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Can I kill people with my autonomous drone? If I were to deploy an autonomous drone that went around shooting people, what could I be convicted of? Suppose that all decisions were made by the drone, and I had no intent of this happening. E.g., perhaps I wrote an algorithm that discerned between what and what not to shoot, but a bug slipped in that caused it to shoot people. Although it's, in my opinion, subjective, I'd say that the possibility of the drone killing someone would be one that came across the deployer's mind, but, still didn't expect to happen. Sort of like a nuclear power plant melting down. Contrarily, what if I did design the drone to shoot people, but I didn't actually pull the trigger? | In the US, it depends on the jurisdiction because each state has its own homicide statutes: but, the defining elements don't differ a lot. Drawing on Washington state law, the first question is whether you intended to kill a person (it doesn't have to be a specific person). If you did, you have committed first-degree murder. It is first-degree murder, because it requires a certain amount of advance planning to kill with a drone. It does not matter that the drone houses the gun that killed the person and a program determines when the gun fires (the "it was the drone, not me" defense gets you nowhere: otherwise, you could always claim "It wasn't me, it was my gun / knife / fist".) If instead this is a badly-designed pig-slaughtering drone, then it could be manslaughter in the first degree, if the act was reckless, or manslaughter in the second degree, if the act was with criminal negligence. To determine which it is, you look at the definitions: A person is reckless or acts recklessly when he or she knows of and disregards a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his or her disregard of such substantial risk is a gross deviation from conduct that a reasonable person would exercise in the same situation. versus A person is criminally negligent or acts with criminal negligence when he or she fails to be aware of a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his or her failure to be aware of such substantial risk constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the same situation. So it would depend on whether you decided that safeguards which would prevent shooting people were too much bother (you know there is a risk and set aside that concern), or it didn't occur to you that a flying gun might hurt a person. | Whether or not a war between political entities can result from some action is completely political and strategic, and not legal. The specific incident is probably legal, given US and international law regarding military action. Unless the order was self-evidently unlawful there is no possibility of arrest and prosecution under US law, however there might be a framework for legal action by Iran, if e.g. a drone operator were to fall into Iranian hands. The specifics of the order are not generally known, though we know that DoD states that this was due to a presidential order. This article discusses targeted killing from a legal perspective. In the context of war, killing is legal though not entirely unregulated. There was a failed attempt to sue the US in the case Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, which involved a targeted killing of a US citizen involved in planning terrorist attacks, a suit which was dismissed. One problem is that the suit "failed to state a 4th Amendment claim", and also failed to state a 5th Amendment due process claim since Al–Aulaqi's deaths was unanticipated. The court notes that a Bivens claim allows damage action against a federal officer for violation of clearly-established constitutional rights. However, No case has discussed precisely whether a plaintiff can proceed on a Bivens action that claims deprivation of life without due process based on the overseas killing by United States officials of a U.S. citizen deemed to be an active enemy. In the discussion, the question arises whether special circumstances counsel hesitation (Doe v. Rumsfeld and citations therein), which the Doe court notes would "require a court to delve into the military's policies", and they will not do that lightly. All of this is about US citizens. Soleimani was not a US citizen. | Some people seem to believe that just because something happens 'in the internet' it is somehow outside normal jurisdictions. Wrong. In may be harder to investigate and prosecute crimes in the internet, but the laws apply all the same. There are some problems when it is unclear 'where in the world' something did happen -- in the jurisdiction of the perpetrator, the victim, or the service provider? But problems of jurisdiction apply e.g. to international fraud cases in the non-web-world as well. In many jurisdictions, the informed and voluntary consent makes some things legal which would otherwise be illegal. For instance, if two boxers get into the ring, it is understood that each of them did consent to be hit by the other. But usually two fighters could not legally agree to a fight to the death, because even if there are laws on assisted suicide, they do not apply to a fight. Insults, libel, and slander are not on the same level as homicide. There are jurisdictions where they are not prosecuted without the request of the victim. But an insult might also violate other laws, e.g. disturbing the peace. So don't bet on such an app unless you know for sure which jurisdictions are involved. | “Never” is a very big word… If a burglar stabs someone in claimed self defense, then we have evidence that this was an armed burglary, so that won’t go down well for that burglar. And your rights to self defence are greatly diminished if you caused that situation illegally. So should you get into the situation, try to run away if at all possible. If you had any chance at all to escape your self defence argument will not be accepted. The only possible situation with self defence is if you are threatened with illegal violence that cannot be justified by the fact that you are a criminal. For example you enter a home, two people with guns inside catch you, bind you to a chair so you are no danger at all, and instead of calling the police they announce they will kill or maim you. This is of course very unlikely to happen. | There may be a purpose to have laws which are impossible to follow. (I'm neither a lawyer nor a politician, following points are what I like to call qualified hearsay - they come from qualified people I know personally but were given as a remark or during a chat over a cup of coffee and therefore are not easily substantiable with rigorous sources. You can treat them as a hypothetical ideas for your thought experiments.) Everybody is implicitly guilty Confident citizens and transparent law is the worst enemy of totalitarian regime. You learn to live with ingrained feeling that there surely is something you are guilty of. Merely being addressed by police makes you nervous and malleable; should you stand up against oppression, it is easy for the state apparat to detain or convict you of one or more default offenses. A good example would be the law present in many, if not all, socialist bloc countries saying that knowing of a comrade having commited an offense or merely planing to and not reporting it to authorities is an offense in itself. Whether you did or did not know would be determined by the authorities. Make your laws very strict with a hope thay they will be followed at least to a degree Not laws in themselves, but standards (technical norms) regarding nuclear power stations in the former Soviet Union were strict to the point where they were technically impossible to follow given the state of the art. For example the standards for manufacture of high pressure pipes would state very low level of material impurities that when the actual manufactured material contained twice the level of impurities the pipe will still be very safe to operate. In a centrally planned economy with ever more ambitious production projections and declared zero need for contingency this was one of several ways how to create a bit of a wiggle room. (Source: I once worked for a nuclear power research institute supporting Soviet technology and was told this by an expert on stainless steel.) So there you have a bit of an illustration what may happen if a law is intentionally impossible to follow. Since you labelled your question 'United States', I believe the follow-up question is why would anyone want to propose such a law. | So each government has jurisdiction of the crime if and only if it occurs within their borders. In addition, the Federal Government can take a crack at any crime any where in the United States, though typically they only do so if the crime involves crossing state lines (kidnapping over state lines, ect). At the maximum, suppose for arguments sake Alice fatally shoots Bob while Bob is standing at dead center of the Four Corners Monument (the only place in the United States where four states meet). This means that one act of Murder has been committed in four seperate states, so Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, and Arizona can all claim jurisdiction over the case and each prosecute Alice for First Degree Murder. Additionally, the Federal Government may step in and also prosecute Alice for First Degree Murder (though they are more likely not too. The Feds rarely prosecute crimes after the State UNLESS the State did something horribly wrong... I.E. Utah let her go because Utah is crazy). Additionally, the monument marks the dividing line between the Navajo Nation and the Ute Tribe, both semi-autonomous Native American Tribes that have their own recognized court systems, so they could conceivably charge Alice with First Degree Murder. So in total, the most amount of times someone can be charged for the same crime due to cross-jurisdiction is 7 times (Four States, 2 Tribal Governments, and one Federal Government). In likely hood, a few of these guys will pass because it's a waste of effort. If Alice gets the death penalty in Arizona, Colorado can't kill her a second time. It's important to note that each government gets exactly one trial so Alice can't be convicted twice in Arizona. A more realistic example occurred in the D.C. Beltway Sniper Case, where the perpetrators were tried in both Virginia and Maryland but only for the crimes committed within those states. VA got first crack because they had (and eventually carried out) the Death Penalty. Maryland tried both for insurance in case the VA cases got thrown out for reasons. The Feds found this satisfying and decided not to press their charges. | Real-world situations are rarely so clear-cut Let's say, hypothetically, that I'm in the driver's seat of a car. The company told me that the car has "Full Self Driving" capabilities based on some sort of artificial intelligence, though they also said that these capabilities "are intended for use with a fully attentive driver, who has their hands on the wheel and is prepared to take over at any moment." Let's say I was not fully attentive at a moment when the car's AI decides to swerve into oncoming traffic, and I fail to grab the wheel and prevent that. Who's at fault? Is it the car company's fault for a bug that caused that? Is it my fault for failing to be fully attentive? Is it some combination of the two? But wait, it can get more complicated: maybe the car company argues that they couldn't have reasonably anticipated the situation that caused it: maybe the lines were incorrectly drawn on the road, and indicated that the road continued in that direction. Maybe I argue that the car swerved quickly enough that even a fully attentive driver couldn't have recovered. These and more are all facts that need to be sorted out in a trial. There's no way to simply say that "any issues that this algorithm caused" are entirely the company's fault. In other words, this isn't really the legal system "breaking down"—it's working as intended, trying to figure out whose fault an event actually was. The law just isn't very developed yet as to the process a court would follow to assign liability. | Natural law does not prescribe particular punishments, that only comes from statutory law. Under Indian law, this would seem to be a violation of IPC 304a, "causing death by negligence". There is no intent to cause great injury, indeed it is a complete mystery why the boy died. The penalty is up to two years imprisonment and a fine. There are more details in IPC 300, focusing on intent to kill under extreme provocation, but the required intent is lacking here. The courts may be lenient, having considered surrounding circumstances, and sentence her to less than the maximum punishment. |
Is it illegal to throw water or soda on people? Yesterday, some guy took a diner's soda and threw it on him for wearing a political hat. Is that considered a crime, or is it ok to throw liquids on people? I know that protesters used to throw pies at politicians in Europe. UPDATE Update, apparently the guy in the example was arrested and charged with theft of a person because he also stole the guy's hat. Apparently they did not charge him with assault. | Yes. It is a crime almost everywhere to throw something at someone, even if it causes little or no injury. Usually it would be classified as "assault and battery" although if it damages clothing or other property, it could also be called, for example, "criminal mischief" which is intentional damage to property. It would also be a tort that could be enforced with civil damages in most places, although only nominal damages would be awarded and there would be no award for attorneys' fees. In practice, however, few people would press charges or turn to the police in such an incident, few police would take action based on the complaint because it is so trivial, and few people would sue in such a case. For what it is worth, the "living law" in Japan recognizes that someone has a duty to pay to clean your clothes or replace them if they can't be cleaned in such circumstances and most people appear to comply with that obligation without court involvement if the victim insists. Also, pie throwing as a political protest in Europe is also almost surely illegal under European law, although, again, this is rarely enforced by common political culture and tradition. | If it’s your pizza, yes The civil equivalent of theft is the tort of conversion, “consisting of "taking with the intent of exercising over the chattel an ownership inconsistent with the real owner's right of possession". In England & Wales, it is a tort of strict liability.” | Normally, making a poison is not in and of itself a crime. If a third party took the poison from the person who manufactured it without their knowledge, the manufacturer would generally not have criminal liability, at least in the absence of "gross criminal negligence" such as leaving the poison manufacturing location totally unsecured and letting people know that there was poison there for the taking. In a civil case, someone might sue the poison manufacturer for negligently securing their facility, but again, that would be a real stretch if even ordinary precautions (e.g. standard locks on doors and cabinets) were in place, or if it was an inside job theft. In the same way, a gun store owner is not usually liable criminally or civilly if someone steals a gun from his store and shoots someone with it. The police could certainly charge Person A with capital murder mistakenly believing him to have intended to kill and did kill someone with the poison, which would make the critical factual point establishing that Person B gave it to someone without Person A's knowledge. Person A might still be guilty of attempted murder if he intended to kill someone (not necessarily the person who was killed) with the poison but had not fully carried out the plot when the poison was stolen. Some places probably require a permit of some kind to make poisons, and if Person A didn't have a permit, he could probably also be charged with making poisons without a permit. | In general, anyone can buy potentially dangerous chemicals. My local service station sells petrol, my local liquor store sells alcohol, my local supermarket sells ammonia, my local pool shop sells chlorine, my local hardware store sells poisons and my local chemist sells drugs. The world is full of dangerous stuff and all of it is for sale. Certain governments may regulate the sale of certain products. Such regulations may cover packaging, storage, quantities, reporting and limits on who can be a buyer or seller. For example, who can be a buyer of Uranium is pretty strictly limited. The decision about what and how to regulate is a political one, not a legal one. In general, governments apply a cost/benefit approach (including political costs/benefits). The fact that one (or a small number) of people use something inappropriately must be balanced with the cost that regulation imposed on government and legitimate users. Also, in most parts of the developed world people are allowed to take risks with their own bodies - climbing mountains, surfing, parachuting and, yes, injecting themselves with foreign substances. It’s unwise but it’s not illegal. I am unable to assist you with who would be responsible for regulating such matters in France but I can suggest that neither the FDA nor the EPA would be relevant in the USA because its neither a food nor a drug (FDA) nor is it being sole in quantities that are likely to adversely affect the environment (EPA). | If you wrote for example "I had thoughts about taking the axe from my garage and decapitating my neighbour", and your neighbour read that, he would reasonably be worried and contact the police. I would take that as a death threat, and the death threat is by itself illegal. There would be some range where I could claim that you were making a death threat and making excuses to avoid legal responsibility. You can have all the thoughs you like, you can write them into your private diary where nobody can read them, but as soon as you publish it, it becomes "speech" and some speech is illegal. | In the US, it is not illegal to lie in general. This includes lying about someone: it's not illegal per se to lie about them. What is illegal is slander and libel: lying about someone in a way that hurts their reputation. The defamation doctrine in the US is generally a common-law doctrine (i.e. the rules and limits are based on court decisions, rather than on laws passed by legislatures), although it may differ state-by-state. Depending on the state, some defamation may be criminal; there is no federal criminal defamation. US defamation law is largely defined through its interaction with the First Amendment. While libel is not constitutionally protected, punishment for libel is seriously limited by the need to avoid either punishing protected speech, or chilling potential protected speech (i.e. discouraging people from saying something that would in fact be protected, because they aren't sure whether or not it's protected). Libel in the US only applies to a false statement of fact, or an opinion which implies some false fact. If it can't actually be proven incorrect, it can't be libelous in the US. The question of whether it's a statement of fact doesn't just depend on the literal speech; it includes things like the context, and is a question about what a reasonable person would think. If I were to claim that someone was "literally Hitler," for instance, no reasonable person would think I was seriously claiming that the person was the former leader of Nazi Germany. Now, no reasonable person who is familiar with Twitter would ever assume that the tweet meant Obama literally stood up in front of the UN and said "Please accept this nothingburger in place of a respectable climate plan." So, it only counts as libel if a reasonable person would think it implies some fact. But a reasonable person familiar with Twitter would most likely think Miesel is saying "The president's pollution plan is a pointless piece of political puffery planned to placate principalities and potentates." This is basically a matter of opinion. Even to the extent that it's not a matter of opinion, public figures in the US cannot win a defamation suit unless they show "actual malice:" the speaker must actually know or actually strongly suspect that their statement is false in some material way. It's not enough that a reasonable person would think "this might not be true;" the speaker themselves must doubt the truth of it (they must be reckless, not just negligent). Courts are also extremely deferential to defendants in these cases. While it is technically possible for a public figure to prove defamation, it is exceptionally difficult. If the person didn't know they were falsely attributing the quote, and honesty thought it was correct, they're in the clear. If the quote isn't supposed to be a statement of fact, but it implies false facts, but the speaker honestly thinks those facts are true, they're in the clear. Private figures don't have to meet the actual malice standard to prove defamation. They still need to show that the statement is a statement of fact or something implying false facts; if it's obviously a summary of something they really said, possibly with added editorial comment, they can't prove defamation. | First, as Mark Johnson said. Second, the job of police and prosecutors is not to put people into jail, their job is to put guilty people into jail. If you go to the police and tell them that you beat up a person, then before they investigate, they know that either you are guilty of assault, or you mistakenly believe that you are guilty of assault, or you are a phantasist who enjoys confessing non-existing crimes to the police. The police will either investigate which one it is, and may prosecute you either for assault or for wasting police time, or they may decide based on your behaviour that there was never any assault and not investigate further. I suspect they will at least question you about details of the claimed assault, to decide whether the crime is real or not. | Let's break it apart: The police has an union or charity. That's legal in most jurisdictions. The union or charity accepts donations from non-police. Also legal in most jurisdictions. The union communicates who the donors are. Generally legal in most jurisdictions. Keeping it secret would be just as problematic. Police officers have some discretion if and how they charge incidents. That's just common sense. Otherwise you get cases like 8-year-olds being arrested. (You get those anyway when the police don't use their discretion, or if the laws are too rigid.) Police officers let themselves be influenced by the donor card in how they apply their discretion. That's usually illegal on the part of the police officer. The Brits use the catchphrase 'without fear or favour.' But it is difficult to prove, even if it is systematic. The union issues donor cards to facilitate the effects of the previous bullet point. That sounds at the very least unethical. Some might argue that it is organized corruption. On the other hand, you can assume that the police unions have some decent lawyers on staff, and that they made sure that the words on their cards are not blatantly illegal in the jurisdiction in question. It might take something like a whistleblower, a sting operation, or an internal affairs investigation to prove corruption. |
Autonomous drone over private property Is it legal to operate a drone (quadcopter or other type) in autonomous mode over private property (either with owner's permission or over my own property)? By private property I mean private real estate like agricultural fields, woods/forests etc. An example usage case would be operating something like a cargo-drone for agricultural purposes. I am interested in global legal situation, but EU, USA and China are my main areas of interest. The contrary to autonomous mode would be manual mode where one usually has to maintain line-of-sight when operating a drone. I also guess there is a maximum height that "hobby" aviators are allowed to reach. A side question - what is the current legal situation for operating a drone in the states listed above? I know about the "Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Registration" in the US only. | In the US, courts have generally held that your property rights do not extend into the sky without limit. In UNITED STATES v. CAUSBY et ux. The Supreme Court ruled that the skies above a certain altitude were a public highway. The federal government currently holds that navigable airspace starts at 500 feet from the ground, so above that altitude the FAA gets to regulate how you use them. That would include any limitations on the use of autonomous drones. The situation is in flux though, and the proliferation of small inexpensive drones is putting the issue before the courts again. | Neighbors(including us) around the property started to mow the part in front of their yard(the weeds grew very high) and continue to do so(is it illegal for us to mow this overgrown land?). There are probably city codes around maintenance of lawns, cutting grass and clearing weeds. You should alert the relevant authorities and they will make sure that the maintenance occurs. You should probably not do it yourself since (a) you don't owe the owner any favors and (b) you might cause trouble for yourself. Recently there was some mowing by large tractors but very little was cut and most of it grew back. The question is really whether their activities bring them into compliance with applicable city codes or not. If they are compliant and you simply don't like how they maintain their property, that is tough luck. If they are not compliant, you are well within your rights to vigorously report them to relevant code enforcement authorities. This overgrown golf course is home to many wild animals(coyotes, snakes, foxes, alligators, etc..) See above 1) Is there any legal action that we can take to force the land owner to maintain the land? See above 2) Could this land somehow under some law be divided and given to the maintainers. This is an interesting question. Technically there are circumstances wherein you could take what's called adverse possession of part or all of the property. This would probably include doing things like actually residing on some piece of that land and establishing a residence there - perhaps getting mail or paying taxes there or paying utilities or operating a business - for a certain period of time without any interference from the technical owner. If you can meet the requirements of adverse possession then you might be able to become a legal owner. Unless you have little to lose, however, actually doing it might be difficult. 3) Is it legal to walk/drive on this land. (I see people walking their dogs, and driving atv's and motor bikes on the golf course) Unless you have been given notice otherwise, it is perfectly legal to walk wherever you like. It is the owner's responsibility to provide reasonable notice and take reasonable precautions against unwanted trespass; e.g., putting up a wall or fence, closing and/or locking a door or gate, posting signs and/or hiring security to patrol the property and enforce property rights - or occasionally checking to make sure their property isn't overrun with squatters. | Sure: No Constitutional rights are totally unencumbered. Even natural rights like the "right to life" are legally "infringed" through various theories (e.g., self-defense, capital punishment, warfare). The Second Amendment has been interpreted as a right to keep and bear weapons that would reasonably be used in self-defense or in military service. You don't have to go to strategic weapons like nukes to find "reasonable infringement" of that right. For example, even though the military and even police routinely use explosives, individuals are absolutely subject to the whims of a federal regulatory agency (the BATFE) as well as state restrictions if they want to keep and bear detonators. Also, I'm not aware of an absolute prohibition on the possession of nuclear devices by non-government entities. E.g., various government regulators oversee private entities that operate commercial and research nuclear reactors and other activities that put them all-but in possession of nuclear arms. If an individual really wanted to legally keep and bear a nuclear weapon it could probably be done with enough money and oversight. (Amendment: Except, as cpast points out in the comments, that there is a law against private possession of nuclear weapons in the U.S. Which just goes back to the broad answer to your general question: In practice there are no unencumbered rights. Constitutional "rights" might better be called things that require "strict scrutiny" and "narrow tailoring" of government infringement.) | If you buy a large piece of land, closed to the public, then yes. You would need a license for your car to allow drivers to use it without hands on the wheel, or the driver will get arrested. But first you need a license that allows using the car on public roads at all. That’s what all the car manufacturers have to do. Requires for example crash tests, tests how polluting the car is, and so on. | For land ownership records and other similar scenarios such as business directors, the requirement for these to be public will be in legislation rather than a contract - this provides the legal basis, see GDPR Article 6(1c). Additionally when government departments are doing it they also have 6(1e) as lawful basis: "1. Processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that at least one of the following applies: ... (c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; ... (e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller;" -- GDPR, Article 6(1c,e). I'm not familiar enough with the specific legislation that will apply here but pretty sure this will be the case, and having said this you may well find public registries also become less public going forward. The reason ICANN has come under fire, is partly because under GDPR privacy is a protected fundamental right and therefore to comply personal data should be kept private by default and privacy never something you would be required to pay extra for. Any contract ICANN have in place with their registrars will not override legislation, it is in fact the other way around. "2. The controller shall implement appropriate technical and organisational measures for ensuring that, by default, only personal data which are necessary for each specific purpose of the processing are processed. That obligation applies to the amount of personal data collected, the extent of their processing, the period of their storage and their accessibility. In particular, such measures shall ensure that by default personal data are not made accessible without the individual's intervention to an indefinite number of natural persons." -- GDPR, Article 25(2). This doesn't stop ICANN from maintaining a register of domain name owners (registrants), but it does mean they can't just publish all records upon request to anyone anymore - whether people will be granted access to personal data will now depend on if they have a lawful basis for this, and in these cases their processing of the personal data will be limited to those purposes. Being nosey doesn't count! "When assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account shall be taken of whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is conditional on consent to the processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of the contract." -- GDPR, Article 7 (4) - Conditions for consent. What this means essentially, is that if the consent is conditional for the contract it will not be treated as freely given, and therefore not valid - it will no longer be acceptable to contractually bind the provision of a product or service with consent to publish personal data or any other form of processing such as marketing mailing lists. Looking now at the specific points you have raised: "GDPR article 6 allows for processing of personal data on a contractual basis (section 1b)" Whilst this is true, this is only part of it - it doesn't allow for unlimited processing for any purpose and sharing it with any people, if you look at Article 5(b) it states that the information is collected for specific explicit legitimate purposes. Each purpose requires its own legal basis and needs to be compatible with the principles of GDPR. Without consent, ICANN currently does not have a legal basis to make the WHOIS records public for EU citizens and should have adopted some technical controls to require them to opt-in if they wish to be included in the public register. They're coming under fire for non-compliance having been given 2 years to prepare and change their systems/processes. "processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract;" Again whilst this is true, not all processing is necessary for the performance of a contract. In the same way people must give consent to receive marketing communications, they must freely give consent for their information to be shared/published (separate to the contract for provision of service) in the absence of other lawful basis for this processing. "Also section 1c, processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject;" There is no legislation which requires them to publish the personal data of domain name registrants. In this paragraph 'legal obligations' refers to those required by legislation (i.e. statutory obligations), not contracts (or non-statutory obligations) which are covered under Article 6(1b). "And finally section 1e, processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller;" ICANN has no official government-assigned authority, and publishing the personal data globally is not in the interests of the data subject's or others' welfare or well-being - this is what is meant by 'public interest'. As far as I can see what ICANN are actually doing to comply seems to be accepted by the European Data Protection Board, they are only 'under fire' as you say because they are late in doing so. The deadline was 25th May 2018 and they had 2 years to prepare like all other organisations. | A lease of land is not the same as a residential lease, the latter being strongly regulated by special laws. So caveat emptor is the default rule for land leases (see this article). You have to look at the laws of your state, but let's take Washington as an example. This is not a residential tenancy which is subject to different laws, it's just leasing land, similar to leasing a chainsaw or a car. Your implied warranty would be that the land is fit for the ordinary purposes for which land is used, and that is all. It might be worth wondering about whether building a cabin on the land changes your property tax liability. | Farmer's Market is private property, which means that the owner gets to set the rule according to which you are allowed to enter and remain on their property. There is no fundamental right to be in a business, either under the US Constitution or California's. While you have a constitutional right to put a soapbox on the public sidewalk and denounce or extol whatever you like, there is no such right on another person's property. You also have a right to express racially and sexually abhorrent content on the street. Your right to express your viewpoint ends at the store's doors. The manager has a property right to withdraw the implicit permission to enter and remain that is implicit in running a publicly accessible store. Your constitutional right to say whatever you want has to do with government action,not private action. You have no right to compel individuals to listen to your viewpoint on private property. It is a business decision, well within the rights of the property owner, for him to find your conduct unacceptable and grounds for expulsion. You do have a recourse: shop somewhere that doesn't care what you say to their customers. | Not in jurisdictions I am familiar with. A "Power of attorney" is a power to act as an attorney-in-fact, not to act as an attorney-at-law. A layperson practicing law for someone other than herself is usually the unauthorized practice of law and is illegal in most jurisdictions. It would be permissible if a jurisdiction carved out an exception for a particular kind of case, but they generally don't and are very unlikely to do so in a criminal case. For example, in Washington State "Limited Practice Officers" can assist people with one of a very limited set of civil legal forms that do not need modification. There may be some exceptions, but they would be more likely to occur before a matter becomes criminal. For example, the accountant who represents a taxpayer before the IRS, or the agent who files a form containing perjury to a federal agency like the post office or homeland security on your behalf. So it is very unlikely, but if it is important to you you can ask someone familiar with your kind of case in your jurisdiction. |
Can I buy a housing development lot and not build a house? Around the suburbs of Kansas City, there's no shortage of housing developments where you can buy an empty lot and are expected to use the land to build a house. Would there be any zoning law preventing me from buying such an empty lot and turning it into a giant garden or a private park? Not a commercial farm, but a private thing. | Zoning is controlled by the municipality (and possibly state, given where KC is) so you would have to check the rules for the municipality of interest and look at the specific zoning designation (e.g. RP-OE, R-2, MXD). Here for example is a page of code from Overland Park, which tells you that RP-4 land can be used for a private park, but agriculture is not a listed permitted use. You might argue with city hall over whether a giant garden is agriculture, and you might even win the argument (if it is a garden where you don't harvest product). Private / non-commercial is not likely to be the controlling factor over agricultural use. | Many states have laws providing for a residence for their governors, but I know of no state that mandates the use of those homes. Oregon's previous governor, for instance, lived in Portland rather than the governor's mansion, Mahonia Hall. Some cities do the same. In New York City, Mayor Bill De Blasio lives at Gracie Mansion, but Mike Bloomberg never did. Although we don't always think of them as government officials, some government schools provide their presidents with state-funded residences, as well. At the University of Virginia, the president lives at Carr's Hill. | In the US, does a person photographing private property (houses, farms etc.) while standing on public ground (road, park etc.) commit any offence? No. In general, while standing on public land, it is legal for your eyes to glance onto everything around you. You cannot be arrested and imprisoned for allowing your gaze to pass over your neighbours lawn. It is legal for you to take out a tripod, canvas and paintbrushes and paint the general scene, even if it includes, for example, a tree standing on private land. Instead of a paintbrush, you may use a camera to create a picture of the scene. There are a few exceptions Some military installations Some installations operated by the department of energy (e.g. some nuclear power stations) You cannot photograph people where they have a "reasonable expectation of privacy" - Note that this is not dependant on how the people feel about it. You can photograph a couple kissing at a bus stop, you probably can't legally point a telephoto lens at their bedroom window through a broken privacy-fence. will they commit any offence by publishing the photos They may need copyright permission from the owners of any identifiable works of art included and may need model releases from identifiable people included. There are specific exceptions allowing the publishing of photographs of sculptures and buildings that are visible from public spaces. See The Photographer's Right | In most common-law jurisdiction, a purchaser buys a house subject to any existing lease. If that is true in your jurisdiction, the notice to vacate was illegal, and you are entitled to remain until the end of the current lease. The return of the deposit will depend on the condition of the property when you move out, and will be governed by the specific law of your jurisdiction. Residential leases are highly regulated in many places, and the laws vary widely. Often they vary even by individual cities or towns within a country. Without the specific locality in which the hosue is, no specific answer is possible. | It depends; Permission may be Required This depends on both the facts on the ground, and the laws of the relevant jurisdiction. Residential fences are often governed by specific local laws at the municipal or county level in the US, so no generally applicable answer is possible, short of a book giving laws for each locality. Common-Law Rules Under the common law, followed by many but far from all US jurisdictions, the key question is whether a fence is a "partition fence" or not. A partition fence is one built on or near the property line that is owned jointly by the owners of the properties it divides. A fence near the property line is probably a partition fence if: The two property owners jointly built or paid for the building of the fence; Parts of the fence are on each side of the property line; The owners have agreed that the fence is common property; or Both owners "use" the fence, as by connecting it to another fence running in a different direction, or by relying on it to contain domestic animals. A Fence is probably not a partition fence if: It is entirely clear of the property line; Only the owner on whose property it rests maintains it; and Only the owner on whose property it rests uses it. The owner of one of the properties may not remove, demolish, or modify a partition fence without permission from the other. Removing or modifying a partition fence without the permission of the owner of the adjacent property is a tort, and can lead to damages for the value of the fence begin awarded. The owners must each maintain a partition fence, often each caring for his or her side. Failing to do so may be a tort. If a fence is not a partition fence, the owner of the land is also the sole owner of the fence, and may modify or remove it without permission from, or notice to, the owner of any adjacent or nearby property. However, the above common-law rules may be modified by local laws, and one would be wise to check, or consult a lawyer who knows how to check, before making any demands. Sources The page "Removal or Destruction of Fences" from US legal reads: A fence is an enclosure creating an adequate blockade around a particular land for the purpose of prohibiting intrusions from outside. A landowner can remove a fence, separating his/her land from that of his/her neighbor, when such fence is located wholly upon his/her own land. However, a landowner is not empowered to remove a partition fence without the adjacent landowner’s consent. A partition fence is the joint property of adjacent landowners. A fence erected on the line between the lands of adjoining owners generally belongs to the parties as tenants in common. Generally, a partition fence is built equally on both sides of the line. Until the contrary is shown, the partition fence is presumed to be the common property of both owners. An owner of adjoining land can remove a partition fence upon formal notice to adjacent landowners. For an improper removal of a partition fence, an aggrieved party can bring an action for damages. The standard for measuring damages for such removal or destruction is its value at the time. The value is determined by replacement costs minus depreciation for age and use. Moreover, when someone builds a fence on another person’s land without any authority to do so, the landowner can remove or destroy such fence. A person is liable for removing, destroying, or injuring a fence belonging to another person just as one who commits such acts against any kind of property belonging to another is liable[i]. Such person is considered a tortfeasor. However, an individual cannot remove or destroy a fence on another individual’s land without his/her consent. The page "Property Line and Fence Laws in Maryland" from FindLaw reads, in relevant part: Maryland doesn't have specific rules dealing with fences. Instead, the state follows the common law practice that a fence built along a boundary line is owned in common by both property owners when both use the fence, unless otherwise agreed. A property owner is said to use a fence when they "hook-up" to the fence with another row of fence, or keep animals in the enclosure created by the fence. A fence built and used only by the builder is that person's sole property. When you purchase a new home, you take a property with an existing fence built and used by prior owners. Simply put, if you buy a property with a co-owned fence, you likely need to continue your maintenance of the fence. The page "Is it legal for the neighbor to remove a fence on our shared property line?" from Justia's "Ask a Lawyer" feature reads: If both landowners paid to install a fence directly on a property line in the past, then yes, they need your permission to remove or replace the fence. Many fences are not built on a property line, but are instead just on one property or the other. If you have had your land surveyed, you may be able to determine your exact property line. You or your neighbor are free to build new fences without permission as long as neither the fence nor any construction or excavation encroaches on the other's property. Fences are a common property dispute, and can have long term effects. If a fence encroaches significantly on someone else's land for many years, this can actually become the new legal property line in some cases. According to the "Fences" section of the page "Disputes between your neighbours" from th New Zealand Law Society: In New Zealand this is regulated by the Fencing Act 1978. Except where modified by individual agreements: Fences must be on the boundary line, though there is provision for give and take where the true boundary is difficult to fence. The cost of building or repairing a fence is borne equally between adjoining owners, unless one owner damages it, in which case the cost of repairs will fall on that owner. You can compel your neighbour to contribute to the cost of the fence bordering your two properties by following the procedures set out in the Fencing Act ... Developers of new subdivisions usually exempt themselves from contributing to the cost of a fence. Under the Property Law Act 2007, it is possible to apply to a District Court for an order to remove or alter a fence that is detrimentally affecting land or obstructing a view. Usually the cost of any removal falls on the person applying for the order. The Booklet "Fences and the Law from the Legal Services Commission, South Australia states, on page 2: Fences should be regarded as a joint asset between neighbours. Even if your neighbour has not paid for the fence they are still a joint owner. This is because a fence on the boundary is legally considered to be part of the land on each side. If you intend to remove or alter an existing fence, you should have your neighbour’s permission or a court order. If you want to put up a fence where there has not been one before, your neighbour has a right to object. It makes no difference if you intend to pay the total cost | There is ample reason to conclude that "non-commercial" would include a church, as well as advocating a political cause or candidate. The hard part of "personal". In the context of (Canadian) bankruptcy law, it can mean "non-business use"; in the context of "personal use property", it can be "A type of property that an individual does not use for business purposes or hold as an investment. In other words, property that an individual owns for personal enjoyment". US tax law takes "personal purposes" to refer to non-business purposes. But in the context of copyright (especially music downloading / copying), it is taken to refer to the use of or by an individual. Distributing free copies of a protected work does not get legally sanctioned due to the copying being non-commercial. The alternative term "private" is much clearer, in identifying "just you", but is probably avoided in this kind of context so as to avoid the wrong inference that you can only play Pokemon in the privacy of your own home. So the slightly less clear term "personal" is used instead of "private" especially in copyright-related contexts. "Personal" and "private" are not exactly the same, but when it's about use, I don't see any difference, and I think there is no question that use to attract to a church or political candidate is not "private", it is public. Since the license does not define "your own personal purposes" and there is not an existing crystal-clear definition of "personal purposes", the phrase could be given its "ordinary (plain) meaning". Of course, plain meaning has to give way to contractual intent, so we have to figure out what the parties intended. Except, you don't have a contract with Niantic, but still, plain meaning surely has some place in the law of licenses. At this point, in a lawsuit, both sides would hire an expert witness like a linguist or English teacher to make the case that a church or other non-commercial non-private use is / is not included in the meaning of "personal purpose". A silly argument could be made to the effect that if you personally have an interest in doing something then it is a personal purpose (if specifically commercial, it would be precluded by the term "noncommercial"). What makes this silly is that everybody does things for personal purposes (even acting in a way that benefits others, since you do so for the personal reason that you should do so), and thus "personal" would not mean anything. That is, "personal purposes" does not mean "whatever motivation or interest you personally have". You can also gain a certain understanding of what "personal purposes" means by looking at similar licenses. In the context of academic publishing, authors are typically granted license to copy "for personal, professional, or teaching purposes". Professional purposes and teaching purposes are things that the person has an interest in, so by mentioning these things separately, we must conclude that "teaching" is not a "personal purpose". And so: I would conclude that a court could find that using a product to support a political campaign, philosophy, or religion, is a "public" purpose, not a "personal" purpose. At the same time, at least as I understand it, a lure module is a thing that others besides yourself personally can see (I admit, I don't go), which implies that the purpose of the thing is not entirely private. In addition, there is a fair amount of buzz out there about how a lure could be good for business, which is (1) clearly in contradiction of the license terms and (2) clearly a golden opportunity for Niantic, perhaps in a few weeks after everybody gets hooked and then they will offer non-personal licenses. Their license terms also say that you will not "use the Services or Content, or any portion thereof, for any commercial purpose or for the benefit of any third party or in a manner not permitted by these Terms". I would say that that definitively says "No don't do it", and it also means that you can't be nice to a neighbor. So what they literally say and what they really intend are probably completely different things. | Providing the antenna was installed in accordance with the law it's hard to see what basis they could either void their lease or seek damages. The antenna poses no risk to health (non-ionising RF radiation is harmless) and you have no rights in any view it may be blocking there is no damage. The only thing that I can see is if there was misrepresentation at the time the lease was formed. That is, the developer knew that there was going to be an antenna and specifically said there wouldn't be. This falls flat if a) they never mentioned antennas or b) the decision to install it was made after the lease was formed. | "Understanding the law" and the availability of information on law and in particular the real estate laws of NYC are different things. There are many online resources for the law; Google "NYC Real Estate law" and look at Wikipedia, Findlaw, Justia, the Cornell and Stanford law sites, state and federal government sites that make codes available, etc. But understanding the law takes your own effort and your skills at reading and critical thinking. It's your choice to read and think and take classes in the law if you choose, i.e. Law | edX. No one or any government is obligated to you in that respect. |
Can people criticize the Imperial Family in Japan? Can people criticize the Imperial Family in Japan? I can't find a case or article about law, people in prison, or deportation of a foreigner for criticizing the Imperial Family. | Yes The 1947 constitution abolished Lèse majesté in Japan. | At the federal level, per 18 USC 751, escaping is a crime. In United States v. Allen, 432 F.2d 939 it was held that an arrest need not be lawful in order for an escape to be illegal; Laws v. US states that "This court has said that a sentence imposed for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 751 is 'not affected by the validity of the sentences being served at the time of the escape'", giving numerous citations. I don't find cases where the escapee was exonerated; prosecutors have the discretion to not prosecute for committing a crime, so it would be hard to find a case where the legality of such a conviction was upheld (also, hard to find a jury willing to convict in such circumstances). | I think that there won't be any trouble from Germany, but the US could be a problem if the girl reports the case to authorities. In that case, further details would depend on the state in question. As far as Germany is concerned, there are two sections in the penal code that could be relevant here: § 176 StGB - Sexual abuse of children § 182 StGB - Sexual abuse of juveniles To make things more complicated, we would also have to take into account juvenile penal law and whether Germany would have jurisdiction in the first place. 1) Jurisdiction: I'm not sure whether this case would fall into German jurisdiction under § 3 StGB as the case could be deemed to be committed in the US. However, in that case, Germany could still assume jurisdiction under § 5 item 8 StGB. 2) Since our guy was only 18, it would be at the discretion of the court to decide whether juvenile criminal law or regular criminal law is to be applied. In the former case, the sentence would be lower (if there is a sentence at all). But then we still have to figure out whether our guy broke a law in the first place. So first of all, let's take a look at § 176 StGB: “Section 176 Sexual abuse of children (1) Whoever performs sexual acts on a person under 14 years of age (child) or has the child perform sexual acts on them incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term of between six months and 10 years. (2) Whoever causes a child to perform sexual acts on a third person or has a third person perform sexual acts on the child incurs the same penalty. (3) In especially serious cases, the penalty is imprisonment for a term of at least one year. (4) Whoever 1. performs sexual acts in the presence of a child, 2. causes the child to perform sexual acts, unless the act is subject to a penalty under subsection (1) or subsection (2), 3. influences a child by way of material (section 11 (3)) or information and communication technologies a) in order to cause the child to perform sexual acts on or in the presence of the offender or a third person or to have the offender or a third person perform sexual acts on the child or b) in order to commit an offence under section 184b (1) no. 3 or under section 184b (3) or 4. influences a child by showing pornographic images or depictions, by playing pornographic audio recordings, making pornographic content available by way of information and communication technologies or pornographic speech incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term of between three months and five years. (5) Whoever offers or promises to supply a child for an offence under subsections (1) to (4) or who arranges with another to commit such an offence incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term of between three months and five years. (6) The attempt is punishable; this does not apply to offences under subsection (4) nos. 3 and 4 and subsection (5).” Since the girl is 15 years old, this section is probably not relevant. However, to know for sure, we would need to know her exact age when contact started. If she was only 13 years and 11 months and contact lasted 1 year and 2 months, then § 176 might be relevant after all. That takes us to § 182. “Section 182 Sexual abuse of juveniles (1) Whoever abuses a person under 18 years of age by taking advantage of a predicament by 1. performing sexual acts on that person or having said person perform sexual acts on them or 2. causing the person to perform sexual acts on a third person or to have sexual acts performed on them by a third person incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a fine. (2) A person over 18 years of age who abuses a person under 18 years of age by performing sexual acts on that person or having that person perform sexual acts on them for a consideration incurs the same penalty. (3) A person over 21 years of age who abuses a person under 16 years of age by 1. performing sexual acts on that person or having that person perform sexual acts on them or 2. causing that person to perform sexual acts on a third person or to have a third person perform sexual acts on that person, and thereby exploits the victim’s lack of capacity for sexual self-determination, incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or a fine. (4) The attempt is punishable. (5) In the cases under subsection (3), the offence is prosecuted only upon request, unless the prosecuting authority deems there to be a special public interest in prosecution which calls for ex officio intervention. (6) In the cases under subsections (1) to (3), the court may dispense with imposing a penalty pursuant to these provisions if, having regard to the conduct of the person against whom the offence was committed, the wrongfulness of the act is minor.” § 182 para. 1 StGB applies only to cases where the offender takes advantage of a predicament. I seriously doubt there's a predicament involved here. § 182 para. 2 StGB only applies for sexual acts for consideration, i. e. when money is being paid. Since apparantly there was no payment involved in this case, no problem here and we can go on to para. 3. § 182 para. 3 StGB only applies to cases where the victim lacks the capacity for self-determination and the offender is at least 21 years old. Neither is the case here. Summary: As far as Germany is concerned, there's no trouble to be expected under § 182 StGB. § 176 StGB might cause problems but only if the girl was under 14 when contact began. (You stated that she's 15. This could mean that she just turned 15 but was 13 years and 11 months when contact began.) As far as German law is concerned, it looks like our guy was overly cautious and there was no need to cut contact. From the US perspective, however, things will probably be different. I'm not familiar with US law but we would probably need to know the state in question. | No A government performing the functions of government (like issuing a visa) is not in a contractural relationship with the person they are doing it for so there is no basis in contract law for such a suit. It might be arguable that they were negligent, however, first they would have to agree to be sued as they have sovereign immunity, secondly you would need to prove that they owed you a duty of care which I am far from sure they do and thirdly you would need to prove that they breached it which I don't think they did. | Does this mean all countries law applies to it? Basically yes. If the videos are in english and are about science in general does this mean if some country some day bans ( imprisonment ) science videos or use of a specific colour in videos can they extraterritorialy enforce this imprisonment if they are in some other country like USA or India? With respect to criminal cases, only if it can arrest that person or convince another country to arrest and extradite that person. Generally speaking, countries will only extradite someone if it is a serious offense under the domestic laws of the country of arrest as well as the country requesting that the person be handed over, and also only if the crime occurred in or was targeted at the requesting country. Sometimes the arrest is not legal in the place where it is made. For example, in this case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court (the quote is from the official syllabus to the case): Respondent, a citizen and resident of Mexico, was forcibly kidnapped from his home and flown by private plane to Texas, where he was arrested for his participation in the kidnapping and murder of a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent and the agent's pilot. After concluding that DEA agents were responsible for the abduction, the District Court dismissed the indictment on the ground that it violated the Extradition Treaty between the United States and Mexico (Extradition Treaty or Treaty), and ordered respondent's repatriation. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Based on one of its prior decisions, the court found that, since the United States had authorized the abduction and since the Mexican government had protested the Treaty violation, jurisdiction was improper. Held: The fact of respondent's forcible abduction does not prohibit his trial in a United States court for violations of this country's criminal laws. U.S. v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992). I mean can a country just bring to jail any youtuber outside its borders ( using its national language as the language of the video ) who uploads content of international appeal because of some law? If the country can manage to arrest the person, yes. There are high profile cases from Saudi Arabia where that has happened. See, e.g., here and here (a blogger and his sister arrested in Saudi Arabia, while his wife and children flee to Canada), here (journalists for Lebanese periodical arrested in Saudi Arabia in relation to years old publications) here (more journalists arrested in Saudi Arabia), here ("A male Saudi Arabian teenager has been arrested in Riyadh over a series of online videos of conversations between him and a female Californian streaming-video star that went viral."), here (Yemeni blogger), and here (Washington Post journalist tortured and killed in Saudi Arabian embassy in Turkey at the direction of a senior member of the Saudi Arabian royal family). Also can a country just hold liable for youtube's data privacy practices a youtuber outside its borders and enforce the judgement if the practices of both youtuber and their chanell and youtube is legal in their home country? A country can hold anyone liable for anything its domestic laws allow it to hold someone liable for, and can enforce that judgment against any assets it can exert power over. Some countries with similar legal systems recognize each other's court judgments widely. Countries with very different legal systems often don't recognize each other's judgements. For example, most European countries do not recognize U.S. money judgment for torts (i.e. civil wrongs such as personal injury awards). Similarly, the U.S. does not recognize most foreign defamation judgments, and does not recognize most judgments of Saudi Arabian courts. One last thing is wether inclusion of ads make a difference? Usually not. But it can matter for purposes of assertions of lawsuit liability over someone outside the jurisdiction seeking to impose liability for something that harmed someone in their country. If conduct amounts to "doing business" in the country seeking to impose liability or amounts to a "purposeful availment" of the laws of the country seeking to impose liability in some why, an imposition of extraterritorial liability is more likely, and that tends to happen more in cases where there are ads that are commercial targeting the people of the country where the courts seek to impose liability. | If I did punch him , would that be okay? No, that would be Assault and Battery. If you did him serious injury you could face a charge of Grievous Bodily Harm. If you killed him, that would be murder. If you are in the UK, Canada or Australia and you were charged with murder you could claim provocation in an attempt to have the charge reduced to Voluntary Manslaughter. If you were in the US you could attempt to argue "extreme emotional or mental distress" if you are in a state that has adopted the Model Penal Code for any of the charges; if successful your sentence would be reduced. I saw people punch one another over this in movies. And I saw aliens invading the Earth in the movies - what happens in the movies if not necessarily true. Kissing my wife is adultery right? No, extramarital sex is adultery. Notwithstanding, adultery is not illegal in common-law countries. I'm pissed and don't know what to do? I sympathise with you but this is not a legal question. Whatever is going on between you, your wife and your neighbour is a social situation; not a legal one. | There are venue restrictions where political speech is restricted, such as on military bases; content restrictions (transmitting classified information to the world); you cannot defraud by saying false things in order to get something, you cannot defame a person, you cannot speak obscenely (though it's hard to tell what counts as "obscenity"). You cannot appropriate other people's property in speaking (i.e. copyright law is a restriction on speech). The type of speech restrictions seem to pertain to speech and violence caused by such speech. A classic limitation is that you cannot speak "fighting words" (Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire 315 U.S. 568), which in 1942 meant calling someone a "damned racketeer" and "damned Fascist", which the court characterized as "inherently likely to provoke a violent reaction". The court subsequently refined its position on "provocative" speech. In Virginia v. Black 538 U.S. 343 a law against cross-burning was found to run afoul of the First Amendment as a restriction on political expression, but it would be fully consistent with The Constitution to outlaw "cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate". This states may "prohibit only those forms of intimidation that are most likely to inspire fear of bodily harm". The current position is that you cannot incite to the imminent use of force. In Brandenburg v. Ohio 395 U.S. 444, the court stated that the First Amendment does not "permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action". There are myriad laws against threats, for instance in Washington you may not "knowingly threaten(s) to cause bodily injury immediately or in the future to the person threatened or to any other person", and you can't do that ("knowingly cause another to believe that the offender will cause serious physical harm to the person or property of the other person") in Ohio either. You can't get away with threatening "to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person" in California. This class of restrictions on speech seems to be quite robust. You may not induce panic in Ohio, e.g. shout "fire" in a theater -- I don't know if any other state has such a law. | If you wrote for example "I had thoughts about taking the axe from my garage and decapitating my neighbour", and your neighbour read that, he would reasonably be worried and contact the police. I would take that as a death threat, and the death threat is by itself illegal. There would be some range where I could claim that you were making a death threat and making excuses to avoid legal responsibility. You can have all the thoughs you like, you can write them into your private diary where nobody can read them, but as soon as you publish it, it becomes "speech" and some speech is illegal. |
First amendment and employment: Can a police department terminate an officer for speech? The following article from CNN describes a Michigan police officer being put on administrative leave for having KKK material at his home: https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/10/us/michigan-officer-placed-on-leave-kkk-document-house/index.html. The materials were discovered while a potential buyer was touring his house. Although I vehemently condemn the KKK, doesn't this officer have the right to display whatever he wants in his home so long as it doesn't actively and deliberately call for violence? Aren't these articles protected under the first amendment? I realize this is an extreme example, and as a police officer his job requires interacting with all races, but unless it can be shown that he's bigoted and that it negatively affected his job performance, isn't it illegal to fire him? Employers can restrict speech according to company policy while at work, but we all have to go home at some point. Can those restrictions follow us after clocking out? | In general, employers in the United States are free to fire you for your speech. The First Amendment does not apply to anyone except the government (other than a narrow set of circumstances where private parties act on behalf of the government or take on government roles, like when private universities employ campus police). If the officer was being fired from a job at a private company, this would not be an interesting question -- the answer would clearly be "no, there is no First Amendment claim here." That’s not to say labor laws might not come into play (for instance, federal law prohibits firing an employee for organizing a union, and some states prohibit firing for off-duty political speech); however, labor law protections exist by statute and are not derived from the First Amendment. What makes this interesting is that the government is involved. Unlike private employers, government agencies are bound by the First Amendment. In Pickering v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court held that this does restrict them in their role as employer and that they can't necessarily fire an employee for speech. Pickering imposes a balancing test, where the harm to the employee's First Amendment rights is weighed against the government's interest in efficient operation. Courts have given particular leeway to police departments punishing speech that would undermine public trust and confidence in the department. A police officer expressing racist views, even privately, can seriously hamper the effectiveness of the department if the speech gets linked back to them. For instance, see Pappas v. Giuliani, where the Second Circuit upheld the firing of an NYPD officer for anonymously mailing racist diatribes from home in his off-duty time. Another answer suggests that the main question is a public safety one: whether the officer could be trusted to carry out his duties without bias. But that's not the only legitimate consideration for the government employer. The courts have repeatedly held that public perception of an agency is a legitimate concern, especially when it comes to agencies (like the police) whose job requires maintaining good relations with the community. In Pappas, the officer was assigned as a computer operator who had no contact with the public, but he was still a police officer whose speech had a high potential to undermine NYPD community relations. | Section 381.00316 is unconstitutional because it is an unjustifiable content-based restriction on speech, in violation of the First Amendment. The law is unconstitutional because private businesses and their owners have a First Amendment right to demand that their customers engage in speech as a condition of doing business. If you've watched Showtime at the Apollo or America's Got Talent, you understand the concept that a business owner can make decisions -- objectively or subjectively -- about what kinds of speech they want to host. If you want to make it through your performance, it's incumbent on you to satisfy the predilections of the business owner. And this doesn't just apply to TV. If you went to a poetry slam at your local coffee shop, the owners could boot you if talked through the performances, making it difficult for other customers to enjoy the show. Likewise, they could boot you if you went to the mic and started spouting racist nonsense, or if you just stood at the mic and said nothing at all. In the Florida case, Norwegian is doing the same thing -- just not for artistic reasons. Beyond requiring customers to pay for a ticket, it is requiring its customers to communicate the message that they are vaccinated, and they are requiring them to communicate using written documentation. In other words, Norwegian is demanding that customers engage in speech ("I am vaccinated") in a certain way (written proof of vaccination), and that kind of exchange falls within the protections of the First Amendment. That speech is subject to regulation because of its vaccination-related content of that speech, making Section 381.00316 a content-based restriction on speech, which subjects it to strict scrutiny, meaning that the state cannot enforce the law unless it furthers a compelling governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to advance that interest. The state argued that the law furthered compelling governmental interests in protecting medical privacy and preventing discrimination, but the court wasn't buying it: Here, Defendant has presented no evidence to demonstrate that his asserted interests are in response to real problems that Florida residents are actually facing. There is no evidentiary support to show that residents have experienced intrusions on their medical privacy or discrimination because some businesses, including cruise lines, have required COVID-19 vaccination documentation. The legislative record cited by Defendant is bereft of any facts or data underpinning the Statute’s purported purpose. In light of the absence of any appropriate data, reports, or even anecdotal evidence on this issue, the Court cannot conclude that Defendant’s articulated interests are based on a problem that exists in fact. And even if these were compelling interests, the state failed to prove that the law was actually advancing them. Because the law outlawed the exchange of written communication rather than outlawing the vaccination requirements themselves, businesses remained free to demand information about vaccination status (through oral statements, for instance), and to discriminate against who they knew or believed to be unvaccinated. (N.B.: For procedural reasons, they court actually applied intermediate scrutiny, but the law ends up invalid for basically the same reasons.) Section 381.00316 is unconstitutional because it substantially burdens interstate commerce in violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause. The law was also struck down because it intrudes on the federal government's authority to regulate interstate (and international) commerce. When a law is challenged under the Dormant Commerce Clause, courts ask two questions: (1) Does the state law favor in-state economic interests; and (2) Does the state law's burden on interstate commerce outweigh the legitimate local benefits to the state? A "yes" answer to either will invalidate the law. Here, the court held that the law did not directly favor in-state economic interests, but that the burdens on commerce outweighed the local benefits. Because the law did not meaningfully advance any of the local interests it had invoked (as discussed above), but it did impose a substantial burden on interstate commerce because Norwegian's ships travel to additional ports where proof of vaccination is required: Section 381.00316 will prevent NCLH and other cruise lines from possessing verified information necessary to effectively and efficiently process landing and disembarking at various, preferred domestic and international ports where documentary proof of vaccination is required. This affects not only opportunities for vacation activities like sightseeing, but also responses to mechanical and medical emergencies, or even geopolitical crises. Depriving cruise lines of corroboration of passengers’ vaccination status impedes their ability to prepare and address these eventualities. Either the First Amendment violation or the Commerce Clause violation would have been independently enough to invalidate the statute. Norwegian also argued that the statute was preempted by the CDC's Conditional Sailing Order and related orders, but the court declined to address that argument. | In the united-states, those actions would be fully protected by the First Amendment. Andy has a constitutional right to speak freely about essentially whatever he wants -- including Mary's criminal conduct -- unless his speech falls into one of several narrowly defined categories, none of which would apply in this case. And because Mary has already put this information out on the Internet, it is likely not sufficiently private to support an invasion-of-privacy claim. However, the unfortunate reality is that complainants, police, prosecutors, and judges frequently ignore First Amendment protections. Indeed, many states have laws against "cyberstalking" and "telecommunications harassment" that are incredibly broad, and that clearly apply to conduct protected by the First Amendment. For instance, Ohio's telecommunications harassment statute makes it a crime to send an e-mail "with purpose to abuse, threaten, or harass another person." This means that many people who engage in First Amendment-protected speech end up getting prosecuted anyway. If they pay for a good lawyer who knows how to properly raise a First Amendment defense, they may escape any penalties. But because most defendants do not have those resources, and because many lawyers are unaware of the First Amendment implications of such prosecutions, most defendants in such situations likely end up being convicted despite behaving perfectly legally. In the united-kingdom, though, the situation is very different. Even if Mary is breaking the law, and even if Andy limits himself to strictly factual information about what's he's learned about her conduct, he may still be held civilly liable. Mary may also be able to pursue Andy criminally for harassment if his e-mail causes her substantial emotional distress, and civilly for "harassment by publication." The fact that this information is already public is likely not going to go very far in changing the analysis. Andy's best course of action is therefore to play it safe by keeping his mouth shut. Doing so has both legal and nonlegal benefits: He avoids exposure to the hassles of defending himself from criminal charges and he gets some time to examine the resentment, jealousy, paranoia that makes him want to humiliate his "friend." | No, it is not illegal to use the symbol of the federal government for your own personal use as it is a public domain symbol. However, the USMC will frown upon it. Marines have a sort of warrior culture ethos to them, when compared to the other branches of the U.S. military and a strong culture among those who served. Among Marine culture "there is no such thing as a former Marine"... that is, once you enter the service, you are a marine even if you retire (a former Marine is usually someone who was dishonorably discharged OR committed an action that would have gotten him/her discharged had they not retired). They do not take kindly to Stolen Valor (pretending or seeming to pretend you served when you did not). While this is legal to do per SCOTUS rule, it's not considered advisable. Most of the US military have dim views of Stolen Valor and will react very negatively. And seeing as how the Marines like to boast in song that they Guard Heaven for God upon Death, these are not enemies you would like to make. Tread extremely cautiously while doing this. | Do flight attendants have an unlimited leeway of forcing the passengers to listen to their gibberish that are completely unrelated to their duties? Pretty much, I'd say. It may not be a good customer experience, but the flight attendant certainly isn't doing anything illegal. You don't have a legal right not to hear speeches that offend your IP sensibilities. I don't think it's legally any different than if they were showing an in-flight movie that you didn't like. If you try to forcibly stop him, you are likely to be found in violation of 49 USC 46504, which prohibits "assaulting or intimidating a flight crew member or flight attendant of the aircraft, interferes with the performance of the duties of the member or attendant or lessens the ability of the member or attendant to perform those duties". Even if making speeches about Mickey Mouse is not part of his duties, anything physical you did to try to stop him would likely tend to also lessen his ability to perform his actual duties. Violation of 49 USC 46504 is a felony and carries a prison term of up to 20 years. If you try to shout him down, you might be charged with disorderly conduct under state or local law, like this guy. You could probably push your call button to summon another flight attendant, and politely state that you object to the loquacious crew member's behavior, and could they please ask him to stop. Alternatively, you can put on your noise-cancelling headphones and turn up the volume on your music. Anything beyond that and you're in a bad legal position. Of course, you can certainly file a complaint with the airline after the fact. There's a fair chance you'll get an apology, maybe some extra air miles, and the flight attendant might be disciplined or fired. But that's an internal customer service or personnel matter; nothing to do with law. | It is possible that there is such a booklet in some jurisdiction, and that local police are required to carry that booklet and show it to persons on demand. This link (apparently) publicly provides the police manual for the city of Seattle, except it is 5 years and a major lawsuit out of date. No provision seems to exist that requires showing authority to detain, when requested. There is no general requirement for all police and all laws, in the US, and the full set of state, county and city codes would be impractical to lug around. If required by law to carry and display some such document, then by law a person can demand to see a police officer's authority to detain. Even without such a law, you have a First Amendment right to challenge the detention, but that does not also enable you to resist arrest. A detention is not invalidated by the fact that the detainee is unsatisfied that the detention is legal. | There is no federal prohibition against sexual discrimination in public accomodations. Colorado has an applicable state law, which covers "any place of business engaged in any sales to the public", where "It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful ...to refuse, withhold from, or deny to an individual or a group, because of ...sexual orientation...the full and equal enjoyment of the goods...". No provision exempts lemonade stands. Churches etc. are specifically exempted: "'Place of public accommodation' shall not include a church, synagogue, mosque, or other place that is principally used for religious purposes". Sex discrimination is allowed "if such restriction has a bona fide relationship to the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of such place of public accommodation", an argument that can't reasonably be made in the described case. It is also not obvious that running a lemonade stand is a business (the courts will not admit unsubstantiated Wiki assertions as evidence). It would be relevant to wonder what constitutes a "business" under Colorado law. E.g. is a business license required? In Colorado (US) law, it has not been definitively decided whether there can be a religious exception to the anti-discrimination law. Masterpiece Cakeshop was decided without answering that (the state showed clear religious intolerance in its handling of the case). We do not know how a similar case will be decided: Arlene's Flowers was handed back to the state court with the instruction "do it again" (with nothing more than a mention of Masterpiece Cakeshop). The court cannot establish certain beliefs and practices as "valid religions" (Establishment Clause); the proxy expression that is used is "deeply held belief", which includes atheism. The relationship of the issue to the First Amendment is uncertain. | Since you asked, and it's a perfectly legitimate question, here's why it doesn't violate the Fifth Amendment (from Garner v. US): The Fifth Amendment doesn't say "you can't be made to say anything that hurts you." It says "no person...shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." The only time Fifth Amendment protection applies is if you are being forced by the government to make a statement that could open you up to an accusation or conviction of a criminal offense. It's fairly broad (if it would help prove any aspect of the charge, you can claim immunity), but it's also restricted (you can't claim it unless it really would tend to incriminate you). That means that you could only argue the Fifth Amendment if your tax return might help prove a criminal case against you (the fact that disclosing income leads to you needing to pay tax does not qualify as "self-incrimination"). But the amount of income is not one of those things that might incriminate you -- you can get income through all sorts of ways. The thing that is incriminating is revealing the source of the income, and you can claim Fifth Amendment privilege for that. So: The only time you could possibly claim privilege is if you were being forced into a statement that might tend to incriminate you in a criminal proceeding. A statement that makes you liable for tax doesn't mean it might incriminate you. Filing an income tax return isn't inherently incriminating. The fact that you have income not included in any other part of the return (illegal income goes under "other income") doesn't imply you've committed a crime -- lots of people have other income. The amount of income can't be incriminating. The source can be, but you can claim Fifth Amendment privilege for that if it might incriminate you. And lawful income under "other income" still might give rise to a reasonable fear of prosecution, so the fact that you're justified in claiming Fifth Amendment privilege in source of income doesn't mean you're guilty of a crime. Note that there are cases where you are flat-out exempt from filing tax returns under the Fifth Amendment: Marchetti v. US and Grosso v. US found that registration and tax on gambling could be blocked by a Fifth Amendment claim, which didn't even have to be asserted at time of filing, because merely filing the special return would establish you as a gambler (heavily regulated/often criminalized at the state level). The difference with the normal income tax form is that everyone (just about) files one, and so filing it doesn't mean you're a criminal. If there was a separate line along the lines of "Income from Illegal Drug Sales," that might be one thing (anything other than $0 is inherently incriminating). But all the questions are broad, and have many legal sources of income associated with them. |
Where can I find regulations for establishing shooting (firearm) schools in the UK? Are there set laws or regulations that govern the setup of a clay pigeon school in the United Kingdom. If so, where can I find the specifications. | There are many regulations to consider, for the firearms themselves, the permits needed by potential customers, and licensing you will need as a business dealing with firearms and ammunition. Start with the Home Office: https://www.gov.uk/search?q=firearms I.e., https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/479794/Guidance_on_Firearms_Licensing_Law_Nov_2015_v16.pdf | Leonard's law says that the school can restrict speech if it is against the religious tenets of the organization. Now I don't think school uniforms fall are part of the tenets of Catholicism, so why can private schools enforce dress codes? I see there's a misunderstanding of the Leonard's law. But I fault the California legislators (not you) for that confusion, since the statutory language is ambiguous and leads to the reasonable interpretation your inquiry reflects. The statute reads: (c) This section does not apply to a private postsecondary educational institution that is controlled by a religious organization, to the extent that the application of this section would not be consistent with the religious tenets of the organization. It is not that a religious school is allowed to restrict speech if it contravenes the tenets of that religion, but that the statute altogether is inapplicable to religious schools because it is considered an infringement of fundamental liberties to which religious institutions are entitled in the US. The [religious] school would prevail on the basis of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. See Dermody v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 530 S.W.3d 467, 474 (2017): The ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine prohibits courts from deciding cases "dependent on the question of doctrine, discipline, ecclesiastical law, rule, or custom, or church government[.]". (Please note that I strongly disagree with the application of that doctrine in the Dermody case and I consider it impermissibly outdated for the controversy litigated therein, but that is a separate issue). A religious school could convincingly argue that the judicial review of its uniforms policy infringes matters of ecclesiastical discipline/rule/custom, aspects which ultimately "involve an internal church dispute over religious authority or dogma" Roman Cath. Archbishop of LA v. Super. Ct., 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 209, 220 (2005). Infringements of ecclesiastical abstention and akin doctrines would be outweighed only in "compelling" [cases] because "the duty to prosecute persons who commit serious crimes is part and parcel of the government's `paramount responsibility for the general safety and welfare of all its citizens'" Roman Cath. Archbishop of LA v. Super. Ct. at 225 (brackets added in this answer). A free speech controversy such as the school's uniform policy simply does not meet that threshold. | Generally, the Second Amendment, so the argument goes, guarantees American citizens the right to bear arms, aka carry firearms. State laws vary by state. California, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, and New York are the only states that do not have a provision in their state constitutions mirroring or significantly reflecting the provisions of the Second Amendment (although New York has a civil rights law containing something almost the same as the Second Amendment). Campus carry laws are also decided at the state level. There are three types: Mandatory: requires publicly funded schools to, in general, allow on-campus carrying (even though certain locations, such as a basketball game, may nonetheless bar weapons). Institutional: each school determines whether or not to allow firearms. These policies are subordinate to state law according to, for example, court holdings in Colorado and Oregon, and as stated by the University of Texas. Non-permissive: the law, with some exceptions, bans firearms on any institution's property. SCOTUS has held in McDonald v. City of Chicago that the Second Amendment applies to state and local laws and, thus, state and local laws are limited in the same way that federal laws are limited with respect to an individual's right to keep and bear arms. It had previously already held that the Second Amendment protects an individual's right to own guns in District of Columbia v. Heller. | I'm not sure about USA law, it's probably similar to UK law. In the UK a trademark is registered for a particular business activity, and you can't just blanket register for "all" activities as that would be anti-competitive. I have a trademark "Dreamcraft" for dream interpretation and related activities. However, the name "Dreamcraft" is also a registered trademark for a company selling luxury yachts, and again for a company selling up-market craft materials. A website or organisation that is a gripe-site using the same name would not be in breach of any of these trademarks because it wouldn't be in direct competition with any of these companies. | Authorisation under section 51, Firearms Act 1968 is required but only if the criteria in the Home Office Guide on Firearms Licensing Law at Chapter 28: Authorisation of armed guards on UK registered ships is met: The policy to allow the use of armed guards applies only in exceptional circumstances: to ships transiting the area at risk of attack by pirates within the High Risk Area (HRA) which is bounded: in the Red Sea: northern limit: Latitude 15°N; in the Gulf of Oman: Northern limit: Latitude 22°N; Eastern limit: Longitude 065°E; Southern limit: Latitude 5°S; when ‘Best Management Practices’ to deter piracy is being followed fully but, on its own, is not deemed by the shipping company and the ship’s master as sufficient to protect against acts of piracy; AND the use of armed guards is assessed to reduce the risk to the lives and wellbeing of those on board the ship. The policy applies to internationally trading passenger ships and cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and above. The policy only applies in relation to the protection of UK registered ships. The assurance process for the authorisation of private maritime security companies is to ensure that as far as possible public safety is not endangered by the use of armed guards. Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSCs) wishing to employ armed guards on board UK registered ships in these exceptional circumstances must be authorised to possess a range of firearms (which may include section 1 and section 2 weapons), including those requiring an authority from the Secretary of State for the Home Department under section 5 of the 1968 Act, and be able to deploy them as necessary. All PMSCs wishing to employ armed guards on UK registered ships must receive clearance via the Home Office section 5 authorisation process. It is an offence for a person to have in his possession, purchase, acquire, manufacture, sell or transfer, or possess, purchase or acquire for sale or transfer, a weapon prohibited under section 5 of the 1968 Act without the authority of the Secretary of State. It is also an offence not to comply with any condition of the authority. [...] 28.14 The PMSC must provide details of the number and type of section 5 prohibited firearms they wish to possess on board the UK registered ship, and why this number and type of weapon is necessary. All PMSCs must be authorised to possess section 5 firearms. The High Risk Area covered by this policy is shown by the red/orange hatching on this map, sourced from UK War Risks (no affiliation): 1Section 5(3) of the 1968 Act states: In this section “authority” means an authority given in writing by— (a) the Secretary of State (in or as regards England and Wales), or (b) the Scottish Ministers (in or as regards Scotland). In this instance, the authorisation would presumably be given by the Home Secretary | This is a question with a subjective answer, not a legal one. "Should I have to turn in my gun" legally, nobody is forced to turn in their guns because of mental illness. There are fourteen states in the United State that have laws to be able to seize weapons from mentally unstable individuals under what is known as "extreme risk protection orders(ERPOs)", these states are: California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. North Caroline only restricts mentally ill individuals from buying firearms, not from owning them. Please see Possession of firearms by people with mental illness for more information about different states laws on mental illness and firearm use. | I think haveibeenpwned would be legal in the EU because it carries out a task in the public interest (Art. 6(1)(e)), and it shares no more data then necessary, for example you can search for a password, but it would not show you the emailaddress which belongs to that password. It would also be legal for you to hold a copy of a leaked database, but only if you have a legitimate interest (Art. 6(1)(f)) to have it. Being a security company does not change that, but finding a legitimate interest might be easier. If you have a legitimate interest to hold a copy of a leaked database, it does not mean you can use it in any way you like. For example testing if the password still works, is very likely illegal everywhere in the EU. But I'm not familiar with the UK laws. | As @DavidSupportsMonica says, you can't go back in time to fix the problem. As a rule regulators are more interested in obtaining compliance than throwing the book. There are no sentencing guidelines for health and safety offences, but most convictions lead to a fine. However HSE Policy is that enforcement should be proportionate to the degree of non-compliance and the level of risk created. 5.2 In our dealings with duty holders, we will ensure that our enforcement action is proportionate to the health and safety risks and to the seriousness of any breach of the law. This includes any actual or potential harm arising from any breach, and the economic impact of the action taken. 5.4 Applying the principle of proportionality means that our inspectors should take particular account of how far duty holders have fallen short of what the law requires and the extent of the risks created An annual inspection that was overdue by one day is a very minor failing, and the principle of proportionality means that you are most likely to get verbal advice not to let it happen again. You say "if anything happens", presumably meaning if there is an actual incident or serious risk, such as a fire or CO poisoning. Its true that in such a case they will certainly want to look at your records, but the proportionality rule still applies. They would need to be able to make a causal link between your failing and the actual incident to make any more of it, which wouldn't be the case here. |
Are medical malpractice lawsuits part of the public record? I know most lawsuits in the U.S. are part of the public record. Exceptions can be made to remove the names of minors etc., but, for the most part, lawsuit details are openly available. With that said, are there exceptions for medical malpractice cases that include protected HIPAA information? If someone files a medical malpractice case, are the contents of those cases and details regarding their medical history exposed? | Different kinds of court records are subject to different rules, but generally speaking, the public has a right to access the complaint in a civil case, derived from both the First Amendment and common law. Under common law, the Court should only block public access if it determines that some interest in secrecy outweighs the interests promoted by the general policy of openness, which include the promotion of actual fairness and the appearance of fairness, community therapeutic value, and facilitating news coverage of the case. Even if you can get the records sealed under the common law test, you still need to pass the First Amendment test, which asks whether there is a compelling governmental interest in limiting access to the record and whether sealing it is the least restrictive way of achieving that interest. The answer to both questions is usually no. In applying those tests, HIPAA neither requires nor permits courts to make exceptions to the public's right to access court records. Its privacy rules only govern protected health information in the possession of medical providers, insurers, etc. This means that filing a medical malpractice case will almost certainly result in the facts underlying that case becoming part of the public record. One could petition the court to seal portions of the record if they were particularly sensitive, but the court is basically required to do whatever it can to avoid granting that motion. | 1a - Where is US government website where person can requesting free copy of their MIB (online or by phone). And I don't mean MIB.com. I am looking for government website that would reference something like MIB, i.e. for instance Federal Trade Commission website references annualcreditreport.com There isn't one. The right to medical information is a right you have vis-a-vis individual heath care providers and insurance companies that have your medical information. The U.S. government does not have access to this information and doesn't facilitate you getting this information, except that you could sue in federal court to get it if the person required by law to provide it to you didn't give it to you. (The fact that the U.S. government does not have access to individual health information is one of the reasons that major medical research studies that capture a sample of the entire population of a country for a given time period are often done instead in foreign countries that have comprehensive medical records databases. In the U.S., the best possible alternative is often to look at the medical records of servicemen and veterans who received government provided health care, or to create very large voluntarily long term studies of populations such as doctors and nurses.) Even in the case of credit reports, the government website merely ends up directing you to a private sector website maintained by credit reporting websites and is not a government website. 1b - Where is US government website where person can requesting free copy of their other personal records (online or by phone) You can apply to the U.S. government via one of the IRS websites to get transcript of your past tax returns for a certain number of years. You can apply to the Social Security Administration to get your earnings history for Social Security purposes and I think that can be done from their website or by telephone. There is a U.S. government website called PACER at which you can get copies of all non-sealed filings in all federal court cases, and all filings in court cases to which you are or have been a party. There is U.S. government website at which you can ascertain whether or not a building, including your home, is in a flood plain. There is a U.S. government website that allows you to locate people who are currently incarcerated in federal prison. There is a U.S. government website that allows you to review census data from time periods when almost everybody is dead. I believe that old immigration records can also be accessed in this manner. There is a phone number at the Veteran's Administration where veterans can ask about their personal veteran's benefits. I'm not sure if that have a website from which they can do so yet. Last time I checked, a long time ago, they didn't. There are several websites and phone numbers that federal employees can access to get their personnel record type information. This is absolutely not a comprehensive list. It shouldn't be hard for you to research yourself the current web address for these sites which changes fairly often anyway. You can get many other kinds of information from the U.S. government that is about you via the Freedom of Information Act (a.k.a. FOIA), but generally speaking, this information isn't available via a website or by phone. Usually, you have to request it in a written letter or application unless a new website allowing you to do this that I don't know about has been created recently. | Under 45 CFR 164.402 a "breach" is the acquisition, access, use, or disclosure of protected health information in a manner not permitted under subpart E of this part which compromises the security or privacy of the protected health information. Disclosing PHI to random people is not permitted under subpart E. Then then allow that it can be deemed to not be a breach if they can "demonstrate[] that there is a low probability that the protected health information has been compromised based on a risk assessment of certain factors – there isn't any clear yes/no rule as to how you could say that disclosing PHI is not a breach. If they discover a breach, they must notify the affected individual. One ploy would be for them to stick their heads in the sand and be careful to not discover: but §164.404(2) says A covered entity shall be deemed to have knowledge of a breach if such breach is known, or by exercising reasonable diligence would have been known, to any person, other than the person committing the breach, who is a workforce member or agent of the covered entity So if, for example, they had been told that person X has moved, a reasonably diligent person would know that sending PHI to the old address will result in a breach. The Sec'y of HHS must also be notified of the breach, though this can go in the annual report if the breach involves fewer than 500 people. The affected individual can also file a complaint with HHS. | If they do a treatment which you didn't consent to and harm you they risk being sued. As such, they get you to sign a consent form to prove you agreed to the treatment and were informed about what was going on and any material risks. They had implied verbal consent from you which is enough legally, but there's a risk that if it went wrong you could claim you didn't consent, they lied about what treatment you had, and they illegally did it. As an example, they often drip something into your eye which can sometimes cause blurry vision for a while. If you had blurry vision after and crashed your car you could theoretically sue them because you say you didn't consent to that and they have no proof you did. | The general rule is that "public records" must be disclosed unless they are by definition not public records. This study summarizes US public records law on a state by state basis, if the issue is about the US. Taking Massachusetts as an example, the law defines public record here, so if the item is not a public record, it is not required to disclose the item. Clause 26 has a long list of exceptions such as (j) the names and addresses of any persons contained in, or referred to in, any applications for any licenses to carry or possess firearms issued pursuant to chapter one hundred and forty or any firearms identification cards issued pursuant to said chapter one hundred and forty and the names and addresses on sales or transfers of any firearms, rifles, shotguns, or machine guns or ammunition therefor, as defined in said chapter one hundred and forty and the names and addresses on said licenses or cards ... (o) the home address and home telephone number of an employee of the judicial branch, an unelected employee of the general court, an agency, executive office, department, board, commission, bureau, division or authority of the commonwealth, or of a political subdivision thereof or of an authority established by the general court to serve a public purpose, in the custody of a government agency which maintains records identifying persons as falling within those categories; provided that the information may be disclosed to an employee organization under chapter 150E, a nonprofit organization for retired public employees under chapter 180, or a criminal justice agency as defined in section 167 of chapter 6. (p) the name, home address and home telephone number of a family member of a commonwealth employee, contained in a record in the custody of a government agency which maintains records identifying persons as falling within the categories listed in subclause (o). If the information is not legally a public record, there is no obligation to disclose. There is a general requirement via statute, regulation and court rulings requiring the government to protect personal information, such as this. You can get a list of sources on that topic here. This does not mean that the government body in question can be forced to redact that information, but it is at least possible that there is a (slim) legal basis for requiring them to protect your privacy. | Can a court order reveal an ssn? Yes, although the legitimacy of such order strongly depends on the claims/charges at issue. That being said, the party may (and should) file a motion to have the records sealed, since the public disclosure --insofar as court filings are public records-- of a SSN is extremely unlikely to advance "the interests of justice" in the claims at issue. | Was the case Sealed? Or is it considered to be Private? Those are two different cases. I was not able to find any laws regarding sealing, or expunging records of Name Changes, but was able to find the Utah Law for Criminal Records. I can only assume they draw from one another. All that being said, assuming your whatever case is sealed, then Some records are sealed. In these kinds of cases, even information about the existence of the case is not publicly available. A person seeking access to a sealed record must petition the court for permission to unseal the records. Rule 4-202.03 states that, ....no one may access a sealed court record except by order of the court. A judge may review a sealed record when the circumstances warrant. From that I can assume that, The records are not public. The records will not show up in a routine check The records will be known only if a there is a court order. Comparing it with the Expungement Act, Continued Use of Sealed Records After sealing, BCI continues to index and maintain all expunged records of arrests and convictions, but the records will not be released to the public. BCI will not divulge any information contained in the expunged records to any person or agency without a court order, unless authorized by statute to do so. Upon request, the following organizations may receive information contained in expunged records: the Board of Pardons and Parole Peace Officer Standards and Training federal authorities, unless prohibited by federal law the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing and the State Office of Education Both cases above require a court order to get that seal record information. However, from what I gather only expunged criminal records can be access upon request by the Division of Occupational Licences. Bottom line, it sounds like you are safe to mark is no previous name, but you may lose your license in the future if something goes south. I will recommend you to get a professional look into the word of the law and provide you with a written statement of the actual law. Another thing you can try is write to the court who sealed your case, present them the situation and explain what you have found so far, and ask for guidance. | Where did California get authorization to receive my medical info from Walgreens? From HIPAA. Permitted Uses and Disclosures. A covered entity is permitted, but not required, to use and disclose protected health information, without an individual’s authorization, for the following purposes or situations: (1) To the Individual (unless required for access or accounting of disclosures); (2) Treatment, Payment, and Health Care Operations; (3) Opportunity to Agree or Object; (4) Incident to an otherwise permitted use and disclosure; (5) Public Interest and Benefit Activities; and (6) Limited Data Set for the purposes of research, public health or health care operations.18 Covered entities may rely on professional ethics and best judgments in deciding which of these permissive uses and disclosures to make. ... (5) Public Interest and Benefit Activities. The Privacy Rule permits use and disclosure of protected health information, without an individual’s authorization or permission, for 12 national priority purposes.28 These disclosures are permitted, although not required, by the Rule in recognition of the important uses made of health information outside of the health care context. Specific conditions or limitations apply to each public interest purpose, striking the balance between the individual privacy interest and the public interest need for this information. ... Public Health Activities. Covered entities may disclose protected health information to: (1) public health authorities authorized by law to collect or receive such information for preventing or controlling disease, injury, or disability and to public health or other government authorities authorized to receive reports of child abuse and neglect; (2) entities subject to FDA regulation regarding FDA regulated products or activities for purposes such as adverse event reporting, tracking of products, product recalls, and post-marketing surveillance; (3) individuals who may have contracted or been exposed to a communicable disease when notification is authorized by law; and (4) employers, regarding employees, when requested by employers, for information concerning a work-related illness or injury or workplace related medical surveillance, because such information is needed by the employer to comply with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OHSA), the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MHSA), or similar state law. See: HIPAA Privacy Rule In plain English... A covered entity (Walgreens) is allowed to use and disclose your PHI without your authorization to public health authorities for controlling and preventing diseases. Additionally, they are allowed to receive this information for the purposes of adverse event recording (reactions to shots), tracking of products (tracking of shots), and notifying you of issues related to the product you were given. Is this legal, and can the State be indicted for breach of privacy? Yes, this is legal, and no, the State cannot be sued for it. |
Bringing an electric gun in the streets (Belgium) Is it permissible to bring an electric gun in a hoster just in case of self-defense? Is there a need of a special written permission by a police department or a weapon center or by a court? What are the bureaucratic steps to entertain for this? Even if it is GENERALLY illegal, can I ask for a specific permission and get it through a hard bureaucratic process? Jurisdiction: Belgium | This answer assumes that with the term electric gun that you mean a electric gun, which is also called a Taser. Is it permissible to bring an electric gun in a hoster just in case of self-defense? With the exception of Austria, such devices are generally forbidden. In many, the police were allowed to use them, but that is now often restricted. Therefore for Belgium, you would need a permit issued against the Weapons Act 2006. The chances for such a permit, to also be carried openly in a holster, for the general purpose of self defense is very unlikely such permits are mostly only granted when the applicant is deemed by the authorities to be in great danger Sources: electric gun (English) United Kingdom Tasers are considered "prohibited weapons" under the Firearms Act 1968 and possession is an offence. Pistolet à impulsion électrique (French) France The Taser is classified as a Category B weapon (as is, for example, a 357 Magnum with a barrel: a weapon subject to authorization). Belgium The possession and carrying a taser by an individual is banned, as defined in the Weapons Act 2006 Elektroimpulswaffe (German) Germany Distance electro-pulse devices (such as Airtaser) are generally prohibited in Germany since April 1, 2008 and are not eligible. Switzerland In Switzerland, the transfer, acquisition, transfer and transfer of electroshock devices "that can impair people's resilience or permanently damage their health" is prohibited. Austria Under § 1 Z 1 WaffG 1996 is thus confirmed that z. B. o. A. Stun gun "[...] is essentially designed to eliminate or reduce the ability to attack or defend people by direct action [...]" and that it is not a prohibited weapon gem. Paragraph 17 (1) is worded as follows: 'Forbidden is the acquisition, importation, possession, and keeping of arms, the form of which is capable of simulating another object, or which are disguised with objects of daily use;' Spanish weapons law limits electric guns for the use of state security/military forces: Article 5 It is forbidden the marketing, trade, ownership and use, except by state agents specially allowed, and in line with the dispositions of the several regulations of: [..] c) electric defenses1, rubber defenses, tonfas or similar 1 And yes, electric defenses include electric guns. | The specific elements of the crime in question are going to be defined by Maltese law, which appears to be a blend of a European-style civil code with English-style common law. However, under ordinary Anglo-American standards, the alleged acts do seem to meet the legal definitions of these terms. At common law, an "assault" consists of placing someone in fear of an unwanted touching, and a "battery" is a completed assault; that is, an actual unwanted touching. If Mr. Suda, as alleged, took the victim's hand and touched it to his own genitals, without her consent, he committed an assault and battery. Any touching can constitute a battery, from a tap on the shoulder to a bullet in the head. Likewise, at common law, "violence" is any degree of physical force. If he tricked her into touching his genitals, that would not be a crime of violence; if he physically moved her hand to his genitals with his own hand, then he used physical force, or violence, to commit the crime. Again, what actually needs to be proven will depend on specifics you would need a Maltese lawyer to go into--but under general common law principles, neither "assault" not "violence" are particularly surprising. | No, it's not legal. This is the tort of assault, not to be confused with criminal assault. A tort of assault does not require actual contact, whereas some jurisdictions define criminal assault elements as those of battery; in others, it is an intended battery without the contact. The elements of common law assault are: A positive, voluntary act You can't do this accidentally or negligently That intentionally causes reasonable apprehension in the plaintiff The person must reasonably apprehend contact. However, this is a subjective standard. If the plaintiff does not apprehend contact, then this element is not satisfied. Additionally, while words alone are rarely enough to satisfy this element, words in a certain tone, or with certain actions, may be. Also, verbal threats are not required for this element. Of immediate You can't assault someone by threatening them with something that'll happen in the future, if it's distant enough. Whether this is distant enough is decided on a case-by-case basis. Unlawful contact The contact needs to be unlawful and harmful. In the situation you describe, a civil action in assault would have all requirements fulfilled. You might also succeed in pressing criminal charges, depending on the jurisdiction concerned. Police officers generally have the power to maintain the peace, and an assault is most definitely a breach of the peace. Again, depending on the jurisdiction, they may have the power to detain them, or to ask them to move along, for example. | For regular firearms you only have to comply with the laws of the state to which you are moving. Since Utah (presently) has no state-specific restrictions on ownership or possession of AR-15 rifles that means in this case, as you say, "no problem." (The only exception would be registered NFA items – e.g., machine-guns, suppressors, SBR, SBS, DD, AOW – for which the BATFE typically requires notice when you are moving them interstate. But if you have gone through the trouble of registering such an item, you probably already know that.) Finally, you have to exercise some care in the actual interstate transportation of firearms: If you are passing through a jurisdiction where possession of them is restricted then you have to follow the rules provided in the Firearms Owners Protection Act. In particular: Under FOPA, notwithstanding any state or local law, a person is entitled to transport a firearm from any place where he or she may lawfully possess and carry such firearm to any other place where he or she may lawfully possess and carry it, if the firearm is unloaded and locked out of reach. In vehicles without a trunk, the unloaded firearm must be in a locked container other than the glove compartment or console. Ammunition that is either locked out of reach in the trunk or in a locked container other than the glove compartment or console is also covered. | The principle of constitutional law is that in order to arrest you, the officer would need probable cause. Certain acts are in themselves violations of the order (being closer to another person that 6 feet, illegal sneezing). Walking in public does not per se constitute a violation. In order to briefly stop a person walking on the street (a "Terry stop"), the officer needs a reasonable suspicion that the person is in violation of the law. That means there has to be a reason, and a gut feeling does not count. An officer would not (legally) be able to stop every person they see walking down the street / driving, and demand an explanation of where they are going. If a person is just aimlessly wandering down the strees with friends (even if they are sufficiently separated), that could suffice to justify a stop, given the limited legal excuses for being outside your home. | It ultimately depends on the situation, but here's a general breakdown: Many states in the United States have anti-trespassing laws that allow citizens to use deadly force in response to threat of bodily harm. These laws and statutes intersect to provide more protections for gun owners encountering trespassers, burglars, or thieves in their home. However, pointing a gun at someone can be considered assault on the idea that it is a threat that puts someone in fear of harm. Thus, the legality of pointing your gun at someone depends on numerous factors. To name a few, it depends on How a state's criminal laws are defined What was the trespassing incident? Was the trespasser in one's home, or on one's property Whether one feared bodily harm from the trespasser Here's a real instance of this happening in the US: A farmer from New Hampshire was sentenced to 3 years in prison after brandishing his handgun to a trespasser. See article here. | The felon-possession law is Utah Code Ann. §76-10-503, which distinguishes Category I restricted person and Category II restricted person, a complex definitions that distinguish felons in general and violent felons, as defined at Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.5. In the case stricter case, the law says: (2) A Category I restricted person who intentionally or knowingly agrees, consents, offers, or arranges to purchase, transfer, possess, use, or have under the person's custody or control, or who intentionally or knowingly purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or has under the person's custody or control: (a) any firearm is guilty of a second degree felony; or (b) any dangerous weapon other than a firearm is guilty of a third degree felony. and in the less strict case: (3) A Category II restricted person who intentionally or knowingly purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or has under the person's custody or control: (a) any firearm is guilty of a third degree felony; or (b) any dangerous weapon other than a firearm is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. The law does not impose any restrictions unrestricted people. A "dangerous weapon" is defined in 76-10-501(6)(a) as "a firearm; or an object that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury". They add a bit of subjectivity to their definition of "dangerous weapon" (i.e. "we'll decide after the fact if the thing is a dangerous weapon"), because: (b) The following factors are used in determining whether any object, other than a firearm, is a dangerous weapon: (i) the location and circumstances in which the object was used or possessed; (ii) the primary purpose for which the object was made; (iii) the character of the wound, if any, produced by the object's unlawful use; (iv) the manner in which the object was unlawfully used; (v) whether the manner in which the object is used or possessed constitutes a potential imminent threat to public safety; and (vi) the lawful purposes for which the object may be used. The felon could not have a stun gun with the intent to use it as a dangerous weapon, but it is not prohibited for a felon to have one to use on for legal purposes. There are contexts where stun guns are held to be dangerous weapons (United States v. Wallace, 800 F.2d 1509. Some states define stun guns as dangerous weapons, but that is not the case in Utah. It is also illegal for an unrestricted person to "sell, transfer, or otherwise dispose of any firearm or dangerous weapon to any person, knowing that the recipient is" a restricted person, and in cases of flagrant negligence the court might find that allowing such a person access to a dangerous weapon constituted "transferring" the weapon. | There is a defense of provocation This doesn’t apply in this instance because the provocation must be such that it would case a reasonable person to lose control. No reasonable person shoots a six year old. |
Could Trump shoot 100 House Democrats and avoid prosecution, at least while in office? A lawyer for Trump named Consovoy said in court that Trump was immune from prosecution even if he shot someone in the street. If Trump killed 100 House Dems, then the Democrats would certainly no longer control the House. | This is technically an open question, but there is a general consensus that Consovoy's argument is unprecedented and unsupportable. If the president can be dragged into civil litigation over private matters in the middle of his presidency, Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997), it seems unlikely that the courts would give him a pass on prosecution for a midterm murderous rampage. If Consovoy is right, though, the answer would have to be that yes, Trump could avoid prosecution. Posing the question that way sort of helps to highlight the problem with Consovoy's theory. As I understand it, Consovoy's argument is that impeachment is the only remedy for crimes committed by a president. But if the president can just kill of Congress, there's no one left to impeach him, leaving the country with no way to remove him. So again, the answer is almost certainly no. | There is no current authorization to bar any member of the house from the floor, so the answer depends heavily on what actually happens. Since remote voting was approved, no constituency would be disenfranchised. But we could imagine the house adopting a rule barring remote participation, and also barring entry to the House floor for any person not wearing a mask. The House is constitutionally allowed to set its own rules. The House did bar Adam Clayton Powell from being seated, and he did indeed sue. SCOTUS, most importantly, asserted that this is a justiciable question, and most importantly "In judging the qualifications of its members under Art. I, § 5, Congress is limited to the standing qualifications expressly prescribed by the Constitution". This could be overcome by expelling the member who refuses to wear a mask (Congress has the power to expel, but not exclude). There would be a significant conflict of rights in this case. Residents of the district has a right to representation (equal protection clause), but Congress has the right to expel members. But Congress has expelled 5 members, and most recently, Ohio's 17th district was without representation in the US House for a half a year after Traficant was expelled. That did not prevent the House from exercising its right to expel a member. | In various states, you may shoot a dog attacking livestock or running at large (the latter possibly only in Indiana). In Ohio, ORC 955.28 allows shooting a dog that threatens (etc.) "livestock, poultry, other domestic animal, or other animal, that is the property of another person, except a cat or another dog". So in fact, dog against cat is specifically exempted. The Kentucky law allows shooting a dog that trespasses and attempt to harm livestock (not cats). Texas has such a law, which says "A dog or coyote that is attacking, is about to attack, or has recently attacked livestock, domestic animals, or fowls may be killed", if they witness the event. This law is not limited to livestock and does not specifically exclude cats. | There is no definitive answer, which can only be determined by SCOTUS if faced with a case. DOJ has opined twice that "the indictment or criminal prosecution of a sitting President would impermissibly undermine the capacity of the executive branch to perform its constitutionally assigned functions". The Impeachment Clause (art.I, §3, cl.7) says Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law The exegesis of this clause is that this means a sitting president cannot first be prosecuted for a crime, but must first be removed from office. The counter-argument is that "nevertheless" indicates that this clause only states that a president can be removed and then prosecuted, and that removal does not preclude further action. In other words, the law has yet to be determined on this matter. | The law you cite says that the Secretary shall furnish such committee with any return or return information specified in such request That includes specific individual returns. That it was intended to include such returns is made clear by the provisions restricting identifiable individual data to executive session. Whether this ought to be the law might well be debated. Whether the House ought to use this law as a way to get at Trump's returns could also be debated. Those are matters of politics, or perhaps ethics, not law. Whether some other provision of law overrides this provision in this case is pretty clearly going to be argued in court, and we will see what the decision is. I won't try to predict it here. | Article I, Section 3, Clause 6 says The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two-thirds of the Members present. Therefore, the House cannot try an impeachment. The wording of the Constitution does not say "The Senate must try any impeachment delivered by the House". The option to reject an impeachment by simple majority runs completely counter to Senate tradition. But analogous to deployment of the "nuclear option" to change Senate rules, it is a conceivable outcome. The first impeachment presented to the Senate was against a Senator, William Blount in 1797, and in that instance the Senate appears to have voted that Blount was not an impeachable officer (so they did not vote on impeachment, but they did vote to expel him). In Nixon v. US, SCOTUS ruled that Senate impeachment actions are not justiciable. While current Senate rules require a trial, the rules can be changed by the Senate by a majority vote, and SCOTUS will not review such actions. The Senate can also adjourn and not take up one or more articles, as happened in Andrew Johnson's case. | It would not prohibit Colorado from passing the law, but it could prohibit implementing the law. SCOTUS rulings (Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486; Term Limits, 514 U.S. 779) establish that neither Congress nor the States can require additional qualifications of federal candidates beyond those listed in the Constitution. The relevant question is whether a law imposes an additional "qualification" on a candidate for president. Every state imposes at least one requirement on a person seeking to be a candidate on the ballot in a state: they must somehow "register" as a candidate. So the Qualifications Clause is not interpreted to mean "anybody can run for president as long as age and natural-born". The Anderson-Burdick doctrine allows certain kinds of requirements to be imposed on candidates, namely those that relate to a state's interest on properly managing elections. A no-felon law would clearly go way beyond the accepted state interest (regarding management of elections) reflected in Anderson-Burdick, and would be found to be as unconstitutional as requiring a candidate for president to have a law degree, or prohibiting a candidate from having a law degree. | First, there is no definitive correct answer to this question because it has never happened over the course of 45 Presidencies. But, it certainly could come up. If the President purports to pardon himself for a federal crime and is then prosecuted, the judicial branch would have to decide if the pardon was valid. But, I would disagree with the answer from @user6726, and would instead take the position that the concept of a pardon inherently implies that one is pardoning someone else. This is why President Nixon, when he resigned, had Vice President Ford, when he became President upon Nixon's resignation, pardon him, rather than pardoning himself. President Bush, in connection with the Iran-Contra scandal also took the position that he did not have the power to pardon himself. Basically, a pardon is an event that is ordinary conceived of as involving two persons, a giver of the pardon and a recipient. Also, recognizing the power of a President to pardon himself or herself would be to give him or her impunity to disregard the law not just in areas where he or she has Presidential immunity, but in anything that he has ever done in his life. (Also, the President can only pardon federal crimes, not state crimes.) There is, of course, an academic literature on the subject (which none of the answers in the PoliticsSE refer to and which the other answer here does not refer to). The two leading law review articles addressing the question are: Brian C. Kalt, "Pardon Me: The Constitutional Case against Presidential Self-Pardons" 106 Yale L.J. 779 (1996-1997) (obviously adopting my position). An expanded version of this article became a chapter in a book called "Constitutional Cliffhangers: A Legal Guide For Presidents and Their Enemies" by the same author. Robert Nida and Rebecca L. Spiro, "The President as His Own Judge and Jury: A Legal Analysis of the Presidential Self-Pardon Power" 52 Okla. L. Rev. 197 (1999) (closed access). It opens with the following language (in part): [C]an the President pardon himself for criminal acts committed while or before holding office? Article II of the Constitution prohibits a President from using the pardon power to overturn an impeachment.5 The Framers of the Constitution placed only this limitation on the ability of the President to exercise his pardon power,6 and the only sanction for the abuse of the pardon power is the removal of the President through impeachment.7 The Constitution is silent, however, as to whether the President may grant himself a pardon from prosecution and, if so, when such a pardon may be issued.8 In the over 20,000 instances that Presidents have used this exclusive power,9 no President has used this power to pardon himself.10 One viewpoint is that a presidential self-pardon is inherently inconsistent with "natural law," which proclaims that one may not judge oneself.11 This article is cited in Comparative Executive Clemency by Andrew Novak who calls it an unresolved question but believes many legal scholars believe that it is possible. Leading Constitutional law scholar Adrian Vermeule analyzes but does not resolve the issue in his book "The Constitution of Risk". A 2017 Vox review from 15 legal experts is here. Their views are mixed and nuanced. A 2017 op-ed in the Washington Post from a former member of Congress who was involved in the impeachment proceedings for President Nixon says "no." Another review of expert opinion in 2017 can be found here. This also noted a dispute within the realm of academic legal opinion. There has also been debate over whether treason is treated differently for pardon power purposes than other federal crimes, but the precedent of the pardons issued after the U.S. Civil War pretty definitively resolved this question in favor of the power of the President to pardon treason, so the nature of the federal offense wouldn't matter. Note also that the pardon power is not limited to cases where criminal charges have been brought or convictions have been obtained. This issue is irrelevant to a President's self-pardon power. |
Can Korean American men visit South Korea without being drafted? I've read some things about how Korean American males 18 or older can't visit South Korea between the age of 18 and 35? 38? (inclusive?) without being drafted into the military. South Korea, of course, requires all able male South Korean citizens between the ages of 18 and 28? 35? to serve in the military for 18? 24? months. Wikipedia's article on South Korean nationality law says that one way to automatically acquire South Korean nationality is “By being born to either a South Korean national father or South Korean national mother after 13 June 1998, or to a South Korean national father before then.” Does this require any registration on the part of your parents/relatives, or is it truly automatic? An article by Seattle Pi from 2004 gives an example of someone who was drafted because “it appears a family member -- maybe his paternal grandfather or his father, who is divorced from Chun's mother and lives in South Korea -- entered his name in the nation's family census registry, the hojok.” However, according to the Wikipedia article on hoju, it was abolished on January 1, 2008. It seems that before 2010, South Korean dual citizenship was impossible, so if one were born before 2010 and had ethnically Korean parents who were both American citizens at the time of their birth, that child wouldn't have any chance of automatically being a South Korean citizen? Is it still true that one would have to rescind their South Korean nationality before the age of 18, and one is unable to do so later? Does visiting Korea for a short period of time (I've heard 30 days) eliminate the risk of being drafted? Is there any paperwork you can fill out beforehand like you can with Israel? The relevant laws have been changing quite a bit in the past few decades apparently, so it's hard to tell what information is still true or what's outdated. Please cite reliable sources if you can. For clarification, I am not in any way Korean, so this question is just out of curiosity and/or for a friend. (Repost from https://travel.stackexchange.com/questions/149164/can-korean-american-men-visit-south-korea-without-being-drafted which was closed as it might be a better fit on this site) | This FAQ from the US embassy in Korea explains all of the concerns that a Korean-American might have. If you have a Korean lational parent, you are automatically Korean. Before March 31 of the year you turn 18, you must renounce your Korean citizenship, lest you be then subject to the military service law. If you were a Korean citizen and then gained another citizenship, you automatically lose your Korean citizenship, and if you did not complete your military obligation and did not obtain an overseas travel permit, you may be punished if you ever return to Korea. The travel permit lets you postpone military service until age 37, so if you are living overseas, by January 15 of the year you turn 25 you must apply for a travel permit. The laws are set up so that you must enlist by age 28, but must have obtained a travel permit by age 25. That means if you are abiding by the law, there is no risk of sudden conscription if you're there for a short period (e.g. as a tourist). The risk seems to come from not obtaining a travel permit. | Volokh commented on this. There is no 2nd Amendment issue, nor does federal law. It may be illegal in some states, depending on whether age is included in public accommodation anti-discrimination laws. For instance, Conn. Gen. Stat. §§46a-64 says (a) It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section: (1) To deny any person within the jurisdiction of this state full and equal accommodations in any place of public accommodation, resort or amusement because of race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, gender identity or expression, marital status, age, lawful source of income, intellectual disability, mental disability or physical disability, including, but not limited to, blindness or deafness of the applicant, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons; §46a-63 defines "public accommodation" (1) “Place of public accommodation, resort or amusement” means any establishment which caters or offers its services or facilities or goods to the general public, including, but not limited to, any commercial property or building lot, on which it is intended that a commercial building will be constructed or offered for sale or rent Public accomodation laws are how states deal with discrimination in sales, such as selling wedding cakes Illinois 775 ILCS 5/1-103 likewise prohibits age discrimination in public accomodations, but defines "age" as "the chronological age of a person who is at least 40 years old". Connecticut used to define "age" as "any age between forty and sixty-five, inclusive", but that clause was deleted. Lousiana also prohibits age discrimination (La. Rev. Stat. §51:2247). Their statement about age likewise limits anti-discrimination protection to "individuals who are at least forty years of age". Maryland in MD State Govt Code § 20-304 also bans age discrimination, and does not redefine "age" or limit the scope of those ages that are protected. So while it is generally legal to refuse to sell goods to the young (and sometimes mandatory, e.g. alcohol, firearms, tobacco), there are a few states where such a policy would violate state anti-discrimination laws. There can also be city laws (Seattle has very broad anti-discrimination laws), but they exclude age from the Public Accommodation subset of discrimination. | When can I re-apply for the citizenship, there is no date mentioned on the letter received. You can reapply as soon as you meet the criteria. If you don't move again to another state or USCIS district, and if you don't spend so much time outside the US that you fail to meet the physical presence requirement, then you can reapply on the three-month anniversary of your move to your current place of residence. The criteria are available at USCIS's Naturalization Information page: Naturalization Eligibility Requirements Before an individual applies for naturalization, he or she must meet a few requirements. Depending on the individual’s situation, there are different requirements that may apply. General requirements for naturalization are below. Be at least 18 years old at the time of filing Form N-400, Application for Naturalization. Be a permanent resident (have a “Green Card”) for at least 5 years. Show that you have lived for at least 3 months in the state or USCIS district where you apply. Demonstrate continuous residence in the United States for at least 5 years immediately preceding the date of filing Form N-400. Show that you have been physically present in the United States for at least 30 months out of the 5 years immediately preceding the date of filing Form N-400. Be able to read, write, and speak basic English. Have a basic understanding of U.S. history and government (civics). Be a person of good moral character. Demonstrate an attachment to the principles and ideals of the U.S. Constitution. | As long as they have diplomatic immunity, they don't have a residency status. If either parent didn't have diplomatic immunity, then the child is a subject to the jurisdiction and they become a citizen at birth. The short explanation with the reasoning can be found on the uscis website. Namely Children born in the United States to accredited foreign diplomatic officers do not acquire citizenship under the 14th Amendment since they are not “born . . . subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” and If one parent was an accredited diplomat, but the other was a U.S. citizen or non-citizen U.S. national, then the child was “born . . . subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,” and is a citizen. | Under Albanian law, the situation is somewhat open to interpretation. Law No. 7850 of July 29, 1994 (English translation) Part 1 Title 1 spells out the law of capacity. Article 6 sets 18 as the age of full majority: The person who reaches eighteen years old wins the full rights so that by his acts he gains rights and holds civil obligations. Articles 7-9 place limits on capacity for those who are younger. Those under 14 can act with approval of their legal representative, but unconditionally can be member of social organization, posses everything he gains by his work, to deposit his savings and to posses these deposits himself. Article 8 says say that he "who has not reached fourteen years old, has no capacity to act", and Article addresses 14-16 in the special case of fourteen to eighteen years who is unable to carry out his own affairs because of psychic diseases or mental illness is deprived of the capacity to perform legal transactions a court decision. These transactions can be performed through his legal representative. There is no law covering mentally-fit people between 14 and 18. The capacity to contract is neither affirmed (as for 18+) nor denied (as for 14-). Albanian Supreme Court decisions could be accessed and searched here to see if there have been any court rulings on disaffirmation of contract when one is between 16 and 18 years old. (Better translations here, Albanian original here). | You will probably not be allowed to enter the United States if your visa is expired. Sometimes foreign student advisors at a college or an immigration attorney will know how to expedite the process to get it renewed in time. Also, sometimes the offeror of a scholarship can move it back to accommodate your inability to get a timely visa renewal, assuming that it is possible to get a visa renewal at all. Applications from the Philippines are processed more slowly than applications from any other country as a matter of official policy. It also isn't obvious to me that you are really talking about a green card (lawful permanent residency) as opposed to a student visa. A tourist visa does not suffice in cases where you need either a student visa or a green card. You need professional help ASAP as this is a highly technical, non-intuitive area, even if that means paying an immigration lawyer hundreds of dollars. | Your children may have automatically become US citizens at birth, depending on how long their mother lived in the US before they were born. US law says that any child born abroad to an unmarried US citizen mother is automatically a US citizen, as long as their mother had lived in the US continuously for at least one year before the child was born. There is a clear discussion of the legal requirements in Chapter 3 of the USICS Policy Manual: US Citizens at Birth . Your specific situation is covered by § C.2: Child of a US Citizen Mother (also at the bottom of the page!). (The underlying statute, §1409 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, is here. Like most of the INA, §1409 is not reader friendly.) | Under the Constitution, the president has to be a natural born citizen of the US, a resident for 14 years (relevant in the early years), and 35 years of age or older. Any action to preclude a candidate has to be based on these qualifications. Art. II of the constitution spells out the powers of the executive branch. His primary power is to carry out laws enacted by Congress, therefore executive orders have to be based on some statute, or specific Constitutional authority (e.g. as commander-in-chief). No law allows the president to nullify the fact that Biden is a natural born citizen of the US, a resident for many time 14 years, and 35 years old. Congress has not passed a law declaring that Biden has been previously impeached and removed from office (another way to stop a person from being elected). There being no such authority, an order to that effect would not be legal. In addition, executive orders give orders within the executive branch, and the executive branch isn't in charge of certifying the next president: POTUS cannot give orders to the House of Representatives, or to the Supreme Court. |
US Permanent Resident : Risking naturalization if international travel is more than six months? I am a permanent resident of US having green card for last three years. This year on 25th July, I traveled to my home country and will go back to states on 17 Jan 2020. I would have spend close to six months outside the states. Now two months of reaching states, I again have to leave for another country for some important project. Now I am worried that would it effect my naturalization/citizenship process when I apply for it after having PR for five years? I have heard that you have to spend at least six months in a year in US to remain eligible for naturalization. Is that really true? I am unable to find such information on their site. It just says that I need to physically spend 30 months out of 5 years in US to remain eligible. Can anyone please provide some clarification with some official references if possible? | I have heard that you have to spend at least six months in a year in US to remain eligible for naturalization. Is that really true? No, that is not true. There is no requirement regarding amount of time you have to spend in the US in a year. The only requirements are the continuous residence requirement and the physical presence requirement. You are presumed to break continuous residence if you have an absence of more than 6 months (though it is possible to overcome the presumption with strong evidence for absences of between 6 months and 1 year). Since your trips are less than 6 months, they should be okay. It is possible that if you returned for just a day, and then leave again, the officer might consider the absences are really just one big absence, which would then potentially jeopardize continuous residence. I don't think that should be an issue in your case. The physical presence requirement is just physical presence for half of the required period (30 months if you are applying under the 5-year rule). So you would not meet it if you were gone for more than half the year every year. But being gone more than half the year for just one or two years, with the other years being here the whole time, should not be a problem for the physical presence requirement. | Yes 15 USC 1501, which is part of the Lanham Act, the basic US trademark law, provides in subsection (a)(2) that: (2) The application [for registration of a trademark] shall include specification of the applicant’s domicile and citizenship, the date of the applicant’s first use of the mark, the date of the applicant’s first use of the mark in commerce, the goods in connection with which the mark is used, and a drawing of the mark. This clearly implies that the applicant may have a citizenship other than US, or else ther ewould be nbo point in specifying the citizenship in the application. subsection (e) of the same section provides, in relevant part: If the applicant is not domiciled in the United States the applicant may designate, by a document filed in the United States Patent and Trademark Office, the name and address of a person resident in the United States on whom may be served notices or process in proceedings affecting the mark. This makes it cleat that an applicant need not be resident in the US., 15 USC 1141a provides that: (a) In general The owner of a basic application pending before the United States Patent and Trademark Office, or the owner of a basic registration granted by the United States Patent and Trademark Office may file an international application by submitting to the United States Patent and Trademark Office a written application in such form, together with such fees, as may be prescribed by the Director. (b) Qualified owners: A qualified owner, under subsection (a), shall— (b)(1) be a national of the United States; (b)(2) be domiciled in the United States; or (b)(3) have a real and effective industrial or commercial establishment in the United States. 1141a (b2) and (b)(3) make it clear that an applicant need not be a national (citizen) of the US. The USPTO's page "Trademark FAQs" lists under the heading "General - Trademark Help - Getting Started - Other" the following Q&A: Must I be a U.S. citizen to obtain a federal registration? No. However, your citizenship must be provided in the application. If you have dual citizenship, then you must indicate which citizenship will be printed on the certificate of registration. | Constitutionally, a person is only required to be granted U.S. citizenship if they are born in the United States. Any other form of citizenship is as provided by statute. So, 8 U.S.C. § 1409 makes some people citizens who would not otherwise be citizens in its absence. In that sense, it grants citizenship. Meanwhile, 8 U.S.C. § 1409(g) supports the proposition, which is a legal fiction in some cases, that someone is a "natural born citizen" of the United States, and hence eligible to run for President someday, and is retroactively considered to have been a citizen in the meantime for myriad other purposes, despite the fact that in the case of an unmarried non-citizen mother and a citizen father, this right is not vested and could never come into being if the required actions aren't taken after the fact. Incidentally, this statute has been upheld against constitutional challenges. Miller v. Albright, 520 U.S. 420 (1997). So, while you would like to clearly distinguish between someone having citizenship granted and having citizenship revoked, Congress, in its wisdom, has not been so accommodating and has declined to clearly distinguish between the two interpretations. This statute is a bit like the question of Schrödinger's cat, who is indeterminately alive and dead at the same time until there is a measurement of its state, in quantum physics. A person with an unmarried non-citizen mother and a citizen father is both a U.S. citizen from birth and always has been, and has never been a citizen of the U.S., until the situation is resolved with an actual determination of the question in accordance with the requirements of the statute. | They can't take his citizenship... Since he claims to be a born citizen, he has citizenship by birthright and nothing CBP can do can possibly revoke it. He can voluntarily renounce his citizenship, but he has to do that through the State Dept. (which CBP is not part of). And that is an elaborate and expensive process that can't even be done inside the United States. If someone could do it merely by entering without papers and asking for a self-deport, lots of expats would save a lot of money - and that's not gonna happen :) ...but they could put him to serious inconvenience In this particular case, CBP found his documents suspect. Probably because (if it's the case we've seen documented elsewhere) he was with two other people whose entry was illegal, and they had forged documents. So most likely, if he agreed to self-deport, CBP would use that as prima-facie evidence that he is not a bona-fide citizen, and therefore, that his papers are faked. They certainly will not give fake papers back to someone who has tried to pass them. So the victim would be obliged to go back to SSA, the state, etc. and re-acquire his identity documents. From outside the country. It's a pretty big chore. | German asylum law is codified in the "Gesetz über den Aufenthalt, die Erwerbstätigkeit und die Integration von Ausländern im Bundesgebiet" (English translation: "Act on the Residence, Economic Activity and Integration of Foreigners in the Federal Territory Residence Act"), or short AufenthG. The paragraphs in this answer all apply to this law unless noted otherwise. This is a very, very long and complex law and the explanations here are grossly oversimplified. I am not a lawyer. This is all my personal interpretation of the laws as a layman. When you want to know it exactly, please read the full law or ask a lawyer to explain it. A foreigner who requests asylum in Germany has permission to stay in the country until their request for asylum has been processed (§25). When the request is denied (for example, because they come from a country considered safe or because there is insufficient evidence that they are in danger in their home-country), they become illegal immigrants and will have to leave the country as soon as possible (§50), if necessary by force (§58). The foreigner can even be imprisoned until a deportation is possible (§62). When the request is accepted, they get a time-limited permission to stay in the country for up to 3 years (§26) which can be extended for another 2 years afterwards. During that extension process it is reconfirmed if they still are in danger in their home-country. When the situation has changed, the extension might not get granted and they have to leave the country. When the asylum extension was granted, the refugee can apply for a permanent settlement permit. Such a permit allows the foreigner to stay in Germany indefinitely. However, this does not make them a German citizen yet. To become a German citizen with full access to social security, a German passport, voting rights etc., a foreigner needs not only a permanent settlement permit but also to go through the process of "Einbürgerung" (naturalization) according to § 10 Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz (Nationality Act). There are several personal requirements for this, like living in Germany for several years, having a permanent employment, not committing any crimes and also passing a written citizenship test. | There doesn't seem to be any indication I could find that your Indiana license would expire or be revoked. That said, that question is likely moot for your purposes per the comment you left. Your Indiana permit is no longer valid in Florida if you have been a Florida resident for 91 days or more. Florida handgun license reciprocity is covered by S 790.015 and applies to non-residents. Individuals who establish residency in Florida and have a license from another state have 90 days to acquire a Florida license (emphasis mine): (3) If the resident of another state who is the holder of a valid license to carry a concealed weapon or concealed firearm issued in another state establishes legal residence in this state by: (a) Registering to vote; (b) Making a statement of domicile pursuant to s. 222.17; or (c) Filing for homestead tax exemption on property in this state, the license shall remain in effect for 90 days following the date on which the holder of the license establishes legal state residence | A US passport does not list height or make claims about ethnicity: what you have is a birth date and state, and photograph. A passport is taken to be strong proof of identity. You may apply for a new passport (turning in the old one), with a new photo. It may be necessary to provide "documentary evidence of identity" by appearing with an identifying witness (citizen or permanent resident) who has known you for 2 years and fills in an affidavit (both of you would need to bring some ID as well, so let's assume you also have a valid driver's license). It would be at the discretion of the accepting agent whether to believe that you and the "old" you are the same person. In the fictitious scenario, the person could videotape themselves undergoing the transformation, but ultimately, if one is sufficiently off the grid, then proving identity could be very difficult. | The law upheld by the decision is a New York law, and thus only applies in the state of New York. Its current text reads in relevant part: No person shall be employed or authorized to teach in the public schools of the state who is... Not a citizen. The provisions of this subdivision shall not apply, however, to an alien teacher now or hereafter employed, provided such teacher shall make due application to become a citizen and thereafter within the time prescribed by law shall become a citizen. The provisions of this subdivision shall not apply, after July first, nineteen hundred sixty-seven, to an alien teacher employed pursuant to regulations adopted by the commissioner of education permitting such employment. The citizenship requirements of this subdivision shall not apply to an alien teacher now or hereafter employed whose immigration status is that of a lawful permanent resident of the United States and who would otherwise be eligible to serve as a teacher, or to apply for or receive permanent certification as a teacher, but for the foregoing requirements of this subdivision. The last sentence of that will no longer be effective starting Nov 30 2022. So, this law only says they are prohibited in New York public schools. And even then, they are allowed if they are applying to be a citizen, if they are hired pursuant to regulations adopted by the commissioner of education, or (until 2022) if they are a lawful permanent resident of the US. Other states may have other laws, of course. |
