultimately, the question is what that particular individual could earn and whether that particular individual was intentionally being lazy in order to influence child support. At a minimum an earnings history and testimony from Mary would be strong evidence disproving the claim, and it would probably take expert testimony to make any kind of credible claim that more income should be imputed that would still be unlikely to succeed. If more money were at stake, a battle of the experts with experts on each side with one testifying that Mary could earn more and the other debunking that expert's testimony, would be appropriate. But, for $300 a month at issue, it probably doesn't make economic sense for either party to hire any kind of expert. And, a judge is usually going to take some random statistical study much less seriously than a history of earnings and testimony from the franchise owner about why it earned more or less than average. | Sec. 171.208(c) of the law provides: (c) Notwithstanding Subsection (b), a court may not award relief under this section in response to a violation of Subsection (a)(1) or (2) if the defendant demonstrates that the defendant previously paid the full amount of statutory damages under Subsection (b)(2) in a previous action for that particular abortion performed or induced in violation of this subchapter, or for the particular conduct that aided or abetted an abortion performed or induced in violation of this subchapter. The apparent intention, as I see it, is that a defendant is only supposed to have to pay the $10,000 damages once, so that it's not possible for a large number of plaintiffs to sue and collect. Some others have pointed out that there may be a loophole in case there are judgments in several cases before the defendant pays for the first one, and that in such a situation the defendant might be required to pay more than once. It doesn't seem to me, on its face, that such a loophole was intended, but we may have to wait and see how courts handle it. In any case, it would seem that the defendant could minimize this possibility by paying the judgment as quickly as possible. | This happened despite the fact that the marriage and Bible verses requirement were almost surely illegal and similar things have happened on and off, mostly in rural courts with non-attorney judges, for pretty much as long as the U.S. has been a country (and earlier). The trick is that the orders take effect unless someone appeals them, and since deals like this are usually a result of a plea bargain which waives rights to an appeal, and even if the result is simply imposed by the judge, one has to consider if taking the case up on appeal, having the sentence reversed, and then having it remanded to the same judge for resentencing would be worse from the perspective of the defendant, given the broad authority of a sentencing judge in a minor case like this one, than simply accepting the illegal sentence. Also, cases that aren't appealed never create precedents and aren't generally available among resources used by legal researchers, so they systemically evade documentation in easily available sources. | It's essentially a legally enshrined incentive for high net worth investors to supply capital, which is consistent with the other entities that qualify in § 230.501. It tends to come with increased access to riskier offerings, where the risk ensues from exempted registration. While nominal dollar thresholds typically get eroded away by inflation, they needed a line in the sand to represent financial sophistication. Speculation: I suspect the initial number was a ballpark attempt to approximate the point at which individuals (at that time) tended to be involved in more complex projects (e.g. certain hedges and ventures). | Suppose the shop bills you $2000 and you have a $750 deductible. You pay them $750, your insurance company pays $1250. Now suppose instead that the shop purports to waive the deductible. In order to get the insurance company to pay $1250 they still have to bill $2000. Then they don't collect the $750 from you. Presumably they write it off as bad debt. It smells like insurance fraud to me, on two counts: first, the shop expects to receive $1250 for a service but they produce a bill of $2000 for the insurance company's benefit and then do not seek payment from the insured party for any balance purportedly due beyond $1250. Second, the insured party has a contract with the insurer undertaking to pay the first $750 of the claim but has conspired with the shop to avoid paying that amount through deception. Had the shop played by the rules, they would have billed $1250 and the insurer would have paid $500. The shop isn't waiving your deductible; it's getting it out of the insurance company by fraud, with your collusion. Another way of handling this is that the auto body shop submits an estimate for the cost necessary to restore the car to a certain degree but then restores the car to a lesser degree. If everyone is aware that this is happening then it might be acceptable, depending on the terms of the insurance policy. | Barela was convicted of robbery affecting interstate commerce and faces a sentence of up to 20 years and $250,000 in fines. I assume your issue is that you think this is too high (although I don't see what it has to do with the 14th or 6th Amendments). Fortunately, it's also almost completely unrelated to the actual sentence. The number that was quoted is the statutory maximum for robbery or extortion affecting interstate commerce. It represents the maximum amount that any defendant under any circumstances could receive for one count of that crime. A career criminal who threatened to kill an armored car guard in order to steal $10,000,000 would face the same 20-year statutory maximum as someone with no record who threatened to give COVID to a store clerk in order to steal $90. In some situations, things like the amount stolen or the defendant's criminal record affect the actual crime the defendant is convicted of. At the federal level, that's mostly not the case. Robbery affecting interstate commerce doesn't have degrees or statutory enhancements. Instead, a judge decides what sentence is appropriate. The judge can, in theory, pick anything between the statutory minimum (here there is none) and the statutory maximum (here it's 20 years). 18 U.S. Code § 3553 lays out the factors for the court to consider. In practice, federal courts generally sentence within the range given in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. While the statute itself doesn't distinguish between stealing $90 by threatening to cough and stealing millions by threatening to shoot, the Guidelines do. Courts don't have to follow the Guidelines range but typically do. If they don't, it's much more likely their sentence will be overturned as unreasonable on appeal. Popehat has a good blog post on the Guidelines, how they work, and why press releases quoting statutory maximums are basically straight-up lies. Sentencing.us has an unofficial calculator you can use to estimate the Guidelines range for a particular crime. If you plug in 18 U.S. Code § 1951 (which translates to the "Robbery" guideline) and enter in $90 stolen, no weapon used, no threat of death, and no criminal record, then you get a range of 33-41 months and/or a fine of $7,500 to $75,000. This is basically the lowest Guidelines range possible for robbery. For comparison, under California state law robbery is punishable by two, three, or five years in state prison. Robbery is a serious and violent crime, so a sentence of multiple years would not be considered unreasonable. But it takes a lot for the Guidelines range to approach the statutory maximum of 20 years. |
is a finger squiggle on an iPad truly binding? We recently had a massive hailstorm and, following that storm, we saw an endless stream of roofing contractors knocking on our door. We're in Boulder County, Colorado. A representative from one of those construction companies pointed out some damage and offered to meet with the insurance adjuster, which he did. Our insurance company wrote us a check to cover some of the hail damage. After emphatically explaining how amazing his replacement windows are, he produced an iPad and asked me to "sign". I foolishly squiggled on the screen. Here's what it said: Quote is valid until ADD DATE HERE CCC has a "no return policy" on windows, doors, glass, and sashes. Project time line - Window delivery - 8 weeks, Prefinish work - 2-3 weeks, Install - 2 weeks. Standard Payment Terms are 50% down at time of order, 25% due upon delivery to CCC shop, and remainder due upon completion of work. Pricing based on payment by check or cash. 3% will be added for payment by credit card. If job cannot be completed (i.e. due to backordered items, remakes, etc) customer will be responsible for full payment for portion of job completed up to that point. If acceptable, please sign and return along with 50% down payment. Thank you! I confirm that my action here represents my electronic signature and is binding. At the time I did not write him a check because I wanted to discuss the scope of the job with my wife. The windows in our house are a bit old, so it would make sense to replace them all at once, and not just the ones that sustained hail damage. Admittedly, I don't know much about windows (or the legal ramifications of squiggling on an iPad screen). That evening, as a sanity check, I looked at Google/Yelp reviews for the window make/model and saw that almost every review had the lowest possible rating. I reached out to the guy and explained that we could not move forward with his recommendation, and I asked him to quote products that rated highly in Consumer Reports, which he did. At that time, he had not ordered any windows from his supplier, so things weren't yet set-in-stone (even though I had stupidly squiggled on the iPad). A few hours later, we received a quote that was almost twice the previous estimate. Because of the large amount of money at stake, I decided to get a second quote. His quote was 76% more expensive than Lowes for exactly the same product. In cash terms, Lowes was $10k cheaper. So, regardless of the squiggle on the iPad, I decided not to move forward with the exorbitant quote. When I mentioned this, he sent me an email saying: in order to break out of the contract we think it would be fair to charge for the time we have put into all of this. Heath ran the numbers and it came to $1,000 So, he knocked on our door, pointed out some damage, met with the insurance adjuster, (over) quoted the job, and is now asking for $1,000 (as a sort of "inconvenience fee"). Even though I screwed up by squiggling on the iPad, I think this is a somewhat predatory sales practice. From my perspective, he tried to rip me off and then sent me a bill for the trouble. From a legal perspective, is my position defensible? I did squiggle, after all. update I took another peek at the electronic document I squiggled on and notice that it's in my wife's name. My name doesn't appear anywhere on the document. Presumably, I do not have the authority to sign legally binding documents on my wife's behalf. I wonder if that alone would invalidate the contract. | Like a paper signature in ink or blood, a finger squiggle is merely evidence that you have agreed to the terms of a contract. You have agreed, and now you are know the downside of that agreement. However, Colorado law gives you a special privilege to cancel certain contracts, and this may be one: here is the law. Under CO Rev Stat §5-3-402, with some exceptions, the buyer has the right to cancel a home solicitation sale until midnight of the third business day after the day on which the buyer signs an agreement or offer to purchase that complies with this part 4. You must give written notice to the seller at the address stated in the agreement. One exception is that you cannot cancel an agreement for an "emergency requiring immediate remedy" (there will be paperwork regarding that). A "home solicitation sale" is one that solicits the sale and the buyer's agreement or offer to purchase is given to the seller or a person acting for the seller at a residence which matches the facts as you describe them. Part 4 is the part that includes §5-3-401 through §5-3-405. §5-3-403 specifies the form of that agreement. One of the requirements is a written agreement or offer to purchase that designates as the date of the transaction the date on which the buyer actually signs and contains a statement of the buyer's rights that complies with subsection (2) of this section. A copy of any writing required by this subsection (1) to be signed by the buyer, completed at least as to the date of the transaction and the name and mailing address of the seller, shall be given to the buyer at the time the buyer signs the writing. Furthermore, Until the seller has complied with this section, the buyer may cancel the home solicitation sale by notifying the seller in any manner and by any means of the buyer's intention to cancel;except that the buyer's right of cancellation shall expire three years after the date of the consummation of the home solicitation sale, notwithstanding the fact that the seller has not complied with this part So it depends on when exactly this happened: you may be able to cancel. | You mean like this? Of course, a website can charge you to access its pages; many do. And yes, clicking on an "I agree" button can form a valid contract (just visiting the website can't). Historically, the law has adopted the position that if you sign it (including by clicking "I agree") you read it, you understood it and you agreed to it. It's hard to imaging how it could be otherwise because allowing people to get out of contracts by saying "I never read it" is problematical as well. However, there are two things that mitigate against the type of term you suggest; one practical and one legal. Practical: How do they get your money? They can ask for your credits card details and, if they do and you give them a court will probably come to the conclusion that you knowingly and willingly agreed to pay for the service. However, if they don't have any method of getting money from you, they would have to take you to court to do so. There are a number of practical problems with this like: who are you? where are you? Which court can they sue you in etc. Legal: At common law, there exists the doctrine of unconscionability that describes terms that are so extremely unjust, or overwhelmingly one-sided in favour of the party who has the superior bargaining power, that they are contrary to good conscience. Such terms are legally unenforcable. Further, in many jurisdictions, consumer protection law often give additional protections up to and including not enforcing terms that are merely unfair not just unconscionable. | You are granted the free trial as part of a trial, not to permanently use the program. When the user downloaded the trial version of the program, he probably had to accept T&C granting a one-time only say 3‑month trial period. It is a mere breach of contract if you’re circumventing this, but you might still be liable to damages. Circumventing technological protection measures is forbidden, § 95a UrhG. However, these protection measures must be considered effective. Now, lawyers are usually no computer gurus, so they might arrive at completely different conclusions, but I guess/hope editing a plain text file, substituting a plaintext ISO 8601 date, will not be deemed “effective”. (I presume the same effect could be achieved by resetting the computer’s RTC.) Having said that, since you intend to “publish a guide […] detailing how to use this exploit” I suspect it might not be that trivial and thus, from a lawyer’s POV, be considered an “effective” technological protection measure. If it is considered an effective technological protection measure, you might be punishable via § 108b UrhG, but I’m not sure about that. The wording is terribly complex. | In general, people have less expectation of privacy in cars than in their homes. To challenge a search and/or seizure under the Fourth Amendment, a person must have standing - the right to sue (that is, you must have had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place where the search happened; if you didn't, no standing - can't claim your privacy was violated if you had no privacy). The US Circuit Courts are split on the issue of unauthorized rental drivers and whether they have the same reasonable expectation of privacy as the authorized driver of a rental car would have. Some Circuits allow the unauthorized driver to challenge a car search if the authorized driver gave them permission. Some Circuits look only at the agreement and if the driver isn't authorized on that, they're out of luck. The 6th Circuit is more case-by-case, with a presumption that driver can't challenge the search that can be overcome based on the facts. (All this info from US v. Haywood, 324 F.3d 514) There's a current case before the Supreme Court (argued January 9, 2018), Byrd v. US, on this very issue. This SCOTUSblog page has a lot of information on the case. Edited to add: Texas is in the Fifth Circuit, which follows the rule that unauthorized drivers don't have standing to challenge a search/seizure even with the authorized driver's permission to drive the car; unauthorized drivers of rental cars don't have a reasonable expectation of privacy because they lack a possessory interest in the car and/or they're violating the rental agreement. Basically, even though it seems the cops' stop of the car would've violated the Fourth Amendment if he were the authorized driver, since this happened in Texas, he's not going to be able to challenge the stop. IMO, this is incredibly unjust especially when the cops admitted there was no probable cause, so hopefully the Supreme Court makes this rule obsolete and allows unauthorized drivers to exercise their Fourth Amendment rights. Some law review articles on the topic of unauthorized rental drivers: "Hertz and the Fourth Amendment" "Resolving a Three-Way Circuit Split" | What happens is the same as if you were an employee in the office, staying with the company for another few years. You are an agent for the company, and everything you do is as if the company was doing it (except for extreme circumstances). A company employee broke your laptop. It's the company's problem. They should have insurance for this kind of thing. And they told you to work from home, so if something happened because you are at home, that's the company's problem as well. It could be different if your company had told their employees not to have any fluids anywhere near their computers, and you had acted against this. Or my company doesn't allow me to take my works computer with me on a holiday; if I did without explicit permission and it got damaged, that would be my problem. | The real story is that the articles you link to are logically fallacious. The first hedges its assertions by saying a mailbox is "effectively considered" to be federal property. It cites 18 USC 1705, which it correctly notes "puts your mailbox under Federal jurisdiction." But that's not the same as assuming ownership of it. The piece also says that you "effectively lease" your mailbox to the federal government, which is a somewhat exaggerated way of putting it, but even if we accept it at face value it falls far short of a claim that the mailbox is federal property. The second concludes that mailbox tampering is a federal offense because "the mailbox belongs to and is controlled by the USPS." There is no evidence offered to support the assertion of ownership, and there is of course an alternative explanation for the fact that mailbox tampering is a federal offense, which is that there are laws such as the aforementioned 18 USC 1705 that prohibit it. These laws, however, say nothing about ownership. The third is ultimately based on the assertion of a letter carrier who said, "Listen, lady, your friends don’t own these mailboxes. We do." The claim was made in explanation of the prohibition against private individuals putting items into a mailbox. As far as I can see, the article is off the mark in another way: that prohibition has nothing to do with safety and security, but rather with protecting the postal service's revenue: it arises from 18 USC 1725, which explicitly is about avoiding the payment of postage. In any event, it does not establish ownership. In short, the idea that all mailboxes are federal property is a myth, as implied by the USPS page you link to. To what extent do property owners have control over their own mailbox? To a fairly high extent, but they do need to comply with the relevant law. They can't, for example, hang a plastic bottle by the roadside for the purpose of receiving their mail. Can they deface or place non-mail in their own mailbox? 18 USC 1705 actually prohibits willful or malicious injury, tearing down, or destruction of a mailbox, not defacing. So technically, they could, but a prosecution seems highly unlikely. Under section 1725, placing non-mail in the box is only prohibited to the extent that there is intent to avoid paying postage. That would be difficult to establish for someone putting something in their own mailbox. Can they tear it down with no intent to replace it? If they're willing to forego mail delivery, yes. They may be able to arrange to have the mail held for retrieval at the post office. If they do not, their mail will be returned to the sender as undeliverable. This arises from the Domestic Mail Manual, which says (in general) that "customers must provide authorized mail receptacles or door slots" as a condition of city delivery (I could not find a corresponding requirement for rural delivery, but it must exist somewhere). The manual also describes requirements for customer mail receptacles. | Given that you voluntarily turned the car over to the buyer, it isn't your car anymore. The correct procedure would be to file a civil case against the buyer for breach of contract, where he would have been required to turn over the pump or compensate you monetarily. You both violated the law and are subject to punishment. Forgery is a crime in California punishable by up to a year in county jail. Stealing a car is grand theft, which has a range of penalties from misdemeanor to up to 3 years prison, depending on your prior history and the circumstances. You can file a complaint with the police over the forgery, and it will inevitably be revealed that you stole his car. So you should call an attorney right away to try to get yourself out of this mess. Your main interest would be not getting prosecuted for grand theft, or at least minimizing the penalty. Assuming that he did indeed forge your signature (a signature on the title is required, and surely DMV would not issue a new title without a signature, but you don't indicate what evidence you have that he forged your signature), he could be motivated to cooperate – your respective attorneys can work out an equitable arrangement. The windshield issue will probably be central to the case. Did you crack the windshield after you struck the deal? Did he have an opportunity to inspect the car? Did you fail to disclose a material fact that affects the value of a car? If you replace the windshield, that could tilt the scales of justice in your favor. Get a lawyer and try to keep it out of the courts. | The store is, as far as i can see, not using the trademarked image to sell their cake. Your family does not intend to sell anything at all. This photo, from the description, could not reasonably be confused with an official image from the trademark holder. (all of this is based on your description, of course). Therefore, the trademark holder probably won't sue for trademark infringement, even if they somehow heard of this event, and if they did sue, they would quite likely lose. You would be making a copy of a presumably copyrighted image. You might have an active defense, but that is very hard to be sure of in advance. (Note that "fair use" is a very specifically US legal concept, and would not apply in the UK. The roughly comparable concept is "fair dealing" but that is more restrictive, and follows somewhat different rules.) In any case, it is possible that the rights holder would sue, and if the situation were a bit different (the was only one person pictured, making the shirt with the protected image very prominent, for example) there might be a larger chance of such a suit being successful. No business is going to want a bakery department manager deciding whether a particular use of a particular image does or does not infringe IP rights, and whether it does or does not expose the business to significant risk. Just to get an opinion from their lawyer on whether this image infringes would probably cost them several times the price of the cake with image printing. The store has no doubt written its guidelines to err well on the side of caution, because one suit, even if they won, would cost far more than the profits of many cakes, and if they lost, could have a very negative effect on their bottom line indeed. The store is entitled to restrict what business it does to keep itself safe from lawsuits. It is going to keep well on the cautious side, in all likelihood, and so it should. I fear you will have to find a store with a different policy, or use a different picture. |
Why was Wouter Basson never charged with crimes against humanity for Project Coast? Project Coast was a biological weapons program that the South African government developed in the 1970's and 1980's. The leading scientist and administrator of Project Coast was a cardiologist called Wouter Basson This was a massive, ambitious weapons program that created both lethal and non-lethal weapons for strategic purposes, such as making black people sterile, and for tactical purposes such as assassinating political opponents. Throughout Project Coast Wouter Basson was, allegedly, responsible for numerous murders by supplying biological weapons; in Operation Duel [1982] Basson allegedly supplied lethal pills that killed 200 members of The South West Africa People's Organization. Why wasn't Wouter Basson charged with crimes against humanity? From my research he is still free, is alive, and has never been found guilty of anything. The United Nations or The Hague have never attempted to charge Basson with crimes against humanity. Why? | I think you are misunderstanding the nature of international criminal courts or tribunals. They were established mostly when the international community believes that the national court systems in a conflict region have become unable or unwilling to provide justice. This perceived breakdown is not usually tied to any one case, it depends on a pattern of denied justice. More recent attempts to establish a genuine international jurisdiction like the ICCt suffer from limited participation. International observers concluded that post-Apartheid South Africa has done a halfway decent job at covering Apartheid-era crimes, considering the difficult circumstances at the time. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission was part of the solution. So there is no need to overrule the South African decision if they want to prosecute the case (or not, as it may be). | Background of the question You are talking of David Hahn, aka the "Radioactive Scout". In 1995 he was 17 when he impersonated a licensed person to acquire radioactive material. But he never got enough material to build a reactor: he built a neutron source from a block of lead, into which he had stuffed lots of somewhat purified radioactive material. He also conducted radioactive experiments without a licensed lab - which is decidedly illegal. Now, he realized that his neutron source was starting to generate dangerous radiation and dismantled his setup - which was what got FBI and consorts to the table. They cleaned up what they found - while his mother already had disposed of most of the experiments via the normal garbage - also decidedly illegal. Since he was 17 and his mother did commit suicide during the year after the events and before her disposing of waste was discovered, neither was prosecuted at that point. Someone alleged in 2007, he was again amessing radioactive material, the FBI investigated but found the tip not enough to warrant more investigation after standing in front of the door with a radioactivity detector and talking to him on the phone, as a report shows: "No immediate threat existed with regards to allegations that Hahn possessed a nuclear reactor within his residence." Later in 2007 he was found guilty of stealing smoke detectors, which some people alleged he planned to extract Americium from. This claim was never at trial, so is to be taken with a grain of salt. The charge was Larceny. Not attempt of obtaining NCBR-Material illegally. Answer To work with materials of radioactive means, you need to be compliant with NCR rules and acquire the needed license. There are companies that have the license to dismantle and extract the radioactive material from smoke detectors - and USPS provides a list of companies that take them and are allowed to - because they make them in the first place and may handle it because of that license. There is no exception for ownership/handling of small amounts of Americium in 10 CFR 30.70 Schedule A, but the smoke detector itself, as a fully contained unit is under 10 CFR 30.15 (a)(7): (a) Except for persons who apply byproduct material to, or persons who incorporate byproduct material into, the following products, or persons who initially transfer for sale or distribution the following products containing byproduct material, any person is exempt from the requirements for a license set forth in section 81 of the Act and from the regulations in parts 20 and 30 through 36 and 39 of this chapter to the extent that such person receives, possesses, uses, transfers, owns, or acquires the following products: (7) Ionization chamber smoke detectors containing not more than 1 microcurie (μCi) of americium-241 per detector in the form of a foil and designed to protect life and property from fires. (b) Any person who desires to apply byproduct material to, or to incorporate byproduct material into, the products exempted in paragraph (a) of this section, or who desires to initially transfer for sale or distribution such products containing byproduct material, should apply for a specific license pursuant to § 32.14 of this chapter, which license states that the product may be distributed by the licensee to persons exempt from the regulations pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section. However, NCR also found that it would need 10-million used smoke detectors in normal trash to become a problem - but that assumes them to be full units, not someone ripping them apart. | At least 56 years Anthony Sawoniuk was convicted in 1999 of 2 murders committed while he was a member of the SS. I cannot find the exact date of the offenses but they were before he deserted in November 1944. There may be longer ones but on seeing your question, Nazi war crimes popped into my head as something easy to check. If the actual answer is some obscure crime from the 19th century, I don’t know how you’d find it. | There are none. Damages against B’s clinic? A does not have a contract with B’s clinic. No duties nor rights without a contract. Damages against B? A does not have a contract with B. If there was a contract, we need details about it. Tort, § 823 Ⅰ BGB? No. B was neither negligent nor did he/she deliberately incur damage. Report B as criminal? A and B had consensual sexual intercourse. This consent (necessarily) comprises the risk of transmission. You cannot give “consent to facts” though. Yet here B had no knowledge of his/her contagiousness. He/she definitely did not deliberately infect A. Negligence is out of question, because there is no general expectation to get regularly tested before having sex with anyone. | Some people seem to believe that just because something happens 'in the internet' it is somehow outside normal jurisdictions. Wrong. In may be harder to investigate and prosecute crimes in the internet, but the laws apply all the same. There are some problems when it is unclear 'where in the world' something did happen -- in the jurisdiction of the perpetrator, the victim, or the service provider? But problems of jurisdiction apply e.g. to international fraud cases in the non-web-world as well. In many jurisdictions, the informed and voluntary consent makes some things legal which would otherwise be illegal. For instance, if two boxers get into the ring, it is understood that each of them did consent to be hit by the other. But usually two fighters could not legally agree to a fight to the death, because even if there are laws on assisted suicide, they do not apply to a fight. Insults, libel, and slander are not on the same level as homicide. There are jurisdictions where they are not prosecuted without the request of the victim. But an insult might also violate other laws, e.g. disturbing the peace. So don't bet on such an app unless you know for sure which jurisdictions are involved. | Normally, making a poison is not in and of itself a crime. If a third party took the poison from the person who manufactured it without their knowledge, the manufacturer would generally not have criminal liability, at least in the absence of "gross criminal negligence" such as leaving the poison manufacturing location totally unsecured and letting people know that there was poison there for the taking. In a civil case, someone might sue the poison manufacturer for negligently securing their facility, but again, that would be a real stretch if even ordinary precautions (e.g. standard locks on doors and cabinets) were in place, or if it was an inside job theft. In the same way, a gun store owner is not usually liable criminally or civilly if someone steals a gun from his store and shoots someone with it. The police could certainly charge Person A with capital murder mistakenly believing him to have intended to kill and did kill someone with the poison, which would make the critical factual point establishing that Person B gave it to someone without Person A's knowledge. Person A might still be guilty of attempted murder if he intended to kill someone (not necessarily the person who was killed) with the poison but had not fully carried out the plot when the poison was stolen. Some places probably require a permit of some kind to make poisons, and if Person A didn't have a permit, he could probably also be charged with making poisons without a permit. | I'm not sure what jurisdiction you're referring to, but here are the state involuntary manslaughter laws. Broad brush, the elements tend to be: Someone was killed as a result of act by the defendant. The act either was inherently dangerous to others or done with reckless disregard for human life. The defendant knew or should have known his or her conduct was a threat to the lives of others. However, you're really backwards planning from a jail vs. army decision, so you might actually be after something like felony hit and run, which can most certainly result in incarceration. The elements of felony hit and run generally include leaving the scene of an accident regardless of fault (hit and run typically becomes a felony when someone was injured in the accident). Since the elements vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, it makes sense to look them up wherever the accident will take place in the book. If it takes place in the U.S. this is a state-by-state compendium. Then you can tweak the story to satisfy the applicable elements and induce the jail vs. army decision (even if army policy prohibits it, it's still pretty common fiction!). | The Constitution does not define any crimes (except for an explicit limit on what can be considered 'treason.') It places limits on what penalties the government may apply for crimes and how crimes are tried in court, but it does not itself actually create any criminal offenses. Rather, state and federal law do that. Having said that, if a state government creates a crime of murder (which, obviously, they all do,) the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment does require that that law protect all people within the jurisdiction of that state. That is, a state cannot make a law criminalizing the murder of a white person, but not of a black person, for example. States can't just pick and choose who is protected by their laws. It would not violate the U.S. Constitution if a state completely decriminalized murder, though. It's exceptionally unlikely to happen, but it would not be a violation of the Constitution. Depending on exactly what you mean by 'murder,' it could be argued that murder by the government is unconstitutional, though. The 14th Amendment bans states from depriving anyone of life without due process of law: No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Similarly, the 5th Amendment provides an equivalent protection from the federal government: No person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law |