What are my working hours rights as an exempt employee My new boss wants to use the following paragraph in my contract to insist that I be in the office 9 - 6 Mon - Fri, be on call 24/7, and go into the office out of hours regularly (including weekends): Normal office business hours are 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. Monday through Friday, although, these hours are subject to change. As an exempt employee, you will be expected to work additional hours as required by the nature of your work assignments. As an exempt employee in the state of California what are my legal obligations and do I have any protection against this? | Read it carefully. "Work additional hours as required by the nature of your work assignments". Does the nature of your work assignments require additional work hours? That's very unlikely. It may be that your boss wants you to do three weeks work in two weeks, but it's not in the nature of your work assignments that they take two weeks. If it's three weeks of work, then it is actually in the nature of your work assignments that it takes three weeks. It may be in the nature of a work assignment that once it is started it must be finished quickly. For example if you are a plumber, it may very well be that once you start a job and unscrew the first screw, that job must be finished. In that case, you can't go home after 8 hours and leave a job unfinished which could be a major problem for your customer. Are you in a similar situation? If your company is too tight to hire enough people to do the job, and deadlines will be missed if people work 40 hours a week, that is not in the nature of your work assignment - it's because your company is too tight to hire enough people. | One thing that may prevent this is contract law: the employer may not have the power to impose new requirements on employees during the period of the current contract. For prisons that are run by government agencies, there may also be statutory restrictions on what the warden or Bureau of Prisons can compel employees to do without legislative approval (this is a general feature of government employment). There are additional disability and religion-based protections for employees. Apart from such legal considerations, the vaccine is not universally available, which explains why not all employers mandate that employees get vaccinated. It's not clear how prisons, specifically, are relevant: there's no general rule that "because it's a prison, normal law is suspended". | You may want to ask Reich what he personally was talking about. There is a distinction within the US between states which prohibit mandatory union membership versus allow mandatory union membership. In about half of the states, a union cannot force an employer to accept a contract which obligates that a person join the union. These are known as right-to-work laws. No state requires all workers to join a union, and no state forbids the formation of unions. | At Will Employment - In General An "at will" employee in the U.S. can be fired at any time for any reason without any prior notice or warning. Outside a union shop or a civil service employment situation, even an illegal reason for firing does not give you the right to be reinstated in your job - instead it gives you a right to sue for money damages. Unemployment Benefits and Employment References If you are fired for good cause (or you quit in a situation that is not a constructive termination), you are not entitled to unemployment benefits. If you are fired without cause particular to your conduct (e.g. you are laid off in the employer's reduction in the size of the employer's labor force), or your are fired for a reason that is not good cause (e.g. you are fire because the boss is annoyed because you are such a goody two shoes that you always show up to work on time), you may be entitled to unemployment benefits based upon your term of service and earnings (short time employees are often not entitled to unemployment benefits no matter what). If you apply for unemployment benefits because you assert that you were fired without good cause, and the employer believes you were fired for good cause, the employer can dispute that finding in a summary administrative hearing. Employers fight awards of unemployment benefits for employees who are fired rather than laid off, because it affects the employer's unemployment insurance rates (and because they care, for non-economic reasons, if the integrity of their stated reasons for firing someone are not believed, or if their reasons for firing someone are not considered to be legitimate grounds for termination by a government agency). Even if you are entitled to unemployment benefits, these benefits are much smaller than your regular pay, and generally last less long than the period for which you were employed. A formula or calculator should appear on the Texas Workforce Commission Website. I assume when you say that "They put a few fake tags on me" that this means that they stated reasons that would be valid "for cause" reasons for termination and you dispute those reasons apply to you, but please clarify if I am mistaken. If that is the case, it is likely that you would have to fight for any unemployment benefits you are otherwise entitled to in an administrative hearing as the company is likely to contest your claim that you were not fired for good cause. This also means that if you seek new employment that they will give you a bad reference to someone who inquires about your employment (although many HR departments are afraid to do that for fear of defamation liability and will only confirm the dates of your employment and your position). Wrongful Termination Lawsuits Separate and apart from unemployment benefits, if you are fired, not just without cause, but for an illegal reasons (e.g. race, sex, and select statutory prohibited reasons), you may bring a wrongful termination lawsuit. Some of those reasons (firings related to discrimination by a private sector employer) require you to file an EEOC complaint and have it investigated by them first, other of those reasons (mostly whistle blowing statutes and breaches of written employment contracts that don't allow for termination of employment without cause) allow you to immediately bring suit for wrongful termination. The legal status of firing someone because you complained about another employee's ethical violation depends upon the exact nature of the ethical violation. For example, a U.S. Supreme Court case decided this month (i.e. February/March 2018) held that whistle blower protections under U.S. securities laws apply to people who report securities fraud to the SEC, but not to people who report securities fraud to a supervisor in the company. "My fellow employee was a lying asshole who acted unprofessionally (in non-technical sense of the word), and I complained about this conduct to my supervisor and the employer didn't care" standing alone, would not normally constitute conduct that is covered by a whistle blowing statute that could allow you to bring a lawsuit for wrongful termination of employment, although it might constitute a constructive termination for bad cause by an employer (if you quit) or termination for bad cause by an employer (if you were fired) for unemployment insurance purposes. The legal theory behind the amount of damages that can be awarded in a wrongful termination lawsuit is a bit obscure. As a rule of thumb, six months wages is a pretty typical settlement amount in a wrongful termination case prior to a determination by a court of employer liability. At trial, there is wide variation in what juries award in wrongful termination lawsuits involving similar facts. Sometimes the award is minimal even when the jury finds that the employer wrongfully fired you, and sometimes the award is very substantial, amounting to many years of lost income in amount. Contractual Payment Obligations Generally speaking, unless a written contract provides otherwise, you have no obligation to return a hiring bonus and the employer has a contractual duty (and probably a statutory one as well) to pay you through the date of termination without deduction for a hiring bonus paid. This includes any amounts, including bonuses, that the employer was obligated to pay you, although proving an entitlement to a bonus can be difficult unless that standard for receiving one is clearly defined and you clearly met those standards as a factual matter. Sometimes, you can even win a breach of contract award for a bonus that was not yet fully earned if the only reason that the bonus was not awarded was the employer's bad faith conduct. You could sue to collect unpaid wages in a Justice Court (the limited jurisdiction court for small claims in Texas) if necessary, if the amount you are claiming is under $10,000. If you have a claim for unpaid wages in a larger amount or also have other damages, you would need to bring suit in the appropriate county court or district court, depending upon the amount claimed. | When does a CEO (or the investor or the board) have to notify employees they will be unable to pay them for work already done? Directors and officers (which includes executive officers like the CEO) but not investors have a duty to ensure that the corporation does not trade while insolvent. In this context, "trading" means incurring new debts and "insolvent" means being unable to pay their debts as and when they fall due. Unfortunately, it is a judgment call by those directors and officers and the exact point where it occurred is generally only clear with hindsight, if then. For example, you describe a "tumultuous week"; quite likely the company was urgently seeking additional sources of funds and until it was clear they had no prospect of getting those, they weren't insolvent. The director's duty is to act reasonably (a broad range of activities) and not be overly pessimistic nor optimistic about the company's prospects. As far as I know, they don't have a positive duty to inform their creditors that they can't pay. If that happens their obligation is to file for bankruptcy and their obligations cease - the bankruptcy trustee then invites creditors to prove their debts. Does an investor have a responsibility to ensure all employees are paid? No. That is pretty much the purpose of limited liability corporations: to shield the investor from the debts of the company. Do the employees have any recourse? Yes. Employees are typically priority creditors in Colorado and rank ahead of many other creditors. However, if the company is not based in Colorado different laws will apply. Of course, you must be an employee of the company - this priority doesn't apply to true independent contractors. Also, the liquidator's fees rank ahead of anyone and unless the bankrupt company has adequate realizable assets, even employees are unlikely to get a dividend. You also need to be clear who you work for as you say "that last Friday was paid for/fronted by the HR company". Do you work for the bankrupt company or this (non-bankrupt) HR company? If the latter then they owe you your wages and the bankruptcy of their principal is their problem, not yours. Is "secured debt" real? And does that reduce the likelihood of receiving a paycheck in a bankruptcy settlement? Yes. There is a priority in the payment of creditors in liquidations and it varies by jurisdiction but a typical arrangement might go like: Liquidator's Fees Employee wages and entitlement accrued within the last 6 months Certain taxes Secured creditors (who may have a ranking among themselves) Unsecured creditors (including employee entitlements more than 12 months old, other taxes, trade creditors etc.) Shareholders (who may have a ranking among themselves) Basically, the lower you rank, the less likely you are to see a dividend. Does any of this change if the company doesn't file for bankruptcy? Sure. Until the company does this it is still a going concern and it has to pay its debts. If it doesn't it's creditors can sue and recover their monies as best they can which may include forcing the company into bankruptcy. | As Tom says and these guys reiterate (I'm quoting those guys), "Employment relationships are presumed to be “at-will” in all U.S. states except Montana. The U.S. is one of a handful of countries where employment is predominantly at-will". Montana (Dept. of Labor and Industry) also states that they are the only ones in the US like that. Montana Code 39-2-904(1)(b) states that a discharge is unlawful if "the discharge was not for good cause and the employee had completed the employer's probationary period of employment". (2)(a) then states that "During a probationary period of employment, the employment may be terminated at the will of either the employer or the employee on notice to the other for any reason or for no reason". There is a presumptive 6 month probationary period in case an employer say nothing, but it could be longer or shorter (it can be 7 years for university professors, and I don't find anything in the code preventing an employer from setting the probationary period at 50 years). | From point 4: transferring all rights and obligations of Company A to Company B Among those rights and obligations are the rights and obligations arising from Company A's agreement with Employee. Employee is therefore still subject to the agreement, which is enforceable by Company B. If the agreement is carefully drafted, it will make explicit mention of Company A's "successors in interest" or some similar phrase or phrases. Even if there is no mention, the rights and obligations associated with this agreement will transfer (perhaps unless the agreement explicitly provides that they will not, but, let's be realistic, of course it does not so provide). | As I understand it, the legal distinction here is: Whose choice was it that you not continue in your job? If the company was prepared to offer you an extension, until you told them that you were not interested, you are leaving of your own free will, and would not be entitled to redundancy rights. If your employer did not extend the contract when you would have been willing to continue, that is either a redundancy, or a dismissal of another kind. If you were dismissed for valid cause, you have no redundancy rights. if you were let go because of a lack of work, or because the employer decided not to have anyone doing that job, that I gather would be redundancy. |
Transferring Paypal money to sons friend I said my son is in prison and his friend. My sons friend has a girlfriend that sends money alot to him and it has to be sent through an approved account so she sends it to me. And the friend has a friend that sent money to me once cause he dont hav a paypal. Its not money laundering to the perosn who said that. I know what money laundering is. Why u answer that? Specialy if u dont know. I am asking a similar wuestion thats on here. Im not helping anyone break the law. I was very vague in my question. And to the person that said about the cell phones. I said nothing about cell phone in jails. I said cell phones but not in jail. And i dont really see anything wrong if someone asked to use my paypal twice to get money. I sont think twice is money laundering. Come on now. Anyhow i shouldnt of put this up and it wont let me delet. The money to my payl isnt nothing big. It was just one time and my sons account is mostly his girlfriend and small amounts like 20 bucks. I dont think thats money laundering. I guess i should be more specific but i didnt and dont feel like writting it all and i can barely see what im typing on here. I just will tell him not anymore to avoid any questions like this . I can barely see this post or questions. Ty to the lady that was helpful about how i wrote it . I just want to know if its ok if someone sends money to paypal its money someone owes him and he dont hav a paypal cause he is in jail. Its not money laundering cause its not been a bunch of times. He has asked once and asked if id do it one more time. I just wanted to know if u thought it sounded true. So i told him no and he was like mom its one time its money he is owed he dont hav paypal to get the money. So what does that sound like to u | But lately he has had his friend use my PayPal account. Someone will send me money and then I transfer it to where he tells me. To cash app or venmo. That's money laundering. Definitely illegal. He said it's money owed for cellphones. People in jail aren't supposed to have cellphones. You are helping him break the law, which means you are helping him break the law. | It is certainly possible to give gifts to your relatives (or to anyone really). But, the harder question is whether or not it is really a gift. A characterization of a transaction as a gift is less likely to be questioned if it is between related parties, and it is less likely to be questioned if it isn't obviously a quid pro quo. If you told your brother that you would make a gift to him of all of the appreciation in the house, if he made the guarantee in advance, it would be a guarantee fee (or an equitable or nominee ownership) rather than a gift. But, with the timing and motives described in this post, it is certainly a closer call. The fact that the "gift" amount exactly matches the appreciation casts doubt on the theory that this is really a gift, but doesn't absolutely clearly require the conclusion that it is not. This could end up being resolved either way, and ultimately, could be very dependent upon the detailed facts and how they are presented to the person determining if tax is owed. | Presumably, they at least took a report which could make it possible to file an insurance claim for the stolen phone. But, a good faith belief of law enforcement that is unable to figure out who committed the crime with the resources available to them is a legitimate reason not to investigate and prosecute a crime, even in countries with legal systems based upon the German one where prosecutors have an enforceable legal obligation to prosecute criminal offenses known to them. A prosecutor can't bring a case unless he knows who did it. And, the police may be wise not to try to investigate a crime that previous experience has proven to them is a dead end most of the time for a crime of modest economic value. Most cases of simple larceny are never solved. And, institutionally, the police have to balance the cost of investigating the crime against the seriousness of the crime. Murders and kidnappings are almost always going to take priority for police resources over stolen phones, particularly if investigating the phone theft may require international cooperation that makes the investigation more costly. A key point is that the mere fact that a phone is pawned doesn't mean that the person pawning it is necessarily committing a crime, so even if you find out where the phone is in some pawn shop (possibly in Albania or Turkey, by now), that doesn't mean that the job is over. That person could have bought it innocently and at fair market value from a flea market, from someone who could have gotten it from someone who received it innocently as a gift, from a friend of a criminal fence, who may have bought it not innocently from a true thief. In fact, because criminals respond to incentives like anyone else, it is far more likely that the phone was swiftly "laundered" along the lines I suggest in this example, than it is that it is still in the possession of someone close to the thief. But, only the fence and the thief would have criminal liability. It is a lot harder to solve the crime of a stolen cell phone than you would think, and the agency may simply not be able to justify the resources it would take to investigate that case properly to a situation where someone had a phone stole that was worth maybe 400 Euros in used condition. The more you can do to solve the crime, the more likely it is that they will find that it is worth further investigating until a thief can be identified and apprehended. For example, the company with the network that serves the phone might be willing to cooperate with its owner. Also, the more that you can do to show that this case might crack an entire ring of people involved in a black market in stolen cell phones might make it more attractive to law enforcement. | I'm not going to comment on the specifics of this law; rather, I think this question shows a misconception of the way the legal system works in general. Here's the question: do you actually have "legally privileged" material on your phone? If not, what's keeping you from claiming that is that it's not true, and lying to a police officer is a bad idea. And just putting a letter from your lawyer on the phone doesn't mean you've established a legal privilege--attorney-client privilege is not a magic spell, it's a reasonable system of protection that only covers certain communications. The bottom line is: the statute in general, and that clause in particular, were included in the law to protect real, important, and substantial legal right. The courts interpret the law in light of that purpose. If the police officer finds a solution that protects your rights while still carrying out the purpose of the statute, the court will be unlikely to fault him or her. In this case, if you tell the officer that there is a letter from your attorney in a particular folder, the obvious solution is for the officer not to open that folder. Problem solved. In practice, in the United States at least, these cases are dealt with routinely; computers are seized, and attorneys and judges work together to ensure that privilege is protected while still allowing reasonable access to seized materials. I would imagine the same is true in the U.K. The bottom line is: the law is not a game, and technical "gotchas" are rarely effective. Common law systems allow judges enough leeway to avoid this sort of pointless technicality. | I'm pretty sure that under GDPR, you can indeed request them to send all data they have on you. If it's a complex request, they may charge you something like £10. If they have a lot of data on you, they may list the categories of data they have and ask you to pick one, rather than them having to collect and send everything. They should respond within one month, but iirc in the UK implementation, they can inform you (within that month) that they will respond within three months instead. For the rest, I only know current Dutch law. GDPR is not that different from what we already had (in general terms) and in many cases it even extends it. Under our law (WBP), you can also request a correction of the data in case it is incorrect, or deletion if they no longer need it for the purpose for which it was collected and stored. I don't really know how that works out in practice though, as Facebook can of course claim that "being able to connect you to your friends when you sign up for WhatsApp or Facebook with that number" is a legitimate purpose (in their eyes). They might also not have your full name and therefore not be able to connect your data to your request. Or, perhaps, they have only your full name (and there are probably more people with your name), so they'll have a hard time verifying that it's really your data which they would be handing over or deleting. The company is required to verify your identity before acting on your request. How they implement that is up to them. Under Dutch law, if I remember correctly, any data that can be connected to your person by any party is personally identifiable information (PII). While Facebook might not be able to find who's behind a phone number, your carrier most certainly can. Therefore, the data falls under PII protection laws and they will have to implement a way to verify you and get you your data. Finally, whether your local laws apply to Facebook, I don't know exactly. There's lots of information on this though, so you should be able to find it. Generally, countries say that if something happened within their territory (e.g. you signed up for WhatsApp while in the UK), their law applies. Companies, I've read, will instead try to claim that their main office is in SomeCountry and therefore SomeCountry's laws apply. But I'm pretty sure you'll be able to find a Facebook office somewhere where GDPR applies, so that's probably fine. While not an exact answer and while I am not sure about everything, I hope this gave you some pointers to go on! | am I required to send the stuff back? No, but you should be able to prove that you met the conditions of the original contract between you two. There is no gift. There is a compensation that forms part of the contract between the offeror and you. The offeror's preference to call it a "gift" does not change the legal fact that his offer and your acceptance to complete Nightwave Season 2 constitutes the formation of a contract. From that standpoint, you are entitled to keep the items he mailed to you as long as you honor your part in that contract. You are right by conjecturing that a party is not allowed to unilaterally alter a contract. Any modification has to be agreed upon by all parties to that contract. However, a consent or agreement may be inferred from the parties' subsequent conduct. Hence the best way to pre-empt or supersede any such inference consists of letting that party know that you disapprove of the belated alteration(s). The absence of a written agreement can only complicate matters, though, since it appears that neither party has an objective, directly credible way to prove the terms of the original contract. Perhaps such terms can be deduced from the subsequent emails that he has been sending you, but that is impossible to ascertain without knowing the wording of the subsequent communications between you two. Lastly, enforceability of your contract is less clear if completing Nightwave Season 2 through someone else's performance amounts to an unlawful act. Not being knowledgeable of the terms and conditions of that game (?), I am unable to state with certainty whether the offeror could lawfully recover from you the items he mailed. | There is usually a law that could be stretched to cover such a case. In Washington, RCW 9A.28.030 says A person is guilty of criminal solicitation when, with intent to promote or facilitate the commission of a crime, he or she offers to give or gives money or other thing of value to another to engage in specific conduct which would constitute such crime or which would establish complicity of such other person in its commission or attempted commission had such crime been attempted or committed. The "intent" of the law is to punish people for saying "I'll give you $5000 to kill Smith". But just looking at the text, if you give someone money to encourage them to engage in a specific kind of criminal conduct (e.g. beating people up), then you've violated the law. So, handing a guy $5,000 and saying "I think you should be rewarded for your act" could easily be construed as promoting the future commission of the same or similar crime. | The reason that you are being asked to comply with a US law is because PayPal, a US company, is required to comply with US laws. If you do not comply, it is likely that they will be non-compliant and subject to sanctions. For more background, FATCA reporting is used to identify businesses that a company does business with. In this scenario PayPal does business with you, 'Kenorb Inc', and so must prove to the regulatory agencies that you are not a US based company, hence the need for the W-8BENE. In a similar way - people from other countries cannot simply ignore UK law when dealing with your business. As for your quotes - they are not contradictory. |
Are legal precedents or tests ever created outside of a traditional trial? Layperson question ahead. My understanding is that laws as passed by federal, state, and local bodies are often open to interpretation. When a question arises during a trial, a judge's logic and reasoning are often used as the foundation for future understanding of a given issue. Other than a judge's decision during a court case, are there other times when such legal 'clarification' takes place that is at least (if not more) binding than precedents? In essence, I'm curious if legal professionals have a mechanism for testing and improving new laws that falls between the two extremes of "try it in court and find out" and "start a petition to motivate a senator to introduce a bill to make a new law" | All precedents are made in court judgements Courts exist in a hierarchy which means there are two kinds of precedent: binding and persuasive. A binding precedent is one set in the same hierarchy by a higher level court. A persuasive precedent is one set at the same or lower level in the hierarchy or in a completely different hierarchy. For example, a precedent set in the Supreme Court of New South Wales sitting as the Court of Appeal is binding on the Supreme Court of NSW in general session, the District Court and the Magistrates Court (lower courts), persuasive on the Supreme Court of New South Wales sitting as the Court of Appeal and all courts in Victoria and Queensland (different hierarchies) and is not a precedent for the High Court of Australia (higher up). In general, while a lower level court can, in theory, set a precedent, such cases are rarely reported so nobody knows about them and, in any event, they would only have limited applicability. Therefore most precedents come from higher level courts which means, they are usually set in appeals rather than trials of first instance. In addition it is only the ratio decidendi that sets binding precedent. Anything in the judgement that is obiter dicta is merely persuasive. Bear in mind that the overwhelming majority of cases do not create precedent - they follow it. Or, if they don’t follow it, the judge was wrong. It is also a legal fiction (i.e. something pretending to be true that everyone knows isn’t) that judges do not create law by precedent - they merely find the law that was already there. Since the role of judges in common law jurisdictions is to only decide cases, they cannot and do not offer opinions on what the law is outside of that. This is a long-standing tradition in English law and the first Chief Justice of the US Supreme Court confirmed that the Constitution did not change this. Therefore, the only way to test the validity of a new law is to have a trial that uses it. That said, governments have lawyers review legislation and regulations before they are promulgated to check for things like legality and workability but these are only professional opinions and are not binding. Furthermore, sometimes legislation is drafted quickly for political reasons. One hopes that legislatures take proper care when drafting legislation that it is legal, is workable and actually makes sense: one is often disappointed in that hope. | A judge has the authority to determine what law applies to a case and to instruct the jury accordingly, and also has the authority to determine which evidence is admissible. Presentation of a defense, in practice, involves presentation of evidence supporting a legal theory. In order to be admissible in evidence in an evidentiary hearing or trial, the evidence must be relevant to a legal theory that is in some way connected to the evidence. If no reasonable juror could make a ruling establishing that a legally recognized defense was established based upon the proposed evidence (especially if the proposed evidence is prejudicial to the prosecution case on the basis of reasoning that is not a legally valid defense) it can be excluded. For example, evidence in support of the theory that the defendant murdered the victim because the murder victim raped the defendant's sister six years ago, might very well sway a jury to acquit the defendant. So a defense attorney might want to make this argument. But, this is not a legally recognized justification for murder, so evidence in support of this defense would be excluded as irrelevant by the judge. In federal court, and in states with rules of evidence based upon the federal rules of evidence, the primary legal authority behind this is Rule of Evidence 402: Rule 402. General Admissibility of Relevant Evidence Relevant evidence is admissible unless any of the following provides otherwise: the United States Constitution; a federal statute; these rules; or other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Some states also have procedural notice requirements for certain kinds of affirmative defenses. For example, if someone is arguing an alibi, a notice of an intent to present this defense must be provided by the defense a certain number of days before trial, so that the prosecution can develop the very different in kind type of evidence needed to rebut that defense, rather than having someone acquitted due to surprise when rebuttal evidence exists but the prosecution doesn't know in advance to locate the necessary witnesses and evidence to rebut this kind of defense. | No Only the ratio decidendi of a case sets binding precedent. By definition, that has to be in the decision of the court’s majority because that’s what decided the case. If a minority decision disagrees with the majority on ratio, then the majority is the binding precedent. If the point is obiter, then it’s merely persuasive, not binding, irrespective of where it is. | Any precedent can be overturned by any court at the same or higher level in the hierarchy So, for your example of a High Court precedent, it can be overturned at Supreme Court, Court of Appeal or High Court levels. However, the longer a precedent is in place, the less likely it is to be overturned because one of the objectives of the legal system is to provide certainty - a system that routinely overturns precedent doesn’t do that. Also, a precedent that is often cited with approval is more compelling because it’s no longer just one judges reading of the law, many other judges agree. Also, the judiciary tends to be conservative in overturning precedent. Most judges see it as their role to interpret law made by the legislature. If the people/legislature think their interpretation is wrong then the judiciary tends to feel that the legislature is the body who should change the law. That said, really old common law precedent that hasn’t been cited for a long while may be readily overturned if it comes up because social expectations may have changed. | 1. Are this and similar ordinances constitutionally valid? Yes. Some future court might decide the law is invalid at some future time. But that possibility is hypothetical and speculative. Therefore, as of now, the law is valid unless and until it is challenged and overturned. 2. What defenses could a government make if challenged? It depends on what grounds the law is challenged. Your question about possible defenses is highly dependent on the nature of any challenge — which you have not specified in your question. The U.S. Constitution, for example, prohibits laws respecting a number of things such as freedom of the press, speech, religion, peaceful assembly, bearing arms, etc. to list just a few of the most notable ones. But your question does not assert the law in question violates any specific or particular prohibition against it. Although the question mentions "restricting free movement as well as targeting only a specific demographic," it does not specify any part of any constitution that prohibits these things. Therefore, your question is unclear as to what might present a constitutional problem for the law. It is also unclear which constitution you think might contain prohibitive language. Is it a federal constitutional issue that concerns you? Or is it a state constitutional matter? In either case, which issue specifically concerns you? Your question needs to address these specifics in order to analyze it and respond in a meaningful way. Look at it like this... just as it is impossible to prove a negative, so is it impossible for anyone to conclude with absolute certainty that any law is not unconstitutional because no one can predict with certainty every possible future challenge a law might face. There are just too many possibilities to (pre-emptively) exhaust them all with certainty. Also, no one can predict with certainty how any future court might rule on the future challenges (which themselves are unpredictable as previously argued). Therefore, one can only say I think the law is unconstitutional and here are my reasons. Then others can analyze the law and the reasons; then offer an opinion. Further, based on precedent, would they likely be successful? See above answer to question numbered 2. Laws aren't required to be "justified" by the constitution. Constitutional justification for a law is a meaningless phrase. There is no requirement for a law to be "justified" by any constitution other than that the legislature is empowered by the constitution to make laws. That's all the justification any law needs. Beyond that, however, no law can violate the constitution as determined by a Supreme Court (or the last court to rule) if challenged. | This is known as a retroactive or ex post facto law. Such laws are explicitly forbidden by the US Constitution (Wikipedia reference), and are generally frowned on in jurisdictions where the rule of law applies, partly because it is difficult to prove criminal intent when your action was not at the time criminal. | Under U.S. law, double jeopardy prevents you from being charged with the same charge twice, and also from being charged with any offense which is a lesser included offense of the charged offense, or a charge so substantially similar that for constitutional purposes it amounts to the same crime. Basically, the test is whether a prior acquittal would be inconsistent with a new criminal charge. For example, even though there is an additional element of the crime of murdering a postal officer to the crime of murdering someone on federal property, double jeopardy would probably bar a retrial of a murder on federal property case simply because the victim happened to be a postal worker and that element wasn't charged in the original indictment. This is because the acquittal of the first murder charge would almost always imply a jury determination that a murder didn't take place which would be inconsistent with a murder of a postal worker charge. On the other hand, a trial on a murder charge would probably not bar, for example, a trial on a burglary charge (which at common law involved trespassing with an intent to commit a crime), even if the burglary charge arose from the same conduct. This is because an acquittal on a murder charge isn't necessarily inconsistent with the existence of a trespass, or with the intent to commit some crime other than the murder for which the defendant was acquitted. But the exact way that the line gets draw is tricky and while what I have described is a good general summary of the cases interpreting the double jeopardy clause, it isn't a perfect one. This issue has been litigated many, many tines over the years, so there are a lot of cases that are squarely on point addressing specific fact patterns in precedents that are binding case law that are not always a perfect fit to the general principles. In these circumstances, the binding case law is going to control, at least until a court with appellate authority over the court whose case established the precedent in question decided to overrule a prior precedent from the lower court, or in the case of U.S. Supreme Court precedents, until the U.S. Supreme Court revisits one of its own prior precedents as wrong decided or wrongly interpreted, which happens now and then, although it is a rare event. | Many jurists do accept that it is appropriate to attempt to ascertain the "legislative intent" as part of the exercise of statutory interpretation, but legislative intent is not an aggregate of the subjective intentions of individual legislators. I am not aware of any question of statutory interpretation that was informed by testimony from staffers or legislators who drafted, debated, or enacted a law. For some rationale, see Judge Easterbrook's foreward to Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner's Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts: Legislative intent is a fiction, a back-formation from other and often undisclosed sources. Every legislator has an intent, which usually cannot be discovered, since most say nothing before voting on most bills; and the legislature is a collective body that does not have a mind; it "intends" only that the text be adopted, and statutory texts usually are compromises that match no one's first preference. If some legislators say one thing and others say something else... how does the interpreter choose which path to follow? canada Even evidence of what was said in Parliamentary debate is treated cautiously (R. v. Heywood, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761): First, the intent of particular members of Parliament is not the same as the intent of the Parliament as a whole. Thus, it may be said that the corporate will of the legislature is only found in the text of provisions which are passed into law. Second, the political nature of Parliamentary debates brings into question the reliability of the statements made. Different members of the legislature may have different purposes in putting forward their positions. That is to say the statements of a member made in the heat of debate or in committee hearings may not reflect even that member's position at the time of the final vote on the legislation. Legislative intent is determined by looking at the words, the scheme, and the object of the provision (R. v. Hutchinson, 2014 SCC 19, paragraph 16). |
Can I be fined for the intention to commit a traffic violation, after the police prevented me from carrying through? After having stopped at a red traffic light, seeing the intersection empty, I was about to get on by bike and turn right when a police officer behind me informed me that doing so would mean a €100 fine¹, so I walked around the corner and then got on my bike there. I did not get fined. Which makes me wonder: Can the police officer issue a fine for clearly intending to commit a traffic violation, even if the police officer prevented me from doing so? ¹Although a general "right turn on red allowed for cyclists" has been discussed, such is currently not allowed in Germany. | General Question Having an intention is never enough for punishments (both Strafe and Bußgeld) of the German state. But having an intention and be right at the start of doing the offense (details are complicated) is sometimes punished as an attempt of the offense (Versuch). This is defined in § 13 Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz (Act on Regulatory Offences). § 13 OWiG (= §§ 22-24 Strafgesetzbuch (Criminal Code)) (1) Whoever, in accordance with his understanding of the act, takes a direct step towards the realisation of the factual elements of the offence, shall be deemed to have attempted a regulatory offence. (2) The attempt may be sanctioned only if expressly provided by law. (3) If the perpetrator voluntarily renounces further execution of the act or prevents its completion, he shall not be sanctioned for attempt. If the act will not be completed without the contribution of the abandoning party, his voluntary and earnest efforts to prevent its completion shall be sufficient. (4) If more than one person participates in the act, the one who voluntarily prevents its completion shall not be sanctioned for an attempt. However, his voluntary and earnest efforts to prevent the completion of the act shall suffice if the act is not completed without his contribution or is committed independently of his earlier participation. If you started the offense but stopped, so you don't fulfill offense, you don't get sanctioned, if you stopped voluntarily (freiwillig), § 13 III OWiG. (The details are more complicated.) This may be the case in your example, but beeing seen by a police officer is no reason for Freiwilligkeit. So you may have attempted the offence. But an attempted offence gets only sanctioned if this is expressly provided by law, § 13 II OWiG. This is provided for no traffic violation. (But for some of the Straftaten in context of traffic, e.g. § 315b StGB Dangerous disruption of road traffic.) So the answer to your question is a clear: No Specific aspects of your case I have searched the norms for your case, a red light offence for cyclist: § 37 II Nr. 1, Nr. 2, Nr. 6 Straßenverkehrsordnung: the rules for traffic light § 49 III Nr. 2 StVO: declaring violations of § 37 StVO as regulatory offences (legal basis: § 24 I Straßenverkehrsgesetz) Nr. 132a Anlage 1 Bußgeldkatalog-Verordnung: sets 60 € fine for red ligth violations of cyclists (legal basis: § 1 I BKatV) Nr. 132a Anlage 1 BKatV: sets 100 € fine for red ligth violations of cyclists after at least one second Nr. 3.2.19 Anlage 13 Fahrerlaubnis-Verordnung: sets fine of one point in Fahreignungsregister (driving ability register) for these offences (legal basis: § 40 FeV) In none of these laws a sanction for attempt is defined. I'm not sure what you did after getting of your bike, you migth have violated the red ligth walking. For this you can get a 5 € fine (Nr. 130 Anlage 1 BKatV), strictly speaking not a Bußgeld (fine), but only a Verwarnungsgeld (warning fine). But the competent authority can but doesn't have to sanction the offence, § 47 I OWiG. So the officer just didn't gave you the warning and thought it is OK. | RockApe's answer is correct but I think it would be better to explain what did happen: the officer is not compelling the suspect to buy the water, she is offering him the opportunity of avoiding arrest, thus if the suspect refuses to clean his mess, he will be arrested, but the charge will not be "he refused to buy water" but "they urinated where he was supposed not to" (however that translates into the English legal code). That arrest would not be a punishment for not buying the water, but for the urination. In this case, buying the water seems to have been the most immediate way of getting the water required to clean. If there was some other water source (for example a public fountain) the police officer could have allowed the suspect to get the water from there. Even if there was some public fountain and the police officer insisted in the accused buying the water, the situation would revert to 2 --> the suspect can simply refuse and he will not be punished for refusing. | While local law varies, most jurisdictions do not authorize citizens' arrests for traffic violations. Generally, citizens arrests are authorized only for misdemeanors and felonies outside the traffic code. Indeed, there are many traffic offenses for which law enforcement is authorized only to stop a violator and issue a ticket, but not even law enforcement is authorized to actually arrest someone. And there is no such thing as a citizen's citation or ticket. Citizens arrests also usually require that the citizen witnessed the crime in progress, but that requirement would be met in this case. If the case had been a hit and run, however, a citizens' arrest probably would have been legally authorized, although the wiser course of action would still be to call the police and to follow the offender at a safe distance. | No. The laws specify what you can and what you cannot do. If the intent of the authority was that you were allowed to drive at 45 mph, you would have a speed limit of 45 mph, not a speed limit of 40 mph. If you go at 41 mph, you are breaking a law and can be punished. That said, law enforcement officers usually have some leeway on how to enforce the law, and they could very well let it pass with just a warning (or even ignore it if they have more pressing issues); the circunstances of it are specific to every situation and officer. The only point that could be made would be if the difference was so small that it could be argued that it can invalidate the evidence on the basis of margin of errors. If the radar catches you driving at 41 mph but the error margin of the radar is 5%, you could argue that you were driving at 39 mph and that the reading is due to the error in the radar1. That would enable you to challenge the evidence (but here the point is not that you are allowed to drive at 41 mph but that there is no proof that you were driving at 41 mph). From what I know, most police forces will be aware of that and avoid issuing fines unless you are well above that margin of error2. 1In fact, in Spain word of the street is that radars are set to account to possible margin of error of the radar, plus possible margin of error of the vehicle speedometer -even if it is the vehicle owner's responsibility to ensure that it works correctly- and some leeway. 2Some people post on the internet the "magic formula" of how many % of speed you can go over the posted speed limit based on those calculations. Of course those magic formulas rely in the radar and the speedometer being 100% accurate and the driver never getting distracted a few seconds and passing it. So, even assuming that those magic formulas are correct, if either the radar or the speedometer are not accurate or the driver gets distracted for a few seconds, you are at risk of getting a ticket. | germany In Germany, the described situation could lead to a fine up to € 2000. As the rider of a horse, you are subject to the existing traffic rules and regulations for all vehicle traffic (§28(2) StVO). As the 'driver' of the vehicle, it is your responsibility to ensure that the vehicle is safe to drive (§23(1) StVO). The administrative offense for the rider of a horse is defined in §49(2) StVO and the possible fine for this offense in §24(3)(5) StVG. Straßenverkehrs-Ordnung (StVO) 2013 Road Traffic Regulations no English version of law text § 23 - Sonstige Pflichten von Fahrzeugführenden (1)... Wer ein Fahrzeug führt, hat zudem dafür zu sorgen, dass das Fahrzeug, der Zug, das Gespann sowie die Ladung und die Besetzung vorschriftsmäßig sind und dass die Verkehrssicherheit des Fahrzeugs durch die Ladung oder die Besetzung nicht leidet. ... § 23 - Other obligations of vehicle drivers (1)... Anyone who drives a vehicle must also ensure that the vehicle, the train, the combination, the load and the occupants are in accordance with the regulations and that the road safety of the vehicle is not impaired by the load or the occupants. ... § 28 - Tiere (2) Wer reitet, Pferde oder Vieh führt oder Vieh treibt, unterliegt sinngemäß den für den gesamten Fahrverkehr einheitlich bestehenden Verkehrsregeln und Anordnungen. ... § 28 - Animals ... (2) Anyone who rides horses, leads horses or cattle or drives cattle is subject to the existing traffic rules and regulations for all vehicle traffic. ... § 49 - Ordnungswidrigkeiten (2) Ordnungswidrig im Sinne des § 24 Absatz 1 des Straßenverkehrsgesetzes handelt auch, wer vorsätzlich oder fahrlässig § 24(3)(5) StVG: Geldstrafe bis zu € 2000 ... 4. Als Reiter, Führer von Pferden, Treiber oder Führer von Vieh entgegen § 28 Absatz 2 einer für den gesamten Fahrverkehr einheitlich bestehenden Verkehrsregel oder Anordnung zuwiderhandelt, ... § 49 - Administrative offenses ... (2) Anyone who acts intentionally or negligently is also an administrative offense within the meaning of Section 24 (1) of the Road Traffic Act [§ 24(3)(5) StVG: Fine up to € 2000] ... 4. As a rider, handler of horses, drivers or handlers of cattle, contrary to § 28 paragraph 2, violates a traffic rule or order that applies uniformly to all traffic, ... What is a 'vehicle' (Fahrzeug)? Everything that is not definded in §24 StVO: (1) Schiebe- und Greifreifenrollstühle, Rodelschlitten, Kinderwagen, Roller, Kinderfahrräder, Inline-Skates, Rollschuhe und ähnliche nicht motorbetriebene Fortbewegungsmittel sind nicht Fahrzeuge im Sinne der Verordnung. Für den Verkehr mit diesen Fortbewegungsmitteln gelten die Vorschriften für den Fußgängerverkehr entsprechend. (2) Mit Krankenfahrstühlen oder mit anderen als in Absatz 1 genannten Rollstühlen darf dort, wo Fußgängerverkehr zulässig ist, gefahren werden, jedoch nur mit Schrittgeschwindigkeit. (1) sliding and push rim wheelchairs, toboggans, strollers, scooters, children's bikes, inline skates, roller skates and similar non-motorized means of transportation are not vehicles for the purposes of the regulation. For the marketing of these means of transport regulations for pedestrian traffic apply accordingly. (2) With wheelchairs or with other as mentioned in paragraph 1 wheelchairs may be driven where pedestrian traffic is allowed, but only at walking speed. What is a 'Motor vehicle' (Kraftfahrzeug)? §1 - Zulassung - Straßenverkehrsgesetz (StVG) ... (2) Als Kraftfahrzeuge im Sinne dieses Gesetzes gelten Landfahrzeuge, die durch Maschinenkraft bewegt werden, ohne an Bahngleise gebunden zu sein. (2) Motor vehicles within the meaning of this Act are land vehicles that are moved by machine power without being tied to railway tracks. | I've contested many of my own traffic tickets in a state where traffic tickets are also considered misdemeanor criminal violations. I would appear in court before the time limit on your ticket. I'd plead not guilty, and I would not waive any rights- which means I would request a trial by jury. Under Georgia law you do have the right to a jury trial IF your ticket is not considered a petty offense. Otherwise you can have a bench trial. If your case starts in a Municipal Court and you request a jury trial, the case will be sent to the State or Superior Court of that county. Jury trials on traffic citations are rare, but it is probably a good tactic because you might be able to work out a better solution than you can in Municipal court. Once the court accepts your plea, then I would make sure the court set a pre-trial hearing. At this hearing make a motion to the judge that you would like the dash-cam video of the officer and the vehicle he stopped you in. If the prosecutor argues that it's not relevant (and they might) explain to the judge why they are relevant (the officer didn't realize exactly what intersection you were at). IMPORTANT: Introduction of your own evidence requires that you 'lay the foundation' of the evidence. This usually means that you must declare officially in court, in front of the prosecution, that your evidence (pictures you take, etc.) are taken by you, and that they are 'true and correct' representations of the location where the alleged offense took place, and that the date and time was (whatever it was). You usually must state this while under oath. OTHERWISE, the prosecution will object to your evidence most likely on the grounds of no foundation. Please read up on how to lay the foundation in either a trial or in a pre-trial setting. For something like this you might need to just present the evidence and lay your foundation at trial. So you'll need to read up on how to lay foundation and present your evidence at trial. You could get lucky and the officer won't show up at trial. So in that case I would make a motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution (you can't cross examine a witness that didn't show up) You'll get to choose jurors, etc. in a process called Voire Dire. So read up on that too. You will not be forced to testify if you don't want to (because of the constitutional right to not incriminate yourself) but if you do choose to testify, the prosecution can ask you questions). | UK seat belt law is here. What you were doing is illegal and carries a fine of £500. As to your specific questions: How illegal is this? It is not a criminal offence in any way. What is the possibility of me getting caught? If a police officer notices you will almost certainly be booked. What is the possibility of being noticed? Depends where you are. If I'm caught what fines and / or penalties can I expect? £500 What's the absolute worst that could happen as a consequence of my actions? You could crash and your passengers could die, you would then go to jail for dangerous driving occasioning death. Having 2 people in a seat belt is extremely hazardous - it would be far safer (but still illegal) to have one person in the seat belt and the other one unrestrained. Could it be possible for me to get away with a warning? No Could I get my licence revoked? (:/) Seat belts offences do not carry a points penalty so, of itself, it would not lead to loss of your licence. | One issue is whether that left-turn (that's what it's normally for, not a u-turn) has a sign that allows u-turns. If it isn't marked, then I think these rules would control: U-turns are prohibited in these locations (from Oregon's DMV): Intersections controlled by a traffic signal, unless a sign permits the turn. Between intersections in a city. Any location within city limits where your vehicle cannot be seen by traffic coming from either direction within 500 feet. Any location outside city limits where your vehicle cannot be seen by traffic coming from either direction within 1,000 feet. At or on a railroad crossing. Any location where U-turns are prohibited by official signs or markings. I find them a little contradictory, but that may be because my state, California, is more permissive with u-turns. I also live in an area that's too crowded so it's easier to get the space and time to make a u-turn 'between intersections.' |
Can people use an LLC in Delaware to legally avoid tax in his home country? Say I am a citizen of Malaysia. I am thinking of either opening a corporation in Seychelles or Delaware LLC. As far as I know, both are tax free, cheap, and stuff. Delaware LLC is even cheaper. Delaware LLC, for tax purpose, is a tax "flow" entities. So if you're an american citizen, you will pay tax as if the income of the LLC is your income. But what about if you are a citizen in other country? From say, Malaysian's point of view, is delaware LLC any different than Seychelles corporation? Both are just foreign entities right? Must you pay tax for any income the delaware LLC have? Assuming you don't repatriate, etc. Note: LLC is a flow through entities. Basically if I were american citizen the tax will flow through as if I don't have LLC. However, given that I am not an american citizen the tax will flow through a foreign entity. From US/Delaware points of view, the tax flow through outside. From my country points of view, an LLC in delaware owns tax. So no body claims they can tax me. That's the idea. | First of all, if your Delaware LLC earns money, you will pay tax in America on that money. America still taxes "foreigners" on American income, just not on"global" income. That is, unless the U.S. has a tax reciprocity treaty with your home country, Malaysia. I don't know about Malaysian law, but I am writing as an American about American law regarding the Seychelles (and I am not a lawyer). The following is only as an "example." If you set up an LLC in the Seychelles, you could, in theory, avoid American tax by accruing income there. In practice, if you did nothing but "banking" in the Seychelles, America would look at your lack of "value added" there, and could tax you on Seychelles income as if your corporation was American. The way to make such a claim stick (typically in a place like Ireland), is to set up a manufacturing or operating facility (e.g. call center) there so that you were shipping goods or services from your offshore operation. Then you'd have a strong claim in America that your operation actually earned most of its income abroad, and the U.S. company was just a holding company. | Yes you can do this in the UK. Section 60 of the Patents Act 1977 has a specific carve-out for this kind of activity: (5) An act which, apart from this subsection, would constitute an infringement of a patent for an invention shall not do so if; (a) it is done privately and for purposes which are not commercial; (b) it is done for experimental purposes relating to the subject-matter of the invention; So if you build and operate your laser without selling anything you are in the clear. You can also experiment with potential improvements. There is no such thing as a "global patent": patents are issued in each country and the national law of each country applies (except for Europe). If an inventor wants patent protection in lots of countries they have to file for a patent in each country. So if this laser is patented only in the USA and you are in the UK then you could make and sell as many lasers as you wanted, as long as you didn't export them to the USA. And vice-versa for a UK patent and a USA engineer. | Yes. You could use student loan proceeds for these purposes. Student loan proceeds are not tracked or traced. If you did so on a wholesale basis (taking out loans intending to cancel your courses before tuition it due to raise money for other purposes), you might be engaged in loan fraud, but since student loans cannot be discharged in bankruptcy, while other loans can be discharged in bankruptcy, that would be a very stupid, self-defeating kind of fraud (which isn't to say that I haven't encountered it once or twice). Some tax preferred accounts (e.g. for retirement) have contribution limits based upon your taxable earned income, however, so while you could use student loan funds to put into those accounts, there would be strict limits on your contributions due to your low income. | Yes Companies can own companies - that’s what subsidiaries are. On a practical level, you know this is true because you actually have an example. Companies House would not have allowed its registration (barring error) if it was illegal. Why can’t it open a bank account? Banks (or any other business) can choose who they will and won’t do business with. Unless it’s discrimination on the basis of a protected characteristic, it’s not illegal. Since juridical persons don’t have protected characteristics (apart from nationality) it’s virtually impossible to illegally discriminate against them. | I'm assuming it would NOT be a good idea to just accept the funding as a person (sole proprietorship). Correct. Would the time be right to form the LLC first, before starting the campaigns on the crowdfunding sites? Or would it be permissible for the entity to be formed IF and once the funding is available? For instance, if the campaign on Kickstarter raises 800 thousand dollars, can an LLC then be created, a bank account opened, and the funds deposited there? Or must the entity be created prior to the asking for startup funds? An entity should be (really must be) formed before funds are raised. This is not a hugely expensive thing to do. For a lawyer drafted one, you are talking on the order of $500-$2000, plus some state filing fees which are modest. I know it's kind of a chicken-and-egg situation, but there isn't a lot of funds available yet for hiring attorneys and drawing up papers before the money is raised. Or should this be something for just forming a very quick LLC and then worrying about the right entity after the funds come in? If you can't afford the money necessary to hire a lawyer to form an entity without crowdfunding, you aren't ready to open a manufacturing company. You really shouldn't consider trying to start a project of this magnitude unless you have at least several tens of thousands of dollars of personal funds on hand prior to the crowdfunding effort. You should also have a detailed business plan in place with fact checked budget lines and reality checked revenues estimates before stating your campaign. If you plan to have patents, you need to at least begin the process of applying to protect them legally, with pre-campaign funds too. Realistically, most people at your stage do a small round of friends and family and personal savings fundraising and often also find an angel investor or two, before going to the general public in a crowdfunding effort. If you can't convince those people that your project is worth investing in, you are probably not ready to run a manufacturing company which will require you to successfully make many similarly difficult pitches to a variety of people. What legal entity(s) would be best for startup funded by kickstarter or other investment? At the state law level a C-corporation and an S-corporation are the same. The distinction is made with a separate tax filing with the IRS in S-corporations. Crowd funding is a term that is often ambiguous and can be used in a multitude of contexts. If it is more than a gift (i.e. in exchange for stock or bonds) there are also securities regulations exceptions that the offering must be tailored to. If the funds are donations for a charitable project, a non-profit corporation would usually be the right choice and 501(c)(3) status needs to be obtained in advance. If funds are raised in exchange for equity interests or non-U.S. citizens/permanent residents own some of the interests, a C corporation would usually be the only permitted choice. If the funds are raised in exchange for interest paying loans/bonds, or the funds are non-tax deductible gifts rather than investments, then financing isn't a concern for choice of entity, and either an LLC or an S-corporation is usually preferred (or perhaps a limited liability limited partnership in lieu of an LLC which has a different control structure). If funds are raised for an operating business with assets that are leased or tend to depreciate in value and has less than 75 owners, and has owners who are also senior employees of the company, an S corporation will usually be the best choice. If funds are raised for a business that will hold assets expected to appreciate in value, or has a financing or control structure more complex than equal shares of common stock plus bonds, an LLC will usually be preferred. Assuming someone is going to start a business that is to design, build and manufacture a small electronic handheld device. A C-corporation or S-corporation rather than an LLC or LLLP is probably preferred for a venture like this one, with the tax classification dependent upon the means of financing and the nature of the owners. Usually, you would use an S-corporation if possible, and a C-corporation if not. A two entity structure, with an LLC owning the IP (if any, other than a trademark for the products), and then licensing it to an S-corporation operating company, would also often make sense in this scenario. I live in Texas, but I assume that the business entity would or could be formed in Nevada or Delaware or anywhere there are more favorable conditions. Not really. A Texas entity would be just fine in this context. A Delaware entity has higher registration fees and legal fees to prepare one, and the advantages it provides for big businesses will often be disadvantages in the kind of entity you are considering. The benefits of Nevada and Alaska trusts are much greater than the benefits of Nevada and Alaska corporations or LLCs. Also, the Texas entity may be more suited to addressing Texas community property issues. | Under German law, yes sure. As long as you keep to all regulations. You have to declare your taxes. This is income, whether it comes from inside Germany or not and whether it is paid into a German bank account or foreign. You have to have a health insurance and likely need to pay into the social security and pension funds. As your employer most likely does not do this for you as a German employer would be required to, you will need to pay both the employee and the employer's part yourself. So yes, if you pay your taxes on it and have health and social security insurance, Germany does not care where the money comes from. Now whether the company in Mauritius is legally allowed to hire and pay you under their law? I have no idea. Please note that filling out all the right forms correctly is not for the faint of heart. And finding out that you did it wrong only years later is painful and costly. Also calculate your costs before you do anything. Paying both parts for your health insurance for example can easily be up to 400€ a month more then a German employee at a German company, so run your numbers. You may be better off being officially self-employed or even incorporated. Just because it's legal, does not mean it's a good idea. Hire a professional to advise you on the economic and bureaucratic side of this. | When the buyer hears "to avoid sales tax" and hears the seller describing as a gift something that s/he knows was nothing of the sort, a reasonable buyer would know that this was at best suspicious, and would find out if this was legal. But assuming that the buyer accepted the seller's suggestion ignorantly and in good faith, the buyer can file a report of the transaction and pay any tax that should have been paid. The exact way of doing this will vary based on the laws of the buyer's jurisdiction (state-level if in the US) which is not given in the question. Such a report and payment might not prevent the local tax authorities from assessing an additional penalty. Criminal charges seem unlikely, but would be possible. If the seller was a used car dealer, the authorities might want the buyer to testify against the seller. They buyer might be wise to consult a lawyer with expertise in sales tax issues in the buyer's jurisdiction. Such a lawyer could advise on exactly what the buyer's legal obligation was, and how to avoid or minimize penalties or other consequences. | FDIC Regulation 500 prohibits discrimination in making loans on the basis of "National origin" but not on the basis of immigration status. This story from The Nation says that Bank of America is denying accounts to non-citizens, and arguing that it is legal because of increased risks, although there are current court challenges to this. Perez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A is a case now pending challenging loan denials based on immigration status. This has particularly come up in regard to DACA recipients, rather than people with LPR status. The US "public accommodation" laws probably do not apply, as a bank is not usually considered a place of public accommodation. Any specific state laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of immigration status might apply. In short, this is an issue still not clearly settled. There seems to be no law or regulation requiring banks to ask for citizenship information, much less to deny accounts based on it, and it would be well to seek a bank with a different policy if possible. The above is very US-specific. Many countries do limit banking access based on citizenship, i understand. I am not a lawyer, and this is not legal advice. Before challenging any bank action, you may well wish to seek advice from a lawyer. |
why is a person allowed to lie in court and get away with it? In a court of law, the defendant can tell as much lies as she wants in order to vindicate herself of the charges. But if the court finds them guilty, the false explanations that the person had given are not revisited. Why is this so? Even if a person is doing so to save her skin, shouldn't giving false testimonies in court be regarded as a crime after the person has been proven guilty? | I don't believe your premise is necessarily true. As the Supreme Court has held, a defendant can be prosecuted for perjury after being convicted for another offense at trial: The conviction of Williams, at a former trial, for beating certain victims is not former or double jeopardy. Obviously perjury at a former trial is not the same offense as the substantive offense, under 18 U.S.C. § 242, of depriving a person of constitutional rights under color of law. . . . It would be no service to the administration of justice to enlarge the conception of former jeopardy to afford a defendant immunity from prosecution for perjury while giving testimony in his own defense. United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58, 62 (1951) (emphasis added). Now as a practical matter, trying a convicted person for perjury is most likely rare, since the prosecutor has already obtained a conviction for the underlying offense. Starting another prosecution for perjury might be excessive or unnecessary. But that doesn't mean it's categorically prohibited. Note also that perjury by the defendant can be considered by the judge to enhance the defendant's sentence. United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 96 (1993). | In the US, a person is "within their rights" to invoke the Fifth Amendment, i.e. refuse to self-incriminate. However, the government can give a person immunity from prosecution for offenses having to do with the testimony, in which case he can be compelled to testify. A person is not required to guess about whether they could actually be convicted based on their testimony. It is the privilege of the court (judge) to determine whether a witness has "a reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer" (Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17). | Is truth the ultimate defense to a defamation lawsuit in the USA? Truth is an absolute defense to defamation lawsuits in modern U.S. law (this was not always the case historically) as a matter of constitutional law in every state. In some kinds of defamation lawsuits (but not all kinds of defamation lawsuits), "actual malice" which means knowing falsity or reckless disregard for the truth, must be shown, so even a negligently stated falsehood is not actionable in those special kinds of defamation cases (mostly cases with public figure plaintiffs, media defendants, and/or case involving matters of public concern). Does a defamation defense vary between states? While most aspects of defamation law are mandated by the U.S. Constitution and a shared common law tradition, there are some slight and subtle differences between the states in defamation law, mostly concerning defamation suits by non-public figures against non-media defendants concerning matters that are not a matter of public concern. This impacts whether "actual malice" must be shown and can influence the burden of proof in defamation cases. Statutes of limitation for defamation suits also vary significantly between states. Even if the release of truthful information results in permanent career damage (i.e. loss of job, reputation, etc.) to someone, the truth would protect the author from a defamation lawsuit, correct? Yes. Keep in mind, however, that a defamation lawsuit is a suit for damage to one's reputation caused by a false statement. Sometimes disclosures of truthful information constitute an actionable tort other than defamation, however. For example, there would potentially be a civil action against someone who had signed a non-disclosure agreement for revealing truthfully information that the person sued contractually agreed not to disclose (e.g. the terms of the settlement agreement in a court case with a non-disclosure/confidentiality term, or the recipe for a restaurant's secret sauce that is a trade secret). Similarly, a doctor who revealed confidential patient medical information that was true could be sued. But, usually, in the absence of a particularlized confidentiality duty, truth is an absolute defense. | Chain of custody and testimony in this regard. Say there is a murder victim, with DNA of the suspect under the fingernails and a knife with the suspect's bloody fingerprints stuck in the chest. There would be testimony what happened to the knife. If a paramedic removed it to attempt first aid, the paramedic would testify. So would the officer who bagged it, and the forensic analyst who took the fingerprints. A pathologist would testify if the knife was consistent with the stab wound (a careful pathologist could never swear that the knife was the cause of death, just that it matches). The pathologist would also testify how DNA was collected under the fingernails, and how it was sent to the lab. The defense may claim that the suspect also tried first aid, or that a corrupt cop forced the suspect to hold the knife. The court or jury then draw their conclusions from this and other testimony. Same here. A lifelike picture found on the web proves nothing. A witness who takes the stand to testify that he or she took a certain picture would be more credible. So would a forensic officer who testifies how she or he removed the data from a surveillance camera, checked for common signs of tampering, and then signed a copy of the data with a private key. (The signing shows no third-party tampering after collection, it is not evidence of integrity before that.) Years ago, in germany, there was the case of a bank robber who claimed that a fleeing suspect had handed him a bag of money in the forest and then vanished. "Prove it wasn't so," he demanded. "You can't. So there is reasonable doubt." Well, the court found that the statement merely created unreasonable doubt, and the sentence was upheld on appeal. | Hope you have a good prosecutor and a sympathetic judge "They asked repeatedly how much she had to drink ..." Objection: Asked and answered "how she could claim not to remember certain details" Objection: Calls for a conclusion/speculation. The witness is not a brain scientist, she cannot speculate as to why people remember some details and not others. She is testifying as to what she does remember, not as to why she doesn't remember things. "asking if she had not been flirting with him in the days before the incident" Objection: Relevance. Is the defense seriously suggesting that flirtation, if it happened, in the preceding days amounts to consent at the time of the incident? "asked her why she had not chosen a more modest one" Objection: Relevance. Is the defense now suggesting that what the witness wore amounts to consent? | I'm not going to comment on the specifics of this law; rather, I think this question shows a misconception of the way the legal system works in general. Here's the question: do you actually have "legally privileged" material on your phone? If not, what's keeping you from claiming that is that it's not true, and lying to a police officer is a bad idea. And just putting a letter from your lawyer on the phone doesn't mean you've established a legal privilege--attorney-client privilege is not a magic spell, it's a reasonable system of protection that only covers certain communications. The bottom line is: the statute in general, and that clause in particular, were included in the law to protect real, important, and substantial legal right. The courts interpret the law in light of that purpose. If the police officer finds a solution that protects your rights while still carrying out the purpose of the statute, the court will be unlikely to fault him or her. In this case, if you tell the officer that there is a letter from your attorney in a particular folder, the obvious solution is for the officer not to open that folder. Problem solved. In practice, in the United States at least, these cases are dealt with routinely; computers are seized, and attorneys and judges work together to ensure that privilege is protected while still allowing reasonable access to seized materials. I would imagine the same is true in the U.K. The bottom line is: the law is not a game, and technical "gotchas" are rarely effective. Common law systems allow judges enough leeway to avoid this sort of pointless technicality. | If you have something to say, you should have said it before now When a judge is about to hand down a decision the case is all but over. Just like figure skating at the Olympics, the points are scored even if nobody but the judges know what they are yet. The onus is on the parties to bring forward all the evidence and make all the submissions on the law that they want the judge to consider before and during the hearing. If they didn't then that's their fault and they can't introduce new stuff now. Now, it's not uncommon for a judge to share their thoughts during the hearing or in writing when considering written submissions. This is because their thinking on the law is at variance with what the parties are contending. The plaintiff says the law is X, the defendant says the law is Y, the judge thinks they're both idiots and the law is clearly Z. They will usually call for submissions on this because the judge's role is to decide the dispute between the parties on the evidence the contend -not to impose the judge's interpretation on them; by doing this the parties may relies the judge is right and a lot of the dispute disappears or they may convince the judge that they are wrong (it's not unknown) and move on from a clear agreed position. | There is no prohibition on lying in general. Misrepresentation If you misrepresent a fact and that misrepresentation is a material inducement to someone entering into a contract with you then there are a number of problems that follow: The (mis)representation may become a term of the contract and if not complied with can allow the aggrieved party to either sue for damages or rescind the contract. If the misrepresentation led to the contract being entered into by mistake then the contract is void for mistake The misrepresentation may have become a collateral contract an innocent or negligent misstatement may give rise to the tort of negligent misstatement misrepresentation may put you in breach of trade practices statutes. Fraud If you knowingly tell a lie with the intention of receiving a benefit then this is both the tort and crime of fraud. You receiving employment or your company securing a contract probably qualifies as intending to receive a benefit. |
Is it legal to have unpaid volunteer moderators (or other types of volunteers) on a for-profit community website? It seems like everyone does it. I've never heard of a paid moderator (though I'm sure they probably exist). From what I've gathered, however, it sounds like having any kind of volunteers is illegal for any for-profit business in the US, based on FLSA regulations. Is this true, or am I reading it wrong? Would this also apply to other types of volunteers (such as someone who wants to help code the website)? | Probably not An employee is someone that the employer "suffers or permits to work" - moderators would appear to be caught by this. There are specific exemptions carved out in the public and not-for-profit sectors where they "a) work toward public service, religious or humanitarian objectives; b) not expect or receive compensation for services; and c) not displace any genuine employees." However, they very specifically say “Under the FLSA, employees may not volunteer services to for-profit private sector employers.” So on the face of it, a moderator is an employee and is entitled to minimum wages and conditions for the hours they work. AOL settled a lawsuit in 2009 with their moderators who were suing for wages for an undisclosed sum and so the case did not set a precedent. This article suggests that "for-profit companies don’t have volunteers; they have lawsuits waiting to happen" and uses examines the situation at Reddit (which could equally apply here). Facebook employs moderators so the precedent exists that this is work that employees do. When the lawsuit happens, we'll find out. It will turn on the particular facts - some types of mods for some companies may be employees while others may not. | It looks to me as if "money laundering" is a misunderstanding; though any organization has a duty to prevent this, charities have no special responsibilties. However, charity law does in general terms prevent a charity from giving money to a cause that does not further the charity's aims. The Charity Commission's guidance says "Charities can only spend their money on projects or activities that support the aims stated in their governing document" (and although it goes on to outline exceptions, you still need to obtain the Commission's agreement to return a gift from a source you find objectionable, for example). The rationale is that people gave money to the University to further the cause of education; the researchers have no right to divert that money to Shelter (or another charity like the Roman Catholic Church) without the giver's consent. My experienced but non-expert view is that these payments would be a breach of the law, though they would probably be treated as a de minimis exception; you can't blame the University's legal team for insisting they should not be made. | Can the name of my LLC include the phrases "Software Engineer", "Software Engineering", or similar derivations thereof? No. Not based on what you've posted. Go to the definitions to see how engineer is defined. It may be they are talking about actual structural engineers or environmental engineers, where if you're wrong people die. But based on above, you can't use the word engineer unless you're licensed as such. Is there even a license for computer engineer? This seems more like it could be a term of use but not actually descriptive of what you're doing. IDK. You'd have to see the definitions and exceptions. Can my resume, curriculum vitae, or my advertising or promotional materials accurately report the subjects I studied in college as the subject matter of "Software Engineering", to the extent that this information is true and accurate? Yes, your CV is supposed to say what you have done, and learned and especially published (lest it's just a resume), but the answer as far as promotional materials, is NO. This, because you don't post your cv on your ad's and if you put that, you will likely be found to be trying to pose as a licensed professional based on a technicality. If that happens the licensing authority will probably censure you by disallowing a license when your qualify. If asked directly by a client, am I even allowed to divulge my area of study accurately,(of course, but you'd also have to divulge the fact that you are not licensed and cannot act in that capacity) Would it be a violation of the law to claim I had engineering knowledge since I have studied (and practiced) software engineering in the past (for instance, at previous places of work in states which did not have these kinds of limitations, or for corporations which did not offer my services to the general public)? It could be if the person reports that you are soliciting work as an engineer w/out a license. It's like a person who went to law school, passed the bar, but never got sworn in. They cannot solicit business as a lawyer. Unless there is a license for being a computer programer, there is nothing barring you from using that terminology. You could be, that if you look up the definition prior to the statue, that it says something like "for the purposes of this section the term engineer means…", In which case it doesn't even apply to you. | Online file converters are legal: there is no law that prohibits a person from making a program available and executing online, including creating output in the form of a file. It is possible that some person may illegally copy copyright-protected material then use a website to modify that material, in which case the question of vicarious liability for copyright infringement could arise, so we appeal to the DMCA safe harbor provisions to see what the website must do. First, the owner of copyright must submit a properly constructed takedown notice to the website. Crucially, the notice must contain sufficient information that the website operator can find and take down the item(s) in question. Assuming that the complainant can supply the "where is it" information, then there is a notice and counter-notice routine where the uploader is informed and can deny the accusation – the website operator doesn't evaluate the merits of the claim, he only sees that the formalities were observed. If the operator follows the rules, he cannot be held vicariously liable. If the link does not expire and if it is somehow promulgated, the technical potential for being a contributor to copyright infringement becomes very real, but it puts the operator in no worse a legal position than Youtube. So the question is not just related to OCILLA, it is entirely covered by that law. Questions of how users or website owners are "supposed to" act don't figure into this. If the website owner does not comply with those provisions, they have no access to the safe harbor provisions, and they can be sued. However, the website itself remains legally "permitted" (there never was a prohibition of such a website). | Does criticizing public figures constitute libel especially in a private group? It depends on the specifics, but a priori your description suggests that the defense of honest opinion would be applicable. This is regardless of whether the subject is a public figure and regardless of whether the statements were in private --albeit non-privileged-- communications. Case law surely provides guidelines or precedents on how the details and circumstances of the events would fare on the parties' legal position, but I am not knowledgeable of UK/English law. Does X have a counterclaim for illegally accessing the data? The matter seemingly depends on how the religious leader had or gained access to the data. Even if he gained access by stealing or hacking a device or account, X would not have standing to [counter-]sue unless the device or account belongs to X. Be mindful of the possibility that third party might have made the disclosure to the religious leader. In that case, actionability (if any) of the disclosure only encompasses the third party, not the religious leader. X's intent that his statements stay only among the participants does not necessarily imply that participants' disclosure elsewhere is unlawful. | Yes The relevant legal concepts are copyright, contract law and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. You are liable to be sued by the people affected for damages and/or be prosecuted by the government for the felony under either or both laws. Let's start here: "I bought a game". No, you didn't; you bought a licence to use the software in accordance with the terms of service (licence) that you freely agreed to. All modern ToS will not allow you to reverse engineer the software. If you breach those terms of service then you have broken a contract - that is what allows them to sue you. They will no doubt argue that the prevalence of cheat routines developed by people like you reduce the number of people willing to play the game - say 100,000 users x $10/month * 12 months = $12,000,000. They will also ask the court to impose punitive damages to discourage this sort of thing. Which brings us to the copyright violation. You are allowed to copy their software provided you comply with the ToS. But you didn't. Therefore you are in breach of the Copyright Act and subject to additional civil and criminal sanctions. Finally, your "cheats" access their servers in a way that the ToS doesn't authorize. This puts you in breach of the CFFA - breaking this carries serious jail time penalties. Not to mention that in the US, a criminal conviction will preclude you from many jobs, including, naturally, any with access to company computer systems. Putting aside the illegalities, cheats are unethical and ruin the game experience for hundreds of thousands of people who don't use cheats. You are a criminal - stop being one! | No. It is an often repeated misconception that "Freedom of Speech" means that no one can restrict speech ever. This is not the case. Let us look at the US Consitution's First Admendment, which contains the "Freedom of Speech" clause: Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press... (Emphasis mine) As one can see, the First Amendment only restricts government actions. (It also stops other branches of government from restricting speech, because those branches are innately weak with very few powers granted to them by the constitution; the majority of executive or judicial branches powers are granted to them by a law passed by Congress, and Congress cannot give a power to another party that they do not possess). A Home Owner Association (HOA) is not a government or government agency; it is a private organization (and it is not the same as the "private management company" that manages the condominium, which is probably in the employ of the HOA; which also means that emailing the manager is not emailing the HOA board). Their power stems from a contract, one that your friend signed when they bought the property (one of the conditions agreed to is that a member who sells or gifts their HOA-member property can only do so to someone who also agrees to the contract). That said, HOAs can be horribly abusive and many states have laws that restrict what kinds of rules and penalties can be applied by an HOA. But that is not a constitutional matter (at either the Federal or State level), nor a question of "Freedom of Speech", but rather a limitation on the kinds of behaviors that can be enforced by contract. | Stack Exchange have already covered this in a couple of places, from MSE's A site (or scraper) is copying content from Stack Exchange. What should I do?: When should I not report these sites? They follow all the attribution requirements. As mentioned before, there is nothing wrong with copying our content elsewhere on the web, so long as they are following all the attribution requirements given. There is no action we can take against a scraper who follows all the rules. And the old Attribution Required blog post mentions that the actual requirements are: Visually indicate that the content is from Stack Overflow or the Stack Exchange network in some way. It doesn’t have to be obnoxious; a discreet text blurb is fine. Hyperlink directly to the original question on the source site (e.g., http://stackoverflow.com/questions/12345) Show the author names for every question and answer Hyperlink each author name directly back to their user profile page on the source site (e.g., http://stackoverflow.com/users/1234567890/username) By “directly”, I mean each hyperlink must point directly to our domain in standard HTML visible even with JavaScript disabled, and not use a tinyurl or any other form of obfuscation or redirection. Furthermore, the links must not be nofollowed |
Bill of Rights protection against mandatory vaccination? Does the the "privacy" protection afforded by the Bill of Rights covers unwanted medical treatments, including unwanted drug taking, notably mandatory vaccines? | It probably does, up to a point. Roe v. Wade asserts a right to privacy, discussed in §VIII. Granting that there is no explicit enumeration of a right to privacy in the Constitution, its implicit presence is discerned via a long series of constitutional rulings of a diverse nature. It is not clear what is the extent of This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people... However, even in the case of explicitly recognized rights, they are not absolute: you cannot commit fraud or threaten a person with death and escape punishment by citing the 1st Amendment, you cannot own a machine gun and cite the 2nd in your defense. Fundamental rights are strongly protected, but they may be limited in a fashion that survives strict scrutiny. This means that the encroachment is necessary to a "compelling state interest", it is "narrowly tailored" towards that end, and is the "least restrictive means" to achieve that end. The question arose in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11 where Jacobson was criminally arraigned for refusing to comply with a mandatory vaccination law (applicable to all persons over 21). The court noted that the liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to every person within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common good. The liberty secured by the 14th Amendment, this court has said, consists, in part, in the right of a person 'to live and work where he will'...; and yet he may be compelled, by force if need be, against his will and without regard to his personal wishes or his pecuniary interests, or even his religious or political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of his country, and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense... According to settled principles, the police power of a state must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations established directly by legislative enactment as will protect the public health and the public safety. The right to compel vaccination is reaffirmed in Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174. There is currently no mandatory vaccination law applicable to adults; were such a law to be created (analogous to the earlier Mass. law regarding smallpox vaccination), it could easily pass judicial review as long as it is "minimalist". The question of "compelling government interest" would distinguish between mandatory Ebola or zombie-fever vaccinations vs. shingles or (ordinary) flu. School-related vaccination laws are the most minimal way to achieve the desired outcome, so a law requiring everybody to submit might not pass a strict scrutiny review. | The emergency temporary standard requires either vaccination, or testing with masks for unvaccinated workers, for employees of an employer with 100 or more employees but has exceptions for employees working alone or exclusively outdoors. According to 1910.501 - Vaccination, testing, and face coverings: 1910.501(b)(3) The requirements of this section do not apply to the employees of covered employers: 1910.501(b)(3)(i) Who do not report to a workplace where other individuals such as coworkers or customers are present; 1910.501(b)(3)(ii) While working from home; or 1910.501(b)(3)(iii) Who work exclusively outdoors. | You may be mistaken about the purpose of the Miller test. If some content is obscene according to the Miller test, then it does not receive First Amendment protection, and could be prohibited from distribution by the government. However, it says nothing about the contractual obligations that two parties can agree to. To the extent that the obligations themselves are objectionable this analysis would fall under the doctrines of unconscionability and public policy. | The health insurance contract should set forth what is and is not covered in detail (in addition, there would be a short summary version). They probably don't have to provide procedure codes that are covered or not covered because no such one to one correspondence exists because the language of the insurance contract is controlling and does not exactly correspond to procedure codes. For example, one of the basic eligibility questions is whether a procedure is medically necessary. A procedure may be medically necessary for one person, but not for another, and usually a denial based upon medical necessity is subject to appeal to other medical professionals engaged by the insurance company. Unless the insurance contract provides that an EOB must contain procedure codes, it probably doesn't have an affirmative obligation to do so, because there is no general principle of law that would require them to disclose their internal classification of services provided outside of a litigation context. And, in a litigation context, you probably could obtain procedure codes in discovery from the insurance company, as the code assigned to a procedure on an EOB would almost surely not be privileged or a legally protected secret. It may very well be that the company has an in house set of procedures for certain common diagnosis codes that are routinely allowed or are flagged for review by an insurance company bureaucrat. But, that would ordinarily be considered something of a trade secret of the company and is not a statement of what is or is not allowed under the actual health insurance contract. However, the privilege against disclosing the information in that context would flow from trade secret law and not from the fact that they are PHI. I don't agree that PHI is the correct reason for failing to disclose that information (unless some case law of which I am not aware has interpreted it differently). The federal law definition of PHI is at 45 CFR 160.103: Protected health information means individually identifiable health information: (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this definition, that is: (i) Transmitted by electronic media; (ii) Maintained in electronic media; or (iii) Transmitted or maintained in any other form or medium. (2) Protected health information excludes individually identifiable health information: (i) In education records covered by the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, as amended, 20 U.S.C. 1232g; (ii) In records described at 20 U.S.C. 1232g(a)(4)(B)(iv); (iii) In employment records held by a covered entity in its role as employer; and (iv) Regarding a person who has been deceased for more than 50 years. The cross reference to 20 U.S.c. 1232g(a)(4)(B)(iv) reads as follows: (iv) records on a student who is eighteen years of age or older, or is attending an institution of postsecondary education, which are made or maintained by a physician, psychiatrist, psychologist, or other recognized professional or paraprofessional acting in his professional or paraprofessional capacity, or assisting in that capacity, and which are made, maintained, or used only in connection with the provision of treatment to the student, and are not available to anyone other than persons providing such treatment, except that such records can be personally reviewed by a physician or other appropriate professional of the student’s choice. In short, it is B.S. that you are being given an illegitimate reason for not complying with your request, but it is probably still within the company's rights for other legitimate reasons to deny your request. | A company can mandate getting a flu shot as a condition of employment. The government can do the same (for its employees) – Washington state has done so at least for covid. Some individuals qualify for a disability accommodation, so they would be exceptions (e.g. they could be moved to working away from the public). A sincere religious conviction also gives rise to a religious-accommodation exemption. This guidance addresses the question of what constitutes a sincerely held religious belief. | Questions about whether a certain action is "just" tend to be maters of opinion, politics and philosophy, but it can be addressed from the perspective of legal theory (especially following the model of common law, where legal principles are based on concepts of just and proper action). Whether or not a certain action is actually legal in a certain jurisdiction depends on the laws of that country -- I suspect that the answer is different for the US versus China. The first question would be whether those government officials have the legal authority – I assume they do. Such authority is generally governed by some specific circumstances, for example, "poses an imminent and grave threat to public health". It is basically not a legal question whether quarantining in the face of this viral threat is necessary from a public health perspective, that is a medical question. What the law would say is that if this is a serious threat, then a person's liberty can be curtailed to a limited extent, because a person does not have the right to harm others because they don't want to do some thing that protects the rights of others (be vaccinated, stay in quarantine until it is safe). However, principles of legal justice also say that the government's response should be proportionate, e.g. shoot-on-sight in response to a sneeze is not proportionate. Quarantining has long been recognized as a valid, just and legal response to such extreme medical threats. Historically speaking, quarantining used to be the only effective action that a government can take against e.g. smallpox, plague, Spanish flu, Ebola. | Following you around with the intent of harassing you is stalking. I don't know whether there's going to be a law actually requiring social distancing in Florida. In other states, I've seen laws set up to make it a crime to violate an order of the Director of Public Health or something like that. I don't know whether Florida actually has an order requiring social distancing by the general public. | The primary protection against doxxing is likely to be the Protection from Harassment Act (1997) s 1: 1 Prohibition of harassment. (1)A person must not pursue a course of conduct— (a)which amounts to harassment of another, and (b)which he knows or ought to know amounts to harassment of the other. (2)For the purposes of this section, the person whose course of conduct is in question ought to know that it amounts to harassment of another if a reasonable person in possession of the same information would think the course of conduct amounted to harassment of the other. The amount only matters insofar as a reasonable person would consider it, in the circumstances, to be harassment of the other. Additionally, you may be able, if you show psychiatric injury, to pursue a tort of psychiatric injury against the perpetrator. |
Public Forum: Public street through Private Property in CA? I speak the Gospel publicly in California in traditional public forums. There is a movie theater on privately owned property, along with other businesses and office buildings, that has a publicly accessible street running through it—Lakes Dr., West Covina, CA. I attempted this last Friday, to speak to the line for tickets. The manager and security for the theater ordered me to stop. After finishing my short talk, I did and cordially informed them that free speech on traditional public forums, like streets and sidewalks, is protected speech. The Theater manager said the street is part of the private property and subject to their dictates. May I speak from within 5ft. of the street, sidewalk not clearly marked, under Traditional Public Forum protected speech? | In most states, the answer would be less clear, as First Amendment protections begin falling away quickly when you enter private property. In California, though, there is some strong precedent indicating that this behavior would be protected. In Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 902 (1979), the California Supreme Court held that "the soliciting at a shopping center of signatures for a petition to the government is an activity protected by the California Constitution." That case adopted the reasoning of a dissent in a previous case where the court had rejected such an argument: It bears repeated emphasis that we do not have under consideration the property or privacy rights of an individual homeowner or the proprietor of a modest retail establishment. As a result of advertising and the lure of a congenial environment, 25,000 persons are induced to congregate daily to take advantage of the numerous amenities offered by the [shopping center there]. A handful of additional orderly persons soliciting signatures and distributing handbills in connection therewith, under reasonable regulations adopted by defendant to assure that these activities do not interfere with normal business operations ... would not markedly dilute defendant's property rights. I'd bet there is case law addressing religious leafleting, as well, but I don't know California law well enough to cite to it. Even if there isn't, though, the First Amendment's requirements of content-neutrality in government decisionmaking would probably require that the same protections be extended to religious speech. Of course, the answer to these kinds of questions always depends on the specific facts, requiring you to engage a lawyer to get a reliable answer. For a lower cost, you could also just ask the local police if they would enforce a request from the property owner to have you removed. | Utah has a lot of public parks, so to point in the right direction, I will assume that this is a public park in Salt Lake City, it's just a plain old grassy field, and it's not during a special event. A person is suspected of some crime like selling drugs, not arrested, but told by a police officer to go away and never come back. This is way beyond the power of the police. After due legal process, a proven (not just suspected) public menace could be ordered by the court to stay away from the park. A police officer can, of course, order a person to leave a park when they violate a park rule, in fact rule number 1 is "It is unlawful for any person to do or to allow or permit any of the acts prohibited by this chapter in any park in Salt Lake City", so the police cannot legally turn a blind eye to rule violations. Violation of park rules is an infraction which can earn you a ticket of up to $299. However, the officer can tell you to go away, rather than giving you a ticket or arresting you. But an police order cannot issue a unilateral restraining order. Apart from city laws, there are general state laws regarding trespass and destruction of property. The state criminal trespass law says that A person is guilty of criminal trespass if...knowing the person's... entry or presence is unlawful, the person enters or remains on to which notice against entering is given by...personal communication to the person by the owner or someone with apparent authority to act for the owner In this case, the owner is the city, and the officer has apparent authority to act for that owner. In the case of private property, the owner or his agent has very broad authority to give notice requiring you to leave (e.g. if you don't like their politics or their shirt); but in the case of public property, the government has more narrowly circumscribed authority to kick you out. | Publishing government records is pretty classic First Amendment-protected activity. Keeping in mind that one can find a lawyer to sue for anything, I think that person would likely be operating well within the law. One thing in particular that I'd recommend staying aware of is how one might attempt to monetize this endeavor. There have been a lot of sites publishing arrest records, court records, and mugshots, and then charging people to have them removed to keep them from popping up in a Google search for those people's names. That is -- rightly -- regarded as sketchy behavior; while several states have passed laws prohibiting that business model, I don't believe any such law exists in Washington State at this point. | I'm not a lawyer, but under the law as it's written, I see two problems: 17 USC 121 allows "authorized entities" to make and publish accessible copies of works. An "authorized entity" is defined as a nonprofit organization or a governmental agency that has a primary mission to provide specialized services relating to training, education, or adaptive reading or information access needs of blind or other persons with disabilities. So if you, as a private citizen, decide to do this, it could conceivably be copyright infringement. You might have to set up some kind of non-profit organization to make it legal. It's also OK (I think) if you make such copies for your own personal use, so long as you don't redistribute them. So far as I can tell, nothing under 17 USC 121 requires the original publisher to provide an "authorized entity" with a copy in any particular format (PDF, paper, or otherwise) for making accessible copies. Basically, the law seems to have envisioned organizations of sighted people purchasing paper copies, transcribing them, and republishing them; not blind individuals doing electronic transcription for themselves. It might still be worth contacting Hal Leonard and asking what they can do for you, but unfortunately it doesn't look like the law requires them to do anything for you. As Nij points out in the comments, this really seems to be a question about the company's policy, rather than the law. | Damaging someone else's property is not protected free speech in the US. Nor is using someone else's property without permission and against the owner's wishes. Scenario 3 would surely be vandalism or "Malicious Mischief" or some similar offense, even if the paint can be fairly easily removed. The same would be petty surely true of scenario 2, as it would take at least some effort to remove the sticker, and it could be a safety hazard until it is removed (obstructed vision). Scenario 1 would probably not be even a minor crime, unless perhaps the person trespassed to attach the string. But the person has no right to insist that the car's owner not remove the sign. I am assuming that the car is owned by someone else, and the the person placing the sign, sticker or paint acted without permission from the owner or any authorized person. | Regarding concern one: I don't know much of anything about historical landmarks and how they get exempted from certain laws. However, I can tell you that the law generally prefers safety over preserving historical value. It is highly unlikely that a court would ever consider a plant that has existed for any number of years to be of more value than a pedestrian's or driver's safety, and thus requiring that the hedge be trimmed or removed to allow for that safety would be far more important. As well, your argument that cutting or removing the hedges would decrease the value of the property isn't the strongest argument. Currently, you have hedges that violate a local law. That immediately decreases the value of your property because a part of your property is in violation of ordinances that would have to be corrected in order for the sale of the property to go through, because most homeowners do not want to buy a property with a burden attached to it. Thus, a potential buyer would likely stipulate that the hedges be removed before they consider buying, or they might also stipulate a lower price so they can use the difference between buying and list price to remove the hedges themselves after the sale. Sure, if you only include the part of "this property has beautiful hedges" then the property value goes up, but once you tack on "which are also in violation of law" that value you just gained is immediately negated. Now in your specific case you mentioned that it hangs a foot over an eight-foot wide sidewalk. That is an abnormally wide sidewalk (a standard sidewalk in most places is only around three feet wide, with some extending up to five feet). I've only personally seen eight-foot or more wide sidewalks in very heavily trafficked areas, which from your "small town" description doesn't sound like the case there. You might be able to argue that in your particular case, due to the size of the sidewalk, that the hedges do not actually inhibit the safety of pedestrians and thus the ordinance shouldn't apply, but there's no guarantee that would work (it sounds like the city council already decided that they want it enforced there). However, if it is hanging over into the street in any capacity, you are pretty much out of luck. It's unlikely you would ever get an exception for that kind of violation. Regarding concern two: You're widely conflating "daily" and "excessive" to mean the same thing. Daily fines are not automatically excessive fines, and it is not in any way unconstitutional for a fine to be assessed on a daily basis. The laws you cite about excessive fines refer to the cumulative total of the fine. At a certain point of assessing a fine on a daily basis, the amount reaches a point where it is an excessive amount to pay. In a situation like that, it makes far more sense to stop increasing the fine and instead jail the person as they have shown a clear disregard for the law and a willingness not to comply with the law. Continuing to fine them has proven not to deter them any further from breaking the law, and that a massive fine does not justly punish them for the actions they have taken. A different punishment is warranted. This is the premise of the case you cite in your question. Brunk argued that a cumulative fine of over $100,000 for his violations was quite excessive and appealed on that argument. I don't know what the final outcome of his appeal was, because that particular court did not make a decision (rather they vacated the amount and sent it back to a lower court for reconsideration to determine if that amount was fair). It's entirely possible he still ended up with the same fine in the end. Regarding concern three: There is nothing remotely illegal about this. So long as there is a city ordinance that allows the officer to write such a citation, the officer is perfectly within his authority to write such fine and threaten such fine for noncompliance. A law in its natural form is a threat. The government body that created that law is issuing a threat to all of its citizens that if they do this thing, then this fine or amount of jail time will be applied to them. We just don't think of laws as threats in that regard when we talk about them. An officer reiterating that to you does not constitute anything other than them telling you what the law is and what can happen if you disobey it. Now if the officer threatened something against you that is not mandated by law, that would be a more serious concern that potentially could have some legal consequences for them. But there's no evidence that occurred here. Your situation in general: If you're hoping for some constitutional argument that you can throw in the officer's face to get him to back off, you're not going to find one. Generally that part of the constitution is only reviewed after fines have been handed down. You would first need to be fined and have a judge review the case to determine a total amount of how much you will be fined for all the cumulative violations. At that point if you believe it is excessive and in violation of the constitution, you would challenge the decision in court or appeal the decision if the case has already been closed. But even then, the fine would not be dropped. It would just be reduced to a value that some other judge reviewing the appeal thinks is a fair, non-excessive amount for a fine given the specific details of your case. Your case details do matter. For example, if you just argue with the officer the entire time and do nothing to resolve the problem identified, a judge might consider a much higher value vs if you actively worked to resolve the problem but just weren't capable of doing it fast enough. "Excessive" here is a completely subjective term that is different for every single case. No one can tell you whether something is excessive until the final number has been totaled and given out. Consider the two alternatives I just mentioned above. If both of those cases were in trial at the same time, they would both likely end up with different amounts for fines and, on appeal, one might succeed in convincing a judge that the fine was excessive and one might not. Better options: You could talk to the officer and explain to him that you are not capable of doing the work that quickly without hiring additional help, which you cannot afford. But that may only work once. If the issue arises again in the future (say next year), the officer likely won't be as forgiving since you've been warned about the hedges hanging over the sidewalks and streets before. If anything at all, it will show a court that you attempted to work out an arrangement of some sort to fix the problem, and were trying to cooperate. If it ended up in court for some reason, that interaction would be immensely helpful to you. As well, you'll want to consult an attorney for exact interpretations of the city's ordinances to make sure that this is actually against the law and how the law punishes its violation. Many cities have ordinances forbidding trees and other plants from obstructing sidewalks and roadways for safety concerns, but not all. As well, I've found it is much more common for a city to impose a single fine for a violation like that if the warning is ignored. The city would then send out its own crew to rectify the problem and then charge the resident for labor, materials, and removal costs. However, if the city does not have their own Public Works department, that may not be an option for them. If you do find more specifics about how the law is to be enforced, politely tell the officer that. It won't get you out of trouble, and he may still have the legal authority to fine you in some way according to the actual law, but knowing the exact details of your township may give you more peace of mind in knowing the actual limitations of how much you can be fined. | As per this question & answer, in the US there is no expectation of privacy in public places (not to be confused with private places where public is allowed e.g. supermarkets). Photos taken in public belong to the photo taker and he/she is free to use them in whatever way. No privacy is violated here. The fact that the person whose photo was taken was a celebrity does not change anything. It would have been completely their fault to expect privacy in a public place and behave rashly. | You are not obliged to say anything to a police officer during a traffic stop, in fact you are generally better off staying silent. This is your Fifth Amendment right to silence. The only exception to this is that the officer could ask for your name and you are obliged to give it under Arizona Laws 13-2412, but the answer to that is language-independent and is usually already answered with your driver's license in a traffic stop. If you did choose to communicate only in German, this may have the effect of frustrating the officer's investigation but if you only make truthful statements in German it is unlikely to be obstruction of their investigation. Arizona Laws 13-2409 is I believe the relevant section (emphasis mine): A person who knowingly attempts by means of bribery, misrepresentation, intimidation or force or threats of force to obstruct, delay or prevent the communication of information or testimony relating to a violation of any criminal statute to a peace officer, magistrate, prosecutor or grand jury or who knowingly injures another in his person or property on account of the giving by the latter or by any other person of any such information or testimony to a peace officer, magistrate, prosecutor or grand jury is guilty of a class 5 felony, except that it is a class 3 felony if the person commits the offense with the intent to promote, further or assist a criminal street gang. In general, a law that required you to give answers to a police officer during an investigation in English if you understand English and have waived your right to silence would violate your First Amendment right to free speech (as it is in effect "forced speech"). However, you would need to be careful not to tell the police officer that you do not understand English if that is not true, as it could be misrepresentation. Police officer training likely includes instructions for detaining someone that cannot understand them and the police can detain you and wait for an interpreter to continue their investigation if they determine that is necessary. You may actually be shooting yourself in the foot by doing this, because the time it takes for them to get an interpreter likely extends the amount of time the detainment can last while remaining "reasonable," so you may be waiting by the side of the road longer than you would have if you had simply told the officer that you were invoking your right to silence and followed the officer's instructions without speaking. As an aside, as more people are educated on their rights via the Internet and understand why they should always invoke their right to silence when detained, police officers will get more used to people they pull over immediately and politely telling them that they are going to invoke their right to silence. I doubt most police officers will hold it against you as long as you are otherwise cooperative and don't yell at them or berate them. |
Does a person sitting in the driver seat of a stopped and off car have to show driver license if the police ask? Suppose a person is walking in a park and gets stopped by park staff, who claim that the person is trespassing (or is doing something else illegal). The person then gets into the driver seat of their car to keep warm but does not drive away (for whatever reason--maybe staff refuse to open the exit gate to let the car through or maybe the person was invited onto the property and was never asked to leave). The person leaves the car off. Police arrive and ask the person for a driver license. The police are not citing or arresting the person and are not investigating a traffic infraction. Does this person have to provide driver license? Does it matter if the car is on? Assume this is in the USA, and assume it is in a state without a general requirement to provide an ID. If it helps, assume it is New York. Edit: the New York assumption made the question fairly uninteresting. | New York has a "stop and identify" law which says that a police officer may stop a person in a public place located within the geographical area of such officer's employment when he reasonably suspects that such person is committing, has committed or is about to commit either (a) a felony or (b) a misdemeanor defined in the penal law, and may demand of him his name, address and an explanation of his conduct. However, there is no requirement to carry an identifying document or to prove your verbal statements of identity. For that matter, there is no requirement that you have your license in your possession when driving, you simply have to be duly licensed. In this case, the officer has reasonable suspicion of a crime, so you do have to tell him your name, address, and what you were doing. In Washington, there is no stop-and-identify law, so you don't even have to tell the police who you are. There does exist a requirement to identify yourself if you are stopped for an traffic infraction: (1) Any person requested or signaled to stop by a law enforcement officer for a traffic infraction has a duty to stop. (2) Whenever any person is stopped for a traffic infraction, the officer may detain that person for a reasonable period of time necessary to identify the person, check for outstanding warrants, check the status of the person's license, insurance identification card, and the vehicle's registration, and complete and issue a notice of traffic infraction. (3) Any person requested to identify himself or herself to a law enforcement officer pursuant to an investigation of a traffic infraction has a duty to identify himself or herself and give his or her current address. However, the proposed scenario does not fall under this requirement because you weren't stopped. Also note that the limited ID law of Washington does not compel you to provide a document, it compels you to provide information. It is a misdemeanor to drive without a valid Washington license, but it is only an infraction to drive having been issued a license but not having it in your possession, as long as you provide an alternative ID document. So if you drive without a license in WA and are stopped, you have to show an ID document or suffer the misdemeanor alternative. But again, in this scenario you were not driving and were not stopped, you will not be forced to provide a document. Because driving without a license is a misdemeanor and the officer did not observe you driving, under Washington's arrest without warrant law, he cannot arrest you for suspicion of having committed the misdemeanor of driving without a license. (The arrest without warrant law is a bit more complicated, see the 11 exception subsections, none of which apply here). If your goal is to try to be forced to show your driver's license, you might try Indiana, where the law says A person who knowingly or intentionally refuses to provide either the person's: (1) name, address, and date of birth; or (2) driver's license, if in the person's possession; to a law enforcement officer who has stopped the person for an infraction or ordinance violation commits a Class C misdemeanor. But again, you were not stopped for an infraction or ordinance violation, so you may keep your license in your wallet. | It seems that the Iowa authorities did attempt to notify the driver. If the letter of notification was returned because the driver changed his or her address, that is not the DOT's fault -- drivers are supposed to notify the authorities of changes of address -- indeed driving with a license with an out-of-date address is itself a violation in some US states. If the error was made by the postal service, that is still not the DOT's fault but they might be more willing to accept an appeal from the driver. In general, authorities must make a reasonable attempt to notify people of court or administrative actions, but if those notifications fail, the authorities can go ahead in many cases. Try explaining that one doesn't owe taxes because an IRS notice was misdelivered. It would be too easy to avoid unwanted governmental actions if nondelivery of mail were a valid excuse. It may well be that there is a procedure to get the suspension waived or ended early, perhaps involving taking the class that should have been taken, and perhaps paying an additional fine. Details of such procedures vary. A local lawyer who deals with traffic issues frequently would probably know what steps might be taken. It may well be that the original ticket mentioned a possible suspension, but it may not have. That also varies by state. | In the U.S. there is no law that requires you to ever say a word to a law enforcement officer, and lawyers generally encourage you to minimize what you communicate to them anyway. I can't think of any situation where a request for information could not be demanded in writing. As a practical matter, in some situations you will probably be subject to some extra scrutiny and inconvenience: E.g., in a stop-and-identify situation, you could hand the officer a note saying, "Please make any requests for information from me in writing." The officer may infer that you have some disability, but if he does not (or discovers you don't) he may get irritated enough to subject you to harassment for "contempt of cop". Of course, if you can understand him, you are still required to obey an officer's lawful orders no matter how they are communicated. But "speak" is not a lawful order. | The statute doesn't say much in detail (from the New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law (unfortunately, the site works on javascript, so, you have to navigate by opening the "Laws" menu and then making your way from there): § 1128. Driving on roadways laned for traffic. Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic the following rules in addition to all others consistent herewith shall apply: (a) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety. (b and c are not relevant) (d) When official markings are in place indicating those portions of any roadway where crossing such markings would be especially hazardous, no driver of a vehicle proceeding along such highway shall at any time drive across such markings. The last bit, (d), is of interest. Basically, you are allowed to change into the correct lane as long as the pavement markings permit it. The pavement markings at an intersection with a sign like the one you posted are generally solid white lines. These details are governed by the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, published by the Federal Highway Administration. Their information on pavement markings is available both in PDF and HTML format. Pertinently, it says: A double white line indicates that lane changes are prohibited. A single white line indicates that lane changes are discouraged. A dashed white line indicates that lane changes are allowed. Therefore, if the lines separating the lanes are, as usual, solid white lines, you are encouraged to get into the correct lane before the beginning of the solid white line, but you are permitted to change lanes across the solid lines. An example of such marking is in the right-hand example in the given image: One point of possible contention is that the New York State Driver's Manual describes the meaning of the solid white line somewhat differently: One solid line: You can pass other vehicles or change lanes, but you can only do so when obstructions in the road or traffic conditions make it necessary. I don't see any statutory basis for that description, but I may well have overlooked something. I suppose you know where the signs are specified, since you probably got the image from there, but for anyone reading this who does not know, they are specified in the publication Standard Highway Signs. This is available as a set of PDF files; the relevant file is the one containing regulatory signs; the sign in the question is 1-33, and it is in the midst of several similar signs. If a police officer ticketed you for getting into the lane too late, I suppose you should find a lawyer who specializes in fighting traffic tickets, and ask whether there really is such a thing as "too late." By my reading of the law, there isn't. (Of course, if it's dangerous to change lanes because of other vehicles, you shouldn't change lanes, but if you had, I would suppose the officer should have written a ticket for some other violation, like reckless driving.) | This is currently untested but the U.S. Supreme Court did leave the door open to allow someone to plead the 5th amendment in order to hide their identity. In Hiibel v. Nevada the U.S. Supreme Court held that the petitioner did not have a 5th amendment right to withhold his name from a questioning police officer. The Supreme Court held that Mr. Hiibel could be arrested for failing to identify himself because Nevada's statute requiring identification was narrowly tailored and was not vague. The police officer who stopped Mr. Hiibel had reasonable suspicion that a crime had occurred and Mr. Hiibel could have satisfied Nevada's statute by simply stating his name; there was no requirement to turn over any papers or other documentation. The final paragraph of the opinion speaks of the importance of the narrow scope of the disclosure requirement and then goes on and states: ...Answering a request to disclose a name is likely to be so insignificant in the scheme of things as to be incriminating only in unusual circumstances...Even witnesses who plan to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege answer when their names are called to take the stand. Still, a case may arise where there is a substantial allegation that furnishing identity at the time of a stop would have given the police a link in the chain of evidence needed to convict the individual of a separate offense. In that case, the court can then consider whether the privilege applies, and, if the Fifth Amendment has been violated, what remedy must follow. We do not resolve those questions here. While the court is leaving unanswered the question of whether there are circumstances where one may refuse to identify themselves, they are making it quite clear that such a situation would be very different than the case decided in Hiibel. There is a strong hint that they would uphold Fifth Amendment privilege in the situation you posit. | The Kentucky restriction against "hit and run" is KRS 189.580, which says that The operator of any vehicle, whose vehicle…is involved in an accident …shall immediately stop and ascertain the extent of the injury or damage and render reasonable assistance Notice that the legal requirement is for the operator to do something: the law requires nothing of the vehicle itself. Supposing that you are correct that the vehicle was operated by someone who hit and ran, then if the police gain suspicions that such is the case, and if those suspicions are reasonable, then then could obtain a warrant to obtain evidence from the vehicle, which could be used against the operator. The fact that you (might) now own the vehicle would not transfer legal responsibility to you – responsibbility goes with the actor, not the instrument. | TITLE XXI Section 263:1-a 263:1-a Allowing an Improper Person. – No person shall knowingly permit a motor vehicle owned or controlled by him to be driven by a person who is not properly licensed or otherwise entitled to drive. Any person who violates this section shall be guilty of a violation, and if the license or driving privilege of the person allowed to drive is under suspension or revocation, the owner or person in control of the vehicle, notwithstanding title LXII, shall be fined not less than $100. I would also hazard that allowing someone to use your vehicle knowing they intend to commit a crime would make you an accessory but I don’t think that’s the answer they’re looking for here. | In general, people have less expectation of privacy in cars than in their homes. To challenge a search and/or seizure under the Fourth Amendment, a person must have standing - the right to sue (that is, you must have had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place where the search happened; if you didn't, no standing - can't claim your privacy was violated if you had no privacy). The US Circuit Courts are split on the issue of unauthorized rental drivers and whether they have the same reasonable expectation of privacy as the authorized driver of a rental car would have. Some Circuits allow the unauthorized driver to challenge a car search if the authorized driver gave them permission. Some Circuits look only at the agreement and if the driver isn't authorized on that, they're out of luck. The 6th Circuit is more case-by-case, with a presumption that driver can't challenge the search that can be overcome based on the facts. (All this info from US v. Haywood, 324 F.3d 514) There's a current case before the Supreme Court (argued January 9, 2018), Byrd v. US, on this very issue. This SCOTUSblog page has a lot of information on the case. Edited to add: Texas is in the Fifth Circuit, which follows the rule that unauthorized drivers don't have standing to challenge a search/seizure even with the authorized driver's permission to drive the car; unauthorized drivers of rental cars don't have a reasonable expectation of privacy because they lack a possessory interest in the car and/or they're violating the rental agreement. Basically, even though it seems the cops' stop of the car would've violated the Fourth Amendment if he were the authorized driver, since this happened in Texas, he's not going to be able to challenge the stop. IMO, this is incredibly unjust especially when the cops admitted there was no probable cause, so hopefully the Supreme Court makes this rule obsolete and allows unauthorized drivers to exercise their Fourth Amendment rights. Some law review articles on the topic of unauthorized rental drivers: "Hertz and the Fourth Amendment" "Resolving a Three-Way Circuit Split" |
Is the premise of Robert Mueller about how a sitting President cannot be indicted imply that a sitting President is above the law? Background In page 213 of the Mueller Report, the Special Counsel team describes thier considerations that guided their obstruction-of-justice investigation. First, a traditional prosecution or declination decision entails a binary determination to initiate or decline a prosecution, but we determined not to make a traditional prosecutorial judgment. The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) has issued an opinion finding that the indictment or criminal prosecution of a sitting President would impermissibly undermine the capacity of the executive branch to perform its constitutionally assigned functions in violation of the constitutional separation of powers. Given the role of the Special Counsel as an attorney in the Department of Justice and the framework of the Special Counsel regulations, see 28 U.S.C. 515; 28 C.F.R. this Office accepted legal conclusion for the purpose of exercising prosecutorial jurisdiction. And apart from constitutional view, we recognized that a federal criminal accusation against a sitting President would place burdens on the President's capacity to govern and potentially preempt constitutional processes for addressing presidential misconduct. Regardless of the reasoning, it is the belief of the Special Counsel's team that a sitting president cannot be indicted regardless of the crimes he committed (at least in obstruction of justice in this particular case). This seems to directly contradict the "no man is above the law" principle outlined by the 14th ammendment of the constitution. Question Does the Special Counsel's non traditional prosecutorial decision making put the president above the law since he is unable to be prosecuted? | Does the Special Counsel's non traditional prosecutorial decision making put the president above the law since he is unable to be prosecuted? All federal government employees, including the Special Counsel, are required to conform to the interpretations of the law provided by the Office of Legal Counsel in the absence of a directly applicable court order to the contrary. But, the fact that the federal government attorneys are effectively prohibited from prosecuting the President for crimes while the President is currently in office does not put him entirely above the law. This does not preclude state and local prosecutors from charging the President with state crimes while he holds office, and if those crimes do not arise from the President's conduct in an official capacity while serving as President (in which case Presidential immunity bars actions). This does not preclude federal prosecutors from charging the President with federal crimes committing while the President held office or before the President held office after the President ceases to serve as President. This does not preclude a federal court from declaring that the Office of Legal Counsel opinion by which the Special Counsel is bound on this issue is invalid, although it is challenging to think of a procedural context in which this issue could be squarely presented to a court. The OLC opinion could also probably be overridden by Congress in a law (that would probably have to overcome a Presidential veto), as the claim that the OLC decision is one that it is constitutionally required to arrive at is a weak one. This does not preclude individuals or Congress from bringing suit against the President in a civil action, including a contempt of court proceeding in a civil action prosecuted by someone other than a federal government attorney. This does not preclude Congress from impeaching the President and removing him from office. Nonetheless, the Office of Legal Counsel opinion referred to by the Special Counsel certainly does significantly impair the extent to which a President can be punished for violating federal law as a practical matter. This seems to directly contradict the "no man is above the law" principle outlined by the 14th amendment of the constitution. I'm not sure what makes you think that the 14th Amendment is relevant in this case. Section 1 of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution sets a minimum threshold for citizenship and sets for constitutional obligations that apply to U.S. states. Sections 2-4 of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution govern issues particular to the Reconstruction era. Section 5 of the 14th Amendment gives Congress the authority to pass legislation enforcing the other sections. There isn't really a "no man is above the law" concept expressly stated in the U.S. Constitution (in contrast, France has had such a provision since the French Revolution). But, to the extent that one can construed a provision of the U.S. Constitution as setting forth such a requirement, it needs to be in a provision that applies to the federal government, rather than one applicable to state governments. | The Main Answer: The Judge Can't Appeal; But Other People Can Since the Judge now has an attorney, can this Judge appeal to the Supreme Court (or appeal again starting from a different court jurisdiction) to potentially allow him to continue his decision to review if the Michael Flynn case should be dismissed? Not exactly. It is potentially subject to appeal, but not by the judge. But the question contains an understandable and natural false premise that confuses the issue. The attorney appointed by the Court to present the position abandoned by the Justice Department is not a lawyer for the judge (who has absolute immunity from liability). Instead, the attorney is someone appointed to provide additional representation to "the People" on the theory that the Justice Department in unable to fully represent the interests of "the People" due to an alleged conflict of interest. The attorney appointed by the judge to present a position that the Justice Department abandoned, might have standing to do so, but the judge himself or herself, while listed as the Respondent in the case, is only a nominal party and not a true real party in interest. Also en banc review of a panel decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals can be raised sua sponte by any judge in the Circuit, without prompting from any part for further review (which is what happened in this case). The Archaic Federal Writ of Mandamus Practice Explained There is a general rule that says that only final decisions of trial courts can be appealed to an appellate court.<1> Thus, usually, a criminal defendant can only appeal from a criminal case after the criminal defendant has been convicted of a crime and sentenced for that crime. But, this general rule has exceptions. A request for a writ of mandamus is one way to get around this general rule. A writ is a court order directed at a government official by a court having jurisdiction over the official, usually, but not always, in a matter in which the government official is not alleged to have done anything making the government official eligible for punishment personally. For example, a writ of execution, is a court order directing the sheriff or some other government official, to take action to enforce a court order awarding someone a money judgment that the prevailing part seeks to have the sheriff involuntarily seize. A request for writ of mandamus (i.e. for an order directing a government official subordinate to the court to take a non-discretionary action in a court case) is structured in the old fashioned approach used in federal court as a lawsuit against a judge brought in a court with supervising authority over the judge. But, in substance, this is a legal fiction and formality used (in this context, writs of mandamus are used in more than one way) to provide review of trial court decisions prior to the entry of a final decision on the merits in a case (something also called an "interlocutory appeal"). This process was established in the All Writs Act of 1789 (now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1651) that applied to the federal courts the process in place immediately prior to the adoption of the United States Constitution in 1789 in the courts of the American Colonies. The procedure used in the pre-constitution courts of the American colonies was borrowed from English common law procedural practices then in place. The English practice was in turn originally established during or not long before the reign of King Edward II (reigned 1307 to 1327 CE). Those procedures have then evolved over time. This procedure was formally established in the U.S. in the federal courts by case law interpreting the All Writs Act (the All Writs Act itself is only a sentence or two long). Put another way, the All Writs Act gave the federal courts the authority to order other government officials (including but not limited to judges) to do things to carry out federal court orders, in the same broad circumstances where English common law courts has the power to do so, and using the same procedures. Originally, a writ of mandamus really was a lawsuit against a judge, and there are contexts where a writ of mandamus is sought against a government official other than a judge that continue to be a lawsuit against a government official. But, now that is just a formality and not a real lawsuit in this context, and that has been the case in cases involving writs of mandamus filed against judges for hundreds of years. <1> A direct appeal of right from a final criminal conviction is a relatively new innovation in the federal courts in the U.S.. The right to bring a direct appeal of right of a criminal conviction secured in federal court did not exist until 1890. And, the right to bring a direct appeal of right of a criminal conviction is not constitutionally guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution or the Bill of Rights, it exists solely by virtue of a federal statute. Prior to 1890, most judicial review of federal criminal convictions was conducted via writs of habeas corpus (which has much narrower grounds upon which relief can be granted) or via Presidential pardons. The Modern Approach Used In Many Jurisdictions Contrasted The modern approach designed to avoid the confusion associated with nominally suing the judge, is to create a court rule replacing the old fashioned legal fiction of writ of mandamus practice, in which someone files an interlocutory appeal captioned (in a criminal case) as People v. Defendant, or as Defendant v. People (depending upon who files first) which is handled essentially like an ordinary appeal but with shorter deadlines and the requirement that grounds for considering the appeal at all prior to a final order in the case be established. For example, in Colorado, where I practice, the equivalent procedure to a writ of mandamus with the judge named as Respondent in a federal court, is called a "Colorado Appellate Rule 21 motion". Further Appellate Options Appeals from interlocutory writ of mandamus rulings made by a panel of a U.S. Court of Appeals are a fairly esoteric corner of federal appellate procedure, and I am not intimately familiar with the ins and outs of it, but there is a process by which someone with standing could seek further appellate review of the U.S. Court of Appeals panel's ruling. The interlocutory appeal in this case was handled by a three judge panel of one of the United States Courts of Appeal. There are two main ways that a ruling of a panel of one of the United States Courts of Appeal may be further appealed. One is to seek en banc review of the decision by all of the judges of the circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals whose panel heard the case. The other is to appeal either from an en banc decision or directly from the panel decision, to the U.S. Supreme Court. In both circumstances, further appellate review of discretionary, the en banc panel or the U.S. Supreme Court, as the case may be, first decides the preliminary question of whether to consider the further appeal at all, and then, if that is answered in the affirmative, considers the merits of the issue or the issues raised in a further appeal. In a case of national interest involving separation of powers in which the panel issued a divided ruling, it isn't unthinkable that there would be further discretionary review of the ruling if it was sought by someone with standing to do so. The most controversial aspect of the panel ruling in this case, highlighted by the dissenting opinion, is that the Justice Department and criminal defense attorney filed the writ of mandamus before the trial court judge had a chance to consider and rule upon the motions filed in the trial court. Normally, a writ of mandamus is not considered "ripe" to file until a judge actually rules on a motion with a court order which the person seeking the writ alleges was mistaken, rather than before the judge gets to consider whether or not to grant that motion in the first instance as was done in this case. To paraphrase the dissenting opinion, the dissenting judge felt that the appellate court panel jumped the gun in an unprecedented and irregular manner that deprived it of jurisdiction to decide the issue because it was not yet ripe for decision. Other Ways This Could Have Been Litigated As an aside, it is also worth observing that there were multiple procedural options available in this case to prevent his client from being sentenced and to force the case to be dismissed. The writ of mandamus was brought by the Justice Department seeking to enforce its own institutional privileges. But, the more conventional approach in a case with a similar fact pattern in federal court, would be for the criminal defense attorney to file a separate lawsuit against the warden of the jail where his client is being held (who is also a nominal defendant under a different legal fiction, and who also has absolute immunity, but would be defended in the lawsuit by the Justice Department absent an alleged conflict of interest like the one present in this case) seeking a writ of habeas corpus ordering the warden to release his client, possibly before a different judge, and subject to direct appeal once resolved, rather than an interlocutory appeal via a writ of mandamus. But, it isn't often that the Justice Department seeks to withdraw its prosecution against a criminal defendant who has already pleaded guilty in a proceeding in which the factual basis of the plea has already been established on the record in open court and the case is ripe for sentencing to a serious felony sentence. Update As Of August 3, 2020 This case was selected for en banc review by the entire DC Circuit based upon the petition of the dissenting judge in the three judge panel that decided the case. The Order states: ORDER Upon consideration of the petition for rehearing en banc, the responses thereto, and the vote in favor of rehearing en banc by a majority of the judges eligible to participate, it is ORDERED that this case be reheard by the court sitting en banc. It is FURTHER ORDERED that the court’s order filed June 24, 2020, be vacated. It is FURTHER ORDERED that oral argument before the en banc court be heard at 9:30 a.m. on Tuesday, August 11, 2020. The parties should be prepared to address whether there are “no other adequate means to attain the relief” desired. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004). A separate order will issue regarding the allocation of oral argument time. Per Curiam | Part of the problem you'll find is that there are so few impeachments in U.S. History (Only 21 articles of Impeachment have ever been drafted, of which only 8 resulted in convictions) and SCOTUS is so selective on cases it chooses to hear, that only one case has ever been heard and that was upheld (Nixon v. United States). In that case, SCOTUS ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to rule on the legal question before it (was the new trial format a proper trial by the senate), but did not have an opinion one way or another to suggest that SCOTUS could not review other cases that come before it. One of the reasons they also haven't is in order to have a legal case in the U.S., the plaintiff must suffer actual harm. More impeachments ended without a conviction than with either acquittal (8), resignation before trial conclusion (4), and expulsion from senate (1, and will never occur again as Congressional office holders are not impeachable following this particular case). Since no harm was caused and courts do not rule on hypotheticals, a case with actual harm (conviction) must occur in order for SCOTUS to even consider hearing the case. Nixon does not bar SCOTUS from hearing more appeals resulting from Impeachment, it only bars those relating to the manner in which the senate chooses to hold the trial. | In a normal case, it is not merely the contents of the indictment that are secret, but also the very fact that an indictment exists. This level of secrecy surrounding grand jury proceedings is a practice so old that it may be impossible to say with any certainty why it began, but it is currently justified on various grounds. For instance: It reduces the danger of reputational harm to suspects who the grand jury believes have not committed any crime. It reduces the danger of witness tampering. It reduces the danger of defendants taking additional steps to avoid detection. It reduces the danger of defendants fleeing upon learning that they've been indicted. Naturally, the importance of any of these considerations will vary from case to case. So, had the process gone normally, the public would not be curious about the Trump indictment because it wouldn't even know the Trump indictment existed. But media leaks put the court in an awkward position, as the court was still legally obligated to pretend it didn't even know whether an indictment existed, even though the defendant had been blabbing about it for days on social media. | Traditionally, anyone could bring a bill of indictment to a grand jury. This article from Creighton Law Review provides some historical context. Government prosecutors are the overwhelming norm now, but private prosecution used to be more common. Indeed, New Jersey still has limited authorization for private prosecution (Court rule 3:23-9(d)). The New Jersey rule governing the grand jury is 3:6, and rule 3:6-8(a) on return of indictment says: An indictment may be found only upon the concurrence of 12 or more jurors and shall be returned in open court to the Assignment Judge or, in the Assignment Judge's absence, to any Superior Court judge assigned to the Law Division in the county. With the approval of the Assignment Judge, an indictment may be returned to such judge by only the foreperson or the deputy foreperson rather than with all other members of the grand jury. Such judge may direct that the indictment shall be kept secret until the defendant is in custody or has been released pending trial and in that event it shall be sealed by the clerk, and no person shall disclose its finding except as necessary for the issuance and execution of a warrant or summons. Note that the jurors decide on an indictment and return the indictment to a judge, not the prosecutor. In the rules governing grand juries, the prosecutor is allowed to be present and to speak, but has no official controlling role, other than whatever leadership is granted by the foreman. I don't know whether it is universal that grand juries do what the prosecutor tells them to, such as indicting a ham sandwich, but at least theoretically they have the power to act independently. The rules actually do not say who can ask questions of a witness, which could lead one to conclude that of course it is the prosecutor (and that the prosecutor does everything, except vote on the indictment). | There is no "different legal procedure" for challenging the constitutionality of a law. The only way to do so is through the process that this question contemplates: to argue that the law is unconstitutional in a civil or criminal trial. Whether the law bears directly on the matter at trial or only on ancillary matters such as discovery, the court has the power to find the law unconstitutional and to issue orders accordingly. The extent to which such a ruling binds other courts depends on which court issues the ruling. | The short answer is no. The President has plenary and absolute power to pardon anyone other than himself, before or after conviction, of any federal crime. Therefore, his constitutional exercise of this power, whatever its motive, can not constitute a crime, although it could be a ground for impeaching the President or retaliating against the President politically. In historical practice, Presidents and Governors have been increasingly loathe to use the pardon power, and tend to use it only when they are political lame ducks, precisely because the political costs of a pardon can be so high. UPDATE: Also, to be clear, a President cannot pardon a crime before it is committed, so a true "pre-emptive pardon" does not exist. A President can pardon a crime that has not produced a conviction, but that is very different from pardoning a crime that has not yet occurred. Further, a pardon does not relieve an individual of civil liability, for example, monetary liability to another private individual, for the same conduct, or of state criminal law liability. It extends only to federal crimes and the civil collateral consequences of any conviction of that crime if there has been a conviction of that crime. For example, a pardon relieves the person pardoned from collateral consequences such as a prohibition on possessing a firearm, a loss of the right to vote, or a prohibition on the right to engage in a licensed occupation that felons are prohibited from being licensed to perform. But, a pardon does not relieve the person pardoned, for example, of engaging in wire fraud, of civil liability for money damages to the person defrauded. Similarly, while one can pardon a criminal contempt conviction, in which a court punishes someone with incarceration or a fine for violating a court order, a pardon can not relieve someone from a civil contempt citation which imposes incarceration or a per day fine (usually) until someone complies with a court order that it is within the power of that person to comply with (e.g. an order directing someone to testify in a civil lawsuit or to turn over the password to a Swiss bank account). | This article sums up the state of the law regarding presidential pardon power. In no case has the court ruled that there are people who are unpardonable. There is no question that a presidential pardon is only available for criminal offenses against the US (not civil contempt of court, but including criminal contempt). Presidential pardons do not require higher approval. |
Is it legally allowed to run a red light by make a double right turn at intersection? I was at the red light in an intersection, the street to my right was a residential undivided street. This car made a curve to that street and turn right out. It wasn't even a U turn. The path the car took is in the diagram. I think it is at best a very jerk movement with no driving manner. Right turn at red light is allowed, but his intention was clearly to get pass the red light. | The route described is probably in violation of Section 22100 of the vehicle code: Except as provided in Section 22100.5 or 22101, the driver of any vehicle intending to turn upon a highway shall do so as follows: (a) Right Turns. Both the approach for a right-hand turn and a right-hand turn shall be made as close as practicable to the right-hand curb The approach for the second turn is being made from the middle of the road. Neither of the exceptions apply, as 22100.5 is about U-turns at traffic lights, while 22101 is about turns controlled by markings or signs. Additionally, since you describe the route as a "curve to the street and turn right out", it's probably in violation of Section 22105: No person shall make a U-turn upon any highway where the driver of such vehicle does not have an unobstructed view for 200 feet in both directions along the highway and of any traffic thereon. Since the driver didn't make a complete right turn, it's likely that the forward view of oncoming traffic was partially blocked by the car's A-pillar or even the passenger seat, while the backward view of traffic was limited because none of the car's mirrors was pointed in the correct direction. It's certainly in violation of Section 22108: Any signal of intention to turn right or left shall be given continuously during the last 100 feet traveled by the vehicle before turning. The side road's not a hundred feet wide. There's no way the driver could have given the required signal for the second right turn. There's a decent chance this is also in violation of Section 22102 of the vehicle code: No person in a business district shall make a U-turn, except at an intersection, or on a divided highway where an opening has been provided in accordance with Section 21651. The six lanes of the main highway make it likely that this intersection is in a business district. "Business district" is rather broad, including not only roads lined by businesses, but roads lined by apartment complexes and other multi-family housing developments. And finally, the catch-all offense of "reckless driving" (Section 23103) could probably be applied: A person who drives a vehicle upon a highway in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property is guilty of reckless driving. | The legality of the stop may be somewhat up in the air, but it would seem that the vehicle is not in the Texassure database, so it is reasonable to think that the person driving is not insured, and therefore is breaking the law. And that is all that is required: that the suspicion is reasonable. Until someone makes a sufficiently persuasive legal stink about this, it is probably a legal stop. This article gives some legal discussion. One applicable case is US v. Broca-Martinez, a Texas case where a person was pulled over for being "unconfirmed" w.r.t. the insurance database: the court held that this was a reasonable suspicion. Thereafter, a charitable interpretation is that you misunderstood the request in providing your sister's information when he asked for your license and insurance: but you are expected to understand that when they request your license and proofs of insurance, they mean you the driver, and not the car owner. That they is even more suspicious, although I understand your confusion. At your hearing you cane explain why you didn't comply with the first officer's request, and the judge may they chalk this up to a simple misunderstanding rather than intentional deception. The problem is that you are expected to know – whether or not you've ever been pulled over before – that you have to provide license, registration, and proof of insurance. You will have a hard time making it believable that you didn't understand what the officer told you and what the law requires. | In most states you are required to pull over to the side of the road and come to a stop for any vehicle displaying flashing red and/or blue lights, whether oncoming or overtaking. If you don't you are guilty of a moving violation.1 If the vehicle with the lights then pulls in behind you the same law forbids you from moving your vehicle. So that's the law for being pulled over by an unmarked car. If you are concerned that you were stopped in this manner by someone not authorized to do so (police impersonators have been known to do this) you should call 911 and get the dispatcher to confirm whether the apparent emergency vehicle is legitimate. In general, if you fear for your safety, you can stay in your car and ask to be escorted to a known police station before exposing yourself. E.g., here's the advice of one Ohio State Highway Patrolman: If the area where you stop looks desolate, Miller said you don't have to stop there. In fact, he said, "Proceed to that well lit area or a public building, the fire department, hospital." [B]efore you even stop, if you don't feel safe, "Use your cell phone to dial 9-1-1 and talk to the dispatcher, let her know what's going on, give your location and have her guide you as to what she wants you to do." There are some jurisdictions that restrict the use of "unmarked" cars by police. | Until it runs out of gas. With the caveat that I can't prove a negative: No, there is no such statute or case law restricting how long a police or law enforcement vehicle can follow someone on a road. However, law enforcement officers can be subject to investigation and sanction under "stalking" or "harassment" laws, which typically require a pattern of documented misbehavior in the absence of good cause for said behavior. | Stop: possibly The standard for initiating a traffic stop is named after Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968): Terry stop. The standard is rather simple: Initiating the stop only requires reasonable suspicion. If their computer claims that the driver's license of the car owner is expired or suspended, that is reasonable suspicion to at least stop the car to check if the owner is driving it and if the license really is expired. Arrest: possibly To facilitate an arrest, the next level of scrutiny is needed: probable cause. Generally, there is little requirement on when a police report is to be written, but contemporary reports (at the same time or close to) are typical. Example of rising through the ranks Alice, 16 years old, dent in the fender from a fenderbender. That is not even a warning's worth and does not rise reasonable suspicion. Bob cop's computer still reads the license plate and Bob gets a flashing light: the car owner's license is expired. That is reasonable suspicion that there is an offense if the owner and Alice are the same person. But Bob needs to verify that. The reasonable suspicion can go away if for example the car was owned by Charles, a 60-year-old gentleman, then the suspicion that Alice's license is expired goes away. But the stop in itself was reasonable! Bob starts the ticket after stopping Alice, then passes the car to get to Alice. Looking in he sees that behind Alice lies a box stamped "Top Secret - US President's Eyes Only" all over. Bob arrests Alice for the probable cause of possibly possessing those documents illegally. The documents were in plain sight, so no search was needed btw. | It's likely that you'll find similar statutes for your state. Florida's specifically considers the circumstances you've described: 316.081 Driving on right side of roadway; exceptions.— (1) Upon all roadways of sufficient width, a vehicle shall be driven upon the right half of the roadway, except as follows: (a) When overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction under the rules governing such movement; (b) When an obstruction exists making it necessary to drive to the left of the center of the highway; provided any person so doing shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles traveling in the proper direction upon the unobstructed portion of the highway within such distance as to constitute an immediate hazard; This last entry represents your stalled car. An obstruction exists and you've yielded the right of way to oncoming traffic. You're good to go. | In California, the law for public bridges and highways appears to be as follows (emphasis mine): CA St & Hwy Code § 30843 (2017) Any person who operates a motor vehicle over a toll bridge or toll highway crossing and the approaches thereto constructed or acquired by any bridge and highway district, at the entrance to which appropriate signs have been erected to notify traffic that it is entering upon a toll bridge crossing or its approaches and is subject to the payment of tolls beyond the sign, is guilty of a misdemeanor in each of the following cases: (a) If the person refuses to pay the tolls. (b) If the person turns, or attempts to turn, the vehicle around in the bridge, approach, or toll plaza where signs have been erected forbidding the turning. (c) If the person refuses to pass through the toll gates after having come within the area where signs have been erected notifying traffic that it is entering the area where toll is collectible or where vehicles may not turn around and where vehicles are required to pass through the toll gates for the purpose of collecting tolls. So it appears the "last exit before toll" signs are sufficient. It doesn't say anything about posting the actual cost of the tolls. | In my State (Louisiana, USA), pedestrians may walk on the side of the road. No guidance is given on how fast they should walk. Pedestrians are not allowed to walk in the middle of the street. In the US, the laws for this will vary by state. Louisiana has statutes that say that pedestrians are bound by traffic laws, and obstruction of traffic is not legal on foot or in a vehicle. Basically, consult your local laws. §216. Pedestrians on highways or interstate highways A. Where sidewalks are provided, it shall be unlawful for any pedestrian to walk along and upon an adjacent highway. B. Where sidewalks are not provided, any pedestrian walking along and upon a highway shall, when practicable, walk only on the left side of the highway or its shoulder, facing traffic which may approach from the opposite direction. C. It shall be unlawful for any pedestrian to cross an interstate highway, except in the case of an emergency. D. Upon conviction of a violation of this Section, a court may order, in lieu of the penalty provisions provided in R.S. 32:57, that the offender perform three eight-hour days of court-approved community service activities, at least half of which shall consist of participation in a litter abatement or collection program. §213. Crossing at other than crosswalks A. Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point other than within a marked crosswalk or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles upon the roadway. B. Between adjacent intersections at which traffic-control signals are in operation pedestrians shall not cross at any place except in a marked crosswalk. "Highway" means the entire width between the boundary lines of every way or place of whatever nature publicly maintained and open to the use of the public for the purpose of vehicular travel, including bridges, causeways, tunnels and ferries; synonymous with the word "street". |
Prosecution in a case of diplomatic immunity There's been recent publicity about an American diplomat in Britain responsible for a car accident that killed someone. She claimed diplomatic immunity and left the country. Could the victim's family sue her in an American court? Could she be criminally prosecuted in America because of what she did in Britain? | There's been recent publicity about an American diplomat in Britain responsible for a car accident that killed someone. She claimed diplomatic immunity and left the country. Could the victim's family sue her in an American court? They could sue, but the case would probably be summarily dismissed, often one of the following two grounds: (1) related to diplomatic immunity, but not specifically covered by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, such as common law sovereign immunity which bars suits against individuals or their employers for actions taken in an official capacity on behalf of a federal government employer (the scope of which is interpreted broadly in the case of diplomatic personnel abroad, much as it is in the case of what conduct of the President of the United States constitutes an action taken in an official capacity), unless waived. Cf. Cruikshank v. U.S., 431 F.Supp. 1355 (D. Hawaii 1977) ("Alleged activities of agents of Central Intelligence Agency in opening and photographing sealed, first-class letters mailed by plaintiff to colleagues in the Soviet Union fell within purview of general waiver of sovereign immunity statute, despite claim that Central Intelligence Agency agents involved could not have been legally authorized to carry out such activities and consequently, as matter of law, were not “acting within the scope of their office or employment,” as that phrase is used in this section.") If a diplomat is acting in an official capacity, lawsuits can be filed against the U.S. government, but not against the individual, and can't only be brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, and only then if an exception to it does not apply. The FTCA is the "exclusive means by which a party may sue the United States for money damages ... in tort" (28 USC § 2679. Exclusiveness of remedy). Accordingly, an FTCA action "can be brought only in a United States District Court" (28 USC § 1346(b)). Regarding the timing of filing, FTCA's § 2401(b) states that the action must be brought "within two years after the claim accrues," or "within six months after ... notice of final denial of the claim by the agency". In addition, under the FTCA, "Liability is determinable in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred" (§1346(b)(1)). More fully, 28 USC § 1346(b)(1) states: Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district courts, together with the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. But, 28 U.S.C. 2680(k) expressly precludes the exercise of jurisdiction under the FTCA over "[a]ny claim arising in a foreign country." See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197 (1993) (FTCA does not apply to claims arising in Antarctica). "It is a longstanding principle of American law `that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.' " Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949). Basically, sovereign immunity is absolute for torts committed abroad in an official capacity by a U.S. government official of any kind. So, if the official capacity conduct claim is barred by diplomatic immunity where it occurred, it is barred everywhere. or (2) in cases not arising from actions taken in the diplomat's official capacity, on the discretionary quasi-jurisdictional grounds of forum non conveniens, even thought American courts, as a general rule, have jurisdiction over all civil claims of private persons arising anywhere in the world against a person who is domiciled in the state where the state or federal court in question is located. For over a quarter century, federal judges have assumed that foreign injury cases, particularly those filed by foreign plaintiffs, are best litigated abroad. . . . Federal judges approach the forum non conveniens decision as if it were a species of choice of law, as opposed to a choice of forum question. Elizabeth T. Lear, "National Interests, Foreign Injuries, and Federal Forum Non Conveniens", 41(2) U.C.-Davis Law Review 559 (2007). One of the leading forum non conviens cases pertinent to this fact pattern is Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981), involving an airplane crash in Scotland in which U.S. defendants were allegedly at fault. Potential loopholes in that decision have been closed by subsequent cases. Federal judges are all that matter in a lawsuit between a foreigner and a U.S. person involving claims in excess of $75,000 (which essentially all personal injury cases worth bringing internationally do), such as the one contemplated in this case, which fall within the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts and can be removed from a state court to a federal court. (And, state courts tend to defer to federal precedents in diversity cases in claims which are not removed from state court to federal court.) The Alien Tort Claim Act expressly authorizes certain lawsuits in U.S. Courts for violations of international law or treaties committed abroad (although whether the judicial power extends to cases where all of the defendants are non-U.S. persons is an issue of ongoing dispute), but not for simple common law torts like the negligence actions that are the basis of most automobile accident cases. There are also other specific statutes that might authorize lawsuits (e.g. civil rights statutes, patent laws, copyright laws, etc.), but none of them would ordinarily apply to a simple automobile accident allegedly causing a wrongful death. It is conceivable that an attorney could find some way to thread a needle through these two strong limitations on bringing suit against U.S. diplomats in U.S. courts for personal injuries caused by ordinary common law torts committed abroad which are barred by diplomatic immunity where they occurred, but it would take extraordinary facts that do not appear to be present in this relatively routine automobile accident allegedly wrongfully causing a death of a non-U.S. person. Could she be criminally prosecuted in America because of what she did in Britain? No. The Vienna Convention only directly limits criminal prosecutions of people with diplomatic immunity in jurisdictions where someone is a credentialed diplomat or head of state. But, usually criminal cases can only be prosecuted in the jurisdiction where they are committed or the jurisdiction to which the crime was directed if a crime is committed outside a prosecuting jurisdiction but directed at a victim or target in the prosecuting jurisdiction. There are federal statutes criminalizing conduct victimizing various U.S. government officials, but very few criminalizing conduct that would otherwise not be a crime subject to U.S. criminal prosecution if it is committed by a U.S. government official abroad (in some cases, a violation of civil rights claims might apply, but not in a car accident case like this one). Note that I am limiting this to a criminally culpable automobile accident against a non-U.S. person while diplomatic credentials were in force. There might be a U.S. prosecution of a diplomat, for example, for espionage in the form of revealing U.S. secrets, or as another example, for a rape of one U.S. person who has diplomatic immunity by some other U.S. person at the same embassy. The cases could arguably be directed at the U.S. or a U.S. person. The most negative U.S. consequence that could arise from criminal conduct that did not take place in the U.S. and was not directed at the U.S. or a U.S. person (for civilians not subject to the U.S. Code of Military Justice) would usually be termination of employment at the U.S. State Department and termination of diplomatic credentials, both of which would have prospective application only. | Yes, they can be sued civilly Or, for that matter, be prosecuted by another jurisdiction- pardons only work within the jurisdiction that issued them. In a common law jurisdiction, the pardon cannot be used as evidence Nor, for that matter, can a criminal conviction. This is partly because the elements that need to be proved for the civil wrong won’t correspond to the elements of the crime. But mostly, because it just isn’t allowed. | Here's the thing: if the plaintiff/appellant/claimant are the same legal entity as the defendant/respondent, it's plain to see that one of them must lose. For instance, consider a case where two trains operated by the same corporation collide. Assuming that the drivers both performed their duties, the company is vicariously liable – such a case is frivolous and is likely to be thrown out for that reason. It's just a waste of time and money. Or your second example: If the woman was driving the city vehicle and crashed it in the course of her duties, it is the city that will be the defendant in the proceedings, not the woman. So essentially: while it's difficult to prove that something has never happened, these are good reasons to expect it would not happen. | Double jeopardy does not bar him from facing federal charges, although U.S. Justice Department policy reserves such prosecutions for exceptional cases. Also, it depends to some extent upon whether there is a suitable federal crime that fits the conduct. | Being misunderstood is not a crime. You could concoct scenarios where any number of statements could be a crime if interpreted unfairly. "I went to Georgia last weekend." "I choose to believe you mean the country instead of the state, and you don't have a passport, therefore you admitted that you went to a foreign country illegally!" The police would be free to investigate, but they wouldn't be able to get a warrant or arrest him based just on an ambiguous statement, let alone obtain a conviction. Of course, if the younger sister decided to accuse him, and the older sister decided to lie about having a relationship with him, that puts the statement in a whole other context - but if someone is falsely accusing you and someone else corroborates their story, you're probably in trouble no matter how exactly that came about. | Just below the section you quoted it says: (3) The victim’s prior sexual conduct is not a relevant issue in a prosecution under this section. There is no stated provision for the case you mention. I suspect that the law would apply. Whether the authorities would choose to prosecute in such a case is a very different question. There might be caselaw of this subject. I wouldn't know. If this is more than hypothetical, i would urge consulting a lawyer with local knowledge of criminal practice. | Yes and No. The Federal U.S. Government as well as each individual state and territory claim Soverign Immunity to a limited degree. In the case of Federal Government, they claim Soverign Immunity to a near limitless degree (more on this in a moment), while States and Territories claim "State Soverign Immunity" which grants them immunity with respect to all soverign powers granted under the U.S. Constitution. To clarify, each U.S. State is seperately soverign in all matters not explicitly allocated to the Federal Government by the U.S. Constitution and all constitutionally written laws. Where the Constitution does not in writing claim a power for the federal government nor reserver a power for the state government, the power is assumed to be state government. So a State can claim immunity for a police situation but not a law it makes regarding immigration or foriegn policy, since that is the exclusive wheelhouse of the Feds. Per the 11th amendment, states can only be sued in state court by citizens of the state, while non-state citizens wishing to sue a state must sue in the Federal Court (Which for the purposes of the trial may adopt the defendant State's laws and regulations for the purposes of questions of fact and law brought up in the suit). All U.S. States and the Federal Goverment additionally wave Soverign Immunity under specific conditions outlined in laws. In the case of the Federal Government, the laws governing when this immunity is waived are governed by the Federal Torts Claims Act (1946) and the Tucker Act (1887). The FTCA covers intentional torts by the Federal Government, while the Tucker Act typically covers matters related to contractual obligations or monitary interactions with the federal government. Things that may be sued for include but are not limited too: Intentional Torts committed by Government Agents in their Official Capacity (i.e. When the FBI violates your rights or maliciously investigates you). Contractual disputes where the Government is a party to the Contract, either in written or implied terms. Constitutional Claims (i.e. The Government may have violated the Constitution. These tend to be for non-monitary relief such as mandemuses, though the 5th Amendment's Taking Clause can be invoked of the government took property and does not justly compensate.). Individual Agencies of the Government when the monitary claim is not drawn from the U.S. Treasury (the agencies own allocated budget is used to pay). Refund for taxes paid In all cases, a Judge will determin if the Government, under the laws, can be sued. If in the example of a government employee being sued, the Justice Department will first make a determination if the employee was acting as an agent of the government when they committed the tortious act, and then will declare themselves Respondent Superior through the agency of employement. From there, the case becomes a suit against the Federal Government and FTCA immunity waiver is determined by a Judge. For example, lets say you (Mr. Rapt) sue Special Agent Jimmy Jones of an intentional tort that he committed in the course of his duty as an FBI agent. The DOJ will first declare that they are Respondent Superior in the case of Rapt v. Jones, thus turning the case to Rapt v. United States Government, Department of Justice, Federal Beura of Investigations, and Jones (Rapt v. United States, et. al.). From here, the Judge who gets the case then determins if the U.S. Government under FTCA can be sued by Rapt, based on Rapt's citizenship status (usually permanent legal residents are covered as citizens for this point, but I can say for certain in this particular law), ripeness (the suit must be filed within 2 years of the incident or first knowledge), and immunity waiver under FTCA. In the case of the State Government, they should have similar laws, but I'm not going to identify all 50 individual laws here. Additionally, the 11th Amendment permits U.S. Congress to waive a State's immunity to suit in certain cases (mostly comes up with the Due Process Clause in the 14th Amendment.). As a fun point, in all cases where a government appears as a defendant in a suit, it is automatically a Bench Trial, as the government usually include a waiver of their right as defendant to a jury trial. The thinking here is that, as a country that was founded by rebelling against the government, a jury of 12 of the government's citizens aren't going to give them any slack at trial, where as a judge (who they pay) is much more likely. TL;DR: Both questions are yes. The immunity is waived under federal law for certain cases, but it is a judge who will make the ruling if the specific case meets the aformentioned waived immunity. | All Four of them! Double Jeopardy is not in play if a jurisdiction can lay claim to your criminal action, so if you stand on the Four Corners and shoot a man in any of the four states, each state has a right to charge murder. In addition, the Federal Government can have a go at you because you crossed state lines while in comission of a crime. Plus the Navajo Nation, which controls the reservation land the border is on. So that six separate charges. That said, the state the dead body occupied at time of Murder would have the best case for action and the other three would likely let that state try you first. The Feds would only step in if each of the four states failed to convict, though they can step in whenever they want (they are just watching to see if you'll serve time first). Not sure at which point Tribal jurisdiction applies, but given that this is a fairly common Jurisdiction issue, I'm sure it's been worked out. |
Does the part of the First Amendment about Free Speech apply to non citizens everywhere? The question is very simple: does the free speech protection provided by the First Amendment apply to non US citizens and does it apply anywhere, outside US territory, protecting these people as strongly as US citizens on US territory from US laws restricting speech? | Speech of foreign nationals is not treated the same as that of citizens. In the case Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, the Supreme Court rules on the constitutionality of various statutory limits on campaign spending. Some parts of the law were upheld, others were overturned in 1st Amendment grounds. They upheld limits on contributions to candidates and volunteers' incidental expenses, and overturned limits on expenditures. In the decision, the court observed that [n]either the right to associate nor the right to participate in political activities is absolute and "governmental 'action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny'" The court stated that Even a 'significant interference with protected rights of political association' may be sustained if the State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms. This is reasonably-standard strict scrutiny boilerplate language: what it remind you is that no Constitutionally-protected right is absolute, and all rights are subject to limitation, when that right conflicts with a compelling government interest. In the case of the federal contribution laws, that interest is the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption spawned by the real or imagined coercive influence of large financial contributions on candidates' positions and on their actions if elected to office. The court then found that under the rigorous standard of review established by our prior decisions, the weighty interests served by restricting the size of financial contributions to political candidates are sufficient to justify the limited effect upon First Amendment freedoms caused by the $1,000 contribution ceiling. 52 USC 30121 imposes a prohibition which, if placed on US persons, would be held to violate the 1st Amendment. That law prohibits, among others, a contribution or donation of money or other thing of value, or to make an express or implied promise to make a contribution or donation, in connection with a Federal, State, or local election by "a foreign national", defined to not include lawful permanent residents but otherwise includes all foreign citizens and entities. The constitutionality of this law was challenged on First Amendment grounds but affirmed in Bluman v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281 (written by Kavanaugh in his previous job), and upheld in a one-sentence affirmation by SCOTUS. So, 1st Amendment rights of foreign nationals are not protected to the same extent as those of US citizens. It should be noted that the court also (expressly) did not decide if Congress could also constitutionally ban contributions by LPRs, or could prohibit foreign nationals from engaging in other forms of speech (issue advocacy and speaking on issues of public policy) – that matter was left undecided. | It probably does, up to a point. Roe v. Wade asserts a right to privacy, discussed in §VIII. Granting that there is no explicit enumeration of a right to privacy in the Constitution, its implicit presence is discerned via a long series of constitutional rulings of a diverse nature. It is not clear what is the extent of This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people... However, even in the case of explicitly recognized rights, they are not absolute: you cannot commit fraud or threaten a person with death and escape punishment by citing the 1st Amendment, you cannot own a machine gun and cite the 2nd in your defense. Fundamental rights are strongly protected, but they may be limited in a fashion that survives strict scrutiny. This means that the encroachment is necessary to a "compelling state interest", it is "narrowly tailored" towards that end, and is the "least restrictive means" to achieve that end. The question arose in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11 where Jacobson was criminally arraigned for refusing to comply with a mandatory vaccination law (applicable to all persons over 21). The court noted that the liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to every person within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common good. The liberty secured by the 14th Amendment, this court has said, consists, in part, in the right of a person 'to live and work where he will'...; and yet he may be compelled, by force if need be, against his will and without regard to his personal wishes or his pecuniary interests, or even his religious or political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of his country, and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense... According to settled principles, the police power of a state must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations established directly by legislative enactment as will protect the public health and the public safety. The right to compel vaccination is reaffirmed in Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174. There is currently no mandatory vaccination law applicable to adults; were such a law to be created (analogous to the earlier Mass. law regarding smallpox vaccination), it could easily pass judicial review as long as it is "minimalist". The question of "compelling government interest" would distinguish between mandatory Ebola or zombie-fever vaccinations vs. shingles or (ordinary) flu. School-related vaccination laws are the most minimal way to achieve the desired outcome, so a law requiring everybody to submit might not pass a strict scrutiny review. | Probably not Now, some US constitutional rights do get interpreted very broadly, and it's possible this might be the case here too. But fundamentally, this situation is not equivalent to the security contractors example you mentioned. The crux is that Facebook already has every right to delete your posts for whatever reason they want. A security contractor does not have any intrinsic right to conduct searches (warrantless or otherwise) on your person, residence or effects. Facebook can choose, at their sole discretion, to delete all your posts, delete none of your posts, or delete some of your posts according to whatever metric they came up with. In this case, the metric is 'did the government flag this as misinformation'. The government isn't censoring you - Facebook is, and Facebook is allowed to do that (they happen in this case to be following the government's advice on what specifically needs censoring, but where they choose to get their advice is also purely their business). A security contractor, by contrast, can't do much of anything to you, except when they have been specifically deputized by the government to do so by some legal process. If this happens, then they are said to be acting 'under color of law', and suddenly First (and Eighth, etc) Amendment restrictions do begin to constrain their actions. Facebook is not getting any kind of state power delegated to them, and thus they aren't considered to be acting 'under color of law'. They aren't doing anything they were not already allowed to do. | The United States has a very liberal attitude when it comes to free speech. Short of materials that are: child pornography, restricted under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), Libelous/Fraudulent, encourage or aid others in breaking the law, or seditious/treasonous/ terroistic/other credible threats there is almost nothing that can't be published. There is another example where supposedly The Golden Book of Chemistry Experiments was banned by the US Government, but I cannot find any evidence or action against the author to support the claim. The Political Mofia by Schiff was not neccessarily banned, but an injunction from publishing was issued against the authors in US v. Schiff, 379 F. 3d 621 - Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit 2004 per 26 U.S.C. 7408 on grounds that the books was fraudulent. Essentially it is the Federal courts that can ban a book from commerce with cause. Schools, libraries and other institutions may ban it from their collections, but not from public commerce. Wikipedia has a list of Books banned by governments that you may want to look at to find examples. | What you describe is essentially a Warrant Canary, which is legally murky. From a functional point of view, it is breaking the non-disclosure requirements of the NSL by omission. Proponents of warrant canaries would point to case law such as West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette and Wooley v. Maynard to suggest that the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment restricts the government from compelling speech. New York Times Co. v. United States could also be read to prevent the prior restraint unless the existence of the NSL was successfully argued to be "crucial military information". | What discrimination? As explained in Conflict between a religious belief that accounts for the existence of transgender people vs. one that doesn't the Constitutional protection of the Free Exercise Clause applies to the exercise of a deeply held belief (religious or not). So, let's accept that a person believes that certain sexual practices or gender identity is morally repugnant for whatever reason and that belief triggers the Constitutional protections. That means, that the person cannot be forced to engage in those sexual practices or adopt a different gender identity. It does not mean that they have a licence to discriminate against people who do in a work or public environment - they can, of course, choose to avoid such people in their private life. Alternatively, if the person believes that they are required by their faith to discriminate on the basis of those characteristics then such a belief does not get Constitutional protection as it is now affecting the rights of others. In the same way that someone who believed in human sacrifice would not get Constitutional protection. | The US developed from an earlier kingdom, and the First Amendment enshrines the main issue that led to our departure from that kingdom. The underlying political premise has been that disagreement is to be dealt with rationally and not through force, such as where opinions contrary to those articulated by the government are squashed (in order to eliminate divisions). There have been numerous laws passed in the US to outlaw "contrary" speech including "disrespectful" speech, and they are constantly being overturned by the Supreme Court. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 and U.S. v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 are two recent reaffirmations that such laws are unconstitutional. The only way such a law can work is if the Constitution is amended to in some way re-write the First Amendment, like this. Outlawing indirect insults towards political figures ("not my Speaker of the House", "not my FBI director") would require an even more extensive suspension of the First Amendment. It is possible that at some time, a bill was introduced to outlaw saying disparaging things about POTUS, but I would be surprised if it got out of committee, because it would fail challenge in court. The most-likely retrenchment on our freedom of expression is likely to be a flag-burning law, which has relatively wide support in the US. There are a number of interpretive problems associated with the key concept "physical desecration". Even more interpretive problems would arise if Congress were given the power (via an anti-disparagement amendment) to outlaw "disparagement of public officials". Can one simultaneously "respect the Office of the President" and "disrespect the holder of the office"? As for specifically restricting the military, that's a challenging issue. It is a court-martial offense for a commissioned military officer to use contemptuous words against the President and Congress (10 USC 888), and by directive from the Department of Defense this also applies to enlisted personnel. SCOTUS in Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 articulated the Military Necessity doctrine, that "The fundamental necessity for obedience, and the consequent necessity for imposition of discipline, may render permissible within the military that which would be constitutionally impermissible outside it". So "not my President" probably is illegal for soldiers. This article reviews various First Amendment issues as they pertain to the military. | It is generally understood that governments do have the right to quarantine citizens in case of epidemic outbreaks. In nations with a rule of law, the extent of quarantine regulations may be challenged in court. A challenge against the app has been filed, and trying to second-guess the court by reading sections of the constitution seems to be pointless. |
Sued outside a country What happens when you get sued for civil matters such as breaching employment contract in one country, after you have already left to another country for good? What is the general protocol for these kind of cases? | In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, you could usually be sued in the jurisdictions where the events giving rise to the claim took place, if you were personally served with process anywhere in the world in a procedurally correct manner. If this happens and you default or fail to cooperate in the judicial process, you will probably have a judgment entered against you. If you lost, the other party would get a judgment against you (an official declaration of a court that you owe another party money that authorizes various involuntary means of debt collection from your income and assets). This could be enforced against assets you have in the jurisdiction where the judgment was entered, or could be "domesticated" to a different jurisdiction where you had assets by bringing suit or exercising another process set forth by treaty or a law of the jurisdiction in which the foreign judgment holder seeks to domesticate the judgment. Whether the foreign judgment is conclusive against you or not, depends upon the domestic law of the place where they seek to enforce the foreign judgment, the nature of the underlying claims upon which the foreign judgment is based, and the legal process used to obtain the foreign judgment. Many countries will pretty much automatically enforce a judgment enforcing a breach of a contract between private sector parties obtained through the ordinary legal process in a country whose legal system is recognized by the U.S., but often will not give legal effect to legal procedures like a pre-dispute "confessions of judgment", an award of exemplary damages, an award of non-economic damages, or an award based upon a legal theory that is not recognized by the jurisdiction in which you seek to enforce the judgment. In general, judgments of U.S. courts in tort cases are rarely recognized by other countries. Similarly, a U.S. court, for example, would not enforce a foreign judgment, from say, ISIL controlled territory, for breach of a contract to deliver slaves to a buyer. Some Saudi Arabian money judgments are not enforced in the U.S. because the courts have held that their system does not protect basic principles of due process and the rule of law, which is why contracts with Saudi Arabia often have arbitration clauses instead of relying upon the royal courts in existence there. Some countries might enforce a judgment entered following a trial on the merits regarding a dispute, but not a default judgment, without essentially bringing the lawsuit all over again in the country where the assets are located, applying the general principles of legal concepts known as "collateral estoppel" and "res judicata". Most countries have special laws specifically governing when an arbitration award will be enforced with a money judgment in that jurisdiction and when it will not be enforced. This varies considerably from one country to another. The U.S. is unusually deferential to employment and consumer arbitration, but most countries will recognize express signed contractual arbitration agreements in a business to business situation that conforms to basic standards of due process. | An agreement to agree is void There is a multitude of case law on this point. If the NDA was not available to you when you signed the employment contract and the term was couched as you describe; then the term would be unenforcable. That is, your employment contract would be binding except for that term i.e. you could not be compelled to sign the NDA. Now, there may be a requirement on you to negotiate in good faith in an attempt to find an NDA you can agree to but if you can't find one you can't find one. You cannot (legally) be fired for this reason. Now, if the NDA was available, and you were told where to find it, and irrespective of if you did or didn't find it, you would be bound to the NDA. | You are subject to the laws of the jurisdiction that you are in. However, some of the laws of the jurisdiction you reside in or are a citizen of have extra-territorial applicability, so you have to comply with those laws too. | As soon as you start working in your second job, you will be violating your first contract. If you refuse to start working in your second job, you will be violating the second contract. You were very careless. Not much of a legal question, but the question is how to get out of the mess you created at the lowest possible cost. I would suggest that you go as soon as possible to the second company (the one with the part time contract), tell them that you are very sorry but you didn't read your first contract properly, and that you cannot start working for them. If you seem suitably sorry there's a chance that they will tear up your contract and send you home, with no more damage than a big red "DO NOT HIRE" in you records. If things don't go nicely (and you don't have any legal right to expect them to be nice about it), you go and get a lawyer. | A business has the right to refuse service, except in the case of unlawful discrimination. "Sued us" is not a protected characteristic. Unless part of the settlement was that the business must serve that customer in future, there is no way this could be considered contempt. | In Great Britain Employees have two types of protections: contractual and statutory. It would be in breach of contract ("wrongful dismissal") for an employer to dismiss without notice for job hunting but contractually there is nothing to stop an employer dismissing for any reason if they give the notice required (which may be only a week or two, say). Statutory protection may, however, prevent "unfair dismissal" but this generally only applies if someone has been employed for at least two years. There are some exceptions - e.g. dismissal as an act of religious/racial/sex discrimination etc. is prohibited even if the employee has less than 2 years service but these exceptions do not include job-hunting. So someone who has been employed for less than 2 years could be dismissed with notice for job hunting. There are also contractual and statutory protections in Northern Ireland. The contractual ones are the same as in the rest of the UK but some of the details of the statutory protections are different from GB. | You have several issues. Breach of Contract When you sign up with each of those services you are entering a legally binding contract and must comply with the terms of that contract. For example, this is taken from Facebook's terms: Here are some commitments you make to us relating to registering and maintaining the security of your account: You will not provide any false personal information on Facebook, or create an account for anyone other than yourself without permission. You will not create more than one personal account. I haven't checked but its a fair bet that the other services have similar terms. Unless you have permission, what you are doing breaches these terms of service. If what you do causes damage to Facebook et al then they can sue you and your employer for damages. Even if it doesn't they can probably bar you from having an account for as long as they like. Improper use of images This is jurisdictional but it is generally required to have the permission of the subject of a photograph where that photograph is used for commercial gain. There are exceptions where the person is not the primary subject (e.g. crowd shots, or images primarily of something else where the person happens to be in the shot) but the type of photos you would use for these services are not going to be exempt. The sanctions for breaching this will be dependent on jurisdiction. Breach of Copyright Somebody owns the copyright in those photographs. If you do not have a licence to use them in the way you propose then you are breaching their copyright. The copyright holder can sue for damages (if any) and any profits you make. Vicarious Liability An employer is strictly liable for the actions of their employees, jointly and severally with the employee. That means a plaintiff can go after either the employer, the employee or both. An employee may have some statutory or contractual indemnity but this is by no means common. | What's the worst that can happen? If you do nothing, it's a bit inconvenient. If you delete all that company's stuff, who knows what they could sue you for. I'm not saying they would be right, but being sued can be expensive, no matter whether you are wrong or right. Send a letter by registered mail, with a witness to the contents, that you are the only one with admin rights to these sites, and asking them how they would like to take over these sites, and informing them that you will delete anything on your personal email after a reasonable time if you don't hear from them. And since anything you do is work for you, you should expect some appropriate compensation. Deleting their property, even if it affects you, is risky. |
Can you text a business/sole trader promotional material if they put their number online? eg. An electrician has put their mobile number on a website to attract business. Can I legally contact that electrician to tell them about a product that he/she may be interested in? .. Everything is based in the united kingdom. | No. From here: Organisations must not send marketing texts to individuals without their specific, valid and prior explicit consent. This consent must be recorded and kept as proof of consent. There is a limited exception for previous customers, which is known as the soft opt-in. A soft-opt in only applies if the organisation have obtained the contact details in the course of a sale (or negotiations for a sales) of a product or service to the customer; they are only marketing their own similar products or services; and they gave the customer an opportunity to opt-out of the marketing, both when first collecting the details and in every message thereafter. | This is possibly but not necessarily fine. The data controller (the garage) is responsible for safeguarding your personal data. They must take appropriate safety measures, but this depends a lot on their own risk assessment. For example, to protect the data from being used by employees for their personal purposes, the controller might use organizational measures like a policy “you're not allowed to do that.” Many companies allow employees to use their personal devices for work purposes (BYOD). When the data controller allows this and takes appropriate safety measures, everything is perfectly fine. The company still has to make sure that the data is only processed for legal purses and deleted afterwards. Implementing a BYOD policy in a GDPR compliant manner is difficult but not impossible. A data breach has occurred when the security measures were insufficient and your data was deleted or disclosed without authorization. Your scenario would only be a breach if the company did not have a BYOD policy and the salesman used their personal phone, and arguably then only if that device is also breached. However, do not discount the alternatives: they do have a BYOD policy and the salesman is acting within their instructions the salesman was using a company-controlled device, not their personal phone If you have good reason to believe that your data was mishandled (and these alternatives do not apply), then the GDPR offers you the following remedies: You can of course complain to the data controller, especially if they have a dedicated data protection officer. You can lodge a complaint with a supervision authority, which is the ICO in the UK. They expect you to attempt to resolve your issue with the controller first. The ICO can then decide if they want to investigate the issue. You can sue them for compliance and for actual damages suffered (you have none, though). Note that all of these alternatives are more effort than they are likely worth. In particular, the garage can always correct the problem, e.g. by getting your contact info deleted from the personal device or by creating a retroactive BYOD policy. | Fairly easily. You want to use their API. They give you the conditions for using it. As long as their conditions aren't illegal or unreasonable, you need to adhere to them to use their API. Is it illegal to not include "insta", "gram", or "instagram" in your company or product name? Almost certainly not. Is it an unreasonable term? Almost certainly not. If you want to include "insta", "gram", or "instagram" in your company or product name, you can try - but you can't then use their API. | Neither of those clauses has anything to do with whether a tax on the use of Whatsapp is legal: The first clause tells users that they are responsible for any taxes that may be owed. It says nothing about whether such a tax is or is not legal. The second clause says that users may not charge for Whatsapp services. It says nothing about whether the government may impose a tax for the use of the services. That is all beside the point, though. Even if the TOS explicitly said, "No one may tax the use of our services," that would have no legal effect. Saying that you're exempt from taxation does not make you exempt from taxation. | The retailer You can try making a subject access request under Articles 15(1) and 15(3) of the UK GDPR. Provide as much information as you can (your name, date of purchase, store you purchased it from, copy of the receipt, etc.) and ask for the serial number. If they still have it, and it is stored in a way which is linked to you in an identifiable way, then they are obliged to provide it without undue delay (and in any event within 30 days). You may want to provide a copy of your passport in the request to pre-empt them coming back with an ID check request under Article 12(6), which then allows them to delay processing the request until you have replied. As stated above, if they no longer have the data or you are not identifiable from the data then they do not have to provide it. If they do have to provide it but refuse then you can complain to the Information Commissioner's Office or ask the County Court for a compliance order under section 167 of the Data Protection Act 2018. The insurer Regulation 3(1) of the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 prohibits "unfair commercial practices". Regulation 3(4) provides that a commerical practice is unfair if, inter alia, it is listed in Schedule 1. Paragraph 27 of Schedule 1 contains the following item: Requiring a consumer who wishes to claim on an insurance policy to produce documents which could not reasonably be considered relevant as to whether the claim was valid, or failing systematically to respond to pertinent correspondence, in order to dissuade a consumer from exercising his contractual rights. As you've provided proof that you purchased the item, you can try to argue that having the serial number of the lost item can not "reasonably be considered relevant". Yes, the contract says that you must provide it, but consumer rights legislation overrides contractual provisions. You may also want to consider dealing with the insurer by email/post instead of by phone, (a) to avoid continuing to waste time on hold, and (b) because if they systematically fail to respond then this may also cause them to be in breach of the above provision, (c) to acquire evidence which you can use later. Escalating If you get no results from the insurer, make a formal complaint to them through their complaints process. Under the FCA Handbook rule DISP 1.3.1R, the insurer is required to provide a complaints procedure. Under rule DISP 1.6.2R they are required to provide a final response to a complaint within 8 weeks. If you are not happy with the response, you can escalate the complaint to the Financial Ombudsman Service which has the power to make financial awards pursuant to section 229 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 ("FSMA"). Doing so is free of charge and is therefore a good alternative to going to court. The ombudsman can also make awards that are not strictly based on law (i.e. they can go further than the courts can) because of section 228 of FSMA which provides that: "A complaint is to be determined by reference to what is, in the opinion of the ombudsman, fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the case." You must generally escalate a complaint to the Ombudsman within 6 months of receiving your final response from the insurer (rule DISP 2.8.2R). | Numbering is for the sake of clarity, and is not intrinsically required. If you refer to a section, you need a way to say which section you mean, and a vague description like "up there where I talked about copying" is insufficient. You can refer to a section by a title, if you need to refer to sections within the contract, as long as your titles match what you refer to them as (and you don't have two sections called "Your Rights"). | According to this page from the US FTC such spam is illegal under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) and the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003. (The specific provisions of those laws are discussed on this page from a law office.) The FTC lists as an exception: Transactional or relationship types of messages. If a company has a relationship with you, it can send you things like statements or warranty information. This does not appear to include ads for new and different products or services from a firm that you have a relationship with that does not involve those products or services. The FTC also advises that: If you are an AT&T, T-Mobile, Verizon, Sprint or Bell subscriber, you can report spam texts to your carrier by copying the original message and forwarding it to the number 7726 (SPAM), free of charge. The page also describes how to file a complaint with the FTC. This Wikipedia article confirms this, and also notes that: The U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) released an order in Aug, 2004 that reiterated that SMS spam messages to cellphones are illegal under the existing Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). Each such unsolicited message received without permission entitles the recipient to take the sender to small claims court and collect a minimum of $1 for each violation. ... The 2003 TCPA Order (18 FCC Rcd at 14115, para. 165) says: “Both the statute and our rules prohibit these calls, with limited exceptions, ‘to any telephone number assigned to a paging service, cellular telephone service, specialized mobile radio service, or other common carrier service, or any service for which the called party is charged.’ This encompasses both voice calls and text calls to wireless numbers including, for example, short message service (SMS) calls, provided the call is made to a telephone number assigned to such service.” This article also mentions the 7726 complaint number. However, some of the restrictions may only apply if an automated dialing mechanism is used or "an artificial or prerecorded message" is sent. According to the Wikipedia article on the TCPA a consumer: may (1) sue for up to $500 for each violation or recover actual monetary loss, whichever is greater, (2) seek an injunction, or (3) both. (see 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(a),(b)) Telling the office that you plan to take them to small claims, which would require them to send someone to represent them in court, and might also be negative publicity for them, might get them to stop sending msgs to you. You could also place a negative review mentioning this spam on any online review service in your area. Or you could tell the office that you will do this if the spam continues. Be careful not to make any false or unprovable statements in any such review. You might want to send a written demand that they stop sending you such unwanted text solicitations, citing the two laws, by certified mail with return receipt. | How come this is viable? Because it’s legal. What if people use their service to commit crimes? What if people use a Ford in a bank holdup? Or a Glock in a murder? Or the US Postal Service in a Nigerian letter scam? If the goods or services are legal and not provided for an obviously illegal purpose, nothing happens. |
Section, sentence, nos. (German immigration law) Section 18b of the Act on the Residence, Economic Activity and Integration of Foreigners in the Federal Territory contains the next text: A foreigner who has successfully completed his studies at a state or state-recognised university or a comparable educational institution in the federal territory shall be granted a permanent settlement permit, if (1..3 omitted) and 4. the requirements of Section 9 (2), sentence 1, nos. 2 and 4 to 9 are met; Section 9 (2), sentences 2 to 6 shall apply accordingly. Section 9(2) consist of: (it's not necessary to read them all) (2) A foreigner shall be granted a permanent settlement permit if he has held a temporary residence permit for five years, his subsistence is secure, he has paid compulsory or voluntary contributions into the statutory pension scheme for at least 60 months or furnishes evidence of an entitlement to comparable benefits from an insurance or pension scheme or from an insurance company; time off for the purposes of child care or nursing at home shall be duly taken into account, granting such a temporary residence permit is not precluded by reasons of public safety or order, according due consideration to the severity or the nature of the breach of public safety or order or the danger emanating from the foreigner, with due regard to the duration of the foreigner’s stay to date and the existence of ties in the federal territory, he is permitted to be in employment, if he is in employment, he possesses the other permits required for the purpose of the permanent pursuit of his economic activity, he has sufficient command of the German language, he possesses a basic knowledge of the legal and social system and the way of life in the federal territory and he possesses sufficient living space for himself and the members of his family forming part of his household. What does 18b #4 mean exactly? Which paragraphs one should satisfy? All from 1 to 9? Why then phrases from 18b are so complicated? | This appears to be a fairly straightforward construction. Section 9(2) and 18b share a number of requirements, so 18b points back instead of repeating them. But not all requirements are shared. In particular, requirement 3 (covering pensions) does not apply to newly-graduated students. That's not strange since students are not paid wages. Also, they're not subject to the 5 year residence permit requirement. As for "sentences 2 to 6 shall apply accordingly.", this covers waivers to these requirements. | I'm answering your title question and assuming that you meant to present a circumstance that would actually trigger criminal liability, but based on the ages you've actually used in your hypothetical, you may not have done so. I'll ignore that complication and just present what the law is. Yes, there are some U.S. laws that people can be found to violate while in another country. The Department of Justice has a "citizen's guide" explaining extraterritorial sexual exploitation of children. The main offences are: 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a): Transportation with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity 18 U.S.C. § 2423(d): Travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c): Engaging in illicit sexual conduct in foreign places For § 2423(a), there must be the intent to engage in "any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense." For § 2423(b) and (c), "illicit sexual conduct" means, among a few other things: "a sexual act (as defined in section 2246) with a person under 18 years of age that would be in violation of chapter 109A if the sexual act occurred in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States." Chapter 109A includes § 2243(a): Whoever, in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States or in a Federal prison, or in any prison, institution, or facility in which persons are held in custody by direction of or pursuant to a contract or agreement with the head of any Federal department or agency, knowingly engages in a sexual act with another person who (a) has attained the age of 12 years but has not attained the age of 16 years; and (b) is at least four years younger than the person so engaging; or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both. | This is the cited article. Thankfully, the interviewee provided a scan of the police letter he received, so the rest of this question is relatively easy to answer. He was specifically charged with Störung der öffentlichen Ordnung (lit. Disturbance of the public order) persuant to § 81(1) of the Sicherheitspolizeigesetz, which reads (after putting it through Google Translate): Who by a behavior that is likely to arouse legitimate annoyance, disturbs public order, commits an administrative offense and is punishable by a fine of up to 500 euros, unless the behavior is justified, in particular by the use of a constitutionally guaranteed right , In the event of aggravating circumstances, instead of a fine, imprisonment can be imprisoned for up to one week, or up to two weeks for repeated offenses. This law is almost certainly constitutional as it specifically allows exercise of constitutional rights. Note this also includes human rights, as Austria has included the European Convention on Human Rights as part of its constitution. Given that, I'm guessing if the interviewee had wanted to, he would have had a decent shot at having this charge dismissed. | Shapiro v. Thompson was overruled in part by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). See the Wikipedia article. In Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973), the court notes and did not object to durational residence requirements imposed by states to qualify for the benefits of lower university tuition. In Vlandis the Court wrote: Like many other States, Connecticut requires nonresidents of the State who are enrolled in the state university system to pay tuition and other fees at higher rates than residents of the State who are so enrolled. Conn. Gen.Stat.Rev. § 1329(b) (Supp. 1969), as amended by Public Act No. 5, § 122 (June Sess.1971). The constitutional validity of that requirement is not at issue in the case before us. What is at issue here is Connecticut's statutory definition of residents and nonresidents for purposes of the above provision. ... The appellees do not challenge, nor did the District Court invalidate, the option of the State to classify students as resident and nonresident students, thereby obligating nonresident students to pay higher tuition and fees than do bona fide residents. The State's right to make such a classification is unquestioned here. Rather, the appellees attack Connecticut's irreversible and irrebuttable statutory presumption that, because a student's legal address was outside the State at the time of his application for admission or at some point during the preceding year, he remains a nonresident for as long as he is a student there. This conclusive presumption, they say, is invalid in that it allows the State to classify as "out-of-state students" those who are, in fact, bona fide residents of the State. ... It may be that most applicants to Connecticut's university system who apply from outside the State or within a year of living out of State have no real intention of becoming Connecticut residents, and will never do so. But it is clear that not all of the applicants from out of State inevitably fall in this category. Indeed, in the present case, both appellees possess many of the indicia of Connecticut residency, such as year-round Connecticut homes, Connecticut drivers' licenses, car registrations, voter registrations, etc.; and both were found by the District Court to have become bona fide residents of Connecticut before the 1972 spring semester. ... In sum, since Connecticut purports to be concerned with residency in allocating the rates for tuition and fees in its university system, it is forbidden by the Due Process Clause to deny an individual the resident rates on the basis of a permanent and irrebuttable presumption of nonresidence when that presumption is not necessarily or universally true in fact, and when the State has reasonable alternative means of making the crucial determination. ... Our holding today should in no wise be taken to mean that Connecticut must classify the students in its university system as residents for purposes of tuition and fees just because they go to school there. Nor should our decision be construed to deny a State the right to impose on a student, as one element in demonstrating bona fide residence, a reasonable durational residency requirement, which can be met while in student status. We fully recognize that a State has a legitimate interest in protecting and preserving the quality of its colleges and universities and the right of its own bona fide residents to attend such institutions on a preferential tuition basis. | The law applies equally to everyone The fact that the person misunderstood the law is irrelevant irrespective of the reason for it. That said, in both cases the person would have access to a lawyer and consular assistance who could explain the law to them. | I have heard that you have to spend at least six months in a year in US to remain eligible for naturalization. Is that really true? No, that is not true. There is no requirement regarding amount of time you have to spend in the US in a year. The only requirements are the continuous residence requirement and the physical presence requirement. You are presumed to break continuous residence if you have an absence of more than 6 months (though it is possible to overcome the presumption with strong evidence for absences of between 6 months and 1 year). Since your trips are less than 6 months, they should be okay. It is possible that if you returned for just a day, and then leave again, the officer might consider the absences are really just one big absence, which would then potentially jeopardize continuous residence. I don't think that should be an issue in your case. The physical presence requirement is just physical presence for half of the required period (30 months if you are applying under the 5-year rule). So you would not meet it if you were gone for more than half the year every year. But being gone more than half the year for just one or two years, with the other years being here the whole time, should not be a problem for the physical presence requirement. | What kind of contract would that be? One about... arbitration? One about "I hereby relinquish my claim for payment of X?" --- children cannot be taken away from their father, no matter what. - OP That contract is void in germany because this contract not only violates public policy, it tries to modify something that is regulated by law into a way that does offer less than the law demands as a minimum. That's not allowed in Germany. Further, a clause that gives custody to the father by default is also Sittenwidrig in Germany, and thus void under §138 BGB. So would be a clause that gives it to the mother by default by the way. In a case of controversy, only a court order can assign guardianship. And only the court can take guardianship away. When the kid is born its guardianship gets assigned to the parents as guardians by §1626 BGB. While it is possible to give your partner guardianship if you're not married under 1626a BGB it is explicitly impossible to assign guardianship for any compensation to either party (e.g. the mother or the new guardian may not receive anything other than the guardianship in the specific paper) under 1626b BGB. Thus a contract that does anything else in addition to guardianship, like a prenup, voids at least the guardianship clauses. And you have to tell the court about that assignment of guardianship under ($1626d BGB). Now comes the kicker: §1628 BGB forces the parents to apply to the court to solve any problems of huge impact, such as guardianship: So technically, mediation results are fully non-binding and you can not mandate it. Also, since all marriages are through the state, it needs a formal instrument of the state to be dissolved. The only three ways that the state ever allowed this to be done after WW2 were a) annulment through a court, which only was possible till 1998, or b) divorce through a court, c) death of one of the marriage partners. Yes, it takes a judge to divorce a marriage under $1313 BGB or one of the two married to die. Because you can't divorce without a filing in court, a clause that demands to divorce in some way that is not including §1313 BGB, that clause would be void. It might be legal to have a clause that demands to try to solve issues in arbitration before filing for divorce or sorting the belongings in such a way, but it can't supplant the court requirement. | If an F-1 student in the US, gets married with a US citizen, how can he protect his money if a divorce happened in the future? Specifically if he has a plan to establish a company and run a business after he graduated, how can he keep all the rights and money/stuck/profit he will earn from his company and won't share it after a probable divorce? Should they wright something like "we promise we won't have any claims about each other's money after the divorce" before they get married? A prenuptial agreement is possible, and only an idiot or fool would draft one himself. An agreement drafted without legal representation would be highly likely to be invalidated in an effort to enforce it in the event of a divorce. Generally, both parties should have separate counsel. This must be accompanied by full financial disclosure by both parties, at least an opportunity to confer with legal counsel providing full informed consent regarding the rights given up in the agreement, and no undue pressure to sign it on the eve of a wedding. It cannot impact child support or child custody. It must also not be unconscionable to either spouse, either at the time it is executed or at the time of a divorce. If the company makes millions of dollars over the course of a ten year marriage, a court would not enforce the agreement according to those terms. In the case of an immigrant marrying a U.S. citizen, having a prenuptial agreement is usually a significant barrier to obtaining a spousal visa, which may be the only visa available after the marriage, on the grounds that this is considered a "yellow flag" that the marriage may actually be a sham for citizenship purposes only. A typical immigration officer who would read a post like this one or hearing an explanation for its purpose in an interview in those words would seriously consider denying a spousal visa or U.S. citizenship on the ground that the marriage is a fraud. The notion of a "probable divorce" in particular would almost certainly doom visa approval or a citizenship application, and would also, at the margins, make it less likely that it would be enforced at all. This is particularly true in the event of the very one-sided agreement proposed when you have a young couple that doesn't have established assets and children from prior marriages, or a pre-existing substantial amount of inherited wealth. Why else would a spouse agree to it? |
SCIF intrusion by members of Congress Having some tangential experience with Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIF) and how seriously they are taken, I was shocked to hear that one was stormed in Congress by people carrying cell-phones. Wikipedia defines a SCIF thusly: A Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF; pronounced "skiff"), in British and United States military, national security/national defense and intelligence parlance, is an enclosed area within a building that is used to process Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) types of classified information. As noted in this article "... bringing phones into the secure area was a potential felony." Is it correct that is it a felony to bring cell phones into such a secure area in the normal case? I have found this document which describes standards around SCIF construction and management: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR CONSTRUCTION AND MANAGEMENT OF SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION FACILITIES I've not, as of yet, been able to find anything that explains what laws apply to these facilities and what ramifications there are for violators. According this article: ...while there are criminal statutes that would otherwise come into play here, it is not useful to discuss them here because, under the Speech or Debate Clause of the U.S. Constitution, a member of Congress cannot be criminally prosecuted for an action he or she takes as part of the individual’s legislative work. There is no reference to which criminal statutes would apply, however. Is this assessment correct that such actions could not be criminally prosecuted were they illegal? The above image is purported to be from the incident. Alex Mooney made a recording inside the SCIF that he then published on Twitter here. | It is unlikely that it is a felony to enter a SCIF with a cell phone (or thumb drive, Apple Watch, fitbit etc). The felony clout comes from the non-disclosure agreement which references Sections 793, 794, 798, 952 of Title 18 and Section 783(b) Title of Title 50 -- gathering and disclosing information is a felony. A non-exhaustive reading of the relevant chapters of the US Code does not provide any evidence of a felony charge relatable to phones and SCIFs. There is a federal law against knowingly entering or remaining in any restricted building or grounds without lawful authority to do so. This includes knowingly, and with the intent to impede or disrupt the orderly conduct of Government business or official functions, obstructs or impedes ingress or egress to or from any restricted building or grounds which protects against intrusion of a building or grounds so restricted in conjunction with an event designated as a special event of national significance The courts would almost certainly hold the recent event to be a non-justiciable political matter. | Intentional sabotage of a TSA computer system is almost certainly a serious crime and would also almost surely give rise to civil liability, although you might avoid both if you warned the TSA that the phone was set up to intentionally break their system, in which case it might be confiscated as contraband. If the product had a "feature" unknown to you and that you had no reasonable reason to know of that caused the harm, you would ultimately have no criminal or civil liability, although the manufacturer might be strictly liable to the TSA under a product liability theory, and you would probably be detained as a witness to figure out what happened. If the product had a "feature" that broke the TSA computer that could be de-activated and that you meant to de-active but carelessly failed to, you would have negligence liability to the government and might or might not have criminal liability (I'm not enough of an expert in the relevant statutes to know). You might be liable for a strict liability Federal Communications Commission offense for having a device that is in violation of their regulations. | If an employee takes home information that his or her employer considers confidential, that would be a matter of company policy. The employer could discipline or fire the employee if it learned of the incident, and chose to act. If the information is considered to be a trade secret, or part of one, disclosing it or mishandling it so as to risk disclosure could be a crime under US law. However, only in unusual cases is criminal action taken on such matters, normally it is left to civil lawsuits or internal company action. I do not know if Canada has a similar law. | Such a law would be constitutional The US Congress could decide to require VPN providers to register the IPs that they provide to VPN customers. The use of such techniques would almost surely be considered "interstate or foreign commerce" and so Congress would have power under the Commerce Clause of the constitution to legislate concerning it. There would clearly be a rational basis for such a law -- the question outlines such a basis. This is not an area subject to strict scrutiny. None of the previously established limits on the commerce power (and there are few) would seem to apply. State laws on this topic would probably be preempted by the dormant commerce clause if Congress does not act, and clearly preempted if Congress does act, unless Congress explicitly permits concurrent legislation. Whether Congress should act on this matter is a policy question not on topic on Law.se. Whether Congress will act is speculation. I can only say that I am not aware of any widespread demand for such action, or any proposed bills, on the topic. However, there is US caselaw to the effect that anonymous speech (or other communication) is protected by the First Amendment , and that laws effectively banning anonymous speech are not acceptable. But there are other ways of anonymizing online speech, so that would not seem to provide sufficient grounds to overturn such a law. | The law is really bad at protecting whistleblowers From my understanding of US law, this is not unauthorised access to a computer: the reporter made a legitimate request to a remote computer, that computer provided data,the reporter accessed the supplied data on their own computer. However, pointing out the failures of people in power is fraught even if it is not illegal. It is certainly within the Governor’s power to authorise an investigation of the reporter. On the face of the law, it seems reasonable to suspect that what was done might be a violation so there is nothing legally wrong with initiating an investigation. I suspect that such a broad interpretation of the law would fall foul of the First Amendment which may partly explain why it wasn’t prosecuted: the government doesn’t want to find out. Similarly they can issue press releases, which, due to the First Amendment, don’t have to be true, just not defamatory. Saying it’s a possible violation is true and not defamatory. Saying the reporter was an evil person who is only doing this for political purposes is a statement of opinion and not defamatory. It’s a fact of the world that people with power can use that power in ways that are malicious, unethical, and unfair but not necessarily illegal. | Yes In New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (aka the Pentagon Papers case) The court specifically permitted public disclosure in national newspapers of information that had been officially classified. This was, of course a request for an injunction, not a criminal proceeding, but it is hard rto imagine that a criminal proceeding could have succeeded after the decision, and in fact no prosecution was attempted. At the start of the unsigned opinion, the court wrote: We granted certiorari in these cases in which the United States seeks to enjoin the New York Times and the Washington Post from publishing the contents of a classified study entitled "History of U.S. Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy." (emphasis added) This makes it clear that the content of the "papers" wa officially classified. In concurrence, Justice Black (joined by Douglas) wrote: I adhere to the view that the Government's case against the Washington Post should have been dismissed, and that the injunction against the New York Times should have been vacated without oral argument when the cases were first presented to this Court. I believe that every moment's continuance of the injunctions against these newspapers amounts to a flagrant, indefensible, and continuing violation of the First Amendment. The question asks: I am wondering if everyone who leaks classified military documents are going to be charged criminally by the U.S. government Even when such charges are constitutionally permitted, the government has the authority not to proceed with them, if it so chooses, for whatever reason it sees fit. Specific laws 18 USC § 793 prohibits conveying various information about the national defense, military equipment, or preparations for war: with intent or reason to believe that the information is to be used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation § 793 does not refer to classification status at all, and it has no explicit excptions, but it would not apply where ther is no "intent or reason to believe" the information will harm the US or help another country. 18 USC § 794 has an intent requirement simialr to that of 793, but covers different kinds of information. Some of its provisions apply only in wartime, and then the required intent is that the information "will be communicated to the enemy". Again classification is not mentioned. 18 USC § 795 Covers making images of "vital military and naval installations or equipment" protected by order of the President. Permission of the relevant military commander is required. No exceptions are listed. 18 USC § 796 is similar to § 795 but limited to images obtained by use of aircraft. No exceptions are listed. 18 USC § 797 prohibits publication of images taken in violation of § 795, unless approved by a censor. It is in form a prior restraint. No exceptions are listed. 18 USC § 798 Prohibits disclosure of information about cryptographic systems. No exceptions are listed, but I think there is caselaw limiting the coverage of this section. 18 USC § 799 prohibits violation of NASA security regulations. | Probably.* Congress has wide latitude to dictate the procedures of "inferior courts" -- the district courts and circuit courts of appeal. Those courts only exist because Congress created them, so Congress can generally set the terms on which they continue to exist. That power is limited in several important ways by the Constitution, including the terms and compensation of the judges, and standing to address cases, and then further limited by separation-of-powers principles. But the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules of Criminal Procedure are a good example of how Congress has already -- and largely unobjectionably -- imposed these types of demands on the judiciary. The rules are generally drafted by the judicial branch, but Congress approves them and gives them the force of law. In both sets of rules, you can already see some requirements on how decisions are worded: Criminal Rule 23 requires the court to "state its specific findings of fact" after a bench trial; Criminal Rule 32 requires the court to "set forth the plea, the jury verdict or the court's findings, the adjudication, and the sentence" in judgments of conviction; Civil Rule 52 requires the court to "find the facts specially and state its conclusions of law separately"; Civil Rule 58 requires that "every judgment and amended judgment ... be set out in a separate document"; Civil Rule 59 requires the court to "specify the reasons [for granting or denying a motion for a new trial] in its order"; and Civil Rule 72 requires magistrates to enter "a recommended disposition, including, if appropriate, proposed findings of fact." The rule you're proposing seems to go well beyond these requirements, but I don't see how it would run afoul of constitutional constraints. I could imagine an argument that this somehow encroaches on the courts' inherent authority, but I'm not really convinced that that authority protects against this. For more information, you can read the Congressional Research Service report on "Congressional Authority Over the Federal Courts." *This answer only applies to Article III courts, but even then does not apply to the Supreme Court, which is co-equal and generally has the authority to set its own rules. When it comes to Article I courts, though, Congress would probably have virtually unlimited discretion to impose the kinds of requirements that you're talking about, and even to say that the court has no jurisdiction to consider constitutionality at all. Congress might even get away with imposing these kinds of requirements on state courts through the Spending Clause | You do need to know the location of both parties. U.S. Federal law (18 USC 2511(2)(d)), which prohibits the interception of wire and electronic communication, states: It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication where such person is a party to the communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State. California Penal Code 632 requires the consent of all parties to a confidential communication in order for the conversation to be recorded. The statute defines a "confidential communication" as follows: The term “confidential communication” includes any communication carried on in circumstances as may reasonably indicate that any party to the communication desires it to be confined to the parties thereto, but excludes a communication made in a public gathering or in any legislative, judicial, executive or administrative proceeding open to the public, or in any other circumstance in which the parties to the communication may reasonably expect that the communication may be overheard or recorded. Once AT&T, or anyone else for that matter, states that the communication is being recorded, it is no longer considered a confidential communication requiring the consent of all parties in order for any party to record it. Part of the California Civil Jury Instructions for this code requires that the plaintiff must prove, among other things, that the plaintiff had a "reasonable expectation that the conversation was not being overheard or recorded." You can see the full jury instructions here: https://www.justia.com/trials-litigation/docs/caci/1800/1809.html |
Can an employee be effectivley fired by making their work really bad? To my understanding An employer is allowed to reduce an employees wage without reason An employer can cancel or reschedule shifts without reason or send an employee home without pay Canada is not employment at will Despite not being employment at will, can't an employer effectively fire an employee by cancelling all their shifts (or reducing them to something really short)? Can't employer reduce pay to minimum wage? If it's that easy what's the point of having laws regarding termination? | Can they? Yes Is it legal? No This is called constructive dismissal and it is as illegal as any other dismissal without legal cause. | canada ontario Speaking from the perspective of law in Ontario, Canada, the clause may indeed be defective, contrary to the currently accepted answer. Consider what is mentioned at Termination Clauses and Continuation of Benefits: A Warning and Reminder for Employers in Ontario (August 2015): Employers often seek to limit their termination liability with termination clauses. If a termination clause does not meet the minimum requirements of the Employment Standards Act, 2000 (“ESA”), then the termination clause will not be valid and an employee will be entitled to reasonable notice at common law, thus increasing an employer’s liability [...] [...] The ESA requires employers to continue benefits during the ESA notice period when terminating employment without cause, whether or not working notice is provided. Where an employer fails to expressly state in a contract that an employee’s benefits will continue throughout the ESA notice period, the termination clause may be unenforceable. [...] In Stevens v Sifton Properties Limited (2012, ONSC) (“Stevens”), the termination clause stated that payment in lieu of notice in accordance with the ESA would be provided where the employer terminates the relationship without cause. The termination clause stipulated that such payment satisfied all future claims against the employer. The Court determined that the clause, in addressing benefits implicitly, did so in a way that “purports to take those [rights of benefits] away upon mere payment of the required pay in lieu of notice.” The Court held that this was contrary to the ESA, as the language denied benefit continuation during the ESA notice period and the termination clause was therefore void. Also, on the saving clause attempt, see Ontario Court of Appeal rules “saving clause” in employment agreement unenforceable (December 2019). Consider what's mentioned in Why employment contracts are now being rewritten all over the country (December, 2020): The Court of Appeal for Ontario has determined that all ambiguous language must be read in the employee’s favour and the presence of ambiguity will nullify a termination provision. Any ambiguity will be fatal. For example, simply stating that the employee will get the greater of their employment standards entitlements or some greater amount, if not worded precisely and correctly, will not hold up because the courts will find the language to be ambiguous. Also, see Ontario Court of Appeal Limits Severability of Termination Clauses in Employment Contracts (August 2020), which says: In addition, the Court of Appeal refused to give effect to the employment contract’s severability clause. The Court stated that a severability clause cannot affect clauses that have been made void by statute. Having concluded that the termination provisions must be considered together, the severability clause in this case could not be applied to sever the offending “for cause” portion of the termination provisions. All emphasis above is mine. I am not a lawyer. | A variety of Canadian national laws have established general restrictions that impart largely universal rights upon all "employees", as well as certain duties upon all "employers" with regard to the definition of who qualifies as an employee and who must be paid. Despite the national framework, the provincial standards construed through case law are largely controlling. Employees in Canada are protected by the employment standards set forth by each province, which then will typically be given precedence over in the national rubric unless the latter gives greater rights to workers. These provincial laws apply to all “employees” and “employers” within the province unless a clearly defined exemption or restriction in the national framework applies, or unless there is not a provincial framework in place. The provincial, versus the national legislation, makes it necessary to determine whether he or she fits into the definition of an “employee” under either of these legal structures; chances are, if a person is working in any way they are employees who need to be paid. While the extended definitions vary, a person is an employee in all provinces if they generally appear to be an employee ( they perform the type of work a person would typically be paid for, they are controlled to some extent by the employer, etc.) As defined through these statutes and stare decisis, individuals who fit these definititoins and tests are employees, and hence, are entitled to receive wages. This is almost always true regardless of any signed contracts or verbal agreements suggesting otherwise - agreements of this type are largely unenforceable except in the rarest of circumstances. Thus, unlike the U.S. where an intern can form a contract with the consideration being the value of the educative environs, in Canada, not so. Hence, whether the intern is willing to not be paid, or has signed an agreement acknowledging that he or she would not be paid, if they decide to sue for wages (or even if the employer is audited without the employees input), the existence of a written waiver of pay is not determinative of employers' liability. Much like the FSLA, these national and provincial employment laws were adopted with the goal of preventing the exploitation and abuse of workers who are in a vulnerable position relative to their employers. The Supreme Court of Canada has held that provincial employment laws should be construed and interpreted in a broad and generous manner because they provide minimum benefits and standards to protect workers as a general class. However, this framework can also backfire and put young Canadian professionals at a disadvantage in this growing global economy. In some circumstances - especially in competitive professional employment markets where experience is an intangibly invaluable asset - and their neighbors to the south (the U.S.) have the benefit of entering into these relationships. In professions such as law, medicine, business, and many others, internships are an invaluable tool and a stepping stone to permanent lucrative employment, that these "protections" may serve to deprive parties the benefit of. It is nearly always illegal in Canada to allow an individual to work in an internship or volunteer like capacity if they do so unpaid, even in ways that would traditionally be exempt from the FSLA (Fair Labor Standards Act) in the United States. Despite their nearness geographically to the U.S., there are a number of statutory and common laws that differ considerably between the two sovereign nations. Canadian courts and provincial authorities apply both the provincial and national employment standards and provisions. Together and/or independent of each other, these laws act in such a way that the test for who qualifies as an employee will inevitably end up encompassing nearly everyone working unpaid, except student interns working few hours. If an intern is not specifically exempted, they are entitled to and must be paid at least the National minimum wage (if the provincial wage is higher, it is the applicable minimum). Interns who do the same work of "employees" or who are subject to any amount of substantial control and direction by their employers, must be paid according to the test that various cases of the Canadian Supreme Court has engrained into Canadian common law. Even in situation where a would-be intern enters into an contractual agreement that he or she will not be paid does not mean that the employer is complying with their provincial employment standards. Any such clause in an oral or written contract is null and void if it contravenes the respective laws, The following link will bring you to a professional publication that examines the history and reasoning for these divergent provincial statutes, as well as the few existing exceptions, citing the most important relevant cases that have determined these issues nationally: http://www.gowlings.com/KnowledgeCentre/article.asp?pubID=3190 | Not by payroll deduction, unless the agreement to do so was not a condition of employment While it is true (as Just a guy's answer notes) that under § 40.1-29(C) an employee may agree via "written and signed authorization" to an employer withholding money from paychecks, the agreement to do so must be voluntary and not a condition of employment/continued employment. § 40.1-29(D) of the Code of Virginia states: No employer shall require any employee, except executive personnel, to sign any contract or agreement which provides for the forfeiture of the employee's wages for time worked as a condition of employment or the continuance therein, except as otherwise provided by law. This does not mean that an employee who damages company property or otherwise negligently causes the company financial harm is not liable for such damages, though. Damages to a vehicle or costs incurred for cleaning it might be possible damages. "Excessive tardiness and absences" seems like it'd be difficult, but not impossible, to prove monetary damages for. But to recover these damages against the employee's will, they'd have to file a lawsuit: they cannot simply deduct the damages from wages unless the employee voluntarily agrees to pay them that way (a blanket authorization as a condition of employment does not count). This article has some more information and a couple relevant examples (including one about vehicle damage). | Without a jurisdiction, I'll just say that unless the comments made in the reviews and discussions were false, the individual is unlikely to have any claim, particularly given that you've stated that this occurred over the course of a year. However, the individual may be able to argue that they were not given sufficient notice of their performance, for example through performance evaluations, and given the length of time, it likely that one would have occurred. A company may be able to terminate an employee in spite of their overall contributions if they have breached policy - for instance, an otherwise outstanding employee who attracts negative customer reviews based in fact, and who is given ample opportunity and guidance to improve, may cause brand and reputational damage to the company; in this case, it is a commercial decision to retain or terminate the employee. As for what recourse the employee has, if the comments were factual, then it is likely that they will not have any, unless the employer has not adhered to procedural requirements - for instance, in Australia, you are required to provide an employee the opportunity to have a support person present at any meeting which may result in the employee's termination - or the employer broke some other law - for instance, discrimination, bullying or harassment law. Unfortunately, the contributions an employee makes does not necessarily negate the harm they do, and complaints based on an employee's performance are completely valid if factual. | Most employment in the US is "at will". That means that the employer or the employee can terminate the relationship without notice for any reason or for no reason. There are certain statutory protections that limit this, however, such as federal protections against discrimination on the basis of a protected characteristic. Arizona may have other protections. So the first thing you need to do (or your lawyer needs to do) is determine whether your employment was at will. If so, then it doesn't much matter if the reasons they gave you were lies, unless you can show that their actions constituted illegal discrimination. (If they lied about you to someone else, though, you might be able to go after them for libel or slander.) If your employment was not at will, then you may be able to challenge the reasons for the firing if the firing violated the conditions under which your employment could be terminated. Even if your employment was at will, your firing might fall under one of the exceptions listed in the Wikipedia article: public policy, implied contract, or good faith/fair dealing (although the article gives conflicting information about whether Arizona has an implied contract exception; the text says that it does not, but the map shows that it does). To analyze the facts of your case in connection with Arizona employment law, you really need to talk to a lawyer with a practice in Arizona employment law. The lawyer will want to review your contract or other written agreement, if there is one. | Can an employer charge employee/contractor a processing fee for payment? No. The matter depends on whether the person qualifies as employee for purposes of the British Columbia Employment Standards Act. Your description suggests that you meet criterion (b) of the definition of employee insofar as you are (i.e., if you are) "a person an employer allows, directly or indirectly, to perform work normally performed by an employee". See section 1(1) of the Act. Section 21(1) prohibits an employer to "directly or indirectly, withhold, deduct or require payment of all or part of an employee's wages for any purpose", and item (2) prohibits the employer to "require an employee to pay any of the employer's business costs except as permitted by the regulations". There is no indication that the alleged business cost of e-transfers would be one such exception. do I have any recourse for such a small amount of money that isn't worth starting a law suit over? You have the option to file a complaint in "an office of the Employment Standards Branch". See sections 74 et seq for further details. You are not specifying the amount of the e-transfer that is being deducted from your compensation. The smaller the amount(s) at issue, the more important it will be for your complaint to persuasively explain how it is not "frivolous, vexatious or trivial". See section 76(c). Directing the employer's attention to the aforementioned statutory prohibition prior to filing a complaint tends to disprove allegations of vexation. That is because you are giving the employer an opportunity to mend its conduct and avert the proceedings that otherwise would take place. That being said, a very occasional cost of few cents is very likely to lead to a conclusion of vexation or bad faith regardless of your preliminary steps. In most other contexts, though, it is in your best interest to stay aware of the obligations that are being presented/proposed to you so that your actions do not constitute an acceptance of terms & conditions you would rather reject. Not all contracts come in the form of a written document signed by the parties. | Some of the categories involve restaurants (i.e. 1(h) and 1(i)), and employers may not want to go through the student learner exception hoops. Every employer has to get worker's compensation insurance for all of their employees. Those rates may be prohibitively high for minors in some kinds of activities. More generally, employers don't want to have worker's compensation claims or injured employees and may simply not trust younger employees to be safe. Some jobs involve access to alcohol that employers want to limit. Some jobs involve contractual authority or decision making that the employer wants to limit to adults. |
Russian firm charged in election interference case pleads not guilty - "speedy trial"? Russian firm charged in election interference case pleads not guilty (USA TODAY) Mueller's office charged in February that 13 Russian nationals and three businesses sought to meddle in the election election ... one of them, Concord Management and Consulting, LLC, dispatched a pair of lawyers to federal court in Washington to plead not guilty to the charges. One of the lawyers, Eric Dubelier, said Concord would "exercise our right to a speedy trial." ... Mueller's office said in a court filing last week that Concord's lawyers had already demanded that prosecutors turn over "sensitive intelligence gathering, national security, and foreign affairs information," including details on electronic surveillance of the company and its employees. How soon must Mueller produce the evidence? (And will it be made public?) Indictment: USA vs. Internet Research Agency et. al. | There may be two questions sort of embedded in here: How long does the government have before it violates Speedy Trial; and How long does the government have to turn over its evidence? Unfortunately, they're probably both impossible to answer at this point. Question 1 Under the Speedy Trial Act (18 USC 3161): In any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial of a defendant charged in an information or indictment with the commission of an offense shall commence within seventy days from the filing date (and making public) of the information or indictment, or from the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which such charge is pending, whichever date last occurs. If a defendant consents in writing to be tried before a magistrate judge on a complaint, the trial shall commence within seventy days from the date of such consent. IRA was indicted on February 16, 2018, so 70 days later would be April 27, 2018, which has obviously already come and gone. But their initial appearance wasn't until May 9, 2018, which pushes the time back to July 18, 2018. That would be the default latest date for a trial to begin, but the Act also allows delays for a variety of factors. Among them are delays "resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant," which includes time the court spends considering the defendants' motions. So if IRA moves to dismiss the case, all the time spent fighting over that motion would "toll" speedy-trial time, meaning that it would stop the clock until the motion was decided. Another provision of potential relevance is 18 USC 3161(h)(8): Any period of delay, not to exceed one year ... [if] an official request .. has been made for evidence of any such offense and that it reasonably appears, or reasonably appeared at the time the request was made, that such evidence is, or was, in such foreign country. So if there's evidence somewhere in Russia linking these guys to the crimes they're accused of, that might push speedy trial back by a year just to deal with that issue alone. So the short answer to Question 1 is that Speedy Trial requires the trial to begin on July 18, but that practically speaking, that probably won't happen. Question 2 The timing of discovery, the process of each side turning over its evidence to the other side, varies based on the kind of evidence involved, so there are usually multiple disclosures of evidence between the time of indictment and the actual trial. Under current DOJ guidelines, prosecutors are encouraged to provide "broad and early discovery." More specifically: Exculpatory evidence available under Brady v. Maryland should be turned over "reasonably promptly"; Impeachment evidence available under Giglio v. United States should be turned over "at a reasonable time before trial to allow the trial to proceed efficiently"; and Material available under Rule 16 should be disclosed "as soon as is reasonably practical." As you can see, these aren't really hard deadlines. The defense will ask for the documents, the government will turn over documents, and then they'll probably both fight about turning over some other documents, and then they'll wait for the court to decide what to do. So when does Mueller have to turn over his evidence? Probably the best answer we have right now is: "When a judge tells him to." | If you are charged under the laws of Estonia (or Australia or Thailand or the UK) then the laws of the USA have no relevance whatsoever. It makes no difference if you are a US citizen, if the alleged crime happened in the USA or was perpetrated against the USA. If nation X has jurisdiction then you are tried under the laws of nation X. That is what sovereignty means. As to your specific example, Facebook does business in Estonia, therefore they are subject to Estonian law, as a US corporation they are also subject to US law and the law of every other jurisdiction they operate in (see why they need big legal departments?). If a legitimate Estonian warrant was served on them to disclose metadata or anything else then they are legally obliged to do so or be in contempt of court. Oh, and by the way, the first amendment right to free speech does not give you a right to anonymous free speech. | "Conflict of interest" has a specific meaning w.r.t. various federal laws, which have financial gain as their underpinning. The so-called conflict which your referring to is an abstract moral duty, eforced at the polls every few years: there is no conflict of interest. "Obstruction of justice" is defined in 18 USC 73. The law does not require a person to passively submit to an investigation, thus you can file motions with a competent court to resist a subpoena. If there is a criminal investigation of a US criminal statute, it is illegal to willfully endeavors by means of bribery to obstruct, delay, or prevent the communication of information relating to a violation of any criminal statute Saying "you don't have authority to tell me to do that" is not obstruction of justice. I have not seen any (credible) claim that it is unconstitutional for the president to order an investigation of election fraud, for example Executive Order 13799. That commission was disbanded, but a new commission could be ordered via the same mechanism. Congress has the power to defund any such commission, and there was an unsuccessful attempt to use that power in the previous instance. | We may soon have a more definitive answer. A Grand Junction, Colorado newspaper is suing a politician for calling it "fake news", and the resolution of that case and the hypothetical that you propose would turn on the same legal principle. It is highly unlikely that such a lawsuit would prevail, because "fake news" probably doesn't constitute libel per se, because the comment could be construed as hyperbole or as a statement of opinion (neither of which are actionable), and even potentially, because a "speech and debate clause" defense under the state constitution might apply (depending upon the context in which the statement was made by the politician). The context of the particular tweet cited generally defines specified organizations as "the FAKE NEWS media" rather than accusing them of any particular instance of making a false statement, so it is probably an opinion or hyperbole. But, if the statement were made knowing it was false or with reckless disregard as to truth or falsity, and if the term "fake news" in the context in which it was used could be legitimately construed the imply a statement of fact which is not true, it wouldn't be impossible for the lawsuit to succeed, and depending upon the context of the statement, it could have such an implication. A suit against Trump could also implicate Presidential immunity doctrines which are more robust than immunity doctrines for other public officials, particularly if the "fake news" comment could be construed as part of the official duties of the President (for which there is absolute immunity) as opposed to his unofficial duties. The immunity question is a closer one than the question on the merits of defamation law about which there is much more case law to flesh out what is and isn't covered. | You'd have to specify the cases you want. All court transcripts are a matter of public record, though a copy may cost you a fee from the court clerk's office to recieve. It should be pointed out that not all cases got to an evidentiary stage to actually evaluate on the record any evidence. A vast majority were decided on pre-evidentiary rules such as standing or laches (timeliness) and not all cases that were able induced evidence debunked the evidence. Any appellent case would also not induce evidence as all appeals cases are strictly matter of law rather than matter of fact (evidence), so those cases would be asking a higher court to double check non-evidentiary decisions. The fact that the party that brought the suit does not have standing to bring the suit OR that the party that brought the suit brought it too late for the courts to proceed on the matter does not debunk evidence that the fraud happened in the eyes of the law... it simply means the questions of fact were never addressed at all | where does the prosecution occur? Prosecutions generally occur where a crime is committed. The area where a crime or other wrongdoing is committed is considered the proper "forum" for adjudicating the case. With respect to the law you cited, you should take note of the statutory limitations imposed upon the Attorney General in pursuing such a case (called a § 1119 prosecution). When considering the limitations, it is unlikely a trial of an American who killed an American in Canada would be tried in the United States. Those limitations begin with a prosecutor seeking written permission by the AG. This permission cannot be granted if the other country has already prosecuted the individual for the same conduct. Also, the AG can only give that permission if, after consulting the Secretary of State, he or she determines that the killing occurred in a jurisdiction where the suspect is "no longer present" and that the country is unable to "lawfully secure the person's return." and I'm wondering what that process actually looks like. This would be a consultation between Justice Department attorneys and the Assistant Secretary(ies) of State whose portfolio contains the foreign country in question. From the DOJ in particular, the Assistant AG for the Criminal Division is in charge of considering the above criteria and granting approvals. The Human Rights and Special Prosecutions Section handles these issues within the Criminal Division. Does the Attorney General have to petition the other government for permission to prosecute them in the home country? No. The statutory limitations listed above necessitate that the suspect has already left that country and part of the AG's determination must be that it is unlikely that country will be able to secure the person's return. That said, might that country petition the United States that it wants the suspect to be returned to stand trial there? Potentially. Does it make a difference if the key witnesses are also all Americans, therefore arguing that chances of conviction are more likely if tried within the U.S. where all participants reside and are available to testify? This is, of course, a general consideration when determining which jurisdiction should handle a matter. It isn't clear to what degree it comes into consideration in this type of prosecution. does anyone know any famous/well known examples of this happening? Famous/well-known? I can't be sure, but see, e.g., United States v White, 51 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (E.D. Cal. 1997), United States v. Nipper, 198 F. Supp. 2d 818 (W.D. La. 2002), United States v. Wharton, 320 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 2003), and United States v. Brimager, 123 F.Supp.3d 1246 (S.D. Cal 2015). Interestingly, the statute gets substantial discussion and review in this Department of Justice White Paper entitled, Legality of a Lethal Operation by the Central Intelligene Agency Against a U.S. Citizen, in the context of whether the CIA could kill an American citizen in Yemen who has been reasonably determined to be a senior leader of al-Qaida. | The defense has an opportunity to question the witness the prosecution had called to provide foundation for the evidence, and in this case the defense's perspective is that the prosecution was trying to introduce evidence that they had improperly digitally manipulated. Part of their questioning was trying to figure out how the witness had manipulated the image prior to offering it as evidence. It's the prosecution's burden to prove that the evidence they are offering is accurate, the defense's purpose in asking the witness questions he could not answer is to try to prove to the judge that the prosecution has not laid proper foundation for the evidence because it has been manipulated from its original form in a way the prosecution cannot explain or justify as remaining fair and accurate to the events captured by the original footage. This case in particular had a lot of video evidence, and most of these issues were handled in motions in limine before the trial started. However, the drone evidence in question was dropped at the prosecutor's office after the trial started, so the prosecution did not really have time to hire and voir dire an expert witness on Amped 5 (keeping in mind that the defense similarly had little time to review and account for the new evidence in the middle of trial). Since the defense in this case were cross-examining the witness, they have some leeway to present an argument with their questioning like they chose to do with the red/blue pixel drawings. As I recall the judge allowed the evidence as-is, so it does not appear that the defense's arguments were persuasive to the judge. | Yes Impeachment proceedings (as are all activities of Congress) are legal proceedings in that they are enabled by the Constitution. While it is true that they are not judicial proceedings, the activities of the legislature as with the executive (like a police interview) and judiciary (like a trial) are legal processes and the Fifth Amendment rights apply. During the McCarthy “red scare” era, pleading the fifth was commonplace by witnesses to Congressional hearings. However, pleading the fifth does not mean you can avoid testifying. If subpoenaed you would need to turn up and answer the questions, pleading the fifth when the answer could incriminate you in a criminal matter. |
On Irish marriage property and divorce law circa 1939 My questions arise from a scenario in Finnegans Wake by James Joyce, published in 1939, and hence pertain to Irish law around or before 1939. As a young Dublin girl, Anna inherits property from her father, a house with inn and shop. Anna marries Finnegan. Post marriage, what would be Anna's and Finnegan's claims on the property Anna inherited before marrying Finnegan? Twin sons are born. Later, Anna has another child, a girl, but Finnegan doesn't think he's the father! Finnegan wants to divorce Anna. Could Finnegan legally divorce Anna? Finnegan throws Anna out of her home for what seems like 3-4 years. If divorce was possible, was there a requirement that the couple live separately for a number of years? If the divorce had legally gone through, what would be Anna's and Finnegan's claims on the property Anna inherited before marrying Finnegan? Just to note that before the divorce can even happen, Finnegan falls from a ladder and dies. | There was no divorce in Ireland between 1937 and 1996 Before 1937, the Irish Free State inherited the divorce laws that were then in force. These required an Act of Parliament (which was ludicrously expensive and therefore not available to someone of Finnegan's means) or annulment (which is strictly speaking, the official recognition that a marriage never happened rather than a divorce). The house belongs to Finnegan At common law a woman could own both real and personal property. However, in the case of a married woman the husband had a life interest in any real property: this continued even after the wife's death, and was known as tenancy "by the curtesy". Personal property passed into the ownership of the husband absolutely, with the exception of certain items of adornment or household use known as paraphernalia. Upon marriage, all of the wife's property becomes under the hands of her husband even if it was her family inheritance. Any money the wife earned through labour or trade also ended up in the hands of her husband whom she was expected to obey in the custom of marriage at the time. | I am not a lawyer; I am not your lawyer. You do not cite a jurisdiction so this makes it very difficult to get a definitive answer. What follows is for Australia but the general principles are common law and would be applicable to other common law jurisdictions except where statues apply or case law has diverged. In the first instance, it seems that you were not party to any arrangement to pay for the electricity. So on the face of it you are not party to any contract requiring you to pay. Even if there was such an agreement: family, domestic, social and voluntary agreements (which this would be) are presumed not to be intended to legally bind the participants. Whether this presumption would be overturned would depend on the specific facts. On the face of it, there is no legal obligation to pay. Your options are: Do nothing; this puts the ball in their court, they can: Forget about it (it would then be over) Attempt to sue you with little prospect of success (which would cost them and you a lot more than $50 irrespective of who won) Do something illegal like beating you up (you really need to assess this risk) Tell everyone they know (in person and on social media) what a skiving prick you are (you could probably sue them for damages but that's not really going to happen, is it?) Pay them what they are asking Offer to pay them something less. Option 1 is likely to break any relationship you have with the person, Option 2 is likely to preserve it and Option 3 could go either way. Ultimately, like most legal questions, this is not about the law; it's about relationships ... broken ones mostly. | Like a lot of Scottish criminal law, there's no specific legislation, but it is illegal through common law. This was also true in the rest of the UK until the 1800s, when statutes were passed with the aim of making abortion law clearer (generally forbidding it). This didn't extend to Scotland leaving much of its abortion law unclear. The 24 weeks limit that the Scotsman article references is from Section 1 of the Abortion Act 1967 (as amended). This act did apply to Scotland. The act specifies conditions under which abortion within the first 24 weeks is legal, and that it is always legal when there is grave risk to the woman's health. When the circumstances of the pregnancy fall outside the provisions of the act, the existing Scottish common law prevails. For further information, this UN document provides a good summary of abortion law in the UK. | A and B have been in a common law marriage for many years. A and C then apply for and receive a marriage license. When A and C marry, what is the legal status of each marriage? I assume in answering all of these questions that C did not know that A was in a valid common law marriage to B at the time of C's marriage to A, although the answers below may implicitly shed some light on how the questions would be resolved if C was aware of this fact. The Marriage Of A and C Is Invalid, The Marriage Of A and B Is In Force The only way to end a common law marriage that is valid in the recognizing state (i.e. either the same one where it is entered into or another way as the case may be; see below for when a common law marriage or foreign marriage must be recognized as valid) apart from a Utah common law marriage, is by the same death or divorce that would terminate a valid marriage entered into with a marriage license. A valid marriage is not established between A and C. No marriage is established between A and C, even if A and C are married in a state that does not recognize common law marriage, and even if both A and C were not aware that a common law marriage was formed between A and B because A and C did not know that the state where A and B were living at the time that the common law marriage was formed recognized common law marriage. This rule is subject to an important burden of proof rule. If there is a facially valid marriage certificate in evidence, the burden of proof is on the person seeking to show that this marriage is void to show that any prior marriage did not terminate by death or divorce prior to the new marriage certificate being issued. This rule flows from the fact that there is no comprehensive index of divorces entered in the United States and the fact that a valid divorce can be entered by consent of the parties in a jurisdiction other than the place where the parties were domiciled at the time of the purported divorce. In practice, this can be used to circumvent the general rule even when the general rule actually applies, especially when a putative marriage existed for many years and the common law marriage was long ago and the couple was separated shortly after it formed (often with the former common law spouse or both spouses being dead at the time of the litigation). But, this is only a burden of proof rule and can be overcome with affirmative proof of a lack of divorce (e.g. by the testimony of A and/or B in this question). The question of when a foreign divorce is recognized by a U.S. state as valid is a complicated one and beyond the scope of this question. It is particularly complicated in countries with non-Western legal systems such as Islamic law, in which some divorces are effected non-judicially. Where Are Common Law Marriages Valid Most states recognized common law marriage at some point in their history, or prior to becoming states when they were territories or parts of other countries. The states that currently recognize common law marriage or recently did so, if the marriage was formed in the first place in that state are as follows: Alabama (if created before January 1, 2017) Colorado (subject to restrictions for minors but allowing same sex marriages even if common law marriage between them was not legally recognized at the time of the common law marriage) District of Columbia Georgia (if created before January 1, 1997) Idaho (if created before January 1, 1996) Iowa Kansas Montana New Hampshire recognizes domestic common law marriage for purposes of probate only (there is a three year cohabitation requirement) although it recognizes valid common law marriages entered into outside the state. Ohio (if created before October 10, 1991) Oklahoma Pennsylvania (if created before January 1, 2005) Rhode Island South Carolina Texas Utah recognizes only common law marriages that have been validated in a judicial proceeding. A common law marriage may be validated by a court of law up to one year after the alleged marriage has been terminated (effectively allowing for "common law divorce" in Utah only). Prior to statehood, Utah allowed polygamous marriage (at least de facto) and this issue greatly delayed its admission as a U.S. state, but it does not now recognize such marriages as valid and all people who entered into those marriages are now dead. The exact test for a common law marriage formation varies by state. The most common test for formation of a common law marriage is an understanding of the couple between each other that they are married, the couple holding themselves out to the public that they are married (especially in joint tax returns and in health insurance applications), and in some states, either cohabitation or consummation of the marriage. There is a body of law governing what connect a couple must have to a state in order for their relationship to be subject to that state's common law marriage rules. If the couple has a shared domicile in the state that is generally sufficient, but this is not always the bare minimum level of connection necessary to establish that a state's common law marriage laws will apply to a couple that is physically present in that state. For example, it is customary in many U.S. subcultures, for example, to hold a wedding in the state of the bride's parents' domicile even if neither the bride nor the groom are domiciled in that state. But, a ceremonial wedding held in a state that recognizes common law marriage without the benefit of a marriage license would almost always be valid in all U.S. states (if otherwise valid), even if neither member of the couple resided there. I am not aware of any U.S. state except New Hampshire where mere cohabitation and/or coparenting for a certain number of years establishes a common law marriage, even though law enforcement and journalists often describe couples in those circumstances as being common law married couples. Functionally, common law marriage usually comes up in one of two fact patterns. First, it validates ceremonial marriages conducted with most formalities of a fully valid legal marriage license marriage with a formal wedding that have some technical defect in formalities; these are easy cases. Second, it establishes marital rights between cohabiting couples (often with shared children) who live together and act more or less like marriage couples who never have a decisive moment that is a wedding or marriage ceremony but end up considering themselves to be a married couple and deal with the administrative state and in their social lives accordingly. In both cases, common law marriage is usually a doctrine invoked generally avoid harsh consequences for wives who have sacrificed economically in reliance on a domestic couple relationship who lack meaningful legal rights do to a lack of marriage formalities. N.B. Australia has a concept called de facto relationships that provide certain legal rights after more than two years of cohabitation for a limited period of time after the relationship ceases to exist in fact. These are not common law marriages in the senes of American law. When Must A State Recognize A Marriage Valid Where Entered Into At The Time Entered Into There is really only one exception to the rule that a common law marriage (or any other form of marriage) which was valid where entered into (even outside the United States) at the time it was entered into (even if that state no longer recognizes common law marriage) is valid in every state. The exception is that a state does not have to recognize marriages which are barred by public policy in the state where the second marriage takes place (for reasons other than a lack of a marriage license), but not in the original state. Basically, the marriages which a state does not have to recognize are: (1) marriages valid where entered into that were polygamous when entered into (generally outside the U.S.), (2) marriages where a spouse was a minor too young to marry at the time of the marriage by the recognizing state's standards if the common law marriage was not reaffirmed by conduct after both spouses were of age (Colorado recognizes common law marriages only when both spouses were at least eighteen years old at the time of the marriage or at some time afterwards in the continued common law marriage, and the validity of this unique limitation has not been legally tested), (3) a marriage entered into without the voluntary consent of both spouses that was valid where entered into (generally outside the U.S.), or (4) a marriage where the spouses were too closely related (although many states will recognize first cousin marriage that was valid where entered into even when first cousin marriage is not recognized in that state). This public policy exception also previously applied to (5) same sex marriages valid where entered into but not in the recognizing state, and (6) to interracial marriages valid where entered into but void in the recognizing state. But, these two public policy reasons to deny recognition of a marriage entered into elsewhere have now been held to be unconstitutional in the United States. Paternity Implications The father of a child born while A and B were married, prior to the purported marriage of A and C would be presumed to be the father among A and B, even if this paternity was not noted on the birth certificate of the child because vital statistics bureau officials were not alerted to the existence of the common law marriage. But, the rule in a majority of jurisdictions is that contrary to the general rule, the presumption that the father of a child born while A and C were purportedly married and at least one of them believed themselves to be married, was the person among A and C who did not give birth to the child, without other proof of paternity, would remain effective even after C learns that A and C are not married. Thus, a child of A and C would be legitimate, even though the marriage between A and C was void. Tenancy By Entirety Implications States with tenancy by the entirety are: Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming. In those states, title to a residency owned by a husband and wife that would otherwise be a joint tenancy with right of survivorship would instead be a tenancy by entirety. A tenancy by entirety property is only subject to being used to satisfy judgments against both a husband and wife, rather than only against one of them individually and functions a bit like an unlimited homestead exemption as to money judgments against one spouse only. Any property purported held in tenancy by entirety between A and C would actually be held in joint tenancy with right of survivorship by operation of law and the claims of a creditor against A or C but not both of them could be enforced against that residence in the one half interest of the person against whom the creditor had a claim. Criminal Law Implications A would guilty of the crimes of bigamy in most states (or under the Uniform Code of Military Justice if A is in the U.S. armed services which might also prosecute A for adultery), although a minority of them might recognize an intent requirement that would absolve A of criminal liability if A didn't realize that A and B were living in a common law marriage state. A may or may not be guilty of the crime of perjury in connection with the marriage application depending upon whether A was aware that A and B were in a common law marriage. Restitution might be awarded in a criminal proceeding resulting in A's conviction, in favor of B or C but probably limited to the legal fees incurred to establish the invalidity of the marriage to C. The odds of a prosecutor pursuing a criminal case under these facts if B complained are probably about 50-50, given that the facts are quite blatant. Often both B and C would ask the prosecutor not to bring charges because both of them have an economic interest in A being able to make money while not in prison so their economic rights can be respected, and often, but not always, a prosecutor would respect those requests. Of course, depending upon the state where the marriage license was issued and the time that the common law marriage of A and B was discovered by a complaining witness to the police or prosecutor's office, the statute of limitations for one or more of these criminal offenses may have run by the time the prosecutor is considering bringing criminal charges. Statutes of limitation for state criminal charges vary greatly from state to state. Rights Of B Against A As A Spouse B has the full rights of a spouse to support during the marriage, and, if either A or B seeks a divorce, to a property division and alimony and if there are joint children to child support and parental rights, with respect to A. While every state has no fault divorce, in some states, fault is considered in property division and alimony and spousal support other than support for children during marriage, and this would work to the disadvantage of A. Rights Of C In States Without A Putative Spouse Doctrine Against A In states without a putative spouse doctrine, C has only the rights of an unmarried person with respect to A (e.g. rights arising from co-ownership and rights to child support and parental rights with respect to their joint children). This said, it is conceivable in these circumstances that C might have a right to recover prejudice in C's economic position as a result of a purported marriage to A under a restitution doctrine, or under a common law fraud theory. Rights Of B In States With An Alienation Of Affections Tort Against C In a few states (including South Dakota, Mississippi, and North Carolina) B would have a right to sue C if C continued to carry on the purported marriage after C learned of the common law marriage of A to B, in an alienation of affections tort. The alienation of affections tort also exists in Hawaii, Illinois and Utah, but subject to greater limitations: Illinois only permits actual economic damages to be recovered in alienation of affection actions. Thus, it prohibits non-economic damages like pain and suffering, and punitive damages, in these suits. Hawaii would only allow B to sue C if C persistently overcame A's free will to establish the relationship with A (e.g. in a relationship that would constitute illegal sexual harassment in employment or an abuse of a fiduciary relationship by C) and B was without marital fault at the time. In Utah, B could sue C only if "full responsibility for the breakdown of a marriage can be attributed solely to the conduct" of C (with the typical case being one where C was a priest or psychotherapist for A). No states have both an alienation of affections tort and a formally recognized putative spouse doctrine. Rights Of C Against A In States With A Putative Spouse Doctrine And For Social Security Benefit Purposes In Colorado, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, Texas, and Washington state and for purposes of Social Security benefits, C has the legal rights of a putative spouse from A for the period from the date of the putative marriage to C until C learns that A was in a common law marriage to B. The rights of a putative spouse are essentially the rights that a legal spouse would have had for a marriage of that duration reduced, to the extent necessary to respect the rights of B as a true spouse. The relative rights of B and C would be balanced by the Court in an equitable manner in the Court's discretion, likely, in part, by imposing greater burdens on A than a single spouse alone would be entitled to in a divorce. Note also that Colorado, Montana and Texas are the only U.S. states to have both common law marriage and to formally recognize putative spouse status. Bankruptcy Priority Consideration If the claims from B and C against A render A insolvent, and A files for bankruptcy, the marital claims of B will generally have priority as bankruptcy claims over the tort and putative spouse and contractual claims (if any) of C. But, child support claims of both B and C will have equal priority to the marital claims for alimony of B and will be superior to the property division claims of B. Probate Considerations If the common law marriage of A to B is discovered by C only after the death of A, then B has all of the rights of a surviving spouse (some of which are higher priority than creditors claims and some of which are lower priority than creditors claims) while C will have no spousal rights in the probate estate. Any putative spouse rights or tort or contract claim or property ownership claim that C has against A at that time can be asserted in the probate case as a creditor or co-owner of probate property. If A left a Will leaving A's estate in whole or in part to C, C will have rights an unrelated will devisee in the estate to the extent that there is anything left over after B's minimum marital rights and the claims of all creditors have been paid. The rights of a surviving spouse at death differ considerable from state to state. If A left assets by virtue of non-probate transfers to C (e.g. joint tenancy and/or beneficiary designations attached to particular assets), generally C will be entitled to those assets, but the assets that C receives at A's death from A may be invaded by B to the extent that the probate estate assets of A's estate are insufficient to meet A's obligations to B at death as A's surviving spouse. Joint Tax Return Considerations If A and C filed as married filing jointly on their taxes, their tax returns would have to be amended for all such tax years for which the statute of limitations had not yet run (usually three year from the due date of that return) as single or head of household taxpayers with separate returns for each of them. Usually, this would result in additional income tax being due from A and C combined. The application of prior tax payments made and prior tax refunds received would be allocated equitably by an appropriate court if necessary because the parties could not agree. Gift and Estate Tax Considerations For estate tax purposes, B will receive any unused gift and estate exemption of A at A's death. B will receive any assets received from A free of gift, estate and income taxes. Transfers at death to C from A will potentially be subject to estate taxation, and gifts made during life to C from A will potentially be subject to gift taxation. But, unless the sum of A's gifts and inheritances given to all people other than B during A's lifetime exceeded about $11.5 million, no gift or estate tax will actually be due at A's death. Retirement Account Taxation If A died with C as a beneficiary of a retirement account of A, or if C died with A as a beneficiary of a retirement account of C, the surviving person of A and C would not be able to roll over the proceeds tax free into a retirement account of the survivor. Instead, the survivor of A or C who was the beneficiary of the retirement account of the decedent among A or C would have to take taxable distributions either over the life expectancy of the surviving person, or over five years, as the survivor elected. Note On Authority I am writing from memory and my summary notes from when I was a professor of estate planning and later a continuing education teacher for lawyers. I could find all of the statutory or case law authority to back it up, but it would take another two or three hours that I don't have to devote to this answer. | The earliest mention of the principle that I can find is in Rolston v Secretary of State for Northern Ireland [1975] NI 195, where the matter of compensation for the widow of a police officer murdered in Northern Ireland arose. I am sure there are earlier cases that express the same principle in different terms, however. It is a broad principle that applies to most areas of civil law, and I cannot find an original source for it. I imagine that it is simply "received wisdom" that has been repeated long enough to become a cornerstone of the law of restitution in England and Wales. There is currently no statutory basis for the principle so I cannot cite any relevant Acts of Parliament either. | Yes, the second home will be part of the New York bankruptcy estate. Congress broadly defined property within the bankruptcy estate as all property, "wherever located and by whomever held," subject to limited exemptions. Florida's homestead exemption is among the broadest in the Unite dStates; the value of the property that can be protected is unlimited. See Florida Constitution, Article X, Section 5. As such, I have broken down your question into two parts: May the debtors use the Florida homestead exemption for their Florida home even if they are domiciled in New York? If not, may the debtors use either the Federal or New York state homestead exemptions to protect their Florida home? Exemption Eligibility The debtors can choose between either the federal exemptions of section 522(d) or the exemptions available under New York state and nonbankruptcy federal law; the debtors may not choose the exemptions available under Florida state law. Section 552 of the Bankruptcy Code is the operative statute. To take advantage of a state's exemption scheme, the debtor must either: Be domiciled in the state for the 730 days immediately prior to filing its petition; or If the debtor has not been domiciled in a single state for such period, the state in which the debtor was domiciled for the 180 days immediately preceding the 730-day period (or for the longer portion of that 180 day period). 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1)(A): . . . any property that is exempt under Federal law . . . or State or local law that is applicable on the date of the filing of the petition to the place in which the debtor’s domicile has been located for the 730 days immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition or if the debtor’s domicile has not been located in a single State for such 730-day period, the place in which the debtor’s domicile was located for 180 days immediately preceding the 730-day period or for a longer portion of such 180-day period than in any other place; As a result, the debtor may only utilize either the Federal or New York homestead exemptions. Federal Homestead Exemption Section 522(d)(1) provides a homestead exemption in the amount of $22,975 in value for the debtor's residence. (1) The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed $ 22,975 in value, in real property or personal property that the debtor or a dependent of the debtor uses as a residence, in a cooperative that owns property that the debtor or a dependent of the debtor uses as a residence, or in a burial plot for the debtor or a dependent of the debtor. (The linked statute says that the federal homestead exemption is capped at $15,000. But pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 104, the amount is adjusted every three years to account for changes in the cost of living. Effective April 1, 2013, the cap is $22,975). Essential to the right to a homestead exemption is designation and occupancy of the property as a residence. Residence and domicile are not necessarily the same thing. Courts seem to be split as to whether a debtor may hold multiple "residences" at the same time. For example, the court in In re Lawrence, 469 B.R. 140 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2012) held: By choosing not to limit the residence qualified for exemption under § 522(d) to a principal or primary residence, Congress presumably intended to encompass a broader category than principal residences, namely any residence . . . . To sum up, on the date of their bankruptcy petition the [debtors] owned two residences, one in Massachusetts and one in Maine. They used them both. They were entitled to exempt either one, but only one, under § 522(d)(1). See also In re Demeter, 478 B.R. 281 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2012); In re Gandy, 327 B.R. 807 (Bankr. S.D.Tex. 2005). But the New Jersey Bankruptcy Court in In re Stoner, 487 B.R. 410 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2013) read the term "residence" in a manner "requiring some measure of permanence." I couldn't find any cases from New York discussing this issue, making it difficult to determine whether a New York bankruptcy court would allow the debtors to apply the federal homestead exemption to their Florida home. But given that the exemption is capped at only $22,975, it is unlikely to have a significant impact on the bankruptcy. New York Homestead Exemption The New York homestead exemption is more generous than the federal exemption. It provides exemptions capped between $75,000 to $150,000. However, it is limited to property located within New York and used as a primary residence. As such, the Florida property is not subject to the exemption. New York Civil Practice Law and Rules § 5206: Property of one of the following types, not exceeding one hundred fifty thousand dollars for the counties of Kings, Queens, New York, Bronx, Richmond, Nassau, Suffolk, Rockland, Westchester and Putnam; one hundred twenty-five thousand dollars for the counties of Dutchess, Albany, Columbia, Orange, Saratoga and Ulster; and seventy-five thousand dollars for the remaining counties of the state in value above liens and encumbrances, owned and occupied as a principal residence, is exempt from application to the satisfaction of a money judgment, unless the judgment was recovered wholly for the purchase price thereof: a lot of land with a dwelling thereon, shares of stock in a cooperative apartment corporation, units of a condominium apartment, or a mobile home. | I don't think that's an accurate interpretation of the statement. The key difference between the two scenarios is the defendant's legal assessment of who owns the necklace. In the first he thinks he is the owner and can claim mistake of law; in the second, he he thinks someone else is the owner, so he cannot. To say he believes "the law allows for someone to do whatever they want with lost property even if they know who the rightful owner is" is very different from saying he thinks he's the owner. He doesn't think he's the legal owner, he just thinks he has legal rights that include some rights associated with ownership. So if the defendant's statement had actually been, "I thought I was the owner," that would have been a successful defense when the crime requires depriving the owner of the property. The defense was actually, "I thought I was allowed to deprive the owner of the property," which is an admission of guilt when the crime requires depriving the owner of the property. There are a couple questions here: a. A different crime that did not require intent -- or even required a different kind of intent -- could still lead to a conviction. A legislature is free to define larceny differently, so it could say that anyone who recklessly or negligently deprives another of property is guilty. Or it could say that your state of mind doesn't matter and that depriving another of property is larceny regardless of intent. b. In most cases, the mistake of law defense requires that the defendant honestly believe in the mistake; unlike mistake of fact, it does not require that his belief also be reasonable. Either way, the question of reasonableness would probably be a question for a jury, so a judge wouldn't be able to reject it (except in a bench trial). c. Mistake of law is a potential defense to any crime that requires an intent to do something that requires an assessment of what the law is. So if it's illegal to intentionally have sex with a woman who is not your wife, and you mistakenly believed you were in a legal marriage, sex with your non-wife would not be a crime. It has potentially very broad implications, but keep in mind that in many cases, the mistake a defendant would have to claim would be pretty far out there. If it were illegal to intentionally let anyone under 21 years old into your bar, I guess you could argue that you only let a 20-year-old in because you thought the law started calculating at conception, but I doubt you'll convince a jury. Mistake of law defenses still pop up pretty regularly. Here's one just yesterday from the Tenth Circuit. And this one is a Kansas case where a conviction for carrying a weapon while a felon was overturned because the court wouldn't allow a mistake-of-law defense. The Kansas case, though, uses the more modern definition of mistake of law, which also includes reasonable reliance on official statements from the government. In that case, the felon's parole officer had told him that it was OK to carry a pocketknife, but in reality, the law titled "Criminal possession of a firearm by a convicted felon" prohibited carrying knives, as well. | What Do England And Wales Share Legally? Why are they so closely associated with each other as to have just one tag on the site, but Northern Ireland and Scotland each seem to be their own worlds? Most laws of general applicability, such as criminal law, and private law (i.e. the law governing the interactions of private parties like property law, contract law, landlord-tenant law, employment law, etc.) are enacted by the National Parliament at Westminster (or effective as part of a shared English common law of case precedents) and shared by England and Wales which have a uniform integrated court system. In contrast, Scotland and Northern Ireland have greater autonomy to enact laws of general application because more authority has been devolved to those regional governments than to the National Assembly of Wales. They also have their own court systems. Historic Causes Wales was basically fully integrated into England starting in the 1200s and subsequently restored some autonomy. Scotland never lost its high level of autonomy and was initially joined to England only by virtue of having the same monarch, rather than being the same country. The United Kingdom was formed first by the personal union of monarchs from 1603 (under King James VI of Scotland a.k.a. King James I of England) followed by a federal style merger of governments approved by the Scottish and English parliaments in 1706-1707, rather than by conquest and it has much more government autonomy in generally applicable legislation and its judicial system than Wales does, and more than Ireland had when it was ruled by England. On the other hand, Scottish sentiment towards independence was not exactly unanimous in support of staying with the U.K. in the last referendum in 2014 when 44.7% of votes cast were for independence with 84.6% voter turnout (including voters as young as age 16). Northern Ireland's story is a bit more complicated as Ireland had a legal status similar to Wales from a similar medieval era, but this was complicated by the Irish independence struggle ultimately leading to the creation of the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. The fine line and complexity of the situation in Northern Ireland is illustrated by this map, and strong autonomy was necessary to allow it to maintain the fragile Protestant-Roman Catholic balance in a divided society there: Each of the components of the United Kingdom has a separate and historically determined status that is not exactly parallel to any of the others. England has no national assembly of its own, sufficing to use the national parliament for its laws despite the fact that some seats in that parliament that govern it are selected in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Likewise, before the U.S. gained independence, different parts of the U.S. had distinct relationships to the U.K., as did the various colonial possessions of the U.K. (e.g. India, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Kenya, Tanzania, Hong Kong). The U.K. is an exemplary example of the philosophy that consistency is the hobgoblin of small minds. To pluck out just one more random example of the English tendency, "Scotland Yard", the national police force headquarters in the City of Westminster within the City of Greater London in England, has jurisdiction over England and Wales, but not over Scotland. Legal Distinctions Between England And Wales To provide a few other examples in addition to the example of language related laws noted by @WeatherVane (noted on my recent visit to England and Wales) and to embellish on that point a little further, the Welsh language is resurgent in Wales where it is a mandatory subject in public schools (often in the North with Welsh as the primary language of instruction) with about 30% of the population (more than 800,000 people) who either speak it as a first language (which is common among the very old and among young people in Northern Wales) by people who are mostly bilingual with English (but may reach for an English word or two now and then) or as a fluent second language. The Anglican Church is the established church in England, but not in Wales where it was disestablished in 1916. The legal implications of this are subtle, but not non-existent. Government agencies are not required to hoist the British flag with primacy over the Welsh flag, and indeed, the British flag is rarely seen there. Primary and secondary education are administered separately in England and Wales with attendant laws on issues like truancy, dress codes, financial arrangements, testing, and certain holidays. This distinction primarily exists to facilitate Welsh language instruction, which is the primary language of instruction in some schools, and a secondary language in others. More generally, the manner in which many government services (e.g. public housing) is administered, and in which tax dollars are expended is not precisely the same between England and Wales. Certain laws regulating immigrants (related to immigrant financial security and leases to immigrants, more or less) differ between England and Wales, although this is a temporary matter and the long term plan is for these laws to be integrated across the United Kingdom. The Welsh Senedd (a.k.a. National Assembly for Wales, i.e. the regional parliament) has some independent legislative power, although honestly, the scope of its legislation is typically closer to what you might see in a U.S. home rule city or a school board, than in a U.S. state government. In particular: The 20 areas of responsibility devolved to the National Assembly for Wales (and within which Welsh ministers exercise executive functions) are: Agriculture, fisheries, forestry and rural development Ancient monuments and historical buildings Culture Economic development Education and training Environment Fire and rescue services and promotion of fire safety Food Health and social services Highways and transport Housing Local government National Assembly for Wales Public administration Social welfare Sport and recreation Tourism Town and country planning Water and flood defences Welsh language I suspect, but do not know, that land use regulation and occupational and business licensing in Wales is less favorable to big businesses and franchises, based upon the fact that such businesses are far more common in England than in Wales, even controlling for places that are similar in population density. But this could be due to historic or economic factors. |
If Van Gogh is in Public Domain, why there are restrictions in the Van Gogh museum? I've been to the Van Gogh museum in Amsterdam, and I was a little disappointed because there were no pictures of some of his most famous work - "The Starry Night" and "Starry Night Over the Rhône". Well, it is well known that Van Gogh artwork is in public domain, according to this question. And I also know that these artworks are in the MoMA (New York City) and in the Musée D'Orsay (Paris). But why can't the museum use a replica? Or sell derived artwork in the museum shop? Or in the art books sold there? Or even tell us about these paintings during the history and life of Van Gogh presented in the museum? It was like these paintings never existed! | There isn’t a legal restriction Which is to say they could show replica’s if they wanted to; they just don’t want to. This is fairly typical - art museums display art, not reproductions of art. They also tend to be interested in displaying the art they have, not telling the life story of the artist. | This appears to mean that the author, while retaining copyright, is allowing anyone to make copies without asking permission from the author. This would seem to be similar to a CC-BY license, or perhaps more exactly a CC-BY-ND license, as the author has apparently not granted the right to create modified versions or other derivative works. This does not require one who makes such copies to distribute them free of charge, unless there is another provision not mentioned in the question. Amazon, or anyone else, would be free to sell copies at any price they cared to ask. If the author wanted to limit the sales price, that would take another provision, and might not be enforceable. | Under US law, and I believe under the laws of most countries, each of the various photographs of the apple would be protected by copyright. Thew initial owner would be the photographer, or perhaps the photographer's employer, in each case. Copyright protects expression, including both words and image. It does not protect ideas. The idea of an apple is not protected. The specific representation of a particular apple would be. If the painter imitates the specific feature of the apple shown in the photographs, to the extent that the painting is a derivative work of one or more of the photos, then the painter needs the permission of the copyright holder(s). Without that permission, creating the painting is infringement of copyright. However, if the painter merely took the general idea of an apple, and created a new expression of that idea, without using any of the specifics of the photos, there there would be no infringement. If the photos were instead images of an imaginary thing, perhaps a dragon, or some invented machine of building perhaps, with the images created by perhaps a compute animation program, or by photographing a model, the legal rules would be the same. If the painter simply used the idea from the photos, there is no infringement. If the painter used sufficient specific detail so that the painting is a derivative work, then permission is required. Exactly how much detail must be used for a work to be considered "derivative" is a matter of judgement -- ultimately the judgement of a court if the matter is disputed. There is no clear bright line making that distinction. That C has commissioned the painter T to create the painting is not relevant, unless C is the copyright owner of the photos, or has secured permission from the copyright owner(s). If C validly grants permission, then there is no copyright issue even if the painting is a derivative work. It does not matter what technique or technical means T uses to create the painting. T may use a brush, a pallet knife, a toy car, drips of paint, or a compute drafting program. If, by whatever means, T creates a derivative work, then permission is needed or else it is an act of infringement merely to create the work. If the work is not derivative, then no permission is needed. Copyright law applies no matter what specific technique the creator of an image uses, provided that human creativity is involved. | One big hole in any scheme that relies on copyright is that it could not preclude people talking about the previous content or talking about you. This is well established First Amendment law. For example, see Near v. Minnesota 283 U.S. 697 (1931), which holds that except in rare judicially established exceptions (relating to military information, obscenity, and inciting acts of violence), government censorship is unconstitutional. Thus, no statutory scheme could be used to prevent third parties who happened to have seen the material while it was freely available from re-iterating what they had seen, or talking about it, or talking about the author (you). People could even reproduce portions of the published content. Some types of reproduction would be protected as fair use in the US, especially if the reproduction is for the purpose of criticism. (17 USC 107, and this previous Law.SE answer) The closest approach would be to protect your work as trade secret, making sure that anyone that you share it with agrees to non-disclosure. But, if you "publish unique content under this pseudonym" there is no way to "arbitrarily or wholly revoke discussion about that content". If the cat gets out of the bag, while you may have remedies against the person who violated the non-disclosure agreement, you would not be able to prevent third-party discussion or reproduction. | The mall is a privately owned public space At least while it’s open to the public. A photograph of architecture taken from within it would not violate copyright. However, photographs of other things (like art) do not have the public space exemption. Additionally, the owner can limit or restrict photography. This has nothing to do with copyright, just that an owner has the right to control what happens on their property (within legal limits). | 20th Century Fox have a trademark on "Simpsons." They have trademarks on "Bart Simpson", on "D'oh", on "Duff Beer". I would assume that they take their trademarks seriously. What you can't do is to use someone else's trademark to make people believe your commercial product is related to theirs. It's quite reasonable to assume that someone seeing your book in a store would think it is written by the makers of The Simpsons show and therefore buy it. Even if you say that isn't your intention, it is what would happen. I'd try coming up with some different titles, maybe "How to write animated TV shows" with "Example: The Simpsons" (well, you are the writer so you should come up with something better), and take them to a lawyer. And then contact the makers of the show (again asking the lawyer for advice how to do this) because even if your lawyer says the title is fine, that doesn't mean you can't be sued. | Yes The US constitution is in the public domain. Anyone may publish a version of it, including an altered version. No US law forbidding publication of an altered version would itself be constitutional -- the First Amendment would prevent such a law. However, if an altered version were sold under such conditions that a customer might reasonably believe it to be an unaltered version, that might be false advertising, or perhaps fraud, because the seller would be deceiving the customer as to what the product is. | I gather that the numerous ramifications you outline are merely contexts and that your main concern is about the application of contract law (contract law in the U.S. does not really vary among states). Thus, I will not really delve in the intricacies of --for instance-- privacy or copyright issues arising from the commercial use of a person's likeness that you mention in one of the scenarios. As a starting point, one needs to bear in mind that: a contract is an exchange of considerations under terms and conditions entered knowingly and willfully by the parties, which can be evidenced by the parties' subsequent conduct (that is, not just by signing a document); and a contract is unenforceable if it contravenes public policy and/or the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Accordingly, the questions are (1) whether a person knew or reasonably should have known about the terms & conditions at or by the time of those events which trigger obligations pursuant to the contract; and (2) whether the provisions therein are unreasonable, illegal, or tantamount to a penalty, especially in the event that the party breaches or repudiates the alleged contract (see the Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 356(2)). The scenario of house for sale entails various difficulties as per contract law and otherwise. Here are some of those issues: Are visitors properly (including "beforehand") notified about the "walkway clause"? If not, the contract is void because it cannot be said that visitors knew about & accepted that condition. Does the house provide alternatives for lawful & informed visitors to safely avoid the walkway? If not, then the seller/owner might end up incurring premises liability with respect to those visitors who get injured in making their reasonable effort not to trigger the "walkway clause". Is the house owner realistically able to prove that use of the walkway by lawful & informed visitors is sufficiently "inconsistent with the offeror's ownership of offered property" so that triggering a house sale is a reasonable consequence (see Restatement at §69(2))? Is the owner-imposed mortgage rate compliant with state law pertaining to granting of credit & loans? These exemplify only some of the burdensome complications when trying to enforce "contracts" which are extravagant or quite one-sided. Lastly, as a side note, the presumption that a person reading the poster and walking in the intended area does not thereby receive consideration is not necessarily accurate. As an example, the "intended area" could have been devised by an entity in the business of enjoyment and recreation, such as a private park. The person who deliberately walks in (regardless of whether he read the poster) certainly receives a consideration, which is the amusement or recreation for which the park was designed. |