How are employer pay statutes enforced against offending employers? An employer recently made some strange demands as a part of a job offer. On advice from The Workplace Stack Exchange I'm going to look for work somewhere else, but I'm concerned the employer is engaged in illegal activity and I feel I have a responsibility to make certain someone enforces the law against them. (the specific demands they were making are illegal for them to make). Note that there is a known form of scam where an employer will try to get an employee to do this so that the employer can conduct fraud on someone else without being as obviously involved in the conduct, and that is one of several reasons that these laws exist. When an employer is violating these rules, what is the employee's next course of action? Is there a specific government enforcement agency I should file a complaint with, such as a banking regulator? Does the employee have to file a lawsuit in some specific jurisdiction (the job offer crossed state lines)? Since this is a matter that relates banking, labor law, and to both state and federal law, and has intersections with both civil and criminal law, what agencies or jurisdictions should this be pursued under? Since there were initially some who argued that these laws don't actually exist I have added the following paragraph to clarify: If you were not aware, U.S. federal law (and some state laws) restrict how an employer can implement their payroll. One of the restrictions is that they can't force you to receive direct deposit at any specific institution. (They can't, for example, tell you that your direct deposit must happen at the same bank the employer uses.) In some states the restrictions are even more severe, prohibiting the requirement of direct deposit. The cited rules include some legal definitions that differ slightly from how you might read something at home (for example, the definition of a consumer, which can include employees). The definitions can be found here. | You can file a complaint with the CFPB regarding 12 CFR §1005.10(e)(2)-1. Your individual state Department of Labor may enforce similar state level regulations too. And, yes, this technically falls under the FDIC as well. You can also file a complaint with them, although it's very unlikely they would pursue any action against a non-bank employer. The FTC has also pursued cases in violation to this statute, however those have only targeted lenders forcing the use of certain banks, and were not aimed at employers. | In general, in the US, Bob may do this. If the second company is a competitor of the first and Bob has access to confidential information from his first employer, then there could be an issue. Some employers require their employees, or some of them, to agree to "exclusive employment", that is to agree not to accept any other employment while employed by the company. If Bob has agreed to such a contract, he would be in breach of it if he took a second job and could be fired if his main employer learns of this. This is not a problem if Bob gets permission for the vacation work from his usual employer. In any case, Bob is not committing a crime, even if he is violating his contract. | The first question would be whether you are an employee, or an independent contractor. There is more to that determination than how the company labels you, but that is a starting point. Based on the minimal autonomy that you imply that you have, you would probably be found to be an employee. Then there are limits on the number of hours that you can work in a week or day, which they are complying with. The employer is required to record the hours that you worked, and it is a crime to keep false records. It is also required that an employer pay for the time you work. Therefore the employer cannot legally refuse to pay you for your labor, and they cannot legally falsify records. The employer can limit your pay to 15 hours per week, if you work just 15 hours per week. They can also set ridiculous performance standards, whereby at the end of the week you will not have done what they wanted you to do. Their only recourse is to dismiss you. In response, you can file a complaint, but note that the concept of "wrongful dismissal" under the act is about entitlement to termination or severance pay. The arbitrator may find that the employer contravened the act, and can order them to rescind the termination. Or, before you get fired, you can complain and the arbitrator could order the employer to either modify their work requirements or else to pay you for the time worked. The difficult point (for you) in this case is that the act does not address employer performance expectations, and employers are generally allowed to set their own performance standards. If you have a written employment contract, there might be provisions regarding termination which could help you. Without a written contact, there is no statutory provision that prevents an employer for terminating you, but they may have to give you notice and pay for doing so, as long as you are not terminated for "just cause". Hoang v. Mann, 2014 ONSC 3762 is an Ontario case where an employee was terminated for just case based on insubordination, job performance, inability to get along with co-workers and so on. On the front of job performance, the courts have found that an employer must clearly communicate standards to employees, and give employees an opportunity to meet those standards. But they do not generally decide e.g. how many units per hour an assembly-line worker can reasonably be expected to complete. | I believe that legally they can't force her to use sick leave since she has met the 40 hours minimum required as a salaried employee. Is this correct? Unfortunately, as far as the Department of Labor (DoL) is concerned, the employer is correct here, provided that this is company policy. First, there is no "40 hours minimum required", the DoL simply says that a salaried (exempt) employee must be paid the full salary for any week in which the employee performs any work, regardless of the number of days or hours worked. This is then limited by the "allowable deductions: Circumstances in Which the Employer May Make Deductions from Pay Deductions from pay are permissible when an exempt employee: is absent from work for one or more full days for personal reasons other than sickness or disability; for absences of one or more full days due to sickness or disability if the deduction is made in accordance with a bona fide plan, policy or practice of providing compensation for salary lost due to illness; to offset amounts employees receive as jury or witness fees, or for military pay; for penalties imposed in good faith for infractions of safety rules of major significance; or for unpaid disciplinary suspensions of one or more full days imposed in good faith for workplace conduct rule infractions. Also, an employer is not required to pay the full salary in the initial or terminal week of employment, or for weeks in which an exempt employee takes unpaid leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act. (Source: dol.gov) Emphasis Mine This means that as long as the employer has a policy or practice requiring the employee to use Paid Time Off (PTO) for sickness (sick-days), then the employer is allowed to make deductions from the employee's salary for those days. So in short, yes, the employer can require that the employee use PTO to cover sick days, regardless of the actual number of hours worked in that week, month, year, etc. There is currently no federal requirement for employers to provide paid sick leave, although some states like California may have local laws. | The reason that you are being asked to comply with a US law is because PayPal, a US company, is required to comply with US laws. If you do not comply, it is likely that they will be non-compliant and subject to sanctions. For more background, FATCA reporting is used to identify businesses that a company does business with. In this scenario PayPal does business with you, 'Kenorb Inc', and so must prove to the regulatory agencies that you are not a US based company, hence the need for the W-8BENE. In a similar way - people from other countries cannot simply ignore UK law when dealing with your business. As for your quotes - they are not contradictory. | are contract terms enforceable that say the employee has to pay the employer if they leave without giving notice? Yes, as long as the penalization is not of punitive nature. The doctrine of at-will employment is only the default condition, but a contract may supersede it. As for the extra question, reciprocity of sanctions (as in leaving without notice) is not a requirement for enforceability of a contract. In general, the lack of reciprocity only signals that there is a difference in the parties' bargaining power, but usually that does not affect enforceability. | I cannot recall an example where a breach of such guidance in-and-of-itself is an offence: it's when the underlying legislation is contravened that one is committed. Note that the cited article say this: this guidance is of a general nature. Employers should consider the specific conditions of each individual place of work and comply with all applicable legislation and regulations, including the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974. This guidance does not supersede existing legislation or regulations across the UK More broadly, and away from the NHS, the relationship between guidance and statute was examined in The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) v Arch Insurance (UK) Ltd & Ors [2020] EWHC 2448 (Comm) where adherence to social distancing measures impacted on safe working practices on building sites, causing delays and an increase in costs. The court determined that: It follows that government advice or recommendations, whether before or after either set of Regulations came into effect, cannot have imposed or ordered a denial of access or a hindrance in access, however strongly worded the advice or recommendations were, since they did not have the force of law. | It is not necessary for an agreement to be verbose and written by a lawyer, for it to be binding. There is some danger in having untrained people writing up agreements (they don't know the distinction between "what the law says" versus "what we had in mind"). The agreement is binding, but their interpretation of the contract language does not automatically prevail. The statement "ALL TUTORS ARE PAID 8 HOURS, unless told otherwise" is slightly problematic since it is not true (you can't pay time, you pay money for time spend). With no other statements about time and payment, and just looking at the words, this says that an employee will be paid for 8 hours work, period. Unless they say something different. That could mean "even if you work 20 hours, you only get paid for 8" (illegal under various labor laws), or it could be "even if you only work 2 hours, you get paid for 8" (the most reasonable interpretation). The interpretation "You are limited to 8 hours of work per pay period / contract" is not a reasonable interpretation: that isn't what the clause says. Such a limit could be clearly expressed ("can work up to 8 hours" is a clear way to state the limit), and since they didn't say anything like that, that is not how the courts will read the clause. They can, however, inform you otherwise, e.g. say "your minimum automatic pay is now 2 hours", or "we will only guarantee 2 hours work", and at that point that's what the number is. Since this is (presumably) a take-it or leave it contract which they wrote up and you didn't actually negotiate, any unclarities are legally interpreted in your favor. If you have worked more than 8 hours and they are using the contract language to argue that you won't be paid for the overage, that is not at all likely to hold up in court. Under terms of the contract (interpreted as stating a minimum guarantee of hours), they can inform you that your new minimum is 0 hours. Also, unless there is some kind of tenure clause, they can terminate the contract at will, and maybe they'll hire you under a different contract. What the terms of employment were for you in the past does not matter, what matters is what the current terms are. If you did not pay attention to the fact that they changed the terms of the agreement as of this quarter, that is not their problem. If they decided to change to "actual hours worked" after the current contract was formed, and they informed you of that fact later, then thereafter that is what the agreement is. Until you are notified of that change, the guaranteed minimum is what it says in the contract. In case their argument is "The university sets this policy, the department made a mistake in not informing you", the university has to take responsibility for the errors of their inferiors. |
Does an employee terminated for refusal to say "Be Blessed" have grounds for legal action? The owner of a local fast-food restaurant has enacted a new policy that requires employees to say "Be Blessed" to all customers as they leave. If an employee refuses to say it, disciplinary action is taken up to and including termination. Does an employee terminated for refusal to follow this policy have grounds for any legal action such as religious discrimination? | It probably depends on whether the employer is covered by a relevant non-discrimination statute. Most employers in the United States are covered, but some are small enough to be exempt. Federal law exempts employers with under 15 employees and religious organizations. There might also be a relevant state law. It also would depend upon whether the EEOC or a court found that "be blessed" was a compelled religious statement in violation of a worker's beliefs, and whether allowing the worker not to say it would be a "reasonable accommodation." This is a strong case, and I suspect that the worker would win on both counts but it isn't a completely open and shut case. There is arguably a secular meaning to the word "blessed" and a court could conceivably find that there is a legitimate and indispensible business purpose for insisting that every single person in the worker's position need to make this statement, although I doubt that a court would do so. | I do not believe that Idaho has such a law. This is not the end of the analysis, however. It isn't clear that saying you do not have a conviction, when in fact, you have a conviction that was dismissed, is a permissible ground for an Idaho employer to, for example, justify the termination of your employment for an improper reasons (e.g. national origin) when the employer, after the fact, discovers that you have a conviction that you did not disclose because it was dismissed. An Idaho court could easily rule that the non-disclosure of a conviction which was dismissed was not a material fact upon which an Idaho employer could justify terminating your employment when it was discovered after the fact. Likewise, fraud prosecutions generally require a misrepresentation to be made regarding a "material" fact, and not just any fact. In the same vein, while misstating your middle name might be a misrepresentation, it might not be an actionable misrepresentation of a material fact. | In New Mexico, where Better Call Saul is set, N.M. R. Prof'l. Cond. 16-505 prohibits an attorney from employing a suspended or disbarred attorney as a law clerk or paralegal only if there is an order from the New Mexico Supreme Court or its disciplinary board prohibiting that appointment. I don't believe the show ever indicates there was such an order. Other states have different rules. Some prohibit this type of activity altogether, while others permit an attorney to continue as a paralegal while suspended, but not after being disbarred. I believe some states merely require that the attorney disclose that she is using the services of an attorney who is under discipline. | what is it called when you are forced to breach a contract? You might be referring to constructive termination or constructive discharge. Held v. Gulf Oil Co., 684 F.2d 427, 432 (1982) explains that a claim of constructive termination arises where "working conditions would have been so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee's shows would have compelled to resign" (citations omitted). Whether a reasonable person in your shoes would feel compelled to resign depends on what your "personal, and possibly medical reasons" are/were at the time of the events and whether the employer sought to take advantage of that. | There are two scenarios to consider. One is that there is such a policy written down and duly communicated in some fashion. In that case, it is obviously "okay" in all senses to enforce that policy. (That does not preclude the possibility of suing the institution because they are abridging some right of yours in having this policy, but that's a separate matter). The alternative is that there is no such policy, and someone spoke incorrectly. If that is the case, then they "can't" enforce a non-existent policy. Actually, they can prevent you from using the facility, the question is, how could you correct their misunderstanding of their policy? The most protracted way to resolve this is to file a lawsuit against the university, for denying some right (constitutional or property). A more efficient way to do that is to bring the matter to the attention of a reasonably high-ranked official within the institution, perhaps the department chair, who may not be aware that subordinates are making up or misinterpreting rules. The fact that you were unable to locate a written statement of policy online really doesn't count for much. It is entirely reasonable to believe that the chair may have instituted such a policy, under his authority as chair, and communicated it verbally to subordinates: or, the subordinates simply do not know where to find the policies. An alternative approach is to raise the question with the Student Advocate's office, if discussion with the chair is unsatisfactory. | A school district has been sued for something like that. In Church of God, Etc. v. Amarillo Indep. Sch., 511 F. Supp. 613, plaintiffs successfully sued the school district "to enjoin the enforcement of the Amarillo School District's absence policy which limits the number of excused absences for religious holidays to two days each school year", where "A fundamental tenet of the Church of God is that members must abstain from secular activity on seven annual holy days". The school district imposed an absence polity where "School work missed may be made up whether an absence is excused or unexcused", and "Excused absences shall be granted to students for a maximum of 2 days for religious holidays in each school year". The court concluded that "This policy poses an unquestionable burden on the Plaintiffs' religious belief", and "This burden is not ameliorated by the make-up work provision. The provision does not require a teacher to evaluate the work made up. It in fact directs the teacher to enter a zero for that work". In this case "Summary judgment is granted and judgment rendered enjoining the enforcement of the Amarillo Independent School District's excused absence policy insofar as it limits the number of excused absences for religious holidays". This is not a matter of religious discrimination, this is a First Amendment issue. The policy is in violation of the Free Exercise clause. Eliminating spring break per se is not a problem: doing so and providing no excused absences is the problem. In the above case, there was clear a religious principle of the church to the effect that one must be off the clock on the holiday. As far as I know, there is no requirement to abstain from work or school on Shrove Tuesday, Ash Wednesday or Good Friday. Nevertheless, in recognition of New Jersey state law which allows any student to take off a religious holiday – including Shrove Tuesday and Ash Wednesday, and dozens more – the Board of Education has prepared a list of such holidays, which includes Wiccan, Hindu, Baha'i, Jewish, Zoroastrian, Church of Scientology (and so on) religious holidays. | Short Answer It might or might not be an anti-trust violations depending upon the states where the employers and employee are located. But, as a practical matter, it is almost impossible for an employee to prove an anti-trust violation without an insider leaking a "smoking gun" document or a company admitting to improper conduct, before a lawsuit is filed. Long Answer There is considerable regional variation regarding the extent to which legal arrangements to limit employee mobility are legal. For example, historically, Massachusetts is notorious for enforcing such limitations strictly. In contrast, California is famous for refusing to enforce such restrictions. In general, the Northeast is strict, the West is lenient and other states are in between, but it is really a state by state issue. (Incidentally, weak non-competition laws have been empirically shown by economists to be better for the economy in the sector where they might be applied but are not applied.) Usually these legal restrictions on employee mobility are imposed unilaterally by the employer without conferring with competitors, and sometimes remedies for a violation of these non-competition arrangements are limited to the employee and not the hiring company (although this is hardly universal - the intentional interference with contract tort historically arose to punish companies that induced employees to violate non-competes and duties of loyalty of existing employees of the suing firm). The anti-trust dimension comes from the agreement between competitors to honor each other's non-competition