How is it legal for the US miltary to decide to help a film maker based on the script? According to this article on TV Tropes and this article in The Guardian, the US military will provide facilities to film makers, as well as advice to help them get the details right. However this is on condition that the film portrays the military in a positive light. There's a catch — a Department of Defense project officer will keep an eagle eye on the script and production phases. If they don't like the portrayal of the military in your film, they will yank the co-operation. This was a major reason for the failure of the TV series Supercarrier. Other movies DoD rejected include Forrest Gump (because the army protagonist was stupid), Mars Attacks! (because everyone was stupid), and Independence Day. However the First Amendment prohibits the government from making such decisions based on the content of the speech. The first amendment reads: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. According to this article on Viewpoint Discrimination: Viewpoint discrimination is a form of content discrimination particularly disfavored by the courts. When the government engages in content discrimination, it is restricting speech on a given subject matter. When it engages in viewpoint discrimination, it is singling out a particular opinion or perspective on that subject matter for treatment unlike that given to other viewpoints. Later on the article cites a particular case: In Rosenberger, the Court held that a student religious journal at the University of Virginia was entitled to the same subsidy from student activity funds received by secular student journals. The Court concluded that the university’s policy of withholding the subsidy from student religious journals was a form of viewpoint discrimination: "[T]he University does not exclude religion as a subject matter but selects for disfavored treatment those student journalistic efforts with religious editorial viewpoints..." The DOD behaviour would seem precisely parallel to that of the University of Virginia in Rosenberger, in that it does not exclude criticism of the military as a subject matter but selects for disfavored treatment those films with critical viewpoints. How is the selection of movies for support by the DOD not a form of viewpoint discrimination? Edit: Government Speech Doctrine A couple of responses have raised the government speech doctrine. This allows the government to make statements that are not content-neutral, and to pay others to do the same. The doctrine was first defined in a case where government subsidies for medical clinics included a condition that the clinics not provide advice about abortion. The Supreme Court held that since the government was paying for the doctors to give advice it could require them to say or not say anything it wanted. However this would seem to be in clear contradiction with the Rosenberger case mentioned above, where the government (through the University of Virginia) was prohibited from putting a viewpoint condition on its subsidies to student journals. In Matal vs Tam the Supreme Court followed a three-part test to determine if a particular instance of speech is by the government or not: Does the medium have a history of use to convey messages by the government? In the case of popular films where the government is not clearly identified as the maker this would seem to be false. The customary "the producers would like to thank..." at the end of the credits is insufficient to override this. Does the government maintain direct control over the messages conveyed? This is a grey area; the Guardian article above seems to show the DOD having veto power over aspects of the scripts, but paradoxically the fact that the film makers could always choose to walk away and make the film without government help seems to suggest that this control is only indirect. "Direct control" would mean the DOD themselves writing a script and then hiring film makers and actors to produce it. Does the public closely identify the message with the government? Again this would seem to be false. People go to a film to see a good story, not to listen to government propaganda, and the films in question do not advertise themselves as presenting the government point of view. So the claim that a film which receives DOD assistance is thereby deemed to have been made by the government does not seem to stack up. At the very least it would be a significant expansion of the government speech doctrine. | This question is addressed in "Viewpoint Discrimination in the Military's Filmmaker Assistance Program and the First Amendment", Communication Law and Policy 19:3 (paywall). Support of media is enabled under a DoD policy "Assistance to Non-Government, Entertainment-Oriented Picture, Television, and Video Productions" (version available in the wild here), which states that [W]hen cooperation of the producers with the Government results in benefitting the Department of Defense or when this would be in the best national interest, based on consideration of the following factors: 3.1.1 The production must be authentic in its portrayal of actual persons, places, military operations, and historical events. Fictional portrayals must depict a feasible interpretation of military life, operations, and policies. 3.1.2. The production is of informational value and considered to be in the best interest of public understanding of the U.S. Armed Forces and the Department of Defense. 3.1.3. The production may provide services to the general public relating to, or enhancing, the U.S. Armed Forces recruiting and retention programs. 3.1.4. The production should not appear to condone or endorse activities by private citizens or organizations when such activities are contrary to U.S. Government policy It should be noted that the policy has not been challenged in court. As the author observes, "[t]he military has a legitimate need to engage in advertising and public relations, as it needs to promote a positive image to attract and retain personnel for an all-volunteer military service, as well as for other purposes". The author observes that the Supreme Court has noted that "'judicial deference… is at its apogee' when Congress legislates under its authority to raise and support armies," which is granted to Congress in the Constitution. that is, one should expect deference to the military by the courts. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, which held that The First Amendment does not prohibit the challenged regulation from being applied to petitioner, even though its effect is to restrict the wearing of the headgear required by his religious beliefs. That Amendment does not require the military to accommodate such practices as wearing a yarmulke in the face of its view that they would detract from the uniformity sought by dress regulations. A general law prohibiting wearing of a yarmulke in public would be tossed out on 1st Amendment grounds in a heartbeat: but the military enjoys not well defined latitude to restrict expression. For example, exclusions of protests on military bases has been upheld (US v. Apel, which kicked the the First Amendment can down the road). One possibilitiy is that the court may engage in forum analysis (Cornelius v. NAACP Leg. Def. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, see also Arkansas Ed. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666) as a means of determining when the Government's interest in limiting the use of its property to its intended purpose outweighs the interest of those wishing to use the property for other purposes Public streets would be a public forum: the nature of military facilities is the threshold question. If a limited or nonpublic forum is involved, a restriction on speech may be valid if it is reasonable and viewpoint neutral (Christian Legal Soc. Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings College of Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661). Military bases fall in the nonpublic forum category. This is one prong of reasoning possible (which the author does not endorse), that in a nonpublic forum it is reasonable to consider the purpose of the underlying program. The author observes that "[u]nder an unconstitutional conditions analysis, a court would need to find that the restriction on speech at issue -- not presenting the military in a negative light -- only applies within the confines of the program itself. Along with that, the program must allow producers to engage in such speech outside of the program. That is the case here, as producers are free to make productions that are critical of the military, or that portray it in a negative light, just without the full support provided to producers who portray the military more positively". The court in Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 found that When Congress established a National Endowment for Democracy to encourage other countries to adopt democratic principles...it was not constitutionally required to fund a program to encourage competing lines of political philosophy such as Communism and Fascism. ... when the government appropriates public funds to establish a program, it is entitled to define the limits of that program. Under the assistance program, the military does not place "a condition on the recipient of the subsidy rather than on a particular program or service, thus effectively prohibiting the recipient from engaging in the protected conduct outside the scope of the federally funded program" (Rust at 197). Producers can be critical of the military in their productions, but have no constitutional right to do so while being assisted by the government. The final answer is far from obvious: perhaps someone will sue and we can get a definitive answer. | There's no question about what was done or who did it, but there appears to be a jurisdictional mess: the host country won't prosecute because everyone involved, on both the victim and perpetrator sides, is a US citizen and it took place on a US military base, and the military can't prosecute because the perpetrator is a civilian who is not subject to the UCMJ. The host country probably has jurisdiction because a military base, unlike an embassy, is not generally immune from domestic criminal law jurisdiction, although the host country is within its rights to decline to exercise that authority and the status of forces treaty with that country would control. The belief that the military cannot prosecute the perpetrator under the Uniform Code of Military Justice because the perpetrator is a civilian who is not subject to the UCMJ is mistaken, and the easiest way to address the issue may be to point this out to the responsible JAG officers and commanding officers with jurisdiction over the case. Generally speaking, as set forth more fully below, the UCMJ does apply to civilians on military bases. See 10 USC 802(a)(11) and 10 USC 802(a)(12). There is also probably U.S. civilian criminal law that is applicable to civilians on a military base much like other federal territories. Historically, these offenses could be presided over in ambassadorial courts of the U.S. ambassador to the country in question, but the current practice is for such prosecutions to be made by the Justice Department before a U.S. District Court judge (I believe from the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, although I may be mistaken on that point). Who Is Subject To The UCMJ? Section 802 of Title 10, set forth in the block quote below expressly states who is subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Mostly, the UCMJ applies to members of the U.S. military, broadly defined, with some of the potentially close cases described with specificity. A lot of the detail in this definition goes to the issue of when non-active duty military personnel (1) are subject to the UCMJ, (2) are subject to state versions of the UMCJ in lieu of the UCMJ, or (3) are not subject to the UCMJ at all. The UCMJ also applies to some civilians and people who belong to other military forces, most of which involve (1) people who are civilian employees of the military or civilian military contractors, (2) civilians and members of foreign militaries who are traveling with the military or present on military bases, and (3) prisoners of war broadly defined. These exception cases are emphasized in bold in the blockquote setting forth 10 USC § 802 below. (a) The following persons are subject to this chapter: (1) Members of a regular component of the armed forces, including those awaiting discharge after expiration of their terms of enlistment; volunteers from the time of their muster or acceptance into the armed forces; inductees from the time of their actual induction into the armed forces; and other persons lawfully called or ordered into, or to duty in or for training in, the armed forces, from the dates when they are required by the terms of the call or order to obey it. (2) Cadets, aviation cadets, and midshipmen. (3) Members of a reserve component while on inactive-duty training, but in the case of members of the Army National Guard of the United States or the Air National Guard of the United States only when in Federal service. (4) Retired members of a regular component of the armed forces who are entitled to pay. (5) Retired members of a reserve component who are receiving hospitalization from an armed force. (6) Members of the Fleet Reserve and Fleet Marine Corps Reserve. (7) Persons in custody of the armed forces serving a sentence imposed by a court-martial. (8) Members of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Public Health Service, and other organizations, when assigned to and serving with the armed forces. (9) Prisoners of war in custody of the armed forces. (10) In time of declared war or a contingency operation, persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field. (11) Subject to any treaty or agreement to which the United States is or may be a party or to any accepted rule of international law, persons serving with, employed by, or accompanying the armed forces outside the United States and outside the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands. (12) Subject to any treaty or agreement to which the United States is or may be a party or to any accepted rule of international law, persons within an area leased by or otherwise reserved or acquired for the use of the United States which is under the control of the Secretary concerned and which is outside the United States and outside the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands. (13) Individuals belonging to one of the eight categories enumerated in Article 4 of the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3316), who violate the law of war. (b) The voluntary enlistment of any person who has the capacity to understand the significance of enlisting in the armed forces shall be valid for purposes of jurisdiction under subsection (a) and a change of status from civilian to member of the armed forces shall be effective upon the taking of the oath of enlistment. (c) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a person serving with an armed force who— (1) submitted voluntarily to military authority; (2) met the mental competency and minimum age qualifications of sections 504 and 505 of this title at the time of voluntary submission to military authority; (3) received military pay or allowances; and (4) performed military duties; is subject to this chapter until such person’s active service has been terminated in accordance with law or regulations promulgated by the Secretary concerned. (d)(1) A member of a reserve component who is not on active duty and who is made the subject of proceedings under section 815 (article 15) or section 830 (article 30) with respect to an offense against this chapter may be ordered to active duty involuntarily for the purpose of— (A) a preliminary hearing under section 832 of this title (article 32); (B) trial by court-martial; or (C) nonjudicial punishment under section 815 of this title (article 15). (2) A member of a reserve component may not be ordered to active duty under paragraph (1) except with respect to an offense committed while the member was— (A) on active duty; or (B) on inactive-duty training, but in the case of members of the Army National Guard of the United States or the Air National Guard of the United States only when in Federal service. (3) Authority to order a member to active duty under paragraph (1) shall be exercised under regulations prescribed by the President. (4) A member may be ordered to active duty under paragraph (1) only by a person empowered to convene general courts-martial in a regular component of the armed forces. (5) A member ordered to active duty under paragraph (1), unless the order to active duty was approved by the Secretary concerned, may not— (A) be sentenced to confinement; or (B) be required to serve a punishment consisting of any restriction on liberty during a period other than a period of inactive-duty training or active duty (other than active duty ordered under paragraph (1)). (e) The provisions of this section are subject to section 876b(d)(2) of this title (article 76b(d)(2)) | From Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). The sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes, or, indeed, is merely capable of substantial noninfringing uses. [...] there is a significant likelihood that substantial numbers of copyright holders who license their works for broadcast on free television would not object to having their broadcast time-shifted by private viewers (i.e., recorded at a time when the VTR owner cannot view the broadcast so that it can be watched at a later time); and (2) that there is no likelihood that time-shifting would cause nonminimal harm to the potential market for, or the value of, respondents' copyrighted works. The VTR's are therefore capable of substantial noninfringing uses. Private, noncommercial time-shifting in the home satisfies this standard of noninfringing uses both because respondents have no right to prevent other copyright holders from authorizing such time-shifting for their programs and because the District Court's findings reveal that even the unauthorized home time-shifting of respondents' programs is legitimate fair use. [...] we must conclude that this record amply supports the District Court's conclusion that home time-shifting is fair use. This is distinguishable from downloading movies because in the case of videotape or PVR recording, the copyright owner authorized the broadcast, and private, non-commercial time-shifting at home has been held to be fair use. When downloading a movie, the copyright owner did not authorize the communication, and copying movies by downloading them from an unauthorized source is not generally considered fair use. One policy reason why this difference might make sense is that when time-shifting, you are usually paying for the channels, and they are in turn paying the copyright owner for the permission to transmit their work. However, this is only a guess, and not really relevant to your legal question. | Let's look at the Ur-example of a free-speech law, and the most wide-ranging, the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America. It says (my emphasis): Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. This limitation applies only to the government. Indeed, it has been argued that this limitation only applies to the legislative branch of government and not to the executive (except when exercising legislatively delegated power) or judicial branches. Certainly, the courts have held that it is within their power to issue "gag" restraining orders. Notwithstanding, it imposes no restrictions on how non-government actors can limit your free speech. The owner of a shopping centre can require you not to evangelise, the owner of a stadium can require you not to use offensive language and the owner of a social media platform can restrict your speech in any way they wish. You have a right to talk - they have a right not to give you a platform. | At least in the United States (and I'm pretty sure this is true around the world), facts and information cannot be copyrighted. Just because a work is copyrighted, doesn't mean every part of that work is copyrighted, and factual information conveyed by the work is a part which is not subject to copyright. Copyright on a collection of facts is limited to the selection and arrangement of those facts, and only if that selection and arrangement has some bare minimum amount of originality. See Feist v. Rural, 499 U.S. 340. In this case, it looks at first glance like the person who made that site made their own selection of which materials and which sources would be included; the one place where they really seem to have copied their selection is from glass catalogs with datasheets from specific manufacturers, who would have a hard time arguing that "everything we manufacture in this widely-recognized class of substances" is an original selection. What the author of the website has done is relinquish his rights in his selection and arrangement of the data. In some places, there are other rights besides copyright that do apply to databases; for instance, the EU recognizes database rights to protect significant investment in compiling a database of stuff. But the US does not have that concept. For citing stuff, that's not really a legal question, and has more to do with academic standards. Ask your adviser or teacher if you have one. | It is a vanishingly small possibility. First, someone would need to bring a case that an appropriation for the Air Force was unconstitutional. A Federal court is unlikely to find that it is because: The constitution would be interpreted broadly where the thing being considered did not exist when it was ratified. That is, the court would consider if, had the Air Force existed the drafters of the constitution would have wanted it governed by the Federal government or the State governments. Almost certainly they would decide on the Federal government. The Air Force is a direct descendent of the Army - originally being the United States Army Air Force. As such, an alternative line of reasoning for the court is that the army contemplated by the constitution consists of both the Army and the Air Force - the fact that they have been split is not relevant. | No The term "sword and shield" is allegorical rather than legal and may be called up in any number of contexts. Such as ... Waiver of privilege In the particular instance, Anthem was claiming that the reports were privileged and hence protected from discovery, presumably because they were prepared in contemplation of litigation - this litigation, one supposes. However, privilege is lost or waived if the privileged information is disclosed, as it was by relying on the conclusion of the report in its defense. As such, the entire suite of reports is no longer protected. Basically, if you want to keep privilege you have to keep what is privileged secret. Note, the could have lost privilege if they had disclosed the findings of the report in any way such as by press release or by simply leaving the document in a public place. In this context, the judge is stating that they cannot use the "shield" of privilege to protect a report that they have used as a "sword" to make a attack their opponent. | LegalZoom did not get it wrong. The case Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission was under Colorado law (hence it was against the Colorado Civil Rights Commission), not federal law. LZ stated that 20 states have enacted laws against discrimination based on sexual orientation, and Colorado is one of those states. The issue was heard by SCOTUS because the plaintiff raised claims under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, hence he could make a federal case of it. A prior case (Azucar Bakery) cited by LZ was about refusing to make a cake with anti-gay slogans, and was decided by the commission. Here is a brief filed by that plaintiff in that and two related cases, arguing a pattern of religious discrmination. LZ got it mildly wrong in saying "the court ruled that this was not discrimination because...", because the case did not go to court, it ended at the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. The second case appears to refer to Charge No. CP2018011310 a complaint filed against Masterpiece, where the same commission found probable cause for an anti-discrimination proceeding. In that proceeding, the Colorado Civil Rights Division finds that complainant Scardina "adequately shows that the Respondent's reason is pretext". This led to a complaint against the commission in US District Court (Civil Action No. 18-cv-02074-WYD-STV). There was a motion to dismiss which had partial success, but which was not about the substance of the case (it had to do with immunity, standing, abstention doctrines). The case was later dismissed, because the parties settled. So at no point did a court rule on the substance of the "pretext" issue – on this point, I think LZ overstated the significance of the commission's decision. |
Can non-US citizens own equity in US companies? Can a non-US citizen who has never been to the US own equity in a company that is only incorporated in the US? | Yes, non-US citizens can own equity in US companies. To be specific: You do not have to be a citizen or resident of the US to own securities in a company incorporated in the US. | Short Answer No. An AI cannot own a company. Artificial intelligences are not legal persons. The law recognizes human beings and legally recognized entities as persons. It does not recognize AIs or for that matter non-human species as persons except in a handful of jurisdictions that recognize, for example, some select rivers as legal persons (e.g. New Zealand). Approximate Alternatives Something close would be possible, however. It is possible to establish a non-profit corporation without owners, or to establish a non-profit entity that is not a corporation (often called a "foundation") that has no owners. These entities are required to have humans who serve on a board of directors. But, the nonprofit entity or foundation could have bylaws that delegate decision making responsibility on all or many matters to an AI, in much the way that decision making responsibility of all or many matters might be delegated to the CEO of a nonprofit corporation. While the AI can't own anything and indeed, to the contrary, would be owned by the entity, the AI's actions could cause the entity to earn income, to acquire and dispose of property, and to participate in lawsuits. And, while most non-profit entities and foundations are designed to have charitable purposes in order to garner tax benefits, there are many kinds of non-profits that exist for non-charitable purposes (e.g. country clubs, stock exchanges, HOAs and political organizations). If an AI was vested with management of most key parts of an entity's operations, that entity had no owners, and its board of directors was relatively docile, this would come reasonably close, in practice, to what an AI owned entity would look like. How The Law Could Be Changed Indeed, one plausible form of organization for the AI would be as a political organization which could be devoted to the purpose of reforming the law to give AIs personhood status. If one U.S. state did so, for example, this would allow all AIs to use that state's law to form entities owned by them, that could operate in any U.S. state, since geographic constraints do not really apply to AIs. And, it doesn't take that much money to lobby a single state to adopt a law if there is no obvious constituency to oppose the adoption of the law. Analogous Historical Precedents There are deep historical precedents for allowing people who were not legally allowed to own property to manage businesses. In the Roman Empire, the practice of having a slave operate a business or venture or transaction as an agent of the slave's owner was well recognized. This was also true, to a much narrower extent and much less frequently, under American chattel slavery. In the medieval and early modern era in Europe and in the post-colonial regimes in the Americas, it was not uncommon in jurisdictions that did nt otherwise recognize the right of a married woman to own property or to be recognized as a legal person in a court to be allowed to manage her husband's affairs on his behalf in his absence as his delegate agent to do so (often for long periods of time, for example, when the husband was away at war, and for entire fiefdoms for which the aristocratic husband was the lord). European law also recognized the concept that when a royal or noble title was inherited by an oldest son due to the death of his father, when the son was just a child, that the mother could serve a regent for the son and manage the affairs of the jurisdiction associated with the son's title, even though the mother was not legally permitted to hold that title in her own right. | A non-E.U. person may own real property in Germany and may rent it. Earning rental income from an isolated piece of investment property is not considered being "gainfully employed" for purposes of a tourist visa. This is basically because the tourist visa and your presence in Germany are not what is facilitating your German rental property income. From an immigration perspective, earning rental income from rental property that you own in Germany is only modestly different from owning a few hundred thousand Euros worth of VW or BMW stock and earning income from that. One could imagine a situation where your need to actively manage a large portfolio of rental properties in Germany on an hands on basis physically in Germany, if you did this, rather than hiring an E.U. based property management firm to take care of this for you, this might violate your visa. But, if it did, in all likelihood, once you had that large of a real estate portfolio in Germany, it would be possible to arrange some sort of investor or employment based visa beyond your simple tourist visa to make it possible for you to do so. | They cannot force a contract on you after the fact. You should leave these numbskulls alone, they are clearly up to something that makes them likely to be sued. I am adding the following: it's not illegal as far as I know to declare anything you want to a person as long as it isn't a threat. "You are now beholden to give me your firstborn makle child." lol, no. | My understanding is that the "flow-through" treatment is specifically a tax law concept. The LLC has its own income, which it can use to pay expenses or acquire assets or for whatever other purpose, and such assets become the property of the LLC. It's just that when it comes time to pay taxes, the LLC's net income is taxed as income to the owner. But that does not mean that the LLC's income is treated the same as the owner's income in all other legal contexts. | There are certain requirements of Statehood according to the Montevideo Convention on Statehood of 1933, which is just a codification of international customary law: a permanent population; a defined territory; government; and capacity to enter into relations with the other states. Is it "legal" to buy a piece of land and claim it to be another country than before(either inventing a new one or migrating it to an already existing one)? According to international law, it is. Sure. But just because you say something is the case, doesn't mean it is. Always. Sometimes it is. But for present purposes, let's say that if you found an uninhabited island and said that you were a country, that wouldn't be the case - nor if you bought it from a man living on it. If you found some land that belonged to another country and decided to claim it as that of an existing country, then it would depend on the specific circumstances. That's exactly what happened to the Krim island in the Ukraine(now Russia maybe?), right? I don't think so. As far as I know, the annexation of territory isn't considered sale. In any case, the ownership of this land is still under dispute. So, if it's possible without the influence of these international institutions, trying this in an area with their influence would be easier, right? If trying this means declaring some land you have purchased to be a new sovereign state Nope. You probably still don't meet the requirements for statehood. If trying this means the acquisition of some land by an existing sovereign state Maybe. Probably not. The Montevideo Convention requires that statehood not be gained through force; while member states' interests may be greater where they are more invested, the requirements for acquisition of territory are the same no matter where you are. What would prevent me from creating my own nation? Money, defensibility, recognition, the fact that you probably don't own any land that you "buy" (depending on the jurisdiction and real estate system), the fact that you generally can't unilaterally declare yourself a sovereign state. | [C]an this decision really be used as legal precedent for birthright citizenship for tourists and illegal immigrants? Yes. If the case did not depend on the fact that they were lawfully resident in the US, then it would apply to those who are not lawfully present in the US. For the case to apply to some people but not others, there must be a distinguishing difference that is relevant to the analysis of the case. The question then is whether lawful residence is a distinguishing difference here, and it seems that no court has ruled on the question. Referring to current events, it would be possible for the executive branch to assert that the 14th amendment does not grant citizenship to one born in the US of parents who were not lawfully present. This would end up in court. For example, such a person could sue to compel the government to issue a passport, or, if the government sought to deport such a person, the person could assert US citizenship in deportation proceedings. At that point, the court would have to rule on the question, whereupon it would almost certainly rule that the 14th amendment does grant such citizenship. See, for example, Plyler v. Doe, in which the court ruled that illegal immigrants in a state are within its jurisdiction for the purpose of the equal protection clause. It would be odd indeed for the court to rule that the same word means something different in the previous sentence. Furthermore, in a footnote, the court writes [W]e have had occasion to examine the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States. . . ." ... [N]o plausible distinction with respect to Fourteenth Amendment "jurisdiction" can be drawn between resident aliens whose entry into the United States was lawful, and resident aliens whose entry was unlawful. You ask: [H]ow is it that foreign diplomats' children born in United States do not have birthright to US citizenship because they are not "subject to the jurisdiction thereof" and children of tourists and illegal immigrants do have the birthright to US citizenship? Consider what happens when an illegal immigrant commits a crime in the territory of a US state: the person is subject to trial and punishment in the state's criminal justice system. A foreign diplomat who commits a crime, on the other hand, or indeed the child or other family member of a foreign diplomat, is immune from prosecution. That is what distinguishes diplomats from illegal aliens such that the first sentence of the 14th amendment applies to the latter, but not the former. | I would imagine they are yours and were always yours. You bought them. You intended to either give them to the company as a gift, sell them to the company or sign them over to the company as part of your initial capital contribution. Without a company none of those can happen. |
Indictment of a sitting vice-president There's been a lot of discussion in the media lately about the question of whether a sitting president can be indicted. The Constitution says that in order to be vice-president one must have the same qualifications that the Constitution requires of the president (being at least 35 years old, being a "natural-born citizen", etc.). How much do the questions of indictment of the president and indictment of the vice-president have in common? Am I right in thinking that in 1973 the vice-president actually was indicted (for having taken bribes when he was governor of Maryland)? | Vice President Aaron Burr was indicted in his last year as Vice President in both New Jersey and New York. The crime was killing Alexander Hamilton in an (illegal) duel. His solution? Simply don't go to those states. Eventually the charges were dropped on technical reasons. But it was nevertheless clear that no one considered it a particular problem for a sitting Vice President to be indicted in multiple states at a time, or even just one. This bit of history is even mentioned in the revised DOJ opinion referred to in Putvi's answer. Ultimately that opinion decides that the comparison between a Vice President and President is apples-to-oranges nonsense—their relative levels of power, importance, and constitutional stature are radically different—, and no substantive inferences could be made from a VP's indictability to the President's. Of course, this DOJ opinion is just the opinion of DOJ lawyers. It is not a court opinion, nor otherwise binding. It does strike me as well-written and logically strong, but it is wholly untested in a court of law (SCOTUS or otherwise). It is simply their advice on what the best course of action the DOJ can take is, given their particular function and powers within the US government and overall constitution. The main conclusion being that those functions and powers are inadequate for the DOJ to decide if it is constitutionally sound to indict a sitting President (that's a job for the judiciary), and so simply advises that they avoid that powder keg and never do so. The opinions actually do specifically hold that it might be constitutional in the right situations; they simply conclude they cannot and should not be the ones deciding if a particular case qualifies or not. For a more definitive answer, you may have to wait for various court cases against President Trump and his administration to make their way through the system. In several of them the President's/White House's lawyers have argued for absolute immunity on all criminal matters, state or federal. The judges have, to date, seemed disinclined to agree; many seem straight-up shocked that this is being seriously proposed to them. But those cases are still in progress, so we can at best make random guesses at what the actual opinions will be, and it is even harder to know what will happen on the almost-certain appeals up to the Supreme Court. | We cannot stipulate that a 6 year old does not understand the concepts of life / death / murder / assault, but that stipulation might be baked into the laws of the jurisdiction. In Washington, a child under age 8 is statutorily incapable of committing a crime. Between 8 and 12, there is a statutory presumption that a child is incapable of committing a crime, but that is rebuttable. The statute says "Children under the age of eight years are incapable of committing crime", and it say nothing about understanding concepts. Florida law used to allow that a 6 year old can commit a crime, then when they arrested a 6 year old, they changed the law. But, the law says A child younger than 7 years of age may not be taken into custody, arrested, charged, or adjudicated delinquent for a delinquent act or violation of law based on an act occurring before he or she reaches 7 years of age, unless the violation of law is a forcible felony as defined in s. 776.08 so a 6 year old can be arrested (charged, tried, convicted) for murder. Virginia does not appear to have any statute declaring 6 year olds to be categorially incapable of committing a crime. The question of capacity is of course a real consideration – insanity remains a defense against criminal charges. | The newly elected Congress does all of the work in electing a new President. Under the 20th Amendment, the newly elected Congress takes office on January 3. Then three days later, on January 6, 3 USC § 15: Counting electoral votes in Congress, requires the new Congress to meet in Joint Session to count the electoral votes. If this session does not produce a President or Vice President, there is what is called a contingent election. In a contingent election the House begins immediately to choose a President from among the top three electoral college vote getters, while the Senate chooses a Vice President from among the top two electoral college vote getters. Both Houses use majority rule. The House votes by state, so a majority is 26, while the Senators vote individually, so a majority is 51. If the House does not pick a President by Inauguration Day, January 20th, the Vice President serves until a President is picked. If neither a President nor a VP has been picked by the 20th, the Presidential Succession Act applies, and the Speaker of the House, President pro tempore or a cabinet officer serves as Acting President. It wasn't always done this way: The 20th Amendment was passed in 1933 to take control over elections away from the lame duck Congress. Before the 20th A was adopted, the terms for P, VP and Congress all ended on Inauguration day, March 4. That meant the lame duck Congress had to deal with electoral matters. By giving Congress and the P/VP different expiration dates, the Amendment meant new Congress could deal with the election. Setting the election counting date after the new Congress was seated (on January 6), meant only the new Congress could. | The witness can go outside and ask questions of the witness’ lawyers So if, for example, Mr Trump chooses to testify to the grand jury he goes in alone - no lawyers. If he wants to consult his lawyers he needs to ask to do, leave the room and consult them. If I were Mr Trump’s lawyer I would be worried that he wouldn’t know when he should do that. | There is a factually similar impeachment case. But there might be a court case fitting these facts as well. No such case is annotated by West under 14th Amendment, Section 3 either with the note or on its list of citations. It is also not mentioned in a law review article looking a WV civil war era jurisprudence up to 1872 when WV's new constitution was adopted. I suspect that the case you are looking for is a pair of related cases (neither of which involves West Virginia), one tried by the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court alone on a habeas corpus petition when riding circuit, and a related decision of the Texas Supreme Court involving the same defendant. Griffin's Case, 11 F. Cas. 7, 2 Am. Law T. Rep. U. S. Cts. 93; 8 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 358; 25 Tex. Supp. 623 ; 2 Balt. Law Trans. 433; 3 Am. Law Rev. 784 (Circuit Court, D. Virginia, May 1, 1869) and In re Caesar Griffin, 25 Tex. Supp. 623 (Tex. April 1869). The official summary of the fact and procedural posture of the main case on point was as follows: Caesar Griffin, a negro, was indicted in the county court of Rockbridge county, for an assault with intent to kill. He removed his case as under the law he had the right to do into the circuit court for that county, and was there tried by a jury which found him guilty and assessed his punishment at imprisonment for two years in the penitentiary. He was accordingly sentenced by the court to that imprisonment While on his way thither, in the custody of the sheriff of Rockbridge county, he sent out this writ which was served on the sheriff. That officer produced the petitioner in the district court then in session in Richmond, and made return to the writ that he held him by virtue of the conviction and sentence of the circuit court for Rockbridge county, making the record of the trial and conviction there a a part of his return. This return the petitioner traversed, denying that there was any court or judge in Rockbridge county as pretended by said pretended record, and that the paper exhibited was any record as alleged. The state of Virginia appearing by the attorney-general, Mr., Judge H. W. Sheffey, the judge of the circuit court for Rockbridge by Bradley T. Johnson, Esq., and the sheriff by James Neeson, Esq. they joined issue on this traverse. The petitioner then proved that Judge Sheffey had been a member of the house of delegates in 1849. That in 1862, he was speaker of the house of delegates, and that his votes were recorded for affording men, money and supplies to support Virginia and the Confederate States, in the war then flagrant with the United States. It was admitted that he was duly appointed on February 22, 1866, by the then government of Virginia, to be judge of the circuit including the county of Rockbridge; that he immediately entered on the duties of that office, and that he has ever since and still is discharging the functions of the same. The cause was argued at great length in the district court, before the district judge in December, 1868, who ordered the discharge of the petitioner, whereupon an appeal was prayed by the sheriff under the habeas corpus act of 1867 [14 StaL 385], to the circuit court, and the petitioner admitted to bail. Before the circuit court could meet other writs of habeas corpus were sued out by other parties convicted of felonies, two of them of murder, on the same ground as in this case, and the petitioners were discharged. A motion was then made by James Lyons, Esq. in the supreme court of the United States for a writ of prohibition against the district judge, to restrain him from further exercise of such power. The supreme court advised on the motion, and never announced any conclusion, but shortly afterward the chief justice opened the circuit court at Richmond, and immediately called up the appeal in Griffin’s Case. This statement is necessary for a full understanding of the pregnancy of the chief justice’s statement that the supreme court agreed with him as to the decision he rendered in this case. In consequence of the failure to oust the state officers disfranchised under the fourteenth amendment by these and similar judicial proceedings, congress in February, 1869, passed a joint resolution directing that all such officers should be removed by the military commanders of military districts into which the late Confederate States had been divided. Thus all the old officers of the state government of Virginia were removed except a very few, and new ones appointed not obnoxious to the denunciation of the federal bar — the supreme court of appeals of Virginia; the judges thereof having been removed by the major general commanding, he appointed as judges in their stead, a colonel of his staff, and two others, who had held or did then hold commissions in the United States army. The president judge of the court performed his functions and drew his pay as colonel and judge advocate on the staff, overlooking the execution of the laws of the military, and at the same time those of presiding judicial officer of the state. The procedural posture of the case and its result match your description even though the state does not, and there is a supreme court connection even though it is not a U.S. Supreme Court decision. The West Virginia association is probably a mental mangling of that case with a somewhat similar case from right time frame, a WV murder conviction overturned due to all white jury requirement by U.S. Supreme Court in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). | A quick answer: your analogy isn't quite right. The Constitution gives the House "the sole power of impeachment." So unlike you, their work is never "going to court." No judge is ever going to look at the evidence they used and say, "You only used notes, not a final report. That isn't good enough, or admissible." A longer answer: impeachment is not a legal process. It is a political process. The only binding requirements are those found in the Constitution. These cover who can be impeached and tried, for what, how punished and by whom. All other matters of procedure are decided by each house. There are several sets of rules and precedents that cover impeachment. But if the House or Senate decides to ignore these rules and make up new rules, they can. After all, Article I of the Constitution gives each house "sole power" over impeachment and trial. It also gives each house the power to "determine the Rules of its Proceedings." You might ask, why, if impeachment is a political process, do so many people talk about it as if it was a legal process? The answer is simple: Both sides are busy trying to put their spin on what is going on in the House. If either side believes they will get more support by talking about impeachment in legal terms, that is how they will talk about it. But this spin should not hide the reality: impeachment is political. That impeachment is political does not mean that it should not be guided by the same values that guide legal processes. Of course, the hearings should be fair, the President should get due process, and so on. But because they are political, no court is going to step in and assure that they are fair. The only guarantee that the President will get a fair hearing and due process is also political. If enough Americans think he did not get treated fairly, or was denied due process, or what impeached unfairly, they can vote the Democrats out of office. Politics is the key to understanding much of what has gone on so far in the impeachment process. For instance, for a long time, Speaker Pelosi refused to hold a vote on whether to formally start impeachment proceedings. She offered a variety of explanations for this, but the truth was that she did not want to force Democrats from close districts to have to openly vote against the President. Similarly, Republicans, who wanted to force Democrats from close districts to vote against the President, argued that it was unfair, illegal or unconstitutional to have any hearings on impeachment without such a vote. Since there are more Democrats than Republicans in the House, Democrats got to decide when that vote was held. Of course, if the House does impeach, and the Senate has to try the President, since Republicans control the Senate, they will control the rules, etc. | No a senator does not have that power under their elected position. However politics does not work like that. A senator could know the governor of their state very well. Governors could issue pardons which will release people from jail. Governors can also command a certain person to do something, like release a prisoner. | No part of the D.C. Sexual Abuse Statute of Limitations Amendment Act of 2018 applies in the case of Tara Reade. The statue of limitations for criminal prosecution had already expired under the existing law and was not revived by the amendment. You are correct that there is a difference between the statute of limitations for criminal prosecution and civil suits. Phoog's answer cites information that is specifically about civil suits, and as it says, the statue of limitations for civil action has also expired. (I have not seen any reports of Reade filing a civil suit.) Tara Reade filed a criminal complaint with the Washington Metropolitan Police Department Reade also confirmed that the statute of limitations around the claims against Biden have passed. "I filed a police report for safety reasons only. All crim [sic] stats beyond limitations. Gratitude for all who have stood by me," Reade tweeted. ("JOE BIDEN SEXUAL ASSAULT ACCUSER TARA READE FILES CRIMINAL COMPLAINT", by Ewan Palmer, 4/11/20, newsweek.com) The web page Sexual Abuse Statute of Limitations Amendment Act of 2018 - Two Year Window Guide, on http://www.davidgrosso.org/, has a link to fact sheet summarizing the changes. There is no statute of limitations for criminal cases regarding sexual abuse committed after May 3, 2019. But sexual abuse crimes committed earlier whose statute of limitations had already expired by that date under the old law cannot be prosecuted. Section 4(a) shall apply to an offense committed before, on, or, after the effective date of this act, unless the statute of limitations for the offense expired before the effective date of this act. D.C. Law 22-311. Sexual Abuse Statute of Limitations Amendment Act of 2018., Sec. 5. (b) The previous statute of limitations seems to have been 15 or in some cases 10 years, so for a crime committed in 1993, the statue of limitations would have expired by 2019. The 2-year revival period only applies to civil suits: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a claim for the recovery of damages that would be time-barred under D.C. Official Code § 12-301 before the effective date of this act, but that would not be time-barred under section 3, is revived and, in that case, a cause of action may be commenced within 2 years after the effective date of this act. (Sec. 5. (a)(2)) |
Legal to drive a car without front tag out of registered state? In the U.S. some states do not require cars to display license plates on the front of a vehicle, but a majority require plates on both the front and rear, as shown in the map below. My car is registered in Pennsylvania, so I only have a plate on the rear. AFAIK, I can drive it into any state that requires front plates without violating a law, because I comply with the registration state's law. But what if my car is registered in a state that requires a front plate (e.g., California) and I drive it in any other state without displaying a front license plate. Is there any state in which I could be cited for a legal infraction? | At least some two-plate states suggest that if you're registered in a two-plate state you must display both plates within their borders. And some even suggest you must have two plates even if your state only issues one, though this scenario would probably not withstand federal scrutiny. In Washington, License plates must be: (i) Attached conspicuously at the front and rear of each vehicle if two license plates have been issued; (ii) Attached to the rear of the vehicle if one license plate has been issued. If it was issued, you must display it. California law says (a) When two license plates are issued by the department for use upon a vehicle, they shall be attached to the vehicle for which they were issued, one in the front and the other in the rear. (b) When only one license plate is issued for use upon a vehicle, it shall be attached to the rear thereof, unless the license plate is issued for use upon a truck tractor, in which case the license plate shall be displayed in accordance with Section 4850.5. So if you were issued one, you can drive with one, and if the department (arguably and statutorily "The Department of Motor Vehicles") issued two, you must display both. You might think that you could therefore remove one out of state plate when in California, but they also require (as of this year) that (a) A license plate issued by this state or any other jurisdiction within or without the United States shall be attached upon receipt and remain attached during the period of its validity to the vehicle for which it is issued while being operated within this state or during the time the vehicle is being held for sale in this state, or until the time that a vehicle with special or identification plates is no longer entitled to those plates; and a person shall not operate, and an owner shall not knowingly permit to be operated, upon any highway, a vehicle unless the license plate is so attached. The law in Oregon says A person commits the offense of failure to display registration plates if the person operates, on the highways of this state, any vehicle or camper that has been assigned registration plates by this state and the registration plates assigned to the vehicle or camper are displayed in a manner that violates any of the following: (a) The plate must be displayed on the rear of the vehicle, if only one plate is required. (b) Plates must be displayed on the front and rear of the vehicle if two plates are required. Somehow, they failed to cover the condition that a person does not have plates issued by Oregon. The law in Ohio is that (1) No person who is the owner or operator of a motor vehicle shall fail to display in plain view on the front and rear of the motor vehicle a license plate that bears the distinctive number and registration mark assigned to the motor vehicle by the director of public safety, including any county identification sticker and any validation sticker issued under sections 4503.19 and 4503.191 of the Revised Code This doesn't even make an exception for vehicles from some adjacent state which have only one plate. If you otherwise keep your nose clean, the law says A law enforcement officer shall only issue a ticket, citation, or summons, or cause the arrest or commence a prosecution, for the failure to display a license plate in plain view on the front of a parked motor vehicle if the officer first determines that another offense has occurred and either places the operator or vehicle owner under arrest or issues a ticket, citation, or summons to the operator or vehicle owner for the other offense. but you can still get busted for driving your car. Finally, Montana says a person may not operate a motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer, pole trailer, or travel trailer upon the public highways of Montana unless the motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer, pole trailer, or travel trailer is properly registered and has the proper license plates conspicuously displayed... (1-plate exception for motorcycles etc)...All other motor vehicles must have one license plate displayed on the front and one license plate displayed on the rear of the motor vehicle. One thing to notice is that these laws are in sections on vehicle registration and not operation, where separate sections of the code regarding street-legal vehicles prohibit driving without lights or a muffler. Under the full faith and credit clause, I think your act of registering a vehicle in PA is given credit in OH, because the requirement pertains to registering, not the conditions for legal operation on the road. | So why are Amish people not required to register their "vehicle," and to have a driver's license when driving on public roads? The Texas registration requirement in Texas is at Sec. 502.040. REGISTRATION REQUIRED; GENERAL RULE: a) Not more than 30 days after purchasing a vehicle or becoming a resident of this state, the owner of a motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer shall apply for the registration of the vehicle for: (1) each registration year in which the vehicle is used or to be used on a public highway; and (2) if the vehicle is unregistered for a registration year that has begun and that applies to the vehicle and if the vehicle is used or to be used on a public highway, the remaining portion of that registration year. (emphasis added) Now, you might argue that this requires owners of motor vehicles also to register their non-motorized vehicles, but I doubt that this is the prevailing interpretation. Regardless, an Amish person who does not own a motor vehicle is certainly not required by this subsection to register horse-drawn vehicles. Similarly, the requirement to hold a driver's license is at Sec. 521.021. LICENSE REQUIRED: A person, other than a person expressly exempted under this chapter, may not operate a motor vehicle on a highway in this state unless the person holds a driver's license issued under this chapter. (emphasis added) Similarly, this requirement does not apply to the operation of a horse-drawn vehicle. In other words, one statement in your question is incorrect: A driver's license is required for all persons "driving" a vehicle. In fact, a driver's license is generally required to drive a motor vehicle (and even there, exceptions exist). | You will still have to pay A ticket can be ammended if the state so chooses (they can look up what color and model your car is). The car is probably on video. The officer can testify if they wrote your car info down somewhere else. And if they identified you inside the car as the violator, the car's color hardly matters. The idea that minor mistakes or omissions on tickets can get you off is a myth. From an actual lawyer | Both are to some extent correct, but as might be expected, the USPTO site is more accurate. Trademarks owned by virtue of use, rather than registration, are protected only in the market area in where actual use can be documented. Even state registration may be limited to a geographic market area in which use can be shown, and may not extend to the whole state unless use throughout the state, or at least in most major markets in the state, can be shown. As discussed in the news story "Burger King Is Banned From Opening Within 20 Miles Of This Original, Mom-And-Pop Burger King Sign" The owners of a small restaurant branded "Burger King" secured a state-level trademark on that name, but it only serves to exclude the well-known fast-food chain from a 20-mile circle. Remember, the prime purpose of a trademark is to identify the source of goods or services, and to prevent one supplier from benefiting by the reputation of another. In an area where the first supplier does not do business, there is considered to be no such risk of unfair competition. Also, nationwide protection is one of the benefits of federal registration. In addition, a mark is only protected for the same class of goods or services. Nationwide use of "Pear" as a mark for a brand of computer would not prevent use of the same word as a mark for a brand of automobile, say, or for a restaurant chain. Note also that trademarks are normally at most national in scope. A US Federal registration will offer no protection in Canada, or any other country. | Maybe: In California, you must be at least 16 years old to drive with an out-of-state permit. Since some states offer permits to persons younger than 16, those would not be valid in CA until the individual's 16th birthday. An out-of-state learner's permit is only valid for 10 days following the date of entry (inclusive). For periods longer than 10 days, one must apply for a Nonresident Minor's Certificate. Cal. Veh. Code § 12504(a) takes the previous two sections on nonresident licensing, which apply to persons over the age of 18, applies them to persons aged 16-18, and adds the 10-day caveat as described above: (a) Sections 12502 and 12503 apply to any nonresident over the age of 16 years but under the age of 18 years. The maximum period during which that nonresident may operate a motor vehicle in this state without obtaining a driver's license is limited to a period of 10 days immediately following the entry of the nonresident into this state except as provided in subdivision (b) of this section. (b) provides that the 10-day restriction does not apply where the person has a license and has a Nonresident Minor's Certificate: (b) Any nonresident over the age of 16 years but under the age of 18 years who is a resident of a foreign jurisdiction which requires the licensing of drivers may continue to operate a motor vehicle in this state after 10 days from his or her date of entry into this state if he or she meets both the following: He or she has a valid driver's license, issued by the foreign jurisdiction, in his or her immediate possession. He or she has been issued and has in his or her immediate possession a nonresident minor's certificate, which the department issues to a nonresident minor who holds a valid driver's license issued to him or her by his or her home state or country, and who files proof of financial responsibility. General learners permit information for non-residents travelling in the 50 states can be found here. | People can take their personal cars through the Channel Tunnel from Great Britain to France. They don't actually drive their cars through the tunnel, but going by car is a perfectly normal way to travel between those two countries. That's probably the most well-known place where drivers will switch from driving on one side of the road to the other, but there are many more . If driving with a car with the wheel on the "wrong" side were forbidden, these options would not exist, because at least one direction of travel would not work. Now, of course, that doesn't mean a country like Belgium, which does not have to direct way to Britain, couldn't forbid cars with the steering wheel on the right. But at least for EU states, that seems to be forbidden, as Poland and Lithuania learned when they tried to require cars that were to be registered there to have the steering wheel repositioned to the left Consequently, the Court holds that the position of the driver’s seat, an integral part of the steering equipment of a vehicle, comes within the harmonisation established by Directives 2007/46 and 70/311, so that, in the context of the registration of a new vehicle in their territory, the Member States may not require, for reasons of safety, that the driver’s seat of that vehicle be moved to the side opposite the direction of the traffic. It notes in that regard that the legislation at issue provides for exceptions with regard to the use of vehicles equipped with a steering-wheel on the right by people who reside in other Member States, and travel to Poland and Lithuania for a limited period (for example, tourists). That fact shows, according to the Court, that the contested legislation tolerates the risk involved in such use. So even those countries that tried to ensure that registered cars had the steering wheel on the "right" side made provisions for cars that were just traveling through. And the EU does not consider it a valid law to require wheels to be repositioned. | The amended section 46.2-2101 is in Chapter 21 of Title 46.2. Chapter 21 deals with regulation of property carriers (e.g. moving companies). So the amendment to 46.2-2101 says that EPDDs are exempt from these Chapter 21 regulations. 46.2-2102 says, in general, that the Section 21 regulations apply to anyone who gets paid to transport property using motor vehicles. So without the exemption, there might be confusion as to whether those regulations would apply to someone using an EPDD. The legislature therefore made it clear that it did not intend those regulations to apply in that case. Most of the rest of the cited Act amends Chapter 8 of Title 46.2, which deals with traffic laws and regulations. The amendment to 46.2-2101 does not exempt EPDDs from those regulations; as you say, that would defeat the whole purpose of the law. | Using two states as examples: In California, emergency vehicle operators are exempt from pretty much the entirety of the rules of the road (VC 21055). They can pass you on the right if they want to. Department policy might say no, but that depends on department policy and the details of their emergency vehicle operation course. However, California law requires all drivers to pull to the right when an emergency vehicle approaches (VC 21806). Even though an ambulance driver legally could pass you on the right, you are required to pull right. According to the BLM's emergency response policy for fire personnel in California, this means passing on the right is heavily disfavored: the emergency vehicle operator doesn't know that the driver (who is clearly not paying much attention) won't suddenly notice them and comply with the vehicle code, cutting them off or running into them. Other policies/things which seem to reflect policies say similar things, and all make it clear that operators need to be careful that the car they're passing won't drive into them. In Maryland, the law is a bit different. Section 21-405 of the Maryland Code obligates drivers to move to the edge of the roadway. This means either edge, so on a divided highway you might pull left. On a non-divided road, you obviously pull right. In this case, the vehicle may end up passing you on the right, but again: they are going to be careful about it, and would rather you get out of their way so they don't have to worry that you'll suddenly see them and drive into them. |
Can an employer be required to provide an escort from office to vehicle? Follow up question to Can an employer be forced to allow an employee to bring a gun to work (Washington State)? It appears that an employer can limit employee concealed carry. (It would also seem that if the employee had a firearm in an appropriate gun safe in the vehicle, the employer would have little or no control over it.) This leaves the employee at risk traveling between the office and the vehicle. It seems reasonable as well that as the employer prohibits the employee's self defence, they would be responsible for the employees defence between office and some safe location (in this case, the vehicle). Can an employer be required to provide an escort from office to vehicle? The original question specifies Washington State, but I would be interested in answers for any US state. | Can an employer be required to provide an escort from office to vehicle? No, at least, not on the theory articulated in the question. I can imagine some circumstances where it is conceivable that there might be a duty arising from some other source, like an OSHA regulation applied to a firing range business, or an express contract with the employee (some employers provide an escort as a matter of right in the evenings or at other high risk times, as an employee benefit, especially college and university employers, in part, because they have worker's compensation liability while an employee is still on a large campus, in part because it helps attract employees who may feel vulnerable, and in part because of an attitude that the employer wants its employees to be safe at dangerous times of day and this shows that the employer cares about them), or a court injunction related to a labor-management dispute where the employee is a scab. There is no such employer duty, but an employer does have strict liability in almost every case (there are some minor exceptions for very small employers and criminal conduct by an employee who is injured when the criminal conduct is clearly outside the scope of duty of the employee) for injuries and death in the course of employment from any cause whatsoever pretty much (including criminal actions of third-parties) which is generally fully insured by worker's compensation insurance. The exact details of when someone ceases to be at work for worker's compensation/employer liability is buried in case law and regulations (for overtime and minimum wage purposes, the standard is "portal to portal" but workers compensation/employer liability need not be identical, although once you are clearly no longer on the employer's premises and commuting after a day's work is done or before a day's work starts, you are clearly not covered). But, any place where there is employer liability at all, it would be worker's compensation covered. Usually, if the employer is required to have worker's compensation but doesn't, the employer likewise has strict liability for the same harms, but the damages that may be awarded are not limited to those that worker's compensation policies would cover. This leaves the employee with at risk travel between the office and the vehicle. It seems reasonable as well that as the employer prohibits the employees self defence, they would be responsible for the employees defence between office and some safe location (i.e. vehicle). This theory pretty much always loses. An employee walking in an ordinary, non-wartime environment without a firearm is not "at risk" in a meaningful sense, any more than someone who didn't choose to carry a firearm who goes about their daily life (or is prohibited from carrying one due to past conduct such as a felony or a domestic violence protection order or a domestic violence misdemeanor or a condition of parole, probation or bond pending criminal charges). Also, the employee is not being prohibited from engaging in any kind of self-defense or protective action whatsoever (or from asserting self-defense rights if a firearm is carried contrary to an employer rule) just from carrying a firearm at that particular moment (on pain of losing a job, not forfeiting a legal affirmative defense under criminal statutes), which is one of many means by which a person can protect themselves from crimes. | I believe that legally they can't force her to use sick leave since she has met the 40 hours minimum required as a salaried employee. Is this correct? Unfortunately, as far as the Department of Labor (DoL) is concerned, the employer is correct here, provided that this is company policy. First, there is no "40 hours minimum required", the DoL simply says that a salaried (exempt) employee must be paid the full salary for any week in which the employee performs any work, regardless of the number of days or hours worked. This is then limited by the "allowable deductions: Circumstances in Which the Employer May Make Deductions from Pay Deductions from pay are permissible when an exempt employee: is absent from work for one or more full days for personal reasons other than sickness or disability; for absences of one or more full days due to sickness or disability if the deduction is made in accordance with a bona fide plan, policy or practice of providing compensation for salary lost due to illness; to offset amounts employees receive as jury or witness fees, or for military pay; for penalties imposed in good faith for infractions of safety rules of major significance; or for unpaid disciplinary suspensions of one or more full days imposed in good faith for workplace conduct rule infractions. Also, an employer is not required to pay the full salary in the initial or terminal week of employment, or for weeks in which an exempt employee takes unpaid leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act. (Source: dol.gov) Emphasis Mine This means that as long as the employer has a policy or practice requiring the employee to use Paid Time Off (PTO) for sickness (sick-days), then the employer is allowed to make deductions from the employee's salary for those days. So in short, yes, the employer can require that the employee use PTO to cover sick days, regardless of the actual number of hours worked in that week, month, year, etc. There is currently no federal requirement for employers to provide paid sick leave, although some states like California may have local laws. | Since you asked two questions: No and No Does a company’s T&C or their house rules supersede law No and is asking private health status (including the request to wear a mask) an offence? No A company cannot require you to do things that are against the law but they can require you to do things that go further than the legal minimum. The UK and Spanish governments do not require you to wear a mask but they do not prohibit private organisations (like airlines) for making it a requirement to access their facilities. The law requires that they make reasonable accommodation for people with disabilities. But you don’t have a disability, you just can’t sleep with a mask on. If you had a disability you would have no trouble in getting a letter from your doctor to that effect. The contract requires them to take you from the UK to Spain: they don’t have to enable you to sleep. If you read the T&C, you will find that they can refuse to carry you if, in their reasonable opinion, you pose a hazard to the aircraft or the people aboard it. | IANAL, and as @GeorgeBailey suggests, you should ask one. That said, some aspects of your question are directly addressable with what we know. Does US law states anything about this? Yes. Federally this falls under the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §2511. Workplace monitoring generally falls under either the "System Administrator Exception" or under Consent. In general, continuing past a banner constitutes consent. Does company policy enforcement with such a warning over ride the right to not be subject to surveillance? In general, yes. You don't need to use the companies network if you don't want to consent - and they don't need to hire you if you don't want to use their network. But it's their network, and their rules apply. There are some nuances, and courts have found that the wording of the notice has made a difference in some cases, but overall, if the systems are properly posted with banners, then the employer may capture communications. See the "Bannering and Consent" section of this article from cybertelecom.org, e.g.: Even if no clicking is required, a user who sees the banner before logging on to the network has received notice of the monitoring. By using the network in light of the notice, the user impliedly consents to monitoring pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c)-(d). Note that stored data is covered by different laws than communications. It's a nuance. Is it ethical to sniff all the data without giving any other warning than the logon banner? "Ethical" is a very different question than "Legal", and largely more subjective. Most employers require signed consent for monitoring as a condition of employment, and use banners thereafter. That is ethical by my definition, in that it meets or exceeds the requirements of the law, and does not mislead or use subterfuge. The tone of your question suggests you find it distasteful, and therefore probably it violates your personal code of ethics. | It works by prohibiting discrimination based on use of medical marijuana, thus it limits employer actions w.r.t. hiring, firing, and on the job treatment. It is not an absolute prohibition. §2103(b)(3) states that Nothing in this act shall require an employer to commit any act that would put the employer or any person acting on its behalf in violation of Federal law. Since employers may be subject to federal drug-free workplace rules, detectable usage of medical marijuana is a fireable offense on such jobs, until the federal regulations are eliminated. The law is also clear that this does not create a right to be under the influence while on the job, and §510 lists definite prohibitions against actions while under the influence. As for the question of whether the law prohibits discrimination based on simple possession of a card but does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of actual use (leaving aside the preceding disclaimers), this has been decided in Palmiter v. Commonwealth Health Systems, Inc. – it's not just card-possession that is protected. Indeed, the hospital in this lawsuit did not contest the claim that the law protects employees who use medical marijuana, the dispute was over whether a cause of private action was created (can a fired employee sue? "Yes", says the court). See also Hudnell v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosps. | As the comment by Ron Beyer mentions when a company wants to impose such restrictions they are normally done through non-compete, non-solicitation, and non-disclosure agreements, as well as via trade secret law. Note the word "agreements". "Restrictions on working in the field" are simply a form of non-compete agreements. A company cannot, legally, simply impose such agreements on its employees. It can require an employee to sign such an agreement as a condition of employment, and it can often require such an agreement from a departing employee as a condition of a severance payment. Exactly what is covered by such an agreement depends on its terms, and those vary widely. In most US states there are limits on the scope and duration of such an agreement. In some states the restrictions can be broad and of fairly long duration, in others they must be narrow and of fairly short duration. An agreement that goes beyond a given state's limits will not be enforceable in court, if the defendant brings that fact up. Trade secret law can prevent an employee from disclosing the trade secrets of a former employer to a new employer, or indeed to anyone else. But that does not prevent a former employee from getting a new job in the field, as long as the employee does not disclose any trade secrets. If an employee has signed, or is asked to sign, such an agreement, it is a good idea to consult a lawyer with employment law experience. If the state is known, I could edit this answer to include the limits, if any, on such agreements in that state. | Unless your employer agreed in a contract to not discuss your employment, then there is no legal restrictions on them discussing anything about your employment. If they say things that are untrue you could sue them for defamation. | The parenthesized part means that if you are being compelled by law to disclose some confidential information, you must promptly notify the company of that fact. They could they respond by trying to get you excluded as a witness, or to limit your testimony, but you don't have to care what they do once they've been notified that you were subpoenaed. It may well be that every time the opposing side asks you a question, "your" side will object, and the judge will decide whether to sustain or overrule the objection. The only way in which you would defer to the company lawyer is by not answering the question before the question is finished (i.e. give the attorney 2 seconds to voice an objection). You would not have to "bring" the employer's lawyer along to a deposition, but that lawyer would probably be present and would similarly raise objections, if he felt like it. Your duty is simply to tell the company that you are being compelled to testify. In case the police or a detective agency are investigating the matter and they come to interview you, you are not compelled by law to answer (or to hand over documents), therefore you are supposed to decline to answer (and you are not obligated to inform the company that someone asked a question). As for an administrative subpoena, the perhaps tricky part will be knowing whether you are being compelled to testify, or invited to testify. The wording of the paperwork should inform you whether this is compulsory. |
privacy and (proxy) voting X and Y are entitled to vote at a UK company's general meeting. Proxies are allowed and instructions are to be notified to the company office in advance of the meeting. Votes at the meeting are to be be counted by poll. The company's articles simply state "polls shall be taken as the chair of the meeting directs". X duly appoints Y to be their proxy. Who is entitled to know this? Who is entitled to know how Y votes? Presumably, at a minimum, whoever tallies the votes must know that Y may have cast multiple votes, and the company will have received notice of the proxy appointment. However, it is not obvious that the membership in general has a right to this information, although I can see how knowing it might help detect/prevent fraud if the scrutineer were not truly independent. With limitations, anyone may inspect or make copies of the register of members. However, I could imagine that GDPR, etc, might treat how someone has voted on a company resolution as sensitive personal information. | Non-secret voting is the norm Secret ballots are usually limited to governmental elections because they are logistically harder than open ballots requiring a trusted third party. Secret ballots are also a much newer invention than companies, having their origin in the 19th and 18th centuries respectively. There is no law that prevents a company from holding secret ballots but there is also no law that requires it. | The scope of the GDPR is entered when personal data is being processed in a structured manner. Personal data is any information relating to identifiable data subjects (definition in Art 4(1)). "Peter attended the meeting on the 14th" is personal data. "That woman with the blue handbag said she wanted to return on the 25th" is personal data. However, aggregate statistics do not relate to individuals, and are typically not personal data. "On the 14th, we had 25 attendees" is not personal data. Not all use of personal data is within the scope of the GDPR. For example, the GDPR would not apply if two organizers talk about who attended the meeting. However, Art 2(1) says the GDPR applies when personal data is processed wholly or partially with automated means (e.g. computers, smartphones), or forms a filing system or is intended for a filing system (e.g. keeping notes on attendees, keeping attendance lists) If GDPR applies, the organization would be responsible for ensuring compliance with its rules and principles, summarized in Art 5. Primarily, this means: having a clear purpose for processing selecting a suitable Art 6 legal basis for that purpose (e.g. consent or a legitimate interest) only processing the minimum data necessary for achieving that purpose determining and implementing appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure compliance and security of the processing activities preparing for data subject rights, in particular by providing an Art 13 privacy notice when collecting data from the data subjects There are of course some complexities in the details. When the legal basis is "consent" (opt-in), the organization would have to ensure that this consent was freely given and sufficiently informed. Per Art 7(4), consent would not be freely given if that consent was a condition for access to the meeting. Using "legitimate interest" (opt-out) can be more flexible, but it requires performing a balancing test to show that the legitimate interest isn't outweighed by the data subjects' interests, rights, and freedoms. Roughly, relying on a legitimate interest is appropriate when the data subjects can reasonably expect the processing activity to occur. Regarding point 1, keeping general counts and aggregate statistics about attendees is probably OK since it wouldn't be personal data. If you are very conscientious about this, you could round all counts and use categories like "0-4 attendees, 5-9 attendees" for each facet, which makes it more difficult to make inferences about individuals. But the fundamental point is that all your data should relate to attendees as a whole, never to individuals. Regarding point 2 and 3, this is a question of legal basis. Since you gather names through informal conversations, I think that attendees would be weirded out if they learned that you kept detailed records on their attendance. So I think that you probably wouldn't have a legitimate interest here. However, being upfront with this and offering an opt-out could change this. On the aspect of keeping detailed notes on data from informal conversations, I'd like to point out H&M's EUR 35 million fine back in 2020 (summary on GDPRHub.eu). In a callcenter, managers used to have conversations with employees. These conversations touched on anything from vacation experiences to health problems, marriage problems, and religious beliefs. All of that is fine. What was not fine is that the managers went full Stasi and kept detailed notes about all of this on a shared drive and used that information for management decisions. This went on until a configuration error made those files accessible to all employees. This violated all the points in the basic compliance process outlined above: the records had no clear purpose, no suitable legal basis, contained way more data than necessary (and even Art 9 special categories of data like information on health or religious beliefs which have extra protection), did not have appropriate measures to prevent unauthorized access, and did not fulfill data subject rights like the Art 13 right to be informed. In case this non-profit is a church or religious organization that had its own comprehensive data protection rules before the GDPR came into force in 2018, those can continue to apply per Art 91. This could probably address some issues of legal basis, but cannot circumvent the GDPR's general principles. | As always, it depends. However, it is by no means certain that any public facing hobby project, such as a web app, is exempt from having to comply with the GDPR. Since the GDPR is only a few days old, we have of course no case law based upon the GDPR itself yet. However, when considering this, one should take the following two facts into consideration. 1. The "personal use exeption" in the GDPR is not new. The personal use exemption is unchanged from the article 3(2) of Directive 95/46/EC. (There as a lot of lobbying for removing "purely" from the sentence – but drafters wanted to keep it.) 2. Case-law under the previous regulation restricts the scope of the exception The ECJ has ruled on the scope of the personal use exception in two cases: C-101/01 C-212/13 In both these cases, the ECJ took an extremely restrictive view, and concluded that the personal use exemption did not apply to the processing done by these individuals. In C-101/01 it can be argued that the hobby project as a blogger was connected to the controllers professional activity (she was a catechist in a local church, and blogged about her work. including her colleagues). But in C-212/13, there no such connection to professional or commercial activity. Here, the controller operated a CCTV to protect his home, but set it up to also capture public space, and that was enough for the ECJ to decide that the personal use exception did not apply. Discussion Case-law based upon Directive 95/46/EC is in no way binding for a future court that need to rule based upon the GDPR. We need to wait for case-law decided under the GDPR to be able to have some degree of certainty about the scope of the "private use exception" under GDPR. However, given what we know about how the ECJ has ruled in these cases in the past, I think it is hazardous to think that just because what you are doing on the web is just a "hobby project" not connected to professional or commercial activity, you are exempt from complying with the GDPR. Conclusion IMHO, you may be exempt, or you may not be exempt. I think it really depends on your activity in your hobby project, and to what extent this project processes the personal data of other people than yourself. | The intention of the GDPR is to minimize the amount of personally identifiable information (PII) you store. So the GDPR never tells you that you have to log certain events. The simplest way to make sure you comply with the GDPR is to simply not store any PII at all. But that might of course conflict with legitimate business interests and with other legal obligations you might have. So when you do store PII, then the GDPR regulates under which conditions you are allowed to store PII, for how long and what you are allowed to do with that PII. So when you receive a GDPR request from a customer to see their data, then you can say that you only have that one timestamp of their registration, because you didn't log their subsequent logins (assuming this is the truth). I hope your privacy policy says that you store all that PII on registration and that you have some good arguments why storing that information is a "legitimate interest" of your organization. | If I have correctly untangled the law, Schedule 2 of the Data Protection Act part 3 identifies as a condition where you are not prohibited from revealing personal data: The processing is necessary for compliance with any legal obligation to which the data controller is subject, other than an obligation imposed by contract. The Animal Welfare Act 25(1) says An inspector may require the holder of a licence to produce for inspection any records which he is required to keep by a condition of the licence I can't tell if you are required to keep customer names, but if you are, it looks like the pieces fit together and you would have to provide the records. Call a solicitor to be sure, though. | IP addresses are personal data. That means you need a legal basis to process them, but not necessarily consent from the user. That IP addresses should be treated as personal data in most contexts is clear, regardless of whether you can associate the IP address with a user ID. That you make such an association affirms that both the IP address and user ID are personal data in your context though. As the answers in the questions you linked indicate, there are alternative legal bases to consent. The GDPR offers a choice of six legal bases (Art 6(1) lit a–f). In most cases, you would instead rely on a “legitimate interest” for logging. But it's not enough to claim that you have a legitimate interest. You must have a clear purpose for which such logs would be necessary, and you would then have to weigh this legitimate interest against the interests, rights, and freedoms of the affected data subjects. If such logs are necessary for security and anti-abuse purposes, your legitimate interest test is likely to prevail. However, you must limit retention of the logged data and the included information to what is actually necessary. For example, keeping user IDs in there might not be necessary. If the association of IP addresses and user IDs is not necessary for a legitimate interest, then you would indeed need consent. Discussion on why IP addresses are personal data. You see many answers and opinions that IP addresses might not be personal data. Some of these are technically correct, but most are misinformed or outdated. I know only a single well-informed person that still disagrees. For everyone else such as the EU Commission, IP addresses are clearly personal data. Under the GDPR, personal data is any information that relates to an (indirectly) identifiable natural person. In the context of log files we can assume that the entries usually “relate” to a person, namely the person making the request. The exception would be requests triggered by automated systems. The more interesting question is whether the person to which the log entry relates is identifiable. While the GDPR does provide further guidance on the concept of identification in Recital 26, it does not provide clear unambiguous criteria. Thus, there is lots of debate about what that precisely means. One approach is to sidestep that debate and and notice that the GDPR's definition of personal data explicitly notes that a person might be identified “in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier” (Art 4(1)). Another but otherwise unrelated part of the GDPR mentions “internet protocol addresses, cookie identifiers or other identifiers such as radio frequency identification tags” as examples of online identifiers (Recital 30). We can also look more deeply into Recital 26 and see that “singling out” already counts as identification. We can use the IP address to single out one person's log entries from the set of log entries, so this could be interpreted as meaning that any stable user ID renders the data personal data – and an IP address is sufficiently stable in this context. Another part of Recital 26 says that we must consider “all the means reasonably likely to be used” for identification, even if this involves additional information from third parties. This phrasing is virtually identical to the GDPR's predecessor, the EU Data Protection Directive. On the basis of that DPD, the EU's top court (ECJ/CJEU) was asked to rule on the question whether dynamic IP addresses are personal data (the Breyer case, C‑582/14, judgement from 2016-10-19). It said yes. “It did not say yes”, some people will object. And they are technically correct. When someone rents an internet connection from an ISP, the ISP will have logs that connect the user's real-world identity to the IP address they were assigned at a time. You don't have access to the ISP's logs. But, if that user violated your rights (e.g. a cyberattack or copyright infringement), then you could (depending on civil vs criminal matters) report this to the appropriate authorities or to petition the court and they would have the right to order the ISP to disclose this information. The CJEU said that if this chain (you → authorities → ISP → user identity) is grounded in law, then the IP address would be identifiable. But whether there are suitable laws to compel the ISP to disclose this data would be up to national laws, and the CJEU doesn't concern itself with that. Spoiler: such laws are pretty common. To summarize typical objections: The IP address doesn't relate to a person: Can be a valid objection, but is not typically the case for user-facing web services. The Recital 30 argument is not valid because it's about profiling, not identification, and it only says that IP addresses may be used for profiling, not that they are always identifying: Technically correct, but I think that Recital 30 merely expresses the implied understanding that of course an IP address is an online identifier and permits identification by itself. “Singling out” does not apply because SOME_REASON: Indeed, this is an ill-defined term with no case law to guide us. However, regulators such as the EDPB and their predecessor WP29 routinely use “singling out” to mean being able to distinguish one person's data from other people's data. An IP address lets us do that. The Breyer judgement is not applicable because the defendant in that case was the German state, and the state has other legal means than ordinary website operators: Nothing in that case was specific to the website operator being a state or other authority. If the website operator can contact the appropriate authority and if they have the right to order the ISP to disclose the relevant data, then the IP address is identifiable. The CJEU didn't say “yes” in Breyer, it said “if”. So I'll take that as a “no”: The CJEU concerns itself with the interpretation of EU law, not with national laws. Specifically in the Breyer case, lower courts confirmed that German law has the necessary means. In other EU member states, further checks would be necessary but it would surprise me if there wouldn't be equivalent subpoena powers. If the ISP doesn't have the data, then the IP addresses are anonymous: Indeed, the CJEU scenario collapses if there is no additional data to be linked with the IP address. However: The CJEU used this scenario as an example to show that IP addresses can be identifiable. If that particular scenario fails, there could be other scenarios that still allow identification. The question of whether IP addresses are identifiable had of course been the subject of wider debate at the time. That the GDPR explicitly mentions IP addresses can be seen as a reaction to this debate. Thus, in a sense, the Breyer case is moot. It is still useful as an explanation of how broad “reasonably likely means” must be interpreted. | According to my knowledge I am not allowed to share other people's full name nor phone number nor email address without their permission. That is not correct. According to GDPR Article 2: This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automated means and to the processing other than by automated means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system. This Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data ... ... (c) by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity; GDPR Recital 18 states in relevant part: (2) Personal or household activities could include correspondence and the holding of addresses, or social networking and online activity undertaken within the context of such activities. Personal data that is not processed by "automated means", for example data which is transmitted verbally, by hand writing, or by manually sent email, is not covered by the GDPR. Data which is used by a natural person for "personal activities" is also not covered. Consulting one's personal lawyer might well be a personal activity unless it is a business matter. Even if such a transfer of data were in scope for the GDPR, consent of the data subject (DS) is not the only available lawful basis. GDPR article 6 permits any of several possible lawful bases to be used, particularly paragraph 1 point (f) which reads: (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. Also possibly relevant is point (c) which reads: processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; In short, providing one's personal lawyer with the names and addresses of relevant people in connection with a legal issue is not at all likely to be prohibited by the GDPR, nor to require the consent of the people whose names and contact info are provided. However, a comment by user PMF reads: The Data Protection laws are mostly for companies, not for individuals. This is an overstatement. The laws do apply to natural persons as DCs, although enforcement is largely targeted at businesses, particularly large, for-profit businesses. | IANAL. (1) GDPR is certainly relevant. (2) This is certainly "personal data" under the definition in GDPR article 4. (3) Maintaining this data is probably lawful under article 6 sections 1(a) (consent) - provided that the Terms and Conditions of the site make clear that the user by signing up is consenting to this information being held (3) There is certainly an obligation under article 14 to disclose that the information exists, and to say how it used. (4) Article 15 says that data subjects are entitled to see the information and know what recipients or categories of recipient have access to the information (I don't know whether it's enough to just say "moderators", or whether the moderators need to be identified). (5) I can't see any reasons why the obligations under articles 16, 17, and 18 regarding rectification, erasure, and restriction of processing aren't relevant. This is exactly the kind of situation that GDPR is designed to address. If you're restricting the service available to particular users based on a record of their behaviour or on judgements made by moderators, then they absolutely have a right to know, and a right of redress. |
s 4(3) Theft Act 1968 — Why is picking wild produce on another person's land not theft? I don't understand this law. Surmise that a wild berry shrub grows on my back yard that's unfenced. I don't cultivate it or do anything – no watering. I invite my piano student to my house – thus no trespassing – no watering, and he picks berries from it. Why does s 4(3) count this out as theft? Isn't it more reasonable for berries to belong me – they're growing on my land!?!?! Herring, Criminal Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (8 edn, 2018). pp 492-493 | The Theft Act 1968 replaces the Larceny Act 1916, which replaces in part the Larceny Act 1901, ad nauseum. In the current act, the exception is accomplished in the definitions section. Redefinition is a device commonly used by legislatures to clarify intent, where traditional wording does/did not express the desired prohibition. In addition, a special definition excluding a case makes it easier to define the general rule. To be certain, one would need a historical record of legislative discussion (and I suspect that there is no record), but it is reasonably likely that it was not previously against the (common) law to pick a wild blackberry for a snack. A reading of various prior versions of the larceny statutes suggests that it was never a crime to pick a wild blackberry, instead the crime was taking cultivated goods (which a person put some effort or resources into creating), and destroying resources on a person's land. Those are the kinds of actions explicitly identified in the prior statutes. §4(3) does state a traditional view of "property" (which is why it's in the "property" section), and would have the (presumptively desired) effect without complicating other parts of the statute. Moreover, s1(3)(a-b) of the 1916 act conveys similar "exceptionality". Norwegian theft law has a similar provision Tilegnelse av naturprodukter, herunder stein, kvister, vekster mv., av liten eller ingen økonomisk verdi under utøvelse av lovlig allemannsrett, straffes likevel ikke Appropriation of natural products, including stones, twigs, vegetation etc. with little or no economic value (taken) under the exercise of the legal right to roam is not punished | Theft in Oregon (and elsewhere, substantially the same) is defined statutorily: A person commits theft when, with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate property to the person or to a third person, the person: (1) Takes, appropriates, obtains or withholds such property from an owner thereof... The car is James' property and it is not John's, even though James is dead. There is a legal process by which at some point in the future the car could become John's, but criminal acts are defined in terms of what is the case at the time of the act, not what might happen in the future. James' intent as expressed in the will notwithstanding, it is not guaranteed that John will become the car owner. So until John is actually the owner of the car, John is taking the property of another, and this is theft. | Illegal weapons Weapons are defined and are made illegal by statute. In many states, it is illegal to possess brass knuckles. For example, California penal code 12020(a)(1) makes it illegal to possess "any metal knuckles", "writing pen knife", "any leaded cane", among other things. I don't know of any state where it is illegal to pick up a stick, or keys, etc. So, yes, there is a legal distinction between your four scenarios. The mechanic is committing a crime by merely possessing the brass knuckles. The others are not committing a crime by the mere possession of the things you mention (unless there are states where they've been made illegal). Effect on a self-defense analysis Courts would have the jury go through the same self-defense analysis in each of these cases, regardless of the legality of the weapon used. We've described that analysis here. A pure self-defense analysis does not factor in the legality of the weapon that is used. But, if the weapon has been made illegal because of its disproportionate ability to injure, etc. that might weigh against the reasonableness of the force that was used when choosing to use that weapon in self-defense. Possession of an illegal weapon might also weigh against the credibility of the owner of that illegal weapon. | I have not read the news report so cannot comment on the alleged offences and police conduct, but what I can say is that the information to given on arrest may be found at section 28 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE): (1) Subject to subsection (5) below, where a person is arrested, otherwise than by being informed that he is under arrest, the arrest is not lawful unless the person arrested is informed that he is under arrest as soon as is practicable after his arrest. (2) Where a person is arrested by a constable, subsection (1) above applies regardless of whether the fact of the arrest is obvious. (3) Subject to subsection (5) below, no arrest is lawful unless the person arrested is informed of the ground for the arrest at the time of, or as soon as is practicable after, the arrest. (4) Where a person is arrested by a constable, subsection (3) above applies regardless of whether the ground for the arrest is obvious. (5) Nothing in this section is to be taken to require a person to be informed— (a) that he is under arrest; or (b) of the ground for the arrest,if it was not reasonably practicable for him to be so informed by reason of his having escaped from arrest before the information could be given. Note the provisions at subsection (3) do not require anyone else to be told the grounds (reasons) at the time of arrest - including members of the public, protesters, bloggers or the press. Kerb-side debates can seriously or significantly distract the officer from ensuring e.g. public safety or preventing e.g. an escape from custody. Also, depending on what else is going on e.g. say in a dynamic and volatile crowd control or public order situation, the person under arrest does not need to told immediately if it would be impractical to do so. The operative phrase being as soon as is practicable, which is not defined by statute as each case needs to be considered individually according to its own set of circumstances. The relevant case law is DPP v Hawkins [1988] 1 WLR 1166, but the only detailed commentary I can find online is behind the PNLD paywall1. Succinctly, the magistrates initially dismissed the case against Hawkins for assaulting four police officers who kept him under arrest without giving the grounds as required by s.28(3) PACE. The DPP appealed, and the Court of Appeal sent the case back to the magistrates saying, inter alia, although there is an obligation under s.28(3) to tell a prisoner of the reason for his arrest as soon as possible (sic) after his arrest, a constable was also under an obligation to maintain that arrest until it was practicable to do so. 1Or free to law enforcement officers | To me this seems analogous to failing to report a bank error in your favour, which amounts to theft in england-and-wales. I wrote an answer about that here. See that answer for the details but briefly there are five elements to establish under section 1(1) the Theft Act 1968: Dishonesty (section 2) Appropriation (section 3) Property (section 4) Belonging to another (section 5) Intention to permenantly deprive (section 6) As pointed out in the comments, there is a separate offence of abstraction of electricty in section 13 which only has the following elements: dishonesty, use of electricity, and lack of due authority. The courts have also held that electricity cannot be considered "property" for the purposes of the Theft Act (Low v Blease [1975] 1 WLUK 325). Arguably this offence is not commited here as you had due authority (permission from the supplier) to consume the electricity, however I will have a look later to see if I can find some case law on this point and edit it in if I find anything. With that said, "property" includes choses in action (section 4(1)). Choses in action are intangible property which can only be recovered by enforcing a right rather than by taking possession. In the case of a bank error, the resulting bank balance is a chose in action and the crime of theft is committed on that basis. In your scenario, the right to be paid for electricity you consume is a chose in action belonging to the supplier. Although I'm not aware of any case law specifically on this point, it seems to me that depriving the supplier from its right to be paid could satisfy the requirement of appropriation of property. The other elements of theft, as in the case of bank errors, are easily established here. Note that you won't be saved by "if and when the company does discover its error, I have no problem with paying the arrears". This is because of section 6(1) of the Act which states: A person appropriating property belonging to another without meaning the other permanently to lose the thing itself is nevertheless to be regarded as having the intention of permanently depriving the other of it if his intention is to treat the thing as his own to dispose of regardless of the other’s rights; and a borrowing or lending of it may amount to so treating it if, but only if, the borrowing or lending is for a period and in circumstances making it equivalent to an outright taking or disposal. Even if you eventually pay for the electrity, your intention was not to do so if they didn't notice. Note also that it is not necessary that there is a contractual requirement to notify the supplier of their mistake. Such a requirement can arise under common law (e.g. A-G's Reference (No 1 of 1983) [1984] 3 All ER 369, elaborated in my other answer). You didn't specify which part of the UK and this answer may not be applicable in Scotland or Northern Ireland. | Stealing money is theft, see RCW Chapter 9a.56 in Washington, and analogous laws in other jurisdictions. What you describe is theft, as defined under RCW 9A.56.020, and that is a crime. Defenses are available only in case of an open taking made under a good faith claim to title to the property ("it's my money"), or an irrelevant defense related to pallet theft from a pallet recycler. There is no exception arising for goods "in the possession of a criminal organization". There is also no applicable attainder process for declaring an organization to be a "criminal organization" to which such an exception could be referred, in Washington or any other state that I am familiar with. At the federal level, 18 USC Ch. 96 does not have a provision for declaring some organization to be a "criminal organization", but it does prohibit using proceeds from "a pattern of racketeering activity" that a person or organization participated in, to support a business engaged in interstate or foreign commerce. There is an extensive but specific list of trigger crimes, which are all federal crimes. Supposing that a state wanted to make it legal to steal from criminals, there would have to be a suitable definition of "criminal". Compare the various sex offender laws, where under dell-defined circumstances, a person is legally declared to be a sex offender required to register. If the property is in fact the proceeds of a criminal activity (not merely "in the possession of a criminal") or is used to support criminal activities, it might be seized under civil forfeiture statutes. However, those statutes only allow the government to seize the property – vigilante civil forfeiture is still theft, a crime for which you can be prosecuted. The state might seize such assets and, when challenged in court, may have to prove that the assets a seizable (this is highly jurisdiction-dependent). The prospects that a prosecutor will turn a blind eye to a theft on the grounds that the victims are criminals is pretty small. More likely, everything gets seized and everybody gets prosecuted. | The Act requires that After the installation of a solar collector, a person owning or in control of another property shall not allow a tree or shrub to be placed or, if placed, to grow on that property so as to cast a shadow greater than 10 percent of the collector absorption area upon that solar collector surface at any one time between the hours of 10 a.m. and 2 p.m., local standard time. The subsequent paragraph pertains to notice that can be given to property owners, and ultimately the tree would be deemable to be a public nuisance and subject to removal. However (25984): This chapter does not apply to any of the following: (a) A tree or shrub planted prior to the installation of a solar collector. (b) A tree planted, grown, or harvested on timberland as defined in Section 4526 or on land devoted to the production of commercial agricultural crops. (c) The replacement of a tree or shrub that had been growing prior to the installation of a solar collector and that, subsequent to the installation of the solar collector, dies, or is removed for the protection of public health, safety, or the environment. (d) A tree or shrub that is subject to a city or county ordinance. In other words, if you place a collector where an existing plant can eventually cause shade on the collector (it can be a short tree), you have no remedy. This follows the doctrine of coming to the nuisance. | It seems to me that some commentators/articles have inadvertently conflated different legislation and a recent event involving the seizure of equipment from protester Steve Bray in Parliament Square. Some articles about Steve Bray have named or otherwise referred to the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 without an explanation of any link between that person and this law - to me there is no link in the context of Bray's equipment seizure (the police may have mentioned other newer powers to Bray). Among other things, section 143 of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 (as amended) explicitly prohibits the unauthorised use of "amplified noise equipment" (including but not limited to loudspeakers and loudhailers) within Parliament Square and (the amendment) "the Palace of Westminster controlled area". Westminster Council provides a map in pdf format of the respective areas: Appendix to Protocol for enforcement of provisions in relation to noise nuisance in the vicinity of Parliament. Before the PRSRA 2011, sections 137 and 138 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 gave the Home Secretary the power to prohibit the unauthorised use of "loudspeakers" in "designated areas" no more than one kilometre around Parliament Square. Part 3 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 amends the Public Order Act 1986 in relation to "public processions and public assemblies", including clauses related to "noise". Section 78 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 abolished the common law offence of public nuisance and created the statutory offence of "intentionally or recklessly causing public nuisance". This more recent legislation has been criticised in relation to protests generally (not solely those that involve megaphones), e.g. by the Joint Committee on Human Rights its witnesses in their scrutiny of the-then Bill. Quote: The Bill introduces a new statutory offence of “intentionally or recklessly causing public nuisance” which was previously an offence at common law. There is a wide range of non-violent conduct that may be caught by the statutory offence, which potentially criminalises some forms of peaceful protest. The offence carries a maximum sentence of 12 months if tried summarily and 10 years if tried on indictment. A person can also be issued with a fine.77 A number of our witnesses raised concerns about the impact of these changes and its compatibility with Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR. We share some of those concerns. In summary the explicit prohibition of "amplified noise equipment" is limited to Parliament Square and "the Palace of Westminster controlled area" but one can easily imagine the police claiming that a protester's use of a megaphone is a public nuisance. |
GPL: Does changing makefiles and configurations considered as "modifications"? I know that editing GPL source code is considered as a "modification", which means all the copyleft rules apply. However, most software includes configuration files and makefiles which you can tweak before rebuilding. Does that count as modification? For example, I am using the swupdate package through Yocto. I override the meta-swupdate layer to specify specific configurations (e.g. CONFIG_LUA_PARSER=y to enable LUA parser), and then build swupdate. | Section 1 of the GPLv3 states: The “Corresponding Source” for a work in object code form means all the source code needed to generate, install, and (for an executable work) run the object code and to modify the work, including scripts to control those activities. The Corresponding Source need not include anything that users can regenerate automatically from other parts of the Corresponding Source. So Makefiles are clearly included if they exists. The point of the GPL is to let the user be free to modify the code. A lot of projects are very hard to modify without the scripts used to fetch dependencies & build the executable so not providing means to build the code would go against the license spirit. | All the CC licenses permit anyone to use the licensed content, and to make copies of it for others. Some of them permit using it for commercial purposes, others (the ones including the -NC- clause) do not. Some CC licenses permit creating modified versions of the original work (derivative works), others (the ones including the -ND- clause) do not. I do not know of any standard license which allows users to create and distribute derivative works, but not to distribute the original. The license used by Project Gutenberg permits re-use and re-distribution, but if a fee is charged beyond recouping expenses requires the removal of the PG name and logo. One problem is that if derivative works are allowed, this would include works which are only trivial modifications to the original, which would have the effect of allowing distribution of the original. If the main concern is about commercial sales, possibly a CC-NC-SA license would effectively serve the purpose? That allows redistribution, including of derivative works, but forbids commercial reuse or distribution without separate permission, and requires all redistribution to be under the same license. Otherwise a new license for this situation might have to be created. It is often a good idea to have the assistance of a lawyer with IP expertise in creating a new license, or the wording chosen may have unexpected effects or include unintended contradictions. Or one could simply place a basic copyright notice along with text such as "Modified versions may be created only with permission from the author. Request permission at [email protected]". However, if the work proves popular, there might be a large volume of requests. | You are concerned that your application is somehow a derivative work of MariaDB and therefore subject to the GPL. It's not totally clear to me whether that is the case or not. But it doesn't matter, because you are not distributing MariaDB itself (or any other part of your application). You're running it on a server which users are connecting to remotely. From MariaDB's licensing FAQ: Internal usage is free The GPL license only affects code that you distribute to other parties. Internal usage within an organization is totally free and not subject to any conditions. There is no such thing as 'internal distribution' that would restrict the usage of your code by requiring it to be GPLed. Connecting to a remote service that runs MariaDB (or any other GPL software) in the background is also free. For internal programs for which you own all the copyright(s), there is essentially no risk in using GPL software. The argument you can use in your defense is that if the software became GPL as part of the distribution, you as the copyright holder could immediately revert your part back to its original copyright. No one has the right to require you to reveal or redistribute your code to the outside of your organization even if you would have distributed it internally linked with GPL software! If your lawyers are concerned about distributions of software linked with GPL libraries between different legal entities within your organization, you can solve this by distributing your components and the GPL software separately, and have your other entity combining them. You can also switch to use the new LGPL client libraries. The use you have described in your question clearly falls into this case, and the presence of this FAQ item clearly demonstrates that the MariaDB developers intended to allow you to do this. The Free Software Foundation (the people who wrote the GPL) agree with this position for both unmodified copies and derivative works. Technically, you don't need a license to "use" a piece of software at all, assuming you have lawfully obtained it. But you're concerned about the possibility of creating a derivative work, for which a license is required. Fortunately, the GPL doesn't care about derivative works so long as they are not distributed. | Every software is potentially vulnerable, unless it runs on an air-gapped computer with sealed data ports. How vulnerability fixes are prioritized against other goals is usually a business decision, legitimately made by the management. There are some jurisdictions and issues where the law requires them to act, but again there is usually a judgement call involved. For example, the GDPR talks about due regard to the state of the art. What you describe seems to be a difference in opinion about the importance of the fix. Ask about that at Workplace SE, not here. There are ways for software developers to influence their management, but ultimately the management is responsible for the outcomes and gets to decide. You can inform your superiors, in writing. If you are in a large company, there may be a legal or compliance department. Inform them if you have a reason to distrust your superiors. In most jurisdictions, you cannot simply talk to the press, either now or later. If you believe that your company is acting criminally, talk to a lawyer. | Impressum Requirement Wow, based on your citations, you've done a lot of research on this topic. I'm just going to add one more reference, which is from the same site as your first German citation and has incredibly detailed and judicially referenced information on almost everything related to the Impressum. All my non-GitHub links are to sections of that page. Based on your research, I'm going to take it for granted that you understand that according to the Telemediengesetz (TMG), an Impressum is required on a web page if it is "business-like" (geschäftsmäßig), or if it helps, I prefer to word it as "potentially commercial." I would have to argue that open source projects have to be seen as inherently "business-like" for the purposes of the TMG for two reasons: Some other legal person may have similar software as part of their business and might have the need to serve legal notifications to the owner of a GitHub project (TMG § 8 gives competitors the right to sue). Think potential copyright violations here. It is possible to build a more traditional commercial business around open source, for example what Canonical is doing around Ubuntu. Additionally, the common legal advice is to even include an Impressum on a personal blog, though I'm not aware of any court case having occurred at that level yet. In my opinion, a GitHub account can be seen as more "business-like" than a personal blog, and would follow that advice out of caution. I'll note that the XING situation you bring up is complicated. It centers over whether the content of XING pages is "business-like" according to the TMG. It may well turn out that some pages will need an Impressum and others won't. As for placing it in the project's readme.md, that might work but I have two concerns: The courts have essentially stated that the text of the link must imply that the required information under TMG § 5 is located there. For example, the words Impressum and Kontakt work, but the word Information does not. To me, "readme" is not sufficient, but this concern might be negated by the fact GitHub by default renders the readme.md directly on the project home page. While it has been ruled that the Impressum does not necessarily have to be directly on the home page (for GitHub, that would be the company's/users profile page), it must still be readily available in an intuitive location. I don't know if putting it in a project page satisfies the legal requirement. If it was sufficient, it's also likely that each project would have to have an Impressum so that it can't be missed. Examples The dominant pattern that I could find1 on GitHub is an off-site link to the Impressum contained in the profile page's byline right underneath the title. Examples: https://github.com/sedadigital, https://github.com/comsysto, https://github.com/znes, https://github.com/eSagu, https://github.com/TIBHannover. I'm almost certain this meets or exceeds the legal requirements. Example screenshot: Additionally, I found a few that had a repository specifically for an Impressum. Example: https://github.com/johsteffens. Since these repositories were clearly visible on the user's main page (either because there weren't enough repositories to make them span multiple pages, or because it was specifically pinned to the main page), I would argue these also meet the legal requirement for being readily available. While I didn't find any examples of it, another possibility would be to combine the above two approaches, having a link in the byline that links to an Impressum repository or some other page within GitHub. This would be useful if you didn't otherwise have an Impressum hosted elsewhere. There were also scattered examples of people placing an Impressum on a project wiki page or on an impressum.md file at the top level. However, none of the users I looked at were consistent in doing this across all their projects. Also as previously mentioned, it's questionable whether not having it on the main user profile page meets the legal requirement. The Wiki page in particular I don't think meets the requirement that it can easily be found. Found using the following Google search: site:github.com impressum -impressum.php -impressum.html -impressum.jsp -impressum-manager -github.io -issue. Exclusions meant to filter out a lot of false positives, mostly projects for websites that had their Impressum in code format meant for deploy and not for display on GitHub itself. | "Pastiche" is a literary, not a legal term, and as a professional coder, I would not use it to describe code that to some extent imitated other code. The legal question here is: is your code a derivative work of the code it is based on, and if it is, did you have permission to make that work. Copyright, in an Berne Convention country, which includes the EU, does not protect ideas and concepts, it protects expression. It protects the choices of words and symbols, and other forms of expression. If all you did was study example code, presented for educational purposes, and then write code that performs a similar function, using the same general techniques, then I don't think you have infringed copyright. That, after all, is why people post code to Stack Overflow and similar sites, to allow them to learn how to use specific coding techniques, including in commercial projects. I have used techniques posted to SO to do coding as part of my paid job. The usual test for copying under US law is "substantial similarity". This takes into account cases where there is essentially only one way to say or code something. I don't know the exact tests under the various laws of various EU countries, and they will not all be the same. But I suspect that on this point they are, well, substantially similar :). I can't advise on your specific situation. But if it is as described, I don't think you have a problem. | Yes, you can. To be precise, I claim that one can take BSD-licensed code and distribute it under the combined terms of both the BSD and the GPL licences. We know that, if I receive someone else's code under a BSD licence, I may redistribute it to you under those same terms. This is common practice, and not (I hope) in any way contentious. We also know that I may not redistribute it to you without the conditions that the BSD licence imposes; that is, I may not place less onerous conditions on you than BSD requires (that is, requiring the inclusion of the original copyright notice, the disclaimer, this list of conditions, and a prohibition on claiming the original author's endorsement on any modified version). So the question becomes whether I can distribute that code whilst adding more onerous terms than the BSD licence itself imposes. It is clear that I can. As the question notes, Microsoft is known to have taken code which it received under a BSD licence and used it in proprietary products. These come with very onerous conditions on the the use, modification, and redistribution of the derived code (usually, they permit one instance of it to be run, and no modifications nor redistributions of any kind). For clarity: if I were to seek from Microsoft permission to modify and/or redistribute the derived code, and they were to grant it, they would not be able to free me from the BSD requirements as they applied to the derived code; I would still need to comply with those. But they are perfectly capable of applying new, onerous requirements of their own. The GPL imposes conditions on redistribution that are more onerous than BSD's, but less onerous than those of most proprietary licences. I am therefore perfectly entitled to receive code under a BSD licence, and - with or without making modifications of my own - redistribute it, adding in the GPL's requirements, if I choose to. If I haven't modified the code, those added requirements are probably pointless; if you don't wish to be bound by them, you will go and get the code from the original author, who presumably will happily distribute it to you under the BSD licence. But if I have modified the code, and you wish to use those modifications, then you will need to abide by the requirements of both the BSD and the GPL licences, since both will apply to this new, combined work (the original code + my changes). | This is similar to giving a hammer and needing to state to one is not responsible if the taker uses it to hit their head with. I believe this is the wrong analogy to use here. It would be more like giving somebody a hammer and saying you are not responsible if the head flies off and injures you. There is a concept in "things" you obtain called "fitness for purpose", so if you download open-source software like a registry cleaner, and it deletes your entire registry, the "WTFPL" doesn't absolve the authors of liability. Explicitly denying any kind of "fitness for purpose" or warranty helps shield the author from legal claims (even if they are meritless) because it kills it out of the gate. It's possible that the WTFPL license granter/author could still be sued and have to defend themselves in court because it isn't explicitly stated that there is no warranty or fitness for purpose. Open source does not mean that it's "use at your own risk", which is why there are so many types of licenses and disclaimers. From comments: Thank you for this very clear answer. Does the fact that someone willingly retrieves free code with no control of the provider changes anything? (vs a software vendor which provides code suitable for A and B, in exchange for money) I think closer to your hammer analogy where I would sue the producer of hammer XXX, a hammer I found on the street or which was given to me without involvement of vendor XXX. No, this doesn't change anything. The software vendor here is the person who writes the code, even if they don't charge for it. They are the ones who license the software and they are the ones who take some level of responsibility for it. In this case, the software author is the "hammer producer" that you would sue... If you buy "Registry Cleaner XL" from Best Buy and it bricks your computer, you don't sue Best Buy, you sue the person who authored the software. In pretty much every case, the author is the responsible party, not the vendor, and it is the author who licenses it, not the vendor (the vendor just acts as an intermediary). |
Why is Silk Road criminal but not LocalBitcoins? How are the Localbitcoins.com founders safe from money laundering laws? LocalBitcoins says its purpose is to connect buyers and sellers. That legalese makes it escape criminal laws. What about Silk Road? Ross Ulbricht doesn't sell drugs. Someone using his service does. | It comes down to intent ... and possibly responses to illegal activity. Localbitcoins intention is to facilitate trade in bitcoins - in itself a legal undertaking. Cryptocurrancy transactions can be used for illegal purposes but it is not the sites intention to enable that. Amazon.com intention is to facilitate trade in books - in itself a legal undertaking. Some books contain material that is prohibited under some countries laws but it is not the sites intention to enable trade in illegal books. Ebay.com intention is to facilitate trade in "stuff" - some "stuff" is illegal but it is not the sites intention to enable trade in illegal stuff. Silk Road intention was to facilitate trade in illegal goods and services - therefore they are accessories to the crimes committed. | Well ... the crime of fraud and the tort of deception. If you say you will do X and enter a contract on that basis knowing that you won't then that is fraud and it carries gaol time. Your bank could also revoke your contract and sue for damages. | No LLC or corporate entity exists around or in relation to SoftDAO. That's a bad thing, not a good thing, to those involved. Mr. Founder is obviously liable. When he wrote the DAO, he intended that it compete with IncumbentCo, and thus almost certainly intended that the software would violate the patent. And it doesn't matter that he's not the majority owner - he's still a part owner, meaning he's profiting from the infringement. Furthermore, he promoted the scheme, and according to 35 U.S. Code § 271(b), "Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer." Mr. Large, and any other identifiable part owner, is liable. Mr. Large did not commit a crime himself and generally is a good citizen. Good for him. But lots of people get sued that never committed a crime. Suing Mr. Large is like suing an Enron shareholder for owning Enron shares. Typically we do not sue shareholders. But he isn't a shareholder, and that's critical. If you want the benefits of a publicly traded company, you need to actually make a publicly traded company. Mr. Large is being unfairly targeted simply because he is a public figure with association with the project due to the Fortune Magazine article. Yes, he's being sued because of the article, but so what? It's like saying the police unfairly targeted you for an underage drinking citation because you were dumb enough to post yourself on Facebook. That argument won't fly in court. IncumbentCo can pick who they want to sue. It is nearly impossible to prove that Mr. Large is the 30th largest owner of SoftCoin. Court warrant allowed the Court to find some of Mr. Large's public keys on the SoftCoin blockchain, but the blockchain says he is actually only the 100th largest owner now. It doesn't matter. He's a part owner, by his own admission and by the blockchain evidence. The developers are also liable, also potentially for the whole amount. They created software that infringed a valid patent, and profited from it. If they can't shut it down, they can't shut it down, but they're going to be paying. I'm thinking this is a case where joint and several liability applies; IncumbentCo can go after any particular one of the owners and developers for the entire amount if they feel like it, and then it would be up to that person to then sue anyone else he thinks is partially liable. If Mr. Large is a billionaire and could pay the entire judgement himself, they might just do that. They'd probably go after Mr. Founder for as much as they thought they could get out of him, though. The users are also liable, since the law provides that using a patented invention without authority is infringing. But they're only liable for their one copy, and IncumbentCo may not bother with them, at least initially. However, the SoftDAO owns no assets No, but IncumbentCo is going to seek injunctions against selling SoftCoins or running the software. Could some people slip through the cracks? Sure. People infringe copyright all the time online, and only some get caught. You could easily imagine someone selling pirated software in exchange for cryptocurrency. This would be little different. | You tag the question with "criminal law", suggesting that by "illegal" you mean "is it a crime" -- that would depend on jurisdiction, but in the US or my state, it is not a crime. There are crimes that you could commit with such an account, but violating the TOS is not itself a crime. However, it is illegal, a breach of contract, as you can see from the TOS "You will not provide any false personal information on Facebook, or create an account for anyone other than yourself without permission". | There is no intention to commit theft, so there is no criminal act on the part of the customer. Even if there was a criminal act, the ability of the restaurant to detain the cusomer (citizen's arrest) is very limited in most jurisdictions. The restaurant can ask the customer for his name and address, but there is no legal obligation on the customer to provide this. Refusal to do so, however, might be evidence of intention to avoid paying and at that point the restaurant might call the police. The customer can leave, and the restaurant can pursue the debt through the civil courts if they have means to do so - they may have CCTV of the customer and his car registration which can be traced. Petrol stations, where people often fill up and then realise they can't pay, usually have established "promise to pay" procedures where they take the customer's details and the customer has 48 hours to pay before police or civil enforcement action is taken. | (assuming United States law here, though I'd be surprised if it were significantly different in other jurisdictions with such restrictions) Your friend is incorrect: that would be a new offense, for which Person A could be prosecuted anew. If your friend's logic were correct, once a person is convicted of robbing a store, they'd be free to rob that store without repercussions for life. It's worth noting that the conviction isn't relevant: the prohibition of double jeopardy in the United States prevents even multiple prosecutions (except, in some cases, for separate state and federal prosecutions or foreign prosecutions). | There is nothing illegal with doing this (absent specific contractual terms or industry regulations to the contrary in particular cases, e.g. in the case of export controlled high technology products). This is called operating a wholesale business or operating as a broker. Lots of legitimate legal businesses have this business model. | Is Crypto the same as any foreign currency? No. Crypto is generally treated as a commodity and capital asset, like gold, and not like a currency, under U.S. tax law. Other jurisdictions vary in how they treat cryptocurrency legally and for tax purposes. Bitcoin (unlike other cryptocurrencies) is also regulated on a non-tax basis as a commodity by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. Other cryptocurrencies are regulated in the U.S. as securities by the Securities and Exchange Commission. Why not regulate it as a currency and not a security? Cyptocurrencies are not very much like currencies which is why they are not regulated in that way. The basis for treating it more like a security and less like a foreign currency for securities fraud/disclosure purposes is that it is a better fit to securities law which is designed for more varied legal arrangements than foreign currency laws. Foreign currencies are backed by the full faith and credit of sovereign countries (which are non-profit entities). Also, foreign currencies are transparently based upon laws that are almost always a matter of public record and relatively straightforward. And, of course, banks and money changing firms trading in foreign currencies are subject to significant tax and financial regulation of their own, although not as securities. In contrast, like other securities, cryptocurrencies are private creatures of contract created by entities with shareholders which do not have uniform legal properties. New "coins" can be created in different ways in different crypto currencies, and the relationship between the cryptocurrency to the non-crypto financial markets varies. Securities-like disclosures are necessary for members of the public dealing with it to understand the risks, benefits, and mechanics of the cryptocurrency in question. The U.S. Securities And Exchange position and its basis is suggested by the ABC News story linked in the question, which states: Coinbase has been targeted by U.S. regulators in a new lawsuit Tuesday that alleges the cryptocurrency platform is operating as an unregistered securities platform and brokerage service. The lawsuit from the Securities and Exchange Commission comes only a day after it filed charges against Binance, the world's largest crypto exchange, and its founder Changpeng Zhao are accused of misusing investor funds, operating as an unregistered exchange and violating a slew of U.S. securities laws. Coinbase shares plunged nearly 15% early Tuesday. In its complaint, the SEC said Coinbase made billions acting as the middle man for cryptocurrency buyers and sellers but did not give investors lawful protections while acting as a broker. “Coinbase has for years defied the regulatory structures and evaded the disclosure requirements that Congress and the SEC have constructed for the protection of the national securities markets and investors,” the SEC said in its complaint, which was filed in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. It seeks injunctive relief, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains plus interest, penalties, and other equitable relief. |
USPS Back Room - Trespassing? I go to my local post office nearly every day to drop off packages for online purchases. A couple of years ago, I had a van full and it would have taken many trips to bring them inside. I asked a clerk if there was an easier way. The supervisor came out and told me to drive around back. I came around back to the fenced (not gated) employee area. No one met me. So, I walked in. He pointed me to the empty carts. I took one, filled it up and brought it back inside and asked him where to put the cart. I handed him my paperwork and left. This was much easier for me. So, I started doing it every trip (4-6 times per week). The postal clerks all know me, see me and interact with me in the back room. I go to the far corner where the supervisor has his desk to hand him the paperwork. It seems like a decent arrangement. Makes it easier for me. No lines. And easier for them as I move the packages right to their sorting area. Although it is clear to me that I am allowed there, I still feel a bit odd for being in the clearly labeled "employees only" area. I would think that at any time, they could revoke this permission, but do not since it is mutually beneficial. I had some "Facebook lawyers" tell me that one day, I will get arrested. While I guess that could happen, I find it far more likely that if a postal police officer happened to be there one day, he'd question me, question the supervisor and either tell me that I cannot (or can) continue to access this area. Does the long-standing policy of allowing my access grant me some-sort of (revocable) license to continue until told otherwise? | Trespassing requires that you be on someone else's property without their permission. The supervisor has explicitly given you permission, so it's not possible for you to trespass. You are correct that someone with the proper authority could revoke this permission at any time, at which point you would have to leave or be guilty of trespassing. The only way this situation could constitute trespassing is if they revoke your permission and you ignore them. You can't trespass somewhere that the property owner has allowed you to be and you observe the rules they have set (which may be implied) for you being there. | Even though student status is not on the list of protected classes, this still might be discrimination. By proxy. Status as student can be a proxy for age, race, and/or color. Maybe even religion if there is a religious school nearby! In fairness to the store manager, when a pack of ten kids comes rolling in on the way home from school things can get pretty hectic. Rather than try to kick out the problem kids many managers will attempt to avoid the problem in the first place. Also, a sign like this might help the manager be less discriminatory. For example, let's say he lets all kids in and only kicks out the ones who are causing problems. If those problem kids are all in one protected class and it's different from the kids who don't get kicked out, the manager looks like he's discriminating based on that protected class. Discrimination by proxy can be hard to prove and I am not sure of the burden of proof in Canada. I have read that "Canadian experience" is used as a proxy in employment discrimination and has been getting some attention lately. That might be a good issue to keep an eye on as it may define proxy discrimination jurisprudence. | My thinking is that there was no meeting of the minds, thus no acceptance. ( I can see that shipping the goods implies acceptance, however I understand that acceptance implies a meeting of the minds - and there would have been subterfuge to modify the return page with the lower amount - thus at the moment of apparent acceptance there was no actual acceptance) I doubt you would have a case against the other party criminally, but quite possibly in a civil court. | Is this interpretation correct? YES Encounters such as this should normally fall within the non-statutory stop & account which covers police-initiated conversations with members of the public to ask general questions about their activities when there are no reasonable grounds to suspect an offence. The terminology varies from Force to Force, but can be summarised as: What are you doing? Why are you in the area? Where are you going? What are you carrying? There is no legal requirement or obligation to answer any of these questions, and the police cannot lawfully detain anyone to ask them - unlike the statutory powers under Stop & Search and Arrest covered by the OP. | Generally, if someone asks you to leave their property you have to leave*. Just because a place is owned by the public, doesn't mean anyone can go there any time they wish. Military bases, firehouses, and jails are owned by the public, but many of these have limited access to the public. It may be open to the general public, but that does not mean restrictions cannot be put into place, either on times, or activities, or individuals. For example, public parks often have time and activity restrictions; schools have the power to restrict individuals from their premises, either specifically or by general category. As a general point of law, the owner of any property, or their agent, can order anyone without the right to stay (e.g. not a co-owner or tenant), and that person must depart, otherwise that person is tresspassing. The Social Service Administrator is almost certainly an agent of the controlling entity that owns the property. Thus their demand that you leave the premises is enforceable, unless you have a non-revokable right to be in that space. *As user Justaguy points out there are some exceptions. Most notably, police can some times enter a property uninvited or against the owner's wishes (such as under emergency circumstances or with a warrant). | There are numerous practical solutions, such as calling their supervisor, or calling the employee of yours who set up this arrangement, or providing some kind of proof that you are the ultimate boss. From a legal perspective, (1) the guards are acting as your agents which gives them some authority to exclude people but (2) you can revoke that authority. There are many things that security guards can do to keep people out, and some of them would be technically illegal (others would be blatantly illegal and we can skip that). I'll cite Washington state criminal law, and you can probably find analogs in Mexican law. First, are they on your property? If you revoke permission to be in the property, that is trespass: (9A.52.070: Criminal trespass in the first degree.) (1) A person is guilty of criminal trespass in the first degree if he or she knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building. (9A.52.080 Criminal trespass in the second degree.) (1) A person is guilty of criminal trespass in the second degree if he or she knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in or upon premises of another under circumstances not constituting criminal trespass in the first degree. How are they stopping you? If they are physically stopping you, that is assault (battery), the severity of which depends in the degree of force: (9A.36.031: Assault in the third degree) (1) A person is guilty of assault in the third degree if he or she, under circumstances not amounting to assault in the first or second degree: (d) With criminal negligence, causes bodily harm to another person by means of a weapon or other instrument or thing likely to produce bodily harm; or (f) With criminal negligence, causes bodily harm accompanied by substantial pain that extends for a period sufficient to cause considerable suffering; or (9A.36.041: Assault in the fourth degree) (1) A person is guilty of assault in the fourth degree if, under circumstances not amounting to assault in the first, second, or third degree, or custodial assault, he or she assaults another. Another possibility is 9A.40.040 Unlawful imprisonment: (1) A person is guilty of unlawful imprisonment if he or she knowingly restrains another person. They don't have to actually use force, they can simply threaten to do so, which is 9A.36.070: Coercion. (1) A person is guilty of coercion if by use of a threat he or she compels or induces a person to engage in conduct which the latter has a legal right to abstain from, or to abstain from conduct which he or she has a legal right to engage in. Though the police are supposed to enforce the law, they may decline to act if it us not clear to them that there is a violation of the law. It would not really help to prove that you own the company, because nobody really knows the relationship between the company and the building – maybe you own the company, someone else owns the building, and you've been legally evicted. So looking for a legal solution isn't the most productive use of your time. Instead, make sure you can contact the guard supervisors, company colleagues in charge of security, and carry your ID badge with you. Let us suppose that the guard company, guards, and your security chief are conspiring to rob you. The long-term and slow solution is to get a court order plus sue the pants of everybody who has done you wrong. The crux of the matter for the police would be, who owns the building (what evidence do you have that you own the building). I could actually show the police proof that I own my house. If the crooked security chief shows up with a document saying that he owns the building, you'd be stuck. But otherwise, establishing ownership of the building should cause them to stop the guards from blocking you. Unless the cops are part of the conspiracy. There's nothing you can do to absolutely protect yourself against a well-planned conspiracy (they make movies based on that). | To be very straightforward, yes, a police department would very likely have records of their past interactions with you in the form of police reports. They cannot just throw them away because it's been scrubbed from your public record. They detail the interactions the police officer had with you. That being said, those records would not show up in a general inquiry into your record, because those records are meant to protect the officer and the department as a reference point they can go back to in case some dispute arose in the future. If a police officer really wanted to find them, they'd have to do a bit of digging for them. The difficulty in finding them would depend on what system the particular police department uses to store those records. Smaller departments may just file them in a cabinet somewhere, whereas larger ones may actually have their own searchable database. But a traffic cop out on the street is only gonna see what you're seeing at the DMV - nothing. There is also a formal NCIC database, but traffic violations would never end up in there. That is a national database that basically stores red flag persons of interest (think stolen vehicles, sex offenders, and gang members). Sometimes multiple departments within a state will share their information with each other, but a department's database is usually kept to that department only. Also keep in mind court records. The court case that had a violation removed under such and such conditions is still gonna be a public record. Those records would generally be available to a judge overseeing your case so if you repeatedly end up in court for the same thing, they're gonna know and they're gonna stop scrubbing it from your record or offerring certain options because you're clearly not learning your lesson. Many laws allow you to have one offense stricken per year and similar stuff like that, but that kind of stuff doesn't just permanently disappear. They have to keep record of it in order to know you've already had your once per year etc. Also a note about parking violations: not all of those are actually issued by police. If it was issued by a private firm then that is not something that would ever show up on your record. It would just be in a database somewhere with whatever private firm issued the fine. Those kind of tickets get sent to collections and hurt your credit score if you don't pay them, rather than affecting your driving record. | I'm assuming you are talking about something like this You didn't specify where you live, but in many places it is illegal to block the sidewalk with a car. I just looked up my local ordinances and it is there. In fact, it is your driveway, but often the land up to and including the sidewalk is considered part of a public easement. Typically you are required by law to maintain any grass in the easement, but if the sidewalk were to fall into disrepair, the local government would fix it. Information on easements can also be found in your local ordinances, here is an example in my area. Should I fight this ticket? You can try, but I doubt you will win. Is there anything I can do to my driveway to allow me to actually use it? I would suggest asking on Lifehacks. And post a link here to your question if you do, I'd be curious to know what they come up with. |
What is minimum that needs to be said in order to legally record a telephone conversation? When dealing with unscrupulous companies (especially insurance companies), I have learned that it is essential to record telephone conversations. Many times, I have been provided with grossly incorrect information, but when I later try to confront them about the false information they have provided, the company simply denies it. Their unethical behavior relies on the fact that I have no proof of what was previously communicated. I have repeatedly been told that it is legal for them to record me, but that it is illegal for me to record them. To my understanding, this is an incorrect understanding of the law. As long as both parties are notified that the recording is taking place, my understanding is that both parties may lawfully record the call. I am seeking the minimum required statement that will allow me to lawfully record calls. I find that if I ask permission to record a call, the person on the other end often gets highly defensive and tells me that recording calls is illegal (which is ironic given that they have often just informed me that they are recording the call). Instead of asking permission, is it sufficient to simply state that the call is being recorded? By continuing the call, has the other party provided consent without explicitly being asked? In order to not violate any laws, what is the verbiage you recommend in order to maximize their willingness to continue with the call being recorded, without scaring them off? Here are a several ideas to use: I am required to notify you that this call may be recorded. I am required to notify you that this call is be recorded. All calls on this line may be recorded. All calls on this line are recorded. Do all these meet the legal requirements for recording a telephone call? Which of the above do you recommend, or do you recommend anything better? Note: The calls currently originate in California (USA), and the companies called are often located in California, but not always. Some of the calls are with Medicare or CMS (government agencies). | If they are recording you, you can record them Assuming that recording requires two-party consent (not all places do), when they informed you that the call may be recorded, they gave consent to it being recorded (obviously) and you gave consent by not hanging up. The consent requirement has been met so anyone and everyone can record it. | A party may subpoena materials from a nonparty using a subpoena under Rule 45. A party may generally subpoena anything that is within the scope of discovery under Rule 26, i.e., any material that is relevant, not privileged, and proportional to the needs of the case. Rule 45 also protects third parties from subpoenas that impose an "undue burden," but I would argue that this is essentially the same thing as Rule 26's proportionality requirement. Records of phone calls, e-mails, and text messages are routinely subject to subpoenas under Rule 45, but again, that assumes that the messages are relevant and not privileged. Records to Facebook and Google can be a bit more complicated. I don't know that the question has actually been definitively answered, but social-media companies seem to take the position that access to certain records created by their users is exempt from subpoena under the Stored Communications Act. | Defamation requires communication to a third-party I can say (or write) anything I want about a person directly to that person and, unless it is a threat, they have no recourse at all. I can call them a liar, a thief, a Nazi, or a goat fornicator. Of course, I have to be careful – calling them a “bastard” might be a slur on their mother communicated to a third-party (them) which would give her a right to sue although that would require a literal and largely archaic use of the term. That said, you do need to check with your lawyer if you can redact names in the face of a subpoena - complying with a legal obligations is a legitimate use of personal data under GDPR. | The answer is, "No, it will not default to the state where the recording device is located." Whether your recording is legal or not may depend on where the device is located, but it may depend on other things as well. For example, to sue under Florida law, "the persons bringing suit must be Florida residents or the improper "interception" must have occurred in Florida." Thus, if the someone from NY is recorded while in Florida by someone in NJ, Florida law does not apply. The rules used to determine which state's laws apply under which circumstances are explained thoroughly here. The issue of which state's laws apply is what is known as "conflict of laws." The basic idea is simple: Because you and the insurance company are citizens of different states, you have "diversity of citizenship." If the laws in your states differ, the court must decide whose law applies -- is it the state you called from, the state you called to, or federal law? Unfortunately for you, choice of law is hard even for lawyers to get a handle on. There are several different approaches states use to answer questions about conflict of law. Which approach a state uses to settle conflicts of law will determine whose law that state's courts will apply. To get a correct answer, you need to talk to an attorney who understands conflict of law and the admissibility of wiretaps. | The information in telephone books is public. so are postal change-of-address records. So are records of the ownership of real estate. So are vital statistics such as birth records. So are voter registration lists -- i myself purchased a voter registration list (in digital form) for a municipality which showed people's names, addresses, and the years when they voted, when I was a political candidate for local office in NJ. It cost about $100. I believe that many states also make driver's license information available for a fee to marketers. Credit records are available for certain limited purposes, also. No doubt there are other public sources I haven't thought of. If such a site relies on public records, or other publicly available data, it is not illegal. Many such sites offer to remove names on an opt-out basis, but there is no legal requirement that sites do so. This kind of information is not considered nto be "private facts" under US tort law. Aside from opting out, if the sites provide that option, I don't think you have any recourse. One could ask the local legislature to pass a law prohibiting such sites, or making them require consent, similar to the GDPR that the EU has. But I don't know of any such law in the US to date. | It is any law protecting me from the people that distrubute a video of me falling the stairs and shared without my permision? No. Your permission is not necessary for distributing or watching that video. The recording was from your workplace, where your entitlement to privacy is quite limited unlike few settings such as (1) your attorney's office in the course of obtaining legal advice for which the disclosure was needed, or (2) your home. Even if such an entitlement existed, your decision to share that recording with the person who was with you generally constitutes a waiver of your right to privacy regarding that incident. The waiver would apply even if California had some legislation akin to the EU's GDPR. Your description nowhere indicates that that person had a statutory or equitable duty of confidentiality. It is also highly doubtful that you would wish to block the distribution of the video if people instead of mocking you expressed something pleasant or encouraging to you. people who I don't even know their names come to me to comment about the video and joke about not falling again. That is not unlawful in and of itself. Since the matter does not involve a protected category such as sex, race, religion, or disability, pursuing a claim of hostile work environment would be quite a stretch. It would also be futile because any relief would not cover outsiders who watch the video and feel like joking about it. The notion of harassment entails a pattern of conduct (meaning that a person engages twice or more in that conduct) that causes a reasonable person to feel annoyed or concerned for his safety. Even if someone engages makes a few jokes that cause you to get annoyed, any petition for restraining orders seems unlikely to succeed. Sooner rather than later, the jokes will get old and people will move on. | In a deposition, attorneys are supposed to keep their objections short and refrain from making an objection that indicates to the witness how he should answer. A question might be objectionable because it lacks foundation, because it is compound, because it calls for speculation, etc. Example 2, for instance, could be said to assume that Ms. Redacted was involved, and I might not want my client to discuss how he would act in that situation. Some attorneys in that situation might say, "Objection, assumes that Ms. Redacted had anything to do with this, which you haven't proved, and it's impossible to say what would have happened under circumstances that never happened." This gives my client a pretty clear signal that he ought to make clear that Ms. Redacted wasn't around, and that he should try to avoid getting pinned down on any questions about what he would have done if she had been. This practice -- known as "a speaking objection" -- can be used to signal to the witness how best to answer, and it leads to huge fights in a deposition. To avoid those fights, courts have developed a practice of requiring lawyers to simply "object to the form," rather than coaching the witness. That puts the objection on the record so it isn't waived, and if it's truly problematic, the parties have an opportunity to explain in greater detail after the deposition is concluded. | When a complaint is first file, per case law, courts have a duty to believe each allegation you make on information and belief as long as they are each not contradicting any other statement or other evidence present at the time of filing. This isn't true. The court doesn't have to actually believe you. The court merely has to assume for sake of argument that the things said are true for the narrow purpose of evaluating whether they describe a legal wrong in a formal sense. Also, under modern federal pleading rules in the U.S., the judge doesn't have to believe you and can dismiss your complaint if it is not "plausible." Your attorney has a duty to not merely assume that everything that a client tells the lawyer is true. In federal court, the governing rule is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, which states that when an attorney files and signs a document in court that the attorney: certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances: (1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law; (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and (4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information. The California state law obligations is more or less identical in substance, although the procedural rules of California are codified differently than the federal rules. So, a lawyer is required to reasonably inquire into whether the client is telling the lawyer the truth about the client's motives and about the facts. It is a breach of the lawyer's duties to the court and the profession to simply take what a client tells the lawyer at face value, accepting it uncritically. |
Is it extortion if someone says they're going to compete with someone in business? Say someone mows lawns for a lawn care company they tell the owner they feel like they deserve a raise and if they don't get one they will quit and start their own competing lawn care company. Is that extortion? | A threat to start a competing business is not extortion. Federal law prohibts extortion generally as part of the Hobbs Act (18 USC 1951): The term “extortion” means the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right. In the case you've described, threatening to start a new business is not a use of force, or violence, nor is it "under color of official right," which generally refers to the exercise of your authority as a government agent. The most you could say is that it is intended to instill fear, but the statute additionally requires that the use of fear be "wrongful." I can think of no legally plausible argument that threatening to compete under the described circumstances would be considered wrongful. State laws generally impose similar requirements. Pennsylvania, for instance, defines extortion as a theft offense, at 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 3923: A person is guilty of theft if he intentionally obtains or withholds property of another by threatening to: (1) commit another criminal offense; (2) accuse anyone of a criminal offense; (3) expose any secret tending to subject any person to hatred, contempt or ridicule; (4) take or withhold action as an official, or cause an official to take or withhold action; (5) bring about or continue a strike, boycott or other collective unofficial action, if the property is not demanded or received for the benefit of the group in whose interest the actor purports to act; (6) testify or provide information or withhold testimony or information with respect to the legal claim or defense of another; or (7) inflict any other harm which would not benefit the actor. As you described the situation, the employee is attempting to obtain the property (additional money) from another (the employer), but he is not doing it by a prohibted means. Quitting and starting a competing enterprise is not (1) a criminal offense or (2) an accusation of one; (3) it does not expose any secret; (4) it is not official action; (5) it is not "collective action," and the property demanded is for the benefit of employee; (6) it is not testimony regarding a legal claim; and (7) the only harm inflicted would benefit he employee. In short, extortion laws should not present any barrier to the creation of a competing business. | Note: IANAL Does the placement of a sticker stating, "We accept XYZ credit cards," essentially obligate a business to accept that card? It depends on whether you mean whether they are obligated to provide goods/services to someone who presents the card, or whether, having provided goods/services, they are obligated to accept the card as payment. For the first question, the answer is "no". The credit card brand could theoretically go after them, however, as names of credit networks are trademarks, so claiming to accept a card but not doing so is trademark infringement. For the second, the answer is "pretty much". Since they misrepresented their establishment, there is no mutual assent and therefore no contract. If they try to use "defrauding the innkeeper statutes", those require fraudulent intent. If you fully intended to pay for you meal by a credit card, and it was their choice to refuse payment, then you have no fraudulent intent. The only avenue I can see for them is some sort of equity argument, but that would be problematic, especially if they ask for the retail, rather than wholesale, price, and not worth the hassle of collecting. So, legally, you can just walk out, but in practice if they have a bouncer they might make trouble for you. | They get paid either way I’m an arbitrator, adjudicator, and mediator and I’ll make this very clear: I don’t give a rat’s arse who wins. When I’m acting as a mediator I can go even further: I don’t give a rat’s arse if the dispute even gets resolved. My job is to do my job. To manage the process and, if making a decision is part of the process, make a decision. My paycheque is totally unaffected by who I decide for. Future employment prospects depend on you being good at the job. Bias is not being good at the job. Oh, yeah. Also, it’s the law that I’m impartial. In any event, most arbitration clauses give the parties no input in the selection of the arbitrator (e.g. by nominating the president of a professional association of arbitrators to appoint them) or require them to agree on the arbitrator. | There is nothing illegal with doing this (absent specific contractual terms or industry regulations to the contrary in particular cases, e.g. in the case of export controlled high technology products). This is called operating a wholesale business or operating as a broker. Lots of legitimate legal businesses have this business model. | Yes. The formation of a contract requires (among other things) that the parties intend to be legally bound. Their sending the offer from a corporate email address shows this. You replying in the same way shows your intention. Signatures are optional. Consider, verbal contracts are binding; how do you sign those? | They say they will award seven top prizes There are three people who are winners Acne lied about how many winners there would be and the fact that there were proposed to be more than there were may have induced people to enter. Well, that looks like sufficient evidence to prove the tort of misrepresentation right there. I'll run the class action on a contingency basis. | Possibly In most contracts, the parties sign in their capacity as people (or agents for other people). However, some contracts are signed in the capacity as the owner of a piece of land and the contract transfers with the land. The liability rests with the current owner and, if unpaid, creates a lien over the property. These are particularly common in contracts with utilities or where the contract involves the a structure on the land. Surprise, surprise, the situation you describe involves both. You need to refer back to your contract for the land as these types of contracts are usually disclosed (unless they are a function of local law because everyone just knows - I don't know anything about Pa. law on this) and the original contract with the gas company. Your settlement may have also involved you paying a figure to purchase the gas in the tank as at the date of settlement. For example, in new-south-wales, council rates and water rates attach to the land as a matter of law and the vendor pays the purchaser for any amount they have paid in advance (or vice-versa if they are in arrears). Electricity and piped gas don't; the vendor ends their account on or before settlement and the buyer opens a new account on or after settlement and each pays for their own use. Propane for portable bottles doesn't but for fixed installations does as a matter of contract with the gas company. | Canadian law defines "theft" thus: Every one commits theft who fraudulently and without colour of right takes, or fraudulently and without colour of right converts to his use or to the use of another person, anything, whether animate or inanimate, with intent (to deprive the owner, pledge as security, mess it up) In this case, you accepted what seemed to be an offer of a free pizza, so if you took and consumed the pizza you did so with a colorable claim of right and without fraud. Perhaps you misunderstood, but it is not a crime to misunderstand another person's intent. They could sue you for the cost of the pizza (assuming that you took it and did not pay), in which case the question would be whether whatever they said to you could reasonably be interpreted as an offer of a free pizza (if not, pay for the pizza). As an advertising stunt, this would not be unusual. However, if they fix the pizza but then demand money before handing over the pizza, you now know that you have no right to the pizza (if you abscond with the pizza in that circumstance, it would be theft). You may of course pay for the pizza, but you can also not pay and not take the pizza. Again, they could sue you, and in this case your defense would be that there was no contract (no agreement). An important question would be how reasonable it is to believe that you were offered a free pizza. People are offered "free" steak dinners all the time (at the cost of sitting through a sales pitch), so that is a reasonable belief. If a Lexus yacht salesman appears to be offering you a free $5M yacht, it is not reasonable to think that this is an ordinary advertising stunt, if you're not a celebrity. |