agreements, which is meaningful because in the states where Apple and Google are headquartered, non-competition agreements are basically unenforceable so this collusion between competitors has an effect in excess of the default legal situation in the absence of collusion. If Apple and Google had instead both been based in Boston instead, where their non-competition agreements were enforceable against both the employee and the new employer as a default rule of law, their agreement would probably not have violated anti-trust laws because they would simply be agreeing to follow the generally applicable law that would apply in the absence of a collusive agreement anyway. Thus, without knowing the default rules of law in the relevant states, and without knowing if there was actually an actual agreement between the competitors, you can't sue for an anti-trust violation. One of the recent revolutions in federal civil procedure, the Twombly case, arose in an anti-trust situation and held that a complaint for an anti-trust violation is not sufficient unless the person bringing suit has actual knowledge of the existence of a collusive agreement between competitors and does not merely infer the existence of such an agreement from the facts and circumstances available to the general public. It is not permissible to sue first and then use subpoenas and other pre-trial discovery procedures to determine if there was actually an express collusive agreement between the competitors rather than having their behavior arise for other reasons (since under Econ 101 microeconomic principles, marketwide price fixing by all participants and completely non-collusive perfect competition are indistinguishable as they both produce a uniform price in the marketplace for a good or service). Since this information is usually impossible to obtain prior to brining suit without an insider who leaks a smoking gun document, as a practical matter, it is usually impossible for an individual employee to prevail in an anti-trust lawsuit alleging collusion between competing firms. Under federal anti-trust laws, circumstances that have the de facto identical results to illegal collusion between competitors, where this is not actually collusion, are usually not actionable (i.e. you can't prevail in a lawsuit based upon those claims). | This is known as the "ministerial exception". Because the Free Exercise and Estalishment clauses of the First Amendment prohibit the government from interfering with religion, the government cannot override a doctrine that contradicts the teachings of a religion (so women and gays cannot sue the Catholic church for not being hirable as priests). In Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC, an individual taught classes and led prayer at a religous school, but was fired ultimately due to a disability (narcolepsy). The Lutheran church does not have any known doctrine condemning narcolepsy: but it was unanimously ruled that "the Establishment Clause prevents the Government from appointing ministers, and the Free Exercise Clause prevents it from interfering with the freedom of religious groups to select their own". Thus the church was legally permitted to fire the individual due to her disability. |
Could members of a minority use collective action to negotiate with racist employers? Some employers are more frequently accused of committing unlawful discrimination. Since union membership can encompass multiple businesses and since union membership does not have to include every labor employee in a department, could members of minority groups form a union that only admitted members of their own race and forced employers to collectively bargain when racism was being alleged? | This is explicitly prohibited under 42 USC 2000e-2(c) (c)It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization— (1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; (2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership or applicants for membership, or to classify or fail or refuse to refer for employment any individual, in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities, or would limit such employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an individual in violation of this section. | Yes, it's legal. It would be lawful discrimination on objectively and reasonably justified grounds Here's why: On the face of it, this is a case of direct discrimination contrary to Section 13 of the Equality Act 2010: (1) A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if, because of a protected characteristic, A treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat others. however, the company may argue that they are taking positive action in line with Section 158 of the Act (emphasis mine): (1) This section applies if a person (P) reasonably thinks that— (a) persons who share a protected characteristic suffer a disadvantage connected to the characteristic, (b) persons who share a protected characteristic have needs that are different from the needs of persons who do not share it, or (c) participation in an activity by persons who share a protected characteristic is disproportionately low. (2) This Act does not prohibit P from taking any action which is a proportionate means of achieving the aim of— (a) enabling or encouraging persons who share the protected characteristic to overcome or minimise that disadvantage, (b) meeting those needs, or (c) enabling or encouraging persons who share the protected characteristic to participate in that activity. It is likely that they will be able to justify direct discrimination on the grounds of positive action. The Government's Explanatory Notes on the section express the intent of the legislation as such (emphasis mine): This clause provides that the Bill does not prohibit the use of positive action measures to alleviate disadvantage experienced by people who share a protected characteristic, reduce their under-representation in relation to particular activities, and meet their particular needs. It will, for example, allow measures to be targeted to particular groups, including training to enable them to gain employment, or health services to address their needs. Any such measures must be a proportionate way of achieving the relevant aim. A clear example is provided: Having identified that its white male pupils are underperforming at maths, a school could run supplementary maths classes exclusively for them. Furthermore, there is case law to establish that such positive action is entirely lawful: R (Adath Yisroel Burial Society and another) v Inner North London Senior Coroner [2018] EWHC 969 (Admin) (emphasis mine): Before leaving this topic we would stress that section 158 does not concern what is sometimes called “positive discrimination”; it is more limited and concerns only what the legislation calls “positive action”. In general “positive discrimination” is unlawful under the Equality Act. Therefore, as a matter of domestic law, prioritisation of some deaths for religious reasons would not be unlawful; to the contrary, it would be consistent with section 158. That position is mirrored in Convention jurisprudence. The point can be well illustrated by the decision in Jakóbski v Poland (2012) 55 EHRR 8. In that case the applicant was serving a prison sentence in Poland. He adhered strictly to the Mahayana Buddhist dietary rules and requested a vegetarian diet for that reason. This was not provided for him. The prison authorities stated that they were not obliged to prepare special meals for prisoners on the basis of religious belief as a matter of Polish law and that to do so would put excessive strain on them. The application before the court succeeded under Article 9. For that reason the Court did not consider it necessary to address separately the right to equal treatment in the enjoyment of Convention rights in Article 14 (to which we return below). However, in our view, the case of Jakóbski is a good illustration of the principle of equality at work in cases of this kind. What on its face looks like a general policy which applies to everyone equally may in fact have an unequal impact on a minority. In other words, to treat everyone in the same way is not necessarily to treat them equally. Uniformity is not the same thing as equality. While this judgement concerns itself with positive action on religious grounds, it has broad application to positive action on grounds of sex too, and would be consistent with Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights—namely that if the discrimination can be objectively and reasonably justified, it is lawful. | I am assuming in this answer that the lease or rental agreement provides the landlord with a right of access for required maintenance. The question is not clear on that point. If there is a specific and reasonable ground for refusing a particular representative or agent of the landlord, you might be able to do so. If, for example, that particular worker had previously insulted you in your apartment, or had attempted to steal from you there, you could probably refuse entrance and request the landlord to send a different worker to do the job. But in general the landlord may choose his or her agents, and if it is a reasonable for an agent to be admitted, you must admit whatever agent the landlord sends. You can probably demand reasonable notice, depending on the terms of the lease. You may be able to demand to be present when the agent is to be in the premises, again depending on the lease. But I fo not think that the tenant can arbitrarily choose which agent the landlord will use. | united-states Under US law, unions and employees enjoy a set of protections codified under the National Labor Relations Act. Some of those rights specifically pertain to strikes, and in particular, employees engaged in "lawful" strikes cannot be fired merely for striking (but they can be replaced). Stack Exchange, Inc. takes the position that moderators are not employees and are not subject to the NLRA. Their reluctance to use the word "strike" likely stems from this position. If the moderation strike were a "strike" within the meaning of the NLRA, that would imply a large and complex set of restrictions on how Stack Exchange may respond to the strike. It would also suggest that moderators, as employees, have a right to discuss their "workplace conditions" with each other or the public - which might be construed to include some or all of the moderation policies that Stack Exchange has distributed in private (but I'm somewhat doubtful of that). Of course, it would also raise serious problems under the Fair Labor Standards Act (moderators are unpaid and the FLSA sets a minimum wage), but that is a different law, and it is theoretically possible that a court would rule that moderators are employees for NLRA purposes but not for FLSA purposes. I have never heard of such a ruling actually happening, and it is far more likely that moderators are not employees for either purpose. Still, it might be unwise to refer to the strike as a "strike," just in case the issue gets litigated. | The fair housing act does not mention "socially marginalized groups". It says that it shall be unlawful To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin. The U.S. Supreme Court just ruled on a case, Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. The Inclusive Communities Project Inc., that covered disparate impact as a measurement of discrimination. Disparate impact raises the question of whether policies that appear to be neutral but result in a disproportionate impact on protected groups are legal. The Supreme Court, in its ruling, indicated that disparate impact claims can be brought but it also imposed significant limitations. How does this case apply to your question? The underlying situation in the referenced case is one where, from the ruling: The ICP alleged the Department has caused continued segregated housing patterns by its disproportionate allocation of the tax credits, granting too many credits for housing in predominantly black inner-city areas and too few in pre-dominantly white suburban neighborhoods. The basis of the claim, which can now be heard under a disparate impact claim, is that a government organization discriminated against pre-dominantly white neighborhoods. FHA protects against racial discrimination, not against racial discrimination only against certain groups. | None because the principle is Freedom to contract There is a general right of any being (natural like a person or even a company) to contract with anyone. Buying someone's service is a contract. A contract forms when: They offer something You offer something Both sides agree on it. (meeting of the minds) It is totally legal for a company to make wears a mask in our place of business a part of either being admitted onto the property or agreeing to contract with you. Noncompliance means as a result that they don't agree to serve you and don't offer to you. In fact, they explicitly reject to contract with you unless you wear a mask, which is their right unless there is a law that would specifically make that reason illegal. There are laws that reduce the freedom of contract, such as the civil right act (protected classes, such as religion, race, sex and more), the Americans with disabilities act (demanding reasonable accommodation), and labor laws (outlawing labor practices or limiting the amount of work or minimum payment) as well as anti-discrimination laws (establishing further classes). However note, that laws need to be written in such a way that they don't discriminate against the company either! One case where freedom to contract was attacked using an anti-discrimination law was Masterpiece Cakeshop - which was decided on first amendment grounds based on the rights of the owner: the law can't force someone to make a product he would not support the message of. Currently, there might only be some ordinance that bans mask policies in Texas, but it is dubious if that might be even an enforceable order from the Texas governor - Especially since OSHA just made adjustments to standards and mandates on the federal level - which include adjustments to respiratory protection fields. | It is mandatory for the employer to provide sufficient restrooms (“cabinets d'aisance”), as per article R4228-10. Other provisions regulate evacuation, ventilation, heating, disabled access, etc. There is no provision regarding when employees are permitted to use the restrooms. There can't be a single rule that works for every profession: some jobs don't let you leave your post whenever you like (e.g. machine operator, driver, guard, teacher, etc.). The most common dispute regarding restroom use is whether employees should be paid during that time. Some employers want to count restroom use as unpaid pause time. Strictly speaking, that's legal: an employee who is in a restroom is not at the employer's disposal, therefore this doesn't count as work time. However enforcing this is often logistically difficult and wildly unpopular, so in practice it's only done in places where employees must clock out to reach a restroom. I could only find one case with actual jurisprudence. In 1995, an industrial butchering company (Bigard) decided to limit restroom breaks to three fixed times a day. This was, as you might expect, unpopular; the employees went on strike, and eventually the labor court struck down this measure. That's a precedent, but it doesn't seem to have made its way to the appellate court. Your case is also slightly different in that the restrooms would only be inaccessible for an hour, which is shorter than in the Bigard case. So legally speaking, it isn't clear who will win. You'll have a better chance of success by banking on the unpopularity of the measure. Talk with your colleagues and your representatives and shop stewards. Point out that employees who are trying to hold it in are unlikely to be at the top of their productivity. | Is this legal? Yes Or does it mean that employee will be in breach of his/her contract? Yes You are assuming that if the evidence is allowed to be presented then that automatically means that keeping it for that purpose is not a breach of the contract. This is not necessarily so; it can be both at the same time. That said, it is unlikely that an employer would attempt to sanction an employee for this as the courts would (rightly) see it as an attempt to pervert the course of justice. As in most things in the law it is possible for all parties in a matter to be on the wrong side of it. If you want to come to the tribunal with "clean hands" then the best thing to do is make a record (not a copy) of the relevant documents and return then to the employer. Before going to the tribunal get your solicitor to subpoena the documents that you want - they will have to produce them and you have them without breaking your contract. |
Can my school force me to use applications or a school-issued computer if I do not agree with the terms of use for that application? Can my school force me to use applications or a school-issued computer if I do not agree with the terms of use for that application? I do not trust most of the applications that my school requires me to use because of the way that they handle my data, so I am wondering if they are allowed to force me to use those applications or if they are required supply me with ways to do the assignments in the ways that I agree with (paper and pencil or applications that do not share my data). Legal Residence: Pennsylvania, United States of America Age and Grade: 8th Grade (I am 13 years old so I believe that COPPA does not apply to me anymore. ) | You're under 18, so you're viewed as a minor under the law, and as such, you can't agree to and sign legally binding contracts. The TOS for the applications are agreed to by your parents by default, because your parents are responsible for you and have no choice in parental guardian-type duties, such as education. Agreeing to the software TOSs may also be done for all student users by the school with their software site license(s) and under an agreement with your parents; ask for and read any written policies the school has. And, you don't have a say in data handling at your school; that will be another school policy for data and network security, and hopefully a policy exists. If a policy exists, it will set by the school board and it will respect a variety of local, state and federal laws. That said, you can approach the school board and outline your concerns and ask to take tests and assignments with pencil and paper. But they are not obligated to change policies for you or make accommodations, other than established accommodations required by law, such as under the ADA act. Once you're 18, you can fight the power. Until then, you're a minor. | Is it legal? Yes. You can make just about any payment arrangements you like. You wouldn't be able to verify compliance, though, without some connection to the student's employer. The IRS won't tell you how much money a third party earned, or how much tax they paid, in a given year. Pretty sure they can't provide that info, which is why companies wanting to verify your income ask for copies of your tax returns rather than permission to get those returns. | This is more than a comment (too long), but not a definitive answer (since I am unfamiliar with the laws regarding this kind of thing). Please forgive me. First, there are some technical misunderstandings. They are not disabling SSL/TLS. Instead, they are inserting themselves in between these connections so they can make sure you aren't accessing material you are not allowed to access. They may actually be required to do this by law. Here is how it works. Typically when you connect to, say Google.com, you are given a certificate from Google.com that has a trusted chain all the way up to some trusted root. That trusted root is explicitly trusted by your web browser manufacturer. In order to be able to inspect these sorts of connections, security appliances will actually replace the certificate provided by Google.com with one that the appliance provides. It has to pretend to be Google.com so your browser doesn't freak out. The problem is, this certificate is no longer has a trusted chain to something that the browser manufacturer trusts. It is provided by the security appliance. So often, the appliance will have a root certificate that the administrators of the system must install on every machine they control. Then the browsers on these machines will not complain that the certificate is invalid. Obviously, you are getting the error on your own machine because you have not allowed the administrator to install these certificates on your machine. Nor should you. You should definitely not allow your school's network administrator to install these certificates on your personal computer. You say that "leaves people's private data being transferred over the school network (such as private e-mail, logins) unsecured and open to packet sniffing". This is not true. Any HTTPS website you visit is encrypted between your computer and the security monitoring appliance using the pretend certificate I mentioned above. Typically then, the traffic is decrypted and inspected by the appliance. Then it is re-encrypted using the real certificate, before being pushed out onto the internet. So, only at the security appliance is data turned back into the clear, only to be protected again before going out to the internet. So, is this illegal? Well, I think you would agree that definitely on the computers that your school owns, they can do anything they want with them. The computers belong to them. Furthermore, the network belongs to them. Likely you signed an agreement (or agree to it each time you connect) that they are allowed to monitor your usage of their computers and their network. This includes when connecting your personal machine to their network. | In South Africa. the duty of care in regards to children and the schools they attend only begins when the child enters the classroom for the first time. All parents are advised that, in the case of primary school children, it is not sufficient to drop young kids of at school. Parents must take them to their specific classroom. The duty to care officially ends when the school day ends. For primary school children that is 13-15 and for highschool children that is 13-45. Teachers are expected to work until 16-00, but the legal obligation for children to attend school ends when the school day ends. A lot of schools don't transport children anymore and have blanket policies of parents being responsible to take children to any extra mural events outside the school. It has just become increasingly harder to ensure children's safety, and many schools are uncomfortable with the liability it creates. The duty of care can be extended to schools who have hostels. In this case, hostel parents take up the role of parents. | Under Fed. R. Civ. P. One can be served according to the state law or: (2) doing any of the following: (A) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual personally; (B) leaving a copy of each at the individual’s dwelling or usual place of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there; or (C) delivering a copy of each to an agent authorized None of those would apply to your facts. Thus you would have to find some jurisdiction that would allow service of process under your fact. I dare say that none will and that due process would come into play. In NJ, due process applies and service may be made (1) Upon a competent individual of the age of 14 or over, by delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to the individual personally, or by leaving a copy thereof at the individual's dwelling place or usual place of abode with a competent member of the household of the age of 14 or over then residing therein, or by delivering a copy thereof to a person authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process on the individual's behalf; It has to be the current place of abode. | You are absolutely allowed to discuss or describe or criticizes software (or books or other copyrighted or trademarked things) without any permission from the copyright holder or trademark holder. This includes teaching people how to use those things. You may not, however, copy protected software without permission. For example you could not include a CD with a copy of Windows 10 as part of a course you taught on using Windows 10, without permission from Microsoft. Also, you may not use a trademark in such a way as to imply that your course is approved or endorsed by the trade mark holder, or by the maker of the trademarked item. If reasonable people could think that your Windows course was approved by Microsoft, you are probably infringing their trademark. Use of screenshots is more of a grey area. Such use, for purposes of teaching or of commentary, is probably covered by fair use (in the US) or fair dealing (in any of several other countries). But that is always a case-by-case determination, and depends on the exact facts, such as how extensive the use is, and whether it in any way harms the market for the original. If in doubt consulting a lawyer experienced in IP issues is wise. But aside from the issues of screenshots, the makers or copyright or trademark holders of software have no right to grant or withhold permission to one who teaches about the softrware, nor to demand any fee from any such person. | I'm pretty sure in France you have moral rights and copyrights. I am writing from New Zealand, but we have some similar intellectual property laws due to being member countries of the World Intellectual Property Organisation. We are also both member countries of the World Trade Organisation (WTO has the TRIPS agreement which relates to IP). So my answer may or may not be right – check what it says in France's copyright acts: you should be able to search for terms like first owner, and moral rights, films/videos, etc. The school isn't your employer, and so the basic rule is that you as the author are automatically the first owner. Since you're not really at school to create anything or research for the school, I don't think the court would enforce a blanket term that you had to agree to that the school owns intellectual property in what you create. You probably own the copyright. You also have moral rights in what you have created, which means even if the school does own the copyright in your work, you can request they attribute it to you if they show it in public (online). Not all works have moral rights. However, in NZ if you create a film/video you do have moral rights in it. | There are two senses in which this action might be "against the law". One is that it violates some specific (statutory) law, the other is that it violates some common-law principle especially pertaining to contracts. We can quickly dispose of the possibility that you have violated a statutory law: there is nowhere in the US where you are compelled by law to do anything about foreign language classes (take, avoid, pass, whatever). Your university has the right to establish and enforce whatever requirements it deems proper for awarding degrees and credits, and has the legal power to act broadly in providing an education. Let's say that they have stated a requirement that everybody must take 2 quarters of some foreign language, then if you don't do that, they are entitled to withhold the degree from you. Whereas, if you had satisfied all of the requirements for the degree, then they could not arbitrarily withhold the degree -- it is now a thing that you have a property right to. Just as the university has the right to impose requirements (with appropriate advance notice), they also have the right to suspend requirements, generally or according to circumstances (as long as it is not arbitrary). A typical actual example is "that class hasn't been taught for 3 years". In this case, the requirement was not suspended, but an agent of the university acting within the scope of their appointment judged that the requirement had already been satisfied in your case. The university administration might not actually approve of the professor's choice and might change their rules or sanction the professor (at my university this was common practice, albeit never officially sanctioned), but it is the sort of thing that is within the scope of the professor's job (to judge that you have satisfied the "bottom-line" requirements of the course). Since there was no wrong-doing on your part and you acted in a good faith belief that the professor's actions were "allowed", then the university would be buying itself a pile of legal trouble if it were to rescind your degree. |
Can a Last Will legally specify beneficiaries at a specified url? Can a Last Will legally specify beneficiaries in an external document? For example, can the Last Will point to a url that shows a list of beneficiaries? | This is a close call, in the example that you suggest, because it won't have been executed with the proper formalities and it isn't clear that the content at a url would be fixed in its language at the time that the Will is executed. Subject to an exception for personal property memorandums (and a more subtle one for powers of appointment in trusts) you can't change the terms of a Will once it is signed except by a Codicil executed with the same formalities. Certainly, the best practice would be to assume that the answer is no. There are times when a reference to an external document in a will is allowed (e.g. a reference to real property by address rather than a full legal description found in a recorded deed), but a list of beneficiaries would ordinarily not be allowed unless it was effectively a reference to vital statistics records (e.g. "all children born to or adopted by me.") In general, references to external documents are not allowed when used to establish the nature of the testator's donative intent (a "testator" is someone who writes a will), unless it "describes the writing sufficiently to permit its identification" and can't be modified after the Will is signed, but can be used to establish general facts about reality. One exception in Colorado is that a "personal property memorandum" designating who will receive specific items of tangible personal property can be incorporated by reference and does not have to be executed with the same formalities as a will. It isn't clear to me if a url could be a valid personal property memorandum and that issue has never been tested in Colorado. Colorado's probate laws are based on the Uniform Probate Code and would be substantially identical to any other jurisdiction that adopted the Uniform Probate Code's substantive provisions. The primary statutes governing this (which aren't necessarily easy to understand without context) are: Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-502. Execution--witnessed or notarized wills--holographic wills (1) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2) of this section and in sections 15-11-503, 15-11-506, and 15-11-513, a will shall be: (a) In writing; (b) Signed by the testator, or in the testator's name by some other individual in the testator's conscious presence and by the testator's direction; and (c) Either: (I) Signed by at least two individuals, either prior to or after the testator's death, each of whom signed within a reasonable time after he or she witnessed either the testator's signing of the will as described in paragraph (b) of this subsection (1) or the testator's acknowledgment of that signature or acknowledgment of the will; or (II) Acknowledged by the testator before a notary public or other individual authorized by law to take acknowledgments. (2) A will that does not comply with subsection (1) of this section is valid as a holographic will, whether or not witnessed, if the signature and material portions of the document are in the testator's handwriting. (3) Intent that the document constitute the testator's will can be established by extrinsic evidence, including, for holographic wills, portions of the document that are not in the testator's handwriting. (4) For purposes of this section, “conscious presence” requires physical proximity to the testator but not necessarily within testator's line of sight. (5) For purposes of this part 5, “will” does not include a designated beneficiary agreement that is executed pursuant to article 22 of this title. and Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-503. Writings intended as wills (1) Although a document, or writing added upon a document, was not executed in compliance with section 15-11-502, the document or writing is treated as if it had been executed in compliance with that section if the proponent of the document or writing establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent intended the document or writing to constitute: (a) The decedent's will; (b) A partial or complete revocation of the will; (c) An addition to or an alteration of the will; or (d) A partial or complete revival of the decedent's formerly revoked will or a formerly revoked portion of the will. (2) Subsection (1) of this section shall apply only if the document is signed or acknowledged by the decedent as his or her will or if it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent erroneously signed a document intended to be the will of the decedent's spouse. (3) Whether a document or writing is treated under this section as if it had been executed in compliance with section 15-11-502 is a question of law to be decided by the court, in formal proceedings, and is not a question of fact for a jury to decide. (4) Subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to a designated beneficiary agreement under article 22 of this title. and Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-510. Incorporation by reference A writing in existence when a will is executed may be incorporated by reference if the language of the will manifests this intent and describes the writing sufficiently to permit its identification. and Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-511. Testamentary additions to trusts (1) A will may validly devise property to the trustee of a trust established or to be established (i) during the testator's lifetime by the testator, by the testator and some other person, or by some other person, including a funded or unfunded life insurance trust, although the settlor has reserved any or all rights of ownership of the insurance contracts, or (ii) at the testator's death by the testator's devise to the trustee, if the trust is identified in the testator's will and its terms are set forth in a written instrument, other than a will, executed before, concurrently with, or after the execution of the testator's will or in another individual's will if that other individual has predeceased the testator, regardless of the existence, size, or character of the corpus of the trust. The devise is not invalid because the trust is amendable or revocable, or because the trust was amended after the execution of the will or the testator's death. (2) Unless the testator's will provides otherwise, property devised to a trust described in subsection (1) of this section is not held under a testamentary trust of the testator, but it becomes a part of the trust to which it is devised, and is administered and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the governing instrument setting forth the terms of the trust, including any amendments thereto made before or after the testator's death. (3) A revocation or termination of the trust before the death of the testator causes the devise to lapse, but exhaustion of trust corpus between the time of execution of the testator's will and the testator's death shall not constitute a lapse; a revocation or termination of the trust before the death of the testator shall not cause the devise to lapse, if the testator provides that, in such event, the devise shall constitute a devise to the trustee of the trust identified in the testator's will, and on the terms thereof, as they existed at the time of the execution of testator's will, or as they existed at the time of the revocation or termination of the trust, as the testator's will provides. and Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-512. Events of independent significance A will may dispose of property by reference to acts and events that have significance apart from their effect upon the dispositions made by the will, whether they occur before or after the execution of the will or before or after the testator's death. The execution or revocation of another individual's will is such an event. and Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-513. Separate writing or memorandum identifying devise of certain types of tangible personal property Whether or not the provisions relating to holographic wills apply, a will may refer to a written statement or list to dispose of items of tangible personal property not otherwise specifically disposed of by the will, other than money. To be admissible under this section as evidence of the intended disposition, the writing shall be either in the handwriting of the testator or be signed by the testator and shall describe the items and the devisees with reasonable certainty. The writing may be referred to as one to be in existence at the time of the testator's death; it may be prepared before or after the execution of the will; it may be altered by the testator after its preparation; and it may be a writing that has no significance apart from its effect on the dispositions made by the will. There is not a statutory definition of a "document" or a "writing" in the Colorado Probate Code. | Transfer of title must eventually occur, otherwise the property was never willed to another because the willing of the property is perpetually incomplete. One can place conditions on the transfer of title, but those conditions cannot last forever. They can last quite long, but there is a rule against perpetuities, especially created due to clauses constraining the transfer of of title in wills. This rule applies to a person who is transferring title, with a conditional clause that bars the full use of the property. If such a clause is limited, then it does not exist in perpetuity. The rule specifically addressed the will's call to reassign title if the transfer's clauses were violated. The maximum limitation historically was the lifetime of some person alive when the will was executed, plus 21 years, to permit an unborn grandchild to inherit. The reason this rule came about was due to the will of Henry Frederick Howard, the Earl of Arundel and Surrey. It effectively left the dead Earl managing his estates after his death, shifting properties that were bequeathed, based on the possibility of a "more suitable" heir being born after the Earl's death. This will eventually created the most complicated bit of common law that exists to date. In my totally amatuer attempt to summarize it; it is a combination of at least two ideas: a "dead hand" (deceased person) cannot guide the activities of the living forever transfer of property (title) must eventually be fully transferred Exceptions to the rule exist for conditional transfer of title back to the person who originally