What's the difference between the various degrees of murder? I often read the terms "first degree murder", "second degree murder" and "third degree murder" in US newspapers. I'm not from the USA, and these terms are quite confusing to me. I've tried reading the Wikipedia article on it, and while it does give a small amount of explanation, it essentially is 2 double-stub length paragraphs based around various jurisdictions, with a bunch of links to specific types of murder and methods of murder. What's the difference between first degree, second degree and third degree murder? | The definition of different degrees of murder and how severely they are punished varies from state to state, so an exact answer would require to list the definitions of all 50 states. So this answer is just a generalization. The main difference between first degree and second degree murder is typically that first degree murder requires that the perpetrator planned the murder in advance while a second degree murder was committed spontaneously. But the exact definition varies from state to state. In some states, certain ways of killing people are always first degree murder, no matter if they were planned or not. Some states do not even have different "degrees" of murder but use other classifications for different kinds of homicide. Third degree murder only exists in 3 states (Florida, Minesota and Pensylvania) and means something very different in each of them. | Double jeopardy does not apply to different offences [N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb... The Supreme Court has held that it means what it says - murder and rape are different offences and so the double jeopardy clause is not triggered. However, if an offence requires that the same elements (or a subset of them) be proved, then they are the same offence. So, for example, both murder and rape normally incorporate the elements of common assault - a person acquitted of either murder or rape cannot subsequently be charged with common assault. Further, the principle of res judicata applies to criminal cases as well as civil cases. Therefore any fact or issue of law that was decided in the first trial cannot be reagitated in the second. | You've got four cases there with four different reasons for substantial delays: In the case of the Aurora theater shooting, the shooter pled not guilty by reason of insanity. There's no doubt about who did it, but doubt was raised about the mental status of the shooter. Murder is not a strict liability crime, so the ability of the defendant to form the intent to commit the crime is relevant. In the case of the Charleston church shooting, the defendant was twice evaluated for competence to stand trial. Again, no doubt about who did it, but most if not all jurisdictions require a defendant to be sufficiently sane to participate in their defense. In the case of the Parkland shooting, the initial delay was confusion over who the defense lawyer would be. Florida will only provide a public defender to someone who cannot afford their own defense lawyer, and it took nearly a year to determine that the defendant had inherited enough money to afford a private lawyer. Due to this delay, the trial was initially scheduled for mid-2020, which caused it to be delayed by the COVID-19 outbreak. In the case of the Tree of Life shooting, it appears to be straight-up delaying tactics by the defense. There are a great many motions, appeals of motions, requests for delay, and other things a lawyer can do to slow things down. Since the defendant is currently being held without bail, the prosecution probably isn't strongly motivated to speed things up. | No. I'm going to assume we're talking about the US, where being convicted of a crime requires proof "beyond a reasonable doubt." Thus, our hypothetical friend has NOT committed murder. Nor has he committed manslaughter (as this too requires that somebody die) or attempted murder or manslaughter (as that requires an intent that the person should die). If it could be proven that the person our hypothetical scumbag ran over died as a result of being run over, our hypothetical scumbag would likely have committed negligent homicide or involuntary manslaughter; however, as these imply a lack of intent, they lack "attempted" versions (see People v. Hernandez, http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/court-of-appeals/1980/76-813.html though state laws differ and some may be weird). In short, he has not committed any flavor of murder or manslaughter. So, what other enterprising charge or legal proceeding might we be able to level against him? I'm sure one exists. I'll edit it in once I find it. Civil suit for wrongful death Normally, our hypothetical scumbag would find himself on the receiving end of a wrongful death lawsuit. This would require that he (1) owed the dead man a duty of care (which he clearly did; all motorists are obliged to exhibit reasonable care in operating their motor vehicles) and that he (2) breached that duty (which he presumably did), but also that (3) this failure caused the death of the guy he ran over (which you have stipulated that we cannot "even guess," which precludes a "preponderance of the evidence" (the standard for civil matters)) and that (4) that person's death has caused actual, quantifiable damages to the plaintiff (which it can't as "nobody knows him"). Reckless driving charge In most states, our hypothetical scumbag's behavior meets the threshold for reckless driving. For example, in VA law: [In reckless driving cases, e]ither the driver is believed to have driven recklessly in a manner that threatened people or property, to have driven 20 miles per hour or more in excess of the speed limit, or to have exceeded 80 miles per hour, no matter the speed limit. http://manassascriminalattorney.com/2015/10/can-reckless-driving-in-virginia-be-a-felony-charge/ In some states, this may be felony reckless driving; in others, it may be a mere misdemeanor. Misc links https://www.virginia-criminallawyer.com/homicide-laws-virginia-code.html http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/proving-wrongful-death-civil-case.html A forum discussion that (thank heaven) cited its sources: http://www.top-law-schools.com/forums/viewtopic.php?t=155412 | The pardon does what it says it does Typically, the pardon is given for which the accused has already been convicted. Therefore, the principle of double jeopardy applies: the person has already been tried on the facts and all the charges that were or should have been brought have been determined. This, of course, doesn't prevent charges from being laid for other crimes allegedly committed at other times over different events. In the case where a person is pardoned more broadly, as in the Michael Flynn example, in addition to the double jeopardy limitation, a prosecutor is prevented from charging anything that falls within the scope of the pardon. Pardons do not constrain civil suits If you are pardoned of say, murder, that does not prevent the victim's dependants from bringing a wrongful death suit, just as being found not guilty wouldn't. These are different cases with different parties and the pardon has no effect. Similarly, a Federal pardon does not prevent a State (or another country) from laying charges over the same matter and vice-versa. | In the United States, we use the phrase "Reasonable Person" which is not to say an average person or a simple man, but an individual who understands the limitations of the situation and would act in accordance with that knowledge. For example, if a doctor improperly rendered help a patient, his actions would be evaluated based on reasonable knowledge of people with his medical knowledge, where as a person practicing medicine without a license would be subjected to a more common-man standard. The phrase person is therefor substituted for a reasonable individual and thus, a "Reasonable Landlord/Renter" could exist in housing cases, or a "Reasonable Doctor" in medical torts or "a Reasonable Woman" in sexual assault cases, so the "Reasonable Person" is often used to allow the jury to put themselves in the shoes of the witnesses and the accused and see how they would react (Historically, the term was called a "Reasonable Man" though "Reasonable Person" was used to make the term more neutral to what the definition of "Man" was (A human male or a member of the Human Species, regardless of gender). | What they teach in self-defense courses is legally irrelevant, though has a practical basis. Under the law, options 1 and 2 are "preferred" because those actions cannot be considered criminal. Shooting a person is potentially a crime (assault or homicide): but it can be legally excused under those circumstances deemed to be "self defense". If shooting a person is justified in self defense, it isn't assault or murder. It is legally "better" to main than to kill, because maiming is less force than killing, and the general rule is that one should use the least force necessary to defend yourself. That is because on the one hand you should not use force against another person, but on the other hand you have a right to live and if a person attempts to deprive you of your life, you are justified to use force to stop them. The degree of force allowed is related to the threat posed. Every legal system encourages putting "shoot to kill" in last place – no jurisdiction favors using maximum possible force in self defense. I think what is confusing you is that as a practical matter, shooting to maim is riskier, and the consequences of erring in favor of less force may be your death. It has nothing to do with killing witnesses (which is illegal), even if that is what they taught you in your self defense class. Brandishing a weapon is also illegal but involves even less force, and is even less effective as a means of self defense. | If I remember the case correctly, he didn't make his home look uninhabited (that is nobody is living there) but as if the inhabitants had left (gone shopping etc.) to make it look attractive to burglars. He then waited inside, armed with a gun, with the intent of shooting any burglars that might arrive. He shot the first burglar in the legs, and then proceeded to kill the unarmed and now defenseless burglar, who was lying injured on the ground and was in no position anymore to hurt him. He then did the same with a second burglar, shooting her in the legs, then shooting her multiple times, and when he found she was still alive, he shot her point blank in the face while she was lying on the ground. You are asking the wrong questions. You are asking "is it illegal to remove a truck". It's not. What is illegal is to intentionally create a situation where you shoot people and try to claim "self defence". It can very well be argued that by luring burglars into your home with the intent to kill them, they are not actually illegal in that home, because you wanted them to be there. You can do many things that are each completely innocent but add up to a crime. Actually, for everyone interested, I posted a question maybe last week or the week before whether you can be convicted for both first degree murder and second degree murder for killing a person, and it was exactly this case that inspired the question. What should he have done? If he hadn't lured the burglars in, I believe the case would have still been a double murder, since he killed both unarmed teenagers when they were absolutely no threat. It might not have been first degree murder since it would not have been premeditated. But he intentionally lured them in, making it premeditated (first degree) murder. If he had only injured them, the fact that he lured them in could very likely have made this an assault. You asked: "Now that the burglars are in his house, what should he have done? " Well, he got himself into a dangerous situation. Remember, he was convicted for premeditated murder. So just before he shot the girl in the head, he should have instead put the gun away and called police and an ambulance. It would have been one murder instead of two. Just before he shot the boy, he should have put the gun away and called police and an ambulance. It would have been just attempted murder. When he heard the first person entering, he should have called the police and waited. When the burglar came in sight, he should not have shot and injured him. It's a similar question to "if I try a bank robbery and there is an armed guard, what should I do". The only legal thing to do is to drop your weapon and wait to be arrested. If an armed burglar had appeared instead of two unarmed teens, well, he would have put himself into a dangerous situation. Just as the burglar would have no right to shoot even if a home owner points a weapon at him, he had no right to shoot, no right to self defense, since he had intentionally created the situation. Tough shit. That's what you may get if you plan a murder. Responding to some comments: @J.Chang Are you being serious? You are not allowed to make your house inviting to burglars, while waiting inside with the intent of killing them. Self defense only applies when a reasonable person would believe they are in danger. Reasonable persons don't think that a burglar comes in with the intent of blowing themselves up and taking the home owner with them. And no, you don't get to "assume the worst". Not when the worst is something no reasonable person would expect. Thanks to Dale for pointing out that even for soldiers in a war situation, where different rules apply, deliberately killing a helpless enemy combatant is murder. |
Would using a StableCoin bypass the "Money Transmitter" laws in the US? I'm considering a startup that allows news/content creators to collect nano-payments (~$0.01) for their content. Since transactions of that size are unreasonable to charge individually by Stripe/etc, I would need to have some kind of virtual wallet to store small amounts of liquid money. From my research, I see that this would put me under heavy US regulation, and I'd like to avoid that, since it would require huge funding to hire lawyers to do something like that. Would using some kind of cryptocurrency stablecoin, meaning it has a stable value of $1:1coin, allow me to bypass this regulation? Here's an example of a service that would in theory allow me to take payments and store the money in stablecoin rather than in a bank account. Would doing something like this solve my problem? Thanks for the help! | I see that this would put me under heavy US regulation, and I'd like to avoid that, since it would require huge funding to hire lawyers to do something like that. There are many reasons for financial and banking industry regulations; namely, fraud protection, corruption and money laundering preventions, use of crypto to avoid taxes and records, etc. If you're serious about a startup that involves financial transaction, one of the first things you do is find a law firm to advise you on the legal plausibility of an idea. And be prepared to spend thousands and thousands of dollars in legal fees for regulatory approval. Would doing something like this solve my problem? You're really going to trust randos on the web for legal advice? | This would be entirely dependant on the jurisdiction. The things that would need to be legal to make this transaction legal are: Is the sexual act legal? Is gambling legal? Ongoing consent by both parties To make this an enforceable contract, in addition you would need: Sexual acts to be valuable consideration, basically, is prostitution legal? The fundamentals of a binding contract: intention, legality of objects etc. | at what point can you just leave? Is it always technically illegal in the UK to leave without paying the bill? Probably depends on what you mean with just leaving. If just leaving translates I haven't paid and I won't pay (because of the hassle with the card) then that's probably Making Off Without Payment, section 3 Theft Act 1978 (Thanks @bdsl). Could the restaurant just force you to wait until close of business if necessary? What if they still hadn't fixed the payment system by then? I don't think a restaurant can physically detain you. Not even the 45 min you have been waiting. But if you leave without paying and without an agreement with them how & when to pay they can of course call the police because again that looks very much like making off without payment. According to your post, they did provide a payment system (cash) which was working all the time and that moreover has the special status of being legal tender. if you don't physically have the cash on you, you can be sued? You can be sued if you don't pay your bill (assuming the bill itself is correct) when it's due. In order to avoid endless hassle of the "I tried to pay via x, but they wouldn't accept this." type, legal tender defines ways of payment of a debt that the creditor/seller must accept. In many legislations, cash in the local currency provides such a fallback if other payment methods fail. Note that cash payment is very robust against internet failure, broken devices and power The UK (+ US) meaning of legal tender is that the restaurant must accept this means of settling the debt (at this time, the food is already eaten but not payed) - but they don't have to accept any other means of payment. (Note that e.g. for the EUR-countries there is at least a recommendation to make acceptance of legal tender mandatory also in retail, which includes simultaneous exchange food vs. payment). The 2nd important implication of this is that any argumentation along the lines that no reasonable means of payment were available would be very weak. You are not required to have sufficient cash with you to pay your bill if you can reasonably assume that some other way of payment will be acceptable to the restaurant. I see that like a spare wheel for a car: if you have a flat tire (card doesn't work) having a spare wheel (cash) allows you to deal with the issue with less hassle than if you don't: change your wheel vs. having to get your car brought to a workshop and wait until they put on a new tire (pay cash instead of waiting for the card to work again or a tedious hunt for another payment method). I'd like to point out that card doesn't work and not sufficient cash at hand (or forgotten purse) is something that happens quite often in general (rarely for any given transaction, but we have lots of transactions). I'd expect a restaurant or a gas station to be experienced in dealing with that. In any case, there are several possibilities to resolve the issue short of "just leaving": The key to all this is communication: talk to the restaurant to find a way to resolve the issue. Reassure them that you're not trying to use the opportunity to defraud them - that's what they are afraid of in this situation. "Where can I find an ATM?" Possibly offering a deposit: "And would you mind looking after my bag [phone] until I'm back?" Possibly showing them your ID card (or similar, if you have any) so they have your address: remember that so far you are an anonymous customer for them: which means that suing you for the money would be somewhere between too expensive and impossible. If you are a group, it should be sufficient if only one of you leaves in search of cash. Credit cards can be charged in a total offline way (MOTO = mail order/telephone order) where the credit card data is entered manually by the seller: the restaurant may be able to charge your credit card if fill in a paper credit card payment form. They may accept settlement via other payment systems: paypal & Co. wire the money via your online banking account (even if that doesn't give an instantaneous transfer, ask them if that's OK with them if you show/forward them the "transfer accepted message" for now) allow them to withdraw the money from your account via direct debit or something similar I'd not expect a restaurant to accept this possibility as they're probably not familiar with it and it means a lot of hassle for them with their bank to get listed to receive money that way. if you are in a region where cheques are still in regular use, that may be a solution as well. Restaurants like any other business can write invoices. They usually don't like this because their risk of having costly trouble to get the money is high. While your printout bill is technically an invoice already, it can be turned into an invoice (+ copy for them) giving your name + address and specifying how and when you'll pay. Which would keep track of how you (pl. = you + restaurant) decided to settle the bill under the peculiar circumstances. This works even in case of e.g. a power outage that prevents you from getting cash from an ATM in the neighborhood. | According to the United States Treasury Department: Money laundering is the process of making illegally-gained proceeds (i.e. "dirty money") appear legal (i.e. "clean"). Typically, it involves three steps: placement, layering and integration. First, the illegitimate funds are furtively introduced into the legitimate financial system. Then, the money is moved around to create confusion, sometimes by wiring or transferring through numerous accounts. Finally, it is integrated into the financial system through additional transactions until the "dirty money" appears "clean." I have no idea if the $10m are proceeds of crime so we apply the duck test - "If it looks like a duck, quacks like a duck and swims like a duck; its probably a duck" A person has gifted another person $10m - there is nothing illegal about giving someone a gift, however, this is a pretty substantial gift. I am calling it a gift because there is no enforceable contract that requires repayment. There is an expectation that the receiver will invest this money for a period of time, hey, if I had $10m I'd probably invest it too. And then return it to the giver; with or without the earnings (you do not say). Again there is nothing wrong with reciprocating a gift; reciprocity is a cornerstone of most societies, however, this is a pretty detailed understanding of what reciprocity means. Quack, quack, quack - its money laundering. Many jurisdictions in the world have "unexplained wealth" laws which basically require a person to explain their unexplained wealth or have it confiscated. If it isn't money laundering it is certainly at risk of this. | Yes, this is a viable option. And no, it doesn't need to be perfect. The use of such a filter is a technical means, but it also serves to communicate that Small Town News explicitly does not envisage to provide service to Europeans or others resident in the EU. If a user chooses to use a VPN to do visit Small Town News webpages, it's reasonable to expect that this would be comparable to buying the Small Town News paper in print while physically in the USA. It's a common principle that courts have to decide on jurisdiction, and actions of a party can factor in this decision. | Of course, the credit company sets a limit on the cash back every quarter and thus no one can get unlimited money this way. That's why it's "legal". But that's not the correct term to use for what's going on. Yes, it's legal under general banking and finance regulations for banks to make cashback offers like that, even if it appears they lose money. A bank isn't going to run a cashback program that is illegal; they'd lose their banking license. What's the sense of that? They're not going to run a cashback program that looses them too much money, either. A better way to think of the cashback system and the way to game the system of 4% by returning purchases it is to realize that it allowed under the Terms of Service of the credit card and issuing bank. They get people to sign up for cards and use them by enticing them with money. And the bank has set a limit to the total cashback each quarter; the bank is smart enough to make terms that have no loopholes, yet still make them money. And, if you read the Terms, I'm sure there is a clause that says the bank can change the terms at any time, and you agree to those terms by default or by simply using the card. The bank can decide at any time to stop the program for certain customers if they abuse it, i.e. try to max out the cashback each quarter. So the idea of this being illegal or fraud isn't the case here; the idea is that it is legal as the bank sets their cashback rules under federal and state regulations, and can change them, when needed. | Suppose you could. Now the proceeds of the sale belong to the shell company. What good does that do you? If you want to use the money to buy stuff for yourself, the shell company has to pay it back to you as a dividend or salary or something, and that payment will be taxable income to you personally. This might even come out worse for you: if you had held the bitcoins for more than a year, and sold them yourself, you could benefit from the lower long-term capital gains tax rate. But if you collect the funds as salary or dividend, you pay the higher ordinary income tax rate. | If only the tip is left in such "fake" money, it would not be theft as there is no legal obligation to leave a tip at all (except in those establishments that add a tip or "service charge' to the bill.) If the "money" is not an attempt to imitate real cash, it wouldn't be counterfeiting (leaving monopoly money for example would not be counterfeiting). The server would be understandably angry. The restaurant might refuse to seat the people who left the "fake" another time, if the servers identified them to the manager, but nothing would require them to do so. This is all on a US basis, I have no idea if tips might be legally required in other countries. |
If I pay someone to place a sports bet that wins, have I committed money laundering? It is my understanding if a private individual sells a chip that is money laundering. Say I pay someone $100 to place a $10000 sports bet that wins. If it wins, I cash the ticket. Have I committed money laundering? In addition: if a private individual sells a casino chip, or sells it for more than the face value, is that money laundering? Jurisdiction is Las Vegas, Nevada. | No. Money Laundering is the act of taking money that was made as a result of criminal activity and turning it into "clean" money. There are a number of ways this occurs, and there may be ways to do it with casino chips, but you haven't demonstrated that your money is "Dirty" to begin with. If you have a $100 dollar chip from a Vegas Casino, it means that the original casino where it was purchased will redeem it for $100 dollars in currency. Nevada is unique in the United States as Casinos operating in the state must honor chips between different casinos so it's possible to buy a Chip at Casino A, go to Casino B, and redeem the chip there. This allows Las Vegas to use them as a sort of alternative currency and so long as the person you are doing business with accepts it as a form of payment, you are allowed to use it same as cash. Collecting Casino chips is a hobby of some people and you can find them on places like Ebay, often times for more value than the face value of the chip. Like Currency, nothing says that you have to buy the chip at face value, so rare, old, or chips with defects may be worth many times over their current face value to the right collector. It would only be money laundering if that $100 dollars was obtained through illegal activity and you were using the chip as a way to gamble to make your legitimate earnings on tax reports. While you can launder any value of money, the people who do so are normally doing so with 10,000s of dollars (the value most banks will notify the government if deposited in a single transaction... and they will take notice if you're doing more frequent smaller transactions to avoid that detection). If you have ever seen "Breaking Bad" there are a few scenes where Money Laundering is explained, but the idea is to take a business that has a large use of hard currency exchange (Arcades, Nail Salons, and Car Washes are all discussed in show as perfect business examples) in which dirty money is mixed with legitimate earnings and deposited into the bank. As cash does not have a paper trail, you can't determine which bills were earned at the arcade verses through other means. As long as your bookie is legitimate, Sports Gambling is legal in Vegas (You can even bet the Superbowl Coin toss) and as long as you report it as taxable income, you're not committing any crimes. | It depends on the rules of the particular betting market and the laws under which it operates. Assuming that the bet itself is legal, it is not uncommon that participants in the contest are not allowed to bet, not because they distort the market, but because they can influence the outcome. Consider if instead of betting to win, Mr Trump bet on himself to lose and then do something which would reduce his chances (hard to imaging what he could do that he hasn't done but anyway). | It isn't necessarily "illegal" (in the sense you are committing a crime) but you may be in violation of a verbal contract (which would fall under tort law). Let's take this a bit further. Perhaps Joe Schmoe gave you his debit card information so that you could make deposits for him and he said you could take $5 out for yourself for the trouble. This is a contract between you and Joe for a service. You can't extend Joe's offer to Jane Doe by saying "here is some debit card information, take $2.50 out for yourself". You have no right to extend your contract with Joe to somebody else. Now specifically for passwords it basically boils down to the same thing. Unless Joe gives you explicit permission to give that to somebody else, you can't just decide to unilaterally give what Joe gave you to somebody else. This may be different if Joe said "here, I'm buying you a subscription to service XYZ because you are a nice guy", this may be construed as a gift which transfers ownership. At that point you have control over what is or isn't done with the account. As another example let's say Joe let you borrow his car. You can't turn around and say to Jane, "here's a car you can use", Joe did not extend the offer to Jane, nor did Joe give you the right to extend the offer to another person. It's a moot point though, in the original context of this question, Netflix does restrict you from sharing your passwords "outside your household". Almost every paid service has some restriction against sharing with others. In the end Netflix may shut off Joe's account and Joe may sue you for damages, but you aren't going to be thrown in jail for this. This would be a civil case (tort) which you may be liable for monetary damages. | Note: IANAL Does the placement of a sticker stating, "We accept XYZ credit cards," essentially obligate a business to accept that card? It depends on whether you mean whether they are obligated to provide goods/services to someone who presents the card, or whether, having provided goods/services, they are obligated to accept the card as payment. For the first question, the answer is "no". The credit card brand could theoretically go after them, however, as names of credit networks are trademarks, so claiming to accept a card but not doing so is trademark infringement. For the second, the answer is "pretty much". Since they misrepresented their establishment, there is no mutual assent and therefore no contract. If they try to use "defrauding the innkeeper statutes", those require fraudulent intent. If you fully intended to pay for you meal by a credit card, and it was their choice to refuse payment, then you have no fraudulent intent. The only avenue I can see for them is some sort of equity argument, but that would be problematic, especially if they ask for the retail, rather than wholesale, price, and not worth the hassle of collecting. So, legally, you can just walk out, but in practice if they have a bouncer they might make trouble for you. | As Putvi says, you are being extorted and this is a criminal matter and thus a matter for the authorities in your jurisdiction. However, you have a second problem entirely apart from that - you almost certainly broke academic ethical rules by submitting a piece of work that you did not write as your own (these things are pretty cut and dried in academic circles). This will not go away. Regardless of whether your extortionists are brought to justice, they can still release your details at any point in time and ruin your career, or it can come out in other ways. Own up to this with your university as soon as possible, and see if you can make it right. This will be hanging over you for the rest of your life, and can drop at any moment - these sorts of things have ruined people before. | It might or it might not be fraud. The outcome will depend on how the facts and evidence are interpreted at trial. A more general version of this question is: If two parties discuss and orally agree to X; then sign a contract that states they agree to Y, what are the parties bound to? X? Y? Or something else? In your version, X is a fraudulent statement. And Y is an obfuscated writing. One party will argue fraud. The other will argue not fraud on the basis that all the facts were disclosed in writing. The party alleging fraud will carry the burden of proof. The standard of proof will be preponderance of evidence (more than 50%). Generally speaking, written evidence outweighs oral evidence if not accompanied by substantiating facts. Substantiating facts could be: emails or other written correspondence, a prior history or pattern of making false claims to others regarding this investment, the respective behavior of the parties after the agreement was made or anything else that corroborates the oral testimony presented at trial. | What you describe is forbidden by corporate law in every jurisdiction with which I'm familiar. I don't know the law in Quebec, but in principle: An entity in control of a corporation can't use that control to unjustly enrich himself at the expense of other shareholders. (If he does so through deceit then he is committing the common law tort of fraud, and quite likely a criminal offense.) A trustee or fiduciary that uses his control of assets to enrich himself at the expense of those to whom he owes a duty (e.g., minority shareholders) is guilty of various statutory offenses, among which may be "Breach of Fiduciary Duty" and "Fraudulent transfer." Sales of corporate assets in general must be done through an "arms-length" mechanism. If they are being auctioned off, and the auction isn't open, so that an insider is able to purchase them below "fair market value," then, once again, a fraud has been committed. The grading and remedies vary by jurisdiction. Of course, whether it's worth pursuing a remedy through legal action depends (as always) on: the amount at stake, the cost of pursuing the remedy, statutory allowances for punitive damages, the likelihood and cost of collecting on any judgement won. Only a lawyer familiar with the jurisdiction, the complaint, and the corporation's governing documents could help you answer that question. | In the case of McKee v. Isle of Capri Casinos, we can tell because that case has been legally decided. As the court says, there was a contract and "the patron was not entitled to the bonus under those rules", and plaintiff "failed to prove the necessary elements of either promissory or equitable estoppel". They did not "represent to her that a bonus would be available if she played the game", and did not "promise to pay the $41 million after the notice was displayed". The (very complex) rules of the game are easily available on the machine, and there is a prominent disclaimer that "MALFUNCTION VOIDS ALL PAYS AND PLAYS". Under the rules, the winning configuration stated that she was entitled to $1.85. The problem was that it also announced "Bonus Award - $41797550.16". This was due to an inexplicable software error which in communicating with the central computer awarded a "legacy bonus", which is no part of the game in question. The maximum legacy bonus is $99999.99; the manufacturer knows of the possibility of this kind of error and has implemented a fix that is thought to eliminate the problem. The first point then is that the casino didn't just claim there was a malfunction, they proved that there was one. Second, the terms of the contract hold: she was entitled to $1.85, and the extraneous message was not part of the contract. That is, she did not actually win the large payout, the malfunction was in saying that she received a bonus. If a patron could likewise prove that they had actually won but the machine malfunctioned to represent the situation as a loss, they would of course be entitled to the appropriate winnings. The problem simply resides in the difficulty of a patron proving that. |
Marijuana Across State Lines, where State Laws Differ I'm taking a trip to Colorado, where recreational marijuana is legal. I live in New Mexico, where I have my state certified, state legal medical marijuana card. I'm taking a plane to and from. Can I buy marijuana in Colorado, and take it on a flight back to New Mexico, with the above legal, certified restrictions/allowances? | Leaving Colorado with a Marijuana product is illegal. You cannot bring Marijuana to Denver International or any other airport in Colorado. You also cannot bring Marijuana into a Federal Park, reserve, ski slope or National Parks. Colorado has a site outlining these restrictions, so no, you cannot bring back Marijuana to your home state, even if you can legally possess it in that state. | Let us assume that you were high on meth at the time, that you were acting normally (that is, were not smashing windows or other such criminal things), but you had mouth sores and high blood pressure. Let's also assume that you are docile, but don't consent: so you stick around. Even with all of these assumptions working against you, the sheriff cannot force you to take a drug test without a warrant. When he goes to the judge, the judge will not issue a warrant to force you to take a test. Drug tests are forms of searches, which are protected by the 4th Amendment, and they basically require "probable cause" to the effect that you had committed a crime. Given your description of the circumstances, there is no such probable cause (i.e. "most likely that it is true"). The threat to call the sheriff was empty, though perhaps sincerely believed (many people sincerely believe lots of wrong things about the law). You can consent (sounds like you did): as far as I know, if you give in to a suggestion from a nurse that the sheriff will make you take the test (an untruth), that would not invalidate evidence derived from a voluntary search. Every citizen is expected (unreasonably) to know and follow the law, and it is expected that you will know that you have the right to refuse, so you cannot say "But I didn't know I could refuse". You always have the right to refuse any medical treatment or testing. This is true even if your insurance requires you to take a certain test. There could be contractual consequences to violating the contract with your insurance company, but again you cannot be compelled to take a test or undergo a procedure because an insurance company "requires" you to. If, for example, your insurance company requires you to take a meth-abuse screening test, then if such a contract condition is legal in California, refusing to take the test could lead to some insurance problems, like they would cancel your policy. As for financial liability for the test that you didn't really want but agreed to, there is a chance that you could argue in court that you were coerced into the test and thus your apparent consent was not real. You have the right to refuse the test; if the other party, "whether or not acting under color of law, interferes by threat, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threat, intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state", then they crossed a legal line and you can sue them, plus any "agreement" that is coerced is null in the courts, and the putative debt arising from the test is also null. You simply have to establish that you were coerced, and not convinced. | Who in the fraternity would be prosecuted if this became an issue? A lot of people could be held liable for this, including people who are not even in the fraternity. Anyone who has knowledge of the machine or the fact that it was possible for minors to access alcohol through it could technically be held liable if a prosecutor wanted to make that case. Presumably the building is owned by someone else and just leased out to fraternity members, and they very well could be held liable for sale to minors also. Would the machine be safer if it just accepted cash (so that no electronic paper trail was created), with a big warning sign WINK WINK that anyone under the age of 21 was strictly prohibited from purchasing from it? No. Payment method is irrelevant here. There are a number of states that legally allow vending machines to sell alcohol, but vendors are required to verify the age of any person accessing them and ensure that those cards aren't being used by people not authorized. What you describe is an extremely relaxed environment where admittedly no one is attempting to verify identities. The "accepting cash" scenario is no different than a liquor store selling alcohol to anyone that comes in just because they're willing to pay with cash instead of a credit card. Sales to minors laws are not "as long as you warn them, you're safe" laws. They require vendors to actively check IDs and ensure that alcohol is not landing in the hands of minors. Accepting cash just to erase the evidence doesn't meet that burden. There are a lot of legal troubles with the situation that could get a lot of people charged with multiple offenses. That you have underage fraternity members living there suggests you should not have alcohol readily accessible in the house at all, as most state laws expressly forbid providing access to alcohol, not just serving or selling. Them being there provides access to it, even if it's just a case in the fridge with a note on it. Not to mention, you technically cannot sell alcohol, as I highly doubt your fraternity has a liquor license to be able to do so. There's a big difference between asking everyone to pitch in to buy the case versus actively selling individual cans through a vending machine. The vending machine itself is violating liquor laws in your state merely by existing. | An individual obtains due process rights upon entering into the United States. For a recent write-up on this question, see this piece at Reason. The people Trump is talking about generally aren't being denied admission at an established, legal border crossing; they're coming across wherever they can get through, and only being discovered by federal agents thereafter. Because they're already in the United States, they have due process rights. As for cross-border interactions with ICE or CBP, the extent of due process protections is still an open question. SCOTUS took it up last year, but it kicked the case back to a lower court rather than deciding it. | In general property owners and employers can impose any rules on their property and employees (respectively) that are not prohibited by law. Granted, there are extensive statutes and regulations to protect "employee rights." I have not heard of protections that include "possession of prescribed medications," but that does not mean they don't exist in your jurisdiction. If you really want to know whether you have a legal right as an employee, and you can't find it in written law or regulation, you would have to consult regulators or employment law attorneys in your jurisdiction. (As a practical matter, of course, it might make sense to first find out whether one's employer wants to assert a policy infringing the right in question.) | There is no basis for the view that requiring a driver's license is unconstitutional. First, it's critical to realize that a right to travel has nothing whatsoever to do with licensing drivers. A right to travel does not in any way mean there's a right to travel in a particular way. Likewise, using a car does not mean you're traveling. Schactman is about the right to obtain a passport, which is a requirement to travel overseas. Kent is likewise about international travel. Freedom of movement means the government cannot, without good cause (like being on parole), prevent you from traveling within the US, living where you choose, or working where you choose. Likewise, there's a right to international travel that means that without good cause, the government can't stop you from leaving the US or re-entering if you're a citizen. Requiring a drivers license to use public roads doesn't stop you from doing that -- there are other ways to travel. The Thompson v. Smith decision explicitly supports the idea that requiring drivers licenses is allowed. To quote a more representative section from the case: STREETS AND HIGHWAYS -- Right of Citizen of Travel and Transport Property -- Use of Ordinary Vehicles. -- The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon in the ordinary course of life and business is a common right which he has under his right to enjoy life and liberty, to acquire and possess property, and to pursue happiness and safety. It includes the right in so doing to use the ordinary and usual conveyances of the day. This right is not a mere privilege which a city may permit or prohibit at will. STREETS AND HIGHWAYS -- Right of Citizen to Travel and Transport Property -- Use of Ordinary Vehicles -- Police Power. -- The right of a citizen to travel and transport property and to use the ordinary and usual conveyances of the day may, under the police power, be regulated by the city in the interest of public safety and welfare; but the city may not arbitrarily or unreasonably prohibit or restrict it, nor may it permit one to exercise it and refuse to permit another of like qualifications, under like conditions and circumstances, to exercise it. AUTOMOBILES -- Drivers' Permits -- Arbitrary Revocation. -- The regulation of the exercise of the right to drive a private automobile on the streets of the city may be accomplished in part by the city by granting, refusing, and revoking under rules of general application permits to drive an automobile on its streets; but such permits may not be arbitrarily refused or revoked, or permitted to be held by some and refused to others of like qualifications, under like circumstances and conditions. While Chicago Motor Coach doesn't seem to be available online, searching it finds other sites stating that the real issue was a commercial operator licensed by the State of Illinois, and whether Chicago, as a municipality within Illinois, could require them to also be permitted by the city. Another line from it seems to be "Even the Legislature has no power to deny to a citizen the right to travel upon the highway and transport his property in the ordinary course of his business or pleasure, though this right may be regulated in accordance with the public interest and convenience." To quote more recent precedent, Miller v. Reed from the 9th Circuit (a federal court of appeals, not a state court) states that The plaintiff's argument that the right to operate a motor vehicle is fundamental because of its relation to the fundamental right of interstate travel is utterly frivolous. The plaintiff is not being prevented from traveling interstate by public transportation, by common carrier, or in a motor vehicle driven by someone with a license to drive it. What is at issue here is not his right to travel interstate, but his right to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways, and we have no hesitation in holding that this is not a fundamental right. (incidentally: Drivers licenses are not required by federal law. They are required by state laws.) | There is a world of legal difference between a doctor or counselor "pressing" you to consider meds and even suggesting several and them actually writing a prescription. The line to cross is a non-doctor writing you a prescription for prescription meds; this has not yet happened. And 99.99% of the time, it won't happen. The counselor is licensed by the state and will clearly know their legal limits, which are an important part of their education and licensing; they are not going to risk their license or a lawsuit by doing something illegal. If the counselor is a doctor and is able to write prescription, then they will ask you about medical history and other meds during a formal clinical visit in order to write the prescription. If you feel the counselor may be pressing you too hard to consider meds, he may be crossing an ethical line, but that's entirely different than breaking the law. Determining if he crossed an ethical line is for his licensing board to consider, not you. You can ask the licensing board how to proceed. Ask the counselor for their license number; they will freely give it and tell you who to contact. | As far as I am aware there is no prohibition against bartering firearms in general. This would be an odd prohibition since it is legal to gift and lend firearms. However, some of your situations change this. could I legally manufacture and exchange a firearm If you manufactured a firearm with the intent to sell you would be required to have an FFL. If this was a one-off sale of a firearm you manufactured at some point in the past for personal use this can be legal without an FFL. There are some additional requirements for the transfer. No party is a known criminal It is illegal to sell or give a firearm to someone you know to be a prohibited possessor. Not all criminals are prohibited from owning firearms, but this helps keep you safe. No party inspects the ID of the other or performs a background check This is state dependent. Some states make you go through an FFL for all transfers, others are much less strict. New Hampshire does not require private sales to go through an FFL if you know the buyer personally. Each party is known to be or appears to be old enough to own a firearm legally This is required for your scheme to be legal. One party barters regularly in this manner using firearms and firearm components This person is now engaged in the business of selling firearms and must be a registered FFL and jump through all the corresponding hoops. No party is licensed to sell firearms Not typically required, unless you do this in a regular basis. |
Making bad movies as money laundering scheme? There is this youtube channel called I Hate Everything in which, among other things, this youtuber reviews Imdb's 100 lowest ranked movies in search for the worst movie: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLxOKy-G3phBomkGrPJuQwUawQmS_1ysNN In one of such movie reviwes he points out that the budget was way too much for a movie that basically looked like it was recorded with an average hand-held camera, terrible actors and no movie sets whatsoever (one part of the movie was apparently recorded with an hidden camera at a real hospital with real, seemigly oblivious people instead of a movie set and extras). This youtuber comments that it seems unlikely that such a terrible and lazy movie could have had such a big budget, and that it seemed like some sort of money laundering scheme (this company has more movies of similar "quality"). My question is, how does someone exactly launder money by making terrible movies and lying about the budget? | Suppose you want to pay for your son's college tuition with cocaine sales proceeds. You hire your son as an actor in your miserable movie and pay him $90,000 for doing so. The movie is produced by a corporation that you don't have to 1099 when you give it money. The corporation treats the money in as a loan which isn't income to it and doesn't have to report the lender to anyone. The son has the money (after paying income tax on it) and can pay for college for the year. The movie company and son don't appear to be doing anything other than being incompetent movie producers and lousy overpaid actors unless you know the big picture. The money has effectively been spent in a way that conceals its illegal origins and makes it look legitimate. Ergo, money laundering. | The reason this section exists is pretty well stated in an English case: Holmes v. Governor of Brixton Prison and Another. In paragraph 12, they discuss the law of theft in England, and note that under the law there as it stood in 2004 (and reaching back to principles of common law, which are often but not always shared with the US), deception required causing someone to believe something. A machine has no mind, cannot think, and can't be made to believe anything -- it sees an input and mechanically performs some response in response to that input. For instance, suppose you were to discover someone's bank account number and printed a check of your own that had that number on it. You then make that check up to look like it's a check from the someone else to you, and deposit it to an ATM; you then withdraw however much is available immediately. In all likelihood, no human will see that check until the victim looks into why they're significantly poorer than they remembered, so no human was deceived. The only things that were possibly deceived were the computers involved in the check-clearing process. But they don't have a mind: as far as they're concerned, they see pixels, pass them through an algorithm, and then send a message to another computer at the bank with certain information (which a human recognizes as an image of a check and an amount of money, but an ATM doesn't know what it means for something to be an image of a check). The machine then mechanically pushes bills out a slot. They don't think the check's real, don't think it's fake, and don't think it's a check: they're just piles of semiconductors and wires acting in accordance with the laws of physics. If you gave a check like this to a check-cashing place, it's clearly theft by deception: you make the human there (falsely) think you have a legitimate check, and they then pay you money based on it. But these days, a lot of this stuff is automated. Alaska's legislature didn't want you to get out of theft by deception charged because something was automated. So, they said that a machine could be deceived. This isn't a crime by itself; you can't be charged with deceiving a machine. You are charged with an offense under the chapter that involves deception. What 11.46.985 does is say you can't argue "this wasn't deception because only the machine was deceived." | Expunction may be possible for instance if you are acquitted, later proven innocent, pardoned, and various other things that fall short of being convicted and doing the time. The entire law is here (Texas code of criminal procedure 55.01). There is also the option of an order of non-disclosure, overviewed here. A requirement for such an order is that you were placed on and completed deferred adjudication community supervision, which from what I can tell is not what happened. "Background check removal" may range between simply taking your money and doing nothing, to doing what you could do yourself to get free of traces via radaris, intelius, spokeo, and so on to "request removal" from that web site. This will not make your record unavailable, because these websites don't have any special powers to reach into and manipulate state records. | Given that both parties have committed criminal offenses (the 'bad actor' is attempting fraud and the 'victim' has committed unauthorized access to a computer system), no court would hear a civil case between these parties. As a matter of public policy, criminals do not owe a duty of care to each other so no one can win this case. | In this instance, the police were almost certainly trying to get you to volunteer to be in a line-up with the victim of the crime picking out potential suspects (of which you were absolutely one, and probably remain so). Assuming the chap or chappete who got mugged, who basically only saw the barrel of the gun, picked you out of the lineup at random, you could have expected to be carted off to a holding cell pending an interview, followed by arrest and very likely conviction for armed robbery. You were wise to refuse. You should never cooperate with the police even if you think have an amazing alibi that means that you couldn't have committed the crime. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d-7o9xYp7eE | I can't comment on what the legal situation would be in your home country, but as a matter of U.S. law, the hypothetical scenario you've described is not illegal. First, because you aren't a U.S. citizen and because you aren't operating in the United States, the U.S. government probably has no jurisdiction over you, your website, or your conduct. Even if it did, the most relevant statute, 18 U.S. Code § 1017, would not apply. The statute prohibits the "fraudulent or wrongful" use of the FBI's seal. But "fraudulent" and "wrongful" generally refer only to conduct where one uses deception or other means to obtain money, property, etc. to which they have no lawful entitlement. United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 399 (1973). Because you aren't using the seal to obtain anyone's property through deception, this use would not fall within the statute's proscriptions. Even if the government sought to prosecute you, you would have a valid First Amendment defense. The First Amendment protects the right to free speech, and it does not allow statements to be criminalized merely because they are false. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). This outcome should be unsurprising to most U.S. observers. I think most people would agree that the U.S. obviously cannot prosecute a Hollywood producer for making a movie dramatizing the FBI's efforts to shut down the Pirate Bay, even if it displayed the FBI's seizure message on a monitor in the course of the movie, and even if it showed the seal being used on a completely fictional website. The hypothetical you're describing is not materially different. In both cases, the seal is being used to falsely create the impression -- for entertainment purposes -- that the FBI has shut down a website. Saying false things for entertainment purposes is not a crime in the United States. | Presumably you consented to have an x-ray. It is a reasonable assumption that it was not your intention to simply be given the films without interpretation by a radiologist. If that was your intention then the obligation would be on you to make that clear since it is so far from ordinary practice that no reasonable person could know that. To use your analogy it would be like you asking to have your window washed but not wanting to have the soapy water rinsed off afterwards (assuming these were separately billable services). Further, rights and obligations under contracts are transferable by default. So it is perfectly legitimate for the lab to outsource the radiography without having to ask you. | Sounds a lot like a bad-luck, move-on situation. I can't imagine any reason why the complex would have any duty to watch your bike for you or otherwise ensure that no one steals it. The fact that you bought it knowing that the bike shed had not yet been built and that the security gates were broken would probably count against you. If you know who stole your bike, you'd have a much better case against them, but it doesn't sound like that's the case. If you're looking for a typical contingency-fee arrangement, in which the attorney takes a fee from your winnings, I'd imagine you're going to be especially out of luck, based on two hard facts: The total damages you can collect is probably going to be equal to the price of your bicycle: £400. The average hourly rate at national firms for the most junior lawyer is already more than £200. If you sat down with such a lawyer, explained your situation, discussed your options, and then tasked the lawyer to write a threatening letter to the apartment complex, you'd already have incurred more fees than the value of the bicycle. Probably no attorney is interested in that arrangement -- especially since it's highly unlikely the complex would pay. So unless you're actually willing to pay hourly rates, I can't imagine any lawyer taking this case. Even if you were, no one may take it just because lawyers don't like taking cases that they're going to lose. |
Is it a HIPAA violation for a dentist office to print a patient's password on paperwork? Dentist office just printed my password (to their portal) on their paperwork. Surely this is a HIPAA violation (or against best practices, HIPAA or otherwise). Can anyone confirm if so and point me to any resources? I have looked independently but am unclear. | This is not a HIPAA violation. HIPAA requires that personal information not be revealed to people lacking a statutorily-defined interest, without the patient's consent. A password itself is not "personal information", though having it could lead to such information. An example of personal information would be the fact that you personally had a certain tooth filled (not that "somebody had a tooth filled"). Protected information can be revealed to certain people, such as the lab that they send samples to, or your insurance company. This is covered by what is known as "The Privacy Rule". There is a related rule, the Security Rule, which essentially says "you need to keep information safe". An example of a required security rule standard is that the provider must Implement policies and procedures to address the final disposition of electronic protected health information, and/or the hardware or electronic media on which it is stored HHS recommends degaussing, but other means of satisfying the rule exist (burning, dissolving in acid). Tossing in the trash would not satisfy the rule. Password management falls under the weaker category of "addressable", that is, a provider needs to think about how they will manage passwords, but there is no specific requirement regarding what you have to do (unlike the requirements of Data Backup, Written Contract. Incident Reporting or Media Disposal). Printing and distributing to customers your account and password would, on the other hand, be a reportable incident. Information about your name, the dental procedure done, and the cost of the procedure, is probably also on the paperwork that they give you, and that even more than your password is protected information. A provider is allowed, indeed required, to disclose protected information to the patient. The assumption is that once you have processed that information, you will destroy or protect the paperwork, as you see fit. | First of all, a contract is valid without a signature and even without being in writing; all that is needed is consent by the parties. Therefore, the signature is merely evidence of that consent and is only relevant if a dispute arises over the general consent or the particular terms that were consented to. A digital signature would make it harder for Bob to argue that those were not the terms he signed but if I have Bob's signature on them then the onus of proving he didn't sign rests with Bob, I don't have to prove he did. All of the methods you suggest are valid as would an email saying "Got the contract. I agree. Bob." | Firstly: that depends on the jurisdiction. It might not even be possible at all for employers to attempt to sue their own employees for damages caused by negligence. Even terminating an employment contract for reasons of negligence is quite difficult in many jurisdictions. Second, if it is possible, the question is wether such legal proceedings could be expected to be successful. Employees making mistakes is part of the risk of doing business, and distinguishing a "mistake" from "negligence", "gross negligence" , or "intentional wrongdoing" by the employee ought to place quite a burden of proof on the employer. To be held negligent in the first place, the employer will have to to prove that the employee was aware of the fact that the password they used was common, well-known and extremely insecure. Knowledge of which passwords are common and well-known is, unless you are considered a skilled IT security professional, not something that a typical employee can reasonably be expected to know. Before there can be a case for negligence by the employee, the employer needs to make a strong case that: either the employee is that skilled IT security professional that really should have know better or the company can demonstrate that they provide all employees with adequate instruction and security training that includes how to select good passwords and which bad ones to avoid and that they seriously ensure both awareness of their password and security policies and compliance. even then, not enforcing a good password policy in your IT systems and assigning or allowing users to select weak passwords is in itself already negligent... | Let’s work it through Is the work copyright? Yes. Are you making a copy or a derivative work? Yes. Do you have permission? No. At this point, it is prima facie copyright violation. However, various copyright laws have defences for breach. You don’t say where you are but as the USA is the most permissive in this regard we’ll use the USA. If it’s not legal there, it’s not legal anywhere. If it is legal there, it’s still likely to be not legal everywhere else. is it fair use? Almost certainly not. Wizards of the Coast (the copyright owner) already do this. While this service is free for creatures from the Monster Manual, it does drive traffic to their web site where they sell stuff. They also licence (presumably for money) others to do the same. Your usage would negatively affect the copyright owners market. This counts against fair use. Because it’s already being done, your work has virtually nil transformative value. This counts against fair use. You are copying a substantial part of the work. This counts against fair use. You are not using it commercially but neither is it for educational use. This is unlikely to matter. On balance: not fair use. TL;DR This is copyright violation. | Late to the party, but I'll answer anyways. In general, providers have a lot of wiggle room when sharing information with parents, on condition that the patient hasn't explicitly objected despite having opportunity to do so. HIPAA allows the provider to make a judgment call on whether such information can be shared without explicit consent: Quoting Title 45 § 164.510 : (i) Obtains the individual's agreement; (ii) Provides the individual with the opportunity to object to the disclosure, and the individual does not express an objection; or (iii) Reasonably infers from the circumstances, based the exercise of professional judgment, that the individual does not object to the disclosure. HHS does discuss disclosure to family members in their FAQ : A covered entity is permitted to share information with a family member or other person involved in an individual’s care or payment for care as long as the individual does not object. A parent of a child who has just turned 18 is likely still somewhat involved in the child's care, so, absent either an objection or a reason to believe the child would object if asked, sharing is probably not a violation. | How does GDPR work with insurers in relation to refusing information about pre-existing medical conditions? Due to it being special category data. As in, which of the "conditions for processing special category data" would apply? As far as I see, Article 9 (a) ("explicit consent") would apply. So the insurer would have to ask the customer for consent. My first thought was it would be consent-based (condition a), but under consent, it is noted that you should avoid making consent a precondition of service. Yes, that is often noted, but that is only partially true. The GDPR actually says (Article 7, emphasis mine): When assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account shall be taken of whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is conditional on consent to the processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of that contract. So making consent a precondition of service can be ok, provided that the data is "necessary for the performance of that contract". Whether knowing about preexisting conditions is "necessary" for an insurance provider is something a court would have to decide, but on the face it does not seem unreasonable. Source: General Data Protection Regulation | There aren't any specific laws or regulations about medical charges. Instead, this is a matter of general contract law, where you have to agree. You have to consent to be treated, and a signature is taken to be evidence of consent. The law does not say that they have to ask permission for absolutely everything they do, the action just as to be in accordance with an accepted standard of medical practice among members of the medical profession with similar training and experience in the same or similar medical community as that of the person treating, examining, or operating on the patient for whom the consent is obtained This law insulates doctors from getting sued. In a situation where treatment is provided against a patient's instructions, you may have a cause of action for e.g. battery. In general, a doctor can't poke you, draw blood, make "offensive contact" etc. without consent, and consenting to one procedure does not "open the floodgates" of consent for any othre procedure. Of course, if the procedure was not performed, you obviously are not liable for the cost (and they are not liable for a non-occurring battery). This may in fact constitute gross negligence. During trial, the primary issue is likely to be whether there is proof that the procedure was expressly rejected. The doctor would probably provide the consent form, and that form may or may not indicate that the test would be conducted. It would not be surprising if the patient never saw an actual form and instead just electro-signed, having been told that this is authorization to treat. Corroborating witnesses would be helpful. From a practical perspective, especially if the billing department is being recalcitrant, this is probably a matter best handled by an attorney who would start with a formal letter summarizing the consequences of unauthorized medical treatment. | I'm wondering whos responsible for this code if people start using it? The user. Can the people using it that think its under GPL in any way get in trouble for it or be made to remove it from their projects? Yes, they can be sued (successfully) for copyright violation. It’s not enough that you think you have permission from the copyright holder - you actually have to have permission. The law places the onus on the copier to seek out and get permission from the copyright holder. In theory, someone deceived in this way could sue the repo poster(s) for misrepresentation, however, there are practical issues about finding them, having them in an accessible jurisdiction and if they are judgement proof. Copyright law was created to protect physical books and paintings - it doesn’t really fit with digital methods of reproduction but it is the law. It doesn’t matter that complying with it can be hard bordering on impossible - comply with it you must. |
Being charged with driving while impaired, in the state of Minnesota? While prescribed desoxyn Or while being prescribed desoxyn by a doctor, Is there a limit of methamphetamine in one's system that can allow one to drive and not be charged with driving while impaired, in the state of Minnesota? Kind of like .08 for alcohol. And or if it is not impairing judgment . | Assuming you mean methamphetamine, then the answer is no. It is illegal to drive with any amount of methamphetamine in one's body. The main Minnesota law on driving while impaired (DWI) is Section 169A.20 subdivision 1: It is a crime for any person to drive, operate, or be in physical control of any motor vehicle, as defined in section 169A.03, subdivision 15, except for motorboats in operation and off-road recreational vehicles, within this state or on any boundary water of this state when: [...] (7) the person's body contains any amount of a controlled substance listed in Schedule I or II, or its metabolite, other than marijuana or tetrahydrocannabinols. The schedules of controlled substances are at Section 152.02. Methamphetamine is listed in Schedule II (subd. 3 (d) (3)). However, there is an exception if you were taking the substance as a prescription. Section 169A.49 subd. 2: If proven by a preponderance of the evidence, it is an affirmative defense to a violation of section 169A.20, subdivision 1, clause (7) (presence of Schedule I or II controlled substance), that the defendant used the controlled substance according to the terms of a prescription issued for the defendant in accordance with sections 152.11 and 152.12. Note that since this is an affirmative defense, the burden of proof falls on you to prove that you had a prescription, and that you were using the substance according to its terms (e.g. taking only the prescribed dose). In particular, if your doctor or pharmacist told you not to drive while taking it, then that would seem to say that you were not using the substance as prescribed. | if the child exchange time and locations are fixed, and the husband can no longer legally drive, does this effectively nullify his visitation rights? No. He can get a ride from someone or get an Uber or Lyft or Taxi or take a bus. The drop off location is near her house, not his, and even if public transportation were an option he would not be the type to use it. He's more the type that would ignore the suspension of his license and go pick up the kids in his car anyway. He is also the kind to try to attempt to manipulate the wife into doing what he wants regardless of what a court order says. Emotional abuse and manipulation were a big part of his game, but fortunately she has gotten much better at ignoring it. What he is inclined to do and why have nothing to do with whether or not it is legal. If he has his license revoked and attempts to pick up the children as always, are there any potential legal repercussions for her if she allows him to pick up the kids? Practically speaking, no, particularly in light of a court order to transfer custody. Theoretically, it is remotely possible, even though it is very unlikely. In theory, she could be held liable for negligent child neglect by allowing this to happen, particularly if the children were then harmed in an automobile accident. If he was visibly drunk or intoxicated at the time of the transfer, however, her risk of criminal liability would be considerable. Would there be any potential legal repercussions for her if she refuses to allow him to pick up the children himself with a suspended license/registration? Potentially, she could be held in contempt of court for refusing to follow a court order. Her better course would be to call the police when he arrived to report that he is driving with suspended license, to not transfer the children and wait until they arrive (seeking cover inside a home and advising the 911 operator again if the situation starts to escalate into a potentially violent situation), and to explain to the police that he is also attempting to endanger the children by trying to drive with them on a suspended license. There is a good chance that he would be arrested and that the police would leave her with the children. The police might, rather than arresting him, drive him home with the kids and tell him not to drive and cite him for driving with a suspended license. Then, she should make an emergency motion to the court, regardless of how it is resolved by the police, seeking permission to formally give her a right to refuse to transfer if he arrives unaccompanied with a suspended license. If he attempts to convince her to drop the kids off somewhere else (presumably at his house) due to the suspension of his license, are there any potential legal repercussions for her if she refuses? Probably not. This time he's not following the court order, not her. It would still be advisable for her to file an emergency motion with the court explaining the situation. | No. The laws specify what you can and what you cannot do. If the intent of the authority was that you were allowed to drive at 45 mph, you would have a speed limit of 45 mph, not a speed limit of 40 mph. If you go at 41 mph, you are breaking a law and can be punished. That said, law enforcement officers usually have some leeway on how to enforce the law, and they could very well let it pass with just a warning (or even ignore it if they have more pressing issues); the circunstances of it are specific to every situation and officer. The only point that could be made would be if the difference was so small that it could be argued that it can invalidate the evidence on the basis of margin of errors. If the radar catches you driving at 41 mph but the error margin of the radar is 5%, you could argue that you were driving at 39 mph and that the reading is due to the error in the radar1. That would enable you to challenge the evidence (but here the point is not that you are allowed to drive at 41 mph but that there is no proof that you were driving at 41 mph). From what I know, most police forces will be aware of that and avoid issuing fines unless you are well above that margin of error2. 1In fact, in Spain word of the street is that radars are set to account to possible margin of error of the radar, plus possible margin of error of the vehicle speedometer -even if it is the vehicle owner's responsibility to ensure that it works correctly- and some leeway. 2Some people post on the internet the "magic formula" of how many % of speed you can go over the posted speed limit based on those calculations. Of course those magic formulas rely in the radar and the speedometer being 100% accurate and the driver never getting distracted a few seconds and passing it. So, even assuming that those magic formulas are correct, if either the radar or the speedometer are not accurate or the driver gets distracted for a few seconds, you are at risk of getting a ticket. | I don’t believe there is an aggravated violation due to his disability, but it is quite likely that a court will find that to be a violation of his rights. Florida’s stop and frisk law 901.151(2) would indicate the original stop and temporary detention was valid, but once the item in his back pocket had been identified, 901.151(3) requires that the detention be immediately terminated. After the identification, he was no longer being legally detained, it was thus either an illegal detention and a violation of his 4th amendment rights or a consensual encounter under Florida law, and if consensual no requirement to Id. But just because it was a violation of his rights doesn’t mean that he will automatically win a lawsuit if he brings one. Jones v. State, 584 So.2d 190 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) holds that you can’t be charged with resisting arrest without violence (aka 843.01), when the arrest itself is unlawful. I suppose Hodges could be charged with “obstructing” which is covered by the same statue, but more ambiguous than “arrest”. | We need to assume that the stop was legal (not a high hurdle to clear), that is, there was some reason to stop you. Even so, following Utah v. Strieff, police don't actually have to have a reasonable suspicion to stop you and if in the course of an ID check they discover that you have a warrant out for your arrest, the arrest is still legal. So if the police stop you, RCW 46.61.020(1) says: It is unlawful for any person while operating or in charge of any vehicle to refuse when requested by a police officer to give his or her name and address and the name and address of the owner of such vehicle, or for such person to give a false name and address, and it is likewise unlawful for any such person to refuse or neglect to stop when signaled to stop by any police officer or to refuse upon demand of such police officer to produce his or her certificate of license registration of such vehicle, his or her insurance identification card, or his or her vehicle driver's license or to refuse to permit such officer to take any such license, card, or certificate for the purpose of examination thereof or to refuse to permit the examination of any equipment of such vehicle or the weighing of such vehicle or to refuse or neglect to produce the certificate of license registration of such vehicle, insurance card, or his or her vehicle driver's license when requested by any court. Any police officer shall on request produce evidence of his or her authorization as such. There is no law that says "you have to provide ID only if accused of a crime", or "police can pull you over only if you are suspected of a crime". Various traffic infractions will get you pulled over but are not crimes; random sobriety checks are legal. However, note that the requirement to provide ID applies to the operator. There is no law requiring citizens to carry identification papers (but there is a law requiring a vehicle operator to carry a specific form of ID). In some states there are "stop and identify" laws which allow police to demand ID from a person suspected of a crime, but Washington does not have such a law. | You are in a tough spot. The main risk is "civil forfeiture" of the duplex if you have sufficient knowledge that it is being used for purposes of drug dealing and take no action. See, e.g., a case from October 1, 2021 when a house was seized on this basis. But the tenant has property rights under a lease that you can't abridge unless you can prove that there is a violation of the law. And, it isn't obvious if you know enough to trigger civil forfeiture exposure based merely on uncorroborated statements from another tenant that observe only conduct often associated with drug dealing and not deals themselves. Still, the knowledge you do have might trigger a duty to inquire if you want to escape civil forfeiture liability. Under the statute, to defeat a civil forfeiture action (assuming it has been used for drug dealing), you must show: (e)(1) A property interest shall not be subject to forfeiture under this Code section if the owner of such interest or interest holder establishes that the owner or interest holder: (A) Is not legally accountable for the conduct giving rise to its forfeiture, did not consent to it, and did not know and could not reasonably have known of the conduct or that it was likely to occur; (B) Had not acquired and did not stand to acquire substantial proceeds from the conduct giving rise to its forfeiture other than as an interest holder in an arm's length commercial transaction; (C) With respect to conveyances for transportation only, did not hold the property jointly, in common, or in community with a person whose conduct gave rise to its forfeiture; (D) Does not hold the property for the benefit of or as nominee for any person whose conduct gave rise to its forfeiture, and, if the owner or interest holder acquired the interest through any such person, the owner or interest holder acquired it as a bona fide purchaser for value without knowingly taking part in an illegal transaction; and (E) Acquired the interest: (i) Before the completion of the conduct giving rise to its forfeiture, and the person whose conduct gave rise to its forfeiture did not have the authority to convey the interest to a bona fide purchaser for value at the time of the conduct; or (ii) After the completion of the conduct giving rise to its forfeiture: (I) As a bona fide purchaser for value without knowingly taking part in an illegal transaction; (II) Before the filing of a lien on it and before the effective date of a notice of pending forfeiture relating to it and without notice of its seizure for forfeiture under this article; and (III) At the time the interest was acquired, was reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture or likely to become subject to forfeiture under this article. (2) A property interest shall not be subject to forfeiture under this Code section for a violation involving only one gram or less of a mixture containing cocaine or four ounces or less of marijuana unless said property was used to facilitate a transaction in or a purchase of or sale of a controlled substance or marijuana. The language in bold is the most threatening part that effectively establishes a duty of inquiry and a duty to take action if your inquiry establishes that drug dealing is going on. If you can't establish that you were ignorant of wrongdoing, and reasonably so, under the circumstances of being told by one of your tenants that something is going on, you are at great risk of losing the duplex to civil forfeiture if the DA can prove that drug dealing is taking place by far less than a reasonable doubt standard. You might want to hire a private investigator to look into the situation carefully, and to try to evict the allegedly drug dealing tenant if the private investigator corroborates the fellow tenant's claims. | This varies from state to state. Here's a representative statute: Any driver or operator of a motor vehicle who, having been given a visual or audible signal by a peace officer directing such driver or operator to bring his vehicle to a stop, willfully fails or refuses to obey such direction, increases his speed, extinguishes his lights, or otherwise flees or attempts to elude the officer. See 625 ILCS 5/11-204. For a first offense, IL calls it a class A misdemeanor punishable by up to 1 year and $2.5K. but on the third offense it becomes a felony punishable by up to 3 years and a $25K fine. If the signal was meant for you, then the divided highway is a moot point so long as you realize it was for you (which might be established by you turning off the road into some neighborhood where you have no business). united-statesillinois | In Wisconsin, right after the perjury law, they have a law prohibiting "false swearing". It applies if a person: Makes or subscribes 2 inconsistent statements under oath or affirmation or upon signing a statement pursuant to s. 887.015 in regard to any matter respecting which an oath, affirmation, or statement is, in each case, authorized or required by law or required by any public officer or governmental agency as a prerequisite to such officer or agency taking some official action, under circumstances which demonstrate that the witness or subscriber knew at least one of the statements to be false when made. The period of limitations within which prosecution may be commenced runs from the time of the first statement. So even if they couldn't actually get you for perjury, they could get you for violating this law. Perjury and false swearing are both class H felonies, so you can expect the same punishment. I am going to guess that the existence of this law suggests that it was needed to cover what would otherwise be a loophole in the perjury law, but I can't say for sure. |
Does a Defendant LLC that is getting sued under two business names get named and served as Defendant once or twice? Let's say "CompanyName" LLC is being sued for its business activities under the business names "FirstAssumedName" and "SecondAssumedName". Does a Plaintiff name and serve the "CompanyName" LLC once or twice for each business name? | You sue the legal person One of the things that distinguishes legal personhood from other structures is the ability to sue and be sued. You can't sue a business name or a trust for example but you can sue a company. I have in fact been required to make adjudication decisions that I know will be unenforceable in court because the applicant named a trust rather than the trustee. | Defendant is normally used as the opposing party to a plaintiff, in a civil cause of action. It also refers to the accused in a criminal matter. Respondent is normally used as the responding party to an applicant, in motions, in certain statutory relief, relief based in judicial review, etc. It is also used to refer to the opposing party to petitioners in various statutory and equitable matters (and in some jurisdictions, there is little to no distinction between petitions and applications). Before administrative adjudicative tribunals and in alternative dispute processes, respondent is often the party that is not the claimant. A plaintiff or defendant may also either be an applicant or respondent on various motions at different times throughout the litigation. Respondent also refers to the non-appellant party or parties on appeal. There are likely other contexts that I am missing. For more, look to the rules, practice directives, or forms for the particular forum and process you are wondering about. | Direct civil suits are not the only way to obtain remedies for property violations. Other options: Ask. You can send them a simple letter describing the violation and asking them to compensate you appropriately. Complain to authorities. If they engaged in any behavior that constitutes a crime (e.g., criminal fraud) then the state (via district or state attorneys) is responsible for any criminal prosecution. If the state prosecutes and you are considered a victim, the state generally takes that into account if they are able to prevail against the defender. Even if they didn't commit a crime, but they have a sufficiently outrageous pattern of abusing individuals' civil rights, state attorneys may decide to threaten or take legal action. Seek a "litigation investor." If the size of damages likely to be recovered via lawsuit is high enough, then law firms will sometimes take cases "on contingency," which typically means the plaintiff does not front any money, but gives up a significant share of any winnings. There are also independent litigation investment companies that perform the same function based on a similar calculus, but often for even larger cuts of any winnings. | Both. The process server deliver's one set of documents addressed to the individual in their individual capacity, and one addressed to the company. If the individual in an official capacity and the company are both parties, as well as the individual in an individual capacity, you serve three sets. Even if the law ultimately is in your favor that serving just one set is sufficient, serving one set of documents for each defendant removes any argument that would have to be litigated as non-minimal expense and producing delays in the case, and it is cheap to do so relative to what is at stake in any case worth suing over. | There are cases out there like Unnamed Petitioners v. Connors, State v. Unnamed Defendant, Williams v. Unnamed Defendant; there have been indictments of John Doe who was only identified via a DNA profile. Not knowing the actual name of a person wouldn't pose a problem per se, and it seems that when the name is not known, John or Jane Doe is generally filled in. There was in instance a year ago in the UK where rioters who refused to identify themselves, and prosecution decided to drop the case. | No. Double jeopardy would not apply. You can't be prosecuted twice for committing the same (or a lesser included crime) arising from the same incident twice. If you commit a new crime you can be prosecuted for that new offense, even if you were acquitted of committing a similar offense at a different time and place in the past. | Your kid is not in trouble; he's a minor. You're in trouble. A criminal case for the charges a prosecutor would bring, i.e. destruction of property (the data) or for a relevant cyber or computer crime (malware, etc.), and/or a civil case for damages due to the destruction of the data would both hinge on one point: the concept of intent. See intent - Wex Legal Information Institute and Civil Law vs. Criminal Law: The Differences | Rasmussen College. Did you knowingly intend to cause damage or data loss with the structure of the name? It's pretty clear you did. The structure of a name that can invoke an SQL command is not in any sense a standard name in spelling or format or punctuation. So how would you convince the jury or judge that you had no intent when you named your kid? The possible poor design of a data system that didn't sanitize inputs is no defense. Saying the door was unlocked so I assume the homeowners didn't care if I trashed their house will get you laughed into jail or on the hook for a stiff civil judgement. | There isn't any kind of legal reason for the distinction; it's just a matter of custom and convenience. The normal rule is that you would shorthand a case name by referring to the first-named party, but there are lots of times where that is not the case. With Casey, the issue is that Planned Parenthood is a serial litigant, so if you were to just refer to "Planned Parenthood," there would be some ambiguity as to whether you were referring to Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), or Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), or any of the many other cases Planned Parenthood has litigated in the circuit and district courts. For the same reason, criminal cases are typically named after the defendant, as we would otherwise have tens of thousands of cases named "California" or "New York" or "United States." |
Are there any indication that article 112 of anti narcotic laws in Indonesia are meant for "dealers" rather than "users"? Indonesia have laws against narcotic However the law is a bit strange. Say there are 2 people doing the exact same crime, namely using drugs. One is jailed a minimum of 4 years and another is freed. The only difference is physical evidence even though both have positive urine tests. All users must have "possessed". How does that work? I did a lot of research and one of the reason is that they are charged with 2 different articles. One is charged with possessions and another is charged with usage. Possession carry much bigger penalty even though every user must have possessed. The only thing that may make sense is that the possession article is intended for "dealers". However, I do not find any corroborating evidences. Some legal expert have that opinion but that's pretty much it. http://www.flevin.com/id/lgso/translations/JICA%20Mirror/english/4868_UU_35_2009_e.html The article 112 says that (1) Any person that without right or against the law possess, store, control, or provide Narcotics Category I which is not a plant, shall be punished with minimum imprisonment of 4 (four) years and a maximum of 12 (twelve) years and a minimum fine Rp 800.000.000,00 (eight hundred million rupiah) and maximum Rp 8.000.000.000,00 (eight billion rupiah). Then article 127 says that (1) Any person that without right or against the law using the Narcotics of category III against others or give the Narcotics of category III to be used of others, shall be punished with minimum imprisonment 3 (three) years and a maximum of 10 (ten) years and fined at least Rp 600.000.000,00 (six hundred million rupiah) and maximum Rp 5.000.000.000,00 (five billion rupiah). I've heard that many complains about these laws. Anyone that uses narcotic must have control, possess, or store the narcotic. So many judges uses article 112 instead of 127. There are opinions that article 112 is for dealers and not users. That is why the penalty is higher. However, I do not see anything in the law or the title of the law that says that 112 is for dealers. So which one is right? Bonus: Is this common in all over the world that the penalty for storing, possessing, or controlling narcotic is heavier than the penalty for "using". Notice that all users must have stored, possessed, and controlled narcotic for the purpose of using. Or is Indonesian laws very strange? Update: I studied court cases in Indonesia. This is some samples I found. I saw 2 users. One get jailed for 6 years (for possession) but most are freed. The difference is trivial. The one jailed for 6 years have physical evidence of possession. Of course all users must have possessed. The idea that the court can't figure this out by logic makes me wonder about the reasonableness of evidence in Indonesia court. The drug is the same. Meth. https://www.idntimes.com/news/indonesia/rochmanudin-wijaya/polisi-hasil-tes-urine-andi-arief-positif-konsumsi-narkoba-jenis-sabu <- politicians free without going to trial https://www.msn.com/id-id/berita/nasional/manajemen-rsko-cibubur-mengaku-tidak-pernah-merehabilitasi-andi-arief/ar-BBVk42G <- told to to go rehabiliation without trial. Of course because most users are not addicted, the rehabilitation clinic simply say he tested negative and move on. Anyone "sentenced" to rehabilitation need only to stop using drugs for 2 weeks to test negative. Typical normal users use drugs like once every 6 months. Some drugs like DMT is used like once or twice a life time https://radarbali.jawapos.com/read/2019/01/24/115702/doyan-sabu-biar-pd-pemandu-lagu-berparas-cantik-terancam-bui-12-tahun <- minimum sentence 6 years https://beritabali.com/read/2019/03/27/201903270013/Jaksa-Tuntut-Pelayan-Kafe-Konsumsi-Sabu-Agar-Kuat-Minum-Layani-Tamu-6-Tahun-Penjara.html <-charged with 6 years jail You probably need google translate and understand that shabu means meth. Basically the "smart" users would use it right away to minimize chance of having physical evidences and that's silly. Cops are often tested for urine. About 10% test positive. Assuming people use drugs once every month and the test is valid for 3 days, the estimate is that all cops use it. Those cops get "counselling" Someone told me that all cops are actually using it https://regional.kompas.com/read/2016/04/01/17350831/Dari.25.Polisi.yang.Ikut.Tes.Urine.12.Orang.Positif.Narkoba this article says 12 out of 25 polices are tested "positive" https://www.jawapos.com/jpg-today/21/02/2018/propam-gelar-tes-urine-terhadap-114-polisi-ada-yang-positif-nyabu/ This one tested positive too. I can't found the case where they just got "counselling". I think I read that. In any case there is no way the cops go to jail. Our jail is full. http://www.jakarta100bars.com/2015/04/illogical-facts-drugs-indonesia.html | Its worth actually reading through the law again - they're meant for different categories of drugs - and its worth looking up the relevant laws as a whole. You can't cherrypick which law you charge them under in this case. It depends on what the suspect has in posession, and if you have more serious charges, they're probably going to be preferred unless the prosecution decides to throw the entire library at the suspect and charge them with everything they can, or a larger subset. A quick search on the internet - which shouldn't be taken as legal advice, brings up this link. Category 1 drugs are addictive and seen as therapeutically useless - you shouldn't have any realistic reason to have quantities of it in your posession. Category 3 is drugs with therapeutic use - stuff like codine. You could get a prescription for that, but there's potential for abuse. They're aimed at different classes of drugs - and the confusion is over a misinterpretation of what the law is about. As an aside, this is why you need to usually read more than just a specific statute or law to get what its about. | A company had me sign two conflicting documents about two years apart. Which one would apply? Possibly both because actually there is no conflict. What you describe does not reflect that these documents are incompatible or inconsistent. There is no indication that the second document impliedly or explicitly replaces the first one. The second document seems just redundant so far. Employees could likewise be required to sign a third document that only says "no drugs or alcohol on the job site on Wednesdays", and that does not mean that any previous documents they signed expire. | Arizona does not license chemists, though they do license pharmacists. There is a law against possession of drug paraphernalia, violation of which is a felony. The law also says In determining whether an object is drug paraphernalia, a court or other authority shall consider, in addition to all other logically relevant factors, the following: Statements by an owner or by anyone in control of the object concerning its use. Prior convictions, if any, of an owner, or of anyone in control of the object, under any state or federal law relating to any drug. The proximity of the object, in time and space, to a direct violation of this chapter. The proximity of the object to drugs. The existence of any residue of drugs on the object. Direct or circumstantial evidence of the intent of an owner, or of anyone in control of the object, to deliver it to persons whom he knows, or should reasonably know, intend to use the object to facilitate a violation of this chapter. Instructions, oral or written, provided with the object concerning its use. Descriptive materials accompanying the object which explain or depict its use. National and local advertising concerning its use. The manner in which the object is displayed for sale. Whether the owner, or anyone in control of the object, is a legitimate supplier of like or related items to the community, such as a licensed distributor or dealer of tobacco products. Direct or circumstantial evidence of the ratio of sales of the object to the total sales of the business enterprise. The existence and scope of legitimate uses for the object in the community. Expert testimony concerning its use. The size of your equipment would be relevant in defending against such a charge; your publications in the field of chemistry would be relevant. The burden of proof is on the prosecution to show that you were using the glassware to make drugs. Paraphernalia is defined as all equipment, products and materials of any kind which are used, intended for use or designed for use in planting, propagating, cultivating, growing, harvesting, manufacturing, compounding, converting, producing, processing, preparing, testing, analyzing, packaging, repackaging, storing, containing, concealing, injecting, ingesting, inhaling or otherwise introducing into the human body a drug in violation of this chapter. so a garden shovel can be used to grow marijuana, but that is not enough. The prosecution has to prove that the items "are used, intended for use or designed for use" in drug making – not just that they could be so used. | The controlling federal (US) law is: 21 U.S. Code § 812 - Schedules of controlled substances 21 US Code 812 and "Marijuana" is specifically listed among Schedule 1 substances. Just as with any other federal law, for this to be changed, Congress would need to amend or repeal this statute so that Marijuana no longer appears in the list and the act would then need to be signed into law by the President, allowed to take effect without signature, or vetoed and overridden by Congress. I suppose another possibility would be for a federal court to rule that 21 U.S. Code § 812 (or Marijuana's inclusion in the list) is unconstitutional. | Since this apparently amends the law giving colleges and universities the power to adopt and enforced various regulations, what it really means is that if such an institution adopts a rule in violation of this law, it may not legally enforce that law. It might also give an affected student a right to sue if such a rule is adopted and enforced. As a comment by ohwilleke mentions, such a law might well authorize a court to issue an injunction forbidding the institution from enforcing the kind of rule prohibited by the law. Note that it is not at all uncommon to have "or else" provisions in different sections of the law. For example Section 123 of the (hypothetical) New France state code might prohibit having a faked driver's license, section 124 prohibit obtaining a license through false or misleading statements on nthe application, and section 458 say "anyone who violates sections 123, 124, 125, or 126 shall be fined up to $2,000, or imprisoned for up to 1 year, or both, as a court may think just". Thus it is not always easy to find what penalties, if any, apply to a code section. | It is illegal to sell alcohol to a minor in Washington (RCW 66.44.270). The seller can get into various kinds of trouble, including losing their license, under liquor board regulations. However, as long as the establishment follows the rules for acceptable ID, they escape liability if in fact they sell alcohol to a minor: the license holder is legally allowed to accept an identification of the specific type. That is the sense in which this is required by law: the customer must have actually presented the identification, in order for the establishment to escape liability (RCW 66.20.210). Looking old enough is not the issue. It is legal to sell alcohol to a person who is over 21, and the law does not require presentation of identification as a condition for a sale. However, under RCW 66.20.180 a person is require to produce ID "upon request of any licensee, peace officer, or enforcement officer of the board". The legal risk attached to sales in an age-marginal situation is very high, and actual presentation of ID is required to escape liability by the establishment, so in that sense, it is "required by law". All requests to produce ID for liquor sales (at least in Washington, and leaving out deliveries which are governed by other laws) are driven by company policy. Typical policies are quite rational, being designed to protect the company's interest in not getting into a heap of trouble for an under-age sale. There is no law saying when you must ask, or when you are protected if you don't ask. Usually, store policy is to use "common sense" so that 90 year olds are not required to produce ID (they may be asked, jokingly). Non-compliance with RCW 66.20.180 carries no legal penalty, that is, there is nothing in the statute that says "if the customer doesn't...". The most obvious would be that the seller would refuse to sell, which the seller can arbitrarily do anyhow. There is no statutory penalty imposed on a licensee if they request ID of a person over 21 and the person fails / refuses to produce the ID. Obviously, the licensee cannot be punished if a customer fails to provide ID (and leaves), especially if they lost it. But the law "requires" them to provide an ID, with ne except "unless you leave / put the bottle back". Somewhat less obviously, if the legislature wants to, it can enact a provision that once a licensee requests ID, they are forbidden to sell alcohol to that customer until ID is provided. But there currently is no such law. "The law" also included regulations, such as WAC 314-17-105. This regulation is a chart, and the relevant entry is PERMIT: Failure to produce permit or identification upon request. See RCW 66.20.310 and 66.20.180. for which the 1st offense consequence is "5-day permit suspension OR $100 monetary option". This is a problematic regulation (potential lawsuit fodder), since it can be interpreted in a number of ways. The question is, of whom is the permit or identification predicated? Only the licensee has a permit, but customers and employees can both have identification. If we interpret this regulation as meaning "Failure by licensee or customer", then we arrive at the absurd conclusion that if a customer fails to produce ID on request, the establishment is fined. It is important to note that this regulation is under a chapter about server training, thus the regulation can only reasonably be interpreted as being about licensee providing identification. | It depends. If the tip is that there are pictures proving that a minor consumed alcohol 10 years ago, probably not. If the tip is that there's a kidnapped child being tortured inside, more likely. In either event, they would probably seek to build up some independently obtained evidence to enable them to obtain a warrant based on probable cause. An anonymous tip might be enough, depending on how detailed it was and whether there were any objective indicators of reliability, but it's not a sure thing. | From the legal perspective, the question is whether the substance is legal in Australia. The legal root of the matter is the Therapeutic Goods Administration. Dosages above 100 mg are on "Schedule 4" meaning they require a prescription. There are also apparently state regulations. In Queensland, there is an amendment to the Drugs Misuse Regulation 1987 to ensure that the substance 5-Hydroxy tryptophan (5-HTP) is captured in Schedule 2 with the exception of preparations that contain 100mg or less of 5-HTP per dosage unit Schedule 2 is "Substances, the safe use of which may require advice from a pharmacist and which should be available from a pharmacy or, where a pharmacy service is not available, from a licensed person". The fact that it is very difficult to verify what the current regulations are may explain the "friction", which may make online purchases difficult. The underlying reason for government regulation is to keep people safe. Politics SE is an appropriate place to debate the balance between safety and usefulness. |
What happens to somebody returning from ISIS, who did not commit crimes inside ISIS? Individual people from American or European countries have joined ISIS over time. Such a person may decide to returns home. If it was never recognized that the person had the intention to join ISIS, he/she is basically just a person returning from traveling. If the person is known to be an ISIS fighter, he will be detained at arrival and probably indicted for some felony. If it is known the person was member of ISIS, but nothing else is known, and there is no indication that he was an active fighter: What happens in this case? There is a good example for the third case happening in Germany. A teenage girl without any relation to Islam was in a state of searching for meaning of live as part of normal being a teenager. She was around 15 years old, and somehow, more or less randomly, came in contact with radical Islam culture. She then decided to travel to join ISIS in some region where it was active. She basically became housewife, in a relationship with an active ISIS fighter. After some time, she realized that it all was not a good idea. Around 2 years after joining ISIS, she decided to return to her family. She began to search for somebody to smuggle her home, and succeeded after multiple attempts. There were no reasons to think she had any relations to ISIS - only her father and the smuggler helping her knew about it. I'm wondering how a member of ISIS returning from any relation with ISIS would be treated when it becomes known, and it is plausible he/she did not engage in any kind of illegal activity during the time. She was still teenager when returning home, but that is not central to my question, except that it probably helped to reduce suspicions. A documentary about the example case in Germany, in English language: My Daughter and the Caliphate | DW Documentary | They committed the crime of providing material support for terrorism Specifically, 18 U.S. Code 2339A and 2339B. "Material support" is defined so broadly that it captures maintaining the household of an Islamic State fighter. Most countries have similar laws and they are all equally problematical as to their legitimacy. Basically, such people are a giant pain in the ass to their governments and so, their governments are generally content to let them rot in Syrian refugee camps so they don't have to deal with them. | Desuetude is the wrong concept. Desuetude relates to laws as a whole falling out of use; it doesn’t relate to individual cases. There is no question that the UK actively enforces their bail laws so they are not falling out of use. There is a statute of limitations that applies to non-major crimes within which the state must initiate prosecution. However, in this case the prosecution for bail violation has been initiated and Mr Assange is “on the run” so this is not relevant. Neither is the fact that the original charges that led to his arrest has been dropped- he is wanted for escaping lawful custody under English law for which the penalty is pretty stiff. I will also venture an opinion that the case against him is as open and shut as it comes. TL;DR When he dies. | The general answer is "yes." Who ever said that only one set of laws applied? Jurisdiction isn't a matter of "one country's laws matter here, let's find out which one it is." All jurisdiction means is that your laws apply to the conduct, not that no one else's can as well. Broadly, there are a few sources of jurisdiction that are generally considered legitimate (to at least some degree) in international law: Territoriality: You have jurisdiction over actions performed in your territory. You also have jurisdiction over crimes where just one part of the crime happens in your jurisdiction (e.g. standing in country A and shooting someone in country B), or even if it just has a significant effect in your territory. Nationality: You have jurisdiction over crimes committed by your citizens anywhere in the world, regardless of whether or not they were breaking the law of wherever they were. Passive personality: You have jurisdiction over crimes committed against your citizens anywhere in the world. Protective: You have jurisdiction over crimes directly harming core state interests, like counterfeiting your passports or sabotaging your warship. Universal: A handful of crimes (like piracy or genocide) are so serious that every country in the world can exercise jurisdiction. If you catch a pirate, you can punish them. These are accepted to different degrees. Passive personality and protective jurisdiction tend to be iffier; territorial jurisdiction is unquestioned (although if it's just based on effects in your territory, it becomes a bit iffier as well). But any of them can be a basis for jurisdiction. If multiple countries have jurisdiction, whoever actually has the offender decides who will try them (jurisdiction to make an arrest is limited to the country in which the arrest is made). So: If you're located in a country, you have to comply with their laws, and they can regulate just about whatever they want, including what you're doing to foreign computers. The foreign country can also generally regulate what you're doing, because part of what you're doing is happening on their territory. Even if both you and the computer are in a foreign country, you may have to answer to the courts of your country of citizenship. Depending on what exactly you're doing, the protective principle may come into play. For instance, if you hack into a computer on a foreign military base, the foreign country could prosecute you for endangering their security. If you're coordinating a genocide, universality applies and anyone can prosecute you. If you hack the computer of a foreigner, passive personality may apply, although this tends to be controversial. | The consequences for the US are perhaps better addressed at Politics; if you're really interested in those consequences, you can re-post this question there. For the police officer shooting a diplomat, the officer may be charged under state law, whatever is normal for an incident of this type; it doesn't matter whether the person is a US citizen or a diplomat or any other kind of alien, regardless of immigration status or lack thereof. If the person is a diplomat, however, the officer is also liable to be prosecuted under federal law, namely 18 USC 1116, which makes it a crime to kill, among others, a "foreign official"; the definition of that term includes any person of a foreign nationality who is duly notified to the United States as an officer or employee of a foreign government or international organization, and who is in the United States on official business, and any member of his family whose presence in the United States is in connection with the presence of such officer or employee. The characterization of the response "just been revoked" as "clearly legal" is inaccurate; a police officer has no power to revoke diplomatic immunity. In fact, only the diplomat's own country can waive this immunity. The United States cannot do so; it can only expel the diplomat. | The Justice Department prosecutes all crimes prosecuted by the U.S. federal government regardless of which agency has jurisdiction over that kind of regulatory activity. The Canadian government could prosecute for passport fraud or forgery. The offshore account country could prosecute for bank fraud or forgery. The U.S. federal government, the Canadian government, and the offshore jurisdiction could probably all prosecute for attempted money laundering or attempted tax evasion (or worse, such as attempted material support of terrorism). Realistically, none of this is terribly likely to happen if there is no harm, and even if there was an arrest and a conviction, the sentence would probably be mild for such a victimless white collar crime (probably probation and a fine or a few months in jail at most unless there were larger aggravating factors). But, harm is not required for a criminal prosecution. Or, more precisely, the violation of the criminal law per se is the harm. 18 U.S.C. § 1543 states: Whoever falsely makes, forges, counterfeits, mutilates, or alters any passport or instrument purporting to be a passport, with intent that the same may be used; or Whoever willfully and knowingly uses, or attempts to use, or furnishes to another for use any such false, forged, counterfeited, mutilated, or altered passport or instrument purporting to be a passport, or any passport validly issued which has become void by the occurrence of any condition therein prescribed invalidating the same— Shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 25 years (if the offense was committed to facilitate an act of international terrorism (as defined in section 2331 of this title)), 20 years (if the offense was committed to facilitate a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 929(a) of this title)), 10 years (in the case of the first or second such offense, if the offense was not committed to facilitate such an act of international terrorism or a drug trafficking crime), or 15 years (in the case of any other offense), or both. This statute clearly applies to both U.S. and non-U.S. passports. But, it isn't obvious that the crime would apply in this case, because the crime may have taken place outside the U.S. and with a target outside the U.S., one or the other must be true for the U.S. to enforce its criminal laws - U.S. citizenship isn't sufficient. The offense in this particular statute is making with the intent that some use it, using or attempting to use a passport. The crime was directed at the offshore location. But, it wouldn't be such a stretch to assume that if the fake passport was made or used by the defendant in a U.S. living room that it was used there even if only to send it over the Internet to a foreign country. On the other hand, if the fake passport were made or used in a hotel room in Montreal by a U.S. citizen and was directed at the Cayman Islands, the U.S. might lack criminal jurisdiction over the case. The maximum offense would be 10 years and a fine for a first or second offense, but the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines would very likely call for a much milder recommended sentence, and any excess punishment over this recommendation would have to be justified by the judge. | As I said in my comments, "It was your choice to ask for a refund because you chose to assess the events as a safety risk to yourself and the airline." The airline did not assess a risk and as a result cancel the flight and issue refunds. The airline did not disregard advisories or laws pertaining to the terrorist acts that took place and result in legal triggers that mandated the airline cancel the flight and give refunds. If a city or country is classified as a war zone - by that country itself or some international body, or by the US State Department - then there are triggers that either suggest or mandate flight closures, through a myriad of laws and jurisdictions. It is solely your perception of the risk to yourself and the airline that you are using as a reason to ask for a refund. You have made a decision on your own and simply don't have a case for a refund. http://www.turkishairlines.com/en-int/travel-information/legal-notice/terms-amp-conditions/cancellation-refund | Community Service Announcement A person going missing is serious. Many thousands of people disappear every year. In most cases they return or make contact with friends or family after a short while, however, a significant number are never heard from again. It is a MYTH that you need to wait 24 hours before telling the police of a missing person. Alert the police as soon as possible. The quicker the authorities start to look for them the more likely there will be a happy outcome. Presumed death All jurisdictions have rules on when a person can be presumed dead, that is, a death certificate is issued notwithstanding the absence of remains. In the united-states this is a matter for state law unless there is a reason for the Federal government to be involved (e.g. military personnel missing in combat). In most, a court or the registrar can decide that a person is probably dead and issue a death certificate/grant probate. People who are known to have been in the area where a tragedy occurred may be declared dead shortly after that tragedy even though no remains are found. For example, people on the Titanic who were not rescued by the Carpathia, people in the 9-11 attacks, the people on MH17 were all issued death certificates shortly after the respective tragedies. Alternatively, at common law (codified by statute in some jurisdictions) a missing person may be declared dead if: The person has been missing for an extended period, most commonly seven years Their absence must have been continuous and inexplicable (e.g. the person did not say they had found a new job and were moving far away) There must have been no communication from the party with those people most likely to hear from them during the period the person has been missing There must have been a diligent but unsuccessful search for the person and/or diligent but unsuccessful inquiry into their whereabouts. Coming back There are interesting legal implications of a person who has been declared dead coming back but they are outside the scope of this question. Please ask another question if you're interested. | US law generally doesn't permit trials in absentia (see Can a country put a foreign criminal on trial, without catching them?), so Sheppard would have to be physically brought to the US before a trial could begin, let alone any sort of testimony or sentencing. This could happen if he voluntarily travels to the US, or if he is extradited from the UK via their legal processes for doing so. He could be represented by a lawyer at trial if he chooses, just like any other criminal defendant. If convicted and sentenced to imprisonment, he would presumably serve the sentence in a US prison just like anyone else, unless the US government decides on some other arrangement. |
Is it legal for Turkish Airlines to refuse to refund a cancelled refundable-ticket purchased online? The issue Before coming to Turkish Airlines office I could refund both tickets online. After the simulation only one ticket was available, I directly ask for cancellation of the remaining ticket online and got refunded after a week. I couldn't refund the second ticket for a technical issue caused by a staff internally. It is not my fault if the second ticket got detached and yet they refuse to refund me now. I believe that my right has changed somewhere. The contract The contract says refundable or exchangeable with cancellation fees. The facts Here are the facts. I am a french and European citizen. My friend is a Nepalese citizen that my family is inviting to France. She holds a Schengen visa that was granted to her after we issued an invitation letter to EU. For that reason I have made a purchase online using my personal credit card attached to a french bank account on Turkish Airline online gateway. Through this purchase I believe that I became the owner of both tickets and I am therefore protected by certain EU consumer rights. This is also why the invoice name and address are different from the passenger name in the case of my friend. The visa being granted after the departure date I then decided to go to the Kathmandu office to ask for a price simulation. The price difference being too important I decided to ask Turkish Airline for cancelling and online refund because that is my right as stipulated in Turkish Airline policy as well as the EU consumer act. When I came back online to cancel and ask for refund only one ticket was available, the second ticket being detached during the simulation process I asked the Turkish Airline’s staff to put everything back as it was when I first arrived. That is when the Turkish Airline’s employee started to behave unprofessionally stating among other things that it was not possible, that I had to ask the call center and finally sending me to an equally ranking staff member that was not part of the process from the start. Even if I consider that Turkish Airline’s staff should have asked a manager or call the Turkish Airline center themselves they said that they had no access to any landline and they started staring at their computer screen without responding to me or even looking at me. I felt humiliated and since it became impossible to establish a clear communication I decided to leave the place and report it by email on the Turkish Airline’s platform. Upon sending the email a first auto response told me to wait 7 days and after 9 days another auto message told me that the issue was still under investigation. I then decided to borrow a mobile phone and call a supposingly Turkish Airline toll free number. After 2 minutes the phone balance went out and I had no other choice but to follow up on the previous ticket by email. My second email must have call upon Turkish Airline attention because the Kathmandu sales contacted me the same day to give me an appointment. I came back for the second time and this time the staff member told me and my friend to write a letter of consent for cancelling and refund. I did write the letter because it was my credit card and I am the one asking to be refunded and not the passenger. Turkish Airline’s staff then asked for a signed authorization from my friend to cancel and refund. When we refused he told us that we were in Nepal and that cancelling and refund would then not be possible if we would not accept to complete the full process. The irritated tone of my voice final made a Manager come out from the back office and ask for explanations. After more than 2 weeks I was surprised that the Turkish Airline’s manager was not already aware of the situation. The Turkish Airline’s staff that did the changes was not at office to answer so the other Turkish Airline’s staff said that I had requested a change of ticket from call center and that it was now impossible for me to cancel and refund it online. I replied that it was not true and that I had never call the Turkish Airline’s center and never give my consent for my friend’s ticket to be separated from my initial order, and certainly not the ownership of the ticket. The simplest way to prove it is that Turkish Airline record every conversations made to the call center and Turkish Airline won’t find any call prior my first visit to Kathmandu office because I never called Turkish Airline’s center before my visit to their office. Turkish Airline’s manager finally asked for my bank account information but asked my friend to sign the information together with a refund receipt written in Turkish. Neither my friend nor I speak Turkish but Turkish Airline staff insisted and under the pressure my friend signed both papers and we left the room once again humiliated. Two weeks later Turkish Airline is contacting me saying “In light of above determination, we regret to inform you that we are unable to meet your demand positively.” Question Here are the questions that I want to ask to anyone who can answer them: 1 — Is it legal for Turkish Airline to charge a EU citizen online and grant full rights over half of the amount of the transaction to a none EU citizen without the consent of the buyer? 2 — Is it legal for a EU citizen to require the signature of an invited passenger to get refunded? 3 — Is it legal for Turkish Airline’s staff member outside the EU to manually modify an invoice issued online with a credit card attached to a EU bank account and force a none EU citizen to give her consent for the refund to be approved? 4 — Is it legal for Turkish Airline’s staff member to change the logs to cover the fact that a transaction manually modified through help desk was instead modified through the call center and can the Turkish Airline prove it without record of the call and therefor client consent? 5 — Is it legal to retain around $200 of cancellation fee for an online transaction and force the client to come back 2 times physically, call 1 time on the phone, send 3 emails, write 1 letter requesting the cancellation and ask a none holder of the credit card for authorization letter and signature? 6 — Finally, is it legal for Turkish Airlines to refuse to refund a cancelled refundable-ticket purchased online? If anyone is interested in seeing the conversation logs between Turkish Airline and I, please let me know. | Turkish airlines states its cancellation policies here – this is what appears to a person in the US, content in Nepal or elsewhere is anyone's guess. The possibility and cost of cancellation depends on whether the ticket is domestic or international, and what the fare class is. For example no cancellation with refund is possible under the international economy promotional fare. There are various charges associated with other fares. So, it is legal for them to refuse to refund a cancelled ticket, depending on the facts. Or there could be some charge for rebooking. An airline does not use force to compel a customers to do things, but they can legally make it inconvenient for you to obtain a refund or rebooking. There is no law requiring that transactions with an airline be concluded by phone call within some number of minutes, or online, or by going into an office. They also provide information on changing someone else's ticket here. Can I travel using a ticket issued in someone else’s name? Topic: Reservations and bookings Last modified: July 03, 2015 No, only the person whose name and surname is written on the ticket can use it to travel or make changes to the booking and route. For this reason, you can only travel using tickets issued in your own name. For more detailed information please visit our booking page. Although you may have paid for the ticket, it is not your ticket. This page also addresses buying tickets on behalf of a third party: I want to buy a ticket for someone living in a different city. Will they be able to collect the ticket in the city where they live? Topic: Reservations and bookings Last modified: July 03, 2015 The person you buy the ticket for can collect the ticket from their nearest Turkish Airlines sales office. This process can also be simplified by using an e-ticket. You can purchase an e-ticket in the other person’s name either online or from our call center. For more detailed information please visit our reservations page. The question about changing logs doesn't have an obvious answer, since said "log" is probably a company-internal record and not a governmentally-regulated record. It would not be legal to falsify evidence in a legal proceeding. In case of legal dispute, you can present whatever evidence you have that tends to support your side of the story, and the court will decide whose version of the story is most credible. | Technically the signage implied an agreement, and allowed you to infer one. But yes, I think that management could not legally insist on more than the posted price, whether for a lost ticket, or for a particular duration. (Unless the sign included "prices subject to change without notice" or something of the sort.) As a practical matter, challenge this is going to be a pain. The employees on the spot probably have no authority to vary the price merely because the amount programmed into the register differs from the posted sign. At least they will claim not to have such authority. And they won't release the car without being paid the $80 that they will insist is the proper price. To challenge this, a person would probably have to pay under protest, and then sue for a refund, I would hope in a small claims court. Most people will not go to that trouble for $10, which perhaps the management counts on. Publicity might be more effective. | There is, in most countries at least, no law requiring a business to treat a customer fairly. In general, a business may refuse to serve a would-be customer for any reason or none, provided that the reason is not membership in a protected class (racial, religious, ethnic, or sexual bias, mostly). Exactly which classes are protected depends on the local law (in the US, there can be such laws at all of federal, state, and municipal levels). If a customer is asked to leave and does not do so, s/he could be charged with defiant trespass (or local equivalent). More likely, security, or the police, could simply escort the customer out of the business, using as much force as is reasonably needed for that purpose. Unless there are grounds for action not mentioned, I see no basis for a successful suit by the customer. | The retailer You can try making a subject access request under Articles 15(1) and 15(3) of the UK GDPR. Provide as much information as you can (your name, date of purchase, store you purchased it from, copy of the receipt, etc.) and ask for the serial number. If they still have it, and it is stored in a way which is linked to you in an identifiable way, then they are obliged to provide it without undue delay (and in any event within 30 days). You may want to provide a copy of your passport in the request to pre-empt them coming back with an ID check request under Article 12(6), which then allows them to delay processing the request until you have replied. As stated above, if they no longer have the data or you are not identifiable from the data then they do not have to provide it. If they do have to provide it but refuse then you can complain to the Information Commissioner's Office or ask the County Court for a compliance order under section 167 of the Data Protection Act 2018. The insurer Regulation 3(1) of the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 prohibits "unfair commercial practices". Regulation 3(4) provides that a commerical practice is unfair if, inter alia, it is listed in Schedule 1. Paragraph 27 of Schedule 1 contains the following item: Requiring a consumer who wishes to claim on an insurance policy to produce documents which could not reasonably be considered relevant as to whether the claim was valid, or failing systematically to respond to pertinent correspondence, in order to dissuade a consumer from exercising his contractual rights. As you've provided proof that you purchased the item, you can try to argue that having the serial number of the lost item can not "reasonably be considered relevant". Yes, the contract says that you must provide it, but consumer rights legislation overrides contractual provisions. You may also want to consider dealing with the insurer by email/post instead of by phone, (a) to avoid continuing to waste time on hold, and (b) because if they systematically fail to respond then this may also cause them to be in breach of the above provision, (c) to acquire evidence which you can use later. Escalating If you get no results from the insurer, make a formal complaint to them through their complaints process. Under the FCA Handbook rule DISP 1.3.1R, the insurer is required to provide a complaints procedure. Under rule DISP 1.6.2R they are required to provide a final response to a complaint within 8 weeks. If you are not happy with the response, you can escalate the complaint to the Financial Ombudsman Service which has the power to make financial awards pursuant to section 229 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 ("FSMA"). Doing so is free of charge and is therefore a good alternative to going to court. The ombudsman can also make awards that are not strictly based on law (i.e. they can go further than the courts can) because of section 228 of FSMA which provides that: "A complaint is to be determined by reference to what is, in the opinion of the ombudsman, fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the case." You must generally escalate a complaint to the Ombudsman within 6 months of receiving your final response from the insurer (rule DISP 2.8.2R). | No, they are not exempt Consumer protection laws (in general) apply to anyone doing business with consumers in that jurisdiction. You need to follow that law and apply to the company for a refund in compliance with the law. If they refuse, you can report them to the German regulator who may, or may not, take action against them. If you paid with a credit card, PayPal etc., once the company has broken the law, you can apply to them for a reversal of the charge. Similarly, most online platforms like eBay or Amazon will reverse the charge if you used them. | Your legal obligation to pay income taxes is generally dependent upon where you perform the work, not where the funds you earn from doing the work are delivered. If you do work in Turkey that causes you to receive earned income, you owe Turkish income taxes on those earning, and your employer has a legal obligation to the Turkish government to make sure that those taxes get collected, or your employer will have to pay your taxes (with penalties) for you. If your employer has to do that, your employer will dock your pay to cover your obligations regardless of which bank account you use or whether you set up a corporation that does work in Turkey as a subcontracting company rather than in an employee-employer relationship. Any of the actions you propose to evade Turkish income taxes would constitute criminal tax fraud and could lead to you and the payroll officials at your employer's company who were complicit in allowing you to attempt to evade Turkish taxes spending time in a Turkish prison. Then you'd be deported. And, of course, you'd be fired probably as soon as you were criminally charged. The U.S. would cooperate with Turkey in pursuing you, your employer and your employer's payroll officials, although I don't know how the Kuwaiti government would respond. | european-union (germany, spain, uk) The cookie consent law is the ePrivacy directive, which was implemented as national laws by all EU member states (including, at the time, the UK). Later, GDPR changed the applicable definition of consent so that implicit consent is no longer allowed. A notice in fine print as in the given example is not sufficient to meet this definition of consent, so any non-necessary cookies set in that context would be a violation. But it would be the national ePrivacy implementation that would be violated, not the GDPR. Thus, the GDPR's famous 4%/EUR 20M fines are not relevant here. Instead, each country can set its own fines. In Germany, this would probably be up to EUR 50k (§16 TMG) though German law doesn't implement this aspect of ePrivacy correctly. In the UK, PECR penalties are determined by more general data protection penalty legislation. Notable instances of cookie consent enforcement include the Planet 49 (ECJ judgement, German BGH verdict) case which basically affirmed that yes, the GDPR's definition of consent applies. Thus, any case law regarding GDPR consent is also applicable to the issue of cookies. Furthermore, the Spanish AEPD has issued an interesting fine due to insufficient cookie consent, but due to much more subtle violations than the outright disregard in the given example. E.g. in the Vueling action (decision (Spanish, PDF), summary, listing on enforcementtracker), the Vueling airline's website had a consent banner but ultimately told the user to reject cookies via their browser settings. This violates the requirement that consent must be specific/granular, since the browser settings are all-or-nothing if they're available at all. The airline was fined EUR 30k, the maximum possible under applicable Spanish data protection law. But what kind of risks would some blog run into that just sets cookies without appropriate consent? If the service is outside of the EU, enforcement is difficult. I am not aware of cookie consent enforcement against non-EU services. National data protection authorities can investigate the violation and issue fines, subject to their respective national data protection laws. They generally only do this when there are lots of complaints. Some authorities like the UK ICO have indicated that cookie consent enforcement isn't a priority for them. Independently, individuals can generally sue the service for damages. Some lawyers might send out cease and desist letters to non-compliant websites in the hopes of collecting fees. So aside from the last point, the risk is likely somewhat low, especially for a smaller site. At this point, it is worth reminding that ePrivacy/GDPR doesn't require consent for all cookies, and is not just limited to cookies. It is more generally about access to and storage of information on a user's device, unless that access is strictly necessary to provide the service explicitly requested by the user. Thus, functional cookies can be set without consent. However, consent does become necessary when cookies or similar mechanisms are used for analytics, tracking, or ads. Even though GDPR is involved, the cookie consent requirements apply regardless of whether the cookies involve any personal data. | The registration office does not have access to your GEZ bill. They cannot deny you deregistration, but also cannot tell you whether your debts are settled. You might prefer to clarify this matter with the GEZ in writing rather than over phone, since you can more easily machine-translate an email or letter. |
Limited partners' obligations for tax wrongdoing? To what extent are Limited Partners at risk for tax malfeasance committed by the Managing Partner? What is a Limited Partner's obligations following discovery of this sort of tax wrong-doing by the Managing Partner? To what extent is a Limited Partner subject to a back-taxes, fines and penalties resulting from financial wrong-doing committed by the Managing Partner? | Fundamentally, to what extent is a Limited Partner subject to a potentially ruinous financial situation resulting from financial wrong-doing committed by the Managing Partner? Civil tax liability Under U.S. tax law, a limited partner in a limited partnership that is taxed under Subchapter K of the Internal Revenue Code (i.e. as a partner) is responsible for that limited partner's share of all taxable income of the partnership, for all interest owed on the unpaid taxes, and generally speaking (subject to very narrow exceptions), to penalties assessed on the unpaid tax. Moreover, frequently, the limited partner has no right to be involved in the tax litigation by the tax matters partner of the partnership on the issues that matter. The limited partner's tax liabilities to the federal government and any other taxing authorities with a pass through income tax system are not limited to the limited partner's investment in the limited partnership. Criminal liability exposure The limited partner will generally not have any criminal liability for tax crimes committed by a general partner or other partnership official engaged in tax work on behalf of the limited partnership without more affirmative involvement in and endorsement of the misconduct, although the partnership itself might See U.S. v. Arthur Anderson, LLP (which was reversed on appeal by the U.S. Supreme Court because proof of intent was inadequate, but demonstrated the principle.) A limited partner would bear the limited partner's pro rata share of a criminal fine but that would be limited to the limited partner's investment in the limited liability partnership. Mitigating the harm with a lawsuit The limited partner will usually have a right to bring a civil action (i.e. a lawsuit) against a general partner whose management of the taxes of the partnership cause the limited partner to incur tax penalties, on a breach of fiduciary duty theory, but the limited partner will generally not be able to recover back taxes owed, or interest on back taxes owed, in a lawsuit of this kind. The limited partner might also be able to bring a lawsuit on other theories that might involve an award of punitive damages against the general partner or other person handling the taxes of the partnership who was involved. The legal theories are complex and many would involve a "derivative action" rather than a direct suit against the general partner or manager. Other questions The "what to do about this situation" part of this question is beyond the scope of Law.SE as it calls for individualized legal advice. A good response to this situation would be challenging to formulate for even a specialist business law and litigation practitioner with far more factual detail available. Litigating of issues like this routinely costs each side hundreds of thousands of dollars and can take multiple years. | The hypothetical situation would be a material misrepresentation of the facts, as well as a fraudulent misrepresentation - both are grounds for nullifying the contract. Under your hypothetical this is almost certainly material and is certainly a fraudulent misrepresentation. A fraudulent misrepresentation of the facts pertinent to a contract occurs when one party, to a bargain for exchange, misstates a fact and either knows or believes that the fact is not true, or is not sure whether or not his statement is true but claims it to be true nonetheless. If a party to the contract relies on the fraudulent misrepresentation and enters into a contract based on that misrepresentation, the contract is voidable by the innocent party. A material misrepresentation is a misstatement of fact that will induce a reasonable person to enter into a contract. If a misrepresentation is material to the contract, the contract will be voidable by the relying party even if the misrepresentation is not fraudulent. So, in this scenario, the contact would be voidable because there is both a material misrepresentation, as well as a fraudulent one. If the other party suffers a monetary loss because of the deceit, you would almost certainly be held responsible for any damages that may flow from the inducement. | From point 4: transferring all rights and obligations of Company A to Company B Among those rights and obligations are the rights and obligations arising from Company A's agreement with Employee. Employee is therefore still subject to the agreement, which is enforceable by Company B. If the agreement is carefully drafted, it will make explicit mention of Company A's "successors in interest" or some similar phrase or phrases. Even if there is no mention, the rights and obligations associated with this agreement will transfer (perhaps unless the agreement explicitly provides that they will not, but, let's be realistic, of course it does not so provide). | If you have no contract to provide the service then you have no obligation under contract law to do so. However, if you are aware that withdrawing the service could or would cause damage to their business then doing so may leave you open to a suit on the basis of negligence; particularly if you do so precipitously and without warning. You should write to them in the following terms: Despite our agreement that the contract would not be renewed you have not made any arrangements to stop using my service. Consequently I consider that by your actions, you have continued to treat the contract as ongoing. I am happy for this arrangement to continue on a month-by-month basis and will be invoicing accordingly. If this is acceptable, please respond by 4pm on x/y/z; if you do not do so I will switch the service off at 4pm on x/y+2/z | A statutory instrument that exceeds the limits of the enabling Act is void. For example, an Act that enables the executive to make regulations about companies would not support a regulation that purported to affect companies and partnerships. There are two controls in place: regulations must be tabled in Parliament and any MP can call for the regulation to be debated and voted down. anyone affected by the regulation can go to court to oppose it - there are lots of things they can argue including that the regulation overreaches its enabling Act. | Yes The directors of a company have a fiduciary duty to act within the law for the benefit of their shareholders - not to their customers, not to the government, not to the environment and not to the public. A lawsuit against the company will incur financial loss irrespective of if it is won or lost. It is difficult to see how it is in the shareholder's interest for the company to be enabling the funding of a lawsuit against it. | Yes. There have been indictments of individuals for failing to pay taxes on fringe benefits, such as the 2019 prosecution related to multiple instances of fraud including failing to report $410,000 of fringe benefits for People's Express, a bankruptcy start up airline. Often executives are prosecuted criminally, but corporations are actually easier to obtain convictions against (for example, corporations do not have protections under the 5th Amendment against self-incrimination). But since civil and criminal fines are hard to distinguish, it is more common to seek civil fines than criminal convictions against corporations, while pursuing criminal penalties against key officers and employees of the corporations. The U.S. Department of Justice has a set of policies (also here) regarding when corporations themselves should be prosecuted criminally that have parallels in state prosecutor's offices. A list of corporate criminal prosecutions in the 1990s (mostly for non-tax violations) can be found here. For example, in 1991, the Georgia Pacific Corporation was convicted of tax evasion and fined $5 million. Tax fraud prosecutions are rare but hardly unprecedented, although large civil penalties are vastly more common. There is nothing terribly new about it either. For example, an academic article on defending criminal tax prosecutions against publicly held companies was published in 1978. Simply stealing money meant for employee fringe benefits or taxes on those benefit is a more commonly prosecuted crime. At the federal level, in 2020, there were 593 tax evasion convictions in the US. In 2019, 848 people were sentenced, and in 2018 — 1,052. 945 prosecutions were recommended for tax crimes in 2020 in the U.S. In 2018, there were 1,050 recommendations. In 2019, the number of recommended prosecutions was 942, and in 2020 — 945. State tax fraud prosecutions are similarly rare but not unprecedented, although the raw number of cases per year is smaller because the federal statistics cover the entire United States, while state tax fraud cases comes from just one of fifty states. Almost all tax code provisions are the subject of fraud prosecutions at some point, and the common bond of the provisions is not the nature of the tax code section violated, but the willfulness of the violation. Detailed breakdowns of tax fraud prosecutions by type of tax code provisions violated are hard to determine, without detailed reviews of court records, because they all fall under the same criminal code sections. Many current federal prosecutions focus on tax fraud related to COVID related tax credits and cryptocurrencies. But federal tax prosecution agencies don't track fringe benefit fraud as a distinct subtype of case, and fringe benefit tax fraud could be variously classified as employment tax fraud, abusive tax schemes, general tax fraud, or corporate fraud. | The issue is not enforceability per se, it is the problem of proving what you agreed to. If the landlord adds conditions that are against your interest, he would need to show that you agreed to those conditions: if you add conditions against his interest, you'd have to likewise prove agreement. Since you both have copies of the agreement, it's a matter of comparison to see if the documents are the same. Rather than voiding the earlier agreement and rewriting everything, the change can be initialed. If you were to cross out the rent and insert a lower figure, you would need proof that he agreed to this (hence, his initials on your copy). In your case, the change is apparently in your interest rather than his, so there's no realistic way that this could become an issue (that I can think of: maybe there's a clause that has to do with the move-in date and moving in early actually works against your interest, in which case he would need to prove that you agreed. The fact of moving in early is sufficient proof of agreement). |
International law vs Treaty vs International agreement What is the difference between International law, treaty and international agreement? What are the consequences if one country fails to obey international law or fails to meet obligations?are they all the same thing? Are the consequences the same in all of the 3 cases? For example if a country that signed the treaty fails to comply the Outer Space Treaty, what will happen? Will there be war? | (Preliminary remark: Your "question" contains at least six questions, half of which are so broad that you might be better served by studying some introductory material on international law.) (Re ¶1) International law is "the legal system governing the relationships between countries; more modernly, the law of international relations, embracing not only countries but also such participants as international organizations and individuals (such as those who invoke their human rights or commit war crimes)." Black's Law Dictionary (11th edn, Thomson Reuters 2019). "International law" does not refer to some big book of statutes (if that is what you mean), it's just the totality of all the treaties, agreements, regulations, etc. that exist. A treaty is "an agreement formally signed, ratified, or adhered to between two countries or sovereigns; an international agreement concluded between two or more states in written form and governed by international law". Id. Similarly, the Vienna Convention defines "treaty" as "an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation". Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, art 2(a). As one can infer from that, agreement is a broader term (encompassing informal agreements, for instance). Of course, the fact that something is called an agreement does not mean it is not, technically, also a treaty. (Re ¶¶2&3) The consequences depend on the particular treaty and on what the parties have agreed on. The WTO, for instance, operates a sophisticated dispute resolution mechanism (see the Wikipedia article). If a particular treaty contains no such stipulations, it us up to the parties to decide what course of action they intend to pursue if they believe that another party does not fulfill its treaty obligations. States are generally bound by art 2(3) of the UN Charter, which provides that "all Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered". In resolving disputes, they must furthermore obey art 33(1): "The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice." Judicial means of dispute resolution are available, most notably in the form of arbitration courts/panels and the ICJ; however, this always requires that the two countries agree to bring their dispute before such a body. It is important to keep in mind that there is no "World Court". If country A believes that country B violates a treaty and B refuses to take action, then that's it. This might be cause for political sanctions by other countries, but there is no body that could somehow "make" B comply with its treaty obligations. | Choice of law (also called conflict of laws) arises when a legal dispute occurs across legal boundaries. For example, suppose I live in New York, and sign a contract to buy computers from you, a company headquartered in California. If we have a dispute about the contract, we need to decide which state's law and which courts (and juries) will be used to resolve the dispute. The law that applies to our dispute is called the applicable or governing law. In many cases, it doesn’t matter which law or court we use. But in some cases, it matters a lot. For example, the California law may be friendlier to customers, or a jury in New York may be friendlier to me than to a California companies. Since we know that the choice of law and court may matter, we may specify in the contract which laws and courts will be used to resolve any disputes. (These may not be the same. The contract could say that our case will be heard in the SDNY using CA law.) The clause that says which laws apply, and which courts will apply them, is called a governing or applicable law clause. Here’s an example many of us have used, probably without realizing it: APPLICABLE LAW By using any Amazon Service, you agree that the Federal Arbitration Act, applicable federal law, and the laws of the state of Washington, without regard to principles of conflict of laws, will govern these Conditions of Use and any dispute of any sort that might arise between you and Amazon. | The law applicable to immovables is the law of the situs (lex rei sitae), i.e. the law of the country where the immovable property is located. This is important because this law changed after the annexation. Therefore, the mortgage may not exist anymore as a security. The lex rei sitae in regard to immovables is usually not subject to a choice of law agreement. Consequently, the law of the country of the creditor, which applied to the mortgage agreement is not applicable. As far as the loan is concerned, the courts in the new country have jurisdiction over a claim for payment under the loan agreement and may apply the law of the country of the creditor and order payment. If you are unable to make payments, your house maybe subject to insolvency rules and sold, the proceeds then paid to your creditors. The country of the creditor may also have jurisdiction, if you are still a national of this country and nationality is a ground for jurisdiction in that country. Assuming the property is your only valuable asset, a judgment in favour of the creditor needs to enforced in the "new" country. Whether this actually happen, depends on the law of the "new" country, and most importantly probably on the relationship between the two countries after the annexation. | Different socities, including some that are not considered sovereign nations, create laws, that is enforceable rules of conduct, in different ways. Not all write them down. But they are all Law in that they are rulwa that societies can and will enforce mon their members. I recommend reading Legal Systems Very Different from Ours by David D. Friedman (Professor of Law at Santa Clara University). There are free versions available on the web, and the final version is available from Amazon. It includes chapters on several systems where law is not written, including: Pirate Law Prisoners’ Law Romani Law Comanche, Kiowa and Cheyenne: The Plains Indians Somali Law Other chapters deal with systems where law may have been written, but its method of formation and operation are very different from the models usually discussed on this site. This include Roman law, Imperial Chinese law, Jewish law, Early Irish Law, and the law of saga-period Iceland. | You could almost define a country as, "an entity that can defend itself against invasions." Non-sovereign entities are indeed generally prohibited from deploying lethal autonomous defense systems like booby-traps. But governments and state-like actors, as a matter of practice, choose their own rules. laws-of-war and international-law are not like "regular" law: When it comes down to it, states only follow international conventions and treaties to the extent that they consider it to be in their own interest to do so. If you start mining your property, you will probably be forced to stop by local law enforcement. If a warlord starts mining his borders, he's going to get away with it until someone with more power convinces or forces him to stop. Was it "illegal" for Turkey to shoot down a Russian military aircraft? One could cite all sorts of laws and conventions to answer that question. But in practice the consequences of that act are limited to whatever Turkey allows, or to what Russia and its allies can impose on Turkey. | The term avoidance, as opposed to cancellation, is an implicit reference to Articles 81-84 of the Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG), which uses the term "avoidance" rather than "cancellation." This multilateral treaty language is referenced because the CISG is the governing law for most International Commercial Sale of Goods Contracts. Why does the CISG itself use of the term "avoidance" rather than the term "cancellation", which is more familiar and idiomatic in American legal English? Probably because the term "avoidance" produced the most understandable and consistent translations into the multiple languages in which equally authoritative version of the CISG are drafted. | Not going to hold up. Dutch Supreme Court confirmed 2012-09-21 in LJN BW6135 that arbitration is still covered by the the right to an independent judge, as established in Golder v UK, ECHR 1975-02-21, nr. 4451/70. Stack Exchange can't decide the rules themselves. (The Dutch case confirms that sector-wide arbitration is in fact legal, with regard to a standard arbitration clause commonly used in the Dutch building sector. The arbiter was found to be independent in that case precisely because they weren't picked by the builder involved.) The GDPR is only indirectly relevant, but the fact that it's mentioned does mean that there is an indisputable intent to provide services to EU consumers. (See section 23 of the GDPR, or its national equivalents). As such, you can't hide behind a US business address. If you intend to do business in the EU, it's under EU laws - all of them. You can't say that only the GDPR applies, and not other rules. I'm having a bit of a problem finding a source, but I'm fairly confident that consumers have the right to sue at their own, local court, overruling the default of suing in the court where the counterparty is located. Finally, I have the right under national law (Dutch: BW 6:236 start and sub-n) to strike the arbitration clause up to 30 days after the conflict arises, and demand a court decision. That's not 30 days after I accept the "Public Network Terms", that's 30 days after the arbitration is invoked. Dutch law explicitly allows arbitration abroad, and arbiters may apply foreign law, but as written the arbitration clause has no legal basis in the Netherlands, and any arbitration resolution would therefore not be considered valid. You may wonder if it matters to Stack Exchange that the arbitration decision would not hold in the EU. Well, consider a clause like Indemnification, which demands the user indemnifies Stack Exchange. That's a pretty empty demand if it's not enforceable. | The general rule is, anything is allowed unless it is forbidden (and not that you can only do things that are expressly permitted). The logical structure of law may be a bit more challenging than procedural programming logic, since it may require a global knowledge and evaluation of the entire code (typically but not absolutely, the scope of the search for "unless otherwise" conditions is restricted to "in this chapter"). In other words, the law is a set of propositions which must all be true, and unlike actual execution of instructions in a sequence, law is to be interpreted simultaneously but hierarchically (that is: the order in which clauses are written is not significant). The appearance that the law is self-contradictory is largely illusory, though the resolution of the conflict may require a careful reading of the law and knowledge of jurisdictional hierarchy (federal law is superior to state law, which entails a particular resolution of the apparent conflict). Sometimes there are real conflicts, which usually result from using words in conflicting ways (note the practice of re-defining words "in this chapter/section/title"). The reason why law is not a science is that law is normative, not descriptive: it dictates what is allowed (a determination made through the political process), and does not attempt to discover what independently is. The reason why the legal process cannot be implemented in software is that software does not yet correctly interpret natural language, and law is written in natural language following interpretations based on judgments of what choices a reasonable would make. Perhaps if you propose a piece of law that you think is contradictory, it would be possible to show how the contradiction is illusory. |
Are recorded conversations regarded as legally binding contracts? Situation: there is a cell phone account in my sister's name. However, she does not use any of the lines, and she does not pay for it (payment comes out of my personal credit card automatically). I was added as an authorized user on the phone account. I called the phone company to change the address, this is the conversation: Rep: I need to speak to the account holder to change the address. You are the authorized representative and not authorized to make changes to this account. Me: fine, how do I change account ownership to me? Rep: You can go to the store with the account holder, each of you need 2 pieces of ID, then, it will be changed. Me: I heard from store employees that the change will result in the phone plan price to increase, is that true? Rep (after a long hold): No, the rates will remain the same after the name change. Now, I have an app on my phone that automatically records all conversations. Canada is a 1-party-consent state. I, therefore, can legally record a call I am involved in. The representative stating "the price will not change after the account ownership changes" on a phone call I record--does that constitute a verbal contract. That if I were to go to the store and the prices increased after a name change/account transfer, they are in breach of? | You asked the rep about how to change some details on your account, and asked him about the cost. It is clear from the recording that you are not changing anything right now. I can't see anything where you state that you want to enter a contract right now, I can not see anything where the rep indicates they want to enter a contract right now. In other words, no contract has been formed. The rep did tell you that a name change will not increase the phone plan price. That was a promise. It was a verbal promise, and you have evidence that the promise was made. Your contract will determine whether the company is bound by such a verbal promise. If you change the name on the contract, with nobody mentioning a price increase, and the price increases, you can surely complain that you were misled and wouldn't have changed the name if you had known about the price increase. However, if you get told that the price will increase before the name change, and you quote the previous promise, I don't think that will force the company to allow a name change without price increase, because your phone conversation didn't create a contract. | He may be entitled to (part) of the deposit or he may owe you more money When you and he agreed you both entered a legally binding contract - you are obliged to sell the vehicle to him, he is obliged to buy the vehicle from you. The deposit is merely the first instalment of the payment for the vehicle with the balance being due on delivery. They are not refundable by default. He now wants to repudiate the contract and you have several options: you can refuse his repudiation and require him to complete the contract within a reasonable time. He probably won’t do this so when he doesn’t we move on to one of the other options. In essence, this is simply a warning shot that if he doesn’t complete the contract you will move on to item 2. you can accept the repudiation and sue for damages, these would include your lost rent, pro-rata of registration, insurance etc. from the time you would have sold to the time you do sell, any additional advertising, any difference in the price you ultimately get if it is lower than his offer etc. you can accept the repudiation in return for keeping the deposit in lieu of the actual damages. This in makes the deposit a liquidated damages amount and it must follow all the same rules, basically it must be a genuine pre-estimate of the damage you would suffer and not be so high that it amounts to a penalty. You can accept the repudiation and, as a gesture of goodwill, return some or all of the deposit. | No, you're not required to sign any contracts. But since you're offering a service, you do have to manage some compliance tasks. You are a data controller under the UK GDPR, regardless of whether you have a company. This brings with it various compliance requirements. For example, you MUST post a privacy notice in accordance with Art 13 GDPR that explains how you process user's information. You must sign data processing agreements with your data processors, such as your server providers. And you should reconsider transfers of data to the US, since such transfers are illegal or at least quite questionable in the wake of the 2020 Schrems II ruling. You now have prospective users that are asking you for an Art 28 data processing agreement (DPA). These are likely other organizations that are data controllers of their own. For them to use your browser extension, they either need to find a legal basis that allows them to share their user's/employee's data with you (controller to controller transfer), or they need you to act as their data processor (controller to processor transfer). The third alternative is not to use your plugin at all. Of these, a C2P arrangement is most convenient for these other orgs, but involves a bit of paperwork to set up first. If you want to act as their processor, this doesn't mean you'd have to create a company (though a corporation might be very desirable as a liability shield). Being a processor means that you're contractually bound to only use the personal data as instructed by the controller, and not for your own purposes. This restricts what you can do, and has some special compliance requirements. For example, you cannot engage new subprocessors without your controller's approval. However, processor status can also be convenient for you because you're not responsible for interacting with the controller's data subjects, e.g. you're not responsible for handling their data subject access requests. Note that it's possible to simultaneously be a controller for some users, and a processor for others. E.g. Google Docs is offered directly to users as a B2C product so that Google is a controller, but also as a B2B product as Google Workspace, where Google acts as a data processor. Personally, I'd rather not sign any contracts unless I'm doing it as a business, and adequately compensated for providing this service. GDPR is only one compliance aspect out of many, making it unwise to offer a SaaS product as a hobby. For example, copying other people's web content has copyright implications… A potential alternative for some of the organizations asking you might be to make it possible for them to self-host your backend, so that they are not required to rely on you as a data processor. If you have no plans to commercialize your software, making it Open Source could be a solution. But you're in no way required to do that if you don't want to. | In general, a properly signed lease is binding. But there are exceptions, and they vary depending on the jurisdiction: country, state/province, and even city or county in many places. You mention a claim that the property should not be leased "because the owner needs it". In some jurisdictions, there is a special exception if the owner personally, or a member of the owner's immediate family, intended to live in the property. It is not clear form the question if such an exception would apply. it might well be that a person in the position described in the question has a valid and enforceable lease, and could simply remain in the property, paying rent, and the owner would have no valid grounds for eviction. But this kind of case will depend on the exact wording of the rental agreement, and on the exact provisions of the applicable laws, which vary widely depending on the location of the property. A person in this kind of situation would b wise to consult a local lawyer who will know local property law, and how the provisions of the agreement and other claims will be treated by local courts. There may also be local tenant assistance organizations, run by the government or by non-profit groups, who will know local law and can assist in such cases. A general answer cannot be gotten from a forum such as this which an individual should rely upon in such a case, particularly when the question does not even state what country, let alone what specific locality, is involved. | The provider has a legitimate interest in the data subjects data, and therefore they can override the right of deletion. See this example from the UK's Information Commissioners Office: A finance company is unable to locate a customer who has stopped making payments under a hire purchase agreement. The customer has moved house without notifying the finance company of their new address. The finance company wants to engage a debt collection agency to find the customer and seek repayment of the debt. It wants to disclose the customer’s personal data to the agency for this purpose. The finance company has a legitimate interest in recovering the debt it is owed and in order to achieve this purpose it is necessary for them to use a debt collection agency to track down the customer for payment owed. The finance company considers the balancing test and concludes that it is reasonable for its customers to expect that they will take steps to seek payment of outstanding debts. It is clear that the interests of the customer are likely to differ from those of the finance company in this situation, as it may suit the customer to evade paying their outstanding debt. However, the legitimate interest in passing the personal data to a debt collection agency in these circumstances would not be overridden by the interests of the customer. The balance would be in favour of the finance company. Article 17 of the GDPR, the "Right to be forgotten", says this: The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller the erasure of personal data concerning him or her without undue delay and the controller shall have the obligation to erase personal data without undue delay where one of the following grounds applies: A) the personal data are no longer necessary in relation to the purposes for which they were collected or otherwise processed; B) the data subject withdraws consent on which the processing is based according to point (a) of Article 6(1), or point (a) of Article 9(2), and where there is no other legal ground for the processing; C) the data subject objects to the processing pursuant to Article 21(1) and there are no overriding legitimate grounds for the processing, or the data subject objects to the processing pursuant to Article 21(2); In your example, it's obvious that the personal data is still necessary for performance of the contract (Art 6(1)(b)) such as collecting payment, or for fulfilling legal obligations (Art 6(1)(c), Art 17(3)(b)) such as the obligation to keep financial records. Thus, there continues to be a legal basis for processing/keeping the data and rejecting the erasure request in whole or in part. Things are slightly different when the legal basis for this processing was consent (Art 6(1)(a)) or a legitimate interest (Art 6(1)(f)). Consent can always be withdrawn, but this kind of data collection is not typically based on consent. You can sometimes object to processing under a legitimate interest (see Art 21) but that doesn't work when the data controller has overriding legitimate grounds to continue processing. Such overriding grounds might be the legitimate interest to pursue the debt, and Art 21(1) and Art 17(3)(e) explicitly call out the “establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims” as overriding grounds. So that covers requests under A, B and C. Things like legal basis and erasure/objection must be analyzed on a per-purpose basis, so it is possible that you could get a partial erasure, such as erasing information that's only necessary for marketing (compare also objection per Art 21(2)). But its quite clear to me that a data subject cannot get out of paying a bill by using the GDPR. | Please note that I'm not a lawyer. If you need specific legal advice, please consult a qualified attorney. Every time someone buys an item from someone else, there's at least an implied contract of sale where the seller of the item agrees to give the buyer the item to be purchased in exchange for a sum of money or other object of value which the buyer agrees to pay as consideration. Generally, in an online purchase, a contract of sale is completed when payment is made and the product has shipped. If the seller fails to provide the item you intended to buy after you make your payment, that's a breach of this contract of sale as the seller has failed to execute their end of the contract. I seriously doubt a "no refunds" policy would excuse the vendor for breaching the contract of sale. If you cannot resolve the issue with the vendor, then your best bet is to initiate a dispute through your credit/debit card issuer. | Can the seller enter a formal agreement with the tenants in which the seller pays a sum of money and in return the tenants vacate the premises before the closing date, and would such agreement hold over the tenants legal right to remain on premises past the closing date? Maybe. It depends on tenancy law in Nova Scotia. Notwithstanding, given that the tenants are “difficult”, what are your plans if they take the cash and don’t move out? What happens if the sale goes though under the assumption that the tenants have left, and in fact the tenants are still occupying the premises? Why would the buyer settle under an “assumption”? At the time of settlement either the tenants have left (so settlement happens) or the haven’t (so the vendor is in breach, settlement doesn’t happen and the buyer decides whether to rescind the contract and claim damages or affirm the contract and claim damages). What guarantees and proofs can the buyer demand as to the vacant status of the property? They take the keys and walk into it. What other questions should the buyer be asking? They should be asking: “Will you be in a position to fulfil your obligations under the contract?” | Contracts don’t need to be signed Unless they are of a class that does - NDA’s aren’t. If the parties agree to a contract then it binds them. You agreed and your evidence for doing so is your signature. They agreed and their evidence for doing so is your signature on the contract they gave you. |