owned the property, but these exceptions cannot apply when the transfer is to a third party. This clause in Evan's will, "If the state violates this clause, the property is to return to the heirs of the estate of Evan Carroll." would only be enforceable for a limited amount of time. First, the Estate of a dead Evan Carroll is not a lasting entity, eventually his estate would be closed. Finally, the transfer to the "heirs" of Evan Carroll would be a transfer to a third party, subject to the rule. Some states interpret their protections against the rule in different ways; but, nearly all states that have revoked the rule have done so by making a new rule (often with easier to manage time limits). A handful claim to have revoked the rule; but, they use other legal approaches to prevent this problem from occurring. Texas has extended the rule to 300 years while New South Wales, puts the limit at 80 years. Texas's extension seemed to be primarily to permit trust funds to operate legally long after the person establishing it had died. Consider what happens if such a rule doesn't exist. The title of the property could never be fully transferred, because the clause could never be proven to not have been violated. This would dramatically devalue the property, and clog the courts with suits claiming property held by one family for 100 years isn't theirs because of some evidence just uncovered about what happened 60 years ago. It also would massively complicate the selling of the property, because a clean title could never be proven. Note that this rule would have no bearing on a covenants not tied to the property's transfer of title. This rule even made it into a recent Disney case, which is explained far better than I can by the Legal Eagle, Devin James Stone | In Civil law jurisdictions, the heir of a deceased person will generally inherit all the possessions, rights and obligations - this may include debts. So if a borrower passes away, the lender will typicall find out who is the heir, and ask them to pay. The heir will be required to pay, and the creditor can use the usual channels (reminders, collection agencies, court judgements) to make them pay. However, if the inheritance is "under water" (has more debts than assets), there are ways to avoid having to pay the debts: In Civil law jurisdictions, acceptance of an inheritance usually means being liable for all the debts, too. Details vary between jurisdictions - in Germany, for example, acceptance of an inheritance is automatic, and a heir must file a document to refuse it (this is called disclaiming the inheritance). In France, in contrast, the default is to disclaim the heritage, but certain interested parties (such as creditors) can require a heir to formally make a choice, then the default is acceptance (https://www.service-public.fr/particuliers/vosdroits/F1199). In contrast, in the United States (which generally uses Common law), creditors are paid first, and the heirs only inherit what is left, in a process called probate. In that case, a heir need not explicitly disclaim an inheritance that is "under water" - they will simply not inherit anything. Note that the heir may choose to inherit certain debts in exchange for keeping certain assets - for example, if a home with a mortage is part of the inheritance, the heir may either choose to sell the home and pay the mortage, or keep the home and accept the mortage as debt. Notes: Even if inheritance is not automatic, the system usually allows a heir to disclaim it. There are other reasons for disclaiming an inheritance apart from debts, for example tax advantages, or the desire to grant the inheritance to a different relative. If a heir disclaims the inheritance, no matter the reason, the inheritance automatically passes to the next heir in line. If all potential heirs disclaim in turn (as would typically happen if the inheritance has more debt than assets), the inheritance will usually fall to the state. Then, the assets will be divided up among the creditors (similar to insolvency proceedings). As an exception to the rule above, the state does not have to pay outstanding debts - so that money would be lost for the creditors. | I skimmed the text of the act and didn't see anything about expiration, so that suggests that it doesn't expire. Normally such a provision would be prominent near the beginning or end. | The law often provides a default which a contract can modify. For example, the law might provide that a lease can be terminated on 30 days notice, but the parties could agree on a different notice period, which would control. But a contract cannot be for an illegal result (or if it is, it will not be enforced by a court). Nor can a contract modify positive legal provisions which are specified as absolute. For example in some US states a consumer sale includes an implied warranted of merchantability, and this cannot be waived or modified by contract. Or the law in some cases gives a period, perhaps three days, within which a party has a right to cancel without penalty. This generally cannot be shortened by contract. There are various reasons why laws provide terms which a contract may not overrule. In many cases it is because one party is perceived as being in a stronger position and might be inclined to take unfair advantage. This is the case with much consumer protection legislation. In other cases it is to society's advantage if there are uniform terms and standards known to all, which cannot be varied by contract, so third parties do not need to check for contract terms. For example, US copyrights always expire on the last day of a year, and no contract can modify this. For another example banking law specifies the position and format of account numbers and routing numbers on a check, and a customer may not contract with a bank for a different format. I do not know if the EU refund law provides a default which can be modified, or an absolute rule which cannot. | The GDPR does not set fixed retention periods. Instead, it says data may not be kept for longer than necessary. What is necessary depends very much on the specific context of the processing activity, in particular on the purpose of processing. The GDPR allows retention for as long as necessary. For example, businesses (including financial institutions) are required to keep financial records. This requirement stems from EU member state law, which also sets specific retention periods. If a business wants to keep personal data in financial records for longer than this retention period, they can't just point to the law to authorize this processing – they must instead find a different purpose why they need to keep the data, and then find a suitable Art 6 legal basis. In some cases, retention periods might not be coupled to a fixed duration, but to certain events. For example, personal data for online accounts should typically be kept until the account is closed, which is potentially indefinite. This follows directly from the GDPR approach of limiting data storage by necessity, not by duration. All processing needs a clear purpose + a legal basis. In the context of a genealogy site, the site should analyze carefully what data they collect for what purposes. These purposes might enable potentially unlimited retention. But such processing must also be covered by a legal basis, and I doubt that the site would have a legal basis to make such storage irrevocable. If the data is collected based on Art 6(1)(a) consent, then the data can only be used as consented to, and consent can always be withdrawn in the future. If the data is collected based on Art 6(1)(b) necessity for performance of a contract, then the data can be used for compatible purposes in the sense of Art 6(4), but that would require a new legal basis (e.g. legitimate interest). If the data is collected based on Art 6(1)(f) legitimate interest, then the data can be used for Art 6(4) compatible purposes but the data subject has the Art 21 right to object to processing. While a genealogy site may have a legitimate interest in keeping supplied data in order to use it for future research, I think this is a fairly weak legitimate interest that can be easily overridden by an Art 21 objection, which in turn could require Art 17 erasure of the data. The genealogy site should also keep in mind principles like data minimisation and data protection by design and by default, so just keeping data for the off chance that it might be useful in the future is not GDPR-compliant. Data can only be collected and processed for “specified, explicit, and legitimate purposes”. The Art 89 privilege for research purposes also imposes conditions. There is a pretty big carveout in these GDPR requirements for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes, and statistical purposes. Specific rules for this exemption are given in Art 89 GDPR. The main value of this exemption is that Art 89 research purposes are always considered compatible with the purpose for which the data was originally collected (cf Art 5(1)(b)), though this might not cover data that was collected under the legal basis of consent (cf Art 6(4)). Other GDPR rules stay intact, and Art 89(1) imposes extra steps to consider: Special attention MUST be given to the data minimisation principle. If the research purpose can be achieved without identifiable data, the data MUST be anonymized. If the research purpose can be achieved with pseudonymized data, pseudonymization MUST be used. Appropriate safeguards MUST be implemented (though this just re-iterates the general requirement in Art 24). In some cases, the research purpose stands in conflict with data subject rights like the right to be informed or the right to object. If so, EU or member state law can provide exemptions from the data subject rights, but can also impose further conditions or safeguards. It is not possible to rely on the Art 89 exception without taking member state law into account. Art 89 does not modify necessity-based retention. Now on to the main question: how long can the personal data be kept for research purposes? While Art 89 research purposes allow us to extend the retention period because we have a new and compatible purpose of processing, it does not affect the general principle that data may only be kept as long as necessary for that purpose. In a scientific context, it would be common to preserve many data sets indefinitely for the purpose of enabling reproducibility of the scientific findings. A privately-run genealogy service might not benefit from Art 89. This “research” angle doesn't seem to be a good fit for a genealogy site. Such a site would typically not be collecting personal data for specific research purposes. At best, it would be operating as an archive of personal data which can be mined by future generations of researchers. But the GDPR specifically only considers archiving purposes in the public interest, which might not cover privately run archives. Archives rely on specific privileges in national laws, and severely restrict access to the information. For example, I'm leafing through the law on public archives in a German state. It forbids access for 10–100 years, depending on the date of death of the data subject and on the age of the documents. This leads me to believe that a privately run genealogy site cannot reasonably rely on the Art 89 exemption, and must instead rely on an ordinary processing purpose + corresponding Art 6 legal basis. This doesn't directly prevent indefinite storage, but means that it will be easy for a data subject to invoke their right to erasure. It is not quite enough to say “we will keep the data indefinitely”, it is also necessary to have a clear purpose for this retention. | If this is Florida, then a will has to be written. If there is no written will, the estate falls under the law of intestate succession, part 1. Per § 732.502, every will must be in writing, signed, and witnessed (therefore a voice mail is not a will). If there are any relatives, they may be entitled to a share; otherwise, the estate goes to the state, where it is sold and the funds go into the state school fund (§732.107). | Yes. The formation of a contract requires (among other things) that the parties intend to be legally bound. Their sending the offer from a corporate email address shows this. You replying in the same way shows your intention. Signatures are optional. Consider, verbal contracts are binding; how do you sign those? |
Submitting list of forbidden words How can I submit a list of forbidden words and paying for it to make it officially forbidden for anyone to talk about it to me directly? This could help people suffering from an injury. | You can't. In order for an action to be enforceably prohibited for everybody, there has to be a law to that effect, enacted by the government. Your local legislature will not make it a crime to discuss peanut butter, generally or specifically with you. In some countries, such as the US, such a law would be unconstitutional. Your only hope is to offer something of value to others, subject to the condition that they not discuss peanut butter with you. For example, you offer every person $1 million if they refrain from discussing peanut butter with you. But you should get a lawyer to draft this agreement, since maybe you want them to also refrain from discussing peanut butter in your presence. Also, the contract needs to have a clause where you are forced to pay out (is this a lifetime restriction – whose lifetime?). This might motivate people to not discuss peanut butter with you, but not everybody will care about the putative reward. Also, there are billions of potential claimants out there, so you need a really big escrow account. | The part about "If I'm the owner of the content, surely I have the right to request its deletion" is the problem. Sure, you have the right to request, but you can't legally compel. You have an agreement with them, according to which you got something, and they got something. You can't then take back the thing that you gave them, which is permission to use. You didn't give them the IP itself, which you still hold. Here's an analogy. You may own a car, and can give a person permission to use the car (let's say "if you bring me back a pound of cheese from the store"). You cannot later change your mind (especially after you've gotten the cheese) a say that you retract that permission and therefore they actually stole your car. When permission to use is given, as long as the conditions for granting permission are satisfied, you can't un-give permission. | It is mandatory for the employer to provide sufficient restrooms (“cabinets d'aisance”), as per article R4228-10. Other provisions regulate evacuation, ventilation, heating, disabled access, etc. There is no provision regarding when employees are permitted to use the restrooms. There can't be a single rule that works for every profession: some jobs don't let you leave your post whenever you like (e.g. machine operator, driver, guard, teacher, etc.). The most common dispute regarding restroom use is whether employees should be paid during that time. Some employers want to count restroom use as unpaid pause time. Strictly speaking, that's legal: an employee who is in a restroom is not at the employer's disposal, therefore this doesn't count as work time. However enforcing this is often logistically difficult and wildly unpopular, so in practice it's only done in places where employees must clock out to reach a restroom. I could only find one case with actual jurisprudence. In 1995, an industrial butchering company (Bigard) decided to limit restroom breaks to three fixed times a day. This was, as you might expect, unpopular; the employees went on strike, and eventually the labor court struck down this measure. That's a precedent, but it doesn't seem to have made its way to the appellate court. Your case is also slightly different in that the restrooms would only be inaccessible for an hour, which is shorter than in the Bigard case. So legally speaking, it isn't clear who will win. You'll have a better chance of success by banking on the unpopularity of the measure. Talk with your colleagues and your representatives and shop stewards. Point out that employees who are trying to hold it in are unlikely to be at the top of their productivity. | I think that the language In consideration of permission to use, ... Recreational Sports Department ... arising from, but not limited to, participation in activities, classes, observation, and use of facilities, premises, or equipment. would be read as limiting the waiver to cases in some way connected with the RSF. Even so limited it is rather broad, and may not be enforceable. In particular public facilities are not always allowed to obtain a waiver of otherwise valid negligence claims. If it were interpreted to mean "all claims on any matter, even ones having nothing at all to do with the RSF" then I think it would be so broad as to be unenforceable as unconscionable, and as misleading, so that there was no meeting of minds. | What can I do to prevent someone from leaving me something in their will? Nothing. Allowing other people to legally change someone's will defeats the purpose of a will: To express the writer's last wishes. (That is why the full title is a "Last Will & Testament"). Do I have to take responsibility for things left to me in a will or are there other options? No! You do not have to accept an inheritance. The legal process for rejecting an inheritance is called "disclaiming." It happens often enough that there are plenty of nice summaries of the process on-line. Your next step should probably be to read one of them. | I'm assuming you are talking about something like this You didn't specify where you live, but in many places it is illegal to block the sidewalk with a car. I just looked up my local ordinances and it is there. In fact, it is your driveway, but often the land up to and including the sidewalk is considered part of a public easement. Typically you are required by law to maintain any grass in the easement, but if the sidewalk were to fall into disrepair, the local government would fix it. Information on easements can also be found in your local ordinances, here is an example in my area. Should I fight this ticket? You can try, but I doubt you will win. Is there anything I can do to my driveway to allow me to actually use it? I would suggest asking on Lifehacks. And post a link here to your question if you do, I'd be curious to know what they come up with. | It seems to be violating IPC §375 Having sex is only the first half of the check. The other is the enumerated list 1-7 that describes pretty much circumstances of no consent. Among them are (1) Against her will. (2) Without her consent. (3) With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her or any person in whom she is interested, in fear of death or of hurt. There are two prongs here: You can argue that the consent wasn't properly given because it was given out of fear of coming injury (IPC §90), or it was given but for a fear of hurt coming from the eviction. In either case, the description demanded can be fulfilled: no-consent theory Being homeless directly leads to physical harm of the body, destruction or loss of property and reputation, and as such is an injury as defined in the IPC. As such, the threat of eviction is a threat of injury. Consent isn't present if the reason for a person to comply with a demand is fear of such an injury. As such, there is no consent as required by IPC §375 (2), and so it is rape. In the alternative, it is forced against the will, and thus violates IPC §375 (1). harm theory Being made homeless is directly harming any person in body and mind. Having obtained consent from a threat of harm to the person or close person, it is violating IPC §375 (3), and as a result is rape. | This is unlawful sex discrimination In fact, its incredibly close to the example given on this website: A nightclub allows women in for free but you have to pay because you’re a man. This is unlawful discrimination because of your sex. How do they get away with it? Did you complain or report them? No? That’s how. |