Employee Stock Ownership as long as Employee Stays in the Company, What Kind of Nonsense is This? Recently a friend of mine has received a stock buy offer from its company. The company offered to sell a specific amount of the company shares with a nice discount rate, because he was in a critical and irreplacable position. Everything is fine up to this point. However, there is a ridiculous clause in the agreement: without any specific lime limit, if the employee quits job or the company fires him (event after 10 years), he will be required to, enforced to sell its shares back to company! Is such a clause legal or against the priciple of private ownership? or can this be called stock buy offer at all? I guess you did not see such a nonsense before. Thanks. | This is neither unusual nor illegal, assuming that the buyback price is specified in the agreement. If your friend does not wish to take advantage of the "nice discount" he can decline the deal, and decide for himself whether he wishes to buy shares without restriction, at the market rate. (It would be interesting to know what happens if he sells his shares and then leaves the company. I am fairly sure the agreement will cover this, but requiring an ex-employee to buy shares and then give them to the company could be considered unconscionable. That might be worth asking a lawyer about). | Can a significant change in incentives void an employment contract? Yes, because a party's unilateral, significant imposition which the counterparty did not expect strikes the premise of a contract/agreement being entered knowingly and willfully. Here, the contract or relevant portion thereof is voidable by the employee, because the employer's belated imposition is tantamount to a misrepresentation as contemplated in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 164(1). The contract clause regarding an employee's off-work hours might be unenforceable as unconscionable, more so where the incentive being slashed represents a significant portion of an employee's income (since it reflects that the employee's salary is not that high so start with). See the Restatement at § 177, 178, and 208. is the employee entitled to any compensation or the right to retain the property? Yes, but the applicable alternative --compensation vs. withholding the IP-- depends on what agreement the employee reaches with the employer. I presume what prompts this part of your question is the mention --in the Workplace SE post-- that the engineer rejected the employer's bid (offer is somewhat of a misnomer) of $25,000 for the employee's off-work IP. The engineer's reluctance is rightfully cautious. Prior to accepting the employer's proposal, it is in the engineer's best interest to ensure (with enough specificity in a new contract) the terms and conditions of that proposal, lest the employer subsequently argue that the payment of $25,000 encompassed any and all subsequent IP produced by the employee during his employment there. Likewise, insufficient caution by the engineer regarding the aforementioned proposal may permit a finding that the parties' subsequent conduct reflects the engineer's acceptance of the new conditions (including the slashing of incentives). | The law is here (too long to quote, or understand). There is a proposed modification of the law which may be enacted. In the section Justification, it is noted that under the existing law a global corporation may technically "own" five subsidiary corporations. Company A may own a winery in France while Company D may own a hotel containing a restaurant in New York. Under New York Law, the liquor license for the restaurant would be prohibited - and it could be subject to financial penalties. So the restrictions are broader that you mention (ownership of stock is an "interest"), but certainly what you mention is prohibited. The proposed law limits the effect to an interest in a restaurant or brewery "licensed under this chapter", i.e. in the state of New York (currently, a NY manufacturer cannot have an interest in an alcohol-selling restaurant anywhere). | An employee is an agent of the employer when working and owes a duty of loyalty to the employer. One of the obligations associated with a duty of loyalty is to refrain from receiving anything other than the employer authorized compensation for the work, rather than benefitting personally from work done on behalf of the employer. By appropriating additional benefit from the customer in a way that is unauthorized by the employer (the employer would be within its rights to sanction and authorize this conduct if desired), an employee who does not turn the profit in this transaction over to the employer has breached a fiduciary duty to the employer for which the employer would have a right to sue the employee for the amount by which the employee was unjustly enriched in the transaction. Would it actually play out this way in real life for these sums of money? Probably not. The stakes involved wouldn't justify the time and money of a lawsuit. But, breaching a fiduciary duty of loyalty to your employer in this context probably constitutes good cause to terminate the employment of the employee without paying severance that would otherwise be payable under Canadian employment law (in theory anyway, I've never seen a reported court case on point). | Based on the contract language quoted in the question, and the facts stated there, it would seem that the employee owns the copyright on the software. It would seem that the software was not created "during the course of employment." However, when the employee offers it to the employer free of charge, the employer may well want to own the copyright and any other related IP. The employer might want the employee to sign an agreement transferring the copyright. Or the employer might simply treat the software as belonging to the employer. Asserting and enforcing the copyright against the employer might be difficult. Insisting on even a token payment would help establish thst the copyright belongs to the employee, or gettign the employer to sign an acknowledgement of the ewmployee's copyright would have a similar, bnt even stronger effect. | does the individual have a legal case against the company? Unfortunately, no. Some details and terms you use are unclear (e.g., "phantom" equity, "manifest" core technology, and so forth), but your overall description reflects that the individual sabotaged himself by signing a contract that does not mention the promise of equity through which he was persuaded to engage. A written contract usually supersedes any prior agreement --regarding the subject matter of that contract-- between the parties. That superseding effect means that the contract formalizes or overrides, accordingly, said agreements or promises. Since the initial promises of equity are not reflected in the "interim" contract, the investor's subsequent silence upon individual's reproach/reminders is from a legal standpoint irrelevant. At that point only the terms of the contract matter. The individual might consider alleging mistake in the sense of Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 151-154 such that would make the contract voidable and perhaps "make room" for other theories of law. However, that seems futile unless the interim contract contains language that (1) provides specific conditions for its expiration, or (2) reflects the company's [mis-]representations that induced the individual to sign it. Neither seems to have occurred in the situation you describe. There is always a possibility that the contract might favor the individual's position and he just has not noticed it. But the only way to ascertain that is by reading the contract itself. | I can't find any law that would prevent an employer from requiring this. Under current Florida law, an employer can even demand passwords and access to an employee's social media accounts. A bill was proposed to prohibit this, but it hasn't passed. Generally, an employer can require anything they want as a condition of employment, as long as it is not illegal. Florida has at-will employment so the employer could certainly fire the employee if they don't comply. | Yes, the employee can choose not to accept the contract offered at the end of the probationary period and thereby allow the probationary period to end without accepting a long-term position. This is usually called "quitting". |
Does the owner of a foreign company need to pay taxes in the country of residence, if he does not receive any money from the company? Imagine someone in Austria, let's call him Franz, registers a company in another, non-EU country. He sells some services in the name of the company. The company gets paid by its customers (the money goes to the bank account of that company). Franz does not pay himself a salary, nor does he take money out of the company in any other way. The company pays all required taxes in the country it is registered it. Also, Franz puts money into the company. Franz has a job in Austria and his employer deducts all required taxes and fees from his salary. Whatever money Franz receives from his employer is already after-tax. Does Franz need to pay taxes/fees in Austria for the earnings of his company, if he does not get any revenue from it (neither salary, nor dividends, nor other money flows from the company to him)? If yes, what taxes or fees does he need to pay? Note: If you don't know the Austrian regulations, but know German ones, please provide the answer for Germany (as the laws are similar in both countries). | what taxes or fees does he need to pay? According to this glimpse of Austrian tax law, Franz would still have to pay income tax on any non-monetary compensation he gets from the company. See section of "Vermietung und Verpachtung [...]". Non-monetary compensation is typically known as benefits. The term serves to distinguish that compensation from (1) any cash flows from the company to Franz, which you ruled out in your description, and (2) any expenses the company incurs for business purposes involving Franz. Your mention that "nor does he take money out of the company in any other way" might mean that you ruled out benefits as well. I just wanted to be safe and preclude any misunderstanding in case you had in mind only cash flows from the company to Franz. | In business dealings, you would have a contract with a company, not with its owner. The new owner inherits both the assets and liabilities of the company. It's up to the buyer of the business to do due diligence before buying the company. The old owner may escape obligations to clients and suppliers once the sale of the business is complete, but the new owner could sue the old owner for fraud. (It may be possible to escape some liabilities by declaring bankruptcy, but that's not the situation you described. One unethical accounting trick that a company can use is to split the company into two corporations such that one branch inherits the liabilities, and it go defunct.) | You are a resident of one state, and a non-resident of the other. Or you could be a "part-year resident" of both. Read the applicable personal tax rules for each state, or hire an accountant to do it for you. Note that, in the end, each dollar of income is only taxed by one state. It's figuring out which state that gets tedious. | The criteria used by the IRS suggest that for federal tax purposes, the cashier would be properly classified as a contractor. Behavioral Control: A worker is an employee when the business has the right to direct and control the work performed by the worker, even if that right is not exercised. There is probably some training involved here, but it seems negligible. Has the company actually retained the right to direct and control the cashier? Is he obligated to use their register, as they tell him to use it? Is his work evaluated for compliance with those instructions? I'd guess that in most cases, the company doesn't actually care about any of this. As long as the company got all the money it was owed, would it really care if the cashier just stuck the money in his pockets until the end of the day? I'd also argue that it isn't really the employer controlling the when and where of the contractor's work, but rather the circumstances. Classifying him as an employee because he has to be at the event doesn't really make any more sense than saying your plumber is an employee because he has to come to your house to do the job. Financial Control: Does the business have a right to direct or control the financial and business aspects of the worker's job? The investment in the cash register seems relatively nominal. The company probably does not reimburse the cashier for expenses incurred in getting the job done. The cashier is presumably free to offer his services to others. The cashier is presumably being paid a one-time, flat fee. As you noted, though, the fact that there isn't much profit-loss opportunity is one factor pointing in the other direction. Relationship: The type of relationship depends upon how the worker and business perceive their interaction with one another. The fact that this is a single, hours-long job is probably the strongest evidence that the cashier is a contractor. Further, the cashier's job is not a key part of the business, as it is only a minor portion of an event that the company has never performed before and has no apparent intention of repeating. I assume that the company is not providing health benefits, sick time, etc., and that any contract with the cashier includes no language suggestive of an employer-employee relationship. Conclusion: The employee-contractor distinction is pretty fact-intensive, but based on what you've provided, there seems to be a much stronger argument that the cashier would be a contractor. | Since Germany and Spain are both in the EU, there is really nothing special you have to do that would be any different from moving money from one account in Germany to another. Indeed, if you deposit money into a bank in Germany that has branches in Spain, you ought to be able to deposit it in Germany and withdraw it in Spain. You could also wire the funds from one bank account to another. Or, for that matter, you could withdraw all the funds in currency form and travel from Germany to Spain and put it under your mattress in Spain. You owe taxes without regard to what you do with the money that you are paid. | The only reason you couldn't take all the profits is if your business were a C-Corp. I don't know of any reason a single-owner LLC would elect to be taxed as a C-Corp. Multi-owner LLCs and LLPs are, for federal tax purposes, either an S-Corp or a C-Corp. When possible they can and should generally elect to be taxed as an S-Corp. IRS Pub 2553 lists the criteria for S-Corp election. (Employees have nothing to do with the question.) For tax purposes partnerships, sole proprietorships, and S-Corps are "pass-through" entities that are not expected to pay a corporate tax. In effect, whether you like it or not, you do pay yourself all of the profits each fiscal year, and they are taxed accordingly. | As written, your question seems to ask for legal advice in a specific case. That would be off-topic. If you are asking strictly as a hypothetical: In germany, there is supposed to be the Bestellerprinzip for services of a real state agent (whoever retains the agent pays the fees). This was clarified in the Gesetz zur Regelung der Wohnungsvermittlung as changed in 2015. Landlords and real estate agents are frequently trying to get around it, but getting the legal construction of the contracts wrong would mean a substantial fine. | If you are the CEO of a public company, this might be a problem if it causes less profits for the shareholders. They could fire you if your actions cost them money. If you are the owner of a business, then the CEO of your company (you) can do anything legal that all your shareholders (you) agree with. Nobody can force your company to deal with anyone, especially with no business, except for existing contracts or if there is illegal discrimination. Now all this is not “your personal opinion” but “the ceo running the company according to the wishes of the shareholders”. You are allowed legally to discriminate against a company whose business practices you don’t like. You have to do nothing, just don’t deal with them. If Facebook sends you a million dollar order, just don’t accept it. Make sure that no sales contract is created. It is remotely possible that you have problems if such a decision causes you to go bankrupt and you can’t pay your taxes or debt, like a debtor could claim you could have paid your debt and want your personal money instead of your broke company’s money. |
Which state can charge you if you commit a crime while standing in more than one of them? The Four Corners Monument is a place where you can stand in four states at the same time (Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, and Utah). If someone committed a crime while standing there, which of the states can or cannot charge that person with that crime? | All Four of them! Double Jeopardy is not in play if a jurisdiction can lay claim to your criminal action, so if you stand on the Four Corners and shoot a man in any of the four states, each state has a right to charge murder. In addition, the Federal Government can have a go at you because you crossed state lines while in comission of a crime. Plus the Navajo Nation, which controls the reservation land the border is on. So that six separate charges. That said, the state the dead body occupied at time of Murder would have the best case for action and the other three would likely let that state try you first. The Feds would only step in if each of the four states failed to convict, though they can step in whenever they want (they are just watching to see if you'll serve time first). Not sure at which point Tribal jurisdiction applies, but given that this is a fairly common Jurisdiction issue, I'm sure it's been worked out. | Absent newly enacted law in response to the end of the separate sovereigns doctrine, the first case to which jeopardy attaches (generally speaking when a jury is sworn and the first item of evidence is presented to it) would bar subsequent prosecutions, without regard to whether it arose in state or federal court. It would be a race to the court house rule. This is how it works if there are multiple prosecutions within a state, for example, one commenced in a municipal court that is not part of a state court system, and another commenced in a state court of general jurisdiction. | Unless there is enough evidence to convict one or more of the suspects, none will be convicted. In general the argument: We know it must be one of you, but we don't know whch, so we find you all guilty. is not allowed in any non-dictatorial jurisdiction. Just how much evidence is needed for a conviction varies by jurisdiction in theory, and by judge or jury in practice. Also, it would be possible to charge several of the residents with having acted jointly in the crime, but there would still need to be sufficient evidence against each defendant to obtain a conviction. | On the contrary there are hundreds of federal statutes that sanction civil forfeiture, as well as 18 U.S.C. § 983 (and other subsections inter alia) that governs civil forfeiture. What you seem to be more concerned with is the judicial oversight and regulations around civil forfeiture. The burden of proof varies between, and within, states - in some, prima facie/probable cause is all that is required, in others, a preponderance of evidence, or clear and convincing evidence is required. Just three states require proof beyond a reasonable doubt and civil forfeiture is only illegal in New Mexico. Civil forfeiture is subject to judicial review: a list of notable cases in civil forfeiture is available on Wikipedia. Here's some of the more interestingly-named ones: Marcus v. Search Warrant One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania Marcus v. Search Warrant held that the search and seizure procedures in that case lacked safeguards for due process, freedom of speech, and freedom of press. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania held because the vehicle was searched without a warrant, and the untaxed liquor found thereby was used to invoke the forfeiture, the forfeiture was illegal (the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures). So, what is the legal framework? Broadly speaking, 18 U.S.C 983, as well as state legislation. What recourse is there? Judicial review. However, the procedures vary between jurisdictions. | New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Virginia still allow private prosecutions that can result in incarceration. See also a state by state summary here. A bar on conflicts of interest (e.g. having the same lawyer pursue a private prosecution and a civil case against the same defendant) greatly limit the practice in Virginia (see also here). There is an argument that this limitation has federal constitutional force. But see, Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 387 (1985) (analysed here). Is there anyone currently in jail/prison as a result of a private prosecution in one of the states which allow them? If not, when was the last time this occurred. They are very rare, and often limited to misdemeanors. I suspect that there is currently someone in incarcerated on the basis of one, but it isn't easy to determine as there are no one who maintains statistics regarding this. Convictions in private prosecutions have resulted in appellate decisions as recently as 2020 in Virginia. A private prosecution resulting in a conviction with a one-year suspended sentence and one year of probation was affirmed on appeal in 2001 in Rhode Island. In many Rhode Island cases, this involves prosecutions by police officers (see also here noting that this is also common in "New Hampshire, New Mexico, South Carolina, and Virginia, where police officers can act as prosecutors throughout the entire misdemeanor process—from a defendant’s first appearance through a plea or trial"). A (pay per view) 2011 law review article reviews the practice of victim prosecutions in New Hampshire (where incarceration may not be sought), New Jersey, and Rhode Island. | It is possible in principle, in the US, under the Bureau of Prison Treaty Transfer program, so that one could serve your time in Australia for example -- but not New Zealand, which isn't part of a bilateral or multilateral treaty with the US: here is the list. Canada and Australia are on the list via the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons. New Zealand is (by choice) not a participant. | The courts do not supersede your constitutional rights, although you may believe that you have a constitutional right that isn't actually there. This article discusses the position that "due process forbids convicting an individual of a crime unless the government proves the elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt". This standard is actually not stated anywhere in the US Constitution, but it has been assumed as an implicit meaning of "due process". It sounds like you were charged with a crime, and there is most likely an applicable statute in your state that is analogous to RCW 26.50.110 in Washington. So you have the right to a trial and the prosecution would have the obligation to prove all of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. It also appears that you did violate the applicable law and you were willing to plead guilty, as urged by your attorney. You are correct that you don't technically have to prove your innocence, but there is a practical problem that if the prosecution provides some weak evidence that you violated the law, then the jury might decide that your failure to refute the evidence means that there is no reasonable doubt. The problem is that there is a tendency for jurors to think that the defendant has to create a doubt. States differ somewhat in how they explain the burden of proof to jurors, and you might fare better in a state where the instruction is that "you must be firmly convinced". Since the attorney seems to have said that "the constitution doesn't apply to this", this is a puzzle. I would not assume (though it is possible) that the attorney was incompetent. It is possible that he was speaking of a non-criminal matter, and it is possible that you were talking at cross purposes. There is no legal situation where "the constitution doesn't apply to this", but perhaps "that constitutional limitation doesn't apply to this specific situation". Regardless of what the attorney said, your attorney doesn't violate your rights, even if he gives you bad advice. The actual court might, and then you would have a cause for an appeal. Similarly, if the district attorney reasonably believes that you are a danger to society and is prosecuting you, that is not a violation of your constitutional rights. An improper conviction would be a violation of those rights, although it might take an appeal to get the court to recognize that fact. | Under U.S. law, double jeopardy prevents you from being charged with the same charge twice, and also from being charged with any offense which is a lesser included offense of the charged offense, or a charge so substantially similar that for constitutional purposes it amounts to the same crime. Basically, the test is whether a prior acquittal would be inconsistent with a new criminal charge. For example, even though there is an additional element of the crime of murdering a postal officer to the crime of murdering someone on federal property, double jeopardy would probably bar a retrial of a murder on federal property case simply because the victim happened to be a postal worker and that element wasn't charged in the original indictment. This is because the acquittal of the first murder charge would almost always imply a jury determination that a murder didn't take place which would be inconsistent with a murder of a postal worker charge. On the other hand, a trial on a murder charge would probably not bar, for example, a trial on a burglary charge (which at common law involved trespassing with an intent to commit a crime), even if the burglary charge arose from the same conduct. This is because an acquittal on a murder charge isn't necessarily inconsistent with the existence of a trespass, or with the intent to commit some crime other than the murder for which the defendant was acquitted. But the exact way that the line gets draw is tricky and while what I have described is a good general summary of the cases interpreting the double jeopardy clause, it isn't a perfect one. This issue has been litigated many, many tines over the years, so there are a lot of cases that are squarely on point addressing specific fact patterns in precedents that are binding case law that are not always a perfect fit to the general principles. In these circumstances, the binding case law is going to control, at least until a court with appellate authority over the court whose case established the precedent in question decided to overrule a prior precedent from the lower court, or in the case of U.S. Supreme Court precedents, until the U.S. Supreme Court revisits one of its own prior precedents as wrong decided or wrongly interpreted, which happens now and then, although it is a rare event. |
Am I obligated to pursue an invoice? I recently had a contractor do some work on my house. I was not happy with them at all: They started later than promised, finished later than promised, did not update me on progress, literally forgot to do part of the project (they did it later, after it came up in inspection), sent me the wrong invoice, and then failed to void the wrong invoice as promised. The original terms were 1/2 up-front and 1/2 when the job is done. Now that the job is done, I have not received the final invoice. (I can guess why: I have reason to believe they sent it to the wrong address because of their own sloppy record-keeping) Do I have any legal obligation to pursue this invoice? To call them and ask about it? Or am I safe in not paying until I'm invoiced, and not being particularly aggressive about receiving the invoice? What might happen in the long run if I never receive the invoice and never pay it? I found the following parts about payment in the contract: Payment for each invoice is due to XXX no later than five (5) days after the invoice date. Full payment of XXX’s final invoice within 30 days of the date on the final invoice is a condition precedent to the operation of RWA’s warranty. Followup: Based on discussion here, I realized that what I was really after is a Lien Release. I went into their office and demanded the Lien Release. That is when they realized they had not provided the final invoice, and they finally provided one (more than a month after project completion). I paid the invoice (reluctantly, but honestly), and got my Lien Release. | Give the contract language now included in the question, it seems that payment is not due until after the invoice is submitted. I don't see any obligation on the homeowner's part to prompt the contractor to submit the invoice, nor to pay until it is submitted. It might be well to keep a sum reserved so that a late invoice will not find the homeowner with a cash flow problem leading to a default, which could allow the contractor to claim damages or file a lien. But I don't see how a lien can be field before the invoice is delivered, because the payment is not due until 30 days after the invoice date, and no lien can be field until payment is overdue. It seems that the warranty on the work is not in effect until after final payment is made. If there is any reason to consider a warranty claim, it might be desirable to get and pay the invoice. | The primary legal question is whether the resident (tenant) has breached a duty of care. There are all sorts of laws establishing duties of care, such as between doctor and patient, which may be created by a legislature or may be part of common law tradition. There is a duty of care imposed on a landlord w.r.t. the tenant, requiring that the premise be "secure", therefore a landlord might easily be held liable if the main door into the building was not locked. This duty is a specific instance of a general duty from tradesman/businessman to customer. As far as I can determine, there is no such statutory duty imposed on tenants in Washington state, and none from case law being revealed by a few cursory searches. In order to be subsumed under general "everybody has a duty to everybody else" law, the damage would have to be foreseeable. It is said that "If something is foreseeable, it is a probable and predictable consequence of the defendant’s negligent actions or inaction". This mean that a reasonable person would have known that, under the circumstances, the damage is likely to result. Circumstances vary quite a bit, and there is no general rule about holding the door open for another person. If there is abundant signage reminding tenants to never ever let in a stranger no matter that their excuse and/or if the premise is in a crime war-zone, the outcome is more likely to be considered to be foreseeable. | There is no fraud for breach of contract That is, except in highly exceptional circumstances where the guilty party acted deceptively and dishonestly to obtain a benefit or cause harm - the landlord must have knowingly never intended to make good on their promise rather than simply failing to do so. There is a difference between a warranty and a representation The key difference between a representation and a warranty is the remedy available to the receiving party. A Representation is a statement of fact which is relied on by the receiving party and induces them to enter into the contract. It is normally before the contract, but may be repeated in the contract as well. A party may claim misrepresentation where a false representation has been made. They may be entitled to rescind the contract, which means that the contract would be set aside and the receiving party may also be entitled to damages to put them back into the position they would have been had the contract never been entered into. A warranty is a statement of fact contained in the contract. If it is not true the receiving party has a claim for breach of contract. If it is a fundamental breach the receiving party may have the right to terminate the contact in addition to a claim for damages. However, unlike a claim for misrepresentation, the contract is not undone. As tis is expressly both, the tenant has the choice of which remedy to peruse - void the contract and seek damages for misrepresentation or affirm (or attempt to terminate - it’s not clear that this breach is egregious enough to justify that) and seek damages. | Generally, what you say you will do in a contract is what you must do - there is no "the dog ate my homework" excuse. For your examples: Employment contracts have so much government regulation that the common law contract is lost in the mists of time. It is unlikely that a court would interpret an employment contract as requiring exact timekeeping; it is also unlikely that the person would have worked exactly 38 hours on every week except the one where they worked 37.5. However, if it were proved that the employee owed 0.5 hours to the employer they could be required to provide it or refund the pay they had received, barring a law that changed this. The dog must be walked. Alice must find a substitute walker if she is unable to provide it. Falling sick is something foreseeable that Alice should have provided for either in the contract ("if I am sick I won't walk the dog") or by arranging for someone else to do it. For purely personal services, falling sick may frustrate the contract, however, dog-walking is probably not personal enough. There is a doctrine which allows termination by frustration where neither party is at fault, however, it is not clear that this would apply. The building burning down is foreseeable and could (should?) have been addressed in the contract. If the destruction of the building was without fault on the owner then the contract is frustrated. If there was some fault on the owner (smoking in bed, inoperative fire alarm etc.) and the cleaner stands willing, ready and able (that is able except for the absence of a building) to perform their obligations, the owner would probably be obliged to pay, at the least for unrecoverable costs (e.g. wages) and loss of profits - if they pay for the cleaning products the cleaner would be obliged to deliver them up. One of the main reasons for the length of contracts for non-trivial transactions is they deal with these contingencies. | I do not have a written agreement of her saying she will pay 1/5 of utilities cost. Can I still take her to small claims court to get my money back? Yes. This type of agreements does not need to be in writing. Proving the other roommates' timely payments is strong evidence that also she is under a similar agreement. You did not elaborate on the form of her refusals. If these are stated in writing, they might evidence elements that further weaken her legal position. For instance, these might reflect her inconsistencies and/or bad faith. Even if you were unable (which seems very unlikely) to prove that there is an agreement to the effect of splitting costs, you might still prevail on grounds of equity. | Suppose Publisher printed 10,000 copies under the terms of the contract, and within those two years they sold 7,000 copies (and paid royalties). If you did not receive leftover copies at the end of the 2 years, then either (1) they broke the contract or (2) at the last minute they sold the remainder to some third party. If the latter is the case, they would be obligated to pay royalties on that last sale, and the numbers should add up (assuming you know how many were printed initially). If they failed to pay royalties, or they continued to sell the book, you would need to send your lawyer after them. Another possibility is the lost-email excuse – "We emailed you asking if you wanted the books, and you didn't reply, so we sold them" (disposing of does not necessary mean "destroy"). The burden would be on them to prove that they offered you the remainders and you elected not to purchase (if that is the wording – the contract could have required a specific refusal, not just a failure to respond). Under the contract, Publisher can't just decide to keep printing the book, nor can they continue to distribute it (but a third party could distribute existing copies forever). You would have "legal exposure" i.e. some risk of being sued if you republish, but it might be minimal – definitely get your attorney to advise you on that. Vendors might refuse to sell the republished work if they think it is an unauthorized edition. | If this requirement was not made before rendering the service, you are under no obligation to accept the term. You and the service provider must now find an agreeable method of payment. You still owe the provider but if you are compelled to pay then the provider will be compelled to be more accommodating in their allowed payment methods (cash, at least). As a general rule, if you are providing a service for any significant amount of money, you should require payment up front or at least a deposit and payments at milestones. Especially if you're 7,000 miles away from your client and put any restrictions on method of payment. | You inspected the property online and based on that inspection you signed the lease. You have a legally binding contract. Now, it is not at all like the pictures How? I mean, are these pictures of a different house? If that is so then your contract is void for fraud. However, if the pictures are of the actual house and you just imagined from them that the house would be other than it is then tough luck for you. the stairwell in the house is a huge safety hazard for children OK. Does it comply with relevant building codes? If not then the landlord needs to bring it up to standard: you cannot walk away from the contract. Is it in need of repair? If so, the landlord needs to repair it: you cannot walk away from the contract. If it is compliant and in good repair and you think it is a hazard notwithstanding then you need to manage that hazard: this is not the landlords problem. I refused to move into the house That's fine: so long as you keep paying the rent there is no obligation on you to move in. If you stop paying the rent then it would appear that you have repudiated the contract and the landlord can sue you for damages - probably the costs of finding a new tenant and the rent up until that tenant takes over. |
Why are Nazi war criminals being prosecuted now? Lately numerous former Nazi war criminals are being prosecuted. The latest being a 97 year old former SS soldier. But why are they being prosecuted now? Why did they take so long to do this? | It is reported that this is the result of new legal reasoning in German law. In the cases of Demjanjuk in 2011 and 2015 it was found that being a camp guard is enough to be found guilty of accessory to murder, even without specific evidence of a crime. In a more recent trial (Rehbogen) the prosecution used the same reasoning to charge and try a concentration camp guard. | If I were a DA (District Attorney) looking out "stamp out" statutory rape, I would make the rounds of the hospitals, identify women who gave birth, or were impregnated when underaged, and go from there. But few, if any DAs, do this. No, you wouldn't. First, you have neither the time nor the budget to do this. Second hospitals are not public property, you would need a warrant which the court won't give you because you don't have probable cause to believe a crime has or is being committed. As a DA, I would of course, follow up on any complaints lodged by the victim, or even by her/his parents. And maybe I would prosecute a case where people were "caught in the act, or there were nude pictures, etc. May even an especially egregious PDA (public display of affection). No, you wouldn't. You would follow up on complaints to the extent that you have the time, budget and manpower to do so and you would prosecute cases where you believe that you have a reasonable prospect of getting a conviction and where prosecution is, in your opinion, in the public interest. In the real world, that means where the police hand you a brief of evidence that is a lay-down misere and (for statutory rape) where there is a real power imbalance between the perpetrator and the victim - giving 2 willing 15 year old kids the label of 'sex offender' for life is probably not in the public interest. But suppose there were no complaints or smoking guns. Could someone investigate based on something like a teenager "holding hands" with someone much older? To make the question objective, what has historically caused DAs to prosecute people outside of the above parameters? With some exceptions, it is not the role of the DA to initiate or conduct investigations of criminal actions - that is the role of law enforcement officers, usually for this particular crime, police officers. Notwithstanding, the general rule in western, liberal democracies (which the United States, with a certain generosity of spirit, can still be considered) is that citizens are allowed to get on with their lives without day-to-day interference from the state. That is, law enforcement officers do not 'go fishing' for crimes, they investigate crimes that they have a probable cause to believe have actually happened, either because they themselves saw it happen or someone has reported it to them as having happened. The term for having a law enforcement officer following you around waiting for you to break the law is 'harassment' and may itself be illegal. A law enforcement officer can initiate an investigation based on anything but as no law enforcement agency has unlimited resources, they tend to follow only those investigations that might lead somewhere. For example, it has been known for parents to hold the hands of their children and even to publicly display affection towards them and parents are often "much older" then their children - this would not generally be grounds for initiating a statutory rape investigation. | In germany, a child below the age of 14 cannot be guilty of a crime. However, a family court may order measures regarding the welfare of the child. In a case like the one you describe, or even somewhat less extreme ones, this might be taking the child out of the family and into a care home where the child would be locked up for his or her own good. | In short, no, that cant be a pardon for those police officers who would be now influenced to take more violent actions towards those they detain. Pardons are only applicable to past actions. You may be pardoned before charges are filed, but the actions must have already occured. Though I less certain about this, simply because Ive never heard such a thing proposed, I would also note that it is highly improbable that the actual statement he made - generic and during a speech - could everbe interpreted as an affirmative act intending to grant pardons to anyone who may act in that manner in the future. | The law was first promulgated on June 8, 1940 By the 76th Congress. The original text is here. It doesn’t seem to be a particularly important piece of legislation and I can find commentary on it and I’m not going to read the debates - if you do, please get back to us. Two points to note, it was passed at a time when most of the rest of the world was at war and the US was quietly preparing to be at war and it seems to be intended to fill a gap in state law since conviction under state law is a defence under Federal. | As explained here, this arises from the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 and the Data Protection Act 1998. There is a concept of a "spent" conviction, where a person convicted is not reconvicted of a serious offense for years, and then the person is (statutorily) "rehabilitated", and under §4 of the law, they "shall be treated for all purposes in law as a person who has not committed or been charged with or prosecuted for or convicted of or sentenced for the offence [s] which were the subject of that conviction". The law also criminalizes certain disclosures of spent convictions, mainly unauthorized disclosures by officials. The reasoning is that "the public interest in rehabilitation outweighs the public interest in continuing publication and knowledge of the offense". The warning is actually not directed at Bob, it is directed at the prosecutor. | For the same reason you can’t ask the parties to a contract what they meant Legislation, once enacted, stands on its own independent of the people who drafted it, introduced it to Parliament and voted for or against it. These are not the same people in any event and since the legislation might have been passed anywhere between the 13th and 21st centuries, a lot of them will be dead. There’s a fundamental issue of fairness here. The people who are obliged to comply with the law (you and I) can’t ask the politicians so neither can the judges who have to decide if we did. Further, the judiciary cannot interact with the executive or the legislature in this way without violating the principle of separation of powers. Imagine you are charged with a crime and your guilt or innocence turns on the interpretation of the statute. Do you really want politicians who are looking at how the case plays out on Twitter telling the judge which interpretation to use i.e. effectively telling them whether you are guilty or not? | The probable answer is right there in the article: the Kim Dotcom case has been a PR coup but a legal disaster. Mr Dotcom has not, at this time, been jailed and it may have become apparent to US and NZ law enforcement agencies that he probably never will be! It is really, really easy to accuse someone of committing a crime; it can be really, really hard to prove it beyond reasonable doubt in a court of law. So after initiating a case that has turned out to be a total disaster, why would you expect them to do the same thing a second time? |
What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid? What is a contract? What elements are required for validity? | The following answer is based on general common law jurisdictions; many jurisdictions have statutes that will change some of these. In particular, consumer contracts, real estate contracts and employment contracts are typically heavily regulated and may have additional requirements. What is a contract? A simple definition of a contract [Guest, AG (ed), Chitty on Contracts, Sweet and Maxwell, 27th ed, 1994, p 1] is: A contract is a promise or set of promises that the law will enforce. Such promises must be between different people; you can't contract with yourself. Note, however, that you and a company you own are different people; so you can form a contract with your company. So at least two people must be parties to a contract but there can be more, in fact, as many as you like. So long as the requirements are met by each of the parties they will be legally bound by their promises. Contracts are ubiquitous Most of us engage in contracting many, many times a day. Almost every transaction where something of value passes from one person to another in return for something of value going the other way is part of a contract. Buy a coffee. Use some electricity. Get a haircut. Sell something on Ebay. What elements are required for validity? To form a contract, all parties must have: Intention to create legal relations Agreement Consideration Legal Capacity Genuine Consent Legality of Objects Intention to create legal relations The mere fact of mutual promises does not create a contract. The law requires some evidence (express or implied) by the parties that they intend to make their promises legally binding. Two presumptions, both of which may be overcome by the evidence, have developed to help determine this: an agreement in commerce or business is presumed to be a contract, an agreement of a family, domestic, social or voluntary nature is presumed not to be contract. In addition, a transaction with a public authority carrying out a statutory function is not normally contractual, even if a fee is paid. In contrast, government commercial activities such as buying or selling goods or services (that are not statutory obligations) are contractual. Agreement The parties, having decided they wish to be legally bound, have to agree on what they will be bound to. The most common way this is determined is by the concept of offer and acceptance, however, a global approach can be taken by looking at the acts and conduct of the parties to determine if they have reached an agreement. Offer An offer is a definite undertaking with the intention that it shall become legally binding when the person to whom it is made accepts it. In working out if a communication is an offer or not, the following are considered: An invitation to treat is not an offer. An invitation to treat can include putting goods on display in a shop (but putting them on display in a vending machine is an offer), publishing a catalogue or price list, advertising an auction or putting a "For Sale" sign on your house or car. An offer can be made to a specific person or persons, a class of persons or the whole world. The offer can only be accepted by someone to whom it was made. For example, if I offer to sell my car for $5,000 to Jim then only Jim can accept it, if Tony "accepts" it there is no contract. An offer must be communicated to the person(s) for whom it is intended. Duh. An offer can be revoked before it is accepted. Acceptance Once an offer is made there are rules used to determine when (and if) it has been accepted: Acceptance must be in reliance of the offer; that is, the person "accepting" the offer must know that it exists. For example, if B find's A's lost wallet and returns it out of kindness, not knowing that A has offered a reward, B cannot claim the reward when he learns of it. Acceptance must be complete and unqualified. If there is anything further to be negotiated then a contract has not been formed. Conditional assent is not acceptance. An agreement to buy "subject to bank finance" for example is not a contract. Acceptance must be clear and certain. The exact terms of the contract must be agreed with sufficient certainty, if the terms are indefinite there can be no contract. Note, however, that common usage or past dealings can provide sufficient certainty. Acceptance may be express or implied. That is, you can accept an offer by word or action. Acceptance may be retrospective. Where parties have acted on the basis that a contract will be formed in the future then if and when that contract comes into existence, those acts form part of it. A counter-offer is a rejection of an offer. If you make a counter offer then that kills the original offer; you cannot subsequently accept that offer unless it is re-made. Acceptance must be communicated (unless it is communicated by conduct). Again, duh! The offeror may prescribe the manner of acceptance. If the offer says it can only be accepted by post for example, then an email is not an acceptance. Example 1 B walks into A's convenience store. A has on display a chocolate bar with a price tag of $1; this is an offer to treat. B can now make an offer on said chocolate bar by: Saying, "I will give you $1 for this chocolate bar", Saying, "I will give you 50 cents for this chocolate bar", Saying, "I will give you $2 for this chocolate bar; but you must accept my offer in writing", Saying, "I will massage your left foot for 1 minute for this chocolate bar", Saying, "please give me this chocolate bar for free" (Note: this is not an offer that can lead to acceptance due to absence of consideration, see below), Picking it up and putting it on the counter (this is implicitly saying what No 1. said explicitly). Needless to say this is the most common method. Now that B has made the offer (by whatever method) it is open to A to accept it. Ignoring the silly offers and focusing on 1./6., this is typically done by A saying "$1, please" (explicit) or holding out his hand (implicit and slightly rude). At that point (but not before) B is legally committed, the offer has been accepted; he can't put the chocolate bar back, however, A is unlikely to sue for breach if he does. Consideration A contract must be an exchange of promises. If A says to B "I will give you $100" and B says "Thank you" there is an agreement but no contract; quite possibly there is no intention to create legal relations but B has given no consideration to support A's promise. Consideration is the price and a price must be paid for every promise to form a contract. Some examples of consideration are: A promise for a promise: A promises to work for B in return for B's promise to pay A. C promises to fix D's leaking tap in return for D's promise to fix C's car. A promise for an Act: E promises to give F a car if F gets a certain grade at university. G promises to pay H's debts in return for I withdrawing a suit against H. J promises to shop in K's supermarket in return for K supplying a trolley. The following rules apply to consideration: Consideration is required for a contract to exist Consideration can be "executed" (a promise for an act) or "executory" (a promise for a promise) but cannot be "past". If the act or promise has already happened, it cannot be consideration for a contract. For example, if A promises to pay B for work already done, there is no contract. Consideration need not be adequate; that is, the deal does not have to be "fair". Consideration must be sufficient - this is different from adequacy. Insufficient consideration falls under: performance of a duty imposed by law, performance of a duty imposed by an existing contract, acceptance by a creditor of part payment by a third party, composition with creditors, moral obligation (i.e. you can't do it for love), illusionary or uncertain promises. Consideration must move from the promissee but need not move to the promisor. For example, if A promises to pay B if C will fix A's car, B cannot enforce A's promise because B has offered no consideration for A's promise. Alternatively, if B had promised to organise C to fix the car then that would be good consideration. Legal capacity A contract may not be valid if one or both of the parties is legally incapacitated. At least six classes of persons are (or were) subject to degrees of incapacity (I won't go into details): Minors the mentally ill the intoxicated married women (archaic) corporations capital felons. Genuine consent Consent may not have been given due to: Mistake, however, remedies are restricted, narrow and technical, Misrepresentation Undue influence Duress an Unconscionable contract Legality of Objects You can't make a contract where the law says you can't. Is there anything else? A great deal, however, these are the basics. As previously mentioned, the common law may have been changed in your jurisdiction by statute; either to contracts as a whole or to certain types of contract. In addition, statutes may require some contracts to be in writing and/or witnessed; contracts to do with real estate and employment are a favourite for this. Other than this there is no need for a contract to be in writing, be signed, be witnessed or have any other special mumbo-jumbo. Indeed the vast majority of contracts are verbal with implied terms (or terms read in by statute) and are formed and completed without the parties even realising there was a contract. | Adults are bound to contracts with minors The technical term is that a contract with a minor is that it is voidable by the minor unless it is subject to the exemptions - a contract for necessities or a contract of benefit to the minor (e.g. a reasonable mobile phone contract). Until the minor chooses to void it, it is binding on everyone involved. They can do this anytime before they reach majority or within a reasonable time after that providing the contract is not complete. That means, for one and done transactions, the contract cannot effectively be voided because the contract is complete - think of a child buying an ice cream, riding a bus or going to the movies. If it is voided, the minor is obliged to return whatever consideration they received and that is still in their possession. So, for the mobile phone contract, if it included a handset, they must return that providing they still have it. | Offer and Acceptance What you have been presented with is an offer; by signing it unamended you accept the other party's offer and create a legally binding contract. If you amend it and sign it you have made a counter-offer that is now open for the other party to accept. There is no contract until they do. Two points to remember: Making a counter-offer ends the original offer: it is no longer open to you to accept the original offer. Offers may be accepted by actions: if you make a (counter-)offer and the other party acts like they have accepted it (e.g. by doing the things the contract would require of them) then it is likely that the offer has been accepted and a contract formed. Many disputes lie along this path - see battle of the forms. Signatures There is no need for an offer, an acceptance or a contract to be signed by anyone. There is not even a need for them to be written down. If you go into the supermarket and put their goods on the cashier's counter, you have made an offer to buy those goods at the price the supermarket has advertised. The supermarket accepts your offer by scanning the groceries and putting them in a bag. The contract is completed when you hand over your money. | the first two highlighted parts seem to contradict each other. No, in this case they do not. The first highlighted portion refers to works or items produced "for or under the direction of the Company", whereas the second highlight refers to your creations that satisfy conditions (a) and (b). Where contradictions actually exist, the doctrine of contra proferentem entitles you (the non-draftsman of the contract) to adopt the portion or reasonable interpretation that favors your legal position. Also wondering how valid those statements actually are They are valid and become enforceable as soon as you sign the contract or your subsequent conduct reflects your acceptance thereof. it's a matter of privacy. So the question is what I can do or what the reality is of the situation The reality is that you are asked to sign a contract that is abusive and ridiculous. One vulnerability from describing your inventions (presumably in Appendix A) is that the employer gets "irrevocable, worldwide, etc" rights on them as soon as you "use or disclose any [items listed in Appendix A] when acting within the scope of [your] employment". This means that if instead of reinventing the wheel you share or apply any portion of your prior creations so as to enhance your productivity, you knowingly and irreversibly grant to the employer perpetual rights to those items. Legal disputes regarding APIs can become extremely intricate. And, since judges usually have no decent background on IT, even those few judges with integrity are unlikely to grasp the key subtleties that would lead to a correct ruling. "not useful with or related to any Company Interest" is very vague. The company could be interested in literally anything these days. Clauses which are too vague or excessively wide-encompassing are supposedly stricken as unconscionable, unenforceable, etc. However, I personally would foreclose upfront the risk of judicial hassle and decline the abusive contract. Legal issues aside, keep in mind that you are offering your expertise (in terms of supply & demand, you are on the supply side). This fact has a less derogatory connotation than "asking for a job". Accordingly, the relation between the parties should be more leveled. | Contracts are transferrable The default rule is that the rights and obligations that one person holds under a contract (your original bank) can be transferred to any other person (your new bank). This is only not the case where the contract is one for personal services (e.g. an employment contract) or where the contract explicitly proscribes or otherwise limits it. For example, if I run a dog walking business and you contract with me to walk your dog on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays for 6 months then, at any time, I can transfer my obligation to walk the dog and my right to be paid by you for doing so to anyone else. I can do this by subcontracting (in which case the rights and obligations are still mine - I'm just using someone else to fulfil them), or by selling individual contracts (which is how debt collection businesses operate), or by selling the entire business. It would be completely normal that the contracts you agreed to when you opened your accounts would allow the bank to sell them. Check the terms and conditions. | What is the difference between personal contract, business contract and full-time contract? There is no formal definition, but it most likely refers to whether you intend to be hired as independent contractor, as a corp-2-corp, or as employee in the company's payroll. Each option has its tax, administrative, and legal implications. Some of these are: whether your compensation will be from payroll vs. invoicing the company; an employee might be statutorily entitled to benefits that outside contractors and companies are not; servicing them in a capacity of contractor or company might make it easier for you to take side projects; under some of these three alternatives the company might be more flexible when negotiating raises; you might be hired on a project basis (that is, if you are not in their payroll); in case of liabilities or when one of the parties commits a tort or breaches the contract, the "administrative remedies" could be different. | No, a contract cannot require a breach of law. Any such contract is invalid, but a clause may limit the extent to which it is invalidated, to only such terms as actually or require a breach of law. | Possibly If the texts are sufficiently precise that they constitute offer and acceptance then they would create a contract notwithstanding that “some documents” were never provided. First, your offer must have been sufficiently clear that it was open to acceptance by a simple “yes” or “ok”. Given that you had a lease, a simple offer to have another one would be enough as “on the same terms” is implied. Second, she must have accepted your offer unconditionally. “Yes, I’ll put together some documents to sign” is an unconditional acceptance even if the documents never appear. “Yes, I’ll put together some documents to sign first” or “Yes, I’ll put together some documents with the terms” aren’t. The first is a conditional acceptance and the condition wasn’t met. The second is a rejection with an intention to make a counter-offer that never eventuated. Third, real estate is heavily regulated. There may be specific requirements (such as a particular form of contract, or that it be witnessed) that mean there is no binding lease even though there would be a contract at common law. |
Is there a database containing all court cases publically available in the UK and or US? I am a Cyber Security student just starting on a course the depends heavily on the use of court cases that used electronically stored information to determine the verdict of a case. Are there a few database-like resources that would allow me to easily search for such cases? | U.S. answer only. Are there a few database-like resources that would allow me to easily search for such cases? It is balkanized. It also isn't entirely clear what information about the cases interests you. Almost all federal court filings (but not administrative law decisions) are in a database called PACER. Each state has its own system. Some are almost completely unified, and in others, there are many databases. In Colorado, for example, the Colorado E-Filing system has all filings in state courts, but courts outside the state court system, mostly the Denver County Court and municipal courts, as well as some major private arbitration firms, are on their own and most subcontract the job to a division of LexisNexis, a private firm. In both cases, access to these filings is not free except to parties, and has lots of data with access restricted to parties and the court. Published appellate court decisions are also available at an Internet based source. None of these covers administrative law decisions in Colorado, however. Administrative law decisions are usually kept by the agency and also often by a commercial firm that compiles them. Some of them do not give the public access to the decisions in the absence of a FOIA or open records act request. Commercial firms like Westlaw and LexisNexis and several less well known firms (including a free one run by Cornell University), keep databases of published decisions of appellate courts plus a somewhat random assortment of unpublished decisions, with federal court trial court decisions getting much more heavy coverage than state court trial decisions and unpublished state appellate court decisions. But, these are only key court orders, not all filings in the case, and are not the true source documents. There is also a non-profit consortium that maintains a database of court records from the 75 most populous counties in the United States, and there is a private firm that keeps selective track of jury verdicts to the fullest extent that it can obtain them. Some credit reporting agencies (both consumer credit and business credit agencies) maintain databases of judgments and liens. | Each case is decided on its own facts I know you want a clear answer to where the bright line between illegality and legality but there simply isn’t one. The reason you feel there is a “legal grey area” is because there’s a legal gray area. The way the common law works is that there are some acts and omissions that are clearly crimes/torts/breach of contract, some that aren’t and some that live in that grey area. When someone brings a case in the grey, the court will make a ruling that will apply to similar facts and we get a little light on the subject. Then the legislature changes the law and it all goes dark again. Each of your bullet points is simply too vague and encompasses so many fact patterns that it’s impossible to say. For example, “Using a fake name/birthday”: do the ToS prohibit this? is there an intent to mislead or deceive? are there laws that prohibit this? is a benefit being received dishonesty? etc. If you come with a specific, detailed fact pattern there might be case law that is specifically relevant that will allow an answer with a high chance of being right. However, nuances matter and no two fact patterns are exactly the same and the difference might be enough to distinguish your case from the precedent. Or there might not be a relevant precedent because no one has sued/prosecuted on this fact pattern before. Then we are in virgin territory and even experts are only making educated guesses until the judge (and the appeals court(s)) hand down their decision. These are the most interesting cases to watch but the most terrifying to be part of. If you need to ask the question”where’s the legal line on this?”, there’s a decent chance you have a foot on each side. | Apparently, Yes In the ECJ's Breyer decision the final conclusion reads: Article 2(a) of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data must be interpreted as meaning that a dynamic IP address registered by an online media services provider when a person accesses a website that the provider makes accessible to the public constitutes personal data within the meaning of that provision, in relation to that provider, where the latter has the legal means which enable it to identify the data subject with additional data which the internet service provider has about that person. It is true that in this case the decision was actually under Directive 95/46/EC, not the GDPR, but the GDPR took its definition of personal Data directly from Directive 95/46/EC, so that should make no difference. It is also true that in this case the website in question was operated by the German Federal government, an not by a private individual, or by a private business. A government might have "legal means" to link an IP address with an individual that a private actor does not. However in point 23 of the decision, the Court refered to the IP addresses as: ... stored by the Federal Republic of Germany, acting in its capacity as an online media services provider, ... which seems to indicate that the same ruels were being applied to it as would have been to a private entity. Point 44 of the decision says that: The fact that the additional data necessary to identify the user of a website are held not by the online media services provider, but by that user’s internet service provider does not appear to be such as to exclude that dynamic IP addresses registered by the online media services provider constitute personal data within the meaning of Article 2(a) of Directive 95/46. In point 47, the court says that: ... in the event of cyber attacks legal channels exist so that the online media services provider is able to contact the competent authority, so that the latter can take the steps necessary to obtain that information from the internet service provider and to bring criminal proceedings. This leads the court to point 49, where it says that; Having regard to all the foregoing considerations, ... Article 2(a) of Directive 95/46 must be interpreted as meaning that a dynamic IP address registered by an online media services provider when a person accesses a website that the provider makes accessible to the public constitutes personal data within the meaning of that provision, in relation to that provider, where the latter has the legal means which enable it to identify the data subject with additional data which the internet service provider has about that person. Nothing in the decision indicates that any particular governmental authority was considered to provide the "legal means" to get an ISP to link an IP used at a particular time to an individual. In this page from Intersoft consulting it is said that: Since the definition includes “any information,” one must assume that the term “personal data” should be as broadly interpreted as possible. ... The same also applies to IP addresses. If the controller has the legal option to oblige the provider to hand over additional information which enable him to identify the user behind the IP address, this is also personal data. In this page from eugdprcompliant.com it is said that: A much discussed topic is the IP address. The GDPR states that IP addresses should be considered personal data as it enters the scope of ‘online identifiers’. Of course, in the case of a dynamic IP address – which is changed every time a person connects to a network – there has been some legitimate debate going on as to whether it can truly lead to the identification of a person or not. The conclusion is that the GDPR does consider it as such. The logic behind this decision is relatively simple. The internet service provider (ISP) has a record of the temporary dynamic IP address and knows to whom it has been assigned. A website provider has a record of the web pages accessed by a dynamic IP address (but no other data that would lead to the identification of the person). If the two pieces information would be combined, the website provider could find the identity of the person behind a certain dynamic IP address. However, the chances of this happening are small, as the ISP has to meet certain legal obligations before it can hand the data to a website provider. The conclusion is, all IP addresses should be treated as personal data, in order to be GDPR compliant. Finally the european Commission says, on this official page: Personal data is any information that relates to an identified or identifiable living individual. Different pieces of information, which collected together can lead to the identification of a particular person, also constitute personal data. ... Examples of personal data ... an Internet Protocol (IP) address; While the case law is scanty on the point, it appears that the consensus is that IP addresses, even dynamic IP addresses, will be considered to be Personal Data under the GDPR. > | Although the USA don't like it, there's a department called INTERPOL which is composed by about 150 countries. When a crime is committed and you need to involve another country to solve it, the sovereignty of each County prevents a police officer from one country acting upon another country. That's when the INTERPOL comes in. They usually requests the police from that country to act up. A judge from that country will grant their local police access to the data to be delivered to the country that requested it. Can the police get a search warrant for data 'in the cloud'? Yes. If the servers are located within the boundaries of your own country, it's a normal procedure. But like the above answer states, it's easier to subpoena the records than to execute a search warrant. In a subpoena, the company itself is bound to provide everything the police asks. Can the police get a search warrant for such third party systems? Yes. If there's enough probable cause, the investigation can lead to allow the police to try and discover files that are held by servers that store the cloud data. But if the servers are located outside the country and the company does not have any office opened in the country, a search warrant won't have validity in another jurisdiction and the police can't act without breaking the sovereignty principle. That's where the INTERPOL services are handy. The department is built in the principle of polices from different countries helping each other. The downside is that it's too bureaucratic and it takes a lot of time. For instance if he has a virtual machine hosted by Amazon, would they serve the warrant on Amazon, or on the suspect? Like mentioned by @Viktor, if the company has an office within the bounds of your country, it's easier to subpoena the records because that way the company will filter and provide only the data linked to the suspect being investigated. That is, the subpoena will have both the name of the company (Amazon) and the name of the Suspect, so the company can provide only the necessary files. Update If the police lack sufficient evidence for a search warrant, but an interpol country was, for some reason, willing to work with the police to collect and provide that information would they be able to use it even if they wouldn't have been able to subpoena a US country? Hypothetically speaking, I see your follow-up as a company that do have a local office and the Federal Police was turned down by a judge on a warrant/subpoena. In that case, there's no reason for another's country police to act on their own country. The suspect is a foreign suspect, the crime is a foreign crime and the police has no reason to work on it. But for the sake of argument, let's say that the local police was turned down by a judge for lack of evidence or something and the suspect has been investigated by a foreign country or whatever. If the information that the local police desires to obtain is available through the INTERPOL, it's most likely to be accepted since it's a data stored by an international police department. In your scenario, the foreign police was granted a legal right to search and collected the data for legal purpose. Maybe they can't use it in their own country, but since they followed a safe chain of custody and provided the information to the INTERPOL, that information has legal validity and it is not fruit of the poisonous tree if the chain of custody was maintained. | In all likelihood, the judge's order related to data collection and reselling is not legally enforceable. They weren't parties to the expungement action, so the judge doesn't have jurisdiction over them. And, the First Amendment protects the right to say truthful things pretty absolutely. Arguably, if the sites provided the information without making clear that it might not be current because records were expunged or corrected, there might be a claim for negligent misrepresentation, false light, or even defamation, but I seriously doubt that even those claims would hold up. The language in the order might cause sites to comply out of not legally justified concern, or just a desire to be accurate, even if it is not enforceable. So, it doesn't hurt to bring that information to the attention of such sites and ask them to take down the information. But, when push comes to shove, I very much doubt that you would prevail in court enforcing that order against them. Certainly, if you do nothing, they will do nothing, because they are not psychic and have no idea that the court order related to those records has been entered. Even a valid and enforceable order directed at a party over whom a court has jurisdiction is not effective until the person ordered to comply with it has notice of the order. And, there is no system that gives sites like that notice without you taking action to inform them of an order. | The UK does have free lawyers for those who cannot afford an attorney. In fact, it is even more liberal than the US, including representation in civil cases for the most part as well (there are a few exceptions, like libel, and from what I've read, even that is changing). Rather than the main source of free representation being called public defenders, they are referred to as Legal Aid, which is a government funded agency much like public defenders are in the United States. Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides that legal aid will be made available to those who lack sufficient resources, in so far as such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to justice. In the event legal aid is too busy to accept a new client, the court will appoint a solicitor from a list of private firms/practitioners that will act in the same capacity. Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) guarantees the right to a fair trial in both civil and criminal proceedings. This has been interpreted as providing for a general requirement of some measure of “equality of arms” between the state and the individual or between the parties in the case, and the overall structure of the article, as well as the case law of the Court, stresses the vital connection between the right to legal assistance and the general interest in guaranteeing the right to a fair trial. When faced with a criminal charge, the right to legal assistance is explicitly set out in Article 6 (3) (c). An entitlement to free legal aid in civil cases is available in cases where the absence of legal support would make any equality of arms impossible and would effectively deprive an applicant of access to the proceedings as such, for example, when a case can be filed to a court only if assisted by a lawyer in circumstances when an applicant cannot clearly afford one. My guess is, if your friend was denied counsel under legal aid, she has too much income or to many assets to qualify, or she is involved in a case that does not qualify. That said, the right to counsel in in the UK is a right for the indigent in most types of cases (even civil) and is becoming more and more fundamental as imposed by findings of the European Court of Human Rights Jurisprudence. Here is a link where you can at least begin to get some information. https://www.gov.uk/legal-aid/overview | What happens to someone who’s committed a murder in the UK? Considering the person will be caught. This is a basic and somewhat vague question so I will provide a basic and very general answer. The name of the court with proper jurisdiction, the relevant criminal procedural rules, and the substantive law that applies varies within the U.K. In particular in Scotland and the various dependencies of the U.K. differ significantly from England-Wales. There are some minor differences in Northern Ireland. England-and-Wales are treated as one for most purposes, but there are some slight differences at the very lowest levels but none materially impact a murder case. If they are caught in England and Wales they are arrested, interviewed, charged then brought before the next available Magistrates' Court who send the defendant to the Crown Court for trial. As a Magistrate has no power to grant bail for murder the defendant must be remanded in custody until he can make an application for bail before the Crown Court, but the default position is that bail should not be granted for murder unless in very exceptional circumstances. In other U.K. jurisdictions, the names of the courts will differ and there may be some other fine details that aren't the same in the pre-trial process but the same general outline applies. If they are outside of the U.K. they will be subject to either an International or European Arrest Warrant and extradited to the UK at the request of the U.K. Government under the terms of the relevant extradition treaties. On arrival in the UK they are arrested for murder and the process proceeds in the same manner. (If they are someplace that does not have an extradition treaty with the U.K., the trial may be deferred until U.K. officials have an opportunity to arrest him and are often dogged in attempting to accomplish, perhaps, for example, while the suspect is on holiday somewhere that there is an extradition treaty.) Prior to the trial, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and the defence will prepare their cases and return to court at various times to settle any issues etc before going to the expense of a full trial. Also, at any time the CPS determine the case to be too weak for a realistic prospect of conviction or the suspect is innocent, they are supposed to dismiss or amend the indictment. The defendant is then tried for murder before a jury (almost always, but not in every single case, e.g., if the defendant admits guilt and the plea is accepted in appropriate proceedings before a judge). The CPS instruct a barrister to present their case with another barrister acting on behalf of the defendant. The process is for juvenile defendants is pretty much the same as for adults, apart from added safeguards to ensure the juvenile understands the proceedings and is not put at any disadvantage due to their age. All of the jurisdictions within the U.K., however, will have a trial that involves presentation of sworn evidence and exhibits and opening and closing arguments from both prosecution and defence counsels to a jury, procedural objections, cross-examination, and sometimes offering of additional evidence under the supervision of a single judge; normally with the defendant present. There will be some means of court reporting, and unless the judge orders otherwise (which is only done in relatively exceptional circumstances), the trial will be open to the public and the press to observe. If the defendant dies before the legal process to secure a conviction is not completed, the case is dismissed as moot. If the defendant is convicted of a homicide offense the trial/sentencing judge will impose a prison sentences, which is "fixed by law", with a life sentence in the case of the most serious homicide offense, murder (there are multiple homicide offenses that hinge largely on the intent of the defendant, often a murder prosecution will include less included homicide offenses as options for convictions). Only in exceptional cases this will be a whole-life term, in all others the judge will prescribe a minimum sentence according to the judicial sentencing guidelines after which the defendant may be released on licence, which is what an American would call parole. Any offences committed on licence will normally result in a recall to prison. The U.K. does not have a death penalty and does not authorise corporal punishment. The vast majority of people who are arrested and tried for murder are convicted, although there are sometimes acquittals or hung juries. This conviction may be appealed by the defendant to the Court of Appeal (and again up to the Supreme Court) (the intermediate appellate court may not be the same in all U.K. jurisdictions) which reviews the proceedings to determine if the law was applied correctly and if there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict. If the court finds that this was not the case, it can vacate the conviction and orders an appropriate revised disposition of the case depending upon the circumstances justifying the reversal of the trial court. If the appeal court affirm the trial verdict then the sentence continues to be carried out. Usually, but not always, the defendant will be in prison pursuant to the sentence imposed pending an outcome of any appeal. Eventually, if the sentence imposed upon a conviction is affirmed (and not a whole life term) the prisoner may be released on licence (which includes some post-release supervision) and is free and to about living their life again, subject to some collateral consequences based upon their criminal record (e.g. inability to work in certain occupations). If the defendant is acquitted, then they go free and cannot be tried again for the same offence, unless the exceptions under the double jeopardy provisions that apply in that jurisdiction apply. The main exception of double jeopardy is for newly discovered evidence of guilt in a case where there was an acquittal. If the person convicted is not a British citizen, they will usually be deported at the conclusion of their sentence if international law allows for it. There are a few exceptions to these rules that come up in a tiny percentage of all U.K. murders that apply (1) in the case of people subject to courts-martial such as active duty military service members, (2) in the case of foreign diplomats with diplomatic immunity, (3) when the murder is classified as an act of terrorism, and (4) in the case that the defendant has a title of nobility that calls for special treatment such as, e.g., Prince Charles (the current heir to the throne) or the Queen. These special cases are really too esoteric for the plain vanilla facts stated in the question and involve unique processes that are very different from the usual one described above. The fourth case is one that does not exist in my country (the U.S.) and in other countries that are republics rather than constitutional monarchies like the U.K., although most countries have some special rules for criminal trials of their very highest officials (like Presidents and Prime Ministers). | Yes it is kind of possible what country would the legal action need to originate from? Would one file in the US and note the foreign defendant or would one file, as a foreigner, in the home country of the defendant? You can go either way. It is not obtaining the judgment that is the biggest trouble here, but enforcing it. You will need: A UK mailing address. Services like ScanMyPost will suffice. Some money to pay the court fees. Time, tenacity and patience to follow through the procedure and fill all necessary forms. Be lucky in that the defendant actually has something to pay the debt with. There are two stages: Obtain a court judgment in your favour. Unless the defendant pays you, enforce the judgment. Obtaining court judgment in the UK In the UK, the "small claims court" functions are executed by HM Courts & Tribunals Service. The specific service is called "Claim for money" which can be filed online via their old or new system. So, basically, you file the online form, pay the fee by credit card and wait for defendant's response. If they do not respond, you ask the court to make a judgment (in my case it took 10 weeks from filing claim to getting judgment). If the defendant responds and defends themselves, expect much longer wait and uncertain outcome. Enforcement So, you and the defendant have both received court judgment saying that they must pay you. But they are not paying. There is a range of options you can choose from: County Court Warrant of Control (claims from £50 to £5,000). Court bailiff will go to the defendant's address and try to seize goods that can be easily sold. High Court Writ of Control (claims from £600). Attachment of earnings order (you ask the court to order the defendant's employer to deduct his earnings in your favour). Third-party debt order (a.k.a. "Garnishee Order") — if you know the defendant's bank account details. Read about potential pitfalls here. Charging order: you will only get paid if the defendant sells their land. Bankrupt the defendant (big court fees!). Alternatively, you could always hire a UK lawyer but then you would probably not need this answer. |
Does buying property on mortgage gives any sort of protection against future Compulsory purchase & massive devaluation Background (inserted editorially) One of the risks of buying a flat / house is that the neighborhood will be declared blighted by the government which would then force property owners to sell their property to the government using the power of eminent domain (a process also called "condemnation" or "compulsory purchase"). When this happens, the government then resells the consolidated block of property in the neighborhood to a developer who develops the entire neighborhood and sells the new housing at a much higher price. This has happened multiple times recently in the Greater London area. The risk is greatest when the neighborhood suffers massive real estate value devaluation, which sometimes happens when a neighborhood reaches what is called a "tipping point" and starts to decline in value rather than increasing in value. But, is hard to predict whether this will happen. Property owners in these situations are at risk of being forced to sell their property for less than the amount owing on their mortgages if this happens. The question is what legal options a property owner has to limit the risk of this happening by structuring a real estate purchase transaction differently, for example, by purchasing the property with a smaller down payment and a larger mortgage loan balance. End of background It is very difficult to predict the future. But if you buy a flat / house for that matter, in UK, through private purchase, could you insure yourself either given the fact that- you bought the property on mortgage? Or, is there any insurance which could protect you against massive downfall in real estate property values in any unforeseen compulsory purchase situation. Or, is there any way to mitigate this risk / avoid this risk? Thanks | Could you insure yourself either given the fact that- you bought the property on mortgage? A mortgage does not generally have the legal effect of insurance. You owe the debt to the lender, which is a strict liability obligation, without regard to the value of the collateral. So, if the collateral is devalued, you still owe the debt, whether or not the lender forecloses. For example, if you sell the property for less than the amount of the debt (i.e. a short sale), you remain personally liable for the deficiency between the proceeds of the sale, and the amount owed on the debt, unless the lender consents. The exception to this is a "non-recourse mortgage", which is a mortgage in which the lender expressly agrees to accept the collateral as the sole means from which the debt can be repaid in a compulsory fashion. The financial crisis of 2009 was mostly a function of a handful U.S. states like California and Florida with economically important mortgage markets having residential mortgage loans that were as a matter of law, non-recourse debts (or nearly non-recourse debts) compounded by people making risky decisions knowing that they didn't face the risk of a deficiency judgment. But, non-recourse mortgage lending is very rare in the U.K. (the linked material inaccurately asserts that mortgages in "most of the United States" are non-recourse, however, when, in fact, that is true only in a small minority of U.S. states, probably not more than five state in all, although a couple of the states that are close to non-recourse for residential mortgages, like Florida and California, are economically important U.S. mortgage markets). Of course, even in the case of a debtor who is obligated on a full recourse mortgage, it may be in the interest of the lender to write off the deficiency judgment, rather than seeking to recovery the debt from the borrower, if the borrower is apart from the collateral, judgment-proof or very nearly so. The lender is taking the risk that both the collateral will be insufficient and that the borrower will also be unable to pay the debt, and when that happens the lender takes a loss. Or is there any insurance which could protect you against massive downfall in any Unforseen compulsory purchase situation. In the United States, lenders often buy what is called "mortgage insurance" at the expense of the buyer, when the down payment on the property is under 20% of the purchase price, that remains in force until 20% of the purchase price has been paid through a combination of a down payment and principal payments on the loan. But, this form of insurance is not generally available to property owners themselves as a matter of economic reality, possibly because it is an uninsurable risk, and possibly because there isn't enough economic demand for it at prices that would make it profitable to do so. Also, when a lender receives a payment on a mortgage insurance policy, the insurance company receives in exchange, all of the rights that the lender had to sue the borrower for a deficiency judgment, if any. These are called the insurance company's "subrogation rights." I have certainly also never seen any form of insurance for an unfavorably bad outcome in an eminent domain/condemnation proceeding for any reason. In a case like that the court determines as a matter of law (in one of the few proceedings where there is still a right to a jury in the U.K.) what the fair market value of the property is at the time of the condemnation, and that determination would complicate recovery on any insurance policy because you would need to have a proof of the loss. Generally speaking, a mere decline in the fair market value of real estate, in and of itself, it not considered to be an insurable loss, of the owner of the real estate, for insurance law purposes. Bonding A very close cousin of insurance contracts are bonding contracts. When a third party is unsure that you will be able to perform a contract or pay a debt, you can encourage them to do business with you by having a bonding company agree to meet your obligations up to a certain dollar amount if you are unable to do so, usually, in exchange for a fee, a right to sue you if they have to make a payment for the amount that they had to pay, and sometimes for some sort of collateral to protect them against the risk that they are taking. But, bonding companies don't generally provide bonds for residential mortgage customers at any price, because someone who needs a bond on a debt like that is unlikely to be able to ever repay the bonding company for its loss if it does have to pay the mortgage debt, and because bonding companies would need to set aside too much money as financial reserves against this risk to be prepared in the event that it had to pay a lot of claims due to collapsing real estate price bubble or something like that. Or is there any way to mitigate this risk / avoid this risk? Option To Sell Contracts On the buyer's side the primary "insurance-like" legal instrument would be for the buyer to purchase from a third-party a legal option to sell the property at a specific price that is lower than the current purchase price. Such an option would probably be legal to enter into, and, with the proper regulatory compliance and financial disclosures, a firm could sell such options to residential property buyers. But, as a matter of practical economic reality, I have never encountered a transaction in which someone actually did that with an unrelated third-party in an arms-length business transaction. In the financial crisis of 2009, secondary market mortgage debt buyers had purchased options to hedge against just this kind of risk, but the counterparties who were obligated to cover the losses pursuant to those options didn't have sufficient reserves and other assets to cover the losses that they were obligated to pay, and so the people who had purchased these options were stiffed anyway. This is because prominent credit rating firms for businesses (of which there were only three or four in the United States) failed to properly evaluate the fact that the risk of one claim under this kind of option was not independent of the risk of other claims under similar options happening at the same time, and in general, failed to accurately evaluate the risk of counterparties being unable to perform their sides of the contracts because the counterparties were be prominent financial companies that had never failed before. But, faced with this situation, almost every investment bank in the United States either went bankrupt or was acquired by another financial company that was not allowed to engage in this kind of derivatives transaction. Mortgage insurance companies, in contrast, paid all of the claims against them, because state insurance regulators had adequately evaluated the risks and forced the mortgage insurance companies to set aside adequate reserves to pay claims in the event of a situation like the 2009 financial crisis. But, because the need to set aside reserves made mortgage insurance (which also had premiums that were not tax deductible to the property owner) made mortgage insurance more expensive than having the same bank give someone both a first mortgage and a higher interest second mortgage on a residence, and then entering option contracts to control their risk of loss in the event of a real estate devaluation that made the second mortgage uncollectible, mortgage insurance companies had a pretty low market share of the financial services providers who were addressing the property devaluation risk for mortgage lenders. Long Term Leases In Lieu Of Purchasing With A Mortgage Another alternative would be to enter into a favorable long term lease of the property, which would be owned by somebody else, rather than actually buying it. If the lease had a term automatically terminating upon a compulsory purchase such as an eminent domain proceeding, the landlord and not the tenant, would bear the risk of loss in the event that the property bad massively devalued due to a change in prevailing market prices (although the landlord would also benefit in the event of massive appreciation at the termination of the lease, although that might be long in the future). This would be an extremely uncommon arrangement for someone to make with their own residence, but isn't unthinkable. For example, over in Ireland, the Guinness Brewing Corporation rents rather than owns most of the real estate that it used on long term 999 year leases (if I recall correctly), possibly out of concern for this possibility, which was a very real one at the time that those leases were put in place. Similarly, my childhood home in a university town was built on land leased from the university on a 99 year lease in the 1960s or 1970s, that was later converted to absolute ownership of the land by my faculty and administrator parents about fifty years into the original lease by mutual agreement between the university and the original home builder. But, that wouldn't really be strictly analogous, because the house was purchased by my parents subject to a full recourse mortgage secured by the building and their rights as tenants on the land lease, so they weren't really protected from a mass devaluation of the property. The transaction didn't really hedge against an economic downturn. Instead, it effectively gave the university the right to buy back the land at the cost of compensating my parents for the value of the residence built on that land, if it wanted to expand. But, it would still probably be possible and legal to enter into a long term lease whose terms did hedge against that possibility, possibly with an option to buy the premises after a certain number of years long in the future when devaluation relative to the purchase price was much less likely to due gradual annual appreciation and inflation over that time period (e.g. 40 years out), if you could find someone willing to serve as a landlord in that kind of deal. Caveat Regarding Taxation The way business transactions are structured is frequently heavily driven not just by the underlying economic effect of the transactions, but also by the tax implications of the transactions. But, I am not familiar enough with the tax laws of the United Kingdom to evaluate that piece of the puzzle. In the context of the question, the most viable alternative to limit risk downside devaluation risk would be to enter into a long term lease rather than buying the residence. But, that only makes sense if there are not big tax benefits to owning a residence with a mortgage as opposed to leasing one. In the United States, there are huge tax incentives to buy rather than lease. But, I don't know if there are similar tax incentives in the United Kingdom that might make a long term lease solution less attractive. For example, a large share of all businesses in the United States lease rather than own the real property that they use, and a large share of skyscrapers and other high rise buildings in the United States are built on leased land. But, those transactions are structured as long term leases, rather than purchase transactions, primarily for tax reasons. Under U.S. tax law, businesses can't treat money spent to purchase raw land or principal payments on mortgages as an expense for tax purposes, but can treat the full amount of any lease payment the business pays to a landlord as an expense for tax purposes. So, transactions are structured accordingly. For example, in a high rise transaction, the building owner pays the fully deductible long term land lease payment to the owner of the land (usually a non-profit that isn't worried about having taxable income not matched by an expense deduction), while the building owner can make up for not being able to deduct principal payment expense on the construction loan by being able to take depreciation deductions on the building itself as an expense in a similar amount. The non-profits usually don't borrow the money to buy the land that they lease to high rise owners. Instead, this is an investment option for cash rich, stable non-profits that need to find a way to get reliable, low risk, long term passively managed returns on their investments. And, the risk of devaluation is much lower for a long term investor with a forty year time horizon than it is for property owner with a shorter time horizon. But, without these tax incentives, there would be far less real estate leasing by businesses in the United States, and a desire to hedge against significant real estate devaluations is a far more secondary reason for businesses to lease of real estate in the United States. | I would assume that the seller ('Transferor') still owned numbers 7 and 11 at the time of the sale. If so, this clause means that the owners of 7 and 11 (now and in the future) have a right of way on the path coloured blue on the plan. The land still belongs to number 9, but the owners cannot build on it so as to block the path. (As mckenzm comments, "on foot only" is an important qualification; the neighbours do not have a right to install utilities under the path, and the owner can put in obstacles that prevent bringing cycles down it). | As the article suggests, this is called adverse possession. This seems to have occurred because the original owner did not make use of the property, nor monitored for adverse possession. The reason this method of acquiring title exists is for a number of reasons, including the prudent use of land, as well as being analogous to a limitation on the time period during which a claim can be brought. It would be reasonably easily avoided if the original owner had made use of the property, or monitored it and took action to eject the adverse possessor prior to their fulfilment of the necessary conditions. | It primarily depends on the title that you have to the house: are you "joint tenants with right of survivorship". This could have happened when you bought the house; it also could have been done after the fact in various ways. In that case, the house is outside of your wife's estate (which, under the circumstances, is divided between children and you). The lender might be confused about the status of the property, but they might be right, so the question is, what is your legal "interest" in the house, that is, does the title document say "tenants in common"? Assuming that the property is not recorded as JTWROS, then there are two matters to attend to. First, the lender may need to be satisfied, somehow, that they aren't taking a risk by refinancing when you aren't really the full owner. The second is clarifying actual ownership. Estates Code 201.0002-.003 govern intestate succession with a surviving spouse, where the dividing question is whether it is a community estate or not, which then implies shares for children. In that case, the children are part-owners, so you need their consent to e.g. sell the house (that is, this is a complication that needs to be fixed). Basically, you have to get a lawyer, and straighten this out. | According to Nolo, which is usually a good source of legal information, yes, an HOA generally does have the power to place a lien on your property if you do not pay your HOA dues, and to foreclose the lien (force sale) if it is still not paid. They have a specific page for Nevada explaining procedures and restrictions. You'll also have to read your covenant (CC&R) to see exactly what you agreed to when you bought the property, but Nolo seems to suggest that whatever's in there is likely to be enforceable. In particular, the covenant may state that the HOA's lien can include penalties and collection costs, and the law seems to allow that. There's a note on the Nolo Nevada page that an HOA may not foreclose a lien based only on a fine or penalty, so it's not clear what would happen if you paid only the outstanding dues but not the other charges. Personally, it seems to me excessive to sue over $400. Being on bad terms with your HOA seems likely to cause trouble down the road. Also, if it were me, I'd want to consult a lawyer to get a sense of the chances of winning. The fact that you were out of state and may have missed communications from the HOA or bank seems like it may weaken your case; they might argue that you had a responsibility to check your bank statements and have your mail forwarded. If you lose in court, you might be liable for the court costs in addition to what you currently owe. | The landlady is trying it on. The purpose of a deposit is to protect the landlord from being left out of pocket by: damage to the property rent arrears Reasonable wear and tear does not constitute damage. It seems unlikely that the stiff tap is as a result of damage. The hob is not so clear cut: the landlady could argue that it was damaged, albeit by accident, and the cost of repair taken from your deposit. If she insists that the only remedy is to replace the hob, she should make an appropriate deduction to reflect the fact that it is several years old and will be replaced by one that is new (thereby gaining her some value). It would be reasonable for you to expect to see the written report from the gas inspector who has condemned the whole hob in that case. But I find it hard to believe that: the plastic knob cannot be replaced doing so would make the hob unsafe, if the knob can be removed for cleaning it's my understanding that if the hob is indeed broken, I only have to pay what it was worth at the moment before it was broken. Your liability is to return her to the position she would have been in had the damage not occurred. If that means replacing a removable plastic part instead of the whole hob, that would be a reasonable remedy. | A lease of land is not the same as a residential lease, the latter being strongly regulated by special laws. So caveat emptor is the default rule for land leases (see this article). You have to look at the laws of your state, but let's take Washington as an example. This is not a residential tenancy which is subject to different laws, it's just leasing land, similar to leasing a chainsaw or a car. Your implied warranty would be that the land is fit for the ordinary purposes for which land is used, and that is all. It might be worth wondering about whether building a cabin on the land changes your property tax liability. | I gather that the numerous ramifications you outline are merely contexts and that your main concern is about the application of contract law (contract law in the U.S. does not really vary among states). Thus, I will not really delve in the intricacies of --for instance-- privacy or copyright issues arising from the commercial use of a person's likeness that you mention in one of the scenarios. As a starting point, one needs to bear in mind that: a contract is an exchange of considerations under terms and conditions entered knowingly and willfully by the parties, which can be evidenced by the parties' subsequent conduct (that is, not just by signing a document); and a contract is unenforceable if it contravenes public policy and/or the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Accordingly, the questions are (1) whether a person knew or reasonably should have known about the terms & conditions at or by the time of those events which trigger obligations pursuant to the contract; and (2) whether the provisions therein are unreasonable, illegal, or tantamount to a penalty, especially in the event that the party breaches or repudiates the alleged contract (see the Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 356(2)). The scenario of house for sale entails various difficulties as per contract law and otherwise. Here are some of those issues: Are visitors properly (including "beforehand") notified about the "walkway clause"? If not, the contract is void because it cannot be said that visitors knew about & accepted that condition. Does the house provide alternatives for lawful & informed visitors to safely avoid the walkway? If not, then the seller/owner might end up incurring premises liability with respect to those visitors who get injured in making their reasonable effort not to trigger the "walkway clause". Is the house owner realistically able to prove that use of the walkway by lawful & informed visitors is sufficiently "inconsistent with the offeror's ownership of offered property" so that triggering a house sale is a reasonable consequence (see Restatement at §69(2))? Is the owner-imposed mortgage rate compliant with state law pertaining to granting of credit & loans? These exemplify only some of the burdensome complications when trying to enforce "contracts" which are extravagant or quite one-sided. Lastly, as a side note, the presumption that a person reading the poster and walking in the intended area does not thereby receive consideration is not necessarily accurate. As an example, the "intended area" could have been devised by an entity in the business of enjoyment and recreation, such as a private park. The person who deliberately walks in (regardless of whether he read the poster) certainly receives a consideration, which is the amusement or recreation for which the park was designed. |
Is imposing taxes on WhatsApp use legal or not? I hope this is the right SE site to ask this question. Recently, in Lebanon, the government decided to impose a daily tax on the first call made using WhatsApp call feature, equal to 0.2$. Now people are debating whether this is legal or not. Some of them are using this script (emphasis mine): Fees and Taxes. You are responsible for all carrier data plan and other fees and taxes associated with your use of our Services. We may charge you for our Services, including applicable taxes. We may refuse or cancel orders. We do not provide refunds for our Services, except as required by law. Source to claim that this is legal. Others are using this (emphasis mine): Harm to WhatsApp or Our Users. You must not (or assist others to) access, use, copy, adapt, modify, prepare derivative works based upon, distribute, license, sublicense, transfer, display, perform, or otherwise exploit our Services in impermissible or unauthorized manners, or in ways that burden, impair, or harm us, our Services, systems, our users, or others, including that you must not directly or through automated means: (a) reverse engineer, alter, modify, create derivative works from, decompile, or extract code from our Services; (b) send, store, or transmit viruses or other harmful computer code through or onto our Services; (c) gain or attempt to gain unauthorized access to our Services or systems; (d) interfere with or disrupt the integrity or performance of our Services; (e) create accounts for our Services through unauthorized or automated means; (f) collect the information of or about our users in any impermissible or unauthorized manner; (g) sell, resell, rent, or charge for our Services; or (h) distribute or make our Services available over a network where they could be used by multiple devices at the same time. Source to claim that it's illegal. My simple question is if imposing taxes on using WhatsApp call is legal or not (with the explanation between the different part mentioned above). If not, could WhatsApp sue the Lebanese Government? | Neither of those clauses has anything to do with whether a tax on the use of Whatsapp is legal: The first clause tells users that they are responsible for any taxes that may be owed. It says nothing about whether such a tax is or is not legal. The second clause says that users may not charge for Whatsapp services. It says nothing about whether the government may impose a tax for the use of the services. That is all beside the point, though. Even if the TOS explicitly said, "No one may tax the use of our services," that would have no legal effect. Saying that you're exempt from taxation does not make you exempt from taxation. | When a platform has the right to kick you out as they deem fit, without any evidence why they did it, does that change if you have a paid? It depends on the purpose of payment and the terms & conditions it triggers. Your description reflects that payment entitles the user to have no ads "and stuff" (?). Payment does not necessarily entitle the user to continued access, diligence from customer service, or other features. Without fully knowing the platform's terms & conditions regarding payment it is impossible to identify what obligations (other than not displaying advertisements) your payment creates on the platform. The information you provide here is insufficient for assessing whether you have a viable claim such as fraud or breach of contract. On the other hand, the platform's apparent arbitrariness and lack of response might support a finding of unfair or deceptive practices if the platform does not honor or proportionally reimburse your payment. Many jurisdictions have legislation prohibiting practices which are unfair, deceptive, or unconscionable (example: MCL 445.903). Oftentimes statutory law establishes an agency in charge of addressing customers' complaints. | If the stranger was aware of the reward offer at the time of the return you have a legally binding contract - you made an offer to the world, money for return of the phone, and they accepted it by returning it. If they were ignorant of your offer and returned the phone then there is no contract and you do not have to pay: albeit at the cost of being a jerk. Of course, if they obtained your phone unlawfully (e.g. by stealing it) the contract is void. | The first point that is already well-established in law is that there really is a legal requirement to pay taxes, not just federal income taxes, but taxes in general. On rare occasion, there is a legal dispute as to whether something is a tax (Obamacare) or whether a particular authority is allowed to levy such a tax. Let us assume that the tax in question is legally levied. Some taxes are independent of any specific intended purpose (e.g. federal income tax, state sales tax). Some are for a specific purpose (Medicare tax, the taxes that are local school levies). Even when a taxing authority corruptly but legally misdirects the funds designated for a specific purpose, you are still required to pay the tax. It's not that a tax law could not be written which allows a person to refuse to pay a tax if they judge that the revenues are being misdirected, it's that the law-makers did no cripple the tax law with such a provision. As far as I know, no taxing authority anywhere allows a person to refuse to pay a tax is they disagree with the use of the taxes, which is to say, taxation is mandatory, not voluntary. If it is voluntary, it is known as a "contribution". You are allowed to contribute to some governmental purpose, you are required to pay taxes. You can't overcome the requirement to pay taxes on First Amendment grounds (being forced to support something that you don't like). The IRS has a FAQ that addresses the First Amendment argument, with a mass of supporting court cases (US v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252; Jenkins v. Commissioner, 483 F.3d 90; US v. Indianapolis Baptist Temple, 224 F.3d 627; Adams v. Commissioner, 170 F.3d 173; US v. Ramsey, 992 F.2d 831; and so on). | Invasion of privacy and false light torts would probably not be applicable here. Very few states have adopted the false light tort because of its conflict with First Amendment principles and there was no agreement or even request to keep the text private. The copyright issue is trickier. First all, the TOS may provide that the copyright belongs to the text service provider or that there is a license. But, even in the absence of an express license, sending someone a message which is equivalent to sending them a letter, probably gives rise to an implied license that the person to whom it is sent can use the message that arises merely from the act of sending it without restriction or qualification. Implied license and fair use also heavily overlap. Publishing the text exactly as it was sent to you protects you from defamation liability because it is true. On the whole it would be extremely unlikely for there to be any legal liability for publishing a text from someone that they sent to you. Of course, one can imagine exceptions. If the person receiving the text was in an attorney-client relationship, or priest-parishioner making confession relationship, or was communicating regarding classified national security matters, or there was a non-disclosure agreement in place, among other possibilities, an evidentiary privilege and duty of confidentiality could apply and disclosing the material without the permission of the privilege holder could breach a duty of confidentiality and give rise to liability. If the picture was a nude picture of a minor, there could be a criminal and/or civil liability issue, and some states have also made posting "revenge porn" a criminal offense and/or a basis for civil liability. If the disclosure was effectively a way to facilitate insider trading that could be a problem. If the contents of the text were accurately transmitted but known to be false and were disseminated without disclosure of its falsity for the purpose of defrauding a third party, that could be a problem. But, no facts that obviously flag any exception are identified in the question. The mere fact that the posting may be embarrassing, or hurt someone's reputation, or was made without someone's express consent, in general, would not be a basis for liability. | In case a company is flooded by such "asymmetric" requests, how should a company react? Although article 12.5 refers to singular "a data subject", it can be inferred that exposing the controller to significant expenses is not part of the legislative intent. Accordingly, the company may have requesters choose between paying a reasonable fee for the ensuing administrative costs or withdrawing the requirement that delivery be by postal mail. The bad faith scenario you outline seems to be a non-sequitur, since generally a pattern (or a high number) of requests for postal mail delivery should prompt the controller to suspect that some or many might not be legitimate. A requester with bad intentions would be unable to prove the identity of the various data subjects he impersonates or alleges to represent. | Yes, it triggers the GDPR obligations Considerations: Can you surely identify those residing in Europe? In that case you should ask them to sign up again and confirm the consent. A lot of mailing lists are doing just that. Did they previously give consent and you can document it? If so, then you can argue that you have the required consent. Do you have business in Europe? If not then I don't think they would bother to go after you. You could just walk away from the fine. What other personal informastion are you storing? If you know who reside in Europe then you already have more info than just the email. The email address itself wouldn't be much of a documentation issue, SAR or Portability task. | You call their employer and impersonate them The onus is on the employer to keep your personal data secure. If they do not take reasonable steps to verify that the caller is indeed you, they fail that duty and can be held to account. So, not a loophole. |
INTERROG/REQ FOR PROD I been sued for small claim court. small claim court has dismissed the case already but plaintiff went to circuit court (appeal). I received a "INTERROG/REQ FOR PROD" from plaintiff (Under Tennessee rule 33 & 34). He requested following things: 1 - my name, date of birth, place where I work, job title, where I lived in last 10 years Question: Aren't these my personal identify information? Under which privacy law I can decline to provide my date of birth, and last 10 year residential history? 2 - plaintiff has requested to provide him call history or any communication I had with other defendant? Question: am I obliged to provide it? Edit Case is about verbal contract. However, there was no verbal contract at all. Plaintiff presented a contract in small claim court with a company where he had put my name without my knowledge and I never provide consent that when he signs the contract with a company, he can put my name on it. Even small claim court judge said, this is illegal and she can send plaintiff to jail for this. However, judge dismissed the case. Under law this is forgery, can I counterclaim for this criminal act if the case is about civil breach of contract? Can I deny to provide him all personal information on the grounds that he already committed forgery. | No, you are not obligated to provide the requested information. You're out of trial court and into the court of appeals, where the civil discovery rules have basically no effect. If the case gets kicked back to the trial court, you would likely be required to respond truthfully. To cover your bases and look responsible, the most proper thing to do would probably be to respond to the discovery requests, but answer with nothing but an objection to the requests on the basis that the Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply after the case has been dismissed. At that point, the burden is on the other party to make a motion to compel, which he probably won't do. And if he does, I'd expect the court to deny it summarily based on the dismissal. | A settlement is fundamentally a contract where parties A and B promise to do certain things (one of them being "stop litigating"). A court order is an enforceable order to do something. A contract cannot be directly enforced (where force is used to make a person comply), it requires a court order for actual enforcement. The conditions of a contract might be enforceable, but you can't get the sheriff to come out based just on a contract. It appears that you got to the "facilitation" phase where the parties talk about the issue and the CRT case manager talks to the parties in neutral terms, aiming for an agreement. If you don't reach an agreement, the Tribunal Decision Process escalates the matter. Under the decision process, the CRT member makes a decision, and it can be enforced in court. They state that "For a $25 fee, the CRT can turn your agreement into an order, if both parties agree that an order should be issued. This is called a “consent resolution order”." I suppose that you did not go through that step, and you only have an agreement. So you would need a separate court process to get a court order. Because everything that you did in this negotiation phase is confidential, if you want CRT to give you something that is enforceable, you have to present the case from the beginning, since they don't have access to what has happened before. The problem in your account is that a settlement has to be reached by yourselves – possibly with the assistance of the CRT case manager. I assume you did actually get a settlement (agreement) with the landlord, but have not filed for a consent resolution order. It may be that the case is too old for you to just pay the $25, and it does require agreement by the other party. Read their FAQ about how cases end. | Posting such a pic and statement may give grounds for a lawsuit, but probably not Overview That is going to depend very much on the the jurisdiction, and on the specific facts. If the statement that the pictured person owes a debt is false, this may be a case of defamation, but that was explored thoroughly in Can you post a picture in your business to embarrass or defame a customer? and its answers. See FindLaw's page "What Is Invasion of Privacy?" for an overview of the classic privacy torts. See also this page quoting the Restatement (2nd) of Torts, § 652 See further the Wikipedia article "Privacy laws of the United States" which gives a history of the four torts. Note that not all US states recognize all, or indeed any, of the privacy torts. Nor do all non-US jurisdictions. In some places these torts have been recognized, or blocked, by legislation, in others by court decision. And in the US they are limited by the federal First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech. Right of Publicity,aka Appropriation There is, in general, no right to privacy in one's physical appearance under any of the standard privacy torts, except that if one's likeness is being used to advertise something, or imply sponsorship or approval of a commercial product, many jurisdictions protect a right of publicity (sometimes called the tort of Appropriation of Name or Likeness). But here it does not appear that the image is being used to advertise or promote or sponsor anything, so that would not apply. Intrusion upon Solitude and Seclusion The tort of Intrusion upon Solitude and Seclusion would only apply if the picture were taken on someone's private premises or somewhere else there the person had a reasonable expectation of privacy. Otherwise it would not apply, there is no general right to privacy for a picture taken in public. Private Facts The tort of Public Disclosure of Private Facts could possibly apply if the fact of the unpaid debt had been carefully kept secret, and if its disclosure would be highly offensie to a reasonable person. But nothing that is a matter of public record can be the subject of such a suit anywhere in the US, because under Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) publication of facts derived from public records is protected under the first and fourteenth amendments, even against a specific state law granting protection. This will obviously not apply outside the US. False Light If the statement of the debt were true, but in some significant way misleading, the tort of False Light might apply. This is described by the Restatement of Torts (2nd) § 652E as: One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of privacy, if (a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in a reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed. Note that the standard of (b) above is the same as the "Actual Malice" standard for defamation cases where the plaintiff is a public figure. False light cases are in many ways similer to defamation cases, and some jurisdictions have treated themn as identical tro defamation, while otrhrs do not recognize them at all. Nothing in the facts stated in the question would imply a false light claim, but more context might possibly support such a claim,. Conclusion Nothing in the question clearly indicates that any privacy-based tort would apply, but the facts are stated it a very brief way in the question. Further context and detail might clarify the answer one way or the other. This answer is largely based onunited-states law, althoguh some of it will apply elsewhere. | Florida bar membership is something that can be determined from public records to see if he is an attorney or not. I would be stunned if he was not. It could be that he was an enrolled patent agent prior to being admitted to the practice of law and has never updated the record. Alternatively, it could simply be that there was a data entry error. No large database is 100% accurate. For most purposes, the rights of an enrolled patent agent and an attorney admitted to patent law practice are the same in PTO practice, so correcting this error (assuming that it is one), even if it was discovered, wouldn't be an urgent priority. | There is, of course, no way to tell how the Court would deal with such a case today. This is not a frequently litigated issue, with lots of case law. I note that in the case you link to, the court limited the statute to false claims made "with a fraudulent purpose". This normally means that the claimant is attempting to secure an improper financial or materiel advantage. In the United States v. Tandaric case, the person convicted had falsely claimed to be a US Citizen on an employment application for a company which did not hire non-citizens, and so gained a job through this false statement. He could have been convicted of ordinary Fraud. The court has not been as protective of Fraud under the First Amendment as it has been of speech generally, or even of false but non-fraudulent speech. I am not at all sure if the court would overturn this law in a similar case today. Edit: In the United States v. Achtner case, the court wrote: But we agree with the District Court that the representation of citizenship must still be made to a person having some right to inquire or adequate reason for ascertaining a defendant's citizenship; it is not to be assumed that so severe a penalty is intended for words spoken as a mere boast or jest or to stop the prying of some busybody, ... This seems to dispose of the example in the question of a neighbor who is merly inquiring as to the character of the area, or perhaps from simple curiosity, and a false speaker who seems to get no direct benefit or advantage from the falsehood. Both linked cases involved false statements made to employers or potential employees, during wartime at that, with the false speaker's employment apparently at stake. | It isn't explicitly prohibited so long as the amount claimed is in the aggregate less than $20,000. But, it would probably be better to file separately. First, very simple single party, single transaction cases are what small claims court is designed to do, and going against the flow often creates unforeseen confusion for the judge in the Justice Court who isn't a sophisticated civil litigation expert. The Justices of the Peace who preside over Justice Courts that handle small claims cases in Texas often aren't and don't have to be lawyers or even high school graduates. Second, if you sue as a group, and one of your group is the lead person handling the case (and that person isn't a lawyer), the lead person is at grave risk of being found to be practicing law without a license by taking actions in a lawsuit on behalf of your fellow plaintiffs. | The answer to the question "can so-and-so sue me?" is almost always "yes", regardless of context. Such a suit might be baseless, and it might get settled in your favor, but you still have to spend the time and money to defend yourself. This can be disastrous for a start-up that's trying to get off the ground, and it's how patent trolls make their money. (I'm not accusing SnapChat of engaging in such tactics as a rule, of course; I'm just pointing out that the legal system does allow for them.) Whether or not you are likely to be sued is a separate question, and one that can really only be effectively addressed by a trademark attorney with full knowledge of the particularities of your situation. | What legal options do I have here? I don't think I can sue for defamation of character since the email was sent to me only. Your rationale about defamation is accurate with respect to the establishment (henceforth "company"). But you may sue the person(s) who approached the company to falsely accuse you of that crime. Being banned certainly qualifies as special damage (that is, concrete damage), whence you have a viable claim of defamation per quod. If the crime that was falsely imputed to you is a felony or serious crime, then you additionally have a viable claim of defamation per se. I was thinking that I may have some legal recourse since the email clearly threatens to defame my character if I re-enter the establishment You have legal remedies, although not necessarily from this angle. The company can credibly argue that it sought to discourage you from contravening the "safety measure" it adopted in response to the accusations made about you. If it turns out that the company fabricated any false accusations it divulges, though, then you could sue the company for torts related to --and in addition to-- its defamatory falsehoods. So far the information you share here shows no signs of company's involvement in inventing the false accusations. What legal options do I have here? You need to ask the company for source and details of the information. In line with this comment, you should also ensure the company is aware of the mistaken identity. If the company declines to listen to you --and ideally see any proofs you have--, that could evidence some sort of tortious conduct on the company's part. Beware that in Florida a defamed person is required to demand a retraction of the false accusations prior to filing a defamation suit. Absent that request for retraction, it will be very easy for the sued defamer(s) to have your complaint dismissed. If the company refuses to disclose the source of the false information, then you need to seek injunctive relief in court. That means suing the company so as to (1) compel the company to identify the person(s) who accused you, and perhaps (2) strike the ban that the company put in place as a result of the false accusations. Even if you don't prevail in striking the ban, the court proceedings would give you the occasion to set the record straight and prevent the company from defaming you if you legitimately expose (to the public) the arbitrariness of its ban. To be clear, the company can always indulge in defaming you for the sake of justifying its ban, although that would be dumb in light of what you will have proved in court by then. In jurisdictions where a request for retraction is not mandatory, a plaintiff who does not know the identity of his defamer(s) may (1) file suit against "Doe defendants", (2) subpoena the non-party company so as to obtain records related to the false accusations (obviously ensuring that these reveal the authorship thereof), and (3) upon production of subpoena records and requesting the identified defamer for a retraction, amend the complaint to properly identify the defendant. This would be more efficient than filing two suits (one for injunctive relief against the company, and another against the defamers). However, I am uncertain of whether this would work in Florida, given its pre-suit requirement of request for retraction. |
At what point can you walk out of a restaurant if they make you wait to pay the bill? The other day, I ate at a restaurant; the food was fine, and I got to paying the bill. Their payment system went down. They couldn't accept cards; only cash, and I didn't have the cash on me for the bill. In the end, their payments system was down for about 45 minutes, with several diners being forced to wait around. The staff didn't at any time offer a reassurance that if things weren't fixed in a certain period of time, we could just leave. But it got me thinking to the legality of things - at what point can you just leave? Is it always technically illegal in the UK to leave without paying the bill? Could the restaurant just force you to wait until close of business if necessary? What if they still hadn't fixed the payment system by then? | at what point can you just leave? Is it always technically illegal in the UK to leave without paying the bill? Probably depends on what you mean with just leaving. If just leaving translates I haven't paid and I won't pay (because of the hassle with the card) then that's probably Making Off Without Payment, section 3 Theft Act 1978 (Thanks @bdsl). Could the restaurant just force you to wait until close of business if necessary? What if they still hadn't fixed the payment system by then? I don't think a restaurant can physically detain you. Not even the 45 min you have been waiting. But if you leave without paying and without an agreement with them how & when to pay they can of course call the police because again that looks very much like making off without payment. According to your post, they did provide a payment system (cash) which was working all the time and that moreover has the special status of being legal tender. if you don't physically have the cash on you, you can be sued? You can be sued if you don't pay your bill (assuming the bill itself is correct) when it's due. In order to avoid endless hassle of the "I tried to pay via x, but they wouldn't accept this." type, legal tender defines ways of payment of a debt that the creditor/seller must accept. In many legislations, cash in the local currency provides such a fallback if other payment methods fail. Note that cash payment is very robust against internet failure, broken devices and power The UK (+ US) meaning of legal tender is that the restaurant must accept this means of settling the debt (at this time, the food is already eaten but not payed) - but they don't have to accept any other means of payment. (Note that e.g. for the EUR-countries there is at least a recommendation to make acceptance of legal tender mandatory also in retail, which includes simultaneous exchange food vs. payment). The 2nd important implication of this is that any argumentation along the lines that no reasonable means of payment were available would be very weak. You are not required to have sufficient cash with you to pay your bill if you can reasonably assume that some other way of payment will be acceptable to the restaurant. I see that like a spare wheel for a car: if you have a flat tire (card doesn't work) having a spare wheel (cash) allows you to deal with the issue with less hassle than if you don't: change your wheel vs. having to get your car brought to a workshop and wait until they put on a new tire (pay cash instead of waiting for the card to work again or a tedious hunt for another payment method). I'd like to point out that card doesn't work and not sufficient cash at hand (or forgotten purse) is something that happens quite often in general (rarely for any given transaction, but we have lots of transactions). I'd expect a restaurant or a gas station to be experienced in dealing with that. In any case, there are several possibilities to resolve the issue short of "just leaving": The key to all this is communication: talk to the restaurant to find a way to resolve the issue. Reassure them that you're not trying to use the opportunity to defraud them - that's what they are afraid of in this situation. "Where can I find an ATM?" Possibly offering a deposit: "And would you mind looking after my bag [phone] until I'm back?" Possibly showing them your ID card (or similar, if you have any) so they have your address: remember that so far you are an anonymous customer for them: which means that suing you for the money would be somewhere between too expensive and impossible. If you are a group, it should be sufficient if only one of you leaves in search of cash. Credit cards can be charged in a total offline way (MOTO = mail order/telephone order) where the credit card data is entered manually by the seller: the restaurant may be able to charge your credit card if fill in a paper credit card payment form. They may accept settlement via other payment systems: paypal & Co. wire the money via your online banking account (even if that doesn't give an instantaneous transfer, ask them if that's OK with them if you show/forward them the "transfer accepted message" for now) allow them to withdraw the money from your account via direct debit or something similar I'd not expect a restaurant to accept this possibility as they're probably not familiar with it and it means a lot of hassle for them with their bank to get listed to receive money that way. if you are in a region where cheques are still in regular use, that may be a solution as well. Restaurants like any other business can write invoices. They usually don't like this because their risk of having costly trouble to get the money is high. While your printout bill is technically an invoice already, it can be turned into an invoice (+ copy for them) giving your name + address and specifying how and when you'll pay. Which would keep track of how you (pl. = you + restaurant) decided to settle the bill under the peculiar circumstances. This works even in case of e.g. a power outage that prevents you from getting cash from an ATM in the neighborhood. | No, the only purpose of a money order is that it's effectively a form of guaranteed cash that only one person can access. There are no additional protections offered by it. However, given that you are amenable to paying a little extra to facilitate your payments, you may want to consider using a credit card in the future. Provided it's not an all the time thing, credit cards will withhold payments on your behalf if a vendor fails to fulfill their obligations. This means that you're not liable for the cost of the merchant sending you the wrong thing or ignoring your order requests. I've personally done this for several things: Hotel reservation that was borderline unsuitable for human habitation. When a vendor failed to send something I'd purchased. When proceeding with this, bear in mind that the credit card company will want you to make such a claim as soon as possible and to provide as much information as possible to support your claim. If you've e-mail chains, save them. If you've been communicating by phone, write down and provide a summary of your communications. If you have an issue, don't wait a month to raise the concern, do it within a week. Probably about once a year I need to do something like this. Generally what this does is it starts a dispute process whereby the credit company will contact the vendor to get their side of the story (usually they don't respond to them either). After 60 days, the charge is dropped from your bill and presumably the credit card company refuses to pay for the disputed item. Ultimately, this gets you the best possible result. You get your money back and you didn't have to go to court to do it. | Your lawyer friend is misguided Casual conversation and writing are not subject to any maxims of interpretation - the words mean what the speaker/writer says and what the listener/reader understands and these may be different things. In a conversation about restaurants, there is no implication that the places not mentioned are not restaurants or don't exist. Even if I were to write a published magazine article called "The 10 best restaurants in the world", there is no implication that no other restaurant can possibly be better than those 10. This applies even in business settings. For example, this is the Petbarn logo: It has images of dogs, fish, cats, and birds. By your friend's argument, it would be unlawful for them to sell products for the care of pet snakes or lizards since they aren't on the sign? Or, for that matter, to operate from a building that is not a "barn"? Finally, your friend is wrong even in legal interpretation. There are many ways of contract and legislative interpretation that are or have been in use in every jurisdiction. "Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius" is one maxim of interpretation but it may be in conflict with others. For example, if a regulation on aircraft listed various types of aircraft but didn't mention helicopters but nevertheless had an entire section devoted to rotor maintenance the "Rule against surplusage" would require that helicopters be included. In any event, modern courts tend to take a more holistic view to interpretation and the use of individual maxims is optional. | A business has the right to refuse service, except in the case of unlawful discrimination. "Sued us" is not a protected characteristic. Unless part of the settlement was that the business must serve that customer in future, there is no way this could be considered contempt. | If you paid by a credit card, the proper procedure is to simply do a chargeback. If the hotel doesn't back down, then the credit card network will hold arbitration. I wouldn't expect them to win, since they don't have anything but their word for it. The hotel does have the option of suing you, but it's unlikely that they will do so for £200, and again they don't have much of a case. Their third option is to just report it to credit reporting agencies as a unpaid debt. For this, there's not much you can do other than have the fact that you dispute it included in your file. Theoretically, you could sue them for defamation, but that would be impractical. | The store is, as far as i can see, not using the trademarked image to sell their cake. Your family does not intend to sell anything at all. This photo, from the description, could not reasonably be confused with an official image from the trademark holder. (all of this is based on your description, of course). Therefore, the trademark holder probably won't sue for trademark infringement, even if they somehow heard of this event, and if they did sue, they would quite likely lose. You would be making a copy of a presumably copyrighted image. You might have an active defense, but that is very hard to be sure of in advance. (Note that "fair use" is a very specifically US legal concept, and would not apply in the UK. The roughly comparable concept is "fair dealing" but that is more restrictive, and follows somewhat different rules.) In any case, it is possible that the rights holder would sue, and if the situation were a bit different (the was only one person pictured, making the shirt with the protected image very prominent, for example) there might be a larger chance of such a suit being successful. No business is going to want a bakery department manager deciding whether a particular use of a particular image does or does not infringe IP rights, and whether it does or does not expose the business to significant risk. Just to get an opinion from their lawyer on whether this image infringes would probably cost them several times the price of the cake with image printing. The store has no doubt written its guidelines to err well on the side of caution, because one suit, even if they won, would cost far more than the profits of many cakes, and if they lost, could have a very negative effect on their bottom line indeed. The store is entitled to restrict what business it does to keep itself safe from lawsuits. It is going to keep well on the cautious side, in all likelihood, and so it should. I fear you will have to find a store with a different policy, or use a different picture. | I believe that under federal law, the franchise owner cannot avoid overtime in this way. A similar case was considered by the Labor Department in 2005 (FLSA2005-17NA): This is in response to your request for an opinion concerning the application of the overtime requirements of section 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to employees who work at two different health care facilities operated by one management company. It is our opinion that all hours worked at any of the facilities must be combined for the purpose of calculating hours worked under the FLSA. The letter explains the logic pretty clearly, with citations. When an employee is "jointly" employed by two or more employers, then the hours are all combined for overtime purposes. 29 CFR 791.2(b) explains how "jointly" is determined: Where the employee performs work which simultaneously benefits two or more employers, or works for two or more employers at different times during the workweek, a joint employment relationship generally will be considered to exist in situations such as: (1) Where there is an arrangement between the employers to share the employee's services, as, for example, to interchange employees; or (2) Where one employer is acting directly or indirectly in the interest of the other employer (or employers) in relation to the employee; or (3) Where the employers are not completely disassociated with respect to the employment of a particular employee and may be deemed to share control of the employee, directly or indirectly, by reason of the fact that one employer controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with the other employer. Paragraph (1) applies: the two employers (the two restaurants) have an arrangement to share the employee's services (the owner is explicitly dividing their hours). Paragraph (3) also applies: both employers are under common control, since the same person owns both. They certainly are "not completely dissociated". The same logic would seem to apply even if the two locations are different restaurants, or different types of businesses. The 2005 letter explains further: Factors that are relevant in finding joint employment include, for example, whether there are common officers or directors of the companies; the nature of the common management support provided; whether employees have priority for vacancies at the other companies; whether there are any common insurance, pension or payroll systems; and whether there are any common hiring seniority, recordkeeping or billing systems. These also seem likely to apply in your hypothetical cases. | Nope. Say I sue you successfully, and the court delivers a judgement that awards $1000 in damages. It is not the responsibility of the small claims court to ensure that the judgement is fulfilled. In fact, the debtor (person who lost) can outright refuse to pay the creditor (or the person who won). They are not in violation of any law at this point. However, the creditor can ask the court for options on enforcing their judgement, and these can include, but are not limited to: Garnishing wages Providing a court order Seizure of assets (through court sheriff, don't use this yourself or you end up getting into criminal matters) and others to enforce the judgement. The debtor isn't liable for refusing, unless when they are in violation of a court order. Violating a court order is a criminal matter, and the debtor could possibly be found guilty of contempt of court. Oh, and the case wouldn't move on to a higher court. Cases go to a higher court when an appeal is made, generally when there has been an error in enforcing the law. You also need to be provided leave to make an appeal. |
Is it true that a suit of defamation could require "very little effort"? A recent comment at SE Meta stated: my reading of US law is that under certain circumstances, the plaintiff need make very little effort to successfully bring a suit of defamation. This strikes me as absurd, because even if the plaintiff has a strong case, there is still a lot of work to be done in bringing any sort of suit. What do the legal experts think? Does the quoted comment hold water? (In case this is helpful: here is a succinct outline of the context that led to this question: https://meta.stackexchange.com/questions/334399/summing-up-the-main-issues-the-story-so-far) | Is it true that a suit of defamation could require “very little effort”? No. Definitely not. The Wikipedia article (and understandably the comment on which it is premised) leaves out many details about substantive and procedural law which are essential in US jurisdictions. For instance, the [Wikipedia] item of "1. accusing someone of a crime" is insufficient for the falsehoods to be considered defamation per se. The crime of which one is falsely accused needs to be considered an infamous crime or involve moral turpitude. Under [US] defamation law, a crime is deemed serious or infamous when it is classified as felony or its punishment could exceed one year of prison. The case law cited in Lakin v. Rund, 896 N.W.2d 76 (2016) reflects how this criterion is uniform among US jurisdictions. Another difficult issue in defamation lawsuits is the need to prove the defendant's mental state known as actual malice. Even where there is clear proof of a defamer's actual malice, a plaintiff can be denied justice because of judge's arbitrary choice to side with the defendant (just like with non-defamation lawsuits). For case law from various jurisdictions regarding defamation law and actual malice, you might want to see the citations in my briefs in the SCOTUS here and here. Most of the records in regard to the latter case are available here. Defamation lawsuits are not exempt of having to comply with the procedural laws involved in judicial proceedings either, nor is the discovery, drafting, or legal research any simpler for being a lawsuit about defamation. In the context of the comments that prompted your question here, the "repeated violations" that SE imputed to former moderator Monica would hardly be grounds for a viable lawsuit against SE for defamation per se or otherwise. Here are some reasons: Rejecting a policy of gender pronouns such as the one SE seeks to impose is not considered an infamous crime. There is no legislation to that effect, at least yet. An actual refusal to adhere to that policy hardly involves moral turpitude. Far from involving corruption (i.e., moral turpitude), the controversy about gender pronouns touches on some of a person's deepest beliefs. Thus, the "offense" of opposing such a policy cannot be said to constitute an act of moral turpitude. The previous two items rule out a viable claim of defamation per se. Thus, Monica would have to prove that SE's falsehoods about her (whatever they are) caused her concrete losses (a typical example is lost income) by prompting others to dissociate from her. I am unaware of whether Monica's situation would fit in this scenario. You are right in that a claim of mental distress is not viable either. Note from here or here that in a claim of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED) (1) the conduct must be intentional and reckless; (2) the conduct must be extreme and outrageous; (3) there must be a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress must be severe Any claims of harassment that might be available to Monica would not be against SE, but against the specific individuals who engaged in harassing her directly. Depending on the methods and severity of the harassment, Monica might be able to obtain injunctive relief --typically in the form of restraining orders-- against those specific individuals. It is noteworthy that not all criticism or heckling at or about Monica would be cognizable as harassment. | united-states Simply insulting someone without saying something false is not defamation in the U.S. (historically it was the subject of criminal defamation liability to might light of someone's disabilities or call them out in an insulting way, but later U.S. constitutional law jurisprudence interpreting the First Amendment in the late 20th century rendered these laws unconstitutional). If a statement might damage someone's reputation if taken literally, and the statement is false, it can be defamatory and give rise to civil liability (or criminal liability in the few states that still have criminal defamation statutes), if the people to whom the statement is "published" (i.e. the audience of the statement) could reasonably believe that the statement was intended to be taken literally. Whether a statement can be taken literally is an "all of the facts and circumstances" analysis. Statements meant only as hyperbole or parody or metaphorically, if a reasonable audience person would understand the statements in that sense, do not impose liability based upon what they would mean if taken literally. Other Countries As noted in the question itself, not all countries treat statements like this the same way. Germany imposes criminal liability for all manner of insults. England and Wales imposes defamation liability in many circumstances when U.S. law would not. And, many countries in Asia are closef to the German model of liability for insulting speech than they are to the U.S. model. | In a civil rights action in which someone prevails (which is by no means certain in this case, but not impossible either), there is at a minimum an award of nominal damages (i.e. $1) and the reasonable attorney fees and litigation costs incurred in the lawsuit. A jury could also award a prevailing party non-economic damages, and/or exemplary damages (a.k.a punitive damages) in connection with a violation of civil rights. There might also be injunctive or declaratory relief stating that this was a violation of civil rights and requiring the government to adopt practices to prevent harm going forward. It is hard to see how there would be any economic damages at issue in this case, but it isn't impossible to imagine some circumstances in which they could be proven, perhaps. | While there are certainly statutory and procedural vehicles for sanctions, they are almost never requested or allowed when moved for, and are almost never imposed by judges. Something very severe needs to occur and not just your typical discovery violation ("speaking objections" during depositions, being late with responses, failure to cite to affidavits, affidavits citing conjecture rather than fact, et). It would have to be something quite serious....like misleading the court or directly failing to comply with a direct order or ruling on a motion. It is exceedingly rare. It is most seen in Federal Court. | The relevant question for libel under US law is "would a reasonable person understand this to be a statement of fact about the plaintiff, or to imply a statement of fact about the plaintiff." It doesn't directly matter if the name was changed or not; what matters is if a reasonable person would think the statements in question are talking about an actual person (the plaintiff) and are stating (or implying) actual facts, or if a reasonable person would think the statements in question are pure fiction and don't say anything factual about the plaintiff. Changing the name tends to make it seem more like fiction, but that's not always enough: suppose I write a long fictional story about Theodore Bau, who is active on the Pile Market series of online Q&A sites, particularly a history one and a board games one, who published an economics book in 2004 and was an econ and history double major, and fills in more details from Tom's SE bios, and in the book talk about how Mr. Bau stole money from clients; I then send thto potential clients of Tom Au. The fact that I changed the names and said "this is a work of fiction and any similarities are coincidental" isn't exactly an automatic get-off-scot-free card. On the other hand, if I'm telling a story about Tom Au that uses a fair bit of your backstory, with no disclaimer that any similarities are pure coincidence but Mr. Au lives a secret life as a legitimate supervillain, a reasonable person is unlikely to conclude that I'm saying that you actually have a volcanic lair and that you are actually plotting to capture a US and a Russian missile sub to provoke a nuclear war. In this case, the court determined that a reasonable person familiar with the context could understand the book to be talking about the plaintiff's actual behavior, instead of just talking about a fictional character. The fact that it was fiction and the names were changed suggested that it wasn't talking about the real plaintiff, but the details of the book could make it go the other way. | I think the answer is that, despite the wording in the question, this case is simply easier. Note that the Attorney General is listed as the applicant, rather than the appellant. The case is a straightforward action for contempt of court but since the court in question is the Supreme Court, it heard the case itself (although with a different set of judges). | You will almost certainly be sued For a small amount like this they would use junior lawyers and while the suit may take a while I’d be surprised if a lawyer spent a week all up on such a simple case. Say 40h at $200 = $8,000 which, when they win, you have to pay. Bargain. | No one can give you a meaningful answer unless you specify what jurisdiction you're in. Assuming you're in the United States: There's no liability for defamation. The company using your picture isn't saying anything about you. Whatever you might feel the implications are, the reasonable reader would not view the ads and conclude that you are actually sick or struggling financially. Even if they would, it is not defamatory to say that someone got sick or that they are struggling financially. As you indicated, those implications would merely be unflattering, and there is no liability for saying something unflattering about someone. There's potential liability for "misappropriation of likeness." One of the four commonly recognized privacy torts covers the misappropriation of a plaintiff's likeness. The classic case would involve the use of a celebrity's name or picture to sell a product that she has not endorsed. Some states allow lawsuits for misappropriation; others do not. Even among the ones that do allow it, there is some variation as to the facts you must prove to win the case. As I recall, some states require that the defendant use the name or likeness for commercial purposes and some require that the plaintiff's likeness already had some meaningful value outside the context of the misappropriation in question. If you're interested in pursuing the case, contact a lawyer with experience in privacy torts in your jurisdiction. |