When and how is service by publication valid? Sometimes a prospective defendant cannot be served because s/he is out of the country, or just plain is in hiding. In that case, a judge will sometimes allow service by publication. That is, after publication of the charges, the defendant will have been deemed to have been served. Under what specific circumstances is this allowed? If the defendant is represented by a lawyer who has answered for the defendant in other aspects of the case, can service be effected just by notifying the lawyer? After all, the defendant engaged the lawyer who (presumably) knows how to reach him or her. Or is this covered by attorney client privilege? | Preface: Why Is Service Necessary? A court order is not binding with respect to a person unless the court in question had jurisdiction over that person, or their predecessor-in-interest (or sometimes someone with a relationship with that person known as "privity"). To obtain jurisdiction over a person, the court must be a forum that is capable of exerting jurisdiction over that person with respect to this particular case, and there must have been service of process upon that person by an acceptable means. In order to obtain a valid court order against a person that makes that person personally responsible for money judgment, or orders them to do something or to refrain from doing something that is not simply with respect to a particular piece of property (i.e. in an in personam action), there must be either personal service (i.e. hand delivery of legal papers to the person), or substituted service (e.g. hand delivery to an adult family member in the same household, hand delivery to an employer, service by mail or email or text message when authorized by a court, etc.). Substituted service is generally not valid for service of a subpoena, only personal service will do in that case. A person can waive service of process by delivering a signed waiver to the person seeking process, or by filing certain kinds of documents with the court in which the lawsuit is pending. Service by publication is only allowed in actions that are in rem or quasi-in-rem, as opposed to in personam. Only Actions In Rem or Quasi-In-Rem Service by publication is only effective with respect to actions in rem, which is to say regarding rights with respect identified property and the relief granted with respect to that defendant is limited to relief in rem, i.e. with regard to rights in that property, or quasi-in-rem (as explained below). For example, no money judgment against the defendant can be entered on the basis of service by publication alone, although service by publication can bar a claim for money damages by the defendant to be satisfied out of the property at issue in the action, such as the assets of a probate or bankruptcy estate. Common in rem actions including evictions (limited to termination of right to possession and not a money judgment for rent owed), replevin (a suit to regain physical possession of tangible personal property), quiet title, foreclosure, civil forfeiture, probate proceedings, bankruptcy cases, and claims processes for failed banking institutions or corporations outside the bankruptcy process (e.g. FDIC resolutions of claims of failed banks). For this purpose, a suit regarding the the existence of or termination of a marriage or family relationship is in rem, although no in personam obligations or liabilities such as a child support judgment or a protection order can be imposed in such an action. For example, this is done in adoption proceedings, in certain guardianship and conservatorship proceedings, in divorces where the other spouse cannot be found, and in determinations of death due to prolonged absence or other circumstances where the death cannot be confirmed. A lawsuit supported by "quasi-in-rem" jurisdiction, if a lawsuit is one that would normally require personal service of process or substitute service of process for the court to obtain jurisdiction, is permitted when any relief is limited to recover from specific property over which the court can claim jurisdiction. As Wikipedia explains at the link: On June 24, 1977, in the case of Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, the Supreme Court of the United States decided that the requirement that the circumstances giving rise to jurisdiction comply with the notion of "fair play and substantial justice" should apply to the quasi in rem jurisdiction questions. The Supreme Court significantly diminished the utility of the quasi in rem jurisdiction because if the case meets the minimum contacts, fair play and substantial justice tests, the action can be brought under the in personam jurisdiction. Quasi in rem jurisdiction, however, can still be an effective option to bring the lawsuit to a particular court because quasi in rem jurisdiction allows litigants to overcome limitations of the long-arm statute of a particular state. Thus under Schaffer v. Heitner, quasi-in-rem jurisdiction is basically only allowed when the court could have had personal jurisdiction over the case if the defendant had been personally served with process, but it is not feasible to serve the defendant with process, and publication (often together with service by mail to the defendant's last known address and the addresses of people like a former attorney or family member with a relationship to the defendant) is reasonably calculated to give actual notice to the defendant. For example, suppose that someone who owns real estate in Maine gets in a car accident in Maine, and the defendant who lives in China cannot be served with process despite duly diligent attempts to do so. If a process server in China had served the defendant with process, he would have been subject to the jurisdiction of a court in Maine where the lawsuit was filed because the accident that gives rise to the liability took place in Maine. Therefore, a court might assert quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over the defendant with relief limited to the real property in Maine (since a Maine court has jurisdiction over real estate in Maine). The court would then allow the injured victim plaintiff to serve the defendant with process via publication (in the county where the lawsuit is brought) and via mail to the defendant and known associates of the defendant such as a spouse and an employer and a former attorney of the defendant. If the defendant did not file an answer in the case by the deadline, a default judgment would enter against the defendant and an evidentiary damages hearing would be held ex parte (i.e. without anyone representing the defendant there). Then, based upon that hearing a judgment would be entered against the defendant by the court, with collection of the judgment limited to that parcel of real estate in Maine. The real estate could then be seized by the plaintiff in an execution sale conducted by the sheriff, to satisfy the judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for the damages caused by the car accident in Maine. There are two types of quasi in rem jurisdiction: 1) quasi in rem type 1 (QIM1); and 2) quasi in rem type 2 (QIM2). In QIM1, a plaintiff sues to secure a pre-existing claim in the subject property. For example, actions that seek quiet title against another's claim to the property. In QIM2, the plaintiff has no pre-existing claim in the subject property. That is, the property rights of the owner are not in dispute, but rather the plaintiff seeks the property so that they may satisfy a separate claim. For example, a person who walks across another's real property and falls into an open pit might have no pre-existing claim regarding the property, but may initiate a QIM2 action to redress his injury. The line between in rem and quasi-in-rem type one jurisdiction (e.g. in the context of a foreclosure or an eviction for unpaid rent or enforcement of a personal property security interest where the property is collateral) is obscure and often ignored in practice. Usually, "quasi-in-rem" jurisdiction refers to quasi-in-rem type 2 jurisdiction. Only Following Duly Diligent Efforts To Secure Personal Service Service by publication requires truthful statement from the person seeking it that a duly diligent effort has been made to locate and/or serve the defendant against whom it is to be effective in person. Service by publication is not effective against a known defendant who could have been served personally, unless the defendant had actual knowledge of the service by publication within a reasonable time before the service by publication is held against him or her. See, e.g. Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 491 (1988), In re Sheridan, 117 P.3d 39, 41 (Colo. App. 2004), and Estate of Russo v. Sunrise Healthcare Corp., 994 P.2d 491, 494 (Colo. App. 1999). In an action where there is a known defendant in an in rem action, service by U.S. mail to a last known address of the known defendant, rather than personal hand delivery of the process to the defendant, is often sufficient. Service Via An Attorney Is Only Sometimes Available If the defendant is represented by a lawyer who has answered for the defendant in other aspects of the case, can service be effected just by notifying the lawyer? This is allowed if the lawyer represents that person in that lawsuit. With only a handful of exceptions (where ex parte motions are allowed) everything filed in court in a case must be served upon every lawyer who has entered an appearance in the case (usually via E-filing these days, but historically, usually by mail). An attorney for someone is not an agent for service of process upon a defendant unless the process served is within the attorney's scope of representation, normally, as disclosed by a general entry of appearance by the attorney in that particular lawsuit (what constitutes a general entry of appearance is something of a technical issue). But, if service of process cannot be hand with due diligence upon a party represented by a lawyer in a related case, a court will often order "substituted service" upon the lawyer (and mail to the last known address of the client) rather than, or in addition to, service by publication. Service upon an attorney does not suffice to establish actual knowledge of service by publication for purposes of issue #2 above. Or is this covered by attorney client privilege? Often the attorney cannot be compelled to disclosure to location of the party represented by the attorney due to attorney-client privilege. But, attorney-client privilege is not directly relevant to whether service upon an attorney constitutes effective service upon the client. Effective Date Usually, service by publication is in a newspaper that has been determined by law to be sufficient to provide legal notice defined by statute, and it must be published every week for three to five weeks depending on the jurisdiction and circumstances, with the date of service deemed to be the date of the last publication. Default judgment can be obtained based upon service by publication only on the X days after service that would apply if there was personal service of process upon that person. Effect Of In Rem Judgment A judgment against a defendant in an in rem action, does not preclude the plaintiff from bringing a separate action against the same defendant, in personam, seeking money damages. But, the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the in rem action are not binding against the defendant in the subsequent in personam action and instead have effect only with respect to rights in the property at issue in the in rem action. For example, if you are evicted from real estate in an in rem action where there is service by publication, because you didn't pay the rent, you cannot be obligated to pay a money judgment for the rent unless you are served with personal service or substituted service in that lawsuit or a later lawsuit. And, if it is a later lawsuit, the court's finding in the eviction action that you didn't pay the rent as agreed is not binding against you except for the limited purpose that you are no longer allowed to be in possession of the real estate from which you were evicted and that you can't challenge the validity of the eviction in a counterclaim or collateral lawsuit. In other words, even if you later prove that you had actually paid the rent that was the basis of the eviction action in a later lawsuit, you are still evicted, because you lost the right to complain about being evicted when you didn't respond to the service by publication. | It's no fantastic legal source, and rules may vary in different countries, but from the Wikipedia article on Attorney client privilege: Lawyers may also breach the duty where they are defending themselves against disciplinary or legal proceedings. A client who initiates proceedings against a lawyer effectively waives rights to confidentiality. This is justified on grounds of procedural fairness—a lawyer unable to reveal information relating to the retainer would be unable to defend themselves against such action. In other words, if the client's lie is related to one of the lawyer's interests (for example, if the client sues the attorney for malpractice based on the advice he was given), the lawyer can break privilege on his own behalf, thus testifying that his client lied. As to the specific case you brought up, I would say that privilege wouldn't protect the client from the lawyer discussing things never brought up. In other words, we could force the attorney to testify, since one of two things is true: The attorney really did give him that advice, in which case the client has already voluntarily given up his right to confidentiality by describing what was said between them, or The lawyer never gave him that advice, and privilege wouldn't protect a conversation between the two that never transpired. | This appears to be covered by the Norway Criminal Procedures Code, of which an English version can be found here. Chapter 10 deals with witnesses. Here are some relevant sections: § 108. Unless otherwise provided by statute, every person summoned to attend as a witness is bound to do so and to give evidence before the court. There follow a number of exceptions (spousal privilege, attorney-client privilege, state secrets, etc). None of them seem to apply to your example. § 115. The court may decide that a witness who fails to attend or who leaves the place of sitting without a valid reason shall be brought before the same or a subsequent sitting of the court. In special cases the court may decide that a witness shall be detained in custody until he can be examined. § 128. Before the examination the president of the court shall admonish the witnesses to tell the whole truth without concealing anything. He shall inform the witnesses of the liability consequent on giving false evidence or making a false affirmation. § 137. If a witness refuses to give evidence after being ordered to do so by a legally enforceable court order, the court may by a new order decide that the witness shall be kept in custody until he fulfils his obligation. Nevertheless a witness may not be kept in custody for more than three months altogether in the same case or in another case relating to the same matter. So effectively, if the witness fails to show up voluntarily, he can be brought in forcibly. He can be ordered to testify, and if he refuses, he can be held in custody (probably a jail) for up to three months. However, the authority to compel testimony is limited to courts; the police cannot compel statements from witnesses. § 230. The police may take statements from suspected persons, witnesses and experts but may not order any person to make a statement. So in your example, it appears that the witnesses would be free to refuse to speak to the police. However, if the case came to trial, they could be ordered to testify, and could be held in custody if they refused. | If they have not filed before the publication, there will be no ability to later file in most of the world. In the U.S. there is a sort-of one year grace period to file after publication. You will not have a way to definitively know if there is an application pending until it publishes or issues. Normally an application publishes and is open for the public to see 18 months after the first priority filing. That applies to the rest of the world, but in the U.S. it is possible to opt-out of publication. In that case no one can see he application until the day it issues as a granted patent, if ever. If you are making, selling, offering for sale, using or importing an infringing process or product when a patent issues you could be sued for patent infringement. I do not see how this can be seen a "retroactive". As a practical matter, if you fold immediately upon the patent issuing it is unlikely you will end up with any liability. You can set a search in more than one search facility to trigger if a patent is issued to one of the known inventors or use with other criteria but this is not foolproof. Edited Of course your product could infringe any number of patents unrelated and unbeknownst to the party who published the software. That party not patenting has nothing to do with what others may have filed before they published. | There is, in most countries at least, no law requiring a business to treat a customer fairly. In general, a business may refuse to serve a would-be customer for any reason or none, provided that the reason is not membership in a protected class (racial, religious, ethnic, or sexual bias, mostly). Exactly which classes are protected depends on the local law (in the US, there can be such laws at all of federal, state, and municipal levels). If a customer is asked to leave and does not do so, s/he could be charged with defiant trespass (or local equivalent). More likely, security, or the police, could simply escort the customer out of the business, using as much force as is reasonably needed for that purpose. Unless there are grounds for action not mentioned, I see no basis for a successful suit by the customer. | A court can neither sue nor be sued as it is not a legal person. The state (read government) can be (subject to sovereign immunity) in its administrative arm (i.e. not the judicial or legislative branches). For your particular examples: A suit filed by a fired employee (e.g. a court stenographer), the court has no employees. Court stenographers et al are employed by the administrative branch - the person who gets sued is the Secretary of State for the Justice Department (or whatever they are called). A suit filed by a utility company for late payments for electricity, Utility companies are not the government even if 100% government owned (most are privately owned anyway) - companies are their own legal person. A suit against a postal service that failed to deliver and lost court documents, etc. I do not know what the legal status of the US Postal Service is - it is either part of a government department ora government owned corporation - see above. The court is impartial because it is constitutionally required to be - it doesn't care who the plaintiff or defendant are. | A court can have jurisdiction over property in rem without personal service upon all persons who may claim an interest in the property. Typically, this is done by providing some form of service (such as notice by mail) upon people who are known to have an interest in the property, and an alternative to service directed at an individual (such as notice by posting at the property, by publication of a notice in a public place, or by publication of a notice in a newspaper where the property is located). Civil forfeiture often involves this kind of indirect notice to unknown parties by publication. what would be the remedy where the Court ordered the property of the other persons to be sold, again without issuing service to said persons The ruling of the criminal court is not binding on people who were not served with process in the original action (either personally, if known, or by publication or some other similar means, if not known to the court) in another legal proceeding. But if a claim becomes moot, there may be not remedy available of a violation of one's rights. They could conceivably bring an action to quiet title, or the equivalent, or an action in replevin, which would not be bound by the Court's findings since the third-parties weren't a party to it, and an injunction on the sale could be sought in that case, if it wasn't too late. But, if the third-parties had actual notice of the pending criminal action, the better option would probably be to file a motion in the criminal action to intervene with respect to disposition of the property. Takings of property in the context of the criminal justice system are not "takings" in the 5th Amendment constitutional sense, for which an inverse condemnation action are available, although there is still a due process requirement, which isn't met without some effort to give potential known or unknown third-party claimants notice of the sale. If there was a court ordered sale, any claim would probably be against the proceeds of the sale, and not against a bona fide purchaser for value at a court ordered sale regularly conducted. Of course, this presumes that the property is not contraband (you can't make a legal claim to cocaine even if you own it). If the defendants did not give you notice of your ownership interest, and this resulted in you not being able to intervene in the criminal action, you could also sue the defendant for breaching duties owed to you as a fellow property owner of the property disposed of in the criminal action. Ultimately, this is not an enviable position to be in, and the likelihood of a court effectively destroying your property interest in the property subject to the criminal proceeding in a manner that there is no economically efficient remedy to address is significant. Some of the relevant case law is discussed at another answer I wrote on a related topic. See also this answer on civil forfeiture. One of the leading U.S. Constitutional law cases on the topic is Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) (“For intentional, as for negligent deprivations of property by state employees, the state's action is not complete until and unless it provides or refuses to provide a suitable post-deprivation remedy.”). | Any written communication is generally admissible Subject to all the normal rules for admissibility of course. For texts between you and a third party the major issue that springs to mind is relevance. As in, how are they relevant to the dispute between you and this man? If they are not, your lawyer should have objected to them on this basis, however, its too late now. I'm curious as to how he obtained these and whether it was done legally or not. Illegality will not affect their admissibility as the exclusionary rule doesn't apply to civil matters, however, it does speak to the gentleman's character. |
Counterparty fails to respond to discovery, should I make another pleading or object at trial? I have a civil trial coming up. I have been accused of speeding in a motor vehicle and plan to defend myself against this false charge. I made a motion for discovery which was for very basic information about the event, essentially a description of how the trooper determined that I was speeding. The court granted my motion and the trooper has received it and signed for it, however the trooper did not provide me with a description of his method and, in fact, told me during a pre-trial conference that he would not provide me with such a "narrative". Is it my best strategy to simply go to trial and object at the trial that the prosecution has failed to comply with the motion for discovery, or do I need to make an additional pleading ahead of time? If I make a pleading, there is the risk the trooper might take the motion more seriously and provide the requested information. However, if I go to court directly, I am concerned the judge might say, "Well, you needed to file pleading XYZ with the court ahead of time if you wanted complain about the non-compliance with discovery." So, the basic question here is a point of law: if a party fails to comply with a granted motion of discovery in a civil/administrative trial, does an additional pleading of some kind need to be made ahead of time, or will the failure to comply automatically become grounds for dismissal at trial? | Convention in U.S. process is to: Attempt "in good faith" to "meet or confer" with the opposing party to try to resolve the discovery dispute directly. Failing step #1, file a Motion to Compel with the court. Rules of Civil Procedure (e.g., FRCP 37) typically have strict requirements for filing such motions. Judges generally frown upon discovery disputes lingering until the beginning of a trial. Which means the outcome of an objection or motion in limine on such matters can be abrupt and unpredictable. If the judge is inclined to side with the party requesting the particular discovery: He will most likely issue an order compelling compliance and continue the case (i.e., reschedule the hearing for a later date that allows time for compliance with its order). He could also grant or unilaterally impose sanctions if he feels the non-responsive party's behavior is "dilatory, obdurate or vexatious." A judge in a very bad mood could conceivably dismiss the case with prejudice or grant a summary judgment against the recalcitrant party. However if the judge concludes that the party requesting discovery was insufficiently diligent, or that the discovery is not reasonable or essential to the trial, he will probably overrule any objection and let the trial proceed. | Are defendants legally obliged to provide all culpatory evidence to prosecution? The question here is whether or not all evidence requested by prosecution must be provided by the defense? If the defense plans on only using the evidence of the prosecution, does the prosecution get to demand evidence the defense would rather not release? No. Usually only specific kinds of evidence related to specific kinds of claims such as alibi evidence, an insanity claim, or expert testimony must be disclosed prior to trial by a defendant in a criminal case. A defendant in a criminal case does not have to disclose evidence harmful to the defendant's case prior to trial as a general rule. Sometimes there is a requirement to disclose witnesses anticipated to be called, or exhibits to be possibly used very shortly prior to trial, but that is more the exception than the rule. Does the answer depend on the whether or not the case is criminal or civil? Yes. A plaintiff in a civil case can compel disclosure prior to trial of all evidence in the custody, control, or possession of the defendant that is relevant or is reasonably calculated to be relevant to a disputed issue identified in the complaint, answer, and other pleadings (e.g. counterclaims, replies to counterclaims, third-party complaints, cross-claims, etc.). The scope of discovery is slightly different in jurisdictions that don't follow the federal model. This can include pre-trial depositions of the parties, although a defendant can claim the 5th Amendment at the risk of being exposed to an adverse inference communicated to the jury at trial if the defendant does so. Furthermore, most jurisdictions require the pre-trial disclosure of expert testimony that will be used at trial, of exhibits that will or may be used at trial, of witnesses who will or may be called a trial, of all documents that are relevant to a disputed issue identified in the complaint, answer, and other pleadings, of all insurance coverage that could cover the claim, of all persons with knowledge of the disputed facts, and of an expected damages calculation. In the federal system, however, one need pro-actively disclose only witnesses and documents that support your case without being asked. Is there consistency on this or is it at the discretion of the judge? The rules of procedure applicable to a case govern the scope of discovery, but judges have considerable discretion to determine that requests are excessive relative to what is at stake in the case, are irrelevant, or unduly burden some other legitimate interest of the person subject to discovery. Is there punishment for non-compliance? Yes. First of all, a failure to disclose when there is a duty to do so is a ground to exclude presentation of that evidence at trial. Secondly, in civil cases, attorney fees incurred to obtain the discovery can be awarded, facts that might have been disclosed can be declared to be true as a matter of judicial sanction where there is not disclosure, claims can be dismissed, etc. The main relevant federal rule in civil cases is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37. It is an unlawful request that must nonetheless be followed with only a hypothetical remedy left to the defendant as is the case in most of these united states to comply with an obviously unlawful arrest that doesn't present an immediate threat to life? I don't understand this long and convoluted sentence. The part about an unlawful arrest seems divorced from the issues in the rest of the the question. It isn't clear what kind of unlawful request is involved either. | If 'literally 300' attorneys declined your case on the basis of a phone call, without looking into the details, I can see three options: You are unable to communicate the nature of your case clearly. In this posting, you mentioned complaints against a company, a municipality, and a landlord, plus being evicted. Focus on explaining one case. If you think you 'know for a fact' that you have several big payouts coming, there is the first problem. Nobody knows what a jury will decide. An attorney might hesitate to work for a client who does not understand this. Litigation is always a risk. All your cases actually lack merit, a lawyer sees this and you do not. Not knowing the cases, I cannot tell. (And no, you should not explain them in detail on the web. If they do have merit, posting your strategy hurts the cases.) Your state has a vexatious litigant list and you are on it. That would not prevent an attorney from taking your case, but it might make them hesitate. | The government must have reasonable suspicion to stop you and ask you questions. The government must have probable cause to arrest you. The government cannot question you if you have invoked your 5th Amendment rights The government must release you if you post bail which is set by a magistrate in some cases but can be posted without conferring with a magistrate for many minor offenses for which the amount is set in advance. Also, you can only be constitutionally held for a certain period of time without appearing before a court for an initial appearance at which you are charged and typically you have an attorney assigned for you if you cannot afford one. Generally speaking a lawyer for a defendant will either post bail on behalf of the client, or will seek to invoke the client's 5th Amendment right to silence and 6th Amendment right to counsel (including the right of a lawyer to visit his client in jail) making further detention much less useful, while challenging law enforcement to articulate probable cause for the arrest with the implication that a civil lawsuit and suppression of evidence and loss of credibility with the local judge could follow if they fail to do so. If the client is not brought before a court by the constitutional deadline (unusual, but not unheard of), the lawyer can bring this to the attention of the court and have the court demand that his client be brought before the court. Of course, strictly speaking the defense lawyer can't force the police to do anything. Instead, the defense lawyer persuades the police to do something based upon what a court is likely to do, or has already done, as a result of their conduct so far. Also, of course, it isn't always possible for a lawyer to get his client out of jail. If the police do have probable cause and the offense is not one for which bail is set in advance, it is not possible for the client to be released until bail is set by a judicial officer such as a magistrate and bail (if granted at all) is posted, which may be beyond the client's means in the case of a serious offense, particularly if the client is considered by the magistrate to be a flight risk. On TV and books, the person that the police have arrested is usually someone that the police had no probable cause to arrest but suspect of a crime anyway, and the police usually fold when called on the fact that they lack probable cause by the lawyer. Less commonly, on TV and in books, the lawyer facilitates the payment of bail on behalf of his client. | In a typical divorce proceeding, both sides are required to provide a sworn statement of their finances, and to respond to written interrogatories, produce documents (e.g. financial statements made in loan applications, balance sheets, tax returns, bank statements, and copies of deeds and certificates of title and stock certificates) and be deposed in pre-trial discovery proceedings. Divorce lawyers have the authority to subpoena third-party records custodians and to take a small number of depositions of third-party witnesses prior to a permanent orders hearing and can usually get permission to take more if there is evidence suggesting that it would be fruitful to do so. There are a variety of sanctions that may be imposed for failure to cooperate, including adverse inferences regarding the facts that would have been disclosed if there had been disclosures in the discovery process. Still, it behooves a client to know as much as possible before commencing the process, since having lawyers gather this information during the course of divorce litigation is expensive and isn't always perfect. Where misconduct is suspected, a spouse's lawyer will typically retain forensic accountants and/or private investigators and will compare bank and accounting and tax records with other public records such as real property records, corporate records and tax filings. Unless an asset has produced no income or expenses flowing through a personal or business account, it will usually show up somewhere. Spouses will also often have familiarity with where to look based upon living with a spouse and often will have obtained copies of relevant correspondence or documents to provide a lead - perhaps a letter asking a spouse to fill out corporate paperwork or receipt from a foreign bank account. This investigation process (collectively called discovery) usually takes place between the filing for a divorce and the half year or more later when a permanent orders hearing is held. Often, in complex cases and cases where there is a likelihood that assets have been hidden, the final hearing will be set later after the original filing than it would otherwise be, and the planned hearing will be longer in light of the evidence that will need to be produced at that time. In my state, a spouse has up to five years after a divorce to reopen a proceeding is undisclosed assets are discovered. It isn't impossible to hide assets in a divorce, but it isn't easy either. | It is certainly possible for the same action to break multiple laws, and be chargeable as multiple crimes. For example, shooting and killing someone may be assault, assault with a deadly weapon, and murder all at the same time. For a different example a person who simply omits to file an income tax return may be guilty of both failure to file a required return, and failure to pay tax due, and in some cases failure to par required estimated tax due as well. For yet another example, driving well above the speed limit may be a violation of the speed limit law, and also careless driving, and possibly also reckless driving. In the first case the assault etc may be lesser included offenses in the charge of murder. That means that they are automatically available to a jury (or judge) trying the accused, who can convict on one of the lesser included charges if they do not convict on the primary count. For the more general case, I don't know of any special term for the situation. It is not usual to have law A which says "do not do X", and also law B which says "you must follow law A". There is no general principle against having such redundant laws, nor is there, in the US, any Constitutional rule against such laws. But legislatures do not normally bother to enact such redundant laws. Laws which will sometimes overlap in their coverage, but in some cases do not overlap are common. | There are all manner of reasons that evidence can be excluded at a trial, most of which are set forth in rules of evidence. If the evidence was not admitted on the grounds of relevance and the charge was speeding, I presume that the reason that it was found not be to relevant was that it was not possible from a video to determine how fast someone was driving and there was no dispute in the case over who was driving. If the defendant could have articulated some reason that the video was relevant to those points, perhaps it could have been admitted. But, as if often the case, pro se defendants are usually not articulate enough to set forth a legally relevant reason that evidence should be admitted. Unless the defendant could show that the video showed something allowing a jury to determine whether or not the law was violated, it probably wouldn't be relevant and I can't easily imagine how it would be relevant, but perhaps there was some special facts or circumstances that might show, for example, that the speed gun was actually picking up another vehicle. | In Wisconsin, right after the perjury law, they have a law prohibiting "false swearing". It applies if a person: Makes or subscribes 2 inconsistent statements under oath or affirmation or upon signing a statement pursuant to s. 887.015 in regard to any matter respecting which an oath, affirmation, or statement is, in each case, authorized or required by law or required by any public officer or governmental agency as a prerequisite to such officer or agency taking some official action, under circumstances which demonstrate that the witness or subscriber knew at least one of the statements to be false when made. The period of limitations within which prosecution may be commenced runs from the time of the first statement. So even if they couldn't actually get you for perjury, they could get you for violating this law. Perjury and false swearing are both class H felonies, so you can expect the same punishment. I am going to guess that the existence of this law suggests that it was needed to cover what would otherwise be a loophole in the perjury law, but I can't say for sure. |
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