How can two people be innocent until proven guilty if their stories conflict? So Bob accuses Alice of stealing his horse. Alice accues Bob of lying slander. They can't both be right. So one is innocent the other is guilty. But according to the law they are both innocent until one is proven guilty. So the law is in conflict with logic. How can this be? Another situation. One of two twins steals a chemical weapon which is caught on CCTV. We know one of the twins is guilty. But in this situation wouldn't the logical thing be to assume both are guilty and send them both to jail in order that the guilty one doesn't activate the chemical weapon? | You misunderstand the significance of the phrase "innocent until proven guilty." This is in part because you are not considering the entire phrase. The full phrase is that an accused party is "presumed innocent until proven guilty." This does not mean that the accused is innocent, only that criminal procedure must take as its starting point that the accused did not commit the crime. The major implication of the presumption, and indeed its original purpose, is that it places the burden of proof on the prosecution. This means that if a prosecutor asserts that you stole something, you do not have to prove that you did not. Rather, the prosecutor must prove that you did. The only reason to present evidence of your own is to rebut the prosecutor's evidence. Another practical implication is that a decision to detain someone awaiting a criminal trial may not be based on the assumption that the accused committed the crime. On the other hand, that decision is not based on the assumption that the accused did not commit the crime. There is a presumption of innocence, but no assumption of innocence, and the government is not obliged before the person is convicted to treat the person as if there is no accusation or charge. Wikipedia has a decent discussion. If we modify your question accordingly, it becomes How can two people be presumed innocent until proven guilty if their stories conflict? Now the answer should be clear. The prosecutor must develop evidence that shows which one of the people has committed the crime. If the prosecutor cannot do that, neither person may be punished. | That's the entire point of a summary proceeding. You're allegedly found committing an offence, that isn't worth the court's time to hear but nevertheless requires some penalty. The only way to "unambiguously deny liability" is by requesting a hearing and denying liability in the notice of this. The court doesn't care what you say to everybody else, it cares what you say on its record. The reasoning is, if you're so sure you're not guilty of an offence, why haven't you sought to argue this in court? And if you weren't committing the offence, why did the informant serve the infringement notice in the first place? The act is not silent at all on this. If you don't request the hearing and serve such notice by the date required, you are liable to enforcement action - whether you deny liability out of court is irrelevant. | We're missing a lot of facts that would help drive the analysis. The first question I'd ask was whether this was part of an actual or attempted sex offense. If that's the case, the suspect could be facing particularly serious charges. Other information is also missing, such as the drug involved, whether it's on the list of controlled substances, her knowledge of the drug, her relationship to the suspect, and so on. Still, based on the information we've got and the inferences we can make from them, I could reasonably see the following charges being filed: Sec. 12-3. Battery. (a) A person commits battery if he or she knowingly without legal justification by any means (1) causes bodily harm to an individual Sec. 12-3.05. Aggravated battery. (g) Offense based on certain conduct. A person commits aggravated battery when, other than by discharge of a firearm, he or she does any of the following: (1) Violates Section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act by unlawfully delivering a controlled substance to another and any user experiences great bodily harm or permanent disability as a result of the injection, inhalation, or ingestion of any amount of the controlled substance. (2) Knowingly administers to an individual or causes him or her to take, without his or her consent or by threat or deception, and for other than medical purposes, any intoxicating, poisonous, stupefying, narcotic, anesthetic, or controlled substance, or gives to another person any food containing any substance or object intended to cause physical injury if eaten. Sec. 12-4.5. Tampering with food, drugs or cosmetics. (a) A person who knowingly puts any substance capable of causing death or great bodily harm to a human being into any food, drug or cosmetic offered for sale or consumption commits tampering with food, drugs or cosmetics. Sec. 12-5. Reckless conduct. (a) A person commits reckless conduct when he or she, by any means lawful or unlawful, recklessly performs an act or acts that: (1) cause bodily harm to or endanger the safety of another person; or (2) cause great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement to another person. Sec. 21-1. Criminal damage to property. (a) A person commits criminal damage to property when he or she: (1) knowingly damages any property of another Sec. 11-1.20. Criminal sexual assault. (a) A person commits criminal sexual assault if that person commits an act of sexual penetration and: (2) knows that the victim is unable to understand the nature of the act or is unable to give knowing consent; Sec. 11-1.30. Aggravated Criminal Sexual Assault. (a) A person commits aggravated criminal sexual assault if that person commits criminal sexual assault and any of the following aggravating circumstances exist during the commission of the offense or, for purposes of paragraph (7), occur as part of the same course of conduct as the commission of the offense: (2) the person causes bodily harm to the victim, except as provided in paragraph (10); (3) the person acts in a manner that threatens or endangers the life of the victim or any other person; (4) the person commits the criminal sexual assault during the course of committing or attempting to commit any other felony; (7) the person delivers (by injection, inhalation, ingestion, transfer of possession, or any other means) any controlled substance to the victim without the victim's consent or by threat or deception for other than medical purposes; Sec. 11-1.50. Criminal sexual abuse. (a) A person commits criminal sexual abuse if that person: (2) commits an act of sexual conduct and knows that the victim is unable to understand the nature of the act or is unable to give knowing consent. Sec. 11-1.60. Aggravated criminal sexual abuse. (a) A person commits aggravated criminal sexual abuse if that person commits criminal sexual abuse and any of the following aggravating circumstances exist (i) during the commission of the offense or (ii) for purposes of paragraph (7), as part of the same course of conduct as the commission of the offense: (2) the person causes bodily harm to the victim; (5) the person acts in a manner that threatens or endangers the life of the victim or any other person; (6) the person commits the criminal sexual abuse during the course of committing or attempting to commit any other felony; or (7) the person delivers (by injection, inhalation, ingestion, transfer of possession, or any other means) any controlled substance to the victim for other than medical purposes without the victim's consent or by threat or deception. Sec. 9-1. First degree Murder (a) A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits first degree murder if, in performing the acts which cause the death: (2) he knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual or another; or (3) he is attempting or committing a forcible felony other than second degree murder. Sec. 9-3. Involuntary Manslaughter and Reckless Homicide. (a) A person who unintentionally kills an individual without lawful justification commits involuntary manslaughter if his acts whether lawful or unlawful which cause the death are such as are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some individual, and he performs them recklessly Sec. 9-3.3. Drug-induced homicide. (a) A person commits drug-induced homicide when he or she violates Section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act or Section 55 of the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act by unlawfully delivering a controlled substance to another, and any person's death is caused by the injection, inhalation, absorption, or ingestion of any amount of that controlled substance. Sec. 9-3.4. Concealment of homicidal death. (a) A person commits the offense of concealment of homicidal death when he or she knowingly conceals the death of any other person with knowledge that such other person has died by homicidal means. Sec. 9-3.5. Concealment of death. (b) A person commits the offense of concealment of death when he or she knowingly conceals the death of any other person who died by other than homicidal means. | Is this normal? Pretty much. Witnesses lie in court all the time (in my experience, defendants, law enforcement officers and medical doctors are the most likely to lie). Dealing with a witness who lies in court under oath effectively is one of the most challenging tasks lawyers face. It is an inherently challenging hurdle to proving or defending a case. The facts as presented in court often differ in some material way from reality. It is a pretty tough thing to accurately measure, but my gut estimate would be that this happens in a least 30%-40% of cases that produce contested trials, although not infrequently, a judge or jury will not find the false testimony to be credible. On the other hand, it isn't at all uncommon (probably at least 10% of the time) for a judge or jury to believe the liars to be telling the truth, and to find the people who are telling the truth to be less credible. There is absolute immunity from civil liability for lying in court testimony, although it could, in theory, give rise to contempt of court sanctions from the judge in some circumstances, or to a prosecution for perjury. But, perjury prosecutions are, in practice, very rare, and a good share of them arise from false statements made in documents under oath, rather than from courtroom testimony. There is probably less than 1 perjury prosecution per 1000 provable lies made under oath in courtroom testimony on material issues that end up influencing the outcome in a case. I totally sympathize with how frustrating this situation is having been there in cases that I am litigating many, many times. But, in short, life isn't fair. | Basically, it is up to the court. The relevant law is the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE). You don't give much in the way of specifics, but it sounds like you confessed something to the police at the side of the road immediately after the accident, and now wish to dispute that confession. If you are taken to court and the police want to introduce your confession as evidence then you (through your lawyer) can ask the court to rule it out. You may be able to do so on a number of grounds. Was the confession properly recorded at the time? Were you treated in an oppressive manner, such that you felt you had to say what the police wanted to hear. Did you think you might get more favourable treatment if you said what the police wanted? For instance, did you think you might be allowed to go home once they were satisfied? Were you given a proper rest, or were you in a mental state that might cause you to say things without understanding the consequences (it sounds like this would be your main argument, but consider the others too). [Edit] If you needed medical treatment that would also be relevant. Were you properly cautioned (that speech beginning "You do not have to say anything...") before the police asked you questions. If you think you may be facing criminal charges then you should get yourself a lawyer sooner rather than later. A lawyer will know all about this and be able to navigate the relevant legal processes on your behalf. A bit of background: back in the 1970s the police frequently attributed incriminating statements to suspects when arrested, such as "Its a fair cop, guv", or "Who ratted on us?". The rules in PACE were made to stop such "verballing". | Because in a civil case you have two equally involved sides. If I claim you damaged my car which cost $10,000 to repair, it's not only that you lose $10,000 if you lose the case, but I lose $10,000 if you win the case. Therefore the burden of proof should be equal in both directions. Assume a kid at an expensive boarding school is accused of causing $10,000 damage to the headmaster's car, and instead of suing for damages, the headmaster took the $10,000 out of the kid's school fees and tells the parents that the kid will be thrown out if they don't pay another $10,000. We have the exact same argument, but now the headmaster would be in court and accused. If the burden of proof was "proven beyond reasonable doubt", in the first case the parents would have to pay if it was proven beyond reasonable doubt that the kid was responsible; in the second case they would only get their money back if it was proven beyond reasonable doubt that the kid was not responsible. | In the USA, you must be found guilty "beyond reasonable doubt". As you describe it, I'd say there is an unreasonable suspicion of guilt, not guilt beyond reasonable doubt. If the magician killed three people that way, then three unexplainable deaths following three spells might get him convicted. A jury might say that even though there is no way to explain how the killing worked, the correlation might be enough to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. | There are all manner of reasons that evidence can be excluded at a trial, most of which are set forth in rules of evidence. If the evidence was not admitted on the grounds of relevance and the charge was speeding, I presume that the reason that it was found not be to relevant was that it was not possible from a video to determine how fast someone was driving and there was no dispute in the case over who was driving. If the defendant could have articulated some reason that the video was relevant to those points, perhaps it could have been admitted. But, as if often the case, pro se defendants are usually not articulate enough to set forth a legally relevant reason that evidence should be admitted. Unless the defendant could show that the video showed something allowing a jury to determine whether or not the law was violated, it probably wouldn't be relevant and I can't easily imagine how it would be relevant, but perhaps there was some special facts or circumstances that might show, for example, that the speed gun was actually picking up another vehicle. |
Is it possible to keep assets from being taken when a company is bought by another? Say you have company A. They are being bought by company B, are there legal ways to permit company B to buy A but not permit B to own assets that company A had originally owned? Or in selling company A to B permit wholesale pundering on B part when they buy A? If there is no place on this website for this question please let me know. | When you buy a company you acquire all its assets and liabilities If the vendor wishes to retain some assets they need to buy them from the company; before, at the time of, or after the sale. The value of a company is its assets less its liabilities plus the present value of its future cash flows all adjusted for risk. If the company owns a fleet of motor vehicles then their market value is part of the assets (and any finance on them is part of the liabilities). If the managing director wants to keep their company car then they need to have it transferred to them and it won’t factor into the valuation That said, its usually only public companies (or large private companies on the verge of going public) that are bought. Because private companies have variable levels of management skill, there could be contingent liabilities no one knows about and a new owner is unlikely to want to take these on. Private companies usually sell their assets (including the “business”) to insulate the new owner. | This is from a Canadian point of view, but the rules regarding how corporations run is generally pretty standard. I took a few classes in corporate governance, but I'm working mostly from memory, so hopefully most of the information is accurate! A corporation is its own entity, separate from any shareholders, and it can make whatever policies it wants. Unless you are an officer or on the board of directors, your participation in the company usually will be limited to voting in shareholders' meetings and receiving dividends. Refusal of service is a policy matter, so the fact that you are a shareholder (or anyone else, for that matter!) should be irrelevant. In fact, you might be denied service because you're an officer due to conflicts of interest. If the company was unincorporated, you may have more rights, but you'd probably be subject to some sort of agreement. | Is transferring money from a company where you're a director to a company where you're an employee considered money laundering? No. The scenario you outline seems too broad and generic. There are many possible, lawful reasons why company B could transfer money to its supplier, company A. Some examples are payment for the services that company A provided, an indemnization/settlement, and a buyout. The mere fact that B's director/shareholder is A's employee does not render the transaction(s) money laundering. Also, the statutory elements of money laundering vary by jurisdiction. | It may be useful to draw a distinction between the NFT and the Art referenced by this NFT. There is no intellectual property in an NFT itself because an NFT is not a creative work, invention, or trade secret. Ownership of the NFT. As far as I'm aware, no laws recognize the Ethereum blockchain as an arbiter of ownership. However, NFTs and other “crypto” assets seem to be recognized as property. Thus, it can be the case that lawful ownership diverges from the ownership records on the blockchain. In the referenced scenario, someone gained control over an NFT but likely did not receive the property rights in that NFT (i.e. stole it). License to use the Art. The “Bored Ape Yacht Club” terms define ownership of the NFT purely in terms of the Ethereum blockchain, and ignore legal ownership: Ownership of the NFT is mediated entirely by the Smart Contract and the Ethereum Network The blockchain-owner of the NFT is then granted a license to use the Art via these terms. This leads to the following conclusions: There are no intellectual property rights in the NFT. Any intellectual property rights in the Art are held by Yuga Labs LLC, the company behind the “Bored Ape Yacht Club”. Nothing in the terms transfers ownership in the Art. Yuga Labs LLC grants the blockchain-owner of the NFT a license to use the Art. Here, this means that the thief held the license, then after the sale the subsequent buyer. Yuga Labs LLC does not grant the legal owner of the NFT any rights, in case the legal owner and the blockchain-owner are distinct. Of course, nothing would prevent Yuga Labs LLC from also granting a license to the legal owner of the LLC. They can still do so retroactively, as their license grant to the blockchain-owner is probably not exclusive. But I would be surprised if they would do so, since it would shatter the “NFT = Art” and “Blockchain = Ownership” illusion that their business model relies on. | If three people inherited a house in equal shares, then a new deed should have been prepared and filed with the appropriate governmental authority (the county in most US states) before probate is closed. When that is done the authority of the executors over the house as executors has ended. However, if I understand you correctly, the two former executors are also two of the three heirs to the house. Thus they own a 2/3rds interest in the house. At least they can sell their interests without your consent, leaving you a minority owner with the purchaser owner a majority. In some jurisdictions they may be able to force a sale, paying you your share of the purchase price. But this would be because of their majority ownership, not because of their former status as executors. Addition: In some states co-owners who are joint tenants may not sell their interests without the consent of the other co-owners, but this is jnot true in North Carolina According to the site of the Hutchens Law office: ownership as tenants in common provides each party with the right to sell, gift, devise, or otherwise convey their interest in the property without the permission of the other owners. This means that the ownership interest is freely alienable or transferable. As a result, an owner may sell or give their interest in the property to anyone they want, or they may willingly or by judgment use their interest in the property to secure or satisfy a debt with a creditor. Therefore, parties entering into an agreement to purchase property as tenants in common should be aware that they may ultimately end up owning the property with a stranger. If this were to happen, there is a way out, but it may be costly. At any time, if the parties can't agree, any owner may petition the court for a partition of the property. The court could require one owner to buy another out or force the sale of the property. The court will decide the ultimate outcome based on equity. ... [I]f the intent of co-owners holding interest as joint tenants is to automatically transfer their interest at death to the survivor, the language must be on the conveying instrument as right of survivorship is not automatic with joint tenancy in North Carolina and if the language in not included, the decedent's interest will pass to his heirs. ... However, any owner has the right to convey their ownership interest during their life; and if they do, the survivorship agreement ends, and owners simply become joint tenants by operation of law. In North Carolina there seems to be little practical difference between co-owners who are tenants in common, and those who are joint tenants without a right of survivorship. But whichever form of co-ownership is chosen: tenants in common, joint tenants without a right of survivorship, or joint tenants with a right of survivorship, each of the co-owners has a right during his or her lifetime to sell, give away, or use as collateral on a loan his or her share of the property, without consulting the other co-owners. They cannot force the other co-owner(s) to sell, except by starting an action of partition in a court, when a judge would decide. An unrelated buyer might be unwilling to purchase only a 1/3 or 2/3rds interest, because the remaining co-owner(s) would still have full rights to use and occupy the house, can could sell to a different buyer. All co-owners are responsible for their proportionate shares of all expenses, including mortgage payments, repairs, and taxes. | When a company is bought by another company, then all their intellectual property is usually transferred to the buyer. That means when Adobe bought Macromedia, then all the copyrights to all Macromedia products presumably went to Adobe. So Adobe can take legal actions when you violate their copyright on Macromedia Adobe Flash 8. I said "usually" and "presumably", because there might always be some contract clause in the purchase agreement between Macromedia and Adobe which says otherwise. And that agreement might not be public knowledge. When a company "disappears", then things can get even more complicated. When a company goes bankrupt, then their assets get liquidated. That means everything they own - material or immaterial - gets sold to the highest bidder. Who that bidder is is not always public information. So the copyrights might land somewhere where you wouldn't expect it. In fact there is a whole industry of "copyright trolls" who buy IP from defunct companies just so they can sue anyone using that IP. When a company is dissolved voluntarily, then any of its assets either get sold off to the highest bidder just like during a bankruptcy, or become the personal property of the company owner(s). Who might be private people or a parent company. Sometimes a company might "nominally" go out of business by sacking all employees and ceasing all business activity, but might still exist on paper. That means whoever owns the company could at any time decide to go back into business just to start a lawsuit. In some cases it might be hard to tell what actually happened to the IP rights to a specific piece of software. The information might be in some contract deeply buried in some file cabinet. Or perhaps there is no documentation at all, so finding out who owns what can become an immensely difficult lawsuit. Bottom line: Who owns the copyright on what is not public information. Just because you can't find out who currently owns the copyright to some intellectual property does not mean nobody does. And when you violate their copyrights, that person might suddenly appear with a lawyer and make all kinds of demands, including suing you for statutory damages (which does not require them to prove that you actually caused financial harm to them). | No, you could not have prevented them from collecting their belongings But you could have sued for trespass Unless those boxes were part of the contract for sale, they remain the vendor’s property and just like you can’t withhold your mate’s trombone that he accidentally left after that great party, you can’t withhold the vendor’s boxes - that’s called “stealing”. What you could (should?) have done is refuse to settle until the boxes were removed. As the vendor was in breach, if you suffered any unmitigated loss as a result of the delay, you would be entitled to recover it. This is one of the reasons why you should inspect on the day of settlement. Given that you accepted the breach, even though the vendor’s boxes were technically trespassing, they could reasonably raise the defense that they had implicit permission- at least for a reasonable time. “A few days” is a reasonable time. | All your work is yours. They've made it very clear it wasn't a work for hire, so it's yours. They can't copyright any of their ideas. You can't copyright an idea. Only specific creative elements authored by them and present in your work could be covered by copyright. You didn't use their block diagrams. I don't see how references to other sites to look at would constitute a creative element they authored. That said, you probably want to talk to a lawyer and get a written legal opinion that you can rely on. |
What is a 'creed' for purposes of New York City's public accommodation anti-discrimination code? Aside from the federal anti-discrimination law, New York City has its own more restrictive anti-discrimination laws, which seem to include more protected classes and which also seems to have a much broader definition of "public accommodation." § 8-107. 4. a. 1. defines these protected classes: actual or perceived race, creed, color, national origin, age, gender, disability, marital status, partnership status, sexual orientation, uniformed service or alienage or citizenship status whereas the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title II (42 USC 2000a) includes only these protected classes: race, color, religion, or national origin While several categories are explicitly added to the New York City law that are absent from the federal Civil Rights Act, 'religion' is notably absent and apparently replaced with 'creed.' My question, then, is how is 'creed' defined in practice for purposes of New York City's public accommodation anti-discrimination code? Is 'creed' here intended to include religious beliefs, but to be more broad so as to also include beliefs and views that aren't necessarily of a religious nature? Would it include, for example, political views? Social views? | From NYC website (creed): Creed refers to a set of moral or ethical beliefs and the practices and observances associated with those beliefs. Although creed includes traditional religious beliefs, it also incorporates belief systems that may not be expressed by an organized religious group. Based on the examples shown on the website, it doesn't seem like it was intended to extend to political views, but rather religion and religion-like beliefs. | "Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights" on the website you linked to is very clear that the Charter of Fundamental Rights only means the EU institutions can't discriminate based on age, and that EU law is not allowed to be age discriminatory. It doesn't mean that individual acts of age discrimination are illegal: In contrast, the provision in Article 21(1) does not create any power to enact anti-discrimination laws in these areas of Member State or private action, nor does it lay down a sweeping ban of discrimination in such wide-ranging areas. Instead, it only addresses discriminations by the institutions and bodies of the Union themselves, when exercising powers conferred under the Treaties, and by Member States only when they are implementing Union law. The practice of youth and senior discounts is older than the charter of fundamental rights. The charter will be interpreted in the light of continuity, it definitely wasn't the intention to outlaw price discrimination. There are specific laws that make price discrimination based on certain principles legal, e.g. UK equality act: Age discrimination - when discrimination is allowed in the provision of goods or services | The First Amendment is never interpreted as a complete prohibition against laws that could affect a religion, nor is it interpreted to mean that you can say or write anything whatsoever that you want. You cannot sacrifice humans when in the name of a religion, and you cannot sacrifice (murder) humans for fun. One part of the First Amendment regarding religion is the Free Exercise clause which says that you cannot prohibit the exercise of a religion, and another, the Establishment Clause, prohibits favoring a religion, or favoring religion over atheism. The clauses about free speech also do not mean that you can commit fraud and you cannot threaten people's lives. What decides how far the government can go is "strict scrutiny", a doctrine that limits the extent to which the government can infringe on fundamental rights – First Amendment rights are the canonical example of a fundamental right. The main hurdle that a law so scrutinized has to pass is that the law is necessary for a compelling government interest. Preventing massive deaths is generally seen as such an interest. Then, the law has to be narrowly tailored to affect "just those cases", and it has to be the lest restrictive means of accomplishing that end. Although the prevention of massive deaths is a compelling government interest, a government might screw this up in their legal arguments, as they seem to have done in Capitol Hill Baptist Church v. Bowser, where mass political protests were allowed but smaller religious meetings were prohibited. The government essentially "waived" that compelling interest, replacing it with an interest in preventing church meetings, which is plainly a violation of the First Amendment – they substantially burdened religious practices. | Political party membership may be indirectly protected, insofar as party membership is a manifestation of a philosophical belief, but it is not a protected characteristic in itself. Political beliefs (e.g. in socialism) are capable of being protected characteristics, but not always. Nazism is not protected, because it is destructive of the rights of others and unworthy of respect in a democractic society. Businesses can usually choose who they do business with Assuming there is no other bad conduct going on (harassment, violence, discrimination, etc.), there is nothing to stop a shop or other business from excluding certain customers. This is the starting point. Some businesses have positive legal duties to serve the public in general. Your water company can't cut off your water, regardless of your beliefs. Barristers must follow the "cab-rank rule" and take your case even if you are a horrible person. So let's assume we just have an ordinary private-sector business, such as a shop. The protected characteristic of belief Contrary to the term "protected class", which is from U.S. law, the U.K. uses the words "protected characteristic" to mean those personal characteristics named in the Equality Act 2010. These include age and race. They also include "religion or belief", a characteristic inherited from prior equality law. Any discrimination claim relating to the "No Nazis allowed" sign would have to hang on the "belief" arm. Interpretation of "religion or belief" follows the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 9. In relation to a philosophical belief, the applicable test is "the Grainger test" formulated by the Employment Appeal Tribunal in 2009, The belief must be genuinely held. It must be a belief and not an opinion or viewpoint based on the present state of information available. It must be a belief as to a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour. It must attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance. It must be worthy of respect in a democratic society, be not incompatible with human dignity and not conflict with the fundamental rights of others. Careful readers will notice that 2009 is before 2010; the statute law was different but the point was the same. Classic examples of beliefs meeting the test include vegetarianism, humanism, and pacifism. Political beliefs There is no sharp line between a "philosophical" belief and a "political" one. Support of a political party is not covered (Grainger at 35), but there is room for belief based on a political philosophy. In this way, "left-wing democratic socialism" met the test in GMB v Henderson. On this basis, one might be tempted to conclude that "Nazism" or "fascism" would be similar, even if "membership in a Nazi party" was not. However, Article 17 of ECHR does not protect totalitarian or Nazi beliefs. This is consistent in the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg court, and in U.K. cases on equality. It is the source of the fifth part of the Grainger test, via earlier cases in the House of Lords and before the European Court. For example, in Forstater v CGD Europe, the EAT held: A philosophical belief would only be excluded for failing to satisfy Grainger V if it was the kind of belief the expression of which would be akin to Nazism or totalitarianism and thereby liable to be excluded from the protection of rights under Articles 9 and 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) by virtue of Article 17 thereof. Employment is more protected In Redfearn v UK [2012], the ECtHR said a bus driver's rights had been violated following his dismissal for being a member of the British National Party. That was in relation to Article 11 (freedom of association) and his Article 9 claim was dismissed. The court noted that the BNP had not been banned in the U.K. and it was also looking at an employment rights issue rather than (as in the question) access to business premises; there is a general set of rights relating to unfair dismissal which were in play. It had not been proved that the driver was actually unfit to do the job. So even though party membership is not protected under the Equality Act, people may still benefit from other legal protections. The case also shows the difficulties of inferring beliefs based on indicators like supporting a political party. If the BNP were banned then it would be another matter, and U.K. law does allow the banning of extremist organisations. (Principally, under the Terrorism Act 2000, part II.) Some extreme-right groups are proscribed in this way, although there is no general restriction of fascism or Nazism. | The Code defines "Source of income" as: lawful, verifiable income paid directly to a tenant or paid to a representative of a tenant. There's nothing to suggest that the occupation is a relevant consideration otherwise. What it would mean is that if the occupation of a person is relevant to their source of income, it would be illegal to discriminate on that basis. I would consider occupation distinct from source of income - I could (but don't) have a family trust that is my source of income, and my occupation is volunteer work. My occupation is very clearly not my source of income. | You didn't specify the context so I am assuming you mean for the purpose of anti-discrimination laws. If so, the definition of disability is found in Section 6 of the Equality Act 2010: (1) A person (P) has a disability if — (a) P has a physical or mental impairment, and (b) the impairment has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on P's ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities. Elaboration is provided in Schedule 1: 2 (1) The effect of an impairment is long-term if — (a) it has lasted for at least 12 months, (b) it is likely to last for at least 12 months, or (c) it is likely to last for the rest of the life of the person affected. (2) If an impairment ceases to have a substantial adverse effect on a person's ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities, it is to be treated as continuing to have that effect if that effect is likely to recur. However, this is subject to regulations made under the Act. Regulation 3 of the Equality Act 2010 (Disability) Regulations 2010 provides: (1) Subject to paragraph (2) below, addiction to alcohol, nicotine or any other substance is to be treated as not amounting to an impairment for the purposes of the Act. (2) Paragraph (1) above does not apply to addiction which was originally the result of administration of medically prescribed drugs or other medical treatment. Regulation 4 provides: (1) For the purposes of the Act the following conditions are to be treated as not amounting to impairments: — (a) a tendency to set fires, (b) a tendency to steal, (c) a tendency to physical or sexual abuse of other persons, (d) exhibitionism, and (e) voyeurism. So, in conclusion, an addiction is a disability provided that the following conditions all apply: It is a mental impairment which has a substantial adverse effect on the ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities. It has lasted or is likely to last at least 12 months. The substantial adverse effect is either current or has ceased but is likely to recur. It is not an addiction to alcohol, nicotine, or other substance unless it is the result of medical treatment. It is not an addiction to setting fires, stealing, physical / sexual abuse, exhibitionism, or voyeurism. It doesn't matter whether the addiction results in illegal activity provided the other criteria are met. | There is, in most countries at least, no law requiring a business to treat a customer fairly. In general, a business may refuse to serve a would-be customer for any reason or none, provided that the reason is not membership in a protected class (racial, religious, ethnic, or sexual bias, mostly). Exactly which classes are protected depends on the local law (in the US, there can be such laws at all of federal, state, and municipal levels). If a customer is asked to leave and does not do so, s/he could be charged with defiant trespass (or local equivalent). More likely, security, or the police, could simply escort the customer out of the business, using as much force as is reasonably needed for that purpose. Unless there are grounds for action not mentioned, I see no basis for a successful suit by the customer. | I would say no, it's not the same. There's a reasonable expectation of privacy that you have in an office that isn't present when you're standing on a roadside or in a city park. In Glik v. Cunniffe, the First Circuit said "The filming of government officials engaged in their duties in a public place, including police officers performing their responsibilities" was in the spirit of the First Amendment. And this is not limited to police; an arrest "in the course of filming officials in the hallway outside a public meeting of a historic district commission" was found to be a First Amendment violation in Iacobucci v. Boulter (1st Cir. 1999). But a private meeting in an office is not a "public place" as it is meant in Glik (even if the building is owned by the government.) And the Glik decision says "To be sure, the right to film is not without limitations. It may be subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions." |
Are Blizzard breaking GDPR by charging people for changing their usernames? I have had an account with Blizzard for several years now. I changed my username (referred to as a battletag) only once, over a year ago. I now want to change it again because searching it on Google shows personal info about me that I don't want others to know. Blizzard charge for changing the username. I contacted them mentioning GDPR, and was told it looks too generic to be personal data, so I would have to pay for a change. Their GDPR contact agreed with this. Surely it is personal data, because they can search it within their own database and link it to my real name which makes it personal data under GDPR. Am I not understanding GDPR correctly, or are they violating my rights? | It’s personal data ... but why do you think you can change it for free? It’s clearly personal data because it can be demonstrably linked to you, both within and outside Blizzard’s database. Presumably, you consented Blizzard having it or they have some other legitimate basis for having it. So far, this is all GDPR compliant. You have a right to be forgotten, so you can ask Blizzard to delete your account. You have a right to confirm the information is correct. And that’s it. They can charge you a fee to change your user name just like your government can charge you a fee to change your real name. | The first thing to notice is that the £100 offer appears to be a legit offer. That is to say, accepting it will create a binding agreement between you and the company. There is no reason yet for the company to believe that you have suffered more damages, and you do have reasonable options to prevent them (ask bank for a new card - that's not going to cost you £100). The second observation is that the GDPR does not really affect the first observation. The GDPR itself does not give rise to additional civil claims or special damages. Yes, the GDPR states that the company is in the wrong, but parties can make agreements how a wrongful deed is made right again. And their offer appears to do so. Note that accepting the offer does not take away your continuing GDPR rights. It just affects their past error. You can still ask them whether they have your card data on file today. | There are two relevant bodies of EU law to consider here. The GDPR covers processing of personal data. Personal data is any data where the data subject can be identified directly or indirectly. The ePrivacy directive is also relevant, and covers how you may access and store information on the user's device. Directives are not directly applicable law. Instead every member state translates the directive into national law. In the UK, ePrivacy is implemented by PECR. Is the data you collect personal data in the sense of the GDPR? Yes: that hashed unique device ID or a system-provided advertising ID likely is personal data, and any linked data would then be personal data as well. This is going to be the case in particular if you store user accounts on your server and can connect these bug reports to a user. Consider also whether the game save could include personal data, and whether the video clip could be analyzed to identify the data subject. Does this mean collecting this information in bug reports is forbidden? No, the GDPR doesn't forbid or allow anything outright. Instead, you should go through the compliance process. In a nutshell: determine the purpose of this processing, e.g. “fixing bugs” find an Art 6 legal basis for this purpose, e.g. “Art 6(1)(f) legitimate interest” or “Art 6(1)(a) consent” if the legal basis is legitimate interest, you must balance that interest against the data subject's interests determine whether your compliance requirements include creating/updating your Records of Processing, or whether you have to write a Data Protection Impact Assessment implement the processing in a manner that respects GDPR principles such as Transparency and Data Minimization if the legal basis is legitimate interest you must implement an opt-out solution if the legal basis is consent, you must request consent first in a manner that satisfies the Art 7 conditions for consent – and allow consent to be revoked easily prepare to satisfy data subject rights: information requirements per Art 13, usually done in the privacy policy right to access, rectification, erasure, and data portability right to object (opt-out) and to restrict processing be aware of your general requirements a data controller to process this data securely, e.g. use HTTPS connections to transmit bug reports, take steps to protect your own accounts (e.g. 2FA), and ensure you have a suitable contract with any data processors that act on your behalf, e.g. cloud providers or contractors I would question whether your bug reports really need to include a device ID. That isn't forbidden, it just complicates compliance a bit. And what about ePrivacy? The ePrivacy directive is known for its cookie consent requirements. But these consent requirements apply when accessing any information on the user's device, or when applying equivalent fingerprinting techniques. Your game save is not an issue because it is necessary for the game. But that device ID and other system information is more difficult. So what to do? Compliance isn't trivial, but certainly possible. You will likely process the bug reports under your legitimate interest, but might still have to collect consent for accessing a system ID due to ePrivacy. Such a screen might look like this: Oh no, the game crashed! Do you want to send a bug report to the developers? Your bug report will be protected as per our privacy policy (link). Your bug report will contain the following information: … Yes, collect system information and send bug report No, do not send bug report You could make an argument that a bug report can be sent in any case, and that you just need ePrivacy consent to collect useful system information. For example: Oh no, the game crashed! When sending a bug report to developers, do you want to include extra system information (link to details) that helps fixing the problem? In any case, your bug report will be protected as per our privacy policy (link). Your bug report will contain the following information: … Yes, send bug report with extra system information No, send anonymous report | Yes, there would still be an obligation to comply with erasure requests – if the data subject can be identified, and if the GDPR applies. This is a case for Art 11 GDPR: processing which does not require identification. The pastebin site is not required to collect identifying info just in order to facilitate later deletion. If the site is unable to identify the data subjects, then the data subject rights (like access, rectification, erasure, restriction, or data portability) do not apply. Other rights like the right to be informed and the right to object do remain, though. But if the data subject provides sufficient additional information that makes it possible to identify their records, then the data subject rights apply again. In practice, this is likely going to mean that anyone with access to a paste will be able to request deletion, since the site would have no ability to verify the identity of the data subject beyond the information in the paste. None of this absolves the site from implementing appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure the security of this data. Even though the pastes might not be directly identifying, they are personal data and are far from anonymous. Common practices like numbering pastes with a sequential ID or showing recent pastes on a homepage have to be viewed critically. My go-to recommendation is to assign a cryptographically random UUIDv4 ID to the post, so that it is practically impossible for anyone to find the paste unless they were given a link by the uploader. Your idea to delete pastes after a fairly short retention period is also good. This helps with security, and it is in line with the GDPR's data minimization and storage limitation principles: data may only be kept as long as necessary for its purpose. On the other hand, quick deletion might not be in line with the purpose of these pastes – it all depends on context. You mention that this is an US-based site. If so, there's a question whether GDPR would even apply. GDPR will apply per Art 3(2) if the data controller is offering its services to people who are in Europe. Here, “offering” does not mean mere availability of the website, but that the data controller intends the service to be used by such people, in particular if the service is somehow targeted or marketed to such people. | If you are purely a designer (and not contracted for the daily operation of the site), the answer is "no". GDPR Article 4 defines the "roles" responsible for complying with GDPR, and there are two: Controller and Processor. The Controller is the one who calls the shots. In particular: Decides what personal data to process. This is usually the owner of the web site. The Processor is the one that actually does the processing. This is usually some company providing some sort of data processing service (e.g. SaaS, PaaS, etc.). The relationship between the Processor and the Controller must be contractual. The contract is called a DPA (Data Protection Agreement or Data Processing Addendum). As a designer, you don't fit into any of these roles. If your contract with the client is silent on liability for GDPR compliance, then you have no liability. This goes for projects completed both before and after the May 25 deadline. Of course, if there are GDPR clauses in your contract, then you must fulfil them just as have to fulfil any other contractual obligation. But unlike the controller and the processor, there are no automatic legal liability for a designer or programmer. | Your VPN scenario is why you have to show the banner to everyone. If you somehow knew beyond any doubt that someone was not in the EU, then you would not have to show a banner, but because you can't verify that, you should always show the banner. Doing so also protects against accidentally violating a similar law in another country; the GDPR is the best-known privacy law, but it is far from the only one. It's good practice to ask for people's permission before collecting their information anyway. | You are processing the users IP address in order to carry out the translation to a physical location (see my comment for the technical issues with that) and an IP address is most certainly considered personal information, so yes under the GDPR you are going to need a published policy because you are both data controller and data processor. You need to inform the user of what you are doing, and you need to tell them of the legal basis for the processing (there are several under the GDPR, of which consent is only one - but in your case its going to be the easiest to justify). If you use a third party service for the location translation, you also need to inform the user of that and make available the third party services data processing policy. | The Art 15 GDPR right to access is pretty absolute. There are only three grounds under which access to a copy of your data can be denied: Art 12(5): the request is “manifestly unfounded”, e.g. clearly just submitted for trolling Art 12(5): the request is “excessive”, e.g. if you repeat the same request very frequently Art 15(4): access to a copy would “adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others” Thus, I am confident that Twitch would respond to an access request with a copy of all your chat messages. Of course, the chat messages might be useless without context, but providing that context might infringe on the privacy rights of others (see Art 15(4)). There are two caveats to this right. The data need not be machine-readable, unless the more limited Art 20 right to data portability also applies. Twitch is under no explicit obligation to provide access in a self-service manner, e.g. through an app or web interface. It would probably in the best interest of Twitch to provide self-service means, but right now the Twitch privacy policy (permalink) asks you to exercise your rights by emailing [email protected]. Alternatively, their privacy choices page contains an entry to “Obtain access to or a copy of certain personal data we hold about you”, which contains a barely-visible link to a web form where you can request chat data. |
Free potable water law in UK and EU In Britain, all licensed premises are required by law to provide "free potable water" to their customers upon request. What legislation covers this? Is this the case in other European countries? I am particularly interested in whether this is a legal requirement in Italy. | In the UK, this is covered in the Licensing Act 2003 (Mandatory Licensing Conditions) (Amendment) Order 2014, which amends the Licensing Act 2003 (Mandatory Licensing Conditions) Order 2010. Mandatory Licensing Condition 2 states: The responsible person must ensure that free potable water is provided on request to customers where it is reasonably available. Note that this applies only to premises which are licensed to sell alcohol. | This helpful video gives the answer, and it's no, you don't have to open your door unless they have a warrant. If you've committed an indictable offence (those considered most serious, such as murder, manslaughter, causing really serious harm (injury) and robbery) they have the power to enter without a warrant (see 17 b of the PACE Act). In the case I saw there was no indictable offence and so the lady didn't (shouldn't!) have opened her door. You can speak to them through a closed door or window and if they try to break in it is they that are breaking the law. | not in germany Germany has laws about founding, operating and financing political parties, the Parteiengesetz which demands certain organisatorial structures, and the Parteifinanzierungsgesetz, which is very explicit about how they can finance themselves and what a party needs to report. The only allowed gains are property proceeds (like from owning property or selling goods), membership fees, gifts to the party, and state sponsorship. Also, non-citizens are not allowed to give to a party unlimitedly. The parties also are also obligated under the basic law to report all financing they get, down to the cent. Their organisation form is strictly limited: Parteien sind frei gebildete Personenvereinigungen im Sinne des Artikels 9 Absatz 1 GG, die sich auf der Basis des privaten Rechts nach den vereinsrechtlichen Regelungen des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches (§§ 21 bis 79 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch - BGB) gründen. Sie sind in der Regel nicht rechtsfähige Vereine This precludes them from being Aktiengesellschaften: they have to be organizations of people (Personenvereinigungen) that follow the BGB, and thus are not allowed to organize as an AG under the Aktiengesetz, which demands that an AG to not be an organization of people. So, a party can't be a stock company, and selling stock in a political party in Germany is not allowed under the framework and is thus neither possible nor legal. | The only applicable law is the local trespassing law. If he wants, the proprietor can demand that the patron leave, and if the patron does not leave, he can be arrested for trespassing. It uncontroversial that the First Amendment protects racist declarations. | UK and EU There is is no legally binding definition of the terms "vegan" and "vegetarian" at EU or member state level. In 2019, the EU began work on legislation for those definitions. However, under the UK's Food Information to Consumers (FIC) regulations (that implemented certain provisions of the EU directive of the same name), food information must be accurate, clear and easy to understand. This is intended to protect consumers from false or misleading labelling. The UK's Trade Descriptions Act also prohibits false or misleading labelling. The UK's Consumer Rights Act 2015 says "Every contract to supply goods by description is to be treated as including a term that the goods will match the description". And in the UK deliberate mislabelling is criminal fraud. I imagine other jurisdictions have similar laws. In 2006 the UK's Food Standards Agency published vegetarian and vegan guidance for food labelling. Unfortunately I can no longer find it on the FSA's website (food.gov.uk). However, it had the following definitions: Vegetarian The term ‘vegetarian' should not be applied to foods that are, or are made from, or with, the aid of products derived from animals that have died, have been slaughtered, or animals that die as a result of being eaten. 'Animals' means farmed, wild or domestic animals, including for example, livestock poultry, game, fish, shellfish, crustacea, amphibians, tunicates, echinoderms, molluscs and insects. Vegan The term 'vegan' should not be applied to foods that are, or are made from, or with, the aid of animals or animal products (including products from living animals). Now, those definitions weren't/aren't legally enforceable in themselves but an enforcement agency might use them as criteria when investigating a complaint. Related: fish and molluscs are key allergens Also under the FIC: Food businesses include restaurants, cafés and takeaways, and businesses that produce, manufacture or pre-pack food. Food businesses must tell you if they use any of the 14 key allergens as ingredients in the food and drink they provide. They must supply allergen information for every item that contains any of the 14 allergens. The 14 allergens include fish and molluscs (e.g. mussels and oysters). The consequences You are free to ask the food business to list the ingredients (indeed this is the advice to people with allergies) You are free to report your concerns to the food business (they really must list their uses of those key allergens) You are free to not give your custom to the business In the UK you can report businesses that you don't believe meet the legal requirements to the National Food Crime Unit. But if there is no direct intention to deceive or deliberate dishonesty it is not a 'food crime' and should not be reported to the NFCU. These non-crime concerns should be reported to the relevant local authority if you get no satisfaction from the business. | In April 2017, a US District court on Colorado ruled that a law prohibiting women from exposing their breasts in public was an unconstitutional discrimination against women. The law was ordinance 134 passed by Fort Collins, Colorado in May 2016. The group opposing it was led by the activist organization "Free the Nipple." This ruling is not binding in other states, however. See this Snopes report for more details. The case is being appealed to the Tenth Circuit. A similar ordinance has been taken to state court in New Hampshire on similar grounds as described in this AP story and this US News story A similar claim in Illinois in 2017 resulted in a law against 'public indecency" being upheld (in Tagami v. City of Chicago) at the Federal Appeals Court level, according to this Reason story A similar law in Ocean City, Maryland, was challenged in federal court in the summer oif 2018 according to this news story. in 1991 in United States v. Biocic the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld a similar law against a similar challenge. This Munknee article lists states where a woman going topless is legal and illegal. According to a Time Article (which gives a similar list): The vast majority of states actually have laws on the books making clear that women can’t be arrested under state law solely for being topless in settings where it’s OK for men. But many local ordinances ban the practice anyway. In short, it is not yet fully settled if there is a US constitutional right for a woman to go topless, and state and local laws vary widely. Local laws do not always conform to the laws of the state, but would probably require a court challenge to enforce the state law. Laws in other countries will vary, but many places ban such exposure. | Jurisdiction: england-and-walesnorthern-ireland The relevant legislation here is the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 together with subordinate legislation passed under that Act. Financial Services and Markets Act 2000: Section 19: (1) No person may carry on a regulated activity in the United Kingdom, or purport to do so, unless he is - (a) an authorised person; or (b) an exempt person. Section 22: (1) An activity is a regulated activity for the purposes of this Act if it is an activity of a specified kind which is carried on by way of business and - (a) relates to an investment of a specified kind; or (b) in the case of an activity of a kind which is also specified for the purposes of this paragraph, is carried on in relation to property of any kind. (5) “Specified” means specified in an order made by the Treasury. Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001: Article 4: The following provisions of this Part specify kinds of activity for the purposes of section 22(1) of the Act (and accordingly any activity of one of those kinds, which is carried on by way of business, and relates to an investment of a kind specified by any provision of Part III and applicable to that activity, is a regulated activity for the purposes of the Act. Article 61: (1) Entering into a regulated mortgage contract as lender is a specified kind of activity. (3) In this Chapter — (a) subject to paragraph (5), a contract is a “regulated mortgage contract” if, at the time it is entered into, the following conditions are met — (i) the contract is one under which a person (“the lender”) provides credit to an individual or to trustees (“the borrower”); (ii) the contract provides for the obligation of the borrower to repay to be secured by a mortgage on land; (iii) at least 40% of that land is used, or is intended to be used — (aa) in the case of credit provided to an individual, as or in connection with a dwelling; or (bb) in the case of credit provided to a trustee which is not an individual, as or in connection with a dwelling by an individual who is a beneficiary of the trust, or by a related person; but such a contract is not a regulated mortgage contract if it falls within article 61A(1) or (2). Article 73: The following kinds of investment are specified for the purposes of section 22 of the Act. Article 88: Rights under a regulated mortgage contract. So, if you are providing the mortgage to someone who will live at the property and are doing so by way of business (likely unless this is an arrangement with a friend or relative) then you will need to be FCA authorised unless there is an applicable exemption. See Chapter XV of Part II of the Regulated Activities Order and Section 38 FSMA and the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Exemption) Order 2001 for examples of exemptions. A full analysis of financial services regulation would be too dense to fit into a Stack Exchange post and you should seek specialised legal advice before considering entering into any kind of mortgage as a lender. "is it even possible to do this once without a company that does this as a general product?" It doesn't matter whether you are a company or whether you do it once or regularly. However, due to the costs and practicalities of obtaining FCA authorisation (where applicable) and ensuring that contracts and land registry charges are correctly drawn up (given the high stakes), you are unlikely to see many one-off or "amateur" mortgages in the real world. | I should have done my research properly, hopefully this will be indexed and be helpful to someone else in the future. The specific legislation is The Road Vehicles (Construction and Use) Regulations 1986 regulation 98: Stopping of engine when stationary 98.—(1) Save as provided in paragraph (2), the driver of a vehicle shall, when the vehicle is stationary, stop the action of any machinery attached to or forming part of the vehicle so far as may be necessary for the prevention of noise. (2) The provisions of paragraph (1) do not apply— (a) when the vehicle is stationary owing to the necessities of traffic; (b) so as to prevent the examination or working of the machinery where the examination is necessitated by any failure or derangement of the machinery or where the machinery is required to be worked for a purpose other than driving the vehicle; or (c) in respect of a vehicle propelled by gas produced in plant carried on the vehicle, to such plant. |
Are homeless people protected by antidiscrimination laws? I was in a restaurant in New Jersey (USA) recently and witnessed the owners telling a (possibly) homeless person that he couldn't come inside because he smelled too bad. Is this legal? More generally, are restaurants and other stores allowed to refuse entry to people for "looking homeless"? I often wonder about this in NYC, where I can imagine store owners wanting to create a "high-class" atmosphere in their store, but at the same time facing possible discrimination laws (and of course ethical issues). | Anti-discrimination laws apply to certain protected classes only. Homelessness (real or assumed) is not one of them, so it is perfectly legal to bar such people from your premises. It is also perfectly legal to bar people with red hair (assuming this is not indirect discrimination against certain racial groups). Nobody is required to serve everybody who comes in; what you are not allowed to do is ban women, homosexuals or other groups set out in the applicable statutes. | There are regulations governing occupational safety, whereby e.g. an employer can be fined for forcing employees to work in a literally toxic environment, for instance breathing chlorine gas. You could file a complaint with a state or federal agency (OSHA). You would need to hire a labor lawyer to get advice about your specific circumstance, to see if there is indeed a provision that covers what you describe, though I doubt it would. OSHA's blurb on disease don't obviously cover your situation (they describe situations that govern healthcare workers in intimate contact with infectious materials). However, certain diseases such as TB or Ebola cause a general health quarantine to be imposed, so if a worker comes in with such a disease, action would be taken by the health department. This does not cover sniffles, and probably not pertussis (but that's a local decision). There are also regulations pertaining to disabled employees, whereby an employee who is disabled by having a severely compromised immune system can be entitled to reasonable accommodation, for example allowed to work in a closed room away from others (if the job is not a receptionist job). That entitlement only applies to the employee, and is controlled by objective health danger (requires a doctor's note), and not the comfort level of the employee. | Yes Businesses (and consumers) can choose who to do business with and what information they ask for and disclose and when they do that. If you’re uncomfortable with how they do business, don’t deal with them. If they don’t like how you do business, they are free not to deal with you. This is called discrimination. However, it is not unlawful because only discrimination against a person due to membership of a protected classes is unlawful. This person “won’t answer my questions” is not discrimination based on a protected class (unless they are a monk who has taken a vow of silence). | "Public space" is not a relevant criteria when considering trespass or other crimes/torts against property. The relevant criteria is who owns it and what they allow you to do on it. All land in the USA is owned by someone. That someone may be a government; that does not make it a public space - Camp David is owned by the US government; it is certainly not public. The owner of the land can decide (subject to the law) who has access to their land and in what circumstances. If they erect a fence then they are saying "You cannot access my land here" - if you ignore this then you are trespassing. This is true even if there are legitimate ways to access the land i.e. there is a place where there isn't a fence; to avoid trespass you would have to access the land from there. If you think of this in terms of a public building like a courthouse you are free to enter through the unlocked front doors but not by climbing through a window. The trespass is in the act of crossing the fence - that is the act that you have been implicitly denied permission to do. Being on one side or the other is not trespass. For the specific image that you show it is quite likely that those roads are owned by different people - the highway is probably owned by the state while the cul-de-sac is a local government road. | Google is very helpful in this regard. I typed nyc restaurant bath and it suggested nyc restaurant bathroom law, the first result being http://www1.nyc.gov/nyc-resources/service/2360/restaurant-bathroom-requirements. It says: You can make reports about any food establishment with 20 or more seats that has no toilet and was established after 1977. These establishments must provide toilets for their patrons. Food establishments that have been in operation since 1977 or before are exempt from this requirement. Food establishments with 19 or fewer customer seats are not required to provide bathroom access to the public. Food establishments are not required to allow public access to their employee toilets. Patrons are not permitted to use any toilets where the patron must walk through the kitchen or any food storage or food preparation area. Call 311 to report a restaurant with 20 or more seats that has no toilet and was opened after 1977. | It is not legal for an employer to discriminate on the basis of sex anywhere in the US (see http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/sex.cfm). Exemptions exist where the discrimination is for bona fide occupational qualifications and, irrelevantly, religious reasons. It is completely legal for a consumer to discriminate on the basis of anything they want to. It is also legal for a business to assist the consumer in that discrimination. Bona fide occupational qualifications generally only apply to instances in which the BFOQ is considered reasonably necessary to the normal operation of a particular business. Mere customer satisfaction, or lack thereof, is not enough to justify a BFOQ defence, as noted in the cases Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. and Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co.. Therefore, customer preference for females does not make femininity a BFOQ for the occupation of flight attendant. However, there may be cases in which customer preference is a BFOQ—for example, femininity is reasonably necessary for Playboy Bunnies. Customer preference can "'be taken into account only when it is based on the company's inability to perform the primary function or service it offers,' that is, where sex or sex appeal is itself the dominant service provided." None of the occupations you mention would, on the face of it, meet the requirements to be BFOQ. Allowing their customers to express a preference for a specific gender may impact on the capacity for the business to deliver on that preference but it would not generally allow a BFOQ defence if this impacted their hiring policies. A possible exception is if the business catered to that preference exclusively, for example, an all female gym with all female staff but I am not aware that this has ever been tested and if a male personal trainer wanted to take them on he may very well win. As an aside, there is no BFOQ defence for racial discrimination except for artistic works where the first amendment rights overrule the anti-discrimination laws. | Excluding "ridiculously unacceptable conditions", it is legal to have "non-uniform" contract terms (where a company treats different classes of individuals differently), provided that the basis for distinction is not statutorily prohibited (race, religion, age, sex... depending on jurisdiction). There is a extremely slim chance that apparently legal income-discrimination can be a proxy for another form of illegal discrimination. However, "ridiculously unacceptable conditions" are unlikely to be found to be enforceable, regardless of any demographic properties associated with the condition. E.g. a clause requiring the surrender of a first-born female child would be unenforceable as "unconscionable". The specific circumstances surrounding such a finding by the court can't easily be summarized, since it relies heavily on prior case law, statutes, and legislative declarations. The underlying premise behind using the doctrine of unconsionability in such a case is that the clause in question is not something that a reasonable person would agree to, but they have no power to disagree. In the US, the case Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture is the leading case on this view. The clause in question was about a payment plan for furniture and the condition that no furniture could be paid off until all of it was. The consequence of the clause was that all of the furniture could be repossessed if any payment was missed, regardless of how much had already been paid. Various factors went into the court's ruling (that the condition was unenforceable), such as "absence of meaningful choice", "terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party", :gross inequality of bargaining power". In the circumstance that you allude to, it is not obvious that the courts would follow Williams in making their ruling – it would depend on the extent to which one could reasonable conclude that the customer understood and freely accepted the term. There are upper limits on what a court can enforce, so a contract requiring a party to commit suicide would be utterly unenforceable (in most countries), and a contract requiring a party to break the law would be likewise. | I'm a notary. If someone showed me a marked-up license, I'd refuse to perform the notarization, and make a note of the persons name and phone number, to make sure I would never make another appointment with the person. Is there a law that says I have to refuse? I don't think so. Is there is a law that says I can refuse if I have any doubts about the person's identity? Absolutely. |
Resources for assigning employee intellectual property back? As an employee of a software company they own my personal time projects, this is not in question. That said, my employer is quite reasonable about said things and at least verbally quite willing to review something and say "this isn't related to our work, you can have it." It being a small shop, verbal acknowledgement has been all they used before; they have no form for assigning a particular projects IP back to an employee. For a project I want to make and open source I would like something in writing. My employer is receptive to that but they want me to provide the form. I have been looking for either a template or some resource to help me write a little thing that they can sign that says something like: "The company transfers back all rights related to this project to employee, and we cannot take this back later." I suspect I don't know the correct terms to search because all I find are templates for employers to have new hires sign that assign their IP to the employer or articles talking about how really the employer owns all IP anyways. Is there a particular term I can search for this? Do such templates exist? | The Free Software Foundation faced the same issue, as many contributors needed disclaimers from their employers. Luckily, it's not difficult. Their template: Yoyodyne, Inc., hereby disclaims all copyright interest in the program “Woodpecker” (which deconstructs trees) written by James Hacker. signature of Moe Ghoul 1 April 1989 Moe Ghoul, President of Vice As the year 1989 indicates, this template has been accepted for decades. | The employee must, during and after employment, without limitation in time, observe a duty of confidentiality regarding [...] the Company's internal affairs such as business plans, profitability, pricing, employees, methods, processes, routines, code and the like as well as other information that the Company typically wants to keep secret The pure information that the company had at some time a security problem with their product is internal knowledge you only gained through working there. By what is written here, you are indeed prohibited from speaking about it. If it were public knowledge, you could point to a press release and say "I did that, that was me fixing the problem". That would work. Because it doesn't share anything that isn't public anyway. But you cannot share things the company wants to keep secret. Finding out whether that contract is legally enforcable in your country and juristiction is the job of a real lawyer, but just as written, they are right. You signed a contract to not do that, not talk about it an certainly not publish it on the internet. So you should not do that, unless a good lawyer you trust tells you otherwise. That said, "I found a security flaw" is about as impressive as "I found a dollar on the floor". Maybe you can talk about your knowledge to prevent something like it happening. That says nothing about whether or not it happened in your old company, and for me as an employer it is much more valuable to have you on board with structured knowledge you can apply, than with your memories of being lucky once. | I would recommend talking to an adult person in HR. I'm quite sure they will notice that what your manager wants to do is more than dodgy, and doing something dodgy may be in the interest of your manager, but not in the interest of the company. The best thing is to go to HR, acting as if a mistake has been made, and point out to them what your start date was, and that the new contract has the incorrect starting date, and they need to fix this mistake or you can't sign the contract. If they insist you sign it, then you DON'T sign it. If they say you will be fired if you don't sign it, then you tell them that in that case you would get legal advice. BTW. You definitely don't sign this as it is. PS. This answer was posted on workplace.stackexchange, not law.stackexchange, so please don't complain if there is no legal content. | Attribution is not a legal requirement If company A owns IP (copyright and trademarks in this case), they can licence it to company N on whatever terms are mutually acceptable. They may require company N to attribute their IP or they may not. | Am I contractually obligated to follow that old handbook? Yes. Consider this: your employer gave you a copy of the handbook saying, "here is a copy of the staff handbook." Because of this, you know that the document in question is the staff handbook of your company, regardless of the fact that it bears an old name, and that the policies it expresses are part of the terms of your employment contract. If you were truly concerned that the document in question had no validity as the staff handbook, you perhaps should have expressed that concern by telling the person giving you the document that they appear to have given you the wrong document, because it bears a different name. By not doing this, you accept the terms in the document. On the other hand, if you do do that, you'll just irritate the people who have to produce a rebranded staff handbook so they can give you a copy. | There is no IP in ideas Any code would by subject to copyright (who owns that copyright is itself a convoluted and separate question), however, if the 4 of you abandoned any existing code, notes and images and start over you would have no legal impediment. | I'm assuming that you are not seeking to change the license, and so it will remain GPLv3. As long as you've built on the original software, that license still applies. You also need to keep the previous copyright notices, including the names of the original people. Assuming that, everything you're doing is legal, which is what's on topic here. There is some etiquette around forks (which is what you're doing), which would be on topic at the Open Source Stack Exchange. I'm puzzled by your desire to have a different license text. You can't change the license from GPLv3, so that has to stay the same. (If the original has GPLv3 "or, at your option, any later version", you can drop the any other version text if you like.) | The notice has a lot to do with legacy requirements in the United States to claim the copyright to a work. Up until 1989, the copyright notice was required. Today, the statements are mainly maintained to protect against "innocent infringement" which might reduce what a content owner can get in court. What exactly do those terms entail? That the owner stated owns all rights and you may do nothing with the content. My biggest concern is this: by writing that, is the company claiming to own everything on the website, even potentially copyrighted user-submitted material? That's exactly what they are doing. Depending on the terms of the specific site, content contributors generally either assign copyright to the site owner or license the content in a way that allows the site owner to do exactly what they want with it. Site creators with the smarts or money to do it right/get someone to do it right usually state something like: Copyright [Site Owner] and contributors. Other sites (like this one) state specifically what they hold the copyright to: site design / logo © 2015 Stack Exchange Inc THIS IS NOT LEGAL ADVICE. CONSULT AN ATTORNEY REGARDING YOUR SPECIFIC SITUATION. |
Practicing medicine across state lines An answer to a question on MedicalSciences.SE prompts my question. Suppose I live in Wisconsin and I fly to Texas to undergo a procedure with a specialist there (I chose the states arbitrarily; I'm not asking about state-specific laws). So I have my procedure and fly back home. This procedure requires medications and months of follow-up care, which means I'll be receiving instructions from the Texas doctor and his staff, refills on prescriptions, and so forth. These interactions are all via phone or email while I remain physically in the state of Wisconsin. I'm fairly sure all these interactions would be considered "practicing medicine" under the law. However, the Texas doctor is not licensed to practice medicine in the state of Wisconsin; and yet, that's exactly what he's doing. How does the law view this? Do state laws typically make a specific exception for an ongoing doctor/patient relationship or is this covered only by case law? If it's based on case law, a citation would be a nice addition to an answer. Bonus points for adding how it would work if the specialist was in Europe instead of Texas. | I think it really is a state-by-state answer. From a web site for doctors getting involved in Telemedicine. Some medical boards such as Alabama, Montana and Oregon offer a special purpose telemedicine license. Other states that regulate telepractice in medicine include Texas, Florida, California and Colorado. The levels of regulation vary greatly by state. For example, California and Florida, similar to New York, require full licensure to perform any function relating to patient care, with some exceptions for consultation in some instances. Other states are exploring the issue of telepractice and in general, how to regulate it. That site has a state-by-state break out of the rules. I see other things about reciprocity among some nearby states. Three states (MD, NY, VA) and Washington DC provide reciprocity to bordering states. Alabama and Pennsylvania have agreements with other states to grant licenses to out-of-state physicians who have licenses in states that reciprocally accept their home state licenses. In Connecticut, an out-of-state physician can obtain an in-state license based on his or her home state standards. | Expunction may be possible for instance if you are acquitted, later proven innocent, pardoned, and various other things that fall short of being convicted and doing the time. The entire law is here (Texas code of criminal procedure 55.01). There is also the option of an order of non-disclosure, overviewed here. A requirement for such an order is that you were placed on and completed deferred adjudication community supervision, which from what I can tell is not what happened. "Background check removal" may range between simply taking your money and doing nothing, to doing what you could do yourself to get free of traces via radaris, intelius, spokeo, and so on to "request removal" from that web site. This will not make your record unavailable, because these websites don't have any special powers to reach into and manipulate state records. | This is a close call, in the example that you suggest, because it won't have been executed with the proper formalities and it isn't clear that the content at a url would be fixed in its language at the time that the Will is executed. Subject to an exception for personal property memorandums (and a more subtle one for powers of appointment in trusts) you can't change the terms of a Will once it is signed except by a Codicil executed with the same formalities. Certainly, the best practice would be to assume that the answer is no. There are times when a reference to an external document in a will is allowed (e.g. a reference to real property by address rather than a full legal description found in a recorded deed), but a list of beneficiaries would ordinarily not be allowed unless it was effectively a reference to vital statistics records (e.g. "all children born to or adopted by me.") In general, references to external documents are not allowed when used to establish the nature of the testator's donative intent (a "testator" is someone who writes a will), unless it "describes the writing sufficiently to permit its identification" and can't be modified after the Will is signed, but can be used to establish general facts about reality. One exception in Colorado is that a "personal property memorandum" designating who will receive specific items of tangible personal property can be incorporated by reference and does not have to be executed with the same formalities as a will. It isn't clear to me if a url could be a valid personal property memorandum and that issue has never been tested in Colorado. Colorado's probate laws are based on the Uniform Probate Code and would be substantially identical to any other jurisdiction that adopted the Uniform Probate Code's substantive provisions. The primary statutes governing this (which aren't necessarily easy to understand without context) are: Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-502. Execution--witnessed or notarized wills--holographic wills (1) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2) of this section and in sections 15-11-503, 15-11-506, and 15-11-513, a will shall be: (a) In writing; (b) Signed by the testator, or in the testator's name by some other individual in the testator's conscious presence and by the testator's direction; and (c) Either: (I) Signed by at least two individuals, either prior to or after the testator's death, each of whom signed within a reasonable time after he or she witnessed either the testator's signing of the will as described in paragraph (b) of this subsection (1) or the testator's acknowledgment of that signature or acknowledgment of the will; or (II) Acknowledged by the testator before a notary public or other individual authorized by law to take acknowledgments. (2) A will that does not comply with subsection (1) of this section is valid as a holographic will, whether or not witnessed, if the signature and material portions of the document are in the testator's handwriting. (3) Intent that the document constitute the testator's will can be established by extrinsic evidence, including, for holographic wills, portions of the document that are not in the testator's handwriting. (4) For purposes of this section, “conscious presence” requires physical proximity to the testator but not necessarily within testator's line of sight. (5) For purposes of this part 5, “will” does not include a designated beneficiary agreement that is executed pursuant to article 22 of this title. and Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-503. Writings intended as wills (1) Although a document, or writing added upon a document, was not executed in compliance with section 15-11-502, the document or writing is treated as if it had been executed in compliance with that section if the proponent of the document or writing establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent intended the document or writing to constitute: (a) The decedent's will; (b) A partial or complete revocation of the will; (c) An addition to or an alteration of the will; or (d) A partial or complete revival of the decedent's formerly revoked will or a formerly revoked portion of the will. (2) Subsection (1) of this section shall apply only if the document is signed or acknowledged by the decedent as his or her will or if it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent erroneously signed a document intended to be the will of the decedent's spouse. (3) Whether a document or writing is treated under this section as if it had been executed in compliance with section 15-11-502 is a question of law to be decided by the court, in formal proceedings, and is not a question of fact for a jury to decide. (4) Subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to a designated beneficiary agreement under article 22 of this title. and Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-510. Incorporation by reference A writing in existence when a will is executed may be incorporated by reference if the language of the will manifests this intent and describes the writing sufficiently to permit its identification. and Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-511. Testamentary additions to trusts (1) A will may validly devise property to the trustee of a trust established or to be established (i) during the testator's lifetime by the testator, by the testator and some other person, or by some other person, including a funded or unfunded life insurance trust, although the settlor has reserved any or all rights of ownership of the insurance contracts, or (ii) at the testator's death by the testator's devise to the trustee, if the trust is identified in the testator's will and its terms are set forth in a written instrument, other than a will, executed before, concurrently with, or after the execution of the testator's will or in another individual's will if that other individual has predeceased the testator, regardless of the existence, size, or character of the corpus of the trust. The devise is not invalid because the trust is amendable or revocable, or because the trust was amended after the execution of the will or the testator's death. (2) Unless the testator's will provides otherwise, property devised to a trust described in subsection (1) of this section is not held under a testamentary trust of the testator, but it becomes a part of the trust to which it is devised, and is administered and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the governing instrument setting forth the terms of the trust, including any amendments thereto made before or after the testator's death. (3) A revocation or termination of the trust before the death of the testator causes the devise to lapse, but exhaustion of trust corpus between the time of execution of the testator's will and the testator's death shall not constitute a lapse; a revocation or termination of the trust before the death of the testator shall not cause the devise to lapse, if the testator provides that, in such event, the devise shall constitute a devise to the trustee of the trust identified in the testator's will, and on the terms thereof, as they existed at the time of the execution of testator's will, or as they existed at the time of the revocation or termination of the trust, as the testator's will provides. and Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-512. Events of independent significance A will may dispose of property by reference to acts and events that have significance apart from their effect upon the dispositions made by the will, whether they occur before or after the execution of the will or before or after the testator's death. The execution or revocation of another individual's will is such an event. and Colorado Revised Statutes § 15-11-513. Separate writing or memorandum identifying devise of certain types of tangible personal property Whether or not the provisions relating to holographic wills apply, a will may refer to a written statement or list to dispose of items of tangible personal property not otherwise specifically disposed of by the will, other than money. To be admissible under this section as evidence of the intended disposition, the writing shall be either in the handwriting of the testator or be signed by the testator and shall describe the items and the devisees with reasonable certainty. The writing may be referred to as one to be in existence at the time of the testator's death; it may be prepared before or after the execution of the will; it may be altered by the testator after its preparation; and it may be a writing that has no significance apart from its effect on the dispositions made by the will. There is not a statutory definition of a "document" or a "writing" in the Colorado Probate Code. | The courts of Washington will not apply the law of Tennessee in an action somehow involving something about Tennessee, they will apply the laws of Washington. If neither end of the conversation is in an all-party state, no party has standing to sue under the laws of some other state. If a person in Idaho calls a person in Oregon and the call is routed through Washington state, neither party can sue under Washington law. In all 50 states, there is an "exception" to the consent requirement when the "interception" is due to routing / switching, otherwise it would be illegal to call from house to house if you don't have a single wire between the houses (never the case). No state has a law that imposes two-party state law in calls that pass through a two-party state. The federal wiretapping law say you may not intercept any wire, oral, or electronic communications without consent, then sets up the definitions to encode the exceptions. For example, "aural transfer" is a transfer containing the human voice at any point between and including the point of origin and the point of reception (anticipating the need for connections), and "intercept" means "acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device" (a hearing aid is a device). But then "electronic, mechanical, or other device" is further defined to exclude a hearing aid, or also they exclude any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility, or any component thereof, (i) furnished to the subscriber or user by a provider of wire or electronic communication service in the ordinary course of its business and being used by the subscriber or user in the ordinary course of its business or furnished by such subscriber or user for connection to the facilities of such service and used in the ordinary course of its business; or (ii) being used by a provider of wire or electronic communication service in the ordinary course of its business, or by an investigative or law enforcement officer in the ordinary course of his duties which is a good thing since the telephone is a device, and the switching system is a system used to make a phone call possible, but it intercepts under the ordinary meaning of intercept. Intercept has a specific, narrow meaning. The law of Florida is very similar | A variant of this question is addressed in Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, with recording taking place in a call between a 1-party and an all-party jurisdiction (California and Georgia). The CA Supreme court ruled in favor of California as the "most-interested" jurisdiction, which if applied to your hypothetical would favor Florida as the most-interested jurisdiction. There would be a true conflict in the law of the two jurisdictions, and (with substitution of names of jurisdictions) as a general matter, the failure to apply California→Florida law in this context would impair California's→Florida's interest in protecting the degree of privacy afforded to California→Florida residents by California→Florida law more severely than the application of California law would impair any interests of the State of Georgia→Nation of Canada The thing is, the person in Florida is violating Florida law by recording, so the cross-jurisdictional issue would only favor the person being recorded in Florida. The Florida statute makes no mention of where the person being recorded is, so there exception to the effect that the law does not apply when the person being recorded is outside of Florida. The Florida person broke Florida law. | I'm not a lawyer or a medical professional, but on Wikipedia's page about DNR, we see the following quote: In the United States the documentation is especially complicated in that each state accepts different forms, and advance directives and living wills are not accepted by EMS as legally valid forms. If a patient has a living will that states the patient wishes to be DNR but does not have an appropriately filled out state sponsored form that is co-signed by a physician, EMS will attempt resuscitation. Based on this, I would hazard the guess that you can't treat anything other than those forms as legally binding, as they even ignore a living will without that state's form. | Because the prohibition of selling to a resident of another state isn't a state law, but rather a Federal law. ATF explains May a licensee sell a firearm to a nonlicensee who is a resident of another State? Generally, a firearm may not lawfully be sold by a licensee to a nonlicensee who resides in a State other than the State in which the seller’s licensed premises is located... In addition, a licensee may sell a rifle or shotgun to a person who is not a resident of the State where the licensee’s business premises is located in an over–the–counter transaction, provided the transaction complies with State law in the State where the licensee is located and in the State where the purchaser resides. [18 U.S.C. 922(b)(3); 27 CFR 478.99(a)] | It depends highly on which jurisdiction you're referring to. This is one of the areas where it varies state to state. "Practicing law" is not generally defined in statute, but the Wikipedia definition defines it as (emphasis mine): giving legal advice to clients, drafting legal documents for clients, and representing clients in legal negotiations and court proceedings such as lawsuits, and is applied to the professional services of a lawyer or attorney at law, barrister, solicitor, or civil law notary. Wikipedia defines Legal advice as the giving of a professional or formal opinion regarding the substance or procedure of the law in relation to a particular factual situation. and displays the following enforcement provision (emphasis mine): Criminal laws and enforcement of "Unauthorized Practice of Law (UPL)" statutes is the organized bar's preferred method. Thus, New Jersey has a law which makes it a “disorderly persons offense” to knowingly to engage in the unauthorized practice of law, and a “crime in the fourth degree” to commit UPL if one (a) creates a false impression that one is a lawyer; (b) derives a benefit from UPL, or (c) causes an injury by UPL. See also IANAL, which has some information about usage on the Internet: The case law standard for determining what comments cross the line is generally "the application of law to facts specific to an individual seeking legal advice". |
Is it legal for Blizzard to demand a copy of my government id before deleting my account? I am trying to delete my Blizzard account, however they demand a copy of my government id before doing so. I've seen a somewhat related question about Twitter at How can I get Twitter to delete my account?, however I do have full access to my own account and the connected email. The relevant quote at GDPR 12(6) says Without prejudice to Article 11, where the controller has reasonable doubts concerning the identity of the natural person making the request referred to in Articles 15 to 21, the controller may request the provision of additional information necessary to confirm the identity of the data subject. Which is a fair point in the linked question, but since I do have full access and there is no reason to doubt that, can they actually legally demand a copy of my government id? Note I would be totally fine with waiting for a few days to verify I have not been hacked. But I am not comfortable giving out my government id to a large company, let alone one with questionable ethics. | When you make a request based on the GDPR, Art. 12(6) GDPR applies. Without prejudice to Article 11, where the controller has reasonable doubts concerning the identity of the natural person making the request referred to in Articles 15 to 21, the controller may request the provision of additional information necessary to confirm the identity of the data subject. As you can see, this only applies when the data controller (Blizzard) has reasonable doubts about your identity. If I understand it correctly, Blizzard provides services (games) which requires you to login with a username and password. So they have no doubts about your identity when you use their (paid) services with just a username and password. So there should also be no reasonable doubts when you make other requests when you are able to login to their website. A copy of your government ID seems unnecessary. Recital 57 also confirms that identification does not require a government ID: Identification should include the digital identification of a data subject, for example through authentication mechanism such as the same credentials, used by the data subject to log-in to the on-line service offered by the data controller. A copy of your id, includes a photograph. The photograph could show health, religious, racial or ethnic information. That kind of personal data has much stricter rules defined in Art.9 . Most governmental IDs contain a national identification number. EU Member States can limit processing of those identification numbers even further. For example in the Netherlands processing of the identification number is only allowed when a specific law exists. So Blizzard is not allowed to process a Dutch national identification number. There are also ID convers] which hide sensitive information like document numbers and photographs in case you do need a copy of an ID. Also note that identification is only possible by comparing existing personal data with the provided personal data. I assume you did not provide a copy of your ID when registering. So many things which are shown on the ID do not make sense to sent to Blizzard. It does not know your place of birth, so it cannot verify it. Art. 5 requires 'data minimisation' for personal data. So they are not allowed to process more data than required. So you also do not need to send you more data than required. You should get an answer on your request within 30 days. However, since you ask to delete your account, the answer also might be that they will deny your request. They have to explain why they will not delete your account. | You violated Facebook's Terms of Service, and it's entirely within your contractual agreement with them for them to close your account. You agreed to abide by the contract you "clicked through" when you signed up and opened a Facebook account. They didn't break any laws when you broke your contract with them. You clearly broke the contract by violating the TOS. They are not breaking any laws by not restoring your account. What you see as the value of your personal or business data doesn't really mean anything; it was your choice to use Facebook in the first place, and your mistake to break the TOS. You could try hiring a lawyer to make a case that you see a difference between the personal data you want to retrieve and the business data that caused the violation, but that's up to you; Facebook is under no legal obligation (this could be different, according to your jurisdiction and national laws) to restore any or all access to your account or data, but it's possible they could be persuaded. | According to my knowledge I am not allowed to share other people's full name nor phone number nor email address without their permission. That is not correct. According to GDPR Article 2: This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automated means and to the processing other than by automated means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system. This Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data ... ... (c) by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity; GDPR Recital 18 states in relevant part: (2) Personal or household activities could include correspondence and the holding of addresses, or social networking and online activity undertaken within the context of such activities. Personal data that is not processed by "automated means", for example data which is transmitted verbally, by hand writing, or by manually sent email, is not covered by the GDPR. Data which is used by a natural person for "personal activities" is also not covered. Consulting one's personal lawyer might well be a personal activity unless it is a business matter. Even if such a transfer of data were in scope for the GDPR, consent of the data subject (DS) is not the only available lawful basis. GDPR article 6 permits any of several possible lawful bases to be used, particularly paragraph 1 point (f) which reads: (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. Also possibly relevant is point (c) which reads: processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; In short, providing one's personal lawyer with the names and addresses of relevant people in connection with a legal issue is not at all likely to be prohibited by the GDPR, nor to require the consent of the people whose names and contact info are provided. However, a comment by user PMF reads: The Data Protection laws are mostly for companies, not for individuals. This is an overstatement. The laws do apply to natural persons as DCs, although enforcement is largely targeted at businesses, particularly large, for-profit businesses. | I believe you have just misunderstood what you paid for. Blizzard's End User License Agreement says: Your use of the Platform is licensed, not sold, to you, and you hereby acknowledge that no title or ownership with respect to the Platform or the Games is being transferred or assigned and this Agreement should not be construed as a sale of any rights. It also says: Blizzard may change, modify, suspend, or discontinue any aspect of the Platform or Accounts at any time, including removing items, or revising the effectiveness of items in an effort to balance a Game. Blizzard may also impose limits on certain features or restrict your access to parts or all of the Platform or Accounts without notice or liability. | Does GDPR prohibit reading unsolicited emails from people who have not explicitly opted in to a mailing list? tl;dr: No. I have never heard of this, and I don't see how this could follow from the GDPR. You should follow up with the Secretary to find out how she came to her conclusion. Detailed reasoning: The GDPR restricts the processing of personal data, so it does in principle cover reading email, since reading counts as "processing", and an email may contain personal data. However, Article 2 (emphasis mine) says that: This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automated means and to the processing other than by automated means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system. I would read this to mean that a human reading emails is only covered by GDPR if the emails are part of a "filing system" or intended to be. So reading the emails is ok, it's only problematic if you intend to systematically store them. Even filing them, while covered by GDPR, would presumably be allowed, because to actually act on the email, you would have to keep it, and Article 6 allows processing of personal data to "take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract" and when "processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller". One caveat: If the email contains data that falls under special categories of personal data (Article 9) you may need explicit consent for storage. That covers things like racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious beliefs and health information. So if someone discloses a health problem or their religious belief in their mail, you may need to ask them for permission to keep it. In summary: At most, GDPR would require you to promptly delete the email once you no longer need it (which could be immediately if the email is irrelevant to you). If the email contains data you legitimately need (e.g. a complaint you need to follow up on), you are allowed to keep it as required (based on Article 6 (f)). Note that in both cases no explicit consent is required from the email sender, unless the email contains particularly sensitive data, such as political/religious beliefs or health data. | Per GDPR Art 12(5), “any actions taken under Articles 15 to 22 and 34 shall be provided free of charge”. The right to rectification is Art 16 and reads in its entirety: The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller without undue delay the rectification of inaccurate personal data concerning him or her. Taking into account the purposes of the processing, the data subject shall have the right to have incomplete personal data completed, including by means of providing a supplementary statement. Thus, I think it would be invalid to charge a fee for an address change if that change was made in exercise of your data subject rights. If you didn't invoke this right, it's debatable whether charging a fee would be proper. On the one hand, they can charge whatever service they want (provided that this was part of the contract you entered). On the other hand, they have an obligation to assist you with your exercise of data subject rights. This includes recognising a data subject request even if you didn't explicitly invoke the specific GDPR article. For example, refusing a request for erasure just because you didn't invoke some magic GDPR words would be clearly noncompliant in my opinion. If the company offers multiple customer service options, charging for some of them may be all right. Typically, the lowest-cost solution for a company to deal with GDPR requests is to offer an online self-service option. An email to the data protection officer would typically also be free. Charging for phone support might be fine though. In an insurance context, there could also be a legitimate claim that updating your address is not a mere correction of your personal data, but a modification of the contract (depending on what you're insuring). Another possible counterpoint (which I think is not valid though) would be that the company never stored inaccurate data and therefore doesn't have to satisfy a rectification request. | If there's a reason to believe that your machine has data that would be relevant to a lawsuit, then yes, it is subject to inspection under Fed. R. Civ. P. 34: A party may serve on any other party a request ... to produce and permit the requesting party or its representative to inspect, copy, test, or sample the following items in the responding party's possession, custody, or control: ... any designated documents or electronically stored information—including writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, sound recordings, images, and other data or data compilations—stored in any medium from which information can be obtained either directly or, if necessary, after translation by the responding party into a reasonably usable form. So if there's a lawsuit where there becomes a question about what you downloaded from the network, then it's quite plausible that your device could be demanded or subpoenaed. But that's not the same thing as "forfeiting" your device. The normal procedure in such a case would be that the agency's lawyers would notify you of the demand, and you would take your device to an ESI expert, who would make a digital image of the device's hard drive. The parties would then fight about what portions of that image they are allowed to access, but you would have your device again while that was going on. | Your confusion might be caused by the fact that even with a contract, only the data necessary for that contract is covered under the GDPR. So yes, while there might be an "execution of contract" under the T&C, this would only cover necessary data. That means you can't ask arbitrary signup data under the guise of a contract. If you need to deliver a physical product, you can store a physical address. If it's an online service, you can store an email address or similar handle. But you can't mix the two. A physical address is unnecessary for the execution of a contract that's not physical in nature. Now, you mention "consent". Under GDPR, this is a distinct justification besides "execution of contract". You might have consent to store a physical address in addition to an online address, e.g. if you offer a customer to physically mail a password request form. This consent is additional to the contract. Also note that the bit above only covers the lawful reasons for the processing of personal data (article 6). You also have to obey the other GDPR rules, e.g. fully inform the user, make sure that consent is freely given, etc. |
paying debt collector's invalid rent claim, then suing landlord for money back TLDR: terminated lease after continued upstairs noise, landlord sent debt collector, trying to decide if should pay debt collector and sue landlord for money back. We had been renting an apartment in Massachusetts. For over a year, we had trouble with our upstairs neighbors' noise which got worse until we couldn't sleep more than 3-5 hours at night (we have thoroughly documented these issues and our requests to the landlord to resolve them). After this lead to degraded performance at work, we obtained legal consultation which advised us to terminate the lease since the landlord did not provide a safe and habitable environment (State Sanitary Code, 105 CMR 410.00) which we did. The landlord, a property management, did not agree with this, did not refund us our security deposit despite no issues with the apartment, and wanted us to pay the rent until they find a new renter which we declined. We think they also did not immediately advertise the apartment as for rent as it did not show up on their website. After some months, we were contacted by a debt collector, asking us to pay two months of rent. We told them the claim was invalid for the reasons stated above, but they said they will report the claim to credit agencies as disputed. We don't want this issue to adversely affect our credit and got legal consulting which suggested we should pay the debt collector to protect our credit score, and then sue the landlord for the money back in small claims court. I'm a little worried about this strategy since it requires to hand away the money first, and am trying to get second opinions. | We don't want this issue to adversely affect our credit and got legal consulting which suggested we should pay the debt collector to protect our credit score, and then sue the landlord for the money back in small claims court. I'm a little worried about this strategy since it requires to hand away the money first, and am trying to get second opinions. The debt collector is probably either the owner of the claim against you, if it is an assignee of the claim, or an agent of the landlord for purposes of collection. Thus, payment to the debt collector is equivalent to payment of the landlord. The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction regarding whether payment constitutes of waiver of a right to sue over the debt. Sometimes it is necessary to designate the payment "under protests" or "reserving all rights", but that is not a uniform rule of law that applies in all jurisdictions, and I do not have the time and familiarity with that state's law to research Massachusetts case law on that point accurately. | I am an Ontario-licensed lawyer. The following is a general information about the law and not specific legal advice. You are not my client and I have not given you advice related to your circumstances. First, even when you ask a generic question, define the jurisdiction of interest. For the purpose of your question, Canada is a collection of different jurisdictions with different rules. My answer relates to Ontario, Canada. Other Canadian jurisdictions have different rules. The Law The applicable Section 109 of Ontario's Residential Tenancies Act http://canlii.ca/t/33p is reproduced below for your convenience. EMPHASES MINE. Receipt for payment 109 (1) A landlord shall provide FREE OF CHARGE to a tenant or former tenant, on request, a receipt for the payment of any rent, rent deposit, arrears of rent or any other amount paid to the landlord. 2006, c. 17, s. 109 (1). Former tenant (2) Subsection (1) applies to a request by a FORMER TENANT only if the request is made within 12 months after the tenancy terminated. 2006, c. 17, s. 109 (2). Regulation Ontario Regulation 516/06 http://canlii.ca/t/sjx dictates minimal form: Receipt A document constitutes a receipt for the purposes of section 109 of the Act if it includes, at a minimum, (a) the address of the rental unit to which the receipt applies; (b) the name of the tenants to whom the receipt applies; (c) the amount and date for each payment received for any rent, rent deposit, arrears of rent, or any other amount paid to the landlord and shall specify what the payment was for; (d) the name of the landlord of the rental unit; and (e) the signature of the landlord or the landlord’s authorized agent. O. Reg. 516/06, s. 9. Landlord Compliance A good landlord will provide receipts immediately upon payment, and keep a copy. An very good landlord will provide additionally a summary of payments for the year, in tabulated form, and keep a copy of the yearly receipt instead of the multiple receipts for each payment. An excellent landlord will keep the tabulated information in a computer system and will issue a receipt for the whole tenancy period on termination. Keep a copy. Tenant's Application If your Ontario landlord refuse to comply with the above, file a T2 http://www.sjto.gov.on.ca/documents/ltb/Tenant%20Applications%20&%20Instructions/T2.pdf *A T2 can also be filed online. Remember to ask for cost http://www.sjto.gov.on.ca/documents/ltb/Interpretation%20Guidelines/03%20-%20Costs.html | If you want to be argumentative about it, the burden of proof is on the person making the accusation. This also means the burden of production is, too. Underlying the whole matter is a claim that you've engaged in "breach of contract," namely failing to pay rent. Your legal obligation is to not engage in contract fraud nor breach of contract. You are to exercise due diligence in resolving any breach of contract. You may ask the lessor to provide evidence in support of the claim while admitting that you have difficulty looking that far back into the issue. The idea here is to "work with" the lessor rather than immediately taking an adversarial stance. Normal people become very disgruntled by those taking an immediate adversarial approach rather than seeking to work with the other person to resolve the dispute. | You can read about your rights as a California tenant at http://www.dca.ca.gov/publications/landlordbook/catenant.pdf This is rather ridiculous: 1) No judge will evict someone for paying rent by mail. (I assume you have the new landlord's address.) 2) If the landlord cashes the check you mail then he's not going to be able to claim you didn't pay the rent. If he actually refuses to cash your mailed check then that's all to the good for you. 3) You can ignore any requirements imposed by the new landlord that aren't in the lease, just as the landlord could ignore any new requirement imposed on him by you. Even some terms in a lease can be ignored, because not all terms in a contract are legal. (This is especially the case in tenant-landlord law.) If you think there will be trouble then use certified mail. | There are two separate questions here, it seems to me. First: are law enforcement officers required to respect your house rules and avoid making a mess? At least in the United States, the answer is unequivocally no. If the only "damage" suffered is that you need to sweep the floor, or put your clothes back in drawers, that's not the police's problem. You have not suffered any damages that a court is going to reimburse, and your best case scenario, even if you win a suit against the police, is an award of one dollar as nominal damages. Second: are law enforcement officers required to reimburse you for any physical damage they caused while executing the search warrant? The answer here is tricker, and depends on the search warrant. If the warrant is invalid, then the answer is yes. But remember: just because, for example, the cops are looking for the guy you bought your house from, who moved out a month ago, that doesn't mean the warrant is "invalid." Just because the cops got a bad tip, or suspected you wrongly, or were in some other way wasting their time--as long as the warrant is technically proper and they were able to convince a judge it was reasonable, the warrant is valid. Even if the warrant is invalid, you may need to sue the police to get anything reimbursed. If the warrant is valid, in practical terms, you will almost certainly need to sue the police to recover anything, and you will have to show the Court that the police's actions that damaged your property were so extreme that they were outside the reasonable scope of the warrant. For instance: the warrant is for a large item, like a stolen car: the police cannot smash holes in your walls to make sure the car isn't hidden inside. If they're looking for drugs, they may be able to. If the officers' actions are consistent with the scope of the warrant, then you are not going to recover anything. The warrant is, basically, permission from a judge to enter your home and perform those actions, and they will not be liable for them. A number of relevant cases are discussed in this article: http://www.aele.org/law/2010all01/2010-1MLJ101.pdf | The easiest way would be to hire a collection agency to collect the debt (for a fee of course), because collection agencies routinely include debts that they are collecting in credit reports. Credit reporting agencies differ in what other kinds of debts they will report. Recording a judgment lien in real property records will trigger a credit report entry with some agencies, but not others. Some agencies report all judgments entered in courts, but others don't. You could also contact a credit reporting agency and ask it if it will simply report your judgment without further action if you send them a copy. | They almost surely have no liability to you for the loss of, or damage to, your property, as the standard rental agreement that you signed almost certainly relieves them of this responsibility. If you have insurance (even though you didn't provide them with proof of insurance) that would probably cover your loses. If not, you are probably just screwed and have no recourse. | Is this even legal? Yes, it is lawful. The Ontario Tenancy Act does not seem to outlaw that type of clauses. But the clause (or lease) will be binding only if you agree to it. Also note that the clause refers to reasonable costs, which implies that those costs must be for a reasonable cause. In other words, the landlord would be barred from recovery of legal expenses if you persuade the Board that the landlord's complaint is frivolous or vexatious. Notwithstanding that the clause is lawful, I would personally discourage you from agreeing to pay the adversary's attorney fees. Note that the clause may apply in the event that neither party fully prevails, whence it is in your best interest to preclude the risk of having to reimburse the landlord in that scenario. |
When will a passport be needed to go the UK from the EU? When the UK was a member of the EU there was no need for a passport to visit the UK. It was enough with a ID card from your EU country or a driving license. As brexit process is going on when are EU citizens meant to use their passports to visit the UK? | The UK remains an EU member state until 31st October 2019. Unless a further extension is requested and granted. (One is obligated to be requested if an agreement is not reached by the 19th Oct) At the time of writing, there have been no changes to identity document requirements for EEA (includes EU) or Swiss citizens visiting the UK - they can enter the UK with a valid passport or a national identity card issued by such a state. We don't know today whether that will change after March 2019. | There are two kinds of EU laws: regulations and directives. Regulations have direct effect throughout the EU, which helps harmonize the laws of the Single Market. Directives instruct the member states to implement their own laws to some effect, which helps adapt the laws to that member state's circumstances. Reverse engineering is the subject of the EU Computer Programs Directive. As a directive it has no direct effect in the UK. The directive was implemented by amending the UK's Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. The Copyright Act is UK law, created by parliament and not the EU. It will continue to be in effect even after a Brexit. Note that many EU regulations also have corresponding passages in UK law, for example the Data Protection Act 2018 mirrors the GDPR. And per the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, all relevant EU laws will be transformed into domestic UK law upon exit day, including the principle of supremacy of (ex-)EU law over domestic law. That way, the regulatory environment doesn't suddenly change. So even if reverse engineering were the subject of an EU regulation, it would continue to apply after Brexit and would supersede pre-Brexit UK laws to the contrary. | UK, Identity Documents Act 2010, false identity documents etc: Possession of false identity documents etc with improper intention (1) It is an offence for a person (“P”) with an improper intention to have in P's possession or under P's control— (a) an identity document that is false and that P knows or believes to be false, (b) an identity document that was improperly obtained and that P knows or believes to have been improperly obtained, or (c) an identity document that relates to someone else. Each of the following is an improper intention— (a) the intention of using the document for establishing personal information about P; (b) the intention of allowing or inducing another to use it for establishing, ascertaining or verifying personal information about P or anyone else. ... Possession of false identity documents etc without reasonable excuse (1) It is an offence for a person (“P”), without reasonable excuse, to have in P's possession or under P's control— (a) an identity document that is false, (b) an identity document that was improperly obtained, ... Such an identity document could be an "an immigration document", "a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom or by or on behalf of an international organisation" or "a document that can be used (in some or all circumstances) instead of a passport" (e.g. a European country's identity card). | You do not have to prove that you are an EU citizen, because EU citizenship is entirely irrelevant to the GDPR. Have a look at Article 3, which basically says that GDPR applies if you are in the EU or if the company is in the EU. If the company is in the EU, therefore, you do not need to send them anything or prove anything about yourself to invoke GDPR. If the company is outside the EU, you can send proof of address or other evidence that you are in the EU, which might be something that they already have, like your IP address. | All residents in Germany need to have a registered address. The reasons for that are numerous: no need for a separate voting registration, it gives a place to deliver legal notices, it helps enforcing tax regulation (though tax law has another definition of "residence"), certain taxes are assigned to the municipality where you are registered, no need to do a utility bill or credit report dance when trying to prove your address to third-parties, it was always done like that. The last is reason enough as far as bureaucracy is concerned. As far as your question goes, there are a few wrong assumptions. First, nobody is trying to limit or deny registrations. Municipalities actually get money for every resident they have registered through tax allocation. Second, if you (semi-)permanently live at some place you are not considered "officially homeless" but as someone has didn't properly register themselves (which could result in a fine). Third, multiple people can be registered at the same address. How else could people register themselves in huge apartment buildings? Or even a family living together? If there is a suspicious amount of people registered they might want to check whether other regulation (such as minimum space per person) is adhered to. Fourth, to register somewhere you need proof that you actually live there. This is where you probably ran into problems. This proof is usually a letter given by the person allowing you live at a place. Note that this is not necessarily the owner of the place but literally the person allowing you to stay (the authorities can check with the owner though). Often subletters won't sign that piece of paper, either because they think they are not allowed to or they don't have permission by the owner to sublet the place to begin with. If that happens you are supposed to tell that to the authorities (§ 19 Abs. 2 BMG) who then can choose to fine the one providing the place for refusing to sign the paper. (The need for proof was recently reintroduced after it was noticed that there was a huge amount of people who registered at an address where they didn't actually live.) Fifth, if you never have been registered before you can't actually properly pay your taxes as you need a tax ID for that. This is automatically assigned when you – surprise – register for the first time. If you are not an EU/EEA/CH citizen you also need to register yourself before they can change anything about the residence permit within Germany. To end with an answer to your question if taken literally: German citizens can register themselves as homeless (ohne festen Wohnsitz) if they really are. For foreigners this is a bit more complicated. EU citizens usually don't have freedom of movement rights if they can't properly support themselves, a living space is supposed to be part of that. Other foreigners likely violate their residence permit. | @DaleM isn't wrong, but some elaboration is in order. You (almost always) gain your citizenship (or nationality) in the first instance, at birth, without the agreement or assent of you or your parents. It is thrust upon you. Usually, your country of citizenship must consent to end your citizenship (or authorize you to do so unilaterally) under that country's laws. Once you have citizenship or nationality, in practice, in most countries, you can generally only renounce your citizenship if you contemporaneously or already have a citizenship somewhere else. You are at a minimum strongly dissuaded from doing so and are not a sympathetic candidate for relief under laws related to statelessness if you willfully put yourself in this position knowing the consequences. This is a feature of the citizenship laws of most countries in order to implement international treaties designed to prevent statelessness which are widely adopted. When an adult is naturalized as a citizen of a new country, usually, their old citizenship is revoked by operation of law under the laws of their old country. In many countries, including the U.S., there are high fees and tax consequences for renouncing your citizenship. Any potential tax liabilities in the future that were not yet due under U.S. law (e.g. capital gains taxes an appreciated assets not yet sold, and estate taxes that would be due if the person renouncing their citizenship had died on that date) are owed immediately upon applying to renounce your citizenship. A stateless person is, subject to quite narrow exceptions, still subject to all of the laws of the place where they are located, including almost all of its criminal laws (except treason) and its tax laws (at least on income earned in that country). A stateless person lacks many rights. They can't travel internationally (there are exceptions under treaty in some cases, but obtaining those rights is cumbersome at a minimum). They can't vote. They typically aren't entitled to domestic welfare state benefits like national health insurance, disability payments, unemployment benefits, subsidized housing, old age or retirement benefits, etc. They can't work in a licensed or regulated profession. They may not even be able to sign a lease. They may not be allowed to own a company or serve as an officer or director of a company or as a trustee of a trust. They aren't entitled to diplomatic assistance. There are many fraudulent legal movements such as the "sovereign citizen movement" (and the Moorish Sovereign Citizens) that assert that citizenship is voluntary and that just by disavowing it in some official feeling way, they can be exempt from taxes, court jurisdiction, and/or other laws. This is false and people who act on this fraudulent misinformation often suffer serious legal consequences as a result. | (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR) is available in 24 languages. It wouldn't be practical for everyone communicating with EU citizens to be obliged to translate to all of them. Article 12 in Chapter 3 section 1 specifies : The controller shall take appropriate measures to provide any information referred to in Articles 13 and 14 and any communication under Articles 15 to 22 and 34 relating to processing to the data subject in a concise, transparent, intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language If your application is available only in Ukranian and only people who understand Ukranian will be able to use it, your policies and responses to customer enquiries should also be in Ukrainian - but in a form that's "concise, transparent and easily accessible". | In summary: Statute law allows Ireland to revoke your naturalisation on the grounds of acquiring another citizenship. But this law has recently been found unconstitutional. In practice, the government does not do this anyway. In the case of the UK, it is particularly unlikely. As an Irish citizen, there is no particular reason to pursue UK naturalisation. The law As of now, the possibility deprivation of Irish nationality for any reason is unclear, because of a ruling of the Supreme Court (Damache v Minister for Justice [2020] IESC 63) that declared the statute allowing for this to be unconstitutional. That was because the law (section 19 of the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956) did not provide enough procedural safeguards. The Minister would initiate the process and make the final decision after expert advice, but was not an "independent and impartial decision-maker". It is now for the legislature to replace section 19 so as to cure the defect. Under section 19, the grounds for revoking a certificate of naturalisation include: (b) that the person to whom it was granted has, by any overt act, shown himself to have failed in his duty of fidelity to the nation and loyalty to the State and (e) that the person to whom it is granted has by any voluntary act, other than marriage or entry into a civil partnership, acquired another citizenship. The issue in Damache was (b) following the appellant's conviction for terrorism offences in the United States. Regarding (e), it would seem on its face that acquiring UK nationality might trigger the possibility of revocation. However, in the scenario envisaged, that would leave you without any EU nationality, and in the Tjebbes case of 2019 (ECLI:EU:C:2019:189) the European Court of Justice found that such deprivation would only be possible after consideration of the specific consequences for the person concerned and their family. This point was not reached in Damache but would also tend to rule out any "automatic" loss of nationality; it would have to be the result of some longer and more involved process. Whatever replaces section 19 would have to be of this kind. Special considerations also apply if loss of Irish nationality would leave you stateless, but that is not the issue in question. The policy Aside from cases of immigration fraud and terrorism, the State has rarely initiated processes under section 19. In fact, official guidance on immigration and nationality admits a policy of dual nationality being allowed. For the United Kingdom, there are many people who are dual British and Irish nationals. The understanding between the governments with respect to the Common Travel Area, the Good Friday Agreement, and the general historic situation, would make it very unlikely that Ireland would treat acquisition of British nationality as a problem. The British-Irish Agreement of 1998 includes that both governments respect the "right to hold both British and Irish citizenship" for the people of Northern Ireland. Even if you are not a person of Northern Ireland, any action by the government of Ireland that would be seen as potentially touching on this right is politically untenable. Irish citizens have full rights in the UK anyway Under UK law, an Irish citizen can enter without a visa, live there as long as they want, get a job, claim benefits, vote in elections, be elected as an MP, and do everything that a UK citizen can normally do. There may be a vanishingly few exceptions for national security jobs. Because of this, there isn't much reason why being naturalised in the UK would be worthwhile. You could do so for sentimental reasons but as far as the UK's concerned, you already hold a status that's just as good. Extra note: UK honours (In response to a comment below.) The British Crown does grant honours, including knighthoods, to non-UK citizens and dual/multiple citizens, in some circumstances. It depends on whether the other nationality has King Charles III as head of state, and the attitude of the foreign government. Therefore, Canadians do not get knighthoods (Charles is King but the Canadian government would rather not), Belizians do (Charles is King and the government is fine with it), and Americans can get it as an honorary award that does not come with the Sir/Dame title. For Ireland, Terry Wogan is an example of how this works. He was an Irish citizen who lived and worked in the UK for many years. In order to receive a British knighthood, he had to take up British citizenship (which was granted on an expedited basis), becoming Sir Terry. On the other hand, Bob Geldof is an Irish citizen (only) who holds an honorary British KBE, and is not formally entitled to be Sir Bob - much like American recipients such as Rudy Guiliani. The Irish government does not object to either possibility, although some individuals do. An American-Irish-British triple citizen would be able to receive a UK knighthood and use the title Sir, assuming that the British government was willing to grant it, and unless there were some foreign legal blocker (e.g. the U.S. government does not allow federal officeholders to receive overseas decorations). |
Legal to make an app that organizes other people's youtube videos? I'd like to make a mobile application that organizes youtube videos into groups, allowing the user to browse groups and watch videos. For example - I'd like to organize certain cooking videos (not made by me - linking to content made by someone else) in a helpful way. I cannot find literature helping me understand if this is allowed or not. Can someone help me find the right rules to read? | I know of an app that did similar. They sold membership access and linked Youtube videos. One of the Youtuber's started to take legal action against them. I don't know what happened but the app blocked their content from being shown. Updated this comment to remove incorrect information. After looking at Youtube's recent terms and conditions; you aren't allowed to link, embed or use the API if you want to put content behind a paywall, or show it alongside advertising: Under the section: Permissions and Restrictions https://www.youtube.com/static?gl=GB&template=terms So long as your app is free, and doesn't contain advertising you are probably okay. | Yes, you may The layout of the board and its appearance are not protected by copyright, because they are not expressions or any other type of copyrightable content. Even if they were (say if some protested art was displayed on the board) you are displaying this for instructional purposes, and not harming any market for the board, so fair use is likely to apply (in the U.S.). The device could be protected by patent, but you are not copying or imitating the board, nor showing anyone how to do so, so that would not apply. You are not selling or advertising the board, nor knock-offs of it, so trademark protection would not apply, even if a protected trademark is visible on th board. Just in case, be sure to make clear that your video is not authorized or endorsed by the maker of the board. | It's not fair use. Fair use is when you do something that normally only the copyright holder can do. Playing a video game is the ordinary, intended use of the work. In the United States, ordinary use is not protected by copyright. 17 USC 106 sets out the rights protected by copyright. The include copying the work, producing derivative works, distributing the work, and so on. None of these are ordinary use. Someone could perhaps argue that you are creating a derivative work. I doubt that argument would work because you are not taking any protectable elements from the work. But if anyone did argue that, it would make sense to also argue that if that's so, your use would still be covered under fair use because it's transformative, does not substitute for the original work in any way, and takes very little of the work. | Yes you can. What you do is called mere aggregation. Your app and the GPL container run isolated and do not share memory space: they are clearly separate programs vs parts of one program, so your app does not get infected by GPL. | Is this illegal? No, subject to some possible narrow exceptions discussed below. Do the social media companies have a duty under the First Amendment to not censor users? No. Indeed, usually, there is greater liability exposure for failing to censor content, for example, by failing to honor a "take down notice" under Title II of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act based upon an alleged copyright violation, or for failure to censor content related to potential sex trafficking. The First Amendment to the United State Constitution (which applies to state and local government via the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution) is a limitation on the power of governmental actors only. This said, some state constitutions, such as California's, provide free speech protections not just from government action, but also in spaces that are privately owned, but are open to the public and constitute de facto public forums. The authority of California to expand its state constitutional protections to these private settings was confirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). It is conceivable that these doctrines could be expanded to public Internet forums in the case of California based social media companies (e.g., Facebook has its headquarters in Menlo Park, California; so does its sister platform Instagram; LinkedIn is based in Sunnyvale, California; and Google is based in Mountain View, California). There are also laws that limit how employers can regulate employee speech in a labor relations context, although most of them don't have constitutional dimensions. It is conceivable that these doctrines could limit social media platform's authority to limit some kinds of speech by their own employees, or in situations where the social media platform looked like it was acting as a mere agent of some other employer controlled by that employer for all practical purposes. There has also been litigation related to free speech on social media regarding the rights of governmental account holders to exercise the same kinds of account management that is available to other users, implicating the First Amendment right to petition the government. The social media platform operator is not itself the primary target in these cases, but if it simply implements its terms of service neutrally with respect to all account holders, it could be facilitating a constitutional violation by its governmental account holders and could conceivably be held liable for aiding and abetting that violation of the law by a governmental account holder (in the context of a lawsuit for money damages this is a special subtype of something called a civil conspiracy). | I'm not a lawyer, but under the law as it's written, I see two problems: 17 USC 121 allows "authorized entities" to make and publish accessible copies of works. An "authorized entity" is defined as a nonprofit organization or a governmental agency that has a primary mission to provide specialized services relating to training, education, or adaptive reading or information access needs of blind or other persons with disabilities. So if you, as a private citizen, decide to do this, it could conceivably be copyright infringement. You might have to set up some kind of non-profit organization to make it legal. It's also OK (I think) if you make such copies for your own personal use, so long as you don't redistribute them. So far as I can tell, nothing under 17 USC 121 requires the original publisher to provide an "authorized entity" with a copy in any particular format (PDF, paper, or otherwise) for making accessible copies. Basically, the law seems to have envisioned organizations of sighted people purchasing paper copies, transcribing them, and republishing them; not blind individuals doing electronic transcription for themselves. It might still be worth contacting Hal Leonard and asking what they can do for you, but unfortunately it doesn't look like the law requires them to do anything for you. As Nij points out in the comments, this really seems to be a question about the company's policy, rather than the law. | It is probably illegal, just not pursued. In the case of something like bank robbery, you'd have a victim that filed a police report. A murder would need to be discovered somehow - either a missing person report or a dead body. If the porn shoot happened somewhere that a member of the public saw it and subsequently filed a police report, the video could be used as evidence. Absent a report, the police simply have no reason to look into it (unless the police catches them in the act, but we probably don't see those videos posted online). Why would these public offenses go unreported? Perhaps nobody sees it. Perhaps the bystanders in the video are paid extras. Maybe they're filming in what appears to be public but is actually private property. Perhaps they have a permit to use a public space for this purpose. Perhaps they just got lucky. Again, there might be some confirmation bias here - you're not going to see as many videos of folks they catch breaking the law, since they will either be interrupted and stopped or (maybe) have their videos ordered taken down. | First of all, taking a video made by someone else, making alterations and then distributing the resulting work is probably already a copyright violation. There are exemptions like fair use (check the comments for an example), but just taking a whole video, mirroring it and reposting it without any own contribution very likely does not constitute fair use. The people who do that don't avoid copyright infingement. They just try to avoid getting caught by any automatic system YouTube has in place to detect copyright infringements. But avoiding automatic filters does not mean to avoid DMCA takedown notices, cease&desist letters or lawsuits from real humans who find a mirrored version of their video and feel that their copyright was violated. However, alterations to a creative work can be a creative work in itself. So regardless of the fact that one violated copyright in creating a derivative work, that derivative work might still be eligible for copyright in its own right. That means someone who reposts a video originally made by party A and then altered by party B would violate the copyright of both A and B at once and thus expose themselves to potential legal actions from either party. But the question is if simply mirroring a video constitutes the necessary threshold of originality to make the resulting work eligible for copyright. In most courts, it probably would not. |
Can someone be a director and shareholder of a company in UK without having rights to work in UK Can someone be a director and shareholder of a company in UK without having rights to work in UK ? Scenario: 2 Directors, one is British, second one is not british and there right to work is expired, even though they applied for ILR, it will take couple of months to come back. So they are allowed to live in UK under 3C but no rights to work. Can a non british person be part of shares as share holder and director with another british partner in UK ? Edit To help others who want to know answer in future... I was able to open the limited company but now it seems impossible to open a business bank account as they are asking for residence card which is expired. | A person can be a shareholder or director of a UK company without being in the UK. Being a shareholder or director of a UK company does not give a person a right to be in the UK. The 3C leave extension is unrelated to this. A person with 3C leave may remain in the UK on that basis regardless of whether the person is a shareholder or director of a company. Attending "board-level meetings" is an activity that is allowed under the visitor rules, even if the director is paid (see V4.7), so one may conclude that doing so does not constitute "work." It should therefore be permitted for someone under 3C leave even if the person is not authorized to work. Doing work for the company other than attending meetings would not be permitted until the person gains authorization to work. | To preface my answer, this aspect of UK law is unclear at best and I try to set out general principles where available. If you are acting in a private sphere, then the recording of conversations are unregulated, however this is only for personal use – i.e., should you desire to make notes on what was said for your reference at a later date. Should you wish to share it with a third party, then you would need consent from all participants or be able to demonstrate that it would be in the public interest. If you are acting as an employee or a company, then the situation changes. Firstly, you need to check your contract, whilst this does not constitute a crime, it may be against the terms of your employment. Secondly, a company can only make recordings without knowledge under statutory conditions, such as to establish facts, ensure regulatory compliance or demonstrate standards that are achieved or need to be achieved by training. It is a general principle that conversations recorded without consent are inadmissible in court, particularly in terms of a criminal proceedings. In civil matters, it similarly follows the concept that a claimant should come to court with clean hands. However, judges are usually more pragmatic in civil cases and if parties are aware of the existence of the recording, then it often be subject to usual rules of disclosure, though this may open the creator of the recording to subsequent litigation regarding the illegality of the recording under Data Protection Act or others. | This is a live political issue. Currently, the various datasets are incomplete and have known accuracy issues. Considering a particular parcel of land: It might not be in the Land Registry at all. About 85% of land in England and Wales is registered, and less in Scotland and Northern Ireland. Scottish registered land might only appear on the paper "Register of Sasines", as opposed to the more recent electronic database, or potentially in even older county-specific sasine registers. The owner might be a company, partnership, trust, etc., rather than a natural person. The ownership and control of that company (etc.) can be hard to trace. Companies House data is not verified; companies can be incorporated overseas; the trusts register is not publicly searchable; things can be muddled. Raw data might not show that a dozen properties, each owned by a single company that owns nothing else, are in fact ultimately controlled by a particular person of interest. Different people may own the freehold, or a leasehold, or have various other forms of ownership or control. Even a long-term tenancy may be of interest for database purposes. Because of continuing interest in anti-money laundering, tax evasion, and general accumulation of wealth, there have been plans to have a new "register of beneficial ownership". Such a register would record, for each plot of land, the name of the human beings who actually own and control it in the end. In the anticipated structure, each of those people would have an identifying number, and so we would get your proposed reverse index where you could look up a person and see what they owned. The register introduced by the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022 is the "Register of Overseas Entities" (ROE). However, as the name suggests, it only covers companies/partnerships/etc. from outside the UK. It's operated by Companies House. Overseas entities who have dealt in UK land since 1999/2014/2022 (depending on which part of the UK the land was in) have to list their beneficial owners. Because this is new, it is also not very complete yet: it only went live on 1 August 2022 and no penalties apply until the deadline of 31 January 2023. In Scotland, the "Register of Persons Holding a Controlled Interest in Land" (RCI) is meant to do the same but not just for overseas entities. It is live since 1 April 2022 and the initial registration period ends on 1 April 2023, so again it may not be very complete just yet. There will likely be more political tussle over potential creation of a more extensive UK-wide register. Until that exists, this is a known problem with the extent of current data. You can get a partial view but even that will be frustrating when it comes to the most interesting chunks of property. | A special case is not paying the income tax that the company is supposed to be paying on behalf of its employees. If an employee makes £4,000 a month, and the employer is supposed to pay £1,000 tax and doesn't, that's not the employer's money, that's the employee's money. Not paying the employee's money is a much more serious matter than not paying your own taxes. A google search found this article http://www.gaebler.com/Not-Paying-Payroll-Taxes.htm which says that a person not paying taxes for employees is personally liable, that this liability does not go away with bankruptcy, and that jail is possible. So their advice is: Whatever other debt you have, paying taxes for your employees' payroll is the absolutely highest priority (higher priority than paying wages, paying the rent, paying company taxes and so on). | People are laid off all the time when sales are down, the market is bad, etc: there is no legal "right to a job" except whatever is in your employment contract. There is a legal concept of promissory estoppel which boils down to promises being binding. However, there has to be a clear and definite promise, not for example a statement like "we hope to bring you back after this is over". Normally, the employer can argue that they have the right to fire you regardless of performance, and that would be the end of it. Let's say you have it in writing, and it is clear that they unconditionally promise to hire you back: you would want to (e)stop them from arguing that they have the right to fire you. The underlying idea of promissory estoppel is that such a promise keeps them from making that argument. But: it is not enough that they made the promise, you also had to rely on the promise and act / forbear from acting in some way because of that promise. It could be, for example, taking another job, or moving to another country, or simply looking for another job. The hard part, then, would be getting a clear and definite promise. | Links are in French. As the author of a work, you would generally hold copyright unless there's a contract otherwise. L113 of the Code de la propriété intellectuelle determines who is the rights holder of a given work and I don't see anything there that changes things for you as a contractor. Even if you assigned some rights to your employer through a contract, France has moral rights which can never be ceded. In fact, even if you were a salaried employee, you still hold the rights by default, unlike the US. There are a few exceptions to that though: software, inseparable joint works, and works where the creative process was purely directed by your superiors. | There are two legal jurisdictions in the Channel Islands, the Bailiwick of Guernsey and the Bailiwick of Jersey. The law in Guernsey differs from the law in the UK partly because the Common Law developed differently (more Norman influence on Guernsey than on England) and partly because Guernsey and the UK have different legislatures and so pass different laws. Until recently the UK was a member of an organisation based in Belgium and Luxembourg called the European Union which has its own legal system and courts and which requires member states to enact identical legislation in certain matters including, in particular, employment law. Although the UK is no longer a member of the EU most of its employment laws remain as they were in the EU-era. By contrast Guernsey has never been a member of the EU. So this is an additional reason for differences in laws. Generally the parties to a contract can stipulate what law governs the contract and which country's courts have jurisdiction. For example a contract between a Guernsey company and an individual resident in England could be stipulated to be governed by the laws of France and subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of Barbados (this particular example is highly unlikely but I am just illustrating the principle). If the contract does not stipulate the law (or the contract is unwritten) then there are default rules which determine which jurisdiction's laws apply. However, that said, most countries, including England and Wales, have some "mandatory" employment laws. These are laws which apply to everyone employed in England (or Wales) even if England/Wales does not generally cover the contract of employment. Mandatory laws typically cover such things as minimum pay rates, rest periods, minimum paid holiday entitlement, protection from unfair dismissal etc. So some employment laws in England and Wales apply to everyone working in England and Wales whilst some other aspects of the employment relationship are governed by the law of the contract - which might be England and Wales or might be some other system of law. | united-kingdom To extend on @ohwilleke's answer about US inheritance tax, I can answer the UK side of things. UK inheritance tax does not apply to inheritances from abroad, unless that person was domiciled in the UK or some of their assets were in the UK. If you are not a UK resident for tax purposes (which, from the context of your question is unlikely), then you wouldn't even have to pay tax on the interest you earned from depositing the inheritance. If the deceased were taxed for being domiciled in the UK, and the US taxed your inheritance, you'd actually qualify for tax relief from HMRC based on what you'd already paid the IRS. If you are not domiciled in the UK for tax purposes, and neither was the decedent you would owe precisely zero to HMRC in the UK. More info can be found here: https://www.taxoo.co.uk/uk-resident-receiving-inheritance-from-abroad/ |
What are the limits of religious freedom in the workplace? Federally in the US, only race, sex, and religion are protected classes, i.e. it's illegal to make employment decisions (hiring/firing/salary/promotion/etc.) on the basis of a worker's race, sex, or religion. Let's say that I have a Christian employee, Joe, who verbally harasses a gay employee, Steve. Joe is confronted by management or HR about his behavior, but he defends himself by saying that he is a devout Christian and he is only attempting to save Steve's soul. (For the record, while I personally am a Christian, I don't think the workplace is the right place for these conversations.) What could the company do? Could they reprimand, or even fire, Joe for his harassment of Steve? Or would the company be required by federal law to keep Joe on staff even when he harasses other workers? I can think of an example involving only religion as well. If I saw another employee wearing a Satanic symbol I would be very offended. But Satanists have religious freedom too and are also protected by federal law. So who wins? | The EEOC web site has much information on this topic including summaries of close cases that have been decided in court. To determine whether allowing or continuing to permit an employee to pray, proselytize, or engage in other forms of religiously oriented expression in the workplace would pose an undue hardship, employers should consider the potential disruption, if any, that will be posed by permitting this expression of religious belief.[196] As explained below, relevant considerations may include the effect such expression has had, or can reasonably be expected to have, if permitted to continue, on co-workers, customers, or business operations. a. Effect on Workplace Rights of Co-Workers Expression can create undue hardship if it disrupts the work of other employees or constitutes – or threatens to constitute – unlawful harassment. Since an employer has a duty under Title VII to protect employees from religious harassment, it would be an undue hardship to accommodate such expression. As explained in § III-A-2-b of this document, religious expression directed toward co-workers might constitute harassment in some situations, for example where it is facially abusive (i.e., demeans people of other religions), or where, even if not abusive, it persists even though the co-workers to whom it is directed have made clear that it is unwelcome. It is necessary to make a case-by-case determination regarding whether the effect on co-workers actually is an undue hardship. However, this does not require waiting until the alleged harassment has become severe or pervasive.[197] As with harassment on any basis, it is permitted and advisable for employers to take action to stop alleged harassment before it becomes severe or pervasive, because while isolated incidents of harassment generally do not violate federal law, a pattern of such incidents may be unlawful.[198] | The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution does not prohibit people with no affiliation with the government from trying to convert people to their religion in a way not endorsed by a government official or agency. It could be that there is some content neutral prohibition on strangers accosting young school children if that person is so persistent that it amounts to content neutral harassment, or that the person might actually be a sex offender prohibited from contacting children. But, the facts of the question don't seem to compel this conclusion. Even if it violates any law to do this, it is not a violation of the U.S. Constitution. | No. Absent some collective bargaining agreement to the contrary, you have no recourse because you have not been legally wronged. You have no right to privacy in this regard. You have no right to be free of humiliation based upon truthful statements. If the email is truthful and you were indeed suspended, then the manager is entirely appropriate in sharing that information, and indeed has a need to do so. You would have no recourse in Tennessee, even if your manager gave a national television interview on your suspension and truthfully stated all reasons for the suspension and threw in statements of opinion disparaging you. Humiliation is only actionable if it amounts to "outrageous conduct" beyond mere truthful speech (e.g. throwing your clothes in the toilet or secretly putting some self-disparaging statement on the back of your uniform) and was calculated with a specific intent to cause you extraordinary emotional harm that was not necessary for some legitimate purpose. | It is not legal for an employer to discriminate on the basis of sex anywhere in the US (see http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/sex.cfm). Exemptions exist where the discrimination is for bona fide occupational qualifications and, irrelevantly, religious reasons. It is completely legal for a consumer to discriminate on the basis of anything they want to. It is also legal for a business to assist the consumer in that discrimination. Bona fide occupational qualifications generally only apply to instances in which the BFOQ is considered reasonably necessary to the normal operation of a particular business. Mere customer satisfaction, or lack thereof, is not enough to justify a BFOQ defence, as noted in the cases Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. and Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co.. Therefore, customer preference for females does not make femininity a BFOQ for the occupation of flight attendant. However, there may be cases in which customer preference is a BFOQ—for example, femininity is reasonably necessary for Playboy Bunnies. Customer preference can "'be taken into account only when it is based on the company's inability to perform the primary function or service it offers,' that is, where sex or sex appeal is itself the dominant service provided." None of the occupations you mention would, on the face of it, meet the requirements to be BFOQ. Allowing their customers to express a preference for a specific gender may impact on the capacity for the business to deliver on that preference but it would not generally allow a BFOQ defence if this impacted their hiring policies. A possible exception is if the business catered to that preference exclusively, for example, an all female gym with all female staff but I am not aware that this has ever been tested and if a male personal trainer wanted to take them on he may very well win. As an aside, there is no BFOQ defence for racial discrimination except for artistic works where the first amendment rights overrule the anti-discrimination laws. | Financial institutions in the US are subject to regulations that restrict what sorts of things non-licensed employees can talk about with clients and advice they can give about structuring accounts and payments in ways that might avoid triggering money laundering alarms. I think this employee was being cautious about getting into a gray area and phrased the reason they couldn't talk about it poorly. The reason they were restricted from giving you an answer could be a legality, but not necessarily because they are giving you legal advice. | "Discrimination" is in some way treating people differently from other people. Much discrimination is a sound idea. Not letting someone fly a plane who does not have pilot training is discrimination, but not a bad kind. So is not allowing someone to do surgery who has not trained as a doctor. Unlawful discrimination is discrimination that a particular law in a particular country declares to be forbidden. Different countries have different laws for what kinds of discrimination is unlawful under what circumstances. Discrimination on a basis not forbidden by law is legal, even if immoral. For example, a restaurant could, in most if not all countries, ban left-handed people from being served there. This might be immoral, but would not be illegal, because no law has made it illegal. Commonly, discrimination on the basis of religion, ethnicity, national origin, sex, or political opinion is unlawful. In some jurisdictions discrimination on the basis of disability is unlawful. Other bases may be unlawful in some places. There may be exceptions. Employment discrimination may not have the same standards as housing discrimination, and admission to public places or ability to run for public office may be different yet. All this will vary based on the particular laws of particular places. Note that some of these protected classes are things about which people have no choice, such as sex and national origin, others are matters of choice such as religion and political opinion. Laws may create a protected class on any basis. Note also that many things about which people have little or no choice, such as height, handedness, or intelligence, are not protected categories in most places. To the best of my understanding being vaccinated or not is not a protected class in most if not all of Europe, so legal distinctions may be made based on vaccination status. In such jurisdictions, discrimination in favor of those who are vaccinated is legal, although some may think it wrong. A few US states have made it unlawful to restrict various public or private services or access to places on the basis of vaccination status. I am not aware of any country in Europe that has such a law. | Like the other rights in the First Amendment, religious freedom is not absolute. For example, you can't use religious freedom to get away with assault or murder (e.g. fulfilling the fatwa to kill Salman Rushdie). The basis of many anti-abortion laws is that the fetus is a person, and thus abortion is murder. So by the same logic that you can't kill a person out of the womb for religious reasons, you wouldn't be allowed to kill an unborn person. So whether the Satanic Temple is a real religion or a parody is moot, because religion cannot be used to justify murder. The RFRA doesn't get around this. It has the following exception: the government may burden a person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person: (1) furthers a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. What falls under "compelling government interest" is up to the courts to decide. But in the past they've determined that paying taxes is a compelling government interest (Adams v. Commissioner), and even that getting a social security number is not a significant burden (Miller v. Commissioner). So it seems likely to me that actions that directly harm another person would not be allowed. The basis of most anti-abortion laws is that the fetus is a person, deserving of human rights, and abortion deprives them of the right to life. It's hard for me to imagine that preventing this would not be considered a compelling government interest in states that prohibit abortion. We can't be certain about this, since Roe v. Wade was only overturned very recently, and there's little precedent in how the anti-abortion laws that are now allowed will be interpreted in corner cases like this. But in the current political climate, I think it's almost certain that a question like this would be decided in the pro-life direction. While pro-life conservatives also tend to be pro-religion, they generally restrict this to Christian religious traditions (these same groups were in favor of Trump's Muslim travel bans). A fringe religion like TST would likely not receive favorable treatment. Because of this, perhaps the right place for a question like this would be Politics | This is an open question. California's Unruh Act prohibits discrimination in public accommodations on the basis of political affiliation. This same issue has come up previously, in a case where four neo-Nazis showed up wearing swastika pins at a German restaurant. When they refused to remove the pins, the restaurant called the police to remove them. The Nazis sued the restaurant under the Unruh Act, which prohibits various forms of discrimination in public accommodations (restaurants, hotels, etc.) Although the Unruh Act does not specifically mention discrimination on the basis of political ideology, the California Supreme Court has interpreted its list of classes as describing, not limiting, the classes eligible for protection, which it has also explicitly said include political affiliation: Whether the exclusionary policy rests on the alleged undesirable propensities of those of a particular race, nationality, occupation, political affiliation, or age, in this context the Unruh Act protects individuals from such arbitrary discrimination. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 726 (1982). Based on these interpretations, the trial court refused to dismiss the Nazis' case against the restaurant, and the parties eventually settled without going to trial. Read commentary about the case here. So it seems clear that the Unruh Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of political affiliation. Because wearing a swastika indicates that you affiliate with the National Socialist German Workers' Party or one of its offshoots, the Unruh Act probably prohibits a business from discriminating against customers on the basis of wearing a swastika. But federal law may pre-empt the Unruh Act. But the problem doesn't end there, because intepreting the law that was creates potential conflicts with federal public-accommodations law, employment law, and the First Amendment. For instance, federal law prohibits the creation of a "hostile environment" in terms of both providing public accommodations on equal terms regardless of race, and in terms of equal employment opportunity regardless of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. Proving a hostile environment can be pretty difficult, but if you could demonstrate that allowing swastikas on premises created a hostile environment for customers or employees, you'd then have a strong Supremacy Clause argument that the Unruh Act can't be enforced to require the admission of swastika-wearing customers. Beyond that, businesses have First Amendment rights on generally the same terms as natural humans. There's a reasonable argument to be made that those businesses, in banning swastikas, are communicating a First Amendment-protected anti-Nazi message, or that they are exercising their right to control who speaks in the forum that they control. If the court were to accept either of those arguments, it would again mean that the Unruh Act probably could not be enforced to benefit those wearing swastikas. |
UK inheritance: partner, sibling, child Let's start with person A. Person A wants to write a will leaving "everything" to their partner, person B. They are not married, or in a legal partnership of any kind. Person A would prefer that their only sibling inherit nothing. And that a child born out of wedlock, but acknowledged on their birth certificate (foreign, but not UK) , living overseas, receives a share, despite the will, as a gesture, stating that person B inherit "everything". Given the will, does person A's sibling have any claim? Their child? | The child C cannot receive anything as a "gesture despite the Will" if everything in the Will is left to B; unless B agrees to a Deed of Variation the Executor is legally bound to follow the instructions in the Will. C may have a claim if he is dependent on A at the time of A's death and A has failed to make provision. It is possible that A's sibling S might also have a claim if dependent. Although you have tagged the question as United Kingdom, inheritance and intestacy law differs widely between England and Scotland. Such a Will should be drafted by a specialist trust and executry planning solicitor to avoid the risk of contentious probate. | These types of situations can, do and will get very messy and bitter fast. The key question here is actually two basic areas: What’s the legal situation now in terms of what you can actually claim etc? For this you need a lawyer familiar with the local laws. Second, and much more important, is how much you value your relationship with your sister. These types of situations can and do irreparably break families, and you need to think very hard about this element of the situation regardless of what your legal rights are. Personally I would err towards probing gently into what she thinks is fair/your mother intended etc and go from there, with the emphasis on extreme caution. Money can always be replaced. Families can’t. | Issue in this sense means a person's children or other lineal descendants such as grandchildren and great-grandchildren. It does not mean all heirs, but only the direct bloodline. | united-kingdom To extend on @ohwilleke's answer about US inheritance tax, I can answer the UK side of things. UK inheritance tax does not apply to inheritances from abroad, unless that person was domiciled in the UK or some of their assets were in the UK. If you are not a UK resident for tax purposes (which, from the context of your question is unlikely), then you wouldn't even have to pay tax on the interest you earned from depositing the inheritance. If the deceased were taxed for being domiciled in the UK, and the US taxed your inheritance, you'd actually qualify for tax relief from HMRC based on what you'd already paid the IRS. If you are not domiciled in the UK for tax purposes, and neither was the decedent you would owe precisely zero to HMRC in the UK. More info can be found here: https://www.taxoo.co.uk/uk-resident-receiving-inheritance-from-abroad/ | Would capital gains taxes come into play given that the house is his daughters primary residence, but not his? Yes. He sold something that was his property, i.e., his [long term] asset. The fact that it was not his primary residence is irrelevant in this regard. The issue of primary vs. non-primary residence might be relevant only for purposes of computing the applicable credits and/or deductions, but that is very jurisdiction-specific. | If you buy a house and your wife signs a quitclaim deed to you, that transfers to you whatever rights she has in the house. Similarly, if you and your wife sign an agreement that anything deposited in a particular bank account in your name would be your separate property, that would override the pre-nup as far as that account was concerned. Such an agreement could include a dollar limit per month or per year, or an explicit purpose, such as savings for a down payment. (It could be thought of as a gift to you of her share of any funds deposited.) Giving property to your parents or others with the understanding that it will be returned on your request might be seen as an attempt to evade the pre-nup, and a court might hold that the property was actually shared, if you ever do divorce. There might also be gift tax issues if the value is high enough. Whether asking your wife to agree to a quitclaim or any sort of agreement to modify the pre-nup would help or harm your marriage I cannot know, nor did you ask that. But I would think that for most people being open would work better than going behind a spouse's back. None of this should be taken as legal advice. I am not a lawyer. | I was told that when you sign something in the UK, then it is your signature, no matter what name you are using. So if you sign a contract with my name, then it's your signature and you are bound by the contract. Things might be invalid because you signed and not me. For example, if you sign a contract selling my car in my name, then that contract is not valid. If some document needs signatures of two witnesses, and you sign with your name, then with my name, then there are no two signatures. As far as I know, signing under a false name is not in itself criminal, but might very well be supporting fraud, for example, and might therefore be illegal. The contract for the sale of my car, signed by you using my name, would very likely be part of fraud and therefore criminal. | She never said that She said: When I joined that family, that was the last time, until we came here, that I saw my passport, my driver's licence, my keys. All that gets turned over With respect to my adult children and their passports, the same is true in my house. I ask them for their passports when they aren’t needed, they give them to me, I store them in a safe place and I give them back to them when they need them. That’s just a sensible precaution against them being lost and in no way illegal. Now if I took their passports without permission and withheld them when they wanted them, that would be illegal as it would for anyone else including the Queen (who, I’m sure, had absolutely nothing to do with it - that’s the job of the Keeper of the Royal Passports or some such). Similarly, if you came to my house and I offered to take your coat and you gave it to me and I gave it back when you left, that would be perfectly legal. When I pull up in my car, I put my keys in a bowl in the laundry (unless I forget and then I can’t find them and it’s really annoying). I would prefer instead to have an employee jump into the car, park it and put the keys in their bowl so that when I want the car latter, it’s their job to remember where they left the keys. But I can’t afford that. |
Is using a photo reference for pose fair use? If I draw an imaginary character and use a photograph as reference for human body/pose, is that legal, copyright-wise? Let's say I change the hair and the face? I know it needs to be 80% different, but not sure how much % a figure pose is worth. Basically, the pose is the only thing that would be the same. Country I'm in (for laws): USA (posted this on arts and crafts originally, but they said it's better posted here) | If I draw something, having been inspired by looking at some other thing, you are not copying that thing. If you carefully copy something even if you are also deliberately changing features of the original, then you are copying. Copyright law gives the copyright holder the exclusive right to make copies. There is a difference between copying music and visual art in this respect, since music can be reduced to a small set of specific symbols, so "being inspired by" a musical work is often found to be infringement. The difficult part is legally distinguishing "making a copy" versus "being inspired by". The courts use a subjective test of "substantial similarity" to decide if there has been copying. the case of Mannion v. Coors. "Pose" is an element that is considered in assessing similarity: the question the court would ask (itself) is whether such a pose could ever have come from elsewhere (such as, your own creative efforts). | There will be single frames from let's say "The Exorcist" that are highly recognisable. You say it's not the heart of the work, but it may be representative for a substantial part. If I wrote a book about the movie, then say 25 frames out of the movie would illustrate the book very nicely, so this is substantial. And there is a market for selling pictures, t-shirts, posters etc. all using a single frame, or selling single frames to book authors wanting to use it for illustrative purposes. You deprive them of income for this activity. So what you said is something similar to what I would expect your lawyer to say in court, but I would expect the opposing lawyer to come up with some very different wording. All in all, I find the argument for "fair use" not convincing. | Let’s work it through Is the work copyright? Yes. Are you making a copy or a derivative work? Yes. Do you have permission? No. At this point, it is prima facie copyright violation. However, various copyright laws have defences for breach. You don’t say where you are but as the USA is the most permissive in this regard we’ll use the USA. If it’s not legal there, it’s not legal anywhere. If it is legal there, it’s still likely to be not legal everywhere else. is it fair use? Almost certainly not. Wizards of the Coast (the copyright owner) already do this. While this service is free for creatures from the Monster Manual, it does drive traffic to their web site where they sell stuff. They also licence (presumably for money) others to do the same. Your usage would negatively affect the copyright owners market. This counts against fair use. Because it’s already being done, your work has virtually nil transformative value. This counts against fair use. You are copying a substantial part of the work. This counts against fair use. You are not using it commercially but neither is it for educational use. This is unlikely to matter. On balance: not fair use. TL;DR This is copyright violation. | A character can not be copyrighted. Only a work (picture, text, movie etc.) featuring that character can. However, a character can be registred as a trademark (more specifically, its name and its appearance). | Yup, copyright statutes and case law cover these situations. In Canada, look at at Copyright Act Section 30.7: It is not an infringement of copyright to incidentally and not deliberately (a) include a work or other subject-matter in another work or other subject-matter; or (b) do any act in relation to a work or other subject-matter that is incidentally and not deliberately included in another work or other subject-matter. The US doesn't have this in statute, but some defendants used a fair use defence, some successful, some not. (http://www.iposgoode.ca/2010/04/cindy-incidentally-the-incidental-inclusion-exception-in-canadian-copyright-law/) If you're using a piece of art as part of a tutorial, or being illustrative of a point, or subject of commentary, review, or criticism, that may be fair use or fair dealing. | The images and text are copyright (if they are). What Google does with them is fair use/dealing. It works like this: if Google's bot can find them then you (the owner) have put them on the World Wide Web presumably because you want people to see them, effectively you have put them on public display. Google is assisting you in that endeavour by enabling people who are looking for what you are displaying to find it. Their use of your material enhances its value to you which is a rock solid defence. If you don't want your stuff on public display then a) don't put it on a public part of the web - there are plenty of private cloud storage facilities or B) stick a file in your website that tells bots not to index it. | is it plausibly the case that ownership of an original photograph would be awarded to the subject (or the subject's heirs) because the subject did not consent to the making of the photograph? No The photograph belongs to the person who owned the photographic plate. Copyright in the image belonged (it has long ago entered the public domain) to the photographer. Subjects (then and now) have no claim on either. Do Massachusetts laws indeed protect personality and publicity rights in photos more than 160 years old, if they were originally taken without consent of the subject, and are now used without consent from the subject's next of kin? No The people in the photograph may bring a suit. These people are long since dead and their estates have long ago been wound up. There is no longer anyone with standing to bring such a suit. Does the US 13th amendment give any private right of action to claim property obtained via ownership of slavery, or that may constitute a "badge of slavery"? No In its entirety, the 13 amendment reads: Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. It does not deal with the products of slavery at all. | Your feeling is correct. Copyright in those images is owned by Amazon, or by someone Amazon contracted with, in any case not by you. Using them to sell your bean bag would be infringement, unless you have been granted permission to use the images. (It is not very likely that you would be sued over this, but please do the right thing anyway.) In any case those stock images may not show quite how your particular bean-bag looks now. Take your own photo and upload it with your sale listing. |
What happens if my spouse won't attend court for divorce procedure? Going through divorce process with my wife, she signed the notice and acknowledgment of receipt but she refuse to attend divorce proceedings, arguing that the documents I filled using online divorce service onlinedivorcer.com not legit and don't have a power.Is it possible that court will force me to remain in the marriage if she don't agree on divorce? Is there any issue with documents if I used help from side to fill them? | The first question would be whether those papers are indeed "legit", and we don't do product reviews. Assuming the company didn't mess up and she was legally served, the next question would be whether she responded (in the legal sense) or not. If she failed to respond at all within 21 days (add 9 days if she is out of state), then your next step would be to file default divorce paperwork (presumably that's covered in the service you paid for). If she agreed to the divorce and the courts knows that, then you file some more paperwork and she doesn't have to show up to anything. If she disagreed, there will be an "answer" and possibly a counterpetition. There is an exchange of paperwork w.r.t. assets, a mandatory mediation stage, more paperwork, disclosures etc. and a pre-trial conference, followed by a trial. If you are at this stage, attendance is mandatory. As long as you have proof of service, nobody requested a postponement, and there is some evidence to support your claim, a default judgment can be issued. It's not clear what "divorce proceeding" you are referring to that involves her attendance. However, you can file divorce paperwork yourself or using an online service, and using an online service does not render the paperwork illegitimate. It's not guaranteed that the service did what would be necessary for you to get the outcome you desire, but that's beyond the scope of what we can tell you. | Can a divorced man win a downward modification of alimony and/or child support if he were tricked into a marriage by a child that wasn't his? The couple then gets divorced and the wife sues for alimony and child support. Will the man likely be able to get reduced child support and/or alimony on the claim that he was tricked into a marriage he would not otherwise have undertaken? Generally speaking, marriages induced by fraud about anything other than the extreme case of fraud involving who someone is marrying in the act of marriage itself (i.e. someone believed they were marrying John Smith from Denver but actually was married to John Smith from Los Angeles, whom they had never met before, because the marriage ceremony was conducted with disguises and they didn't look closely at the marriage certificate), has no impact on marital rights. Evidence regarding fraud to induce a marriage wouldn't even be admissible at trial because it wouldn't be legally relevant. This has no impact on alimony. Paternity can be contested by filing a paternity suit within the statute of limitations for doing so which varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction (usually within two to five years of the child's birth). If the husband prevails in a timely paternity contest, child support will not be owed. Otherwise, actual genetic paternity would be irrelevant. In California, the statute of limitations to disavow paternity of a child born to one's wife is two years from the date of birth. N.B. I am making some interpretations of inexact language in the question. It says: The couple then gets divorced and the wife sues for alimony and child support. But I assume that what is really meant is that one or both of the members of the couple file for divorce and that in the course of the divorce proceeding the wife seeks alimony and child support. If the divorce proceeding is concluded without an adjudication of paternity that would usually preclude a later lawsuit to disavow paternity. | A prosecutor cannot make a change to a plea agreement after it is signed. That's why it has to be signed. If there is an error in it then it needs to be re-written and re-signed. No, your friend cannot get their conviction vacated over this. They can have it reversed and put back into pre-trial for a new determination (plea, trial, etc.). They need to speak to an attorney to understand if this is worthwhile or not. There really are very very few instances where a mistake in the legal system means you can get away with a crime. | No In general, there is no need for a plaintiff, defendant, or witness to attend court in person if there is a legitimate impediment to them doing so. Parties can be represented by their lawyers, testimony can be made by affidavit, cross-examination can be conducted over Zoom. During the recent pandemic, entire cases, both criminal and civil have been dealt with without anyone meeting up in person. | I exclude Shari`a law because I don't know, but generally there would be no legal recourse that depends on the lie. A marriage is not legally viewed as a contract with enforceable obligations, so a woman could not be forced to bear a child against her will if she had earlier promised to do so, and she could not be penalized in any way. The man still has the ability to obtain a divorce. There is a difference between a fault-based divorce and a no-fault divorce, where a fault-based divorce may be quicker (dispenses with the requirement for months of separate living). In a jurisdiction that has fault-based divorce, the traditional grounds are cruelty, adultery, desertion, imprisonment, and physical inability to engage in sexual intercourse undisclosed before marriage. The latter does not include the inability to get pregnant. Division of marital assets is governed by law, where the principles of division are not punishment, they are equity (although states split into "community property" vs. "equitable distribution" based on the distinction "what is equitable" versus "50-50" – equitable distribution states do not sanction punishing a spouse for misconduct). There are also "marital torts" for certain kinds of wrongful acts, such assault, infecting a spouse with an STD, defamation etc. But as is the case with any tort, there has to be a legal duty between the parties, and that duty has to come from operation of law and not just agreement. There is no legal duty to always tell the truth or to bear children. | Short Answer SIMPLIFIED AND UPDATED BASED ON ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IN THE QUESTION: The marriage is valid, but their marriage will not allow the girlfriend to refuse to testify as a witness in the case. She can be compelled to testify against him under oath, but does not have to testify about the confidential communications that they have with each other after they get married (e.g. if he confesses to her while there are having a private conversation after they are married, while he is outside the jail, while he is meeting with his lawyer). All of her recorded statements made at any time, and everything that happens before they are married are available to be used as evidence at trial (assuming no other rule of evidence excludes it). Only confidential statements made between the wife and the criminal defendant while they are married can be excluded based upon their spousal status. END UPDATE Long Answer This question is about the marital privilege, which is created by statute or case law. There are actually two separate marital privileges that are analyzed separately. Also, I'm simplifying this answer to limit it to the "criminal case with a jury trial" situation. The rules are more complicated when it is not a criminal case, and in a bench trial as opposed to a jury trial, all references to the jury would instead be to the judge. But, almost everyone facing murder charges chooses a trial by jury instead of a bench trial, as is their right. The Husband-Wife Confidential Communications Privilege The stronger marital privilege applies to confidential communications made to a defendant's spouse during the marriage, which the defendant can insist not be presented to the jury. It doesn't matter if the spouse is still married to the defendant at the time of trial. The main exception to this privilege is for crimes committed against the spouse who is testifying, or to a crime committed against a child of either spouse. This privilege does not apply to anything that the defendant says to the girlfriend prior to getting married and does not apply to statements made by the defendant to the spouse when other people were present, and is similar to the attorney-client privilege or the parishioner-clergy privilege. In Florida this privilege, created by statute, reads as follows: Florida Evidence Code Section 90.504 Husband-wife privilege.— (1) A spouse has a privilege during and after the marital relationship to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, communications which were intended to be made in confidence between the spouses while they were husband and wife. (2) The privilege may be claimed by either spouse or by the guardian or conservator of a spouse. The authority of a spouse, or guardian or conservator of a spouse, to claim the privilege is presumed in the absence of contrary evidence. (3) There is no privilege under this section: (a) In a proceeding brought by or on behalf of one spouse against the other spouse. (b) In a criminal proceeding in which one spouse is charged with a crime committed at any time against the person or property of the other spouse, or the person or property of a child of either. (c) In a criminal proceeding in which the communication is offered in evidence by a defendant-spouse who is one of the spouses between whom the communication was made. In many states (and in federal court), this Husband-Wife privilege for confidential communications has an exception for cases where the husband and wife jointly carry out a crime or fraud. But, Florida does not have this exception to the Husband-Wife privilege for confidential communications in state court criminal cases. In federal criminal cases, the case law under Federal Rule of Evidence 501 creates a substantially similar privilege for the purposes of this question. Federal Rule of Evidence 501 is as follows: The common law — as interpreted by United States courts in the light of reason and experience — governs a claim of privilege unless any of the following provides otherwise: the United States Constitution; a federal statute; or rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. But in a civil case, state law governs privilege regarding a claim or defense for which state law supplies the rule of decision. Since this is a criminal case, the last sentence of Federal Rule of Evidence 501 does not apply. There are also not any rules regarding this topic that have actually been prescribed by the U.S. Supreme Court. And, neither the U.S. Constitution nor any federal statute creates a husband-wife or spousal testimonial privilege. So, this issue is governed in federal court by "The common law — as interpreted by United States courts in the light of reason and experience." The relevant common law rules apply nationwide, although different federal court of appeals circuits may apply them slightly differently when the U.S. Supreme Court hasn't supplied a clear rule. The Spousal Testimonial Privilege The weaker marital privilege (sometimes called the spousal testimonial privilege) in many states, which is similar to the 5th Amendment right of a criminal defendant not to testify at trial, is a criminal defendant's right to prevent his current wife (but not a former spouse) from testifying against him at trial on any matter whatsoever, regardless of whether it relates to something that happened during the marriage or not. This marital privilege often has many exceptions for serious crimes and domestic violence in jurisdictions where it applies. In the federal courts, however (pursuant to case law developed under Federal Rule of Evidence 501), this weaker privilege belongs to the spouse called as a witness rather than to the criminal defendant. The spouse of a criminal defendant isn't required to testify against a current spouse in federal criminal prosecutions, but the spouse and not the criminal defendant gets to decide if the spouse will refuse to testify. There may be exceptions to the federal spousal testimonial privilege in cases where one spouse is accuses of a crime against the spouse or a child of one of the spouses, where they are joint participants in a crime, or where the competency of the criminal defendant is at issue (see Wikipedia). The only exceptions which might plausibly apply in a federal criminal trial are if the criminal defendant is the father of your son, or if the criminal defendant and his girlfriend whom he marries were joint participants in the crime, neither of which seems likely to be the case here. In Florida, the weaker marital privilege also known as the spousal testimonial privilege cannot be asserted in state court criminal prosecutions but may be asserted in federal court criminal prosecutions. (See, e.g., here). | Courts have inherent jurisdiction to reconsider/recall their own decisions. This rarely happens (especially if the decision has already been "sealed" i.e. issued in writing) but still possible. The principle of finality only applies to parties asking courts to reconsider; it does not constrain courts themselves. So, in this example, "the judge agrees to vacate them" but that decision hasn't been sealed yet. The judge can easily just change their mind (although, again, it rarely happens). No double jeopardy applies because it is still the same trial. | NY Est Pow & Trusts L § 3-2.1(a)(1)(C)(4) requires that There shall be at least two attesting witnesses, who shall, within one thirty day period, both attest the testator's signature, as affixed or acknowledged in their presence, and at the request of the testator, sign their names and affix their residence addresses at the end of the will. There shall be a rebuttable presumption that the thirty day requirement of the preceding sentence has been fulfilled. The failure of a witness to affix his address shall not affect the validity of the will. That means that the witnesses attest to having seen you sign the will, and you must know that it is a will being signed. There is no requirement that they see the will itself, and they do not "attest" anything regarding sound mind, memory or testamentary capacity. It is not required that witnesses receive a copy of the will (for any reason), and it is probably extremely rare for them to do so. However, a witness could be called, during a subsequent court procedure, to testify as to relevant facts such as that a beneficiary held a gun to the testator's head. |
How much is intentionality relevant to specific crime(s) in the US? Let's say, person A who is not fluent in English, calls somebody else (B) by a derogatory or racist name or names, which might generally fall under some law restricting such speech (eg. hate speech) and gets sued for that. Does it matter from legal perspective, if it can be proved that A either doesn't happen to know that this word is commonly understood as derogatory, or he was explicitly mislead by somebody else that it was a normal everyday word without any negative connotations, therefore, it can be proved that A didn't mean any harm to B by his speech? | In the US, there are no (and can be no) laws against hate speech. You also cannot sue a person for using an ethnic or similar epithet. A false accusation, however, might be grounds for a defamation lawsuit. Word connotations do not matter, what matters is the denotation, for example calling someone a "rapist" denotes a specific criminal act. Even calling someone a rapist isn't necessarily defamatory, since hyperbole abounds especially on the internet, so in order to actually be defamation, the statement would have to be understood as a particular accusation (a form of unlawful sexual assault). A defamatory statement has to be made with reckless disregard for the truth of a statement, which is not the case in the situation you describe (perhaps the person correctly said that so-and-so is a therapist, but was ineffective in their use of English). | Can a statement of one's beliefs constitute defamation if those beliefs can't be proven true? You might think that it is impossible to prove what's going on in your mind. But this is done all the time. Thoughts can be inferred from words and actions. For example, theft requires an intent to permanently deprive someone of property. If someone hides merchandise under their shirt and proceeds to the exit, there's generally not a reasonable doubt about whether they intended in their mind to steal it. Defamation laws vary by state. However, the First Amendment sets a baseline that all states must follow. Defamation requires a false fact. Pure opinion is not defamation. However, it is possible to defame via a statement which is an opinion, if that opinion implies undisclosed facts which are false. If you say that you "believe" the companies are deceptive, this clearly implies you know something that makes you believe that. You can get around this by disclosing the entire factual basis for your opinion. If you say that the New York Giants are deceptive because their stadium is actually located in New Jersey, that's not defamation, because people can judge for themselves whether that's actually deceptive. But if the team was actually located in New York, you could be liable. Would we still have some potential burden of proof The burden of proof is on the plaintiff, but it's only preponderance of the evidence in most cases, meaning the jury just needs to find it 50.001% likely that you are liable. But if the plaintiff in a defamation case is considered a "public figure" the standard of proof is raised, and they must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that you acted with "actual malice" (which more or less means that you didn't actually believe what you were saying.) According to this paper it's an open question as to whether a corporation can be a public figure (although I don't know if their analysis is still valid since it's from 2001); the answer might depend on which circuit you are in, and even if you know how your circuit has decided the matter, the Supreme Court might rule the other way. And if your case goes all the way to the Supreme Court, you're going to be paying a lot of legal fees over the course of many years. You should also know that even if it's not defamation, you might not be off the hook. There's something called "tortious interference of business". If you're going to literally have people stand in front of businesses to try to drive their customers away from them and to you, I would highly suggest you get a lawyer from your area to determine whether and how you can legally do this. | That book provides advice on legal writing; it is not a source of rules for legal writing. Rather than repeatedly identifying themselves using their full name, parties customarily refer to themselves in the third person, e.g., "The defendant refused to waive his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial." In practice, though, pro se litigants regularly refer to themselves in the first person, and there is no formal consequence for this. | There are not "illegal thoughts" in the abstract, but what you are thinking can make the difference between something being a crime or a basis for bringing a lawsuit, and actions being non-criminal or not a basis for any legal liability. If you fire someone because they are black, you've engaged in actionable employment discrimination. If you fire the same person, in the same circumstances, because you've noticed that they were late to work by 10 minutes every day this month but recorded their hours as if they came on time, you've acted legally. If you shoot someone in bear suit hovering over your toddler in your backyard at twilight believing it is a bear, you haven't committed a crime. If you realize that the person in the bear suit is your husband playing a prank and shoot anyway, you are guilty of aggravated assault or attempted murder if he lives, and murder if he doesn't. If you buy a $200 refrigerator thinking that it's a bankruptcy fire sale price, you are not guilty of anything. But, if you know that the refrigerator was stolen because you hear the store owner talking about it in the back room, you are committing the crime of trafficking in stolen goods if you buy it. If you record a song because it just comes to you when you've never heard it before, you haven't infringed a copyright. But if you've heard it (at least if you remember it) and then record it, you've infringed the copyright in the song (assuming you don't get permission to do so and the copyright is still valid, etc.). What a person committing an act is thinking is part of what must be proven in court for someone to be guilty or liable in the case of all but a small minority of crimes and torts (i.e. civil wrongs which can be the basis of a lawsuit). Often, the element that involves what you are thinking as one part of a case that must be established in court is described with the latin phrase mens rea (which translates literally as "guilty mind"). Conversely, sometimes thoughts are not crimes or torts unless there are actions taken in connection with the thoughts. If you carefully plan out a murder, but take no concrete actions to carry out your plan, you haven't committed a crime or tort. But, if you have planned out a murder and take significant affirmative acts to carry it out, you've committed attempted murder, even if those acts might not have constituted attempted murder if you took those actions for purposes unrelated to a plan to commit a murder. Similarly, if you imagine a seven year old having sex with you in your head, you haven't committed a crime (although if you are a sex offender, doing so might prevent you from receiving parole), but if you download or make a video depicting that act, you've committed a crime. | Relying on this version, proof of truth is only allowed in order to establish a "public interest" defense or for a "necessary defense"; but also "if an official is charged with the commission of an act in the exercise of his office". Good luck with "necessary defense". It is not a defense to say "But what I said is true". However, if the defamed person has been convicted in court of said act (the defamatory statement) then there can be no punishment. | Specifically, the threatened action is about stalking and implicit threats to his family. I'm not suggesting that there is a lot of merit to the claim, but that is how he is presenting the argument. The question would be where there is an intentional, repeated following of a person for the purpose of harassing the person with express or implied threats of violence or death. The jury would have to decide whether the implicit threat is credible (somebody plans to blow him or his family out of the sky), a decision would probably turn on the number of death threats he receives. | A statement cannot be libel unless it actually identifies the plaintiff to defame him. The identification need not be by name, but it must be specific enough that the public would be able to determine who the statement referred to. You can read more about this concept at Prof. Eugene Volokh on Libel Law Therefore, if nobody other than the plaintiff or defendant learned about the connection before the filing of the case or the publication of discovered emails, the original work of fiction was not a libel. And by telling everyone that the connection existed, yes, the plaintiff was impliedly consenting to any further alleged libel and it would be a defense from liability for the plaintiff. Furthermore, there wouldn't be libel unless whatever the fictional character did was untrue (something the real plaintiff didn't do) and the public would think that whatever the character did was actually an assertion that the real plaintiff did it. I could write a satire about a President Brock O'Bama who is actually a lizardman in disguise, and that's my First Amendment right, not a slander of the President. Disclaimer: only describing the common law and majority rules. State laws may differ. | Eugene Volokh categorizes this as "crime-facilitating speech" in his articles, "The Freedom of Speech and Bad Purposes", and "Crime-Facilitating Speech". He characterizes the situation like this: Some chemistry textbooks discuss how explosives are made, some posts to computer security discussion groups discuss security bugs in a leading operating system, and some works on criminology or forensics discuss how hard-to-solve murders are committed. May the explicitly politically connected speech be treated as more valuable than the scientific speech? The Supreme Court has never decided a case squarely involving the suppression of scientific speech, but it has repeatedly described scientific speech as constitutionally equal in value to political speech. He presents a split amongst the circuits and statutes regarding mens rea for crimes stemming from such speech. The Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue. In one example case, the 9th Circuit ruled that merely distributing computer code "with the knowledge that it would likely be used for bookmaking" could be punished. Other cases have held that speech must "purposely" rather than incidentally inform people how to commit a crime in order for that speech to be punished. |
Is it duress if you feel you are forced to sign a contract by an employer? When I was promoted, I was given a significant sign-on bonus, but was made to sign a document that said if I left within 12 months, I would have to pay back the gross amount in around two weeks. I want to say I was made to sign it under unfair circumstances and come to an agreement with my employer. Is there any reasonable claim to duress, coercion or a similar description that applies to this situation? | If I did not sign promotion bonus document, my career would be over. Is this duress? No. The premise is hardly true or even logical, and what you describe falls short of duress. Not every imbalance of bargain power implies duress. First, it seems that you could have declined the bonus, thereby preempting the sanction/remedy for leaving within 12 months. Second, it seems hard to prove (and unrealistic) that your career would have been over if you refused to sign the document. The employer can easily refute that allegation by pointing out that there are many others who did not sign that employer's document and yet work elsewhere as investment bankers. You would need certain, additional context to reasonably allow for a conclusion that your career altogether depends on what happens with this single entity. Third, your mention that "the bonus mitigates the horrendous weekly hours" reinforces the idea that signing the document was your preference (namely, for the purpose of obtaining some additional, non-compulsory stimulus) rather than employer-inflicted duress. The rationale and decision for acceptance of those conditions reflects that you knowingly exercised your freedom of contract. A party is not entitled to void a contract only because he belatedly changed his mind about conditions of which he was aware beforehand. | if a manager emailed an prospective employee a contract containing the pay rate of $20/hr, if the prospective employee crossed out $20/hr and replaced it with $25/hr, then went to work and gave the manager the contract which he failed to carefully read, continued working for a few months, would the employee be entitled to $20/hr? A party ought to timely alert or notify the other counterparty about any disagreements or proposed changes. This is especially recommendable when evidence suggests that the counterparty's expectation that the party only would sign the contract was reasonable. In the example you outline, the employee's unilateral alteration of the compensation/rate in the contract seems unlikely to favor the employee's position. That is because typically employer and employee negotiate compensation prior to formalizing their agreement. In that case, the employee would need stronger evidence with which to overcome the employer's credible argument that he did not knowingly accept the altered rate. | What §670 BGB basically says is that the default is that companies have to reimburse you for expenses that you incurred for interviewing with them. If they don't want to reimburse you, they have to tell you so in writing before you incur any costs. That way it's your decision if you still want to go if you have to pay for expenses yourself. It does not mean your expenses have to be paid, it means you should know beforehand whether they will be paid. So what I take from your story is that you never actually asked the company for reimbursement, expecting the Agentur für Arbeit to pay that for you. Well, no company is going to pay your expenses if you don't ask for it. And that's not a crime. You also never told the Agentur für Arbeit that you were not informed beforehand that your expenses would not be paid. They asked for proof, you delivered proof. It's not their job to find out how or when you got handed this written statement and if that constitutes a violation of §670. And as a little reality check: paying your expenses (probably something along the lines of a cab fare or bus ticket?) is way more cost effective for the AA than suing a small company for the same amount. Just the time of the lawyer filing the suit will probably cost more than your public transportation ticket for the next year. | First Part OR 324 is quite the right article for this. If the employer doesn't want that you work (because he has nothing to do for you) it's his problem, not yours. He still has to pay if you are there and ready to do work. This is for instance also mentioned in this article. The meaning of this is obvious if having a contract with a fixed number of work hours per day/month/year. Second part Prove that you have a fixed work contract. If the shift plans are made in advance you have a proof that you have a certain number of hours to work (and thus an expected income). If I interpret this here correctly, this is "echte Arbeit auf Abruf" (true work on request), because if your employer wants your work, you have to be there according to the shift plan, as opposed to your employer asking "who is ready to work tonight?". So your employer must pay you the hours agreed on in the shift plan, regardless of whether he has work for you or not (but you must explicitly tell him that you are willing to take work). Third part Can the employer change the shift plan, and to what extent? The employer must announce changes to work hours as soon as possible, and changes on short notice are only acceptable in emergency cases. A reduction in work hours due to not enough work shall not reduce the employee's salary. The business risk is entirely with the employer and he must not shift that responsibility to his employees. (That was common in the late 19th and early 20th century, with all the officially self-employed home workers in the textile industry). Here is a federal court decision that affirms this (BGE 125 III 65 S. 66). | Don't do it. It is of course breach of contract when you signed a contract with no intention to fulfil it. However, you are talking about Germany. German employers take a very dim view of this. While a UK employer would say "good riddance" and do nothing, many German employers would see that as a personal insult. It's something that you just don't do in Germany. There's a good chance that they will do what they can to make you miserable if you do this. For example, inform authorities that you just cancelled your contract which may get a visa cancelled. Or tell the company that you want to start with, which will also take a very dim view of this. Or sue you for damages, not because they want to get the money, but to make you miserable. On the other hand, if they send you a contract, and you sign it, you have a contract. | The issue is not enforceability per se, it is the problem of proving what you agreed to. If the landlord adds conditions that are against your interest, he would need to show that you agreed to those conditions: if you add conditions against his interest, you'd have to likewise prove agreement. Since you both have copies of the agreement, it's a matter of comparison to see if the documents are the same. Rather than voiding the earlier agreement and rewriting everything, the change can be initialed. If you were to cross out the rent and insert a lower figure, you would need proof that he agreed to this (hence, his initials on your copy). In your case, the change is apparently in your interest rather than his, so there's no realistic way that this could become an issue (that I can think of: maybe there's a clause that has to do with the move-in date and moving in early actually works against your interest, in which case he would need to prove that you agreed. The fact of moving in early is sufficient proof of agreement). | Virginia employer terminated employee and wants signing bonus returned Can the employer legally keep his last check and send the employee a bill for the remainder ? No, unless (1) the employee resigned and (2) his resignation does not amount to constructive termination. The employer may withhold the remaining $7,000 only if the employee did not meet the condition of "30 days of employment with xxxxx". Absent any language to the contrary, the requirement of "1-year commitment" is to be construed as the consideration expected from the employee (namely, "not to quit") in exchange for the bonus. Termination by the employer is self-defeating in the sense the employer himself made it impossible for the employee to fulfill the consideration that was expected from the employee. Therefore, the employer forfeits his entitlement to reimbursement. In the event that the employee met the condition of "30 days of employment with xxxxx", he would be entitled to the remaining $7,000 as well. Virginia labor law has no provision for treble damages (this is in response to one of the comments, per the OP's suggestion). The statutory provisions are only a civil penalty no greater than $1,000 for each violation, a portion of attorney's fees, and "all wages due, plus interest at an annual rate of eight percent". See Code of Virginia at § 40.1-29 A.2, F, and G. Item E of that statute determines which violations are misdemeanors and which are felonies. This statute would be applicable only if (1) the employer disavows the employee's entitlement to the remaining $7,000, and/or (2) the employer withholds a portion of the employee's earned compensation in an attempt to recover the initial payment of $3,000. | could I claim that my product must be added asap? And is it reasonable to ask for compensation for the missed revenue due to pushing back the launch? Unfortunately, no. Your description reflects that you consciously treated as sufficient the limited knowledge you had at the formation of the contract. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts at §154(b). There is no indication that (1) at the formation of the contract the company committed to a more specific timing, or (2) you would have declined the invitation had you known at the formation of the contract that the company would keep postponing the inclusion of your product in the way you describe. You were given the expected date only after you performed your duties pursuant to the contract, which defeats the notion that the company's timing was any relevant to your decision of entering the contract. The only way you could prevail is by proving that the company breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing that is implied in all contracts. See Restatement at §205. Other than that, the lack of contract provisions to protect your interests give the company significant discretion. |
Would a confession obtained via Wonder Woman's Magic Lasso be admissible in US court, or any court? There's a scene in Justice League (the movie from 2017) where a policewoman is taking down the stories of three criminals who are wrapped in in Wonder Woman's magic Lasso. The Lasso does a couple of things: Anything anyone who is touching the lasso says is true. It compels anyone touching the lasso to speak. And it also seems to compel this speech to be relevant. (Isn't magic useful?) So a person bound by the lasso can't stay silent, or go on a rant about how Superman is wearing his underwear on the outside. It seems to me that this sort of thing violates a person's 5th amendment right to stay silent. However, this question (ironically about masked vigilantes), asserts that a person's 4th amendment rights cannot in general be violated by a private citizen. It seems to me that this should also apply to the 5th amendment, and I would find it hard to believe that Wonder Woman would be described as anything other than a private citizen. Is the confession under the lasso admissible, or is it a violation of 5th amendment rights? I'm definitely interested in US jurisdictions, but if you live somewhere else, I'd be interested to hear how the issue would be handled there. EDIT: As suggested by user6276 in the comments, it's quite possible that Wonder Woman is a deputized in some fashion, since she has various special immunities. It seems to me that if this is the case then the confession could not possibly be admitted (as a violation of 5th amendment rights). Feel free to let me know if that's wrong. | The Fifth Amendment only protects you against being compelled to testify by the government. So unless Wonder Woman is acting on behalf of the government, information obtained through the use of the Golden Lasso is admissible. The question about whether she has been "deputized," is not the right one. Rather, the question is whether she is a "state actor." The answer to such a question is not always clear, as courts may ask a variety of questions to reach it: Is the actor paid by the government? Directed by the government? Assisted by the government? Acting under some power established by law? Also, is it "fair" to attribute that actor's actions to the government? Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U. S. 936 (1982). Undoubtedly, there are occasions in Wonder Woman's history where she has worked closely enough with the police that a Golden Lasso confession would be inadmissible. And there are many times where she was working so independently that a Golden Lasso confession would be plainly admissible. I don't remember the exact circumstances of the confessions you're talking about, but if they were from the "small group of reactionary terrorists" I remember from the beginning of the film, I can't think of any basis for excluding their confessions. Wonder Woman came on scene independently, took control and subdued the suspects without any police direction or assistance. Unless the police later asked her to assist with the interrogations, those confessions could not be "fairly attributed" to the government. (All of this is of course ignoring the fact that the crime and confessions occurred outside of the United States and are therefore not covered by the Fifth Amendment.) | An existing law actually prohibits using census data "against" a person, see this recent question. The 5th Amendment ("nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself") is not interpreted to imply an absolute privilege to not answer, it means that your answer cannot be used against you in a criminal case. You can be compelled to testify "against yourself" if you are granted immunity from prosecution. | The article "The Posse Comitatus Act..." analyzes the legal restrictions on use of military power arising from that act. Following US v. McArthur, 419 F. Supp. 186, where the act played a role in trials related to Wounded Knee, it was found and subsequently supported in various ruling that the use which is prohibited by the posse comitatus statute is that which is regulatory, proscriptive or compulsory in nature, and causes the citizens to be presently or prospectively subject to regulations, proscriptions, or compulsions imposed by military authority. Mere "involvement" of "deployment" of the military is not contrary to the act. It should also be noted that the act includes a provision for actions expressly authorized by Congress, as was the case of the Espionage Act of 1917 and the related Magnuson Act of 1950. Hypothetically (in extremis), Congress might pass a law requiring the seizure of persons infected with a disease. If Congress expressly authorized USAMRIID to effect such seizures, that would not be in violation of the act. Otherwise, it would be. Since USAMRIID is a research lab and not an enforcement arm of the military, it is both highly unlikely that Congress would authorize such activities or that USAMRIID would get involved in this way. W.r.t. their ordinary operations, scientific research, nothing in what they do that contradicts the Posse Comitatus Act. Since we are dealing in hypotheticals, I should point out that SCOTUS has so far not definitively endorsed the "regulatory, proscriptive or compulsory" test, so that test could be overturned, though it is unlikely to be. | The California jury instructions for the crime of perjury give more detail on what it means to commit perjury: it's not just that you make a statement that is false, you have to willfully state that the information is true even though you know it is false. If you have a belief that you will be convicted for perjury (or any crime) by testifying, you may invoke your 5th Amendment right (I assume you are not testifying as the defendant in a criminal matter). You might (theoretically: see below on immunity and perjury) be granted immunity from prosecution, in which case there is no 5th Amendment right to refuse to testify (you are not putting yourself in criminal jeopardy), and the court can order you to testify. Or, you might not be granted immunity and still be ordered to testify. The federal immunity statute, 18 USC 6002, also needs to be scrutinized. When ordered to testify, "the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination", but it generally cannot be used against him: no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case However, there is an exception: except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order. In other words, you cannot be immunized against a perjury charge. In Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 defendant refused an order to testify, on the grounds that they (allegedly) believed that the government's grant of immunity was not broad enough, i.e. that there were areas where they might be questions and forced to criminally implicate themselves. They refused, and were held in contempt. The opinion recognized that the 5th Amendment "protects against any disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used" (emphasis added). In Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, the court held that The Fifth Amendment does not relieve a witness from answering merely on his own declaration or judgment that an answer might incriminate him; whether he must answer is determinable by the trial court in the exercise of its sound discretion, and unless there is reasonable ground, as distinct from a remote or speculative possibility, to apprehend that a direct answer may prove dangerous to the witness, his answer should be compelled. Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131 asserts that "the constitutional protection is confined to real danger, and does not extend to remote possibilities out of the ordinary course of law, citing Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (itself quoting Lord Chief Justice Cockburn): "the danger to be apprehended must be real and appreciable, with reference to the ordinary operation of law in the ordinary course of things; not a danger of an imaginary and unsubstantial character, having reference to some extraordinary and barely possible contingency, so improbable that no reasonable man would suffer it to influence his conduct" Although the wording of the immunity statute does not allow immunity from prosecution for perjury, the 5th Amendment right can only be invoked against a real legal jeopardy. They can be compelled to testify, they probably cannot be immunized against a perjury conviction (certainly not at the federal level). We would need to know the entire circumstances of the case to be able to assess whether the "knowing to be false" part could be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. | There is no clear rule on this matter, but there is a reasonable prospect for using an entrapment defense in this case, when deliberate deception is employed. There are two tests for entrapment: the subjective test and the objective test. The former focuses on the defendant's state of mind: whether the defendant is predisposed to commit the crime without law enforcement pressure. The latter is where the officer uses tactics that would induce a reasonable, law-abiding person to commit the crime. It depends in part whether the jurisdiction recognizes one of these defenses. An example of objective entrapment: "A reasonable, law-abiding person could be tempted into committing prostitution for a substantial sum of money like $10,000." Similarly, applicable to this question: A reasonable, law-abiding person could be tempted to undertake a pleasurable action having been assured that the action is actually legal. Where the subjective test applies: The fact of asking about the legality of an action is evidence that the defendant was not predisposed to commit the crime. | There are several misunderstandings here. First of all, the US exclusionary rule applies only to evidence gained by the police, or by people acting as agents of the government, and not always to them. Secondly it applies only in criminal cases. The question does not say which state this would be in, and these are largely matters of state law, so it makes a difference. But I don't know of any state where taking a video without explicit consent, in a place where the person has a right to be, is a crime. In some states it would not even be a tort. If a video is taken without the subject's consent, that may be an invasion of privacy, and the subject might be able to sue (not "file charges). In such a case the video itself would absolutely be put in evidence, and if it recorded verbal permission to take the video, the case would be promptly dismissed, quite possibly with sanctions for a frivolous lawsuit. Even if the video were taken by a police officer, and was presented as evidence in a criminal case, the office could testify to the verbal permission. That would be enough for the judge to view the video as part of a suppression hearing (which is not before a jury). If the judge saw and heard verbal permission to take the video, that would be an end to the motion to suppress, unless it was claimed that the permission was somehow coerced or faked, and evidence supported such a claim. | I'm not familiar with the case you're citing, but it sounds like this may be an application of the doctrine of "inevitable disclosure" or "inevitable use." A classic case would go something like this. WonderWidgets has discovered that by treating its widget molds with a teaspoon of ground cinnamon, it can create a superpowerful widget that is impervious to normal wear and tear, and will last forever, with very little additional expense. To protect its competitive advantage, WonderWidget takes all sorts of measures to ensure that AAA Widgets never learns about the benefits of the cinnamon additive. WonderWidgets hires Jane, an engineer with a PhD in cinnamonology to make improvements to the additive. She signs a confidentiality agreement promising to protet the company's trade secrets. After a year with WonderWidgets, Jane is recruited by AAA Widgets. WonderWidgets sues them both to prevent them from consummating an employment relationship. Assuming that the information Jane acquired from WonderWidgets is a protected trade secret, the idea here is that everyone knows exactly why AAA is hiring Jane, and that it would basically be impossible for Jane to work for them without applying the knowledge she acquired from WonderWidgets, i.e., there her employment would lead to an inevitable disclosure of WonderWidgets' trade secrets. I think most people would agree that there's at least a reasonable argument to be made in favor of WonderWidgets, there are also efforts to apply this doctrine in much shakier circumstances. For instance, WonderWidgets might try to prevent its janitor from going to work for AAA because it taught him how to mop floors, and it has cleaner floors than AAA, and therefore its cleaning techniques must be superior, and therefore those techniques must be protected. There are some states in which WonderWidgets would win the cinnamon case, and some where Jane would win, because the state doesn't recognize inevitable-disclosure at all. I don't know of any states where WonderWidgets would win the janitor case. Of course, most cases are not as clean-cut as either of these hypotheticals, but I'd say the one you're asking about is closer to the second one than the first. | As edited, this asks two different questions: Is it legal to have a religious belief that killing mutants is a moral necessity? Is it legal to preach a religious belief that killing mutants is a moral necessity? The answer to the first question is pretty clearly yes. Your right to think whatever you want is essentially ironclad under the First Amendment, under both the Free Exercise and the Free Speech clauses. The answer to the second question is more nuanced. Although it can be tricky to actually apply, there's little question that merely advocating for murder is generally protected under the First Amendment: The teaching of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action. There must be some substantial direct or circumstantial evidence of a call to violence now or in the future Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 298 (1961) Over time, the courts have developed a two-part test for evaluating whether the advocacy of crime can itself be criminalized. We now assume that speech advocating for the commission of a crime as protected under the First Amendment, unless and until that speech is: (1) intended to cause imminent lawless action; and (2) likely to actually result in imminent lawless action. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, (1969). So if Rev. Stryker meets Charles Xavier for a televised debate on the merits of killing all mutants, that speech would likely be protected by the First Amendment. Although he may sincerely hope his words will inspire others to kill mutants, the time between speaking them and any resulting murder is too great to say they are either intended or likely to cause imminent lawless action. But if the X-Men confront Rev. Stryker on television, and Rev. Stryker urges his studio audience to storm the stage and kill them all, that's more likely to result in immediate violence, and therefore more likely to be considered unprotected incitement. There's of course a lot of middle ground between those two options, so the tough part for judges and juries is figuring out the speaker's actual intent and how imminent is too imminent. |
Two EU citizenships Is it permissible, under a European legal framework, to hold two EU citizenships? Sometimes I read that it is possible, sometimes I read this is not possible because a person cannot be European "twice or more". | Indeed, it is not possible to be European "twice or more," but that doesn't prevent the possession of multiple EU nationalities. A person who possesses the nationality of an EU country is a citizen of the European Union, and a person who possesses the nationality of more than one EU country is also a citizen of the European Union. This follows from Article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union: 1. Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship. There is no unified EU nationality law; each member state determines the conditions for the acquisition and loss of its nationality. Some EU countries have ratified the 1968 Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality and on Military Obligations in Cases of Multiple Nationality, and others have not. Germany ratified it and later denounced it. Among other provisions, this convention specifies that a national of one participating state who acquires the nationality of another participating state should lose the first nationality. But it does not seem to prohibit the simultaneous acquisition at birth of multiple nationalities, nor to require someone with multiple nationalities acquired at birth to renounce any nationality at any time. There is also the 1997 European Convention on Nationality, also ratified by only a subset of EU countries. This convention explicitly provides that states must allow certain cases of multiple nationality, and may allow other cases. The mandatory cases are those of a person having multiple nationalities automatically from birth and of a person acquiring another nationality automatically through marriage (Art. 14(1)). Therefore, the general answer to your question Is it permissible, under a European legal framework, to hold two EU citizenships? is yes. It is not, however, generally possible for every citizen of an EU country to acquire the nationality of another EU country without losing his or her original nationality. That is not a feature of EU law, however, but of each country's domestic law. The specific possibilities for any given person depend on the countries involved and on the manner in which each country's nationality has been acquired or will be acquired. | On the first page of https://www.gov.uk/duty-free-goods/overview you find: "You can bring some goods from abroad without having to pay UK tax or ‘duty’ (customs charges), as long as they’re for your own use." And on the next page "... will use them yourself or give them away as a gift". This clearly doesn't cover anything that you bring into the UK to sell it. And a bit further on the site it says "You must tell customs (known as ‘declaring’) on arrival in the UK if you have goods: ... that you plan to sell". Since you are asking here, it is quite obvious that you intend to sell :-) You said "e.g. say this guys comes every month from Russia to France for unrelated business, each time he fills up his luggage with the maximum allowed amount of goods that comply with custom laws". If this guy sells the stuff to you, then the maximum allowed amount of goods to import without paying taxes is zero. Once he is willing to pay taxes, there is no limit. Obviously regularly importing things from Russia or France and selling in the UK at a profit means that he is running a business in the UK, which means he would have to register a business, pay corporation taxes etc. It's all a matter of degree; for small amounts nobody cares (up to some limit you don't need to register a business or pay taxes; I don't know the details). | You are subject to the laws of the jurisdiction that you are in. However, some of the laws of the jurisdiction you reside in or are a citizen of have extra-territorial applicability, so you have to comply with those laws too. | I'm a notary. If someone showed me a marked-up license, I'd refuse to perform the notarization, and make a note of the persons name and phone number, to make sure I would never make another appointment with the person. Is there a law that says I have to refuse? I don't think so. Is there is a law that says I can refuse if I have any doubts about the person's identity? Absolutely. | Does this mean that anyone who is born in the US is automatically a US citizen, whether they want it or not? Yes (subject to a couple of exceptions, namely the children of diplomats with full immunity and the children of a hostile foreign occupier). Or does this amendment just offer the possibility of requesting citizenship? In other words: is there an action to be made in order to become a US citizen when born in the US (and therefore one is not before this action is performed)? No. For someone who falls under the 14th amendment's citizenship clause, the only way to avoid being a US citizen is to relinquish or renounce it, which generally means that one is stuck with the US citizenship for at least 18 years. Most countries' citizenship laws, or at least all of those with which I am familiar, operate this way—automatically—for "normal" cases of acquisition of citizenship by virtue of the circumstances of birth. This is true whether the citizenship derives from the place of birth or from the parents' citizenship. | People can take their personal cars through the Channel Tunnel from Great Britain to France. They don't actually drive their cars through the tunnel, but going by car is a perfectly normal way to travel between those two countries. That's probably the most well-known place where drivers will switch from driving on one side of the road to the other, but there are many more . If driving with a car with the wheel on the "wrong" side were forbidden, these options would not exist, because at least one direction of travel would not work. Now, of course, that doesn't mean a country like Belgium, which does not have to direct way to Britain, couldn't forbid cars with the steering wheel on the right. But at least for EU states, that seems to be forbidden, as Poland and Lithuania learned when they tried to require cars that were to be registered there to have the steering wheel repositioned to the left Consequently, the Court holds that the position of the driver’s seat, an integral part of the steering equipment of a vehicle, comes within the harmonisation established by Directives 2007/46 and 70/311, so that, in the context of the registration of a new vehicle in their territory, the Member States may not require, for reasons of safety, that the driver’s seat of that vehicle be moved to the side opposite the direction of the traffic. It notes in that regard that the legislation at issue provides for exceptions with regard to the use of vehicles equipped with a steering-wheel on the right by people who reside in other Member States, and travel to Poland and Lithuania for a limited period (for example, tourists). That fact shows, according to the Court, that the contested legislation tolerates the risk involved in such use. So even those countries that tried to ensure that registered cars had the steering wheel on the "right" side made provisions for cars that were just traveling through. And the EU does not consider it a valid law to require wheels to be repositioned. | The relevant part of the 22nd amendment to the US constitution says: No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice, and no person who has held the office of President, or acted as President, for more than two years of a term to which some other person was elected President shall be elected to the office of President more than once. The question is dues "more than two years of a term to which some other person was elected President" mean "more than two years of any single term ..." or "more than two years of any and all such terms taken together". The former is closer to the plain meaning of the text, but the latter is almost surely what Congress intended, given the history of the 22nd. There is no case law, because there is no case in which a person has been elected VP and become president in two or more different terms. Indeed there is no case of a person who, having become president on the death or resignation of a president, then ran again as VP. There is no telling how a court would rule in such a situation, but I rather suspect that the 10-year limit interpretation would be upheld. | The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in effect since 1976 and currently signed by about 179 countries, has in Article 12 Paragraph 4: No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country. It's not absolute, as it would allow for a person to be deprived of that right if it weren't "arbitrary". But it's the strongest statement I've found so far. |
traffic stop, do you have to give id if no crime was commited? If you are involved in a traffic stop where the officer can not provide you with a crime you have committed or a ordinance you have broken is the officer allowed (legally) to ask/demand your id? According to RCW 46.61.020, during a traffic stop the driver of the car must provide license, registration and proof of insurance to an officer. And for those who have heard that you can keep your window up and press your ID against the glass, I wouldn’t recommend it. It is unlawful for a driver to refuse an officer’s request to take ID for inspection during a traffic stop. | We need to assume that the stop was legal (not a high hurdle to clear), that is, there was some reason to stop you. Even so, following Utah v. Strieff, police don't actually have to have a reasonable suspicion to stop you and if in the course of an ID check they discover that you have a warrant out for your arrest, the arrest is still legal. So if the police stop you, RCW 46.61.020(1) says: It is unlawful for any person while operating or in charge of any vehicle to refuse when requested by a police officer to give his or her name and address and the name and address of the owner of such vehicle, or for such person to give a false name and address, and it is likewise unlawful for any such person to refuse or neglect to stop when signaled to stop by any police officer or to refuse upon demand of such police officer to produce his or her certificate of license registration of such vehicle, his or her insurance identification card, or his or her vehicle driver's license or to refuse to permit such officer to take any such license, card, or certificate for the purpose of examination thereof or to refuse to permit the examination of any equipment of such vehicle or the weighing of such vehicle or to refuse or neglect to produce the certificate of license registration of such vehicle, insurance card, or his or her vehicle driver's license when requested by any court. Any police officer shall on request produce evidence of his or her authorization as such. There is no law that says "you have to provide ID only if accused of a crime", or "police can pull you over only if you are suspected of a crime". Various traffic infractions will get you pulled over but are not crimes; random sobriety checks are legal. However, note that the requirement to provide ID applies to the operator. There is no law requiring citizens to carry identification papers (but there is a law requiring a vehicle operator to carry a specific form of ID). In some states there are "stop and identify" laws which allow police to demand ID from a person suspected of a crime, but Washington does not have such a law. | You give no jurisdiction but in general: First, police have no obligation to be honest. So, yes they can collect this without consent by e.g. taking hair from your hairbrush (with a warrant) or giving you a glass of water while interviewing you and getting it from your fingerprint oils (which may not actually be technically possible but never mind that). No, they can't take it by "force" by sticking a swab in your mouth. Yes, it will almost certainly go into a database. Of course, there are some jurisdictions where police are entitled to decide you are guilty based on the fact that you didn't pay them a bribe. | united-states In the US, the default rule is that your home is your castle. In general, nobody, not even the police, can enter your home without your permission. The main exception to this rule is that police do not need your permission if they have a search warrant to search your home. To get a warrant, the police must convince a magistrate that they have good reason (ie, "probable cause"), such as a gps track, to believe they will find evidence of a crime if they search the house. The police in your hypothetical are in a similar situation to police who are tracking the gps signal from a "bait car/bike/phone/tablet/package." (A bait car is a car/etc that has been fitted with a camera and gps tracker, and left out as bait for thieves.) As long as the car is in public view, the police do not need a warrant to search it and arrest the person driving it. However, once the bait car is out of public view, where the police can no longer see it, they need a warrant to go in and recover it, even if they can see it on the tracker. (See, for example, the instructions for bait car programs from the Eugene and Reno Police Departments.) (For phones, which may not be in "plain view" even if the thief is, the police use ring programs to make the phone ring. Hearing a phone respond to a ring program gives them probable cause under the "hearing" version of the "plain view" doctrine.) Bottom line: In the US, the police need a search warrant. Since search warrants take time and effort, police may be unwilling to get a warrant for something as low valued as a phone. If the police can't or won't help, there are various options for privately enforcing one's rights. These range from the legal -- knocking on the door and confronting the thief -- to the illegal -- left to your imagination. | Taking the stated facts at face value (i.e. you can prove them in court). Md. TRANSPORTATION Code Ann. § 20-102 § 20-102. Driver to remain at scene -- Accidents resulting in bodily injury or death (a) Bodily injury. -- (1) The driver of each vehicle involved in an accident that results in bodily injury to another person immediately shall stop the vehicle as close as possible to the scene of the accident, without obstructing traffic more than necessary. (2) The driver of each vehicle involved in an accident that results in bodily injury to another person immediately shall return to and remain at the scene of the accident until the driver has complied with § 20-104 of this title. So, you must stay there until you have complied with § 20-104. Md. TRANSPORTATION Code Ann. § 20-104 § 20-104. Duty to give information and render aid (a) Rendering assistance. -- The driver of each vehicle involved in an accident that results in bodily injury to or death of any person or in damage to an attended vehicle or other attended property shall render reasonable assistance to any person injured in the accident and, if the person requests medical treatment or it is apparent that medical treatment is necessary, arrange for the transportation of the person to a physician, surgeon, or hospital for medical treatment. (b) Duty to give certain information. -- The driver of each vehicle involved in an accident that results in bodily injury to or death of any person or in damage to an attended vehicle or other attended property shall give his name, his address, and the registration number of the vehicle he is driving and, on request, exhibit his license to drive, if it is available, to: (1) Any person injured in the accident; and (2) The driver, occupant of, or person attending any vehicle or other property damaged in the accident. (c) Exhibiting license. -- The driver of each vehicle involved in an accident that results in bodily injury to or death of any person or in damage to an attended vehicle or other attended property shall give the same information described in subsection (b) of this section and, on request, exhibit his license to drive, if it is available, to any police officer who is at the scene of or otherwise is investigating the accident. (d) If no one able to receive information. -- If a police officer is not present and none of the specified persons is in condition to receive the information to which the person otherwise would be entitled under this section, the driver, after fulfilling to the extent possible every other requirement of § 20-102 of this title and subsection (a) of this section, immediately shall report the accident to the nearest office of an authorized police authority and give the information specified in subsection (b) of this section. So, not only is it legal to leave to seek aid, its required. | In Ohio, a stop sign would be a traffic control device, but not a traffic control signal. From R.C. 4511.01: (QQ) "Traffic control device" means a flagger, sign, signal, marking, or other device used to regulate, warn, or guide traffic, placed on, over, or adjacent to a street, highway, private road open to public travel, pedestrian facility, or shared-use path by authority of a public agency or official having jurisdiction, or, in the case of a private road open to public travel, by authority of the private owner or private official having jurisdiction. (RR) "Traffic control signal" means any highway traffic signal by which traffic is alternately directed to stop and permitted to proceed. | The policeman ordered, right as he took a step out of his car "Turn it off!" - which is a lawful demand to prevent the biker from possibly kicking the gas and running. As the driver did not seem to comply (from the policeman's PoV) during his walk over to the bike, he enforced the order himself by turning off the bike and confiscating the key for the moment. Having made it safe that the driver couldn't leg it, he guided traffic around him so he could get to the side of the road. We don't know what happened after the driver reached the curb to be lectured and/or arrested, the bike could be impounded or the confiscation might be temporary. So all we can do here is discuss the action of demanding that a motor vehicle be turned off, the doing of such and taking the keys. Demanding a vehicle to be shut off is standard procedure in police stop, as it is ensuring the safety of everybody involved. In a somewhat recent case (trying to find it again!), a driver did not shut off the car and had to stand on the brake to keep it where it was. As commands came conflicting (keep your hands where we can see them, get out of the car!) and he could not comply or the car would jump forward and ram somewhere, things escalated and the driver was shot. But back to the first step. Was the stop lawful? ACLU in NY tells us: Police may stop and briefly detain you only if there is reasonable suspicion that you committed, are committing, or are about to commit a crime. Don’t bad-mouth a police officer or run away, even if you believe what is happening is unreasonable. That could lead to your arrest. There was a crime committed: Splitting is illegal in NY (among others: Section 1122, overtaking on the right), so the stop was justified under NY CPL 140.50. From my own experience, it is not uncommon for bikers to try to evade police by swerving back into traffic and using their higher mobility to get away. On its face, this makes it reasonable to demand the bike be shut off as the policeman advanced, and I'd like to congratulate the officer for taking the less escalating step and just turning the bike off himself on the noncompliance instead of drawing his gun and possibly escalating it to a use of force. Most lawyers suggest to drivers pulled over to do things akin to "After you brought your car to a complete stop [on the curb], roll down your window and shut off the engine". Like this one. Possibly confiscating the keys might be an overreach by the policeman, but the demand to turn it off clearly is not. | You are not reading a law book here and you should not interpret a driving test so literally. It's quite clear that the question implies you should follow all of their instructions regarding how to proceed through traffic. Sometimes those instructions do involve "breaking laws" such as driving on the wrong side of the road or proceeding through a traffic signal that was not turned off. The B option clearly does not mean they have the power to disobey all laws in existence, only those concerning traffic as evidenced by the examples given. You are not Sheldon Cooper and you should know how to interpret a vague question correctly. You are also not a gopher, and you can correctly deduce that crashing into another car or driving off the cliff into the water is not in your best interests, and that calling the police to report someone abusing their position is probably a good idea. If you're concerned by the wording, try contacting the California DMV to have them clarify the wording. | You are right, the entry and exit photos are only evidence that you were there. This is something they need to prove so the photos may only be for that. Their statement that you didn’t display a valid ticket/permit is, at present an unevidenced assertion. If you contest this, they will provide evidence that you didn’t (e.g. the actual records they refer to) and you would provide evidence that you did and, if it goes to court, the judge will decide what evidence they prefer. As this is not a criminal matter, they need to prove the offence on the balance of probabilities. However, there are almost certainly administrative remedies which will allow you to contest the fine without going to court. This would involve you sending them a copy of the permit and them assessing whether their belief that you didn’t display it is justified or not. |
Why is threatening to sue not considered extortion? I'm reading about extortion and it says: Most states define extortion as the gaining of property or money by almost any kind of force or threat of [...], harm to reputation, or unfavorable government action. It is not necessary for a threat to involve physical injury. It may be sufficient to threaten to accuse another person of a crime. However, I understand lawyers (and I guess non-lawyers) routinely send mail that amounts to a threat to involve government action (e.g. file a lawsuit) unless some settlement is reached. How does that itself not constitute extortion? Are there exceptions to the threats that can be made? What are they generally? | A threat is not a threat if its lawful Let's look at a particular statute s249K of the Crimes Act 1900 [NSW]: (1) A person who makes any unwarranted demand with menaces: (a) with the intention of obtaining a gain or of causing a loss, or (b) with the intention of influencing the exercise of a public duty, is guilty of an offence. s249I defines "unwarranted": (1) For the purposes of this Part, a demand with menaces is "unwarranted" unless the person believes that he or she has reasonable grounds for making the demand and reasonably believes that the use of the menaces is a proper means of reinforcing the demand. If you genuinely believe that you have reasonable grounds for your demand and that a lawsuit is a proper means of enforcing that demand, then threatening to initiate one is not blackmail. | An obvious example would be a contract that gives possession of something to someone else. It's normally legal to use some reasonable amount of force to protect or prevent trespasses against property you own, but if you give possession of that property to someone else you can lose that right. For example, you can use force remove a guest who refuses to leave real property you own, but can't use force to remove a tenant even if they broke the terms of your contract. In most jurisdictions you'd need to get a court order and have the police use force if necessary remove the tenant. | A contract need not be written to be valid and enforceable. However, if there is no written contract, then in a dispute the burden of proving (via a preponderance of evidence) a contractual obligation falls on the party asserting it. In the scenario you describe it sounds like that would be impossible for the processing company. | What you're talking about is a liquidated-damages clause, where the contract explicitly spells out the damages to be awarded in the event of a breach. The law will vary some from state to state, but these clauses are generally enforceable. Some courts limit their use to cases where calculating the damages resulting from the breach would be impossible or impractical. But in the United States, along with all other common law jurisdictions, courts generally agree that if the liquidated-damages clause appears to penalize the breach instead of simply compensating for it, it is not enforceable. See, e.g., Ridgley v. Topa Thrift & Loan Ass'n, 17 Cal.4th 970, 977 (Cal. 1998) (“A liquidated damages clause will generally be considered unreasonable, and hence unenforceable under section 1671(b), if it bears no reasonable relationship to the range of actual damages that the parties could have anticipated would flow from a breach.”) The trillion-dollar damages clause "bears no reasonable relationship" to the damages that would actually result from a breach of a software license, so you can safely expect a court to refuse to enforce it, and limit you to whatever damages you could actually prove in court. Even if you were to drastically reduce it to "all the money you have, and then some," "all the money you have," "half the money you have," or even " "1 percent of all the money you have," the language still makes clear that the contract is not aimed at compensating for the breach, but rather penalizing the breaching party. In the end, what you're talking about isn't going to work, because contract law is generally less concerned with penalizing people than with making them whole. | If the agreement is the result of a binding determinative process like the decision of a court, arbitrator or administrative tribunal, the aggrieved party can go to the court for enforcement. If it isn’t, then the agreement may be enforceable as a contract (see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?). Breach of the contract allows the aggrieved party all the normal remedies. In either case, breach by one party does not excuse breach by the other. Of course, the agreement can be worded “you do this then I do that” so if you don’t do this, you are in breach but I’m not. If it isn’t either of the above, it can’t be enforced. | Now the party in question is threatening to sue (but of course refuses to point to which sections he believes are libelous) ... do we have to pay the $$ to "lawyer up" if we want to be safe? If you get sued, you will definitely want a lawyer. If you don't get sued, well, in that case you're safe. So your first question is whether the supposedly aggrieved party will actually sue. Your second question is, if they sue, do they have a good case? That question will be useful in deciding whether to settle. If the threats are empty then you might want to hire a lawyer to call their bluff. Otherwise you may have to endure the continual empty threats. This is especially true if the libel case is weak. Your lawyer can write a letter that explains why there is no case. If they do sue, they will have to identify the specific libelous statements, so you will at that point be able to refute the claims. But you'll also want a lawyer at that point, so you won't have to be directly concerned with the details; your lawyer will take care of them. As suggested in a comment, do keep in mind that a true statement cannot be libelous, by definition. To the extent that you can prove that every statement in the piece is true then you don't have much to worry about. But even then you'll want a lawyer's advice, because even if you know yourself that everything is true, you don't know what it will take to prove that in court. (Another aspect of the element of falsity is that statements of opinion are generally not defamatory.) To learn for yourself about the elements of libel you can start with Wikipedia or a bit of internet searching. To get a thorough analysis of the facts of your case in light of the laws of the relevant jurisdictions, you will need to engage a lawyer. It might not cost as much as you fear. | The need to prove a negative arises only from the way you've phrased the problem. In the UK, theft is defined as— dishonestly appropriating property belonging to another with the intention of permanently depriving its legitimate owner of it. All five elements must be proved in order to secure a conviction for theft. In the case of an item removed from a store, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that— the defendant had a dishonest intent; the defendant appropriated the item (treated it as his own); the item was 'property' (straightforward in this case); the item belonged to someone else (ditto); and the defendant intended to permanently deprive the owner of it. Clearly proving that the defendant left the shop without paying would be an important element in proving (2) and (5) above. Note that the prosecution must prove that he left without paying, not that he did not pay. In this example, the prosecution might adduce CCTV or witness evidence of defendant leaving without paying. If the defendant did pay for the item but doesn't have a receipt, he can still give witness testimony in his own defence. The prosecution is unlikely to have strong evidence to the contrary if payment was in fact made. The totality of evidence, put before a jury or summary court, will be considered in the round when establishing guilt. | The term "illegal" is also often used for actions that the law prohibits, but that give rise to civil liability, rather than criminal prosecution. We see such use a lot in questions on Law.SE. One also says that a person "is liable" when there are grounds for a civil suit against that person. One might also say that such a person "has commited a tort" or "has civil liability" or "could be held liable". In the specific cases of copyright, trademark, and patent law, one says that a violator "his infringed" or has committed infringement" and that an act contrary to those laws "is an infringement". |
Does my phone company have the right to charge me later for a service that I never requested? I have a phone service that charge a flat rate every month providing 30GB data at high speeds and then unlimited data at 2G. Now I noticed that as I finished my 30GB data quota, the company never slowed down my data speed as it promised. So far I have used about 40GB high speed data this month and the system shows my data balance is negative. Surely I am enjoying more (unlimited?) high speed data, but I am wondering if eventually they will charge me for the high speed data that I used after the 30GB limit. Since I never requested high speed data beyond 30GB and the company did not slow down my data speed as it promised, I am basically receiving a free service that is neither promised by the company nor requested by me. Does the company have the right to charge me eventually for the high speed data that I used? Will they likely to do so? Or maybe it is simply a loophole that I am not responsible of (in which case I can use as much high speed data as I need with no consequence)? | To me it appears that your agreement includes 30GB at high speed, and unlimited data at 2G or better. The phone company may have valid internal reasons to offer those 10GB at better-than-2G speeds, for instance the lack of a 2G network in your area. Since they are the only party that can reasonably throttle the network data speed (it's their network), you can't be held responsible for the fact that they delivered data faster than they promised. | IANAL, and as @GeorgeBailey suggests, you should ask one. That said, some aspects of your question are directly addressable with what we know. Does US law states anything about this? Yes. Federally this falls under the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §2511. Workplace monitoring generally falls under either the "System Administrator Exception" or under Consent. In general, continuing past a banner constitutes consent. Does company policy enforcement with such a warning over ride the right to not be subject to surveillance? In general, yes. You don't need to use the companies network if you don't want to consent - and they don't need to hire you if you don't want to use their network. But it's their network, and their rules apply. There are some nuances, and courts have found that the wording of the notice has made a difference in some cases, but overall, if the systems are properly posted with banners, then the employer may capture communications. See the "Bannering and Consent" section of this article from cybertelecom.org, e.g.: Even if no clicking is required, a user who sees the banner before logging on to the network has received notice of the monitoring. By using the network in light of the notice, the user impliedly consents to monitoring pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c)-(d). Note that stored data is covered by different laws than communications. It's a nuance. Is it ethical to sniff all the data without giving any other warning than the logon banner? "Ethical" is a very different question than "Legal", and largely more subjective. Most employers require signed consent for monitoring as a condition of employment, and use banners thereafter. That is ethical by my definition, in that it meets or exceeds the requirements of the law, and does not mislead or use subterfuge. The tone of your question suggests you find it distasteful, and therefore probably it violates your personal code of ethics. | My guess is the answer to this question is going to be in your lease. You likely signed a lease that agreed that you would pay accept this practice and spelled out what ever rights you have to challenge the billings. My guess is they are as limited as the courts will allow in Florida. And the only way to ensure access to those records would be to get the court to compel they provide you with the records. Perusal of the Water codes in Florida does not appear to directly engage this practice(I could have missed it). However it appears that there is code regulating the management of electrical limits the billing to no more than the actual costs to the customer of record(probably your real estate management company.) According the the NCSL (This refers to electrical service. I am assuming there is similar language used elsewhere for plumbing, or that the intent of the law is uniformity of these codes in all utility billings. Where individual metering is not required and master metering is used in lieu thereof, reasonable apportionment methods, including submetering may be used by the customer of record or the owner of such facility solely for the purpose of allocating the cost of the electricity billed by the utility. The term “cost” as used herein means only those charges specifically authorized by the electric utility's tariff, including but not limited to the customer, energy, demand, fuel, conservation, capacity and environmental charges made by the electric utility plus applicable taxes and fees to the customer of record responsible for the master meter payments. The term does not include late payment charges, returned check charges, the cost of the customer-owned distribution system behind the master meter, the customer of record's cost of billing the individual units, and other such costs. Any fees or charges collected by a customer of record for electricity billed to the customer's account by the utility, whether based on the use of submetering or any other allocation method, shall be determined in a manner which reimburses the customer of record for no more than the customer's actual cost of electricity. Each utility shall develop a standard policy governing the provisions of submetering as provided for herein. Such policy shall be filed by each utility as part of its tariffs. The policy shall have uniform application and shall be nondiscriminatory (Fla. Administrative Code §25-6.049). Now here is where the 3rd party comes in. The 3rd party is the one levying fees for the management on your landlord. Granted if you follow the strings ill bet you find that the billing company is owned by the same company that owns your rental management firm. So your landlord can collect no more than what it costs to provide you with the service, but part of providing the service is employing this 3rd party utility management firm. | It would depend on your contract. Clearly, if I was selling timber and you ordered some with the agreement that I'll try to deliver at date X with no extra penalties, it would cost some amount. If we had a contract where I deliver at date X and pay for all your cost if the timber doesn't arrive at that date, then I'll either refuse to take the contract or charge you more. Maybe substantially more. | I will try to answer some of my questions based on recent developments and other information I've seen. Yes. 2. No. On page 23 of this Commerce Dept. memo on TikTok, it describes: This prohibition would remove the TikTok app from U.S.-based mobile app stores, preventing mobile users from being able to download the app to their devices or receive updates. As scoped, this prohibition would only apply to app stores accessible in the United States, thus users would still be able to download the app while outside the United States. On page 15 of this Commerce Dept. memo on WeChat, it describes: This prohibition would remove the WeChat app from U.S.-based mobile app stores, preventing mobile users from being able to download the app to their devices or receive updates. As scoped, this prohibition would only apply to app stores accessible in the United States, thus users would still be able to download the app while outside the United States. 3,4,5. No for WeChat. In letters sent to the opposite party in a lawsuit and filed with the court, the US government has provided assurances that WeChat users will not have any civil or criminal liability for downloading or using the app for personal or business communication. we can provide assurances that the Secretary does not intend to take actions that would target persons or groups whose only connection with WeChat is their use or downloading of the app to convey personal or business information between users, or otherwise define the relevant transactions in such a way that would impose criminal or civil liability on such users. In other words, while use of the app for such communications could be directly or indirectly impaired through measures targeted at other transactions, use and downloading of the app for this limited purpose will not be a defined transaction, and such users will not be targeted or subject to penalties. I'm not entirely sure for TikTok, but the same may be true for TikTok since the prohibited transactions for both are essentially the same. No. The regulations on prohibited transactions do not require the blocking of traffic from the apps. Simply carrying the traffic of the app is not one of the prohibited transactions, as long as the company does not have a contract for internet transit or peering with ByteDance/Tencent, nor are providing hosting or content delivery services to ByteDance/Tencent. On page 23 of the Commerce Dept. memo on TikTok linked above, it says: User data could still be served by data centers, [redacted] operating outside of the United States. On page 7 of this declaration by a Commerce Dept. official further explains that WeChat traffic will still flow through the US: Moreover, this prohibition would not affect Internet transit or peering services in the United States that are not “directly contracted or arranged” by Tencent, and thus would leave the overwhelming majority of Internet traffic, including WeChat data, untouched. | The provider has a legitimate interest in the data subjects data, and therefore they can override the right of deletion. See this example from the UK's Information Commissioners Office: A finance company is unable to locate a customer who has stopped making payments under a hire purchase agreement. The customer has moved house without notifying the finance company of their new address. The finance company wants to engage a debt collection agency to find the customer and seek repayment of the debt. It wants to disclose the customer’s personal data to the agency for this purpose. The finance company has a legitimate interest in recovering the debt it is owed and in order to achieve this purpose it is necessary for them to use a debt collection agency to track down the customer for payment owed. The finance company considers the balancing test and concludes that it is reasonable for its customers to expect that they will take steps to seek payment of outstanding debts. It is clear that the interests of the customer are likely to differ from those of the finance company in this situation, as it may suit the customer to evade paying their outstanding debt. However, the legitimate interest in passing the personal data to a debt collection agency in these circumstances would not be overridden by the interests of the customer. The balance would be in favour of the finance company. Article 17 of the GDPR, the "Right to be forgotten", says this: The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller the erasure of personal data concerning him or her without undue delay and the controller shall have the obligation to erase personal data without undue delay where one of the following grounds applies: A) the personal data are no longer necessary in relation to the purposes for which they were collected or otherwise processed; B) the data subject withdraws consent on which the processing is based according to point (a) of Article 6(1), or point (a) of Article 9(2), and where there is no other legal ground for the processing; C) the data subject objects to the processing pursuant to Article 21(1) and there are no overriding legitimate grounds for the processing, or the data subject objects to the processing pursuant to Article 21(2); In your example, it's obvious that the personal data is still necessary for performance of the contract (Art 6(1)(b)) such as collecting payment, or for fulfilling legal obligations (Art 6(1)(c), Art 17(3)(b)) such as the obligation to keep financial records. Thus, there continues to be a legal basis for processing/keeping the data and rejecting the erasure request in whole or in part. Things are slightly different when the legal basis for this processing was consent (Art 6(1)(a)) or a legitimate interest (Art 6(1)(f)). Consent can always be withdrawn, but this kind of data collection is not typically based on consent. You can sometimes object to processing under a legitimate interest (see Art 21) but that doesn't work when the data controller has overriding legitimate grounds to continue processing. Such overriding grounds might be the legitimate interest to pursue the debt, and Art 21(1) and Art 17(3)(e) explicitly call out the “establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims” as overriding grounds. So that covers requests under A, B and C. Things like legal basis and erasure/objection must be analyzed on a per-purpose basis, so it is possible that you could get a partial erasure, such as erasing information that's only necessary for marketing (compare also objection per Art 21(2)). But its quite clear to me that a data subject cannot get out of paying a bill by using the GDPR. | You ask permission, preferably with legal counsel to handle the details. It really is that simple. Unsurprisingly, most companies don't want to give their code away- especially to a competitor. If you even get a response, they will expect something in return i.e. money. Realistically though, it's unlikely they will respond, much less deal with you. | There is no misrepresentation by the bank as you describe it, there is negligence by the account holder to comply with the terms of the account. The bank made no representation at all regarding a balance due. If you want the bank to be at fault, they the customer would have to demand a declaration as to the existence of a balance due (choose your words carefully), and the bank would have to have falsely asserted that there is no present or future obligation. This is not going to happen. All the bank can say is that they have no present record of charges. The customer's question might be something like "Do you guarantee that there will be no charges to this account as of now". Of course, the bank cannot know whether there is a forthcoming paper charge that was made at some mountain resort. If case they did make such a promise, you could disavow the debt, using your reliance on their assertion as the basis for denying the debt. There is no law requiring banks to warn people of their contractual obligations when they close an account. I've never encountered a credit card contract that includes such a clause, but I suppose some bank might include a mandatory-warning clause, in which case they could be in breach of contract. |
Requested to remove YouTube embeds? I used the YouTube API to play a series of videos hosted by one particular YouTube channel of national (US) prestige. About a month later, I received a letter from one of their attorneys requesting to remove the "republished" videos since permission was not granted. They pointed to the YouTube terms of service (5B): You shall not copy, reproduce, distribute, transmit, broadcast, display, sell, license, or otherwise exploit any Content for any other purposes without the prior written consent of YouTube or the respective licensors of the Content. However, my research and re-reading of the terms seems like it's pretty cut and dry that if the embedding functionality is offered, it's fair to use (non-monetary purposes at that) (6C): You also hereby grant each user of the Service a non-exclusive license to access your Content through the Service, and to use, reproduce, distribute, display and perform such Content as permitted through the functionality of the Service and under these Terms of Service. These two sections seem in conflict with each other (You've granted permissions for users to do these things, but "under these Terms of Service" they must receive your permission?). What I've read (Quora, blog posts, etc) suggests that what I had built violated no copyright and was well within the terms of service. I've taken the material down, so I'm not looking for specific legal advice in this specific situation, but I am curious about how this community would interpret this situation. Right or wrong, I have no time, money, or energy to fight them for what was a single page side project, but given how pervasive embedding YouTube videos is, some clarity on the above two clauses would be valuable! | The question that you need to answer is whether, when you embed, you "copy, reproduce, distribute, transmit, broadcast, display, sell, license, or otherwise exploit any Content". It seems that you have done that, i.e. you didn't just "watch". The next question is whether you have "prior written consent of YouTube". Youtube requires a license from contributors granting users the right to "access your Content through the Service, and to use, reproduce, distribute, display and perform such Content as permitted through the functionality of the Service and under these Terms of Service". To fill the gap, you have to determine whether your act of embedding is permitted by the Youtube TOS. Their TOS states §2A that "The Service" includes the YouTube "Embeddable Player". It also says §4 YouTube hereby grants you permission to access and use the Service as set forth in these Terms of Service, provided that: (A) You agree not to distribute in any medium any part of the Service or the Content without YouTube's prior written authorization, unless YouTube makes available the means for such distribution through functionality offered by the Service (such as the Embeddable Player). On the face of it and as long as you do the stuff that follows in B-I, you have complied with that requirement and therefore you have written permission from Youtube. | The section you quote as clearly saying a thing is not clearly saying the thing. However: you cannot pass on or resell any license keys seems to say a thing clearly. However, one could argue that it's the sharer of the account who is in the wrong, and not the person receiving and passing on the account. I'd say that that piece of the agreement, combined with this: must not... let other people get access to anything we've made in a way that is unfair or unreasonable says that, yes, they are out of bounds. | You also retain the right to license the work to others. Therefore you can sell similar rights to MusicBook and anyone else, as long as you do not grant an exclusive license (you have already licensed another party to distribute). They do not gain the right to sub-license your work. If you had executed a copyright transfer, you would have no rights to the work whatsoever (leaving out moral rights for jurisdictions that have them and where they are absolute). | The Youtube terms of service allow you to play music, and they do not impose any condition to the effect that you have to be alone in a soundproof room to play music. The school district might have a rule prohibiting the playing of music on school grounds (presumably with an exception for music classes), but there are too many school districts in Alabama to research that question. You might ask the superintendent of your local district about such rules, if it's important. Copyright law does include a separate requirement for permission to perform publicly, for example the music played in a store requires a performance license. Under 17 USC 106(4), the copyright owner has the exclusive right to authorize a person "to perform the copyrighted work publicly". The definitions section says what it means to perform publicly: (1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered; or (2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times. It does seem that we're in the realm of a "public performance", since the law does not specifically say "intentionally play so that others can hear it" (we don't know whether the teacher is being unintentionally overheard). However, the purpose of the performance license is to cover businesses that rely on playing music to make a buck, and is not intended to force people to watch out if strangers / co-workers are listening. There is a classroom-use exception, whereby teachers can perform music for instructional purposes, which this probably isn't. However, the Youtube TOS does say that all content-providers also grant each other user of the Service a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free licence to access your Content through the Service, and to use that Content (including to reproduce, distribute, modify, display, and perform it) only as enabled by a feature of the Service. Therefore the teacher has permission to perform: except if the content is illegally uploaded by someone lacking the right to grant permissions (and to upload, in general). If you suspect that someone has illegally uploaded some artist's content to Youtube, you can contact the copyright holder with relevant information. They may or may not pursue a DMCA takedown; if they do, and they are really gung-ho, they could try go to recover lost licensing revenue. It isn't clear that there is a license for "teacher laying music that others can hear". | The part about "If I'm the owner of the content, surely I have the right to request its deletion" is the problem. Sure, you have the right to request, but you can't legally compel. You have an agreement with them, according to which you got something, and they got something. You can't then take back the thing that you gave them, which is permission to use. You didn't give them the IP itself, which you still hold. Here's an analogy. You may own a car, and can give a person permission to use the car (let's say "if you bring me back a pound of cheese from the store"). You cannot later change your mind (especially after you've gotten the cheese) a say that you retract that permission and therefore they actually stole your car. When permission to use is given, as long as the conditions for granting permission are satisfied, you can't un-give permission. | I very much suspect she is in right to 1) no receive promotion emails anymore, 2) Have them close the account again and 3) have them delete her pictures. No, she does not have those rights. She agreed to a legally binding contract when she signed up for the service when she clicked "OK" to open the account. That contract outlines her "rights," as you call them, and they can be very different from what you assume to be ethical and moral bounds to a business relationship. What you imagine to be fair business practices could be generally regarded as fair and normal consumer relations; but that's not necessarily what may be in the contract. What she agreed to in the Terms of Service (TOS) could be some form of long term licensing of her photos to the service, and that could be why they won't delete the photos and why she can't delete them in bulk. The TOS states the terms of the promo emails she agreed to receive. Read the TOS; everything will be outlined. The company is in no way obligated to make life easy for her or change the contract to appeal to her; she agreed to everything, including downloading all her photos. If she didn't read the TOS and feels they copied all her photos "without her knowing", that's her fault. It's possible that the company is breaking consumer protection laws with some of their practices, but you'll need to read Canada consumer laws and see if they require ease of use, permanent op-out of emails, etc. I doubt the company would be flagrantly violating consumer law. | This is all outlined at Terms of Service - Stack Exchange When you ask a question, and/or comment on or answer a question, or otherwise participate on an SE site, you license your content to SE. You agree that all Subscriber Content that You contribute to the Network is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license. In turn, (emphasis mine) Subscriber acknowledges that Stack Exchange has no control over, and no duty to take any action regarding: which users gains access to the Network; which Content Subscriber accesses via the Network; what effects the Content may have on Subscriber; how Subscriber may interpret or use the Content; or what actions Subscriber may take as a result of having been exposed to the Content. Much of the Content of the Network is provided by and is the responsibility of the user or subscriber who posted the Content. Stack Exchange does not monitor the Content of the Network and takes no responsibility for such Content. Subscriber releases Stack Exchange from all liability for Subscriber having acquired or not acquired Content through the Network. ... This doesn't mean someone can't sue you anyway, notwithstanding that disclaimer. Anyone can sue anyone in civil court. That's the way the system works. Someone could track you down and sue you for the (bad) advice you gave that cooked their Macbook, even though they got that advice on SE and SE states that SE is not responsible for any damages resulting from the use of the information. The TOS of all SE site(s) shows that anyone who uses SE sites is bound by this click-through agreement, even if they didn't read it. And that should suffice in a court if it gets that far. It should suffice for any attorney thinking of taking the case of someone who wants to sue you. Again, someone could sue you; but chances are really great that it will never go very far due to the legal nature of SE and your contributions. This SE site - Law SE - has more of a specialized TOS, as practicing law without a license is illegal, and giving legal information as a layperson (or even as an attorney, of which there are some who particpiate here) needs special terms; see the sidebar for this disclaimer and link: Law Stack Exchange is for educational purposes only and is not a substitute for individualized advice from a qualified legal practitioner. Communications on Law Stack Exchange are not privileged communications and do not create an attorney-client relationship. General Disclaimer - Law Stack Exchange So, if you do get sued by someone who cooked their Macbook by following your bad advice, you can ask about the lawsuit here on Law SE. But, unless your question is about general legal procedures, terms, case law, etc. (as outlined at What topics can I ask about here? - Law SE), your question will be closed because this site is not for giving specific legal advice in specific legal situations, especially active lawsuits. You will be advised to talk to an attorney. | Yes, that’s allowed. Under the Stack Exchange terms of service, content you upload is licensed to Stack Exchange Inc. on a non-exclusive basis under CC-BY-SA 4.0. The terms of service do not give Stack Exchange the copyright to your contributions, and a non-exclusive license means you are not promising Stack Exchange that “only Stack Exchange will be allowed to use this content.” That means you can continue to do whatever you want with your own content and do not need to mention Stack Exchange at all. The only restriction is that you can’t stop Stack Exchange from continuing to use your Stack Exchange content under CC-BY-SA 4.0, and since it’s a Creative Commons license you also can’t stop anyone else from using your Stack Exchange content under that license. |
Can you take an employer to court for false promise? When I was interviewing for a contractor job, the hiring manager indicated many times that they would convert my position to full time job within one year. (I resigned from my full time job to take this contractor job due to his verbal promise). During this time, I was offered full time jobs by other companies and I did not accept because of the promised conversion to full time. My manager even stated via Instant Messenger that my request was approved and I was going to be converted. But, now he seems to be playing games and not being straight with me. One year latter, I am still not full time. Do I have a case to go to court so that he cannot do the same thing to other potential future contractors? | One case of a "false promise" suit from an employee to an employer can be seen in the "Toy Yoda" suit, which was settled out of court in favour of the employee. As seen in this news article: PANAMA CITY, Fla. (AP) — A former waitress has settled her lawsuit against Hooters, the restaurant that gave her a toy Yoda doll instead of the Toyota she thought she had won. Jodee Berry, 27, won a beer sales contest last May at the Panama City Beach Hooters. She believed she had won a new Toyota and happily was escorted to the restaurant's parking lot in a blindfold. But when the blindfold was removed, she found she had won a new toy Yoda — the little green character from the Star Wars movies. David Noll, her attorney, said Wednesday that he could not disclose the settlement's details, although he said Berry can now go to a local car dealership and "pick out whatever type of Toyota she wants." After the stunt, Berry quit the restaurant and filed a lawsuit against Gulf Coast Wings, the restaurant's corporate owner, alleging breach of contract and fraudulent misrepresentation. Therefore, at least in some cases, it is possible to sue an employer (and win) for false representation, especially if such claims are clearly made. | You can hire someone to locate the defendant with the information that you have, or you can apply to a court for permission to serve them with process via "substituted service" because their physical address can't be determined. But, in general, better business practice is to not enter into contracts with people with whom you have more than a name that might be false, and an email address, unless you have some means of non-judicial enforcement of your agreement (like the practical ability to shut down access to an internet subscription). If you don't even know if someone's name is real and have done nothing to confirm that then you also have no assurances that they have any assets from which you could collect if you won a breach of contract lawsuit. If you deal with large numbers of people in low value contracts, it may be worth treating the fact that some contracts are effectively unenforceable as a cost of doing business. But, if a contract is important, it was foolish from a business perspective to rely on a contract on that basis alone, even if it is legal to do so. | Most employment in the US is "at will". That means that the employer or the employee can terminate the relationship without notice for any reason or for no reason. There are certain statutory protections that limit this, however, such as federal protections against discrimination on the basis of a protected characteristic. Arizona may have other protections. So the first thing you need to do (or your lawyer needs to do) is determine whether your employment was at will. If so, then it doesn't much matter if the reasons they gave you were lies, unless you can show that their actions constituted illegal discrimination. (If they lied about you to someone else, though, you might be able to go after them for libel or slander.) If your employment was not at will, then you may be able to challenge the reasons for the firing if the firing violated the conditions under which your employment could be terminated. Even if your employment was at will, your firing might fall under one of the exceptions listed in the Wikipedia article: public policy, implied contract, or good faith/fair dealing (although the article gives conflicting information about whether Arizona has an implied contract exception; the text says that it does not, but the map shows that it does). To analyze the facts of your case in connection with Arizona employment law, you really need to talk to a lawyer with a practice in Arizona employment law. The lawyer will want to review your contract or other written agreement, if there is one. | Contracts can say all sorts of unenforceable things, you provided an example of one of them. A person cannot be compelled to stay and work somewhere they no longer wish to work. At the risk of getting my wrist slapped for straying too far into the land of opinion, a clause like this is likely intended to take advantage of naive teenagers who will provide free employment referrals because they think they have to. | If I did not sign promotion bonus document, my career would be over. Is this duress? No. The premise is hardly true or even logical, and what you describe falls short of duress. Not every imbalance of bargain power implies duress. First, it seems that you could have declined the bonus, thereby preempting the sanction/remedy for leaving within 12 months. Second, it seems hard to prove (and unrealistic) that your career would have been over if you refused to sign the document. The employer can easily refute that allegation by pointing out that there are many others who did not sign that employer's document and yet work elsewhere as investment bankers. You would need certain, additional context to reasonably allow for a conclusion that your career altogether depends on what happens with this single entity. Third, your mention that "the bonus mitigates the horrendous weekly hours" reinforces the idea that signing the document was your preference (namely, for the purpose of obtaining some additional, non-compulsory stimulus) rather than employer-inflicted duress. The rationale and decision for acceptance of those conditions reflects that you knowingly exercised your freedom of contract. A party is not entitled to void a contract only because he belatedly changed his mind about conditions of which he was aware beforehand. | Assumed: United States jurisdiction, no discrimination component to your experiences. There is not a legal limit on how much time an employer requires you to be in another city so long as the employer is complying with wage and hour laws, family leave laws, and the like. They may be in violation of their employment contract with you if the contract specified that you were being hired for a position in one city. A four-week trip does not sound like "time travelling" to me, it sounds like a temporary posting in another city. Similarly, depending on how well the contract is drafted, the state whose law governs the employment, and the company's other behavior you may be able to sue them using material misrepresentation or fraudulent statements about the position you would be taking. If you want more insight into whether you might have a case, take your contract to an attorney. In practice, however, the solution is almost certainly not a lawsuit. The solution may be to start looking for a new job, to communicate better with your boss, or to figure out how much money it would take to keep you working doing the job you are actually doing rather than the one you were hired to do, and to negotiate a salary increase. Try posting your question with a few more facts over at workplace.stackexchange.com for more insight into how to deal with the problem professionally. | It seems that this is known as a "working interview". Asking a candidate to do actual work without paying for it is illegal under Texas law. However asking a person to take an extensive, even a multi-day, skills test is not. Asking a prospective web developer to submit a portfolio of prior work, or to design a web site for a fictional company, say for the Acme Company that supplies the Coyote, is legal. Had the applicant created a web site for the actual employer without being paid, the applicant would own the copyright, and the prospective employer would be in violation of Texas minimum wage law, and would have committed copyright infringement if they used the design, without securing permission. Statutory damages for wilful copyright infringement can be as high as $150,000, and as low as $750. A federal suit must be filed to collect such damages. However, if no actual work was done, I doubt that the applicant has a valid claim. One would need to consult a lawyer to see if some other basis for a claim would apply. Many lawyers will offer an initial consultation for free or a nominal charge. Here are some Texas sources on the issues with "working interviews". The page "Are “Working Interviews” Legal?" from the Gay Reed law firm says: If you bring someone in for a working interview you must pay them for their time in compliance with state and federal law and make appropriate withholding. Some believe that since they are only going to be there for a few days, you don’t have to do new-hire paperwork. Just skip the I-9, background check, application, and W-2. Wrong again. If you hire anyone – for 1 day or 1,000, you have to do new hire paperwork. Depending on how long you would like to conduct your interview, we can create a day contract or a week contract for the prospective employee. This will limit your exposure under unemployment compensation laws, and you can even reduce the amount you pay. Where you might pay a good hygienist $20 per hour or more as a full time wage, you can pay them minimum wage during a working interview. The page "What Is a “Working Interview” and How Does It Work? from CEDR HR Solutions says: A “working interview” is the act of assessing a job candidate’s skills and ability to fit with your existing team by bringing them in to perform work for your business temporarily before you officially bring them on board. Traditionally, working interviews take place after a successful verbal interview. ... However, using working interviews does not exempt you from your obligations as an employer, and performing working interviews without understanding their legal implications can actually get you in a lot of trouble. ... If your “interviewee” is performing work for your business that would usually be performed by one of your employees, in a legal sense, that person must be treated as an employee of your business. By testing your applicants’ abilities and knowledge without having them perform actual work for your business, you can get an idea of their skill level without putting your practice at risk. “Skills tests” are especially helpful when it comes to evaluating candidates for clinical positions. ... Instead of performing an unpaid working interview or trying to call someone an independent contractor when they do not fit those requirements, hire them and use a “Getting Acquainted” period to judge whether a new hire will be a long-term fit for your practice (90 days is often a good span of time for this). The Texas Workforce Commission (TWC) has a page on "Interviews" which says: Interviews When interviewing applicants, apply the same standard that is applied to job applications - ask only about things that are directly related to the job requirements for the position under consideration. Watch out for tape-recording - the applicant might be tape-recording the interview without an employer's knowledge, and a video- or tape-recording of an interview would be discoverable in a discrimination claim or lawsuit. Tell the managers who conduct interviews to be extremely careful about note-taking during interviews - anything like that can be discovered in a claim or lawsuit - many discrimination cases have been lost due to careless and/or embarrassing comments written by interviewers. Test for whether something should be written down: would you feel comfortable explaining it in front of a judge and jury? "Working interviews" are not the same as pre-hire interviews at which an interviewee might demonstrate how he or she would carry out a sample task - an "interview" during which the worker performs actual work and receives what most companies would call "on the job" training or orientation to the company is work time - a company must pay at least minimum wage for such training time, satisfy all of the usual new-hire paperwork requirements (W-4, I-9, new hire report, and so on), and report the wages to TWC and IRS. The TWC can be reached at: 512-463-2222 The TWC page on the minimum wage says that Texas uses the federal minimum wage of $7.25/hr. It lists several exceptions, none of which seem to apply to the situation described in the question, or rather the situation that would have occurred had the applicant accepted an "unpaid trial" or "working interview". The actual Texas law is Chapter 62 of the Labor Code The exact section is 62.051. | Nah, you can't. First of all, you can't require the other party anything until you have a contract. They owe nothing to you. Once you've got an offer from them (i.e. a written contract they offer you to sign), you can ask them to clarify the terms as much as you wish — until they get bored and withdraw the offer. You also can make counteroffers: draft your own contract instead and offer them to sign. (Note that by doing this you kill their initial offer i.e. you can't accept it anymore unless they offer it again). Misrepresentation (let alone fraudulent) is not relevant until proven. Lack of clarity or complex legalese language is no misrepresentation. |
Is a list of the most common English words copyrightable under US law? I am currently interested in doing some research performing various measurements and algorithms on the most common words in the English language. I have found a few good word lists online that would be suitable, but I am concerned that they may be subject to copyright and would like to be sure about their status before I use them. The lists are in the form of a simple text file with one word per line. I understand that collections of words such as dictionaries are subject to copyright because they contain a large amount of words and their definitions which can be considered to require original work and creativity, but what about just words without any definitions or additional information? I have seen this other Law Stack Exchange question, which mentions lists of words, but the author seems to have been interested in also using some short definitions, and I am not certain the answer refers to plain word lists. Is a list of common words copyrightable? If so, would it still be considered fair use to use the word list to generate data not related to the words themselves? | Depending on your jurisdiction, such lists may be protected, but not by copyright. For example, in Germany there was a court decision that scanning all the country’s phone books and selling them on CD constituted “unfair competition” and was illegal, while hiring 1000 typists who would manually type in all this information would not be. Databases are protected in many jurisdictions, and a list of the 1000 most commonly used English words could reasonably be called a database. | Person A has to have created the data to hold copyright; for most kinds of data this has no legal effect because facts are not protected by copyright. A mineable database probably does not have the necessary creative elements for copyright. An algorithm is not protected by copyright (it might be patented). Person C's program is copyrighted. The product created by D is probably copyrighted, depending on what degree of creativity is involved in their transformation. If the transformation is automatic then no, but if creative judgments are applied to the output of the program then maybe. Though the resulting product is another database of facts, and the facts cannot be protected. In terms of "using the model", only C and possibly B have any control. If it is necessary to validate the software using A's data and A has kept the data secret, C might negotiate with A to use the data, in order to complete his program, and that could give A some interest in the program. | First of all there is no such thing as "fair use" in the UK, that is a specifically US legal concept, and it does not apply in the UK. The UK has a legal concept that is somewhat similar, known as "fair dealing" but it is much more limited than the US concept of fair use. See this Wikipedia article and this page from the British Library In general Fair Dealing is an exception to copyright that permits use for: purposes of research or private study; purposes of criticism, review or quotation; purposes of reporting current events (this does not apply to photographs) None of those seem to apply to an image from a TV show or film modified to add two additional characters as if they had appeared in the original. Unless somehow this is being used for criticism of the original, but the question does not mention any such criticism. The Wikipedia article says: Under United Kingdom law, an infringer relying on fair dealing as a defence must show that their actions fall into a specific category of acceptable use, as opposed to the "illustrative open list of purposes" in US law.[4] The fair dealing exceptions had previously been formalised in case law as "fair use" forms, but this was eliminated by the Copyright Act 1911. The use as described in the question appears to be a case of copyright infringement by creating a derivative work. It does not seem to come under fair dealing in the UK, and might well not be a valid fair use under US law, either. Whether any profit is made by the infringer is not relevant. Whether the market for the original is harmed is relevant, but not decisive. However, when used for a small private circulation of less than 10 copies, it is unlikely that the copyright owner would sue, or indeed would ever learn of the existence of the infringement. if posted to the net, however, this is much less safe. Programs exist to make automated searches of the web or of images listed on search engines for images similar to a copyrighted work. If such a search finds a similar image, the copyright holder might choose to file an infringement suit. This is entirely up to the copyright holder. Such a suit might result in significant damages. It is not, however, likely to lead to criminal prosecution unless mass commercial infringement is discovered. One of the things copyright protects is the right to create, or authorize the creation of, derivative works. Thus it is never correct to say that something is "mine because it is derivative". If the derivative work is made without permission, and the original is protected by copyright, than simply making the derivative work is a copyright infringement, jsut like making an unauthorized copy of the original. Fair use (in the US) or fair dealing (in the UK) is such an exception to copyright. Several of the EU nations have exceptions similar (but not identical) to the UK fair dealing. These are often called "fair dealing" when discussed in English. Most include exceptions for criticism and classroom instruction. None are as broad as the US fair use concept, to the best of my understanding. The only way to be fully lawful about this would be to contact the copyright holder and request permission for the derivative work, and get it. I cannot say if the holder would grant such permission, or on what terms. The holder has no duty to grant permission on any terms, or even to reply to a request. No reply must be treated the same as a reply of "No!", I am afraid. | The main impediment is identifying exactly what "a law" is. When people talk (casually) about "the law", that can refer to statutes enacted by Congress, regulations set forth by administrative agencies to articulate specifics of those statutes, and Supreme Court rulings as to what "the law" is or says. The canonical example of "a law" is a statute passed by Congress. Under that understanding, you could point to the US Code and ask the question "how many", though you may have to also subtract things ruled unconstitutional by SCOTUS (they aren't removed from The Code, unless actually repealed by Congress). In the US code, there isn't an enumerable element "a law". Title 17 pertains to copyright; Title 18 pertains to crime. There isn't just one law about crime and one law about copyright. There are 12 chapters in Title 17; Chapter 1 has a couple dozen sections. Sections can get fairly minutely subdivided: there is no clear point at which you can say "this is one law, this is another". However, it is legally irrelevant how many there are – unless Congress passes a law that counts likes ("must repeal two laws for every new one passed"). The immediate product of congressional enactments is the US Code; the immediate product of administrative rule-making is the Code of Federal Regulations. Supreme Court decisions are also published in United States Reports, though I don't if there is an exhaustive online compendium of all rulings. Also note that things passed by Congress are "Laws" (some public, some private). Things in the US Code originate in such acts of Congree, but not every act of Congress affects the US Code, for example PL 118-81. When new subject matter is first introduced it is usually entirely contained in the corresponding law passed, but subsequently it can be amended, and an amendment to copyright law could be snuck into a bill generally about terrorism. I think that the stuff in the US Code corresponds to what most people think "a law" is, but it's better to look at the US Code as a single thing – "the law" – rather than try to count individual laws. If you are armed with access to all of these resources, you would also need to know where to find relevant law. Once you find all of the applicable text, you simply apply general legal principles to reach a conclusion, then hire a lawyer to determine where you went wrong, then hire another lawyer to determine where he went wrong. At least in difficult cases. Fortunately, although enacted bills often glue stuff together in crazy ways, when it is assembled into the US Code, it is organized more sensibly. Still, not all crimes are defined in title 18 (there 1re 52 other titles to search to find crimes). | No, it means you can't copy it. By default, the copyright to a work is owned by its creator, and nobody else is allowed to copy it, or create derived works, without their permission. That permission can be granted by a license. "License unknown" doesn't really tell us anything, but it certainly isn't clearly granting you permission. So you don't have permission to copy, and thus you cannot. You would have to seek permission from the copyright holder. See also If no licence is distributed with an application/source code, what license applies by default if any? (Some jurisdictions do allow for "fair use" exceptions, which allow you to copy a work without permission. You haven't said what jurisdiction you are in.) | Whether the use of excerpts from songs protected by copyright in the cover version of a different song is a "fair use" under US law is always a fact-driven question, and often there is no clear answer to fair use issues short of a lawsuit. One must remember that fair use is a specifically united-states legal concept, and that reproduction of such a cover version outside the US would not be protected by fair use, even if it was fair use under US law. Fair use is defined by 17 USC 107. That law spells out the four factors that must always be considered in any fair use claim. They are: (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. These have been explained and analyzed in several answers here on law.se, recently including this answer. In this case the commercial nature of the compilation probably causes factor (1) to lean against fair use. The creative character of the songs being used will cause factor (2) to lean slightly against fair use. That the use is for a charitable purpose might have a positive effect on factor (1), although it does not fit the "educational" purpose specifically mentioned in the law. I don't see how this would be in any way relevant to the other three factors, but it might influence the decisions of copyright owners. There is not enough information in the question to even approximate an analysis of the other two factors in this case. Note that the "substantiality" mentioned in factor (2) refers to how much of the source work is used, not how large a part of the resulting work it forms. Note also that there is a wide range of what has been acceptable here. In one famous case (Harper v Nation Enterprises) some 300 words of a 500 page book were found not to be fair use because they were held to be the "heart of the work"; in that case there was also a substantial market effect. One might want to consult a lawyer with expertise in copyright and music to get a better idea if the specific use seems likely to be a fair use. Alternatively, one could ask the copyright owners of the works of which excerpts are to be included if a license can be obtained. Some owners will in some cases provide licenses for a small fee or even for no fee if the source is properly acknowledged. Others will not. Licensing of one song by a given artist does not affect whether use of another song by the same artist is or is not fair use, but it might influence the willingness of that artist to license the second song on favorable terms. | Copyright in the US is usually a civil matter. Meaning that the copyright owner can sue (typically for money damages or injunctive relief) an infringer. The criminal laws that we have are aimed at the reproducer and/or distributor. In other words, chances are that you won't get in any criminal trouble for accessing academic articles of dubious origin. But never say never. RIP Aaron Schwartz. | Here is an example: The Author agrees to hold harmless and indemnify the Journal and The University against any legal claim or action or expense of any nature arising from any claim of infringement of copyrights or proprietary rights resulting from publication of the manuscript or claims of libel, obscenity, unlawfulness or invasion of privacy arising out of anything contained in the manuscript as furnished by the Author. Suppose Author infringes the copyright of Jones, by copying large parts of it into Author's work. Author is now in legal trouble because he illegally copied stuff into his manuscript, but Journal is also in big (bigger) legal trouble, because it made many copies of Jones' word and sold them. Jones will now sue everybody, mostly the Journal (since Journal has money, and Author doesn't). Thanks to the indemnity clause, when Journal gets sued, all of the costs (of litigation and judgment) have to be born by Author. The primary purpose is to protect Journal from suits by third parties. Nothing can keep you from getting sued, but such a clause (theoretically) means that the person whom your contracting with has to cover the cost of his wrong-doing (assuming that he is not a turnip). The term "hold harmless" is there to guarantee that Author can't decide to sue Journal for publishing a libelous or infringing article. The functions are similar, but not totally the same: this and references therein could be interesting reading, by way of more details. He argues against using both terms, and instead you should use only "indemnify". In this case, the court said "When two words are used in a contract, the rule of construction is that the words have different meanings", which caused the court to assign distinct meanings to the words (which are typically used as though they mean the same thing), which doesn't seem to have been the original intent. |
Document proving date of receiving U.S. citizenship I am currently trying to obtain a German passport, my mother is German and therefore I have a right to citizenship. However, German citizenship laws say that you can lose German citizenship if you apply and choose to take up another passport. I obtained a U.S. passport while I was a minor, because my father held a U.S. passport and I was a legal U.S. resident, therefore I was automatically eligible as his child. I have spoken with the German embassy in London (I am also British, by birth), and provided all relevant documents and they confirmed with me my eligibility for a German passport, however they require proof of how/when I obtained my U.S. passport to prove that it does not contravene the aforementioned policy about obtaining new citizenship. That's where I'm having some trouble, I need documentation to prove that I obtained citizenship while still a minor. I became a U.S. citizen quite close to my 18th birthday so my passport issue date fell after my 18th birthday. I don't have any documentation from the process of getting my U.S. citizenship, so I'm at a loss of how to get the documents I need. I looked up the process on the USCIS website, and it looks like a form N-600 would have been submitted. Is there some way I could get a copy of it from the government, or is there another document that would be able to provide the proof I need? Update: If there is a way to prove when I received my green card, that might also suffice. As with that information I could prove that on that date I fulfilled all of the criteria to be automatically a U.S. citizen. | Here is everything that I learnt throughout this process: I was not born a U.S. citizen, and I did not naturalise. Instead, I inherited U.S. citizenship at the moment I became an LPR (Legal Permanent Resident), because I both had a parent with citizenship and I was under the age of 18. There is no paperwork to file to inherit citizenship this way, it is completely automatic and as a result there are people in the U.S. that do not know they are citizens. In order to assert that I was now a U.S. citizen, I just had to apply for either a U.S. passport, or a Certificate of Citizenship. There is no deadline to do this, because I was a fully-fledged citizen from the day of approval of my Permanent Residence application. When I applied for my U.S. passport, I simply had to prove that I was a child at the time of receiving my Green Card, and that one parent was a U.S. citizen. This is exactly what I had to provide the German consulate. I provided my own birth certificate, my I-485 form (with approval date) and my father's naturalisation certificate. Those were accepted without question. To obtain a copy of my Form I-485, I had to file a FOIA request--I used a Form G-639 to make it easier--and I emailed it to [email protected]. I did attempt to get a copy of my passport application, as I filed that while under 18, but I was told by the State Department that they did not have a copy of it (curiously, several months later a full copy of my original passport application arrived by post from the State Department...). The response was not a surprise as when I applied for a passport at the age of 17, I was told by the official that they do not keep a record of my application, so I should also have a Passport Card in case my passport goes missing and I must prove citizenship. Under German citizenship law, one loses citizenship when "voluntarily" obtaining another citizenship. The reason that I did not lose my citizenship when I became a U.S. citizen was because: I was a child, and it happened automatically. Therefore, it is not considered voluntary. Luckily, I did not have to explain this, since it was a consulate in the U.S. (Houston, TX) that I visited, they were well aware of the way in which I inherited U.S. citizenship. However, I had some trouble when dealing with the London embassy as they did not understand all of the U.S. citizenship qualifiers. I hope this helps anyone else that finds themselves in a similar situation! I was completely lost when I started this process, but three months later I have my German passport in my hand. | No. Refusing to tell the address alone is not a reason to detain somebody. But there are situations where the authorities can demand that a person identifies himself or herself, including such details as the address (or lack of a permanent residency). In such a situation, failure to identify yourself can get you locked up. Also, the tone of your posting seems to question the legitimacy of the UK government and legal system as a whole. That is a box you're putting yourself into, and the company you find there is not very pleasant. | There is, of course, no way to tell how the Court would deal with such a case today. This is not a frequently litigated issue, with lots of case law. I note that in the case you link to, the court limited the statute to false claims made "with a fraudulent purpose". This normally means that the claimant is attempting to secure an improper financial or materiel advantage. In the United States v. Tandaric case, the person convicted had falsely claimed to be a US Citizen on an employment application for a company which did not hire non-citizens, and so gained a job through this false statement. He could have been convicted of ordinary Fraud. The court has not been as protective of Fraud under the First Amendment as it has been of speech generally, or even of false but non-fraudulent speech. I am not at all sure if the court would overturn this law in a similar case today. Edit: In the United States v. Achtner case, the court wrote: But we agree with the District Court that the representation of citizenship must still be made to a person having some right to inquire or adequate reason for ascertaining a defendant's citizenship; it is not to be assumed that so severe a penalty is intended for words spoken as a mere boast or jest or to stop the prying of some busybody, ... This seems to dispose of the example in the question of a neighbor who is merly inquiring as to the character of the area, or perhaps from simple curiosity, and a false speaker who seems to get no direct benefit or advantage from the falsehood. Both linked cases involved false statements made to employers or potential employees, during wartime at that, with the false speaker's employment apparently at stake. | If you falsely claim to be a US citizen in order to obtain work, vote in a US election, or receive public benefits in the United States, you can be deported, lose a green card, or be banned from ever obtaining a green card or US Visa. See https://dyanwilliamslaw.com/2015/02/why-lying-about-being-a-u-s-citizen-can-stop-you-from-becoming-a-permanent-resident-and-what-you-can-do-to-overcome-this-obstacle/ and https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/how-falsely-claiming-us-citizen-can-deportable.html for more detail. This very much includes checking an incorrect box on an I-9 form when obtaining a job, although that is not usually considered a "benefit". In fact incorrect I-9 statements are a common source of such bans. However, if a person lies in response to a merely curious question, when no government or private benefit, and no job eligibility is involved, the ban should not, as far as I can see, come into effect, nor should that be grounds for deportation, or indeed any criminal or immigration action. If a person falsely claims to be a US Citizen merely to obtain social status or personal importance or reputation, that would seem not to be a crime under the doctrine of U.S. v. Alvarez, nor should it lead directly to any immigration consequences, althoguh I suppose it might draw attention to someone who is deportable on other grounds. | Legally your daughter is a US citizen How you go about demonstrating that is not a legal question, it’s a question about bureaucratic processes and off-limits for this site. | Passports were required in ancient, medieval, and early modern ages, either for immigration or for emigration or both. However, what was called passport back then might be better characterized as entry and exit visa. As time went on and travel became more common, those mutated into multi-use identity documents. There was a brief period before 1914 when passport requirements lapsed. Immigration control was done by other means, some emigration controls weakened. Read up to the history of Ellis Island for a well-documented example what immigration controls looked like. | The document may, but probably doesn't say what it is you are witnessing. For example, a person witnessing a statutory declaration in NSW attests: their qualification to be a witness (JP, solicitor etc.) that they actually saw the declarant sign it that they asked the declarant if they believed their declaration was true that they have known the declarant for more than 12 months OR the declarant provided a photo ID and either their face matched the photo or they had a valid reason for not showing their face. If it doesn't say then what you are witnessing is that the signature was made by a person whom you could identify if necessary (e.g. if the person denied the signature). | The UK remains an EU member state until 31st October 2019. Unless a further extension is requested and granted. (One is obligated to be requested if an agreement is not reached by the 19th Oct) At the time of writing, there have been no changes to identity document requirements for EEA (includes EU) or Swiss citizens visiting the UK - they can enter the UK with a valid passport or a national identity card issued by such a state. We don't know today whether that will change after March 2019. |
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